Forestry, Faculty of
DSpace
UBCV
Hotte, Ngaio
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
University of British Columbia
Jurisprudence and international agreements have motivated increased recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ rights to lands and waters in Canada and around the world. Consequently, non-Indigenous governments are shifting from top-down approaches to collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities. Trust is widely recognized as critical to successful collaborative natural resource governance; however, a legacy of marginalization of Indigenous Peoples under federal and provincial laws and policies has created a challenging environment for building trust. Insights into how trust can be created have the potential to improve governance processes and outcomes. The trust literature offers insights regarding how trust is created; however, existing theoretical frameworks and empirical studies are often limited by disciplinary boundaries and few studies focus on collaborations involving Indigenous communities. This research took a multidisciplinary approach to developing and empirically testing a theory of trust in this context using a two-phased, mixed-methods approach. First, a multidimensional theoretical framework for trust was developed based on the literature and case studies of collaborations on Haida Gwaii, an archipelago located off the coast of British Columbia, Canada. Qualitative data were collected using a document review and 32 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with representatives of Indigenous, federal and provincial governments who were involved in three collaborations: the Archipelago Management Board, the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table and the Marine Planning Partnership for the North Coast Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team. Results showed that trust in this context is shaped by individual, interpersonal and institutional influences. Next, the theoretical framework was tested using a survey of 51 representatives of Indigenous, federal, provincial and territorial governments who are involved collaborative natural resource governance across Canada. Results revealed statistically significant relationships between interpersonal and institutional influences and behavioural trust; however, only experiences of discrimination predicted decreased behavioural trust across both multivariate statistical models. These results show that behavioural trust is linked to interpersonal and institutional influences and that people who have experienced discrimination tend to be less trusting toward collaborators. This suggests that lack of trust will remain a barrier to successful collaborative natural resource governance until discrimination against Indigenous Peoples in Canada is addressed.
HOW IS TRUST CREATED DURING COLLABORATIVE NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INVOLVING INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES IN CANADA? by Ngaio Hotte B.Sc., University of Guelph, 2006 MFRE, University of British Columbia, 2010 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Forestry) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) January 2020 © Ngaio Hotte, 2020 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the dissertation entitled: How is trust created during collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities in Canada? submitted by Ngaio Hotte in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Forestry Examining Committee: Dr. Robert Kozak, University of British Columbia Supervisor Dr. Stephen Wyatt, Université de Moncton Supervisory Committee Member Dr. Rima Wilkes, University of British Columbia Supervisory Committee Member Dr. Theresa Satterfield, University of British Columbia University Examiner Dr. Shannon Hagerman, University of British Columbia University Examiner iii Abstract Jurisprudence and international agreements have motivated increased recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ rights to lands and waters in Canada and around the world. Consequently, non-Indigenous governments are shifting from top-down approaches to collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities. Trust is widely recognized as critical to successful collaborative natural resource governance; however, a legacy of marginalization of Indigenous Peoples under federal and provincial laws and policies has created a challenging environment for building trust. Insights into how trust can be created have the potential to improve governance processes and outcomes. The trust literature offers insights regarding how trust is created; however, existing theoretical frameworks and empirical studies are often limited by disciplinary boundaries and few studies focus on collaborations involving Indigenous communities. This research took a multidisciplinary approach to developing and empirically testing a theory of trust in this context using a two-phased, mixed-methods approach. First, a multidimensional theoretical framework for trust was developed based on the literature and case studies of collaborations on Haida Gwaii, an archipelago located off the coast of British Columbia, Canada. Qualitative data were collected using a document review and 32 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with representatives of Indigenous, federal and provincial governments who were involved in three collaborations: the Archipelago Management Board, the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table and the Marine Planning Partnership for the North Coast Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team. Results showed that trust in this context is shaped by individual, interpersonal and institutional influences. Next, the theoretical framework was tested using a survey of 51 representatives of Indigenous, federal, provincial and territorial governments who are involved collaborative natural resource governance across iv Canada. Results revealed statistically significant relationships between interpersonal and institutional influences and behavioural trust; however, only experiences of discrimination predicted decreased behavioural trust across both multivariate statistical models. These results show that behavioural trust is linked to interpersonal and institutional influences and that people who have experienced discrimination tend to be less trusting toward collaborators. This suggests that lack of trust will remain a barrier to successful collaborative natural resource governance until discrimination against Indigenous Peoples in Canada is addressed. v Lay summary This research examined how trust is created among representatives of Indigenous and federal or provincial/territorial governments who collaborate to make decisions related to natural resources. The research occurred in two phases. First, a theory was developed based on case studies of three collaborations on Haida Gwaii. The case studies involved interviews with representatives of Indigenous and federal or provincial governments who were involved in these collaborations. Results of the first phase showed that trust is shaped by individual, interpersonal and institutional influences. Next, this theory was tested using a survey of representatives of Indigenous, federal, provincial and territorial governments who are involved in similar collaborations across Canada. Results of the second phase showed that, while interpersonal and institutional influences are related to trust, how much discrimination a person has experienced is the only variable that consistently predicts whether that person will engage in trusting behavior toward a collaborator. vi Preface One manuscript has been published in a peer-reviewed journal based on a case study included in one of the research chapters (5). I am the lead author on this publication, which was co-authored with my doctoral supervisor, Dr. Robert Kozak, and one committee member, Dr. Stephen Wyatt. My role in this publication was to design the study, collect and analyse the data, write the manuscript, make any revisions required prior to publication and communicate with journal editors. Dr. Wyatt helped to acquire funding to support the research. Drs. Kozak and Wyatt provided feedback on the research design and on several drafts of the manuscript.  Hotte, N., Wyatt, S., & Kozak, R. (2019). Influences on trust during collaborative forest governance: A case study from Haida Gwaii. Canadian Journal of Forest Research, 49(4), 361-374. https://doi.org/10.1139/cjfr-2018-0222. One research chapter (5) has been published in a peer-reviewed journal. I am the lead author on this publication, which was co-authored with my doctoral supervisor, Dr. Robert Kozak, and one committee member, Dr. Stephen Wyatt. My role in producing the manuscript was to design the study, collect and analyse the data, write the manuscript, make any revisions required prior to publication and communicate with journal editors. Dr. Wyatt helped to acquire funding to support the research. Drs. Kozak and Wyatt provided feedback on the research design and on several drafts of the manuscript.  Hotte, N., Kozak, R., & Wyatt, S. (2019). How institutions shape trust during collective action for forest governance on Haida Gwaii. Forest Policy and Economics, 107, 101921. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2019.05.007. vii One research chapter (6) is intended to be published as a manuscript in an academic journal. All research was conducted with approval from the UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board (UBC BREB # H16-02587). viii Table of contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iii Lay summary ..................................................................................................................................v Preface ........................................................................................................................................... vi Table of contents ........................................................................................................................ viii List of tables..................................................................................................................................xv List of figures ............................................................................................................................ xviii List of abbreviations ....................................................................................................................xx Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... xxi Dedication ................................................................................................................................. xxiii Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................1 1.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Research questions .......................................................................................................... 5 1.3 Approach to the research ................................................................................................ 6 1.4 Dissertation structure ...................................................................................................... 9 1.5 Positioning the research – and the researcher ............................................................... 12 Chapter 2: Background ...............................................................................................................20 2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 20 2.2 Background ................................................................................................................... 25 2.2.1 Context ...................................................................................................................... 25 2.2.2 Theoretical perspectives on collaboration and trust.................................................. 31 2.2.2.1 Collaborative governance ................................................................................. 31 ix 2.2.2.2 Trust .................................................................................................................. 41 2.2.2.2.1 Individual influences on trust ...................................................................... 43 2.2.2.2.2 Interpersonal influences on trust ................................................................. 45 2.2.2.2.3 Institutional influences on trust ................................................................... 50 2.2.3 Theoretical framework .............................................................................................. 53 Chapter 3: Collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii ...............................59 3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 59 3.2 Background ................................................................................................................... 61 3.2.1 Haida Gwaii: Islands of the People ........................................................................... 62 3.2.2 The beginning of Haida-settler relations................................................................... 70 3.2.3 The beginning of collaboration ................................................................................. 77 3.2.3.1 Archipelago Management Board ...................................................................... 86 3.2.3.2 Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table .................................. 92 3.2.3.3 Marine Planning Partnership for the North Pacific Coast (MaPP) Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team ........................................................................................ 104 3.3 Discussion ................................................................................................................... 112 3.3.1 Starting conditions .................................................................................................. 117 3.3.2 Collaborative process .............................................................................................. 120 3.3.3 Institutional design .................................................................................................. 122 3.3.4 Facilitative leadership ............................................................................................. 128 3.3.5 Outcomes ................................................................................................................ 130 3.3.6 Systems context ...................................................................................................... 133 3.4 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 135 x Chapter 4: Influences on trust during collaborative natural resource governance: Case studies on Haida Gwaii ..............................................................................................................139 4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 139 4.2 Background ................................................................................................................. 143 4.2.1 Collaborative governance ....................................................................................... 143 4.2.2 Trust ........................................................................................................................ 148 4.2.3 Building trust in the context of collaborative natural resource goverance on Haida Gwaii… ............................................................................................................................... 151 4.3 Research objectives ..................................................................................................... 154 4.4 Methods....................................................................................................................... 154 4.4.1 Data collection ........................................................................................................ 155 4.4.2 Data analysis ........................................................................................................... 160 4.5 Results ......................................................................................................................... 164 4.5.1 Case study 1: Archipelago Management Board ...................................................... 164 4.5.1.1 Starting conditions .......................................................................................... 165 4.5.1.2 Collaborative process ...................................................................................... 166 4.5.1.3 Institutional design .......................................................................................... 169 4.5.1.4 Facilitative leadership ..................................................................................... 173 4.5.1.5 Systems context .............................................................................................. 174 4.5.1.6 Outcomes ........................................................................................................ 176 4.5.1.7 Summary ......................................................................................................... 177 4.5.2 Case study 2: Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table ................. 178 4.5.2.1 Starting conditions .......................................................................................... 179 xi 4.5.2.2 Collaborative process ...................................................................................... 180 4.5.2.3 Institutional design .......................................................................................... 185 4.5.2.4 Facilitative leadership ..................................................................................... 193 4.5.2.5 Systems context .............................................................................................. 194 4.5.2.6 Outcomes ........................................................................................................ 197 4.5.2.7 Summary ......................................................................................................... 199 4.5.3 Case study 3: MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team ......................... 200 4.5.3.1 Starting conditions .......................................................................................... 201 4.5.3.2 Collaborative process ...................................................................................... 203 4.5.3.3 Institutional design .......................................................................................... 206 4.5.3.4 Facilitative leadership ..................................................................................... 209 4.5.3.5 Systems context .............................................................................................. 209 4.5.3.6 Outcomes ........................................................................................................ 212 4.5.3.7 Summary ......................................................................................................... 213 4.5.4 Individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust across case studies……. ........................................................................................................................ 213 4.5.4.1 Individual influences ....................................................................................... 214 4.5.4.2 Interpersonal influences .................................................................................. 216 4.5.4.3 Institutional influences .................................................................................... 219 4.5.5 Individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust across governments…… ................................................................................................................ 221 4.6 Discussion ................................................................................................................... 223 4.6.1 Individual influences ............................................................................................... 225 xii 4.6.2 Interpersonal influences .......................................................................................... 226 4.6.3 Institutional influences ............................................................................................ 229 4.6.4 Perspectives on trust across governments ............................................................... 232 4.6.5 The role of power .................................................................................................... 235 4.6.6 Limitations .............................................................................................................. 238 4.7 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 241 Chapter 5: How institutions shape trust during collective action: A case study of forest governance on Haida Gwaii ......................................................................................................245 5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 245 5.2 Trust, collective action and the role of institutions ..................................................... 247 5.3 Collaborative forest governance and trust on Haida Gwaii ........................................ 254 5.4 Methods....................................................................................................................... 260 5.5 Results ......................................................................................................................... 263 5.5.1 Agreements ............................................................................................................. 263 5.5.2 Procedures and terms of reference .......................................................................... 267 5.5.3 Legislation............................................................................................................... 269 5.5.4 Norms ...................................................................................................................... 270 5.6 Discussion ................................................................................................................... 273 5.7 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 278 Chapter 6: Influences on trust during collaborative natural resource governance: A survey of collaborations across Canada ...............................................................................................281 6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 281 6.2 Research objective ...................................................................................................... 284 xiii 6.3 Background ................................................................................................................. 285 6.3.1 Trust ........................................................................................................................ 286 6.3.2 Government-to-government relations in Canada .................................................... 290 6.4 Methods....................................................................................................................... 294 6.4.1 Survey design .......................................................................................................... 294 6.4.2 Data collection ........................................................................................................ 299 6.4.3 Data analysis ........................................................................................................... 302 6.5 Results ......................................................................................................................... 306 6.5.1 Characteristics of survey participants ..................................................................... 306 6.5.2 Results of statistical analyses .................................................................................. 309 6.5.2.1 Correlation analysis ........................................................................................ 309 6.5.2.2 Chi-square tests of significance ...................................................................... 311 6.5.2.3 Analysis of variance (ANOVA)...................................................................... 312 6.5.2.4 Multivariate statistical analysis ....................................................................... 318 6.5.2.5 Summary of significant results ....................................................................... 321 6.6 Discussion ................................................................................................................... 323 6.7 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 333 Chapter 7: Conclusions .............................................................................................................336 7.1 Phase I: case study findings ........................................................................................ 336 7.2 Phase II: survey findings ............................................................................................. 340 7.3 Key research findings ................................................................................................. 343 7.4 Limitations .................................................................................................................. 347 7.5 Returning to the research questions ............................................................................ 350 xiv References ...................................................................................................................................356 Appendices ..................................................................................................................................403 Appendix A Interview questions ............................................................................................ 403 Appendix B Comparison of interviewee responses across cases............................................ 406 Appendix C Survey instrument ............................................................................................... 408 Appendix D Missing data from the survey ............................................................................. 448 Appendix E Results of bivariate statistical analyses............................................................... 460 Appendix F Results of nested models of regression analyses ................................................ 466 F.1 Binomial logistic regression ................................................................................... 466 F.2 Multiple regression ................................................................................................. 469 xv List of tables Table 2-1. Elements of collaborative governance......................................................................... 36 Table 2-2. Individual influences on trust (Hotte et al., 2018). ...................................................... 43 Table 2-3. Interpersonal influences on trust (Hotte et al., 2018). ................................................. 45 Table 2-4. Institutional influences on trust (Hotte et al., 2018). ................................................... 50 Table 3-1. Case study collaborations and key developments. ...................................................... 85 Table 3-2. Elements of collaborative governance....................................................................... 114 Table 3-3. Comparison of three cases of collaborative governance on Haida Gwaii. ................ 116 Table 4-1. Elements of collaborative governance....................................................................... 146 Table 4-2. Number of interviews conducted for each case study, by interviewee affiliation. .... 157 Table 4-3. Frequency of interviewees that identified individual influences on trust in the context of the Archipelago Management Board. ..................................................................................... 177 Table 4-4. Frequency of interviewees that identified individual influences on trust in the context of the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table. ................................................ 199 Table 4-5. Frequency of interviewees that identified individual influences on trust in the context of the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team. ........................................................ 213 Table 4-6. Frequency of interviewees that identified individual influences on trust, by case study...................................................................................................................................................... 214 Table 4-7. Frequency of interviewees that identified interpersonal influences on trust, by case study. ........................................................................................................................................... 216 Table 4-8. Frequency of interviewees that identified institutional influences on trust, by case study. ........................................................................................................................................... 219 xvi Table 4-9. Frequency of interviewees that identified individual influences on trust, by government represented. ............................................................................................................. 222 Table 4-10. Individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust associated with elements of collaborative governance in three collaborations on Haida Gwaii.......................... 224 Table 5-1. Characteristics of institutions that motivate trust (Hotte et al., 2018). ...................... 252 Table 5-2. Documents that outline formal rules for collective action for forest governance on Haida Gwaii. ............................................................................................................................... 257 Table 5-3. Characteristics of formal and informal rules that motivate trust. ............................. 263 Table 6-1. Constructs included in the survey............................................................................. 297 Table 6-2. List of variable names and variables used in the analysis. ........................................ 304 Table 6-3. Characteristics of survey participants. ....................................................................... 307 Table 6-4. Correlation coefficients and p-values for relationships between scores for trust and distrust for trust variables............................................................................................................ 310 Table 6-5. Mean scores for continuous variables, by categorical variable. ................................ 317 Table 6-6. Coefficients of binomial logistic regression. ............................................................. 318 Table 6-7. Coefficients of multiple regression. .......................................................................... 319 Table 6-8. Results of Pearson correlation analysis for statistically significant relationships between continuous variables. .................................................................................................... 321 Table 6-9. Results of chi-square tests of independence for statistically significant relationships between categorical variables. .................................................................................................... 321 Table 6-10. Results of ANOVA for statistically significant relationships between continuous and categorical variables.................................................................................................................... 322 Table 6-11. Coefficients of binomial logistic regression. ........................................................... 322 xvii Table 6-12. Coefficients of multiple regression. ........................................................................ 322 Table 7-1. Types of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust identified through the case studies. ............................................................................................................. 337 xviii List of figures Figure 1-1. Approach to the research. ............................................................................................. 6 Figure 1-2. Structure of the dissertation. ........................................................................................ 9 Figure 2-1. Number of papers published (annual) (Thomson Reuters, 2019). ............................. 24 Figure 2-2. Number of citations (annual) (Thomson Reuters, 2019). .......................................... 24 Figure 2-3. Theoretical framework for trust-building in the context of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities. ............................................................ 57 Figure 3-1. Decision-making bodies involved in forest and land management on Haida Gwaii...................................................................................................................................................... 103 Figure 5-1. Trust, forms of social capital and their linkage to achieving collective action (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). ............................................................................................................................. 247 Figure 5-2. Governing bodies involved in forest and land management on Haida Gwaii (Hotte et al., 2018). .................................................................................................................................... 258 Figure 6-1. Locations of survey participants. ............................................................................. 301 Figure 6-2. Experiences of major discrimination by perceived reasons for discrimination. ...... 308 Figure 6-3. Parties represented in collaborations identified by survey participants (a) and the number of different types of agreements used by those collaborations (b). ............................... 309 Figure 6-4. Correlation matrix of relationships between continuous variables. ......................... 311 Figure 6-5. Relationships (significant) between type of government represented by a survey participant and type of government represented by a collaborator (a) and survey participant race (b). ............................................................................................................................................... 312 Figure 6-6. Relationship (significant) between level of education and race. .............................. 312 Figure 6-7. Relationship (significant) between behavioural trust and country of origin. ........... 314 xix Figure 6-8. Relationships (significant) between individual influences on trust and (a) type of government represented by a survey participant and (b) type of government represented by a collaborator. ................................................................................................................................ 315 Figure 6-9. Relationships (significant) between trust in government and type of government represented by a survey participant (a) and type of government represented by a collaborator (b)...................................................................................................................................................... 315 Figure 6-10. Relationship (significant) between trust in institutions and type of government represented by a collaborator. ..................................................................................................... 316 Figure 6-11. Relationship (significant) between experiences of major discrimination and type of government represented (a) and race (b). ................................................................................... 316 Figure 6-12. Relationship (significant) between number of adults in the household and marital status. .......................................................................................................................................... 316 Figure 6-13. Relationships between variables that influence trust. Line indicates correlation, arrow indicates causation and associated direction. Solid black boxes are trust variables, hatched black boxes are employment variables and hatched grey boxes are demographic variables. .... 323 Figure 7-1. Revised theoretical framework for trust-building in the context of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities. Line indicates correlation, arrow indicates causation and associated direction. Solid black boxes are trust variables, shorter hatched black boxes are employment variables and longer hatched black boxes are demographic variables. ..................................................................................................................................... 341 xx List of abbreviations AMB Archipelago Management Board ANOVA Analysis of Variance BC British Columbia HGMC Haida Gwaii Management Council MaPP Marine Planning Partnership for the North Coast Region xxi Acknowledgements This research would not have been possible without the support of the Council of the Haida Nation, the Archipelago Management Board and 32 interviewees and 51 survey participants who took time out of their days to share their insights. Haawa (thank you). The University of British Columbia and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada also provided essential financial support for this research, for which I am tremendously thankful. All research was conducted with funding from UBC (Four-Year Fellowship #6456) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Insight Grant File #435-2015-1296; Canada Graduate Scholarship File #767-2016-2343). I am grateful to the UBC faculty members who helped to open the doors to my doctoral studies: Dr. George Kennedy, who accepted me into a Master’s program on a promise to complete the pre-requisite coursework; and Dr. Rashid Sumaila, who subsequently put me on the path to academic research. Thank you to my doctoral program supervisor and committee members: Dr. Robert Kozak, who has been in my corner and always made time in his schedule to provide advice and support; Dr. Stephen Wyatt, who generously brought me into his SSHRC project; and Dr. Rima Wilkes, who has both provided encouragement and challenged me to make my research achieve its full potential. xxii Finally, this research would not have been possible without the moral and emotional support of Pam, Tim, Nick, and my plucky four-legged co-author, Abby. You have buoyed my spirits and kept me afloat on this journey. xxiii Dedication This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my friend and mentor, the late Gigame’ ‘Walas Gwa’yam (Chief Beau Dick). Your patience, kindness and generosity helped me to learn some of the most important lessons. Gilakas'la, I promise to continue this work with integrity. 1 Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Introduction “Trust is the most important resource.” - Dr. Elinor Ostrom (2010) The history of government-to-government relationships involving Indigenous Peoples in Canada is a story of colonization and resistance. Over the past 150-plus years since confederation, the British Crown has claimed ownership of lands and waters and been confronted by Indigenous leaders and communities who have challenged these claims. Government-to-government relationships involving Indigenous and federal, provincial or territorial governments continue to evolve in response to jurisprudence that sets a minimum standard for federal, provincial and territories governments to respect Aboriginal rights and consult with and accommodate Indigenous Peoples’ rights to ancestral lands and resources and to self-government. This body of jurisprudence has, over the past several decades, shifted the balance of power in natural resource governance from the hands of colonial governments toward increasing influence by Indigenous Peoples (Wyatt et al., 2010; Bowie, 2013; Coates & Crowley, 2013). While federal, provincial and territorial governments continue to assert control over what they refer to as “Crown” lands, the rights of Indigenous Peoples to be involved in decisions affecting their territories has been established (Bowie, 2013). Across Canada, an estimated 490 bilateral and trilateral agreements now exist between Indigenous organizations and governments and provinces (Papillon, 2015) and many Indigenous communities are engaged with non-Indigenous 2 governments in collaborative management processes and institutions (Bowie, 2013). However, these collaborations are fraught by a history of conflict due to a legacy of dispossession and marginalization of Indigenous peoples by colonial governments. Indigenous Peoples are suspicious of governments' capacity to negotiate in good faith and to share power beyond tokenism, and federal, provincial or territorial governments doubt Indigenous Peoples' capacity to make sound decisions and to limit their claims against the state (Goetze, 2005). The current pace and economic significance of natural resource development has heightened tensions between governments in recent years. The collaborative governance literature, however, emphasizes the importance of trust among collaborators (Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Ostrom, 2003; Davenport et al., 2007). Trust is reported to be an essential component of collaboration and power-sharing between governments and with local communities (Dolšak & Ostrom, 2003) and its absence a barrier to collaboration and achievement of desired outcomes (Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Ostrom, 2003; Armitage et al., 2009). Trust is particularly emphasized in collaborative governance involving Indigenous Peoples (Nadasdy, 2006; Menzies, 2015). Representatives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments “are routinely urged to ‘trust one another’ and are warned that without such trust co-management cannot succeed” (Nadasdy, 2006: 147). Trust is necessary for collaborators to be truthful, to have confidence in one another and to act on shared information (Nadasdy, 2006) and lack of trust acts as a barrier to collaboration and effective natural resource management (Ostrom, 2003; Armitage et al., 2009; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). However, trust is constrained by power imbalances in a colonial setting (Nadasdy, 2003, 2006) which disadvantages 3 Indigenous Peoples’ rights and knowledge and may even use collaboration to perpetuate colonial relations (Nadasdy, 2005, 2007; Menzies, 2015). Thus, the challenge remains: how can trust be built between representatives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments engaged in collaborative natural resource governance? Few researchers have explored the topic of trust from a multidimensional perspective in the context of collaborative natural resource governance (e.g., Smith et al., 2013; Stern & Coleman, 2015; Coleman & Stern, 2018a). An even smaller number of studies have focused specifically on collaborations involving Indigenous Peoples, who are rights holders rather than stakeholders (Smith, 1996; Natcher, 2001; Wyatt et al., 2010). Where Indigenous communities are involved, collaborations must respect traditional knowledge and affirm Indigenous communities’ rights to self-governance and decision-making powers (Tipa, 2002; Natcher et al., 2005; Nadasdy, 2006; Tipa & Welch, 2006; von der Porten et al., 2016). This affirmation of a right to self-governance runs up against state assumptions of ultimate sovereignty. In contrast to much of the collaborative governance literature, which focuses on trust between stakeholders and in managing agencies (e.g., Davenport et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2013; Coleman & Stern, 2018b; Davis et al., 2018), collaborations involving Indigenous communities require increased power-sharing (Goetze, 2005), participation and intercultural purpose (Hill et al., 2012). 4 A vast literature on the topic of trust offers clues as to its nature and origins that can help to understand how trust is created. Trust has been explored from the fragmented perspectives of economics, psychology, management and sociology, among other disciplines (Castaldo, 2002; Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010; Schilke & Cook, 2013), with scholars from each of these fields using different approaches to study various aspects of trust. Economists, for example, have focused primarily on trust behaviour, using experimental games that limit interpersonal interaction and emphasize rationality (Ostrom, 2009), while psychologists have also considered how personal characteristics, emotion and affect can shape trust between individuals (e.g. Evans & Revelle, 2008). Scholars of management have explored trust in organizational environments (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Möllering, 2006), including the role of institutions and relationships between individuals (e.g. Lewicki et al. 2006; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012) and between organizations (e.g. Schoorman et al., 2007; Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; Bachmann et al., 2015), while sociologists have examined how trust is shaped by broader societal influences such as power, race and class (e.g. Schilke et al., 2015; Wu & Wilkes, 2016). As noted by Rousseau et al. (1998), to study trust within and between organizations requires exploring the issue at a variety of levels encompassing micro-level individual psychological processes, interpersonal group dynamics and macro-level institutional arrangements. Therefore, each of the perspectives from which trust has been studied offers a different piece of the puzzle that needs to be considered in the context of government-to-government relationships involving Indigenous Peoples. 5 This research begins to fill this gap by taking a multidisciplinary approach to trust in the context of collaborative governance involving Indigenous Peoples. It integrates existing theoretical frameworks for trust from economics (e.g. Ostrom & Ahn, 2009) and management (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995) and draws on published empirical research to explore the forces that shape trust at individual, interpersonal and institutional levels and associated trust behaviours. 1.2 Research questions The research was oriented toward answering the following questions in the context of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities:  How do representatives of Indigenous and federal or provincial/territorial governments (i.e. collaborators) conceptualize trust?  What are the essential components of trust-building between collaborators?  How do perceptions of power shape the essential components of trust-building?  How can the essential components of trust-building and the resulting trust between collaborators be measured?  What are the relationships between the essential components of trust-building?  To what degree do the essential components of trust-building motivate trust, or vice versa? 6 1.3 Approach to the research The research was carried out using a phased, mixed methods approach that encompassed a literature review, case studies (Phase 1) and a survey (Phase 2) (Figure 1-1) to construct and test a multidisciplinary framework for trust in this context. A mixed methods approach was chosen to provide both depth and breadth of exploration of the topic, given the lack of existing research on trust in this context. Mixed methods research helped to combine logic of discovery (qualitative) and logic of verification (quantitative) methods (Luker, 2009) to support development and testing of the theoretical framework for trust in the context of collaborative natural resource governance. Figure 1-1. Approach to the research. Literature review • Develop theoretical framework • Identify potential individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust • Identify research methods • Develop draft interview questions • Develop draft survey and identify key contacts Phase 1: Case study • Identify desired benefits of research for case study participants • Obtain permission to conduct research from the Council of the Haida Nation, Archipelago Management Board and UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board • Revise interview questions • Conduct interviews • Analyze qualitative data • Revise theoretical framework Phase 2: Survey • Revise and pre-test survey • Finalize survey and contact list • Administer survey • Complete quantitative data analysis • Empirically test theoretical framework • Revise theoretical framework • Communicate research results 7 A literature review provided the basis for Phases 1 and 2 of the research. The review began with the literature on collaborative governance, by identifying the state of knowledge regarding trust in such arrangements as well as the context of collaborative governance on Haida Gwaii. It then shifted toward identifying potential gaps between the literatures on collaborative governance and on trust, respectively, and between the broader collaborative governance literature and that which focused specifically on relationships involving Indigenous communities. Finally, the focus of the review shifted to the literature on trust, to begin a deeper exploration of the topic and develop the theoretical framework. During the review, draft lists of interview and survey questions were compiled and a multidisciplinary theoretical framework for trust was developed based on published literature. Phase 1 of the research focused on qualitative data collection and analysis. Case studies of collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii was used to identify individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust in three collaborations: the Archipelago Management Board, the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table and the Marine Planning Partnership for the North Coast (MaPP) Haida Gwaii Technical Team. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 32 representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation, the Government of Canada and the Province of B.C. who are or were previously involved in the case study collaborations. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and qualitatively coded and analyzed to characterize individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust and inform revision of the theoretical framework for trust. Codes were derived from both published literature and interviews to support analysis from theoretical and emergent perspectives. An initial list of codes 8 was identified based on peer-reviewed literature regarding individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. This list of codes was subsequently expanded during qualitative analysis of interview transcripts to capture participant experiences and link these to the published literature and create a typology based on related concepts. Once coding was complete, agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis was perfomed using NVivo 11 to identify similar themes and concepts. Using this approach, a coherent narrative of influences on trust was developed to test and refine the theoretical framework. The results of the case studies were subsequently used to refine the survey instrument and inform Phase 2 of the research. The final version of the survey instrument used in the study consisted of 120 items, consisting primarily of scale items from multiple published sources, and measured behavioural trust and distrust, individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust and distrust, trust in institutions and trust in a government represented by a collaborator. Behavioural trust refers to a person’s willingness to be vulnerable in a relationship with a specified other (Gillespie, 2012). Items were also included to measure experiences of major discrimination and demographic characteristics of participants. The survey instrument was subject to two rounds of pre-testing and revisions before an electronic, web-based version of the survey was distributed to representatives of Indigenous, federal, provincial and territorial governments who had been engaged in collaborative natural resource governance in Canada for a minimum of one year. Inferential statistics, based on bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses of survey responses, was used to empirically test relationships between trust and demographic variables and to 9 behavioural trust. The results of these analyses were used to further test and refine the theoretical framework and support generalizability. 1.4 Dissertation structure The chapters that make up this dissertation are structured around the phased approach to the research previously outlined in Figure 1-1. Figure 1-2 illustrates linkages between the phases of the research, dissertation chapters and research questions. Figure 1-2. Structure of the dissertation. •Chapter 1: IntroductionLiterature Review•Chapter 2: Background•Chapter 3: Collaborative natural resource governance on Haida GwaiiPhase 1: Case Studies•Chapter 4: Influences on trust during collaborative natural resource governance: Case studies on Haida Gwaii; and•Chapter 5: How institutions shape trust during collective action: A case study of forest governance on Haida Gwaii•How do representatives of Indigenous and federal or provincial/territorial governments (i.e. collaborators) conceptualize trust?•What are the essential components of trust-building between collaborators?•How do perceptions of power shape individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust?Phase 2: SurveyChapter 6: Influences on trust during collaborative natural resource governance: A survey of collaborations across Canada•How can the essential components of trust-building and the resulting trust between collaborators be measured?•What are the relationships between individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust?•To what degree do individual, interpersonal and institutional influences motivate trust, or vice versa?•Chapter 7: Conclusions10 Chapter 2 outlines the historical, legal and political context of government-to-government relationships involving Indigenous Peoples in Canada and summarizes the relevant literature on trust and collaborative governance to this context. It provides a widely accepted definition of trust and highlights individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust as essential components of trust-building. It concludes by proposing a multidisciplinary framework for trust that encompasses these three types of influences and recognizes that they are shaped by the context in which they act to motivate trust. Chapter 3 provides a deeper dive into the context of collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii, an archipelago located off the west coast of British Columbia, Canada, where several collaborations that have been established in recent decades. Haida Gwaii offers a rich history of experience in which to study trust and collaborative natural resource governance and is commonly heralded as an example to follow in other jurisdictions (National Centre for First Nations Governance, 2013; Dowie, 2017). Chapter 3 summarizes some of the history that led to establishment of three of these collaborations – the Archipelago Management Board, the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table and the Marine Planning Partnership for the North Coast (MaPP) Haida Gwaii Technical Team – as a foundation from which the reader may interpret the case study research presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 continues the story of the three case study collaborations on Haida Gwaii as they were in 2017, at the time the case study research was conducted. It builds on the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2 and uses qualitative data collected through 32 semi-structured, in-depth 11 interviews with representatives of Indigenous and federal or provincial governments with experience in the case study collaborations to characterize individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust and refine the theoretical framework. Results outlined in Chapter 4 show that discrimination, inequality and trauma experienced by the Haida continues to be detrimental to trust. Trust is also shaped by interpersonal influences such as ability, affect, emotion and bonding, benevolence, integrity and time spent with fellow collaborators and by institutions that demonstrate alignment of interests, justice, fairness and satisfactory terms. Chapter 5 examines the role of institutions in motivating trust by focusing specifically on one of the case study collaborations: the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table. Based on interviews with seventeen past and present members of the Haida Gwaii Management Council and the Solutions Table, this chapter identifies three forms of formal rules and one form of informal rules as well as fourteen associated characteristics that motivated trust between collaborators. Cluster analysis reduced the fourteen characteristics to four clusters: alignment of interests, fairness, cohesion and satisfactory terms of cooperation. The results of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5: form the basis of the survey research presented in Chapter 6:. In this chapter, the theoretical framework is revised, revisited and tested to integrate the lessons from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 using a survey of 51 representatives of Indigenous and federal or provincial/territorial governments with experience in collaborative natural resource governance across Canada. Results outlined in Chapter 6 provide evidence of statistically significant relationships between interpersonal and institutional influences and behavioural trust, 12 but no evidence of a relationship with individual influences. Only experiences of discrimination consistently predicted behavioural trust, reinforcing a key message from Chapter 4 that a legacy of discrimination, inequality and trauma remains a persistent barrier to trust. Finally, Chapter 7 highlights key findings of the dissertation, identifies which findings support, challenge and build upon existing literature regarding trust and provides answers to the initial research questions. 1.5 Positioning the research – and the researcher This research took place in the midst of several important events in the history of Indigenous-settler relationships in Canada, including the release of findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) in 2015 and 150th anniversary of Confederation in 2017. These events raised the profile of Indigenous voices and rights among settler communities, including my own, and brought greater awareness to injustices perpetrated against Indigenous Peoples through the residential schools and reserve systems. The context in which this research occurred undoubtedly influenced the research – and hopefully the research, in turn, will influence the context. My understanding of my own place in both these events and in history is essential to the narrative of this research. I conducted this research as a white settler woman of European descent, living within the traditional, unceded and ancestral territories of the Musqueam, Tsleil-Waututh and Squamish First Nations in an area commonly known by its settler name: 13 Vancouver. For a three-month period during the case study component of the research, I also lived in another settler community, which many Haida refer to as Daajing Giids Llnagaay (Village of Queen Charlotte), within the traditional territory of the Haida Nation. This community is located seven kilometers west of the Haida community of Hlg̱aagilda (Skidegate) along the southern shore of Kiis Gwaay (Graham Island). Admittedly, the significance of these facts and their implications for the research were not fully impressed upon me at the outset. If I had remained in Vancouver for the duration of my research, it might have been possible for me to complete my studies without deeply considering the influence of positionality. But the entire population of Haida Gwaii numbers only approximately 4,500 people, nearly half of whom are Haida, and the contrast between Indigenous and settler life on the islands, while not as stark as in other parts Canada, made my position apparent nonetheless. My motivation to engage in the research had been driven primarily by my professional and volunteer experiences with natural resource conflicts and a desire to resolve them for the benefit of people and the planet. It had seemed to me that the collective knowledges and experiences of multiple rights holders and stakeholders were not being fully considered in natural resource management, and that our collective wellbeing would be better served if they were. My decision to focus on the relationship between Indigenous and federal or provincial/territorial governments was based on the seemingly intractable but important challenge of bringing these groups closer together. My background was in biological science, resource economics and facilitation and I 14 lacked the formal training and education in social sciences necessary to appreciate the forces of Indigenous-settler dynamics. At first, as I began to learn about the history of European imperialism, colonialism and settlement and the subsequent relationship between First Nations and federal and provincial governments, I felt discomfort with the “settler” label that I discovered I had been wearing all my life. I was unaware that I bore such a label, or any label at all. I was raised in a small rural town and, despite attending high school in a relatively more multicultural city, never fully grasped my settler identity or its implications. This meant that initially, the settler label seemed, ironically, foreign. I also had difficulty accepting the negative connotations of a label that I felt I had not earned. The label said I was a direct descendent of a people who were racist and paternalistic, had decimated populations of Indigenous Peoples and had stolen their lands not just in Canada, but around the world. The realization that I needed to own that label – settler – if I was to do this research in a meaningful way crystalized during the long drive from Vancouver to Haida Gwaii in early January 2017. It began somewhere outside Smithers, British Columbia, as I listened to a CBC Radio program that focused on the Colten Boushie case.1 1 An archived recording of this broadcast can be found online: CBC Radio (January 8, 2017) 'There's a price to be paid for 450 years of discrimination': Bob Rae says we must right Canada's racist past. CBC Radio. 15 Colten Boushie was a 22-year old Cree man who became known to the Canadian public in 2016 after he was shot in the head in the back seat of a vehicle that had been driven, by another young Indigenous man, onto a farm late one night near Biggar, Sasktchewan. Boushie was with three others from the Red Pheasant First Nation when he was killed by Gerald Stanley, a farmer who later claimed he had feared Boushie was there to commit a crime and that the shooting was an accident. Boushie’s death became a lightening rod for racist and anti-racist sentiments across the country. In an outcome heavily criticized by some Canadians, including the prime minister, an all-white jury subsequently acquitted Stanley on murder and manslaughter charges. During the CBC program about the Colten Boushie case, lawyer and former Canadian politician Bob Rae spoke about racism as “a disease of the heart and a disease of the mind.” “There is a price to be paid for 450 years of discrimination,” said Rae. “In Africa, the settlers left. We haven’t decolonized.” He described the need to decolonise the power relationship between settler and Indigenous Peoples in Canada and ensure that Indigenous Peoples are able to make choices about their own lives. While Rae was speaking in the context of the Colten Boushie case, he was also referencing the relationship between Indigenous Peoples and the Government of Canada just one week into the sesquicentennial anniversary of Canada as a Nation. Media outlets, no doubt prompted by the 16 Government of Canada, had begun promoting “Canada 150” events over the preceeding months and had escalated their efforts leading up to New Year’s Eve 2017. These promotions had raised the ire of Indigenous groups across Canada, who questioned: What are we celebrating? Cultural genocide and colonization? Residential schools? Abuse and murder of Indigenous women? Poor living conditions on-reserve? Or perhaps, the current federal government’s failure to deliver on campaign promises to rebuild the relationship with Indigenous Peoples? That the words of Bob Rae, of all possible experts on the topic of Indigenous-settler relations, were the ones that catalyzed my understanding of my own settler identity, is itself an indicator of my settler roots. As the former Premier of Ontario, where I spent much of my childhood, Bob Rae himself is, to me, a familiar figure of authority and respect. This, too, is due to the settler environment in which I was raised and its established political structures that predominantly feature non-Indigenous white men. These realizations crystallized my understanding that if settlers, as the inheritors and perpetuators of the settler dynamic, are to reshape our identity, we must first work to understand it and claim it as our own. This point of departure led me to explore more deeply the concepts of Indigenous and settler identities. 17 The work of settler scholar Avril Bell provided considerable clarity and helped me to claim and interpret the meaning of my settler label. Where I had previously struggled to identify with the colonial history of my country, Avril Bell provided clarification with a quote from Patrick Wolfe (1992: 2): “[…] colonization is ‘a structure, not an event.’ Structurally, present-day white […] Canadians occupy the positions in our societies that were created by the labour of the early settlers. We still constitute the dominant culture of our societies, and our political and economic institutions are largely governed by people like us. […] We are structurally, if not biologically, ‘settler descendants.’ […]” That I found myself, in the early stages of this research, gravitating to the work of settler individuals to help me understand my settler identity, is unsurprising but significant for both my research and for Indigenous-settler relations more broadly. In his book, If this is your land, where are your stories?, Edward L. Chamberlin describes the importance of language to story-telling because language is “the manifestation of thought” and American author and environmental historian William Cronon (1992: 1349) speaks about the power of narrative: “In the act of separating story from non-story, we wield the most powerful yet dangerous tool of the narrative form. […] The very authority with which narrative presents its vision of reality is achieved by obscuring large portions of that reality. Narrative succeeds to the extent that it hides the discontinuities, ellipses and contradictory experiences that would 18 undermine the intended meaning of its story. Whatever its purpose, it cannot avoid a covert exercise of power: it inevitably sanctions some voices while silencing others.” What this signalled to me is the importance of hearing both Indigenous and settler stories and the role of skilled interpreters to translate these stories in ways that we can understand. As Avril Bell (2014: 4) points out: “If colonial dynamics are relational, requiring both colonizing and colonized figures, new forms of both indigenous and settler subjects are necessary to break out of these colonial patterns.” This, finally, is how I see my role in this research: as a translator of knowledge to reshape the settler identity and its relationships with Indigenous Peoples. This role comes with a responsibility to amplify Indigenous voices in settler spaces, to shine light on places in our narratives that have obscured or silenced the stories of Indigenous Peoples and to find ways to communicate with other settler peoples about our history and our future. It also means continuously questioning settler narratives to listen for silenced voices and working to understand Indigenous stories that may be told in ways that are difficult for my settler ears to hear. Avril Bell (2014: 5) quotes the work of Antonio Gramsci when she writes: “[…] ‘the starting point of critical elaboration is […] ‘knowing thyself’ as a product of the historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without 19 leaving an inventory.’ […] Identifying these traces of history is the first step to assessing them and determining what is worth holding on to and what is holding us back.” The process is much like learning a new language: unfamiliar and awkward at first, with many mistakes and blunders, but ultimately essential for the work of undoing the harm done to Indigenous Peoples and creating new Indigenous-settler relationships in Canada. This research is therefore written primarily for a settler audience, and settler governments in particular, to shed light on the path toward decolonization and reconciliation in natural resource governance. It is a call to settlers to see more clearly the role that each of us plays in reconciliation, with a focus on trust and relationships in the context of decisions made about lands and waters. While we cannot change the past, we are responsible for ongoing actions and decisions regarding natural resources on Indigenous lands. In the words of settler scholar Paulette Regan (2010: 4): “To those who say that we cannot change the past, I say that we can learn from it. We can better understand how a problematic mentality of benevolent paternalism became a rationale and justification for acquiring Indigenous lands and resources […] Equally importantly, we can explore how this mentality continues to influence Indigenous-settler relations today.” 20 Chapter 2: Background 2.1 Introduction In recent decades, numerous collaborative natural resource governance processes and institutions have been created to address long-standing political conflicts between Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments over lands and resources in Canada (Bowie, 2013). Following a broader global trend away from adversarial and managerial approaches, collaborative governance brings together relevant parties to engage in consensus-oriented decision making related to activities such as planning, policy making and management (Ansell & Gash, 2007). This approach acknowledges that different interests must be engaged in negotiation to seek mutually acceptable outcomes (Gunton & Day, 2003). However, if these collaborations are to be successful in terms of governance outcomes, collaborators must build trust (Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Ostrom, 2003; Armitage et al., 2009) in a relationship coloured by a history of conflict and mutual distrust between Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments (Goetze, 2005). The literatures on collaborative natural resource governance and on trust, respectively, provide a starting point to identify how trust may be built in this context. Ansell & Gash (2007) defined collaborative governance as: “A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.” Central to this definition is that participants engage directly in decision making through a forum that aims to make decisions by consensus. Emerson et al. (2012) expanded on the work of Ansell & Gash, broadening the 21 definition of collaborative governance to include “the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished.” The definition loosened constraints by Ansell & Gash (2007) that limited involvement in decision-making to state and non-state stakeholders, making space for collaboration between levels and types of government and industry players and beyond formal, state-initiated arrangements. “Collaboration” necessarily includes two-way communication and influence between the parties engaged in collaborative governance, whereby the respective institutions must meet together in a deliberative, collective and multilateral process (Ansell & Gash, 2007). “Formal” organization implies an explicit and public strategy of organizing collective influence such as joint activities, joint structures and shared resources (Walter & Petr, 2000:495; Ansell & Gash, 2007). Collaborative natural resource governance occurs in many forms and under many names, including cooperative management (Langdon et al., 2010), co-management (Armitage et al., 2009), shared decision-making and joint decision-making (Hillier & Metzger, 2015). Various approaches also encompass different "levels" of collaboration based on the degree of power-sharing between collaborators, which ranges from top-down processes focused on informing and consultation to more balanced approaches (Berkes et al., 1991; Berkes & Henley, 1997). Power-sharing is particularly emphasized in the literature on collaborative governance involving Indigenous Peoples (Goetze, 2005) and includes aspects such as participation, intercultural 22 purpose (Hill et al., 2012) and respect for traditional Indigenous rights and knowledge (Goetze, 2005; Natcher et al., 2005; Pinkerton, 2007). Collaborative natural resource governance has been hailed as a means to reduce conflict among stakeholders; build social capital; address environmental, social and economic issues; and produce better decisions (Innes, 1996; Bernard & Young, 1997; Brick et al., 2000; Weber, 2000; Conley & Moote, 2003). But effective collaboration hinges on several factors, including the presence of trust between collaborators. Trust enables the pursuit of cooperation, reduces the various costs (e.g. time, money) of managing group dynamics (Cook et al., 2005: 2) and is necessary for collaborators to be truthful and to have confidence that others are behaving similarly (Nadasdy, 2006). In collaborations involving Indigenous Peoples, representatives of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments “are routinely urged to ‘trust one another’ and are warned that without such trust co-management cannot succeed” (Nadasdy, 2006: 147). However, trust is constrained by power imbalances in a colonial setting (Nadasdy, 2003; Nadasdy, 2006) which underpriviledges Indigenous Peoples’ rights and knowledges. In such situations, collaboration may even be used to reinforce colonial relations (Nadasdy, 2005; Nadasdy, 2007; Menzies, 2015). Nevertheless, both parties have the potential to reap the benefits in relationships where real trust can be built. 23 The trust literature offers clues as to the conditions that can support trust-building in the context of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous Peoples. Researchers have studied trust from the perspectives of disciplines such as anthropology, economics, psychology, sociology and political science, using a range of approaches and methods leading to differing opinions about the nature of trust and trust-building (Bhattacharya et al., 1998). A search of Web of Science using the terms “trust natural resources” revealed 796 related publications. Elimination of search results associated with “land trust”2 decreased the total number of publications to 612. The number of articles published annually increased steadily from four in 2000 to 64 in 2018 (Figure 2-1). The number of citations each year increased even more rapidly, from 12 in 2000 to 2,022 in 2018 (Figure 2-2). A refined search, conducted using the terms “trust collaborat* AND natural resources,” revealed 137 related publications. The most common journals found in the search results were: Ecology & Society (13), Society & Natural Resources (13), Environmental Management (8), Forest Policy and Economics (4) and Sustainability Science (4). 2 The term “land trust” refers to an institutional structure for separating ownership and control of land. 24 Figure 2-1. Number of papers published (annual) (Thomson Reuters, 2019). Figure 2-2. Number of citations (annual) (Thomson Reuters, 2019). The increasing number of journal articles published and cited on the topic of trust in natural resource governance indicates growing importance of the topic. However, much of this literature focuses on documenting factors that influence trust in individual case studies of collaborative natural resource management in specific geographic locations (Davenport et al., 2007; Leahy & 25 Anderson, 2008; Lachapelle & McCool, 2012) and few researchers have taken a multidisciplinary approach to trust. Lewicki & Bunker (1995) emphasize the need for integrative approaches to trust, while Bigley & Pearce (1998) proposed that various conceptualizations of trust are necessary to address the range of organizational issues in which trust may be explored. Existing empirical studies of trust in collaborative governance typically characterize trust placed in government natural resource managers by communities, where decision-making remains a top-down process that is informed through participation (e.g. Davenport et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2013; Coleman & Stern, 2018a; Davis et al., 2018). However, there remains a need to develop a multidisciplinary framework for trust-building in the context of collaborative natural resource governance that addresses power-sharing and the rights of Indigenous Peoples. 2.2 Background 2.2.1 Context In Canada, like many other countries around the world, collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities has developed in an environment where trust is particularly elusive due to a history of devastating human rights violations that have occurred under the Indian Act since it was first introduced in 1876 (Canada et al., 1996; Blackstock, 2001; UN Human Rights Council, 2014). Laws such as the federal Indian Act have, over the past 150 years, been used to restrict First Nations Peoples’ freedom to practice their culture, to access justice and to maintain autonomy and self-determination, among other injustices (Blackstock, 2001; Carlson, 2010; Coates & Carlson, 2013). Federal and provincial institutions treated First Nations people as inferior and assumed responsibility for decisions on their behalf, including 26 through the reserve and residential school systems (Blackstock, 2001; Partridge, 2010; Bombay et al., 2014). While some blatantly discriminatory elements of the Indian Act have since been removed, the colonial spirit of the Act is preserved in its remaining form. Understanding the history of the relationship between First Nations and federal and provincial governments and the impact of the Indian Act is essential to making sense of contemporary interactions and activities (Coates & Carlson, 2013). Distrust of the federal government, such as that by First Nations people, may create an atmosphere of cynicism that can be difficult to reverse (Lawrence et al., 1997; Leahy & Anderson, 2008), but this reversal lies at the core of the possibility of a new relationship. The story of government-to-government relationships involving Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments in Canada dates back to the time of European exploration and contact, when countries such as Spain and England were looking to expand their empires. Papal Bulls – documents issued by the pope – of the 15th century gave Christian explorers the right to claim lands they “discovered” and lay claim to those lands for their leaders (Reid, 2010; Telford, 2014; Assembly of First Nations, 2018). In particular, the Papal Bull Inter Caetera, issued by Pope Alexander VI in 1493, established that any land that was not inhabited by Christians was available to be “discovered” (Reid, 2010; Telford, 2014; Assembly of First Nations, 2018). This "Doctrine of Discovery" held that, upon discovery of a territory, Indigenous Peoples could not claim ownership of their land, only rights of occupation and use (Reid, 2010). Thus, discovery became the basis for initial and subsequent attempts to extinguish Aboriginal rights (Assembly of First Nations, 2018). 