Education, Faculty of
Education, School of (Okanagan)
DSpace
UBCO
England, Christopher
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
This study sets out to answer two questions: 1) What do all students living in liberal democracies deserve when it comes to their education? and 2) How can we ethically pursue educational justice in liberal democracies? This study analyzes how social justice is currently promoted through education. Current efforts to promote social equality though equity, inclusion and diversity are put into policy, sometimes without careful consideration of their ends. This lack of clarity is a potential source of unethical educational policies and practices. The task of social justice is to ensure that all citizens get what they deserve. Scholars and educationalists have argued that citizens of liberal democracies deserve equal opportunities, equality of outcomes or other measures of social equality. I argue that these approaches to justice are misguided. Instead, I argue that educational justice requires universal access to the conditions required for individual freedom. After an analysis of the idea of social equality, I argue that social equality is a problematic aim because 1) it is redundant, 2) it masks underlying aims, 3) it distracts from other aims, 4) it is only instrumentally valuable, and 5) it is used metaphorically but interpreted literally. I present Raz’s (1986) account of personal autonomy, which requires personal access to certain skills, adequate options and independence, as the most complete conception of individual freedom. Further, I argue that current movements promoting social justice (which are understood as promoting social equality), like equity, inclusion and diversity, rely on the foundations of critical theory. As such, these movements are better understood, not as promoting social equality, but as promoting human emancipation (freeing people from their unfair disadvantages). I argue further that the promotion of human emancipation should be only part of a broader aim: the aim to promote individual freedom. In conclusion, I argue that ensuring all citizens have access to the conditions of personal autonomy is a necessary and sufficient aim for educational justice. This aim also reveals when measures promoting equity, inclusion and diversity can be implemented ethically, and when they overstep themselves.
PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND EDUCATIONAL JUSTICE by Christopher England B.A. University of British Columbia, 2012 B. Ed. University of British Columbia, 2014 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE COLLEGE OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Interdisciplinary Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Okanagan) May 2021 © Christopher England, 2021 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the College of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis/dissertation entitled: Personal Autonomy and Educational Justice submitted by Christopher England in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts . Christopher Martin, Associate Professor, Faculty of Education (UBC-Okanagan) Supervisor Sabre Cherkowski, Associate Professor, Faculty of Education (UBC-Okanagan) Supervisory Committee Member Andrew Irvine, Professor, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (UBC- Okanagan) Supervisory Committee Member Krassimir Stojanov, Professor, Faculty of Philosophy and Education (Catholic University Eichstatt-Ingolstadt) University Examiner Click or tap here to enter text. iii Abstract This study sets out to answer two questions: 1) What do all students living in liberal democracies deserve when it comes to their education? and 2) How can we ethically pursue educational justice in liberal democracies? This study analyzes how social justice is currently promoted through education. Current efforts to promote social equality though equity, inclusion and diversity are put into policy, sometimes without careful consideration of their ends. This lack of clarity is a potential source of unethical educational policies and practices. The task of social justice is to ensure that all citizens get what they deserve. Scholars and educationalists have argued that citizens of liberal democracies deserve equal opportunities, equality of outcomes or other measures of social equality. I argue that these approaches to justice are misguided. Instead, I argue that educational justice requires universal access to the conditions required for individual freedom. After an analysis of the idea of social equality, I argue that social equality is a problematic aim because 1) it is redundant, 2) it masks underlying aims, 3) it distracts from other aims, 4) it is only instrumentally valuable, and 5) it is used metaphorically but interpreted literally. I present Raz’s (1986) account of personal autonomy, which requires personal access to certain skills, adequate options and independence, as the most complete conception of individual freedom. Further, I argue that current movements promoting social justice (which are understood as promoting social equality), like equity, inclusion and diversity, rely on the foundations of critical theory. As such, these movements are better understood, not as promoting social equality, but as promoting human emancipation (freeing people from their unfair disadvantages). I argue further that the promotion of human emancipation should be only part of a broader aim: the aim to promote individual freedom. In conclusion, I argue that iv ensuring all citizens have access to the conditions of personal autonomy is a necessary and sufficient aim for educational justice. This aim also reveals when measures promoting equity, inclusion and diversity can be implemented ethically, and when they overstep themselves. v Lay Summary This study takes a close look at our efforts to use education as a tool to reduce individual disadvantages. Disadvantage is a position where some people have fewer opportunities, less access to developing certain skills and less independence compared to others. When we try to make our society better for everyone (also known as social justice), these pursuits can lead to disagreements and conflicts. Some people propose that we could resolve the problems of disadvantage if people were simply more equal. I strongly disagree. After careful consideration, I argue that it is a mistake to think of education as promoting social equality. I argue that equality is only valuable because it sometimes improves individual freedom. I argue that in societies like ours, to pursue social justice ethically, we should abandon ideas of improving social equality. Instead, I argue that people in our society deserve the opportunity to live free lives. . vi Preface This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, C. England. vii Table of Contents Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary .............................................................................................................................. v Preface ....................................................................................................................................... vi Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... ix Dedication ................................................................................................................................... x Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Topic and context ........................................................................................................ 1 1.2 Personal background and motivation ............................................................................. 5 1.3 Purpose and research questions ..................................................................................... 7 1.4 Overview of the study .................................................................................................. 8 Chapter 2: Should equality be a social and educational aim? ....................................................... 10 2.1 Introduction to equality ...............................................................................................10 2.2 Educational Aims .......................................................................................................12 2.3 Equality as sameness ..................................................................................................16 2.4 Equality as a social aim ...............................................................................................22 2.5 Five criticisms against equality as a social aim ...............................................................33 2.6 Summary ..................................................................................................................40 Chapter 3: Individual freedom and personal autonomy ............................................................... 42 3.1 Introduction to individual freedom ...............................................................................42 3.2 The concepts of negative and positive liberty .................................................................44 3.3 The concept of personal autonomy ...............................................................................52 3.4 Personal autonomy and compulsory education ...............................................................59 3.5 Summary ..................................................................................................................64 Chapter 4: The three calls for “social equality” ........................................................................... 65 viii 4.1 Current aims for social equality ...................................................................................65 4.2 Critical theory and human emancipation .......................................................................66 4.3 Critical pedagogy and educational justice ......................................................................73 4.4 The three calls for “social equality” ..............................................................................78 4.5 Equity and its aims .....................................................................................................82 4.6 Inclusion and its aims .................................................................................................87 4.7 Diversity and its aims .................................................................................................91 4.8 Summary ..................................................................................................................94 Chapter 5: Personal autonomy and educational justice ................................................................ 96 5.1 Putting it together .......................................................................................................96 5.2 Human emancipation and personal autonomy ................................................................98 5.3 Personal autonomy and soft equity ............................................................................. 103 5.4 Rough equity and personal autonomy ......................................................................... 108 5.5 Personal autonomy and soft inclusion ......................................................................... 111 5.6 Rough inclusion and personal autonomy ..................................................................... 113 5.7 Personal autonomy and soft diversity .......................................................................... 116 5.8 Rough diversity and personal autonomy ...................................................................... 119 5.9 The raising principle ................................................................................................. 123 5.10 Concluding remarks ................................................................................................. 127 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 130 . .. . ix Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been possible if it was not for the help and encouragement of many wonderful individuals. I would like to thank UBC-Okanagan and its amazing faculty for the opportunity to study once again under its roof. The courses and professors were as always, top notch. Thank you for believing and investing in me. This is truly an institution devoted to learning and thought. I would like to offer a special thank you to my professional mentor, Jo-Anna LeGrandeur who encouraged me to pursue my intense curiosity about educational justice academically. I would also like to thank my many colleagues for their interest in my studies and the many opportunities they afforded me to speak my ideas aloud. I would like to thank my committee members, Dr. Sabre Cherkowski and Dr. Andrew Irvine for all the time they devoted to providing me feedback on my research. They provided me with many opportunities to improve the quality of my writing. I am indebted to my supervisor, Dr. Christopher Martin, for the quality of my program. I cannot thank him enough for the guidance and support he gave me throughout my studies. He helped me navigate the complexities of graduate studies in a friendly and professional manner. I will never forget our many fantastic conversations. Lastly, I must thank my wife and family. My studies cost countless hours away from them, but their patience, love and support made it all possible. x Dedication For everyone navigating the complexities of justice in education. 1 Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Topic and context The revolutions that paved the way for liberal democracies pursued values such as liberty, equality and brotherhood. While liberal democracies like our own have secured freedoms that are incomparable to other periods of human civilization, we are always striving for improvements. Moral and political goals aiming to improve the circumstances of all citizens are sometimes called ‘social justice.’ Recently, measures that promote social justice have been a source of great controversy and conflict, especially in educational settings.1 These measures are often understood as promoting social equality. But pursuits of social equality are misguided, particularly when it comes to compulsory education. Instead, when it comes to compulsory education, I argue that the aims of social justice should entail the pursuit of individual freedom. In liberal democracies, individual freedom is an important value. As such, liberal democracies are tolerant towards a variety of religions, beliefs, cultures, values and lifestyles. They implement laws to allow people to lead lives of their own making. In this sense, liberal democracies value diversity. But if individual diversity is valued, in what sense should education promote social equality? Should education strive to promote equality at all? For example, some students do not have home lives where they can regularly complete homework. If homework is likely to increase academic achievement, should teachers still assign homework, even if it means that disadvantaged students are further disadvantaged?2 Social and educational justice are often 1 Some examples include efforts to remove standardized testing (Rosales, 2018), the use of technology for homework (Wong, 2018)—which became a spotlight issue during to the COVID-19 pandemic (Tate, 2020), and efforts to implement Indigenous content into classrooms (Omand, 2017). 2 See Wong (2018) on the “homework gap.” 2 thought of in terms of promoting equality, but there are good reasons to reconsider this understanding. In this study, I set out to analyze the aims of social and educational justice. The focus of my research concerns problems of justice in a liberal democratic context. Here I understand the major problems of justice to concern what people deserve.3 These topics will be explored in greater detail throughout this study, but social justice is essentially about what people deserve as members of a society and educational justice is about what people deserve in respect to their education. In this sense, educational justice is a branch of social justice. As such, I will often talk about social justice in general, which has direct implications for educational justice. Even so, my study is particularly concerned with educational justice. Since educational justice is about affording people with the education they deserve, this study is also concerned with the aims of education. After all, we cannot provide people what they deserve without first identifying what they deserve. There is currently great confusion when it comes to educational justice in liberal democracies. This confusion has sparked many intense educational controversies—and my interest in this topic. Some of the controversies that caught my attention were when a school district made efforts to sensitize children to their white privilege (Duran, 2018), when educational unions filed a human rights complaint after a school trustee spoke out against the implementation of sexual orientation and gender identity initiatives (Lazatin, 2018), and when various levels of government waged legal battles with Christian schools regarding policies 3 Miller (1979) discusses suum cique (to each his due) and other notions of justice (p. 20). While I do not attempt to present a full account of justice in this study, I do understand justice as primarily concerning what people deserve, either positively or negatively. 3 around diversity and inclusion (Corbella, 2018). These controversies are often ignited by movements towards social equality. I will argue that many of these conflict are unnecessary and avoidable if the aim of measures promoting social justice are clarified. The measures taken to increase social equality often demand that some people adjust their beliefs and values, and this causes conflict. After all, these are the same kinds of values over which people sometimes wage wars. Liberal democracies are tolerant of a variety of incompatible ways of living. For example, they tolerate people living with or without religion, living family lives or single professional lives. Liberal democracies are also tolerant of a wide variety of personal values, leaving people free to pursue lives of wealth, fame, happiness, exploration, spirituality, recognition, self-fulfillment, service, solitude and even lives of self-indulgence. People are generally free to conduct lives of their own making if they do not harm or interfere with others’ abilities to do the same. Yet, in liberal democracies, educational institutions are often viewed as instruments of political and social change. So, in free countries, where rational adults disagree about what is valuable in life (and therefore the aims of education), how can decisions about equality be made while considering the best interests of all students? I believe part of the answer involves clarifying that equality should not be an educational aim, and neither is equality the aim of movements towards equity, diversity or inclusion. The full answer to this question is very complex. Within our polarized political environment, some people champion initiatives for more equal playing fields in education. Other proponents of social equality argue that merely leveling the playing field is not enough; they advocate for equal chances and sometimes equal participation in the benefits education provides. In this sense, they argue that there should be equality of outcome, so that no students are 4 disadvantaged by their educational achievements.4 For example, some people advocate to remove standardized testing; one reason is to reduce the effects of racial and cultural inequalities on educational opportunities (Rosales, 2018). On the other side of this politically charged debate, some people push back against equality initiatives, as they infringe on certain freedoms that are currently enjoyed by the status quo. For example, measures of standardized testing are viewed by some people as promoting equality in education, since they look beyond irrelevant identity markers (like race and wealth), focusing instead on individual abilities and merit (Guo & Kang, 2018). Advocates for standardized testing also claim that it promotes equality by reducing the unfair advantages of having more “generous” teachers (Guo & Kang, 2018). Advocates for these opposing approaches often view the opposing position as unethical and reprehensible, referring to their approaches as “racist” or “bigoted” (Rosales, 2018). But the clashes on topics of equality in education are unnecessary and the efforts invested on these discourses could be better spent. The major source of tension on topics of educational justice is the result of pursuing equality as a value. Some people understand social equality to mean that everyone should be equal under the law, and that irrelevant personal identity markers should never play a role in policies or individual treatment (where relevant attributes include personal abilities and motivations).5 Other people understand social equality as necessarily considering all individual identity markers, including individual history, past treatment and group affiliations. The problem here is that social equality is used by people to support both identity-blind and identity-conscious 4 One major movement for equality in this sense is educational levelling-down. ‘Levelling-down’ entails taking action to diminish all hierarchical elements of education. This can include reducing the potential achievement of students at the top in order to raise up those at the bottom. See Brighouse and Swift (2006). 5 See Rawls (1999) on the topic of fair equality of opportunity (p. 12). 5 approaches to equality.6 This is a major conflict. This conflict is also unacknowledged by many educationalists and teachers striving for social and educational justice. The solution to this problem, I will argue, is that we abandon aims of social equality all together. While this solution sounds radical, it does not entail abandoning pursuits of social justice. In this thesis, I will argue that social equality is both a misleading and insufficient aim in the pursuit of social justice. I will also argue that people are mistaken to hold aims of social equality as inherently valuable. In fact, some aims of social equality are harmful. Instead, I argue that social and educational justice require the pursuit of individual freedom; pursuing individual freedom should be a fundamental aim of education, and focusing on this aim will realize the goals of equity, diversity and inclusion better than if we focus on such goals directly. 1.2 Personal background and motivation As previously mentioned, I was partially drawn to this topic due to the intense educational controversies surrounding it. My interest in this topic also stems from the role equality plays in public education. I noticed in my first few years of teaching that the boys in my classes were—on average—performing much lower than the girls. My mentor teacher recommended I read a book called Man, Interrupted, co-authored by Philip Zimbardo of the Stanford Prison Experiments. In the book, Zimbardo and Coulombe (2016) explain how boys have been failing educationally since the 1990s. When I raised concerns about the low performance of boys in my classes with people in higher places, I was snubbed.7 While boys seemed to be doing poorly in 6 See Roberson (2006) on identity-blind and identity-conscious approaches to diversity and inclusion. 7 It may be important to note that I am not particularly concerned with what appears to be unequal educational performance in boys. Although inequality can be a symptom of injustice, inequality alone is not sufficient evidence of injustice. What drew my interest from this experience was the lack of concern towards boys when it comes to equality in education, since equity, inclusion and gender equality are presented as educational aims. In other words, I am curious about the underlying values leading to an apparent double standard when it comes to topics of justice. 6 my school, our school hallways had many posters encouraging girls to enter STEM fields or the trades. Girls also had priority placement in the accelerated trades programs. For all the talk of making girls equal to boys, girls generally seemed to be outpacing the boys at our school—and across North America according to Zimbardo and Coulombe (2016). These observations and experiences caused me to question how equality was presented as an educational aim. In those first years, I also had questions about how equality was pursued within the teaching profession. For instance, the BCTF’s magazine (Teacher) made it clear that social justice and workplace equality was of primary value. The articles in this publication supported equality in the workforce, particularly through measures of equity, diversity and inclusion. But the underlying aims of these measures were difficult to identify. For example, inclusion was presented as a value, but then there were workshops exclusively for women, to promote their leadership and bargaining skills (Dodds, 2017, p. 12). So, it seemed that equity was perhaps more important than inclusion. But then there were articles that outlined the steady departure of men from the profession since the 1970s, with no concern that men now made up just 27% of teacher membership—as opposed to about 48% in the 1970-1980s (Dodds, 2017, p. 13). This was surprising to me, since Zimbardo and Coulombe (2016) identify a strong correlation between male teachers, male role models and the success of boys in schools. Topics concerning boys were not mentioned in Teacher magazine, instead, there were articles discouraging men from taking leadership positions to make way for women (Dodds, 2018, p. 13).8 In short, the combination of fiery controversies, poorly performing boys and confusion about the aims of social justice brought me to this topic. 8 Here again, I am not suggesting that these measures are unjust or otherwise. These articles seemed to have conflicting values at play, which piqued my curiosity. 7 1.3 Purpose and research questions The purpose of my study is to analyze and identify the aims of educational justice. Since educational justice is about securing for students what they deserve, I will need to identify the aims of education. To keep the size of my study manageable, I have limited the scope of this analysis to compulsory education within liberal democracies. An analysis of educational justice and educational aims leads to the primary question of my study: what do all students living in liberal democracies deserve? There will always be room for improvements in liberal democracies since they can only be as perfect as the people living, leading and voting within them. Despite the social improvements and emancipations of the last century, there are still people prone to unnecessary disadvantages through no faults of their own. But what measures are ethical to improve the situations of disadvantaged people? Is improved social equality justifiable at any cost? What about equity, inclusion and diversity? How should educational justice be pursued? In this thesis it will not be my goal to identify an exhaustive list of curricular outcomes that must be met for educational justice. Instead, I hope to identify a unifying aim for compulsory education to strive towards. Since compulsory education is a public institution in liberal democracies, my analysis of educational justice is intertwined with social justice. As such, movements towards equity, diversity and inclusion will be analyzed to identify their underlying aims. I hope that this study will help strengthen the aims of social and educational justice. Unclear social aims are ineffective in two important ways: 1) if concepts are unclear, people aiming at one goal (like equality) may be aiming at different goals (like the identity-blind and identity-conscious versions of equality), and 2) unclear aims are also less effective because they 8 are difficult to justify, making it difficult to rally broad support. My research will lead to stronger aims for educational justice, as these two problems will be overcome. 1.4 Overview of the study The structure of my argument is relatively simple. Chapter 1 is an introduction to my topic and the direction of my thesis. The literature that informs my project will be reviewed throughout its analysis. In Chapter 2, I will critique equality as an aim. I will argue that the pursuit of social equality is only valuable so far as it promotes individual freedom. In Chapter 3, I will present a conception of freedom. I will argue that the ideal of personal autonomy, as developed by the philosopher Joseph Raz, is the best conception of individual freedom. Chapter 4 is an analysis of the aims of equity, inclusion and diversity. In that chapter, I argue that the primary aim of these three social justice movements is the same as that of critical theory: human emancipation. In Chapter 5, I argue that human emancipation is necessary but insufficient for social justice, whereas personal autonomy serves as a necessary and sufficient condition for social justice. I will argue that aiming for personal autonomy reveals when current measures for equity, inclusion and diversity are ethical, and when they overstep themselves. If I am correct that personal autonomy is the aim of educational justice, this has some important implications for compulsory education in liberal democracies. One implication is that citizens of liberal democracies have a duty to ensure that all people have access to the conditions of personal autonomy, including certain skills, adequate options and independence. This aim also reveals that social justice is only ethical when it does not harm others, including harming their access to the conditions of personal autonomy. In other words, social justice that harms anyone’s access to the conditions of personal autonomy is unethical. On this same topic, I conclude my study with a general principle of 9 educational justice. I argue that pursuits of educational justice are only ethical when they raise students up, but never when they pull them down. 10 Chapter 2: Should equality be a social and educational aim? 2.1 Introduction to equality In liberal democracies, equality is often valued as a political, social and educational goal. Many people would be more satisfied with our social arrangements—the way in which society and its basic institutions are organized—if there was greater equality. But what sort of equality is desirable and what methods should we use in its pursuit? Also, people are not always talking about the same thing when they use the term equality. For example, ‘equality in the workplace’ could imply equality of wages, equality of treatment, having the same workplace or equality of something else entirely. I will refer to measurements of interpersonal equality, like comparisons between individual goods, opportunities and status as social equality. Principles of social equality are moral: they prescribe how people ought to compare one to another. Any comparison between people that measures the sameness of some quality is within the domain of social equality. As such, social equality is the broadest category of interpersonal equality, and this category contains subcategories—all of which are social in nature—such as political equality, economic equality, legal equality and educational equality. Education is often thought to be the primary vehicle to arrive at social goals, particularly when it comes to social equality. In effect, while the topic of this chapter is educational equality, the chapter will also consider social equality as far as the aims overlap. In liberal societies, citizens, policymakers and political leaders advance wide-ranging conceptions of equality. The major philosophical doctrines that defend a robust level of equality in liberal societies are egalitarianism and liberalism. By ‘egalitarianism’ I mean a range of political doctrines that establish social equality within primary political values; by ‘liberalism’ I mean a political doctrine that places freedom as among the primary political values, where some 11 level of freedom always takes priority over equality. Liberals and egalitarians may, for example, advocate strongly for principles that prioritize equality in terms of wealth, social status or moral respect (Dixon, 2010; Nielsen, 1981; Honneth, 2001). On the other hand, some advocate for equality of certain rights, the satisfaction of basic needs, such as freedoms, access or skills (Sen, 1979; Benn & Peters, 1959; Nozick, 2003). But what exactly is equality, and what are people aiming at when they aim at achieving social equality through education? The layout of this chapter will be as follows. First, I will explain what I mean by aims and how they relate to education. Then, I will detail different philosophical conceptions of equality as presented by Bedau (1967) in in his introduction to the topic in Equality, concluding in broad agreement with Bedau that equality is most akin to the concept of sameness, but with some important nuances. The goals of equality as an educational aim will be explored by analogy to sameness as an educational aim. (The phrase ‘sameness as an educational aim’ reveals the emptiness of ‘equality as an educational aim,’ and will be explored in Chapter 4.) After establishing what equality as an educational aim implies, I will explain how equality is currently held as a social aim. I will explore how egalitarians, liberals and liberal egalitarians all hold goals of improving social equality. After showcasing how equality is held as a social aim, I will present five of what I take to be the most cogent philosophical critiques against equality as an independent educational aim, drawing from both Raz (1986) and Frankfurt (1997). I will conclude the chapter by asserting that equality should not be an independent educational aim, and that aims that have previously used such language should be rearticulated more precisely to identify the goods they are aiming towards. The major claim I want to defend in this chapter is that equality cannot stand by itself as a value. That is to say, I will argue that the value of equality always depends on some other good, 12 and that presenting the term equality as a social aim is both vague and misleading. Essentially, I will be asserting that equality is not an intrinsically valuable state of affairs. If I am right, this means that equality is an empty social aim: it is not an aim in itself, since it is only useful in realizing other social aims. If equality is an empty aim, meaning it has no content of its own, then all social movements for equality must be aiming towards something else of value. The way we conceptualize equality needs to be clarified, especially if the term is to be useful as an aim for guiding educational policy and practice. People have too many different interpretations of the term. This chapter will help conceptualize what we mean by equality as a social aim, and it will also highlight the problems of using equality in this manner. The ambiguity of the term leads to conflicting or even contradictory educational aims. In liberal democracies, the strength of social aims rely on the number of people that value a shared goal. The problem with a vague social aim is that the goal may be unclear. Vague social aims lead to vague social goals and vice versa. Social goals are much more likely to be realized if they are understood and shared by as many members of the society as possible. 