Arts and Social Sciences, Irving K. Barber Faculty of (Okanagan)
Economics, Philosophy and Political Science, Department of (Okanagan)
DSpace
UBCO
Villegas Solano, Ricardo
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
Canada's Liberal government has worked alongside the international community to respond to the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis per proclaimed domestic values and international objectives. The project examines the domestic and international factors that shape Canada's response to Venezuela's political and economic crisis and the exodus of approximately 7.7 million migrants and refugees. It argues that Ottawa's proclaimed internationalist foreign policy serves as a tool to mask the factors guiding the formation and implementation of Canada's response to the crisis, including its economic and security dependence on the U.S. and shared ideological interests with Washington. It also suggests that the limited capacity of the Venezuelan community in Canada restricts their ability to influence policy formation in Ottawa. The study uses information from eighteen semi-structured interviews with government officials, non-governmental organizations, academics, and Venezuelan community leaders in Canada to uncover the rationale behind the government's response. In addition, the project draws from the Venezuelan experience to offer a critical analysis of Canada's immigration policies, especially its refugee protection program, to examine the characteristics underpinning the program. The study challenges Canada's global humanitarian reputation by investigating the formation and implementation of policies that constrain the Venezuelan refugee crisis within a specified zone. It offers an opportunity to assess Canada's foreign policy, immigration policies, and role in the global system.
Canada’s Response to the Venezuelan Humanitarian Crisis: Strengths and limitations of Canada’s policies to help Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees by Ricardo Villegas Solano B.A., University of Western Ontario 2022 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE MASTER OF ARTS in THE COLLEGE OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Interdisciplinary Studies) (Global Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Okanagan) October 2024 © Ricardo Villegas Solano, 2024 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the College of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis/dissertation entitled: Canada’s Response to the Venezuelan Humanitarian Crisis: Strengths and limitations of Canada’s policies to help Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees submitted by Ricardo Villegas Solano in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts Dr. James Rochlin, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences Supervisor Dr. Adam Jones, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences Supervisory Committee Member Dr. Carlos Teixeira, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences Supervisory Committee Member Dr. Sue Frohlick, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences University Examiner iii Abstract Canada's Liberal government has worked alongside the international community to respond to the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis per proclaimed domestic values and international objectives. The project examines the domestic and international factors that shape Canada's response to Venezuela's political and economic crisis and the exodus of approximately 7.7 million migrants and refugees. It argues that Ottawa's proclaimed internationalist foreign policy serves as a tool to mask the factors guiding the formation and implementation of Canada's response to the crisis, including its economic and security dependence on the U.S. and shared ideological interests with Washington. It also suggests that the limited capacity of the Venezuelan community in Canada restricts their ability to influence policy formation in Ottawa. The study uses information from eighteen semi-structured interviews with government officials, non-governmental organizations, academics, and Venezuelan community leaders in Canada to uncover the rationale behind the government's response. In addition, the project draws from the Venezuelan experience to offer a critical analysis of Canada's immigration policies, especially its refugee protection program, to examine the characteristics underpinning the program. The study challenges Canada's global humanitarian reputation by investigating the formation and implementation of policies that constrain the Venezuelan refugee crisis within a specified zone. It offers an opportunity to assess Canada's foreign policy, immigration policies, and role in the global system. iv Lay Summary Understanding the factors influencing Canadian relations with other countries is imperative for developing policy recommendations. The research project investigates how and why Canada created its policies towards the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis based on domestic and international considerations. Values associated with Canadian national identity, such as human rights and democracy, became a political tool to mask policy alignment with the United States and justify Canada’s response. The project interviewed 18 participants, including a member of the Venezuelan Task Force in Global Affairs Canada and a former Venezuelan ambassador to Canada. The findings indicate that underlining Canadian political and economic interests limit the effectiveness of existing policies and the support granted to Venezuelans. The project contributes to Canadian foreign policy analysis with a case study investigation of an overlooked region in Canadian research, the Americas. v Preface The research project is an original and independent product of the researcher and author, Ricardo Villegas Solano, under the supervision of Dr. James Rochlin. The project is not part of any additional published material beyond the requirements for a Master’s in Global Studies at the University of British Columbia Okanagan. The research project used Grammarly as generative artificial intelligence (AI) to correct grammar. It did not use any additional AI to draft or prepare the dissertation. The Behavioral Research Ethics Board approved the fieldwork in the form of 18 semi-structured interviews under the UBC Ethics Certificate number H23-01639. vi Table of Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary ............................................................................................................................... iv Preface ............................................................................................................................................ v Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... vi List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. viii Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... ix CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1 Literature Review ......................................................................................................................... 4 Canada’s Place in Global Politics ............................................................................................ 5 Canada and Venezuela .............................................................................................................. 9 Migration Studies .................................................................................................................... 13 CHAPTER 2 – CONCEPTS AND METHODS ....................................................................... 18 Conceptual Framework .............................................................................................................. 18 Constructivism and Foreign Policy ....................................................................................... 18 Political Economy: World-Systems Theory .......................................................................... 21 United States Influence ........................................................................................................... 23 International Migration .......................................................................................................... 26 Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 29 Recruitment ............................................................................................................................. 29 Qualitative Data: Interviews .................................................................................................. 31 Limitations and Remaining Chapters ................................................................................... 33 A Reflection on Positionality .................................................................................................. 35 Sample Interview Questions....................................................................................................... 36 CHAPTER 3 – DOMESTIC FACTORS ................................................................................. 37 Economic Interests .................................................................................................................. 37 Ideological Commitments ....................................................................................................... 42 Human Rights ......................................................................................................................... 45 Misconception and Neglect ..................................................................................................... 48 Immigration and Refugees ..................................................................................................... 51 The Venezuelan Community in Canada ............................................................................... 54 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 58 vii CHAPTER 4 – INTERNATIONAL FORCES ......................................................................... 59 The United States Influence ................................................................................................... 59 Washington and Caracas ........................................................................................................ 62 Democracy Promotion ............................................................................................................ 65 A Material Reality ................................................................................................................... 68 An International Refugee Crisis ............................................................................................ 71 Collaborative Migration Management ................................................................................. 75 The Global Order .................................................................................................................... 77 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 80 CHAPTER 5 – POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................. 81 Domestic Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 81 An Independent Foreign Policy ............................................................................................. 82 Reflect and Learn .................................................................................................................... 85 Categorization and Exclusion ................................................................................................ 88 Causes and Conditions ........................................................................................................... 91 International Recommendations ............................................................................................... 94 Diplomatic Relations ............................................................................................................... 94 Democratic Elections .............................................................................................................. 97 Humanitarian Needs Over Ideological Divides .................................................................. 100 Host Capacity and Integration. ........................................................................................... 102 Collaboration with NGOs .................................................................................................... 106 Recommendations ..................................................................................................................... 109 CHAPTER 6 – CLOSING REMARKS ................................................................................... 112 Summary of Findings ............................................................................................................ 113 Contributions to the Literature ............................................................................................ 116 Limitations and Future Directions ....................................................................................... 118 Notes ........................................................................................................................................... 122 References .................................................................................................................................. 126 viii List of Abbreviations CCR Canadian Council for Refugees CFGB Canadian Foodgrains Bank CGR Canada Global Response CVDF Canada Venezuela Democracy Forum DFATD Department of Foreign Affairs Trade and Development DPCC Development and Peace Caritas Canada FIAP Feminist International Assistance Policy FIP Fundación Ideas para la Paz FTA Free Trade Agreements GAC Global Affairs Canada IDRC International Development Research Centre IRCC Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada LAWG Latin American Working Group NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NGO Nongovernmental Organization OAS Organization of American States PDVSA Petróleos de Venezuela R4V Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants STCA Safe Third Country Agreement UBC University of British Columbia UN United Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/Refugee Agency UMCA United States Mexico Canada Agreement VCSBC Venezuelan Canadian Society of BC VTF Venezuelan Task Force ZOARC ZOA Refugee Colombia ix Acknowledgements I express my utmost gratitude to my Supervisor, Dr. James Rochlin, for his guidance, belief, feedback, and support throughout this entire journey. Without his guidance, I would not have learned to question deeply and critically. I am profoundly grateful for his insightful experience and perspectives on Latin America and Canadian engagement in the region. I want to thank Dr. Carlos Teixeira for his encouragement and feedback regarding qualitative research. I want to extend my appreciation to Dr. Adam Jones for his support and rigorous feedback based on his extensive knowledge of Latin America. Their contributions were fundamental for my development as a researcher and the formation of this project. I also extend my gratitude to Dr. Luis Aguiar for the opportunities to develop as a researcher and for his invaluable guidance throughout my studies. This project would not have been possible without the invaluable support of the participants. I am deeply grateful for their willingness to share their experiences and provide recommendations, which were crucial for the project’s success. Their kindness and insightful discussions have significantly enriched my analysis and understanding. The faculty and staff at UBC I encountered these past two years inspired the formation of this project. I am forever thankful for their lessons and guidance. I want to thank the subject librarians at the university, especially Barbara Sobol, for her assistance and insight into research techniques. My cohort from the Global Studies theme and my fellow students at the university offered fundamental support. Lastly, thank you to those closest to me. My friends and family for their unconditional inspiration and moral support from start to finish 1 CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION The project’s central research question is: “What are the domestic and international factors influencing Canada’s response to the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis?” Conceptually, the project relies on a constructivist framework to argue that Ottawa uses a proclaimed commitment to human rights and liberal democracy as a strategy to mask the underlying factors influencing its response to the Venezuelan crisis. The central argument is that Canada’s economic and military dependence on the U.S. is the primary factor influencing Canadian policies towards the crisis. With shared economic and ideological interests, Ottawa aligns its foreign policy with Washington. Canada supports the U.S.-led effort to shift political leaders in Venezuela towards a government that supports liberal democracy and existing global economic structures. A secondary argument is that the limited capacity and political influence of the Venezuelan community in Canada reduces their ability to guide policy formation in Ottawa. The findings suggest that Ottawa’s response limits the opportunities available for Venezuelan refugees by reinforcing hierarchical classifications of humanitarian assistance while constraining the crisis in neighbouring countries like Colombia. Canadian policies should reflect the reality of the situation in Venezuela. The escalation of Venezuela’s political and economic instability after 2015 posed regional challenges that questioned Canada’s proclaimed internationalist foreign policy and the protection of human rights in the Americas. The fall of oil prices in 2014 to from $100 to $30 a barrel and an inflation rate of 180.9% in 2015 brought the Venezuelan economy to its near collapse.1 Power outages, limited medical supplies, food shortages, and political oppression resulted in social unrest and mass protest across Venezuela escalating in 2017 (Briceño-Ruiz 2019, 182; Boersner 2020, 547). The persecution of political opposition, the restructuring of 2 democratic institutions, and the repression of social unrest further destabilized the situation. Since 2019, Canada has responded to the Venezuelan crisis following a proclaimed commitment to protect human rights and uphold liberal democratic principles. This project examines the factors influencing Canada’s response, such as racialized hierarchical classifications of refugees and polarized global divisions embedded in Ottawa’s policies. Polarization is the emergence of two opposing forces divided by incompatible political ideologies, values, and interests (García-Guadilla and Mallen 2019, 63). Opposing political views in Venezuela divided society into two groups that became further polarized by interference from global actors. A combination of internal and external elements led to deteriorating conditions in Venezuela. The restructuring of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) with those loyal to President Hugo Chávez reduced foreign investment and transformed diplomatic ties with countries like the U.S. (Rosales and Bull, 7). Although Venezuelan oil continued to flow into U.S. refineries, Chávez’s Venezuela challenged existing political and economic structures with the Bolivarian Revolution (A.Romero and M. Mijares 2016, 179-180). The revolution aimed at restructuring Venezuelan society through participatory democracy, social programs, and regional cooperation.2 The fall of oil prices in 2014 limited the financial resources available for his successor, Nicolás Maduro, in an oil-dependent economy (Cheatham and Roy, 2022). Maduro tried to consolidate power after social unrest by restructuring the judicial system, creating a constituent assembly, and solidifying his alliances with security forces (Briceño-Ruiz and Lehmann 2021; Boersner 2020, 547; Rendon et al. 2020). Imposed sanctions by the U.S., Canada, and members of the European Union in 2017 further polarized the situation, and increased Venezuela’s socio-economic vulnerability (Weisbrot and Sachs 2019). These conditions are the basis of the unprecedented refugee crisis extending across the region. 3 The significance of the Venezuelan crisis stems from the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the country and the outflow of approximately 7.7 million refugees and migrants. Venezuelans began experiencing the effect of economic isolation in grocery stores and pharmacies with a shortage of imported food and medicine (Boersner 2020, 547; Mora et al. 2021, 20). The Venezuelan currency, the Bolivar, depreciated by 90% in 2019, leading wealthy Venezuelans to purchase goods and services with the U.S. dollar (Boersner 2020, 546; Bull and Rosales, 2020, 8; Mora et al., 2021). These conditions, combined with Maduro’s persecution of political opposition, forced Venezuelans to escape to neighbouring countries. The influx of refugees and migrants imposed humanitarian pressure on neighbouring countries with pre-existing socio-economic vulnerabilities like Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.3 In 2023, 520 000 migrants and refugees crossed the Darien Gap with 368, 650 being Venezuelans (Roy and Baumgartner 2024).4 Human rights violations in Venezuela and neighbouring countries and the spread of the refugee crisis to Canadian and U.S. borders, call into question the effectiveness of existing global responses. Ottawa’s role in the Lima Group and its recognition of Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's president contributed to the polarization of global responses to the crisis. The Lima Group, a coalition of regional governments established in August 2017 to pressure Maduro out of power, increased global divisions regarding the crisis based on ideological principles (Engler 2021). Ottawa’s political opposition towards Maduro through sanctions and its recognition of Juan Guaidó as interim president increased the polarization of the crisis by re-enforcing Cold War-like blocs. As the leader of Venezuela’s National Assembly, Guaidó declared himself president per an interpretation of Article 231 of the Venezuelan constitution after allegations of fraudulent elections in 2018 (Boersner 2020, 541 - 542). Canada played a vital role in forming the Lima 4 Group and campaigning for global recognition of Guaidó as the legitimate president (Grenier 2021, 447). The extension of the refugee crisis onto Canada’s national boundaries also highlights the crisis’ significance in the Canadian context. The humanitarian pressure imposed on neighbouring countries and the rise of migration northward influenced Canadian policies. Migration governance represents another key factor in analyzing Canada’s policies. Irregular migration to Canada intensified through crossings such as Roxham Road in Quebec, a point which we will return to in more detail in chapter four (Smith 2020). Despite its reputation as a refugee resettlement country, forming a collaborative migration governance strategy like the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) outlines the shift in emphasis to deterring northward migration. The STCA is an agreement between Canada and the U.S. that declares each country safe for refugees. It allows Canadian authorities to reject asylum claims and redirect refugees to the U.S., where they are often deported to their national countries. Critics outline the political motives behind the agreement as it limits refugee claims at the Canadian border.5 Ottawa’s prioritization of financial assistance to host countries, and its unwillingness to develop resettlement programs for Venezuelans in Canada compared to other global emergencies, calls into question the rationale behind its response. The link between immigration policies and foreign policy objectives offers a departure point to investigate the contrast between Canada’s claims and actions towards Venezuela. Literature Review Three literatures are relevant to this study, including the history of Canada's foreign policy, that focuses on Latin America, Canada-Venezuelan relations, and migration studies. This section examines each literature to highlight its relevance to understanding Canadian policies towards the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis. It also identifies the gaps in each literature to 5 highlight the project's contributions to Canadian foreign policy analysis, Canadian relations with countries in the Americas, and studies on Canada’s immigration system. Canada’s Place in Global Politics The discourse on Canadian foreign policy emphasizes middle-power politics and internationalism as defining features in the country's global affairs (Belo 2021; Paris 2014; Raschupkina 2022; Smith 2009). The discourse on middle power politics splits between a realist framework of behaviour and a liberal notion of functionality. The behavioural approach emphasizes the role of power and state capacity in defining a middle power (Holbraad 1984; Potter 1997; Efstathopoulos 2018). On the other hand, the functionality narrative underlines the actions of a middle power within the international system to help maintain order and stability (Wilkins 2017, 52). It represents a commitment to preserving the international system through multilateralism and cooperation. The two definitions demonstrate a relation to internationalism by evaluating a country based on its power and, thus, its commitment to multilateralism because of its capacity to exercise that power. Ronald Paris’ work Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? emphasizes this notion through a historical analysis of the patterns associated with internationalism in Canadian foreign policy leading to Stephen Harper's conservative government. Paris investigates whether or not internationalism is embedded within the Canadian public as part of Canada’s national identity (Paris 2014, 275). Internationalism refers to a political principle that promotes cooperation amongst states through a sense of responsibility and a commitment to international norms and institutions (Smith 2011, 59 - 60; Paris 2014, 27). The author's contributions are significant because they underline Canada's historic pattern of an internationalist foreign policy through multilateral diplomacy, international institutions, and international law, while also illustrating the importance of these characteristics to Canada’s national identity (Paris 2014, 277). Like Paris, 6 other scholars emphasize the role of internationalism in Canadian foreign policy by criticizing Harper's shift away from it (Smith 2009; Schmitz 2016). This illustrates the interconnection of domestic characteristics with international engagement based on the defining features the public considers significant. However, understanding why Ottawa maintains an internationalist approach to global affairs requires further investigation. Ottawa mobilizes what the literature classifies as niche diplomacy and functionalism. It refers to Canada concentrating its global engagement in specified geographical zones and selective concepts of interest. Niche Diplomacy as Canadian Foreign Policy by Evan H. Potter argued for the mobilization of niche diplomacy in Canadian global affairs to maximize the impact of Canadian policies (Potter 1996, 30). Potter recommended that Ottawa focus its global attention on areas where it had the expertise and capacity to make meaningful contributions, such as the resettlement of displaced persons (Potter 1996, 36). The functionalism principle supports this notion by suggesting that states outside the great power sphere should contribute according to their interests and capabilities (Chapnick 2017, 273). It emphasizes state engagement on selective issues and organizations based on strategically identifying interests and capabilities. The Liberal government’s foreign policy follows this strategy by promoting the idea of Canada’s global reputation using internationalism (Jones 2019). Protecting human rights and upholding liberal democracy represent the internationalist strategy towards Venezuela. The constructivist approach to Canadian foreign policy fills the gap left by the realist behaviour analysis and the liberal functional interpretation. The constructivist literature argues that ideas and identity are instrumental in state formation in the international system through foreign policy (Gecelovsky 2009; Gilley and O'Neil 2014; Shin 2015; Wilkins 2017). It argues that ideas and values that formulate a country's national identity ultimately determine how that 7 state perceives itself, other states, and the world around them (Wilkins 2017, 54). The Canadian context demonstrates that its identity embeds and reinforces its values and ideas in its foreign policy. Paul Gecelovsky illustrates this argument by providing an explanatory analysis of how Canada acquired and sustained its middle- power status through an ideational framework (Gecelovsky 2009). Ideas and values are crucial to understanding Canadian foreign policy because they orientate Ottawa’s global engagement according to domestic and international perceptions. Foreign policy is a tool for Canadian governments to create and sustain a national identity. A constructivist conceptualization reinforces Benedict Anderson's analysis of the formation of national identity based on a collective sense of belonging founded on values and ideas (Anderson 1983). Canadian governments referred to values associated with liberal internationalism, such as multilateral cooperation, liberal democracy, mediation, and human rights, to construct a Canadian identity (Berdahl et al. 2010, 999). Creating this national identity translates to the global level via foreign policy. As Grecelovsky argues, national ideas become influential in foreign policy formation because they identify, organize, and deliver what is essential for the state (Grevelovsky 2009, 82-83). Canadian governments try to justify their global engagement based on this manufactured identity, as seen in their relations with countries in the Americas like Venezuela. Protecting human rights and promoting liberal democracy are two principal values Canadian governments reference to validate their actions in the region. Canada’s continuous struggle to find its identity as a state in the Americas illustrates the complicated relationship between Canada and Latin American countries. A dominant aspect of the literature questions the existence of shared identity between Canada and its Latin American neighbours (Cros 2012; McKenna 2018; McKercher 2022; Stevenson 2000; Thérien 2013). One 8 approach suggests that Canadian identity aligned more with Europe, due to transatlantic ties and heritage, than with neighbouring American countries, with the U.S. being a notable exception (Granatstein 1985; Nossal 1992; Vucetic 2011). Another perspective identifies Canadian Francophone-Latin heritage as a coinciding feature that pushed Canada towards Latin America under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (Demers 2014; 2016; McKenna 1994, 68; Rochlin 1994, 30). In both approaches, identity, represented by Canadian cultural and economic attachment to specified geographical zones, dictated its foreign relations. Without a coherent historical or cultural attachment to countries in the Americas, state interests guide Canadian actions. The realist approach towards Canadian relations with Latin America stresses the dominance of state interests. Jean Daudelin's Foreign Policy at the Fringe: Canada and Latin America provides a realist explanation for Ottawa's engagement with Latin American countries. Daudelin argues that Canada has marginal interests in the region beyond notable actors like Mexico and Brazil due to Latin America's lack of political stability and economic opportunity (Daudelin 2003, 660 - 661). The author suggests that Canadian officials rediscover the region to justify new policies and make sense of the complexity of their relations (Daudelin 2003, 639). Ottawa ‘rediscovers’ the region to justify its renewed engagement with countries like Chile, Colombia, Honduras, and Peru in pursuit of Free Trade Agreements (FTA). The point is that Canada’s priorities in the region are limited to certain countries based on economic interests (McKenna 2018, 23 - 24). With countries like Mexico, Ottawa references its close economic ties when formulating its foreign policy. For others like Venezuela, a proclaimed commitment to protecting human rights and upholding liberal democracy is a pretext that helps Ottawa mask the dominance of larger economic interests in its foreign policy. 9 Canada and Venezuela Before the formation of the Bolivarian Republic, Venezuela ranked highly in Canada’s interests in Latin America. Pierre Trudeau’s prioritization of Latin American relations identified Venezuela as of-top-level importance, along Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, because of their economic potential (Rochlin 1994, 81). The similarity between Canada and Venezuela regarding oil production and exports made it a priority for Canadian interests (Rochlin 1994, 85-86). Canadian companies took advantage of Venezuelan oil supplies while the local government expanded the infusion of foreign capital, primarily using PDVSA (Hellinger 2004, 57). Most existing literature concerning the two countries' relations focuses on Chávez’s time as president, as it symbolized a political shift with regional and economic implications (M. Burns 2012; Lacroix 2012). Ideological differences between Ottawa and Caracas played a vital role in shifting relations. The dominant factor, however, was the role of international forces, especially Washington's relations with Caracas. Ottawa’s opposition towards the newly formulated Bolivarian Republic resembled Washington’s stance. The United States has asserted dominance in Latin America since the Monroe Doctrine, and throughout the Cold War limiting Canada’s flexibility in its relations with regional countries. (MacDonald 2018, 28; Stevenson 2000 91-92). Jean-Michel Lacroix demonstrates this notion by comparing Canada's and the U.S.'s approaches to Venezuela during the Bush, Obama and Harper governments. Lacroix suggests that ideological divergence was fundamental in Harper's opposition to Chávez as the Venezuelan president undertook a series of economic reforms that nationalized significant parts of the economy, undermining Canadian interests (Lacroix 2012, 714). Lacroix effectively demonstrates the influence of the U.S. in Canadian bilateral relations with Venezuela. This project will build on Lacroix's work to examine whether U.S. influence continues to shape Canadian policies with new political leaders. 