Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Foster, Richard
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
Jeffrey Winter’s return to the material foundations of oligarchy has facilitated the reinvigoration of a typology typically reserved for classical political thought. Oligarchs, he suggests, are the ultra-wealthy individuals who deploy vast amounts of material wealth for the purpose of personal wealth defence and subsequent social position. This understanding, contrary to popular scholarly discourse, implies the mutual inclusivity of democracy and oligarchy. How then can one characterise the relationship between the active deployment of material wealth by oligarchs and democracies? Typically, the empirical literature suggests that the contingencies and complexities of the policy-making process (e.g. mobilised opposition, public opinion, legislator preferences) mean that the deployment of material wealth in pursuit of an individual interest is broadly impotent, and thereby political, and by extension, democratic, implications are limited. However, the oligarchic deployment of material wealth is different: its immense concentration, coordinated deployment through the Income Defence Industry, low public salience, and minimally resourced opposition ensures that typical contingencies faced by interests can be avoided. The primary implication of this is that inclusion of this interest (oligarchic wealth defence) is empowered in the democratic system on the basis of wealth - disempowering the inclusion of the less affluent and reducing the system's capacity for collective agenda-setting.
OLIGARCHIC MATERIAL POWER AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS by Richard Foster B.A. (Hons.), The University of York, 2019 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) August 2023 © Richard Foster, 2023 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the thesis entitled: Oligarchic Material Power and the Implications for Democratic Systems submitted by Richard Foster in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science Examining Committee: Mark E. Warren, Professor Emeritus, Political Science, UBC Supervisor Bruce Baum, Associate Professor, Political Science, UBC Supervisory Committee Member iii Abstract Jeffrey Winter’s return to the material foundations of oligarchy has facilitated the reinvigoration of a typology typically reserved for classical political thought. Oligarchs, he suggests, are the ultra-wealthy individuals who deploy vast amounts of material wealth for the purpose of personal wealth defence and subsequent social position. This understanding, contrary to popular scholarly discourse, implies the mutual inclusivity of democracy and oligarchy. How then can one characterise the relationship between the active deployment of material wealth by oligarchs and democracies? Typically, the empirical literature suggests that the contingencies and complexities of the policy-making process (e.g. mobilised opposition, public opinion, legislator preferences) mean that the deployment of material wealth in pursuit of an individual interest is broadly impotent, and thereby political, and by extension, democratic, implications are limited. However, the oligarchic deployment of material wealth is different: its immense concentration, coordinated deployment through the Income Defence Industry, low public salience, and minimally resourced opposition ensures that typical contingencies faced by interests can be avoided. The primary implication of this is that inclusion of this interest (oligarchic wealth defence) is empowered in the democratic system on the basis of wealth - disempowering the inclusion of the less affluent and reducing the system's capacity for collective agenda-setting. iv Lay Summary This paper considers how ultra-wealthy citizens (i.e. oligarchs) in liberal democracies (such as the US, the UK, and Canada) pursue undue influence over democratic processes in order to increase their own incomes and wealth. It considers how money may be used in democracies to pursue a given interest and the effectiveness of money in achieving this interest, across a number of channels. It then discusses these channels with reference to oligarchs, considering what makes their deployment of money exceptional in pursuit of undue influence for a given interest. I conclude that the oligarchic deployment of money in pursuit of further wealth defence is broadly more effective in pursuing undue influence for wealth defence. v Preface This thesis is the original, unpublished work of the author, Richard J. Foster. vi Table of Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary ............................................................................................................................... iv Preface .............................................................................................................................................v Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... vi Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... viii Dedication ..................................................................................................................................... ix Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Overview ..................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Oligarchy and Democracy .......................................................................................... 5 1.3 Power Resources and Material Wealth ....................................................................... 9 Chapter 2: Domains of Political Influence ......................................................................... 13 2.1 Political Officials ...................................................................................................... 13 2.1.1 Material Power and Official Position Power ........................................................ 13 2.1.2 Effectiveness of Lobbying and Campaign Contributions ..................................... 17 2.1.3 Oligarchy, Lobbying and Campaign Contributions .............................................. 21 2.1.4 Democratic Implications of Oligarchic Material Power and Political Officials ... 25 2.2 The Electorate ........................................................................................................... 27 2.2.1 Material Power and Mobilisation Power .............................................................. 27 2.2.2 Effectiveness of Deploying Material Power in Media Systems ........................... 29 2.2.3 Oligarchy and Material Power in Media Systems ................................................ 33 2.2.4 Democratic Implications of Oligarchic Material Power in Media Systems ......... 36 2.3 The Market ................................................................................................................ 37 vii 2.3.1 Material Power and Coercive Market Power ........................................................ 37 2.3.2 Effectiveness of Capital Flight and Capital Strike ................................................ 40 2.3.3 Oligarchy and Market Structure ............................................................................ 41 2.3.4 Democratic Implications of Oligarchic Material Power in Markets ..................... 43 Chapter 3: Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 45 3.1 Summary ................................................................................................................... 45 3.2 Future Research on Material Power and Oligarchy .................................................. 47 References .....................................................................................................................................49 viii Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge the support and guidance given to me by Prof.Warren on this project. His capacity to help me understand my own ideas has proven invaluable to my current and future study. I would also like to thank Dr. Baum for his feedback on this project, it will certainly prove useful in defining my future research. I am also immensely grateful for the conversations I have had with Prof. Johnston and Dr. Chowdhury who helped to define my initial project. Finally, to Dr. Afsahi and Dr. Sultan, thank you for your support throughout the year, and encouraging me to aim high. I really could not be happier with my future which the two of you have helped to shape. ix Dedication To Dave and Cindy, I wish you the absolute best in this new chapter in your lives.1 Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Overview Borne of Jeffrey Winters’ (2011) study of the concentration of wealth in the modern era, the term ‘civil oligarchy’ describes a system in which the ultra-wealthy (i.e. oligarchs) are, contrary to historical precedent, detached from the means of coercion to defend their amassed personal wealth and are instead bound to rulings applicable to the collective. Therein exists “strong and impersonal systems of law” which constrain the oligarch to legal bounds and regulations in return for their property rights to be affirmed and protected (208). Yet, adherence to these constraints does not expunge the conflict which oligarchs face in wealth defence; it merely reshapes it into a less violent form. However, within liberal democracies, the same principles which ensure property rights of individuals also facilitate the legitimate use of coercive powers which threaten wealth and income, primarily in the form of redistribution and regulation. Oligarchs, characterised by their deployment of vast material wealth in the pursuit of personal wealth defence and subsequent social position, adapt to their ‘civil’ constraints and will, directly or indirectly, pursue influence over the dispensation of the coercive tools of the state which can otherwise hinder their attainment of their primary interest, personal wealth defence (via taxation and regulation). However, it is suggested that the channels through which political influence is sought in liberal democracies can give undue advantages to those holding material power resources; the channels for influence can be better accessed through the deployment of material wealth or by account of the structural advantages which wealth brings (for the most comprehensive accounts see Graetz and Shapiro 2005; Gilens 2012; Scholzman, Verba and Brady 2012; Bartels 2016). Yet scholars who have investigated these channels of material wealth deployment (e.g. lobbying, campaign contributions, media) in pursuit of interests have found 2 consensus around the idea that wealth deployment is not the decisive factor in determining overt policy outcomes; the contingencies and complexities (e.g. elite preferences, party pressures, public opinion, opposing interests) in the decision-making process make overt policy outcomes on account of material wealth deployment notably irregular occurrences (Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012, 291-3; Gilens 2012, 244; Baumgartner et al 2009, 194). In other words, on the face of it, the active deployment of material wealth, and by extension the oligarchic deployment of material wealth in pursuit of wealth defence, does not appear to be immediately pertinent to democracies and political outcomes as initially supposed. Whilst observing individual channels may not demonstrate consistent overt policy outcomes by account of the deployment of material wealth, it does not suggest that material wealth is inconsequential. One suspects this to be especially true of theories of oligarchy in liberal democracies; concentrated material power is deployed simultaneously albeit independently, across a number of channels, for a shared purpose, against an opposition with negligible counterbalancing resources (Winters and Page 2009, 723; Winters 2011, 225; Gilens 2012, 160-1; Hacker and Pierson 2010, 278-9). The Americanist proclivity for evaluating solely based on overt policy outcomes truly distracts from the broader implications for democracies; the problem of the deployment of material wealth should not only concern how it may create policy outcomes inconsistent with public opinion (Page and Jacobs 2010a), there is a deeper problem, one which is primarily concerned with how democracies function. Therefore, in this paper, I take a different approach to deployment of material wealth which instead understands the issue as a democratic problem, one in which the policy outcomes identified by Americanist scholars are symptomatic of defective democratic systems - whilst changes in overt policy outcomes in response to material wealth deployment would provide useful 3 evidence, its absence does not disprove the potency of material power, given the multitude of contingencies and complexities of the policy-making process. Specifically, I engage with Warren’s (2017) problem-based approach which assesses democratic systems based on three core democratic functions, to ensure: empowered inclusion, collective agenda setting and will formation, and collective decision making. These functions encapsulate the fundamental principles that underpin democratic systems; they “describe the relationships between individual and collective agency” which accords democracy as “rule of the people” (43). Through evaluating liberal democracies in this way, we can provide a clearer and more granulated image of the issue of the deployment of material wealth in democracies. This approach not only allows us to break down the causal mechanism between wealth deployment and subsequent political outcomes, but provides a clear typology to express the normative concerns of material wealth deployment. Moreover, this approach can allow us to identify where, which, and how functions are violated, providing us with the basis for institutional solutions.1 I begin the paper by characterising oligarchy in the context of liberal democracies. I then expound a conception of material wealth which understands it as a ‘power resource’ (Korsi 1985) and treat this as the theoretical underpinning of my paper - this provides an intelligible typology to understand the dynamic of power involved in the relationship between deployed wealth and democracy. I then turn to three domains in which I suspect interests’ deployment of material wealth in political channels to affect democratic functions - I identify the domains to be political officials, the market and the electorate. Within each domain, I conceptualise a theoretical account of how 1 Various solutions have been offered to eliminate the political influence of material power although each have seemingly irresolvable problems associated with them, including vastly increasing capacities for coercion or requiring institutional overhauls (see for example McCormick 2011; Vergara 2020; Landemore 2020, see critiques of these Lafont 2020; Bagg 2021; Vergara 2022; Landemore 2022). 