Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Kowalchuk, Katelynn Rae
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
Notwithstanding the expansion of the role, capacity and democratic legitimacy of municipal governments in modern public life in Canada, they remain vulnerable to the whims of their respective provincial governments. Smith and Spicer’s (2018) work, “The Local Autonomy of Canada’s Largest Cities”, is the first attempt within the Canadian urban politics field to quantitatively measure local autonomy in Canadian cities, drawing on previous qualitative research within Canada and international quantitative indices. Most of their measures of local autonomy are naturally suited to quantitative research (such as per capita expenditures); however, other measures are more challenging to place within a quantitative framework, prompting the opportunity for critique and refinement. My thesis argues that two of Smith and Spicer’s indicators of political autonomy are not fully supported by the literature, lack a strong theoretical narrative for their explanatory power, and are limited by the constraints of their strictly quantitative methodology. Additionally, I contend that their universality is overestimated, and that political autonomy would be captured more powerfully through an understanding of the historical context and the motivations of powerful actors in cities and provincial capitals. These two measures of political autonomy, and Smith and Spicer’s index more broadly, would benefit from additional nuance stemming from historical qualitative research which can illuminate the details, contingencies, and unique dynamics that can be lost within the requirements of quantitative research. My thesis aims to demonstrate the importance of capturing this nuance through an examination of the history of Vancouver politics vis-à-vis the BC provincial government throughout the 1930s. This historiography supports my assertion that political actors are not bound by the institutional constraints assumed by Smith and Spicer’s measures of political interconnectivity. Rather than Smith and Spicer’s assumption that politically migratory politicians will always support policy which favours municipalities, one can adopt an alternative institutionalist lens which instead assumes the careerist aspirations of Canadian politicians and how they behave when vying for political power. The presence of a political threat further contributes to this behaviour, suggesting that the index may benefit from accounting for ideological and partisan conflicts.
PARTISANSHIP, IDEOLOGY, AND CIVIC AUTONOMY: TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR MEASURING AUTONOMY IN CANADIAN CITIES by Katelynn Rae Kowalchuk BA, The University of Regina, 2020 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) July 2022 © Katelynn Rae Kowalchuk, 2022 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the thesis entitled: Partisanship, Ideology, and Civic Autonomy: Towards a Comprehensive Framework for Measuring Autonomy in Canadian Cities Submitted by Katelynn Rae Kowalchuk in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science Examining Committee: Carey Doberstein, Associate Professor, Political Science, UBC Supervisor Gerald Baier, Associate Professor, Political Science, UBC Supervisory Committee Member iii ABSTRACT Notwithstanding the expansion of the role, capacity and democratic legitimacy of municipal governments in modern public life in Canada, they remain vulnerable to the whims of their respective provincial governments. Smith and Spicer’s (2018) work, “The Local Autonomy of Canada’s Largest Cities”, is the first attempt within the Canadian urban politics field to quantitatively measure local autonomy in Canadian cities, drawing on previous qualitative research within Canada and international quantitative indices. Most of their measures of local autonomy are naturally suited to quantitative research (such as per capita expenditures); however, other measures are more challenging to place within a quantitative framework, prompting the opportunity for critique and refinement. My thesis argues that two of Smith and Spicer’s indicators of political autonomy are not fully supported by the literature, lack a strong theoretical narrative for their explanatory power, and are limited by the constraints of their strictly quantitative methodology. Additionally, I contend that their universality is overestimated, and that political autonomy would be captured more powerfully through an understanding of the historical context and the motivations of powerful actors in cities and provincial capitals. These two measures of political autonomy, and Smith and Spicer’s index more broadly, would benefit from additional nuance stemming from historical qualitative research which can illuminate the details, contingencies, and unique dynamics that can be lost within the requirements of quantitative research. My thesis aims to demonstrate the importance of capturing this nuance through an examination of the history of Vancouver politics vis-à-vis the BC provincial government throughout the 1930s. This historiography supports my assertion that political actors are not bound by the institutional constraints assumed by Smith and Spicer’s measures of political interconnectivity. Rather than Smith and Spicer’s assumption that politically migratory politicians will always support policy which favours municipalities, one can adopt an alternative iv institutionalist lens which instead assumes the careerist aspirations of Canadian politicians and how they behave when vying for political power. The presence of a political threat further contributes to this behaviour, suggesting that the index may benefit from accounting for ideological and partisan conflicts. v LAY SUMMARY Local governments in Canada do not have constitutional protection, unlike many other countries, and are often left to the will of the provinces. Questions of local autonomy have gained popularity among political scientists, local politicians, and activist groups. My thesis offers a critique of a recent framework for measuring the autonomy of cities within Canada, which assumes that provincial politicians with previous experience in local politics (and vice versa) will always support policies which are favourable to cities. My research shows that this assumption is weakly supported by the academic literature, and a thorough retelling of Vancouver’s political history throughout the 1930s demonstrates that increased political interconnectivity between levels of government may diminish a city’s autonomy, rather than bolstering it. Future iterations of this framework should consider the nuance that supplemental qualitative research can provide, and interrogate the assumptions made about how political actors behave in specific contexts. vi PREFACE This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, K. R. Kowalchuk. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ............................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary ....................................................................................................................... v Preface ................................................................................................................................. vi Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................. viii Dedication ............................................................................................................................ ix Section One: Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 Section Two: Literature on Local Autonomy ....................................................................... 5 Section Three: Methodology ............................................................................................. 17 Section Four: The Political History of Vancouver, 1930s .................................................. 21 Section Five: Synthesis ..................................................................................................... 32 Section Six: Conclusion .................................................................................................... 36 References ........................................................................................................................ 41 viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am extremely grateful to my supervisor Carey Doberstein for his unwavering support and thought-provoking discussions throughout the past year, which have deepened my understanding of, and respect for, the work that we do. I would also like to extend thanks to my examiner, Gerald Baier, for his thoughtful queries on my research. The City of Vancouver Archives staff were also instrumental in the completion of this thesis. I would also like to extend my sincere appreciation to my friends both within the UBC Political Science graduate program, and those in Vancouver more broadly. I will always cherish our times together, and humbly thank you all for making Vancouver feel more like home. My friends and family back home in Saskatchewan are also deserving of recognition, for keeping me grounded and reminding me of why I do the work that I do. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge my partner, Nigel, for his continuous support throughout my master’s degree. Your belief in me and my work means more to me than I can possibly express. This thesis was made possible with the financial support of the SSHRC CGS-M program. ix For the local activists and community organizers who continue in their steadfast struggle for our collective right to the city. 1 Section One: Introduction Notwithstanding the expansion of the role, capacity, and democratic legitimacy of municipal governments in modern public life in Canada, they remain vulnerable to the whims of their respective provincial governments. The evergreen reference to cities as “creatures of the provinces” (Tindal & Tindal, 2000, p. 8-9) in a constitutional sense remains salient among urban scholars in Canada, at the same time as local autonomy movements gather momentum. It is not a particularly novel event when a provincial government interferes with a city’s decision-making autonomy. One of the more recent examples in Vancouver concerns the allocated budget for the Vancouver Police Department (VPD). In May 2020, Vancouver City Council voted to maintain the VPD’s level of funding at 2020 levels through to the 2021 fiscal year due to shortfalls in the city’s budget arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. The maintenance of the 2020 funding levels equated to a difference of about $6.4 million in expected growth in the budget that was not approved (St. Denis, 2020). Nearly two years after this decision, British Columbia’s Director of Police Services overruled the city council’s vote and ordered that the funds be returned to the VPD’s budget or the city would face a reduction in services provided by the VPD (Little, 2022). A similar override of the norms of local autonomy in Canada occurred in Ontario during Toronto’s 2018 municipal election. In July 2018, Ontario Premier Doug Ford announced that the provincial government would introduce legislation to reduce the size of the Toronto city council from 47 seats to 25. Mayor John Tory derided this decision, indicating that the city should instead hold a referendum on the issue in the midst of “…a major change being made to their civic democracy,” particularly given that this change occurred during the municipal election campaign (Shum, 2018). The legislation, titled The Better Local Government Act (2018), received royal 2 assent later that year, though the Supreme Court of Canada recently ruled in City of Toronto v. Attorney General of Ontario that the Ford government was within its legal right to reduce the size of Toronto city council (Zimonjic, 2021). These are but a few recent examples of the provincial government unilaterally interfering with the autonomy of cities, though there are myriad ways in which provincial governments (subtly or overtly) enlarge or restrict local autonomy (fiscally, politically, administratively, etc.). Alison Smith and Zachary Spicer’s (2018) work, “The Local Autonomy of Canada’s Largest Cities”, is the first attempt within the Canadian urban politics field to quantitatively measure local autonomy in Canadian cities, drawing on previous qualitative research within Canada and international quantitative indices. A few of their measures of local autonomy are naturally suited to quantitative research (such as per capita expenditures); however, other measures are more challenging to place within a strictly quantitative framework, prompting the opportunity for critique and refinement. My thesis therefore offers a constructive critique of Smith and Spicer’s (2018) quantitative framework measuring local autonomy in Canadian cities. Their index contains three dimensions of autonomy: legal-administrative, fiscal, and political. Despite this breadth, my analysis focuses solely on two indicators within the political autonomy dimension, as these are perhaps the most vulnerable to the challenges of quantification without losing their theoretical depth. This is not to say that explorations of the validity of the measures within the legal-administrative and fiscal autonomy axes are not warranted. However, a full critique of these measures is beyond the scope of this research. 3 Smith and Spicer include the largest city within each Canadian province in their study - Vancouver (BC), Calgary (AB), Saskatoon (SK), Winnipeg (MB), Toronto (ON), Montréal (QB), Saint John (NB), Halifax (NS), Charlottetown (PEI), and St. John’s (NL). Their results indicate that Vancouver holds the most autonomy in all three dimensions when compared to the other cities, though the authors contend that no municipality can be said to have a high level of autonomy overall. My critique focuses on the final two indicators within the political autonomy portion of their index, which stipulate that political interconnectivity between local and provincial levels of government is indicative of higher levels of local autonomy. Vancouver scored fairly low on the two measures of political autonomy with which this thesis is concerned; namely, the proportion of MLAs with previous municipal government experience, and the proportion of municipal councillors with previous experience in the provincial government. I posit that these indicators of political autonomy are not fully supported by the literature, lack a strong theoretical narrative for their explanatory power, and are limited by the constraints of their strictly quantitative methodology. Additionally, I contend that their universality is overestimated and that political autonomy would be captured more powerfully through an understanding of the unique historical context and the motivations of powerful actors in cities and provincial capitals through an alternative institutional approach. These two measures of political autonomy, and Smith and Spicer’s index more broadly, would benefit from additional nuance stemming from historical qualitative research which can illuminate the details, contingencies, and unique dynamics that can be lost within the requirements of quantitative research. My thesis aims to demonstrate the importance of capturing this nuance through its examination of the history of Vancouver politics vis-à-vis the BC provincial government throughout the 1930s. This 4 historiography supports my assertion that political actors are not bound by the institutional constraints assumed by Smith and Spicer’s measures of political interconnectivity (i.e., that an MLA with previous experience in elected local government would be more sympathetic to local autonomy). Rather, they can be perceived of as actors who leverage their political connections at multiple levels of government to further their own political careers, often at the expense of the city’s autonomy. In other words, rather than Smith and Spicer’s assumption that politically migratory politicians will always support policy which favours municipalities, one can adopt an alternative institutionalist lens which instead accounts for the careerist aspirations of Canadian politicians and how they behave when vying for political power. The presence of a political threat further contributes to this behaviour from political actors, suggesting that the index may benefit from accounting for ideological and partisan conflicts. This thesis will proceed as follows. I begin with a literature review wherein I briefly outline relevant trends in Canadian urban politics research and Smith and Spicer’s (2018) index, along with their associated theoretical claims. Next, I explain the methodological approach I use to engage with questions of political autonomy in Canadian cities. Following this, I begin my historical review of Vancouver politics throughout the 1930s in relation to the provincial government to demonstrate the merits of historical qualitative research in exploring local political autonomy. Lastly, I conclude with a brief overview of my thesis’ aims, findings, and potential pathways for future research and index refinement. 5 Section Two: Literature on Local Autonomy The majority of the academic literature on Canadian municipal politics emerged within the past twenty years, though there are multiple works of substantial merit from prior to this period, and the literature portrays various unique aspects about municipal politics within the Canadian context. Perhaps the most prevalent idiosyncracy is the lack of constitutional recognition for municipalities as a distinct level of government within the Canadian federation, with multiple scholars addressing the precise nature of this unique relationship between the cities and the provincial and federal governments (Stevenson & Gilbert, 2005; Andrew & Graham, 2014; Stoney & Graham, 2009; Sancton, 2002). This has led to some observers referring to Canadian cities as “creatures of the provinces,” referencing their reliance on, and subordination to, provincial authority, though some have questioned this framing (Good, 2019; Magnusson, 2005). There has also been more recent attention paid to the politicization and ideology of municipal politics, both within cities with party systems and those without (Chiasson, Gauthier, & Andrew, 2014; Lucas & Armstrong II, 2021; Lucas, 2021; Mehiriz, 2017). Others have identified the relative isolationism of urban studies, which tends to not consider urban politics within the broader realm of policy-making structures, and have advocated for increased attention to the interconnectivity between levels of government (Lucas, 2017). While the study of Canadian urban politics is not new, the majority of works in this area have emerged within the previous two decades and grapple with multiple areas of inquiry, including questions of municipal autonomy. However, unlike other countries, this literature did not include a quantitative comparative framework for measuring autonomy in Canadian cities until 2018, when Zachary Smith and Alison Spicer published their article titled “The Local Autonomy 6 of Canada’s Largest Cities.” The following paragraphs aim to briefly review the object of my critique, “The Local Autonomy of Canada’s Largest Cities”, including Smith and Spicer’s justification for creating a Canada-specific quantitative framework and the formulation of their axes and measures. Smith and Spicer open their work with the assertion that, unlike many other countries often invoked in comparative studies alongside Canada, Canadian cities exist within fairly restrictive legislative bounds (2018, p. 932). They explain that while some cities have been afforded additional responsibilities and authorities above and beyond those typically expected from cities (for example, through the creation of city charters), the literature lacks both a comprehensive understanding of the expressions of autonomy in large Canadian cities and a standardized quantitative framework for measuring their autonomy. Smith and Spicer note that there have been previous attempts to determine the extent of local autonomy enjoyed by Canadian cities, but that these projects have been primarily qualitative. They state that, while these are welcome additions to the literature on Canadian local autonomy, a quantitative framework for measuring local autonomy would serve to complement their contributions and create a standardized framework for measurement in future studies. Further, a quantitative examination of local autonomy in Canada can serve as a foundation for measuring local autonomy in other federal states (Smith & Spicer, 2018, p. 932). Scholars in other regions of the world, primarily the United States and western Europe, have published frameworks for measuring local autonomy in their respective jurisdictions, but these frameworks cannot be applied to the Canadian case without substantial revision due to their 7 unique contexts, histories, and divisions of power. For instance, many measures of local autonomy in the United States include the concept of home rule (a U.S. state constitutionally granting some level of autonomy to municipalities), which is not applicable to Canadian governance structures. Additionally, the