2.2 Educational Aims I have said that I will argue that equality is an empty educational and social aim, at least as far as it is held as an independent aim. But what do I mean by a social aim? A social aim is most simply identified as something people are intentionally moving towards. Social aims are contrasted by individual aims, such as learning to play the guitar. Guitars are generally played by individuals, although instruction to play one is often provided through social means. Those whose goal is to learn to play guitar are aiming at learning the guitar. Guitar education may be a social aim, as it requires both teachers and students, but learning to play the guitar is an 13 individual aim. Social aims require joint efforts by a group of people to move towards something of shared value, such as winning a soccer league or being a successful corporation. By societal aims, on the other hand, I mean social aims that appeal to largely held social values, such as securing universal rights, public education, healthcare or welfare. Conceptualized in this manner, the connection between aims and values becomes apparent. That which we strive to move towards or obtain are values. Values represent goods worth aiming towards. All societal aims are social aims. The societal aims of liberal societies differ in some major ways compared to non-liberal societies, and there are often differences across liberal societies. The major shared values of liberal societies will be explored in Chapter 3, where I will assert that these values—such as certain rights, freedoms and therefore personal autonomy—ought to serve as the foundations for educational aims in liberal societies. The focus of this chapter will therefore be on social aims, particularly societal aims regarding equality, how they influence educational aims, and the ethical implication of this influence. This topic is pertinent to discussions of basic education, because basic education is compulsory in liberal democracies for a reason. Social aims are necessary in education because, as R. S. Peters (1964) so eloquently states, “Human beings are not like flowers in having a predetermined end which serves as a final cause of their development” (p. 89). For example, most liberal democracies teach primary language literacy in some form. People tend not become literate unless intentionally educated. They do not become literate through mere socialization or by accident. There must be a goal initially, some value ascribed to a certain good, and then an aim made to achieve this value. Human beings can grow in innumerable directions—some desirable, some not. Although people have some predeterminations due to their biological wiring, there is no debate that socialization has a major impact on personal development. Feral 14 children are perhaps the most obvious evidence for this claim; if children are neglected and deprived of opportunities to acquire linguistic skills before a certain age, they may never acquire them later in life.9 Simply put, if people’s lives unfolded like a law of nature, we would not need education. A problem for educational goal setting is determining which human ends are desirable, which are acceptable and which are neither. In liberal democracies, most people agree that education should enable people to live good lives; however, there are multiple acceptable conceptions of the good life. By ‘conceptions of the good life’ or ‘conception of the good’ I am referring to the different ways that people imagine the best lives for themselves. The distinction here between desirability and acceptability is of crucial importance. One major problem is that acceptability does not imply desirability; aims cannot be established from acceptability alone. For example, it is acceptable in liberal democracies for people to make their living by engaging in activities that some people in the same society consider immoral.10 People in these professions may find their lifestyles desirable and believe they live good lives. But just because some of these professions are deemed societally acceptable, educational institutions do not guide students towards them. In fact, there would likely be outrage if teachers suggested or encouraged students to enter these professions. This applies to many professions and lifestyles that are viewed as acceptable, but not desirable. Although one way of living a good life may be viewed as desirable for some people, this desirability does not achieve desirability at a societal level. On the other hand, it is viewed as societally acceptable for educational institutions to encourage students to participate in a range of activities, like academics and trades, or to encourage students who 9 See, for example, Maclean (1978). 10 Prime examples include any sort of sex work. 15 want to live a family life. Herein lies the problem with establishing societally desirable goals, particularly for education. There are many acceptable ways to live a good life in liberal democracies, but acceptability does not imply desirability. If people disagree about the desirability versus the acceptability of certain ways of living, what criteria can be established to determine societally desirable goals? The problem of educational aims is both a normative problem and an empirical one. The problem is normative in the sense that we are concerned about what is desirable, valuable or worth aiming towards. In this sense, the problem of educational aims is a question of what ought to be aimed towards in education. This problem is also empirical. It is empirical in one sense, as people are born with a variety of biological predispositions that will affect what is attainable for them through education. It is also empirical, because some outcomes that are desirable will be unattainable because of human nature and other human limitations. It is also empirical in the sense that people are born into a range of environments, with varying upbringings, with a broad range of opportunities and other external factors. The distinction between the normative and empirical elements of problems posed by educational aims are important in the development of aims that can produce the desired ends. While this discussion of aims will focus more on the normative elements than the empirical ones, it is important that decisions are made with consideration of the empirical situations where they are made. Education is not merely theoretical. Education is practical. Education is participated in, acted out and carried out. Since education is practical, it must also be feasible. As such, educational aims ought to be feasible. The question then, will not simply be what ought we to aim towards in education, but what ought we to aim towards given the empirical reality in which we are situated. For example, it may be unfeasible to aim to achieve 100% graduation rates and maintain high standards for academic 16 achievement. Likewise, it would be an unfeasible educational aim that all students become astronauts, even though the profession may be desirable and highly esteemed by society. So, when I talk about equality as a social aim, I am referring to interpersonal comparisons and intentional attempts to achieve sameness in some quality, quantity or value between people. When I talk about equality as an educational aim, I am referring to the anticipated achievement of particular social aims, but through educational processes. Although educational aims are composed of individual, social and societal aims, equality is not an individual aim—because equality is about how individuals stand in relation to one another. Therefore, I am only referring to social and societal aims in this chapter. Aims to decrease the unfair disadvantages experienced by citizens are social aims, and so they pertain to the domain of social justice. The role that compulsory education plays in realizing these same aims is the concern of educational justice. Having now explained the concept of aims and their relevance to debates about equality in education, and society more generally, I will clarify what is meant by equality before discussing equality as an educational aim. 2.3 Equality as sameness Equality is a difficult term to conceptualize because it has different meanings depending how it is used. Not only do people sometimes mean different things by the term equality, its meaning can change depending on the objects and context. One of the most helpful introductory discussions of the concept of equality is offered by Bedau (1967) in his chapter “Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality.” According to Bedau (1967), equality is like the term ‘sameness,’ but there are some major problems with equating equality with sameness (p. 4). Equality demands some sort of comparison between two things, and often these two things can be shown to have specific similarities, although they may have more differences than similarities. One person may 17 have difficulty determining the equivalence between two things, but this difficulty is compounded by every additional person making the comparison. For example, six apples are nearly equal to six oranges for someone who likes both the same and wants to have plenty of fruit available. But six apples are not equal to six oranges for someone who likes apples but not the oranges. If two people are comparing whether equal numbers of apples and oranges are equal, the problem is additionally complex and reliant on the value they subjectively ascribe to each item. The allocation of equal shares is dependent on what is determined to be of value—the metric of equality. A further confusion presented by the term equality, is that at times, it demands exact equality, whereas at other times it can imply rough equality (Bedau, 1967, p. 6). For example, if a grocer tells me that oranges and apples have an equal cost, I expect the price to be the exact same. On the other hand, if I divide six apples equally between six people, most people will be satisfied with a single apple, despite some inherent variance between the apples in measurements of size, weight, ripeness and so forth. What matters is that the apples are roughly equal as opposed to precisely equal. Equality is also an elusive term because it has many synonyms that incompletely convey the same meaning. At times, the synonyms for equality can express part of the meaning of equality, but other times they fall short. For example, terms such as same, similar, fair, or equitable are all used in place of equality. Bedau (1967) criticizes the term equity. He understands the term as the philosopher John Dewey conceptualized it: as intentionally unequal distribution that achieves some measure of overall equality. Bedau (1967) thinks the term equity 18 is an absurdity because it is an equality measure that justifies many flagrant inequalities (p. 5).11 For example, it may be equitable to give my three-year-old son more than three attempts to hit a softball; but justifying this alteration to my eight-year-old daughter will be difficult. If she is held to the standard rules, she will notice that something is indeed not equal. At her age, it is likely that I can explain how it is fairer in some sense to give him additional swings, but this explanation cannot rely on equality. Equality often implies sameness. But the term same is problematic because it often means identical. In one sense, nothing can be identical to my share of something, except for my share of the thing. If I take a course in high school, but I am unhappy with my grade, I can attempt to improve my grade be retaking the same course. But taking the same course twice may be a different experience in many ways.12 At the same time, a friend of mine could take the same class that is offered by a different teacher. But if my friend takes this course with another teacher, they have taken the same course in some ways, but it is also a different course in many ways. We cannot say that my friend took the equal class, although it may be equal in credit on a transcript. We could perhaps even say we shared an equal experience in participating in the same course, but many things, like the students, teachers, content, assessments and the delivery may not have been the same. We may be tempted to use the term similar in such cases, but the substitution is incomplete. Once again, if the cost of apples and oranges is similar, they cannot be said to be equal. Without precise definitions, terms like equity and similar provide additional 11 In this thesis, I argue that equity should be promoted; however, the concept needs to be divorced from notions of equality to ensure that it is compatible with the promotion of individual freedom. I argue that equity should not be understood as the promotion of some higher form of equality, but as the alleviation of unfair disadvantage. 12 For example, taking a course with a set of different students can have a strong effect on the dynamic of the class. Also, the teacher may be in different circumstances, like navigating a divorce, and the course could change greatly as a result. 19 confusion regarding equality, as each term may imply equality, but they may also allow for inequalities. Despite the inherent vagueness of the term equality, it is perhaps best defined as one specific element of sameness between two or more things. When people use the term, they are trying to pick out a certain element in which two things are the same. With this definition in mind, it must be noted that this cannot be the case where sameness means identity, as the exercise of exploring one thing’s equivalence with itself is seldom useful. When measuring equality or sameness, it is important to be precise in what element is being compared. For instance, there is a substantial difference between having an equal right to vote (the same right is given to all) versus having a right to an equal vote (the vote is equal in worth) (Bedau, 1967, p. 6). It is also important to be precise about which elements are being measured because most things that are the same or equal in some ways are not equal in other ways. Bedau (1967) acknowledges that most things that are equal in some way are usually very dissimilar to each other, however, for those aspects that are equal between two different things, they must not only be similar, but the same (p. 7). Similarity is therefore insufficient for equality when conceptualized as sameness. Bedau writes, “Persons have (received) an equal distribution, equal treatment, or equal rights etc., if and only if they have (received) the same distribution, treatment, rights, etc.” (Bedau, 1967, p. 7). In this specific sense, sameness of a specific measurement between two or more things is the best measure of equality. This definition of equality also makes the usual distinction between equality and equity unnecessary, as equity is also a movement toward sameness of something, quite often of outcomes. Equity still aims at sameness; the term just acknowledges there may be unequal distributions of resources, access or other provisions to achieve that sameness. This definition of equality as sameness across one 20 specific element does not resolve the problem that different measurers may disagree about the sameness between compared elements. People must specify what is to be compared, such as equality of opportunity or equality of access.13 In its general sense, it is hard to craft meaningful policy. With a definition of equality as sameness of some specific element in mind, it is possible to compare how different thinkers have presented equality as a social aim. However, before moving on to these aims, for the sake of clarity, a few terms need to be defined. First, I will be talking about principles of equality, and sometimes other political and moral principles. ‘Moral principles’ and ‘political principles’ involve primary human values (or aims). These principles concern the values that should define our public and political lives, determining how we act and how we act towards each other. When we act to move society closer to a political or moral principle, we are treating these values as moral or political ideals. In this sense, ideals are aims in respect to certain principles, so I will treat these terms interchangeably. When I classify a thinker as ‘egalitarian,’ which is a contested concept, I am simply referring to someone who holds ideals that prioritize equality in some capacity. I use the term egalitarian to cover a range of thinkers, grouping them by the similarity that they all hold equality as one of the most important social values; the sort of equality valued by egalitarians is of little importance in this classification, and they may value the equality of distribution such as wealth, respect, dignity, moral worth or any such social value. Egalitarians may hold equality to be either intrinsically or instrumentally valuable. 13 In later chapters, I will argue that the term equality remains misleading, even when used in reference to a specific element. 21 I will also be talking about liberal principles and ideals. These ideals and principles are most simply identified as those that prioritize freedom in some capacity. When I classify someone as ‘liberal,’ I am referring to someone who holds ideals that prioritize freedom in some capacity. Liberals, like egalitarians, value some forms of equality. The primary difference between my categorization of someone as liberal, instead of egalitarian, is the value given to freedom. Liberals hold principles of both freedom and equality, but they hold some principle of freedom in priority to equality. ‘Lexical priority’ means that one of the principles ought to be satisfied first, or that it is to be held as primary if there is conflict between the two principles (Rawls, 1999, p. 266). There is as much diversity in liberal thought as there is in egalitarian thought. It is important to note that someone can hold both egalitarian and liberal ideals simultaneously. These ideals are not necessarily in conflict. ‘Liberal egalitarians,’ for example, may hold both egalitarian and liberal ideals, without holding one of the political ideals in priority to the other. The next part of this chapter is intended to show that many people in liberal democracies hold equality as a social aim. The intention is not to give a complete account of all social aims involving equality. Instead, I will introduce a variety of political doctrines in liberal democracies that hold equality as a value and therefore as a goal. I will introduce and analyze how egalitarians, liberals and liberal egalitarians conceptualize equality as a social aim. It is important to note that there is often overlap between the principles of egalitarian and liberal thinkers in liberal democracies. The value ascribed to each principle can differ greatly from one thinker to another, and many thinkers hold different equalities and freedoms in priority. The purpose of the upcoming section is to show how equality is held as a social aim by a range of intellectuals before this aim is criticized. 22 2.4 Equality as a social aim First, I will explore how egalitarians value equality. Egalitarians thinkers are diverse, but what they share is the belief that equality should be one of, if not the most important, basis for political principles. Many egalitarians believe that equality is intrinsically valuable, meaning that equality is valuable in and of itself.14 Intrinsic value is contrasted by instrumental value, whereby something is valuable for bringing about something else of value. To make this distinction concrete, someone who volunteers for the opportunity simply to participate in the activity itself values the activity intrinsically; someone who works a job they hate because it pays well, values the job instrumentally—the job is not valuable in itself, but only as a means of good pay. Egalitarians are often concerned about social inequalities and how they may be diminished (particularly socioeconomic inequalities) (Bedau, 1967, p. 13). Depending on the particular inequalities of concern, whether of economics, social esteem, power or some other societal value, egalitarians recommend rearrangements to resolve inequalities. In effect, topics such as advantage and disadvantage play a key role in establishing justice in egalitarian debates. However, while egalitarians are interested in removing inequalities across a range of outcomes, such as access to healthcare, justice and education, there is little consensus on how inequalities should be eliminated. For example, a Marxist may desire to flatten all social power imbalances through direct intervention, whereas a social democrat may advocate for social equality through more gradual methods, such as affirmative action.15 Equality is often held as intrinsically valuable in liberal democracies. However, I argue that equality can only be of 14 In this paper, I position myself against this claim. I argue that equality is only valuable in so far as it improves personal autonomy. 15 Three major approaches to establishing justice through equality will be analyzed in Chapter 4. 23 instrumental value (and sometimes no value at all). If equality is not intrinsically valuable, then it must be valuable as a means to other ends. These other ends that give equality its value, I argue, are individual freedoms. Again, the purpose undertaking this analysis at this stage of the argument is to show that equality is held as a social aim in liberal democracies—an aim, that I will argue later, is misguided. In its strongest version, egalitarianism prioritizes equality above other social aims, such as freedom or economic success. This form of strong egalitarianism is sometimes termed radical egalitarianism. Bedau (1967) identifies ‘radical egalitarianism’ as the belief that “All social inequalities are unnecessary, and unjustifiable, and ought to be eliminated” (p. 13). On this view, any unequal outcome in society can be attributed to some form of injustice. Some egalitarians have even argued that all egalitarian demands are radical (Cohen, 2008, p. 182). Radical egalitarianism is concerned with the distribution of wealth, power, social esteem, respect, social and positional goods of any kind and so on.16 Radical egalitarianism is concerned with hierarchical relationships and how to topple or dismantle them. Dixon (2010) notes that radical egalitarianism is a doctrine that power, authority, control, respect and material conditions ought to be equally dispersed among all people, in all cases (p. 31). Bedau (1967) notes that radical egalitarianism has been heavily critiqued for its apparent moral, conceptual and factual absurdities (p. 15). For instance, some may argue that children, the deteriorating elderly, or the mentally disabled will not be able to enjoy or make use of the same distributions of power, authority or control as other people. To take radical egalitarianism seriously would demand the dissolution or major restructuring of our primary social relationships, such as parent-child, boss- 16 Goods are positional when their value is dependent on the relative distribution of the goods, such as education, qualifications or fame (Halliday, 2016, p. 152). 24 worker, teacher-student, leader-group and so on. In fact, some philosophers have argued that the social demands of strong egalitarianism are contrary to human nature and the social arrangements we enjoy (Benn & Peters, 1959). Other thinkers, such as Dixon (2010), suggest that radical egalitarianism has not been given a fair chance and that our social arrangements should undergo major shifts towards realizing more social equality. Radical egalitarians hold egalitarian ideals to be more fundamental, or prior to, all other political principles. Moderate egalitarianism is another political doctrine that values social equality. Moderate egalitarianism does not demand such extreme societal equality as the radical variant; indeed, many egalitarian ideals target one specific element of social inequality. These egalitarian ideals are often distributive in nature, recommending how certain resources or social commodities ought to be distributed, often to maintain a certain minimum threshold. Examples of this form of egalitarianism include forms of financial welfare, progressive taxation that increases with earnings, affirmative action and the universal provision of educational opportunities. The underlying intuition for this ideal is that no one should enjoy luxuries while others lack necessities (Bedau, 1967, p. 16). Ideals of this nature are commonplace, but not universal, in liberal democracies. But why do egalitarians value social equality? At this point, I will analyze the value of social equality, particularly as viewed by egalitarians. The justification of the intrinsic value of equality has proven to be elusive. Despite lacking clear justifications, many people hold an intuition that social equality is desirable in liberal democracies. In liberal democracies, we enjoy substantial amounts of freedom, but we also have underlying egalitarian values. We have social programs and institutions to support the least fortunate people in our societies, and for the most part, these programs hold broad appeal and require little justification. Few people criticize 25 institutions that support the least fortunate, and criticism is usually targeted at the inefficiency or ineffectiveness of these programs, not because they are aiming at improving the situation of the least fortunate.17 Equality in this sense is a common aim in liberal democracies. But what is the source of this intuition? One way to justify aims of social equality is to claim that they are intrinsically valuable. For example, it may be argued that social equality is intrinsically valuable since equality means that people will not suffer from poverty or other privations. But the desired value is that people do not suffer: equality is irrelevant. If it was otherwise, equally impoverishing people would be valuable. If social equality is intrinsically valuable, it should be justifiable as intrinsically valuable. By this I mean that we should be able to give some good reasons why it is valuable in and of itself. It could be argued that inequality is intrinsically undesirable, since it could lead to resentment or envy. For example, I may resent my neighbours for having nicer vehicles than I do, even if I do not care much for cars. However, not all people will be envious or resentful if others have more than they do. Envy and resentment is not a universal response. In fact, our society views enviousness as character flaw. Rawls (2006) even notes that he assumes rational people do not suffer from envy (p. 124). But the value of equality itself remains elusive. If something is intrinsically valuable, its justification tends to be simple. For example, the value of delicious food is that it is enjoyable. Food may serve as a means of gaining energy (instrumental value), but food is also plainly enjoyable for its own sake (intrinsic value). Likewise, the value of collector items is that they are sought after. The value people receive from personal autonomy is the enjoyment of being in control of parts of their lives. 17 See, for example, Friedman (1952). 26 I believe we do not value equality in this same way. We do not value equalities like having the same number of freckles or the same size feet as others. We may find value in having equalities in things of value, but this is because of the value we ascribe to the things of value, not to their equality. But some egalitarians insist that equality is intrinsically valuable. Marmor (2007) makes one of the strongest cases for the intrinsic value of equality (in this case economic equality). Marmor (2007) argues that equality is intrinsically valuable because sufficiently meeting people’s needs means that they do not have much less than most others (p. 259). Marmor (2007) thinks that sufficiently meeting people’s needs is only possible relative to the possessions of others. But, what Marmor calls intrinsic value, in actual fact, is instrumental value. Here is why: it does not matter if someone has fewer freckles than someone else. There is nothing intrinsically valuable about an equality of freckles. Freckles have no value in and of themselves, and so an equality of them is devoid of value. Equality is only of interest when the things being compared already have some value of their own. If someone has much less than others in anything, this inequality is only important depending on the value or importance of the thing in question—the value is not to be found in their equality. In short, the equality is only valuable when it brings something else of value; this means that equality is not intrinsically valuable. Some of the strongest advocates for egalitarianism have relented that it may be impossible to justify our intuitions concerning social equality (Nielsen, 1981, p. 264); this lack of justification further reinforces my notion that equality is not intrinsically valuable. Nielsen (1981) leans heavily on social intuitions to defend the priority of egalitarian ideals: 27 I am not sure that we can justify such a fundamental ideal as the belief that all humankind have [sic] a right to an equality of concern and respect. And I am not confident that we even need to try, for it may very well be that there could be nothing more fundamental that we could appeal to make such a justification. Perhaps here we should say that justification comes to an end and that we just have to make up our minds what kind of human beings we want to be. (p. 265) The important observation from Nielsen’s claims is that many egalitarian ideals appeal to broader social intuitions for caring about our shared humanity. What I would like to emphasize is that we should care about disadvantages, privations and human suffering. However, we need not care about equality to care about these things. In short, equality itself is not intrinsically valuable. I will now return to explore how liberals hold social equality as an aim. Moving beyond justifying equality in the abstract, things begin to look more complex when we ask how freedom and equality should relate in a liberal democracy. Just like egalitarians, liberal thinkers are a diverse group, but they share the belief that individual freedom should be one of the most important political principles. Equality is often valued instrumentally by liberal thinkers, since equality allows for greater freedoms, particularly for people who are less fortunate than others. For example, liberals tend to value equality of opportunity, since equal access to opportunities increases the free choices that people can make in their lives. ‘Equality of opportunity’ in this sense entails that people of similar motivations and abilities have access to similar opportunities (Rawls, 1999, p. 12). Irrelevant identity markers, like their initial social positions, race, gender, wealth, etc. should not play a role. Liberals disagree about the relative priority of certain freedoms, equalities and how they fit together. 