Arts and Social Sciences, Irving K. Barber Faculty of (Okanagan)
DSpace
UBCO
Komil-Burley, Dilsora
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
University of British Columbia
Prior to Soviet control of Central Asia, Islam was a matrix which produced socio-political culture. The Soviet government, however, viewed religion as a threat to its ideology. During seven decades of Soviet rule in Uzbekistan, Islamic texts were destroyed, religious practices suspended, mosques and learning centres demolished, Islamic legal systems abolished, and Islamic leaders persecuted (Khalid, 2007). The gradual weakening and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with the revival of Islam in Central Asia. In the early 1990s, socialism’s hostility towards religion was replaced by paradoxical models of religious governance in Uzbekistan. On one hand, Islam became central to national identity and was embraced by the majority of Uzbeks; on the other hand, the transition away from socialism coincided with the establishment of an anti-Islamic authoritarian regime. Islamic revivalism is a complex phenomenon. It refers to diverse forms of movements, that seek renewed commitment to Islam by promoting Islamic education, practices, values, and principles in society. For this dissertation, I conducted multi-method qualitative research to study Islamic revivalism and the relationship between the secular state and Islam in Uzbekistan from various perspectives. Building on recent work in critical secular studies (Mahmood, 2017; Gole, 2015; Kosmin, & Keysar, 2007), I studied different religious and political engagements; how they perpetuate inequality, intolerance, and destruction while intersecting with power dynamics; how the labels ‘extremist’, ‘radical’, and ‘terrorist’ aided the government in seizing and securing power; and how the social construction of “adashganlar” – Muslims on “the wrong path” – served the government of Uzbekistan to strengthen its grip on society and justify persecution of innocent Muslims. I examined the re-establishment of official Islam and reformation of underground unofficial Islam, the repertoire of exchanges between these two forms of Islam and the secular state. I combined relational and dialectical approaches to frame the progression of radicalization between the state and Islam, which I called dialectical radicalization. The advancement of social media and internet technologies also played a significant role in the rigorous revival of Islam by creating new virtual spaces for easy interaction (Helland, 2000).
ISLAMIC REVIVALISM, RADICALISM AND THE PARADOXICAL GOVERNANCE OF ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN by Dilsora Komil-Burley M.A., University of Alberta, 2014 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE COLLEGE OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Interdisciplinary Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Okanagan) April, 2023 © Dilsora Komil-Burley, 2023 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the College of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis/dissertation entitled: ISLAMIC REVIVALISM, RADICALISM AND THE PARADOXICAL GOVERNANCE OF ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN Submitted by Dilsora Komil-Burley in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy . Dr. Bonar Buffam, Irving K. Barber School of Arts and Sciences Supervisor Dr. Luís LM Aguiar, Irving K. Barber School of Arts and Sciences Co-supervisor Dr. Adeeb Khalid, Carleton College. Supervisory Committee Member Dr. Kyong Yoon, Faculty of Creative and Critical Studies Supervisory Committee Member Dr. Lawrence Markowitz, Rowan University External Examiner Dr. Hussein Keshani, Faculty of Creative and Critical Studies University Examiner iii Abstract Prior to Soviet control of Central Asia, Islam was a matrix which produced socio-political culture. The Soviet government, however, viewed religion as a threat to its ideology. During seven decades of Soviet rule in Uzbekistan, Islamic texts were destroyed, religious practices suspended, mosques and learning centres demolished, Islamic legal systems abolished, and Islamic leaders persecuted (Khalid, 2007). The gradual weakening and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with the revival of Islam in Central Asia. In the early 1990s, socialism’s hostility towards religion was replaced by paradoxical models of religious governance in Uzbekistan. On one hand, Islam became central to national identity and was embraced by the majority of Uzbeks; on the other hand, the transition away from socialism coincided with the establishment of an anti-Islamic authoritarian regime. Islamic revivalism is a complex phenomenon. It refers to diverse forms of movements, that seek renewed commitment to Islam by promoting Islamic education, practices, values, and principles in society. For this dissertation, I conducted multi-method qualitative research to study Islamic revivalism and the relationship between the secular state and Islam in Uzbekistan from various perspectives. Building on recent work in critical secular studies (Mahmood, 2017; Gole, 2015; Kosmin, & Keysar, 2007), I studied different religious and political engagements; how they perpetuate inequality, intolerance, and destruction while intersecting with power dynamics; how the labels ‘extremist’, ‘radical’, and ‘terrorist’ aided the government in seizing and securing power; and how the social construction of “adashganlar” – Muslims on “the wrong path” – served the government of Uzbekistan to strengthen its grip on society and justify persecution of innocent Muslims. I examined the re-establishment of official Islam and reformation of underground unofficial Islam, the repertoire of exchanges between these two forms of Islam and the secular state. I combined relational and dialectical approaches to frame the progression of iv radicalization between the state and Islam, which I called dialectical radicalization. The advancement of social media and internet technologies also played a significant role in the rigorous revival of Islam by creating new virtual spaces for easy interaction (Helland, 2000). Key Words: Islamic revivalism; Uzbekistan; Secularism; dialectical radicalization; Relational theory. v Lay Summary This study examines the complex revitalization of Islam and the relationship between the secular government and Islam in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. After the independence of Uzbekistan was established in 1991, Islam was recognized as part of the country’s ethnic inheritance and national identity; however, the government of Uzbekistan recognized only certain forms of Islam and prohibited others. In response to the latter, thousands of Muslims were surveilled, detained, and prosecuted, while many others left the country to avoid persecution. The Islamic revival in society was further intensified by the development of social media, the structure and function of the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan, laws concerning religion, and the propaganda on extremism and terrorism used by the Karimov government to exaggerate the role of “enemy.” The government’s relationship with Islam indicates the type of secularism practiced, and what secular means, in Uzbekistan. vi Preface This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author. The fieldwork carried out for this research was approved by the Behavioural Research Ethics Board of UBC Okanagan. The Ethics Certificate number is H19-01082. The article published in the International Journal of Qualitative Methods in 2021 is based on the field study for this research. The title of the article is “Conducting Research in Authoritarian Bureaucracies: Researcher Positionality, Access, Negotiation, Cooperation, Trepidation, and Avoiding the Influence of the Gatekeepers.” vii Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ iii Lay Summary ................................................................................................................................ v Preface .......................................................................................................................................... vi Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ xi Dedication .................................................................................................................................... xii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1 1.1 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH ................................................... 1 1.2 ESSENTIALS OF UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN UZBEKISTAN ............. 3 1.2.1 Understanding the basics of Islam. ............................................................................ 3 1.2.2 Islam before and under the Soviet rule in Uzbekistan .................................................. 5 1.2.3 The Doctrine of Scientific Atheism .......................................................................... 11 1.2.4 The establishment of the official Islam in the Soviet Union ....................................... 15 1.2.5 Understanding Islamic revivalism in Uzbekistan. ..................................................... 20 1.2.6 Main arguments and contributions of the study ......................................................... 34 1.3 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS .................................................................................. 37 CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW ........................ 41 2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER ................................................................................ 41 2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CRITICAL SECULAR INQUIRY ............................. 42 2.2.1 Islam and the secular state ...................................................................................... 42 2.2.2 Paradoxical governance of Islam in Uzbekistan: Who are “adashganlar”? ................... 47 2.2.3 “Adashganlar” - those on the wrong path ................................................................ 54 2.2.4 Relational approach to the relationship between the state and Islam ........................... 59 2.2.5 Dialectical radicalization ........................................................................................ 62 2.3 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 69 viii CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................ 71 3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER ................................................................................ 71 3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................... 72 3.2.1 Overview of the research questions ......................................................................... 72 3.2.2 Multi-method qualitative research design ................................................................. 73 3.2.2.2 Ethnographic observations ............................................................................. 83 3.2.2.3 Media analysis ................................................................................................... 86 3.2.2.4 Archival inquiry ................................................................................................. 89 3.3 SAMPLING, RECRUITMENT AND DATA ANALYSIS .............................................. 91 3.3.1 Sampling, Recruitment and Entry to the Research Cite .............................................. 91 3.3.2 Data management and analysis ............................................................................... 97 3.3.4 Transcribing and translating interview data .............................................................. 99 3.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................ 100 3.4.1 Institutional ethics and risk management ................................................................ 100 3.4.2 Data protection and privacy of the participants ....................................................... 101 3.4.3 Complexities, challenges and ethical concerns during the fieldwork ......................... 102 3.4.4 Paradigmatic positioning and reflexivity ................................................................ 103 3.5 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 107 CHAPTER 4: SITUATING OFFICIAL ISLAM IN “SECULAR” UZBEKISTAN ...................... 109 4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER .............................................................................. 109 4.2 THE SOVIET STYLE OF GOVERNANCE AND INDEPENDENT UZBEKISTAN ...... 110 4.2.1 Roots of Islamic revival in Uzbekistan: three generations of Islamic revivalists ......... 110 4.2.2 The legacy and the lingering effects of the Soviet rule ............................................ 117 4.2.3 Three pillars of the new identity ............................................................................ 131 4.3 OFFICIAL ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN ....................................................................... 136 4.3.1 Establishment, Structure and Function of the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan ............... 136 ix 4.3.2 Legal and policy framework ................................................................................. 145 4.4 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 157 CHAPTER 5: SITUATING UNOFFICIAL ISLAM IN “SECULAR” UZBEKISTAN. WHO ARE “ADASHGANLAR?” .................................................................................................................. 161 5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER .............................................................................. 161 5.2 CRAFTING THE ENEMIES OF THE STATE ............................................................ 162 5.2.1 Entrance of foreign Islamic missionaries to Uzbekistan: dialectical radicalization ...... 162 5.2.2 Who are “adashganlar” in Uzbekistan? ................................................................ 165 5.2.3 “Adashganlar” in the legal framework ................................................................... 170 5.2.4 The Enlightenment Against Ignorance campaign and purge of Islamic leaders .......... 176 5.2.5 “Adashganlar” – fabricated criminals ................................................................... 184 5.3 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 197 CHAPTER 6: ROLE OF MEDIA IN THE REVIVAL OF ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN ............... 201 6.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER .............................................................................. 201 6.2 SOCIAL MEDIA, ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS ......................................................................................... 202 6.2.1 How did social media influence Islamic revival: social media logic .......................... 202 6.2.2 Islam Online and Online Islam .............................................................................. 208 6.2.3 Cyber-radicalization ............................................................................................ 217 6.2.4 The government of Uzbekistan’s response to cyber radicalization ............................ 226 6.2.5 Is internet diminishing Islam? ............................................................................... 228 6.3 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 235 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 238 7.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE STUDY .............................................................................................................................. 238 7.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY AND PRACTICE ................................................... 247 x 7.2.1 The achievements of this research and suggestions for further research .................... 247 7.2.2 Theoretical framework and relations to the world ................................................... 254 7.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY .............................................................................. 259 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 264 Appendices ................................................................................................................................. 285 xi Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr. Luis Aguiar and Dr. Bonar Buffam, for their unwavering support and guidance throughout my Ph.D. program. I would also like to thank the other members of my supervisory committee: Dr. Adeeb Khalid and Dr. Kyong Yoon. They all supported my work by providing critical insights, based on their areas of expertise, during each stage of this research. I am fortunate, indeed, to have had a highly supportive and able supervisory committee. I could not have completed this journey without them. I am sincerely thankful to Dr. Ruth Frost for the undergraduate teaching experience, and to Dr. Bonar Buffam and Dr. Eric Li for employing me as a research assistant, thus giving me opportunities to work on diverse and exciting projects. This research could not have been successful without the support from the officials in Uzbekistan, and the wholehearted participation of primary respondents and key informants. I am sincerely grateful to all of them. For their companionship and steadfast support, I thank my fellow graduate students, friends and colleges: Barbara Wilke, Katey Kyle, Joanne Taylor, Sumeet Sekhon, David Lacho, Nassiba Ahadi, Laura Mudde, Corinna Netherton, Mustahid Husain, and Billie Franck. Special thanks to my dear friends Margaret Armstrong, Dale Ripley, Alan Champagne, Nels Ekelund, and Olimxon Tadjiev for supporting me in different times in life when I needed them the most. And, finally, I would like to thank my husband, siblings, children, and in-laws, for their moral support. xii Dedication To my mother and father, Mayram and Komil, who despite only having completed 8th grade, made me believe that education matters. To my husband, Jason, and my children, Firdavs, Davron, and Sophie, from whom I stole time to achieve my educational goals. 1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH In the Muslim-majority country of Uzbekistan, which spent seventy years as a republic of the former Soviet Union, the revival of Islam in Uzbekistan was brought about by Muslims looking to restore Islam in society. The Soviet rejection of religion and stern control over the practice of Islam created spiritual hunger in society, yet it also produced a generation of secular Muslims. This dissertation examines the revival of Islam and the relationship between the state and Islam in Uzbekistan following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Building on recent works in critical secular studies (Mahmood, 2015; Göle, 2015; Mufti, 2004), I study different kinds of religious and political engagements; the formation of official and unofficial Islam; and how the labels such as Islamic extremist, radical, and terrorist aided the government in seizing, securing, and maintaining power. The revival of Islam in Central Asia and the relationship between secular governments and Islam started to get some attention in recent decades. Some of the grounding knowledge in this area of research comes from the historical analysis of religion and politics in Uzbekistan (Khalid, 2007; Babadzhanov and Kamilov, 2001; Haghayeghi, 1995; Kamp, 2016, Frank, 2012, Akbarzadeh, 1997), the coercion and legitimation of authoritarianism (March, 2003; Markowitz, 2017; Gershewski, 2013; Edel & Josua, 2018), and the impact of 9/11 in response to the “war on terrorism” in Uzbekistan (Ruzaliev, 2005; Steinberg, 2013). My research provides an interdisciplinary analysis of the revival of Islam and the relationship between the state and Islam. Inspired by Nilufer Göle, Saba Mahmood, Talal Asad and many others, this research analyzes the relationship between the secular state and Islam in the process of Islamic revivalism 2 following the collapse of the Soviet regime, under which the relationship between the state and Islam was marked by the Communist Party’s Programme of Scientific Atheism. The Soviet assault on Islam, which occurred in order to bring about utopian changes (Khalid, 2003; Kamp 2016; Sartori, 2010), was a disruption to the way Islam was evolving in society. The loss of Islamic knowledge and the living resources of Islam, Islamic teachers and ulama1 had lasting effects in society. Therefore, I first examine to what extent the loss of Islamic knowledge in society made Muslims vulnerable to the influences of radical Islam. How did the Soviet attack on Islam, the historical trauma, and the lingering effects of those attacks affect the rise of diverse Islamic establishments and state attitudes towards religion in post-Soviet Uzbekistan? How did they affect the kind of Islam that emerged in post-Soviet Uzbekistan? Second, I delve into the concepts of radical Islam and extremism and how they are defined by the government of Uzbekistan. I consider the discrepancies between the legal definitions of the terms and how they are used in practice, the social construction of “adashganlar” as an informal term for extremists in society, and the exercise of punitive practices towards Muslims who do not fit into the legal framework of officially sanctioned Islam. What are the main struggles between the existing political system and Islam in Uzbekistan? What does the term radical Islam mean in the social, political, and legal domain, and does religious extremism exist beyond state discourse? What are the signs of radicalization and how informed and qualified is the state in distinguishing radical from non-radical forms of Islam? Third, I examine the role social media has played in the revival of Islam and radicalization. Islam becoming online increased the ways Islamic education was received in 1 In Islam, the ulama are the guardians, transmitters, and interpreters of religious knowledge in Islam, including Islamic doctrine and law. By longstanding tradition, ulama are educated in religious institutions. 3 society. Muslims were not only exposed to Islamic content, but they also started to participate in the production of Islamic content. Social media also provided platforms for establishing Muslim communities and for different Islamic groups to interact and debate, and the internal battle within Islam in Uzbekistan became observable through social media. Media played a significant role in the revival of various forms of Islam. Therefore, understanding the revival of Islam in Uzbekistan requires media analysis. 1.2 ESSENTIALS OF UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN UZBEKISTAN 1.2.1 Understanding the basics of Islam. Islam, like all religions around the world, is internally plural and open to multiple interpretations and hence always contested (Khalid, 2007). The content of the Quran, the words of Allah, and Hadith, the words and practices of the Prophet Muhammad, are interpreted, understood, and practiced differently by different groups within Islam. Likewise, there are many shades and shapes of Islamic revival. Islam is an Abrahamic2 and monotheistic religion revealed to Muhammad ibn Abdullah between 610 and 632 of the Common Era in Makkah, Saudi Arabia. Muslims generally agree that Allah (God) is the creator of the world, the prophet Muhammad Sall-Allahu alayhi wa sallam (S.A.W)3 is the last prophet Allah chose to deliver divine messages and the Quran4 is the final revelation of God. According to Islamic beliefs, the revelations were made to Muhammad 2 According to Louis Massignon (1949), Abrahamic religions come from one spiritual source – God, such as Christianity and Islam. 3 (S.A.W) is an expression that Muslims use whenever the name of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) is mentioned or written. It means: "May the blessings and the peace of Allah be upon him (Muhammad). 4 According to Al Faruqi; Lois Ibsen (1987). "The Cantillation of the Qur'an" The literal meaning of Quran is “the recitation”. It was sent to Muhammad (S.A.W) between 610 CE and 632 CE in the form of verses. The Quran was written based on his companions' memorization of the verses. 4 over twenty-three years, which were collected in the Quran after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Islam has two main denominations: Sunni and Shia5. The division is explained by the separation of Muslims as they followed different leaders after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Shia Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad designated Ali ibn Abu Talib as his successor and leader of Muslims after his death; however, this view contrasted with the Sunni Muslims’ belief that the Prophet Muhammad did not appoint a successor and that the best candidate for leading Muslims was Abu Bakr, who was appointed caliph after Muhammad. This fracturing led to a perpetual conflict between the two largest denominations in Islam. The establishment of four madhhabs6 within the Sunni denomination of Islam in the ninth and tenth centuries – Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi’i – is attributed to the different judgements and jurisprudence which resulted from the independent reasoning of founders of the madhabs and the Islamic scholars and practitioners who followed them. The methodologies of interpretation and extraction from scriptures were different, therefore they came to different judgements in certain areas (Rabb, 2009; Hussin, 2014). Although all four of these madhabs are accepted as legitimate and recognize each other’s validity, Islamic scholars often suggest that it is healthiest for Muslims to choose to follow only one of the four madhabs (Hussin, 2014). The Ja’fari school of Islamic jurisprudence is one of the known madhabs in Shia Islam. Often Ja’fari viewed as fifth main madhab in Islam beside four Sunni schools of jurisprudence. Debate between the scholars of these four schools of thought has continued for centuries (Hussin, 2014). 5 According to https://www.thoughtco.com/worlds-muslim-population-2004480, Sunni Muslims make-up roughly 80 - 90 percent of Muslim population and the rest is mainly Shia Muslims (about 170-340 million). 6 Madhab is a school of thought within Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). 5 According to Hackett, Stonawski and McClendon (2017), the spread of Islam in different parts of the world is mainly attributed to the invasion of foreign lands by Muslims and the changing global religious landscape is attributed to the higher birth rate in Muslim families. There are many other explanations for the diversity of Islam. One of the main views is that Islam cannot be understood separately from local traditions and cultures (Asad, 2009). The diversity of Islamic traditions, according to Asad (2009), is due to their evolution, shaped and reshaped through different historical periods, practices, experiences, and interactions with other institutions, and is also characterized by its own rationality and reasoning. Asad (2009) therefore views Islam as a discursive tradition – a cluster of many Islamic traditions. 1.2.2 Islam before and under the Soviet rule in Uzbekistan Islam was a matrix in which socio-political culture was produced prior to the installment of the Soviet government in Central Asia. Muslimness as an experience can be located in the intersections of Islamic, ethnic, and cultural beliefs and practices and is often affected by social, political, and economic realities. Islam played a significant role in the lives of Central Asian Muslims as a substantial part of their culture, traditions, and day-to-day affairs, providing spiritual and moral guidance and a foundation for of all social, economic, and political relations, such that it would have been unimaginable to completely erase it from society (Khalid, 2007). According to Zurab (2005), Islam played an important role in the Khiva and Kokand khanates and in the Bukhara Emirate. The misconceptions about Central Asian Muslims being peripheral to the Islamic world have been challenged by scholars who have presented the enormous contributions of local Islamic intellectuals of the Hanafi legal tradition, such as Muhammad Al-Bukhari and Al-Hakim al-Termidhi, who collected the most authentic hadith; Abu-Mansur Al-Maturidi, who formed Sunni Islamic theology; and Ahmad Yassawi and 6 Bahuvuddin Naqshibandi, who had enormous influence in the Sufi order in Islam. These intellectuals emerged from the region where modern-day Uzbekistan is located and had a significant impact on the development of Islamic sciences, culture, and civilization in the Muslim world (Frank & Mamatov, 2006). These scholars contributed to the revived interest in Islam and the dynamism of the different trends of Islam in society, which were fluid and changed periodically. For example, Olcott and Ziyaeva (2008) argue that despite the rich theological tradition in the region, Islamic teaching lost its dynamism after the Timurid period (1370-1506) and “became dominated by a narrow scholastic approach (p. 4).” The history of Islam in Central Asia, including periods of intensification and weakening of religious sensibilities, has strong connections with the processes of political change in the region. This landlocked terrain had historically been extremely attractive to Iranian, Chinese, Arab, Mongolian, and Russian invaders. The Arab invasion in the late seventh and early eighth centuries “resulted in the establishment of the Muslim-ruled sub-province of Transoxiana7” (Tor, 2009 p. 279), of which modern Uzbekistan was a part. Mawarannahr is a more widely used name to refer to this region. The region was subject to many attacks and periods of expansion under different rulers. The main rulers in the region were Samanids from the 9th to the 10th century, Qarakhanids from the 10th to the 13th century, Timurids from the 14th to the 15th century, Shaybanids from the 16th to the 18th century, Kokand Khanate from the 18th to the 19th century. As a result, the names and borders of the Central Asian states changed often over time; therefore, 7 Transoxiana is known as Mā warāʼ an-Nahr, which means “beyond the river” in Arabic. It is the ancient name used for the portion of Central Asia corresponding approximately with modern-day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, southern Kyrgyzstan, and southwest Kazakhstan. 7 the history of Uzbekistan up until 1924 is better understood when considered as one part of Central Asia. Between 1865 and 1917, Central Asia was called Russian Turkistan and was under the control of the Russian Empire. Three khaganates located in the territory of current Uzbekistan were conquered by the Red Army one at a time. The conquest of the Bukhara khanate can help to envision the history of Uzbekistan becoming a Soviet republic. According to Safarov (1996), at the end of August 1920, the Turkistan Front, with an army of 25-30 thousand people, attacked the Bukhara khaganate from all sides. The emirate was heavily bombed by aircraft. The Bukhara operation, which lasted from August 28 to September 2, killed thousands of people, burned one-fifth of the city, destroyed monuments, and looted Emir Olimkhan’s treasury and the other wealth of Bukhara's rich. The looted gold and other valuables were loaded onto 14 wagons and sent to Moscow in mid-September. Russian troops and the Red Guard were the primary groups involved in the looting and violence (Safarov, 1996; Argenbright, 2011). The Russian Empire’s hostility towards national and religious matters and their draining of natural and agricultural resources in Central Asia led to resentment and riots against colonialists (Bakhodirov, 2021). The best lands were given to the Russian farmers and water was unevenly distributed between Uzbek dehqans (farmers) and Russian farmers. Uzbek dehqans were forced to grow cotton that was exported to Russia very cheaply while they were forced to buy imported Russian wheat for unaffordable prices (Bakhodirov, 2021). Social ills, such as alcohol consumption, gambling, and prostitution, became widespread as part of the new lifestyle introduced by the Russian colonialists and was disturbing for religious Muslims, which was a normative framing that recentered religious moralities. Poverty was progressive and people suffered from hunger and injustices. The local intellectuals were deeply concerned about the 8 future of the Uzbek Muslims. Riots were violently suppressed, and rioters were brutally punished.8 The current borders of Uzbekistan were drawn as part of the former Soviet Union in 1924 and the region became the UzSSR (Khalid, 2007). The sole party of the Soviet Union was called the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its members were regarded as Communists. The Communist Party adopted Marxist-Leninist-based ideology, which is often referred to as Communist ideology. Before the establishment of the UzSSR in 1924, Islam was generally tolerated or ignored by the Russian autocracy. The Soviet Union’s hostility towards religion was aggravated by its perception of Muslim societies as backwards and barbaric (Deweese, 2002). Islam was held primarily accountable for Central Asian nations lagging in the modernization and industrialization that roared across Europe in the nineteenth century (Jones, 2017). According to Deweese (2002), Central Asia was seen as a highly desirable location to test Russian utopian visions for social transformation. Utopian social transformation became a primary goal when the Central Asian states formed their national borders and became Soviet Socialist Republics in 1924 (Ohlsson, 2011; Hanks, 2001; Khalid, 2007; Kamp, 2016). Based on Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels’s (1967) model of social transformation, which were hostile to all religion, the Soviet attacks against Islam reached their climax in the late 1920s and the 1930s. Under Stalin’s Hujum (attack) campaign, any remnants of Islam were brutally targeted: Islamic learning centres, religious texts, and places of worship were destroyed; religious practices suspended; the Islamic legal system 8 For example, the “Dukchi Eshan” riot in the Namangan district in 1898 was suppressed and over 777 people were arrested for their alleged involvement in the uprising, which resulted in 380 people being sentenced to death, 15 deported to Siberia, 147 imprisoned for 20 years, 41 to 15 years, and others receiving various lesser sentences (Bakhodirov 2021: 43). 9 abolished; and many Muslim authorities and reformers persecuted. The doctrine of scientific atheism was propagated as the enlightened and modern way of thinking, living, and being (Khalid, 2007; Deweese, 2002; Jones, 2017; Babadzhanov & Kamilov, 2001). There were two main social movements at this time, in which Islam played an important role and contributed to Islam’s future in Uzbekistan. Both of these movements were suppressed by the Soviet government. The al-Islahiyya was based on fundamentalist ideas of Islam and later became known as the Salafiya movement (Olcott & Ziyaeva, 2008). Kehl-Bodrogi (2008) says that “countless ulama, the learned experts of the faith, were executed, imprisoned, or sent to work camps, and religious texts were confiscated and burned, with their owners being punished” (p. 3). Resistance to colonial forces was violently suppressed (Frank & Mamatov, 2006). For example, an anti-Bolshevik guerrilla movement called the Basmachi Movement9 was violently defeated in the early 1930s (Broxup, 1983). The second movement, which was more prominent in the 1920s and 1930s, was usul-isautiyya jadidiyya, better known as the Jadid reformers. The Muslim modernist movement in the 1920s and 1930s – Jadidism – is often viewed as a Muslim accommodation to secularism, influenced by European rationalism (Khalid, 1999; 2006; Sartori, 2016). The Jadid reformers were young and vibrant men who welcomed the ideas of modernization, with clear visions of Islam playing a significant part in it. They were writers, poets, dramaturgs, activists, and teachers who were the visionaries of the future of an Uzbek nation. They were influenced by the 1917 Russian revolution and were enthusiastic about national and cultural reform. In his book The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia, Khalid (1999) gives a thorough 9 Basmachi is the name used for the members of these guerilla movements that fought against the Soviet government between 1918 and 1928. In some cases, the Basmachi Movement continued until the end of 1930s (Broxup, 1983). 10 historical analysis of the Central Asian Jadid Muslim reformers. He discusses the opposition the Jadids faced from both the Soviet government and the fundamentalist Islamist elite. Khalid (1999) acknowledges that, Although the Jadids saw themselves as reformer of their society, their enthusiastic embrace of modernity led them to radically new conceptions of society. Their attempts at rescuing tradition redefined it, and their attempts to return to a “pure” Islam brought new understandings of Islam and of what it meant to be a Muslim. (p. 5) Jadid reformers’ visions for the future overlapped with the ideas of the Bolsheviks in many areas, such as modernizing the health care and education systems, but their vision of Islam being part of the modern UzSSR did not fit in well with Communist ideology (Khalid, 1999; Sartori, 2016). The resonances between Islam and Marxism during the late 19th and early 20th centuries were not limited to the Jadid reformers in Uzbekistan and Central Asia. Intellectuals in the Muslim world were concerned with modernizing Islamic societies and Westernizing them; therefore, Jadid reformers saw Marxism as a potential solution to the problems facing Islamic societies, as it offered a comprehensive critique of capitalism and imperialism and proposed an alternative economic and political system based on equality, social justice, and communal ownership. However, Jadid reformers recognized the potential tensions between the two systems. There were tensions between religion and secularism, as well as tension between Muslim authority and Marxism’s promotion of class struggle and the overthrow of existing political structures. Despite these challenges, Jadids and their contemporaries elsewhere continued to see potential alignment between Islam and Marxism, believing that Marxist theory could help Islamic societies to achieve their goals of modernization and social justice. Muslim intellectuals and the ulama were targeted by the Communists. While Jadids encouraged modernization in society, they were against the political decisions that would exclude Islam from society. The Communist agenda for the complete secularization of Muslims 11 did not fit well with the principles of Jadidism, so the Communist system violently purged Jadid Muslim modernists (Khalid, 1999). After the Soviet government’s assault on Islam in the 1920s and 1930s, a small group of ulama were able to convince Stalin to allow the establishment of an Islamic organization called the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM) given Muslims’ support of the Soviets during WWII. The SADUM was established in 1943 and tightly controlled by the Soviet government, functioning as an official, state-sanctioned Islam. Although the Soviet government viewed religion as a potential threat to its power, official Islam was deemed compatible with Soviet ideology. Mosques and religious schools were subject to state control, Muslim clerics and leaders were required to swear loyalty to the Soviet government and to promote Soviet ideology. Many Islamic practices that did not promote Soviet ideology were suppressed. For example, the Soviet control of waqf, a type of Islamic charitable endowment that is used to support social, educational, and religious purposes, increased tensions between the Soviet government and Muslim communities. Muslims argued that waqf assets belonged to the community and that this policy demonstrated the Soviet government’s hostility towards Islamic practices. 1.2.3 The Doctrine of Scientific Atheism The Programme of Scientific Atheism was a policy of the Communist Party based on the Marxist-Leninist thought (Thrower, 2011). The partisan nature of the study of religion in the former Soviet Union depicted religion as a fantasy of alienated man. Quoting from Ugrinovich (1966), the “religious man not only believes in the reality of supernatural, not only postulates it, not only enter into an emotional relationship with it – he finds in his relationship with the supernatural practices which we can only call ‘illusory’” (Thrower 2011 p. 51). Such research 12 condemned religion, asserting that there is no religion without illusion. Therefore, the Programme of Scientific Atheism was on a mission to bring those it believed to be out of their senses back to reality. This gives some explanation for why Muslims were regarded as barbaric and delusional. Deweese (2002) analyzes the outrageous claims and harmful effects of Sovietology in the former Soviet Union. Since UzSSR was part of the Soviet Union, the general notions about the Soviet Union in academic literature are also applicable to Uzbekistan unless otherwise indicated. Scientific Atheism posited the ultimate purpose of human existence, a moral code of conduct, and a collection of atheistic rituals and ceremonies that mimicked religious ones (Froese, 2004). As Froese (2004) further explains, Atheists waged a 70-year war on religious belief in the Soviet Union. The Communist Party destroyed churches, mosques, and temples; it executed religious leaders; it flooded the schools and media with anti-religious propaganda; and it introduced a belief system called “scientific atheism,” complete with atheist rituals, proselytizers, and a promise of worldly salvation. But in the end, a majority of older Soviet citizens retained their religious beliefs and a crop of citizens too young to have experienced pre-Soviet times acquired religious beliefs (p. 35). The doctrine of Scientific Atheism was taught in schools, promoted in media and emphasized in celebrations. In essence, it was a “new religion” to replace all other religions in the Soviet Union. The doctrine of scientific atheism was hostile to any religion, and it deeply threatened the roots and fundamentals of Islam. The propagation of scientific atheism was damaging to the identity of Muslims and undermined their daily religious practices. Those who wanted Islam to play any part in society’s plans for the future, such as Jadid reformers and religious leaders, were purged. Embracing the Communist ideology and its principles became the only way to live and, often, to survive. The education system during the time of the Soviet Union was fully reformed. Obtaining Islamic education was impossible for the majority of Uzbek Muslims; only a few chosen students could 13 study in the state-permitted Islamic institutions (Khalid, 2007). However, despite the fact that the Soviet government prohibited private religious instruction, some families were able to pass down Islamic knowledge and traditions to their children through informal channels. Some parents and grandparents taught children about Islamic practices and beliefs, and in some cases religious figures continued their teaching in private, regardless of the risk of persecution (Olcott & Ziyaeva, 2008). The campaign to remove the veils of Uzbek women was part of the utopian change the Communists sought in Uzbekistan, which triggered massive violence among the fundamentalist religious elite against women. In her book The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism, Marianne Kamp (2016) provides insight into the transformation of women in Uzbekistan under Soviet rule. Kamp (2016) argues that, as a path to social and intellectual liberation, the mass unveiling cost the lives of hundreds of women in the 1930s and was then used by the Bolsheviks to justify wiping out the fundamentalist elite from society. The campaign to remove the veils of women was a state-led effort to modernize Muslim societies. In comparison, some countries, such as Turkey and Iran, passed laws prohibiting the wearing of the hijab in public spaces as part of broader efforts to create a more secular and modern society and to eliminate “backward and oppressive” traditional cultural practices (Cinar, 2008). Similar to the case in Uzbekistan, the campaign to remove the veils of women in Turkey was met with resistance from conservative segments of Turkish society. The degree of repression of Islam was not the same over the seventy years of Soviet rule. Muslims experienced totalitarian domination when Islam was at the centre of the political focus during the Stalin regime. DeWeese (2002) claimed that Islam survived even in “the atmosphere of harassment and intimidation” (p. 316) but became dormant. The rise of other political issues 14 like World War II led to a slight reduction of the control exercised by the Soviet Union, giving Islam some regulated freedom; however, as Khalid (2007) argues, by the time of the Second World War, the systems of transmitting Islamic education in Muslim societies in the former Soviet Union had been seriously damaged, if not destroyed. By the late 1970s, the rigidness of the Soviet system towards religion was further relaxed as the Soviet Union started on the road to implosion, leading to the emergence of some new Islamic trends in Central Asia (Exnerova, 2017). Changing attitudes towards Islam and religion in general and the failure of the state to restrict them widened the practice of Islam. The vigorous revival of Islam in the 1990s demonstrated that the internal mechanism of Islam was still powerful because it survived as part of culture and traditions and had been slowly reviving underground for decades. The daily lives of Uzbek Muslims continued to be based on Islam-infused tradition and cultural practices only because, in many cases, the Soviet government was not able to separate elements of Islam from cultural practices, though the Soviets suppressed Islamic practices when they could be separated. Khalid (2007) observes two main effects of the Soviet attack on Islam: first, the localization and the reduction of Islam to tradition and to customary practices, as it was impossible to separate Islam from cultural practices; and second, the major “de-Islamization of the terms of public discourse” (page number), which often led to loss of the original meaning attached to it. Islam was entering all aspects of social life: fashion, diet, publication of Islamic materials, participation in prayers, study of Islam and Arabic language, practice of Islamic rituals in traditional ceremonies, and many more. 15 1.2.4 The establishment of the official Islam in the Soviet Union Survival being essential for revival, the revival of Islam would be impossible without it surviving the harsh political violence during totalitarian governance by Stalin in the 1920s and 1930s. However, during World War II, Soviet attitudes towards religion took another turn. Ulama helped to mobilize Muslims to support the USSR in its war efforts in exchange for the official recognition of Islam and permission for the formation of some sort of union of Muslims (Koçak, 2018). The peculiarity of this was noticed by many scholars. DeWeese (2002 p. 310) describes it as "one of the strange ironies of Soviet history” and Khalid (2007) explains that “for the duration of the war, it largely put ideology on hold, and Stalin banked quite shamelessly on traditional source of legitimacy for the war effort” (p. 78). In response to this relaxation or opportunity, the SADUM was founded in Tashkent (Khalid, 2007; Kehl-Bodrogi, 2008). Islamic revival is an umbrella term that is used to describe the experience of revival and growth of Islam in various parts of the world. The conditions in which Islam revived are as different as the forces behind the revival. In the Middle East, the rapid social, political, and economic changes and the rise of secularism and modernization created a sense of cultural and religious crisis, leading to a renewed interest in Islam among Muslims (Molnar, 2017). In Southeast Asia, the revival of Islam has been attributed to the appearance of influential Islamic scholars and leaders in the region, leading to an increased interest in Islamic education and the effective promotion of Islam through Islamic organizations (Lapidus, 1997). In the West, migration was one of the main factors for the establishment of mosques and Islamic centers and the increased interest in Islamic education and culture. The factors for and conditions of the revival of Islam are complex and Islamic revival was taking place in the more secularized, globalized, and technologically-advanced world, 16 leading to new ways of obtaining Islamic education and practicing Islam. As such, Islamic revival embodies the experiences of the revitalized or renewed interest in Islam, the restoration of commitment to Islamic principles, and the reassertion by Muslims of their religious identity. Two main Islamic educational institutions, the Mir-i Arab madrasa in Bukhara and the Imam Al-Bukhari institute in Tashkent, both in Uzbekistan, began teaching a very small number of Central Asian students (Kehl-Bodrogi, 2008 p. 4). As Koçak (2018) says, the purpose of accredited body was not to address the actual needs of the Muslim population, rather to ensure that their practice of Islam did not pose a threat to the ruling regime. The state was more concerned with maintaining its power and control than with providing support for spiritual needs of Muslims (p. 110). DeWeese (2002) argues that the Islamic scholars educated in these institutions were not always trusted as Islamic leaders. They were accepted with great reluctance by Muslim communities due to the fact that they were educated in institutions founded by the Soviet government, given the government’s earlier assaults on Islam. The reasons for this relaxation of the restrictions against religion are the subject of debate. Some scholars argue that warfare increases the levels of religiosity in society and that religiosity, in turn, increases social solidarity and unifies people to fight against the enemy (Henrich et al., 2019). Therefore, Stalin wanted the benefit from increased social solidarity to help win the war. According to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the United Nations website, “out of 6.5 million people who lived in Uzbekistan back then, 1.5 million people joined the battle. Four hundred twenty thousand lost their lives; six hundred forty 17 thousand sustained varying degrees of injuries10.” The rest of society – women, children, and unqualified men – participated by supplying the battle with: 2,100 planes, 17,342 aircraft engines, 17,100 mortars, 22 million mines, 560 thousand ordnances, more than 2 million air bombs, around 1 million grenades, 330 thousand parachutes, 5 armored trains, 18 military-sanitary trains and other necessary products11. All this patriotism could be another reason for Stalin’s approval of the requests by ulama to ease the restrictions on Islam. There are some other arguments about the start of the revival of Islam in the Soviet Union. Stephane Dudoignon (2009) argues that the revival of Islam started in Central Asia in the aftermath of the reopening of the GULAG12 in 1955-56. Dudoignon (2009) states, It is the amnesty of 27 March 1953 and partial reopening of the Gulag during the following three years which offered to thousands of young mullahs repressed in the 1930s and late 1940s, the possibility of settling back in their places of origin: a possibility that most had not enjoyed in previous waves of releases during and in the wake of the Second World War. Tracing the roots of Islamic revival leads to consider some of these important historical moments. The discharge of Muslims from GULAG after World War II also played a crucial role in the revival of Islam because many of these individuals had extensive knowledge of Islamic theology and history which they were able to share with others after they returned home. The underground revival of Political Islam in Ferghana Valley in the 1970s (Externova, 2017) was a response to continued repression of Islam by the Soviet authorities. The establishment of SADUM (official Islam) and secretive hujra teachings (unofficial Islam) after the World War II further contributed to the revival of Islam in Uzbekistan. Hujra, which refers to a room or 10 https://www.un.int/uzbekistan/news/uzbekistan-those-who-lost-their-lives-second-world-war-and-home-front-workers-are-remembered 11 ibid 12 GULAG – Glavnoy Upravlenie Lagerey can be translated as the “Chief Administration of the Camps.” 18 gathering place where Muslims come together to study Islam, played an important role in transmitting Islamic knowledge and values to future generations. The formation of official Islam was a marker for the survival of Islam. From that point on, Islam was revived in a cloak-and-dagger manner because of the caution necessary for even minor religious activities. By the late 1970s, the rigidness of the Soviet system towards religion was starting to ease even more and some Islamic trends started to emerge (Khalid, 2017; Jones, 2017; Exnerova, 2017). The end of the 1970s is often characterized by the emergence of Muhammadjan Hindustani, often referred to as Domla Hindustani, as a religious figure (Epkenhans, 2016). Many well-known religious scholars and imams in Uzbekistan took lessons from Muhammadjan Hindustani and many of his pupils were persecuted by the government of Uzbekistan13. As part of an extensive historical analysis of religion, politics, and culture in Central Asia, the revival of Islam in Uzbekistan was closely observed by Adeeb Khalid. Khalid reflects on the complexity of Islam and its relationship with the government. Khalid provides foundational knowledge for this research in his two books, Islam After Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia (2007) and Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Revolution and Empire in the Early USSR (2016). Khalid (2007) argues that, during the seventy years of Soviet rule in Central Asia, Islam suffered from the sustained assault by the Soviet government. The Soviet authorities suppressed and abolished many Islamic practices and institutions. The transmission of Islamic education and knowledge was severely disrupted, and many traditional ways of learning 13 For example, imam Obidkhon Qori Nazarov left Uzbekistan to avoid persecution, lived in Kazakhstan for a while, and ultimately found refuge in Sweden. In December 2015, he was shot by an Uzbek citizen, Yury Zhukovsky, who was later sentenced to life in prison. Obidkhon Qori survived with serious damage to his wellbeing. The disappearance of Abduvali Qori Mirzaev from the International Airport of Tashkent in 1995 is another example of the persecution of Domla Hindustani’s pupils, which I discuss further in the next chapter (Khalid, 2007). 19 and teaching Islam were lost. Although SADUM’s establishment did not restore all of the traditional way of transmitting Islamic education, it did however, provide a framework for the preservation and promotion of Islamic practices in a more moderate and secularized form. Despite the restrictions placed on Islamic practices, many Muslims in Uzbekistan continued to practice their faith in secret, often in private homes or other clandestine settings. Islam’s strong stance against sinful acts (haram), such as consuming forbidden food and drinks like alcohol and pork, prostitution, and lending or borrowing with interest, were intentionally ignored by Muslims. Khalid (2007) also notices the emergence of ethnonational secular identities, which created balance between religious and secular tendencies. Official Islam was under the strict control of the Soviet government and, as such, was obliged to help to manage and control Islam in society. The mechanism of how official Islam worked was also adopted by the newly independent states of Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Khalid (2007) believes that the resurgence of Islam in the 1990s is “connected with how Islam is deployed in politics, how the authority of Islam is used to justify or legitimate political action, and which interpretations of Islam come to dominate the political landscape of the country” (p.139). The most critical claim Khalid (2007) makes in his book is that the emergence of political and fundamentalist Islam poses a threat to secular governments; however, secular governments pose much more of a threat to Islam and Muslims. The revival of Islam in the limited Soviet space under strict control is also significant because it shaped two distinct forms of Islam: 1) official Islam, which was flexible enough to work with the secular state and survived the complexities of secular political demands, and 2) unofficial Islam, which includes all expressions of Islam outside the control of SADUM. However, there are group of Muslims within unofficial Islam who view official Islam as a group 20 of traitors who cooperated with the enemy and allowed further damage to Islam, which Babadzhanov & Kamilov call (2001) the “Great Schism.” 1.2.5 Understanding Islamic revivalism in Uzbekistan. The weakening and ultimate collapse of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at the end of the 1980s coincided with the rapid revival of Islam in the post-Soviet Republics in Central Asia (Khalid, 2007; Jones, 2017; Collins, 2007; Tazmini, 2001). After breaking free from the former USSR, Uzbekistan declared independence on August 31, 1991. Islam Abduganievich Karimov became the last Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in 1989 and was named the President of the Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist Republic (UzSSR) on March 24, 1990. After independence, the name of the party was changed to the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDP) and, through a presidential election, Karimov became the first President of the independent Uzbekistan on December 29, 1991. The majority of the political elite from the UzSSR remained in power after independence. While Uzbekistan was still dealing with the difficult politics of becoming independent, the formation of politically motivated Islamic militant groups in the Ferghana Valley raised anxiety in the Karimov government (Khalid, 2007; Jones, 2017; Externova, 2017; Nunn et al., 1999). The Communist Party’s Programme of Scientific Atheism was replaced by paradoxical models of religious governance in Uzbekistan (Shahrani, 1995). On the one hand, Islam became central to the national identity and inheritance and was embraced by many Uzbeks (Karimov, 2000; 2008); on the other hand, the transition away from socialism coincided with the establishment of an anti-Islamic authoritarian regime (Khalid, 2007; Edel, & Josua, 2018). President Karimov’s subsequent religious persecution, criminalizing and exclusion of large 21 numbers of Muslims starting in 1991 (Khalid, 2007; Jones, 2017), marked the start of the harsh repression of Islamic groups. The current official Islam in Uzbekistan is united under the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan (MBU) and mainly follows the Hanafi branch of Sunnism. Official Islam is the Islam that is accepted, endorsed, and celebrated, Islam that cooperates with the government and that supports it when and how it requires. Unofficial Islam, by contrast, is Islam that is skeptical about the framework created by the state, or Islam that is repressed and depicted as extremism and radicalism to manipulate public attitudes towards it. The formation of official Islam created Islamic minorities and terms like Wahhabi, Hisb-ut Tahrir, and Akromia were used to ascribe strong political implications to Islamic fundamentalism (Appleby et al., 2001), extremism, and terrorism (Ruzaliev, 2005). The use of the terms “official” and “unofficial” Islam in this dissertation serves to shed light on the paradoxical governance of Islam in the post-Soviet Uzbekistan. These forms of Islam are often collectively referred to as “independent Islam,” (HRW, 2004). Islam was categorized many times by the scholars of various disciplines. For example, Bennigsen (1985) defined moderate Islam as a political system that is open to democratic principles, pluralism and tolerance, and extreme Islam as a political system that seeks to impose sharia law in society and intolerant towards other forms of governance. Bennigsen’s perspective on Islam does not reflect how and why I use the terms “official” and “unofficial” Islam. Given my use of the term official Islam to describe the state-sanctioned form of Islam, Islamic groups that do not fall in that category will be referred to as unofficial Islam. Politically motivated Islamic groups became observable in early 1990s, but they were relatively few in number (Khalid, 2007). Extremism and terrorism propaganda were used by the Karimov government to exaggerate the threat they posed, serving as a political tool to justify 22 punishing all forms of opposition to the existing government or driving them out of the country. After leaving Uzbekistan to avoid persecution, the leaders of these politically motivated Islamic groups founded the radical organizations Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), which formed alliances with the Taliban and al Qaeda and brought followers of Islam, especially young Uzbek men, closer to foreign radical Islamic organizations (Mann, 2002; Naumkin, 2003). IJU splintered from the IMU in the early 2000s; however, both organizations remained committed to toppling the government of Uzbekistan and establishing a radical Islamist caliphate in all of Turkistan, which historically covered the region between the Caspian See and Xinjiang in western China. The Karimov government used the term “adashganlar” in the political rhetoric to refer to these groups. The direct translation of “adashganlar” is “lost” or “gone down a wrong path,” often as a result of misleading ideologies or influence from religious groups or individuals. Often, the “adashganlar” was seen as synonymous with “Islamic extremist” or “terrorist” in order to justify violence against individuals, whether or not the accusations were legitimate. “Adashganlar” were portrayed as a threat not only because they had gone down a wrong path, but because they were seen as dangerous. Although “adashganlar” is a very broad term, the interviews I conducted revealed that people are quite familiar with the underlying implications of this term. “Adashganlar” was an umbrella term for those who believed or followed Islamic doctrines the government disapproved of, such as Salafism, Wahhabism, Hisb-ut Tahrir, and Tablighi Jamoa. The right path, in this case, was what the government of Uzbekistan insinuated to be right, which was followed by those who supported the government. This was achieved by forming an official Islam and creating Islamic minorities. 