western European literature on the subject is usually geared toward unitary states rather than federal states, which is consequential for the study of local autonomy. For example, the nuances of the relationships between Canada’s three levels of government (not to speak of the emerging recognition and importance of Indigenous governments), along with the constitutional vacuum in which municipal governments exist, cannot be gleaned from unadapted measures of local autonomy in unitary states. In sum, frameworks and typologies for measuring local autonomy are heavily context dependent, and difficult to apply without adaptation to countries for which they were not originally designed. For this reason, at the time of writing, there exists no broadly applicable framework for measuring local autonomy between countries. Thus, Smith and Spicer formulate their own framework by examining previous works on local autonomy internationally, as well as relevant Canadian literature, and adapt the measures to be suitable for the unique Canadian context. Smith and Spicer selected the largest city by population in each Canadian province to include in their study, numbering 10 total, to establish a baseline measure of local autonomy up to 2014. Their framework includes three axes of autonomy: legal-administrative, fiscal, and political. Overall, the cities score relatively low in local autonomy and the authors speculate that this is due to the overall low scores within the fiscal autonomy axis. They also posit that these axes are not independent from each other. For instance, Smith and Spicer argue that the fiscal autonomy of a city plays a significant role in determining its legal-administrative autonomy; a city with a low 8 fiscal autonomy score is less capable of utilizing its legal-administrative powers, even if they are substantial on paper. Despite this trend of uniformly low autonomy across all cities, they note that we cannot treat all cities in a uniform fashion when conducting comparative analyses, due to variation in legal-administrative and political autonomy (Smith & Spicer, 2018, p. 934). In other words, Smith and Spicer identify both inter-country and intra-country comparisons of local autonomy as needing careful attention to context and history. There is no universally accepted definition of local autonomy within the academic canon, though Smith and Spicer detail a general overview of the development of the term in both the international and Canadian literature. Gurr and King (1987) define local autonomy in terms of both internal and external constraints which limit a city’s ability to manage its own affairs, while Page (1991) instead argues that the availability of opportunities for local political elites to shape public services can be used to determine local autonomy. Page posits that these opportunities are afforded to local elites through the relationship between the city in question and its central government in two domains: the legal (a local government’s formal powers) and the political (a local government’s ability to influence national-level politics which affect the municipality). Vetter (2007) challenges Gurr and King’s definition of local autonomy but maintains their dichotomy of operationalization (i.e., the legal and political domains of autonomy), and instead defines it in terms of both the functions that a local government performs, as well as the scope of their discretion. Opting for a relationship-based definition rather than one based solely on capacity or jurisdiction, Sellers and Lidström (2007) focus on the relationship between local and upper levels of government in relation to the devolution of powers to cities. Their examination of this 9 intergovernmental relationship includes both local capacity (the ability of the municipality to accomplish its aims) and supervision of the municipality by higher levels of government. Jacob et al. (2008) examine autonomy strictly in the Canadian context and argue that autonomy should be thought of in terms of capacity and, regardless of a municipality’s levels of fiscal or legal autonomy, a lack of capacity renders all other forms of autonomy moot. They define capacity as both an outcome and a process, wherein the mobilization of resources and assets (i.e., capacity as process) to achieve a specific objective (i.e., capacity as outcome), which returns the municipality increased resources and assets. Smith and Spicer assert that all definitions of local autonomy include one common thread: the constraints that are placed on local government, whether constitutional or otherwise. They define local autonomy for the purposes of their article as “…the ability to develop and implement policies at the local level, free from provincial institutional constraints” (Smith & Spicer, 2018, p. 935), a minimalist definition of the term from which their index arises. Smith and Spicer then identify the specific measure within each of the aforementioned authors’ indices for measuring local autonomy and adapt these measures to suit the unique Canadian context. The three dimensions of autonomy used in their index are drawn from Sellers and Lidström’s (2007) work on decentralization and the autonomy of local governments: legal-administrative, fiscal, and political. Each dimension contains four indicators, many of which use proxy measures to allow for quantification (such as the proportion of municipal to provincial employees in a particular department). As my research is only concerned with two indicators of political autonomy and their shortcomings, I begin the following section with a brief outline of 10 each dimension and its associated indicators before devoting greater attention to problematizing the definitions and measures of political autonomy, the focus of my contribution. Legal-Administrative Smith and Spicer note that they use proxy measures to determine the level of autonomy each city holds, which keeps with approaches used in previous indices. For example, rather than quantifying the areas which fall within a municipal government’s jurisdiction, they instead measure the proportion of employment in both the municipal and provincial governments within each sector, which comprises the first indicator of legal-administrative autonomy in their index (Smith & Spicer, 2018, p. 940). This measure is drawn from multiple sources, including Vetter (2007) who examines local autonomy in western Europe, Wolman et al. (2010) who focus on the United States, and Sellers and Lidström (2007) with their cross-national examination of welfare states and decentralization. The second indicator in this dimension is the presence (or absence) of a city charter, wherein a city which has been granted a charter is deemed to be more autonomous than a city without. This indicator is also taken from Sellers and Lidström (2007) and Wolman et al. (2010), though adapted to the Canadian context, as neither the constitutional protection of local autonomy (Sellers & Lidström, 2007) nor the concept of home rule (Wolman et al., 2010) apply to Canada’s political arena. The third indicator is whether a province is required to consult a city before interfering in its jurisdiction or if the city is protected from certain provincial interference, and is adapted from Sancton and Young’s (2009) work on Canadian municipal governance. The final indicator presumes that a city is considered less autonomous if the province determines the size and form of the city council, termed “supralocal control of government form” (Smith & Spicer, 2018, p. 941). 11 Fiscal The first indicator within the fiscal autonomy dimension is the proportion of local government expenditure within total public provincial expenditure, with higher local spending coinciding with a higher level of autonomy. The second indicator is quite similar to the first, though instead of measuring expenditure, it measures local tax revenue; again, a higher proportion of local tax revenue when compared to the province is associated with a higher level of local autonomy. The third indicator is in regards to conditional grants. Smith and Spicer posit that a lesser amount of municipal revenue derived from conditional grants creates lower levels of financial dependence on the province, and is subsequently associated with higher autonomy (2018, p. 941). The final indicator in the fiscal autonomy dimension is the presence of hierarchical borrowing conditions, which refers to whether provincial approval of municipal capital borrowing is required. Political The final dimension of Smith and Spicer’s index is political autonomy, which also contains four indicators. The first indicator, adapted from Sellers and Lidström (2007) and Page (1991), measures the strength of local interest representation in the provincial political arena using the relative strength1 of municipal representational associations at the provincial level (for example, the Union of British Columbia Municipalities). The stronger the representational association, the higher the level of autonomy. The second indicator focuses on provincial restrictions imposed upon local election campaigns, more specifically the spending and contribution limits for mayoral races. Fewer provincially-defined restrictions on campaign finances are indicative of a higher degree of autonomy. 1 Smith and Spicer are not explicit on how they define a strong, moderately strong, or weak association, which are the designations used within their index. 12 The final two indicators, and the subject of my contribution, consider the political linkages between the provincial and municipal governments; one indicator measures the proportion of municipal councillors who have previous experience in provincial politics, and the other measures the proportion of provincial MLAs who have previous experience in municipal politics. More specifically, they operationalize “experience” as having served as a sitting member of the respective council or legislature and do not include other forms of involvement in either provincial or municipal politics (such as service on an executive board of a party, work conducted on a campaign, etc.). Smith and Spicer adapted these indicators from Page (1991), and reference earlier works which have found that political relationships (and political experience in a more general sense) can foster both opportunity and autonomy for local governments (Goldsmith & Page, 2010; Hamilton, Miller, & Paytas, 2004). Smith and Spicer do not elaborate on the aforementioned texts’ findings and their interpretations of the relationship between political linkages and local autonomy, though a complete understanding of their source material is relevant to my critique. In their appendix, Smith and Spicer detail the specific source locations for their measures, including measures within their source documents which they did not use for various reasons (such as the lack of applicability to Canadian politics). They identify Page (1991) as their source for the third and fourth measures within the political autonomy dimension. There are a few key differences between Page’s conception of political linkages and their impact on civic localism.2 First, Page examines the political interconnectivity between local and national-level governments, rather than local and sub- 2 Page (1991) defines civic localism as “…the opportunities for local political élites to shape public services [through] political or legal [avenues]” (p. 6). Smith and Spicer interpret this definition as analogous with their understanding of civic autonomy. 