"Arts, Faculty of"@en . "Anthropology, Department of"@en . "DSpace"@en . "UBCV"@en . "Ma, Sen"@en . "2010-03-06T00:18:40Z"@en . "1977"@en . "Doctor of Philosophy - PhD"@en . "University of British Columbia"@en . "This study examines the movement to establish and consolidate rural people's communes in China during the period 1958-1965. It concentrates on the development and consolidation of people's communes in the northern province of Shandong.\r\nThe thesis argues that there are two trends in contemporary theories of Third World Development. One sees the development of Third World countries as a process of economic moves through adoption of advanced western technology and by the transformation of social institutions according to the features of ideal type of the western model. The other suggests that the development of Third World countries is not merely a process of economic growth, but is conditioned both by their respective historical backgrounds and the world-system. It is argued that China subscribes to the latter version of development theory. It is suggested that, historically, Chinese society followed a particular path of development. The western impact on China gradually brought about the disintegration of the traditional society. Chinese development strategy after 1949, especially after the establishment of the people's communes, is distinctive and differs not only from the dominant mode of development in China's past, but also from the modes in advanced societies of western Europe and North America, and the Third World in general.\r\nThe people's commune is considered as possessing an identifiable structure and subject to a process of growth and change. Its development is seen as a response to basic economic realities and also, to an important degree, to human decision-making. It is argued that the commune system is at the center of China's strategy for rural development.\r\nWithin the context of Shandong, the development of the people's commune is seen through an analysis of agricultural production, local industry, building of water conservancy, as well as changes in family institutions. The analysis of this study shows that the characteristics of the development of the people's communes during 1958-1965 manifest in two major aspects. First, development planning aims at resolving certain peasant problems which are a heritage of the traditional mode of economic development in China, and to fulfill modernization and some specific ideological goals. Secondly, the development of the people's communes helps to retain the traditional structure of rural community. The latter is essentially found in the features of self-control and self-sufficiency in political and economic life in the people's communes, and also in the development of human relations.\r\nThe major sources of this study consist of documentary research, i.e., Chinese local and national newspapers of the period under study, and magazines of the same period. Interviews of \u00E9migr\u00E9s were also used as supplementary sources."@en . "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/21629?expand=metadata"@en . "THE RURAL PEOPLE'S COMMUNES IN SHANDONG PROVINCE, 1958-1965 A MODEL OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT by ) MA SEN M.A. , Taiwan Normal University, 1959 Doctorate Candidate, University de Paris, 1966 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Anthropology and Sociology University of British Columbia We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 1977 Ma Sen, : 1977 In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i sh Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree ly ava i lab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thesis f o r scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives . It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th is thesis fo r f inanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my writ ten permission. Department of Anthropology and Sociology The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date 30 December 1977 ABSTRACT This study examines the movement to establish and consolidate rural people's communes in China during the period 1958-1965. It concentrates on the development and consolidation of people's communes in the northern province of Shandong. The thesis argues that there are two trends in contemporary theories of Third World Development. One sees the development of Third World countries as a process of economic moves through adoption of advanced western technology and by the trans-formation of social institutions according to the features of ideal type of the western model. The other suggests that the development of Third World countries is not merely a process of economic growth, but is conditioned both by their respective historical backgrounds and the world-system. It is argued that China subscribes to the latter version of development theory. It is suggested that, historically, Chinese society followed a particular path of development. The western impact on China gradually brought about the disintegration of the traditional society. Chinese development strategy after 1949, especially after the establishment of the people's communes, is distinctive and differs not only from the dominant mode of development in China's past, but also from the modes in advanced societies of western Europe and North America, and the Third World in general. The people's commune is considered as possessing an identifiable structure and subject to a process of growth and change. Its development is seen as a response to basic economic realities and also, to an important degree, to human decision-making. It is argued that the commune system is at the center of China's strategy for rural development. Within the context of Shandong, the development of the people's commune is seen through an analysis of agricultural production, local industry, building of water conservancy, as well as changes in family institutions. The analysis of this study shows that the characteristics of the development of the people's communes during 1958-1965 manifest in two major aspects. First, development planning aims at resolving certain peasant problems which are a heritage of the traditional mode of economic development in China, and to fulfill modernization and some specific ideolo-gical goals. Secondly, the development of the people's communes helps to retain the traditional structure of rural community. The latter is essentially found in the features of self-control and self-sufficiency in political and economic life in the people's communes, and also in the development of human relations. The major sources of this study consist of documentary research, i .e. , Chinese local and national newspapers of the period under study, and magazines of the same period. Interviews of Emigres were also used as supplementary sources. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page Abstract ii List of 11 lustrations ix Preface and Acknowledgments xiii Chinese Units Used in This Thesis xvi Note on Transliteration xvii Chronology of the Commune Movement xviii One Introduction 1 I The Methodology of This Study 2-20 A . Method of Data Selection 20 B. Method of Analysis 23 II The Objective and Scope of This Study 24 A . The Objectives of This Study 24 B. The Limitations of This Study 24 C. The Organization of this Study. 27 Two An Approach to Chinese Society from the Historical Perspective 29 I The Traditional Stage (Before 1840) 29 A . Political Structure 38 B. Mode of Production 39 C. Values and Goals 41 II The Transitional Stage (1840-1949) 43 III The Socialist Stage (1949 Onward) 45 Three The People's Commune Movement in China 49 I The Prelude to the People's Commune Movement 49 V Table of Contents - continued Chapter Page II The Evolution of the System of the People's Commune 62 A . The First Stage - Period of Confusion - April 1958 to December, 1958 62 B. The Second Stage - Period of Crisis - January 1959 to July 1959 68 C. The Third Stage - Period of Regression - August 1959 to August 1962 71 D. The Fourth Stage - Period of Consolidation -September 1962 to 1965 73 III Summary 75 Four General Background for the Rural Economy in Shandong Before the Establishment of the People's Communes , 78 1 I Geographical 0and Historical. .Background 78 II Recent History in Shandong and Theoretical Interpretations of Economic Development 84 A. Recent History in Shandong 84 1. Invasion of imperialistic powers 85 2. Peasant rebellions 86 3. Acceleration of class polarization 87 4. Civil wars 89 B. Theoretical Interpretations of Economic Development 90 III On the Eve of Communization in Shandong 96 Five Structure of the People's Commune (1) : Organization and Leadership.. 105 I Size 105 II Organization 113 A . Administrative Organization 115 B. Party Control 117 III Leadership 121 A . Definition and Categorization of Leaders 121 B. Functions of Party Leaders and Administrative Leaders 126 C. Social Origin and Emergence of Leaders 129 D. Procedure of Becoming Leaders 133 E. Disciplines of Cadres 135 F. Methods in Leading 136 vi Table of Contents - continued Chapter. Page G . Shortage of Rural Leaders 141 H. Morale Maintenance of the Rural Leaders 143 IV Socialist Education 145 A . Definition 145 B. Policy 146 C. Principle 147 D. Methods 148 V Summary 154 Six Structure of the People's Commune (II) : Ownership and Management... 158 I Ownership 158 A . Public Ownership (gong-you) 158 B. Collective Ownership and Ownership by the Whole People.... 161 C . Three Level Ownership With the Production Brigade as the Foundation 166 D. Three Level Ownership With the Production Team as the Foundation 170 E. An Example of Ownership 172 II Management 175 A . Units of Management 176 1. Three level management with emphasis on the commune.... 176 2. Three level management with emphasis on the production brigade and production team 182 0. summary 190 B. Methods of Management 191 C. Summary 200 Seven Structure of the People's Commune (III) : Accounting and Distribution... 201 I Accounting 201 A . Basic Unit of Accounting 201 B. How was Accounting Done? 204 1. How was the accounting system practically set up in the people's commune? 204 2. The accounting scheme 205 C. An Example of Accounting 209 vii Table of Contents - continued Chapter Page II Distribution 211 A . Policies 211 1. First phase 211 2. Second phase 215 B. Work-Point System 216 1. \"Basic point\" system (di-fen-zhi) 217 2. \"Norms of Work\" system (ding-e zhi) 218 3. Dazhai system 220 4. An example of work-point system 221 C. A Few Remarks Concerning the Distribution 222 D. Examples of Remuneration (two case studies) 230 1. Comparison of remuneration between East Hao Production Team and West Hao Production Team of the Yingzi People's Commune, Linju County. 230 2. Peasant remuneration of the Second Production Team of the Caopo Brigade 232 III Conclusion of the Structure of the People's Commune 235 A . Utilization of the Pre-Existing Structure 236 B. Structural Differences Between the Commune and the Advanced Cooperative 236 C. A Significant Feature of the Commune System 238 Eight Local Industrialization 239 I Industrial Backgrounds in Shandong 239 A . Industrial History 239 B. Development of the Local Industry Before the Establishment of the People's Commune 242 II An Upsurge in the Building of Local Industry (1958-1959) 245 A . Policies 245 B. High Tide of Xian-she Industry - Five Case Studies 248 III The Ebbing of Local Industry (1960-1962) 262 A . New Contradictions versus Old Contradictions 262 1. Competition for the labor force between local industry and agriculture 263 2. Waste of capital investment 265 3. Quantitative pursuit of local industry 265 4. Multiple movements dispersing human force 266 5. Confusion of leadership in the industrial enterprises 267 B. De-emphasis on Local Industry 268 C. Limitations Imposed on Local Industry 269 viii Table of Contents - continued Chapter Page IV The Changing Direction of Local Industry (1963-1965) 271 A . The Spread of Technical Groups 271 B. Mechanization. 273 C. Sideline Production 275 1. Collective Sideline Production 276 2. Household and individual sideline production 278 V Summary 280 Nine Water Conservancy 283 I Construction of Water Conservancy in Shandong 283 A . Natural Conditions 283 B. Construction by the Masses 287 C. Efforts of the State 294 II Construction of Water Conservancy in Three Production Brigades of the Gufengtai People's Commune, Yishui County : A Case Study on Labor Accumulation 297 A . Construction of Water Conservancy and Field Works in Three Production Brigades (Zhangjiarongren, Shagou and Xiwangzhuang) 297 B. Utilization of Underemployed Labor Force 298 C. Labor Accumulation and Members' Income Distribution 304 1. Financial responsibility for basic construction 304 2. Labor employment for basic construction and income distribution 306 D. Significance of Labor Accumulation in the Development of the Rural Economy 309 E. Summary 311 III Construction of Water Conservancy in the Xia Dingjia Production Brigade, Da Lujia People's Commune, Huang County : A Case Study on Water Conseryancy 312 A . Physical Setting 312 B. Construction of Water Conservancy 313 C. Basic Construction of Field Works 314 D. Ref orestat ion 316 E. Other Measures for Increasing Output 316 F;. Result of the Water Conservancy and Field Works - Increased Output in Agriculture and Sideline Production 319 G . Investment in Water Conservancy and Field Works 320 H. Driving Force Behind the Scene 322 i x Table of Contents - continued Chapter Page IV Summary 324 Ten Economic Development in the People's Communes (Three Case Studies) 328 I The Case of Xiyou People's Commune, Ye County 328 A . Economic Development 328 1. Basic construction, commune industry and mechanization.... 328 2. The technical revolution 330 3. Development of agricultural production and improvement of members' income 332 B. Social Development 333 1. Welfare and health services 333 2. Education 333 3. Change in leadership 334 C. Significance of the Commune System in the Socioeconomic Development of the Xiyou Commune 336 II The Case of Dongguo Production Brigade, Lingcheng People's Commune, Qufu County 338 A . Focus in Promoting Agricultural Production 338 1. Improving field conditions 338 2. Improving crop strains 339 B. Results of the Agricultural Output 340 C. Dongguo Brigade as a Model 341 III The Case of Taojiakuang Brigade, The Municipality People's Commune of the Weihai Municipality 342 A . Multiple Managements with Grain Production as Foundation... 342 B. The \"Directed Development\" and the People's Commune 344 Eleven Social Development in the People's Commune : Changes and Continuity in Family Structure 347 I Family and Household 347 II Kinship Network 351 III Marriage 353 A . Age of Marriage 353 B. Betrothal 354 C. Wedding 359 XII List of Illustrations - continued Tables Page 9.8 Income of Households by Strength of Laborers for 1964 in the Second Production Team, Xiwangzhuang Brigade 308 9.9 Comparison of Output in the Three Brigades Between 1957 and 1964 310 9.10 Comparison of Reserve Funds Between 1957 and 1964 in the Three Brigades 311 9.11 Comparison of Per Unit Yield by Crops, Soil Condition and Field Work in Xia Dingjia Brigade 315 9.12 Per Unit Output of Food Grains in Xia Dingjia Brigade from 1959 to 1964 in Comparison with That of 1957 319 10.1 Comparison of Elementary and Middle School Graduates Between 1949 and 1960 in Houlu Brigade 334 Charts 5.1 Organizational Division of Xingfu People's Commune 119 5.2 Organizational Division of Taiqian People's Commune (Shouzhang County) 120 Maps Map 1 Shandong Province (showing topography) 79 Map 2 Shandong Province (showing counties) 85 xiii r -PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In speaking of the Chinese people's communes, one of the first western researchers to have been interested in this subject has said: \"Over a fifth of mankind live in people's communes. To turn a blind eye to such a social organism is to deny a primary fact of twentieth-century life. \" (Crook, 1965 : xi). However, the difficulty of access to field investigation in China did not facilitate the outsider sociologists and anthropologists in their task of collecting system-atic data at first hand during the first years of the people's communes. Only in the last few years wlhen China has become relatively more open than before and when documentary data about the people's communes has been accumulated abroad, have outsiders been able to undertake research on the commune movement. Among the researches of the Chinese commune, attention has been one-sidedly concentrated on one province, Guangdong, at the expense of all others, due to the unequal availability of data by geographical areas. In order to have a better under-standing of the commune movement and system in China, it is strongly desirable to extend the studies'to as large an area as possible. With its natural and historical idiosyncrasies, each province can add some particularities in some aspects to the common pool of know-ledge about the communes. The difficulty of data collection is indeed an obstacle to studying the less accessible areas, but it is nevertheless not insurmountable. This study is an attempt to scrutinize one area which has not so far been touched in this connection, in the hope that it will be a contribution to the common knowledge of the commune movement. Ir is no exaggeration to say that ail results of research come from the direct and indirect contribution and efforts of many people. Without the support of a multi-tude of institutions and the wise advice and kind help of a host of people, this disserta-tion could not have been completed. First I should like to express my gratitude to those institutions that have sup-ported me in various domains: The Department of Anthropology and Sociology of the University of British Columbia has provided me with an adequate training in sociology; the Department of Asi:an Studies of the same University has resolved my financial prob-lem's by kindly offering me some courses to teach during my sociological study; the Canada Council granted me a fellowship which made my fieldwork possible; and the Universities Service Center and the Union Research Institute of Hong Kong have both helped me greatly in my data collection. Secondly, I am deeply indebted to many professors of the University of British Columbia and a large number of friends. I owe a great deal to Dr. Grahem E. Johnson, the chairman of my dissertation committee, who has not only directed my study, but has also listened patiently to my complaints during my moments of frustration. I should also mention his kindness in making available to me his private library. I must express my thanks to Dr. Yun S. Chang, Dr. Tissa Fernando, Dr. Edgar Wickberg and Dr. Marwin Samuel who have all given me invaluable critical comments and suggestions, helping me greatly to shape the direction of this dissertation. To' two professors I owe a special intellectual debt. Professor Michael Ames brought me closer to the contemporary thought of social science, including both conservative and radical. Professor Cyril Belshaw has incessantly encouraged fne to think independently and has helped me a great deal in shaping my own thinking in the theory of development. I cannot forget , XV Dr. William Willm'ott who was the one who encouraged students of social science to use their imaginations and to rid themselves, of academic narrowness in thinking and outlook. My friends, Dr. Jan Walls of the University of British Columbia, Dr. Lee Yun-kuang and Professor Meng Chuang-ming of the Hong Kong Chinese University, Professor Chuang Shen of the Hong Kong University, and Mr. Wang Ching-hsi, Director and Publisher of the \"Perspective Review\" and Literary Publishing House in Hong Kong deserve my thanks for offering me additional information, and their concern for and encouragement of my research work. My thanks are also due to Mr. John Dolfin, Director, Mr. Lau Yee-fui, librarian, and other staff members of the Universities Service Center in Hong Kong for their having facilitated my research during my fieldwork. I should like to thank my friend Roger Langford for his patience in sitting down with me to read my manuscript and to polish my English, and Mrs. Ellen Moore for her kind help in typing the manuscript. Finally, I feel grateful to so many people who have helped me and encouraged me in the undertaking of this study in different ways, and only regret that space does not permit me to name them all. By mutual agreement I cannot mention the names of my informants, although I would like to express my gratitude to them. Last but not least I thank Annick, who has kindly taken the entire charge of our children to permit me to be free in my research. Needless to say, I alone am responsible for all errors and imperfections of this study. xv i CHINESE UNITS USED IN THIS STUDY II Governmental Administration: Sheng Xian Shi Xiang Zhen Curi> or Zhuang II Communal Units: Ren-min gong-she Sheng-chan da-dui Sheng-chen xiao-dui Province County Municipality Township Town Village People's commune Production brigade Production team Measurement: MU.J -, ?\" 6 mu = 1 acre Jin 15 mu = 1 hectare 1.1 pounds 0.5 kilograms IV Currency: Yuan U.S.