10 However, the article does not reflect on the importance of oil in bilateral relations, as both countries compete in global exports, especially to the U.S. The political economy lens elaborates on Canada-Venezuela relations by investigating the role of oil production and exports in both countries. A study by Juan Kornblihtt and Manuel Casique Herrera illustrates the competing interests between Canada and Venezuela concerning oil exports to the vast U.S. economy (Kornblihtt and Herrera 2021). The authors argue that understanding the current situation in Venezuela requires a critical analysis of international components such as global oil prices, U.S. oil demands, and Canadian oil exports from Alberta (Kornblihtt and Herrera 2021, 147). An article by Deborah Jaremko also suggests that an increase in Venezuelan oil supplies to the U.S. market would result in Canadian companies receiving lower prices for the same products (Jeremko 2022). Both analyses raise questions regarding how much Canadian interests benefit from Venezuela's unstable political and economic conditions. The project will attempt to answer this question by investigating the link between Canada and Venezuela's oil production and its effect on Ottawa's policy formation. Beyond the economic realm, promoting liberal rather than radical democracy remains a consistent feature of Canadian relations with countries like Venezuela. Neil A. Burron suggests that Canadian democracy promotion differs from the U.S. approach because of its focus on civil society participation and independence from other foreign policy objectives (Burron 2011, 403). A more critical examination by Thomas Legler indicates that Canadian democracy promotion in Latin America remains inconsistent and centres on bilateral relations with the U.S. (Legler 2012, 588). Legler’s work attests to the extensive U.S. influence in dictating Canadian foreign policy, even if the region offers minimal benefits for Ottawa (Legler 2012, 597). The linkage between Washington and Ottawa is evident in a case-study analysis of Venezuela under Chávez’s 11 presidency. Democracy promotion became a political tool for Canada and the U.S. to oppose Chávez as his political and economic reformations hampered foreign interests. The Venezuelan case illustrates how Canada and the U.S. safeguard their political and economic interests by promoting liberal democracy. The U.S. tied democracy promotion to its security framework by classifying Chávez's Venezuela as a threat to regional stability. Canada justified its opposition with the common idea that political stability correlates with economic growth under a democratic neoliberal model (Mace and Thérien 2012, 574-575; Shamsie 2022, 113). Both countries perceived democracy promotion as a legitimate response to Chávez’s anti-neoliberal rhetoric. Max Cameron investigates this approach by studying the role of the OAS and the ability of its members to respond to ‘democracy threats’ using Peru and Venezuela as case studies (Cameron 2003). The author suggests that Chávez's institutional maneuvering and domestic support limited Canada's and the U.S.'s attempts to justify interference using democracy promotion (Cameron 2003, 111). Lesley M.Burns extends this notion by suggesting that differing conceptualizations of democracy between Canada and Venezuela hamper bilateral relations (Burns 2012, 288). Under Harper’s leadership Canada followed U.S. ideological opposition towards Caracas when Chávez’s policies undermined their economic interests in Venezuela while threatening neoliberalism in the region (Gordon and Webber 2016, 246). Ideological opposition to Chávez continued with the rise of Maduro as Ottawa tried to justify its involvement under the rubric of democracy promotion. While some contributions explore the domestic and international factors that led to Venezuela's political and socio-economic crisis (Briceño-Ruiz 2019, 2020; Kleszczyńska 2020; Mora et al. 2021), the discourse does not critically analyze the Canadian response, only briefly mentioning Canada’s role in forming the Lima Group and recognizing Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela (Garcia and 12 Alberto 2020). The project will draw upon the discourse to examine Canada's commitment to promoting liberal democracy and to evaluate the effectiveness of its methods in Venezuela. The minimal examination of Canadian policies is striking considering the extent of Ottawa's engagement. Studies like Canada’s Past and Future in Latin America, intended to examine Canadian foreign policy in the region, do not examine the Venezuelan situation until the conclusion. (Heidrich and Macdonald 2022, 279). The authors outline the Liberals’ incoherent response to the crisis based on little or no knowledge of the factors shaping the situation in Venezuela and the region. Only a handful of studies analyze the Canadian perspective, outlining Ottawa’s political responses through the Lima Group and recognition of Juan Guaidó. Two articles by Yvon Grenier outline Canada's primary responses to Venezuela while briefly examining Ottawa's policies. Grenier identifies six factors to argue that Canada responded to the situation because of existing domestic and international conditions that allowed for a multilateral approach (Grenier 2019, 57–58). The author also describes Canadian leadership in the Lima group following a perceived commitment to defending democracy and human rights (Grenier 2021, 455). However, such claims do not acknowledge the political basis of Canadian actions, or the ideological divisions generated by the group between capitalism and socialism (August 2020; Engler 2021; Schalk 2021). The article places too much significance on Ottawa's declarations without investigating Washington's role in Canada's formation of the Lima Group. (Schalk 2021). It also downplays the role of domestic factors like the capacity and influence of the Venezuelan community in Canada. Olinto’s working paper demonstrates the domestic challenges faced by Venezuelan migrants to five major cities in Canada. Existing literature has signalled the severity of the 13 migration crisis for the Western hemisphere, but examinations of the Canadian context are few (Gedan 2017; Pirovino and Papyrakis 2023). Olinto makes a telling contribution by demonstrating the relevance of the Venezuelan crisis in the Canadian context due to increasing Venezuelan asylum claims and migration to Canada (Olinto 2022, 5). The author’s work also draws attention to the unique challenges Venezuelans face trying to navigate Canada's immigration system while establishing a socio-economic foundation in a new country (Olinto 2022, 12-13). The article offers a distinct approach by examining the domestic factors that influence Canadian responses while also providing insight into the experience of Venezuelans already in Canada and their transnational links. Each of the articles mentioned in this section offers significant contributions. However, they do not represent a rounded picture because they do not develop an interdisciplinary analysis of the domestic and international elements shaping Ottawa's response. The project will use these studies’ foundational analysis and information collected from interviews to reconceptualize Canadian understandings of the crisis, and responses to it. Migration Studies The principal focus of existing literature on the Venezuelan refugee crisis addresses the internal and external conditions that led to the crisis. It traces the situation back to political and economic decisions made by Chávez to understand the conditions contemporary Venezuelans face with Maduro as president (Doocy et al. 2019; Gouveia 2023; Aliaga Sáez 2021). Others investigate global factors and characteristics, such as regional politics and U.S. interests (Gandini 2022; Kleszczyńska 2020; Mora et al. 2021; Provino and Papurakis 2023). The combination of both approaches is most pertinent to this study because of its ability to explain the internationalization of the crisis. A study by Sandro Pirovino and Elissaois Papyrakis breaks down the political, economic, and social factors leading to Venezuelan migration and how the 14 characteristics of host countries dictate migrants’ chosen destination (Pirovino and Papyrakis 2023, 4 -5). The authors separate Venezuelan migration into two periods to demonstrate how political and economic conditions in Venezuela after 2015 shifted migration patterns (Pirovino and Papyrakis, 2023, 15). They argue that geographical proximity trumped the previous economic incentive that motivated migration before 2015 as conditions in Venezuela intensified. The regional consequences of the crisis drew attention to the integration of Venezuelans into host communities like Colombia. Like the study by Pirovino and Papyrakis, the discourse on integration examines the role of cultural similarities as motivators for migration and integration in host countries (Wentzel et al., 2022). In contrast, Lucena and De Nardi investigate the challenges of integrating Venezuelan children in Brazil due to cultural differences and language barriers (Lucena and De Nardi, 2023). Despite these similarities, host country capacities result in informal employment for Venezuelans who also encounter xenophobia and exposure to the criminal activities of armed groups and drug traffickers in the border regions (Freier and Pérez 2021; Mantilla 2020; Mc Letchie 2023; Rochlin 2023). Considering that most Venezuelan migrants and refugees remain in the region, it is fundamental to identify the obstacles that limit socio-economic integration from a case-study perspective. However, it is also essential to investigate the role of outside forces in shaping regional policies such as financial aid. The project will thus extend the literature on integration from a Canadian perspective to investigate the rationale and effectiveness of international support for regional integration efforts. The Venezuelan refugee crisis questions international, regional, and national categorizations of refugees and migrants (Herbert 2021; Freier et al. 2022; Heaven and Skleparis 2018; Reed-Hurtado 2017). Reed Hurtado's work illustrates Latin American efforts to enhance international classifications of refugees and migrants at a regional level to delineate state 15 responsibility in the wake of rising levels of migration (Reed Hurtado 2017, 151-152). The Cartagena Declaration is significant because it challenges the categorization of Venezuelans as migrants (Freier et al. 2022, 21). Venezuelans are refugees under the declaration. However, despite the declaration and regional frameworks to protect Venezuelans, the host state's capacity and the politicization behind what qualifies as ‘disturbing public order’ create a gap between rhetoric and application (Freier et al. 2022, 26). In her work, Gandini examines regional responses to the crisis to outline the political, economic, and cultural factors influencing national responses to migration flows (Gandini 2022). The relationship between regional categorization mechanisms and Canada's classification of Venezuelan refugees and migrants remains limited (Olinto 2022; Smith 2020). Thus, the study must reflect on regional and international categorization frameworks for Venezuelan refugees to understand Canadian actions. It is not simply about terminology but also the conceptualization of migration-related space. Emerging perceptions and manipulations of space offer the project an opportunity to investigate how the Global North attempts to control migration flows. Jennifer Hydman’s work on the geopolitics of migration analyzes the various governing methods based on a biopolitics of mobility. Hydman illustrates how geography interlocks with power to manage and restrict the flow of bodies across created spaces (Hydman 2012, 248-249). The author helps examine the use of space by actors in the Global North, primarily the U.S., to restrict the flow of Venezuelan migrants to their borders. Scott FitzGerald argues that states control migration beyond national boundaries through specific policies and by pressuring other governments to adhere to their governing strategy (FitzGerald 2020, 5). Recent amendments to the Canada-U.S. STCA outline the connection between space, migration, and foreign policy as irregular migration increased in Canada (Boyd and T.B. Ly 2021; Smith and Masferrer 2023; Smith 2020). The agreement allows 16 Canada to turn away refugees entering through unofficial points in collaboration with the U.S., which often deports them to their national country (Smith 2023, 1685 -1686; Steiner 2024). The study will use space to analyze migration management based on Canadian foreign and immigration policy formation. The Global North's migration management requires examination. A political lens unveils the interconnection of economic incentives and immigration that characterizes Latin American migration to Canada (Gabriel and Macdonald 2022, 144; Smith 2020; Wagner 2023). Canada's temporary migration pathways for migrant workers from countries like Mexico illustrate the economic incentive, as the government uses these programs to fill labour shortages in the agriculture and construction sectors. (Anwar 2014; Lu and Hou 2020; Tannock 2011; Walsh 2011). The point is that Canada manages migration from Latin America and the Caribbean following an economic incentive that allows temporary residency to fill labour shortages. Countries from other regions like Ukraine receive more permanent immigration programs like the Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel.6 Studies have highlighted the racial elements embedded in Canada’s immigration system by revealing the use of policies to control or exclude ‘undesirable’ immigrants based on stereotypes and racism (Kyriakides et al., 2018; Levine-Rasky et al. 2014, 87 – 89; Pardy, 2023; Tannock, 2011, 1136 – 1137). The contrasting approaches to different migrants and refugees stem from the idea that it is easier to accept people who look like ‘Canadians’ (Zhou 2022). The project will investigate these elements in the context of Canada’s response to Venezuelan migration. The Latin American experience is underrepresented in the literature on Canada’s immigration system. The literature frames Latin American migration to Canada as waves resulting from conditions in sending countries and the international system (García 2006; Gabriel 17 and Macdonald 2022; Simmons 1993). The waves refer to political crises in Central and South America between the 1970s and 1990s, resulting in migration and resettlement in Canada. A principal example is the resettlement of Chilean refugees fleeing Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship (Gabriel and MacDonald 20022, 141). It is worth noting that Canada accepted Chilean refugees against U.S. wishes due to pressure from civil organizations and NGOs (Garcia 2006, 146). It shows the void filled by NGOs advocating for increased attention and action from policymakers in Ottawa to protect human rights (Audet et al., 2013; Foster, 2022). The limited literature on Venezuelan migration to Canada analyzes the flow of migrants during Chávez’s political and economic reforms. It examines the political divisions amongst ‘Chavistas’ and ‘Nonchavistas’ leading to emigration, but also the polarization amongst Venezuelan communities abroad (Sætermo 2018, 147). The economic dimension includes the flow of former Venezuelan oil workers to different parts of Alberta due to their experience (Millman 2008). Both analyses highlight the Canadian emphasis on a particular type of migrant easily adaptable and productive to Canadian society. Beyond these contributions there are few examinations of contemporary migration since the outbreak of the crisis. A study by Olinto provides a contemporary analysis of the resources available for Venezuelans entering Canada (Olinto 2022). The project builds on this contribution to provide a wider examination of the political and economic components shaping the resources available for Venezuelans in Canada compared to other global refugees. 18 CHAPTER 2 – CONCEPTS AND METHODS Conceptual Framework The study relies on two theoretical frameworks to unpack the domestic and international factors guiding Canadian foreign policy formation. Conceptually, a constructivist lens helps examine how a manufactured Canadian global identity through values such as human rights and liberal democracy functions as a pretext to mask the political and economic factors guiding policy formation. The political economy lens fills the gap by providing a theoretical foundation to investigate the significance of those political and economic factors. It highlights the role of political alliance and economic dependence on the United States in shaping Canadian foreign policy. It also offers a conceptual framework to investigate Canada’s response to the Venezuelan refugee crisis based on the neoliberal components of its immigration system and the use of space to manage migration northward. Constructivism and Foreign Policy Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities provides a theoretical framework to analyze the formation of a nation’s identity and nationalism. Anderson uses a post-modernist approach to suggest that the formation of national identity arose from the social construction of common principles (Anderson 1983). In the Canadian context, it meant forming a set of common principles that would unite a culturally divided population. Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King indicated that Canadian national identity should be rooted in the social and material rights of being Canadian, a commitment to internationalism, and the repudiation of Canada as a British nation (B. Blake, 2020). Building on Anderson's work, these notions became the defining features of being Canadian, which policymakers in Ottawa extended through foreign 19 policy. As Canada grew, values associated with its national identity became pillars of its foreign policy strategies. Liberal and Conservative governments use foreign policy to reinforce Canadian national identity domestically and abroad (Berdahl and Raney 2010, 998-999). Despite continuous debate surrounding the basis of Canadian identity, values attributed to this identity became vital to understanding Ottawa’s policy formation. Values such as multiculturalism, human rights, and internationalism became national elements embedded within Canadian foreign policy. A vital component of this identity is the notion of a ‘good’ international citizen formed through internationalism (Banham 2016, 471; Ozguc 2011, 43). Canada constructed a notion of this concept through liberal internationalism, wherein Ottawa mobilizes a foreign policy rooted in multilateralism, mediation, and niche diplomacy in line with selective concepts and interests (Dolata 2017). The current Liberal government campaigned to restore liberal internationalism to correspond to Canadian identity (Jones 2019). The point is to illustrate the use of values and ideas as political tools to justify foreign policy based on perceptions of how these concepts relate to Canadian identity. Understanding the mobilization of values as political tools for foreign policy formation is vital to analyzing Canada's response to the Venezuelan crisis. Canada's liberal internationalism aligns human rights and liberal democracy with a constructed identity to proclaim Canada's relevance in the global system. Human rights are one example of the use of values as a political tool as governments in Ottawa attempt to validate Canada's role in global affairs despite its troublesome human rights record. Ottawa's policies towards Latin America follow this approach as they try to establish Canada's relevance in the region as an advocate and defender of human rights (Duhaime 2012; Mace and Thérien 2012, 574-575). The justification lies in the perception 20 that values underlying the human rights rhetoric, such as liberty and multiculturalism, are pillars of Canadian society. Consequently, Ottawa justifies its engagement in international affairs and the situation in Venezuela with this narrative. By framing the Venezuelan crisis as a human rights issue, Ottawa finds the domestic justification to confront the crisis. The project will examine the link between national identity and Canadian policy towards Venezuela to identify the weight of values and ideas on policy formation. It will investigate how Canada's commitment to liberal democratic principles and human rights serves as a pretext in Ottawa's policy formation. To do this, the study will incorporate a constructivist framework. The constructivist lens provides the theoretical basis to examine the role of values and ideas in influencing Canada’s global affairs (Howard and Neufeldt 2011, 14-15). Identity and values help identify the issues considered significant, the geographical extent of state interests, and states' strategic courses of action (Gecelovsky and Murray 2019, 533). The Liberal government's attempt to revive an internationalist foreign policy in 2015 demonstrates this idea as it justified its increased global engagement with human rights and climate change based on a proclaimed Canadian identity (Gecelovsky and Murray, 2019, 541). However, Ottawa's actions, especially in Venezuela, illustrate the use of values as a pretext for larger foreign policy objectives. The contrast between Ottawa's claims and actions highlights the contradictions in its foreign policy. Canada supports the U.S. campaign to undermine the Venezuelan government while claiming a leading role in strengthening the rule of law in the global system (Carment and Nimijean 2019). The point is twofold. First, values and ideas manufactured a Canadian identity that helped guide Ottawa's direction in global affairs. Secondly, connecting specific values to Canadian identity serves as a pretext for larger foreign policy objectives like supporting the U.S. Understanding the Canadian government's actions towards Venezuela requires incorporating these concepts into the analysis. 21 Political Economy: World-Systems Theory The economic conditions within Venezuela and the political nature surrounding the crisis demand a political economy perspective that explains the motives behind Ottawa’s policies. Immanuel Wallerstein’s World-systems theory offers a theoretical framework to understand the domestic and international factors influencing Canada's policies towards Venezuela within the global economic structure. Wallerstein distinguishes core and peripheral countries based on their modes of production and position within the global economy (Wallerstein 2004, 28-29). His work helps explain how established global economic structures dictate Venezuela’s relations with countries like the U.S. and Canada. It is vital to reflect on the power and ideological dynamics within Wallerstein’s work because they explain state relations and their global positions. What is significant for the study is Wallerstein's categorization of different countries and the ability of powerful actors to intervene or prevent weaker states from developing policies that impede dominant economic interests. Understanding the role of capitalism and neoliberalism domestically is necessary before undertaking a global examination. Canada's economic structure is rooted in capitalist ideology and capital accumulation (Wallerstein 2004, 24). Neoliberalism operates as a theory of political economic practice that proposes the liberation of individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade (Harvey 2005, 2). Both characteristics illustrate the structure of Canadian society and Canada’s global actions as the country seeks to sustain both its capitalist system and its place in the world economy. Domestically, this involves creating the institutional framework and the economic conditions for capital accumulation through private property rights, free markets, and deregulation (Harvey 2005, 2). As Wallerstein illustrates, the international dimension consists of monopolization and the division of labour and production (Wallerstein 2004, 28). The Canadian government provides corporations with diplomatic support to accumulate resources and maximize profits in countries in the periphery 22 (Gordon and Webber 2016;2019). Understanding this strategy through a political economy lens is imperative to conceptualize Canadian-Venezuelan relations. The classification of Canada as a core country in the world-system references its exploitation of labour and extraction of raw materials from countries in the periphery. It has the power and production capacity to maximize capital but requires labour and materials from peripheral countries to sustain its dominance (Wallerstein 2004, 27-28). Ottawa developed a series of free trade agreements following a neoliberal model that secured access to Latin American resources and markets (Macdonald 2016; McKenna 2018, 23 – 24). The Conservatives under Stephen Harper tried to justify their engagement using this model to argue that economic prosperity benefitted all parties while combatting poor socio-economic conditions (Cooper 2012; Macdonald 2016). However, Canada’s actions in the region reaffirmed its neoliberal tendencies by focusing on corporate interests and partnership with the U.S. rather than socio-economic inequalities (Shamise and Grinspun 2010). A political economy perspective provides the basis for the project to investigate how economic considerations between Canada, the U.S., and Venezuela influence policy formation towards the crisis. Venezuela’s position in the global economy also demonstrates the significance of a political economy analysis. The country formerly ranked highly in the semi-periphery due to its vast oil supplies and ability to accumulate capital from this industry. Semi-periphery states encounter constant interference from the core to sustain the conditions that benefit the global economic system (Wallerstein 2004, 29). From Chávez to Maduro, Venezuela undertook a political and economic process that redefined its position within the world system by rejecting the neoliberal narrative (Gordon and Webber 2016, 246-247; Spanakos and Pantoulas 2017, 42-43). The political nature of this challenge and the potential economic threats to Canada and other core countries are at the 23 forefront of this project. The economic elements embedded within the situation in Venezuela and Canada’s perception of these factors are imperative for policy formation. Although Wallerstein's work provides a theoretical framework to examine these conditions at an international level, it has limitations. An underlying limitation is the centering of economic interests to inherently explain Canadian actions in the global system, and in this case, Venezuela. Laura Macdonald’s work on Canadian foreign policy in Latin America fills the void by investigating the connection between economic interests, ideology, and changing political conditions. It is not to discredit or undermine the significance of Canadian economic interests in Venezuela and the U.S. due to investments in the country's oil sector (Trapara 2020). Rather, it adds a supplementary lens that considers changing regional and international political dynamics (Macdonald 2016, 12). It is also necessary to note the limited Canadian government and public knowledge of conditions in Latin America (Macdonald 2016, 5 - 6; Thérien 2013, 162). Canada’s perception of the situation in Venezuela as a politically driven ideological issue ignores the socio-economic conditions like inequality that led to initial public support for Chávez and Maduro or the experiences of refugees. Investigating Canadian actions through only an economic lens does not encapsulate the situation, considering the political and social factors involved. Instead, the task is to identify and analyze the extent to which political and social factors relate to economic interests in Ottawa’s policy formation. United States Influence A political economy examination accounts for the U.S. influence in Canadian policy formation. As Wallerstein suggests, monopolization is a fundamental component of the global economy because it creates the conditions for capital accumulation through controlling production costs and sale prices (Wallerstein 2004, 26). After the Second World War, the U.S. used its economic and military capacity to dominate globally through institutions and political maneuvering that maximized profits. Threats to U.S. economic dominance in the last fifteen 24 years, especially in Latin America, from countries like China, illustrate the significance of a political economy perspective (Urdinez et al. 2016). Through policies like imposed sanctions, Washington punishes those who challenge a U.S.-led system. Washington's policies towards Chávez and Maduro reflect Wallerstein's reference to penalizing those who question the structural mechanisms of capital accumulation (Wallerstein 2004, 24). The U.S.-sponsored isolation of Venezuela's economy stems from political and economic divergences that challenged Washington’s and Ottawa’s interests. A theoretical examination of U.S.-led sanctions demonstrates how Washington pressures semi-peripheral and peripheral countries to adhere to global economic structures that support Washington’s interests (Felipenko et al. 2020, 71). Using sanctions as a geoeconomic statecraft policy demonstrates how the U.S. imposes its political and economic power to sustain the existing global structure that serves its interests (Lee and Maher, 2022). Chávez’ policies like the nationalization of PDVSA threatened U.S. investments in Venezuela and existing global structures by reducing foreign investment. Since 2006, the U.S. has imposed financial and targeted sanctions on Venezuela for corruption, human rights violations, and non-cooperation with anti-terrorism efforts (Congressional Research Service 2024). Critical reflections on these sanctions highlight the political and economic incentive as the U.S. tries to pressure the Venezuelan government out of power (Humes 2018, 53). Venezuela’s direct opposition and criticism of U.S. interference in Latin America threatens Canadian and U.S. interests in the region as countries reconsider the access granted to foreign companies (M. Burns 2012, 302-303; M. Gill 2019, 298). The U.S. and Canada use foreign policy and sanctions to enforce neoliberal market structures in countries like Venezuela to protect their economic interests. Canada’s economic dependence on the U.S. results in a foreign policy alignment that protects shared interests while ensuring bilateral relations remain unchallenged (Hawes 2004; Paquin and 25 Beauregard 2013; Zhou 2018). The next chapter will examine Canada’s economic dependence on the U.S. in detail. In the meantime, it is imperative to note the shared economic interests Canada, and the U.S. have in Venezuela due to entrenched neoliberal principles. Venezuela’s challenge to these interests, primarily the expulsion of U.S. and Canadian firms in the energy sector, hampered relations (Antonopoulos and Cottle 2018, 62-63; Higginbottom 2013, 201; Kornblihtt and Herrera 2021). Companies like ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Petro Canada had their assets expropriated after rejecting Chávez’s attempt to renegotiate contracts with international oil companies due to rising oil prices in 2007.7 Opposition towards Caracas represents an ideological foundation as both Washington and Ottawa publicly criticize Venezuela for opposing the neoliberal model but also ensure criticism does not prevent oil flow to U.S. refineries (Lacroix 2013, 713). Such politically driven strategies require a framework that investigates the connection between ideology, economic interests, and foreign policy at an international level. Venezuela’s attempt to redefine its position in the global economy and Canada-U.S. opposition represents the political basis of the crisis (Antonopoulos and Cottle 2018, 62-63). From the Canadian and U.S. perspectives, Chávez and Maduro's policies represent a socialist attempt to suppress and destroy economic structures that provide stability and socio-economic growth (Gordon and Webber 2016, 251-252; Heidrich and Macdonald 2022, 279). Political leaders in Caracas justify their actions based on the oppressive and exploitative consequences of capitalist and neoliberal policies for their population (Antonopoulos and Cottle 2018, 53-54). The colliding ideologies are the intersection at which the crisis becomes polarized, as each side shifts responsibility for Venezuela’s conditions to socialist or neoliberal policies. Such divisions created Cold-War-like blocs in global responses to the situation, representing great power competition (Boersner and Haluani, 2022; Cardozo Uzcátegui and Mijares, 2020; Cui and Zhou, 26 2019). For Ottawa, existing policies prioritize supporting its strongest ally while ensuring Canadian firms gain access to capital accumulation in Venezuela and other Latin American countries. A political economy lens provides a base to examine this strategy. Canada’s political attempt to collaboratively isolate Maduro’s Venezuela through sanctions further illustrates the ideological basis of political and economic policies. A study by Mikkel Sejersen offers a conceptual lens to investigate how the framing of sanctions impacts the target state. The author examines the effects of imposed sanctions on Venezuela based on the U.S. framing of sanctions (Sejersen 2021, 3). Canada and the U.S. framed their targeted sanctions against Maduro’s government following a human rights and democracy rhetoric (Akande et al. 2021, 494; Sejersen 2021, 8). On the other hand, Maduro and his allies perceive them as another attempt by the U.S. to undermine Venezuelan sovereignty to secure access to its energy sector and resources (M. Gill 2019, 300; Nugent 2019). Both conceptualizations derive from ideological tensions as one side attempts to preserve the existing system while the other challenges it. For the project to examine the rationale behind Canada’s policies, it must investigate the formation and framing of sanctions to serve political or economic objectives. Considering Canada tries to justify its sanctions following human rights and liberal democratic rhetoric, unveiling the masked interests behind such political claims is imperative. International Migration The exodus of 7.7 million migrants and refugees questions the political and economic dynamics concerning Venezuelan refugees. The Venezuelan people are the subjects of internal mismanagement, foreign interference, and unstable global oil prices, leading to the deteriorating conditions in the country since 2014 (Briceño-Ruiz and Lehmann 2022, 216-217; Mora et al. 2021, 20; Wallace 2020, 174). The project prioritizes a political economy approach to analyze the migration crisis due to the intersection of these concepts and the narrative surrounding Venezuelan migrants and refugees. A political economy framework outlines the use of categorization mechanisms as 27 political tools based on economic incentives to justify exclusive and containment policies (Crawley and Skleparis 2018, 49-50; Freier 2022; Herbert 2021). In the Venezuelan case, international and regional actors mobilize categorization strategies to shift responsibility concerning integrating Venezuelan refugees and migrants (Freier 2022, 53-54; Herbert 2021, 22). Categorization represents a defining feature in Canada's immigration system, which is used to identify who is allowed in and who is excluded. The embeddedness of neoliberal characteristics demonstrates how the Canadian system excludes selected groups under a prevailing economic narrative. Canada’s immigration system displays neoliberal dynamics in its points-based system that commodifies and marketizes applicants to reduce federal costs and serve private interests (Bhuyan et al. 2017; Edwards 2020; Li et al. 2023). These dynamics also highlight the hierarchical elements within a system that ranks applicants based on an intersection of race, gender, and class (Ellermann and Goenaga 2019, 95; Li et al., 2023). The Canadian model frames refugees and migrants using a cost-effective model based on potential economic contributions (Bhuyan et al. 2017; Ellermann and Goenaga 2019, 103). Hierarchical classification systems based on constructed notions of citizenship and economic consideration are fundamental to analyzing Canada's response to the Venezuelan refugee crisis. Ottawa's creation of refugee resettlement programs for situations like Syria and Ukraine questions the hierarchical elements that govern which global emergencies benefit from such programs. The project will investigate Ottawa's reluctance to offer similar programs for the Venezuelan experience. Perceived vulnerability influences Canadian policy formation as the government builds on public sentiment to justify its actions (Anderson and Soennecken 2022). The projection of suffering and vulnerability became political tools for Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government in 28 2015 in response to the Syrian Civil War. The Liberals campaigned on a resettlement initiative for 25,000 Syrian refugees to restore Canada’s global reputation as a generous humanitarian actor (Garcea and Kikulwe 2019,94). It gained momentum through the humanized depiction of refugees that appealed to the Canadian public by generating a sense of shared moral obligation (Mustafa et al. 2021,887; Wallace 2018). Examining the public perception and discourse surrounding the Venezuelan experience will be fundamental. Despite the extent of the Venezuelan refugee crisis, Canadian public efforts remain distant and preoccupied with other global emergencies (Olinto 2022). The project will examine government and public knowledge and attitudes towards the crisis. The spatial distance between Canada and Venezuela offers a point of commencement. States attempt to control and manage migration flows using a notion of bordering that creates a transnational space beyond the traditional conceptualization of borders (Collyer and King 2015, 187). Regionally, the collaboration between Prime Minister Trudeau and the Biden administration through modifications to the STCA illustrates how Canada and the U.S. try to control the flow of people beyond their national boundaries (Boyd and T.B. Ly 2021; FitzGerald 2019, 129-130). In the Venezuelan example, both governments attempt to keep the refugees within the Global South rather than allowing them to travel to the U.S. and Canada by supporting host country integration efforts and imposing barriers to refugee and migrant access to alternative pathways. Claims of responsibility sharing seek to mask Canada’s limited intervention in rising migration in the hemisphere beyond financial contributions (Smith 2020, 15 -16). The use of space to manage migration correlates to migration diplomacy as states mobilize foreign policy to secure their interest and objectives (Atak et al., 2023; Adamson and Tsourapas, 2019). 