"Arts, Faculty of"@en . "French, Hispanic, and Italian Studies, Department of"@en . "DSpace"@en . "UBCV"@en . "Langdon, David Jeffrey"@en . "2011-05-20T23:16:58Z"@en . "1970"@en . "Doctor of Philosophy - PhD"@en . "University of British Columbia"@en . "This thesis attempts to present a synthesis of the views on moral and social questions which may be found dispersed throughout Diderot's works and correspondence. In the course of the presentation a number of alleged contradictions are either denied or resolved, and it is demonstrated that the philosopher's mature doctrine attains a substantial, though not total, unity.\r\nAfter his early deistic period, Diderot never departed from a materialistic and deterministic conception of the world and of man. It is inaccurate to say that on an emotional plane he rejected the determinism of which he was convinced intellectually. Moreover, between his denial of free-will and his social utilitarianism\r\nhe admits no real incompatibility. In claiming that in a deterministic world the concepts of vice and virtue are meaningless and in replacing them by those of maleficence and beneficence, he retains the essential distinction between moral good and moral evil, but stresses that one must look especially to improvements in the structure of society to encourage individuals to act in the general interest.\r\nDiderot's radical criticism of the moral code prevailing in his own society, especially with regard to sexuality, should he regarded not as advocacy of an anarchism which would run counter to the whole notion of a harmonious society, hut as an appeal for a more rational.social morality. His thinking, as it relates to moral conduct in existing social contexts, and his suggestions for possible reform of the moral code are cautious and imply a considerable degree of relativism. \r\nA major spokesman of eighteenth-century liberalism, Diderot protests eloquently against arbitrary government and social injustice. He proclaims the principle of popular sovereignty, though he does not propose either direct or representative majority rule as an effective political solution. Disillusioned regarding the possibility of an absolutism dedicated to the general interest, he increasingly favours constitutionally limited monarchy. His vision of an anarchical, yet harmonious, society is a purely speculative ideal; for practical purposes, human imperfection renders government and legislation necessary. While fearful, of the immediate consequences of revolution, Diderot nevertheless suggests that it may well be the only means of instituting a political structure more favourable in the long run to general happiness.\r\nAlthough Diderot lays great emphasis on the value of individuality,\r\nand deplores the pressures which lead to a dull uniformity of character, he stops short of condoning the kind of individuality which must express itself in anti-social acts. His admiration for the grandeur d'ame of certain criminals in no way implies moral approval of their conduct.\r\nDiderot's ethical thought is not merely critical. He rejects, extremes of moral relativism and seeks to base a universal moral law on the nature of man and of human relations. The moral obligation of the individual to obey this law presents Diderot with a difficult problem. He tries to show that the individual's self-interest, if correctly understood, must always prompt him to act in accordance with the general interest. To demonstrate this proposition, Diderot is obliged to appeal to elusive subjective factors such as remorse. Even so, he is not thoroughly convinced that this doctrine of the bond between virtue and personal happiness is universally valid, for it conflicts with his recognition\r\nof the great variation in individual human nature. He is thus torn between his emotional need to believe a certain ethical doctrine and intellectual doubts regarding its validity. Here is the true conflict between head and heart in Diderot and the only important point upon which his ethical thought falls short of complete unity."@en . "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/34738?expand=metadata"@en . "I DIDEROT'S MORAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT by DAVID JEFFREY LANG-DON B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of Oxford, 1956 L. es L., U n i v e r s i t y of L i l l e , 1964 M .A., McMaster U n i v e r s i t y , 1965 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n the Department of FRENCH We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 1970 In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment o f the requirements fo r an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make i t f r ee l y ava i l ab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th i s thes is for scho la r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h is representat ives . It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th i s thes is fo r f i nanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permiss ion. Department of F r e n c h The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date August 20, 1970 ABSTRACT This thesis attempts to present a synthesis of the views on moral and s o c i a l questions which .may he found dispersed throughout Diderot's works and correspondence. In the course of the presentation a number of alleged contradictions are either denied or resolved, and i t i s demonstrated that the philosopher's mature doctrine attains a substantial, though not t o t a l , unity. After his early d e i s t i c period, Diderot never departed from a m a t e r i a l i s t i c and deterministic conception of the world and of man. It i s inaccurate to say that on an emotional plane he rejected the determinism of which he was convinced i n t e l l e c t u a l l y . Moreover, between his denial of f r e e - w i l l and his s o c i a l u t i l i t a r i -anism he admits no r e a l incompatibility. In claiming that i n a deterministic world the concepts of vice and virtue are meaningless and i n replacing them by those of maleficence and beneficence, he retains the essential d i s t i n c t i o n between moral good and moral e v i l , but stresses that one must look especially to improvements i n the structure of society to encourage individuals to act i n the general in t e r e s t . Diderot's r a d i c a l c r i t i c i s m of the moral code prevailing i n his own society, especially with regard to sexuality, should he regarded not as advocacy of an anarchism which would run counter to the whole notion of a harmonious society, hut as an appeal f o r a more r a t i o n a l . s o c i a l morality. His thinking, as i t relates to moral conduct i n existing s o c i a l contexts, and his suggestions for possible reform of the moral code are cautious and imply a considerable degree of rela t i v i s m . i i A major spokesman of eighteenth-century l i b e r a l i s m , Diderot protests eloquently against arb i t r a r y government and s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e . He proclaims the p r i n c i p l e of popular sovereignty, though he does not propose either direct or representative majority rule as an ef f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l solution. D i s i l l u s i o n e d regarding the p o s s i b i l i t y of an absolutism dedicated to the general interest, he increasingly favours c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y limited monarchy. His v i s i o n of an anarchical, yet harmonious, society i s a purely speculative i d e a l ; for p r a c t i c a l purposes, human imperfection renders government and l e g i s l a t i o n necessary. While fearful, of the immediate consequences of revolution, Diderot nevertheless suggests that i t may well be the only means of i n s t i t u t i n g a p o l i t i c a l structure more favourable i n the long run to general happiness. Although Diderot lays great emphasis on the value of individu-a l i t y , and deplores the pressures which lead to a d u l l uniformity of character, he stops short of condoning the kind of i n d i v i d u a l i t y which must express i t s e l f i n a n t i - s o c i a l acts. His admiration for the grandeur d'ame of certain criminals i n no way implies moral approval of their conduct. Diderot's e t h i c a l thought i s not merely c r i t i c a l . He rejects, extremes of moral r e l a t i v i s m and seeks to base a universal moral . law on the nature of man and of human relations. The moral obligation of the individual to obey this law presents Diderot with a d i f f i c u l t problem. He t r i e s to show that the individual's s e l f - i n t e r e s t , i f correctly understood', must always prompt him i i i t o a c t i n accordance w i t h the g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t . To demonstrate t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n , D i d e r o t i s o b l i g e d t o a p p e a l t o e l u s i v e s u b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s such as remorse. Even so, he i s not t h o r o u g h l y c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h i s d o c t r i n e o f the bond between v i r t u e and p e r s o n a l h a p p i n e s s i s u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d , f o r i t c o n f l i c t s w i t h h i s r e c o g n i -t i o n o f the g r e a t v a r i a t i o n i n i n d i v i d u a l human n a t u r e . He i s thus t o r n between h i s e m o t i o n a l need t o b e l i e v e a c e r t a i n e t h i c a l d o c t r i n e and i n t e l l e c t u a l doubts r e g a r d i n g i t s v a l i d i t y . Here i s the t r u e c o n f l i c t between head and h e a r t i n D i d e r o t and the o n l y i m p o r t a n t p o i n t upon which h i s e t h i c a l thought f a l l s s h o r t o f complete u n i t y . TABLE OP CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I Diderot and deterministic materialism 15 CHAPTER.II The e t h i c a l consequences of determinism 53 CHAPTER III Man the victim of an unnatural morality 80 CHAPTER IV Government and the governed 113 CHAPTER V Liberty and licence 145 CHAPTER VI The ind i v i d u a l and society 172 CHAPTER VII A universal moral law 218 CHAPTER VIII Diderot's e t h i c a l dilemma 254 CONCLUSION 286 BIBLIOGRAPHY 293 INTRODUCTION Throughout the present century the writings of Diderot have attracted increasing attention from students of l i t e r a t u r e and of the history of ideas. His f i c t i o n a l works have earned him high regard as a l i t e r a r y a r t i s t , while his philosophical ideas have been judged worthy of serious scholarly consideration. His growing reputation as a thinker can no doubt be partly explained by the declining influence of that nineteenth-century school of conservative denigration which saw i n him a threat to established s o c i a l and moral values, but the continuing interest i n his ideas must be mainly attributed to t h e i r i n t r i n s i c value and to the powerful and stimulating forms i n which they f i n d expression. It has often been said that Diderot i s not a systematic thinker. I f this judgment implies that his thought i s chaotic, I would deny i t categorically. I f i t means simply that he does not express his ideas i n c a r e f u l l y constructed and l o g i c a l l y argued t r e a t i s e s , i t i s indisputable. His opinions on most philosophical subjects are to be found scattered throughout his f i c t i o n a l and non-fict i o n a l works, often i n the form of digressions, r e f l e c t i o n s on contemporary events or comments on other men's writings. This lack of systematization i s especially apparent i n his moral and s o c i a l thought, which i s the subject of the present 2 dissertation. My aim w i l l be to examine his various r e f l e c t i o n s on morality and the nature of society \u00E2\u0080\u0094 subjects which are inseparable i n his thought \u00E2\u0080\u0094 and to present the main l i n e s of his doctrine i n as clear and coherent a manner as possible. P r a c t i c a l considerations have prompted me to l i m i t the scope of my enquiry by excluding, i n p r i n c i p l e , such peripheral questions as the sources of Diderot's thought, i t s relations to that of his contemporaries and i t s a f f i n i t i e s with the views of l a t e r thinkers. I have, i t i s true, often found i t necessary to examine his comments on other writers, since he so frequently defines his own position by his reaction to other men's ideas. Nevertheless, my sole purpose remains throughout to render an accurate account of Diderot's personal views on moral and s o c i a l questions. I have further r e s t r i c t e d the main object of my scrutiny to the doctrine which i s contained i n the mature writings, giving only cursory attention to the early works, i n which Diderot had not yet e n t i r e l y rejected the r e l i g i o u s views which were the legacy of his Christian upbringing and education. In the works he wrote after about 1756, the date of his important l e t t e r to Lahdois concerning determinism and i t s e t h i c a l consequences,-'\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 ^ See below, pp. 58> 72-78, The precise date at which Diderot's deism gives way to atheism i s d i f f i c u l t to establish with much certainty, since i t i s hard to determine the s i n c e r i t y of his professions of orthodox or d e i s t i c b e l i e f i n the 1740's and 50' s. As I explain i n connection with the a r t i c l e \"Droit naturel\" (See below, pp. 277-79), I am in c l i n e d to think that he had d e f i n i t i v e l y abandoned deism well before 1756, but I am doubtful whether positive proof of an e a r l i e r date can be furnished. 3 his doctrine (when allowance i s made for prudence i n published works) manifests a coherence and a consistency which seem to me to j u s t i f y treating i t as a single whole. I therefore have considered i t undesirable to complicate the discussion of this u n i f i e d doctrine by laying undue stress on the evolution or fluctuation of Diderot's opinions on certain subjects i n the e a r l i e r period. I have not, however, maintained a superstitiously s t r i c t rule of excluding from consideration everything he wrote before the mid 1750's. While I deny that there i s any marked transformation i n Diderot's general position on moral and s o c i a l questions after that time, I do allow that on points of d e t a i l there i s some evolution, and I examine these cases as they a r i s e . I am also ready to admit that his particular moral and s o c i a l preoccupations were oriented toward dif f e r e n t problems at di f f e r e n t periods i n his l i f e . However, though I would agree that these changes i n emphasis form an interesting part of Diderot's i n t e l l e c t u a l biography, I think such considerations are not essential to an account of his moral and s o c i a l thought as a whole, as long as there i s no incompatibility i n his conclusions on the d i f f e r e n t problems he approaches. In presenting as a cohesive system ideas which i n Diderot's writings appear i n a highly disconnected form, I have t r i e d to avoid a r b i t r a r i l y supplying l o g i c a l connections of my own devising. I have sought instead to u t i l i z e those l i n k s which Diderot himself e x p l i c i t l y provides, or to c l a r i f y those which are 4 i m p l i c i t . Since my primary object i s to elucidate rather than to evaluate the ideas I discuss, I have t r i e d as f a r as possible to prevent my personal e t h i c a l opinions from colouring my approach. Diderot's philosophy has been the subject of a substantial body of c r i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . Various inte r e s t i n g studies examine part i c u l a r aspects of his thought or assess the contribution of indi v i d u a l works to the t o t a l picture. B r i e f surveys of his moral and s o c i a l thought are not lacking, i n the form of articles-*-or of chapters i n general studies of his writings. But no single work i n this f i e l d can compare i n scope and thoroughness with Pierre Hermand's Les Idees morales de Diderot, which was written 2 before the F i r s t World War. While I am conscious of my debt to the commentators who have preceded me, my conclusions are based throughout on a personal and, I hope, thorough examination of the writings of Diderot over a period of several years. In general I have not cited the opinions of other scholars i n corroboration of my own analysis, though I do occasionally refer the reader to their 1 See especially Rene Hubert, \"La Morale de Diderot,\" Revue du dix-huitieme s i e c l e , I I , 1914, p p . 328-40, and III, 1916, pp. 29-42; Eugene Meyer, \"Diderot moraliste,\" Revue des cours et conferences, XXVI (Ire Serie), 1925, pp. 375-81, 469-80, 641-49, and XXVI (2e Serie), 1925, pp. 742-60. 2 Paris, 1923 (Reprinted 1969). 5 works for further information on a question which I have decided to treat more succinctly. I have also found i t helpful at times to stress my disagreement with a particular c r i t i c a l view i n order to make my own position clearer. The general tenor of Hermand's approach was to dispel the myth that Diderot 1s moral and s o c i a l thought i s a tissue of contradictions and to demonstrate instead i t s basic coherence. Since the publication of his study, however, many scholars have clung to the opinion that Diderot's thought i s self-contradictory, though they tend to see i n i t not a chaos, but a dichotomy. A notable example of this attitude i s the view that there i s i n Diderot a c o n f l i c t between head and heart with respect to the denial of free-will.\"^ Between his determinism and his exaltation.of duty and virt u e , there exists, i t i s asserted, a contradiction of which he himself was aware and which caused him great distress.. His determinism, the argument continues, i s an i n t e l l e c t u a l conviction which, on an emotional plane, he refuses to accept; when he considers i t s l o g i c a l consequences for ethics, he i s dismayed; he would l i k e to be able to deny determinism i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , but finds himself unable to do so, and must content 1 Cf. Henri Lefebvre, Diderot. Paris, 1949, p. 284; Georges May, Quatre visages de Denis Diderot, Paris, 1951, pp. 148-49; Lester Crocker, The Embattled Philosopher. London, 1955, pp. 319-20 and 347. 6 h i m s e l f with the c o n c l u s i o n that s p e c u l a t i v e t h e o r i e s may cease to he true when a p p l i e d to r e a l s i t u a t i o n s , i n which one must l i s t e n to the reasons of the h e a r t . For my p a r t , I s h a l l attempt to show th a t , i n f a c t , Diderot faces up to these e t h i c a l consequences of determinism and i s not deeply t r o u b l e d by them. I s h a l l argue t h a t , whereas, f o r p r u d e n t i a l and s t r a t e g i c reasons he o f t e n adopts i n h i s m o r a l i s t i c works a terminology compatible w i t h b e l i e f i n f r e e - w i l l , the e s s e n t i a l moral message of even h i s e x o t e r i c w r i t i n g s remains u n a l t e r e d when i t i s t r a n s l a t e d i n t o terms concordant with h i s a u t h e n t i c views. My i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of D i d e r o t ' s p o s i t i o n on f r e e - w i l l and determinism and on t h e i r e t h i c a l consequences w i l l form the s u b j e c t of my f i r s t two chapters. Another v e r s i o n of the view that D i d e r o t ' s ideas present a dichotomy i s the c o n t e n t i o n that h i s supposed c o n t r a d i c t i o n s r e s u l t from a c o n f l i c t between two d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed aspects of h i s p e r s o n a l i t y . T y p i c a l of t h i s s c h o o l of thought have been the;' many i n f l u e n t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Le Neveu de Rameau which see the two i n t e r l o c u t o r s l u i and Moi as i n c a r n a t i o n s of divergent tendencies w i t h i n the author h i m s e l f . In Moi we are to see the D i d e r o t who p r i d e s h i m s e l f on h i s v i r t u e , but f o r whom v i r t u e c o n s i s t s i n conformity to the p r e v a i l i n g notions of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y , a man more concerned with h i s p u b l i c r e p u t a t i o n than with the e s s e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e s of e t h i c s , i n s h o r t , something of a h y p o c r i t e . L u i , on the other hand, i s to be regarded as the embodiment of that u n f e t t e r e d bohemianism which might have been D i d e r o t ' s mode i 7 of existence i f he had not succumbed to the temptations of bourgeois r e s p e c t a b i l i t y and the material and psychological security which i t affords; at the same time, we are told, Diderot ascribes to the Nephew the e t h i c a l position to which his own materialism leads him when he follows i t to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion. Thus Lui i s seen as a manifestation of Diderot's authentic s e l f , of an a l t e r ego, amoral but free from hypocrisy, which i s generally suppressed to the subconscious l e v e l , but which emerges i n the characters of his f i c t i o n or i n c u l t u r a l and s o c i a l day-dreams which his bourgeois consciousness rejects as mere paradox.^ I have not thought i t necessary to offer a systematic refutation of such an interpretation of Le Neveu de Rameau. though I s h a l l have occasion to take issue with i t on several s p e c i f i c points. I have, on the other hand, considered i t important to argue at length against the general attitude of which this analysis of the work i s an example, namely that Diderot's supposed psychological duality manifests i t s e l f i n an unresolved c o n f l i c t between two facets of his moral and s o c i a l thought. Even Hermand subscribes i n some measure to this view, speaking 1 I do not claim that the interpretation of Le Neveu de Rameau which I have outlined here can be found i n precisely this form i n any p a r t i c u l a r c r i t i c . It i s to be taken as a composite theory t y p i f y i n g a whole school of thought. It combines elements from such writers as Hegel (La Phenomenologie de 1'Esprit, trans. Jean Hyppolite, Paris, 1939, II, 76-84), Daniel Mornet (\"La veritable s i g n i f i c a t i o n du Neveu de Rameau,\" Revue des Deux Mondes, 1927, pp. 881-908) and, to quote a recent example, James D o o l i t t l e (Rameau's Nephew, a study of Diderot's Second Satire, Geneva, I960). 8 of \" l a contrariete qui existe, i r r e d u c t i b l e , nous semble-t-il, entre 1'individualisme de Diderot et une morale qui sera essentiellement sociale.\"\"'\" In contrast to this opinion, the whole of the central portion of my study (chapters III-VI) may he considered as an attempt to demonstrate that i n fact Diderot never exalts individualism at the expense of that form of society which he considers to he most conducive to the general happiness of mankind. Thus, i n my t h i r d chapter, I s h a l l study Diderot's views on sexual morality and show that, while he challenges the d e s i r a b i l i t y of most of the r e s t r i c t i o n s which custom and l e g i s -l a t i o n have placed on the expression of sexuality, he i s f a r from condoning, even i n a r a d i c a l l y simplified society, unre-strained individualism i n sexual r e l a t i o n s . Even i n his Tahitian utopia, sexuality i s s t i l l governed by a s o c i a l ethic. Again, i n the fourth and f i f t h chapters, which treat s p e c i f i c a l l y of Diderot's views on the r e l a t i o n between the individual and society and between the individual arid government, I s h a l l point out that even i n his b i t t e r e s t and most r a d i c a l c r i t i c i s m s of the prevailing p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l structure he does not go so far as to cast doubt on the value of s o c i a l bonds per se. Of these two chapters, the f i r s t w i l l be devoted to Diderot's protest against u n j u s t i f i a b l e infringements of personal l i b e r t y by government, while the second w i l l refute the view that 1 0p_. c i t . , p. 116. 9 the profound motivation underlying these c r i t i c i s m s i s a rejec t i o n of that l i m i t a t i o n of individual freedom of action which i s implied by any form of society. With respect to govern-ment, I concede that i t i s for Diderot an unfortunate necessity and that he would l i k e to believe that an anarchical society could maintain i t s e l f i n harmony and happiness. He stresses, however, that such an arrangement i s an ideal which must forever remain i n the realm of speculation. 1 Having dealt, i n my t h i r d to f i f t h chapters, e s s e n t i a l l y with Diderot's plea that no arbitrary r e s t r i c t i o n s be placed on the s a t i s f a c t i o n of needs common to a l l mankind, i n my sixth I s h a l l turn to his defence of the right of each individual to develop his own peculiar p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . Diderot's i l l u s t r a t i o n s of his position generally concern individual p e c u l i a r i t i e s which present no r e a l threat to the welfare of other people. But some 2 c r i t i c s have suggested that he tends toward the view that the right to the free development and expression of i n d i v i d u a l i t y should be granted even to men whose peculiar propensity i s to commit harmful acts. In order to demonstrate the f a l s i t y of t h i s c r i t i c a l opinion, I s h a l l examine Diderot's views on great criminals and his conception of strength of character. I s h a l l 1 See below, pp. 1 5 8 - 6 3 . p E.g. Henri Lefebvre, ojo. c i t . , pp. 208-09, and Charly Guyot, Diderot par lui-meme, Paris, 1953, pp. 74-76. 1 0 endeavour to show that, while he finds aesthetic value i n the consistent development of o r i g i n a l propensities even i n criminal characters, he does not accord moral approval to criminal acts as such, and I s h a l l further argue that there i s no evidence that he claims a right for maleficent individuals to express their o r i g i n a l personality without r e s t r i c t i o n . I s h a l l conclude the chapter by showing that the strength of character which Diderot admires i n certain great criminals pleases him s t i l l more i n the virtuous man. In my l a s t two chapters I s h a l l leave the discussion of Diderot's plea for human l i b e r t y and turn to his views on the nature of moral obligation. In the seventh chapter, I s h a l l deal with his claim that there i s a universal and immutable moral law. On the assumption that the general interest i s the right end for a l l individuals to pursue, Diderot deduces from the positive r e a l i t y of common human nature certain moral principles which are binding on a l l men at a l l times and i n a l l places. This \"natural\" morality, he claims, i s the standard by which l o c a l and temporary customs and i n s t i t u t i o n s must be judged. It lays down both the inalienable rights of the individual and the l i m i t s which he i s morally obliged to set upon his own conduct. Diderot could conceivably have been content to consider as self-evident the basic assumption that a l l individuals ought to pursue the general good; i n other words, he could have treated the concept of moral obligation as sui generis. He takes the view, however, that moral obligation i s a psychological experience, 11 actual or potential, and therefore feels the need to j u s t i f y his u t i l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e by appealing to the hedonistic notion of enlightened s e l f - i n t e r e s t . However great a s a c r i f i c e may be required, virtue i s s t i l l , Diderot attempts to show, the best way to happiness for every i n d i v i d u a l . In my eighth and f i n a l chapter, I s h a l l weigh the s i g n i f i -cance of Diderot's doubts regarding the v a l i d i t y of this r e l a t i o n between virtue and happiness. He has a profound and persistent emotional need to believe that a motivation to obey the \"natural\" moral law arises from the depths of the individual nature of a l l men. But the evidence of var i a t i o n i n the psychological needs of individuals forces him at times grudgingly to admit that he i s deluding himself. This admission certainly does not mean that he i s tempted to reject the universal moral law; but i f men are not, when enlightened, universally motivated to obey i t , i t s authority seems to him to be d i f f i c u l t to comprehend. This i s not simply an i n t e l l e c t u a l problem for Diderot. He i s emotionally committed to the view that human nature, not only i n a general sense, but i n each ind i v i d u a l , i s b a s i c a l l y good; but he finds i t d i f f i c u l t to maintain this position i n t e l l e c t u a l l y i n the face of positive evidence to the contrary. Here, rather than over the question of f r e e - w i l l and determinism, one may speak of a c o n f l i c t between head and heart i n Diderot. Since Hermand's day, much work has been done to establish a 12 correct text of Diderot's works and correspondence and I have taken f u l l advantage of the most recent editions. For the sake of convenience, however, I r e f e r uniformly to the Oeuvres completes edited by Assezat and Tourneux,except for works not contained therein or works of which a considerably modified 2 text appears i n a more r e l i a b l e edition. For the Correspondence 3 I refer to the edition by Georges Roth. Where I quote from the Oeuvres completes, I occasionally prefer a reading from another edition, i n which case the change and i t s source w i l l be indicated. I am also more fortunate than most of my predecessors with regard to the canon of Diderot's works. Certain long accepted attributions have been rejected. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y the case with a large number of Encyclopedic a r t i c l e s with which Assezat or Tourneux credited Diderot. We are indebted primarily to Jacques Proust and John lough for c l a r i f y i n g this question.^ I have accepted Lough's view that Diderot's authorship of a considerable number of a r t i c l e s can be s u f f i c i e n t l y established on int e r n a l evidence i n the absence of the e d i t o r i a l asterisk or the testimony of Naigeon. My opinion on the a t t r i b u t i o n of 1 Paris, 1875-77. Designated hereafter by the i n i t i a l s \"AT\". 2 Thus I have referred, i n the case of the Elements de physiologie. to the edition of Jean Mayer* Paris, 1964. ^ Paris, 1955- . Hereafter referred to as \"Roth\". ^ Cf. J. Proust, Diderot et l'Encyclopedie, Paris, 1967, pp. 117^ 49 and 532-40, and J. Lough, \"The problem of the unsigned a r t i c l e s of the Encyclopedie,\" Studies on V o l t a i r e and the Eighteenth Century. XXXII, 1965, pp. 327-90. 13 i n d i v i d u a l a r t i c l e s to Diderot generally coincides with that of Lough; the small number of cases where I d i f f e r concern mainly a r t i c l e s which are irrelevant to this thesis and which I have therefore not mentioned.\"*\" A further r e s t r i c t i o n of the canon has resulted from an 2 a r t i c l e by Jean de Booy which reveals that four short works attributed to Diderot by Assezat were i n fact written by Mme 3 d'Epinay. These reductions of the canon have been more than compensated for by the addition of a number of new texts. These include the Lettre apologetique pour l'abbe Raynal.^ the Pages contre un 5 6 tyran. and the Commentaire sur Hemsterhuis. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 .Finally, i t has been demonstrated that large portions of Raynal's Histoire des For my views on the authorship of \"Liberte (Morale)\", see below, p. 23, note 3\u00C2\u00AB p \"Inventaire provisoire des contributions de Diderot a. l a Qorrespondance l i t t e r a i r e , \" Dix-huitieme s i e c l e , I, 1969, pp. 353-97. 3 The works concerned are Q^ u'en pensez-vous?, La Marquise de Claye et l e comte de Saint-Albin. Cinqmars et D e r v i l l e and Mon pere et moi, a l l of which appear i n v o l . IV of the Oeuvres completes\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 ^ F i r s t published by Herbert Dieckmann i n his Inventaire du Fonds Vandeul, Geneva, 1951. I refer to the text presented by Paul Verniere i n Oeuvres philosophiques, Paris, 1961, pp. 621-44. F i r s t published by Franco Venturi, Paris, 1937. I refer to the edition by Verniere i n Oeuvres politiques, Paris, 1963, pp. 127-48. ^ Published by Georges May i n Francois Hemsterhuis, Lettre sur 1'Homme et ses rapports, avec l e commentaire ine d i t de Diderot, New Haven, 1964. 14 deux Indes, and especially of the third edition (1781), came from Diderot's pen.3\" It i s to be hoped that we s h a l l not have long to wait for the presently projected edition of Diderot's complete works, and that i t w i l l encourage and f a c i l i t a t e c r i t i c a l discussion and interpretative studies. With regard to Diderot's moral and s o c i a l ideas, I neither hope nor desire to have said the l a s t word, but simply to have c l a r i f i e d a certain number of points by presenting them i n the t o t a l context of his thought on in d i v i d u a l conduct and the nature of society, and perhaps to have gone a l i t t l e further than previous scholars i n bringing out the coherence of his ideas and the dominance and compatibility of the two major facets of his position, namely his desire that the i n d i v i d u a l should be free and that society should e f f e c t i v e l y serve i t s essential purpose of assuring the happiness of i t s members. Gf. Anatole Feugere, \"Raynal, Diderot et quelques autres 'Historiens des Deux Indes 1,\" Revue d'histoire l i t t e r a i r e de l a France. XX, 1913, pp. 343-78; Michele Duchet, \" l e Supplement au Voyage de Bougainville et l a collaboration de Diderot a 1'Histoire des Deux Indes,\" Cahiers de 1'Association Internationale des Etudes Francaises, XIII, 1961, pp. 173-87; Yves Benot, \"Diderot, Pechmeja, Raynal et l'anti-colonialisme,\" Europe, Jan.-Feb., 1963, pp. 137-53- I have made sparing use of Diderot's contributions to the Histoire des Deux Indes, since I think i t prudent to wait u n t i l further research has established with greater certainty which particular passages can be attributed to him.' CHAPTER I DIDEROT AND DETERMINISTIC MATERIALISM No adequate discussion of Diderot's moral ideas can f a i l to take account of the continuity which he postulates between the physical, psychological and moral aspects of human nature. Since he considers human beings to be e n t i r e l y composed of matter and i n no way separate from the general material system, I s h a l l f i r s t b r i e f l y discuss his conception of the physical world, before going on to show how man i s , i n his view, integrated into this scheme of things. Pascal was troubled by Descartes's picture of the material universe because i t made God almost redundant. A l l that was required of the Prime Mover was to give a f i l l i p to set i n motion the system of matter, after which inexorable laws took charge of everything with no further help from God.\"^ \" Diderot goes a step further than Descartes. He dispenses with God completely, considering that motion i s an essential attribute 2 of matter and that therefore the o r i g i n a l f i l l i p i s not required. Thus Diderot conceives of the material universe as s e l f -s u f f i c i e n t and subject to immutable laws. Thinking i n terms of a corpuscular theory of matter, he expresses as follows his 1 Pensees, i n Oeuvres completes, ed. Jacques Chevalier, Paris, 1954, p. 1137. 2 Cf. Principes philosophiques sur l a matiere et l e mouvement. AT,11, 64-70. 16 idea of the rigorous mechanism governing the ever-changing state of the physical world: S i l a somme peut-etre i n f i n i e de l a multitude peut-etre i n f i n i e des molecules de l a nature nous e t a i t parfaitement connue, i l m'est evident que nous verrions tous les pnenomenes s'executer par des l o i s rigoureusement geometriques . . . .J-It follows that a given conjunction of conditions can he succeeded only by one particular new set of conditions: Je crois que l a forme actuelle sous laquelle l a matiere existe est necessaire et determinee, a i n s i que toutes l e s formes diverses qu'elle prendra successivement a. toute eternite. In p r i n c i p l e , a l l phenomena would be predictable i f we knew completely and with perfect accuracy the conditions obtaining at one pa r t i c u l a r moment. But, i n fact, predictions can never be anything but approximate and probable: On ne peut r i e n prononcer sur l a marche d'un phenomene compris entre une seule cause et un seul ef f e t ; parce q u ' i l ne peut etre que l e resultat d'une i n f i n i t e de causes, et l a cause d'une i n f i n i t e d'effets.^ Associated with this doctrine of determinism i n the physical 1 Elements de physiologie, ed. Mayer, Appendice II, p. 330. 2 Commentaire sur Hemsterhuis, ed. G-. May, p. 127. 5 Elements de physiologie, ed. Mayer, Appendice II, p. 330. 17 universe, though perhaps not l o g i c a l l y a part of i t , i s the rejection of finalism. Diderot denies that either the universe as a whole or any part of i t i s what i t i s because of some purpose which i t i s meant to f u l f i l . One of the t r a d i t i o n a l teachings of the Church was that the existence and goodness of God was manifested by the loving care with which He had furnished the world with a multitude of things conducive to the well-being of man. In such a si m p l i s t i c form i t never was a very s o l i d argument, and Diderot i s one of many eighteenth-century free-thinkers who r i d i c u l e i t . In Jacques l e f a t a l i s t e , the master t r i e s to account for the insects which plague Jacques as \"une nuee de petits chirurgiens a i l e s qui viennent avec leurs petites lancettes te piquer et te t i r e r du sang goutte a goutte.\" Jacques re t o r t s : \"Oui, mais a tort et a travers, sans savoir s i j 1 en a i trop ou trop peu. Faites venir i c i un etique, et vous verrez s i les petits chirurgiens a i l e s ne l e piqueront pas.\" Similarly, i n the Salon de 17.67, i n his discussion with the abbe on the question of Providence, Diderot uses the p a r t i c l e of g r i t which has lodged i t s e l f i n the abbe's eye as a p r a c t i c a l example to refute the opinion that nature has been arranged with a view to the well-being of man. In fact, says Diderot, the world i n which we l i v e i s partly favourable and partly unfavourable to us: Nous sommes dans l a nature; nous y sommes tantot bien, tantot mal; et croyez que ceux qui louent l a 1 A T , VI, 263. 18 nature d'avoir au printemps tapisse l a terre de vert, couleur amie de nos yeux, sont des impertinents qui oublient que cette nature, dont i l s veulent retrouver en tout et partout l a bienfaisance, etend en hiver, sur nos campagnes, une grande couverture blanche qui blesse nos yeux, nous f a i t tournoyer l a tete, et nous expose a. mourir glaces. La nature est bonne et b e l l e , quand e l l e nous favorise; e l l e est l a i d e et mechante, quand e l l e nous a f f l i g e . 1 Besides, i f nature were not, on balance, s u f f i c i e n t l y conducive to our continued existence, we would simply cease to exist: Ge bel ordre qui vous enchante dans l'univers ne peut etre autre q u ' i l est. Vous n'en connaissez qu'un, et c'est c e l u i que vous habitez; vous l e trouvez alternativement beau ou l a i d , selon que vous coexistez avec l u i d'une maniere agreable ou penible. II serait tout autre, q u ' i l serait egalement beau ou l a i d pour ceux qui coexisteraient d'une maniere agreable ou penible avec l u i . Un habitant de Saturne, transports sur l a terre, s e n t i r a i t ses poumons dechires, et p e r i r a i t en maudissant l a nature. Un habitant de l a terre, transports dans Saturne, se s e n t i r a i t etouffe, suffoque, et p e r i r a i t en maudissant l a nature . . . . Not only does Diderot deny that anything i n the universe possesses a f i n a l i t y related to man's purposes, he also asserts that neither the universe nor any of i t s parts has any purpose at a l l , and that therefore the terms good and e v i l cannot be applied to things i n themselves: C'est q u ' i l n'y a n i bien n i mal absolu dans l e tout; c'est que supposer dans l e tout un melange de bonnes efecfe mauvaises l o i s , pour en deduire l e bien et l e mal des individus, c'est une absurdite. Le bien et l e mal ne peut se dire non plus de l'univers que 1 Salon de 1767. AT, X I , 109. 2 Ibid., p. 104. 19 d'une machine p a r t i c u l i e r e oix i l y aurait une partie qui en f a t i g u e r a i t une autre. Since we cannot predicate good or e v i l of the -universe as a whole, i t follows that the transformations to which i t i s subject cannot be said to constitute improvements or deteriorations: . . . l'ordre general change sans cesse. Les vices et vertus de l'ordre precedent ont amene l'ordre qui est, et dont les vices et les vertus ameneront l'ordre qui sui t , sans qu'on puisse dire que l e tout s1amende ou se deteriore. S'amender, se deteriorer sont des termes r e l a t i f s aux individus d'une espece entre eux, et aux differentes especes entre e l l e s . The passages concerning the order of the universe which I have quoted so far evoke a completely impersonal mechanistic system and seem to exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of an emotional response to i t on the part of man. Yet some commentators have spoken of pantheism as one of the tendencies of Diderot's thought.