Arts and Social Sciences, Irving K. Barber Faculty of (Okanagan)
DSpace
UBCO
Derksen, Kai Alexander
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
The history of Canadian nuclear possession from 1950-1984 is a topic of growing importance. While considerable work exists on the topic, much of it is outdated and ultimately fails to consider some of the more pertinent questions that may help to reveal how and why Canada became nuclear capable. This study therefore aims to address these deficits in existing literature, analyzing the relationships that led to Canada becoming a nuclear custodial power and how this period came to shape current Canadian national security and nuclear policy. In addition to this it will take a deeper look at the US-Canadian relationship during this period, critically analyzing the power dynamics, both economic and political, that existed therewithin and contributed to events. To accomplish these tasks, this study relies heavily on diplomatics and discourse analysis of the pre-existing literature that exists on the topic of Canadian nuclear possession and the recently declassified body of primary documents within archives and databases. This study will be broken down into two main sections. The first will be a historical chronology that details the period of Canadian nuclear custody, and the second, a theoretical analysis that considers the how and why behind nuclear custody and the decision to ultimately abandon said custody. This study is part of a wider attempt to influence Canadian national security and nuclear policy, which since the Cold War has been largely dominated by American interests. It therefore argues that Canada must reevaluate its relationship to the US - politically, militarily, and economically. It is only once this is achieved that Canada can move beyond the outdated practices of the Cold War and truly begin working towards a nuclear-weapon-free future.
INCINERATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN NUCLEAR WEAPON POSSESSION by Kai Alexander Derksen B.A., The University of British Columbia (Okanagan), 2022 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in (Interdisciplinary Studies) (Power, Conflict and Ideas) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Okanagan) April 2024 © Kai Alexander Derksen, 2024 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the College of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled: INCINERATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF CANADIAN NUCLEAR WEAPON POSSESSION submitted by Kai Alexander Derksen in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts. Dr. Tim Paulson, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Supervisor Dr. Margaret Carlyle, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Supervisory Committee Member Dr. Piotr (Peter) Ahmad, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Supervisory Committee Member Dr. Manfred Elfstrom, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences University Examiner: iii Abstract: The history of Canadian nuclear possession from 1950-1984 is a topic of growing importance. While considerable work exists on the topic, much of it is outdated and ultimately fails to consider some of the more pertinent questions that may help to reveal how and why Canada became nuclear capable. This study therefore aims to address these deficits in existing literature, analyzing the relationships that led to Canada becoming a nuclear custodial power and how this period came to shape current Canadian national security and nuclear policy. In addition to this it will take a deeper look at the US-Canadian relationship during this period, critically analyzing the power dynamics, both economic and political, that existed therewithin and contributed to events. To accomplish these tasks, this study relies heavily on diplomatics and discourse analysis of the pre-existing literature that exists on the topic of Canadian nuclear possession and the recently declassified body of primary documents within archives and databases. This study will be broken down into two main sections. The first will be a historical chronology that details the period of Canadian nuclear custody, and the second, a theoretical analysis that considers the how and why behind nuclear custody and the decision to ultimately abandon said custody. This study is part of a wider attempt to influence Canadian national security and nuclear policy, which since the Cold War has been largely dominated by American interests. It therefore argues that Canada must reevaluate its relationship to the US - politically, militarily, and economically. It is only once this is achieved that Canada can move beyond the outdated practices of the Cold War and truly begin working towards a nuclear-weapon-free future. iv Lay Summary: The Canadian custody of nuclear weapons on behalf of the US from 1950 – 1985 is treated by many as a subject of the past, having little influence on the present. However, literature on this topic and from this time period reveals how Canadian nuclear custody and compliance with the American Cold War philosophy came to shape the current state of Canadian politics, national security, and the economy. This study therefore aims to address this period of Canadian history, considering how and why Canada chose to become a custodial nuclear power, and then ultimately abandon this capability. In doing so, this study takes a deeper look at the current state of Canadian nationalism, born of Cold War sentiments. To accomplish these tasks, it will consider the often-overlooked power dynamics that led to Canadian nuclear possession. It also makes use of the methods of “diplomatics” and “discourse analysis,” taken from the field of history. These methods will allow for an in-depth understanding of the literature, both primary and secondary, that exists on the topic. Ultimately, this study is part of a wider effort to influence Canadian national security and nuclear policy in such a way that works towards a nuclear-weapon-free future. v Table of Contents Abstract: ......................................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary: ................................................................................................................................ iv Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ v List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... viii 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Research Questions and Objectives ...................................................................................... 2 1.2 Literature Review, Theoretical Approach, and Methods ...................................................... 3 1.3 Research Design and Methodology ...................................................................................... 6 1.4 Outline................................................................................................................................... 8 1.5 Implications........................................................................................................................... 9 2. Canada Joins the Club: Nuclear Acquisition, Possession, and Disarmament........................... 12 2.1 The Pre-Nuclear Period (1945-1963).................................................................................. 12 2.2 The Canadian Nuclear Arsenal ........................................................................................... 20 2.3 Bilateral Control.................................................................................................................. 26 2.4 The ‘Intended Use’ of Canadian Nuclear Weapons ........................................................... 28 2.5 Disarmament ....................................................................................................................... 31 3. Canada’s Nuclear Weapon Philosophy ..................................................................................... 34 3.1 Incineration without Representation ................................................................................... 36 3.2 Nuclear Responsibilities and Benefits ................................................................................ 38 3.3 The Soviet Threat ................................................................................................................ 43 3.4 NATO Nuclear Philosophy ................................................................................................. 46 3.5 From Mutually Assured Destruction to Limited Nuclear War and Deterrence .................. 50 4. Nationalism in Canada .............................................................................................................. 54 4.1 Canadian National Defense, the Global Economy, and Canadian Nationalism ................. 59 4.2 Transmuted Canadian Nationalism ..................................................................................... 62 4.3 From Transmuted to Liberated Canadian Nationalism ....................................................... 66 4.4 Potential for Change ........................................................................................................... 70 5. Concluding Thoughts ................................................................................................................ 73 vi 5.1 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 74 5.2 Moving Forward ................................................................................................................. 76 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 78 vii List of Figures Figure 1. Approximate timeline detailing the process of Canadian nuclear acquisition. ............. 20 Figure 2. North Bay CFB BOMARC Site .................................................................................... 22 Figure 3. Bomarc Missiles ............................................................................................................ 23 Figure 4. Inspecting missile prior to loading onto CF 101 Voodoo aircraft ................................. 26 Figure 5. The Theory of Nuclear Opportunism. ........................................................................... 30 viii Acknowledgements There are several individuals without whom this study simply would not have been possible. To begin, I would like to thank my partner Johanna who not only travelled across the country with me for this study but assisted in countless hours of research in the National Library and Archives in Ottawa. Many hands make light work, and while the two of us alone did not amount to many, the experience was far more bearable with her at my side. She has served as a constant source of joy and motivation throughout the two years it has taken to complete this study. Next, I would like to thank my supervisor, Doctor Timothy Paulson, for being a constant source of help throughout this study. His guidance was instrumental throughout the entire process, especially in his assistance in applying for travel grants or other funding, and I can honestly say that without his encouragement I would not have been motivated to pursue this topic. Truly, I owe the conception of this study to him, as the first ‘draft’ of what would become this study was done as a project in one of his 3rd year undergraduate history courses. I also need to thank Doctor Piotr Ahmad as perhaps the single greatest source of knowledge when it came to the sociological side of this study. He allowed me to pick his brain on several occasions which undoubtably had a profound impact on the final result of this study, not to mention he introduced me to some of the key works which I have framed this study within, such as Ozkirimli’s Theories of Nationalism. Furthermore, he graciously accepted a position as one of the supervisory committee members of this study. I would also be remiss if I did not thank Doctor Margaret Carlyle for not only serving on the supervisory committee of this study, but also for her influence in determining the topic of this study. It was in her 4th year History of Science undergraduate course that I rounded out exactly what topic I wanted to focus on for this study, and more importantly how I wanted to approach it. I can confidently say I would not have possessed the skills necessary to chronologize the Canadian possession of nuclear weapons in a such a technological manner without having taken her courses. Lastly, but certainly not least, I would like to thank the incredibly helpful and dedicated staff of the Candain National Library and Archives (LAC). For two years I was in contact with various staff members at the LAC, and every time I communicated with someone, they were ix always kind and extraordinarily helpful. This study would not have been possible without their assistance and the vital work which they do for this country. 1 1. Introduction The start of the Cold War marked another beginning, of a nuclear age, which has proven exceedingly resilient. The 1950s saw the birth of a race involving nations from across the globe to develop and manufacture a device capable of harnessing the destructive power of the atom; many were to succeed. By the 1990s nine countries had successfully armed themselves with nuclear bombs; the United States of America, the Unions of Soviet Socialist Republics (and later the Russian Federation), the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. As the turn of the millennia came, and time unceasingly marched on, these world nuclear powers, which hold the fate of the world in their palms, have continued to possess incredible sway in the geopolitical arena. Their existence in 2024, and their continued profound influence on global affairs, maintains an environment where the development and possession of nuclear weapons is sought after, even actively pursued. For this reason, we are in many ways entering a renewed Cold War, one which has global implications, but perhaps none are caught in the middle as literally as Canada. Our geographic positioning made Canada a hotspot during the Cold War, and a strategically important buffer zone for American national security. Billions of American taxpayers’ dollars were invested by the US to transform Canada into the first line of defense against a Soviet attack. Radar systems were constructed that lined the arctic circle meant to detect and ultimately intercept a Russian nuclear attack coming over the North pole, a series of air bases were also constructed in the Canadian North that could accommodate nuclear-capable long-range bombers. American experts and public commentators believed that if nuclear war was to break out between the US and the Soviet Union, Canada would be one of the first battle grounds. The US thus saw it necessary to entrust some 270 to 390 nuclear weapons to Canada, which from 1950-1984 counted itself among the world’s few nuclear powers (Maloney 2007, 133). For twenty-one years Canada was officially a custodial nuclear power, hosting a total of four different delivery systems and six nuclear warhead designs, intended for offensive and defensive use (Clearwater 1998, 18-21). But Canada’s nuclear capability was short lived, and with the advent of inter-continental ballistic missiles in 1958 the Canadian harboring of nuclear-capable fighter jets, bombers, and anti-air gradually became obsolete. Despite this, 2 Canada chose to accept these very systems from the US in 1963, years after they were predicted to be phased out, suggesting that there were significant political motivations behind nuclear acquisition aside from those purely defensive motivations. By 1984, Canada had returned the weapons under its custody to the US, bringing an end to Canada’s nuclear possession, an exceedingly short-lived period in comparison to other nuclear capable nations. But the removal of nuclear warheads from Canadian soil did not alter the nation’s alignment with American nuclear policy. Canada’s Cold War history, and its decision to follow US nuclear defensive strategy, has resulted in a nation that is almost entirely dependent on exterior forces for its own national defense, raising concerning implications given the recent instability of both American democracy and its economy. The topic of this study will be a critical-historical analysis, looking at the period of Canadian nuclear possession from 1950-1984. While this period of Canada’s history has not necessarily been overlooked, it has existed in a somewhat nebulous zone as far as its application in academic works, often used in a manner that fetishizes military history, or that emphasizes Canada’s anti-nuclear advocacy, but rarely in such a way that considers this history’s impact on current Canadian politics and foreign affairs. To understand how and why Canada became a custodial nuclear power, and ultimately chose to relieve this custodial capacity, is of the utmost importance in an age where continued nuclear development and proliferation is a reality. Similar circumstances to those that initially led to Canada accepting nuclear weapons on behalf of the US may very well arise again. This possibility, along with the prospect of a looming Trump presidency that intends to pull America from NATO (Barnes and Cooper 2019), points towards a future where Canada will need to reassess not only its relationship with the US, but with nuclear weapons. 1.1 Research Questions and Objectives The main question this study will seek to answer is: what were the circumstances that created an environment wherein Canada first sought to become a custodial nuclear power, and then ultimately abandon this capability? This question will be answered in such a manner that places the US-Canada relationship at its center rather than the US-Soviet binary that defined the wider Cold War. Writing on this topic has waned considerably in the 21st century, with contemporary acknowledgement of this history often being reserved for anti-3 nuclear advocacy. While older work, such as that written during the Cold War and shortly after on the topic, present the affair of Canadian nuclear custody as international in character, paying little attention to the deeper political and economic relationship with the US that defined Canadian nuclear possession. More than answering this main research question however, my study will have several other objectives. One such objective, and perhaps the most pertinent given recent geopolitical developments, is to understand Canada’s current stance on nuclear weapons, including our own nuclear philosophy and policy, and how these have changed over time with dramatic shifts occurring in the 1950s and 1980s, wherein the popularity of nuclear weapons waxed and waned. While Canada publicly presents itself as a leader in global peace initiatives and staunchly against the continued development of nuclear weapons (Government of Canada 2022), our position in NATO and NORAD contradicts this. This study will also include some speculation on future US-Canadian relations and its impact on national attitudes, a topic I believe worthy of discussion because of these attitudes’ potentiality to drive Canada to seek to nuclear capabilities once again. In answering this question and achieving these objectives, my study will help shed a more contemporary light on this period of Canadian history, which has important implications in 2024. But more than this, it will expose some serious problems in the past and present US-Canada relationship and how it has impacted Canadian national security and nuclear policy. 1.2 Literature Review, Theoretical Approach, and Methods This topic of the Canadian custody of nuclear weapons from 1950-1984 has seemingly fallen out of trend in recent academic literature. While scholars writing during the Cold War discussed Canadian nuclear custody with considerable passion, speaking on how it impacted Canadian sovereignty and security, recent historical works tend to cite the topic in passing as an example of nuclear dispossession in wider discussion on global anti-nuclear advocacy. Recent Canadian anti-nuclear literature, such as Joanna Dean’s A Gendered Sense of Nature which discusses the Canadian reaction to, and protest against, the America nuclear tests on Amchitka Island, while powerful in its gender and feminist-based approach, does not touch on the complex economic, political, and military relationship between Canada and the 4 US concerning nuclear weapons (Dean 2019, 281-297). While this is also an important area of study, it is somewhat disconcerting that the topic is considered in such a limited capacity, as it is this history that served as the basis for current Canadian national security and nuclear policy. This study aims to revitalize and add to this waning area of research, considering the topic from a unique angle that hopefully inspires similar works in the future that further expand on this critical part of Canada’s history. However, even in literature written during the Cold War that considers Canadian nuclear custody in depth, there seems to be a lack of critical analysis concerning the Canadian-US relationship. Works such as Reginald Whitaker and Gary Marcuse’s Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957 is a wealth of information as far as the chronological order of events, but ultimately lacks a critical angle when it comes to understanding the underlying power dynamics, besides the Soviet-US binary, that resulted in Canadian nuclear weapon possession (Whitaker and Marcuse 1994). A similar error is made in John Clearwater’s Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada's Cold War Arsenal where, despite making use of recently (as of 1998) declassified documents, fails to bring any theoretical critique to the wider issue of nuclear development and proliferation (Clearwater 1998). Even works as recent as Sean M. Maloney’s Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War, lacks an analysis of the shortcomings of NATO nuclear practice and national security, instead framing NATO actions as necessary reactions to the Warsaw Pact (Maloney 2007). These previous academic shortcomings are among the questions my study will aim to address. Although this study will take a largely grounded approach to research, it is important to note my own personal ideological framework in which I will situate my research. I intend to conduct this study from a critical theory perspective. While I initially planned to structure my approach around C. Wright Mills’ theory of the Power Elite, especially when it came to an understanding of the Canadian-US economic and military relationship, I quickly found that this would have been an oversimplification of the complex and multileveled power dynamic witnessed between the two nations throughout the Cold War and into the present. This is not to say that Mills’ work has been disregarded in this study, rather I still view his theory as immensely pertinent within this conversation, however I have chosen not to include it as a focus of this study as I felt it would take it beyond its practical scope. Indeed, I found 5 that there were very few pre-existing theories that could serve as a framework in which to explain Canada’s political, economic, and military position. Thus, I have opted to rely on a sociological theory which focuses not on individual power-holders as Mills’, but rather the winder nationalist mindset in Canada in an attempt to better understand the nuances of the Canadian-US relationship and, perhaps more importantly, how it is publicly perceived today. This decision to include critical theory in my approach is first and foremost because I believe it will lend itself well to the theoretical side of this study, which will critically analyze the political and economic motivations behind nuclear development and proliferation. However, it will be Umut Ozkirimli’s work on nationalism that will serve as the main theoretical framework for this study. Ozkirimli, political scientist at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Istanbul University, describes the different ways nationalism may appear in various nations and cultures based on a sense of shared history and material conditions. The culmination of centuries of work, Ozkirmli compiles, and builds off many preexisting theories of nationalism in a manner that is both clear and digestible. Although I doubt he would consider himself a Critical Theorist, Ozkirimli’s work has been instrumental in the development of this study’s explanation for the current state of nationalism in Canada. Beyond this, his work will also help develop an understanding of why a nation such as Canada is willing to sacrifice its sovereignty in the name of security. Despite looking at several theories throughout this study, they will all ultimately be framed within Ozkirimli’s wider discussion on nationalism. A major aspect of the theoretical side of this study will also be considering how and why Canada became a custodial nuclear power; what were the political and economic conditions that resulted in the national mindset on nuclear weapons to change over time? To assist in this question, I will draw heavily on Mark Bell’s theory of Nuclear Opportunism, in which he presents a theory for why nations pursue nuclear capability, and what they will ultimately use this nuclear capability for, be it towards political, militaristic, or economic ends. Bell’s work is perhaps the only contemporary effort at a comprehensive theoretical framework for nuclear possession (Bell 2021). Bell’s theory of Nuclear Opportunism will assist in developing an understanding not so much of how Canada became nuclear capable, but why and for what reasons. 