4 material power is deployed by interests and subsequently converted into different power resources within the constituent channel(s). In this, I consider the implication of this conversion for democratic functions; primarily, my concern is that the exercise of the resultant power resources disempower the inclusion of alternative interests. I then draw on the distinct empirical literatures to evaluate the capacity for the conversion of power resources in these channels, I suggest that, for each channel, a number of contingencies prevent the successful conversion of material power into other power resources, thereby restricting the undermining of democratic functions.2 I finally consider the deployment and conversion of material power in pursuit of oligarchic wealth defence, how these contingencies may be circumvented, and the subsequent democratic implications of this. The paper concludes that the deployment and conversion of oligarchic material power in the pursuit of wealth defence causes a subversion of democratic functions through, firstly, disempowering the inclusion of the interests of less affluent citizens and secondly, through ensuring that these interests are not equally represented throughout the agenda-setting process. I suggest that this occurs because, whilst most interests typically face a series of political contingencies (e.g. equally powerful opposing interests, need for public opinion alignment) in the successful conversion of material power into the power resources which can induce political influence, the pursuit of oligarchic wealth defence do not face as many of these contingencies. The vastness of oligarchic material power, the nature of its simultaneous deployment and coordination through the Income Defence Industry, and its lack of salience means that a broad number of these contingencies can be circumvented. 2 The empirical literature which I review primarily concerns the United States; the amount of research which has been performed on inequality in the US vastly outnumbers the research regarding other liberal democracies. 5 However, I also note that this is not to suggest that oligarchs are not totally empowered. I suggest that these contingencies may likely be overcome, but across each channel, oligarchs are not guaranteed success in pursuit of their interest. In particular, I consider how in the last domain, the market, that oligarchs, although empowered with vaster material resources than the typical capitalist, this difference in the amount of resources is relatively inconsequential in determining outcomes due to a number of contingencies (primarily legislator beliefs and institutional processes) which simply cannot be circumvented through the deployment of material wealth. 1.2 Oligarchy and Democracy Rule of the few - or some variation thereof - has been the standard (and etymologically correct) definition of oligarchy. Yet this imprecise definition has received scathing challenges from Leach (2005) and, more recently, Winters (2011). Oligarchs, as referred to by Aristotle, were without reasonable exception, those holding wealth; the additional power resources (governmental positions, hereditary privileges, etc.) which scholars presume oligarchs to characteristically hold are later developments to oligarchic theory constructed by Italian school elite theorists such as Michels, Mosca and Pareto (Winters 2011, 2-5). Returning to these material foundations allows us to more precisely characterise the political dimensions of oligarchs. Thereby, in this paper, I do not address the direct deployment of these additional power resources. These individuals, distinct from other elites (e.g. bourgeoisie, political elites, capitalists), are characterised by their deployment of vast personal wealth into the political sphere in order to 6 pursue their personal interest - as in Aristotle, in almost all instances, this is wealth defence.3 In order to undertake substantial deployment of personal wealth, a considerable amount is prerequisite yet this is hard to define due to its dependence on context. Despite an absence of thresholds pertaining to either accumulated wealth or the extent of its deployment, the use of some heuristic devices allow an understanding of the sums of wealth to remain conceptually lucid. Winters and Page (2009) loosely identify the oligarchic group as those who would appear in Forbes 400 (736) whereas Bulmer and White (2022) provide a satisfying yet whimsical characterisation of the amount of wealth which oligarchs possess: “[Oligarchy] refers to the very rich, a small subset of the first group: perhaps the top 0.01%, or the ‘billionaire class.’ The mass affluent fly business class; the billionaire class can own an airline” (275). Oligarchs are the exceptionally wealthy. Winters (2011) offers additional clarity regarding the nature of oligarchy by presenting a historical account of its manifestations. The form of oligarchy is dependent on firstly, how coercion is operationalised, specifically the oligarchic role in coercion, between armed-personal and disarmed-impersonal, and secondly, whether the type of rule is personalistic-fragmented and collective-institutional (34). I do not elaborate on the intricacies of characterisation nor consider alternative forms of oligarchy here, but for the purpose of this paper, civil oligarchies are positioned at the juncture of collective institutional rule and a minimal, disarmed role in coercion 3 Winters (2011) briefly acknowledges that individual oligarchs may have additional personal interests however, he suggests, on issues other than wealth defence, there is not an overwhelming bias from those holding the wealth, as such, the material power deployed in pursuit of interests other than wealth defence would likely be balanced by other ultra-wealthy individuals supporting competing interests (7). This perspective is not entirely convincing; the affluent and less affluent tend to diverge in a number of policy areas as suggested in surveys reported by Gilens (2012). In other words, the distribution of policy preferences is not the same throughout different levels of affluence. It would be folly to suggest that this logic would not be extended to the extreme economic strata where oligarchs lie. Given the possibility for the conversion of material power into political influence, this requires further exploration. 7 (36). Liberal democracies are necessarily civil oligarchies; decisions are collective, institutionalised, and the state’s institutions - not private individuals - maintain the typical means of legitimate coercion. On the contrary, civil oligarchies are not necessarily liberal democracies; oligarchs can be unarmed but collective rule can be relatively weak - see for example Singapore (Winters 2013, 33). Under this ‘civil’ form of oligarchy, wealth is ensured by a system of impersonal laws, in liberal democracies, these impersonal laws are maintained via the rule of law and democratic institutions - wealth itself tends to be treated with utmost legal sanctity. Yet, when the protection of oligarchic wealth is ensured, the interest of the oligarch then becomes income defence. Protected income ensures that wealth is maintained, perhaps increased, and thereby social position is secured, but in liberal democracies, income is not endowed with the same political sanctity as wealth; its protection is by no means assured. Thereby, the safeguarding of income emerges as the primary scope in the pursuit of oligarchic wealth defence. Whilst oligarchs may deploy resources directly in pursuit of wealth defence (as I discuss in the domain of the market), it is the Income Defence Industry which assumes a central role, constituting the key actors responsible for securing the incomes of oligarchs. The Income Defence Industry exchanges these services in return for a portion of the oligarch’s material wealth (I primarily discuss the Income Defence Industry when considering the domains of political officials and the electorate). The Income Defence Industry encompasses a diverse spectrum of actors, including accountants, tax specialists, lawyers, lobbyists, and wealth managers, collectively serving as the "middle and upper-class worker bees" instrumental in generating outcomes favourable to oligarchic interests (Winters 2011, 18). Whilst these actors pursue a number of routes 8 to induce wealth defence, including legal challenges, accounting loopholes, portfolio management, there are two broad political pursuits undertaken by the Income Defence Industry. One arm of the Income Defence Industry specialises in offering tailored tax services to clients seeking to maintain a balance wherein profitability is preserved while delivering a value-for-money service. As highlighted by Winters (2011), this facet of the Income Defence Industry advocates for the intricate complication of tax codes, a strategic move that empowers expert accountants and wealth managers to widen the discrepancy between an oligarch's tax obligations and the actual amount paid (213). This includes endeavours aimed at reducing taxation on income and inheritance for the ultra-wealthy, as corroborated by the works of Herber (1981; 1988). The implication arising from these dynamics is that the strategic objective of such firms is not centred on advocating for tax cuts but rather on orchestrating bespoke personal tax frameworks that ensures a more advantageous financial environment for client interests, but one which can only be utilised by the firm. The other arm of the Income Defence Industry, primarily wealth management firms, adopt a different approach. Their approach attempts to maximise the overall portfolios of clients, with less emphasis on tax complications; for them, policies conducive to wealth defence also facilitate their management of larger sums of money, thereby enhancing their profitability. These are the firms interested in reducing overall tax rates. These actors are central in the explanation of oligarchic wealth defence; the Income Defence Industry provides the means for the culmination and professional direction of material power such that the individual pursuits of wealth defence are more effective. Finally, of particular note to the study of oligarchy, the oligarchic interest of wealth defence presents a stark contrast to the interests of the less affluent. Page and Jacobs (2010a; 2010b) study 9 of American preferences in regards to inequality understands US citizens to, contrary to the trope that Americans reject government support of social mobility, hold views which can characterise them as ‘pragmatic egalitarians’ in their support for public policies which taxes according to capacity to pay, regulate large corporations, and provide an efficient welfare state. These policy preferences are perhaps the antithesis to those held by oligarchs which attempt to reduce the burden on the extremely wealthy. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper, it is worth noting that the US public - the less affluent - hold latent political preferences which are in opposition to policies of wealth defence, although as I discuss later in the paper, these preferences are not expressed sufficiently through democratic processes.4 1.3 Power Resources and Material Wealth The concept of ‘power resources’ provides a framework for understanding the interactions between actors in the application of power. Power resources quantify the capabilities held by actors which can be utilised in pursuit of their interests (Korpi 2006, 172). This provides us with a simplistic typology to clarify the nature of complex relational structures in causal and intentional explanations of political outcomes (Korpi 1985, 31). In other words, it allows us to better explain and contextualise the intentional actions of actors when trying to understand political outcomes - in the case of oligarchy, this is understanding political and democratic outcomes in terms of the conversion of material power into different power resources. Power resources theory (PRT) was first used in order to explain the development of - and in some states, absence of - the welfare state, 4 Throughout this essay, I use the term ‘pragmatic egalitarians’ as if it were synonymous with ‘the broad citizenry’ and ‘the less affluent’ as across liberal democracies, these broadly egalitarian perspectives, which are opposed to oligarchic wealth defence tend to be held by a broad majority of the public. 10 where traditional Marxist accounts failed to acknowledge the centrality of mobilised labour in its development (Olsen and O’Connor 1998, 6; Korpi 1983; 1985; 2006). This theme of mobilised labour also recurs in explanations of oligarchic wealth defence as its absence, as I discuss towards the end of this paper, equates to a minimally empowered opposition to the pursuit of wealth defence. There are several power resources which Winters (2011) rightly identifies as relevant to the explanation of oligarchic power. Political rights, as a power resource, refers to the capacity for individuals to exercise influence over the state and political outcomes. When deployed independently, it is not a particularly powerful resource (in that its individual exercise is relatively ineffective in rewarding or punishing actors), and very broadly dispersed (13). However, when applied in unison, it can be a particularly powerful resource, potentially generating political outcomes friendly to a given collective’s interests. Mobilisational power refers to the capacity to be able to change the attitudes of citizens and, in turn, mobilise citizens to action. This mobilisation tends to be realised when possessors “activate the latent political power of others” (16) - in other words, it can induce the deployment of people’s political rights in support of an interest. The most basic interpretation of mobilisation power is the capacity to engage citizens in the support of a political cause, whether that be through engaging with the issue in the public sphere, voting in a way conducive to the cause, campaigning and advocating for the cause. Coercive power refers to the capacity to punish actors for not acquiescing to demands of the possessor in such a way that actors are responsive. Within liberal democracies, this power is typically exercised by the state when the rule of law (i.e. the demand) is violated. Official positions are a power resource on account of the number of resources and people which they command; government officials, corporate executives, religious officials, can exercise this power resource with at least a degree of 11 freedom, although its application for the pursuit of personal interest is constrained heavily by institutions and rules.5 Finally, there is material wealth: money, bonds, real estate or capital allows other power (and non-power) resources to be procured through exchange. It is characterised by its vast domain (many actors react to it), liquidity (it can be deployed quickly), and high concentration potential (few checks on the amount which individuals can hold and guaranteed by the state) (Korpi 1985, 34). Moreover, its domain, scope and centrality are all high, in other words, it has a large number of receptive actors, a large range of actions which other actors could respond with in response to it, and it is of high importance in other actors lives, respectively. However, what is perhaps most exceptional about material wealth as a power resource is its high degree of convertibility: it can be easily deployed and converted into alternative power resources. Within this paper, I consider how the deployment of material power, in pursuit of influence over the policy-making process, involves the conversion of material power into several different resources, dependent on the domain of its deployment. For political officials, I consider how material power can be deployed directly or indirectly (through the Income Defence Industry) in the form of lobbying and campaign contributions, in an attempt to convert material power into official position power, by proxy. By this, I refer to the fact that oligarchs or their employed agents, do not come to possess this power resource themselves, but, through the deployment of material power, they appropriate the official position power associated with political officials. Finally, in considering the market, I consider how the market 5 Whilst oligarchs may possess - and likely do possess in the form of corporate directorships, political positions etc - any of these types of power in addition to their material power, I do not consider the deployment of them within this essay. It is only material power which characterises oligarchs. 12 structure of liberal democracies facilitates the conversion of material power into a form of coercive power. In reference to the electorate, I consider how material power can appropriate media systems to endow possessors with mobilisation power. 13 Chapter 2: Domains of Political Influence 2.1 Political Officials 2.1.1 Material Power and Official Position Power Political officials, whether that be legislators, cabinet ministers, committee members, or party elites provide a proxy through which material power deployment leads to increased influence over the dispensation of the power resources which accompany official positions (broadly, input into the policy-making process).6 I suggest that this conversion of material power into official position power operates through two channels: lobbying and campaign contributions. Whilst empirical studies would suggest that neither channel is typically effective in ensuring conversion of these power resources due to a series political contingencies, I suggests in the oligarchic context, the contingencies which typically restrict the conversion of material power into official position power are circumvented primarily due to the non-salient nature of wealth defence policy outcomes and an under-resourced, minimal opposition. I conclude that the oligarchic deployment of material power in pursuit of official position power restricts the inclusion of opposition interests in the policy-making process at the level of political elites thereby subverting a democratic system’s capacity to firstly, empower inclusion and secondly, generate collective agendas and wills. Lobbying, in the broadest sense, refers to an interest group or individual actor’s attempt to influence public officials in the positions they take and decisions they make as to further some shared, either public or private interest. It better connects legislators to the plurality of interests prevalent in liberal democracies, acting as an information proxy, something which a number of scholars have traditionally deemed to be a ‘transmission belt’ (for example, see Truman 1951; 6 For this paper, I refer to legislators (or legislature candidates) unless stated otherwise. 14 Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1963; Milbrath 1963; Austen-Smith 1993; Grossman and Helpman 2002; see more recently Klüver 2012 on Europe). Under these conceptions, lobbying provides an informational advantage to legislators. They indicate the consequences of action or inaction in relation to certain issues relevant to their interest, the stakeholders in relation to the policy decisions they are making, and more generally, information relating to policies which would otherwise be difficult for legislators and surrounding actors to collect (e.g. Baumgartner et al 2009; see also Hall and Deardorff 2006 on ‘legislative subsidies’ providing informational support for candidates conducive to their interests). Theoretically, legislators use this information in conjunction with - often quite incoherent - public opinion in order to develop a clearer understanding of public policy preferences, and, theoretically conform to these policy preferences in pursuit of re-election (Schumpeter 1942, 269-73; for a specific account of the role of interest groups in representing public preferences see Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 1995). However, despite their role, interest groups are self-interested; they aspire to see the attainment of their private or public good as the political outcome. Whilst they provide an informational role, scholars have also highlighted the capacity for lobbying to be used as a channel in the pursuit of undue political influence. Numerous examples have pointed towards interest groups appearing to have been the cause for certain policy outcomes (see for example Langbein 1986; Wright 1990; Segal, Cameron and Cover 1992; Gehlbach 2006; Hill et al 2013). By this account, material power is deployed by individuals or organisations of a given interest into an interest group which performs the lobbyist role itself, or directs funds towards paid advocacy groups to lobby on their behalf. Lobbyists then provide political officials with the sort of information which is conducive to the attainment of their given interest, often omitting information otherwise (Austen-Smith 1993). If this information is received and accepted by political officials, 15 the information concerning this interest is then included in the policy-making process (e.g. Austen-Smith 1995). This information can become the basis for an official’s involvement in a given policy-making process, and thereby, the official position power resource is deployed in a way conducive to the given interest. Campaign finance on the other hand refers to funding raised for the campaigns of political candidates, political parties and political issue organisations (i.e. political actors). Recipient actors use finances to purchase the instruments necessary to inform, persuade and motivate citizens to support them, through the exercising of voting rights, or otherwise. Campaign finance is often a relatively central interest for political elites; a number of models of campaign success have identified finances as often an important variable for successful political outcomes for these actors (Jacobson 1990; Gerber 1998; Garrett 1999; Ferguson, Jorgenson and Chen 2019).7 Within liberal democracies, campaign financing tends to be provided primarily through private individuals, with some financing coming from associations, organisations or corporations, with only a few exceptions providing a mixed system which includes public funding through allocating funding according to individual allocations (e.g. Canada). This may be contributed directly by individuals or may come indirectly through an organisation (e.g. a corporation, business association, trade union, interest organisation or PAC) The intentions which lay behind campaign contributions are unclear and varied (Francia et al 2003). Whilst there is certainly some evidence of contributions made for reasons other than political interest (see for example social connections and intimacy in Francia et al 2003), most 7 Whilst there is broad consensus, this perhaps is overgeneralising. A number of studies have identified various nuances on the relationship between spending and political success, with particular attention more interested in the conditions under which campaign finance is effective at achieving political outcomes. See for example Erikson and Palfrey 1998; Goodliffe 2001; Brown 2012; Schuster 2020. 