^ The text which lends most support to such a view i s Le Reve de d'Alembert. But Verniere i s probably right i n Elements de physiologie, ed. Mayer, Appendice II, p. 329. \"Individus\" has i n thi s text the technical philosophical sense of \"individual e n t i t i e s \" ; i t does not refer to human beings. Cf. also the Encyclopedie a r t i c l e \"Laideur, AT, XV, 410. p Ibid., p. 209. A similar passage occurs i n Commentaire sur Hemsterhuis, ed. May. p. 503. It should be noted that i n these two passages the terms \"vertus\" and \"vices\" should not be taken as r e f e r r i n g to human morality i n particular, but rather to harmonious and discordant features i n the universe, or perhaps to what human beings consider to be favorable or ho s t i l e to themselves. Again the \"individuals\" and \"species\" mentioned are not necessarily l i v i n g beings. ^ Cf., for example, D. Mornet, Diderot, 1'homme et 1'oeuvre, Paris, Boivin, 1941, pp. 47-48. 20 remarking that Diderot's \"acceptation i n t e l l e c t u e l l e du pantheisme et son image baroque de 1'immense araignee etreignant l'univers ne sont que jeux d'esprit.\"\"*\" It i s true that one finds at times i n Diderot, i f not a t r u l y r e l i g i o u s or mystical f e e l i n g towards the impersonal mechanism which for him constitutes the universe, at least a certain awe, and a sense of man's insign i f i c a n c e . \"Pardonnons a l a nature qui est aveugle,\" he writes, \"et qui a f a i t l a partie pour l e tout, et non l e tout 2 pour une des parties.\" But despite the s u p e r f i c i a l l y r e l i g i o u s tone of such passages, a careful analysis of the ideas they contain brings us back to Diderot's usual view of the -universe 3 as void of any di r e c t i n g purpose. Such r e f l e c t i o n s on the deterministic universe probably reveal the influence of Spinoza.^ But, whereas modern commentators recognize i n Spinoza's pantheism a t r u l y r e l i g i o u s attitude, Diderot, l i k e the philosophes i n general, considers i t to be a disguise for atheism and values i t as such. He i s t y p i c a l of ^ Spinoza et l a pensee frangaise avant l a Revolution, Paris, 1954, I I , 599. Verniere refers to AT, II, 142-43. 2 Roth, IX, 179 (Undated fragment). Cf. also Moi's reference to the wisdom of Nature, i n Le Neyeu de Rameau, AT, V, 397, which I s h a l l discuss i n chapter VI (see below, pp. 191-92). 3 For further examples of a s u p e r f i c i a l r e l i g i o s i t y serving as a v e i l for materialism, see the Encyclopedie a r t i c l e s \"Harmonie\", AT, XV, 76, and \"Imparfait\", AT, XV, 185. ^ P. Verniere, Spinoza et l a pensee frangaise, I I , 607-08, demonstrates that this influence was direct as well as from intermediary sources. 21 his age i n that his metaphysical thought i s merely a prelude to his thought on man. It serves, l i k e that of Lucretius, to r i d the heavens of menacing presences, and to weaken the power of their earthly representatives. For Diderot, what r e a l l y matters i s man. What, then, i s man i n the midst of t h i s rigorously determined universe? Rejecting the notion of the s p i r i t u a l human soul, to which Cartesian dualism attributed a mysterious independence from the body and an even more mysterious capacity for con t r o l l i n g i t , Diderot asserts that man i s composed of only one substance, matter. Man's consciousness i s an awareness, on the part of the matter of which he i s formed, of i t s own actual state. This awareness does not distinguish man es s e n t i a l l y from other material beings, for s e n s i b i l i t y (by which Diderot seems to mean s e l f -awareness, and not simply responsiveness to stimuli) i s an inherent quality of a l l matter. Even inanimate matter possesses an \" i n e r t \" s e n s i b i l i t y , which becomes \"active\" i n l i v i n g beings.\"1\" What distinguishes sentient beings i s that i n them awareness i s not momentary, but continuous. This i s the res u l t of memory, 1 Cf. Entretien entre d'Alembert et Diderot, AT, II, 106. This d i s t i n c t i o n between \" i n e r t \" and \"active\" s e n s i b i l i t y raises d i f f i c u l t problems both with regard to Diderot's exact meaning and to the v a l i d i t y of his views on this point. For further discussion, see, for example, Emile C a l l o t , La philosophie de l a vie au XVIIIe s i e c l e , Paris, 1965, pp. 280-87. 22 which Diderot considers to he a physical process.\"** As for thinking beings, Diderot suggests that the particular type and degree of self-awareness which they possess are attributable to the s pecial function of the brain, which acts as a unitary 2 receiving-point for information from the senses. Against the dual i s t s ' view that the s p i r i t u a l soul i s capable of governing the actions of the body by the operation of a faculty called the w i l l , Diderot denies that the w i l l , whatever i t i s , can operate without a cause. Thus he objects to Hemsterhuis's constant use of the term \" v e l l e i t e \" on the grounds that this term \"semble supposer en moi un acte sans cause, ce 3 que je ne saurais admettre.\" There can be no causeless act i n man because man i s a part of nature and must obey i t s laws: La volonte est l ' e f f e t d'une cause qui l a meut et l a determine; un acte de volonte sans cause est une chimere. Rien ne se f a i t par saut dans l a nature; tout y est l i e . L'animal, l'homme, tout etre est soumis a cette l o i generale.4 The following argument, attributed to Jacques, demonstrates i n more precise terms the impossibility of f r e e - w i l l : Quelle que s o i t l a somme des elements dont je suis compose, je suis un; or, une cause n'a qu'un 1 Cf. Entretien entre d'Alembert et Diderot. AT, II, 112. 2 Cf. Refutation d'Helvetius, AT, I I , 318, 319-20, et passim. 3 Commentaire sur Hemsterhuis, ed. May, p. 65. ^ Elements de physiologie. ed. Mayer, p. 262. 23 e f f e t ; j ' a i toujours ete une cause une; je n'ai done jamais eu qu'un effet a. produire; ma duree n'est done qu'une suite d'effets necessaires.l Similarly, i n Le Reve de d'Alembert, Bordeu speaks as follows: Est-ce qu'on veut, de soi? La volonte nait toujours de quelque motif i n t e r i e u r ou exterieur, de quelque impression presente, de quelque reminiscence du passe, de quelque passion, de quelque projet dans l'avenir. Apres cela je ne vous d i r a i de l a l i b e r t e qu'un mot, c^est que l a derniere de nos actions est 1'effet necessaire d'une cause une: nous, tres compliquee, mais une.^ In the a r t i c l e \"Liberte,\" Diderot declares that \"ce que nous sommes dans 1'instant qui va suivre depend s i necessairement de ce que nous sommes dans 1'instant present, q u ' i l est metaphysiquement impossible que nous soyons autres,\" and offers Jacques l e f a t a l i s t e . AT, VI, 180. 2 AT, II, 175- 1. G. Crocker defends f r e e - w i l l against Bordeu-Diderot as follows: \"Actually, a l l he [Bordeu] has done i s to stipulate a motive for every action. But ' f r e e - w i l l ' , or freedom of the s e l f , does not mean that our acts have no causes, or that our desires are free. Freedom, i f i t exists, l i e s i n the conscious control we have over the passage of impulse into action. The strongest motive we must obey. It i s not determined, however, by a mechanical competition for nerve paths, but selected by the Self, by an operation of the mind, by our own decision. The mind i s capable of creating or being i t s own cause.\" (The Embattled Philosopher, p. 331*) But Crocker f a i l s to indicate how a decision of the \"Self\" or the \"mind\" (by which he presumably means an immaterial entity) can cause effects i n the human body, without the matter of which the body i s composed ceasing to obey the laws which govern physical phenomena i n general. His position i s much the same as that of Descartes, and equally untenable. 5 AT. XV, 481. The a r t i c l e \"Liberte (Morale)\" i s included i n the Oeuvres completes and was therefore accepted as Diderot's by many c r i t i c s u n t i l the findings of Jacques Proust and John Lough were published. (See above, p. 12.) It was assumed that motives of prudence explained any discrepancies between the views expressed i n the a r t i c l e and Diderot's known opinions on the f r e e - w i l l question. Paul Verniere, i n his discussion of \"Liberte\" 24 the following graphic i l l u s t r a t i o n : Supposons une femme qui soit entrainee par sa passion i n Spinoza et l a pensee francaise. I I , 589-91, does not question the a t t r i b u t i o n of the a r t i c l e to Diderot. However, once the pr i n c i p l e s of a t t r i b u t i o n on which Assezat and Tourneux based the i r c o l l e c t i o n of a r t i c l e s had been shown to be unreliable, i t became abundantly evident that \"Liberte\" contained passages which could not possibly have been written by Diderot. Proust remarks that \" i l n'y a aucune raison de l ' a t t r i b u e r a Diderot.\" (Diderot et 1 1 Encyclopedic, p. 311, note 72.) Proust refuses to attribute d e f i n i t e l y to Diderot any a r t i c l e which does not bear the editor's asterisk, unless his authorship i s vouched for by Waigeon or confirmed by some other external evidence. Lough considers such caution to be excessive and i s w i l l i n g to attribute numerous a r t i c l e s to Diderot on internal evidence. However, he s t i l l r ejects \"Liberte.\" For my part, I consider that certain portions of the a r t i c l e were i n fact written by Diderot. A large proportion of the text consists of a confrontation of arguments i n favour of f r e e - w i l l and others supporting determinism, the former pre-sented as the opinion of the author, the l a t t e r as anticipated objections which he must refute. However, the deterministic arguments sometimes bear a strong resemblance, i n phraseology as well as i n thought, to texts d e f i n i t e l y attributable to Diderot. I suggest that the a r t i c l e i n i t s present form i s the result of collaboration between Diderot and another writer who favoured f r e e - w i l l . (This may perhaps have been the abbe Yvon. See Proust, op_. c i t . , p. 158, note 178.) The basic text seems to have been submitted to Diderot, who interpolated objections which the other writer then answered. In favour of t h i s hypothesis, i t should be noted that, whereas we read, on p. 480: \"On peut reduire tous l e s arguments dont Spinoza et ses sectateurs se sont servis pour soutenir cette absurde hypothese a. ces deux . . . ,\" we are given, after two b r i e f l y summarized Spinozistic arguments, lengthy t h i r d and fourth arguments, which judging.by both style and content, I consider to have been written by Diderot. (From p. 481: \"En troisieme l i e u , ' i l s ajoutent . . . \" to p. 484: \". . \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 d'une nature differente de c e l l e des poids.\") The f i r s t two Spinozistic arguments are answered systematically (pp. 484-85), but Diderot's interpolation i s not. The writer of the a r t i c l e continues instead by. defending f r e e - w i l l on the basis of the subjective conviction of l i b e r t y . He then introduces a further objection to f r e e - w i l l with the sentence: \"Un des plus beaux esprits de notre s i e c l e a voulu essayer jusqu'a quel point on pouvait soutenir un paradoxe.\" (P. 487.) The reference, I think, i s to Diderot. The defender of f r e e - w i l l has scarcely 25 a. se j e t e r t o u t a. l ' h e u r e e n t r e l e s b r a s de son amant; s i nous imaginons cent m i l l e femines entierement semblables a. l a pr e m i e r e , d'age, de temperament, d ' e d u c a t i o n , d 1 o r g a n i s a t i o n , d ' i d e e s , t e l l e s , en un mot, q u ' i l n'y a i t aucune d i f f e r e n c e a s s i g n a b l e e n t r e e l l e s e t l a pr e m i e r e : on l e s v o i t egalement soumises a. l a p a s s i o n dominante, e t p r e c i p i t e e s e n t r e l e s br a s de l e u r s amants, sans qu'on p u i s s e c o n c e v o i r aucune r a i s o n pour l a q u e l l e l ' u n e ne f e r a i t pas ce que t o u t e s l e s a u t r e s feront.-*-D i d e r o t , then, d e n i e s the freedom o f the w i l l . He does n o t , however, deny the e x i s t e n c e o f the w i l l . I f he d i d so, he would f i n d i t hard t o g i v e an e f f e c t i v e answer t o the argument, t o 2 w h i c h Rousseau, f o r example, a p p e a l s , t h a t we have an i n n e r begun t o r e p l y t o the \"paradoxe\", when he i s i n t e r r u p t e d by a s e r i e s o f o b j e c t i o n s ? (P. 489: \"Mais, 1 dans ce systeme . . . \" t o p. 491: \" . . . s u r l e s d i s p o s i t i o n s m a t e r i e l l e s . \" ) These o b j e c t i o n s a r e the n answered by the orthodox w r i t e r (pp. 491-97). The a r t i c l e t a k e s on the a s p e c t of a v e r i t a b l e d i a l o g u e . There i s no evidence o f any i n t e r p o l a t i o n or i n t e r v e n t i o n on D i d e r o t ' s p a r t i n the remainder of the a r t i c l e . My c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t , w h i l e the b u l k o f t h e a r t i c l e cannot be a t t r i b u t e d t o D i d e r o t , it..:Lcontains s e v e r a l passages which can w i t h c o n f i d e n c e be r e s t o r e d t o him. H i s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the a r t i c l e seems not t o have c o n s i s t e d s i m p l y of i n t e r p o l a t i o n s i n a ma n u s c r i p t s u b m i t t e d t o him; t h e r e must have been d i s c u s s i o n between the w r i t e r of the b a s i c t e x t and h i m s e l f . A l l passages from \" L i b e r t e \" quoted i n t h i s t h e s i s a r e t a k e n , u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e s t a t e d , from p a r t s of the a r t i c l e which I c o n s i d e r t o have been w r i t t e n by D i d e r o t . 1 \" L i b e r t e \" , AT, XV, 481. The a r t i c l e \" M a c h i n a l \" , AT, XVI, 34, which Lough a c c e p t s as D i d e r o t ' s work, c o n t a i n s a v e r y s i m i l a r passage, as A s s e z a t a l r e a d y n o t e s . p Cf. the f o l l o w i n g passage from La N o u v e l l e H e l o i s e : \"J'entends beaucoup r a i s o n n e r c o n t r e l a l i b e r t e de l'homme, e t j e meprise tous ces sophismes; parce qu'un r a i s o n n e u r a beau me prouver que j e ne s u i s pas l i b r e , l e sentiment i n t e r i e u r , p l u s f o r t que tous ses arguments l e s dement sans c e s s e , et quelque p a r t i que j e prenne dans quelque d e l i b e r a t i o n que ce s o i t , j e sens p a r f a i t e m e n t q u ' i l ne t i e n t qu'a. moi de prendre l e p a r t i c o n t r a i r e . Toutes ces s u b t i l i t e s de l ' e c o l e s o n t v a i n e s precisement parce q u ' e l l e s prouvent t r o p , q u ' e l l e s combattent t o u t a u s s i b i e n l a v e r i t e que 26 awareness of the freedom of our w i l l . Diderot admits that we have an awareness of the exercise of our w i l l , hut denies that we have an awareness of i t s freedom. He contends that the word \" w i l l \" refers to our consciousness of the motives which prompt us to perform an action: II parait a c e l u i qui examinera les actions humaines de pres, que toute l a difference des volontaires et des involontaires consiste a avoir ete, ou a. n'avoir pas ete r e f l e c h i e s . Je marche, et sous mes pieds i l se rencontre des insectes que j'ecrase involontairement. Je marche, et je vois un serpent endormi, je l u i appuie mon talon sur l a tete, et je 1'ecrase volontairement. However, our awareness of the motives which prompt us to perform an action does not mean that these motives are within our control, i n the sense that we can choose either to have them or not to have them. The a r t i c l e continues: Ma r e f l e x i o n est l a seule chose qui distingue ces deux mouvements, et ma reflexion, consideree relativement a. tous les instants de ma duree, et a. ce que je suis dans l e moment ou j'agis, est absolument independante de moi. In \"Libert^\" Diderot writes: II n'y a de difference entre l'homme automate qui l e mensonge, et que so i t que l a l i b e r t e existe ou non, e l l e s peuvent ser v i r egalement a prouver qu'elle n'existe pas. A entendre ces gens-la, Dieu meme ne ser a i t pas l i h r e , et ce mot de l i b e r t e n'aurait aucun sens.\" (Ed. Mornet, Paris, 1925, IV, 246-47.) 1 Art. \"Involontaire\", A T , XV, 242. p Loc. c i t . There i s a trace here of the attitude which I s h a l l term \"pseudo-scientific fatalism\". (See below, pp.31-32.) In re-jecting unmotivated acts of reflexion, Diderot finds himself separating the s e l f from i t s a c t i v i t i e s . But I think that this i s only a verbal s l i p , as he so consistently rejects any kind of dualism. 27 agit dans l e sommeil et l'homme i n t e l l i g e n t qui agit et qui v e i l l e , sinon que 11entendement est plus present a. l a chose; quand a. l a necessite, e l l e est l a meme. . . . L'homme n'est done pas d i f f e r e n t d'un automate? Nullement dif f e r e n t d'un automate qui sent; c'est une machine plus composee.J-The motivation which leads us to perform a voluntary act consists of a desire or an aversion, or, where there are several c o n f l i c t i n g desires and aversions, of the f i n a l impulse which results from 2 t h e i r combination. The w i l l , says Bordeu i n Le Reve de 3 d'Alembert, i s \" l a derniere impulsion du desir et de 1'aversion.\" Partisans of f r e e - w i l l may perhaps object that our desires and aversions are created, at l e a s t sometimes and i n part, by our w i l l . But Diderot w i l l have none of t h i s : Pretendre q u ' i l y a dans l'ame une a c t i v i t e qui l u i est propre, c'est dire une chose i n i n t e l l i g i b l e , et qui ne resout r i e n . Car i l faudra toujours une cause independante de l'ame qui determine cette , a c t i v i t e a. une chose plutot qu'a. une autre . . . . People claim, he remarks, \"que l e desir nait de l a volonte; c'est l e contraire; c'est du desir que nait l a volonte. Le 5 desir est f i l s de 1' organisation . . . . 1 1 The deterministic mechanism governing the operation of the w i l l i s often described by Diderot i n psychological terms. We -\"\"AT, XV, 482. 2 Cf. \"Liberte\", AT, XV, 482, where the analogy of the balance i s used, as also i n the l e t t e r to Landois (see below, p. 7 3 ) . 3 AT, I I , 175. 4 Art. \"Liberte\", AT, XV, 481. Elements de physiologie, ed. Mayer, p. 265. 28 have already noted Bordeu's claim that acts of w i l l always arise \"de quelque motif i n t e r i e u r ou exterieur, de quelque impression presente, de quelque reminiscence du passe, de quelque passion, de quelque pro jet dans 1' avenir.\"\"\"\" This i s the sort of language we use when we describe the contents of our consciousness, which we know i n t u i t i v e l y ; i t i s not the objective language of pure materialism. Again, i n the following passage from the Elements de physiologie, the determinism to which human beings are subject i s expressed i n terms of the psychological analysis elaborated by Locke and Condillac: Toutes les pensees naissent l e s unes des autres; cela me semble: evident. Les operations i n t e l l e c t u e l l e s sont egalement enchainees. La perception nait de l a sensation, de l a perception l a r e f l e x i o n , l a meditation, l e jugement. II n'y a r i e n de l i b r e dans l e s operations i n t e l l e c t u e l l e s , n i dans l a sensation, n i dans l a perception ou l a vue des rapports des sensations entre e l l e s , n i dans l a re f l e x i o n ou l a meditation ou l 1 a t t e n t i o n plus ou moins forte a ces rapports, n i dans l e jugement ou 1 1 acquiescement a ce qui parait vrai.2 In the Refutation d'Helvetius Diderot remarks that man i s subject to a double determinism, psychological and physical: Dans l'homme qui r e f l e c h i t , enchainement necessaire d'idees; dans l'homme attache a t e l l e ou t e l l e profession, enchainement necessaire de t e l l e s ou t e l l e s idees. Dans l'homme qui agit, enchainement d'incidents dont l e plus i n s i g n i f i a n t est aussi 1 AT, II, 175. p Elements de physiologie, ed. Mayer, pp. 59-60. 29 contraint que l e lever du s o l e i l . Double necessite propre a. l ' i n d i v i d u , destinee ourdie depuis l ' o r i g i n e des temps jusqu'au moment ou je suis . . . . Tout s'est f a i t en nous parce que nous sommes nous, -toujours nous, et pas une minute les memes. But, whereas Helvetius i s led astray by taking too l i t e r a l l y the Lockean metaphor of the tabula rasa and gives a s i m p l i s t i c pseudo-materialistic version of human motivation, Diderot never forgets that the only r e a l causes are physical ones, that true materialism speaks i n terms of the brain, not the mind, and of causes rather than motives. True, when he wishes to refute Helvetius's reduction of a l l higher motives to crudely hedonistic ones, he distinguishes between physical pleasures and those of the \"entendement\", or \"understanding\"; but he s t i l l believes that, for a l l the v a l i d i t y and usefulness of this d i s t i n c t i o n , the \"entendement\" i t s e l f i s , i n the f i n a l analysis, only the subjective awareness of highly complicated modifications of the brain, from which i t has no independence. In other words, consciousness i s for Diderot an epiphenomenon. He e x p l i c i t l y affirms that man's w i l l and understanding are physical and are subject to the same r i g i d laws as the rest of the material universe: La volonte n'est pas moins mecanique que 1'entendement. . La v o l i t i o n precede 1 'action des fibres musculaires. Mais l a v o l i t i o n suit l a sensation; ce sont deux fonctions du cerveau; e l l e s sont corporelles. It i s to this i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the subjective world of the human mind with the objective world of matter that Diderot refers when 1 AT, II, 373. 2 Elements de physiologie, ed. Mayer, p. 262. 30 he says of Jacques that \" l a d i s t i n c t i o n d'un monde physique et d'un monde moral [ i . e . a psychological world] l u i semblait vide de sens.\" In short, man i s part of the material world and conforms to the same basic laws which govern the movements of a l l matter. In man, matter i s endowed with awareness of i t s e l f , but possesses no special faculty whereby i t might suspend the operation of the laws of nature and thus free i t s e l f from i t s subjection to these laws. As I pointed out i n my Introduction,^ many c r i t i c s have claimed that such a view of man i s i n contradiction with Diderot's position as a moralist and that he was b i t t e r l y aware of thi s dilemma, f e e l i n g himself torn bbetween his i n t e l l e c t u a l convic-tions and the promptings of his heart. I w i l l attempt i n my next chapter to show that, i n fact, he regarded his deterministic materialism as compatible with a personal commitment to benefi-cence and did not think himself i l l o g i c a l i n exhorting others to make a similar \"choice\". The remainder of the present chapter w i l l be devoted to showing that Diderot does not think that his conception of determinism entails the b e l i e f that the human 1 Jacques l e f a t a l i s t e . AT, V I , 180. p See above,pp. 5-6. 31 in d i v i d u a l i s merely a passive witness of his own destiny. The f r a g i l i t y of many of the arguments advanced by the c r i t i c s to whom I have referred above w i l l become apparent. It w i l l f a c i l i t a t e our discussion to distinguish three d i f f e r e n t , though related, doctrines or attitudes regarding the degree of autonomy attributable to man, a l l of which play a part, of greater or lesser importance, i n Diderot's thought. I s h a l l designate these, admittedly i n a rather personal and arbitrary fashion, by the following terms: 1) s c i e n t i f i c determinism; 2) mythological fatalism; 3) pseudo-scientific fatalism. By \" s c i e n t i f i c determinism\" I mean the theory, which I have already examined i n Diderot's writings, that the human individual i s part of the material universe and therefore subject to the same immutable laws which govern a l l matter. By \"mythological fatalism\" I mean the b e l i e f that, although we have the p o s s i b i l i t y of choosing to act i n diff e r e n t ways, the l i n e of conduct we adopt cannot aff e c t the r e a l l y important events i n our l i f e , since these are pre-ordained. Innumerable versions of this b e l i e f may be found i n l i t e r a t u r e and i n popular superstition even i n the most;\"advanced\" contemporary s o c i e t i e s . This type of fatalism, which Shakespeare expresses i n the words \"There's a D i v i n i t y which shapes our ends, / Rough-hew them how we w i l l , \" derives no support from a s c i e n t i f i c view of the world; indeed, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to reconcile the two. 'I s h a l l use the term \"pseudo-s c i e n t i f i c fatalism\" to refer to the doctrine which sees the 32 human ind i v i d u a l as the passive witness both of the events which take place i n the physical universe (including his own body) and of the succession of his own thoughts. This view d i f f e r s from s c i e n t i f i c determinism i n that i t implies a kind of dualism: the s e l f i s thought of as separate from the body and even from the mind. In s c i e n t i f i c determinism, on the other hand, the s e l f i s i d e n t i f i e d with the body and with the epiphenomenal mind. It i s not free from the general chain of events, being a part of i t , but neither i s i t en t i r e l y passive, since, l i k e every other part of the universe i t possesses i t s own o r i g i n a l dynamism and thus contributes i t s share to the development of the whole. Let us f i r s t consider the role of mythological fatalism i n Diderot's thought. We fin d t h i s attitude i n several texts i n which Diderot complains that human beings are the playthings of destiny. He writes, for example, to Mademoiselle Jodin: . . . nous sommes tous sous l a main du destin qui nous promene a son gre, qui vous a deja. bien ballottee, et qui n'a pas l ' a i r de vous accorder s i t o t l e repos. Vous etes malheureusement un etre energique, turbulent, et 1'on n He would prefer a world where men l i v e d i n harmony without need of coercion. He 1 Art, \"Cyniques\", AT, XIV, 261. See above, pp. 12h-25. 3 Art, \"Chasse\", AT, XIV, 110. 159 i s d e l i g h t e d w i t h the U t o p i a n p i c t u r e of such a w o r l d p a i n t e d by t h e B e n e d i c t i n e monk Dom Deschamps: Un moine appele Dom Deschamps m'a f a i t l i r e un des ouvrages l e s p l u s v i o l e n t s e t l e s p l u s o r i g i n a u x que j e c o n n a i s s e . C'est l ' i d e e d'un e t a t s o c i a l ou l ' o n a r r i v e r a i t en p a r t a n t de l ' e t a t sauvage, en passant par l ' e t a t p o l i c e , au s o r t i r duquel on a 1'experience de l a v a n i t e des choses l e s p l u s i m p o r t a n t e s , et ou l ' o n c o n c o i t e n f i n que l ' e s p e c e humaine s e r a malheureuse t a n t q u ' i l y a u r a des r o i s , des p r e t r e s , des m a g i s t r a t s , des l o i s , un t i e n , un mien, l e s mots de v i c e s et de v e r t u s . Jugez combien c e t ouvrage, t o u t mal e c r i t q u ' i l e s t , a du. me f a i r e de p l a i s i r , p u isque j e me s u i s r e t r o u v e t o u t a coup dans l e monde pour l e q u e l j ' e t a i s ne. An e x a m i n a t i o n of the work t o which D i d e r o t r e f e r s , namely Le 2 V r a i Systeme, r e v e a l s q u i t e c l e a r l y t h a t the i d e a l s o c i a l s t a t e f o r w hich he c l a i m s t o be by n a t u r e s u i t e d i s not one i n which every i n d i v i d u a l pursues h i s own h a p p i n e s s a t the expense o f whoever i s too weak t o r e s i s t him, but one i n which a l l men are f r e e from m i s c o n c e p t i o n s and p r e j u d i c e s r e g a r d i n g the n a t u r e o f t h e i r t r u e h a p p i n e s s , and t h e r e f o r e c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e i r f e l l o w -men. I n t h i s i d e a l w o r l d t h e r e are no laws because no laws a r e needed; t h e r e a r e no words f o r v i c e and v i r t u e because v i c e does not e x i s t ; t h e r e are no k i n g s , p r i e s t s or m a g i s t r a t e s because t h e r e i s no need f o r a s u p e r i o r a u t h o r i t y t o impose obedience t o l a w s ; t h e r e i s no p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y because such an i n s t i t u t i o n i s not r e q u i r e d t o ensure t h a t a man s h a l l e njoy the f r u i t s o f -1 R o t h , IX, 245 (Fragment; p r o b a b l y 1769). Cf. a l s o AT, V I , 439 (Remarks on Le Temple du bonheur). 2 Dom Deschamps, Le V r a i Systeme, ou l e mot de 1'enigme metaphysique e t morale, ed. J . Thomas and F. V e n t u r i , Geneve, 1939. 160 his labour. This v i s i o n i s certainly anarchistic i n the exact sense of the term, but i t i s not open to the charge of amoralism or unfettered individualism.\"\"\" It i s perhaps surprising that Diderot should be so appreciative of the ideas of Dom Deschamps, since many of them run counter to his own views. He surely cannot have found much s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the monk's subtle metaphysics. It i s , moreover, hard to believe that the author of the Refutation d'Helvetius would accept the view that individual differences are mainly attributable to s o c i a l influences and should r e l i s h the prospect of everyone being so similar i n the \"etat de moeurs\" as to be p r a c t i c a l l y interchangeable. Nor would he have admitted that the destiny of free men could ever be f u l f i l l e d without a dynamic culture. Diderot has f o r -gotten a l l these ideas of Dom Deschamps and has remembered only his attack on the oppressive forces i n the actual state of society and his v i s i o n of a world i n which harmony i s achieved without compulsion. Diderot does not take Dom Deschamps's ideas too seriously. He sees i n them \"un beau paradoxe\". The Utopian \"etat de moeurs\" 2 i s , he admits, \"diablement i d e a l \" . Presumably he means that i t would be p r a c t i c a l l y impossible to fi n d a way of changing'. \"\"\" It i s worth noting, perhaps, that the anarchism which Diderot praises here i s very di f f e r e n t from the theories expounded i n the majority of eighteenth-century U t o p i a s . Morelly's communistic state, for instance, far from being anarchistic, i s a highly regimented society. Cf. Kingsley Martin, The Rise of French L i b e r a l Thought, New York, 1954, pp. 242-46. AT, VI, 439 (Remarks on Le Temple du bonheur). 161 from the present state to the way of l i f e advocated by Dom Deschamps, since men have been conditioned by t h e i r upbringing to seek their own advantage i n every way which the laws do not p o s i t i v e l y prevent, and have come to associate the possession of private property with freedom and happiness. In other words, the whole psychology of men would have to be changed. Dom Deschamps contends that the a b o l i t i o n of laws, and, i n particular, those on which the i n s t i t u t i o n of property i s based, would produce thi s necessary psychological change. But Diderot could never accept such a view, since he thinks that there w i l l always be a certain number of individuals who are so constituted as to be incapable of pursuing their own interest i n cooperation with others, and s t i l l more people whose passions are too strong for them to control unless their reason i s reinforced by fear of punishment. In order that the general welfare may be protected against such people, laws w i l l always have to be promulgated and enforced.\"\"\" I f a l l men were perfect and could trust each other i m p l i c i t l y , no laws would be necessary, but i n practice laws are needed for To judge from a l e t t e r from Dom Deschamps to his friend the marquis de Voyer, i t appears that, i n his conversations with the Benedictine, Diderot raised such p r a c t i c a l objections to the monk's Utopian \"etat de moeurs\". Dom Deschamps remarks that Diderot believes man to be \"moitie mechant par nature et moitie par etat s o c i a l . \" Dom Deschamps, who thinks that the e v i l i n man i s caused entir e l y by the structure of society, makes fun of Diderot's attitude on this point: \"On d i t cet homme athee, mais on a t o r t . II se c r o i t mechant par l e grand diable d'enfer, des q u ' i l se c r o i t mechant par nature; et croire cela c'est croire au grand diable d'enfer. Or, qui c r o i t n'est point athee, et je ne vois pas pourquoi i l craint l a police a, ce t i t r e . \" (Roth, IX, 106 Aug.' 13, 1769 .) 162 the maintenance of a general standard of morality. Diderot remarks that \" s i l a vertu d'un p a r t i c u l i e r peut se soutenir sans appui, i l n'en est pas de meme de l a vertu d'un peuple.\" 1 There i s , i n practice, need of a coercive force to compel those who are not s u f f i c i e n t l y motivated by love of virtue andv a sense of duty to behave i n accordance with the general good, and thereby with their own s e l f - i n t e r e s t r i g h t l y understood. Another reason for the general enforcement of laws i s that, i n fact, unless they are generally enforced, i t i s doubtful whether i t w i l l be i n the true interest even of an individual who i s aware of their justice and conformity with the general good to obey them when other individuals infringe them. In the memoir \"De l a morale des r o i s , \" Diderot explains that, i n their relations with each other, sovereigns are s t i l l i n the j u r i s t i c state of nature, there being no superior authority to constrain them c o l l e c t i v e l y to just behaviour; so that, while some of them recognize the pr i n c i p l e of justice i n international a f f a i r s , even these are often obliged to disregard this p r i n c i p l e i n practice because they have no assurance that the other sovereigns w i l l respect i t . ^ These two reasons c l a r i f y Diderot's remark i n the a r t i c l e \"Grecs\": . . . qu'est-ce que l a voix de l a conscience, sans l'a u t o r i t e et l a menace des l o i s ? les l o i s I l e s l o i s ! v o i l a l a seule barriere qu'on puisse elever contre les passions des hommes; c'est l a volonte generale q u ' i l faut opposer aux volontes p a r t i c u l i e r e s : et 1 Roth, II, 55 (To the Princess de Nassau-Saarbruck; May or June 1758). p Memoires pour Catherine II, ed. Verniere, pp. 231 and 234. 163 sans un glaive qui se meuve egalement sur l a surface d'un peuple, et qui tranche ou fasse baisser l e s tetes audacieuses qui s'elevent, l e f a i b l e demeure expose a. 1'injure du plus f o r t ; l e tumult e regne, et l e crime avec l e tumulte; et i l vaudrait mieux, pour l a surete des hommes, qu'ils fussent epars, que d'avoir l e s mains l i b r e s et d'etre v o i s i n s . l It i s clear, i n the l i g h t of what we have just said, that this \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 passage does not deny the v a l i d i t y of the princip l e of justice or claim that i t originates i n positive l e g i s l a t i o n . It i s also evident from this text that Diderot i s not advocating anarchy when he refers to a state of isolated existence, but i s simply pointing out that such a state would be preferable to a cohesive existence without the enforcement of general laws. In some texts Diderot states categorically that to bring men closer together and to strengthen the bonds between them i s always desirable. He writes to Catherine II, for example: Dans une societe d'hommes quelconque, plus l e s parties en sont eparses, moins e l l e s sont rapprochees, plus cette societe est eloignee de l a veritable notion de societe; moins e l l e s se soutiennent, moins e l l e s s'entraident, moins e l l e s sont fortes; moins e l l e s luttent avantageusement et contre l'ennemie constante de l'homme, l a nature, et contre les ennemies accidentelles, l e s societes adjacentes, plus l e tout est v o i s i n de l ' e t a t sauvage. 2 But i n texts l i k e this there i s the i m p l i c i t assumption that the society under discussion i s a well-ordered society, one which corresponds to the ide a l conception of that state. We should not 1 AT, XV, 57. Memoires pour Catherine I I , ed. Verniere, p. 176. Some changes have been made i n the punctuation. 164 be m i s l e d by D i d e r o t ' s f r e q u e n t l y b i t t e r c r i t i c i s m of h i s own s o c i e t y and h i s doubts as t o whether i t i s a t a l l p r e f e r a b l e t o p r i m i t i v e anarchy: he never f o r one moment l o s e s s i g h t o f the k i n d o f c i v i l i z e d s o c i e t y he d e s i r e s and towards the c r e a t i o n of which a l l h i s e f f o r t s as a t h i n k e r and p r o p a g a n d i s t a r e d i r e c t e d . The p e r f e c t s o c i e t y would not c r e a t e a new. type o f human n a t u r e , but would p r e s e r v e and p r o t e c t those a d m i r a b l e and v a l u a b l e q u a l i t i e s which a r e n a t u r a l t o man and would a l l o w some o f them t o develop t o a degree which i s i m p o s s i b l e i n the absence o f s o c i a l bonds. D i d e r o t imagines savage man, l i v i n g i n i s o l a t e d f a m i l y groups, t o be a d m i r a b l e i n h i s independence and i n h i s sense o f d i g n i t y and p e r s o n a l v a l u e . But man i n such c o n d i t i o n s i s i g n o r a n t and must p i t h i s own unaided s t r e n g t h a g a i n s t n a t u r e ; he can never hope t o a c h i e v e the c u l t u r a l advances the germs of whic h l i e dormant i n h i s n a t u r e but w i l l o n l y d e v e l o p i f he enjoys l e i s u r e and s e c u r i t y . These he can never o b t a i n except through c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h o t h e r men, which means f o r m i n g a s o c i e t y . 1 The man who i s s u b j e c t e d t o u n j u s t , t y r a n n i c a l government i s a s l a v e . I t would be b e t t e r f o r him i f he l i v e d the savage l i f e i n the p r e - s o c i a l s t a t e of n a t u r e . But the f r e e c i t i z e n , the man who, i n obeying l a w s , i s i n f a c t c o nforming t o h i s own judgment of what conduct i s b e s t f o r him as a member of a c o o p e r a t i v e group, p r e s e r v e s the same d i g n i t y and p r i d e i n h i s own l i b e r t y as the savage p o s s e s s e s . C o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g p o r t r a i t o f savage man: 1 P l a n d'une u n i v e r s i t e . AT, I I I , 4 2 9 - 3 0 . 165 Un a i r de f i e r t e mele de f e r o c i t e . Sa tete est droite et relevee; son regard f i x e . II est maitre dans sa foret. Plus je l e considere, plus i l me rappelle l a solitude et l a franchise de son domicile.1 Republican man i s remarkably similar to savage man i n his dignity and sense of freedom: l a republique est un etat d'egalite. Tout sujet se regarde comme un p e t i t monarque. L'air du republicain sera haut, dur et f i e r . In the l i g h t of the texts which we have just examined, I 3 propose now to discuss the meaning of a work which some c r i t i c s have adduced as evidence of a fundamental leaning towards i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c anarchism, namely Les Eleutheromanes (1772). Diderot explains i n the \"argument\" which precedes the poem that he wrote i t on the occasion of receiving for the t h i r d year i n succession the bean which t r a d i t i o n a l l y confers an honorary kingship at Twelfth-night. Treating this t r i v i a l circumstance with mock-seriousness, he i s caught up by the gravity of the symbolic interpretation which he gives to this offer of a crown, and his j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r immediately abdicating his royal power raises the work from the l e v e l of l i g h t society verse to that of 1 Essai sur l a peinture, AT, X, 487. 2 Ibid., AT, X, 487. E.g. Karl Rosenkranz, Diderot 1s Leben und Werke, Leipzig, 1866, II, 351; Ernest S e i l l i e r e , Diderot, Paris, 1944, pp. 93-94. 