23 By analyzing the secular government’s motivations for the formation of religious minorities in the Muslim-majority state of Uzbekistan, this research enters the conversations initiated by Asad, Mahmood, and Göle in critical secular studies, that secularism is not a neutral or objective framework, rather it is historically and culturally specific set of ideas and practices that reflet particular power relations and ideologies in society. From a critical secularism perspective, during the Islom Karimov’s presidency some forms of Islam was framed as a threat to national security and used as a justification for authoritarian measures. This approach not only perpetuates forms of exclusion and domination, but also fails to address the root causes of religious extremism and social conflict. While Islam is continuing to revive, the relationship between the secular state and Islam in Uzbekistan, the matters around the relationship between the state and Islam is complex and multifaceted, and requires careful consideration of the historical, cultural, and political context in which it is situated. Islamic revival as a social movement is not organized around a unified, coherent, and centralized structure. It is better understood as the multiplicity of Islamic movements motivated around parallel reasons and purposes (Lewis, 1990). Muslims call for social reform towards a return to basic, untainted Islam and the experience of pure Islamic values in society (Mahmood, 2005; Göle, 2017); this call has been attractive to a variety of Islamic revivalist movements around the world. Momayezi (1997) believes that the main aim of Islamic revivalism is to “strengthen Islamic influence in political, economic and social life.” Mahmood (2005 p. 31) distinguishes two goals driven by Islamic revival: first, the wish to make Islamic values central to daily life and practices; and second, Islamism – a desire to create an Islamic state in which Islam will be central to all political, legal, and social practices. As Kosugi states, “Islamic revival 24 can be defined as a reorientation of a Muslim society at mass level toward Islam (re-Islamization) after a significant degree of de-Islamization” (Yasushi, 2006 p. 5). Many scholars have discussed the reasons for such a call (Khalid, 2007; Mahmood, 2005; Göle, 20017; Hallaq, 2012). Colonial domination in many Muslim societies caused a loss of religious, cultural, and traditional values (Potter, 1994). Often, colonizers not only forced the colonized to adopt their culture and standards, but the colonized were forbidden from practicing their own religious and cultural practices. The oppression against Islam, widespread corruption in society, and tyrannical domination became intolerable for many Muslims. Therefore, Islamic revivalism is best viewed as a reaction to the negative consequences of modernity (Esposito, 1999), a genuine movement for moral revitalization and radical change in Islamic societies. For Oliver Roy (1994), Islamic revival, especially political Islam, or Islamism, is not a reaction to modernism but is the very product of modernism, initiating from economic and political crises, a lack of good employment and educational opportunities, growing poverty, and increased authoritarian control in some parts of the world. In his book The Impossible State, Hallaq (2012) argues that, prior to the colonial experience, Islam had the potential to become an advanced political, legal, and administrative system to serve Muslims. The undermining of Islamic tradition by colonizers and their view of Islamic values as backward or barbarian led to the revival of Islam. It was Muslims’ way of reclaiming their identity and recognition of their religion and traditions while re-establishing and strengthening Islamic values (Hallaq, 2012; Potter, 1994; Esposito, 1999). Esposito (1999) cited states that "at the heart of th e revivalist movements lies the quest for authenticity, identity and tradition” (as cited in Bascio, 2007 p. 228). These scholars believe that the rise of Islamic 25 revivalism is the encouragement to resist Western domination and standards; however, it does not challenge a stable world order. Other scholars view Islamic revivalism differently. They view Islamic revivalism as the war between the West and Islam that replaced the war between Communism and the West. The scholars with such views believe that the Iranian Revolution against Western-inspired modernization and Egypt’s “holy war” against Israel demonstrate that Islamic revival does challenge a stable world order. In the early 1990s, some Western scholars argued that, historically, there has always been some sort of clash between civilizations that brought down existing political orders, whether the order is authoritarian or democratic. Therefore, Islamic revivalism is viewed as the revival of an ideology and force against Western philosophies and institutions to overthrow the existing establishment (Huntington, 1993; Sciolino, 1996). For example, in his widely debated and criticized work, Samuel Huntington (1993) argues that the “west at the peak of its power confronts non-wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and resources to shape the world in non-western ways” (p. 26). In his book Radicalized, Neumann (2016) provides a chronological survey of jihadist movements within Islamic revivalism to date, a thorough analysis of jihadism, and the ideological and political connections between them. Neumann (2016) argues that all types of terrorist movements had the same roots and that the underlying cause of terrorism has been the same all along. The jihadists, for Neumann, are not a group, but an activism that is “inextricably bound up with a radical political movement” (p.43), originating as a response to the colonial suppression of Islam and the damage from the imposition of Western or democratic standards to Islamic values. The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist movements and the influences of prominent figures in twentieth-century Islamism, including Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid 26 Qutb, Abul ala Maududi, and Ruhollah Khomeini, according to Neumann (2016), was the beginning of Islamism, which led to the most violent and ruthless Islamist militia to date: ISIS. The emergence of dynamic revival of Islam and the reclamation of lost identity and religious freedom by Muslims was perceived as a threat to the world. The international panic and loss of confidence in democracy’s ability to handle the challenges of Islamic terrorism and extremism have marked Islamic revivalism as “the security problem” of the world (Nasr, 1995). Nasr (1995) argues that Islamic revivalists are a “revolutionary force whose aim is to topple the established order in the Muslim world, be they authoritarian or democratic.” This sort of disturbing view goes hand-in-hand with depicting Muslims as terrorists, unifying them with those few politically motivated groups with an Islamic facade. Huntington’s ideas in the “Clash of Civilizations” also have been controversial in the context of Islamic revivalism. Huntington (1993) viewed Islamic revival as a broad-based movement in the Islamic world that seeks to return to the fundamentalist of Islam as a means of countering the perceived cultural and political domination of the West. Although Huntington provides useful perspective for understanding the contemporary global political landscape, associating Islamic revival with conservative and fundamentalist movements reinforces negative stereotypes of Islam, oversimplifies the complex dynamics of Muslim societies and ignores the heterogeneity of Islamic beliefs and practices. Even politically motivated groups that call themselves Islamic are dissimilar and multifaceted, better understood in relation to the political realm in which they operate. Jones (2017) provides a general overview of how, in the 1990s and 2000s, the understanding of the nature and meaning of Islamic revival in Central Asia and its socio-political impact over time were dominated by three main perspectives. The first perspective viewed Islamic revival as simply the resurgence of beliefs and practices suppressed under Soviet rule. 27 The second perspective looked at Central Asia as the periphery of the Islamic world. The presumptions about what true Islam is and what Islamic revivalism is about were made in accordance with what Jones (2017) calls it “Arab core as a reference point.” It viewed Islamic revivalism both as unidimensional, moving towards scriptural forms of Islam and undermining traditional practices, and unidirectional – “as fundamentalism was viewed as inherently political..., the Central Asian Muslims would become radicalized” (Jones, 2017 p. 293). The third perspective placed less significance on internal sources of influence and assumed transnational influence to be a dominant and negative force in the revival of Islam in Central Asia (Jones, 2017). Jones rightly confirms that the Islamic revival in Central Asia is neither unidimensional nor unidirectional; it is instead multifaceted and unpredictable. The rise of Islamic revivalism at the end of the 1980s in Central Asia shifted the relationship between religion, society, and politics. It resonated with the revival of Islam in other Muslim countries in the 1970s and 1980s, as has been broadly acknowledged by a wide range of scholars (Khalid, 2007; Jones, 2017; Tazmini, 2001). A wide range of scholarship agrees that, at the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union was showing signs of weakening and that various political and religious establishments were forming (Khalid, 2007; Jones, 2017). The collapse of the Soviet Union created a great deal of confusion. People were looking everywhere for guidance and there were not many options. Nationalist and religious tendencies were intensifying. Some scholars held the belief that Islam as a religion would re-gain considerable strength and serve as a source of cultural identity and spiritual guidance (Rashid, 2002; Roy, 2000; Jalil, 2017). Others assumed that Islam might emerge as a powerful political ideology with the capability of mobilizing Muslims (Allworth, 1994; Haghayeghi, 1995; Voll, 1994; Jalil, 2017). The strong revival of nationalist and religious 28 tendencies replacing the Communist ideology was an inverse situation to the 1920s, when Soviet interests had replaced nationalism and religion with Communist ideology. Often, scholars argue that “internal factors such as economic determinants” and “external pressures exerted from the Middle East” (Tazmini, 2001) were the main factors for the revival of Islam in Central Asia. The Islamic revolution in Iran and the Mujahidin’s victory in Afghanistan are also pointed to as catalysts for the revival of Islam in the region, though Soviet policies prevented it from surfacing earlier. Contrary to Tazmini’s (2001) claim about economic determinants, however, increased Islamic practices in society show little difference between different social and economic classes. The political changes initiated by Michael Gorbachev, which led to the rectification of the religion policy of the Soviet Union in 1988, provoked a series of demonstrations and riots in the capital cities of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan by groups motivated by religious and nationalist drives (Warikoo & Norbu, 1992). The government of Uzbekistan’s decision to announce Islam as part of the cultural heritage also played a significant role in the revival of official Islam. Therefore, I argue, while political decisions were important, they served as an indirect stimulus. Inclination towards Islam as moral guidance and a way of life is natural for many Muslims. Although it was officially limited to state-preferred forms and criteria of Islam, the revival of Islam in Uzbekistan resulted from the freedom granted for people to live an openly religious life. Therefore, the main determinants of Islamic revival were internal and natural rather than external and synthetic. While political decisions influenced the revival of Islam, the revival of Islam also influenced political decisions, creating both anxiety and opportunity for the political system in Uzbekistan. Islam Karimov’s government chose a nationalism-based ideology for the future of 29 the republic, with Islam used as part of that philosophy. The ideological gap that was left wide following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party’s Scientific Atheism Programme required new systems of belief and hope to fill it (March, 2002). Although formal knowledge of Islam was at one of its weakest points, Islam was part of the culture and traditions, thus society had an appreciation of Islam as a source of moral guidance. The resurgence of Islam in Uzbekistan in the 1990s started with the rise of the underground currents of Islam and spread under the government’s reassurances. Acknowledging Islam as part of the national heritage and Muslimness as an element of identity was freeing for those who were previously afraid to study, practice, and transmit it. Andrew March (2002) argues that “Islam Karimov is unique in Central Asia not so much for his authoritarian structures and patterns of rule, but for his systematic, formal and self-conscious efforts to formulate, transmit and impose a new ‘national ideology’ as a means of legitimation” (March, 2002). The scholars of Critical Secular Studies (Göle, 2016; 2017; Mahmood, 2016) stress the importance of the relationship between the state, majority norms, and religion in the processes of nation building. Following Uzbekistan’s independence in 1991, there was an observable rush to re-create national identity and the political ideology. A series of articles by Andrew March, for example, discuss the issue of legitimation in Uzbekistan during the Karimov presidency: the legitimation of violence for security and stability (March, 2003), legitimation of official Islam by making false claims about the history and idealizing historical figures (March, 2003b), and legitimation of authoritarianism through “the ideology of national independence” (March, 2002). President Karimov (1997), in his book Uzbekistan on the threshold of the XXI century. Security threats and ensure progress, stresses the importance of peace and stability and the necessity of awareness of 30 security threats. Uzbekistan was trying to build an identity as a Muslim-majority country and to join and cooperate with Muslim countries around the world. Karimov insisted that the path chosen for the future of Uzbekistan was “the path of democratic development and cooperation with the progressive world,” and that Islam was a significant part of that chosen path (Karimov, 2000; 2008; 2010). However, political power remained in the hands of the former Communists and the Soviet beliefs and methods of governance were deep-rooted in the structure and practices of independent Uzbekistan (Khalid, 2007; March, 2003; Jones, 2017). A shift in the state’s attitude towards the expression of Islam was a notable feature of the Karimov government. In the Soviet discourses, the Sufi ways of practicing Islam were “identified as Islam’s most irrational and world denying expressions” (Louw, 2007 p. 3). Sufis were under strict surveillance before and during the Soviet period (O’Dell, 2017; Bennigsen & Wimbush, 1986). President Karimov showed great interest in embracing Tariqa, an order of Sufism. Papas (2005) argues that “great mystical masters are celebrated as role models for today’s citizens and their teachings are reinterpreted in a politically correct way. In this respect, post-Soviet Uzbekistan is reinventing itself through its Sufi heritage, while preserving political habits from the recent Soviet past” (p. 38). The early Sufis who lived in Central Asia, locally called avliyo (Muslim saints), such as Bahauddin Naqshband, Khoja Ubaydullah Ahrar, Muhammad al-Hakim al-Termidhi, Ahmad Yassawi, and Abd al-Khaliq Ghijduvani, became significant parts of the national identity. Their shrines were renovated, and their doors opened to visitors. The practices of Sufism are individual-oriented and do not require a group’s support. O’Dell argues that the promotion of Sufism and Hanafi jurisprudence as part of the “national inheritances” allowed governments to reject transnational Islamic influences like Wahhabism 31 (O’Dell, 2017 p. 102), which also demonstrates that what is defined as the radical is relational to the state politics. The forceful revival of Islam in Uzbekistan was multifaceted and heterogenous. While the Karimov government was supporting official Islam by building mosques and Islamic educational institutions, publishing Islamic books, and making connections with the Muslim world, the formation of politically motivated Islamic militant groups in the Ferghana Valley was observable. Although the processes of revival for official and unofficial Islam were similar, their attitudes towards and experiences with the secular state in Uzbekistan diverged. Often, political ambitions numbed the senses of those who served the governments, leading them to implement policies that increased fragmentation and the mass persecution of certain groups in society, as Asad (2009) elaborates upon while talking about the Islamic orthodoxy. These ambitions also render insensate those who might otherwise have questioned such actions. The rise of various religious establishments, including Islamic preaching, Quran lessons, state-registered Islamic organizations, and underground groups with radical Islamic views occurred concurrently with the commencement of state surveillance of mosques, investigation of religious groups, and detention of practicing Muslims. The IMU, an alliance between the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, and al Qaeda, was formed in 1998 (Stern, 2003). According to Ruzaliev (2005), the government’s short-sighted policies in the fight against terrorism and its inability to distinguish radical political Islam from moderate Islam led to state violence against Muslims with non-extremist, non-radical levels of religious involvement. The initial signs of Islamic mobilization of organized Muslims in Uzbekistan coincided with the political and ideological transformation in the early 1990s (Adamson & Tucker, 2017). The revival of Islamism or political Islam is one part of the larger movement of Islamic 32 revivalism (Binzel & Carvalho, 2013). Although no agreed-upon definition of Islamism exists, Islamism is an activism advocating for the implementation of Sharia law, Islamic principles, and installation of an Islamic caliphate and pan-Islamic unity in all social, political, and legal aspects of society (Kundnani, 2012). Metaphorically, Islam is a mother to numerous revivalist movements, one of which is Islamism. The country was moving away from the Communist Party’s ambitions and restlessly trying to find its place in the region and in the world. Four months after the declaration of independence of Uzbekistan, the country underwent its first presidential election on December 29, 1991. Twenty-one days prior to the election, on December 8, 1991, Islam Karimov went to Namangan to meet the electorate. Tohir Yo’ldosh and the members of his Adolat Islamic party, were eager to meet the presidential candidate but Karimov refused to meet. After Karimov left Namangan, the anger within the crowd intensified. The furious mob occupied the government building in Namangan city and demanded that Karimov return. The group members started to march in the city to bring more people out in support of their position. The riot grew louder and more intense as time passed. Khalid (2007 p. 140) recalls that the situation was “serious enough that Karimov flew back” to Namangan the next morning to meet with the protestors. It was a very delicate time before the elections and Karimov did not use any force against the protestors. From the videos taken, it is not difficult to tell that it was a cold winter day, and the crowd of thousands of angry Muslims were shouting “Allah-u Akbar” (Allah is great) from the balconies of all six floors of the government building. They were holding the black flags of the Islamic State with white Arabic writing on them. When Karimov came to the stage, he could not be heard over the noise from the crowd. To calm the crowd, Tohir Yo’ldosh took the microphone and started to recite the Quran. Everyone around him, including Karimov, sat on the ground to 33 listen14. Relative peace was achieved, allowing Tohir Yo’ldosh to give a speech. After he spoke to the crowd, Karimov also spoke. He begged for forgiveness with his left hand on his chest, a sign of respect in Uzbek culture, and swore to work with them and for them. Karimov stated that he would visit three Muslim countries after the elections to better serve the interests of Uzbek Muslims with the help and support from these states. Following the speeches to the crowd, eleven members of the group were selected to negotiate their requests with Karimov in a separate room15. The leaders of the Islamic groups demanded eight major changes to the government to restore “ancient religious and moral values” in the country (Mamatov, 2003). They demanded that the government declare Uzbekistan as an Independent Islamic State and impose Sharia Law in the country. They also insisted upon getting rid of the Communists from the government and recruiting government officials from among the practicing Muslims. They wanted Friday to be a holiday for Muslims instead of Sunday. Careful analysis of another video, footage from the discussion between Karimov and the leaders of the Islamic groups, reveals that Karimov promised to make changes to the constitution and the structure of the government after he was elected as president, but that the parliament had to approve his proposals. The people around the table asked to have a referendum, which showed that they had a strong belief that people in Uzbekistan would support their propositions16. On December 29, 1991, Karimov won the election and became the first president of the independent Uzbekistan. This occurrence is remembered in Uzbekistan as the first sign of Islamism coming to the surface. There are numerous scholarly analyses of December 9, 1991, 14 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwVS8CQg2s4&t=476s 15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fiWme7v9oq0 16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fiWme7v9oq0 34 and raw video footage of the events on YouTube.17 The runner-up presidential candidate, Muhammad Salih (Salay Madaminov)18, believed the elections were unfair and that he had won the election with at least 52% of the popular vote. There are few facts known about the integrity of the presidential election in 1991 in Uzbekistan; however, there are numerous scholarly works showing how democracy was manipulated by the Karimov government, the unreliability of the elections, and how Karimov changed laws to extend his time as a president (Ilkhamov, 2002; Lewes, 2005). The supporters of Muhammad Salih, mostly university students, demonstrated at the Students’ Town (Talabalar Shaharchasi) in Tashkent. The demonstrations turned violent, and the students were forcibly sent to their hometowns in buses to restore calm in the capital. It was one of the most volatile days for the new Karimov government (Rasanayagam, 2012). Islam Karimov witnessed aggressive and angry crowds twice in one month: political Islam in Namangan and politically galvanized university students in Tashkent. 1.2.6 Main arguments and contributions of the study The establishment of SADUM was recognized as an accomplishment for official Islam, which was often viewed as a puppet of the Soviet government (Louw, 2014) and as one of the factors that laid the ground for the revival of Islam in the Soviet Union (Dudoignon & Noack, 2014). While many known scholars in the field assert that the revival of Islam in the Soviet Union began in the 1970s and 1980s (Khalid, 2007; Kamp, 2016), I believe that the establishment of official Islam and the resulting formation of unofficial Islam were the first seeds of the revival of Islam. Despite the Soviet repression of Islam, Islam continued to take root in 17 See Naumkin, 2003; Khalid, 2007; Adamson and Noah, 2017; Ruzaliev, 2005. The video footage of these events can be found in here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwVS8CQg2s4&t=476s 18 Interview 013 (Muhammad Salih). 35 secret or in small, underground communities. The revival of Islam in the USSR gained momentum in the late 1980s, as the Soviet Union began to undergo political and social changes that led to greater openness and freedom. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 further contributed to the revival of Islam, as newly independent Muslim-majority states in Central Asia and the Caucasus sought to establish their own national identities and reassert their Islamic heritage. The internal power of Islam until 1943 was concentrated on survival rather than revival. I argue that the radicalization in the relationship between the state and Islam after the collapse of the Soviet Union was not an accident: first, it was Islam’s response to the “Soviet assault on Islam” (Khalid, 2007); second, it was the secular government’s response to radicalized Islam. Neither a relational nor a dialectical approach alone can explain this process fully. A relational approach explains the violent response to nonviolent politics and a dialectical approach can explain the progression in the conflict or divergence; however, these two approaches together can best explain the relational progression in the radicalization between the secular state and Islam. I argue that the dialectical relationship between the state and Islam is the main cause of radicalization of both sides. I refer to this process as dialectical radicalization. I propose the use of dialectical radicalization in the study of radicalization processes between two or more parties. Use of the relational approach alone in the relationship between the state and religion is also a useful tool to understand the secular-religious interaction in the study of the sociology of religion. Radical Islam exists in society, but the level of it threat it poses depends on what lens is used to look at it. For secular states, any form of Islam that does not serve the system can be radical. In this dissertation, I argue that the radical Islam which views the secular state as inconsistent with Islam reaching its full potential exists, but that its 36 prevalence was overexaggerated by the government of Uzbekistan as a means of eradicating any political opposition. While the state in Uzbekistan was radicalized against unofficial forms of Islam, it needed a justification for the repression of some Islamic groups. I argue, “Adashganlar,” as a social construction, served the government of Uzbekistan in its efforts to fight against various forms of Islam and the degree of religiosity in society, to ensure stability by eliminating political opposition, to take authoritarian control over society by spreading propaganda, and to legitimize violence used by the government in pursuit of these ends. It was a political technique to create fear and seize greater control over society. The discussions of the relationship between the secular state and Islam in Uzbekistan and the social construction of “adashganlar” contributes to the field of critical secular studies. The study of the revival of Islam in Uzbekistan allowed me to engage with the main stakeholders in the relationship between the state and Islam, which serves as an instructive example of similar developments in other parts of the world. I maintain that being able to recruit and interview senior government officials, members of both official and unofficial Islam, incarcerated and exiled religious activist, was a result of a carefully crafted methodology, a clear and focused target, articulation of the importance of my research project led to successful results. Also, ethnographic observations in mosques, studying archived content in the human rights organizations, and the media observations of the interaction between the members of official and unofficial Islam helped me to obtain rich data to ensure nuance in this research. Considering the political pressure in Uzbekistan, I also conducted interviews with former imams and government officials who currently lives outside the country. There are also many practical contributions in this research. The successful completion of this sensitive field research 37 in one of the tightly controlled settings was one of the substantial contributions. It offers a practical methodology to conduct similar research, as well as demonstrating the possibility of conducting such studies in authoritarian societies. An interdisciplinary approach to studying Islamic revival and the relationship between the state and Islam can provide more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of these complex phenomena. By combining insights from sociology, political science, history, and anthropology, this research sought to develop a more holistic understanding of the social, political and cultural factors that shape the dynamics between Islam and the state. It also contributes to the system that intends to overcome disciplinary boundaries in academia. 1.3 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS The main objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of this dissertation, including the specific terms and main arguments, to prepare the reader for the forthcoming analysis. To do this, I briefly told the story of Islam in Uzbekistan: how Islam was introduced to the region, the role it played in the lives of Uzbek Muslims, the relationship between Islam and the Soviet government after Uzbekistan became part of the former Soviet Union, the weakening and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union, the independence of Uzbekistan, and the rise of Islamic revivalism. This chapter will conclude with an outline of the chapters that comprise this dissertation. Chapter 2 provides a critical assessment of the arguments in the chosen literature surrounding the subject of this research, lays out a conceptual platform to build on, and helps to provide a better understanding of my main arguments. The revival of Islam and factors that contributed to its revival are discussed from different perspectives. In this chapter, the main focus is on the literature that provides a necessary understanding of the processes surrounding 38 the revival of Islam and the changes that transpired in the relationship between the secular state and Islam in the light of the resurgence of Islam. The governance of religion in Uzbekistan was built not upon the institution’s understanding of Islam, but its preference for what Islam should be. Islamic ideologies and practices that conflicted with the government’s choice of Islam, which are regarded as official Islam, were called “radical Islam” and members of unofficial Islam were called “adashganlar.” The state adopted a paradoxical governance of Islam, whereby the secular state was motivated to achieve Islamic civilization by eliminating unofficial Islam from society. These contradicting binaries require an additional level of careful analysis to understand the relationship between the secular state and state-sponsored official Islam, as well as the authoritarian state and radical Islam in Uzbekistan. In the third chapter, I share the processes of research and the details of the research methods I used to collect and analyze data. I conducted eighty-five interviews, archival research, ethnographic observations, and media analysis to answer my research questions. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology designed to conduct this research. The following three chapters – Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 – focus on the data analysis and the findings of this research. Three major pathways emerged during the analysis of the data and a chapter is attributed to each of them. In Chapter 4, I discuss the relationship between the gradual weakening and disappearance of the Communist system and the rise of religious establishments in Uzbekistan. Islamic revivalism in post-Soviet republics is a unique case because of the Communist system’s cruel treatment of and assault on Islam. The revival of Islam and religious awareness created a 39 distinctive manifestation of resistance in both the political and religious realms. A secular state was the choice of political system and those holding political power upon independence. I explore some of the most potent debates surrounding the effects of the post-Soviet struggle in the revival of Islam and in the emergence of rebellious Islamic militant groups, the relationship between the state and religion, and the triangular quarrel between repression, human rights, and radicalism. The tension between religious and secular became one of the observable struggles and causes of separation in society in Uzbekistan. The principles of Sharia were informally used as a main source of guidance, even at the expense of constitutional rules. Building on recent works in critical secular studies (Mahmood, 2005; 2015; Göle, 2015; An-Naim, 2008), Chapter 4 covers the discussions of secularism and the similarities and differences between the Soviet form of secularism, where Islam was completely suppressed, and the form of the secular state in a country where the majority of citizens are Muslims and Islam is in the midst of a vigorous resurgence. Chapter 5 analyzes the relationship between the authoritarian state and unofficial Islam that resulted from the constant aggravation caused by the practices of both the religious and the secular realms. The conditions for extremism in Uzbekistan were shaped by the loss of religious knowledge and fundamentals of Islam due to the Soviet system. In this chapter, I answer the question of what radical Islam and extremism are in Uzbekistan. The government of Uzbekistan violently suppresses some forms of Islam and endorses others. I question whether religious extremism exists beyond the state discourse and how the depiction and classification of “adashganlar” supported the Uzbek government’s efforts to seize and secure power in society. Building on the works of relational thinkers such as Harrison White, Charles Tilly, Mustafa Emirbayer, and others, I use a relational perspective (Alimi et al., 2015) and dialectical approach 40 in sociology to understand radicalization between the secular state and Islam in Uzbekistan, which I call dialectical radicalization. Islamic revivalism is not limited to the offline world; it incorporates a wide range of online activism to bring about the revitalization of the Islamic faith and to re-establish Islam in society. As part of my media analysis, I observed the Uzbek segment of YouTube channels, blogs, and Facebook pages, examining their arguments and views about Islam and Islam’s role. In Chapter 6, I discuss the role of social media in the revival of Islam in society and in the relationship between the secular state and Islam. In the concluding chapter, Chapter 7, I provide a summary of my findings and the conclusions. The conclusion is particularly important because of the recommendations I provide that are specific both to the evidence from my study and for further research in the subject area as well as research’s contributions to existing academic knowledge. I will conclude the chapter with self-reflection about the lessons I have learned as a researcher and final thoughts about the limitations I experienced. 41 CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER This chapter focuses on the literature and the theoretical approaches to understand the revival of Islam and its relationship with the state in Uzbekistan. By analyzing Uzbekistan as a secular state, this research builds on the works of scholars of critical secular studies to further discover the hidden veracities about the secular state’s relationship with Islam. My hope is to demonstrate that so called “radical Islam” or “Islamic extremism” in Uzbekistan is not some remote form of Islam; it is the same Islam viewed from different perspective. It is shaped and reshaped as a result of the changing relationship between these two institutions. The critical secular studies framework rejects views such as the state’s neutrality towards religion and the separation between the state and religion from its roots, questioning the secular by providing a critical frame to see the invisible, the overlooked, and the obscure in the relationship between the state and religion. I use the tools that critical secular studies19 provides to locate the secular in Uzbekistan and conclude that paradoxical secularism is the best way to describe secularism as it was practiced in Uzbekistan. The contributions of scholars such as Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, Nilufer Göle, Joseph Massad, Ahmed An-Naim, and many others to critical secular studies in recent decades reveal the complex relationship between modernity, the 19 The disagreement about the basic significance of secularism between scholars led to the emergence of a new field: critical secular studies. It is one of the evolving interdisciplinary fields that focuses on the study of the role of religion in contemporary societies, the role of the secularist state regulatory powers over religious institutions and religious communities, and everything else involved around secularism. About a decade ago, in 2010, the scholars Talal Asad, William Connolly, Charles Hirschkind, and Matthew Scherer met at the American Political Science Association conference. According to the story in the Social Sciences Research Council by Matthew Scherer19, the two books Why I Am Not A Secularist (Connolly, 1999) and Formation of the Secular: Christianity, Islam and Modernity (Asad, 2003) that they discussed became a base for the newly emerging field of what they called the critical study of secularism. 42 secular state, and religions. They have criticized and problematized secularism for its explanation of the position of religion in politics. I use the relational approach in sociology to understand the relationship between the state and Islam. Tilly (2003 p. 72) defines relational realism as "the doctrine that transactions, interactions, social ties and conversations constitute the central stuff of social life.” Relational thinkers believe that “society is not a space containing relations or an arena where relations are played. It is rather the very tissue of relations” (Donati, 2011). Tilly (1998a) argues that a political process is best understood as a dialog between discourses, relations, and interactions which captures the dynamics of these associations. However, the relational approach cannot explain the continual escalation of the tension in the relationship between the state and Islam in Uzbekistan. The dialectical approach and method in sociology, shaped by the philosophies of Plato, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and others, mixed with a relational approach provides the best framework for understanding the relationship between the state and Islam which led to the radicalization of both institutions towards one another. I will discuss the existing literature in this chapter to further explain the theoretical framework and its application to this dissertation. 2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CRITICAL SECULAR INQUIRY 2.2.1 Islam and the secular state At the end of the 1980s, Islam started to revive in Central Asia in the secular space formed and maintained by the Communists. The conditions of the secular space had to be altered for Muslims to have any religious freedom. It was difficult for the secular to accept the non-secular other. When the non-secular other was accepted, it had to be under conditions set by the secular; the non-secular other’s habits, beliefs, feelings, and emotions had to be altered, adjusted, modified, and regulated (Göle, 2017). What they could and could not do, wear, read, write, and 43 hear had to be controlled, judged, double checked for security, and only sometimes permitted in order to make them feel that they received something from the hands of the secular. The question is what the non-secular other wanted that the governing secular was not willing to concede. Secularism is an ambiguous concept (An-Na’im, 2008; Göle, 2015; Asad, 2003). The term is used as a theory, belief, ideology, political model, and method to frame some form of separation between the state and religion, state neutrality towards religion, anticlericalism (opposition to the clergy’s influence in political and social affairs), disestablishment (opposition to the rights and privileges granted to the church by the government), atheism, banishment of religious signs and symbols from the public sphere, or official disbelief in religion and the existence of God20 (Taylor, 2010). In short, it means the laws and regulations of the state are not influenced by religious positions (Eller, 2010). Secularism, when coupled with liberal democracy, promotes freedom of conscience and religious rights. Secularism as intellectual, spiritual, and political configurations can indicate often contradictory notions about the relationship between the state and religion (Kosmin & Keysar, 2007). Secularism is the product of secularization (Asad, 2003), the depoliticization of religion and transformation from traditional religious standards to secular and rational norms in the political platform (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). According to Wilson (1966), secularization is “the process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose their social significance” (p. 157). A secular state is a notion that the state does not identify itself with any religion, asserting the state’s official commitment to neutrality in the matter of religion and equal treatment of different religious and non-religious groups (Bullivant & Lee, 2016). 20 See Stephen Bullivant and Lois Lee ed (2016) “Secularism” A dictionary of Atheism. Oxford University Press. 44 According to Asad (2003), conceptions of the secular and religious are generally imported with Western worldviews, often through colonial movements; however, he acknowledges the existence of some parallel ideas about the secular and religious in different non-Western cultures. Secularism is often tied to the separation between church and state or between religious and political authority – the idea that religious groups do not interfere in state affairs and the state does not interfere in religious affairs. Mahmood (2015) argues that modern secular states are involved in shaping and controlling religious spheres instead of separating the religious sphere from the political. The oppression of religious groups is not the failure of secularism, Mahmood (2015) argues; rather, it is a symptom of structural paradoxes that exist in modern secular states. In the power dynamics between two groups, the more powerful group influences how everything should be in the political, economic, religious, and social realms based on its own biases. Critical theory provides a framework to see how powerful groups control others, how they influence laws and regulations, how they manipulate social understanding of what is happening in society, and how this influence is organized, consented, and then implemented. Asad (2003) believes that secularism is a doctrine in which opposing belief systems are supposed to have uniform experiences through respect for others’ religions, belief systems, and rights by creating a neutral public sphere (Asad, 2003). He says that “in my view the secular is neither singular in origin nor stable in its historical identity, although it works through a series of particular oppositions” (Asad, 2003 p. 25). According to Asad (2009), secular and religious are not fixed categories; they have different origins and are different everywhere depending on the conditions created in the public sphere by the political realms. The “public sphere is a space necessarily (not just contingently) articulated by power” (Asad, 2003 p.184). He continues: 45 And everyone who enters it must address power’s disposition of people and things, the dependence of some on the goodwill of others … these are all presupposed in the idea of free public debate as a liberal virtue. But the performatives are not open equally to everyone because the domain of the speech is always shaped by preestablished limits (Asad, 2003 pp.183-4). The disposition of the powerful determines the extent to which Islam is accepted or not accepted. According to Asad (2009), the powerful groups’ disposition and attitudes towards certain creeds of Islam determines Islamic orthodoxy in society. The modern conception of religious life and Muslim subjectivities in secular public spheres is examined by Turkish-French scholar Nilufer Göle. Göle (2015), in her book Islam and Secularity: The Future of Europe’s Public Sphere, problematizes the conditions of the relationship between Islam and secular modernity in the public spheres of Europe. Göle suggests that “the presence of Islam has radically altered our ways of thinking about the prospect of secular modernity” (p. 28). Göle joins Asad (2009) in rejecting the universality of secularism. Göle (2015 p. 53) says that “there is not one ‘ideal form’ of secularism” and that Muslims are “critically appropriating and reinventing the modern experience.” She adds that the religious-secular divide in our time is being radically transformed in Europe (p. 3). Therefore, we have to de-center and change our post-Enlightenment and Eurocentric understanding of modernity, which often refers to individual emancipation from traditions and religiosity. However, contrary to Talal Asad, Göle is skeptical about the state’s power to determine the conditions of the public sphere in places like Europe. For Göle (2017), both religious and secular have some power of influence in society and “the differential attitudes toward modernity become a battleground between religious and secular agents” and the public sphere in Europe provides a perfect place for it (p. 25). She notices the changes happening in the secular public sphere in Europe that are creating “the site for confrontational proximity and co-penetration” (Göle, 2017 p. 8). 46 Göle (2017) further discusses the secular formations in relation to the historical processes and colonialism and argues that the secular formation in society is not only the result of the state power but also follows from the moral values adopted to govern oneself and, as such, the relationship between the secular and religious must focus on the “re-composition between the two” – the inter-civilizational conversation (p. 73). Göle (2017) argues that the intersectionality between the public sphere, visibility, and gender in Turkey is the place to observe conflicts between religious and secular. The public sphere, Göle argues, should be viewed as a “stage for performance rather than an abstract frame for textual and discursive practices” (p. 141). Continuing Asad’s conversation about religion’s relationship with power, Saba Mahmood examines (2015) how the “discursive operations of power” in modern secular liberal nation-states changes the ways religious differences are generated, defined, intensified, and regulated in the public, private, political, and religious realms, which she calls political secularism. The significance of Mahmood’s argument lies in her analysis of how modern secular governance, while originally established as a basis for civic, religious, and political equality, has exacerbated religious differences and tensions in unprecedented ways rather than reducing them. Modern secular states, Mahmood (2015) discusses, define religion while promoting the majority norms, but by favouring secular order, the political rhetoric, court rulings, and standards of the public sphere, they undermine the main secular value of neutrality. Mahmood (2015) suggests that the operation of political secularism relies on the paradoxes inherent in modern secular liberal nation-states: “the modern state’s disavowal of religion in its political calculus and its simultaneous reliance on religious categories to structure and regulate social life” (p. 25). Mahmood (2015) states that it is often argued that the existence of Islamic extremism and fundamentalism is a sign of inadequate secularism within the government and society; therefore, 47 the solution is increased secularity in society. The state’s neutrality towards religion, one of the arguments for secularism, became one of the main objects of secularist policymaking and was replaced by the state’s focus on reforming Islam, which Mahmood (2015, p. 32) calls “the contemporary form of imperialism.” Secular, liberal reformers of Islam rely on their understanding of Western modernity and liberal secularism. Mahmood (2015) argues that the use of violence from either side, religious or political, destroys the conditions for consensus or for choosing a peaceful route for coexistence. Following in the footsteps of these and other scholars of critical secular studies in various disciplines, I examine the relationship between the state that claims to be secular and Islam, a society where religious and secular views are called upon to live together, which is also undergoing a revival in society. The majority of Muslims in Uzbekistan accept secularism as a safeguard to fundamental rights such as equality for men and women, freedom of religion, and free speech. However, there are men and women in Uzbekistan who believe that what is Islamic is not secular and that what is secular is not Islamic. Similar to the neutrality towards religion and the separation of church and state, the marriage of religious and secular views is another ideal. It also involves thinking outside of these ideals of political and theoretical frameworks and analyzing the human competence to freely share social space with others and all the hidden blockages of this will. 2.2.2 Paradoxical governance of Islam in Uzbekistan: Who are “adashganlar”? The paradoxical governance of Islam in Uzbekistan combines conflicting features. On the one hand, Islam Karimov started to show enthusiasm for re-establishing Uzbek national and cultural identity by returning to the old roots, where Islam was prominent in society (Khalid, 2007 p. 138; Abramson & Tucker, 2017). The changes were rapid: the government of 48 Uzbekistan was funding the construction of new mosques and renovating old ones; re-introducing Islamic scholars who lived in the region to society, renovating their shrines, and publishing their books; opening doors to the development of halal21 food chains and Islamic fashion (Abramson and Tucker, 2017); promoting Islam through media; adding Islamic phrases and words such as alhamdulillah (praising Allah) and Insha’Allah (with the name of Allah) to the political rhetoric; and replacing the names of places, streets, and parks with national and religious terms. The construction of new mosques increased the attendance of Muslims at mosque prayers. The government’s adoption of Islamic trends soon shifted to the economic world, with Islamic publications, restaurants, clothing stores, and other Islamic stores and products exploding in number. Daily practices, traditions, and previously secular activities started to take an Islamic turn. Society, in general, was becoming more religious. On the other hand, the transition away from Soviet control of Islam coincided with the re-establishment of strict control over unofficial Islam and crafting of an anti-Islamic hardline authoritarian regime in Uzbekistan (Khalid, 2007; Louw, 2007; Jones, 2017). This is the paradox: official Islam was regulated, supported, and subsidized by the government, but unofficial Islam was suppressed, denounced, criminalized, and brutally penalized. March (2002 p. 372) states that “Karimov has gone to great lengths to suppress not only radical Islamist activism but also any serious avowal of pan-Turkism or attempts to construct a moderate, reformist and modernist conception of Islam and politics.” Karimov’s new national ideology was echoed in his series of books, speeches, and even comments for media. His books became required reading throughout all levels of education, propagated in mass media, state institutions, cultural associations, and organs of local administrations (March, 2002). History, including 10 Islamic diets. 49 historical accounts of Islamic philosophy, was manipulated to justify the choices made by the Karimov government. According to March (2002, p. 380), President Karimov used Islamic philosophy to legitimate a secular conception of the state. This is a brilliant tactic of arguing against contemporary political Islam not merely through the secular liberalism of the West, but through Uzbekistan’s own Islamic intellectual heritage, as if it contained within itself the seeds of secularism. The dimension of danger posed by political Islam was exaggerated by the Uzbek government to take stringent control of society. The members of various unofficial Islamic groups were called “adashganlar”22 by government officials and their supporters, a label applied to followers of all other shades of Islam except official Islam. The social construction of “adashganlar” started with the term being used to describe the members of the restricted Islamic groups and organizations, those who were reading, listening, or watching the material produced by these groups, those who were detained for having contact with them or having prohibited Islamic materials in their phone, those who had a Quran in their homes, and those who illegally taught Arabic, or anything related to Islam. In Chapters 4 and 5, official and unofficial Islam are further analyzed. Official Islam refers to a group of Islamic authorities who work in the hierarchical positions, starting from the Grand Mufti of the MBU at the top to the imams in the mosques at the bottom, along with their followers. Official Islam in Uzbekistan after independence was a re-establishment of the official Islam of the Soviet Union, which was a small group of ulama who accepted the framework of secular democracy, approved of the principles, rules, and regulations, and cooperated with the government. In independent Uzbekistan, that small group of official ulama became the religious leaders of the nation of Muslims. Giving an Islamic look to the country had another implication. After being part of the Soviet Union for over seventy years, 22 As mentioned in Chapter 1, adashganlar means those who are on a wrong path or misguided. 50 Uzbekistan was not religious or Islamic enough for the Muslim world and Karimov was determined to change that. During my fieldwork, the repetition of the phrases orthodox Islam or Islamic orthodoxy by government officials and some of the professors at the Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan was noticeable, which brought to mind Asad’s thoughts on this subject: “orthodoxy is not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship of power to truth,” and that “wherever Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine or replace incorrect ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy” (Asad, 2009 p. 22). The paradoxical governance of Islam is arguably an outcome of the accepted and restricted expressions and practices of Islam by the political system in Uzbekistan. Unofficial Islam is complex and heterogeneous. Some human rights organizations and scholars call it “independent Islam” (HRW, 2004; Khalid, 2007). Although various forms of unofficial Islam are independent from official Islam, they are not independent, liberated, or self-regulating in any other sense. Unofficial ulama were those who did not cooperate with the government or disapproved of the secular political system and secular society. The use of the term “adashganlar” towards unofficial Islam in Uzbekistan has similarities with the creation of racial and ethnic minorities during the colonial expansions, of national/religious minorities by the Nazi Party in Germany, and the Soviet Union. The creation of some type of “enemy” is essential for the installation of totalitarian governments, and “adashganlar” served that purpose for the Karimov government. Arendt (1973) argues that the elements of totalitarian governance can exist in modern political systems and that once a totalitarian movement is started, it is not easy to stop it. 51 “Adashganlar” were not a national, ethnic, or religious minority; they shared ethnicity, nationality, religion, and often bloodlines with members of the “righteous” majority. It was a social construction. They were not officially criminals, but the term “adashganlar” suggested that they were dangerous deviants on the wrong path. The term was imposed by the state in attempt to install an Islamic orthodoxy in Uzbekistan. The term is not neutral and is not used by those who are described as “adashganlar” or their supporters. The legal system in Uzbekistan lost its rationality because of the alleged crimes committed by “adashganlar,” which were not in the criminal code but were behaviours that only the state knew must be punished. The term “adashganlar” was synonymous with extremists, radicals and, in the worst cases, terrorists, but these terms were not defined by the legal system until 2018. So-called “adashganlar” had to be deprived of their rights to challenge the legal system. Once they were detained by the police, their lives were deemed unworthy of defending. The system would prove the accused to be whatever it wanted them to be. “Adashganlar” often did not know the crimes they were alleged to have committed and, therefore, their fate. Their death, brutal harm to their body and mind, or confinement was politically engineered by the violent capacity of the state. They could not appeal to the court system, law enforcement, or even the president of the country, because all these systems were working together to create an enemy from ordinary people and torture them. Creating fear in society as the most effective tool for control of populace existed long before Hobbes wrote Leviathan in the midst of the English Civil War (1642-1651). Hobbes’s work contributed to the shaping of western political thinking that fear is a powerful tool that the strong can use to dominate the weak. Arendt (1973) argues that creating fear in society is also the most convenient way to install tight control. 52 The danger is that a global, universally interrelated civilization may produce barbarians from its own midst by forcing millions of people into conditions which, despite all appearances, are the condition of savages (p. 202). Fear makes people obedient, diminishes trust and social ties. In the case of Uzbekistan, fear from the threat of terrorism and extremism made people view the Karimov government as a safeguard, while so called “adashganlar” as a danger. The secret police or National Security Services (NSS) carried out the dirty work for the government, such as purging religious leaders and fabricating evidence against so-called “adashganlar.” The power to disregard the law was granted to those who served the dictatorial government. The crimes committed by the NSS translated as the service to the country. As Arendt (1973) points out, in such governments there is a destruction of the rational hierarchy of power. Power is given to one leader from whom subordinates derive their authoritative power. Arendt (1973) says, . . . the ostensible power of the party bureaucracy as against the real power of the secret police corresponds to the original duplication of party and state as known in Nazi Germany, and the multiplication (of administrative offices) becomes evident only in the secret police itself, with its extremely complicated, widely ramified network of agents, in which one department is always assigned to supervising and spying on another (p. 403). By the end of the 1990s, the surveillance of Muslims reached its height: mosques were under surveillance; the undercover agents of the NSS regularly gathered information about regular attendees, the topics discussed, and even the prayers, especially da’wah, the call for Islamic commitments; unregistered Islamic groups were restricted; many religious people were detained; and the wearing of a hijab in public spaces, including schools and universities, was restricted by law. Following these legal reforms, hundreds of university students who continued to wear hijabs were forced to leave their universities.23 The repression against unofficial Islam was continuous and the government exerted power both through bureaucracy and ideology. Islam Karimov 13 BBC Uzbek archived news. 53 continually created artificial instability by depicting the image of an enemy. Certain Islamic content, including debates, texts, mosque preaching, and commentary (Frank & Mamatov, 2006) were asserted to be contrary to state ideology, which was used to frame certain Muslims as enemies of the state. The oppression of “adashganlar” reached its climax in the mid-2000s. The significance of this inconsistency in the governance of Islam manifested in the unfair treatment of thousands of innocent Muslims in the country. In 2005, the U.S. Department of State released a report which stated that the constitution of Uzbekistan “provides for a presidential system with separation of powers between executive legislative and judicial branches; however, in practice, President Islam Karimov and the centralized executive branch that serves him dominated political life and exercised nearly complete control over the other branches.”24 When 700 people were killed in the city of Andijan by the government on May 13, 2005 (Khalid, 2007), the violent capacity of the state was directed towards internalizing terror in society. The slaughter was undeniable. After the February 13, 1999, bombings in Tashkent, thousands of people were detained and jailed (Polat and Butkevich, 1999). Polat and Butkevich state that “the Uzbek government clearly is using the Tashkent bombings as an excuse to intensify its crackdown on religiously based and to a lesser degree, secular dissent” (p. 545). Hundreds of people were detained and the “alleged terrorists were sentenced to death… after closed unfair trials…[where] confessions were the only evidence presented at the Supreme Court hearings that determined their fate” (p. 542). As Arendt (1973) points out, mass murder or viciously engineered death has 24 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Uzbekistan – 2005, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour. February 28, 2005. 54 a specific function in society. It is often used to shock people, as fear is exercised to make people obedient. 2.2.3 “Adashganlar” - those on the wrong path Scholarly contributions outside of Uzbekistan do not mention the use of the term “adashganlar”; however, reports include direct quotes from official ulama and government officials in which the phrase “people on the wrong path” is used. To my knowledge, the nuanced research that acknowledges all the complexities and meanings present to the relationship between the state and Islam in Uzbekistan does not exist inside the country. I reviewed Ph.D. dissertations written between 1991 and 2019 in this area through the database of the National Library of Uzbekistan of Alisher Navoi in Tashkent. In the entire database of the National Library’s Hall of Dissertations, I found only few relevant theses. Either independent research by graduate students was not allowed in the country or such research was not available for review. I was interested to know what kind of materials were taught at the colleges and universities and if there were study materials that could give me an idea of the delivered message about the relationship between the state and Islam or about unofficial Islam. I located a series of books at the library of the International Islamic Academy of Tashkent, published with the permission from the CRA at the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan and used as a teaching material for colleges and universities. The authors were also university professors, and I was able to reach out and interview some of them. The eight books I found were published with the silver stamp of the CRA on the cover and they were very similar in many ways. Their opening pages suggest that permission to publish this book was granted by the CRA. In the corner, there was another circular logo that said, “enlightenment against ignorance,” a well-exploited phrase by the first president Islam Karimov 55 and the name of his government’s campaign against extremism. This logo suggests that the state-approved Islam, or official Islam, is the best, most enlightened form of Islam and that all other forms of Islam are ignorant. All of these books have a very clear position on what form of Islam is best and what forms are not expectable. For example, Tulepov (2013:5) states that “the direction of the ummah’s salvation is ‘Ahl al-Sunnah w’'l-Jama’'ah’25 and between four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, Hanafiism is the most suitable for our culture and traditions” (Tulepov, 2013. Pp. 26-40). Another common feature of these books, like the theses I found, is they all start and end with direct quotes from former president Islam Karimov and have many more of Karimov’s quotes throughout the book. These books frequently discuss the achievements since independence, including the construction of new mosques, changes to the religious laws, increased attendance in pilgrimages, establishment of educational institutions and research centres, and the government’s relentless fight against extremism and terrorism to preserve stability and peace in the country. Although written or edited by scholars, these books are the representation of how the state and the state-sponsored official Islam view unofficial Islam. Most of these books list several people as contributors. For example, Religious Tolerance and Bigotry: One Hundred Answers to One Hundred Questions (2017) lists eleven contributors at the end of the introductory chapter. In the second conversation of Religious Tolerance and Bigotry is named “Hanafiism is a Moderate Sect,” which gives a clear idea about official Islam in Uzbekistan. It gives several 25 Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jamaa’ah are those who adhere to the Sunnah and who unite upon it, not turning to anything else, whether that be in matters of belief (‘aqeedah) or matters of actions which are subject to shar’i rulings. Hence, they are called Ahl al-Sunnah because they adhere to it (the Sunnah), and they called Ahl al-Jamaa’ah because they are united (mujtami’oon) in following it. (www.islamqa.info ) 56 reasons for why the Hanafi tradition established by Imam Abu-Hanifa is the one to follow. According to the book, a) Hanafiism is the historically-practiced tradition of Islam in the land where Uzbekistan is located by Abbasids, Qarakhanids, Ghaznavids, Seljuks, Khorezmshahs, Timurids, Baburis, and Usman Empire, among others; b) Hanafiism is one of the most convenient and tolerant forms of Islam that is suitable for Uzbek culture, traditions, and lifestyle; c) Hanafiism is the best sect to deal with legal issues; d) Imam Abu Hanifa, who developed Hanafiism, endorsed human rights, business rights, and equal marriage rights for both men and women, suggesting his views of Islam were not harsh; and e) most of the scholars that lived in what is now Uzbekistan were Hanafi scholars, therefore Hanafiism is part of the national and cultural inheritance. Obviously, these are the reasons why the government of Uzbekistan chose Hanafiism as an official Islam in Uzbekistan. Considering that Uzbekistan claims that no religion has any influence over political and legal decisions, some of the arguments advanced in the book about why the Hanafi tradition is the best for Uzbekistan is as illogical as the rest of the claims. Although Muslims often use Islamic guidance in their daily lives, which includes dealings related to human rights, business rights, and marriage rights between members of the Islamic faith, in the absence of enforcement, the principles of Hanafiism or any other madhabs of Islam are limited to a personal choice. The claim that Islamic scholars known to whole Muslim world were living on the historical territory that is now Uzbekistan is the most rational claim of those advanced. The next five chapters of Religious Tolerance and Bigotry discuss unofficial Islam and list Salafism, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, Taliban, Akromiya, Tablighi Jamaat, the Nurcu Movement, Tovba Islamic Group, Islamic Movement of Turkistan, IMU, Mujaddidiya, IJU, Wahhabism, Babiism and Ahmadiyya as some of the Islamic groups on the “wrong path.” 57 The term “adashganlar” is used many times in the book, referring to all forms of unofficial Islam. Any involvement in these groups is viewed as misguided and it warns against having any interaction with them. It calls for awareness and a war against extremism to preserve stability and peaceful life in society. Ochildiev and Najmiddinov’s (2017) Proselytizer: Essence, Objectives, Consequences and Ways to Avoid starts with a direct quote from former President Islam Karimov, which hints at the state’s attitude towards unofficial Islam: It is important to analyze and conduct comprehensive, scientific and practical assessments of religious threats, to identify their primary goals: whom and what they are against; their impact on different segments of the population; their harmful effects, which are contrary to our national interests and way of our lives; to reveal the harmful essence of their ideologies and ideological attacks, to strengthen the foundations of national thinking and a healthy worldview in the hearts of our citizens.26 This quote makes a powerful accusation against the so-called “religious threats.” The book sheds negative light on missionary activism and proselytizing and provides little explanation about the Criminal Code provisions that criminalize such behaviour. “Adashganlar” are similarly viewed as corrupted Muslims. Ochildiev and Najmiddinov (2017) cites Quranic verses about the corrupted27. Reviewing the Quran online in English, I am convinced that some parts of these verses are misrepresented or are being used out of context.28 I only surveyed Quranic translations to 26 The translation is mine. The original quote is: “Diniy tahdidlarni, ...ilmiy amaliy jihatdan atroflicha tahlil qilish va baholash, ularing ustivor yo'nalishlarini, kimga va nimaga qarshi qaratilganligini aniqlash, aholi turli qatlamlariga ta'sirini o'rgaish, milliy manfaatlarimizga, hayot tarzimizga zid bo'lgan zararli g'oyalar va mafkuraviy xurujlarning mohiyatini ochib berish, fuqarolarimiz qalbida milliy tafakkur va sog'lom dunyoqarash asoslarini mustahkamlash alohida ahamiyat kasb etadi.” 27 Allah does not like corruption (al-Baqarah 2: 205). And when it is said to them: “Do not make mischief on the earth,” they say: “We are only reformers.” Verily, they are the ones who make mischief, but they perceive not (al-Baqarah 2: 11-12). Conspiracy is worse than murder (al-Baqarah 2: 191) 28 For example, al-Baqarah 2:191 is written as “Kill them whenever you confront them and drive them out from where they drove you out. (For though killing is sinful) wrongful persecution is even worse than killing. Do not fight against them near the Holy Mosque unless they fight against you; but if they fight against you kill them, for that is the reward of such unbelievers.” (http://islamicstudies.info/reference.php?sura=2&verse=191) 58 examine the credibility of these sources and focus on the justification Proselytizer provided for its claims. It argues that the Islamic groups discussed in this book intend to lead people away from the righteous path for selfish motives and that these groups claim that the believers of official Islam are “adashganlar” (Ochildiev & Najmiddinov, 2017, p. 10). The book calls these groups “adashganlar” and warns that they label followers of official Islam as “adashganlar” to deceive them. Religious Fanaticism: Essences, Goals and the Ways to Prevent by A. Hasanov, O. Yusupov, K. Shermuhammedov, U. G’afurov, and J. Karimov (2017) also starts and ends with direct quotes from Islam Karimov’s speech in 2013, which focus on describing the formation of “adashganlar” as a category in society: “[t]he fanatical forces that are carrying out abominable deeds under the guise of Islam are trapping inexperienced, ignorant young people, and misguiding and using them for their own nefarious purposes” (Islom Karimov in Hasanov et al. 2017 p. 3). The authors define an extremist as a person who has chosen an Islamic current different from the one preferred by the state. Extremists are extra dangerous, they argue, because they are spreading their ideology among young people and forming masses of “adashganlar”. “Adashganlar”, in Karimov’s quote, are not yet extremists; they are our youth, our fellow citizens, but they have lost their righteous path and are on their way to radicalization because they were infected by the extremist ideology. Another book, Extremist and Terrorist Associations Under the Guise of Islam (2017), edited by Shermuhamedov and Karimov with contributions from nine authors, lists seventeen different groups, including Salafism, Nurcilar, Muslim Brotherhood, Shabab Muhammad, Hisb-ut Tahrir, Jamaat al-Muslimun, Hizballah, Lashkari-Toiba, Abu Sayyaf, Taliban, Akromiya, Al- 59 Qaida, IJU, Boko haram, ISIS, and Jabhat an-Nusra as extremist and terrorist Islamic currents. Each group’s origin and a short chronological account are provided, along with the primary goals of each group. Shermuhamedov and Karimov (2017) state that “Hisb-ut Tahrir is increasing the number of misguided (adashganlar) in the region by providing economic assistance to Muslims, helping with utility bills, protecting their rights, supporting young families to build their houses, and distributing food on holidays” (p. 29). Shermuhamedov and Karimov (2017 p. 71) argue that extremist and terrorist organizations expanded by actively brainwashing the children of misguided Muslims in the 1990s. The repeated reference to people who were influenced by these groups as “adashganlar” is common in most of these books. The contrast presented in these books between official Islam and “adashganlar” helps to justify violence against all these unofficial forms of Islam in Uzbekistan. Through interviewing some of the authors of these books and other scholars and university professors, I learned that they were paid to go to prisons, have conversations with religious convicts, and write reports summarizing their meetings. They were also assigned to make regular visits with the people who left prison during their probationary period. The main thing they had to comment on was whether the religious convicts with whom they had conversations had changed their beliefs over the course of their time in prison.29 2.2.4 Relational approach to the relationship between the state and Islam Relational theory developed in the 1980s and focuses “on interpersonal processes that promote, inhibit, or channel collective violence and connect it with nonviolent politics” (Tilly, 29 Interview 030 (Anvar Bo’ronov) – National University of Uzbekistan; Interview 028 (Ibrohim Usmonov) – International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan; 025 (Jamoliddin Karimov) – International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan 60 2003 p. 20). It is mainly used in the study of social movements, policing of riots and protests, radicalism, and terrorism, where various actors respond to each other in spirals of action and reaction (Della Porta, 1995; Bosi & Malthaner, 2015). This spiral of actions and reactions is also explained by the dialectical approach, which gives more a clear sense of the process. The relational theory of society changes the way how social relations are defined, “the kind of reality that is attributed to them, how they configure social formations, and the way in which their changes are conceived” (Donati, 2015 p. 86). Relational theorists reject individuals, groups, or society as starting points of sociological analysis. Society for them does not consist of substances but of interactions and relationships (Dewey & Bentley, 1960: Foucault, 2014; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Power relations in society, Knoke (1990) says, must be viewed in relational terms to be properly understood. Social formations are the product of previous interactions between various parties in power relations. For example, the formation of political Islam in Uzbekistan is often viewed as response to the Soviet assault on Islam, which led to the repression of Islam by the Karimov government between 1991 and 2016. Donati (2015 p. 87) applies critical realism to the relational theory of society and concludes that “society is not a space ‘containing’ relations, or an arena where relations are played. It is rather the very tissue of relations.” Therefore, according to Donati (2015), society “is relations” and does not “have relations”. However, Luhmann’s recognition of that relations do not exist without substance is important. He says, “there are no elements without relational connections or relations without elements” (Luhmann, 1995 pp 20-22) and view society as both substances and relationships, including individuals, groups, institutions, and the interaction between them, as a starting point for sociological analysis. 