27 While the Doctrine of Discovery broadly guided the process of European occupation and colonization, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 shaped the subsequent history of Aboriginal rights in Canada. Issued by King George III after Britain won the Seven Years War, the Royal Proclamation conferred ownership over North America to the British but explicitly confirmed the existence of Aboriginal title and asserted that all land would be considered Aboriginal land until ceded through a treaty (Reid, 2010; Telford, 2014). The Royal Proclamation also established that only the Crown could sign treaties or buy land from Indigenous Peoples, thereby creating a monopoly over access to Indigenous territories (Telford, 2014). Treaties became the basis for relationships between Indigenous Peoples and Canada and the federal Indian Department was established as an intermediary between Indigenous Peoples and the Crown (Telford, 2014). The federal government drafted legislation to govern its relationship with Indigenous Peoples following enactment of the Constitution of Canada in 1867. The original version of the Indian Act, passed in 1876, outlined federal responsibilities to, and restrictions on, status “Indians” (Coates & Carlson, 2013; Telford, 2014). Central to its direction was to restrict Indigenous Peoples to reserves based on the argument that they were unready for integration into settler society (Coates & Carlson, 2013; Telford, 2014). The reserve system has been argued to have served many purposes: to protect Indigenous Peoples from European encroachment (Alcantara, 2003); to divest the federal government of its responsibilities to Indigenous Peoples and support their “civilization” into the new, commercialized, European-influenced Christian society (Sinclair et al., 2015); and, not least of all, to open up land for settlement and development (Menzies & Butler, 2008; Sinclair et al., 2015). Local Indian Agents strived to eliminate 28 Indigenous Peoples’ spiritual beliefs and to supplant these with Christian values, ostensibly to prepare them for the transition. Indian Agents were under orders to suppress Indigenous cultural and economic practices, with particular emphasis on the potlatch: a gift-giving feast-ceremony associated with transfers of hereditary titles and responsibilities (Coates & Carlson, 2013). While the stated intent of the potlatch ban was to enable a capitalistic ethos to be instilled in Indigenous people (Cole & Chalkin, 1990), its other effect was to undermine existing inter-reserve self-governance structures and processes (Carlson, 2010). These systematic efforts to assimilate Indigenous Peoples by erasing their distinct legal, social, cultural, religious and racial identities is now described as “cultural genocide” (Sinclair et al., 2015). One tool that the federal government relied upon heavily to commit cultural genocide was residential schools, which separated children from parents and communities in an attempt to “civilize” the younger generation (Partridge, 2010; Coates & Carlson, 2013; Sinclair et al., 2015). These schools were funded by the federal government and operated by various religious institutions (Partridge, 2010). Indigenous children were separated from their families, often forcibly or through coercion, and prohibited from practicing their own cultures or speaking their own languages (Partridge, 2010; Sinclair et al., 2015). Neglect and abuse were common and many children died or disappeared while in the care of the schools (Bombay et al., 2014; Sinclair et al., 2015). The schools operated for more than 120 years and were attended by more than 150,000 children (Sinclair et al., 2015). Between 2009 and 2015, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) spoke with residential school Survivors and their families and communities to document the events, conditions and abuses that occurred and to begin the 29 healing process (Sinclair et al., 2015; TRC, 2015). The TRC and others have documented lasting, cumulative intergenerational trauma across several generations that continues to undermine the well-being of Indigenous people and their communities (Bombay et al., 2014; Sinclair et al., 2015; TRC, 2015). Despite systematic efforts aimed at assimilation, Indigenous people continued to fight for recognition of their land, resource and cultural rights, including through several delegations to Ottawa and London (Coates & Carlson, 2013; Telford, 2014). Instead of reconciling, the federal government responded with an aggressive revision of the Indian Act in 1927 that prevented Indigenous groups from pursuing their case at higher levels by making it illegal for Aboriginal groups to raise or give money for pursuit of a claim against the Crown (Coates & Carlson, 2013; Telford, 2014). The restriction remained in effect until after World War II, when public awareness of human rights abuses led to heightened national and global interest in the rights of minorities and Indigenous peoples (Coates & Carlson, 2013). This, combined with recognition of the active role of Indigenous Peoples in the Canadian Armed Forces during the War and renewed Indigenous political activism, led the federal government to amend the Indian Act in 1951 to drop both the ban on potlatches and the prohibition on giving or soliciting money for pursuit of claims (Coates & Carlson, 2013; Telford, 2014). Enactment of the Canadian Constitution Act in 1982 provided new opportunities for Indigenous Peoples to challenge federal and provincial governments in Canada on the basis of Aboriginal Law. Sections 91 and 92 of the 1867 version of the Constitution Act set out the division of 30 powers between the federal and provincial governments (PNCIMA Initiative, 2013), respectively, and it was on this basis that Canada was granted the legislative authority over “Indians” and reserve lands that enabled creation of the Indian Act. Section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act introduced language that recognizes and affirms the existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of Indigenous Peoples (PNCIMA Initiative, 2013). Where Aboriginal title or rights exist, Canada has a duty to consult with First Nations regarding decisions that may infringe on those rights (Jones et al., 2017). Consultation may occur in the form of providing justification regarding how that infringement is necessary to meet an existing objective, such as resource conservation, and/or accommodating First Nations before proceeding (Jones et al., 2017). In general, the duty to consult is commensurate with the strength of claim. Over the following decades, Indigenous groups ramped up legal actions to seek recognition of their harvesting, land and resource rights through a series of lengthy, expensive court trials including Bob and White, Calder, Guerin, Sparrow and Delgamuukw (Coates & Carlson, 2013; Telford, 2014). While these cases led to recognition of specific Indigenous rights, including the right to hunt and fish for food and subsistence purposes, provincial authorities have retained control over contested lands and resources under Crown title and resisted participation in negotiations with Indigenous communities (Coates & Carlson, 2013). Despite arguments that the Royal Proclamation remains valid, Indigenous Peoples have continually had to prove their existing title to the land through legal disputes. The issue has been of particular concern in British Columbia, where the vast majority of lands have never been ceded by Indigenous Peoples through treaties. The Province of B.C. has maintained that the Royal Proclamation does not 31 apply to B.C. since it had not yet been settled by the British when the Proclamation was issued in 1763. This perspective has been the subject of much debate between government officials, academics, and the public, some who claim that the Proclamation would have applied to B.C. when British sovereignty was established in the province. In recent decades, jurisprudence in Canada has altered perceptions of Aboriginal title and rights and shaped government policies and approaches to resource development (Jones, 2006). However, the legacy of colonization and assimilationist policies has bred distrust of government agencies among Indigenous communities (Chrismas, 2012). Despite the dark history that exists between Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments, most Indigenous communities remain committed to establishing a relationship and finding a mutually acceptable accommodation to Indigenous-settler coexistence (Coates & Carlson, 2013). The collaborative governance literature offers insights into how these relationships may be shaped from an institutional perspective, while the trust literature provides a starting point for identifying how trust may be built in these new relationships. 2.2.2 Theoretical perspectives on collaboration and trust 2.2.2.1 Collaborative governance For millennia, Indigenous Peoples relied on their own laws to govern access and use of natural resources (Borrows, 1996). During the process of colonization, non-Indigenous governments claimed ownership to forests, lands and waters and established centralized state agencies to assume these responsibilities, thereby displacing and excluding Indigenous Peoples from their 32 traditional roles (Nikolakis & Hotte, 2019). However, jurisprudence in recent decades has recognized the rights of Indigenous Peoples in Canada, leading to recognition and engagement of Indigenous Peoples through collaborative governance and rights-based approaches (Nikolakis & Hotte, 2019). Collaborative governance models are increasingly considered and adopted to address concerns regarding unsustainable, ineffective or unfair resource management regimes, particularly where disputes exist regarding the rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hawkes, 1996). In practice, this often takes the form of a management board or committee that includes state and local representatives (Pinkerton, 1993: 16; Hawkes, 1996). Where title disputes remain unresolved, management boards typically act in an advisory capacity, with state decision-makers retaining authority (Hawkes, 1996). However, collaborative governance institutions can provide a solution to conflict regarding sovereignty or jurisdiction are involved if responsibility for management of lands and resources is shared equally (Hawkes, 1996). Collaborative governance arrangements encompass cooperative management (Langdon et al. 2010), co-management (Berkes, 1994, 2010; Armitage et al., 2009), shared decision-making and joint decision-making (Davis, 2010: 285; Hillier & Metzger, 2015: 317). In essence, these terms all refer to some combination of centralized, state-level management and traditional, local-level resource management systems and involve some degree of sharing of decision-making power (Hawkes, 1996). "Weak" or incomplete collaborative governance systems may include minimal public participation in resource governance, while “stronger” systems can involve the delegation of full management authority to the local level (Pinkerton, 1989; Berkes, 1994). Some scholars have argued that processes which engage local actors but limit their role with respect to dialogue 33 and decision-making represent a “stretching” of the definition of collaborative governance (Sandstrӧm 2009; Pearson & Dare, 2019). Such processes can enable political co-opting of processes to deliver management outcomes similar management practices to hierarchical governance (Pearson & Dare, 2019). These same concerns appear in the literature on collaborative governance involving Indigenous Peoples. While several scholars have identified specific characteristics of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous Peoples (Berkes, 1991, 1994; Sen & Raakjaer Nielsen, 1996), there remains debate about which forms of collaborative governance are “real” or legitimate (Tipa, 2002; Tipa & Welch, 2006). Some forms of collaborative governance that are pointed to in the literature are viewed as tokenism by Indigenous communities (Tipa, 2002) due to insufficient power-sharing. Tipa & Welch (2006) exclude these from their charactization of collaborative governance in favour of three typologies of collaborative governance that provide “a level of participation in resource management that goes some way to address the aspirations of Indigenous communities” through respect for traditional knowledge and affirmation of decision-making powers. Several theoretical frameworks have been developed for collaborative governance, including highly cited works from Ansell & Gash (2007) and Emerson et al. (2012). Key elements of these frameworks and relevant literature on collaborative governance are summarized in Table 2-1. Ansell & Gash (2007) developed a conceptual framework with a specific focus on collaborative governance based on meta-analysis of 137 cases. The authors define collaborative governance as 34 “A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.” Central to this definition is that participants engage directly in decision making through a forum that aims to make decisions by consensus. The framework identified four factors that are critical to collaborative governance: starting conditions, institutional design, facilitative leadership and the collaborative process. Trust-building is considered to be an independent component of the collaborative process alongside aspects such as commitment to process, shared understanding, intermediate outcomes and face-to-face dialogue. Starting conditions are believed to establish baseline levels of trust, conflict and social capital; institutional design lays ground rules under which collaboration takes place; and leadership offers mediation and facilitation for the collaborative process. The process is highly iterative and nonlinear; however, a strong basis of trust must be built early on the in process in order for collaborators to be willing to be vulnerable. Emerson et al. (2012) expanded on the work of Ansell & Gash, broadening the definition of collaborative governance to include “the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished.” The definition loosened constraints by Ansell & Gash (2008) that limited involvement in decision-making to state and non-state stakeholders, making space for collaboration between levels and types of government and 35 industry players and beyond formal, state-initiated arrangements. Nevertheless, the state remains a key actor in most conceptualization of governance – while other actors may change depending upon the issues orthe context, the state is always present. Emerson et al. (2012) also emphasized the influence of systems context on collaborative governance: the host of political, legal, socioeconomic, environmental and other influences that interact with governance processes (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996). The importance of context in conflict and collective action is similarly emphasized by Ratner et al. (2013). While Ansell & Gash (2007) largely ignored the influences of the external forces of broader context on dynamics of the collaboration, both at the beginning of the collaboration and over time, Emerson et al. noted that systems context creates drivers, incentives, interdependence and uncertainty that can profoundly influence the collaboration. Emerson et al. (2012) and Ratner et al. (2013) also noted the influence of outcomes and impacts of collaborative governance on the context and the process itself, leading to a cyclical process of adaptation and change over time. Where Ansell & Gash categorized some of these as influences on starting conditions, Emerson et al. emphasized their dynamic nature and the possibility of change in external conditions over time. However, the distinction between systems context and drivers of change presented by Emerson et al. is unclear, since both appear to have the potential to create changes in the collaboration. 36 Table 2-1. Elements of collaborative governance. Element Description Source Starting conditions Crisis; third-party intervention; legal mandate; common vision; strong leader; incentives to collaborate Crisis; legal mandate; strong leader; prehistory of cooperation Power-resource-knowledge asymmetries; incentives for and constraints on participation; prehistory of cooperation or conflict Selin & Chevez (1995) Pinkerton (1989) Ansell & Gash (2007) Institutional design Participatory inclusiveness, forum exclusiveness; clear ground rules; process transparency Open, accessible and transparent process; clear, written plan; consensus-based decision making; decisions regarded as just; consistent with existing laws and policies Assigned roles; formal agreements to monitor and ensure compliance Ansell & Gash (2007) Conley & Moote (2003) Selin & Chevez (1995) Facilitative leadership Promote broad and active participation; ensure broad-based influence and control; facilitate productive group dynamics, extend the scope of the process Ansell & Gash (2007), Lasker & Weiss (2003: 31) Collaborative process Face-to-face dialogue; commitment to process; shared understanding; capacity for joint action Principled engagement; shared motivation; capacity for joint action; collaborative actions Governance; administration; organizational autonomy; mutuality; norms Broadly shared vision; clear, feasible goals; diverse, inclusive participation; participation by local government; linkages to individuals and groups beyond primary participants Ansell & Gash (2007) Emerson et al. (2012) Thomson et al. (2009) Conley & Moote (2003) 37 Element Description Source Outcomes Intermediate outcomes: “small wins”; strategic plans; joint fact-finding Change in system context; collaborative process or institutional design Improved habitat; land protected from development; improved water quality; changed land management practices; biological diversity preserved; soil and water resources conserved; relationships built or strengthened; increased trust; participants gained knowledge and understanding; increased employment; improved capacity for dispute resolution; changes in existing institutions or creation of new institutions Ansell & Gash (2007) Emerson et al. (2012) Conley & Moote (2003) Systems context Policy legal frameworks; political dynamics; network connectedness; levels of conflict/trust; socioeconomic/cultural health & diversity; interdependence; uncertainty Attributes of resources; attributes of resource users; governance arrangements Emerson et al. (2012) Ratner et al. (2013) 38 Theories of power (Lukes, 2005; Gaventa, 2006; Haugaard & Clegg, 2009) also play an important underlying role in collaborative governance (Brisbois & de Loë, 2015) that cuts across all elements of collaborative governance. For example, Ansell & Gash (2007) note that power and resource imbalances affect incentives to participate in collaborative governance. This perspective is supported by collaborative planning literature, which emphasizes institutional design principles to balance power among collaborators (Wondolleck & Yaffe, 2000; Innes, 2004). However, this approach to balancing power has been criticized for failing to address macro-level structures and power inequalities (McGuirk, 2001; Yiftachel & Huxley, 2000; Sandström et al., 2013). Critics argue that effective collaborative governance requires more than just equitable participation because structural power relationships between collaborators transcend institutional boundaries (Emerson et al., 2012; Brisbois & de Loë, 2015). In this broader structural, social context, power is described as “a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures (‘rules of the game’) that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970: 43-44). In this way, power is embodied not just in the authority and position of individuals within a collaboration but is engrained in people’s assumptions about appropriate ways of thinking and acting in daily life (Foucault, 1974). These same assumptions may become embedded in the institutional design and process through which collaboration occurs (Healey, 2003). Giddens (1984) recognized the continual integration of individual, or “agency,” and structural elements in 39 institutions and sought to integrate both into planning (Healey, 2003). His theory of structuration describes how human interactions both produce and reproduce social structures (Giddens, 1984). Reflecting on Dahl (1961: 66), Lukes (2005) notes that conflict is crucial in identifying power in relationships: without the exercise of power in the form of conflict, power dynamics fail to show up. This view of power “involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation” (Lukes, 2005: 19). Thus, conflict plays an important role in identifying and shifting power between parties engaged in collaborative governance. This view is supported in the context of natural resource governance by Sandström et al. (2013), which references the thinking of Émile Durkheim and Auguste Compte in interpreting conflicts as both “the cause and outcome of processes of structural change.” Thus, institutions of natural resource governance both shape and are shaped by conflicts and their management. A conceptual framework for power in collaborative governance, proposed by Takeda & Røpke (2010) and based on the work of Clegg (1989), Haugaard (1997) and Lemke (2002), encompasses three highly interdependent layers of power: agency power, institutional power and structural power. Agency power refers to the capacity of individuals to mobilize resources and act on their own interests, institutional power describes the distribution of authority and influence entrenched in established rules, roles and responsibilities and structural power refers to the macro-societal structures that shape the perceptions, decisions and actions of individuals (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). Agency and structural power are similarly described in sociology literature as 40 situational and durable power (e.g. Schilke et al., 2016; Wu & Wilkes, 2016). Purdy (2012) provides a framework to assess institutional power by identifying inclusion and exclusion of participants, design of the collaborative process and content upon which the collaboration focuses. Structural power is also identified in a framework developed by Brisbois & de Loë (2015) for analyzing power in collaborative approaches to water governance. This framework emphasizes the work of Lukes (2005) and Gaventa (2006) in addition to more recent work by Haugaard & Clegg (2009) and separates aspects of Takeda & Røpke’s agency power into “instrumental power,” which emphasizes the role of resources in influencing outcomes, and “discursive power,” through which parties manipulate the desires of others. Despite the importance of power in collaborative governance (Innes & Booher, 2010: 108-112), the topic has received relatively little attention in peer-reviewed literature. For example, in a systematic review of 57 papers on collaborative water governance, Brisbois & de Loë (2015) found that power “was not addressed in 32% of articles, addressed minimally in 39%, partially addressed in 19%, strongly addressed in 4% and very strongly addressed in 7%.” While 44% of articles were found to mention the word “power,” authors often did not engage in any (4%) or much (19%) deeper analysis and only three articles explicitly referenced insights from power theory (Brisbois & de Loë, 2015). Structural power was identified in more than two-thirds of papers that touched on the issue of power, while instrumental power was noted in slightly fewer than half (Brisbois & de Loë, 2015). Discursive power was the least frequently identified and was described in one-fifth of all papers that touched on power dynamics (Brisbois & de Loë, 2015). 41 2.2.2.2 Trust Trust has been conceptualized in various ways across different disciplines; however, many scholars refer to Rousseau et al. (1998: 395), who define trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.” The trust literature distinguishes between the perception of trust (subjective trust), which is believed to arise as result of the existence of antecedents (influences on trust), and trusting actions (behavioural trust), which involve vulnerability (Das & Teng, 2004; Colquitt et al., 2007; Gillespie, 2012). Trust theory characterizes a tripartite relationship in which entity a trusts entity b to perform action c (Lewicki et al., 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998; Hardin, 2002; Cook et al., 2005: 5). While the trustor (entity a) is typically a person, trust may be placed in an individual, an organization (e.g. a government or news agency), an object (e.g. a compass), or a process (entity b) (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; Coleman & Stern, 2018b). The balance of power between entities also has important implications for trust. If, for example, a potential trustee possesses a high degree of power, they may have no incentive to uphold commitments (Farrell, 2004b). Thus, the risk of trusting may be perceived by a potential trustor as too great. Those with greater power are also less dependent on trust than those who are powerless, so may exhibit less trusting behaviour (Wu & Wilkes, 2016). Trust is only possible to the extent that both parties value continuation of the relationship and have some reason to take the other’s interest into account (Farrell, 2004). Theoretical frameworks touch on three types of influences on trust, which we refer to as individual, interpersonal and institutional influences. For example, drawing on Worchel (1979), 42 Lewicki & Bunker (1995, 1996) described trust as an individual characteristic; as a characteristic of interpersonal transactions; and as an institutional phenomenon (Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Stern & Coleman, 2015). These three types of influences on trust are shaped by numerous factors that are identified throughout the literature and summarized in Table 2-2, Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 (already published in Hotte et al., 2018). While trust is often portrayed in a positive light, a high degree of trust can have negative consequences (Butler et al., 2009). Some researchers suggest there exists an optimal level of interpersonal trust (Wicks et al., 1999; Butler et al., 2009). Individuals with a strong propensity to trust may perceive others as being similar to themselves and be overly optimistic, causing them to take on disproportionately more social risk, be cheated more frequently and ultimately perform less well than those whose levels of trustworthiness are closer to the average (Ross et al., 1977; Cook et al., 2005: 2). Too much trust can lead to decisions and actions based on blind faith (e.g. insufficient information gathering and processing), complacency of parties (e.g. excessive satisfaction and commitment to the relationship) and cumbersome obligations (e.g. excessive communication and interaction); each of which increases the risk of exploitation (Das & Teng, 2001). Those with low levels of trust also perform poorly because they behave too conservatively to avoid being cheated, thereby foregoing profitable opportunities. 43 2.2.2.2.1 Individual influences on trust Table 2-2. Individual influences on trust (Hotte et al., 2018). Factors influencing trust Source Disparities in residential stability and economic conditions for whites living in racially or ethnically diverse communities Abascal & Baldassari (2015) Recent history of traumatic experiences; belonging to a group that experienced discimination; low income and education; living in a racially mixed community and/or in one with a high degree of income disparity Alesina & La Ferrera (2000) Country of origin and the timing of arrival of forebears Algan & Cahuc (2010) Country of origin; values instilled by parents Butler et al. (2009) Intelligence Carl & Billari (2014) Country of origin, including affluence and civicness Delhey et al. (2011) Social conflict; public safety; informal social networks; income; social status; education; satisfaction with life; job satisfaction; happiness; anxiety Delhey & Newton (2003) Ethnic homogeneity; Protestant religious traditions; good government; wealth; income equality Delhey & Newton (2005) Incidental emotions (happiness, gratitude, anger) Dunn & Schweitzer (2005) Developmental experiences; personality type; cultural background Hofstede (1980) Trusting stance; faith in humanity McKnight et al. (1998) Civic engagement Paxton (2005) Social interaction Putnam (2000) Economic equality; equality of opportunity Rothstein & Uslaner (2005) Secure attachment Simmons et al. (2009) Disposition; risk propensity and vulnerability; values Stern & Coleman (2015) Race; advantage; education; Southern (USA) residence Wilkes (2011) Individual influences on trust (i.e. dispositional trust, propensity to trust) are studied primarily in the fields of psychology and sociology. Studies of individual influences focus on enduring, individual traits and personal experiences in trust situations (Rotter, 1967; Berg et al., 1995) that cause individuals to be inherently more or less trusting of others that they do not know (Rotter, 1980; Mayer et al., 1995; Evans & Revelle, 2008). Willingness to trust unfamiliar others is positively correlated with positive affect (Scharlemann et al., 2001; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Kirchsteiger et al., 2006), a history of positive experiences in trust situations (Evans & Revelle, 44 2008), and equality of economic opportunity or status (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Other factors that influence individuals’ propensity to trust include characteristics of their community (Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000), their country of origin and values instilled by their parents (Butler et al., 2009). In general, people tend to be more willing to trust toward unfamiliar individuals within their own social group or class (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Alesina & La Ferrera (2000) explored the determinants of trust among individuals belonging to different racial groups in the USA. Their research found that trust is diminished by the occurrence of recent traumatic experiences, belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated against (e.g. minority groups), possessing low levels of income and education and living in a racially mixed community and/or in one with a high degree of income disparity. The latter effect was attributed, in part, to the fact that individuals feel greater trust toward those who they identify as similar to themselves (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000). In racially heterogeneous communities, inter-racial mixing in social groups was found to be low and individuals who did not participate in such groups had the strongest views against racial mixing and the lowest levels of trust toward others (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000). Butler et al. (2009) observed little change in behaviour among individuals’ propensity to extend trust during a repeated trust game, suggesting that individuals’ propensity to trust is relatively persistent over the short term. A related concept, referred to as generalized trust or social trust, expresses an individual’s level of trust in other members of society at large (Taylor et al., 2010; Wilkes, 2011). Social trust has been linked to resilience to adversity, with those living in trustworthy environments experiencing fewer negative impacts to subjective well-being after enduring discrimination, ill-health or unemployment (Helliwell & Wang, 2016). 45 2.2.2.2.2 Interpersonal influences on trust Table 2-3. Interpersonal influences on trust (Hotte et al., 2018). Influence on trust Source Expectations of return; unconditional kindness Ashraf et al. (2006) Shared values Braithwaite (1998) Emotional displays Campellone & Kring (2013) Benefits and costs Coleman (1990) Good-faith effort; honesty in exchange; limited opportunism Cummings & Bromiley (1996) Similarity (values, opinions, actions, goals, interests); competence; transparency; honesty; intentions; risk perception; benefit perception Earle (2010) Costs and benefits from staying in the relationship; degree of interdependence and alternative relationships; reputation Lewicki & Bunker (1996) Ability; benevolence; integrity Mayer et al. (1995) Competence; responsibility; reliability and dependability McAllister (1995) Categorization processes; illusions of control processes; benevolence belief; competence belief; honesty belief; predictability belief McKnight et al. (1998) Reciprocal and recurring exchange; social similarity Newell & Swan (2000) Smiling Scharlemann et al. (2001) Power in social exchange Schilke et al. (2015), Wu & Wilkes (2016) Leadership styles Schaubroeck et al. (2011) Affect; emotion; violation and repair; distrust; international and cross-cultural issues Schoorman et al. (2007) Communication; cooperation; performance Seppanen et al. (2007) Relational form, depth and risks Sheppard & Sherman (1998) Performance (competent, problem solving, unity, alignment, respect); permeability (openness, communication, information flow, financial); relational bonding (long-term relations, compatibility) Wong & Cheung (2005) 46 Interpersonal influences on trust have been studied primarily in the fields of psychology, economics and organizational behavior. These influences emerge in relationships between two or more individuals or entities (Cook et al., 2005) and are shaped by judgements and perceptions of trustworthiness (Hardin, 2002; Möllering, 2006; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). In unfamiliar situations (e.g. the beginning of a new collaboration), individual predispositions are of relatively greater importance for trust (Leahy & Anderson, 2008). However, as people become familiar with one another, interpersonal influences become the primary motivator of trust (Rotter, 1980; Bigley & Pearce 1998). Research on interpersonal influences suggests that an optimal level of trust, empathy and, perhaps, identification (McAllister, 1995; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) emerge through repeated interactions and patterns of behavior (Wong & Cheung, 2005; Stevens et al., 2015). A cyclical relationship is also reported to exist between interpersonal influences and trust: individuals are more likely to trust when they have evidence that another person is trustworthy and the trustee, in turn, is more likely to reciprocate when they feel trusted (Burnham et al., 2000; Ostrom, 2003; Pillutla et al., 2003; Evans & Revelle, 2008). Trust is considered not as a static state, but rather “an ongoing process that must be initiated, maintained, sometimes restored and continuously authenticated” (Flores & Solomon, 1998: 206) wherein parties formulate decisions about whether to trust on an ongoing basis. However, beginnings set the atmosphere of a relationship and can be difficult to alter (Nooteboom, 2005). Key interpersonal influences identified in the literature include perceived ability or competence, benevolence and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995; Smith et al., 2013), shared values (Braithwaite 1998), responsiveness, honesty and consistency (Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Davenport et al., 47 2007; Stern, 2008) and time engaged in meaningful social interactions (Stern, 2008). Interpersonal influences may be rational or calculative and based on cognitive judgements, or they may be relational or affinitive and shaped by emotions (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Lewicki et al., 2006; Möllering, 2006; Kunnel & Quandt, 2016; Coleman & Stern, 2018a). In addition to motivating trust between individuals, these influences can also shape trust between individuals and organizations (Smith et al., 2013), between groups of people and between organizations (Schoorman et al., 2007; Schilke & Cook, 2013). The strength of interpersonal influences is inversely correlated with social distance between individuals (Evans & Revelle, 2008; Delhey et al., 2011). Aron et al. (1997) focused on testing a process for developing temporary “interpersonal closeness” between research participants who were not previously acquainted. The research was based on previous findings that development of close relationships is associated with sustained, escalating, reciprocal, personalistic self-disclosure (Altman & Taylor, 1973; Derlega et al., 1993; Collins & Miller, 1994; Dindia & Allen, 1995; Berg & Clark, 1996; Aron et al., 1997). The researchers identified that it was possible to incite the participants to “feel close,” but that a long-term relationship would be required for them to “behave close.” Behavioral decision theories (e.g. rational choice) describe the rational component of decisions to trust others (Axelrod, 1984; Bigley & Pearce, 1998). The decision to cooperate rather than compete with other individuals or groups is cited as an example of a rational decision. For example, Evans & Revelle (2008) proposed that vulnerability can be defined by the ratio of costs 48 (i.e. associated with betrayal) and benefits (i.e. associated with reciprocation) of trusting. Coleman (1990) described these decisions in terms of the “payoffs” associated with engaging in a certain behaviour (e.g. trusting). The relative benefits of engaging in the behavior are weighed against the benefit of not engaging in it, as illustrated in a payoff matrix (Coleman, 1990). Empirical evidence indicates that individuals are indeed sensitive to this ratio: if vulnerability is high, then individuals are less likely to trust (Snijders & Keren, 2001; Malhotra, 2004). Additional influences on trust enter into play when interactions involve diverse groups in terms of race/ethnicity, power, equality or advantage. In the field of sociology, there are two prevailing theories regarding development of trust between diverse actors: the contact hypothesis and conflict/threat theory (Abascal & Baldassarri, 2015). The contact hypothesis suggests that contact with members of other groups disconfirms existing generalizations and reduces prejudice (Allport, 1954). Conversely, conflict/threat theory asserts that prejudice is the result of competition for scarce resources, which increases with spatial and social proximity (Sherif et al., 1961, 1988). While these theories may seem at odds, they may simply be two outcomes determined by starting conditions: conflict may result from contact when inequalities exist between individuals or their respective socioeconomic or ethnic groups (Pettigrew, 1998; Abascal & Baldassarri, 2015). The role of power in trust has not been extensively studied and questions remain about whether differences in power between parties could, in fact, increase trust in some situations (Simpson, 2007). For example, relationships with an unequal balance of power could impede development of trust if the powerful person pursues self-interest at the 49 expense of another party (Simpson, 2007). However, if the party with more power uses it to act in the interest of another party, this interaction could generate trust (Simpson, 2007). The concept of interpersonal trust has also been expanded to encompass other types of inter-party trust including individual-organization, intergroup and interorganization trust (Curall & Inkpen, 2006; Schilke & Cook, 2013). These categorizations were put forth as distinct constructs based on their antecedents of trust building and implications for trust (Schilke & Cook, 2013). However, trust between each of these pairings of parties offers insights for and is related to trust between the other pairings (Curall & Inkpen, 2006; Grimmelikhuijsen & Knies, 2015). Just as interpersonal trust is based on the expectation that the other party will not take advantage of one’s vulnerabilities, so too does this expectation hold for trust in a government or other organization (McAllister, 1995; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Grimmelikhuijsen & Knies, 2015). As noted in Schoorman et al. (2007): “Just as perceptions about an individual’s ability, benevolence, and integrity will have an impact on how much trust the individual can garner, these perceptions also affect the extent to which an organization will be trusted.” Therefore, it may be helpful to consider interpersonal trust in a broader sense: as inter-party trust. This perspective underpins the characterization of trust in the context of social license to operate (i.e. the degree to which the general public collectively expresses trust toward a private sector resource developer) (Poppo & Schepker, 2010). Curall & Inkpen (2006: 241) posit that a bi-directional and reciprocal relationship exists among trust these types of inter-party trust in which, as time progresses, interpersonal trust can influence trust at the intergroup and, eventually, inter-organizational levels. The authors state that “developmentally speaking, trust may have its 50 origins in one-on-one relationships between managers but, over time, such trust may diffuse within an organization by fostering trust among groups.” 2.2.2.2.3 Institutional influences on trust Table 2-4. Institutional influences on trust (Hotte et al., 2018). Influence on trust Source Justice, fairness and expectations Aryee et al. (2002), Dirks & Ferrin (2002) Alignment of interests; value alteration; selectivity in transactions; research/information revelation Bhattacharya et al. (1998) Norms; sanctions Coleman (1990) Control systems Coletti et al. (2005) Mutual interests; interpersonal trust; joint dispute resolution; policies and procedures; reporting structure; staffing and training; decision-making process; rituals, ceremonies and networking; proactive information collection; setting objectives; planning and budgeting Das & Teng (2001) Interaction frequency; symmetry of dependence; multiplexity of relationships and cooperation-related incentives Eberl (2003) Structural assurance belief; situational normality belief McKnight et al. (1998) Expectations embedded in norms, structures and institutions Newell & Swan (2000) Interaction of past exchange experiences and expectations of continuity Poppo et al. (2008) Power in social exchange Schilke et al. (2015) Wu & Wilkes (2016) Leadership styles Schaubroeck et al. (2011) Affect; emotion; violation and repair; distrust; international and cross-cultural issues Schoorman et al. (2007) Communication; cooperation; performance Seppanen et al. (2007) Relational form, depth and risks Sheppard & Sherman (1998) Type of instigation; network size; flexibility/adaptability; influence Willem & Lucidarme (2014) System-based trust (satisfactory terms, adoption of alternative dispute resolution, reputation) Wong & Cheung (2005) 51 Institutional influences on trust are studied predominantly in the fields of economics and management. These influences are embedded in institutional environments and create favourable assumptions and expectations about a potential trustee’s behaviour (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011) by providing information about how different groups are likely to behave towards each other (Farrell, 2009a). Institutions can establish shared understanding and expectations that enables actors to interpret situations in similar ways (Farrell, 2009a). Such institutions can reduce the risk of one or more parties behaving in an untrustworthy manner (Möllering, 2006; Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011) and increase parties’ willingness to take a risk (i.e. be vulnerable) and engage in trusting behaviour (Schoorman et al., 2007). However, institutions themselves may need to be trusted before they can motivate trust among actors (Möllering, 2006). Control mechanisms, for example, can be designed to make people behave in a more trustworthy manner, thereby creating conditions under which trust increases because it is much less risky (Das & Teng, 1998; Cook, 2001; Coletti et al., 2005; Schoorman et al., 2007). Such mechanisms include voluntary or mandatory certification of professionals (e.g. of engineers, accountants and planners), products (e.g. Forest Stewardship Council, Marine Stewardship Council, Oceanwise) or processes (e.g. International Organization for Standardization, ISO), legal regulations and professional codes of conduct and organizational reputation (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; McDermott, 2012). 52 Importantly, institutions encompass both formal controls, including mechanisms such as contracts and agreements, and informal or social controls, which encompasses norms of behavior (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). Organizational reputation and behavioural norms are both examples of informal controls that can motivate trust (McDermott, 2012). Bachmann & Inkpen (2011) hypothesize that formal controls are most important during initiation of the relationship, whereas social controls are more relevant during subsequent interactions. This idea suggests that different factors have varying levels of influence on trust building at different stages of the institutional relationship. Furthermore, institutional design (e.g. decision rules) can influence participation and inclusion, with implications for generating interpersonal understanding and empathy, which are noted to be strong predictors of trust (Warren, 1999; Morrell, 2010). Several scholars question whether trust can truly exist in the presence of formal controls since vulnerability and willingness to take a risk are hallmarks of trust (Cook, 2001; Hardin, 2002). As noted by Farrell (2009a), “there is considerable murkiness and confusion about where institutions end, and where trust begins.” Some level of trust is often necessary because it is impossible to monitor every action of another party (Das & Teng, 1998). Whether control systems have a positive or negative influence on trust (Mayer et al., 1995; Coletti et al., 2005; Schoorman et al., 2007; Willem & Lucidarme, 2014) may be due to effects of framing and attribution, which provide cues about how fellow collaborators’ trustworthy behaviours should be interpreted (Coletti et al., 2005). Unliateral implementation of control systems by one part may indicate a low-trust relationship (Hotte et al., 2018). 53 While actors explicitly negotiate formal institutions, informal institutions typically emerge from independent instances of social bargaining between actors in a manner that reflects existing power relations between them (Farrell, 2004). More powerful actors may be expected to be more successful in these social bargaining situations, with actors’ expectations crystallizing over time and reinforcing imbalances of power (Farrell, 2004). 2.2.3 Theoretical framework While published literature on collaborative governance emphasizes the importance of trust (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2007), few studies to date explicity take a multidisciplinary approach that links individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust with behavioural trust in this context (Stern & Coleman, 2015). Furthermore, frameworks and analyses for trust typically address one or two influences on trust (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995; Davenport et al., 2007; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Smith et al., 2013) but rarely address all three (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; Stern & Coleman, 2015). Specifically, individual and institutional influences have received considerably less attention in theoretical frameworks for trust than interpersonal influences (Kramer, 1999; Colquitt et al., 2007; Schoorman et al., 2007; Frazier et al., 2013). Advocates of behavioural decision theory downplay the relative importance of individual influences, suggesting instead that trusting behaviour is only possible in the presence of considerable interpersonal knowledge (Cook et al., 2005). The decision to trust is assumed to be based exclusively on an assessment of another’s motivations and expected future behaviours (Cook et al., 2005). According to this characterization, it is impossible to trust strangers, 54 acquaintances, institutions or governments (Cook et al., 2005). Rather, individuals decide to trust because they believe the other person wishes to have an ongoing relationship and therefore assumes (or “encapsulates”) the trustor’s interests into their own (Cook et al., 2005). The possibilities of an individual having a moral commitment to being trustworthy or possessing a trustworthy disposition are flatly rejected as unfounded, despite evidence to the contrary. The framework outlined in McAllister (1995) adopts this approach by linking two types of interpersonal influences, affect and cognition, to trust between peers and in managers, respectively. However, McAllister (1995) includes professional credentials in the framework, which scholars such as Bachmann & Inkpen (2011) and McDermott (2012) would categorize as institutional influences. Lewicki & Bunker (1995, 1996) begin by introducing the three types of influences on trust, but then proceed to adopt a behavioural decision theory, or rationalist, approach to describing three stages in the development of trust (i.e. from calculus-based trust, to knowledge-based trust, to identification-based trust) that is based solely on interpersonal influences. Bhattacharya et al. (1998) subsequently developed a sequential, rationalist mathematical model that included interpersonal influences and behavioural trust. However, the theoretical framework for trust presented by Mayer et al. (1995), which includes both individual (propensity) and interpersonal (trustworthiness) influences, remains frequently cited in the trust literature. Futhermore, it identifies three specific types of interpersonal influences: ability (i.e. relevant skills, competencies and characteristics), benevolence (i.e. belief that another party takes the trustor’s interests to heart) and integrity (i.e. adheres to a set of values the trustor deems acceptable) (Mayer et al., 1995). Individual influences are reported to 55 shape both interpersonal influences and perceived trust, while interpersonal influences are believed to act only on perceived trust. Perceived trust, in turn, is said to shape risk-taking (behavioural trust), subject to a moderating effect of perceived risk, which leads to outcomes. These outcomes then impact interpersonal influences through a feeback effect, resulting in a cyclical process for trust building. Ostrom & Ahn (2009) present a strikingly similar framework to Mayer et al. (1995); however, the manuscript offers no indication that the former were aware of the work of the latter. The list of references cited by Ostrom & Ahn indicate the authors relied primarily on the economics literature, including only a small number of citations for articles published in political science, psychology and sociology journals. Both frameworks characterize influences on trust and the central role of trust in motivating risk-taking behaviour. While Mayer et al. took an organizational behaviour approach and emphasized individual and interpersonal influences, Ostrom & Ahn followed the tradition of neo-institutionalists and collective action theorists who focused on interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. The framework presented by Ostrom & Ahn was intended to provide a theory linking social capital with collective action, but highlights trust as a “core link” between the two (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009: 22) and lists trustworthiness, networks and institutions as forms of social capital. However, other research suggests that trustworthiness and networks may both fall within the category of interpersonal influences: networks encompass interpersonal dynamics among multiple actors that can supply information about reputation and trustworthiness of actors and punish untrustworthy behaviour (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Buskens, 2002; Tilly, 2005). Ostrom & Ahn describe trust as enabling 56 a trustor to “take an action involving risk of loss” (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009: 23), noting the specific example of collective action as a subsequent action. Mayer et al. (1995) also adopt this conceptualization of trust which, according to the broader trust literature, refers to perceived trust that can lead to behavioural trust in the form of risk-taking and collective action (Colquitt et al., 2007; Gillespie, 2012). Ostrom & Ahn also note the role of contextual variables in shaping trust; however, the authors do not elaborate on what these variables entail or the mechanism through which they shape trust. These may be variables that influence perceived risk (Mayer et al., 1995), such as political, legal, socioeconomic, environmental and other factors (Emerson et al., 2012). However, while Ostrom & Ahn suggest that contextual variables act only on perceived trust, the trust literature suggests these variables can also shape individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. For example, socioeconomic factors can impact individual influences on trust such as discrimination and disparities in income, education and economic opportunity (Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005) and interpersonal influences such as perceived similarity of others (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Newell & Swan, 2000). Socioeconomic and political factors can also impact institutional influences on trust such as power-sharing (Nadasdy, 2003; Nadasdy, 2006) and decision-making processes (Das & Teng, 2001). 57 Therefore, Mayer et al. (1995) and Ostrom & Ahn (2009) present slightly different, yet overlapping, perspectives of trust-building that are constrained by the limits of their respective disciplines. However, when integrated and interpreted with respect to the broader trust literature, these two frameworks provide a foundation for a multidisciplinary framework for trust in the context of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities (Figure 2-3). Figure 2-3. Theoretical framework for trust-building in the context of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities. According to this framework, individual, interpersonal and institutional influences can motivate perceived trust which, subject to perceived risk, has the potential to lead to behavioural trust. Manifestations of behavioural trust in the context of collaborative natural resource governance can include risk-taking and collective action (e.g. Ostrom and Ahn, 2009). Individual influences on trust can also shape interpersonal influences because individuals who are more willing to trust unknown others may be trusting toward specific actors (Colquitt et al., 2007; Heyns & 58 Rothmann, 2015), including other collaborators. Outcomes of behavioural trust can have feedback effects that impact individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust, with positive outcomes in trust situations leading to positive impacts and increased trust and negative outcomes leading to negative impacts and decreased trust. Contextual variables, including political, legal, socioeconomic, environmental and other factors, can shape trust by acting on any variable in this framework. This multidisciplinary theoretical framework forms the basis of subsequent chapters in this dissertation. These chapters refine and test the framework based on empirical data collected by the researcher. Chapter 3:, Chapter 4: and Chapter 5:Error! Reference source not found. use case studies of collaborations on Haida Gwaii to characterize individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust, as well as trust itself, in the context of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities. These results lead to refinement of the framework, which is subsequently tested in Chapter 6 using a survey of representatives of Indigenous, federal and provincial/territorial governments with experience in similar types of collaborations across Canada. 59 Chapter 3: Collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii 3.1 Introduction The field of collaborative governance has experienced a surge in interest in recent decades (Conley & Moote, 2003). The resulting body of published literature encompasses both idealized narratives of collaborative governance as a means of reducing conflict, building social capital and producing better decisions as well as case studies of collaborative governance in practice (Innes, 1996; Weber, 2000; Conley & Moote, 2003). However, additional research is needed to identify larger scale issues, such as trust and power, that are at play in the context of collaborative governance. Detailed case studies can offer insights into these types of issues (Conley & Moote, 2003). The remote archipelago of Haida Gwaii, located approximately one hundred kilometers off the coast of British Columbia (B.C.), Canada, provides a rich history through which to study collaborative governance. Following several decades of destructive resource extraction on Haida Gwaii, the seeds of collaborative natural resource governance were planted in 1974 when the Haida3, the Indigenous people of Haida Gwaii, began to assert their position as a self-governing Nation and take a firm stance against industrial logging activity (Takeda & Røpke, 2010; Lee, 2012). 3 “Haida” is an English pronunciation of the word Xayda, which means "person." 60 For the Haida, collaborative governance became a tool to halt destruction of old-growth forests, biodiversity and Haida cultural sites; for the Province of British Columbia (B.C.), it offered a means to reduce conflict on the land base. The collaborative governance approach, initially implemented to govern a terrestrial protected area, was subsequently applied to other natural resources including forests and marine areas. The history of conflict, negotiation and collaboration on Haida Gwaii has profoundly shaped who has power and who makes decisions that affect the environment and natural resources (Lee, 2012) and has served as a model for collaborative governance approaches in other areas (Penikett, 2012; Dowie, 2017: vii; Jones et al., 2017). Understanding this history and the relationships between collaborating organizations – specifically, the Council of the Haida Nation, the Government of Canada and the Province of B.C. – is critical to understanding the development and current status of collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii. This chapter provides a brief overview of collaborative governance on Haida Gwaii with a focus on three case study collaborations that will be the focus of further study in Chapter 4. It begins with an introduction to the place and people of Haida Gwaii, followed by a brief history of the evolution of collaborative natural resource governance, an overview of three case study collaborations and a comparison of these collaborations across six elements of collaborative governance. The framework for this comparison is based on existing theoretical frameworks for analyzing collaborative governance and emphasizes starting conditions, collaborative process, institutional design, facilitative leadership, outcomes and systems context (Selin & Chevez, 61 1995; Conley & Moote, 2003; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Emerson et al., 2012; Ratner et al., 2013). The chapter concludes with a summary of this comparison and ideas for areas of future research. 3.2 Background Collaborative governance is broadly defined as a “governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Emerson et al. (2012) broadened this definition to include “the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished.” Collaborative governance encompasses a broad range of power sharing arrangements, from "weak" or incomplete systems that involve limited participation by non-state actors to “stronger” systems that involve full delegation of decision-making authority to the local level (Berkes, 1994; Pinkerton, 2003). These arrangements may be variously referred to as co-management (Berkes, 1994, 2010; Armitage et al., 2009), cooperative management (Langdon et al., 2010), shared decision-making and joint decision-making (Davis, 2010: 285; Hillier & Metzger, 2015: 317). Each of these arrangements is characterized by its own unique development and design and the collaborations that have developed on Haida Gwaii over more than three decades provide some sense of the broadness of the range of collaborative governance arrangements. 62 There are many ways to begin telling the story of these three case study collaborations. One way would be to start at a seemingly critical point in history and chart progress since that time. Another would be to start with a description of the place itself (Coulthard, 2014). This latter approach aligns more closely with the worldview of the Haida, who are the original inhabitants of Haida Gwaii and have occupied the islands since time immemorial (Brown & Brown, 2009). The following section attempts to balance both approaches by providing a description of place followed by a historical developmental perspective on collaborative governance on Haida Gwaii. 3.2.1 Haida Gwaii: Islands of the People Xaadaa Gwaay, Xaaydaga Gwaay.yaay or Haida Gwaii, as the name translates in English, means "Islands of the people" (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Formerly known as the Queen Charlotte Islands, the archipelago of more than 150 islands located on the North Coast of British Columbia, Canada (Stearns, 1981), was renamed in 2010 as part of a formal reconciliation process between the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009). However, the two islands that remain permanently inhabited are still commonly known by their settler names, Graham Island and Moresby Island (Dale, 1999). These two islands, which are separated by Skidegate Channel, are home to six communities: the predominantly Haida villages of Old Massett and Skidegate and the predominantly non-Haida villages of Massett, Port Clements, the Village of Queen Charlotte and Sandspit (Dale, 1999). 63 The west coast of Haida Gwaii is shaped by a mountain range that rises abruptly out of the Pacific Ocean to a height of 915 metres (3,000 feet) (Stearns, 1981). According to Haida oral histories, the islands were, at one time, covered with ice and grass (Council of the Haida Nation, April 2017). During the most recent ice age, approximately 18,000 years ago, much of Haida Gwaii was buried beneath glaciers, while ice-free areas provided refugia for several species (Grzybowski & Slocombe, 1988; Council of the Haida Nation, April 2017). The first tree species to appear on the Islands, ts’ahl (Lodgepole pine, Pinus contorta), arrived arrived some 14,500 years ago (Council of the Haida Nation, April 2017). Over hundreds of years, ts’ahl was joined by Kal (Red alder, Alnus rubra), Kayda Kaaxawaay (Common juniper, Juniperus communis), SGaahlan (Yellow cedar, Cupressus nootkatensis) and K’aang (Mountain hemlock, Tsuga mertensiana) (Council of the Haida Nation, April 2017). A shifting climate saw these forests give way to the temperate rainforests of today, which are dominated by Kayd (Sitka spruce, Picea sitchensis), K’aang (Western hemlock, Tsuga heterophylla) and the most recent arrival, ts’uu (Western red cedar, Thuja plicata) (Grzybowski & Slocombe, 1988; Council of the Haida Nation, April 2017). Other ecosystems include stunted forests, wetlands, tidal marshes and alpine tundra (Grzybowski & Slocombe, 1988). The nutrient-rich waters, diverse shoreline environments and rich kelp forests and eelgrass bays of Haida Gwaii create conditions for abundant marine life (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Groundfish such as Pacific Halibut, Sablefish, several species of rockfish, sole and cod have nourished the Haida throughout their history (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Geoduck and Red Sea Urchin can be found in nearshore environments (Marine 64 Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Several species of marine birds breed in colonies on Haida Gwaii, while many shorebirds use the islands as a stopover during migration (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Grey and Humpback Whales migrate through the area, stopping to feed on abundant sea life, and Killer Whales, Northern Fur Seals, porpoises and dolphins are frequent visitors (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Pacific Harbour Seals and Steller Sea Lions use rocky outcrops and islets as rookeries and haulout sites (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Haida cosmology tells of a time when Raven created the world, “bringing creeks, trees, fish, birds, animals and even the sun and moon to Haida Gwaii” (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). Haida stories describe events throughout the Haida’s history on the islands, including at least two floods, volcanoes, earthquakes, ice sheets and changes in sea level, plants and animals (Brown & Brown, 2009). Some stories describe travelling across steppes and grasslands to visit other villages (Brown & Brown, 2009). Such stories have been supported by modern archaeological findings such as microblades and stone tools (Brown & Brown, 2009). Other stories describe a time when the ancestors of the Haida came out of the sea; a time when these supernatural beings could shift between being ocean people and being land people (Brown & Brown, 2009). The land, the sea and sky are of central importance in Haida culture, as are the plants and animals that inhabit these places (Brown & Brown, 2009). Haida beliefs about their origin and relationship to the natural world attach intrinsic spiritual value to all its elements including fish, birds, sea and land animals, creeks and places and place animals at an equal or higher level of 65 respect than humans (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). Haida stories describe creatures and plants of the land and ocean as Ocean People, Sky People or Forest People (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000; Brown & Brown, 2009) and Haida belong to either the Raven Clan or the Eagle Clan (Brown & Brown, 2009). Each clan includes multiple groups or families and each family held, and continue to hold, certain traditional rights (Brown & Brown, 2009). For example, the right to use certain personal, house and canoe names, the right to wear certain objects or representations of objects and to carve them on their houses (Brown & Brown, 2009) and the right to sing or speak certain songs or stories. Each Haida clan has its own origin story, tracing back to supernatural beings such a Foam Woman, who arose on a reef (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). While clan chiefs are typically male, descent is matrilineal and lineage stories link each clan to a certain place where the family settled, which connects them to their ancestors (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). This connection is accompanied by a stewardship responsibility to care for the places and beings within their territory (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). Haida society is organized around the principles of Yaghuudang, respect for all things, and Tll Yahda, the ability to make things right if something has been done otherwise (Brown & Brown, 2009). The two principles work hand-in-hand: if things have been done with Yahguudang, there is no need to worry; if they have not, it is necessary to enact Tll Yahda (Brown & Brown, 2009). A person who has done wrong must stand up publicly with witnesses, talk about what was done and offer some appropriate form of retribution (Brown & Brown, 2009). Examples of 66 Yahguudang include when the spirit of a cedar tree is acknowledged before taking wood or bark, when a fisher speaks respectfully to a halibut before asking it to bite his hook or when offerings are made to Creek Woman before any salmon are taken from creeks or rivers (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). Haida values provide direction and purpose for their actions and thoughts (Brown & Brown, 2009). These values teach the Haida to respect all life forms and recognize the connection and interdependence of all living being and the spirit world (Brown & Brown, 2009). Living and respecting traditional values has enabled Haida to sustain their culture (Brown & Brown, 2009). Five Haida Values are described in documents published by the Council of the Haida Nation (Council of the Haida Nation, 2007): Yahguudang or Yakguudang Respect Respect for each other and all living things is rooted in our culture. We take only what we need, we give thanks, and we acknowledge those who behave accordingly. ‘Laa guu ga kanhllns Responsibility We accept the responsibility passed on by our ancestors to manage and care for our sea and land. We will ensure that our heritage is passed onto future generations. 67 Giid tll’juus The world is as sharp as the edge of a knife Balance is needed in our interactions with the natural world. If we aren’t careful in everything we do, we can easily reach a point of no return. Our practices and those of others must be sustainable. Isda ad diigii isda Giving and Receiving Giving and receiving is a respected practice in our culture, essential in our interactions with each other and the natural world. We continually give thanks to the natural world for the gifts that we receive. Gina k’aadang.nga gii uu tl’ k’anguudang Seeking Wise Counsel Our elders teach us about traditional ways and how to work in harmony. Like the forests the roots of our people are intertwined. Together we consider new ideas and information in keeping with our culture, values and laws. The potlatch has traditionally been and continues to be an important element of Haida culture and governance (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). A potlatch is held to commemorate important events such as house-naming, pole-raising, marriage or funeral (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). Haida Chiefs use these opportunities to demonstrate power and prestige by giving gifts to those in attendance (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). 68 This tradition, which continues today, meant that Chiefs had to be wealthy enough to host such feasts (Brown & Brown, 2009). Traditionally, the potlatch has also been an occasion to conduct business in the presence of witnesses. Trading was an important aspect of Haida culture and continues to be practiced today (Brown & Brown, 2009). Trade also had an important role for Haida Chiefs to establish and demonstrate power (Brown & Brown, 2009). Trade partnerships with other Chiefs provided strength and opportunity to their clans (Brown & Brown, 2009). Exclusive trade alliances were solidified through clan or marriage relationships and acknowledged through a feast during which the Chief would give gifts to all those in attendance (Brown & Brown, 2009). Northern and southern villages traded locally available foods such as razor clams and seaweed (Brown & Brown, 2009). Because of their history of maritime travels, the traditional territory of the Haida extends to southern parts of Alaska (Brown & Brown, 2009). Haida frequently travelled in ocean-going canoes carved from Western Red Cedar to trade with neighbouring First Nations on the mainland including the Kitkatla, Heiltsuk, Nisga’a, Tsimshian and other coastal First Nations (Brown & Brown, 2009; Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Unlike in other regions, where multiple Peoples shared overlapping territories, the Haida were the exclusive human occupants of Haida Gwaii (Stearns, 1981: 26; Penikett, 2012). The Kaigani Haida migrated from Haida Gwaii to Alaska in the eighteenth century (Stearns, 1981: 26; Moss, 2008). 69 Historically, seasonal Haida villages and fishing camps dotted sheltered bays all along the coastlines of Haida Gwaii (Brown & Brown, 2009; Council of the Haida Nation, September 2010; Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). In summer, families would disperse to fish and gather food (Council of the Haida Nation, September 2010). In winter, people would come together at places like Skidegate, Masset and Skedans, where clans lived together in longhouses. Today, approximately half of Haida Gwaii’s 4,500 inhabitants (Statistics Canada, 2018) are Haida; the other half are largely non-Indigenous. This demographic shift has brought with it a change in cultural, spiritual and ecological values. Modern Western policy and law is generally anthropocentric, with values ascribed in terms of human use (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). Haida emphasis on well-being of the community, including human and non-human beings, has been brought into conflict with Western focus on the individual and free will (Williams-Davidson, pers. comm., Feb. 3, 2017). The Haida have undergone significant cultural change which has altered some of their traditional values (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). The modern economy has become important and the Haida are now involved in commercial forestry and fishing operations and live in modern communities (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). The waters of Haida Gwaii now support commercial fisheries salmon species, Dungeness Crab, Red Sea Urchin and Geoduck, Razor Clam, Pacific Herring roe-on-kelp, prawn, many groundfish species, Albacore Tuna, Pacific Halibut and Sablefish and shrimp (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Fisheries for roe herring, Sea Cucumber, Northern Abalone and Green Sea Urchin are currently closed due to concerns about available stocks (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Stocks of Northern Abalone, an important food source for the 70 Haida, collapsed in 1990 and have been listed as Endangered under the federal Species at Risk Act (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Poaching is suspected to be a major factor preventing Northern Abalone recovery; however, several fisheries across British Columbia are experiencing declines due to issues ranging from overfishing to changes in ocean conditions and productivity (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Recreational fisheries are also popular and growing, with anglers typically targeting Chinook and Coho Salmon, Pacific Halibut, Lingcod, and rockfish species (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Most of this activity is occurs around fishing lodges and charter boat operations on Langara Island and along the north and west coast of Graham Island (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). 3.2.2 The beginning of Haida-settler relations The history of the Haida, including records of people and events, spans millennia; however, major disruptions to Haida society since European contact have impacted transmission of this history between generations (Fedje & Mathewes, 2005). Much of the history of Indigenous Peoples in British Columbia, including the Haida, has been recorded from a non-Indigenous perspective (Menzies & Butler, 2008) and emphasizes developments post-contact. European traders George Dixon and Nathaniel Portlock first arrived on Haida Gwaii from Britain in 1787 (Stearns, 1981) during a three-year expedition to develop the British fur trade. Over the next century, numerous traders visited the islands and in 1876, William H. Collison became the first missionary to arrive (Stearns, 1981). 71 European settlement began a new wave of arrivals by geologists, surveyors, prospectors, photographers, loggers, cannery operators and tourists (Stearns, 1981). These Yaats-Haida, or “iron” people, so named for their trade goods (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000), also brought disease. Subject to an onslaught of disease, resource extraction and segregation, Haida society was impacted dramatically by a combination of economic and political forces after European contact. In the late 1700s, the Haida may have numbered as many as 15,000 people (Fedje & Mathewes, 2005). By the late 1800s, the Haida population had fallen to approximately 880 people, including 300 who had migrated to Alaska (Council of the Haida Nation, September 2010). Survivors from many Haida communities across the archipelago, whose populations had fallen drastically, migrated to two remaining communities: Uttewas, now called Masset, in the northern part of Graham Island and Skidegate in the south (Stearns, 1981; Brown & Brown, 2009). Ethnographers documented many of the histories and stories told by Haida elders; however, these efforts may have inadvertently legitimized the federal government’s efforts to assimilate and extinguish the rights of the People themselves. Grek-Martin (2007: 375) cites the writing of geographer and amateur ethnographer George Dawson as an example of this issue: “[T]he ultimate fate of the Red Man of North America is absorption and extinction: just as European animals introduced into Australia and other regions, frequently drive those native of the country from their haunts, and may even exterminate them, and as European wild plants accidentally imported, have become the most sturdy and strong in our North 72 American pastures; so the Indian races seem to diminish and melt away in contact with the civilization of Europe [...]” Grek-Martin argues that by weaving the narrative of the “Vanishing Indian” into ethnographic accounts of the Haida and other Indigenous Peoples during his cartographic expeditions, Dawson contributed to colonization by providing evidence that was used by the Governments of British Columbia and Canada to justify paternalism, Euro-Canadian settlement and resource extraction. The narrative was continued by ethnographers such as Edward Curtis and John Reed Swanton into the early twentieth century (Council of the Haida Nation, September 2010). In economic terms, the arrival of Europeans catalyzed a shift away from what Menzies & Butler (2008: 135) describe as “chiefly economies,” based on kin relationships, to a paradigm of industrial resource extraction capitalism. The Haida, like other First Nations of the northwest coast, took advantage of new opportunities and began to engage in trade and wage labour in the resource trade. Haida began to engage in commercial fishing and forestry, both on Haida Gwaii and in other parts of coastal British Columbia (Stearns, 1981). Demand for furs from the European and Chinese markets drove sea otters to extirpation, leading to a cascading effect on intertidal ecosystems through changes in abalone, urchin, bull kelp and seaweeds (Grzybowski & Slocobme, 1988). 73 Clearcut logging, by European-owned companies that hired both Haida and non-Haida loggers, caused erosion and sedimentation of local streams and destroyed salmon spawning habitat (Grzybowski & Slocobme, 1988). The interaction of logging impacts with exploitation of salmon stocks dramatically reduced salmon populations (Grzybowski & Slocobme, 1988). The relationship between the Haida and the federal government has changed drastically since 1867, when Parliament first approved an “Act to amend and consolidate the laws respecting Indians” (Stearns, 1981: 3). This legislation, later renamed the Indian Act, provided justification for the federal government to establish the boundaries of the reserves at Skidegate and Massett in 1883 (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010), assume custody of the Haida and open the Queen Charlotte Agency in Masset in 1910 (Stearns, 1981). Where Haida Chiefs had previously controlled the full extent of their People’s traditional territory, the Indian Act enabled the federal government to allocate a total reserve area that amounted to approximately six hectares per Haida, compared to 160 hectares for non-Haida settlers (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). The decision was made by government Commissioners who visited Masset one summer. Seeing only elderly men occupying the village site, and hearing that the rest of the Haida were at the seasonal villages, the Commissioners set reserve boundaries based on the fishing culture of the Haida (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). Since they did not practice agriculture, the government reasoned, the Haida had no use for the inland regions of Haida Gwaii (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). 74 Government Commissioners determined that the lands were of no use except to cut firewood and for logging (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). In 1913, a Commission of the Dominion government arrived on Haida Gwaii to examine the state of “reservations” (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). By this time, settlers had established gold, coal and copper mines, several canneries, two whaling stations and timber companies as well as the settler communities of New Masset, Queen Charlotte and Skidegate Landing (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). The Commission sought to document the character of the reserves and any agricultural or economic activities occurring there. In his address to N.W. White, the Chairman of the Commission on September 9, 1913, Chief Councilor Alfred Adams spoke on behalf of the Haida when he described the effects of settlement and the Indian Act (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010: 6): “The missionaries came among us, and the government took charge of us. We were asked to centralize, to be Christianized and educated, and we came here, to Massett, and built our homes, returning, now and then, to our old homes, where we fished and where the bodies of our forefathers laid. At the mouth of every river and stream, you will find our old camping grounds. All along the coastline are our former hunting grounds and the places where we fished, hunted and made our boats and canoes. These places are now covered by coal and timber licenses and occupied by preemptors […] 75 Without any treaty; without being conquered; we have quietly submitted to any laws made for our government […].” Adams acknowledged respect for the law and the flag of Great Britain and requested, on behalf of his people, equal treatment for settlers and the Haida and for Indigenous Peoples on all reserves (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). The Chairman thanked Adams for his address and the “kind way” in which his people had received the Commission and acknowledged that he understood how Adams would “look back upon that [history] with very great regret” (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010: 7). Nevertheless, the Chairman declared that his Commission could do nothing about the issue of Haida title and the issue would have to be brought to the Privy Council to be dealt with by the court. This Chairman could not have known that this event would mark the beginning of a lengthy series of court cases involving the Haida and the Crown. The Haida fought back through political organizing to defend the land and their rights alongside other neighbouring Indigenous communities from the mainland, from the Nisga’a in the north to the Salish in the south (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). These efforts led to the formation in 1916 of the Allied Tribes of British Columbia, a powerful lobbying force for Indigenous rights and title consisting of 16 tribal groups (McFarlane, 1993). 