6 I will be utilizing the practices of diplomatics and discourse analysis as a means to expose the underlying power dynamics contained within pre-existing literature, be it primary or secondary sources. Diplomatics refers to this study’s approach to archival sources, wherein, instead of taking them at face value, diplomatics requires that archival sources be considered not purely for the factual claims made within, but for their origins and relationship to the truth relative to other narratives (Duranti 1989). By following this approach, a single source that at face value merely depicts a correspondence between two actors and perhaps makes several factual claims, may yield considerably more information about a subject or period through the consideration of its contents in relation to other narratives. Diplomatics therefore will rely heavily on this study’s ability to engage in discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is a way of reading texts, chiefly primary sources, where both linguistic content and sociolinguistic context are taken into account, leading to a given text yielding far more information than what is simply in writing. This will be especially valuable when analyzing correspondence, where the contextual relationships behind a text will be considered, such as underlying power dynamics. These selected methods have proven valuable in the field of history, where they have been used to extract meanings and contexts from texts that at surface value may appear lacking in sociolinguistic information. Upon further inspection with the use of diplomatics and discourse analysis, such sources have the potential of being invaluable. 1.3 Research Design and Methodology As a historian and sociologist belonging to the most recent generation of academics, I have been deeply influenced by the injustices that plague our age. The world is confronted by multiple threats; climate change, growing wealth inequality, the failure of the democratic process, all of which weigh heavy on my mind. It is for this reason I drifted toward critical theory for assistance in understanding why these injustices not only persist in our world, but are seemingly internalized, and ultimately ignored. This critical lens is something that has been lacking from much of the prior work on the topic of Canadian nuclear possession. This is in part due to the period in which the majority of this work was written. There were two main waves wherein literature on this topic boomed, the first was in the midst of the 7 neoliberal fervor of the late Cold War during the Reagan Presidency (1981-1989), and the second, in the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Center (2001-2008). Both these periods saw renewed support for NATO and burgeoning interest in topics of national security. Thus, much of the literature emerging from these two periods on Canadian nuclear history and policy follow a common narrative that neglects any sociological angle, choosing to focus instead on the historical and political aspects that can more easily be used to bolster - or profit off of - national support. My study design combines several approaches in order to comprehensively analyze the topic of Canadian nuclear possession. My background in history, sociology, and interdisciplinary studies therefore positions me well for such an undertaking. I have considerable experience working in archives and analyzing history from a theoretical perspective, both of which will be major aspects in such a study. In order to accomplish such an undertaking, I have developed a methodological framework specifically tailored to this topic. I will begin by taking a traditional approach from history of arranging events in a chronology in order to properly situate the study moving forward. A firm understanding of when events happened, and in what order, will be vital when considering the underlying dynamics that influenced such events. Although similar chronologies have been completed in the past on Canadian nuclear custody, such as in John Clearwater’s Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada's Cold War Arsenal (1998, 18-21), the research I have conducted in the National Archives of Canada on classified materials and materials that have only recently become declassified allows me to achieve a more accurate and detailed chronology than has thus far been produced. Much of my time over the past year was spent working in archives, both virtual and physical. Chief among these was the National Library and Archives of Canada in Ottawa. Here I was granted access to vast quantities of primary materials, from letters, biographies, and of course official correspondence. While some of the work analyzed for this study remains classified, and are thus not citable, insights from such documents were nonetheless instrumental for understanding the Canadian-US relationship and its current trajectory. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that while such sources are missing from the bibliography, they were immensely influential in developing the wider theoretical approach of this study. For example, much of Lester B. Pearson’s archives, which I gained access to 8 after a background check and security clearance, remain classified. However, from correspondence and journal entries drawn from this archive I was able to gain insight into his personal beliefs and attitudes on peoples and events. Thus, despite being unable to cite such sources, they came to influence this study considerably. Besides visiting the National Library and Archives in person in the summer of 2023, I also utilized their online archive extensively, where a great deal of relevant documentation has already been digitized, such as the MC 48 and MC 14/2 NATO agreements, which are the cornerstone documents of this study. I also made use of various other archives and databases, including the American National Archives, the Canadian War Museum, and the Canada Aviation and Space Museum, the latter of which I also was privileged to visit in person in the summer of 2023. These sources were invaluable, especially when it came to obtaining the imagery used in this study. Physical and digital documents, many of which are primary sources, therefore serve as the chief body of information drawn on for this study. However, beyond this, I also consulted the highly skilled archivists at the above listed institutions, some of which suggested further documents and works which have served as valuable sources of knowledge in and of themselves. 1.4 Outline This study begins by outlining Canada’s history with nuclear weapons, from when they first entered the country, through the period of Canadian custody, to when the final weapons were retrieved by the US. As the most technical chapter of the study, it also serves as a chronology of the major technical and political developments relevant to Canadian nuclear custody. This will include detailed accounts of all the major milestones that led up to nuclear acquisition for Canada. Through the analysis of considerable quantities of archival documents, some of which remains classified as well as that which only recently became declassified, this chapter details the number, location, and type of nuclear weapons Canada was in possession of. Furthermore, an understanding of the bilateral nature of Canadian possession will be established with a particular focus on what this meant for not only Canadian security, but Canadian sovereignty. Lastly, this chapter will look at the 9 anticlimactic dispossession of the Canadian nuclear arsenal, thus bringing a close to the short-lived age of Canadian nuclear possession. Chapter 3 will analyze the philosophy that not only led to Canadian nuclear acquisition, but bound the nation to a common nuclear doctrine, a doctrine which, as will be seen, had more to do with economic security, than national security. This chapter will also include a critical look at the motivations behind this doctrine, mainly, the threat of a Soviet invasion, which despite serving as the basis for considerable Cold War fears, was perhaps far less likely than was assumed by the public. Beyond this, it will consider the difficult position Canada inhabited as a junior ally to a world superpower during the Cold War, and how this position often left Canada and its leaders feeling powerless and desperate for a sense of representation. Finally, chapter 4 takes us into the more theoretical aspects of this study and considers how Canadian nationalism impacted nuclear acquisition, and vice versa. But more than this, this chapter considers the current state of Canadian nationalism and how it has been deeply influenced not by domestic, but by extra-national forces, chiefly the US, but also through the actions or inactions of other NATO members, such as France and Britain. This will include a deeper analysis of the Canadian nationalist movement’s lack of national identity and a continued failure to correctly identify their national interest. As the most contemporary part of the study, this chapter remains open ended, presenting predictions for how Canadian nationalism will shift in the near future and what this will mean for Canadian national defense, and possibly Canadian nuclear possession. An alternative form of nationalism is presented as a possible result of shifting political attitudes which I claim may even serve as a potential solution to the waning sovereignty and security of Canada. 1.5 Implications As much as the world wishes to move on from the tumultuous, and at times deadly, memory that was the Cold War, its implications are far too pertinent to ever truly be left behind. Indeed, recent trends seem to point towards an increasing value of this period's most volatile tool, nuclear weapons. China and North Korea continue to expand their nuclear arsenals, and both the United States and Russia have recently dedicated hundreds of billions of dollars to modernization programs for their respective nuclear stockpiles (Gilli 2020). This 10 in tandem with the American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019 (BBC 2019), and the Russian withdrawal from the New Strategic Arms Ratification Treaty (START) in 2023 speaks of a doom that many believed - and hoped - had been left in the past (CBC 2023). A failure to understand the past can lead to avoidable historical repetitions, and given that we are approaching, or are perhaps already in what appears to be a renewed Cold War, Canada and its leaders would be wise to analyze this past for help in navigating the present. For Canada will soon be forced to reevaluate its position in an increasingly volatile geopolitical scene. Despite our involvement in such campaigns as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTB) (Government of Canada 2022), Canada remains to this day a supporter of American nuclear policy. This support comes through its involvement, both militarily and monetarily, in the American-dominated North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Both of these institutions continue to rely on nuclear weapons as their chief means of national defense, of which Canada is a primary beneficent (Keating and Pratt 1988, 49-82). In lieu of recent events, principally the outbreak of war in Ukraine and the abandonment of the INF and New START treaties, the topic of Canadian nuclear possession, both past and present, is perhaps approaching a second wind, or at least it should be. If questions such as those that this study puts forward and others which critically analyze Canada’s past are not asked, it is possible that Canada and its leaders may blunder into a situation eerily similar to that of the Cold War, where we continue to piggyback off of US security practices, rather than take command of our own national security. Ultimately, this study will be part of a wider pursuit of mine to influence change in Canadian national security and nuclear policy. I see the current state of these fields as in need of a great deal of improvement, and this improvement should start with taking an independent stance from that of the US, who has in recent history displayed little willingness to pursue practical means towards nuclear non-proliferation and decommissioning. I feel that I have a certain responsibility as a Canadian citizen who is witnessing injustice committed against our nation to do what I can to influence change. I am greatly concerned about Canada’s present and future national security, and I believe my ability to critically analyze 11 the past may help, however little, steer current events in a safer and more desirable direction for all Canadians. 12 2. Canada Joins the Club: Nuclear Acquisition, Possession, and Disarmament The story of Canada’s path to nuclear acquisition is a long one, involving several prime ministers of different political orientation and spanning nearly two decades. The ultimate decision to acquire nuclear weapons would prove to be one of the most controversial actions in Canadian history, and despite only lasting 21 years, it briefly brought Canada into the exclusive ranks of the world nuclear club. But even within this exclusive club, Canada proved unique, for not only was it one of the few nations to possess nuclear weapons, it was one of the even fewer nations that shared bilateral control over nuclear weapons and eventually chose to willingly give them up. This chapter will consider this story, following it chronologically, from the beginnings of Canadian cooperation with the US in their bid for nuclear supremacy, to the political debates that took place prior to nuclear acquisition, to the first time nuclear weapons entered Canada, and finally, until ultimate dispossession. In this process we will encounter the major players and institutions that allowed for a supposed peace-loving nation to come into possession of the deadliest weapon humans have thus far devised. Moreover, this chapter will include a more technical analysis of the actual number, types, and locations of Canadian nuclear weapons and the ways in which Canadian leaders justified their possession, much of which draws on recently declassified, or previously unpublished documentation. This chapter is therefore the culmination of nearly 40 years of Canadian history and countless works conducted on the topic of Canadian nuclear possession. Relying on primary sources and pre-existing studies, this chapter aims to create a decisive chronology and categorization of the technological and political advancements relevant to Canadian nuclear possession. In doing so, it will lay the technical groundwork in which the more theoretical aspects of this study will be conducted. 2.1 The Pre-Nuclear Period (1945-1963) The path to Candain nuclear possession began with an end, specifically of a war, one which ended in a (literal) bang, left swaths of Europe and Asia ravaged, and rearranged the global balance of power. The Second World War saw the rise of two new world superpowers, diametrically opposed ideologically, whose rivalry would come to define the 13 next half century. The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) emerged from the war in greatly elevated positions, with each rapidly attempting to expand their sphere of influence in the vacuum that was created by the fall of the Axis powers and the waning of old colonial powers. Many nations were caught in the middle of this power struggle, desperate to secure a place for themselves in this new world order (Yoshihide 2004). Canada was one such nation. In the wake of the Second World War, there was significant uncertainty concerning whether the US would continue to serve as the bulwark of the so-called ‘free world’ or if they would retreat back into isolationism, as they did after the First World War. Thus, other democratic nations were swift to do what they could to appease the US and entice them to remain within the international scene. The culmination of such appeasement was the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April 4th 1949, a military and economic alliance of democratic nations led by the US. While other efforts, such as the American Marshall Plan helped serve similar political goals, it was NATO that ultimately rallied the western world to the US. Isolation was no longer an option for the new world superpower, much to the relief of nations such as Canada desperately seeking a return to a civilian lifestyle, but also global security in the face of a spreading communism in the East (Whitaker and Marcuse 1994, 10-16). NATO paved the way for further military collaboration between the US and its allies, and with the first successful Soviet nuclear test on August 29th 1949, many nations were quick to seek additional security from this newfound threat. Canada emerged from the Second World War in a similar, if not greatly scaled down, position to that of the US. It had been spared the worst of the fighting in Europe and had seen its industries develop significantly over the past decade in supplying its allies in Europe. Because of its close relationship with both the US and Britain, Canada had even been included in the Manhattan Project, which eventually devised the first atomic bomb (Whitaker and Marcuse 1994, 20), although this involvement was mainly the case because the US relied on a supply of heavy water extracted from Trail, B.C. and uranium mined in the North West Territories that was enriched by the US for use in the manufacturer of some of the first nuclear bombs (Maloney 2007, 78). However, from the moment the bombs became public after their use on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many Canadians developed a considerable fear of the bomb. They did not 14 view the weapon as a means to swiftly end wars, or spare soldiers’ lives. Instead, like many nations outside of the US, Canada saw the destruction wrought by the bomb and sought not to acquire it, but whatever means were available to defend themselves against it, especially after the Soviets acquired their own atom bomb in 1949. A fear gripped the nation, wherein many believed that the next war, should these weapons be used, would certainly be the last (Whitaker and Marcuse 1994, 20). This fear inevitably drove Canada closer to the US in search of defense against such weapons, and after the foundation of NATO, Canada had officially aligned itself strategically with the American military. Despite Canada’s aversion to the bomb, the American doctrine stipulated that the best means of defense against an enemy nuclear strike was a series of stations that hosted smaller defensive nuclear weapons. It gradually became clear to Canadian leaders that, in order to placate fears of a nuclear strike, Canada would have to seek nuclear weapons for themselves. The St. Laurent government (1948-1957) was the first to seriously consider how Canada may acquire nuclear weapons, and on the 22nd of November 1954, it agreed to the MC 48 document, which bound NATO allies to a similar strategic response to any future war that involved the use of nuclear weapons (Maloney 2007, 39). In 1955, St. Laurent toyed with idea of domestic nuclear weapon production, despite previous governments announcing that Canada would never seek to acquire nuclear weapons of its own. However, it was decided that the weapons did not serve enough strategic value to justify the immense cost that would come with domestic production. If the weapons were needed, purchasing them from an ally made far more economic sense (Maloney 2007, 69-78). As one of his final acts in office, St. Laurent signed the MC 14/2 NATO agreement on the 23rd of May 1957, which expanded on the MC 48 document. It stipulated that Canada would abide and assist the US in any way it could concerning the defense of North America, which may include the stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian territory (Maloney 2007, 298). Thus, as early as the mid-1950s, Canada had already taken significant steps in the process that would lead to nuclear acquisition nearly a decade later. However, prior to actual nuclear acquisition, Canada took considerable action to appease the US in regards to its strategic aims and the defense of North America, such as their cooperation with the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, a $750 (CAD) million dollar 15 ($8 billion in 2024 after being adjusted for inflation) venture completed in July of 1957 that saw the construction of a number of radar stations stretching from Alaska to Greenland meant to give advance warning of any Soviet invasion over the Arctic (Maloney 2007, 23). Indeed, Canadian leaders found it exceedingly difficult during this period to abide by the strategic aims of the US and NATO while maintaining Canadian sovereignty. It began to seem that security and sovereignty were rapidly becoming mutually exclusive. Even if Canadian leaders pushed back against certain American aims, they quickly found it was impossible to resist for any extended length of time. The US simply held too much power through NATO and later bilateral treaties for Canada to seriously object to anything (Whitaker and Marcuse 1994, 145). For example, despite many Canadian leaders and military officials believing the best course of action for their nation and NATO was to build up conventional forces to deter a Soviet land invasion of Europe during the early Cold War period (1945-1958), they stood by while the US realigned its strategic focus to its nuclear arsenal, all but guaranteeing the next war would involve their use (Maloney 2007, 217). The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), founded on the 12th of September 1957, was the culmination of US strategic pressure on Canada. Unlike NATO, NORAD was a bilateral treaty exclusive to the US and Canada that was meant to strengthen the defense of North American airspace. NORAD gave the US a far greater ability to station aircraft and lease air bases on Canadian territory, although, Canada had already been leasing air bases to the US since at least 1950, which included giving the US permission to station armed nuclear capable bombers and conduct refueling missions over Canada prior to the NORAD agreement (Maloney 2007, 13). Nonetheless, NORAD paved the way to nearly unlimited military cooperation between the US and Canada and can be viewed as fulfilling the technical requirements that were needed for Canadian nuclear acquisition. Therefore, by September of 1957 the three pillars of Canadian nuclear acquisition had been established; the MC 48 and MC 14/2 NATO agreements, which will be analyzed in more detail shortly, and the NORAD bilateral treaty. If Canada was legally and technically prepared to acquire nuclear weapons as early as September of 1957, why did it take another six years for nuclear weapons to come into its possession? The answer can be found in the efforts of one man, Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. Diefenbaker was the leader of the Progressive Conservative party and 16 Canadian Prime Minister from 1957-1963. He was known for his conservative values and staunch commitment to the ‘old’ Canadian ways. As a loyalist to Britain, and possessing a profound dislike for the Americans, it was clear from the beginning of his Prime Ministry that he would do all in his power to maintain Canadian sovereignty and save it from the clutches of American militarism. This manifested in the nuclear acquisition discussions, which by the time of his election in June 1957, were already well under way. One of his first actions in office was the reluctant signing of the NORAD treaty, which was largely thanks to efforts of the previous Liberal government. Most Canadians at the time approved of the formation of NORAD, and thus for Diefenbaker to scrap the treaty so early in his leadership would have been tantamount to political suicide (Maloney 2007, 100-103). Therefore, by the time he completed his first year in office, the fundamental groundwork for nuclear acquisition had already been laid. Diefenbaker is remembered for spending much of his time in power resisting American and internal pressure from the Department of National Defense for Canadian nuclear acquisition. He believed that, if Canada accepted nuclear weapons from the US, it would give them far too much power over Canadian national security and air defense, making the nation all but reliant on their neighbor to the South (Maloney 2007, 153). Part of this resistance was appointing Howard Green as Secretary of State for External Affairs. Similar to Diefenbaker in his ideological and political alignments, Green believed he was sent by God to rid the Earth of nuclear weapons (Maloney 2007, 173). Diefenbaker and Green began spouting this narrative in tandem with a considerable upturn in Canadian anti-nuclear advocacy in the early 1960s, which came off the heels of the publication of several studies warning about the harms of radiation caused by nuclear tests. But, even with this growing awareness, nuclear weapons remained overwhelmingly positive in the public opinion. Until the election of 1963, Diefenbaker and Green did all in their power to delay Canadian nuclear acquisition, which by this time was all but inevitable. They were so committed to this goal that it significantly marred the US relationship with Canada, who, until Diefenbaker’s Prime Ministry were under the impression Canada was fully prepared to accept nuclear weapons once the proper arrangements were in place (Unknown Author 1962). 