$ 0.382 (February 1965 official exchange rate) xvii Note on transliteration: The transliteration of Chinese words, whether they are names or special terms used in this study, is in the pin-yin system, except for a few well-known names such as Mao Tse-tung and Peking. The reasons for using pin-yin instead of other systems are manifold. First, with pin-yin the pronunciation of the Chinese words will be more accurate than with other systems. Second, pin-yin is the official system of latinizing the Chinese language in China and has been adopted by almost all the Chinese language teachers in the world (except in Taiwan) in teaching Chinese. The students who have some interests in China will certainly know this system better than others in the future. Third, in Europe most of the newly published books have used pin-yin to transliterate Chinese words. In North America, there are also a few students of China who have begun to adopt pin-yin in their published works. Therefore, it is worthwhile promoting the utilization of pin-yin to gradually replace the other less accurate systems. However, in order to help the readers who are not familiar with this system, the corresponding transliteration in Wade-Giles will be added in the glossary. CHRONOLOGY OF THE COMMUNE MOVEMENT April, 1958 August 3-13, 1958 August ,17-30, 1958 End of August, 1958 September 1, 1958 September 10, 1958 November 2-10, 1958 November 21427, 1958 November 28-December 10, 1958 December 10, 1958 December 19, 1958 February, 1959 April, 1959 Establishment of the Weixing People's Commune .Mao Tse-tung's inspection tour in Hbbei, Shandong and Honan Mao said: \"We had better set up the People's Cormunes! \" Beidaiho enlarged meeting of the Politboro announcing formation of the people's communes High tide of the commune movement Publication of the Draft of the Experimental Regulations of the Weixing People's Commune, Chaya Mountain, Honan in Hong-qi (No. 7, 1958); Publication of the Beidaiho Resolution in RMRB Meeting in Zhengzhou, Honan Meeting in Wuchang, Hubei Sixth Plenum of the Eightth Central Committee of the CCP Resolution adopted by the Eight Central Committee of the CCP at its Sixth Plenum in Wuchang, Hubei Publication of the \"Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Commune\" (Wuchang Resolution) in RMRB, which called for the rectification of the communes Enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CCP in Zhengzhou, Honan, to revise the rectification of the communes Seventh Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in Shanghai The resolution of the enlarged meeting of the Politburo in Zhengzhou in February was approved, but no detailed report of it was published xix August 2-16, 1959 Eighth Plenum in Lushan November, 1960 January, 1961 Decision on three-level system of ownership in communes with the production brigade as the foundation; Marshall Peng De-huai and associates dismissed from Ministry of National Defence for their criticism of the commune movement The \"Twelve Articles of Emergency Directives for Work in the Countryside\" is issued by the Central Committee of the CCP (not publicly published) Confirmation of the three level ownership with the production brigade as the foundation; private plots are allowed to be returned to members of the commune; rural markets are allowed to be re-opened Ninth Plenum Announcement of full retreat on the economic front March, 1961 September, 1962 \"Draft of the Regulation for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes\" (Sixty Articles) iis Issued (not published); the production team gains more importance in ownership and management Tenth Plenum The \"Revised Draft of the Regulation for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes\" is issued (not published); consolidation of the commune system; three level ownership and management with the production team as the basic unit of accounting. Chapter One INTRODUCTION From the point of view of development, the contemporary world can be divided into at least three large categories of models: the western model, the Soviet model and the model (or models) of the Third World (Horowitz, 1972). China, in this classification, occupies an ambiguous and undetermined position. From the ideological and political point of view, she should be a member of the bloc of the Soviet model in spite of her divergence of views with the Soviet leaders; but from the point of view of her socio-economic conditions, she shares many traits in common with the countries of the Third Worl'dv1 The western model and the Soviet model can be well defined by specific features in their development. The Third World as a whole is difficult to define owing to a large range of diversity in race, culture, history and social and economic institutions of the countries included in it. Indeed, the Third World cannot be considered as one model but, rather, a set of models of development. Since the establishment of the people's communes in 1958, China has become increasingly different, as much from the Soviet model as from those of the Third World. This study is an attempt to discuss the Chinese case as a parti-cular model of development through an examination of the development of agricultural communes in Shandong province from 1958 to 1965. ^ This is the reason why Horowitz has so much hesitation in placing China in the Third World category and finally gave China the status of marginal membership (Horowitz, 1972 : 17). 1 2-20 I THE METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY The methodology used during this study is conditioned by my theoretical frame-work on the one hand, and by the availableidata on the other. A . Method of Data Selection In the beginning, the writer hoped to do fieldwork in China but, as this was not possible, he had to be content with fieldwork in Hong Kong. That meant gathering information by documentary research, and by interviewing emigres1. Due to the actual circumstances in Hong Kong, the main body of data for this study comes from document-ary-research. Both the documentary research and interviews with \u00C2\u00A3migresi have posed certain technical problems. The problems relevant to the interviews will be found in Appendix I. Here, I confine myself to the technical problems of the documentary research. First, the problem of diversity of primary sources: Michel Oksenberg has classified the primary sources for research on contemporary China into five categories: (1) the press, and monitored radio broadcasts of the Peoples' Republic of China; (2) interviews with, and publications of former residents of China; (3) accounts by visitors to China;; (4) Chinese fiction (particularly novels and short stories); and (5) secret Chinese documents obtained and released by agencies outside China (Oksenberg, 1969 : 577-606). Oksenberg has rightly advised the students of China to use different sources in order not to be biased by any one of these sources. Although sometimes the material conditions do not provide enough means or the time for a researcher to exhaust all sources, Oksen-berg's advice cannot be overlooked. In my case, the main bulk of information came from the first and the fifth categories. However, the other three categories have played a 'checking' role in my study. My interviews with emigres have been a very useful source to testify and to supplement, to some extent, my documentary data. I have also used the accounts of visitors to China in the same way. I have not directly used any source from Chinese fiction, but this does not mean that I have not employed some of them indirectly. Because one of my specialities is Chinese fiction, my knowledge in this domain forms a background for testing all other relevant sources. Another advantage for me is that I have sufficient competence in Chinese language to look directly into the original documents so that I could avoid the stylization of the translators of the United States Consulate in Hong Kong, who certainly had their own policy in the selec-tion of translations. Secondly, discontinuity of information constitutes a difficult problem for all 2 researchers of China. Since 1960 not only have local newspapers not been exported, but the national newspapers and reviews have, for a long while, been less informative. I have relied mostly on local newspapers for the period 1958-1959, on national news-papers for the period 1960-1961, and on secret documents released outside China, Hong Kong news, and interviews for the period thereafter. The discontinuity of information has constituted an important handicap in constructing a continuing picture of develop-ment of some units to be studied, which I have only partially overcome. Thirdly, how to evaluate data is another crucial technical problem. As John S. Aird reported, the statistical work during the GLF period became \"creative\" and ^For the four local newspapers of Shandong Province, the DZRB ceased to appear in the Union Research Institute Collection in October, 1958, the YTRB in August, 1958, the QDRB was only seen in one issue in October, 1959, and the JNRB in one issue in January, 1958. 22 played a major role in promoting the production enthusiasm of the masses (Aird, 1972). Some statistical figures of this period might be more fictive than real. The principal method of evaluating the validity of data is to compare it with, and to test it by other sources. Sometimes intuition is also useful. But competence in evaluating data can, after all, only be achieved through experience, and when you have become familiar enough with the subject to be studied. I have put aside much data during my study due to my doubts about their validity. But this does not guarantee that I have not misused some questionable ones owing to fallibility. My documentary research was conducted mainly in the Union Research Institute in Hong Kong. Some documents were gathered from Hong Kong University Library, Hong Kong Chinese University Library (section of the United College), Hoover Institution Library, and the University of British Columbia Asian Studies Library. With regard to the studies of the people's commune in China, only the documents concerning Guangdong Province up to 1967 were recorded and classified (Baum, 1968). The documents concern-ing other provinces were widely dispersed; the enormous collection of the Union Research !nstitutk>n, therefore, constitutes an untapped gold mine for future researchers who are interested in the commune problems of provinces other than Guangdong. For my research, the data gathered are too much and, at the same time, not sufficient - too much because of some data which I judged relevant at the beginning, such as those concerning social control and political education, which I later found could not fit into my schema of study, and could be separate studies in themselves. It is in-sufficient because some crucial problems could not be adequately explained without the due amount of information. It should also be pointed out that the main weakness of these data is that they cannot equally cover all the counties of the province to be studied, nor can they be considered representative as an average. Most of the documents that I 23 found are related to a few eommunes or production brigades which were regarded as exemplary in production or organization. This means that documents about the under-productive communes and brigades are lacking. However, because those model units have pioneered the way in the recent development of China, the abovementioned draw-backs cannot affect much of their representative quality concerning the main trend of development in China. B. Method of Analysis Although development is a process of growth and change, it occurs within a certain structure. At the analytical level, this structure has first to be considered as somewhat static in order that it can be described. Talcott Parsons said: Any ordinary system, therefore, is capable of description as on the one hand a structure, a set of units or components with, for the purposes in hand, stable properties, which of course may be relat-ional, and on the other hand of events, of processes, in the course of which \"somethLngxhap'pens-htoicchangejspmesprbperties and some relations among them (Parsons, 1964 : 84). In order to combine the description of structure and that of development, the method used in this study is a combination of those used by the structural-functionalists and historians. First, the communeais viewed as a system which is described as an amal-gamation of related functional parts. Secondly, the process of development is presented mostly by case-studies. In each case-study, some particular aspects of growth and change will be emphasized and interpreted in the light of the proposed theory. But the commune movement, as a whole, will be situated in an historical perspective to throw the signifi-cance of the commune movement as a particular model of development into relief.' 24 II THE OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THIS STUDY This section will deal first with what the writer attempts to achieve with this study, and then with the limits of the study, both temporal and spatial. Following this will be a brief introduction to how the study is organized. A . The Objectives of the Study The purpose of this study will be to attempt an interpretation of the Chinese commune movement from the point of view of development. This interpretation will be done by a description of events of the movement and by analysis of the people's commune as a system. The interpretation will be guided by the theory which I have proposed in this chapter. The final purpose is to single out the Chinese commune movement as a meaningful model of development among other models in the world in the light of its particular features manifested during the process of development, and its particular goals to be pursued. B. The Limitations of This Study When sociologists are scrutinizing a part of a social system, their final interests are nevertheless in the whole. To scrutinize the parts is to look into how these parts are related to the whole. For the purpose of research, any system has to be abstracted as a model of ideal type. In doing so, only the features which are considered crucial in the whole structure through the researcher's perception will be singled out. Thus, the parts under scrutinization only reflect the researcher's perception. The. degree of the near-ness between the abstracted ideal type and the reality depends upon this perception which is conditioned by the researcher's competence and the adequateness of the theory he has chosen for his research. This is the first limitation for every researcher, as it is for me. Following this, the researcher has to choose the unit of study. A unit must first possess the same characteristics as the whole, and, secondly, have an adequate size. That is to say, it must not be too big for the researcher to handle, or small enough to lose its representative quality. For the study of the Chinese society, thirty-odd years ago, Radc I iff e-Brown considered the village as the most suitable unit of study (Radcliffe-Brown, 1936). Thirty years later, Maurice Freedman expressed his feelings of dissatisfaction with Radcliffe-Brown's suggestion and encouraged anthropologists who worked on China to aim at the total society (Freedman, 1963a). G . William Skinner argues similarly by suggesting that the concentration in research on village has obscured the significance of the Chinese case (Skinner, 1964). Indeed, in any complex society, a village is too small to be taken as a unit of researcher if the researcher is to aim at an understanding of the society as a whole. How-ever, to take a whole country as the unit of study, especially one of such a size as China, is technically impossible. Thetefore, a choice of unit of study becomes necessary before undertaking any research. In the case of the commune movement, a single commune is no doubt too small as a unit of study, because no comparison between communes and no relations between the commune and a larger structure are possible to establish. A whole province is presumably too large for a researcher to handle. The adequate size is, in my view, the county. A county which has some twenty communes provides for the re-searcher a large range of possibilities for study such as comparison, ranking, relating, etc. 26 Unfortunately, sometimes the choice is not merely a subjective matter depending on the researcher's good will. It depends, for the time being, more upon the availability of data than upon any other factors. In my case, finding that no single county could provide enough data for a study of this kind, I was obliged to take a unit of study as large as a province. But why did I choose Shandong rather than others? In the beginning, the choice was based simply on personal interest as a native of that province, and on the consideration that I should better know its general conditions than those in other pro-vinces. However, I found, later in my research, other justifications for my choice of Shandong as the unit of study. First, Shandong is a province which shares many common traits with the other provinces in North China such as Hobei, Honan, Shanxi, Shanxi and the northern part of Jiangsu. Secondly, Shandong is very representative in the solution of Chinese peasant problems. These two points will be discussed further in Chapter Four and Chapter Twelve. Following the geographical limitation, there necessarily comes a temporal limita-tion. I have previously mentioned that any process of development can only be observed over a relatively long period of time. For an anthropologist, if his study is related to a relatively stable society, a year may be adequate time for observing the whole range of activities and events. But such is not the case in the commune movement. The latter experienced vital turns during the first years of its inception. The commune of 1960 was diffenent&om that of 1958-1959, and that of 1962 from that of 1960-1961. Only after 1962 did the commune system seem to become relatively stable. That is the reason why seven years is covered in my study. The years between 1962 and 1965 permit me enough time to observe the movement in a stable phase of evolution after the system had been readjusted. The reason for stopping my observation at 1965 is that after that year the Cultural Revolution started. The period of Cultural Revolution, a revolution which is political rather than economic by nature, should be considered as a separate stage from the period I have chosen to deal with. C . The Organization of This Study In the foregoing discussion, it was suggested that the commune movement is best treated as both a system and a dynamic evolution, and that the whole picture is meaning-ful only when it is located in the long course of history. There are, therefore, three component parts which are of importance in this study: system, evolution and history. While the first two parts constitute the main body of the study, the third one provides the background. With a concern for logic and chronology, the last part has to be presented first. The background will thus be introduced in the first three chapters following the introduc-tion. Chapter Two will provide an historical approach to the development of the Chinese society as a whole. This will be seen in a series of sequential stages. The idiosyncratic features of the Chinese society and those of each stage will be emphasized. Chapter Three will introduce the commune movement in China on a national scale. In order to make its evolutionary line as clear as possible, the movement will be approached by stages. The geographical and historical backgrounds particular to Shandong and relevant to the commune movement will be discussed in Chapter Four. The second part, also consisting of three chapters, will deal with the commune as a system. A system is always composed of related parts. These parts will be described separately. However, due attention will be paid to the relationships between these parts on the one hand, and between the parts and the whole system on the other. In the mean-2 8 time, though analyses of system are inevitably static, the change and evolution of the system will be described as well and, for the most part, this will be illustrated by concrete examples. Chapter Five will be devoted to the size, organization, leadership and social education of the commune. Chapter Six will center on the problems of ownership and management, while Chapter Seven deals with accounting system and distribution. The best way to grasp the dynamiicfpicture of development is to see it through concrete cases. However, it is impossible to see everything at one time. A choice among various sectors submitting to development is necessary. The more the chosen sectors are relevant to the march of the whole system, the more accurate the dynamic picture of the development as a whole\u00C2\u00ABwill be. Two sectors are judged to have crucial importance in the commune movement. They are local industry and the building of water conservancy. The development in the two sectors will be the content of Chapters Eight and Nine. Chapter Ten, which is composed of three case-studies, will present the picture of economic growth and changes as continuing in some developing communal units. Chapter Eleven will be a case study of changes in the family structure. The character-istics of the commune movement which appeared in these units will be specially pointed out in order to show the particularity of the Chinese model of development. Finally, the last chapter will present the result of this study. This will be done first in the context of the Chinese history and then on the international scale. 29 Chapter Two A N APPROACH TO CHINESE SOCIETY FROM THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE There were two turning points in recent Chinese history. One was 1840, the year of the Opium War, the other was 1949, the year of the establishment of the People's Republic of China. It is suggested in this chapter that the development of Chinese society be divided into three stages: the traditional stage (before the western impact, up to 1840), the transitional stage (between 1840 and 1949, therperiod dating from China's exposure to western influence until the Communist Party came into power), and the socialist stage (1949 onward). The different stages imply a change from one type of society into another as a result of shifted orientation in development. I THE TRADITIONAL STAGE (BEFORE 1840) Karl Wittfogel's hydraulic theory about the Chinese society (and other Asiatic societies) has been widely known (1957). In my view, although he is right to advance the hydraulic order as a necessary cause of the Chinese political system, it seems that he is not right when making it a sufficient cause. First, the hydraulic work gave birth to a set of conditions on which the kinship group founded its elementary form of operation and organization. The legendary hero Yu was the first clan leader who went beyond his kinship group for the purpose of water control. Throughout Chinese history, only a few large-scale hydraulic works, mostly for transportation, were initiated and controlled by the state (Eberhard, 1952 : 34); all other irrigation water controls of a small scale were in the hands of the peasants at the village level.^ Hsiao Kung-ch'uan has pointed out ' Franz Schurmann also diverged with Karl A . Wittfogel in this connection. He does not think that local irrigation in China depended on the State (Schurmann, 1970 : 405). 