13 national governments, which was a result of Smith and Spicer’s adaptation of this measure to the Canadian context. Additionally, each of the examined states (Great Britain, France, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Spain, and Denmark) are European and unitary in structure; in other words, examining the relationship between the local and national-level governments in these contexts is the most appropriate (and generalizable) approach for Page’s research. Smith and Spicer’s choice to examine provincial, rather than federal, municipal interconnectivity is an appropriate adaptation given the differences between provincial-municipal relationships, Canada’s status as a federal state, and the federal government’s largely hands-off approach to the cities (though this has been changing in recent years, particularly in relation to fiscal transfers to cities – see Chianello, 2022). Lastly, Page’s analysis of political interconnectivity between governments is one-way, only examining the effect of politicians with previous experience in local politics who then began a career in national-level politics. Smith and Spicer expand this measure and adopt a two-way approach, analyzing both the effect of politicians who move from municipal to provincial politics and from provincial to municipal politics. However, Page is also critical of this measure, stating that the political background of a politician is not sufficient to determine their advocacy for local policy issues at the national level. Rather, he proposes that the structure of political careers in the country in question determines the effectiveness of political linkages in leading to increased localism (Page, 1991, pg. 66). In other words, while Smith and Spicer’s construction of measuring political autonomy through the proportion of MLAs with previous municipal experience (and vice versa) is consistent with Page’s thoughts on the potential influence of interconnectivity, it is stripped of much of its theoretical grounding. While there may be defensible reasons as to why other indices developed outside of 14 Canada require adaptation, as well as opportunities for new ideas on how to measure political autonomy, Smith and Spicer remain silent on Page’s (1991) own critique of the original measure and provide a limited theoretical defense of their own adaptations by their mobilization of Goldsmith and Page (2010) and Hamilton, Miller, and Paytas (2004). In their 2010 book which re-examines their previous work on localism in Europe (including Page, 1991), Goldsmith and Page expand their case studies to include both unitary and federal states in Europe. Upon the book’s completion, their findings reflect those proposed by Page (1991) and discussed here previously: that political interconnectivity between levels of government is largely context-based and not universally applicable. More specifically, they explain that In the two former communist systems [Czech Republic and Hungary] the strength of local government and the ability to resist consolidation and amalgamation of small units had less to do with the political legitimacy of local elites and their access to national elites (as in countries such as France and Italy) and more to do with the conception of the place of local government in the development of democratic institutions (Goldsmith & Page, 2010, p. 257). Hamilton, Miller, and Paytas (2004) do not question this measure’s validity. However, they also do not adequately support its validity, and it is mentioned only briefly near the beginning of their article. They postulate that national-level politicians have often previously occupied positions in local governments and rely on the support of local actors to maintain their political appeal (Hamilton, Miller, & Paytas, 2004, p. 151). This assertion does not feature prominently in their work, nor do they provide citations for further support. In sum, despite mobilizing three sources to justify the inclusion of these indicators in their index, Smith and Spicer do not engage with Page’s (1991) own critique of measuring political autonomy in this manner, and do not provide a strong theoretical defense of the measures’ inclusion in their index. 15 As they discuss earlier in their article, Smith and Spicer’s aim is to adapt measures from previous works on local autonomy in the United States and Europe to inform their own index of local autonomy in Canada. Given that their work is the first attempt to quantitatively measure autonomy in Canadian cities, this adaptive approach seems to be appropriate. However, a more nuanced approach to the concepts derived from their source material (Page, 1991 and Hamilton, Miller, & Paytas, 2004 in particular) would provide greater theoretical depth to the objectives of their research. As mentioned by Smith and Spicer earlier in their article, “…it is not safe to presume uniformity in terms of local–provincial relations in the Canadian decentralized federation” (Smith & Spicer, 2018, p. 939). This assertion is also demonstrated in Goldsmith and Page (2010), wherein they argue that contextual understandings of local autonomy must be accounted for, particularly between cases with varying histories and traditions. While I understand Smith and Spicer’s goals with the creation of this index, the limitations and constraints posed by applying a strictly quantitative framework to Canadian local autonomy should not be disregarded. A thread of continuity that is alluded to in both Smith and Spicer’s work and their source material is the assumed structural or institutional basis of their measures. While certain indicators are broadly generalizable across cases and are appropriate to conceptualize in an institutional sense (such as the proportion of local government expenditure compared to the proportion of provincial government expenditure), others appear to require an alternative institutional approach that accounts for the political careerist motivations of powerful and complex actors. The assumption that an MLA who previously served as a city councillor will always advocate for policies within the local zeitgeist is fundamentally an institutionalist approach, wherein actors are bound by the conditions in which they operate. However, as my case study in the following section will 16 demonstrate, political actors who have traversed the intergovernmental landscape may not act in favour of their former municipal political home. Rather than utilizing their connections at the provincial level to advocate for policies which would benefit municipal interests, they may instead use their connections to further their personal political careers at the expense of the city’s autonomy (e.g. Premier Doug Ford in Ontario). This suggests that an alternative institutionalist framework which accounts for the careerist nature of Canadian politics may be more suitable. 17 Section Three: Methodology Smith and Spicer’s index, while using a valid form of index-creation through their adaptation of previous literature, would benefit substantially from historical, qualitative analysis to remedy the shortcomings of its quantitative approach: namely, the lack of attention paid to actors who utilize their political connections to subvert local autonomy for their own political careers and ideological commitments. As such, my thesis uses primarily historical qualitative analysis with a focus on secondary academic sources on Vancouver politics in the 1930s, supplemented by archival research. While the literature on this era in Vancouver politics is relatively scarce due to both temporality and its niche application, this case study illustrates two key findings relevant to my critique. First, it demonstrates that political actors are not necessarily bound by the institutional constraints which are assumed to exist in perpetuity in Smith and Spicer’s index. While Smith and Spicer’s measures of political interconnectivity posit that MLAs with former experience on city council will always support municipally favourable policies (and vice versa), my study of Vancouver in the 1930s shows that this is not always accurate, and an alternative institutionalist assumption may be required. Second, there is no mention in Smith and Spicer’s index of the potential impact of partisanship or ideology on local autonomy. Recent studies on municipal voting and elections suggest that ideology can impact a constituent’s vote choice in municipal elections, with evidence from both the United States (Holman and Lay, 2020; Sances, 2018) and Canada (Cutler and Matthews, 2005; McGregor, 2017; Lucas and McGregor, 2021). As I demonstrate through my examination of the Vancouver political sphere throughout the 1930s, the influence of partisanship and ideology on political actors’ decisions in regards to local autonomy cannot be understated. 