29 Consequently, migration management provides a conceptual lens to examine the intersectionality of space, foreign policy, and migration in Ottawa's policy formation toward Venezuela. Theoretical conceptualizations of the relationship between space and migration become crucial to understanding the severity of the Venezuelan crisis and Canadian responses. David Scott FitzGerald’s work offers a foundation to analyze the link between migration and foreign policy based on the remote control of migration. It refers to a strategy by powerful states like the U.S. to control the movement of migrants and refugees beyond their national territories using buffer states (FitzGerald 2019, 12). The project will note Canada and the U.S.’ use of host countries like Colombia and Mexico to constrain migration flows. A constructivist and political economy framework help unveil how Canada masks its use of the remote control of migration toward Venezuelan refugees and migrants. The constructivist lens offers a basis to examine the use of the human rights rhetoric as a political strategy to justify Canadian financial assistance to host countries like Colombia. A political economy approach provides a foundation to investigate the influence of the U.S. in Canada’s collaborative migration management through amendments to the STCA (Borelli et al. 2021; Boy and T.B. Ly 2021; Fluri 2023). It highlights the influence of shared racial categorizations of refugees in guiding Canada’s response to the regional impact of the Venezuelan exodus. Methodology Recruitment Understanding Canada's response to the Venezuelan crisis requires an interdisciplinary investigation that analyzes the underlying factors influencing policy formation. The researcher conducted a preliminary investigation of the Canadian government's response to the crisis. I identified sanctions, financial assistance to host countries, and humanitarian collaboration with 30 NGOs as the primary themes of Ottawa’s response. Canada's political opposition against Maduro and its humanitarian aid highlighted the significance of including diverse perspectives. Consequently, I separated the investigation into domestic and international factors. I identified the organizations receiving funding from the Canadian government for humanitarian aid to select potential participants. Global Affairs Canada's (GAC) inventory records the distribution of resources to partner organizations. I identified members of the Venezuelan Task Force (VTF) at GAC and representatives from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) for a political lens. Recruitment focused on selecting experts across different organizations to investigate the political, economic, and social factors that influence policy formation. In addition to members from GAC and IDRC, I contacted officials from Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). NGOs such as Development and Peace Caritas Canada (DPCC), Cuso International, and Canada Global Response (CGR) were selected to share their experience with humanitarian contributions. Members of the Venezuelan community in Canada highlighted the political and social factors influencing policy formation. Including academics in the study contributed a critical reflection of the multiple forces dictating Ottawa's decisions. I selected academics based on recently published material on the Venezuelan crisis and Canada's response. Academics from Canada, Venezuela, Colombia, and the United States were selected to include diverse perspectives. The internationalization and polarization of the Venezuelan experience highlighted the importance of their inclusion. After receiving approval from the Behavioral Research Ethics Board at the university, I emailed selected participants to share information about the research project and request their participation. Emails included information about the researcher, supervisor, and project 31 objectives. They also highlighted how their experience would contribute to the study. I began sending these emails in August 2023. The objective was to recruit 15 – 25 participants with at least five experts from each targeted organization and institution. I was only able to recruit participants in the development sector of the VTF, not its political counterpart. Pre-existing contacts with the Venezuelan Canadian Society of BC (VCSBC) facilitated the recruitment of Venezuelan community members in Canada. It also helped recruit a former Venezuelan ambassador to Canada. The researcher found more success in recruiting NGO representatives. The NGOs recruited for the study consisted of Canadian, international, and Colombian organizations. DPCC, The Canadian Foodgrains Bank (CFGB). Cuso International, and CGR represented the Canadian perspective. The study interviewed members of these organizations due to their individual and collaborative projects with GAC designed to assist Venezuelans. Representatives from ZOA Refugee Colombia (ZOARC) and Fundación Ideas para La Paz (FIP) also participated in the study for their work in Colombia. To better understand domestic factors influencing Canadian responses, I interviewed members of the VCSBC and the Canada-Venezuela Democracy Forum (CVDF). A snow sampling technique improved the recruitment of different organizations. It also facilitated contact with government officials responsible for coordinating collaboration between government agencies and NGO partners. Qualitative Data: Interviews The study uses qualitative methods in the form of eighteen semi-structured virtual interviews with participants from Canada, Venezuela, the United States, and Colombia. To achieve the project's objective of understanding the basis behind Canada's response to the crisis, it had to consult experts across different fields. A qualitative approach allows for collecting valuable information about a particular event, decision, or issue (King et al. 1994, 4). Semi- 32 structured interviews allowed the researcher to better interact with participants to collect more insightful information. The 18 interviews allowed me to conduct a diverse but extensive range of conversations with each participant. Once participants agreed to the study, they received a consent form describing the interview process. They also received an agenda before the scheduled interview as a reference for discussion. I formulated spontaneous questions as the conversation evolved to strengthen two-way communication and gain insightful information. Most of the interviews took place between August 2023 – November 2023. Three interviews occurred between January 2024 and April 2024 as I did not have their contact information before that period. I interviewed all participants virtually using my UBC Zoom account. Participants had the option for an interview in Spanish or English. I collected interview notes for all discussions and an audio recording for those who consented to being recorded. The interviews ranged from 40 minutes to an hour. I asked all participants a set of standard questions, which can be found below. However, depending on the participant, I adjusted one to three questions. For example, interviews with NGOs had additional questions that focused on the project the organization implemented. This flexibility enhanced the discussions by allowing participants to share their diverse perspectives and experiences. The underlying objective of all discussions was to understand why and how Canada responded to the crisis. Near the end of the discussion, I asked participants for recommendations to improve policies and programs designed to help Venezuelans. I analyzed the information from January 2024 to February 2024. I organized all the information collected from interviews into different themes based on participants' associations. The four themes include: (1) Government, (2) NGO, (3) Academics, and (4) Venezuelan Community. Separating the information helped differentiate and identify the link between 33 domestic and international factors. It also helped identify the primary factors influencing policy formation after being mentioned in multiple discussions. After synthesizing the data, I decided to recruit more participants to obtain more information. I recruited two more academics and a member of the VTF. Translations also took place during this period. I used my proficiency in Spanish and English to translate the information. Limitations and Remaining Chapters The primary limitation concerns the project’s timeframe. Canadian policy towards the situation in Venezuela gained momentum in 2019 after allegations of fraudulent elections against Maduro in 2018. Ottawa suspended diplomatic ties in 2019 by removing its embassy from Venezuela. The project could not acquire insight into the environment in Ottawa during this period. I contacted leading government officials from the VTF and the former Canadian Ambassador to Venezuela. Although the project included the perspectives of government officials, it was difficult to recruit participants involved in 2019 because, by 2023, they had moved to new assignments in GAC. In email discussions, they indicated that they could no longer comment on the Venezuelan file. Another limitation in recruitment concerns my limited contacts. It was challenging to recruit participants, considering I had close to no pre-existing contacts with any potential participants. Without pre-existing relations, it was difficult to recruit government officials. After consultation with my supervisor, I mitigated this issue by drafting informative and convincing initial contact emails. A snow sampling technique also helped mitigate this by providing a middle person between myself and a potential participant. Another constraint is the lack of voice provided to Venezuelan migrants and refugees. Due to the potential challenges of including such a vulnerable group, the project focused on community and NGO members working with Venezuelan refugees. These organizations function 34 as the middle ground between refugees and the government, trying to advocate for increased engagement. Since the project's objective was to understand the factors influencing government policy, I determined that their participation would be more beneficial and have fewer risks. Finally, it is worth noting that some interviews were conducted in Spanish, with the researcher transcribing the information into English. The project acknowledges the challenges embedded in language translations and thus reaffirms my commitment to remain as authentic as possible to the original meaning of the discussion. The remaining chapters will outline the motives behind Canada's policies towards Venezuela while evaluating their effectiveness using the information from interviews. The next chapter breaks down Canadian policies and responses to the crisis based on domestic components such as economic interests, national identity, and the Venezuelan community in Canada. Chapter four focuses on international factors such as the influence of the U.S., the world order, and international migration. The fifth chapter provides future policy recommendations to assist Venezuelan migrants and refugees while considering Canadian interests and objectives. The final section revisits the primary findings, the study's methodology, and the study's significance to suggest potential areas for future research. 35 A Reflection on Positionality Separating oneself from the research is a genuine challenge, especially for students beginning their research careers hoping to transform existing narratives. This study is no exception, as my experience as an immigrant dictates my perception of Canada’s immigration system and policies toward Latin America. I was born in Colombia and migrated to Canada as a refugee when I was eight years old. The combination of my Colombian heritage and my experience growing up in Canada inspired my interest in the study while outlining the stark contrast in my experience compared to Venezuelan refugees. As a Canadian citizen, I have privileges people in Colombia, Venezuela, and other Latin American countries dream of. I developed the project from my utter disbelief and outrage at the lack of general attention or support for Venezuelans compared to other people. My attention turned to identifying the components that made the Venezuelan experience different so that I could analyze them and develop future recommendations. Without critically analyzing the motives behind a government action, we will never identify the strengths and limitations of the policies they created to assist particular groups of people. 36 Sample Interview Questions English 1. What is your organization doing to help Venezuelans in host countries? 2. Do you receive support from the Canadian government? If so, how much? 3. What are the primary obstacles you encounter while providing these assistance programs? 4. What economic or political interests does Canada have in Venezuela? 5. What obstacles does the Venezuelan community encounter in Canada? 6. What has the Venezuelan community in Canada done to increase government engagement in Venezuela? 7. Are sanctions an effective strategy to pressure Maduro’s government? 8. Has the situation in Venezuela improved? 9. Do you think financial assistance to host countries is sufficient to confront the influx of migrants and refugees? 10. How much influence does the U.S. have on Canada's policy toward Venezuela? 11. What led to Canada’s support for Juan Guaidó? 12. What more could the Canadian government do to help Venezuelan migrants and refugees? Spanish 1. ¿Qué está haciendo su organización para ayudar a los venezolanos en países receptores como Colombia? 2. ¿Reciben apoyo del gobierno canadiense? Si es así, ¿cuánto? 3. ¿Cuáles son los principales obstáculos que encuentran al intentar proporcionar estos programas de asistencia? 4. ¿Qué intereses económicos o políticos tiene Canadá en Venezuela? 5. ¿Qué obstáculos enfrenta la comunidad venezolana en Canadá? 6. ¿Qué ha hecho la comunidad venezolana en Canadá para aumentar la participación del gobierno hacia la crisis en Venezuela? 7. ¿Son las sanciones una estrategia efectiva para presionar al gobierno de Maduro? 8. ¿Ha mejorado la situación en Venezuela? 9. ¿Cree que la asistencia financiera a los países receptores es suficiente para enfrentar el flujo de migrantes y refugiados? 10. ¿Cuánta influencia tiene Estados Unidos en la política de Canadá hacia Venezuela? 11. ¿Qué llevó a Canadá a apoyar a Juan Guaidó? 12. ¿Qué más podría hacer el gobierno canadiense para ayudar a los migrantes y refugiados venezolanos? 37 CHAPTER 3 – DOMESTIC FACTORS This chapter explores national components influencing Ottawa’s foreign policy formation such as economic interests, political incentives, and the Venezuelan community in Canada to reveal their influence on the Liberal government’s response to the situation in Venezuela. A lack of coherent political and economic interests combined with a fragmented Venezuelan community influences the nature of Canada’s response. In the absence of substantial domestic incentives, a combination of national values and identity serves as a political tool to justify Canadian engagement as Ottawa uses the Venezuelan situation to serve larger foreign policy objectives like supporting the United States. Economic Interests Based on their position within the global economy, Canadian relations with Venezuela illustrate the link between political actions and economic interests. Wallerstein's world-systems theory provides a framework to unveil the political economy elements of Ottawa’s response to the crisis following the flow of capital and labour in the capitalist global economy (Wallerstein 2004). Foreign dominance of Canadian affairs, beginning with the British Empire and later the U.S., tilted Canada's position in the production hierarchy towards the semi-periphery due to its vast raw materials (Resnick 1989,164). Canada's industrialization, driven by capitalist ideology, transformed the country into the core with technological, financial, and manufacturing power. Venezuela’s resources, especially within the extractive sector, and its reliance on exporting its resources place it within the periphery. Consequently, relations between the two countries represent an unbalanced relationship as Canadian private companies exploit Venezuela's extractive sector, creating a trade deficit between the two countries (Burns 2012, 302). The politicized dynamics within bilateral economic interests intensified during Chávez's presidency. 38 Analyzing Canadian relations with Venezuela during Chávez's presidency is vital to understanding existing policies towards the Venezuelan crisis. Economic ties with notable actors like Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela became a political tool for Canada to establish a presence in a region it struggled to find its relevance (Dudelin 2003, 660-661; Macdonald 2016, 32-33; McKenna 2018, 26). Initially, Venezuela ranked highly due to its economic potential and similarities within its oil sector compared to Canada (Rochlin 1994, 85-86). Before Chávez, governments in Caracas adhered to U.S. and Canadian interests through neoliberal policies despite their potential implications on Venezuelan society (Mora et al. 2021, 6-7). Neoliberal reformations by President Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1989 set the foundation for Chávez’s campaign to restructure Venezuela’s political and economic system (Hellinger 2006, 60 -61). Once in power, Chávez built on social unrest to regain control in the country’s leading industries by reducing foreign influence. Chávez reformed the constitution to solidify his political authority and replaced PDVSA leaders with those loyal to him (Rosales 2018, 453 - 454). Using Wallerstein’s framework, these represented a challenge to the axial division of production and accumulation of capital as the government tried to regain control over these industries (Wallerstein 2004, 29-30; Romero and Mijares 2016, 171). Despite these reformations, it is vital to note the ideological narrative guiding Canadian discourse toward Venezuela. Bilateral relations during the Chávez and Stephen Harper governments illustrate the ideological factor influencing Canadian approaches toward Venezuela. Canadian and U.S. government officials feared the potential consequences of Chávez's actions due to the precedent set by the nationalization of PDVSA in 1976, which halted Canadian and U.S. extractive operations in Venezuela (Cattano 2007; Schmidt 2007). Due to imposed barriers on foreign investment, Canadian businesses became hesitant to engage in commercial activity in Chávez’s 39 Venezuela (M.Burns 2012, 303). Former Prime Minister Harper publicly stated his opposition to Chávez’s policies.8 However, a parliament report on Canadian trade with Venezuela demonstrates increased trade and foreign investment between 2006 – 2011.9 Economic relations remained unaffected, demonstrating the ideological narrative behind the political opposition between Ottawa and Caracas. Relations represented a polarized collision between capitalism and socialism influenced by Washington’s anti-socialist campaign in the Americas. Political narratives symbolized an ideological rhetoric rather than an economic reality as trade and investment continued until Nicolás Maduro’s succession. The situation became more polarized with Maduro’s rise to power and the collapse of the Venezuelan economy due to global oil prices. Venezuela’s oil-export-dependent economy experienced a 73% decline in oil revenue with the fall of oil prices in 2014 and 2016 (Jraissati and Jakee 2022, 348). Sanctions imposed by the U.S. in 2017 also contributed to Venezuela’s economic decline (Weisbrot and Sachs 2019). It is also necessary to note the effects of internal mismanagement and corruption by Chávez and Maduro’s governments (Jraissati and Jakee 2022, 351; Rendon and Price 2019). As Wallerstein suggests, core-periphery relations are characterized by the process of production, in which the state relocates its economic activities to maximize profit (Wallerstein 2004, 29-30). Chávez’s reformations led Canadian officials to relocate operations to other countries like Colombia, to which Harper extended trade agreements (Rochlin 2012, 17). By the time Maduro gained power, Canada shifted its economic activities as trade surplus with Venezuela dropped by approximately 25% in 2017 from 2016.10 Canadian investments also dropped in 2017 as Venezuela ranked 188 out of 190 countries for ease of conducting business.11 The political environment in Venezuela, based on Maduro's internal and global reputation, was a fundamental element in reduced economic activities. 40 The extent to which these numbers influence Canadian policies towards the crisis is minimal, considering Venezuela is currently not a major trading or investment partner. However, it is vital to note that a transition to a ‘NonChavista’ government in Caracas serves Canadian interests by potentially generating favorable economic conditions. The current conditions in Venezuela however reduce the validity of a Canadian economic argument beyond pressure from Washington. According to Antulio Rosales, an Associate Professor at York University in Toronto, the deterioration of Venezuela’s leading industries due to the polarized situation diminishes Canadian economic interests. “The Venezuelan economy is not as powerful as before. The oil industry is practically destroyed. The conditions do not allow for Canadian investment, there are more important actors in the region like Colombia and Brazil.” (Antulio. Interview by author, 2024). The rise of inflation to 180.9% in 2015, combined with a decrease in oil prices, imposed sanctions, and the closure and expropriation of leading businesses, crumbled the Venezuelan economy (Cheatham and Roy 2023; Mora et al. 2021, 19-2020). These conditions diminish the rationale for Canadian investment, thus reducing the validity of Ottawa’s actions based on economic interests. Instead, Jean Daudelin, an Associate Professor at The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs in Ottawa, suggests that the absence of economic interest allows policymakers in Ottawa to act without severe implications. “Due to the lack of interests, the governments have a lot of liberty in their approach to make ‘new’ discoveries of the region. But a lack of interests means it hard to sell your involvement in the country.” (Jean. Interview by author, 2024). Unstable conditions and limited economic incentives allow government officials to formulate policies that serve alternative foreign policy objectives, such as supporting Washington's campaign against Maduro. A reflection on Canada’s economic dependence on the U.S. demonstrates the material and ideological basis of Ottawa’s response. 41 With limited economic ties with Venezuela, it is Canada’s relationship with the U.S. that dictates its response to the situation. Economic interdependence with the U.S. is a principal domestic factor influencing Ottawa’s policy formation. Goods and services trade between Canada and the U.S. totalled $908.9 billion in 2022.12 The U.S. has substantial economic interests in Venezuela due to investments in the extractive and manufacturing sectors. The situation in Venezuela hampered these interests, forcing the U.S. to impose pressure on Maduro to abide by the existing rules of the global economy (Smilde 2020, 46 - 47). “For the U.S., there are both (economic and geostrategic) interests, but overall, it is mostly driven by geostrategic considerations.” (Timothy. Interview by author, 2024). “It is not so much about ideology but more about Chávez and now Maduro reducing U.S. hegemony and the creation of organizations to reduce U.S. influence. Criticizing U.S. foreign policy and neoliberalism.” (Timothy. Interview by author, 2024). As Timothy Gill, an Associate Professor at the University of Tennessee, indicates, U.S. opposition to Venezuela represents a complex link between economic interests and diverging political perspectives. This ideological and materially driven opposition extended onto Ottawa’s political agenda due to its political and economic relationship with Washington. The point is that economic relations between Canada and Venezuela do not incentivize Ottawa’s decision, but interdependence with the U.S. provides the material basis for policy formation. Ideology underpinned Ottawa's actions in executing Washington's campaign against socialism in Venezuela. A proclaimed principle of internationalism and multiculturalism tried to mask the political reality behind these policies. Critics of Canada's engagement in Venezuela, particularly its role in the Lima Group, highlight Ottawa’s support for Washington’s subversion and dismantling of Venezuela's political system due to its opposition to U.S. and Canadian economic interests (Engler 2019; Schalk 2021). Ottawa tried to portray the group as a multilateral attempt to generate change in Venezuela to mask the right-wing coalition of 42 governments pushing for regime change (Engler 2019). The point is not to discredit the significance of corruption and abuses by Maduro's government but to identify the rationale behind Canadian actions. A discussion with Professor Daudelin highlighted the problem between Canadian claims and actions toward Venezuela. “It is an issue to claim the idea of a ‘rules-based international order,’ yet you get involved in Venezuela’s domestic affairs. How can you defend a rules-based order and then act this way in Venezuela?” (Jean. Interview by author 2024). It is problematic for Canada to claim a rights-based internationalist foreign policy while supporting a U.S.-led regime change in Venezuela to secure investment and commercial opportunities in the country. Canada and the U.S. seek to dismantle socialism in Venezuela and the Americas to ensure the survival of a capitalist global economy. Ideological Commitments Private and public officials build on traditional narratives correlating to Canadian values and ideas to lobby for engagement. The two stated values that dominate Canadian policies towards Venezuela are the promotion of liberal democracy and the upholding of human rights. A constructivist lens demonstrates the importance of these values in masking the real motivators forming Canadian foreign policy. The significance of this framework stems from the idea that material forces alone do not explain state actions at the international level. Instead, understanding how values and ideas construct the content of power and interests helps conceptualize why states act in a particular way (Wendt 1999, 95). For Canada, values and ideas are dominant features embedded in its foreign policy as the country tries to position itself in the international system and find its relevance in Latin America (Cros 2012; McKercher 2022; Thérien and Mace 2013). Canadian approaches and policies towards Venezuela represent a continued reliance on facade values to justify foreign policy actions. 43 Canada’s liberal-internationalist foreign policy represents the ideological factors in Ottawa’s policy formation towards Venezuela. The policy links values associated with Canada, such as freedom of expression, global humanitarianism, and free trade, with global norms and institutions. Former Foreign Affairs Minister Freeland’s speech on Canada's priorities placed liberal democratic values at the forefront of Canadian foreign policy, which Maduro’s rule was said to threaten in Venezuela.13 The Bolivarian Revolution and Maduro's actions challenge this rhetoric based on their opposition to Canadian liberal democracy (M.Burns 2012, 297; Gordon and Weber 2016, 251-252). The Liberal government’s approach further demonstrates the constructivist notion of ideas influencing state behaviour (Wendt 1999, 115). Ottawa formulated and tried to justify its engagement in Venezuela by defending human rights and liberal democracy. This is problematic, considering Canada's blind eye to human rights violations in countries with investment opportunities for Canadian corporations (Gordon and Webber 2016; 261, 273; Vucetic 2017). Ottawa tries to hide the basis of its actions in Venezuela behind the internationalist discourse despite its contradictory behaviour in other countries. The Liberals acted based on a proclaimed commitment to liberal internationalism backed by Maduro's neglect and oppression of Venezuelan democracy. The same year the Minister delivered the speech, Venezuelans protested Maduro's government for neglecting democratic principles and deteriorating socio-economic conditions (Broner 2017; Llorens 2018; Watson et al. 2023, 269-271). The protests demonstrated the linkage between ideas and material reality, as civil society acted based on a material threat to fundamental values and crumbling conditions. The government’s response through security forces added a material element, which the Canadian government used to justify subsequent policies.14 Since 2017, the Liberal government has continued to act against Maduro based on the ideological and material threat his rule 44 supposedly represents to Venezuelan society, regional stability, and the global order.15 It justifies Canadian actions based on an established set of values and principles that Maduro symbolically and materially threatens. Ottawa’s support for Juan Guaidó and the formation of the Lima group reinforces the ideological dynamics guiding its policies. According to government reports, Ottawa’s overarching goal is to support the return of democratic and constitutional order while reducing the impact of the crisis on Venezuelans.16 It frames the situation as an ideological conflict in which liberal democracy becomes the solution. Allegations of fraudulent elections, Maduro’s restructuring of democratic institutions, and repression of Venezuelan society provided a material element for Canada’s response (Grenier 2019; 2021). Thus, Ottawa mobilizes Canada's internal perception and global reputation to formulate a multilateral response. Professor Daudelin highlighted the basis for Canadian recognition of Juan Guaidó following proclaimed Canadian values. “Why did they support Guaidó? It was about selling a political position with minimal risk. It reaffirmed this international idea of Canadian values without severe implications due to the lack of invested interests.” (Jean. Interview by author, 2024). It positions Canada as a legitimate actor that can mediate the restoration of liberal democratic principles. The formation of the Lima Group and its international recognition of Guaidó as interim president allowed Canada to confront the prevailing material conditions while imposing its values on Venezuelan society as a viable solution (Schalk 2021). Canada's liberal internationalist agenda is a political tool for Ottawa to extend values and ideas that align with state interests through its foreign policy. Supporting the U.S. and securing access to Latin American markets are two objectives masked by the liberal internationalist strategy. In the following chapter, the paper will examine Washington's role and how its material interests influence Ottawa’s decisions. In the meantime, it is vital to note that Ottawa's opposition towards 45 Maduro and its commitment to liberal democracy in Venezuela aligns with Washingtons' political agenda (Boersner 2020, 553-554). Human Rights Another value that reinforces the ideological elements within Canada’s response is the notion of defending human rights. The material reality in Venezuela is the violation of human rights due to economic collapse, oppression, and persecution of opposition by Maduro’s government. Adriana Boersner, a Venezuelan Associate Professor at The Military College of South Carolina, outlined Venezuelans' everyday challenges. “The majority of the population does not have the resources to live a quality life. They experience constant power outages, lack of medicine, food insecurity, and internet outrages.” (Adriana. Interview by author, 2023). Malnutrition, the lack of essential services, attacks on freedom of expression, repression, and illegal mining activities intensified during Maduro’s presidency.17 Reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and a U.N. Fact-Finding Mission linked Venezuelan government officials with human rights violations associated with persecution, oppression, torture, and impunity.18 The severity of the situation undoubtedly requires international attention, yet Canada’s response extends beyond humanitarian claims. The concern for human rights serves a political strategy to hide Canada’s policy alignment with the U.S. Ottawa uses a perceived global identity to mask the basis of its actions. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau campaigned on liberal internationalism to defend and uphold Canadian values abroad through foreign policy based on a perceived compassionate global reputation (Browne 2019; Gecelovsky 2019). Defending human rights embodies both values while granting the basis to act in situations like Venezuela. The severity of the situation in Venezuela and neighbouring countries compels Canadian actions based on its humanitarian reputation and commitments. It questions Ottawa's commitment to defending and upholding 46 human rights, which the government has responded to through financial contributions, sanctions, and multilateral cooperation. Foreign policy functions as the government's attempt to reaffirm a particular role within the global system (Howard and Neufeldt 2000, 14; Thérien and Mace 2013, 152). It adds to Canada’s orientation in Latin American affairs, in keeping with a claim that Canada is a defender and promoter of human rights (Duhaime 2012). Subsequently, Ottawa’s response to the infringement of human rights throughout Venezuela demonstrates a political effort to sustain a reputation while reaffirming the global significance of liberal internationalist values. The polarization of the Venezuelan crisis influences Canada’s commitment to extending national values aligned with liberal internationalism. Canada's opposition to Maduro symbolizes a global contention between liberal democracy and alternative forms of government associated with socialism. Defending human rights falls under a collaborative strategy between Ottawa and Washington to isolate and combat socialist threats to the liberal internationalist order. It represents the external projection of Canadian identity through nation branding to connect domestic values with a global notion of progression (Nimijean 2006; Nimijean 2018). It perceives values associated with Canadian identity, such as liberal democracy and human rights, as pillars of an international system Canada must uphold and defend (Rashchupkina 2022). It is imperative to note that the situation in Venezuela warrants legitimate criticism of Maduro’s government, and promotion of international initiatives to protect human rights. However, the analysis suggests that Ottawa’s policies derive from a complex political environment rooted in ideological competition and international stakes. Interviews with academics researching the polarized elements of the Venezuelan crisis outline the ideological factors dictating regional responses. One of these dynamics is Canada's 47 self-perception as a humanitarian state and its position in the global system. Existing humanitarian narratives towards Venezuelans serve as political discourses that manufactures a public image to achieve international aims (Perez 2019, 60). José Oviendo Pérez suggests that unpacking existing policies demonstrates the political basis of humanitarian narratives as governments and state leaders attempt to portray themselves as protectors against an ideological opposition. “In Colombia and Brazil, Duque and Bolsonaro designed their response to the refugee crisis to make themselves look more humanitarian while criticizing socialism.” (José. Interview by author, 2023). For Canada, its financial humanitarian assistance to host countries aligns with its internationalist agenda while providing a material basis for the humanist appeal in its national identity. Professor Daudelin also outlined contradictions within Canadian policies as they try to act according to perceived Canadian values while simultaneously aligning their responses with Washington's.19 Although Canadian financing helps host countries confront the influx of Venezuelan refugees, it is imperative to critically reflect on the rationale behind these policies. Discussions with non-governmental representatives, international organizations, and community leaders suggest that the humanitarian claim is insufficient to explain Canada’s response. Venezuelan community leaders outlined the challenges of increasing Canadian government engagement under a humanitarian argument. “Our organization created a petition to create a humanitarian visa or pathway for Venezuelan refugees similar to other humanitarian crises. We tried to use declarations made by the government regarding receiving more immigrants to gain more support for Venezuelans. Canada could do more for those who want to come to Canada.” (Ivan. Interview by author, 2023). “The conservatives and liberal governments have this idea of protecting human rights, but they turn a blind eye to Venezuela. It is political. Unfortunately, the Latin American community in Canada does not have a strong base for votes. We can’t give something to Canadian politicians.” (Josué. Interview by author, 2023). 48 Petitions to Parliament focused on increasing Canadian engagement could not capture government attention compared to other international crises seen as more pressing or relevant to the Canadian context.20 NGOs working in Venezuela or neighbouring countries also struggled to sustain the government's attention as funding from GAC decreased. A representative from DPCC expressed this challenge while trying to transition initial humanitarian responses to long-term sustainable development for Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Colombia.21 These experiences illustrate the minimal weight the humanitarian claim has on sustainable Canadian engagement. Further examination of NGO efforts demonstrates another dynamic within Canada's rationale for responding to the crisis. Misconception and Neglect “Canadians do not understand the severity of the situation in Venezuela” (Josué. Interview by author, 2023). Investigating Canada's political and humanitarian policies towards Venezuela requires evaluating the government's understanding and perception of the crisis. It is a common practice by the Liberal and Conservative governments to re-engage or rediscover the countries in the Americas to solidify a foreign policy objective, such as the formation of FTAs (Daudelin 2003, 637-638; Daudelin and Dawson 2008; McKenna 2018; Mckercher 2022, 49). At the same time, both governments portrayed themselves as distinctive from the U.S., to bolster their appeal as regional partners (Cooper 2012, 671; Lacroix 2012). Despite these efforts, contemporary policies illustrate a degree of ignorance through the neglect of factors and conditions associated with the crisis, which limits the effectiveness of Canada's commitment to assist Venezuelans. It follows Macdonald’s suggestion that the world-system theory does not account for contemporary changes in the political economy of Latin America, as it ignores social changes among countries 49 in the region (Macdonald 2016). Existing policies demonstrate a misconception and neglect of conditions in Venezuela and transnational forces that shape the internationalization of the crisis. Despite government efforts to entrench a cultural connection with the Americas, disinterest and minimal knowledge dictate Canadian perceptions of the region (Thérien and Mace 2013, 159; McKercher 2022,48). Developing skills and knowledge associated with Europe and Asia takes precedence in Canadian foreign policy, while Latin America remains in the margins to be rediscovered to diversify Canadian trade (McKercher, 2022; Shamsie and Grinspun 2010, 186-187). “The principal problem is the lack of historical connection or attachments between Canada and the Americas. They are more attached to the commonwealth but feel invoked to participate in inter-American affairs.” (Antulio. Interview by author, 2024). The inconsistent engagement demonstrates the government’s continued reliance on a handful of Latin American experts called upon once Ottawa decides to re-engage rather than invest in long-term understandings of the region. Its ignorance stems from the conceptualization of Latin America instead of individual states. Following this strategy ignores fundamental cultural values embedded in various Latin American societies, influencing the relationships Canada can build and sustain (McKenna 2018, 27). Whether it is a lack of interest or stretched resources, the point is that Canada’s conceptualization of the region generates policies that ignore fundamental political and cultural elements that represent each country's uniqueness. An examination of Canada’s policies towards Venezuela supports this claim. Canada's conceptualization of the Venezuelan crisis reinforces a lack of government and public understanding. By restricting diplomatic relations in Caracas, the Canadian government essentially reduced the possibility of interacting with government officials, NGOs, and community leaders who provided insight into the situation. A discussion with a member from the 50 GAC VTF outlined the challenge of implementing development programs without reliable insight into conditions on the ground. “Information regarding program success and limitations comes from partners not necessarily governments. It is hard not having a presence in the country, so we rely on information from partners.” (Venezuelan Task Force. Interview by author, 2024). The ideological basis used to justify Canada's diplomatic absence reaffirms a lack of interest in understanding Venezuela's conditions. Rather than acknowledging the structural inequalities that led to initial support for Chávez and Maduro, Ottawa continues conceptualizing Caracas as an ideological threat (M. Burns 2012, 298). Implementing sanctions demonstrates the prioritization of ideological elements over material reality in Venezuela. Canadian sanctions aimed at pressuring Maduro’s governments to adhere to democratic principles and uphold human rights norms have unintended consequences Ottawa seems to ignore. Ottawa fails to acknowledge how the sanctions also hamper their goals. Professor Boersner suggests that the sanctions augment the internationalization of the crisis while intensifying Maduro’s grip on power. “The sanctions have done the opposite of originally intended as other great powers have taken their position in helping Maduro.” (Adriana. Interview by author, 2023). The deteriorating socio-economic conditions in Venezuela, partially because of sanctions, influenced Maduro's authoritarian actions to solidify his rule in the face of public unrest (Corrales 2020). These actions destroyed the remaining validity of Venezuelan democracy as Maduro placed loyal representatives across institutional posts such as the National Assembly and the judicial system (Briceño-Ruiz 2019; Bull and Rosales 2020, 8). Rather than restoring democracy, the sanctions increase authoritarian ruling at the expense of Venezuelan society. Canada's continued reliance on sanctions as a political tool demonstrates a lack of interest in 51 improving conditions and an ignorance towards adequately examining the effectiveness or consequences of existing policies. A similar approach becomes evident concerning human rights. Maduro’s government filled the economic void created by sanctions with alliances with Russia and China while contributing to the development of new markets. The intensification of these markets, such as illegal mining activities in the Orinoco Belt, has severe human rights implications while solidifying Maduro’s ruling with alternative alliances (Boersners 2019, 546, 548; Rendon 2020; Rosales 2019). Alliances amongst the government, military, and armed groups operate a complex illicit mining system that coerces and oppresses local and indigenous communities (Bargent and Rainsford, 2020). These communities became subject to abuse, child labour, and displacement. The link between sanctions and the expansion of these activities is a subject of debate. However, the point is that Venezuela's economic isolation resulted in alternative markets for the state, which inherently undermined human rights in the country. The limited attention attributed to these unintended consequences undermines Canada's proclaimed objective of upholding human rights for Venezuelans. Ottawa's tendency to neglect countries in Latin America extends to its response to Venezuela, as it frames the situation in a way that excludes relevant factors. The influx of Venezuelan migrants and refugees amplifies the extent of this misconception. Immigration and Refugees The values and ideas that constitute Canada’s immigration system underpin another domestic element within Ottawa’s response. Immigration is a fundamental aspect of Canadian society as the government develops pathways to meet labour shortages, support population growth, and recruit talent to sustain Canadian competition in the global economy (Akbar 2022,3930; Lin and Haan, 2023; Trebilcock, 2019). Considering Canada’s open immigration system and its international reputation for refugee resettlement programs, what distinguishes the 52 Venezuelan experience? That is, why are there no refugee resettlement initiatives for Venezuelans when Canada's Liberal administrations are known for such policies? The federal government focused on financial assistance to host countries until November 2023, when IRCC announced a family-based pathway for Colombians, Venezuelans, and Haitians to migrate to Canada.22 Once again, values and perceptions of the Venezuelan experience provide a foundation for conceptualizing a material reality. The categorization of Venezuelans as migrants and refugees provides a point of departure. The differentiation of Venezuelans based on international classifications of refugees and migrants influences the responses and opportunities that governments such as Canada’s provide. Canadian conceptualizations of refugees derive from the UN 1951 Refugee Convention, which defines a refugee as a person with the well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.23 The issue for Venezuelans is not the definition itself but the perception of their experience by international governments reflecting attributed characteristics of vulnerability (Kyriakides et al. 2019, 5; Perez 2019, 58). Orlando Viera-Blanco, a former Venezuelan ambassador to Canada, expressed the structural challenges faced by Venezuelans in gaining international recognition. “There is an international critique that justifies international intervention under what is considered a humanitarian crisis or catastrophe caused by war or natural causes. Venezuela did not fall under one or the other. There was no war or confrontation. What exists is a political catastrophe with statistically worse conditions in terms of hunger, death, exodus, displacement, political persecution, and human rights than one that a civil war or natural catastrophe can cause.” (Orlando. Interview by author, 2024). “For these conditions, gaining recognition from the UN Refugee Agency or Canada for Venezuelans as refugees was difficult. I think this is something that needs to be reviewed because the sole definition or criteria for humanitarian catastrophes needs to be amplified to consider not just the causes but the consequences.” (Orlando. Interview by author, 2024). 