28 What is important to note is that liberals also value and hold equality as an aim. However, unlike radical egalitarians, liberals are unwilling to sacrifice certain freedoms in the name of equality. Berlin (1958) states that liberty always needs to be weighed against other values, such as equality, justice or happiness (p. 36). Berlin uses the terms liberty and freedom interchangeably, and so will I. According to Berlin’s view, freedom is not simply the ultimate value that trumps all others. In The Morality of Freedom, the political philosopher Joseph Raz (1986) explains that some liberal thinkers defend freedom for its instrumental value (p. 6). According to Raz (1986), some liberal thinkers mistakenly believe that the value of freedom is solely instrumental, as freedom allows for other values—like equality. Raz (1986) thinks that pursuing freedom only for its instrumental value is misguided, as this neglects the intrinsic value of freedom (p. 7). The observation of importance here is that some liberal thinkers hold equality as a social aim. Perhaps the most influential conception of equality in the liberal state was developed by the philosopher John Rawls. Rawls’ (1999) concept of justice, while primarily liberal, also relies on egalitarian ideals.18 Rawls’ concept of justice includes a liberty principle and an equality principle. Rawls’ (1999) liberty principle aims to afford everyone with the most extensive equal basic liberties (p. 266). Included in this list of basic liberties are political freedom, the right to personal property, freedom from harm, freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of speech, assembly, thought, conscience, thought, person and dignity (Rawls, 1999, p. 53). He believes these freedoms should be equal in the sense that they are applied to all people equally. His equality principle calls for arrangements to benefit the least advantaged and to allow for equality 18 The classification of Rawls as a liberal is contested, but he does give priority to his liberty principle. See for example, Brighouse (2014). 29 of opportunity (Rawls, 1999, p. 266). Rawls (1999) does not think that the distribution of income and wealth must be equal, but he does think this distribution must be to everyone’s advantage (p. 53). In other words, inequalities are only justified when they benefit everyone in the society. For example, incentivising important positions, like being a judge, should attract competent people to these roles. Having competent judges will mean that the legal system is more just than it would be otherwise, which is to everyone’s benefit. In this sense, inequalities of distribution are justified. On Rawls’ account, the state should support affirmative actions that provide opportunities for people in society that are less fortunate than others; however, Rawls explains that the idea behind equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity is not simply to help the least fortunate (which he thinks is necessary as well), but to put everyone in positions that allow them to manage their own affairs and participate in society with mutual respect (Rawls, 1999, p. xv). In this sense, Rawls is an advocate for equity. Rawls advocates for equality in the distribution of basic liberties, and he also advocates for equality of opportunity. For Rawls (1999), equality of opportunity also requires equal access to positions of authority and responsibility (p. 53). Rawls aims at social equality of both freedoms and opportunities. Rawls is often cited by egalitarians to support the priority of egalitarian ideals, but it is important to recognize that Rawls (1999) gives his liberty principle priority: “The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore the basic liberties can be restricted only for the sake of liberty” (p. 266). What he means here is that it would be unjust to interfere with the liberty principle for the sake of the equality principle, which is also important, but subordinate to the liberty principle. An example of this kind of injustice would be forcibly taking the property of the wealthy to give to the less fortunate, as this would infringe on the basic liberty of being able to own private property. Basic liberties can only be interfered with if it means an 30 improvement in the basic liberties of all. The key point here is that Rawls holds equality as an important aim. Rawls thinks that certain basic freedoms some people enjoy can be justly overridden, so long as the elimination of those freedoms allow for greater equal basic liberties for all. Some egalitarians do not think that Rawls takes equality seriously enough. Some strong egalitarians have been critical of Rawls’ take on equality. Dixon (2010), for example, criticizes Rawls for thinking that equality is simply about fair opportunity and remedying poverty (p. 31). Dixon thinks that Rawls shares a false assumption with many liberal thinkers, that equality in this sense should only be surface level. Dixon thinks that equality should be much deeper than remedying poverty. He thinks that radical egalitarianism has not been taken seriously, and that social structures should be reshaped in the name of equality and justice (Dixon, 2010, p. 30). The type of social reshaping that Dixon envisions would move us not only to economic equality, but equality at all levels of society, such as social status, respect, and dignity. Cohen, on the other hand, criticizes Rawls’ incentives argument that defends economic inequality (Smith, 1998, p. 205). Cohen does not think inequalities are justifiable in response to differing abilities (Smith, 1998, p. 206). Smith (1998) explains how Cohen imagines a society where there are inequalities, but they are instead based on differences in taste, preference and choice (p. 206). Liberals and egalitarians both seem to value equality so far as it allows people to live lives of their own choosing. But what does social equality aim to achieve? Liberal and egalitarian thinkers often interpret the aims of equality differently from each other. Later in this chapter, these conflicting interpretations of equality will be relevant to the criticisms I lay against equality as an independent social aim. Also from the liberal tradition, Benn and Peters (1959) argue that 31 equality is more of a prescriptive term than a descriptive one (p. 108). They state that phrases like “All men are equal” do not point to any attributes that people share, but instead emphasize that people ought to be treated in the same way (Benn & Peters, 1959, p. 108). Benn and Peters (1959) understand the principle of equality as not prescribing that all humans must be treated alike, but instead presuming that they should not be treated differently unless there are good grounds for different treatment (p. 111). Liberals are not interested in equality as the ultimate goal of a political community, but it is still one of their concerns. Equality in this sense is about ensuring just treatment. Some thinkers are difficult to classify as either liberal or egalitarian, but they still defend equality as a just societal aim. Amartya Sen, for instance, a renowned philosopher known for developing his own capabilities approach to equality and justice, gives much of his attention to the less fortunate or disadvantaged members of a society. One of Sen’s primary aims is something he calls ‘basic capability equality.’ Basic capability equality is an aim concerned with ensuring people have equal access to basic thresholds regarding their interests and their needs (Sen, 1979, p. 218). Sen (2001) is also interested in the promotion of freedom, but he views equality as an aim that promotes freedom. In other words, he believes that equality is instrumental to freedom. Sen’s concern for equality is influenced by a broader concern for what is called luck egalitarianism. ‘Luck egalitarianism’ is the idea that some people have disadvantages that they had no hand in prearranging, which include genetic preconditions that affect health, family upbringing and socialization—elements that people cannot control, but that affect their living conditions significantly—and that justice demands that people are only held accountable for circumstances that they could be held responsible for making (Stojanov, 2018, p. 38). Sen thinks measures should be taken to diminish the effects of inequalities that are due to 32 bad luck of this sort. Brighouse (2003) is also concerned with the relationship between luck egalitarianism and education, calling for measures to equalize the circumstances of people who are unlucky in this sense (Brighouse, 2003, p. 473-75, as cited in Stojanov, p. 41). Brighouse (1998) advocates for equality of opportunity (p. 732), which will be explored further in Chapter 4. Equality is not always presented as a socioeconomic distributive aim. Anderson (2007) expresses her aim of equality as focusing on people enjoying equal dignity and respect, while not being vulnerable to oppression (p. 615). She imagines a just society as one in which people function as equal members of a civil society, sharing equal amounts of social and cultural capital (Anderson, 2007, p. 615). The idea that equality should be of something comparable to respect or dignity is shared by many other thinkers. Hand and Levinson (2012) present equality—an inclination to treat people equally—as a valuable disposition (along with reasonableness, peaceableness, orderliness, truthfulness, freedom and respect), required for student development of the skills necessary for life in liberal democracies (p. 616). Similarly, McAvoy and Hess (2013) propose that schools teach students to communicate and share their differing views while treating each other as political equals (p. 19). Each of these aims attempt to promote equality in society. Liberal democracies are often presented as promoting the mutual values of freedom and equality. Christman (2018) notes how liberal societies are structured to promote both freedom and equality. He explains that liberal societies pursue the widest range of freedoms consistent with equal opportunities for everyone (p. 112). He identifies freedom and equality as the primary values of liberal society (Christman, 2018, p. 112). What is valued by society becomes an aim, so equality, according to Christman is a liberal aim. Liberal democracies often use the word 33 equality, paired with a variety of other aims. However, there are several reasons why the term equality is problematic when used in this manner. The major goal of this chapter so far has been to describe what people commonly mean by the aim of equality, and to demonstrate that it is presented as a social (and therefore an educational) aim. I have also shown that it is a much more complex idea than its everyday use might suggest. I will proceed by presenting several problems with treating equality as a fundamental social aim. I will conclude the chapter by arguing that many social aims should be articulated more precisely, which usually involves avoiding the term equality. 2.5 Five criticisms against equality as a social aim Does it make sense to treat equality, in our schools and elsewhere, as a fundamental aim? The first criticism against holding equality as an aim is that its use is unnecessary when articulating general social principles. Raz (1986) criticizes the term equality for being redundant when applied to other principles. He explains his objection to the term as an unnecessary appendage to any other principle: All principles are statements of general reasons. As such they apply equally to all those who meet their conditions of application. Generality implies equality of application to a class. Adding “equally” to the statement of the conditions or consequences of a principle does not necessarily turn it into one which has more to do with equality. (Raz, 1986, p. 220) In effect, if we take any egalitarian principle, for example ‘people deserve equal opportunities,’ and remove the term equal, we are left with the essence of the same principle, ‘people deserve 34 opportunities.’ This phrasing also makes us investigate exactly what we mean by deserve. In this sense, it is prescriptive, suggesting that people should have good life options from which to select. Principles like this are general and apply to everyone, so there is no need to use the term equality. As an addition to Raz’s thinking, the availability of good life options for everyone does not need to be comparative. If the options available are good opportunities, then the opportunities will be sufficiently desirable and satisfactory to the people choosing them. The word equality only frustrates the true aim of a principle like this one, and causes unnecessary and unfruitful comparisons, many of which can never come close to being realized. For example, a severely tone-deaf person may lack the basic aptitudes to become a famous musician. Instead of wasting time trying to be like their musically gifted friends, their time may be better invested in the pursuit of other interests they have, especially if they do not experience any intrinsic value from practicing music. Many opportunities are individual and cannot be provided equally among people. The second major criticism against the term equality is that it presents inequality as the main targeted concern, which often masks the true concern presented by a principle. Raz (1986) questions why we care if one person’s hunger is worse than another person’s hunger, and he decides that we care about the negative elements of being hungry, not inequality (p. 239-240). Adding to Raz’s argument, if we cared solely about inequality and not their hunger, we would be satisfied by starving both people to reduce inequality. This same line of reasoning causes Raz (1986) to conclude that morality requires more than principles of equality (p. 234). Inequality alone is insufficient evidence for injustice. When it comes to items of low value, equality becomes irrelevant. For example, if someone has more dust in their house or more leaves in their 35 trees, there is no reason to demand equality in relation to others. When it comes to goods like opportunities (or their lack), noticing inequalities may be useful as far as they may reveal injustices. Inequalities are not inherently unjust, but they may be symptomatic of injustice. The inequalities in themselves are possibly justified, but that does not justify the privations that may accompany them. Although inequalities may help identify injustices, it is rarely the inequality that is causing the unpleasant experience or effect. Raz (1986) says if one person is hungrier than another, it is the hunger that is relevant—the same goes for the need of the needy and the suffering of the ill (p. 240). He concludes that it is our concern for people in need, their hunger, their suffering that makes us give them priority, not our concerns for equality (Raz, 1986, p. 240). When equality is used to frame such principles, they can become misleading. If the suffering caused by hunger is the problem being targeted, equality need not be mentioned at all. For example, ‘people’s hunger should be equally satisfied,’ is not as accurate as, ‘we should have social provisions so no one suffers from hunger.’ The first of these two phrasings can be interpreted to miss the aim of preventing hunger entirely. Social equality has little ethical relevance outside of instances of privation. For example, imagine if during a famine, relief packages were organized to have more than double what the receiving family could eat in a week. Let us even suppose the families get to select the best possible foods of their preference. If all families were provided with the relief packages, and there was no scarcity, or even threat of scarcity, it would not really matter if one family consistently had access to two packages and the rest only had one. It would be unequal, but it would not provide any additional value (assuming they were not going to sell it or otherwise convert it into something else of value). A third criticism of equality as a social aim is that it can cause people to lose sight of other fundamental life aims. This criticism can be applied to both social and individual aims. At 36 the social level, it is possible for us to become too fixated on equality. Dixon (2010) notes that some philosophers have argued that the label inequality numbs our sensibilities to human pain (p. 25). In other words, inequality is an abstraction that distances the topic from the lived experiences of the people experiencing the correlated problems. For example, societal aims to resolve income inequality are vague and abstract. On the other hand, societal aims that targets families that are struggling to keep their children fed and clothed are more concrete. If the more concrete problem is addressed as a societal aim, there is a specific aim in mind, and the aim can be satisfied once all families have adequate food and shelter for their children. The abstract aim of income inequality also has no definitive end. The plausibility of having a society without income inequality is a topic of debate on its own. This aim is informed by the ideal that no one should lack necessities while others enjoy luxuries (Bedau, 1967), but this ideal dissolves beyond a certain threshold, once these necessities are met. The aim, however, to resolve income inequality, extends beyond this initial ideal that informs it. As a result, people may continue comparing income inequalities beyond necessities being met. Including elements of equality in social aims can cause unnecessary focus on equalities and inequalities that are a waste of time and resources, as they may not remedy any substantial societal harms. Debates about reducing inequalities between the middle class and the wealthy often ignore the emergency of poverty. Excessive social comparison can also cause us to lose sight of other valuable directions and opportunities to improve not only socially, but individually. This third criticism of equality as a social aim applies to individual aims as well, particularly when people are not living in states of privation. Frankfurt (1997) concisely sets out this critique in the following terms: “[A] concern for being equal to others tends to alienate people from themselves. It leads them to define their goals in terms that are set by considerations 37 other than the specific requirements of their own personal nature and of their own circumstances” (p. 13). People who are too tied up with comparing themselves to others may lose sight of their own aims in life. They may replace their desires and goods for others’ desires and goods by comparing what they lack in comparison to others. For example, someone may have been quite satisfied with their current phone until they saw a friend’s new one. While there may be nothing wrong with wanting a new phone after seeing someone else with one, this may distract someone from a more meaningful individual aim and cause that person to put resources towards something less rewarding in the long run. A phone is just a phone, but if this behaviour is fostered by comparing every element of one’s life to another's life, it could quickly detract from one’s individual life aims, leading to what Layard (2005) calls ‘The Hedonic Treadmill.’ Layard (2005) explains that living standards are like drugs, and if people are only concerned about getting new experiences, they will always be chasing them just to stay happy (as cited in Pilgrim, 2008, p. 248). If people are overly concerned with their position as it compares to others, they will not set goals of their own accord. In response, Layard (2006) has argued, that since happiness is negatively affected by other people’s incomes (p. 24), we should have a corrective tax to reduce the appeal of raising relative income (p. 27). While I do not argue to support or dismiss Layard’s suggestion, he does raise an important point that comparing ourselves to others has been demonstrated to lead to unhappiness (Layard, 2006, p. 26). People will not find much happiness in comparing themselves to others. Their goals and aims may become dictated by others, thereby diminishing their abilities to satisfy their own desires. Frankfurt does assume that people’s true desires are not always socially influenced, and this may be a topic of debate on its own. However, there does seem to be something intuitively undesirable about living a life that is dictated by the aims and desires of others. A freedom that is 38 valued in most liberal democracies, one that will be explored in the next chapter, is autonomy: that people ought to lay out and strive toward their own account of the good life. Focusing too heavily on equality can detract from the value of autonomy. The fourth criticism of equality as a social aim is that it is empty or too formalistic. Here I use the term ‘empty’ to mean that there is no content to the aim, and that the content must be supplied by some other aim. The problem with using an empty aim is that it can cause confusion: “Out of context, ‘equality’ is an empty framework for a social ideal; It [sic] has content only when particularized” (Benn & Peters, 2010, p. 115). This criticism is like the second one, which asserted that the addition of the term equality can be misleading. This criticism is different in the sense that aiming at social equality independently lacks content. In other words, we must state that we are aiming at social equality of something. The underlying social aim is not always masked by the term equality: sometimes there is no aim present at all. It is not uncommon to see the terms equality or equity used independently as aims or values in mission statements for educational and other social institutions, but these statements often fail to communicate what the equality is supposed to accomplish. This fourth criticism also suggests the possibility that some educational aims, such as equality on its own, are nonsensical. Frankfurt (1997) argues that equality does not have value independently, and it is an impediment to what is truly of moral and social worth (p. 13). The term equality may be added to social principles to give them an element of sympathy. Raz (1986), as I have already detailed, argues that any principle of equality requires some other principle that supports it (p. 173). Nozick (2003) also concludes that equality has no intrinsic merit. Equality is empty of both content and value on its own. If we aim at equality alone, we are not aiming at anything of substance or worth. 39 A fifth criticism of the social aim of equality is that it is often used metaphorically but interpreted literally. The term equality is often used as a moral endowment, not in a literal sense as it is often interpreted. Benn and Peters (1959) explain how when we say, “all men are equal,” we mean that no one deserves better treatment than others unless good grounds are given for unequal treatment (p. 110). We certainly do not mean “all people are the same” when we say they are equal; people are different in many ways. (In fact, we may value these differences!) The intention may be that people deserve to have the same rights or the same respect as one another, but these are prescriptions of rights and respect, not of equality. Simply saying “all men are equal” implies something other than what is said. The phrase suggests that there are some things that should be attributed universally, however, once again this phrase is empty. It gives no guidance for how people are to be equal, and leaves the interpretation subject to hermeneutical contradictions, many of which were not intended to be taken literally. My observation that equality is an ambiguous and empty social aim should not be interpreted as arguing that inequality is not a problem or that we should not care about it. I do argue that social inequality is insufficient as evidence of injustice or some other problem on its own. Social inequality can be symptomatic of injustices, misfortunes or disadvantages that are unnecessary and avoidable. Inequalities are concerning as far as they are connected to harm. If inequalities are a result of some harm or will likely be harmful, then there are grounds for social action. However, equalities of wealth, respect, and opportunities are not necessary in a just, liberal democracy. What is desirable is that people are not destitute, that their dignity is respected, and that people can make choices between good life options, regardless of how their options compare to others. 40 2.6 Summary When we clarify what we mean by equality as a social aim, it becomes apparent that we need to change how we currently use the term. There is no inherent value in making people equal. Equality of some other aim may be desirable, but it is desirable because of some deficiency or unmet need, not because it is equal. Although it is unlikely that equality will lose its appeal as an independent social aim, we must acknowledge that this social aim alone is ambiguous, empty and misleading. In this chapter, I presented several reasons why aiming at social equality is misguided. More specifically, I explained how it has many imperfect synonyms and can mean exact sameness, rough equality, similarity, fairness or equitability. I reviewed how egalitarians and liberals espouse equality as a social aim. I then introduced five critiques against equality as an aim. I argued that 1) equality is redundant when applied to general principles, 2) including equality as an aim can mask the true nature of the aim, 3) concerns for equality can cause people to lose sight of their own life aims, 4) equality is an empty aim that requires equality of something specific other than equality, and 5) equality is often used in metaphorical ways, leaving it open to literal misinterpretations. Although I have argued that equality alone is an empty aim, I do not intend to devalue egalitarian ideals or the variety of principles and aims that fall under this heading. These aims are often valuable: they are simply misidentified by the term equal. In Chapter 4, I will analyze a range of measures that promote social justice that are understood as promoting social equality. I will argue that all these approaches to justice are universally aiming at promoting elements of individual freedom and not equality. In the upcoming chapter then, I will present a conception of freedom that is intrinsically valuable in liberal democracies, and this conception of freedom, I will argue, is also the underlying value of social equality. 41 42 Chapter 3: Individual freedom and personal autonomy 3.1 Introduction to individual freedom In the last chapter I argued that aims of social equality should be valued for instrumental reasons, in the sense that these aims are valuable only as far as they aim to realize other goods or values.19 Although there may be some exceptions, I claim that the primary value promoted by social equality is individual freedom.20 Later I will argue that this value is central to educational justice, but before going on to do so, having developed this initial argument, the focus of this chapter is establishing a strong conception of individual freedom. Why is this needed for my argument? Conceptual clarity is necessary in the development of strong social and educational aims. For example, last chapter I explored how convoluted the aims of social equality can be without a clear conception of equality. Freedom can run into the same problems if it is not clearly conceptualized. If important concepts like freedom are misconceived or misunderstood, social aims will be less effective and may miss their marks. Therefore, before I defend the view that social equality aims at improving individual freedoms, I must articulate what exactly I mean by freedom. Freedom is another conceptually ambiguous term like equality. When people use this term, they are not always referring to the same things. The philosopher Robert Dearden (1972) notes the interchangeability and overlap in terms like autonomy, freedom and independence (p. 19 I will return to the topic of how social aims of equality are generally freedom promoting in Chapter 4. 20 Social equality may be valuable psychologically for people who compulsively compare themselves with others (Layard, 2006). The value of social equality in this sense comes from reducing envy—envy being negative. This consideration would require further exploration, as there are other effective ways to reduce envy. An analogous question would be whether revenge is valuable. Vengeance, like envy is often viewed as a negative emotion. If people desire retribution for previous harms, satisfying this desire is not necessarily valuable, and not synonymous with justice. In the same way, reducing envy is not necessarily valuable nor synonymous with justice. 43 334-335). He argues that clear concepts will help prevent such overlap and confusion in meaning, allowing for clear educational aims (Dearden, 1972, p. 333). We can talk about freedom in terms of individual freedom, free will, free states and so forth. The way we use the term freedom is complex. For example, we may call people in our society free. If people abuse their freedom, they may wind up in prison—this puts them in a position of non-freedom. But, in liberal democracies, we claim that our countries are free. Does this mean that someone can be both free and unfree? Is a prisoner in a free country still free? Is a non-imprisoned citizen in an unfree country free? Furthermore, people may be free to do what they want but refrain from acting when they have moral reason to do so. Definitive answers to these problems require more clarification of what is meant by freedom. Given problems of this sort, there does not seem to be a single defining criterion that can be used to distinguish between when people are ‘free’ and when they are ‘unfree.’ In the abstract, freedom does not appear to be an absolute state, but a matter of degree across numerous criteria and contexts. In this chapter, I set out to establish a conception of individual freedom that should serve as a universal aim for education in liberal democracies. If I am correct that individual freedom should serve this purpose, then all students in liberal democracies deserve to have access to individual freedom. In this sense, educational justice would be served by ensuring all students have access to individual freedom. The conception I present will be based on Raz’s (1986) conception of personal autonomy. The advantage of this conception, I will argue, is that it fully accounts for the many ways people use the term freedom. Raz’s (1986) conception of personal autonomy includes not only the freedom to engage in certain activities, but also requires access to the requisite skills for those activities and the freedom from undue interference while engaging in them. 44 Today, many people still side with Berlin on the topic of freedom. Berlin’s (1958) conception of freedom is in opposition to Raz’s conception. As such, I will proceed by outlining Berlin’s account of freedom and highlighting its shortcomings. Afterwards, I will outline Raz’s (1986) conception of personal autonomy and highlight why it is a stronger account of individual freedom. Following the outline of Raz’s (1986) account of personal autonomy, I will explore some of its implications, as they will become relevant to discussions of compulsory education in Chapter 5. 3.2 The concepts of negative and positive liberty Berlin’s (1958) conception of freedom remains a dominant one, particularly in liberal thought.21 In Chapter 2, I presented five reasons egalitarians and others who value social equality should reconsider this value. Now, in a similar manner, I will use Berlin’s conception of negative liberty to argue that some people should reconsider their conception of freedom. The burden I present in this thesis, to refocus the aims of education in liberal democracies, calls for people on both sides of the political divide to reconsider how they conceptualize important values. On this topic, I argue that Berlin’s (1958) conception of freedom is only part of the picture. Berlin (1958) articulates a distinction between two concepts of freedom: he calls them negative liberty and positive liberty. Berlin’s two concepts of liberty provide valuable insights into the many misunderstandings that arise in debates on freedom. In what follows, I will outline his two concepts of liberty. I should note in advance that Berlin favors his concept of negative liberty, so I will also explain why he rejects the concept of freedom as positive liberty. At the end 21 In our current polarized political environment, political views like those that Berlin presents (classical liberalism) are viewed as being right of centre. Berlin’s (1958) conception of liberty is also the one most commonly adopted by libertarians and what some people term neo-liberals. 