18 There appear to be electoral motivators for local politicians with provincial political experience to leverage their intergovernmental connections for their own political career or ideological commitments. While I only examine a single case in this thesis, it is powerfully illustrative of my overall argument: that portions of Smith and Spicer’s index fall victim to the limitations of quantitative research, and would benefit from both additional qualitative analysis and factoring in the effect of partisanship and ideology into their examination of political autonomy in Canadian cities. My source material for the historiography was taken primarily from two sources: Archival records in media, and historical scholarly works. The archival material was sourced from the City of Vancouver Archives, located within Vancouver, BC. There was limited archival material on the 1935 and 1936 elections, though all relevant sources have been included in this research. While there was a significant number of microfiche newspaper articles on the Non-Partisan Association (NPA), these were not temporally relevant as they were published during the 1970s. However, the initial meeting minutes of the NPA’s first meetings are cited here due to their relevance to my research. The most fruitful portions of the archive were their newspaper articles on both Gerry McGeer and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, with multiple archival documents relating to both appearing throughout the historiography. I completed a thorough search of the City of Vancouver Archives and have included all relevant materials within this research. There were limited academic sources available that were relevant in scope to my research (specifically, the politics of Vancouver in the 1930s), most of which were published in the journal BC Studies in the 1980s. I was able to locate these articles through the University of British 19 Columbia online library database. Given how the popularity of historical political research has waxed and waned in Canada (discussed further in the following paragraph), the concentration of works during this period is not surprising. The majority of works dedicated to Vancouver history were only marginally concerned with the political nature of the 1930s and referenced it only briefly (though these references were not always relevant to my research). Many works in this area focused on the history of Indigenous peoples in the area now known as Vancouver, the experiences of immigrants (primarily the Chinese diaspora), or criminal developments in the city. The articles included in this historiography appear to be some of the only works dedicated specifically to this era of Vancouver political history, and thus have all been included within my thesis research. My justification for selecting the political history of Vancouver to support my argument, rather than a case study in the present day, is two-fold. First, many trends observed within Vancouver politics throughout the 1930s remain present in modern examinations of local autonomy. This demonstrates that questions regarding local autonomy in Canada are ongoing; they are neither a recent iteration of intergovernmental struggles nor confined to Canadian history. Rather, the struggle for local autonomy is ongoing and continues to permeate the political sphere throughout the country, as exemplified by my earlier examples of infringements on local autonomy within Toronto and Vancouver. Second, Canadian political-historical analysis is a well- established approach within political science. Research trends within the discipline wax and wane as new innovations emerge, with Canadian political history reaching a peak in the 1980s and experiencing a decline in the decades following (Lucas & Vipond, 2017). However, it has always remained present within the literature, though with a certain degree of uneven application. Lucas and Vipond (2017) make a compelling case for the revival of Canadian political history inspired 20 by the subfield of American political development which allows for, if not outright encourages, experimental freedom of methodology and conceptual diversity (Lucas & Vipond, 2017, p. 230). Despite its current ebb within the discipline, Lucas and Vipond (2017) demonstrate that Canadian political history still holds substantial merit as a complex and rich subfield which can serve to inform answers to the “big questions” in Canadian political science. Despite Canadians’ general lack of interest in local elections and the pervasive belief that local government has less of an impact on the lives of residents (Lucas & McGregor, 2021), there should be increased civilian attention and care paid to local elections than is currently present. The primary justification for this is the proximity of local elections, and local politicians, to the lives of residents within their respective municipalities. There are a variety of critical services and supports provided by municipalities that directly impact the everyday lives of residents and are influenced by local electoral outcomes, including matters of public safety, key infrastructure, and public transit. While federal and provincial elections are, of course, due their share of attention, the direct impact that local elections have on residents cannot be understated. 21 Section Four: The Political History of Vancouver, 1930s Municipal political parties, whether officially branded as such or operating as adjacent entities, have been present in Vancouver politics since the city was incorporated in 1929, following the amalgamation of Vancouver City, Point Grey and South Vancouver (Tennant, 1980, p. 3). This amalgamation also saw the creation of the ward system, spurring a hotly contested debate on the merits of such a system in comparison to an at-large electoral structure which presently continues as a part of the public debate (Tennant, 1980, p. 5; Kotyk, 2020). This historical analysis of the Vancouver political system will begin in the late 1800s, to set a historical precedent for the course of Vancouver politics since that period. The City of Vancouver was originally incorporated in 1886, governed primarily by businessmen dedicated to balanced budgets and firmly opposed to social spending or relief programs. This ethos of government-as-business permeated throughout the early third of the 20th century; Premier Simon Frasier Tolmie of the Conservative Party affirmed his government’s business-based philosophy throughout his tenure from 1928 to 1933, and created a cabinet comprised primarily of successful Vancouver businessmen (Smith, 1982, pp. 46-47). Near the end of their tenure, the Conservative government commissioned an inquiry into government expenditures at the provincial level, titled the Kidd Report. The Report recommended significant retrenchment to recuperate costs incurred throughout the Great Depression, such as the abolition of party politics and a reduction in the number of MLAs, though these reforms were never implemented (Smith, 1982, p. 47). The period between 1886 and the early 1930s saw little advocacy for reform, contrary to the national trend during this period (Smith, 1982, p. 46). The Great Depression saw cities succumb to the will of their respective provinces, particularly with 22 regard to fiscal matters (Smith, 1982, p. 46). In other words, the Great Depression was marked not only for its economic impact on all levels of government, but also for the diminished autonomy of municipalities. These conditions led to increased hostility between municipalities and their respective provincial governments as resources became increasingly scarce. The tensions between the municipal and provincial governments in British Columbia continued into the 1930s following the election of the Liberal Party at the provincial level. Under Premier Thomas Dufferin Pattullo, relations between the two levels of government continued to decline, further abetted by Pattullo’s suspicions of Vancouver’s influence on provincial politics and ongoing interpersonal conflict between himself and Liberal Party MLA Gerald Gratton McGeer (Smith, 1982, p. 48). The first point of contention arose when Pattullo refused to appoint McGeer to a cabinet position, despite McGeer’s claims that he was promised as such (“Say M’Geer is Potential A-G.,” 1933). McGeer would soon denounce the Liberal Party following this snub, and announce his run for mayor of Vancouver in November 1934 after weeks of speculation on his political future (“M’Geer May Be Mayor’s Only Rival,” 1934; “M’Geer Statement is Not Ready Yet,” 1934). His first mayoral platform was comprised of 12 planks, divided into two categories: local problems and general problems. While the local problems included subjects such as unemployment and law enforcement, the general problems included multiple references to federal policy issues, such as freight rates and constitutional adjustments (“McGeer Pleads For National Minded Mayor,” 1934). He also proposed that the next mayor of Vancouver must be able to “…lift his view above the horizon of municipal affairs to the rarer political altitudes of national and world events.” (“McGeer Pleads For National Minded Mayor,” 1934). McGeer’s perspective of intergovernmental relations through a municipal perspective is present throughout news articles 23 of the time, often through bombastic remarks directed at prominent politicians. When Premier Pattullo had refused to meet with B.C. municipality representatives, McGeer responded by declaring that “if anybody slams the door on me, even if he is a provincial prime minister, I’m liable to kick that door down.” (“Cut Mayor’s Salary Also,” 1934). There was already speculation that he would make a future run for a federal seat, with the Winnipeg Free Press claiming that McGeer’s focus on monetary and credit reform policy suggest that his goal may be claiming his seat in federal government (“Election Of McGeer Attracts Attention All Over Dominion,” 1934). McGeer was subsequently elected mayor of Vancouver on December 12th, 1934 during one of the highest turnout votes ever recorded in the city at that time. (“Heavy Vote Recorded As City Selects Its Mayor,” 1934) He also chose to retain his position as a provincial MLA (Smith, 1982, p. 48). His connections in the provincial government, combined with his prominence as a public figure, led to his becoming a significant link between the municipal government of Vancouver and the provincial government (Smith, 1982, p. 48). Following the mayoral election, McGeer began to put his intergovernmental aspirations into action. Within a month of assuming his mayoral title, he announced that he will be seeking power from the provincial government to enforce a 50 percent reduction in municipal debt interest (Morley, 1974, p. 222; “Mayor’s Inaugural Speech,” 1935). This plan was later rejected outright by Premier Pattullo, stating that “Vancouver [can] default on its interest obligations…but the government will not be party to any such programme.” (“Mayor’s Inaugural Speech,” 1935) McGeer’s pursuit of provincial cooperation in local matters would continue throughout his tenure as mayor, with another prominent example being his involvement in the shift to an at-large ward system in the city’s electoral structure, to be explained later in this section. 