76 However, the Government of Canada maintained its efforts to assimilate the Haida into settler culture under the Indian Act. Indian Agents received orders to suppress cultural and economic practices, with particular emphasis on the potlatch (Carlson, 2010; Coates & Carlson, 2013; Collison, 2017: 147). The ban was used to prosecute potlatching from 1897 until it was repealed in 1951 (Carlson, 1997; Coates & Carlson, 2013). Throughout the early- to mid-1900s, Indian Agents were also dispatched to Haida communities to enroll children in the settler school system, which often involved removing them from their families and sending them to residential schools in areas as far away as Prince Rupert and Chilliwack, B.C. (van den Brink, 1974; Toronto Star, 2015; Collison, 2017). Once at residential schools, Haida children were routinely punished for speaking their own language, told that the way their people lived was heathen and objectionable and subject to constant criticism (van den Brink, 1974). Some of these children were also subjected to sexual and physical abuse, in addition to verbal and emotional abuse (Toronto Star, 2015; Collison, 2017). Lasting effects of residential schools on First Nations communities are now widely recognized as cultural genocide (Toronto Star, 2015; TRC, 2015). From banning the potlatch, to denying First Nations people the right to vote, to revoking Indian status of First Nations women if they married a non-First Nations man, the Indian Act legalized and supported discrimination against the Haida (Coates, 2008; Coates & Carlson, 2013; Collison, 2017). Until the shuttering of the Queen Charlotte Agency office and its relocation to Prince Rupert in 1966, Indian Agents frequently asserted power over the lives and activities of the Haida (Stearns, 1981). Despite removal of the most discriminatory elements of the Indian Act and renaming of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) to the 77 Department of Aboriginal and Northern Development Canada (AANDC), and subsequently Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs (CIRNAC) and Indigenous Services Canada (ISC), the Government of Canada asserts administrative control over many decisions of the Haida to this day. 3.2.3 The beginning of collaboration “There comes a time when a people got to do what a people got to do and when the stakes are your land and your culture losing is not an option a people armed with the truth are a people with conviction that over-rides fear a generation at a crossroad chose to stand” – Guujaaw, 2010 (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010) 78 The seeds of collaborative natural resource governance between the Haida and the federal or provincial governments were planted in 1974, when the Haida began to take a firm stance against industrial logging activity and formalized self-governance as a Nation (Takeda & Røpke, 2010; Lee, 2012). The two actions went hand-in-hand, with the existence of one governing body providing strength necessary for legal claims and court battles. That year, a small group of Haida was successful in pursuing a vision to organize the Haida under a single political entity: the Council of the Haida Nation (Council of the Haida Nation website). The intent to settle land claims was in no small part a foundation for this vision. That same year, a forestry company, ITT-Rayonier, submitted a plan to then-B.C. Ministry of Forests to begin logging on Burnaby Island (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). The proposal enflamed existing tensions about the pace and extent of logging on the islands and catalyzed a group of Haida and non-Haida residents to form the Islands Protection Society to protect wilderness areas on Moresby Island (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010) and elsewhere in the southern portion of the Haida Gwaii archipelago (Grzybowski & Slocombe, 1988). Islands Protection Society was aware that the forest tenure, Tree Farm License (TFL) 29, held by ITT-Rayonier would expire in 1979 and hoped to take advantage of the opportunity to end logging in the area (Pinkerton, 1983). After logging on Burnaby Island was successfully stopped, ITT-Rayonier began logging on Lyell Island the following year under a Tree Farm License issued by the B.C. Ministry of Forests, which granted the company rights to harvest timber (Council of the Haida Nation, November 79 2010). Three years later, following expiry of the ITT-Rayonier Tree Farm License, Chief T’anuu (Nathan Young) and Guujaaw from the Haida Nation partnered with Islands Protection Society on a court action against Rayonier and the Province of B.C. in an attempt to halt logging on Lyell Island (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). The action, a judicial review, was met with an expression of interest in court by the Deputy Minister of Forests, who stated that the B.C. Ministry of Forests was willing to meet with the Haida to address their concerns (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). However, the judicial review was denied by the Supreme Court of B.C. because the Tree Farm License had not yet been renewed. As logging continued on Lyell Island, the B.C. Ministry of Forests created the South Moresby Resource Planning Team to undertake a planning program for the South Moresby area (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010), a wilderness area comprising the southernmost 15 percent of the land area on Haida Gwaii (Grzybowski & Slocombe, 1988). The South Moresby Resource Planning Team consisted of six government and non-government representatives who, over a period of four years beginning in 1979, held most than 500 hours of meetings and produced two reports outlining two ecological reserve proposals for the Windy Bay area and four alternative land use options, respectively (Wilson, 1988). While the first report included a clear recommendation to protect the Windy Bay watershed, the second report offered little guidance (Wilson, 1988). All of the alternative land use options presented in the second report were dismissed as unrealistic by the forest tenure holder in the area, Western Forest Products (Wilson, 1988). Meanwhile, Islands Protection Society continued to advocate for curbing logging activity in the area (Wilson, 1988). 80 Taking matters into its own hands, the Council of the Haida Nation launched the Haida Gwaii Watchmen Program in 1981 (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010; Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, May 2010). Haida volunteers stepped up to watch over southern village and cultural sites within the park to protect them from inappropriate use, theft and other damage while offering visitors an experience in Haida culture (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, May 2010; Haida Gwaii Watchmen Program website). In its early days, the Haida Gwaii Watchmen Program consisted of small parties of one or two volunteers who would travel to K'uuna (Skedans), T'aanuu (Tanu), SGaang Gwaii (Anthony Island/Ninstints), Hlk'yah (Windy Bay), Burnaby Narrows, and Gandle K'in (Hotspring Island) using their own boats and stay there for the duration of the summer season (Haida Gwaii Watchmen Program website). That same year, the Council of the Haida Nation submitted a land claim to the Federal Government (Pinkerton, 1983; Grzybowski & Slocombe, 1988). The claim was accompanied by a statement from then-Grand Chief of the Haida Nation, Percy Williams, that the "existing aboriginal rights" are limited not by government or the new Constitution of Canada (in which the phrase appears) (Pinkerton, 1983). Chief Williams also asserted that the Haida have a moral obligation to protect the resources of Haida Gwaii from by forest companies acting under Provincial government authority (Pinkerton, 1983). While the federal government accepted the claim two years later, negotiations required participation by the Province, which, at the time, refused to engage (Takeda, 2015). 81 Faced with continued and growing logging pressure, the Council of the Haida Nation created a Haida Heritage Site in 1985 (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, May 2010). The area encompassed the southernmost third of Moresby Island and the Council of the Haida Nation petitioned the Province of B.C. to defer all proposed development within its boundaries (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010; Gill, 2010; Takeda, 2015). The Council of the Haida Nation worked hard to gain support for the designation from the main fishing organizations in the area – the United Fisherman and Allied Workers’ Union and the Native Brotherhood – as well as the Graham Island Advisory Planning Commission (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). The Haida welcomed all islanders to a feast to declare the designation and organized the first All-Islands Symposium to rally local communities behind the initiative (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010; Takeda, 2015). Throughout this time, the Council of the Haida Nation met with representatives from the B.C. Ministries of Parks, Environment and Forests, respectively, to explore solutions for protecting South Moresby (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). Despite assurances from the British Columbia Ministers of the Environment and of Parks that logging must cease and that no new cutting permits would be issued in Duu Guusd while talks were ongoing, the B.C. Minister of Forests proceeded to issue new permits to log an area of Lyell Island (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). 82 Tensions between the Haida and the Province of B.C. reached a boiling point in November 1985, when the Haida blockaded logging access road on Lyell Island (Grzybowski & Slocombe, 1988; Takeda, 2015). In total, 72 Haida were arrested (Grzybowski & Slocombe, 1988) and ten faced contempt of court charges (Gill, 2010). The logging contractor, Frank Beban, who was working on behalf of Western Forest Products, applied for contempt of court charges against and was supported by the B.C. Attourney General, who served contempt of court and mischief charges against seventeen Haida (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). Ten of these charges were upheld (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). These ten Haida received suspended sentences and were not permitted to access Lyell Island (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). A prominent environmentalist, Dr. David Suzuki, helped draw national and international attention to the stand at Lyell Island through his television program, The Nature of Things (Vernon, 2010). Newspapers and broadcasts across Canada showed footage of Haida, including elders, being led away from protest lines by police. As the media caught wind of the events unfolding on Haida Gwaii, public scrutiny of the provincial government and support for the Haida began to mount (Wilson, 1998). In July 1987, after many months of negotiation, the two parties reached an agreement: the area designated by the Haida as the Haida Heritage Site would become a national park, co-managed by the Council of the Haida Nation and Parks Canada (Grzybowski and Slocobme 1988; Takeda, 2015). The South Moresby Memorandum of Understanding halted logging in the area and led to 83 development of the Memorandum of Agreement on South Moresby, which committed to protect the area under the designation of a national park reserve (Archipelago Management Board, 1996). Under this agreement, the federal government committed to protecting both marine and terrestrial areas, while the Province of B.C. agreed to transfer its land and marine interests (Archipelago Management Board, 1996). This landmark agreement signalled the beginning of a wave of new collaborations between the Council of the Haida Nation, the Government of Canada and the Province of B.C. encompassing forests, lands, parks, protected areas, heritage sites, fisheries and marine areas. Thirty years later, the significance of this occasion is remembered by a former President of the Council of the Haida Nation as a turning point in government-to-government relationships. Before the Haida Nation drew the line at Lyell, many people were unaware of how logging companies treated the forest on Haida Gwaii. When our hereditary leaders flew over Gwaii Haanas to survey the land, most of them were in complete awe at the level of devastation. The extent of clearcutting was far beyond what they had imagined. It wasn’t until people grew aware of the destructiveness of clearcut logging that everything started to change. Our awareness of the problems in forestry has led us to a better place. – kil tlaats ‘gaa Peter Lantin, President of the Haida Nation, 2017 (Council of the Haida Nation, April 2017) 84 The following sections focus on three formal government-to-government collaborations that have developed over the decades following the conflict at Lyell Island: the Archipelago Management Board, the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table and the Marine Planning Partnership for the North Coast Region (MaPP) Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team. A timeline of developments for these three collaborations is included in Table 3-1. 85 Table 3-1. Case study collaborations and key developments. Year Archipelago Management Board Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team 1993  Gwaii Haanas Agreement signed  Archipelago Management Board formed 2005  Haida Land Use Vision released 2007  Haida Gwaii Strategic Land Use Agreement signed  Towards a Marine Use Plan for Haida Gwaii released 2008  Memorandum of Understanding on Pacific North Coast Integrated Management Area Collaborative Governance signed 2009  Kunst’aa guu-Kunstaa’yah Reconciliation Protocol signed 2010  Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement signed  Gwaii Haanas National Marine Conservation Area Reserve and Haida Heritage Site Interim Management Plan and Zoning Plan finalized  Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act enacted  Haida Gwaii Land Use Objectives Order enacted  Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table formed 2011  First Nations-BC Marine Planning Partnership for the North Pacific Coast (MaPP) launched 2013  Draft PNCIMA Plan released 2015  Haida Gwaii Marine Plan completed 2017  PNCIMA Plan approved 86 3.2.3.1 Archipelago Management Board Building on the Memorandum of Agreement on South Moresby, the 1993 Gwaii Haanas Agreement established a new collaborative governance arrangement between the Council of the Haida Nation and Parks Canada for the terrestrial area, also commonly referred as the South Moresby area, that was designated as the Gwaii Haanas Haida Heritage Site and National Park Reserve (Gwaii Haanas) (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). In addition, the Gwaii Haanas Agreement committed the parties to including the marine area at a future date (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). Under the Gwaii Haanas Agreement, two designations – Haida Heritage Site and National Park Reserve – recognize different types of protection under each party’s respective jurisdiction and authority (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). The Haida Heritage Site was designated to “maintain the area in its natural state while continuing [the Haida] traditional way of life as they have for countless generations,” while the Marine Park Area was designated “as a reserve for a National Park of Canada and a reserve for a National Marine Park of Canada respectively” under the Canada National Parks Act, 2000 (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). Reflecting Haida culture and values, both parties agreed to maintain and use Gwaii Haanas “so as to leave it unimpaired for the benefit, education and enjoyment of future generations,” with specific focus on “the protection and preservation of the environment, the Haida culture, and the maintenance of a benchmark for science and human understanding” (Government of Canada and 87 Council of the Haida Nation, 1993: Section 3.1). Unlike many other National Parks in Canada, the Gwaii Haanas Agreement stipulates that certain traditional renewable resource harvesting activities that are integral to Haida culture will be supported within the park and that (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). Commercial resource extraction or harvesting of the lands and non-tidal waters is prohibited except for the trapping of fur-bearing animals or the cutting by Haida of selected trees for ceremonial or artistic purposes (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). The Gwaii Haanas Agreement stipulated that co-operative management was to occur through a consensus-based management board called the Archipelago Management Board (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000). As defined by Parks Canada, “co-operative management” means decision-making authority rests with the federal Minister of the Environment in accordance with his or her responsibilities to Parliament and that any bodies created under the Canada National Parks Act (2000) are advisory in nature (Langdon et al., 2010). The Archipelago Management Board was initially comprised of two representatives of the Government of Canada and two representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation to ensure equal representation of both parties (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). Each party designates one of these representatives as a co-chairperson for the AMB (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). AMB members use consensus decision-making on proposals and initiatives and AMB recommendations are subsequently provided to senior officials within the Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 88 (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). If AMB members are unable to reach consensus, a decision is referred to the Council of the Haida Nation and the Government of Canada to seek and reach agreement (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). In practice, this means that decisions at the AMB level, while based on consensus, are provided as recommendations to the President of the Council of the Haida Nation and the federal Minister of the Environment. While the federal government promised that tourism generated by the park would create jobs for Indigenous peoples in the area, many Haida were initially frustrated that new jobs were being given primarily to white, non-Haida bureaucrats and were discouraged that tourism numbers had not risen as expected (O’Donell, 1993). O’Donell (1993) described the Haida view that an army of government bureaucrats had arrived to tell the Haida how to care for forests they had been looking after since time immemorial. "It's like a new set of missionaries have been steaming in here to save us,” said one Haida woman. “But we're not being convened. We know how to take cart of our land." In 2001, Moresby Explorers Ltd. challenged the Gwaii Haanas management arrangement in court (Moresby Explorers Ltd. v. Canada 2001). Moresby Explorers, a local tour operator, challenged a decision by the superintendent of Gwaii Haanas to refuse user quota and claimed that the federal Minister had fettered her responsibility by delegating management authority to the Archipelago Management Board (Nesbitt, 2016). Because the Archipelago Management Board is technically an advisory board and final decision-making authority remains with the 89 Minister, the court ruled against Moresby Explorers (Nesbitt, 2016). While this ruling demonstrated the Minister’s willingness to come to the defence of the Archipelago Management Board while respecting its recommendations, it also highlighted a weakness in the Archipelago Management Board’s influence over management decisions because the federal government remains the highest decision-making authority regarding Gwaii Haanas. While the South Moresby and Gwaii Haanas Agreements established a goal to protect both terrestrial and non-tidal waters, the Gwaii Haanas Agreement did not extend to marine waters (Archipelago Management Board, 1996). However, since its creation, the Archipelago Management Board has acknowledged the “close relationship that exists between land and sea” and identified the need for a plan to protect the marine area (Archipelago Management Board, 1996). The Government of Canada and the Council of the Haida Nation attempted to close this gap in 2010 by developing the Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement, which established the Gwaii Haanas National Marine Conservation Area Reserve (NMCAR) to provide “integrated conservation of land and sea-from mountain top to deep-sea” (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, May 2010). Under the Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement, two seats were added to the Archipelago Management Board: one representative from Fisheries and Oceans Canada and one additional representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, January 2010). This expansion maintained equal representation of both the Government of Canada and the Council of the Haida Nation. 90 Signing of the Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement followed several years of negotiations between the existing Archipelago Management Board members, the Council of the Haida Nation and Parks Canada, and representatives from Fisheries and Oceans Canada. These discussions focused largely on the potential role of commercial and recreational fisheries within the Gwaii Haanas National Marine Conservation Area Reserve under the enabling legislation, the Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act (2002). While the legislation gives Parks Canada the authority to establish marine conservation area reserves in consultation with local communities, First Nations and other governments, it also specifies that fisheries within National Marine Conservation Areas will continue to be managed by Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) in partnership with Parks Canada (Hillier et al., 2007). With “numerous marine harvesting activities” occurring within or adjacent to the proposed Gwaii Haanas National Marine Conservation Area, DFO was concerned about maintaining status quo fisheries management, while Parks Canada was focused on protecting “representative and sensitive ecosystems within the NMCA” (Hillier et al., 2007). These conflicting priorities created friction between the two federal governments. With its focus on conservation, Parks Canada had more shared interests with the Council of the Haida Nation than with its counterpart within the federal government. Hillier et al. (2007) aptly predicted, “the development, and implementation of the Gwaii Haanas National Marine Conservation Area may prove challenging.” A major focus of tensions among members of the Archipelago Management Board has been the herring spawn on kelp and herring roe fishery. In 2014, the Council of the Haida Nation opposed opening the commercial herring spawn on kelp and herring roe fisheries (Lam, 2015) around 91 Haida Gwaii, including during meetings of the Archipelago Management Board (Haida Nation v. Canada 2015 FC 290). The fisheries had been closed for the previous decade due to impacts of overfishing on herring stocks (Lam, 2015). When Fisheries and Oceans Canada opened the fishery despite concerns, Haida members of the AMB enacted a dispute resolution process under the Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement and the Council of the Haida Nation reached out to the local fishing community and reached a voluntary agreement that no commercial fishing of herring would occur (Lam, 2015; Jones et al., 2017). The following year, Fisheries and Oceans Canada opened the herring fishery again, noting in an internal memo that stocks were “projected to be above the commercial cut-off level for the 2015 season” (McElroy, 2015). This time, the Council of the Haida Nation obtained a court injunction to prevent opening of the fishery (McElroy, 2015; Jones et al., 2017). The judge sided with the Council of the Haida Nation, citing “a real and serious risk of irreparable harm if the Haida Gwaii area is reopened for roe herring fishery in 2015” and failure by the federal government to meaningfully consult with the Council of the Haida Nation regarding the herring fishery, particularly given the existence of the Gwaii Haanas Agreement and the duty to protect constitutional rights of the Haida (McElroy, 2015). The judge also ruled that a commercial herring fishery cannot be opened until a judicial review application receives a judicial hearing, a herring management framework is in place and an integrated Gwaii Haanas Management Plan has been completed (McElroy, 2015). 92 The Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement had indeed committed the parties to developing a Gwaii Haanas Marine Area Management Plan, which would be reviewed every five years, and a Gwaii Haanas Marine Area Strategy (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, January 2010). The Gwaii Haanas Gina ’Waadluxan KilGuhlGa Land-Sea-People Management Plan was released in 2018 and provides direction for the AMB to manage Gwaii Haanas “from mountaintop to seafloor as a single, interconnected ecosystem” (Council of the Haida Nation and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2018: 2). Gina ’Waadluxan KilGuhlGa translates from Haida as “talking about everything” (Council of the Haida Nation and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2018: 2). The plan outlines a shared vision for the future, includes guiding principles based on Haida cultural values, describes the AMB’s goals and objectives for the next ten years and provides zoning for the land and sea (Council of the Haida Nation and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2018). 3.2.3.2 Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table Signing of the Gwaii Haanas Agreement was an important step toward protecting the southernmost areas of Haida Gwaii, yet conflict continued over logging on Graham Island. In 1993, the British Columbia Court of Appeal ruled that the Government of British Columbia must consider Aboriginal land rights when awarding logging contracts (O'Donell, 1993). The Haida took note of this decision and, two years later, challenged the renewal of Tree Farm License (TFL) 39, the largest of such licenses on Haida Gwaii (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). They asserted that the Minister of Forests lacked the requisite authority to renew the licence because the land remained encumbered by Aboriginal title (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). While the British Columbia 93 Court of Appeal affirmed in 1997 that the land was indeed encumbered by Aboriginal title, the judge maintained that title had not yet been proven (Williams-Davidson 2005: 3; Takeda & Røpke, 2010). Nevertheless, the court strongly urged the Crown to consult with the Haida Nation. This ruling was followed in 1997 by the decision in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, which confirmed that Indigenous title had not been extinguished in B.C. and articulated the Crown’s responsibility to consult and accommodate Indigenous Peoples (Barry, 2012). While this duty was noted to vary according to circumstances, the ruling established that lands “held pursuant to title cannot be used in a manner that is irreconcilable with the nature of the [Indigenous title] claimants’ attachment to those lands” (Delgamuukw, 1997, para. 125). Delgamuukw also laid out a test for Aboriginal title that determines title to exist if a First Nation occupied an area of land in 1846 (Jones et al., 2010). The following year, the Council of the Haida Nation, Hereditary Leaders, Old Massett Village Council and the Skidegate Band Council signed the 1998 Haida Accord (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010), which established that the Council of the Haida Nation would represent the Haida in dealings with the federal and provincial governments regarding lands and resources. The Haida Accord was the first step in a series of actions by the Council of the Haida Nation to strengthen its internal governance. The official mandate and responsibilities of the Council of the Haida Nation were enshrined in the Constitution of the Haida Nation in 2003 (Council of the Haida Nation website). The Constitution was developed by the Haida and 94 formally passed through a vote at the House of Assembly, which meets four times per year and is open to all Haida citizens (April Churchill, pers. comm., January 17, 2017). The responsibilities encompass Haida Gwaii and surrounding waters, aim for full independence, sovereignty and self-sufficiency of the Haida Nation and identify the need to protect Haida heritage and cultural identity (Council of the Haida Nation website). Peaceful co-existence with other people and governments is prioritized but must not compromise the objectives of the Haida Nation (Council of the Haida Nation website). Furthermore, the Constitution tasked the Council of the Haida Nation with establishing land and resource policies and regulations that are “consistent with nature's ability to produce” that will apply to all users of the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii (Council of the Haida Nation website). The unified position of the Haida offered strength when the Council of the Haida Nation launched two major legal actions against the Province of B.C. in 2000 and 2001. First, the Council of the Haida Nation launched a court case claiming that the Province had ignored Haida title to forest lands in its handling of decisions regarding Tree Farm License 39 (TFL 39) (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010; Jones et al., 2010). Second, it filed a Statement of Claim to the lands, inland waters, seabed and sea of Haida Gwaii, calling for the Province of B.C. to provide compensation for damages to the land resulting from “unlawful occupation” and “infringement of Aboriginal Title and Rights;” disclose all revenues, royalties, taxes profits and other benefits collected; and revoke all natural resource tenures, permits and licences issued without accommodation (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010; Gill, 2010: 259; Takeda & Røpke, 2010). Although Haida title had not yet been proven in court when the judge made his 95 decision in the TFL 39 case, he ruled in favour of the Haida based on the strength of their prima facie case for title (Jones et al., 2010). The ruling means that the provincial government must consult with First Nations and provide accommodation if its actions have the potential to adversely affect Aboriginal rights and title (Jones et al., 2010). Two Protocol Agreements signed by the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. in April 2001 committed the parties to cooperatively developing a strategic land use plan based on ecosystem-based management and a government-to-government process to resolve disagreements (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2007). With these priorities in mind, the two governments engaged Haida and non-Haida citizens in an in-depth land use planning process beginning in 2003 (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2007). The Haida Gwaii/Queen Charlotte Islands Land Use Planning process began with a Community Planning Forum and included an All-Islands Symposium to discuss share knowledge and explore common ground (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). The Council of the Haida Nation’s engagement with the provincial government and non-Haida communities was also mirrored in internal discussions. Anticipating the need for a clear, comprehensive document detailing the Haida’s own vision for the future, the Council of the Haida Nation also developed its own Haida Land Use Vision, which was founded on the principle of Yahguudang, respect for all things (Council of the Haida Nation, 2005; Jones et al., 2010). 96 Meanwhile, the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. continued to battle in court over TFL 39 (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). In 2004, the final appeal of a second court case was heard in which the Supreme Court of Canada would decide whether the Province and/or the tenure holder were obligated to consult and accommodate Haida interests in any sale or transfer of the license (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). Two days before the hearing, the Council of the Haida Nation announced it had gained support and partnership of local non-Haida communities in the form of signed Protocol Agreements with representatives of the communities of New Masset, Port Clements, Regional District Area D and Queen Charlotte (Council of the Haida Nation, 2006; Gill, 2010: 259; Takeda & Røpke, 2010). These Agreements recognized Haida title as well as individual property rights for non-Haida residents of the islnds and formalized commitments to jointly maintain ongoing communication and relationships to work together on collectively resolving the environmental and economic issues facing all islanders (Council of the Haida Nation, 2006; Takeda & Røpke, 2010). Through these agreements, non-Haida communities became an important pillar of support for the Haida in their struggle to influence forest and land use decisions. The strength of the Council of the Haida Nation’s claim of Aboriginal title supported its efforts to influence resource governance. In Canada, Aboriginal title is a legal property interest based on occupation of the land prior to assertion of Canadian sovereignty and includes a right to determine use of the land (Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 1997; Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014; Jones et al., 2017). In Haida Nation v. British Columbia (2004), the Supreme Court of Canada found that the Haida have a strong prima facie case for Aboriginal title to all of 97 Haida Gwaii (Jones et al., 2017) and ruled that the provincial government was indeed obligated to consult with First Nations and accommodate their interests before granting, reapproving or transferring a tree farm licence (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). Nevertheless, only three months after the ruling was handed down, another company announced they had reached a deal to acquire coastal assets from an existing tenure holder, including TFL 39 (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). The deal had been made without consultation with the Haida Nation or accommodation of their interests and the Province, in the midst of the court case, had amended legislation to abdicate itself from the duty to approve license transfers (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). In addition, the Province granted authorization for logging in areas identified as cultural cedar reserves in the Haida Land Use Vision (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). The actions sparked outrage in both Haida and non-Haida communities. A public demonstration was organized outside the Ministry of Forests office and Haida cast votes of non-confidence in the provincial government (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). The demonstration led to a broader protest, called Islands Spirit Rising, that focused on increasing pressure on the provincial government and logging companies to deal fairly with the Haida (Dean, 2009). 98 Between March and April, 2005, the Haida, with the support of local communities, blockaded the main logging road between Queen Charlotte City and the Yakoun River bridge, established checkpoints to record the names of people traveling to protected areas and seized logs that had been cut within contested areas (Dean, 2009; Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). The Haida also hosted a Unity Feast in Queen Charlotte to celebrate the shared vision among Haida and non-Haida islanders (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). Within weeks of the establishment of the blockade, the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. reached an agreement to resume the land-use planning process and suspend further logging in areas of concern to the Haida (Dean, 2009). Then-Premier, Gordon Campbell, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with then-President of Council of the Haida Nation, Guujaaw, that committed to interim protection for Protected Areas, cultural and archaeological cedar stands and bird nesting habitat identified in the Haida Land Use Vision, provided the Haida with a volume-based forest tenure of 120,000 cubic metres per year plus $5 million in preliminary compensation for resources extracted from the Islands and included a commitment to reconvene a community forum to address economic transition and community stability (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010; Takeda & Røpke, 2010; Egan, 2011). Collectively, this Memorandum of Understanding, the land use planning process that followed and the Haida Land Use Vision laid the groundwork for the Strategic Land Use Agreement, which was finalized in 2007 and presented a framework for collaboration between the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of British 99 Columbia, 2007). The Strategic Land Use Agreement outlined accepted sustainable forestry practices for Haida Gwaii, established a network of terrestrial protected areas covering 52 percent of total land area and 72 percent of coastal areas (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2007; Jones et al., 2010), described interim and permanent protection measures for new protected areas and identified land use objectives and management structures to oversee implementation of ecosystem-based management (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2007). Specific objectives addressed traditional forest and heritage resources of the Haida including Monumental Cedar, western yew, western red and yellow cedar and culturally-modified trees as well as aquatic habitats, biodiversity and wildlife habitat (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2007). This enabled traditional Haida values to be enacted through the Agreement (April Churchill, pers. comm., Jan. 17, 2017). Another distinguishing feature of the Strategic Land Use Agreement was that it established an annual allowable cut (AAC) of 800,000 cubic metres of timber harvest per year, which represented a drastic reduction from the pre-Agreement AAC of 2.2 million cubic metres (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2007; Jones et al., 2010), and committed the parties to jointly analyzing future timber harvest and determination of long-term timber supply (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2007). This represented a significant shift of power from the Province of B.C., which had previously retained sole authority for determining harvest levels. This type of collaborative arrangement was unprecedented in British Columbia and remains the only jurisdiction within the province where the AAC is not determined solely by the Chief Forester for the provincial government (Mickleburgh, 2011). Each of the parties 100 retained responsibility for meeting commitments under its respective “laws, policies, customs, traditions and decision-making processes and authorities” (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2007). While the Strategic Land Use Agreement focused on upland and forest areas, it also committed the parties to future collaborative planning for nearshore and foreshore areas (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2007). At its core, the Strategic Land Use Agreement shaped land management on Haida Gwaii in two important ways. First, it confirmed land use zones and objectives for ecosystem-based management and provided a framework for collaborative implementation at the technical level. Second, it guided the government-to-government relationship for land use decisions at both the technical and political levels. Each of these processes required further development to be enacted in practice. The Kunst'aa guu-Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009) was the next major step in developing a new relationship between the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. The Protocol committed the parties to seeking “a more productive relationship” and represented “an incremental step in a process of reconciliation of Haida and Crown titles” involving shared and joint decision-making respecting lands and resources on Haida Gwaii through the Solutions Table and Haida Gwaii Management Council, respectively (Council of the Haida Nation and Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, 2009). Under the agreement, the Council of the Haida Nation received a portion of the revenue generated from carbon offsets on Haida Gwaii and a forest tenure of 120,000 101 cubic metres of timber per year, plus $10 million to acquire the tenure (Council of the Haida Nation and Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, 2009). Implementation of the Protocol was outlined to be jointly funded and the parties were “responsible for development, implementation, ongoing review and refinements to the decision-making framework” (Council of the Haida Nation and Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, 2009). The Land Use Objectives Order was established in 2010 to address the technical component of ecosystem-based management on Haida Gwaii (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2015). It was legally established under the Land Act (1996) and the Forest and Range Practices Act (2002) by ministerial order (Province of B.C., 2010) and expanded on existing, Province-wide land use objectives to include locally-important aspects for cultural features such as cedar stewardship areas, cultural features, Haida traditional heritage and forest features, culturally modified trees, monumental cedar and yew; aquatic habitats; forested swamps; black bear dens and other bird habitat (Province of B.C., 2010). The legal standards set out in the Land Use Objectives Order are also accounted for in Annual Allowable Cut determinations (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2015; Haida Gwaii Management Council website). Amendments to the Land Use Objectives Order were made in 2014 and 2017 to incorporate new information about Haida traditional forest features as well as aquatic and terrestrial species’ habitats and to make changes to schedules and definitions. 102 The Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act (2010) was the next step in formalizing the relationship between the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. Signed into legislation in 2010, the Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act established the Haida Gwaii Management Council, a collaborative decision-making body consisting of two representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation, two representatives of the Province of B.C. and one neutral chairperson who is jointly appointed by the two parties. The Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act amended sections of the Forest Act, Forest and Range Practices Act (2002), Heritage Conservation Act (1996) and Land Act to delegate decision-making authority to the Haida Gwaii Management Council. Members of the Haida Gwaii Management Council are responsible for making a specific set of key management decisions that are enacted by members of the Solutions Table: determining the Annual Allowable Cut for timber, establishing and amending objectives for the use and management of land and resources, developing protected area management plans, establishing policies and standards for identification and conservation of heritage sites. While the Haida Gwaii Management Council makes decisions, the Solutions Table is a vehicle for consultation and accommodation (Figure 3-1). 103 Figure 3-1. Decision-making bodies involved in forest and land management on Haida Gwaii. While the overall balance of power and decision-making authority remains unequal between the Council of the Haida and the Province of B.C., these developments have increased the degree of influence of the Council of the Haida Nation over decisions about lands and resources on Haida Gwaii compared to historical, top-down governance approaches. Strategic Technical Political Reconciliation Table Haida Gwaii Management Council Solutions Table Decision-maker for CHN Integrated Stewardship Team Statutory decision-maker for B.C. Operational 104 “People used to come into meetings asking why ‘Haida’ didn’t have a say in how our land was treated. Today we are managing a large part of the land base ourselves and we own a Tree Farm License. We have negotiated agreements like the Kunst’aa Guu-Kunst’aayah Reconciliation Protocol that have a higher level of respect for Haida Gwaii. In 2004, we won the TFL 39 (Haida Nation v. British Columbia and Weyerhaeuser) case which affirmed our right to be consulted and accommodated in forestry decisions – we’ve come a long way.” – kil tlaats ‘gaa Peter Lantin, President of the Haida Nation, 2017 (Council of the Haida Nation, April 2017) 3.2.3.3 Marine Planning Partnership for the North Pacific Coast (MaPP) Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team Despite progress toward cooperative, shared and joint decision-making in the context of terrestrial and nearshore environments, marine areas remain largely controlled by federal government authorities. With the creation of the Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement, the Government of Canada expanded the realm of influence of the Archipelago Management Board to include the marine area by involving representatives from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Recent efforts focused on marine planning have attempted to increase Haida influence in decisions regarding the marine environment beyond Gwaii Haanas, to the remaining waters of Haida Gwaii. 105 The federal Oceans Act (1996) established responsibility for the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to lead and coordinate development and implementation of a national system or network of marine protected areas (Government of Canada, 2011). The legislation led the federal government to develop Canada's Oceans Strategy (2002), Canada's Oceans Action Plan (2005) and Canada's Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy (2005) and allocate Health of the Oceans funding (2007) to direct and support planning for a national marine protected area network (Government of Canada, 2011). This network will cover at least 10 percent of coastal and marine areas across Canada's three oceans and involve the three federal government departments with jurisdictional authority over oceans under Canadian law: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Parks Canada and Environment Canada (CBD, 2010; Government of Canada, 2011). In 2007, the Council of the Haida Nation engaged in an internal strategic planning process in anticipation of collaborative marine planning, which resulted in a document titled Towards a Marine Use Plan for Haida Gwaii (Council of the Haida Nation, 2007; Jones et al., 2010). The document was prepared by the Haida Marine Work Group, which includes appointed members from the Council of the Haida Nation, Old Massett Village Council, Skidegate Band Council, Hereditary Chiefs Council and other Haida citizens and was supported by a three-person technical team (Jones et al., 2010). It developed a Haida vision for the marine environment that was founded upon Haida ethics and values to guide action to care for the marine area around Haida Gwaii and enable it to “sustain families, economies and cultures for generations to come” (Council of the Haida Nation, 2007). 106 The following year, the Council of the Haida Nation signed on to an initiative involving neighboring First Nations, the Canadian federal government and the Province of B.C. to develop an integrated ocean management plan for the Pacific North Coast Integrated Management Area (PNCIMA) Large Ocean Management Area (Jones et al., 2010; PNCIMA Initiative, 2013). This initiative was launched by the federal government to develop a framework for ecosystem-based management for the PNCIMA (PNCIMA Initiative, 2013). A Memorandum of Understanding was signed by representatives of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada and First Nations of the Pacific North Coast (2008) regarding governance of the PNCIMA collaborative planning process. The PNCIMA process was based on Canada’s Oceans Act and was intended to take a collaborative approach to integrated management of human activities to minimize conflict among users by engaging all interested and affected parties (PNCIMA Initiative, 2013). PNCIMA acknowledged “the importance of First Nations in the governance, stewardship and use of ocean resources” and the fact that “First Nations have laws, customs and traditions for the protection, management and stewardship of marine areas within PNCIMA,” (PNCIMA INITIATIVE, 2013). The Council of the Haida Nation participated in the PNCIMA process through the PNCIMA Steering Committee, the PNCIMA Planning Office, workshops and Sub-Regional Forums (PNCIMA Initiative website). In an unexpected move, the federal government withdrew from a funding agreement to support PNCIMA alongside other stakeholders in 2011 (Kimmett, 2013). While the federal government justified its decision by claiming it was made to conclude the planning process in 2012, federal government representatives also made public statements criticizing the funding partner, the U.S.-107 based Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, which would have donated the money through Tides Canada, a Canadian charity, on accusations that they were trying to block development of a new pipeline to the coast (The Canadian Press, 2012). Access to Information documents later revealed that lobbyists from the pipeline proponent, Enbridge, had made similar accusations against Tides Canada in a meeting with a senior bureaucrat, sparking suspicion that lobbying had played a role in the federal government’s decision to withdraw (The Canadian Press, 2012). Just days before the federal government withdrew from PNCIMA, federal, provincial and territorial members of the Canadian Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers approved the National Framework for Canada's Network of Marine Protected Areas to chart a course for establishing a national marine protected areas (MPA) network (Government of Canada, 2011). This network would encompass a broad range of marine protected areas designated under federal, provincial and First Nations laws including national marine conservation areas (NMCAs), national parks, marine wildlife areas, provincial parks, ecological reserves, conservancies and wildlife management areas (MPA Network website). Fisheries and Oceans Canada regions were directed to develop and implement regional strategies to design MPA networks in accordance with this framework (Government of Canada, 2011). Representatives of the federal and provincial governments in British Columbia worked together to develop the Canada-British Columbia Marine Protected Area Network Strategy, released in 2014, which outlines goals and principles for a Pacific coast-wide system of MPAs to help guide MPA establishment and regional planning initiatives (Government of Canada, 2011). It identifies 108 ecological, social, economic and cultural design principles for the creation of effective, functional networks in B.C. The primary stated objective of the MPA network, according to the Government of Canada (2011), is conservation of nature; however, the framework acknowledges that “there are many sites that are important to Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal coastal communities and Canadians in general for social and cultural reasons.” The framework notes, in the last category listed within the section on network design, that these cultural areas could be considered for inclusion in the MPA network for the purposes of conserving cultural heritage, public use and enjoyment and/or education (Government of Canada, 2011). And while the National Framework for Canada's Network of Marine Protected Areas describes an approach to network planning that “aims to build collaboration and partnerships” to establish new nearshore and offshore MPAs (MPA Network website), neither the framework nor the Canada-British Columbia Marine Protected Area Network Strategy received input from First Nations representatives. First Nations’ input is slated to be integrated at the Pacific Regional level during the network planning stage (MPA Network website). The Council of the Haida Nation, along with other First Nations and several stakeholder groups, will be represented during discussions regarding the Northern Shelf Bioregion as well as the Haida Gwaii subregion (MPA Network website). With the Department of Fisheries and Oceans no longer involved in PNCIMA, the Province of B.C. and First Nations recognized the need to forge ahead with marine planning work and reorganized their own collaborative government-to-government process under the new First 109 Nations-BC Marine Planning Partnership for the North Pacific Coast (MaPP) with funding from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). The partnership was governed in accordance with three agreements. A Letter of Intent (LOI) was signed in November 2011 by the four MaPP partners including the Coastal First Nations, of which the Council of the Haida Nation is a member, and BC MFLNRO, on behalf of the Province of B.C. (MaPP, 2011a). The LOI outlined a formal commitment to the four-tiered MaPP management structure, identified key outputs, delineated four sub-regional planning zones and specified a focus on policy and legal direction for marine uses (MaPP, 2011a). A Support Project Memorandum of Understanding outlined the responsibilities and decision-making authorities of the four partners and the funder, Tides Canada Initiatives Society, which administered the funds on behalf of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (MaPP, 2011b). Finally, specific implementation agreements were developed for partners within each sub-region of the marine plan, including the Council of the Haida Nation, to identify opportunities and structures to implement the completed sub-regional plans (MaPP, 2016). However, political circumstances prevented the PNCIMA Plan from being approved by the First Nations and federal governments (O’Neil, 2012; Council of the Haida Nation, March 2017a). Over the next three years, the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C., represented by the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations, worked closely to develop the Haida Gwaii Marine Plan based on input from the Haida Marine Work Group and a new Haida Gwaii Marine Advisory Committee, consisting of members with backgrounds in marine tourism, marine conservation, marine science, community interests, commercial fishing, 110 recreational fishing, seafood processing and marine transportation (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Input was also gathered from local governments, marine stakeholders and members of the public (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). The Haida Gwaii Marine Plan, completed in 2015, was intended to complement the Haida Gwaii Strategic Land Use Agreement by applying principles of ecosystem-based management, adopted in SLUA for the terrestrial environment, to the marine environment and reflecting a shared perspective on how to maintain and restore a “healthy marine environment and a sustainable marine economy on Haida Gwaii” (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). While the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. both approved the final Marine Plan, the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada has not yet provided its approval. Due to the division of authority between the federal government and the provinces outlined in the Constitution Act, 1867, lack of federal government involvement in MaPP limits its implementation regarding issues such as marine fisheries and shipping (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). The accumulation of marine planning efforts to meant that there were two major alliances that offered somewhat different potential trajectories for marine planning with relevance to Haida Gwaii. The National Framework and Canada-British Columbia Marine Protected Area Network Strategy, led by the federal government and the Province of B.C., assumed that these governments would retain decision-making authority and develop a bioregional MPA plan for the Pacific North Coast Large Ocean Management Area that prioritizes conservation while accepting input from First Nations. 111 Meanwhile, the Haida Gwaii Marine Plan, developed by the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C., was founded on an ecosystem-based framework that set scientific knowledge on equal footing with traditional and local knowledge and aimed to provide a sub-regional framework for “joint or shared management of marine and coastal areas” (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). The Haida Gwaii Marine Management Board was subsequently established in 2018, and consistsing of two representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation and two representatives of the Province of B.C. (MaPP website). In accordance with the Haida Gwaii Marine Implementation Agreement (August 2016), this Board receives input from a new Haida Gwaii Implementation Technical Team and implements the Haida Gwaii Marine Plan with support from existing decision-making structures such as the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table. The Haida Gwaii Marine Management Board approves budgets, terms of reference and work plans for implementation of the Haida Gwaii Marine Plan; appoints technical staff; evaluates progress on the Agreement and makes recommendations to senior decision-makers from the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2016). Fortunately, these efforts have begun to align in recent years. In February 2017, the Council of the Haida Nation, along with ten other First Nations, joined the federal and provincial governments to announce approval of the PNCIMA Plan (Council of the Haida Nation, March 2017a). The final version of the Plan established an ecosystem-based management framework as well as goals, objectives and strategies for marine planning in the region, which extends north from the tip of Vancouver Island to the Alaska border and west to the continental shelf (Council 112 of the Haida Nation, March 2017a; DFO, 2017; PNCIMA Initiative, 2017). Importantly, priority actions identified in the PNCIMA Plan align with Haida Gwaii Marine Plan objectives and strategies, such as promotion of sustainable marine economic development opportunities, Marine Protected Area network planning for the Northern Shelf Bioregion and minimizing potential impacts of marine vessel traffic (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015; Council of the Haida Nation, March 2017a; PNCIMA Initiative, 2017). The PNCIMA Plan provides a framework for ecosystem-based management that supports management direction regarding collaborative governance, marine ecosystem health and human wellbeing outlined in the Haida Gwaii Marine Plan (Council of the Haida Nation, March 2017a). Marine Spatial Planning in the Northern Shelf Bioregion remains ongoing, but now involves federal, provincial and First Nations partners in a tripartite approach to sharing knowledge and develop an agreement that will complement the Reconciliation Framework Agreement for Bioregional Management and Oceans Protection (Fisheries and Oceans Canada website). 3.3 Discussion The three case studies described in this chapter – the Archipelago Management Board (AMB), Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table and MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team – all developed within the same broad historical, social, cultural and legal contexts. They were similarly influenced by, for example, the colonial relationship between First Nations and the federal and provincial governments and were negotiated by representatives of these governments subject to similar legal constraints. However, important differences exist among them in terms of elements of collaborative governance. 113 Existing conceptual frameworks for collaborative governance emphasize six important elements: systems context, starting conditions, collaborative process, institutional design, facilitative leadership and outcomes (Table 3-2). Systems context encompasses the host of political, legal, socioeconomic, environmental and other influences that interact with governance processes (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Emerson et al., 2012). Starting conditions establish baseline levels of trust, conflict and social capital, while the collaborative process includes the range of interactions in which collaborators engage. Institutional design lays ground rules under which collaboration takes place and facilitative leadership provides support and direction for the collaborative process. Outcomes and impacts of collaborative governance influence both the process itself and the systems context, leading to a cyclical process of change over time. Table 3-3 compares the three case study collaborations across these six elements of collaborative governance. 114 Table 3-2. Elements of collaborative governance. Element Description Source Starting conditions Crisis; third-party intervention; legal mandate; common vision; strong leader; incentives to collaborate Power-resource-knowledge asymmetries; incentives for and constraints on participation; prehistory of cooperation or conflict Selin & Chevez (1995) Ansell & Gash (2007) Institutional design Participatory inclusiveness, forum exclusiveness; clear ground rules; process transparency Open, accessible and transparent process; clear, written plan; consensus-based decision making; decisions regarded as just; consistent with existing laws and policies Assigned roles; formal agreements to monitor and ensure compliance Ansell & Gash (2007) Conley & Moote (2003) Selin & Chevez (1995) Facilitative leadership Promote broad and active participation; ensure broad-based influence and control; facilitate productive group dynamics, extend the scope of the process Ansell & Gash (2007), Lasker & Weiss (2003: 31) Collaborative process Face-to-face dialogue; commitment to process; shared understanding; capacity for joint action Principled engagement; shared motivation; capacity for joint action; collaborative actions Governance; administration; organizational autonomy; mutuality; norms Broadly shared vision; clear, feasible goals; diverse, inclusive participation; participation by local government; linkages to individuals and groups beyond primary participants; Ansell & Gash (2007) Emerson et al. (2012) Thomson et al. (2009) Conley & Moote (2003) 115 Element Description Source Outcomes Intermediate outcomes: “small wins;” strategic plans; joint fact-finding Change in system context; collaborative process or institutional design Improved habitat; land protected from development; improved water quality; changed land management practices; biological diversity preserved; soil and water resources conserved; relationships built or strengthened; increased trust; participants gained knowledge and understanding; increased employment; improved capacity for dispute resolution; changes in existing institutions or creation of new institutions Ansell & Gash (2007) Emerson et al. (2012) Conley & Moote (2003) Systems context Policy legal frameworks; political dynamics; network connectedness; levels of conflict/trust; socioeconomic/cultural health & diversity; interdependence; uncertainty Attributes of resources; attributes of resource users; governance arrangements Emerson et al. (2012) Ratner et al. (2013) 116 Table 3-3. Comparison of three cases of collaborative governance on Haida Gwaii. Archipelago Management Board Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team Starting conditions Recent history of conflict Power imbalance Public support for the Haida Political support Recent history of conflict Power imbalance Public support for the Haida Political support Recent history of cooperation Increased power sharing Funding to support participation Loss of federal government support Collaborative process Shared values among original collaborators, exploring shared values with new collaborators Holistic vs. segmentalistic approaches to governance Some shared values Holistic vs. segmentalistic approaches to governance Some shared values Holistic vs. segmentalistic approaches to governance Institutional design Co-operative management Joint recommendations Collaborators: Council of the Haida Nation (3), Parks Canada (2) and DFO (1) Disputes held in abeyance and/or referred to senior representatives Stakeholder advisory committee Joint and shared decision-making Collaborators - HGMC: Council of the Haida Nation (2) and Province of B.C. (2) Collaborators - Solutions Table: Representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation (2) and Province of B.C. (2) plus Chair (1) Disputes referred to senior representatives No stakeholder advisory committee Collaborative planning Joint recommendations Collaborators: Co-chairs from the Council of the Haida Nation (1) and Province of B.C. (1), plus technical staff Disputes referred to the MaPP Marine Working Group Stakeholder advisory committee Facilitative leadership Formal: two co-chairs, senior decision-makers Informal: collaborators, political and hereditary leaders Formal: one neutral chair (HGMC), two co-chairs (Solutions Table), senior decision-makers Informal: collaborators, political and hereditary leaders Formal: two co-chairs, Marine Working Group, Executive Committee Informal: collaborators, political and hereditary leaders Outcomes Recommendations regarding planning, operation, management and use of Gwaii Haanas Haida employment Protection of ecological features and cultural sites Marine Area Interim Management Plan Land, Sea, People plan (in draft) HGMC: AAC determination, Land Use Objectives, protection of ecological and cultural features Solutions Table: implement HGMC decisions, fast turnaround of applications Haida Gwaii Marine Plan Systems context Legacy of discrimination and inequality Strong Haida governance Intensive industrial logging, environmental change Jurisprudence in Canadian Aboriginal law Legacy of discrimination and inequality Strong Haida governance Provincial government priority on relationships with First Nations Intensive industrial logging, environmental change Legacy of discrimination and inequality Strong Haida governance Lobbying from oil and gas industry Federal government priorities shift Commercial fishing, environmental change 117 3.3.1 Starting conditions Prevailing situational context can generate different baselines of trust prior to engagement between individuals or groups (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). Ansell & Gash (2007) emphasize three influences on starting conditions: prior history of conflict or cooperation, incentives for stakeholders to participate and power and resources imbalances. In these three case studies, these influences are closely linked. In the cases of the Archipelago Management Board and the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table, a history of conflict and need to avoid further conflict created a powerful incentive to collaborative. In the case of the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team, incentives to participate were provided in the form of resources allocated to the collaboration by a third party. Both of the former cases involved a significant shift of power and decision-making authority from federal and provincial governments, respectively, to the Council of the Haida Nation through collaborative governance. This shift occurred only after considerable conflict, when the Haida’s efforts to negotiate a shift in governance failed to produce change led them to move from negotiation to other strategies including confrontation, attempts at political dispute resolution and litigation (Jones et al., 2017). Direct action, including protests and blockades, was used as an incentive to force dialogue on the part of federal or provincial governments (Jones et al., 2017). Jones et al. (2017) describe this willingness to act as a source of power and an important factor in negotiations. Since litigation requires both resources and internal political support, it has typically been pursued as a last resort when other efforts fail to achieve a response (Jones et al., 2017). Efforts to gain external support and form alliances with other groups, such as 118 industry, local non-Haida communities and non-government organizations, have also bolstered the Council of the Haida Nation’s efforts to pursue collaborative governance (Jones et al., 2017). Local and regional organizing and mobilization of support from Haida and non-Haida communities on Haida Gwaii has been critically important to shifting the balance of power in government-to-government relationships (Grzybowski & Slocobme, 1988). Thus, conflict has played an important role in identifying power imbalances in government-to-government relationships and subsequently shifting the balance of power (Dahl, 1961; Lukes, 2005; Sandström et al., 2013). The Council of the Haida Nation has also exercised power during the starting conditions of collaborative governance through preparation. For example, Dowie (2017: 120) quotes Guujaaw, former President of the Council of the Haida Nation, as saying: “We had the courts, our alliances, and blockades all working together while we developed and negotiated a land-use plan. Timing was always at the forefront of our minds, and our timing was good.” The statement refers to preparation by the Council of the Haida Nation in advance of establishment of the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table. Similar preparation took place when the Haida gained community support and designated a Haida Heritage Site prior to establishment of the Archipelago Management Board (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, May 2010) and when the Council of the Haida Nation developed a Haida vision for the marine environment prior to the PNCIMA and MaPP processes (Council of the Haida Nation, 2007; Jones et al., 2010). These efforts positioned the Council of the Haida Nation to articulate its interests in a strong and unified manner once the collaborations were formed. 119 Political support also played an important role in influencing starting conditions for collaborative natural resource governance. In the case of Gwaii Haanas, political support for increased engagement of Indigenous communities on the part of senior leaders within Parks Canada can be traced by to revisions made in 1991 to the Department’s long-range plan (Dubrow & Goodman, 2003). Addition of this priority provided established direction for engagement in collaborations like the Archipelago Management Board. Emphasis on reconciliation by former Premier Gordon Campell (Hunter, 2007) supported development of the Strategic Land Use Agreement, Kunst'aa guu-Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol and Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act and, in turn, development of the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table. In the case of the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team, withdrawal of political support for the PNCIMA process by the Government of Canada was offset by increased funding support from a charitable organization for the MaPP process (Kimmett, 2013; The Canadian Press, 2012). Availability of funding support made it easier for representatives of the Province of B.C. to participate in MaPP. While the effect of political support may be most pronounced at the beginning of a collaboration, such as when it provides the necessary motivation to sign a collaborative governance agreement and establish a new collaboration, it can also be reflected in subtler influences through the systems context. 120 3.3.2 Collaborative process Published literature on collaborative governance notes a large number of potential influences on the collaborative process. These include establishing clear direction through a shared vision, mission, values, goals and plans and setting expectations for commitment, ownership, openness to ideas and good faith negotiation (Conley & Moote, 2003; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Emerson et al., 2012; Ratner et al., 2013). Where collaborators themselves are responsible for shaping institutional design, these influences can be reflected in rules, roles and responsibilities of the collaboration. The influence of shared values and goals is apparent in all three case studies; however, the difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous approaches to environmental governance, in the form of holism versus segmentalism (Pinkerton, 2007), has also created challenges. While the Haida value of Yahguudang asserts that everything is connected (Council of the Haida Nation, 2007), provincial and federal government departments strictly adhere to jurisdictional authorities for decision-making (Pinkerton, 2007). In the case of the Archipelago Management Board, values shared by the Council of the Haida Nation and Parks Canada helped set the tone for collaboration. Both organizations had a history of protecting landscapes from industrial disturbance; however, protection of cultural features was a new area for Parks Canada (Parks Canada, 2002; Dubrow & Goodman, 2003: 340). Shared values were reflected in the Gwaii Haanas National Marine Conservation Area Reserve and Haida Heritage Site Interim Management Plan and Zoning Plan (Government of Canada and 121 Council of the Haida Nation, May 2010). While both parties expressed values regarding protection of the marine area (Archipelago Management Board, 1996), lack of federal jurisdictional authority over marine issues on the part of Parks Canada initially limited the authority of the Archipelago Management Board to the terrestrial area. When the Department of Fisheries and Oceans joined the collaboration in 2010, it introduced its own values regarding economic benefits and viability of the commercial fishing industry (e.g. DFO, 2009) that had not previously been represented among members of the Archipelago Management Board. Increasing the number of values represented created challenges for shared values among collaborators. The Gina ’Waadluxan KilGuhlGa Land-Sea-People Management Plan encompasses a new set of shared values and establish an overarching vision, principles, goals, objectives, targets and zoning information (Council of the Haida Nation and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2018). The issue of shared values is also challenging in the context of the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table. While the Haida have witnessed firsthand the damage done by industrial logging operations on Haida Gwaii, the B.C. Ministry of Forests and Lands, now called the B.C. Ministry of Forests, Lands, Natural Resource Operations and Rural Development, has supported industrial forestry in its mandate of (e.g. B.C. Ministry of Forests and Range, September 2009). 122 The Province of B.C.’s dual goals of expanding markets for B.C. forest products and forging a new relationship with First Nations (BC Government, 2005; Tollefson et al., 2009) have been variously emphasized over time by different governments in power, with implications for shared values and goals among collaborators acting as representatives of their respective organizations. The Province of B.C. was also involved in the MaPP Haida Gwaii Technical Team; however, in this case, matters of jurisdiction strongly influenced which values could be expressed by collaborators. While the Province of B.C. has legislative jurisdiction over coastal lands, inland waters and seabed areas located “between the jaws of the land,” the Government of Canada retains legislative jurisdiction over resources in the water column and on the ocean surface (Short, 2012). This meant that collaborators representing the Province of B.C. were not permitted to explore values associated with such issues as commercial fisheries and marine shipping due to infringement on federal areas of jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. identified a shared set of values that are reflected in the Haida Gwaii Marine Plan (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). 3.3.3 Institutional design Institutional design refers to the rules, roles and responsibilities of collaborators and their respective organizations that help to structure the collaborative process. Important elements of institutional design include identifying and engaging a diverse but focused group of participants and establishing a fair and transparent process for communicating and making consensus-based decisions (Conley & Moote, 2003; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Emerson et al., 2012). Terms of 123 reference and other written agreements can provide important information about institutional design; however, other elements may remain unwritten. While published literature emphasizes the importance of consensus decision-making (Conley & Moote, 2003; Ansell & Gash, 2007), rules regarding the decision-making process also vary across the three collaborations, with important differences reflected in formal agreements. The three case study collaborations also vary in size and level of inclusiveness with respect to stakeholders. Since 2010, the Archipelago Management Board has included three representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation, two representatives of Parks Canada and one representative of DFO (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, May 2010). The Gwaii Haanas Agreement and Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement were based on a co-operative management approach (Langdon et al., 2010). Co-operative management, as defined in the Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement, means that members of the AMB “strive in a constructive and co-operative manner to achieve a consensus decision of the members, which will be deemed recommendations both to the Council of the Haida Nation and the Government of Canada” (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, January 2010). Therefore, the AMB makes joint recommendations to decision-makers within each organization, respectively, and has not been delegated formal decision-making authority. The Gwaii Haanas Agreement (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993) stated that, in the event of a disagreement among AMB members, issues “will be held in abeyance, and will be referred to the Council of the Haida Nation and to the Government of Canada to attempt to reach agreement on the matter in good faith.” However, commitment to joint dispute resolution under the subsequent 124 Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement is less firm; the agreement now reads “senior representatives of the Parties may agree that any actions arising will be held in abeyance” (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, January 2010). The latter reflects greater discretion on the part of senior decision-makers regarding whether issues will be held in abeyance. Throughout development of the forthcoming Land, Sea, People plan, representatives of the Archipelago Management Board sought input from the Gwaii Haanas Advisory Committee, which consists of Haida youth, individuals who possess relevant Haida traditional ecological and/or cultural knowledge and individuals with scientific or relevant industry knowledge (e.g. tourism, recreational fishing and commercial fishing industries) (Government of Canada, 2014). These interests and representatives were identified by members of the Archipelago Management Board to provide a diverse range of perspectives. The Kunst'aa guu - Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol is based on shared and joint decision-making (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009). Though no single definition for shared decision-making has been formally adopted by the Province of B.C. (Davis, 2010), the term typically describes a situation where a collaboration develops consensus-based recommendations that are provided to a Provincial Government decision-maker for consideration (Hillier & Metzger, 2015). In the context of the Solutions Table, shared decision-making encompasses “review of applications, collection of information and conducting the necessary analysis to provide informed input to decision makers,” from the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C., respectively (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009). Joint decision-making, by comparison, requires consensus among members of the Haida Gwaii 125 Management Council to achieve a single decision (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009). Unlike the Archipelago Management Board, which makes recommendations to a statutory decision-maker, the Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act delegates the Haida Gwaii Management Council authority to make a specific set of management decisions. While representatives of the Haida Gwaii Management Council aim to make decisions by consensus, a vote may be taken. A tied vote can be decided by the chair (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009). The Solutions Table, on the other hand, operates as a shared decision-making body and is responsible for reviewing technical and operational information. There is no dispute resolution mechanism for the Solutions Table other than resolution by the Haida Gwaii Management Council or initiating legal action. And unlike the Archipelago Management Board, the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table do not formally seek input from a stakeholder committee. However, in early 2017, collaborators partnered with forestry licensees to host Forestry Information Sessions in each of the communities on Haida Gwaii, answer questions about forest management and obtain feedback (Council of the Haida Nation, March 2017b). The Kunst'aa guu - Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol bears a strong resemblance to the Gwaii Haanas Agreement in its structure but differs in its scope and approach to decision-making. Like the Gwaii Haanas Agreement and Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement, the Kunst'aa guu - Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol explicitly outlines each party’s views with respect to sovereignty, title, ownership and jurisdiction over Haida Gwaii while recognizing their shared desire to seek a more productive relationship based on a respectful approach to “co-existence by 126 way of land and natural resource management” on Haida Gwaii (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009). However, the Gwaii Haanas Agreement focuses on co-operative management of a particular area of land under a specific set of designations (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). The Kunst'aa guu - Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol, on the other hand, is a foundational document that broadly outlines a new government-to-government relationship between the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C., including “lands and natural resources on Haida Gwaii and other collaborative arrangements including socio-economic matters pertaining to children and families” (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009). The Letter of Intent (LOI) that established the MaPP governance structure commits the Council of the Haida Nation, as members of the Coastal First Nations, and the Province of B.C. to more limited engagement than the Gwaii Haanas Agreement or Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement. Unlike the latter agreements, which established an ongoing relationship, parties to the LOI agreed only to develop sub-regional and regional marine plans, “to respect each others’ decision-making structures and authorities” and “to the extent possible, make joint recommendations to their respective executive/leadership” (MaPP, 2011a). Because the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team involved the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C., it was subject to the spirit of engagement established through the existing Kunst'aa guu - Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol (MaPP, 2016). In terms of decision-making, the use of a collaborative process to develop joint recommendations is similar to the process used by the Archipelago Management Board: both organizations retain the authority to decide whether to 127 accept recommendations. The LOI for the MaPP process did not explicitly address the issue of disputes other than to specify that the Executive Committee was responsible for resolving strategic issues, while the Marine Working Group was responsible for resolving issues related to joint planning work (MaPP, 2011a). The MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team adopted an approach to stakeholder engagement that was closer to that of the Archipelago Management Board by seeking input from the Haida Gwaii Marine Advisory Committee, which consisted of select individuals with relevant backgrounds and experience (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Differences in decision-making authority among the three case study collaborations can be explained, in part, by existing federal and provincial legislation and by political support for exploring options to relinquish some degree of power through amendments to legislation. For example, creation of Gwaii Haanas was supported by amendments made to the Canada National Parks Act in 1988 by a supportive federal Minister of Environment (Kopas, 2008). In the case of the Haida Gwaii Management Council, transfer of decision-making authority from the Province of B.C. to the Haida Gwaii Management Council was made possible through enactment of the Land Use Objectives Order and Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act, which provided legal authority for the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. to be equal partners in decision-making. This level of decision-making authority does not exist the Gwaii Haanas Agreement or Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement, where the federal Minister of Environment, now called the Minister of Environment and Climate Change, retains the authority to make final decisions (Langdon et al., 2010). While the Gwaii Haanas Agreement acknowledged the respective and 128 differing opinions of the parties regarding title, the Kunst'aa guu - Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol goes a step further as “an incremental step in a process of reconciliation of Haida and Crown titles” (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009). 