30 that in the traditional Chinese society, \"kinship group and rural community were virtu-ally identical, village leadership was none other than clan leadership\" (Hsiao, 1960 : 327). That is to say, the small-scale hydraulic works were virtually operated not by the state, but by clan organizations. If the hydraulic work had exerted any influence to shape the form of political system, it must have been indirectly, by passing through kinship and family institutions. Secondly, if we compared ancient China to ancient Greece, we fwould find that the patriarchal clan organizations of the two areas shared many common characteristics (cf. Fustel de Coulanges, 1864), although Wittfogel tells us that ancient Greece was not under the influence of hydraulic order. Other kinds of agricultural work could give similar influence to social organizations provided they demanded similar conditions of cooperation between men. Sociologically, ancient Chinese patriarchy and ancient Greek patriarchy may be classified as the same type, but each certainly possessed other particularities of which the hydraulic order may constitute one relevant faction;.. Hydraulic order, therefore, can hardly be viewed by itself as a sufficient condition, or a determining condition of the Chinese political system. To understand the nature and structure of Chinese traditional social and poli-tical systems, we must look into the Chinese kinship and family institutions. Historically, the Chinese term for family, \"jia\", was not the same as it is under-stood in its modern sense, but a clan organization. The jia of a thousand chariots and that of a hundred chariots referred to by Mencius indicate the jia's dimension which Would not pertain to a simple family. Although this was a phenomenon of aristocracy, it is not improbable that the clan organizations among peasants already existed in an early time. The Chinese feudalism of Zhou (roughly 1100-500 B.C.) was based on clannish principles. As Max Weber pointed out, \"the high vassals of the time (chu hou, the princes) were exclusively selected from the descendents of the ancient rulers\" (1951 : 35). Weber was the first western sociologist who paid close attention to the \"charis-matic sibe\" in ancient China. In fact, even after the dissolution of the ancient feudal-ism (221 B.C.), the basic social order was not touched and the charismatic sibe in Weber's terms not only persisted as usual, but widespread so pervasively as to be soon a phenomenon of a general social organization in China. The clan organization became so important that individuals who lost their kindred ties would go to parasitize upon other clans instead of living independently. In Chinese history we find that the indi-vidual often acted in the society on behalf of his kinsmen. He shared glory as well as misfortune and, to a certain extent, properties, with the members of his kinship group. He was controlled by and exerted influence upon them. In contrast to the common belief that lineage is an expanded kinship group, it would be more appropriate to say that the 2 family, in the Chinese sense, is a sub-unit of lineage. Before the western impact, jia meant to Chinese a sub-unit of a lineage in the form of an expanded or joint family in which an agnatic group of more than two generations and sometimes more than one collateral degree, lived under the same roof. There were cases where the members of the group lived separately but shared joint rights to property and-recognized-each other-as-belonging^tpthe-same-jia. A household might be a jia, but in many cases it was not. An extended household which could include non-family members was what Morton H. Fried saw in Ch'u Hsien (1969 : 29-30), or a reduced I use clan and lineage interchangeably in this thesis. For the distinction between these two terms in the Chinese case, see Freedman, Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore (1957 : 18). household was often a fluctuating form of more than or a part of a jia in order to adapt itself to the social and economic demands. On the other hand, most of the Chinese have experienced the extended family at least once in their life cycle, especially during the first few years, and the last years of life. In ancient times, it seems likely that there was no clear distinction between lineage and family. A kinship organization, whether it be a large form like lineage or a restricted form like family, was primarily an elementary political organization. From Confucius, Mencius and other classics, we can see that the Chinese feudalism and the principalities of the late Zhou (roughly 6th-3rd century, B.C.) were organized accord-ing to kinship principles. The dissolution of feudalism which coincided with the unifica-tion of China by Qin Shi-huang-di (221 B.C.) was a real revolution in Chinese history; nonetheless, i;t did not destroy the foundation of the Chinesesociety: the kinship organization. As soon as the Liu family took over the political power, the new state again set its foundation on kinship principles. Until the last dynasty,which was replaced by a republic in 1911, the Chinese state could roughly be viewed as an enlarged form of lineage. At a lower level, the peasant lineages always were, as Hsiao Kung-ch'uan said, identicals with communal organizations. The Chinese monarchical structure and ethics were none other than kinship structure and ethics, differentiating only in scale. Even the bureaucracy, historically speaking, originated from a division of domestic functions. As for the economic structure of the traditional society, C . K. Yang has pointed out: The most outstanding of the characteristics^ (the economic structure) was the predominance of the family as a unit of production; a unit of 33 organization of labor, capital and land for the acquisition of goods and services to meet the needs of the members of the household... . In agriculture, partnerships and other forms of organization were numerically negligible in comparison with the vast majority of China's traditional family forms. In commerce and industry the family as unit of organization was equally dominant. When a boy reached working age, he worked in the family business. Should the family business be too small to employ him, he would be apprenticed if possible to a firm owned by relatives... The dominance of the family as an organiza-tional unit of production led to the development of another prominent characteristic of the Chinese family, namely, the provision oficollec-tive security for its immediate members and the extension of economic aid to more distant kinsmen... A high degree of economic self-sufficiency was another vital characteristic of the traditional family. Only those necessities that could not be fashioned at home or grown from the soil were purchased from outside (Yang, 1959 : 137-138). From the above description, two crucial points attract our attention: one is the dominance of the family as an organizational unit of production, and another is the self-sufficiency of the family. Generally speaking, a village which was often identical with one lineage or a branch of a lineage, was a larger self-sufficient unit than family in terms of both production and consumption. The main consumption was supplied by domestic products and to a certain extent local products within the village; only secondary necessities were purchased from towns or other villages. The latter gave birth to a limited scope of commercial transaction. In cities and towns, the situation was different. There, two different categories of social groups dominated the scene, namely, the bureaucracy and the guild (Burgess, 1928). Lacking large markets in the wide country-side, the urban merchants never had the opportunity of accumulating significant capital as those in Europe at the time of industrialization. However, a great deal of data, both from historical documents and from local gazetteers, indicate that the class of merchants was richer,- and lived much better off than the class of peasants, even than the class of lower ranking bureaucrats. But a career in commerce had never been as attractive as a career in officialdom. The reason, I think, is partly because the Chinese ideologically looked down upon the merchant class, and partly because the career of the merchant forced him to travel a lot and to often live apart from his kinsmen, and therefore, he could not enjoy security in times of crisis and have his kinsmen share his pleasure in times of prosperity. As a rule, as soon as a merchant had succeeded in accumulating a sizeable sum, he invested it in the land in order to settle down somewhere (usually in his native place) to become a landlord. If he had several sons, his land would be divided accordingly, and second or third genera-tions would have a good chance to become ordinary peasants. The equal division of the father's property by sons constituted a crucial factor in both population control and social mobility in the traditional stage. It is true that the prescription of this rule resulted from the deliberate elimination of primogeniture at the beginning of the Han Dynasty. It is not, however, proper to consider this measure as being only in favor of the central government. In fact, it greatly benefited the integ-ration of local lineage organizations because the practice of primogeniture had often forced the younger sons to leave their nativepplaces, a phenomenon quite well-known in Japan. Without lineage, the effect would be different. For instance, in France, many scholars have regarded the practice of primogeniture to be a preventive measure for family integration and have considered that its abolution after the revolution of 1789 constituted one of the causes of the disappearance of large families (Delzons, 1913 : 249; Arils, 1960 : 417). The Chinese case has empirically refuted the theory that primogeniture could play a determining role in family integration. Whether it could, affect the membership of the family unit or not must depend upon other variables. Although the practice of equal division of property among sons did not impede the formation of extended family in China, it seems that it resulted in a positive check on population growth. Once land was divided and re-divided into small parcels, it would quickly reach the limit in meeting its minimum surface which could hardly support a small household. The limitation of division of land resulted in the limitation of proliferation of households, and hence the limitation of the growth of population. Population growth must be related to the quantity of available arable land in Chinese history. Ho Ping-ti suggested that the introduction of new kinds of rice and other cereals from outside was the primary cause of population growth during the last centuries in China and the expan-sion of arable land was rather a consequence (Ho, 1959). I think the expansion of arable 3 land during the last centuries might be, in the first place, a consequence of population growth, but could in all probability turn later into a cause of further population growth. Without birth control, the Chinese population was checked by various factors, one of which might have been the land division. Ebnimgre than two thousand years the Chinese population Imqitataimediian equilibrium, both within the society, and between the society and its ecological environment. Under such an equilibrium of population, the Chinese society was not in a state of stagnation as many people supposed. The vertical social mobility in Ming and Qing China was even greater than in \"most large pre-modern western societies\" according to Ho Pint-ti's research on social mobility during the two last Chinese dynasties (Ho, 195871959?: 347). However, Ho's concern was only involved in social mobility through imperial examinations which obviously cannot represent o According to Robert F. Dernberger, between 1600 and 1893 there was 148 percent increase in cultivated land in China (1975 : 25). Perkins states that \"by the middle of the 20th century the amount of cultivated land in China was four times the level of the late 14th century\" (1969 : 185). The cultivated land continued to increase even after 1949 in a so thickly populated area as Guangdong (Johnson, 1973 : 15). the whole picture of social mobility. Needless to say, more research is needed to gain a further understanding in this respect. Two aspects are, in my view, of crucial import-ance. First, Ho's data about the candidates for examinations and the holders of titles are arranged according to surnames, so the result of his research tells us much of the duel between lineages of different surnames, but nothing about the social mobility within one given lineage. In the Chinese villages which were mostly clustered by lineage-differen-tiation, there existed a social stratification side by side with the kinship hierarchy. I have the impression that the social mobility within a lineage must have been more dif-ficult than the inter-lineage social mobility. That is why the kinship organizations appeared more stable than any other social groups. Secondly, however limited the scope of commerce might be, it seemed to be of importance to social mobility. There is no doubt that the talented of the first class were attracted by bureaucracy, but commerce was a sure way to get rich and thus constituted an outlet for the ambitious people. As Ho Ping-ti has pointed out, \"there is definite evidence showing that many officials and frustrated candidates openly engaged in trade and that not a few members of merchants' families managed to pass the national examination and become officials\" (ibid : 333). Nonetheless, the merchant class was not a stable social stratum in the Chinese society, because they aimed at either officialdom or investment in land, as I have shown. The merchant class had merely a transitional place in social mobility. The latter, both up-ward and downward can be seen in the following diagram: 37 t ' officialdom \K I \ [ L landlord i * \ V \ \u00C2\u00BB peasant \ \ I \u00C2\u00BB \ mei r erchant Ideologically, the merchant class was lower than the peasant class, but practically, it was higher because it was much better off than the latter. The merchant class occupied only a marginal place in the Chinese social structure and thus never constituted an initial changing factor in the societal develop-ment in the traditional stage. The pattern of the merchant class was more influenced by, than exerted influence on the peasant class (including rich peasant), which was in turn dominated by the landlords or gentry class. It may be supposed that urban areas did not emit initial changes in the traditional stage as has happened in the European 4 countries. In this light, perhaps we can suggest that the place of the merchant class in the social strata may constitute one more indicator of the development of Chinese society which was never able to orient itself along the same direction as the western societies until the western impact. Max Weber has spent much time studying the relationships between the Chinese religions and the Chinese society (1951). He concluded that it was the Confucian and 4 Franz Schurmann has also noticed the difference between Chinese cities and European cities. He says: \"The continuing link between countryside and city undoubtedly in-fluenced the nature of the traditional Chinese city, which did not develop the urban character so typical of European and Japanese cities. A bourgeoisie, that is, a social class explicitly identified with the city, never arose in China - at least not until modern times\" (Schurmann, 1970 : 366). Taoist ethics which prevented the Chinese society from a capitalistic development; otherwise the Chinese society had the potentiality, probably more than Japan, of assimi-lating capitalism. On the other hand, the Chinese modern historians have used the term \"incipient capitalism\" to describe the economic situation of the pre-modern-impact period. It is evident that all of them have based their studies on the premise that capita-lism is supposed to be a necessary stage of all societies. This thesis, from Spencer and Marx, had never been challenged until recent times. It has formed a restrictive para-digm in social sciences in which societies differentiated in kinds can be granted a place in development and can be understood only when they are put in connection with capital-istic societies. In the Chinese case, I cannot see any convincing evidence which would lead the Chinese society to a capitalistic stage before influence came from outside. I cannot see such a necessity either. In short, the Chinese patrilineal kinship structure was so powerful and all-permeating that it has moulded a particular model of society, and a particular type of development which had its own direction, just as many other particular societies might be developing in other directions. The particularity of development of the traditional Chinese society can be seen in the following outlines: A'. Political Structure Chinese feudalism before the unification of China by Qin Shi-huang-di (221 B.C.) originated from clan organizations.^ When the JJ clan of Zhou took control over Cf. Si-ma Qian, Shi-Ji (the part concerning the pre-Han history). 39 other clans, it imposed its members as heads on only a few regions where the clans had been destroyed because of their hostility toward Zhou, but kept all the other clans intact. The prince of each principality was at the same time chief of his clan. All the principalities inside the Chinese territorial boundary recognized at the time as such founded a large alliance by marriage along the exogamic principle. An alliance was strongly clan-centric, affinal ties by marriage were viewed rather as a diplomatic re-lationship. It was impossible at the time for an individual without a clan to survive. He would perish or would let himself be adopted by another clan. It seems that everybody belonged to a clan; participating in clan activities meant participation in political life. Clan structure was identical to political structure.-Qin Shi-huang-di was the first ambitious leader in Chinese history who intended to break up clan organizations and to establish instead a network of bureaucratic officials exercising direct control over commoners. He failed. Fifteen years later when the Han Dynasty was founded, new rulers re-linked the Qin's bureaucratic system with clan organizations. Until the birth of the Republic in 1911, clan or lineage organizations always constituted the basic element of social and political fabric during the time of the Chinese monarchy. Even the two exotic political orders during the Mongol dominance and that of the Manchus did not touch this foundation. B. Mode of Production The patrilineal kinship structure determined the collective ownership of property of a patrilineal kinship group. The practice of agricultural production led the group to a fixed locality. Consequently a patrilineal kinship group was identical with a certain locality. The division of labor between sex and age created a feeling of interdepend-ence between members of the group. The collective ownership precluded any strong feeling of personal possessions. An individual was thus not only interdependent with his kin, but also with the land he cultivated, in other words, nature. He did not exploit nature, nor did he enslave it to his service but, rather, nourished it in the hope of getting a return which constituted the source of subsistence and happiness of the whole group. The relationship between man and nature determined the special mode of produc-tion which was labelled by Marx as \"Asiatic mode of production\". The Asiatic mode of production had been understood as a mode of production in stagnation, at least with little progress in technology used in production. This is not false, but the problem can also be examined from another angle. According to the outlook moulded by the patri-lineal kinship structure, material fortune was not viewed as being of paramount import-ance in achieving happiness on the one hand; nature, embodied in land for the peasant, was regarded as an integral part of the kinship group and thus must not be squeezed in-definitely, on the other. There was an equilibrium between man and nature established as a result of mutual exchange for a long time. This equilibrium did not point to any significant change or \"progress\" in the sense of evolutionist terminology. It should be remembered that this kind of relationship between peasant and nature was almost universal. The technological improvement in agriculture in European societies was the result of industrialization rather than the progress of agriculture per se. If we cannot say that the patrilineal kinship structure in itself determined the Chinese society as an agricultural or peasant society, at least we are certain that such a social structure cannot develop toward the industrialized society, in the sense of capitalism. Generally speaking, industry, trade and technology were not unknown in 41 China (Needham, 1956 \u00E2\u0080\u0094 ). According to recent archaeological findings, industry and technology in some sphere in ancient and medieval China could be seen as very \"advanced\" in comparison with European countries. Why did these industries and tech-nology not experience proportional development as modern industrial societies? Many scholars, including the clear-sighted Max Weber, have spent life-times attempting to answer this question. Yet the problem is not clear. They have always concentrated on seeking such and such factor which might hinder the capitalistic development, but have forgotten the holistic structure of the Chinese society which would point to a quite different direction from that of a capitalistic and industrial society. I believe that in-dustry, trade and technology in ancient and medieval China were different from those of modern times, not in quantity but in quality. In essence, they were regarded as tools to add to the amount of happiness, but not as a means of accumulation of capital for the purpose of reproduction. The development of industry and trade was neither a necessary nor a desirable condition for maintaining or improving the harmony of family and kinship relationships. For these reasons, industry and trade could never develop independently vis-a-vis agricultural development. When the production and comsumption of agriculture had already entered into a stage of equilibrium, industry and trade worked perforce to maintain this equilibrium. C. Values and Goals Ideologically, Confucian virtue was based upon self-perfection. The cultured man must not be just a means for specified useful purpose. He is an end in himself. The Chinese \"ego\" is not an individualistic conception, but related to a network of kinship relationships. Self-perfection means above all the process of personal achievement in bringing the family interpersonal relationships to perfection. Xiao (filial piety) and you (brotherhood) are both the beginning and the end of self achievement according to Confucian ethics. Practically, the individual was brought up and educated by his parents or other members of near kin within the family framework. His personal fulfillment was not only involved with the interest of his living relatives, but also with that of his de-ceased ancestors. His troubles would be shared by other members of the family; and his satisfaction would be mainly dependent upon the positive attitude and behaviour of the same members. Without the help of his parents and kinsmen, an individual could not realize his ambition in the society at large, and without the sharing of his kinship group the realization of his ambitions would be meaningless. In Chinese history, almost with-out exception, successful ministers and officials ended their lives in returning to their native homes after a long political career. Luo-ye gui-gen (the floating leaves will all return to the root of the tree) symbolizes well the Chinese life outlook. Tiah-lun zhi luo (the family happiness) indicates the ultimate goal of an individual's life pursuit. A very different system of values and goals from that of the capitalistic society had been fostered within the patrilineal kinship structure in China and attained maturity at a very early age (more or less at the time of Confucius). That is to say, the social, economic and political systems have for a long time already adapted to each other to form a whole cultural unit which is dissimilar to other societies and could not, and still cannot, develop toward the same direction as the other societies point to. All attempts to place the Chinese society in a stage of any uni lineal development or to judge the 43 Chinese society in relation to the capitalistic societies would be misleading and would probably offer a false departure in theory and conception in the social science. II THE TRANSITIONAL STAGE (1840-1949) Students of Chinese society have all remarked some actual changes or symptoms of changes in the Chinese socioeconomic structure during the transitional stage as a consequence of western impact on China. Few would deny that since the Opium War (1840) the influence exercised by the western countries on China was tremendous; from foreign trade, steamship transportation and financial institutions to missionary works, educational undertakings and journalistic enterprises. The total amount of foreign trade in the thirty years before the Sino-Japanese War (1894) more than doubled, but in the following thirty years it increased almost six times (Hou, 1965 : 51). After 1895, some 33 ports were opened to foreign trade. Foreigners could travel freely along a sea coast of 5,000 nautical miles and through inland rivers as long as 10,000 nautical miles (Shigeo, 1941 : 90-92). In the same period /a.length of 7,671 miles of railway was built, mostly, with foreign capital (Chang Chia-ao : 424). With regard to banking, by 1925 foreigners had established 63 banks in China, with 179 branches, of which there were 17 with capital exceeding 10,000,000 yuan (pre-war value), while China itself set up two banks of some importance (Chien l-shih, 1939 : 249-251). Postal and tele-graphic offices had also made much headway: the former had increased from 100 in 1901 to more than 12,000 in 1930, and the latter from about 500 in 1922 to 1,400 44 in 1930 (Chang Liang-jen, 1937, Vol. II : 5-7).