Keeping metaphysics respectable : a methodological critique
department or school: Arts, Faculty of
department or school: Philosophy, Department of
data provider: DSpace
degree campus: UBCV
creator: Trout, Cristian Walsh Levy
issued: 2021-04-22T22:08:32Z
issued: 2021
related degree: Master of Arts - MA
degree grantor: University of British Columbia
description: With no consensus in sight, but an ever-proliferating array of theories, one should fear that contemporary “heavyweight” metaphysics is broken. Some, such as Amie L. Thomasson (2017), have taken this as motivation to abandon the ambitions of so-called “heavyweight” metaphysics and pursue projects of Carnapian inspiration instead. Others, such as myself, take these fears as motivation to troubleshoot and fix heavyweight metaphysics. In this task, I draw upon the critiques of metaphysical methodology from Juha Saatsi (2016; 2017b) and others, which scrutinize the use of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) that is so popular among metaphysicians today. Saatsi helpfully identifies two broad strategies for justifying and deploying IBE that correlate with two understandings of how metaphysical theories are confirmed: in parallel with scientific theories, since they address largely orthogonal questions; or in conjunction with scientific theories, since the subject matter of metaphysics is, in one way or another, continuous with science. (The latter strategy involves contemporary incarnations of the indispensability argument that appeal to explanatory indispensability). In the first two chapters I discuss how Saatsi’s critiques apply to specific projects from exemplars of the discipline, Laurie Paul (2012a), Timothy Williamson (2013) and Ted Sider (2011). Throughout I attempt to point out pitfalls and suggest methodological improvements. In the third and final chapter I turn to a dilemma that arises from the choice between our two methodological strategies, a dilemma that concerns the very ambitions of metaphysics. These ambitions allegedly devolve into either a rivalry with science, or a mystical pursuit for answers to “esoteric” and “unanswerable” questions. In answering this dilemma, I hope to show how we might systematize our ambitions and get a better grip on our elusive subject matter.
aggregated CHO: https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/77939
note: KEEPING METAPHYSICS RESPECTABLE: A METHODOLOGICAL CRITIQUE by Cristian Walsh Levy Trout B.A. (Hons.), The University of British Columbia, 2018 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Philosophy) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) April 2021 © Cristian Walsh Levy Trout, 2021 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the thesis entitled: Keeping Metaphysics Respectable: A Methodological Critique submitted by: Cristian Walsh Levy Trout in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy. EXAMINING COMMITTEE: Roberta Ballarin, Associate Professor, Philosophy, University of British Columbia Supervisor Ori Simchen, Professor, Philosophy, University of British Columbia Supervisory Committee Member iii Abstract With no consensus in sight, but an ever-proliferating array of theories, one should fear that contemporary “heavyweight” metaphysics is broken. Some, such as Amie L. Thomasson (2017), have taken this as motivation to abandon the ambitions of so-called “heavyweight” metaphysics and pursue projects of Carnapian inspiration instead. Others, such as myself, take these fears as motivation to troubleshoot and fix heavyweight metaphysics. In this task, I draw upon the critiques of metaphysical methodology from Juha Saatsi (2016; 2017b) and others, which scrutinize the use of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) that is so popular among metaphysicians today. Saatsi helpfully identifies two broad strategies for justifying and deploying IBE that correlate with two understandings of how metaphysical theories are confirmed: in parallel with scientific theories, since they address largely orthogonal questions; or in conjunction with scientific theories, since the subject matter of metaphysics is, in one way or another, contin…
has type: Thesis/Dissertation
date issued: 2021-05
is shown at: 10.14288/1.0396928
language: eng
degree discipline: Philosophy
provider: Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
publisher: University of British Columbia
rights: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
rights URI: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
scholar level: Graduate
type: Text
identifier URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2429/77939