166 a philosophical poem. He begins by affirming that absolute power i s a very dangerous thing because men who are not corrupted by i t are extremely rare. It would be presumptuous, he f e e l s , to suppose that he could himself wield absolute power without succumbing to the temptation of i n j u s t i c e . Supposing he should become another Caligula! The hated name i s a signal for the poet to c a l l upon tyrants to behold the danger of revolt which i s forever threatening them. Awake and l i s t e n , he c a l l s to the oppressor: . . . et tu sauras qu'en ton moindre sujet, Ni l a garde qui t'environne, Ni l'imposant hommage qu'on rend a. ta personne N'ont pu de s'affranchir etouffer l e projet.1 So far there i s nothing here which goes beyond the generalities of Diderot's oft-repeated condemnation of p o l i t i c a l tyranny. But the next passage, i n which the poet evokes natural man impatient of a l l authority, restive beneath the bonds imposed by society, unwilling either to impose or to submit to laws, i s ce r t a i n l y disquieting. Here, i f anywhere, one may ask whether Diderot's ideal i s a world i n which individual freedom reigns so uncontrolled as to leave no basis for right and wrong except the a b i l i t y of the stronger man to impose his w i l l on the weaker. It w i l l be necessary to quote the whole passage before commenting on i t : L'enfant de l a nature abhorre l'esclavage; Implacable ennemi de toute autorite, II s'indigne du joug; l a contrainte l'outrage; 1 AT, IX, 14. 167 Liberte, c'est son voeu; son c r i , c'est Liberte. Au mepris des li e n s de l a societe, II reclame en secret son antique apanage. Des moeurs ou grimaces d'usage Ont beau s e r v i r de v o i l e a. sa fer o c i t e ; Une hypocrite urbanite, Les souplesses d'un tigr e enchaine dans sa cage, Ne trompent point l ' o e i l du sage; Et, dans l e s murs de l a c i t e , II reconnait l'homme sauvage S'agitant sous les fers dont i l est garrotte. On a pu l ' a s s e r v i r , on ne l ' a point dompte. Un t r a i t de physionomie, Un vestige de dignite Dans le'fond de son coeur, sur son front est reste; Et mille f o i s l a tyrannie, Inquiete ou trouver de l a securite, A p a l i de 1'eclair de son o e i l i r r i t e . C'est alors qu'un trone v a c i l l e ; Qu'effraye, tremblant, eperdu, D'un peuple furieux l e despote imbecile Connait l a vanite du pacte pretendu. Repondez, souverains: qui l ' a dicte, ce pacte? Qui l ' a signe? qui l ' a souscrit? Dans quel bois, dans quel antre en a-t-on dresse l'acte? Par quelles mains f u t - i l e c r i t ? L'a-t-on grave sur l a pierre ou l'ecorce? Qui l e maintient? l a justice ou l a force? De d r o i t , de f a i t , i l est p r o s c r i t . J'en atteste les temps; j'en appelle a tout age; Jamais au public avantage L'homme n'a franchement s a c r i f i e ses droits; S ' i l osait de son coeur n'ecouter que l a voix, Changeant tout a coup de langage, II nous d i r a i t , comme I'hote des bois: \"La nature n'a f a i t n i serviteur n i maitre; \"Je ne veux n i donner n i recevoir de l o i s . \" Et ses mains ourdiraient les e n t r a i l l e s du pretre, Au defaut d'un cordon pour etrangler les r o i s . x As Assezat points out, this poem was not published u n t i l 1795, so that there i s no reason to suppose that i t had any influence on the excesses of the French Revolution. Nor need we suppose that the f i n a l l i n e s of the passage quoted indicate Ibid., pp. 15-16. The d i v i s i o n into strophe, antistrophe and epode has been omitted, since i t seems a r b i t r a r i l y to interrupt what i s i n fact a continuous development of ideas. 168 any l u r k i n g b l o o d t h i r s t i n e s s i n D i d e r o t . What he i s s a y i n g i s t h a t i f men were not c o n d i t i o n e d t o behave i n an o r d e r l y , submis-s i v e manner, they would r e v o l t a g a i n s t t h e i r o p p r e s s o r s i n as savage a way as might t h e i r u n c i v i l i z e d a n c e s t o r s i n the f o r e s t s o f y o r e . As i n the .Supplement au Voyage de B o u g a i n v i l l e , D i d e r o t shows us a n a t u r a l man l a n g u i s h i n g enchained i n the h e a r t of c i v i l i z e d man, but now the s p e c i a l r e f e r e n c e i s not to s e x u a l c o n s t r a i n t s , but t o p o l i t i c a l t y r a n n y . The f e r o c i t y o f t h i s n a t u r a l man does not mean t h a t t r u e human n a t u r e i s i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y a g g r e s s i v e , but s i m p l y t h a t when, as i n the savage s t a t e , man i s not i n h i b i t e d by an a c q u i r e d r e l u c t a n c e t o r e s o r t t o v i o l e n c e and i s not i n d o c t r i n a t e d w i t h r e s p e c t f o r a u t h o r i t i e s unworthy of i t , he w i l l use f o r c e t o w in or m a i n t a i n h i s freedom. A l t h o u g h i n c i v i l i z e d man t h i s w i l l t o freedom has been mastered, i t has not been d e s t r o y e d and o n l y the p h y s i c a l power of the t y r a n t can p r e v e n t i t from b r e a k i n g l o o s e . The \" s o - c a l l e d p a c t \" t o which D i d e r o t r e f e r s i s not the t a c i t c o n t r a c t by which i n d i v i d u a l w i l l s a r e abandoned i n f a v o u r of an a u t h o r i t y which s h a l l execute the g e n e r a l w i l l . I n s t e a d , D i d e r o t r e f e r s here t o the H o b b e s i a n 1 There i s , a d m i t t e d l y , no e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e here t o Hobbes him-s e l f . L e l a n d Thielemann, i n \" D i d e r o t and Hobbes,\" D i d e r o t S t u d i e s , I I , 1952,.po239, n o t e s the r a r i t y of D i d e r o t ' s comments on Hobbes's defence of a b s o l u t e monarchy and on h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f the p o l i t i c a l c o n t r a c t , and r i g h t l y observes t h a t \"of a l l the c o n t e x t s i n which D i d e r o t r e f e r r e d e x p l i c i t l y t o Hobbes, the one i n which h i s c o n v i c -t i o n s d i f f e r e d most c o m p l e t e l y and most c o n s i s t e n t l y from those o f the E n g l i s h p h i l o s o p h e r was a t the same time the one i n which he mentioned Hobbes l e a s t o f t e n . \" \"Few of [ D i d e r o t ' s ] p o l i t i c a l ^ w r i t i n g s however,\" Thielemann c o n t i n u e s , \"even though they d i d not e x p r e s s l y name Hobbes, f a i l e d t o make c l e a r the uncompromisable d i f f e r e n c e s between the Hobbesian and the l i b e r a l t h e o r i e s of p o l i t i c a l government.\" Cf. Thielemann's subsequent remark: \"The g r e a t l i b e r a t i n g concept of the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t . . . had been 169 concept of a contract of submission by virtue of which the subjects give up a l l t heir rights i n exchange for the guarantee by the monarch of the maintenance of public order. This view of govern-ment i s t o t a l l y opposed to Diderot's conception of the relations between subjects and sovereign, as he expresses i t i n the a r t i c l e s \"Autorite politique,\" \"Cite\" and \"Citoyen.\" 1 Diderot does not agree with Hobbes that the natural state of man i s a war of a l l against a l l , and considers such a doctrine to be dangerous because i t provides a specious j u s t i f i c a t i o n for tyranny. When he writes i n l e s Eleutheromanes: \"Jamais au public avantage / L'homme n'a franchement s a c r i f i e ses d r o i t s , \" Diderot means not that man has never f r e e l y abandoned his right to pursue his own personal advantage at the expense of a l l other men \u00E2\u0080\u0094 Diderot consistently refuses to concede that man ever possessed 2 such a right , even i n the state of nature \u00E2\u0080\u0094 but that man has never, i n exchange for a \"public advantage\" consisting solely of the guarantee that society w i l l not lapse into a war of a l l against a l l , spontaneously abandoned his right to be free from the i n j u s t i c e which others might wish to exercise towards him. Diderot agrees 3 with Locke that the anarchy of nature, though spoiled by the perverted to the uses of ru l i n g despots who were now pretending that t h e i r despotism was l e g a l . In the poem Les Eleutheromanes, Diderot merely echoed the sentiments of Ramsay [See AT, IV,.54.1 i n challenging the despots to produce the document.\" (Ibid., p. 244.) 1 See above, pp. 1 13-15 . See below, p. 2 2 6 . 3 Cf. The Second Treatise of Government, ed. Peardon, chap. II, sect. 13, pp. 9-10. 170 a c t i o n s o f a c e r t a i n number of v i c i o u s men a g a i n s t whose e n t e r -p r i s e s the j u s t man has no r e c o u r s e except t o whatever s t r e n g t h he may p o s s e s s , i s not n e c e s s a r i l y worse than a form of c i v i l i z e d s o c i e t y i n w h i c h i n j u s t i c e i s w r i t t e n i n t o the laws and i n s t i t u -t i o n a l i z e d i n e q u a l i t y encourages c r i m e : J ' o s e r a i s presque a s s u r e r q u ' i l se commet p l u s de c r i m e s en un j o u r a. P a r i s que dans t o u t e s l e s f o r e t s des sauvages en un an. D'ou i l s ' e n s u i v r a i t qu'une s o c i e t e mal ordonnee e s t p i r e que l ' e t a t sauvage. P o u r q u o i n o n ? 1 Thus Les Eleutheromanes i s not a p r o t e s t a g a i n s t law i n g e n e r a l , but a g a i n s t u n j u s t laws e n f o r c e d by t y r a n n i c a l powers. J u s t i c e precedes a l l p o s i t i v e l a w s , b e i n g a p r i n c i p l e i n s e p a r a b l e 2 from the n a t u r e o f man. To make one's conduct conform t o n a t u r a l law i s not t o g i v e up one's freedom, whereas t o submit t o a c t s i n which another person i n f r i n g e s n a t u r a l law i s t o be e n s l a v e d . The p o t e n t i a l advantage of the s o c i a l s t a t e over the s t a t e of n a t u r e i s t h a t the s o c i a l s t a t e can p r o v i d e a mechanism f o r c o m p e l l i n g such men as have t e n d e n c i e s towards u n j u s t conduct t o r e s p e c t the freedom of t h e i r f e l l o w s . What D i d e r o t laments and what makes him a t times r e g r e t the savage e x i s t e n c e where a s m a l l number of hideous c r i m e s have t o be b a l a n c e d a g a i n s t the l a c k o f o r g a n i z e d o p p r e s s i o n and of i n j u s t i c e s a n c t i o n e d by p o s i t i v e l a w s , i s t h a t i n a c t u a l f a c t c i v i l i z e d s o c i e t i e s have c o n s e c r a t e d the bondage of man by e n f o r c i n g not n a t u r a l law, but \"\"* O b s e r v a t i o n s s u r l e Nakaz, ed. c i t . , p. 401. 2 See below, p. 233. 171 an a r t i f i c i a l and arbitrary morality and the dominance of small groups of people over the general mass of mankind. We may sum up the argument put forward i n th i s chapter by saying that Diderot never contests the d e s i r a b i l i t y of a j u s t l y ordered society, but condemns only unjust and oppressive s o c i a l systems. He denies that obedience to just laws and moral principles detracts from the true freedom of man. Indeed, no man i s t r u l y free unless he has become the slave of duty. \"II vaut mieux etre mort que fripon;\" he retorts i n a l e t t e r to Jean-Jacques, \"mais malheur a, c e l u i qui v i t et qui n'a point de devoir dont i l s o i t esclave!\" 1 Many years l a t e r , i n the Essai sur l e s regnes de Claude et de Neron, he writes the following imaginary dialogue: \u00E2\u0080\u0094Pour etre heureux, i l faut etre l i b r e : l e bonheur n'est pas f a i t pour c e l u i qui a d'autres maitres que son devoir. \u00E2\u0080\u0094Mais l e devoir n ' e s t - i l pas imperieux? et s ' i l faut que je serve, qu'importe sous quel maitre? \u00E2\u0080\u0094 I I importe beaucoup: l e devoir est un maitre dont on ne saurait s'affranchir sans tomber dans l e malheur; c'est avec l a chaine du devoir qu'on brise toutes les autres. -1 Roth, I, 235 (March 14, 1757). 2 AT, III, 314. CHAPTER V I THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY My l a s t t h r e e c h a p t e r s have been concerned w i t h D i d e r o t ' s p l e a t h a t m o r a l i t y and the s t r u c t u r e o f s o c i e t y s h o u l d be founded on the common n a t u r e o f mankind, so t h a t the e s s e n t i a l needs o f men might be s a t i s f i e d w i t h o u t a r b i t r a r y r e s t r i c t i o n s . I have s t r e s s e d t h a t t h i s demand f o r freedom does not a p p l y t o men as i n d i v i d u a l s , but r a t h e r as members of a common s p e c i e s , and t h a t the freedom c l a i m e d f o r each member of the s o c i a l group i s l i m i t e d by the freedom of the o t h e r members. However, D i d e r o t i s w e l l aware t h a t the n a t u r e o f each i n d i v i d u a l combines, on the one hand a t t r i b u t e s common t o a l l human b e i n g s and, on the o t h e r , c e r t a i n p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . What I now propose t o d i s c u s s i s the degree of freedom which D i d e r o t would a c c o r d the i n d i v i d u a l i n the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f h i s s p e c i a l needs and the development o f h i s p a r t i c u l a r p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . D i d e r o t ' s view of what we might term c h a r a c t e r o l o g i c a l i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s founded on h i s c o n c e p t i o n of the p h y s i c a l n a t u r e o f man. Human be i n g s are h i g h l y d i v e r s e i n t h e i r g e n e r a l b o d i l y make-up and, what i s e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t as r e g a r d s c h a r a c t e r , i n the s t r u c t u r e of t h e i r b r a i n and of t h e i r \"diaphragm\", which 173 Diderot considers to be the centre of a physical system corres-ponding to emotional sensibility.\"*\" From these physiological differences there results a great d i v e r s i t y i n physical, emotional and i n t e l l e c t u a l needs and aptitudes, and one would expect that i f these needs and aptitudes were not subjected to constraints which tend to produce uniformity, there would be a great range of behaviour and l i f e - s t y l e s . But Diderot observes that, within a given s o c i a l group, men manifest a tedious sameness, i n contrast to which he finds any kind of o r i g i n a l i t y refreshing. He loves to portray i n his f i c t i o n a l writings characters l i k e Rameau's nephew, who can be r e l i e d upon to think and act d i f f e r e n t l y from the next man. We are told that the f a t a l i s t Jacques i s \"un franc o r i g i n a l , ce qui a r r i v e r a i t plus souvent parmi les hommes, s i 1'education d'abord, ensuite l e grand usage du monde, ne l e s . usaient comme ces pieces d 1argent qui, a force de c i r c u l e r , 2 perdent leur empreinte.\" This i s a favourite image with Diderot. We f i n d i t again i n the Refutation d'Helvetius, where Diderot suggests that the great uniformity of s p i r i t and character which foreigners notice i n the French i s due to th e i r extreme s o c i a b i l i t y : \"ce sont des pieces dont 1'empreinte s'est usee par un frottement 3 continu.\" It may be considered strange that Diderot should decry 1 Cf. Elements de physiologie, ed. Mayer, pp. 48 and 138; Refutation d'Helvetius. AT, II, 333-37 and 365-67. 2 AT, V I , 192-93-5 AT, II, 382. 174 s o c i a b i l i t y i n this way, since he does not appear to have been troubled by the inaptitude for s o c i a l relations which made Rousseau's l i f e so wretched. Diderot's l e t t e r s provide ample evidence of the great enjoyment he found, for example, i n the society of the d'Holbach c i r c l e . But this contradiction i s only apparent. He was, i n fact, shy of strangers. He writes to Mme d ' Epinay: Vous croyez done que ma sauvagerie est une pretendue sauvagerie; que je n'ai que l a peau de l'ours, mais que l a personne n'est pas dessous. C'est que vous prenez tous pour un brave c e l u i qui n'est qu'un poltron revolte. Je f a i s dans 1'occasion, comme tout l e monde, de necessite vertu. Mais i l n'y a qu'a. me regarder dans l e premier moment, et l'on verra comment a l'approche d'un inconnu, mes joues tombent et ma huppe se releve. Je suis tout effarouche et j'en a i bien l ' a i r . The fact i s that Diderot r e a l l y enjoyed s o c i a l contact only with people whom he knew well enough to be tr u l y himself, who put him at his ease and accepted him for what he was. \"Je vous jure,\" he remarks i n the same l e t t e r , \"que je ne suis nulle part heureux, qu'a l a condition de jouir de mon a/me, d'etre moi, moi 2 tout pur.\" He was unwilling to undergo those lar g e l y unconscious modifications of personality by which people adjust to each other u n t i l they a l l approach what he would have considered to be the same d u l l common denominator. He was proud of possessing individual characteristics of manners and behaviour which could raise a smile 1 Roth, VII, 170 (Oct., 1767). 2 Ibid., p. 171. 175 from those unused to such deviations from accepted norms. When Garat wrote to him apologizing for having published i n the Mercure a somewhat ca r i c a t u r a l account of a meeting with the philosopher, Diderot inserted i n the text of his Essai sur les regnes de Claude et de Neron a paragraph reassuring the jo u r n a l i s t : II y a de l a ver i t e dans l e plaisant r e c i t de notre premiere entrevue; je m'y suis reconnu, et j ' a i r i du vernis leger d'ironie poetique q u ' i l y a repandu, et qui l ' a rendu piquant. On sera tente de me prendre pour une espece d'original; mais qu'est-ce que cela f a i t ? Est-ce done un s i grand defaut que d 1avoir pu conserver, en s'agitant sans cesse dans l a societe, quelques vestiges de l a nature, et de se distinguer par quelques cotes anguleux de l a multitude de ces uniformes et plats galets qui foisonnent sur toutes les plages?l To his beloved Sophie he writes: II est v r a i que vous etes un peu baroque; mais c'est que les autres ont eu beau se f r o t t e r contre vous, i l s n'ont jamais pu emousser tout a f a i t votre asperite naturelle, et j'en suis bien aise. J'aime mieux votre surface anguleuse et raboteuse, que l e p o l i maussade et commun de tous ces gens du monde. Au milieu de leur bourdonnement sourd et monotone, s i vous ietez un mot dissonant, i l frappe et on l e remarque. A dif f e r e n t image serves to praise the baroness d'Holbach for similar q u a l i t i e s : Cette femme est origi n a l e . E l l e a des choses tres fines, et tout a. cote des naivetes. Peu de monde, mais en revanche r i e n de cette uniformite s i decente et s i maussade qui donne a un cercle de femmes du monde l ' a i r d'une douzaine de poupees tirees par des f i l s d'archal.3 **\" AT, III, 392. Garat's pen-portrait i s reproduced from the Mercure of Peb. 15, 1779 i n AT, I, x x i - x x i i . 2 Roth, III, 265 (Nov. 25, 1760). 5 Roth, IV, 82 (To Sophie Volland; July 31, 1762). 176 On learning that Sophie's s i s t e r Mme Le Gendre has resolved to acquire s o c i a l graces, Diderot expresses his disappointment that she should deliberately try to replace her most estimable q u a l i t i e s with s u p e r f i c i a l charms which would make her indistinguishable from the multitude of well-trained society women: S i l a resolution qu'elle a prise de s'apprivoiser tient encore, d i t e s - l u i de prendre garde de semer des fleurettes sur une belle etoffe pleine et unie. II faut bien du gout et de l ' a r t pour f a i r e serpenter une guirlande autour d'une colonne sans detruire sa noblesse. Toutes ces petites vertus de societe auxquelles e l l e ne se p l i e r a jamais de bonne grace ne vont point avec l a franchise et l a severite de son caractere. Madame Le Gendre, mon Uranie, j o l i e , polie, attentive, prevenante, affable, souriante, souple, reverencieuse? Cela ne se peut. Eh! qu'elle reste comme nature l ' a f a i t e : grave, serieuse, noble et pensante. Nature l ' a f a i t e grande et noble: et l a v o i l a qui veut se f a i r e petite et j o l i e . In his Essai sur l a peinture, Diderot defines true grace as \"cette rigoureuse et precise conformite des membres avec l a nature de l ' a c t i o n . \" Quite di f f e r e n t i s the conventional grace which a dancing master teaches. If the famous Marcel were to find one of his pupils standing i n the slouching pose of the c l a s s i c a l statue of Antihous, he would i n s i s t that the young man adopt an attitude more i n keeping with his own pre-conceived rules of deportment: . . . l u i portant une main sous l e menton et 1'autre sur les epaules: \"Allons done, grand dadais, l u i d i r a i t - i l , est-ce qu'on se tient comme cela?\" Puis, l u i repoussant l e s genoux avec l e s siens, et l e relevant par-dessous l e s bras, i l ajouterait: \"On d i r a i t que Roth, IV, 95 (To Sophie Volland; Aug. 8, 1762). 177 vous etes de c i r e , et que vous a l l e z fondre. Allons, nigaud, tendez-moi ce jarret; deployez-moi cette figure; ce nez un peu au vent.\" Et quand i l en aurait f a i t l e plus insipide petit-maitre, i l commencerait a. l u i sourire, et a. s'applaudir de son ouvrage. The teacher of deportment here symbolizes the despotism of s o c i a l pressures, which bring about a break between the deep springs of thought and action i n the indi v i d u a l and his actual behaviour, replacing what would be his spontaneous mode of expression by manners modelled on a common pattern, and eventually atrophying the o r i g i n a l personality. Diderot d i s l i k e d the highly s t y l i z e d type of dancing i n vogue i n his time and would have preferred a dance which took the form of an imitation of some human a c t i v i t y . 2 He himself, he claims, lacked a l l aptitude for dancing. But one suspects that this claim may rather have been a symbolic r e f u s a l . At any rate, i t seems l i k e l y that his i n a b i l i t y to dance had acquired that value i n Diderot's mind. \"On apprend a. danser a 1'ours;\" he writes, \"mais l'ours qui danse est un animal bien malheureux. On ne m'apprendra jamais a. danser.\" While the whole of s o c i a l l i f e exerts this constant pressure towards uniformity, i t i s i n the upbringing of children that the 1 AT, X, 489. 2 Refutation d'Helvetius. AT, II, 333. 5 Ibid., p. 384. 178 greatest and most irrevocable damage i s done. Children are too s t r i c t l y regimented, too much trouble i s taken to ensure that they are well behaved, according to adult standards, well groomed, always reasonable, never straying from the patterns of expression and conduct acceptable i n t h e i r parents' s o c i a l world. Diderot pleads for a freer upbringing, allowing children to develop their o r i g i n a l i t y : J'eus l e courage de dire hier au s o i r a. Mme Le Gendre qu'elle se donnait bien de l a peine pour ne f a i r e de son f i l s qu'une j o l i e poupee. Pas trop el^ver est une maxime qui convient surtout aux garcons. II faut un peu l e s abandonner a l'energie de nature. J'aime qu'ils soient violents, etourdis, capricieux. Une tete ebouriffee me p l a i t plus qu'une tete bien peignee. Laissons-leur prendre une physionomie qui leur appartienne. S i j'apercois a travers leurs sottises un t r a i t d ' o r i g i n a l i t e , je suis content. Nos petits ours mal leches de province me plaisent cent f o i s plus que tous vos petit s epagneuls s i curieusement dresses. Quand je vois un enfant qui s'ecoute, qui va l a tete bien droite, l a demarche bien composee, qui craint de deranger un cheveu desa f r i s u r e , un p l i de son habit, l e pere et l a mere s'extasient et disent: Le j o l i enfant que nous avons l a ! Et moi je d i s : II ne sera jamais qu'un s o t . l In a memoir written for Catherine II, Diderot describes the edu.cation of the pupils at the Ecole des Cadets, one of the Empress's newly founded educational i n s t i t u t i o n s . Vigorous physical exercises w i l l give the cadets strength of body, courage and a healthy constitution capable of withstanding the rigours of the harsh Russian climate. Their t r a i n i n g i n the s o c i a l graces might be considered deficient by people who judge according to Roth, V, 65 (To Sophie Volland; July 25, 1765). 179 the standards of fashionable French society. Diderot imagines a conversation between himself and a Parisian \"elegant\". The French fop doubts whether these young Russians possess \"cette politesse qui annonce une jeunesse liberalement eievee et qui p l a i t meme encore lorsqu'elle ne tient pas ce qu'elle promet.\" 1 The children of the French upper classes, he continues, acquire at an early age the grace and politeness of high society because, instead of being kept continually i n the company of their tutors and of companions of their own age, they are introduced early i n l i f e to fashionable c i r c l e s . Their parents i n s t i l i n them the desire to create a pleasing impression, and they model themselves on the adults who surround them. The Russian cadets, on the other hand, brought up i n the rough-and-tumble of their classmates' company, with l i t t l e opportunity to observe the s o c i a l behaviour of po l i t e adults, cannot f a i l to exhibit a r u s t i c gaiety lacking a l l finesse; they w i l l inevitably rush around l i k e young animals, with loud voices and a bold manner, except when, i n unfamiliar company, 'they become stupidly shy. Diderot, casting himself i n the role of a Russian Spartan, retorts to the inhabitant of the new Athens that any disadvantages which the cadets' upbringing may have as regards th e i r adaptation to the demands of po l i t e society are more than compensated by the preservation of their o r i g i n a l i t y : Chez nous, Athenien, mon ami, on ne veut pas que les enfants soient po l i s et manieres comme tes poupees; et tu crois qu'un homme qui a conserve un peu du gout 1 Memoires pour Catherine II, ed. Verniere, p. 215. 180 de l a v e r i t a b l e nature n'aime pas mieux l a f r a n c h i s e , l a l i b e r t e , l e s sauts, l e s c r i s , 1'impetuosite, l e s t i r a i l l e m e n t s de ces especes de p e t i t s sauvages-la que l e s reverences cadencees, l e s pieds portes en avant ou r e t i r e s en a r r i e r e de tes i n s i p i d e s p e t i t s mannequins? Mets tes j o l i s p r ecieux marmots dans des b o i t e s . l e s notres ne sont pas f a i t s pour c e l a . Tu r e c u l e s a. 1'aspect de l e u r s cheveux e b o u r i f f e s et de l e u r s vetements d e c h i r e s . C'est a i n s i que j 1 e t a i s quand j ' e t a i s plus jeune, et c'est a i n s i que je p l a i s a i s , meme aux femmes et aux f i l l e s de ma province. E l l e s m'aimaient mieux d e b r a i l l e , sans chapeau, q u e l q u e f o i s sans chaussure, en veste et pieds nus, moi, f i l s d'un forgeron, que ce p e t i t monsieur b i e n vetu, b i e n poudre, b i e n f r i s e , t i r e a. quatre e p i n g l e s , l e f i l s de madame l a pre s i d e n t e du b a i l l i a g e ; parce que mes bonnes p r o v i n c i a l e s avaient de l a r a i s o n , de l a s i m p l i c i t e , et un gout n a t u r e l pour l a sante, pour l a l i b e r t e , pour l e s q u a l i t e s vraiment estimables. E l l e s voyaient que deux p o l i s s o n s comme moi, laches sur une douzaine de p e t i t s p r e s i d e n t s en miniature, l e s a u r a i e n t mis en deroute. E l l e s voyaient a. ma boutonniere l a marque de mes progres dans l e s etudes, et un enfant q u i montrait son ame par un mot net et f r a n c , et qui s a v a i t mieux donner un coup de poing que f a i r e une reverence, l e u r p l a i s a i t plus qu'un mol, l a c h e , faux et effemine p e t i t f l a g o r n e u r . Ce que tu c u l t i v e s s i soigneusement dans tes p e t i t s enfants, l e s n otres 1 1apprendront en deux ans dans l e monde, avec c e t t e d i f f e r e n c e que l e u r s premieres annees auront ete mieux employees, et q u ' i l s conserveront a jamais 1'empreinte de l e u r o r i g i n a l i t e propre. Tous vos p e t i t s enfants semblent a v o i r ete fondus dans'le meme j o l i moule. lious voulons que l e s n o t r e s , s o r t i s d i v e r s des mains de l a nature, r e s t e n t d i v e r s . Tu prepares des modeles a. Boucher, nous en preparons a Van Dyck. Tu eleves des c o u r t i s a n s , nous elevons, nous, des magistrats et des s o l d a t s . P a i s comme t u voudras, mais ne dedaigne pas sottement ce que l e s autres f o n t . Tu as ton but et i l s en ont un autre, ou p l u t o t t u n'en as po i n t et i l s en ont un. Tu veux a v o i r des agreables, et i l s v e u l e n t , eux, a v o i r des hommes.l Did e r o t blames not only the u s u a l t r a i n i n g i n manners, but a l s o the i n t e l l e c t u a l education given to c h i l d r e n i n the c o l l e g e s i n h i s day. This education was based very l a r g e l y on the study Memoires pour Catherine II, ed. V e r n i e r e , pp. 216-17. 181 of Latin. Although himself an excellent L a t i n i s t , he considered the almost exclusive study of this ancient tongue to he quite unsuited to the needs and aptitudes of the majority of pupils. They not only f a i l e d to reap the benefits this training could offer to the very few who were f i t t e d for i t , but whatever natural aptitudes they may have possessed remained undeveloped and atrophied. 1 It was Helvetius's contention that the way children turn out i s ent i r e l y the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the i r teacher, who has the power, provided he has the required knowledge of his subject and of the pedagogical art, to make of his pupils what he w i l l . To this Diderot r e p l i e s : Je ne connais pas de systeme plus consolant pour les parents et plus encourageant pour les maitres. Voila son avantage. Mais je n'en connais pas de plus desolant pour les enfants qu'on c r o i t egalement propres a. tout; de plus capable de remplir l e s conditions de l a societe d'hommes mediocres, et d'egarer l e genie qui ne f a i t bien qu'une chose; n i de plus dangereux par 1'opiniatrete q u ' i l doit i n s p i r e r a des superieurs qui, apres avoir applique longtemps et sans f r u i t une classe d'eleves a. des objets pour lesquels i l s n'avaient aucune disposition naturelle, les rejetteront dans l e monde ou i l s ne seront plus bons a. r i e n . On ne donne pas du nez a. un l e v r i e r , on ne donne pas l a vitesse du l e v r i e r a. un chien-couchant; vous aurez beau f a i r e , c e l u i - c i gardera son nez, et celui-la. gardera ses jambes.2 True education i s quite a diff e r e n t matter: En quoi consiste done 1'importance de 1'education? Ce n'est point du tout de f a i r e du premier enfant 1 Plan d'une universite pour l e gouvernement de l a Russie, AT, III, 469-73, 485. 2 Refutation d'Helvetius, AT, II, 277. 182 communement bien organise ce q u ' i l p l a i t a ses parents d'en f a i r e , mais de l'appliquer constamment a l a chose a. laquelle i l est propre: a 1'erudition, s ' i l est doue d'une grande memoire; a. l a geometrie, s ' i l combine facilement des nombres et des espaces; a. l a poesie, s i on l u i reconnait de l a chaleur et de 1'imagination; et a i n s i des autres sciences: et que l e premier chapitre d'un bon t r a i t e d'education doit etre de l a maniere de connaitre l e s dispositions naturelles de 1'enfant. x This r e f u s a l of Diderot's to believe with Helvetius that a l l men are b a s i c a l l y the same and that they become what they are, both morally and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , through the sole agency of environmental influences, i s more than a disagreement on a point of psychological theory. For Helvetius, this doctrine makes possible a shining hope for the future happiness of the human race: only i f one believes that there are i n men no ineradicable tendencies m i l i t a t i n g against the eventual triumph of knowledge and goodness can one have f a i t h that the application of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge to the relations between man and his environment and between man and man w i l l some day put an end to ignorance and i n j u s t i c e . Helvetius places his trust i n enlightened rulers possessing s u f f i c i e n t knowledge of human psychology and of the art of managing and manipulating men to be able to direct them of necessity to virtuous s o c i a l behaviour, and thus to happiness. Diderot agrees that an appropriate system of education and l e g i s -l a t i o n would be the best means of improving the general standard of morality, but he denies that o r i g i n a l individual dispositions could ever be completely eliminated, and asserts that, even i n 1 Ibid., AT, II, 374-75. 183 the best organized state, there would always be a certain number of persistently maleficent individuals, just as there w i l l always be some men whose altruism exceeds the duties imposed by laws and s o c i a l pressures.\"1\" Diderot seems to suspect that Helvetius's theory might be used to provide a specious pretext for a l l the kinds of despotism, p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and educational, which he deplores. He feels also that the attempt to obliterate individual differences would mean a great loss of human potential both for i n t e l l e c t u a l and a r t i s t i c achievement and for moral excellence. The plea- that s o c i a l pressures should not be allowed to destroy individual differences has led some c r i t i c s to see i n Diderot a fundamental contradiction between the importance he attaches to i n d i v i d u a l i t y and the s o c i a l ethic which he so often proclaims. Pierre Hermand expresses this c r i t i c a l position as follows: . . . nous n'essayerons pas de nier l a contrariete qui existe, i r r e d u c t i b l e , nous semble-t-il, entre 1 1individualisme de Diderot et une morale qui sera essentiellement sociale: 1'existence meme et l e maintien de l a societe ne s o n t - i l s pas l i e s a. ce conformisme, \u00E2\u0080\u0094 resultat de 1'education et des multiples contraintes c o l l e c t i v e s , \u00E2\u0080\u0094 a tout cela contre quoi s'insurge Diderot?^ 1 Cf. Refutation d'Helvetius, A T , II, 314-15. 2 Op. c i t . , p. 116. 184 But this judgment i s by no means as incontrovertible as Hermand imagines. Diderot does not claim that the o r i g i n a l dispositions of the individual should be allowed to develop i n an environmental vacuum; indeed, he rea l i z e s that this i s inconceivable. In Le Neveu de Rameau, both Lui and Moi 1 agree that some kind of moral education i s necessary, since i t i s impossible for man, a s o c i a l animal, to subsist, either i n d i v i d u a l l y or as a member of a group, i f the basic physical drives, as they grow more powerful with physical maturity, are not tempered by the development of reason. This i s the meaning of Moi's remark regarding Lux's young son: Si l e pet i t sauvage e t a i t abandonne a. lui-meme, q u ' i l conservat toute son i m b e c i l l i t e et q u ' i l reunit au peu de raison de 1'enfant au berceau l a violence des passions de l'homme de trente ans, i l tordrait l e cou a son pere et coucherait avec sa mere.2 The best form of moral education, as Diderot conceives i t , involves placing the c h i l d i n an environment i n which he i s obliged by the r e a l i t i e s of s o c i a l relations to temper his own spontaneous impulses i n order to obtain the maximum s a t i s f a c t i o n compatible Some explanation i s perhaps required regarding my use of the names Lui and Moi. Le Neveu de Rameau takes the form essentially of an interview between Jean-Francois Rameau, nephew of the composer Jean-Philippe Rameau, and a narrator, whom numerous de t a i l s i n v i t e us to i d e n t i f y with the author. In the dialogue portions of the work, the speakers are designated by the pronouns \"Lui\" and \"Moi\". I prefer to use the word Moi, rather than to refer to Diderot by name, since I wish to avoid giving the impres-sion that the remarks addressed to Rameau are necessarily to be taken as the author's true opinions. Although I do not accept the view that Moi represents a self-caricature of certain h y p o c r i t i c a l l y conformist tendencies which Diderot discerns i n himself (cf. D o o l i t t l e , o_p_. ext., passim.), I readily admit that there i s a degree of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , deliberate, I think, between the image of himself which Diderot offers us i n Moi and the image which, from our t o t a l knowledge of him, we may suppose that he considered himself to present sub specie a e t e r n i t a t i s . 2 AT, V, 474. 185 with his continued integration i n the s o c i a l group. On this point Lui d i f f e r s from Moi only i n his contention that moral education should teach the c h i l d to adapt to the corrupt society which actually exists, whereas Moi holds that i t i s preferable for children to be brought up i n a s o c i a l and moral environment which f i t s them less for the existing state of society than for an i d e a l society i n which men would cooperate i n the pursuit of their common welfare. 1 In reacting against the stereotyping of character, Diderot does not mean to suggest that no restr a i n t s should be placed on basic human urges. The Russian cadets, for example, receive a large part of their moral education from the s o c i a l relationships i n which they interact with t h e i r fellow-cadets on a footing of equality, a better school for virtue than the h i e r a r c h i c a l adult society into which the young Parisians are early introduced and which provides such excellent training i n f l a t t e r y and deceit. The question whether Diderot's \"individualism\" c o n f l i c t s with his s o c i a l ethic cannot, however, be decided solely by re f e r r i n g to the texts quoted so far i n th i s chapter, texts i n which Diderot c r i t i c i z e s the a r t i f i c i a l uniformity of manners and 1 Cf. AT, V, 471-73. 186 character imposed by s o c i a l pressures. Other c r i t i c s have voiced an opinion similar to that of Hermand, but i n a more extreme form, quoting as evidence various passages i n which Diderot expresses admiration for individuals who have preserved the or i g i n a l energy of thei r nature, even when their conduct i s a n t i -s o c i a l . The following remarks of Jean Pabre are a good example of this approach: Pour se rassurer, plus encore que par gout du paradoxe, [Diderot] cherche volontiers a. j u s t i f i e r , sur l e plan de l a moralite, son admiration pour les grandes ames, meme criminelles: l e spectacle de 1'energie est toujours salutaire, meme dans l e mal (Cf. Salon de 1765, AT, X, 342: \"Je ne hais pas les grands crimes . . .\"; Salon de 1767, AT, XI, 118; A r t i c l e \"Laideur\", AT, XV, 410, etcT) Da haine de l a mediocrite l e pousse jusqu'a esquisser une apologie du crime: ne sont meprisables que ces hommes \u00E2\u0080\u0094 l a majorite helas! \u00E2\u0080\u0094 dans lesquels \" i l n'y a pas assez d'etoffe, n i pour f a i r e un honnete homme, n i pour f a i r e un fripon.\" \" Si l e s mSchants n'avaient pas cette energie dans l e crime, les bons n'auraient pas l a meme energie dans l a vertu.\" Tarquin garantit Scaevola, et Damiens Regulus. . . . Les scrupules moraux ne tiennent guere devant l'esthetique et cette consideration: de 1'unite, essentielle a l a d e f i n i t i o n du Beau. \"Vous l e savez, vous, ma Sophie, vous l e savez, vous, mon amie. Un tout est beau l o r s q u ' i l est un; en ce sens Cromwell est beau, et Scipion aussi, et Medee, et Aria, et Cesar, et Brutus. . . . \" (10 aout 1759) 1 More recently, David Punt has contended, i n a similar vein, that i n Diderot there i s a conventional morality, founded upon the res t r a i n t of conventional rules and maxims, both l e g a l and p o l i t e . . . . There i s also a more fundamental or natural morality, as i l l u s t r a t e d i n the Supplement au Voyage de Bougainville. . . . The acquired morality of Edition of Le Neveu de Rameau, pp. 213-14. The references are Pabre's. 187 conventions i s transcended by the morality founded on the i n t e g r i t y of the person and i t s uninhibited expres-sion, a morality i n which, Diderot sometimes suggests, even the great criminal may participate. \"L'atrocite de 1'action vous porte au-dela du mepris,\" claims the nephew of Rameau (AT, V, 457). It i s this morality of i n t e g r i t y to which i s opposed the h y p o c r i t i c a l , i . e . that which i s i n int e r n a l c o n f l i c t with i t s e l f , hence inhibited, and which gives r i s e only to petty ideas and petty acts, whether i t be a question of petty virtues or petty crimes. \"On prise en tout 1'unite de caractere,\" says the nephew again (AT, V, 453). 1 These remarks of Fabre and Funt are rather imprecise and 2 ambiguous, but their implication seems to be that Diderot considered as the highest ideal for human conduct not s o c i a l cooperation but the vigorous and uninhibited deployment of the origitasal forces of the individual nature. His ideal world would thus presumably be caracterized by agressive competition between individuals for survival and domination. Such interpretations are, I think, erroneous. The scholars who have proposed them have probably been deceived by Diderot's predilection for para-doxical forms of expression. I s h a l l attempt to show i n the remaining part of this chapter that a careful analysis of Diderot's text does not bear out the charge that he at times subscribes to an immoralistic ethic of individual efficacy running counter to his s o c i a l ethic. \"Oh'..the conception of the 'vicieux' i n Diderot\", i n Diderot Studies, X, 1968, pp. 58-59. 2 E.g. Fabre's comment, \"les scrupules moraux ne tiennent guere devant 1'esthetique . . . ,\" and Funt's use of the words \"transcended\" and \"participate\". 