17 By the 1963 election, Diefenbaker had already proven to be a highly unpopular Prime Minister, in part because of his anti-nuclear stance at a time when Canadian approval for nuclear acquisition had skyrocketed to 60% (in no small part due to the Cuban missile Crisis of October 1962). Even his own party attempted to have him removed as leader, when in February during a cabinet meeting Diefenbaker nearly resigned after it became clear he no longer had the support of the Canadian people (Maloney 2007, 294). He ended his last year in office with only a 34% approval rating and on April 8th, 1963, he lost by a landslide to Liberal Party leader Lester B. Pearson (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2018). Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson was the architect of Canadian nuclear acquisition. Having served as Secretary of State for External Affairs under the St. Laurent Government (1948-1957), Pearson had been present for the formation of NATO as well as the signing of MC 48 and MC 14/2. He was therefore well versed on Canada’s bid to become nuclear capable. However, as a member of External Affairs, which had traditionally harbored anti-nuclear sentiments, Pearson’s attitudes towards nuclear weapons were less than accepting for quite some time. In 1960, he declared publicly as Leader of the official opposition and Liberal Party that Canada’s efforts would be better spent building up its conventional forces than wasting time and money on the development of nuclear capable interceptors and the leasing of American nuclear weapons, which, in his opinion, were an infringement on Canadian sovereignty (Maloney 2007, 217). However, this attitude would rapidly shift as Diefenbaker and Green further pursued their anti-nuclear crusade. By the 1963 election, Pearson had entirely shifted his rhetoric, although he maintained that exclusive control of nuclear weapons was not necessary for Canada, he embraced the concept of ‘custody’ wherein Canada would bilaterally control nuclear weapons stationed on Canadian soil alongside the US (Clearwater 1998, 35). What exactly caused this shift in Pearson’s moral compass is unclear, as he discusses the topic of nuclear weapons shockingly little in his memoirs and personal correspondence, but it almost certainly had to do with the rising public support for Canadian nuclear acquisition which at the time was causing Diefenbaker’s approval rating to plummet (Pearson 1975, 30-58). As leader of the official opposition, Pearson likely saw a chance to win some easy votes and seized the opportunity, or perhaps he genuinely believed Canadian custody of nuclear weapons would be beneficial to the nation. 18 Pearson saw in MC 48 and MC 14/2, which were signed under St. Laurent, the means for Canada to acquire nuclear weapons. Although the documents were not originally signed with the intention of allowing junior NATO partners to acquire nuclear weapons on lease from the US, the language contained within could be presented as just that. For example, MC 48 stated: In any examination of how these advantages can best be offset and overcome, it is essential to keep in mind that in the event of war the primary tasks of the NATO forces would be not only to survive the enemy’s initial attacks, but also to retaliate immediately with atomic weapons. To be able to carry out these tasks successfully, it is necessary for NATO to take measures to [...] ensure that, in the event of aggression, NATO forces would be able to initiate immediate defensive and retaliatory operations including the use of atomic weapons (The North Atlantic Military Committee 1954, 236-237). Furthermore: The forces of NATO should be provided with an integrated atomic capability for use as rapidly as possible in order to give them maximum deterrent power and the ability to participate effectively in an immediate atomic counter-offensive in the event of war (The North Atlantic Military Committee 1954, 249) While these statements alone may have been grounds enough for Pearson to argue that MC 48 bound Canada to nuclear collaboration, if not direct nuclear possession, MC 14/2 also stipulated that: Since the chief objective of NATO is to prevent war by creating an effective deterrent and since a vital element of the deterrent force is located in North America, the knowledge throughout the world that the Strategic Air Command base complex cannot be successfully attacked is of prime importance (The North Atlantic Military Committee 1957, 306). According to this statement, Canada was required to defend its Strategic Air Command bases - which after the signing of the NORAD treaty in 1957 increased exponentially - with all means at NATO’s disposal, including defensive nuclear weapons should they be deemed necessary. In addition to this, when speaking of the defense of the northern regions of North America, MC 14/2 notes: 19 “The objectives for this area are; a. To provide an effective base for, and effective protection of, the strategic nuclear counter-offensive capability; b. Maintenance of an effective early warning and air defense system; c. Protection of as much of the industrial, mobilization and military potential, and population as practicable” (The North Atlantic Military Committee 1957, 306-307). Pearson used these documents to argue that Canada had accepted the responsibility of nuclear acquisition as early as 1954 with the signing of MC 48 and doubled down with the signing of MC 14/2 in 1957. With the formation of NORAD in 1957, he saw the means to practically carry out the process of Canadian nuclear acquisition as the US now had considerable military access to Canadian air bases. Thus, one of Pearson’s first major actions in office was a government-to-government agreement with the US on the bilateral control of nuclear weapons to be stationed in Canada as soon as was practicable (Maloney 2007, 313). For a detailed timeline chronologizing the path to Canadian acquisition, consult figure 1. 20 2.2 The Canadian Nuclear Arsenal Figure 1. Approximate timeline detailing the process of Canadian nuclear acquisition. Although a great deal of importance was placed on Canada to become nuclear capable and in turn better defend the Northern approaches to the US, nuclear weapons had in fact entered Canada far before any official government-to-government agreement was signed. Goose Bay in Labrador was constructed during the Second World War as a joint base of operations for the Canadian, American, and British air forces on the northern East Coast of North America, although the base was officially on Canadian territory and under the Canadian Armed Forces’ control. In 1950, the Canadian government authorized nuclear storage sites to be constructed under the utmost secrecy. By the summer, American Strategic 21 Air Command brought 11 model 1561 Fat Man and Mark 4 atomic bombs to the base where they remained until December (Clearwater 1998, 18). Later, it was revealed the bombs were brought in for use by American B36 bombers “in the event of an emergency” (Maloney 2007, 12), what type of emergency would warrant their use was not revealed until the MC 48 and MC 14/2 agreements. However, despite the Canadian government agreeing to construct the storage sites, no official approval was given for the weapons to enter the country at that time. Nonetheless, Goose Bay served as a storage site for American nuclear weapons in transit until 1971 (Maloney 2007, 12-13). Therefore, nuclear weapons had entered Canada long before official acquisition. However, the bombs stored at Goose Bay were under strict American control, wherein Canada merely provided the facility for their storage. But after Pearson succeeded in brokering a government-to-government agreement with the US on the bilateral control and storage of nuclear weapons in Canada, the way was cleared for bombs to come into Canadian possession for the first time. On a cold winter’s night in 1963, the first nuclear weapons officially entered Canadian possession. The Canadian Armed Forces poised to receive the weapons had been preparing for this moment for nearly a decade, having gone as far as receiving the actual housing complexes of the various weapons for training purposes (Maloney 2007, 220). But now the warheads themselves were loaded onto trucks and shipped to their various destinations. Officially, nuclear weapons were deployed to 6 Canadian bases; North Bay, La Macaza, Chatham, Comox, Bagotville, and Val d’Or. Between the bases were a total of 3 American designed defensive nuclear delivery systems: the CIM-10 BOMARC surface-to-air missile, the MGR-1 Honest John surface-to-surface rocket system, and the W25 Genie air-to-air rocket. In addition to these defensive systems in Canada, the 8 Canadian CF-104 Starfighter squadrons (about 90 aircraft) in Europe were supplied with offensive tactical nuclear weapons. In total, these delivery systems amounted to 270-390 warheads at the peak of Canadian nuclear possession in 1965; 56 CIM-10 BOMARCs, 16 MGR-1 Honest Johns, 108 W25 Genies carried by CF-101 Voodoo jets, and anywhere from 90-210 tactical nuclear weapons of unknown make and model for use by the CF-104 Starfighter squadrons in Europe (Clearwater 1998, 18-21). Each of these systems were acquired by Canada for unique roles in the defense or offensive requirements of the nation as stipulated by NATO and NORAD. 22 The BOMARC was a surface-to-air missile system, meaning it was launched from a ground-based carrier to defend against an aerial attack. These ‘carriers’ were each the size of a small house, and often up to 28 BOMARCs were prepared for deployment at any given time from their site of storage. Thus these housing complexes were often quite large, taking up a significant area as is seen in figure 2. Each BOMARC unit was armed with a 10 kiloton W40 fission warhead and had a range of 700 kilometers making it ideal for aerial defense in Canada with its vast northern approaches (Hemsch 1992). 2 squadrons existed in Canada, one stationed at North Bay and another at La Macaza. By stationing the BOMARCs at these locations in Southern Ontario and Quebec, they could effectively be used to defend the northern approach to the Canadian and American industrial centers on the East coast (Clearwater 1998, 58). The sleek rocket-like design of the BOMARC made them an easy publicity piece (see figure 3), and because of this, and the fact they were the first weapons to become operational in Canada, they quickly became the face of Canadian nuclear acquisition. Figure 2. Unknown Photographer. 2014. “North Bay CFB BOMARC Site.” Uploaded February 24, 2014. https://www.fortwiki.com/File:North_Bay_CFB_BOMARC_Site.jpg. The 28 BOMARC missiles stored at North Bay each had their own housing complex and were prepared to launch at a moments notice until their retirement in 1972. 23 Figure 3. Unknown Photographer. 2009. “Bomarc Missiles.” Uploaded June 3, 2009. https://www.fortwiki.com/index.php?title=File:Bomarc_Missiles.jpg&oldid=81510. 4 American BOMARC missiles stand poised for launch from a base in Florida; their housing complexes had roofs that opened, allowing the missiles to stand on end. The MGR-1 Honest John, like the BOMARC, was a carrier launched rocket. Although the Honest John was a far earlier concept, designed as the very first surface-to-surface nuclear capable delivery system by the US, Canada did not receive the rockets until 1963, despite the US having made them available to NATO members in 1957. The exact dates of acquisition have yet to made publicly available, but from de-classified archival documents, it is clear the 4 defensive systems Canada had custody over likely arrived in the winter of 1963 (Unknown Author 1963).The Honest John was armed with the 20 kiloton M31 fission warhead with a range of only 24.8 kilometers (Wade 2003). The rockets were mobile, owing to their truck-mounted launching system, and were thus much more versatile in their combat application than the BOMARC, which required a stationary housing complex and launching system. However, the limited range of the rocket made it less viable for operations in Canada, as the truck-mounted launching system required road access within the 24.8 kilometer range of a missile’s target, an unlikely scenario given the vast expanses of the Canadian North and the requirements of defense. Therefore, it was decided that the rockets would serve a greater purpose in Europe in the defense against a Soviet conventional invasion. A total of 4 systems, each capable of launching 4 rockets each (for a grand total of 24 16 warheads) eventually made their way into the hands of Canadian forces operating in West Germany (Clearwater 1998, 19). The W25 Genie Rocket made up the great bulk of defensive nuclear weapons in Canada, with approximately 108 available to the Canadian Air Force’s CF-101 Voodoo fighter jets (see Figure 4). The W25 was the most widespread warhead in Canada, being stored and deployable at Comox (from June 1, 1965 - June 25, 1984), Chatham (from June 1, 1965 - March 31, 1975), Bagotville (from June 1, 1965 - April 11, 1984), and Val d’Or (from May 15, 1970 - March 31, 1975). Although the Genies were made available to Canada later than the BOMARC and Honest John systems, they were nonetheless some of the longest-lived, remaining operational until 1984 when Canada relieved the last of its nuclear weapons back to the US (Clearwater 1998, 192). As an air-to-air missile, the Genie was designed to be carried and fired by aircraft at aerial targets. Therefore, the range of the Genie was limited only by the range of the aircraft that carried it; the CF-101 Voodoos which carried Canada’s weapons had a top speed of 1,825 km/h and a maximum range of 2,450 kilometers, making them ideal for aerial defense over Canadian frontiers. Of all the defensive weapons hosted by Canada, the Genies had the lowest yield at only 1.7 kilotons. This low yield was by design, as the rockets were intended to intercept individual aerial targets at close range, where, if the blast produced by the rocket hitting its target was too large, the pilot may become an unintended casualty. Because of the rocket’s weight and size, each Voodoo was armed with only a single Genie, meaning that a maximum of only 54 Genies could be deployed at any given time, as this was the maximum number of Voodoos operational in Canada from 1961-1984 (Clearwater 1998, 20). Finally, Canada was host to a number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. While it is evident from the lack of declassified documentation on this area of Canadian nuclear possession that it was, and still is, considered a topic of secrecy, researchers have nonetheless been able to glean a basic understanding of Canada’s nuclear role in Europe. This role revolved around Canada’s CF-104 Starfighter aircraft which entered service just prior to nuclear acquisition in 1962. The CF-104 was purchased by Canada from the US with the explicit intention of it serving as a nuclear strike craft, as it was capable of delivering a number of tactical nuclear weapons of US design. Initially, a total of 8 Starfighter squadrons were deployed to Europe, however this number was later reduced to 6 in 1967, and then 25 down to just 3 in 1970 (Clearwater 1998, 91-116). This reduction is likely due to the growing importance placed on ICMBs throughout the 1960s and 1970s, along with the reduced concern of a Soviet conventional invasion or nuclear attack by bombers. The Canadian CF-104 could be made to accept three different designs of tactical nuclear weapons; the B28, B43, and the B57. The B28 and B43 were both thermonuclear (fusion) gravity bombs that were made in varying yields, ranging from 70 kilotons to ~1 megatons (Clearwater 1998, 91-116). The B57 was a fission gravity bomb, designed specifically to be dropped during supersonic flight. It had a yield ranging from 5-20 kilotons. The CF-104 Starfighter was the primary strike craft for the Canadian Air Force in Europe, originally manufactured by Lockheed but modified by Canadair to meet Canadian specifications and featured a sleek, almost rocket-like design. It had a top speed of 1,844 km/h and a maximum range of 2,630 kilometers and could deliver its nuclear payload to anywhere across Europe in a moment's notice (Clearwater 1998, 91-116). The CF-104 was eventually phased out, along with its nuclear weapons, for the CF-18 Hornet in the early 1980s, bringing an official end to the Canadian nuclear strike role in Europe. 26 Figure 4. Unknown Photographer. 1968. “CFB Chatham, Inspecting missile prior to loading onto CF 101 Voodoo aircraft, Left to Right, Cpl. V. MacFadyen, Cpl. J.G. Adams, Cpl. R. Leblanc and Cpl. J.L. Mather.” Library and Archives Canada. Accessed January 15, 2024. https://recherche-collection-search.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/home/record?app=fonandcol&IdNumber=4014845. A W25 warhead (likely a dummy round for training) is loaded onto a CF-101 Voodoo by Canadian Armed Forces 2.3 Bilateral Control The cornerstone of Canadian nuclear possession was the bilateral control arrangement that Prime Minister Pearson and President Johnson ultimately settled on. Without this unique arrangement, it is unlikely Pearson would have successfully sold the concept of nuclear possession to the Canadian public or his fellow liberal party members. After all, nuclear acquisition walked a fine line between an immensely costly and dangerous venture that was nonetheless vital to national security in the nuclear age. For Pearson, bilateral control was seemingly a solution; Canada could reap the benefits of nuclear defense and deterrence, while only having to foot the cost of the weapon’s maintenance and storage. Perhaps the more pertinent question was what bilateral control meant for Canadian sovereignty. 27 While thus far I have often referred to the Canadian ‘possession’ of nuclear weapons, a more appropriate term would be ‘custody’. Possession implies that Canada had complete control over its nuclear weapons and could therefore treat them as if they were legal property. However, this was not the case. The government-to-government agreement signed by Prime Minister Pearson and President Johnson, was very clear on the fact that the nuclear weapons that were to be supplied to Canada were the legal property of the US, not Canada. Unlike other arms deals between the US and Canada, where Canada purchased planes, tanks, and the like, and from that point on owned them as legal property and choose how to modify them, where to station them, how to use them, in the case of nuclear weapons, Canada was their custodian, rather than new owner. Nuclear weapons under Canadian custody remained the legal property of the US, and thus Canada could not modify, use, or move the bombs without American approval, despite them being deployed on Canadian territory and operated by Canadian crews (Clearwater 1998, 17). It is for this reason I refer to Canada during this period of possession as a custodial nuclear power. This was in fact a rather strict arrangement. At nearly all times nuclear weapons on Canadian territory were overseen by two teams; one consisting of qualified Canadian military officials, and another of qualified American military officials. The weapons were officially under bilateral control, as stipulated by the government-to-government agreement, meaning that any action conducted on the bombs required the approval of both teams, even in the event of their ultimate use (Clearwater 1998, 17). Perhaps the only exception to this arrangement was when the pilots of the CF-101 Voodoos or CF-109 Starfighters were alone in the cockpit of their plane armed with a nuclear weapon. However, even in this case the bombs supplied to the aircraft would have required an arming code that would need to be sent to the pilot prior to use, which would have been approved by both American and Canadian leaders. While this arrangement prevented the accidental or purposeful use of a nuclear bomb by a rogue pilot, it did not negate the possibility the bombs go missing in an accident or were taken with a defecting pilot. According to a draft on the Authorization for the Operational Use of Nuclear Weapons written on December 31st, 1963 - potentially several weeks after official Canadian acquisition - the exact circumstances in which the American teams would relieve nuclear weapons to sole Canadian custody for their ultimate use was still unclear (Unknown Author 28 1963). It would take several more weeks for a procedure to be firmly established, wherein consultation over the weapons’ use would occur at the senior levels of both respective governments and then come down the chain of command through a series of codes to the pilots and operational teams themselves (Clearwater 1998, 17). While this arrangement limited Canada’s ability to independently use the weapons in its custody, it also effectively gave Canada the power to veto their use. Neither overseeing team, or government for that matter, could independently call for the use of the bombs; instead, both sides would have to independently analyze the request and approve or disapprove, and, if one side denied the request, the weapons could not be used according to the agreement (Clearwater 1998, 17). Whether or not Canada would truly be capable of holding an America bent on war at bay from utilizing nuclear weapons is perhaps another question, but at the very least they could prevent the use of those weapons under their custody. For this reason, it is perhaps understandable why Prime Minister Pearson believed the arrangement did not diminish Canadian sovereignty; Canada may not have independent control over the use of its nuclear arsenal, but it did have an independent power to veto their use. But on this note, what exactly was the ‘intended use’ of this nuclear arsenal? What circumstances needed to arise for both the US and Canada to agree to the use of these weapons under bilateral control? 