45 of this section on negative and positive liberty, I will argue that his concept of negative liberty is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of individual freedom. Berlin (1958) defines negative liberty as freedom from interference with individual activities (p. 4). Liberty in this sense is negative because it entails the absence of interference. For example, if students are let outside at recess, and no one interferes with their activities, by say taking away their sticks or commanding them to go inside, in this sense, they are free. This does not mean that they are free to do anything they can imagine outside, like use someone’s car or build a rocket ship; it just means that no one will interfere with the activities they can accomplish independently. Berlin explains that on this account, coercion is deliberate interference in the activities of other human beings, and negative liberty is only deprived if someone deliberately prevents others from attaining their goals (Berlin, 1958, p. 4). So, if these students set out to build a rocket ship, but produce nothing more than a pile of sticks and grass, their negative liberty is unaffected. If no one intentionally interferes with the students’ independent activities, their negative liberty remains intact. However, if someone physically restrains these students from collecting their grass, or kicks over their pile of sticks, then their negative liberty is deprived. Negative liberty is essentially the absence of interpersonal interference. Some people hold negative liberty and individual freedom to be one and the same. In other words, they claim that having negative liberty is both necessary and sufficient for being free (Berlin, 1958; Dearden, 1972). Many liberal thinkers are sympathetic to the concept of freedom as solely negative liberty. Both Berlin (1958) and Dearden (1972) prefer to conceptualize freedom in this negative sense. For example, Dearden (1972) claims that, “On a fairly widely accepted view, freedom is a negative notion. It consists in the absence of 46 constraints or restraints relevant to what we do want or might want to do” (p. 335). Although it may be widely accepted, I disagree with this view. Negative liberty is an essential element of individual freedom, but there are other important conditions that contribute towards individual freedom as well. The primary reason I view negative liberty as insufficient for individual freedom is because of two underlying assumptions. I will expand upon this point later, but the first assumption of negative liberty is that people have some worthwhile activities that make freedom from interference desirable in the first place. The second assumption is that if I have some worthwhile activities to engage in, this also assumes that I have the abilities required to engage in them. For instance, rewarding students with free-time after completing their work is not very rewarding if there is literally nothing for them to do but sit still. Likewise, giving students a textbook is not the same as giving them the freedom to learn: the students may not have the skills required to learn from the textbook. By extension, it is not difficult to imagine people in difficult circumstances, such as severe poverty or poor health, in which the absence of interference with their actions does not put them in positions of freedom.22 People in such difficult circumstances seem to be somehow less free. They are unable to direct their lives in the ways they may desire. Berlin calls this other notion of freedom ‘positive liberty.’ Berlin clarifies his concept of negative liberty by contrasting it with positive liberty. Berlin (1958) defines positive liberty as the ability to self-govern (p. 14). He emphasizes the importance of self-direction in this concept of freedom: the desire that people’s lives and decisions are based on their own will and not on external forces. Berlin (1958) explains that with positive liberty, “Freedom is to plan my life in accordance with my own will...a rule does not 22 This same line of argument is put forward by scholars taking a capability approach to justice (Sen, 1993; Nussbaum, 1992). 47 oppress me or enslave me if I impose it on myself or accept it freely, having understood it, even if it was invented by others” (p.21). Positive liberty is about the freedom to choose for oneself. For example, if my life choices are made by others, such as which university to attend or who to date, then I am not exercising my positive liberty. Berlin does not think that people can conceptualize freedom as both negative and positive liberty. Berlin presents positive and negative liberty as at odds with one another. He notes that proponents for negative liberty view positive liberty as nothing more than a disguise for total slavery (Berlin, 1958, p. 10-11). He outlines the heart of their incompatibility in a few sentences: “What liberals demand, therefore, is the limitation of sovereignty as such; what believers in ‘positive’ liberty demand is the placing of it in their own and not in others’ hands. These views are ultimately not reconcilable” (Berlin, 1958, p. 34). In other words, negative liberty is about limiting how much power is given to the state or to people in positions of power, but positive liberty is about distributing that same power to individuals. Proponents of negative liberty are not concerned about who holds control over certain aspects of their lives if this control is limited. On the other hand, proponents of positive liberty do not care as much about the constraints placed on their lives, so long as they are in control of these constraints. For example, proponents of negative liberty would be fine with living under a monarchy, so long as the powers of that monarchy were limited. In contrast, proponents of positive liberty would question the authority of the monarchy, particularly if citizens had no choice but to be ruled by them. Further, proponents of negative liberty would reject the demands of democratic governments if they infringed on personal freedoms; by contrast, proponents of positive liberty would accept the infringements on their freedoms, so long as citizens had voted for the infringements. Berlin does 48 not think that both concepts of freedom can be held simultaneously. He presents these two concepts of liberty as an either-or situation. Given the choice between the two possible concepts of liberty, Berlin favors negative liberty. He rejects positive liberty for two major reasons. First, he argues that positive liberty encourages self-denial. He explains that living under a concept of positive liberty, if people want to direct their own lives, but they cannot satisfy certain desires, they should simply rid themselves of those desires to increase their freedom (Berlin, 1958, p. 15-16). For example, if I have always aspired to be wealthy, but I am unable to secure sufficient employment, I can simply rid myself of the desire for wealth to increase my freedom; I can be the master of my own life simply by sabotaging my desires. Berlin argues that this ‘retreat to the inner citadel’ as he calls it, is undesirable since it causes people to unnecessarily restrict their goals, aspirations and desires. The second reason he rejects positive liberty is because it can be used to justify coercion, in the name of idealism and self-realization (Berlin, 1958, p. 22-27). Berlin (1958) argues that positive liberty allows for the establishment of a ‘rational ideal,’ realizable in practice, whereby people are wholly wise, good, just, free and happy (p. 35). He thinks that conceptualizing freedom as positive liberty is dangerous because it can be exploited to justify coercive attempts to promote rational idealism. For example, if freedom is my ability to self-direct, then any assistance I can be given to self-direct increases my freedom. If the aim is to maximize my freedom, then others are justified in interfering with my actions, so long as this interference increases my positive liberty. For instance, if I have always wanted to live in France, but lacked the motivation required to learn the language, others may be justified in forcing me to learn French against my will, for my own good. Further, they may even be justified in forcing me to 49 move to France at gunpoint, so long as their actions allow me to achieve my goals. As a result, Berlin (1958) concludes that freedom is better conceptualized as negative liberty. While I disagree with Berlin’s (1958) conclusion that freedom ought to be conceptualised solely as negative liberty, negative liberty itself is an important condition for freedom. I will argue later that the major elements of Berlin’s two concepts of freedom, negative and positive liberty, are not only reconcilable, but both necessary conditions for individual freedom. Berlin’s hesitations about positive liberty also prove to be valuable since they can be used to test if a conception of freedom is too paternalistic or self-denying. I hold negative liberty as a necessary condition for individual freedom, so it is important to explore the concept more fully. Negative liberty is a necessary condition of individual freedom, but unrestricted negative liberty is undesirable. People subject to undue coercion cannot be said to be free, but certainly there are times when people ought to be forcibly prevented from engaging in certain activities. Negative liberty has been defended as the most basic political principle of liberalism, both by Berlin and the philosopher J. S. Mill (Hardy, 2018). Negative liberty is essentially the freedom to be left alone unless there are sound reasons to interfere. But when is interference justified? The most common justification for state interference with personal activities is harm. There are desirable limitations to our negative liberties. Even Berlin (1958) acknowledges that negative liberty must be balanced with other values (p. 34). There are times when state interference with personal activities is justifiable and desirable. But how do we know when interference is justified and when it is not? Mill argues that decisions to interfere should not be based on public opinion or social pressure. He thinks that certain undesirable ways of living should be tolerated, even if most people despise them. Mill’s (1859) position prevents a 50 potential ‘tyranny of the majority,’ whereby popular opinion leads to injustice (p. 8-9). Following his line of reasoning, the fact that most people in one state may reject the practice of gay marriage is not a sound reason for rejecting it. He argues that democratic decisions regarding individual freedoms ought to be limited. Mill (2007) argues that the only legitimate reasons for states to interfere with the actions of citizens, against their will, is to prevent harm (p. 16).23 Mill’s ‘harm principle’ as this is called, justifies restrictions of individual activities in the name of self-preservation. The harm principle justifies state interference when people intend to harm others. According to this principle, interference with personal activities cannot otherwise be justified. Therefore, when I refer to negative liberty, I am referring to negative liberty that is subject to Mill’s harm principle. Negative liberty in this restricted sense is always valuable. But unrestricted negative liberty is undesirable because it leaves people vulnerable to those who may wish them harm. Unrestricted negative liberty as a general principle is also paradoxical, so it must be restricted by something; if people are free from interference in their actions, how are conflicts resolved when individual activities negatively affect the activities of others? There needs to be an additional principle that resolves these conflicts, and the harm principle fits the bill. In this refined sense, negative liberty protects people from undue interference in their lives. Interestingly, this necessary condition of freedom also presents a duty: the duty to leave others alone, to tolerate them, unless their activities may be harmful. 23 Raz (1986) argues that the harm principle allows for perfectionist policies if they do not require coercion (p. 420). Perfectionist policies, in this sense, are policies that shape our conception of the good life (e.g. curriculum that attempts to impart democratic values). 51 Mill’s harm principle has been both strongly criticized and defended. The major problem with his principle is that he never clearly defines what he means by ‘harm.’ This has left precise interpretations of his harm principle open for debate. One of the most cogent interpretations of what Mill means by harm is put forward by Turner (2014), where he interprets Mill’s “harm” as generally implying “bad consequences,” as a companion term for “good,” just as “cost” is to “benefit” (Turner, 2014, p. 320). Turner’s argument is more convincing than more extravagant interpretations of what Mill may have intended by ‘harm’ because if Mill had meant something other than this simple interpretation, like only coercion or bodily violence, he likely would have elaborated. Mill carefully articulates his more complex concepts and principles. It would be uncharacteristic of his writing to have skipped over ‘harm’ if he intended something more complex. Therefore, I will rely on Turner’s simple understanding of harm throughout the remainder of this thesis. So, when I refer to negative liberty, I am referring to the same negative liberty Berlin presents, particularly the freedom from undue interference in personal activities; what justifies interference in this sense is that the activities may cause harm to others. As I mentioned earlier, I part ways with Berlin and other thinkers on the topic of negative liberty. While I agree that negative liberty is a necessary condition of individual freedom, I do not think it is sufficient. The major reason for my position is that negative liberty is about a lack of undue interference with personal activities, but this statement assumes that I have some personal activities worth pursuing. It also assumes that I have the abilities required to engage in these activities. Teachers often want greater professional autonomy, but imagine a teacher with complete professional autonomy but nothing worth teaching. Negative liberty presupposes such activities are somewhat worthwhile, or else there would be no loss if my pursuit of them was subject to interference. But 52 people in certain difficult circumstances may lack access to worthwhile personal activities, or they may lack the abilities to engage in them. Individual freedom then, also requires that 1) people have the necessary skills to engage in certain activities, and 2) they have opportunities to engage in worthwhile activities. These two conditions are included in Raz’s (1986) account of personal autonomy. 3.3 The concept of personal autonomy I have argued that one necessary condition of individual freedom is freedom from interference. Positive liberty accounts for the other two conditions. Positive liberty requires that people not only have access to opportunities worth pursuing, but also that they have access to the skills required to engage in them. Together, these three conditions are jointly sufficient for individual freedom. By this, I mean that people must satisfy all three conditions to enjoy individual freedom. While I relied primarily on Berlin’s (1958) distinction to introduce negative liberty and the debate surrounding freedom, it is Raz’s (1986) concept of personal autonomy that presents the most complete account of individual freedom. I will argue Raz (1986) includes all three elements of freedom in his account of personal autonomy. I also believe that Raz’s account completely addresses the hesitations that Berlin holds against positive liberty, showing that these hesitations are unfounded. Academic debates on the meaning and importance of autonomy are current and relevant to the field of educational philosophy (Hirst et al., 1972; Dearden, 1972; Raz, 1986; Young, 1986; Brighouse, 2000; Taylor, 2005; Schinkel, 2010; Martin, 2018). However, resolving the debate between different concepts of autonomy lies outside the scope of my argument. Instead, I will rely on Raz’s (1986) concept of personal autonomy. Not only is his concept very robust, it is in line with many of the educational aims we hold in liberal democracies. For example, we are 53 under the impression that education can indeed cultivate certain autonomy promoting dispositions in students.24 We believe that education will help prepare students to live independently. Our educational policies and curriculum prescribe a sequence of skills for students to acquire, with the aim of developing their cognitive, reasoning and critical thinking skills. We attempt to teach students to reflect on their own goals and interests. We expect that a good education will present students with valuable life options. In liberal democracies, some of the major aims of our educational systems already attempt to promote a skill set that is in line with Raz’s (1986) concept of autonomy. Raz’s (1986) concept of personal autonomy is relatively simple. He defines personal autonomy as the idea that people should make their own lives (p. 369). Raz’s concept is like those of Dagger, Spinner-Halev, Benn, Callan, Dworkin, Gutmann, Kymlicka, Macedo and Reich (Swaine, 2020, p. 34). His concept stems from the liberal tradition as identified by Swaine (2020), where autonomy is identified as basically “self-rule” (p. 36).25 While other liberal concepts of autonomy present some valuable considerations, they all boil down to the same basic idea of self-governance (Killmister, 2017).26 Raz (1986) notes the importance of people controlling, to some extent, their own destinies, and shaping their lives through successive decisions (Raz, 1986, p. 369). He outlines the identifying qualities of an autonomous person: 24 See for example the BC curriculum page that includes competencies for developing communication skills, furthering learning, getting things done, intellectual development, understanding, habits of mind, metacognitive awareness, individual thriving, self-knowledge and achieving one’s purpose in the world (Core Competencies). 25 Swaine (2020) further defines autonomy by contrasting it with heteronomy, where rule is by external sources (p. 40). 26 There are subtle differences between autonomy as self-rule and self-governance, but at this level, they are similar enough to fit under the same conceptual umbrella. In essence, the idea of self-rule is one of total self-control, whereas self-governance implies a partially shared responsibility of self-direction (Swaine, 2020, p. 68-72). 54 An autonomous agent or person is one who has the capacity to be or to become significantly autonomous at least to a minimal degree. Significant autonomy is a matter of degree. A person may be more or less autonomous. (Significantly) autonomous persons are those who can shape their life and determine its course. They are not merely rational agents who can choose between options after evaluating relevant information, but agents who can in addition adopt personal projects, develop relationships, and accept commitments to causes, through which their personal integrity and sense of dignity and self-respect are made concrete. In a word, significantly autonomous agents are part creators of their own moral world. (Raz, 1986, p. 154) For Raz, personal autonomy requires more than being able to make choices between life options. Personal autonomy requires that people have the capacity to shape the directions of their lives, to identify some of their own values, and have a say in how they ought to live. Raz’s concept of autonomy has several parallels with Berlin’s concept of positive liberty. Raz (1986) himself notes that his concept of personal autonomy, which involves both certain abilities and adequate options, has been referred to as positive freedom (p. 408). He further notes that whatever increases one’s positive freedom enhances one’s abilities to live autonomously (Raz, 1986, p. 409). He also includes the two conditions I presented earlier in connection with positive liberty—1) certain abilities and 2) adequate options—as the first two conditions for personal autonomy. Raz's third condition for personal autonomy accounts for negative liberty. Raz’s (1986) third condition for personal autonomy is 3) independence (p. 372). He explains the place of the 55 third condition, alongside the first two: “Finally, his choice must be free from coercion and manipulation by others, he must be independent” (Raz, 1986, p. 373). This third condition may sound familiar, since what Raz calls ‘independence’ is essentially what Berlin calls negative liberty. So, with conditions 1) and 2), Raz encapsulates what was previously introduced as positive liberty, and with 3) he includes negative liberty. In other words, Raz’s concept of personal autonomy is a conjunction of the two concepts of liberty. Yet, recall that Berlin argues the two concepts conflict with each other and cannot be held simultaneously. In what follows, I will therefore outline how Raz combines the two concepts of liberty without running into the conceptual impasse Berlin (1958) presents. Before I get too far into Raz’s conditions of autonomy, it is important to note that he distinguishes between two ways we use autonomy—autonomy as a value and autonomy as a capacity (Raz, 1986, p. 372). He explains that living an autonomous life is the value of autonomy, since having lived an autonomous life is intrinsically valuable. For example, if the way I live allows me to establish my own worthwhile goals and to make decisions that progresses me towards these goals, this way of living is intrinsically valuable. But Raz further explains that the capacity for living autonomously is valuable instrumentally: it is valuable as far as it allows one to live an autonomous life. This means that the skills and aptitudes required for autonomous living are not necessarily of intrinsic value, but they are valuable because they are prerequisite to living an autonomous life. For example, people may use the skills required for autonomous living poorly, which may not end up contributing at all to their ability to live autonomously. So, to reiterate, Raz identifies autonomous living as intrinsically valuable. The capacity for autonomy, on the other hand, is necessary for autonomous living, but it is also 56 compatible with poor decisions. Therefore, the capacity for autonomy is only valuable instrumentally, as far as it contributes towards living an autonomous life. The three conditions required for the capacity of autonomy are what Raz (1986) calls the ‘conditions for autonomy.’ In what follows, I will briefly account for each condition in more depth, and then I will explore how Raz's concept avoids Berlin’s hesitations. It is important that Raz’s concepts fully addresses Berlin’s hesitations, as many liberal thinkers still side with Berlin on the topic of negative liberty. If Raz is correct, however, and individual freedom includes elements of positive liberty, this has broad reaching implications for freedom promoting education in liberal democracies. These implications will be explored in Chapter 5. Raz notes that people have varying degrees of personal autonomy, since people will meet these conditions at varying levels (Raz, 1986, p. 154). As such, personal autonomy is not all-or-nothing. It is a matter of degree. Raz’s first condition of autonomy is a set of abilities. Raz (1986) notes that for someone to make their own life, they need certain mental abilities, including the abilities to form sufficiently complex intentions, rationality, comprehension and faculties to plan their actions (p. 372-373). When Raz says “sufficiently complex intentions” he is talking about the ability to establish personal goals. These goals can range from large life goals to minor ones. For someone to be what Raz considers ‘significantly autonomous,’ they require some proficiency with all these abilities. The second condition of autonomy is an adequacy of options. What really separates Raz from Berlin is that Raz (1986) argues that people must have access to an adequate range of choices in their lives to be autonomous (p. 373). Raz (1986) explains that these options must include both long-term pervasive consequences, short-term options of little consequence and a 57 good spread of options in-between (p. 374). Raz (1986) lists some examples like commitments, projects, friendships, relationships and other occupations, all the way down to the insignificant things like when to bathe (p. 374). He notes that adequate choices are necessary in all aspects of our lives if we are to be considered the authors of our own lives. Raz also thinks that having adequate options demands a variety of available options. Raz observes that people have a variety of innate drives, like moving around, exercising their bodies, engaging in imagination, affection and so on. He considers these innate human drives and argues that an autonomous life requires that people have options that allow them to exercise all the capacities that we have innate drives to exercise—or options to decline their development (Raz, 1986, p. 375). He also argues that autonomy requires the availability of morally acceptable options (Raz, 1986, p. 381). By ‘moral’ he means options that are not in conflict with the values held by individuals. For example, a pacifist that is only provided career options in the army, air force or navy, is not given adequate options. The reasoning is that if people want to be moral, but have no moral options available, then they cannot choose to live in the way they want. People cannot in that sense be autonomous. Raz further notes that autonomy does not require that people select from this range of morally acceptable options, but he does argue that autonomy is only valuable if it is exercised in the pursuit of the good. The third condition of autonomy is independence. As I mentioned earlier, this condition essentially entails negative liberty. However, in his full account, Raz’s condition of independence is a little more complex than just negative liberty. Negative liberty is primarily protection from coercion, or undue interference with personal activities, but Raz also considers independence a protection against manipulation. Coercion and manipulation are similar in the sense that they are both ways of invading personal autonomy. Raz’s notion of coercion does not 58 stray from Berlin’s notion. But Raz (1968) argues that where coercion is about interfering with a person’s options, manipulation is about perverting how the person reaches their decision or goals (p. 377-378). Violations of independence (i.e. coercion and manipulation) subject the will of one person to that of another (Raz, 1986, p. 378). The logic here is straightforward: if people are no longer the authors of their own lives, then they cannot be called autonomous. People may wonder why these conditions are worthwhile when they can, after all, be used in pursuits of the good or the bad. Autonomy is valuable because living an autonomous life contributes to individual well-being. Raz (1986) defines personal ‘well-being’ as the successful pursuits of self-chosen goals (p. 370). It is important not to confuse well-being with self-interest. Raz (1986) defines ‘self-interest’ as desires that maintain people’s biological lives, like having access to proper nutrition, shelter, safety and so forth (Raz, 1986, p. 295-296). Raz explains that doctors providing medical assistance to victims of an epidemic sacrifice their self-interest but retain their well-being (p. 296); they put their desires for safety at risk for the satisfaction of other desires, in this case, their goals to help others. Individual freedom is best understood in terms of personal autonomy. The conditions of personal autonomy account for both negative and positive liberty, which are the two major ways people conceptualize freedom. Individual freedom, if taken to mean this conjunction of positive and negative liberties, is the freedom to create one’s life: “Autonomy means that a good life is a life which is a free creation” (Raz, 1986, p. 412). If Raz is correct, then the negative liberty is insufficient for individual freedom. Negative liberty provides freedom from undue interference, but it is not particularly valuable for people lacking worthwhile activities or the abilities to engage in those activities. Likewise, positive liberty alone is too narrow because it does not account for personal independence. Raz’s condition of independence serves as protection against 59 both coercion and manipulation, putting Berlin’s hesitations about positive liberty to rest. If people are independent as Raz imagines, they are not subject to the paternalism and idealism of others. Forcing people to be perfect contradicts the whole point of personal autonomy. No one could justifiably force another to better satisfy conditions 1) or 2). In short, Raz’s (1986) concept of personal autonomy is relatively simple. Autonomy is a person’s ability to make one’s own life, to be involved in the selection of a good life, to establish goals and make progress towards those goals. An autonomous life is valuable for its own sake. The capacity for autonomy requires three conditions: certain abilities, adequate options and independence. Since people will have these conditions met to varying degrees, autonomy is a matter of degree. Autonomy contributes to personal well-being, which is essentially the joy people experience from setting their own goals and making choices that progress them towards these goals. Autonomy is presented as a necessary condition for a person’s well-being, and an essential element of the good life (Raz, 1986, p. 424-425). 3.4 Personal autonomy and compulsory education The goal of my thesis is to defend an argument that—within a liberal democratic context—compulsory education ought to provide access to the conditions for personal autonomy. This aim is foundational to any conception of educational justice. I argue that these aims of individual freedom are broadly held, although they are sometimes masked as aims of social equality. In Chapter 4, I will analyze some of the primary movements for social equality. In Chapter 5, I will argue that aims of social justice are better understood in terms of personal autonomy. However, my position has some immediate implications for compulsory education even before we go into these matters. Which is why, before moving on, it is worth considering some preliminary implications about compulsory education that promotes personal autonomy. The 60 following section considers several implications from Raz’s (1986) account of personal autonomy, including the duty to help others develop autonomous capacities, the provision of adequate options, accounting for students with diverse needs, the importance of toleration and the relationship between self-realization, personal autonomy and self-control. Raz (1986) argues that if the conditions of autonomy are to be met, people have certain duties towards one another to provide these conditions. Raz (1986) argues that personal autonomy requires certain interpersonal responsibilities: One is to help in creating the inner capacities required for the conduct of an autonomous life. Some of these concern cognitive capacities, such as the power to absorb, remember and use information, reasoning abilities, and the like. Others concern one's emotional and imaginative make-up. Still others concern health, and physical abilities and skills. Finally, there are character traits essential or helpful for a life of autonomy. They include stability, loyalty and the ability to form personal attachments and to maintain intimate relationships. The third type of autonomy-based duty towards another concerns the creation of an adequate range of options for him to choose from. (p. 408) As with negative liberty, it seems almost paradoxical that for people to be the masters of their own lives they have responsibilities towards others. On the other hand, we necessarily share our lives with others. Our existence is not individual. To maintain our autonomy, certain liberties must be defended, not only for ourselves, but for others as well. However, personal autonomy does not have to be directly supported by all individuals. We can indirectly satisfy this duty towards others through the institutions we create. In fact, most of the duties that Raz outlines 61 here can be accomplished at the institutional level, through institutions such as public education, public health and families. To a large extent, personal health and the quality of someone’s family are subject to chance. On the other hand, the quality of public education available to students can be made consistent. Although personal capacities are subject to chance as well, this leaves compulsory education as one of the most important—if not the primary—institution for promoting consistent access to personal autonomy.27 A society that values personal autonomy needs to ensure that people have access to adequate options in their lives. It is important to note that these options need to be appealing to the individuals making the choices. Offering someone many options, but none that are desirable, is the same as having no options. Raz (1986) argues similarly that the choice between hundreds of identical options is no choice at all (p. 365). It can be difficult to distinguish good life options from bad ones. When help is required, it should be from trusted adults that have a person’s best interests in mind. Studies have found that adults who are closest and attuned to listening to the desires of their dependents are, in fact, in the best positions to make these sorts of decisions (Jacobs et al., 2019). The purpose of including this point is to resist the idea that good life options can be identified technocratically—by experts that do not know the individuals or their goals. If our society values autonomy, it has the duty to provide its members with the conditions for autonomy. Compulsory education is one of the primary institutions for providing these conditions to everyone. Raz (1986) argues that autonomy is morally valuable, and this is reason enough to promote it for everyone (p. 407). He explains that when people control and determine 27 See for example White (1990), Curren (2000), Brighouse (2002), Winch, (2002), Guttman (2003), Schinkel (2010), Hand and Levinson (2012), Moschella (2016), and Martin (2018). 