188 I n many of the passages which a re f r e q u e n t l y mentioned as i n s t a n c e s of such an e t h i c of i n d i v i d u a l e f f i c a c y , D i d e r o t ' s r e a l c o ncern seems t o be r e l a t e d t o the simu l t a n e o u s presence of both good and e v i l i n the w o r l d . I t w i l l be co n v e n i e n t f i r s t t o examine c e r t a i n t e x t s i n which he d e a l s w i t h the presence of bo t h good and e v i l i n the same i n d i v i d u a l , and then t o c o n s i d e r o t h e r passages i n which he r e f e r s i n s t e a d t o the occurence of good and e v i l s e p a r a t e l y , i n d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s . I n one of the l e t t e r s t o Sophie V o l l a n d , the d i s c u s s i o n i s c e n t r e d on L o v e l a c e , hero o f R i c h a r d s o n ' s n o v e l C l a r i s s a . I t appears from D i d e r o t ' s remarks t h a t Sophie and h e r s i s t e r Mme Le Gendre r e a c t e d t o L o v e l a c e by w i s h i n g him to be d e s t r o y e d as an e v i l b e i n g . D i d e r o t c o u n t e r s by d e c l a r i n g t h a t the l a d i e s have been too h a s t y i n w e i g h i n g up the b a l a n c e of good and e v i l i n C l a r i s s a ' s seducer; a l l i s not e v i l i n L o v e l a c e ' s c h a r a c t e r : C'est que ce L o v e l a c e e s t d'une f i g u r e charmante, q u i vous p l a i t comme a. t o u t l e monde, et que vous en avez dans 1 ' e s p r i t une image q u i vous s e d u i t ; c ' e s t q u ' i l a de 1' e l e v a t i o n dans 1'a.me, de 1 ' e d u c a t i o n , des co n n a i s s a n c e s , tous l e s t a l e n t s a g r e a b l e s , de l a l e g e r e t e , de l a f o r c e , du courage; c ' e s t q u ' i l n'y a r i e n . d e v i i dans sa s c e l e r a t e s s e ; c ' e s t q u ' i l vous e s t i m p o s s i b l e de l e m e p r i s e r ; c ' e s t que vous p r e f e r e r i e z m o u r i r L o v e l a c e , de l a main du c a p i t a i n e Morden, a v i v r e Solmes; c ' e s t qu ' a . t o u t p r e n d r e , nous aimons mieux un etre m o i t i e bon m o i t i e mauvais, qu'un e t r e i n d i f f e r e n t . Nous esperons de n o t r e bonheur ou de n o t r e a d r e s s e d ' e s q u i v e r a. sa m a l i c e et de p r o f i t e r dans 1 ' o c c a s i o n de sa bonte. C'royez-vous que quelqu'un sous l e c i e l eut ose impunement f a i r e s o u f f r i r a. C l a r i s s e l a centieme p a r t i e des i n j u r e s que L o v e l a c e l u i f a i t ? C'est quelque chose qu'un p e r s e c u t e u r q u i , 189 en meme temps qu'il nous tourmente, nous protege contre tout ce qui vous environne et nous menace. Et puis, c'est que vous avez un pressentiment que cet homme, qui s'est endurci pour une autre, se serait adouci pour vous. As i s frequently the case when Diderot poses moral problems for Sophie and her s i s t e r , his aim i s to amuse and tease them and also, probably, to c r i t i c i z e the conventionality of their moral attitudes. The serious point which emerges, however, from his remarks i n the l e t t e r under discussion i s that Lovelace i s only a p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r i k i n g example of the general truth that good and e v i l are intermingled i n human nature, and that therefore i t i s often a very d i f f i c u l t matter to decide whether there i s more good or more e v i l i n an individual. Diderot i n no way denies the immorality of Lovelace's conduct towards Cl a r i s s a ; nor does he suggest that the many admirable q u a l i t i e s which the charming scoundrel possesses exonerate him for his wickedness. Rather Diderot contests the conventional tendency to c l a s s i f y individuals as either a l l good or a l l bad. The problem of the correct attitude to take towards characters i n which good and e v i l q u a l i t i e s are found concomitantly i s also Diderot's main concern i n the well-known passage from Le Neveu de Rameau where Lui and Moi discuss men of genius who manifest moral defects i n their private l i v e s . According to Lui, such men, apart from the single f i e l d of a c t i v i t y i n which they excel, are good 1 Roth, III, 317-18 (Sept. 28, 1761). 190 f o r nothing: \" i l s ne savent ce que c'est que d'etre citoyens, peres, meres, parents, amis.\"\"\"\" Thus, continues L u i , i t i s i n the i n t e r e s t of any i n d i v i d u a l to resemble them as f a r as p o s s i b l e , but not to wish them to be common. Moi concedes that men of genius are often maleficent i n t h e i r p r i v a t e l i v e s , but argues that they are beneficent through t h e i r achievements. When one weighs the b e n e f i t s and disadvantages which such men b r i n g to mankind, one must conclude that the good they do g r e a t l y exceeds the e v i l . He takes as an example Racine: Mais Racine? C e l u i - l a certes a v a i t du genie, et ne pas s a i t pas pour un trop bon homme. . . . Lequel des deux prefereriez-vous? ou q u ' i l eut ete un bon homme, i d e n t i f i e avec son comptoir, comme Briasson, ou avec son aune, comme Ba r b i e r , f a i s a n t regulierement tous l e s ans un enfant l e g i t i m e a sa femme, bon mari, bon pere, bon oncle, bon v o i s i n , honnete commercant, mais r i e n de plus; ou q u ' i l eut ete fourbe, t r a i t r e , ambitieux, envieux, mechant, mais auteur d'Andromaque, de B r i t a n n i c u s , d'Iphigenie, de Phedre, d'Athalie? . . . Pesez l e mal et l e bien. Dans m i l l e ans d ' i c i , i l f e r a verser des larmes; i l sera 1'admiration des hommes, dans toutes l e s contrees de l a t e r r e . I I i n s p i r e r a l'humanite, l a commiseration, l a tendresse. On demandera qui i l e t a i t , de quel pays, et on l ' e n v i e r a a l a Prance. I I a f a i t s o u f f r i r quelques etres qui ne sont plus, auxquels nous ne prenons presque aucun i n t e r e t ; nous n'avons r i e n a redouter n i de ses v i c e s , n i de ses defauts. I I eut ete mieux sans doute q u ' i l eut recu de l a nature l a v e r t u d'un homme de bien avec l e s t a l e n t s d'un grand homme. C'est un arbre qui a f a i t secher quelques arbres plantes dans son voisinage, qui a etouffe l e s plantes qui c r o i s s a i e n t a. ses pieds; mais i l a porte sa cime jusque dans l a nue, ses branches se sont etendues au l o i n ; i l a prete son ombre a. ceux qui venaient, qui viennent et qui viendront se reposer autour de son tronc majestueux; i l a produit des f r u i t s d'un gout exquis, et qui se renouvellent sans cesse.2 1 AT, V, 392. 2 AT, V, 395-97. 191 In order to judge, t h e r e f o r e , whether mankind i s b e t t e r or worse o f f f o r the exis t e n c e of men of genius whose p r i v a t e conduct i s wicked, we must take a long-term' view: . . . oublions pour un moment l e po i n t que nous occupons dans l'espace et dans l a duree; et etendons notre vue sur l e s s i e c l e s a v e n i r , l e s regions l e s plus eioignees et l e s peuples a. n a i t r e . Songeons au bie n de notre espece; s i nous ne sommes po i n t assez genereux, pardonnons au moins a l a nature d ' a v o i r ete plus sage que nous. As i n the case of Lovelace, Diderot-Moi does not deny that Racine's p r i v a t e conduct was m a l e f i c e n t ; he claims, however, that the t o t a l e f f e c t of Racine's a c t s f o r mankind as a whole i s over-whelmingly b e n e f i c i a l . The question here r a i s e d i s not that of the moral judgment to be passed on p a r t i c u l a r a c t s , but r a t h e r whether one i s j u s t i f i e d i n c r i t i c i z i n g a n a t u r a l order i n which good and e v i l are o f t e n i n e x t r i c a b l y mingled, i n t h i s case i n the same being. Moi b e l i e v e s , i t i s true, that one can f i n d examples of the genius who i s f r e e from notable moral d e f e c t s ; i t i s c l e a r , n e v e r t h e l e s s , from h i s comments on V o l t a i r e and Greuze that he recognizes a c e r t a i n c o r r e l a t i o n between moral d e f i c i e n c y and genius. V o l t a i r e ' s s e n s i t i v i t y to c r i t i c i s m a r i s e s from the same p s y c h o l o g i c a l source as the a r t i s t i c s e n s i b i l i t y which enables him to crea t e the cha r a c t e r s of h i s t r a g e d i e s . S i m i l a r l y , Greuze's v a n i t y has the same o r i g i n as the enthusiasm which accounts f o r h i s t a l e n t as a p a i n t e r : S i vous j e t e z de l ' e a u f r o i d e sur l a t e t e de Greuze, vous e t e i n d r e z peut-etre son t a l e n t avec sa v a n i t e . 1 AT, V, 397. 192 Si vous rendez de Voltaire moins sensible a l a c r i t i q u e , i l ne saura plus descendre dans l'ame de Merope, i l ne vous touchera p l u s . x The cases of Lovelace and Racine concern primarily the presence i n the same individual of q u a l i t i e s which are respectively beneficent and maleficent towards others. The Salon de 1767 contains some re f l e c t i o n s which, while r e l a t i n g to a similar theme, deal with q u a l i t i e s which are respectively harmful and b e n e f i c i a l to the individual who possesses them. Here too i t was Diderot's b e l i e f that Nature tends to balance good q u a l i t i e s with bad. Reflecting on the kind of personal character which brings i t s possessor happiness, Diderot contrasts the balance, the lack of strong passions, the mediocrity, which shield a man equally from blame and envy with, on the other hand, the tendency to f l y to extremes, the strong passions, the acute s e n s i b i l i t y , which resu l t i n a mixture of exaltation and unhappiness. But why i s i t , he asks, that, for a l l the apparent or r e a l disadvantages of s e n s i b i l i t y , no one would w i l l i n g l y give up his share of i t and become mediocre? He takes as examples of mediocrity and s e n s i b i l i t y two contrasting characters from Piron's comedy La Metromanie. M. Baliveau, a r i c h bourgeois, i s eager for the s o l i d advantages afforded by wealth, bent on exercising a petty tyranny over those near him, and t o t a l l y devoid of idealism. His nephew Damis, on the other hand, who has. adopted the s i g n i f i c a n t pseudonym of M. de l'Empiree, l i v e s above his means, neglects his law studies, 1 AT, V, 397. 193 but i s generous and sets no value on money for i t s own sake or for i t s material advantages; his eyes are fixed on literary-fame; i n his personal relations he i s honorable and kind. While his uncle i s scheming to have him imprisoned, the young man contrives to overcome the obstacles impeding the happy marriage of his friend Dorante. 1 Diderot comments as follows: Heureux, cent f o i s heureux, . . . M. Baliveau, capitoul de Toulouse! c'est M. Baliveau, qui boit bien, qui mange bien, qui digere bien, qui dort bien. G'est l u i qui prend son cafe l e matin, qui f a i t l a police au marche, qui perore dans sa petite famille, qui arrondit sa fortune, qui preche a ses enfants l a fortune; qui vend a. temps son avoine et son ble; qui garde dans son c e l l i e r ses vins, jusqu'a ce que l a gelee des vignes en a i t amene l a cherte; qui s a i t placer surement ses fonds; qui se vante de n'avoir jamais ete enveloppe dans aucune f a i l l i t e ; qui v i t ignore; et pour qui l e bonheur inutilement envie d'Horace, l e bonheur de mourir ignore fut f a i t . M. Baliveau est un homme f a i t pour son bonheur et pour l e malheur des autres. Son neveu, M. de l'Empiree, tout au c o n t r a i r e . 2 I think i t w i l l be clear from the three passages which I have cited so far that Diderot does not wish to question the v a l i d i t y of an ethic of beneficence or to propose new and unorthodox c r i t e r i a for judging particular actions. His meditation has quite another object. The problem he examines i s whether one should c r i t i c i z e the natural order for producing e v i l alongside of good. Moi, i n Le Neveu de Rameau, defends not the e v i l that I base this description of the two characters on the text of Piron's play, to which one must, I think, return i n order to understand what Baliveau and M. de l'Empiree represent for Diderot. For an example of a misinterpretation of Baliveau, see S e i l l i e r e , op. c i t . , pp. 264-65. 2 Salon de 1767, AT, XI, 126. 194 men of genius do i n t h e i r p r i v a t e l i v e s , hut rat h e r Nature f o r c r e a t i n g t h i s mixture of good and e v i l i n them. I think i t unnecessary here to examine i n d e t a i l the arguments put forward by l u i and Moi wit h respect to the simultaneous presence of good and e v i l i n the world and i n man. Mod's f i n a l conclusion \u00E2\u0080\u0094 and, I t h i n k , that of the author \u00E2\u0080\u0094 i s that i t i s unreasonable to pass a value judgment on the a c t u a l order of the universe since i t i s the only p o s s i b l e order: Acceptons done l e s choses comme e l l e s sont. Voyons ce q u 1 e l l e s nous coutent, et ce qu'elles nous rendent, et l a i s s o n s la. l e tout que nous ne connais sons pas assez pour l e louer ou l e blamer, et qui n'est peut-etre n i bien n i mal, s ' i l est necessaire, comme beaucoup d'honnetes gens l'imaginent. So f a r we have considered passages i n which Diderot r e f l e c t s on the coexistence of good and e v i l i n the same i n d i v i d u a l . There are, however, s e v e r a l important passages, r e l a t i n g to a s i m i l a r theme, but which i l l u s t r a t e h i s concern w i t h the presence of both good and e v i l i n the human race when they occur separately, i n d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s . Here too we s h a l l see that the main object of Diderot's enquiry i s to determine whether one should c r i t i c i z e the n a t u r a l order which has brought about t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s . His answer to t h i s l a s t question emerges most c l e a r l y from a l e t t e r to Sophie Volland: 1 AT, V, 398. 195 Si les mechants n'avaient pas cette energie dans l e crime, les bons n'auraient pas l a meme energie dans l a vertu. S i \"l'homme a f f a i b l i ne peut plus se porter aux grands maux,.il ne pourra plus se porter aux grands biens. En cherchant a. 1'amender d'un cote, vous l e degraderez de 1'autre. S i Tarquin n'ose v i o l e r lucrece, Scoevola ne tiendra pas son poignet sur un brasier ardent. Cela est singulier; on est en general assez mecontent des choses, et l'on n'y toucherait pas sans les empirer.l The reference to amending human nature means here, I think, imagining i t i n an improved form. Diderot never doubted the a d v i s a b i l i t y of taking p r a c t i c a l measures to ameliorate the actual conduct of individuals. He may have gone so far as to question the d e s i r a b i l i t y of a type of education which so weakened the f i b r e of human nature as to render men incapable of either great crimes or of great heroism; but he never suggests that society should cease to apply laws and to enforce them by punishing wrong-doers. Although the passage I have quoted i s immediately preceded by the remark \"Je ne puis m'empecher d'admirer l a nature humaine, meme quelquefois quand e l l e est atroce,\" I do not think this implies moral approval of crime on Diderot's part. It i s , however, easy to see how the paradoxical form of such a remark might be misleading. I s h a l l have more to say presently about thi s admiration of Diderot's for energy i n crime. The following passage also deals with the theme of the presence of good and e v i l i n different individuals and proposes 1 Roth, III, 98 (Sept. 30, 1760). Henri Lefebvre, having quoted t h i s passage, exclaims: \"On c r o i t rever; ou done est passe l e moraliste? En bonne forme, v o i l a un tres beau plaidoyer pour les mechants.\" (Op., c i t . , p. 229,) 196 a similar account of the interdependence of these moral opposites: . . . c'est que les grandes et sublimes actions et les grands crimes'portent l e meme caractere d'energie. Si un homme n'etait pas capable d'incendier une v i l l e , un autre homme ne serait pas capable de se prec i p i t e r dans un gouffre pour l a sauver. S i l'ame de Cesar n'eut pas ete possible, c e l l e de Caton ne l ' a u r a i t pas ete davantage. l'homme est ne citoyen tantot du Tenare, tantot de l'Olympe; c'est Castor et Pollux; un heros, un scelerat; Marc-Aurele, Borgia: di v e r s i s s t u d i i s ovo prognatus e_odem.\u00C2\u00B1 Once again, l i k e that previously quoted, th i s passage i s immedi-ately preceded by a s t a r t l i n g l y paradoxical remark: \"Je hais toutes ces petites bassesses qui ne montrent qu'une ame abjecte, mais je ne hais pas les grands crimes . . . . 1 1 Here too there i s not, I think, any implication of moral approval of great crimes, any b e l i e f that the great criminal transcends common humanity to such a degree that he earns the right to be judged by a diff e r e n t moral law. Diderot i s merely pointing out that i f one wishes the natural order to produce heroes, one has to accept having great villains as well; we need not approve of them, but we must reconcile ourselves to an order of things i n which they inevitably exist. With regard to the presence of good and e v i l i n dif f e r e n t individuals, Diderot's point i s , i n fact, much the same as the one he makes with regard to the concomitance of ^ Salon de 1765. AT, X, 342. Diderot alludes to the legend of Manlius Curtius, who plunged on horseback into an abyss i n order to save the c i t y of Rome. Presumably the man who burned the c i t y i s Nero. The twin brothers Castor and Pollux, born from Leda's egg, were respectively mortal and immortal. 197 good and e v i l i n the same ind i v i d u a l . He does not propose that we should judge the e v i l personal q u a l i t i e s of certain men of genius or the maleficent energy of great criminals according to a dif f e r e n t moral standard from that which i s applied to ordinary men. Diderot i s concerned with the universal scheme of things, and concludes that i t makes no sense to pass value judgments on human nature as a whole; one must accept i t , as one must accept the fundamental order of the universe. As a f i n a l example of Diderot's r e f l e c t i o n s on a world order i n which heroes and great criminals exist side by side, l e t us examine his remarks on Damiens, the would-be assassin of Louis XV: Qu'il y a i t eu parmi nous un homme qui a i t ose attenter a l a vie de son souverain; q u ' i l a i t ete p r i s ; qu'on l ' a i t condamne a etre dechire avec des ongles de fer, arrose d'un metal bouillant, trempe dans l e bitume enflamme, etendu sur un chevalet, demembre par des chevaux; qu'on l u i a i t l u cette sentence t e r r i b l e , et qu'apres 1'avoir entendue, i l a i t d i t froidement: \"La journee sera rude\"; a 1'instant j'imagine aussi q u ' i l respire a cote de moi une ame de l a trempe de ce l l e de Regulus, un homme qui, s i quelque grand interet, general ou p a r t i c u l i e r , l ' e x i g e a i t , entrerait sans p a l i r dans l e tonneau herisse de pointes. 1 I s h a l l have further remarks to make on thi s passage l a t e r . For the moment I wish only to stress that here again Diderot's position i s that i n the actual order of the world there i s an interconnection between the existence of great criminals and great heroes, that one cannot have one without the other. Roth, III, 141-42 (To Sophie Volland: Oct. 14-15, 1760). 198 The explanation Diderot gives for the interdependence of good and e v i l , whether i n the physical world, i n the same human individuals, or separately i n different individuals, i s that good and e v i l have the same or i g i n . He expounds this theory most f u l l y i n a note to l e Proselyte repondant par lui-meme (c. 1763): J' a i vu de savants systernes, j ' a i vu de gros l i v r e s e c r i t s sur l' o r i g i n e du mal; et je n'ai vu que des reveries, l e mal tient au bien meme; on ne pourrait oter l'un sans 1'autre; et i l s ont tous les deux leur source dans les memes causes. C'est des l o i s donnees a. l a matiere, lesquelles entretiennent l e mouvement et l a vie dans l'univers, que derivent les desordres physiques, l e s volcans, l e s tremblements de terre, l e s tempetes, etc. C'est de l a s e n s i b i l i t e , source de tous nos p l a i s i r s , que resulte l a douleur. Quant au mal moral, qui n'est autre chose que l e vice ou l a preference de soi aux autres, i l est un effet necessaire de cet amour-propre, s i essentiel a. notre conservation, et contre lequel de faux raisonneurs ont tant declame. Pour q u ' i l n'y a i t pas de vices sur l a terre, c'est aux l e g i s l a t e u r s a f a i r e que les hommes n'y trouvent aucun i n t e r e t . l In a second note, Diderot declares that i t i s inconceivable that a world should exist without e v i l : Je ne sais s ' i l peut y avoir un systeme ou. tout serait bien; mais je sais bien q u ' i l est impossible de l a concevoir. Otez l a faim et l a s o i f aux animaux, qu'est-ce qui les av e r t i r a de pourvoir a. leurs besoins? Otez-leur l a douleur, qu'est-ce qui les previendra sur ce qui menace leur vie? A l'egard de l'homme, toutes ses passions, comme l ' a demontre un philosophe de nos jours, ne sont que l e developpement de l a s e n s i b i l i t e physique. Pour f a i r e que l'homme so i t sans passions, i l n'y a pas d'autre moyen que de l e rendre automate. Pope a tres bien prouve, d'apres Leibniz, que l e monde ne saura.it etre que ce q u ' i l est; mais l o r s q u ' i l en a AT, II, 85, note 1. 1 9 9 c o n c l u que tout e s t b i e n , i l a d i t une a b s u r d i t e ; i l d e v a i t se contenter de d i r e que tout est n e c e s s a i r e . ^ With. regard to meral e v i l and human s u f f e r i n g these remarks confirm the ideas of Moi concerning V o l t a i r e and Gfreuze and those of D i d e r o t r e g a r d i n g the b e n e f i t s and disadvantages which a M. de l'Empiree d e r i v e s from the g i f t of s e n s i b i l i t y . The source of moral e v i l and of moral good i s s e l f - l o v e , which i s fundamentally the tendency of a l l organisms to s t r i v e to continue t h e i r own ex i s t e n c e . T h i s s e l f - l o v e i s guided by s e n s i b i l i t y , which i n i t s o r i g i n i s a p h y s i c a l phenomenon in s e p a r a b l e from the organism and which i n i t s developed form gives r i s e to the human passions. In order to r e f u t e completely the view that Diderot tended towards i m m o r a l i s t i c i n d i v i d u a l i s m , i t w i l l be necessary to examine i n some d e t a i l h i s ideas concerning the passions. As e a r l y as 1 7 4 6 , i n the Pensees philosophiques, Diderot d e c l a r e s h i s preference f o r s t r o n g passions, the f i r s t f i v e . s e c t i o n s of the work being devoted to t h i s theme. The f o l l o w i n g s e l e c t i o n w i l l g ive an i d e a of Did e r o t ' s p o i n t of view: I b i d . , p. 8 5 , note 2 . Assezat i d e n t i f i e s the \"philosophe de nos j o u r s \" as C o n d i l l a c . Cf. V o l t a i r e ' s Preface to the Poeme sur l e des a s t r e de Lisbonne of 1 7 5 5 (Melanges, P l e i a d e e d i t i o n , P a r i s , 1 9 6 1 , pp. 3 0 1 - 0 3 ) . A l l these r e f l e c t i o n s of Did e r o t ' s concerning good and e v i l i n the universe should be seen i n the context of the controversy r e g a r d i n g optimism i n the decade around 1 7 6 0 . 200 On declame sans f i n contre l e s passions; on leur impute toutes les peines de l'homme, et l'on oublie qu 1elles sont aussi l a source de tous ses p l a i s i r s . C'est dans sa constitution un element dont on ne peut dire n i trop de bien n i trop de mal. Mais ce qui me donne de l'humeur, c'est qu'on ne les regarde jamais que du mauvais cote. . . . Cependant i l n'y a que les passions, qui puissent elever l'ame aux grandes choses. Sans e l l e s , plus de sublime, s o i t dans les moeurs, soit dans les ouvrages; les beaux-arts retournent en enfance, et l a vertu devient minutieuse. . . . l e s passions sobres font les hommes communs. . . . Les passions amorties degradent l e s hommes extraordinaires. La contrainte aneantit l a grandeur et l'energie de l a nature. Voyez cet arbre; c'est au luxe de ses branches que vous devez l a fraicheur et l'etendue de ses ombres: vous en jouirez jusqu'a. ce que l' h i v e r vienne l e depouiller de sa chevelure. Plus d'excellence en poesie, en peinture, en musique, lorsque l a superstition aura f a i t sur l e temperament l'ouvrage de l a v i e i l l e s s e . We s h a l l see l a t e r that Diderot does i n s i s t that i n the i r expression strong passions should be subjected to some form of re s t r a i n t . But I would l i k e to concentrate for the moment on his 'preference for strong rather than weak passions. I would not seek to deny that he prefers a world i n which there i s a mixture of extremes i n good and e v i l to a world i n which moral mediocrity i s the rule. He prefers the energy which gives r i s e either to great crimes or to great heroism rather than the moral weakness which makes a man incapable either of marked altruism or of a s u f f i c i e n t l y resolute selfishness to act i n a decidedly malevolent way. It i s i n this sense that he hates \"toutes ces petites bassesses qui ne montrent qu'une ame abjecte,\" but does not hate great crimes, because of the quality of energy which, \" 2 l i k e acts of heroism, they manifest. 1 AT, I, 127-28. 2 See above, p. 196 . Cf. also the rather similar remark i n his l e t t e r to Sophie Volland dated Sept. 30, 1760, quoted above, p. 19-5. 201 With the \"energetic\" character, whether good or e v i l , Diderot contrasts the mediocre man: Tenez, mon amie, votre Desmarets n'etait bon a. r i e n . II n'y avait pas assez d'etoffe n i pour f a i r e un honnete homme n i pour f a i r e un fripon. S ' i l n'est pas encore completement stupide, cela ne tardera pas a. venir. Au reste, un coup d'oeil sur l e s inconsequences et l e s contradictions des hommes, et l'on v o i t que l a plupart naissent moitie sots et moitie fous. Sans caractere comme sans physionomie, i l s ne sont decides n i pour l e vice n i pour l a vertu. I l s ne savent n i immoler les autres n i se s a c r i f i e r ; et soit qu'ils fassent l e bien, soit qu'ils fassent l e mal, i l s sont malheureux et j'en a i p i t i e . It i s true, on the other hand, that according to Diderot, i t i s precisely the mediocre mass of mankind, lacking a pronounced natural disposition either to cooperative or to a n t i - s o c i a l behaviour, which can be influenced by edxication and l e g i s l a t i o n : II est un phenomene, constant dans l a nature, auquel Helvetius n'a pas f a i t attention, c'est que l e s ames fortes sont rares, que l a nature, ne f a i t presque que des etres communs; que c'est l a raison pour laquelle les causes morales subjuguent s i facilement 1'organisation. It i s this fact which j u s t i f i e s our hope for the general improve-ment of the standard of human morality through the agency of good government and an appropriate educational system. But the kind of virtue, i f i t deserves the name, which results from careful nurture i s not what f i l l s Diderot with enthusiasm or makes him proud to belong to the human race. He i s more impressed Roth, III, 97-98 (To Sophie Volland; Sept. 30, 1760). 2 Refutation d'Helvetius, AT, II, 393. 202 by that virtue which springs spontaneously from the o r i g i n a l seed of the individual nature. Diderot's preference for a world i n which a l l i s not mediocrity, but where there are instances of great heroism, inevitably balanced by other instances of great villainy, may no doubt be rejected by some moralists, who consider that a state of harmonious mediocrity would be more conducive to the happiness of society as a whole. I think, however, that much could be said on either side of the question and that i t would be wrong to reach the hasty conclusion that Diderot's position i s immor-a l i s t i c . When we consider, for example, a l l the passages i n which Diderot speaks of the concomitance i n the natural order of great crimes and great heroism, we find that his attitude toward di f f e r e n t types of great criminal varies. For instance, when he contrasts Marcus Aurelius and Borgia, Manlius Curtius and Nero,\"'\" his attention is. concentrated, as regards the villains, on one quality only, their \"energy\", which here seems to mean the strength of the passions. This quality pleases him, he explains, for two reasons. One i s that i t provides him with an a e s t h e t i c a l l y pleasing spectacle: \"On en f a i t de beaux tableaux et de belles tragedies.\" The other reason i s that the existence i n some men of violent passions directed toward e v i l affords an \"*\" See above, p. 196. 2 Salon de 1765, AT, X, 342. 203 assurance that there exist i n other men equally strong passions directed toward good. I do not think one can suppose that Diderot has any actual moral admiration for a Nero or a Borgia, i n the sense that he would l i k e to resemble them. In other cases, however, i t seems that he feels a true moral admiration for at least certain aspects of the character of a criminal. He admires, for instance, Damiens's courage i n the face of his t e r r i b l e sentence. Such admiration does not denote immoralism. Diderot himself c l a r i f i e s i n the following passage the d i s t i n c t i o n between approval of criminal ends and admiration for the i n t e l l e c t u a l or psychological q u a l i t i e s which are deployed i n their pursuit: Une seule chose peut nous rapprocher du mechant; c'est l a grandeur de ses vues, l'etendue de son genie, l e p e r i l de son entreprise. Alors, s i nous oublions sa mechancete pour courir son sort; s i nous conjurons contre Venise avec l e comte de Bedmar, c'est l a vertu qui nous subjugue encore sous une autre face. In t h i s context we must, i n my view, take the word \"vertu\" to mean something dif f e r e n t from justice, which i s the way Diderot, true to his s o c i a l ethic, usually defines i t . Here i t has a meaning closer to i t s etymological sense and refers to whatever qu a l i t i e s are considered desirable i n a man. This meaning i s broader than that of beneficence or justice, for i t includes also the i n t e l l e c t u a l and psychological characteristics which make a man e f f i c i e n t i n carrying out his designs. In short, the word refers to q u a l i t i e s which, from the point of view of s o c i a l morality, are neutral. My interpretation i s confirmed, I think, 1 Salon de 1767. AT, XI, 118. 204 by a c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l passage i n the a r t i c l e \" l a i d e u r \" : Une chose e s t b e l l e ou l a i d e sous deux a s p e c t s d i f f e r e n t s . L a c o n s p i r a t i o n de V e n i s e dans son commencement, ses progres et ses moyens nous f a i t e e r i e r : Quel homme que l e comte de Bedmar! q u ' i l e s t grand! La meme c o n s p i r a t i o n sous l e s p o i n t s de vue moraux e t r e l a t i f s a l'humanite et a l a j u s t i c e nous f a i t d i r e q u ' e l l e e s t a t r o c e , et que l e comte de Bedmar e s t h i d e u x ! x D i d e r o t ' s c o n c e p t i o n of what i s a d m i r a b l e i n human c h a r a c t e r i s c o m p l i c a t e d by the f a c t t h a t a t times he ap p e a l s t o the p r i n c i p l e o f u n i t y of c h a r a c t e r . I n a l e t t e r t o Sophie V o l l a n d , he remarks: Un t o u t e s t beau l o r s q u ' i l e s t un. En ce sens, Cromwell e s t beau, et S c i p i o n a u s s i , et Medee, et A r i a , et Cesar, e t Brutus.2 T h i s p r i n c i p l e of u n i t y , however, i s r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t from the p r i n c i p l e on which i s founded D i d e r o t ' s a d m i r a t i o n f o r Damiens or the comte de Bedmar. I n such men D i d e r o t f i n d s q u a l i t i e s which he would l i k e t o p o s s e s s ; but i t i s c l e a r from c e r t a i n p o r t r a i t s I N LJL\u00C2\u00A9 Neveu de Rameau t h a t he would not f e e l t h i s way about a l l c h a r a c t e r s p o s s e s s i n g u n i t y . Such u n i t y may be found i n weak as w e l l as i n s t r o n g c h a r a c t e r s , i n base s o u l s as w e l l as i n n o b l e ones, a f a c t which i s i l l u s t r a t e d by Bouret and P a l i s s o t , i n whom Rameau's nephew f i n d s a u n i t y of c h a r a c t e r of which he h i m s e l f f a l l s s h o r t . T h e i r p e r f e c t i o n i n baseness may p o s s i b l y be the 1 AT, XV, 410. 2 R o t h , I I , 208 (Aug. 11, 1759). 205 source of a c e r t a i n a e s t h e t i c p l e a s u r e f o r the o b s e r v e r , but, i f one can speak a t a l l o f t h e i r i n s p i r i n g a d m i r a t i o n , i t i s c e r t a i n l y not the s o r t o f a d m i r a t i o n w i t h which Damiens 1s courage f i l l s D i d e r o t , r e m i n d i n g him as i t does of the courage of a Regulus. We remember t h a t Rameau, h a v i n g f a i l e d t o e l i c i t from Moi a n y t h i n g o t h e r than amused contempt f o r P a l i s s o t and B o u r e t , t r i e s a g a i n w i t h h i s anecdote c o n c e r n i n g the renegade of A v i g n o n . x The s c o u n d r e l i n q u e s t i o n g a i n s the c o n f i d e n c e of a r i c h Jew, s t i l l p r i v a t e l y p r a c t i s i n g \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 hils\"1 , r e l i g i o n , and p r e t e n d s t o be c o n v e r t e d t o Judaism; whence the a p p e l a t i o n \"renegade\". A f t e r some time has e l a p s e d , he s e c r e t l y denounces the Jew t o the I n q u i s i t i o n and makes o f f w i t h h i s f o r t u n e on the p r e t e x t of k e e p i n g i t s a f e from the a u t h o r i t i e s . Meanwhile the Jew i s burned a t the s t a k e . The main d i f f e r e n c e between the case of the renegade and those o f P a l i s s o t and B o uret i s t h a t h i s a c t i s i n f i n i t e l y more h e i n o u s . He i s an example of those extremes i n v i c e w hich g i v e D i d e r o t the assurance t h a t t h e r e w i l l e x i s t i n o t h e r men e q u a l extremes of v i r t u e , whereas Bouret and P a l i s s o t p a r t a k e r a t h e r of t h e m e d i o c r i t y of a Desmarets. However, we a r e not tempted t o i d e n t i f y o u r s e l v e s w i t h the renegade. The o n l y q u a l i t y w h ich we might perhaps w i s h t o possess i n e q u a l measure i s h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e ; but even t h i s we c l a s s r a t h e r as g u i l e and have l i t t l e sympathy w i t h i t . One would n o t , i n the case of the renegade, speak of - \" l a grandeur de ses vues, l ' e t e n d u e de son 1 AT, V, 454-56. 206 g e n i e \" , as D i d e r o t does w i t h r e g a r d t o the comte de Bedmar. As f o r courage, t h e r e i s no evidence t h a t the renegade possesses any. He has worked out such a c l e v e r p l a n t h a t he does not need t o he courageous. I t may be p o s s i b l e t o d e r i v e a c e r t a i n a e s t h e t i c p l e a s u r e from c o n t e m p l a t i n g the u n f o l d i n g o f h i s n e f a r i o u s scheme, j u s t as one might from o b s e r v i n g a s e r i e s of c l e v e r chess moves; the degree of h i s wickedness may w e l l a s t o n i s h one; but t h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n , e i t h e r f o r D i d e r o t or f o r h i s r e a d e r , of f e e l i n g a p o s i t i v e a t t r a c t i o n f o r the q u a l i t i e s o f h i s p e r s o n a l i t y . I t i s t r u e , a d m i t t e d l y , t h a t , i n the f o l l o w i n g remarks, D i d e r o t l e n d s l u i , as so o f t e n throughout the d i a l o g u e , c e r t a i n of h i s own i d e a s : S ' i l i mporte d ' e t r e s u b l i m e en quelques genres, c ' e s t s u r t o u t en mal. On crache s u r l e p e t i t f i l o u , mais on ne peut r e f u s e r une s o r t e de c o n s i d e r a t i o n a un grand c r i m i n e l : son courage vous etonne, son a t r o c i t e , vous f a i t f r e m i r . On p r i s e en t o u t 1 ' u n i t e de c a r a c t e r e . A l l t hese i d e a s a r e D i d e r o t ' s own, and I t h i n k t h a t he would have been ready t o defend them as c o m p a t i b l e w i t h h i s b e l i e f i n b e n e f i c e n c e . But l u i p a r t s company w i t h the a u t h o r when he i l l u s t r a t e s t hese p r i n c i p l e s by the example of the renegade i n such a way as t o i m p l y t h a t moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are i r r e l e v a n t t o the case. A p a r t from the f a c t t h a t the renegade l a c k s the \" s u b l i m e \" q u a l i t i e s o f a Damiens, L u i ' s approach i s u n a c c e p t a b l e t o Moi because i t i s an attempt t o s u b s t i t u t e a e s t h e t i c judgments f o r moral ones i n a case where the l a t t e r seem of i n f i n i t e l y g r e a t e r importance t o a man o f v i r t u e . 1 AT, V, 453. 207 Lui's t a c t i c s i n the dialogue are largely dictated by his desire to atta i n i n the philosopher's eyes a significance which w i l l raise him above mere contempt. To this end he presents himself as an a r t i s t i n f l a t t e r y and i n the manipulation of people. Admitting, however, that he himself f a l l s short of perfection i n baseness and immorality, he attempts to gain at least Moi's recognition of the excellence of other more consummate examples. For a while Moi i s amused, but on hearing the anecdote of the renegade his amusement gives way to horror: Je commencais a supporter avec peine l a presence d'un homme qui di s c u t a i t une action horrible, un execrable f o r f a i t , comme un connaisseur en peinture ou en poesie examine les beautes d'un ouvrage de gout, ou comme un moraliste ou un hi s t o r i e n releve et f a i t eclater les circonstances d'une action herolque. 1 This i s precisely the reaction Lui was hoping to e l i c i t from Moi. The l a t t e r ' s horror i s proof that he no longer sees Lui as merely a despicable nonentity. Surely, i n the eyes of the reader too, Lui arouses a more positive f e e l i n g than mere contempt; but this does not mean that the reader i s thereby an immoralist at heart, or that he approves morally of the Nephew's character or conduct. I f \"energy\", for Diderot, i s not to be equated simply with unity of character, what meaning does he give the term? It might be supposed, since he often expresses his approval of strong 1 AT, V, 457. 208 passions, that \"energy\" consists of their uninhibited expression. Yet i t seems that there i s a difference between his attitude to a Nero and to a Damiens or a comte de Bedmar. The answer, I believe, i s that Diderot conceives of a type of energy which i s more admirable than the unrestrained discharge of passion. It i s a controlled energy, r e s u l t i n g from a certain equilibrium i n the personality, which renders the individual not only more e f f i c i e n t i n acting upon the exterior world, but also more s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , more independent of circumstances. Thus Diderot admires Damiens because he i s capable of submitting to the most t e r r i b l e fate without being dismayed. Early i n his career, Diderot seems to look to a balance between opposing passions to achieve the coordination which results i n this inner strength: Ge serait done un bonheur, me dira-t-on, d'avoir les passions fortes. Oui, sans doute, s i toutes sont a l'unisson. Etablissez entre e l l e s une juste harmonie, et n'en apprehendez point de desordres. S i l'esperance est balancee par l a crainte, l e point d'honneur par 1'amour de l a vie, l e penchant au p l a i s i r par l ' i n t e r e t de l a sante, vous ne verrez n i l i b e r t i n s , n i temeraires, n i laches.1 This conception i s one which Diderot seems to have subsequently discarded. Perhaps he f e l t that such a balance between opposing Pensees philosophiques, AT, I, 128. The notion of a balance of opposing passions seems to have been an i n f l u e n t i a l idea among early eighteenth-century moralists. Verniere observes i n a note on this passage (Oeuvres philsophiques, p. 11, note 2) that Diderot may well have been influenced on this point by the Nouveaux dialogues (1711) of Remond de Saint-Mard, who, with his brother Remond l e Grec, author of a Dialogue de l a volupte (1736), was a well known apologist of the passions. 