16 candidates and campaigns receive contributions as a means to inducing an outcome conducive to the attainment of an interest - whether this be through contributors supporting candidates in order to persuade them to support a certain interest, a quid pro quo relationship (Stratmann 1995; 2002), because they have a shared ideological interest (Bronars and Lott 1997), or a candidates ideological interest would serve the private interest. Additionally, one re-emerging perspective has stated the importance of campaign contributions being a means of an interest group (or the paid advocates who represent them) having greater access to legislators to inform and pressure them into action conducive to their interest, thereby treating campaign contributions as part of the lobbying process, rather than treating contributions as an exogenous variable in the function of legislator action (Wright 1990; Hall and Wayman 1990; Austen-Smith 1995; Fouirnaies 2018; Fouirnaies and Hall 2018). Nevertheless, regardless of the exact mechanism, the deployment of material power as campaign contributions is an attempt to control either who possesses official position power or how that official position power is deployed. To this extent, the deployment of material power for an interest is, ceteris paribus, determining the exercise of official position power by the proxy of the officials themselves. However, this conversion has implications for democratic systems which deserve thorough consideration. Democratic systems should empower the inclusions of citizens through its practices. Whilst lobbying and campaign contributions have the potential to empower voices through information offerings and access, which may not be reasonably accessed through other democratic practices such as voting (see for example Hopkins, Klüver and Pickup 2019; Fouraines 2018), these are not channels which can be accessed by every individual or interest. Participation in these practices are conditional upon access to material power in this way, thereby empowering only the affluent, 17 although the system's approach is not inherently against this; the inclusion of different groups of citizens may come from different practices, such as voting. But, if inclusion of a given interest in democratic processes were totally dependent on deployment of material power in lobbying and campaign contributions, this would be problematic - in practice this is not necessarily the case for liberal democracies. Successful conversion of material power into official position power entails legislators who are aware of the contributing/lobbying interest group’s issues such that their contributions to elite discourse may be premised by information, arguments and opinions pertaining to that interest. This is especially pertinent considering the recent studies from Fouirnaies (2018) who highlights that interest group campaign contributions (as part of the lobbying process) are increasingly targeting committee leaders and senior party members to bring their issues to the forefront of political discussion; these are the individuals who determine which issues are ripe for legislative agendas. In this way, the ‘struggle for recognition’ of issues and their importance in elite agendas becomes further dependent upon the deployment of material power (Habermas 1996, 314). In this way, the capacity to set the agenda for elite discourse - which is also deeply connected with agenda-setting and will formation in public discourse (Habermas 1996, 307-8) - is partly conditional upon these channels of material power deployment, especially under minimally informed legislators. 2.1.2 Effectiveness of Lobbying and Campaign Contributions Whilst this theoretical formulation of the issue presents an initially compelling concern for two core democratic functions, this concern is not entirely reflective of empirical reality. In practice, the conversion of material power into the dispensation of official position power is a considerably intricate and constrained process. The cases in which material power, deployed as lobbying and 18 campaign contributions, appear to have successfully been converted into official position power, and thereby appear to have influenced political outcomes, appear to be the exception rather than the rule. The scholarly work on interest groups has been frustratingly inconclusive as to the effectiveness of lobbying in pursuing interests in this way - as one prominent scholar of lobbying has concluded: “the search for a definitive statement about the power of lobbyists has become the Holy Grail of interest group studies” (Leech 2010, 534). Despite the individual cases considered in the section above, once one begins considering lobbying over a number of cases with a number of variables, the ‘easy’ cases considered above appear to be a minority of occasions, entirely unrepresentative of the influence which lobbying has the majority of the time (for a compelling account of this, see the bivariate correlations between the deployment of lobbying resources and policy outcomes in Baumgartner et al 2009, 222-3). The reason for this, it has been suggested, is that a number of political contingencies curtail the capacity of interests to convert material power into official position power, albeit in slightly different terms. One route for explaining the low correlation between the deployment of material resources and policy outcomes considers heterogeneous lobbying around an issue. In their groundbreaking study of the effectiveness of interest group lobbying, Baumgartner et al’s (2009) primary explanation for low correlation was the heterogeneity of surrounding the issue and importantly, the number of resources held by the different sides of the issue - in most cases, resources were equal (209-11). Similarly Becker (1983) finds that when legislators are informed by only one side, interests are substantially more likely to achieve their policy outcomes (367). This logic is intuitive; legislator information would become more complete under competing provisions of information, as such, elite input into policy-making processes will not be informed with 19 information conducive to a single outcome in relation to an issue when alternative sources of information and direction are not available (see also Austen-Smith and Wright 1992 for a model of competitive lobbying; Alves 2020 on competitive lobbying in Europe). The opposing deployments of material power through lobbying channels limit the extent to which interests can access official position power. Another route for explaining a lack of correlation considers the role of public opinion. Gilens (2012) finds public opinion alignment as central for interest group attainment of advocacy goals (133-7) whilst Baumgartner et al (2009) consider the relationship between material resources of lobbying groups and public opinion in the achievement of advocacy goals: lobbying contrary to mass public opinion can easily be overwhelmed (194). Schlozman, Verba and Brady (2012) add further nuance to the relationship between lobbying, public opinion, and policy outcomes with their study considering evidence of lobbying effectiveness in influencing political outcomes across low and high salience issues. In lower salience issues, such as earmark allocation, the relationship between lobbying spending and outcome appears notably stronger than in high salience issues, such as social issues (303-4). The successful conversion of material power here appears to be dependent on public preferences surrounding that issue, and how salient the issue may be to the public. The literature on campaign contributions is perhaps more conflicting as to its effectiveness in the conversion of material power. Drawing on the literature considered above, how can one accurately assess the causal influence of campaign contributions if the mechanism is not clear? The dramatic difference in mechanism between a quid pro quo approach (Stratmann 1995; 2002; 20 2006) and a shared ideological approach (Bronars and Lott 1997; Ensley 2009) makes it hard to formulate a complete account of material power’s conversion into official position power.8 Nevertheless, accounts of the influence of campaign contributions do find some consensus across different interpretations of the conversion mechanism. In the case of a quid pro quo approach, drawing on evidence from the Affordable Care Act, McKay (2020) emphasises, in the case of individual candidates, the requirement for negative attention not to be garnered in order for a private benefit to be awarded (354; see also evidence in Fellowes and Wolf 2004; Hall and Wayman 1990). On the account of interest group contributions supporting ideological friendly candidates, for effective conversion (i.e. having an official using their power to help pursue an interest), this requires the official to be electorally successful. This implies that the candidate would not be successful if they were advocating for an unpopular policy. Therefore, one can loosely infer that public opinion in regards to the interest becomes an important contingency for the effective conversion of material power into official position power (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder 2003, 115).9 Either way, campaign contributions are ineffective if an issue is unpopular. Accounts which concern access rely on models in which campaign contributions operate in tandem with lobbying (e.g. Fouirnaies 2018; Fouirnaies and Hall 2018; Judd, forthcoming). 8 Empirical accounts of the relationship between contributions and legislator voting provide no enlightenment as to the effectiveness of the conversion of material power into official position power. Whilst Stratmann (1995; 2002) finds a relationship, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003; see also Bronars and Lott 1997) find no relationship between PAC campaign contributions and legislators' votes, suggesting uncertainty under a quid pro quo account of campaign contributions (see also Jacobs 1978). The validity of the evidence presented in regards to quid pro quo accounts (e.g. Stratmann 1995) has been the subject of methodological disagreement across a number of papers in the literature on campaign contributions. For the two core opposing papers which debate this issue, see Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) and Stratmann (2005). 9 In other words, if an interest group’s policy goals are unpopular and they contribute to a candidate who is friendly to these policy goals, they are unlikely to find that the candidate is elected. In this way, public opinion presents a contingency for the effective election of the candidate (i.e. the interest group’s exercise of the official position power by proxy). 21 Campaign contributions may provide lobbyists closer access to legislators however, how the legislator responds is, as discussed above, dependent on the other information which legislators have access to (i.e. the information and access of competing interest groups), legislator preferences and, again, public opinion (Austen-Smith 1995). The contingencies to the conversion of material to official position power are particularly similar across these channels: namely, competition and public opinion alignment appear to be the most prominent contingencies which are considered within the literature.10 2.1.3 Oligarchy, Lobbying and Campaign Contributions Two core contingencies appear in the typical interest’s conversion of material power into official power, by proxy - and currently, although not in the same theoretical terms, scholars continue to pursue comprehensive understandings of the dimensions of these contingencies across broad policy areas (e.g. Fouirnaies 2018; McKay 2020; Judd, forthcoming). However, oligarchic wealth defence, as an interest, does present a situation in which the contingencies (i.e. public opinion alignment and opposition interests) considered above could be circumvented, by account of the vastness of collective oligarchic material power, how it is deployed, and the nature of the interest. Whilst the attainment of official position power by proxy through deployment of material power is, at least partially, dependent on the material power of opposed interests (e.g. Baumgartner et al 2009, 210-1), this is less of a concern for oligarchy. The pursuit of wealth defence in lobbying and campaign contributions is met with minimal opposed interests, and when there is opposition, it is not endowed with equal material power. Organised groups, including various organisations of 10 This is not to suggest that these are the only contingencies to effectiveness, but these are certainly the most prominent contingencies considered within the literature of both channels, despite being in slightly different terms. 