61 According to relational theory, relationships shape the structure, mindset, and attitudes and contribute to the emotional state of those involved in them. Della Porta (2018) states that “radicalization is a process of escalation from nonviolent to increasingly violent repertoires of action that develops through a complex set of interactions unfolding over time” (p. 461). A relational perspective (Alimi et al., 2015) frames radicalization as the product of continual, complex, and contingent sets of interactions between conflicting parties. In the relationship between the state and Islam, the state always has more power to control, oppress, or grant partial freedom to Islam. The historical interactions between these two institutions show that Islam also has the internal ideological power structure to survive and resist. Conflicting relationships and the continuum of needs for each participant in the conflicting relationship must be negotiated by those who are involved (Hahn & Paynton, 2019). In one example from the relationship between the state and Islam in Uzbekistan, the Jadid Muslims in the 1920 and 1930s (Khalid, 1999) sought to negotiate the relationship between the secular state and Islam. There was a conflict between fundamentalist Muslims (qadimchilar) and Jadid intellectuals (Khalid, 1999) and between the Bolsheviks and Jadid intellectuals, because reforms presented by Jadid diplomats were not accepted by either the fundamentalists or the Bolsheviks. Both the Jadids and the fundamentalist Muslims were purged by the Soviet state as a result, ending that relationship. It was one of the weakest periods for Islam. Repression was too harsh. The state was equipped with powerful tools to fight Islam, but Islam was not equipped to fight the Soviet state and became dormant in society. Relational theory explains this sequence of processes as Islam’s response to harsh repression. Islam and the state as institutions have contrasting views for how society should be and what direction it should take. The interactions between them demonstrate their position and their 62 power to achieve their goals. Although the relational perspective explains the increased tensions between opposing sides, it is not enough to fully explain the process of radicalization in society as a result of the relationship between two institutions. 2.2.5 Dialectical radicalization A theory is a strategy to describe, interpret, and/or explain a phenomenon. As Allen and Henderson (2017 p. 13) note, theory “offers a compelling story-line that helps us to interpret the how and why of situation or experience where we need to know more.” A relational perspective mixed with a dialectical approach in sociology provides the best framework to analyze the escalation of the tension between the state and Islam. This escalation led to harsh repression by the government and politically mobilized Islamic movements organized by the previously peaceful Muslims. I stress the word escalation in this sentence to provide justification for the inadequacy of the relational approach to explain radicalization. Understanding dialectical as a sociological conception requires a basic understanding of it as a philosophical thought. For Plato, a dialectic was a spoken conversation between two people with opposing views to find the transcendent. Kant viewed it as a never-ending dialog, therefore he thought dialectics had limitations, as both sides with opposing views will have their own truth (Corbett & Connors 1999). . Therefore, the dialectic becomes infinite and will not serve to find the common truth. For Hegel, one of the most important thinkers on the subject, dialectics should not be understood as an interaction only between people, but that there is dialectic interaction between objects, cultures, ideas, or people that have some internal antagonism (Corbett & Connors 1999). Another important element in dialectics is the progression of thought, conflict, or ideas, described as the clash between thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis, which becomes a new 63 thesis. This process will continue infinitely and the relationship between these oppositions will advance through this process. Dialectical relationships are mutually constitutive: each is part of the other and one can only be understood fully in relation to the other (Harvey, 1996). Earlier developments of dialectical trends have been challenged and transformed. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ work on dialectical materialism has influenced recent developments in dialectical sociology that emphasized the inherence of contradictions in social relations. In Marx’s philosophy, the dialectical is understood through dialectical contradictions: the acceleration of gradual social change that includes steps such as consciousness of the status quo, negation of the status quo, negation of that negation and, finally, resurgence of a more sophisticated manifestation of the original status quo (Marx, 1967). When dialectics are applied to radicalization, the escalation in the process of radicalization is dialectical and is viewed as “actions of some kind associated with other actions and reactions, often expressed in some sort of reciprocal relationship” (Taylor & Horgan, 2012 p. 130). In such cases, “dialectics forces us to ask the question of every ‘thing’ or ‘event’ that we encounter: by what process was it constituted and how is it sustained?” (Harvey, 1996 p. 51). Relational dialectics, often used by communication scholars, highlight the tensions, struggles, and interplay between opposing sides when they experience paradoxical desires, ideas, positions, or motives at the same time and place (Baxter and Montgomery, 1998). According to Allman (2003, p. 12), “dialectics is a way of thinking that brings into focus the full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world.” Tyner and Inwood (2014) distance themselves from Allman’s notion of dialectics, stating, Dialectics, conversely, opens space for a deeper and more profound analysis. Reality, from a dialectical vantage point, consists not simply of disparate ‘things’ but rather processes and relations. In other words, reality is more than the epiphenomenon that can be counted, classified, 64 and mapped; it is more than the ‘observation’ that strikes us immediately and directly, which masks the underlying structures and social relations. (p. 774) Dialectical radicalization stresses the escalation of tension and extreme responses through interactions between two or more parties, which a relational framework underrates. Times of radicalization and periods of deradicalization between the state and Islam in Uzbekistan were part of the relationship between them. Historical occurrences, including the Soviet assault on Islam in the 1920s and 1930s, the establishment of official Islam in 1943, the release of religious people from Kulaks in the 1950s, and the commencement of secretive hujra teachings of Islam marking the revival of unofficial Islam, have strong connections to the events that took place after Uzbek independence. Each of these events had complex roots and even more complex consequences. The radicalization of the Soviet state towards the forced deradicalization of Islam through both soft and hard power (Wagner, 2014), destruction of everything Islamic, purge of Islamic scholars and practitioners, and adaptation of the Programme of Scientific Atheism pushed Islam into a state of dormancy. Hard power is the use of coercive means to achieve certain outcomes while soft power (Nye, 2004) is less visible, being done through influencing and co-opting people rather than using violence (Wagner, 2014). The application of dialectical radicalization and deradicalization assist the relational approach to explain the complex relationship between the state and Islam. Earlier, I argued that Islam’s response to the Soviet assault was to become dormant, because any battle against the Soviet government would damage Islam further. Yet some ulama managed to convince the Soviet state, or more precisely Stalin, to form an official Islam in 1943. The Soviet state was preoccupied with the war and Muslims were helping with even very limited freedom. Islam started to revive. This was Islam’s subsequent response to the behavior of the 65 state. At the same time, there were other relationships forming against the Soviet government and official Islam that was working with the Soviet government. Unofficial Islam was forming, and it had resentment towards the Soviet government and official Islam because official Islam was viewed as rationalizing the Soviet government and helping it to control Muslims. As the former Soviet Union started to weaken, both official and unofficial Islam started reviving vigorously. There were cases of radicalization against the secular state. The Soviet government’s assault on Islam was not described as radicalization, while the response of Islamic forces, despite being powerless and far less violent than state actors, was indeed described as radicalization. The Soviet government was extremely radicalized and violent towards Islam; however, the acts of the politicized Islamic groups were met with another wave of state violence against Islam. In the relationship between the state and Islam in Uzbekistan, the state is the more radicalized institution. The government’s paradoxical response to the renewed interest towards Islam in society resulted from the political calculations as to what forms of Islam could serve and support the existing political system and which ones presented challenges. There is no consensus among scholars about the definitions of radicalism or radicalization, though there is general agreement that radicalization is a process (Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino and Caliya, 2011; Schmid, 2013) and that radicalism is the beliefs or actions that advocate for complete political or social reform (Schmid, 2013). Neuman (2016) insists that radicalization is political rather than religious or cultural. The process of radicalization involves the adoption of radical beliefs and the escalation of violence and violent actions; however, not all radical beliefs lead to violence (Malthaner, 2016). Tilly (1978 p. 176) defines violence as “any observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are seized or damaged in spite of resistance.” However, radicalization of the state is often viewed as a political violence 66 (Malthaner, 2017) rather than viewing it through the relational approach. Often, the ways political violence is analyzed and explained are one-sided and do not elucidate the circular action and reaction in the historical processes between two institutions. At a basic level, it is argued that no one is born radical, and that extremism and radicalism have no race, religion, gender, or age30. Ideology, economics, and politics are three main drivers of radicalization (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). At the core of extremism is the idea of “us versus them,” either with some groups claiming superiority – secular versus religious or official Islam versus unofficial Islam being examples – or some groups feeling victimized, like Muslims being under attack during Soviet rule. In short, the hidden spaces of hate and hurt are a home for radicalization. In the case of the state, however, political confidence in it is hurt by Islam, as a strong opposition to the political system. There are complex factors that stimulated radicalization in Uzbekistan, including the lack of Islamic knowledge in society that resulted from the suppression of Islam by the Soviet state (Naumkin, 2003). Widespread corruption in the system, economic and political instability, and ideological differences and intolerance between the secular state and Islamic groups have also been suggested as factors (Cornell, 2006; Naumkin, 2003; Hanks, 2007). The relational approach to radicalization allows us to analyze dialectical interactions between these sides, either separately or together. The historical repertoire of interactions between the state and Islam includes repressive laws and policies, attacks on Islamic belief systems by adapting conflicting ideologies and doctrines such as scientific atheism, purges of ulama, targeted surveillance, and persecutions of 30 https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/terrorism/module-2/key-issues/radicalization-violent-extremism.html 67 Muslims on one hand. On the other hand, teaching Islam and forming underground Islamic organizations, expressing disagreement and anger towards the existing political system, mobilizing people against the state, and using Islamic ideology and victimhood to stimulate political aggression are examples of Islamic responses to the state. Radicalization as a response to hidden political aims and secretive actions is what Della Porta (2013) refers to as extremism caused by the clandestine political violence. When Abduvali Qori Mirzaev disappeared, Obidkhon Nazarov was shot, and Abdulla Utaev left home and never came back,31 the NSS of Uzbekistan knew that these actions were not against specific individuals, but against leaders and their followers. The whole Islamic establishment they led was threatened. The Karimov government intended to wipe out all opposition to his government, religious or non-religious, and used Islamic radicalism and terrorism to justify its politics. Karimov’s radical stance towards both religious and non-religious opposition helps to understand that the radical was not about religion but politics. HRW’s (2004) report states: The government’s actions were intended to eliminate a perceived threat of Islamic “fundamentalism” and “extremism” by silencing and punishing Muslims who rejected government control of religion. The policy was designed and carried out to remove charismatic Islam from the political equation, to prevent any potential contest between the Karimov government and independent-minded Muslim leaders for authority and the loyalty of the people32. (p. 5) The government of Uzbekistan shied away from defining radicalization and extremism or identifying the markers for these terms until 2018 but relied on them in legal proceedings for almost thirty years. The definition of extremism given by the government of Uzbekistan will be discussed in Chapter 5. 31 https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/uzbekistan/uzbek-02.htm 32 https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uzbekistan0304.pdf 68 The analysis of the relationship between the state and Islam in Uzbekistan requires careful examination of the historical interactions between these two institutions. Historical studies reveal home-grown radicalism or radicalization of local Muslims, led by local imams, who were the students of local ulama. The three generations of Islamic revivalists in Uzbekistan I reviewed in this chapter are an example of how Islam’s resistance and response to the cruelties of the Soviet government heightened over time. It seems strange to think that this succession ended up forming one of the most daring extremist and terrorist organizations, which became an international threat (Khalid, 2007; Karim, 2006; Rashid, 2002). In the 1990s and 2000s, thousands of men and women went to Syria to join ISIS. Within the framework of five MEHR operations33 between 2019 and 2021, exactly 531 women and children were brought back to the country by the government of Uzbekistan from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan34. Several thousand more were killed or disappeared. What are the causes of such deep radicalization of Uzbek Muslims? Why did peaceful Muslims turn violent and patriotic? How can we understand the relationship between the state and Islam through the observations of repression and radicalization? We cannot understand the revival of Islam and the relationship between the state and Islam without answering these questions. Therefore, dialectical radicalization between the secular state and Islam refers to a process in which the actions of each side in a conflict reinforce and intensify the radicalization of the other. This can occur when a secular state enacts policies that are seen as hostile or discriminatory towards Muslims or when Islamic groups take actions that are perceived as a 33 Called MEHR 1, MEHR 2, etc. 34 https://yuz.uz/en/news/operation-mehr-5-93-women-and-children-are-returned-from-syria; http://www.uzdaily.com/en/post/62266; https://kun.uz/en/news/2019/10/11/operation-dobro-2-64-children-were-returned-from-iraq-to-uzbekistan; https://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=22131; 69 threat to the secular state’s authority or stability. The government of Uzbekistan’s enactment of policies banning the wearing of hijab in schools and universities, for example, lead to increased radicalization among Muslims. Conversely, the Islamic group Hisb-ut Tahrir spreading leaflets with various ways of promoting Islamic khalifate was perceived as a threat to the secular state’s authority in Uzbekistan at the end of 1990s led to increased hostility towards Muslims. Understanding dialectical radicalization can help to break this cycle and encourage both sides to engage in dialogue and seek common ground. This may involve addressing the underlying social, economic, and political factors that contribute to tensions between the secular state and Islam, such as discrimination, inequality and political exclusion. 2.3 CONCLUSION Critical secular studies reject the main beliefs of secularism about the relationship between the state and religion by questioning the state’s neutrality towards religion and the separation between the state and religion. It provides a framework to observe hidden realities of how powerful groups control the powerless, how they influence laws and regulations, and how they manipulate the public understanding of the relationship between the state and religion. This chapter reviews the related works of scholars of critical secular studies such as Nilufer Göle, Saba Mahmood and Talal Asad to understand the relationship between the state and Islam, which is the study of the practice of secularism in Uzbekistan. As both Asad (2009) and Göle (2017) argue, there is no ideal form or universal understanding of secularism. Using critical secular framework to analyze the relationship between the secular government in Uzbekistan and Islam helps to understand the nature of secular practice, power relations in the interactions between different forms of Islam and the government, and formation of official and unofficial forms of Islam in Uzbekistan. As Mahmood (2015) argues, the Eurocentric or post-70 enlightenment understanding of modernity in modern states is often coupled with the ideals of secularism as individual liberation from religious pressures. However, Islam presents principles that challenge the values of the secular state. The paradoxical governance of Islam is one of the qualities that demarcate the secular state in Uzbekistan which resulted from the formation of official Islam. Muslims who did not fit the standards created by the official Islam were publicized as people on the wrong path. The relational approach in sociology views society as relations or ongoing interactions instead of substance. Interactions between people, groups, and social institutions make the fabric of society. When the repertoire of the interactions between the state and Islam are examined, the growing tension between them is observable. A dialectical perspective which explains the progression in social interactions integrated with the relational approach provides a better framework to understand the radicalization between the secular state and Islam in Uzbekistan which will be discussed in-depth in Chapter 2. The marriage between the relational approach in sociology and a dialectical perspective does not only explains dialectical radicalization but it also provides a useful understanding of dialectical deradicalization. 71 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER This chapter presents the research design and summarizes the specific measures used to conduct this study. The purpose of this chapter is to show the logic and rationale for the methodological choices and explain the careful consideration of the linkages between the purpose of this study, the research questions asked, and the research methods selected. The Research Design and Sampling section gives rudimentary information about the design of the research questions, lays out the methodological framework, and provides rationales for choosing multi-method qualitative research for examining the phenomenon at hand. Two tables are presented in this section to increase readability and comprehensibility of research methods and sampling through visual content. The Research Methods and Data Collection section discusses the processes of data collection processes, the techniques used, and the associated activities engaged in each step. The overview of the field study shows how four different research methods were harmonized to increase efficacy in recruiting research participants, engaging with the field, gathering useful data, and following research ethics. The Data Management and Analysis section provides a summary of the data management, analysis, transcription, and translation processes. It also covers the methods used for integrating data sources and the use of different methods to leverage research findings. In the Ethical Considerations section, I discuss the ethical concerns that arose during my field work and the unexpected situations I faced while conducting this study. While reflecting on my own positionality as an insider-outsider researcher, I stress the importance of reflexivity during the field study. The scope and limitations of the study are also discussed in this section. 72 3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 3.2.1 Overview of the research questions The four sets of research questions that guided this project were intended to understand the revival of Islam in Uzbekistan, the relationship between the state and Islam from various perspectives, the roots of and contributing factors to the Islamic resurgence, and the engagements between the political and religious in this process. These questions require consideration of political Islam, a phrase with many different interpretations (Karagiannis, 2006). I use political Islam to refer to the interpretations of Islam that were used as a source for political identity and action (Voll & Sonn, 2010). In other words, individual Muslims, Islamic groups, and Islamic doctrines with political tendencies such as advocating the formation of a khalifate or Islamic state that governs society according to Islamic principles would be considered to be political Islam in this context. These are the questions I answered through this research: (1) What explains the rise of Islam and its practices in post-Soviet Uzbekistan? Are there any connections between the repression of Islam during over seven decades of the Soviet rule and the formation of political Islam in early 1990s? What is the connection between the radical secularism in the Soviet Union and the radicalization of certain Islamic groups in post-Soviet Uzbekistan? (2) What do the terms extremism and radicalism mean in the social, political, and legal domain in post-Soviet Uzbekistan? Who are extremists? Does Islamic extremism exist beyond state discourse? What are the signs and signifiers of radicalization and how informed, qualified, 73 or equipped is the justice system in Uzbekistan to distinguish radical from non-radical forms of Islam? (3) How did the introduction of diverse Islamic doctrines35 and the emergence of political Islam intensify the conflict between the secular state and Islam in Uzbekistan? How can a critical-secular framework explain this relationship? What are the main prospects for the relationship between Islam and the secular state in Uzbekistan going forward? (4) What is the role of media in the resurgence of Islam and in the relationship between the state and Islam? What kind of role does the media play in radicalization and in the government’s efforts to control radical and extremist inclinations? Various political developments distress, disturb, and alter social, cultural, and traditional patterns in society, often leading to unpredictable and unintended outcomes. The deliberate aim to manipulate and control Islam by political systems is observable through historical analysis (Khalid, 2007). Islam’s claim to be capable of forming a complete political and legal system positions it as a source of strong political opposition with an ideology that is already accepted by Muslims. The complexity of this research lies in the intention to answer the research questions above while remaining conscious of my positioning in this phenomenon. 3.2.2 Multi-method qualitative research design Qualitative research methods are often used to obtain the rich data necessary to understand complex social processes and answer research questions by developing a contextual understanding of the political and social situations, facilitating interactive study environments, 2 Such as Wahhabism, Jihadism, and Hisb-ut Tahrir. 74 adopting an interpretive stance, and maintaining design flexibility (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012). The complexity of the structures and processes being studied made me recognize the need to use multiple qualitative research methods for data collection to gather multiple sets of data: ethnographic observations, semi-structured interviews, archival research, and media analysis. One of the strengths of multi-method design is that it allows for more comprehensive and well-rounded analysis to answer research questions by enabling the gathering of data from different sources (Brewer & Hunter, 2006). Doubts and uncertainties arising from one source of data, such as interviews, can be addressed through the data gathered by another method, such as review of archival documents. Additionally, the data gathered through one methodological approach are, to the extent possible, corroborated through other methodological approaches. As Brewer & Hunter (2006) state, the multi-method approach’s fundamental strategy is “to attack a research problem with an arsenal of methods that have nonoverlapping weaknesses in addition to their complementary strengths” (p. 4). Multi-method research generates multiple data sets, each collected by a different method; however, “the chief advantage of the multi-method approach is not the quantity of data that it provides but rather the data’s diversity and the opportunities for comparison that this diversity affords” (Brewer & Hunter, 2006 p. 14) The complexity of the researched phenomenon and the presence of opposing structures, beliefs, opinions, and conflicting parties require a carefully mapped research design and choice of research methods to achieve validity and reliability. Using multi-method reduces the misinterpretation in research procedures, which Denzin (2012) refers to as “triangulation.” Triangulation is the use of multiple lines of sight speaking to the same research question from different perspectives through careful map-making to investigate a phenomenon (Denzin, 2012). In other words, triangulation refers to the data analysis process where, when there are two 75 opposing sets of data, a third set helps to validate and produce reliable information. Using multiple methods increases the chances of noticing the multi-dimensional and contradictory nature of the phenomenon under study. Richardson (2000) refers to this as “crystallization.” Using multiple data-collection methods or “multiple lines of sight” (Berg, 2007 p. 5) in research methodology permits a deeper understanding of multifaceted socio-political behaviour and helps to avoid short-sightedness and the influence of gatekeepers in research (Komil-Burley, 2021). Often, the data gathered through one method were enriched by the data gathered through another method. For example, the archival data from the human rights organizations provided factual documents about the experiences mentioned during the interviews. Another example was that media observations made it possible to observe internal struggles in Islam. I observed the online debates between the members of official and unofficial Islam, their arguments, and attitudes towards one-another. Making use of interviewing as a “conversation with purpose” (Berg, 2007 p. 89), semi-structured interviews were one of the essential methods of data collection in this study. Semi-structured interviews are often viewed as a combination of structured and unstructured interviews (Smith, 1995; Smith, 2019): the structured part allows the researcher to obtain reliable, comparable and, most importantly, useful data; the unstructured part includes open-ended questions that are amenable to new ideas, opinions, and experiences shared by the participants. Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to change the direction of the areas being explored based on the data and answers shared (Keller & Conradin, 2020). They are schedules that can be more-or-less structured, with flexibility as to the order of the questions, the level of language, the use of follow-up or supplemental questions, and the ability to ask for clarification during the interviews. In the beginning, offering some personal information 76 including talking about my background, family, and research interests to establish genuine rapport and common ground with each participant (Berg, 2007 p. 117) became a common practice in my interviews. It helped to get the conversations off to a smooth and easy start and signaled to the participants that this was a safe space for sharing. In the structured part of my interviews, I asked questions about the research participants, their views on Islam, whether they identify themselves as belonging to any specific Islamic groups, how they use the internet for religious purposes, and their experience practicing their religion in Uzbekistan. After getting to know them through structured questions, I asked questions in accordance with their views and experiences in the unstructured part of the interviews. Structured questions allowed me to choose the direction of the conversation to obtain the most relevant and important information while unstructured questions helped me to stay flexible while keeping the main questions of my research in mind (Westby et al., 2018). I conducted interviews both inside and outside Uzbekistan, tracing various experiences of Muslims and their families during the first three decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Interview were with official ulama, state authorities, Islamic scholars, and members of unofficial Islam, as well as incarcerated Muslims, those freed after periods of incarceration, and those who left Uzbekistan to avoid religious persecution. The research participants in this study were from various backgrounds selected with the principles of purposeful selection of research participants. The majority of the them provided invaluable information to study different perspectives. The meanings they make of their experiences are useful in many ways, one of which is to avoid or reduce research bias. Questions for each group of participants were tailored according to their experiences and knowledge. For example, questions for the government officials focused on how Islam is 77 regulated, how religious laws and regulations are justified in Uzbekistan, their opinions about Islam, especially unofficial Islam, and the types of concerns Islam presents to the government. The main purpose behind these questions was to understand their beliefs and attitudes towards Islam and what they believe the relationship between the secular state, Islam, and society should be in the process of Islamic revival. Structuring questions for the members of unofficial Islam focused on their involvement in types of Islamic groups, how they practice Islam, their beliefs about what should be the relationship between the state and Islam, and their experiences for practicing their religion. In four cases, follow-up interviews were also conducted, with one participant being interviewed three times. Altogether, I conducted 87 interviews: 22 women and 65 men. I conducted 27 interviews with study participants who were originally from Uzbekistan but fled the country because of the oppression they endured and who were currently living in the USA, Canada, Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, England, Turkey, Russia, Kazakhstan, China, and Korea. Many of them had been previously accused of involvement in some form of radical Islam, with some having been detained and jailed, while others fled the country to avoid prosecution. I travelled to the USA, Canada, France, Turkey, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to conduct face-to-face interviews with some participants outside the country. Although I preferred face-to-face interviews, I conducted about two-thirds of the interviews online or by phone because of the cost and time required for travelling. I found that the engagement and rapport building was easier and trust levels were higher in face-to-face interviews, with the exception of those who wanted to remind anonymous and opted for online or phone interviews. In cases when the participants wished to stay anonymous, I was more cautious and critical of what I was hearing. I spent a week in Istanbul, two weeks in Paris, and two months in Uzbekistan in the summer of 2019. I revisited 78 Turkey twice and Uzbekistan four times to continue interviews and observations. My last interview took place in Tashkent in July 2022. I interviewed 59 people in Uzbekistan, including Shaikh Abdulaziz Mansur, the second-highest religious authority at the MBU; Mr. Shoazim Munavarov, director of the Center for Islamic Civilization in Tashkent; Mr. Khayriddin Sultonov and Mr. Odil Abdurahmonov, two presidential advisors and members of the Cabinet of Ministers at the Republic of Uzbekistan; Mr. Rustam Kamilov, advisor to former President Islam Karimov and member of the CRA at the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan; Salay Madaminov, a former presidential candidate and leader of the Erk Party; Abror Mukhtor Aliy, a board member of the MBU and well-known imam and blogger; Mahmud Abdulmomin, a known member of the Islamic group Hisb Ut-Tahrir Al-Islami; Muhammadsalih Abutov, a pupil of Abduvali Qori Mirzaev who was disappeared from the International Airport of Tashkent in 2005 and later accused of organizing a Wahhabi Islamic group, a prohibited Islamic organization in Uzbekistan; and Ruhiddin Fakhruddinov, a pupil of Sheikh Obidkhon Nazarov who was exiled from Uzbekistan and granted asylum in Sweden in 2006 and was the victim of an assassination attempt in 2012. Fakhruddinov was sentenced for extremism- and terrorism-related charges to seventeen years in prison, the final two of which he was serving when I interviewed him. These are some of the more well-known participants who agreed to disclose their identity. I interviewed five people in prison colony 64/47 in Tashkent and another eleven previously incarcerated individuals inside and outside of Uzbekistan. The five people I interviewed in prison were Ruhiddin Fakhruddinov, Akrom Malik, Tohirjon Abdusamatov, and Yusuf Hoji and Azim Ibodullaev. Ruhiddin Fakhruddinov and Akrom Malik are two key informants in this study; however, I discuss my interview with Fakhruddinov at greater length in 79 this dissertation not only because of his relationship with known unofficial ulama such as Shaikh Obidkhon Qori Nazarov,36 who was shot by unknown people in Sweden in 2012, but because he embodies many of the traits ascribed to the artificial category of “adashganlar” created by the authorities in Uzbekistan to label those opposed to it. I had repeat interviews with both Ruhiddin Fakhruddinov and Akrom Malik after they were released from prison in 2021. Meeting with the families of the victims of religious persecution was often stressful. The participants wanted to share their experiences, hoping that I was someone who could do anything to help them. The best part of interviewing them was that, having endured hardships and heartbreaks, they were no longer scared. Often, interviews would take the form of a group interview; all family members who wished to participate in the study signed the consent forms. As I asked a question of the main participant, other family members would fill in the gaps and remind them of certain faded memories. When I visited families of the incarcerated individuals in Tashkent for an interview, Dilorom Ishoqova, a human rights activist and writer, accompanied me. She has had close contact with many families whose relatives were in jail or who had lost their family members due to their religious beliefs; however, I was aware of the issues that could arise from over-reliance on one gatekeeper and was cautious. I stopped recruiting once the experiences and views expressed by interview subjects started to show some level of repetition and pattern in the institutional practices – the saturation of data had been achieved (Constantinou et al., 2017). In the semi-structured interviews, the discussions may diverge from the interview guide. McIntosh & Morse (2015) suggests that “it is 36 https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-imam-nazarov-recovering-attack-sweden/28322492.html 80 important that these questions are open-ended and formulated to elicit unstructured responses and generate discussion.”37 I recorded all of the interviews, transcribed the recordings in Uzbek, and allowed my interviewees who were interested to see the transcripts and to review and confirm the content of the interviews (Nikander, 2008). Most participants did not show any interest in reviewing the transcripts; those who wanted to review were provided with transcripts to verify that they were not misrepresented. Altogether, eleven people expressed an interest in reviewing transcripts. I was able to send transcripts to seven participants who provided email or social media addresses, six of whom replied expressing that they did not have any issue with the transcript; another four people who were interested did not provide any email or social media addresses, so I was unable to send them the transcripts. Cross-cultural qualitative research involves an additional layer of labour and potential difficulties with translating and interpreting the information gathered. However, the researcher’s cultural and linguistic fluency in the research field, or transliguistics – “the fluid use of linguistic and semiotic resources in diverse communities” (Lee, & Dovchin, 2020 p. 204) – helps to produce more reliable and valid data compared to the researcher who uses interpreters or other means to gather and understand data (Lopez et al., 2008). Building a good rapport with both male and female participants, including those who were imprisoned, was challenging but critically important for the success of the research and it was accomplished in most cases. For example, right after I introduced myself, Ruhiddin Fakhruddinov,38 who was imprisoned on charges of extremism and involvement in terrorist organizations, recited four lines from one of my poems called “At the end of endurance”, published in 2003 in my first poetry book (Fozilova, 37 The page numbers for this article are not applicable. 38 Interview 053 (Ruhiddin Fakhruddinov) December 12, 2019. 81 2003).39 That moment, during what was scheduled to be a meeting with an alleged extremist and terrorist “other,” turned out to be a very poignant one because of the level of engagement and rapport I developed with him. A very informative interview with Fakhruddinov continued for over three hours. Meeting female spiritual leaders in teahouses or mosques and having long and engaging conversations or being invited to participate in religious ceremonies by them, were other examples of the high level of engagement with my participants. Recording interviews allows the researcher to concentrate on the conversation instead of taking frantic notes. The recorded interview can be listened to as many times as needed to better understand the tone and emotion of the participant. Patton agrees that "as a good hammer is essential to fine carpentry, a good tape recorder is indispensable to fine fieldwork" (Patton, 2002, p. 380). The quality of recording is also very important in the transcription processes, as transcribing is one of the most important steps in qualitative data analysis. The recordings enabled me to study data closely, codify them, make connections between ideas, and begin to see common themes. 39 I published 2 poetry books in Uzbekistan in 2003 and 2017. Both books included many social issues written in a poetry form. The poem Fakhruddinov read can be found through this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FqlJ4tWQzOA 82 Table 1: Summary of research methods and types of data RESEARCH METHOD(S) PARTICIPANT(S)/GROUP(S)/SOURCE(S) TYPE(S) OF DATA Semi-structured Interviews Group A – Religious people whose views contradicted the state-authorized or accepted Islam, and those who were considered to be opponents to the state politics (unofficial Islam) Digital/Audio recordings Transcripts Access to memoirs/websites/blogs Photos Group B – Government officials and the leaders of an official Islam who directly and indirectly participated in decision-making processes where religion was concerned Ethnographic Observations a) Observation of Islamic practices and ceremonies, speeches given by otinoyis b) Observation in mosques/shrines and public religious events Notes of the religious practices Video and audio recordings of religious practices Transcribed conversations with participants Media Analysis a) Blogs b) YouTube channels c) News outlets in Uzbekistan d) Websites e) Also Islamic bloggers were interviewed as part of the Media Analysis Notes/Transcripts of discussions Video and audio files Copies of published articles Interview transcripts Archival Research International Human Rights Organizations: a) Fiery Hearts Club b) Association for Human Rights in Central Asia Various documents about cases of disappearances, human rights abuses, and applications for seeking refugee status: court orders, medical certificates, copies of letters from governmental institutions, etc. Audio interviews Published materials Photos, images 83 3.2.2.2 Ethnographic observations Ethnography can be considered a reflexive process, as social research is part of the world that it studies (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1998). Defining ethnographic observations and making the distinction between participant and non-participant observers is not an easy task. Participant observations can be defined as those observations carried out when the researcher is playing an established participant role in the scene studied, but the observer as a participant or participant as an observer does not have to play an established role (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1996; Ajayi, 2014). Therefore, there is an overlap between participant and non-participant observations. The reason for conducting ethnographic observations of everyday Islam in Uzbekistan was to examine phenomena as perceived by people and include it in my research. The term everyday Islam in this context refers to what it means to be a Muslim in people’s everyday lives, including how people live out their faith in schools, homes, workplaces, and in their relationships (Dessing et al., 2013). Consistent with what Loizos (1992) described, it was like peering into a society where Islam as a religion and cultural practice had been developing deeper roots over the last thirty years. The main foci in choosing this research method were the observations of different aspects of Islam as tradition, Islam as faith, and Islam as opposition to secular governance and the revitalization of each as part of Islamic revivalism (Massad, 2015). Using participation as the process, I treated my entire research as a platform for different participants and participant groups, allowing me to take advantage of every opportunity to engage people with different levels of knowledge, different experiences, and different opinions in order to study the phenomenon at the heart of my research. For example, I observed Friday prayers in mosques. Mosques are widely dominated by males; however, there are more women in shrines. They share food, pray, and make dua (say a prayer) together. In those cases, I simply 84 participated in these processes. Often, there was someone there who told a story about their lives, which I listened to. Observation is often an effective research strategy to test the waters, perceive the subjectivity of different views, and extract cognitive data from the practices being observed (Berg, 2007). The main focus of my observations was to learn how everyday Islam, how Islam is understood and practiced among ordinary Muslims in that society (Louw, 2007), contributed to the revival of Islam. I visited religious sites and participated in traditional gatherings where Islam played a huge role. I also observed that Islam is becoming a significant element in the business world. I separated my observations into three categories according to settings: 1) religious sites; 2) traditional ceremonies and gatherings; and 3) unspecified settings, including markets, stores, restaurants, homes, and more. For the third category, I would look for unusual and observable practices and behaviours, similar to how women with and without hijab were treated, as part of my daily practices while I was in the field. My observations in Friday prayers and funeral ceremonies allowed me to observe how Islam is understood, practiced, interpreted, and disseminated. Da’wah, the call for faith in Friday prayers for men and religious ceremonies for women, played a significant role for Islamic educational engagement. Female spiritual guides read the Quran and talked about religious teachings and the afterlife. It is noticeable how the importance of following Islamic principles, the certainty of punishment and reward, and how Muslims should behave were some of the common topics discussed by both imams and otinoyis (female spiritual leaders). Particularly, how Muslim women should conduct themselves was repeatedly discussed in both men’s and women’s gatherings. Observations of the daily practices of Islam and religious events also prepared me for asking more informed questions in the interviews. The most important element 85 in the observations was that my participation was not questioned; although patricians were inquisitive as to who I was, I was accepted as an insider, as access and participation in any culture is “negotiated and renegotiated throughout the research process” (Burgess, 1991 p. 43). Using observations, "the systematic description of events, behaviors, and artifacts in the social setting chosen for study" (Marshal & Rossman, 2014 p. 79), as a research process offered me the opportunity to take part in and engage with group behaviour, attitudes, and experiences, to build rapport with my participants, and to blend in with the culture and tradition while being open and non-judgemental. The observations in mosques, shrines, markets, religious ceremonies, and elsewhere increased my understanding of the burgeoning role of Islam in society, including how people make sense of their changing environment, one that is becoming more Islamic, and the principles created that serve as a driving force in the revival of Islam such as “more religious as more moral.” They required me to be a careful observer and a good listener and to reflect on my thoughts and experience while writing detailed field notes. Participant observations is "the process of learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day or routine activities of participants in the researcher setting" (Schensul et al., 1999 p. 91). I was often limited to observing women-dominated places. For example, in funeral ceremonies and newborn baby ceremonies, men and women were in separate premises or rooms. However, I could participate in events that were for both men and women, such as Nazr (giving) – a religious ceremony where both women and men were invited to have food, recite Quran and pray for the family. I was not able to closely observe or participate in the men-only religious events like Friday prayers. Interviews with male participants, however, allowed me to learn about those experiences by asking questions. 86 3.2.2.3 Media analysis The advancement of internet technologies and the development of social media affected the religious and social lives of Muslims in Uzbekistan. While traditional Islam expanded to online platforms, non-traditional online Islamic groups and practices started to emerge. Through media analysis, I analyze the role of social media in Islamic revivalism and the relationship between the state and Islam in Uzbekistan. Some religious communications around the world started to take place through emails and other more basic internet services in the 1980s (Consalvo & Campbell, 2013 p. 231). Scholars around the world began to debate the “potential impact of importing offline religious beliefs and practices online” (Consalvo & Campbell, 2013 p. 232). The concepts of God and religion were re-manifesting in the new online environments (O’Leary, & Brasher, 1996; O’Leary, 2013). As innovative ways of delivering and consuming online religious content started to develop, various disciplines started to research religious influencers who shaped audiences’ attitudes through blogs, tweets, videos, and posts (Freberg et al., 2011). Internet was not popular at that time, especially in countries like Uzbekistan and therefore, literature about online religion in Uzbekistan in 1980s does not exist. Internet became more accessible by the mid-1990s in regions like Central Asia; however, it was one of the quickest developments. The questions about media’s role in the revival of Islam, how media is used for religious purposes, and how people feel about learning through online sources were added to the interview schedule. Although I observed Islamic content created and distributed by the most active Uzbek bloggers since 2019, paying particular attention to the social media spaces where the conflict between official and unofficial Islam was observable, significant part of the media analysis come from the interviews. During the Islam Karimov presidency, Muslims were detained and jailed for 87 engaging with Islamic content from prohibited sources. Often, people were not advised which sites or content were prohibited and, therefore, did not realize that they were violating the law and could be accused of extremism and radicalism. The fear created through these developments is still observable in society. Some of the steps taken by the government of Uzbekistan show that media is viewed as one of the most active contributors to the revival of Islam and radicalization of some Muslims. For example, on March 12, 2019, forty online websites were formally blocked and prohibited40 by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan in accordance with Article 14 of the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan of July 30, 2018, the Law on Combatting Extremism. On December 15, 2020, the law was amended, and the list of banned religious literature and online materials was expanded. Most of the prohibited material focuses on criticism of how Islam is being regulated in Uzbekistan, largely centered on interpretations of Islam, political Islam, jihad, or holy war. The amended law reiterates the existing ban on all material by all outlawed groups and movements, including Islamic State, Hisb-ut Tahrir, Tablighi Jamoa, Nurchilar, and Akromiya, and adds 40 social media profiles, pages, tv channels, and books. People’s phones could be screened at the airports and by authorities whenever they wanted. People were detained and jailed for having prohibited religious material on their phone. By taking these steps, the government of Uzbekistan illegalized the notion of “adashganlar” and justified harsh repression against them. I also used media analysis to closely observe the most viewed, acknowledged and influential members of both official Islam (imam Abror Mukhtor Aliy) and unofficial Islam 40 https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/8167/file/Uzbekistan_law_counter_terrorism_2000_am2019_en.pdf 88 (Mahmud Abdulmomin, a member of Hisb-ut Tahrir al-Islami) to better understand the conflict between these two groups. The role of media in the revival of Islam and the relationship between Islam and the state were my main focus; however, some new themes emerged during the interviews, such as the intensity of the relationship between official and unofficial Islam on social media platforms and the fear of unofficial Islam in society due to the threat of false accusations and punishment. To better understand the large amount of Islamic content produced by both sides, I interviewed several religious bloggers whose content I also observed. For instance, I interviewed both imam Abror Mukhtor Aliy and Mahmud Abdulmomin. Abror Mukhtor is a member of official Islam, head of one of the departments in the MBU, while Mahmud Abdulmomin is a member of Hisb-ut Tahrir, one of the restricted groups in Uzbekistan. Mukhtor lives in Uzbekistan and Abdulmomin outside of Uzbekistan and both actively produce Islamic content for several media outlets. I discuss my findings in Chapter 6. Understanding the motivations for Islam-based media materials provided valuable data to differentiate between various trends in Islamic and secular tendencies. Often, the line between the radical and non-radical Islam is blurry, as is the line between the radical and non-radical non-Islamic. By non-Islamic, I refer to the harsh criticism of Islamic clothing, speeches of Imams, and related topics by certain groups such as “Rumbling Bullet” (Daydi O’q) and “Uzbek Atheists” (O’zbek Ateistlari) on social media. The process of Islamic revival in society, increased appeal of Islam, and the intensification of religious practices were often viewed as radicalization. As a result, a number of social media outlets were banned to prevent radicalization and involvement in extremism in Uzbekistan, since authorities considered media as a source of the influences that push people towards radicalization. I analyzed whether political 89 agendas were involved in mobilizing and radicalizing Muslims, or if radicalization occurred unexpectedly. Was there a hidden political agenda to control society by creating an enemy in the form of extremist, terrorist, or radical Islam? Continual observation of media blogs, YouTube channels, and Islam-based social media pages informed this research with present day conversations on and about Islam in Uzbekistan. 3.2.2.4 Archival inquiry Archival research provides a unique opportunity to the researcher to access historically significant information by providing transparency of findings across time and showing continuity of historical developments. It involves the study and collection of documents and artifacts (Mills & Mills, 2018). Archives, according to the Universal Declaration on Archives, …are authoritative sources of information underpinning accountable and transparent administrative actions. They play an essential role in the development of societies by safeguarding and contributing to individual and community memory. Open access to archives enriches our knowledge of human society, promotes democracy, protects citizens’ rights, and enhances the quality of life (ICA, 2011). Human rights organizations are active in Uzbekistan. The reports from international human rights organizations were an indication of their involvement with the participants I was targeting. Although their offices are located outside of Uzbekistan, they closely observe human rights issues in the country and provide services for the victims. In this research, I reviewed archived materials from two human rights organizations in Europe: The Fiery Hearts Club international human rights organization and the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia in Paris, France. Human rights defenders often attend court proceedings, interview victims and their families, review various documents to understand human rights issues, and work to address them. They also help victims to apply for refugee status when and where necessary. All documents belonging to each case are kept in a separate box and numbered. 90 The human rights organizations I worked with supported my research in three different ways. They provided me with archived documents about the Muslims who were victimized by the government for their religious beliefs, helped me to recruit participants as an intermediary, and offered invaluable information about religious offenders in prison. Particularly, their good reputation among the victims of religious persecution and an already-established rapport with many of the participants eased the processes of recruitment. Since conducting research in the participatory archives in human rights organizations provides a great annex to the interview data (Gilliland & McKemmish, 2014), I obtained invaluable factual information from these archives relating to Uzbek religious detainees and refugees, including many cases where Muslims were accused of extremism and terrorism without a valid reason, forcing them to flee the country. I was also able to interview important informants whom I would not have been able to access without help from these organizations. Each case consists of different documents such as personal information, pictures, summaries of individual cases, copies of court documents, voice-recorded interviews, and interview transcripts. Many cases are organized by year and include key words, making it relatively easy to locate documents relating to certain incidents. First, I received digital copies of the documents belonging to an individual recruited by the human rights organization, allowing me to learn about each individual case before the interviews took place. I wrote down additional questions that surfaced while I was reviewing cases and asked these questions during the interviews. This was a very effective process that provide me context as to the very complex experiences of my participants, serving as a source for fact-checking in many cases and allowing me to dig deeper during the interviews. 91 After finishing most of my interviews, I travelled to Paris for two weeks to review more documents. I also looked at non-digital materials for other cases, such as forced disappearances and the cases of victims I was not able to interview. I video recorded Mutabar Tajibayeva, the leader of the Fiery Hearts Club, providing an overview of each case. I photocopied the relevant documents and organized them in separate folders, as they were in the archive. Content analysis is generally described as a thorough, detailed, systematic analysis of a particular body of work, including but not limited to written documents, transcribed materials, photographs, pictures, video, and audiotapes, in an effort to identify patterns, biases, and meanings (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005; Neuendorf, 2017; Berg, 2007). Content analysis of the archival documents helped me to see the established patterns of disappearances of religious authorities, fraudulent arrests and incarcerations, and immoral treatment of the families of accused Muslims. Archival research also allowed me to review factual documents such as court decisions, reports, pictures, letters, and interview transcripts for each case. The knowledge and precision of the leaders of these human rights organizations was a huge asset to this research. These four methods together allowed me to study the revival of Islam and the very complex and multifaceted relationship between Islam and the secular state in Uzbekistan. 3.3 SAMPLING, RECRUITMENT AND DATA ANALYSIS 3.3.1 Sampling, Recruitment and Entry to the Research Cite Mapping different categories of participants and ensuring a logical balance between opposing sides is called sampling (Berndt, 2020). Proper sampling helps the researcher to gather balanced data as well as to avoid bias, especially where the relationship between multiple conflicting groups and ideologies is the central focus of the research. The complexity of the 92 phenomena examined in this research encouraged and often required me to be critical in sampling and recruitment methods and practices. Selecting a similar number of participants from opposing sides was important to balance the voices and draw fair conclusions; however, there were fewer total participants representing the government and official Islam combined than the number of participants representing unofficial Islam in my study. There are two main reasons for that. First, the willingness and curiosity of the representatives of the government and official Islam were significantly lower compared to those who represented unofficial Islam and, therefore, were victims of oppression. Second, the experiences of the members of unofficial Islam provided significantly more data towards answering the questions of this research. Although the 36 informants from the government and official Islam allowed me to study their observations in relation to the revival of Islam, the relationship between the state and Islam, and their understanding of unofficial Islam, the experiences of the 50 members of unofficial Islam were ground-breaking. As observations, opinions, and experiences of male and female participants may differ, I aimed to recruit similar number from both sides. Unfortunately, it was impossible to recruit similar numbers of male and female participants because both government officials and ulama in Uzbekistan are mainly men. The recruitment of otinoyis within official Islam and families of the victimized members of unofficial Islam helped to partly tackle this issue. I interviewed 24 women and 63 men. The state in this research was represented by the lawmakers, politicians, and professors of the state-sponsored Islamic universities and schools who participated in government programs to observe, examine, and assess previously and currently incarcerated members of unofficial Islam; however, there was a blurry line. The state-represented Islamic educational facilities represented both the state and official Islam. Given their role as the state-authorized and state-funded bodies 93 in decision-making processes and the mutual support between the state and official Islam, it was logical to combine the number of the participants in these groups for sampling purposes. I used observations and interviews to recruit more participants, creating opportunities for more observations and interviews. Each of these methods, including the details about sampling, recruitment, entry, and further details about the claims made and the processes of the study are discussed in the following subsections. The participants in the first group are: a) government officials who directly or indirectly participate in decision-making processes where religion is concerned; and b) professors/instructors of Islamic schools in Uzbekistan, including the International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan, a state sponsored university located in Tashkent. Initially, I only included government officials in this group; however, over the course of my research, I learned that the government of Uzbekistan employs scholars and university professors to assist the government in identifying and legitimizing an orthodox Islam and examining religious inmates from unofficial Islam to determine whether their beliefs and support for unofficial Islam had changed. The university professors were not only responsible for differentiating between the official and unofficial Islam but also held determinative positions over people’s lives and wellbeing, as their reports were used to decide whether the alleged extremists should be released or further incarcerated. Scholars had regular follow-up conversations with previously incarcerated religious individuals during the probation period, after they were freed from prison, and these scholars reported their assessments to the government. Given that processes of demonizing members of unofficial Islam as enemies resulted from the formation of official Islam, I questioned why the responsibility for evaluating people seeking release from prison was assigned to scholars. Also, some of the professors I 94 interviewed were co-authors of books written about Islamic groups banned in Uzbekistan. Thus, it was important to interview these university professors for the purpose of this study. The participants in the second group were religious people whose views largely contradicted the views of the state-authorized or accepted Islam and those who were opponents of state politics. Many of the Muslims who follow unofficial Islam were jailed, disappeared, or even killed; however, a considerable number of them managed to leave the country to avoid prosecution, persecution, and harsh treatment. Therefore, I decided to interview both Muslims who left Uzbekistan because of their religious beliefs and Muslims who were in prison, who had been previously incarcerated, and the family members of those who were killed, jailed, or disappeared. The participants in the second group are divided into 3 subcategories: a) exiled Muslims living outside the country; b) currently incarcerated Muslims; and c) Muslims who were incarcerated and had been released from prison. Table 3.1 gives a fuller picture of the category and gender of the research participants. The third group of participants were the ulama and the members of official Islam. The official ulama includes the heads of the MBU and the imams in mosques, while members include followers of official Islam in Uzbekistan, which is the majority of Muslims in Uzbekistan. The breakdown of the interview participants can be found in Table 2. Sampling is a very important part of research. The right questions must be asked to the right participants to increase the quality of the research by obtaining pertinent answers. I used two sampling methods. The first method was purposive sampling, where the “elements selected for the sample are chosen by the judgment of the researcher” (Black, 2019 p. 232). This method focuses on a particular subgroup (Saunders et al., 2012) to choose participants whose knowledge and experiences can help to answer the questions being researched. This method allowed me to 95 target specific groups of participants. For example, the head of the MBU as part of official Islam, members of unofficial Islam who were previously or currently incarcerated for extremism-related charges, and the professors at the International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan enlisted to make judgements about imprisoned Muslim were participants whom I recruited through purposive sampling. The second method I used was snowball sampling, which further assisted me in identifying participants who had related experiences both inside and outside of Uzbekistan. Snowball sampling is “the most widely employed method of sampling in qualitative research…” and “often employed as particular effective tool when trying to obtain information on and access to hidden population” (Noy, 2008 p. 330). During or after interviews, mosque observations, and participation in religious meetings and ceremonies, I spoke about my research and let existing participants know that I was still looking for more participants to interview. Only one subsection of participants was recruited through methods other than the two identified. After obtaining permission from the Minister of the Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, I provided a list of the individuals I wanted to interview, which was formed from my review of the archival documents. I was granted permission to interview some but not all of the people named on the list. I also used observations and interviews to recruit more participants and interviews to create opportunities for more observations. These show that I could not follow the initial sampling and recruitment methods chosen for this research in all cases. Both of the main sampling methods have certain limitations. One part of the purposive sampling I used is called critical case sampling. Critical case sampling investigates a case to understand a certain event or phenomenon. I was interested in the practices and experiences of the members of unofficial Islam that led to them getting detained and incarcerated. I wanted to 96 know how they were surveilled, what kind of religious practices were considered as extremist or radical, and how those judgements were made. This purposive sampling led me to recruit Muslims who were currently and previously incarcerated. This group, however, was tightly controlled by the government, requiring me to obtain permission from and agree to cooperate with the officials to conduct interviews. One of the downsides of this cooperation was that the locations for the interviews were chosen by the government officials, leaving me as a researcher questioning whether the places were under audio or video surveillance and whether participants who shared sensitive information as part of this research would be putting themselves at risk. Also, these participants appeared to be fearful to talk about their cruel treatment because they saw officials nearby before the interviews took place. In purposive sampling, the sample population in each category has to be carefully considered and organized. Sometimes, it is hard to find and recruit informants with experience in certain processes. For example, recruiting the government officials and university professors was not easy. When recruited and interviewed, they were hesitant to share certain information. It took significant effort to establish relationships and convince these participants of the value of their participation in this research. One of the limitations of the snowball sampling in this research was that it was difficult to predict when and what kind of participants I would access. This type of sampling requires little effort for recruitment but may not produce relevant data. In other words, some of the participants were interested in participating in this research but provided little useful information for the purpose of this research. 97 Figure 1: List of Research Participants . 