24 McGeer’s popularity grew steadily in Vancouver throughout his tenure as Mayor. He was vocally critical of large financiers, as well as a proponent of a national banking system and a state-controlled economic structure (“Election Of McGeer,” 1934). His focus on economic policy, paired with his bombastic zeal, proved immensely popular among Vancouverites (Smith, 1982, pp. 48-49). Fundamentally, he can be identified as a populist whose appeal extended to large areas of the city. His earlier connections to the east side and monetary policy were popular among east-side residents, and his later attacks on organized labour and communism won favour among the west and downtown populations (Smith, 1982, p. 49). His staunch criticism of the relief camps and their subsequent strikes in 1935 is well documented; he claimed that such camps were a “disgrace to Christian civilization”, and later read the Riot Act at a thousand-person relief camp strike at Victory Square in April 1935 (“M’Geer Critical of Relief Camps,” 1935; “Mayor Condemns Both Government and Strikers,” 1935). Anti-communism became a prominent component of his exhortations throughout his career, including blaming communists for the relief camp strike and purporting that the democratic socialist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was working with communists to dismantle the Dominion of Canada (“‘Revolution’ Was Promised,” 1935; “Mayor is Firm in Stand on Strike,” 1935; “Mayor’s View on May Day Parade,” 1935; “Mayor Howled Down in Church,” 1935, “Communists are Attempting,” 1935). While his charges against the CCF may indeed have been his true opinion, this conflation also served as a political strategy to discredit the CCF, a common recurrence throughout this period of McGeer’s career. Throughout 1935, he used his leverage at the provincial and local levels to mobilize a national campaign for constitutional reform, which was starkly critical of how the Great Depression was handled by both provincial and federal governments (Smith, 1982, p. 49). 25 McGeer’s popularity and continuous crusade against both levels of government heightened tensions between himself and Premier Pattullo. Pattullo considered the Kidd Report by the previous Conservative government to be an attempt by Vancouver businessmen to circumvent the electoral success of the Liberals, and saw McGeer’s political sway as a further testament to the influence of Vancouver on provincial politics (Smith, 1982, p. 49). To avoid further abetting this influence, Pattullo constructed a cabinet “as independent as possible from the Vancouver machine” and denounced the previous government’s significant ties to business interests (Smith, 1982, p. 49). Municipal and provincial tensions increased further after Pattullo offloaded responsibility for social services to municipalities in British Columbia, which the cities touted as significantly unfair give their limited sources of revenue through property taxation. Municipal opposition to this reform resulted in calls for increased municipal connections to the federal government through Dominion Conferences (Smith, 1982, p. 49). Pattullo’s municipal economic policy proved unpopular even within his government, with Vancouver’s Liberal MLAs opting to side with McGeer, who remained vehemently opposed to the matter. He had proposed a variety of economic reforms to the provincial government, but Pattullo’s steadfastness created stark divisions within the Liberal caucus (Smith, 1982, p. 50). The pressures felt by both local and provincial elected officials were further heightened by the rising influence of the CCF within Vancouver’s political sphere. Despite earlier unsuccessful campaigns at the local level in 1933 and 1935, the CCF’s local base was growing; the Great Depression wreaked havoc on the job market, and multitudes of the unemployed in the city were 26 either official members of the party or sympathetic to its aims (Smith, 1982, p. 51). Additionally, the bulk of the provincial CCF’s support during the 1933 election came from urban areas of the province, resulting in the party becoming the official opposition to the Pattullo Liberals. Of particular concern to local and provincial politicians was that the CCF had gained two seats in East Vancouver, a working-class area particularly affected by the Great Depression. While Vancouver municipal politics up to this point had been relatively devoid of class-based voting, a local CCF campaign which mobilized the east side was seen as a potential threat which could divide the municipal political system along class-lines while also serving to strengthen the provincial CCF, given their interconnected nature (Smith, 1982, p. 51). Both political and media forces sought to discredit the party after their foray into municipal politics. The Vancouver Sun mounted an anti-socialist campaign against the CCF, and Mayor McGeer began to conflate the CCF with communism and atheism in an attempt to discredit them (Smith, 1982, p. 52; Williams, 1986, pp. 142, 200; “‘Revolution’ Was Promised,” 1935; “Mayor is Firm in Stand on Strike,” 1935; “Mayor’s View on May Day Parade,” 1935; “Mayor Howled Down in Church,” 1935, “Communists are Attempting,” 1935). His offensive against the CCF was two-fold; his personal politics were misaligned with the CCF given their left-wing position, and the CCF also posed a significant challenge to his vying for a federal seat in the east-end of Vancouver due to the emergence of class-based voting. His crusade against the party, bolstered by his taste for reform, led to his March 1935 proposal to alter Vancouver’s electoral structure to an at-large system, and decrease the number of sitting alderman by four (“City May Have Eight Aldermen,” 1935). Following the city council’s deferral of McGeer’s proposal for at least one year, he took his proposition to the provincial legislature’s Private Bills Committee, aiming to vie 27 for the support of Liberal Party members within the Committee. If he were successful, there would be two possible outcomes: either the city would be forced to accept this alteration to their political structure, or hold a plebiscite during the next municipal election (Smith, 1982, p. 53). City council was ultimately required to include both issues in a dual plebiscite during the next municipal election (“Overwhelming Majority Given Both Plebiscites,” 1935). This reform, in McGeer’s vision, would serve two purposes: to lessen the strength of the municipal CCF in east Vancouver, and to hasten the process for deciding on the location for the new city hall (due to his impatience with the speed of the current council) (Smith, 1982, p. 53). Despite the possibility for such a reform to weaken the municipal CCF, they were also in favour of this motion due to their ideological stance that the representation of ward interests can lead to corruption and favouritism, as well as the fact that the poor and working-class areas were not well-represented by Vancouver’s ward system. Instead of seeing an at-large system as a threat to their political interests at the municipal level, they perceived of it as an opportunity to strengthen the energy of their working-class voting base to gain more municipal power (Smith, 1982, p. 54; Tennant, 1980, p. 5). Ultimately, both McGeer and the CCF supported the shift to at-large voting, with vastly different perspectives on how such a change would affect their political ventures. The proposal for a plebiscite was derided by the majority of city councillors, who perceived this initiative as an encroachment by the provincial government into local affairs (“Overwhelming Majority Given Both Plebiscites,” 1935). Other actors, such as the Associated Property Owners and the Board of Trade, were undecided on which side of the issue was most in their favour and took a more neutral stance. Broadly speaking, besides political officials, the attitude towards 28 reform was indifferent; this aloofness was also reflected in the turnout rates for the plebiscite, which sat at 19% (Smith, 1982, p. 56). The plebiscite passed with 69% in favour, and the provincial legislature approved the reform in March 1936 (Smith, 1982, p. 56; Tennant, 1980, p. 6; Lightbody, 2006, p. 205; “Recount Sought in Ward Three,” 1935). This post-electoral reform period saw the emergence of slates; groups of candidates which do not necessarily have official partisan ties, but which share a general political disposition. However, the province encouraged voters to alter their way of thinking of the municipal government away from electoral-partisan politics and towards a board of directors, and to consider candidates who had this type of prior experience during municipal elections (Smith, 1982, p. 57). This was not a direct attack on the CCF, but can be inferred as an attempt to persuade voters away from voting for a socialist, primarily working-class party at the municipal level. Media outlets later claimed that this strategy was successful; the Vancouver Sun noted in their December 11th, 1936 edition that “…the electors…in the mayoralty election [were] distinctly in favor of experience in municipal affairs” (“The Civic Elections,” 1936). However, despite this media campaign and assumptions that an at-large system would hurt the CCF’s electoral prospects, their showing in the 1936 election was impressive. The CCF received around 24% of the vote and won three out of eight seats on the city council; All incumbents lost their seats save for one (Smith, 1982, p. 57; “Only Two City Council Members,” 1936). Their electoral loss may be attributed to their decisions to run independently with no identifiable label or affiliation. The CCF’s first time on council was viewed as dangerous by the provincial government. The three councillors voted as a bloc, began holding teaching sessions for municipally-minded 29 politicos to encourage their involvement with provincial politics, and held to their steadfast ideological stance on the provision of social welfare services from the province. The popularity of the CCF was also growing at the provincial and federal levels. The federal party won 33.2% of the British Columbia provincial vote in the 1935 election, and 28.3% of the vote in the 1937 provincial election, drawn mainly from Vancouver and other urban centers (Smith, 1982, pp. 58-59). Of particular concern was the provincial CCF’s removal of the moderate wing within the party and its explicit return to its socialist roots. The CCF’s success at all three levels of government, paired with its renewed ideological stance, posed an imminent threat to other political interests, primarily the province’s traditional ruling parties, the Liberals and Conservatives. This shift strengthened the anti-partisan ethos of Vancouver, and led to the formation of the Non-Partisan Association in 1937. On [November 3rd, 1937], eight men met in a downtown office to discuss Vancouver’s political future. The result was the formation of a new political group