209 f o r c e s might r e s u l t i n p e r s o n a l i t i e s marked by c h r o n i c i n d e c i s o n or by t h a t moral m e d i o c r i t y which he d e t e s t e d . Furthermore, a t l e a s t one of the motives which he l i s t s , namely the need or d e s i r e t o conserve one's h e a l t h , i s r a r e l y a p a s s i o n . I t i s more a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b e d as a r a t i o n a l m o tive. I n m e n t i o n i n g i t , D i d e r o t a l l o w s a n o t h e r c o n c e p t i o n o f the c o n t r o l of the p a s s i o n s t o i n t e r v e n e , one which he devel o p s f u l l y i n l a t e r w r i t i n g s , where he appeals t o a r e g u l a t i n g f o r c e s u p e r i o r t o the p a s s i o n s and of a d i f f e r e n t n a t u r e , namely the w i l l , c o n c e i v e d as the e x e c u t i v e agent o f the r e a s o n . He thus r e v e r t s t o the p o s i t i o n o f D e s c a r t e s i n the T r a i t e des -passions. The f o l l o w i n g passage from the s e c t i o n of t h a t work e n t i t l e d \"En q u o i on c o n n a i t l a f o r c e ou l a f a i b l e s s e des ames\" i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g i n t h i s r e s p e c t , s i n c e here D e s c a r t e s s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s h i s p r e -f e r e n c e f o r the r e g u l a t i o n o f the p a s s i o n s by r e a s o n r a t h e r than by o t h e r p a s s i o n s : C'est par l e succes de ces combats que chacun peut c o n n a i t r e l a f o r c e ou l a f a i b l e s s e de son ame; c a r ceux en q u i n a t u r e l l e m e n t l a v o l o n t e peut l e p l u s aisement v a i n c r e l e s p a s s i o n s e t a r r e t e r l e s mouvements du co r p s q u i l e s accompagnent ont sans doute' l e s ames l e s p l u s f o r t e s ; mais i l y en a q u i ne peuvent jamais eprouver l e u r f o r c e , parce q u ' i l s ne f o n t jamais combattre l e u r v o l o n t e avec ses pr o p r e s armes, mais seulement avec c e l l e s que l u i f o u r n i s s e n t quelques p a s s i o n s pour r e s i s t e r a quelques a u t r e s . Ce que j e nomme ses p r o p r e s armes sont des jugements fermes et determines touchant l a con n a i s s a n c e du b i e n et du mal, s u i v a n t l e s q u e l s e l l e a r e s o l u de c o n d u i r e l e s a c t i o n s de sa v i e ; et l e s ames l e s p l u s f a i b l e s de t o u t e s sont c e l l e s dont l a v o l o n t e ne se determine p o i n t a i n s i a s u i v r e c e r t a i n s jugements, mais se l a i s s e c o n t i n u e l l e m e n t emporter aux p a s s i o n s p r e s e n t e s , l e s q u e l l e s , e t a n t souvent c o n t r a i r e s l e s unes aux a u t r e s , l a t i r e n t t o u r a. t o u r a l e u r p a r t i e t , 1' employant 210 a. combattre contre elle-meme, metteni l'ame au plus deplorable etat qu'elle puisse etre. Probably Diderot's r e f l e c t i o n s on human physiology, a subject which had interested Descartes too, caused him to f e e l the inadequacy of a conception of \"energy\" and human greatness which stressed only the strength of the passions and neglected the idea of a superior moderating force. Bordeu, i n Le Reve de d'Alembert, expounds a theory of the nervous system i n which information from the senses i s carried along a network of threads to the brain, which i n i t s turn transmits orders through the nerve threads, thus causing actions. The nerve threads are likened to branches and the brain to a trunk. Bordeu explains that there i s va r i a t i o n from person to person as to the r e l a t i v e dominance of the trunk or the branches, the character of the person d i f f e r i n g accordingly: Le principe ou l e tronc e s t - i l trop vigoureux relativement aux branches? De la. les poetes, les a r t i s t e s , l e s gens a. imagination, les hommes pusillanimes, les enthousiastes, l e s fous. Trop faibl e ? De la. ce que nous appelons les brutes, l e s betes feroces. Le systeme entier lache, mou, sans energie? De l a les imbeciles, l e systeme entier energique, bien d'accord, bien ordonne? De la. l e s bons penseurs, les philosophes, les sages.^ Clearly we have here a different conception of \"energy\" from that which would equate i t with strong passions. It i s broadly true that the passions are here represented by the strength of the x Traite des passions, a r t i c l e 48, Pleiade edition, Paris, 1953, p. 720. 2 AT, II, 169-70. 211 i n f l u e n c e of the nerve t h r e a d s , though perhaps t h i s e q u a t i o n i s not e n t i r e l y a c c u r a t e , s i n c e , f o r example, e n t h u s i a s t s a re c l a s s e d w i t h those i n whom the t r u n k i s too p o w e r f u l r e l a t i v e t o the branches. The nerve t h r e a d s seem t o r e p r e s e n t a t one and the same time the i n f l u e n c e o f e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y and the b a s i c p h y s i o l o g i c a l needs. The t r u n k a l s o seems t o have a double meaning. I t appears t o r e p r e s e n t , on the one hand, t e n d e n c i e s which e x i s t w i t h i n the p e r s o n a l i t y i n d e p e n d e n t l y of e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y , t e n d e n c i e s t o c r e a t e i n n e r appearances, and, on the o t h e r hand, the c a p a c i t y f o r o b t a i n i n g a b a l a n c e d p i c t u r e of e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y from the o f t e n exaggerated r e p o r t s a r r i v i n g t h r o u g h the nerve t h r e a d s . I n t h i s second meaning the t r u n k r e p r e s e n t s r e a s o n . T h i s , i t seems, i s the asp e c t o f the t r u n k ' s a c t i v i t y which dominates, or a t l e a s t c o u n t e r b a l a n c e s , the i n f l u e n c e of the nerve t h r e a d s i n the c l e a r t h i n k e r s , the p h i l o s o p h e r s and the sages. Bordeu s u b s e q u e n t l y e x p l a i n s more p r e c i s e l y how the g r e a t man a t t a i n s h i s s t r e n g t h : Le grand homme, s ' i l a malheureusement r e c u c e t t e d i s p o s i t i o n n a t u r e l l e C e x c e s s i v e s e n s i b i l i t y ] , s'occupera sans r e l a c h e a, l ' a f f a i b l i r , a l a dominer, a se re n d r e m a i t r e de ses mouvements et a c o n s e r v e r a 1 ' o r i g i n e du f a i s c e a u t o u t son empire. A l o r s i l se possedera au m i l i e u des p l u s grands dangers, i l j u g e r a f r o i d e m e n t , mais sainement. R i e n de ce q u i peut s e r v i r a. ses vues, c o n c o u r i r a. son but , ne l u i echappera; on l ' e t o n n e r a d i f f i c i l e m e n t ; i l a u r a q u a r a n t e - c i n q ans; i l s e r a grand r o i , grand m i n i s t r e , grand p o l i t i q u e , grand a r t i s t e , s u r t o u t grand comedien, grand p h i l o s o p h e , grand poete, grand m u s i c i e n , grand medecin; i l r e g n e r a s u r lui-meme et s u r t o u t ce q u i l ' e n v i r o n n e . I I ne c r a i n d r a pas l a mort, peur, comme a d i t sublimement l e s t o l c i e n , q u i 212 est une anse que s a i s i t l e robuste pour mener l e f a i b l e partout ou i l veut; i l aura casse l'anse et se sera en meme temps affranchi de toutes les tyrannies du monde. Greatness, thus defined, i s no guarantee of beneficence. But, as I have stressed throughout this discussion, there i s no reason for supposing that Diderot approves morally of the actions of a \"great\", but maleficent man. A good i l l u s t r a t i o n i s his attitude to Frederick II, i n whom he saw greatness joined with wickedness. 2 In his l e t t e r on education addressed to the comtesse de Forbach, Diderot distinguishes between \"fermete\" (which, according to Bordeu's account, would be i d e n t i c a l with greatness) and \" l a veritable grandeur\". The t r u l y great man, Diderot here affirms, possesses the same qu a l i t i e s as the t r u l y good man: La justice et l a fermete; l a justice, qui n'est r i e n sans l a fermete; l a fermete, qui peut etre un grand mal sans l a justice; l a justice, qui regie l a bienfaisance et qui arrete l e murmure; l a fermete, qui donnera de l a teneur .a. sa conduite, qui l e resignera a sa destinee et qui 1'elevera au dessus des revers.^ Wo doubt this issue i s r e a l l y only terminological. It a l l depends whether or not one includes justice or beneficence i n the d e f i n i t i o n of greatness. The important point for our discussion i s that Diderot e f f e c t i v e l y distinguishes between, on the one hand, that 1 AT, II, 171. p Cf. Correspondance inedite, ed. Andre Babelon, Paris, 1931, I, 220 (To Mme d'Epinay; A p r i l 9, 1774). 5 Roth, XII, 37. (To the comtesse de Forbach; ca. 1772.) 213 s t r e n g t h of the p e r s o n a l i t y which makes a man master o f h i m s e l f and t h e r e f o r e master o f h i s f a t e ( i n the sense t h a t he can c o n t r o l h i s r e a c t i o n s t o c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) , and, on the o t h e r hand, the co m b i n a t i o n o f t h i s q u a l i t y w i t h b e n e f i c e n c e and j u s t i c e . There ar e no grounds f o r su p p o s i n g t h a t D i d e r o t does not p r e f e r the l a t t e r ; n o r , as far' as I can see, i s t h e r e any immoralism i n f e e l i n g a d m i r a t i o n f o r the f i r s t q u a l i t y even when i t i s accompanied by m a l e f i c e n c e . l e t us now r e v i e w the c o n c l u s i o n s we have so f a r reached c o n c e r n i n g D i d e r o t ' s p r e f e r e n c e s w i t h r e g a r d t o the i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t y . We have seen t h a t he p r e f e r s u n i t y of c h a r a c t e r t o t h a t l a c k of c o o r d i n a t i o n which r e s u l t s i n weakness; and he p r e f e r s p o w e r f u l i m p u l s e s t o weak ones. The c o m b i n a t i o n of the s e two i d e a l s r e s u l t s i n a p e r s o n a l i t y i n which p o w e r f u l i m p u l s e s a r e kept i n check by an i n t e r i o r d o m i n a t i n g f o r c e . T h i s g i v e s a man r e s o l u t e n e s s i n c a r d i n g out h i s purposes and i n n e r s t r e n g t h i n t he f a c e o f the blows of f a t e . Up t o t h i s p o i n t these p r e f e r -ences of D i d e r o t ' s may be termed a e s t h e t i c , s i n c e m o r a l judgments conc e r n , i n h i s view, the s o c i a l e f f e c t s of a c t s , and the q u a l i t i e s l i s t e d so f a r may be s o c i a l l y e i t h e r b e n e f i c e n t or m a l e f i c e n t . 1 D i d e r o t does not a p p e a l here t o the n o t i o n of f r e e - w i l l . Whether an i n d i v i d u a l can a c h i e v e such s e l f - m a s t e r y or not w i l l depend upon the i n t e r a c t i o n o f e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s and the o r i g i n a l f o r c e s of h i s n a t u r e . 214 However, Diderot's highest i d e a l for individual development includes also beneficence. This, i n order to be effecti v e , demands, when circumstances are d i f f i c u l t , much the same qua l i t i e s of inner coordination and strength which he finds ae s t h e t i c a l l y pleasing. The just and beneficent man, which i s how Diderot defines the virtuous man, employs his energy of soul not only i n opposing external d i f f i c u l t i e s , but also i n an i n t e r i o r combat. It i s the servant of his reason i n i t s constant struggle not to destroy, but to temper his passions. 1 In the Essai sur les regnes de Claude et de Neron, Diderot protests against a certain over-complacent moral naturalism which he finds i n certain writings of Seneca: \"La nature nous a formes pour l a vertu . . . \" C'est l e prejuge d'un homme de bien qui a oublie ce q u ' i l a f a i t d'efforts et de s a c r i f i c e s pour devenir vertueux. Combien de passions violentes et naturelles dans l e franc sauvagel Dans l ' e t a t police, mille vicieux pour un sage . . . \"le chemin de l a vertu n'est n i raide n i escarpe. . .\" Le chemin de l a vertu est t a i l l e dans un roc escarpe. Celui que de longs et penibles travaux ont conduit a. son sommet, s'y tient d i f f i c i l e m e n t : apres avoir longtemps gravi, i l marche sur une planche etroite et elastique, entre des precipices.2 This conception of virtue as requiring a s a c r i f i c e does not con-f l i c t with Diderot's oft-repeated contention that enlightened s e l f -interest always j u s t i f i e s virtuous conduct.-5 The compatibility See the l e t t e r to Landois, quoted above, p. 7*+\u00C2\u00AB 2 AT, III, 288. See also Plan d'une universite, AT, III, 431-32, and Eloge de Richardson, AT, V, 214. 3 Diderot's arguments i n support of this doctrine w i l l be discussed i n the next chapter. See below, pp. 239-52. 215 of the two principles i s c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d i n the following passage: . . . l'oeuvre du bonheur ne s'accomplit pas sans peine; l a vertu est presque toujours un s a c r i f i c e penible de s o i ; l a probite demande de l a force, du courage, une vue bien c l a i r e , bien nette de ses propres interets bien entendus, l ' o u b l i du moment, dont l a recompense incertaine n'est que dans 1'avenir.1 The fact that virtue requires a short-term s a c r i f i c e means that, i n the man who understands the necessity of this s a c r i f i c e for the ultimate attainment of the greatest possible personal happiness, there arises a battle between reason, and the demand of the passions for immediate s a t i s f a c t i o n . The stronger the passions which drive him toward maleficent actions, the more d i f f i c u l t i t i s for his reason to overcome them. Some men are good naturally and without notable e f f o r t , but many must achieve goodness \"en t r a v a i l l a n t 2 sur eux-memes\". In l e F i l s naturel, Diderot portrays i n Dorval precisely this inner struggle and the f i n a l triumph of virtue. The s t r i k i n g l y paradoxical form i n which Diderot couches his remarks on the great criminals should not make us forget the numerous passages i n which he expresses his admiration for heroic vi r t u e . Thus he relates, for instance, how a black slave i n one of the colonies, when commanded by his master to hang some fellow-slaves who had run away and been recaptured, cut off his own hand 3 i n a gesture of re f u s a l . We must r e c a l l also his admiration for 1 Pages contre un tyran, i n Qeuvres politiques, ed. Verniere, p. 137. Cf. also Sssai sur l e merite et l a vertu, AT, I, 60, note. 2 Roth, VII, 202 (To V i a l l e t ; Oct. or Nov. 1767). 3 Refutation d'Helvetius, AT, II, 409. The anecdote i s repeated i n the Essai sur les regnes de Claude et de Neron, AT, III, 313. 216 calm fortitude with, which Socrates s a c r i f i c e d his l i f e to remain true to his p r i n c i p l e s , 1 and his constant allusions to the heroes of antiquity, to Codrus, Curtius, Regulus and Cato of Utica. In fact, to take a broad view of Diderot's writings as a whole, there i s no doubt that while he admires strength of character whether i t occurs i n virtuous men or i n criminals, he prefers that i t should be joined with virtue. This i s not to imply that the q u a l i t i e s of character admired by Diderot are a l l d i r e c t l y concerned with beneficence. On the contrary, strength of character, the power to overcome one's own weaknesses and to remain undaunted by the blows of fate, i s a value whose j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s independent of considerations of s o c i a l u t i l i t y . Nevertheless, heroic virtue remains Diderot's highest i d e a l for the individual character. It may perhaps be objected f i n a l l y that the inner struggle between reason and the passions which Diderot considers to be the necessary preliminary to virtuous action i s precisely that war i n the cavern between natural man and a r t i f i c i a l and moral man 2 which B i n the Supplement au Voyage de Bougainville deplores. I do not think, however, that t h i s i s a v a l i d p a r a l l e l , for the man of whom B speaks i s not the individual, but man i n general, as he exists i n European society. His \"natural\" aspect i s not to be equated with the uncontrolled passions nor his \" a r t i f i c i a l and 1 Cf. De l a poesie dramatique, AT, VII, 314-16. See above, p. 86. 217 m o r a l \" a s p e c t w i t h the demands of the i d e a l s o c i a l m o r a l i t y . I n s t e a d , the \" n a t u r a l \" a s p e c t may be t a k e n as i n c l u d i n g such l i m i t s on s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n as are i n s e p a r a b l e from s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e \u00E2\u0080\u0094 the k i n d of l i m i t s one f i n d s even i n the T a h i t i a n U t o p i a \u00E2\u0080\u0094 w h i l e the \" a r t i f i c i a l and m o r a l \" a s p e c t r e f e r s t o r e s t r i c t i o n s w h i c h are not e s s e n t i a l t o a s a t i s f a c t o r y s o c i e t y , but a r e a r b i t r a r y , s i n c e they are not d i c t a t e d by man's i n h e r e n t needs e i t h e r as an i n d i v i d u a l o r as a s o c i a l b e i n g . On the c o n t r a r y , these needs, i n t h e i r d u a l a s p e c t , a r e the source of a moral law which D i d e r o t c o n s i d e r s n e i t h e r a r b i t r a r y nor \" a r t i f i c i a l \" , but n a t u r a l . T h i s law, he a f f i r m s , t a k e s precedence over s t r i c t l y i n d i v i d u a l i m p u l s e s and p r o p e n s i t i e s . We must now proceed t o the e x a m i n a t i o n o f D i d e r o t ' s c o n c e p t i o n of t h i s n a t u r a l moral law and i t s r e l a t i o n t o the p o s i t i v e laws a c t u a l l y i n f o r c e i n v a r i o u s s o c i e t i e s . 104 c o n s t i t u t i o n was not p e r f e c t l y w e l l timed. M? In part t h i s concern r e f l e c t e d o p i n i o n i n the mother country where the i d e a l a r t i c u l a t e d by Blackstone and De Lolme o f an independent Commons a c t i n g as a balancing organ i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l but disappeared i n the r e a c t i o n to the Revolution a f t e r 1792. Only i f the King and landed a r i s t o c r a c y maintained s u f f i c e n t \" i n f l u e n c e \" t o c o n t r o l the Commons and i n general e x e r c i s e d predominant p o l i t i c a l power, could England be saved from Jacobinism. Moreover the o l d n o t i o n that o p p o s i t i o n t o government by organized f a c t i o n s i m p l i e d d i s l o y a l t y had been r e v i v e d and was ex-p l o i t e d w i t h e f f e c t by Pitt\u00C2\u00BBs supporters to suggest that the F o x i t e Whigs were c o l l a b o r a t i n g w i t h the enemy.^ S i m i -l a r a u t h o r i t a r i a n a t t i t u d e s p r e v a i l e d among the E n g l i s h i n Lower Canada. The E n g l i s h assemblymen w i t h v i r t u a l un-a n i m i t y supported a l l l e g i s l a t i v e measures proposed by the Governor or Executive C o u n c i l l o r s and w i l l i n g l y conferred powers on the Executive at the expense of the j u d i c i a r y , 9 ?Ke nt t o Dalrymple, 1 Dec. 1792, n. 2 above. <* See e.g. Brown, The French Revolution, ch. IV, passim; A r c h i b a l d S. Foord, His Majesty's Opposition. 1714- 1330 (Oxford, 1964), 415-20. 9 See e.g. p. 65-66 above. CHAPTER VII A UNIVERSAL MORAL LAW So far I have considered Diderot mainly as a c r i t i c a l thinker i n ethics. I have shown, however, that his c r i t i c a l attitude towards many orthodox values does not lead him to moral nih i l i s m , and that his condemnation of much that characterizes the European society of his day (or our own, for that matter) does not imply that he questions the d e s i r a b i l i t y of s o c i a l bonds which favour the development of what i s valuable i n human nature. In this chapter I wish to study i n some d e t a i l his attempt to establish a doctrine of universal e t h i c a l values. Such an ethic i s s o c i a l i n that i t concerns the individual's relations with his fellows, but i t i s not, as Diderot conceives i t , at variance with the moral obligations of man as they would be i n a state where there were not yet any positive laws or reciprocal conventions. In Diderot, s o c i a l morality and natural morality are, i d e a l l y , the same. Diderot has no sympathy with that extreme scepticism which denies even the ultimate d i s t i n c t i o n between the notions of good and e v i l . Deductive reason, he claims i n the a r t i c l e \"Pyrrhonienne\", must be used with sobriety; for a point i s reached at which reason casts the maximum possible l i g h t on a question and beyond which further subtleties merely cloud the issue: Lorsque, de consequences en consequences, j'aurai conduit un homme a. quelque proposition evidente, je cesserai de disputer, je n'ecouterai plus c e l u i qui niera 1 'existence des corps, les regies de l a logique, l e temoignage des sens, l a d i s t i n c t i o n 219 du v r a i et du faux, du bien et du rnal, du p l a i s i r et de l a peine, du vice et de l a vertu, du decent et de 1'indecent, du juste et de 1'injuste, de l'honnete et du deshonnete. x Diderot i s far from wishing to replace the old certainties by a mere void. In fact, his objection to t r a d i t i o n a l morality, both r e l i g i o u s and secular, i s not that - i t lays down r i g i d universal p r i n c i p l e s , but, on the contrary, that i t i s inconsistent and lacks any firm basis. One of Diderot's main aspirations as a moralist i s to establish immutable and universal e t h i c a l principles. For Diderot the formulation of a doctrine of universal moral values was not simply an i n t e l l e c t u a l ambition but a deeply f e l t emotional need. It may perhaps seem strange that this should be so, since the theme of incessant and ineluctable change i n nature and i n man i s so prominent i n his writings, and inconstancy i s at times regarded by him as one of those natural prerogatives of the 2 indi v i d u a l which i t i s an act of oppression to negate. 1 AT, XVI, 491-92. 2 Of. Supplement au Voyage de Bougainville, AT, II, 224: \"Rien, en e f f e t , te p a r a i t - i l plus insense qu'un precepte qui proscrit l e changement qui est en nous; qui commande une Constance qui n'y peut etre, et qui v i o l e l a l i b e r t e du male et de l a femelle, en les enchainant pour jamais l'un a l'autre; qu'une f i d e l i t e qui borne l a plus capricieuse des jouissances a un meme individu . . .?\" 220 But, on the whole, his insistence on mutability i s accompanied by an acute f e e l i n g of regret. This i s perceptible i n a passage from Jacques l e f a t a l i s t e i n which the vows of f i d e l i t y of mortal lovers are contrasted with the signs of perpetual change v i s i b l e everywhere i n the universe of which they are part: Le premier serment que se f i r e n t deux etres de chair, ce fut au pied d'un rocher qui tombait en poussiere; i l s attesterent de leur Constance un c i e l qui n'est pas un instant l e meme; tout passait en eux et autour d'eux, et i l s croyaient leurs coeurs affranchis de vic i s s i t u d e s . 0 enfants! toujours enfants! \u00C2\u00B1 A l e t t e r to Falconet reveals even more e x p l i c i t l y the anguish with which awareness of mutability f i l l s Diderot. Does not Falconet, he asks, f e e l for his sculpture, for his beautiful Pygmalion, a father's attachment to his children? Est-ce que tu n'es pas pere? Est-ce que tes enfants ne sont pas de chair? Est-ce que, quand tu t'es epuise sur un morceau qui te s a t i s f a i t , apres l e souris d'approbation, ne te v i e n t - i l pas sur l a levre un soupir de regret que, passe l e present tribut precaire du jour, tout sera f i n i demain pour l'ouvrier et pour l'ouvrage? Et certes, regardant et voyant ces pieds, ces mains, ces tetes, ces membres s i d e l i c a t s , je me suis quelquefois eerie douloureusement: Pourquoi f a u t - i l que cela f i n i s s e ? Et c'etait du plus profond de mon coeur. . . . J' a i d i t de ton ouvrage ce que j ' a i quelquefois d i t de Voltaire meme, de l'homme, lorsque son poeme m'enchantait, et que je pensais a. l a caducite qui l e touche . . .: Pourquoi f a u t - i l que cela meure? 2 It i s this same anguish, and not any serious hypothesis reconciling materialism with the p o s s i b i l i t y of immortality, which Diderot expresses i n the following l i n e s : \u00E2\u0080\u00A2\"\u00E2\u0080\u00A2AT, VI, 117. 2 Roth, VI, 38-39 (Jan. 27, 1766). 221 0 ma Sophie, i l me r e s t e r a i t done un espoir de vous toucher, de vous sentir, de vous aimer, de vous chercher, de m'unir, de me confondre avec vous, quand nous ne serons plus! S ' i l y avait dans nos principes une l o i d ' a f f i n i t e , s ' i l nous e t a i t reserve de composer un etre commun, s i je devais dans l a suite des sie c l e s r e f a i r e un tout avec vous, s i les molecules de votre amant dissous venaient a s'agiter, a se mouvoir et a. rechercher les votres eparses dans l a naturel Laissez-moi cette chimere; e l l e m'est douce; e l l e m'assurerait l ' e t e r n i t e en vous et avec vous. x This desire for permanence, Diderot suggests, may he an essential part of human nature: L*animal n'existe que dans l e moment; i l ne voit r i e n au dela. L'homme v i t dans l e passe, l e present et l'avenir. Dans l e passe pour s' i n s t r u i r e ; dans l e present pour jouir; dans l'avenir pour se l e preparer glorieux a. lui-meme et aux siens. II est de sa nature d'etendre son existence par des vues, des projets, des attentes de toute espece. The human s p i r i t i s \"un esprit dont les elans sont toujours vers 3 l ' i n f i n i . \" Supposing an astronomer were to prove conclusively that i n a thousand years' time the earth w i l l be destroyed by a c o l l i s i o n with a comet, a l l c u l t u r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l ambition would languish, perhaps even power and glory would cease to motivate men; everyone would simply cultivate his garden and plant his cabbages: \"Sans nous en douter, nous marchons tous a l ' e t e r n i t e . \" 4 The chemist Venel, who ceases working on his 1 Roth, II, 284 (To Sophie Volland; Oct. 15 [?], 1759). 2 Roth, VI, 259-60 (To Falconet; Aug. 5, 1766). 5 Roth, V, 208 (To Falconet; Dec. 4, 1765). 4 Elements de physiologie, ed. Mayer, Appendice I, p. 327 (Fragment e n t i t l e d \"Influence de l a brievete du temps sur les travaux des hommes.\") 222 analysis of the medicinal waters of France as soon as the govern-ment ceases paying him, puzzles and disturbs Diderot. How can a man be so lacking i n idealism? How can a man l i v e so exclusively i n the present moment, unmindful of anything but i t s f l e e t i n g pleasures? II boit, i l mange, i l dort; i l est profond dans l a pratique de l a morale de Salomon, l a seule qui l u i paraisse sensee pour des etres destines a. n'etre un jour qu'une pincee de poussiere. There i s l i t t l e evidence from Diderot's writings of a physical horror of death or annihilation. What he feels seems rather to be a need to believe that human existence and endeavour are i n some way meaningful. Immortality or an a f t e r - l i f e , l i t e r a l l y understood, are not necessary; what i s required i s b e l i e f that, though the individual passes into nothingness, he contributes to a permanent achievement and upholds unchangeable values. It i s i n this l i g h t that we must see Diderot ';s insistence on posterity and the i n f a l l i b l e judgment which i t w i l l pass on us. We w i l l not be conscious of i t personally, but i n a l l other respects i t has the same significance as the \"next world\" has 2 for the r e l i g i o u s man. As a basis for morality, r e l i g i o n i s inadequate, since i t provides no consistent universal p r i n c i p l e s . While s t i l l i n his 1 Voyage a Bourbonne. AT, XVII, 342. 2 Roth, VI, 67 (To Falconet; Feb. 15, 1766). 223 early d e i s t i c stage, Diderot contrasts the v a r i a b i l i t y of parti c u l a r cults with the un i v e r s a l i t y of natural morality. 1 Many years l a t e r we find him condemning the incoherence of the 2 moral principles contained i n the Bible and inveighing against the inconsistency of the morality championed by the p r i e s t : Sa justice ou c e l l e de Dieu, ou des l i v r e s inspires, est c e l l e des circonstances. II n'y a point de vertus q u ' i l ne puisse f l e t r i r , et point de f o r f a i t s q u ' i l ne puisse s a n c t i f i e r ; i l a des autorites pour et contre. True morality cannot change i n this way; i t i s permanent, not arbitrary. What i s claimed to be the w i l l of God can provide no basis for i t , since man must use his own reason to decide whether the demands made on him i n God's name are just or not. Ch r i s t i a n i t y , then, has been put to the test and found wanting. It does not provide that sure foundation for the principles governing the conduct of l i f e for which Diderot f e l t such a passionate need. He marks this rejection, while at the same time affirming that i t i s a positive and constructive step, by postulating the existence of a secular T r i n i t y i n place of the rel i g i o u s one. To Voltaire he writes: Ce qui me p l a i t des freres, c'est de les v o i r presque tous moins unis encore par l a haine et l e mepris de c e l l e que vous avez appelee 1'infame que par 1'amour de l a vertu, par l e sentiment de l a bienfaisance et par l e gout du v r a i , du bon et du beau, espece de . t r i n i t e qui vaut un peu mieux que l a leur.? 1 De l a suffisance de l a r e l i g i o n naturelle, AT, I, 272-73. 2 Memoires pour Catherine II, ed. Verniere, pp. 112-13. 3 Plan d'une universite, AT, III, 511. 4 Roth, IV, 176-77 (Sept. 29, 1762). 224 T h i s t h e m e o f t h e s e c u l a r t r i n i t y , w h i c h a p p e a r s i n s e v e r a l s u b s e q u e n t w r i t i n g s , 1 i s n o t a m y s t i c a l i d e a , b u t a r h e t o r i c a l d e v i c e w h i c h c r y s t a l l i z e s i n a s t r i k i n g f o r m D i d e r o t ' s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t t h e r e e x i s t c e r t a i n u n i v e r s a l v a l u e s , u n a f f e c t e d b y c i r c u m -s t a n c e s a n d v i c i s s i t u d e s , b y t h e u n c e a s i n g f l u x o f t h i n g s . T h e f i r s t p e r s o n o f t h e n e w t r i n i t y , \" l e v r a i \" , r e q u i r e s , p e r h a p s , s o m e e l u c i d a t i o n . A l t h o u g h D i d e r o t e x p l a i n s n o w h e r e i n p r e c i s e t e r m s w h a t h e m e a n s b y i t , i t i s c l e a r , f r o m t h e v a r i o u s c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h h e u s e s i t , t h a t i t c o n c e r n s p r i m a r i l y g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n m a t t e r s o f c o n t i n g e n t f a c t . D i d e r o t i s n o t a v e r s e t o t h o s e w h i t e l i e s w h i c h a r e s o o f t e n n e c e s s a r y t o s p a r e o t h e r p e o p l e , o r o n e s e l f , p a i n o r e m b a r r a s s m e n t . ' I n P a g e s c o n t r e u n t y r a n , h e e n d o r s e s t h e e x c e p t i o n w h i c h d ' H o l b a c h m a k e s i n f a v o u r o f s u c h \" m e n s o n g e s o f f i c i e u x \" i n h i s E s s a i s u r l e s p r e . j u g e s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e g a r d i n g t h o s e t r u t h s w h i c h a f f e c t t h e h a p p i n e s s o f t h e h u m a n r a c e , h e s h a r e s d ' H o l b a c h 1 s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t . . . i l e s t d ' u n p h i l o s o p h e , d ' u n h o m m e d e b i e n , d ' u n a m i d e s e s s e m b l a b l e s , d e l e s a n n o n c e r s a n s m a n a g e m e n t ; . . . c ' e s t q u e l e m e n s o n g e n e p e u t a v o i r q u e d e s s u i t e s f a c h e u s e s e n c o r r o m p a n t l e j u g e m e n t e t l a c o n d u i t e ; c ' e s t q u e l e m e n s o n g e e s t a. 1 ' o r i g i n e d e t o u t e s n o s c a l a m i t e s ; c ' e s t q u e l e b i e n q u ' i l p r o d u i t e s t p a s s a g e r e t f a i b l e e t q u e l e s s u i t e s e n s o n t l o n g u e s e t t o u j o u r s f u n e s t e s ; 1 C f . , f o r e x a m p l e , M e m o i r e s p o u r C a t h e r i n e I I , e d . V e r n i e r e , p . 249: \" . . . i l e s t u n e t r i n i t e c o n t r e l a q u e l l e l e s p o r t e s d e l ' e n f e r n e p r e v a u d r o n t j a m a i s : l e v r a i q u i e n g e n d r e l e b o n , e t l e b e a u q u i p r o c e d e d e l ' u n e t d e 1 ' a u t r e . \" p C f . M o n s i e u r H a r d o u i n i n E s t - i l b o n , e s t - i l m e c h a n t ? 225 c ' e s t q u ' i l n'y a aucun exemple que l a v e r i t e a i t ete n u i s i b l e n i pour l e p r e s e n t n i pour l ' a v e n i r . The \" t r u t h \" which D i d e r o t i n c l u d e s i n h i s s e c u l a r t r i n i t y i s , t h e n , f i r s t and foremost the t r u t h about human n a t u r e and the human c o n d i t i o n . The f a l s e h o o d s t o which i t i s opposed are those p r e j u d i c e s r e g a r d i n g human n a t u r e and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s which a r e embodied i n the t r a d i t i o n a l s e x u a l e t h i c and the i d e a l of moral a u s t e r i t y , and i n the e s t a b l i s h e d system of p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t y . The t r u t h about man i s t h a t each i n d i v i d u a l has an eq u a l r i g h t w i t h h i s fellow-men t o h i s share i n the common happin e s s and t h a t he cannot o b t a i n h i s share w i t h o u t h e l p i n g h i s fellow-men t o o b t a i n t h e i r s . The p u r s u i t o f i n d i v i d u a l h a p p i n e s s , the e q u a l i t y of men, and the bond between b e n e f i c e n c e 2 and h a p p i n e s s , t h e s e a r e the b a s i c t e n e t s c o n s t i t u t i n g \" l e v r a i \" . We can perhaps b e s t i l l u s t r a t e D i d e r o t ' s c o n c e p t i o n of the second person o f the s e c u l a r t r i n i t y , \"the good\", by s t u d y i n g h i s r e f u t a t i o n o f the view t h a t m o r a l i t y i s e s s e n t i a l l y a m a t t e r o f p r e s e r v i n g p u b l i c o r d e r , t h a t t h e r e f o r e v i r t u e c o n s i s t s i n o b e y i n g whatever p o s i t i v e laws a r e i n f o r c e , and, f i n a l l y , t h a t w i t h o u t the f o r m u l a t i o n of p o s i t i v e laws t h e r e would not e x i s t any p r i n c i -p l e s o f m o r a l i t y . The T a h i t i a n Orou p o i n t s out t o B o u g a i n v i l l e ' s c h a p l a i n t h a t the a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n s of m a g i s t r a t e s and p r i e s t s cannot a l t e r t he j u s t or u n j u s t n a t u r e of a c t i o n s : Oeuvres p o l i t i q u e s , ed. V e r n i e r e , p. 139. Cf. the f o l l o w i n g remarks o f Moi i n l e Neveu de Rameau, AT, V, 394: \". . . j e c r o i s que s i l e mensonge peut s e r v i r un moment, i l e s t necessairement n u i s i b l e a l a longue, et qu'au c o n t r a i r e l a v e r i t e s e r t n e c e s s a i r e m e n t a. l a longue, b i e n q u ' i l p u i s s e a r r i v e r q u ' e l l e n u i s e dans l e moment.\" 2 See below, p. 239-226 . . . s o n t - i l s maitres du bien et du mal? Peuvent-ils f a i r e que ce qui est juste s o i t injuste, et que ce qui est injuste soit juste? depend-il d'eux d'attacher l e bien a des actions nuisi b l e s , et l e mal a des actions innocentes ou u t i l e s ? Tu ne saurais l e penser, car, a ce compte, i l n'y aurait n i v r a i n i faux, n i bon n i mauvais, n i beau n i l a i d ; du moins, que ce q u ' i l p l a i r a i t a. ton grand ouvrier, a tes magistrats, a tes pretres, de prononcer t e l ; et, d'un moment a. l'autre, tu serais oblige de changer d'idees et de conduite. Diderot i n s i s t s against Helvetius that there i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between justice and i n j u s t i c e which even savage men must have recognized before the existence of any general convention: Je serais assez porte a, croire que l e sauvage qui enleve au sauvage l a provision de f r u i t s q u ' i l a f a i t e , s'enfuit, et que par sa f u i t e i l s'accuse lui-meme d'injustice, tandis que l e spolie, par sa colere et sa poursuite, l u i f a i t l e meme reproche.^ Expressed i n this form, Diderot's view i s open to obvious objec-tions. One can easily imagine a variant of this scene i n which the aggressor stands his ground, confident that he has nothing to fear from a weaker savage, while the l a t t e r takes to his heels to avoid a f i g h t . The conclusion Diderot draws i s , however, less easy to refute: \"Les l o i s ne nous donnent pas l e s notions de 3 j u s t i c e ; i l me semble qu'elles l e s supposent.\"^ In the Entretien d'un pere avec ses enfants, Diderot raises the question whether, i n circumstances where one believes a greater effective good w i l l result from i n f r i n g i n g a positive law Supplement au \"Voyage de Bougainville, AT, II, 224-25. 2 Refutation d'Helvetius, AT, II, 355. 3 l o c . c i t . 227 than from obeying i t , one i s j u s t i f i e d i n breaking the law. Several cases are discussed, the c r u c i a l one being, I think, that which was faced by Diderot's father many years before. On the death of a r i c h priest, he receives from the priest's poor relations an authorization to undertake certain l e g a l formalities pending their a r r i v a l . While making an inventory of the priest's property, he discovers a w i l l naming as sole heir a r i c h Parisian bookseller. He wonders whether to destroy the w i l l . The book-s e l l e r does not need the money, whereas i t could a l l e v i a t e the desperate si t u a t i o n of the pri e s t s ' relations. Besides, a p i l e of unopened l e t t e r s from the bookseller and the age of the w i l l make i t highly probable that the priest had changed his mind and had simply forgotten to destroy the w i l l . It seems to Diderot's father that the only argument against doing so i s that i t would mean breaking a law. Hesitating, however, to trust his own judgment, he consults a highly respected casuist, Father Bouin, who pronounces that the positive law must take precedence over any assessment of probable good or i l l e ffects. Submitting, i t appears, more to the casuist'.s authority than to his arguments, Diderot's father refrains from destroying the w i l l . He witnesses the despair of the poor relations and i s dismayed at the callous-ness of the heir, who refuses to help them i n any way. In the conversation with his children, the old man admits that he s t i l l f e e l s troubled by the decision which he took. Yet how, he asks, could he reject the authority of Father Bouin? The young Diderot boldly declares that his father's decision was wrong, that he 228 should have been guided by natural equity instead of by the l e t t e r of the law. He admits that his own attitude i s one which i t would be dangerous to publicize, because the majority of people are not wise enough to make right decisions on the basis of natural equity and i t i s better that they should consider themselves s t r i c t l y bound by the l e t t e r of the law. But, he whispers to his father at the end of the dialogue, \"a l a rigueur i l n'y a point de l o i s pour l e sage Toutes etant sujettes a des exceptions, c'est a l u i q u ' i l appartient de juger des cas ou i l faut s'y soumettre ou s ' en af f r a n c h i r . 1 , 1 This does not mean that ultimately a l l moral decisions res u l t from the arbitrary v o l i t i o n of an ind i v i d u a l . The young-Diderot of the dialogue claims that when the wise man makes a moral decision, he i s obeying the universal human reason i n which he participates: Mon pere: Tu aurais prefere ta raison a l a raison publique; l a decision de l'homme a c e l l e de l'homme de l o i . Moi; Assurement. Est-ce que l'homme n'est pas anterieur a l'homme de l o i ? Est-ce que l a raison de.M'espece humaine n'est pas tout autrement sacree que l a raison d'un le g i s l a t e u r ? ^ This \"reason of the human species\" i s what, i n the a r t i c l e \"Droit naturel\", Diderot c a l l s the \"general w i l l \" . Natural law, he says, has i t s source i n the general w i l l of the human species: C'est a l a volonte generale que l ' i n d i v i d u doit s'adresser pour savoir jusqu'ou i l doit etre homme, 1 AT, V, 307-08. 2 AT, V, 301. 229 c i t o y e n , s u j e t , pere, e n f a n t , et quand i l l u i c o n v i e n t de v i v r e ou de m o u r i r . C'est a e l l e a f i x e r l e s l i m i t e s de tous l e s d e v o i r s . Vous avez l e d r o i t n a t u r e l l e p l u s s a c r e a. t o u t ce q u i ne vous e s t p o i n t c o n t e s t e par l ' e s p e c e e n t i e r e . . . . Tout ce que vous co n c e v r e z , t o u t ce que vous m e d i t e r e z s e r a bon, grand, e l e v e , s u b l i m e , s ' i l e s t de l ' i n t e r e t g e n e r a l et commun. The g e n e r a l w i l l may be c o n s u l t e d dans l e s p r i n c i p e s du d r o i t e c r i t de t o u t e s l e s n a t i o n s p o l i c e e s ; dans l e s a c t i o n s s o c i a l e s des peuples sauvages e t b a r b a r e s ; dans l e s c o n v e n t i o n s t a c i t e s des ennemis du genre humain e n t r e eux, et meme dans 1 ' i n d i g n a t i o n et l e r e s s e n t i m e n t , ces deux p a s s i o n s que l a n a t u r e semble a v o i r p l a c e e s jusque dans l e s animaux pour s u p p l i e r au d e f a u t des l o i s s o c i a l e s et de l a vengeance p u b l i q u e . However, r e a l i z i n g no doubt t h a t t h i s evidence i s o f t e n c o n t r a d i c -t o r y and t h a t i t can p r o v i d e r e l i a b l e guidance o n l y a f t e r i t has been s i f t e d and i n t e r p r e t e d , D i d e r o t goes on to s t a t e t h a t the g e n e r a l w i l l of the human s p e c i e s i s p r e s e n t i n each i n d i v i d u a l as \"un a c t e pur de 1'entendement q u i r a i s o n n e dans l e s i l e n c e des p a s s i o n s s u r ce que l'homme peut e x i g e r de son semblable, et s u r ce que son semblable e s t en d r o i t d ' e x i g e r de l u i . \" ' ' I do not propose t o d i s c u s s D i d e r o t ' s s p e c i f i c views on the t h i r d person of the s e c u l a r t r i n i t y , \" l e beau\", s i n c e h i s a e s t h e t i c AT, XIV, 299-300. 