3.3.4 Facilitative leadership Facilitative leaders can support the collaborative process by engaging collaborators in discussion, providing guidance during difficult conversations, upholding norms of openness to ideas and good faith negotiation and upholding institutional rules (Conley & Moote, 2003; Frame et al., 2004; Ansell & Gash, 2007). Qualities of such leaders may depend on the specific context; however, neutrality may be advantageous in situations where trust among collaborators is low (Warner, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2007). Facilitative leadership may also be provided by multiple individuals acting in formal and informal leadership roles rather than by a single leader (Bradford, 1998; Lasker & Weiss, 2003). Formal leadership for each of the three collaborations is provided by its respective chair or co-chairs: the Archipelago Management Board has two co-chairs, from the Council of the Haida Nation and the Government of Canada (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993, 2010); the Haida Gwaii Management Council has one neutral chairperson (Council of the Haida Nation and Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, 2009); and the Solutions Table has two co-chairs, from the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C., respectively, as did the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team. Facilitative leadership for the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team also provided by the the 129 Marine Working Group and the Executive Committee (MaPP, 2011a). The Haida Gwaii Management Council is the only collaboration in which facilitative leadership is expressly provided by a neutral, third party; however, the only role specified for the chair under the Kunst'aa guu - Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol is to cast a tie-breaking vote if collaborators cannot reach consensus (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009). All other collaborations balance power among collaborators by assigning an equal number of facilitative leaders from each of the organizations represented to the positions of co-chair. In addition to representing the interests of their respective organizations, these individuals are responsible for jointly calling and conducting meetings and authenticating minutes (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, January 2010) and managing group dynamics. In some cases, co-chairs may agree that these responsibilities will alternate between them (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, January 2010). However, informal leadership also plays an important role, not only in the collaborations themselves but also in shaping the systems context that influence them. To achieve consensus decisions or recommendations, collaborators themselves must work toward agreement while representing the values and interests of their respective organizations. Collaborators must also communicate within their own organizations to obtain input and support for decisions. Haida hereditary and political leaders, like Guujaaw, who also bears the name Chief Gida’nsta, also played an important role by exercising power through discourse and legal action in the days before the collaborations were formed as well as by building relationships and negotiating agreements within the collaborations (Gill, 2010). Representatives of the Province of B.C., such 130 as the District Manager, who have worked internally within their organizations to gain support for collaborative approaches have also helped to create a more conducive environment for collaboration. 3.3.5 Outcomes Outcomes of collaborative governance can include both intermediate outcomes during the collaborative process as well as broader outcomes that are central to a shared vision and mission. Examples of outcomes noted in the literature include relationship building, institutional design or change, strategic planning, research and information gathering and achievement of social or ecological objectives established by collaborators (Conley & Moote, 2003; Ansell & Gash, 2007). Ratner et al. (2013) note that, in the context of collaborative natural resource governance, outcomes may be measured in terms of changes in livelihood security, resource sustainability, adaptive capacity or shifts in the institutional and governance context. These types of outcomes can be variously observed across the three case study collaborations. While the Archipelago Management Board, Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table have been operating for enough time to demonstrate outcomes in terms of livelihoods and resources, outcomes of the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team have yet to be seen. Therefore, its outcomes are primarily related to planning, research, information gathering, building relationships and shaping institutional change. 131 The Archipelago Management Board has been responsible for planning, operation and management of Gwaii Haanas for more than two decades (Lee, 2012). Intermediate outcomes during this time have included development of the Gwaii Haanas National Marine Conservation Area Reserve and Haida Heritage Site Interim Management Plan and Zoning Plan (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, May 2010) and the Gwaii Haanas Gina ’Waadluxan KilGuhlGa Land-Sea-People Management Plan (Council of the Haida Nation and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2018), which provide strategic direction for decisions. In addition to its ecological objectives, the Archipelago Management Board also established a goal of achieving and maintaining 50 percent Haida representation at all levels of employment, with associated commitments to support for training and capacity building (Lee, 2012). To achieve objectives related to preservation of cultural sites, the Archipelago Management Board set a quota for overnight visitors, a limit on the number of visitors at any cultural site at one time and acceptable measures for preserving village sites, house and mortuary poles and cultural artifacts (Herrmann et al., 2016). This has supported protection and preservation of cultural sites at SG̱ang Gwaay (Anthony Island), Ḵ'uuna Llnagaay (Skedans), T’aanuu Llnagaay (Tanu), Hlk'yah G̱awG̱a (Windy Bay), G̱andll K’in Gwaay.yaay (Hotspring Island) and other locations (Parks Canada website). And on August 15, 2013, the first monumental pole was raised in Gwaii Haanas in 130 years (Parks Canada website). The Legacy Pole honours the 20th anniversary of collaborative governance of Gwaii Haanas. 132 One important outcome of the Haida Gwaii Management Council was establishment of a new annual allowable cut (AAC) for Haida Gwaii (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2015). The decision lowered the AAC from 1,772,616 cubic metres per year to 931,000 cubic metres per year to support sustainable forest management (Council of the Haida Nation, 2016). In response to new information obtained through LIDAR and an improved forest inventory, the Haida Gwaii Management Council launched a process to establish a new AAC in May 2016 (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2015), resulting in a discussion paper released for public comment in November 2019 (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., November 2019). Comments on the Haida Gwaii Timber Supply Review Public Discussion Paper will be accepted through mid-January 2020 and be considered in the final determination thereafter. The Haida Gwaii Management Council has also established and revised Land Use Objectives for Haida Gwaii, established processes for Minor and Major Amendments to the Land Use Objectives Order and developed and revised the Background and Intent Documents that guide interpretation of the Land Use Objectives Order (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2015). Land Use Objectives have led to protection of cultural features, aquatic habitats, biodiversity and forest reserves (Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C., 2017). Work has also begun on issues within its other three areas of decision-making authority – protected areas, heritage sites and forestry strategy – however, plans and strategies have not been finalized. And while the Solutions Table has maintained a clear and streamlined process to support “some of the fastest turn-around times for applications in the province,” it has struggled 133 with limited capacity and non-consensus among collaborators (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2015). In light of these issues, the Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C. (2015) have noted the need to “assess efficiency and viability of administrative structures” established through the Kunst'aa guu - Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol. The MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team was responsible for establishing terms of reference and selecting members for the Haida Gwaii Marine Advisory Committee, developing the Haida Gwaii Marine Plan and establishing the Haida Gwaii Marine Management Board and appointing its inaugural members to support the implementation phase (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Broader outcomes will be monitored once the plan is implemented. 3.3.6 Systems context Legal, socioeconomic, environmental, political and other factors can both influence and be influenced by collaborative governance (Emerson et al., 2012). Ratner et al. (2013) specifies three types of contextual factors: attributes of resources, of resource users and of governance arrangements. These influences generate opportunities and constraints for collaborations that may change throughout its lifespan. All three case study collaborations operate within the broader context of the legacy of the Indian Act and the relationship it established between the Haida and the Government of Canada. Lasting effects of this legislation have profoundly affected Haida governance, both of the people and of the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii, and created a legacy of adversarial relations between the 134 two governments that presents creates a challenging environment for collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Furthermore, all three collaborations operate within the overarching legal frameworks established by the Government of Canada and the Province of B.C. Legislation such as the Parks Act, Forest Act, Forest and Range Practices Act (2002) and Fisheries Act, among others, defines what is within the jurisdiction of collaborators and strongly influences how decisions are made. Haida governance and law are integrated in varying degrees through institutional design, such as through interpretation of the Gwaii Haanas Agreement and Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement and through the Haida Gwaii Land Use Objectives; however, this process requires ongoing negotiation among collaborators. The Council of the Haida Nation has helped provide a strong and unified voice for the Haida in the context of such negotiations, indicating the importance of governance as an element of the systems context. Collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii has also developed against a backdrop of jurisprudence regarding Aboriginal rights and title. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) and Haida Nation v. British Columbia (2004), in particular, helped strengthen the Council of the Haida Nation’s claim to Aboriginal title and establish an obligation for the Province of B.C. to consult with the Haida on issues within their traditional territory (Takeda & Røpke, 2010; Jones et al., 2017). These developments have created a strong incentive for federal and provincial governments to engage with the Council of the Haida Nation across all three case study collaborations. 135 These collaborations also developed in the context of environmental change on Haida Gwaii which was driven, in large part, by industrial resource extraction from its lands and waters over the past 150 years (Lee, 2012). While these influences have continued throughout collaboration, the nature of these influences is highly dynamic. Issues such as harvest of cedar (Gowgaia Institute, 2007) and aquaculture development (MaPP, 2015) have emerged in recent years and can drive environmental change and influence the work of collaborators. 3.4 Conclusions This chapter provided an overview of three case studies of collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii: the Archipelago Management Board, Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table and Marine Planning Partnership for the North Coast (MaPP) Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team. These case studies provide examples of collaborative governance in practice and can help to identify issues for further exploration. The three case studies were compared using some of the existing theoretical frameworks for collaborative governance (Conley & Moote, 2003; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Emerson et al., 2012; Ratner et al., 2013). These frameworks broadly describe the importance of starting conditions, collaborative process, institutional design, facilitative leadership, outcomes and systems context. The case studies demonstrated evidence of influences on starting conditions that are noted in the literature. In the cases of the Archipelago Management Board and the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table, a history of conflict and need to avoid further conflict created a powerful incentive to collaborate. This resulted in a significant shift of power and decision-136 making authority from federal and provincial governments, respectively, to the Council of the Haida Nation. In the case of the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team, incentives to participate were provided in the form of resources allocated to the collaboration by a third party. Preparation and political support were also important influences that shaped starting conditions across all three collaborations. Shared values and goals also influenced the collaborative process of all the three collaborations. While collaborators have identified shared values, the difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous approaches to governance, reflected in holism versus segmentalism, has created challenges. Shifting political priorities, which typically follow a change in government, can also have implications for shared values and goals among collaborators, who act as representatives of their respective organizations. Formal and informal elements of institutional design vary widely among the three case study collaborations, particularly with respect to size, level of inclusiveness of stakeholders and decision-making and dispute resolution processes. While published literature emphasizes the importance of consensus decision-making, federal and provincial legislation and political will to relinquish power through amendments have strongly shaped how decisions are made or influenced by collaborators. 137 Formal leadership of each of the three case study collaborations was provided by a chair or co-chairs. Only one of these leadership positions was held by a neutral, third party; even then, the only role specified for this individual was to cast a tie-breaking vote if collaborators cannot reach consensus. All other collaborations assigned an equal number of co-chairs from each of the organizations to balance representation. However, other collaborators and hereditary or political leaders also provided facilitative leadership through communication, negotiation, relationship-building and shaping the systems context. Outcomes also varied across the three case study collaborations. The collaborations that have had sufficient time to implement changes have demonstrated outcomes in terms of livelihoods and resources, while the collaboration that has only focused on the planning phase has delivered outcomes in terms of research, information gathering, building relationships and shaping institutional change. All three collaborations operate within the broader context of the legacy of the Indian Act and the relationship it established between the Haida and the Government of Canada. Lasting effects of this legislation, in its historical and current forms, have profoundly affected Haida governance and well-being and created challenging environment for collaboration. Furthermore, all three collaborations operate within the overarching legal frameworks established by the Government of Canada and the Province of B.C., with implications for jurisdictional authority and decision-making. 138 The nature and character of collaborative governance on Haida Gwaii will continue to evolve in response on legal and political developments. In particular, the Council of the Haida Nation’s ongoing title case that lays claim to the “land, inland waters, seabed and sea” of Haida Gwaii will have profound implications not only for Haida Gwaii, but for collaborative governance arrangements involving First Nations across Canada. The case studies presented in this chapter raise several interesting questions about collaborative governance. In particular, the issue of trust is noted in the literature to influence collaborative governance at several places in the framework described in this chapter (Ansell & Gash, 2007). For example, trust during starting conditions sets the tone for interactions during the collaborative process. Power imbalances, such as those in the systems context that were created under the Indian Act, are noted as contributing to distrust during starting conditions. Facilitative leadership can help to build trust during the collaborative process through upholding ground rules, engaging collaborators in dialogue and exploring mutual gains. Commitment, shared understanding and respect demonstrated during the collaborative process can also help to build trust. And “small wins” or outcomes can help to bolster trust and support future collaboration. Despite the emphasis on trust in collaborative governance in the literature (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2007), there remains few empirical studies that examine its role and formation (Stern & Coleman, 2015). Therefore, trust appears to be an important part of collaborative governance that would benefit from further exploration. 139 Chapter 4: Influences on trust during collaborative natural resource governance: Case studies on Haida Gwaii 4.1 Introduction In Canada, there are an estimated 490 bilateral and trilateral agreements involving Indigenous organizations and governments and Provinces (Papillon, 2015). This reflects a broader global trend toward increasing implementation of collaborative natural resource governance to resolve conflicts, generate social and ecological benefits and increase implementation of decisions (Innes, 1996; Wondolleck & Yaffe, 2000; Stern & Coleman, 2015). Case studies have shown that by bringing together relevant parties to engage in consensus-oriented decision-making during planning, policy making and management, collaborative governance can help to address long-standing conflicts over lands and resources (Ansell & Gash 2008; Bowie, 2013). Several studies have identified the importance of trust in the context of collaboration (Ostrom, 2003; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012), particularly where natural resource management is concerned (Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Davenport et al., 2007). Trust is a vital component of collaboration and power-sharing between governments and with local resource users (Dolšak & Ostrom, 2003; Morten, 2009; Berkes, 2010a,b; Innes & Booher, 2010; Zurba, 2012; Lyver et al., 2014). Lack of trust between federal, provincial and/or First Nations governments and the absence of established processes for building trust between these parties are barriers to collaboration and effective natural resource management (Ostrom, 2003; Armitage et al., 2009; Fulmer & Gelfand 2012). However, trust theory and its applications remain underexplored within the context of collaborative natural resource governance (Stern & Coleman, 2015). Research that generates 140 insights into how trust is created during collaborative natural resource governance has the potential to improve processes and outcomes. Haida Gwaii, an archipelago located off the west coast of British Columbia, Canada, offers a particularly rich history of experience in collaborative natural resource governance. More than a century of industrial resource extraction and efforts by the Government of Canada to assimilate the Haida, the Indigenous people of Haida Gwaii, into settler society, was followed by decades of conflict as the Haida fought to reduce unsustainable practices and regain influence over the decisions that concern the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii. Now, the archipelago is the site of several distinct collaborative governance arrangements. Throughout the 20th century, Haida Gwaii was subject to industrial logging across more than 168,000 hectares of forest (Gowgaia Institute, 2007). In 1974, conflict between the Haida and the federal government over proposed logging of a culturally and archaeologically significant site on Athlii Gwaay (Lyell Island) led to signing of a landmark co-management agreement in 1993 between the Council of the Haida Nation and the Government of Canada and creation of Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve and Haida Heritage Site (Takeda & Røpke, 2010; Lee, 2012). The 147,000-acre park reserve broke new ground as the first of its kind in Canada to be co-managed by a First Nation and the federal government (Takeda & Røpke, 2010) and shifted the course of natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii (Lee, 2012). 141 The Gwaii Haanas Agreement was a particularly innovative collaborative governance agreement and has contributed to shaping federal and provincial government policy, both on Haida Gwaii and elsewhere in Canada (Hawkes, 1995, 1996; Lee, 2012). Nearly ten years later, the Haida Gwaii land use planning process reframed relationships between the islands’ communities and led to the creation of a new Haida Land Use Vision (Council of the Haida Nation, 2005). Haida control over land and resource governance was further solidified with the signing of the Kunst’aa guu-Kunst’aayah Reconciliation Protocol in 2009 (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009; Bowie, 2013). Even in the absence of formal recognition of Aboriginal title, these historic power shifts have resulted in greater collaboration between the Council of the Haida Nation, the Government of Canada and the Province of British Columbia (B.C.) in the context of natural resource governance and provide a rich context in which to study the trust-building process that unfolded. The Council of the Haida Nation has continued to work with federal and provincial government partners to implement these agreements and to extend its influence over natural resource decisions. Neither effort has been without challenges, but the accumulated experience of building trust and sharing power through collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii can provide a wealth of knowledge for other Indigenous communities and non-Indigenous governments involved in collaborative governance in Canada and around the world (National Centre for First Nations Governance, 2013). 142 This chapter explores influences on trust in the context of collaborative natural resource governance through three case studies on Haida Gwaii: the Archipelago Management Board, which oversees Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve, National Marine Conservation Area Reserve and Haida Heritage Site (Bowie, 2013); the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table, which make decisions about lands and forests (Takeda & Røpke, 2010); and the Marine Planning Partnership for the North Coast (MaPP) Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team, which developed the Haida Gwaii Marine Plan (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). These case studies span protected areas, forestry and marine planning and encompass relationships between the Council of the Haida Nation, Government of Canada and Province of B.C. While some of these case studies have been influenced by others through overlapping actors and elements of institutional design, each remains independent and unique. The context of the Council of the Haida Nation is particularly interesting because, while the Haida’s connection to the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii, formerly known as the Queen Charlotte Islands, dates back more than 10,000 years (Takeda & Røpke, 2010), Haida Gwaii is not covered by a historic treaty or a land-claim agreement (Bowie, 2013). In such circumstances, the authority of Indigenous communities involved in natural resource governance processes has traditionally been far less than is recognized in areas where settled land claims exist (Bowie, 2013). Despite the absence of these legal precedents, the Haida have regained considerable influence (Bowie, 2013). 143 The empirical grounding for this chapter was provided by 32 semi-structured interviews conducted by the author with representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation, the Government of Canada and the Province of B.C. Two additional interviewees participated in the Haida Gwaii Management Council as neutral Chairs and, as such, did not represent any government in the context of collaborative governance. Interviewees who are currently or did formerly participate in one or more of the case study collaborations were approached to participate in the research. Qualitative data obtained through the interviews was used to conduct in-depth comparisons of the experiences of individuals across resources and collaborations within the same legal, political, historical and geographic context. 4.2 Background 4.2.1 Collaborative governance Collaborative governance is broadly defined as a “governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Ansell & Gash, 2007: 2). Emerson et al. (2012: 2) broadened this definition to “the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished.” 144 Collaborative governance arrangements can take a wide variety of forms including cooperative management (Langdon et al., 2010), co-management (Berkes, 1994, 2010; Armitage et al., 2009), shared decision-making and joint decision-making (Davis, 2010; Hillier & Metzger, 2015). Nevertheless, these forms typically combine several key elements: centralized state-level management; traditional local-level resource management systems, and some degree of shared decision-making (Hawkes, 1996). "Weak" or incomplete collaborative governance systems may include minimal public participation in resource governance, while “stronger” systems can involve the delegation of full management authority to the local level (Pinkerton, 1989; Berkes, 1994). Collaborative governance models are increasingly considered and adopted to address concerns regarding unsustainable, ineffective or unfair resource management regimes, particularly where disputes exist regarding the rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hawkes, 1996). Tipa & Welch (2006) emphasize that legitimate collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous Peoples must provide “a level of participation in resource management that goes some way to address the aspirations of Indigenous communities” through respect for traditional knowledge and affirmation of decision-making powers. Published literature on collaborative governance emphasizes six elements: starting conditions, collaborative process, institutional design, facilitative leadership, systems context and outcomes (Table 4-1). Systems context encompasses the host of political, legal, socioeconomic, environmental and other influences that interact with governance processes (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Emerson et al., 2012). Starting conditions establish baseline levels of trust, conflict and social capital, while the collaborative process includes the range of interactions in which 145 collaborators engage. Institutional design lays ground rules under which collaboration takes place and facilitative leadership provides support and direction for the collaborative process. Outcomes and impacts of collaborative governance influence both the process itself and the systems context, leading to a cyclical process of change over time. Peer-reviewed literature from the field of collaborative governance emphasizes the importance of trust, with implications for all six elements (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Emerson 2012). However, few studies have focused directly on trust in collaborative governance (Stern & Coleman, 2015) and fewer still attempt to bridge between the literatures on trust and collaborative governance, respectively. While an extensive body of literature on trust spans across the fields of economics, psychology, sociology, organizational behaviour, management and planning, among others, three categories of influences on trust are particularly relevant in th context of collaborative natural resource goverance: individual, interpersonal and institutional (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996; Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Bigley & Pearce 1998; Stern & Coleman, 2015). 146 Table 4-1. Elements of collaborative governance. Element Description Source Starting conditions Crisis; third-party intervention; legal mandate; common vision; strong leader; incentives to collaborate Power-resource-knowledge asymmetries; incentives for and constraints on participation; prehistory of cooperation or conflict Selin & Chevez (1995) Ansell & Gash (2007) Institutional design Participatory inclusiveness, forum exclusiveness; clear ground rules; process transparency Open, accessible and transparent process; clear, written plan; consensus-based decision making; decisions regarded as just; consistent with existing laws and policies Assigned roles; formal agreements to monitor and ensure compliance Ansell & Gash (2007) Conley & Moote (2003) Selin & Chevez (1995) Facilitative leadership Promote broad and active participation; ensure broad-based influence and control; facilitate productive group dynamics, extend the scope of the process Ansell & Gash (2007), Lasker & Weiss (2003: 31) Collaborative process Face-to-face dialogue; commitment to process; shared understanding; capacity for joint action Principled engagement; shared motivation; capacity for joint action; collaborative actions Governance; administration; organizational autonomy; mutuality; norms Broadly shared vision; clear, feasible goals; diverse, inclusive participation; participation by local government; linkages to individuals and groups beyond primary participants Ansell & Gash (2007) Emerson et al. (2012) Thomson et al. (2009) Conley & Moote (2003) 147 Element Description Source Outcomes Intermediate outcomes: “small wins”; strategic plans; joint fact-finding Change in system context; collaborative process or institutional design Improved habitat; land protected from development; improved water quality; changed land management practices; biological diversity preserved; soil and water resources conserved; relationships built or strengthened; increased trust; participants gained knowledge and understanding; increased employment; improved capacity for dispute resolution; changes in existing institutions or creation of new institutions Ansell & Gash (2007) Emerson et al. (2012) Conley & Moote (2003) Systems context Policy legal frameworks; political dynamics; network connectedness; levels of conflict/trust; socioeconomic/cultural health & diversity; interdependence; uncertainty Attributes of resources; attributes of resource users; governance arrangements Emerson et al. (2012) Ratner et al. (2013) 148 4.2.2 Trust Lewicki & Bunker (1995, 1996) described trust as an individual characteristic, as a characteristic of interpersonal transactions and as an institutional phenomenon (Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Bigley & Pearce 1998; Stern & Coleman, 2015). Trust is also subject to individual, interpersonal and institutional influences, identified within an extensive body of literature. These influences are summarized in Section 2.2.2.2, Table 2-2, Table 2-3 and Table 2-4, and reviewed in this section. Research on trust as an enduring, individual trait supposes that personal characteristics cause individuals to be inherently more or less trusting of others whom they do not know (Rotter, 1980; Hardin, 1993; Mayer et al., 1995; Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Evans & Revelle, 2008). Willingness to trust others is positively correlated with positive affect (Scharlemann et al., 2001; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Kirchsteiger et al., 2006) and a history of positive experiences in trust situations (Berg et al., 1995; Evans & Revelle, 2008). Equality in terms of economic opportunity or status also has important implications for trust, with people expressing greater generalized trust toward individuals within their own group or class (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Abascal & Baldassarri, 2015). Interpersonal influences on trust emerge in the context of relationships between two or more individuals (Cook et al., 2005). In unfamiliar situations, individual predispositions are of relatively greater importance in interactions; however, as people become familiar, knowledge and experience become the primary drivers of trust (Rotter, 1980; Bigley & Pearce 1998). Through repeated interactions and patterns of behavior, an optimal level of trust emerges (Wong 149 & Cheung, 2005; Stevens et al., 2015). Some authors have also used interpersonal influences on trust to describe trust between individuals and organizations, trust between groups of people and trust between organizations (Curall & Inkpen, 2006; Schilke & Cook, 2013). For example, Schoorman et al. (2007) noted: “Just as perceptions about an individual’s ability, benevolence, and integrity will have an impact on how much trust the individual can garner, these perceptions also affect the extent to which an organization will be trusted.” Additional influences on trust are embedded in the institutional environment (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). Formal and informal institutions help to establish a shared set of expectations among individuals and their respective organizations and reduce the risk of trusting (Möllering, 2006; Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). For example, control mechanisms can be designed to make people behave in a more trustworthy manner, thereby creating conditions under which it becomes much less risky to trust (Das & Teng, 1998; Cook, 2001; Coletti et al., 2005; Schoorman et al., 2007). However, several scholars question whether trust can truly exist in the presence of formal controls since vulnerability and willingness to take a risk are hallmarks of trust (Cook, 2001; Hardin, 2002). Bachmann & Inkpen (2011) hypothesize that the formal controls are most important during initiation of the relationship, whereas informal institutions, such as norms and social controls, are more relevant during subsequent interactions. However, institutions themselves need to be trusted before they, in turn, can influence trust (Möllering, 2006). 150 The balance of power between parties can affect individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. For example, if one party possesses a high degree of power, they may have no incentive to keep commitments (Farrell, 2004). Thus, the risk of trusting may be perceived by a potential trustor as too great. Trust is only possible to the extent that both parties value continuation of the relationship and have some reason to take the other’s interest into account (Farrell, 2004). Since power can be embedded in broader societal influences or specific to interpersonal or institutional dynamics, it has the potential to manifest its influence is several ways, sometimes even simultaneously. Conflict also has a role to play in either building or damaging trust. When trust exists, individuals or groups are able to work through conflict more easily than if it does not (Lewicki, 2011). Bitter or acrimonious confict has the potential to destroy trust, making conflict resolution more difficult (Lewicki, 2011). Trust repair is often an important element of conflict resolution (Lewicki, 2011) and some researchers even assert that conflict contributes positively to trust development (Ronson & Peterson, 2007; Ayoko & Pekerti, 2008; Chen & Ayoko, 2012). While trust is often portrayed in a positive light, a high degree of trust can have negative consequences (Butler et al., 2009). Research suggests there may exist an optimal level of interpersonal trust (Wicks et al., 1999; Gargiulo & Ertug, 2006; Butler et al., 2009; Stevens et al., 2015). Too much trust can lead to decisions and actions based on blind faith and complacency, which can increase the risk of exploitation (Das & Teng 2001; Stevens et al., 2015). 151 4.2.3 Building trust in the context of collaborative natural resource goverance on Haida Gwaii Collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii formally began in July 1987, when the Council of the Haida Nation and the Government of Canada agreed to designate the southern portion of Haida Gwaii a protected area, to be co-managed by the Council of the Haida Nation and Parks Canada (Grzybowski & Slocobme, 1988; Takeda, 2015; see also Section 3.2). The move was prompted after long-standing tensions over industrial logging reached a boiling point and the Haida blockaded activity on Lyell Island (Grzybowski & Slocombe, 1988; Takeda, 2015). The South Moresby Memorandum of Understanding halted logging in the area and led to development of the Memorandum of Agreement on South Moresby, which committed to protecting both marine and terrestrial areas of Gwaii Haanas National Park and Haida Heritage Site (Gwaii Haanas) (Archipelago Management Board, 1996). Building on the Memorandum of Agreement on South Moresby, the Gwaii Haanas Agreement (1993) established a new collaborative governance body – the Archipelago Management Board – which included the Council of the Haida Nation and the Government of Canada, represented by Parks Canada, which was responsible for the terrestrial area commonly referred to as South Moresby. The area received two new designations as the Gwaii Haanas Haida Heritage Site and National Park Reserve (Gwaii Haanas) (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). In 2010, the protected area was expanded to include the surrounding waters through the Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement. Under the new agreement, one representative from Fisheries and Oceans Canada and one additional representative of the Council of the Haida Nation were added to the Archipelago Management Board (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, January 2010). The Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement reflected several years of 152 negotiations between the parties that focused largely on the potential role of commercial and recreational fisheries within the new Gwaii Haanas National Marine Conservation Area Reserve. Conflict was also a motivating factor in the development of collaborative forest governance on Haida Gwaii. Failure on the part of the Province of B.C. to consult and accommodate the interests of the Haida in the context of forestry activities sparked a public protest in 2005, called Islands Spirit Rising, that was organized by the Haida and supported by non-Haida communities (Dean, 2009; Takeda & Røpke, 2010). Between March and April that year, the Haida blockaded the main logging road between Queen Charlotte City and the Yakoun River bridge (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). Within weeks of the blockade, the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. reached an agreement to resume the land-use planning process and suspend further logging in areas of concern to the Haida (Dean, 2009). A subsequent land use planning process led to the Strategic Land Use Agreement, finalized in 2007, which presented a framework for collaborative forest management involving the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2007). The Kunst'aa guu-Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009) was the next major step and committed the parties to seeking “a more productive relationship” involving shared and joint decision-making respecting lands and resources on Haida Gwaii through the Solutions Table and Haida Gwaii Management Council, respectively (Council of the Haida Nation and Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, 2009). Despite progress toward cooperative, shared and joint decision-making in the context of terrestrial and nearshore environments, marine areas remain largely controlled by federal 153 government authorities. Conflict regarding natural resource governance has also historically focused on the terrestrial environment. Marine planning efforts, including through the Marine Planning Partnership for the North Pacific Coast (MaPP), have attempted to increase Haida influence in the marine environment outside of Gwaii Haanas. The MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team involved representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C., with funding from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015), and resulted in development of the Haida Gwaii Marine Plan. The Plan was informed by the Haida Marine Work Group and Haida Gwaii Marine Advisory Committee, which consisted of members with backgrounds in marine tourism, marine conservation, marine science, community interests, commercial fishing, recreational fishing, seafood processing and marine transportation (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Each of these three collaborations – the Archipelago Management Board, Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table and MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team – required trust be built to support collaborative governance. These collaborations are not only part of the ongoing evolution of natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii, but are indicative of a broader shift in government-to-government relationships involving Indigenous communities across Canada. Collaborations between the Council of the Haida Nation and the Government of Canada or the Province of B.C., which form the basis of this research, offer important lessons for building trust in the context of collaborative natural resource governance that may be broadly applicable in the context of government-to-government relationships, particularly those involving Indigenous communities. 154 4.3 Research objectives This chapter seeks to determine how representatives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments – in this case, the Council of the Haida Nation, the Government of Canada and the Province of B.C. – conceptualized trust and characterized important influences on trust within three collaborative natural resource governance processes. It also considers how perceptions of power can contribute to shaping individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. The research built upon existing research in the areas of collaborative governance and trust by qualitatively and empirically examining influences on trust between Indigenous and federal or provincial governments in Canada in the context of three case studies of natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii. It characterized important influences on trust, explored how representatives of these governments conceptualized trust and identified how perceptions of power shape individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust in collaborative natural resource governance. 4.4 Methods Three case studies on Haida Gwaii were chosen to compare experiences with respect to building trust across three different resources – a protected area, forests and a marine area – in the same cultural, political, historical, legal and geographic context. Haida Gwaii was chosen as the area of focus because the strength of the Council of the Haida Nation’s claim to Aboriginal title has resulted in a heightened duty to consult by the federal and provincial governments and led to a greater degree of power-sharing than in other jurisdictions (Penikett, 2012; Dowie, 2017; Jones et al., 2017). The Haida are the sole claimants of Aboriginal title, meaning that Haida Gwaii is not covered by any “overlapping claims” from other First Nations (Penikett, 2012). Collaborative 155 governance on Haida Gwaii has also led to the Haida achieving many of their goals for resource management, including protection of Haida cultural sites, a 50 percent reduction in the annual allowable harvest of forests, implementation of ecosystem-based management and doubling of the total area of parks and protected areas (Penikett, 2012). Thus, collaborative governance arrangements on Haida Gwaii are commonly looked to as examples to follow in other jurisdictions (e.g. National Centre for First Nations Governance, 2013; Dowie, 2017). 4.4.1 Data collection Prior to initiating the research, preliminary discussions were held with representatives of the three governments to identify potential interest and ways in which the research could be tailored to generate meaningful results for the collaborations. Subsequently, formal applications to conduct the research were submitted to the Council of the Haida Nation and to the Archipelago Management Board in accordance with their respective internal permitting processes for research studies. Once approval was received from the Council of the Haida Nation and the Archipelago Management Board to conduct the research, an application was submitted to the Office of Research Ethics at the University of British Columbia (UBC). Approval to conduct the research was received from the UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board in December 2016. 156 Next, potential interviewees were identified based on three inclusion criteria. First, a potential interviewee needed to be a current or former representative of the Council of the Haida Nation or of the federal or provincial government. Second, they must have actively participated or be participating in one or more of the case study collaborations in a decision-making capacity for a minimum of one year. Finally, interviewees needed to be willing to provide written or oral consent to participate in the research. No exclusion criteria were identified for potential interviewees. Theoretical sampling supported cumulative data collection regarding important events or developments during collaboration (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In spring 2017, 32 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives from the Council of the Haida Nation, the Government of Canada and the Province of British Columbia (B.C.), respectively, regarding their experiences with the case study collaborations (Simons & Peterson, 2000; Krishnan et al., 2006; Davenport et al., 2007; Hagerman et al., 2010). Two additional interviewees participated in the Haida Gwaii Management Council as neutral Chairs and, as such, did not represent any government in the context of collaborative governance. The sampling strategy initially aimed to target equal numbers of interviewees from each government for each collaboration; however, once interviews began, it was revealed that federal and provincial governments experience higher rates of employee turnover than the Council of the Haida Nation. This meant that there was a larger pool of previous federal and provincial government representatives to interview than there was of previous Council of the Haida Nation representatives. Several individuals who had previously represented the federal government on 157 the Archipelago Management Board were particularly willing to speak about their experiences, resulting in relatively greater representation of this group in the interviews. Representatives of all three governments were predominantly male. Table 4-2 summarizes the number of interiews conducted for each case study and the number of interviewees that represented each government. Three interviewees had been involved in more than one collaboration. Table 4-2. Number of interviews conducted for each case study, by interviewee affiliation. Archipelago Management Board Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team Council of the Haida Nation 4 8 3 Province of B.C. 9 3 Government of Canada 8 Not representing government 2 Total 12 19 6 A semi-structured interview approach was adopted to support an emergent aspect of the research by enabling the researcher to gather information that was surprising or conflicted with existing theories. Interviews were used to reveal emotional dimensions of social interactions and processes among individuals, such as their interpretations of events, actions and beliefs about themselves others (Pugh, 2013; Lamont & Swidler, 2014). Interviews were conducted on Haida Gwaii over a two-month period beginning in mid-February 2017 and by phone in Vancouver, B.C., during a subsequent two-month period. Interviewees that were not located on Haida Gwaii were interviewed during the latter period. Interviews were conducted in batches, with the majority of interviews for each case study conducted within the same two- to three-week period. Interviews occured one-on-one, either via telephone or in-person, depending on interviewer and 158 interviewee availability. In-person interviews were preferred to allow observation of visual cues; however, telephone interviews were accepted as a substitute for interviewees who were based in other geographic areas. In-person interviews took place at preferred locations identified by the interviewees, including cafés and offices (Pugh, 2013). Data collection began with interviews focused on the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table, then moved to the Archipelago Management Board before concluding with the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team. The order of case study data collection was based on the level of detail anticipated in the inteviews. For example, the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table were in the midst of intense discussions regarding issues related to the cedar harvest on Haida Gwaii and non-consensus issues at the Solutions Table, which resulted in lengthy and detailed discussions with interviewees. The Archipelago Management Board had a longer history than the other two collaborations but, of late, had experienced relatively harmonious relations, so it was expected that interviewees would provide somewhat less detail. The MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team had experienced a lull in activity and had not yet reconvened participants, so these interviewees were expected to provide the least detailed responses. By starting with interviewees who were expected to provide the greatest level of detail, it was anticipated that major revisions to the theoretical framework could be made early in the analysis, with each subsequent case resulting in relatively minor adjustments. Each batch of interviews began with individuals who are currently involved in the collaboration. At the end of each interview, the interviewee was asked to recommend potential interviewees who had previously been involved in the collaboration. Because there is little published information available to identify former members of collaborations, this approach 159 enabled identification of key past participants in each collaboration and helped to gain access to additional interviewees through referral. Interview questions were formulated to explore perceptions of trust (e.g. social and cultural differences in characterizations of trust) and personal experiences of individuals involved in the case study collaborations to gather information about influences on trust. Interviews focused on actions, perceptions and experiences of individuals, as well as the institutional design of the collaborations. Questions explored actions and events that have occurred during and as a result of collaboration as well as perceptions of other individuals and their respective organizations. Open-ended questions (e.g. “Tell me about your experiences with X.”) and clarifying questions (e.g. ‘‘Can you give me an example?’’) followed an unconstrained format to allow conversation to flow naturally and interviewees to deeply explore their perspectives and experiences (Hagerman et al., 2010). A list of interview questions is included in Appendix A . These questions provided a starting point for the interviews and were used to explore interviewees’ history of involvement in collaborative governance on Haida Gwaii, situations in which they recalled experiencing or perceiving trust or distrust and influences they felt shaped these experiences. Interviewees were asked to provide specific examples to explore the underlying beliefs, interpret cultural meanings of language and metaphor and observe underlying emotions (Pugh, 2013). 160 Additional questions were asked when an interviewee raised an issue multiple times, used the same metaphor multiple times, used particularly expressive language to describe their experience or became emotional (Luker, 2009). Such occurrences were interpreted as cues that the interviewee had touched on something they feel is significant. Standard methodological information was captured including the number of interviewees contacted, interviewed and not interviewed; duration of interviews; list of questions and question format; and recording/documentation format (Oakley, 1981). Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim, systematically coded and analyzed using NVivo software and supported by interpretation of social cues (Pugh, 2013). The use of both techniques was complementary to reveal both what people say and how they say it (Pugh, 2013). 4.4.2 Data analysis Interview transcripts were coded using NVivo 11 software to support interpretation of individuals’ subjective experiences and perspectives and to achieve abstraction of key themes from observations and individual statements (Charmaz, 2006). Initial codes were identified from peer-reviewed literature regarding individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. This initial list of codes was then expanded during interviews to capture participant experience and link this to the published literature. In this way, codes were derived from both published literature and interviews to support analysis from both theoretical and emergent perspectives. This approach followed the responsive interviewing model in which codes are developed for concepts, themes, events and topical markers (Rubin & Rubin, 2005) to create a typology based on related concepts. Responsive interviewing was determined to be appropriate due to the 161 proliferation of existing research on collaborative governance and trust and the range of descriptors used to discuss variables that influence trust. A codebook was maintained in NVivo 11 that contained a list of codes accompanied by a definition, brief description, instructions for when to use the code and when not to use the code (i.e. inclusion and exclusion criteria) and an example (Rubin & Rubin, 2005; Luker, 2008). A sample of three transcripts was coded by an independent researcher, who was not affiliated with the research, using the codebook. Internal consistency of codes assigned by the primary and independent researcher was analyzed using Cohen’s kappa (κ=0.59) and weighted kappa statistic (κW=0.47) (Cohen, 1960; Davey et al., 2010). These coefficients indicate fair (George & Mallery, 2003) or moderate (Landis & Koch, 1977) agreement between coders. Due to the large number of codes used in this study, this level of interrater reliability was deemed to be acceptable. Data analysis was performed in an iterative cycle that allowed continuous comparison of new results with previous findings to inform subsequent analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Analysis occurred case-by-case in the same order as interviews were conducted. After three interviews for a case were coded, all excerpts for each code were reviewed to ensure concepts, themes, events and topical markers were consistent with the codebook and to provide an opportunity to evaluate whether new codes should be added or existing codes merged. Once all interviews for a case study had been coded, transcripts were reviewed again and, where necessary, recoded to reflect codes that had been derived through subsequent interviews. This meant that, as the volume of data under each code increased, codes could be re-evaluated to identify whether additional codes 162 were required. Interview excerpts were then sorted by code to support logical integration and synthesis (Weiss, 1994; Emerson et al., 1995). Analysis was case-focused (i.e. each case considered independently as a case of trust) and generalized to identify the trust-building process across different typologies of cases (Weiss, 1994). Coding for each case began with the revised theoretical framework that resulted from analysis of the previous case. Thus, the framework was subject to revisions based on data analysis for each subsequent case. Once coding for all three case studies was complete, agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis was perfomed using NVivo 11 to identify similar themes and concepts. NVivo 11 used the complete linkage (i.e. farthest neighbour) algorithm to calculate Pearson correlation coefficients based on words within each theme and concept code. The most similar concepts were then grouped under their respective themes. Using this approach, a coherent narrative of the trust-building process across cases was developed to test the theoretical framework, noting examples that both supported and challenged the framework and possible explanations (Weiss, 1994; Emerson et al., 1995). The resulting coding structure is represented in Appendix B . Queries were created in NVivo to identify the number of interviewees (i.e. “sources” in NVivo) that referred to each code regarding individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. Analysis of queries focused on agglomerated, emergent themes generated through cluster analysis (Sections 4.5.4 and 4.5.5); however, detailed themes and concepts were also examined across case studies (see Appendix B ). Separate queries were created to compare emergent themes across case studies and across governments represented. Query results were then exported to Microsoft Excel to determine the frequency of interviewees referring to each code, 163 calculated as the number of interviewees that referred to a particular code relative to the total number of interviewees for the case study or government. These frequencies were then categorized as low (<25 percent), medium (25-50 percent) or high (>50 percent) levels of interviewee response. Cutting and sorting was then used to identify quotes that illustrated use of codes by interviewees in the context of each case study (Ryan & Bernard, 2003), viewed through the lens of the six elements of collaborative governance outlined in Section 4.2.1. Case studies provided an opportunity to empirically examine theoretical logic by tracing causal processes observed in situ and assessing whether they were consistent with or challenged relevant theories and the theoretical framework (Campbell, 1975; Coppedge, 1999; Janssen & Ostrom, 2006). The intention of the case study approach was not representativeness, but richness and depth of analysis of a social process to advance theory (Lareau, 2012). This approach supported examination of the trust-building process in a particular historical, legal, political, socioeconomic and environmental context (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Janssen & Ostrom, 2006; Lareau, 2012). Embedded within this approach is exploration of how these factors influenced the dynamics and performance of the three collaborations over time, resulting in new possibilities or challenges (Emerson et al., 2012). Expert views are reported anonymously; numbers in parentheses that follow interview quotes indicate a specific interviewee response. 164 4.5 Results Detailed descriptions of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust for each case study, viewed through the lens of the six elements of collaborative governance, are provided in Section 4.5.1 through Section 0. Individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust are compared across case studies in Section 4.5.4, followed by a comparison of these influences across the three governments in Section 4.5.5. 4.5.1 Case study 1: Archipelago Management Board Signed in 1993, the Gwaii Haanas Agreement established a new collaborative governance arrangement between the Council of the Haida Nation and Parks Canada for the terrestrial area designated as the Gwaii Haanas Haida Heritage Site and National Park Reserve (Gwaii Haanas) (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). Under the Gwaii Haanas Agreement, two designations – Haida Heritage Site and National Park Reserve – recognize different types of protection under each party’s respective jurisdiction and authority (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). Both parties agreed to maintain and use Gwaii Haanas “so as to leave it unimpaired for the benefit, education and enjoyment of future generations” with specific focus on “the protection and preservation of the environment, the Haida culture, and the maintenance of a benchmark for science and human understanding” (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). The Gwaii Haanas Agreement also committed the parties to working toward including the marine area, a goal that was achieved in 2010 with the Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010). The change expanded the four-person 165 Archipelago Management Board, comprised of two representatives from the Council of the Haida Nation and Parks Canada (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993), to a six-person Board by adding one Haida representative and one representative from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, May 2010). Each party designates one of these representatives as a co-chairperson for the AMB (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). AMB members use consensus decision-making on proposals and initiatives and AMB recommendations are subsequently provided to senior officials within the Government of Canada and the Council of the Haida Nation (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). If AMB members are unable to reach consensus, the issue is referred to the Council of the Haida Nation and the Government of Canada to seek agreement (Government of Canada and Council of the Haida Nation, 1993). 4.5.1.1 Starting conditions Interviewees described challenges related to trust during establishment of the AMB, particularly due to the history of relations between the Council of the Haida Nation and the federal government and the nascency of cooperative management involving Parks Canada. Some interviewees described the importance of alignment of interests, including shared values, between the Council of the Haida Nation and Parks Canada related to protected areas as an important foundation for building trust among AMB members. 166 “[The Haida] were really suspicious of working with government in general and it was a bit of an adversarial time for both parties […]” (Interviewee 24) “[…] it definitely, in those days, was something that was pretty new for Parks Canada and it was really the only cooperative management arrangement that they had […]” (Interviewee 25) 4.5.1.2 Collaborative process Relevant knowledge, particuarly of local issues and interests, as well as accountability to local communities were noted by interviewees as important aspects of ability. Interviewees noted that living on Haida Gwaii helps to provide a level of accountability by creating opportunities for collaborators to answer for and witness the impacts of their decisions on a daily basis through interactions with community members. “[…] the members of the Archipelago Management Board, because they had so much experience in managing Gwaii Haanas, understood maybe we were suggesting something be done a certain way […]” (Interviewee 29) “If you come and go from somewhere else, you don't have to always answer for your decisions on the ground all the time. So, I think that's an important point in trust is that people who live there, from that place, that live in that area, are involved in that process.” (Interviewee 21) 167 Affect, emotion and bonding were noted by several interviewees as playing an important role in influencing trust and depersonalizing conflict. In particular, the annual week-long trip to Gwaii Haanas was noted to contribute to personal connection, familiarity and shared experience among AMB members. Field visits conducted in Gwaii Haanas also helped collaborators to align interests. “[…] we spent four or five days together on the boat, eating our meals together, stopping and doing some beachcombing together, stopping at some sites and doing some work, cleaning up some of the Heritage Sites or, you know, just spending itme together.” (Interviewee 22) “[…] we've developed more personal interconnections as well and that's helped us work through the difficult stuff […] [T]here's less personalizing of a conflict.” (Interviewee 19) Interviewees described the importance of demonstrating commitment, with references to benevolence. Personal commitment to the process and spirit of collaboration was emphasized by all interviewees as an important characteristic of collaborators. Over the course of the AMB’s history, collaborators established strong norms related to communication and commitment to a collaborative approach, which have, in turn, helped to foster a sense of benevolence through a sense of tackling challenges together. Interviewees also described honesty, permeability and proactive information sharing, both among members of the AMB and within their respective organizations, as important for trust. 168 “[…] you come to the table understanding the agreement and the principles of the agreement and saying, ‘OK, I'm fine with this agreement and I'm here to make this work.’” (Interviewee 29) “[…] we had a much warmer relationship as time went on, more trusting relationship, and it was all through actions and deeds and commitments to what the AMB had agreed to.” (Interviewee 24) Several interviewees noted respect for others as an important aspect of conduct and comportment. Respect encompassed both respect for individuals and for their authorities. Understanding and respecting one another’s institutional processes also played a role in beginning to address alignment of interests between the parties. “[…] both sides were open to recognizing the rules or the political constraints on each other and all of that is to say, really, it comes down to one single word, and that's respect.” (Interviewee 29) “[…] believe that they have the same or more, in some cases, authority or decision-making power than you do and you need to figure out a way for you to exercise your authorities in a way that allows them to walk away and feel like they've exercised their authority, even though they may be two totally opposing views.” (Interviewee 20) 169 Several interviewees noted the importance of time for influencing trust. Specifically, it took time for collaborators to become familiar with one another, assess one another’s ability and explore alignment of interests. A few interviewees described there being no substitute for time spent together. “[…] we got to a place where […] we just worked as a team and were completely honest with each other.” (Interviewee 18) “It takes time to build that relationship, it takes time to build that trust, it takes time to understand that your objectives really are common objectives.” (Interviewee 22) 4.5.1.3 Institutional design Interviewees reported that, while the Gwaii Haanas Agreement broadly established the terms of the collaboration, collaborators themselves were primarily responsible for determining how it would be implemented and adapting institutional design to meet changing needs over time. Flexibility built into the Agreement helped the AMB to address a range of issues as they arose, enabled adaptability to meet changing needs over time and contributed to perceptions of satisfactory terms of the agreement. “[The Gwaii Haanas Agreement] set the framework that the AMB's mission was to collaborate and cooperate in planning, management and operation of the protected area. After that, it was basically open to the AMB to work with those broad requirements and obligations and work out the details themselves.” (Interviewee 24) 170 “[…] the Agreement itself was really carefully crafted […] and it allows for lots of latitude […] that sort of set up the consensus management model because you have to take general wording and try to apply that.” (Interviewee 25) Various aspects of alignment of interests were emphasized by interviewees, including shared objectives, values and vision. Frequent, open communication was noted to help align interests and develop shared objectives and values and, eventually, a shared identity as a collaboration. Shared understanding and commitment to tackling challenges together provided a foundation for collaborators to achieve outcomes. However, misalignment of interests can also be unclear until conflict arises, in part because collaborators use the same words with different meanings or hold assumptions about one another’s interests and objectives. “[…] the values that Parks Canada has, as an organization and through its mandate […] aligned quite well with the Haida Nation's values when it comes to looking after the land.” (Interviewee 20) “[…] understanding what your common objectives are and identifying what those common objectives are is really important and that sometimes that's a little more complicated […] [Y]ou may use the same words, but they mean different things.” (Interviewee 22) 171 Interviewees also described consensus decision-making as important to perceptions of justice, fairness and expectations. Under the Canada National Parks Act (2000), the AMB makes recommendations rather than decisions; however, collborators have been able to effectively achieve consensus decision-making by ensuring AMB members have the authority to speak on behalf of their respective organizations. Therefore, recommendations by the AMB have the support of all parties, in effect achieving consensus despite legal limitations. By achieving consensus in this way, collaborators felt that the AMB also fulfilled its duties to consult and accommodate. “[…] the Agreement is written in a way where the AMB technically doesn't have any authority to make decisions, we make recommendations, but the way we've been able to make those decisions […] is the people sitting on the Board have authority to make decisions.” (Interviewee 20) “[…] if you can't reach full consensus, then it's more important to not make a decision than to make one. It's important to not […] to act unilaterally. That would destroy the relationship.” (Interviewee 20) While the Council of the Haida Nation and Parks Canada had aligned their interests and established norms of consensus decision-making, interviewees reported challenges since the addition of DFO to the collaboration. Introducing a new party meant that the alignment of interests that had been developed among pre-existing parties had to be re-established with DFO. While the pre-existing parties expected that the established institutional design would continue to 172 function as it had, DFO also brought its own expectations to the table. Influence of AMB representatives within their respective organizations also created challenges: unlike representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation and Parks Canada, who are vested with the authority to make decisions on behalf of their respective organizations, DFO’s internal decision-making process concentrates decision-making power at more senior levels. If one party decides to act unilaterally in the event of a decision or conflict, either at the AMB level or at a more senior level in one of the organizations represented, trust among collaborators can be seriously damaged. “[The CHN and Parks Canada] had a certain process and a certain understanding […] [T]here was a number of preconceptions that were in place that things that would happen on the fisheries side would be similar to how they had been occurring on the terrestrial.” (Interviewee 22) “DFO has a different delegation process from Parks Canada and the Area Director [who represents DFO at the AMB] doesn't have the same level of authorities for decision-making.” (Interviewee 20) In terms of justice, fairness and expectations, interviewees described the process of putting disputed issues into abeyance as important. Under the Gwaii Haanas Agreement, disputed issues may either be set aside for future discussion or passed on to senior-level decision-makers for resolution. This dispute resolution process provided all collaborators equal influence in decisions. Interviewees reported that this process led to successful dispute resolution between the 173 Council of the Haida Nation and Parks Canada without exception; however, the process is less clear under the more recent Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement. Interviewees also noted that the process for senior-level decisions is currently not well-defined and putting issues into abeyance is difficult for time-sensitive decisions, such as those related to fisheries management. “[…] occasionally, we came to a place where there was significant challenges and decisions would get set aside for a little while until more information was available or people had a chance to think about it or become more comfortable with it and then we would move ahead.” (Interviewee 29) “[…] in the Gwaii Haanas Agreement, it talks about consensus decision-making and if there's a dispute, the issue will be held in abeyance. […] In the [Gwaii Haanas] Marine Agreement, it's slightly different: if there's a dispute […] the item may be put into abeyance and go through a dispute resolution process […]” (Interviewee 22) 4.5.1.4 Facilitative leadership Interviewees described the role of facilitative leaders in building trust both during the formation of the Archipelago Management Board and during its operation. While the collaboration has two Co-Chairs, interviewees noted several situations in which collaborators in a variety of roles demonstrated leadership. Commitment and honour were common themes among anecdotes regarding influences of facilitative leaders on trust. 174 “Guujaaw and them were brilliant as politicians and they created Gwaii Haanas when nothing like that was being done anywhere.” (Interviewee 18) “[I]t takes extra effort to do things differently, right? […] [W]hen you see examples of some of the behind the scenes work or get an understanding of what it takes to change, you can appreciate the effort and so, in that way, you would b uild some trust […]” (Interviewee 21) 4.5.1.5 Systems context Interviewees described that Gwaii Haanas was created after a lengthy campaign, led by the Haida and supported through alliances with local communities and organizations, to protect the area. Agency power exercised by the Haida in terms of social organization, protest and negotiation, as well as institutional power leveraged through legal action, created conditions under which the collaboration formed. “[…] they really forced the hand of government to do something unique and the work of Guujaaw and Miles Richardson and people like that that really said, ‘OK, if it's going to work, it has to be something that works for the Haida, it has to work for Canada, it has to be unique.’” (Interviewee 25) “[…] The political timing for them was right, all of it was just... and they had everything in place to make it happen.” (Interviewee 18) 175 At the time when Gwaii Haanas was established, Parks Canada’s Chief Executive Officer had also introduced a departmental policy that established working with First Nations as a priority. Interviewees noted that, under this direction, an amendment was made to the Canada National Parks Act (2000) to allow Parks Canada to enter into cooperative management under the Gwaii Haanas Agreement. Direction from senior level leadership provided Parks Canada representatives with the support needed to demonstrate commitment, tackle challenges together and provide the AMB with the necessary power to influence decisions. “[…] our policy stated that we would work collaboratively and cooperatively with First Nations. We would respect traditional hunting rights, traditional activities, and accommodate those.” (Interviewee 24) “[..] the CEO of the day put priority on building relationships with the Aboriginal Peoples.” (Interviewee 25) Despite involvement of all parties in negotiation of the Gwaii Haanas Agreeement and Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement, it was noted that the collaborations remain profoundly shaped by colonial language and constructs. Lasting effects of colonialism were noted to have significant, though often overlooked, implications for institutional design with implications for justice, fairness and expectations. 176 “We still are using processes from another culture and another people and using that language. So, we're always at a bit of a disadvantage and a compromise in the way everything is done.” (Interviewee 21) 4.5.1.6 Outcomes Several interviewees noted the importance of outcomes for building trust, with linkages to benevolence through commitment and honour on the part of both the individual collaborators and the organizations they represented. Major outcomes, such as decisions, as well as minor ones, such as letters signed by all AMB members or meetings arranged with senior level decision-makers, were described as helping to demonstrate commitment to collaboration and shared identity. Even demonstrated effort toward achieving an outcome was suggested to be sufficient to contribute to some building of trust. Outcomes were described as both a result of trust and an input for building trust in the future, with connections to alignment of interests, based on their role in generating positive expectations among AMB members. Specific examples of outcomes included employment of community members and park management. Importantly, satisfactory outcomes were emphasized as meeting the needs of all parties involved in the collaboration as well as their constituencies. “[…] the process is worth a million dollars, […] the cherry on the cupcake was the decision itself […]” (Interviewee 8) 177 “[…] people have seen that it is well-managed and I think the investment in the Haida cultural elements of the Park, treating it as a cultural site as well as a National Park has really gone a long way […]” (Interviewee 25) 4.5.1.7 Summary Table 4-3 summarizes individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust described by interviewees with experience as collaborators involved in the context of the Archipelago Management Board. Table 4-3. Frequency of interviewees that identified individual influences on trust in the context of the Archipelago Management Board. Influence on trust Frequency of response Individual influences Low Developmental experience Low Discrimination, inequality and trauma Low Faith in humanity Low Incidental emotions Low Values Low Interpersonal influences Medium Ability Medium Affect, emotion and bonding High Benevolence High Conduct, comportment Medium Integrity Low Reputation Low Takes time High Institutional influences Low Alignment of interests High Control vs. flexibility Medium Justice, fairness and unmet expectations High Satisfactory terms High 178 4.5.2 Case study 2: Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table Signing the Gwaii Haanas Agreement was an important step toward protecting the southern portion of Haida Gwaii, yet conflict continued over logging further north, on Graham Island. In particular, the Province of B.C.’s handling of renewal and transfer of a large forest tenure, Tree Farm License (TFL) 39, created tensions with the Council of the Haida Nation that led to a subsequent series of court battles (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010; Jones et al., 2010; Takeda & Røpke, 2010). The conflict reached a boiling point in 2005 when a demonstration and blockade, dubbed Islands Spirit Rising, was organized to increase pressure on the Province of B.C. and logging companies to deal fairly with the Haida (Dean, 2009). The blockade led the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. to create the Strategic Land Use Agreement, which established a government-to-government relationship for land use decisions; and the Kunst'aa guu-Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol, which committed the parties to seeking “a more productive relationship” involving shared and joint decision-making regarding lands and resources on Haida Gwaii (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009). It established the five-person Haida Gwaii Management Council, consisting of two representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation and two representatives from the Province of B.C. plus one neutral Chair; and the four-person Solutions Table, consisting of two representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation and two representatives from the Province of B.C. 179 The Haida Gwaii Management Council operates in a joint decision-making capacity and is responsible for decisions regarding the Haida Gwaii Strategic Land Use Agreement, Land Use Objectives for forest practices, Allowable Annual Cut for Haida Gwaii, management plans for protected areas and policies and standards concerning heritage sites (Council of the Haida Nation and Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, 2009). Joint decision-making was legally enacted through the Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act which, in 2010, officially delegated authority for specific decisions to the Haida Gwaii Management Council. Representatives of the Haida Gwaii Management Council aim to make decisions by consensus; however, a vote may be taken and a tied vote can be decided by the chair. The Solutions Table, on the other hand, uses shared decision-making and is responsible for reviewing technical and operational information. While the Haida Gwaii Management Council makes decisions, the Solutions Table is a vehicle for consultation and accommodation. There is no dispute resolution mechanism at the Solutions Table level; rather, disputes may be referred to the Haida Gwaii Management Council, senior-level decision-makers or settled in court. 