2.4 The ‘Intended Use’ of Canadian Nuclear Weapons The four nuclear delivery systems (and accompanying 6 warhead designs) were selected after nearly a decade of debate surrounding the defensive and offensive needs of Canada. As the greatest threat to Canada during the early Cold War period (1945-1958) was determined to be a two-pronged attack on behalf of the Soviet Union, one consisting of bombers entering North America via the Arctic, and the other of a conventional Soviet assault on Europe (Maloney 2007, 23), Canada sought to acquire weapons that would assist in the defense against such an attack. Thus 3 systems were selected for the defense of North America; the CIM-10 BOMARC, the MGR-1 Honest John, and the W25 Genie. The BOMARC and the Genie were meant to stop a Soviet bomber invasion before it could reach the industrial centers of 29 Southern Canada and the Eastern seaboard - or at the very least stall it until the Americans arrived. If the bombers were accompanied by some sort of ground assault or attempted beach landing, the Honest John would hopefully make quick work of landing craft and other ground-based vehicles (Maloney 2007, 24). Meanwhile, in Europe, the Canadian Starfighter squadrons, accompanied by other NATO-allied air forces, would be striking industrial and military targets in Russia and Eastern Europe, with the goal of cutting off supply chains and making it impossible for the Soviets to continue to wage war (Richter 2002, 132). Such was the intended use of Canadian nuclear weapons according to NATO military doctrine. Thankfully, the situation during the Cold War was never severe enough for Canada to have to use its nuclear arsenal. However, even in the event that Canada was forced to use the bombs in its possession, according to modern strategic military planning around nuclear warfare, it is unlikely that the scenario predicted by NATO and NORAD doctrine in the 1950s is how the situation would have realistically played out due to technological advancements that began to appear around this time. By 1963, the time of Canadian nuclear acquisition, America and Russia had already begun the manufacture of something that would usher in the next phase of the Cold War; the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). After the launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, and its ability to serve as a global positioning system, it was realized that this technology in combination with ICBMs, meant that the nuclear capable bomber was no longer the greatest threat in the initiation of a nuclear war. Now, an ICBM could be launched from the other side of the globe and still strike its target with near pinpoint accuracy. Despite the threat of ICMBs being known at the time of Canadian nuclear acquisition, the government-to-government agreement that specified what nuclear weapons Canada would have access to chose to base itself on the pre-existing Early Cold War doctrine, wherein a Soviet bomber invasion was perceived as the greatest threat to North America. Thus, all the defensive systems Canada acquired, while being highly effective against bombers and other aerial targets, were entirely useless against ICMBs which travel at supersonic speeds in high sub-orbit. Why the government-to-government agreement went through, when by 1963 it was known the Soviet bomber invasion was no longer the primary threat, is a question that remains today. Perhaps Prime Minister Pearson was aware of this fact, and saw the 30 agreement as less about the security of Canadian borders, but the security of Canadian political relations with the US, which had been badly damaged under the previous Diefenbaker government and its anti-nuclear stance. This is perhaps also why he baked into the agreement a ‘rust-out’ process, wherein after the service life of the weapons Canada acquired in the 1960s ended, they would be relieved to the US, rather than replaced with more modern variants (Maloney 2007, 309). Therefore, a new process was born, one which Canada would be doomed to repeat time and time again, wherein the nation reluctantly agreed to the purchase of arms from the US only to stall on the deal due to political disagreement or bureaucratic disorganization to the point that when acquisition finally occurs, the weapons in question are already outdated. Therefore, after billions of dollars had been spent on the construction of housing complexes and the training of personnel, the nuclear weapons Canada had spent so long waiting for were already obsolete and served as little more than a symbol of Canadian cooperation in the American nuclear philosophy. This is not to say that Canadian nuclear acquisition, which proved to be one of the single most controversial military decisions in Canadian history, was little more than a publicity stunt. It is certain that there were many people in the Pearson Government that believed nuclear acquisition would genuinely make Canada more secure, this is reflected in the fact that the BOMARC, Honest John, and Genie systems were not simply accepted as those systems recommended by the US, but rather, a great deal of time and effort was spent determining what systems best suited Canadian defensive and offensive needs (Unknown Author 1963). While their intentions were honest, their shortfall was relying on an outdated doctrine. Perhaps there were even those who accepted that nuclear acquisition, while possibly not making Canada more secure, would at the very least elevate the nation’s position in international politics as now being a member of the exclusive ‘nuclear club’. However, as we will see in the next chapter, even this political ‘advantage’ gained from nuclear acquisition proved to be part of a flawed mentality. 31 2.5 Disarmament As mentioned, Canadian nuclear possession was always viewed as a temporary measure to survive the most volatile phase of the Cold War. This is reflected in the fact that when the government-to-government agreement was signed for Canadian nuclear acquisition, there was no inclusion of a modernization program, but rather a ‘rust-out’ program. Despite the considerable hurdles that had been overcome for acquisition to occur, the weapons remained in Canada for only a little over two decades. While this could be explained by the simple fact the weapons had served their intended lifespan, and were now obsolete, it does not answer why Canada did not seek to modernize its arsenal. To understand why Canada’s existence as a custodial nuclear power was so short lived, we must return to the years prior to acquisition. During the St. Laurent years (1948-1957), it appeared that Canada was primed and willing to accept nuclear weapons as soon as a service-to-service and a government-to-government agreement could be finalized. In the eyes of America and other nuclear capable NATO allies this could not come soon enough, as the Cold War was well and truly heating up with the outbreak of proxy wars in Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam. Canada needed only to arrange the technical and political requirements that would enable nuclear acquisition, as was stipulated under the MC 48 and MC 14/2 NATO agreements. However, something occurred that perhaps very few predicted, Canada elected a progressive-conservative Prime Minister, one who was not only passionately opposed to US influence over Canada but was also a strong anti-nuclear advocate. Prime Minister Diefenbaker, along with his right-hand man Howard Green operating as Secretary of State for External Affairs, successfully managed to stall Canadian nuclear acquisition for the entirety of his time in office, despite nearly all the political and legal pieces being in place and a 60% public approval rating for Canadian nuclear acquisition (Maloney 2007, 294). Canadian nuclear acquisition was thus stalled for as much as 5 years by Diefenbaker, during which some of the most volatile events of the Cold War came to pass, including the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Evidence suggests that the specific delivery systems Canada was to gain custody over were decided upon by the early 1950s, when it was presumed a nuclear strike would be carried out by a Soviet bomber invasion over the arctic. The intention was for these delivery 32 systems to be supplied to Canada as soon as St. Laurent achieved a government-to-government agreement (Unknown Author, 1960). No one within NATO strategic planning could have predicted that finalizing such an agreement would drag on for another decade and into another Prime Ministry hell bent on resisting American military influence. Therefore, if Canadian nuclear acquisition had occurred when first intended by the St. Laurent Government and NATO strategic planning – perhaps as early as 1957 after the service-to-service agreement was finalized - the weapons Canada received would not have been outdated, as the Soviet bomber threat was considered legitimate until ~1958, and Canada would have served as a considerable source of deterrence in the Northern Hemisphere (Unknown Author, 1960). Here is important to consider the possibility that the ‘rust-out’ procedure included within the acquisition agreement, which bound Canada to disarmament by 1984, was some vestige of Pearson’s own moral ground concerning nuclear weapons. As mentioned, Pearson served as Secretary of State for External Affairs (1948 –1957), a department which traditionally harbored those politicians with more reserved views on nuclear weapons. It is thus doubtful that, upon his row with Diefenbaker and Green in the leadup to the 1963 election, Pearson abandoned any anti-nuclear sentiments he may have had. Rather, he likely viewed nuclear acquisition as a necessary evil if Canada was to survive a period of extreme militaristic and political volatility. Therefore, he may have perceived the ‘rust-out’ procedure as a safeguard against full Canadian commitment to nuclear cooperation. If we are to believe Pearson was aware of the outdated nature of Canada’s acquired arsenal, then the above becomes more pertinent; for Pearson effectively elevated Canada to the status of a world nuclear power - mostly at the expense of the Americans - which led to a perception of increased security among the Canadian public, despite the addition of only limited responsibility to the Canadian Armed Forces, all while remaining committed to eventual disarmament. In this, we may have to consider the possibility that Pearson’s actions were something close to ingenious, if we can overlook the fact that he effectively set in motion the contemporary Canadian reliance on the American military industrial complex. Official nuclear disarmament began in the late 1960s through to 1984 to very little fanfare. Although the liberal government of Pierre Trudeau initiated the ‘rust-out’ program earlier than was intended by NATO strategic planners amidst a dramatic rise in anti-nuclear 33 advocacy - in so doing painting himself as the popular figurehead of Canadian disarmament - it was clear from the initial government-to-government agreement signed between Pearson and President Johnson that Canada’s existence as a custodial nuclear power was always meant to be finite (Trudgen 2009). By the time of disarmament, Canada was losing very little in terms of defensive capability, as ICMBs had long negated the usefulness of the Canadian nuclear arsenal. But what had it ever truly gained? Nuclear acquisition was praised as a firm step by the Pearson Government towards a more secure Canada, but this ‘security’ only lasted 21 years, during which time Canada made itself a target of any future Soviet nuclear strike, increasingly bound itself to American military doctrine, and came to rely entirely on the purchase of American arms and equipment. Much of the impacts of Canadian nuclear custody, and eventual disarmament, thus remain within Canada’s politics, economy, and military. 34 3. Canada’s Nuclear Weapon Philosophy To begin this chapter, I believe it is necessary to reflect on what is implied when speaking of nuclear war, as presently and historically, the concept has been brought up all too casually as a viable means to defeating an enemy, or swiftly ending a war. The stark reality is that a “mere handful” of nuclear bombs can plunge the world into a new dark age. This was a fact that became realized quite early in the Cold War, as hydrogen bomb tests, such as the 1954 Castle Bravo detonation in the Bikini Atoll displayed for all to see the true destructive power of the atom. Military strategists in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact realized that a war involving even the limited use of nuclear weapons - i.e. use against military targets only - would devastate the Northern hemisphere (Sagan 1985, 38). While physical destruction of infrastructure would likely be reserved to those nations directly partaking in the war, the resulting fallout and firestorms would make many food and water sources poisonous and cause a 2-3 degree (celcius) drop in global temperatures. The lower agricultural yields caused by the temperature decrease would quickly catch up with global food supply chains; this would be further exacerbated by a breakdown in global trade and a famine on a previously unforeseen scale would follow. Hundreds of millions would succumb to starvation (Sagan 1985, 38). The population decrease, resulting from the war and famine, would see the collapse of social structures globally, governments would dissolve, militaries would splinter into factions, and something reminiscent of tribal warfare would spread over the globe, at least to those areas not choked by radiation (Sagan 1985, 38). This was the grim prophecy put forward by Carl Sagan in 1985. Although his claims have since been contested, it is generally agreed that after a nuclear war involving two or more major world powers, no true ‘victor’ could possibly emerge due to the devastating impact nuclear weapons would have globally, not just against adversaries (Monroe 2009, 21). It is therefore all the more surprising that for decades NATO structured its military planning and development around a 2-phase model of nuclear war. One phase occurring before and during a nuclear strike and consequent retaliation, and another occurring after the nuclear stockpiles had been expended (Maloney 2007, 39). Within this strategic planning, Canada inhabited a somewhat nebulous zone, for at once it acted as one of the US’s chief allies, however in and of itself it presented virtually no 35 threat to the Soviet Union other than its involvement in NATO and the access it granted to American forces within its territory. As we have seen, even the nuclear weapons eventually hosted on Canadian soil were for the most part defensive systems under bilateral control. In a first strike situation, where the Soviets initiated a nuclear attack against NATO, it was believed they would first target NATO bases in Europe to prevent a retaliatory strike before sending a massive conventional force West to secure key cities and territory (The North Atlantic Military Committee 1954, 236-237). While it was difficult to predict what the exact targets of a Soviet first strike would be, NATO nuclear bases were deemed primary targets. Prior to the advent of ICBMs, NATO strategists predicted a simultaneous attack on both European and North American NATO nuclear bases and defensive systems by large bombing fleets (Keeting and Pratt 1998, 64). Only in this arrangement could the Soviets possibly hope to prevent a retaliatory strike by NATO. Canada would therefore not be spared in this situation, as it hosted American nuclear bombing fleets as well as defensive nuclear missiles. While it remains unknown whether the Soviets would have targeted Canadian population centers directly, we can be certain that cities such as Toronto, Kingston, Windsor, and Ottawa would be caught in the crossfire of a Soviet-US nuclear war if only because of their proximity to major US population centers and the sheer scale of a hydrogen bomb blast and fallout radius. As we have also discussed, Soviet bombers would need to fly over Canadian airspace to reach their targets in the US, and it is possible that Soviet bombers carrying nuclear weapons ranging in the megaton yields would be shot down by defensive nuclear systems stationed in Canada, potentially causing multiple nuclear detonations on Canadian soil near population centers (Maloney 2007, 23). All this needed to be considered when it came to crafting the Canadian nuclear philosophy. This chapter will consider this ‘nebulous zone’ Canada inhabited regarding nuclear philosophy during the Cold War and how it gradually changed over time with considerable shifts in the 1950s and 1980s that witnessed a ebb and flow in the popularity of nuclear weapons. In doing so, an understanding of how Canadian leaders justified becoming a custodial nuclear power will also be established, which will include an analysis of how American influence came to shape Canadian decision making around nuclear policy. 36 3.1 Incineration without Representation Throughout the Early Cold War period, Canada possessed one great fear: being left out of the ‘inner circle’ of NATO. From NATO’s conception to the present, we can see Canada desperately attempting to remain relevant and strategically important in the eyes of the Americans, NATO’s leading nation. Canadian leaders went to extreme lengths, some of which greatly jeopardized Canadian national sovereignty, to prevent this fear from becoming reality. This included the signing of agreements that allowed for the stationing of American nuclear weapons on Canadian soil as early as 1950, which greatly increased the possibility that Canada became a target in the event of a Soviet nuclear strike. Canadian leaders were even willing to agree to bilateral control over nuclear weapons, thus negating any potential benefit a nation receives from their possession. This was all done to appear as a ‘team player’ in the eyes of the US, and while this resulted in Canada receiving exclusive arms deals and bilateral defense agreements with the US, it came at the cost of Canadian representation and self-determination in the event of a nuclear war. The early Cold War period - which this study has defined as the period from ~1945-1958 (with 1958 chosen as the cut off as this was the advent of ICBMs) - was largely characterized by a sense of prolonged uncertainty. Communication between the East and West was at an all-time low and flashpoints of ideological tension were springing up one after another in the form of proxy wars in Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam. It seemed that every day the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack increased. Many nations, Canada included, felt that their futures were being gambled with by the newly emerged world superpowers, the US and the USSR, and desperately fought to have a say in the emerging nuclear arms race and ideological struggle. While some nations, such as France, the United Kingdom, and China took it upon themselves to develop their own nuclear arsenals, for junior allies like Canada this was not feasible. Canada seemingly never seriously considered the domestic production of nuclear weapons, despite being one of the first nations to possess such an ability. As early as King’s prime ministry, he declared publicly that “Canada [will] not manufacture, possess or use Atomic weapons, nor [will] it be party to any agreements that [will] make Canada the custodian of other countries’ bombs” (Richter 2002, 21). While the former half of this quote was seemingly taken to heart, the later was quickly abandoned. It was widely accepted among Canadian military planners that Canada had no 37 strategic need to develop its own nuclear arsenal; for it was not a major military power, nor did it present a threat to other nations that already possessed nuclear capabilities (Richter 2002, 20). This initial mentality towards nuclear weapons only began to shift when it became clear that Canada would be caught in the middle of any nuclear exchange between the US and the USSR. Canadian military strategists’ views on nuclear weapons only began to change in the early 1950s, when the Americans expressed grave concern over Canada’s vast undefended arctic region which served as the shortest route for Soviet bombers making their way to American industrial targets on the Eastern Seaboard. This threat was deemed serious enough to warrant the development of systems that could effectively detect and stop a Soviet bomber invasion, including, but not limited to, radar stations, air bases, and surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles (Maloney 2007, 24). It was at this point Canada was forced to make a decision that would come to shape the next two decades of military planning; either it remain a minor military power on the sidelines of NATO and hope it is passed over in any future nuclear war, or do what it can to take control of the situation and become a world nuclear power - if only through custody. While many have criticized Canada’s choice not to remain neutral after the Second World War, as Sweden or Finland did, by this time neutrality was no longer an option. Even prior to the signing of the NATO agreement, Canadian leaders believed that their geographical position meant that regardless of allegiances, Canada would be caught in the crossfire of any war between the Americans and the Soviets, and thus it made the most sense to rally behind the US which shared similar ideological and economic values with Canada (Whitaker and Marcuse 1994, 139). The possibility of remaining neutral was never seriously considered outside of the New Democratic Party of Canada and other left-wing political associations; this platform consequently never gained serious traction among the public (Keeting and Pratt 1998, 7). Even less popular was the limited movement for Canada to join the Soviet sphere of influence, which was mainly contained within the Communist Party of Canada (Keeting and Pratt 1998, 29-30). Therefore, Canadian leaders opted to become nuclear capable knowing full well it increased the possibility they become involved in a future war between the US and the USSR. The mentality was that, at the very least, Canada would possess the means to defend 38 its territory from a Soviet nuclear attack, even if this was achieved through bilateral control of defensive nuclear arms, which Pearson stated explicitly to justify his decision in 1963 (Maloney 2007, 5). It ultimately gave Canada a limited amount of control over a situation they would have been powerless in if they chose to deny becoming nuclear capable. Thus, while the stationing of BOMARC, Genie, and Honest John rockets in Canada during this period was meant to avoid the fate of incineration without representation, it in fact solidified it. Whether Canada would have been spared in the event of a Soviet nuclear strike had it refrained from stationing defensive nuclear weapons on its territory is impossible to say, however, it is certain that in becoming a custodial nuclear power Canada made itself a target, a target which was nonetheless now capable of defending itself to a limited degree. Soviet bombers would need to eliminate Canadian defensive systems before reaching their targets in America, ensuring Canada was one of the first targets of a Soviet invasion, and one of the first battlegrounds of a Third World War. 3.2 Nuclear Responsibilities and Benefits There is a certain amount of political, economic, and strategic advantages that have been historically associated with the process of nuclear acquisition. In the 20th century, it was widely believed that one of the chief gains a nation receives in becoming nuclear capable is an increased sense of security. The simple possession of a device capable of bringing about the death of millions and the destruction of entire cities obviously warrants a certain amount of caution on behalf of adversaries. In theory, nuclear capable nations thus need worry less about their sovereignty being infringed upon or their borders being threatened. This way of looking at nuclear possession came to be known as the theory of Nuclear Revolution, wherein it was believed that acquisition was in the interest of all nations, if only for the simple reason that the possession of nuclear weapons made a nation far more dangerous to trifle with (Bell 2021, 3). It was this belief, that all nations would seek nuclear acquisition, that initially drove the US to take on the mantle of the ‘world’s nuclear policeman’ after the Second World War in a futile attempt to maintain its hegemony over nuclear weapons. While this eventually failed, with Soviet nuclear acquisition in 1949, the Americans maintained this self-imposed responsibility; if it could not maintain a hegemony, 39 it would at least do all in its power to ensure only the nations it approved of became nuclear powers (Bell 2021, 125-127). While the theory of nuclear revolution has certainly been on display in some nations that have become nuclear capable, recently it has been challenged as a universal model. Mark Bell has produced a model for why nations seek nuclear acquisition that I feel far better encapsulates the reality of nuclear proliferation. Bell’s theory accounts for the many intricacies that accompany nuclear acquisition beyond a pursuit of mere security, but more than this, it can effectively predict how nations will act after nuclear acquisition on a case-by-case basis. However, most important for this study, is that Bell’s model explains why, despite nuclear acquisition, Canada reaped very few of the benefits witnessed by other nations through the possession of nuclear weapons. Bell posits that the pursuit of security is just one of the many goals a nation may seek through nuclear acquisition. He presents a model with six elements that a nation may ultimately pursue through the aid of nuclear weapons: 1. Aggression: nuclear weapons allow a nation to pursue goals born from pre-existing disputes with more vigor; 2. Expansion: nuclear weapons can allow a nation to expand their goals in territorial acquisitions and international politics (such as through the facilitation of new alliances); 3. Independence: nuclear weapons allow a nation to assert its independence over senior allies; 4. Bolstering: nuclear weapons allow a nation to take more radical actions in strengthening its allies; 5. Steadfastness: nuclear weapons allow a nation to stand firm in the face of disputes or in the defense of its status quo; 40 6. Compromise: lastly, nuclear weapons may allow a nation to be more open to compromise and accepting less to maintain peace (Bell 2021, 5). Which element(s) a nation chooses to pursue depends on their pre-existing goals as a nation. In other words, nuclear acquisition does not as a default result in a nation feeling more secure, rather, nuclear weapons will be used in the pursuit of whatever the nation’s pre-existing political goals were. To explain this process, Bell has produced a helpful flow chart to visualize the process, seen in figure 7. Using this model, one can effectively predict a nation’s course of action after nuclear acquisition with only a minimal understanding of its history. Figure 5. Bell, Mark . 