22 the Income Defence Industry or pro-wealth PACs, favouring wealth defence policies, are culminations of, already vast, individual deployments of material power, such that they can deploy even greater amounts of material power to lobby and contribute to campaigns. Opposition truly pales in comparison. Whilst Americans can be defined as ‘pragmatic egalitarians’ in their latent support for increased taxation and regulation on vast incomes (Page and Jacobs 2009a), there is not the coordination nor the will to contribute small amounts of material power, which collectively would make this interest incredibly powerful (Winters and Page 2009, 735). This coordination issue is partly explained by decreasing trade union membership and the minimal donation-reward payoff in contributing to tax justice groups which pursue anti-wealth defence policies through lobbying (Gilens 2012, 160-1; Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012, 320). These vast asymmetries in material power between wealth defence and anti-wealth defence interests are highlighted in the estate tax case presented by Graetz and Shapiro (2005): the largest think-tank opposition to the estate tax, Citizens for Tax Justice, possessed only a third of the budget of one of the core think-tanks in favour of repeal, Heritage (242). The same cannot be said for a number of different issues where heterogeneous lobbying occurs - competing interests tend to have at least somewhat similar resources (Berry 1999; Browne 1990; Holyoke 2009).11 Moreover, material power inequality also has an effect on campaign contribution effectiveness in converting material power into official power, yet the mechanism is dependent on which interpretation of the campaign contribution is taken. Firstly, under a quid pro quo understanding, the highest bidder wins, thereby consistently advancing wealth defence by account 11 Although broadly true, this does also depend on certain conditions, see Austen-Smith and Wright (1990) and Ainsworth (1997) for additional nuance - in particular, the initial position of the legislator being lobbied matters immensely for determining the ‘winner’ of competing interest groups. In the case of wealth defence, later in this section, I discuss how campaign contributions derived from oligarchs lead to an increased likelihood that legislator’s positions are conducive to legislator support for wealth defence policies. 23 of its vastness compared to opposition. Secondly, under an ideologically friendly candidate selection understanding, if opposing interests do not have the material power to support other candidates, ceteris paribus, the opposing interest (i.e. anti wealth defence) will lose out. Finally, under an access understanding, if the legislator requires information regarding an issue, again holding all else equal, the legislator would provide access (and by implication, allow them greater influence over the legislator's official position power) to the highest contributor over lower contributors. In each case, the higher the deployment of material power increases the likelihood of conversion from material power into official position power. However, even when powerful interests appear to circumvent contingencies relating to the material power of competing interests, they can still fail miserably. Gilens (2012) draws attention to the banking lobby in the US: an incredibly powerful industry, access to political elites, a multitude of lobbyists, a number of PACs and a directive interest group, the American Bankers Association, which contributed to candidates and campaigns conducive to their interests. Yet, when the banking lobby went up against the credit unions, an interest with only modest material resources, and tried to regulate them to eliminate competition, they failed, the “mom-and-pop” image of credit unions prevailed in the eyes of the public, and their legislators - despite the lobbying and contributions money can buy, material power still failed (244). Public opinion in relation to the issue is important too, yet oligarchic wealth defence appears to be more immune to the implications of this contingency than other interests due to firstly, by account of asymmetries in material power, and secondly, by account of the nature of wealth defence as an interest. In regards to the material power of oligarchs pursuing wealth defence, Graetz and Shapiro (2005) draw attention to masses of material power being deployed 24 (by lobbyists) to move public opinion regarding pro-wealth defence policy (estate tax repeal).12 Conservative think-tanks were mobilised (242). Lobbyists utilised associated blocs and associations to advocate on their behalf (244). Whilst there was an active opposition lobbying (e.g. academics, inequality think tanks, tax justice groups), the resources required to launch a substantial counter-attack on repealists were absent (245). But more pertinently, the nature of wealth defence policies means that, by-and-large, the public does not care. To illustrate, in the sector of the Income Defence Industry which lobbies for incremental tax code changes, the immediate implications for the public are negligible (Winters 2012, 223). Whether the change happened or not can be important for an individual oligarch, but near meaningless for the public. This lack of salience in the public leads to lower visibility, implying that legislators, committee leaders and party elites, will be more responsive to lobbying and campaign contributions as the lack of salience means less notice is taken by the public and thereby accountability for the official (Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012, 303-4; Fellowes and Wolf 2004; Stratmann 1992; Hall and Wayman 1990). In the case of oligarchy, competition is overwhelmed by the vastness of coordinated material power (through the Income Defence Industry and associated lobbyists), and perhaps limited by the minimal competing material power of opposition groups (e.g. trade unions, tax justice networks). Whilst anti-wealth defence organisations may compete using different resources and channels, lobbying and campaign contributions as channels for interests to access official position power appear to be dominated by oligarchic wealth defence. Moreover, the lack of salience of the issue in the broader public is concerning. Although this may apply for a number of 12 I consider this in more explicit terms within the final domain which I believe oligarchic material power to be deployed in, the electorate. 25 issues, policy alignment appears to be less important, and less of a limiting factor to conversion of material power and official position than typical interests. 2.1.4 Democratic Implications of Oligarchic Material Power and Political Officials Oligarchs deploy material power across these two channels in order to convert it into official position power, and exercise it by proxy. Unlike typical opposing interests, wealth defence overwhelms opposition, anti-wealth defence, in lobbying and campaign contributions; the cumulative material power of oligarchs, under the direction of the Income Defence Industry completely overwhelms the meagre material power deployed by opposing interests - as is the case in Graetz and Shapiro’s (2005) estate tax example (241-5). Moreover, oligarchs and the Income Defence Industry do not typically face the contingency of public opinion in the attainment of official position power by proxy; whilst the public may have a latent preference for egalitarianism endorsing redistribution and condemning those attempting to cheat the tax system (Page and Jacobs 2010), individual issues relating to oligarchy are not salient (for the most part), and thereby those holding official position are unlikely to be held accountable. This is particularly true in the case of the incremental changes in high income tax codes as pursued by associations in the Income Defence Industry, the implementation of which would have a negligible effect on individuals in the public (Winters 2012, 223). Perhaps most broadly, the exclusion of these egalitarian perspectives at the level of political officials is a serious concern for democrats; a healthily functioning democratic system should ensure that these widely held perspectives are empowered and included within formal governmental processes. These underlying anti-wealth defence interests are certainly not included at this level. However, there may be alternative ways in which these perspectives can be 26 empowered which do not use material power as a means of conversion, as Baumgartner et al (2009) note with regards to lobbying and campaign contributions (194): “Material resources can sometimes be trumped by sheer numbers - organizations with many members may be heeded just as rapidly as organizations able to make large campaign contributions. Large numbers of members not only provide some democratic legitimacy to a cause - ‘look how many people are represented by that organization; look at how many constituents agree with this argument’”. The implication is that, even if material resources are deployed, perspectives may still be empowered. However, in the case of opposing wealth defence, a number of authors have considered how labour mobilisation power may become an effective means to including these forgotten interests (Gilens 2012, 160-1; Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012, 95; O’Neill and White 2018, 256–58). But for the moment, mobilised labour power does not appear to be limiting the oligarchic conversion of material power into official position power; these perspectives are not included at the level of political officials, pressure is insufficient and political elites appear hesitant to work with trade unions (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 278-9). The inclusion of these less affluent interests certainly needs further exploration. Moreover, when it is political officials who are targeted by lobbying and campaign contributions, the information provided by wealth defence interest groups (and the preference of the funded candidate) become the basis for the formation of agendas in such a way, that means agendas are not collectively formed; they are not inclusive of the perspectives contrary to wealth defence. This concern is emphasised further given Fouirnaies’ (2018) identification of campaign contributions and lobbying being directed towards individuals who are vital in agenda setting: part of the role of party elites and committee leaders is to formulate wills and agendas in their respective institutions. In this way, the ‘pragmatic egalitarian’ perspective simply does not have any agenda-27 setting power in the formal governmental process, and by extension through the process of elite communication, the broader public sphere (Habermas 1996, 307-8). Despite the idiosyncrasies of oligarchy and the primary interest of wealth defence which allow it to avoid the contingencies which would typically face different interests’ in the conversion of material power into official position power, I am not suggesting that this conversion is guaranteed. However, as the example provided by Graetz and Shapiro (2005) would suggest, there is certainly a concern that the (broadly egalitarian and widely held) interests of the less affluent are disempowered. 2.2 The Electorate 2.2.1 Material Power and Mobilisation Power Material power may be deployed as a means of mobilising the electorate towards a given interest. Here, I consider how media systems (and their constituent channels) may be captured by interests through their deployment of material power, and can then be used to inform, persuade, or manipulate citizens, in such a way that is conducive to the attainment of the given interest’s goals. In other words, through the deployment of material power in media systems, interests can gain access to mobilisation power.13 However, as I suggest, this conversion unduly disempowers interests by account of limited material power, and secondly, it can potentially constrain the agenda-setting of media systems to exclusively those interests with deployable material power. Pulling together two distinct literatures within political communication and sociology, I consider the contingencies which may restrict the conversion of material power into mobilisation power, in 13 Mobilisation power, in this way, refers to the capacity to move people in a certain way, whether that is to provoke certain responses in opinions and thoughts, or to induce political action (Winters 2011, 15-6) 28 other words, contingencies which prevent the ‘receiving’ and ‘accepting’ of politically relevant information such that it could not dominate the discourse of the public sphere (Zaller 1992). Primarily, I suggest that typically, a competitive public sphere, contesting predispositions, and high levels of political awareness prevent mobilisation power from being realised by interests. However, in the case of oligarchic wealth defence, these contingencies are circumvented in light of its minimal competition, vast amounts of coordinated material power, and the (partial) non-salience of elements of wealth defence pursuit. Deliberation, as a core practice in liberal democracies, occurs in the public sphere, connecting citizen preferences through the formation of collective wills and agendas (Warren 2017, 46). Habermas, in a reprise of his work on The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), has recently re-emphasised the necessity of the role which media systems must play in this democratic practice. Drawing on a diverse array of viewpoints and interests, media systems should generate the “public opinions that satisfy the standards of deliberative politics” (Habermas 2022, 157). In other words, mass media systems should collect and disseminate the broad political information, opinions, arguments and reasons which become the foundations for the formation of collective wills and agendas in the public sphere. However, given this role of the media in liberal democracies, to the extent that one can control the throughput - as Habermas terms it - of media systems, one can set the agenda for political discourse and