2 I b i d . , p. 300. 5 I b i d . , p. 300. 230 t h e o r y i s beyond the scope of my s u b j e c t . L e t us i n s t e a d examine i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l what he understands by the i m m u t a b i l i t y , or u n i v e r s a l i t y , of v a l u e s . F i r s t of a l l , u n i v e r s a l v a l u e s are those which do not change w i t h time and p l a c e . I n a l e t t e r t o the a c t r e s s - n o v e l i s t Mme R i c c o b o n i , D i d e r o t r e j e c t s the view t h a t t h e r e are d i f f e r e n t and e q u a l l y v a l i d s t a n d a r d s of e x c e l l e n c e f o r t h e a t r i c a l works i n d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s . W ith t h i s a f f i r m a t i o n o f the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f l i t e r a r y v a l u e s he c o u p l e s t h a t o f the u n i v e r s a l i t y of moral p r i n c i p l e s : Je ne c o n n a i s et ne s u i s d i s p o s e a, r e c e v o i r de l o i l a - d e s s u s que de l a v e r i t e . V o t r e d e s s e i n s e r a i t - i l de f a i r e de 1 ' a c t i o n t h e a t r a l e une chose t e c h n i q u e q u i s ' e c a r t a t t a n t o t p l u s , t a n t o t moins de l a n a t u r e , sans q u ' i l y eut aucun p o i n t f i x e , en d e l a et en deca duquel on put 1'accuser d ' e t r e f a i b l e , o u t r e e , ou f a u s s e ou v r a i e ? l i v r e z - v o u s a. des c o n v e n t i o n s n a t i o n a l e s , et ce q u i s e r a b i e n a. P a r i s s e r a mal a. Londres, et ce q u i s e r a b i e n a. P a r i s et a. Londres auj.ourd' h u i , y s e r a mal demain. Dans l e s moeurs et dans l e s a r t s , i l n'y a de b i e n e t de mal pour moi, que ce q u i l ' e s t en t o u t temps et p a r t o u t . Je veux que ma morale et mon gout s o i e n t e t e r n e l s . x I n the O b s e r v a t i o n s s u r l e Nakaz, he t a k e s h i s stand a g a i n s t the p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i v i s m t o which C a t h e r i n e I I , under the i n f l u e n c e 2 o f Montesquieu, s u b s c r i b e d : L a R u s s i e e s t une p u i s s a n c e europeenne. Peu i m p o r t e q u ' e l l e s o i t a s i a t i q u e ou europeenne. Le p o i n t 1 R o t h , I I , 95 (Nov. 27, 1758). 2 x Cf. V e r n i e r e ' s I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the O b s e r v a t i o n s , i n Oeuvres p o l i t i q u e s , p. 331, and Yves Benot's remarks i n Textes p o l i t i q u e s , P a r i s , I960, p. 33. 231 important, c'est qu'elle soit grande, f l o r i s s a n t e et durable. Les moeurs sont partout des consequences de l a l e g i s l a t i o n et du gouvernement; e l l e s rie sont n i africaines n i asiatiques n i europeennes, e l l e s sont bonnes ou mauvaises. On est esclave sous l e pole ou i l f a i t tres f r o i d . On est esclave a Constantinople ou i l f a i t tres chaud; i l faut que partout un peuple s o i t i n s t r u i t , l i b r e et vertueux. Ce que Pierre I e r apporta en Russie, s ' i l e t a i t bon en Europe, e t a i t bon partout. Sans nier 1'influence du climat sur les moeurs, l' e t a t actuel de l a Gfrece et de l ' l t a l i e , l ' e t a t futur de l a Russie montreront assez que l e s moeurs bonnes ou mauvaises ont d'autres causes. Ces Scythes s i jaloux de leur l i b e r t e , s ' i l s existaient encore, occuperaient auelques provinces ou russes ou voisines de l a Russie. Diderot's intransigence on t h i s point must be seen as a reaction against the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l conservatism for which he suspects that Montesquieu's r e l a t i v i s m i s being used as a pretext. He would l i k e to f e e l certain that, when Catherine II speaks of making l e g i s l a t i o n conform to the s p i r i t of the nation, this i s not just an excuse for taking no action to mitigate the absolutism of the Russian government, to diminish the excessive inequality between the classes or to grant the serfs their personal freedom: C'est a l a l e g i s l a t i o n a suiyre 1'esprit de l a nation. Je ne crois pas cela; c'est a. l a l e g i s l a t i o n a. f a i r e 1'esprit de l a nation. Je sais bien que Solon s u i v i t 1'esprit de sa nation; mais Solon n'etait pas despote, mais Solon n'avait pas a f f a i r e a, un peuple s e r f et barbare. Quand on peut tout et q u ' i l n'y a r i e n de f a i t , i l ne faut pas s'en tenir aux meilleures l o i s qu'un peuple peut recevoir: i l faut l u i donner les meilleures l o i s possibles. In Qeuvres politiques, ed. Verniere, pp. 349-50. Observations sur l e Nakaz, ed. c i t . , pp. 370-71. 232 D e s p i t e t h i s i n s i s t e n c e on the u n i v e r s a l i t y and i m m u t a b i l i t y o f n a t u r a l law, D i d e r o t r e c o g n i z e s the n e c e s s i t y f o r p o s i t i v e laws t o v a r y a c c o r d i n g t o l o c a l and te m p o r a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s and admits t h a t t o r e c o n c i l e t h i s v a r i a b i l i t y w i t h the i m m u t a b i l i t y of n a t u r a l law p r e s e n t s a t r i c k y problem: V o i c i p o u r t a n t une d i f f i c u l t e . l e s l o i s n a t u r e l l e s sont e t e r n e l l e s e t communes. l e s l o i s p o s i t i v e s ne sont que des c o r o l l a i r e s des l o i s n a t u r e l l e s . Done l e s l o i s p o s i t i v e s sont egalement e t e r n e l l e s et communes. Cependant, i l e s t c e r t a i n que t e l l e l o i p o s i t i v e e s t bonne e t u t i l e dans une c i r c o n s t a n c e , n u i s i b l e e t mauvaise dans t e l l e a u t r e ; i l e s t c e r t a i n q u ' i l n'y a p o i n t de code q u ' i l ne f a i l l e r e f o r m e r avec l e temps. C e t t e d i f f i c u l t e n ' e s t p e u t - e t r e pas i n s o l u b l e ; mais i l f a u t l a r e s o u d r e . l I n s p e a k i n g o f p o s i t i v e laws as \" c o r o l l a r i e s , \" r a t h e r than as \" a p p l i c a t i o n s , \" of n a t u r a l l a w s , D i d e r o t makes the problem appear more d i f f i c u l t t han i t need be. To judge from o t h e r passages i n the same work, he does i n f a c t t h i n k of p o s i t i v e laws as a p p l i c a -t i o n s o f unchanging n a t u r a l laws t o p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . We see t h i s i n the f o l l o w i n g passage: Au r e s t e , j e ne c r o i s pas que 1'evidence n i aucun a u t r e moyen p u i s s e r e n d r e l e s l o i s immuables; j e l e s c r o i s non pas t o u t e s , mais quelques-unes du moins, abandonnees aux v i c i s s i t u d e s des c i r c o n s t a n c e s . La p o s i t i o n a c t u e l l e d'un E t a t i n s p i r e une l o i t r e s sage; et c e t t e l o i dependante de l a c i r c o n s t a n c e s e r a i t t r e s n u i s i b l e s i l a p o s i t i o n v e n a i t a changer.2 The v a r i a t i o n s a r i s i n g from the a p p l i c a t i o n o f n a t u r a l law t o changing c i r c u m s t a n c e s can be seen most f r e q u e n t l y , says D i d e r o t , i n the case o f the c r i m i n a l law: 1 I b i d . , p. 353. Cf. a l s o i b i d . , p. 436 ( s e c t i o n CXX). 2 I b i d . , p. 359. 233 C'est s u r t o u t l a p o r t i o n c r i m i n e l l e du. code q u i , sans c e s s e r d ' e t r e une consequence de l a l o i n a t u r e l l e , s o u f f r e e t d o i t s o u f f r i r de f r e q u e n t e s c o r r e c t i o n s . Les c i r c o n s t a n c e s d o i v e n t souvent f a i r e v a r i e r l e s r a p p o r t s des d e l i t s aux p e i n e s , parce q u ' e l l e s f o n t v a r i e r l a n a t u r e des d e l i t s . 1 I t may perhaps seem t h a t D i d e r o t c o u l d e a s i l y have r e s o l v e d the whole problem by c o n s i d e r i n g n a t u r a l law as d e f i n i n g g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , w h i l e a d m i t t i n g t h a t these might be observed i n a v a r i e t y of ways a c c o r d i n g t o c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Indeed, t h i s i s the p o i n t of view which he adopts i n h i s R e f l e x i o n s s u r l e l i v r e de 1 ' E s p r i t , when he r e j e c t s H e l v e t i u s ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no a b s o l u t e j u s t i c e or i n j u s t i c e : Ce paradoxe e s t f a u x en lui-meme, et dangereux a e t a b l i r : f a u x parce q u ' i l e s t p o s s i b l e de t r o u v e r dans nos b e s o i n s n a t u r e l s , dans n o t r e v i e , dans n o t r e e x i s t e n c e , dans n o t r e o r g a n i s a t i o n et dans n o t r e s e n s i b i l i t e q u i nous exposent a l a d o u l e u r , une base e t e r n e l l e du j u s t e et de 1 ' i n j u s t e , dont 1 ' i n t e r e t \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 g e n e r a l et p a r t i c u l i e r f a i t e n s u i t e v a r i e r l a n o t i o n en cent manieres d i f f e r e n t e s . C 'est, a l a v e r l t e , 1 ' i n t e r e t g e n e r a l et p a r t i c u l i e r q u i metamorphose i 1 i d e e de j u s t e et d ' i n j u s t e ; mais son essence en e s t independante. I t seems, however, t h a t D i d e r o t was r e l u c t a n t t o concede t h a t n a t u r a l law c o u l d not be f o r m u l a t e d i n any more p r e c i s e way. Perhaps he f e l t t h a t i f i t c o u l d be g i v e n a more d e f i n i t e c o n t e n t the appeal t o i t a g a i n s t the i n j u s t i c e s of the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l system would have a g r e a t e r p e r s u a s i v e f o r c e . T h i s h y p o t h e s i s r e c e i v e s some support from the f o l l o w i n g passage, i n which he c l a i m s t h a t , whereas many laws must be temporary and 1 I b i d . , p. 376. 2 AT, I I , 270. 234 variable, those which safeguard c i v i l l i b e r t y and the security of property and ensure that taxation i s levied equitably are immutable: . . . i l n'y a point de code dont l a sagesse puisse etre eternelle . . . . I I faut rappeler l e s l o i s a l'examen, parce q u ' i l y a deux sortes de bonheur. Un bonheur constant qui tien t a l a l i b e r t e , a l a surete des proprietes, a l a nature de l'impot, a sa r e p a r t i t i o n , a sa perception, et qui distingue l e s l o i s eternelles. Un bonheur accidentel, variable et momentane, qui demande une l o i momentanee; un etat de choses qui passe. Ce bonheur, cet etat de choses passe; l a duree de l a l o i deviendrait funeste, i l faut l a revoquer. The second attribute of a universal e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e i s that i t does not vary with the i d e n t i t y of the moral agent. That a l l men's actions must be judged by the same e t h i c a l standard i s taken for granted throughout Diderot's writings. It i s i m p l i c i t , i n particular, i n his insistence that laws must 2 apply equally to a l l c i t i z e n s . It may, therefore appear contra-dictory for him to write, i n his memoir \"De l a morale des r o i s \" : \"Je doute que l a justice des r o i s , et par consequent leur morale, 3 puisse etre l a meme que c e l l e des p a r t i c u l i e r s . . . . \" However, Diderot does not mean that the essential principles of justice are d i f f e r e n t for a king, but that the lack of any superior agency to enforce them equally on a l l his fellow-sovereigns means that Memoires pour Catherine II, ed. Verniere, p. 2 3 6 . Both the \"eternal\" and the temporary laws to which Diderot refers here are, of course, equitable laws. He c l e a r l y did not think that the unjust laws regulating taxation i n eighteenth-century France were, or should be, permanent. 2 See above, pp. 1 1 9 - 2 0 . 3 Memoires pour Catherine II, ed. Verniere, p. 2 3 1 . 235 there i s a great pressure on him to take precautionary measures which c o n f l i c t with i d e a l j u s t i c e . I t i s certain that Diderot himself sees no contradiction i n his position, for, only a few pages l a t e r i n the same memoir, he affirms that God's notion of justice cannot r a t i o n a l l y be supposed to d i f f e r from ours: \"Mais qui vous a d i t que Dieu devait etre un souverain comme vous l'imaginez?\" Le sens commun; car s ' i l y a deux notions de souverainete et de bienfaisance, l'une pour l u i et 1'autre pour moi, i l y aura deux notions de vice et de vertu, deux notions de just i c e , deux morales, une morale celeste et une morale terrestre. Sa morale ne sera plus l a mienne, et j'ignorerai ce q u ' i l faut que je fasse pour conformer mes actions a ses principes et pour l u i p l a i r e . x The t h i r d requirement which must be f u l f i l l e d for moral principles to be universal i s that they must not vary according to the id e n t i t y of the recipient of the action. Again, this i s im p l i c i t i n the demand that the law must be applicable equally to a l l c i t i z e n s . But not only does the duty of justice and beneficence take no account of difference of class and wealth, i t also transcends national barriers. Recommending to Hume a Frenchman newly arrived i n London, Diderot invokes the bond of 2 f r a t e r n i t y which nature has established between a l l men, and i n a l a t e r l e t t e r addresses the S c o t t i s h philosopher i n the following terms: Ne verrons-nous jamais f i n i r ces aversions nationales qui resserrent dans un pet i t espace l'exercice de l a bienfaisance? Et qu'importe que cet homme soit ne en deca. ou au dela. d'un det r o i t : en e s t - i l moins un 1 Ibid., p. 233. Cf. also Roth, II, 192 (To Sophie Volland; Aug. 3, 1759). 2 Roth, VII, 220 (Nov. 24, 1767). 236 homme? N'as-tu pas les merries besoins? n'es-tu pas expose aux memes peines, avide du meme bonheur? Pais done pour l u i ce q u ' i l est en droit d'attendre de t o i sur une i n f i n i t e de rapports immuables, eternels et independants de toutes l e s conventions. Je trouve Polypheme plus excusable d'avoir mange les compagnons d'Ulysse, que l a plupart de ces petits Europeens, qui n'ont que cinq pieds et demi, et deux yeux, qui se ressemblent en tout, et qui ne s'en devorent pas moins. Mon cher David, vous etes de toutes l e s nations, et vous ne demanderez jamais au malheureux son extrait baptistaire. Je me f l a t t e d'etre, comme vous, citoyen de l a grande v i l l e du monde.x A r i s t o t l e , Diderot remarks, places brigandage i n the category of hunting, a scandalous view: Je suis tente de rayer du nombre des sages un leg i s l a t e u r assez etranger au sentiment d'humanite, pour defendre l e vol et 1'injustice a. t r o i s ou quatre milles a l a ronde, et l e permettre au dela.2 So far our discussion i n this chapter has been concerned primarily with i l l u s t r a t i n g Diderot's b e l i e f i n universal e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . We have s t i l l to see what kind of conduct these principles prescribe for the individual, what, i n other words, constitutes right action. Diderot gives a double answer to thi s question. The Tightness of an action consists i n i t s conformity, on the one hand, with / 1 Roth, VIII, 15-16 (Feb. 22, 1768). 2 Refutation d'Helvetius. AT, II, 396-97. 237 the interest of the individual, and, on the other hand, with the general good. The Tahitian Orou puts the case as follows: Veux-tu savoir, en tous temps et en tous lieux, ce qui est bon et mauvais? Attache-toi a l a nature des choses et des actions; a. tes rapports avec ton semblable; a. 1'influence de ta conduite sur ton u t i l i t e p a r t i c u l i e r e et l e bien general.1 It may be objected that to base morality, at one and the same time, on individual interest and the general good i s unsatis-factory, since i t f a i l s to resolve one of the major problems of ethics, the frequent c o n f l i c t between individual advantage and the common weal. This objection can best be answered by analysing a formula i n which Diderot c l a r i f i e s the relationship between individual happiness and the general welfare: \"II n'y a qu'une seule vertu, l a justice; un seul devoir, de se rendre heureux. ,,2 \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 The f i r s t part of t h i s double formula defines right action, while the second defines obligation to perform right action. To define virtue as justice has two implications, which may be termed negative and positive. Negatively such a d e f i n i t i o n implies the exclusion of various kinds of conduct which have sometimes been considered to be admirable, e.g. asceticism and s e l f -maceration, scrupulous performance of r e l i g i o u s r i t e s , a magnificent manner of l i v i n g , aggressiveness, the point of honour, and unquestioning l o y a l t y to a group. The positive meaning of 1 Supplement au Voyage de Bougainville, AT, II, 225. 2 Memoires pour Catherine II, ed. Verniere, p. 231. A similar formula appears at the end of the Elements de physiologie, ed. Mayer, p. 308. 238 j u s t i c e , f o r D i d e r o t , i s w e l l - o r d e r e d b e n e f i c e n c e . I t o f t e n happens t h a t b e n e f i c e n c e i s so i l l - j u d g e d as t o produce, a l l t o l d , more e v i l t han good. T h i s can happen, f o r i n s t a n c e , when a m a g i s t r a t e ' s clemency towards a c r i m i n a l endangers the l i v e s o f c o u n t l e s s p e o p l e . 1 The second p a r t o f D i d e r o t ' s d e f i n i t i o n of m o r a l i t y i s n e c e s s a r y because h i s d e t e r m i n i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f human psychology does not p e r m i t him t o c o n c e i v e o f moral o b l i g a t i o n , or duty, as b e l o n g i n g t o a d i f f e r e n t c a t e g o r y from d e s i r e : Nous sommes t o u t a u s s i p a s s i f s dans l e d e s i r e t l e . d e v o i r . Dans l e d e s i r , c a r i l a un o b j e t q u i se p r e s e n t e a. moi a u s s i i n v o l o n t a i r e m e n t qu'un o b j e t physique a mes sens, et dont ou l a presence ou l e r e s s o u v e n i r me meut t o u t a u s s i i n v o l o n t a i r e m e n t . Et a i n s i du d e v o i r , ou du bonheur q u i m'est pr o p r e e t que j e c o n s i d e r e sous un c e r t a i n p o i n t de vue q u i m ' i n v i t e ou m'eioigne d'une a c t i o n . L ' i d e e de mon bonheur, et t o u t ce q u i s ' e n s u i t ou v i e n t au moment ou j e m'y a t t e n d s l e moins, ou \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 ne v i e n t pas, ou p r o d u i t un e f f e t ou n'en p r o d u i t p o i n t . . 2 Thus D i d e r o t i s bound t o c o n s i d e r the i n d i v i d u a l ' s d e s i r e f o r h a p p i n e s s as the o n l y b a s i s of h i s moral o b l i g a t i o n s ; f o r duty can have no o t h e r meaning. I t i s i n t h i s sense t h a t he a f f i r m s : \"Je veux e t r e heureux, e s t l e premier a r t i c l e d'un code a n t e r i e u r a. t o u t e l e g i s l a t i o n , a t o u t systeme r e l i g i e u x ; \" and: \" I I n'y a qu'un d e v o i r , c ' e s t d ' e t r e heureux. Puisque ma pente n a t u r e l l e , Commentaire s u r Hemsterhuis, p. 333. Commentaire su r Hemsterhuis, p. 311. O b s e r v a t i o n s sur l e Nakaz, ed. c i t . , p. 371. 239 i n v i n c i b l e , inalienable, est d'etre heureux, c'est l a source et l a source unique de mes vrais devoirs, et l a seule base de toute bonne legislation.\"\"*\" These statements i n no way imply amoral individualism. Underlying them i s the assumption of a natural harmony between the true happiness of each individual and general happiness. When Diderot defines ethics as \" l a science qui f a i t decouler de l'idee du v r a i bonheur, et des rapports actuels de l'homme avec ses semblables, ses devoirs et toutes les l o i s 2 justes,\" everything turns on the meaning of the word v r a i . It implies that individuals are often motivated by a fals e idea of thei r own happiness, which prompts them to perform apparent, instead of true, duties. In Diderot's system, then, duty i s enlightened desire; i t i s what one would inevitably do i f one understood perfectly one's true interests. The big problem which remains for Diderot i s to show that th i s harmony between the true happiness of the individual and conduct conducive to general happiness does i n fact obtain, even when positive laws are unjust or where the \"force legitime\" i s not efficacious i n enforcing them consistently on a l l . In order to refute Helvetius's claim that \"un homme communement bien organise est capable de tout\", Diderot cites himself as an example of a man who, possessing i n abundance the qu a l i t i e s necessary for successful e t h i c a l thought and motivated \"\"\" Memoires pour Catherine II, ed. Verniere, p. 235. 2 Plan d'une universite, AT, III, 490-91. 240 by a strong desire for achievement i n that f i e l d , has nevertheless found several e t h i c a l problems completely beyond his power to solve. The f i r s t instance he quotes i s precisely the problem to which I have just alluded: . . . je suis convaincu que dans une societe meme aussi mal ordonne que l a notre, ou l e vice qui reussit est souvent applaudi, et l a vertu qui echoue presque toujours r i d i c u l e , je suis convaincu, d i s - j e , qu'a tout prendre, on n'a ri e n de mieux a f a i r e pour son bonheur que d'etre un homme de bien.l He would dearly l i k e to be able to write a convincing defence of this l a s t proposition: C'est une question que j ' a i meditee cent f o i s et avec toute l a contention d'esprit dont je suis capable; j'avais, je crois, l e s donnees necessaires; vous 1'avouerai-je? je n'ai pas meme ose prendre l a plume pour en ecrire l a premiere ligne. Je me d i s a i s : S i je ne sors pas victorieux de cette tentative, je deviens l'apologiste de l a mechancete: j'aurai t r a h i l a cause de l a vertu, j'aurai encourage l'homme au v i c e . 2 Diderot i s quite accurate i n stating that he never penned a complete and thorough demonstration of the connection which he postulates between happiness and virtue. However, from the numerous passages i n which he approaches one aspect or another of the question, we can form a composite picture of what might have been his attempt at such a demonstration. This i s what I propose to do i n the following pages. Diderot found the society i n which he l i v e d a depressing x Refutation d'Helvetius, AT, II, 345. 2 Loc. c i t . Cf. Roth, II, 106-09; X, 60; AT, II, 345, 510; V, 215, 427; VI, 439; XII, 316. 241 spectacle of moral corruption i n which the good man often f a i l e d to receive his just deserts, while unscrupulous men were frequently-rewarded. Nor did he find any consolation i n his reading of history: . . . l'on v o i t a chaque ligne l e crime heureux a, cote de l a vertu opprimee, l a mediocrite recompensed a-cote du talent persecute, 1'ignorance sous l a pourpre, l e genie sous des hai l l o n s , l e mensonge honore, l a verite dans les f e r s . ! In another l e t t e r , he remarks b i t t e r l y : J ' a i d i t quelque part que l'homme de bien ressemblait aux parfums dont on n'obtenait une odeur deiicieuse qu'en les broyaht. Cela est v r a i . Mais cela n'est-i l pas bien consolant pour l e parfum broye? Son sort est done de recreer l'odorafc du mechant. Rameau's nephew thinks that the undeniable misfortune of many good men and the success of many wicked ones i s a peremptory argument against virtue: L u i : . . . Mais, a. votre compte, i l faudrait done etre d'honnetes gens? Moi: Pour etre heureux, assurement. Lu i : Cependant je vois une i n f i n i t e d'honnetes gens qui ne sont pas heureux et une i n f i n i t e de gens qui sont heureux sans etre honnetes. 3 Moi: II vous semble. \"II vous semble.\" Diderot's way of answering the objection i s precisely to show that the evidence from history and the contem-porary scene regarding the r e l a t i o n between virtue and happiness i s i l l u s o r y . The virtuous men who seem to be unhappy are not 1 Roth, VI, 94 (To Falconet; Feb. 15, 1766). 2 Roth, IX, 179 (To Mme de Maux [?]; probably Autumn 1769). 5 Le Neveu de Rameau, AT, V, 426-27. 242 r e a l l y unhappy, and the wicked men who seem to be happy are r e a l l y -unhappy. Let us consider the various ways i n which Diderot accounts for this discrepancy between appearances and r e a l i t y . To begin with, one has to take into account not just one moment i n the l i f e of a man, but the over-all picture. I f one allows s u f f i c i e n t time to pass, the anomalies due to chance are r e c t i f i e d : C'est, mon ami, que l a mechancete n'a que son moment. C'est q u ' i l faut tot ou tard que l a peine boiteuse atteigne l e coupable qui f u i t devant e l l e . . . . Laisse f a i r e les mechants; f a i s l e bien; attends, et sois heureux.l 2 Admittedly, crime may procure a momentary pleasure. In i t s immediate consequences i t s advantages often outweigh i t s draw-backs. I f this were not so, no one would commit any crimes. But i n the long run vice destroys happiness. Even when a crime goes completely undetected and enta i l s , at least overtly, no unpleasant consequences for the doer, i t nevertheless begins or confirms the habit of criminal conduct and so increases the chances of eventual punishment: . . . apres une mauvaise action, on est bien plus v o i s i n d'une seconde; apres deux mauvaises actions, bien plus v o i s i n encore d'une troisieme. On en f a i t done -trois, on en f a i t done mille, et l'on tombe dans l e chatiment et l e mepris que 1'on merite.3 1 Roth, VIII, 108 (To Falconet; Sept. 6, 1768). 2 Cf. Roth, VI, 13 (To Falconet; Jan. 10, 1766). 5 Roth, IV, 146 (To Sophie Volland; Sept. 9 , 1762). 243 Ih.i another l e t t e r to Sophie, to account for the fact that some wise men meet with constant f a i l u r e and some f o o l i s h men constant success, Diderot invokes the laws of probability. In a conversa-ti o n i n which he had taken part the following question had arisen: Comment i l a r r i v a i t que des sots reussissaient toujours, et que des gens de sens echouaient en tout, en sorte qu'on d i r a i t que l e s uns semblaient de toute eternite avoir ete predestines au bonheur, et l e s autres a l'infortune. Je repondis que l a vie e t a i t un jeu de hasard; que les sots ne jouaient pas assez longtemps pour r e c u e i l l i r l e s a l a i r e de leur sottise, n i les gens senses, c e l u i de leur circonspection. I l s quittent l e s des lorsque l a chance a l l a i t tourner; en sorte que, selon moi, un sot fortune et un homme d'esprit malheureux sont deux etres qui n'ont pas assez vecu.-'-Since, i n Diderot's opinion, a wicked man i s a man not wise enough to see where his best interests l i e , one may, I think, apply the idea of this passage to the inevitable, though sometimes tardy, r e t r i b u t i o n which awaits a l l wicked men. Admitting, then, that the vagaries of chance are often responsible for a certain delay i n the a r r i v a l of the natural punishments which b e f a l l the vicious man and of the benefits which naturally accrue to the virtuous man, we must now ask what exactly i s the nature of these rewards and punishments i n Diderot's view. The apparent p l a u s i b i l i t y of the objection raised hy Rameau's nephew i s due to a common misconception of happiness. He equates i t with worldly success, that i s to say, with money, power and the pleasures which these can procure, and hopes that his son 1 Roth, III, 98-99 (To Sophie Volland; Sept. 30, 1760). Cf. AT, IV, 91; AT, IX, 206. 244 w i l l be \"heureux, ou, ce qui revient au meme, honore, riche et puissant.\" X The philosopher denies the Nephew's premise, claiming to be one of those \"strange people\" (\"gens bizarres\") who do 2 not regard wealth as the most precious thing i n the world. In the Refutation d'Helvetius, Diderot makes a similar i r o n i c a l use of the word b i z a r r e r i e . Helvetius asks: \"Pourquoi s i peu d'hommes honnetes?\" and r e p l i e s : \"C'est que l'infortune poursuit \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 presque partout l a probite.\" Helvetius's point i s that this s i t u a t i o n should be remedied by appropriate changes i n l e g i s l a t i o n . Diderot, for his part, i s not content to say that enlightened s e l f - i n t e r e s t would motivate men to virtue given a suitable form of l e g i s l a t i o n ; he wishes to prove i n addition that virtue i s the best path to happiness even i n the most corrupt and unjust society: II n'y a point de peuple s i generalement corrompu qu'on n'y puisse trouver quelques hommes vertueux; parmi ces hommes vertueux i l n'y en a peut-etre pas un seul qui ne fut parvenu aux honneurs et a l a richesse par l e s a c r i f i c e de l a vertu. Je voudrais bien savoir par quelle b i z a r r e r i e i l s s'y sont refuses, quel motif i l s ont eu de preferer une probite indigente et obscure au vice opulent et decore.-^ There are several passages which i l l u s t r a t e well Diderot's conviction that wealth i s very often not what men most desire. The Salon de 1769, for example, contains the following anecdote. The painter H a l l , commissioned to paint the portr a i t s of two young 1 te Neveu de Rameau, AT, V, 472. 2 Ibid., p. 478. 5 AT, II, 425. 245 p r i n c e s , b r i n g s with, him s e v e r a l m i n i a t u r e s . W h i l e he i s p a i n t i n g one of the p r i n c e s , the o t h e r l o o k s a t the m i n i a t u r e s and i s s t r u c k by the p o r t r a i t of a young peasant g i r l : \"La j o l i e p e r s o n n e l s ' e c r i a l e p r i n c e . \u00E2\u0080\u0094 I I e s t v r a i , d i t 1 ' a r t i s t e ; a u s s i a i - j e eu grand p l a i s i r a. l a p e i n d r e . \u00E2\u0080\u0094 E l l e vous a done donne b i e n de 1'argent? (N'etes-vous pas e m e r v e i l l e de c e t t e b e l l e r e f l e x i o n , mon ami?) \u00E2\u0080\u0094 Non, monseigneur, e l l e n ' e t a i t pas en e t a t de me payer; c ' e s t moi q u i l ' . a i payee d ' a v o i r b i e n v o u l u se p r e f e r a. l a f a n t a i s i e que j ' a v a i s de l a p e i n d r e . \u00E2\u0080\u0094 Ce p o r t r a i t vous f a i t done grand p l a i s i r ? \u00E2\u0080\u0094 Un p l a i s i r i n f i n i , monseigneur . . . \" A c e t t e reponse, savez-vous ce que f a i t monseigneur? I I prend l e p o r t r a i t et l e met en p i e c e s . L Presumably, H a l l ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o work f o r h i s p e r s o n a l s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h o u t monetary reward i s f e l t by the young p r i n c e to c o n t r a d i c t the s c a l e of v a l u e s on which h i s own l i f e i s founded. The boy r e f u s e s t o a c c e p t the i d e a t h a t , s i n c e a p a i n t e r can know a s o r t of h a p p i n e s s which a p r i n c e ' s w e a l t h c o u l d never buy, b e i n g a p r i n c e c o n f e r s no e s s e n t i a l s u p e r i o r i t y . He t h e r e f o r e seeks to d e s t r o y the source o f the p a i n t e r ' s h a p p i n e s s . I n a l e t t e r t o P r i n c e s s D a s h k o f f , D i d e r o t e x p r e s s e s an i d e a l o f happiness i n which w e a l t h and p u b l i c o f f i c e a r e u n i m p o r t a n t : Pour moi, i l y a t a n t de choses dont j e p u i s aisement me p a s s e r , q u ' i l ne m'en coute pas de m e p r i s e r l e s r i c h e s s e s . Un morceau de p a i n , n o i r ou b l a n c peu i m p o r t e , un pot d'eau c l a i r e , quelques l i v r e s , un ami, et de temps en temps l e s charmes d'un p e t i t e n t r e t i e n f e m i n i n ; v o i l a , avec une c o n s c i e n c e t r a n q u i l l e , t o u t ce q u ' i l me f a u t . Les honneurs q u i n'amenent pas avec eux des d e v o i r s sont de purs badinages c r e e s AT, X I , 451-52. 246 tout expres pour amuser de grands enfants. L'age n'est plus pour moi ou ces choses-la pouvaient me p l a i r e , quoique, a l a v e r i t e , en jetant un regard en a r r i e r e sur l e passe, je ne me rappelle pas l e moment ou e l l e s ont pu avoir pour moi beaucoup d ' a t t r a i t . The reason why wealth and honours do not necessarily bring happiness i s that they neither provide peace of mind nor compensate for the lack of i t ; for peace of mind i s , i n Diderot's view, the essential constituent of happiness. In his long l e t t e r to the Princess of Nassau-Saarbruck, written i n 1758, he says that i f he were entrusted with the education of the Princess's children he would teach them \"que l e bonheur peut etre aussi a c e l u i qui scie l e marbre et qui coupe l a pierre; que l a puissance ne donne pas l a paix de l'ame, et que l e t r a v a i l ne l'ote pas.\" In a l e t t e r to Sophie Volland, he contrasts the happy l i f e of the simple, honest farmer Jean-Jacques-Nicolas Bled with the wretched existence of the r i c h landowner Caesar-Alexandre-Victor de Soyecourt, a dishonoured man, who, amid his gilded panelling, 3 i s consumed by shame and boredom. What does Diderot consider necessary for the enjoyment of that inner contentment which i n his view constitutes happiness? It i s not simply the consciousness of one's virtue that produces 1 AT, XX, 43 (To Princess Dashkoff; Jan. 25, 1774). 2 Roth, II, 53 (May or June 1758). 5 Roth, IV, 198-99 (Oct. 17, 1762). Cf. Constance's contempt for the trappings of worldly success i n Le F i l s naturel, AT, VIl,'70. 247 th i s f e e l i n g . We s h a l l show l a t e r that this consciousness, though a sine qua non of contentment, i s not s u f f i c i e n t alone to procure the most complete happiness. Diderot refuses to go as far as the Stoics i n i d e n t i f y i n g virtue and happiness: L'homme heureux du st o l c i e n est c e l u i qui ne connait d'autre bien que l a vertu, d'autre mal que l e vice; qui n'est n i abattu n i e n o r g u e i l l i par les evenements; qui dedaigne tout ce q u ' i l n'est n i l e maitre de se procurer, n i l e maitre de garder, et pour qui l e mepris des voluptes est l a volupte meme. Voila. peut-etre l'homme par f a i t ; mais l'homme par f a i t e s t - i l l'homme de l a nature? 1 Diderot prefers the doctrine of Epicurus, who considers that pleasures, both physical and psychological, can increase our happiness, provided we are not enslaved by them. Physical pain i s an e v i l and physical pleasures, i n moderation, contribute to a man's contentment. But more important s t i l l are the non-physical pleasures, those one may find i n aesthetic appreciation, i n companionship, friendship and love, and i n the practice of beneficence. Rameau's nephew goes too far when he says that a l l i s vanity except for physical pleasures, good wine, 2 delicious food, beautiful women and soft beds. The philosopher's position i s more nuanced: Je ne meprise pas les p l a i s i r s des sens, j ' a i un palais aussi, et i l est f l a t t e d'un mets de l i c a t ou d'un vi n delicieux; j ' a i un coeur et des yeux, et j'aime a voi r une j o l i e femme, j'aime a. sentir sous ma main l a fermete et l a rondeur de sa gorge, Essai sur les regnes de Claude et de Weron, AT, III, 315. Le Neveu de Rameau. AT, V., 423. 248 a presser ses levres des miennes, a. puiser l a volupte dans ses'regards, et a. en expirer entre ses bras; quelquefois avec mes amis une partie de debauche, meme un peu tumultueuse, ne me deplait. pas; mais, je ne vous l e dissimulerai pas, i l m'est infiniment plus doux encore d'avoir secouru l e malheureux, d'avoir termine une a f f a i r e epineuse, donne un conseil salutaire, f a i t une lecture agreable, une promenade avec un homme ou une femme chere a. mon coeur, passe quelques heures instructives avec mes enfants, e c r i t une bonne page, rempli les devoirs de mon etat, d i t a c e l l e que j'aime quelques choses tendres et douces qui amenent ses bras autour de mon cou. Among the psychological pleasures which the philosopher exalts, the most important i s the joy of beneficence. He continues, i n the passage just quoted, by affirming that he would rather be the r e h a b i l i t a t o r of the memory of Galas then the author of Mahomet. Referring to the education which he i s giving his daughter, Diderot writes to Sophie Volland: Et puis nos promenades, l a petite bonne et moi, vont toujours leur t r a i n . Je me proposal dans l a derniere de l u i f a i r e concevoir q u ' i l n'y avait aucune vertu qui n'eut deux recompenses: l e p l a i s i r de bien f a i r e , et c e l u i d'obtenir l a bienveillance des autres. . . .2 Another of his correspondents receives the following exhortation: Vous etes jeune, vous avez l'ame honnete et sensible; accoutumez-vous de bonne heure au p l a i s i r de f a i r e l e bien, aux ind i f f e r e n t s , aux amis, au pauvre, au riche, a. l'homme heureux, a. l'homme malheureux, aux ennemis, aux bons, et meme aux mechants. Quand vous aurez goute de cette s a t i s f a c t i o n , vous ne pourrez plus vous en passer.5 1 Ibid., pp. 425-26. 2 Roth, IX, 127 (To Sophie Volland; Aug. 31, 1769). 5 Roth, XI, 221 (To the abbe de Langeac; ca. end of 1771). The phrase \"aux ennemis\" seems to be misplaced; l o g i c would require i t to be placed i n the v i c i n i t y of \"aux amis\". 249 Diderot himself declares that he i s \"possede du demon de l a bienfaisance\".\"'\" He i s drawing on his own experience when he asks the Marechale: \"We pensez-vous pas qu'on peut etre s i heureusement p ne, qu'on trouve un grand p l a i s i r a f a i r e l e bien?\" For Diderot, then, psychological pleasures are more important than physical ones. Indeed, as regards the physical side of man's nature, he i s more concerned with the avoidance of pain t h a n with the enjoyment of pleasures. Thus he c a l l s good health 3 the corner-stone of happiness. But peace of mind i s , i n his opinion, even more essential: Apres l a connaissance de l a verite et 1'amour de l a vertu, l e s deux plus grands biens de l'homme sont l a paix et l a sante; mais l a paix avant l a sante. On ne jouit pas de l a sante sans l a paix, et l'on voit quelquefois c e l u i qui a l a paix, sourire dans l a douleur. T r a n q u i l l i t y of conscience i s more important than either-physical or psychological pleasures, because these may be poisoned by remorse i f they are contrary to virtue, whereas the man who retains a good conscience, though suffering physically and mentally, can s t i l l at least prefer his l o t to that of a man l i v i n g amid luxury and pleasure, but tormented by g u i l t and self-contempt: \"II reste . . . dans ces coeurs-la. une particule sensible que l e 1 Roth, XII, 92 (To Francois Tronchin; July 17, 1772). 2 Bntretien d'un philosophe avec l a marechale de . . ., AT, II, 510. 3 Essai sur l a peinture, AT, X, 485. 4 Roth, II, 57. (To the Princess de Nassau-Saarbrilck; May or June, 1758). 250 ver ronge sans cesse et ne detruit jamais.\"\"1\" Remorse i s the greatest 2 of a l l sufferings. In l e F i l s naturel, Dorval, i n order to persuade Rosalie that they must give up their love, stresses the unhappiness which remorse and shame would bring them: Songez, mademoiselle, qu'une seule idee facheuse qui nous su i t , s u f f i t pour aneantir l e bonheur; et que l a conscience d'une mauvaise action e s t - l a plus facheuse de toutes l e s idees. Quand nous avons commis l e mal, i l ne nous quitte plus; i l s ' e t a b l i t au fond de notre ame avec l a honte et l e remords; nous l e portons en nous, et i l nous tourmente.5 Diderot's theory of the inevitable remorse of the wicked man helps him refute the objection that wickedness i s often crowned with success: Dans les societes corrompues, l e s avantages du vice sont evidents; son chatiment est au fond du coeur, on ne l'apercoit point. C'est presque l e contraire de l a vertu.4 The peace of the soul which constitutes the essence of happiness can be known only by the virtuous man: \"La serenite n'habite que dans l'ame de l'homme de bien; i l f a i t nuit dans l'ame du 5 mechant.\" If wicked men merely despised virtue, i t would be hard to account for the phenomenon of remorse, but, according to Diderot, \"\"\"Roth, IV, 211 (Oct. 31, 1762). 2 Roth, IX, 179 (To Mme de Maux [?]; probably Autumn 1769). 3 AT, VII, 78. 4 Essai sur l e s regnes de Claude et de Heron, AT, III, 252. 5 Pensees detachees sur l a peinture, AT, XII, 86. 251 they always respect and admire virtue i n the depth of their hearts Lorsque je vois un scelerat capable d'une action heroftque, je demeure convaincu que les hommes de bien sont plus reellement hommes de bien, que les mechants ne sont vraiment mechants; que l a bonte nous est plus indivisiblement attachee que l a rnechancete; et, qu'en general, i l reste plus de bonte dans l'ame d'un mechant, que de rnechancete dans l'ame des bons. He i s convinced that \" i l n'y a point de mechant qui n'ait souvent desire d'etre bon, et que l e bon ne desira jamais d'etre mechant.\" In the same work he writes: \"On peut haEr un homme vertueux dont l a presence nous en impose; mais je ne crois pas que l e plus mechant des hommes puisse hair l a vertu et l a v e r i t e , non plus que trouver beau ce qui est hideux.\" Virtue, then, even when i t c o n f l i c t s with a man's material interest, at least exempts him from remorse and brings him peace of mind and self-respect. \"II n'y a de f e l i c i t e que pour l'homme dont l a conscience est en paix,\" writes Diderot to his brother; 4 and to General Betsky: \"je ne connais r i e n dans ce monde dont un homme qui a pour soi 1'attestation du censeur que l a nature a place au-dessous de l a mamelle gauche puisse se l a i s s e r affecter \ 5 jusqu'a un certain point.