2021. “The Theory of Nuclear Opportunism.” In Nuclear Reactions, 5. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 41 For example, without getting into too much detail, if we are to input the case of the US after the Second World War into the model, we can see that because it faced no serious territorial threat or ongoing war and had no senior ally, but was in fact a rising power, it used its nuclear weapons to facilitate expansion, steadfastness, and bolstering of junior allies; as was indeed the case in the number of proxy wars the US engaged in, its resolve in such conflicts as the Berlin Crises, and its willingness to share its nuclear arsenals with junior allies. This same process can be done for virtually any nation using Bell’s model, even if that nation has yet to become nuclear capable. Let us then consider what actions nuclear acquisition should have resulted in for Canada according to Bell’s model. Referring to the flow chart, we can see that at the time of nuclear acquisition in 1963 Canada was not facing any serious territory threats or ongoing wars, however, it did have a senior ally. Thus, according to Bell’s theory, Canada’s natural course of action in becoming a nuclear capable nation should have been a pursuit of independence from the US. Yet, what was observed was almost the complete opposite. Nuclear acquisition gave the US more control over Canada than ever before, for now the weapons needed for the very defense of Canadian borders from a foreign invasion required American sign off under the bilateral control stipulated in the government-to-government agreement. Canada therefore fails to follow Bell’s model of Nuclear Opportunism. But why is this the case? Britain was in a very similar position to Canada in 1952 when it developed its own nuclear arsenal, and yet the result was indeed in line with Bell’s predictions; Britain used its nuclear weapons to gain greater independence from the US, whom Britain had been increasingly relying on - both economically and militarily - after the Second World War. The marked difference between the British and the Canadian case lies is the domestic production of nuclear weapons. While Britain invested billions of dollars into research and development independent of the joint Manhattan Project to build its nuclear weapons, Canada pursued the much simpler and cheaper route of leasing nuclear weapons from the US. While the lease of nuclear weapons alone did not eliminate Canada’s ability to pursue greater independence from the US, an agreement on bilateral control did. For it is in a nation’s ability to command its nuclear arsenals, independent of a foreign power, that allows it to pursue pre-existing 42 political goals. Otherwise, as was in the case for Canada, nuclear weapons under bilateral control only serve the interest of the more powerful nation. Therefore, while Canada’s nuclear acquisition was presented to the public as a means to increase Canadian security, it in fact put it at far greater risk in the event of a Soviet attack, for now the Soviets would first need to clear Canadian nuclear defenses before making their way into the US. In the eyes of America, the true purpose of Canada’s nuclear arsenal was to create a buffer zone between the US and the Soviet Union; the time it would take for the Soviets to destroy Canadian nuclear defenses would buy the US a few precious hours in preparing their own retaliatory strike and defenses (here it must of course be remembered, that Canadian nuclear acquisition was based on the early Cold War period’s strategic mentality towards nuclear weapons, wherein bombs would have to be delivered by massive bombing fleets, and not the later mentality that developed with the emergence of ICBMs). This evolved to be the case because of the Canadian agreement to bilateral control over nuclear weapons stationed in Canada, which effectively eliminated any strategic use Canada could make of them beyond defense of its borders from a Soviet invasion. Any use of the weapons had to be approved by both US and Canadian officials. Canada was therefore unable to utilize the weapons in a manner that was exclusively advantageous to itself, furthermore, even if Canada wanted to utilize its nuclear arsenal to gain greater independence from the US, this was impossible due to the bilateral nature of the weapons. Thus, Canada was essentially tasked with the security, upkeep, and stationing of nuclear weapons that acted merely as an extension of American defensive systems, only the destruction wrought by them would occur on Canadian, rather than American territory. It is difficult to say, then, whether Canada truly gained any strategic advantage at all from nuclear acquisition. After all, the weapons they received in 1963 were already outdated upon arrival as far as the ICMB threat was concerned, and furthermore possessed a finite period of lease wherein American retrieval of the weapons was stipulated in the initial contract of custody (Maloney 2007, 309). All of this made Canada appear less than fully commitment to nuclear possession, and thus it failed to pursue the political goals of a true nuclear power in Canada’s position, as predicted by Bell – chiefly, greater independence from the US. 43 Nonetheless, the claim can be made that nuclear possession still potentially gave Canada a greater say among NATO and other nuclear powers, and may have even made Canada more capable in defense against a Soviet attack, but as the above analysis has revealed, the bilateral control of nuclear weapons rendered Canada little more than custodians in the nuclear defense of American assets, and in this process likely made Canada a primary target of a Soviet attack. Canada therefore belongs to a much more exclusive nuclear club, wherein membership is reserved to those few nations who came into the possession of humanity’s most deadly creation by means of, and in concordance with, a senior ally; much like a child tasked with holding one of his father’s guns, intoxicated by responsibility and desperate to gain approval. 3.3 The Soviet Threat NATO’s, and in turn Canada’s, nuclear philosophy was built around the event of a Soviet surprise strike. Until McNamara presented the alternative of a limited and tactical response to a nuclear strike in 1962 (McNamara 1962), it was believed that the only feasible way to ‘win’ a nuclear war was to launch an attack without warning and with everything at a nation’s disposal, taking out the enemy’s own nuclear arsenals and cities thus eliminating their ability to launch a retaliatory strike. Therefore, NATO’s defensive systems and nuclear arsenals were deployed in a way as to respond to such a surprise attack. This included billions spent in the construction of radar stations, and air bases located within striking distance of the Soviet Union, all meant to mitigate the advantage gained in a Soviet first-strike scenario (Maloney 2007, 23). However, in my research I found that many Canadian leaders and military planners were less concerned with defending against a Soviet surprise attack, than preventing the Americans from provoking a Soviet surprise attack. Indeed, prior to the formation of NATO, there was a widespread concern that America may launch a preventative war against the Soviet Union while it still maintained a hegemony over nuclear weapons. Evidence even suggests that if early Cold War events such as the First Berlin Crisis (1948) had turned into a shooting war, the Americans were prepared to use all means at their disposal against the Soviet Union, not excluding their nuclear arsenal (Keeting and Pratt 1998, 23). 44 The NATO agreement was perhaps the main development that helped stay such American ambition. And yet, over the next half century, the American’s proceeded to structure their defensive policy around the threat of a Soviet first-strike. Although the Americans repeatedly claimed they would not be the ones to initiate a nuclear strike, the MC 14/2 agreement created considerable room wherein an American first-strike may still occur. When speaking of the manner in which the Soviets would attempt to overrun Europe, the document states: In either case there will almost certainly be Soviet land, sea and air campaigns with the purpose of isolating and seizing NATO Europe. Since NATO would be unable to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe unless NATO immediately employed nuclear weapons both strategically and tactically, we must be prepared to take the initiative in their use (The North Atlantic Military Committee 1957, 289). Therefore, in the event of even a conventional Soviet invasion of Europe - i.e. an invasion unaccompanied by the use of nuclear weapons - the US would still be inclined to launch a nuclear strike against both tactical and strategic targets (military and civilian targets respectively). This is in part because of the NATO philosophy around nuclear weapons, which viewed the bombs as a means to reduce expensive conventional forces without necessarily sacrificing the alliance’s ability to defend its member nations or act as a force of deterrence. Following this philosophy after the end of the Second World War resulted in a severe imbalance between NATO and Soviet-allied conventional forces. By the 1950s, NATO was incapable of defending against a Soviet invasion with conventional forces alone, instead the US opted to pour NATO resources into nuclear deterrence, hoping that it would be perceived as a threat viable enough to prevent the Soviets from believing that a conventional invasion alone could overrun Western Europe (Bell 2021, 2). Therefore, the US took a major gamble in reducing their conventional forces; in the short term it allowed for the reduction of manpower and money going into NATO militaries, but it ensured that war with the Soviets would require the use of nuclear weapons. However, the US was aware of this fact when it opted to favor its nuclear forces over its conventional forces, and throughout the Cold War this proved to work quite well for NATO. It is important to note that limiting the number of active conventional forces had 45 surprisingly little impact on the American military industrial complex and the wider American economy. Despite the Eastern Bloc having much larger conventional forces, most soldiers were operating with outdated equipment, with the most modern equipment being reserved for special units. The Americans, and in turn the rest of NATO, chose to keep smaller conventional forces that - theoretically - would be equipped with the most up-to-date equipment that could be offered (Harrington de Santana 2009, 339). Thus, the same number of American forces could accomplish far more than the same number of Soviet forces in a conflict scenario. This arrangement was more than agreeable for American military manufacturers, who saw little to no change in the number of military contracts they received. If anything, profits increased as the militaries now wanted to acquire the most modern equipment possible to counteract their reduced conventional forces (Harrington de Santana 2009, 326). While this arrangement eventually proved unsustainable, it functioned for much of the Cold War with desirable results for the Americans. Moreover, under this nuclear-focused model, the Americans could project deterrence around the globe without necessarily needing to move conventional forces around. In relying on the threat a potential nuclear strike would generate, they could effectively safeguard all NATO members without the requirement of having conventional forces stationed in said nations (Bell 2021, 2). While the US often opted to still maintain a small conventional force in all member nations, in a pinch they could extend deterrence purely through the nuclear threat, as was done in 1961 when the US stationed intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Turkey. This was done in order to exert a severe form of deterrence against the Soviets, as they could now reliably strike Soviet cities at a moment’s notice (Office of the Historian 2023). Therefore, while NATO’s Cold War nuclear weapon’s philosophy was built around the supposed threat of a Soviet invasion, the US heavily leaned on said threat to justify cutting back on conventional military expenditures while becoming increasingly reliant on its nuclear arsenal, a reliance which, as it grew, meant nuclear war became more possible, indeed inevitable, if the US and Soviets entered direct military conflict against one another. If we are to look back on whether NATO leaders saw a Soviet invasion as a legitimate threat, we find mixed messages. The Americans, unsurprisingly, are the loudest voice in this discussion, constantly stoking fears of communist insurrection and a surprise 46 attack, but among junior allies a different story is to be uncovered. Canadian leaders can be found throughout the Cold War expressing doubts of a Soviet invasion. Even Mackenzie King, the first Prime Minister of the Cold War era, expressed his fears that it would not be the Soviets that initiate a war, but American impatience that could potentially lead to acts of aggression that in turn would lead to a war (Keeting and Pratt 1998, 2). Howard Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs under Prime Minister Diefenbaker, harbored a similar fear, that it would not be Soviets who strike out of the blue, but rather the Americans who would continue to provoke the Soviets until a breaking point was reached (Maloney 2007, 176). Reginald Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, two of the foremost historians on Canada during the Cold War, go as far to say that a Soviet invasion, particularly of North America, was always unrealistic at any given point in the Cold War. The risk was simply too high, with too little reward, for Soviet leaders to justify such an invasion. The most likely scenario for a Soviet strike would occur if the nation felt its existence was fundamentally threatened by external forces, such as provocations on behalf of America or NATO (Whitaker and Marcuse 1994, XI-XII). It is perhaps helpful, therefore, to view the preponderance of the Soviet first-strike philosophy, as a convenient, if not potentially manufactured, mind set from which the Americans seem to be the chief beneficent, for they were able to utilize the fear generated by the Soviets to rally their western allies around nuclear deterrence while also fueling their military industrial complex. 3.4 NATO Nuclear Philosophy For the general public, Mutually Assured Destruction, or M.A.D., has become a term nearly synonymous with the Cold War and discussions of nuclear warfare. While those more versed in the Cold War would be aware that M.A.D. was in fact a revolutionary development in global nuclear philosophy, toted as ethically humanitarian and instrumental in preventing the limited use of nuclear weapons in warfare (McNamara 1962), the term has since been used to describe the outcome of any nuclear exchange between world powers, wherein the scale, quantity, and selection of targets would result in the destruction of any and all nations involved (Parrington 1997). In other words, there can be no winner in a nuclear war. 47 Canadian experts in the Department of National Defence had spoken of an apparent paradox within the NATO nuclear philosophy as early as 1951, wherein if the scale and quantity of nuclear weapons continued expanding at their current rate, a nuclear war would almost certainly result in the destruction of all nations involved (Richter 2002, 60). However, the concept of M.A.D. did not actually emerge until the advent of hydrogen bombs and the ability for a targeted nation to reliably retaliate against a nuclear strike. Although experts had identified that M.A.D. would eventually come to define nuclear weapon philosophy, given the ever increasing scale of the weapons and means to guarantee a retaliatory strike, it was not until intercontinental ballistic missiles arrived on the scene that the US began to accept M.A.D. as the harsh reality of nuclear war. Prior to M.A.D. a different philosophy dominated thought around nuclear warfare. During the early Cold-War Period (1945-1958) the accepted model of a nuclear war involved 2 phases; the first phase took place immediately before and during a nuclear strike and retaliation, the second phase took place in the weeks, months, and years following a nuclear exchange. The MC 48 agreement even established a common doctrine for NATO allies on how they would respond to a nuclear strike. MC 48 stated that the first phase of a nuclear war would… be initiated by an atomic onslaught against which NATO would have to react in kind. This would result in an intensive initial phase of operations - approximately thirty days or less - in which each side would strive to deliver a large portion of its accumulated stockpiles of atomic weapons as rapidly and effectively as possible in an effort to neutralize the opponent’s atomic delivery capability. Instead, therefore, of the gradually increasing rate of destruction prevalent in recent wars of prolonged mobilization and attrition, maximum destruction would occur within the first few days or weeks as both sides strove to exploit their accumulated atomic stockpiles to gain atomic superiority. In addition to this atomic exchange both sides would initiate operations of their land, sea and air forces to achieve strategic advantage and to be prepared to conduct continued operations (The North Atlantic Military Committee 1954, 234). This first phase, therefore, would last until both sides of a nuclear war had exhausted their nuclear arsenals, or one side lost the ability to retaliate further. As one may assume, great emphasis was placed on this initial phase of a nuclear war, especially after the US opted to 48 place strategic importance on its nuclear rather than conventional forces. It was even believed that a nuclear war could be won in this initial phase alone, as MC 48 continues: It is considered that the scale of devastation resulting from this initial atomic exchange, when supplemented by continued attacks, may well be so great that the side gaining superiority in this field would probably be able to prevent the enemy regaining the initiative. Thus, the loser in the initial exchange might possibly capitulate (The North Atlantic Military Committee 1954, 234-235). We can see from this that, at this time, there was no concept of ‘limited’ nuclear war, at the very least not between the US and the Soviets, who both believed the greatest advantage of their nuclear arsenals would be reaped by a massive nuclear strike in the opening moments of a war. To wait to retaliate would result in one’s retaliatory capabilities being greatly diminished, therefore, the most effective plan of action was to launch everything at one's disposal before it was destroyed, a “use it or lose it” mentality. With this being said, it may seem ridiculous to speak of how a war would develop after such a nuclear exchange, an exchange expected to be so destructive that capitulation of one side may be the result, however, MC 48 lays out plainly how NATO strategists believed a second phase would develop once the nuclear arsenals of both sides are exhausted: “[D]espite the destruction wrought during the initial phase, it is probable that hostilities would not cease. In this case there would be a subsequent period of readjustment and follow-up, the exact nature of which would largely depend on the outcome of the initial phase [...] As it cannot safely be assumed that hostilities will terminate at the end of the initial phase, our forces must be prepared to conduct subsequent operations of a much longer duration. Our ability, however, to defeat the enemy will depend on our ability to survive and gain superiority in the initial phase. Thus our peacetime force pattern must be designed primarily to achieve success during this initial phase and emphasis must be placed upon development of the forces which can participate most effectively in these operations” (The North Atlantic Military Committee 1954, 234-235). While MC 48 keeps this second phase quite nebulous, stating that its nature would be defined by the initial phase and thus cannot be reliably predicted, it is nonetheless clear it would consist of a clash of conventional, rather than nuclear forces, as the latter would have been all but exhausted in the initial phase. Here, the committee sees ‘success’ in a nuclear exchange 49 as mere survival. If, at the end of such an exchange, governing institutions still stand and are still capable of commanding what is left of the nation’s armed forces, the US would have succeeded in the initial phase. Best case scenario would be that NATO nuclear retaliation obliterates the opposition to such a degree that their governing structure collapses and in turn their military cannot readjust for a second phase. However, if both sides survive the initial phase, conventional war would spread over the ashen planes that used to be Europe and North America. The duration of this second phase cannot be accurately guessed at, nor can its scale or ultimate outcome. MC 48 makes no mention of just what the goal of the second phase would be beyond the final annihilation of the enemy. It makes it clear that a nuclear exchange in the initial phase would wreak untold destruction upon any and all powers involved in the war; population centers of all nations would certainly be targets in a war that sees the absolute expenditure of both sides’ nuclear arsenals. The question must be raised then, if the initial phase of the war has already seen the destruction of many or perhaps even most major population centers in the US and the Soviet Union, and thus the death of billions would have already occurred along with the irradiation of the northern hemisphere, what would soldiers be fighting for in this second phase beyond bragging rights that a handful of their soldiers defeated a handful of the enemy’s on the barren and poisoned grounds of some final battle? What would they have to return home to? Their cities would be destroyed, their families dead, their food and water non-consumable. The very land and people they were fighting to defend would already be gone. Herein lies the grand paradox of a 2-phase model of nuclear war, for the only thing that can follow an unlimited nuclear exchange is death and destruction. While at the time of the MC 48 signing, M.A.D. was not yet a term in the public purview, the document itself inadvertently depicts it, and while over the following decade the absurdity of a ‘second’ phase in a nuclear war was realized, for the duration of the early Cold War period this very model structured NATO nuclear philosophy and led Canada down the path of nuclear acquisition. 