\u00C2\u00B0 Both commerce and industry had begun to increase in volume since the foreign economic intrusion, although commerce occupied the leading position. It may be noted that the total foreign investments in China increased from (U.S.) $787,900,000 in 1902 to $34,483,200,000 in 1936 (Hou, 1965 : 13). Besides the economic invasion, the western missionaries worked intensively in social and educational spheres. In 1937, the Catholic missionaries maintained 2,985 primary schools (with 123,389 pupils), 58 high schools for boys (with 11,335 students), 45 high schools for girls (with 7,167), three universities (1,321 students and 908 prepara-tory students), 415 orphanages and 236 hospitals and homes for the poor. The educat-ional activities of the Protestants were even more widespread than those of the Catholics. In 1935, about 150,000 children were educated in their primary schools, 47,940 in their high schools, and 7,098 in their 16 universities and colleges. In 1937, 271 hospitals were maintained by the Protestants (Lang, 1946 : 18). All these innovations brought about by the invasion of the western powers drastically affected the Chinese society to a degree that was deep and far-reaching. Above all , the development of the Chinese traditional society was drawn away from its own orbit. During the transitional stage, the Chinese society gradually changed its goals from the social norms dictated by Confucian ethics which precluded the social action \u00C2\u00B0 Sources which come from, respectively, Shigeo, Imura, History of Euro-American Economic Aggression in China, Tokyo: Dobunkai, 1941; Chang Chia-ao, Railway Construction in China; Chien l-shih, Economic History of Modern China, Tokyo, Keio Book Store, 1939; and Chang Liang-jen, Postal Administration in China, Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1937, are all cited by Wu Kan (1952). 45 from pursuit of profit to a series of westernized new goals. It has been noted that, as in the course of industrialization in most western countries, the general tendency of changes in China during this stage was also manifested by urbanization of social life, dissolution of extended family, equalization between sex and age, degradation of father's authority, etc., probably to a lesser extent. Changes, of course, occurred unequally along the line of differences between urban area and rural area, gentry and peasantry, literates and illiterates, westernized and conservators, and so forth. It is also recognized that some change in the social structure was not only a consequence of changing economic patterns, but also resulted from the introduction of western customs and ideology, especially the western individualism. Ill THE SOCIALIST STAGE (1949 ONWARD) At the beginning of the Chinese socialist revolution, the revolutionary leaders seemed to be convinced that the priority of economic development must be given to industrialization, following the Soviet Union model. Taking the Soviet model means, in a certain sense, to trace indirectly the economic development of the western capital-ist countries with the sole exception of stressing on state planning.^ A planned indust-rialization implies a planned restructure of social institutions. The success of industriali-zation depends much upon the flexibility of social institutions. The first two quiquennial plans in China resulted, however, in some grave consequences: acceleration of urbani-zation,^ disintegration of familial organization, reinforcement in \"elite\" education ^ The Soviet Union resembles the capitalist industrial countries in a variety of ways despite their differences in political systems (Inkeles and Bauer, 1959). ^ It is reported that between 1949 and 1960 China's urban population increased by some 70 million, described as one of history's largest population shifts in so short a time (Buchanan, 1970 : 30). 46 which implied the continuation of the split between intellectuals and masses, and con-solidation of bureaucracy including entrepreneurship. Some of these phenomena contra-dict the Chinese traditional norms which still persisted, at least partially, in spite of the western impact, and others contradict the communist ideals. The so-called \"struggle between two roads\" during the Cultural Revolution reflected, in my view, the divergence of viewpoint in regard to the societal develop-ment. On the one hand, Liu Shao-qijand his followers attempted to pursue an industriali-zation along the lines of the Soviet model in order to catch up with the western productive standards as soon as possible, even though it was detrimental to other social factors. On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung endeavored to combine the communist ideals with the Chinese traditional social structure. As we know, it was Mao who came out of this struggle as vanquisher. This struggle has an historical and sociological bearing of crucial importance because it was the first time since the western impact on China that the Chinese society placed emphasis on goals of social performance and economic development other than those in the western countries. Among others, the collectivization which implied an anti-individualistic attitude, is not only related to communist ideals, but has much to do with the traditional chinese kinship structure. In the western countries, rapid industrialization and urbanization caused the disintegration of the rural communities. Collective life has become impossible in the context of the industrial setting. However, in China, the introduction of individualism has encountered resistance because the Chinese people have a strong propensity to collective life due to their familial organization. During the process of modernization, it seems that they had to make the choice between industrialization and collective life. 47 In comparison with Japan, China is geographically much larger and socially much less urbanized. It would be much more difficult for the Chinese people to emerge from their collective life and adapt themselves to the standards of individualistic \"univer-salism\". Under such circumstances, the Chinese peoples' propensity for collective live might constitute a real handicap in the way of industrialization. It would be a long time before the Chinese people could be urbanized, become universalistic, and finally be equipped with all the conditions favorable to industrialization. But the Maoist vision in this matter was quite different. According to them, the collective life is not at all incompatible with industrialization; on the contrary, it may be a favorable factor by the facility of organizing manpower. If it had some incompatibility with urbanization, why could one not do something different from the experience of western industrialization through an unorthodox process, namely, industrialization without urbani-9 zation? Many analyses by orthodox Marxists, as well as modern western social scientists, have shown that the process of urbanization, concomitant of the western industrialization, has brought about a dichotomy of metropolitan centers and their vast peripheries, which inevitably led to the rise of imperialism (Cohen, 1973). As a result, the formula of people's commune was launched. The original blueprint of the people's communes was conceived as an all-comprising unit. Functionally, the communes run banks, factories and commercial en-terprises, handle credit and distribution, undertake cultural and educational work, and control their militia and political organizations, besides the agricultural tasks. It seems Rhoads Murphey points out in his analysis that the anti-urbanism attitude of the CCP \"is directed primarily against the former treaty ports, but it involves by association all cities\" (Murphey, 1970 : 69). 48 clear that the commune continues in fact to keep the basic characteristics of the tradi-tional rural community: self-control in political and military affairs, self-sufficiency in economy and collective life (especially collective ownership of land and affection-ate relationship between members of the collectivity). What is added to the traditional structure is its modern organization and additional new goals, of which the develop-ment of small-scale industry and the transformation of the natural environment are the most important ones. 49 Chapter Three THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE MOVEMENT IN CHINA The Chinese People's Communes were set up in 1958. While few have expressed reservations about the importance of the newly created socioeconomic unit, arguments have diverged as to the process of its birth. Some speak of it as a logical outcome of economic and political development in China, ^ whereas others insist on the forced setting-up in immature circumstances. It is certain that both views have presented some truth, butnne'i'ther of them seems able to avoid being biased by their respectively political inclinations. In this chapter I will try to establish an account as close as possible to the historical reality, and to find, and also to explain, the implications of ihe different arguments in such a controversy. I THE PRELUDE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE MOVEMENT When speaking of the development in China, it is not possible to ignore the leading role played by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the leadership of its chairman, Mao Tse-tung, in decision-making in any sector and at any crucial moment since 1949. The movement to establish people's communes was, like other turning points in the history of the People's Republic of China such as the Great Leap Forward (GLF) ^ This point of view is specially represented by the Chinese official attitude and research done in China using only the Chinese official sources. For instance, Too Chu (1964), Chu Li and Tien Chieh-yun (1974), and Wu Chou (1975). 2 This point of view is specially represented by those who have a hostile attitude toward the CCP and the Chinese government such as researchers in Taiwan and some researchers of Chinese economy in the United States, for instance, Xiang Da-kun (1966), Cheng Chu-yuan (1959), and Hughes (1960). and the Cultural Revolution, deeply imprinted by the CCP's past experiences. Franz Schurmann has rightly pointed out that \"the revolutionary history of Chinese communism is closely linked to the peasantry; its organizational history is closely linked to the village cooperatives\" (1970 : 413). During both the Jiang-xi Soviet period (1927-1934) and the Yan-an period (1935-1946), the CCP always tended to carry out its program of land reform and to establish cooperatives. And they got some successful results (Shi Jing-tang, 1957). It is worthwhile noting that the village cooperation based on kinship organizations was a commonplace in the countryside in China. Therefore, the communist program for social revolution, though guided by the communist ideology, also had its roots in Chinese tradition. What was radical is that the program of land reform aimed at eradicating the landlord class and replacing it by revolutionary organizations. From the point of view of rural development, the main achievement of the CCP during the two periods mentioned above was the experience gained from land redistribution and from organization of small-scale cooperatives, which was to become the basic guide of land reform on a nationwide scale after 1949. The large-scale land reform started in 1950 and ended in 1952. Its importance in the history of cooperativization lies in its wiping out of a whole class of landlord and gentry. Schurmann called it one of the greatest social revolutions of modern times (1970 : 437). However, the land reform did not solve the problems of production either in organization or in technological revolution. The poor peasants who had received land from land redistribution were faced with the difficulties of effectively exploiting it, due to the lack of investment, draught animals and farm tools. In a short time after the land reform, some again got into debt while others began to sell land. New rich peasants got the upper hand in the rural economy. Middle peasants were trying to turn 51 themselves into rich peasants. Under such a situation, the CCP saw the obligation to speed up the cooperative movement by starting with the mutual-aid teams. The latter was a traditional form of cooperation in the countryside. The teams consisted of a small number of households which shared their draught animals, farm tools and labor force in the busy season. But they did not pool their properties together. It was easier to use a traditional pattern than to initiate a new form before coming into cooperativization. The mutual-aid teams were thus planned as a preparatory step to setting up cooperatives. Some cooperatives were set up immediately after the land reform; but in most places the movement was slow because of the shortage of local cadres. In January, 1954, the Central Committee of the CCP issued a directive on \"developing agricultural producers' cooperatives\". It was reported that 114,165 cooperatives had been formed by the end of that year (Schurmann, 1970 : 442). However, the cooperative movement speeded up in 1955 due to the personal intervention of Mao Tse-tung (Carin, 1960 : 192). It was in the main completed by the end of 1956. According to the Chinese official statistics, by the first half of 1955, the number of agricultural producers' cooperatives (nong-ye-she) increased to 670,000, embracing a number of households of about seventeen million (The State Statistical Bureau of China, 1960 : 28). But in only one year, by the end of May, 1956, the total number of cooperatives made a great leap forward, number-ing 1,003,657, and the number of households rose to 110,134,226. Among those co-operatives (therejLwere^302y756)advdnced agricultural producers' cooperatives (gao-ji nong-ye-she) with the number of households being 74,720,054 (RMRB, 19 June, 1956). By the end of the year, more than 96 percent (or about 12 million) of all the peasant 52 households in China had joined agricultural producers' cooperatives, of which an over-whelming majority (87.8 percent of the total peasant households) had become parts of advanced cooperatives. Only 8.5 percent remained in the elementary agricultural producers' cooperatives (chu-ji nong-ye she) (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). In the elementary type, the ownership of land and of other important means of production, such as draught animals and large farm implements, were transferred from the members to the cooperatives. These means of production as well as land were con-sidered as the peasants' shares to be used collectively Jay the-cooperative for joint production. The peasants, however, retained the ownership of their houses, domestic animals, small farm implements and tools needed for sideline production. In addition, the peasants were allowed to have a small plot of land, called \"private plot\" (zi-liu-di), not exceeding 5% of the average landholding in the cooperative, for growing vegetables and raising pigs and poultry for their own use. While the cooperative products had to be sold to the state at fixed prices, the peasants' earnings were calculated on the basis of their \"labor days\" (lao-dong-ri) as well as the amount of their shares. The crucial difference between the advanced type and elementary type of co-operatives is in the treatment of land compensation. In the advanced type, a peasant was not entitled to compensation for the amount of land that he had contributed to the co-operative. His income was determined solely by his \"labor days\". Besides, he had no shares for his draught animals and large farm implements for which he received a sale 3 price from the cooperative. Another characteristic of the advanced type is its larger There were some cooperatives of the advanced type set up from the very beginning of the cooperativization, for example, the Bai-pen-yao Advanced Agricultural Producers' Cooperative (The General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, 1956, Vol. 1 : 294-300). 53 Table 3.1 ^AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION (I) (thousand households) No. of peasant No. of peasant households in No. of peasant households in agricultural producers' cooperatives households mutual-aid and in mutual-aid cooperative Total Advanced Elementary teams organizations 1950 11,313 0.219 0.032 0.187 11,313 1951 21,002 1.618 0.030 1.588 21,000 1952 45,423 59 2 57 45,364 1953 45,912 275 2 273 45,637 1954 70,775 2,297 12 2,285 68,478 1955 77,310 16,921 40 16,881 60,389 1956 117,829 117,829 107,442 10,407 \u00E2\u0080\u0094 \u00E2\u0080\u0094 Source: China : Ten Great Years. p. 34 Table 3.2 AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION (II) (percentage) Percentage of peasant Ag ricultural Producers' households in mutual- cooperatives aid and cooperative Mutual-aid organizations to total teams no. of peasant house- Total Advanced Elementary holds 1950 10,713 w \u00E2\u0080\u0094 \u00E2\u0080\u0094 \u00E2\u0080\u0094 \u00E2\u0080\u0094 _ . _ 10.7 1951 19.2 19.2 1952 40.0 0.1 0.1 39.9 1953 39.5 0.2 0.2 39.3 1954 60.3 2.0 2.0 58.3 1955 64.9 14.2 14.2 50.7 1956 96.3 96133 87.8 8.5 Source: China : Ten Great Years, p. 35 54 larger size than the elementary one. It included a number of households of between 150 and 300. It could thus have more possibilities in planning land utilization and labor management. It is easy to understand that not all the peasants who joined the cooperatives did so wholeheartedly. Some, especially the rich peasants (fu-nong) and the upper-middle peasants (shang-zhong-nong) were extremely unwilling to work in a collective framework for they had become used to relying on their own calculations in production and to hiring labor for heavy field work. But the majority which was composed of lower-middle peasants (xia-zhong-nong) and poor peasants (pin-nong) were filled with en-thusiasm, because they had little to lose in collectivization. Therefore, while many rich and upper-middle peasants withdrew from the cooperatives in many parts of China during the course of collectivization, the poor peasants insisted on continuing along the collective road. A striking example was the Wang Guo-fan Cooperative in Zunhua County of Hobei Province. After the withdrawal of almost all members of the coopera-tive, three poor peasant households succeeded in proving the advantages of cooperation and finally regained all their lost members (cf. The General Office of the Central Com-mittee of the CCP, 1956 : 5; Mao Tse-tung Si-Xiang Wan-Sui, 1969 : 200). What was the most important advantage of the collectivization in the eyes of the peasants? No doubt it was the increase in production. Since 1949, following the course of collectivization, the output of grain crops and cotton had increased year by year. The yield of 1957 increased 71 percent over that of 1949 for grain crops and 270 percent for cotton.^ For 1958, the year of The GLF, the national grain figures were The Chinese official statistical figures on agricultural production between 1955 and 1957 have been considered more reliable than other years by economists in western countries. See Liu and Yeh (1965 : 42), and Cheng (1963 : 184-185). 55 first estimated to increase 100 percent above 1957 (Liao, 1958), and then adjusted to 35 percent(see Table 3.3). The improvement of the living standards in the countryside has also been wit-nessed by many foreign visitors. And the increase in agricultural production was con-firmed by Mao Tse-tung himself through direct reports addressed to him.^ It was the striking success of cooperativization that paved the way for communization. The process of establishment of the people's commune began with the merger of small-scale cooperatives into larger ones. During the \"Chengdu Conference\" in March, 1958, Mao's suggestion was to work out a plan for merging small cooperatives (Xiang, 1966 : 13), because the small cooperatives, with fewer members, less land, and little capital, were not able to operate on a large scale or employ machinery and would bind the development of productive force (The General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, 1956 : 611). It was not long after Mao's call that Minhou County of Fujian Province made plans to unify all the cooperatives of the county into one, in April of the same year (Yue, 1958). Following the example of Minhou County more than one thousand cooperatives were merged into seven hundred larger ones in Lu County of Sichuan Province (RMRB).23 April, 1958). At the same time two provinces, Honan and Liaoning, became experimental spots in this task for the whole country be-cause they were in advance of all others. Honan had successfully merged its 38,473 small cooperatives into 1,378 and Liaoning its 9,600 into 1,412 (RMRB, 2 September, 1958. ^ For example, Rene Dumont, Isabel and David Crook, Keith Buchanan, Jan Myrdal, etc. \u00C2\u00B0 Mao said during his \"Second, Talk' at the Second Session of the Eighth Central Com-mittee of the CCP\": \"There are many cooperatives in every province that have in-creased their output. When there is any increase, it would be either twice or several times the output of the previous years. Can you still not believe this?\" Mao Tse-Tung Si-Xiang Wan-sui, 1969 : 200). 