dedicated to the elimination of party politics at the civic level, the Non-Partisan Association. According to the founding members, the NPA’s function was to protect the integrity of civic politics by endorsing a slate of candidates who had not pledged allegiance to any outside body (Smith, 1982, p. 59; see also Tennant, 1980, p. 7; Miller, 1975, p. 4). The NPA did not recruit candidates but instead endorsed them, in keeping with their anti-partisan nature. Additionally, candidates who were successful in their run would not be bound to vote as a bloc. This new organization, despite its anti-partisan messaging, was a discrete way for the provincial Liberals and Conservatives to weaken the municipal CCF and, by virtue of their municipal structure being a jumping-off point for provincial and federal politics, weaken the provincial and federal CCF (Miller, 1975, p. 4; Smith, 1982, p. 59; Tennant, 1980, p. 7). Working under a single banner would avoid the risk of splitting the centre-right vote, and an alliance at the municipal level (where parties did not officially operate) was easier to build and maintain than an 30 official provincial arrangement. The NPA’s logic was to weaken the CCF by discrediting partisanship in municipal politics, despite their own partisan ties at the provincial level. They also aimed for an even proportion of Liberals and Conservatives in their organizational and political structures, in order to avoid one group becoming dominant (Miller, 1975, p. 5). Nearly all founding members of the NPA had long-term provincial partisan ties to the Liberal and Conservative Parties, and only two (R. Rowe Holland and E. W. Rhodes) did not have such connections (Smith, 1982, p. 60). These ties were primarily electoral or related to the provincial executives of their respective parties; for example, Brenton S. Brown was a Vice-President of the Liberal Party, and S. S. McKeen was a recently ousted Liberal MLA (Smith, 1982, p. 60). They also maintained connections to the municipal government, with members having worked with mayoral campaigns previously. Mayor McGeer was also present at many initial meetings of the NPA, served on the Advertising and Speakers committee of the organization and spoke at multiple meetings, though he would not run for the slate until his next mayoral campaign in 1946 (Non-Partisan Association Meeting Minutes, 1937 (November 8, 12, & 19); Non-Partisan Association Executive Meeting Minutes (November 12 & 15)). The CCF was not fooled by the supposed anti-partisan nature of the NPA; their defensive included editorials within local papers, decrying “…the hypocrisy of the ’no-politics’ smokescreen used by the NPA...[which] is just as much a party as is the CCF” (Smith, 1982, p. 61). The NPA’s provincial partisan character was further confirmed when all but the two non-partisan founding members were included in the organization’s first executive. Additionally, most retained financial interests across the country which were threatened by the success of the federal CCF, further solidifying their interest in a 31 weakened CCF at multiple levels of government (Smith, 1982, p. 61; see also Lightbody, 2006, p. 207). The NPA’s strategy proved to be immensely successful, with the “non-partisan” agenda acting in favour of the NPA and against vocally political (and socialist) organizations (Miller, 1975, p. 15). Only one CCF candidate was able to gain a seat on city council in the 1937 election, despite nominating a full slate (“C.C.F. Nominates Full Slate,” 1936). This was also the first election where the CCF was explicitly running as a municipal party, rather than a slate (“C.C.F. Nominates Full Slate,” 1936; “C.C.F. To Contest Every Office,” 1937). The CCF maintained a pocket of support, but even areas in the east side which had been favourable for the CCF previously had defected to the NPA by 1940 (Miller, 1975, p. 5; Tennant, 1980, p. 7). The secret to the NPA’s near-immediate success was “…money and sophisticated organization, especially [their] access to Liberal and Conservative voters’ lists, campaign opportunities for NPA candidates at provincial association meetings, and the experienced assistance of provincial party organizers” (Smith, 1982, p. 62). The NPA was completely in control of the Vancouver city council between 1937 to 1940, and nearly half of the elected aldermen had ties to the provincial Liberals or Conservatives. While they came from a variety of backgrounds (though a significant portion were small businessmen), of the utmost importance to the NPA was their dedication to the protection of provincial government interests (Smith, 1982, p. 63). Following the party’s devastation during the 1940 election, the CCF withdrew from municipal politics entirely. 32 Section Five: Synthesis The history of Vancouver politics throughout the 1930s exemplifies the primary argument of this thesis: that quantitative research on local autonomy in Canada can avoid some of the pitfalls associated with the methodology by including qualitative (and historical) research into their frameworks. An analysis of the political history of Vancouver demonstrates that Smith and Spicer’s (2018) measures for political interconnectivity are not universally applicable; increased political connections between the provincial and municipal governments may pose more of a threat to local autonomy than an asset, particularly when analyzing the case from an alternative institutionalist perspective which accounts for the careerist nature of Canadian politics. There are three instances in particular throughout Vancouver’s political history during the 1930s which demonstrate that political interconnectivity served to weaken the city’s autonomy, rather than reinforce it. First, the hostile relationship between Mayor McGeer and Premier Pattullo in the early 1930s, combined with the conditions of the Great Depression, resulted in British Columbian municipalities being offloaded responsibility for social services. Pattullo’s economic policy was negatively received, including by members of his Liberal government, and can be perceived of as the culmination of an interpersonal feud between himself and McGeer, following his being snubbed for a cabinet position as a Liberal MLA. While it cannot be ascertained whether this policy would have been proposed in the absence of such a conflict, it is not unreasonable to assume that the connection is present, particularly given how unpopular the decision was even within Pattullo’s government. In sum, a personal conflict stemming from provincial partisan relations may have influenced Vancouver (and other British Columbian municipalities) receiving an economic deal touted by many as unfair and an exertion of provincial political will over cities. 33 Second, McGeer’s decision to appeal to the provincial government on the matter of implementing the at-large system in 1935 demonstrates how these relationships can further deteriorate municipal autonomy. Then-city councillors refused to take action on McGeer’s proposal to shift away from the ward system, with the counter-offer that they will consider the proposal after one year. Rather than wait to bring the issue to city council, McGeer instead opted to vie for intervention on behalf of the provincial government through the Private Bills Committee. This route offered two potential outcomes: forcing the city to unilaterally accept an at-large system through an amendment to the City Charter, or instituting a plebiscite on the issue at the next municipal election. While the change was not unilaterally imposed and was passed via plebiscite the following year, McGeer’s mobilization of his provincial connections to alter Vancouver’s political structure (particularly given the reform’s electoral motivation) further served to lessen local political autonomy, particularly given the significantly low turnout rate for the plebiscite. Lastly, the creation of the NPA in 1937, while claiming to be “non-partisan”, was a project led nearly entirely by provincially-entrenched Liberals and Conservatives. All but two of their founding members were heavily involved in both parties, either as candidates or experienced members with high-ranking positions, and most retained financial interests across Canada which would be threatened by a federal CCF government. The NPAs political ties were further confirmed when their inaugural executive was comprised entirely of Liberal and Conservative partisans, including multiple appearances by McGeer at their early meetings. By 1937 the CCF had gained significant momentum at all three levels of government and served as a menace to provincial political interests. By weakening the municipal CCF, which was feeding support to the provincial 34 party, this team of provincial partisans believed that they could weaken the provincial CCF, thus defending their shared interest in maintaining a non-socialist, bi-partisan norm. These three instances exemplify the weaknesses of Smith and Spicer’s measures for political interconnectivity by showing that increased interconnectivity between provincial and municipal governments does not always equate to increased autonomy for the city in question. This particular institutional approach does not account for political actors who may make decisions for political gain at the expense of local autonomy. Pattullo’s decision to offload responsibility for social services to the municipalities, despite protest from his own cabinet, appears to have been influenced by the ongoing tension between himself and McGeer. While this may not have been done to increase Pattullo’s political capital (given the decision’s unpopularity), it may have instead served as a snub to local interests and, by proxy, McGeer’s mayorship. McGeer’s decision to appeal to the provincial government to implement an at-large system in Vancouver can also be thought of in terms of political gain, more explicitly than the previous example. Both McGeer and the CCF were in favour of the shift to an at-large system, with both believing that the alteration would serve them politically. McGeer presumed that a shift to at-large voting would weaken territorially based organizations or candidates, such as the CCF which had the majority of its support concentrated in the east side of Vancouver. The NPA also mobilized their political connections at the provincial (and federal) levels to pose a political threat to the CCF at the municipal level in Vancouver. Their political connections and the resources gained from those intergovernmental connections (such as voting lists and institutional knowledge) also helped to bolster their emergence in municipal politics. In sum, Vancouver’s political history demonstrates that political interconnectivity does not always lead to increased local autonomy; interconnectivity 35 can also be mobilized to lessen local autonomy for political gain, either at the municipal or provincial level. This case study has also revealed gaps in Smith and Spicer’s index which may be worth exploring in future iterations of the local autonomy index. Directly following the reformation of Vancouver’s political system to an at-large structure, the province encouraged voters to change the way they think about municipal politics. Rather than seeing candidates as potential ideological representatives, the province promoted viewing them as executives on a board of directors, and to consider candidates who had previous experience in business or on executive boards. During this period the CCF had been gaining power provincially and federally, and while their foray into municipal politics had not yet been successful, the province began to feel threatened by their popularity. This anxiety would later become validated when the municipal CCF, having gained multiple seats on council, used their platform to initiate municipal politicos into the provincial party to run as candidates and organize campaigns. While the provincial use of propaganda campaigns to influence municipal elections is not captured by Smith and Spicer’s index, perhaps a measure which accounts for provincial political influence outside of regulations and interconnectivity would be beneficial to a more comprehensive analytical framework of local autonomy. 