50 3.5 From Mutually Assured Destruction to Limited Nuclear War and Deterrence M.A.D. stood as the reigning philosophy of nuclear warfare for the later Cold War period (~1958-1991), and despite several close calls during the Kennedy and Regan presidencies, M.A.D. proved an exceptionally capable doctrine in terms of deterring war between nuclear powers. With the arrival of ICBMs on the scene in the late 1950s, a growing awareness took shape around the consequences of any future nuclear war. World leaders grew increasingly reluctant to use nuclear weapons as a threat in small-scale conflicts, which could now rapidly escalate into global conflicts that may threaten a war between nuclear powers. While M.A.D. did little to halt the arms race between the US and the Soviet Union - in fact, keeping up technologically with one’s enemy became more important than ever, lest one side gain an advantage - it did largely stay the fear of a Soviet surprise attack, despite the US maintaining this narrative for the remainder of the Cold War. It now seemed the greatest catalyst to nuclear war would be a deranged world leader who initiates a nuclear strike despite the consequences, or a computer malfunction in the unfathomably complex system that linked ICBMs and allowed them to be launched at a moment’s notice. Ultimately one thing became clear to East and West alike; no sane person would ever advocate for nuclear war. However, in 1991, after a prolonged period of political and economic turmoil the Soviet Union dissolved and left in its place a castrated Russian Federation, greatly reduced in power and territory in comparison to its predecessor. Despite a brief American attempt at establishing a puppet state during the Boris Yeltsin years (1991-1999), Russia eventually settled at a renewed equilibrium under the leadership of the United Russia Party. Under this new leadership Russia took a radically different stance concerning its nuclear philosophy, despite being composed of many former CCCP members. M.A.D. was no longer accepted as the inevitable outcome of a war between nuclear powers; the dissolution of the USSR left Russia in a greatly diminished position, geographically and economically, with much of its former holdings now under the control of independent governments. Therefore, since the early 2000s, the Russian Federation has maintained a clear goal of expansion wherein it has sparked military conflicts throughout Eastern Europe in an attempt to reclaim lost territories, bring lost territories under their political and economic umbrella, or maintain its faltering hold over regions currently under its control (Kroenig 2016, 2). The starting point of such 51 expansion can roughly be pinned to the outbreak of war in Dagestan and Chechnya in 1999, with the most recent examples being the invasion of Crimea in 2014, and the wider invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Russian Federation has displayed a marked shift in military philosophy compared to the late USSR, launching aggressive and immensely destabilizing military campaigns into nations that were formerly part of the USSR, however, the most concerning shifts can be seen within their nuclear policy. According to NATO intelligence reports, Russia has modernized approximately 80% of its strategic nuclear arsenal since the early 2000s, with ‘strategic’ in this context referring to those weapons ranging in the megaton yields that would be used on non-military targets such as population centers. But perhaps more alarming is the Russian development of low-yield tactical weapons that would be strictly reserved for military targets. This has led NATO intelligence to believe that Russia’s nuclear policy has shifted to allow the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons in defense of Russian territory as part of its new ‘de-escalation’ strategy (Gilli 2020, 3). Such was the belief in the early stages of the Russian war on Ukraine, where many feared Russia may deploy tactical nuclear weapons after the nation illegally annexed the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson Oblast, and Zaporizhzhia Oblast regions and claimed it was now Ukraine that was attacking Russian territory (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2022). Indeed, Russian President Valdimir Putin made it clear in a September 2022 interview that Russia would use “all available means” to defend its newly annexed territories in Ukraine (Schifrin 2022). The changing nuclear landscape has led countries such as Russia to believe that the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons may serve as a means to bring about a swift end to a war before it can escalate into a wider conflict (Kroenig 2016, 2). However, Russia is not the only nation to have displayed a shift in regard to nuclear philosophy; with more recent acquisitions, countries such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea likely possess similar policies when it comes to the use of nuclear weapons in a military conflict. In turn the US has sought its own program to modernize and develop tactical nuclear weapons, which it claims is simply in order to maintain adequate deterrence against those nations with shifting philosophies (Gilli 2020, 3), and while officially the US maintains its Cold War philosophy of deterrence and massive retaliation, with limited nuclear warfare becoming more possible, this philosophy may now present more risk than assurance. 52 In a case of true irony, it seems that the existence of M.A.D. has allowed for these more ‘limited’ philosophies around nuclear weapons to develop; for if the very existence of strategic nuclear weapons precludes the possibility they be used because of their destructive capabilities, their actual political use is therefore greatly diminished. Strategic nuclear weapons only serve political value if a nation can convince its adversaries that it will use the weapons if pushed to a certain point. However, with the advent of M.A.D., it became increasingly unlikely any nation would willingly initiate a war in which their own destruction was assured. It is for this reason that nations rising in power, such as India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Russia have adopted a limited nuclear philosophy. These nations are gambling on a belief that America will view the limited use of nuclear weapons as not a grave enough threat to retaliate strategically to, or perhaps to respond to at all if outside the NATO sphere of influence, for their response would require a massive nuclear retaliation according to their current philosophy (Kroenig 2016, 2). Thus, in recent years American nuclear deterrence has lost its ability to serve as a tangible threat due to the shifting philosophy of smaller nuclear powers. Concerningly, while there have been some efforts to develop tactical nuclear weapons in order to deter this emerging philosophy, the overwhelming mentality among American military planners has been to continue to rely on M.A.D. in an age where the use of strategic nuclear weapons is largely unfathomable (Kroenig 2016, 5). The harsh reality of our time is that the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons in a military conflict has perhaps never been greater. M.A.D. can no longer serve as a crutch on which NATO leans in the face of large-scale nuclear modernization and increasing global instability. Although considerable progress was made throughout the later Cold War period to limit the number of nuclear weapons possessed and deployed by America and the Soviet Union, progress in the 2000s has stalled. In fact, the only standing treaty that serves to limit the number of nuclear warheads possessed by each nation is the START III or New START treaty, originally ratified in 2011 by US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The treaty set the maximum number of possible nuclear warheads at 1,550 each and included a process of verification, the latter being something which was lacking from previous treaties signed under the Bush Government (Amiard 2021, 38-39). Despite New START being a huge step 53 forward regarding disarmament, virtually no progress has been made since, with the treaty being extended until 2026. Rather, recent years have been marked by the abandonment of treaties that were previously hailed as bringing the world closer to a future free from the threat of nuclear war. In 2019, President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, citing Russian failure to comply with the treaty’s agreements (Casey-Maslen 2022, 2). Interestingly, we may regard the US withdrawal from the INF as a desperate attempt on behalf of America to maintain some level of deterrence over Russia; short and intermediate-range missiles are one of the most common delivery methods for tactical nuclear weapons, therefore, the US withdrawal from the treaty would suggest that the US is prepared - or would at least like Russia to believe it is prepared - to retaliate on a limited scale to a tactical nuclear strike. Therefore, we are once again at a point of considerable uncertainty regarding global nuclear philosophy. Even the US - with its historically blind belief in Cold War institutions - has displayed a recent shift regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons. M.A.D. has been sidelined by nations desperate to make use of their nuclear arsenals in an age of faltering conventional forces and rising global instability. With the rising threat of such limited nuclear warfare, more nations will be driven to acquire their own means of defense against nuclear weapons, while such defenses may be produced domestically, the more likely answer is a return to Cold War era system of lend-lease wherein nations will be forced to once again rally behind world nuclear powers to safeguard their own national defense. While no one can be certain what a limited nuclear war would mean, their use would undeniably set a new precedent wherein the use of nuclear weapons has once again become acceptable. The setting of such a precedent is in the interest of all of humanity to avoid. 54 4. Nationalism in Canada While conducting research for this study, I traveled with my fiancée to Ottawa, the Canadian capital, in June of 2023 to visit the National Library and Archives. Besides the beautiful architecture and rich history, what I found most striking was the lingering presence of supporters of the Trucker Convoy, formally known as the Canadian Convoy Protest of 2022. The Canadian Convoy Protest was a short-lived nationalist movement that saw truckers lead a group of protesters on a nation-wide trek to Ottawa to protest the Covid-19 safety mandates put in place by the Canadian Liberal Government. On January 29, some 18,000 protesters converged on Ottawa, blocking city streets, and effectively immobilizing the city. Although the crowd dwindled over the following days, many 18-wheeled semis continued to block important trade routes with the US until mid-February. In line with his father’s legacy, Justin Trudeau eventually invoked the Emergencies Act, which grants Canadian law enforcement extraordinary temporary powers to respond to public emergencies (Al-Hakim 2022). Within five days of the Emergencies Act being put into place, Ottawa’s streets had been cleared of the great bulk of protesters, and trade began to flow as normal. The aims of the Convoy were disunited at best. There was no manifesto to their movement, and no clear end goal. Rather, it was a gathering of politically united - but not ideologically united - individuals who saw the mandates that were put in place for public safety during the Covid-19 pandemic as an affront to their individual rights and liberties. One would assume that a lifting of the mandates put in place would have therefore been the end to such a movement, and while the streets of Ottawa eventually cleared, the individuals who composed the movement are seemingly still impassioned. Because nationalist movements such as the Canadian Convoy Protest lack any sort of understanding of national interest, the goals of the movement are far more fluid and adaptable. One day they are protesting Covid-19 mandates, but the next it has transformed into an anti-trans or anti-immigrant movement (Bilefsky 2023). While it is certainly arguable that these were elements of the movement from its outset, such is the nature of right-wing nationalist movements, it would seem contemporary Canadian nationalism lacks any sort of larger identity beyond the flashpoints it is born out of. The Canadian Convoy Protest was an anti-Covid movement that, since the (relative) recovery of the nation, has struggled to find where it fits in. Therefore, it has no 55 other place to go but back to those most primordial beliefs of the individuals that compose the movement. It is for this reason you see Convoy Protesters in 2023 berating trans people and harassing immigrants; for they return to their most basic instincts - usually fear of those perceived as ‘Other’ - when unbound to any sort of wider national interest. It is thus difficult to designate the Canadian Convoy Protest a nationalist movement. While it was seemingly national in character, and politically homogeneous, it lacked any goals beyond that of a vague notion of ending the Covid-19 mandates. It was a nationalist movement with no national identity. However, this is not even what I find most disconcerting about these events. While at first glance it would seem the Convoy was a domestic nationalist movement with grassroots origins, a deeper look reveals a concerning fact. Throughout the duration of protests, it was vocally supported by right-wing politicians in the US, who saw the Convoy as in a similar vein of resistance to the January 6th Capitol Hill Attack. Funding spilled over the border out of republican pockets to the protesters, who were, in my opinion, clearly engaging in an act of insurrection. A total of 44% of the $10 million dollars raised by the protestors through their GoFundMe was donated by such American sources (PBS News Hour 2022). Therefore, while the initial conception of the Canadian Convey Protest may have indeed been grassroots in origin, we can see here that there was traceable funding provided by the American right-wing to a group that was actively engaging in insurrection within Canadian borders, insurrection that was deemed a big enough threat to warrant one of the most severe measures a Prime Minister can implement in times of crisis. The Canadian Convoy Protest was far more than a domestic affair; by its termination, it had been transmuted into what appears to be a case of clear-cut American funded insurrection and effort to disrupt a democratic system. When I arrived in Ottawa, the scale of protest was minimal. A few scattered individuals sat outside the Parliament Building on Wellington Street adorned with all sorts of memorabilia to the 2022 Convoy, including a variety of merchandise that expressed their strong anti-liberal beliefs. But what was most evident was the overwhelming influence of American politics on the remaining protesters; American, Confederate, and Gadsden flags decorated the sidewalk, flying next to the Canadian flag. Loudspeakers blared Fox News, Alex Jones, Tucker Carlson, and other conspiratorial “news” outlets day and night. All this 56 led me to consider what exactly Canadian nationalism is, for here before me was one of the chief examples of a Canadian nationalist movement in the 21st Century, and yet it hardly possessed a national character in its outward appearance. Nationalist movements are usually characterized by a disdain for non-national powerholders, and yet here we see something bordering on the fetishization of supra-national influences. How is that such a national character has taken shape in Canada? Throughout my research, I discovered that through a proper understanding of nationalism in Canada - or in other words, the Canadian public’s relationship to, and perception of, their nation – the shifting perceptions of nuclear possession could be far better explained. What is witnessed in Canada’s road to nuclear acquisition is a nation torn between an evolving national identity and greater forces of extra-national influence. Historical sociologist Anthony D. Smith describes national identity as the perceptions harbored by a nation’s population regarding the nation itself and, more importantly, what it means to identify as a member of that nation. These perceptions may take the form of a shared language, history, culture, or territory, and serve to establish a sense of cohesion among a populace (Smith 1991). Canada’s short history has meant that it has lacked the time needed to establish a firm national identity. As a nation composed of immigrants, Canada has only a short common history that rarely extends beyond the century in which it has existed as an independent nation-state. This is a similar fate that befalls other post-colony nations, such as Australia and New Zealand, that outside of their indigenous history share very little common ancestry or history. This lack of a shared history, whether born of the defense of its borders, or in upholding a national religion, language, or otherwise, has made the identification of national interests a difficult task in Canada. National interest, while intimately related to national identity, is the more practical shared aims of members of a nation. These interests could be a pursuit to reclaim a historical territory that has been lost, as is the case of Russia’s perceived claim on Ukraine, or the defense of one’s territory from a historically hostile neighboring power, such as Poland’s position between Germany and Russia has resulted in (Smith 1991). Because of Canada’s limited shared history, the identification of national interests has been far more fluid than the more concrete examples witnessed in nations with longer histories. The result has been that 57 nationalism in Canada has not only flowed and ebbed, as occurs in all nations, but has shifted dramatically regarding its ideological goals. Perceptions of what Canadian nationalism is have therefore changed considerably throughout the 20th and now the 21st century. Where once being a nationalist in Canada meant undying loyalty to the British Crown, a declaration of official independence in 1982 and the passage of several centuries has resulted in a form of nationalism that would be entirely unrecognizable to Canadians of a previous period. Perhaps nowhere is this shift more evident than in the realm of Canadian national defense, where changing perceptions of national interests resulted in Canada becoming one of the few nations to ever possess nuclear weapons. But it is also important to understand how Canadians currently express nationalism as an ideological practice. Much like the Canadian possession of nuclear weapons, the form in which contemporary Canadian nationalism takes has been largely determined by American influence since the end of the Second World War. This chapter will explore this connection. While I do not attempt to tackle the task of the Canadian identity crisis in this chapter, I do work to identify what I believe can - and should - be considered national interests. Once Canadian national interests have been correctly identified, only then can it be seen how the current nationalist ideology witnessed in Canada is in fact counter-productive to these shared interests. Canada is in a unique position as far as the identification of national interest and the presentation of nationalism goes within its borders. Contemporary Canadian nationalism is in many ways an outlier in global nationalist movements, having failed to correctly identify national interests. But to see why contemporary Canadian nationalism is idiosyncratic, we must first establish a traditional definition of nationalism in order to understand how the current Canadian form fails to conform to this definition. However, pinning down a single definition to which we can hold contemporary Canadian nationalism against is not as simple as it first may seem. Indeed, defining nationalism has been a deeply contested task among sociologists, historians, philosophers, and political scientists alike for much of the past century. There are some definitions from such popular scholars as Ernest Gellner, who would claim that nationalism is “[a] theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given 58 state [...] should not separate the power-holders from the rest” (Gellner 1983, 1). Besides being somewhat dated in language, such a definition ultimately fails to consider the more intricate shifts or variations in ethnicity that have been witnessed in post-colonial nations like Canada that share little common ancestry or culture. The problem with definitions such as Gellner’s specifically lies in their fixation on ethnicity, which creates too rigid of a template, as Umut Ozkirimli notes “[e]thnic ties like other social bonds are subject to economic, social and political forces and therefore fluctuate and change according to circumstances” (Ozkirimli 2017, 64). Therefore, to define nationalism on the basis of ethnicity does not account for the nuances of post-colonial nations. Most Canadians do not share a common ethnicity. You may have disparate groups within Canada that possess a shared ethnicity, but as a multicultural nation, a nationally shared ethnicity is not possible at this stage in Canadian history. However, one of the strengths of Gellner’s definition is its mention of “power-holders” (Gellner 1983, 1), an element of nationalism that is often overlooked by other scholars. Gellner, perhaps inadvertently raises an important question that must be considered when attempting to analyze a nationalist movement; in whose hands do they desire ultimate power to lie? This is often what will separate grassroots movements from politically or economically manifested movements, something we will analyze in more depth shortly. Instead of attempting to define nationalism itself as an ideology, I believe a more primordial definition not of nationalism, but of what nationalists traditionally believe will serve our needs more effectively. Ozkirimli claims that: For the nationalist, nationality is an inherent attribute of the human condition. The nationalists believe that humanity is divided into distinct, objectively identifiable nations. Human beings can fulfill themselves and flourish only if they belong to a national community, the membership of which overrides all other forms of belonging. The nation is the sole depository of sovereignty and the only source of political power and legitimacy. This comes with a host of temporal and spatial claims, notably to a unique history and destiny to a historic ‘homeland’[...] Nationalists share a common language, a common frame of reference to express their claims. What remains constant and central to all these narratives is the belief in, and representation of, the nation as a mystical, a temporal, even transcendental entity whose survival is more important than the survival of its individual members at any given point in time. (Ozkirimli 2017, 53-54) 59 I believe Ozkirimli’s words neatly encapsulates nationalists’ beliefs, at least as a general blueprint for how they have traditionally appeared. It does this while not placing nationalism as an ideology with specific goals in a box as Gellner’s and others’ definitions tend to do by relying on elements that change over time or are oftentimes not nationally shared, such as ethnicity. Contemporary Canadian nationalists’ beliefs are at least somewhat in line with Ozkirimli’s claims; there is certainly a belief that power and legitimacy must stem from the nation, and there is an observable fulfillment nationalists receive from identifying with the Canadian nation, as can be witnessed in the feverishness with which individuals take up the nationalist ‘cause’ in this country. This is the case even though Canada possesses no firm national identity. But where contemporary Canadian nationalists’ beliefs begin to break down in relation to Ozkirimli’s claims, is in a belief of a shared “history and destiny” (Ozkirimli 2017, 53-54). As we have established, Canada has very little shared history outside of the 20th and 21st century, what national identity that can be gleaned from this period is little more than involvement in two world wars and various relationships with senior allies. While such a discrepancy may seem minor, this shared ‘history and destiny’ is the driving factor of most historical nationalist movements. The fact that contemporary Canadian nationalists lack such an essential element has given rise to a unique form of nationalism that fails to correctly identify its nation’s interests. This void in contemporary Canadian nationalism is compounded when Ozkirimli notes nationalists possess a “common frame of reference to express their claims” (Ozkirimli 2017, 54), or in other words, a shared national interest and a shared understanding of the means required to fulfill these interests. But for all this talk of contemporary Canadian nationalism’s failure to correctly identify national interests, where is this failure practically observed? Here is where we must look to Canadian national defense and the Canadian economy. 