56 Table 3.3 OUTPUT OF GRAIN CROPS AND COTTON Of which: Grain crops Rice (unhusked) Wheat Coarse grains Potatoes Cotton (Pre-libera-tion peak year=100 1949 1952 77.9 111*3 111.3 84.J8 119.3 59.3 77.8 69.2 99.6 155.5 257.9 52.4 153.6 1957 133.4 151.2 101.5 101.8 346.2 193.2 1958 180.2 198.3 124.2 119.8 715.0 247.3 (1949=100) 1952 142.8 140.7 131.2 143.9 165.9 293.4 1957 171.1 178.4 171.2 147.1 222.7 369.0 1958 231.3 233.7 209.8 \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 173.0 460.9 472.4 (1952=100) 1957 119.8 126.8 130.4 102.2 134.3 125.8 1958 161.9 166.1 159.9 120.3 207.3 161.1 (1957=100) 1958 135.1 131.0 122.4 117.7 207.3 128.0 Average Annual Rate of Increase (%) 1950-1952 12.6 o 12.1 9.5 12.9 18.4 43.2 1953-1957 3.7 4.9 5.5 0.4 6.1 4.7 1950-1958 9.8 9.9 8.6 6.3 18.5 18.8 Source: China: Ten Great Years, p. 120 57 - 58 One of the merged cooperatives in Suiping County of Honan, composed of 27 small cooperatives, took the name of Weixing (sputnik) People's Commune in 7 8 April, 1958. According to the available data, it must be the first of its kind. This new collective unit was distinct from the advanced cooperatives not only in having a larger size and in its more advanced character of ownership, but in integrating local government administration and commune management into one. Such an experience had beer* unknown not merely in Chinese history but also in other socialist countries. In addition to the Crooks' description in which a commune is believed to take upon itself spontaneously all the functions of both cooperative and township, it has been shown that the original idea stemmed from Mao. During his inspection trip to Hobei, Honan and Shandong, Mao is reported to have said: \"It is better to set up People's Communes because the communes can combine See \"Chaya Shan Weixing Ren-min Gong-she Shi-xing Jian-zhang Cao-an\" (The Draft of Experimental Regulations of Weixing People's Commune in Chaya Mountain), Hongqi, No. 7, 1958. During a press conference for the journalists from Hong Kong and Macao, Tao Chu mentioned that the Zhangshi People's Commune in Qujiang County, Guang dong Province, was also set up in April, 1958 (cf. \"On the Problems of the People's Commune - Tao Chu's Response in detail to the Journalists from Hong Kong and Macao\" in Ren-min Gong-she Wen-ti Zi-liao, 1959 : 77). But there is no other evidence to prove that Zhangshi People's Commune was set up earlier than Weixing People's Commune. 59 industry, agriculture, commerce, education and the militia together, thus facilitating leadership.\" (Wu Zhi-pu, 1958 : 5). Following the example of a few early established people's communes in Honan to which Mao publicly gave his approval, the 5,376 cooperatives in Suiping and Pingyu counties of the same province had been merged into 208 communes by early August (RMRB, 18 August, 1958). By the end of August, 1,378 communes had already been built from the 38,473 cooperatives in Honan Province (ibid., 2 September, 1958). In view of such an upsurge of communization in Honan and, at the demand of Mao Tse-tung, the Politburo held an enlarged meeting in Beidafho, lasting from August 17 to August 30. The conference concluded that the People's Communes were the \"logical output of the march of events\" and adopted a \"Resolution on the Establishment of the People's Communes in the Rural Areas\" (XHBYK, No. 8, 1958 : 1-2). This resolution provided a guideline for the ongoing commune movement, since by then the People's Communes were mushrooming throughout the country. From April, the month of emerg-ence of the first commune, to the end of September, a mere six months, 90.4% of the total number of peasant households in China had been integrated into the commune system (the number and size of communes in different provinces and municipalities are shown in Table 3.4). By the end of 1958 communization could be considered completed in China. From all available data it is safe to say that the creation of people's communes is an organizational change moving from the already well-established cooperatives rather than any kind of new establishment created by state investment, or promoted by techno-logical innovations. This organizational achievement, however important it may be, 60 Table 3.4 People's Communes Established to September, 1958 Number of Number of Percentage Average Communes Participat- of Total Number of Established ing house- Peasant Households holds Households in each ' 1': ;936, J5P Commune Peking 56 663,124 100.0 11,841 Shanghai 23 256,000) 100.0 11,130 Hobei 951 8,402>639 100.0 8,836 Shanki 975 3,483,564 100.0 3,573 Inner Mongolia 812 1,561,023 98.6 1,922 Liaoning 428 3,264,579 100.0 7,627 Jilin 481 1,914,547 100.0 3,980 Heilong-jiang 718 1,946,478 100.0 2,710 ShSnxi 1,673 3,232,904 100.0 1,932 Gansu 794 2,006,389 100.0 2,527 Qinghai 1144 245,624 100.0 2,456 Ninxia 53 201,815 67.3 3,808 Xinjiang 389 625,151 59.3 1,607 Shandong 1,580 11,347,989 100.0 7,182 Jiangsu 1,490 9,127,234 99;.4 6,125 Anhui 1,054 7,219,244 100.0 6,849 Zhejiang 761 5,697,412 100.0 7,487 Fujian 622 2,672,839 95.1 4,297 Honan 1,285 10,272,517 100.0 7,994 Hubei 729 6,040,000 96.1 8,286 Hunan 1,284 8,172,440 100.0 6,365 Jiangxi 1,240 ;3,'/7/20,(OO0 92.0 3,000 Guangdong 803 7,905,553 100.0 9,845 Guangxi 7841 4,041,944 100.0 5,155 Sichuan 4,827 13,676,988 99.1 2,833 Guizhou 2,194 3,101,205 94.5 1,413 Yunnan 275 1,137,148 31.0 4,135 Total 26,425 121,936,350 98.2 4,614 Source: Tdff^-fi Gong-zuo (Statistical Work), Semi-Monthly, No. 20, 1958 : 23. 61 has incited much hostility from outside as well as discontent within the CCP itself, especially among the high-ranking leaders. Since the pre-Cultural Revolution period, students of modern China have become more and more aware of the disagree-ments among Chinese decision-makers. After the Cultural Revolution burst forth, a stream of documents has revealed to us that the Chinese decision-makers did not constitute a monolithic body acting from consensus. On the contrary, serious disagree-ments over a set of important issues had existed among the top leaders. It has been said that the approach to collectivization by organization and ideopolitical education was advocated by Mao Tse-tung. His rivals, such as Liu Shaorqi and his followers, were inclined to relate collectivization to agricultural mechanization. Since they were aware of the Soviet experience, they agreed that collectivization would be feasible only after industry has been able to equip the agricultural sector with sufficient mach-inery. Otherwise China would certainly fall into the same pitfall of losing the incentives of farmers as had the Russian people. The struggle between the two factions within the CCP had gone on for at least a decade before reaching its climax at the Cultural Revolution. As the \"invincible\" leader in modern Chinese history, Mao's policies eventually prevailed over those of his rivals. Chao Kang has correctly pointed out a crucial fact - that \"all important decisions that resulted in drastic accelerations in agricultural collectivization were reached in special meetings under Mao's personal auspices\" (Chao, 1970 : 23). Therefore, it can be said that Mao played a decisive role in the establishment of the people's communes. Chao Kang has given a clear description of the struggle between Mao and Liu over agricultural development (1970 : 11-35). II THE EVOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE Stages of change in the People's Commune system have been the subject of some previous studies. ^ I shall deal with these stages in this section by changing slightly some details according to my own data. The evolution of the People's Com-mune can be roughly divided into four stages: A . The First Stage - Period of Confusion - April 1958 to December 1958 After the first commune had emerged in Honan, rural communes were organized with incredible speed throughout the whole country. Within half a year, 26,425 com-munes were set up, representing 98.2 percent of the total number of peasant households, with an average of 4,614 households in each commune (see Table 3.4). Although the communization can be seen as completed by the end of September, 1958, considerable disparities existed in size, organization, ownership and distribution systems among the newly established units throughout the country. The \"Draft of An Experimental Regulation of the Weixing People's Commune\" was published on 1st September, 1958 in Red Flag. It seemed to be published for the purpose of serving as a model for other newly established communes in the country. The major points were: (1) Weixing People's Commune is a basic social unit combining agriculture, trade, culture, education and political affairs. ^ For example, Cheng Chu-yuan, Communist China's Economy 1949-1962 : Structural Changes and Crisis, Chapter 4, pp. 37-59; Chao Kang, Agricultural Production in Communist China 1949-1965, Chapter 1, pp. 26-35; and Xiang Da-kun, Problems of the Communist People's Communes, pp. 12-24. G . E. Johnson has also given a detailed description in his master's thesis \"Mobilization, Growth and Diversity : The Chinese Case 1958-1963\" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Cornell University, 1966). 63 (2) The commune system is considered as the proper form bridging socialism and com-munism, a stage to prepare the transition from the society of \"to each according to his work\" to that of \"to each according to his needs\". (3) Every citizen over sixteen years old, except those who have been landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and those who have been deprived of political rights for other reasons, can be a full member. Those in the excepted categories can only be informal members; that is, they will not have the rights of electing, being elected, and voting. (4) All the public property formerly belonging to the cooperatives that have become part of the commune must be transferred to the commune and will be owned by the commune. The share funds formerly contributed by the members of the co-operatives are still valid, but will not be refundable if a member leaves the com-mune, or dies. (5) Members' private plots, grounds of houses, livestock, trees, etc., will be trans-ferred to the ownership of the commune; however, members are allowed to retain a small number of livestock. The Commune will compensate members for their losses of livestock and trees. (6) The commune will take special care to develop industry, irrigation, transportation, electrification and to set up commercial and bank services. (7) The commune is composed of all cooperatives in the whole township (xiang) with the former head of the township as its director. (8) The commune is divided into production brigades which are in turn divided into production teams,J^ While the commune is only responsible for profits and losses, ^ At the beginning of communization, there were a few variations for the brigade and team levels, but most of the communes were based on a three-level system. For con-venience, I translate all terms of the second level into \"production brigade\" and those of the third level into \"production team\" the production brigade is the basic unit of production management and account-ing, and the production team is the basic unit of labor organization. (9) Distribution system is a combination of wages based on the principle of \"to each according to his work\" and supply of free grain according to rations fixed by the state for each person. Those who work well can receive a prize in the maximum amount of one-quarter of their wages. Those who are lazy will be forced to work. Every male member is entitled to two days' leave per month, and female members three days' leave per month, without reduced wages. Absenteeism will be the subject of wage reduction. Women on leave for one month due to pregnancy will receive half a month's wages. (10) Each production brigade should organize its own mess hall and nursery. Those who do not want to eat in the mess hall or to use the services of the nursery are allowed to make other arrangements. (11) - The commune will improve the housing'[conditions of the members by rebuilding houses in accordance with the consideration of facilitating production and leadership. (12) Inside the commune, management at every level must be carried out democratically. Management personnel must participate in labor. As a means of democratic exp-ression, masses will be encouraged to use the Big Character posters to make criticisms (Hong-qi, No. 7, 1958 : 16-20). Inspired by the experimental regulation of the Weixing People's Commune, Mao suggested drafting the \"Resolution About the Problems Concerning the People's 12 Commune\" at the enlarged meeting of the Politburo in Beidaiho which was to be ^ Mao said during his \"Talk at the Lushan Conference on 23 July 1959\": \"It was I who suggested to write down the Resolution at the Beidaiho Conference\" (cf. Mao Tse-tung Si-xiang Wan-sui, 1969 : 304). published on 1 Oth September, 1958 in the Peoples' Daily. This resolution was a direc-tive from the highest authority and was also one of the causes of confusion. With extreme enthusiasm and optimism the authorities uttered their ideas in the resolution in an idealistic and encouraging manner rather than in a realistic and practical one; many terms and ideas were expressed ambiguously. The resolution considered the appro-priate size of a commune to be one xiang (township) in the slogan yi xiang yi she (one township for each commune) with about 2,000 households; and yet it is also suggested that local cadres should not oppose larger communes with more than 10,000 or 20,000 households, and advocated crossing township and county boundaries. It warned that the collective ownership should not be changed too quickly into ownership by the whole people, but, at the same time, thought that this transition period would be only a matter of three or four years in some places, and five or six years in others. It said that it was not necessary to deal immediately/ with the question of private plots, scattered fruit trees, share funds, and so on; on the other hand it suggested that the private plots might be pooled together to be managed collectively during the merger of cooperatives into com-munes. But, above all , two other measures promoted in the resolution were to become a source of disturbance to peasant life: one was militarization of the organization of labor force, the other was the everyday life being collectivized for which the most important symbol was the mess hall. Because the suggestions contained in the Resolution v\ere not precise enough to be followed, the leading cadres of each commune thought they had to do their best in the communization process. If deviation could not be avoided, they preferred to deviate to left rather than right, as a result of their experience in political education. This seemed unbelievable to outsiders so far as the efficiency of militarized actions of 66 the Chinese peasants is concerned. For example, at the beginning of the establish-ment of Weiguo People's Commune in the rural area of Yantai Municipality, Shandong Province, during half a night, under the orders of the production captain, the young peasant \"soldiers\" broke up all brick beds (Kang) of twelve households in the village in order to turn them into manure. Due to that very efficient action, the twelve households would face the problem of heating in the winter (YTRB, 26 August, 1958). In Xinyang Administrative District, Honan Province, in August, 1958, almost all the peasant households destroyed their private cooking stoves and handed over their con-served grain to show their determination to eat in the public mess hall (Li Fa-jiu, 1958). These were not isolated cases. Many other communes were, in the beginning, organized along military lines. For example, the Chengmen People:5s Commune in Minhou County, Fujian Province, was set upas a regiment which was divided into battalions at the brigade level. The whole commune was thus divided into 15 battal-ions, 121 companies, 329 platoons, and 1,254 squads (Hong-qi, No. 10, 1958 : 26). Most of the local cadres who led the commune movement were so afraid of being criticized as backward elements that they tended to take an overzealous attitude, without considering closely the objective situation. Protected by resounding slogans such as y i da er gong (literally, first big, second public; but here the word gong con-notes the meaning of fairness and equality) and chi-fan bu-yao qidn (eating without payment), they thought they could go as far as the Resolution had suggested. Con-sequently, some were looking for the big size in unifying all cooperatives in a county into one commune while others were striving to be highly public in eliminating Statistics showed that in 13 provinces, 94 counties had either established only one commune, or formed a federation of communes in each (RMRB, 1 October, 1958). 67 private plots, destroying private cooking stoves, even going so far as to separate 14 couples into different dormitories, and confiscating private houses and livestock. A general confusion rose throughout the country leading to reaction on the part of the peasants in the form of work slowdown, attacks on cadres, damage to public property, slaughter of livestock, waste of grain, and so forth (Cheng, 1963 : 126-129). Not only the peasants felt bitter; dissenting voices were heard even among the local cadres and high-ranking officials. In the face of such confusion, Mao Tse-tung convened two meetings, one in Zhengzhou, Honan, between November 2-10, 1958, and another in Wuchang, Hubei, between November 21-27, 1958 (Wen-hui Bag, 1959 : 1) to hear reports from secretaries of provincial, autonomous regional and municipal Party Committees and to analyze the situation. These two meetings were the prelude to the 6th Plenary Session of the 8th CCP Central Committee which was to be held from November 28 to December 10, 1958. The Central Committee adopted a new resolution to amend and consolidate the Peoples' Commune. Following publication of this \"Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes\", although the configuration of the commune became much clearer than before, the movement entered into a period of crisis. Mao l^erodeplored the situation by saying: \"We have blown the \"wind of communism' as to seize the property belonging originally to brigades or teams. Pigs and cabbages were carried away without uttering a single word. This is incorrect:\" (\"Talk at the Wuhan Conference\", Mao Tse-tung Si-xiang Wan-sui, 1969 : 297). 68 B. The Second Stage - Period of Crisis - January 1959 to July 1959 The objective of the \"Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes\" was to confirm the correctness of the Beidaiho Resolution, to eliminate some ambiguities and to make it easier to follow in order to consolidate the People's Commune system. The essential points as amended were: (1) The necessary tempo from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people is not three to four years or five to six years, but fifteen to twenty years. (2) Federation of communes within one county is encouraged. (3) The principles of \"to each according to his work\" is emphasized. Distribu-tion is still based on half supply half wage, but wages can be ranked on a six or eight-degree scale, the highest being four times the lowest. The means of subsistence and savings deposit are guaranteed to be owned privately forever. (4) Increase of income for at least 90% of the members must be guaranteed. (5) Balanced development between agriculture and industry is encouraged. (6) Owing to the negative effect of the excessive shock actions, a limited time-schedule for one working day is fixed: 10 hours (8 for working and 2 for learning)for normal times and 12 hours during the busy farming season. (7) The leadership of militia is separated from that of administration and produc-tion. (8) \"Politics iri command\" should be enforced. Among these rectifications, a very strange item was inserted in the Resolution: presum-ably based on the swollen figures of the agricultural output in 1958, the authority sud-denly discovered that the agricultural problems had not lain in shortage of arable land and overpopulation, but on the contrary, in a shortage of labor force and surplus of arable land. Thus, a gradual reduction of one-third of the present cultivated land during the coming years was advocated. Of course, this suggestion was quickly to fall into silence and would never be talked of again. Mao's point of view was still strongly reflected in this Resolution. However, it was at the same conference that Mao decided not to be nominated for presidency of the state for another term. The real motive behind his decision is still unclear. Certain documents released during the Cultural Revolution suggest that he was forced to yield his position by a contending group led by Liu Shao-qi, apprently because of the econ-omic failure of the Great Leap Forward and the confusion caused throughout the country-side by the escalation of the communization. Now, looking back at the events, it seems probable that Mao preferred to sacrifice his presidency in order to get through the resolution about the People's Commune. At the end of the Resolution all party and administrative cadres at the provincial, municipal and autonomous regional level were called to participate intensively in the checking-up or rectification campaign of com-munes in organizing ten-thousand-person groups (wan-ren tuan) to investigate the situation. In February, 1959, an enlarged meeting of the Politburo was held in Zheng-zhou to revise the so-called rectification campaign. Some concrete measures were said to be formulated by this conference and approved by the CCP Central Committee's 7th 70 Plenum in April in Shanghai. But no detailed report was published. The full impact of the confused situation caused by the setting-up of the People's Communes on agricultural production began to be tested by the summer of 1959. Although no statistical figures were published, it can be suggested by other evidence that agricultural production decreased drastically in comparison with the previous years (Buck, 1965, and Clark, 1965 : 148-49). Criticism among the high-ranking officials against the commune system began to mount. The famouse case of Marshall Peng De-huai's petition at the Lushan Conference, held in August of that year, (which cost Peng his position as Minister of Defence), was representative of a large number of the high-ranking Party members. Although Mao succeeded during the Lushan Conference in subduing once again the opposition in the Party, his personal prestige was considerably lowered. A succession of readjustment measures was to be taken for the purpose of easing the economic crisis which confined to deepen as time went on. The period of 1959-1961 has been reported to be a time at the edge of a veritable famine, the cause of which is usually attributed to natural calamities, but it is alleged that Lui Shao-qi/ihas said in a subsequent report that \"the economic crisis was 30 percent attributable to natural calamities and 70 percent to man-made disaster\" (Chao, 1970 : 31). An official report issued in August, 1960, suggests that deliberate devasta-tion of land by peasants during the spring sowing season had become serious (RMRB, 14 August, 1960). The shortage of grain for the coming years was so grave that the 15 government was forced to buy wheat in great quantity from Australia and Canada. It is estimated that China imported 5-6 million tons of wheat from Australia, Canada and France in 1961 (Jan Deleyne, 1971 : 172). 