53 In Canada, the perceived vulnerability of a migrant or refugee influences government policies (Anderson and Soennecken 2022; Xu 2021, 664). In 2015, the material reality of the Syrian civil war and Canadian perceptions of Syrian refugees was influential in Canada’s federal election due to a Liberal commitment to a large-scale refugee resettlement initiative (Macklin et al. 2018, 40; Tyyskä et al. 2017, 7-9; Wallace 2018). This illustrates the weight of Canadian public opinion in dictating government policies according to existing notions of vulnerability and suffering. Canada's limited understanding of the situation in Venezuela due to disinterest and U.S. dominance, combined with the conceptualization of vulnerability, shaped Ottawa's response. The point is not to compare interpretations of vulnerability and suffering across international crises but to suggest that conceptualizing varying experiences becomes a tool to serve political objectives (Perez 2019, 59-60). In 2015, the situation in Syria raised the issue of refugees and Canadian engagement in political discourse (Adler-Nissen 2020, 93; Siddiqi and Koerber 2020). The Liberal government combined this narrative with existing Syrian communities in Canada to campaign for the upcoming election. Professor Vyon Grenier at the Brian Mulroney Institute of Government outlined the lack of incentive for politicians to extend their support for Venezuelan migrants and refugees because the Canadian -Venezuelan community lacks the capacity to influence Ottawa.24 Despite the severity of Venezuela's situation, its migrants and refugees fall under existing frameworks that measure their experience as economic migrants rather than refugees from a war-torn country. A lack of information combined with limited political incentives reduces the likelihood of a refugee resettlement program for Venezuelans. Instead, Canada concentrates on financial contributions to host countries in the region to sustain ideological narratives and manage the refugee crisis. 54 Canada justifies its financial contributions based on the idea that Venezuelans provide economic growth and opportunities to host countries.25 Significant contributions validate this statement, as many Venezuelans have substantial skills and experience (Arena et al. 2022; Rossiasco and de Narváez 2023). The issue is Canada’s evaluation of Venezuelan’s as economic benefits to justify its policies. It perceives them as contributors to host country economies, but also as potential burdens to social programs in Canada. Canada had no issue welcoming former PDVSA workers to Alberta for its oil industry, but simultaneously limited access to migrants and refugees (Kraul and J. Williams 2005; Milman 2007). “People see Venezuelans as economic migrants in that their lives are not “really” at risk.” (Berti. Interview by author, 2023). “It is like changing beds in the Titanic.” (Berti. Interview by author, 2023). These statements by Berti Olinto, a researcher for the Canada Excellence Research Chair in Migration and Integration at Toronto Metropolitan University, speak to the categorization barriers that limit the support granted to Venezuelan refugees and the ineffectiveness of keeping the refugee crisis in neighbouring countries. It is problematic considering host countries have their own political and socio-economic issues to address in addition to the unprecedented influx of Venezuelans (Cazzetta 2020, 49; Muñoz-Pogossian and Winkler 2023; Rendon and L. Schneider 2018). Despite their notable efforts, they have limited resources and capacity to implement widespread, long-term integration. Canada bolsters its international reputation by assisting host countries, but this serves as a political strategy to preserve the refugee crisis beyond Canadian and U.S. borders. The Venezuelan Community in Canada Despite the prioritization of other destinations due to cultural similarities, Venezuelan migration to Canada increased as the crisis escalated. Originally, similarities in the oil sector 55 resulted in Venezuelan migration to different cities in Alberta during Chávez's presidency (Olinto 2022, 6; Milman 2008). As of 2022, there are approximately 27 320 Venezuelans in Canada, with the majority residing in Ontario, Alberta, and Quebec.26 Venezuelans travelled northward to Canada in light of deteriorating conditions. Roxham Road in Quebec became a national centre for international crises as Venezuelans and others used the border crossing to seek asylum and new opportunities in Canada (Clark, 2023). About 40,000 people entered Canada through unofficial entry points like Roxham Road, which forced provincial and federal governments to re-evaluate their approach to the situation (Consky, 2023; Onishi, 2023). The global became interlinked with the national, forcing Canadian officials to reconsider their policies towards the large-scale refugee crisis spreading across the hemisphere. The next chapter will extend this narrative, considering the influence of international factors. However, it is important to indicate that existing Canadian conceptualizations do not account for the localization of the Venezuelan refugee and migrant crisis within national boundaries. Internal divisions among Venezuelans influence the organization of their community in Canada. Venezuelans in Canada have encountered political divisions rooted in the polarization of their country's politics since the 1990s. Mistrust and ideological differences dictate their relations, primarily based on political alliances.27 Trauma from past experiences also impacts the formation of relationships and community-building for Venezuelans.28 Rather than considering the severity and complexity of these experiences, Canadian programs for Venezuelans already in the country follow the traditional narrative of Latin America. They misconceptualize the uniqueness of the Venezuelan experience and the diversity of people from Latin American countries.29 The different waves of Venezuelan migration to Canada extend internal divisions while increasing the need to develop programs that meet the individual needs of Venezuelan 56 experiences. Despite the situation's complexity, notable community efforts have sought to influence Ottawa's response Venezuelan organizations in Canada tried to provide humanitarian relief through individual efforts and lobbied for increased government attention. A discussion with a community leader of the CVDF demonstrated the individual and collaborative efforts to raise awareness while trying to increase humanitarian relief. The organization developed a transnational project that provided medicine and medical equipment to Venezuela to confront shortages.30 The participant emphasized the support for the project from Venezuelans and other Latin American communities in Canada. Despite the project’s success, the discussion also outlined the challenges encountered while lobbying for increased engagement and immigration pathways. “It is political. Unfortunately, the Latin American community in Canada does not have a strong base for votes. We can’t give something to Canadian politicians.” (Josué. Interview by author, 2023). The size and capacity of the Venezuelan community, combined with the political environment around Ottawa, limits the opportunity to influence policy formation. A discussion with a member of the VCSBC reinforced the challenges faced by Venezuelans trying to present petitions to the Canadian Parliament. “Our organization created a petition to create a humanitarian visa or pathway for Venezuelan refugees similar to other humanitarian crises. We tried to use declarations made by the government regarding receiving more immigrants to gain more support for Venezuelans. Canada could do more for those who want to come here.” (Ivan. Interview by author, 2023). Both community leaders indicated that the Venezuelan situation was not on Ottawa's list of priorities, with notable exceptions made by certain members of Parliament.31 The experiences demonstrate that despite its efforts, the Venezuelan community does not have the capacity or the political weight to influence policy formation in Ottawa (Grenier 2021, 462). On the other hand, 57 former U.S. President Donald Trump campaigned on a strong stance against Maduro, partly to gain the support of the Venezuelan community in states like Florida and Texas. “There is more at stake in the U.S. regarding electoral votes. When Trump came in, he did things his own way, but by then, Maduro had also become more authoritarian. He was trying to look tough on socialism and another country. The Biden administration has a bit more sympathy for the Venezuelan people.” (Timothy. Interview by author, 2024). In sum, the Venezuelan community in Canada made significant humanitarian contributions independent of government initiatives but struggled to influence policy decisions due to a limited political incentive. In light of political complexities, individual Venezuelans and organizations developed their responses to the crisis. The examples mentioned above and a discussion with an individual from CGR demonstrated the adaptability of Venezuelan community members trying to raise awareness while providing humanitarian relief. CGR collaborated with organizations in Venezuela to provide food supplies and language and business training. “I initiated the project for Venezuela in 2016 to help small businesses thrive with resources and training to produce. We also developed the Soup of Love to combat hunger by distributing food once a week at different locations. We do not work with the Canadian government. Our organization is about helping in the most humanitarian way possible without political ties.” (Katiluska. Interview by author, 2023). Individual efforts trumped political narratives as the Venezuelan community in Canada raised awareness and created humanitarian projects through donations. These experiences illustrate the politicization of the crisis, as humanitarian claims cannot influence policy formation without additional incentives. 58 Conclusion Ottawa’s political and humanitarian policies towards the Venezuelan crisis stem from ideological claims rooted in domestic values and an international reputation. Venezuela’s near economic collapse reduced the incentive for Canadian investments, which grants policymakers in Ottawa the liberty to act with limited implications. Human rights abuses and a crumbling democracy offer a material basis for Ottawa to pursue its political objectives. The conceptualization of the Venezuelan experience and Canada’s emphasis on economic migrants impacts the pathways available for Venezuelans. Despite barriers, the Venezuelan community in Canada created distinct initiatives to meet humanitarian needs. Most significantly, Ottawa’s continued disinterest in Latin American affairs produces an ignorance of political, socio-economic, and cultural factors in its policy formation toward the Venezuelan experience. 59 CHAPTER 4 – INTERNATIONAL FORCES This chapter examines the international factors' influencing Ottawa’s response to the Venezuelan crisis. The rationale behind Ottawa’s actions stems from a constructed claim of a multilateral response based on an internationalist agenda, but it principally serves as a pretext to mask U.S. interference due to similar commercial and geopolitical interests. The international elements shaping Ottawa's policies limit the success of existing programs designed to help Venezuelans by prioritizing foreign policy objectives over humanitarian realities. The United States Influence “The U.S. hemispheric policy shapes Canadian foreign policy in accordance with Washington, especially with democracy promotion. It follows the U.S. anti-communist agenda.” (Antulio. Interview by author, 2024). Former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau delivered a potent summary of Canada – U.S. relations, stating, "Living next to you is like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered the beast is, if I can call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.”32 When examining Canada's foreign policy, one must consider how the U.S. factor influences Ottawa’s global actions. Canada-U.S. relations stem from geographical proximity, shared values, common interests, and an entrenched economic interdependence.33 The special relationship directly influences Canadian foreign policy decisions as Ottawa balances national autonomy with economic and military dependence. At the same time, it attempts to project an international image as a mediator or alternative to the U.S. (Gecelovsky and Murray 2019, 531). Canadian actions in Latin America illustrate these colliding elements as Ottawa searches for its distinctive role in a region dominated by U.S. influence (Cros 2012, 727; Cooper 2012, 688; Rochlin 1994, 47). Consequently, unveiling Canadian policies towards Venezuela requires an examination of Washington’s role in Latin America, especially its ideological campaign against the spread of socialism. 60 Historically, the U.S. treated Latin America as its sphere of influence through imperialist strategies and declarations like the Monroe Doctrine. During the Cold War, the U.S. conducted diplomatic, espionage, and military interventions to protect its economic interests and proclaimed national security (Kline and Wade 2022, 84). The U.S. acted as an imperialist power, undermining the interests of Latin American countries, and instead justified its actions under a democratic campaign against communism (Knight 2008, 34). The spread of communism and Soviet influence in Latin America resulted in U.S. support and alliance with dictators and right-wing governments that secured Washington's economic and geostrategic interests (M. Sanchez 2021, 384). The point is that the U.S. has a record of intervening in Latin American affairs to secure its interests, which contradicts Canada's proclaimed commitments to the region. As Ottawa tries to develop alternative strategies to confront regional inequality and development, its economic and military dependence on the U.S. drags its foreign policy towards Washington. Notable exceptions include Canada’s approach to the Cuban Revolution, which Ottawa used to demonstrate its independence from the U.S. and its acceptance of 7,000 Chilean refugees after the U.S.-backed coup of 1973 (Gabriel and Macdonald 2022, 141; Grenier 2023, 229). Despite these exceptions, the alignment of foreign policy between Ottawa and Washington is the principal international factor that requires examination. Canada-U.S. economic relations are fundamental for Ottawa’s foreign policy formation. The U.S. is Canada's largest trading partner, with $3.6 billion worth of goods and services crossing the border each day in 2023.34 Trade with the U.S. represents two-thirds of Canada’s global trade.35 Most recent reports cite an increase in exports to the U.S. of 2.6% and a rise in imports of 1.7% in June 2024.36 In 2022, Canadian foreign direct investment in the U.S. was $589.3 billion.37 These numbers speak to the commercial linkage between both countries that 61 guides Ottawa's domestic policies and global engagement. Due to its economic reliance on the U.S., Canada often aligns its global engagement with Washington, especially in the Americas (Paquin and Beauregard 2013, 620; Stevenson 2000, 8; Zhou 2018, 108). Interdependence also manifested in the security sector, with collaborative security agreements like the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). An overview of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) demonstrates the economic incentive while offering the basis of Canadian engagement with the Americas since the 2000s. NAFTA promotes commercial engagement between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico through trade liberalization and tariff reduction. The agreement also had two effects fundamental to this study. First, it enhanced Canada’s economic interdependence on U.S. markets (Hawes 2009, 596; Payne 2020, 124). Professor Daudelin suggests that NAFTA negotiations leading to the United States Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2019 dominated Canadian foreign policy, highlighting the prioritization of Canada-U.S. economic relations. “For the liberals, the most important thing was reassuring NAFTA; it was the priority, and there was not much time for Venezuela” (Jean. Interview by author, 2024). Secondly, it impacted Canada’s engagement with the Americas by strengthening the neoliberal campaign through the promotion of FTAs (Macdonald 2016, 7). Venezuela and other states who oppose this neoliberal model encounter opposition and isolation from the U.S. Although the agreement focuses on North American politics, both aspects influence Canada’s policies towards the Americas due to its emphasis on free markets. The point is that due to its economic dependence on the U.S. and its own neoliberal agenda, Ottawa has continuously aligned its foreign policy with Washington, emphasizing free markets. Harper's Americas policy demonstrates the basis of a free-market agenda that dominates Canada’s relations with the region. 62 Free market principles become the principal scope for Canada’s relations with the Americas. The conservatives signed FTAs with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and Honduras, with NAFTA’s neoliberal framework at its core (Macdonald 2016, 7). Such agreements and the government's support for mining companies illustrate the economic incentive continued by the Liberal government (Gordon and Webber 2019, 81-82; Macdonald 2016, 9 -10). However, a fundamental factor is an ideological component guiding these policies and Ottawa’s approach toward countries with differing perspectives. Those who oppose the implementation of these economic policies encounter isolation and pressure. Venezuela, under Chávez and Maduro, represents a political challenge to this strategy (Gordon and Webber 2016, 255). By isolating these states and condemning their governments, Washington punishes those who challenge the existing model.38 Washington and Caracas Chávez's rise to power offers a departure point for analyzing U.S.-Venezuela relations due to his government's policies. Chávez's presidency symbolized a transformation of Venezuela's political and economic system previously sustained by the PuntoFijo Pact (Mora et al. 2021, 10-11). In response to the 1980s debt crisis, President Carlos Andrés Pérez implemented neo-liberal style economic adjustment programs strongly opposed by the population, which had a lasting impact on perceptions of neoliberalism and U.S. interference (Mora et al. 2021, 6). In 1992, Chávez attempted to overthrow Pérez's government before being elected Venezuelan president in 1998. By 2002, Chávez directly challenged U.S. regional influence and global dominance. Under George W. Bush, Washington responded by framing Chávez's presidency as threatening U.S. commercial interests and national security. Allegations of U.S. involvement in a 2002 coup d’état against Chávez solidified his claim against U.S. global hegemony and intervention in Latin American affairs (Gill 2020, 425). Despite the polarized 63 situation, the U.S. continued to purchase Venezuelan oil. This demonstrates the strategic rationale behind its stance towards Venezuela. Washington opposed Chávez because he criticized U.S. global influence and interreference in the Americas. The rise of alternative markets and distinctive forms of government in Venezuela challenged the U.S.’s influence on the global system and its economic interests. The U.S. imposes sanctions against countries that challenge the existing structure (Brown 2020; Fattahi and Nafisi-Moghadam 2023). It represents Wallerstein's notion of states mobilizing their power and influence to shape the market's structure (Wallerstein 2004, 27). The U.S.'s commitment to sustain the global capitalist system encountered resistance from Chávez's Venezuela. The Bolivarian Revolution aimed at providing an alternative form of government for countries in the Americas while challenging U.S.-led neoliberal globalization (Gordon and Webber 2016, 251, 259; Hellinger 2011, 47). Chávez also wanted to diversify oil exports and increase Venezuela's global influence by strengthening relations with Russia, Cuba, Iran, and China (Gill 2019, 299-300; Mijares 2017, 213). Washington responded by publicly challenging Chávez, labelling him as a dictator, and supporting opposition leaders (Gill 2019, 309). Economic relations remained as Venezuela became a vital actor in U.S. economic interests, with companies like ExxonMobil and Chevron investing in technology and infrastructure projects in the energy sector.39 Chávez's anti-U.S. rhetoric and restructuring policies that granted the state more authority over Venezuela’s leading industries, increased Washington’s perception of Caracas as a security threat. The concerns, however, reflected a Cold War environment of capitalism versus socialism rather than a material reality. “It was not reducible to just economic terms because oil kept flowing into the U.S. It was more to do with the fact that Venezuela was not falling in line with U.S. global leadership.” (Timothy. Interview by author, 2024). 64 By 2011, 40% of Venezuela's crude oil exports went to the United States, while Venezuela was the fourth largest source of imported oil for the U.S.40 These numbers demonstrate that despite the political opposition between both governments, commercial relations persisted because they allowed both states to sustain their political agenda. Domestically, Chávez undertook a series of social programs to increase access to education, health care, and land distribution for a neglected portion of the population. Global oil prices and increased state control of PDVSA provided the financial backing to implement these programs (Bull and Rosales 2020, 7).41 On the other hand, the U.S. dependency on foreign oil to power its vast consumption meant Washington required crude oil exports from Venezuela (Johnson 2019, 3-4). These political dynamics illustrate the ideological rationale behind Washington's policies toward Venezuela. Sebastian Herbstreuth's work provides the conceptual basis to examine the construction of different perceptions of foreign oil using political ideologies. Herbstreuth suggests that the U.S. conceptualizes foreign oil as a self-versus other, determining its economic relationship with that state (Herbstreuth 2014, 26). Canadian oil receives a positive perception under the self-category because of shared economic interests and ideologies with the U.S. The conceptualization of other countries becomes significant because it dictates the framing of foreign policy toward that country. Chávez's opposition to U.S. global leadership and interference in Latin American affairs framed bilateral relations in terms of national security and U.S. imperialism in a Marxist sense. That is, Washington perceived Chávez as a direct threat to its economic and commercial interests; therefore, securing access to Venezuelan oil became a notion of national security. Canada followed what Herbstreuth refers to as creating discourse and identities to frame a state as the other (Herbstreuth 2014, 31). Canada also framed Chávez as a threat to economic and commercial interests due to his socialist challenge to the existing global 65 system and Petro Canada’s losses in Venezuela under his government (Gordon and Webber 2016, 255). This shows how Canada aligned its foreign policy with the U.S. following a constructed political narrative that justified economic interests with an ideological claim. Canada and the U.S. sustained a global campaign against Chávez's government because he directly opposed the structure of the existing system. Canada supported U.S. opposition towards Chávez due to its shared interests in the country and the global order. Like U.S. companies, Canadian oil companies like Petro Canada were forced to abandon their investments in Venezuela due to Chávez’s restructuring of the country's oil industry.42 Prime Minister Stephen Harper shared Washington’s assessment of Chávez’s Venezuela (Lacroix 2013, 714). Rather than developing an independent stance towards Venezuela, Ottawa supported Washington’s ideological divergence due to shared commercial and geostrategic interests (Gordon and Webber 2016. 251; Lacroix 2013, 714). Venezuela’s extensive oil industry influenced Ottawa’s position as it tried to secure energy sector imports and investment (Burns 2012, 301). Canadian economic and military dependency on the U.S. and the two countries’ convergent interests resulted in a foreign policy alignment towards Venezuela. Democracy Promotion The ideological basis for Canada’s and the U.S. opposition towards Venezuela intensified following Chávez’s death and Maduro’s rise to power. Former Prime Minister Harper offered his condolences, but also outlined his hope for Venezuela to seek a brighter future in line with democratic principles.43 The Prime Minister's statement demonstrates Ottawa's perception that liberal democracy results in prosperity and economic growth. It imposes values and ideas onto other states because it helps secure Canadian and U.S. interests while sustaining the global order. Maduro's government provided the material basis to support Canada's push for liberal democracy 66 through his disregard for Venezuelan democratic institutions, human rights, and civil society.44 However, it is also imperative to note the consequences of Washington and Ottawa’s joint pressure on Venezuela. Both elements demonstrate the mobilization of democracy promotion as a political tool to justify their actions against Maduro and ultimately secure their interests. Canada’s liberal democracy promotion in the Americas represents a political strategy aimed at constructing its relevance in the region while securing its interests and objectives. The rationale behind this strategy is the belief that democracy promotion correlates with domestic and international peace and prosperity (Ladd 2014, 210). Another aspect is the perceived link between democracy/prosperity and neoliberal free-market policies (Burron 2011, 392; Legler 2012, 587). Canada frames these two aspects to reaffirm its role in the region as a promoter and supporter of development through democracy. It also allows Canada to sustain its global reputation and prestige with its allies (Burron 2011, 408). However, underneath this strategy is continuous pressure from Washington and Ottawa’s pursuit of commercial interests. Despite its attempt to differentiate itself, Ottawa’s democracy promotion in the Americas supports the notion of Pax Americana while securing the institutional and economic conditions for trade and corporate interests (Burron 2011, 406-407). The pattern continues in Canada’s response to the Venezuelan crisis. The continuous equation of democracy with development in Venezuela demonstrates the rationale behind existing Canadian policies. The political economy lens illustrates how democracy promotion becomes a political tool to advance free market principles and policies that serve the economic interests of the established global system (Gill 2022, 38). Discussions with experts on Canadian and Venezuelan affairs suggest that the economic narrative does not sufficiently explain Ottawa’s response.45 However, an examination of the link between foreign 67 aid in Latin America and Canadian corporate interests undermines the validity of government actions based on humane rhetoric (Brown 2018, 24; Macdonald 2019, 286). The Liberal government's emphasis on restoring democracy in Venezuela reinforces the belief that widespread implementation of "Canadian" values aligns with Venezuelan interests. It frames the humanitarian crisis as an ideological issue that democratic restoration can resolve. Maduro's actions are inherently problematic and require accountability and action. Nevertheless, it is also problematic for Canada and international actors to declare what is in Venezuela's interests simply because it correlates with their political and economic objectives. The validity of Canadian claims becomes problematic when we analyze Canada’s role in the Lima Group. The Lima Group consisted of a coalition of American governments trying to engineer a democratic transition of power in Venezuela after gridlock within the OAS. It presented itself as an alternative to U.S. President Trump's hardline approach through economic isolation and threatening military intervention.46 Canada’s leading role within the group stems from its proclaimed global reputation as a meditator and multilateral global actor. A critical analysis of Canadian actions illustrates the overarching U.S. influence despite Ottawa’s claims. Rather than an alternative multilateral response, the group represents a continuation of U.S. ideological opposition towards Maduro as many right-wing governments became members.47 “It is not about economics but regime change.” (Jean. Interview by author, 2024). “At the time the decision to support Guaidó seemed a legitimate option as Canada shared the anti-communist ideology with the U.S.” (Antulio. Interview by author, 2024). Ottawa increased global divisions towards the situation by creating an ideological coalition of states seeking to impose a shared set of values onto Venezuela (Engler 2021; Lalla 2020). This is not to discredit the possibility of a multilateral response to the crisis, but rather to emphasize the ideological basis of Ottawa's policies. It is problematic for Ottawa to proclaim an 68 independent response based on a perceived global identity as a mediator, considering its role in supporting Washington’s ideological campaign against Venezuela. Despite its attempt to mask these actions, the encompassing U.S. influence overcame an independent response. A Material Reality “The migration crisis already has 7.8 million Venezuelans in the exterior, and we are on track to reach 8 million. It is the largest displacement crisis in the world. “(Orlando. Interview by author, 2023). Venezuela's economic decline since 2014 and corruption within Maduro's government created the conditions for the refugee crisis. The collapse of global oil prices in 2014 had monumental consequences for Venezuela's export-dependent economy (Congressional Research and Service 2022, 9; Johnson 2018). Oil production plummeted by over 50% from 2016 to 2019 (Briceño-Ruiz 2020, 166; Verrastro and Stanley 2019). Others assert that U.S.-imposed sanctions are the primary source of the country's crumbling economy and classify them as collective punishment (Weisbrot and Sachs 2019). Discussions with Venezuelan academics and community leaders reaffirm the deteriorating conditions in Venezuela beyond the effects of sanctions. “The economy did not fall just because of sanctions. Corruption and lack of investment are also responsible. The sanctions have reduced the countries and the government’s revenue to create social programs.” (Adriana. Interview by author, 2023). “The people are very affected and suffering but not for the sanctions. They have been suffering even before the sanctions; they were leaving the country before the sanctions.” (Ivan. Interview by author, 2023). Recurring blackouts and shortages in electricity augmented the severity of social conditions. Regardless of the factor underlying the situation, the point is that conditions in Venezuela created a material reality that the international community, including Canada, could not ignore.48 Nonetheless, there is also a limit to which Canada and the U.S. may frame themselves as righteous saviours or responders to the humanitarian crisis.49 Canada and the U.S. hold a measure of responsibility for the malnutrition and lack of medical services generated by imposed 69 sanctions (Dagher 2019: Dekany 2020; Weisbrot and Sachs 2019, 18 - 19). As the severity of the refugee crisis generates international attention, governments like Canada’s respond according to long-established foreign-policy priorities and objectives. According to government reports, Canada's international engagement in global migration policy provides an opportunity to advance Canada's international interests and priorities while demonstrating leadership in well-managed migration and refugee protection.50 This declaration demonstrates the notion of Migration Diplomacy as a political strategy to obtain aims or achieve goals related to migration, economic interests, and political objectives (Gerasimos and Tsourapas 2019, 117). Politically, Canada tries to position itself as a leader in migration management and promote norms within specified areas (Atak et al. 2023, 455). Foreign policy serves as a mechanism to mobilize this strategy to reinforce Canada's significance to the global system while entrenching ‘Canadian’ values internationally. Its response to Venezuela reinforces this argument as Ottawa and the international community proclaim Canada's leading role.51 It is not about discrediting Canadian humanitarian contributions but about arguing that political motives trump actions based on humanitarianism. The conditions in Venezuela and host countries provide the material basis for Canada's masking of its strategic policies. The extension of the Venezuelan crisis onto neighbouring countries through the influx of migrants and refugees’ shapes Canada's response (Muñoz-Pogossian and Winkler 2023). While Canada helped organize international conferences to reaffirm the significance of multilateralism and its global identity, countries neighbouring Venezuela confronted the bulk of the refugee crisis. According to the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), 6.54 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees remain in the Latin American and Caribbean regions.52 Consequently, Canada became a leading contributor of 70 financial humanitarian assistance to host countries like Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru to provide immediate aid and resources for socio-economic integration programs. Beyond the traditional support for the International Organization for Migration, Canada provided approximately $60 million in financial assistance to host countries and organizations for capacity building, humanitarian relief, and development efforts.53 The humanitarian argument does not sufficiently explain Ottawa’s actions because it ignores the political interests aligned with Washington's externalization of the border to reduce the flow of migrants. At first glance, these policies seem justifiable due to Venezuelans' immediate needs in these countries, yet a critical reflection of host country capacity compared to Canada’s highlights the issues of these policies. Despite their notable efforts, these countries have their own political, economic, and social issues and lack the resources to confront such an influx of refugees (Camilleri and Hampson 2018, 12-13; Muñoz-Pogossian and Winkler 2023; Rochlin 2023, 335). “There is a hypocrisy in the human rights rhetoric when you compare Canada’s capacity and preparedness to receive migrants and refugees compared to other countries who are enduring the bulk of the refugee crisis.” (Antulio. Interview by author, 2024). “So, the perspective I have is that these countries, specifically Colombia, already have several problems, socioeconomic, political, and also, when they are receiving such a large number of immigrants, even if it's a country, I don't know, like a European country, a country like the United States or Canada, when 2 or 3 million people arrive, it's very complicated to integrate that population in the country.” (Juan Pablo. Interview by author, 2023). Rather than addressing these implications, the international community and Canada continue their financial assistance while framing Venezuelans as valuable assets for these countries' economies (Arena et al., 2022). Responsibility sharing and multilateral cooperation serve as a discourse that reaffirms Canada’s internationalist commitments while masking the political basis for its actions. Canada seems committed to preserving the refugee crisis within the region, but 71 why? The absence of pathways for Venezuelan refugees and migrants trying to enter Canada provides an answer. An International Refugee Crisis “Canada has no plans to initiate special temporary measures for Venezuelans and is not considering any dedicated resettlement efforts. However, existing immigration programs, including family reunification visas and economic programs, remain available for Venezuelans who qualify."54 The quote above comes from IRCC concerning Canadian responses to the Venezuelan refugee crisis after signing the Global Compact for Migration. It is significant because it outlines the categorization frameworks based on Canadian policies toward refugees and their connection to foreign policy. Canada established a global reputation as a leading contributor to refugee resettlement programs and humanitarian assistance (Boyd and Ly 2021, 95). Despite this reputation, Canada’s response to the Venezuelan crisis contrasts starkly with its engagement elsewhere (Smith 2020,14). The international system's lack of accountability and responsibility reduces Canada's obligation to respond to the crisis (Rausis 2023, 4). However, the internationalization of the crisis through irregular