62 aspects of their lives, this is intrinsically valuable (Raz, 1986, p. 144). Raz’s idea that personal autonomy is necessary for individual well-being is backed by recent studies in social science. Bubic & Erceg (2018) have shown that people feel most fulfilled when they make choices towards major life goals (p. 223). Although it comes as no surprise that people are happiest when drawing nearer their goals, it is important to recognize that this element of drawing towards personal goals is necessary for personal well-being.28 Compulsory education that promotes personal autonomy also requires toleration. Raz (1986) explains that toleration is not just refraining from coercing others who seem to be acting wrong or evil; toleration is the curbing of unwelcoming activities based on dislike and antagonism, allowing others to maintain their direction or advantage (p. 401-402). He notes that toleration is not only about tolerating what people see in others as bad or wrong, but also tolerating their limitations (Raz, 1986, p. 403). In this sense, compulsory education (the institution) must be structured in a way that is tolerant of a diverse range of students, and it must also help students become tolerant towards others. Valuing personal autonomy demands toleration for a variety of ways of living. To advocate for personal autonomy is to advocate for moral pluralism (Raz, 1986, p. 133). Moral pluralism is essentially the idea that multiple, incompatible, but morally valuable forms of life exist (Raz, 1986, p. 133). In other words, there are many ways that people could live a good life. For example, in liberal democracies, one form of the good life includes a family life. Having children and living a family life closes off some alternative options for living a good life, such as living a single professional life. In liberal democracies, however, living a single professional life 28 Interestingly, the ability to pursue long-term goals allows people to more successfully accomplish the instrumental goals necessary in their achievement (Bubic & Erceg, 2018, p. 223). 63 is also seen as a valuable option for living. People living in liberal democracies hold a variety of (at times conflicting) values, likes and dislikes, so an autonomy valuing society must provide options for all acceptable versions of the good life. This requires toleration at both the individual and institutional levels. Another important educational implication is that providing the conditions for autonomy is not the same as demanding student self-realization. Raz’s condition of independence avoids the paternalism of positive liberty—thereby satisfying one of Berlin’s hesitations. If people are to be free from coercion and manipulation, they cannot be forced to choose options against their will, even if those options may have better outcomes for them. Here Raz (1986) makes an important distinction between self-realization and autonomy. He notes that self-realization and autonomy are often mistaken terms: “Self-realization consists in the development to their full extent...all the valuable capacities a person possesses. The autonomous person is the one who makes his own life, and he may choose the path of self-realization or reject it” (Raz, 1986, p. 375). He argues that self-realization is separate from his notion of autonomy. If autonomy is valuable as far as it allows a person to pursue the good life, and a necessary condition of well-being (Raz, 1986, p. 424-425), then a valuable autonomous life is likely one that includes some measure of self-realization. However, as Raz (1986) explains, an autonomous life is valuable when it promotes the good, but autonomy is still compatible with poorly lived lives (p. 412). Promoting autonomy, then, does not necessarily entail self-realization. Choosing to avoid self-realization is compatible with personal autonomy; it is just perhaps contrary to its value. One last implication is that compulsory education for personal autonomy does not force students to become self-denying. If anything, education that provides access to the conditions for personal autonomy promotes the opposite. This point addresses Berlin’s other hesitation about 64 positive liberty, where he sees it as self-denying, causing a retreat to the inner citadel. Personal autonomy is valuable as far as it contributes to personal well-being, which requires the establishment of personal goals and the pursuit of their achievement. Personal autonomy is valuable for the sake of trying new things, exploring different ways of interacting with the world and being creative. To discard these goals in the name of increased freedom would be to discard personal well-being for the sake of personal well-being. It would be contrary to the value of personal autonomy. This concept of personal autonomy, therefore, presents no reasons to be concerned about fostering self-denial. 3.5 Summary Some people hold negative liberty to be the extent of individual freedom, but this definition of freedom is too narrow. If freedom entails only freedom from undue interference with personal activities, the value of this freedom relies on an assumption that people have some worthwhile activities and the requisite skills to engage in them. In essence, the value of negative liberty relies on some level of positive liberty. Raz’s concept of personal autonomy accounts for the value of individual freedom completely. Therefore, individual freedom is best conceptualized as personal autonomy. Individual freedom, in this sense, is universally valuable in liberal democracies, and should serve as a universal educational aim. In the following chapters, when I refer to individual freedom or personal autonomy, I am referring to Raz's (1986) conception as outlined in this chapter. In the upcoming chapter, I will argue that the sets of ideas commonly understood as promoting social equality—equity, inclusion and diversity—are all aiming at promoting some measure of individual freedom. 65 Chapter 4: The three calls for “social equality” 4.1 Current aims for social equality I have reached the point where it is possible to explain the importance of equality and freedom in debates regarding educational justice. The overarching argument of my thesis is that in liberal democracies, educational justice should require universal access to the conditions of personal autonomy for all citizens. Up to this point, I have presented two premises of this argument. In Chapter 2, I argued that equality alone is an insufficient social aim. In Chapter 3, I argued that individual freedom is best understood in terms of personal autonomy. In this chapter, I bring these two premises together to argue that many of the arguments in favour of social equality—particularly equality in education—are actually arguments promoting elements of individual freedom.29 Before I go on to argue in Chapter 5 that educational justice requires the provision of universal access to the conditions of personal autonomy, I need to show that many of the current measures to promote social equality are actually promoting individual freedom. The layout of this chapter will be as follows. First, I will highlight how current thinking about equality in education has been strongly influenced by critical theory (in all of its various forms). As such, I will introduce critical theory and critical pedagogy, the language used in these domains and importantly, identify the core critical aim as human emancipation. Next, I will argue that calls for social equality are actually calls for social justice. In the remaining portion of the chapter, I will analyze each call for social justice separately, arguing that measures to promote equity, inclusion and diversity are not aiming at social equality, but at social justice, 29 In this case, I call these elements of individual freedom because these aims are necessary, but insufficient for individual freedom. I will explain in Chapter 5 how aims towards human emancipation are necessary but insufficient for personal autonomy. 66 particularly, social justice through human emancipation. This argument is not intended to discredit the aims of human emancipation, but to illustrate how they fit in with broader aims towards securing general access to personal autonomy.30 4.2 Critical theory and human emancipation There are several politically popular ideologies that promote what is commonly perceived as social equality. These ideologies can be analyzed to reveal the aims of social equality in our society. When I say ‘ideology,’ I mean an established way of thinking, or a set of ideas that promotes a particular set of aims to the exclusion of others.31 Critical theorists have taken up topics that deal with social inequalities, particularly inequalities due to racial domination, gender oppression, multiculturalism, climate change, radical democracy, neoliberalism and so forth (Wheeler-Bell, 2019, p. 275). One problem with my use of the term ideology is that it often takes on negative or pejorative connotations in the context of critical theory and critical pedagogy (Foucault, 1980; Habermas, 1990; Bohman, 2000; Giroux, 2004; Wheeler-Bell, 2017). When people examine the world using critical theory, which is largely grounded in the Marxist/neo-Marxist tradition, ideologies are criticized as sets of ideas and beliefs that reproduce forms of domination (Wheeler-Bell, 2017, p. 564). It is important to note I am attempting to reconstruct the positions of people who advocate for social equality. As such, I will be reconstructing these positions, but not evaluating them at this point. I will be using technical 30 If my argument stands, valuing social equality is the same as valuing personal freedom: egalitarians are just particularly concerned with the personal freedoms of people from groups that tend not to have sufficient access to personal freedom. 31 In this sense, it could be argued that my position in this paper is ideological. Perhaps this is true, as I do defend and advocate for general access to personal autonomy. On the other hand, the “ideology” of liberalism is devoid of content: it does not promote a particular set of beliefs, other than the one that people should access to the most comprehensive set of beliefs available. Perhaps the most ideological element of my argument so far has been adopting the harm principle, in which I view harm as sound grounds to interfere with the activities of others. 67 language that is not always clear outside of these conversations, but I will try to explain key terms when I come across them. My plan is to treat these concepts as charitably as possible and undertake conceptual analysis to uncover what they mean. Equity, inclusion and diversity are separate ideologies, although there is some overlap between them. Since these ideologies are founded upon the same principles as critical theory, I will avoid using the term ideology when referring to them. Instead, I will generally refer to these three sets of ideas as the three calls for social equality. The aim of this chapter is to establish what exactly these three calls entail, and to analyze their aims. I will proceed by introducing the framework of critical theory and critical pedagogy, under which these three calls primarily operate. Critical theory came out of the Western European Marxist tradition of the Frankfurt School (Wheeler-Bell, 2019). Critical theory has evolved since its original conception. It has developed in response to significant academic contributions (Habermas, 1990) and to changing political and economic climates. By today’s standard, critical theory is not one specific doctrine related to any specific field. Instead, critical theory, or the label ‘critical’ is appropriated by various disciplines that have strayed quite far from the original philosophical grounding (Wheeler-Bell, 2019). The philosopher Axel Honneth (2007) credits Horkheimer as one of the most important founding figures of critical theory. Despite being called a theory, Horkheimer (1972) thinks that critical theory is as much about practice. But what exactly is Horkheimer’s original vision for critical theory? What is he hoping that it can help to achieve? Horkheimer (1972) thinks that critical theory can enact positive real-world change. Horkheimer writes under the tradition of social philosophy, which aims to articulate and resolve 68 social misdevelopments, disorders or pathologies—all conceptualizations of societies going wrong (Honneth, 2007, p. 18). Horkheimer (1972) thinks that critical theory can improve the world by eliminating human slavery.32 He explains that knowledge and theory are not enough to realize the changes he has in mind: “[T]he theory never aims simply at an increase of knowledge as such. Its goal is man’s emancipation from slavery...the free development of individuals depends on the rational constitution of society” (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 246). This primary goal that Horkheimer (1972) identifies to eliminate human slavery is known as ‘human emancipation.’33 He notes here that free individual development requires a rationally constructed society. In other words, he argues that people need to imagine desirable social arrangements and produce plans for achieving these goals, as opposed to allowing these arrangements to arise through happenstance. He also notes that knowledge (about the societal functions that produce oppression) is only part of the theory, and only valuable as far as it contributes to this primary aim of emancipation. Importantly, this aim of human emancipation that Horkheimer establishes is at the foundation of all critical theory. Although Horkheimer plays a key role in the development of critical theory, he is not its only major figure. But it is beyond the scope of this chapter to include a full historical account of critical theory. Instead, I will focus only on key additions that contribute to current ideas about social and educational justice. 32 The type of slavery Horkheimer has in mind is a corruption of power relations whereby some people are left without much or any power. Similar concepts of social pathologies include bifurcation, reification, alienation, nihilism, demystification, depersonalization, commercialization and collective neurosis (Honneth, 2007, p. 62). 33 In my opinion, Horkheimer’s (1972) use of the term ‘slavery’ is too hyperbolic as it trivializes actual slavery. He uses the term ‘human slavery’ in a broader sense, referring to people in positions where they have little control over the direction of their lives. 69 Critical theory has been applied to many social domains since its first conception. Horkheimer’s (1972) original work, Critical Theory, applies critical theory primarily to economics. Early critical theorists focus on topics of economics and the flaws of capitalism, but this interest quickly spreads to other political and social domains. Since its foundation, other thinkers have used critical theory in emancipative efforts in various domains. People who fight for emancipation due to racial, cultural, political, religious or gendered reasons often adopt critical theory as a tool in their efforts. Critical theory is used by feminists to bolster their efforts towards gender equality (Fraser, 1989; Allen, 2008). Other thinkers adopt critical theory in efforts to emancipate people from either racial (McCarthy, 2009) or political oppression (Giroux, 2004). Michel Foucault helped popularize critical theory. Foucault’s focus in his work, Power/Knowledge is primarily the relationship between critical theory and epistemology (Foucault, 1980). While Foucault is often classified as a postmodernist, he is especially concerned about the relationship between power and knowledge, particularly as far as knowledge can be used for human emancipation. In his writings, he explains that critical theory is contrasted by traditional theory, which relies on hierarchies of power and knowledge (Foucault, 1980, p. 133). The idea is that traditional theory reinforces and maintains current social relations, which perpetuate power imbalances. For Foucault, critical theory has emancipatory power by detaching power and truth from forms of social, economic and cultural hegemony. For example, the hard sciences used to be viewed as a male domain. The emancipatory element of critical theory would be the process of questioning why women should not be allowed to pursue careers in the hard sciences, thereby interrupting masculine ‘hegemonic control.’ Wheeler-Bell (2017) explains that ‘hegemony’ is the process that dominant groups undertake in creating social 70 practices that reproduce ideological assumptions (p. 564). For instance, the idea that women ought to pursue careers other than the hard sciences would be an example of hegemony. Critical theory does this by questioning and interrupting coercive, unitary, formal scientific discourses, preventing them from establishing themselves in ways that dismiss all other forms of knowledge and truth (Foucault, 1980, p. 85). He explains that by preventing hegemonic control of knowledge and truth, everyone has access to the power that knowledge and truth contain (Foucault, 1980, p. 199). Foucault argues that critical theory is emancipatory because it can be used to interrupt hegemony to redistribute knowledge and power. Jurgen Habermas’s contributions have left a lasting impact on critical theory. Wheeler-Bell (2019) explains that Habermas’s (1984) Theory of Communicative Action provides critical theory with an ethical, or normative, foundation. Wheeler-Bell (2019) calls this the ‘normative turn’ in critical theory (p. 270). Before Habermas, critical theory was only an explanatory or diagnostic theory. Critical theory was able to provide a narrative and a framework for critiquing social institutions and ideologies, but it could not be used to justify what these institutions ought to look like. After Habermas, however, critical theory developed from being able to reveal simply how unjust current social arrangements are to how they ought to be. Habermas’s normative turn relies on two principles. Martin (2016) explains that Habermas presents his ‘discourse principle’ as the only way citizens can freely determine what a just society ought to look like (p. 687). The discourse principle states that the only valid norms are those that could be approved by everyone affected as participants within a discourse; in other words, people need to be convinced that a norm is legitimate (through rational argument) before they have any obligation to observe it (Martin, 2016, p. 687-688). This principle is foundational to a branch of ethics known as ‘discourse ethics.’ The second principle Habermas presents is 71 referred to as his principle of universalization. This principle states that norms are valid when their foreseeable consequences are accepted by all individuals concerned, without coercion (Martin, 2016, p. 687). These conditions provide normative grounding for critical theory because they express how a society can come to know when its basic principles are just and fair. Discourse ethics has been further developed by Forst (2011). This normative branch of critical theory imagines a just society as one that establishes reasonable social institutions and practices through the giving and taking of reasons (Wheeler-Bell, 2017, p. 570). Forst (2011) argues that just societies must meet a reciprocity condition and a generality condition (Wheeler-Bell, 2017, p. 570). Wheeler-Bell (2017) explains the essence of these two conditions: Reciprocity means that no one may refuse the particular demands of others that one raises for oneself (reciprocity of content), and that no one may simply assume that others have the same values and interests as oneself or make recourse to ‘higher truths’ that are not shared (reciprocity of reasons). Generality means that reasons for generally valid basic norms must be sharable by all those affected (Forst, 2011). In relation to education, curricula are democratically legitimate, and thus publically justified, when all individuals are included in the deliberative process (reciprocity) and the reasons for determining what to teach children and why are reasonably shareable to all those affected—including those who are oppressed (generality). (p. 570) Wheeler-Bell (2017) explains that satisfying the generality condition demands that scholars explore how ideology distorts or masks unheard, but reasonable arguments, particularly those that could be put forward by oppressed groups. For example, certain minorities may have 72 perfectly legitimate reasons for rejecting certain government projects. Discourse ethics demands that their arguments be heard and considered in the decision-making process (not that they need to hold any special consideration, but they cannot be dismissed for the sake of being minority voices). This type of deliberation would be contrasted with technocratic decision-making, where only expert reasons are truly considered. The focus here is that rational justifications should not be overlooked for any reason; privilege, position or other means of power should not influence what is considered truth and knowledge. It is important to note that both Habermas and Forst think the strongest arguments should always prevail (Wheeler-Bell, 2017, p. 575). Critical theorists position themselves against hegemonic control of cultural capital, resisting ideologies. The notion of ideology has also developed, particularly since Habermas. Prior to Habermas, ideologies were interpreted as systems of ideas, beliefs and commitments that reproduce forms of domination (Wheeler-Bell, 2017, p. 564). However, after Habermas, critical theory adopted a new understanding of the term ideology. In the Habermasian sense, ideologies are the beliefs and values that prevent individuals from listening and learning from each other, resulting in inequalities (Wheeler-Bell, 2017, p. 573). However, under either interpretation of the term, critical theory presents ideologies as beliefs that produce imbalances of power. The primary aim of critical theory is to eliminate these imbalances, thereby emancipating those who are oppressed. To emancipate people living under oppressions, critical theory directs people to question power and its uneven distribution. To combat hegemonic power relations, critical theory states that people must learn to recognize how their own histories and assumptions shape the ways they make sense of the world (Simon et al., 1987, p. 112). Critical theory is defined as an activity: 73 What holds the critical tradition together, then, is not a comprehensive set of agreements or theoretical approaches, but rather a willingness to actively participate in conversations and debates about the nature of power and oppression, and the contours of human emancipation...individuals who locate themselves within the critical tradition are moved by certain political and ethical concerns. (Wheeler-Bell, 2019, p. 278) In summary, critical theory is about actively resisting oppression, revealing ideology and fighting against unfair social power imbalances, all in the name of human emancipation. 4.3 Critical pedagogy and educational justice Critical pedagogy is a label applied to educational practices that are informed (at least partially) by critical theory. ‘Pedagogy’ refers to the sets of methods and ideas teachers apply during educational interactions. Between 1970 and 1981, when authors like Freire (1970), Bowles (1976), Apple (1979) and Giroux (1981) were writing, critical pedagogy was strongly connected to critical theory, pulling especially from the Marxist/neo-Marxists traditions (Wheeler-Bell, 2019, p. 272-273). However, Wheeler-Bell (2019) notes that contemporary critical pedagogy has drifted from these original foundations, and is now held together, not by its relation to critical theory, but by the scholars’ progressive or radical political commitments (p. 280). Wheeler-Bell (2019) argues that critical pedagogy is fragmented because it has not undergone the same normative turn as critical theory. He notes that Habermas did not have the same impact on critical pedagogy as he did on critical theory (Wheeler-Bell, 2019, p. 271). Without a normative grounding, i.e., without an argument for why its political claims of liberation are well justified or legitimate, Wheeler-Bell (2019) argues that critical pedagogy cannot sufficiently justify its ends (p. 276). But what does critical pedagogy entail and what does 74 it aim at achieving? The answer can be found in the writings of two of critical pedagogy’s major figures, Paulo Freire and Henry Giroux. Freire is one of the first scholars to apply critical theory to education. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed he contrasts critical pedagogy with what he calls the ‘banking concept of education,’ whereby teachers fill their passive pupils with knowledge (Freire, 1993, p. 72). Friere’s pedagogy is strongly opposed to that of scholars like R.S. Peters (1964), who view teachers as masters initiating students into different fields of knowledge. Freire (1993) critiques the traditional model of learning and argues that teachers should not be viewed as superiors, but equals that ‘co-construct’ knowledge with their pupils, helping them raise their consciousness about how systems hide their own oppression (p. 69). He further explains that teachers’ roles are to present material for students to consider, and together they consider and re-consider the content to co-create knowledge (Freire, 1993, p. 81). In this sense, teachers that take up a critical pedagogy share their special relationship to power and knowledge with their students, preventing hegemonic control. Freire (1993) thinks that the educational relationship between teachers and pupils should be thought of as co-investigators, as opposed to a relationship where the teacher is dominant, and the student is passive (p. 106). He does not think that the banking model of education is sufficient for overcoming oppression and marginalization: “The solution is not to ‘integrate’ [students] into the structure of oppression but to transform that structure so that they can become ‘beings for themselves’” (Freire, 1993, p. 74). Here the connection to critical theory is evident, in the notion of challenging structures of oppression. Here the goal of Freire’s critical pedagogy is also revealed to be human emancipation. Freire’s (1993) pedagogical method for achieving emancipation is helping students develop a critical awareness of reality, allowing them to take 75 possession of that reality (p. 106). For example, Freire would likely reject the study of history as an exploration of past events understood as facts. Instead, he would encourage pupils to understand how people have historically been oppressed, make connections to their own situations and endeavour to prevent further oppression. Henry Giroux is also an important figure in the establishment of critical pedagogy. Much like Freire, Giroux (1997) is particularly interested in knowledge and its transmission. Giroux (1997) claims that knowledge is largely socially constructed, and teachers should know this. By ‘socially constructed’ he means it is linked to human intentionality, behaviour and power; this means that knowledge can be used for emancipation or domination (Giroux, 1997, p. 23). For example, states can adjust their curriculums to include or exclude certain details to construct a particular national narrative. But Giroux (1997) claims that schools are not solely factories for oppression but can be used in the interests of emancipation (p. 98). For example, schools can promote critical pedagogical practices that raise student awareness of their own oppression. In short, Giroux (1997) also holds emancipation as a primary goal for educational pedagogy. Like Freire, Giroux also thinks that mainstream educational pedagogies, which recreate and perpetuate existing social inequalities, need to change. Giroux does not think that the whole educational system must be thrown out; he thinks it must be revised. Giroux (1997) states that educators must critically analyze the characteristics of the traditional curriculum that reproduce inequitable social relations (p. 107-108). He thinks that teachers should link students’ schooling to other social movements, and “fight for forms of emancipatory authority as a foundation for the establishment of freedom and justice” (Giroux, 1997, p. 112-113). He further argues for the politicization of teachers, for what he calls ‘radical’ teachers. He encourages teachers to take-up 76 pedagogies defined by modernism, postmodernism and postmodern feminism, all pedagogies that according to him, embrace human interests (Giroux, 1997, p. 226). Critical pedagogues like Giroux identify human slavery in terms of oppression or disadvantage (Giroux, 1997). Critical theory is intended to resist all forms of dominance and hegemony, including not just economic goods and services, but also cultural capital like knowledge, abilities, language forms and other tastes that are defined by dominant groups as legitimate (Giroux, 1997, p. 6). Giroux (1997) explains the essence of praxis in critical theory: “If we think of emancipation as praxis, as both an understanding as well as a form of action designed to overthrow structures of domination, we can begin to illuminate the interplay between historical consciousness, critical thinking, and emancipatory behavior” (p. 26). The goal of critical pedagogy is human emancipation; the aims include transforming how we understand power relations, our histories, ourselves and our relationships with one another. These elements of raising historical consciousness, critical thinking and emancipation are common in much of what is defined as critical pedagogy. Simon et al. (1987) argue that according to critical pedagogues, schools are places of cultural politics, identity, worth, value, self-image, desires and possibilities, making them vital places for students to learn to question future identities and possibilities (p. 102). Simon et al. (987) explain that critical pedagogy has two central tasks: For us a critical pedagogy is centrally concerned with the moral and analytical task of assessing whether specific social forms encourage and make possible the "realization of differentiated capacities, or whether they disable, deny, dilute and distort those capacities" (Corrigan, 1987). As well, critical pedagogical practice is concerned with the 77 educational and political tasks of constructing new forms that would expand the available range of social identities and possibilities. These twin tasks we view as both the problem and the project: to expand what it is to be human. (p. 103) This ‘human expansion,’ through the development of both capabilities and possibilities, ties critical pedagogy, once again, to human emancipation. Critical pedagogy is about resisting the existing social structures and limitations on human potential. As Wheeler-Bell (2019) argues, critical pedagogy is connected in this way to critical theory, whether it is acknowledged or not (p. 281). I have argued that critical theory and critical pedagogy share the fundamental goal of human emancipation. In the next chapter, I argue that human emancipation alone, at least as it is conceived by these thinkers, is an insufficient aim to realize social justice through education. Critical theory promotes human emancipation, which may contribute towards personal autonomy. However, endeavours to promote human emancipation are often misguided, particularly when they focus on promoting social equality. In this chapter, I argue that measures promoting equity, inclusion and diversity are sometimes misguided in this way. If I am correct, this has some major implications for how equity, inclusion and diversity measures are implemented, particularly in educational contexts. These three calls for what is thought of as social equality have conceptual foundations in critical theory, and, if my argument stands, these three calls for equality have very specific roles to play in bringing about social justice. In the upcoming sections, I will analyze the topics of equity, inclusion and diversity, attempting to give an account of each. I will determine both their relationships one to another and their underlying aims. 78 4.4 The three calls for “social equality” I have introduced critical theory and critical pedagogy, not only to highlight the fundamental goal they share, but to reveal the foundation upon which the calls for social equality rest. In the next section, I argue that the three calls for social equality are informed by critical theory both through their focus on social pathologies and their underlying aims of human emancipation.34 The three calls for social equality are interrelated. It is important to note that these sets of ideas are not only informed by critical theory, but often by postmodernism as well. Since postmodernism teaches people to be skeptical of established knowledge, by default, these calls for action are resistant to adopting a singular conception or definition. Therefore, in my analysis of each topic, I will consider how these sets of ideas are understood, used and defined in current literature. As such, I will not be attempting to present a complete account of these sets of ideas, but merely a sketch of their general shape. I will argue that, in general, each call for equality is aiming at the larger goal of human emancipation. It is a mistake to understand these social movements in terms of equality. My argument in this section puts forward three premises. I argue that 1) calls for social equality are better understood as calls for social justice, not equality. In this sense, I argue that 2) justice is primarily concerned with what people deserve, so social justice is about ensuring that people get what they deserve. These calls for what is thought of as equality set out to articulate what people deserve. By analyzing what scholars advocating these ideas hope to achieve, it is clear that they are aiming at increasing human well-being by eliminating disadvantages and satisfying 34 The link between critical theory, equity, inclusion and diversity may not always be acknowledged. People supporting these sets of ideas may not identify as critical theorists, but they share the same social outlooks and aims regardless. 