4.5.2.1 Starting conditions Several collaborators recalled an atmosphere of distrust during the early stages of the collaborations, particularly regarding perceived or assumed motives and intentions. Distrust was coloured by the history of adversarial relations between the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. Interviewees who were present when the collaborations were formed described relatively lower levels of trust in the early stages, while those who entered an existing collaboration described relatively greater levels of trust. 180 “This was the first time that that relationship had ever existed between the Province of B.C. and the CHN and there was a lot of baggage on both sides.” (Interviewee 8) “[…] we were fresh off of so many disputes over the land, and then trying to come to the table to work together with some guys that we've never worked with.” (Interviewee 12) While control systems were initially imposed on the collaborations by lawyers from the Province of B.C. to reduce the risk of trusting, these systems were reported to impede development of trust because they were not developed by collaborators, lacked flexibility and were viewed as not meeting the needs of collaborators. A few interviewees noted the issue of control mechanisms serving as a substitute for trust in more general terms. “[…] there was no precedent on which to go, so they built into it some boiler plating to – [the lawyers] hoped – ensure that things would work even if there was no trust and some of those pieces of boilerplate actually got a bit in the way of establishing trust.” (Interviewee 30) 4.5.2.2 Collaborative process Representatives of the Province of B.C. involved in the Haida Gwaii Management Council typically live outside of Haida Gwaii, which limits opportunities for development of affect, emtion and bonding. In such cases, reputation and connections to local communities can help to influence trust during the early stages of individuals’ involvement in the collaboration. In contrast, members of the Solutions Table typically live on Haida Gwaii and have a shared history 181 of work experience as well as personal connections that generate affect, emotion and bonding. Several interviewees emphasized the importance of personal connection as an influence on trust. Affect, emotion and bonding were linked to tackling challenges together or treating a fellow collaborator’s challenges as shared. “[…] we built up a lot of trust through that time just from being able to talk on the phone and get together have dinner, have coffee and just build that relationship.” (Interviewee 12) “[One of the Provincial representatives said:] ‘I can't give [confidential information] but I can tell you exactly what I found when I went there.’ [And] that was a really huge step towards earning my trust, right? I was like ‘Wow, this person cares.’” (Interviewee 2) “[…] being responsive to each other's needs […]” (Interviewee 7) Ability, described in terms of relevant knowledge and accountability to local communities that are directly impacted by forest management decisions, was also emphasized as important for trust. Perceptions of accountability were noted as a persistent challenge for collaborators who live outside of Haida Gwaii. Interviewees also described the importance of selecting collaborators that have the appropriate knowledge, skills and area of focus for the collaboration. Overall, interviewees expressed that collaborators with different backgrounds who demonstrate openness to other perspectives and personal interest in Indigenous cultures and histories should be selected to cover the breadth of responsibilities of the responsibilities of the collaboration and 182 that these individuals must also be familiar with the workings of their own organizations. Having the skills to communicate with other members of their respective organizations to clarify interests and internal decision-making processes and present this information clearly to fellow collaborators was emphasized. “[…] it would be good to see decision-makers, people who are responsible for these kinds of strategic decisions, actually being resident on the islands. Because [collaborators living elsewhere] could come in and make AAC decisions and go back to wherever […] and there's no, kind of, accountability there when you're making the decision.” (Interviewee 15) “[trust is] established and reaffirmed on an ongoing, probably daily, basis, as opposed to [collaborators who live elsewhere], who do not have that experience with the people on Haida Gwaii.” (Interviewee 13) Interviewees emphasized several dimensions of benevolence. Honesty and transparency were linked to proactive information sharing, where these influences were both necessary for trust and an outcome of trust. Interviewees described the role of permeability in maintaining openness to others’ ideas and perspectives and to new ways of doing things. Commitment and honour were also emphasized as important qualitites of collaborators that were successful in building trust. Honour was described in terms of micro scale commitments in the context of work deliverables as well as honouring the broader spirit of collaborative governance established in the Kunst'aa guu – Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol. 183 “[…] a lot of it is enthusiasm for what we do.” (Interviewee 7) “[…] picking the right people that understand the two sides and putting people [at the table] that are constructive and able to see different viewpoints.” (Interviewee 3) Conduct and comportment, in the form of mutual respect for one another’s organizations, constraints and respective processes as well as objectivity and impartiality were noted as influences on trust. One collaborator clarified that respect helps to build trust, but can exist in its absence. A few interviewees noted professionalism and ability to listen as elements of respect. “[T]he Council members themselves were just very respectful of one another. They listened, they didn't take adversarial positions.” (Interviewee 30) “[…] one of the challenges […] is ensuring that we're not coming to the table with biases or preconceived notions of what outcomes should be […]” (Interviewee 11) Interviewees described the importance of integrity; however, they also referred to three sets of values: Haida values, those of their respective governments, those of the collaboration itself. These values may, at times, be understood differently by the parties or create conflicting objectives. 184 “[…] the Province is bound to their legislation and we're bound to our Stewardship Law and to the House of Assembly. So, we have different stuff that we follow, but there's also the spirit of Yahguudang, which is respect of the land. There's a whole bunch of different stuff that's in play […].” (Interviewee 2) While trust has been built within the collaborations, there remains less trust in the governments represented. Trust among collaborators does not appear to have had a major influence on trust in their respective organizations. Interviewees alluded to beliefs regarding commitment and honour on the part of individuals versus the that of the governments they represent. “You can't really trust an organization, it's the individuals of the organization you build trust with.” (Interviewee 5) “People still go back to their Ministries or […] they still work for the District and they have different agendas. […] I guess I'd say I'm more distrusting of the people behind who you're sitting with.” (Interviewee 3) “[…] institutional trust is only as deep as one group of individuals actually having faith that the others are going to do what they say. And, I think, to some degree, that's transferrable [between representatives of the same organization]. But, it's always going to come down to the relationship between people and that takes time.” (Interviewee 8) 185 4.5.2.3 Institutional design Trust began to be built as collaborators explored areas of alignment of interests. The process of working together to design the institutions helped to align interests, including shared objectives and visions of the collaborators. Interviewees noted that having clear procedures and terms of reference helped to matinain alignment of interests and that designing institutions together helped to create a sense of justice and fairness. However, interviewees noted challenges at the Solutions Table because the scope of responsibilities changed over time. This meant that new responsibilities were added in the absence of collaboratively developed institutional rules for addressing issues. “Whenever process is built from the ground up, it creates a real solid sense of working together. […] We need to be in the room with a blank piece of paper and let's start together. That way, we have buy-in to what's in front of us. And when we don't have that, there's just no trust.” (Interviewee 1) “[…] trust starts with having that similar vision and we may not always agree on how to get there or what that end result might actually look like, but we certainly agree on our task at hand and what it is we're trying to achieve.” (Interviewee 17) “I think we all just were finally able to let our guard down and say, ‘You know what? We're all here for the same purpose.’” (Interviewee 16) 186 Control systems, formal agreements and terms of reference that outline the relationship between collaborators and the objectives of the collaboration was emphasized by interviewees as important to reduce the risk of extending trust and to align interests of the parties; however, interviewees also expressed frustration regarding lack of flexibility associated with control systems. While control systems, such as the Land Use Objectives Order, provide specific types of protection within forests, strict reliance on the Order and requirements for Province of B.C. decisions under the Forest and Range Practices Act (2002) reduce flexibility for collaborators involved in decision-making. “[…] we do look at things differently and have different values but to date, because we have clear mandates, it's been pretty straightforward.” (Interviewee 3) “[The Provincial statutory decision-maker is] not allowed to go outside of what's legislated. And so even if he has a personal opinion on something, he's really focused on what he is and isn't allowed to do […]” (Interviewee 2) Consensus decision-making was also emphasized as an important element for trust. Joint decision-making, where both parties have equal influence, and creating institutional design together were viewed as important influences on trust. These elements were reported to exist within the Haida Gwaii Management Council. Joint decision-making is viewed as appropriate by representatives from both governments given the strength of claim to title of the Haida. Interviewees noted that adopting a joint decision-making model required changes to some Provincial legislation. 187 “The Haida Gwaii Management Council [is a] very positive process. It's not perfect but it's very positive and it was built together. And we have equal say there.” (Interviewee 1) “Joint decision making is very clearly defined with five areas where there's actually joint decision making and both parties have sub-delegated their authority down to these two individuals representing each party to actually make decisions. That's really powerful. I feel very trusting about that.” (Interviewee 1) “We've gone beyond, to the true spirit of Section 35 of the Constitution [Act, 1982], gone beyond the common law, to say, ‘This is what it means. Reconciliation means making decisions jointly, by statute.’ You have representatives that have equal authority, no more, no less, than the representatives that the other party has. And that's what the Haida Gwaii Management Council is.” (Interviewee 14) The Solutions Table uses shared decision-making, rather than joint decision-making, which has created tensions between the two governments. Under shared decision-making, the Province of B.C. retains authority for making final decisions on applications and consensus is not required among collaborators. While collaborators attempt to reach consensus on applications, the Province of B.C. can, and in some cases must, under Provincial legislation, make a unilateral decision to sign off on an application that is opposed by representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation if it meets the technical requirements established by the Land Use Objectives Order. 188 “At the Solutions Table proper, it's pretty equal. When it [leaves] the Solutions Table, it's unequal. The Crown still makes the decision. But that's what was agreed to. And that is the problem. There's no doubt in my mind.” (Interviewee 5) “I think the trust issue would be [improved by] having [the Haida] have real influence and power, even though they've had a huge influence.” (Interviewee 6) “[...] when there is non-consensus between the co-Chairs [and] the Province goes ahead and makes the decision anyways, […] I think that adds to a sense of lack of trust and the sense that we're not really true equals yet in this voyage that we're on.” (Interviewee 13) Several interviewees offered suggestions to improve the decision-making process at the Solutions Table. These suggestions focused primarily on justice, fairness and expectations, with an emphasis on influence. Suggestions included shifting toward joint decision-making and resolution regarding the balance of decision-making authority at a higher level of authority among the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. “[…] having the Solutions Table be a decision-making body and having higher level people sit at it and make those decisions […]” (Interviewee 4) “[…] a proliferation of non-consensus means somebody needs to sort something out at a higher level.” (Interviewee 7) 189 As a decision-making body with statutory authority vested by the Province of B.C., the Haida Gwaii Management Council goes a step further than the Solutions Table in its efforts to create alignment of interests by putting all collaborators through a two-day workshop. The workshop provides all members with background training in administrative law and Haida law, thereby ensuring collaborators are equipped with a basic level of understanding about their respective organizations and decision-making practices to understand one another’s interests and constraints. “[…] we all took administrative law training and Haida law training, with the goal to ensure that we know how to make statutory decisions […]” (Interviewee 11) “[A representative from the Council of the Haida Nation] came in and gave us two or three sessions around [Haida law] and that was helpful for our guys. I think it was even helpful for the Haida guys, trying to see what the context was.” (Interviewee 15) Collaborators did not express confidence in dispute resolution processes of either the Haida Gwaii Management Council or the Solutions Table; however, relatively greater confidence was expressed in the former. In the event of a non-consensus issue at the Haida Gwaii Management Council, the neutral Chair is expected to break a tie vote. Interviewees noted that by forcing the Chair to take a position, this dispute resolution mechanism has the potential to erode trust. “I don't think it would be good for the relationship between the Haida and the Province for the Chair to have to come in and make a decision.” (Interviewee 13) 190 At the Solutions Table, emergence of non-consensus issues resulted in creation of a new Stage 4 Process through which additional consultation is sought at a higher level of authority within the Council of the Haida Nation by the Province of B.C.; however, these discussions are not required to result in consensus. This has generated concerns regarding justice, fairness and expectations among collaborators, particularly regarding the relative influence of the two governments involved. “If we can't work it out then we sign non-consensus and then it goes to the Stage 4 process. […] [T]hat's when the two senior parties look at it again and […] try to resolve the non-consensus. And if that doesn’t happen, it might be signed or it might not be signed by the Province and issued.” (Interviewee 6) “[…] the two senior level reps from each government [have] some dialogue to try to reach, or to try to bring it back to consensus. But it hasn't worked out to any solutions to date […]” (Interviewee 12) Challenges were reported when collaborators represent political interests within collaborations that have a technical focus. However, spillover of political interests into technical discussions was reported to occur more commonly at the Solutions Table than at the Haida Gwaii Management Council, suggesting that unresolved conflict is a motivating factor for spillover of political discussions into technical ones. 191 “[…] they're saying, ‘OK, well the Solutions Table isn't the avenue to do that.’ […] And I'm saying, ‘Well if it's not here, then where is it?’” (Interviewee 2) “[…] let those people who are working on that political direction work on that piece in whatever context we're working in at that point in time. […] we can go back, as Council members, and continue down the role of the Council, the work that we're working on […]” (Interviewee 17) Interviewees also emphasized the need for a process to adapt institutional design to changing needs of both governments in a timely manner, as perceived by the parties. While there is a process for making changes to the agreements, collaborators from both governments acknowledged that the Council of the Haida Nation is increasingly frustrated that changes are either not happening or happening too slowly to meet the needs of the Haida. Some interviewees suggested that changing political priorities within the Province of B.C. have meant that support for working on the agreement has waned. “[…] there's a bunch of work and always the agreement happens and there's a signing ceremony and everybody is great, but that's just the starting line.” (Interviewee 8) “[…] nothing when you are building a relationship can stay static. It has to keep growing.” (Interviewee 5) 192 “The Haida view the Land Use Order and the Kunstaguu-Kunstaaya Protocol as a beginning.” (Interviewee 6) “[…] those were the areas where we were able to reach agreement on a government to government level, but that still falls short of recognizing all of the Haida values on the land base, right? So, it only encompasses those that we agreed upon at the time of the Land Use Plan, that doesn't preclude that there [are] other values to the Haida over the mandate.” (Interviewee 12) Some collaborators also expressed frustration at a perceived lack of flexibility by the Province of B.C. in interpreting legislation; however, others described provincial legislation as varying in the discretion afforded to statutory decision-makers and noted the challenges this presents to the collaboration. These perspectives did not divide evenly along organizational lines. “[…] I think that [the Provincial statutory decision-maker] has a much more, there's a much wider opportunity to read the legislation and see opportunity within that and I don't think he really explores that.” (Interviewee 1) “[…] they've got no choice but to sign it off because it's in the legislation.” (Interviewee 10) 193 “[…] the Solutions Table [consults on applications with respect to] 14 Acts. In [the Forest and Range Practices Act], it basically says, ‘the decision-maker must’ […] And pretty much the only time [the Provincial decision-maker] can [reject an application] is when the technical requirements aren't met [or it violates] Section 35 of the Constitution. […] So, he's extremely limited in that, but not all Acts are like that. The Land Act is almost completely discretionary. It's always ‘the decision-maker may’.” (Interviewee 4) 4.5.2.4 Facilitative leadership Facilitative leadership was described by interviewees in many ways, with different types of leadership emphasized at different stages and levels of collaboration. Interviewees variously described the leadership roles of the neutral Chair of the Haida Gwaii Management Council, Co-Chairs of the Solutions Table and the collaborators themselves. In particular, three key leadership qualities emerged: individuals were described as possessing a vision, demonstrating courage and resolve and being skilled at building relationships. These characteristics can motivate communication, align interests among the parties and signal commitment and honour. “[…] leadership can come in many forms, but I think the big leadership trait here was courage. […] [I]t's easy sometimes to be the pusher, to try to push change. What's tougher sometimes is to be the person to accept the change.” (Interviewee 7) “[The absence of a neutral chair at the Solutions Table] puts more of an onus on the members themselves to have a full discussion amongst themselves, to be straightforward and up-front with each other.” (Interviewee 13) 194 4.5.2.5 Systems context The Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table were created in the wake of a sustained effort by Haida leaders and the Council of the Haida Nation to gain influence over forest management on Haida Gwaii. Interviewees noted the importance of exercising agency power, including social organization and protest, as well as legal action in creating conditions under which the Province of B.C. was willing to engage in joint and shared decision-making. Representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation were also able to build relationships with senior representatives of the Province of B.C., including the Premier at the time, that helped to provide a more collaborative environment. The strength of governance by the Council of the Haida Nation and its ability to exercise agency power continues to shape its influence both within and outside the collaborations. “[At the beginning of the collaboration,] we have a shift to a very indescribable figure that is the President of the Haida Nation for that time and the history that he brings with him. We have a massive shift in the leadership of the, kind of, the senior bureaucrat on-island and you have a shift in the perceptions of opportunity among the professionals that worked on the islands and their ability to see the picture that was emerging and to align themselves with change.” (Interviewee 14) “[…] communities were instrumental in us making achievements […] [T]hey stood right beside us. […] And that's really important to continue. Not only the memory of it, but to continue to strive to work together. Because it really empowers us when we speak with a united voice and it makes us start to actually trust each other.” (Interviewee 1) 195 “[When the Solutions Table was formed] there was a government that really, really supported this approach and so when we went back to those folks and said, ‘OK, this agreement, the way it's set up, there's this thing that's not really working for us.’ There was a lot of willingness to say ‘OK, well how can we do it better?’ So, then CHN saw that and that faith, that trust, started to grow a little bit.” (Interviewee 8) The legacy of colonialism and history of assimilationist policy by federal and provincial governments, including intergenerational trauma associated with residential schools, was noted by several interviewees as presenting a barrier to trust in government-to-government relations. Interviewees noted the authority of the provincial statutory decision-maker at the Solutions Table level, federal and provincial legislative constructs under which this decision-maker operates and lack of federal or provincial government recognition of Haida title as examples of the continued effects of colonialism on institutional power, with implications for justice, fairness and expectations. “The stuff they've endured at the hands of Western government and organizations […] [W]e have to get to a place where a lot of our public still has a lot of resentful feelings, but we still move forward.” (Interviewee 3) “We already have title, it's just that they don't recognize it.” (Interviewee 1) 196 “To increase trust, I think we need to understand, and clearly reflect it, that the Haida have title to these islands in some fashion and then set the mechanisms to actually reflect that.” (Interviewee 5) Lack of public trust in the forest industry also remains a challenge for collaborators and creates a wedge between the Haida, who have suffered through the damage done by extractive industries over centuries, and the Province of B.C., which has typically had a more positive relationship with the forest industry. Distrust of the forest industry is reflected in the prescriptive nature of the Land Use Objectives which was designed as a control system to reduce the risk of trusting foresters and forestry companies to operate on Haida Gwaii. “[The Haida] have an inherent distrust in logging companies for the past hundred years because they've had a complete disregard for any kind of values that [the Haida] have […]” (Interviewee 2) “[…] if you look at […] places where there's these Land Use Objective Orders, you'll see that they're very prescriptive. And so that gives no real latitude for the Professional [Foresters] to be discretionary.” (Interviewee 7) Trust was also noted as important in the context of traditional knowledge. The Council of the Haida Nation has worked to formally document traditional knowledge in the form of interviews, maps and databases. While some of this information is collected specifically in the context of forest management, much of it is being gathered as supporting information for the ongoing title 197 case and cannot be disclosed until court proceedings begin. Trust in both the Council of the Haida Nation’s process for gathering this information and the perceived legitimacy of the information itself was identified as an underlying issue in the relationship between the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. “[…] what they say is, ‘How do we know you guys just didn't make that up?’ That's what we're up against, you know, when it comes to the trust aspect of this. […] [E]ither they accept [traditional knowledge] or they don't. And if they accept it, then we can move into an area where we believe trust can be built. But that's not always the case.” (Interviewee 23) “[…] the new Land Use Order Objectives, they talk about habitat [...] that's all coming from our historical and traditional knowledge as well. So, the trust is building up because we're seeing decisions not being made using that type of information and knowledge.” (Interviewee 23) 4.5.2.6 Outcomes Interviewees noted that outcomes are important for demonstrating commitment and honour and for building trust. In the early days of the collaborations, outcomes included major accomplishments, such as designing the institutions and aligning interests, as well as seemingly minor ones, such as designing business cards together. For the Haida Gwaii Management Council, outcomes were strategic in nature and included overseeing technical studies, determining the annual allowable cut for timber and establishing Land Use Objectives. For the 198 Solutions Table, goals were more operationally focused and technical in nature. Interviewees reported that seeing the outcomes of those collaborations result in changes in the way forests are managed has helped to build trust. However, other interviewees noted that outstanding issues with forest management remained a concern and continued to present a barrier to building trust. Nevertheless, the ability of the Council of the Haida Nation to influence forest management through these collaborations was viewed as a step toward building trust by several interviewees. Integration of traditional knowledge into decisions was also noted as an important outcome for building the trust of Haida collaborators. “[…] within a 2.5-year period, all of a sudden now we're creating policy together […] [W]e built a lot of those technical supporting documents for the legislation together […]” (Interviewee 7) “[…] our team has been fairly successful in moving forward in accomplishing some of our goals and being able to work together […] [I]t’s completely different than what was happening before. It's a huge first step.” (Interviewee 3) 199 4.5.2.7 Summary Table 4-4 summarizes individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust described by interviewees with experience as collaborators in the context of the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table. Table 4-4. Frequency of interviewees that identified individual influences on trust in the context of the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table. Influence on trust Frequency of response Individual influences Medium Developmental experience Low Discrimination, inequality and trauma Low Faith in humanity Low Incidental emotions Low Values Low Interpersonal influences High Ability High Affect, emotion and bonding High Benevolence High Conduct, comportment High Integrity Medium Reputation Low Takes time Medium Institutional influences Low Alignment of interests High Control vs. flexibility Medium Justice, fairness and unmet expectations High Satisfactory terms High 200 4.5.3 Case study 3: MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team Despite progress toward cooperative, shared and joint decision-making in the context of terrestrial and nearshore environments, marine areas remain largely under the jurisdiction of the federal government. With the creation of the Gwaii Haanas Marine Agreement, the Government of Canada expanded the realm of influence of the Archipelago Management Board to include the marine area by involving representatives from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Recent efforts focused on marine planning have attempted to increase Haida influence on decisions regarding the marine environment beyond Gwaii Haanas, to the remaining waters of Haida Gwaii. In 2008, the Council of the Haida Nation signed on to an initiative involving neighboring First Nations, the Government of Canada and the Province of B.C. to develop an integrated ocean management plan for the Pacific North Coast Integrated Management Area (PNCIMA) Large Ocean Management Area (Jones et al., 2010; PNCIMA Initiative, 2013). When the federal government withdrew from PNCIMA in 2011 (Kimmett, 2013), First Nations and the Province of B.C. moved ahead with marine planning under the First Nations-BC Marine Planning Partnership for the North Pacific Coast (MaPP) (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Over the next three years, the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C., represented by the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations, worked closely to develop the Haida Gwaii Marine Plan based on input from the Haida Marine Work Group and the Haida Gwaii Marine Advisory Committee (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). Input was also gathered from local governments, marine stakeholders and the public (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). 201 The Haida Gwaii Marine Plan, completed in 2015, was intended to complement the Haida Gwaii Strategic Land Use Agreement by applying principles of ecosystem-based management, adopted in SLUA for the terrestrial environment, to the marine environment and reflecting a shared perspective on how to maintain and restore a “healthy marine environment and a sustainable marine economy on Haida Gwaii” (Marine Planning Partnership Initiative, 2015). The final version of the PNCIMA Plan, approved in February 2017, established an ecosystem-based management framework as well as goals, objectives and strategies for marine planning in the region, which extends north from the tip of Vancouver Island to the Alaska border and west to the continental shelf (Council of the Haida Nation, March 2017a; DFO, 2017; PNCIMA Initiative, 2017). 4.5.3.1 Starting conditions While PNCIMA had been led by the Government of Canada, with the Province of B.C. acting more like an observer in the process than an active participant, the Province of B.C. took a much more active role in MaPP. Interviewees described that this commitment, in the absence of support from the Government of Canada, as well as alignment of interests between the two governments regarding the need for spatial planning and sub-regional planning had a considerable influence on trust. Funding to support capacity, staffing and training, provided by a third-party charitable organization, helped to make commitment possible and influenced trust by raising expectations of outcomes by both parties. 202 “[…] the federal government decided they were going to change the scope of the plans so it didn't include spatial planning and it didn't include sub-regional planning and that's when the Province and First Nations, including the Haida Nation, said, ‘Well, we need to do that other part.’” (Interviewee 33) Interviewees reported that a positive history of interactions between the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. at the local level through integration of work at the technical level and in the context of the land use planning process. These experiences supported interpersonal influences on trust, through demonstrated ability, affect, emotion and bonding, as well as institutional influences, through alignment of interests. “[…] we've had a good relationship […] where we worked together on the Land Use Plan. We try to do as much integrated as possible […] So, it was just kind of an extension, kind of like, ‘Well, we've done the land, now let's do the water.’” (Interviewee 26) “[…] we had a history of building that trust […] that all kind of led us to a place where we were comfortable partnering on the process.” (Interviewee 28) 203 4.5.3.2 Collaborative process Interviewees emphasized knowledge of local issues and interests as an important aspect of ability. Local knowledge was specifically noted as important for understanding norms, interests, impacts of decisions and precedents. The collaboration sought input from a local stakeholder committee that was appointed based on its knowledge, familiarity with local interests and ability to discuss issues without taking positions. Thus, ability was linked to benevolence through permeability. “[…] we developed a more local perspective because we had local managers […]” (Interviewee 33) “[…] they had knowledge about Haida Gwaii […] but they were not there to represent their industry […]” (Interviewee 26) Affect, emotion and bonding, generated through shared experience and personal connection, was emphasized by interviewees as important for developing trust and depersonalizing conflict. Several interviewees, including both residents and non-residents of Haida Gwaii, noted the role of shared work experience and personal connection in generating affect, emotion and bonding. However, the level of familiarity and personal connection associated with living in a small, remote community, such as those on Haida Gwaii, was also noted to present challenges for trust because people can form judgements based on personal decisions that are beyond the scope of the collaboration. 204 “[…] opportunities to socialize outside of work are super important for relationship building […] going out for a drink or dinner with those same people is a great way to get to know somebody and I think it's easier to talk to somebody that you know […]” (Interviewee 34) “[…] we know each other and if we have a disagreement, we know it's a disagreement about a certain topic […] It seldom becomes personal.” (Interviewee 26) “[…] it's not a big place, so you have personal relationships with a lot of the people that you have to engage with or you should be engaging with for different processes […]” (Interviewee 27) In terms of benevolence, permeability, compromise, commitment and honour were all described by interviewees as influences on trust. Permeability manifested as willingness to explore ideas and alignment of interests which, in turn, was related to compromise. Both making and keeping commitments were emphasized as important for building trust in individuals and organizations by interviewees that participated in the collaboration. While making commitments demonstrates benevolvence, keeping commitments provides a stronger signal of both benevolence and integrity and involves tackling challenges together. Interviewees also noted that while collaborators themselves may demonstrate commitment, challenges can arise if their respective organizations do not provide the necessary support to honour those commitments. Still, commitment itself was sufficient to influence some level of trust. 205 “[…] you need someone who's willing to look and say, ‘Well, maybe we could do that differently.’ And not be constrained by the normal rules.” (Interviewee 33) “[…] it would be difficult, you can imagine, if First Nations were working really, really hard to get some outcomes and the Province was lagging behind and taking forever to make decisions […] [H]aving each partner agreeing to timelines and working diligently towards those timelines and having those shared levels of standard in quality is really important.” (Interviewee 27) Treating others with respect was noted as an important element of conduct and comportment and was linked to integrity. Where values differed among collaborators, a few interviewees specifically underscored the need to respect others’ objectives, values and authorities. “Having a shared set of goals and compatibility, values and beliefs. And then, where they might be incompatible, just having respect for the differences […]” (Interviewee 34) Interviewees also noted the importance of time to build trust; in part, due to the need to gather information about influences on trust. Over time, collaborators form perceptions of ability, benevolence and integrity and have the opportunity to share work and personal experiences that contribute to affect, emotion and bonding. Trust was also noted to fluctuate throughout the collaborative process. 206 “[…] when you meet a new person, um, either professionally or maybe even personally, you don't know anything about the person, you want to give them the benefit of the doubt, so you're looking for signals. You're looking for clues.” (Interviewee 26) 4.5.3.3 Institutional design Interviewees described alignment of interests as both important and challenging during the process. While some collaborators expected that MaPP would be a continuation of PNCIMA, withdrawal of federal government support meant that the scope of MaPP was more limited. The Council of the Haida Nation wanted to include commercial capture fisheries in the Plan; however, the Province of B.C. lacked authority to address capture fisheries. Interviewees emphasized face-to-face meetings and permeability, in the form of openness to one another’s perspectives and ideas, as important for exploring alignment of interests and building trust. Norms of permeability were established by collaborators and supported by Co-Chairs. Alignment of interests was linked to justice, fairness and expectations through shared understanding of the mandate and anticipated outcomes among collaborators. “[…] that was one of the big challenges of MaPP -- and we all made it work -- but one of the big challenges was it came from PNCIMA, where all three parties were at the table, and then we went to MaPP, where it was only the Province and First Nations […]” (Interviewee 32) 207 “[…] if you can maintain, be consistent on the message and the role of the party throughout, [that’s] really key to maintaining that trust. Because then there's no surprises.” (Interviewee 32) “[…] being able to see somebody eye-to-eye, it puts us both in a place where we need to be a little less aggressive […] We're a little bit more solution-oriented, I think, when we're together.” (Interviewee 27) The joint dispute resolution process, which had been established and agreed to by all parties at the beginning of the collaboration, was noted as contributing to perceptions of justice, fairness and expectations by resolving issues in a way that was perceived as fair. Stability and continuity among collaborators were noted by interviewees as important, with connections to affect, emotion and bonding. Interviewees also described capacity, staffing and training as resources that support alignment of interests and help collaborators to deliver outcomes. “[…] we had some agreed-to procedures in place when we were going to enter into, when we had conflicting views and couldn't agree at a particular level […] [W]e just had a very systematic way of resolving a dispute.” (Interviewee 28) “[…] one of the biggest challenges is that you build a relationship with somebody -- positive or negative -- and then, all of a sudden, you're dealing with somebody completely different and you have to start to assess your relationship with them, whether you trust them, what you can do with them, their style [etc.]” (Interviewee 27) 208 Interviewees expressed satisfaction with the terms of the institution, which were broadly laid out at a regional scale and tailored for sub-regions, including Haida Gwaii. These terms included decision-making and reporting structures and a joint dispute resolution process. The Province of B.C. joined the marine planning process once MaPP was established and adopted the established sub-regional engagement process. The Council of the Haida Nation took a leading role at the local scale, including establishing the engagement process, rather than collaboratively developing the process. The Province of B.C. had the option to make changes to institutional design but did not feel changes were necessary. “[The Council of the Haida Nation] worked with the Haida community [including an] advisory group called the Haida Marine Work Group […] to develop the Haida perspective on the plan. […] [I]t was only after that internal process was done that other people were engaged on the islands in a larger Haida Gwaii Marine Advisory Committee role.” (Interviewee 31) “The Province has been basically playing catch up the whole process […] [T]he CHN set up the advisory committee, the advisory terms of reference set up, the process, the meeting schedule, the compensation. And then […] the Province came on board […]” (Interviewee 26) 209 4.5.3.4 Facilitative leadership Co-Chairs from the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C., respectively, were responsible for providing leadership for the collaboration. They helped to reinforce norms of permeability and focusing on interests, rather than positions, that were established among collaborators. Interviewees also noted the importance of Co-Chairs for influencing trust by remaining neutral, paying attention to group dynamics and body language and balancing power among collaborators. “[…] we selected people based on their experience and knowledge and we looked for people who weren't there to say, ‘I have a responsibility to represent this interest.’ It's more, ‘I have knowledge and experience in these areas and I'm bringing it to the table.’” (Interviewee 27) “[…] some won't talk but they'll show their concern, displeasure, pleasure, whatever, through small little signals […] [S]ome people, especially the quieter ones, it helps if you can just almost give an opportunity or force them to speak up.” (Interviewee 26) 4.5.3.5 Systems context The Council of the Haida Nation was noted to have exercised agency power through preparation and shaping the discourse regarding marine planning. This power helped to create influence for the Council of the Haida Nation and the collaboration as a whole, with implications for justice, fairness and expectations. 210 “[…] the CHN had already been working on this for six years and they started their own advisory group […]” (Interviewee 26) “[…] there was already a framework to work from when that started.” (Interviewee 31) Some interviewees reported that conflicts regarding the Government of Canada’s withdrawal from the PNCIMA process impacted trust among collaborators; however, others expressed that the relationship between the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. was stronger as a result of the Province maintaining its support of the MaPP process. An important distinction may be between distrust on the part of stakeholders, who were not involved in government-to-government negotiations, versus collaborators, who were actively involved. “There was great distrust between stakeholders and marine planning and general, and I think part of it was their soured experience with PNCIMA […] there was obviously quite a bit of distrust toward the federal government and some of that probably bled over to the Province […] [O]n the flipside, I'd say some people really sort of appreciated B.C.'s stepping up and filling the void that DFO left behind […]” (Interviewee 34) “[…] through that process, I think a lot of trust was developed with the Province.” (Interviewee 33) While the Government of Canada’s absence from MaPP limited the scope of marine planning by excluding marine transportation and commercial capture fisheries, lack of an existing marine plan and presence of relatively fewer powerful stakeholders in the marine environment created 211 opportunities for influence. Interviewees alluded to the notion that the potential to influence outcomes through MaPP helped to foster trust. In contrast, the influence of powerful stakeholders during the PNCIMA process was noted to have contributed to the withdrawal of the Government of Canada and erosion of trust. “[…] it was kind of a little easier to deal with that type of resource management because it was really around public access, space, how to allocate space for different resource user groups […] [T]here would be way more livelihoods affected when you get into the fisheries and forestry realm.” (Interviewee 28) “[…] it came out that Enbridge had lobbied the federal government to basically stop the PNCIMA process, and so that was part of it: there was a lot happening in the background and also some of the commercial fishing groups were concerned about it.” (Interviewee 33) Interviewees also noted the importance of support from within their respective organizations as an influence on trust. Political priorities can affect capacity, staffing and training available to the collaboration; commitment and honour of collaborators; and outcomes. “[…] we're the worker bees and we have a certain latitude within which we can make decisions and work on this stuff, but ultimately […] we need to follow our mandate and we can't always make those decisions so we need [leaders] to be there to express that […]” (Interviewee 32) 212 4.5.3.6 Outcomes Accomplishing intermediate outcomes throughout the process, such as agreeing on terms of reference and organizing stakeholder engagement sessions, were important for demonstrating commitment and honour. Interviewees described difficulties achieving a final version of the Haida Gwaii Marine Plan that both parties could agree on, largely due to lack of authority over commercial capture fisheries. However, collaborators were ultimately able to reach achieve alignment of interests and finalize the Haida Gwaii Marine Plan. “[…] there's certainly key points in the process […] [such as] getting our agreement in place […] [A]ctions speak louder than words, right?” (Interviewee 33) “[At the regional level] it wasn't really what the First Nations wanted in the end, but it was like, ‘Well, it's one level of government. We're going to get certain agreements with them and we'll create a plan that we can now take to the federal government and hopefully get some agreement with them.’” (Interviewee 26) 213 4.5.3.7 Summary Table 4-5 summarizes individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust described by interviewees with experience as collaborators in the context of the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team. Table 4-5. Frequency of interviewees that identified individual influences on trust in the context of the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team. Influence on trust Frequency of response Individual influences Developmental experience Low Discrimination, inequality and trauma Low Faith in humanity Low Incidental emotions Low Values Low Interpersonal influences Ability Medium Affect, emotion and bonding High Benevolence High Conduct, comportment High Integrity Medium Reputation Low Takes time High Institutional influences Alignment of interests Medium Control vs. flexibility Low Justice, fairness and unmet expectations High Satisfactory terms High 4.5.4 Individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust across case studies Analysis of the frequency of interviewees that referred to emergent themes regarding individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust provided information regarding the relative emphasis placed on these influences across case studies. Overall, fewer than one-quarter of interviewees described individual influences on trust; however, all interviewees described 214 interpersonal and institutional influences. Key individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust, indicated by the associated level of interviewees response, are summarized in Table 4-6, Table 4-7 and Table 4-8, respectively. Frequencies are categorized as low (<25 percent), medium (25-50 percent) or high (>50 percent) levels of interviewee response. Specific concepts related to these influences, organized by theme, and the associated frequency of interviewee response are presented in Appendix B . 4.5.4.1 Individual influences The frequency of interviewees that referred to each emergent theme regarding individual influences on trust is presented in Table 4-6. Table 4-6. Frequency of interviewees that identified individual influences on trust, by case study. Influence on trust Archipelago Management Board Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table Haida Gwaii Sub-region Marine Planning Developmental experience Low Low Low Discrimination, inequality and trauma Low Low Low Faith in humanity Low Low Low Incidental emotions Low Low Low Values Low Low Low A few interviewees alluded to the impacts of developmental experience on trust but withheld more specific information during interviews. The interviewer respected their level of comfort and did not press for details. The legacy of colonialism and mistreatment of Indigenous Peoples by federal and provincial governments in Canada, including residential schools and assimilationist policies, was noted by interviewees from all three governments as presenting a persistent barrier to trust in government-to-government relations. A few interviewees also 215 offered statements that reflected varying degrees of faith in humanity and values regarding trust. Interviewees that described strong faith in humanity also reported a high degree of trust in other collaborators. Trust was also reported to be influenced by situational and emotional factors beyond the scope of the collaborations. Overall, only a small number of interviewees described individual influences on trust in response to open-ended interview questions. When interviewees did note individual influences, probing questions rarely revealed additional information. Literature regarding self-reporting methods suggests several possible explanations for this occurrence including a tendency for interviewees to avoid disclosing information they feel portays them as less trusting, to feel uncomfortable disclosing information about deeply personal experiences or to look for external influences on trust to protect self-esteem (Bradley, 1978; Paulhus & Reid, 1991; Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002). 216 4.5.4.2 Interpersonal influences The frequency of interviewees that referred to each emergent theme regarding interpersonal influences on trust is presented in Table 4-7. Table 4-7. Frequency of interviewees that identified interpersonal influences on trust, by case study. Influence on trust Archipelago Management Board Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table Haida Gwaii Sub-region Marine Planning Ability Medium High Medium Affect, emotion and bonding High High High Benevolence High High High Conduct, comportment Medium High High Integrity Low Medium Medium Reputation Low Low Low Takes time High Medium High Ability, in the context of the case study collaborations, was linked to accountability and relevant knowledge, both of which had a strong local focus. Accountability to local people, provided in the form of day-to-day interactions with Haida and non-Haida community members on Haida Gwaii, as well as knowledge of local issues and interests, was linked to ability through cluster analysis. Ability was emphasized more frequently by interviewees involved in the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table than those from the other two collaborations. The role of affect, emotion and bonding in building trust was emphasized by several interviewees across all case studies, with implications for depersonalizing conflict. Familiarity and shared experience in a work setting as well as personal connections in a social setting were linked to empathy among collaborators and tackling challenges together. In particular, treating one another’s challenges as shared was highlighted by several interviewees as having a powerful influence on trust. Simply spending time with fellow collaborators and getting to know them 217 beyond their role in the collaboration was noted to be essential. Interviewees from all three governments described some of their former fellow collaborators from other governments as friends. Familiarity and personal relationships were important to several interviewees, some of whom noted that high turnover of collaborators limited ability to build trust. Affect, emotion and bonding were also reported to be more difficult to achieve among collaborators who were based in geographically distant locations. In cases where collaborators live outside of Haida Gwaii, reputation and ties to the local community helped reduce the risk of trusting and provide accountability. Benevolence was similarly emphasized by interviewees across case studies as important for building trust. Demonstrated commitment, in the form of both assertions and honour of those commitments, on the part of both individuals and the governments they represent, was described by several interviewees. Collaborators recognized the difference between individuals’ commitments and those of the organizations they represent and were willing to trust fellow collaborators who exhibited effort toward honouring commitments, even if they were ultimately unsuccessful due to factors beyond their control. Honesty and transparency, characterized in part by proactive information collection and sharing, as well as permeability, in the form of openness to new ideas and perspectives, were noted as important elements of communication that influenced trust. Interviewees also felt that elements of conduct and comportment were important for trust. Interviewees described the importance of maintaining objectivity and impartiality and demonstrating respect for fellow collaborators, such as in the context of their respective 218 organizational processes and constraints. Conduct and comportment were noted by only slightly fewer interviewees from the Archipelago Management Board than those from the other two collaborations. Interviewees described the importance of integrity, or adherence to a set of principles or values that are deemed acceptable; however, four sets of values were noted: Haida values, personal values, values of the collaboration and values of the organizations that are represented. Integrity was reported as an influence on trust by only slightly fewer interviewees from the Archipelgo Management Board than those from the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team. Following Haida values as well as organizational rules and mandates were most commonly described by interviewees involved in the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table. Interviewees also noted the importance of reputation for providing a signal of these influences at the beginning of a new collaboration or when a new individual joins a collaboration. Several interviewees also emphasized that trust takes time to develop and rises and falls over the course of collaboration. The length of time required to build trust varied from as little as six months to nearly a decade. Collaborators reported greater success building trust between individuals than building trust in the organizations they represent. Individuals indicated that they recognize organizations impose constraints on one another’s actions and decisions. Some interviewees expressed that, over time, trust developed between collaborators can transfer to others within their organization. Time was 219 most commonly reported as important by interviewees involved in the Archipelago Management Board and least commonly reported by interviewees Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table. Fluctuation in trust over time was most commonly reported by interviewees involved in the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team. Several interviewees expressed that trust was more easily built among collaborators at the technical level and that, as the level of political influence increased, building trust became more difficult. At the technical level, expressing benevolence through treating other collaborators’ challenges as shared was emphasized by several interviewees as a strong positive influence on trust. 4.5.4.3 Institutional influences The frequency of interviewees that referred to each emergent theme regarding individual influences on trust is presented in Table 4-8. Table 4-8. Frequency of interviewees that identified institutional influences on trust, by case study. Influence on trust Archipelago Management Board Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table Haida Gwaii Sub-region Marine Planning Alignment of interests High High Medium Control vs. flexibility Medium Medium Low Justice, fairness and expectations High High High Satisfactory terms High High High Alignment of interests among individuals and their respective organizations was repeatedly emphasized by several interviewees across all case studies as essential to building trust and encompasses aspects such as shared objectives, norms, values and vision. Face-to-face meetings 220 were noted to be helpful for identifying common interests and formal agreements helped to provide clarification. Developing an understanding of one another’s organizational mandates, constraints and decision-making processes was frequently linked to alignment of interests. Some interviewees also described difficulty achieving alignment of interests because it takes time and can change when new individuals or organizations join the collaboration. Alignment of interests was also linked to trust through perceptions of integrity and honour which, in turn, were linked to generating positive expectations of actions or behaviour on the part of individuals and organizations. Fewer interviewees involved in the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team noted the importance of alignment of interests, both in general and across all aspects, than interviewees involved in the other two collaborations. When trust among collaborators was low, such as at the start of a collaboration, control systems were reported to be important for reducing the risk of engaging in trust. In mature collaborations with established levels of trust, collaborators were less dependent on control systems and relied more on alignment of interests. While control systems were noted as providing necessary assurances to reduce the risk of trusting, flexibility was also noted as necessary to allow collaborators to address a range of challenges as they arose. Fewer interviewees involved in the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team described the influence of flexibility than those involved in the other two collaborations. Interviewees across all three collaborations noted the importance of justice, fairness and expectations as influences on trust. A few interviewees noted that capacity, staffing and training, including stability of these resources, were important because of their role in supporting delivery 221 of outcomes. Influence of individual collaborators and the collaboration as a whole was also noted as important, particularly in the context of decision-making and joint dispute resolution. Influence manifested, in part, in terms of responsiveness to concerns raised by collaborators: concerns that were not perceived to be addressed in an acceptable timeframe led to tensions regarding influence and fairness. Unfettered decision-making was specifically noted as important, as was local perspective and the ability to have this perspective reflected in decisions. Satisfactory terms of collaborative governance were reported to encompass aspects of accountability and reporting, adaptability and transparency. Having these terms clearly outlined in policies, procedures and terms of reference and supported by legislation was described as influencing trust. While interviewees involved in the Archipelago Management Board and Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table emphasized the importance of institutions being developed by collaborators, those involved in the MaPP Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team expressed that the institutional design was effective despite the Council of the Haida Nation taking the lead. In the latter case, representatives of the Provincial Government had the opportunity to influence institutional design, but supported the existing process developed by the Council of the Haida Nation. 4.5.5 Individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust across governments The frequency of interviewee references to emergent themes regarding individual, interpersonal and institutional influences was also used to compare the perspectives of interviewees representing the Council of the Haida Nation, Government of Canada and Province of B.C. This part of the analysis explored how representatives of these governments conceptualized trust in the context of their experiences with collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii. 222 While there was broad agreement among interviewees in terms of key individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust, subtle differences were observed among responses by representatives of the three governments (Table 4-9). Table 4-9. Frequency of interviewees that identified individual influences on trust, by government represented. Influence on trust Council of the Haida Nation Government of Canada Province of B.C. Individual influences Developmental experience Low Low Low Discrimination, inequality and trauma Medium Low Low Faith in humanity Low Low Low Incidental emotions Low Low Low Values Low Low Medium Interpersonal influences Ability High Medium High Affect, emotion and bonding High High High Benevolence High High High Conduct, comportment Medium High High Integrity Medium Medium Medium Reputation Low Low Low Takes time High High Medium Institutional influences Alignment of interests High High High Control vs. flexibility Medium Low Medium Justice, fairness and unmet expectations High High High Satisfactory terms High High High Interviewees from all three governments noted the impact of discrimination, inequality and trauma on on trust; however, a relatively greater proportion of interviewees from the Council of the Haida Nation described this influence. A slightly higher proportion of interviewees from the Province of B.C. described values as an influence on trust; however, this difference was minor. 223 Representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation placed relatively greater emphasis on accountability as an aspect of ability than representatives of the federal or provincial governments. Ability, as a general concept, was also noted by fewer federal government representatives than by representatives of the other two governments. While interviewees from all three governments noted the importance of respect, objectivity and impartiality as elements of conduct and comportment, a greater proportion of federal and provincial government representatives noted these influences on trust than did representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation. Slightly fewer provincial government representatives noted the importance of time; however, this difference was minor. Control systems were not noted as important for trust by any federal government representatives. Flexibility was also noted by a larger proportion of representatives from the Council of the Haida Nation than by federal and provincial government representatives. Overall, the balance between control and flexibility was noted most frequently by representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation and least frequently by federal government representatives. 4.6 Discussion The case studies identified five individual influences, seven interpersonal influences and four institutional influences on trust in the context of collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii. Individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust described by interviewees in the context of the case study collaborations are summarized in Table 4-10. Qualitative data analysis also identified broad similarities between conceptualizations of trust 224 among representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation, the Government of Canada and the Province of B.C.; however, some differences were observed. The case studies also demonstrated ways in which agency, institutional and structural power can positively or negatively shape individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. Table 4-10. Individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust associated with elements of collaborative governance in three collaborations on Haida Gwaii Element of collaborative governance Individual influences Interpersonal influences Institutional influences Systems context Discrimination, inequality and trauma Starting conditions Developmental experiences Faith in humanity Values Reputation Alignment of interests Control systems vs. flexibility Justice, fairness and expectations Collaborative process Incidental emotions Ability Affect, emotion and bonding Benevolence Conduct, comportment Integrity Takes time Alignment of interests Justice, fairness and expectations Institutional design Control systems vs. flexibility Justice, fairness and expectations Satisfactory terms Facilitative leadership Ability Benevolence Outcomes Ability Affect, emotion and bonding Benevolence Justice, fairness and expectations 225 4.6.1 Individual influences Only approximately twenty percent of interviewees noted individual influences on trust. Several of these interviewees described the role of discrimination, inequality and trauma (Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000; Delhey & Newton, 2005; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005); however, other influences such as developmental experience (Hofstede, 1980), faith in humanity (McKnight et al., 1998), incidental emotions (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005) and values (Butler et al., 2009) were mentioned only offhand. Literature regarding the limitations of self-reported data suggests several possible explanations for this occurrence, including self-report bias. The low level of reporting of individual influences on trust may indicate a tendency across individuals to avoid disclosing information they feel portays them as less trusting, to feel uncomfortable disclosing information about deeply personal experiences or to look for external influences on trust to protect self-esteem (Bradley, 1978; Paulhus & Reid, 1991; Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002). While several of these potential individual influences on trust are noted in the literature, interviewees did not make explicit linkages between these influences and trust in the context of the case studies. What is clear from interviewees’ experience on Haida Gwaii is the influence of the legacy of discrimination against the Haida by federal and provincial governments. A history of mistreatment and disempowerment by federal and provincial governments has created a challenging environment for building trust. The negative influence of discrimination, inequality and trauma on trust is supported by evidence from across the U.S. (Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Wilkes, 2011). Representatives from all three governments noted this challenge and expressed that, while government-to-government relations have improved in 226 recent decades, in part through the practice of collaborative governance, actions to date represent only the first steps in reshaping a relationship that requires ongoing attention, adaptation and improvement. The need to recognize and accept Haida title and traditional knowledge and to collaboratively develop institutions that reflect this recognition and acceptance emerged as an important next step for continuing to build trust. 4.6.2 Interpersonal influences Interpersonal influences on trust were strongly emphasized by interviewees from all three governments. Many of these interviewees described strong interpersonal relationships as the only way to build trust, adding that it is impossible to trust an organization. This view is supported by behavioural decision theory, which suggests that trust is only possible in the presence of considerable knowledge about another individual or individuals (Cook et al., 2005). The case studies also support published literature regarding the importance of ability (Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Earle, 2010), affect, emotion and bonding (Wong & Cheung, 2005; Schoorman et al., 2007), benevolence (McKnight et al., 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; Ashraf et al., 2006; Earle, 2010) and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995) as interpersonal influences on trust. Ability was tied to aspects of accountability, particularly to local interests and communities, as well as relevant knowledge related to issues handled by the collaboration. While the link between trust and accountability is emphasized within literature from the fields of political science and business (Caldwell & Clapham, 2003; Yang & Holtzer, 2006; Svedin, 2012), this concept has not specifically been linked to ability (Mayer et al., 1995). Presence in the local 227 community emerged in the case studies as important for perceptions of accountability because of the need to answer for decisions on a day-to-day basis. Affect, emotion and bonding was reported to be shaped by familiarity, shared experience, personal connection and tackling challenges together. Published literature notes the importance of time to allow individuals to first form judgments about one another, including considerable time spent in one another’s physical presence (Kadefors, 2004; Schoorman et al., 2007). The case studies showed that living and working in geographically distant location presents a challenging, but not impossible, environment for affect, emotion and bonding. This issue may be particularly salient in the context of collaborative governance, where federal and provincial government representatives may be concentrated in central office locations. In such circumstances, creating regular opportunities for face-to-face interaction, including informal bonding opportunities that help to reconnect collaborators to one another and their collective interests, appears to be essential. Benevolence encompassed elements of honesty, permeability and proactive information collection and sharing that appear in the literature (Mayer et al., 1995; Earle, 2010). In addition, actions such as commitment, honour of commitments and compromise were important for building trust (Korsgaard et al., 1995; Das & Teng, 1998; Vangen & Huxham, 2003; Ansell & Gash, 2007). The case studies highlighted that collaborators needed to have both the appropriate level of authority to make commitments and support from their respective organizations. 228 Collaborators also needed to proactively communicate within their own organizations as well as with collaborators to shape expectations regarding internal processes and constraints and gain support for decisions. Interviewees also described the influence on trust of conduct and comportment, specifically in terms of objectivity, impartiality and respect for others. While some literature classifies objectivity and impartiality as aspects of integrity (Borum, 2010), cluster analysis placed these influences in a separate category. Other literature emphasizes impartiality as important only for facilitative leadership (Warner, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2007), suggesting an implicit expectation that all collaborators act in leadership roles rather than seeking leadership from one or two individuals (Bradford, 1998; Lasker & Weiss, 2003). Respect, particularly where differences in priorities and values exist, was emphasized (Wong & Cheung, 2005); however, the Haida definition of respect applies more broadly to all living things (Jones & Williams-Davidson, 2000; Brown & Brown, 2009). Integrity (McFall, 1987; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Mayer et al., 1995) was equally important to representatives of the three governments but defined differently by interviewees based on four sets of values: personal values, Haida values, values of the collaboration and values of the organizations that are represented. The varying degrees of importance of these values among collaborators in terms of evaluating integrity has the potential to create conflicting objectives and expectations. Awareness of and respect for one another’s values and weaving these into institutional design can help to provide clarity. 229 While reputation is also noted in the literature (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Abrahao et al., 2017), the case studies suggest that reputation is a weak substitute for first-hand information and experience regarding other influences on trust. Reputation emerged as relevant during starting conditions, such as when a new collaboration is formed or a new collaborator joins an existing collaboration. One aspect of trust that was emphasized in the research, but has not received significant attention in the literature (Schoorman et al., 2007), is the importance of time for building trust. Interviewees described trust taking as little as six months to as long as six years to develop. The length of time required for trust to build appears to be related to starting conditions, including the history of interactions between governments, as well as the perceived level of vulnerability and degree of risk associated with trusting. Trust is also required to develop perceptions of ability, benevolence and integrity and to create affect, emotion and bonding. In this way, time is an important underlying influence with linkages to several other influences on trust. 4.6.3 Institutional influences Alignment of interests, which appears in the literature (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Das & Teng, 2001), was revealed to be a multi-faceted influence on trust, with the need for shared objectives, values and vision emphasized by several interviewees. Shared values among collaborators and their respective organizations (Sitkin & Roth, 1993) were noted as helping to provide a foundation for collaboration from the outset; however, ongoing communication remained necessary for alignment of interests throughout the collaborative process. Misalignment of interests may only become apparent when conflict occurs, in part 230 because collaborators use the same words with different meanings or hold assumptions about one another’s interests and objectives. Face-to-face meetings and formal agreements were noted as supporting alignment through helping to orient collaborators toward solutions (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Alignment of interests, combined with commitment to tackling challenges together, enabled collaborators to achieve outcomes. Viewed through a trust lens, alignment of interests, developed through open communication and information sharing, helped collaborators to gain understanding of one another’s organizational processes and crystallize expectations in the form of shared problem definitions, mandates, objectives and visions. In cases where considerable trust had been built, some interviewees reported that collaborators developed a shared identity while simultaneously upholding the mandates and interests of their respective organizations. While both control systems and flexibility are described in peer-reviewed literature on trust (Coletti et al., 2005; Willem & Lucidarme, 2014; Stern & Coleman, 2015), trade-offs between the two have received little attention. Interviewees placed greater emphasis on control systems when describing conditions at the beginning of a new collaboration or when trust within government-to-government relationships was low. However, interviewees also noted that control systems initially imposed on collaborations to reduce the risk of trusting impeded development of trust because they were not developed by collaborators and because they lacked the flexibility to address evolving needs of the collaborative process. These findings are corroborated by published literature on control systems regarding their ability to reduce vulnerability and increase willingness to trust while simultaneously acting as a barrier to trust (Willem & Lucidarme, 2014). In the case of the Archipelago Management Board, the longest-standing collaboration within this study, interviewees placed greater emphasis on the role of shared understanding for 231 creating trust. Flexibility built into the Gwaii Haanas Agreement has helped the AMB to address a range of issues as they arose, enabled adaptability to meet changing needs over time and contributed to perceptions of satisfactory terms of the agreement. Justice, fairness and expectations (Newell & Swan, 2000; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Aryee et al., 2002) were strongly linked to influence (Willem & Lucidarme, 2014). Interviewees expressed more trust in collaborations where both or all parties had equal influence, particularly in decision-making and joint dispute resolution processes. These elements are noted in the literature on consensus decision-making (Korsgaard et al., 1995; Conley & Moote, 2003; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Nesbitt, 2016). Federal and provincial legislation was reported to make true consensus decision-making challenging; however, interviewees noted examples where amendments to legislation were made to support this approach. Ensuring that collaborators have the authority to make commitments or decisions on behalf of their respective organizations can also circumvent the need for legislative change by ensuring all parties act under their respective authorities. In this way, influence of collaborators within their respective organizations was also linked to influence of the collaboration as a whole. Fairness became a concern in situations where collaborators did not have equal influence within their own organizations to make commitments and decisions during the collaborative process. Capacity, staffing and training was also linked to expectations through their effects on a collaboration’s influence and ability to achieve outcomes. Finally, existence of satisfactory terms (Wong & Cheung, 2005), as perceived by collaborators, acted to influence trust. Satisfactory terms encompassed policies, procedures and terms of reference that form part of the institutional design. These terms helped to provide clarity and 232 guidance to collaborators and supported alignment of interests; however, they also needed to be adaptable over time based on the needs of the collaborators and the issues at hand. Collaborators also expressed greater satisfaction with terms that supported transparency and were developed jointly, rather than imposed by one party. The process of designing institutions supported alignment of interests through communication. Legislative support for institutional design also influenced trust, in part through its ability to bolster influence of the collaboration and support outcomes. 4.6.4 Perspectives on trust across governments As noted in Rousseau et al. (1998), trust hinges on “willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.” Following from this definition, building trust requires shared expectations among individuals regarding which intentions or behaviour are needed for trust to occur. If expectations differ, individuals may struggle to behave in ways that positively influence trust or convey trustworthiness (Jones & George, 1998). Differences in values, calculative processes and social constructions across individuals and groups have the potential to shape development of trust (Yousfi, 2010). In this way, cultural differences in conceptions of trust among representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation, Government of Canada and Province of B.C. have the potential to shape the ability of collaborators to build trust. However, the research revealed broad agreement across representatives of the three governments in terms of their perceptions of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust, suggesting that intervewees shared a generally similar understanding of what is important. 