migration, especially across the Darien gap, transformed the global into the local as migrants and refugees sought asylum in Canada.55 This condition, combined with the material reality for Venezuelans in transit and host countries, demands a critical examination of how Canadian immigration policies relate to its foreign policy. The link between material factors and ideological notions demonstrates the rationale behind Canadian policies as Ottawa responds to the crisis based on narratives surrounding foreign policy objectives. The extension of the refugee crisis onto Canadian boundaries produced a reality that demanded federal attention. The influx of migrant crossings into Canada through unofficial checkpoints like Roxham Road brought what seemed like a Latin American regional issue to 72 Canadian territory (Smith 2020, 11-12). According to IRCC, 90% of irregular border crossings in Canada occurred at Roxham Road, with 39,000 refugees claiming asylum in Quebec.56 Irregular migration to Canada grew from 2017 – 2020, with Venezuelans and refugees beyond the western hemisphere entering through Roxham Road and parts of Manitoba (Boyd and T.B. Ly 2021, 102-103; Smith 2020, 12).57 As of 2023, approximately 3,000 Venezuelans filed asylum claims to Canada on the grounds of persecution.58 Official claims follow Canada’s emphasis on regular migration, but the rising unofficial entries challenge the country's traditional geographic isolation (Knight 2016; Trebilcock 2019, 834-835). “Now Venezuelans are crossing the border from Mexico into the U.S. and making their way to Canada. There, they are in the process of determining whether they will be accepted in Canada as refugees.” (Orlando. Interview by author, 2023). Although Canada's response focuses on assisting transit and host countries, the increase in unofficial entries forces Ottawa to re-evaluate its approach. Subsequently, a combination of domestic and international dynamics, such as the commodification of refugees and the STCA are further elements in understanding Canada's response to the crisis. Family reunification, private sponsorship, and economic programs are the primary pathways for migrants and refugees to enter Canada (Knight 2016, 18). However, existing pathways demonstrate a prioritization of economic interests in shaping government policies with selective family reunification programs despite increased migration across Latin America.59 To respond to increasing irregular migration in the Americas, IRCC minister Marc Miller stated, "Canada is providing a path for economic opportunities to help address forced displacement as an alternative to forced irregular migration.”60 By linking its response to an economic framework, Ottawa reinforces existing categorization mechanisms that commodify Venezuelans. Although socio-economic integration contributes to refugees' well-being, Canadian pathways do 73 not address the extent of the crisis because they neglect the most vulnerable populations. The family reunification and humanitarian pathway for Venezuelans, Colombians, and Haitians outlines these limitations. Canada did not have a humanitarian pathway for Venezuelans until November 2023. The requirements associated with the program illustrate the limitations of Canada’s contributions. First, the pathway has a cap of 11,000 applicants shared among two other countries with unstable political and socio-economic conditions. Second, only those with family members already residing in Canada are eligible to apply.61 These requirements ignore the different waves of migration that constitute the refugee crisis. Initial migration flows consisted of middle—to upper-class Venezuelans with the documentation, education, and financial resources to enter Canada and the U.S. through official channels.62 The latest flow of refugees, however, represents the most vulnerable members of society who lack the resources to enter officially. Rather than confronting these irregularities, Ottawa continues its emphasis on regional regular migration and economic pathways through temporary migrant worker programs for Mexico, Guatemala, and the Caribbean.63 Opening pathways for selective groups will not reduce irregular migration, considering that those moving through unofficial channels do not have the resources or capacity to seek an alternative route.64 Canada’s hesitancy to open a pathway for Venezuelans until 2023 and the requirements within the existing program highlight the prioritization of economic interests over humanitarian needs. The categorization of Venezuelan migrants and refugees is another factor shaping Canadian policies. The perception of Venezuelans by civil society and government actors plays a fundamental role in the resources and programs available for these migrants and refugees within these countries (Herbert 2021, 22). Declarations like the 1951 Convention on Refugees and the 74 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees serve as a model for states to conceptualize migrants and refugees (Herbert 2021; Reed-Hurtado 2017). Despite these models, states throughout Latin America created national categorization frameworks for the entry and regularization of Venezuelan refugees (Gandini 2022, 457). Government agencies considered point of entry, documentation, education, employment, and criminal record for regularization initiatives. Although policies like Temporary Residency Permits Protection or the Estatuto Temporal de Protección de Migrantes Venezolanos (ETPMV) helped Venezuelans access social services, categorization frameworks also exclude vulnerable populations (Rochlin 2023, 335). Later waves of Venezuelan migration shifted the refugee profile to less educated and more vulnerable populations (Gandini 2022, 461). Since these refugees do not meet the requirements for temporary protection programs, they remain on the margins, increasing their vulnerability. These categorization and differentiation frameworks impact Canadian policy by contributing to its conceptualization of the crisis. Ottawa emphasizes regular migration through collaboration with host and transit countries. These policies link regularization with economic benefits for recipient countries.65 This allows Ottawa to frame its response under a humanitarian rhetoric while masking its political incentive. Canada’s financial contributions to recipient countries follow a positive-sum framework wherein both sides benefit to varying degrees (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019, 122). Recipient countries benefit by gaining funding and collaborative assistance to confront the influx of refugees while receiving international recognition for their efforts. Canada benefits by limiting the crisis to the Global South while sustaining its global reputation of humane internationalism. 75 Collaborative Migration Management “Canada needs to think more strategically; 7 million Venezuelans already left, and they need to prepare more pathways.” (Ivan. Interview by author, 2023). Ottawa's response to the escalated internationalization of the Venezuelan refugee crisis represents a collaborative initiative to curb migration flow northwards. As leading contributors to humanitarian assistance in the Americas, the U.S. and Canada jointly use recipient and host countries as barriers to reduce the number of refugees and migrants entering their national boundaries. Consequently, the United States is once again an international factor influencing Canadian responses based on their border policies and conceptualization of Latino immigrants. The rationale behind this approach stems from domestic policies and economic interests and created perceptions of Venezuelan refugees. It frames the influx of Venezuelans as a security issue that requires a collaborative response extending beyond national boundaries.66Amendments to the STCA demonstrate Washington and Ottawa's attempt to manage and restrict migration flows northward. As the Venezuelan refugee crisis is the most pressing in the hemisphere, an analysis of the STCA illustrates the formation and implementation of responses to the crisis. The STCA’s primary purpose is to manage access to the refugee system in both countries. On March 24, 2023, Canada and the U.S. extended the STCA to include the entire borderland, including waterways.67 These amendments came after increasing asylum claims alongside unofficial points in the Canada-U.S. border.68 It follows joint claims towards responsibility sharing and confronting the rise in migration through regular and safe pathways by reducing unofficial entry (Steiner, 2023). Upon critical reflection, however, one can identify the political motives behind its implementation as Canada shifts responsibility onto the U.S. The agreement also derives from a categorization framework as the government determines what is safe for refugees. By classifying the U.S. as a safe destination for refugees, Canada puts asylum 76 claimants at risk of detention and potential deportation.69 The Biden administration's recent deportation agreement with Maduro increases NGO fears surrounding the effectiveness of the STCA.70 Canada is participating in a U.S.-led campaign to reduce northward migration by confronting irregular entries. This also serves Canadian interests by reducing irregular migration across unofficial points like Roxham Road. Attempts to control migration flows do not stop at the U.S.-Canada border but expand beyond Canadian national boundaries. The Venezuelan crisis reaffirms the imbalance in responsibility-sharing as neighbouring countries receive the bulk of refugees (J. Roth 2021, 264).71 Although Canada has made substantial contributions to support these efforts, the issue is the manipulation of its assistance as a political tool to support mutual interests with the U.S. The concentration of Canada's response on supporting socio-economic integration outlines the use of host countries as a bordering space to restrict the flow of migration northward. Analyzing the Canadian response illustrates the structural dynamics of space governance as states develop different networks and strategies to manage spatial boundaries beyond national territories (Collyer and King 2015, 192-193). It is not to discredit government-funded NGO integration and regulatory efforts; it is about outlining Canada’s use of host countries to deter migration. By campaigning on notions of shared responsibility and capacity building, Canada contributes to global efforts to deter migration flows into the Global North (Atak et al., 2023,468-469). There is also an economic element linked with migration governance through the commercialization and connection of development with migration flows. According to the Canadian Director General for Latin America and Inter-American Relations, “Migrants bring innovation, ambition, entrepreneurship, and skills to contribute to economic growth in their host countries.”72 The categorization of refugees and migrants demonstrates the commercial aspect by 77 framing them as human capital and potential market benefits. The commodification of refugees, combined with their perceived vulnerability, become incentives to persuade states to regularize newcomers. Although Venezuelans do have the education and experience to make meaningful contributions, the different waves of migration and the categorization mechanism in place leave a significant portion of refugees in the margins.73 Canada and the U.S. respond to this imbalance under a development model that suggests capacity building and training will fill the void while promoting development in these countries. Notable scholars like Arturo Escobar have criticized the notions of development imposed onto the Global South (Escobar 1972, 413-414). Despite this criticism, the Global North frames development to govern migration flows. The Global Order “Latin America is not important, but as soon as China and Russia get involved, the U.S. and Canada get nervous.” (José. Interview by author, 2023). A final but overarching factor influencing Ottawa's decision is the escalating rivalry between the U.S., Russia, and China for increased international influence and authority. The evolving nature of the global system is problematic for Canada because of its dependency on the U.S. and the rise of power-oriented global politics. Venezuela’s ideological, military, and commercial ties with Russia and China further polarize the crisis because of its international significance. "At the same time, the situation and U.S. involvement brought international attention to countries like China and Russia who have interests and may want to change the narrative. They come to ‘help’ but to serve their individual interests like cheap oil, and a location to counter the U.S." (Ivan. Interview by author, 2023). Venezuela will not decide the fate of the global order, but the polarized crisis entangles the situation with a power competition that undermines pressing humanitarian necessities. While non-governmental organizations focus on the humanitarian narrative, Ottawa's actions correlate with the U.S. and its campaign to deter growing Chinese influence and Russian advancement. 78 Relations with Russia gave Chávez the ideological, military, and economic means to challenge U.S. global hegemony. During his presidency, Chávez solidified relations with Moscow through commercial and military agreements as part of a grand strategy to diversify Venezuelan partners while reducing U.S. influence (Mijares 2017, 221). Ideological similarities between Moscow and Caracas aligned their foreign-policy objectives, ultimately solidifying their relations (Uzcátegui and Mijares 2020, 184). Venezuela has become a destination for Russian arms sales and military operations as Moscow provides fighter aircraft, transport helicopters, guided bombs, and anti-ship missiles (Boersner and Haluani 2023, 373). In 2006, Caracas granted Russian company Gazprom a permit to explore oil deposits on Venezuelan territory to solidify relations beyond the military sector (Shuya 2019, 25). Maduro entrenched bilateral relations through foreign oil ownership and loans from Rosneft to help curb sanctions and confront deteriorating economic conditions (Boersner and Haluani 2023, 374; Shuya 2019, 25). Considering Russia's close ties with Venezuela, the U.S. response focuses on pressuring Maduro to leave power, and to shift Caracas' political leadership to align with Washington's interests. The intensification of U.S. pressure under the Trump administration demonstrates Venezuela’s and Canada’s role in a macro-global context. The former U.S. president mobilized a hardline approach toward Maduro by extending Venezuela’s economic isolation through imposed sanctions (Congressional Research and Services 2022, 18). Canada followed the U.S. in pressuring Maduro's government through sanctions after allegations of fraudulent elections in 2018 and human rights abuses.74 U.S. and Canadian opposition to Venezuela falls under a global competition between liberal democracy and alternative forms of government. Discussions with experts reaffirm existing evidence suggesting that U.S.-led pressure increases Maduro’s incentive to improve its alliances with Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey.75 Consequently, Venezuela has 79 become a domain for global geopolitical rivalries with existing and rising powers trying to leave their mark. In addition to Russia, China’s rise as a global power spread into geopolitical tensions in Venezuela through their economic diplomacy. China’s presence in Venezuela focuses primarily on investments, infrastructure projects, and loans (Mijares 2017, 222-223). “When you look at China’s relations with Venezuela, it is more pragmatic. Their foreign policy focuses on the economic and financial sectors because it aligns with their global objectives.” (Adriana. Interview by author, 2023). China provided approximately $60 billion between 2007 and 2016 from the Chinese Development Bank and the International Commerce Bank of China (Alamyah and Wiranata 2021, 94). Maduro also concluded special economic agreements and joint development plans with China (Briceño-Ruiz and Molina Medina 2020, 152-153). Venezuelan community leaders indicated their concerns with the internationalization of the crisis as countries like China increase their presence in the country to serve individual interests.76 Bilateral relations allow China to pursue its global search for energy supplies while promoting the internationalization of Chinese firms (Xu 2016, 67). Like Russia, China has become an ally in confronting Venezuela's economic isolation as Caracas purchases medical supplies from Beijing.77 Intentionally or not, China’s presence in Venezuela further polarizes the situation by extending divisions between Washington and Caracas (Soliz de Stange 2021, 128). The point is twofold: U.S.-led attempts to pressure Maduro only solidify Caracas’ relations with U.S. rivals. Secondly, foreign presence in Venezuela influences Ottawa's and Washington's policies towards the crisis. The political economy designates global competition for energy security as a driving force behind the polarized situation. The U.S., Canada, and the European Union support democratic restoration in Venezuela for reintegration into the global economy (Ayuso et al. 2024, 80 141). For those framed as the opposition to the U.S.-led system, Venezuela represents another example of Washington's interference in a state's domestic affairs (Gill and Brown 2020, 5 – 6). Despite growing claims for Canada to diversify its commercial ties and alliances in response to declining U.S. power, its approach towards Venezuela remains in line with that of Washington. A lack of interest and the prioritization of other international issues representative of Canadian society, like the war in Ukraine, explains Ottawa's actions.78 The Venezuelan crisis reaffirms Canada’s continued reliance on the U.S. within its foreign policy in the Americas and global affairs despite challenges to an existing system that Canada helped to create and sustain. Conclusion The international factors guiding Ottawa’s response to the crisis correspond to its internationalist foreign policy campaign based on a perceived global identity. Its commitment to multilateralism and human rights provides the political rhetoric to formulate collaborative democracy promotion policies. Canada worked in tandem with its neighbouring ally to confront the migration crisis collaboratively and beyond its national boundaries. Constructed international perceptions of Venezuelan refugees and Canada’s emphasis on economic migrants influenced this decision. Financial and capacity-building assistance became the basis for Canada's actions to reduce northward migration. The U.S., the common denominator amongst these elements, shaped Ottawa’s humanitarian contributions and political decisions to fit an ideological global competition. Ottawa’s inability to separate its foreign policy from Washington’s undermines humanitarian needs while prioritizing political objectives. The discrepancy between foreign policy commitments and tangible government actions hinders Canada’s global identity by unveiling the political reality masked by the internationalist rhetoric. 81 CHAPTER 5 – POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS The contrast between Canada's internationalist claims under the Liberal government and the political reality behind its response to the Venezuelan crisis questions the validity of existing policies. Using information from semi-structured interviews, this chapter critically examines Canadian political and development policies to provide recommendations more equipped to assist Venezuelan refugees. The project does not intend to determine what is best for the Venezuelan people but to analyze the strengths and drawbacks of existing Canadian approaches following information collected from academic, NGO, government, and community personnel. Domestic Recommendations On December 23, 2023, Salasan Consulting Inc (SCI) published an assessment report on Canada’s response to the Venezuelan Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean Region. The Canadian government hired SCI to independently assess the $59.9 million in programs distributed throughout the region and managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) and IRCC. According to a member of the VTF, the government hired the firm due to concerns over capacity and accountability. “GAC does not have the capacity to analyze projects to this degree involving various sources. It is also about accountability to the Canadian public of having a third-party evaluation.” (Venezuelan Task Force. Interview by author, 2024). Although an outsider may provide an alternative perspective, the government's reluctance to assess its programs questions its interests and engagement in the crisis. SCI’s findings correlate to the recommendations provided by this study. Consequently, the chapter supplements the evaluation taken by SCI with strategic suggestions drawn from community and political stakeholders engaged in Canadian and local development responses to the crisis. It begins with 82 domestic suggestions followed by international recommendations due to the situation's complexity. An Independent Foreign Policy A centralized focus on Canadian engagement with the Venezuelan crisis unveils characteristics associated with Ottawa’s overarching policy towards the Americas. Studies on Canadian foreign policy in the Americas tend to separate Ottawa’s engagement into four periods. The second period, 1968 – 1979 and the third, extending from 1980 – 1988, were the most prominent because of government and civil interest in the region (Stevenson 2000, 112-113). Under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Latin America became a foreign policy priority following his emphasis on realism and pragmatism in Canadian global affairs to confront evolving challenges in international relations (Rochlin 1994, 110; Stevenson 2000, 114 -115). Bilateral diplomacy to diversify Canada’s commercial relations and civil initiatives to address socio-economic conditions dominated Ottawa's policy during these two periods. It is imperative to reflect on Ottawa's behaviour during this period, because it represents an independent foreign policy towards the region that has largely evaporated since the 1980s. To reflect on Canadian approaches towards Venezuela, examining the characteristics and factors influencing Ottawa's decisions during that time is crucial. By identifying the rationale behind Ottawa's shift to an independent policy towards the Americas, the project will form the necessary basis to provide policy recommendations. Former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau developed a foreign policy based on Canadian capabilities and values that emphasized the Americas. Canada experienced domestic and global conditions during this period that influenced Ottawa's policies. Domestically, cultural tensions between Anglophones and Francophones challenged Canada’s sense of a united national identity (Cros 2012, 728). Increased attention to the Americas aligned with the cultural connection 83 between Francophones and the region in light of their shared Latin roots (Demers 2016, 202). Trudeau justified increased engagement with the region accordingly, and promoted the idea that Canada had a sense of hemispheric identity and responsibility it had previously ignored. These elements tied Canadian identity to foreign policy objectives, leading to increased public and civil engagement with situations occurring in the region (Cros 2012, 733; McKercher 2022, 40-41). Identity also prompted a shift in Canadian global engagement as Ottawa reflected on the decline of Canada's influence in the aftermath of the Second World War. It was a matter of determining Canada's new role in a Cold War environment with ideological competition, emerging markets in China, and geopolitical tensions in Latin America (Halloran et al. 2015, 311). Declarations became actions as conflicts escalated in the Americas. Canadian actions in Chile and parts of Central America, like Nicaragua, confirmed the government’s commitment towards a new approach in the region based on Canadian interests and independent objectives. The U.S. neoliberal campaign to solidify its interests while deterring Soviet socialist advancement challenged Ottawa's commitments. Rather than adhering to Washington, Ottawa stood firm in its independent approach by accepting Chilean refugees fleeing Pinochet's dictatorship (Gabriel and Macdonald 2022, 140; McKercher 2022, 44). The decision was significant because of U.S. involvement in overthrowing Salvador Allende. The aftermath of the Nicaraguan Revolution posed a similar challenge as the U.S.-backed Contras waged President Regan’s anti-communist war on supposed national security grounds. Under civil pressure concerned with deteriorating human rights conditions in Nicaragua, Ottawa responded independently and critically to the U.S. militarization of Central America (Gabriel and Macdonald 2022, 141; Stevenson 2000, 140 -141). Ottawa differed from Washington’s approach 84 by identifying socio-economic conditions as the basis for the situation in Central America rather than ideological tensions (Garcia 2006). The question remains about why responses in the 1980s are significant for Canadian approaches towards the Venezuelan crisis. Canadian actions during this period offer a reference point concerning the rationale for Ottawa's independent foreign policy in the Americas. First, the period was the last example of an independent approach adopted despite Washington's influence. Beyond the symbolic gesture of membership into the OAS, from the 1990s and into contemporary affairs, Ottawa aligned its approach towards the Americas with Washington's. Prime Minister Harper’s renewed engagement in the region followed Washington’s ideological rhetoric while trying to implement neoliberal commercial ties and opportunities for Canadian extractive companies (Daudelin and Dawson 2008, 7; Macdonald 2016, 31). Development and assistance measures also correlated with Washington’s use of foreign aid to sustain commercial interests (Gill 2019, 296; Tijerina 2017, 229). The Liberals’ actions towards Venezuela since 2017 through sanctions and the formation of the Lima Group entrench Washington's objectives within Ottawa's policies. The point is that Canada last had an independent foreign policy towards the Americas in the 1980s. Second, the absence of public pressure and government-led initiatives seen in the 1980s illustrates the limitations of formulating alternative Canadian responses to the Venezuelan crisis. To provide policy recommendations better equipped to assist Venezuelans, it is imperative to note that the civil pressure and government-led initiatives during the 1980s do not correspond to contemporary domestic conditions. Under Pierre Trudeau and Joe Clark, Canada’s independent approach towards Central America allowed the government to mobilize a mediating response through multilateral initiatives like the Contadora Group (B.Godefroy 2008, 5 -6). The 85 Liberal government has shown its inability to develop a similar policy towards Venezuela separate from Washington. Absent awareness and widespread interest from civil society limit the pressure imposed on the government to respond. The Venezuelan community in Canada lobbied for an increased response with limited success. Their size, capacity and limited political incentive reduce the success of their efforts. A preoccupied and disinterested government combined with limited public pressure are the two underlying domestic factors that explain Canadian actions in Venezuela. Understanding the elements that shifted Canada's neglect of the Americas is vital to offering recommendations to improve policies designed to assist Venezuelans. Reflect and Learn The first recommendation concerns internal analysis. Before reflecting on its existing initiatives towards the crisis, the Canadian government must determine the rationale behind its engagement in the region. In other words, Canada must identify why and for what purpose it will continue responding to the crisis. Regional and international obligations through declarations provide a basis for engagement. Canada’s response must be clear and direct, whether it follows humanitarian rhetoric or political incentives. Identifying a particular focus following context specific information may also increase Canadian public engagement by rallying behind a single purpose. As SCI's assessment suggests, Canadian responses stretch across various countries, trying to obtain varying results.79 Such initiatives become too ambitious, stretch resources, and undermine the success of existing programs. Instead, Canada must identify specific targets and objectives following a country-based approach that considers the specific context and evolving local conditions. Avoiding the crisis's polarized nature is difficult, but selecting a specific purpose and objective will improve program effectiveness by reducing its focus. Canada’s continued neglect of Latin America undermines the effectiveness of existing policies and relations with the region. Ottawa often feels obliged to engage in inter-American 86 affairs despite its closer ties with European powers and the commonwealth.80 In the early 2000s, shared security concerns with the U.S. shifted Canadian attention away from the Americas, which Harper tried to redirect by combining free-market policies with progressive development models (Shamsie and Grinspun 2014, 174; Thérien and Mace 2013, 155) Harper's attempt to increase the region's importance in Canadian foreign policy speaks to a pattern within Ottawa's policies trying to justify importance and relevance in an area it historically overlooks (Daudelin 2003, 638; McKenna 2018, 19). It is difficult for Canada to justify its engagement based on belonging and connections with the Americas when the region is a distant priority for Ottawa’s foreign policy.81 Canada should focus on finding its relevance in the region rather than continuing to proclaim its importance based on non-existent connections. The Venezuelan crisis offers Canada an opportunity to do so. As the previous chapter demonstrates, Washington’s influence looms over Ottawa's response, complicating Canada’s role. Acknowledging these limitations is fundamental for Ottawa to develop an effective policy towards the crisis. Concerning domestic learning, Canada should work with academics, the Venezuelan community, and NGOs engaged in the crisis. A discussion with an academic conducting similar research outlined the limitations of Canadian assistance for Venezuelan refugees and migrants in Canada based on a generalization strategy. “Government resources apply to Latin America as a whole. Just because the people providing these services in Canada speak the same language as Venezuelans does not mean they understand their experience. Insecurity, instability and the trauma experienced by Venezuelans is not the same across all of Latin America.” (Berti. Interview by author, 2023). Although there are similarities among Latin American countries, there are context-specific differences that Canada must consider. The services generalize Latin American countries while ignoring the contextual conditions that represent their diversity. They also ignore the complexity and individuality behind the Venezuelan experience. This lack of understanding illustrates 87 Canada's need for knowledge mobilization to improve its understanding of the Americas and Venezuela. Another example concerns political divisions among the Venezuelan community abroad that stem from socio-economic factors in Venezuela. “Political divisions among Venezuelans go back longer than the current situation. Divisions come from electoral decisions. Did you vote for Chávez or not?” (Adriana. Interview by author, 2023). “Political and personal divisions from Venezuela extend to Canada.” (Josué. Interview by author, 2023). Government stakeholders must collaborate with Venezuelan community members to understand the complex dynamics that shape the Venezuelan experience and develop more oriented policies. Despite their limited numbers, the Venezuelan community in Canada has the information to help guide Canadian engagement. Due to the politicization of the situation, Canada should engage with NGOs and community organizations without political affiliations. For example, CGR food relief and humanitarian project demonstrates the effectiveness of an independent project without political connections. The project uses donations from Venezuelan community organizations and partnerships with local organizations in Venezuela.82 It follows the recommendations provided by SCI, suggesting that collaboration with local partners and existing platforms increases the effectiveness of Canadian engagement. The point is that the government must learn through interactions with academics, members of the Venezuelan community, and NGOs. Secondly, a humanitarian response with no political ties increases the effectiveness of initiatives (J. Essex 2012, 339 -340; Lucatello and A. Gómez 2022, 12 – 13). An improved understanding of the Venezuelan experience will contribute to a reconceptualization of refugees and migrants. 88 Categorization and Exclusion In May 2019, the UNHCR published an update to their Guidance Note on the Outflow of Venezuelans of March 2018 to call upon the international community to act appropriately to the needs of refugees.83 The guidance note responds to a global phenomenon concerning the categorization of groups of people fleeing conditions that align with international and regional definitions of refugees. The 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration are the points of reference for migration flows in the Americas, which unfortunately become tangled into bureaucratic and political barriers (Reed-Hurtado 2017, 163-164). The Venezuelan exodus questions the validity of these frameworks due to the gap between official policy and practical reality. It demonstrates the constructed discourse around the exodus that frames Venezuelans as persons needing international protection rather than refugees because of the state responsibilities attributed to such declarations (Gandini 2022, 464). Exiting contributions point to conditions that grant Venezuelans the legal basis to receive refugee status recognition and asylum claims (Aliaga Saéz 2021, 69; Freier et al. 2022, 20 - 21; Rochlin 2023, 341-342). However, it is fundamental to reflect on the hierarchical power dynamics that govern these categorizations from the Global North onto the Global South using the Canadian example. Existing Canadian immigration policies follow categorization mechanisms by prioritizing economic migration and selectively choosing which situations compel refugee resettlement programs (Atak et al., 2023, 454-455). Political and social factors influence the latter with limited electoral incentives and social pressure compared to other global emergencies, reducing the resources mobilized for Venezuelans.84 Unfortunately, restricted insight from governmental officials tasked with formulating the basis of these selections limits our understanding of the rationale behind their implementation. However, a combination of information collected from interviews, government publications, and existing literature provides a conceptual explanation. 89 Despite its proclaimed reputation as a welcoming refugee state, Canada's conceptualization of the Venezuelan crisis prioritizes political narratives rather than humanitarian conditions. The only existing pathway for Venezuelans reinforces this argument by selecting the types of refugees and migrants allowed into Canada. The project does not suggest that a Canadian refugee resettlement pathway is a viable solution to the crisis. Instead, the point is to outline the political basis that impacts Canada's reluctance to open such pathways based on existing mechanisms prioritizing certain groups. For example, Canada welcomed Venezuelans into Alberta during Chávez's presidency due to their potential contributions to the oil sector (Olinto 2022, 6). The 2023 family reunification pathway targets Venezuelans of a similar social and economic standing with the financial resources and credentials to integrate quickly and effectively into Canadian society (Hernandez, 2024). Subsequently, the pathway does not address the extent of the situation as it ignores the millions of Venezuelans meeting the international criteria for refugee status. Instead, it selects which Venezuelans to accept and considers host countries as adequate destinations despite the varying capacities these countries' immigration systems have compared to Canada's. The project proposes a shift in the IRCC’s approach to the Venezuelan exodus away from categorization and towards inclusive mechanisms that address the practical reality for refugees. Participants emphasized their gratitude for Canadian contributions but outlined the limitations and necessity of adjusting existing policies. “Canada is one of the countries that has done the most and has gone by their word on what they said they would do, but unfortunately, it is not enough.” (Josué. Interview by author, 2023). A former Venezuelan ambassador to Canada suggested professional and education pathways for Venezuelans trying to escape deteriorating conditions. 