79 individual needs. With this observation in mind, I argue that 3) aims of social equality are not genuinely concerned with equality or sameness, but the achievement of social justice through human emancipation. In the upcoming chapter, I build on these three premises. I argue there that social justice cannot be achieved through human emancipation alone, but a sufficient aim for social justice is found in personal autonomy. Before I go on to analyze each call for equality separately, I will present the first two premises of this argument. In my second chapter, I gave five critiques against equality as a social aim. Here I build upon that argument, asserting that equality as a social aim is a vague way of demanding social justice. Discourses involving social equality often open unfruitful discussions between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. Advocates for these three calls for equality do not have a clear preference for either kind of equality. Fair equality of opportunity, according to Rawls (1999), is about positions and life chances being open to all people with similar abilities and skills, regardless of their initial social positions (p. 12).35 In other words, he argues there should be roughly equal prospects for everyone with similar motivations and endowments—social class and other aspects should not play a role (Rawls, 1999, p. 12). Other scholars argue for the stronger conception of equality of outcome. Phillips (2004) argues that equality of outcome is not as extreme as its critics assert (p. 2). She argues that outcomes (such as resources, occupations and roles) are the key measure for equality of opportunity (Phillips, 2004, p. 6). Her argument relies on an assumption that between groups, we should expect roughly equal participation across social activities (Philips, 2004, p. 18). If there are extreme differences in 35 Rawls is not considered a critical theorist. 80 outcomes across groups, she argues, then there are likely not equal opportunities in the first place (p. 3-6). These discussions are unfruitful because neither position is truly about equality. Rawls’ (1999) position is only about sameness to the extent that people should not be treated differentially based on certain criteria. In fact, he is in favour of differential opportunities being available to match people’s motivation and abilities. These two criteria could be used to justify vastly different life options among people, which is not the equal situation many people interpret this principle as supporting.36 Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity is better understood as fair opportunities solely based on individual abilities and motivations. Phillips (2004) is also not genuinely concerned about equality, but about outcomes that do not match our expectations (Philips, 2004, p. 18). In short, she is concerned about injustice. Including the topic equality in discussions of justice is unfruitful as the discussions become muddled by varying conceptions of equality, which themselves turn out to be irrelevant, as these are discussions primarily concerned with justice—not necessarily sameness. Therefore, calls for social equality are calls for social justice. The D5 coalition—an online philanthropic organization for the advancement of diversity, equity and inclusion—states, “Improving equity is to promote justice, impartiality and fairness within the procedures, processes, and distribution of resources by institutions or systems” (D5). Calls for justice may come as demands for fairness, equity or any other means of ensuring some level of social equality. Despite calling for equality, calls for social equality are not usually demanding similar 36 This observation is a prime example of how convoluted discussions on equality can become, particularly when equality is taken to mean sameness. 81 treatment. When people say that others should be treated as equals, or people should get what they deserve, these are calls for justice, masked as calls for equality. One of the foundational understandings of justice is suum cique (to each his due).37 This call for justice asserts that people should be treated as they deserve to be treated. And how people deserve to be treated is the core problem of justice. Aims of social equality are about how people ought to be treated and what they deserve. For example, the notion that ‘people should be treated equally’ is just a vague way of saying ‘people should be treated justly.’ This is particularly true if our conception of justice asserts that people should not be treated differently unless there are good reasons to do so.38 Equality in this sense is about ensuring just treatment, which is why the term justice can be used in place of equality. In fact, the term equality should be avoided on topics of social justice. Social equality has too many important hermeneutical problems (as it can ambiguously imply sameness, justice, fairness, and in other cases, a range of differential treatment). Now that I have put forward my first two premises, namely that 1) social equality is better understood in terms of social justice and 2) justice is primarily concerned with what people deserve, I will move towards my third premise. I will analyze various accounts of equity, inclusion and diversity to demonstrate that they all aim, not at the achievement of equality, but at human emancipation. 37 Miller (1979) discusses suum cique and other notions of justice (p. 20). 38 This claim is similar to many other statements about the demands of social equality in liberal democracies: “What we really demand when we say all men are equal is that none shall be held to have a claim to better treatment than another in advance of good grounds being produced” (Dixon, 2010, p. 26). 82 4.5 Equity and its aims The first concept I will analyze is equity. ‘Equity’ is often defined in relation to equality. For advocates of equity, equal treatment is often conceptualized as the same treatment at the surface level, whereas equitable treatment is differential treatment for the satisfaction of some other, higher level of equality. Equity in this sense is not about sameness in treatment, but sameness of result, outcome, status or position, after some support. For example, equitable measures to ensure all students have access to nutritious lunches would only be concerned with providing lunches to those who could not afford or otherwise access lunches. It would be unconcerned with how much support is or is not given to all students, particularly those who could otherwise access lunches. If social justice demands equity, it is particularly important to have clearly established aims. For instance, if everyone is supposed to have fair access to opportunities in their lives, there needs to be clarity in what this entails. Spratt (2017) notes two key requirements in the pursuit of equity. She argues that equity is only possible if first, we have clear aims and second, we acknowledge the diversity of human circumstances, such as age, gender, abilities, ethnicity, income, and so forth (Spratt, 2017, p. 24). These differences are important in this framework because people receive unjust differential treatment in their lives based on these identity markers. The essence of equity lies in the statement that ‘equality is not always achieved by treating people equally.’ However, this phrase can be articulated more precisely, as this phrasing applies two meanings of the term equality. Better phrasing is that ‘justice is not always achieved by treating people the same,’ since equality in the first portion of the phrase means fairness or justice, and in the second portion refers to sameness. When people pursue equity as a social aim, their calls for equality are calls for justice. After exploring the literature on equity, its primary aim is to achieve justice through the 83 elimination of unfair disadvantages. Equity aims to achieve justice in this sense by improving access to adequate life options for all, improve well-being and meeting individual needs. This primary aim, eliminating unfair disadvantages, I argue is synonymous with the pursuit of human emancipation. Equity’s proponents strive to achieve social justice through the reduction of unfair disadvantages. In an educational context, Gorard (2013) states that disadvantage is essentially a state of having lower educational outcomes and fewer opportunities based on students’ backgrounds (p. 1). He argues equity is one of the main reasons why developed countries have free, universal, compulsory education for children: to reduce students’ disadvantages based on family backgrounds (Gorard, 2013, p. 1). Equity in education demands certain interventions to put students—as much as possible—on a level playing field. But, as Gorard (2013) notes, sometimes this includes equalizing outcomes. Egbo (2018) explains, “[I]f one’s goal is to achieve social justice, then fair treatment should result in differential treatment” (p. 22). Differential treatment is often held to be necessary for increasing the opportunities available to disadvantaged students, but differential treatment is controversial at the level of outcomes. For example, it is not very controversial that entrance exams should be free from cultural bias: if we hope to get the strongest students into competitive positions, their cultural background should have insignificant effect on their entrance. On the other hand, without making any value claim, affirmative action that requires certain levels of representation, based on student demographics, is much more controversial. Affirmative action is also a prime example of how there are blurred lines between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. For example, is the educational opportunity found in the chance to write and do well on the entrance exam, or is the opportunity found in the chance to try the first year of courses? 84 Some scholars claim that equity is concerned with individual access to opportunities, particularly due to reasons beyond individual control. Gorard (2013), for example, claims that the main reason for widening participation in post-secondary education is to increase equality of opportunity, reducing links between social, ethnic and economic elements of individuals (p. 1-2).39 The various approaches to widening participation in post-secondary schools are often framed in terms of equality of opportunity, but just as Phillips (2004) argues, this is primarily measured by outcomes.40 Like Rawls, Gorard (2018) argues that individual intersections of time, place, sex, family and school ought not to influence access to individual opportunities (p. 187-196); in other words, most identity markers should not influence a person’s available opportunities. But, unlike Rawls, Gorard (2018) neglects to establish the criteria that rightfully ought to influence the opportunities available to students. Rawls (1999) argues that motivation and abilities should determine which individual opportunities are available, but Gorard only gives the vague notion of ‘equal’ to guide individual opportunity allocation. ‘Equal’ is too vague to be used in this instance, as people will have different interpretations of what equal opportunities entail. But, as a generous interpretation, Gorard (2018) seems to be relying on a mutual understanding of ‘equal’ to mean good or valuable life options.41 Like critical theory, 39 Widening participation in post-secondary education means that students from diverse backgrounds are participating in post-secondary as well. A number of measures are recommended in the pursuit of widening participation, such as increasing first-year admissions, affirmative action initiatives, lowering entrance requirements, removing standardized admission exams, providing special programs for students from disadvantaged backgrounds and so forth. See for example Cefai et al. (2016) “Breaking the cycle: a phenomenological approach to broadening access to post-secondary education.” 40 For example, according to equality of outcome, if opportunities are supposed to be equal across all social groups to attend universities, outcomes with poor participation from some groups suggests that opportunities are not the same. However, this account of equality does not consider that different groups may hold different values. This is another example of why using the term equality is misleading and confusing in topics of social justice—it is unclear what kind of equality is intended. 41 Many life options are also incommensurable. This presents another major problem for equality of opportunity: there are often no standards for measuring the value of various opportunities. 85 equity is concerned with the circumstances of people who are disadvantaged compared to others. Equity aims to help people overcome disadvantages in their lives by increasing their access to valuable options. The equitable aim of reducing personal disadvantages also aims to promote well-being. After all, what is to be gained in removing personal disadvantages? Gorard (2013) argues that overcoming disadvantage in education is not just about improving educational results, but also about enhancing the well-being of students (p. 164). Schools cannot ensure every condition is provided for student well-being, such as satisfying all their biological needs, ensuring adequate health, providing a caring home environment and so on, but they can provide students many of the tools that contribute towards their well-being. For instance, in the next chapter, I will argue that schools can effectively promote personal autonomy by providing access to the three conditions of personal autonomy as identified by Raz (1986). Schools can help students develop certain abilities, improve their access to certain life options and help protect them from undue coercion and manipulation—all things that are necessary for autonomous living and prerequisite for personal well-being in a liberal democracy. Another major aim of equity is the satisfaction of individual needs. Spratt (2017) explains that equal distributions, such as income, are insufficient to satisfy equitable arrangements as some people’s needs are greater than others (p. 24). For example, people with debilitating diseases or dependents with special needs may not be able to enjoy the same quality of life compared to others with the same income, even with incomes well above the poverty line. Higher income does not necessarily mean people’s needs are met, particularly if their life options are diminished by their physical conditions. As such, considerations of individual disadvantage must recognize the extent to which people’s needs are met across numerous domains: income 86 itself is insufficient. Sen (1992) notes that equal treatment for everyone may demand unequal treatment in favor of those who are disadvantaged (p. 1, as cited in Spratt, p. 24). As a result, Sen advocates for equitable treatment, particularly because some people’s needs are so poorly met in comparison to others. These aims of lifting people out of states of disadvantage—improving their opportunities, allowing them to achieve more well-being in their lives and meeting their needs—are all aiming towards human emancipation. In other words, equity is about preventing people from living in circumstances that are considered both undesirable and preventable. In this major way, equity is about eliminating human slavery in Horkheimer’s sense, of people having little control over the directions of their lives. Equity is about providing people with the ability to live a life that is more of their choosing: one freed from their unfortunate circumstances. Inequalities are sometimes useful as diagnostic tools, pointing out injustices that could be remedied through equitable measures. However, the presence of inequalities themselves are insufficient for demanding justice through equitable measures. To sum up, equity is primarily concerned with helping people overcome disadvantages that are no fault of their own. It is a call for the identification and elimination of barriers that prevent disadvantaged individuals from fully participating in society. This observation reveals a major similarity with this call for social equality and critical theory; equity is about emancipating people from states of oppression or disadvantage. In what follows, I will apply a similar analysis of the aims of inclusion and diversity. 87 4.6 Inclusion and its aims The next major call for social justice I will analyze is inclusion. Inclusion is primarily about making sure everyone is included in a society, regardless of their identity. Inclusion and diversity are interrelated and often confused concepts. In what follows, I will attempt to distinguish between the two concepts and point to their major aims.42 It is helpful to contrast these two concepts in their definition. The Canadian Centre for Diversity and Inclusion (CCDI) explains that while there are many definitions, diversity is about individuals, whereas inclusion is about the collective. They further explain that diversity is about the unique dimensions, qualities and characteristics we all have, while inclusion is about creating a culture of equity that values differences (CCDI).43 The D5 coalition also acknowledges that there are many ways to define each concept, but to them, diversity is about the demographic mix of four specific groups of people, 1) racial and ethnic groups (specifically Asian, Hispanic, African and Native American), 2) LGBT populations, 3) people with disabilities and 4) women. The D5 explains these four groups are of interest in the 21st century because they have been historically underrepresented. The D5 describes inclusion as the degree to which diverse people can participate in the decision-making processes in organizations and groups. They further explain that inclusive groups are necessarily diverse, while diverse groups may or may not be inclusive (D5).44 42 Some scholars use an interwoven concept of these two terms, only referring to the concept as “diversity and inclusion” (Gerz, 2018). 43 The Racial Equity Tools website explains that diversity is silent on the subject of equity, whereas inclusion can be seen as taking an anti-oppression stance. However, this is a contested position on diversity, held by Baltimore Racial Justice Action. 44 Many other institutions advocating for diversity and inclusion defined the two concepts in similar terms (e.g., Independent Sector and UC Berkeley). 88 With these fundamental differences in mind, I will focus in this section on inclusion. Moore and Schnellert (2017) explain that inclusion is about including absolutely everyone in a society, particularly people who need the most support (p. 14). The underlying idea behind inclusion is that all people, regardless of their identities or capabilities, deserve to have opportunities to participate in social lives. Kauffman & Badar (2020) explain that inclusion should be for all, but they use the term ‘all’ loosely. They think that there will be some exceptions in society and that thinking otherwise requires a level of religious faith that everyone can be taught certain meaningful skills (Kauffman & Badar, 2020, p. 8). So, although there may be a small percentage of people who are outliers, inclusion aims to allow all members of a society to participate in social lives. Some scholars define inclusion as a moral outlook. Kliewer (1998) explains that inclusion cannot be full or partial because it is a way of looking at the world (p. 320). This way of looking at the world is one where people are presumed to have a right to belong, with full participation, full membership and valued citizenship (Kliewer, 1998, p. 320). Kliewer (1998) contrasts inclusion with segregation, whereby people are separated from each other, further restricted in their membership and participation in society (p. 318). Inclusion is difficult to define through its antonyms, however, since terms like segregation bring ideas like integration to mind. Inclusion is often confused with its synonyms. Moore and Schnellert (2017) explain that people often mistake the idea of inclusion with ‘integration’ (p. 15). Integration is simply the putting of people together. But putting people together does not necessarily facilitate inclusion. The fact that people are together does not mean that every one of them has access to skills or opportunities. Some people, especially those without access to good life options, will need support to be able to access opportunities. Moore and Schnellert (2017) explain that inclusion, 89 unlike integration, is voluntary; it entails presenting opportunities for students to have certain experiences, but with support (p. 16-17). The experiences are not forced upon anyone, but simply made available. Integration, on the other hand, can be involuntary. Inclusion does not mean that people must choose certain opportunities: it means that opportunities are made available and accessible. Inclusion in educational domains focuses primarily on students who are disadvantaged in comparison to others, often due to disabilities. Kliewer (1998) explains that inclusive education is primarily about membership through active, meaningful and valued participation (p. 317). Kliewer compares learning in a segregated environment to learning in a classroom, which leaves the learner unprepared for cultural immersion; he explains that inclusive education is like learning a language through cultural immersion, which more fully prepares learners to participate in that same culture (p. 317-318). He explains that since the early 1990s there has been unmistakable evidence that educational opportunities are improved when there are opportunities for children with and without disabilities to learn together (Kliewer, 1998, p. 320). In this sense, inclusion is about physically participating in the group. There are two major approaches to inclusion in education. Kauffman & Badar (2020) call the first approach ‘habeas corpus,’ in which membership entails being physically present; the second approach is called ‘proprium instructio,’ where appropriate instruction is provided, regardless of student placement. Kauffman & Badar (2020) explain that proprium instructio (which is often neglected in discourses on inclusion) is always to the benefit of all students with disabilities (SWD), unlike habeas corpus, which is not always beneficial. They argue that proprium instructio must take priority over habeas corpus, and that habeas corpus is a terrible 90 starting point as it can be abusive of both students and teachers (Kauffman & Badar, 2020, p. 7). The conflict presented between the habeas corpus and proprium instructio approaches to inclusion appear to revolve around differing notions of membership. Habeas corpus presents a notion of direct membership, of being physically present in a group. By analogy, it implies being on stage when the orchestra performs. Proprium instructio, on the other hand, presents a notion of indirect membership, whereby people are members of a broader group to which they share certain abilities or skill sets. By analogy, this notion of membership is like being part of a group of people who play piano at a specific level. This distinction is useful, and perhaps both notions are at play when we talk about membership in society.45 The methods of inclusive education depend on the aims of the institutions implementing it. If the primary aims of education are providing students with a sense of belonging and group membership, then place-based (habeas corpus) may be most appropriate. If the aims of education are skill based, then activity-based inclusion (proprium instructio) may be more fitting. It seems intuitive that this is not an either-or case, and educational institutions may strive to find some balance between these methods of inclusion. With either approach, the aim of inclusion is to allow for group membership in order to provide social opportunities. In both senses, participation can be valuable. Inclusion is primarily about ensuring all members of a society have opportunities to participate in social life. The aim is to support people who are otherwise excluded to have 45 In a classroom setting, these distinctions can be much more complex, and inclusion often entails a mixture of habeas corpus and proprium instructio. In the next chapter, I will consider what inclusion that promotes personal autonomy may entail. 91 access to opportunities available to those already included. Habeas corpus does not necessarily improve social opportunities, but proprium instructio always increases opportunities. In both senses, inclusion is about diminishing disadvantages, increasing opportunities, increasing personal well-being and satisfying individual needs. Just like equity, then, inclusion is ultimately about promoting human emancipation. Kauffman & Badar (2020) argue that schools should already be inclusive regardless of color, heritage, weight: height ratio, and so forth, but schools must address student needs based on their age, interests, and prior achievements (p. 2). With this understanding of inclusion in mind, I will now turn towards the other forms of diversity mentioned and explore what calls for diversity entail. 4.7 Diversity and its aims As mentioned in the previous section, diversity is defined in many ways, but it is usually understood as focusing on individuals instead of the collective. Roberson (2006) explains that diversity focuses primarily on heterogeneity and demographic composition of groups, whereas inclusion is about the integration of diversity into groups and systems (p. 228). Roberson (2006) makes an interesting observation that inclusion and diversity are another iteration of the identity-blind and identity-conscious debate, respectively (p. 231). In other words, inclusion is about minimizing differences so that all people can enjoy full participation and membership of a group. On the other hand, diversity is about highlighting individual differences. But if diversity is also about promoting equality, why would people want to highlight the differences among individuals? Critical theorists—and others focused on social justice—are particularly interested in how people are subject to varying levels of advantage or disadvantage based on certain elements of their identity. The interplay between identity and disadvantage gives critical theorists a reason 92 to be concerned with human diversity—the ways that people differ. Giroux (2004) argues for the importance of acknowledging diversity and resisting color-blindness. He argues that color-blindness allows for the expansion of ideological and structural inequalities in society. He thinks race is tangled up with asymmetrical power relations, and color-blindness allows whites to think their success is because of individual determination, work ethic, moral values and education (Giroux, 2004, p. 65). But he is not only concerned about colour. Giroux (1997) also argues that culture is inseparable from power relations, and therefore it plays a key role in asymmetrical power relations (p. 129). He explains that social policy on the topic refuses to acknowledge the power that human diversity has on discrimination and exclusion (Giroux, 2004, p. 59). The topic of diversity becomes important for identifying how individual elements such as race and culture play a role in social injustices or pathologies. Intersectionality is the dominant model for understanding and analyzing interpersonal differences. ‘Intersectionality’ refers to the careful observation and understanding of how individual identities are composed of many different variables. These variables intersect in unique ways that lead to unique experiences for everyone. Some human variables are considered particularly important in discussions on diversity, inclusion and equity, while some are not. The major variables of importance are well established: sex and gender differences; social class and socio-economic status differences; race, ethnicity and cultural differences; religious and belief differences; and differences in abilities (Mitchell, 2016). Intersectionality plays a significant role in a strand of critical theory knowns as critical race theory (CRT). CRT presents intersectionality as a tool to help people understand how differences in ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality, age, disability and religion play a role in our classification of strangers as 'others' (Bhopal & Preston, 2011, p. 1-3). The problem of being 93 ‘othered,’ or being identified as an outsider in one’s own community, is that it can lead to unfair discriminations, such as racism, sexism, bigotry and so forth. Discrimination, in this sense, is another barrier to full membership and participation in society. In other words, discrimination can lead to a variety of disadvantages. The main idea of intersectionality is that conditions of social life cannot be understood as shaped by one factor, but the intersection of many individual differences; likewise, power and privilege in societies should not be understood as being shaped by a single element, but many axes that work together (Collins & Bilge, 2016, p. 11). The major themes of diversity are social inequality, power, relationality, social context, complexity and social justice (Collins & Bilge, 2016, p. 27-30). These scholars suggest the aims of diversity are then to recognize individual complexity, reduce inequality, balance distributions of power and bring about social justice. Diversity is often understood in terms of social equality. Collins & Bilge (2016), like many other critical theorists, argue that diversity is concerned to reducing social inequality. Egbo (2018) argues that diversity combats inequality in several ways. First, she argues that one of the aims of diversity is to make sure diversity issues are viewed as relevant by the dominant group (Egbo, 2018, p. 187). This is presented as an argument against social inequality because Egbo suggests that diversity issues are not valued equally by most white Canadians. Egbo (2018) also writes that diversity initiatives are about promoting multiculturalism (p. 188) and tolerance (p. 189). She argues that multiculturalism and tolerance promote equality because instead of being treated as others, minorities can be treated inclusively, as member of the group (p. 27). In this sense, diversity is used to promote inclusion. Egbo (2018) presents diversity as promoting the equal status and membership of all Canadians, despite their different identities (p. 85). 94 Diversity is a call for people to become aware of significant differences in others. Diversity itself does not have any inherent value in the pursuit of justice. Diversity is used to support inclusion and equity, but it does not necessarily serve either (Independent Sector). For this reason, many scholars refer to diversity only in conjunction with inclusion (Gertz, 2018). In this sense, thinking of the two as diversity and inclusion, diversity becomes valuable since it can be used to help make a group or organization more inclusive. The purpose of including others as full members of the group serves equitable aims, in order to remove any unfair disadvantages and to diminish the effects of individual identity on group membership. Diversity is valuable as far as it supports inclusion and equity. Since its value is found in the promotion of inclusion and equity, its primary goal is human emancipation. 4.8 Summary In this chapter I analyzed three ideas commonly understood as calls for social equality: equity, inclusion and diversity. I presented critical theory and critical pedagogy as the foundations for these calls for social equality. My intention was to describe, but not justify their shared aims of human emancipation. Roberson (2006) argues that researchers and practitioners are in better positions to promote equality for historically disadvantaged groups when they understand terms like diversity and inclusion more fully (p. 234). In this chapter, I argued that all three of these calls for equality are better understood as calls for justice. Advocates for these ideas call for people to get what they deserve, and they present human emancipation as this end. The major problem with these calls for equality is that their ends are not fully developed. Human emancipation, I will argue in the next chapter, is better understood in terms of individual 95 freedom than equality. Equality is too vague and conceptually muddy to stand as a social goal.46 For example, what level of interpersonal differences are permissible given that equity is valued? To what extent do all people need to be included in the membership of groups and activities of others? And lastly, what sort of diversity is to be held as important and why? Aiming for equality does not help answer any of these questions. Equality does not provide a normative foundation for understanding the goals of these calls for action. The three calls for social equality I explored in this chapter are better conceptualized as promoting justice. This insight may not come as a ground-breaking statement for many educationalists, as I am merely highlighting the fundamental aims of critical theorists. However, in practice, efforts to promote social justice, are often misunderstood in terms of equality.47 I explored the relationship between each of these calls and critical theory, arguing they all aim to promote human emancipation. As these calls for social equality are currently conceptualized, there is little guidance provided on how any of these goals ought to be achieved, and what methods ought to be avoided in their realization. This has led to numerous educational controversies in liberal democracies. Understanding these calls for justice in terms of individual freedom resolves these problems. 