233 Interviewees from all three governments noted the impact of discrimination, inequality and trauma on on trust; however, a relatively greater proportion of interviewees from the Council of the Haida Nation described this influence. Representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation also expressed these impacts very personally, in terms of effects on their families and communities. These differences indicate that, while federal and provincial government representatives are aware of the influence of discrimination, inequality and trauma, they are not confronted with daily reminders of its impact. Research regarding awareness of residential schools and discrimination against Indigenous Peoples in Canada supports this finding (Environics Institute, 2016). For example, in 2016, 66 percent of non-Indigenous Canadians had heard about residential schools, compared to only 51 percent in 2008 (Environics Institute, 2016). Representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation also placed relatively greater emphasis on accountability as an aspect of ability than did representatives of federal or provincial governments. In particular, accountability to local communities was emphasized. This concern has its roots in an environment where resource extraction has a legacy of benefitting non-residents and federal and provincial authorities based in geographically distant locations issued decisions without Haida input (Takeda, 2010; Lee, 2012; Markey, 2012), representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation have become sensitized to the need for local accountability. While interviewees from all three governments noted the importance of objectivity, impartiality and respect as elements of conduct and comportment, a greater proportion of federal and provincial government representatives noted these influences on trust than did representatives of 234 the Council of the Haida Nation. This may reflect cultural differences in what constitutes appropriate professional behaviour. For example, the traditional view that everything is connected is encompassed within the Haida value of Yahguudang (Council of the Haida Nation, 2007). Indigenous knowledge is strongly rooted in observation and engagement with the natural world, which can put Indigenous approaches to science-based decision-making at odds with Western approaches that prioritize distance and objectivity (Black Elk, 2016; Ludwig, 2016). In situations where such differences exist, respect for others’ approaches and worldviews is particularly important. Control systems were not noted as important for trust by federal government representatives; however, very few federal government representatives also made references to flexibility. A relatively greater number of representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation noted the influence of flexibility, while a greater proportion of representatives of the Province of B.C. noted the influence of control systems. These findings run counter to expectations that the Council of the Haida Nation may be less willing to be accept vulnerability and more reliant on control systems based on the history of adversarial relations with federal and provincial governments. Instead, representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation appear to prioritize flexibility to address a range of issues and concerns as they arise, while representatives of the Province of B.C. prioritize control systems such as prescriptive rules and legislation. The literature regarding trust and control systems presents several perspectives on the relationship between the two. Some researchers describe trust as a type of control mechanism (Bradach & Eccles, 1989), while others conceive of trust as a substitute for control (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). A third view positions them as distinct concepts that are both linked to cooperation (Das & Teng, 235 1998; Coletti et al., 2005). While Coletti et al. (2005) found that control systems motivate cooperation, which leads to trust, other researchers describe control systems as a substitute for trust with positive or negative impacts on its development (Mayer et al., 1995; Schoorman et al., 2007; Stern & Coleman, 2015). Both positive and negative impacts of control systems were described by interviewees. 4.6.5 The role of power While power-sharing between governments is central to collaborative governance (Dolšak & Ostrom, 2003; Morten, 2009; Berkes, 2010a,b; Innes & Booher, 2010; Zurba, 2012; Lyver et al., 2014), the case studies illustrated varying degrees of power-sharing and highlighted some of the ways that power affects individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. Power can be analyzed in terms of three highly interdependent layers: agency power, institutional power and structural power (Haugaard & Clegg, 2009; Takeda & Røpke, 2010). Agency power refers to the capacity of individuals to mobilize resources and act on their own interests, institutional power describes the distribution of authority and influence entrenched in established rules, roles and responsibilities and structural power refers to the macro-societal structures that shape the perceptions, decisions and actions of individuals (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). Agency power can be further broken down into instrumental power, which emphasizes the role of resources in influencing outcomes, and discursive power, through which parties manipulate the desires of others (Haugaard & Clegg, 2009). 236 Lukes (2005) also notes that conflict is crucial for identifying power in relationships: without the exercise of power in the form of conflict, power dynamics fail to show up. Conflict plays an important role in identifying and shifting power between parties engaged in collaborative governance (Lukes, 2005; Sandström et al., 2013). On Haida Gwaii, the history of collaborative natural resource governance is punctuated by conflict. In response to intensive resource extraction, the Council of the Haida Nation exercised agency power through preparation, negotiation, social organization and protest as well as institutional power leveraged through legal action. This exercise of power precipitated signing of both the Gwaii Haanas Agreement and the Kunst’aa guu-Kunst’aayah Reconciliation Protocol. Representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation also exercised agency power through building relationships with senior representatives of the Province of B.C., an approach to power that is rooted in Haida cultural values of Yahguudang (respect for all things) and Isda ad diigii isda (giving and receiving). The federal and provincial legislative frameworks, including the Indian Act, established institutional power dynamics between the Haida and settler governments that have influenced the systems context. The legacy of colonialism and history of assimilationist policy operationalized under this legislative framework continues to present a barrier to trust in government-to-government relations. Strong and unified Haida governance, through which the Haida exercise their own institutional power, has helped to counteract these influences; however, considerable distance remains to be covered before expectations of the Haida in terms of full equality in decision-making can be met. Additional forms of institutional power exist within the case study 237 collaborations themselves through institutional design that dictates the roles of collaborators and participation in the decision-making process (Purdy, 2012). The case studies showed that differences between levels of decision-making authority among collaborators can create challenges related to justice, fairness and expectations. Unilateral exercise of power, such as in the event of a decision or conflict, either within the collaboration or at more senior levels in one of the organizations represented, was noted across case studies as a serious threat to trust. Structural power relationships, shaped by historical and social influences, operate through the systems context and transcend institutional boundaries (Emerson et al., 2012; Brisbois & de Loë, 2015). In this broader structural, social context, power is described as “a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures (‘rules of the game’) that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970: 43-44). Structural power is perpetuated through institutional design and the collaborative process (Healey, 2003). On Haida Gwaii, structural influences have contributed to discrimination against the Haida, leading to inequality and trauma, with negative implications for trust (Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Wilkes, 2011). Structural power also shapes collaborators’ assumptions about appropriate ways of thinking, speaking, acting and making decisions (Foucault, 1974). The case studies illustrated this issue regarding the human relationship to nature: while the Haida value of Yahguudang asserts that everything is connected (Council of the Haida Nation, 2007), federal and provincial government departments strictly adhere to jurisdictional authorities for decision-making (Pinkerton, 2007). 238 This difference in approaches is described in the literature in terms of holism versus segmentalism (Pinkerton, 2007). Operating within federal and provincial legislative frameworks, collaborations are limited in the scope of their decisions in ways that are at odds with Yahguudang. 4.6.6 Limitations Three notable limitations of the methods used in this study have implications for accuracy and generalizability of results: use of comparative qualitative case studies, small sample size of interviews and reliance on self-reported data. Qualitative case study methods have fallen in and out of favour among social science researchers since the 1960s (George & Bennett, 2005). Critics of the qualitative case study approach point to concerns regarding over-reliance on inductive reasoning, representativeness, generalizability and ability to discriminate between competing explanations (George & Bennett, 2005). However, advocates assert that case study methods trade off theoretical parsimony, offered by statistical methods, for explanatory richness and offer the benefit of providing instances of classes of events upon which theory can be developed (George & Bennett, 2005; Hyett et al., 2014). Since representativeness and generalizability were not primary goals of this research, the trade-off between parsimony and richness was deemed to be acceptable (George & Bennett, 2005). Collaborative governance on Haida Gwaii has been referred to in guidance for governance best practices (e.g. National Centre for First Nations Governance, 2013), making the cases included in this research of particular interest. Using both within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons helped to strengthen inferences drawn from the data (George & Bennett, 2005). 239 Because the research was grounded in published literature regarding trust, the case study approach also helped to achieve construct validity (George & Bennett, 2005) in the context of collaborative governance in Canada. Construct validity will support future empirical testing of the revised theoretical framework through a survey of individuals involved in similar collaborations across Canada. The case study approach also provided information about causal relationships between influences on trust that may not have been apparent through quantitative methods, such as surveys, and revealed information about multiple influences and variables, unlike controlled experiments which test one or a few variables at a time (George & Bennett, 2005). Sample size of interviews for qualitative research is a similarly debated topic. Qualitative studies typically have smaller sample sizes than quantitative studies and many scholars argue that the concept of saturation is the most important consideration when choosing sample size in qualitative research (Mason, 2010; Dworkin, 2012). Saturation is typically deemed to occur when additional data collection offers no new or relevant data (Charmaz, 2006; Dworkin, 2012). Use of peer-reviewed literature to identify potential influences on trust helped to achieve saturation at a smaller number of interviews than would have been possible using a grounded theory approach, which uses an emergent process to discover codes. In the context of this research, saturation was achieved when no new major codes were identified through additional coding of interviews and only sub-codes were added. 240 While self-reporting is a relatively easy way to explore people’s perceptions of others and of their own experiences, self-reports are prone to various forms of response bias and may result in misattribution of correlational and causal relationships (Stone et al., 2000; Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002). Donaldson & Grant-Vallone (2002) describe self-report bias as influenced by characteristics of the respondent, the measurement situation and the construct of interest (e.g. sensitivity of the information). In particular, socially desirable responding may lead interviewees to respond to questions in ways that present a favourable image of themselves. As a result, they tend to under-report behaviours they feel may portray them negatively and over-report behaviours they believe cast them in a favourable light (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002). The length of time between the event in question and its reporting may also make accurate recall of events challenging, particularly where interviewees who were involved during the early stages of a collaboration or are reporting on recurring events that blend together in memory, such as routine meetings of collaborators (Jobe, 1999). To delve deeper into questions about individual influences on trust, future research may require greater participant anonymity than is afforded by the in-person interview format (Bowling, 2005). Research participants may be less prone to social desirability bias feel and more comfortable responding to questions and regarding individual influences through a survey instrument (Bowling, 2005) where items are designed to use indirect questioning (i.e. “for typical collaborators”) rather than direct questioning (i.e. “for themselves”) (Revzina, 2008) and confidentiality is briefly mentioned, rather than emphasized at the beginning of an interview (Singer et al., 1992). 241 Despite these limitations, the case studies indicate areas of exploration for future research on individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. Self-reporting offers the benefit of ease of interpretation, richness of information, motivation for interviewees, causal explanatory force and practicality (Paulhus & Vazire, 2009). 4.7 Conclusions This chapter explored individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust in the context of three cases of collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii: the Archipelago Management Board, the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table and the Marine Planning Partnership for the North Coast (MaPP) Haida Gwaii Sub-Regional Technical Team. These case studies were used to compare experiences regarding trust across three different resources – a protected area, forests and a marine area – in the same cultural, political, historical, legal and geographic context. The history of mistreatment and disempowerment by Indigenous communities, including the Haida, by federal and provincial governments has created a challenging environment for building trust. The influence of discrimination, inequality and trauma on trust is corroborated by the trust literature. While government-to-government relations between the Council of the Haida Nation and the federal and provincial governments have improved in recent decades, these developments represent only the first steps toward reshaping the relationship. 242 Interpersonal influences on trust including ability, affect, emotion and bonding, benevolence and integrity that appear in the literature were also observed in the case studies. Influences on trust that are not emphasized in the literature also surfaced in the case studies. Accountability was emphasized by interviewees as an important element of ability, a finding that is not highlighted in the literature. Collaborators also expressed that conduct and comportment, including respect for others as well as differences between collaborators, were important influences. Interviewees also emphasized the importance of time to build trust, a finding that does not feature prominently in trust literature. The level of trust among collaborators was also noted to fluctuate over time across all collaborations. While published literature states that trust can be placed in organizations, interviewees emphasized strong interpersonal relationships as the only way to build trust and expressed that it is impossible to trust an organization. Institutional influences were found to encompass alignment of interests, justice, fairness and expectations and satisfactory terms. Alignment of interests, which appears in the literature, was revealed to be a multi-faceted influence on trust that includes shared objectives, values and vision. Justice, fairness and expectations were strongly linked to influence, with interviewees expressing greater trust in collaborations where both or all parties had equal influence. Consensus decision-making was emphasized across collaborations as an important influence on trust. While both control systems and flexibility are described in peer-reviewed literature, trade-offs between the two, which were noted during the case studies, have received little attention. Interviewees also placed greater emphasis on control systems as influencing trust at the beginning of a new collaboration or when trust within government-to-government relationships was low. 243 While there was broad agreement among interviewees regarding individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust, some differences were observed between the three governments. A relatively greater proportion of interviewees from the Council of the Haida Nation described the influence of discrimination, inequality and trauma. Representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation also placed relatively greater emphasis on accountability, particularly to local communities, as an aspect of ability than did representatives of federal or provincial governments. A relatively greater proportion of federal and provincial government representatives noted the importance of conduct and comportment. Flexibility, as well as the balance with control, was noted by a larger proportion of representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation than of other governments. The case studies illustrated varying degrees of power-sharing between governments and highlighted some of the ways that power affects individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. Over the history of the case studies, federal and provincial governments have responded to natural resource conflict on Haida Gwaii using institutional power established under their respective legislative frameworks and the Council of the Haida Nation has responded with agency power in the form of preparation, negotiation, social organization and protest as well as institutional power leveraged through legal action. The legacy of colonialism and history of assimilationist policy operationalized under federal and provincial legislative frameworks continues to present a barrier to trust in government-to-government relations. Strong and unified Haida governance has helped to counteract these influences; however, considerable distance remains to be covered if true power-sharing is to be achieved. 244 This study focused on how trust is created between collaborators engaged in collaborative natural resource governance, including the role of institutions in reducing the risk of engaging in trust; however, several interviewees described the importance of trust that community members have in the collaborations themselves. There exists an important analytical difference between this type of institutional influence on trust and the trust that individuals, including members of the public, have in institutions. Community members gain or lose trust through their experiences with representatives of an institution experiences the system by interacting with other actors who represent the system. Public trust in the collaborations themselves is necessary to ensure outcomes will be supported and can influence dynamics among collaborators who are expected to remain accountable for their decisions. Future research could explore influences on public trust in collaborations by extending the sampling frame to include interviews with community members to provide further insights into how trust is created. The case studies provide initial insights regarding which influences that appear in the trust literature may be particularly important in the context of collaborative natural resource governance and where gaps may exist. While the research design of this study limits generalizability of the results, future research can help to expand the scope of analysis to include a larger number of collaborations and experiences. In particular, a survey of collaborators engaged in collaborative natural resource governance across Canada can increase generalizability, determine common factors among influences on trust and identify the relative importance of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. This research, which forms the subsequent phase of this study, will have broader applications across collaborative governance institutions, particularly those involving Indigenous communities. 245 Chapter 5: How institutions shape trust during collective action: A case study of forest governance on Haida Gwaii 5.1 Introduction Trust is known to be important for collective action (Kahan, 2003). Individuals who have faith that others will contribute to collective activities will voluntarily respond in kind, leading to subsequent cooperation in kind as individuals observe others contributing to public goods (Kahan, 2003; Berkes, 2010a,b). Mutual trust also lowers transaction costs (North, 1990), such as those associated with monitoring others’ actions (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Pretty & Ward, 2001; Vanni, 2014) and administering incentive schemes to entice compliance (Kahan, 2003). In her Nobel Prize4 lecture, Dr. Elinor Ostrom noted the “central role of trust” in addressing collective action problems among individuals involved in multi-level, polycentric governance of common-pool resources (Ostrom, 2009). Her lecture concluded with a call to identify how institutions help or hinder collective action, including by motivating trust (Ostrom, 2009). However, trust remains an understudied construct within the context of collective action. While some scholars have explored the role of social capital and norms (e.g. Keefer & Knack, 2005; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009), literature on collective action “has paid more attention to payoff functions than to how individuals build trust” (Ostrom, 2009). The trust literature offers insights regarding characteristics of institutions that motivate trust and Farrell (2009) calls for “a properly developed theoretical account of how trust and institutions interact.” Ostrom & Ahn (2009) provide a theoretical foundation for this work by outlining the relationship between institutions, 4 Ostrom received the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel; commonly (inaccurately) referred to as the Nobel Prize in Economics. 246 trust and collective action. Empirical research, including case studies, can help to identify which characteristics of institutions that appear in the trust literature are particularly relevant for motivating trust and, subsequently, collective action. Collaborative forest governance on Haida Gwaii, an archipelago located off the coast of British Columbia, Canada, offers an opportunity to explore the characteristics of institutions that motivate trust to support collective action. Conflict between the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of British Columbia (B.C.) regarding widespread industrial logging led the two parties to sign a Reconciliation Protocol in 2009, which established two distinct but related structures to govern forest and land use on Haida Gwaii: the Haida Gwaii Management Council (HGMC) and the Solutions Table. This paper presents a case study of the characteristics of institutions that motivate trust based on interviews with past and present members of the Haida Gwaii Management Council and of the Solutions Table. As Indigenous communities across Canada – and around the world – regain control over lands and resources, experiences from Haida Gwaii can provide insights for how institutions can motivate trust and support collective action involving Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments. This paper builds on an existing theoretical framework that links institutions, trust and collective action (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009) and characterizes institutions that motivate trust to support collective action based on empirical research from a case study of collaborative forest governance on Haida Gwaii. 247 5.2 Trust, collective action and the role of institutions Ostrom & Ahn (2009) outline the relationship between institutions, trust and collective action (Figure 5-1). According to this framework, forms of social capital – including trustworthiness, networks and institutions – motivate trust which, subject to contextual variables, supports collective action. Figure 5-1. Trust, forms of social capital and their linkage to achieving collective action (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). Trust has been explored from the disparate perspectives of economics, management, marketing, psychology and sociology and is defined in many ways throughout these bodies of literature (Castaldo, 2002; Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010; Schilke & Cook, 2013). One common definition, adopted in Ostrom & Walker (2003: 6) from Rousseau et al. (1998: 395), describes trust as the “intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions of the behavior of another.” The perception of trust by an individual, referred to as “subjective trust,” is believed to arise as result of the existence of trust antecedents which motivate trusting actions, or “behavioural trust” (Gillespie, 2003; Das & Teng, 2004; Colquitt et al., 2007; Gillespie, 2012). Antecedents of trust include actions such as making promises, shaping expectations of behavior, expressing normative values and developing a shared identity (Davis & 248 Holt, 1993; Ostrom, 2003). Trust between actors involved in collective action can enable joint gains that exceed the value of those possible through acting alone (Ostrom & Walker, 2003). Mutual trust also lowers transaction costs (North, 1990), such as by reducing the need to monitor others (Pretty & Ward, 2001; Vanni, 2014) and creating incentives to invest in collective activities based on confidence that others will do the same (Berkes, 2010a,b). However, the temptation to betray another’s trust – for example, by breaching the terms of a contract or agreement – in pursuit of short-term gain creates a challenging environment for building or maintaining trust among actors (Ostrom, 2003). Despite this temptation, people cooperate more frequently than rational choice models would predict (Davis & Holt, 1993; Ostrom, 2003). “Building trust,” notes Ostrom (2003: 34) “appears to be a key link in the communication-cooperation connection.” Poteete et al. (2009) note that early theories of collective action focused on individual resource users acting independently and in self-interest, leading to resource depletion if not for private ownership or regulation (Poteete et al., 2009). Examples included the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) and the problem of free-riding (Olson, 1965). However, field-based studies documented many cases of successful collective natural resource governance in the absence of private ownership or government regulation, leading game theorists and other scholars to develop new equilibrium concepts and more realistic models of human behavior and strategic interaction (Poteete et al., 2009). This included development of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982) which sought to explain collective action in field settings of diverse and complex institutions (Poteete et al., 2009). Thus, early explorations of collective action that focused on 249 actions taken by a group of individuals in pursuit of members’ perceived shared interests (Marshall, 1998) gave way to analyses of complex, multilevel and polycentric institutions (Poteete et al., 2009), including co-management (Berkes, 2009; Vanni, 2014) and institutional collective action (Feiock, 2013). Co-management describes a partnership that bridges levels of governance by sharing power, knowledge and responsibility between a central government and local resource users (Singleton, 1998; Berkes, 2009: 1692; Berkes, 2010a,b; Vanni, 2014). In such arrangements, different levels of organizations bring their respective comparative advantages in generating and mobilizing knowledge at different scales (Vanni, 2014) to support collective action through increased efficiency and legitimacy (Singleton, 2000). By comparison, institutional collection action (ICA) describes decisions that involve two or more independent formal authorities (Feiock & Scholz, 2010; Feiock, 2013). ICA recognizes that, while only individuals are capable of action, individuals often act as composite actors in the name of or in the interest of a group or organization (Ostrom, 2005; Feiock & Scholz, 2010). Such arrangements can result in collective action dilemmas among government authorities “similar to those much-studied problems for individuals” (Feiock & Scholz, 2010: xv) in which decisions made by one independent formal authority do not consider costs or benefits imposed on others (Feiock & Scholz, 2010; Feiock, 2013). However, in both types of arrangements, collective action may be motivated by the potential to increase quality and lower cost of information, enhance effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement and increase legitimacy of the system through involvement of multiple actors in its development (Vanni, 2014). 250 Institutions are an important form of social capital that can help actors increase trust during collective action (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). They can act as antecedents of trust by creating favourable assumptions and expectations about a potential trustee’s behaviour and reducing the risk of one or more parties behaving in an untrustworthy manner (Möllering, 2006; Farrell, 2009; Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). The trust literature refers to this phenomenon as “institution-based trust” (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011) and describes how institutions can offer assurances (e.g. Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) to prospective trustors and sanctions (e.g. Shapiro et al. 1996) to potential defectors. Ostrom (1986, 1990: 51, 2011) defines institutions as “the sets of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will he used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must not be provided and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions.” This set of rules typically includes some combination of formal rules, such laws, agreements and contracts, as well as informal rules, such as customs, traditions and norms (Coleman, 1990; Coletti et al., 2005; Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011), that collectively represent shared understandings among actors regarding what actions are required, prohibited or permitted (North, 1990, 1991; Crawford & Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom, 2011). Such institutions are used by individuals to organize and govern themselves to reduce information asymmetry, provide guidelines for behaviour and increase the likelihood of collective action by reducing the temptation to defect – in essence, to behave in a trustworthy manner (Möllering, 2006; Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). 251 Because rules are subject to interpretation (Aligica and Boettke, 2009, 2011), stability of actions based on rules hinges on existence of shared meaning among actors (Ostrom, 2011). However, shared meaning itself can shift over time due to changes in norms, events or the state of knowledge (Ostrom, 1980). The trust literature points to several characteristics of institutions that motivate trust by creating favourable or unfavourable assumptions and expectations about actors’ behaviour (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). These characteristics are summarized in Table 5-1. However, this literature encompasses a broad range of institutions. While it offers a list of characteristics of institutions that may be conducive to trust, empirical research regarding natural resource governance institutions is needed to inform development of formal and informal rules that are tailored to this type of collective action situation (Ostrom, 2009). 252 Table 5-1. Characteristics of institutions that motivate trust (Hotte et al., 2018). Influence on trust Source Justice, fairness and expectations Aryee et al. (2002); Dirks & Ferrin (2002) Alignment of interests; value alteration; selectivity in transactions; research/information revelation Bhattacharya et al. (1998) Norms; sanctions Coleman (1990) Control systems Coletti et al. (2005) Mutual interests; interpersonal trust; joint dispute resolution; policies and procedures; reporting structure; staffing and training; decision-making process; rituals, ceremonies and networking; proactive information collection; setting objectives; planning and budgeting Das & Teng (2001) Interaction frequency; symmetry of dependence; multiplexity of relationships and cooperation-related incentives Eberl (2003) Structural assurance belief; situational normality belief McKnight et al. (1998) Expectations embedded in norms, structures and institutions Newell & Swan (2000) Interaction of past exchange experiences and expectations of continuity Poppo et al. (2008) Power in social exchange Schilke et al. (2015), Wu & Wilkes (2016) Leadership styles Schaubroeck et al. (2011) Communication; cooperation; performance Seppanen et al. (2007) Relational form, depth and risks Sheppard & Sherman (1998) Type of instigation; network size; flexibility/adaptability; influence Willem & Lucidarme (2014) System-based trust (satisfactory terms, adoption of alternative dispute resolution, reputation) Wong & Cheung (2005) 253 Contextual issues of power also have important implications for trust and collective action in co-management and ICA arrangements. Because institution-building occurs in a particular political, social and economic context (Prabhu et al., 2007; Berkes, 2010a,b), the ability to exercise power and the kinds of powers held be each party can shape institutions in important ways (Ribot et al., 2006; Berkes, 2010a,b). For example, rules may be crafted by actors themselves, imposed by one governing body or some combination thereof and are shaped by exogenous influences. While Ostrom (1990) asserts that resource users themselves must devise their own rules, norms, and sanctions to ensure that group interests are in line with those of individuals to influence behaviour and create legitimacy (Vanni, 2014), the level of power-sharing, devolution of powers and retention of existing powers may be more strongly influenced by one party in co-management – typically, by state governments. And while formal rules are explicitly negotiated, informal rules often emerge from independent instances of social bargaining between actors in a manner that reflects implicit power relations (Farrell, 2009). Actors that are more powerful may be expected to be more successful in these social bargaining situations, with actors’ expectations crystallizing over time and reinforcing imbalances of power (Farrell, 2009). If one party possesses a high degree of power, they may have little or no incentive not to renege on their commitments (Farrell, 2004). Thus, the risk of trusting may be perceived by a potential trustor as too great. Trust is only possible to the extent that both parties value continuation of the relationship and have some reason to take the other’s interest into account (Farrell, 2004). 254 5.3 Collaborative forest governance and trust on Haida Gwaii Collaborative management, or collaborative governance, are often used as synonyms for co-management (Berkes, 2010a,b). In Canada, collaborative management typically refers to an informal (non-legal) relationship, while the term co-management is reserved for formal power-sharing arrangements involving a state government and local resource users (Berkes, 2009; 2010). However, no single, universally accepted definition of co-management exists because there is a continuum of arrangements with different degrees of power sharing (Pinkerton, 1989; Armitage et al., 2007; Berkes, 2010a,b). Where two or more parties to a co-management agreement participate and share power under their own authorities, the relationship resembles an ICA arrangement. At the other end of this continuum, participation in collaborative governance may be limited to an advisory capacity (Bowie, 2013). Approximately 490 bilateral and trilateral agreements have established collaborative governance arrangements involving Indigenous organizations and governments and provinces regarding lands, resources and economic development in Canada (Papillon, 2015). Development of these agreements has been motivated by a combination of jurisprudence regarding Aboriginal rights and title (e.g. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, Haida Nation v. British Columbia) and conflict associated with increasing pressure on natural resources (Papillon, 2015). These institutions have developed in an environment where trust is particularly elusive due to a history of assimilation and domination carried out under Canadian laws such as the Indian Act (Blackstock, 2001). These laws have, over the past 150 years, been used to restrict First Nations5 Peoples’ freedom to 5 In Canada, Indigenous Peoples are variously described as belonging to one of three groups: First Nations, Inuit or Métis. The Haida are one of the First Nations (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). 255 practice their culture, to access the justice system and to self-determination, among other injustices (Blackstock, 2001; Carlson, 2010; Coates & Carlson, 2013). Federal and provincial institutions treated First Nations people as inferior and assumed responsibility for decisions on their behalf, including through the reserve and residential school systems (Blackstock, 2001). While some blatantly discriminatory elements of the Indian Act have been removed, the colonial spirit of the Act is preserved in its remaining form. This legacy has generated conflict and mistrust between First Nations and federal or provincial governments (Canada et al., 1996; Blackstock, 2001) and has important implications for how power is shared in collaborative governance by assigning authority for natural resource decisions primarily to federal and provincial governments. Collaborative forest governance on Haida Gwaii, which involves the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C., has developed against the backdrop of this legacy and the history of industrial resource extraction it supported (Lee, 2012). Haida Gwaii, formerly known for a time as the Queen Charlotte Islands, is an archipelago of more than 350 islands located off the North Coast of British Columbia, Canada, and home to some of the world's last remaining tracts of intact coastal temperate rainforest (Gaston et al., 2008; Takeda & Røpke, 2010). The cool, oceanic, humid-perhumid climate, with mean annual precipitation of 1,100 to 4,200 mm (Environment Canada, 1980), supports a range of ecosystems, a largely forested landscape (Gaston et al., 2008) and a current annual allowable cut of 921,500 cubic metres per year through licenses administered by the Province of B.C. (Sutherland, 2012). 256 The Haida’s connection to the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii dates back more than 10,000 years (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). Throughout the 20th century, Haida Gwaii was subject to widespread industrial logging and the Haida were denied a voice in natural resource governance decisions by federal and provincial governments (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). Even after a Supreme Court ruling in Haida Nation v. British Columbia recognized the strength of the Haida’s claim to Aboriginal title and established the Province of B.C.’s obligations regarding consultation and accommodation (Jones et al., 2017), the Province of B.C. failed to act accordingly in its decision regarding a forest tenure (Takeda & Røpke, 2010). This failure sparked a protest in 2005, called Islands Spirit Rising, which focused on increasing the role of the Haida in forest governance (Dean, 2009). The protest generated political pressure that resulted in interim protection for culturally and ecologically significant areas and features, launched a renewed land use planning process and set in motion a series of negotiations that led to four documents that underpin collective action for forest governance on Haida Gwaii (Table 5-2) (Council of the Haida Nation, November 2010; Takeda & Røpke, 2010; Egan, 2011). 257 Table 5-2. Documents that outline formal rules for collective action for forest governance on Haida Gwaii. Agreement Highlights Strategic Land Use Agreement (2007)  Outlined sustainable forestry practices  Established terrestrial protected areas over 52% of land area  Described interim and permanent protection measures for new protected areas  Identified land use objectives and governance structures  Lowered the annual allowable cut (AAC) from 2.2 million cubic metres per year (m3/y) to 800,000 m3/y  Committed to joint analysis and determination of future timber harvest Kunst'aa guu-Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol (2009)  Committed to seeking “a more productive relationship”  Represented “an incremental step in a process of reconciliation of Haida and Crown titles”  Outlined shared and joint decision-making respecting lands and resources on Haida Gwaii  Introduced the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table Land Use Objectives Order (2010)  Addressed technical components of ecosystem-based management  Expanded on Province-wide land use objectives to include locally-important cultural and ecological features Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act (2010)  Delegated authority for the following decisions to the Haida Gwaii Management Council: o Determining the Annual Allowable Cut for timber o Establishing and amending objectives for the use and management of land and resources o Developing protected area management plans o Establishing policies and standards for identification and conservation of heritage sites These four documents, the terms of which were negotiated and agreed to by the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C., established and provide the basis for formal rules for two governing bodies: the Haida Gwaii Management Council and the Solutions Table (Figure 5-2). The former consists of two representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation, two representatives of the Province of B.C. and one neutral chairperson who is jointly appointed. The 258 latter also includes four members, two from the Council of the Haida Nation and two from the Province of B.C.; however, one co-chair is appointed from each organization. While the Haida Gwaii Management Council makes decisions, the Solutions Table is a vehicle for consultation and accommodation. Figure 5-2. Governing bodies involved in forest and land management on Haida Gwaii (Hotte et al., 2018). These developments have increased the degree of influence of the Council of the Haida Nation over decisions about lands and resources on Haida Gwaii relative to the former top-down governance approach. Collective action on forest governance has led the Haida to achieve several of their goals for resource management including protection of Haida cultural sites, a fifty percent reduction in the annual allowable cut of forests, implementation of ecosystem-based management and a doubling of the area of parks and protected areas (Penikett, 2012). Strategic Technical Political Reconciliation Table Haida Gwaii Management Council Solutions Table Decision-maker for CHN Integrated Stewardship Team Statutory decision-maker for B.C. Operational 259 Consequently, this approach to forest governance is often looked to as an example by other jurisdictions (e.g. National Centre for First Nations Governance, 2013; Dowie, 2017: vii). The events leading up the establishment of collaborative forest governance on Haida Gwaii illustrate a fundamental ICA dilemma: as resource use began to approach a critical threshold, decisions by one government with formal authorities over aspects of forest and lands management (i.e. the Province of B.C.) imposed growing negative externalities on another government (i.e. the Council of the Haida Nation) (Feiock & Scholz, 2010). The existence of these negative externalities led to conflict and transaction costs in the form of litigation and protest. To achieve both governments’ objectives, representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. had to move from a place of distrust and conflict to one of collective action. These developments have increased the degree of influence of the Council of the Haida Nation over decisions regarding lands and resources on Haida Gwaii compared to other top-down Provincial governance approaches. Trust has been essential for these collaborations, which are indicative of a broader shift in government-to-government relationships involving Indigenous communities across Canada. The experiences of individuals involved in forest governance through the Haida Gwaii Management Council and the Solutions Table can offer insights regarding how formal and informal rules can motivate trust among actors in collective action situation. By empirically examining the institutional rules that motivate trust in forest and land management processes on Haida Gwaii, this research also addresses Ostrom’s call to action to identify institutional rules that motivate trust and support collective action. 260 5.4 Methods A case study approach was used to empirically examine characteristics of formal and informal rules that motivate trust among actors involved in collective action for forest governance on Haida Gwaii. This approach was chosen because it provides an opportunity to examine logic posited by theorists by comparing empirical evidence with relevant theories and determining whether it is consistent or challenging (Janssen & Ostrom, 2006). Case studies have been used extensively in the literature regarding collective action theory (Janssen & Ostrom, 2006). In this study, we empirically examined characteristics of formal and informal rules that motivated trust among actors involved in collective action for forest governance on Haida Gwaii through the Haida Gwaii Management Council and the Solutions Table (the “collaborations”). Case studies of this type have been used extensively in collective action research and provide an opportunity to compare logic posited by theorists to empirical evidence, determining whether it is consistent or challenging (Janssen & Ostrom, 2006). The research was planned cooperatively with representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation (CHN) and the Province of B.C., with approval subsequently sought and obtained from both the CHN and the Office of Research Ethics at the University of British Columbia (UBC). Data was obtained through semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 17 people who are currently or were formerly involved in one of the collaborations for a period of at least one year.6 This included eight representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation, nine representatives of the Province of B.C. and two individuals who had participated in the Haida Gwaii Management Council as neutral chairs. All interviews were conducted by the lead author on Haida Gwaii, 6 These 17 interviewees are a subset of those who participated in the case studies discussed in Chapter 4. 261 either in person or by telephone, over a two-month period beginning in mid-February 2017. These interviews explored experiences of individuals in the collaborations, their perceptions of trust and influences that they felt shaped these perceptions. Open-ended questions (e.g. “Tell me about your experiences with X.”) and clarifying questions (e.g. ‘‘Can you give me an example?’’) focused on subjective and behavioural trust (Gillespie, 2003; Das & Teng, 2004; Colquitt et al., 2007; Gillespie, 2012) and followed an unconstrained format and allowed conversation to flow naturally (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Questions focused primarily on collective choice rules, which determine who is eligible to make operational rules and how they may be made and changed (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 2005), as these are most relevant to the collective action situations in which interviewees operate. Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim and systematically coded and analyzed using NVivo software (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). NVivo 11 software supported interpretation of qualitative codes and abstraction of themes. Initial codes regarding characteristics of institutions that motivate trust were identified from peer-reviewed literature (Table 5-1). This initial list of codes was expanded during interviews to capture participant experience, support analysis from both theoretical and emergent perspectives and create a typology based on related concepts (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Codes regarding the forms of formal and informal rules used by the Haida Gwaii Management Council and the Solutions Table were identified from the interviews. A codebook was maintained in NVivo 11 that contained a list of codes accompanied by a definition, brief description, instructions for when to use the code and when not to use the code (i.e. inclusion and exclusion criteria) and an example (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). A sample of three transcripts was coded by an independent 262 researcher, who was not affiliated with the research, to analyze internal consistency of codes based on a comparison of codes assigned by the lead author and the independent researcher. Internal consistency was analyzed using Cohen’s kappa (κ=0.44) and weighted kappa statistic (κW=0.44) (Davey et al., 2010). These coefficients indicate fair to moderate (George & Mallery, 2003) agreement between coders. Due to the large number of codes used in this study, this level of interrater reliability was deemed acceptable. Data analysis was performed in an iterative cycle that allowed continuous comparison of new results with previous findings to inform subsequent analysis (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Once all interviews had been coded, transcripts were reviewed again and, where necessary, recoded to reflect codes that had been derived through subsequent interviews. Agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis was then performed using NVivo 11, which employs the complete linkage (i.e. farthest neighbour) algorithm to calculate Pearson correlation coefficients based on words within each theme and concept code. The most similar concepts were grouped under their respective themes to develop a coherent narrative of the trust-building process across cases. A matrix query was conducted in NVivo to identify references to that linked rules-in-use and characteristics that motivated trust. Query results were exported to Microsoft Excel and an “if” statement was used to convert numerical data to a qualitative indicator of presence (“X”) or absence (“ ”) at each intersection. Cutting and sorting was then used to identify quotes that described characteristics of rules-in-use that motivate trust (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). Expert views are reported anonymously; numbers in parentheses that follow interview quotes indicate a specific interviewee response. 263 5.5 Results Interviewees described three forms of formal rules (agreements, procedures and terms of reference and legislation) and one form of informal rules (norms), as well as fourteen associated characteristics that motivated trust. Cluster analysis reduced the fourteen characteristics to four clusters: alignment of interests, fairness, cohesion and satisfactory terms of cooperation. These forms of rules and the characteristics that motivate trust are summarized in Table 5-3 and described in this section, supplemented by excerpts from participant interviews. Table 5-3. Characteristics of formal and informal rules that motivate trust. Characteristics of rules Alignment of interests Fairness Cohesion Satisfactory terms Adaptability Shared beliefs Flexibility Responsiveness Shared values Shared vision Influence Unfettered authority Shared identity Stability Accountability Developed by collaborators Shared objectives Transparency Forms of rules Agreement X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Procedures and terms of reference X X X X X X X X X X X X Legislation X X X X X X X Norms X X X X X X X X X 5.5.1 Agreements Agreements were noted to provide clarity regarding shared objectives and secure commitment among actors. Importantly, interviewees noted that these agreements should be developed by both parties, recognize respective authorities of the parties and commit them to jointly developing further rules such as procedures and terms of reference. 264 “We agree that [the forests and lands] can be looked after, and we agree to a structure to look after them and then develop the rules there.” (Interviewee 9) Several interviewees from both collaborations also noted that agreements should be adaptable to evolving needs of both governments over time. Representatives from both governments acknowledged frustrations resulting from the pace and degree of change since the Kunst'aa guu-Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol was signed. This particular agreement, named using the Haida word for “the beginning” (Dowie, 2017), was intended to mark the beginning of a new relationship among the parties. However, a few interviewees noted that changing political priorities have reduced political will to continue to work on the relationship. This has been viewed by some as a lack of commitment, which has led to a decline in trust. “[…] we agree that these are the things we need to move on jointly now and everything else, we need a better system than we had before and we need to work on what the future of those decisions and that kind of engagement is going to look like as time goes along, into the future.” (Interviewee 14) “[…] trust is continuing to build on a relationship, keep moving forward in some fashion, but also keep understanding that there's two partners in the relationship that demand attention.” (Interviewee 5) 265 Agreements can also act as a substitute for trust, especially due to the changing nature of governments. While mutual understanding may be reached among senior leaders within two governments at a particular time, changes in one or both governments can lead to shifting priorities. Agreements enshrine commitments made by both governments and provide a point of reference that reduces the risk of engaging in collective action. “[…] don't leave them to trust, but rather, be clear about what the arrangement is […] down to the signed agreement.” (Interviewee 9) Interviewees also specifically noted the importance of two elements of agreements – decision-making processes and joint dispute resolution. Joint decision-making, which is used by members of the Haida Gwaii Management Council members and requires consensus except in the event of a tie-breaking vote, provides both parties with equal influence and was viewed as having a positive influence on trust. Joint decision-making was viewed as appropriate by representatives from both governments given the strength of claim to Aboriginal title of the Haida. “[It’s a] very positive process. It's not perfect but it's very positive and it was built together. And we have equal say there.” (Interviewee 1) “You have representatives that have equal authority, no more, no less, than the representatives that the other party has.” (Interviewee 14) 266 In contrast, the Solutions Table uses shared decision-making, under which the Province of B.C. retains authority for making final decisions on applications. Consensus is not required among collaborators, which has created tensions between the two governments. While collaborators attempt to reach consensus on applications, the Province of B.C. can and, in some cases, must under Provincial legislation, make a unilateral decision to sign off on an application that is opposed by representatives of the Council of the Haida Nation if it meets the technical requirements established by the Land Use Objectives Order. “At the Solutions Table proper, it's pretty equal. When it [leaves] the Solutions Table, it's unequal. The Crown still makes the decision.” (Interviewee 5) Dispute resolution processes are used to manage disputes between actors in the event of conflict regarding a decision. Collaborators expressed concerns regarding dispute resolution processes of both the Haida Gwaii Management Council and the Solutions Table; however, relatively greater confidence was expressed in the former. In the absence of consensus among members of the Haida Gwaii Management Council, the neutral chairperson is expected to cast a deciding vote. Interviewees noted that by forcing the chairperson to take a position, this process has the potential to erode trust. “I don't think it would be good for the relationship between the Haida and the Province for the Chair to have to come in and make a decision.” (Interviewee 13) 267 At the Solutions Table, emergence of non-consensus issues led to the creation of a new process through which additional consultation is sought at a higher level of authority within both governments. The process was developed by collaborators and provides a transparent record of discussions that outlines areas of disagreement regarding issues that meet the technical requirements of the Land Use Objectives Order; however, these discussions are not required to result in consensus. This has generated concerns regarding influence and fairness. “[…] the two senior level reps from each government [have] some dialogue to try to reach, or to try to bring it back to consensus. But it hasn't worked out to any solutions to date […]” (Interviewee 12) “[…] a proliferation of non-consensus means somebody needs to sort something out at a higher level.” (Interviewee 7) 5.5.2 Procedures and terms of reference Agreements were associated with procedures and terms of reference that performed provided specific guidance to actors. The Kunst'aa guu-Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol, for example, includes the Streamlined Process, which outlines procedures for the Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table. “Appendix A to the Streamlined Process […] has 14 different Acts in it and it goes through all the different types of authorizations and whether they're Scenario 1s or 2s. [It’s] very key to how the process works.” (Interviewee 4) 268 Procedures and terms of reference were described as important for establishing guidance for actors, including clarifying a shared vision, values and/or objectives and establishing accountability to those aspects. Developing procedures together was important for building trust, helped actors to clarify shared objectives and provided opportunities for actors to tackle challenges together. In situations where norms regarding relevant issues and knowledge differed among representatives of the two governments, terms of reference helped to bridge the divide by drawing attention back to a shared vision and objectives. “We need to be in the room with a blank piece of paper and let's start together. […] [W]hen we don't have that, there's just no trust.” (Interviewee 1) “The process of building the administrative structure […] was pretty helpful, I think, in helping build that confidence […] [I]t became a common effort.” (Interviewee 15) “[…] we do look at things differently and have different values but to date, because we have clear mandates, it's been pretty straightforward.” (Interviewee 3) Interviewees described that, while some procedures were formally established through documents such as the Streamlined Process, others were established collectively by actors themselves. The Haida Gwaii Management Council, for example, established a procedure to maintain continuity among members through staggered terms. This procedure was contrary to the Streamlined Process but helped knowledge and norms pass from one set of Council members to the next. 269 Some interviewees noted challenges at the Solutions Table because the scope of responsibilities changed over time and new responsibilities were added without collaboratively developed institutional rules. 5.5.3 Legislation Legislation and regulations, such as the Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act and Land Use Objectives Order, were described by interviewees as both a result of distrust and a motivator for trust. Some interviewees pointed to the stringency and prescriptiveness of the Land Use Objectives Order as evidence of the lack of trust between the parties when the Kunst'aa guu-Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol was negotiated. Others noted that these same characteristics helped to establish specific, shared objectives of the two parties, which served to motivate trust. These perspectives were complementary, rather than conflicting, and indicate the dual role of legislation and regulations. Interviewees from both governments and both collaborations expressed support for the Land Use Objectives Order and described it as a positive development. Joint development and implementation of the Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act and the Land Use Objectives Order were noted as important characteristics for motivating trust. “[The LUOO] gives you a recipe of what you have to do. The prescriptiveness of the objectives is what demonstrates a lack of [trust].” (Interviewee 7) “We probably have the most stringent regulatory regime in the world on Haida Gwaii here. So, I feel good about that and I trust that we're managing that together very well.” (Interviewee 1) 270 While several interviewees described the importance of representatives of the two parties working together to develop legislation and regulations, a few noted that these documents remain limited by the Provincial legislative framework. This creates a persistent imbalance in the level of influence each party can exert in the process, with the Council of the Haida Nation operating at a disadvantage. 5.5.4 Norms Interviewees described norms related to honesty, permeability, respect, commitment and tackling challenges together. The first three relate to communication, while the latter two relate to behaviour. Honesty was noted to help to actors to align interests through communication and required permeability to ensure actors were prepared to listen and be open to others’ perspectives as well as respect for differences. Nested within the norm of honesty was an expectation of proactive information sharing, both among collaborators and with their respective organizations, that meant actors trusted others to raise any issues that were relevant to their collective role. Commitment and tackling challenges together enabled actors to persevere in times of disagreement and continue to seek consensus. A norm regarding commitment to seeking consensus was noted to both support decision-making help avoid use of the dispute resolution process. Thus, the strength of this particular informal control enabled it to act as a substitute for formal controls. 271 Norms were noted to have been consciously shaped among actors during the early stages of collective action and continued thereafter; however, new actors experience a period of adjustment. A few interviewees from the Province of B.C. also noted the role of hiring and recruitment, through which actors are selected to participate in collective action, in maintaining these norms by selecting individuals who behave accordingly. Shared values and beliefs were important for shaping norms; where differences existed, interviewees described struggling to act according to norms. Interviewees from both collaborations made statements that reflected values regarding which issues and what knowledge they felt were relevant during collective action. While interviewees from the Council of the Haida Nation tended to note the importance of traditional knowledge and a holistic approach to decisions that reflected the Haida value of Yahguudang (respect for all things), interviewees from the Province of B.C. referred more frequently to objective and science-based decisions that were seen to be within the mandate of the collaboration. In situations where actors disagreed about which topics were open to discussion or what information was admissible when making decisions, trust diminished. At times, distrust of one another’s knowledge hindered actors’ ability to shape collective norms related to relevant issues and knowledge. Norms of permeability and respect helped to mitigate the effects of differences in values. “[…] there's Haida law and traditions and there's a whole slew of things […] that aren’t in Provincial mandate.” (Interviewee 3) 272 Interviewees also noted differences between the two governments with respect to beliefs about influence. While the Haida governed forests on Haida Gwaii for millennia, the Province of B.C. has primarily assumed authority for decisions over the past 150 years. The Kunst'aa guu-Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol recognizes these differences in beliefs “with regard to sovereignty, title, ownership and jurisdiction over Haida Gwaii” (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009). Interviewees noted that these differences in beliefs have manifested in actors behaving according to norms regarding their organization’s perceived level of influence, rather than a shared norm of equal influence established within the spirit of the Protocol. This was specifically noted with reference to handling of non-consensus issues among members of the Solutions Table by more senior level bureaucrats. “[The Province has] done it a certain way for so long […] I think it's kind of different for them.” (Interviewee 3) “I think that adds to a sense of lack of trust and the sense that we're not really true equals yet in this voyage that we're on.” (Interviewee 13) Norms were seen to have some degree of substitutability with procedures and terms of reference. For example, norms of honesty and proactive information sharing prompted actors to engage in practices that supported transparency in ways that were not formally documented in procedures and terms of reference. 273 5.6 Discussion The case study and its underlying theoretical framework (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009) focused on how formal and informal institutions motivate trust; however, trust has also been shown to motivate development of institutions. For example, trust between individuals is important for establishing new collaborations (Coleman & Stern, 2018) and jointly developing institutions (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Emerson et al., 2012; Coleman & Stern, 2018). This finding supports the notion of a cyclical process through which designing institutions builds trust which can subsequently be reinforced by these institutions (Mayer at al., 1995; Nooteboom, 2005; Davis et al., 2018). The theoretical framework should thus recognize this cyclical relationship between institutions, trust and collective action. Furthermore, while institutions may establish constraints that reduce the risk of defecting from collective action by reducing the benefits of defection and increase its costs; however, the role of individuals’ personal characteristics and interpersonal relationships should not be overlooked. Micro-level influences on trust include psychological dimensions that are shaped by an individual’s own life experiences and interactions with other actors (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau 1998). While the case study focused on the characteristics of formal and informal rules that motivate trust, other areas of the literature that are relevant to the discussion are the characteristics of individuals and of interpersonal relationships. Ostrom & Ahn (2009) identify trustworthiness and networks as important for trust, but do not consider the role of individual characteristics. Integration of these aspects in further research can contribute to a more holistic theoretical framework for trust in the context of collective action. 274 The case study identified fourteen characteristics of formal and informal rules as having a positive influence on trust. These characteristics were reduced to four clusters: alignment of interests, fairness, cohesion and satisfactory terms of cooperation. Alignment of interests, which is noted in the literature as having an influence on trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Das & Teng, 2001), encompassed elements of adaptability, shared beliefs, flexibility, responsiveness, shared values and shared vision. However, the case study also highlighted an important difference in shared values, with specific implications norms of collective action: while the Haida value of Yahguudang asserts that everything is connected (Council of the Haida Nation, 2007), the Province of B.C. strictly adheres to jurisdictional authorities for decision-making (Pinkerton, 2007). This difference in approaches, which is described in the literature in terms of holism versus segmentalism (Pinkerton, 2007), created challenges among actors in this study who needed to determine what information and which issues were relevant to decision-making. Fairness, which is noted in the literature (Newell & Swan, 2000; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Aryee et al., 2002), was linked to influence (Willem & Lucidarme, 2014) and unfettered authority. Equal influence, particularly in decision-making and joint dispute resolution processes, was particularly important. This finding is unsurprising given the potential for coercion (Williamson, 1993) in situations where power or influence are imbalanced. Joint development and implementation of the Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act and the Land Use Objectives Order, as well as joint decision-making by the Haida Gwaii Management Council, were noted as examples where equal influence had motivated trust among actors. In contrast, provincial legislation that both 275 established the decision-making authority of the statutory decision maker for the Province of B.C. and limited their discretion in decision-making made equal influence challenging for members of the Solutions Table, with negative consequences for trust. Cohesion was expressed in terms of shared identity and stability. Shared identity is described in the trust literature with reference to identification: actors are more likely to trust others they identify as similar to themselves (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996; Bhattacharya et al., 1998) and be concerned for one another's outcomes (Bhattacharya et al., 1998). When fully developed, a shared identity can enable actors to internalize one another’s desires and intentions (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996). Stability is noted in the literature with reference to continuity due to its role in generating expectations of behaviour among actors, supporting sequential actions and connecting the past with the present and future (North, 1991; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Poppo et al., 2008). From a game theory perspective, actors are more motivated to honour trust if interactions are repeated (Eberl, 2003). Satisfactory terms of cooperation (Wong & Cheung, 2005), as perceived by collaborators, included aspects of accountability, development by collaborators, shared objectives and transparency (Willem & Lucidarme, 2014). These terms provided clarity and guidance to collaborators, supported alignment of interests and limited opportunism. Collaborators expressed greater satisfaction with terms that were developed jointly, rather than imposed by one party, suggesting a strong connection to fairness. 276 Indeed, the four clusters that emerged in this study demonstrated some degree of overlap. Shared objectives, for example, may be part of a broader shared vision. Satisfactory terms must reflect fairness and alignment of interests and cohesion may be supported by alignment of interests. Nevertheless, these clusters help to highlight overarching themes that unite the characteristics of rules that motivate trust. These characteristics were described with reference to three forms of formal rules (agreements, procedures and terms of reference and legislation) and one form of informal rules (norms). While all four forms of rules were associated with alignment of interests, fairness and satisfactory terms of cooperation, only three forms of rules were associated with cohesion. The notable omission was legislation, which did not necessarily need to support cohesion to motivate trust. Instead, legislation functioned more as a tool to induce cooperation. Some researchers argue this is evidence of mere coordination or confidence, rather than of trust (Williamson, 1993; Eberl, 2003). The distinction is particularly murky because formal rules and trust can be either complements or substitutes (Woolthuis et al., 2005). Eberl (2003) emphasizes that trust includes an emotional dimension that “cannot be fully controlled by organizational measures.” The case study showed that a sense of cohesion can be supported through procedures and terms of reference that document the shared nature of the relationship and support transitions between actors but that norms also play an important role. Elements of cohesion were both supported by norms, which contributed to a sense of shared identity and stability, and enabled the establishment of norms. 277 The case study also indicated some degree of substitutability between formal and informal rules. A norm regarding commitment to seeking consensus was noted to substitute for reliance on a dispute resolution process; however, existence of both controls safeguarded against breakdown in one or the other. Terms of reference also served as a substitute for norms among representatives of the two governments regarding what types of knowledge and issues are relevant to discussions. Evidence of the imperfect nature of this substitution is provided by non-consensus issues between the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. at the Solutions Table. While the Kunst'aa guu-Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol and the Streamlined Process formally outlined the relationship between the two parties, Haida norms of reliance on traditional knowledge and Yahguudang (respect for all things) continue to conflict with norms of Provincial representatives regarding objectivity, science-based decision-making and a focus on mandates. While the case study focused on the role of formal and informal rules in motivating trust among actors, the social, economic and political setting in which these rules are created and operationalized also has profound effects (North, 1991; Williamson, 1993). In the framework presented by Ostrom & Ahn (2009), these contextual variables have important implications for trust. The Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table operate within federal and provincial legislative frameworks and, as such, are subject to established power dynamics that have created the potential for coercion and opportunism. The legacy of colonialism and history of assimilationist policy operationalized under this legislative framework continues to present a barrier to trust by and shifting the costs of defection from collective action onto the Council of the Haida Nation. In the event of non-consensus among members of the Solutions Table and a 278 decision by the Provincial statutory decision-maker under their authority, established under the provincial legislative framework, the Council of the Haida Nation must bear the costs of a lawsuit or protest. While these terms were agreed to by both parties under the Kunst'aa guu-Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol, the institutional environment has created forces that make power-sharing in collective action challenging. The case study highlights fundamental differences in approaches to power and participation among the Council of the Haida Nation and the Province of B.C. The Kunst'aa guu-Kunst'aayah Reconciliation Protocol notes that “The Parties hold differing views with regard to sovereignty, title, ownership and jurisdiction over Haida Gwaii,” with each claiming sovereignty (Council of the Haida Nation and Province of B.C., 2009). This would indicate an institutional collective action arrangement in which each party engages in collective action under its own authority, such as at the Haida Gwaii Management Council. The Solutions Table; however, operates akin to a collaborative governance arrangement in which the Council of the Haida Nation act in an advisory capacity as a local resource user. This imbalance in the costs of defection was noted as a serious threat to trust. 5.7 Conclusions This paper delved deeper into characteristics of institutions that motivate trust to support collective action. It focused on formal and informal rules and provided linkages to theoretical works from the trust literature and empirical case study of collaborative forest governance on Haida Gwaii. The case study identified fourteen characteristics of formal and informal rules that motivated trust. 279 These characteristics were grouped into four clusters that highlight overarching themes among characteristics of rules that motivate trust: alignment of interests, fairness, cohesion and satisfactory terms of cooperation. Jointly developing rules and ensuring they were adaptable to evolving needs over time was particularly important for motivating trust. Where distrust existed, such as during the early stages of collective action, some forms of formal rules acted as both a substitute for trust and a motivator for it. Informal rules, in the form of norms, were shaped by actors over the course of collective action. The case study also indicated some degree of substitutability between formal and informal rules; however, existence of both forms of rules safeguarded against breakdown in one or the other. Trust literature suggests that formal institutions may be relatively more important during early stages of collective action (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). Over time, actors gain information about one another, relatively greater weight placed on informal rules and interpersonal relationships (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). Longitudinal or comparative case study approaches that examine relative influences of formal and informal rules over time are needed to test these theories. The case study also highlights the importance of power-sharing for trust. While the trust literature identifies characteristics of institutions that motivate trust, some of which relate to power-sharing, contextual variables can limit the degree to which power is shared and constrain the potential to create trust. This may be particularly relevant to cases of collective action involving Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments, where parties disagree on their respective authorities. 280 An important next step in this area of research would be to develop studies to better understand the influence of institutional characteristics on trust and to identify measureable outcomes of collective action. Exploring situations where participants make decisions under different sets of rules can help to predict actions and outcomes in a range of institutional settings. This type of information could be used to develop rules that support collective action among actors who manage common-pool resources. 