\" It i s the consciousness of his virtue Entretiens sur l e F i l s naturel. AT, VII, pp. 127-28. Cf. Roth, III, 281 (To Sophie Volland; Dec. 1, 1760). p Essai sur les regnes de Claude et de Neron, AT, III, 172. 5 Ibid., p. 358. 4 Roth, XII, 134 (Sept. 25, 1772). ^ AT, XX, 61 (June 9, 1774). Diderot i s speaking metaphorically when he refers to the heart i n this way. As we s h a l l see i n the next chapter (pp. 25^-55)> n e does not believe i n the doctrine of a special moral sense. The conscience i s , i n his view, not an innate faculty, but i s of experiential ori g i n . 252 we are told, which consoles Seneca when he has l o s t a l l the other precious things i n l i f e . 1 In a l e t t e r to Vernes, Diderot extols the virtuous man: Ah! monsieur, etendez cet homme sur de l a p a i l l e , au fond d'un cachot. Chargez-le de chaines. Accumulez sur ses memhres toute l a variete des tourments. Vous en arracherez peut-etre des gemissements; mais vous ne l'empecherez point d'etre ce q u ' i l aime l e mieux. Privez-le de tout. Faites-l e mourir au coin d'une rue, l e dos appuye contre une borne, et vous ne l'empecherez pas de mourir content. Diderot sums up his j u s t i f i c a t i o n of virtue by affirming that good men have no reason for envying the l o t of the wicked or for thinking that there i s any i n j u s t i c e i n the worldly success which often attends th e i r wickedness, for the wicked man i s s u f f i c i e n t l y punished by the very fact that he i s wicked. Hence this prayer of a Muslim philosopher: 0 mon Dieu, pardonne aux mechants, parce que tu n'as rie n f a i t pour eux, puisque tu les as l a i s s e s devenir mechants. Les bons n'ont r i e n de plus a te demander, parce qu'en les faisant bons, tu as tout f a i t pour eux. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2> Such i s Diderot's attempt to derive from a certain conception Bssai sur les regnes de Claude et de Heron, AT, III, 136. 2 Roth, II, 108 (Jan. 9, 1759). 5 Roth, IV, 172 (To Sophie Volland; Sept. 26, 1762). Cf. also Roth, III, 118 (To Sophie Volland; Oct. 7, 1760); Addition aux Pensees philosophiques, section x i i , ed. Verniere, p. 59; Salon de 1769, AT, XI, 45. 253 o f human n a t u r e p o s i t i v e p r i n c i p l e s o f d u t y w h i c h a p p l y t o a l l men. S i n c e he c o n s t a n t l y s t r e s s e s t h a t t h i s i s a t a s k i n w h i c h he i s n o t s u r e t h a t he h a s s u c c e e d e d , t h e q u e s t i o n a r i s e s w h e t h e r he i s f u l l y c o n v i n c e d o f t h e t r u t h o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s he i s t r y i n g t o p r o v e o r w h e t h e r he m e r e l y h a s a s t r o n g d e s i r e t o b e l i e v e them. I s h a l l d e v o t e my n e x t and f i n a l c h a p t e r t o s e e k i n g a n a n s w e r t o t h i s q u e s t i o n . CHAPTER VIII DIDEROT'S ETHICAL DILEMMA In the course of my analysis of Diderot's attempt to base a universal ethic on enlightened s e l f - i n t e r e s t , I have had occasion to note 1 certain misgivings on his part regarding his chances of success i n this venture. To complete the picture of his e t h i c a l thought, i t w i l l be necessary to examine the significance of these doubts. We have seen that, i n order to remain f a i t h f u l to his deterministic account of human psychology, Diderot defines moral obligation i n terms of the happiness of the agent, and, further, that an evaluation of the agent's true happiness must take into account the elusive factor of remorse, low, to claim that the man who acts against the general interest w i l l inevitably f e e l remorse implies the existence i n a l l men of a moral conscience. Our present enquiry must begin with a discussion of Diderot's doctrine concerning the o r i g i n and development of this moral conscience. It would perhaps have simplified his problem i f he had been w i l l i n g , along with several of the moralists with whose writings he was familiar, to consider that knowledge of moral principles was innate, or at least that i t was acquired by the exercise of 1 See above, pp. 239-1+0. 255 a s p e c i a l moral f a c u l t y which r e c e i v e d knowledge of the moral world i n much the same way as the f a c u l t y of v i s i o n r e c e i v e s knowledge of the v i s i b l e world. But Diderot c o n s i s t e n t l y r e j e c t s both these views. In the Supplement au Voyage de B o u g a i n v i l l e , A remarks that the law of nature i s a law which we b r i n g with us i n t o the world \"gravee au fond de nos coeurs.\" B c o r r e c t s him: Cela n'est pas exact. Nous n'apportons en n a i s s a n t qu.'.unesimilitude d' o r g a n i s a t i o n avec d'autres e t r e s , l e s memes besoins, de l ' a t t r a i t vers l e s memes p l a i s i r s , une a v e r s i o n commune pour l e s memes peines: v o i l a . ce qui c o n s t i t u e l'homme ce q u ' i l e s t, et d o i t fonder l a morale qui l u i c o n v i e n t . l In h i s commentary on Hemsterhuis, Diderot r e j e c t s the Dutch ph i l o s o p h e r ' s theory that there e x i s t s a s p e c i a l moral f a c u l t y the f u n c t i o n of which i s to make moral judgments. These are made, says D i d e r o t , by the same organ which makes a l l other judgments, i . e . the b r a i n : \"Ce n'est p o i n t un organe p a r t i c u l i e r ; ce n'est t o u j o u r s que l a r a i s o n , ou l a f a c u l t e i n t u i t i v e appliquee \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 a. un nouvel objet; i l est v r a i que c e t t e a p p l i c a t i o n donne de l ' e x e r c i c e au diaphragme, aux muscles, aux n e r f s , a. toute l a machine.\" 2 Another theory current i n the eighteenth-century i s that human beings have a n a t u r a l sympathy f o r others of t h e i r s p e c i e s . In Diderot there are a few r e f e r e n c e s to the exis t e n c e i n man of a p r i n c i p l e of benevolence, with which i s a s s o c i a t e d a complementary p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - l o v e . The c l e a r e s t t e x t i s the f o l l o w i n g : 1 AT, I I , 241. p Commentaire sur Hemsterhuis, p. 241. 256 II y a dans l a nature de 1'homme deux principes opposes: 1 1 amour-propre qui nous rappelle a, nous, et l a bienveillance qui nous repand. S i 1'un de ces deux ressorts venait a se briser, on serait ou mechant jusqu'a l a fureur, ou genereux jusqu'a l a f o l i e . It i s not quite clear, however, whether this benevolence i s innate or acquired through experience. If i t i s acquired, we have merely a variant of the experiential explanation of the moral conscience which we s h a l l discuss l a t e r . I f i t i s viewed as innate, i t i s s t i l l not i n i t s e l f a s u f f i c i e n t explanation of the development of the moral conscience, since the function of the l a t t e r would, on this theory, presumably consist i n establishing some proportion between the two principles of benevolence and self- l o v e , when they are i n c o n f l i c t . Nor, i n fact, does Diderot seem to base his theory of the or i g i n of the moral conscience on these two pri n c i p l e s . For Diderot, the moral conscience \u00E2\u0080\u0094 i n other words, an awareness of the obligation to respect the principles of justice \u00E2\u0080\u0094 i s the result of the individual's experience, from his e a r l i e s t infancy. This experience shows him that he needs the cooperation of other people, and that i n order to obtain i t he must behave toward others as he would have them behave toward himself. The individual soon realizes that other people are b a s i c a l l y similar to himself and have the same needs as he has. He realizes that they need him as much as he needs them. It i s this s i m i l a r i t y i n \"\"\" Roth, II, 52 (To the Princess de Nassau-Saarbruck; May or June 1758). 257 physical and psychological constitution between men \u00E2\u0080\u0094 Diderot c a l l s i t \"identite Cor \"similitude\"J d'organisation\" 1 \u00E2\u0080\u0094 which explains the un i v e r s a l i t y of the notions of justice, friendship, f i d e l i t y and the other virtues. The common weakness of men confronted by nature has necessitated their cooperation; hence society has arisen. For society i s , essentially, \"une l u t t e commune et concerted contre des dangers communs, et naissant du sein de l a nature meme qui menace l'homme de cent cotes d i f f e r e n t s \" . In other words, recognition of e t h i c a l principles i s r e a l l y only a refined form of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Remarking that Helvetius defines man as an animal who combines ideas, Diderot enquires: \"Quelles idees combine-t-il, s i ce n'est ce l l e s de son repos, de son bonheur, de sa securite, idees tres voisines de l a notion de 3 justice?\" One might object that ideas can be very close to each other without being i d e n t i c a l . Diderot would answer, presumably, that, i n his opinion, enlightened s e l f - i n t e r e s t i s i n fact i d e n t i c a l with the acceptance of the duty to be just, since, i n his doctrine, the only duty, i n the f i n a l analysis, i s to seek one's own happiness. This text continues with an argument designed to answer the objection that only weak men are motivated to justice by enlightened s e l f - i n t e r e s t : 1 Refutation d'Helvetius, AT, II, 356: \". . . l a morale est fondee sur 1'identite d'organisation, source des memes besoins, des memes peines, des memes p l a i s i r s , des memes aversions, des memes desirs, des memes passions.\" Cf. AT, VI, 444. 2 Fragment eehappes, AT, VI, 444-45. 5 Refutation d'Helvetius, AT, II, 355-56. 258 S i u n h o m m e s e u l e t a i t p l u s f o r t q u e t o u s l e s h o m m e s q u i l ' e n t o u r e n t , p e u t - e t r e v i e i l l i r a i t - i l s a n s a v o i r d ' a u t r e s i d e e s c l a i r e s q u e c e l l e s d e l a f o r c e e t d e l a f a i b l e s s e ; m a i s i l n e t a r d e p a s a c o n n a i t r e l e r e s s e n t i m e n t , p u i s q u ' i l l ' e p r o u v e , e t a s a v o i r q u e l a f l e c h e q u i l e f r a p p e r a p a r d e r r i e r e t r a v e r s e r a s a p o l t r i n e , l ' e t e n d r a m o r t s u r p l a c e , e t q u e c e t t e f l e c h e p e u t p a r t i r d e l a m a i n d ' u n e n f a n t . Q u ' e n c o n c l u r a - t - i l ? Q u ' i l e s t d a n g e r e u x d e f a i r e i n j u r e k 1 ' e n f a n t . 1 T h e s e q u o t a t i o n s f r o m t h e R e f u t a t i o n d ' H e l v e t i u s m i g h t l e a d o n e t o s u p p o s e t h a t D i d e r o t t h i n k s t h a t t h e m o r a l k n o w l e d g e d e r i v e d f r o m e x p e r i e n c e a l w a y s t a k e s t h e f o r m o f c o n s c i o u s l y f o r m u l a t e d g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h a r e t h e n a p p l i e d t o p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s . ' T h i s , h o w e v e r , d o e s n o t s e e m t o h a v e b e e n h i s c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d o p i n i o n . H e p o i n t s o u t t h a t m e n k n e w w h a t j u s t i c e r e q u i r e d o f t h e m i n p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s l o n g b e f o r e a n y g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i c e h a d b e e n f o r m u l a t e d : I I n ' y a p a s d e s c i e n c e p l u s e v i d e n t e e t p l u s s i m p l e q u e l a m o r a l e p o u r 1 ' i g n o r a n t ; i l n ' y e n a p a s d e p l u s e p i n e u s e e t d e p l u s o b s c u r e p o u r l e s a v a n t . C ' e s t p e u t - e t r e l a s e u l e o u l ' o n a i t t i r e l e s c o r o l l a i r e s - l e s p l u s v r a i s , l e s p l u s e l o i g n e s e t l e s p l u s h a r d i s , a v a n t q u e d ' a v o i r p o s e d e s p r i n c i p e s . P o u r q u o i c e l a ? C ' e s t q u ' i l y a d e s h e r o s l o n g t e m p s a v a n t q u ' i l y a i t d e s r a i s o n n e u r s . C ' e s t l e l o i s i r q u i f a i t l e s u n s , c ' e s t l a c i r c o n s t a n c e q u i f a i t l e s a u t r e s : l e r a i s o n n e u r s e f o r m e d a n s l e s e c o l e s , q u i s ' o u v r e n t t a r d ; l e h e r o s n a i t d a n s l e s p e r i l s , q u i s o n t d e t o u s l e s t e m p s . . . . S o u v e n t i l f a u d r a i t u n l o n g d i s c o u r s a u p h i l o s o p h e p o u r d e m o n t r e r c e q u e l ' h o m m e d u p e u p l e a s u b i t e m e n t s e n t i . ^ D i d e r o t r e p o r t s t o S o p h i e \" V o l l a n d t h e o p i n i o n w h i c h h e h a d e x p r e s s i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n a b o u t \" i n s t i n c t \" , a w o r d w h i c h , h e s a y s , i s ^ I b i d . , p . 356. p E s s a i s u r l e s r e g n e s d e C l a u d e e t d e H e r o n , A T , I I I , 313-14. C f . O b s e r v a t i o n s s u r l e H a k a z , e d . c i t . , p . 405, w h e r e a s i m i l a r p o i n t i s m a d e w i t h r e g a r d t o p r i n c i p l e s o f p o l i t i c a l j u s t i c e . 259 constantly applied to taste and to morality, but which i s never defined: Je pretendis que ce n'etait en nous que l e resultat d'une i n f i n i t e de petites experiences qui avaient commence au moment ou nous ouvrimes les yeux a l a lumiere, jusqu'a. c e l u i ou, diriges secretement par ces essais dont nous n'avions plus l a memoire, nous prononcions que t e l l e chose e t a i t bien ou mal, belle ou l a i d e , bonne ou mauvaise, sans avoir aucune raison presente a 1'esprit de notre jugement favorable ou d e favorable.1 This view i s i n l i n e with his general theory of human action. He does not believe that conscious l o g i c , either deductive or inductive, i s the t y p i c a l way i n which the human mind puts into effect the lessons of experience and so directs action e f f i c a c i o u s l y . The following passage explains how he conceives the t y p i c a l r e l a t i o n between experience and judgment or action: Qu.!.est-ce done que l e gout? Une f a c i l i t e acquise par des experiences reiterees, a. s a i s i r l e v r a i ou l e bon, avec l a circonstance qui l e rend beau, et d'en etre promptement et vivement touche. S i l e s experiences qui determinent l e jugement sont presentes a l a memoire, on aura l e gout e c l a i r s ; s i l a memoire en est passee, et q u ' i l n'en reste que 1'impression, on aura l e tact, 1'instinct. Michel-Ange donne au dome de Saint-Pierre de Rome l a plus b e l l e forme possible, l e geometre de l a Hire, frappe de cette forme, en trace l'epure, et trouve que cette epure est l a courbe de l a plus grande resistance. Qui est-ce qui i n s p i r a cette courbe a Michel-Ange, entre une i n f i n i t e d'autres q u ' i l pouvait choisir? I 1experience journaliere de l a v i e . U'est e l l e qui suggere au maitre charpentier, aussi surement qu'au sublime Euler, 1'angle de l ' e t a i avec l e mur qui menace ruine; c'est e l l e qui l u i a appris a donner a l ' a i l e du moulin 1'inclinaison l a plus favorable au mouvement de rotation; c'est e l l e qui f a i t souvent entrer, dans son ca l c u l s u b t i l , des elements que l a geometrie de l'Academie ne saurait s a i s i r . 2 1 Roth, IV, 125 (Sept. 2, 1762). 2 Essai sur l a peinture, AT, X, 519. The examples Diderot cites here are also used i n the l e t t e r to Sophie which I have just quoted. 260 D i d e r o t ' s t h e o r y o f the development of the moral c o n s c i e n c e p r o v i d e s , i t i s t r u e , a p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n o f the phenomenon of remorse; but i t f a i l s t o o f f e r any assurance t h a t t h i s phenomenon must occur u n i v e r s a l l y or t h a t , i n cases where remorse i s e x p e r i e n c e d , the s u f f e r i n g i t causes w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be g r e a t e r than the s a c r i f i c e e n t a i l e d by v i r t u e . May t h e r e not e x i s t some i n d i v i d u a l s i n whom the c o m b i n a t i o n of o r i g i n a l p r o p e n s i t i e s and s o c i a l e x p e r i e n c e has r e s u l t e d i n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r brand.of h a p p i n e s s b e i n g i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h v i r t u e , even when a l l due a l l o w a n c e i s made f o r f e e l i n g s o f remorse? F o r D i d e r o t ' s u l t i m a t e dilemma i s t h i s : how can he base duty on the d i c t a t e s of i n d i v i d u a l h a p p i n e s s and a t the same time a f f i r m t h a t a l l men have the same d u t i e s , u n l e s s he i s ready t o a s s e r t t h a t the t r u e happiness of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s i s the same? That D i d e r o t had grave doubts c o n c e r n i n g the v a l i d i t y o f t h i s l a s t a s s e r t i o n i s c l e a r from h i s remarks on a book e n t i t l e d Le Temple du Bonheur. He r e l a t e s how one day, as he i s e n j o y i n g the p l e a s u r e s of c o u n t r y l i f e a t d'Holbach's e s t a t e , he i s d e l i g h t e d t o w i t n e s s the a r r i v a l of h i s f r i e n d G a l i a n i . The abbe, however, r e f u s e s t o s t a y a moment l o n g e r than h i s commission r e q u i r e s . \"Je h a i s l a campagne a l a mort,\" he e x p l a i n s , \"et j e me j e t t e r a i s dans ce c a n a l s i j ' e t a i s condamne a. p a s s e r i c i un q u a r t d'heure de plus.\"\"\"\" T h i s i s enough t o c o n v i n c e D i d e r o t how 1 AT, V I , 4 3 8 . 261 d i f f e r e n t i s one man's ha p p i n e s s from a n o t h e r ' s . Such r e f l e c t i o n s may, perhaps, seem innocuous enough, s i n c e a man's p r e f e r e n c e f o r town or c o u n t r y l i f e need not a f f e c t h i s moral conduct. But D i d e r o t goes on t o a p p l y the p r i n c i p l e of the i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r o f h a p p i n e s s d i r e c t l y t o the q u e s t i o n of e t h i c s : Mais q u o i i e s t - c e que l a p r a t i q u e de l a v e r t u n ' e s t pas un s u r moyen d ' e t r e heureux? . . . Won, p a r b l e u , i l y a t e l homme s i malheureusement ne, s i violemment e n t r a i n e par 1 ' a v a r i c e , 1 ' a m b i t i o n , 1'amour desordonne des femmes, que j e l e condamnerais au malheur s i j e l u i p r e s c r i v a i s une l u t t e c o n t i n u e l l e c o n t r e sa p a s s i o n dominante. Mais c e t homme ne s e r a - t - i l pas p l u s malheureux par l e s s u i t e s de s a p a s s i o n que par l a l u t t e q u ' i l e x e r c e r a c o n t r e e l l e ? Ma f o i , j e n'en s a i s r i e n , et j e v o i s tous l e s j o u r s des hommes q u i aiment mieux m o u r i r que de se c o r r i g e r . l The t e x t c o n t i n u e s w i t h a s p e c i f i c a l l u s i o n t o D i d e r o t ' s l o n g -c h e r i s h e d hope of d e m o n s t r a t i n g the l i n k between v i r t u e and ha p p i n e s s : J ' e t a i s b i e n jeune l o r s q u ' i l me v i n t en t e t e que l a morale e n t i e r e c o n s i s t a i t a. prouver aux hommes qu'apres t o u t , pour e t r e heureux, on n ' a v a i t r i e n de mieux a. f a i r e dans ce monde que d ' e t r e v e r t u e u x ; t o u t de s u i t e j e me s u i s mis a. m e d i t e r c e t t e q u e s t i o n , e t j e l a medite encore. I n the l i g h t of D i d e r o t ' s p r e c e d i n g remarks, t h i s can o n l y mean t h a t he doubts whether the v i r t u e - h a p p i n e s s bond h o l d s t r u e i n a l l c a s e s , even when one ta k e s i n t o account the s u f f e r i n g of remorse. T h i s i s a problem which must n e c e s s a r i l y a r i s e f o r a m o r a l i s t who contends t h a t \" n o t r e propre bonheur e s t l a base de x I b i d . , pp. 438-39. 2 I b i d . , p. 439. 2 6 2 tous nos vrais devoirs\", and who then finds himself obliged to admit that \" i l y a autant de manieres d'etre heureux q u ' i l y a d' individus. I have already pointed out that, according to Diderot, a l l psychological phenomena correspond to material modifications i n 2 the body, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the brain. It follows that, i n the f i n a l analysis, what defines the happiness peculiar to a given individual i s his t o t a l bodily state, what Diderot c a l l s \"organisation\". In his attempt to construct a universal ethic, he accords great importance, as we have seen, to the p r i n c i p l e of the i d e n t i t y of organisation. But, as he constantly points out to Helvetius, this i d e n t i t y i s only approximate. As early as 1757, i n the essay De l a poesie dramatique, he remarks that we can scarcely wonder i f men's judgments concerning truth, goodness and beauty are neither uniform nor consistent, since men d i f f e r so much organically and psychologically and since a given i n d i v i -dual undergoes so many changes i n the course of his l i f e . For Diderot, who has so passionate a need to believe i n permanent and universal values, the dilemma i s acute: l'homme e s t - i l done condamne a. n'etre d'accord n i avec ses semblables, n i avec lui-meme, sur l e s seuls objets q u ' i l l u i importe de connaxtre, l a v e r i t e , l a bonte, l a beaute? Sont-ce l a des choses locales, momentanees et a r b i t r a i r e s , des mots vides de sens? 1 Observations sur l e Nakaz, ed. c i t . , p. 404. 2 See above, p. 22. See above, p. 233. 263 N'y a - t - i l r i e n qui so i t tel? Une chose e s t - e l l e vraie, \"bonne et belle, quand e l l e me l e parait? Et toutes nos disputes sur l e gout se resoudraient-e l l e s enfin a cette proposition: nous sommes, vous et moi, deux etres dif f e r e n t s ; et moi-meme, je ne suis jamais dans un instant ce que j'etais dans un autre? 1 Diderot further r e f l e c t s on this question i n the Salon de 1767. F i r s t he points out that the very i d e n t i t y of organisation which defines a species defines also i t s morality and l i m i t s the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of this morality to the species i n question: Tout tend a. son bonheur; et l e bonheur d'un etre ne peut etre l e bonheur d'un autre... La morale se renferme done dans l'enceinte d'une espece... Qu'est-ce qu'une espece?... Une multitude d'individus organises de l a meme maniere... Quoi! 1'organisation serait l a base de l a morale!... Je l e c r o i s . . . 2 Next, admitting that a species i s not composed of exactly i d e n t i c a l individuals, he draws the et h i c a l consequences of this f a c t : . . . je pensais que s ' i l y avait une morale propre a. une espece d'animaux et une morale propre a une autre espece, peut-etre dans l a meme espece y avait-i l une morale propre a. differents individus, ou du moins a differentes conditions ou collections d'individus semblables . . . .* The example Diderot chooses to i l l u s t r a t e these remarks i s AT, VII, 391-92. Diderot proposes that we find the required universal standards of truth, goodness and beauty i n an ideal of humanity which must be formed i n the imagination from elements actually existing i n nature. He does not, unfortunately, explain how we are to select the appropriate elements, or how different individuals could agree on this selection. I f he means that forming the proposed i d e a l i s to be the task of an e l i t e of wise men, how could the conclusions of such a minority be binding for a l l men? It seems, therefore, that the i n i t i a l problem remains unsolved. 2 AT, XI, 124. Ibid., p. 124. 264 the a r t i s t . To at t a i n the sublime i n his works, the a r t i s t , or the poet, must constantly seek extremes and avoid that golden mean which i n everyday l i f e i s the road to happiness. But Diderot's meditation i s not long confined to the nature of the a r t i s t ' s creative a c t i v i t y . Even though the work i n which this text i s placed i s concerned primarily with aesthetic judgments, here he i s r e f l e c t i n g on an et h i c a l question. His example, which, he declares a few l i n e s e a r l i e r , i s chosen so as not to scandalize his reader \"par un exemple trop serieux\", quickly changes character. What he i s r e a l l y concerned with are men who, not i n a r t i s t i c productions, but i n their r e a l l i v e s , are poets: II ne faut point f a i r e de l a poesie dans l a vie. les heros, l e s amants romanesques, l e s grands patriotes, les magistrats i n f l e x i b l e s , les apotres de r e l i g i o n , l e s philosophes a toute outrance, tous ces rares et divins insenses font de l a poesie dans l a vie, de l a leur malheur. Here and i n the page which follows there i s an inextricable mixture of l i t e r a l n e s s and irony. It i s quite clear that a l l Diderot's sympathy i s for.these \"divine madmen\". Not only does he honour them for the benefits they bestow on mankind, but he finds their character admirable per se. He would l i k e to resemble them; no doubt he knows that at times he has. But he knows at the same time that these people suffer as a result of their single-mindedness. l e t this i s not Diderot's l a s t word on the matter. The onlooker who does not share these men's ideals cannot weigh 1 Ibid., p. 125. 265 against their obvious s a c r i f i c e s and misfortunes the satisfactions which they themselves experience. Diderot's experience i s wide enough to embrace both points of view: \"Je f a i s a i s en moi-meme l'eioge de l a mediocrite qui met egalement a l ' a b r i du blame et de l'envie, et je me demandais pourquoi cependant personne ne voudrait perdre de sa s e n s i b i l i t e et devenir mediocre?\"\"'\" It w i l l be noticed that some of these \"divine madmen\" are men whose moral conscience makes demands on them which exceed those which the majority of honest, law-abiding c i t i z e n s experi-ence. The question therefore arises, how the theory of the or i g i n and development of the moral conscience which I outlined e a r l i e r i n this chapter can account for cases such as these. We can, indeed, broaden the question to include the problem posed by a l l kinds of behaviour which are commonly described as a l t r u i s t i c . How does i t come about that some men, for example, consider themselves bound by a pr i n c i p l e of justice even beyond the group i n which their s e l f - i n t e r e s t can be an operative motivation? S i m i l a r i t y of organisation and the need for cooperation i n the struggle against nature explain the recognition of rules of conduct within a group, but they do not make inevitably for the application of these rules to outsiders. Diderot points this out himself: Voila. l ' o r i g i n e des l i e n s p a r t i c u l i e r s et des vertus domestiques; voila. l ' o r i g i n e des l i e n s generaux et 1 Ibid., p. 125. 266 des v e r t u s p u b l i q u e s ; v o i l a l a source de l a n o t i o n d'une u t i l i t e p e r s o n n e l l e e t p u b l i q u e ; v o i l a l a source de tous l e s p a c t e s i n d i v i d u e l s et de t o u t e s l e s l o i s ; v o i l a l a cause de l a f o r c e de ces l o i s dans une n a t i o n pauvre et menacee; v o i l a l a cause de l e u r f a i b l e s s e dans une n a t i o n t r a n q u i l l e e t o p u l e n t e ; v o i l a l a cause de l e u r presque n u l l i t e d'une n a t i o n a 1 ' a u t r e . x We have a l r e a d y seen t h a t D i d e r o t h i m s e l f w i l l not countenance such a l i m i t a t i o n o f the f i e l d o f a p p l i c a t i o n o f the p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e . The d i f f i c u l t y c o u l d p a r t l y be s o l v e d by s a y i n g t h a t once c o n t a c t has been made w i t h a n o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l or group, the p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e c i p r o c i t y , e i t h e r c o o p e r a t i v e or r e t a l i a t o r y , cannot be r u l e d out, and t h a t t h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n f o r e x t e n d i n g the p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e t o a l l mankind. T h i s e x p l a n a -t i o n does n o t , however, account f o r the f a i r l y w idespread concern f o r the w e l f a r e o f p o s t e r i t y , a concern which forms an i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f D i d e r o t ' s p e r s o n a l m o r a l commitment. Nor does an account of the moral c o n s c i e n c e which r e l i e s s o l e l y on e n l i g h t e n e d s e l f - i n t e r e s t e x p l a i n how i t happens t h a t some men a c q u i r e a p o s i t i v e p r e f e r e n c e f o r j u s t conduct and do not conform t o i t s i m p l y as a p r u d e n t i a l c a l c u l a t i o n . D i d e r o t o f t e n quotes examples from a n c i e n t h i s t o r y of p e r s o n a l s a c r i f i c e f o r the sake of the group, when not t o make the s a c r i f i c e would not have meant punishment or even blame from the group. That c e r t a i n people f e e l themselves m o r a l l y o b l i g a t e d beyond what s o c i e t y a t l a r g e c o n s i d e r s t o be the \" c a l l of d u t y \" i s h a r d l y d e n i a b l e . I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t one of the i d e a s of l a n d o i s 1 Fragments echappes, AT, V I , 445. 267 which Diderot rejects i s that men receive virtue grudgingly, as a patient does his medicine.\"\"\" This same l e t t e r to landois provides, I think, Diderot's answer to the problem. He describes the man committed to virtue as a man who has a special kind of vanity, who constantly congra-tulates himself on possessing the inner strength necessary to make the s a c r i f i c e s entailed by pursuing the general interest i n preference to his particular interest. The ori g i n of this \"vanity\" must l i e i n the transformation of a purely prudential attachment to justice into an independent motivation. This i s consistent with the doctrine of the autonomy of acquired psychological drives with which Diderot counters Helvetius's attempt to reduce a l l 2 human motivation to basic physical needs. I think this doctrine explains Diderot's position i n another text i n which he rejects an entir e l y prudential account of the moral conscience: J'avouais bien que l a crainte du ressentiment et a i t bien l a plus forte digue de l a rnechancete; mais je voulais qu'a ce motif on en jo i g n i t un autre qui nai s s a i t de 1'essence meme de l a vertu, s i l a vertu n'etait pas un mot; je voulais que l e caractere ne s'en effacat jamais entierement, dans les ames meme les plus degradees. Je voulais qu'un homme qui preferait son interet propre au bien public sentit plus ou moins qu'on pouvait f a i r e mieux et q u ' i l s'estimat moins de n'avoir pas l a force de se s a c r i f i e r . ^ These remarks do not imply that love of v i r t u e i s innate, but that 1 Roth, I, 212 (June 29, 1756). See above p. 76. 2 Cf. Refutation d'Helvetius. AT, II, passim. 5 Roth, III, 281 (To Sophie Volland; Dec. 1, 1760). 269 from the t h e o r e t i c a l point of view, i t i s as much a c o n t r a d i c t i o n of.' the u n i v e r s a l i t y of m o r a l i t y as the absence or d e f i c i e n c y of the moral conscience i n some men. The two cases seem, i n f a c t , to be l i n k e d i n Diderot's thought i n the passage from the Salon de 1767 which I have been d i s c u s s i n g . When he says he has chosen the example of the e t h i c appropriate to the a r t i s t so as to avoid a more scandalous example, I t h i n k he i s a l l u d i n g p r e c i s e l y to the a n t i t h e s i s of those benefactors of mankind to whom h i s r e f l e c t i o n s on the a r t i s t almost immediately b r i n g him. The r e a l l y scandalous example would be the wicked man who d e l i g h t s i n h i s wickedness. Diderot's e x p e r i e n t i a l d o c t r i n e of the o r i g i n and development of the moral conscience thus f a i l s to give one a s o l i d assurance that i n c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s the i n t e r a c t i o n of t h e i r o r i g i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n s and t h e i r experience w i l l not r e s u l t i n a d e f e c t i v e development of the moral conscience. Extreme cases w i l l be r a r e , f o r even where the g e n e r a l i z i n g process r e f e r r e d to e a r l i e r f a i l s to operate, s o c i a l pressures are u s u a l l y strong enough to produce at l e a s t a v e i l of prudent conformism. But i n c e r t a i n cases of mental derangement, where r e a l i t y i s unable to make i t s e l f adequately f e l t , one w i l l f i n d d e l i g h t i n maleficence i n an undisguised form. Such i s the case of the \"w i l d beast\" who murders a capuchin monk and r e v e l s i n watching the contortions of h i s 268 once a commitment t o j u s t and c o o p e r a t i v e conduct has been e s t a b l i s h e d i n i n f a n c y and e a r l y c h i l d h o o d , i t h e n c e f o r t h p e r s i s t s as an independent f o r c e i n the p e r s o n a l i t y , and even when, l a t e r on, o t h e r m o t i v a t i o n s outweigh i t , i t makes i t s e l f f e l t i n the form of remorse. The p r o c e s s by which the commitment t o moral r u l e s becomes independent of p r u d e n t i a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t appears i n the f o l l o w i n g passage t o c o n s i s t of the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of the r u l e t o i n c l u d e the m oral agent h i m s e l f o b j e c t i v e l y and on a f o o t i n g of e q u a l i t y w i t h o t h e r moral agents: Nous ne pouvons e x i s t e r longtemps sans c o n c e v o i r des i d e e s d'ordre e t de d e s o r d r e , de b i e n f a i s a n c e e t de m a l f a i s a n c e , d'amour et d ' a v e r s i o n en nous et dans l e s a u t r e s . I I e s t i m p o s s i b l e que nous ne j u g i o n s pas nos propres a c t i o n s , en l e s comparant a ces i d e e s . I I e s t i m p o s s i b l e que nous ne nous avouions pas a nous-memes l e u r c o n f o r m i t e ou o p p o s i t i o n a. ces i d e e s ; et v o i l a . l a c o n s c i e n c e q u i juge. I l e s t i m p o s s i b l e que nous nous r e f u s i o n s l e mepris que nous a u r i o n s pour un a u t r e q u i l e s a u r a i e n t commises; et v o i l a l e remords q u i n a i t . I I e s t i m p o s s i b l e que nous entendions l e s a u t r e s d e t e s t e r ces a c t i o n s et ceux q u i l e s ont commises sans r o u g i r ; et v o i l a . l a honte; sans c r a i n d r e d ' e t r e d e c o u v e r t s e t d'en e t r e c h a t i e s ; e t v o i l a . l e m a l a i s e du m a l f a i t e u r . 1 I n t h i s way, D i d e r o t succeeds i n making h i s t h e o r y o f m o t i v a t i o n s u f f i c i e n t l y complex to account f o r those i n d i v i d u a l s whose c o n s c i e n c e makes g r e a t e r demands on them than i s the case w i t h the average man; but t h i s does not r e a l l y h e l p him t o e s t a b l i s h the u n i v e r s a l i t y of the p r i n c i p l e of moral o b l i g a t i o n . True, moral heroism, i s not u s u a l l y c o n s i d e r e d t o p r e s e n t a problem, but, Commentaire s u r Hemsterhuis, p. 315. 270 dying victim.\"'\" In Nero we see an inborn malevolence eventually overcoming the superimposed education: Claude e t a i t ne bon; des courtisans pervers l e rendirent mechant: . Neron, ne mechant, ne put jamais devenir bon sous les meilleurs i n s t i t u t e u r s . l a vie de Claude est parsemee d'actions louables: i l vient un moment ou. c e l l e de Neron cesse d'en o f f r i r . However, besides such instances of positive malevolence, there are numerous cases where i t would appear that the influence of an ethic generally accepted, and sanctioned (albeit imperfectly) by l e g i s l a t i o n , has as i t s sole effect the desire to avoid punishment. Diderot's works offer a whole p o r t r a i t - g a l l e r y of characters i n whom there i s no i n t e r i o r commitment to beneficence. Among these characters one should distinguish on the one hand men l i k e Gousse and Father Hudson, whose personal ethic i s unorthodox, who seem not to have arrived at a clear general p r i n c i p l e of conduct and who therefore appear as beings alternately determined by good and by e v i l motives, and on the other hand characters l i k e the Lui of Lui et Moi, Palissot and the renegade of Avignon, who, for a l l one can t e l l , are devoid of the capacity \u00E2\u0080\u00A25 to derive pleasure from an act which benefits another. But the 1 Refutation d'Helvetius, AT, II, 408. p Essai sur les regnes de Claude et de Neron, AT, III , 61. J For G-ousse, see Jacques l e f a t a l i s t e , AT, VI, 69-71; for Father Hudson, see i b i d . , pp. 183-92; for Palissot, see Le Neveu de Rameau, AT, V, 450-51; for the renegade of Avignon, see above, p . 205. The dialogue Lui et Moi appears i n AT, XVII, 481-85. 271 problem whether a man may p o s s i b l y be so c o n s t i t u t e d t h a t h i s t r u e h a p p i n e s s does not n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e him to be b e n e f i c e n t i s most s t r i k i n g l y posed by Rameau's nephew, though s c a r c e l y i n the most s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d manner, s i n c e we can never be sure t h a t h i s a n a l y s i s of h i s own n a t u r e i s c o r r e c t : he may be a t t e m p t i n g t o d e c e i v e h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r , and he may be h i m s e l f d e c e i v e d . The Nephew's c l a i m i s t h a t he i s e s s e n t i a l l y i n d i f f e r e n t t o moral v a l u e s : . . . dans un s u j e t a u s s i v a r i a b l e que l e s moeurs, i l n'y a d'absolument, d ' e s s e n t i e l l e m e n t , de generalement v r a i ou f a u x ; s i n o n q u ' i l f a u t e t r e ce que l ' i n t e r e t veut qu'on s o i t , bon ou mauvais, sage ou f o u , decent ou r i d i c u l e , honnete ou v i c i e u x . l Those c r i t i c s who have supposed t h a t i n l e Neveu de Rameau D i d e r o t f a c e s up t o t h e l o g i c a l consequences f o r e t h i c s o f h i s own d e t e r m i n i s t i c m a t e r i a l i s m would presumably f i n d support f o r t h e i r view i n the passage I have j u s t quoted. Now, i t i s t r u e t h a t D i d e r o t ' s t h e o r y o f m o t i v a t i o n can be expressed i n t h e s e terms, but t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e between h i s t h e o r y o f m o t i v a t i o n and h i s t h e o r y of moral o b l i g a t i o n . The concept of i n t e r e s t on which the l a t t e r i s based i s t h a t o f t r u e , as opposed t o apparent, i n t e r e s t . S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , f o r D i d e r o t t o admit t h a t h i s e t h i c does not a p p l y momentarily i s a t r u i s m , because h i s d e t e r m i n i s m r e q u i r e s him t o h o l d t h a t every a c t i o n a c t u a l l y performed i s t h a t which a t the moment when i t o c c u r s c o s t s the agent l e a s t ; i n o t h e r words, one always obeys the s t r o n g e s t m o t i v a t i o n . The t h e o r y of 1 l e Neveu de Rameau, AT, V, 443-44. 272 e t h i c a l value i s , and can only be, concerned with the effect of conduct over a considerable period of time, i d e a l l y the whole l i f e of the agent. The Nephew's parting remark, \"Rira bien qui r i r a l e dernier,\" i s paralleled by the following remarks from the Conclusion of the Elements de physiologie: \"Je ne saurai qu'a. l a f i n ce que j'aurai perdu ou gagne dans ce vaste t r i p o t , oil j'aural passe une soixantaine d'annees l e cornet a l a main, tesseras agitans.\" x It is, of course, quite possible that the Nephew too i s thinking of the long-term conception of interest. In this case, his statement i s indeed a challenge to Diderot's e t h i c a l position, since i t implies a denial of the philosopher's contention that true happiness, that i s to say long-term s e l f -interest, always dictates a policy of beneficence. It seems to me that the r e a l challenge which the Nephew represents for Diderot i s not, therefore, the necessary l o g i c a l outcome of the p r i n c i p l e of determinism, since the virtue-happiness equivalence i s not l o g i c a l l y incompatible with determinism; nor i s i t the l o g i c a l outcome of Diderot's materialism, since this i s not concerned solely with physical pleasures. Rather, the issue i s an empirical one: are men what Diderot would l i k e to believe them to be, or are they as the Nephew sees them? The refusal of the author to provide the answer to the e t h i c a l r i d d l e posed by his work should not be taken as proof that the 1 Ed. Mayer, p. 307. Cf. Plan d'une universite, AT, III, 456: \"Toute notre vie n'est qu'un jeu de hasard; tachons d'avoir l a chance pour nous.