46 Many scholars pair the aims of social justice and equality. See for example Thompson (2020), Cole (2011) and Pickett (2008). 47 Aiming towards equality can quickly become unethical if the underlying aims for the equality are unclear. I Chapter 2, I presented five reasons why people should not aim for equality itself. As an example in practice, a Kindergarten teacher restricted the boys in her class from paying Lego, hoping to promote spatial and math skills only for the girls in her class (Gonzales, 2017). Her intention was to help promote STEM skills for the girls, but at the cost of developing those same skills in the boys. In the next chapter, I will present an argument that suggests this type of pulling-down is unethical. 96 Chapter 5: Personal autonomy and educational justice 5.1 Putting it together In Chapter 4, I analyzed three calls for social equality, namely equity, inclusion and diversity. With consideration of their relationship to critical theory and critical pedagogy, I argued that they ultimately share the fundamental aim of human emancipation. I argued that aiming for social equality as a goal in and of itself is misguided because this aim is only valuable to the extent that it improves the situations of disadvantaged people—an aim that is better understood in terms of human emancipation. Pursuits to improve social equality are in fact pursuits of social justice; they aim to ensure that people get what they deserve. According to these movements for social equality, like equity, inclusion and diversity, what people deserve is to be emancipated. In this chapter, I argue that human emancipation is a necessary, but insufficient condition for social justice. Instead, I argue that social justice is better served through pursing personal autonomy.48 While I accounted for some similarities between critical theory and liberalism in Chapter 4 (particularly human emancipation), it is important to note that they have a couple important differences. One difference is that critical theory is primarily distributive in in its approach to justice. Critical theorists are often concerned about the distributions of goods, opportunities, status, power, and so forth. On the other hand, liberals may be concerned with these same distributions, but liberalism is primarily aggregative, concerning itself with the overall range of freedoms available to citizens. In this sense, liberalism is concerned with the establishment and maintenance of a robust set of freedoms. This leads to the major difference between the two: 48 For clarification, I advocate for measures that promote equity, inclusion and diversity, so long as steps taken to promote these movements are taken ethically. This chapter will outline an ethical approach to promoting justice in education. 97 critical theory is primarily concerned with people who are not emancipated—with those members of society who are dispossessed or disadvantaged. Critical theory aims to liberate people in these positions. In this respect, critical theory does not necessarily place value on the total set of freedoms available to its citizens, but focuses on those who are comparatively disadvantaged. Liberalism, on the other hand, highly values these aggregative freedoms—despite the potential unavailability for some of its disadvantaged members. In short, critical theorists and liberal both value individual freedom, but they may hold differing notions of justice since one is primarily distributive and the other is primarily aggregative. The primary problem of justice is discovering what people deserve. The goals of social and educational justice are more likely to be realized if they are both articulated clearly and rationally connected to broadly desirable social values. Not only is their realization more likely if their value is shared by most people in our society, but if more people are aiming towards the same goals, they are more likely to be achieved. The current problems encountered by contemporary social and educational justice initiatives are the result of a lack of clarity and a lack of public support.49 Many initiatives rely on political presuppositions that are not universal, nor valued by the people they are imposed upon. So, the question arises, in liberal democracies, is there something universally valuable that movements for social and educational justice can aim towards? This chapter will proceed in the following manner. First, I will argue that the aims of human emancipation are insufficient for social justice.50 Instead, I will argue that personal 49 For example, a noted in Chapter 1, there have been controversies around sensitizing children to their white privilege (Duran, 2018), the implementation of sexual orientation and gender identity initiatives (Lazatin, 2018), and implementing policies regarding diversity and inclusion (Corbella, 2018). 50 By extension, this also applies to educational justice. 98 autonomy should be the aim of social justice. Then, I will present how this new aim allows us to discern when attempts to achieve social justice are justified and when they are not—especially in the context of educational policy and practice. While further implications are beyond the scope of my thesis, I will conclude with the contribution of a single principle for educational justice. 5.2 Human emancipation and personal autonomy Human emancipation is commonly held as the goal (or end) of social justice. Human emancipation involves freeing people from slavery, in whatever terms that slavery is understood. Human slavery in this broader sense is usually conceptualized as the result of a power imbalance, preventing people from having control over the directions of their lives or giving others unjustified power over them (Honneth, 2007). Contemporary scholars understand human slavery in terms of oppression, marginalization, powerlessness and unfair disadvantage—all of which leave people susceptible to coercion (Giroux, 1997; Gorard, 2013; Spratt, 2017). While I do not aim to revise this conception of human emancipation, I do think that aiming at human emancipation is only part of the goal intended by social and educational justice. Understanding the end goal of social and educational justice in terms of personal autonomy not only identifies a more specific aim than human emancipation, but it also identifies a concrete value shared by most people living in liberal democracies. In this sense, it makes room to identify ways in which freedom is undermined in terms other than those advanced by critical pedagogists. Human emancipation is concerned with human freedom in both the negative and positive senses. Concern for human emancipation stems from the tradition of social philosophy, which is particularly concerned with social pathologies, disorder and misdevelopments (Honneth, 2007, p. 18). Welzel (2013) explains that theories of human emancipation center on the desire for a life free from domination (p. 37). In this sense, human emancipation focuses on freedom from, in the 99 negative sense established by Berlin (1958). Goals of human emancipation typically focus on the obstacles that prevent people from exercising power over their own lives. As a result, they give little guidance in the positive sense of freedom: they provide little criteria for evaluating the quality of the freedom enjoyed by individuals within a society. The insufficiency of human emancipation in respect to social justice can be articulated by an extended analogy comparing health with freedom. By analogy, it would be a mistake to equate the identification and treatment of pathologies with the general promotion of good health. For example, the absence of illness is insufficient to determine individual health, since people could be unhealthy from malnourishment or exposure to harmful chemicals. Treating pathologies is important in the maintenance of individual health but refraining from certain activities is only part of maintaining individual health. In comparison, human emancipation only accounts for part of an individual’s freedom. If people desire to be healthy, they must also engage in certain activities (like eating a healthy diet, exercising and getting adequate sleep). The avoidance of pathologies is insufficient to account for good health. In comparison, if people are to enjoy individual freedom, they must have worthwhile activities to engage in, and the skills required for their engagement. In this sense, human emancipation is only part of a broader goal: the goal of personal autonomy. Exploring this analogy further reveals how human emancipation is not necessarily valued by everyone in liberal democracies. The ability to identify pathologies (and treat them) is of particular importance to people affected by these pathologies. For example, people who have been directly affected by pathologies like cancer are most likely to be concerned with its treatment. Some people in liberal democracies will be less concerned with cancer (particularly if they have never been directly affected by it). While everyone should be concerned about cancer, 100 its treatment is not necessarily a daily concern for most people. By analogy, many people in liberal democracies are less interested or invested in human emancipation. This is not necessarily because they are bad people; they may just have other priorities. For example, people who are struggling with their own problems, like maintaining a proper diet, may simply be less interested in others’ problems. People without pathologies may still have health concerns. Everyone has good reason to be concerned with the prevention of cancer, as this potentially affects their own health. By analogy, a societal aim to promote general health is stronger than the aim to identify and treat pathologies. This broader aim is stronger because it is of interest to everyone, not just those already afflicted by pathologies. And, for this reason, the broader topic of personal autonomy is stronger than human emancipation. Everyone living in liberal democracies has reason to be concerned with their personal autonomy. In liberal democracies like our own, people enjoy robust sets of freedoms. Many of these freedoms have not been available for most of human civilization, including freedom of religion, movement, employment, association, speech, politics and other beliefs. While it is a serious and pressing problem that some people in liberal democracies do not enjoy the same levels of freedom compared to other citizens, sacrificing the freedoms already secured to resolve these problems is undesirable. By analogy, people should not be expected to sacrifice their own health for the sake of the ill. If we value freedom, we need to worry both about the lack of individual freedom available to some, but also the maintenance of the freedoms we enjoy. Since it is only part of the picture and not necessarily of concern to everyone, human emancipation is insufficient to serve as the goal for social and educational justice. The stronger goal is individual freedom conceptualized as personal autonomy. 101 If social justice is a question about what people in our society deserve, this question is best answered by Raz’s (1986) concept of personal autonomy. The core value that can be aimed towards in liberal democracies, regardless of identity or other values, is that everyone deserves access to the capacity for autonomous living. Considering the multiple valid conceptions of the good life in our society, autonomous living is the only moral solution to account for this pluralism. In liberal democracies, autonomous living and personal well-being requires that people can freely establish their own goals and make progress towards their achievement (Raz, 1986). In this sense, a liberal democracy acts justly as far as it allows and enables its members to participate in autonomous living. This can be determined to the extent that people are able to shape and determine the courses of their lives as part creators of their own moral worlds (Raz, 1986, p. 154). This observation also identifies the valuable role of critical theorists, to identify people who are unable to access personal autonomy and to bring their needs to light. Access to personal autonomy is valuable to everyone living within a liberal democracy—not just the individuals who lack it. For the emancipated, human emancipation is not necessarily something on their moral radar. Life is difficult, and even autonomous people have obstacles and problems in their lives. As such, many people living in liberal democracies will be unwilling to adopt additional moral obligations: some people do not have the capacity or resources to absorb increased moral responsibilities in their lives. Some people will prefer a life of meeting their basic duties and responsibilities towards others—and nothing more. On this topic, John White (1990) makes an insightful distinction between maximalist and minimalist moralities. He explains that maximalists fill their lives with moral obligation, moralizing everything; on the other hand, 102 minimalists prefer fulfilling their basic moral responsibilities, which once met, leaves them free for other pursuits (White, 1990, p. 43). Minimalists keep positive rules (i.e. “you must do x”) to a minimum (White, 1990, p. 45). Maximalists and minimalists will thus disagree on moral principles concerning human emancipation. However, these moral approaches reveal the shared value of personal autonomy. Minimalists are interested in principles and policies that allow the greatest exercise of individual freedom. Maximalists are also interested in principles and policies that allow people to exercise their freedom, they are just particularly concerned with those people in society who have fallen short.51 The aim of human emancipation may not provide compelling reasons for minimalists to act. On the other hand, minimalists and maximalists inherently value personal autonomy. To summarize, personal autonomy is a more robust aim for social justice than human emancipation. Human emancipation is only of particular interest for people negatively affected by social pathologies. Emancipated people in liberal democracies may be concerned with human emancipation, but they may have other pressing concerns in their lives. On the other hand, personal autonomy is of interest to everyone in liberal democracies, and it accounts for human emancipation. To this point in my thesis, I have argued that calls for social equality are calls for social justice. Social justice concerns providing people with what they deserve. In liberal democracies, all citizens deserve to have access to the conditions of personal autonomy. In this sense, our 51 On a related topic, Moschella (2016) differentiates between education for minimally decent citizenship and education for good citizenship (p. 108). She argues that compulsory education must meet the standards of minimally decent citizenship, but it should not entail education for good citizenship, as this oversteps the rights of children and parents (Moschella, 2016, p. 146). However, Moschella (2016) argues it is appropriate for governments to encourage education for good citizenship, as long as it is not compulsory (p. 109). 103 personal obligations to each other are to ensure that everyone has access to adequate life options and opportunities to develop certain mental abilities, while being free from coercion and manipulation (Raz, 1986). Centering on this goal will help eliminate unnecessary and distracting interpersonal comparisons caused by goals of equality. This goal is also one that everyone in liberal democracies can value: it is not of only of interest to the unemancipated or moral maximalists. Perhaps most usefully, this goal sets clear criteria to gauge when movements towards social justice are ethical and how they can prevent overstepping their aims. In the next section I will consider some implications for what I call soft and rough versions of justice. Individual freedom is not zero sum and can be fostered without damaging the freedoms of others.52 Likewise, improving the condition of the sick does not require altering the condition of the healthy. In efforts to improve the condition of sick people, we view the involuntary harvesting of human organs as unethical. In the same way, it should be viewed as unethical to harm the autonomy of the emancipated to improve the conditions of the disadvantaged. I will refer to measures that promote social justice in ways that preserve the freedoms of autonomous people as soft approaches, and those that infringe on existing freedoms I will refer to as rough approaches. 5.3 Personal autonomy and soft equity Holding equity as autonomy promoting significantly distances it from notions of equality. Equity is no longer about promoting a higher measure of equality, but about promoting personal autonomy for people who lack it. In other words, soft equity is about reducing or eliminating 52 I take this point to be self-evident. In the last half decade, the freedoms of people living in liberal democracies has greatly improved without any losses in the freedom of others. Examples include the leaps in freedom for people based on their sex, race, ethnicity, gender identity and abilities (or disabilities). 104 disadvantages people have regarding their access to personal autonomy. The capacity for autonomy requires three conditions: certain mental abilities, adequate options and independence (Raz, 1986).53 This account of soft equity is much less controversial, particularly within an educational context. Soft equity is concerned with improving the life options of people who are disadvantaged through no fault of their own. This sort of luck, of being unable to control one’s own health, genetics, family upbringing or socialization is referred to as someone’s ‘brute luck’ (Stojanov, 2018, p. 38). Brute bad luck includes all the negative life circumstances beyond people’s control (Dworkin, 2000, p. 73). Brute luck is contrasted with option luck, where people deliberately opt for something risky (Dworkin, 2000, p. 73). Some scholars, like luck egalitarians, argue that all social and economic inequalities based on brute luck should be diminished as far as possible (Stojanov, 2018, p. 38).54 If people have lost access to certain life options because of option luck (such as gambling), equitable measures are not easily justifiable. In fact, many people may argue it is unjust to bail out people who have damaged their life options through their own choices (Phillips, 2004, p. 1). The key point, whether one is a luck egalitarian, is that equity is particularly concerned with remedying disadvantages based on brute bad luck. In the soft sense, equity is solely concerned with combating brute bad luck. A person’s good fortune is not something that must be remedied. If someone is thrown into a life of great 53 It is also important to note that Raz (1986) argues for the value of personal autonomy assuming that other biologically determined elements of well-being are already met (p. 308). 54 Luck egalitarians sometimes strive to diminish only brute bad luck, but sometimes they also strive to reduce the benefits of good luck as well. Stojanov (2018) does not consider how these two luck egalitarian positions differ, but the difference has some important implications for compulsory education. I will pick up this topic after discussing equity, inclusion and diversity. 105 wealth, or other means of well-being, this is considered lucky, but not unjust. Since equality is not an aim of personal autonomy, there is no interest in cutting down the autonomy of others. Unlike some egalitarian thinkers that view all inequalities as constraints and hinderances (Dixon, 2010, p. 37), personal autonomy is unconcerned with inequalities. Inequalities are only significant as potential symptoms of insufficient access to the conditions of autonomy. Some people’s poor access to autonomy is the result of poor life choices and natural consequences. This is not the case of everyone, particularly the dependents of people who are in such positions. As a result, equity ought to focus primarily on improving the situations of people who are disadvantaged due to their brute bad luck, as opposed to their option luck. Where emancipation offers little in the way of direction for the end goals, personal autonomy is quite clear. Disadvantaged people need access to education that can help them develop the skills required for autonomy. They need to be provided with access to adequate life options and they need to have some level of independence. Providing the conditions for autonomous living is sufficient for satisfying social justice. Soft equity is compatible with people choosing values contrary to personal autonomy in their lives. Providing access to the capacity for autonomy is sufficient for social justice. In an educational context, there are many ways to support soft equity. These include all efforts to improve disadvantaged students’ access to the conditions of personal autonomy. Examples include providing opportunities for disadvantaged students to develop the cognitive skills required for personal autonomy (which may entail placing limitations on tracking or streaming students, especially at early ages, since tracking them early may separate them from opportunities they could have engaged with, given more time to develop). Depending on the needs of the students, these opportunities may require support outside of the regular timetable or 106 classroom. Soft equity may also demand resources to help disadvantaged students, not only in the way of supplies, like technology, but also in personnel, like educational assistants, specialists, tutors and mentors. Soft equity in education also requires that students have access to adequate life options. This may entail providing funding for students that cannot otherwise afford certain opportunities (like participating in school trips, sports or certification). Adequate options in this sense ought to be matched to both student abilities and motivations. So long as the options adequately match abilities and motivations, there need not be additional interpersonal comparisons. Soft equity does not require moral maximalism. Soft equity allows for inequalities, particularly when they do not harm others.55 Ripstein (2006) argues that people should not be able to prohibit others from doing things that do not wrong them (p. 238). In other words, if interpersonal differences do not harm others, there is nothing unjust about these ‘inequalities.’ Since personal autonomy directly contributes to personal well-being in liberal democracies, harming another’s ability to live autonomously would be morally wrong. However, Ripstein (2006) explains that defeating someone in fair contest does not deprive one of one’s powers; it is merely a failed attempt that may be disappointing, but it does not deprive someone of one’s ability to live autonomously (p. 238). As such, inequalities from fair competitions are perfectly just according to soft equity, so long as both parties retain the autonomy they had prior to engaging in the contests. Soft equity holds access to the conditions of personal autonomy as a minimum threshold for social justice. There are several benefits to conceptualizing social justice in this manner. 55 In this sense, harm is taken to mean damaging someone's well-being, or damaging their personal autonomy, as autonomy contributes to personal well-being (Raz, 1986). 107 First, it does not require constant comparisons between individuals. There are so many dimensions across which people can be measured that it is a daunting task to try to use equality as a means of measurement. Curren (2000) takes one step in the right direction when he tries to divert from absolute relational equality in defense of a threshold approach to equality (p. 186). One further improvement is to abandon the concept of equality for personal autonomy.56 If we aim to ensure the same threshold for everyone, we can just aim for the threshold for everyone. When it comes to general aims, equality is redundant (Raz, 1986, p. 220). Curren arrives at some of these same thresholds as a minimum for social justice, such as adequate education (which is included in Raz’s notion of certain mental abilities) (Curren, 2000, p. 195). Instead of personal autonomy, Curren (2000) argues that educational justice entails ensuring children can grasp what is good in the laws and accept the burdens of following those laws (p. 194). But Curren’s approach to educational justice is insufficient because it merely focuses on the development of certain cognitive abilities. According to his conceptions of justice, children could have inadequate life options and perhaps not enjoy any level of personal independence. For example, a law-abiding citizen in a poor community may fully understand and appreciate the laws, but totally lack access to the adequate life options and independence required for justice in a liberal democracy. To account for these concerns, personal autonomy is the better aim. Soft equity is appealing to moral minimalists, but it is also something that moral maximalists can support. For minimalists, their basic duty is to ensure universal access to the conditions of personal autonomy. While this is a demanding endeavor, it is mostly attainable through the establishment of strong social institutions, including public education. Maximalists 56 Bedau (1967) observes that equality essentially means sameness, but we are slow to admit this (p. 27). 108 can still pursue social justice, but they must realize that helping others beyond this basic duty is a personal choice, based on individual moral motivations. As such, there will still be plenty of opportunities for people to help others secure better access to personal autonomy in their lives. This soft approach to promoting equity should serve as the basis for educational policy, rules and pedagogy that promote social justice. 5.4 Rough equity and personal autonomy Mark Twain is attributed with claiming that comparison is the death of joy. Whether or not people compulsively compare themselves to others is a matter of individual temperament, but comparison is not a sound foundation for justice. Comparisons can sometimes help identify injustices, but within liberal democracies, there will be many just individual differences. For example, there is nothing inherently unjust about unequal distributions of goods. In fact, Rawls (2006) imagines that unequal distributions are necessary to attract the right talent to certain positions in a just society. Not only are unequal distributions often fair, but fixation on differences is a major source of envy and resentment. Envy is a problem for societies. Moral concern for social envy is at least as old as the Ten Commandments, which warn against coveting. Rawls (2006) makes an important assumption in his conception of justice: “The special assumption I make is that a rational individual does not suffer from envy” (p. 124). The problem with Rawls’ assumption is that envy is a human emotion, and it is one that cannot easily be eliminated. Rationality may help people diminish their feelings of envy, but constantly reviewing interpersonal differences for the sake of justice will always lead to feelings of resentment against those who have more. Envy can cause efforts towards equity to take a morally dark turn—to what I will call rough equity. Rough equity is a means of pursuing equity at any cost. It does not consider the 109 ethics behind the means of securing equity since the ends are used to justify the means. But just because something is worthwhile does not mean that it can be pursued in any manner. Just as law enforcement officers are prevented from certain approaches in securing justice, such as planting evidence, so too should equity be pursued with careful restrictions. Rough equity may aim to diminish brute luck, like soft equity. But unlike soft equity, it does not discriminate between good or bad luck. Egalitarians pursuing rough equity are willing to sacrifice the well-being of some people (usually the wealthy, powerful or successful) for the sake of disadvantaged people. Some egalitarians decree that “Everything that can be done to ensure appropriately equitable treatment should be done” (Gorard, 2013, p. 161). But some policy makers take claims like this to mean that any action is justifiable in the name of equity. Dixon (2010) explains that people in dominant positions mistakenly think equality threatens them—that egalitarian measures might diminish their liberties (p. 37). But when it comes to rough equity, these people are justified in worrying about their freedoms. If equity can be pursued at any cost (i.e. at the expense of others), then free people should be concerned for their individual freedoms. Individual freedoms are valuable, whether they are possessed or not. Equity also turns rough when its advocates demand that everyone adopts a particular moral outlook. In other words, equity becomes rough when its advocates think that people should share their idea of the good life. Equity in this sense becomes rough since a single conception of the good life is presented as a universal conception of justice. But this is contrary to the moral pluralism enjoyed in liberal democracies. Advocates for equity sometimes demand that everyone prioritize in their lives causes of human emancipation. Some theorists claim that moral outlooks that do not prioritize human emancipation are toxic and predatory (Giroux, 2015, p. 168). On the other hand, critical theorists that acknowledge the value of moral pluralism, argue that the pursuit 110 of human emancipation is not a moral imperative, but a personal choice (Wheeler-Bell, 2019, p. 270). To compel people—particularly through social ostracization, harming the opportunities available to them—to adopt a particular moral outlook is unethical in a liberal democracy. People can adopt a variety of sound moral outlooks, none of which ought to be forced upon them. Rough equity does not hold individual freedom as a primary value; it prioritizes equality, which (as I argued in Chapter 2) is an empty aim. Berlin (1958) warns, “Equality of oppression is not equivalent to liberty. Nor does universal consent to interference cease to make it interference...” (Berlin, 1958, p. 32). Rough equity is contrary to the value of living in a liberal democracy. It is used to justify undue interference with personal autonomy for the sake of equality. Cutting everyone down for the sake of envy, resentment or equality serves no one's interests—at least no rational interests. As such, envy should never be held as a sound foundation for principles of justice. Rough equity is too demanding. In a liberal democracy, people value the freedom to form and pursue their own personal goals. If they are forced to adopt a maximalist approach to equity, they will resent their losses of freedom. White (1990) notes that personal interests will conflict with moral demands when they are maximal (p. 55). For example, teaching is an infinitely demanding profession: there are always students who could use more support. But if teachers were required to tend to all the possible needs of their students, teachers would have no time for their own activities. White’s (1990) solution to this problem is that people learn to recognize moral goals as personal goals—as part of their own well-being, not of everyone’s well-being (p. 55). As such, rough equity is the wrong course of action in the pursuit of social justice. A strong personal conviction for equity is admirable, but not morally obligatory. The proper role of 111 the egalitarian is to scrutinize social inequalities to ensure they are based on justifiable differences (Bedau, 1967, p. 27). When it comes to the issue of everyone’s freedom, a soft approach is best. 5.5 Personal autonomy and soft inclusion Social justice requires some level of social inclusion. Raz (1986) argues that valuing personal autonomy presents some social duties, including opportunities to develop certain mental skills and providing an adequate range of options for everyone (p. 408). By extension, if we follow Raz’s reasoning, it is a social duty to make sure everyone is included in the group of people with adequate life options. Soft inclusion in this sense strives to allow everyone in a liberal democracy to participate as full members in the social group that has access to personal autonomy. Importantly, access to autonomous living is always shifting. As the social world changes, what is understood as adequate life options changes. For example, thirty years ago it was uncommon to have access to the internet. By today’s standard, it is essential for social connectivity and practices, access to important resources and even for work. Kahane and Savulescu (2012) note that individual well-being often depends on adequate access to current technology (p. 328). Their idea of justice focuses on the importance of identifying what affects well-being, and the distribution of whatever this entails (Kahane & Savulescu, 2012, p. 328). Soft inclusion will likely require moderate state intervention to ensure that everyone has access to adequate options. It is easy for people to be left out in a diverse society. Although liberal democracies boast the most comprehensive set of individual freedoms, they have their problems (such as the marginalization of people with alternative lifestyles or minorities). To allow everyone access to personal autonomy, adequate life options must be made available. 