3.3.2 Data management and analysis During my fieldwork, I ensured all data were stored and secured safely. All devices and electronic data files used to store data were encrypted and password protected. I continually ParticipantsGroup 1The state and state-sponsored institutions (official Islam)Government officials 4 (males)2 (females)University Professors 5 (males) Group 2Unoffical Islam: Persecuted and exiled individuals a) Exiled Uzbek Muslimsb) Exiled governement officials a) 17 (males) & 4 (females)b) 6 (males) (a) Imprisoned Muslims(b) Their family members(a) 5 (males)(b) 7 (females)Muslims released from prison and their family 11 (males)Group 3Official Islam:Official ulamaMembers of official Islam15 (males) 11 (females)98 transferred collected data to the University of British Columbia’s (UBC’s) cloud-based data storage and deleted data from my computer when crossing borders to ensure the privacy of the participants in the event my computer was screened by border control services. I carried my field journal, my phone for voice recording, and my personal laptop with me at all times, but I ensured that none of these items were left unattended. All consent forms were copied into digital files and the hard copies were shredded before I crossed any borders. After returning from fieldwork, I downloaded all the data back to my computer to analyze. All the data will be kept for five years after publication of the thesis. At the end of the mandated five-year period, the hard copies will be shredded, and the digital data will be erased from storage devices. Most of the data was converted into a digital text, encoded, and then the codes were transformed into categorical labels and themes. I used NVivo, a powerful qualitative data management software that helps to develop an efficiently searchable warehouse of data (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). The field notes, interview transcriptions, archival data, and data collected from media observations were organized separately and grouped by the questions they could answer in two different sets of folders. NVivo allowed me to store and organize different types of data, link archival data with transcribed interviews, develop preliminary codes for interview data, refine the coding structure, and create themes for data analysis. An alternative to the traditional methods of manual data analysis, NVivo provides a set of tools that assist in undertaking an analysis of qualitative data and allows the researcher to visualize content and to link ideas and concepts in various stages of data analysis (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013 p. 2). The ability to create a Node tree in NVivo, in particular, helps to label the transcribed interview data using a hierarchy of main codes and sub-codes. For example, one theme in the research such as “Effects of the Soviet assault on Islam on the revival” can serve as the body of the tree and all 99 the information gathered through the four research methods can be linked to it, forming branches of the tree. This enabled me to visualize a general picture and have easy access to all of the detailed information, such as parts of an interview or a document from the archival study. NVivo is also very useful in analyzing the relationships between different themes and in refining the coding structure through the modelling function for codes. It presents new ways of looking at the collected data that allow the researcher to manage data and keep track of records, ensuring rigor in the process of data analysis. 3.3.4 Transcribing and translating interview data All interviews in this research were conducted in Uzbek, the primary language spoken in Uzbekistan. I am a native-born Uzbek and am therefore fluent in the culture and language. I used two digital recording devices to record interviews to ensure quality. For the most part, interviews were transcribed a few days following the interviews. Transcribing recorded interviews requires many important decisions regarding the level of detail to include and if the quality of the transcribed document is poor, it slows or negatively affects the analysis process (McLellan et al., 2003). In most cases, one recorded interview took four-to-six hours to transcribe; however, translating was even more complex and time-consuming compared to transcribing. Translating interviews involves understanding the idioms and expressions used in conversations. Excessive use of Quranic terms by some participants, for example, made the translation processes more challenging. Many conversations could not be translated word-for-word, as this robs conversations of their meaning (Nikander, 2008). I listened to the interviews numerous times and carefully read the transcripts to ensure I conveyed both the meaning and the tone in the translation (Temple & Young, 2004). In an attempt to retain the cultural context, 100 particularly when I could not find appropriate English words to convey the meaning of certain expressions, I kept the original words in Uzbek and wrote the English meaning in brackets. 3.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 3.4.1 Institutional ethics and risk management This research was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the UBC’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board (BREB). The relationship between the secular state and Islam is a very sensitive topic on which to conduct research in many parts of the world today. Therefore, the research proposal underwent a review by the full BREB. The Board assessed this research as a medium risk, given the participant vulnerability and risk to the researcher due to the sensitivity of the topic. The BREB paid particular attention to the safety of the researcher and research participants, the informed consent of research participants, the benefits, and the procedures for the research before agreeing to sanction it. The research ethics board was very particular about the possible risk. As part of the safety protocol, the ethics board recommended registration with UBC’s Student Safety Abroad program, which enabled the researcher to maintain contact with UBC in order to receive assistance in the event of an emergency when conducting international research. The BREB also required me to get permission from the responsible institutions in Uzbekistan in order to conduct this research. Following the death of former president Islam Karimov in 2016, the political and legal rigidity towards religious matters eased (Peshkova, 2016); however, in order to prevent any potential political harm to the researcher or to participants and their families, requests for permission to conduct research in Uzbekistan were submitted to the NSS and the Supreme Attestation Commission at the Cabinet of Ministers of the 101 Republic of Uzbekistan. The Supreme Attestation Commission reviewed research proposals, consent forms, and interview questions prior to granting the necessary permissions on July 4, 2019, to conduct this research in Uzbekistan. However, conducting interviews with imprisoned individuals in prison required a separate permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. After a lengthy review the of my request, the second set of permissions were granted on December 1, 2019. I had to cooperate and collaborate with the individuals personally assigned by the NSS and Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan to be able to interview participants from these groups. My recent article (Komil-Burley, 2021) gives a fuller picture of the conditions of obtaining permissions and cooperating and collaborating with the state gatekeepers. I noticed that “identifying the right gatekeepers who can grant or deny access to research sites, obtaining qualifying permissions, and negotiating and collaborating with gatekeepers are important to gain access to and remain in the relevant research sites for the study” (Komil-Burley, 2021). 3.4.2 Data protection and privacy of the participants The protection of data and the privacy of the research participants were the primary concern of the institutional ethics board (Berg, 2007). Ensuring informed consent and voluntary participation, treating participants’ information in a manner respecting their safety and privacy, and respecting participants’ rights and interests were of primary importance in this research (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012). All participants in this research were over the age of 19. As noted during the interviews, some of the participants were from a lower socioeconomic background. To remove any possible influence that might negate the free consent of the participants, it was explicitly stated that there was no financial compensation for participation, only beverages and snacks; however, in one case I was touched by the financial difficulties one large family with six 102 children was experiencing and handed them one hundred dollars for compensation. Following the culture and tradition in Uzbekistan, as a first-time visitor I did not enter their homes empty handed; I picked up some sweets or fruits on my way to these interviews. The participants were aware of their “rights as autonomous persons to voluntarily accept or refuse to participate in the study” (Orb et al., 2001 p. 95). Through informed consent, participants were allowed to choose a pseudonym or to participate under their own names. All audio recordings and transcribed interviews were stored in the UBC drive for researchers and erased from the researcher’s computer prior to crossing any borders, to ensure that the data was not viewed by border control services. Data will be stored in the UBC drive for five years after the publication of the thesis; only my two supervisors, Dr. Luís LM Aguiar and Dr. Bonar Buffam, and I will have full access to data. 3.4.3 Complexities, challenges and ethical concerns during the fieldwork Institutional ethics seeks to foresee all possible risks related to the research under review; however, it is often unable to fully address the concerns with material, social, political, and power differences in research processes in international fieldwork (Sultana, 2017). The ethical concerns during the fieldwork were multifaceted. Each case required deliberate judgement and there was no singular concern I could not address appropriately. The permissions I received from the government of Uzbekistan often were not enough by themselves to convince participants that they could participate safely. I had to negotiate and cooperate with the hierarchy of gatekeepers to obtain consent for their staff to participate in my research. Some of the highly religious participants insisted on wearing full Muslim garb during the interviews and, often, mosques were the preferred places for interviews. As a Muslim researcher, I was prepared to dress appropriately and wear a veil out of respect for my religious participants. One of the participants 103 in Istanbul also asked me to bring a mahram (male member of my family) to meet him. Unfortunately, I did not have a family member with me. After back-and-forth negotiations, he provided an alternative offer to bring his wife, an offer I accepted. In a few cases, I was escorted by bodyguards and invited to lavish dinner tables, which raised serious ethical and safety concerns. I used institutional ethics as a defense, informing participants and officials that research ethics prohibits certain practices. In one case, after arriving in Istanbul, I contacted my first potential participant to set a time and location for our interview. The reply to my message was “please send me information about your hotel, one of my bodyguards will pick you up tomorrow at 10:00 AM.” Being in a foreign country where I did not know anyone, there was a significant risk posed by not knowing the situation into which I would be entering. The variety of requests resulting from the rigidness of beliefs were often intimidating; however, I tried to avoid being overly concerned about reflexivity and positionality, which could paralyze me in the middle of the fieldwork (Nagar, 2002). I wrote detailed notes about my locations and situations in the Student Safety Abroad, left contact information with hotel reception, prepared myself mentally, and tried my best to avoid risks, keeping in mind that “ethical research is produced through negotiated spaces and practices of reflexivity that is critical about issues of positionality and power relations at multiple scales” (Sultana, 2017 p. 374). 3.4.4 Paradigmatic positioning and reflexivity Understanding the researcher’s role as part of the social world being investigated, or reflexivity, is one of the most important elements in qualitative research (Boyle, 1994; Berg, 2007). For Harding (1988), it is knowing the researcher’s position that makes research comprehensible. The research questions that guided this project have emerged based on many 104 years of my own personal experiences. In the summer of 2002, I was told by Uzbek government officials to leave the country that night due to my involvement in social and political activism. Therefore, I am aware of the structural qualities and the randomness of the political and legal decisions in Uzbekistan, which helped me to understand the routes taken by those Muslims who survived fabricated criminal accusations. In 2015, I went through numerous long interviews with officials in the NSS of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the fabricated case against me was dropped as a result. However, these conversations allowed the high-level officials to get to know me more closely. After a few unsuccessful attempts to obtain permission to conduct research in Uzbekistan, I contacted those officials directly. The permissions were granted. Being an active supporter of democratic governance in Uzbekistan and continually participating in international conferences on socio-political issues in Central Asia, participating in relevant TV shows, publishing non-academic articles and providing feedback for news analysis in Uzbekistan helped me to build a strong network with numerous leaders of religious, political, and human rights organizations. I met many experts who are involved with various parts of the research topic, such as former Uzbek presidential candidate, poet, and leader of the political opposition to the government of Uzbekistan Muhammad Salih, who was accused of involvement in Islamic extremism and terrorism and who found refuge in Turkey in 1993; the leader of the Fiery Hearts Club international human rights organization, Mutabar Tajibayeva, who had been kidnapped, jailed, and tortured by officials of the government of Uzbekistan before the Andijan bloodshed; Abdurahim Pulat, the leader of the Birlik Party, who was assaulted and left the county in 1993; Muhammad Salih Abutov, who was jailed for involvement in Wahhabism; Jahongir Mamatov, the co-writer of the declaration of independence of Uzbekistan, a politician and author who lives in the USA; Kamoliddin Rabbimov, a political 105 analyst who found refuge in France after leaving the country because of political pressures, and many other knowledgeable people. These people’s participation in my research as an informal research team served as an invaluable asset for my research. They also played a significant role in the recruitment of government officials for interviews. My familiarity with the region, Uzbek culture, and Islamic traditions, as well as my fluency in English, Russian, and Uzbek, eliminated the cultural and language barriers that might otherwise obstruct this research. Given my experiences, my partnership with human rights organizations and former government officials, and my active participation in the analysis of socio-political issues in Uzbekistan over the past twenty years, I was uniquely positioned to undertake this research, which yielded important insights into the global trajectories of secularism, Islamic revivalism, and post-Soviet forms of nationalism. In this study, reflexivity was a guiding philosophy when working with different groups of people in order to ensure their safety and well-being while conducting a gold standard of research. Reflexivity is not an act of “looking harder or more closely, but of seeing what frames our seeing” (Lather, 1993 p. 675). My positionality as an insider-outsider researcher (Komil-Burley, 2021) also produced challenges and gave me many moments of discomfort, confusion, and fear over the course of this research. As an insider, reflexivity was a critical analytical tool for addressing my own subjectivities while participating in various social research processes. For example, over the course of my research, I noticed that religious Muslim men preferred mosques as a location for meeting with a female researcher for an interview or a conversation when presented with a few different options. Not all my meetings in mosques were for interviews; in some cases, I was contacted by someone who wanted to have a conversation but was not interested in formally participating in the research. I decided to take advantage of 106 those opportunities when someone had something to say, even if it wasn’t an interview. I always wore proper Islamic attire, including a veil, when I entered mosques, to avoid unnecessary attention and tension. Although I occasionally saw groups of tourists and families visiting shrines together, mosques are male-dominated spaces in Uzbekistan. Sometimes I felt that I was the only female in the entire mosque. Once, I asked a participant in jest: “why do men prefer meeting with me in a mosque? What is separating me from those women who are not usually welcomed in mosques?” He laughed, saying “it is not you who is different from other women... maybe a little.” After a pause, he added, “when [a] man and [a] woman is alone, Shaytan (Satan) is the third partaker in that meeting, whispering (waswas) in the ears of both [the] man and [the] woman. Although mosques are not immune from Shaytan, one is in a right place to seek refuge with Allah from him. The men who prefer mosques to meet you are perhaps doing so for your and their own safety from Shaytan.” Being Muslim and Uzbek, growing up in Uzbekistan, and speaking the languages spoken in the country qualified me as an insider, yet living outside the country for a long time and conducting research through a Western university were the reasons why my identity was questioned. As an outsider, the intensified religious sensibilities since I left the country required an extra level of perceptiveness and compliance with my participants’ beliefs. It is the researcher’s “internal dialogue that repeatedly examines what the researcher knows and how the researcher came to know this” (Berg, 2007 p. 179). Throughout the research, I sought to ensure trustworthiness, validity, reliability, and credibility at every stage to make sure that my research was conducted in a rigorous manner. Credibility is a key component of any research (Merriam, 2009; Berg, 2007; Bloomberg and Volpe, 2012). Ensuring methodological validity was the most important part of designing this research. The supervisory committee 107 repeatedly discussed, questioned, and considered whether the logic of the chosen methods was appropriate given the scope and the purpose of this research. Generalizability was not the focus of this study; however, to establish transferability, the “speculation on the likely applicability of findings to other situations under similar, but not identical conditions” (Patton, 1990 p. 489), I used multiple methods for data collection, different sources of data, and recruited a variety of participants and participant groups with different experiences and perspectives. I used purposive sampling techniques, meaning that participants were selected with the explicit purpose of obtaining “information-rich cases that can illuminate the use and meaning of particular concepts within particular settings” (Patton, 2015 p. 291). It also meant stopping the collection of data once no new categories were ostensible. 3.5 CONCLUSION This chapter outlines how the research methodology was designed and the main steps taken to gather and analyze data. I draw a roadmap by providing brief information about the chapter, research questions, and the rationale for conducting this research in Uzbekistan. I give detailed-yet-precise information about the demographics, religion, and status of religious freedom in the country and how these informed my decision to study this phenomenon in Uzbekistan. Islamic revival is a multifaceted form of social activism and engagement with Islam. Revival of Islam in Uzbekistan changed the relationship between the state and Islam, leading to the paradoxical governance of official and unofficial Islam. The rationale for the research design explains the reasons for choosing multiple research methods to gain better knowledge and to reduce or eliminate misconceptions. 108 The majority of this chapter was spent explaining research methods and the processes of data collection, followed by the description of data management and the methods used for data analysis. In the final part, I discussed ethical considerations including institutional ethics and the challenges and complexities I experienced during fieldwork. My position as a researcher and how that has helped me to carry out this research, as well as my awareness of my position during the study, is explained in the final part of the chapter. 109 CHAPTER 4: SITUATING OFFICIAL ISLAM IN “SECULAR” UZBEKISTAN 4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER The introduction of Islam to Central Asia, which occurred between the 7th and 10th centuries, started with the invasion of the region by Arab Muslims. The so-called “Islamic Golden Age,” a period of thriving of culture, art, and science in the Muslim world,41 is another historical period often highlighted in the broad chronicles of Islam in Central Asia. Islam underwent various pressures and assaults by different invaders. Mongol invasions of Central Asian khaganates, for example, caused some of the greatest devastation in the history of Islamic civilization. The Russian Empire’s annexation of the land during the second half of the 18th century was another turning point for Islam in the region. The establishment of the Soviet Socialist government and adoption of the Communist ideology based on Marxism and Leninism, followed by Uzbekistan becoming one of the republics of the Soviet Union (1924), led to the harsh repression of Islam from the 1920s to the 1940s. The establishment of the SADUM in 1943 and the formation of official Islam with a small number of ulama led to the further fragmentation of Islam. Following these periods, the weakening of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the resurfacing of Islam during that time, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the independence of Uzbekistan in 1991 provide both cinematic imagery and a broad context for the historical occurrences discussed in Chapter 1. This chapter provides an account of how the Soviet assault on Islam affected the relationship between the state and Islam and how the methods of governance practiced in the 41 There is no agreement about the time period of the Islamic Golden Age. Some historians argue that the period ended with the collapse of the Abbasid caliphate due to Mongol invasions in 1258. Others link the end of that period with the Timurid Renaissance around 1350, and more modern historians believe that the Islamic Golden Age continued until the end of 16th century or even until the 18th century. 110 Soviet Union, such as eliminating any form of opposition, installing strict control over society and social institutions, and using fear to achieve compliance, informed the governance of post-Soviet Uzbekistan. Understanding and explaining the claim of secularity based on the state’s administrative, legal, and political framework requires in-depth analysis of the construction of official religious authority and its relationship with political power in Uzbekistan. I argue that the radicalization in the relationship between the state and Islam is dialectical and relational: past interactions between these institutions are responsible for later developments. This is one of the main arguments of the thesis which I discuss in this chapter. One of the main differences between the Soviet state and the government of post-Soviet Uzbekistan is that the Islam Karimov government’s problem was not with Islam, but with opposition to his government. Islam was used as a political tool; the paradoxical approach to the governance of Islam, creating an official Islam and sponsoring it, on the one hand, while oppressing unofficial Islam, on the other hand, is evidence for this claim. Unofficial Islam in Uzbekistan is also a complex phenomenon. It includes a handful of politically motivated Muslims who use Islam a tool for their opposition to the government and a large number of Muslims and Islamic groups who were ostracized and demonized by the government of Uzbekistan in its fight against extremism. Re-establishment of official Islam played a vital role in the creation of an “enemy” in the picture of unofficial Islam. In this chapter, I will focus on official Islam, while the discussion of unofficial Islam will continue in the next chapter. 4.2 THE SOVIET STYLE OF GOVERNANCE AND INDEPENDENT UZBEKISTAN 4.2.1 Roots of Islamic revival in Uzbekistan: three generations of Islamic revivalists To analyze the progression of Islamic revival, I considered the history of three generations of Islamic leaders. The three generations of well-known religious leaders in Uzbekistan, Sheikh 111 Hindustani, his pupils Sheikh Abduvali Qori Mirzaev and Sheikh Obidkhon Qori Nazarov, and their pupils imam Tohir Yo’ldosh and Jumaboy Hojiyev, were connected through ustoz-shogird (teacher-pupil) relationships. Muhammadjan Rustamov (1892-1989), better known by his epithet Domla Hindustani, studied at madrasas in Kokand and Bukhara in Uzbekistan (Babadzhanov & Kamilov, 2001). When Jadid Muslim reformers were purged in the late 1920s, Domla Hindustani left Uzbekistan. He lived in Afghanistan and India and studied the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam at the Usmania Madrasa in Ajmer, India, before returning to Uzbekistan in 1929. In the chapter titled Muhammadjan Hindustani (1892-1989) and the Beginning of the “Great Schism” Among the Muslims of Uzbekistan, Babadzhanov and Kamilov (2001) provide decades of observations of Islamic revival from within, conversations with local Islamic authorities, and a unique analysis of Islam in Uzbekistan. The establishment of the SADUM during WWII led to the formation of two Islamic educational institutions in Uzbekistan where a handful of ulama were permitted to study and practice Islam. That was the marker of the revival of official Islam in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan. Unofficial Islam also revived underground. The roots of the revival of unofficial Islam in Uzbekistan started at the time when Domla Hindustani was teaching Islam secretively starting in early 1960s. According to Babadzhanov and Kamilov (2001), Domla Hindustani started to teach Islam privately in hujra to a small group of pupils illegally, for which he was jailed three times between 1933 and 1953. Olcott (2012) states that Hindustani “was a major figure during the Brezhnev years, teaching pupils privately without the permission of the Soviet authorities” (p. 8). Domla Hindustani was not part of official Islam, which was formed in 1943. His relationship with official Islam in the Soviet Union was very complicated (Olcott, 2012). His 112 teachings were rooted in the conservative Hanafi tradition, and he did not demonstrate much interest in modernizing or reforming Islam. Instead, he was interested in purifying Islam to its origins (Babadzhanov & Kamilov, 2001). People in the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan have always had distinctive connection with Islam and many well-known ulama from the Fergana Valley were Domla Hindustani’s pupils, including the first Grand Mufti of the MBU and head of official Islam Sheikh Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf; imam Abduvali Mirzaev, who disappeared from the international airport of Tashkent in 1995; and imam Obidkhon Nazarov, who was shot in Europe and was fortunate to survive. Babadzhanov and Kamilov (2001) believe that Hindustani continuedly “engaged in open or written disputes” (p. 306) with other ulama and even with his own former pupils. As Babadzhanov and Kamilov (2001) state, From his point of view, it was very undesirable to employ coercive methods in the struggle for the faith (ai-Jihad as-saghir). Hindustani believed that one should resort to such methods only when the prospects for success were beyond doubt. Otherwise, he argued, it was a still greater sin to doom oneself and other Muslims to senseless self-destruction at the hands of a stronger adversary (page 307). Hindustani maintained a critical view of the activities of the SADUM, which became the MBU following the independence of Uzbekistan, especially “those of its fatwas that delegitimized the customary Hanafite rituals” (Babadzhanov and Kamilov, 2001 p. 309). Despite that, one of Hindustani’s pupils, Sheikh Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf, became the first Grand Mufti of the MBU. Thus, his pupils ended up in both official and unofficial Islam in Uzbekistan. An observable case of unofficial Islam’s revival, known as Mujaddidiya, gained ground in the Ferghana Valley at the end of the 1970s and later spread to the other regions of Uzbekistan (Exnerova, 2017). The term “mujaddid” refers to a Muslim who brings renewal and purity to Islam. The members of the Mujaddidiya were called “young mullahs” and their focus was on reforming Islam in their local communities. They started to teach their own courses, actively 113 endorsing Islamic clothes and practices. Over time, radicalization of the Mujaddidiya members against the Soviet government and the standards colonizers brought to society such as the consumption of alcohol, prostitution, styles of clothing, and more were observable. In the city of Namangan, they reportedly attacked modern weddings, broke into houses and shops to confiscate alcohol, smashed bottles, assaulted uncovered women, and even said to their parents, “you are no longer my father or mother if you do not read Namaz (prayer) five times per day or wear the hijab” (Exnerova, 2017 p. 64). Many people in the region became concerned about the “unknown phenomenon and the apparent strength of this version of Islam” (Exnerova, 2017 p. 53). Babadzhanov & Kamilov (2001) also review the Mujaddidiya movement and suggest that the leaders of the SADUM were aware of it and disapproved of the activities of the Mujaddidiya members (Babadzhanov, 2015). The revival of Islam at the end of the 1980s resulted from the “quest for spiritual and moral values” (Khalid, 2007, p. 117) in the light of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Glasnost. Various nationalist and religious political parties and movements started to form in Uzbekistan, including Birlik (Unity), Erk (Liberty) and Islomiy Uyg’onish (Islamic Renaissance), though they struggled to obtain official recognition and registration of their organizations. Local manifestations of various Islamic groups in the beginning of the 1990s, such as Islom Lashkarlari (Islamic Warriors), Adolat (Justice), and Tovba (Repentance), were observable right after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 in Namangan city (Naumkin, 2005). These Islamic groups, under the leadership of Tohir Yo’ldosh, demanded the declaration of Uzbekistan as an Islamic State (Khalid, 2007; Naumkin, 1992, Naumkin & Naumkin, 2005; Exnerova, 2017). As mentioned earlier, Tohir Yo’ldosh and his like-minded partner Jumaboy Hojiyev were pupils of Sheikh Abduvali Mirzaev (Ruzaliev, 2005; Collins, 2007; Khalid, 2007; Edil & Josua, 2018). This 114 marked the start of the politicization of Islam (Esposito, 1999; Mozaffari, 2017) and the treatment of these groups as Muslims on the wrong path. Terms like Wahhabis, HT and Akromiya were used to ascribe strong political implications to Islamic fundamentalism, extremism, and terrorism in Uzbekistan (Haghayeghi, 2005; Ruzaliev, 2005). Jumaboy Hojiyev was a former paratrooper who served in the Soviet Air Forces in Afghanistan from 1987-1988 (Mamatov, 2003). Both Tohir Yo’ldosh and Jumaboy Hojiev went into hiding in Uzbekistan when Karimov started mass persecution of the members of the Islamic groups in Namangan. According to archived documents from the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan dated November 17, 2000, Tohir Yo’ldosh and Jumaboy Hojiyev left Uzbekistan on August 22, 1992, and joined the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan. These documents state: Tohir Yo’ldosh and Juma Namongoniy joined the militant forces that were fighting against the lawful government in Tajikistan and made plans to override the constitutional government in Uzbekistan. They persuaded their supporters from Ferghana Valley to leave Uzbekistan and join them in Tajikistan. They formed a “Namangan” military battalion. Tohir Yo’ldosh announced himself as the Amir and Juma Namongoniy the military commander of the Islamic Jihad Union.42 Tohir Yo’ldosh and Juma Namongoniy and their Islamic groups felt deceived by Karimov because he had promised that he would address their requests before the presidential elections, but instead started rapidly jailing the members of their groups after the elections. After leaving Uzbekistan, the leaders of some of these groups founded the IMU and the IJU (Rashid, 2002), which formed alliances with the Taliban and al Qaeda and brought followers of Islam, young Uzbek men and women, closer to foreign radical Islamic organizations (Mann, 2002). Muslims who feared persecution left Uzbekistan to join these groups (Ruzaliev, 2005). IMU was viewed as the most serious violent nonstate actor in the region (Cornell, 2005). In 1999, the IMU declared war on Uzbekistan (Cornell, 2005; Naumkin, 2003). 42 Supreme Court of Uzbekistan on 17 November 2000. 115 Islam in Uzbekistan following independence was more politicized than ever. Two of Hindustani’s other well-known pupils, Sheikh Abduvali Qori Mirzaev and Sheikh Obidkhon Qori Nazarov, shared his views and were also critical of official Islam. Both Mirzaev and Nazarov were under the surveillance of the NSS and ultimately faced persecution at the hands of the government of Uzbekistan. Abduvali Mirzaev and his assistant Ramazan Matkarimov disappeared from the Tashkent International Airport on August 29, 1995, when they were scheduled to fly to Moscow to attend a conference (Olcott & Ziyaeva, 2008). The people who were with them in the departure lounge saw airport workers abduct them inside the airport after going through all the security checkpoints (Olcott & Ziyaeva, 2008). Obidkhon Nazarov left Uzbekistan to avoid persecution and was granted asylum in Sweden in 2006. On February 23, 2012, Obidkhon Nazarov was found unconscious, shot in the head four times. Fortunately, he did not die but he remained in a coma for six months. In the upcoming chapters, I discuss these two scholars further while analyzing my interviews with their well-known pupils. Some of their pupils were exiles who now live in Turkey and Europe after leaving prison and some of them were still in jail in Uzbekistan. Being able to interview these people provides significant insight for this research. Because of the prosecutions of followers of Islam, Muslims felt their inner circle was being targeted. They combined the groups Islom Lashkarlari, Adolat, and Tovba into the IMU and later tried to unite all jihadists under the name of IJU. Tohir Yo’ldosh and Juma Namongoniy continued working together in Tajikistan and Afghanistan (Naumkin, 2005). Tohir Yo’ldosh declared himself as the IMU’s leader with Juma Namongoniy as his military commander. According to Jahongir Muhammad,43 Juma Namongoniy became the most 43 Interview 052 (Jahongir Muhammad). 116 dangerous terrorist in the region. In addition to his role in the IMU, he held prominent positions in the Taliban. Namongoniy demonstrated his ability to attract and work with people from different national and ethnic backgrounds to create different forms of Al-Qaida in Central Asia (Esposito, 2009). In considering three generations of local Islamic revivalists in Uzbekistan, the heightened politization of Islam is notable. Hindustani taught in hujras secretly and his relationship with the Soviet form of official Islam at the time was complex. He got into trouble a few times and was jailed for eight years in total. Hindustani’s pupils Obidkhon Nazarov and Abduvali Mirzaev engaged in more overt forms of Islamic preaching. They also continually criticized official Islam and the repressive government. The forced disappearance of Mirzaev and the acts that drove Nazarov out of the country and led to him being shot indicate that the government of Uzbekistan, or state security forces to be precise, were very hostile towards both of these scholars despite not taking open, legal actions against them. The third generation, Yo’ldosh and Namongoniy, who were pupils of Mirzaev and Nazarov, openly engaged in political Islam or Islamism and organized extremist or terrorist organizations. While reviewing the repertoire of the interactions between the government and three generations of unofficial ulama, the continual radicalization of both sides becomes observable. Thus, I argue that the dialectical relationship between the state and Islam is the main cause of radicalization of both sides. I call this process dialectical radicalization. However, the repressive behaviour of the state towards Islam was not solely motivated by the radicalization of domestic Islamic groups and it dominated Islam in this relationship. 117 4.2.2 The legacy and the lingering effects of the Soviet rule For many centuries, Islamic tradition and Sharia law served as a basis for political, legal, and social affairs in Central Asia (Khalid, 2007). Hallaq (2012) argued that there was a chance for Islam to serve as a moral, legal, and political system for Muslims; however, this opportunity was lost because of the over seven decades of colonial destruction. As Oliver Roy (2007 p. 131) writes, The Soviets adopted a two-tiered policy toward Islam: to undermine and even attempt to destroy popular Islam, particularly the connections between national and religious identities, and to create a token, regulated, officially appointed clergy in order to manage the few remaining religious institutions and, after 1955, to improve relations with friendly Muslim countries. The scientific atheism of the Soviet state was not about separating the state and church, neutralizing religious influence in state affairs, or eliminating religion only from the public sphere. Instead, it sought to dominate Islam entirely. The social, political, and economic environment created by the Soviet state insisted upon this transition. The majority of Uzbeks adapted to the Communist ideology that infused modernization and secularization and, over time, they became secular Muslims. Over time, practices that were considered to be against Islamic principles, like drinking alcohol, eating pork sausages, or citing Darwinism as a story of creation, ceased to be seen as offensive by many secular Muslims. A relatively small group of intellectuals that emerged in Central Asia during this time continually questioned the Soviet dominance and repression of nationalist and religious sentiments and strived for the restoration of Islamic culture, national heritage and, most importantly, national freedom. The waves of the Soviet repression persecuted this group. Khalid (2007) gives a detailed overview of the violent Soviet campaigns against these Central Asian intellectuals. There was also a layer of traditionalist or fundamentalist Muslim authorities and their followers who remained, albeit in survival mode. As Khalid (2003 p. 573) states, “they 118 exist in a cultural milieu that, after seven decades of Soviet-style modernization and secularization, is not hospitable to them.” Any resistance or activism was crushed by the rigid Soviet policies. Islam’s historical predominance in the cultural, political, and legal realms is arguably a source of the persisting confidence in Islam’s ability to act as a governing institution. When the effects of the Soviet period are analyzed, it is important to consider the experiences of political, legal, social, and religious institutions separately: legal and political institutions were reformed, religious institutions were supressed, and society was subjugated under the pressure of reckless utopian transformation. Robert Crews (2009), in his book “For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Central Asia,” reveals the ways in which the Tsarist empire was constructed with broad Muslim support. Crews (2009) argues that while the Orthodoxy continued to be the state religion, Catherine the Great of the Tsarist Empire emphasised openness towards religious pluralism, which also included tolerance towards Muslims, as essential features of the Empire. Upon the invasion of Central Asia by the Russian Empire in the 19th century, however, support for the Muslim religion came into question. The Empire had issued an edict of toleration of non-Orthodox faiths, but the official policy disregarded Islam (Crew, 2009; Khalid, 2019). The former USSR was not simply an authoritarian secular state that excluded religion from state affairs; it aggressively sought to eliminate religion and reorganize Uzbek society according to Communist beliefs, principles, and laws. Under the rule of Joseph Stalin, the campaign of Hujum forcibly and rapidly changed the existing order in every aspect of Uzbek society (Khalid, 2007; Kamp, 2008). Soviets asked for facts if someone contested godlessness. The processes of abrupt secularization and the Soviet assault on Islam are well documented by 119 historians:44 mosques were destroyed, Islamic texts abolished, chains of oral Islamic knowledge damaged through the purge of Islamic scholars, and Muslims knowledgeable about Islam cut off from the rest of the world. As Akbarzadeh (1997) states, “churches of all denominations, including the Islamic establishment, were stripped of their religious assets. Mosques and madrasas were closed and waqf property was confiscated” (p. 73). The only channels of interaction with other Muslim countries, education, and military were completely atheistic (Khalid, 2007). The consequences of the Soviet assault on Islam (Khalid, 2007) were deep and left a lingering desire in many people to reconnect with the vanished intellectual, cultural, and spiritual treasure. Sebzor,45 a participant who retired after working in the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan for many years during the Karimov presidency, said, Killing the best of the nation… intelligent, knowledgeable, ambitious people, destroying intellectual wealth, our mosques and burning valuable books were a huge national loss, of course. But the biggest loss was the knowledge, our journey as a nation, pride of our ancestors and their intellectual treasures (madaniy meros). We lost nationalist mentality (milliy zehniyat) and became zombies. People started imagining Kremlin when they think about homeland. Our kids sang “Lenin bobomlar”46 and didn’t know who their actual grandfathers were. This is a tragedy. We lost religious values (diniy qadriyat) that kept us together. People started to have a hard time to differentiate “halal” from “haram”. Our mentality (zehniyat) was filled by the Communist and atheist ideals. That is not who we are. Now our people view Islam as the only way to return to these values. Schools taught that Islam was an “obsolescent residue.”47 Once Communist values and mentality were internalized, the guilt from violating Islamic principles and abusing national 44 For example, see Khalid (2007) for the Soviet assault on Islam, Khalid (2014) for the abuse of ulama by Bolshevism, Kamp (2006) for the secularization and forced unveiling of Uzbek women. 45 Interview 014 (Sebzor). Sebzor is a pseudonym. Interestingly, Sebzor was the name of the teahouse where we met for the interview. 46 Children’s song that was popular during the Soviet Union. “Lenin bobomlar” means “Lenin my grandfather” referring to Vladimir Ilich Lenin. 47 Interview 014 (Sebzor). 120 values largely disappeared from society.48 Another study participant, Zayniddin,49 had similar views. He said that “the Soviet government attacked the soul of the nation where national and religious values and mentality were located.” When burning books, turning mosques into warehouses, eliminating Islamic educators, pushing the doctrine of scientific atheism, and teaching children songs saying that Lenin is their grandfather are done continuedly to the point where there is no one left to teach Islam, no open mosque to pray, and no books to study, the soul of the nation is targeted. It is a cultural genocide. The Soviet state had a totalitarian strategy to abolish Islam from Muslim societies. Islam, however, was internalized in society and survived as part of culture and tradition and continued to serve as moral guidance for the majority of Muslim families in secularized Uzbekistan. Islam survived and underwent revival underground without institutional support and resurfaced when the political constraints upon it were weakened (Olcott & Ziyaeva, 2008). Kendzior (2006, p. 533) suggests that, As a vital component of identity, religion can exist without any clergy, place of worship, or understanding of sacred text, much as a nation can exist without a state or a government. The illusory aspects of religion, the comforts and mystery of rite and ritual, are as difficult for a state to control as national sentiment, and often prove the impetus behind the latter. Some Muslims invested in the Soviet discourses and became content with having Islam as a part of their culture and tradition (Sartori, 2010), yet “in the 1980s it was religiosity, malleable and stubborn, which proved as essential to the decline of the Soviet Union as did nationalism” (Kendzior, 2006). Therefore, reclaiming Islam as part of national heritage, building mosques and Islamic educational institutions, allowing religious publications, and increasing the number of 48 Interview 014 (Sebzor). 49 Interview 001 (Zayniddin). Zayniddin is a pseudonym. 121 Muslims attending pilgrimages to Mecca were the markers of moving away from the repressive governance of Islam. It was viewed as a celebration of Islam in the country. However, when it revived, it was not the same Islam anymore. It revived in a modernized and secularized world (Jones, 2017); it was further and more deeply fragmented, and it suffered through many attacks and struggles that were prolonged and intense. The Soviet hostility towards Islam and Uzbek nationalism was a common refrain in many interviews. Muyassar, the oldest participant in my study, told stories of her father, a local imam, being sent to Siberia and the erosion of trust between people in society because the KGB (State Security Committee) employed ordinary people to spy on their neighbors, friends, and family. Muyassar’s father was taken away because he said at one of the village gatherings that “this (Soviet system) can’t be forever, we will return to our own Muslim way of living (Musulmoncha hayot).”50 It was that easy to persecute someone to implement Marxist-Leninist secular utopian vision and colonize the region. “People in the village gained points by betraying one another. They just were afraid, they wanted to preserve their own lives by being closer to them (Bolsheviks),” Muyassar said. There is an observable parallel between what Arendt (1973) observes in society under totalitarian control and the memories of Muyassar about the social conditions in Uzbekistan under the Soviet rule. As Arendt (1973) argues, isolation, breaking social bonds and trust, and turning human beings into living corpses who lack any spontaneity or freedom are features of radical evil; they aren’t done for humanly understandable motives such as self-interest, but merely to reinforce totalitarian control. Muyassar51 also shared her personal experience of 50 Interview 013 (Muyassar Aya) 51 Interview 066 (Muyassar) 122 visiting Bahovuddin Naqshbandi Mosque in Bukhara in the 1960s. I found this story fascinating because of how Tariqa was celebrated in Uzbekistan after the independence and how it was restricted by the Soviet government. Muyassar and her husband offered to sacrifice a lamb in the Naqshbandi Mosque if they had a child. After years of longing, they had a baby boy and decided to fulfill their duty by sacrificing the pledged lamb. When they arrived at the village of Qasri-Orifon outside of the city of Bukhara, they learned that the doors to the mosque had been nailed shut with plywood and no one was allowed in. They turned back. According to Muyassar, not long after they turned back, her son started to show signs of illness and was not able to breathe properly. So, they tried once more to visit the mosque. There was a qorovul (security guard) to ensure no one entered to the mosque. After begging the qorovul for an extended period of time and explaining the situation, he whispered that they could come back after midnight, and he would let them in. They came back after midnight and peacefully entered the mosque through a back door for a few hours to cut the lamb, cook it inside the mosque, and then distribute the food in the nearby village. “The entire mosque was covered with thorns,” Muyassar aya said. Her descriptions of the ruined sacred place and the hardships involved in practicing their faith were a living history. She conveyed so much emotion in her description of how important that practice was to her. For her, restoring diniy qadriyat and reinventing madaniy meros meant giving Muslims back the freedom of embracing what they appreciate and what nurtures their cultural and spiritual needs. It felt ironic when she said “I prayed to Allah every day to take this Soviet government (sho’ro hukumati) away from our head. Alhamdulillah (thanking Allah) my Allah listened.”52 52 Interview 066 (Muyassar) 123 Bahovudding Naqshband was a recognized Islamic Scholar and the founder of the Naqshbandi Sufi order (Sultanova, 2011; Mullerson, 2014). Using the terms extremist or radical Islam to describe particular forms of Islam was not common during the Soviet Union, as everything about Islam was seen as radical, backward, and intolerable. Tariqa, however, was specifically targeted as being a radical, backward, and barbaric form of Islam during the Soviet period because of wide influence wielded by the Sufi orders. Soviet officials placed Sufism and Sufi imams under strict surveillance and stripped away Sufi endowments and wealth (O’Dell, 2017). The re-introduction and officialization of Sufi mysticism following independence brought the cultural, traditional, and spiritual aspects of Sufi tradition back as national identity. It shows the fluidity of what forms of Islam can be considered radical. Endorsing the Sufi order and reinventing the reputation of Sufi scholars was a sign of opening doors for both cultural and religious revival in Uzbekistan (O’Dell, 2017 p. 101). The lives of Muslims were often regarded as valueless and expendable by the Soviets. The director of the otinoyis, Oliya Otiniyi, told a story of how some Muslims were persecuted and how that affected people in that neighbourhood. “Otinoyi” is a germ used to refer to a female spiritual guide who provides Islamic guidance and mentorship to her followers. The role of female spiritual guide is as important as that of a male spiritual guide in Islamic tradition. Oliya Otinoyi’s parents lived in the Yunusobod region in the city of Tashkent in the 1930s. According to Oliya Otinoyi, there was a huge empty field on one side of the neighbourhood called Alvasti-ko’prik (Witch-bridge). In the 1930s, Bolsheviks would bring people to the Alvasti-ko’prik to shoot them, leaving the dead bodies out in the open. Oliya explained that, 124 people feared going to that site. On hot summer days, when the wind blew, it would smell horrible in the neighbourhood – said my mother. People knew where that was from, they said to their kids that Alvasti-ko’prik was haunted, so they should never go to that site.53 I was not able to confirm these facts with primary or secondary sources, but my intention here is to understand the role of those experiences in the recent revival of Islam and in the relationship between the state, Islam, and society. People giving their lives or having their lives taken for a cause mark it, whether it is religion or national values, as having a value comparable to that of life. Such experiences resonate through memory; it is a different iteration of the exercise of power. This sort of violence against Muslims abated following the death of Stalin, though it is noticeable from the interviews that many Uzbeks still feel angry and betrayed. One of the participants remembered his grandfather’s reaction while listening to President Gorbachev’s speech on television, when Gorbachev said “slava bogu” (thank God), on TV, my grandfather jumped up from the kurpacha54 and said with excitement, “Gorbachev said “slava bogu”, he believes in God, alhamdulillah, we got to see these days. I was often troubled of thinking, being put in a grave without janaza55. I’ll never forget his excitement and I saw… he was literally crying.56 Muhammadsalih Abutov’s story about his grandfather shows the longing for recognition of God, or religion of any kind, in society. It is important to notice that Allah in this speech is being projected onto any reference to God. Speaking with humour and metaphors are part of Uzbek culture, something noticeable during the interviews as well. While talking about Islam in the Soviet Union, Jahongir Mamatov said “the ulama in the Soviet Union were under strong narcotic 53 Interview 021 (Oliya Otinoyi) – Oliya is a pseudonym and Otiniyi is her status. 54 Kurpacha is a traditionally handmade mattress people sit or sleep on. 55 Janazan is a funeral prayer, (Janaza in Uzbek) 56 Interview 008 (Muhammad Salih Abutov) 125 intoxication. They started to return to consciousness at the end of the 1980s.”57 Muhammadsalih Abutov similarly joked: Islam was like a sleeping beauty, put in prolonged and static sleep by the bite of a Soviet apple, poisoned by the scientific atheism of the Communist ideology and its harsh propaganda. The spell was slowly broken as the Soviet system started to fail.58 While Abutov laughed after saying this, it reflects certain truths: Islam was not dead, but unconscious. Islam was revived by the kiss of liberation from the Communist ideology and the Soviet Union. The Soviet assault on Islam (Khalid, 2007) helps us to understand the revival of Islam and the relationship between the Karimov government and Islamic groups after Uzbekistan’s independence. Although there was an emerging powerful religious and nationalist establishment following Uzbek independence, the former Communists continued to control the government of Uzbekistan. As Muhammadsalih Abutov said during an interview, “the former Communists rolled over and became the frontrunners of the independence and national identity, and the promoters of the Islamic tradition. The head was still the same, they only changed their hat,”59 pointing out that the ruling elite in the independent Uzbekistan were the same political elite who served the Soviet government and fought against the nationalism and religion they now embraced. The Soviet incentives were deeply rooted and accepting a new way of governing was difficult. History was repeating itself during the Karimov government, which parallels with Hallaq’s (2012) argument that “the postcolonial nationalist elites maintained the structures of power they had inherited from the colonial experience… they often aggressively pursued the 57 Interview 052 (Jahongir Muhammad) 58 ibid 59 Interview 009 (Muhammad Salih Abutov) 126 very same colonial policies they had fiercely fought against during the colonial period (p. 2).” Official Islam, governed by the MBU, was created by the Karimov government from the SADUM of the Soviet Union (Khalid, 2007; Olcott, 1995; Hanks, 1994). The MBU’s functions are not all that different from the SADUM: managing Islamic publications and mosques, regulating the appointments of imams and otinoyis (Fathi, 1997), and organizing twice-annual Muslim pilgrimages and the celebration of Eid, two of the main Islamic celebrations (Henrik, 2011). The formation of an official Islam in the Soviet Union was consequential. The small number of people practicing and representing Islam publicly were insufficient to satisfy the needs of other Muslims, therefore underground Islam took root. Unofficial Islam viewed and still views the official ulama as traitors, enemies of Muslims, and the “puppets of the Communists,”60 while official ulama argue that they did what they could under the Soviet pressure to save Islam. Open conflicts between official and unofficial Islam can be observed through online debates between the members of both groups, which will be discussed in Chapter 6. Following independence, the Communist Party’s name changed to the People’s Democratic Party, with Karimov as the leader of the party. The need to secure consensus among the citizens of Uzbekistan emphasized why social change was necessary and was legitimate, comprehensible, and coherent within the state-created socio-political framework. The Karimov government intended to show that all chosen national and religious symbols were culturally rooted in order to internalize the proposed changes (March, 2003). Na’im (2008) rightly argues that the amount of power the state can exercise and influence the state can have over society 60 For example: Interview 054 (Mirrakhmat Muminov); Interview 059 (Ismigul); Interviews 008 and 011 (Muhammadsalih Abutov) used the same or similar descriptions of official Islam in Uzbekistan. 127 depends on people’s willingness to accept or at least acknowledge the state’s actions. Propaganda and the legitimization of its actions by the government, of course, plays a vital role in such processes. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the sole party allowed in the former USSR. Influenced by the reforms initiated by Gorbachev, multiple political and religious groups started to emerge in Uzbekistan at the end of the 1980s. On March 14, 1990, Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution was amended and marked the transition to a multi-party-political system. The E’tiqod (Belief) People’s Movement was founded by Fakhriddin Khudayqulov.61 When I asked Khudayqulov the reasons for organizing E’tiqod, he said, it was happening already; the progressive and radical atmosphere was evolving, and people were ready. Societal forces, both religious and nationalist, could become wild and unmanageable. We thought, we better take control of these growing wild breakers. Later, on July 11, 1990, E’tiqod became Birlik (Unity). Birlik was the first political and social movement founded by a group of anti-Soviet Uzbek intellectuals with the ambition of ending the Communist dictatorship and restoring national values. The organization had over 700 members, most university students, and thousands of supporters. That same year, the leaders and active members of the party, an intellectual class of politicians, writers, and scholars, brought thousands of people out to the central square of the capital for demonstrations, demanding the registration of the Uzbek language as the official language of the republic (Fane, 1996; Gleason, 1997). Enshrining the Uzbek language as an official language of the republic in the Constitution on October 21, 1989, was one of considerable steps towards the recognition of Uzbek nationalism. On April 30, 1990, Erk (Liberty) party was established. It was recognized as the first official opposition political party in the history of Uzbekistan. The founding congress of the Erk 61 Interview 084 (Fakhriddin Khudayqulov). Fakhriddin Khudayqulov currently lives in Toronto, Canada. 128 Democratic Party of Uzbekistan was held in the "House of Knowledge" in Tashkent and the party was formally registered by the Ministry of Justice. In 1990, the only Islamic political party, Islomiy Uyg’onish (Islamic Renaissance) Party of the USSR was established in city of Astrakhan. Branches of this party were also formed in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Abdullah Utaev, a professor at the Islamic Institute of Uzbekistan, became the head of the branch of the Islomiy Uyg’onish Party in Uzbekistan. According to a video interview with Abdulla Utaev which was published on YouTube,62 about three hundred Muslims assembled in Red Square in Moscow in 1990 to demand the permission to form an Islamic Party. They approached officials and, as a result, they were able to form the party. Abdulla Utaev continued as leader of Islomiy Uyg’onish party of Uzbekistan until his disappearance in 1992. After reviewing existing information on internet, I conducted an interview with Abdulla Utaev’s son, Ubadydulla Utaev,63 who lives in the USA. On January 26, 1991, Islomiy Uyg’onish organized its first congress in Tashkent. About 500 people participated. The Party confirmed a leader, Abdulla Utaev, and a committee consisting of twenty-five ulama members of the Party. The congress was interrupted by the armed forces of Uzbekistan, who detained many participants. The state-authorized religious leader Mufti Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf published two articles in the newspapers Komsomolskaya Pravda and Soviet Uzbekistan that criticized the Islomiy Uyg’onish. Islomiy Uyg’onish was ultimately never registered in Uzbekistan despite several attempts, remaining unofficial until its dissolution after Abdulla Utaev’s disappearance. According to his son, 62 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BWWvxcVcx3Q 63 Intervew 065 (Ubaydulla Utaev) 129 Abdulla Utaev went missing after being abducted by several gunmen on December 15, 1992, on Huvaydo Street in Tashkent. Two out three main opposition parties unsuccessfully attempted to register. Erk was the only party registered and its leader, Muhammad Salih, participated in the 1991 presidential elections. Right after the elections, the opposition was repressed. The leaders of Erk, Muhammad Salih, and Birlik, Abdurahim Polat, were exiled from Uzbekistan and sought political asylum to avoid persecution. The leader of Islomiy Uyg’onish, Abdulla Utaev, went missing, a consequence of his stubbornness to remain in Uzbekistan despite many warnings. While in exile, Muhammad Salih was blamed for the 1999 Tashkent bombings (Polat and Butkevich, 1991) and accused of terrorism. His two brothers and many of his compatriots were imprisoned and tortured in the prisons of Uzbekistan.64 One of the active members of Birlik, Ismoil Dadajonov, had his house burned while his family was inside it and Mutabar Tajibayeva, the leader of the Fiery Hearts Club international human rights organization, was kidnapped and tortured in jail. It was not much different than under the CPSU, though ironically the government of independent Uzbekistan framed its ideology based on the ideals of nationalist and religious parties and movements which the Soviets aggressively suppressed. Eliminating both nationalist and Islamic parties and other organizations and purging, jailing, or pushing the leaders out of the country show that the Karimov government viewed any opposition as radical (Bjelajac, 2001). I interviewed leaders of several of these parties: Muhammad Salih in Turkey, Abdurahim Polat in the USA, and Abdulla Utaev’s son Ubadydulla Utaev, also in the USA. From the interviews, I sensed that Karimov’s government was not specifically opposed to religion; rather, his politics were based on remaining in power as long as 64 Interview 013 (Muhammad Salih) 130 possible, eliminating any form of opposition to achieve that, and taking strict control of all aspects of society. The formation of tightly controlled official Islam and illegalization of other forms of Islam, therefore, suited Karimov’s needs. Polat & Butkevich (1991) argue that the Tashkent bombings were orchestrated by the government not only to legitimize the massive detention and persecution of Muslims in Uzbekistan, but also to further intensify it. Intimidating society to take control and manipulate through fear was a characteristic of both the Soviet and the Karimov governments (Babadzhanov, 2015) which, Arendt (1973) argues, is one of the essential characteristics of totalitarian control. The elite-engineered model of social fear was used to redirect attention away from the existing problems that impacted those who were in power (Jeffrey, 1995) and legitimize the actions of the government. Several participants in this study, including Muhammadsalih Abutov, Fakhriddin Khudayqulov, and Kamoliddin Rabbimov believe that the presence of extremism and terrorism in Uzbekistan was grossly exaggerated by the Karimov government. Kamoliddin Rabbimov,65 a former government official and political analyst, said that “there has been no extremism or terrorism in Uzbekistan to the extent that it could undermine statehood and social stability.”66 The Karimov government was viewed as a group of Communists who planned to continue the Soviet style of governance. Muhammadsalih Abutov said, After the independence, the communist Islam Karimov rolled over and became a national leader – a hero. He did not possess any national or religious mentality…(pause) He (Karimov) didn’t even speak Uzbek well. 67 65 Interview 045 (Kamoliddin Rabbimov) Kamoliddin Rabbimov is the participant’s own name that he consented to use in this research. Kamoliddin is a political scientist who specializes in Uzbekistan. 66 I met with Kamoliddin Rabbimov in Paris, France, where he has lived for over a decade after leaving Uzbekistan to avoid persecution during the Islam Karimov presidency and had two lengthy interviews. His book “The Civilization of Two Worlds: From Localism to Globalization. The Evolution of Islamic Civilization” was published in 2018. Some of Rabbimov’s comments are analyzed in different parts of the dissertation. 67 Interview 007 (Muhammad Salih Abutov) This participant participated under his own name. 131 Islam Karimov was raised in a Soviet orphanage68 where Russian was the operational language. Karimov’s inadequate cultural and religious knowledge and limited Uzbek language skills became very noticeable in light of cultural and national revitalization. It was also observed by Kendzior (2006; 2010) that Karimov barely ever spoke Uzbek, especially during the first few years after independence. The leaders of the pan-nationalist movements openly claimed democracy and secularism as a base for their political motivation while religious leaders were silent about it (Hanks, 1994). The rise of militant Islam in the Ferghana Valley shook the foundations of the newly established government in the early 1990s (Rashid, 2002). All nationalist and Islamic organizations and parties, except those who were in collaboration with the government, were repressed. 4.2.3 Three pillars of the new identity The independence of Uzbekistan was a symbolic marker of a new direction for the country. The ideas around religion, nationalism, and ethnicity started to reappear in the political rhetoric following independence as missing elements of Uzbek identity. Identity often indicates something that is “clearly defined, stable and fixed,” but identity formation is a “dynamic process involving deliberate choices” (An-Naim, 2008 p. 19). The proclamation of sovereignty in Uzbekistan coincided with the identification and declaration of a roadmap to nation building. Adams (2010 p. 10) states that “nation building through culture is an explicit political project in which a state attempts to unite its citizens and enhance its legitimacy as the representative of those citizens.” The political rhetoric of independence stressed the re-recognition of national 68 https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/26/background-on-islam-karimov-pub-47650 132 identity (o’zlikni tanish) as part of the well-exploited motto “Uzbekistan – the Future of the National Greatness” (Uzbekiston – Kelajagi Buyuk Davlat)69. National identity was based on three main pillars: the restoration of cultural inheritance (madaniy meros), strengthening nationalist mentality (milliy zehniyat), and putting emphasis on religious values (diniy qadriyat). These pillars signaled the use of nationalism, religion, culture, and the identity of the ancestors of the dominant ethnic group in Uzbekistan to build the new identity of Uzbek people. This proposal echoed through the country and was even included in the Odobnoma (moral education)70 and Ma’naviyat71 classes in elementary, middle, and high schools72 aiming to restore moral principles, raise ethical standards,73 and make connections with the nation’s past.74 Nation building in Uzbekistan included the construction of the national identity by answering the question of “who we really are,” uniting the nation around common purposes and shared symbols, highlighting the specifications of their uniqueness, and identifying the friendly networks and common enemies (Yerekesheva, 2021). However, the nation building project in Uzbekistan was reclamation of an identity that modern Uzbeks never possessed; it was based on a politically-imagined identity – the identity of long-disregarded ancestors, repressed religion, and deconstructed national archetypes. This was only possible by condemning seven decades of 69 This motto can also be translated as “Uzbekistan – the Future of the Great Nation” 70 There is no exact translation of this word. It means teachings of moral or rules of conduct. These classes are taught in schools to students from grade 1 to grade 12. 71 Ma’naviyat translates as spirituality in English; however, its Uzbek version does not stand for spirituality. It is more like moral and ethical education. 72 For example: Interview 023 (Karomat otinoyis) talked about the importance of Madaniy meros, milliy zehniyat, and diniy qadriyat in raising the younger generations; Interview 030 (Anvar Bo’ronov) said that those who are joining international terrorist organization have less national identity and religious values therefore they are finding themselves in the wrong paths: Interview 043 (Sardom Salim) believed that independence was mainly about reclaiming Madaniy meros, milliy zehniyat, and diniy qadriyat. 