4.1 Canadian National Defense, the Global Economy, and Canadian Nationalism As stated previously, Canada has never been responsible for its own national defense. The gauntlet of Canadian national defense first befell the British Empire, and then NATO, but never was it in Canada’s hands alone. But this reliance on others was not restricted to 60 national defense. Economically Canada has never been self-sufficient, and while this is largely impossible in the globalized economy of today, few countries are as internationally integrated economically as Canada (Owram 2016). In its current state, the Canadian military on its own is entirely incapable of keeping Canada’s immense coastlines and borders secure without the help of senior allies. While this has certainly not always been the case – especially during and immediately after the Second World War, where for a time Canada hosted the fourth largest navy in the world (Pritchard 2011, 464) - the contemporary results of this have been a nation that is largely at the whim of more powerful states when it comes to its own national defense. This arrangement has historically taken the form of Canadian appeasement of the Americans, especially in conflicts where NATO military forces are involved. This is primarily done so out of fear, for any resistance Canada presents to the American national interest could result in a negative impact on Canada’s own national defense or economy. The Cold War is the chief example of such appeasement wherein Canada repeatedly bowed to American national interests to safeguard its own national defense and economy, as was witnessed in the signing of MC 48 and MC 14/2. A failure to do so, may have resulted in American refusal to supply the equipment that made Canadian national defense in this period possible, such as the US manufactured BOMARC surface-to-air missiles or the Genie rockets. The cost of Canadian national defense during this period often required the overt subversion of supposed Canadian national values, such as a general consensus on non-proliferation and peace-keeping. But here we can see how Canadian national interest is fluid, at once presenting the nation with an ability to adapt in times of crisis such as during the Cold War, but at the cost of failing to possess a firm national identity. To return to a point raised by Gellner, the “power-holders” in the area of Canadian national defense are external to the nation. They are not members of the nation which they are responsible for defending. While other nationalist movements of nations with more concrete identities would view this relationship as completely subversive to their national interests, contemporary Canadian nationalism sees no discrepancy. Indeed, Canadian nationalists were quick to praise decisions such as nuclear acquisition, despite the fact it subverted traditional national interest. Domestic control over those forces required to defend the nation, and in the long run perhaps even domestic production of the means of this defense 61 - arms, ammunition, and so on. - are in fact some of the chief concerns of other nationalist movements. So why is this not the case in Canada? This is a question we must explore further. Canadian nationalists’ sentiments towards the Canadian economy, the greatest source of power under capitalism, also results in their marked failure to fit traditional nationalists’ beliefs, as described by Ozkirimli. It is worth noting here that I am hardly qualified to speak on this subject, and thus rely heavily on external research to analyze the current state of the Canadian economy. I also refrain from getting too technical in this chapter and choose to focus on a few key examples that relate primarily to Canada’s gross domestic production, thus providing an extremely general overview of the situation. This area of my study is certainly in need of expansion, and thus I leave an in-depth analysis of how the Canadian and US economies are integrated to economic historians and those more qualified than myself. I treat this chapter as a very brief overview of the current economic situation in Canada, while still providing a surface level understanding of the current economic relationship between Canada and the US. But I digress. Canada is a globalized nation, meaning that it possesses considerable assets outside of its own borders, and in turn, other nations possess considerable assets within Canadian borders. The result is an economic interdependence that would have been impossible in a previous age. For example, a report from Press Progress, a Canadian non-profit investigative journalism group, found that in 2019 only 0.8% of companies operating in Canada are considered multinational, meaning they possess facilities or assets outside of Canada. Of this 0.8%, roughly half were domestically owned, while the other half were foreign owned. Meaning that only about 0.4% of companies operating in Canada are strictly foreign owned (Press Progress 2019). A reasonable number, perhaps even surprisingly low, considering the scale of global economic integration. However, what I have thus far refrained from mentioning is that these multinational companies - that compose only 0.8% of companies operated in Canada - control 67% of all assets in the Canadian economy. These assets primarily take the form of manufacturing and extraction industries (Press Progress 2019). It is therefore shocking that one hears little criticism of this permeation of the Canadian economy by foreign powers from contemporary Canadian nationalists. If nationalists believe that “[t]he nation is the sole depository of sovereignty and the only 62 source of political power and legitimacy”, why would they not be up in arms about such an arrangement (Ozkirimli 2017, 54)? Technically it could be said that contemporary Canadian nationalists are aware of this fact, however they reserve their anger and resistance for nations they deem as ‘hostile’ or ‘Other’, a distinction that usually comes down to race. Such can be seen in the recent sinophobia witnessed in Canada among many contemporary Canadian nationalists, who despise any integration between the Canadian and Chinese economies (Balintec 2022). However, this is highly hypocritical, for if they are to criticize the involvement of one foreign economy in Canada, they ought to criticize any foreign economic involvement, especially the involvement of the nation that possesses the most foreign owned assets in Canada, the US. Anything else would be the result of clear racial bias. Here I should be clear, that multinational companies in and of themselves are not inherently damaging to the Canadian economy. In fact, they are perhaps the main reason why Canada has been able to maintain its position as the world’s 10th largest economy. However, an overreliance on multinational companies can prove extremely harmful when the affiliated nations become politically or otherwise unstable. Herein lies the ignorance of Canadian nationalism and its attitudes towards the Canadian economy, for one repeatedly hears utter disdain from the lips of Canadian nationalists when words such as ‘nationalization’ within an economic context are raised. 4.2 Transmuted Canadian Nationalism Thus far I have been referring to the nationalist ideology in Canada as simply ‘contemporary Canadian nationalism’. But from what has been discussed, we can deduce that we are speaking of a more nuanced movement, one that separated itself from other more traditional nationalist movements and one that is constantly being constructed and reconstructed, as it has to be; when a nationalist movement lacks a national identity - and thus clear national interests – it is forced to constantly redefine why their movement exists. Evidence of this can be seen in contemporary Canadian nationalism’s failure to conform to traditional nationalists’ beliefs, as described by Ozkirimli. If contemporary Canadian nationalism did conform to such traditional beliefs, one would expect to see far more emphasis placed on the national and ethnic homogeneity of power holders within the nation (Gellner 1983, 1), or at the very least, a stronger sense of Canada’s shared history and other 63 elements which bind them together as members of a nation (Ozkirimli 2017, 53). So, if these are not the core tenets of such a movement, the question must be raised of what the axioms of Canadian nationalism actually are? For this we must first understand how contemporary Canadian nationalism came to be. Not unlike other Canadian national afflictions, it is my belief that this modern form of Canadian nationalism is a transmuted disease - note here that I use transmuted, instead of transmitted - that has spilled across our southern border. I say this is a transmuted affiliation because it is not as simple as a mere replication of American nationalism that has been transmitted. Rather, Canadian nationalism changes the American form, which it is nonetheless heavily influenced by, in several marked ways. Chiefly, there seems to be a lack of self-aggrandizement that is present in American nationalism. Slogans such as “America First” or “the Greatest / Strongest Nation on Earth” are common within American nationalism, but seemingly absent in the Canadian form. Instead, there may be a far more general sense of North American superiority, western superiority, or in more volatile situations, white superiority over other races. I believe this ability to transmute the American form is one of the main aspects of contemporary Canadian nationalism that allows it to identify as a nationalist movement while still supporting the influence of foreign powerholders. Obviously, Canadian nationalism does not possess the extremely volatile history that the American form does, notably, an armed conflict between two domestic forces vying for control of the nation. Therefore, Canadian nationalism, while similar to American nationalism, is somewhat watered down, if only because Canadian politics is - at least for the time being - less polarizing than in the US. I wish to make it clear that I do not make these claims lightly, as I believe the existence of this form of Canadian nationalism is merely a symptom of a far larger and more concerning trend of increasingly permeating American influence. More specifically, I believe modern Canadian nationalism is born of a growing American right-wing influence in this nation. This is the case for two reasons. First, this form of nationalism appears almost exclusively within the Canadian right-wing, which perhaps more so than the rest of the population struggles with a lack of national identity. This identity is in fact so weak, that the Canadian right-wing often appears as an appendage of the far more volatile American right-wing and will flow and ebb with the changing tides of US politics. This can be seen in the flashpoints of recent Canadian political 64 debates on trans-identity and abortion laws that have their roots in the US. After debates began in the US about trans athletes’ participation in sports in the spring of 2023, the conversation quickly made its way into Canadian discourse as well, where attacks on suspected trans athletes even occurred (Bilefsky 2023). A nearly identical situation occurred after the overturning of Roe v. Wade on June 22nd, 2022, where suddenly the ability to have an abortion in Canada, which has been relatively secure since 1969, once again came into question on a national scale (Smith 2023). While it is difficult - nigh on impossible - to confirm that it was American influence alone that gave rise to the debate of these topics in Canada, indeed such topics have become flashpoints in many Western countries, what is important to observe is the tactics and rhetoric the Canadian right-wing uses in discourse around these topics. One will quickly find that the language and arguments used by the Canadian right-wing against trans and abortion rights are identical to their American counterpart. However, such influence is perhaps inevitable, given the almost entirely unrestricted flow of news and information across our borders with the US. The result is a widespread consumption of American privatized news outlets and an investment in US politics among the Canadian public on both the right and left of the political spectrum. Recently, if a point of interest crops up in US politics and is in turn widely covered in the US media, it will inevitably be transmuted into Canada. Second, we can see that the limited goals of Canadian nationalists are only in the rarest of occasions out of line with American capital. As Ozkirimli states, traditionally, nationalists believe that it is the nation which exists as the primary source of power and legitimacy - from the nation alone stems the sovereignty of its people (Ozkirimli 2017, 53). This would naturally entail that the national powerholders are also members of the nation. This was indeed the case in such historical examples of nationalist movements as the First Indo-China War (1946-1954) where a nationalist group fought against the oppression of a foreign power, in this case, the Vietnamese and the French respectively. Goals of such nationalist movements often include the nationalization of domestic industry, the adoption of a domestic language as the official language of the state, and domestically held elections or at the very least leadership by domestic powers. All these are actions that affirm the legitimacy and power of the nation - they work to solidify the sovereignty of the nation and its people (Smith 1991). However, we can see that the contemporary Canadian nationalist movement 65 sees none of these as particularly important, with perhaps the exception of domestically accepted languages. In fact, the Canadian right-wing is often the most vocal force in opposition to actions that would assist in the legitimization and power of the Canadian nation, such as the nationalization of domestic industry and the strengthening of Canadian independence from the US. To understand why this is the case, we must remember that the Canadian right-wing is an imitation of its American counterpart, and in this attempt at emulation it failed to develop an ideology that considered distinctly Canadian national interests, instead maintaining the original American national interests. However, this is an affliction not unique to the Canadian right-wing alone, for in recent history even moderates on the center-Left tend to be subservient to American capital interests. For instance, the Keystone Pipeline was a project initiated under a Conservative government in Canada. The pipeline would run from Alberta all the way to the Southern US and would be capable of pumping millions of gallons of oil a day (Transcanada Corporation 2013). Under the Conservatives, the project was touted as a means to create jobs in Canada and bolster the Canadian economy after the devastating 2008 economic crash. But the project was not completed under the Conservatives. As it dragged on into 2016, the newly elected Liberal Party of Canada adopted the project as its own, despite its claimed aversion to the fossil fuel industry. While it is undeniable is that the project - at least initially - bolstered the Canadian economy and created new employment opportunities, the project is owned and operated by Transcanada, which, despite the name, is a multinational, publicly traded, corporation, with a large portion of its shares owned by American investors. Indeed, the completion of the project depended entirely on the supply of US capital and the approval of US presidents. Over the course of 3 US presidents the project was scrapped, revived, and then scrapped again, showing how even a project that is supposedly of such national character as the Transcanada Keystone Pipeline, is ultimately dependent on US capital and politics. The above is a sign of a nationalist movement in Canada that fails to pursue goals in line with national interest, instead adopting initiatives that place foreign capital at its pedestal. It is for this reason that I have taken up the habit of referring to the current state of nationalism in Canada as ‘transmuted’ in nature. I feel it appropriate to deem it as such due to the fact that while other nationalist movements are born of deep-rooted historical injustices 66 or shared traumas, Canadian nationalism, which lacks such a shared history, must not only construct its own justification for existence, but borrow said justification from flashpoints in American politics. The resulting form of nationalism is constantly changing, adapting to the flows and ebbs of politics, and thus is more comfortable appearing not as homogenous across the nation, but rather within distinct political groups, such has the Canadian right-wing, which adopts nationalism to disguise their more primordial fears. While contemporary Canadian nationalism is chiefly a phenomenon of the right-wing, historically we can see that this has not always been the case. This is because of Canada’s lack of national identity, resulting in nationalist movements that are constructed around the current material and political circumstances of a period. Therefore, while in one decade a particularly fervent nationalist movement may appear on the Left, the passage of a mere decade may see the rise of an equally fervent nationalist movement on the Right. All this is not to say any one of these forms of nationalism are more or less harmful than another, but we can certainly see that the nationalism in Canada is in a constant state of change and development, appearing unique in character compared to those more traditional movements witnessed elsewhere throughout history. 4.3 From Transmuted to Liberated Canadian Nationalism Canada is seemingly unique in its allowance for such an extreme degree of American penetration into its power-holding institutions and culture, a problem which has led Canadian politicians to repeatedly trust a nation - which has actively worked to undermine their own nation’s internal security - with its national defense. While I do no claim to hold a solution to a problem as pervasive as this, I do believe there are some actions that could be taken to at least counteract the growth of transmuted nationalism in Canada. Perhaps the main catalyst to the growth of transmuted nationalism is a failure of Canadian liberalism - here I use liberalism in its traditional ideological form, not its modern political form - to correctly identify the Canadian national interest, particularly in the realms of the national economy and national defense. From the conversation thus far, it may be presumed that a nation that does not possess a firm national identity will be incapable of correctly identifying its national interest. After all, how can one know what they need to survive if they do not know themselves; know what they hunger for, know what they thirst 67 for? However, I believe it is not as simple as this. While having a national identity may allow a nation’s members to understand their national interests more naturally, nations that lack national identity may still correctly identify their national interest, however they will not have the benefit of a shared history to serve as supporting evidence (Smith 1991). Therefore, a form of nationalism that correctly identifies the national interest in Canada would have to possess a great deal more faith than their counterparts in nations that can look to history for justification of their movement. However, Canadian nationalists would benefit from the fact that there does seem to be a consensus about those most basic things that are in the national interest of nearly all nations. These things are basic enough that, to many, they appear as common sense regardless of one’s national history. What, then, would a Canadian nationalist movement that correctly identifies its national interest pursue? To speak on this is of course hypothetical and would likely require a dramatic shift in Canadian politics that is not currently being seen. I have chosen to designate such a movement, which again I do not currently see existing in Canada, as a ‘liberated’ form of nationalism. While I dislike the modern connotations of the word ‘liberty’, I believe such a term is appropriate given the independence this form of nationalism would need to gain from foreign influence. The current transmuted form of nationalism witnessed in Canada is largely concerned with maintaining the status quo; that is, a continuation of American influence and worship of American capital. While they certainly demand change in other areas, such as healthcare and education, very few of their pursuits would require structural changes that would impact the national character of Canada, and if they do, it would only be to adopt an American blueprint. Liberated nationalism, on the other hand, focuses almost exclusively on large-scale systemic changes that would allow Canada greater independence from foreign powerholders, chiefly the US. Systemic change in line with liberated Canadian nationalism would possess two main axioms: 1. They would seek the nationalization of a large portion of Canadian industry. While industry in Canada is already nationalized to some degree, such as the energy sector, the nationalization of resource extraction and production industries - which as we know are largely owned and operated by foreign or multinational corporations - would give Canada far greater control over its 68 own industry and, in turn, its economy. State ownership of Canadian industry would not need to be all encompassing and some private industry should remain to allow for diversity in the Canadian consumer market. But liberated Canadian nationalism would vie for all major resource extraction, agricultural, and military production industries within Canadian borders to be under state ownership. This would also have the added benefit of giving Canada the ability to rapidly adjust its industry to meet not only the needs of its population, but climate goals, something Canada has and is currently struggling to meet. Moreover, it would allow the state to plan for a more sustainable and self-sufficient industry, military, and economy that relies less heavily on imports. State ownership of such industries could potentially alleviate the increasing burden placed upon Canadian taxpayers as well, as the money that previously would have been filling the pockets of CEOs and top executives would now exist as a surplus which taxes would now only need to supplement. All of this is of course assuming that the Canadian bureaucratic institution would be capable of taking on such a task, which is unlikely given its at times debilitating inefficiency. Therefore, liberated nationalism would also seek to restructure the Canadian bureaucratic institutions in such a way as to effectively manage this new responsibility, perhaps through a centralized system of state-sanctioned unions. 