\" 273 Nephew r e p r e s e n t s an as p e c t of D i d e r o t ' s p e r s o n a l i t y which he n o r m a l l y suppressed, but which c o n t i n u e d t o s t r i v e f o r r e l e a s e n e v e r t h e l e s s , and t o which he gave o b l i q u e e x p r e s s i o n i n the c r e a t i o n s of h i s i m a g i n a t i o n . There a r e none but s u p e r f i c i a l resemblances between D i d e r o t and the Nephew. Above a l l , Rameau does not r e p r e s e n t the f r e e b e i n g D i d e r o t would l i k e t o be; on the c o n t r a r y , he i s s e r v i l e and dependent. The worm has t u r n e d , 1 momentarily, i t i s t r u e , but Rameau's p r e s e n t r e f u s a l t o h u m i l i a t e h i m s e l f by beg g i n g f o r the f o r g i v e n e s s and c o n t i n u e d h o s p i t a l i t y o f the p a t r o n s who have e j e c t e d him i s but the e x c e p t i o n which proves the r u l e t o which h i s l i f e conforms. How l o n g x^an we expect him t o m a i n t a i n h i s d e f i a n t s t a n c e ? I t may w e l l be t r u e t h a t D i d e r o t had t o combat w i t h i n h i m s e l f the d e s i r e t o throw o f f c o n v e n t i o n a l m o r a l i t y ; but t h i s i s not a t a l l the meaning of the Nephew's p o s i t i o n . R a t h e r , h i s m o r a l i t y c o n s i s t s o f a p r e c i s e c o n f o r m i t y t o the s t a n d a r d s of b e h a v i o u r g e n e r a l l y 2 p r e v a i l i n g i n the s o c i e t y which he f r e q u e n t s . W i t h such a AT, V, 430: \"Moi: . . . v o t r e d i g n i t e me f a i t r i r e . L u i : Chacun a l a s i e n n e . Je veux b i e n o u b l i e r l a mienne, mais a ma d i s c r e t i o n et .non a. l ' o r d r e d ' a u t r u i . F a u t - i l qu'on p u i s s e me d i r e : Rampe, e t que j e s o i s o b l i g e de ramper? C'est 1 ' a l l u r e du v e r , c ' e s t l a mienne; nous l a s u i v o n s l ' u n e t 1'autre quand on nous l a i s s e a l l e r , mais nous nous r e d r e s s o n s quand on nous marche sur l a queue; on m'a marche s u r l a queue, et j e me r e d r e s s e r a i . 2 Cf. AT, V, 419: \"Moi: Et p o u r q u o i employer t o u t e s ces p e t i t e s v i l e s r u s e s - l a ? L u i : V i l e s I e t p o u r q u o i , s ' i l vous p l a i t ? E l l e s sont d'usage dans mon e t a t ; et j e ne m ' a v i l i s pas en f a i s a n t comme t o u t l e monde. Ce n'e s t pas moi q u i l e s a i i n v e n t e e s , et j e s e r a i s b i z a r r e et m a l a d r o i t de ne pas m'y conformer.\" 274 character Diderot, at any l e v e l of his being, can have had l i t t l e sympathy. The true meaning of Le Neveu.de Rameau cannot be expressed by reducing i t to a clear-cut affirmation of an et h i c a l p r i n c i p l e , of any sort. But, i f anything i s certain, i t i s that i t does not imply any doubt on Diderot's part concerning his personal moral commitment. The main et h i c a l significance of the figure of the Nephew i s that he embodies a challenge to Diderot's proposed universal ethic. I f the Nephew i s r e a l l y what he claims to be, then human nature i s not what Diderot would l i k e to think i t i s , or perhaps there i s no universal human nature at a l l . But i n the dialogue this problem i s ultimately l e f t unresolved. In the Salon de 1767, Diderot himself points out that any attempt to j u s t i f y a universal ethic must be based on a certain conception of human nature:. Que suis-je?... Qu'est-ce qu'un homme?... Un animal?... Sans doute; mais l e chien est un animal aussi; l e loup est un animal aussi. Mais l'homme n'est n i un loup n i un chien... Quelle notion precise peut-on avoir du bien et du mal, du beau et du l a i d , du bon et du mauvais, du v r a i et du faux, sans une notion preliminaire de l'homme?... Mais s i l'homme ne peut se d e f i n i r . . . tout est perdu. Combien de philosophes, faute de ces observations s i simples, ont f a i t a l'homme l a morale des loups, aussi betes en cela que s ' i l s avaient 275 p r e s c r i t aux l o u p s l a morale de l'homme I 1 L e t us c o n s i d e r f o r a moment D i d e r o t ' s p a s s i n g query, whether any d e f i n i t i o n of man i s p o s s i b l e . F o r h i s purposes, n e i t h e r a rough p r a c t i c a l d e f i n i t i o n , nor the v a r i o u s d e f i n i t i o n s proposed by a n a t o m i s t s or a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , a r e s u f f i c i e n t . D i d e r o t needs a d e f i n i t i o n c a p a b l e of s e r v i n g as a b a s i s f o r h i s p r e - c o n c e i v e d i d e a o f an e t h i c which i s u n i v e r s a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e t o mankind. Thus h i s doubt c o n c e r n i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a d e f i n i t i o n o f msn i s j u s t a n o ther way o f e x p r e s s i n g h i s doubt as t o the success o f h i s attempt t o demonstrate t h a t e n l i g h t e n e d s e l f - i n t e r e s t j u s t i f i e s an e t h i c o f s o c i a l c o o p e r a t i o n . D i d e r o t ' s main a s p i r a t i o n as an e t h i c a l t h i n k e r i s t o r e p l a c e the a u t h o r i t y o f d i v i n e w i l l or of p o s i t i v e law, which, i n h i s o p i n i o n , s u b j e c t s man to moral bondage, by an a u t h o r i t y which, h a v i n g i t s source w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l h i m s e l f , i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h h i s moral freedom, w h i l e a t the same time i t t r a n s c e n d s the i n d i v i d u a l by i t s s i m u l t a n e o u s presence i n a l l men. Thus the young D i d e r o t i n the E n t r e t i e n d'un pere avec ses e n f a n t s r e s o l v e s t o be guided by the \"reason of the human s p e c i e s \" , i n which he p a r t i c i p a t e s , t o quote \" D r o i t n a t u r e l \" , by \"a pure a c t of the \"\"\" AT, XI, 124. D i d e r o t i s presumably t h i n k i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y of Hobbes, one of whose maxims was homo h o m i n i l u p u s . The o b j e c t i o n s w h i c h he l a t e r r a i s e d t o H e l v e t i u s ' s d o c t r i n e a l s o s t r e s s the e r r o r of t r e a t i n g man a s i f he were one of the a n i m a l s . H e l v e t i u s equates human m o t i v a t i o n w i t h t h a t of a n i m a l s i n g e n e r a l , s e e i n g men as prompted i n a l l t h i n g s by the d e s i r e f o r s e n s u a l p l e a s u r e and a v e r s i o n f o r p h y s i c a l p a i n . D i d e r o t complains t h a t t h i s may be t r u e of the l o w e r a n i m a l s , but t h a t i n man one cannot deny o t h e r k i n d s of m o t i v a t i o n : \"II me f a u t des causes p r o p r e s a l'homme.\"' (AT, II, 300.) 276 understanding reasoning i n the silence of the passions.\"\"'\" But Diderot only succeeds i n eliminating the arbitrariness of the moral decisions of individuals by adopting an arbitrary d e f i n i t i o n of man and refusing to attribute human status to any individuals who do not conform to this d e f i n i t i o n . Thus, i n \"Droit naturel\", he writes: J'apergois d'abord une chose qui me semble avouee par l e bon et par l e mechant, c'est q u ' i l faut raisonner en tout, parce que l'homme n'est pas seulement un animal, mais un animal qui raisonne; q u ' i l y a par consequent dans l a question dont i l s'agit des moyens de decouvrir l a ve r i t e ; que c e l u i qui refuse de l a chercher renonce a l a qualite d'homme, et doit etre t r a i t e par l e reste de son espece comme une bete farouche; et que l a verite un f o i s decouverte, quiconque refuse de s'y conformer est insense ou mechant d'une mechancete morale. 2 It seems to me that two objections can be raised to this position. F i r s t , who s h a l l decide what i s reason and what i s unreason? Secondly, by excluding certain unreasonable or morally wicked men from the human species, has Diderot not already abandoned the quest for a completely universal ethic? It would indeed appear that the universal moral principles which he postulates i n \"Droit naturel\" are, i n effect, binding only for those whom he considers to be \"r a t i o n a l \" . I say \"rat i o n a l \" , rather than \"virtuous\", because Diderot wishes his ethic to apply to the wicked also, provided that they are ra t i o n a l , for, i f they are, he believes that they 1 See above pp. 228-29. 2 AT, XIV, 298. 277 w i l l say, l i k e Medea: \"Video meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor.\" The a r t i c l e \"Droit naturel\" poses a particular problem which I s h a l l now discuss because the solution I propose has an impor-tant bearing on the question of Diderot's success or f a i l u r e i n establishing a universal ethic. This problem concerns particu-l a r l y the following paragraph: II est evident que s i l'homme n'est pas l i b r e , ou que s i ses determinations instantanees, ou meme ses o s c i l l a t i o n s , naissant de quelque chose de materiel qui s o i t exterieur a son ame, son choix n'est point l'acte pur d'une substance incorporelle et d'une faculte simple de cette substance, i l n'y aura n i bonte n i rnechancete raisonnees, quoiqu'il puisse y avoir bonte et rnechancete animales; i l n'y aura n i bien n i mal moral, n i juste n i injuste, n i obligation n i d r o i t . D'ou l'on v o i t , pour l e dire en passant, combien i l importe d'etablir solidement l a r e a l i t e , je ne dis pas du volontaire, mais de l a l i b e r t e , qu'on ne confond que trop ordinairement avec l e v o l o n t a i r e . 2 I tkink i t i s clear that Diderot intends any censor, and indeed any orthodox reader, to understand that this paragraph i s an affirmation of dualism and of f r e e - w i l l . However, what he i n fact does i s to state the e t h i c a l consequences which would be entailed by deterministic materialism and to point out that, i f one i s to avoid these consequences, one must establish the r e a l i t y of f r e e - w i l l . \"Droit naturel\" appeared i n volume V of the Encyclopedie i n September 1755 and the l e t t e r to landois dates from June 1756. Is i t l i k e l y that Diderot's views on the question of f r e e - w i l l and determinism should have changed so r a d i c a l l y i n \"\"\" Diderot i s fond of quoting or alluding to this verse of Ovid; e.g. Roth, VII, 205-06 (To V i a l l e t ; Oct. or Nov. 1767). 2 AT, XIV, 297. 278 th i s i n t e r v a l of nine or ten months? Admittedly, i t i s not impossible \u00E2\u0080\u0094 especially i f we assume that at the e a r l i e r date Diderot was already perfectly familiar with the arguments on both sides, but had not yet taken the f i n a l step of adhering to the deterministic doctrine. This would account for the great s i m i l a r i t y i n the way he formulates the question i n the two texts, p a r t i c u l a r l y with respect to the d i s t i n c t i o n between voluntary actions and f r e e - w i l l . I find this solution, however, very hard to accept. As early as 1753, i n De 1'Interpretation de l a Nature, he points out that Maupertuis's a t t r i b u t i o n of s e n s i b i l i t y to matter leads, i f one draws the l o g i c a l conclusions consistently, to a m a t e r i a l i s t i c monism. Diderot i s not sincere i n claiming that i n pointing to these consequences he i s simply showing that Maupertuis's hypothesis, since i t leads to consequences incompa-t i b l e with the Christian conception of God, must be erroneous. Verniere notes 1 that Maupertuis, undeceived by Diderot's show of orthodoxy, remarks i r o n i c a l l y i n a work of 1756: \"Si l'on e t a i t moins persuade de l a r e l i g i o n de l'auteur de 1'Interpretation de l a nature, on pourrait soupconner que son dessein n'est pas tant de detruire l'hypothese que d'en t i r e r ces consequences q u ' i l appelle t e r r i b l e s . \" I f then, i n 1753, Diderot was w i l l i n g to accept a m a t e r i a l i s t i c account of the soul, how can one suppose that i n 1755 he believes i n f r e e - w i l l , which he defines as \"l'acte pur d'une substance incorporelle et d'une faculte simple de cette 1 Qeuvres philosophiques, p. 228, note 2. 279 substance\"? I therefore conclude that the balance of probability-favours the view that Diderot's professed rejection of determinism i n \"Droit naturel\" i s insincere. If this be so, must we suppose that Diderot would admit that a contradiction exists between his deterministic views and the theory of natural law and the general w i l l which he has elaborated i n the remainder of this a r t i c l e ? I think not, but contend rather that he does view this theory as meaningful even i f one rejects the notion of f r e e - w i l l . In the f i r s t two paragraphs of the a r t i c l e he notes the complex problems besetting the philosopher who attempts to give a consistent r a t i o n a l account of natural law. He does not claim to be able to give a complete solution to these d i f f i c u l t i e s , but l i m i t s his objective to establishing certain principles which w i l l provide answers to \"les d i f f i c u l t e s les plus considerables qu'on a coutume de proposer contre l a notion du dr o i t n a t u r e l . \" 1 The customary objections which he attempts to answer are, i n fact, those of Hobbes, who rejects the t r a d i t i o n a l conception of natural law i n favour of the view that justice i s the result of s o c i a l convention or the positive laws, which draw the i r binding authority from the contract of submission of subjects to government. We have already noted that 2 on t h i s point Diderot- consistently opposes the Hobbesian school. His opposition, however, does not i n i t s e l f imply acceptance of f r e e - w i l l . I f , i n \"Droit naturel\", Diderot prefaces his rebuttal 1 AT, XIV, 297. 2 See above, pp. 163-69, 266. 280 of Hobbes by an insincere profession of b e l i e f i n f r e e - w i l l , this merely indicates that, i n disputing with Hobbes over the nature of right and obligation, he has decided to remain within the l i m i t s of his exoteric d o c t r i n e . 1 He i s j u s t i f i e d i n doing so because right and obligation are concepts which are useful when one i s dealing with that majority of mankind i n whom s o c i a l experience has developed, however imperfectly, a moral conscience. Individuals i n whom this moral conscience has not developed belong, on the other hand, to a realm where the very notions of right and obligation are void of meaning. In \"Droit naturel\", Diderot affirms that they are to be treated by the rest of the human race as wild beasts; i n the l e t t e r to landois, he declares 2 that they are to be strangled on the public square. At this l e v e l , the exoteric and the esoteric doctrines coalesce. Both of these doctrines are, I believe, proposed by Diderot as v a l i d and useful each i n i t s own domain. The exoteric doctrine, with i t s stress on rights and obligations, can, and indeed must, be applied i n discussions where a l l parties accept as a basic assumption that the general good i s a desirable end. Diderot shares that assumption with Hobbes, for example, and therefore can use i t as a basis for discussing the nature of obligation. The esoteric doctrine, caauthe other hand, has the advantage of placing the whole question of human conduct i n a broader perspec-t i v e , i n which both Hobbes and Diderot must see themselves 1 See above, p. \"]h. 2 Roth, I, 214 (June 29, 1756). 281 surrounded \"by men some o f whom, l i k e Rameau's nephew, do not share t h e i r b a s i c assumption t h a t the g e n e r a l good i s d e s i r a b l e . G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , D i d e r o t ' s e x o t e r i c d o c t r i n e d i f f e r s from h i s e s o t e r i c d o c t r i n e i n t h a t the former uses an orthodox t e r m i n o l o g y and t r e a t s as a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s which the e s o t e r i c d o c t r i n e r e c o g n i z e s as o n l y r e l a t i v e t o the p r e v a i l i n g form o f s o c i e t y , the p a r t i c u l a r p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l o r h i s s o c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . W i t h r e g a r d t o the u n i v e r s a l i t y of e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , however, the case i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t . Here, the e s o t e r i c d o c t r i n e admits t h a t t h e r e can be no complete u n i v e r s a l i t y , t h a t t h e r e a r e men, a l b e i t perhaps a s m a l l number, i n whom du t y , as D i d e r o t c o n c e i v e s of i t , does not r e q u i r e t h a t t hey a c t i n the g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t ; the e x o t e r i c d o c t r i n e , on the o t h e r hand, r e f u s e s t o admit these e x c e p t i o n s . On t h i s p o i n t , t h e r e f o r e , i t i s not p o s s i b l e t o m a i n t a i n t h a t the two d o c t r i n e s a r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y i d e n t i c a l . There seems here t o have been a r e a l h e s i t a t i o n i n D i d e r o t ' s mind. He so d e s p e r a t e l y wishes t o b e l i e v e t h a t b e n e f i c e n c e and s o c i a l c o o p e r a t i o n a r e the a p p r o p r i a t e f u l f i l m e n t o f human n a t u r e i n a l l i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t he f i n d s i t d i f f i c u l t t o r e s i g n h i m s e l f t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h i s i s t r u e o f some men, but not of a l l men. I t i s h e r e , I t h i n k , i n s t e a d o f i n the q u e s t i o n of m a t e r i a l i s m and de t e r m i n i s m , t h a t one i s j u s t i f i e d i n l o c a t i n g the c o n t r a d i c t i o n which many c r i t i c s have seen between h i s i n t e l l e c t and h i s h e a r t . I f one a l l o w s f o r h i s o v e r s t a t i n g the case f o r e t h i c a l u n i v e r s a l i t y i n many t e x t s i n o r d e r t o r e f u t e the d o c t r i n e of a r b i t r a r y e t h i c a l 282 v a l u e s and f o r r h e t o r i c a l e x a g g e r a t i o n f o r the purposes of moral e x h o r t a t i o n , one f i n d s the mature D i d e r o t t o be f u n d a m e n t a l l y s c e p t i c a l about the p o s s i b i l i t y of a c o m p l e t e l y u n i v e r s a l e t h i c . D i d e r o t ' s r e l u c t a n c e t o admit the u l t i m a t e f a i l u r e of h i s defence of a u n i v e r s a l l y b i n d i n g m o r a l law has p r e v e n t e d him from e x p l o r i n g f u l l y the t h e o r e t i c a l consequences of such an e t h i c a l p o s i t i o n . To conclude t h i s c h a p t e r , I s h a l l s k e t c h out some of the consequences which seem t o me t o be i m p l i c i t i n h i s t h i n k i n g on t h i s q u e s t i o n . I must a t the same time warn the r e a d e r t h a t we a r e here i n the r e a l m o f h y p o t h e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and t h a t the p a u c i t y o f d i r e c t evidence makes i t i m p o s s i b l e t o m a i n t a i n w i t h complete ass u r a n c e t h a t D i d e r o t would s u b s c r i b e t o a l l o f the c o n c l u s i o n s which I s h a l l suggest. The abandonment of e t h i c a l u n i v e r s a l i t y by no means l e a v e s D i d e r o t w i t h no a l t e r n a t i v e but amoralism. He does not cease t o b e l i e v e t h a t f o r h i m s e l f duty i s j u s t i c e . Rameau's nephew does not r e p r e s e n t a p a r t or a s p e c t of h i m s e l f , but i s the p r o o f or i l l u s t r a t i o n of the i l l u s o r i n e s s o f h i s d e s i r e t o b e l i e v e t h a t a l l men a r e o f the same moral n a t u r e as h i m s e l f . Some men, he must u l t i m a t e l y admit, have a n a t u r a l p r o p e n s i t y towards b e n e f i -cence and c o o p e r a t i v e conduct, o t h e r s towards m a l e f i c e n c e . S o c i a l i n f l u e n c e s may modify the way these p r o p e n s i t i e s a r e m a n i f e s t e d i n conduct; the n a t u r a l l y good man may be c o r r u p t e d and the 283 n a t u r a l l y bad man be o b l i g e d out of prudence t o r e s t r a i n h i s m a l e f i c e n t i m p u l s e s . The m a j o r i t y o f men a r e , i n any case, not p r e d i s p o s e d i n a d e c i s i v e way e i t h e r t o b e n e f i c e n c e o r t o m a l e f i -cence; f o r them i t i s s o c i a l i n f l u e n c e s which t i p the b a l a n c e . Thus i t i s t r u e t h a t the g e n e r a l s t a n d a r d o f m o r a l i t y i n a s o c i e t y w i l l depend on the i n f l u e n c e of l e g i s l a t i o n , government, e d u c a t i o n , e t c . , On the o t h e r hand, w i t h r e g a r d t o p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s , the r e l a t i o n between these i n f l u e n c e s and m o r a l i t y i s not c o n s t a n t : t h e r e w i l l always be some good men i n the most c o r r u p t s o c i e t i e s , some e v i l men i n the s o c i a l systems most conducive t o b e n e f i c e n c e . I f , t h e r e f o r e the p r o p o r t i o n o f good t o e v i l i n a g i v e n s o c i e t y i s t o be i n c r e a s e d , s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l have t o be m o d i f i e d so as t o be more conducive t o b e n e f i c e n c e and j u s t i c e on the p a r t o f i n d i v i d u a l s . But, i n o r d e r t h a t s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s may be changed i n t h i s way, i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t the i n f l u e n c e o f those i n d i v i d u a l s who a l r e a d y d e s i r e t o promote the common w e l f a r e be s t r o n g e r than the i n f l u e n c e of those who have no such commitment. Thus one can c o n s i d e r the moral h i s t o r y of mankind as a s t r u g g l e f o r dominance between opposing f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g b o t h through the i n s t r u m e n t of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e and t h r o u g h the agency of i n d i v i d u a l men. I n t h i s b a t t l e between good and e v i l , the c o l o u r s t o which men r a l l y a r e woven i n t o the f a b r i c of t h e i r d e s t i n y . Few are c o n s t a n t l y f a i t h f u l t o o n l y one s t a n d a r d . Indeed, the b a t t l e r ages w i t h i n each man as w e l l as between men. Such i n t e r n a l s t r u g g l e s c o n s t i t u t e the p r o c e s s of moral c h o i c e . The outcome 284 of this process i s i n each case predetermined. Whether one considers i t to be free or not depends on one's d e f i n i t i o n of freedom. In any case, once one has rejected the notion of a s p i r i t u a l soul, independent of the body and related i n some way to a superior p r i n c i p l e of goodness, the whole question of meta-physical freedom has a quite di f f e r e n t significance. To ask the question whether man can be free i s now to ask whether matter can be free, which i s to say, whether the changes which affect i t take place always according to constant principles or whether there can be random changes. It can be argued that to speak of such randomness as \"freedom\", thereby implying that conformity to constant laws i s \"bondage\", i s merely to apply the analogy of the freeman and the slave to a domain where i t i s no more than a poetical comparison devoid of r e a l v a l i d i t y . Besides, i t i s hard to see why a thinker who desires a victory of good over e v i l i n their eternal contest should see any reason for hope i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of randomness, whether at the sub-atomic l e v e l or at that of human behaviour. As for Diderot, he might possibly have derived hope and comfort from his theory of the two \"procureurs generaux\". There are, he says two \"public prosecutors\"; one i s the o f f i c i a l whose function i s to punish those who break society's laws; the other i s Nature, who punishes those vices which the law does not. 1 In this respect Nature's functions go beyond simply applying the penalty of sickness to vices such as over-indulgence i n sensual 1 Memoires pour Catherine II, ed. Verniere, p. 232. 285 pleasures. She exterminates beings which are incompatible with the general order; she eliminates monsters. 1 Diderot perhaps supposed, or hoped, that Nature eliminated moral as well as 2 physical monsters. But, even i f moral defects do i n fact tend to be eliminated as incompatible with the general order, i s there any necessary r e l a t i o n between moral defects i n this sense and the forces of e v i l ? Is i t only maleficence which suffers this fate? Alas, no. The benefactors of mankind, the \"divins insenses\", are treated no better. Often their s i n g u l a r i t y of character i s associated with a derangement i n their temperament or brain which i s a seed of destruction. Nor are they exempt from the rigours of the laws of men, as the example of Socrates proves. Often, as i n the case of the ancient heroes Curtius, Codrus and Decius, 4 the very n o b i l i t y of these sublime s p i r i t s singles them out for elimination by self-immolation. The two \"public prosecutors\" seem bent on preserving the mediocre mass, easi l y enslaved and ready to e n l i s t as the s e r v i l e minions of enslavers. The monsters, maleficent or beneficent, continue to be produced and eliminated \u00E2\u0080\u0094 and who can t e l l what the outcome of i t a l l w i l l be? For the man who i s committed to the cause of good, the only p r a c t i c a l solution i s to remain hopeful, and continue the f i g h t . 1 Elements de physiologie, ed. Mayer, p. 209. 2 Regarding Diderot's ideas on monsters, physical and moral, see &. Norman laidlaw, \"Diderot's teratology,\" Diderot Studies, IV, 1963, pp. 105-29. 5 Cf. Salon de 1767, AT, XI, 125. 4 For these heroes, see, for example, Refutation d'Helvetius, AT, II, 304, 364, 443. CONCLUSION I s h a l l bring my study to a close by recapitulating the most important aspects of Diderot's e t h i c a l position as I see i t . I have shown that, i n the writings of his maturity, he i s an atheist, a materialist and a determinist, and that on these points he never wavers. He views the p r a c t i c a l consequences of determinism as limited, i f the doctrine i s correctly understood. A l l the various means by which society encourages beneficent conduct r e t a i n their efficacy. As for their \" j u s t i f i c a t i o n \" , while t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s may consider i t unsatisfactory, their objections are i n Diderot's opinion, based on an untenable theory of the w i l l . What separates Diderot from the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s even more than his rejection of f r e e - w i l l i s the great difference between thei r conception of the most desirable way of l i f e for mankind and his own view. Their attitude implies that man i s , i n his indi v i d u a l nature, maleficent; a l l manner of constraints have therefore to be imposed on him to make him amenable to a coopera-tive existence. Diderot r e p l i e s that some of these constraints, p a r t i c u l a r l y those which affect man's enjoyment of sexual pleasures and physical pleasures i n general, are unnecessary to the existence of a satisfactory society. The other kind of constraint, namely the l i m i t a t i o n of individual l i b e r t y necessary to preserve the maximum possible degree of l i b e r t y f or a l l individuals as they pursue their common welfare, need not be imposed from above, but 2 8 7 s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o emanate from the g e n e r a l consensus of i n t e r e s t s of t he members of the s o c i a l group. Indeed, when laws are imposed from above, the g e n e r a l w e l f a r e of a l l i s i n f a c t o n l y a p r e t e x t ; i t i s r e a l l y the s e l f i s h i n t e r e s t s of a s m a l l number o f i n d i v i d u a l s w h i c h a r e s e r v e d . D i d e r o t c o n s t a n t l y c r i t i c i z e s t he a c t u a l s t a t e o f c i v i l i z e d s o c i e t y and wonders whether, i n t h i s form, i t i s not the source of more e v i l t h a n good; but he never doubts t h a t l i f e i n s o c i e t y \u00E2\u0080\u0094 p r o v i d e d t h a t i t i s w e l l - o r d e r e d \u00E2\u0080\u0094 i s always p r e f e r a b l e t o an i s o l a t e d e x i s t e n c e . He f i n d s h i m s e l f t h e r e f o r e f a c e d w i t h the problem o f how t o improve the e x i s t i n g s t a t e of s o c i e t y . Here the i m p o r t a n t and d i f f i c u l t t a s k i s t o weigh the l o n g - t e r m advantages of r e f o r m a g a i n s t the immediate d i s a d v a n t a g e s of f l o u t i n g the e s t a b l i s h e d norms. W i t h r e g a r d t o s e x u a l i t y , he hopes f o r a slow and g r a d u a l r e f o r m o f laws and customs, but the o n l y sound p r i n c i p l e f o r the i n d i v i d u a l t o f o l l o w i n the meantime i s t o adapt h i s conduct t o c i r c u m s t a n c e s , b e h a v i n g i n a more or l e s s emancipated way a c c o r d i n g t o the p r o b a b l e good or e v i l e f f e c t s o f h i s conduct on o t h e r s , and always remembering t o t a k e i n t o account r e a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l needs even when these are t h e u n n a t u r a l p r o d u c t s o f a c e r t a i n type of u p b r i n g i n g . W i t h r e g a r d t o p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s , changes s h o u l d be sought through the r e f o r m o f e x i s t i n g laws r a t h e r than by mass d i s r e g a r d f o r them, s i n c e the absence o f e f f e c t i v e law i n a c i v i l i z e d s o c i e t y i s a g r e a t e v i l . On the o t h e r hand, the overthrow of an e x i s t i n g government by a sudden v i o l e n t movement can sometimes be a good t h i n g , p r o v i d e d t h a t i t 288 r e p l a c e s the p r e v i o u s laws and system of government by b e t t e r ones. When D i d e r o t demands f o r the i n d i v i d u a l t h a t he sh o u l d be f r e e t o de v e l o p a c c o r d i n g t o h i s o r i g i n a l p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , he i s not r e j e c t i n g u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y a l l k i n d s o f s o c i a l l y e x e r t e d i n f l u e n c e s . The i n d i v i d u a l d evelops through the i n t e r a c t i o n o f h i s i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e and the e n v i r o n m e n t a l i n f l u e n c e s t o which he i s s u b j e c t e d . He cannot p o s s i b l y escape t h e s e i n one form or ano t h e r . D i d e r o t ' s demand i s t h a t t hey s h o u l d be conducive t o the development of the n a t u r a l t a l e n t s of the i n d i v i d u a l . W ith r e g a r d t o m o r a l i t y , i f the c h i l d has p r o p e n s i t i e s which tend t o make him a n t i - s o c i a l , t h ey s h o u l d c e r t a i n l y be curbed as f a r as p o s s i b l e ; i f he has a n a t u r a l l e a n i n g towards sympathy and k i n d n e s s , t h e s e t e n d e n c i e s s h o u l d be encouraged and a l l o w e d t o develop f r e e l y . The i d e a l i n a l l cases i s the maximum freedom of i n d i v i -d u a l development which i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the i n t e g r a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l i n t o s o c i e t y . D i d e r o t sees h i s own s o c i e t y as e x e r t i n g an unnecessary degree of r e s t r i c t i o n on the development o f i n d i v i -d u a l s , r e s u l t i n g i n an u n n a t u r a l and u n d e s i r a b l e s i m i l a r i t y between them. Moreover, the s t r u c t u r e o f European s o c i e t y i s based on a h i e r a r c h y of powers i n which a t a l l l e v e l s a u t h o r i t y t a k e s the form o f d o m i n a t i o n of' a g r e a t e r by a s m a l l e r number of i n d i v i d u a l s . Thus s e r v i l i t y i s encouraged and the s p i r i t of independence i s s t i f l e d . D i d e r o t ' s concern f o r the freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l i s p a r t l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o h i s d e s i r e t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l s h o u l d be happy. I t a l s o r e s u l t s i n p a r t from h i s f e e l i n g t h a t i t i s 289 i n t r i n s i c a l l y p r e f e r a b l e f o r a man to be f r e e r a t h e r than enslaved. I do not t h i n k i t would be true to d e s c r i b e the f i r s t of these a t t i t u d e s as e t h i c a l and the second not as e t h i c a l , but as s o l e l y a e s t h e t i c . D i d e r o t t h i n k s that the f r e e , independent, existence i s i n h e r e n t l y more v a l u a b l e than the l i f e which i s c o n s t r a i n e d and s u b s e r v i e n t . I t i s not simply a question of the a e s t h e t i c e f f e c t on an observer, though I would not deny that an a e s t h e t i c element does enter i n t o h i s a t t i t u d e . What we r e a l l y have here are two e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , one based on happiness, the other on d i g n i t y . I do not t h i n k that D i d e r o t makes i t c l e a r what r e l a t i o n s h i p he sees between the two,, except that, i n some men, a sense of d i g n i t y i s i n s e p a r a b l e from happiness. The freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l , as Diderot conceives i t , i s not to be equated with the u n r e s t r a i n e d expression of an i n t e r n a l f o r c e . His i d e a l of the t r u l y f r e e man i s the man who i s f r e e from e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t s because he has not been subjected to unnecessary and a r b i t r a r y r e s t r i c t i o n s and because he v o l u n t a r i l y imposes on h i m s e l f such r e s t r i c t i o n s as are necessary to the existence of a cooperative s o c i e t y . Such a man c o n t r o l s any p o t e n t i a l l y m a l e f i c e n t impulses which e x i s t i n him because he has decided r a t i o n a l l y that he must do so i n order to remain f a i t h f u l to h i s dominant commitment, which i s to cooperate i n the p u r s u i t of the general welfare. I t i s true that D i d e r o t does allow one to suppose that c e r t a i n men a t t a i n the degree of s e l f - m a s t e r y which e n t i t l e s them to be considered as f r e e men without being committed to beneficence, but I do not t h i n k he can be accused of 290 c o n t r a d i c t i n g h i m s e l f i f he c l a i m s t h a t the i d e a l c h a r a c t e r i s one which combines s t r e n g t h , t h a t i s t o say freedom, w i t h b e n e f i -cence and j u s t i c e . Thus D i d e r o t ' s e x a l t a t i o n o f freedom does not i n f a c t i m p l y a r e j e c t i o n of the v a l u e o f such c o n s t r a i n t s as a w e l l - c o n c e i v e d s o c i e t y n e c e s s i t a t e s ; nor does h i s c r i t i c i s m of many of the p r i n c i p l e s of t r a d i t i o n a l e t h i c s mean t h a t he d e n i e s the e x i s t e n c e o f a l l e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . D i d e r o t would perhaps say t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e between h i s view of moral o b l i g a t i o n and t h a t of C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i s t s i s t h a t , w h i l e they a f f i r m t h a t men ought t o behave i n a c e r t a i n way i f they w i s h t o obey the w i l l of God, he h i m s e l f m a i n t a i n s t h a t men ought t o behave i n a c e r t a i n way i f they w i s h t o promote the g e n e r a l w e l f a r e . D i d e r o t would, of c o u r s e , l i k e t o d i s p e n s e w i t h such l i m i t i n g r e f e r e n c e s t o the g e n e r a l w e l f a r e . I have shown how he makes e l a b o r a t e attempts t o demonstrate a u n i v e r s a l moral i m p e r a t i v e which depends o n l y on the c o n d i t i o n \" i f the i n d i v i d u a l w ishes t o be happy.\" I f one c o u l d then assume t h a t a l l i n d i v i d u a l s cannot but w i s h t o be happy, one would a r r i v e a t an i m p e r a t i v e w h i c h c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d as c a t e g o r i c a l r a t h e r than merely c o n d i t i o n a l . D i d e r o t f a i l s , no doubt, i n t h i s attempt, and I have i n d i c a t e d t h a t he h i m s e l f i s aware o f h i s f a i l u r e , though he cannot b r i n g h i m s e l f t o admit t h a t i t i s d e f i n i t i v e o r r e s i g n h i m s e l f t o a c c e p t i n g i t e m o t i o n a l l y . But are the C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i s t s i n any b e t t e r p o s i t i o n ? E i t h e r they admit t h a t t h e i r e t h i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s u l t i m a t e l y r e s t on what D i d e r o t would see as 291 the u n p r o v a b l e assumption t h a t man ought t o obey God, or e l s e they attempt t o j u s t i f y t h e i r i m p e r a t i v e s by a p p e a l i n g t o the concept of human n a t u r e , i n which case they must i n e v i t a b l y f i n d themselves f a c e d w i t h the same problems encountered by D i d e r o t . I doubt i f D i d e r o t ' s p l a c e i n the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y w i l l ever be a p p r e c i a b l y g r e a t e r than i t has been h i t h e r t o , i f o n l y because o f the l a b o u r o f c o l l a t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which i s demanded b e f o r e one can a r r i v e , a t a view of h i s thought i n i t s t o t a l i t y . I n the f i e l d o f e t h i c s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , much u n c e r t a i n t y must i n e v i t a b l y remain where so much i n t e r p r e t a t i v e c l a r i f i c a t i o n has been n e c e s s a r y . The academic p h i l o s o p h e r w i l l a l s o be j u s t i f i e d i n f i n d i n g a g r e a t d e f i c i e n c y i n the l o g i c a l form of some of D i d e r o t ' s arguments and may be excused f o r not w i s h i n g t o ta k e the t r o u b l e t o s u p p l y h a l f of the n e c e s s a r y assumptions from h i s o t h e r w r i t i n g s . Even when a l l due a l l o w a n c e i s made f o r d e f e c t s i n the form r a t h e r than i n the substance of h i s thought, i t must s t i l l p r o b a b l y be concluded t h a t D i d e r o t i s s i l e n t or inadequate on many problems which moral p h i l o s o p h e r s c o n s i d e r i m p o r t a n t . I n support o f h i s c l a i m t o a p l a c e i n the h i s t o r y of moral p h i l o -sophy, one can, however, a t l e a s t say w i t h some assurance t h a t h i s m e d i t a t i o n on man's moral n a t u r e i s more f a r - r e a c h i n g , o r i g i n a l and profound than t h a t of any o t h e r e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h e r . 292 F o r the g e n e r a l r e a d e r , on the o t h e r hand, D i d e r o t ' s thought i s p r o b a b l y a l l the more s t i m u l a t i n g p r e c i s e l y because of i t s l a c k o f s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n , i t s o f t e n s t r i k i n g l y p a r a d o x i c a l form of e x p r e s s i o n and i t s c o n s t a n t e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n i n f i c t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s and c h a r a c t e r s . I t s r e l e v a n c e t o the predicament of t w e n t i e t h -c e n t u r y man no doubt a l s o goes f a r toward e x p l a i n i n g i t s c u r r e n t a p p e a l . D i d e r o t ' s r e f l e c t i o n s on s e x u a l m o r a l i t y , on p o l i t i c a l freedom and on e q u a l i t y b e f o r e the law speak d i r e c t l y t o those men who today r e c o g n i z e the need f o r s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and moral change, but who f e a r t h a t i n the p r o c e s s v a l u a b l e elements of the t r a d i t i o n a l o r d e r may be l o s t . H i s doubts r e g a r d i n g the i n c r e a s e i n g e n e r a l human happi n e s s r e s u l t i n g from what i s commonly c a l l e d p r o g r e s s a g a i n s t r i k e a r e m a r k a b l y modern n o t e . We may be s u r e t h a t he would e n t e r t a i n s i m i l a r doubts r e g a r d i n g those modern advances i n t e c h n o l o g y , i n c o m p l e x i t y o f economic o r g a n i -z a t i o n and i n the e x p l o i t a t i o n o f the e a r t h ' s n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s w hich have c r e a t e d as many problems as they have s o l v e d . D i d e r o t b e l i e v e d t h a t , i f men knew t h a t the w o r l d was to be d e s t r o y e d i n a thousand y e a r s ' t i m e , they would l o s e a l l m o t i v a t i o n t o s t r i v e f o r g r e a t achievements and would c o n t e n t themselves w i t h p l a n t i n g t h e i r cabbages. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o s p e c u l a t e what he would t h i n k today when a thousand y e a r s seems an o p t i m i s t i c e s t i m a t e of the f u t u r e of mankind. Perhaps he would p o i n t out t h a t most people are b l i n d t o the danger, and t h a t t h i s i s b o t h a good t h i n g and a bad t h i n g , s i n c e i t enables men t o c a r r y on w i t h t h e i r u s u a l a c t i v i t i e s undismayed, w h i l e a t the same time making the e v e n t u a l d i s a s t e r s t i l l more p r o b a b l e . 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