90 “Educational and technological engagement to facilitate programs between Canadian and Venezuelan universities for students to develop professionally. This could be an interesting program.” (Orlando. Interview by author, 2023). “A special program with specific characteristics for certain professions like doctors and other professions. Canada needs qualified immigrants, and there are many professionals and students with the necessary skills in Venezuela.” (Orlando. Interview by author, 2023). Such programs would give Canada an economic incentive to accept Venezuelans, considering their experience and credentials. An examination by Smith and Wagner also emphasizes the economic advantages of increasing pathways for refugees and migrants from the Americas (Smith and Wagner 2021, 4 -5). However, they would sustain the commodification of Venezuelans while ignoring the reality of the thousands of refugees forced to flee using irregular routes like the Darien Gap (Human Rights Watch 2023; Roy and Baumgartner 2024). Although an economic pathway incentivizes the government to respond, resettlement programs should not measure humanitarian assistance on future commercial benefits. To achieve its proclaimed commitment to human rights, the liberal government must restructure existing policies and immigration pathways. It requires collaboration with experts in the field and acknowledging that a universal approach to humanitarian aid proves ineffective. Although humanitarian crises share overlapping characteristics, each has a contextual basis that should guide international responses. SCI's assessment supports this statement by outlining the significance of context-specific realities throughout Latin America. The reality is that Venezuelans continue to leave the country due to economic instability, oppression, and Maduro’s consolidation of power (Briceño-Ruiz 2020, 116; Briceño and Lehman 2022, 217; Freier et al. 2022, 22 -24; Muñoz-Pogossian and Winkler 2023). Canadian actions do not reflect this reality by ignoring the primary victims of these conditions. They also preserve the crisis within a region with its own political and socioeconomic vulnerabilities. Without diplomatic relations, the 91 Canadian government must collaborate with NGOs at the forefront of the crisis to align its response with reality. Although Canada already supports active NGOs, the data illustrates insufficient consultation between these organizations and governmental representatives from IRCC and GAC branches.85 Causes and Conditions “De esta manera, cuando las condiciones de vida ya no se pueden sostener en el país de origen la migración como proceso voluntario se torna forzado; que es cuando la salida se transforma en huida y se vuelve obligada, ya que incluso se trata de vida o muerte, de subsistencia o de sucumbir frente a la violación de derechos humanos.” (Aliaga Sáez 2021, 71) "In this way, when living conditions can no longer be sustained in the country of origin, voluntary migration becomes forced; this is when departure turns into flight and becomes obligatory, as it even becomes a matter of life or death, of subsistence or succumbing to human rights violations.” (Translation by author 2024). Developing a foreign policy that better assists Venezuelans requires adjusting Canadian immigration policies to adhere to the drastic conditions faced by refugees. The link between foreign policy and domestic immigration policies is most evident in Canada’s global migration governance aimed at managing the flow of refugees and migrants northward (Smith and Masferrer, 2023, 543). It is also crucial to acknowledge the impact Canadian approaches towards Maduro's Venezuela have on the influx of refugees across the Americas and the Caribbean. A discussion with a Venezuelan community member reaffirmed this claim by suggesting that Canada holds a sense of responsibility towards the flow of refugees in the region because of its pressure on Maduro's government and its hesitancy to offer more pathways for refugees fleeing. “Canada needs to realize they are not as innocent. They need to think more strategically, 7 million Venezuelans already left they need to prepare more pathways.” (Ivan. Interview by author, 2023). Community members, academics, and political figures emphasized the need for extended pathways considering Canada’s immigration capacity compared to neighbouring countries embracing the bulk of refugees. Such a recommendation requires reconfiguring constructed 92 categorization mechanisms that reduce the resources and protection given to Venezuelan refugees. The Canadian government must recognize the limitations of categorization mechanisms that reduce the services available for Venezuelan refugees based on regional and international frameworks. In 2023, the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) initiated a campaign appealing for an equitable framework for responses to global emergencies regardless of the country of origin.86 The campaign questions the governments' contrasting response and unequal distribution of resources to global emergencies in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is significant because it questions the government's conceptualizations of crises, and its response based on a created framework. The reality is that Venezuelans do not receive the type of refugee protection granted to other global emergencies. This is not a mere Canadian issue, as other countries in the Global North also follow qualification mechanisms (Freier 2022; Thomaz 2018, 221). However, Canada’s framework requires examination as it tries to project an international reputation as a leader in migration governance. The CCR campaign captured a structural issue that prioritizes assistance to certain groups. The Venezuelan refugee profile illustrates the intersectionality of characteristics that dictate Canada's migration governance strategies. Venezuelan community members argued that Ottawa's preoccupation with other international crises undermined the resources available for Venezuelan refugees.87 Participants suggested that the Venezuelan refugee did not correspond to Ottawa’s political and economic interests. The Ukrainian experience reaffirms the significance of civil society influencing government policy, considering the size of the Canadian-Ukrainian community (Xhardez and Soennecken 2023, 270). Nevertheless, the role of additional elements such as race and social standing is worth noting. Like other Global North countries, Canada 93 follows a racial categorization mechanism that excludes certain refugees, especially from the Global South (McNevin 2017, 263). As mentioned above, certain members within these groups with the required social standing receive opportunities while excluding others. The distribution of Canadian resources to other global emergencies compared to Venezuela reaffirms this argument. Although causes and conditions vary, the extent of the Venezuelan exodus and the differences in Canada’s responses to Ukraine offers a point of analysis. The issue is not Canada’s support for Ukraine but the embedded hierarchical mechanisms determining who deserves humanitarian protection. Ottawa’s rapid formation of refugee resettlement programs for Ukrainians speaks to the hierarchical nature of its refugee policies. The unequal distribution of resources to humanitarian crises outlines the political, racial, and class elements shaping Ottawa’s policies (Pardy 2023). These categorization mechanisms determine Canada’s response based on a measurement of suffering and refugee characteristics. For Venezuelans, the cause of their suffering gives them refugee status per the Cartagena Declaration, yet they fall under a categorization system that depreciates their experience (Freier 2022, 54; Herbert 2021, 22). The point is that the racial and political elements within Canada's refugee resettlement program reinforce a hierarchical migration governance system that prioritizes the protection of certain groups at the expense of others. Ottawa's emphasis on responsibility sharing towards the Venezuelan crisis sustains this system by categorizing and measuring refugees and migrants. The humanitarian discourse surrounding the crisis sustained by Canada and other states emphasizes a sense of responsibility-sharing while masking the political narrative behind its response (Balyk 2022, 615; Espinoza et al. 2021, 4). In line with Canada’s immigration system, its policy towards the crisis follows an economic discourse indicating Venezuelans offer benefits 94 and economic potential to host countries.88 The rationale stems from a political attempt to preserve the crisis within the region by facilitating integration into host countries. Rather than opening a pathway as per the situation in Ukraine, the Canadian government sells the idea of receiving Venezuelans under an economic argument. If Venezuelans offer such economic benefits, why limit their opportunity to arrive in Canada, a country known for pursuing global talent through immigration? The answer to this question derives from hierarchical classifications and the lack of political incentive within Canadian civil society. International Recommendations Global adjustments pose a greater challenge due to established alliances but are nevertheless necessary. Confronting the political situation requires multilateral collaboration amongst actors with varying ideologies and objectives. Despite these multilateral efforts, the Canadian government must also act independently to reduce the political narratives that undermine the needs of Venezuelans. The following section addresses these dynamics to provide suggestions for international factors influencing Ottawa's policies. It argues that Ottawa must acknowledge its responsibility in polarizing the Venezuelan crisis and determine the right moments to act independently and multilaterally. In both cases, diplomacy offers a point of commencement. Diplomatic Relations “Future DFATD and IRCC program development in support of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, as well as broader approaches to migration in the Americas, should prioritize management structures that bring Canadian project oversight and decision making as close as possible to the countries hosting the assistance.” 89 Hampered diplomatic relations between Ottawa and Caracas limit the success of Canadian policies aimed at assisting Venezuelans. Imposed sanctions and support for the U.S.- 95 led transfer of power to Juan Guaidó dismantled diplomatic relations. Rather than acting independently, Ottawa supported Washington’s ideological campaign against Maduro through imposed sanctions and the formation of the Lima Group. Washington's opposition to Maduro stems from political and economic interests related to ideological differences and access to Venezuelan oil (Bustamante and Paredes 2020, 55). Ottawa’s leading role within the group represents increased foreign policy alignment with Washington under an ideological basis aimed at removing governments in the Americas that oppose the existing global system (Engler 2019). The group gained a reputation as an ideologically driven coalition of states. Corruption and human rights abuses orchestrated by Maduro’s government require international attention. However, it is problematic and hypocritical for Ottawa to proclaim itself as the righteous actor, considering its actions as a U.S. echo chamber in the Lima Group. Consequently, the first international recommendation consists of finding a middle ground to engage with existing political leaders in Caracas or civil organizations. Imposed pressure on Maduro through sanctions and multilateral declarations failed to achieve the U.S.-led push for power shift in Caracas. Instead, the Maduro regime maneuvered around Western pressure by solidifying alliances and trade with China, Russia, Turkey, Cuba, and Iran (Boersner 2019, 551-552; Kleszczyńska 2020, 37-38; Mora et al. 2021, 21-22). Venezuelan community members in Canada and academics expressed concern over Maduro's continuous grip on power despite international pressure. “The sanctions are not enough to pressure Maduro. It’s been years and what have they accomplished?” (Ivan. Interview by author, 2023). “Sanctions have been important in the creation of illegal economies. The government developed alternatives with the transit and exports of informal goods, drugs, and influence in the extractive sector.” (Antulio. Interview by author, 2024). 96 “Maduro’s government is directly involved in the informal economy. The military administers the import and export of goods with control over major ports. Whenever there is an internal issue, the government publishes a file on corruption that signals out a single individual. It Is their way of “dealing” with corruption.” (Antulio. Interview by author, 2024). Some suggested further pressure from Canada, while others outlined their concern over the effects of a polarized environment on humanitarian assistance. Recent events in Caracas also illustrate the barriers to a democratic shift in the country as Maduro strengthens his grip on power.90 Ottawa must recognize the failure of existing interventionist policies and focus on establishing a foundation for diplomatic relations that allows Canadian NGO engagement in the country. This is not to suggest that Ottawa must turn a blind eye to human rights violations, oppression, and corruption within the government in Venezuela. As Canada searches for a means to enhance its engagement and presence in Venezuela, it must also determine ways to hold political leaders accountable for the oppression of Venezuelan society. The lack of centralized authority within organizations like the International Criminal Court limits the mechanisms available for Ottawa (J. Fisher and Sarkany 2019, 208). Some participants recommended increased pressure on Maduro, considering his abuse of power and neglect of Venezuelan democratic institutions.91 However, Canadian individual and collaborative pressure on Maduro undermines the humanitarian reality by strengthening Cold War-like blocs. It also increases Maduro’s incentive to manipulate his regime under an anti-imperialist campaign. The U.S. factor suggests that Canada will continue its pressure on Maduro. Therefore, the project indicates that Ottawa must prioritize its engagement with organizations in Venezuela that are confronting the humanitarian situation. To do so requires restoring a degree of diplomatic relations. Canada's foreign policy record demonstrates the challenges and opportunities to implement this strategy. It cannot justify its absence in Venezuela solely on human rights abuses 97 based on its existing engagement with other countries with similar records (Vucetic 2017, 512 -513). Under Prime Minister Harper's government, Ottawa had no issues sustaining diplomatic relations with Colombia despite its human rights abuses (Anzueto et al. 2022, 256; Gordon and Webber 2018,80; Rochlin 2014, 561). Such actions reinforce the ideological and commercial basis behind Canada's policies in the region, influencing its response to Venezuela. For Canada to stand by its proclaimed global commitments and objectives in Venezuela, it must demonstrate its willingness to engage with political leaders in Caracas. Such actions may pose a challenge to bilateral relations with the U.S., but the Cuban precedent suggests the possibility of an independent approach (Grenier 2021, 463; Lacroix 2013, 712 -713). A Canadian embassy in Venezuela would address Canada's limited understanding of the situation while confronting the root causes of the crisis. It would reinforce the significance of people-to-people contact in confronting a complex situation and validate Canada’s claimed position as an alternative to the U.S. (McKenna 2018, 27). It must be clear and precise towards its objectives to avoid further polarization and ensure it works with groups focused on assisting Venezuelans. “Supporting partners is the primary focus because of the lack of capacity in Venezuela.” (Venezuela Task Force. Interview by author, 2024). If Canada hopes to address the root causes of migration, it must establish a presence in Venezuela. Democratic Elections “One is to have the capacity in the opposition’s organization and support. Another issue has to do with the institutional capacity to pressure Maduro out. The current government has absolute control of the constitution.” (Antulio. Interview by author, 2024). Canada must learn from its past responses to Venezuelan elections to avoid committing the same mistakes. Supporting Juan Guaidó proved ineffective and increased the polarization of the situation. It also created a sense of uncertainty and confusion amongst Venezuelans in Canada 98 who were trying to enter the country. A Venezuelan community leader indicated that the shift of Canadian relations with Venezuelans through Juan Guaidó created an identity crisis for Venezuelans in the country, who were unsure of the proper procedure to validate documents such as passports and visas.92 The Venezuelan ambassador to Canada under Guaidó outlined the challenges of validating Venezuelan credentials due to bureaucratic barriers and conditions in Venezuela.93 These conditions illustrate Canada’s incoherent response to a situation with limited understanding and minimal consideration of potential implications (Shamsie et al. 2014, 190-191; MacDonald and Heidrich 2022, 279). Ottawa’s actions in the Lima Group further polarized the situation while contradicting its attempts to differentiate itself from the U.S. in the Americas. The Venezuelan elections in July 2024 will not undo past actions but will serve as a moment for Ottawa to act per its foreign policy objectives. A shift in political leaders in Caracas supports the Canadian foreign policy objective of democracy promotion with the possibility of improving human rights in Venezuela. It is unclear whether the opposition in Venezuela would improve democratic and human rights conditions. International pressure and corruption within Venezuelan institutions demonstrate the prolonged path towards stability for all people in the country (Bull and Rosales 2020, 8; Mora et al. 2021, 24 -25). Holding Canadian actions accountable for ultimately improving conditions is unfair and inaccurate. Nevertheless, Ottawa is responsible for its response. Some interviews proposed a Canadian mediating role for upcoming elections. However, due to past actions, it is problematic for Canada to fulfill this responsibility, especially if it continues to align its policies with Washington's. As mentioned above, Canada last acted independently in the Americas in the 1980s, with its support of the Contadora peace initiative. 99 Considering its compromised role as a mediator, Ottawa must restructure diplomatic strategies to support the capacity and validity of democratic institutions in Venezuela. It is fundamental for Canadian efforts to avoid imposing our values and ideas onVenezuela. Interviews with community leaders and academics indicated a Venezuelan desire to participate in the country’s restoration. “Venezuelans want the opportunity to return to their country when the situation gets better. They want to be part of the process of restructuring the country.” (Ivan. Interview by author, 2023). Consequently, the project recommends a Canadian approach prioritizing capacity building and support rather than directly implementing what is ‘right’ for Venezuelans. The conditions are present for Canada to play a more effective role, aligning with its proclaimed objective of establishing its relevance in the region. It would require recognizing past errors, demonstrating a willingness to collaborate with different groups and organizations regardless of ideological background, and gradually separating Washington's sphere of influence (McKenna 2018, 27-28). Engaging with experts, communities, and organizations at the forefront is instrumental, considering Canada's limited knowledge as an outsider in the region (Daudelin 2003, 666; McKenna 2018, 26-27). Most importantly, Ottawa must identify the purpose of its actions. Whether to help Venezuelans or create favourable conditions for commercial interests, Ottawa must follow a particular plan rather than acting to please its closest ally or to validate its international image. The economic element stems from the unfortunate reality that a humanitarian incentive is insufficient to formulate Ottawa’s policies in the Americas (Tijerina 2017, 223 – 224). Until Canada identifies the basis of its actions and begins listening to those involved, its policies will prove ineffective in assisting Venezuelans. The project’s recommendation poses various political 100 challenges, yet there are strategies that Ottawa may follow. Collaboration with Canadian and international NGOs to reduce ideological influences provides a foundation for improvement. Humanitarian Needs Over Ideological Divides “External assistance to migrants and refugees is inherently political and therefore host communities must be directly involved and included as direct beneficiaries to mitigate tension within affected communities.”94 The policies designed to pressure Maduro out of power, such as sanctions, only increase ideologically driven global divisions. (Boersner 2020, 551-552; Uzcátegui and Mijares 2020, 183). Canadian Special Economic Measures on Venezuela focus on targeted sanctions on Maduro’s political circle. Nevertheless, it cannot claim innocence as it repeatedly campaigned for further international pressure while collaborating with Washington (Engler 2019). In Venezuela, the sanctions augment socioeconomic conditions that force civil society to migrate. There are various domestic and international elements to attribute sole responsibility to imposed sanctions as the principal cause for Venezuela’s economic collapse (Roy 2022). However, blocking operations and revenues from the leading oil sector had severe socioeconomic implications for the country (Bull and Rosales 2020, 8). Hyperinflation, power, food, and medicine shortages are some of the consequences of Venezuela’s economic decline (Boersner 2019, 545-546). Corruption and illegal activity also increase as unintended consequences of sanctions (Rendon and Price 2019; Uzcátegui and Mijares 2020, 189 - 190). The point is that Canada holds responsibility for the polarization of the crisis. Beyond sanctions, Canada’s collaborative response to the refugee and migrant crisis reinforces U.S. influence while outlining the ideology behind its policies. A discussion with an academic conducting similar research in Brazil reinforced this argument. “When Maduro came to power everyone had an opinion or something to say. Everyone wanted to help in some way. There are divergent perspectives. Each side follows what they think is the 101 truth, but the people do not have a voice. They are pulled to one side or the other.” (José. Interview by author, 2023). "There is little effort on listening to Venezuelans or creating pathways to help the people without making it ideological. It shows the different narratives designed around Venezuela and humanitarianism.” (José. Interview by author, 2023). Canada and the U.S. want to portray themselves as righteous saviours to the conditions created by socialist governments. Assisting traditional allies confronting the bulk of the crisis, like Colombia, also reinforms the ideological blocs. It contributes to larger foreign policy objectives focused on reducing the spread of Chinese and Russian influence in the region (Barrios 2021, 52-53; Boersner and Haluani, 378-379; Bull and Rosales 2020, 10 -11). In 2022, China's foreign direct investment in the region amounted to roughly $12 billion, with $60 billion worth of state loans to Venezuela alone (Roy, 2023). Due to its dependence on the U.S., Canada has become tangled in the U.S. and China's global competition, as seen in its response to Venezuela. To transform these narratives requires an independent Canadian foreign policy towards the Americas not seen since the 1980s. Considering the political and economic implications of formulating such a strategy, the project recommends separating political and humanitarian responses. This suggestion alone entails challenges following the politics shaping Canadian humanitarian assistance, such as electoral and economic considerations. However, based on information collected from interviews, the conditions exist for implementing this strategy. This is not about creating new initiatives or programs but adapting existing ones to prioritize humanitarian needs over ideological objectives. A principal element of this strategy is transforming the discourse around humanitarian and development assistance. The notion of development reinforces the ideological narrative by imposing ideas and values onto Venezuela by Washington's and Ottawa's interests (Audet 2015, 114). This does not discredit the importance of adjusting institutions or 102 organizations to confront reality. The point is that any changes or programs concerned with development require consultation with Venezuelans and those directly involved with responses. Consultations with NGOs offer the basis for implementing this transition in neighbouring countries. Although the federal government provided financial backing for implementing programs and initiatives designed to assist Venezuelans, it has also shown disinterest in the material reality these organizations face. A discussion DPCC, the leading international development organization from the Catholic Church in Canada, demonstrated this challenge. “The entry point to Venezuela is Colombia. It is difficult to determine who is who on the ground in Venezuela. No staff to do research in Venezuela, but we are slowly making our way.” (Anne. Interview by author, 2023). “Before we go into Venezuela we need more reliable information. We need to get a better sense of the area and the situation. There is a lack of information and dedication towards Venezuela. Is somebody going to step up in 2024?” (Anne. Interview by author, 2023). They also indicated that the discourse around development ignores the stories and experiences of the people living through humanitarian conditions. An individual from IDRC reaffirmed this statement as they recommended increasing civil involvement to improve the effectiveness of existing programs and initiatives.95 It is problematic to frame the crisis under a development model that imposes its values and ideas under political rhetoric without consulting the communities and individuals at the forefront. The information is present to improve existing efforts; it is a matter of demonstrating commitment and willingness to act. Host Capacity and Integration. Discussions with NGOs in Colombia outlined the lack of involvement between Canadian government officials administering these programs and their implementing partners. Work by DPCC encountered limited consultation with GAC officials due to constant personnel shifts. “There is little dialogue or communication with people with GAC because of constant transfers within the organization.” (Anne. Interview by author, 2023). 103 Due to limited dialogue, they felt these agencies did not understand the extent of the situation or the contextual dynamics. A discussion with Juan Pablo, a researcher from Fundación Ideas para La Paz (FIP) in Colombia, an organization collaborating with the IDRC, supported this claim. The participant indicated that IDRC projects emphasized specific areas without understanding the capacity and context of implemented cities like Cúcuta and Barranquilla.96 Due to its proximity to Venezuela, Cúcuta is at the centre of the refugee crisis with an unequal balance of capacity compared to refugee numbers. Despite notable domestic efforts and international support to increase capacity, the reality is that many refugees seek employment in informal economies (Bahar et al. 2022, 17). Representatives from Cuso International, ZOARC, and DPCC demonstrated the challenges Venezuelans encounter in host countries due to bureaucratic and political barriers to their regularization. The primary barriers concern the inability to access employment or health services, especially among families.97 Representatives emphasized refugees’ desire to work to establish themselves in society and regain a sense of dignity lost by the situation in Venezuela and their migration process.98 However, bureaucratic delays and regulations limit their ability to achieve this objective. “Immigration laws in host countries need flexibility to cover the realities and necessities of migrants. How can you work without permits? Venezuelans in host countries turn to illegal markets when they do not have the proper documentation to obtain a work permit. It is problematic to expect them to wait for a completed regularization process before they begin working.” (Adriana. Interview by author, 2023). Confusion regarding asylum processes and their rights as refugees also challenges the regularization efforts (Freier 2022, 53; Gandini 2022, 462-463). Both aspects outline two fundamental limits to existing Canadian approaches that future initiatives must acknowledge. The first concerns the confusion and uncertainty amongst Venezuelan refugees regarding 104 integration processes and their rights, which reduces the legal basis for integration (Blouin 2020, 65). Secondly, structural limitations within host countries undermine efforts due to capacity issues (Balyk 2022, 621). Host countries like Colombia are predominantly refugee and migrant-sending countries, not recipients, which corresponds to reduced immigration capacity compared to a country like Canada. "Colombia receiving refugees is not the same as Canada receiving them because of Colombia’s pre-existing vulnerabilities like its record of persecuted people." (Anne. Interview by author, 2023). Combining these elements reduces the number of Venezuelans with documentation to access employment and health services, forcing them to obtain informal employment or continue their migratory pathway to other destinations. Between April and June 2024, the proportion of informal occupations in Colombia was approximately 56%.99 Cúcuta ranked third as the city with the highest percentage of informal employment, with 60.4%.100 These statistics raise questions regarding the basis of socio-economic integration and employment opportunities. First, programs should reflect on what it means to integrate Venezuelan refugees and migrants into the economy. What does integration consist of in cities and a country with such a high level of informal employment? “We are a country that has. I don’t remember the exact number, but I think it is a 48% of employment in the informal sector. Right? About 50% of people have multidimensional poverty. If you go to rural areas, these numbers are much higher. So, when we talk about integration, about people from other countries coming to these communities, in this case Venezuelans. What do we mean? Integration so they live in the same conditions as the local people. To live with the same levels of inequality, marginalization, or for them to live better than the local Colombian population? This creates this idea and tension that organizations only come to help Venezuelans and not the local community.” (Juan Pablo. Interview by author, 2023). It is also worth noting the benefits of informal employment. As Juan Pablo suggests, the informal economy benefits employers and refugees. 105 “The most efficient labour relationship, economically speaking, between an employer and a migrant is in the informal sector. An employer does not have to pay for everything it is required to pay; They will receive someone who will most likely work efficiently as that person requires a means to make a living. The migrant receives a way to make a living without providing documentation and answering any questions.” (Juan Pablo. Interview by author, 2023). These are merely some contextual elements that existing and future programs must consider, especially those designed to target socio-economic integration. Canada should continue prioritizing collaboration with local governments and NGOs because they understand the local conditions. Consequently, Ottawa should continue humanitarian relief efforts but prioritize regulatory initiatives based on the needs of Venezuelans and realities in host countries. Contributing to regulatory efforts aligns with Canadian strategies and objectives. Ottawa's reluctance to open refugee resettlement programs for Venezuelans correlates to this project's recommendation of prioritizing capacity-building initiatives in host and transit countries. "These policies that Canada and other countries in the Global North take in that they have all these expectations for countries like Colombia regarding Venezuelan. With south-to-south migration has a lot to do with an experiment. It has to do with them measuring how much capacity Colombia has, when, or how much they can endure. “Let’s see what happens.” I think you need more than just money for a successful policy." (Juan Pablo. Interview by author, 2023). Existing programs should continue to support regulatory efforts but must also recognize the gap within integration efforts due to host country capacities, requirements, and bureaucratic barriers. Formulating programs that provide the legal basis for refugees to access labour rights, health services, and social services is fundamental. “A 6-month project is not a solution to change people’s lives. You need to improve sustainability. How can we invest the money to set up a business? It is about establishing a foundation for their success.” (Matilda. Interview by author, 2023). Programs like the federally funded Sustainable Opportunities for Employment in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru offer a point of reference for employment opportunities through collaboration 106 with private and public actors. After addressing initial humanitarian needs, the project shifted its focus towards training and business development for Venezuelans to integrate into host communities.101 Without a refugee resettlement program, Canada should focus on capacity building and adjusting programs to reflect the reality of existing initiatives. These contributions stem from Canada's experience in refugee crises and its attempt to establish itself as a leader in global migration governance. Collaboration with NGOs Working with NGOs and community members involved in crisis response offers the necessary information to shift the focus onto a humanitarian reality. Notably, most Canadian humanitarian contributions focus on financial assistance to NGOs and international organizations. The point is not to discredit these efforts, considering the importance of initiatives implemented by Cuso International, DPCC, and the CFGB. These organizations developed programs and initiatives that provide immediate humanitarian assistance for Venezuelan refugees and migrants. Through program extensions and collaboration with implementing partners in countries like Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, they have shifted towards long-term socioeconomic integration programs to confront the evolving reality of Venezuelans and Colombian returnees. Despite these efforts, political discourse and bureaucratic barriers limit the extent of their programs. Subsequently, the projects propose increased flexibility within the regulations imposed by the federal government. Regulations and requirements are necessary, but more flexibility will assist in advancing and transforming existing programs and initiatives. “Look for new concepts and openness. Canadian programs focus on particular concepts but there are others that are also important.” (Josué. Interview by author, 2023). 107 Following the Liberal government's internationalist foreign policy, federal funding requires focusing on particular concepts within the crisis. The emphasis on a feminist foreign policy, for example, reduces the scope of the project within a particular group. Addressing the varying conditions experienced by women and other vulnerable groups is fundamental. Generalizing their experience as a refugee does not account for the differentiated impact on women and girls.102 However, politicizing this focus to project a foreign policy objective does not prioritize humanitarian realities. A meeting with a representative involved in a project with these concepts emphasized the importance of flexibility and adaptability. The representative indicated that although these initiatives are vital, one must act cautiously when working with sensitive topics and thinking about often neglected groups.103 Targeting specific groups also neglects family members who do not meet the requirements to access these programs. A discussion with FIP also outlined the limitations of following a particular idea based on local and state capacities. The issue is not the concept or idea but the region's capacity to implement these programs.104 In this sense, capacity refers to institutional frameworks to regularize refugees, credential validation, and commercial systems to offer economic opportunity for refugees and local populations. In Colombia, for example, local populations and refugees migrate to urban centres for opportunities. Projects in areas with local pre-existing vulnerabilities and limited capacities increases the incentive for xenophobia by concentrating attention and resources on refugees (J.Bellino and Ortiz-Guerrero 2023, 13-14: Freier and Parent 2019, 59-60; Gonzalez Balyk 2022, 621). “We tried to stress the importance of including host communities in the project to avoid creating conflict with refugees.” (Anne. Interview by author, 2023). “Our projects try to provide services to host community members to address the rise of xenophobia due to job competition. We discuss migration following the Canadian narrative in a 108 positive way that speaks to their contribution to economic growth.” (Venezuelan Task Force. Interview by author, 2024). The point is that initiatives must recognize the capacity of implementing partners due to local conditions and the varying security elements associated with spatial boundaries. Conditions and experiences vary depending on spatial characteristics (Rochlin 2023, 350). Concepts and ideas must reflect the project's location based on its transit or host city characteristics. Visibility through local communities and organizations should be the focal point for humanitarian efforts, considering they understand the basis of these conditions.105 Implementing partners and civil organizations also provide information concerning cultural elements. Canadian programs like the Empowerment and Accountability for Venezuelan and Host Community Girls and Women represent Ottawa’s focus on women's rights during the crisis. It follows the Liberal's emphasis on a Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) that focuses on women’s empowerment, addressing violence against women and girls, and gender equality. Implementing these concepts becomes problematic as Canada extends its ideas and values to host communities with existing cultural practices (Rao and Tiessen 2020, 351 – 352; Tiessen et al. 2020, 344 - 345). Due to the sensitivity of discussing such concepts, a VTF representative outlined the challenges of implementing gender-based programs in Peru.106 Some of the focal points of Canadian aid, such as sexual reproductive education, are concepts discussed privately in local communities due to traditional practices. It is also worth noting the link between religion and conservative political views in some of the communities, especially in Colombia. To promote general equality for refugees and local populations, community-led initiatives in a gradual time frame should be the liberal government's focus. The concepts are necessary but addressing them requires acknowledging the cultural elements through collaborations with local personnel. 109 Information is available on how to incorporate these initiatives in host communities. Although the government has played an active role in technical assistance, it can do more to improve the reach and success of its projects. Discussions with Canadian organizations and international NGOs all mentioned the lack of awareness regarding the information available to advance existing programs. A representative from ZOARC argued that an analysis of collected information is necessary to adjust existing and future programs to the needs of Venezuelan refugees and migrants. “The team is full of information regarding purchasing trends. What do Venezuelans spend their money on? What are their spending habits? But in terms of time and resources, we do not have the time or budget to publish material.” (Matilda. Interview by author, 2023). Oversight from Ottawa cannot encapsulate conditions in local communities; therefore, it is imperative to collaborate with local governments and civil organizations directly involved. Hearing what the target population requires is more effective than any targeted program designed to align with a foreign policy objective. NGOs and community members have access to this information; it is up to the federal government to sit down and listen. This strategy aligns with the federal government’s emphasis on data to measure programs’ success. However, it should exercise caution because it is problematic to quantify the experience of a refugee to a numerical value. Statistics should be suppletory to information collected from personnel at the forefront. Recommendations This section offers point form recommendations for the political and humanitarian responses developed and supported by the Liberal government. The suggestions stem from information collected from interviews and literature on Canadian foreign policy in the Americas. The findings suggest expanding existing programs to focus on humanitarian realities over ideological rhetoric through collaborations with active non-governmental organizations. 