2. Liberated Canadian Nationalism would do its utmost to make national defense in Canada a domestic affair. This would not necessarily mean abandoning pre-existing alliances such as NATO or NORAD, rather, I believe these institutions remain essential to the world power balance, but it would mean moving away from a reliance on senior allies for Canadian national defense. This would require the domestic production of a naval and air force capable of defending Canada’s massive land and sea borders, which would be no small feat. However, with the nationalization of Canadian industry, such contracts would be immensely stimulating to the Canadian economy, as it has the potential to create hundreds of thousands of jobs both in industry and the 69 military. But keen-eyed readers might already see red flags shooting up at this pursuit, for in the nuclear age what could national defense possibly look like other than domestic nuclear arms production? While nuclear arms would certainly make Canadian national defense more secure, they would not be essential. A nation such as Finland, which is not a member of NATO and thus does not rely on senior allies for its national defense, possesses no nuclear weapons, and while not free from foreign military threats, has successfully defended its national sovereignty throughout the nuclear age. On the other hand, Canada is more than capable of producing or purchasing its own nuclear arms if it desired to possess full control over its own national defense, indeed, as this study observes, it nearly took that route on multiple occasions. While potentially destabilizing to the overall nuclear balance, Canada is in the unique position of being a nation that has already been among the world nuclear club in the past, and the laws and policies that allowed for this historic nuclear possession still stand. Canadian possession of nuclear weapons would certainly elevate its status, not only among NATO members, as was the case when France and Britain became nuclear powers in the 1950s and 1960s respectively, but among world powers. Being in control of its own national defense, and potentially its own nuclear arms, would allow Canada to possess a voice in international politics on a previously unforeseen scale. Canada’s potential for good, and bad, would be greatly elevated. For example, Canada would, for the first time in its history, be able to speak out against senior allies without fearing how this may impact its national defense. Canada would no longer be made to blindly support every American economic blockade or invasion of a developing nation. It is important to make it clear that I do not necessarily subscribe to such a form of nationalism, rather, I present it here as an alternative to the current transmuted form that I see as doing more harm than good. While I certainly see strengths in the liberated form, particularly when it comes to creating a sustainable industry and economy in Canada, there are concerning implications of a nationalist movement that pursued such goals. While 70 historically such pursuits as nationalization and domestic military production have occurred across the political spectrum, any such attempts in Canada to carry out these goals would be met with impassioned opposition from all libertarian political groups. While I believe it is important that such an endeavor be carried out by more egalitarian actors than the powers currently witnessed in Canada, the transition would occur far more smoothly if it was accepted on both the Left and Right as being in the national interest, a highly unlikely feat. For this reason, I believe that while the goals of liberated nationalism may be common sense to many, the actual practical implementation of them would be extremely difficult in the current Canadian political climate. Perhaps the only way such a movement could materialize would be through remaining so incredibly general in rhetoric that it is impossible for it to be adopted by only one side of the political spectrum. In other words, it would need to remain apolitical. 4.4 Potential for Change I have chosen to discuss this alternate form of nationalism, even though I have already admitted that there is currently no sign of a liberated nationalist movement taking place in Canada, not because of any current existence of the movement, but because of the great potential for its conception in the coming years. The close US-Canadian relationship has been one of the great constants of the 20th and now the 21st Century, so much so that the relationship is often taken for granted. Since the end of the Second World War, Canada has been able to rely on the US for its national defense because in American military strategists’ eyes American national defense and the defense of North America were considered one in the same. More than this, America is bound to come to Canada’s aid if its national sovereignty is challenged due to the existence of such organizations as NATO and NORAD. This has produced a very convenient situation for Canada, wherein it can routinely fail to meet NATO military spending goals and face very little repercussions, as it can always rely on the US to fill this deficit - as any weakening of Canadian national defense would be perceived as a weakening of American national defense by American military strategists. This convenient relationship was brought into question for the first time since the foundation of NATO near the end of Donald Trump’s Presidency, when he began making 71 claims that he intended to pull the US from NATO. When he lost the 2020 election, he adopted the claim as part of his Presidential campaign for 2024. John Bolton, former National Security Advisor under Trump, has continued to maintain that in the event Trump is reelected, one of his first priorities in office would be working towards withdrawing the US from NATO (Robertson 2023). While many were initially quick to dispel such a claim as highly unrealistic, there has been a growing and increasingly vocal movement on the American Right in support of such a withdrawal. Recent conflicts, such as the War in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas War, which have threatened to pull NATO into another global conflict have fueled this support. The result has been a forced consideration in Canada, and all other NATO allies, of what US withdrawal from the organization would mean. NATO is by all practical accounts an American-led organization. Of the 31 nations that make up NATO, the US foots over 16% of the total funding provided to the organization (Canada sits at just 6.8%), and while Germany matches the US contribution, in terms of actual military expenditures, the US nearly doubles the $485 billion Germany spends annually at $877 billion (NATO 2023). The US is therefore by far the largest contributor both economically and militarily to the NATO alliance. This is not to mention that the NATO nuclear deterrence is almost entirely reliant on US nuclear stockpiles. Here it is important to remember that NATO is far more than just a military alliance, it is also the largest trade alliance to ever exist. The NATO treaty economically binds all members to US capital, this is because the US has established itself as the economic standard of the globe, and while Russia and China have come close to threatening this position, the US remains the world’s economic hegemon. What this means practically, is that a failure of US capital would result in a failure of all those nations economically bound to the US - in other words, a worldwide recession. Therefore, in the event of a Trump reelection, Canada would be rapidly forced to reconsider its approach to its national defense as well as its national economy. Logically, Canada would likely remain in NATO, which would now be greatly weakened. Because of this, Canada would be forced, for the first time in its history, to take over the responsibility for its own national defense. For as it currently stands, no other powers within NATO would be capable of filling the vacuum that US withdrawal would create, this would include the ability to guarantee the security of junior allies such as Canada. Naturally, there would be a 72 large growth in support for Canadian military buildup. This would require a massive quantity of arms and equipment, which would either need to be purchased from foreign powers, or domestically produced. While such a large quantity of arms could theoretically be purchased from the US or other foreign powers, this would present Canada with a prime opportunity to establish a domestic military industry, one that would rely on Canadian resources and a Canadian workforce. Not only would this result in a self-sufficient military in Canada, but the creation of jobs would be immensely stimulating to the Canadian economy. American withdrawal from NATO would likely force Canada to take actions that are in line with a liberated nationalist ideology. Therefore, it is my belief that if a Trump Presidency did follow through with this outrageous promise, such a movement would organically take shape within Canada, as its pursuits are the natural plan of action for a nation that has now taken over the burden of its own national defense. While at this point all of this remains speculation, this theory may very well be put to the test in the coming year. However, this is not the only situation in which I believe liberated Canadian nationalism could take shape. As American influence continues to grow in Canada, and the Canadian economy begins to suffer because of it, it is likely that there will be a growing portion of the population with a strong aversion to the continuation of the current US-Canadian relationship. This, too, would give rise to a liberated nationalist movement in Canada, if only more gradually and less dramatically. It could be argued that the first signs of such sentiments have already taken seed within Canada, as there is considerable fear circulating around the strength of the US economy and political institution, and what the failure of either of these would mean for Canada. Therefore, it may not be long before Canadians begin to feel increased sovereignty from the US is not only in their personal interest, but in the nation's interest. 73 5. Concluding Thoughts This study began as little more than a hobby. Nuclear technology, and nuclear weapons in particular, have not only always fascinated, but also terrified me, and to find out that the nation which I call home had a less than open history with nuclear possession sent me down a path I could never have expected to lead me here, to this study. Even throughout the two years in which I have been conducting this study, I was forced to reevaluate my own alignments and perspectives to properly analyze Canada’s complicated relationship to nuclear weapons. I realized that I had no pre-existing political, or ideological framework in which I could attempt to understand this messy, and complicated topic. I originally set out with a single goal in mind for this study to accomplish; a chronology of the Canadian acquisition, possession, and dispossession of nuclear weapons. I chose this topic because I was shocked to find it had not been discussed, let alone mentioned throughout my academic studies. However, I quickly found that I could not explore this topic in a vacuum, indeed it would be virtually impossible to consider Canadian nuclear possession without also developing an understanding of Canada’s political relations and domestic ideological struggle. I was unaware, at the conception of this study, that these latter two aspects would develop into such a major part of my work and in many ways take on an importance that I now feel is greater than Canada’s brief history of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, I came to discover that Canada’s acquisition, possession, and dispossession of nuclear weapons was just one key - and potentially devastating - example of a much larger trend of weakening Canadian sovereignty and growing subservience. While I always expected my ideological beliefs to play a significant role in this study, especially when it came to critically analyzing the Canadian-US relationship, I had not pictured myself developing a definition for a unique form of nationalism witnessed in Canada. Nor had I intended to consider the possibility of a major ideological shift in Canada brought about by the dissolution of hallmark Cold War institutions. However, I could not allow myself to ignore such pertinent elements such as these, which above all else in this study help depict the rising sense of fear and uncertainty in our current age. Thus, this study came to take on its current form. 74 5.1 Summary Chapter 2 served as the technical side of this study, considering chronologically Canada’s acquisition, possession, and ultimate dispossession of nuclear weapons. This included detailing the type, number, location, and intended use of Canada’s nuclear arsenal, much of which has only recently become declassified information. Here it was seen that after Canada’s nuclear acquisition in 1963, the weapons Canada received were not only largely obsolete from a technological standpoint but were selected based on an outdated nuclear philosophy agreed upon in the MC 48 and MC 14/2 documents. Thus, nuclear acquisition was in many ways a political act, more than a defensive act, reflected in the fact that Canada only possessed its long fought for nuclear arsenal for a mere 21 years. This chapter also considered the long political strife between the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties, but more than this, it looked at the more personal concerns of individual Canadian leaders, such as Pearson and Diefenbaker, where a trend emerged; nearly all Canadian leaders during this volatile early Cold War period were concerned above all else with Canada’s waning sovereignty, and sought through various means - that were at times vastly contrasting - to remedy this growing problem. Prime Minister Pearson, the largest looming figure of this period, believed nuclear weapons presented an answer to this question for Canada. Despite being the legal property of the US and under constant bilateral control, Pearson saw in these weapons a means to give Canada a voice among the world’s Nuclear Club, a voice which came at a considerable cost to domestic control over Canadian security. Chapter 3 was dedicated to the philosophy behind not only Canada’s nuclear weapons, but the wider NATO arsenal. While NATO philosophy shifted several times throughout the Cold War, Canada’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons revolved around the early assumption that any nuclear strike launched against Europe and North America on behalf of the Soviets would occur through a coordinated tactical and strategic bombing campaign. NATO doctrine during the early Cold War period thus focused on defense and retaliation against such an attack. MC 48 and MC 14/2 were analyzed in depth here, revealing that during this period NATO had no grasp on what we today understand to be mutually assured destruction, instead they planned for a two-stage nuclear war, the first phase consisting of the use of nuclear weapons, and a second, more drawn-out period of conventional fighting. Despite the true shortsightedness of this philosophy, Canada 75 nonetheless supported it, and allowed its nuclear possession to be structured around this two-stage plan. In this process, Canadian leaders ensured that if a nuclear war was to break out, Canada would at least have the means to defend itself, however they also, perhaps inadvertently, ensured that Canada would now be perceived as a target of any Soviet nuclear strike. Beyond this, the wider mentality of nuclear powers was considered through the theories of Nuclear Revolution and Mark Bell’s Nuclear Opportunism, where it was found that Canada failed to conform to either theory’s preconceived understanding of nuclear power behavior, chiefly due to the bilateral nature of its nuclear arsenal, as opposed one which is domestically produced and controlled. Here it was also considered whether a Soviet nuclear strike was as grave a threat as NATO believed it to be during this period, where it found that much of the paranoia and uncertainty generated by the Soviets was utilized by the US to further bolster support for its reliance on nuclear weapons. Experts in the field have since determined that a Soviet strike was highly unlikely at any given time during the Cold War (Whitaker and Marcuse 1994, XI-XII), and a far more likely scenario was the US goading the Soviets into a conventional war that then inevitably turned nuclear (Keeting and Pratt 1998, 2). The chapter ended with a brief look into the current state of nuclear philosophy where a concerning trend to disregard M.A.D. has led some nations to adopt a ‘limited’ mentality toward the use of nuclear weapons. NATO, for its part, has continued to officially rely on a philosophy of deterrence, but will soon be forced to adapt if other nations are truly willing to use tactical nuclear weapons. Lastly, chapter 4 branched into the more theoretical implications of not just the Canadian possession of nuclear weapons, and the mentality that led to acquisition, but to the wider ideological forces currently driving national defense and the economy in Canada. In this process it was seen how the US acts as the greatest source of external influence over politics, defense, and the economy in Canada. Despite this fact, it was analyzed that current nationalist movements in Canada are overwhelmingly pro-American, which led the discussion to consider how Canadian nationalism is unique from traditional ideological understandings. Contemporary Canadian nationalism was deemed unique enough to warrant its own description and distinct title, which I termed as a ‘transmuted’ form of nationalism due to it constantly being reshaped and redesigned around flashpoints in American politics. 76 This form of nationalism in Canada was seen to be not only highly unproductive in terms of national development but destructive in many respects as it directly jeopardizes Canadian sovereignty in welcoming foreign influence over politics and the economy. The final section of this chapter considered a potential alternative to the current form of transmuted nationalism in Canada, one which correctly identifies national interest and seeks out practical actions through which national goals can be accomplished. Chiefly among these goals was a domestication of military industries, increased independence (economically and politically) from the US, and a nationalization of considerable sectors of industry in Canada. This alternative form of nationalism was deemed to be ‘liberated’ in nature, due to its independent stance from the US, and although admittedly there are no current signs of such a movement developing in Canada, with the future prospect of a Trump presidency pulling the US from NATO, Canada may be forced to reconsider its national interest and find that it is in line with this liberated form. 5.2 Moving Forward I conducted this study not merely to answer some research question which I devised for a master’s thesis that would in turn qualify me for some job. Rather, I felt a certain sense of duty, as one of the few individuals who have taken the time to properly understand this period in history to share my findings and expose the more concerning trends I have witnessed, trends which I believe have been instrumental in shaping our current age of fear and uncertainty. And while this is by all practical accounts still little more than an academic analysis of a historical period, one which will inevitably join the body of countless other works published by master’s students, if I could have readers take away anything from this study it would be an awareness of the influence which Cold War institutions continue to have over Canada; institutions, such as NATO and NORAD, which were designed to combat an enemy which no longer exists, and yet continue to shape Canadian defense and the economy. Now, perhaps more than ever before, Canadians are at a crossroads; we can either sit idly by and continue to abide by those archaic institutions, which have proven themselves incapable of solving contemporary conflicts without resorting to wars in developing nations, or we can begin to tackle the incredibly daunting task of reconsidering our alignment to global powers and establish ourselves, for perhaps the first time in history, as a truly 77 independent voice. Canada and its people have the potential to serve as a beacon of multiculturalism, of acceptance, and of peace in the world, and yet we allow our leaders to cower behind more powerful nations, blindly supporting and following their every move, even when they commit to actions that are directly against our national interest and wind up costing Canadian taxpayers billions. In the past, this has gone as far as accepting weapons capable of killing millions and plunging the world into a new human-caused ice age, all in the name of ‘security,’ which was defined by fear mongering individuals seeking to make profit off military production. We seem to be currently approaching a scenario eerily similar to that of the early Cold War, where due to fear and uncertainty, the Canadian people, left with no domestic source of influence, are left to rally behind those more volatile and vocal powers, such as the American right wing, in their desperate search for solutions. However, these individuals will inevitably be left angry and full of misdirected hatred, still searching for solutions. While I am not so blind as to urge Canada to adopt a pacifistic, demilitarized stance, it has become clear to me that one thing, if nothing else, must be done; Canada must cease its blind subservience to the American military industrial complex and begin paving the way for its own future, one in which Canada has the potential to serve as the bulwark for nations truly interested in seeking peace instead of war, of collaboration instead of competition. But before this can be accomplished, I fear things must get far worse before they can get better. Currently, an increasing number of Canadians are drawn in by fear mongering rhetoric, rhetoric that seeks to paint those that go against the status quo as ‘Other’, as an enemy worthy of nothing but destruction. This mentality can only lead to war, to more death, and to more suffering. 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Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Interdisciplinary Studies
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Paulson, Tim
Incineration without representation : a critical analysis of the history of Canadian nuclear weapon possession
Text