will-making. Given that media is primarily privatised across liberal democracies, this should be concerning due to its capacity to empower holders of material power in determining the throughput. Fraser (1990) clarifies the allusions of Habermas in emphasising the role which material power can play in determining this throughput of mass media, and its 29 constituent channels which formulate the basis of political communications (64-5).14 The material barrier prevents the equal participation of interests; instead, the interests of the affluent few with greater access would theoretically dominate these channels. These inequalities in material power thereby turn the public sphere into an arena of discourse in which the scope is limited to what those who possess material power implicitly, or explicitly, deem appropriate - what Mansbridge et al (2012) term ‘social domination’ (24).15 In this way, an interests’ deployment of material power determines individual citizens' roles (i.e. what information, reasons, arguments, ideas they propagate) in the formation of wills and agendas, in regards to a given interest. This capacity to determine the role which they play is a form of mobilisation power over the citizenry - in other words, material power is converted into mobilisation power. However, through a given interest deploying material power in this way, information and perspectives contrary to the interest may be excluded, disempowering alternative interests, and subsequently ensuring that agenda and wills are not collective in their formation, disrupting two of the core functions of a democratic system.16 2.2.2 Effectiveness of Deploying Material Power in Media Systems This simplistic theoretical formulation of the role of material power in media systems perhaps omits some of the important nuances of this domain. Habermas, drawing on empirical studies of 14 By channels, I refer to both the sources of the production and means of dissemination of information, including but not limited to think tanks, research institutes, universities, journalists, news media, television, radio, and social media. 15 See also similar conclusions in Herman and Chomsky (1988) and Walzer (2002). 16 Whilst there may be a claim that on account of its prominence within media systems, there is already a violation of collective agenda-setting, this is not inherently a subversion of the democratic function itself. Media systems present a culmination of channels through which information, arguments and ideas may be received, but they do not form the agenda within the public sphere, even if they do exert vast influence upon the majority of throughput into it (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982). 30 the formation of public opinion and agendas, does concede that the citizenry are not simply ‘cultural dopes’ in that they do not simply consume and onboard political communications without critical reflection (1996, 377). Yet it is perhaps Zaller (1992) who provides the clearest typology for understanding the extent to which the political communications which permeate the public sphere are received - and responded to - by individual citizens. Through this we can begin to understand the effectiveness of the deployment of material power in pursuit of mobilisation power over the electorate. Zaller’s (1992) concept of political communication is built around the ‘Receive-Accept-Sample’ (RAS) model of considerations. This model of response supposes that when individuals are exposed to, or rather receive, communications (constituted by a number of considerations), primarily derived from the media but also the environment around them, they evaluate whether these messages are consistent with their currently accepted considerations.17 If they are consistent, individuals will likely accept them into their epistemology (i.e. internalise them), if not, they will reject them. Whilst these communications are consumed mostly independently within modern liberal democracies, once they are accepted, they become a constituent part of the individual’s involvement in the public sphere, and subsequent involvement in the processes of collective agenda-setting, will formation and decision-making. Nevertheless, the receiving and acceptance of the considerations embedded in political communications provides an initial starting point for understanding the contingencies which interests face in deploying material power as a means to accessing mobilisation power. 17 Considerations are the thoughts, memories, interpretations, representations, associations (i.e. cognitive elements) which individuals have in regards to a given issue, person, thing, concept or idea. 31 Firstly, the RAS model draws attention to two central individual-level variables: predispositions and political awareness. Predispositions refer to the values - or crystalised considerations - which are held by individuals and used as the evaluative standard for the acceptance of additional considerations (22-4).18 When interests propagate communications conducive to their goals, and the message is received, if this message is understood as contrary to these predispositions, the consideration would be rejected by an individual. In other words, material power would not have been converted into mobilisation power. Secondly, political awareness refers to the extent to which individuals are engaged with political issues and affects both the receiving and accepting aspects of the model. When political awareness of an issue is high, people are more likely to receive the message as they pay greater attention to the communications relevant to it yet, they are also less likely to accept it as their systems of considerations relating to the given issue will be clearer (more accessible for them to think about) and more coherent (stronger belief system). Conversely, when political awareness is low, although people receive less communications by account of their lack of awareness, they will have less accessible and less coherent systems of considerations and thus will accept more of what they receive (24-6). Thereby, the conversion of material power into mobilisation power (and how the conversion can occur) is partly dependent on how aware the individual is. Moving away from the core variables in Zaller’s model, the interests which deploy material power to communicate considerations conducive to their interest must do so in competition with other interests, both adversarial and non-adversarial. In each case, a number of interests may be 18 According to the RAS model, predispositions are unlikely to change due to media communications, but the accessibility of certain considerations can change via considerations. This can affect political action, including interaction in the public sphere in which the most accessible accepted considerations are more likely to be included in the individual’s participation. 32 deploying material power through media systems at one time, competing with the communications of other interests, competing for the time and attention of citizens, competing for the reception of messages (Zaller 1992, 332). Some models of political communication (especially accessibility models) even emphasise that simply the amount of times a message is received may be a particularly important variable in its uptake (Miller and Krosnick 2000). This competition extends into the acceptance of considerations from communications. In considering political communications which utilise priming and framing, scholars have identified the moderating effect of the competitive environment in which they are deployed in.19 Chong and Druckman (2007) suggest that communications which frame issues are ineffective at changing attitudes in a competitive environment. In one experiment, the authors exposed participants to an issue with frames at two different levels of strength. Their first finding was that when the issue was framed strongly, opinion moved significantly, and when it was framed weakly, it tended to not (645). When repeating the experiment with competing frames, an interesting dynamic occurred. Under conflicting weak and strong frames, a contrast effect occurred and participants would tend to move closer to the position held by the strong frame than if they were exposed to only the strong frame (646-7). Finally, when conflicting frames are both strong, this has a 19 Priming refers to a cognitive effect in which an individual is exposed to some stimulus (the prime) which unconsciously changes the response to some other stimuli (the target). In the typology used by Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988) and Zaller (1992), the prime changes the availability of considerations (e.g. thoughts, memories, interpretations, representations, associations) which individuals “retrieve” when responding to some stimulus (see Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988, 305-11; Zaller 1992, 77-80; Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski 2000, 176-7; 218-9). Through changing the accessibility of certain considerations, priming changes “the standards that people use to make political evaluations’’ (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, 63). Framing refers to the cognitive effect created when an individual is exposed to an issue in a way which constructs the issue in a certain context. Using the typology identified above (see Zaller and Feldman 1992; Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski 2000), the way the issue is constructed determines the considerations which individuals access in response because of different contexts having different associations and connotations. In the context of political communication, one can emphasise “a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” through the use of a frame (Entman 1989, 357). 33 moderating effect - people end up in a more intermediary position (650). Klar (2013) finds a similar phenomenon occurring with priming effects; when relevant primes of equal strength are competing with one another, the efficacy of both primes in moving subject attitudes is virtually eliminated. In this way, a highly competitive environment is not conducive to political communications being accepted, and thereby, one could suggest that the conversion of material power into mobilisation power is contingent upon a minimally competitive environment. 2.2.3 Oligarchy and Material Power in Media Systems Despite experimental studies of political communication which suggest the media’s communications to be particularly effective in changing the considerations of individuals, the external validity of these claims is weak. The environment in which messages are disseminated is saturated with other messages which compete for both the receipt, the predispositions held by those receiving messages and the low levels of acceptance individual derived from high levels of political awareness all limit the considerations which are accepted - especially when these considerations are being introduced into the public sphere. As such, the capacity for the material power, working through media systems, to be converted into a type of mobilisation power appears to be quite limited. Nevertheless, the case of oligarchic wealth defence is exceptional here; we have a number of reasons to believe that these contingencies could be partially overcome. Vast amounts of coordinated material power can be deployed across a number of sites of information production in the pursuit of wealth defence. Circling back to Graetz and Shapiro’s (2005) discussion of estate tax, Income Defence Industry lobbyists go to lengths to fill the public sphere with information and tropes which are conducive to wealth defence (242-3). In this case, resources were funnelled to sponsored research by conservative economists with results permeates 34 around the wider public sphere (e.g. arguments supporting tax cuts by account of potential economic growth being repeated in the media) whilst political consultants ensure that certain tropes would become popularised through extensive framing of the issue successfully reframing the estate tax as a levy which was unfair and unjust, as the ‘death tax’, a ‘grave-robber’s tax', the ‘grim reaper’s tax’ or some variation thereof (75-83). Through the deployment of material power, the Income Defence Industry could dominate the general competition for public attention through hiring well-connected political consultants to ensure that the frame, and its propagators, had frequent airtime on major news networks. Whilst there was certainly opposition on the opposing side (e.g. academics, inequality think tanks, tax justice groups), the vast material resources required to launch a substantial communicative counter-attack on the repealists were simply were not there (245) and despite the occasional rhetoric of philanthropic oligarchs (e.g. Soros, Gates, Buffet), it was not in their wealth defence interests (or philanthropic interest given the nature of the tax) to try to ensure the limitation