281 Chapter 6: Influences on trust during collaborative natural resource governance: A survey of collaborations across Canada 6.1 Introduction Despite considerable evidence regarding the importance of trust in collaborative governance (Huxham et al., 2000; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Ran & Qi, 2018), including that of natural resources (Ostrom, 2003; Stern & Coleman, 2015), few studies have attempted to test a multidimensional theory of trust in this context (Hotte et al., 2018). Rousseau et al. (1998) observed that to study trust within and between organizations requires exploring the issue at a variety of levels encompassing micro-level individual psychological processes, interpersonal group dynamics and macro-level institutional arrangements. An extensive body of literature on trust drawn from several disciplines, including economics, management, marketing, psychology and sociology (Castaldo, 2002; Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010; Schilke & Cook, 2013) provides a basis for a multidimensional exploration of this topic. Research that adopts a multidimensional approach to trust has the potential to generate insights into how trust is created during collaborative natural resource governance and improve processes and outcomes by encouraging cooperation (Kahan, 2003; Berkes, 2010a,b). However, building trust can be challenging because interests, values and problem definitions often conflict and distributions of power, risk and vulnerability may be inequitable (Balint et al., 2011; Margerum, 2011). Thus, the question of how trust is created is important for advancing natural resource management (Stern & Coleman, 2015). Trust can be particularly difficult to build in contexts marked by a history of conflict (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments in Canada is such a context, where the challenge is to build 282 constructive, collaborative relationships (Coates & Crowley, 2013). Since the time of European exploration and contact, colonial governments have dispossessed Indigenous peoples of their lands (Menzies & Butler, 2008; Sinclair et al., 2015; Ladner & Tait, 2017), but in recent decades, jurisprudence has motivated growing recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples in Canada, leading to an increase in collaborative governance between Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments (Nikolakis & Hotte, 2019). However, the colonial history and injustices perpetrated under the federal Indian Act remain critical barriers to trust in an environment where power imbalances persist (Nadasdy, 2003; Nadasdy, 2005; Nadasdy, 2006; Menzies, 2015). Indigenous peoples remain suspicious of non-Indigenous governments' capacity to negotiate in good faith and to share power beyond tokenism, while federal/provincial governments doubt Indigenous peoples' capacity to make sound decisions and to limit their claims against the state (Goetze, 2005). Where these governments engage in collaborative natural resource governance, it may be in the best interest of both parties to build a trusting and trustworthy relationship to achieve mutual objectives; however, issues such as power asymmetry (Huxham et al., 2000; Ran & Qi, 2018) and discrimination perpetrated against Indigenous peoples (Sinclair et al., 2015) remain barriers to trust. Peer-reviewed literature on collaborative governance emphasizes the importance of trust during collaborative natural resource governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Emerson et al., 2012) and the role of power asymmetry as a barrier to trust (Ran & Qi, 2018). Frameworks and analyses for trust in the context of collaborative governance typically focus one or two types of antecedents, or influences on trust (e.g. Davenport et al., 2007; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Smith et al., 2013) and on trust between stakeholders and in managing agencies (e.g. Davenport et al., 2007; Smith et 283 al., 2013; Coleman & Stern, 2018a; Davis et al., 2018). Few studies have tested a multidimensional theory of trust (Schoorman et al., 2007; Hotte et al., 2018), particularly in the context of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities (Nikolakis & Nelson, 2018). This paper approaches the question of how trust is created in this context by integrating the frameworks of Mayer at al. (1995) and Ostrom & Ahn (2009) with empirical work previously published by the authors (Hotte et al., 2018). Mayer et al. (1995) identify trustor’s propensity and factors of perceived trustworthiness in terms of ability, benevolence and integrity as influences on trust, while Ostrom & Ahn (2009) emphasize the influence of institutions in addition to trustworthiness but neglect to note the role of individual propensity. Hotte et al. (2018) combines these frameworks to take a multi-dimensional approach to trust; the former being used to elucidate individual and interpersonal influences on trust, and the latter describing institutional influences on trust. The current study used a survey of 51 representatives of Indigenous, federal and provincial or territorial governments with experience in natural resource collaborations from across Canada to identify the how important individual, interpersonal and institutional influences are for motivating behavioural trust toward other collaborators. The survey empirically tested a multi-dimensional theoretical framework for trust developed by Hotte et al. (2018) to support triangulation and generalization (Morse, 2003). 284 6.2 Research objective This study identified the importance of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences in motivating trust behaviours in government-to-government relationships involving Indigenous communities. It focused on representatives of Indigenous and federal or provincial/territorial governments engaged in collaborative natural resource governance in Canada. Recognising the importance of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust, we identified eight hypotheses related to the magnitude and direction of these influences on behavioural trust, five of which (H1-H5) were previously observed in case studies that informed this research (Hotte et al., 2018). We proposed that: (H1) individual influences on trust will have an impact on behavioural trust, with this impact being positive for some influences (e.g. faith in humanity, incidental emotions, values) and negative for others (e.g. developmental experience, discrimination, inequality and trauma); (H2) interpersonal influences on trust will have a positive association with behavioural trust; and (H3) institutional influences on trust will have a positive association with behavioural trust. We also proposed that there would be interacting effects, through which: (H4) individual influences on trust will have a positive association with interpersonal influences on behavioural trust; and (H5) institutional influences on trust will have a positive association with interpersonal influences on trust. Three additional hypotheses (H6-H8) were added subsequent to the case studies, based on the literature. We proposed that (H6): trust in institutions will have a positive association with behavioural trust; (H7) trust in government will have a positive association with interpersonal influences on trust; and (H8) trust in institutions will have a positive association with trust in government. 285 6.3 Background The term “collaborative governance” is typically applied to governance arrangements that focus on public policy decision making and management, while engaging people from public, private or civic spheres for a public purpose (Innes & Booher, 1999; Emerson et al., 2012; von der Porten et al., 2016). Literature on collaborative governance involving Indigenous peoples emphasizes power sharing, participation and intercultural purpose (Hill et al., 2012), as well as integration of traditional Indigenous rights and knowledge alongside Western approaches (Goetze, 2005; Natcher et al., 2005; Tipa & Welch, 2006; Pinkerton, 2007; von der Porten et al., 2016). Typologies of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous peoples (e.g. Berkes, 1991, 1994; Tipa & Welch, 2006; Hill et al., 2012; Wyatt et al., 2013) present a spectrum of arrangements that vary in the degree of power-sharing. At one end of the spectrum, Indigenous communities and leaders are limited to an advisory role; at the other, power is shared more evenly through co-governance, and Indigenous communities have significant roles in decision-making (Bowie, 2013). Examples of the latter include cooperative management (Langdon et al., 2010), co-management (Armitage et al., 2009) and shared- or joint decision-making (Hillier & Metzger, 2015). Collaborative governance arrangements at the former end of the spectrum risk being viewed as illegitimate by Indigenous communities due to insufficient power-sharing, failure to address the aspirations of Indigenous communities or lack of respect for traditional knowledge (Tipa, 2002; Tipa & Welch, 2006; von der Porten et al., 2016). Trust is also emphasized in the literature on collaborative governance involving Indigenous Peoples, particularly with linkages to power (Nadasdy, 2006; Menzies, 2015). Representatives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments “are routinely urged to ‘trust one another’ and are 286 warned that without such trust co-management cannot succeed” (Nadasdy, 2006: 147). Trust is necessary to be truthful, to have confidence that others are behaving similarly and to act on one another’s information (Nadasdy, 2006). However, ability to act is constrained by power imbalances in a colonial setting (Nadasdy, 2003; Nadasdy, 2006) which place Indigenous peoples’ rights and knowledge on less than equal footing with those of non-Indigenous governments that may perpetuate colonial relations (Nadasdy, 2005; Nadasdy, 2007; Menzies, 2015). 6.3.1 Trust Rousseau et al. (1998) defined trust as “willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.” However, the concept of trust “has been operationalized in multiple, sometimes conflicting ways” throughout the literature (Stern & Coleman, 2015: 118). Rather than a single concept, trust is described as a “meso” concept which integrates “micro-level psychological processes and group dynamics with institutional arrangements” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 393). These processes and dynamics are variously emphasized across different disciplines; economists view trust as calculative or institutional, psychologists focus on people’s internal cognitions and sociologists view trust as socially embedded in relationships among people and institutions (Rousseau et al., 1998; Kunnel & Quandt, 2016). Broadly, trust is described a psychological state experienced by an individual (subjective trust) (Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Hardin, 2002; Mӧllering, 2006) that leads to an observable behaviour (behavioural trust) (McKnight et al., 1998; Das & Teng, 2004; Colquitt et al., 2007; Stern & 287 Coleman, 2015). The trustor is typically a person, but trust may be placed in an individual, an organization, an object (such as a map) or a process (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; Coleman & Stern, 2018b). Trust is influenced by antecedents, which act as drivers of positive expectations and behavioural outcomes (Stern & Coleman, 2015). These antecedents include individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust (Hotte et al., 2018). Literature regarding these influences on trust is summarized in Section 2.2.2.2 (Chapter 2). Research on trust as an enduring, individual trait supposes that personal characteristics cause individuals to be inherently more or less trusting of others whom they do not know (Rotter, 1980; Mayer et al., 1995; Evans & Revelle, 2008; Alarcon et al., 2018). Frazier et al. (2013: 78) describe individual propensity to trust as “a stable within-person trait that is consistent across referents and situations” and originates within an individual. Willingness to trust others is positively correlated with developmental experience and values (Hofstede, 1980) and a history of positive experiences in trust situations (Evans & Revelle, 2008) and negatively correlated with the experience of discrimination (Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000). Equality of economic opportunity or status also has important implications for trust, with people expressing greater trust toward individuals within their own group or class (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Interpersonal influences emerge in the context of relationships between two or more individuals (Cook et al., 2005). In unfamiliar situations, individual predispositions are of relatively greater importance in interactions; however, as people become familiar, knowledge and experience become the primary drivers of trust (Rotter, 1980). This is also described in the trust literature as a shift from generalized to particularized trust (Smith, 2010). Perceived trustworthiness involves 288 perceptions and beliefs about the trustworthy character of another person (Colquitt et al., 2007; Gillespie, 2012), such as their ability, benevolence and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995), and may result from a “shared identity” between two or more actors that is established through interactions (Kunnel & Quandt, 2016). Some authors have also used the framework of interpersonal influences on trust to describe trust between individuals and organizations, between groups of people and between organizations (Schoorman et al., 2007; Schilke & Cook, 2013). However, others have pointed out that interorganizational relationships are affected by boundary spanners who bridge between organizations and share information and that these individuals exist at different levels (e.g. operating, corporate), with potential for interacting effects across levels (Perrone et al., 2003; Coleman & Stern, 2018). When a boundary spanner enters a new interorganizational relationship, with no prior experience with collaborators, their initial trust perceptions of others are likely to be based on assessments of the general reputation of the organizations represented (Schilke & Cook, 2013). Thus, individuals may be predisposed to trust representatives of institutions or governments (Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015). Additional influences on trust are embedded in the institutional environment (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). Formal and informal institutions help to establish a shared set of expectations among individuals and their respective organizations and reduce the risk of trusting (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). For example, control mechanisms can be designed to make people behave in a more trustworthy manner, thereby creating conditions under which it becomes less risky to trust (Das & Teng, 1998; Coletti et al., 2005; Schoorman et al., 2007). Institutions can also balance power or establish power asymmetry between collaborators (Gray, 1989; Huxham et al., 2000; Ran & Qi, 2018). While power asymmetry is generally understood to negatively impact trust and 289 power sharing to positively impact trust, the effect also depends on what type of power is used (Ran & Qi, 2018). Coercion, for example, tends to have a negative effect while the effect of expert power is less clear (Ran & Qi, 2018). Trust has also commonly been conflated with two separate, yet related, constructs: trustworthiness and distrust (Colquitt et al., 2007; Gillespie, 2012). Trustworthiness describes perceived characteristics of another individual (Mayer et al., 1995; Colquitt et al., 2007; Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010) that act as interpersonal influences on trust. Unlike the absence of trust, which is agnostic, distrust is characterized by negative beliefs about another party’s motivation and intentions (Lewicki et al., 1998; McDermott, 2012; Kunnel & Quandt, 2016). However, scholars disagree about whether trust and distrust exist on opposite ends of a spectrum or whether they are distinct constructs (Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Lewicki et al., 1998; Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015), which may even exist simultaneously (Lewicki et al., 2006). A small number of studies have empirically examined the relationships between individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust and with behavioural trust. Studies have found positive relationships between individual influences and behavioural trust (Rotter, 1980) and between interpersonal influences and behavioural trust (Rotter, 1980; Colquitt et al., 2007; Heyns & Rothmann, 2015; Alarcon et al., 2018). Interpersonal influences were shown to have a greater impact on behavioural trust than individual influences (Rotter, 1980) and were of relatively greater stated importance for behavioural trust than institutional influences (Hotte et al., 2018). Discrimination, inequality and trauma experienced by Indigenous Peoples have also been shown to negatively impact individual influences on trust (Hotte et al., 2018). 290 Based on these studies, interpersonal influences were expected to have a relatively stronger influence on trust than individual influences (Rotter, 1980; Colquitt et al., 2007; Hotte et al., 2018) or institutional influences (Hotte et al., 2019). Lower individual propensity to trust was also expected among representatives of Indigenous governments, many of whom are themselves Indigenous (Hotte et al., 2018). Females were expected to demonstrate lower propensity to trust than males (Rau, 2011; Zeffane, 2018) and individual propensity to trust was expected to be positively correlated with age among non-Indigenous participants (Zeffane, 2018), but negatively correlated with age among Indigenous participants due to mistreatment experienced through the residential school system in Canada (Nikolakis & Nelson, 2018). 6.3.2 Government-to-government relations in Canada Understanding the history of the relationship between Indigenous and federal and provincial/territorial governments in Canada is essential for making sense of contemporary interactions, including collaborative governance (Coates & Carlson, 2013). The history of this relationship is a source of distrust that is difficult to reverse (Lawrence et al., 1997; Leahy & Anderson, 2008), with unavoidable implications for behavioural trust between collaborators. Government-to-government relationships involving Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments in what is now known as Canada date back to the time of European exploration and contact, when countries such as Spain and England were looking to expand their empires (Reid, 2010). Documents issued by the Pope during the 15th century established that any land uninhabited by Christians was available to be “discovered,” claimed and exploited by Christian rulers (Reid, 2010). Under this "Doctrine of Discovery," Indigenous Peoples were forced to fight for recognition of their rights through colonial courts (Lindberg, 2010; Reid, 2010; Assembly of 291 First Nations, 2018). It wasn’t until 1763 that a Royal Proclamation established guidelines for European settlement of Indigenous lands, recognized “Aboriginal title” and stated that all lands would be considered Aboriginal lands unless ceded to the British Crown through a treaty (Telford, 2014). The French and British Crowns then set about establishing treaties with First Nations along the east coast of Canada, across parts of the prairies and on Vancouver Island (Telford, 2014). Cooperation with Indigenous Peoples subsequently deteriorated and a period of renewed colonial domination began during Confederation in 1867 (Telford, 2014). The Constitution Act (1867) assigned the federal government responsibility for “Indians, and Land Reserved for Indians” and paved the way for the Indian Act (1876) (Telford, 2014). The original version of the Indian Act outlined federal responsibilities to, and restrictions on, status “Indians” (Coates & Carlson, 2013), as identified by the federal government, and supported federal government policy to eliminate Indigenous peoples’ Aboriginal and treaty rights and traditional systems of governance (Sinclair et al., 2015; Ladner & Tait, 2017). Local Indian Agents strived to eliminate Indigenous Peoples’ spiritual beliefs and to supplant these with Christian values to facilitate their transition to settler society. One tool that federal government relied upon heavily to instill Christian values was residential schools, which separated children from parents and communities in an attempt to sever their connection to culture and identity (Partridge, 2010; Sinclair et al., 2015; Ladner & Tait, 2017). 292 When the Constitution of Canada was patriated in 1982 and Canada was no longer governed under British law, treaty rights established under the Royal Proclamation were recognized and affirmed under Section 35 of the Constitution Act (1982) (Telford, 2014). Section 35 established that, where Aboriginal title or rights exist, Canada has a duty to consult with First Nations regarding decisions that may infringe on those rights (Jones et al., 2017; Nikolakis & Hotte, 2019). In general, the duty to consult is commensurate with the strength of claim to Aboriginal title to land (Nikolakis & Hotte, 2019). Nevertheless, federal and provincial or territorial authorities have continued to assert control over contested lands and resources under Crown title (Coates & Carlson, 2013). Residential schools and other human rights violations conducted under the authority of the Indian Act (UN Human Rights Council, 2014) have had lasting impacts on the health and well-being of Survivors as well as their families and communities (Partridge, 2010; Sinclair et al., 2015). Many Indigenous children who attended residential schools suffered infectious diseases, sexual and physical abuse and emotional trauma (Sinclair et al., 2015). As adults, Survivors unwittingly passed this trauma on to their own children or grandchildren (Sinclair et al., 2015). Nikolakis & Nelson (2018) found low trust among people in three Indigenous communities, particularly among women and older respondents, with the latter attributed to lasting psychosocial impacts of assimilation policies. Sinclair et al. (2015) documented several experiences of residential school Survivors who described loss of trust toward others as a result of their experiences. Indigenous Peoples in Canada also have higher infant and age-specific mortality rates, rates of diabetes and alcohol- and drug-related mortality and suicide rates than non-Indigenous people (Sinclair et al., 2015), Indigenous children are over-represented in state 293 care and Indigenous women continue to be reported missing or murdered in high numbers (Ladner & Tait, 2017). These disparities have roots in federal policies that separated Indigenous peoples from their traditional lands and livelihoods and confined them to reserves that were ill-equipped to meet their basic needs (Sinclair et al., 2015; Ladner & Tait, 2017). An evolving body of jurisprudence has established a minimum standard that federal, provincial and territorial governments must meet to consult and accommodate the interests of Indigenous Peoples in Canada based on their strength of claim to Aboriginal title to their ancestral lands and waters (Nikolakis & Hotte, 2019). Broader recognition of the rights of Indigenous Peoples in Canada and around the world and commitments to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) have prompted a movement toward reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples (The United Nations General Assembly, 2007; UN Human Rights Council, 2014; Sinclair et al., 2015; Ladner & Tait, 2017). While this has motivated an increase in collaborative governance of lands and waters (Nikolakis & Hotte, 2019), this history and continued injustices perpetrated under the current form of the Indian Act remain critical barriers to trust. Representatives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments are often encouraged to be trusting and truthful and to have confidence in one another during collaborative natural resource governance; however, this trust is constrained by power imbalances in a colonial setting that often uses collaboration to perpetuate colonial relations (Nadasdy, 2003; Nadasdy, 2005; Nadasdy, 2006; Menzies, 2015). 294 6.4 Methods 6.4.1 Survey design Schoorman et al. (2007) emphasize the need for a clear multilevel conceptual framework for studies of trust that involve multiple organizations, such as in the context of collaborative governance. Previous studies that empirically tested multilevel relationships between individual and interpersonal influences on trust (Colquitt et al., 2007) and with behavioural trust (Heyns & Rothmann, 2015; Alarcon et al., 2018) informed development of this study. The approach for empirically testing the theoretical framework for influences on trust was based on recommendations from Ansell & Gash (2007), who suggested that a survey of individual stakeholders could be used to operationalize key behavioral variables included in their own theoretical framework (Margerum, 2001; Frame et al., 2004). The survey method was adapted from previous survey-based studies of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust (e.g. Gillespie, 2003, 2012; Wong & Cheung, 2005; Thomson et al., 2009). Due to the highly fragmented nature of the literature on trust measures and array of instruments available to study trust (McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011; Gillespie, 2012), scale items from multiple sources informed survey development. An initial pool of 152 items was identified to measure individual, interpersonal and institutional influences and behavioural trust and distrust. The initial pool included 115 items from the peer-reviewed literature on trust, a five-item social desirability scale and 30 items developed for this study to measure specific influences on trust that are not addressed in published, peer-reviewed scales. The pool of items was reduced to those that focused on the operational definitions used for the independent and dependent variables used in this study. Only those items that unambiguously measured a construct of interest distinct from 295 other constructs using simple, straightforward language appropriate for the target audience were retained for the final survey instrument (Clark & Watson, 1995). The final survey instrument included 120 items, including 11 items that focused on demographic characteristics of participants. Scale items were used to characterize constructs of behavioural trust (Gillespie, 2003, 2012) and distrust, individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust (Wong & Cheung, 2005) and distrust (Greenglass & Julkunen, 1989), trust in institutions (Grimmelikhuijsen & Knies, 2015) and trust in a government (Inglehart et al., 2014) represented by a collaborator. Each construct was operationalized using a minimum of three closed-ended questions per element that asked survey participants the extent to which they possess certain perceptions or engage in certain behaviours (Thomson et al., 2009; Kline, 2013). Scale items were positively worded to measure trust (Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Lewicki et al., 1998; Gillespie, 2003, 2012) and negatively worded to measure distrust (Lewicki et al., 2006). Items were also included to measure experiences of major discrimination (Williams et al., 1997) due to its relationship to individual propensity to trust (Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000; Taylor et al., 2010; Wilkes, 2011; Hotte et al., 2019). A five-item social desirability scale (Hays, 1989) was also included to gauge the impact of social desirability on responses. Demographic information was collected at the end of the survey. Items from the peer-reviewed literature were prioritized based on four criteria: they measured one of the specific constructs of interest as operationalized in this study, had the potential to elicit a range of responses; they had been developed specifically as a measurement tool; and they 296 had been subject to analysis regarding construct validity (Clark & Watson, 1995; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). Nine scales met these criteria: Frazier et al. (2013), Gillespie (2003, 2012), Greenglass & Jukulnen (1989), Grimmelikhuijsen & Knies (2015), Inglehart et al. (2014), Krieger et al. (2005), Mayer & Davis (1999), McAllister (1995) and Williams et al. (1997). Survey questions developed by Thomson et al. (2009) were also adapted to measure institutional influences on trust and had the potential to elicit a range of responses, but failed to meet criteria regarding measurement and construct validity. These items were included in the absence of scales that met all four criteria. A summary of constructs included in the survey is provided in Table 6-1. 297 Table 6-1. Constructs included in the survey. Construct Description References Published scale? Behavioural trust Intention to accept vulnerability to a trustee based on positive expectations of his or her actions Mayer et al. (1995) Colquitt et al. (2007) Gillespie (2003, 2012) Yes Behavioural distrust Unwillingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another party Bijlsma-Frankema et al. (2015) Kunnel & Quandt (2016) No Individual influences on trust General willingness to trust others, regardless of social and relationship-specific information Mayer et al. (1995) Frazier et al. (2013) Yes Individual influences on distrust Extent to which one displays a consistent tendency to not be willing to depend on general others across a broad spectrum of situations and persons Greenglass & Julkunen (1989) McKnight & Chervany (2001) Yes Experiences of major discrimination Exposure to discrimination Williams et al. (1997) Krieger et al. (2005) Yes Interpersonal influences on trust Characteristics of another individual that inspire positive expectations on the part of a trustor McAllister (1995) Cummings & Bromiley (1996) Mayer & Davis (1999) Colquitt et al. (2007) Yes Interpersonal influences on distrust Negative beliefs about another individual’s motivation and intentions and the expectation that they will behave inappropriately Bijlsma-Frankema et al. (2015) Kunnel & Quandt (2016) Guo et al. (2017) No Trust in institutions Willingness of an individual to be vulnerable to the actions of institutions Inglehart et al. (2014) Yes Trust in a government Characteristics of a government that inspire positive expectations on the part of a trustor Grimmelikhuijsen & Knies, (2015) Yes Institutional influences on trust Characteristics of an institution that inspire positive expectations on the part of a trustor Ellonen et al. (2008) Thomson et al. (2009) No Institutional influences on distrust Beliefs and fears that conditions conducive to situational success in a risky endeavor are not in place McKnight & Chervany (2001) No 298 A range of response formats were used to minimize participant fatigue and complacency. Response formats included measures of willingness to engage in behaviour (“not at all willing” to “completely willing”) on a seven-point Likert-type scale, as well as frequency of occurrence of events (“never” to “very often”), degree of similarity (“not at all” to “very much”) and level of agreement (“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”) on a five-point Likert scale (Clark & Watson, 1995; Wong & Cheung, 2005; Thomson et al., 2009). A minimum of five points on response scales helped to reveal underlying variance in participant response, while odd-numbered response formats provided the opportunity for participants to express a neutral response, rather than being forced to respond positively or negatively (Clark & Watson, 1995). Items regarding experiences of major discrimination described nine situations and asked participants to indicate how often they had experienced these situations and their perception of the “main reason for this experience” (e.g. race, disability, gender). Major discrimination questions were adapted to elicit answers regarding frequency of occurrence (e.g. “At any time in your life, have you ever been unfairly fired?” is replaced with “How many times have you been unfairly fired?”). Five demographic questions and a comment box for feedback on the survey were also included. The survey instrument in its entirety is included in 7.5Appendix C . The survey was subject to two rounds of pre-testing. Initial pre-testing was performed with ten researchers who were not affiliated with the research. The instrument was subsequently revised and the scope of the study broadened. In addition to behavioural trust and individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust, which had been the focus of previous research by the authors (Hotte et al., 2018, 2019), one of the researchers involved in pre-testing recommended including distrust, trust in institutions and trust in government. Distrust was noted 299 as a potentially distinct construct from trust (Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015) and trust in institutions and trust in government were noted as having potential linkages to other trust variables (Zaheer & Harris, 2006; OECD, 2018; Hotte et al., 2019). The revised survey instrument included items to measure behavioural distrust, individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on distrust, trust in institutions and trust in a government represented by a collaborator. Inclusion of new constructs necessitated reducing the number of items included in the original survey instrument to a minimum of three and maximum of five items per variable. The revised survey was pre-tested with nine people who were not affiliated with the research, only one of whom had participated in the first pre-test, and further minor revisions were made. 6.4.2 Data collection Data collection took place over a four-month period and was completed in December 2018. An electronic version of the survey was distributed to representatives of Indigenous, federal and provincial or territorial governments who are currently or have previously been engaged in collaborative natural resource governance in Canada for a minimum of at least one year. These institutions necessarily involved some degree of power-sharing between governments (Tipa, 2002; Tipa & Welch, 2006). The sampling frame included collaborations identified through web searches as being within the study scope. Collaborations within the study scope met several inclusion criteria. Collaborations had to be focused on management of natural resources and include at least one representative from an Indigenous government, such as a band council, traditional governance structure or national government (Ladner, 2001), and at least one representative from a federal or 300 provincial/territorial government. Equal representation of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments was not required. Collaborations within the study scope also needed to have a formal structure, such as a board, commission or council, although incorporation was not required. Finally, and importantly, the collaborations needed to provide some degree of power sharing between Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments. Many collaborations also employed staff or had a professional representative or executive officer, but this was not a requirement. Several collaborations, primarily located in the Yukon, were determined to be outside the study scope because collaborators are appointed by Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments, but do not act as government representatives. Key contacts for each collaboration were identified through web searches prior to conducting the survey or recommended by other participants through snowball sampling during the survey. Key contacts needed to have a public-facing and leadership role, such as Executive Director, Chair, Co-Chair or Coordinator. A total of 137 key contacts were contacted by phone, of which seven did not respond to a voice message, eight were determined to be outside the study scope and three declined to participate in the survey. The remaining 118 potential participants were emailed a formal invitation to participate in the research and a link to an online survey, hosted by the University of British Columbia using Qualtrics software. Each key contact was also asked to distribute information regarding the study, including the invitation letter, consent form and link to the web-based survey, to others in their collaboration and was sent two email reminders to participate in the survey. The first reminder was sent approximately two weeks after initial contact and the second another two weeks later. One participant requested their information be withdrawn from the study upon completion of the survey. 301 A total of 121 participants accessed the online survey, of which 54 achieved completion. Three participants were not representatives of Indigenous, federal or provincial or territorial governments and consequently did not meet inclusion criteria. Analysis was therefore based on data collected from 51 participants who were representatives of Indigenous, federal and provincial/territorial governments. These participants were located across Canada, with a large number of participants located in British Columbia and none in Alberta, Saskatchewan or Manitoba (Figure 6-1). Figure 6-1. Locations of survey participants.7 7 Locations markers represent the geographic locations of participants’ IP addresses at the time they completed the survey and may not represent the locations of the collaborations themselves. 302 6.4.3 Data analysis Once data collection was completed, responses were exported to Microsoft Excel for numerical coding (e.g. of response scales). Survey data was then exported to R for univariate, bivariate and multivariate statistical analysis. Descriptive statistics (e.g. mean, standard error, median, mode, standard deviation, sample variance, kurtosis, skewness, z-scores) were compiled for each variable. Kurtosis and skewness were measured using the adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized moment coefficient. Histograms were created to identify distribution of responses and responses with z > |1.96| for kurtosis and/or skewness were identified as being statistically different than a normal distribution, which corresponds with an alpha level 0.05 (Kim, 2013; Cain et al., 2016). Frequency diagrams of missing data were created to identify potential issues with independent variables (see 7.5Appendix D for a table identifying all missing data). Missing values for dependent and independent variables were imputed in R using the MICE (Multivariate Imputation via Chained Equations). MICE is one of the commonly used packages and creates multiple imputations instead of a single imputation (e.g. using the mean) (van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011). MICE assumes that missing data are Missing at Random (MAR), therefore the probability that a value is missing depends only on observed values and continuous missing values can be predicted using regression (van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011). Missing values were imputed using predictive mean matching for continuous variables, polynomial regression for categorical variables and logistic regression for binary variables. Twenty complete datasets were generated to capture potential variation in imputed values and achieve convergence through pooling of results (Graham et al., 2007; van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011) prior to subsequent analysis. Bivariate and multivariate analyses followed the three-phased approach outlined in van Buuren (2012), which involves imputation of m compete 303 datasets, analysis of m complete datasets, followed by pooling of parameters. Distributions of continuous variables were checked and standardized prior to subsequent analysis to support comparability across five- and seven-point response scales and to enable regression analyses. Likert summated scales were created to measure each construct (Harpe, 2015). Correlation analysis was used to determine the strength and direction of relationships between behavioural trust and distrust and between individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust and distrust. Due to the existence of moderate or strong negative correlations between summated scales for trust and distrust, negatively-worded scale items were reverse coded (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2012). A list of variable names and variables used in the analysis is included in Table 6-2. 304 Table 6-2. List of variable names and variables used in the analysis. Variable name Variable Trust variables Trust Behavioural trust trust_binary Dummy variable for behavioural trust, with levels “high” and “low” Indiv Individual influences on trust interp Interpersonal influences on trust Instit Institutional influences on trust trustinstit Trust in institutions trustingov Trust in government Employment variables govrep Type of government represented othergovrep Type of government represented by collaborator in whom trust is placed Demographic variables Age Age countryborn Country of birth Educ Level of education gender Gender hhadults Number of adults in the household hhkids Number of children in the household income Level of income majordisc Experience of major discrimination marriage Marital status religion Religion Independence of variables was tested using Pearson correlation analysis for pairs of continuous variables, chi-square tests of independence for pairs of categorical variables and ANOVA for pairs of continuous and categorial variables, respectively. Bivariate analyses were performed for paired variables for each of the 20 complete datasets and results pooled. Pooled results of correlation analyses were used to plot a correlation matrix, indicating statistically significant and non-significant results. Boxplots were used to visualize statistically significant relationships between categorical variables and plots of pooled means and standard errors were created for trust variables by type of government represented as well as for all statistically significant relationships analyzed using ANOVA. Pooled means were calculated by taking the average of 305 means for each variable for all imputed datasets. Multiple pairwise comparisons between means of continuous variables by categorical variable for were made for each of the 20 complete datasets using the Tukey Honest Significant Differences (HSD) test to determine whether statistically significant differences existed between categories. Differences between pairs of variables were assumed to exist where statistically significant results (p>0.05) were observed in Tukey HSD test results for more than 10 complete datasets. Prior to performing multivariate statistical analysis, distributions of factor variables were checked to determine whether sufficient data existed for each category to provide meaningful analysis. At this stage, level of education was regrouped into four categories, income into three categories, race into three categories, country of origin into two categories, religion into three categories and marital status into three categories. Binomial logistic regression and multiple linear regression were then conducted with behavioural trust as a binary and as a continuous variable, respectively. For binomial logistic regression, participants were re-categorized as demonstrating low or high behavioural trust based on the median of a Likert Summated Scale of responses to associated scale items (Wrightsman, 1991; Dibben & Rose, 2010). Measures of central tendency for behavioural trust (x̅=53.22, x̃=52) were similar and the data were slightly positively skewed (G=0.17). Participants with measures of behavioural trust at or below the median were categorized as having low behavioural trust (Nlow=26) in this context, while those that exceeded the median were categorized as having high behavioural trust (Nhigh=25). Both types of multivariate analyses were performed for all 20 imputed datasets and results subsequently pooled. Multivariate analyses followed a modified stepwise method based on combined approaches of Brand (1999) and Wood et al. (2008) and outlined in van Buuren 306 (2012). Stepwise model selection was conducted separately for all variables within each imputed dataset, followed by the construction of a fitted model containing all variables that were present in at least half of the stepwise models (van Buuren, 2012). Multivariate Wald tests were then performed to compare the fit of the new model with each variable removed using the D1 statistic, resulting in backward elimination applied to all remaining variables (van Buuren, 2012). Each variable with a p-value larger than 0.1 was removed and the procedure repeated with a smaller fitted model until all variables demonstrated p<0.1. This approach addresses the issue created by stepwise variable selection that can arise if different sets of variables are selected across m imputed datasets (van Buuren, 2012). 6.5 Results 6.5.1 Characteristics of survey participants Analysis was based on data collected from 51 representatives of Indigenous, federal or provincial/territorial governments who participated in the survey. Demographic characteristics of participants are summarized in Table 6-3. 307 Table 6-3. Characteristics of survey participants. Variable Number of participants Proportion of participants Age 18-30 1 2% 31-40 9 18% 41-50 20 39% 51-60 12 24% 61-70 5 10% >70 1 2% No response 3 6% Gender Female 19 37% Male 30 59% No response 2 4% Country of origin Canada 45 88% Other 6 12% No response 2 4% Level of education 9th-12th grade, no diploma 1 2% High school diploma or GED 1 2% Some college, no degree 6 12% Technical certificate or diploma 2 4% Bachelors 13 25% Masters 24 47% Doctorate or Professional 4 8% Annual household income $25,000 - $34,999 5 10% $50,000 - $74,999 5 10% $75,000 - $99,999 12 24% $100,000 - $124,999 10 20% $125,000 - $149,999 9 18% $150,000 - $174,999 5 10% $175,000 or more 5 10% No response 4 8% 308 More than half of survey participants had experienced some form of major discrimination during their lifetime. Frequency of perceived reasons for discrimination reported by participants are summarized in Figure 6-2. Of those participants who indicated reasons they felt they had been discriminated against, 50 percent of participants indicated one reason, 18 percent indicated two reasons and 32 percent indicated three reasons. Figure 6-2. Experiences of major discrimination by perceived reasons for discrimination. Parties represented in collaborations in which survey participants reported being or having been engaged are outlined in Figure 6-3a. While the scope of the study meant that all collaborations involved an Indigenous government or community and either a federal or provincial/territorial government, other groups, organizations and interests were also reported to be represented. A majority of participants reported that the collaboration they participated in involved a First Nation government or First Nation community; however, collaborations involving Inuit or Métis governments or communities were also represented. Five collaborations involved two or more Indigenous governments or communities and seventeen collaborations involved both federal and provincial/territorial governments. 309 While some collaborations involved a Treaty Agreement or Land Claims Agreement, more than half used a range of other agreements including Memorandums of Understanding and collaborative planning or management agreements (Figure 6-3b). Figure 6-3. Parties represented in collaborations identified by survey participants (a) and the number of different types of agreements used by those collaborations (b). 6.5.2 Results of statistical analyses Results of correlation analysis, chi-square tests of independence and ANOVA for all pairs of variables included in the study are included in 7.5Appendix E only. Statistically significant bivariate relationships are described below. 6.5.2.1 Correlation analysis Correlation analysis revealed statistically significant negative correlations between summated scores for trust and distrust constructs for individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust (Table 6-4). Individual influences on trust and individual influences on distrust were moderately negatively correlated, while interpersonal and institutional influences on trust and interpersonal and institutional influences on distrust, respectively, were strongly negatively 310 correlated. Consequently, distrust items were reverse-coded and included in summated scales for trust items during subsequent analysis. Table 6-4. Correlation coefficients and p-values for relationships between scores for trust and distrust for trust variables. Variable R p-value Trust -0.0706 0.633 Indiv -0.287 0.0443* interp -0.662 4.714e-07*** Instit -0.588 6.613e-06*** Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. Correlation analysis also revealed several statistically significant relationships involving trust variables, including reverse-coded distrust variables (Figure 6-4). Strength of relationships between independent variables was determined based on correlation coefficients and categorized as strong (1>r>=|0.67|), moderate (|0.67|>r>=|0.33|) or weak (|0.33|>r>0) (Ratner, 2009). Behavioural trust was moderately positively correlated with interpersonal (R=0.373, p<0.05) and institutional (R=0.344, p<0.0001) influences on trust and had a weak negative correlation with experiences of major discrimination (R=-0.300, p<0.05). Individual influences on trust were weakly positively correlated with interpersonal influences on trust (R=0.302, p<0.05) and moderately positively correlated with institutional influences on trust (R=0.390, p<0.001), trust in government (R=0.500, p<0.0001) and trust in institutions (R=0.498, p<0.0001). Interpersonal influences on trust had moderate positive correlations with institutional influences on trust (R=0.354, p<0.05) and trust in government (R=0.540, p<0.0001), a weak positive correlation with trust in institutions (R=0.329, p<0.05) and a weak negative correlation with experiences of major discrimination (R=-0.306, p<0.05). Institutional influences on trust showed a weak positive correlation with trust in institutions (R=0.304, p<0.05) and a moderate positive 311 correlation with trust in government (R=0.516, p<0.001). Trust in government had a moderate positive correlation with trust in institutions (R=0.584, p<0.0001) and a moderate negative correlation with experiences of major discrimination (R=-0.023, p<0.05). Figure 6-4. Correlation matrix of relationships between continuous variables.8 6.5.2.2 Chi-square tests of significance Figure 6-5 summarizes type of government represented by a collaborator (Figure 6-5a) and participant race Figure 6-5b), respectively, by type of government represented by a survey participant. One noteworthy result is that approximately half of all Indigenous government representatives identified as Indigenous, compared to one fifth of federal government representatives and no provincial/territorial government representatives. A chi-square test of independence also revealed a statistically significant relationship between level of education and race (χ2=2.090, p>0.05), depicted in Figure 6-6. 8 Relationships that were not statistically significant are marked with “X”. 312 Figure 6-5. Relationships (significant) between type of government represented by a survey participant and type of government represented by a collaborator (a) and survey participant race (b). Figure 6-6. Relationship (significant) between level of education and race. 6.5.2.3 Analysis of variance (ANOVA) ANOVA identified differences in mean scores for behavioural trust by country of origin (F=3.576, p>0.05), with people born in Canada having lower scores for behavioural trust than those born elsewhere. Relatively lower scores for trust variables indicate less trust, while relatively higher scores indicate more trust. Statistically significant differences were observed between mean scores for individual influences on trust by type of government represented (F=3.675, p>0.01) and type of government represented by a collaborator (F=4.932, p>0.001). 313 Individual influences on trust were lowest for representatives of Indigenous governments and similar for representatives of federal and provincial/territorial governments, with this pattern reversed when collaborators were representatives of these governments. Scores for trust in institutions differed by type of government represented by a collaborator (F=2.587, p>0.05). Mean scores for trust in a government represented by a collaborator differed by type of government represented (F=2.902, p>0.05) and type of government represented by a collaborator (F=5.025, p>0.001). Representatives of Indigenous governments had the lowest trust in a government represented by a collaborator and federal government representatives had the highest trust, with provincial/territorial government representatives in between. Trust in a government represented by a collaborator was lowest when a collaborator represented the federal government and highest when a collaborator represented an Indigenous government. ANOVA also identified differences between the mean number of adults in the household by marital status (F=3.232, p>0.01). Relatively lower scores for the number of adults in the household indicate fewer adults, while relatively higher scores indicate more adults. Participants who were married or had a long-term partner and those who were never married had greater numbers of adults living in the household than those who were separated or divorced. Differences also existed between mean scores for experiences of major discrimination by type of government represented (F=2.435, p>0.05) and race (F=2.420, p>0.05). Relatively lower scores for experiences of major discrimination indicate fewer experiences, while relatively higher scores indicate more experiences. Indigenous government representatives had the highest mean number of experiences of major discrimination and federal government representatives had the lowest mean, with provincial/territorial government representatives in between. Indigenous 314 survey participants had the highest mean number of experiences of major discrimination and white survey participants had the lowest. Statistically significant relationships between continuous and categorical variables are illustrated Figure 6-7 through Figure 6-12 (see also Table 6-5). With respect to trust and government-government relationships, representatives of Indigenous governments or communities reported significantly lower mean scores for individual influences on trust and trust in a government represented by a collaborator than federal government representatives. Conversely, survey participants whose collaborators were representatives of Indigenous governments reported significantly higher mean scores of individual influences on trust, trust in institutions and trust in a government represented by a collaborator than federal or provincial/territorial government representatives. Representatives of Indigenous governments also reported significantly higher mean scores for experiences of major discrimination than federal government representatives, and Indigenous survey participants reported significantly higher mean scores of experiences of discrimination than white survey participants. Figure 6-7. Relationship (significant) between behavioural trust and country of origin. 315 Figure 6-8. Relationships (significant) between individual influences on trust and (a) type of government represented by a survey participant and (b) type of government represented by a collaborator. Figure 6-9. Relationships (significant) between trust in government and type of government represented by a survey participant (a) and type of government represented by a collaborator (b). 316 Figure 6-10. Relationship (significant) between trust in institutions and type of government represented by a collaborator. Figure 6-11. Relationship (significant) between experiences of major discrimination and type of government represented (a) and race (b). Figure 6-12. Relationship (significant) between number of adults in the household and marital status. 317 Table 6-5. Mean scores for continuous variables, by categorical variable.9 trust countryborn Canada Other -0.0887a 0.814b Indiv govrep Indigenous Federal Provincial/territorial -0.569a 0.273b 0.205a,b othergovrep Indigenous Federal Provincial/territorial 0.372a -0.489 a,b -0.501b trustingov govrep Indigenous Federal Provincial/territorial -0.473a 0.308b -0.0878a,b othergovrep Indigenous Federal Provincial/territorial 0.360a -1.090b -0.250b trustinstit othergovrep Indigenous Federal Provincial/territorial 0.253a -0.0666a,b -0.499b majordisc govrep Indigenous Federal Provincial/territorial 0.484a -0.348b 0.168a,b race Indigenous White Other 0.483a -0.227a 0.249a hhadults marriage Never married Married/partnered Separated/divorced -0.300a,b 0.153a -1.304b 9 Superscripts indicate statistically significant differences between means, identified using Tukey HSD tests. 318 6.5.2.4 Multivariate statistical analysis Backward stepwise binomial logistic regression produced the following specific model estimated from the data: logit (high behavioural trust) = α + β1(othergovrep) + β2(majordisc) where the dependent variable is logit high behavioural trust, α is the estimate for the intercept and β1 and β2 are the coefficients of the predictors. Results show that of the three predictors, only experiences of major discrimination (p<0.05) has a statistically significant negative relationship with high behavioural trust (Table 6-6). Table 6-6. Coefficients of binomial logistic regression. Estimate Std. error z-value p-value (Intercept) 0.910 0.985 0.924 0.361 othergovrepIndig -0.470 1.108 -0.424 0.674 othergovrepProvTerr -2.274 1.276 -1.783 0.082 majordisc -0.937 0.443 -2.115 0.041* Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. The results of binomial logistic regression analysis showed that the regression model containing two predictors is statistically significant at the ten percent level (p=0.0594). Therefore, the independent variables significantly predicted the outcome variable, high behavioural trust. Results of a Wald test using the D1 statistic showed that the effect of othergovrep (D1=4.472, p=0.0403) is statistically significant at the five percent level and that the effect of majordisc (D1=2.773, p=0.0735) is statistically significant at the ten percent level, leading to rejection of the null hypothesis that removing either variable from the model will not substantially harm the fit of the model. McFadden’s (R2=0.175), Cox and Snell (R2=0.216) and Nagelkerke (R2=0.288) pseudo R-squared measures of the coefficient of determination indicate that between 17.5 percent and 29 percent of the variance in the dependent variable is predictable from the two 319 independent variables. The fitted model predicted values of the dependent variable with 69 percent accuracy. Odds ratios show that a shift from collaborating with a federal government representative to collaborating with an Indigenous or provincial/territorial government representative results in a decrease in the odds of reporting high behavioural trust increase by a factor of 0.63 or 0.10, respectively. For each experience of major discrimination, the odds of reporting high behavioural trust decrease by a factor of 0.39. Backward stepwise multiple linear regression produced the following specific model estimated from the data: E(Y|X) = α + β1(instit) + β2(majordisc) where the dependent variable is behavioural trust, α is the estimate for the intercept and β1, β2 and β3 are the coefficients of the predictors. Results show that institutional influences on trust has a statistically significant positive relationship with behavioural trust (p<0.05) and experiencing major discrimination (p<0.05) has a statistically significant negative relationship with behavioural trust (Table 6-7). Table 6-7. Coefficients of multiple regression. Estimate Std. error t-value p-value (Intercept) 0.001 0.133 0.005 0.996 Instit 0.313 0.137 2.289 0.027* majordisc -0.261 0.135 -1.931 0.060 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. 320 The results of multiple regression analysis showed that the regression model containing two predictors was statistically significant at the one percent level (p=0.00639). Therefore, the independent variables significantly predicted the outcome variable, behavioural trust. Results of a Wald test using the D1 statistic showed that the effect of instit (D1=3.730, p=0.0597) was statistically significant at the ten percent level and that the effect of majordisc (D1=5.239, p=0.0269) was statistically significant at the five percent level, leading to rejection of the null hypothesis that removing either variable from the model will not substantially harm the fit of the model. The adjusted coefficient of multiple determination indicates that the model explains 22 percent of the variation in the response variable (R2=0.285, Adjusted R2=0.223). The fitted model predicted values of the dependent variable with 66 percent accuracy. Nested models of binomial logistic and multiple regression, respectively, are included in Appendix F . 321 6.5.2.5 Summary of significant results Statistically significant results are summarized in Table 6-8 through Table 6-12. Table 6-8. Results of Pearson correlation analysis for statistically significant relationships between continuous variables. Variable 1 Variable 2 R p-value Strength Direction Significance Trust instit 0.344 0.017 moderate positive * Trust interp 0.373 0.008 moderate positive ** Trust majordisc -0.300 0.037 weak negative * Instit interp 0.354 0.013 moderate positive * Instit indiv 0.390 0.008 moderate positive ** Instit trustingov 0.516 0.0002 moderate positive *** Instit trustinstit 0.304 0.039 weak positive * interp indiv 0.302 0.032 weak positive * interp trustingov 0.540 0.00004 moderate positive **** interp trustinstit 0.329 0.024 weak positive * interp majordisc -0.306 0.033 weak negative * Indiv trustingov 0.500 0.0003 moderate positive *** Indiv trustinstit 0.498 0.0004 moderate positive *** trustingov trustinstit 0.584 0.0001 moderate positive **** trustingov majordisc -0.341 0.023 moderate negative * Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”, p<0.0001 “****” Table 6-9. Results of chi-square tests of independence for statistically significant relationships between categorical variables. Variable 1 Variable 2 Chi-square p-value Degrees of freedom Significance educ race 2.090 0.051 6 * govrep othergovrep 4.745 0.001 4 **** govrep race 2.199 0.067 4 * 322 Table 6-10. Results of ANOVA for statistically significant relationships between continuous and categorical variables. Y X Sum of squares Degrees of freedom F-value p-value Significance10 hhadults marriage 7.989 2 3.232 0.041 ** indiv govrep 7.558 2 3.675 0.026 ** indiv othergovrep 9.608 2 4.932 0.007 *** majordisc govrep 7.548 2 2.435 0.091 * majordisc race 5.340 2 2.420 0.089 * trust countryborn 3.744 1 3.576 0.059 * trustingov govrep 6.252 2 2.902 0.055 * trustingov othergovrep 12.625 2 5.025 0.008 ** trustinstit othergovrep 5.333 2 2.587 0.075 * Table 6-11. Coefficients of binomial logistic regression. Estimate Std. error z-value p-value (Intercept) 0.910 0.985 0.924 0.361 othergovrepIndig -0.470 1.108 -0.424 0.674 othergovrepProvTerr -2.274 1.276 -1.783 0.082 majordisc -0.937 0.443 -2.115 0.041* Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. Table 6-12. Coefficients of multiple regression. Estimate Std. error t-value p-value (Intercept) 0.001 0.133 0.005 0.996 instit 0.313 0.137 2.289 0.027* majordisc -0.261 0.135 -1.931 0.060 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. 10 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”, p<0.0001 “****” 323 6.6 Discussion Results of this study revealed several surprising relationships between variables that influence trust. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 6-13. Figure 6-13. Relationships between variables that influence trust. Line indicates correlation, arrow indicates causation and associated direction. Solid black boxes are trust variables, hatched black boxes are employment variables and hatched grey boxes are demographic variables. The results of this study do not support the hypothesis regarding an effect of individual influences on behavioural trust (H1). Contrary to the widely-cited theoretical framework for trust from Mayer et al. (1995), which suggests such an effect, results corroborate previous empirical research (e.g. Heyns & Rothmann, 2015; Alarcon et al., 2018) that did not find evidence that individual propensity to trust predicted behavioural trust. According to Rotter (1980), this may be attributed to the fact that participants are operating in situations that have become familiar and in which propensity to trust is less influential. Results did not provide evidence that other 324 demographic variables noted in the literature, such as age (Sutter & Kocher, 2007), gender, income and education (Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000; Delhey & Newton, 2003; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005), had statistically significant relationships with behavioural trust. However, results provide supporting evidence for a relationship with country of origin (Butler et al., 2009; Algan & Cahuc, 2010; Delhey et al., 2011; Carl & Billari, 2014). Results also showed a relationship between individual influences on trust and type of government represented, which may be explained by the statistically significant relationship between the latter variable and race, with the majority of Indigenous government representatives having identified as Indigenous. Indigenous participants also reported more experiences of major discrimination than white participants or those of other races, a variable that was also related to individual influences in both the study and the literature (Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000; Taylor et al., 2010; Wilkes, 2011; Hotte et al., 2019). Study results do not directly corroborate existing literature that links experiences of discrimination, inequality and trauma with individual propensity to trust (Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000; Delhey & Newton, 2005; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). However, they do provide evidence for a relationship between discrimination and behavioural trust. Individual influences on trust also correlated positively with trust in institutions and trust in a government represented by a collaborator. Some authors have attributed this relationship to a generalized trust toward unfamiliar others that encompasses both people and institutions (OECD, 2018), while others suggest that procedural fairness and other characteristics of institutions motivate individual influences on trust among citizens (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). 325 Results of the bivariate analyses support the hypothesis regarding a relationship between interpersonal influences and behavioural trust. However, a predictive relationship is not supported by multivariate analysis (H2). These results are somewhat surprising given the emphasis placed on interpersonal influences on trust in the literature (e.g. Rotter, 1980; Mayer et al., 1995; Gillespie, 2012; Kunnel & Quandt, 2016) and findings of previous empirical studies (e.g. Heyns & Rothmann, 2015; Alarcon et al., 2018; Hotte et al., 2019). There are two possible explanations for this finding. One possibility is that a bidirectional relationship may exist between interpersonal influences and behavioural trust that was captured in the correlation analysis, but not in the multivariate models. Indeed, the trust literature describes a reciprocal relationship between interpersonal influences and trust, in which individuals who are trusted are also more likely to exhibit behavioural trust in return (Burnham et al., 2000; Ostrom, 2003; Pillutla et al., 2003; Evans & Revelle, 2008). Alternatively, the literature on interorganizational trust may offer an explanation, particularly in light of results that link the type of government represented by a collaborator with behavioural trust as well as those linking interpersonal influences with type of government represented by a collaborator. Perrone et al. (2003) found that trust between organizations has a mediating effect on the relationship between organizational characteristics and interpersonal trust between boundary spanners who bridge between organizations. While Schilke & Cook (2013) characterize trust in relationships involving two or more organizations into three levels – individual–individual, individual–organization and organization–organization – Zaheer & Harris (2006) caution that studying each of these relationships is challenging because although these 326 forms of trust are “related phenomena, they are clearly not the same thing.” Individuals can develop strong interpersonal relationships; however, the organizations they represent may be motivated primarily by their own interests (Zaheer & Harris, 2006). These perceptions can shape trust in ways that reinforce or oppose interpersonal influences by collaborators. Hotte et al. (2019) found that individuals acknowledged constraints imposed on others’ behaviour by the organizations they represent in collaborations, with implications for interpersonal influences on trust. The relationship observed between type of government represented by a collaborator and trust in that government indicates that the type of government represented by a collaborator may be a mediating variable between interpersonal influences and behavioural trust in the context of collaborative natural resource governance. If so, there may be serious limitations on efforts to build trust between representatives of some types of governments based on interpersonal influences. Results of multiple regression support the hypothesis that institutional influences are a statistically significant predictor of behavioural trust (H3). While several authors have proposed theoretical models outlining the importance of institutional influences on trust (e.g. Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; Schilke & Cook, 2013), this analysis provides important empirical evidence linking institutional influences and behavioural trust. Bachmann & Inkpen (2011: 297) suggest that institutions may produce a “form of trust which is weaker” than that motivated by interpersonal influences However, results of this study suggest this assertion underestimates the importance of institutional influences. These findings provide evidence that carefully designed institutions can indeed create conditions under which collaborators are more likely to engage in trusting behaviour, with implications for information sharing and cooperation. 327 Results of correlation analysis support hypotheses regarding positive relationships between individual and interpersonal influences on trust (H4) and between interpersonal and institutional influences on trust (H5). These results support previous studies (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2007; Heyns & Rothmann, 2015) which found a relationship between individual and interpersonal influences, leading Heyns & Rothmann (2015: 111) to conclude that “individuals with a natural predisposition to trust others will be more inclined to perceive a specific trust referent as trustworthy.” While several authors have identified the importance of interpersonal and institutional influences on trust (e.g. Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Wong & Cheung, 2005; Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011), results of this study empirically identify a statistically significant relationship between these two types of influences. The hypothesis regarding a positive relationship between trust in institutions and behavioural trust (H6) was also unsupported by the study results. Trust in institutions had significant positive correlations with individual, interpersonal and institutional influences and with trust in governments, respectively, and did not have a significant correlation with behavioural trust. These results suggest that trust in institutions captures a generalized trust toward unknown others (OECD, 2018) that does not motivate behavioural trust in this context (Heyns & Rothmann, 2015; Alarcon et al., 2018). A statistically significant correlation did support the hypothesis regarding a positive relationship between trust in a government represented by a collaborator and interpersonal influences on trust (H7). Similar to trust in institutions, trust in a government represented by a collaborator was also positively correlated with individual and institutional influences on trust. Both variables also had 328 a statistically significant relationship with type of government represented by a collaborator. This finding lends support to the issue described previously regarding the importance of government affiliation in constraining interpersonal and institutional influences on behavioural trust (Zaheer & Harris, 2006; Hotte et al., 2019). Trust in a government represented by a collaborator, but not trust in institutions, was negatively correlated with experiences of major discrimination. This contrasts with literature that suggests that groups who experience discrimination typically experience it across multiple institutional contexts, which can colour generalized trust toward institutions (Smith, 2010). While trust in institutions appears to have characteristics of a generalized predisposition toward trusting unfamiliar others and organizations, trust in a government represented by a collaborator may be impacted by experiences, such as effects of discriminatory policies imposed by that government. Finally, results of bivariate correlation analysis supported the hypothesis regarding a statistically significant, positive relationship between trust in institutions and trust in a government represented by a collaborator (H8). This result is discussed above with respect to H6 and the notion of a generalized trust toward unknown others (OECD, 2018), including governments. Beyond the hypotheses, several other observations were noted. Results also showed statistically significant relationships between summated scores for trust and distrust constructs for individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. Several of the trust variables had statistically significant positive associations, suggesting overlap or spillover effects between individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust, trust in institutions and trust in a government represented by a collaborator. Conversely, a lack of significant relationships between variables may suggest noteworthy differences. For example, interpersonal and institutional influences on 329 trust were associated with all other trust variables, while individual influences on trust, trust in institutions and trust in a government represented by a collaborator were associated with all trust variables except behavioural trust. Type of government represented was linked to both race and experiences of major discrimination and was associated with both individual influences on trust and trust in institutions. Type of government represented by a collaborator was linked to all trust variables except individual and interpersonal influences on trust. Trust in a government represented by a collaborator was lowest when that collaborator represented the federal government and highest when that collaborator represented an Indigenous community or government. Conversely, federal government representatives also had the highest trust in a government represented by a collaborator and Indigenous government representatives the lowest. Provincial and territorial government representatives reported the highest level of behavioural trust, while Indigenous government representatives reported the lowest. These findings may be explained by interpreting Wu & Wilkes (2015), who note that those in positions of power are more apt to be trusting because the risk associated with doing so is lower than those who lack power. Literature on the role of boundary spanners also indicates that collaborators who are free from constraints on their actions imposed by their organizations will be trusted more (Perrone et al., 2003), but that there is acceptance in this context that governments continue to constrain actions of collaborators acting as representatives (Hotte et al., 2018). While the trust literature emphasizes the actions of boundary spanners themselves as important for building trust (Perrone et al., 2003; Safford et al., 2017; Coleman & Stern, 2018), results of this study suggest that the type of government represented by a collaborator can either constrain (i.e. federal government) or support (i.e. Indigenous community or government) behavioural trust. 330 Put differently, while interpersonal and institutional influences play a role, the impact of the colonial history of government-to-government relationships involving Indigenous peoples in Canada has persistent impacts on behavioural trust through trust in governments represented by collaborators. Overall, only one variable predicted behavioural trust in both binomial logistic and multiple regression: experiences of major discrimination. This variable had a statistically significant relationship with behavioural trust in the binomial logistic regression model and significantly impacted the fit of both models. The importance of this variable relative to others in the models emphasizes the persistent negative impacts of discrimination toward Indigenous people in Canada. While the negative impacts of experiences of major discrimination on individual propensity to trust are well-documented in the literature (e.g. Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000; Smith, 2010; Wilkes, 2011), they are typically referenced as one of several influences. This study underscores discrimination as a critical influence on behavioural trust in government-to-government relationships involving Indigenous communities. The results are supported by literature demonstrating relatively higher rates of discrimination experienced by Indigenous Peoples (e.g. Partridge, 2010; Sinclair et al., 2015; Ladner & Tait, 2017) and negative impacts of systemic discrimination by colonial governments on trust (Sinclair et al., 2015; Nikolakis & Nelson, 2018). Historical injustices cannot be undone, but changes to systemic treatment of Indigenous peoples by colonial governments may help reduce experiences of discrimination in the future. Accordingly, Obed (2017) describes the challenge of reconciliation as a long-term process. 331 “Everyone wants in on reconciliation today, but often on non-Indigenous terms. You don’t want true partnerships; you just want to be branded with that term, to feel good about the fact that you’re doing something for us, with us. My central take on reconciliation is that it’s not as easy as it looks. And it should be hard.” Literature on trust and power indicates that correcting power asymmetries between governments would be a step in the right direction (Nadasdy, 2003; Nadasdy, 2005; Nadasdy, 2006; Menzies, 2015; Ran & Qi, 2018). Indigenous scholars have offered solutions to balance power and reconcile the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments in Canada. These include honouring existing treaties and “inviting Indigenous peoples who do not have treaties into the Canadian federation” to formally implement treaty federalism and constitutional reconciliation (Youngblood Henderson, 2017) and ensure that Indigenous Peoples can assert more influence over decisions regarding their communities and traditional territories (Arnold, 2017). In so doing, the federal government could institutionalize existing constitutional rights of Indigenous Peoples (Youngblood Henderson, 2017) and begin to reconstruct federal and provincial legislative frameworks that have been supported discrimination. Results of this study are subject to a number of limitations, including those related to measures of trust and distrust, linkages between discrimination and colonialism, sample size and scales included in survey design. Based on the literature (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Lewicki et al., 2006) and correlation analysis of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust and distrust, trust and distrust and were treated as opposite ends of the same 332 spectrum. However, behavioural trust and distrust were not statistically significantly correlated. Furthermore, due to the scarcity of published scales to measure distrust, only items to measure individual influences were obtained from a published scale (Cook & Medley, 1954; Greenglass & Julkunen, 1989), while items to measure behavioural distrust and interpersonal and institutional influences on distrust were developed for this study based on the literature. Thus, results should be interpreted with caution due to potential issues of construct validity and reliability associated with scale items. Further research is required to test scales regarding behavioural distrust and individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on distrust. Similar limitations existed regarding measurement of the impacts of colonialism. While a scale to measure experiences of major discrimination was adapted from published literature, no such scale exists to specifically measure impacts of colonialism. The link between discrimination and colonialism has been established in previous research by the authors (Hotte et al. 2018). However, lack of a published scale to measure impacts of colonialism made it challenging to quantitatively test its relationship to discrimination in this study. While the small sample size of this study limits generalizability of results, they highlight potentially important issues regarding development of trust between representatives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments in the context of collaborative natural resource governance. This study also raises a broader methodological question: how do we know we are measuring trust and its influences correctly in this context? Trusting actions are known to be influenced by cultural forces that can have a powerful effect on the antecedents, nature and consequences of trust (Wicks & Berman, 2004; Zaheer & Harris, 2006; Schoorman et al., 2007). 333 The scales used in this study were based primarily on those published in the literature, where available. Many of these scales were developed without explicit consideration for an intercultural context, let alone an Indigenous context, with potential implications for construct validity in the context of the current study. While supplementary questions developed for the context of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities, further research is needed to establish construct validity of the survey instrument in this context. 