112 White (1990) argues that states should have a hand in ensuring that these options exist (p. 23). It is not always in the self-interest of individuals to ensure others have adequate life options, but these options are prerequisite for the conditions of autonomy to be available to all. As such, just liberal democracies will arrange themselves to allow all citizens access to the conditions for autonomy. White (1990) further notes that it is not enough to simply provide the options, as individual must be aware that these options exist, rather people need to be made aware and come to understand that they can partake in these opportunities (p. 23). This highlights the importance of education in a just liberal democracy. Soft inclusion defines the minimum threshold to which everyone must be included. As such, social justice in liberal democracies requires that all people be included in the group that has access to the conditions of personal autonomy. Brighouse et al. (2019) call similarly for inclusion, urging educators to focus on equality, adequacy and benefitting the least advantaged (p. 37). However, if their focus were on personal autonomy, these three values could be simplified into one. Equality itself should not be a focus since it is valuable only as far as it contributes to personal autonomy and personal well-being. Instead, only elements that contribute towards individual capacities for autonomy should feature (which will likely entail improving the condition of many schools and districts). The point is that comparisons between schools are unnecessary if the access to the conditions for autonomy are held as the threshold. Likewise, personal autonomy also serves as the threshold for adequacy without leaving this value a mystery. Holding personal autonomy as this threshold will always serve the interests of disadvantaged people. If most people have access to the conditions for autonomy, the focus for improvement will be those who do not. 113 5.6 Rough inclusion and personal autonomy Like equity, calls for inclusion can also be too demanding. Rough inclusion in this sense promotes inclusion, even at the expense of personal autonomy. Rough inclusion occurs when there are requirements that people must physically be together, included in all groups or that there be an equality of outcome. Such aims overshoot access to the conditions for personal autonomy. The line between soft and rough inclusion is revealed by a distinction introduced in Chapter 4. Kauffman and Badar (2020) introduce two types of inclusion: proprium instructio (appropriate instruction based on individual abilities) and habeas corpus (physically being present). They introduce these concepts within an educational context, but they can be applied more broadly. Outside of an educational context, the idea of appropriate instruction is like Raz’s notion of adequate options. Proprium instructio is like soft inclusion, since it calls for matching individuals with adequate options: it does not demand that people be given the same opportunities as others (such as being in the same physical groups). On the other hand, the strict enforcement of habeas corpus is in line with rough equity, as it demands physical placement or outcomes where everyone is physically a member in the target group. Kauffman and Badar (2020) argue that habeas corpus is a silly starting point for inclusive education (p. 7), and by extension, it is also a silly approach to social justice. Inclusion in the rough sense can also take the form of equality of opportunity. The rough inclusion interpretation of ‘equality of opportunity’ is a compelling argument for the need to move away from the distinction between equality of opportunity and outcome. Rough inclusion blurs the lines between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. Benn and Peters (1959) explain that equality of opportunity is consistent with educational streaming, where everyone 114 starts on the same footing and follows it as far as their capacities allow (p. 118-119). However, those who hold rough notions of inclusion are apt to criticize such practices. They focus instead on how student opportunities are tied to educational outcomes and the positional goods that come with them. In this sense, inclusion is used to justify placing all members in positions of equal opportunity. These artificial arrangements, where everyone achieves the same levels of recognition, despite having different abilities, in the name of equal opportunities, is more like equality of outcome. A further problem with these artificial arrangements is that students may be miles from each other in terms of capacities, despite appearing similar on paper. This sort of equality of opportunity looks like inclusion, but entirely misses the aim of developing certain mental abilities and providing adequate opportunities.57 Many of the students will not be matched with adequate or appropriate life options in these situations. The solution to this confusion is thinking of equality of opportunity, instead, in terms of universal access to the conditions of personal autonomy. Benn and Peters (1959) further explain that the pursuit of equality of opportunity is to neutralize the effects of wealth on things like individual opportunities (p. 120). Benn and Peters (1959), like Rawls (1999), suggest that individual abilities and motivations should be the primary criteria for allocating individual opportunities. But advocates of rough equity resists these criteria, substituting instead identity markers such as ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation or other elements that have little to do with the opportunities at hand. 57 See also the phenomena of ‘undermatching’ and ‘overmatching.’ These terms are used to describe situations where students that are high achieving do not enroll in selective colleges but students that are low achieving do enroll, respectively (Cortes & Lincove, 2018). 115 Another example of rough inclusion is using irrelevant identity markers to distribute opportunities. Such practices are clearly exclusionary. Since rough inclusion is concerned with equality of outcome, its proponents often desire to have certain groups represented in equal numbers. For example, if a population is composed of fifty percent women, people pursuing rough inclusion would hope to see the same numbers represented in workforces, particularly those having to do with power and influence (e.g. politicians, police and teachers). Rough inclusion is only concerned about the options available to disadvantaged or marginalized people: it is not concerned about the personal autonomy of everyone. This is a major flaw, as social justice cannot be framed as something that harms some people for the sake of others, particularly when those harmed have truly earned their opportunities. Rough inclusion disrespects personal autonomy. When people lead autonomous lives, they play a role in the development of their own values and conceptions of the good life. This means that free choices may lead to vastly different outcomes. Expecting equal outcomes does not respect these values and goals. As one example, immigrant populations in small communities should not be expected to value the same things as everyone else. If the children of these families are not playing on junior hockey teams, this does not imply that the teams are not inclusive, nor does it imply that the teams need more immigrant youth on them. Outcome oriented conceptions can mistakenly interpret all inequalities of outcome as instances of injustice, even when there are no unfair exclusions. The children from these families may simply be interested in different sports, based on their own values. People will have to apply reason to distinguish measures of rough inclusion from soft inclusion. It can be difficult to differentiate between equal opportunity and equal outcome. 116 Gutmann (2003) suggests that the answer is found somewhere between state toleration and state support: Without some line drawn between toleration and support, democratic governments will either entirely fail to tolerate any voluntary associations that are not themselves democratic (even if they do no injustice) or entirely fail to oppose the many common kinds of discrimination practiced by voluntary associations that serve to undermine equal liberty and civic equality. When a reasonable line is drawn between toleration and state support, a democratic government distinguishes between exclusions that do and do not undermine civic equality and between exclusions that it can and cannot tolerate consistently with its basic principles. (p. 88) Likewise, soft inclusion can be identified as inclusion that is necessary to guarantee universal access to the conditions of personal autonomy. On the other hand, if these measures undermine the liberties of others, this harm is unjustifiable. 5.7 Personal autonomy and soft diversity Diversity alone does not promote social justice. Becoming aware of diversity, particularly through intersectionality, allows people to acknowledge important interpersonal differences. These differences sometimes include differences in core beliefs and values, differences that are often shared by other members of people’s identity groups. Soft diversity is an acknowledgement that some personal differences are important in the consideration of individual access to the conditions of autonomy. Soft diversity is about ensuring people have adequate options, given their various identities, and focuses on educating about others. 117 Soft diversity requires educating people about the differences of others within a society. Not only does this help prevent people from being ignorant of their fellow citizens, it also allows decision makers to make better choices. Arneson (2003) gives an argument that supports this kind of diversity: If one is nonnegligently ignorant either of the existence of others who disagree with one’s views or the grounds for their disagreement, one will not be epistemically at fault in ignoring the challenge their views pose to one’s own. But once one is aware, or should be, that others disagree for certain reasons, then one cannot proceed as though there is no challenge. (p. 22) Soft diversity is about ensuring that all views are considered in decision making. It does not mean that the wants and needs of marginalized or underrepresented individual are of more value compared to others. However, rational and reasonable arguments from marginalized people must be considered with equal weight compared to everyone else. Arneson (2003) argues further that people do not have any sound basis for regarding their own views as superior to others, particularly when their views are tied or bettered by opposing views (p. 22). Soft diversity, then, is an effort to consider all worthwhile views and positions before decisions are made. Diversity in the soft sense holds rationality and reason as the ultimate decision-making tools. These tools are held to be universally applicable, meaning they apply, even to people who are less persuaded by them. For example, some people may be less persuaded by reason, and more persuaded by group allegiance or direction from religious leaders. Arneson (2003) argues, “Interacting with others, I have a right to be treated according to rational principles, the 118 principles most strongly supported by practical reason” (p. 28). While this treatment may be unsatisfactory to some people living in liberal democracies, such as religious fundamentalists or white supremacists, it is perfectly compatible with notions of social justice as promoting personal autonomy. Arneson (2003) explains further that if someone’s practical reason goes off track and they affirm racist principles, it is not disrespectful to treat them with rational nonracist principles that they reject (p. 28-29). Diversity in the soft sense is about ensuring that ideas and the values of others are not unfairly ignored. As such, if diversity is to play a role for issues of justice, it cannot focus only on certain differences, like race and sex. Diversity of belief is often one of the elements of intersectionality that plays only a minor role. Dixon (2010) argues that our commitment to political pluralism, which acknowledges the possibility of electoral defeat, needs to encourage diversity of political opinion and action, particularly to prevent corruption and ossification (p. 57). Mcavoy and Hess (2013) also arrive at the conclusion that embracing ideological diversity is crucial for education in liberal democracies like our own (p. 40). Soft diversity is the kind that allows people to hold a variety of political and other beliefs. This observation also draws a line between acceptable and unacceptable political opinions in liberal democracies. Harmful political principles and opinions (i.e. those that aim to restrict the freedoms of others by harming them or their opportunities) are unacceptable in liberal democracies. For example, liberal democracies should not have equal tolerance for personal beliefs that require killing family members in the name of honor. We need not tolerate beliefs and opinions that are contrary to personal autonomy, particularly those that are harmful to individuals—including harm to their personal freedom. 119 People who value soft diversity are accepting of a variety of ways of living, but they do not hold all ways of living neutrally. White (1990) argues that supporting autonomy is to abandon neutralism (in respect to all ways of living), since this favors one particular version of the good life (p. 21). Rawls (1986) and Berlin (1958) both advocate for moral pluralism, the belief that there are a variety of incompatible ways of living, that are each valuable and morally good (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 3). If Berlin and Rawls are right, then moral pluralism is a necessary element of a free society. Moral pluralism differs from neutralism since it presents a variety of ways of living as desirable, but not all ways of living. Rawls (1986) defines respect for others in terms of accepting their doctrines, despite disagreeing about their validity (as cited in Nussbaum, 2011, p. 17). Importantly, this respect only applies to some ways of living, not all feasible options. When it comes to soft diversity, respect is particularly for others’ autonomy. Callan (1995) explains that in order to accept the diversity of other valuable ways of living, we must overcome a bias that we have in viewing our own doctrine of good living as the best one (Callan, 1995, p. 269). This is called a ‘burden of judgment.’ Callan (1995) writes, “In embracing a life that revolves around teaching, scholarship, and familial intimacy, I choose one honourable way to live at the cost of many other worthwhile possibilities” (Callan, 1995, p. 269). Valuing personal autonomy requires accepting that there are other worthwhile ways of living and thinking than our own. Soft diversity is about promoting a variety of ways of living, while keeping access to personal autonomy intact. 5.8 Rough diversity and personal autonomy Diversity can take an ethically dark turn in numerous ways. I will argue this occurs when 1) diversity is used in defense of ideas and principles that are harmful to autonomous living, 2) 120 when principles of diversity silence reasonable ideas, and 3) when diversity is used to manipulate or coerce people into adopting prescribed values. Essentially, rough diversity negatively affects access to personal autonomy. Rough diversity in the first sense defends neutralism and value relativism. Value relativism is the belief that all human values are subjective and cannot be evaluated against any sound criteria. In this sense, ideas and values are simply relative, and have no reasonable or rational foundation. For relativists, all ideas and beliefs are of the same value. The problem with relativism is that it can be used to support values that are harmful towards individuals, particularly towards their personal autonomy. Value relativism is an inappropriate moral outlook within liberal democracies. Liberal democracies must value and protect individual freedom (and by extension, elements of democratic government). Some values are simply unacceptable in liberal democracies. For example, all rational people agree that the Holocaust was a terrible thing. Nazism and its values are unacceptable within liberal democracies. Likewise, beliefs that people should be put to death for drawing certain pictures or leaving their faith are unacceptable. To defend relativism is to defend these cruel and irrational ways of living. It can be difficult to determine which ways of living are permissible; however, in liberal democracies, the value of personal autonomy reveals the line between acceptable and unacceptable ways of life. Mouffe (1993) presents a convincing argument in favour of this claim. Patell (2001) explains her argument: Mouffe cautions, however, that we must be careful lest we retreat too far from what is valuable within the liberal tradition. The desire to be able to render moral judgment that 121 lies behind both the universalism and the rationalism of the Enlightenment must not be abandoned altogether in the favor of cultural relativism and absolute pluralism. As Mouffe notes, there are certain distinctions—between ‘‘the public and the private, the separation of Church and State, and of civil and religious law’’—that are the ‘‘basic achievements of the democratic revolution’’ and that ‘‘are what make the existence of pluralism possible. One cannot therefore call these distinctions into question in the name of pluralism” (1993, 132). (Patell, 2001, p. 191) Not all ways of living are equal. Diversity is misguided when it claims they are. Ways of living that threaten the values and structure of our liberal society, or the safety and well-being of its citizens, ought not to be tolerated. The second way diversity becomes rough is by silencing the discussion of ideas and beliefs. Diversity of political ideas and other beliefs are desirable in liberal democracies. When reasonable people disagree, they can produce better solutions through discourse. But, when diversity is used to identify people’s politics and negate their legitimacy, it becomes rough. Ideologies, according to Habermas, are the beliefs and values that prevent individuals from listening and learning from each other, resulting in inequalities (Wheeler-Bell, 2017, p. 573). For example, Giroux (2015), writes “Neoliberalism is a toxin that is generating a predatory class of the walking dead who are producing what might be called dead zones of the imagination. They are waging a fierce battle...” (Giroux, 2015, p. 168). In another article, Giroux (2019) pairs the ideas of fascism and neoliberalism in ways meant to debase the latter (p. 10). He also argues that neoliberalism promotes racism, self-preservation and brutal self-interest (Giroux, 2004, p. 63). Although Giroux clearly does not agree with neoliberal politics, his approach is to make 122 neoliberalism unacceptable in the same way as fascism. The problem with his attack on neoliberal politics is that neoliberalism is not harmful to personal autonomy or individual well-being in the same way as murderous fascist doctrines. As such, doctrines like neoliberalism should be treated rationally, even if people disagree with it. Rough diversity in this sense becomes an ideology, preventing people from understanding it and its rationality. The third kind of rough diversity emerges in attempts to force prescribed values on people. Several situations cause this kind of rough diversity. There is a gray area between fostering desirable dispositions and values in others and manipulation. Negative manipulations of this kind include indoctrination and other coercive methods, such as social ostracization. Rough diversity can lead to indoctrination. I use the term ‘indoctrination’ in the sense that Snook uses the term, as teaching with the intention that the pupils believe propositions regardless of any evidence against them (as cited in Martin, 2020, p. 14). For example, some students may be taught they must tolerate the actions of others, even if those actions are reprehensible. Indoctrination in this sense forces people to adopt a dogmatic, unquestioning, non-rational mindset (Marin, 2020, p. 14). But this mindset is contrary to the mental skills required for personal autonomy. The value of personal autonomy once again reveals the ground between concepts like indoctrination and desirable impositions on others’ values. White (1990) argues that not all impositions of values onto others are undesirable; he explains that some impositions on others’ values are desirable, such as teaching children to care for each other, teaching them to avoid harming themselves, not hurting others, enjoying cooperative activities and controlling personal desires so they can realize other goals (p. 119). He further explains that these impositions are 123 different than indoctrination, because they do not have to be taught in a way that is difficult or impossible for people to reflect upon (White, 1990, p. 119). Some versions of rough diversity aim to foster unshakable, unquestionable beliefs about the value of human diversity. These values taught may be positive, but some methods overstep the aims of social justice. If diversity education prevents students from developing the reflective or critical skills to make their own decision, the method for teaching these values is unethical. The ends may still be desirable, but the ends do not justify the means when they harm student access to personal autonomy. 5.9 The raising principle Personal autonomy as the primary aim of educational justice has many implications. Most of the implications are beyond the scope of this chapter, except one pressing implication I would like to present. If the aim of educational justice is personal autonomy, this aim protects the existing autonomy of all students, and stands as reason to promote autonomy for those who lack it. As a principle of educational justice, it is only ethical to pursue educational justice through increasing the autonomy of those who lack it; it is never okay to pull others down.58 I will refer to this principle as the raising principle. The remainder of this section is an argument in support of this principle. The raising principle rests on Raz’s notion of harm. Raz explains, “Roughly speaking, one harms another when one's action makes the other person worse off than he was, or is entitled to be, in a way which affects his future well-being" (Raz, 1986, p. 414). Raz is not the only 58 See, for example, the issue related to girls only Lego (Gonzales, 2017). While practices like this may be relatively uncommon, I hope that this principle can be preventative, rather than transformative. 124 philosopher that has made this assertion. Rawls defends the idea that it is not permissible to improve the lot of the poor if it involves denying opportunities to others in the society (Dixon, 2010, p. 31). In the sense of harming students’ actual or prospective life options, and in the sense of harming the development of certain mental abilities, certain educational decisions can harm students. Decisions harm students when they limit the development of their autonomy, particularly with the intention of benefitting disadvantaged students. For example, during the pandemic our school moved to an online learning model. At a staff meeting, some teachers argued that since some of the students did not have adequate technology for learning at home, this model should be avoided and some alternative model should be used. One argument was that there should be no online instruction if everyone could not benefit from it.59 This, however, is an unethical decision according to the raising principle (assuming the online learning model presented was the best option available for everyone else). Choices to remove opportunities unless they are available to everyone, like this, harm the rest of the students because it makes them worse off than they would have been if the handful of students were not in their classes. Of course, a solution where everyone has opportunities to engage in learning would be optimal. But, the opportunities available to some people should not be removed because they are not available to all. In these situations, solutions for offering opportunities to everyone should be the chosen approach. In my opinion, my administrators made the right decision to continue with online learning, with the delivery of supplementary paper learning packages for students who required them. 59 This issue is also related to the “homework gap” mentioned in the introduction. See Wong (2018). 125 In liberal democracies, we tolerate people living different lives, having their own values and respect their personal autonomy. If we tolerate these differences, we must also tolerate unevenly distributed advantages and disadvantages. If we are to tolerate that some people live lives that we disagree with, subject to the constraints of maintaining personal autonomy, then we must tolerate all manner of variations. Raz (1986) explains his notion of toleration: Toleration, then, is the curbing of an activity likely to be unwelcome to its recipient or of an inclination so to act which is in itself morally valuable and which is based on a dislike or an antagonism towards that person or a feature of his life, reflecting a judgment that these represent limitations or deficiencies in him, in order to let that person have his way or in order for him to gain or keep some advantage. (Raz, 1986, p. 402) Toleration must be given the those who are not only viewed as living strangely, or deficiently, but also towards those who appear to have advantages. So long as people are abiding by the rules of our society, there cannot be complaints about the unequal outcomes. It is unacceptable to harm the crimeless autonomy of some people to improve the autonomy of others.60 White (1990) argues, “a justifiable government policy is one which seeks to promote the autonomy of all its citizens and does not favour some at the expense of others” (White, 1990, p. 22). But this claim is true in both directions. Such policies cannot favour anyone—the advantaged or the disadvantaged. 60 In this sense, there must be some significant, targeted or measurable harm. For example, governmental taxation cannot be said to be harmful when people have less expendable cash but universal life opportunities improve. Taxation is excessive when it eliminates life opportunities of those being taxed. 126 Harming access to personal autonomy in the name of equality is undesirable. Martin (2020) explains that when it comes to promoting access to knowledge, we prefer to increase it at the bottom rather than restricting it at the top; if we strive for equal access by restricting knowledge at the top, it could lead to equal distributions of inadequate knowledge (p. 172). In an educational context, the restriction of knowledge at the top comes in the form of ‘levelling-down,’ whereby curricula are watered down so that all students can grasp the concepts and achieve highly (Brighouse & Swift, 2006). The result is that the educational bar is lowered. Such results are undesirable. The same is true of personal autonomy. It is desirable to have significantly autonomous individuals in a society. Some people’s aspirations are big, and the products of their goals benefit the entire society. Someone’s privilege is irrelevant when they make significant contributions to domains like education, medicine, technology and entertainment. Everyone benefits. Some scholars advocate for restricting the benefits of those who are doing well. Brighouse et al. (2019) argue that people who support adequacy and equality support policies that raise the spending in lower spending school districts and limit the spending for higher spending ones (p. 38). One of the aims of my thesis is to demonstrate why this approach to equality is a poor and unnecessary means to social justice. In disagreement with Brighouse et al. (2019), I argue that adequacy is sufficient when it comes to access to the conditions for personal autonomy. Equality is irrelevant, so no pulling down is ever required. Educational justice is only ethical when it is a raising up of disadvantaged students, and never a pulling down of non-disadvantaged students. Frankfurt (1987) argues that the major flaw of egalitarianism is supposing that equality is important, regardless of how much either party has (p. 34). Personal autonomy is a matter of degree, and even significantly autonomous people have 127 problems and obstacles to overcome in their lives. So long as free people are not harming others, including harming their well-being and personal autonomy, they must be tolerated. Wheeler-Bell (2017) explains that domination occurs when rules and practices do not meet the standards of public justification (p. 572). Just as the pursuit of health for those in need cannot come at the cost of others, so too must increased access to personal autonomy come at no cost to others. 5.10 Concluding remarks Efforts to increase social and educational justice in liberal democracies are noble undertakings. However, sometimes these efforts are misguided. By clarifying the goals of social and educational justice, more effective initiatives and policies can be developed. Not only will these efforts be stronger when more people understand what they are truly aiming for, but they will be less controversial because most people living in liberal democracies will share their values. Raz (1986) argues that autonomy is morally valuable, giving reason enough for everyone to promote it for others (p. 407). Importantly, this study has a number of limitations. First, it only considers education within a liberal democratic context, and does not consider what all students deserve as a human right. Second, it does not does not provide a comprehensive list of skills, values or aptitudes that students ought to develop in liberal democracies. In this sense, it cannot be used to draft policy, however it can be used to inform policy decisions and identify ethically problematic practices. In the same manner, it will largely be up to policy makers and those that influence them to identify the adequacy of the educational opportunities provided to students, particularly younger students. Future research directions may explore the practical extension of these principles, and attempt to identify contemporary sets of skills and values necessary for all learners in liberal democracies. 128 Another avenue to explore would be education that promotes personal autonomy as a general human right (extending beyond the confines of liberal democratic contexts). Personal autonomy is the prime shared value in liberal democracies, and as such, it should be available to everyone. Arneson (2003) argues that intelligent, reasonable people do not arrive at similar values and beliefs about human life in free societies (p. 21). However, there is certainly a range of acceptable ways of living. Ways of living that harm others, either physically or their well-being, are unacceptable in liberal democracies. Since the capacity for autonomy is prerequisite for autonomous living and well-being, harming someone’s access to personal autonomy harms their well-being (or potential well-being). Schinkel et al. (2010) explain that autonomy is valuable for three major reasons: 1) it causes people to be reliable because they have shared fundamental concerns and preferences, 2) it allows people to make prudent decisions, contributing to human flourishing and, 3) being a master over one’s own life is intrinsically valuable (Schinkel et al., 2010, p. 275-276). In liberal democracies, a renewed appreciation for personal autonomy can help refocus efforts of social and educational justice. White (1990) argues that the political left and the political right can be united in the shared goal of promoting general autonomy (p. 22). This mutual aim must simply be recognized. There has perhaps never been a timelier moment to reaffirm this aim, as political polarization is leading to difficulties in communication. While autonomous living is not the best way of life in all circumstances, it is the best approach to life in liberal democracies (White, 1990, p. 26). People of all reasonable beliefs and political dispositions can agree on the values of personal autonomy and the education of children in liberal democracies: 129 It was suggested there that children be brought up to desire such things as: physical pleasures – of food, sex, exercise; close personal relationships; the avoidance of pain and injury to themselves; the protection of their own and others’ moral rights, both universal rights, like non-injury or freedom of expression, and rights attached to specific roles; benevolence extending beyond their intimate circle and embracing at the limit humanity as a whole; personal projects pursued for their own sake; co-operation with others for shared goals; virtues like courage, temperance, patience, and practical wisdom; the coordination of lower-order values within a coherent value-structure; and personal autonomy. (White, 1990, p. 121) These are the values of personal autonomy. None of these aims have to do with the pursuit of equality. 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Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Interdisciplinary Studies
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Martin, Christopher
Personal autonomy and educational justice
Text