73 Interview 031 (Tillaeva. Otinoyi) 74 Interview 024 (Mukarram) 133 colonial rule and holding them accountable for the loss of cultural inheritance, nationalist mentality, and religious values. Two socio-political initiatives, Perestroika (restructuring) and Glasnost (transparency), within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were initiated by the Party’s General Secretary Michail Sergeyivich Gorbachev (Lane, 2002). They were organized to reform political and economic aspects of Soviet society and bring openness and transparency to allow the citizens to publicly discuss the issues they faced (Lane, 2002). Perestroika and Glasnost were pushing towards increased democratic reform. Kendzior (2006 p. 535) says that when visiting Tashkent in November 1986, Gorbachev called on the Uzbek leadership to “reinforce atheist propaganda among the masses” as part of an uncompromising effort against Islam. The changes from these policies were substantial in the central parts of the Soviet Union but progressed much more slowly in the Central Asian republics. Brown (1995) believes that the censorship of media was one of the main reasons for why Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika did not take root in Central Asia. He says that while the leaders of the republics “cite the threat of interethnic conflict as justification for restricting the press, other factors go farther to explain media's dependence on government” (Brown, 1995, p. 249). The reform targeted structural corruption and social issues. Perestroika and Glasnost became mechanisms that facilitated a large-scale change but independence, a product of these initiatives, became the mechanism that cut these positive changes short. The changes were overly “inconvenient.” A new wave of intellectuals who supported national, ethnic, and religious models for development emerged; however, Communists continued to rule the independent Uzbekistan. The Karimov government 134 easily reversed the changes initiated by Perestroika and Glasnost and installed a dictatorial government. As Nurulloh Muhammad Raufkhon75 stated, …those who desperately wanted independence and those who fought for the independence of our nation were left out, purged or pressured to leave the country, and the communists who were completely against it claimed ownership to the independence. When a significant part of our people was jeopardizing their lives and safety in search of freedom, these Soviet trained cadres were struggling to save the USSR, the Russian colony and afterwards, the fundaments of the Soviets. Arguably, the political elite in Uzbekistan was not interested in the independence of Uzbekistan but in remaining in power. Those who wanted national freedom and cultural and religious development were regularly removed by purging them or forcing them into exile. The intellectual community appeared to create too much discomfort for those in power. Members of the intellectual layer would be purged when they proposed new changes for national development, as their visions usually conflicted with the existing political elite’s interests. Islam Karimov was against the dissolution of the USSR prior to its break-up,76 meaning that the independence of Uzbekistan was, in a sense, thrust upon him. On August 29, 1991, two days before the announcement of the independence of the country, Khalq So’zi (People’s Word), one of the prominent newspapers in Uzbekistan, published Islam Karimov’s statement that he disagreed with Michael Gorbachev’s declaration of the dissolution of the Communist Party. He stated, Today, I want to assure you that we will no longer make any decisions without consulting the Communists and without taking into account the views of the members of the Plenum of the Central Committee. I absolutely do not agree with Gorbachev's decision to dissolve the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). He has the right, of course, to resign as Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, the question of the party's self- 75 Interview 063 (Nurulloh Muhammad Raufkhon) 76 For example: Interview 013 (Muhammad Salih) – leader of the Erk Party and the opponent of Islam Karimov in the 1991 elections; Interview 063 (Nurulloh Muhammad Raufkhon), writer and publisher; Interview 052 (Jahongir Muhammad) – one of the authors of the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 135 dissolution and the fate of the party's property must be decided by the Plenum or the party congress77. Clearly, neither the independence of Uzbekistan, nor the restoration of madaniy meros, milliy zehniyat, and diniy qadriyat were part of Karimov’s political agenda initially. The people who sought to restore madaniy meros, milliy zehniyat, and diniy qadriyat were inspired by the Jadid intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s. Muhammad Salih, Abdurahim Polat, Jahongir Muhammad, Abdulla Utaev, and many other activists were the neo-Jadids of the 1980s and 1990s and ultimately faced a similar fate. They made the Uzbek language official, crafted the Declaration of Independence, and insisted that the Karimov government adopt it, which the Supreme Council of the Soviet Uzbekistan did on June 20, 1990, well before independence.78 The process of Islamic identity formation in Uzbekistan is an important and central part of Islamic revivalism. Muslims in Uzbekistan were negotiating their identity with the state in the process of finding their identity within Islam. The separation of Islam into official and unofficial and the introduction of the term “adashganlar” by the Karimov government led to widespread religious persecution. Which forms of Islam were accepted or rejected was a purely political decision, as it was when the Soviet Union established an official Islam. There is no justifiable evidence for partitioning Islam in such a way. The imperative of preserving the safety and stability of the country was promoted by the elites who controlled the state. As Sengupta (2003) notices, the revival of Islam as a distinct marker of nationalist identity in post-Soviet Uzbekistan is definitely a political construction of the new nationalist elite which threatens to reduce Islam into 77 This statement was published on August 29, 1991, on the first page of the Khalq So’zi published under the name of Islam Karimov. Karimov was the last First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan between 1989 and 1991. 78 For example: Interview 013 (Muhammad Salih) – leader of Erk and the opponent of Islam Karimov in the 1991 elections; Interview 063 (Nurulloh Muhammad Raufkhon), writer and publisher; Interview 052 (Jahongir Muhammad) – one of the authors of the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 136 a monolithic block, ignoring the myriad Sufi and pre-Islamic religious traits of the people of Central Asia (p. 364). Motivated by the idea of locating proposed social change within the Uzbek cultural history and historical identity, the Karimov government promoted locally available sources of Islamic education to build an official Islam. Values considered to be profoundly religious, culturally rooted, and deeply internalized were used as a political tool to great advantage (Adams, 2010). This was the safest road for the Karimov government. 4.3 OFFICIAL ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN 4.3.1 Establishment, Structure and Function of the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan As mentioned earlier, the Islamic governance organization in Uzbekistan after its independence was a recreation of the SADUM of the Soviet Union. The first Muslim Spiritual Assembly was established in 1788 in the Russian Empire. In the early 1920s, the Muslim reformers’ initiative to modernize Islam was seen as consistent with the Soviet goals and local Muslim boards were established; however, this did not last long (Khalid, 2007). Once Uzbekistan officially became the part of the former Soviet Union in 1924, Islam was placed under repressive control. The Hujum campaign of the Communist Party steered the forced unveiling of women, closure of mosques, destruction of Islamic content, persecution of Islamic leaders and Muslim reformers, and rushed utopian reformation in all aspects of social life (Khalid, 2007 pp.71-77). In 1943, during World War II, the SADUM was established with its headquarters in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Given the limited scope of opportunities for religious freedom within the Soviet Union, the SADUM had various responsibilities including managing Islam-related affairs, training Islamic clergy, and supervising and organizing the publication of Islamic materials. 137 Three generations of Bobokhons served as the head of official Islam in the Soviet Union. Eshon Bobokhon inb Abdulmajidkhon was the first Grand Mufti of the SADUM, appointed in 1943. After Eshon Bobokhon inb Abdulmajidkhon, his son Ziyouddinkhon ibn Eshon Bobokhon continued his work, serving as Grand Mufti between 1957 and 1982. Then, the third generation, Ziyouddinkhon’s son, Shamsuddinkhon ibn Ziyoviddinkhon, was the next Grand Mufti of the SADUM and led the organization between 1982 and 1989. The SADUM was not spared from the chaos that erupted in the Soviet Union during the latter part of the 1980s. The forces opposing official Islam were apparent. The propaganda circulated by these anti-official Islamic forces led to riots, with people demanding the resignation of the Mufti Shamsuddinkhon ibn Ziyoviddinkhon in 1989. A picture of him dining with women was circulated as evidence of him being too much like the Communists and, therefore, unworthy of maintaining his position. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan established its own version of the SADUM, the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan,79 also called Muftiate (Khalid, 2007). The next Mufti, Sheikh Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf, was working as a rector at the Islamic Institute of Uzbekistan at that time. Sheikh Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf was seen as much more in line with the demands of the transitional period. It was a period of various internal conflicts between Muslims in Uzbekistan, official and unofficial ulama, and the government. The Karimov government also started cracking down on unofficial Islam. There were many differences between the ulama who studied in secret (in small rooms known as hujra) and the imams of the official religious administration. Hujra-educated ulama were trained in the anti- 79 In Uzbek, O’zbekiston Musulmonlar Idorasi. 138 Communist spirit. They were not sympathetic towards official Islam, viewing its followers as servants of the Communist regime. Mufti Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf struggled to unite these disparate groups. In 1992, he called for both official and unofficial ulama to meet around the table with the intention of eliminating internal conflicts and uniting ulama. The meeting was called Sulh, meaning peace through negotiation or dialog. Later, he published a book called “Conflicts, Causes and Solutions” (Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf, 2016) reflecting on his thoughts about the conflicts he encountered at that time. The dialog, however, was unsuccessful. The official and unofficial ulama could not form an alliance or dialog and all of those who participated in this meeting from unofficial Islam were persecuted by the Karimov government. Some of the unofficial ulama who participated in the meeting were Umarkhon domla from Namangan district, Abdullatif Qozi from Andijan city, Muhammad Sodiq Qori, imam Abdulhakim Bosiev, Abduvali Qori Mirzaev, who disappeared from an airport in 1995, and Muhammad Rajab Qori. These ulama later were accused of Wahhabism, Islamic sectarianism (Madhabparast), and Islamic fanatism (Mutaasib). Sheikh Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf contributed greatly to the advancement of the official Islam in Uzbekistan; in the meantime, however, opposition to him from other ulama also grew. The former Grand Mufti Shamsuddinkhon ibn Ziyoviddinkhon, who still held great influence among officials in Tashkent, was working as an ambassador in Egypt at that time. He was sympathetic to the Mufti's opponents. In 1993, Sheikh Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf was forced to leave his position and the country. The two Grand Muftis of the MBU between 1993 and 2006, Mukhtorjon Abdulloh Bukhoriy and Abdurashid Qori Bahromov, fully cooperated with the Karimov government. They 139 did everything that the government asked them to do. As Muhammadsalih Abutov recalled during the interview, During the Tashkent bombings in 1999, I was in Tovoqsoy jail. One day after the bombings, I was watching TV when the Mufti Abdurashid Qori announced a new fatwa. He said, “do not allow marriages between your daughters and sons and the members of Hisb-ut Tahrir and Wahhabis or their children, do not shake hands with them, do not visit them if they are sick, and when they die there should not be janaza for them (Islamic funeral ceremony).” I have not heard of such a fatwa being given by ulama against godless, pagan polytheists, Jews, Christians, or any other category before. I will not say nothing about how compatible this fatwa is with Islam. It has nothing to do with Islam. In 2000, President Islam Karimov brought Sheikh Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf back from Egypt. Karimov wished to use him against various radical groups that had emerged at the time, but the Sheikh was no longer involved with the MBU. On August 8, 2006, Usmankhan Alimov was appointed as the Grand Mufti of the MBU, replacing Abdurashid Qori Bahromov. The Grand Mufti of the MBU, therefore, was no longer elected at the MBU’s congress but was personally appointed by President Karimov. Usmonkhon Alimov remained as the Grand Mufti until his death in August 2021. The MBU and the ulama registered with this agency are often referred to as official Islam. Official ulama consist of Islamic scholars and authorities who are employed by the state. Official Islam is theoretically separated from the state, with the state asserting there to be separation between the state and church. During my fieldwork, I had the chance to spend some time in the MBU and interviewed eleven members of the Board, including Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur,80 the second-highest authority in the MBU after the Grand Mufti of Uzbekistan. Much of the information about the MBU was collected from the interviews with these authorities. The MBU was re-established in 1992 after the independence of Uzbekistan and called the Mawarannahr (Transoxiana) Muslim Board. In 1996, the name was changed to the MBU, and its 80 Interview 017 (Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur). 140 structure and function were expanded. The agency manages religious affairs among Muslims in Uzbekistan, issues fatwas, makes decisions about religious holidays and social issues, establishes training programs, certifies male and female imams, and appoints imams to mosques. The MBU publishes a monthly magazine called Hidoyat and a weekly newspaper called Islam Nuri and also controls the volume and content of Islamic publications across the country.81 Every religious book in the country is authorized by the MBU and also approved by the CRA. Financially, beside the government subsidy, MBU is also supported by donations from Muslims to mosques, revenue from subsidiary farms, and also from the publication of religious books. Three participants talked about the large amount of money generated through mosques and the increased corruption in the system. One of the government officials82 thinks that the reason for the regulation of Islam by political elite is not only political but also financial. He has a specific view on the reasons behind the proliferation of imams and those who want Islamic education, stating that “ironically, non-profit Islamic institutes became a highly profitable business. People like to invest in their afterlives more than schools and other worldly stuff these days. Most of those who are pursuing Islamic education are either after the reputation of being religious (dindorlik maqomi) or the easy money they can make.”83 By the “reputation of being religious,” Ulugbek is also pointing out the parallel between religiosity and morality made in society while claiming that there are financial motivations behind the increased interest in Islamic education. The Office of the Supreme Council is the highest governing body in the MBU. The Grand Mufti of Uzbekistan is the head of the MBU and the chairman of the Office of the 81 Interview 017 (Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur). 82 Interview 086 (Ulug’bek) He is one of the assistants of the head of the provincial government (hokim). 83Interview 086 (Ulug’bek). 141 Supreme Council. The Office of the Supreme Council has departments of law, international relations, education and training, and mosques and fatwas. Official Islam is often criticized for serving the government and therefore, having nothing to do with serving Allah and its ummah – the whole community of Muslims united under Islam. For that reason, Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur84 started the conversation by stating that the agency is separate from the state and independent from state influence. Considering the evidence that suggests otherwise, his repeated assertions about being free from state influence came across as a sign of a guilty conscience. The government placing one group of Muslims over others and whether the relationship between official Islam and the government should be called cooperation between Islam and the government, rationalization of the governance of Islam, or division of Islam in Uzbekistan is a discussion that will follow in this chapter. 84 Interview 017 (Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur). 142 Figure 2: Islamic hierarchy in Uzbekistan and its control by the government Figure 2 illustrates the Islamic hierarchy in Uzbekistan and its control by the government. The governmental organizations in this diagram are in blue and Islamic organizations are in pink. The arrows represent the direction of the influence and control. Figure 2 is an illustration of the how the government of Uzbekistan is monitoring and controlling the MBU through the CRA, which in turn governs everything about official Islam in society. The CRA is an agency that is accountable to the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan and is the main governing body that controls the MBU (Ohlsson, 2011). Although the MBU is presented in a way that implies that there is separation between the state and church, the CRA and MBU have a one-way relationship: the MBU is controlled and managed by the CRA. In other words, the Muslim Board is scrutinized and controlled by the executive branch of the government. The NSS actively participates in the processes of regulation of Islam; it is an PresidentChief of State Head of GovernmentExecutive Branch Cabinet of Ministers Legislative BranchSenate and Legislative Chamber and their local branches Judicial Branch Constitutional CourtSupreme CourtMilitary Court and their local branches Local Branches of THE MBU Regional Imams District Imams Municipal ImamsMosque Imams MUSLIM BOARD OF UZBEKISTAN (MBU) MUFTIATE COMMITTEE ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (CRA) OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE MBU 1. Approval of publication and distribution of religious content 2. Certification of imams and Otinoyis3. Registration of Mosques, religious organization and educational institutions 4. Organization of Haj Pilgrimages 5. Funding the construction and restoration of mosques143 independent organization controlled by the National Security Council under the President of Uzbekistan. The training of imams and otinoyis, male and female Islamic authorities, is also under the control of the MBU. According to Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur, there are 2,071 mosques across Uzbekistan registered with the MBU. Ten Islamic schools provide Islamic training for imams and otinoyis. According to twelve participants, these Islamic training centres, members of the MBU, and the profile of each individual who participates in Islamic training are scrutinized by the NSS. Although the CRA controls the MBU, it also works closely with the NSS and other branches of the government. The CRA also takes an active part in organizing the annual pilgrimages of nearly five thousand Muslims. Many participants who are not members of the MBU say that it is controlled by the government and is a puppet of government officials. In other words, although the MBU is officially a governing body for Uzbek Muslims, it is actually a bridge between the state and Islam that effects the government’s control over Islam and Islamic affairs. Participants who faced oppression at the hands of the government and Muslims forced into exile have especially negative opinions about the MBU. They call the members of the Muslim Board saroy mullalari, which means “mullahs of the castle.”85 Regardless of the conflict between the official and unofficial Islam in Uzbekistan, official Islam enjoys relative freedom and support from the government. Official Islam has another function: it is a demonstration of the spiritual freedom or freedom of conscience promised by the Constitution of Uzbekistan. 85 For example, Interviews 009 (Muhammad Salih Abutov); 007 (Ulug’bek Bakirov); 003 (Komil); 015 (Abu-Yusuf) 144 During the interviews, Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur said that “they, the government officials from the CRA, come here to get some advice to make or revise laws and policies where Islamic matters are involved… and we listen to their concern too.”86 He was trying to convince me that government officials often come to the MBU to get advice to amend policies. Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur’s assistant was in the room during our interview, taking notes of our conversation. Sheikh kept asking him when was the last time that authorities from the government came to seek advice on something, but neither of them could remember. I do not doubt the possibility of such interactions between the MBU and the government; however, the inclination to exaggerate it, or highlight it, was observable and appeared to be an intentional misrepresentation of the relationship between the state and Islam because of the state pressure on the MBU. I asked some questions about areas where Islam and the secular state often clash, such as polygamy, the marriage age, and Islamic attire. Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur said, Islam permits polygamy for men; Islam allows certain age groups to get married… but Islam does not demand it. Family is sacred, children are involved. If Islam did not insist, we listen to the government’s arguments, based on various considerations. For marriage age, we do believe in science. Girls need to get education, go to college… (pauses) and those men… if we allow polygamy, some men use it for wrong purposes. Then you can’t control it. It creates a mess in society. It is unfair for our women and children. (…) Whoever wants to wear Muslim like attire (Musulmoncha kiyim), they are wearing it. No one is stopping them. Some journalists…(pauses) bloggers like creating noise. They say that kids are not allowed to mosques, men are not allowed to have facial hair, women are not allowed to wear hijab. That is just noise.87 It is obvious that Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur and other MBU members I interviewed support the decisions of the government of Uzbekistan and provide justification for government positions. When I asked a question about Islamic attire that was banned in the public sphere by the Religion Law of 1998, Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur said that they understand the public frustration and that the MBU is always working with the government on those issues. He mentioned that the open 86 Interview 017 (Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur) 87 Interview 017 (Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur) 145 and continual relationship between the MBU and the government is “healthy and necessary.”88 During our conversation, he provided examples of how the government is supporting Islam, such as the increased number of mosques, Islamic publications, and number of Muslims who are able to participate in the Haj pilgrimage. It seemed that Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur had a more secular inclination than some other participants I interviewed. 4.3.2 Legal and policy framework One of the indications of the nature of the relationship between the secular state and Islam is the legal and policy framework implemented by the government concerning religion. There are many factors that affect the relationship between the state and religion and political leaders play a considerable role in it. This section aims to give a better understanding of the legal framework and the role it plays in the governance of Islam. To establish a better understanding of the relationship between the state and Islam, it is important to understand the state’s structural and legal framework that interacts with or controls religion. As Asad (2003) states, the nation-state requires clearly demarcated spaces that it can classify and regulate religion, education, health, leisure, work, income, justice, and war. The space that religion may properly occupy in society has to be continually redefined by the law because the reproduction of secular life within and beyond the nation-state continually affects the discursive clarity of that space (Asad, 2003, p. 201). As Asad (2003) states, the continual reproduction of secular life blurs the lines around the space religion can occupy. It requires regular examination to ensure the clarity of religious space granted for religion. The violation of that space often occurs when one law undermines another law, the interpretation of one law leads to the breach of another law in practice, or laws directly contradict each other and form blockages in the spaces granted to religion. In this section, I 88 ibid 146 provide an overview of the legal and policy framework effects on religious space in society and the cases of its violation. Article 61 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan establishes a secular framework by stating that “[r]eligion and religious associations are separate from the state and are equal before the law. The state does not interfere with the activities of religious associations.”89 In the previous section, we outlined the government structures (diagram 4.2) that tightly control the MBU, the official Islamic organization in the country. The MBU controls all the mosques, shrines, appointment of imams, Islamic publications, Islamic celebrations, and organization of pilgrimages – in short, everything considered part of institutional Islam. Article 31 of the Constitution also declares that “[f]reedom of conscience is guaranteed to all. Everyone shall have the right to profess or not to profess any religion.” The Religion Law of 1998 provides for freedom of worship, freedom from religious persecution, separation of the state and religion, and the right to establish schools and religious assemblies (Beckwith, 2000). Official Islam does enjoy some of these rights and freedoms while unofficial Islam is not even considered to be Islam. The Religion Law also criminalizes unregistered religious activity; requires formal approval of the content, production, and distribution of religious publications; prohibits proselytism and other missionary activities; and outlaws Islamic education, except in state-approved educational institutions. This shows that nearly anything religious an individual or group does without the government’s approval is outlawed while the registration of religious organizations is very complex and difficult. 89 The quotes in this subsection are from the actual Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan or otherwise signified https://Constitution.uz/en/clause/index#section7 147 The Religion Law of 1998 also overrides any religious freedom if it conflicts with national security measures, which puts all religious rights and freedoms provided by the Constitution back into the hands of the government and the NSS. The registration of religious groups requires the approval of the CRA, which reports to the Cabinet of Ministers and the NSS. In 2014, the government of Uzbekistan also introduced the Law on Prevention of Violation of the Law, which gave state officials the authority to punish illegal possession, production, and distribution of religious content;90 holding of illegal religious ceremonies, meetings, street processions, and gatherings;91 use of premises, means of communication, or transportation for conducting religious activities without state permission;92 conduct of religious activity involving youth and children and organization of study groups not relating to worship;93 and persuasion of others to join illegal religious groups.94 The provisions of law on prohibited religious groups were often justified in the name of protection and security of society, the state, constitutional order, territorial integrity, and tolerance. The term extremism is defined in the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan as the “expression of extreme forms of actions, focused on destabilizing social and political situations, a violent change in the constitutional order in Uzbekistan, a violent seizure of power and usurping its authority, inciting national, ethnic or religious hatred.”95 The Criminal Code of Uzbekistan draws a clear line between membership in groups that are unregistered or illegal and membership in prohibited Islamic associations viewed as extremist. The penalties for membership in the latter 90 Article 184-2 91 Article 201, Part 2 92 Article 202 93 Article 240, Part 1 94 Article 216-1 95 https://www.minjust.uz/en/ (Official website of the Ministry of Justice of the republic of Uzbekistan). 148 groups are up to twenty years of prison while membership in the former groups is punishable by expensive fines96 and short-term imprisonment. While the government sponsors the construction of most mosques and religious schools, the interview data indicates that the registration of mosques and religious organizations that are not sponsored by the government requires meeting criteria that are very difficult to satisfy in Uzbekistan, which Rasanayagam (2012) and Adamson and Tucker (2017) also observe. One of the interview participants, Maktubkhon,97 a former student of the International Islamic Academy of Tashkent, provided a step-by-step account of how he, a certified imam, could not register a mosque that people built with their own money in their village for over two years. Some of the requirements to register mosques include presenting the list of the names and addresses of over one hundred citizens aged 18 years or older, registering with the Ministry of Justice, which had very few administration offices that were often far away from most towns and villages, and providing a lengthy list of required documents, including permissions from multiple different government organizations. According to the official website of the US Embassy in Uzbekistan,98 citizens “must submit ‘letters of guarantee’ from the regional branches of the Ministry of Construction, the State Sanitary and Epidemiological Service, and the Department of the State Fire Safety Service under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.” The law also makes it clear that religious meetings and ceremonies can only be held 30 days following registration and only at the registered addresses. Maktubkhon mentioned that not many Muslims like to be listed for religion-based initiatives because of the fear created in society, which he called “self-censoring.” 96 50 to 100 times the minimum monthly wage 97 Interview 019 (Maktubkhon) 98 https://uz.usembassy.gov/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom-uzbekistan/ 149 The blurry line between what kind of Islam is not acceptable and the unfair accusation of Muslims for extremism- and radicalism-related crimes instilled a fear of punishment. Fines for unregistered religious factions and establishments99 and for the publication and distribution of uncertified Islamic content100 were increased in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Proselytism – religion-based speech to influence people and religious services conducted by unregistered religious organizations – is also criminalized under Article 216, Parts 1 and 2, respectively. Another research participant Muhammadsalih Abutov lives in Europe after being imprisoned in Uzbekistan for nine years. During the interviews he remembered how hard he tried to follow the laws and regulations, but when the officials themselves did not follow it, simply being law-abiding was insufficient to be safe. Muhammadsalih Abutov was a pupil and follower of Sheikh Abduvali Qori Mirzaev, who disappeared from the International Airport of Tashkent in 1995. Abutov said, In was the beginning of 1995, if I am not wrong… (pause). The mosque where I was serving as an imam was shut down for lacking some proper documentations. I went to Andijan to meet Qori aka101 and explained the situation. He said, “you must get all the documents they are requiring. We have to interact with the government through the laws they acknowledge.” Qori aka encouraged me to fully follow the rules and regulations of the government. Little he knew about this government. The government, against its own law, abducted him later that year and he has gone missing since.102 Sheikh Abduvali Mirzaev advocated fully following the laws and obtaining all the necessary documentation. In the end, he was abducted from the airport while one of his followers was jailed for nine years. In Uzbekistan, Islamic education in public schools is prohibited. There are a total of eleven Islamic educational institutions in Uzbekistan that teach a mix of Islamic and 99 Article 217 Part 2 of the Criminal Code, and Article 201 of the Administrative Code 100 Article 244 Part 3 of the Criminal Code 101 Sheikh Abduvali Qori Mirzaev – who was kidnapped and disappeared on August 29, 1995, from the Tashkent International Airport while flying to Moscow for a conference. 102 Interview 011 (Muhammadsalih Abutov) 150 academic subjects certified by the government. The government of Uzbekistan also outlawed Islamic teaching in any public or private schools other than the state-approved religious schools and only by instructors who were certified to teach Islam by the MBU (Olcott & Ziyaeva, 2008). There are many legal restrictions on the unauthorized teaching of religion in Uzbekistan. Article 229-2 of the Criminal Code outlaws "teaching religious beliefs without specialized religious education and without permission from the central organ of a [registered] religious organization, as well as teaching religious beliefs privately.” Article 240, Part 1 of the Religion Law bans the “carrying out of unauthorized religious activity, evasion by leaders of religious organizations of registration of the charter of the organization, the organization and conduct of worship by religious ministers and of special children's and youth meetings, as well as vocational, literature and other study groups not relating to worship.” Likewise, Article 241 bans “teaching religious beliefs without specialized religious education and without permission from the central organ of a [registered] religious organization, as well as teaching religious beliefs privately.” Islam is a rich source of moral education and Uzbek Muslims often loudly express their dissatisfaction with the limitations on their religious education rights. One of the otinoyis I interviewed said that “Islamic moral standards practiced at home should be complemented with Islamic education at school.”103 When I asked a state official about these limitations, he responded that “education must be free from religious influences. If we allow Islam, then we have to allow all other religions as well. As a secular state, we cannot favour one religion over another and have to maintain secular education… generally.”104 103 Interview 023 (Karomat Otinoyi) 104 Interview 022 (Ehson) 151 The Uzbek government’s establishment of the Center of Islamic Civilization under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the International Islamic Academy in Uzbekistan, and the International Center Imam al-Bukhari intended to unite research on Islamic studies including the philosophy of Islam, Sharia law, ancient manuscripts and lithographs, archeological findings, contemporary study of Islam in different disciplines, and more. The establishment of the International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan in particular is viewed as a tremendous contribution to the development of Islamic studies.105 Such developments are often cited as an indication of a positive transformation in the relationship between the state and Islam; however, my interviews with officials106 also indicate that there are some relevant questions the government struggles to answer. What kind of educators does the government trust to teach Islam? What happens if extremist ideologies are delivered in classes and auditoriums? Can those youths who graduate from faith schools be trusted in the political realm? If they can be trusted, can a secular framework be maintained with people whose values are deeply entrenched in Islam? Uzbekistan is not alone in wishing to have answers to these questions. Insecurity surrounding the maintenance of secular values is one of the themes that emerged during my data analysis. This insecurity is the main factor behind the paradoxical governance of Islam in Uzbekistan. State restrictions on private religious instruction and Islamic education criminalize the classical and traditional methods of transmission of religious education and Islamic values through unofficial hujras (Eickelman, 1993; Kamp, 2006; Khalid, 1998; Olcott & Ziyaeva, 105 Interview 025 (Professor Jamoliddin Karimov) 106 Interview 086 (Ulug’bek Sattorov); Interview 083 (Mirazim Munavarov) 152 2008). Peshkova (2014) argues that private and hujra teachings of Islam became more secretive because of the strict laws. Another law that undermines religious rights and freedoms is Article 14 of the Religion Law of 1998, which prohibits wearing religious attire, identified as “cult robes,” in public spaces. This provision provides no further explanation of what “cult robe” means, leaving it open to various interpretations. In general, this law is ignored except in relation to both public and private schools. The requirement for students to wear school uniforms was often viewed as the state’s struggle with Islam and the deepening religiosity in the country. Multiple participants spoke about the discriminatory treatment of those wearing religious garb, including a majority of employers not hiring women wearing hijab,107 government officials openly refusing to allow women to wear hijab at official gatherings,108 and a male patient wearing “Arab-like clothing”109 being kicked out of the hospital.110 Human Rights Watch reported that 26 female students were expelled from universities in Uzbekistan between 1997 and 1998 for their religious appearance.111 The The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (GVS) article on May 27, 2019 about Luiza Muminjonova being expelled from the International Islamic Academy for wearing hijab shows that this law is still enforced in the education system. Even Islamic educational institutions are not excepted.112 Often, policies introduced in Uzbekistan targeted religious attire without directly restricting it. For example, Policy 666, which legalized the mandatory standardized school uniforms, was introduced in by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan on 107 Interview 023 (Karomat Otinoyi) 108 Interview 043 (Sardor Salim) 109 The participant uses this exact phrase. I assume that the clothes the man wore were some form of traditional Arabic garb. 110 Interview 047 (Kamol) 111 https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/uzbekistan/uzbek-04.htm 112 https://www.globalvillagespace.com/the-irony-islamic-university-bans-hijab/ 153 August 15, 2018. The Ministry of Public Education was given responsibility for supervising the implementation of policy. The government declared that school uniforms were going to be mandatory in schools for the new 2022-23 academic year; however, after much heated debate, it was delayed until 2025. Such policies cause a wide range of public dissatisfaction and frustration and are often viewed as targeting religious attire. Often, I am invited to discussions of such issues as someone researching the relationship between the state and Islam. In an interview with a journalist from one of the main news outlets in Uzbekistan (www.ozodlik.org), I said that the government must not force students to make a choice between their right to faith and right to education. If school uniforms are mandatory, the government should offer the option to wear headcover and religiously acceptable models of clothes as well. A small piece from that interview was widely circulated on social media, which attracted some attention from the authorities. The legal framework and the control over religion indicate that Uzbekistan practices an authoritarian secularity that manipulates Islam and limits religious rights and freedoms. This is justified as a necessary measure to ensure the protection, security, and stability of the country. As explored in earlier chapters, Muslims are easily criminalized, often by officials using fabricated facts and allegations to throw them into the punitive system. The legal and policy framework is established to keep a very tight control over religion. The structure of official Islam and how it is controlled by the government through policies that intend to manipulate Islamic expression complicate the discussion of Uzbekistan as a secular state; however, the concept of secularism has never been a clear-cut notion, as described in Chapter 2. State secularism is often explained through binaries such as moderate versus authoritarian or passive versus assertive secularism. 154 Secularism in Uzbekistan is difficult to categorize. It cannot be simply understood as the state’s opposition or neutrality towards religion. Rather, it an issue of boundaries: the boundary to control the degree of religiosity and the distinct boundaries build around the various Islamic entities and various Islamic impulses. It is about the classification and management of piety. It is about using Islam as a means to inspire, unite, and liberate society on the one hand, and viewing certain interpretations of Islam as impediments to development and a challenge to power on the other. Paradoxical governance of religion in Uzbekistan, creating a controlled space and granting freedom to official Islam while oppressing unofficial Islam, leads me to argue that the secularism in Uzbekistan can be regarded as paradoxical secularism. Paradoxical secular states have contrasting or contradictory elements. In the midst of the vigorous revival of Islam, the government of Uzbekistan insists on secular values and controls both official and unofficial Islam for its own political interests by creating distinct boundaries. The developments between the state and religion since the independence of Uzbekistan indicate qualities of both passive and assertive secular states. Ahmed Kuru (2006) explains the difference between passive and assertive secularism as, passive secularism implies state neutrality toward various religions and allows the public visibility of religion. Assertive secularism, on the other hand, means that the state favours a secular worldview in the public sphere and aims to confine religion to the private sphere (Kuru, 2006, p. 137). On the one hand, Islam is strictly controlled and repressed in both the public and private spheres. On the other hand, religion is promoted, funded, and declared to be part of the national identity and heritage. Uzbekistan uses chosen symbols and expressions of Islam in both the political and the public realms, but strictly controls non-preferred symbols and expressions. School and universities are not favorable to those who wear hijab and grow beards. There are cases of mass 155 detention and shaving of bearded men. Hijab and beards, of course, are among the most visible expressions of Islam. The state declares Islamic celebrations as national holidays, builds mosques, and supports organizational Islam while imposing strict surveillance and persecuting unconventional forms of Islam. It declares itself to be a secular democratic state in its constitution that does not use any religion113 as a basis for its political and legal structure, at least theoretically, but the conduct of the state contradicts its own constitution. The secular state in Uzbekistan is neither anticlerical, with the separation of religious authority from the political and public domain, nor is it atheist, with the absence or rejection of belief in religion or any kind of spiritual power. The anti-religious campaigns of the Soviet system are viewed as totalitarian secularism (Modood, 2010; Kosmin & Keysar, 2007). One of the government officials explained that secular and democratic, are natures that we chose for our political framework: it doesn’t mean that we have ideal secular state or ideal democratic state. It is the chosen path or a goal we think it suits our purposes. This is a journey, the part of becoming. Maybe we never had ideal secular democratic state and maybe we will never have. This journey is not about that… 114. The fluidity in the understanding of the secular and the goal of Uzbekistan becoming an “secular state” are neither attainable nor rational. The relationship between the state and religion is therefore volatile, relational, and dialectical, which resonates across other realms in society. State insecurity towards the maintenance of secular values in Uzbekistan is often the basis for the struggle with the expressions of Islam. Kamoliddin Rabbimov said that “the government of Uzbekistan has always struggled with the degree of religiosity. Aggressive 113 According to the official website 88% of the population in Uzbekistan are Muslims (mostly Sunni, with a 5% Shi'a minority), 9% Eastern Orthodox and 3% other faiths (which include small communities of Korean Christians, other Christian denominations, Buddhists, Baha'is, and more). As of 1 June 2010, there were 2,225 registered religious organisations from 16 different denominations. 114 Interview 085 (Rustam Kamilov). Rustam Kamilov was a presidential advisor and a member of the CRA in the Cabinet of Ministers during the Karimov presidency. I interviewed him on August 23, 2021 in Tashkent. 156 opposition to beard and hijab does not change how people feel about their faith, but it makes them captious and often angry that their faith is attacked.”115 Continual and escalating interest in wearing religious clothing and beards are part of Islamic revival. It has complex and multiple motives that are stronger than states’ intention to manipulate it. A participant, Noila, wears religious headcover herself but her view on religious expression and its control was interesting. She said, I observe four or five years old little girls wearing hijab (pauses). What do they know? More and more women are wearing hijab. All good… but do they wear it for the right reason? Wearing hijab became a sign of being well off. Women want to show that their husbands are capable of providing for them, that they don’t have to work. The market of expensive and glamorous religious attire is expanding. They walk like queens in the gatherings. They are considered as virtuous, worthy and ethical. Wearing hijab became the practice of the rich. The job market discriminates against headcover, so women who want to work always have a second thought about wearing a headcover. Youth openly say they want to marry women with hijab. You have no idea how influential this is… every girl wants to be that wanted bride. They want that wealthy husband who wants them to be one of those queens. Another one… if you are not covered today, both men and women throw a cruel gaze, at least. Women start wearing hijab under these pressures. When they wear hijab, they are losing their voice in society, they are not able to work, they are becoming silent against domestic and sexual violence. The government is fighting against the shape (she meant the religious expression by “shape”) of Islam but does not examine the reasons behind the massive transition to Islamic appearance.116 Noila believes that the reason for transitioning to Islamic attire is not always faith, but worldly interests and even infectious social ills. These motives are much stronger than the government’s intent to control it. To the extent that the strict control over religious expression aims to maintain secular values and reduce radicalization, it is miscalculated. When Noila says that “the government is fighting against the shape of Islam,” she is saying that the fight is not against the unwanted side effects of Islam such as extremism, radicalism, or intolerance, but rather that the government is escalating radicalization by fighting against Islamic expression. Opposing beards and headcover does not de-radicalize people; it often makes them feel that their faith is 115 Interview 045 (Rabbimov) 116 Interview 068 (Noila) 157 threatened, making them angry and aggressive. Another participant, Ulug’bek Sattorov, said that “the government’s kindness towards Islam is superficial. The officials call men and women with Islamic appearance ‘wovchik’ – a twisted term for Wahhabi.”117 Misunderstanding social processes and miscalculating the effect of new policies and regulations creates a complex situation in Uzbekistan. Insecurity towards secular values arises from the fear of radicalization and leads to a continuation of authoritarian control over religion, leading to paradoxical governance. 4.4 CONCLUSION This chapter discussed my findings about the relationship between the state and official Islam. First, I located MBU within the governmental structure, identifying how Islam is controlled by the government. The government’s stern control over Islam, endorsing one form and repressing another form of Islam, raises question about the nature of the “secular” in Uzbekistan, which contributes to the discussion of the critical secular framework. I also discuss the legal framework that reflects on the relationship between the state and religion to deepen the conversation about the control of Islam in the country. Situating the relationship between these two institutions in the transition process from when Uzbekistan was under the Soviet rule and the period after its independence and the transition from scientific atheism of the Soviet state to vigorous Islamic revival helps to understand Uzbekistan’s struggle with the lingering legacies of Soviet governance. While Uzbekistan made modifications to official Islam as established under the Soviet Union following its independence, the way it was controlled and required to cooperate with the government continued. Islam was used for political benefit: to connect with the Muslim 117 Interview 086 (Ulug’bek Sattorov) 158 world, to win the hearts and minds of the Uzbek Muslims, and to justify the treatment of Islamic groups that officials labelled as “adashganlar.” Supporting and repressing Islam at the same time justified the paradoxes between the law in theory and in practice and the paradoxes of dealing differently with the different shades of Islam. In light of these experiences, I question what secular means in Uzbekistan. An-Naim (2008) says that Islam as a religion claims to possess its own political and legal framework to establish an entirely Islamic society. Therefore, investigating and understanding the nature of the secular state and the internal struggles between the secular state and Islam in Muslim-majority societies like Uzbekistan is essential. Some answers to questions about the relationship between the secular state and Islam have come from various scholarly perspectives in the research from historians, anthropologists, political scientists, and experts from many other disciplines. The topics explored include Islam and politics by Khalid (2007), Kehl-Bodrogi (2008), and Rasanayagam (2012); the secularization of Uzbek women by Russian invaders by Kamp (2016); the revival of Islam and transition away from scientific atheism in Central Asia by Jones (2017); the Islamic education and state ideology by Olcott & Ziyaeva (2008) and Muminov et al (2009); and the general categorization of Uzbekistan as an authoritarian secular state by An-Naim (2008), Esposito (2009), and others. Nevertheless, secularity and the establishment of authoritarian secular states in Muslim majority post-Soviet republics in Central Asia is an area that has not adequately been studied and there are few sociologists studying the relationship between the state and religion in Uzbekistan. This chapter also reflected on Uzbekistan’s long history of being an Islamic society, with Islam being a basis for legal, political, and administrative platforms and serving as a way of day-to-day life in society. The land of Uzbeks lived through the Golden Age of Islam between the 8th 159 and 14th centuries. Its achievements in art and science laid a base for later developments in the world. However, Uzbeks and Central Asian Muslims were viewed by the Russian invaders as poor, backward, and barbaric based on the periodic struggles caused by wars, poor leadership, and natural disasters. Islam was blamed for every ill. The establishment of the Soviet Socialist system in Uzbekistan left lasting effects on the nation. Although society internalized changes, adapted, and secularized, the Soviet assault on Islam changed the national and religious mentality of the people, eradicated Islamic knowledge and values, and left the nation disconnected from its history. The relationship between the state, Islam, and society in post-Soviet Uzbekistan was the outcome of how social and political institutions were affected by Soviet governance. The political elite in Uzbekistan were the former Soviet elite. If the Perestroika and Glasnost movements in the Soviet Union could have lasted longer before Uzbekistan gained its independence, political, economic and cultural reform would have had a chance to ease the legacy of Soviet totalitarian control and, potentially, Uzbekistan would not have had to suffer another 25 years of dictatorial rule at the hands of the former president Karimov. The Karimov government, I argue, adopted the ideas of both nationalist and religious frontrunners to advance his political agenda, but he adopted the methods that the Soviet government used to deal with religion. The tone set by the Karimov government towards religion has changed following his death in 2016. As one of the participants in my research stated, “the Karimov government in Uzbekistan was the embodiment of who Karimov was as an individual.”118 He re-created official Islam to assert greater control over Muslims and outlawed and repressed those who did not fit 118 Interview 008 (Muhammad Salih Abutov). 160 within his political framework. They were called “adashganlar” in Uzbekistan and I will dedicate the next chapter to analyzing the Muslims labelled as such by the government. 161 CHAPTER 5: SITUATING UNOFFICIAL ISLAM IN “SECULAR” UZBEKISTAN. WHO ARE “ADASHGANLAR?” 5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER The establishment of official Islam in the Soviet Union with a handful of carefully selected ulama during WWII led to the formation of underground unofficial Islam. The government’s distinctive attitudes towards official and unofficial Islam steered the paradoxical governance of Islam after the independence of Uzbekistan. Official Islam was accepted and publicly celebrated, while unofficial Islam was heavily supressed. In Chapter 4, I discussed the government’s claims of secularity in Uzbekistan, despite the MBU being strictly controlled and used for political purposes by the government. Official Islam carries out its functions with the full consent of the government and cooperates with state authorities in the decision-making processes relating to Islam and its regulation. Although unofficial Islam is heterogeneous in nature and its attitudes towards the relationship between the government and official Islam vary, a common view is that official Islam is not serving Allah or Muslims, but instead is satisfying the needs of the government and helping to manage Muslims. In this chapter, the notion of unofficial Islam and its relation to the term “adashganlar” is examined. Unofficial Islam encompasses all forms of Islam that do not fit within the narrow definitions of the state-approved official Islam. The term “adashganlar” is not only used by the government to describe Muslims who believe in unofficial forms of Islam; many who have been labelled as “adashganlar” practice the same forms of Islam as official Islam but are considered to be insufficiently subservient to the government or who have had the misfortune of being targeted by the government. Often, they are the Muslims who fail to conform to the rigid religious regulations set out by the MBU or the government, those who knowingly or 162 unknowingly interact with prohibited Islamic groups and online resources, or those who were detained and jailed based on fabricated evidence. This chapter stresses the role of corruption, false accusations, and fabricated evidence in the demonization of “adashganlar” as a dangerous layer of society, as well as the intensification of repression against them. I provide several cases of unfairly criminalized Muslims to support my argument. I argue that the development of the category of “adashganlar” in Uzbekistan was a political technique to create fear, seize greater control over society, rationalize the persecution of so-called “enemies of the state,” and keep the degree of religiosity under control. In this chapter, I continue the discussion by re-directing the focus from official Islam, which I discussed in Chapter 4, to unofficial Islam, “adashganlar,” and the slippery definitions of extremism and terrorism in Uzbekistan. I provide evidence from the data gathered to support my earlier arguments that the radicalization between the state and Islam in Uzbekistan is two-sided, relational, and dialectical. 5.2 CRAFTING THE ENEMIES OF THE STATE 5.2.1 Entrance of foreign Islamic missionaries to Uzbekistan: dialectical radicalization After the fall of the Soviet Union, the interests that attracted outsiders to the Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union were economic, political, cultural, and religious in nature. Central Asia was also an “ideological battle ground” (Karim, 2006 p. 439). Though the former Soviet Bloc was largely disconnected from Islamic developments around the world, Islam globally continued to follow various paths of evolution during the latter stages of the Soviet era. According to Khalid’s (2007) observations, Islamic revival has taken three distinct paths in recent history. The first path was focused on “reinventing modernity on truly Islamic principles” (p.13). The Society of Muslim Brothers, organized by Hasan Al-Banna in Egypt, and 163 Jama’at-e Islami (Islamic Party), established by Sayyid Abu’l Ala Maududi in India, are both based on Islamists’ belief that interpretation of scriptures was evil and, thus, their practices were inflexibly drawn directly from Islamic sources. The second path was informed by the critique of the modern state and based on the Islamic theory of “rule of jurists” (Persian: Vilayat-e Faqih; Arabic: Wilayat al-Faqih). The Islamic revolution in Iran and the establishment of the Islamic State can be seen as the progressive work of modern Islamic intellectuals towards the political advancement of Islam (Khalid, 2007 p.16). Third, Khalid (2007) observes the roots of another trajectory of the modern Islamic movement that is based on the interpretation of “jihad in a purely military sense,” which was originated by both Muslim and non-Muslim political actors with their own specific interests in militarized Islam. Interpreting jihad as “fighting unbelievers” or “fighting enemies of Islam” made the former Soviet Union, which was an atheist system, a perfect target for jihadists. Each of these Islamic paths were adopted by various Islamic groups, both political and non-political. The entrance of various Islamic groups, whose religious roots can be identified by one of the three trajectories Khalid (2007) discussed, to Uzbekistan goes back to the Karimov government’s eagerness to establish good relations with other Muslim countries around the world in the early 1990s. As a result, Jalil (2017) states, “an array of Islamic groups from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere rushed into Central Asia to support Islamic institutions by distributing generous financial contributions, as well as to establish their presence and political influence” (p. 5). Many Islamic groups from other Muslim countries sent missionaries to recruit Uzbek Muslims and branches of these groups took root in Uzbekistan following its 164 independence, such as Hisb-ut Tahrir, Nurchilar, Tablighi Jamaat, Salafists, Wahhabi, and many more (Rashid, 2002). In the first few years following independence, these missionaries operated freely in Uzbekistan. The repressive focus of the Uzbek government was towards home-grown groups espousing political Islam and other opponents of the government. The mass persecution of the members of these new Islamic groups started towards the end of the 1990s after several assassinations in 1997 and intensified following the large-scale Tashkent bombings in 1999 (Polat & Butkevich, 1999). These terrorist attacks were attributed to the IMU and Hisb-ut Tahrir. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Religion Law of 1998 provided the legal basis for the government to intensify the campaign against unofficial Islam and equipped law enforcement agents and state officials with the authorization to demonize and criminalize the Muslims who did not fall into the category of official Islam, calling them extremists and radicals despite the fact that extremism and radicalism were not formally defined in the legal system until 2018. Harsh punishments and unfair treatment of religious detainees created tremendous fear in society. The families of the alleged “adashganlar” were prepared to bribe officials at any cost which will be discussed in the upcoming subsections. Thus, extremism-, radicalism-, and terrorism-related accusations became a money-making machine during the Karimov presidency. Cases of “catching terrorists” or “detaining extremists” were glorified in media, received significant attention, and raised the reputation and status of the authorities involved. This encouraged law enforcement to falsify and exaggerate such cases, furthering the conflict and hostility between the government and unofficial Islam. 165 5.2.2 Who are “adashganlar” in Uzbekistan? Unofficial Islam and independent Islam are other terms used (HRW, 2004) to address what Oliver Roy (2007, p. 131) called a “parallel Islam.” These terms, however, have distinct meanings. Independent suggests a lack of attachment to already-existing forms of Islam, while unofficial can mean underground but also without status. Neither of these terms fully conveys the descriptions attributed to “adashganlar” – those on the wrong path, often as a result of misleading ideologies, beliefs, and influence by religious groups or individuals already on what is perceived to be a wrong path. Official and unofficial Islam in Uzbekistan are not necessarily different currents of Islam. For example, the leaders of the IMU, one of the deadliest terrorist organizations formed by Uzbek citizens, identified themselves as following the Hanafi schools of Sunni Islam, which is recognized as official Islam in Uzbekistan. The term “adashganlar,” therefore, is more useful to the government of Uzbekistan than the term “unofficial Islam” to describe those who do not subscribe to official Islam. The first time I recognized the repetitive use of the term “adashganlar” was during an interview with one of the high-level state authorities in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, who told me about the deep empathy he felt towards “adashganlar.” The official used the terms “adashganlar” and “wrong path” several times during our short conversation and used it as though it were something familiar, a well-known category that everyone understood and agreed upon. “Adashganlar” is an ambiguous term open to a wide range of interpretations. It is a noun, usually used in the plural and applied to groups of people. The meaning it conveys is one of disorientation and confusion and the term is associated with deviancy and abnormality. It is used 166 as a euphemism in political rhetoric to describe extremists, radicals, and, in the worst case, terrorists; however, it is also used to describe those who were caught possessing prohibited religious material or interacting with other “adashganlar.” The use of “adashganlar” to address nonconforming Muslims was a political decision, with “adashganlar” becoming a term easily interpreted by Uzbeks in the way the authorities sought to use it. The implication of “adashganlar” meaning “being on the wrong path” is that the people so described started as members of the community; however, because of the “wrong” Islamic ideologies or leaders they followed, they became disoriented and dangerous to society, forcing the government to deal with that danger. Many of the research participants were victims of the state’s discursive authority over what constitutes official Islam, extremism and radicalism, as well as how slippery these categories were in Uzbekistan. President Karimov stated in one of his speeches that it was “necessary to straighten out the brains of one hundred people in order to preserve the lives of thousands,”119 but I believe he persecuted thousands just to ensure a few radical Islamists were apprehended. I use the term “adashganlar” not because I believe the Muslims who have been labelled as such to be on the wrong path or lost, but because it is an established term to highlight the ostracization and demonization of Islam outside the official framework in Uzbekistan. The discussions of “adashganlar” are to clarify the ongoing analytical question of what constitutes extremism and radicalism in Uzbekistan. I argue that “adashganlar” are a convenient proxy for an enemy created by the Karimov government to fight against various forms of Islam and the 119 Human Rights Watch, “’Straightening Out the Brains of One Hundred’: Discriminatory Political Dismissals in Uzbekistan”, Helsinki Watch, April 1993. 167 degree of religiosity in society, to ensure stability by eliminating political opposition, to take authoritarian control over society by spreading propaganda, and to legitimize violence used by the government in pursuit of these ends. The re-establishment of a state-sponsored Islam in post-Soviet Uzbekistan played a significant role in first distinguishing and then repressing “adashganlar.” On one hand, the standardization and normalization of practices of piety went hand-in-hand with popularizing the Hanafi scholars of the region, publishing their books and books about them, reconstructing their shrines and opening them to the public, and making documentaries and educational television shows about their lives and work. On the other hand, the publication of books and media that demonized other forms of Islam mushroomed. Shaming “adashganlar” in mosque prayers and on television became regular practices. The familiarization of the term “adashganlar” in society helped to further stigmatize, criminalize, and dehumanize unofficial Islam. Public shaming of “adashganlar,” making them confess to their alleged crimes and write forgiveness letters to the president, was one of the preferred ways for authorities to deal with them. Official ulama constantly helped the government with these activities. The independent investigations conducted by HRW describe “adashganlar” as individuals following the “wrong religious path,” Public denunciations also take place in official mosques, prior to or after prayer services. In these cases, the state-appointed imam makes a general statement warning of the consequences of following the “wrong religious path” and then calls on “volunteers” to come forward to admit their guilt to the congregation and ask for forgiveness (HRW, 2004 p. 186).120 120 https://www.hrw.org/reports/uzbekistan0304.pdf (Creating Enemies of the State Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan) 168 According to interview data, Muslims who were following the unofficial doctrines of Islam were publicly shamed and brought to mosques during the Friday prayers to confess publicly and ask for forgiveness from the president121. Similar practices took place in prisons. Inmates with extremism-related charges had to write a letter to the president Karimov asking his forgiveness.122 Those who refused to write letters were often tortured123. Other times, official ulama talked about the plight of “adashganlar.” Here is an excerpt from a speech by an official imam: Those who have gone astray can come to the court, to the procuracy, to law enforcement agencies, to their police departments, mahalla committees, or local mosques and ask forgiveness, and the government will forgive them. No one will cause them harm… A few days ago, we were invited to the Tashkent UVD [city police station], where several people detained for distributing leaflets were being held. We talked with them about how it's considered a crime to call for a coup d’état, and that it is punished with imprisonment of five to twelve years. Then they told us that, wanting to study religion and the Koran, they had started down the wrong path. "Here in the basement, we're suffering, our parents and families are suffering... Now we understand that we went astray. It won't happen again. We ask for forgiveness, we repent.” (HRW, 2004, p. 188)124 Distributing leaflets was common for members of Hisb-ut Tahrir al Islami (HT) and, later, Akromiylar, and their members were accused of distribution their brochures. The involvement of ulama by law enforcement agencies in the processes of detaining so-called “adashganlar” and compelling them to apologize to change the consequence of their alleged crimes prior to conviction shows the chaotic nature of this practices. “Adashganlar” could be those who attended mosque services led by Wahhabi leaders. The term Wahhabi was wrongly used to label fundamentalist believers who refused to praise the president during Friday prayers. 