110 1. Identify a clear objective – Why are you getting involved? Existing approaches are too ambitious and politically driven. Reducing the focus and following a context-specific approach will advance existing initiatives and programs. 2. Reflect and learn from existing policies and approaches. Despite Canadian contributions, the crisis persists. The government must acknowledge the consequences of past actions to improve future involvement. 3. Work with and listen to NGOs and community organizations at the forefront of the crisis. The information is present to help Canadians adjust their approaches to better assist Venezuelans. 4. Shift the discourse towards the crisis and existing responses away from a "development" model. The discourse around development undermines the interests and needs of those directly affected by the crisis. Rather than imposing your values and ideas, listen to those directly involved and affected by the situation. 5. Formulate immigration policies on humanitarian needs rather than categorization mechanism. Categorization frameworks exclude many Venezuelan refugees that do not meet the political and economic incentive for regularization in the Global North. 6. Support host country regularization capacity while forming alternative pathways. Ensure immigration initiatives represent the reality for vulnerable groups left in the margins. 7. Acknowledge the limitations of political pressure against Maduro to formulate alternatives that address the unintended consequences of sanctions. Canada’s role in the Lima Group and its extension of international support for Guaidó increased the ideological divisions around the situation in Venezuela. It undermines humanitarian needs 111 by polarizing the situation following ideological competition and geopolitical and commercial considerations. 8. Play an active but independent role to support Venezuelans future elections. Rather than echoing the U.S., Canada should be open to alternative forms of democracy. It should support the restructuring of Venezuela’s democracy in accordance with its people’s interests without imposing its values and ideas. 112 CHAPTER 6 – CLOSING REMARKS The lack of attention given to Canada’s response to the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis inspired the formation of this project. Venezuela’s crumbled economy and political turmoil generated a refugee crisis of approximately 7.7 million people. Close to 2.5 million remain in Colombia, where local governments notably mobilized the resources available to meet the needs of refugees (Rochlin 2023, 235). Colombia's response received global recognition and academic attention for its adaptive immigration policies and regularization efforts. However, Canada's financial assistance to international organizations in Colombia and neighboring countries remained unexamined. Seeing the limited media and academic attention from a Canadian perspective on the unfolding situation in Venezuela and neighboring countries like Colombia was striking. Canada was not ignoring the crisis as it publicly denounced Nicolás Maduro and provided $180 million of humanitarian assistance. The issue was that most existing research prioritized the limitations of regional responses like Colombia's without reflecting on the motives or effects of international involvement. The basis behind Canada's leadership in mobilizing global responses did not receive attention. Following the 2018 Venezuelan elections, Ottawa centered its foreign policy towards Caracas on upholding liberal democracy and protecting human rights. The Americas are often minimal in Canadian foreign policy analysis, yet Ottawa mobilized significant resources to respond to Venezuela. Canada’s perceived global identity as a human rights and refugee protector aligned with Ottawa's proclaimed return of an internationalist foreign policy. The escalation of the crisis enhanced Canadian engagement through financial support to host countries, the formation of the Lima Group to remove Maduro, and economic isolation with imposed sanctions. Emerging studies referred to Canada’s foreign policy record with human rights and 113 democracy as justification for Ottawa’s policies (Grenier 2021). The absence of a critical analysis beyond these factors resulted in the formation of this research project. This led to the following research question: What are the domestic and international factors influencing Canada's response to the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis? I developed a national and international investigation due to the complexity of understanding Canadian foreign policy formation. Identifying the primary factors influencing Ottawa's decisions offered the necessary information to critically reflect on Canada's role in global engagement with the crisis. After a preliminary investigation, the link between humanitarian assistance and foreign policy became more evident. The study argues that Canada's response to the crisis prioritizes political alliances and economic interests with the United States over humanitarian realities for Venezuelans. Secondly, it argues that the Venezuelan community in Canada lacked the capacity to influence policy formation. Ottawa’s policies reinforce hierarchies in humanitarian assistance and constrain the refugee crisis in neighboring countries. Canada's actions such as its role in the Lima Group polarized responses to the crisis by augmenting ideological divisions between capitalism and socialism. This final chapter briefly summarizes the project's methodology and the formation of the arguments above. It highlights the primary factors influencing Canadian policies, such as the Venezuelan community in Canada and its dependence on the United States. It also outlines the project's contribution to gaps in existing literature. Finally, it concludes with an overview of the study's limitations and suggestions for future research. Summary of Findings The findings rely principally on qualitative data from semi-structured interviews with 18 participants from Canada, Venezuela, the United States, and Colombia. Participants include the team leader from the development sector at the VTF in GAC and a representative from the 114 IDRC. Representatives from NGOs working on the regularization of Venezuelan refugees, like Cuso International and DPCC were also interviewed. Experts on the Venezuelan situation and inter-American affairs, like Professor Adriana Boersner, Antulio Rosales, and Jean Daudelin, provided an academic lens. Leading members of the Venezuelan community in Canada shared their experience advocating for increased attention in Ottawa. The discussions had two objectives. First, to determine the basis behind Ottawa's actions. Secondly, to provide recommendations to improve Canada's response. Discussions with Venezuelan community members in Canada illustrated Ottawa's limited interest in formulating a coherent response to the crisis. Venezuelan organizations and community members lobbied for increased federal engagement. The study found that the Venezuelan community lacked the size and capacity to influence policy formation. Instead, they relied on independent humanitarian contributions and programs using established connections in Venezuela. Without internal pressure or a significant electoral incentive from the Venezuelan community, the question remained as to why Ottawa mobilized such an extensive response. A reflection on larger economic incentives concerning the U.S. and the existing neoliberal global structure offered a fuller explanation. The findings suggest that Canada's economic ties with the United States was a primary factor. Canada's trade and investment dependence on U.S. markets is a dominant foreign policy consideration illustrated in Ottawa's policy towards Caracas. Ottawa selected to align its opposition towards Caracas with Washington's despite limited interests in Venezuela. The near collapse of the Venezuelan economy reduced Canada's business interests. Reduced economic activity between Canada and Venezuela allowed policymakers in Ottawa to oppose Maduro's government. It allowed Ottawa to support its closest ally while contributing to a potential shift in 115 Caracas towards a government favorable to the existing global structure. Canada's response thus represents economic considerations with a related ideological foundation. Venezuela's economic recovery serves Canadian and U.S. interests, but only if they can secure access to its markets. Ultimately, Canada's collaborative pressure on Venezuela reaffirms its shared ideological and economic interests with the U.S. National values and identity served as a pretext to mask these incentives. Ottawa mobilized a response using values associated with a manufactured Canadian identity such as human rights and liberal democratic principles. Such values are pillars of foreign policy formation, especially as Canada has tried to find its relevance in inter-American affairs. Human rights abuses and the refugee crisis provided a material reality for Canadian engagement. However, the study found that protecting human rights and supporting liberal democracy functioned as a pretext to mask a polarized response. Ottawa's commitment to containing the refugee crisis in host countries and its reluctance to create immigration pathways for Venezuelan refugees reduced the validity of a humanitarian argument. The lack of coordination between officials in Ottawa and partner organizations in host countries also outlined a limited understanding of the humanitarian reality. Promoting liberal democracy offered Ottawa a means to hide the basis of its actions. Canada portrayed itself as a leading advocate for democratic principles by forming the Lima Group. Its formation was a collaborative attempt between Ottawa and Washington to shift Venezuela's leadership towards a government supportive of U.S. capitalism. What was portrayed as a righteous response increased the polarization of global actions towards the crisis. The escalation of the Venezuelan exodus increased policy alignment between Ottawa and Washington. Amendments to the STCA served Canada and the U.S. interest in curving migration 116 northward. The findings suggest that Canada's emphasis on economic immigration combined with racialized conceptualizations of Venezuelan refugees influenced policy formation. A proclaimed return to a liberal internationalist foreign policy with increased global engagement tried to hide the basis of migration governance. Ottawa's inability to separate its policies from Washington limited the resources available for Venezuelans and increased the polarized environment around the crisis. The presence of other global actors also dictated Canadian actions. Tensions between the U.S., Russia, China, and Canada's positions within the global system were other significant factors. Venezuela's economic isolation strengthened ties between Caracas, Moscow, and Beijing. U.S. opposition towards Venezuela led to Cold War-like ideological blocs. Unfortunately for the Venezuelan people, the crisis became entangled in global power competition. Humanitarian realities and Venezuelan voices heard through elections and protests became secondary under a polarized crisis. Like the U.S., Canada tries to preserve the existing order and reduce the spread of socialism in the Americas. For Maduro and its allies, it is about challenging the global order and Washington's interference with alternative forms of government. Such an environment undermines Canada's independent role in the Americas and its capacity to mediate as it did between the 1950s and 1980s. Contributions to the Literature The project contributes to Canadian foreign policy analysis beyond the state-centred approach. A constructivist framework steps away from the state-centered analysis of foreign policy by examining the extent to which constructed values influence policy formation. Values like human rights and liberal democracy influence Canadian identity and policy formation abroad. Notable contributions studied the relationship between Canada's global identity and 117 foreign policy, especially in the context of the middle power discourse (Chanick 2017; Cooper 2012). These studies focused on the state's capacity to examine foreign policy without reflecting on the role of values to justify global engagement. The study filled the gap using the Venezuelan example to investigate the use of human rights and liberal democracy as justification for Canadian engagement. The finding made a critical contribution to investigate the mobilization of these values as a political pretext to mask larger foreign policy objectives. The Venezuelan experience contributed to the discourse on Canadian foreign policy in the Americas. Canadian foreign policy analysis primarily focuses on transatlantic ties with European powers, Canada-U.S. relations, and the Indo-Pacific. The project examines Canada's involvement in the overlooked region of the Americas. Existing studies on the region tend to fall under the political economy discourse or a realist perspective that questions the region's importance for Canadian interests. The study fills the void left by these approaches by supplementing a constructivist framework with the political economy perspective. It examines domestic and international factors to determine the primary forces influencing Canadian policies towards Venezuela. Doing so will provide a more profound understanding of Canada's regional role and objectives. Uncovering the factors guiding Ottawa's actions provides insightful information to develop future policy recommendations. The study analyzed the effectiveness of existing policies based on Canada's objectives of defending human rights and upholding liberal democracy. The findings suggest that a polarized response limits the resources available to Venezuelans while increasing the ideological divisions undermining humanitarian realities for Venezuelans. The objective was to identify limitations within Canada's response to provide recommendations that are more reflective of Venezuelan needs. Recent events following the Venezuelan elections in July 2024 demonstrate the 118 significance of reflecting on the success of existing policies. Allegations against fraudulent elections and human rights abuses against civil society directly threaten Canada's proclaimed commitments in Venezuela. Thus, the project provides a foundation for future policymaking in adjusting Canadian policies to reflect the reality of an ongoing situation. The final contribution concerns migration studies. Canada's immigration system and reputation as a refugee resettlement state receive substantial academic investigation. Studies that examine refugee resettlement programs identify the challenges to integration. The study makes a different contribution by trying to uncover why the Canadian government did not consider creating a refugee resettlement program for a portion of the 7.7 million Venezuelan refugees. In doing so, it outlined the significance of economic considerations and racialized perceptions of Venezuelan refugees. Existing pathways for Venezuelan refugees and migrants will receive future attention following the aftermath of the elections in July 2024. The project's examination of global migration governance offers a foundation to investigate the rationale behind responses to the Venezuelan exodus. It offered an interdisciplinary investigation of the connection between foreign and immigration policies. Limitations and Future Directions The study encountered a series of limitations that should be recognized. The principal limitation concerns the period when the investigation took place. Canada was most actively engaged in the crisis in 2019 when it supported Juan Guaidó, created the Lima Group, and closed its embassy in Venezuela. The project would have benefitted from the experience and insight of government officials in Ottawa formulating Canada's response during this period. However, I conducted all interviews in late 2023 and early 2024. By then, Canadian government officials directly involved in policy formation had moved to other files within GAC. Consequently, the 119 study did not represent the perspectives of those involved during the height of Canadian engagement. Rather, it consists of the perspectives of government members tasked with post-pandemic aid and integration policies for refugees in host countries. Challenges with recruitment were another study limitation. Despite contacting various actors and experts through email, the research experienced limitations with recruitment. It was my first time organizing a research project of this scale. Consequently, I did not have pre-existing contacts to begin recruitment. I relied on initial contact emails to share information about the investigation and recruit participants. The findings would benefit from insight from Canadian diplomatic personnel in Venezuela leading up to the crisis, like Ben Rowswell, who ran the Canadian embassy from 2014 – 2017. Recruiting high-profile actors was difficult. A snow sampling technique helped mitigate the limited number of contacts, as many participants recommended interviewing other experts. Although the project included diverse perspectives, it acknowledges the limitations associated with recruiting high-ranking experts. Canada's response stretches across various countries, making reaching a consensus on its success challenging. The project mitigated against this challenge by narrowing the scope of the investigation to Canada's response in Colombia. Due to the scale of Venezuelan migration in Colombia, a centralized investigation raised other limitations. Canadian financial assistance in the country expands onto government offices, local organizations, and international organizations. Measuring the exact distribution of these resources across different organizations was difficult without access to government resources. Thankfully, I was able to interview NGO representative who provided insight into the implementation of programs to assist Venezuelan refugees with Canadian government funding. Discussions with Cuso International and DPCC 120 offered insight into the implementation and success of these programs. A final limitation leading to future research concerns Venezuela's evolving situation following the elections in July 2024. Canada's ongoing responses to the crisis will encounter new challenges after Maduro's proclaimed victory. Venezuela regained international attention following allegations of fraudulent elections and Maduro's unwillingness to provide a breakdown of the results. Security forces confronted protests, leading to international concerns over human rights violations. The latest statement by Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mélanie Joy, outlined Canada's continued support for the Venezuelan people and the peaceful restoration of democracy. Will Canada continue to isolate Maduro and recognize the opposition leader as the legitimate winner? Will Ottawa restore diplomatic relations with Caracas? Although the completed project cannot answer these questions, it provided a foundation for future studies by identifying how and why Canada responded to the crisis. Most importantly, it demonstrated that the situation in Venezuela is an ongoing issue that requires continued investigation. Future studies may investigate the transformation of Canadian policies in contemporary Venezuela. The current situation offers an opportunity to examine whether Canada learns from its previous actions to develop new policies or if it will continue its approach. In particular, they can analyze the actions of the Venezuelan community in Canada, which recently organized rallies in Victoria, Vancouver, and Ottawa to raise awareness. A new project may look closer at the impact of the Venezuelan community on foreign policy formation. Despite their limited capacity, the community is committed to restoring democracy in Venezuela. Without a diplomatic presence in Venezuela, Ottawa may benefit from greater consultation with community members with pre-existing contacts in Venezuela. 121 As discussed in the last chapter, there is room for improvement in Canadian policies designed to assist Venezuelan refugees. Recent events in Venezuela following the election suggest deeper global isolation with further implications for a weakened economy. Frustration and uncertainty over the country’s future under Maduro may result in another wave of migration. Public perception of Venezuelan migration and rising xenophobia may increase border security in the region for countries like Brazil, Chile, and Peru. Colombia may exhaust its remaining resources as its proximity makes it the primary destination for Venezuelans. Having already endured the bulk of the Venezuelan exodus, these countries may call upon the international community for greater support. Canada must decide whether to develop a response in accordance with this reality or continue allowing its subordination to the U.S. to guide its policies in the Americas. Canada has the capacity to develop an independent response that reduces pressure on these countries through alternative immigration pathways for Venezuelans. 122 Notes 1 Venezuela Says Inflation Rose to 180.9% in 2015. New York: Dow Jones & Company Inc, 2016. https://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuela-says-inflation-rose-to-180-9-in-2015-1455816904 2 Gott, R. In the Shadow of the Liberator: Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution. London: Verso, 2011. 3 Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V). Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan 2024 https://www.r4v.info/en/rmrp2024update 4 Migración. República de Panama Gobierno Nacional. Tránsito irregular de extranjeros por la frontera con Colombia por region según orde de imperotancia: Año 2023. Cuadro No.001. https://www.datosabiertos.gob.pa/dataset/migracion-irregulares-en-transito-por-darien-por-pais-2023 5 “Safe Third Country | Canadian Council for Refugees.” Accessed September 2, 2024. https://ccrweb.ca/en/safe-third-country. 6 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. “Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel.” Backgrounders, March 17, 2022. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2022/03/canada-ukraine-authorization-for-emergency-travel.html. 7 Rapier, Robert. “How Venezuela Ruined Its Oil Industry.” Forbes. Accessed September 4, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2017/05/07/how-venezuela-ruined-its-oil-industry/. 8 News, C.B.C. "Venezuela Protests Harper Statement on Chavez as 'Insensitive.'" March 7, 2013. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/venezuela-protests-harper-statement-on-chavez-as-insensitive-1.1353466. 9 Canada. Parliament. Economics, Resources, and International Affairs Division. Report on Trade and Investment: Canada – Venezuela. Edited by Marie Dumont. NO. 2018-638-E. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 United States Trade Representative. “Canada.” Accessed May 12, 2024. https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/canada. 13 Canada, Global Affairs. 2017. “Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s Foreign Policy Priorities.” Gcnws, June 6, 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/globalaffairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html 14 S.S.C. Rep. Issue 136, at 5 -6 (2017) (Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade) 15 Canada, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Report on The Deepening Crisis in Venezuela: Canadian and Regional Stakes 2018. https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/AEFA/reports/2018_03_19_GovResponse(Venezuela)_e.pdf 16 Ibid. 17 Human Rights Watch. “Venezuela: Events of 2022.” In Share This via Facebook, 2023. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/venezuela. 18 Canada, Global Affairs. "Canada's Response to the Venezuela Crisis." G.A.C., May 29, 2017. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/venezuela.aspx?lang=eng. 19 Jean. Interview by author. January 16, 2024. 20 Ibid. 21 Anne. Interview by author. October 31, 2023. 22 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. “Statement from Minister Miller on Canada’s Commitment to Support Migrants in the Americas.” Statements, October 10, 2023. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2023/10/statement-from-minister-miller-on-canadas-commitment-to-support-migrants-in-the-americas.html 23 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Text of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Resolution 2198 (XXI) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly (December 2010), https://www.unhcr.org/media/convention-and-protocol-relating-status-refugees 24 Yvon. Interview by author. August 21, 2023. 25 Jason Tolland, Director General Latin American and Inter-America Relations, “Introduction address,” March 16, 2023, International Conference in Solidarity with Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants and their Host Countries and Communities. https://webcast.ec.europa.eu/2023-international-conference-in-solidarity-with-venezuelan-refugees-and-migrants-and-their-host-countries-and-communities-2023-03-16 123 26 Government of Canada, Statistics Canada. “Immigrant Population by Selected Places of Birth, Admission Category and Period of Immigration, 2021 Census,” October 26, 2022. https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2021/dp-pd/dv-vd/imm/index-en.cfm. 27 Berti. Interview by author. August 29, 2023. 28 Ivan and Josué. Interviews by author. October 3, 2023, and September 19, 2023. 29 Berti. Interview by author. August 29, 2023. 30 Josué. Interview by author. September 19, 2023. 31 Ivan and Josué. Interviews by author. October 3, 2023, and September 19, 2023. 32 CBC Radio. “Sleeping with a Very Cranky Elephant: The History of Canada-U.S. Tensions.” June 15, 2018. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/sunday/the-sunday-edition-june-17-2018-1.4692469/sleeping-with-a-very-cranky-elephant-the-history-of-canada-u-s-tensions-1.4699017. 33 Canada, Global Affairs. “Canada-United States Relations.” GAC, March 28, 2019. https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/us-eu/relations.aspx?lang=eng. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Canada, Global Affairs. “Monthly Trade Report – February 2024.” GAC, January 18, 2021. https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/economist-economiste/statistics-statistiques/monthly-mensuel.aspx?lang=eng. 37 United States Trade Representative. “Canada.” Accessed May 3, 2024. https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/canada. 38 Council on Foreign Relations. “Excerpt: Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy.” Accessed May 8, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/excerpt-economic-sanctions-and-american-diplomacy. 39 Rapier, Robert. “Charting The Decline Of Venezuela’s Oil Industry.” Forbes. Accessed March 6, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2019/01/29/charting-the-decline-of-venezuelas-oil-industry/. 40 “Political Risks Focus Attention on Supply of Venezuelan Oil to the United States - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).” Accessed March 25, 2024. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=9651. 41 Voice of America. “Venezuela’s Oil Wealth Powers Social Programs, Drives Divisions,” August 4, 2010. https://www.voanews.com/a/venezuelas-oil-wealth-powers-social-programs-drives-divisions-100077894/123381.html. 42 The Globe and Mail. “Petro-Canada Gets Cash for Venezuela Stake.” September 1, 2007. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/petro-canada-gets-cash-for-venezuela-stake/article963472/. 43 The Globe and Mail. “Chavez’s Death Brings Hope of a Better Future for Venezuela: PM Harper.” March 5, 2013. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/chavezs-death-brings-hope-of-a-better-future-for-venezuela-pm-harper/article9321008/. 44Amnesty International. “Human Rights in Venezuela.” Accessed March 22, 2024. https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/venezuela/report-venezuela/. 45 Antulio. Jean. Interviews by author. February 8, 2024, and January 16, 2024. 46 Ibid. 47 José. Interview by author. September 14, 2024. 48 In correspondence to documents provided to the author by Global Affairs Can, records are found in A-2019-0258. They were shared by email on March 7, 2024. 49 Jean. Interview by author. January 16, 2024. 50 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. “CIMM - Additional Information - International Relations,” September 18, 2020. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/transparency/committees/march-12-2020/additional-information-international-relations.html 51 Canada, Global Affairs. “Minister Sajjan to Co-Host International Conference in Solidarity with Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants.” News releases, March 15, 2023. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/03/minister-sajjan-to-co-host-international-conference-in-solidarity-with-venezuelan-refugees-and-migrants.html. 52 Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V). Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan 2024 https://www.r4v.info/en/rmrp2024update 53 Canada, Global Affairs. “Canada’s Response to the Venezuela Crisis.” GAC, May 29, 2017. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/venezuela.aspx?lang=eng. 124 54 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. “CIMM - Additional Information - International Relations,” September 18, 2020. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/transparency/committees/march-12-2020/additional-information-international-relations.html. 55 News, CTV. "In Search for Freedom, Chinese Migrants Increasingly Risk It All by Braving the Darien Gap," March 16, 2024. https://www.ctvnews.ca/w5/in-search-for-freedom-chinese-migrants-increasingly-risk-it-all-by-braving-the-darien-gap-1.6809429. 56 Andreychuk A., Raynell. “Venezuela An Uncertain Transition.” Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Senate Canada, May 2019. https://canadacommonsca.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/artifacts/1186351/venezuela/1739474/view/?page=9. 57 News, CTV. "Canada Shut Its Land Border to Asylum Seekers. More Refugees Came Anyway," September 2, 2023. https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canada-shut-its-land-border-to-asylum-seekers-more-refugees-came-anyway-1.6546267. 58 Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board of. “Claims by Country of Alleged Persecution - 2023,” May 16, 2023. https://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:443/en/statistics/protection/Pages/RPDStat2023.aspx. 59 Hernandez, Alejandro. “IRCC’s Latin American Humanitarian Program Is Unfair.” Policy Options, January 26, 2024. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2024/latin-america-humanitarian-inequities/. 60 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. “Statement from Minister Miller on Canada’s Commitment to Support Migrants in the Americas.” Statements, October 10, 2023. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2023/10/statement-from-minister-miller-on-canadas-commitment-to-support-migrants-in-the-americas.html. 61 Ibid. 62 Berti. Interview by author, August 29, 2023. 63 House, The White. “Fact Sheet: The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection U.S. Government and Foreign Partner Deliverables.” The White House, June 10, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/10/fact-sheet-the-los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-and-protection-u-s-government-and-foreign-partner-deliverables/. 64 Hernandez, Alejandro. Originally published on Policy Options and 2024. “IRCC’s Latin American Humanitarian Program Is Unfair.” Policy Options. Accessed March 29, 2024. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2024/latin-america-humanitarian-inequities/. 65 In correspondence to documents provided to the author by Global Affairs Can, records are found in A-2019-0258. They were shared by email on March 7, 2024. 66 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. “Canada Opens the Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework Support Platform Signature Event.” News releases, May 21, 2022. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2022/05/canada-opens-the-comprehensive-regional-protection-and-solutions-framework-support-platform-signature-event.html. 67 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. “Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement.” Not available, March 27, 2023. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/agreements/safe-third-country-agreement.html. 68 Ibid. 69 “Safe Third Country | Canadian Council for Refugees.” Accessed March 19, 2024. https://ccrweb.ca/en/safe-third-country#:~:text=Under%20the%20Safe%20Third%20Country,wherever%20they%20cross%20the%20border. 70 Sullivan, Eileen, and Frances Robles. “First Venezuelans Sent Back Under New U.S. Policy Arrive in Caracas.” The New York Times, October 19, 2023, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/world/americas/venezuelans-deportations-migrants.html. 71 Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V). Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan 2024 https://www.r4v.info/en/rmrp2024update 72 Jason Tolland, Director General Latin American and Inter-America Relations, “Introduction address,” March 16, 2023, International Conference in Solidarity with Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants and their Host Countries and Communities. https://webcast.ec.europa.eu/2023-international-conference-in-solidarity-with-venezuelan-refugees-and-migrants-and-their-host-countries-and-communities-2023-03-16 73 Berti. Interview by author, August 29, 2023. 74 Andreychuk A., Raynell. “Venezuela An Uncertain Transition.” Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Senate Canada, May 2019. https://canadacommonsca.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/artifacts/1186351/venezuela/1739474/view/?page=9. 75 Adriana and Yvon. Interviews by author. September 28, 2023, and August 21, 2023. 76 Ivan. Interview by author. October 3, 2023. 125 77 Adriana. Interview by author. September 28, 2023. 78 Berti. Interview by author, August 29, 2023. 79 Canada, Global Affairs. “Canada’s International Assistance in Haiti, 2016-17 to 2020-21 – Evaluation Summary.” GAC, January 10, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/audit-evaluation-verification/2023/venezuela-summary-sommaire.aspx?lang=eng. 80 Jean. Interview by author. January 16, 2024. 81 Ibid. 82 Katiuska. Interview by author. September 7, 2023. 83 UNHCR Operational Data Portal (ODP). “UNHCR, Guidance Note on International Protection Considerations for Venezuelans – Update I, May 2019 [EN].” Accessed April 18, 2024. https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/69883. 84 Berti and Josué. Interviews by author. August 29, 2023, and September 19, 2023. 85 Anne. Interview by author. October 31, 2023 86 “Campaign for Equitable Framework for Response to Emergencies | Canadian Council for Refugees.” Accessed April 3, 2024. https://ccrweb.ca/en/campaign-equitable-framework-response-emergencies. 87 Berti, Ivan, and Josué. Interviews by author. August 29, 2023, September 19, 2023, and October 3, 2023. 88 Canada, Global Affairs. “Canada Mobilizes International Donors to Support Venezuelan Refugees, Migrants and Countries in the Region.” News releases, June 17, 2021. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2021/06/canada-mobilizes-international-donors-to-support-venezuelan-refugees-migrants-and-countries-in-the-region.html. 89 Canada, Global Affairs. “Canada’s International Assistance in Haiti, 2016-17 to 2020-21 – Evaluation Summary.” GAC, January 10, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/audit-evaluation-verification/2023/venezuela-summary-sommaire.aspx?lang=eng. 90 Glatsky, Genevieve. “Venezuela, que estuvo abierta a unas elecciones limpias, da marcha atrás.” The New York Times, May 29, 2024, sec. En español. https://www.nytimes.com/es/2024/05/29/espanol/venezuela-elecciones-maduro-union-europea.html. 91 Ivan. Interview by author. October 3, 2023. 92 Josué. Interview by author. September 19, 2023. 93 Orlando. Interview by author. September 19, 2023. 94 Canada, Global Affairs. “Canada’s International Assistance in Haiti, 2016-17 to 2020-21 – Evaluation Summary.” GAC, January 10, 2024. https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/audit-evaluation-verification/2023/venezuela-summary-sommaire.aspx?lang=eng. 95 Interview by author. October 12, 2024. 96 Juan Pablo. Interview by author. September 4, 2023. 97 Interviews by author. September 21, 2023, and October 31, 2023. 98 ZOA Refugees Colombia. Interview by author. October 5, 2023. 99 Boletín Técnico: Ocupacíon Informal Trimestre enero – marzo 2024.Departamento Administrativo Nacional DE Estadistica. August 12, 2024. https://www.dane.gov.co/files/operaciones/GEIH/bol-GEIHEISS-abr-jun2024.pdf 100 Ibid. 101 Cuso International. Interview by author. September 21, 2023. 102 Venezuelan Task Force. Interview by author. April 30, 2024. 103 Interview by author. October 12, 2024. 104 Juan Pablo. Interview by author. September 4, 2023. 105 Interview by author. October 12, 2024. 106 Venezuelan Task Force. Interview by author. April 30, 2024. 126 References Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, Katrine Emilie Andersen, and Lene Hansen. “Images, Emotions, and International Politics: The Death of Alan Kurdi.” Review of International Studies 46, no. 1 (January 2020): 75–95. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210519000317. Akbar, Marshia. “Temporariness and the Production of Policy Categories in Canada.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 48, no. 16 (December 10, 2022): 3929–46. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2022.2028355. Alamsyah, Mirah Satria, and Indra Jaya Wiranata. “China-Venezuela Relations: China Dilemmatic Options towards Venezuela Crisis and the Role of China Community of Common Destiny Principles in Maintaining Cooperation.” JASSP 1, no. 2 (October 27, 2021): 93–102. https://doi.org/10.23960/jassp.v1i2.32. Aliaga Sáez, Felipe Andrés. "Causas De La Migración Forzada De Venezuela a Colombia." Aula (Santo Domingo) 67, no. 2 (2023): 67-77. https://revistas.unphu.edu.do/index.php/aula/article/view/180 “Americas: Migrants Pushed to Cross Darién Gap, Abused | Human Rights Watch,” November 9, 2023. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/09/americas-migrants-pushed-cross-darien-gap-abused. Amnesty International. “Human Rights in Venezuela.” Accessed February 27, 2024. https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/venezuela/report-venezuela/. Anderson, Melissa Mary, and Dagmar Soennecken. “Locating the Concept of Vulnerability in Canada’s Refugee Policies at Home and Abroad.” Laws 11, no. 2 (March 18, 2022): 25. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws11020025. Anzueto, Marc-André, Etienne Roy Grégoire, and Philippe Dufort. “Beyond the ‘Weakness of the State’: Canada’s Intervention in Post-Agreement Colombia.” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 77, no. 2 (June 2022): 248–69. https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020221135370. Arena, Marco, Fernandez Corugedo, Emilio, Guajardo, Jaime, and Yepez Francisco, Juan, “Venezuela’s Migrants Bring Economic Opportunity to Latin America.” International Monetary Fund (December 7, 2022), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/12/06/cf-venezuelas-migrants-bring-economic-opportunity-to-latin-america. Atak, Idil, Claire Linley-Moore, and Julie (Ha Young) Kim. “Canada’s Implementation of the UN Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees: Advancing Foreign Policy Objectives and the Status Quo ?” Refugee Survey Quarterly 42, no. 4 (December 6, 2023): 453–74. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdad014. 127 Audet, François. “From Disaster Relief to Development Assistance: Why Simple Solutions Don’t Work.” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 70, no. 1 (March 2015): 110–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702014562595. August, Arnold. “Why the Canadian Government Is Confronting Venezuela.” Canadian Dimension, July 17, 2019. https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/why-the-canadian-government-is-confronting-venezuela. Barrios, Ricardo. "Reimagining U.S. Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean in Response to a Risen China." In From Trump to Biden and Beyond, 39–59. Singapore: Springer Singapore Pte. Limited, 2021 Bargent, James. And Cat Rainsford. 2020. "Gamechangers 2019: Illegal Mining, Latin America's Go-To Criminal Economy." InSight Crime. Retrieved on April 27, 2020 from https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/gamechangers-2019-illegal-mining-criminal-economy/ B. Knight, Stanley. “The International Refugee Crisis: The Canadian Response.” In The International Refugee Crisis British and Canadian Responses, 17–25. 1993. Reprint, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan London, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12054-3. Bellino, Michelle J., and Marcela Ortiz-Guerrero. “‘The Worst Thing That Could Happen to Us but Unfortunately, They Have Nowhere to Go’: Colombian Students’ Contradictory Views on Venezuelan Migration, Democratic Crisis, and Xenophobia.” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, July 19, 2023, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2023.2228243. Belo, Dani. “Middle Power Foreign Policy in an Era of Gray Zone Conflict: Addressing the Challenges for Canada.” In Canada and Great Power Competition: Canada among Nations, by David Carment, Laura Macdonald, and Jeremy Paltiel. Springer International Publishing, 2022 Berdahl, Loleen and Tracey Raney. "Being Canadian in the World: Mapping the Contours of National Identity and Public Opinion on International Issues in Canada." International Journal (Toronto) 65, no. 4 (2010): 995-1010. Birn, Anne-Emanuelle, Mariajosé Aguilera, Nikisha S. Khare, and Ted Schrecker. “Canada Kills, Inc.: a critical political economy of health analysis of Canadian mining in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue canadienne des études latino-américaines et caraïbes 48, no. 2 (May 4, 2023): 301–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/08263663.2023.2193045. Boersner, Adriana. “Venezuela 2019: A Tale of Two Presidents.” Revista de Ciencia Política (Santiago) 40, no. 2 (June 2020): 539–65. https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2020005000118. 128 Boersner Herrera, Adriana, and Makram Haluani. “Domestic and International Factors of the Contemporary Russo–Venezuelan Bilateral Relationship.” Latin American Policy 14, no. 3 (September 2023): 366–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12309. Booth, David. "In 40 Years since OPEC, what is the Lesson? 1973 Oil Embargo." Province (Vancouver, B.C.),2013. Boyd, Monica, and Nathan T.B. Ly. “Unwanted and Uninvited: Canadian Exceptionalism in Migration and the 2017-2020 Irregular Border Crossings.” American Review of Canadian Studies 51, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 95–121. https://doi.org/10.1080/02722011.2021.1899743. Briceño-Ruiz, José and Norbert Molina Medina. "China–Venezuela Relations in a Context of Change." In China–Latin America Relations in the 21st Century, 147-168. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020 Briceño‐Ruiz, José. “The Persistent Crisis in Venezuela.” Latin American Policy 11, no. 1 (May 2020): 165–74. https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12183. Briceño-Ruiz, Jose, and Kevin Lehmann. “Venezuela in Crisis: Governability, Equity and Democracy.” In Financial Crisis Management and Democracy, 213–34. Springer, Cham, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54895-7_13. Broner, Tamara Taraciuk. “Crackdown on Dissent.” Human Rights Watch, November 29, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/11/29/crackdown-dissent/brutality-torture-and-political-persecution-venezuela. Brown and Hein Online U.S. Congressional Documents Library. Oil Market Effects from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Iran, Russia, Venezuela (R46213) [2020]. 4621st ed. 2020 Brown, Stephen. “Foreign Aid, the Mining Sector and Democratic Ownership: The Case of Canadian Assistance to Peru.” Development Policy Review 38, no. S1 May 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12454. Browne, Rachel. “In 2015, Justin Trudeau declared ‘Canada is back’ – so where are we now?” Global News, October 20, 2019. https://globalnews.ca/news/6047377/justin-trudeau-2015-and-now/ Bull, Benedicte, and Antulio Rosales. “The Crisis in Venezuela: Drivers, Transitions, and Pathways.” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 0, no. 109 (April 20, 2020): 1. https://doi.org/10.32992/erlacs.10587. Búrquez, Alberto and Gilberto Cristian Aranda Bustamante. "La Cuestión Venezolana Y La Fractura Del Regionalismo Latinoamericano." Historia 396 10, no. 1 (2020): 33-72. Burron, Neil A. "Reconfiguring Canadian Democracy Promotion: Convergence with the U.S. Approach?" International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 66, no. 2 (June 2011): 391–417. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201106600209. 129 Camacho, Texto: Catalina Oquendo, Fotografías: Chelo. “El limbo de los migrantes que se traga la selva del Darién.” El País América Colombia, June 12, 2023. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2023-06-12/el-limbo-de-los-migrantes-que-se-traga-la-selva-del-darien.html. “Campaign for Equitable Framework for Response to Emergencies | Canadian Council for Refugees.” Accessed April 3, 2024. https://ccrweb.ca/en/campaign-equitable-framework-response-emergencies. Canada, Global Affairs. “Canadian Sanctions Related to Venezuela.” GAC, October 19, 2015. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/venezuela.aspx?lang=eng. Canada, Global Affairs. “Canada Suspends Operations at Embassy of Canada to Venezuela.” Statements, June 2, 2019. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/06/canada-suspends-operations-at-embassy-of-canada-to-venezuela.html. Canada, Global Affairs. "Canada and Latin America and the Caribbean." G.A.C., April 12, 2017. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/latin_america-amerique_latine/index.aspx?lang=eng. Canada, Natural Resources. “Crude-Oil-Industry-Overview,” February 5, 2016. https://natural-resources.canada.ca/our-natural-resources/energy-sources-distribution/fossil-fuels/crude-oil/crude-oil-industry-overview/18078. Canada. Parliament. Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Report on The Deepening Crisis in Venezuela: Canadian and Regional Stakes. 1st sess., 42nd Parliament, 2017. Committee Report 136. https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/AEFA/reports/2017Report_Venezuela-Web_e.pdf Cardozo Uzcátegui, Alejandro, and Víctor M. Mijares. “The Versatile Amalgam: Interests and Corruption in Russia-Venezuela Relations.” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 0, no. 109 (May 20, 2020): 181. https://doi.org/10.32992/erlacs.10557. Carment, David, and Richard Nimijean. “Trudeau’s Precarious Hold on the Liberal Foreign Policy Agenda.” iPolitics, July 9, 2019. https://www.ipolitics.ca/news/trudeaus-precarious-hold-on-the-liberal-foreign-policy-agenda. Castano, Emanuele, Alain Bonacossa, and Peter Gries. “National Images as Integrated Schemas: Subliminal Primes of Image Attributes Shape Foreign Policy Preferences.” Political Psychology 37, no. 3 (June 2016): 351–66. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12259. Cattano, Claudia. "Farewell, Venezuela Hello, Oilsands; how did Petro-Canada Get it so Wrong? `National Edition." National Post (Toronto), 2007. 130 Cazzetta, Hannah Maria. "Colombian Institutional Responses to the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis." In Refugees and Higher Education: BRILL, 2020. Chaves Garcia, Carlos Alberto. "La Crisis Política En Venezuela y El Papel Del Grupo De Lima: Balance y Desafíos De Su Acción Diplomática." Revista De Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad 15, no. 1 (2020): 177-193. Cheatham, Amelia and Roy, Diana“Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed February 19, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis. Clark, Campbell. "Here is the Deal on Roxham Road.” The Globe and Mail, March 13, 2023. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-heres-the-deal-on-roxham-road/. Consky, Mitchell. “Canada Launches New Humanitarian Migration Pathway for Colombians, Haitians and Venezuelans,” CTV, News November 17, 2023. https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canada-launches-new-humanitarian-migration-pathway- for-colombians-haitians-and-venezuelans-1.6650771. Corrales, Javier. “Authoritarian Survival: Why Maduro Hasn’t Fallen.” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 3 (2020): 39–53. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0044. Cooper, Andrew F. “Canada’s Engagement with the Americas in Comparative Perspective: Between Declaratory Thickness and Operational Thinness.” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 67, no. 3 (September 2012): 685–701. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201206700308. Crossley, Noele. Understanding Humanitarian Protection. 1st ed. London: Routledge, 2022. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003006671. Crowley, Michael, and Julie Turkewitz. “Trump Gives Venezuela’s Guaidó the Embrace He Wanted.” The New York Times, February 6, 2020, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/world/americas/trump-guaido-venezuela.html. Daudelin, Jean, and Laura Dawson. “A New Chapter?” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 14, no. 3 (January 2008): 5–10. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2008.9673471. David, Charles-Philippe, and Julie-Pier Nadeau. “Avoiding the ‘ HUUUGE’ Crisis Predicted: Third-Party Issues and Canada-US Relations in the Age of Trump.” American Review of Canadian Studies 50, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 116–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/02722011.2020.1743003. de Stange, Ana Soliz. "The Triangular Relation between China, the United States and Venezuela." In China-Latin America and the Caribbean, edited by Kellner, Thierry and Sophie Wintgens. 1st ed., 126-139: Routledge, 2021. 131 Dolata, Petra. “Canada and/in the World.” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 50, no. 1 (March 2017): 351–67. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423916001128. Dougherty, Michael L. "Scarcity and Control: The New Extraction and Canada's Mineral Resource Protection Network." In Mining in Latin America, edited by Deonandan, Kalowatie and Michael L. Dougherty. 1st ed., 83–99: Routledge, 2016. Dumont, Marie, Canada. Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Canadian Government EBook Collection, Canada. Library of Parliament.Economics, Resources and International Affairs Division, and Canada. Library of Parliament. Canada-Venezuela. Vol. no. 2018 638-E.;no. 2018-638-E;. Ottawa: Library of Parliament = Bibliothèque du Parlement, 2018. Emersberger, Joe, and Justin Podur. “The Guaidó Era: A Sixth, Very Long Coup Attempt.” Monthly Review, June 1, 2021, 37–53. https://doi.org/10.14452/MR-073-02-2021-06_3. “Energy Facts: Oil, Natural Gas and Coal,” December 6, 2023. https://energy-information.canada.ca/en/energy-facts/oil-natural-gas-coal. Engler, Yves. “Canada’s Ugly Role in the US-Led Coup in Venezuela,” February 2019. https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/canada-us-coup-venezuela. Escobar, Arturo. “Reflections on ‘Development.’” Futures 24, no. 5 (June 1992): 411–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287(92)90014–7. Espinoza, Vera, Marcia, Victoria Prieto Rosas, Gisela P. Zapata, Luciana Gandini, Alethia Fernández De La Reguera, Gioconda Herrera, Stephanie López Villamil, et al. “Towards a Typology of Social Protection for Migrants and Refugees in Latin America during the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Comparative Migration Studies 9, no. 1 (December 2021): 52. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-021-00265-x. Essex, Jamey. “The Politics of Effectiveness in Canada’s International Development Assistance.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue Canadienne d’études Du Développement 33, no. 3 (September 2012): 338–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2012.713856. Fattahi, Shahram, and Maryam Nafisi-Moghadam. “Do Oil Sanctions Affect the Interdependence and Integration of Financial Markets?” Heliyon 9, no. 2 (February 2023): e13793. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e13793. Fisher, Kirsten J., and Laszlo Sarkany. “Canada, the International Criminal Court, and the Intersection of International Politics and Finances.” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 74, no. 2 (June 2019): 206–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019852700. FitzGerald, David Scott. “Remote Control of Migration: Theorising Territoriality, Shared Coercion, and Deterrence.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 46, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 4–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1680115. 132 France 24. “Oposición venezolana denuncia ‘maniobra’ para frenar la postulación de su nueva candidata,” March 23, 2024. https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20240323-oposici%C3%B3n-venezolana-choca-con-muro-virtual-para-postular-candidata. Freier, Luisa F., Nicholas R. Micinski, and Gerasimos Tsourapas. “Refugee Commodification: The Diffusion of Refugee Rent-Seeking in the Global South.” Third World Quarterly 42, no. 11 (November 2, 2021): 2747–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1956891. Freier, Luisa Feline, Isabel Berganza, and Cécile Blouin. “The Cartagena Refugee Definition and Venezuelan Displacement in Latin America 1.” International Migration 60, no. 1 (February 2022): 18–36. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12791. Freier, Luisa Feline, and Nicolas Parent. “The Regional Response to the Venezuelan Exodus.” Current History 118, no. 805 (2019): 56–61. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48614415. Fossum, John Erik. Oil, the State, and Federalism: The Rise and Demise of Petro-Canada as a Statist Impulse. Studies in Comparative Political Economy and Public Policy 2. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997. Gandini, Luciana. "Between Closure and Openness: Migration Governance and the Venezuelan Exodus." In The Routledge History of Modern Latin American Migration, edited by Feldmann, Andreas E. 1st ed., 456–471: Routledge, 2023; 2022. García-Guadilla, María Pilar, and Ana Mallen. “Polarization, Participatory Democracy, and Democratic Erosion in Venezuela’s Twenty-First Century Socialism.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1 (January 2019): 62–77. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716218817733. Gecelovsky, Paul. “From Humane to Responsible: Stephen Harper, Narrative and Canadian Foreign Policy.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 26, no. 3 (September 1, 2020): 239–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2019.1684962. Gecelovsky, Paul and Robert W. Murray. "Toward an Understanding of Canada's International Identity." The American Review of Canadian Studies 49, no. 4 (2019): 530-546. Gill, Timothy M. “Shifting Imperial Strategies in Contemporary Latin America: The U.S. Empire and Venezuela under Hugo Chávez.” Journal of Historical Sociology 32, no. 3 (September 2019): 294–310. https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12216. Gill, Timothy M., and Joseph Marshall Brown. “Two Decades of Imperial Failure: Theorizing U.S. Regime Change Efforts in Venezuela from Bush II to Trump.” Class, Race and Corporate Power 8, no. 2 2020. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48644420 Gill, Timothy M. Encountering U.S. Empire in Socialist Venezuela: The Legacy of Race, Neocolonialism, and Democracy Promotion. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2022. 133 Gill, Timothy M. “The Civilizing Mission Persists: Racism and Justification for U.S. Intervention into Socialist Venezuela.” Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 19, no. 2 (September 2022): 309–28. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X21000394. Gonzalez Balyk, Lana. “La Solidaridad o La Soledad? Cooperation and Tensions in the Regional State Response to the Venezuelan Migration Crisis.” Studies in Social Justice 16, no. 3 (November 7, 2022): 612–27. https://doi.org/10.26522/ssj.v16i3.2723. Gordon, Todd, and Jeffery R. Webber. Blood of Extraction: Canadian Imperialism in Latin America. Halifax; Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2016. Gordon, Todd, and Jeffery Roger Webber. “Canadian Capital and Secondary Imperialism in Latin America.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 25, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 72–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2018.1457966. Government of Canada, Statistics Canada. “Immigrant Population by Selected Places of Birth, Admission Category and Period of Immigration, 2021 Census,” October 26, 2022. https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2021/dp-pd/dv-vd/imm/index-en.cfm. Government of Canada, Public Works and Government Services Canada. “Canada Gazette, Part 2, Volume 153, Number 14: Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Venezuela) Regulations,” July 10, 2019. https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2019/2019-07-10/html/sor-dors263-eng.html. Government of Canada, Canada Energy Regulator. "C.E.R. – Market Snapshot: Canadian Crude Oil Is Mainly Exported to Two Regions in the United States," November 28, 2023. https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/market-snapshots/2019/market-snapshot-canadian-crude-oil-is-mainly-exported-two-regions-in-united-states.html. Grenier, Yvon. “Opportunities to Promote Human Rights and Democratic Values Abroad: The Case of Canadian Foreign Policy toward Venezuela.” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 76, no. 3 (September 2021): 446–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020211048431. Hancock, John. “The Third Option: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Come?” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 70, no. 2 (June 2015): 322–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702015575005. Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. 1st ed. New York; Oxford;: Oxford University Press, 2005;2007;. Heidrich, Pablo, Laura Macdonald, and Scholars Portal Books: Canadian University Presses 2022. Canada's Past and Future in Latin America. Toronto; Buffalo; University of Toronto Press, 2022. 134 Hellinger, Daniel. “Venezuelan Oil: Free Gift of Nature or Wealth of a Nation?” International Journal 62, no. 1 (2006): 55. https://doi.org/10.2307/40204245. Hernandez, Alejandro. “IRCC’s Latin American Humanitarian Program Is Unfair.” Policy Options, January 26, 2024. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2024/latin-america-humanitarian-inequities/. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. “Canada Doubles Immigration Program for Out-of-Status Construction Workers in the Greater Toronto Area.” News releases, January 20, 2023. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2023/01/canada-doubles-immigration-program-for-out-of-status-construction-workers-in-the-greater-toronto-area.html. Jraissati, Jorge, and Keith Jakee. “Venezuela’s Collapse: Exogenous Shock or Institutional Design?” Economic Affairs 42, no. 2 (June 2022): 344–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12537. Johnson, Keith. “How Hugo Chávez Blew Up Venezuela’s Oil Patch.” Foreign Policy (blog), July 16, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/16/how-venezuela-struck-it-poor-oil-energy-chavez/. Johnson, Stephen. “Neorealism and the Organization of American States (OAS): An Examination of CARICOM Rationality Toward Venezuela and the United States.” SAGE Open 9, no. 4 (July 2019): 215824401988795. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244019887950. Jose U., Mora, Zerpa de Hurtado Sadcidi, and Hurtado Alberto J. "Understanding the Venezuelan Crisis: Origins and Current Situation." The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 46, no. 1–2 (2021): 3–26. Kingsbury, Donald V. “4 Oil’s Colonial Residues: Geopolitics, Identity, and Resistance in Venezuela.” Bulletin of Latin American Research 38, no. S1 (May 2019): 76–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12947. Kleszczyńska, Iga. “Analysis of the Venezuelan Humanitarian Crisis and International Response to the Regional Refugee Problems.” Studia z Polityki Publicznej, no. 4(28) (November 18, 2020). https://doi.org/10.33119/KSzPP/2020.4.2. Knight, Alan. “U.S. Imperialism/Hegemony and Latin American Resistance.” In Empire and Dissent: The United States and Latin America, 23–52. American Encounters/Global Interactions. Duke University Press, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822381440. Kramarz, Teresa and Donald Kingsbury. "“The Devil’s Excrement”: Venezuela as the Prototypical Extractive State." In Populist Moments and Extractivist States in Venezuela and Ecuador, 51-73. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. Kraul, Chris and J. Williams, Los Angeles Times Carol. "Venezuela's Oil Workers Moving On," November 25, 2005. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-nov-25-fi-venoil25-story.html. 135 Kyriakides, Christopher, Dina Taha, Carlo Handy Charles, and Rodolfo D. Torres. “Introduction: The Racialized Refugee Regime.” Refuge 35, no. 1 (June 12, 2019): 3–7. https://doi.org/10.7202/1060670ar. Lacroix, Jean-Michel. "Canadian and U.S. Approaches towards the Americas: Similarities and Differences." International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 67, no. 3 (September 2012): 703–21. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201206700309. Ladd, Jeremy Martin. “Contemporary Developments in Canadian Democracy Promotion and the Way Forward.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (May 4, 2014): 209–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2014.934856. Legler, Thomas. “Wishful Thinking: Democracy Promotion in the Americas under Harper.” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 67, no. 3 (September 2012): 583–602. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201206700303. Levine-Rasky, Cynthia, Julianna Beaudoin, and Paul St Clair. “The Exclusion of Roma Claimants in Canadian Refugee Policy.” Patterns of Prejudice 48, no. 1 (January 2014): 67–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2013.857477. Li, Yuchen, and Michael Haan. “From Temporary Foreign Workers to Permanent Residents: Differences in Transition Rates Among Work Permit Categories.” Canadian Ethnic Studies 55, no. 2 (July 17, 2023): 125–57. https://doi.org/10.1353/ces.2023.a902154. Llorens, Manuel. "Dolor País, Versión Venezuela: Las Protestas De 2017 y Sus Secuelas." Nueva Sociedad no. 274 (2018): 71-82. Lucatello, Simone and Oscar A. Gómez. "Understanding Humanitarian Localization in Latin America—as Local as Possible: But How Necessary?" Journal of International Humanitarian Action 7, no. 1 (2022): 1-15 Macdonald, Laura. “Evaluating Canadian Economic Diplomacy: Canada’s Relations with Emerging Markets in the Americas.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 22, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 26–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2016.1144212. Macklin, Audrey, Kathryn Barber, Luin Goldring, Jennifer Hyndman, Anna Korteweg, Shauna Labman, and Jona Zyfi. “A Preliminary Investigation into Private Refugee Sponsors.” Canadian Ethnic Studies 50, no. 2 (August 13, 2018): 35–57. https://doi.org/10.1353/ces.2018.0014. McKenna, Peter. “Canada and Latin America: 150 Years Later.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 24, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 18–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2017.1386579. Mijares, Víctor M. “Soft Balancing the Titans: Venezuelan Foreign‐Policy Strategy Toward the United States, China, and Russia.” Latin American Policy 8, no. 2 (December 2017): 201–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12128. 136 “Milestones: 1969–1976 - Office of the Historian.” Accessed January 11, 2024. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo. Millman, J. "Fleeing Chávez, Oil Workers Flock to Frigid Alberta. "The Wall Street Journal. June 26, 2008. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118281923961747865 Montoya-Galvez, Camilo. “Venezuelan Arrivals along U.S. Southern Border Drop after Biden Starts Deportations - CBS News,” November 14, 2023. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/immigration-venezuelan-arrivals-us-southern-border-biden-deportations/. Moslimani, Mohamad, Mark Hugo Lopez, and Luis Noe-Bustamante. “11 Facts about Hispanic Origin Groups in the U.S.” Pew Research Center (blog). Accessed January 11, 2024. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/08/16/11-facts-about-hispanic-origin-groups-in-the-us/. Muñoz-Pogossian, Betilde, and Alexandra Winkler. “The Persistence of the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Crisis,” November 27, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/persistence-venezuelan-migrant-and-refugee-crisis. "Neoliberalism's Long Legacies | Perspectives on History | A.H.A." Accessed January 14, 2024. https://www.historians.org/research-and-publications/perspectives-on-history/october-2020/neoliberalisms-long-legacies-pondering-the-impact-of-the-us-presidential-election-in-latin-america. Nimijean, Richard. "The Politics of Branding Canada: The International-Domestic Nexus and the Rethinking of Canada Place in the World." Revista Mexicana De Estudios Canadienses no. 11 (2006). Nimijean, Richard. “Introduction: Is Canada Back? Brand Canada in a Turbulent World.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 24, no. 2 (May 4, 2018): 127–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2018.1481873. Nossal, Kim Richard. “Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of ‘Good International Citizenship’ in Canadian Foreign Policy.” International Journal 54, no. 1 (1998): 88. https://doi.org/10.2307/40203357. Olinto, Berti. “The Challenges of Settlement and Integration: Exploring Canada’s Response to Venezuelan Migration.” Working Paper. Toronto Metropolitan Centre for Immigration and Settlement, September 2022. https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/centre-for-immigration-andsettlement/tmcis/publications/workingpapers/2022_10_Olinto_B_The_Challenges_of_Settlement_and_Integration_Exploring_Canadas_Response_to_Venezuelan_Migration.pdf. Pérez, José Oviedo. “Venezuela and Its Neighbors: The Discursive Struggle for Latin America.” Relaciones Internacionales 28, no. 57 (December 10, 2019): 53–69. https://doi.org/10.24215/23142766e071. 137 “Provincial-Federal Confrontations: 1970s to 1981 - Conventional Oil - Alberta’s Energy Heritage.” Accessed January 11, 2024. http://www.history.alberta.ca/energyheritage/oil/energy-crises-political-debates-and-environmental-concerns-1970s-1980s/provincial-federal-confrontations/1970-to-1981/default.aspx. Quesada, Juan Diego, and Florantonia Singer . “María Corina Machado cede su candidatura a Corina Yoris, una académica de bajo perfil.” El País América, March 22, 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-22/maria-corina-machado-cede-su-candidatura-a-corina-yoris-en-consenso-con-toda-la-oposicion.html. Rapier, Robert. “Charting The Decline Of Venezuela’s Oil Industry.” Forbes. Accessed March 6, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2019/01/29/charting-the-decline-of-venezuelas-oil-industry/. Rausis, Frowin. “Restrictive North versus Permissive South? Revisiting Dominant Narratives on the Evolution of the Refugee Regime.” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, October 13, 2023, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2023.2266419. Rendon, Moises, and Max Price. “Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?” September 3, 2019. https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela. Resnick, Philip. "From Semi-periphery to Perimeter of the Core: Canada's Place in the Capitalist World-Economy." Review - Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations 12, no. 2 (1989): 263–297. Rochlin, James Francis. Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy towards Latin America. Canada and International Relations 8. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994. Rochlin, James. “A Golden Opportunity Lost: Canada’s Human Rights Impact Assessment and the Free Trade Agreement with Colombia.” The International Journal of Human Rights 18, no. 4–5 (July 4, 2014): 545–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2014.917627. Rochlin, James “Power, Mobility, and Space: Human Security for Venezuelan Refugees in Colombia.” Journal on Migration and Human Security 11, no. 4 (December 2023): 333–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/23315024231202492. Romero, Carlos A., and Víctor M. Mijares. “From Chávez to Maduro: Continuity and Change in Venezuelan Foreign Policy.” Contexto Internacional 38, no. 1 (May 17, 2016): 165–201. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-8529.2016380100005. Rosales, Antulio. “Pursuing Foreign Investment for Nationalist Goals: Venezuela’s Hybrid Resource Nationalism.” Business and Politics 20, no. 3 (September 2018): 438–64. https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2018.6. 138 Rosales, Antulio. “Statization and Denationalization Dynamics in Venezuela’s Artisanal and Small Scale-Large-Scale Mining Interface.” Resources Policy 63 (October 2019): 101422. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2019.101422. Rosen, Fred, ed. Empire and Dissent: The United States and Latin America. American Encounters/Global Interactions. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008. Roth, Benjamin J. “Temporary Shelter: Venezuelan Migrants and the Uncertainty of Waiting in Colombia.” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 21, no. 3 (July 3, 2023): 263–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2021.1974147. Roy, Diana. “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed April 14, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri. Roy, Diana. “Do U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela Work?” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed April 15, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/do-us-sanctions-venezuela-work. Roy, Diana, and Sabine Baumgartner. “Crossing the Darién Gap: Migrants Risk Death on the Journey to the U.S.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed April 15, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/article/crossing-darien-gap-migrants-risk-death-journey-us. Sætermo, Turid Fånes. "Migration Across Intersecting Temporalities: Venezuelan Migrants and ‘Readiness’ in Montreal." In Migration, Temporality, and Capitalism, 141-159. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG, 2018 Sanchez, Peter M. "U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean during the Cold War." In The Routledge History of U.S. Foreign Relations, edited by Reeder, Tyson. 1st ed., 380–390: Routledge, 2021. Sagarzazu, Iñaki, and Cameron G. Thies. “The Foreign Policy Rhetoric of Populism: Chávez, Oil, and Anti-Imperialism.” Political Research Quarterly 72, no. 1 (March 2019): 205–14. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918784212. Schalk, Owen. “Guaidó is gone, but we shouldn’t forget Canada’s interference in Venezuela.” Canadian Dimension, January 8, 2023. https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/guaido-is-gone-but-we-shouldnt-forget-canadas-interference-in-venezuela Schmidt, Lisa. "Petro-can Joins Exodus from Venezuela; Move Follows Exxon, Conoco Pullout Series: Herald Energy: Oil & Gas - Electricity Alternative Energies: Final Edition." Calgary Herald,2007. Scott, James M., and Ralph G. Carter. "Promoting Democracy in Latin America: Foreign Policy Change and U.S. Democracy Assistance, 1975–2010." Third World Quarterly 37, no. 2 (February 2016): 299–320. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1108824. 139 Shamsie, Yasmine, and Ricardo Grinspun. “Missed Opportunity: Canada’s Reengagement with Latin America and The Caribbean.” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 35, no. 69 (January 2010): 171–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/08263663.2010.10816992. Shuya, Mason. “Russian Influence in Latin America: A Response to NATO.” Journal of Strategic Security 12, no. 2 (July 2019): 17–41. https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.2.1727. Siddiqi, Sara and Duncan Koerber. "The Anatomy of a National Crisis: The Canadian Federal Government’s Response to the 2015 Kurdi Refugee Case." Canadian Journal of Communication 45, no. 3 (2020): 411–435. Smilde, David. "Trump and Venezuela: Return to the Monroe Doctrine." In The Future of U.S. Empire in the Americas, edited by Gill, Timothy M. 1st ed., 37-58: Routledge, 2020. Smith, Craig Damian. 2020. Extraction, Dependence, and Responsibility-Sharing: Taking Stock of Canada's Role in Western Hemispheric Migration Governance. Working Paper no. 2020/16. Ryerson University. Retrieved from: https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/cerc-migration/Policy/Final_PB_Smith_Wagner_April19.pdf Smith, Craig Damian, and Dana Wagner. “How Canada Can Address Skills Shortages by Improving Access to Economic Pathways for Refugees and Displaced People in Latin America.” Policy Brief.: Canada Excellence Research Chair in Migration and Integration Toronto Metropolitan University, April 2021. https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/cerc-migration/Policy/Final_PB_Smith_Wagner_April19.pdf. Smith, Craig Damian. "Policy Change, Threat Perception, and Mobility Catalysts: The Trump Administration as Driver of Asylum Migration to Canada." The International Migration Review 57, no. 4 (2023): 1678-1709. https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183221112418 Sørensen, Ninna Nyberg. “Revisiting the Migration–Development Nexus: From Social Networks and Remittances to Markets for Migration Control.” International Migration 50, no. 3 (June 2012): 61–76. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2012.00753.x. Spencer-Churchill, Othon A. Leon and Julian. “Beyond the Monroe Doctrine: The Need to Re-Adapt U.S. and Canadian Policy to Address Social and Alignment Shifts in the Americas.” iAffairs, November 3, 2023. https://iaffairscanada.com/beyond-the-monroe-doctrine-the-need-to-re-adapt-u-s-and-canadian-policy-to-address-social-and-alignment-shifts-in-the-americas/. Steiner, Isabelle. “Safe Third Country Agreement Expansion Causes Asylum Seekers to Explore New Routes | Wilson Center,” September 14, 2023. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/safe-third-country-agreement-expansion-causes-asylum-seekers-explore-new-routes. Stevenson, Brian J. R. Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism: A Foreign Policy Analysis, 1968-1999. Vol. 15 MQUP, 2000. 140 The Globe and Mail. “Opinion: Last Call for Neoliberalism: What I Saw at the Party at the End of the World Order.” August 5, 2023. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-last-call-for-neoliberalism-what-i-saw-at-the-party-at-the-end-of-the/. Thomaz, Diana. “What’s in a Category? The Politics of Not Being a Refugee.” Social & Legal Studies 27, no. 2 (April 2018): 200–218. https://doi.org/10.1177/0964663917746488. Tijerina, Stefano. "Canadian Official Development Aid to Latin America: The Struggle Over the Humanitarian Agenda, 1963–1977." Journal of Canadian Studies 51, no. 1 (2017): 217–243. Trebilcock, Michael. “The Puzzle of Canadian Exceptionalism in Contemporary Immigration Policy.” Journal of International Migration and Integration 20, no. 3 (August 1, 2019): 823–49. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-018-0633-6. Tyyskä, Vappu, Jenna Blower, Samantha DeBoer, Shunya Kawai, and Ashley Walcott. “The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Canadian Media.” Other, May 24, 2021. https://doi.org/10.32920/ryerson.14669130. UNHCR. “Global Trends Report 2022.” Accessed April 6, 2024. https://www.unhcr.org/global-trends-report-2022. Urdinez, Francisco, Fernando Mouron, Luis L. Schenoni, and Amâncio J. de Oliveira. "Chinese Economic Statecraft and U.S. Hegemony in Latin America: An Empirical Analysis, 2003-2014." Latin American Politics and Society 58, no. 4 (2016): 3-30. Vucetic, Srdjan. “A Nation of Feminist Arms Dealers? Canada and Military Exports.” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 72, no. 4 (December 2017): 503–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702017740156. Wallace, Rebecca. Originally published on Policy Options in 2018. "How the News Media Framed the Syrian Refugee Crisis." Policy Options. Accessed February 12, 2024. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/march-2018/how-the-news-media-framed-the-syrian-refugee-crisis/. Wallerstein, Immanuel. "The Modern World-System as a Capitalist World-Economy: Production, Surplus Value, and Polarization." In World-Systems Analysis, 23. United States: Duke University Press, 2004. Watson, Antonella, Margarida Soares Rodrigues, and Juheon Lee. “Government Performance, Political Trust, and Satisfaction with Democracy in Venezuela, 2016–2017.” Latin American Policy 14, no. 2 (June 2023): 267–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12299. Xu, Man. "Constructing the Refugee: Comparison between Newspaper Coverage of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Canada and the U.K." Current Sociology 69, no. 5 (September 2021): 660–81. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392120946387. 141 Xu, Yanran. "China's Strategic Partnerships in Latin America: Case Studies of China's Oil Diplomacy in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, 1991 to 2015."ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2016. Zhou, Kevin. "Is it Time for the Beaver to Hop Off the Eagle? A Case for Canada to Reconsider its Geopolitical Alignment with the United States." The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare 1, no. 1 2018. Zhou, Steven. “Canada’s Two-Tier Approach to Refugees Says the Quiet Part Aloud.” NCCM - National Council of Canadian Muslims (blog). Accessed August 21, 2024. http://www.nccm.ca/canadas-two-tier-approach-to-refugees-says-the-quiet-part-aloud/.
Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Interdisciplinary Studies
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Rochlin, James Francis, 1956-
Canada's response to the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis : strengths and limitations of Canada's policies to help Venezuelan migrants and refugees
Text