of their own personal wealth defence (248). In this case, the mass of oligarchic material power and the nature of its deployment (i.e. deployed in unison and coordinated by the Income Defence Industry) appear to have circumvented the contingency of competition for both receiving (with non-antagonistic interests) and acceptance (with antagonistic interests). On the face of it, given Zaller’s (1992) identification of predispositions and political awareness does not present a particularly convincing case for the possibility of oligarchic wealth defence to overcome the contingencies to accessing mobilisation power. As demonstrated in Page and Jacobs (2009a), there is a latent preference in the US (among other liberal democracies) for egalitarian policies, a preference which has been relatively steady over the last half century, implying its engrainment in American belief systems. Whilst simultaneously, as identified by 35 McClosky and Zaller (1984), the US public is broadly aware of issues relating to income and wealth inequality, with a majority believing that the gap between the rich and poor of the country is too large, implying a large degree of political awareness in the US public (see also Chong, McClosky and Zaller 1983; see more recently Page and Jacobs 2009a; 2009b). However, these contingencies are perhaps not as disempowering to oligarchic wealth interest as they may appear. Whilst predispositions cannot be feasibly changed by political communications nor would direct political communications (contrary to predispositions) induce the acceptance of considerations, the pursuit of oligarchic wealth defence could - and does - take advantage of the different interpretations of wealth defence. The case of wealth defence has been known to reframe the issues relating to wealth defence in a different way, with different predispositions evaluating the acceptance of considerations - as Graetz and Shapiro (2005) discuss in reference to the ‘unjustness’ of the estate tax (242).20 This reframing of an issue allowed evaluation of the policy in the terms of considerations which are different to those which related to egalitarianism. Yet, reframing issues in this way is not necessarily possible for other interests - there are two reasons to believe this: firstly, there may not be a reasonable alternative frame available which does not activate negative considerations in evaluation, and secondly, reframing an issue in the broad public requires vast amounts of material resources to ensure media channels can become dominated with the frame - as was the case in the estate tax example (242-3). In this way, the nature of wealth defence as an interest and the vastness of material power supporting has ensured the conversion of material power into mobilisation power. 20 Although this should be understood in conjunction with the disparity between the resources of wealth defence advocates and its opposition. The vastness of the material power of the Income Defence Industry (and the lack of resources of opposition groups) could ensure that the reframing of the issue would permeate a number of media channels. 36 Moreover, whilst people may be aware of inequality, this does not quite capture Zaller’s (1992) conception of political awareness surrounding an issue: “Political awareness denotes intellectual or cognitive engagement with public affairs as against emotional or affective engagement or no engagement at all” (21). This awareness requires active cognitive engagement with the issue - not an underlying awareness which is detected when probed (Page and Jacobs 2009a) - but, as noted earlier, a number of policies which relate to wealth defence are not particularly salient issues (Winters 2012, 223). Therefore, when communications derived from advocates are received by individuals, the lack of coherence and accessibility of their considerations means that they are more likely to be accepted. 2.2.4 Democratic Implications of Oligarchic Material Power in Media Systems Material power can be converted into mobilisation power through the channels of media systems. The Habermasian approach considers how streams into public discourse can be hijacked by certain interests in light of their material power, limiting the information, reasons, arguments, opinions and ideas circulating the public sphere (Habermas 1989; 1996; 2022). In this way, the limited content entering and circulating within the public sphere limits the discourse, and subsequent political action, to such that is conducive to oligarchic wealth defence. Zaller’s (1992) approach provides additional nuance to this; it is not simply a case of manipulation of which information enters public discourse, but the form of the information which enters public discourse and the information environment in the public. This deployment of material wealth has several implications for democracies. Firstly, this certainly does not empower inclusion; perspectives contrary to wealth defence are not empowered as they cannot access the material power necessary to expend on trying to 37 propagate perspectives, access the mobilisation power they may bring, and exercise political influence. In other words, they cannot compete in media systems, disempowering these perspectives. Secondly, the formation of norms, wills and agendas relating to wealth defence are certainly not collective; restricting the throughput of media systems, and the use of cognitive effects to distort the importance and/or interpretation of information. Whilst these are certainly criticisms of political communication generally, the growing concentration of media in fewer (oligarchic) hands ensures that competing information and cognitive effects are non-existent, a contingency which would otherwise present a challenge to individual’s responsiveness. Finally, there is a question as to how collective decision-making is impeded - whilst collective decisions were certainly made whilst material power was being converted to mobilisation power, there is certainly a normative question to answer here. Even if there is ‘collective’ decision-making, how can this be justified as legitimate? 2.3 The Market 2.3.1 Material Power and Coercive Market Power Finally, the market presents a channel through which material power may be deployed, and in its deployment, I suggest that collective agenda-setting may be subverted. This is due to the market structure of liberal democracies which converts material power into a form of coercion power. Similar critiques of the issue of markets in liberal democracies have been reiterated across various contexts by a number of scholars (see for example Lindblom 1977; 1982; 2001; Bowles and Gintis 1986; Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988; Cohen 1989; Barry 2002; Christiano 2010; White 2011). Nevertheless, expounding an understanding of the structural economic defects of liberal democracies with reference to the effect of oligarchic deployment of material power, and the 38 functional democratic implications, provides a new dimension of analysis and additional nuance to these theories. Moreover, it still remains an essential channel through which material power is deployed in pursuit of wealth defence. The free market has long been understood as problematic for liberal democracies for its capacity to impede political equality (Dahl 1971; 1996). The freedom to invest and divest capital resources which, in part, characterise the free market of the liberal democratic state is one aspect of this. Investment is undoubtedly desirable to market economies through its capacity to increase economic growth, employment and subsequent living standards. However, if investment is made undesirable in one jurisdiction through political decisions (e.g. regulation, taxation), the holders of capital can divest from that market, re-investing resources elsewhere. This divestment (capital flight), or lack of investment (capital strike), can be detrimental to the liberal democratic capitalist economy which relies on investment of capital for production and thus growth. Theoretically, this is a tension in the relationship between the sovereign people, who make collective decisions about regulation and taxation (as implied in White 2011), and the holders of material wealth. In practice within liberal democracies, this becomes a source of tension between political elites and corporate investors (or private holders of significant enough amounts of capital that they have personal oversight over investment decisions) as the actors responsible for investment and divestment decisions. Political elites are thus faced with this constant anticipatory state of equilibrium in which the threat of capital flight (or capital strike) perpetually constrains the policy alternatives which these political elites can offer the electorate, only being able to offer them ‘realistic’ policy alternatives (Schattschneider 1960, 138). I use the term ‘realistic’ as the threat of exercising divestment instils the belief in citizens and elites that deriving from these alternatives may result in divestment, economic downturn, and the government of the time to be 39 held accountable for the failure of the economy, and subsequently unelected (Barry 2002, 170). In other words, the material power derived from material power stored as corporate assets is effectively converted into coercive power over the electorate, and thereby, the market becomes a ‘prison’ in its constraint of economic policy alternatives (Lindblom 1982).21 The literature tends to discuss business holistically, considering how firms (governments) broadly respond to changes in corporation tax (business threats) or some other policy relating to most capital holdings (e.g. Cameron 1978; Jacobs 1988; Quinn and Shapiro 1991; Swank 1992; Smith 1999). Yet this does not necessarily capture how this can occur within individual markets. Bell and Hindmoor (2013) discuss the nuance of this coercive power in the context of the mining industry in Australia, with only a few firms effectively inducing a sense of constrained policy alternatives through threatening capital flight.22 In a later article, Bell and Hindmoor (2017) go on to consider the banking industry in the UK in which political elites began to understand threats as incredible. In these cases, it was only the firms - or perhaps the owners of capital - which constituted specific markets which attempted to coercive power against elites - not business broadly. Nevertheless, the primary theoretical democratic concern is that collective agenda-setting in both the public sphere and governmental process is constrained. Owners of capital (i.e. material power) deploy it in such a way (willing to invest or divest at any moment, doing so dependent on policy outcome) that it can thus be treated as a coercive power resource; it can be used to punish 21 Returning to power resource theory, there is an important differentiation in the material powers possessed by the affluent and the oligarch. Independently, the affluent simply cannot exercise coercive power by account of their levels of material power; it requires the coordination of many investors by an external actor, the corporate elite who actually convert their power (official position) into coercive power. 22 There is some nuance to note in this case. Whilst Bell and Hindmoor (2013) do suggest that the mining industry did indeed threaten capital flight, in this case, they find that this threat of capital divestment was effective not in determining elite policy offerings, but in public opinion regarding these alternatives. 40 elites and citizens for not acquiescing to demands. This coercive power functions to ensure that policies conducive to capital interests are seen as the only ‘realistic’ policy options as contrary policies would result in divestment and subsequent economic detriment. Thereby, economic planning becomes heavily constrained by this coercive power and elites will only offer policy alternatives conducive to these interests (Schattschneider 1960, 138). With these as the only ‘realistic’ policy options available, the coercive power of capital has constrained the agenda in such a way that interests hostile to capital are excluded. 