6.7 Conclusions This study examined the importance of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences for motivating behavioural trust between representatives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments involved in collaborative natural resource governance. Bivariate statistical analyses provide evidence of relationships between interpersonal and institutional influences and behavioural trust, respectively, and trust in institutions and trust in a government represented by a collaborator may also play a role which is mediated by the type of government represented by a collaborator. While one of the multivariate statistical analyses indicated that institutional influences on trust predicted behavioural trust, both models showed that experiences of major discrimination are a predictor of low behavioural trust. These findings suggest that positive interpersonal and institutional influences on behavioural trust between representatives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments involved in collaborative natural resource governance are important, but may be hampered by constraints imposed by the organizations they represent. Collaborations that involve people who are skilled at building trust through demonstrating trustworthiness and rely on institutions that possess 334 characteristics that motivate trust, such as fairness and power-sharing, are expected to exhibit more trusting behaviours than those that do not. However, if one or more governments represented in the collaboration are not trusted by other collaborators, interpersonal and institutional influences may be hampered. In the context of relationships involving Indigenous communities, low trust in non-Indigenous governments lingers due to an ongoing history of discrimination and may be exacerbated by misalignment of interests or constraints imposed on government representatives in the context of collaboration. Results revealed showed that representatives of provincial or territorial governments report engaging in the most trusting behaviour, while representatives of Indigenous governments report engaging in the least trusting behaviour. Combined with results that showed experiences of major discrimination were a predictor of low behavioural trust, with a greater prevalence of such experiences reported by Indigenous survey participants, the lingering stain of discrimination on government-to-government relationships in Canada remains. While non-Indigenous governments may focus on carefully choosing their representatives in these types of collaborations to nurture trusting relationships, the impacts of the colonial legacy of government-to-government relationships in Canada continues to shape behavioural trust in collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous peoples. Attention to reconciliation in this relationship on the part of federal and provincial or territorial governments is an important step in this direction; however, initial efforts have not addressed the asymmetry in power that persists in government-to-government relationships or reshaped legislative frameworks that have supported discrimination. Balancing power by honouring existing treaties and taking bolder steps toward institutionalizing constitutionally-entrenched rights of Indigenous 335 Peoples is an important step in motivating behavioural trust between collaborators. Such changes to power relationships must be guided by Indigenous leaders and scholars who provide numerous recommendations for implementation. 336 Chapter 7: Conclusions “It’s hard to trust when all you have from the past is evidence of why you shouldn’t.” - Anonymous This research began with a question: how is trust built? The question has been asked by many scholars, across many disciplines, and in a broad range of contexts. We were concerned specifically about the context of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities, but drew broadly from the trust literature to inform our understanding. Using a two-phased multidisciplinary approach, we pieced together theoretical and empirical works to provide a starting point for this exploration and identify elements of trust-building. Underpinning this approach were frameworks for trust proposed by Mayer et al. (1995) and Ostrom & Ahn (2009), which highlight the roles of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences that act as motivators for perceived trust. According to the multidisciplinary theoretical framework outlined in Section 2.2.3 (Chapter 2), perceived trust may give rise to behavioural trust, subject to the constraints imposed by perceived risks associated with trusting. Each of these variables is also impacted by the political, legal, socioeconomic, environmental and other contexts in which they occur. 7.1 Phase I: case study findings During Phase I (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), we dug deeper into the characteristics of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust to determine, specifically, what motivates trusting behaviour toward collaborators who are acting as representatives of Indigenous, federal, provincial or territorial governments. We discovered that trust, in this context, is motivated by 337 five types of individual influences, seven types of interpersonal influences and four types of institutional influences (Table 7-1). Table 7-1. Types of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust identified through the case studies. Individual influences on trust Interpersonal influences on trust Institutional influences on trust Developmental experience Discrimination, inequality and trauma Faith in humanity Incidental emotions Values Ability Affect, emotion and bonding Benevolence Conduct, comportment Integrity Reputation Takes time Alignment of interests Control vs. flexibility Justice, fairness and unmet expectations Satisfactory terms Relatively few people described the role of individual influences on trust during interviews. However, those who did primarily described the role of discrimination, inequality and trauma on willingness to trust (Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). This influence was noted primarily with respect to a legacy of systemic discrimination against Indigenous Peoples by colonial governments in Canada (Bombay et al., 2014; Sinclair et al., 2015; Ladner & Tait, 2017; Nikolakis & Nelson, 2018). Other influences, such as developmental experience (Hofstede, 1980), faith in humanity (McKnight et al., 1998), incidental emotions (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005) and values (Butler et al., 2009), were also mentioned by interviewees, but received considerably less emphasis than discrimination, inequality and trauma. Interviewees were considerably more open and forthcoming about discussing the role of interpersonal influences on trust compared to individual influences. In fact, many interviewees explicitly emphasized interpersonal relationships as the only way to build trust. Interviewees described the importance of ability (Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Earle, 2010), affect, 338 emotion and bonding (Wong & Cheung, 2005; Schoorman et al., 2007), benevolence (McKnight et al., 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; Ashraf et al., 2006; Earle, 2010) and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995) as interpersonal influences on trust. While these influences are generally well-documented in the literature, they also had specific meanings in this context. For example, ability was judged not only with respect to skill and knowledge of subject matter, but was also tied to accountability, particularly to local interests and communities. Collaborators were expected to be present in local communities and to answer for their decisions on a day-to-day basis in order to be trusted. Important differences also appeared between Indigenous and non-Indigenous interviewees with respect to perceptions of integrity (McFall, 1987; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Mayer et al., 1995). Both groups expressed that integrity was important, but individuals defined it somewhat differently based on four sets of values: personal values, Haida values, values of the collaboration and values of the organizations that are represented. The varying degrees of importance of these values among collaborators in terms of evaluating integrity has the potential to create latent conflicts that may be difficult to address. Other interpersonal influences on trust that were reported in the case studies have received less attention in the literature. These included affect, emotion and bonding (Kadefors, 2004; Schoorman et al., 2007), conduct and comportment (e.g. objectivity, impartiality and respect for others), reputation (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Abrahao et al., 2017) and time together (Schoorman et al., 2007; Stern, 2008; Davis et al., 2018). Affect, emotion and bonding were shaped through time spent in one another’s physical presence, familiarity, shared experience, personal connection and tackling challenges together. Consequently, collaborators who live and work in geographically distant locations, including some federal and provincial government 339 representatives, faced difficulties being perceived as trustworthy by their collaborators. Actions such as commitment, honour of commitments and compromise were also important for building trust (Korsgaard et al., 1995; Das & Teng, 1998; Vangen & Huxham, 2003; Ansell & Gash, 2007), but required collaborators to have both the appropriate level of authority to make commitments and support from their respective organizations. Conduct, comportment and reputation provide signals of trustworthiness to collaborators; however, the latter appears to be a weak substitute for first-hand experience with fellow collaborators that is most important at the beginning of a new collaborative relationship. Trust-building required anywhere from months to years, depending on the history of interactions between governments and the perceived level of vulnerability and degree of risk associated with trust. Interviewees also described several institutional influences that appear in the literature, including alignment of interests (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Das & Teng, 2001), shared values among collaborators and their respective organizations (Sitkin & Roth, 1993), control systems and flexibility (Coletti et al., 2005; Willem & Lucidarme, 2014; Stern & Coleman, 2015), justice, fairness and expectations (Newell & Swan, 2000; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Aryee et al., 2002) and satisfactory terms (Wong & Cheung, 2005). In addition, the case studies provided important information about nuances of these influences that are not well-documented. For example, control systems had the potential to motivate trust by reducing risk at the beginning of a new collaboration or when trust was low. However, control systems that were imposed unilaterally by one of the parties impeded development of trust because they failed to refect the interests of both parties and lacked the flexibility to address 340 evolving needs of the collaboration. Satisfactory terms, in the forms of policies, procedures and terms of reference, could support alignment of interests, but only if those terms were adaptable over time based on the needs of the collaborators and the issues they faced. A key finding was that people felt greater trust in collaborations where parties had more balanced influence, or power, particularly in decision-making and joint dispute resolution processes (Korsgaard et al., 1995; Conley & Moote, 2003; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Nesbitt, 2016). Collaborators also expressed greater satisfaction with terms that supported transparency and were developed jointly, rather than imposed by one party. Results of Phase I (case studies) provided empirical support for the multidisciplinary theoretical framework for trust (Section 2.2.3) and helped to characterize individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. However, the case studies also suggested that interpersonal influences were the most important element for building trust. Interviewees repeatedly asserted the importance of interpersonal relationships and vividly described situations in which collaborators either proved or disproved their trustworthiness. 7.2 Phase II: survey findings We began Phase II (Chapter 6) with the expectation that the survey would confirm the importance of interpersonal influences relative to individual or institutional influences, and that the theoretical framework would need to be revised accordingly to reflect greater relative importance of interpersonal influences on trust. Yet, results of Phase II painted a somewhat different picture of trust-building, one in which institutional influences and experiences of major discrimination were important predictors of trusting behaviour. While subject to the limitations 341 of a small sample size (see Section 6.6), these results provide further empirical support for the multidisciplinary framework for trust (Section 2.2.3), with one exception: the relationship between individual influences and trust. They also reveal additional variables that are important for building trust during collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities that were not identified in the multidisciplinary framework that formed the basis for this research. Thus, the revised framework, informed by results of Phase II, is outlined in Figure 7-1. Figure 7-1. Revised theoretical framework for trust-building in the context of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities. Line indicates correlation, arrow indicates causation and associated direction. Solid black boxes are trust variables, shorter hatched black boxes are employment variables and longer hatched black boxes are demographic variables. While Mayer et al. (1995) suggests a relationship between individual influences and trust, Ostrom & Ahn (2009) does not. Previous empirical research (e.g. Heyns & Rothmann, 2015; Alarcon et al., 2018) also found no evidence that individual propensity to trust predicts behavioural trust. What is more perplexing is the lack of evidence to support a relationship between individual influences on trust and experiences of major discrimination. Study results 342 conflict with existing literature that links experiences of discrimination, inequality and trauma with individual propensity to trust (Alesina & La Ferrera, 2000; Delhey & Newton, 2005; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005), suggesting instead a correlation with interpersonal influences on trust. One possible explanation for these unexpected results is the choice of scale used to measure individual influences on trust. Results of Phase II do provide evidence for a relationship between experiences of discrimination and behavioural trust, and between race and discrimination. Indigenous participants also reported more experiences of major discrimination than white participants or those of other races and were, as expected, more commonly acting as representatives of Indigenous governments than of federal, provincial or territorial governments. While bivariate statistical analysis indicated a significant positive relationship between interpersonal influences and behavioural trust, a predictive relationship was not observed, despite contrary evidence in the theoretical literature (e.g. Rotter, 1980; Mayer et al., 1995; Gillespie, 2012; Kunnel & Quandt, 2016) and empirical literature (e.g. Heyns & Rothmann, 2015; Alarcon et al., 2018; Hotte et al., 2019). However, this may be due to a bidirectional relationship between interpersonal influences and behavioural trust (Burnham et al., 2000; Ostrom, 2003; Pillutla et al., 2003; Evans & Revelle, 2008) or a mediating effect of trust between organizations (Perrone et al., 2003; Zaheer & Harris, 2006). Results of Phase II make a particularly important contribution to the literature regarding institutions and behavioural trust. While institutional influences were noted in the theoretical framework by Ostrom & Ahn (2009), as well as a few others (e.g. Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; Schilke & Cook, 2013), they have received considerably less attention in the trust literature than 343 individual or interpersonal influences on trust. This analysis provides important empirical evidence to support these theories and suggests further research regarding the role of institutions to motivate trust is warranted. The roles of trust in institutions and trust in a government represented by a collaborator, respectively, were also considered in Phase II. Trust in institutions had a positive relationship with individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust, suggesting this variable represents a broader willingness to trust unknown others (OECD, 2018) but does not motivate behavioural trust. While trust in a government represented by a collaborator had a positive relationship with trust in institutions, it was also positively correlated with both institutional influences on trust and experiences of major discrimination. Combined with results of Phase I that showed a legacy of discrimination perpetrated by non-Indigenous governments under colonial legislation, such as the Indian Act, these results show the impact of discrimination on government-to-government relationships. However, trust in a government represented by a collaborator was not observed to directly influence behavioural trust in collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities. 7.3 Key research findings The results of Phases I and II, collectively, paint a damning picture of the treatment of Indigenous Peoples in Canada throughout the nation’s history. When asked about what motivates them to trust their collaborators, people who have experienced discrimination typically focused on interpersonal influences and were reluctant to even discuss the impact discrimination has had on their lives and willingness to trust others. While a few people were brave or aware enough to 344 allude to the impacts of their personal history on their willingness to trust others, or to describe the mistreatment their People has experienced collectively, many were unwilling to even discuss these influences on trust. And yet, when protected by the anonymity of an electronic survey design, only one variable predicted behavioural trust in both multivariate statistical models: experiences of major discrimination. Indigenous survey participants were also the primary bearers of this burden of discrimination. The many forms of discrimination perpetrated against Indigenous Peoples by non-Indigenous governments in Canada have been well-documented in recent years, most notably by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) (e.g. Sinclair et al., 2015; TRC, 2015), but also by scholars (e.g. Partridge, 2010; Ladner & Tait, 2017). Some literature even documents the negative impacts of systemic discrimination by colonial governments on Indigenous Peoples’ willingness to trust (Sinclair et al., 2015; Nikolakis & Nelson, 2018). Phase I of this dissertation demonstrates the persistent negative impacts of the colonial relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments on trust in the context of collaborative natural resource governance in Canada, while Phase II finds that discrimination experienced by Indigenous people predicts lower behavioural trust toward collaborators. An important first step for building trust in these collaborations, therefore, is to address the political, legal and socioeconomic contexts that perpetuate discrimination against Indigenous Peoples. Historical injustices cannot be undone, but changes to systemic treatment of Indigenous Peoples by colonial governments may help reduce experiences of discrimination in the future. The TRC outlined several “Calls to Action” to begin the process of reconciliation between 345 Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples in Canada and dismantle systems that perpetuate discrimination, including recommendations regarding child welfare, education, language and culture, health, justice and more (TRC, 2015). Such efforts would require political will and leadership on the part of federal, provincial and territorial leaders which, in turn, is dependent on a supportive public. However, recent polling suggests awareness and concern among non-Indigenous Canadians about issues facing Indigenous Peoples may have fallen since the TRC published its findings in 2015 (Environics Institute, 2019). In its 2019 Survey of Canadians, Toward Reconciliation: Indigenous and non-Indigenous Perspectives, the Environics Institute states: “over the past three years, non-Indigenous Canadians appear to have become less supportive of Indigenous rights and policies to advance reconciliation” (Environics Institute, 2019). While this finding may reflect a change in methodology by the Environics Institute, the result is disconcerting and merits further investigation. If these findings are confirmed through public opinion polling, a sustained effort is essential to educate non-Indigenous Canadians about discrimination against Indigenous Peoples and its negative impacts and to generate continued public support for political leaders to implement the TRC’s Calls to Action. The task of dismantling systems of discrimination and undoing the harm of more than 150 years of colonialism may seem overwhelming for people who are engaged in these types of collaborations. However, results of this dissertation also identify tangible actions to support reconciliation that can be taken at the level of collaborations, by establishing interpersonal relationships and designing institutions that can motivate trust. These actions can happen on-the-ground in tandem with higher-level political initiatives. Collaborators who participated in the case study described how spending time engaging and bonding with representatives of other 346 governments, both within and outside an official work context, enabled them to familiarize themselves with one another’s expectations with respect to qualities of trustworthiness (e.g. ability, benevolence, conduct and comportment, integrity). Where differences existed between expectations, these collaborators were able to be respectful of one another’s expectations and demonstrate their trustworthiness in ways that were important to their counterparts. Collaborators should also bear in mind that building trust takes time and that they may need to work particularly hard to gain the trust of fellow collaborators who may have experienced discrimination throughout their lifetimes. When designing institutions, including processes or practices, collaborators can ensure that institutions are developed jointly and balance power between governments. Institutions can be designed to embody characteristics that motivate trust by seeking alignment of interests, maintaining a balance between control and flexibility, upholding principles of justice and fairness and ensuring terms are satisfactory to all parties. Overall, trust between collaborators must be supported by both interpersonal and institutional influences. Strong interpersonal influences can be undermined by weak institutional influences, and vice versa. Thus, governments seeking to build trust must take a holistic approach by combatting discrimination against Indigenous people, selecting representatives who demonstrate the capacity to be trustworthy and jointly developing institutions that support trust between collaborators. The fragile nature of trust also means that it is difficult to build, but easily lost. Interpersonal and institutional influences may work synergistically to buffer against negative impacts of conflict, but both are required for building and rebuilding trust. 347 7.4 Limitations While the two-phased research design supported both in-depth analysis (i.e. Phase I, qualitative case studies) and generalizability (i.e. Phase II, quantitative survey), each of these research methods presents its own set of limitations. Specifically, three issues exist: small sample sizes (Phases I and II), reliance on self-reporting (Phases I and II) and use of published scales that were not validated in the specific context of the research (Phase II). Qualitative case study methods have been criticized with respect to inductive reasoning, representativeness, generalizability and ability to discriminate between competing explanations (George & Bennett, 2005). The intent of the two-phased approach was to generate rich and detailed descriptions (George & Bennett, 2005; Hyett et al., 2014) of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust through the case studies, revise the multidisciplinary theoretical framework accordingly, then test the generalizability of the revised framework using a larger sample size of survey participants. However, small sample sizes in terms of both the number of interviewees and the number of survey participants raises potential issues regarding accuracy and generalizability of results. In particular, challenges obtaining survey participants and ensuring completion of the survey imposed constraints on sample size. Therefore, results should be interpreted with a degree of caution. Statistically significant results observed in Phase II highlight areas where future research is warranted, but may not provide conclusive evidence regarding the relative importance of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. Future research would benefit from having an internal champion within a government that is involved in a large number of collaborations to motivate participation in the research, increase the response rate and obtain generalizable research results. 348 Self-reporting was used in both qualitative and quantitative data collection because it offered a relatively simple way to explore people’s perceptions of others and of their own experiences (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002). However, self-reports are known to be prone to various forms of response bias (Stone et al., 2000; Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002). While the sensitivity of the research topic was expected to result in some degree of response bias in the interviews (Phase I) (Revzina, 2008), the anonymous, electonic format of the survey was expected to counteract this effect to some degree (Bowling, 2005). Contrasting results regarding the relative importance of individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust between Phases I and II of the research indeed suggest some degree of response bias in Phase I. Specifically, interviewees may have found it challenging to identify or recall specific aspects of institutions that contributed to trust, particularly where interviewees were involved during the early stages of a collaboration (Jobe, 1999), or may have been uncomfortable describing personal experiences of discrimination that contributed to low trust to an unfamiliar interviewer. During Phase II, specific questions about characteristics of institutions may have helped to prompt survey participants to recall institutional influences on trust. The electronic survey format may have also provided a prompt to consider experiences of discrimination and afforded anonymity necessary for participants to feel comfortable reporting their experiences (Bowling, 2005). Despite reduced risk of response bias in Phase II, this issue remains a concern with respect to data collection in both phases of the research. Future research could include experimental games (e.g. Bachmann & Zaheer, 2006; McEvily et al., 2012) or ethnography to corroborate self-reports regarding behavioural trust in this context and directly observe behavioural trust between collaborators. 349 Scales for trust variables included in the survey instrument deployed during Phase II were adapted from the trust literature and supplemented with items developed for the specific context of collaborative natural resource governance involving Indignous communities. This presented several challenges regarding measurement of trust and distrust. First, trust and distrust and were treated as opposite ends of the same spectrum based on some evidence from the literature (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Lewicki et al., 2006) and results of correlation analyses for individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust and distrust. However, behavioural trust and distrust were not statistically significantly correlated and other authors have proposed that trust and distrust are distinct constructs (Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Lewicki et al., 1998; Colquitt et al., 2007; Gillespie, 2012; Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015), which may even exist simultaneously (Lewicki et al., 2006). Therefore, it is difficult to establish conclusively whether distrust items were handled correctly during the analysis (i.e. by reverse-coding). Furthermore, due to the scarcity of published scales to measure distrust, only items to measure individual influences on distrust were obtained from a published scale (Cook & Medley, 1954; Greenglass & Julkunen, 1989). Items to measure behavioural distrust and interpersonal and institutional influences on distrust were developed for Phase II based on the literature and had not been validated for measurement of these constructs. Furthermore, lack of a published scale to measure impacts of colonialism made it challenging to quantitatively test its relationship to discrimination in this study. Finally, the scales used in Phase II also raise broader methodological questions regarding measurement of trust and its influences in this context. Cultural forces are known to shape influences on trust as well as the manifestation of trusting behaviours (Wicks & Berman, 2004; Zaheer & Harris, 2006; Schoorman et al., 2007). Published scales used in the research, such as the scale used to measure individual influences on trust (Frazier et al., 2013), may not 350 reflect Indigenous worldviews with respect to trust toward unknown others. Using published scales that have been developed, and even validated, without explicit consideration of the effects of an intercultural context may present issues with respect to construct validity. Validation of scales used in the research with Indigenous research participants, and subsequent refinement if necessary, could help to ensure construct. Further research could establish construct validity of the survey instrument used in Phase II in an intercultural context that involves Indigenous and non-Indigenous collaborators. 7.5 Returning to the research questions This research was oriented toward answering the following six questions, introduced in Section 1.2 (Chapter 1), regarding how trust is created between representatives of Indigenous and federal, provincial or territorial governments who are engaged in collaborative natural resource governance:  How do representatives of Indigenous and federal or provincial/territorial governments (i.e. collaborators) conceptualize trust?  What are the essential components of trust-building between collaborators?  How do perceptions of power shape the essential components of trust-building?  How can the essential components of trust-building and the resulting trust between collaborators be measured?  What are the relationships between the essential components of trust-building?  To what degree do the essential components of trust-building motivate trust, or vice versa? 351 Representatives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments spoke about trust, and betrayal of trust, in similar terms. Descriptions of trust converged on similar meanings and interpretations across cultures in the context of collaborative natural resource governance. Trust is broadly understood by collaborators in the way it is described by Rousseau et al. (1998), as a willingness to take a leap of faith and be vulnerable to the actions of another based upon positive expectations of their behavior. While the nuances of influences on trust varied slightly between collaborators representing Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments, there was no evidence of a divide in worldviews when it came to trust. The concept of trust and its influences, broadly speaking, are understood similarly across the types of governments represented in this research. Representatives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments also described the three types of influences on trust – individual, interpersonal and institutional influences – that are reported in the literature as essential components of trust-building. The case studies characterized five individual influences, seven interpersonal influences and four institutional influences on trust in the context of collaborative natural resource governance on Haida Gwaii. The history of mistreatment and efforts to disempower Indigenous communities, including the Haida, was reported in the case studies as a persistent barrier to trust. Interpersonal influences on trust such as ability, affect, emotion and bonding, benevolence and integrity, that appear in the literature, were also observed in the case studies. However, the case studies also linked accountability to ability, identified the importance of conduct and comportment and emphasized the need for time to build trust. These findings are not well-established in the published literature on trust. Institutional influences were found to encompass alignment of interests, justice, fairness and expectations and satisfactory terms. While these influences are noted in the literature, the case 352 studies also showed that alignment of interests was a multi-faceted influence on trust, that justice, fairness and expectations were strongly linked to influence in decision-making, that consensus decision-making was important and that trade-offs exist between control systems and flexibility. Control systems were more important at the beginning of a new collaboration or when trust within government-to-government relationships was low. The case studies illustrated varying degrees of power-sharing between Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments on Haida Gwaii and highlighted some of the ways that power affects individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. Over the history of the case studies, federal and provincial governments tended to respond to natural resource conflict using institutional power established under their respective legislative frameworks. Meanwhile, the Council of the Haida Nation responded with agency power in the form of preparation, negotiation, social organization and protest in addition to institutional power leveraged through legal action. Strong and unified Haida governance has helped to counteract an imbalance of power between Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments on Haida Gwaii; however, power remains unevenly distributed across all three case study collaborations. These types of dynamics have been reported by Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars in the literature on collaborative governance in Canada. The imbalance of institutional power established under federal and provincial or territorial legislative frameworks is a pervasive issue for collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities across the country. 353 Both the case studies and the survey highlighted a divide between representatives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments in terms of two aspects: discrimination and power. Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples in Canada are a world apart in terms of lived experiences of discrimination and power. While these two aspects have been considered separately throughout this research, as individual and institutional influences on trust, respectively, they are inextricably linked to one another and to trust in government-to-government relationships. Power inequities in institutions are themselves are a structural form of discrimination that continue to negatively impact Indigenous Peoples in Canada. In the context of collaborative natural resource governance, this can manifest in institutions that are developed unilaterally by non-Indigeous governments and that impose limitations on the role of Indigenous government representatives in decision-making. These two interrelated issues have been shown through this research to have implications for trust during collaborative natural resource governance and addressing them is key to trust-building efforts. While interpersonal influences are also linked to trusting behaviours between collaborators, collaborations that rely entirely on interpersonal relationships to create trust will struggle to build and maintain trust over the long term if individual and institutional influences, such as discrimination and power, remain unaddressed. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada has identified a clear path to begin addressing these issues at a political level, it is now a matter of public and political support for implementation. In the meantime, collaborators working in this context can work to demonstrate trustworthiness and create or reshape collaborative institutions to possess characteristics that can positively influence trust. 354 Through this research, we have also developed a survey instrument that can be used to measure trust in this context; however, further testing and refinement is required to ensure construct validity and generalizability. Specifically, measures of behavioural trust and individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust should be validated with a larger sample size of representatives from Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments to ensure each construct is indeed being measured accurately and reliably. Additional survey items may need to be developed to reflect Indigenous worldviews and associated nuances of each construct. This area of future research could help to make a stronger empirical connection between influences on trust and behavioural trust and establish greater generalizability of research results. Importantly, results of this research empirically linked interpersonal and institutional influences on trust with behavioural trust. Institutional influences on trust and experiences of major discrimination were also observed to predict behavioural trust and evidence suggests a bidirectional relationship may exist between interpersonal influences on trust and behavioural trust. While individual influences on trust were not empirically linked to behavioural trust, they were related to interpersonal and institutional influences on trust. Interpersonal influences on trust were also related to both institutional influences on trust and experiences of major discrimination. Finally, institutional influences on trust were linked to experiences of major discrimination which, in turn, were related to race. 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Environmental Management, 49(6), 1130–1142. 403 Appendices Appendix A Interview questions The following interview questions provided a starting point for open-ended conversations with interviewees.  My research looks at how people build trust within groups that include representatives from different types of government that are working together to manage natural resources. Trust is an important part of any effective relationship, so whether people trust each other has important consequences for the benefits that we gain from natural resources over the long term. This is particularly interesting to me because I enjoy helping people to work together more effectively. I’m hoping that the results of this research can help groups like yours to create and maintain strong working relationships that help everyone work together and make decisions that meet everyone’s objectives and achieve better natural resource management outcomes. I’d like to hear about your experiences working within [group name] to get a better understanding of how trust is built or diminished.  May I interview you as part of my research?  What is your role in [institution name]?  Tell me about your experience working with [institution name].  What is your reason for engaging with [institution name]?  What rules do members of [institution name] follow?  Tell me what a typical meeting of [institution name] looks like.  What are the responsibilities of the members of [institution name]?  How were these rules and responsibilities decided? 404 (Interview questions, continued from previous page)  What happens if there is a dispute between members of [institution name]?  How would you describe the power held by the various members within [institution name]?  How would you describe the power held by [institution name] as a whole?  Who provides leadership within [institution name]? How do they demonstrate leadership?  In what ways is leadership within [institution name] effective? How is it ineffective?  How has your relationship with other members of [institution name] changed over time?  Do you feel that you can trust the members of [institution name]? Why? Why not?  How would you describe trust?  How do you show your trust in another person?  What would happen if another member of [institution name] betrayed your trust? What would that look like? How would you respond? And what could they do to restore your trust in them?  Have your feelings of trust toward other members of [institution name] changed over the course of your relationship?  What experiences do you think have influenced your feelings of trust toward other members of [group name]?  What actions have built or reduced trust between you and er members of [institution name]?  What personal characteristics of other members of [institution name] cause you to trust someone more or less? 405 (Interview questions, continued from previous page)  What could other members of [institution name] do to increase your level of trust in them?  Do you feel that you are trusted by other members of [institution name]? Why? Why not?  How do you, personally, go about building trust with other members of [institution name]?  What would you say is the single most important thing for building trust within [institution name]?  So far, we have talked about trust of individuals. Now I would like to ask a few questions about trust between organizations. Do you feel that you can trust the other organizations that are represented within [institution name]?  What characteristics of other organizations within [institution name] increase your trust in them?  What characteristics of other organizations within [institution name] decrease your trust in them?  Is there anything else that you think is important about trust between members of [institution name]?  Thank you so much for taking the time to be interviewed for this research. 406 Appendix B Comparison of interviewee responses across cases Table B-1. Level of interviewee response regarding interpersonal influences on trust, by case study (<25%=Low, 25-50%=Medium, >50%=High). Archipelago Management Board Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table Haida Gwaii Sub-region Marine Planning Ability Accountability Low Medium Medium Relevant knowledge Medium High Low Of local issues and interests Low Low Medium Affect, emotion and bonding Empathy Low Low Low Familiarity, shared experience Medium High High Personal connection High Medium High Tackle challenges together Low Medium Medium Treat other's challenges as shared Low Low Low Benevolence Commitment High Medium High Compromise Low Medium Medium Honesty, transparency High High Low Proactive information collection and sharing High High Low Honour High Medium Medium Permeability Medium Medium Medium Conduct, comportment Objectivity, impartiality Low Low Low Respect for others Medium Medium High Integrity Follow Haida values Low Medium Low Follow rules and mandate Low Medium Low Reputation Low Low Low Takes time High Medium High 407 Archipelago Management Board Haida Gwaii Management Council and Solutions Table Haida Gwaii Sub-region Marine Planning Alignment of interests Face-to-face meetings Low Low Medium Formal agreement Medium Low Low Interests represented Low High Low Norms Medium Low Low Shared identity, value alteration Medium Medium Low Shared objectives High High Medium Shared values Medium Medium Low Shared vision Low Medium Low Control vs. flexibility Control systems Low Medium Low Flexibility Medium Medium Low Justice, fairness and expectations Capacity, staffing and training Low Medium Medium Stability, continuity Low Low Medium Influence Medium Medium Low Decision-making process High High Medium Influence within respective organizations High Medium Medium Joint dispute resolution High High Medium Local perspective Low Low Low Responsiveness Low Low Low Unfettered authority High Low Low Satisfactory terms Accountability, reporting structure Low Low Medium Adaptability Medium High Low Developed by collaborators Medium Medium Medium Legislative support Medium High Medium Policies and procedures, ToR Low Medium Low Transparency Low Medium Low 408 Appendix C Survey instrument See next page. 409 Department of Wood Science 2424 Main Mall Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z4 WELCOME TO OUR SURVEY CONSENT FORM: TRUST IN COLLABORATIVE NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE Study description: We would like you to answer some questions about yourself and your experiences working with other governments on natural resource issues. Results of the survey will be reported in aggregate in Ngaio Hotte’s dissertation and may be published in journal articles and books. Purpose of the study: To examine how trust is created between employees of Indigenous and federal, provincial or territorial governments that work together (collaborate) on natural resource issues. Who is conducting this survey? Primary researcher: Ngaio Hotte, PhD candidate, Faculty of Forestry, University of British Columbia (UBC) {email}. Research supervisors: Dr. Rob Kozak, Professor, Faculty of Forestry, UBC {email}. Dr. Stephen Wyatt, Professeur adjoint, Faculté de Foresterie, Université de Moncton {email}. Confidentiality: All information received will be confidential. Participants will not be identified. Time: The survey will take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. Questions and concerns: If you have any questions about the study, please contact Ngaio Hotte {phone, email}. If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, contact the Research Participant Complaint Line in the UBC Office of Research Ethics (phone: 604-822-8598, toll-free: 1-877-822-8598, e-mail: RSIL@ors.ubc.ca). 410 Q1 First, we would like to ask you some questions about your involvement in a collaboration that makes or influences decisions about natural resources. When we talk about a collaboration, we are referring to a government-to-government organization, such as a board or council, involving employees of Indigenous and federal, provincial or territorial governments. If you are or have been involved in more than one collaboration, please focus on one in which you have or had the most recent and meaningful involvement for the purpose of this survey. Q2 Which of the following groups participate in this collaboration? Please check all that apply. ▢ First Nation government or First Nation community ▢ Inuit government or Inuit community ▢ Métis government or Métis community ▢ Federal government ▢ Provincial or territorial government Q3 What other groups are involved in this collaboration? Please check all that apply. ▢ Regional, municipal or local government ▢ Industry ▢ Non-profit sector ▢ Other: ________________________________________________ 411 Q4 Does this collaboration occur under a government-to-government agreement? o Treaty Agreement o Land Claims Agreement o Other: ________________________________________________ o No agreement 412 Q5 Next, we would like to ask you some descriptive questions about this collaboration. Please indicate the degree to which each statement describes this collaboration by selecting a response from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“very much”). Not at all (1) A little (2) Somewhat (3) Mostly (4) Very much (5) Don't know/ Not sure A formal agreement outlines the relationship between organizations in this collaboration. o o o o o o This collaboration has controls (like laws, contracts) in place to make sure everyone works together. o o o o o o This collaboration can be flexible to address unexpected issues. o o o o o o The goals of this collaboration are clear. o o o o o o The goals of this collaboration are supported by the people involved in it. o o o o o o Everyone in this collaboration has to agree before a decision is made. o o o o o o People in this collaboration have the authority to make commitments on behalf of their respective organizations. o o o o o o 413 Not at all (1) A little (2) Somewhat (3) Mostly (4) Very much (5) Don't know/ Not sure Community members' opinions are represented in this collaboration. o o o o o o This collaboration has enough resources (like funding, staff) to support its activities. o o o o o o People in this collaboration share a vision of the future we are working toward. o o o o o o There is a process for this collaboration to report on its activities. o o o o o o 414 Q6 We have a few more descriptive questions about this collaboration. Please indicate the degree to which each statement applies to this collaboration by selecting a response from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“very much”). 415 Not at all (1) A little (2) Somewhat (3) Mostly (4) Very much (5) Don't know/ Not sure There are rules (like policies, procedures or terms of reference) that provide guidance for this collaboration. o o o o o o The rules (like policies, procedures or terms of reference) this collaboration uses were created jointly by the partners. o o o o o o The rules (like policies, procedures or terms of reference) this collaboration uses evolve over time. o o o o o o Decisions can be made even if some people in this collaboration disagree with them. o o o o o o People in this collaboration make decisions without interference from others outside it. o o o o o o The way this collaboration makes decisions is unfair. o o o o o o Records are kept about discussions and decisions of this collaboration. o o o o o o This collaboration has a process for resolving disputes. o o o o o o 416 Not at all (1) A little (2) Somewhat (3) Mostly (4) Very much (5) Don't know/ Not sure I understand the internal processes of other governments involved in this collaboration. o o o o o o I understand the roles and responsibilities of this collaboration. o o o o o o Shared values exist for this collaboration. o o o o o o The values I represent in this collaboration are not taken seriously. o o o o o o The way this collaboration resolves disputes is fair. o o o o o o My opinions are taken seriously when decisions are made by this collaboration. o o o o o o I feel disempowered in this collaboration. o o o o o o 417 Q7 Now we would like to ask you some questions about your actions when you are involved in a collaboration that makes or influences decisions about natural resources. Think of a person from another government (Indigenous or federal/provincial/territorial) with whom you collaborate. Please indicate how willing you are to engage in each of the following behaviors with this person by selecting a response from 1 (“not at all willing”) to 7 (“completely willing”). 418 Not at all willing (1) (2) (3) Neutral (4) (5) (6) Completely willing (7) Don't know/ Not sure Rely on the skills and abilities of this person. o o o o o o o o Depend on this person to handle important issues on my behalf. o o o o o o o o Avoid interacting with this person. o o o o o o o o Rely on this person to represent my work accurately to others. o o o o o o o o Depend on this person to back me up in difficult situations. o o o o o o o o Rely on this person’s work-related judgments. o o o o o o o o Monitor this person's behaviour. o o o o o o o o Share my personal feelings with this person. o o o o o o o o Punish this person for making a mistake. o o o o o o o o 419 Not at all willing (1) (2) (3) Neutral (4) (5) (6) Completely willing (7) Don't know/ Not sure Share my personal beliefs with this person. o o o o o o o o Discuss things with this person that I wouldn’t want others to know about. o o o o o o o o Confide in this person about personal issues that are affecting my work. o o o o o o o o Withhold information from this person. o o o o o o o o Discuss how I honestly feel about my work with this person, including negative feelings and frustrations. o o o o o o o o 420 Q8 The next questions ask about your impressions of a person from another government in this collaboration. Think of the same person from another government (Indigenous or federal/provincial/territorial) with whom you collaborate. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement by selecting a response from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). 421 Strongly disagree (1) Disagree (2) Somewhat disagree (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat agree (5) Agree (6) Strongly agree (7) Don't know/ Not sure This person is knowledgeable about the work that needs to be done. o o o o o o o o I feel very confident about the skills of this person. o o o o o o o o This person is well qualified for their role in this collaboration. o o o o o o o o This person would not knowingly do anything to hurt me. o o o o o o o o This person looks out for what is important to me. o o o o o o o o I think this person meets their obligations under our agreement. o o o o o o o o In my opinion, this person is reliable. o o o o o o o o I feel that this person is honest. o o o o o o o o 422 Strongly disagree (1) Disagree (2) Somewhat disagree (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat agree (5) Agree (6) Strongly agree (7) Don't know/ Not sure I am suspicious of this person. o o o o o o o o I would feel a sense of loss if I could no longer work with this person. o o o o o o o o We have a personal interest in one another beyond our working relationship. o o o o o o o o I had a personal and/or work relationship with this person prior to the collaboration. o o o o o o o o 423 Q9 We have a few more questions about your impressions of a person from another government in this collaboration. Think of the same person from another government (Indigenous or federal/provincial/territorial) with whom you collaborate. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement by selecting a response from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). 424 Strongly disagree (1) Disagree (2) Somewhat disagree (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat agree (5) Agree (6) Strongly agree (7) Don't know/ Not sure I think this person tries hard to be fair in dealings with others. o o o o o o o o This person is dishonest. o o o o o o o o I have a strong sense of shared values with this person. o o o o o o o o Sound principles seem to guide this person's behaviour. o o o o o o o o This person's values conflict with mine. o o o o o o o o I think this person follows the rules. o o o o o o o o This person is respectful. o o o o o o o o I believe this person would take advantage of me. o o o o o o o o This person behaves professionally. o o o o o o o o 425 Strongly disagree (1) Disagree (2) Somewhat disagree (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat agree (5) Agree (6) Strongly agree (7) Don't know/ Not sure I think this person makes decisions objectively. o o o o o o o o 426 Q10 Which government (Indigenous or federal/provincial/territorial) employs the person you have been thinking of? o First Nation government or First Nation community o Inuit government or Inuit community o Métis government or Métis community o Federal government o Provincial or territorial government 427 Q11 Now, we would like to ask some questions about your impressions of the government (Indigenous or federal/provincial/territorial) that employs this person in this collaboration. Think of your interactions with the government they represent during this collaboration. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement by selecting a response from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). 428 Strongly disagree (1) Disagree (2) Somewhat disagree (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat agree (5) Agree (6) Strongly agree (7) Don't know/ Not sure This government is capable. o o o o o o o o This government is expert. o o o o o o o o This government carries out its duty very well. o o o o o o o o If citizens need help, this government will do its best to help them. o o o o o o o o This government acts in the interest of all citizens. o o o o o o o o This government is genuinely interested in the well-being of all citizens. o o o o o o o o This government approaches citizens in a sincere way. o o o o o o o o This government is sincere. o o o o o o o o 429 Strongly disagree (1) Disagree (2) Somewhat disagree (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat agree (5) Agree (6) Strongly agree (7) Don't know/ Not sure This government keeps its commitments. o o o o o o o o This government is honest. o o o o o o o o 430 Q12 Now, we would like to ask you a few questions about your attitudes toward people in general. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement by circling a number from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). 431 Strongly disagree (1) Disagree (2) Somewhat disagree (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat agree (5) Agree (6) Strongly agree (7) Don't know/Not sure I usually trust people until they give me a reason not to trust them. o o o o o o o o My tendency to trust others is high. o o o o o o o o It is safer to trust nobody. o o o o o o o o I think most people would lie to get ahead. o o o o o o o o Trusting another person is not difficult for me. o o o o o o o o No one cares much what happens to other people. o o o o o o o o My typical approach is to trust new acquaintances until they prove I should not trust them. o o o o o o o o Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people. o o o o o o o o 432 Q13 This marks the halfway point for this survey. Thank you for sticking with it! Next, we would like to ask you some questions about your personal attitude and approach to life. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement by circling a number from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). 433 Strongly disagree (1) Disagree (2) Somewhat disagree (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat agree (5) Agree (6) Strongly agree (7) Don't know/ Not sure I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. o o o o o o o o There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. o o o o o o o o I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. o o o o o o o o I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way. o o o o o o o o No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. o o o o o o o o 434 Q14 Now we would like to ask you some questions about your attitude toward institutions. Please indicate how much trust you have in each institution by selecting a response from 1 (“distrust a lot”) to 7 (“trust a lot”). 435 Distrust a lot (1) Distrust (2) Somewhat distrust (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat trust (5) Trust (6) Trust a lot (7) Don't know/ Not sure The federal government o o o o o o o o The provincial/territorial government o o o o o o o o The armed forces o o o o o o o o The police o o o o o o o o Parliament o o o o o o o o The civil service o o o o o o o o Political parties o o o o o o o o The courts o o o o o o o o 436 Q15 Just a few more questions to go! In the following questions, we are interested in the way other people have treated you in your life. Please indicate how frequently each situation has occurred in your life by selecting a response from 1 (“never”) to 5 (“very often”). 437 Never (1) Rarely (2) Sometimes (3) Often (4) Very often (5) Don't know/ Not sure How frequently have you been unfairly fired? o o o o o o How frequently have you, for unfair reasons, not been hired for a job? o o o o o o How frequently have you been unfairly denied a promotion? o o o o o o How frequently have you been unfairly stopped, searched, questioned, physically threatened or abused by the police? o o o o o o How frequently have you been unfairly discouraged by a teacher or advisor from continuing your education? o o o o o o How frequently have you been unfairly prevented from moving into a neighborhood because the landlord or a realtor refused to sell or rent you a house or apartment? o o o o o o How frequently have you moved into a neighborhood where neighbors made life difficult for you or your family? o o o o o o 438 Never (1) Rarely (2) Sometimes (3) Often (4) Very often (5) Don't know/ Not sure How frequently have you been unfairly denied a bank loan? o o o o o o How frequently have you received service from someone such as a plumber or car mechanic that was worse than what other people get? o o o o o o Q16 Have any of these experiences happened to you in your life? o Yes o No Display This Question: If Have any of these experiences happened to you in your life? = Yes 439 Q17 What do you think was the main reason for this/these experience(s)? (Select all that apply.) ▢ Your ancestry or national origins ▢ Your gender ▢ Your race ▢ Your age ▢ Your religion ▢ Your height or weight ▢ Your shade of skin colour ▢ Your sexual orientation ▢ Your education or income level ▢ A physical disability ▢ Other: ________________________________________________ ▢ Don't know/Not sure ▢ Prefer not to say Q18 Which group are you employed by in this collaboration? 440 o First Nation government or First Nation community o Inuit government or Inuit community o Métis government or Métis community o Federal government o Provincial or territorial government o Other: ________________________________________________ o Prefer not to say Q19 What is the name of the collaboration you have been thinking of as you answered these questions? o Name of collaboration: ________________________________________________ o Prefer not to say Q20 What is your age? ________________________________________________________________ 441 Q21 What is your gender? o Female o Male o Transgender, transitioning o Other: ________________________________________________ o Prefer not to say Q22 In what country were you born? ________________________________________________________________ Q23 If you were born in a country other than Canada, at what age did you arrive in Canada? ________________________________________________________________ 442 Q24 What is your marital status? o Never married o Married o Common law spouse o Widowed o Divorced o Separated o Other: ________________________________________________ o Prefer not to say 443 Q25 What is the highest level of formal education you have completed? o Doctorate (PhD, EdD) or Professional (MD, JD, DVM, DDS) o Masters (MA, MS, MBA, MEd) o Bachelors (BA, BS, AB) o Associates (two-year degree) o Technical certificate or diploma o Some college, no degree o High school diploma or GED o 9th - 12th grade, no diploma o 8th grade or less o Other: ________________________________________________ o Prefer not to say 444 Q26 What is your annual household income before tax? o Less than $25,000 o $25,000 - $34,999 o $35,000 - $49,999 o $50,000 - $74,999 o $75,000 - $99,999 o $100,000 - $124,999 o $125,000 - $149,999 o $150,000 - $174,999 o $175,000 - $199,999 (15) o $200,000 or more (11) o Don't know (12) o Prefer not to say (13) Q27 How many adults live in your household? ________________________________________________________________ 445 Q28 How many children live in your household? ________________________________________________________________ Q29 What is your race or ethnic background? Do you consider yourself: o First Nation, Inuit or Métis o White o Hispanic o Black o Asian o American Indian, Pacific Islander or other Indigenous group o Multiracial or multi-ethnic o Other: ________________________________________________ o Prefer not to say 446 Q30 What is your religion, if any? o Protestant o Roman Catholic o Mormon o Orthodox o Jewish o Buddhist o Hindu o Atheist o Agnostic o No religion o Other: ________________________________________________ o Prefer not to say 447 Q31 Thank you for making the time to participate in this survey, we truly appreciate your involvement. Your participation is an important part of this research and will help us learn what is necessary for trust to be built. If you wish to offer any comments about the survey, please write them in the comment box below. ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ If you have any questions about the study or wish to receive a copy of any published results, please contact Ngaio Hotte {phone, email}. If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, contact the Research Participant Complaint Line in the UBC Office of Research Ethics (phone: 604-822-8598, toll-free: 1-877-822-8598, e-mail: RSIL@ors.ubc.ca). 448 Appendix D Missing data from the survey Table D-1. Missing data, by participant and survey question. instit Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 1 2 3 4 5 NA NA NA 6 7 8 NA NA NA 9 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 10 11 12 13 NA NA 14 15 NA 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 NA NA 449 instit Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 25 26 27 28 29 30 NA NA 31 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 32 33 NA 34 35 36 37 NA 38 39 NA NA 40 41 NA NA NA 42 NA 43 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 44 NA 45 46 47 NA NA NA 48 49 NA 50 NA NA 51 450 trust Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NA NA NA 10 11 NA NA NA NA 12 13 NA 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 451 trust Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 26 NA NA NA NA 27 NA 28 29 30 31 32 NA NA NA NA NA 33 34 35 36 37 NA 38 39 40 NA NA 41 42 NA NA 43 44 45 NA NA 46 47 48 49 50 51 452 interp Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 NA NA NA 2 3 4 NA NA 5 6 7 8 9 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 NA 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 453 interp Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 NA NA 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 NA NA 42 43 44 NA NA 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 454 trustingov indiv Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 NA NA 5 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 6 7 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 8 9 NA NA NA 10 11 NA 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 NA 25 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 26 455 trustingov indiv Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 27 28 NA NA NA NA 29 30 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 NA 41 42 43 NA NA NA NA 44 45 46 47 48 NA 49 NA NA NA NA NA NA 50 51 456 trustinstit majordisc Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 NA 2 3 4 NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 6 7 8 NA 9 NA NA NA NA NA 10 11 12 13 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 14 15 16 17 18 19 NA 20 21 22 23 NA NA NA 24 25 26 457 trustinstit majordisc Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 27 28 29 NA 30 31 32 NA 33 34 35 36 37 38 NA 39 NA 40 41 42 NA NA NA 43 44 45 NA 46 NA NA 47 48 49 NA 50 51 458 Participant othergovrep govrep age gender countryborn marriage educ income hhadults hhkids race religion 1 NA NA 2 NA NA NA 3 NA 4 NA 5 6 NA 7 NA 8 NA 9 NA NA NA NA 10 NA 11 12 NA 13 14 NA NA 15 16 17 18 NA 19 20 NA 21 NA 22 NA NA 23 24 NA 25 26 NA NA NA 27 NA NA NA 459 Participant othergovrep govrep age gender countryborn marriage educ income hhadults hhkids race religion 28 NA 29 NA 30 31 32 33 34 NA 35 NA 36 NA NA 37 38 NA NA 39 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 40 41 NA 42 NA 43 NA 44 45 NA 46 NA 47 NA 48 NA 49 NA 50 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 51 460 Appendix E Results of bivariate statistical analyses Table E-1. Results of Pearson correlation analysis for relationships between continuous variables. Variable 1 Variable 2 R p-value Strength Direction Significance11 age hhadults 0.133 0.394 weak positive age hhkids -0.057 0.785 weak negative age trust 0.033 0.823 weak positive age instit 0.022 0.895 weak positive age interp 0.244 0.151 weak positive age indiv -0.142 0.427 weak negative age trustingov 0.161 0.343 weak positive age trustinstit -0.016 0.917 weak negative age majordisc -0.054 0.727 weak negative hhadults hhkids -0.123 0.509 weak negative hhadults trust 0.048 0.743 weak positive hhadults instit -0.035 0.838 weak negative hhadults interp 0.147 0.392 weak positive hhadults indiv -0.028 0.883 weak negative hhadults trustingov 0.074 0.651 weak positive hhadults trustinstit 0.062 0.677 weak positive hhadults majordisc -0.001 0.994 weak negative hhkids trust -0.106 0.517 weak negative hhkids instit -0.100 0.579 weak negative hhkids interp -0.004 0.982 weak negative hhkids indiv -0.160 0.346 weak negative hhkids trustingov -0.037 0.827 weak negative hhkids trustinstit 0.005 0.976 weak positive hhkids majordisc -0.119 0.467 weak negative trust instit 0.344 0.017 moderate positive * trust interp 0.373 0.008 moderate positive ** trust indiv 0.160 0.286 weak positive trust trustingov 0.202 0.169 weak positive trust trustinstit 0.087 0.567 weak positive trust majordisc -0.300 0.037 weak negative * instit interp 0.354 0.013 moderate positive * instit indiv 0.390 0.008 moderate positive ** instit trustingov 0.516 0.0002 moderate positive *** instit trustinstit 0.304 0.039 weak positive * instit majordisc -0.118 0.425 weak negative interp indiv 0.302 0.032 weak positive * interp trustingov 0.540 0.00004 moderate positive **** interp trustinstit 0.329 0.024 weak positive * 11 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”, p<0.0001 “****” 461 Variable 1 Variable 2 R p-value Strength Direction Significance12 interp majordisc -0.306 0.033 weak negative * indiv trustingov 0.500 0.0003 moderate positive *** indiv trustinstit 0.498 0.0004 moderate positive *** indiv majordisc -0.217 0.137 weak negative trustingov trustinstit 0.584 0.00001 moderate positive **** trustingov majordisc -0.341 0.023 moderate negative * trustinstit majordisc -0.281 0.056 weak negative 12 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”, p<0.0001 “****” 462 Table E-2. Results of chi-square tests of independence for relationships between categorical variables. Variable 1 Variable 2 Chi-square Degrees of freedom p-value Significance13 countryborn marriage 0.357 0.700 2 countryborn educ 1.567 0.195 3 countryborn income 0.142 0.868 2 countryborn race 0.928 0.396 2 countryborn religion 0.209 0.812 2 educ income 0.331 0.921 6 educ race 2.090 0.051 6 * educ religion 0.754 0.606 6 gender countryborn 0.240 0.624 1 gender marriage 0.523 0.593 2 gender educ 0.696 0.555 3 gender income 0.313 0.731 2 gender race 0.382 0.683 2 gender religion 0.982 0.375 2 govrep othergovrep 4.745 0.001 4 **** govrep gender 1.741 0.176 2 govrep countryborn 0.160 0.853 2 govrep marriage 0.297 0.880 4 govrep educ 0.749 0.610 6 govrep income 0.702 0.591 4 govrep race 2.199 0.067 4 * govrep religion 0.773 0.543 4 income race 0.837 0.502 4 income religion 0.754 0.606 6 marriage educ 1.588 0.146 6 marriage income 0.142 0.868 2 marriage race 0.928 0.396 2 marriage religion 0.209 0.812 2 othergovrep gender 0.317 0.728 2 othergovrep countryborn 0.459 0.632 2 othergovrep marriage 0.224 0.925 4 othergovrep educ 1.134 0.340 6 othergovrep income 0.320 0.864 4 othergovrep race 1.197 0.310 4 othergovrep religion 0.237 0.917 4 race religion 0.626 0.644 4 13 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”, p<0.0001 “****” 463 Table E-3. Results of ANOVA for relationships between continuous and categorical variables. Y X Sum of squares Degrees of freedom F-value p-value Significance14 age govrep 2.706 2 0.720 0.488 age othergovrep 4.589 2 1.809 0.165 age gender 0.773 1 0.578 0.447 age countryborn 1.240 1 0.662 0.417 age marriage 2.543 2 0.795 0.452 age educ 1.540 3 0.171 0.916 age income 0.646 2 0.211 0.810 age race 1.286 2 0.165 0.848 age religion 2.081 2 0.505 0.604 hhadults govrep 0.582 2 0.162 0.851 hhadults othergovrep 2.739 2 0.921 0.399 hhadults gender 0.238 1 0.159 0.690 hhadults countryborn 0.759 1 0.503 0.478 hhadults marriage 7.989 2 3.232 0.041 ** hhadults educ 2.356 3 0.514 0.673 hhadults income 1.774 2 0.329 0.720 hhadults race 1.031 2 0.154 0.857 hhadults religion 1.431 2 0.265 0.767 hhkids govrep 2.563 2 0.658 0.519 hhkids othergovrep 1.895 2 0.204 0.816 hhkids gender 1.348 1 0.712 0.400 hhkids countryborn 0.582 1 0.420 0.517 hhkids marriage 3.888 2 1.130 0.325 hhkids educ 2.725 3 0.298 0.827 hhkids income 2.596 2 0.481 0.619 hhkids race 2.866 2 0.572 0.566 hhkids religion 1.786 2 0.195 0.823 indiv govrep 7.558 2 3.675 0.026 ** indiv othergovrep 9.608 2 4.932 0.007 *** indiv gender 0.821 1 0.778 0.378 indiv countryborn 2.859 1 2.711 0.100 indiv marriage 2.002 2 0.534 0.587 indiv educ 3.733 3 1.211 0.304 indiv income 0.699 2 0.184 0.832 indiv race 3.918 2 1.492 0.226 14 Significance levels denoted as follows: p>0.05 “*”, p>0.01 “**”, p>0.001 “***”, p>0.0001 “****” 464 Y X Sum of squares Degrees of freedom F-value p-value Significance15 indiv religion 1.137 2 0.333 0.717 instit govrep 0.698 2 0.283 0.754 instit othergovrep 3.706 2 1.108 0.332 instit gender 0.034 1 0.018 0.895 instit countryborn 1.345 1 1.148 0.284 instit marriage 3.198 2 1.439 0.237 instit educ 2.324 3 0.718 0.541 instit income 1.491 2 0.541 0.582 instit race 0.625 2 0.163 0.849 instit religion 1.115 2 0.325 0.722 interp govrep 2.707 2 1.285 0.277 interp othergovrep 2.642 2 0.927 0.396 interp gender 0.070 1 0.063 0.802 interp countryborn 1.677 1 1.573 0.210 interp marriage 2.032 2 0.835 0.434 interp educ 3.496 3 1.127 0.337 interp income 0.170 2 0.046 0.955 interp race 2.424 2 1.183 0.306 interp religion 3.542 2 1.117 0.329 majordisc govrep 7.548 2 2.435 0.091 * majordisc othergovrep 4.805 2 1.436 0.241 majordisc gender 0.711 1 0.645 0.422 majordisc countryborn 1.479 1 1.098 0.295 majordisc marriage 3.597 2 1.729 0.177 majordisc educ 4.539 3 1.459 0.224 majordisc income 2.069 2 0.742 0.476 majordisc race 5.340 2 2.420 0.089 * majordisc religion 0.426 2 0.162 0.851 trust govrep 3.869 2 1.859 0.156 trust othergovrep 2.393 2 1.024 0.359 trust gender 0.081 1 0.050 0.824 trust countryborn 3.744 1 3.576 0.059 * trust marriage 0.640 2 0.269 0.764 trust educ 4.727 3 1.571 0.194 trust income 0.151 2 0.037 0.964 trust race 3.505 2 1.718 0.179 trust religion 3.098 2 1.316 0.269 15 Significance levels denoted as follows: p>0.05 “*”, p>0.01 “**”, p>0.001 “***”, p>0.0001 “****” 465 Y X Sum of squares Degrees of freedom F-value p-value Significance16 trustingov govrep 6.252 2 2.902 0.055 * trustingov othergovrep 12.625 2 5.025 0.008 ** trustingov gender 0.067 1 0.035 0.851 trustingov countryborn 0.660 1 0.458 0.499 trustingov marriage 1.656 2 0.749 0.473 trustingov educ 4.086 3 1.320 0.266 trustingov income 0.937 2 0.384 0.681 trustingov race 3.368 2 1.501 0.223 trustingov religion 2.907 2 0.987 0.373 trustinstit govrep 4.985 2 1.876 0.155 trustinstit othergovrep 5.333 2 2.587 0.075 * trustinstit gender 0.367 1 0.337 0.562 trustinstit countryborn 0.411 1 0.325 0.569 trustinstit marriage 0.289 2 0.094 0.910 trustinstit educ 0.514 3 0.147 0.932 trustinstit income 1.090 2 0.482 0.618 trustinstit race 1.703 2 0.594 0.552 trustinstit religion 2.115 2 0.828 0.437 16 Significance levels denoted as follows: p>0.05 “*”, p>0.01 “**”, p>0.001 “***”, p>0.0001 “****” 466 Appendix F Results of nested models of regression analyses F.1 Binomial logistic regression Table F-1. Number of times each variable was selected for the final model from m=20 imputed datasets during backward stepwise selection using binomial logistic regression. age countryborn educ hhadults hhkids income instit 2 1 2 5 5 5 9 interp majordisc marriage othergovrep religion trustingov trustinstit 11 20 18 19 3 4 7 Table F-2. Coefficients of binomial logistic regression for a model with all four variables. logit (high behavioural trust) = α + β1(othergovrep) + β2(majordisc) + β3(marriage) + β4(interp) Estimate Std. error z-value p-value (Intercept) 2.062 1.359 1.517 0.137 othergovrepIndig -1.330 1.435 -0.927 0.360 othergovrepProvTerr -3.326 1.662 -2.002 0.052 majordisc -0.969 0.529 -1.831 0.075 marriageNevermarried -2.328 1.532 -1.520 0.137 marriageSepDivorce -1.721 1.581 -1.088 0.283 interp 0.499 0.379 1.316 0.196 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. Table F-3. Coefficients of binomial logistic regression for models with three variables. logit (high behavioural trust) = α + β1(majordisc) + β2(marriage) + β3(interp) D1=3.036, p=0.0591 Estimate Std. error z-value p-value (Intercept) 0.221 0.359 0.615 0.542 majordisc -0.563 0.396 -1.423 0.162 marriageNevermarried -1.468 1.267 -1.159 0.253 marriageSepDivorce -1.416 1.299 -1.090 0.282 interp 0.484 0.350 1.383 0.174 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. 467 logit (high behavioural trust) = α + β1(othergovrep) + β2(marriage) + β3(interp) D1=3.354, p=0.0745 Estimate Std. error z-value p-value (Intercept) 1.164 1.179 0.987 0.329 othergovrepIndig -0.333 1.241 -0.268 0.790 othergovrepProvTerr -2.109 1.355 -1.557 0.127 marriageNevermarried -1.991 1.355 -1.469 0.149 marriageSepDivorce -1.683 1.417 -1.188 0.242 interp 0.647 0.355 1.824 0.075 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. logit (high behavioural trust) = α + β1(othergovrep) + β2(majordisc) + β3(interp) D1=1.592, p=0.216 Estimate Std. error z-value p-value (Intercept) 1.097 1.055 1.040 0.304 othergovrepIndig -0.703 1.187 -0.592 0.557 othergovrepProvTerr -2.435 1.327 -1.835 0.074 majordisc -0.833 0.460 -1.812 0.077 interp 0.421 0.356 1.185 0.243 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. logit (high behavioural trust) = α + β1(othergovrep) + β2(majordisc) + β3(marriage) D1=1.731, p=0.195 Estimate Std. error z-value p-value (Intercept) 1.775 1.291 1.375 0.177 othergovrepIndig -1.020 1.363 -0.748 0.459 othergovrepProvTerr -3.095 1.614 -1.917 0.063 majordisc -1.068 0.509 -2.096 0.043* marriageNevermarried -2.277 1.456 -1.564 0.126 marriageSepDivorce -1.496 1.587 -0.943 0.352 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. 468 Table F-4. Coefficients of binomial logistic regression for model with two variables, based on results of multivariate Wald tests. logit (high behavioural trust) = α + β1(othergovrep) + β2(majordisc) Estimate Std. error z-value p-value (Intercept) 0.910 0.985 0.924 0.361 othergovrepIndig -0.470 1.108 -0.424 0.674 othergovrepProvTerr -2.274 1.276 -1.783 0.082 majordisc -0.937 0.443 -2.115 0.041* Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. Table A4.5. Coefficients of binomial logistic regression for models with one variable. logit (high behavioural trust) = α + β1(othergovrep) D1=4.472, p=0.0403 Estimate Std. error z-value p-value (Intercept) 0.173 0.864 0.201 0.842 othergovrepIndig 0.362 0.978 0.371 0.713 othergovrepProvTerr -1.285 1.069 -1.202 0.236 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. logit (high behavioural trust) = α + β1(majordisc) D1=2.773, p=0.0735 Estimate Std. error z-value p-value (Intercept) -0.011 0.312 -0.037 0.971 majordisc -0.710 0.357 -1.986 0.053 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. Table F-5. Coefficients of binomial logistic regression for the final fitted model. logit (high behavioural trust) = α + β1(othergovrep) + β2(majordisc) Estimate Std. error z-value p-value (Intercept) 0.910 0.985 0.924 0.361 othergovrepIndig -0.470 1.108 -0.424 0.674 othergovrepProvTerr -2.274 1.276 -1.783 0.082 majordisc -0.937 0.443 -2.115 0.041* Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. 469 F.2 Multiple regression Table F-6. Number of times each variable was selected for the final model from m=20 imputed datasets during backward stepwise selection using multiple regression. age countryborn govrep hhadults hhkids indiv instit 3 8 13 2 7 2 16 interp majordisc marriage othergovrep religion trustingov trustinstit 15 15 1 4 14 10 2 Table F-7. Coefficients of multiple regression for a model with all five variables. E(Y|X) = α + β1(instit) + β2(majordisc) + β3(religion) + β4(govrep) + β5(interp) Estimate Std. error t-value Pr(>|z|) (Intercept) 0.095 0.267 0.356 0.724 instit 0.281 0.143 1.964 0.057 majordisc -0.289 0.151 -1.910 0.064 religionNoReligion -0.566 0.320 -1.770 0.085 religionOther 0.067 0.400 0.168 0.868 govrepIndig 0.124 0.335 0.372 0.712 govrepProvTerr 0.725 0.370 1.957 0.058 interp 0.143 0.152 0.941 0.353 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. Table F-8. Coefficients of multiple regression for models with four variables. E(Y|X) = α + β1(instit) + β2(majordisc) + β3(religion) + β4(govrep) D1=0.885, p=0.353 Estimate Std. error t-value Pr(>|z|) (Intercept) 0.141 0.263 0.539 0.593 instit 0.333 0.132 2.531 0.016* majordisc -0.327 0.146 -2.237 0.031* religionNoReligion -0.645 0.299 -2.158 0.038* religionOther 0.089 0.399 0.223 0.825 govrepIndig 0.107 0.339 0.316 0.753 govrepProvTerr 0.700 0.372 1.882 0.068 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. 470 E(Y|X) = α + β1(instit) + β2(majordisc) + β3(religion) + β4(interp) D1=1.975, p=0.152 Estimate Std. error t-value Pr(>|z|) (Intercept) 0.296 0.233 1.267 0.213 instit 0.307 0.145 2.117 0.041* majordisc -0.245 0.138 -1.772 0.084 religionNoReligion -0.572 0.318 -1.795 0.080 religionOther -0.082 0.394 -0.207 0.837 interp 0.127 0.156 0.815 0.420 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. E(Y|X) = α + β1(instit) + β2(majordisc) + β3(govrep) + β4(interp) D1=2.085, p=0.138 Estimate Std. error t-value Pr(>|z|) (Intercept) -0.119 0.192 -0.619 0.540 instit 0.210 0.144 1.461 0.152 majordisc -0.221 0.151 -1.462 0.151 govrepIndig 0.003 0.327 0.009 0.993 govrepProvTerr 0.638 0.369 1.730 0.091 interp 0.247 0.145 1.697 0.097 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. E(Y|X) = α + β1(instit) + β2(religion) + β3(govrep) + β4(interp) D1=3.647, p=0.0637 Estimate Std. error t-value Pr(>|z|) (Intercept) 0.140 0.272 0.515 0.609 instit 0.271 0.150 1.805 0.079 religionNoReligion -0.451 0.330 -1.366 0.180 religionOther 0.038 0.409 0.092 0.927 govrepIndig -0.104 0.310 -0.335 0.739 govrepProvTerr 0.578 0.364 1.585 0.121 interp 0.227 0.151 1.501 0.141 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. 471 E(Y|X) = α + β1(majordisc) + β2(religion) + β3(govrep) + β4(interp) D1=3.857, p=0.0566 Estimate Std. error t-value Pr(>|z|) (Intercept) 0.021 0.270 0.079 0.938 majordisc -0.281 0.154 -1.819 0.077 religionNoReligion -0.431 0.325 -1.326 0.193 religionOther 0.069 0.411 0.168 0.867 govrepIndig 0.108 0.342 0.317 0.753 govrepProvTerr 0.787 0.378 2.082 0.044* interp 0.261 0.145 1.803 0.079 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. Table F-9. Coefficients of multiple regression for model with two variables, based on results of multivariate Wald tests. E(Y|X) = α + β1(instit) + β2(majordisc) Estimate Std. error t-value Pr(>|z|) (Intercept) 0.001 0.133 0.005 0.996 instit 0.313 0.137 2.289 0.027* majordisc -0.261 0.135 -1.931 0.060 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. Table F-10. Coefficients of multiple regression for models with one variable. E(Y|X) = α + β1(instit) D1=3.730, p=0.0597 Estimate Std. error t-value Pr(>|z|) (Intercept) -0.001 0.136 -0.004 0.997 instit 0.343 0.141 2.442 0.019* Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. E(Y|X) = α + β1(majordisc) D1=5.239, p=0.0269 Estimate Std. error t-value Pr(>|z|) (Intercept) (Intercept) 0.000 0.138 0.998 majordisc majordisc -0.298 0.139 0.037* Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”. 472 Table F-11. Coefficients of multiple regression for the final fitted model. E(Y|X) = α + β1(instit) + β2(majordisc) Estimate Std. error t-value Pr(>|z|) (Intercept) 0.001 0.133 0.005 0.996 instit 0.313 0.137 2.289 0.027* majordisc -0.261 0.135 -1.931 0.060 Significance levels denoted as follows: p<0.05 “*”, p<0.01 “**”, p<0.001 “***”.
Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Forestry
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
How is trust created during collaborative natural resource governance involving Indigenous communities in Canada?
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