36 Section Six: Conclusion My thesis has analyzed Smith and Spicer’s (2018) quantitative index of local autonomy in Canada and provided a constructive critique of two of their measures of political autonomy, which are concerned with political interconnectivity between provincial and municipal governments. Through a close reading of their source material, it is evident that there is a lack of theoretical support for their measures of political interconnectivity. My case study of Vancouver politics during the 1930s demonstrates how the index may be improved in two capacities. First, supplementing quantitative studies on local autonomy with historical qualitative research can avoid some of the pitfalls associated with strictly quantitative research, such as the necessary loss of nuance, contingency, and unique dynamics at play. Smith and Spicer’s (2018) index is the first attempt at quantifying the level of local autonomy held by Canadian cities. They have mobilized multiple sources, both Canadian and international, to support their index and measures within, as well as to justify their contribution. However, despite their use of qualitative and quantitative works to inform their index, there are gaps left by their strictly quantitative approach to measuring autonomy. Their third and fourth measures within the political autonomy dimension, which measure the political interconnectivity between provincial and municipal governments, assume that an increase in interconnectivity is always associated with an increase in autonomy for the city in question. However, my analysis of Vancouver’s political history throughout the 1930s demonstrates that this assumption is not accurate, and examinations of political interconnectivity are in need of additional nuance and context. 37 Second, measures of autonomy such as political interconnectivity may be better paired with an alternative institutional approach. The implicit assumption made by the measures of political interconnectivity is that all politicians who shift between municipal and provincial systems will act in similar ways (i.e., in support of policies which favour municipalities). However, this assumption does not account for individuals who act for political gain at the expense of the municipality’s autonomy. While my case study demonstrates how actors may mobilize their intergovernmental connections to subvert the autonomy of cities, observers may question the modern relevance of such a case given its historical nature. I would advise those whose thinking aligns with this critique to refer to my earlier discussion of Toronto; Ontario Premier Doug Ford’s decision to drastically reduce the size of the Toronto city council can also be thought of as an infringement on local political autonomy (despite its legality). This thesis has given rise to multiple areas of inquiry that may be beneficial for future research. As previously mentioned, increased attention to the implicit interference of non-governmental actors in local affairs may be worthwhile to explore further, particularly given that recent research has indicated that Canadian newspapers can have ideological leanings which frame their coverage of events (Gunster & Saurette, 2014; Kozolanka, 2010). The Vancouver Sun’s coverage of the CCF following its foray into municipal politics demonstrates how non-governmental sources can also potentially impact a city’s autonomy through its ideological framing of political events and campaigns. The ongoing acquisition of multiple Canadian newspapers by Postmedia, and the ideological bent of the newspapers owned by the company (“Expect Less Local”, 2022), suggest that more attention should be paid to the role these 38 organizations play in influencing public attitudes around municipal elections, particularly in the presence of a municipal political party structure. Another area for potential future research is the impact of municipal political party structures on local autonomy. As discussed within my case study, many instances of interference in Vancouver’s political autonomy arose out of the threat of the CCF in municipal politics, during the creation of the party system in the city. Both McGeer and the NPA sought to discredit the CCF within the local sphere, either explicitly in McGeer’s case (through his continuous tirade against the party and conflating them with communists) or implicitly in the NPA’s case (through their crusade against ‘politics’ in city hall, a subtle nod to the democratic socialist CCF). In other words, these actors and organizations mobilized their intergovernmental connections to thwart a political threat at the municipal level. Future research on interference with local autonomy should be mindful of the intricacies of municipal party systems and how the existence of such systems may encourage actors with intergovernmental connections to either undermine or bolster a city’s autonomy. I concur with Smith and Spicer that quantitative approaches for measuring local autonomy in Canada are necessary for a more complete understanding of the relationship between municipalities and provinces within the federal Canadian system. The critique posed by this thesis is intended to prompt further discussion on this index and to refine its measures for future research. This thesis also prompts discussion on methodological approaches within political science (and perhaps the social sciences at large), given that my research demonstrates the shortcomings of quantitative measures for certain aspects of political autonomy in Canada. Despite my critique, I 39 do not argue that measures of political autonomy should be removed from future iterations of the Canadian local autonomy index. However, more attention must be paid to the unique contexts and constraints in which each municipality (and, by extension, province) operates. Smith and Spicer (though not explicitly stated) mobilize their index through an institutional lens wherein political actors are bound by their roles and external conditions. They anticipate that when political actors move between municipal and provincial political spheres, regardless of circumstance or context, they will always act in favour of a municipality’s interests. It is possible to adopt an alternative institutionalist approach, rather than abandoning this framework altogether. For instance, Page (1991) suggests a similar tactic in his critique of political interconnectivity as an indicator of civic localism; instead of assuming that politicians are bound by the institution of supporting their previous (or aspirational) municipal government by default, he proposes that researchers should heed the political careerism within each locality. In other words, he simply alters the institutional framework, rather than replacing it. This approach can easily be applied to the case study presented here, given McGeer’s careerist aspirations through the political ranks. I do not intend to discount the validity of institutional research through my critique of Smith and Spicer’s institutional assumptions (particularly given my own personal proclivity for such research). However, it is evident that Smith and Spicer’s (2018) measures of political interconnectivity are deserving of revitalization to reach their full analytical potential. One approach for quantifying political autonomy while maintaining an institutional approach is to examine the voting records of politicians who migrate between municipal and provincial spheres on questions concerning local autonomy, taking cue from Page’s (1991) original critique of measuring political autonomy. 40 Another approach to revision may be to implement a mixed-methods approach; namely, a preliminary qualitative input design (PQID). A PQID is a research design in which the quantitative aspect takes priority, with a qualitative study serving as a supplement to inform the quantitative core (Morgan, 2014, p. 153). Morgan (2014, p. 153) identifies three uses for these research designs (discovery-oriented, development-oriented, and definition-oriented), though the first of these is perhaps most useful for amending this index. A discovery-oriented PQID is based primarily around exploratory research, wherein the primary objective of the qualitative aspect is to identify variables that may impact the quantitative core of the research agenda. For example, if a researcher were to apply this index with a PQID to 1930s Canadian politics, their supplementary qualitative analysis may uncover the same findings I have identified here; a powerful political actor whose decisions do not align with the index’s assumptions surrounding political interconnectivity. The researcher may then decide whether to adapt their measures of political interconnectivity based on their findings. 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Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Political Science
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Doberstein, Carey
Partisanship, ideology, and civic autonomy : towards a comprehensive framework for measuring autonomy in Canadian cities
Text