71 In the face of such a disaster in rural economy, Mao's voice could no longer be as resounding as it had once been. It is very likely that a contending group took shape at the time around Liu Shao-qi and Deng Xiao-ping, and began to act in concert. The decision of the Lushan Conference and the \"Twelve Articles of Emergency Direc-tives for Work in the Countryside\" issued by the Central Committee of the CCP in November, 1960^ marked another stage which may be called the \"stage of regression\". C . The Third Stage - Period of Regression - August 1959 to August 1962 Following the Lushan decision, the \"Twelve Articles of Emergency Directives for Work in the Countryside\" were issued to carry out some important modifications: (1) The basic ownership of the production brigade and partial ownership of the production team was strengthened. (2) Labor force should be controlled at the production team level. (3) The portion paid in wages and the portion supplied should be 70% and 30% respectively. (4) The private plots were returned to members of the communes. (5) Family sidelines were allowed. (6) Rural trade markets were restored in a controlled manner. (7) The proper balance between work time and rest was assured. (8) Masses should be mobilized to participate in the \"rectification campaign\" of the commune (Chiang, 1965 : 70-71; 1967 Yearbook oh Chinese Communism : 1029-1030). 1\u00C2\u00B0 The \"Twelve Articles of Emergency Directives\" and the later \"Sixty Articles Con-cerning the People's Communes\" have never been published in the Chinese press. I found them in the URI's collection, and the Hoover Institution collection among the materials gathered by the Taiwan Security Office. They have been viewed as veracious. 72 Based on the principles of the above \"Emergency Directives\", a document called \"Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes (known also as \"Sixty Articles Concerning the People's Communes\") was issued in March, 1961, in order to concretize in detail the spirit of the \"Twelve Articles\". The \"Sixty Articles\" went further in putting a limitation on local industry and larger plans of irri-gation systems in order to concentrate the labor force directly on agricultural production. The ex-landlords and rich peasants who had behaved well were for the first time allowed to be full members. Along with this, the slogan of \"san-zi y?-bqo\" (three privates and one guaran-tee) which was to become notorious during the Cultural Revolution was carried out as an efficient measure to stimulate the peasant's zeal in production. The \"three privates\" means private plots, free markets and responsibility for losses and gains in rural handi-crafts production. All three things had existed during the cooperativization period. The one guarantee which caused the communal land to be distributed to individual house-holds on condition that each household guaranteed a fixed quota in production, was a new policy. It is apparent that this policy made the system of labor distribution retreat even beyond the cooperativization period. That is why this period can be considered as a period of regression. However, it seems very likely that the \"one guarantee\" policy did not become really prevalent before being criticized as the main crime of the capital-istic roaders. ^ ^ Deng Zi-hui, one of the high-ranking officials in the Government, was purged by Mao because he proposed the adoption of a nationwide system to sefguaranteed production quotas\" for individual farm households instead of production teams (see Liu's \"Confession\", China Monthly, Sept. 1969, p. 35, quoted by Chao, 1970 : 322-323). If is difficult to affirm now whether the cause of the improvement in agricul-tural production in 1962 was due to amelioration of weather, or to the drastic modifi-cations in the commune system; probably both. In any event, the sign of the end of crisis gave Mao and his supporters an opportunity not to yield further in the Commune movement to Liu's group which considered that the economic policies had not been retreated far enough. Now Mao decided to launch his counter attack during the Tenth Session of the Eighth Central Committee, held in September, 1962, by focussing the economic problems on ideological ground. Class struggle was once again raised to gauge the standard of correct policy-making. The Maoists thereafter called this meet-ing amhistorical turning point in the duel of power struggle against the capitalist roaders (Chao, 1970 : 31). It was also this meeting which opened a nationwide cam-paign of politico-ideological indoctrination known as the Socialist Education Movement. D. The Fourth Stage - Period of Consolidation - September 1962 to 1965 The meeting of the Party's Central Committee in September, 1962 has been considered decisive by the Maoists because an alleged proposal on further modifications of the communal organization by Liu was not accepted at the meeting. In Maoist terms, the situation was that \"the black wind of capitalism was victoriously stopped\" (Chao, 1970 : 31). It seems that Mao regained since then some influence in decision-making which had been manipulated by Liu's group during the crisis period of 1959-1961. Although Mao and his policy have never been publicly criticized in the Chinese Press, 1 g For a full account of this movement see Richard Baum (1975). 74 Mao recognized in many instances his mistakes in communization and specially pointed out two important deviations during the movement, namely, \"ping-jun zhu-yi\" (equali-tarianism) and gong-chdn feng\" (wind of communism).^ The former refers to the blunder of cadres in not understanding the necessity of socialist principle in distribution, \"to each according to his work\". The latter refers to the contradictions between commune and brigade, commune and team and brigade and team, on the one hand, and between collectivity and individual household on the other. Mao later recognized that the passage from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people would require much more time than he had originally thought. That is why he made no attempt to reverse 20 the main modifications made by Liu's group, except the \"one guarantee\" policy. Following the purge of Deng Zi-hui, who had been the flagbearer of Liu's \"one guarantee\" policy, the commune organization retained the \"three levels\" system with-out handing the communal land to individual households except at some experimental spots. The revised version of the \"Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes\" at the Party's Central Committee meeting in September, 1962, made clear that the ownership was of a collective nature, not by the whole people. Most property such as hilly land, fruit trees, small-scale industries, formerly owned by the commune, was handed over to the brigade and team for possession and management.. The production team was designated instead of the brigade as the basic unit of accounting.^ ^ See Mao's \"Talk at Zhengzhou Meeting in March 1959: and \"Talk at Lushan Con-ference in July 1959\" (Mao Tse-tung Si-xiang Wdh-sui, 1969 : 279-305). 20 See Mao's \"Talk at the Conference of the Party's Central Committee Work Group at Beidaiho on 9 August 1962\" (Mao Tse-tung Si-xiahg Wdn-sui, 1969 : 425). In the revised version, a two-level system (commune and team without brigade) was mentioned as a variation (See \"Nongcun Renmin Gongshe Gbhgzuo Tidoli-Xiuzheng an (\"A Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Commune\" or \"Revised Version of the Sixty Articles Concerning the People's Communes\"), Sept. 1962, reprinted by the Taiwan Security Office in May, 1965. 75 Along with the modifications in organization, the size of the commune was 9 9 also reduced drastically. Up to November, 1963, the total number of communes had increased to 74,000 from around 26,000 in 1959 (Peking Review, 1 November, 1963 : 9), corresponding roughly to the number of townships in China. From 1962 to 1965 no miraculous increase in agricultural output has been re' ported, but it is very likely that agricultural production was being steadily increased dujing that period. There is little doubt that the commune system was gradually con-solidated and entered into a stage of stability. Ill SUMMARY Eighteen years have elapsed since the emergence of the people's commune. More and more people are recognizing the importance of this socioeconomic organism, and more and more information and research results are being published. However, we still feel the danger of being misled in one direction or another. Let us put aside for the time being a few studies made in China on the People's Communes, because they could be thought of as being published for the purpose of dis-seminating some kind of propaganda. In the western countries there still exist two oppos-ing points of view. For instance, Cheng Chu-yuan concluded in his study on the People's Commune: \"The failure of communization, first experienced in the Soviet Union and now in Communist China, provides a valuable lesson to all other less developed countries -collectivization definitely leads to the deterioration of agricultural production (1963:5-6). 22 For the reasons and process of re'ducing commune size, see G . William Skinner, \"Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China\", Part III : \"Rural Marketing in Communist China\" (The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, May, 1965 : 363-399). 76 Perspicacious as he is, Chao Kang takes the view that the communes existed almost in name only by 1961 (1970 : 29). On the other hand, Keith Buchanan states that the \"changes (modifications) do not mean the commune system is collapsing; they are rather a sign that the system is very much alive and developing\" (1966 : 38). His point of view is shared by Jan Myrdal (1965 : 1970) and Peter Worseley (1975). It is certain that both views must be tested before 'either one can'be.accepted as a theory which can cope with the reality. However, we may ask a prior? if these opposing points 23 of view were not the consequence of their guiding theories. As a matter of fact, a few social scientists have been aware of the danger of being misled by the theories, well established in the vWest, in approaching the problems of the Third World (Frank, 1967;:Gurley, 1971). But most of them have expressed their dissenting points of view in the form of criticism, few have attempted to break up the paradigmatic restraint with suggestive studies. As has been expressed in the introduction, this study is an attempt to go beyond the conventional theories on the Third World. The development of the People's Commune is viewed, in this thesis, as a different model from the western capitalist and the Soviet socialist ones. It is likely not appropriate to 'establish this model by using the same criteria as would be used to build a model along the capitalist line. From this point of view, neither GNP index nor capital formation index is very meaningful in judging whether the commune system is a failure or a success. It is rather suggestive that the development of the People's Commune should be treated in its own historical and cultural backgrounds and sociological environment. Its success This academic dispute is not a novelty, but has its roots in the pre-World War. II research which will be discussed further in the next chapter. 77 or failure is based on the structural flexibility of the Chinese society to the theory with which the decision-maker was attempting to change the social reality in order to attain some predesigned goal on the one hand, and the flexibility of the theory in its adapta-bility to the Chinese situation on the other. The process of change is a dialectical one. However utopian a predesigned goal may be, if it is malleable and ready to modify itself in accordance with inter-reaction between itself and the pre-existing social structure, it will be no longer Utopian. On the contrary, a feasible predesign may become Utopian if it is too rigid to adapt it-self to the social reality. Therefore, it is almost inconceivable for me to consider the rectification of the commune as a pure regression without taking its adaptive aspect into account. It is undeniable that there were things which could be deemed as regressive in comparison with the original design of a very radical nature, but there were also other things which provided advanced indices for further development. In contrast to the con-clusions of C'heng and Chao, I cannot find any solid ground of failure, nor can I say that the commune system is only a name. After the stage which I have called \"regression\", it was the stage of consolidation. Why is the People's Commune to be considered not as a failure, but as a valuable model? Why is it not merely a different name for the co-operative system? How was it being consolidated in a continuing developmental process? And how can it be perceived as such? the following chapters will respond to these questions. 78 Chapter Four GENERAL BACKGROUND FOR THE RURAL ECONOMY IN SHANDONG BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNES This chapter will be presented in three sections: the first section will provide a geographical and historical background of Shandong Province; the second section will deal with the historical facts relevant to the rural economy and the theoretical interpretations of the latter; and the third section will give a description of the situ-ation of cooperativization on the eve of the commune movement in Shandong. I GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Shandong Province, stretching from latitude 38\u00C2\u00B0N to 34\u00C2\u00B0N and from longitude 115\u00C2\u00B0E to 123\u00C2\u00B0E, has an area of a little more than 150,000 square kilometres, roughly corresponding to 1.5 percent of the total area of China. ^ The topography of Shandong is uneven. Mountainous and hilly regions comprise three-fifths of the total area. The province can be divided into four parts (see Map 1). 1. The Western Alluvial Plain is a part of the vast North-China Plain. Ninety percent of its surface is under fifty metres above sea level. The Yellow River and the Great Canal pass through, and cross each other in the middle of the region. Between the mountains in the central part of the province and the Yellow River alluvial plain, short rivers form lakes. Weishan Lake, the largest one, covers an area of approximately six hundred and sixty square kilometres. To the north of the region a delta formed by the ^ China is about 9,6000,000 square kilometres. 1. The Western. Alluvial Plain* 2. The Jiaolai Plain 3* The Central Mountainous Region*. k\u00C2\u00BB The Eastern Liaodong Hilly Region. Sources Atlag by Provinces of the PRC. 197i*tH3 - o Yellow River between the estuaries of Tuhai River and Xiaoqing River stretches to the Gulf of Bohai. 2. The Jiaolai Plain is situated between the central mountainous region and the Jiaodong hilly region. It is also an alluvial plain formed by the rivers of Wei, Bailang, Jiaolai and Dagu. 3. The Central Mountainous Region consists of a chain of mountains such as Tai, Mong, Lu and Y i . The highest peak on Tai Mountain rises to more than one thousand five hundred metres, but the borders of the region are no more than three hundred metres above sea-level. 4. The Eastern Jiaodong Hilly Region is the main part of the Shandong Peninsula. This portion is made up of granite and gneiss with some crystalline limestone. It is not more than four hundred metres high on the average. The cultivated areas are concentrated in the two plains regions (cf. Atlas by Provinces of the PRC, 1974 : 37-40). Ramon Myers describes Shandong Province as one area with poor soil conditions because \"rainfall was insufficient to leach out most of the lime so that the soil was alka-line\" (Myers, 1970 : 9). The annual rainfall is so irregular that agriculture used to 2 depend largely upon the weather. Drought often occurred in the past, but flooding was no less frequent because the concentration of rainfall in a short period during the summer 2 During the nineteenth century Shandong had 30 droughts. See Amano Motonosuke, \"Shindai no riogyo to sono kozo\" (Agriculture during the Qing period and its structure) in Ajia kenkyu (Asiatic Studies), 3.1 : 240 (quoted by Myers, 1970 : 274). usually caused the Yellow River to overflow. Drought, flood, alkali and sand have been viewed as the four major natural calamities contributing to the low agricultural output. Compared with the fertile Yangzi Delta, that of Pearl River, or the Sichuan Basin, the geographical conditions of Shandong province are greatly inferior, but they are no more severe than in many other inland provinces such as Honan, Shanxi and Shanxi. If the arable land and the total area ratio are taken into account, Shan-dong will occupy a better position. Shandong has been ranked first of all the provinces in China with respect to its net cultivated surface area (see Appendix III, Table I). In spite of the relatively low yield per unit (Appendix III, Table 2), it has been ranked second only to Sichuan Province on the list of net output of food grains (Appen-dix III, Table 3). However, one factor which has placed Shandong among the poorest provinces is its man-land ratio. Its population numbered more than 48,870,000 in the census of 1955 (Tregear, 1965 : 228), 54,000,000 in 1958 (DZRB, 1 October, 1958), and 55,520,000 in 1974,^ a population three times as large as that of Shanxi Province which is equal to Shandong in area, and has twice the population of Canada which is almost as big as China.^ In the past, the vast virgin land in the North-east was the ideal colonial area for the surplus population of Shandong. In short, poor soil conditions, insufficient annual rainfall, regular flooding of the Yellow River, and overpopulation, have constituted the main problems of 3 During the last 2,000 pears, tUa 2, JOG years, the lower course of the Yellow River has overflowed in Honan and Shandong Provinces more than 1,500 times (see Huanghe Zai Qian-jin (The Yellow River Goes Ahead), published by the Ministry of Irrigation and Electricity, Peking, 1972. ^ Atlas by Provinces of the People's Republic of China, op. cit., p. 39. In Shenzhou Jubian (Drastic Change in China), published in January, 1976 in Hong Kong by the Economic Report News Press, A population of more than 68,000,000 is given for Shandong Province (p. 88). ^ Shandong is ranked second after Jiangsu Province in population density, but Jiangsu is much more fertile than Shandong. Shandong Province. These problems are no different than those of China as a whole, but they have manifested themselves in a more acute manner in Shandong than in any other province. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that Shandong is, geographically one of the most representative areas of China with regard to basic problems in agricul-tural development. Historically, Shandong is one of the places where the early Chinese culture flourished. Thanks to the archaeological discoveries during recent decades, we know that an early culture, called by archaeologists the Longshan Culture or Black Pottery Culture^ developed between approximately 2,000 and 1,200 B.C. in the present Long-shan Township of Licheng County (Shi Zhang-ru, 1954 : 26). This neolithic culture spread to the north, west and south and was to meet the Yang'shaoCCuIture in the present Honan Province to form the earliest Chinese culture known to us before the Shang Dynasty (Pei, 1954 : 56). It was also in this province that Confucius was born and pro-pagated his philosophy. Shandong Province formed part of the territory of China at a very early time and was part of the Chinese cultural unit long before the provinces to the south of the Yangzi River. Administratively, at the end of the Qing Dynasty, Shandong was divided into ten fu and three zhi-li zhou (directly under the jurisdiction of the provincial govern-ment). Those ten fu were divided into 7 zhou and 97 xian (counties) (Shandong Tong-zhi, 1915). After the Revolution of 1911, all zhou were converted into counties. So the province was divided first into 108 counties (Feng-sheng, D?-zhi, 1935), and then into 107 counties (see Map 2). After 1949, although some county seats were moved It has been so called because the excavation was found at Longshan, Licheng County, Shandong Province, and consisted mainly of black potteries. Counties of Shandong Provinces 1\u00E2\u0080\u00A2Wudi 2.Zhanhua 3.Yangxin 4.Luoling 5.Ningjin 6.Shanghe 7.Huimin 8.Bin 9.Lijin ICBoxing U.Guangrao 12*Shouguang 13\u00C2\u00ABYidu 1if.Linzhi 15* Changshan l6.Zouping 17.Gaoqing 18. Huantai 19.Putai 20.Qingcheng 21,Qidong 22.Jiyang 23.Linyi 24*Ling 25.De 26. En 2?.Wuchang 28.Xiajin 29\u00C2\u00BBLinqing 30*Qiu 31. Quantao 32.Guan 33-Xin 3^-Zhaocheng 3 5 . Fan 3&.Guancheng 37.Pu 38*Hezhe 39*Dingtao 40.Cao M.Dan if2..Jinxiaig 43*Chengwu kh* Juye if5.Yuncheng i*6.Jiaxiang if7.,Wenshang i+8.Dongping 49.Shouzhang 5CDong\u00C2\u00ABa 51.Piayin 52.Yanggu 53\u00E2\u0080\u00A2Tangyi 54.Liaocheng 55.Shiping 56.Boping 57\u00C2\u00BBQingpin 58.Gaotang 59-Pingyuan 6Q*Yucheng 61.Qiho 62.Licheng 63.Changqing 64.Feicheng 65\u00C2\u00ABTai*an 6 6 . Ningyang 67\u00C2\u00BBSishul 68.Qufu 69*Yanzhou 70.Jining 71.Yutai 72.Zou ?3*Teag. 7^.Yi 75.Daacheng 76.Fei 7?.Mengyin 78\u00C2\u00BBXintai ?9.Laiwu 80.Zhangqiu 8l.Zhichxan 82.Boshan 83Linju 8/f.Yishui 85.Liayi 86.Rizhao 87.Ju 88.inqiu 89.Changluo 90.Wei 9 K C h a n g y i 92*Gaomi 93.Zhucheng 9 W i a o 95.Piagdu 96.Te 97.Zhaoyuan 98.Laiyang 99*Jiiao 100.Hai.yang IQUQixia 102.Huang 103*Penglai 104.Fushan 105.Muping 106.Wendeng 107\u00C2\u00BBRongcheng Sources; Myers 1970s 10-11 and Atlas by Provinces of the PRC> 1974:37-38. 84 because of the development of transportation and some small counties were merged into large ones, the province continued in the main to keep the traditional subdivi-sion. However, according to the available sources, we know that changes have been occurring since 1949. A 1958 source shows that the province was divided into 8 large Administrative Districts (Zhuan-qu) which were in turn divided into 6 municipalities and 104 counties in addition to four municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the provincial government (DZRB, 7 July, 1958). The Administrative Atlas of China published by the U.S. Directorate of Intelligence in 1969 gives 9 Administrative Dist-ricts and 107 counties under their jurisdiction of Shandong Province. The most recent Chinese Atlas shows that the province is divided into 9 Administrative Districts and 4 municipalities under the jurisdiction of the provincial government. The 9 Administrative Districts are;subdivided into 106 counties and 5 municipalities (Atlas by Provinces of the PRC : 39). No available source tells us when the trivial changes in the administra-tive division occurred between 1958 and 1974. As the more recent atlases do not contain the demarcation lines between counties, Map 2 remains the only reference as to county demarcation for the beginning of commune movement. Ill RECENT HISTORY IN SHANDONG AND THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT A . Recent History in 'Shandong The following is a resume of significant historical facts about Shandong Province since the Opium War of 1840 (cf. History Department of Shandong University, 1960), which reflect the extent to which peasant life was disturbed by both internal and external forces and the gradual collapse of the rural economy. 