121 Interview 019 (Maktubxon) 122 Interview 009 (Muhammadsalih Abutov); Interview 055 (Muhammad Bekjon) 123 ibid 124 This is from the videotaped speech of Imam Rakhmatullo Kori, in Kokcha mosque, Tashkent, January 21, 2000, translated from Uzbek. (https://www.hrw.org/reports/uzbekistan0304.pdf) 169 “Adashganlar” could be used to describe non-violent believers of Islam outside the official institutions and parameters of Islam, as well as those who left Uzbekistan to join terrorist organizations like ISIS or the IMU. “Adashganlar” could even be those who like longer beards or wearing hijab. This nebulousness is the political power the term “adashganlar” enjoys in Uzbekistan. As Pottenger (2004) observed, Thousands of individuals have been arbitrarily arrested, detained under inhumane conditions, kept incommunicado, tortured and frequently killed by Uzbek police and security forces. Individuals publicly accused of various infractions of the law—from conspiracy to overthrow the government to worshipping in unapproved mosques, possessing banned literature, or growing a beard—have been convicted by Uzbek courts in unfair trials, as adjudged by standards found in international agreements to which the Republic of Uzbekistan is a signatory. The use of forced confessions as well as refusal to consider evidence presented by the defense is pandemic, with sentences of punishments frequently disproportionate to the crimes alleged to have been committed. (p. 70) Notwithstanding the claims of widespread extremism or radicalism in society, Magahed (2006) argues, polling data debunk the notion that terrorism enjoys widespread support in Uzbekistan. The ambiguity of the notion of “adashganlar” in society reflected the legal system’s inability to provide clear definitions for either extremism or radicalism. Detention, incarceration, unlawful surveillance, disappearances, and torture in the law enforcement and punitive systems reflect this ambiguity rooted in the relationship between the state and Islam. The state’s inability to pinpoint the definitions of extremism and radicalism and the broad number of people these offences targeted resulted in thousands of people being punished to make sure the few individuals with actual radical mindsets were also eliminated. During the second interview with the director of the Centre for Islamic Civilization, Mr. Shoazim Munavarov, I noted that he lowered his voice to a near-whisper when he spoke about 170 “adashganlar” and said that “ninety percent of those religious convicts were innocent.”125 While his ninety percent statistic may not be accurate, Mr. Munavarov held a position as a president’s advisor during the Islam Karimov presidency and, as such, he was aware of what was happening in the country. When I asked whether or not he participated in the decision-making processes, Munavarov said that he made a mistake without openly explaining what mistake he made. 5.2.3 “Adashganlar” in the legal framework The first provision of the Law on Religion of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 1993 led to two institutions, the MBU and the CRA, being “charged with defining acceptable Islamic practices and weeding out Islamic leaders who refused to conform to them” (HRW, 2004 p. 20). The remainder of the law closely resembled the one inherited from the Soviet Union. The structure and function of these institutions is explained in detail in Chapter 4. In 1998, the Religion Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan126 (Religion Law of 1998) was passed, adding several articles that targeted “adashganlar,” including religious, political, and rights activists, under the umbrella of extremism. Article 5 of the Religion Law of 1998 prohibits proselytism. It states that “[a]ctions aimed at converting believers of one religion into another (proselytism) as well as other missionary activity is banned. Persons violating this rule bear responsibility established by the legislation.” Article 5 also states that “[i]t is not permitted to use religion for the purpose of anti-state and anti-constitutional propaganda, incitement of enmity, hatred, international discord, breach of 125 Interview 083 (Shoazim Munavarov) 126https://legislationline.org/sites/default/files/documents/4a/Uzbekistan_Law_freedom_religion_belief_1998_am2018_en.pdf Criminal Code of the republic of Uzbekistan and the 1998 Law on Religion of the republic of Uzbekistan is available in a PDF format on internet. The document does not have any page numbers. 171 moral principles and civil accord, distribution of slanderous insinuation destabilizing situation, spreading panic among population and taking other actions against the state, society and person.”127 This crime is defined in Article 216 of the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan. It criminalizes the illegal establishment of public associations or religious organizations: Article 216, section 2 (violation of legislation on religious organizations, including proselytism); section 2, part 2 (conversion of believers of a faith and other missionary activities). Article 6 states that “the Committee for Religious Affairs (CRA) operating at the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan is entrusted with coordination of relationship of State agencies with religious organizations and execution of control over implementation of legislation on freedom of conscience and religious organizations.” As discussed in Chapter 4, the CRA is the main regulatory and decision-making body of religion, as it controls the Muslim Spiritual Board. Article 9 of the Religion Law of 1998 bans religious instruction and prohibits private teaching of religious principles, which was criminalized in Article 229, section 2 of the Criminal Code: “teaching religious dogmas without special religious education and without permission of the Central Administrative Body of [a given] Religious Organization, as well as teaching religious dogmas in private.” Articles 8 and 11 of the Religion Law of 1998 criminalize unregistered religious associations, which is an offence under Article 216 of the Criminal Code: the organization of, or participation in the activities of a “[p]rohibited religious organization.” Article 216, section 2, 127 https://legislationline.org/sites/default/files/documents/4a/Uzbekistan_Law_freedom_religion_belief_1998_am2018_en.pdf Criminal Code of the republic of Uzbekistan and the 1998 Law on Religion of the republic of Uzbekistan is available in a PDF format on internet. The document does not have any page numbers. 172 part 1 of the Criminal Code, identifies “failure to register a religious organization” and Article 216, section 1 identifies persuasion of others to join a prohibited religious group as offences under this Article. Articles 10 to 18 of the Religion Law of 1998 deal with the registration of religious organizations. The first requirement, which many religious organizations struggled to meet, was submitting an “application signed by citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, not less than 100 in number.” Interview material suggested128 that Muslims were afraid of putting their name on a list that would be sent to the government to register a religious organization. These Articles include a long list of required documents and indicate that “[j]ustice agencies have the right to request additional information and receive expert conclusions from the relevant agencies,” leaving it up to the judgement of law enforcement agencies. Article 14 of the Religion Law of 1998 outlaws the wearing of religious clothing by non-clerics and bestows the right to perform religious rites and worship to religious organizations rather than individuals. It states that the “[a]ppearance of the citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan at public places wearing religious dress is not permitted (with the exception of ministers of religion).” Article 19 bans the “[p]roduction, storing and distribution of publications, cine-, photo-, audio-, video-production and other materials containing ideas of religious extremism and separatism.” Muslims could be charged under Article 244, section 1 (production and distribution of materials that create a threat to public security and public order) and section 2 (establishment, direction of, or participation in religious extremist, separatist, fundamentalist, or other banned 128 Interview 019 (Maktubxon) 173 organizations) of the Criminal Code for possession and distribution of literature containing “religious extremism, separatism, and fundamentalism.” Upon the introduction of the Religion Law of 1998, all religious groups and organizations in the territory of Uzbekistan were required to be registered. In addition to unregistered religious organizations, the law restricted private religious education, the wearing of religious attire in public spaces, and the possession of restricted religious material. By illegalizing these broadly-defined activities, the government of Uzbekistan tainted a large swath of activity as criminal, opening the doors to very imprecise judgements in the law enforcement, legal, and punitive systems. The registration of religious groups and organizations was a political matter. Many Islamic groups were prohibited, but even some groups that were not prohibited were unable to register. Interview data showed that even registering new mosques was very difficult. I will discuss the registration processes later in this chapter. Although this legislation targeted extremism and radicalism, no definition of these was provided by the government of Uzbekistan until 2018. This is an example of what Arendt (1963) once referred to as “a crime that was not, at the time, a law on the books.” Defining these terms is not an easy task and the difficulties involved in defining these terms are not always obvious. There is no agreement among scholars about the definitions of extremism, radicalism, or radicalization, except that radicalization is a process (Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino and Caliya, 2011; Schmid, 2013); however, scholars often propose certain measures for the discussion of extremism (Coleman and Bartoli, 2003). The most ambiguous part of defining extremism is the fact that it is subjective and depends on the viewer’s values, beliefs, understanding, and relationship to the actors (Keltner and Robinson, 1996; Werner, 1995). 174 Attitudes towards extremism are subject to change when the political landscape, government leadership, and political opinions change. Power also plays a significant role in the perceptions of extremism, because “when in conflict, the activities of members of low power groups tend to be viewed as more extreme than similar activities committed by member of groups advocating status quo” (Coleman & Bartoli, 2003 p. 5). Widespread claims of extremism followed by mass detentions and incarcerations would seem to imply the existence of a clear definition of extremism and detailed descriptions of what constitutes extremism-related crimes. However, Muslims were charged under extremism-related laws for offences such as administrative issues, wearing religious attire, having religious books, downloading religious video or audio materials from prohibited sources, or even sitting and having a conversation with someone assumed to be religious. In 2018, the government of Uzbekistan finally provided definitions of extremism and extremist activities in Article 3 of the Law on Countering Extremism129. Extremism was defined as the “[e]xpression of extreme forms of actions, focused on destabilizing social and political situation, violent change in the constitutional order in Uzbekistan, violent seizure of power and usurping its authority, inciting national, racial, ethnic or religious hatred.” Extremist activities include the “production, storage, dissemination or demonstration of materials containing a threat to public order and security” or exposing “attributes or symbols of extremist organizations”, and “public calls” for such actions. It also includes a broad range of behaviors, including terrorist activities and incitement to hatred. Despite the significance of such charges being formally codified, the vague description of 129 Comments on the Law on Countering “Extremism” of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (December 9, 2019) https://www.osce.org/odihr/441056?download=true. 175 extremism still fails to establish a clear requirement for when and in which situations the charge of extremism is applicable. The ambiguity of the descriptions, including the sorts of behavior such as destabilizing the social situation, distribution of materials, displaying symbols, and issuing public calls, make the law open to significant discretionary interpretation, allowing for the arbitrary application of violence by law enforcement. As it stands, the law threatens to disregard the freedoms of expression, opinion, religion, and belief. Although extremism does not constitute a criminal offense under the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan, several provisions overlap with the definition of “extremist activities” in the Law on Countering Extremism, including Articles 155 (terrorism), 156 (incitement of national, racial, ethnic, or religious enmity), 159 (violations of the constitutional system), and 244 (production, storage, distribution, or demonstration of materials containing a threat to public safety and public order). This creates a confusing legal situation where several sets of laws are overlapping and apply to the same conduct. The criminalization of a “public call” for listed actions is particularly susceptible to misinterpretation. As a result, without having clearly contextualized what constituted extremism, thousands of Muslims were targeted, detained, persecuted, and tortured as religious criminals for over twenty-five years. Muslims who debated, preached, or published Islamic content that differed from state-approved Islam (Frank & Mamatov, 2006) were accused of spreading knowledge contrary to state officialism and labelled as enemies of the state. Islamic extremism is often linked to religious violence, with political decisions often being made without considering the multidimensional nature of the phenomenon. The question is how officials assess the degree of 176 threat posed when categorizing Muslims into those to be watched, those to be charged, or those to be physically eliminated. 5.2.4 The Enlightenment Against Ignorance campaign and purge of Islamic leaders President Karimov viewed religion as one of the threats to his government and, his main concern was the deepening religiosity in society. He recognized the role of ideology in the radicalization of Muslims and started a campaign called Enlightenment Against Ignorance. For Karimov, only official Islam was enlightened Islam, only official Islam was not religious fanaticism or extremism because it was tightly controlled. All currents of Islam except official Islam were ignorant doctrines of Islam and therefore a wrong path. Karimov (1996 p. 26) stated, Anti-humanist ideas bring nations only misery and poverty. Both ancient and recent history offer countless such examples. Ideas of such an order served as the foundation for the Crusades, the spreading of religious fanaticism, fascism and bolshevism. Today, when humanity has entered the 21st century, religious fanaticism and extremism represent a social evil threatening peace and progress on Earth. Without defining religious fanaticism and extremism, equating it to a social evil served one primary function in society: providing legitimation to detain Muslims and have those detained people perceived as a “social evil.” Karimov recognized the spiritual hunger that Muslims in Uzbekistan were experiencing after over seven decades of Soviet rule. In his book High Spirituality is an Invincible Force (2008), Karimov talks about the importance of spirituality in the development of society and in straightening the national identity. He continuedly warns people to be aware of fundamentalist and extremist ideologies, suggesting instead educating people in the spirit of love for motherland, respect for national-historical lifestyle, and memory and inherited spiritual values (Karimov, 2008). 177 The Enlightenment Against Ignorance campaign in Uzbekistan (Zuhriddin et al, 2022; Tadjibaeva, & Oblomurodova, 2020) was intended to “cure ideological diseases” (HRW, 2004 p. 11) by preventing youths from becoming exposed and attracted to such ideologies. Therefore, anyone on the wrong path must be plucked from society. For Karimov, Islamic extremism and religious fanatism were one of the most powerful threats to peace and stability (Karimov, 1997). Karimov’s Enlightenment Against Ignorance went hand-in-hand with the creation of “adashganlar.” They were a danger to society because they had the wrong ideology that could influence the youth Karimov repeatedly claimed to be protecting. Karimov (1996a p. 135) recognizes the authoritarian regime he installed, but seeks to legitimize his actions by aiming to preserve peace and stability in society, I admit, perhaps in my actions there are signs of authoritarianism. But this I explain as follows: in certain periods of history, especially during the construction of statehood, strong executive power is necessary. It is necessary in order to avoid bloodshed and conflict, to preserve in the region inter-ethnic and civil harmony, peace and stability, for which I am prepared to pay any price. The Enlightenment Against Ignorance campaign was instrumental in the legitimization of the detention, incarceration, and torture of thousands of Muslims as an ideological threat to society. Forced disappearances of unofficial Islamic authorities, although the government of Uzbekistan never admitted its involvement, were part of curing ideological diseases. Religious leaders who refused the government’s demands to cooperate with them and praise the President during the Juma prayers were wrongly labelled as Wahhabis (HRW, 2004). Wahhabism is a revivalist movement that was first formed in Saudi Arabia by a follower of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Wahhabism advocates for the purification of Islam based on the Quran and Hadith’s unaltered sayings and practices of the prophet Muhammad. Those who had more fundamentalist views of Islam were an easy target 178 for Wahhabis. Some scholars argue that the danger of this Islamic wave is seen in its rejection of culture, tradition, and Islamic civilization (Haghayeghi, 1995). Since Uzbekistan’s political ideology after independence was based on culture, historical inheritance, and Islamic civilization, Wahhabism was viewed as a threat. Those who were labelled as Wahhabis or members of Hisb-ut Tahrir, who studied Islam abroad, or who were the followers of the imams labelled as Wahhabi were all easily defined as “adashganlar.” Wahhabi became a widespread label among Muslims, regardless of whether they actually adhered to Wahhabism or not (Nunn et al., 1999). Purging the most influential layer of society was not unique to the Karimov government in the history of Uzbekistan. As history has shown, when powers clash, the stronger side purges the most influential and knowledgeable members of the opposition (Khalid, 2007). The Soviet political system wiped out Uzbek intellectuals many times, as discussed in Chapter 2. Islamic ulama who agreed to work with the government became more powerful and those who chose not to started to face political pressures and life-threatening challenges. Ultimately, many of the Islamic scholars and authorities who did not ally themselves with the Karimov government were subject to subsequent political purges of Islamic authorities. Forced disappearances do not require legal justification; they are the dirty work carried out by the NSS (HRW, 2004; AI, 2005). Abdulla Utaev130, who disappeared on December 15, 1992, was a victim of one of the earliest purges of Islamic leaders in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. Utaev was the leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party, which was established in 1990 in Saratov, Russia. Utaev was chosen as the leader of the Uzbekistan branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party at the party’s first congress in Tashkent. The party started to publish its own newspaper called Da’wah and unsuccessfully 130 In some sources “Utaev”– the Russian pronunciation and “O’taev” – Uzbek pronunciation 179 attempted to register the party in Uzbekistan. I reviewed a folder about Utaev’s case131 in the archives of a Fiery Hearts Club132 international human rights organization in Paris, France. It included documents from the Islamic Renaissance Party, copies of the published newspapers, papers from the attempts to register the party, and the rejection letter received from the government; however, the most interesting piece in Utaev’s folder was the document that showed that the Tashkent City, Shaykhontohur region branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a judicial warrant to search for Utaev on June 18, 2008, sixteen years after his disappearance. On top of that, the Russian Federation’s Federal Investigation Unit opened an investigation into Utaev’s case the same year133. On August 29, 1995, Shaikh Abduvali Qori Mirzaev and his colleague Ramazan Matkarimov disappeared from the Tashkent International Airport while waiting to board a flight to Moscow for a conference. Following the disappearance of Mirzaev, many of his followers’ associates were detained and jailed by the Karimov government. Nematulloh Parpiev continued Mirzaev’s work and became an imam in the Jome mosque134; however, he left home one summer morning in 1996 and also disappeared (HRW, 2004 p. 87). I interviewed imam Muhammadsalih Abutov135, a pupil of Shaikh Abduvali Mirzaev who was accused of “committing Wahhabi” and served 8.5 years in prison. Abutov was exposed to Islam from a young age. His parents sent him to the 80-year-old imam’s home to live and learn the Arabic language and Islam when he was ten. Sending children secretly to live in the houses of the people who possessed Arabic language and Islamic 131 All archival materials discussed in the dissertation are available for reviewing. 132 Mutabar Tajibayeva is a leader of this human rights organization. I worked with Tajibayeva in the archive for 3 weeks in Paris, France in September 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moʻtabar_Tojiboyeva 133 Case number № 09226/93 134 Congregational mosques or Friday mosques usually host prayers on Fridays which also called Jome mosques. 135Interview 008 & 009 (Muhammad Salih Abutov) 180 knowledge during the Soviet era was one of the ways Islam was transmitted from one generation to the next (Khalid, 2007; Roi, 2000). Abutov remembers that Islamic texts were rare then and he studied from handwritten Islamic sources. His religious mentor was a Sufi-imam, therefore Abutov studied Sufism. Sufism, also known as Tasawwuf (Huda, 2003; Shaikh Muhammad Sodiq, Muhammad Yusuf, 2016), is one of the historically-practiced doctrines of Islam in Central Asia and is accepted as official in post-Soviet Uzbekistan despite it having been considered as radical Islam during the Soviet era (Deweese, 2002). During Glasnost and Perestroika, Abutov served in the Soviet Army and, after returning home, he decided to further his Islamic education in madrasa. At this time, he met Shaikh Abduvali Mirzaev in the Jome mosque in Andijan. In 1993, Abutov obtained a certificate from the MBU and became an imam for a new mosque called Komilkhoja. Imam Abutov regularly used Abduvali Qori Mirzaev’s speeches to educate Muslims in his mosque. Abutov considers Sheikh Abduvali Qori Mirzaev as one of the best Islamic scholars in the Muslim world. According to Muhammadsalih Abutov136, a letter was sent to President Karimov about the disappearance of Sheikh Abduvali Mirzaev, asking the president to help to find the Shaikh. Thirty people signed the letter. Over the next six months, all thirty people who signed the letter were detained and jailed. In September 1995, Abutov was fired from his position as an imam; in October, he was taken away by the police; and in December, he was jailed. After being jailed for 8.5 years, between December 1995 and May 2004, and staying under house arrest for another six months, Muhammadsalih Abutov left Uzbekistan. This short story Abutov provided shows that any connection to purged Islamic leaders marked Muslims as “adashganlar.” Unofficial Islamic doctrine or ideology was treated like an infection or disease. Interacting with Islamic leaders who 136 Interview 008 (Muhammad Salih Abutov) 181 were accused of Wahhabism, fundamentalism, or any prohibited form of Islam meant that Muslims were infected and, therefore, needed to be thrown into the punitive system. According to Abutov, Shaikh Abduvali Qori Mirzaev was a charismatic Islamic leader, and his speeches were passionate. Abutov collected the books and audio and video recordings of Shaikh Abduvali Mirzaev, later publishing them in a blog137. Therefore, I was able to listen to Shaikh Mirzaev’s speeches: Our way is the Kitob (Quran) and Sunnah and delivering them to people in their original and pure version. On this road, we don’t place the benefit of any person, nation or government over the benefit of our religion. Even if we are hated, thrown the stones of false accusations, called out of mind, tortured, forced to leave, jailed, chopped to pieces, we will not turn from the road of Kitob (Quran) and Sunnah, not even as long as the blink of an eye. Turning from the Kitob and Sunnah away is turning away from heaven towards hell (recorded speech)138. Shaikh Abduvali Mirzaev and his followers were accused of Wahhabism. During the Karimov presidency, it became obvious that Uzbekistan had not abandoned the Communist tactics of prosecution, abduction, and execution of religious leaders and the intellectual class139. In the second half of the 1990s, Hisb-ut Tahrir (HT) was frequently used alongside Wahhabism to address those labelled as “adashganlar;” however, Rahim140 says, detaining the members of HT was not popular until the end of 1990s. Well-known, well-respected Islamic authorities presented bigger threats to the government. After their forced disappearances or flight from the country, hundreds of people who associated with them were taken into custody and thrown into the punitive system. One well-known imam, Obidkhon Nazarov, left Uzbekistan to avoid persecution and found asylum in 137 https://sahwii.wixsite.com/abduvaliqori/shajh-abduvali-ori-dushanba-darslar-1 138 https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/49cf19_87818fbb294b48edb6f73ed5ea69d4e5.pdf 139 See for example, Adeeb Khalid (2007) Ch-3. The Soviet Assault on Islam. Pages: 50-83 140 Interview 035 (Rahim) A devoted member of HT who was jailed for 11 years. I interviewed him a week after he was released from prison. 182 Sweden in 2006. On February 23, 2012, Obidkhon Nazarov was found unconscious, shot in the head four times. Fortunately, he did not die, but he remained in a coma for six months. I interviewed Ruhiddin Fakhruddinov, Obidkhon Nazarov’s pupil and close associate, in prison. He had been kidnapped from Kazakhstan and imprisoned for 17 years141. Fakhruddinov also recounted the stories of several religious individuals who were disappeared in the mid-2000s. Fakhruddinov is one of the main informants in this study; however, during the first interview he said, “I am not sure what do you already know and how much I can share with you.” Although I wanted to know everything about his experiences, I was respectful of the boundaries he was setting. Therefore, I conducted a second interview with him after he was released from prison, and he indeed shared more in this interview. Fakhruddinov denied any involvement in any violent terrorist organization. He said “hujra teachings, as much as we could, were told.” He did not say who was giving the directions and what kind of teachings they were being told to deliver in hujras. When I asked why it had to be done secretively, Fakhruddinov said that they had an “all or nothing vision about Islam in society which the government would never tolerate.142” My interpretation of “all or nothing” was that it referred to dissatisfaction from the boundaries created for the study and practice of Islam, repression of unofficial forms of Islam, and the use of official ulama by the secular state to manipulate Muslims; however, I realize that “all or nothing” could also refer to the belief that either there has to be a full-scale Islamic state or no Islam at all. Husniddin Nazarov, the son of imam Obidkhon Nazarov, was kidnapped on May 16, 2004 and disappeared. I obtained a copy of the letter written by Husniddin Nazarov’s mother, 141 Interview 053 (Ruhiddin Fakhruddinov) 142 Interview 053 (Ruhiddin Fakhruddinov) 183 Minnura Nasruddinova, to the head of the NSS, Rustam Inayatov, on August 15, 2004. In her letter, she states that “if Obidkhon Nazarov angered you by not agreeing to your illegal/unlawful requests and refused to secretly cooperate with NSS, please find and punish him. You have no right to take revenge on his family, friends and associates143.” Later, Minnura Nasruddinova wrote letters to various international human rights organizations, informing them that her letters to the President of Uzbekistan and the head of the NSS had been ignored. I also interviewed the mother of a disappeared businessman who introduced herself as Sharifa144. Sharifa is a 73-year-old woman who lives with her disappeared son’s wife and two children in Tashkent. Hikmatjon, who disappeared in February 2005, was Sharifa’s third child – the youngest. He was a director of a company called Budur. Hikmatjon, as his mother describes him, was a hardworking, respectful, intelligent, and successful businessman who cared deeply about his family and the people around him. He helped the poor, considering it his duty as a decent Muslim. In February 2005, Hikmatjon was called to the NSS office by an official by the name of Gulom Chorshanbiev to be interviewed about his friends who had been brought before the court on religious matters. On March 7, 2005, Hikmatjon’s wife had a baby. On March 12, 2005, Hikmatjon went to the government registration office to get the birth certificate for his child. He told his mother that once he returned, they would go and pick his wife and newborn up from the hospital. He left home with his car and never came back. Both of his friends whom the NSS had inquired about were disappeared a month before Hikmatjon, according to his mother. The story of every disappearance is dramatic and often it was hard to stay focused on whether those disappeared men were practicing, influential Muslims, whether they were 143 All archival materials discussed in the dissertation (including the copy of this letter) are available for review. 144 Interview 054 (Sharifa) 184 members of any restricted religious groups, whether they were critical of government or government officials, or whether they organized any meetings or funded any Islamic groups. Abduvali Mirzaev, Obidkhon Nazarov, and Abdulla Utaev were influential Islamic authorities. Their disappearances can be seen as the government wanting to fully remove their influence from society. The disappearance of their family members and associates had distinct repercussions. On one hand, the government wanted to get rid of everyone who might continue their legacy, and on the other hand, creating fear in society was necessary for the government to exert greater control over Muslims. It meant that contact with any Islamic groups or Islamic authorities like Mirzaev, Nazarov, or Utaev in any form could result in forced disappearance without any opportunity to dispute any allegations. 5.2.5 “Adashganlar” – fabricated criminals Several interviews, including those with Fakhruddinov, Malik, Abutov, Mahmud Abdulmomin, Abu Yusuf, and Muminov, suggested that there was a level of involvement by some Uzbek Muslims in restricted Islamic groups in Uzbekistan such as HT, Akromiya, Wahhabis, or Salafism. These groups advocate for unchanged Islam and believe that so-called extremism is actually just a way of resisting the threat to Islam and Muslims145. This is not a novel argument; it has been made by a wide range of Muslims from those who simply wear niqab as a form of resistance to the leaders of the some of the most dangerous terrorist organizations. For example, Osama bin Laden once said, “They violate our land and occupy it and steal the Muslim’s possessions, and when faced by resistance they call it terrorism” (Coleman & Bartoli, 2003 p. 1). However, the majority of the research participants who were 145 Interview 008 & 011 (Muhammadsolih Abutov); Interview 053 (Ruhiddin Fakhruddinov) 185 victims of accusations of involvement in forbidden religious organizations asserted that their involvement was not formal membership ins such groups. Befriending members of these groups, having conversations or dining with them, or even possessing booklets from these groups signified one’s membership in them, in the eyes of the government. Therefore, they were punished and considered to be on the wrong path: “adashganlar.” In Uzbekistan and neighbouring countries, there was surveillance everywhere: airports, mosques, and mahallas146. Mosque prayers were placed under video surveillance and phones were screened at airports and during any interaction with law enforcement. Possession of any religious material from forbidden sources could make people subject to punishment. Undercover officials were everywhere, especially in mosques, profiling Muslims based on their appearance and behaviors. One of the research participants had recently been released from prison after having served seven years of a ten-year sentence for extremism-related charges. The interview only lasted for about twenty minutes because his responses were very brief and inducing open discussion was difficult. Sardor147 was a high school teacher. When I asked him about his involvement in restricted groups, he said “I never did. I was a pedagogue and taught Madaniyat and Ma’naviyat (Culture and Spirituality) lessons at school. I was never interested in or involved with any Islamic groups. I only learned about them to teach. My detention, incarceration and all [pause] was a mistake.” I wished that he had been more explicit and had spoken more about his arrest, the court processes, and his treatment in prison. Instead, his story was quite short. He said, My salary as a teacher was not enough to take care of my family. My two friends and I went outside of a city where a new settlement was being built to make some extra money on the weekend. We worked for two days and made some cash. On our way back home, 146 Mahalla is the lowest local government in Uzbekistan. It is similar to community or a neighbourhood. 147 Interview 027 (Sardor) 186 we were very hungry and tired, so we stopped at the teahouse (choykhona). And that… teahouse was under surveillance and there were a group of “adashganlar” dining at that time. So, we sat and start eating. Before we finished eating, they (officials) came and arrested everyone in the teahouse. I was just in the wrong place at the wrong time. One of my friends had enough money in his pocket to pay off and he got out that night. My other friend and I were locked up for seven years. Only after I was in prison the security guard told me that I was charged with extremism and membership in Hisb-ut Tahrir148. Although short, there was much to his story. He was a secular Muslim, never involved in any religious groups or activities; he did not go through any court processes; he did not know what he has done wrong. His friend bribed officials and freed himself, but Sardor and his other friend could not because they did not have enough money. This is the description of extremism, the definition of “adashganlar” in Uzbekistan. If Sardor could be wrongly detained that night at the teahouse and end up serving seven years in prison, how can we understand the surveillance processes, investigations, and court decisions at play? How could someone find himself in prison for seven years without knowing the crime he was convicted of? How could his friend bribe officials and get out that night while he spent years wrongfully imprisoned? Sardor’s case is a clear example of how helpless and hopeless people who were labelled as “adashganlar” felt inside the corrupt punitive system in Uzbekistan. Fighting back could cost more lives and result in more grievances and more injustices. Men, however, were not the only victims of extremism-related false accusations and criminalization. Muslima149 is a young mother of three children. She reached out to me at the suggestion of one of my previous participants, hoping to at least meet someone who understood her situation. On June 9, 2019, officials from the Tashkent City, Chilanzar branch of the Ministry of 148 Interview 027 (Sardor) 149 Interview 056 (Muslima) 187 Internal Affairs called Muslima’s mother and asked for Muslima’s phone number. Later that day, Muslima got a phone call from the officials and learned that they wanted her to come to their office immediately. Upon her arrival at the branch that evening, her phone was taken from her for screening. Muslima was confused. Different officials kept coming into the room and asking her various questions. She grew anxious. Finally, they showed her a picture of a woman and asked if she knew her. Muslima said she did not. The officials said, “don’t lie; we know everything.” They then showed her a conversation on Facebook Messenger. A conversation that started with the woman in the picture, Nargiza Aripova, saying hello to Muslima online and then having a very brief chat about their age and how many children they each had. Muslima did not even remember that conversation. The officials forced Muslima to write three letters of accusation against three women and the Facebook page called Zulmatdan Nurga (from darkness to light). The officials dictated the letters. I asked Muslima if she remembered what she was forced to write. She said, I was frightened and very anxious. I was trembling… I had to write that I was in contact with these women because they had told me to. That they were members of Hisb-ut Tahrir. That they spoke against the government, as such. In actuality, I don’t know who they are.150 Despite having been coerced into writing these letters, the officials did not leave Muslima alone. She was regularly commanded to come to the branch and forced to sign many more papers levelling accusations against people she did not know. She was intimidated and silenced. Muslima and her husband started to have conflicts over her going to the Ministry branch so often. Finally, after three or four months, her husband said that he was done and that he did not 150 Interview 056 (Muslima) 188 want a wife like her. He blamed her for becoming secretive and stressed all the time. He called Muslima’s father and asked him to take his daughter back. Muslima’s life started to fall apart. She wanted to get back together with her husband and three children. She stopped taking the officials’ calls, infuriating them. The officials told her husband that Muslima was involved in ten to fifteen cases of extremism-related crimes. This process was ongoing when I interviewed Muslima and I have not been able to make contact with her since. In Muslima’s case, being labelled as an extremist ignored the complex realities of her life. She was a mother of three and her alleged crime was having a short conversation on Messenger with someone who was allegedly accused of extremism. Muslima was forced to sign fabricated accusations of extremism against ten other people. She was a vulnerable woman who wore a hijab, whose relationship with her spouse was fragile, who was rejected and abandoned when she needed protection, who did not know her rights and could not defend herself. Cases like Muslima’s and Sardor’s show how Muslims in Uzbekistan are trapped. Once you were ensnared, it was hard to disentangle yourself. A significant portion of extremism- and radicalism-related charges in Uzbekistan targeted religious and political activists, as well as the families of those who criticized the government, whose actions did not fit into the state framework, or who acted against the government’s wishes. Another participant, Muhammad Bekzhanov151, is the brother of Muhammad Salih, a well-known politician and the leader of Erk, the opposition party to the Karimov government. Muhammad Salih was a presidential candidate in 1991. After losing the election to Karimov, he left Uzbekistan to avoid persecution and was declared to be a terrorist by the Karimov 151 Interview 055 (Muhammad Bekzhanov) 189 government following the 1999 Tashkent bombings (Polat & Butkevich, 1999). I interviewed both Muhammad Salih and his brother Muhammad Bekzhanov, the latter of whom was arrested on March 15, 1999, in his apartment in Kiev, Ukraine and then languished in prison for 17 years. Ukraine’s Security Services cooperated with the Uzbek NSS to arrest him. Muhammad Bekzhanov is a journalist who was arrested for working as an editor for the banned newspaper Erk (Liberty) and for belonging to his brother’s party. Muhammad Bekzhanov, his brother Rashid Bekzhanov, and five other people, all journalists, were taken to court at the same time. Muhammad Bekzhanov was sentenced to 15 years in custody152. On February 22, 2017, the day Muhammad Bekzhanov was released from prison, AI reported that: Muhammad was tortured and otherwise ill-treated while in custody, including being beaten with rubber batons, choked and electrocuted. He was forced to incriminate himself in having committed “anti-state crimes”. Although in 2003 his sentence was reduced by almost four years under an amnesty, in December 2011, just three months before his forthcoming release, Muhammad was sentenced for a further 5 years – this time for his purported “disobedience to lawful demands of the penitentiary administration.”153 Muhammad Bekzhanov had nothing to do with Islam, but the Karimov government produced documentaries depicting him as a dangerous extremist and terrorist, which were shown on Ukrainian television154. What do these three cases of alleged extremism tell us? How can we define extremist and radical as they were interpreted by the Karimov government – poor? Powerless? Submissive? In the wrong place at the wrong time? Fighting for political, religious, or human rights? A journalist or writer critical of the government? 152 Interview 055 (Muhammad Bekzhanov) 153 https://www.amnesty.ca/our-work/good-news/muhammad-bekzhanov-freed-after-17-years-prison 154 Interview 055 (Muhammad Bekzhanov) 190 HT is a pan-Islamist fundamentalist organization that originated in the Middle East in the 1950s with the ultimate goal of the re-establishment of an Islamic caliphate to unite Muslims and implement Sharia. Although this group rejects the use of violence in achieving their ultimate goal, it has been nonetheless banned by several states around the world including China, Egypt, Germany, Russia, and Turkey (Karagiannis, 2010). HT started to spread in Uzbekistan in 1995 (ICG, 2003)155. In the beginning, they were invisible; the group spread their ideology through private conversations. They preached Islam and it was difficult to discern any overt political element in their ideology. By 1998, the group had gained a considerable foothold in Uzbekistan. They were openly distributing their leaflets when the Religion Law of 1998 was introduced. Notwithstanding the passage of the Religion Law of 1998, HT was allowed to remain in Uzbekistan and government agencies did not try to stop them from spreading their message. People were unaware that HT was a political Islamic organization, having joined it to learn Islam and satisfy their spiritual needs. The rapid detention and persecution of HT members started following the Tashkent bombings in 1999. Dilorom Isoqova, a human rights activist from Tashkent, took me to see a family whose four sons were convicted for membership in HT. Akbar aka156, the father of the four, opened the door. I realized his eyesight was poor from the cane in his hand and his difficulty finding the doorknob. When Akbar aka agreed to participate in my research, the family made some tea and brought some fruits, various nuts, and sweets to the table – a deeply established tradition in 155 International Crisis Group (ICG) 156 Aka (brother) is commonly used term in Uzbekistan towards men who is older than the person talking. 191 Uzbekistan. The whole family – Akbar aka, his wife, and the wives of their four sons – gathered and it became another group interview. People were hungry for religion. Once religion was allowed, everyone began to study Islam openly. My children also learned from their grandfather. They learned the letters (Arabic), so their interest started to grow. I didn’t know who they talked to. I was not aware that they were members of any group. But they were really studying Islam. They brought Arabic-Russian dictionaries and began to read the Quran in Russian. I mean Baranov, the author was Baranov. They were fluent in Russian. Suddenly, the beatings and arrests began. After Uzbekistan’s independence, the study of Islam was no longer hidden, with open study sessions offered by various individuals and groups. Knowledge of Arabic and the Quran was important but knowing which particular doctrine those offering the study sessions followed was often impossible. The desire to study Islam led to the detention and incarceration of many youths. Akbar aka remembers the detention of his sons, My boys were well behaved, good Muslims… hardworking... They were translating Quran. That’s all what they did wrong. It seems the government set traps intentionally. One day, they (authorities) called me in the evening and asked me to bring my Husan to the Hokimiyat.157 We were standing beside the door of the terrorism department… I didn’t know why we were there, there were many people inside. While we were waiting, someone called Husan, he said “Husan come here.” My eyes don’t see well. After a minute or so, I heard Husan yelling, “dad they are taking me”. My eyesight was really bad that day, I couldn’t see. I only could see shadows. I ran after the voice and fell… couldn’t do anything… I couldn’t find Husan for 2 days. Then they hired a lawyer for him and asked for money through that lawyer… Then they took Hasan (Hasan and Husan are twins). He was working in the field that day… It was a set-up. They said they found narcotics in my son’s pocket. My children never smoke or drink alcohol. My third son was taken from the choyxona (tea house), where he got together with his friends once a month. And then the fourth one was taken…158 (he cries) The officials called Akbar aka and his son Husan to the Department of Terrorism. They detained Husan through a process akin to state-sanctioned kidnapping. Akbar aka could not find his son 157 A government building. 158 Interview 034 (Akbar aka) 192 for two days before getting a call from his son’s lawyer asking for payment equal to $2000 USD to free his son. Two thousand dollars is a large amount of money in Uzbekistan; for context, Akbar aka’s pension was about seventy-five dollars per month in 2019159. That the authorities might be willing to close such cases for what is, to the government, a relatively small amount of money raises the question of how serious they considered the alleged crimes to be. After Akbar aka’s second son, Hasan, was detained, the officials seized their family car, claiming that the court ordered the confiscation of everything belonging to Hasan. They never showed Akbar aka the court order and the automobile the authorities took was in Akbar aka’s name160. Accusations of extremism and terrorism became a way for some authorities to line their pockets. Corrupt officials hunted for religious Muslims to earn extra income. People, especially young men, were accused of involvement in extremism and radicalism without cause. Through word-of-mouth, people learned that the religious detainees were being tortured. There was no humanity shown towards these individuals once in custody. Families tried everything to save their loved ones from such cruelty. When the authorities seized Akbar aka’s new automobile despite presenting there was no supporting documentation, they also asked him for $2000 USD to release one of his sons, but he was barely able to scrape together $1400 USD. Lives were negotiated for money. Human rights organizations reported many cases of corruption in law enforcement and used the detention of religious groups and individuals as a money-making machine161; however, conducting scholarly research to shed light on the relationship between the state and religion was impossible during the Karimov presidency. 159 Interview 034 (Akbar aka) 160 Interview 034 (Akbar aka) 161 For example: HRW (2004 p. 248) 193 HRW (2004 p. 248)162 analyzes several interviews with religious detainees and their families who reported that the lawyers, prosecutors, and even guards demanded bribes. On January 7, 2016, Al Jazeera published an article that said that “the persecution and jailing of alleged ISIL loyalists is just a new tag for Uzbekistan’s law enforcement agencies, and corrupt officials to continue the repressions…”163 The article also provides a quote from Daniel Kislov, a Moscow-based researcher: “Fighting ISIL in Uzbekistan is not a fight with a mythical Islamist threat. It is often inspired by security agencies to fulfil a quota.” Rahim164 was freshly out of jail, having been released about a week before our visit. According to Rahim165, he was a young scholar of physics when he was jailed for three-and-a-half years for a first offence of distributing HT leaflets in 2000. After he was freed from jail, he became a committed member of HT. Rahim was very open about it. As a result of his continued membership, Rahim was jailed for another 15 years. When I met him, it was his 17th day at home after 15 years of incarceration. As Rahim said to me, The main task (of the members of HT) was to make people understand that building a caliphate was the only way to have an Islamic life but of course conversations do not start this way. We had to talk to people wherever we could: public transportation, gatherings or in private. The government decisions were analyzed and explained to us. The leaders told us what was wrong with what the government was doing and how it should be. This is one of the reasons why Hisb-ut Tahrir was dangerous for the existing system. Rahim stated that HT was against the democratic government and everything their group did was intended to weaken the system, I was sensing a radical mood in society. People didn’t know Islam. All they know was Allah is great and everyone should do what Allah wants us to do. Democracy is kufr166 and we should not agree with it… After independence, the groups like Tablighi Jamaat, 162 https://www.hrw.org/reports/uzbekistan0304.pdf 163 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/1/7/thousands-of-uzbek-muslims-jailed-for-extremism 164 Interview 035 (Rahim) 165 Interview 035 (Rahim) 166 Kufr is an Arabic term that means unbeliever, or someone/something rejects the existence of Allah. It is usually used towards a person or a government. 194 Hisb-ut Tahrir, and Wahhabism started to spread in Uzbekistan. They had their own internal competition. For example, the Old City side of Tashkent was occupied by all three groups. One side belonged to Wahhabis, one side to Hisbi and another to Tablighi. All three were “pulling the cart” to their own side. Between these three Hisb-ut Tahrir members appeared knowledgeable and calm to me. The conversations didn’t start from caliphate or overturning the government. We talked about Islam and had discussions about societal issues. I knew three languages. I became increasingly interested in Hisb-ut Tahrir. The government was not paying much attention at that time to Hisb-ut Tahrir. I know that until 1998 no one was jailed from Hisb-ut Tahrir. The success of Hisb-ut Tahrir because it has nothing to do with Hanafi madhab. They can adapt any madhab167. According to Rahim, there were a few key reasons the government of Uzbekistan became hostile towards HT. First, the members of HT started distributing leaflets about Karimov and his family’s background to turn people against him. Government decisions were continually criticized and analyzed through Islamic lenses. When people read these leaflets, they started disliking the Karimov government. Second, when the supporters of Tohir Yo’ldosh and Juma Namongoniy became members of HT, the government became very critical of the group. Third, there was a radical mood within the group because “the new members of HT did not have much Islamic knowledge.”168 Bosit169 was jailed eleven months before the Andijan events in 2005 and spent 15 years in jail for his membership in Akromiylar. He was a businessman. He sold construction materials in the Urikzor market in Tashkent until he was diagnosed with a brain tumor. He thought he would die, so he quit his business. After staying home for a while, doctors told him his tumor stopped growing, so he took a chance and returned to work to look after his family. Bosit says his involvement in Akromiylar was totally accidental: One day, my clients from Ferghana Valley gave me the 12-page brochure written by Akram Yo’ldosh. I read it a few times. It was about being a good Muslim and fulfilling Allah’s wishes, the importance of giving and helping others. It had some verses from 167 Interview 035 (Rahim) 168 Interview 035 (Rahim) 169 Interview 026 (Bosit) Bosit is the participants legal first name. 195 Quran and their interpretations. I still had that worry of dying soon. So, I joined the group. I truly enjoyed faith because the worry and trepidation about death disappeared. I started to help people. Whoever we helped wanted to join our group. I can’t blame them. It was (economically) hard times in Uzbekistan (…) The Andijan events happened eleven months after they locked me up, I was still in the basement of the SNB. It was hard to believe. I remember after the Andijan event the authorities said, “you told us that Akromiylar are harmless and have nothing against the government. Do you want to know what they have done?” Later, I met other members of Akromiylar in the jail and asked them about Andijan. They said they weren’t sure; the command came from the top. The leaders said that we had to fight for the members. But I really don’t know what happened in Andijan170. Despite its use of cruelty and force, President Karimov’s government could not get rid of the disease it called extremism and radicalism, though he was able to push much of it outside of Uzbekistan’s borders. Many innocent people suffered. If these individuals committed a crime, why did the government not try them in court and punish them openly? Political, religious, and rights activists received similar treatment in prisons in Uzbekistan. They were collectively categorized as extremists; however, they were further divided into two sub-categories: those who were “broken,” and those who resisted. Almost every formerly incarcerated participant used the term “broken” and told stories of what it took to “break” an individual in prison171. The methods used were terrifying. Being in the second category was even more dangerous, because those prisoners were subjected to all the tortures that sought to break them, but something in them survived. Many of those who resisted were purged in the prisons – the system was unkind to those who were resilient. In 1999, the Karimov government opened a new prison for political and religious prisoners called Jaslyk, commonly called a “place of no return” by prisoners. International 170 Interview 026 (Bosit) 171 For example, Interview 009 (Muhammad Salih Abutov); Interview 055 (Muhammad Bekzhanov); Interview 026 (Bosit) 196 human rights organizations repeatedly reported on the tortures practiced in Jaslyk. My intention here is not to individually review the stories of the participants; rather, I want to understand what the motivations or the ultimate goals, if there were any, were for torturing political and religious prisoners. I reviewed numerous human rights complaints at the Fiery Hearts Club in Paris, which often included photographs of the bodies of deceased inmates. Their bodies bore indescribable scars, bruises, and destroyed body parts that were often returned to their families. International human rights organizations reported cases of prisoners being boiled alive, burned with acid, shocked with electricity, sexually assaulted, forced to have their fingernails and toenails pulled out, and subjected to long stints of solitary confinement in cold cement cells without food, drink, or clothes172. I interviewed a religious prisoner whose nine-year-old daughter was raped to “break” him173. Another participant saw people being thrown into the burning chamber of the in-prison building materials manufacturing facility174. Some prisoners compared the treatment of religious and political inmates to Nazi concentration camps175. The very dramatic stories by the participants in this research made me look further for confirmed cases of such experiences. Perhaps I was questioning everything I had heard or could not believe that acts this extreme were happening in Uzbekistan at that very moment. While reviewing two cases of Islamic extremism charges, New York-based HRW’s 2002 report176 caught my attention. The report was about two prisoners’ bodies being returned to their families. 172 Also reported in Interview 055 (Muhammad Bekzhanov) and Interview 009 (Muhammad Salih Abutov) 173 Interview (Rukhiddin Fakhriddinov). Rukhiddin Fakhriddinov was an imam and Islamic scholar, who was also the student of known imam Obidkhon Nazarov. 174 Interview 009 (Muhammadsalih Abutov) 175 Interview 009 (Muhammadsalih Abutov) 176 https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/09/uzbekistan-two-brutal-deaths-custody 197 HRW classifies both Muzafar Avazov and Khusniddin Alimov as religious prisoners of Uzbekistan. After viewing the body of the 35-year-old Muzafar Avazov, according to HRW, doctors reported that the burns on his body made them believe that he was put into boiling water alive. His teeth were smashed, and his fingernails ripped out. The report included photos of his body. According to the 2002 HRW report, Khusniddin Alimov was put in the punishment cell, often called the Iron Cage, which is described as “too small to sit and too short to stand up,” for many weeks before his death. Both Muzafar Avazov and Khusniddin Alimov were punished for refusing to stop praying and refusing to write an apology letter to President Karimov (HRW, 2002). HRW’s office director in Uzbekistan, Matilda Bogner, said in the report that the use of torture "continues to be systematic."177 5.3 CONCLUSION The initial radicalization of Islam in Uzbekistan was a response to the radicalization of the Soviet government against Islam. Actions and reactions followed. The radicalization between the state and Islam is relational, but it also advances over time – dialectical. As suggested in relational sociology, such actions and counteractions (Alimi, Demetriou & Bosi, 2015) between the state and religious groups caused the continual intensification of the conflict between them. This was not about solving the existing conflict; rather, both sides wanted to destroy each other. As a result, thousands of innocent people were victimized. Neither side aimed to negotiate; negotiation was not an option because dialectic radicalization had blinded both sides and created 177 https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/09/uzbekistan-two-brutal-deaths-custody 198 fear from one another. Can such a form of linear progression of radicalization between two institutions be attributed to the back-and-forth dialectical violence? I argued it could. While there are some parallels between this radicalization process and Hegel’s dialectical notion of “being” progressing to “becoming” with the effect of “negation” (Bencivenga, 2000; Burbidge, 1981), my goal is not to provide a philosophical explanation of dialectical radicalization. Rather, I aim to question whether understanding the conflict between the state and radical Islam through the dialectic radicalization framework would direct us towards understanding the relational processes of de-radicalization: the lessening of the radical. Accusing non-violent Islamic groups of extremism and terrorism radicalized them. Persecuting innocent Muslims and purging their leaders made Islamic groups feel that their inner circle was being threatened, further radicalizing them. Even though these groups were non-militant at one point in time, it did not mean that they could not change their tactics to achieve their end goals or react to the actions taken against them. The government of Uzbekistan was the main instigator in the process of radicalization by detaining, jailing, and torturing innocent Muslims. Abuses of power in the lower branches of the government, accusing innocent people of involvement in restricted Islamic groups, labelling them as “adashganlar,” and forcing them to sign confessions helped authorities to exaggerate the danger and line their pockets. This gave Islamic militant groups justification to convince their members that violence was necessary because their inner spheres were being targeted. When the casualty numbers become real people’s lives and reports become stories of victims with deep pain and agony, each of them worthy of having a book written about them, any researcher might feel an overwhelming responsibility and obligation to do justice to the data they gathered. While intending to define extremism and radicalism in Uzbekistan, I realized that these 199 terms were less about religious activism than they were about opposition to the existing government, whether political or religious. The terms were also in part government constructs, designed to exert a stronger grip on society. Corruption in the system resulted in the further torture of defenseless Muslims. Law enforcement officials used extremism as a money-making machine. Orchestrated events, fabricated evidence, and cruel treatment of the religious were part of a broader political game. Detained Muslims were forced to name other Muslims and give false witness testimony against them. If punishment was based on the false accusations, potential risk, and pre-crime, how many of the people falsely imprisoned posed actual threats? If the state uses the most violent mechanisms and fabricated allegations against innocent Muslims, then is it not the state that is the most radicalized? How can these cases be ignored when attempting to define extremism and radicalism in Uzbekistan? In this chapter, I demonstrated how and why the common definitions of extremism and terrorism cannot be applied to the “adashganlar” in Uzbekistan. Those lumped into the category of “adashganlar” in Uzbekistan range from totally innocent to extremely violent, with the majority being innocent Muslims. The lucrative business of labelling people as extremists and terrorists went hand-in-hand with the Karimov government’s political purposes of eliminating opposition and taking strict control over society. Propaganda and fear were produced, blurring the line between truth and lies supplemented by the corruption in the law enforcement and legal systems. Arendt (1973) emphasizes the role of thought in society and problematizes the separation of action and agency. Those who understood what was happening in Uzbekistan and did nothing about it and those who fabricated evidence against innocent people without thinking about the implications were equally responsible for these social catastrophes. Arendt (1963) also argues that evil is not 200 radical; rather, it is the outcome of mediocrity, thoughtlessness, and lack of ability for reasoning. The greatest evil in the world is the evil committed by no one, evil that has no intentions or deep goals, the evil that is the outcome of thoughtlessness (Arendt, 1963). Thousands of innocent Muslims were the victims of fabricated criminal evidence not only due to those seeking to commit banal evil (Arendt, 1973), but also those who sought to make money for themselves by taking advantage of the government’s desire to eliminate opposition. While deradicalization of the government was not something Islam could do, establishing a program to deradicalize radicalized Islamic groups and individuals could help the government of Uzbekistan in the long run. 201 CHAPTER 6: ROLE OF MEDIA IN THE REVIVAL OF ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN 6.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER The development and advancement of internet technologies and social media have played a significant role in the intensification of the revival of Islam. The revival of Islam in Uzbekistan is not only about religion, but also the search for identity, the rejection of the Soviet past, and the need for a new narrative. In Chapters 4 and 5, I discussed the re-establishment of official Islam and the formation of unofficial Islam in Uzbekistan. I argued that the paradoxes in the governance of Islam resulted from the differing attitudes towards official and unofficial Islam, which led to dialectical radicalization between the state and Islam. In this chapter, I focus on how social media provides a platform for government officials and official Islamic leaders to interact with the public and disseminate information about official Islam, while at the same time providing a stage for individuals and groups who practice unofficial Islam to connect with one another and share their views and beliefs, which can potentially challenge the official version Islam promoted by the government. Social media is a subset of “new media,” which refers to digital and internet-based forms of media that are characterized by their interactivity, participatory nature, and decentralization relative to “old media,” which refers to traditional, primarily one-way forms of media such as television, radio, newspapers, and magazines. In this chapter, I discuss the importance of understanding the distinction between “Islam online” and “online Islam” to provide important insight into how the internet and social media are affecting the religious beliefs and practices of Muslims. The term “Islam online” refers to the presence of Islamic teachings, practices, and communities on the internet while “online Islam” refers to the ways in which the internet and social media are shaping and reshaping Islam. 202 Social media can be used to facilitate communication and coordination among radicalized individuals, to disseminate propaganda, and to influence public opinion, which can further fuel cyber radicalization; however, online radicalization is not limited to extremist groups or individuals. Echo chambers are online communities where individuals with similar beliefs and perspectives reinforce each other’s views, which can lead to the reinforcement of extremist ideologies. Radicalization through social media is a complex phenomenon and influenced by a variety of individual, social, religious, and political factors. The social media logic of programmability, popularity, connectivity, and datafication supported the heightened interaction with popular Islamic content on social media in Uzbekistan. During Islam Karimov’s presidency, the government of Uzbekistan increased its efforts to monitor and control online radicalization and the spread of extremist content online through the use of strict laws, surveillance, and censorship. Individuals found in possession of prohibited online religious material could face arrest, detention, and other legal consequences. As a result, research findings indicated the increased social anxieties Uzbek Muslims feel about using the internet for religious purposes. 6.2 SOCIAL MEDIA, ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS 6.2.1 How did social media influence Islamic revival: social media logic The most remarkable characteristics of the recent Islamic revival in Uzbekistan were its pace, scope, and effect on society (Sztompka, 2004)178. Islamic revival is a complex and 178 This is explained by Sztompka (2004) in his chapter called “The Trauma of Social Change.” While Sztompka does not mention Uzbekistan or Islam in his discussions of the speed of social change to describe revolutions and market collapses, his ideas are applicable to the revival of Islam in Uzbekistan. 