2.3.2 Effectiveness of Capital Flight and Capital Strike Whilst the various structural dependence theories of capitalism are theoretically sound, it does not necessarily reflect the empirical reality of liberal democracies, and thereby is less concerning to democratic functions as initially supposed. Perhaps most notably, the evidence that political elites have been responsive to coercive power, and inversely, that holders of coercive market power (whether that be by their material power or their official position power) have been responsive to government policy changes is particularly mixed: empirically testing theories of structural dependency in the US, Quinn and Shapiro (1991) find that governments are fairly unresponsive to perceived threats of theoretical coercive power; they do not find that when investment is low, that governments respond with taxation cuts (855-64; see also Jacobs 1988; Swank 1992; 2016; Smith 1999). Yet, a number of empirical studies find the opposite results, suggesting that low investment (which leads to high unemployment, low growth), is responded to by governments with corporate tax decreases (Cameron 1978; Campbell and Allen 1994). With such inconsistent correlations between investment (or its derivative variables) and tax rates, it is unclear as to how effectively material power can be converted into a coercive power - as Quinn and Shapiro (1991) conclude, 41 searching for conclusive evidence of structural power is “much like using a water-witching stick to dowse a field for underground water” (868). Nevertheless, scholars have tried to explain these inconclusive results with the primary consideration that, like the other channels considered in this paper, there are contingencies which prevent this seeming conversion of power. There are two themes. Firstly, as Hacker and Pierson (2002) note, the political institutions which exist within liberal democracies act as an effective mediator. In the case of the US, the federal system allows for easy capital mobility between jurisdictions which makes it easier for businesses to move (i.e. easier for material power to be coercive) (314). Secondly, a number of authors have drawn attention to the legislators themselves, considering how their beliefs also determine their actions, including whether they think capital threats are credible and whether they believe the electoral consequences of following (or diverging) from policies conducive to capital (Bell and Hindmoor 2016; Bell 2012; Smith 1999; Quinn and Shapiro 1991), 2.3.3 Oligarchy and Market Structure In the theoretical conversion of material power into coercive power, oligarchy plays an important role by account of its vastness. The typical mechanism through which capital flight and capital strike operate involves holders of capital entrusting investment and divestment decisions to corporate decision-makers; individual withdrawals of investment would be ineffective without coordination as the sums withdrawn are small.23 However, oligarchs present a particular case in which oligarchic withdrawals matter: whilst varying amounts of material power are held by almost 23 In purely theoretical terms, this would actually involve the simultaneous withdrawal of capital resources in response to policies which are not conducive to capital. In this way, my account is only quasi-theoretical. 42 every actor across the economic strata and the form which this material power takes is not uniform. One of the most striking features of oligarchic holdings is the type of assets held and how this difference compares, not just to the meagrely affluent, but even to the extremely affluent, the top 1%. In the US, the top 0.1% cumulatively hold 72.8% of their assets in corporate equities, mutual fund shares or private businesses, whilst the top 1% hold 56.5% and the top 10% hold a meagre 32.6% of assets in this form (Federal Reserve 2023). This ownership of vastly concentrated capital implies an empowerment of oligarchs with coercive power by account of their deployed material power; these large amounts of capital allow oversight over effectively coercive investment decisions. This presents a contrast to typical bourgeois capital owners whose material power is converted into coercive power for the corporate executives and management (i.e. those with official position power) - not the holders of material power themselves. In other words, unlike the modest capitalist deployment of material power which modestly contributes to the structural exertion of material power, the oligarchic deployment of material power can be, by its own accord, used to pose a credible threat to political elites. Oligarchs will not be able to deploy this power directly to change broad business legislation as they simply do not have access to the amounts of material power necessary to do this. But this could certainly be part of an oligarchic attempt to exercise coercive power to change legislation related to a corporate holding (e.g. a private in a given industry). In other words, oligarchs could produce credible threats to ensure their policies conducive to their business/personal income interests are pursued. Yet, this does not equate to a functional difference between oligarchs and other holders of capital. The institutions which act as the mediator for government responsiveness to threats of capital strike and flight by corporate executives (on behalf of capitalists) would not be different for oligarchs. Moreover, although oligarchs may have the material power to deploy additional 43 material resources in lobbying, so does the collective power of capitalists directed by corporate executives. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons for us to suspect that the material power of oligarchs may be converted into a greater form of material power than that of the typical holder of capital. The core takeaway from this section is that oligarchs possess greater coercive power, and can possess coercive power in light of their own material power, unlike other capitalists who possess it in the context of being part of many (whether that be through corporate coordination or structurally) but this is functionally inconsequential. 2.3.4 Democratic Implications of Oligarchic Material Power in Markets The theoretical implications of capital flight and capital strike are drastic. It would constrain the policy alternatives offered by elites to only those which are perceived as conducive to the interests of holders of capital. In this way, agenda-setting in relation to economic policy would not be determined by the collectivity, but would be determined by holders of capital. Oligarchs, as holders of vast material power, stored as primarily corporate holdings and private business, would be central to this, either converting material power to coercive power via their personal control over of their material wealth, or through corporate mechanisms. In this way, they would possess many times more coercive power than less affluent individuals. However, the theoretical formulations of structural dependence are not reflected in empirical reality, the conversion of material power into coercive power is, on a preliminary view, limited by a number of contingencies relating to legislator parties and public preferences. Whilst independently, the deployment of material power as a means of accessing coercive power appears inconsequential, even for oligarchs, deployment alongside the deployment of material power amongst other 44 channels may be an effective route to, once again, constraining the agenda (as suggested by Lindblom 1997, 190).45 Chapter 3: Conclusions 3.1 Summary Material power is a robust power resource which, theoretically, can be converted into additional power resources: it can utilise the resources of political office by proxy to further a given interest, it can be used in the public sphere to mobilise citizens towards a given interest, and it can be used as a coercive power in the market to restrict the choices of citizenry to policies compliant with their interests. However, the extent to which an interest’s deployment of material power in these channels is very much limited by various contingencies discussed above. In the domains of political officials and the electorate, these contingencies primarily relate to the capacities of heterogeneous interests to also deploy similar power resources as to increase their political influence in a given channel. In the domain of the market, individuals typically are limited by the extent of their material power which they can convert into coercive power by institutional mechanisms and the beliefs of legislators. Thereby, the deployment of material in pursuit of a given interest is severely limited; the empirical literature would suggest that material power is relatively impotent. Yet, oligarchic wealth defence is different. The minimal counterbalancing interests, a lack of salience in relation to policy outcomes, an asymmetry in power resources held by competing groups (where they exist), and the coordination of vast amounts of oligarchic material power by the Income Defence Industry make these contingencies to conversion less pertinent within the domains of political officials and the electorate - although, as noted, these features mean that the contingencies faced within the market remain. Nevertheless, in the case of oligarchic wealth defence, through not facing all of the typical contingencies to the conversion of power resources, material power appears to have the capacity 46 to be successfully converted into additional power resources, in the pursuit of wealth defence. When deployed, these power resources translate into political influence conducive to wealth defence policies. However, this conversion has serious implications for democratic systems - I consider the two most pertinent to this paper. The successful conversion of material power into additional power resources disrupts the capacity for democratic systems to empower inclusion. Official position power, by proxy, allows oligarchic interests to gain formal input into democratic processes, working through officials who are informed (lobbying) or supported (campaign contributions) by interests pursuing policies conducive to oligarchic wealth defence. Through dominating media systems with the deployment of material wealth, material power becomes mobilisation power. The public sphere becomes permeated with information, arguments and ideas which are conducive to oligarchic wealth defence. In turn, this is also limiting the capacity of collective agenda-setting. Elite discourse can become dominated by the information, arguments, and people (ideologically friendly to wealth defence) in the case of campaign contributions, especially given the targeting of lobbying and campaign contributions (i.e. material wealth resources) at committee leaders and political elites who determine elite agendas (Fouirnaies and Hall 2018). The discourse of the public sphere, and subsequent political action, also has its agenda set, not only through political elite discourse permeating through it, but through the uptake of information from the media systems which set the agenda for discourse. Finally, there is also a concern from the market that the conversion of material power into coercive power constrains policy alternatives, such that policies which are not friendly towards capital are seen as ‘unrealistic’ and thus are absent from the agenda. 47 In this way, the oligarchic deployment of material power subverts the empowered inclusion of interests in democratic systems, and limits a democratic system in its capacity to allow the formation of collective wills and agendas. 3.2 Future Research on Material Power and Oligarchy This paper is not a definitive statement on the democratic implications of oligarchy in liberal democracies. Yet, through attending to the empirical studies across three broad areas of literature, the pursuit of wealth defence appears to be able to overcome some of the contingencies which typically face interests in the deployment of material power in the pursuit of political goals within two of these domains, and in doing so, subverts the aforementioned democratic functions. In response to this, whilst I advocate for an increase in research concerning specifically oligarchic deployments of material power, contrary to most comprehensive studies of inequality in democracy (see for example Bartels 2016; Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012; Gilens 2012; Hacker and Pierson 2010), I also suggest two broad avenues to the research necessary for solving these democratic problems under liberal democratic constitutions which would not involve excessive collusion. Firstly, future research needs to consider how to disempower wealth defence interests in democratic systems by preventing these conversions of material power from being successful as it is through these conversions that democratic functions are subverted. Whilst there have been some very well-developed accounts of some of the ways material power can be neutralised (e.g. Ackerman and Ayres 2004), these accounts are less concerned with the democratic trade-offs involved. For example, Ackerman and Ayres’ (2004) voting dollars suggestion could close a 48 potential channel for the inclusion of more diverse perspectives in democratic systems, where majoritarian voting systems have left them behind. Secondly, future research also needs to consider how to empower less affluent voters can be sustainably empowered in liberal democracies. 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Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Political Science
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Warren, Mark (Mark E.)
Oligarchic material power and the implications for democratic systems
Text