85 1. Invasion of Imperialist Powers As a result of the Second Opium War in 185.8, Yantai, an east-coast port in Shandong, was opened to foreign trade. Following the arrival of commercial goods, Catholic and Protestant missionaries from France, Italy, Germany, and the United States began to penetrate deeply into the countryside with three bastions in three big cities: Jinan (western parochiality of Shandong), Yanzhou (southern parochiality) and Yantai (eastern parochiality). It was not long before the religious activities of the American missionaries spread to a large number of counties such as Pingdu, Linqing, Qufu, Linyi, Weixian, Laiyang, Changqing, Yucheng and Enxian. The secession of Taiwan as a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-71895 whetted the Japanese appetite and consequently they occupied by force Weihaiwei, on other east-coast port in Shandong. At the same time, under the pretext of the dis-appearance of a German missionary, Germany occupied Jiaozhou Gulf where Qingdao was to be developed into a German bastion, ln 1898 Great Britain seized Weihaiwei by routing the Japanese, and imposed another trade treaty port on China. The German-Chinese Railway Company, the German-Chinese Mineral Exploita-tion Company and the German-Chinese Bank were set up simultaneously in 1899. The Jiao-Ji Railway was built by Germany in order to exploit a large area between Qingdao and 'Jiinan. In the meantime, intervention by the foreign missionaries in Chinese domestic affairs provoked peasant resistance and riots^ among which those in Pingyuan County Deleted. (1895), in Cao County and Dan County (1896), in Juye County and Yanggu County (1897), and in Yucheng County, Licheng County, Feicheng County, Guan County and Linqing County (1899) were the most well known. During the First World War, the Japanese entered the conflict on the Allied \u00C2\u00A7:ide in order to move into the German concessions on Shandong. The famous Twenty-one Demands presented to China by Japan in 1915 provoked the May Fourth Movement which would have far-reaching influence in modern China. But China was too weak at that moment to defend herself. The Japanese army finally entered Shandong in 1927 to impede the northward march of Chiang Kai-shek's North-Expedition Army. The merciless massacre of the inhabitants of Jinan, the capital of Shandong, by the Japanese army, on May 3, 1928, makes this date a memorable one in modern Chinese history. From 1937 to 1945, all the big cities and a large area along the railways in Shandong were occupied and governed by the Japanese forces. Because the communist guerrillas were active in the countryside, under the pretext of eliminating communists, Ibotingtamd the massacre of Chinese peasants by the Japanese became routine in a large part of the province. 2. Peasant Rebellions The failures in wars with foreign powers forced the Manchu government to continuously increase agricultural taxes. Between 1840 and 1854, open and organized peasant resistance to payment of taxes occurred in fifteen counties. In 1854 the Tai-ping Army entered Shandong and at the same time peasant riots flared up in the western part of the province. Between 1855 and 1868 the Nian 87 Army actively engaged the Manchu Armies in a large region of Shandong. Both Taiping and Nian rebellions were on a nation-wide scale. Many other rebellious instances, although originating locally and having limited influence, affected even more the peasant life of this province. The best known of these local uprisings were: (1) the Fu-jun in the counties of Mengyin, Yishui, Te.ng/ Fei, Y i , Taian, and Laiwu (1856-1862); (2) the Zou-jiao-jun in the counties of Zou and Qufu (1860-1862); (3) the Chang-qiang Hui (the Long Lance Society) in the counties of Fan, Mengcheng and Dongchang (1861-1867); (4) the Bai-liah Jiao (the White Lotus Society) in the West of Shandong (1861-1863); and (5) the Yi-he Quan (the Boxers 1863-1901) which was originally a branch of the White Lotus Society, expanding later into Hobei Prov-ince and Peking and finally becoming widely known because of the War of the Boxers. In a relatively short span of time, the fact that so many peasant revolts oc-curred, strongly indicated the state of instability in the countryside. 3. Acceleration of Class Polarization Due to disintegration of the social and economic structures and to the modern means of accumulating wealth, class polarization proceeded at an unprecedented pace. Because of disintegration of social and economic structures, the restraining forces, both structural and moral, were considerably weakeried;5becausecofcm'odepn:means of accumu-lating wealth, people could be enriched in a short span of time to a degree that formerly took several generations. Two facts can be seen to indicate the tendency to class polari-zation: (1) Multi-enterprises of landlords: Besides leasing land, landlords also undertook commercial and handicraft enterprises, and began to set up money stores (qian-zhuang) or silver stores (yin-hao). The last named was a modern means of acculumating wealth, much more efficacious than the means of traditional userers. The Xu family in Xiajin County and the Shu family in Zhichuan County were very representative of this category of landlord. 8 (2) Militia groups (Tuan-lian) : Inasmuch as the Manchu legal forces were in-capable of protecting people against either foreign invaders or armed peasant rebels, many wealthy and influential landlords embarked on the organization of a defensive militia. They built citadels and armed their tenants. They even collected taxes from the inhabitants of their spheres of influence. They offered an alternative to the peasants: aligning with the rebels, or looking for protection from these influential landlords. As the militia groups were proven efficient in fighting against the peasant rebels, they were en-couraged by the government. This phenomenon was not, of course, limited to Shandong Province. It was a nationwide movement during this period. A few of these militia groups developed into warlords at the beginning of the Republic. According to Chinese official statistics, before the Land Reform the landlord class in Shandong represented 3%-4% of the total population, but occupied 30%-50% of the total arable land. This situation was exacerbated in some places, for instance, at the time of Land Reform, officially reported surveys indicated that in the southern part of Zhucheng County, the landlord representing 10% of the local population possessed 80% of the land (DZRB, 6 August, 1957). This situation created tension not only between landlords and peasants, but also among the peasants themselves \u00C2\u00B0 T h o u g h the tuan-lian varied greatly in different, places, under different circum-stances, it was invariably a gentry creation for local militarization and control in response to a time of administrative weakness (cf. Kuhn, 1970 : 93-104). 89 because of the scarcity of land, a situation which made so many people pessimistic about the Chinese rural economy. 4. Civil Wars; In Myers1 book, the Japanese invasion of Shandong between 1937-1945 seems not to have dealt a serious blow to the rural economy. But his perceptions are highly suspect because he relied strongly on Japanese data to study the Chinese economy. He nevertheless gives a detailed account, always according to the Japanese surveys, of the impactsof warlordism and the civil war between the Communists and Nationalists on the rural economy (Myers, 1970 : 277-287). Shandong was not only the battlefield of the Japanese invasion armies, but also of the civil wars before and after them. As Myers says: \"no other phenomena between 1911 and 1937 (sic!) caused such upheaval and misery in the countryside as that of dissident military units wandering about pillag-ing and warring with one another\" (ibid. : 277). Between 1937 and 1945, the rural situation became worse because of the pitiless attacks by the Japanese armies for the purpose of seizing provisions and elimin-ating the communists. But the defeat of the Japanese forces did not bring about calm-ness in Shandong. Between 1945 and 1948, the communist forces made assaults on the county seats one after another before they finally conquered the provincial capital, Jinan. It is known that the defeat of the Nationalist government did not result only from the military collapse, but also - probably mainly - from economic bankruptcy. On the eve of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, just as Myers points out, \"the collapse of both urban and rural economy in north China was complete\" (ibid. : 187). 90 B. Theoretical Interpretations of Economic Development Many scholars, both Chinese and Western, have used much of their time and energy to investigate the causes and to look for some feasible solutions to the problems of backwardness or regression in Chinese agricultural development. In his research on peasant economy in Hobei and Shandong (the only serious study about local economy of Shandong Province so far as I know), Ramon H. Myers puts forth two theories for explaining the backwardness of Chinese agriculture: the:distribution theory and the eclectic theory, as previously mentioned in Chapter One (Section I). Although those theories were not derived exclusively from research on Shandong and Hobei provinces, Myers thinks they can be applied towards explaining the agrarian problems in these two provinces. He states that his study is closer to that of J . L. Buck than tb that of any other student of the Chinese rural economy. Therefore, he espouses Buck's explanations which rested on \"incontrovertible evidence that the funda-mental problems of agriculture had nothing to do with rural socioeconomic relationships\" and \"that China's rural problem was rooted firmly in improving farming technology and in the government undertaking various forms of assistance to permit farmers to manage their land more efficiently\" (Myers, 1970 : 292). Before advancing my comments about the divergence between the \"distribution theory\" and \"eclectic theory\" named by Myers, I would like to say a few words about the nature of Myers' data upon which he has based his research. In the first place, there is little doubt that the North China rural surveys made by the Japanese during the war period (1939-1943), which constituted the bulk of the sources of Myers' data, have certain value for understanding the peasant economy in the corresponding areas. In some ways, they might even be regarded as very valuable if there existed no other sources of the same nature, covering the same period. However, as Myers was aware, the validity of data is questionable because they were \"collected via interpreters by citizens of a conquering power, by foreigners whose compatriots had committed aggression of the most naked kind\" (Myers, 1970 : 37). After citing such a strange condition of data collecting, I can hardly believe that Myers could be so naive as to think that the Chinese peasants' \"characteristic tolerance (and long experience) of alien powers suggested that they probably told the truth\" and that \"they could under-stand that these particular investigators were not the usual servants of the invading army\" (ibid.). So far as I have observed, the Chinese peasants are no more tolerant of alien powers than any other people.' Nor can I believe that the peasants during a time of war were capable of distinguishing \"these particular investigators\" from the \"servants of the invading army\" . 1 0 In the second place, the four villages from whence the bulk of the data was derived, were all close to big cities such as Peking and Jinan, or to county seats. They were not very representative of inland villages, either by number or by their geographical situation. 9 The Mongols and Manchus, in spite of their rapid Sinicization, were not really tolerated even after 80 years and more than 200 years domination respectively. 1 0 Even I, a Chinese, when collecting information for my thesis in Hong Kong, felt I had incited some undue suspicion in my compatriots, yet it was not a time of war. Moreover, I was in Hong Kong, a large westernized city, faced with informants who were more or less educated and surely capable of distinguishing a student from a secret agent; after all, I did not need an interpreter and was capable of communi-cating with my informants in the most subtle Chinese way (see Appendix I). 92 Thirdly, many examples in the data which could lead to a different conclu-sion were not discussed by Myers. For instance, in the data of Ling Shui Kou Village in Shandong Province, the land distribution is reported as very unequal. As we know, before 1949 the village leadership was strictly linked with wealth. The number of families belonging to the village council until 1925 represented 2% of the total number of village householders, but owned 10% of the land. Between 1928 and 1939, the number of village leaders increased to 4% while the land they owned decreased to 8%. There are two possible explanations for such an abrupt change occurring within a time span of only a few years. The first is that the members of the village council did not report the accurate figures of their land holdings between 1928-1939 for fear of being over-taxed by the Japanese. The second explanation may be that given the accuracy of the figures, this trend rather indicates a general impoverishment of the villagers, including the wealthy peasants, and not more equality of land distribution, because there was little chance that the land lost by the village leaders fell into the hands of the poor non-leader families. Who could purchase this land? Absentee landlords? Presumably. If this explanation is reasonable, it would touch the socioeconomic relationship in the rural areas. It was no longer possible to confine the problem merely to a purely economic framework. With respect to the two theories about peasant development in China advanced by Myers, many points were shared by the two theories. Both sides recognized the im-poverishment of the peasants and both thought that a large proportion of their incom was unjustly taken away by taxes, high rents, usury and the like. The crucial difference between them in their conclusions is that the distribution theorists viewed the causes and solutions in production relationships and stressed them, whereas the eclectic theorists 93 viewed the causes and solutions in and stressed on productive forces. Bearing this in mind, we immediately find that this difference in thinking and in the accordingly derived arguments is not only confined to the research before World War II, but is still carried on by the students of China today. The difference between Buchanan, Worsley and Jan Myrdal on the one hand, and Cheng Chu-yuan and Chao Kang on the other, on the people's commune which I have discussed in the previous chapter, is none other than the old theme of production relationships versus productive forces. One interesting remark is that those who espouse the \"eclectic theory\" are mostly economists trained in the purely western academic tradition in economy, no matter whether their origins be Chinese or western. On the other side stand mostly non-economists whether they be sociologists, anthropologists or social historians. At this point, James Hansen's remark about the paradigmatic limitations in modern empiricist science woul'd become very suggestive.11 The old paradigmatic framework set up by 1 9 Adam Smith in economic development is still in vogue. Laissez-faire, self-interest and competitive markets are viewed as basic principles for rapid economic development. Derivatively, any interference from government is viewed as evil and undue action which could only obstruct a normal and healthy development. That is why those econ-omists, when studying the Chinese economy, have done everything to avoid looking at any evidence which might contradict those principles. In spite of historic facts, many of them still think that communism was imposed on the Chinese peasants by a host of elitists and that the creation of the People's Commune was also arbitrarily conceived 11 In criticising the Empiricist Science, Hansen says: \"This type of science is prevalent in most lab-work: the scientist 'collects' 'facts' in accordance with some pre-estab-lished paradigm\" (1967). ^ John G . Gurley has made a precise analysis in this matter. See \"Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development \"(1969). 94 by Mao or by a few people against the peasants' will, and that if the Chinese peasantry was to be given a chance to develop itself along the line of laissez-faire, self-interest and competitive markets, it would have developed much better. But laissez-faire, self-interest and competitive markets have operated in a set of historical conditions and sociological institutions that the countries outside the western sphere do not possess. If the social and economic prerequisites for development in developing countries consist merely of introducing the necessary social \"(institutions as well as technology from the developed countries, there would already have been some \"united states\" emerging in Latin America or Asia. The historical evidence of economic development shows that the countries of Latin America have not successfully received such similar condi-tions and institutions by diffusion from the developed countries after having developed along the line of \"liberal economy\" for more than two centuries, at least. India is another example of a country which has not successfully developed in this way. Even Japan, which has always been regarded as an exception in terms of a successful model of liberal economy, has not possessed similar institutions, although some historical conditions similar to the western countries in their development were created during World War II and are continuing in effect. Ironically enough to the expectations of some economists, they were not created by the liberal economy, but by Japanese military invasion. The divergence between the two theories becomes all the more important when it is not merely circumscribed within the academic realm, but brought into the sphere of policy-making. It has been reported that the question of \u00C2\u00BBw'hetlheri:produetion relation' ships\"on\u00C2\u00ABproduetKve>fo^ constituted the most burning issue of 95 the struggle between two factions within the CCP during the collectivization move-ment. The fact that the final decisions were always inclined to change the produc-tion relationships in order to resolve the contradiction between them and the productive forces, could sufficiently indicate that the final analyses of the decision-makers were in accord, to some degree, with the 'distribution' theorists. Contrary to Myers' accu-sation that the distribution theorists lacked thorough examination of \"the great body of rural data\" and critical analysis, they often brought about insight into the problems wJth.more historical perspective and less limitation by the western economic paradigm. This discussion may help the reader to understand that Mao's decision to establish the People's Commune in order to bring about some radical changes in the production re-lationships in the rural areas was not so arbitrary as many have supposed it to be. Even Mao was not influenced by the research of the so-called \"distribution\" school, at least his analyses coincided with many of those theorists. Therefore, there is no reason to think that Mao was alone in having such a point of view, and was in default of theoretical support. Before turning to the discussion of the Commune system it is necessary to present a brief description of the developmental situation in Shandong just before the creation of the People's Commune. ^ The faction led by Liu Shaoqi has often been depicted by the students of Chinese economy as representative of the \"productive-force-first\" theory and thus were more perceptive to the reality. In fact, there is no evidence to prove that Liu and his followers did not take the production relationships into account and that they were \u00E2\u0080\u00A2asHiber&laaslan;landifrLad&an^hh^ , 96 III O N THE EVE OF COMMUNIZATION IN SHANDONG In China as a whole, the cooperative movement is said by a number of authorities to have started in 1955. But in some places, agricultural producers' co-operatives were set up as early as 1952, the very year of the completion of the Land Reform and the inception of the mutual-aid groups. Shandong was one of those places. According to the available sources, one of the earliest cooperatives was the Red Star (Hongxing) Agricultural Producers' Cooperative in the Village of Hou-zhaizi, Junan County, which was organized in the winter of 1952. It started with only 25 house-holds, but this number was increased to 140 in 1954, representing 86.2% of the total households of the village (DZRB, 23 November, 1954). By 1954, there were already more than 24,000 agricultural producers' cooperatives while 68.1% of the total house-holds had joined the mutual-aid groups in Shandong (DZRB, 10 November, 1954). By the end of 1955, 7,190,000 peasant households (or 76% of the total households in the province) had joined the cooperatives.^ In March of 1956 the number of co-operativized households rose to 10,070,000, or 91.8% of the total number of the peasant households. Among them, 7,200,000 households or 65.6% of the total number became members of the advanced type.^ Up to iihebeginning of 1957, 96% of the peasant households in Shandong had been cooperativized and 85% were in the advanced cooperatives. 1\u00C2\u00B0 The cooperative movement can, in the main, be considered to '4 \"Report on the National Economic Development and the Situation of Implementation of State Planning of Shandong Province in 1955\" by the Statistical Bureau of Shandong Province (DZRB, 18 April, 1956). 1 j-bidor According to the provincial Statistic Bureau's report for 1956, there were 137 State farms in the province besides the cooperatives (DZRB, 9 August, 1957). ^\u00C2\u00B0 Report presented by Tan Qi-long, the first secretary of the Provincial CCP Committee of Shandong Province to the Third Plenum of the Second Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (RMRB, 12 March, 1957). have been completed in 1957 in Shandong. The most important achievement's in agricultural development since the cooper-ative movement started were the increase of arable land by exploiting the virgin and deserted lands, and amelioration of soil conditions by building and improving irrigation systems, and afforestation. Mechanization also got under way. In 1955, the newly exploited land amounted to 168,000 mu, giving a total increase of 1,219,000 mu over 1952 (DZRB, 18 April, 1956). In the sector of irriga-tion, in 1955, 245 small-scale dams, 737 irrigation canals and more than 5,000 reser-voirs were built. There was also a well-building endeavor that brought the number of wells up to 2,110,000 (ibid.). Due to these basic irrigation works, 18,000,000 mu of land were brought under irrigation in 1956. 