203 multifaceted process, and it is influenced by a variety of factors, among them social media. Social media platforms shape and are shaped by the dynamics of the societies in which they are used. Social media not only amplified the religious message, but it also played a significant role in the intensification of Islamic revival by providing a platform for the dissemination of Islamic teachings and practices, permitting the formation of online communities and networks of like-minded individuals. The gradual progression of engagement and the intensity of use of social media for religious purposes can range from passive consumption to active creation and distribution of content. At one end of the continuum, individuals may use social media primarily to access religious information and teachings, such as watching religious videos online. At the other end, individuals may use social media to actively participate in religious communities and practices and, based on their areas of interest, produce, and disseminate content. The concept of “social media logic” refers to the ways in which people use social media and how the design of social media influences the way people communicate, access information, and form beliefs. Social media logic is closely related to “algorithmic culture” (Striphas, 2015 p. 396), the concept that the way individuals consume and distribute information is shaped by the algorithms and designs of social media platforms. The constant flow of information and how it is circulated are affected by the social media filters, which tend to expose users only to ideas similar to their own, leading to the reinforcement of existing beliefs and creation of echo chambers (Striphas, 2015). Programmability refers to “the ability of a central agency to manipulate content in order to define the audience's watching experience as a continuous flow” (Van Dijck & Poell, 2013 p. 5). Social media platforms are designed to be easily customized and tailored to the individual user’s preferences and interests based on their previous engagement and behaviour. The 204 algorithm in social media calculates reactions and responses, which influences the data traffic. Social media is easily used and navigated by users, making it simple for people to access and consume content, share, like, and comment, which increases the visibility leading to the increased engagement with that content. Social media platforms are designed to prioritize and highlight certain pieces of content that are popular among users, creating trending topics, viral videos, and most-liked posts. Its ability “to shape public opinion by filtering out influential voices” and to increase engagement and exposure explains popularity within this logic (Van Dijck & Poell, 2013 p. 6). Social media also facilitate communication and connection among users and enables them to easily find and join networks and communities. Connectivity refers to the ability of social media to connect individuals and communities from all over the world and to the ways social media platform gear “mediates users’ activities and defines how connections are shaped,” while still giving users “considerable influence over the contribution of content” (Van Dijck & Poell, 2013 p. 8). Popular Islamic content on social media can be shared and discussed across borders and cultures, leading to increased exposure and engagement with the content. These three elements of social media logic – programmability, popularity, and connectivity – “are grounded in the condition of datafication,” which refers to the “ability of networked platforms to render into data many aspects of the world that have never been quantified before” (Van Dijck & Poell, 2013 p. 9). Social media collects data about users, their interests, and their online behaviours. Datafication is the process of turning data into information and knowledge. Supported by the social media logic, Van Dijck &Poell (2013) argue, social media heightened people’s interaction with popular Islamic content and, therefore, played a 205 central role in the Islamic revival. It initiates social change by altering the conditions and rules of social interactions (Van Dijck & Poell, 2013) The power that social media can wield is influenced by how people feel about certain subjects in Islam. As Ozukum (2021) states, “social media has become a determining factor in shaping the religious, social and cultural life of the people (p. 213).” The common belief that “more religious as more moral” refers to the idea that being more religious leads to an increase in moral behavior and attitudes and that religious individuals are more likely to possess a strong moral compass. This belief is not unique to Islam but can be found across many religions and cultures. The claims of religion evoking morality go back as far as ancient Greece; in Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates famously asked “whether goodness is loved by the gods because it is good, or whether goodness is good because it is loved by the gods” (Dostoevsky, 1990 in McKay and Whitehouse, 2015 p. 448). Islam as a main source of moral guidance for Muslims (Eisenlohr, 2011) and as an ideology against westernization (Moshiri, 2019) and modernization (Herrera, 2004) offered a strong, appealing model for the revival of Islam. Backed by these arguments, widely publicized Islamic values and symbols, the cultural meanings attached to them, and the condemnation of unbelievers as deviants increased societal inclination towards religiosity in Muslim countries. Therefore, as Anderson (2000) observed, “the Muslim world is experiencing a media explosion… Redrawing the dimensions of Islamic discourse, identity, and consciousness extends beyond audience fragmentation to an expanding public sphere of new genre and channels of expression for new voices and interpreters (p. 39).” The processes by which like-minded users formed connections on social media, as well as the media algorithms resonating and reinforcing their shared narratives while simultaneously 206 limiting other perspectives, explain the emergence of media echo chambers (Cinelli at al., 2021). Echo chambers in social media play a significant role in the dynamism behind the online revival of Islam. Social media is also where various relationships, such as the relationship between the official and unofficial Islam, between both forms of Islam and the government, and between the general population and these institutions become observable. Online discussions between the members of official and unofficial Islam often become heated, showing the dialectical radicalization between the two groups. In some cases, offline relationships are replicated in the online world, while in other cases, they are intensified or exaggerated, with underground conflicts becoming real and observable. Over last two decades, the rapid diffusion and adoption of internet technologies and social media platforms provided new opportunities for religious initiatives in Uzbekistan. Initially, internet users in Uzbekistan were mostly a small group of well-educated Muslims who were more likely to have studied abroad, wealthier than the majority of people, understood technology better, and travelled to neighboring states for temporary work (Kendzior, 2011). As of July 2021,179 the number of internet users had grown to 18.6 million out of a population of 30.8 million180. Access to internet technologies in Uzbekistan gradually increased as popular social media sites such as Facebook181, YouTube182, and Twitter183 were developed. Comparing statistics on the use of social media sites in Uzbekistan, Facebook is currently the leading social networking 179 https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2021-uzbekistan 180 https://www.indexmundi.com/uzbekistan/demographics_profile.html 181 Smith, Aaron; Segal, Laurie; Cowley, Stacy (October 4, 2012). "Facebook reaches one billion users". CNN. Retrieved June 4, 2017. 182 Helft, Miguel; Richtel, Matt (October 10, 2006) "Venture Firm Shares a YouTube Jackpot" The New York Times. Retrieved March 26, 2017. 183 Dorsey, Jack (March 21, 2006). "just setting up my twttr". Twitter. Retrieved February 4, 2011. 207 website (27.49%), followed by YouTube (25.5%), Pinterest (23.6%), and Instagram (13.17%)184. Information about one hundred Islamic channels on the Telegram App that distribute Islamic discourse based on official Islam in Uzbekistan can be found on the Telegram Statistics website185. Facebook statistics, on the other hand186, do not have a dedicated category for Islamic content. The videos uploaded on YouTube are usually shared on other social media platforms and other apps by the content creators and their followers. The internet today is ubiquitous in Uzbekistan and is used to call, chat, socialize, and engage in online buying and selling, as well as for devotional reasons such as gaining Islamic education, forming online prayer communities, fasting, going on pilgrimages, and giving charitably. While discussing social media in Uzbekistan, Imamova (2015 p. 360) states that “what social media has given people, whether they are from a city or a village, are the necessary tools to communicate with the wider world and think in new ways.” Therefore, understanding the revival of Islam and the relationship between Islam, society, and the government in Uzbekistan would not be complete without considering the role of social media. According to Bunt (2009), the impact of social media in religious behaviour and its potential to change people’s religiosity and practice of piety have received some scholarly attention in recent years. Social media provides a wide range of opportunities to win the hearts and minds of Muslims through Islamic expression; however, those who still do not use the internet remain unaffected or, at least, not directly affected by online Islam (Bunt, 2009). 184 https://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/uzbekistan 185 https://uz.tgstat.com/ru/religion 186 https://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/facebook 208 In general, the common purpose of offline and online Islamic activism is to educate and influence Muslims through Islamic expression, form and expand communities of believers, strive for religious freedom, and provide support to Muslims. Ibahrine (2020) argues that most religious leaders and preachers “capitalize on the effectiveness and efficiency of social media in engaging with the community of believers and enhancing their fidelity and loyalty (p. 69).” The majority of religious authorities whom I interviewed that have their own websites, blogs, and social media platforms resonate with Ibahrine’s argument. I provide some examples in the next subsections. 6.2.2 Islam Online and Online Islam The experience of social life in online and offline spheres are comparably responsible for changing social consciousness, including ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes, and cultural architypes. According to Schlitz et al. (2010), “religion, culture, and geographic region, together with all the experiences people have both internally and in relationship to their environments, give rise to their worldview, or their general way of viewing themselves and the world around them (p. 21).” Religion can influence every aspect of religious life. When the influential power of religion meets the power of social media to disseminate ideas, it can stimulate both progressive and regressive changes. The creation of virtual religion is “not only about how religion is performed and articulated online but how digital spaces are shaping and being shaped by religious practices” (Campbell, 2012 p. 2). The transmission of Islamic knowledge and co-practice of Islam between Muslims are some of the most valued practices in traditional Islam. Islamic proselytization in mosques is limited to small groups of Muslims; however, the internet and social media provide new opportunities to transmit and receive Islamic knowledge on a much larger scale, both through 209 traditional forms of knowledge transmission that moved online and new types of Islamic experience that emerged due to the internet. The online Islamic piety model, which includes both religion online and online religion (Helland, 2000), not only includes Islamic education and pious practice, but responds to all kind of societal needs, including moral guidance, entertainment, discussion, debate, analysis of global events, and more. Its availability with no regard to time and place is the most important feature of this model (Helland, 2000). Religion online is online religious content based on offline sources that empowers its members by bypassing well-established systems of gatekeepers, legal restrictions, and the limits of time, space, and geography. It refers to the ways in which Islamic beliefs and practices are adapted and expressed in the digital context. It includes the use of digital tools for prayer and study and creation of virtual mosques and Islamic centers and the use of social media for Islamic teachings and preaching. Online religion, by contrast, refers to new forms of religious practices and engagements online that took advantage of the new virtual spaces and technological opportunities dynamizing the revival of Islam (Helland, 2000). It can include websites, social media account and forums that provide information and recourses on Islam. These two terms refer to the ways in which Islamic faith is practiced and expressed through the internet and digital technologies. It is important to understand that both Islam online and online Islam are not limited to the traditional understanding of Islam, rather they include the emergence of new forms of Islamic practices and communities that shaped by the digital context. Both official and unofficial Islam in Uzbekistan commonly use online Islam and Islam online as part of Islamic practices. As discussed in the Chapter 4, the government of Uzbekistan controls the Muslim Board, which in turn controls everything related to Islam in the country. This also means that the content created and published by official ulama represents the beliefs 210 and wishes of the government. In an interview with the head of the MBU, Shaikh Abdulaziz Mansur,187 he stated, Our job is making the moral guidance and Islamic knowledge available for those who are seeking it. People need dependable websites where they can find reliable resources. They maybe want to compare our interpretations of Islam to those who are spreading deceiving information. They often ask questions, and we answer. We don’t want to hand our youth to those [audible pause] various forces188. The borderless nature of the internet means that occupying more space is viewed as having the power to engage with more Muslims and, therefore, having a better chance to influence them. Shaikh Abdulaziz Mansur confirmed that both Islam online and online Islam widely utilized for Islamic practices of official Islam. They broadcast the traditional practices of Islam and also use new ways to engage with people online. Islam online, the traditional ways of Islamic practice transitioning to online world, can be observed in the dissemination of mosque prayers and preaching and conversations that took place after Friday prayers. Video recordings of religious ceremonies were also part of traditional Islamic practices being made available online. Recordings of Friday mosques preaching (Juma Maruzalari)189 became widely available on the internet, allowing those who did not participate in Friday prayers to take part. Many Islamic channels on YouTube upload Friday proselytization videos and share them on other social media platforms. Some of the larger and more established mosques have their own social media platforms. For example, At-Termiziy Mosque (At-ATermiziy Jome Masjidi) has a program called Juma Online that broadcasts live videos of Friday prayers.190 People’s social media feeds tend to prioritize what their friends share, thus encouraging greater piety within Muslim communities. 187 Interview 017 (Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur) 188 Interview 017 (Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur) 189 https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=juma+maruzalari+online 190 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UGPmeIu3_T4 211 I interviewed a group of videographers who video record Friday prayers and the preaching afterwards. They edit the videos and manage the mosques’ social media platforms. Husan aka, a videographer, and social media manager, says that “We are basically image makers, but we record, edit and distribute videos. We don’t only videotape and distribute the mosque’s materials, we intend to put that mosque and imam in the best light possible. We have multiple accounts in every platform. We cut the most important messages and effective parts from the long videos and create short. We try to create attention-grabbing videos by adding music and images and continuedly disseminate to keep the audience engaged. Short videos can be as short as two minutes. We do our own research to increase audience. More subscribers, more viewers, more sharing and liking means we are doing good. People these days don’t have the patience to watch long videos. So, short videos are more viewed and circulated in social media.”191 Interview with Husan aka shows how significant role social media plays in the spread of religious materials and how social media logic is studied and used for their purpose. I asked if they only videotape Friday prayers and Husan aka said, “no, imams let us know if there is an important conversation is planned to take place in the mosque. It depends if something happens, and imams need to address those issues. My guys and I are usually prepared to go any time.” By “something happens,” shows official Islam’s active involvement in politics and day-to-day governance. Muslims often listen to religious authorities more than political leaders. The dissemination of Islamic material is not taken lightly in Uzbekistan. This is an example of Islam online. Proselytization or Islamic preaching is commonly called Daavat (call to Islam) in Uzbek192 and is popular among Muslim preachers. It is one of the important practices performed by ulama, who are usually accepted as having extensive Islamic knowledge (Salihin 2008). Daavat is a significant factor in the steady infusion of the virtues of Islam into people’s personal 191Interview 080 (Husan aka) 192 Dawah in Arabic 212 and social lives through communication and winning the hearts and minds of believers and non-believers.193 While Daavat in mosques being broadcasted is an example of Islam online, online Daavat is a new, increasingly important religious practice. Online Daavat is broadcasted from the imams’ own homes or offices. There is no traditional offline audience; rather, they often have thousands of Muslims watching them live, asking questions online, and getting answers from the imam. Islamic preachers also issue video or audio content and stream on as many social media platforms as possible to reach out to as many Muslims as they can. Islamic leaders started to preach online to reach their religious and intellectual followers and form communities. Online Islam can be observed in the social media through new ways to practice Islam. Social media in recent years became a new social landscape for forming social identity and community in Muslim societies (Stanton, 2014). Survey of ninety students within Islamic Communication department at State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Palu indicate that students find social media preaching much easier to find new information, help them to build personal identity and to increase Islamic knowledge (Latepo et al., 2021). Often, communities formed around religious authorities who regularly produce content and organize online conversations. While it changed the way Islam was learned, practiced, and experienced, it did not change the conceptual framework of the religious groups using it. Social media serves as a medium to form and build a community of believers who support, motivate, and encourage a deeper faith and Islamic lifestyle. It is impossible to know how many and what kind of Islamic communities exist on social media; however, is a step towards the Muslim unity that has been central to practice of Islam. 193 Dawah is an Arabic word means invitation. In Uzbekistan people pronounce it as “daavat” 213 Online Islam also made it possible to observe the interactions between official and unofficial Islam which is impossible to observe in the offline world. Using real time live video conference, some members of official and unofficial Islam call out one another for open online discussions, mostly to debate on each other’s previous points. The discussions often lead to both sides harshly criticizing one another. As part of the media analysis, I selected active members of both official and unofficial Islam who continuedly had open online conflict to observe who run multiple social media channels, blogs, and websites. The reason behind the selection of these two imams was their comparable levels of popularity and numbers of followers on social media; however, the most important factor was, it allowed the observation of the continual conflict between official and unofficial Islam, their differences, and struggles. One of the YouTube channels of Mahmud Abdulmomin has over 115,000 subscribers194 and one of his debates with Abror Mukhtor Aliy has been viewed over 663,000 times, with over 37,000 people having watched the debate live.195 After observing their buttle for two years, I interviewed both of them in 2021. My intentions were to compare and contrast online and offline practices of Islamic activism, understand the relationship between official and unofficial Islam and study the role of social media in the revival of both official and unofficial Islam. Abror Mukhtor Aliy and Mahmud Abdulmomin196 are two of the most popular active Islamic content creators in the Uzbek language. As social media logic suggests that the popularity of the actors on social media plays a significant role in their ability to influence people. Abror Mukhtor Aliy is a member of the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan, whereas Mahmud 194 https://www.youtube.com/c/MahmudAbdulmomin (this link is only to see the number of audiences) 195 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9Dyd1R-bhs (this link is only to see the number of audiences) 196 Both Mahmud Abdulmomin and Abror Mukhtor Aliy chose to participate in this research with their own names through informed consent. 214 Abdulmomin is a member of the restricted Islamic groups called Hisb-ut Tahrir al Islami who lives outside of Uzbekistan and openly and strongly criticizes the political system and official Islam in Uzbekistan. They both make themselves available for public questions, interact with people through Facebook, Telegram and Instagram, and spread their content across multiple social media platforms through multiple profiles. Both Aliy and Abdulmomin employed a crew to help them to create and distribute content. During the interview with Abror Mukhtor Aliy I noticed his disapproving attitude towards unofficial Islam. He stated, …we must not give our space to those “self-condescending” people. When a Muslim brother or sister searches for something on the internet, the content we created should be readily available and appear first. We are being there for our fellow Muslim brothers and sisters when they need us the most. We must lead them to the right path. We want to save them from those who misleading them197 Spreading Islam, according to Aliy is about preventing Muslims from following the “wrong Islam” and creating moral society.198 He dreams of Uzbek soldiers massively praying at praying times, because Islam makes them the most dedicated men for the defense of the country. He believes he is fighting for the future of the nation.199 Official and unofficial Islam compete for the attention and devotion of Muslims and also scared of one-another. Although deepening Islam in society is a goal for both, the question of what kind of Islam polarizes them. Another point Aliy made is significant to understand the role of social media in the revival of Islam. He said, Islam encourages jamaat200 and social interaction. Social media is not any different. We have to be there, where the most Muslims and Mu’mins are. If they are on social media, we had better be there for them. Muslimun is an external position – if Muslim says “I am Muslim” that means their Muslims. Muminun is an internal position – consciousness… if you will. Seeing and listening to 197 Interview 018 (Abror Mukhtor Aliy) 198 Interview 018 (Abror Mukhtor Aliy) He used the term “ahloqli jamiyat.” My translation of it is “moral society.” 199 Interview 018 (Abror Mukhtor Aliy) He used the term “millat kelajagi.” My translation of it is “the future of the nation.” 200 Community 215 messages of Islam sprout change in the consciousness first. Sooner or later, it translates itself into the external, too.201 By internal position, Abror Mukhtor Aliy is talking about the internalization (Berger and Luckmann, 2016) of Islam and degree of religiosity. Islamic deepening in society, therefore, starts in the consciousness. Abror Mukhtor Aliy believes that the debates with Mahmud Abdulmomin and others help people to distinguish the right path from the wrong path in Islam and protect them from being influenced by radical groups and ideologies.202 Raddiya is a term I came across while observing Abror Mukhtor Aliy and Mahmud Abdulmomin’s disagreements. This term is widely used by Islamic authorities to reject someone’s claims, statements, or actions. Raddiya functions as antithesis to reject earlier ideas (or theses)203. Often, Islamic authorities condemn certain interpretations of Islam by giving raddiya. Islamic authorities challenge one another by calling for live debates or producing video content to counter the content produced by others. Official ulama continually produce videos giving raddiya to the unofficial ulama, who often disapprove of the political ideology and the government’s actions. Such raddiya videos have become very popular with the advancement of social media platforms. Two research participants said that they watch these buttles because they are entertaining, which made me think whether such live video battles are also initiated to get public attention. Abror Mukhtor Aliy and Mahmud Abdulmomin alone produced over one hundred raddiya videos and organized dozens of real time discussions204 against one another. Interestingly, they both often call one another an “enemy of Islam” or “murtad,” someone not 201 Interview 018 (Abror Mukhtor Aliy) 202 Interview 018 (Abror Mukhtor Aliy) 203 Dialectical method is explained in earlier chapters. 204 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nw_BPJgjMEc 216 belonging to Islam. Islamic proselytization by exiled Islamic authorities often has strong political tones and undermines and criticizes official Islam and the government of Uzbekistan. Often, it raises awareness of structural issues such as repression of Muslims, unemployment, labour migration, or increased rates of divorce and prostitution and then presents Islam as the only way to address these issues, preaching from the Quran and Hadith to support their arguments.205 For example, Mahmud Abdulmomin continuedly harshly criticizes official ulama in Uzbekistan. He says, if we think those who read a lot and know a lot are our scholars, then there will be no better scholar than Shaytan (devil). Shaytan is more knowledgeable than any of those scholars. True scholars are those who use their knowledge to serve Muslims, not their enemies.206 He argues that official ulama serve the government rather than Muslims and that the government is an enemy to Muslims.207 The formation of “us versus them” is observable in both Aliy and Abdulmomin’s statements. Aliy used the term “adashganlar” towards unofficial Islam and says they are dangerous for society. Abdulmomin has similar opinion about official Islam. He says, People need to know the truth; people are doomed by government. Alhamdulillah, internet allow us to fight them back. I have more followers than half of the imams have in Uzbekistan… (pause). They are (official ulama) a bunch of enemies of Islam working for the security services of Uzbekistan. They are helping the government to put chains on Muslims. They bend Islam as they wish… use it for the convenience of the government. Islam shouldn’t be modified according to the needs of people or governments; people and governments must modify their behaviour according to the principles of Islam.208 There is a political tone and sense of entitlement in both Aliy and Abdulmomin’s comments. It is obvious that there is strong disagreement between official and unofficial Islam, with even 205 For example, Mahmud Abdulmomin, unofficial imam and the member of Hisb-ut Tahrir al-Islami, is very critical about such issues. https://www.youtube.com/c/MahmudAbdulmomin 206 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsoR2wfpYGM 207 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsoR2wfpYGM 208 Interview 004 (Mahmud Abdul Momin) Translated by the researcher 217 increased open online discussions between the groups incapable of resolving their complex issues with one another. One of the online discussions between Abror Mukhtor Aliy and Mahmud Abdulmomin in June 2019 had over 116,000 live viewers.209 Within a year, that video had been seen by over 555,00 people, and has 703,000 viewers as of January 20, 2023, which was produced in 2020. This shows that such discussions are not taken lightly in Uzbekistan. Mahmud Abdulmomin was detained and jailed in August 2019 in Russia and representatives from human rights organizations spoke on his behalf at his court hearing, which took place on September 5, 2019. This is not the first time Mahmud Abdulmomin has been imprisoned for religious activism which shows that online activism often has consequences in the real world. 6.2.3 Cyber-radicalization Cyber-radicalization is one of the negative effects of social media that has emerged in the course of Islamic revival. Cyber-radicalization refers to the process by which individuals become radicalized through the use of online platforms and social media. Due to the increasing use of social media as a tool for spreading propaganda, cyber-radicalization became more observable in recent decades. Cyber-radicalization can take many forms and social media platforms provide easy access to extremist materials including videos, speeches and visuals. Social media provides virtual space to spread extremist ideologies and propaganda. It is impossible to fully understand the reasons behind dialectical radicalization without taking cyber-radicalization in account; however, it is important to note that the vast majority of Muslims are peaceful and reject extremism. Social media’s power to connect, bringing like-minded individuals and groups closer 209 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9Dyd1R-bhs&t=5288s 218 and shaping their perceptions, beliefs, and ideas, played a significant role in this process. Also, social media algorithms augment the most viewed, liked, and commented upon content, opening a wider road for radicalization. A relational approach provides a better understanding of dialectical radicalization between various stakeholders in social media. As established in previous chapters, the individuals and groups affected by increased unemployment, poor socio-economic conditions, unstable political situations, social marginalization, and dissatisfaction after the collapse of the Soviet Union became vulnerable to radical Islamic ideologies (Salayeva and Baranick, 2005). The influence of the ideology of both foreign and local Islamic groups, regionally formed terrorist groups like the IMU, and transnational terrorist organizations like al Qaeda played an important role in these developments. When Islam transitioned to the online platforms – Islam online – these groups also used the internet to advance their purposes (Tucker, 2014). Several academic accounts of Noah Tucker, as part of the Central Asian Program (CAP) at George Washington University, shed light on the Uzbek Islamism on internet and social media. Although Tucker pays greater attention to Islamism and ISIS recruitment of Uzbeks through social media, his writings are a direct analysis of how Uzbek ISIS spokesmen use social media to recruit Uzbeks and the government’s response to it. According to Tucker (2014), when the cost of internet was quite high, low-cost digital media was used to recruit Uzbek Muslims to join jihadists in Syria, Uzbek jihadists in Syria, particularly those aligned with KIB and ANF210 and their branded media studios, produce more digital media depicting intense and successful operations than Uzbeks fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan ever could. The Uzbeks fighting around Aleppo use social media to show that they are on the “front lines of jihad.” (Tucker, 2014, p. 2) 210 Two jihadist groups of Uzbek people in Syria: KIB (Imam Buxoriy Katibasi) and ANF (Al-Nusra Faghters) 219 The high cost of internet in the early stages of digitization in Uzbekistan, therefore, did not stop efforts to recruit Uzbek men and women to join extremist organizations. These organizations found cheaper alternatives to carry on their missions. In another article, Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Uzbekistan211, Tucker (2016) further explains, The Uzbeks in ISIS created a media service called KhilofatNews, several video studios, and related social media accounts on Facebook, Twitter, Odnoklassniki and video-sharing sites including YouTube and Vimeo. ISIS Uzbeks rejects secular state borders in the region and target co-ethnics in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and those working in Russia or other countries. While only a small portion of the public is vulnerable to ISIS recruitment, Uzbekistan utilizes various tactics to fight against ISIS messaging and recruitment. Often, respected religious figures from official Islam are employed to create anti-ISIS recruitment content and distribute it in the places where ISIS videos appear (Tucker, 2016). Abror Mukhtor Aliy, for example, is one of those official ulama who works with the government to produces such content. Although the number of Uzbek people who have joined terrorist organizations is unknown, facts suggest that their involvement in international terrorism is significant. Tucker (2022) highlights some of these facts, Following the recapture of large parts of Syria and Iraq at least hundreds and as many as several thousand women and children from Central Asia were detained in camps like al-Hol in northern Syria and within the Iraqi prison and orphanage system, alongside citizens of between 80 and 110 other countries. Addressing both the humanitarian and potential security crises that this situation presented, the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have become world leaders in repatriation of their citizens following the conflict, organizing state programs to repatriate and re-integrate 654 and 512 people respectively. 211 https://www.centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CERIA-Brief-12-February-20161.pdf 220 Interactive media offers intimacy and participatory ways to engage with audiences. Religious influencers discuss daily issues, including the news shared by the mainstream media, in more ideology-based ways (Tucker, 2014). The vulnerability of the audience coupled with recruiters targeting those vulnerabilities allows for the building of strong ties. Relationships and social ties play a central role in violent radicalization. A relational approach, therefore, helps to understand the relational mechanisms of the reasons why ordinary people get involved in radical ideologies. Malthaner and Lindekilde (2017) suggest that “relational patterns are informative not only because they locate and specify sources of radicalizing exposure, but also because social ties are cardinal vectors of intervention.” Claims that the inner circle of Muslims is being threatened are widely used as propaganda on internet networks. Tucker (2014) states that “Uzbek jihadist groups in Syria present themselves on the front line of the global resistance to ‘anti-Muslim oppression.’” They back their arguments with “feelings of moral outrage and the belief that a war is being waged against Islam, particularly when they resonate with personal experiences” (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). They take questions and answer them, making them accessible, which also empowers their audiences and helps to strengthen social ties. They build trust through participatory engagement (Tucker, 2014). Tucker (2016) states that “Uzbekistan released one of its most influential Islamic figures from prison to improve its anti-ISIS campaign,” referring to Hayrullo Hamidov, a prominent journalist and independent religious figure who had a genuinely popular influence on counter-ISIS recruitment. Radicalization exists not only in the relationship between cardinal actors such as terrorist organizations and governments, however; the shape and scope that radicalization between various social groups can take is diverse but relational. More efficient, rational, and 221 objective decision making with respect to the governance of extremism requires more region-specific analytical research in these areas, which is largely lacking in Uzbekistan. In countries like Uzbekistan, where youth have very few opportunities and suffer high unemployment, radicalized social media pages and channels serve as a better option to tend to the wounds they often do not realize that they have (Tucker, 2009). These outlets blame the government for all existing social issues and suggest that violence is the only way left to deal with them. For example, Abu Salah Darsliklari212 is one of the many restricted channels in Uzbekistan. Abu Salah, who is originally from Uzbekistan, is a member of the terrorist organization Tawhid wal Jihad213. Content creators like him form specific social identities which are “often likened to that of an exotic disease, something that is little understood and debilitating to the entire body politic” (McGlinchey, 2005). They attract certain groups of Muslims who are eager for a sense of belonging and righteousness and are easy to influence towards countercultural or counter-political rebellion (McGlinchey, 2005). The development of Uzbek segments of social media led to the proliferation of cyber-imams and the i-fatwas. Anything negative posted about Islam or ulama can cause dramatic online radicalization in Muslim societies. Criticizing ulama, in particular, causes significant backlash. Whether it is between religious and secular groups or official and unofficial Islam, the conversations in this space are often very heated. Lim (2005) argues that Islamic radical fundamentalists are proving that the internet has the potential to facilitate identity formation. A fatwa declaration provides interpretations and applications of Islamic scriptures with respect to day-to-day issues (Wiechman et al., 1996). Internet fatwas and ordinary people’s 212 https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC-Q_lTTl8d4xee9A0dr1XvQ 213 https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/04/27/katibat-al-tawhid-wal-jihad-a-faithful-follower-of-al-qaeda-from-central-asia/ 222 response to them in recent years has become a widespread phenomenon in the Islamic world (Williams, 2007; Al-Kandari & Dashti, 2014; Hosen, 2008; Hashim & Mizerski, 2010). Fatwa declarations in cyber-Islam, issued by internet imams, became more controversial and were often based on less formal or prohibited sources; however, social media consumers often accepted them without examining or considering these factors. Social media shaming is another way of reinforcing Islam in society. I observed cases where social media users started a campaign against an individual who had been caught saying something unacceptable under Islam. In extreme cases, such as racist outbursts, the social media algorithm exposes the radical content to an even greater public audience (Bouvier, 2020, p. 1). Unlike offline radicalization, social media radicalization creates a different type of spectacle. Often the reputation of the individual is harmed, and the harm is augmented by the social media algorithm. In the process of the media observation I undertook, I witnessed a couple cases of social media outbursts. One of the cases involved the radicalization of religious people against a woman who criticized polygamy, using the prophet Muhammad and his first wife as an example. For a couple of weeks, starting on March 9, 2019, the Uzbek corners of social media were hit by the waves of an online storm. The newly appointed deputy head of the State Agency of Media and Information in Uzbekistan, a woman named Nargiza Saidova, replied to a provocative post on polygamy in Islam on Facebook and used the Prophet Muhammad and his first wife, Khadicha, as an example214. This response to Hayot Baxtiyor’s comment was alleged to be an insult towards Muhammad (S.A.W) and Khadicha (R.A.) by many Uzbeks. 214 In the conversation on Facebook, Hayot Baxtiyor says “Men who cannot marry a second wife are lame and their wives who don’t allow them to marry to a second wife are b*..s” Nargiza Saidova responds: “Prophet Muhammad 223 The conversation was casual, but the resulting social media radicalization was not. The crossed-out picture of a journalist and a screenshot of Saidova’s reply on Facebook were circulated with angry headings like “Death to Murtad”, “Punish the Infidel”, and “Death to anyone who insults Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W).” She was called “mulhid”, “munafiq” and “kafir,” terms used to label “heterodox thinking and refusal of a faith formerly embraced” (Schilke, 2012, p. 311). Schilke (2012) argues that accusations of unbelief and impiousness in Islam are much more common and consequential than actual unbelief. Additionally, women suffer the most severe admonishments. Anonymous accounts participated actively in this cyber-attack against Saidova. It was followed by livestreamed videos on YouTube that fueled an intense bullying campaign against her. YouTube was the primary platform for this attack, with over 165 videos of anger, radical voices, hatred, and emotions of mostly Uzbek men being posted within three days. An Uzbek man living in Turkey produced a YouTube video crying and demanding punishment for Saidova215. The content creators ranged from well-known imams216 and leaders of radical groups217 to musicians218 and young Islamic bloggers219. Many of these videos demanded Nargiza Saidova’s imprisonment and the imposition of a death sentence. The Uzbek segment of social media became a display of unauthorized cyber-fatwas for a few weeks. The main Uzbek-language news outlets, including those operating outside the country, produced special programs on this issue. Two days after the incident, Kun.uz, an Uzbekistan- did not marry another woman while he was married to mother Khadicha (Prophet’s first wife). Then do you mean Prophet Muhammad was lame and Mother Khadicha was a b*.... You know better” 215 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1N8h1VdwZHM 216 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XxlkDoe3QyQ 217 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1u1y8BAGYyk 218 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYeObAqOM20 219 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NY9TUlHtAZk 224 based news agency, broadcast Saidova’s formal apology, stating that she did not intend to insult the Prophet Muhammad or any other Muslim and that using the Prophet Muhammad and his wife in her example was an “unintentional mistake.” Her apology was also circulated on social media, often resulting in further angry and insulting comments. The authors of the hate videos produced a second round of videos responding to her apology by bringing up a verse from Quran (At-Tavba [The Repentance]) explaining that anyone who insults or ridicules the Rasul Allah (prophet of Allah), even by mistake or in jest, will not be forgiven; therefore, they said, she had to die. Some Islamic scholars and imams from inside the country, such as imam Abror Mukhtor Aliy and many other official ulama, broadcast videos trying to calm the public down and calling for tolerance and forgiveness for Saidova through Islam. They called the campaign against Saidova a fitnah, civil strife or distress caused by the provocation of anonymous people on social media. Other religious people, however, responded by blaming official ulama for serving the secular government in Uzbekistan. On March 13, 2019, Radio Freedom reported that Nargiza Saidova was forced to a take leave of absence from her position as a Deputy Director General of the State Agency of Media and Information for security reasons and that her house was being guarded by 24-hour security services220. The case of Nargiza Saidova revealed the deep fragmentation between the religious and secular groups in Uzbek society. Value-based societal cleavages often become visible in such situations and this social fragmentation was mirrored in the fragmentation of the media. Social media served as a platform to facilitate debate between the angry Muslims and those who encouraged tolerance, who held the far weaker position. 220 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LF9EU0VBC_Q 225 In Muslim communities, social media radicalization usually occurs when some sort of religion-related issue provokes an extreme reaction which circulates online. As Odag et al., (2019 p. 261) state, the “extremist groups make use of the internet to spread right wing or jihadist ideologies, connect like-minded others in echo chambers and cloaked websites, and address particularly marginalized individuals of a society.” The echo chambers in social media can be understood as situations where like-minded people group together to support a claim originating from one source of information, which then becomes amplified through repetition, strong reaction, and exaggeration until most people assume it to be true. In these situations, the amplified information is shielded from denial or counter arguments because of opposing voices being lost through the effect of the echo chamber (Vosoughi et al., 2018; Cinelli et al., 2021). First, information stimulating a strong reaction backed with some sort of ideological claim is disseminated. This information is often accompanied by an image that grabs people’s attention, provokes anger, and triggers mobilization: in Saidova’s case, her screenshotted reply with her X’d-out picture, sometimes edited with Satan’s horns and long tongue drawn in, was circulated. In the second stage, social media celebrities, Islamic bloggers, and Islamic authorities produce and spread hundreds of videos on various social media platforms with very dramatic responses wrapped in alleged Islamic facts, claiming that Islamic faith and Muslims’ belief systems are in danger and demanding an instant solution. With respect to Saidova, they ascribed guilt to those who were not participating in this spectacle for not safeguarding Islam or doing enough when faith called, openly suggesting very radical solutions. People circulated these videos and posts until anger and hatred in comments reached a fever pitch. The counter-voices were undermined and often insulted. Such anger and radicalized response to the trigger did not 226 allow room for healthy debate and did not tolerate any other shades of opinions. Third, some counter-radicalization efforts occur, such as Saidova’s apology and nicely narrated counter arguments being circulated, in hopes of abating the outrage. In Saidova’s case, the upheaval slowly calmed. Radicalization is a complex phenomenon and a difficult process to fully understand; however, the cases of online radicalization can be observed and examined through the ways in which social media spectacles transpire. Everton (2016 p. 191) argues that “most forms of religious extremism do not result in violence;” however, violence is not far away from the climax it can reach. The concepts of free expression and respect for one’s religion were put at odds with each other in Saidova’s case, creating an environment ripe for radicalization. In cases where the Quran or Prophet Muhammad is ridiculed, this can lead to very radicalized campaigns, which is another example of the relationality of exchanges and dialectical radicalization. 6.2.4 The government of Uzbekistan’s response to cyber radicalization The government’s involvement in the media landscape in Uzbekistan is overwhelmingly complex. Counter-extremism measures, according to the country’s “Counter Extremism Project,” include monitoring and removing extremist content, disabling accounts of extremist groups and individuals, working with civil society organizations, and implementing widespread censorship and surveillance of the internet221. Countering online radicalization is viewed as part of its broader efforts to combat religious extremism and terrorism. Rollberg & Laruelle (2015) argues that through both print and electronic media, the governments of post-Soviet republics in Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, “engage with their civil societies in a wide variety of communicative 221 https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/uzbekistan-extremism-and-terrorism/report 227 processes, ranging from genuine dialogue to unabashed censorship and from subtle manipulation to brutal pressure (p. 227).” To better control media, Haghayeghi (1997) states that “almost all Central Asian republics have enacted comprehensive legislation designed to control the activities of the media” since the 1990s. Uzbekistan’s Law on Mass Media for example, “imposes a set of comparable restrictions equally undemocratic in character.” (Haghayeghi, 1997). Haghayeghi (1997) explains further that under Article 5 of this law, ordinary citizens cannot establish any form of mass media organization; only certain groups are allowed to legally establish such organizations. Article 6 further states that if a mass media organization is “intended for foreign audiences, it must be registered by the Cabinet of Ministers under the President” (Haghayeghi, 1997). Article 27 declares that all foreign journalists must be accredited by the Cabinet of Ministers under the President (Haghayeghi, 1997). This shows the powerful control the state exercises over media and how stringent the requirements to engage in mass media and journalism are. Control and manipulation of social media, however, is far more complex (Brian et al., 2012). Often, radicalized content creators appeal to audiences, especially young and disillusioned media consumers, by explicitly rejecting existing socio-political frameworks (Tucker, 2014). The government of Uzbekistan’s restriction of forty social media accounts including YouTube channels, blogs, and Facebook pages by law (See Table 2) led to the criminalization of people who knowingly or unknowingly downloaded or shared Islamic content produced by those groups. It opened the door to a wide range of policing practices. Social media, therefore, not only serves as a platform for open discussions and exchange, but also as a stage for suppressing and manipulating certain discourses (Turaeva, 2022). 228 6.2.5 Is internet diminishing Islam? The impact the internet has had on Islam is complex and multifaceted. The general observation is that the internet is not a monolithic entity and that it can be used to serve different purposes, whether in positive or negative ways. It can be a powerful tool for the dissemination of Islamic teachings, practices, and communities, but it can also be used to spread extremist or radical ideologies. On one hand, the internet can be a powerful tool for the dissemination of Islamic teachings, practices, and communities to a wide audience. It provides access to religious information and resources that may not be available in traditional forms of media and connects individuals and communities from all over the world. The internet can also expose individuals to a wide range of Islamic teachings and practices, which can lead to a greater diversity of Islamic beliefs and practices online. Social media platforms and online communities can also facilitate the formation of virtual religious communities, which can be a source of support and inspiration for those who are far from traditional religious centres. On the other hand, the internet can also be a source of misinformation, extremist ideologies, and falsehoods about Islam and can be used to recruit individuals to extremist ideologies. The internet is shaping the way Islam is practiced and understood. It provides new opportunities and challenges for the Islamic faith and the global Muslim community. It is used to create online communities and networks of like-minded individuals, where people can share and reinforce similar views and beliefs, which can further amplify the reach and influence of certain ideologies. This can lead to the spread of misconceptions and stereotypes about the religion and can contribute to the marginalization of and discrimination against Muslims. 229 Three additional concerns about Islam’s presence on the internet emerged from the interview analysis, where forty-three of the eighty-seven participants expressed some concern about using the internet for religious purposes. First, there were anxieties about being accused of extremism and radicalism for accessing online Islamic sources. During the massive detentions of religious people under Islam Karimov’s presidency, searching for online extremist or radical Islamic materials was one of the most commonly used methods by law enforcement (HRW, 2004)222. People’s phones were searched upon arrival in Uzbekistan and following any sort of detention. Second, participants expressed anxieties about loved ones being affected by radical ideologies of Islam. Although older participants or those who were parents mostly worried about youths or their children, younger participants also expressed similar worries about increased radicalization in society. Third, nonstop conflicts between official and unofficial ulama and also religious and secular groups often led to the reputations of religious people being damaged and observers losing their faith in Islam because many followers were accused of corruption and other forms of deviance. Young Muslims engage with their faith through engagement with their peers online. Parents often have mixed feelings about consuming online Islam. According to Pattacchini and Zenou (2016), parents’ religiosity affects their investment in transmitting religious values and initiating religious socialization of their children. Interview data shows that parents who are more religious want their children to connect with religious peers and religious material on the internet. One of the research participants, Zayniddin, said, 222 https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uzbekistan0304.pdf 230 Internet has everything these days, good and bad. I check my children’s phones all the time. I want to know what they are interested in. Thank God, I see Islamic apps, Islamic channels, Islamic videos in their YouTube history. I see they are friends with other faithful guys. It is better if they talk about Islam and do faith related things together. It’s fun for them. Especially, when it comes to my daughters. I want them to be good, ethical… good wife, good mother tomorrow to her children, you know!?223 It is not difficult to notice that people often think that as long as children are engaged with Islam, they will be more moral and that learning about Islam leads them to be better. Zayniddin also raises the very important point that there is a difference between boys’ and girls’ reasons for using the internet and their expectations from their consumption of religious content. Doing faith-related activities with peers for fun contrasts with the aim to prepare daughters to be good wives and mothers. The notion of “more religious as more moral” leads people to act, talk, and express themselves in more religious ways, while parents feel that engaging with Islam helps them to raise moral children. Posting Islam-related posts also falls into this category. It shows that the individual is interested in and engaged with Islam. Choudhury (2007) confirms that for youth, Islam became the main source of identity formation and that social media was a vehicle for this identity formation. There is a strong sense of fear and confusion about internet and media use for religious purposes among research participants. The availability of large amounts of Islamic content and finding it difficult to differentiate between acceptable Islam and unacceptable Islam224 made people nervous. One of the participants, Ehson, said, There is too much information in social media. It is highly probable that a person who has recently entered Islam and the prayers gets confused and becomes a partisan. There are many different answers to every question. It is difficult to know which one is correct. It has led to an increase in unrest. Twenty years ago, Wahhabis used to invite people to their homes by putting paper on their doors. On the contrary, today that is done through the internet225. 223 Interview 001 (Zayniddin) 224 Interviews: 001 (Zayniddin); 003 (Komil-1); 009 (Muhammad); 019 (Maktubxon). Interview 003 (Komil-1) is not myself. It is the first name of the participant I interviewed twice. 225 Interview 022 (Ehson) 231 It is easy to sense the disquiet and fear about the wrong strains of Islam being disseminated through the internet. Even those who think that the internet is a great tool for learning about Islam and uniting with other Muslims show some level of anxiety. For example, Zayniddin said, Ordinary people had no access to Islamic knowledge before. Most Uzbeks do not bother buying books and attending courses. They don’t spend money on this kind of stuff; they have other things to take care of... You can learn hadiths, fardhs,226 sunnah,227 and much more about Islam from social networks. But there is too much… It is overwhelming. They are being distributed to the public. You just have to be able to differentiate the right from the wrong. Otherwise… (pauses)… God forbid, it is easy to lose your life228. According to Zayniddin, if you cannot differentiate “right” Islam from “wrong” Islam and distinguish between proper sources and not-so-proper ones, one’s life may be in danger. Zayniddin also jokingly said that “Allah is witness that they all sound brilliant,” which actually holds great truth about why Muslims feel confused. The books and other publications published with the stamp of the CRA229 and internet spaces occupied by them indicate what constitutes state-approved Islam. Muslims who knowingly or unknowingly engage with other forms of Islam are labelled as “adashganlar,” as discussed in Chapter 5. I discussed the story of Muslima, a woman who was caught in the legal system and forced to help authorities fabricate evidence against other Muslims solely for having had a short conversation with someone on social media who was under state surveillance. There are many other cases of people being detained for having Islamic content the state disapproves of on their phone. 226 Fardh is a religious duty assigned by Allah in Islam. 227 Doings and sayings of the prophet Muhammad 228 Interview 001 (Zayniddin) 229 Although CRA was mentioned many times in other chapters, it’s here to remind that the CRA under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan is an organ of state administration empowered to solve problems in the field of ensuring the rights of everyone to freedom of conscience and religion, equality of citizens regardless of their attitude to religion. However, informally they are the state organization that controls the MBU and everything it does. 232 Another participant, Sardor, had similar views. He said that “in my opinion, the propaganda of some currents of Islam is being circulated, the true Islam that has evidence from the Quran is rare in social media. I think it is scary to have youth learning Islam through [the] internet today.”230 Sardor also mentioned that following local imams online is the safest way to learn Islam because the government considered their knowledge to be acceptable. Another participant, Feruza, an otinoyi, indicated that she is very scared of social media and many other mothers she knows are scared as well. She says that there are many harmful Islamic groups online and that these mothers are scared of their youngsters becoming radicalized. Feruza said, Social media platforms are dangerous in the Valley231. Telegram is the most propagandistic social media platform. It is terrifying. Anyone who is not lazy is opening a channel and sharing radical content. The saddest thing is that these radical Telegram channels are doing what extremists couldn’t do! They are going after kids. They have already harmed kids’ minds by inserting certain harmful ideologies232. By observing the Muslim women’s Facebook page “Begoyim.Uz” over a couple of years, I noticed that Feruza’s worries were echoed by many mothers in Uzbekistan, not only because they worry about the moral predicament of radical Islam but also the risk involved with interacting with unofficial Islam. The toll that forced disappearances, mass detentions and imprisonments, intimidation, and fabricated offenses take on society is observable in the intense forms of fear some participants show towards unofficial Islam. Although fear and anxiety are highly noticeable, interacting with other Muslims is another important part of Islamic activism233. Predictions about technology’s role in increasing 230 Interview 027 (Sardor) 231 Ferghana Valley 232 Interview 042 (Feruza Madaminova) 233 For example, interviews: 002 (Qudrat Bobojon); 004 (Mahmud Abdul Momin); 005 (Mo’tabar Tadjibaeva); 007 (Ulug’bek Bakirov); 015 (Abu Yusuf); 018 (Abror Muxtor Aliy) 024 (Mukarram) 233 democratic features in the 1990s (Grossman, 1995) were strengthened by the elevated optimism towards the freedom social media provided for social, political, and religious engagements (Howard & Parks, 2012; Valenzuela, 2013). New media changed the old media model of one-way interaction between producers and consumers of content, allowing a wide range of voices in Islam, including those expressing radical, extremist, and terrorist sentiments. The threats of extremism and terrorism have increased over the past three decades, with social media being blamed by many for spreading radical views. The explosion in the number of online ulama and rapid development of online Islam has had various negative effects, including online radicalization, social shaming, people pretending to be religious, increased pressure on women and girls, and so on. Jahongir Muhammad pointed out another major negative effect of online Islam during the interview, Usually, educated believers and imams are much calmer and more tolerant but the internet is becoming chaotic. It is creating an army of "religious" people who shout, insult, ban, divide people into categories, seek money for religion, and blaspheme the rule of the people. This is not an act of strengthening Islam, rather a struggle against Islam. Internet is diminishing Islam.234 Jahongir Muhammad believes that “those who are creating noise in the name of Islam are not truly educated but are merely seeking attention. They create chaos by attempting to defend what they believe to be ‘true’ Islam or show strong reactions to anything they deem ‘un-Islamic,’ deepening divisions in Islam.”235 Another participant, Maktubkhon, sounded even more alarmed while talking about the online clash between official and unofficial Islam. He said, When two sides are trashing one another on the net by pretending to defend Islam, I wonder if they really understand what they are doing is harming Islam… harming Islam in our society. Islam is not going to change whether the majority of us believe or follow that side or this side. Its value will not change even if we renounce it. However, the human mind is impressionable, it draws its own conclusions from this kind of argument. They shape their understanding through 234 Interview 052 (Jahongir Muhammad) 235 ibid 234 these two idiots' rants about religion and then their mindset changes; they conclude that "that's all there is to it."236 By participating in the process of spreading Islam, providing platforms for all kinds of relationships to shape and discussions to take place, social media is contributing to the revival of Islam in Uzbekistan. Maktubkhon’s point is well taken by continuedly denying each others’ interpretations of Islamic scriptures, turning online discussions into verbal abuse, Islamic ulama are damaging Islam, fracturing Muslim unity, and diminishing people’s faith in Islam. As discussed earlier, Islam as moral guidance is the most appealing feature of Islam and when online discussions take an offensive turn, it is not a particularly good example of moral behaviour. Another concern rises from allegations spread across social media about the crimes and taboos committed by religious leaders. Often, followers of conflicting Islamic groups post about accusations on social media, which damages the reputation of religious leaders. Sherali Komilov237 says, Social media is showing the true faces of these religious leaders. They are not heavenly (he used a Russian term “svetoy”) as they claim. The facts about some religious leaders stealing from charity came out, facts about some religious people involving in sexual assault of minorities, corruption, forgery, family violence came out. People think if you know Islam you will not do anything bad. Look how many imams are proving otherwise. The internet and social media can be used to expose misconduct or abuse by imams, providing a way for victims to come forward and share their stories. This can include the sharing of stories of sexual abuse, financial misconduct, or other forms of misbehaviour. As mentioned earlier, most Muslims believe that the more religious a person is, the more moral they will be. And shedding 236 Interview 019 (Maktubkhon) 237 Interview 087 (Sherali Komilov) 235 light on the wrongdoings of religious authorities, even when the allegations are truthful, has a damaging effect on both religious leaders and Islam. 6.3 CONCLUSION The development of social media provided a space for online versions of traditional Islam (Islam online) and for new ways of knowledge transmission and the practice of Islam (online Islam). Social media contributed to the revival of Islam in Uzbekistan by providing the opportunity for the unlimited distribution of Islamic content. Social media logic, consisting of programmability, popularity, connectivity, and datafication, coupled with the “more religious as more moral” attitude widely accepted in society, intensified and provided direction for Islamic revival. Social media provided more freedom of expression; however, it also provided a platform for suppression of dissenting voices. Social media echo chambers, the unification of like-minded people to the exclusion of opposing voices and viewpoints, heightened online radicalization. The governments responsible for online activity engage in policing perceived extremism to prevent domestic instability, which often leads to violence against religious people. The detention and mass imprisonment of Muslims during the Islam Karimov presidency and the use of social media as an excuse to accuse Muslims of being radicalized and disseminating forbidden extremist ideology are some of the main causes of the fear surrounding the dissemination of Islam on the internet. Increased radical voices and calls for jihad and violence showed the relationality of the reactions. Therefore, in addition to the fear of being unfairly accused of extremism, the fear of youngsters being influenced by radical ideologies is also strong in Uzbek society. Interview analysis revealed people’s fear and anxieties towards the internet and social media use for Islamic purposes. Many 236 participants also expressed that social media has had a damaging effect on both Islam and Islamic leaders because wrongdoings of the religious leaders are spreading fast. One of the differences between offline Islam and Islam that is online is that the internet allows people to view debates and conflicts between Islamic groups that would otherwise be largely hidden. Through social media, the conflicts within Islam and between Islam and the secular state became perceptible. Previously hidden struggles and conflicts became available to observe. Interviews indicated that some people view these online discussions as damaging to Islam, while others believe that Islam cannot be damaged, though Muslims in society could be negatively affected by these constant battles that often devolve into offensive personal attacks. Social media amplifies radicalization against undesired voices, including those that criticize Islam or certain parts of Islam. The notion of “more religious as more moral” plays a significant role in these sorts of online spectacles. The insults used and very rapid radical reactions make manifest the younger voices of those who are in the process of identity formation. Such people take it as an opportunity to express how affected or upset they are by any negative statement or ridicule of Islam in order to establish themselves as religious identities. Social media also provides a stage for debates within Islam and between Islam and more secular groups and individuals. Religious groups shaming less religious or more secular individuals and groups is often observable on social media. Sometimes, these discussions can take a very dramatic turn. Saidova’s case, for example, shows that any negative statement towards Islam can be taken out of context to create online spectacle, especially if women are the ones being accused. The ability for individuals attacking others online to stay anonymous, the lack of face-to-face interactions, and young people craving attention can be some of the issues contributing to such radicalization. Official Islam in Uzbekistan is often accused of disloyalty 237 towards Islam and Muslims by unofficial Islam because official imams help the government to manage radical voices and fight against unofficial Islam. This unites official Islam and the government of Uzbekistan to fight against a common enemy: unofficial Islam. There is not enough research on Islamic revival and the relationship between the state and Islam that meaningfully considers the role of new media. In the case of Uzbekistan, in particular, this matter remains almost entirely untouched. As Bunt (2003, p. 4) rightly states, “if a holistic contemporary understanding of Islam is sought, then part of that interpretive process has to include… a discussion about internet.” 238 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 7.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE STUDY Islamic revival in Uzbekistan is a loosely organized but intensive and forceful social movement (Collins, 2007; Lubeck, 2000; Tazmini, 2001) driven by a variety of factors, including the collapse of the Soviet Union, political changes in the region, economic factors, and the emergence of social media and popularization of Islamic content. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a loosening of state control over religious practices and the emergence of new religious groups and movements. Economic factors such as poverty and unemployment and the ideological vacuum created by the failure of the Communist ideology led many people to seek solace in religion. The government of Uzbekistan implemented policies and programs to promote a more moderate, state-controlled form of Islam in an effort to counter extremism and terrorism. The widespread availability of the internet and social media made it easier for people to access Islamic teachings and resources and to connect with other Muslims. The rise of Islamic content on social media and the internet, where it is easily accessible, and the perception that being more religious is more moral have led to an increase in the production and consumption of Islamic content. Islamic revival in Uzbekistan is observable in the growing number of mosques and the growing number of people who attend them for prayers. It is also observable in every aspect of social life: food, fashion, business, education, media, traditions, political and social rhetoric, and more (Aijaz, 2015). Islam is a heterogeneous religion and the revival of Islam led to the resurgence of various forms of Islam, some of which openly reject secular democratic principles. The online radicalization (Odas et al., 2019) of thousands of Muslims against secularism shows 239 how demanding and incapable of accepting outside views Islam can be. The growing tensions between the religious and secular and between official and unofficial Islam, as well as the diversity in how Muslims understand and practice Islam, the varying degrees of religiosity and tolerance between different Islamic groups, and societal pressures make Islamic revival a complex phenomenon to understand. During the Soviet era, the government of the Soviet Union sought to suppress religious practices and institutions, including Islam. The government's official policy was one of state atheism and it promoted the idea that religion was a "vestige of the past," destined to “wither away” (Anderson, 1983 p. 27) and eventually disappear. The Soviet government closed mosques, arrested and persecuted religious leaders, and discouraged the practice of Islam. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly independent Uzbekistan government adopted a policy of Islam as a national heritage, supporting forms of Islam practiced by the early Islamic scholars of the region to counter the rise of religious extremism and to promote a more moderate and state-controlled form of Islam. This policy was implemented through the establishment of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Uzbekistan, a state-controlled organization that oversees the religious affairs of the country, later renamed the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan (MBU). The government has also sought to promote the study of Islam in universities and to provide funding for the restoration and maintenance of mosques and other religious buildings. While the government of independent Uzbekistan has allowed for more religious freedom compared to the Soviet era, it has also sought to exert significant control over religious practices and institutions, particularly in regard to Islamic practices. The government closed down unregistered mosques, arrested and persecuted religious leaders, discouraged the practice of forms of Islam it perceived as a threat to its authority, and implemented strict censorship and 240 surveillance of religious materials, including on the internet, officially to prevent the spread of extremist ideologies. The inconsistency in the treatment of different forms of Islam and the complex relationship between the state and Islam are described as the paradoxical governance of Islam in Uzbekistan. This brief history of the revival of Islam in Uzbekistan that marks the starting point of this dissertation. This chapter revisits the research questions, the main findings of the study, and the theories used to explain them. It also provides an account of the theoretical contribution while deliberating research limitations and suggestions for further research. The initial appearance of the multifaceted and multidimensional Islamic resurgence in society at the end of 1980s and its continual intensification in the following decades explains the changing relationship between the secular state and Islam during this period. Therefore, the first set of questions in this dissertation is concerned with the factors behind the rise of Islam and its practices in post-Soviet, independent Uzbekistan. I investigate any possible connections between the repression of Islam in the Soviet Union, including the Soviet assault on Islam, the establishment of official Islam in 1943 (Khalid, 2007), and the rise of diverse Islamic establishments and radicalization of certain Islamic groups in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. Chapter 1 provides the history of Islam in Uzbekistan and reflects on the relationship between the state and Islam in different periods. Political changes in the region resulting from the development of Soviet rule caused rapid structural changes, many of which were focused on the elimination of Islam in Muslim societies where it was the dominant ideology. Society in pre-Soviet Central Asia used Islam as a basis for its political, legal, and administrative systems, and part of the culture and tradition. The ambitious utopian changes the Soviet government imposed caused the loss of significant Islamic knowledge: mosques were destroyed or turned into warehouses, books were burned, Islam was 241 wiped from the education system, Islamic practices were restricted, and Islamic scholars and practitioners were purged (Khalid, 2017). The Soviet government did not tolerate Islam, but it could not completely separate Islam from the culture and traditions of Central Asian nations. Young Muslim intellectuals (Jadids) in the 1920s and 1930s saw the joint advancement of Islam and modernity together as the future for Uzbek Muslims (Khalid, 1998); however, their visions were not seen favorably by the Soviet Communists. Jadids were the subject of the initial purges of Uzbek intellectuals by the Soviet government (Khalid, 1998). During WWII, however, a small group of Islamic authorities achieved a limited measure of freedom when official Islam in the Soviet Union was established. This, I argue, sowed the first seeds of the recent Islamic revival. Islam, to the extent it was permitted, remained under strict control, yet from that period on, it was in a state of slow but continual revival and re-establishment as an institution. I also argue that the establishment of official Islam, which required cooperation with the government and was subject to extreme scrutiny, led to the emergence of unofficial Islam. I conclude that the revival of Islam, including politically motivated Islam, did not start in a vacuum; it resulted from complex historical developments. Various doctrines of Islam existed and took distinct paths in their revival, all of which had unique relationships with the government of Uzbekistan (Babadzhanov, 2015). After the independence of Uzbekistan, the attitudes of these doctrines and their followers towards the government became crystalized and apparent. The state’s attitude towards different doctrines of Islam also changed. The Sufi order in Sunni Islam, for example, was viewed as radical Islam in the Soviet Union (Roi, 2000), but was endorsed and celebrated following Uzbekistan’s independence. Numerous historical Islamic scholars were reclaimed and re-introduced; their places were renovated, books re-published, and accomplishments widely praised in the media. 242 The works of local Islamic scholars and their Islamic practices were used by authorities to campaign against the influence of outside Islamic groups. The re-establishment of official Islam and adoption of the Hanafi school within the Sunni denomination as official Islam led to harsh repression against other creeds of Islam, which I refer to collectively as unofficial Islam throughout the dissertation. Chapter 4 utilizes the tools provided by critical secular inquiry (Mahmood, 2017; Gole, 2015; Kosmin & Keysar, 2007; Kuru, 2013; Mufti, 2004) to situate official Islam in the secular state in Uzbekistan. By delving deeper into the details of the structure of the government and the MBU, I explain how religion was controlled, which answers the parts of the first and third research questions relating to how the secular political framework in Uzbekistan can be understood through analysis of the relationship between the state and Islam and how a critical secular framework can explain this relationship. The concept of secularity varies from one country to another. Typically, claiming secularity indicates that the state separates the functions of the government and religious institutions, does not allow religious beliefs or practices to interfere with the operations of the state, does not adopt an official religion, and does not use its power to promote or discriminate against any religion or system of belief. In a secular state, individuals have the freedom to practice their religion without interference from the state and all citizens are equal under the law, without regard to their religious beliefs, affiliations, or for nonbelief. In Chapter 4, I focus on situating the secular in the relationship between the state and Islam in Uzbekistan. Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of the structure and function of the MBU and how it is controlled by the Committee on Religious Affairs (CRA) at the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The decisions made by the CRA are often publicized 243 through the MBU and everything related to religion is scrutinized by the National Security Services (NSS) of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In doing so, I demonstrate the reproduction of the Soviet-style strict control over religion in the post-Soviet Uzbekistan. This chapter also provides an overview of the legal and policy framework implemented by the government of Uzbekistan concerning religion. A detailed analysis of the Religion Law of 1998 and amendments made to it are also explained. Official Islam refers to the state-controlled and approved form of Islam in Uzbekistan that is promoted by the government through the establishment of the MBU and other policies. Groups and individuals practicing unofficial Islam were labelled by the government as “adashganlar.” The government of Uzbekistan claimed that it was a way to counter extremism and terrorism; however, the frequent laying of extremism-, radicalism-, and terrorism-related charges and the fabrication of evidence against innocent Muslims accused of these offences resulted in the persecution of thousands of Muslims. The analysis of “adashganlar” in Chapter 5 investigates what terms like “radical” and “extremist" really mean in Uzbekistan. If these categories are artificially created for political purposes, does religious extremism exist beyond state discourse? The rise of mobilized, politically motivated Islamic groups in the early 1990s and President Karimov’s cruel response to them marked the beginning of a new era for the relationship between Islam and the state. The harsh authoritarian response to political Islam indicated that it was viewed as a powerful opponent to the state. Both sides were highly radicalized towards each other. The Karimov government used the state’s power to eliminate any existing roots of political Islam, while political Islam unified a number of Islamic groups, leading 244 to the formation of one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the region: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There were several deadly clashes between Islamic forces and the government during the Islam Karimov presidency. I used a relational framework to explain the relationship between the state and political Islam in Uzbekistan. The radicalization was two-sided and heightened through classes. The concept of dialectical radicalization helps to explain the circular progression in the conflict. In other words, the radicalization of one side towards the other was met with equal or greater radicalization in response. To answer the question of whether extremism exists beyond state discourse, I concluded that it indeed exists; however, the threats of extremism and radicalism were overexaggerated by the government of Uzbekistan to keep Islam under control. While the government of Uzbekistan was fighting homegrown political Islam in the Ferghana Valley at the beginning of the 1990s (Nunn, et al., 1999), its decision to welcome preachers from foreign Islamic organizations encouraged the sprouting of various Islamic doctrines in the country. It shows that the government of Uzbekistan did not initially view foreign Islam as a threat. In the 1990s, local imams and missionaries from various Islamic groups preached widely in society. After seventy years of the Soviet rule, Uzbek Muslims were not knowledgeable enough to distinguish between different doctrines of Islam. People were growing more attracted to Islam because of its promotion of decency and virtue. As Islam’s influence grew, however, it began to influence every aspect of life, such that many Muslims were following and supporting Islamic leaders rather than the political elite. Once more, the Karimov government was threatened. Following several high-profile terrorist attacks in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the government of Uzbekistan started a harsh campaign of repression against unofficial Islam. The 245 surveillance, detention, incarceration, and torture of thousands of people for religious matters were extensively reported by human rights organizations over the following five years (HRW, 2004). Chapter 5 examines the claims that the evidence against alleged extremists was regularly fabricated, and Muslims were punished for pre-crimes, rather than actual statutory offences. Interview data indicates that inhumane torture was committed by law enforcement and in jails in Uzbekistan. Terms such as “radicalism,” “extremism,” and “terrorism” were not defined by the legal system in Uzbekistan until 2018, though they were regularly cited as the basis for accusations against Muslims. Even the definitions provided in 2018 were very broad and insufficiently precise for use in the legal system. Chapter 5 also sheds light on the books published to justify unfair treatments against so-called “adashganlar” and the detention and imprisonment of thousands of Muslims in Uzbekistan. Many of these books were published bearing the stamp of the CRA and began and ended with quotes from President Karimov. They listed unofficial Islamic groups as “adashganlar,” provided background on their formation, and asserted that the establishment of an Islamic state or khalifate was their main goal, though this was not always an accurate description. The law enforcement and court systems were highly corrupt, and extremism- and radicalism-related charges were used as a lucrative tool by officials to line their pockets. Officials coerced people into writing false witness statements. This process, I argue, further damaged the relationship between the state and religion, causing further radicalization of Islamic groups. Officials often used social media materials found on the phones or computers of Muslims as evidence to accuse them of radicalism- or extremism-related crimes. In Chapter 6, I analyze the role of social media in the revival of Islam in Uzbekistan. In the mid-2000s, the development and advancement of new media changed the game for Islamic 246 revival, as all manner of Islamic material spread through social media platforms. In addition to traditional Islamic practices shifting to the online world, referred to as Islam online, new practices of Islam for the digital age emerged, known as online Islam. Islam was already attractive to the majority for its promotion of decency, traditional family structure, and rejection of westernization. As more and more Muslims gained access to the internet, Islamic content became even more popular though the social media logic of amplifying the most attractive content. Previous Islamic conversations, preaching, and conflicts and debates within Islam were generally only witnessed in person by a small group of Muslims. Social media platforms provided a stage for highly visible discussions between various Islamic groups, including official and unofficial Islam, in Uzbekistan. The social media logic also helped the processes of radicalization by amplifying radical views. Through social media, online groups of like-minded Muslims could interact with other Muslims around the world. Chapter 3 provides detailed discussion about the methodology of the study and the processes of field study in Uzbekistan. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 87 participants, including victims of religious repression, official ulama and otinoyis, government officials who participate in the decision-making processes where religion is concerned, professors from Islamic educational institutions, Islamic bloggers, and members of Islamic groups that are restricted in Uzbekistan. These interviews are the main source of data in this study; however, observations in mosques and participation in religious ceremonies allowed me to understand the social construction of spiritual reality and the uniting power of Islam that shook the political realm and aggravated its insecurity, leading to the state’s unfair repression of Islam. The study of archived documents provided chronicles of the events, highlighting the similarities in the methods used to persecute Muslims and the types of accusations used to 247 convict them. It also provided factual data about human rights abuses concerning religion, some of which were mentioned during the interviews. In short, the data gathered through different methods increased the nuance of knowledge in this study. 7.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 7.2.1 The achievements of this research and suggestions for further research Sociological analysis of the revival of Islam and the relationship between the state, society, and Islam in Uzbekistan was an area that required academic attention, given the government’s strict control over educational institutions and limits on freedom of expression of academics in Uzbekistan. Strict control over the curriculum, research, and teaching led to self-censorship among academics, who were afraid of expressing dissenting views or conducting research that could be seen as critical of the government. Obtaining permission to conduct multi-method qualitative research on a very sensitive topic in Uzbekistan initially felt impossible. I received permission from the Highest Attestation Commission at the Cabinet of Ministers to conduct this research in Uzbekistan in July 2019. Permission to conduct interviews in jails in Uzbekistan was obtained in December of the same year238. According to the officials who reviewed my requests, this was the first time that permission was granted to conduct this type of research in Uzbekistan. Obtaining permissions, safely entering and remaining in the field, being able to locate valuable participants and interview them, and successfully carrying out interviews in prisons, therefore, was a significant step and achievement towards increasing academic freedom in Uzbekistan. 238 Both of these permissions are included with the dissertation. 248 I interviewed numerous participants whose contributions to this study were incredibly important: two presidential advisors and members of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan Mr. Khayriddin Sultonov and Mr. Shoazim Munavarov; members of the CRA at the Cabinet of Ministers Mr. Rustam Komilov and Mr. Ulug’bek Sattorov; historians Dr. Bahrom Irzaev and Dr. Anvar Nazir; political scientist Mr. Kamoliddin Rabbimov; sociologists Dr. Komil Kalanov and Dr. Abdugani Kholbekov; professors at the International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan Dr. Jamoliddin Karimov, Dr. Ibrohim Usmonov, and Dr. Sayyid Eshonkhon; head of the MBU, Sheikh Abdulaziz Mansur; presidential candidate in the 1991 elections as leader of the Erk party, Muhammad Salih; leader of the Birlik party, Abdurahim Polat; and leaders of human rights organizations Ms. Mutabar Tajibaeva and Mr. Abdurahmon Tashanov. These people are noteworthy because of their extraordinary familiarity with the subject matter from various viewpoints. Also, being able to recruit them shows the effectiveness of the methodological tools used for this research. Some of these participants had directly participated in the law-making processes. Mr. Shoazim Munavarov, for example, served as a presidential advisor in the Karimov administration and was appointed as a director of the Center for Islamic Civilization in 2019. Everyone on this list decided to participate in this study willingly using their full legal name. For those who were inside the country and cautious about what they could say, the permission granted by the Highest Attestation Commission at the Cabinet of Ministers signaled the consent of the state for them to speak on this subject; however, I also sensed from participants a desire to discuss these matters of religion and politics openly, considering that the relationship between the state and Islam has been one of the most sensitive topics in Uzbekistan. 249 The structure and practice of how Islam was controlled in Uzbekistan led to the paradoxical governance of official and unofficial Islam. The members of unofficial Islam were marked as “adashganlar” – those on the wrong path – to justify repressing them. Choosing a particular religious path for society, politicizing and institutionalizing it, spreading it in society through propaganda, and validating and justifying the oppression of those who were not on that path are not new phenomena. Hannah Arendt (1973) explored them in the cases of Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union in her The Origins of Totalitarianism. Seeing the formation of “adashganlar” in Uzbekistan through the lens Arendt (1973) provides helps us to see the hidden realities in today’s societies and how close we remain to tragic atrocities even today. The labelling of people as “Adashganlar,” a very important concept in this dissertation, connects this research with political constructions approving one social group over another, or choosing one right path while disapproving of other paths by states, which often leads to increased conflicts, the victimization of innocent people, and even the formation of totalitarian regimes in society. This research draws attention to important but previously unresearched areas such as: a) the establishment of official Islam in the Soviet Union, a well-established and politically conventional doctrine of Islam, and the resulting formation of unofficial Islam as the starting point of Islamic revival which became apparent in the late 1980s; b) the introduction of the term “adashganlar” to serve the political agenda, widely distributing state-endorsed books identifying certain Islamic groups and organizations as “adashganlar” to increase the acceptance of repression against unofficial Islam, mass prosecutions for ill-defined crimes, and laws constraining religious freedom. Also, the fabrication of evidence against innocent Muslims to better control Islam, instill fear in society, and line the pockets of corrupt officials; 250 c) the role of social media in the revival of Islam and radicalization in Uzbekistan. Part of the appeal of Islam is its promotion of decency, which augmented its presence on social media and contributed to the revival of Islam. However, interactive media not only brought like-minded people together, but its algorithms also amplified radical thoughts, while the social media algorithms also diminished disapproving and opposing voices. d) the contribution of corruption in social institutions to the deflective radicalization between the state and Islam. The corruption in the law enforcement and legal systems, I argue, left people powerless and brought them closer to terrorist organizations. Injustices in the system made many people believe that those nongovernmental violent actors or terrorists were heroes who were willing to give their lives to fight these injustices. Considering the involvement of its citizens in international terrorism, Uzbekistan presents a unique case to study radicalization. As a roadmap to studying a wide range of topics related to Islamic revival and the relationship between the state, society, and Islam in Uzbekistan, this research not only shows the possibility of conducting comprehensive sociological research in Uzbekistan on this topic, but also provides methodology to carry it out successfully. The Enlightenment Against Ignorance (Avlani, 2018) campaign in Uzbekistan was intended to “cure ideological diseases” (HRW), similar to the “political re-education” camps in China (Finley, 2021), which are officially called Vocational Education and Training Centers by the Government of China. Mass detentions, forced labour, pervasive state surveillance and control, and the placement of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjian camps (Zenz, 2019; Reuters, 2019) are often regarded as religious and cultural genocide (Finley, 2021) and the Chinese government had been accused of crimes against humanity by Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2004) and Amnesty International (AI, 2011). HRW and AI have also sounded the alarm about surveillance, 251 fabricated indictments, harsh punishments, abductions, and disappearances used to target religious individuals and groups in Uzbekistan since the 1990s. I found that the information collected by Uzbek government authorities was evaluated based on unsubstantiated accounts and beliefs and that political objectives were used as evidence of certain Muslims’ disloyalty to the existing political regime for alleged extremism- and terrorism-related crimes. This adds to the understanding of the misrepresentation of Muslims as extremists. I share the stories of Muslima and Sardor in Chapter 5 and how they became the victims who faced extremism-related charges. As I mention in earlier chapters, President Karimov’s former advisor and current director of the Center for Islamic Civilization, Mr. Munavarov, said that 90 percent of people who were jailed on extremism-related charges had nothing to do with extremism. Targeted Muslims were not only surveilled and captured inside Uzbekistan, but also in neighboring states if they had fled the country to avoid persecution. A segment of Muslim leaders was eradicated from society without the levying of any criminal charges against them (HRW, 2004). The legitimization of strict surveillance and control in both Uzbekistan and China was achieved by crafting a fictionalized image of the enemy: extremists or terrorists from religious groups. A comparative study of repression against Muslims in Uzbekistan and in China would shed light on where such dangerous paths can take the relationship between the state and Islam. From this convergence of power, we learn that the fabrication of the presence of the enemy by the state can be the result of the states’ own political insecurity. Through such practices, secular governments are often contributing to the radicalization in society and the emergence of violent terrorism that they are seeking to protect against. Dialectical radicalization helps to understand how radicalization is two-sided and both sides play equal roles in the 252 intensification of radical thoughts towards the other side, which can lead to totalitarian political regimes or violent terrorism. Governments watching over their citizens, ensuring order through administrative practices and various forms of surveillance, is not a new practice (Agar, 2003; Higgs, 2004). However, surveillance practices become particularly problematic when certain groups are targeted based on the ambiguous definitions in certain criminal statutes. Surveillance refers to the ways in which information about behaviour and activities are collected and managed for the purposes of prevention or investigation of crime or protection of people, objects, or places (Lyon 2012). Surveillance of Muslims to catch extremists and radicals based on such vague definitions in Uzbekistan has been exhaustively documents by human rights organizations; however, there has not been an in-depth analysis of the targeted surveillance in Uzbekistan directed at particular individuals and groups, including the surveillance leading to the state violence against Muslims in Uzbekistan. While the “political re-education” camps in Xinjian have received some academic attention in recent years (Finley, 2021; Leibold, 2019), studies of surveillance, its relation to state violence against religious Muslims, and the political reasons for and structural causes of such chaos in Uzbekistan remain a blind spot in academia. Analyzing the similarities between these two campaigns will contribute to critical security studies and scholarship on the sociology of surveillance. My research focuses on the use of surveillance as state violence against religious groups to advance a political agenda. By investigating how the NSS of Uzbekistan cooperated with their allied counterparts and how Uzbek Muslims were surveilled, detained, and abducted outside the country, it will also contribute to the scholarly work on globalization of personal data and information. 253 The revival of Islam in Uzbekistan led to substantial changes in society. The formation of the non-secular in society not only challenged social norms but also challenged the political and legal systems. The fragmentation and increased tension between the secular and non-secular in Uzbekistan became observable. The disagreements between these groups about many social matters, such as school uniforms, allowing the headscarf in schools, tv shows that were viewed as not fitting into Islamic values, and equality between men and women often led to heated conflicts and social media campaigns. Intolerance and unwillingness to consider alternative views were often observable in society. The revival of Islam also presents various challenges to the legal system in Uzbekistan. Interview data indicated some of the consequential side effects of the Islamic revival. For example, women being forced into marriages before reaching legal age and cases of polygamy, where men marry second or third wives through Islamic marriage (nikah), have increased in recent decades (Ibrahim, 2013; Tokhtakhodjaeva, 2000). As both underage marriages and polygamy are illegal in Uzbekistan, it creates challenges for women, such as when a woman seeks a divorce after agreeing to Islamic nikah instead of legal marriage. According to reports, more than half a million children do not have legally recognized fathers and over 400 women filed lawsuits to collect alimony from the men to whom they were illegally married239. Studying the social conditions that resulted from the revival of Islam in society and conducting a comparison between distinct Muslim societies will contribute to the further understanding of the phenomenon. 239 https://t.me/daydi2021 254 7.2.2 Theoretical framework and relations to the world The revival of Islam in Uzbekistan at the end of the 1980s was not a peaceful one (Babadzhanov, 2015). It was fed by the rage against the Soviet assault on Islam during the seven decades of the Soviet rule. The repertoires of conflict between the state and Islam escalated the violence towards each other. According to Tilly (1978, p. 176), violence is “any observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are seized or damaged in spite of resistance.” In a society where secularization was once a radical thought, the revival of Islam is now associated with radicalization. While Islam was prepared to resist state repression, political radicalization showed the state’s “readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2009 p. 240) to resist the revival of Islam. I use a relational framework in sociology to explain dialectical radicalization between these two institutions: the state and Islam. The review of the historical repertoire of conflicts through a relational lens helps to understand the continued struggle between the secular state and Islam in Uzbekistan. The relationship between the state and Islam cannot be understood when the social world is viewed as being made up of substances or containing static “things;” rather, it should be conceived as consisting primarily of processes (Emirbayer, 1997). The relationship between the state and Islam must be studied as a process consisting of complex back-and-forth exchanges in various forms between these institutions. Influenced by communication theorists (Baxter, 1988; Montgomery & Baxter, 1998), theories of relational dialectics claim that relationships are not one-dimensional and that they involve the tensions experienced by both sides when paradoxical desires, needs, and wants to emerge. Change is a key element in relational perspective to understand the relationship between 255 the state and Islam, as the “contradictions or tensions between opposites never go away and never cease to provide tension” (Baxter & Montgomery, 1998 p. 8) and a contradiction is formed whenever two tendencies or forces are independent yet mutually negate one another. Dialectical radicalization between the state and Islam in Uzbekistan started with the radicalization of the Soviet state against Islam in Soviet Union. The power of the Soviet state’s armed forces, supported by the Communist ideology, overwhelmed the Muslim khaganates located on the land that comprises modern-day Uzbekistan. Islam was attacked until it became dormant in society. The weakening and ultimate collapse of the Soviet state started the reverse process, the yin and the yang of the conflicting relationship. A small group of politicized Islamic forces were radicalized against the assaults received at the hands of the Soviet government and gave an ultimatum to the government of newly independent Uzbekistan, which led the Karimov government to radicalize further and re-impose repressive measures against Islam. Islam and the secular government desired two different things at the same time. The secular state wanted to remove religious influence from the public realm and strictly control every facet of Islam, while Islam sought continual expansion and influence over every aspect of the lives of Muslims. There were many examples of dialectical radicalization of the state and Islam in Uzbekistan. On one side, there was the formation of the IMU and other similar groups, hidden hujra teachings, and recruitment of Uzbek people by international terrorist organizations; on the other side, there was the purge of imams and persecution of thousands of Muslims. One side’s response to the other side was relational. Violent acts received violent responses, while the response to the prohibition of religious clothing and religious symbols in public places by the Religion Law of 1998, which led to the expulsion of students with hijab and forced shaving of beards, was public disapproval, conflict between authorities and citizens, and social media chaos. 256 The Karimov government’s radical strategy of taking greater control in society to reduce radicalization did not reduce radicalization; instead, it pushed these groups out of the country, where they were radicalized further against the state. This dissertation contributes to the relational approach and the study of radicalization by analyzing the relationship between the secular state and Islam and the mutual radicalization of these two institutions in Uzbekistan. Dialectical radicalization furthers relational theory by providing insight into the direction radicalization takes through actions and reactions between two sides. It widens the social phenomenon that relational theory in sociology can frame. In other words, each reaction to the previous action escalates the conflict to a new level. The proper review of the repertoire of exchanges between two sides in conflict, therefore, can show the evolution of the radicalization; however, I believe the same frame can be applied to cases of de-radicalization, where analysis of exchanges shows the lessening of aggression between two sides. The government of Uzbekistan’s paradoxical governance of Islam, supporting and endorsing official Islam while repressing unofficial Islam, is not only challenging for Islam, it presents complex issues and uncertainties for the political system. The establishment of the International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan, for example, is viewed as a tremendous contribution to the advancement of Islam240. Such developments are often cited as an indication of a positive transformation in the relationship between the state and Islam. The interviews I conducted with government officials241, however, indicate that the government struggles with the question of which educators can be trusted to teach Islam. What happens if ideologies the government considers extremist are delivered in classes and auditoriums? Could the youths who 240 Interview 025 (Professor Jamoliddin Karimov) 241 Interview 086 (Ulug’bek Sattorov); Interview 085 (Mirazim Munavarov) 257 graduate from faith-based schools be trusted in the political realm? If so, could a secular framework be maintained with people whose values are deeply entrenched in Islam? Uzbekistan is not alone in seeking answers to these questions. Insecurity surrounding the maintenance of secular values is one of the themes that emerged during my data analysis. This dissertation enters into conversations in the field of critical secularism by exploring the resurgence of the non-secular after seven decades of the Communist propaganda and scientific atheism. The relationship between the secular state and Islam in post-Soviet Uzbekistan is a unique case to analyze. Critical secular studies provide a lens to observe hidden realities in the relationship between the secular state and religion, which helps to advance the understanding of secularity. The constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan states that Uzbekistan is a secular state. The structure and function of government institutions, by contrast, show how everything about Islam is tightly controlled by the government. The MBU obeys the CRA at the Cabinet of Ministers, which is surveilled and safeguarded by the NSS of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In the case of Uzbekistan, secular does not mean the separation between mosque and state, nor does it mean the state’s neutrality towards religion. In the case of Uzbekistan, secularism is reflected in the constitution and the laws, though its application in practice is uncertain and inconsistent. It also shows that the ruling elite are not immune to the deepening Islamization in society, though official secularism in Uzbekistan is useful as a means for the government to protect itself from Islam becoming a powerful, formal political opposition. The secular government of Uzbekistan, like those of many other Muslim-majority countries around the world, is concerned with the possibility of hidden agendas by 258 Islamic forces. As a result, it targets any possible advancement of unsanctioned Islamic doctrines with political tones. Secularism in Uzbekistan is authoritarian. Authoritarian secularism (Gole, 2016; Modood, 2010; Kuru, 2013) in Uzbekistan is about controlling and manipulating Islam in accordance with the new developments in society. Therefore, the direction this domination takes is also relational. In general, building on recent works in critical secular studies (Mahmood, 2015; Göle, 2016), my research contributes to the understanding of different kinds of religious and political engagements; the formation of Islamic minorities; and how the terms like Islamic extremist, radical, and terrorist aided the government in seizing and securing power. Islam in Uzbekistan is divided into official and unofficial Islam and the state’s attitude towards them is paradoxical. Propaganda around “adashganlar,” using this classification to create the image of an enemy and justify the practices of detention and torture, is an example of the elements of totalitarian regimes (Arendt, 1973) in the 21st century. Propaganda, extensive persecution of Muslims through extremism- and terrorism-related charges, and fabrication of evidence as a basis to accuse them are elements Arendt (1973) pointed to as totalitarian practices. The relationship between the secular government and Islam in Uzbekistan shows how secularism can be used by the government to exercise totalitarian control over religion. It also poses the question of how Muslim-majority states like Uzbekistan could be encouraged to become more tolerant of various religions and distinct strains of Islam. Analyzing the role of media in the revival of Islam shows the connection between the advancement of social media, availability of extremist materials, and increased ease in recruitment of people by terrorist organizations. The revival of Islam, I argue, was intensified by the advancement of social media platforms. Studying the role of media in the revival of Islam 259 and the resurgence of radicalization in Uzbekistan contribute to the study of radicalization around the world. 7.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY Researching a topic that requires scholarly analysis from various perspectives, but which has been insufficiently studied makes it difficult to obtain good background information. A systematic study of many areas around Islamic revival and the relationship between the state, society, and Islam in Uzbekistan does not exist. While travelling across Uzbekistan, I noticed the difference in the intensity of Islamic revival. While Islamic artifacts such as mosques, shops with Islamic books, and religious clothing decorations are ubiquitous in the big cities, it is difficult to detect any changes in the countryside; however, it was difficult to find any scholarly works about how Islam revival differed across different regions (viloyat) in Uzbekistan, which could help to better understand the main factors behind the rigorous revival of Islam. Insufficiency of relevant literature was especially observable while studying the media’s role in the revival of Islam and radicalization in Uzbekistan. Through five MEHR campaigns, Uzbekistan repatriated 531 women and children who were held by international terrorist organizations. There is no systematic study of the Uzbek people’s involvement in international terrorism, the factors behind the decision to join these organizations, and the channels they took to do so. What was the experience of these women and children? In many cases, I relied on reports from human rights organizations and news articles alongside the data I gathered through my field study. Conducting fieldwork on a very delicate topic in Uzbekistan was not an easy task and required cooperation and collaboration with the gatekeepers in Uzbekistan. The interview participants in this research were wide-ranging and informative. Obtaining the necessary permissions was very helpful to recruit government officials and the official ulama and to be 260 able to conduct interviews in prison with Muslims who were incarcerated for extremism- and terrorism-related charges. However, there was a struggle to push back against the rules officials were insisting upon for field interviews. Usually, they chose the places for interviews, and in some cases, everything was arranged by officials. While convenient, there was always a concern that the places were being audio or video recorded. That concern led me to avoid asking some questions to limit the political risks to the participants. Officials had to go through the list of participants and provide verbal consent to interview them. It was not made clear why I was not allowed to interview several participants about whom I learned through documents from human rights organizations’ archives. There were cases where I travelled for hours for an interview only for it to be cancelled by the officials, mere minutes before I was scheduled to meet the participant. Once I left Uzbekistan, I tried to find phone numbers and conduct phone or online interview with those participants whom I was not permitted to interview in person, which I was successful in doing for some of them. I published an article entitled Conducting Research in Authoritarian Bureaucracies: Researcher Positionality, Access, Negotiation, Cooperation, Trepidation, and Avoiding the Influence of the Gatekeepers in the International Journal of Qualitative Methods (Komil-Burley, 2021) which provides further analysis of my field work and interactions with gatekeepers in Uzbekistan. Islamic revivalism and the relationship between the state and Islam is a complex and extensive topic. There were many sub-areas that emerged from this research that I could not investigate, as my time and resources were limited. When I was in the field, I connected with more people and observed many hidden realities about the revival of Islam. Some of the social ills such as idolizing religious authorities and hidden polygamy increased along with the revival of Islam. I noted this particularly when the conversation was about women and how these 261 conversations were shaping and reshaping social realities. What these imams said sometimes indirectly challenged the principles of the secular society and the freedoms of religion and conscience. For example, I downloaded hundreds of videos where imams said things such as “even the voice of women is avrat,”242 “women wearing perfume outside their homes is equal to committing adultery,” or “if men allow the women who belong to them – their mothers, sisters, wife, and daughters – to leave home without covering their avrat, those men cannot enter to Jannah (Heaven).” The continual appeals made by imams and instances of targeting uncovered women, silencing them, and even attacking them through the men in their lives show how much religious pressure exists in society. The ideas expressed in these speeches are often reflected on social media through the insulting of women who do not cover themselves the way people feel Islam requires. As Zhussipbek et al., (2020) argues, the ongoing Islamic revival in Central Asia “can be analyzed under the prism, whether it impedes the development of inclusive society and human rights or not.” Understanding the role of such social pressures in the revival of Islam is important, as it can provide another perspective to understand the legal restrictions where Islam is concerned, though I was unable to explore them deeper. Influence in society is achieved through passive propaganda. Looking through the repeated comparison between secular and non-secular identities, the non-secular is preferred and is championed in the narrative. Social media algorithms also help the spread of such passive propaganda (Van Dijck & Poell, 2013). People who like or comment on these propagandistic posts or videos will see more similar posts or videos. After being exposed to the same topics over and over again, victims begin to think that the whole world is like this, further increasing their 242 Avrat or awrah is an Arabic word that refers to intimate parts. Exposing them is normally considered sinful in Islam. 262 belief in the righteousness of their views. As a result, they begin to show aggression towards those who do not think like them. During interviews with currently and previously incarcerated religious offenders, I noticed repeated patterns of surveillance and detention undertaken by the state, becoming aware of the types of information, often including fabricated evidence, that were used to accuse targeted individuals of extremism- and terrorism-related crimes. Often, they shared written narratives and interesting accounts with me about how they were surveilled, including video surveillance in mosques and tea houses and audio recordings of classes in Islamic schools, or how other detainees were forced to provide information or even sign false accusations against them, resulting in their detention and imprisonment. State-supported and state-promoted surveillance is increasingly being normalized and legitimized as an acceptable form of maintaining security and stability, serving as a method of repression and a practical tool for authoritarian control (Ball et al., 2014). Investigating these claims could provide invaluable data about targeted surveillance of Muslims in Uzbekistan, including the reasons for and purposes of such surveillance. Such information helps to understand the relationship between the state and Islam further; however, it was outside the scope of my dissertation research. Secularism in Uzbekistan is an interesting subject to study. It does not mean the separation of state and mosque or the state’s neutrality towards Islam. The constitution in Uzbekistan is secular but laws on religion limit religious freedom, such that secularity becomes meaningless in practice. Secular insecurity leads to irrational political decisions about Islam and increased conflict between the state and Muslims. Recent decisions about school uniforms and restricting girls from wearing hijab at school, for example, caused heated conflicts between school authorities and parents. 263 Further research on the revival of Islam and the relationship between the state, society, and Islam, between Islamic revival and radicalization, and between Islam and the secular in Uzbekistan is essential. 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Central Asia and the Caucasus, 1, (pp.37-42). 285 Appendices Figure 3: Letter of Consent to conduct archival research at the “Fiery Hearts Club” International Human Rights Organization in Paris France. 13 July, 2019 Paris, France “Fiery Hearts Club” International Human Rights Organization LETTER OF CONSENT By writing this letter I am giving permission to the University of British Columbia and researcher Dilsora Komil-Burley to use our organization’s archive for academic purposes. The international human rights organization the “Fiery Hearts Club” was founded on January 17, 2000 in Uzbekistan. The functions of the organization restricted in Uzbekistan on March, 6th, 2006. On February 3, 2011, the “Fiery Hearts Club” was re-registered in France as Association International de Défense des Droits de l’Homme «Club des Cœurs Ardents», the registration number of our organization is W 751208462. Our organization intends to protect and promote human rights including civil, political, economic, religious and cultural rights of people who are originally from Uzbekistan. Dilsora Komil-Burley can copy, take pictures or videos of any types of documents that can be used in her research. We believe, any of our documents used for academic purposes serves for the protection and promotion of human rights in the world. If you have any questions in regards to this letter, our organization or archive, please do not hesitate to contact. Sincerely, Mo’tabar Tadjibaeva Head of the “Fiery Hearts Club” International Human Rights Organization. Phone: +33679233927 Email: mutabartadjibaeva@gmail.com 286 Figure 4. Permission to conduct research in Uzbekistan 287 Figure 5: Letter of permission to conduct research in penal institutions in Uzbekistan. (Uzbek) 288 Figure 6: Letter of permission to conduct research in penal institutions in Uzbekistan. (English Translation) REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF PENALTY OPERATIONS 100105 City of Tashkent, Fergana Road Street. Building 25, (71)291-69-27, guingq@exat.uz --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LETTER OF PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN PENAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AFFAIRS IN UZBEKISTAN 01 December 2019 Dear Dilsora Komil Fozilova This letter of permission is issued in response to your application to conduct scientific research, including to conduct interviews with prisoners, in the Penitentiary Institutions under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, that is, to conduct interviews with prisoners. We are pleased to inform you that the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan has considered your research proposal on the topic "Islamic Revivalism and Paradoxical Governance of Religion in Uzbekistan" and has allowed you to continue this research in the penal institutions. We agreed to the following study procedures: 1) Interviewing prisoners in penal institutions 2) Interviews should be between 1-3 hours 3) A private room for the interview will be provided The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan ensures compliance of the research conducted in the territory of Uzbekistan with the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan "On Research of Human Subjects and Protection of Personal Information" and controls compliance with these requirements when conducting this research. Head of the General Directorate, Colonel, Adilov B. Q (signature) 289 Figure 7. Certificate of approval by BREB The University of British Columbia OkanaganResearch ServicesBehavioural Research Ethics Board3333 University WayKelowna, BC V1V 1V7 Phone: 250-807-8832Fax: 250-807-8438CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL - FULL BOARD PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: INSTITUTION / DEPARTMENT: UBC BREB NUMBER:Luis LM Aguiar UBC/UBCO IKE Barber School of Arts & Sc/UBCO Admin Unit 6 Arts & Sci/UBCO Sociology H19-01082INSTITUTION(S) WHERE RESEARCH WILL BE CARRIED OUT:Institution SiteUBC Okanagan CO-INVESTIGATOR(S):Dilsora Komil-BurleyH V Bonar Buffam SPONSORING AGENCIES:N/A PROJECT TITLE:Islamic Revivalism and the Paradoxical Governance of Religion in UzbekistanREB MEETING DATE: CERTIFICATE EXPIRY DATE:July 3, 2019 July 3, 2020DOCUMENTS INCLUDED IN THIS APPROVAL: DATE APPROVED:August 6, 2019 Document Name Version DateProtocol:Research Proposal 1 June 25, 2019Consent Forms:UZBEK. Consent for Participant Observation 3 August 2, 2019Main Study Consent 3 July 27, 2019UZBEK. Permission for Images, Photos and Videos 3 August 2, 2019UZBEK. Main Study Consent 2 July 27, 2019Consent for Participant Observation 3 August 2, 2019Permission for Images, Photos and Videos 3 August 2, 2019Advertisements:UZBEK. Poster for Recruiting Participants 2 July 17, 2019Poster for Recruiting Participants 2 July 17, 2019Questionnaire, Questionnaire Cover Letter, Tests:Interview Questions for Group (B) 1 June 25, 2019Interview Questions for Group (A) 1 June 25, 2019UZBEK. Interview Questions for Group (B) N/A July 17, 2019UZBEK. Interview Question for Group (A) N/A July 17, 2019Letter of Initial Contact:Letter of Initial Contact 2 July 17, 2019 UZBEK. Eligibility Form 2 July 17, 2019Eligibility Form 2 July 17, 2019UZBEK. Letter of Initial Contact 2 July 17, 2019290 Table 2: Restricted media platforms in Uzbekistan (2019) 1. “Abu Saloh darsliklari” 15. “al-Vaʼy” 29. “Nomoz va benomozga taluqli masalalar” 2. “Jannat oshiqlari” 16. “Roya” 30. “Ayollar darslari silsilasi” 3. “Shom ovozi” 17. “Usulul fiqh” 31. “Aqiyda darslari” 4. “Tavhid va jihod” 18. “Mustalahul hadis” 32. “Silsilaviy darslar va maʼruzalar” 5. “Islam Abu Khalil” 19. “Darslardan qisqa lavhalar” 33. “Muhim darslar” 6. “Polvon Novqatlik” 20. “Fiqh ahkomlari” 34. “Aqiydatul vositiya” 7. “Soxib Maxmudov” 21. “Tavhid darsi” 35. “Mustalahul hadis” 8. “Farruxbek Abdullayev” 22. “Qiyomatdan avvalgi fitnalar” 36. “Alfatx” 9. “Mamaraximov Abduraxim Mirkomilovich” 23. “Savol va javoblar” 37. “Talabalar uchun darslar” 10. “Muxojir Polvon” 24. “Foida Mp3” 38. “ALʼ-FATH TV” 11. “Abu Aisha” 25. “Foida va qoidalar” 39. “DAʼVAT UZ” 12. “Turkiston” 26. “Tafsir darslari” 40. “HIDOYAT TV” 13. “Xurriyat info” 27. “Talbisu iblis darslari” 14. “Najot” 28. “Islomni buzuvchi amallar darslari” 291 Table 3: Online Islamic channels and paged observed for this research (The number of subscribers and videos as of September 20, 2020) Name Subscribers Number of videos Date joined in YouTube Location 1. Islom Uz 155,000 2757 March 2010 Uzbekistan 2. Portal.islom.Uz 154,000 2753 March 2010 Uzbekistan 3 Muslimaat.Uz 35,100 692 July 2011 Uzbekistan 4. Ixlos TV (Sodiq Samarqandiy) 233,000 3209 January 2013 Turkey (Prohibited) 5. Nur AlHanafiy (Ma’murjon domla) 29,100 243 June 2015 Uzbekistan 6. Jannatga oshiqlar Hidden 725 February 2015 Russia. (Prohibited) 7. Begoyim.Uz 21.394 June 2016 Uzbekistan 8. Mahmud Abdulmomon 92,100 1872 March 2017 Egypt (Prohibited) 9. Abror Mukhtor Aliy 91,000 1262 August 2017 Uzbekistan 10. Jannat Sari Media 17,700 36 March 2017 Uzbekistan (Prohibited) 11. Furqon Uz 223,000 286 February 2018 Russia 12. Salah TV (Nuriddin domla) 35,000 196 September 2018 N/A 13. Yasin.media 188,000 45 March 2018 Kirgizstan (Prohibited) 14. Quron va Sunnat TV 116,000 76 September 2018 N/A 15. Azon.uz 128,000 375 February 2019 Uzbekistan 16. Namoz Saboqlari 14,300 107 April 2019 Uzbekistan 17. Abdulloh Zufar Darsliklari 12,600 309 February 2019 N/A (Prohibited) 292 Table 4: Profiles, channels and pages prohibited by law in Uzbekistan N* Profile, Channel or Page N* Profile, Channel or Page 1. “Абу Салоҳ дарсликлари” 21. “Tavhid darsi” 2. “Жаннат ошиқлари” 22. “Qiyomatdan avvalgi fitnalar” 3. “Шом овози” 23. “Savol va javoblar” 4. “Тавҳид ва жиҳод” 24. “Foida Mp3” 5. “Islam Abu Khalil” 25. “Foida va qoidalar” 6. “Полвон Новқатлик” 26. “Tafsir darslari” 7. “Сохиб Махмудов” 27. “Talbisu iblis darslari” 8. “Фаррухбек Абдуллаев” 28. “Islomni buzuvchi amallar darslari” 9. “Мамарахимов Абдурахим Миркомилович” 29. “Nomoz va benomozga taluqli masalalar” 10. “Мухожир Полвон” 30. “Ayollar darslari silsilasi” 11. “Abu Aisha” 31. “Aqiyda darslari” 12. “Turkiston” 32. “Silsilaviy darslar va ma’ruzalar” 13. “Хуррият инфо” 33. “Muhim darslar” 14. “Нажот” 34. “Aqiydatul vositiya” 15. “ал-Ваъй” 35. “Mustalahul hadis” 16. “Роя” 36. “Alfatx” 17. “Usulul fiqh” 37. “Talabalar uchun darslar” 18. “Mustalahul hadis” 38. “Al-Fath TV” 19. “Darslardan qisqa lavhalar” 39. “Da’vat UZ” 20. “Fiqh ahkomlari” 40. “Hidoyat TV” 293 Table 5. List of some of the purged Islamic leaders and Muslims N NAME: DATE OF DISAPPEARANCE 1. Abdulla Utaev D.O.B: 17/01/1948 15/12/1992 Imam. Leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party http://www.ozodlik.org/content/article/27187575.html http://virtualuzbekistan.org/2013/03/1614 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ac3D2uEmv - U http://virtualuzbekistan.org/2015/07/1621 http://www.ozodlik.org/content/article/27187575.html 2. Hasan Utaev (Family member of Abdulla Utaev) 3 Ononullo Utaev (Family member of Abdulla Utaev) 4. Shaikh Abduvali Mirzaev DOB: 11/04/1950 29/08/1995 Imam of the Jome Mosque in Andijan. Known scholar and sheikh. https://tayanchdotcom.wordpress.com/ http://www.ozodlik.org/content/article/27187575.html http://www.bbc.com/uzbek/uzbekistan/2011/08/110830_cy_disappear ed_peoples_day.shtml https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=F1c2y-LPsrw 5. Ramazon Matkarimov DOB: 20/03.1959 29/08/1995 Assistant of Sheikh Abduvali Mirzaev https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=F1c2y-LPsrw http://virtualuzbekistan.org/2012/10/1627 6. Ahmedov Abdulloh DOB: 1948 Summer 1996 Pupil of Sheikh Abduvali Mirzaev. Regularly attended Jome Mosque in Andijan 294 7. Nematulloh Parpiev DOB: 1962 09/2007 Nematulloh Parpiev was pupil of Sheikh Abduvali Qori Mirzaev. After the dissapearnce of Mirzaev on August 29, 1995 Nematullo Parpiev became an imam in Jome Mosque. After two years, he was also disappeared. 8. Kasimbekov Kameletdin & Bekzod Kasimbekov Brothers DOB: 05/08/1999 Charged with Article 159 for membership in Hisb-ut Tahrir for eight years and disappeared at the same time. 9. Kholmurodov Mamatqul DOB: 25/05/1955 21/04/1999 Imam of Chor-Minor Mosque: Accused of Wahhabi, membership in Hisb-ut Tahrir, Tablighi Jamoa. His associate Muhammad Ibn Ibrohim was jailed for 11 years and released in 2018. https://soundcloud.com/blogsahwii/ybmfayfxvzsv https://sahwii.wixsite.com/website-2/faollar-bilan-su-batlar-2http://www.memo.ru/hr/politpr/ cntrasia/uzb5/add6.htm 10. Hasanov Bahodir DOB: 2000 Teacher of French Language. Hasanov disappeared because his brother Yahyo Hasanov was accused of having connection with Islamic groups in Afghanistan and also was killed. 11. Alisher Qurbonov DOB: 1978 09/2000 Alisher was accused of being an Amir to one of the Islamic groups in Qibray. He was detained but vanished after the detention. There are assumptions that he was killed by torture and to cover up the crime he was got rid of. (Interview with his friend) 12. Sayfiddin Mo’minov 2001 Membeer of Hisb-ut Tahrir al-Islami 295 13. Sherzod Malikov 2001 Member of Hisb-ut Tahrir al-Islami 14. Sodiqjon Rahmonov DOB: 1962 2003 Imam. He was the organizer of the Haj Pilgrimages in 1990s. He was taken away from his home by a car and disappeared. 15. Luqmonjon Yunusov DOB:1962 2003 Imam. He was stopped on the road by law enforcement, taken away, and disappeared. He was with his wife and the people who kidnapped him asked him to send his wife home by taxi. 16. Khusniddin Nazarov DOB: 8/07/1976 15/05/2004 Son of a known imam Sheikh Obidkhon Nazarov who was shot in Europe (and survived). He left home to go to mosque and never returned. https://sahwii.wixsite.com/website-2/faollar-bilan-su-batlar-2 http://www.bbc.com/uzbek/uzbekistan/2011/08/110830_cy_disappear 17. Yunusov Oqiljon Azizjonovich DOB: 06/11/1971 28/05/2004 Studied in Saudi Arabia between 1992-1998 at the University of Islamic Studies. He was an instructor of Arabic and Islamic studies. http://www.ozodlik.org/content/ article/27204353.html https://sahwii.wixsite.com/website-2/faollar-bilan-su-batlar-2 18. Farrux Haydarov DOB: 1972 His driver Hikmat also disappeared at the same time. 16/05/2004 Studied in Saudi Arabia between 1992-1998 at the University of Islamic Studies. He was an instructor of Arabic and Islamic studies. He was a pupil of Sheikh Obidkhon Nazarov and went to Madina to study with the support of Sheikh Nazarov. Yunusov Oqiljon and Farrux Haydarov studied together in Saudia Arabia, were friends, and disappeared within a month of each other. 296 http://www.ozodlik.org/content/article/27204353.html https://sahwii.wixsite.com/website-2/faollar-bilan-su-batlar-2 19. Abdurasul Rakhimov DOB: 1972 14/07/2004 Organizer of support for the families of religious convicts. A car came and picked him up from his home and he never returned. 20. Mahmudjon Rashidov Komilovich (DOB: 1968) His driver Anvar Jumadullaev also left home and never returned. 17/02/2005 Friend of Khusniddin Nazarov who was the son of Sheikh Obidkhon Nazarov and friend of Rukhiddin Fakhruddinov, whom I interviwed in prison. He was detained in 2000 but paid a large bribe and avoided jail. He was on the run. On 17 February 2005, he and his driver, Anvar Jumadullaev, left home and never returned. 297 Table 6. List of Abbreviations AI – Amnesty International BREB - Behavioural Research Ethics Board CRA - Committee for Religious Affairs CPSU - The Communist Party of the Soviet Union IMU – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan GULAG - Glavnoy Upravlenie Lagerey can be translated as the “Chief Administration of the Camps.” GVS – Global Village Space. HT - Hisb-ut Tahrir al-Islami HRW – Human Rights Watch ICA - International Council on Archives IJU – Islamic Jihad Union MBU – Muslim Board of Uzbekistan NSS – National Security Services. It was changed to State Security Services (SSS) in 2021 PDP – People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan R.A – Rathiallah Anhu (May Allah be pleased with them) SADUM – The Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan S.A.W. - Sall-Allahu alayhi wasallam (May Allah honor him and grant him peace) USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UzSSR – Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist Republic UBC – University of British Columbia 298 Table 7. Consent Letter for Participants Consent Letter for Participants Title: Islamic Revival and the Paradoxical Governance of Religion in Uzbekistan Study Team: Principal Investigator: Luis LM Aguiar, Ph.D. Associate Professor, Department of Sociology UBC Okanagan Email: luis.aguiar@ubc.ca Tel: 250-807-9346 Primary Contact and Researcher: Dilsora Komil-Burley Interdisciplinary Graduate Studies. Ph.D. candidate, UBC Okanagan Email: kburley@mail.ubc.ca Tel: 250-899-6804 Purpose: This study forms the basis of the doctoral degree requirements in Interdisciplinary Graduate Studies. The purpose of this research is to study the relationship between Islamic revivalism and the secular state in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. I will document the kinds of religious and political engagements that characterize the Islamic groups that have emerged over the last twenty years. In particular, I will direct my focus towards the relationship between the gradual weakening of the socialist system and the rise of religious establishments and the formation of radical Islamic views in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. I will examine how the use of the labels ‘Islamic extremist’ and ‘terrorist’ aided the government of Uzbekistan in seizing and securing power and the economic, political, and cultural factors and other influences on the radicalization of some Muslims, motivating them to join religious extremist organizations. My research will consider the ideological void and the economic conditions that resulted from the transition from socialism to a free-market economy, such as unemployment, erosion of social welfare; lack of opportunities, and declining living standards as possible factors contributing to increased involvement in radical Islamization. This research will contribute to historical and political sociology by studying Islamic revivalism and the relationship between the secular state and Islam in Uzbekistan. 299 Study Procedures: The interviews will be in person, or over the phone, or on skype, or through email. Before the start of the interview, I will review the consent form with you and I will answer any questions you may have. The interview will begin with basic questions about yourself, your general religious views and practices, and your institutional affiliations (e.g. Sunni, Shia...). Next, you will be asked a series of interview questions about Islam, the governance of Islam in Uzbekistan and your opinions about religious life. With your permission, the interview, which will last between 1- 2 hours, will be audio-recorded using a recording device. The interview will be conducted in a location that you feel comfortable in, by phone or online. Participants will not be reimbursed for travel or be paid for their participation. Potential Risks and Benefits of the Study. If you participate in this study, there is a low risk to you. The interviews will be used to gain a good understanding of Islamic revivalism in Uzbekistan and the social and political dynamics that emerged in response to it. I will have two different categories of interviewees: (A) religious and political exiles who live outside of Uzbekistan; (B) religiously-involved men and women in Uzbekistan. There is minimal social risk associated with your participation in the study, which could result in a loss of status and privacy in the very unlikely event of a confidentiality breach. However, to mitigate this risk, I will store all data on my personal, password protected computer and password protect the confidential files containing your name, the consent form, the transcribed interview document, the voice recording of the interview and any personal correspondence that I have with you. If the interview is in-person, I will also select an interview location that is preferred by you and will give you the option to select a comfortable, private location. All data will be encrypted to 128-bit encryption and stored on a USB stick in the principle investigator’s locked cabinet for 5 years following publications. Data gathered from the participants will not cross any borders. They will be uploaded to the University of British Columbia’s “P” drive for researchers and erased from the researcher’s computer. Also, there is a low level of research risk associated with your participation in the study. It is possible that you could discuss information that affects you emotionally, even if the research study does not involve questions that are about personal experiences of harassment or trauma. Therefore, to mitigate the risk to you, I have limited my scope of research to EXCLUDE issues of harassment, misjudgment of your beliefs and opinions, and traumatic events and you are under NO obligation to discuss issues surrounding them. However, if you feel that the best way to answer the question is to share your personal experience with any form of harassment, this is completely acceptable. This type of information will be treated with the same level of confidentiality that is outlined here in the consent letter. If you accidentally discuss personal experiences that involves your direct experience with harassment and traumatic events, you will have the option to decide what is included in the interview, either by reviewing the recording or 300 stopping the voice recorder to discuss the sensitive information. You can also withdraw from the study at any time without penalty or consequence. With all that being said, your participation will contribute to a better understand of Islamic revival, and the relationship between the secular state and Islam in Uzbekistan. These insights could potentially contribute the understanding of the relationship between state and Islam in the world, and make it possible for the researcher to shift the existing views about certain religious doctrines, groups and practices, and suggest changes for the regulation of religion in Uzbekistan. Confidentiality: Your participation in the study will generate data that will be used in my Ph.D. thesis, where I will incorporate direct quotes gained through the interview in the thesis or journal publications. Any materials (interview recordings or transcripts, field notes, correspondence) with personal data will be encrypted to 128-bit encryption and stored on a USB stick in the principle investigator’s locked cabinet at the UBCO for 5 years upon completion of my Ph.D. thesis. Participation is voluntary and can be withdrawn at any time up until 1 March 2021, the expected date of completion for the dissertation. If you withdraw consent prior to that date, all data pertaining to your interview will be securely destroyed and not used in the thesis. You will not be identified in any of the final reports. Pseudonyms will be used for interviewees and any organizational affiliations will not be mentioned. I will ensure that your identity will be kept confidential. Therefore, all materials (audio recordings, transcripts, etc.) will be stored on my password protected computer and personal information will be kept in password protected folders on my personal computer. No data will be uploaded to “P” drive. You will not be identified by name in any reports of the completed study. Feel free to share my research study with people you feel may be interested in participating; however, it is very important that you do not comment, publicly like and/or share your research experience on social media or Facebook within or beyond the closed groups, as it will affect my ability to maintain your confidentiality and the confidentiality of future participants. Study Results: The results of the study will be discussed in a doctoral thesis that form part of the degree requirements for the Ph.D. in Interdisciplinary Graduate Studies. The thesis document will be published on cIRcle, which means that it will publicly available on the internet. I will present my project at a forum that is open to the public and may share my findings in academic venues, such as conferences and peer-reviewed journals. Contacts for Information about the Study: If you have any questions or desire further information about this study, you may contact the researcher. Contact information is provided above. 301 If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, contact the Research Participation Complaint Line in the UBC Office of Research Services toll free at 1-877-822-8598 or the UBC Okanagan Research Services Office at 250-807-8832. It is also possible to contact the Research Complaint Line by email (RSIL@ors.ubc.ca) and reference the study number (H18-01196) when contacting the Complaint Line so the staff can better assist you. Consent: Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you may refuse to participate of withdraw from this study at any time. Please check one, how do you want to be interviewed: in-person___, phone___, online___, email (written)___? Initials________. Do you agree to have the interview audio recorded: _____Yes _____No, Initials_______. Your signature below indicates that you have received a copy of this consent form for your own records. Your signature indicates that you consent to participate in this study. Participant signature Date Printed name of the participant signing above.
Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Sociology
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Buffam, Bonar
Aguiar, Luis L. M.
Islamic revivalism, radicalism and the paradoxical governance of Islam in Uzbekistan
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