1 7 In 1955 the afforestation areas in-creased 100% over 1954 (DZRB, 18 April, 1956). In 1956, 1,991,200 mu were added to make the total afforested area 5,148,800 mu (DZRB, 8 February, 1957). Mechanization in agriculture was first introduced into Shandong in 1952 by the establishment of the first tractor station which possessed 6 tractors. In 1955, 13 more stations (with 364 tractors) were set up, serving 2,469 cooperatives in 22 counties. By September of 1956, the number of tractor stations and of tractors had increased to 36 and 700 respectively (DZRB, 5 September, 1956). The 'per unit1 yield steadily rose for most food grains and economic crops (see Table 4.1). In 1956 food grains increased 10% over 1955, amounting to 30 billion j in. 1^ A survey of 372 cooperatives (10,300 households) in 24 counties revealed that per capita output of food grains was 559 jin in 1955 and 607 fin in 1956. The actual 1 7 It is noted that before 1956 the total irrigated land was only 8,000,000 mu. See Tan Qi-long's report (1957). ^ Tan Qi-long's report, op. cit. Chao Kang's estimate is 25 billion 900 million jin for 1956 and 25 billion 930 million jin for 1957 (Chao, 1970). 98 grain distribution per capita after tax and sale to the State was 423 jin in 1956 (Tan, 1957). Up to 1957, living standards of peasants had been steadily improving. This can be seen in the survey of the Village of Wang's Well (Wang-jing Cun) in the Red Temple Township (Zhu-miao Xiang), Xia jib County (Table 4.2). However, the improve-ment of living standards was better seen in the category of lower-middle class peasants. Few, if any, improvements had been made for those above the upper-middle peasant class. Generally speaking, the sharp difference in living standards between rich peasants and poor peasants as a common pattern before the revolution, had given way to equalization. According to this survey, we see that in comparison with the level of living standards in 1936, the best year during a long period of turmoil before 1949, the upper-.m'i;ddle class peasants consumed more grain, more oil, a little more cotton cloth in 1956, but less meat. In contrast, the poor peasants consumed more of everything in 1956 than in 1936. The living standards of the poor peasants in 1956 almost reached the level'of'upper^-middle class peasants'iri-l-936.;il pc^dnrs t.'t >r2-1956 was a year in which heavy industry still took precedence. It was reported that the gross output value of industry in Shandong increased 339.6% over 1949. The ratio of gross output value in the industrial sector to the total value of industry and agri-culture rose from 29.1% in 1949 to 45.8% in 1956, an increase of 22.8% per year (DZRB, 3 August, 1957). The first half of 1958 was a period of upsurge for the development of rural in-dustry (xiang-she gong-ye literally means \"industry of township and cooperatives\"). 19 According to the average income in the survey, the peasants of the village of Wang's Well were better off than the average in Shandong which was reported as 69 yuan in 1936, 78 yuan in 1952 and 83 yuan in 1956 (DZRB, 6 August, 1957). Table 4.1 Per mu yield for the principal food grains and economic- crops : 1954-55 (unit : jin) 1955 1954 wheat 101.7 111.3 corn 184.1 177.5 millet 204.7 189.8 sorghum 169.0 119.6 soybeans 107.1 95.7 sweet potatoes 344.9 445.9 cotton 36.7 32.9 foreign hemp 187.71 13215 tobacco 185.4 199.1 peanut 260.1 217.8 rape seed 50.1 30.1 Source: \"Report on the National Economic Development and the Situation of implementation of the State Planning in Shandong Province in 1955\" by the Statistical Bureau of Shandong Province (DZRB, 18 April 1956). 100 Table 4.2 (Comparison of living standards from 1936 to 1956 in the Village of Wang's Well, Xia jin County (per individual) net income (unitryan) 1936 1943 1945 1950 1951 1954 1955 1956 upper-middle peasant v 87.7 21.1 47.9 114.17 39.95 114.6 125 137.5 lower-middle 45.36 17.3 30 89.75 43.97 89.2 128.5 145.9 poor 29.5 17.98 33.6 73.72 21.8 91.8 139 165.9 average 54.19 18.79 37.16 92.55 35.24 98.53 130.83 149.77 grain comsumption (jin) upper-middle 347.3 266.9 324.8 373.9 359.5 381.68 395 419.5 lower-middle 261.6 243.5 301.7 369.5 371.7 398.8 399.2 413.2 poor 242 218.7 322.9 356.6 352.8 406.6 411 451.9 average 283.6 243 316.5 369.66 361.3 395.69 401.73 428.2 meat consumption (jin) 7\u00C2\u00AB>66 upper-middle 7.66 0.6 2.88- 11.24 3.9 6.66 7.12 6.88 lower-middle 2.77 0.17 1.88 4.63 2.95 4.31 3.81 5.52 poor ];.3l 0.29 1.35 3.13 1.8 3.33 4.27 5.63 average 3.91 0.35 2.037 /6,:33 2.88 4.77 5.07 6.1 oil consumption (jin) upper-middle 3.53 1.4 2.69 9.5 4.65 4.34 5 5.49 lower-middle 2.5 0.76 1.23 4.63 22.73 4.4 4.19 3.93 poor 2 0.35 1.58 4.61 2.33 3.88 4 4.15 average 2.676 0.84 1.83 6.25 3.24 4.21 4.4 4.52 cotton cloth consumption (chi) upper-middle 23 1.6 11.56 15.69 3.8 14.87 21.53 23.16 lower-middle 8.9 1.7 5.29 14.5 3.64 16.3 17.5 30.1 poor 7.17 0.47 6.47 2.62 14.76 18.37 22.36 average 9.69 1.26 7.75 10.94 2.48 15.31 19.1 25.21 ! n the vilfricthe village, there were 197 households and 725 persons in 1936. The total culti-vated land was about 2,700 mu. 5.1% of the population were landlords and rich peasants who owned 24.7% of the land. There were 110 households (423)persons) of the middle pea-sant class. On the average each of them owned 4.3 mu. 55 households (194 persons) belonged to r the poor peasant class. Each of them owned 1.07 mu on the average. 27 households had no land at al l . In 1943, the number of households increased to 208. 32 middle-peasant house-holds became poor peasant households. The percentage of middle peasants decreased from 56% to 43% while that of poor peasants increased from 28% to 35%. Those who had no land increased from 13% to 17%. In 1956, the year of the survey, there were 259 households totalling 970 persons. The classification of peasants was done during the Land Reform. Source: Survey done by Liu Hong-kui et al (DZRB, 6 July, 1957). 101 In May, 1958, an average of 1,400 factories of various kinds were built up daily in the province (GRRB, 4 June, 1958). (For the extent of the development of the rural factories see Appendix III, Table 4). As Ren\u00C2\u00A3 Dumont has pointed out: \"une telle enumeration laisse re*veur sur I'importance &d'usines2^ aussi varices et aussi vites baties, par si peu de travailleurs!\" (1965 : 68). It is true that the extravagant number of factories can only make people suspect the importance or quality of those factories. However, it is crucial to note that what was important was not the fact that all those factories merited their names, but the fact that the peasants were mobilized on a large scale to face their own problems. This movement had a twofold significance: it indi-cated on the one hand that the urban industry was insufficient to support rural develop-ment; on the other hand, the policy-makers did not rely only upon the urban industry for supporting the development of agriculture. The period 1956-1967 has usually been considered as one of stability. But this stabilityjiwas still precarious. As we have seen in the general rural development in Shandong, although improvement had been marked in different sectors, the living stand-ards were still not as high as people might have expected, especially when the peasants had worked really hard for some years and had been too often promised a better living in a socialist society. Dissatisfaction grew and was sharply felt by the former landlord and rich peasant categories, because not only their living standards quickly lowered instead of being raised when collectivization advanced, but they could not see any promising future for them either economically or politically in socialization. It was these categories of people in the countryside who had more affinity with the intelli-gentsia in the cities. The Hundred Flowers policy which was launched in 1956, and 102 which was an over-optimistic estimation of the situation by the CCP leadership, provided an opportunity for those unsatisfied categories of people to give vent to their anger and disappointment. In the same year, the socialist camp as a whole was dismayed by the Hungarian revolt. In China, many intellectuals, as well as the bourgois remaining in the cities, went so far as to doubt the feasibility of socialism and the legitimacy of the CCP as the absolute power holder. This dissident atmosphere spread widely under the Hundred Flowers policy, both in the cities and in the countryside. In many a place in Shandong, peasants led by the better-off ones, manifested their desire to withdraw from the cooperatives. For instance, in the spring of 1957, more than 4,700 households in Junan County threatened to withdraw from cooperatives (DZRB, 21 March, 1957). In the Village of Shage, Laixi County, 45 households in 7 cooperatives demanded permis-a on to work on their own (DZRB, 15 May, 1957). In Cao County, one-third of the households (about 300) requested withdrawal from the New China (Xinhua) Cooperative (ibid.) According to the Chinese analysts, an increasingly spontaneous tendency to capitalism was emerging. The CCP could not but take some emergency measures in order to reverse the tide. The Hundred Flowers movement was finally ended by a vehement Anti-rightist campaign. It was evident to some CCP leaders, especially to Mao and his supporters, that the collectivization could not remain at the stage of the cooperative movement for too long. As Mao pointed out: \"Small cooperatives have fewer members, less land, and not much money. They cannot operate on a large scale or use machinery. The development of their forces of production is still hampered. They should not stay in this position too long, but should go on to combine with other cooperatives\" (The General 103 Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, 1957 : 460). The shortcomings of the co-operatives, such as their small size and an important part of private ownership, not only bound the productive forces but also fostered the danger of the restoration of capit-alism. We have seen during the last century how destructive the disintegration of the traditional social structure was to the peasant economy and life. This disintegration of social structuresresulted from western impact, but was thereafter enhanced by continued imperialist invasions, peasant rebellions, class polarization and civil wars. It was due to the socialist revolution and the political and economic policies designed by and implemented under the leadership of the CCP that China became independent and free from imperialist invastion, and that the causes of peasant rebellions, class polarization, civil war and other evil forces were eliminated. It is obvious that the restoration of capitalism would sooner signify a revival of all those evils than a happy development of liberal economy. Moreover, as a French sociologist has pointed out, the agricultural history of China is largely that of peasant revolts (Dumont, 1965 : 26). Mao had profoundly understood that China's destiny was identical with the destiny of the peasants. It was recognized that China could not duplicate the Russian model of development by empha-sizing heavy industry at the expense of agrarian development. To find a permanent solution to socioeconomic problems in China, it is necessary, above all, to eliminate the causes of peasant revolt. From Mao's point of view, the key lay in the policy of mass-line. That is to say, unless the peasants held the political and economic power themselves, they would not be able to fully release their potential for initiative and creativity. If the peasants were not allowed to express themselves positively, they would do it negatively, by revolts for example. In order to make the peasants their own masters, it was necessary to set up a structural framework in which the peasant ,> power could be realized and maintained. In the final analysis, under pressures both from outside and within, the co-operative movement arrived at such a precarious stage:during 1956-1957 that it could not gain a real stability without either advancing further or regressing. In order to depart once and for all from the capitalistic road of development, and to release the labor force for further large-scale works in agrarian development, such as the building of irrigation systems, land leveling, and the construction of local industries, it was considered necessary to design a more advanced framework for the economic unit of production. This was embodied in the setting up of the Beople's Communes. 105 Chapter Five STRUCTURE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE (I) : ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP I SIZE When the people's communes were first established in 1958, the Beidaiho Resolution gave a vague directive about their size. On the one hand it proposed that the communes be organized in accordance with the size of the township, but on the other hand it called for the local cadres not to oppose the organization of large com-munes. As in other provinces, there was a great disparity in the size of the communes in Shandong at the beginning of communization. The difference in size by population ranged from 4,000 households (e.g., the Haosheng People's Commune in Zouping County) (RMRB, 6 December, 1958), to 19,000 households (e.g., the Dongjiao People's Commune in Licheng County ( (RMRB, 14 January, 1959). The average was 6,000-diO,000 households (Tan, 1958). By cultivated area, some communes had only about 60,000 mu of land (e.g., the Lao-Zhaozhuang People's Commune in Linqing County) (XHDX, 18 December, 1961), while others could have three times more (e.g., the Xiawei People's Commune in Yishu! County had 186,930 mu) (RMRB, 2 September, 1959). If township is taken as measurement, many communes might correspond roughly to the boundaries of their own townships while many others could cover several townships. For example, the Xingfu People's Commune in the suburb of Yantai Municipality included 2.5 townships in addition to the municipality. \"Township\"\"has been utilized as a useful unit in the studies of Rural China and was taken as a standard in delimiting the boundaries of the commune. But, as an 106 administrative unit, it is an uncertain term because of its frequent variation in size in recent history. ^ Skinner reported that in China as a whole, townships were reduced in size and increased in number during 1951-52 to make about 220,000. This number was reduced to 100,000 by the beginning of 1957, and again to 80,000 by early June of 1958 (Skinner, 1964-65, Part III : 367-368). This means that up to the moment of the establishment of the communes the townships had been changed in size at least three times since 1949. In Shandong Province, the term xiang (township) corresponded to a variety of sizes as an administrative unit or rural division under the county level. First, at the end of the Qing Dynasty, xiang was only one kind of a range of administrative units under the county level and riot necessarily found in every county. Besides xiang, there were zhen, ying, xin, pu and yi. The different terms indicate different kinds of rural clusters. Both ying and xin were garrison points either in former times or dur-ing the Qing Dynasty. PJJ and y\_ were stations of communication and transport. Zhen means a commercial centre. Xiang indicates a cluster of villages which was neither a strategic military point nor a commercial centre. Secondly, xiang, or the township, did not correspond at all to the marketing area. For instance, at the beginning of the Republic, Linyi County was divided into The complicated variation of administrative divisions below the county level during the late Qing Dynasty has been documented by Hsi:ao Kung-ch'uan in Rural China (1960, Ch. 2), but far from extensively. Many variations of the nomenclature of administrative divisions in the countryside were not mentioned by Hsiao. For example, the Linqing zhou (larger than county) had, at the end of the Qing Dynasty, only 5 xiang which were only one kind of the administrative units be-sides others. At the beginning of the Republic, the Linqing County (smaller than the former Linqing zhou) had no xiang at all. Instead, the county was divided into 41 li above the village level. In 1930, the 41 Ii were grouped into 10 qu under the directive of the provincial government (Gazetteer of Linqing County, first published in 1934, reprinted in Taiwan by the Chengwen Press in 1967). 107 9 xiang which were subdivided into 125 she above the village level. There were 56 marketing places in the rural area in the county (Linyi Xian-zhi, 1967). One xiang had roughly 6 markets under its jurisdiction. It was much larger than Skinner's standard marketing area.^ If we take one county as an example, the evolution of xiang size can be ex-plained in a concrete manner. In Qiho County, according to the county gazetteer (Qiho Xian-zhi, 1967), the whole county was divided into 10 xiang in 1906. Each xiang was subdivided into 7 or 8 cfujdistrict!;). Besides the qu which covered the county seat and its surrounding 12 villages, there were in total 75 qu. Each qu embraced a number of villages from 4 to 19. The xiang and qu were reversed in size in 1931. That is to say, the original smaller qu became the intermediate unit between county and xiang, and thus became much larger than before. Accordingly, xiang was reduced in size and increased in number (the numbers of qu, xiang, zhen and villages in Qiho County are shown in Table 5.1). Skinner gives an estimate of 63,000 rural standard marketing systems for 1,790 counties in agricultural China before 1948. One county had approximately 35.2 standard marketing systems. If we subtract the estimated 5,300 standard markets which had died during the process of modernization, there were still almost 33 standard markets per county (Skinner, Part II : 227-228). 108 Table 5.1 Administrative Division of Qiho County in 1931 Qu Xiang Zhen Villages First 12 5 120 Second 13 2 124 Third 11 1 96 Fourth 13 7 112 JFifth 16 2 109 Sixth 5 8 125 Seventh 13 7 109 Eighth 10 5 67 Total: 8 93 37 862 Source: Qiho Xian-zhi (Gazetteer of Qiho County) : 108-122. It should be noted that the term zhen (Skinner called it \"urban township\")was not only a market place ( or commercial centre) at the time, but also an administrative division which headed the surrounding villages. Its size was more less the same as a xiang. Among the 130 xiang and zhen of Qiho County, there were 37 zhen. In each zhen there was at least one commercial centre which could be ranged in importance from a big village in which a market took place periodically to a permanent market place. Besides the county seat where, in addition to its quality of a permanent market-ing place, 16 periodic markets took place, there were still 61 periodic markets in the rural areas. At least 37 of them took place at the zhen. So, the remaining number of periodic markets was much smaller than the number of xiang. It is obvious that the 109 peasants of two or three xiang could not but go to the same market. This fact sufficiently indicates the small size of a xiang at that time. The last population survey reported in the gazetteer which was done in 1928, gave 57,681 households and 292,613 indi-viduals in the county (the previous figures were 250,258 individuals in 1884, and 59,322 households and 277,661 individuals in 1926). One xiang had, on the average, only 443.7 households and approximately 2,250 individuals. According to the data from Honan Province, Skinner found that in 1935 the township (xiang) was larger than the natural village, while the 1948 township was larger than the standard marketing area and that in neither year did the township cor-respond to any natural social or economic system (Skinner, 1964-65, Part III : 222). According to the available data of three counties in Shandong, the xiang before 1949, as in the case cited by Skinner In Honan, did not correspond to any natural social or economic system either. It is clear that xiang was not as meaningful in North China as in Sichuan Province or Guanding with regard to the rural socioeconomic system. How-ever, after 1949, the fact that the Chinese government attempted to enlarge the size of xiang seems to indicate its efforts to make this administrative unit closer to the natural social and economic community. No sources are available regarding changes in size or number of xiang in the whole of Shandong Province since ;1949. However, Skinner's approximate figures indicate that in China as a whole the numberoof xiang was reduced in 1957 from 100% to about 36%. That is to say, the xiang of 1957 was almost three times as large as the former xiang. According to the limited sources on this issue, we know that Shan-dong Province started to enlarge its xiang unit in 1956. In Laiyang County, in July, 1956, the 13 qu as intermediate administrative units between xiang and county were no abolished while the 154 xiang were merged into 35 larger xiang (and zhen) (DZRB, 10 February, 1957). The new xiang was roughly four times as large as the former one, and corresponded to the size of Skinner's standard marketing area. However, the new xiang units were still unequal both in size and in number of population. For instance, Holuo Township covered an area of 225 sq. Ii (about 50 sq. kilometres) with 34 natural villages and had a population of 11,500 belonging to 11 advanced cooperatives (ibid.). Guanzhuang Township in the same county, including 29 natural villages, had an area of 400 sq. Ii (about 100 sq. kilometres) and a population of 14,500 belonging to 22 cooperatives of which 15 were of advanced type (ibid.). By virtue of the nature of the source which tells that the reorganization of xiang in Laiyang County was a response to the need of rural works of the nation, it can be under-stood that the change did not result from local initiatives. If the xiang in other counties were merged in the same way, we could make an estimate of approximately 3,735 xiang for the whole province on the eve of the communization. When the people's communes were set up in 1958, on the average, one commune roughly included 2.4 xiang. It is close to the three to one ratior of townships to people's communes for the whole country. If, in 1958, the xiang size became close to the natural socioeconomic system in the rural areas in Shandong, the commune size was obviously too large to cope with the pre-existing social structure. The reason why the commune was so large in 1958 has been convincingly explained by Skinner: Cadremen who took part in the decisions affecting the forma-tion of particular communes were under pressure to make com-munes as large as prevailing conditions allowed.. .it was imp-lied to the cadreman on the front line that commune size would be taken as a measure of his success in having brought the local area for which he was responsible along the road toward communism. He was, moreover, to make his communes big or risk suspicion as a right deviationist (Skinner, 1964-65, Part III : 391-92). i i i Apart from other problems it has been reported that the most urgent difficulty after the merger of small townships into larger ones was the lack of cadres. In Laiyang County, the 691 cadres at the township level, plus 272 cadres at the qu level before the merger, were reduced to 399 at the township level after the merger of townships and the abolition of qu. In this condition, one cadre must attend to several duties which were beyond his ability and the limitation of time (DZRB, 10 February, 1957). The problem of the shortage of cadres would become keener when two or three townships were merged into one commune, because, given the number of cadres remaining unchanged, the functions of a people's commune were much more diverse and sophisticated than those of a township. Scholarly analyses have contributed at least one of the causes which made the newly established communes function badly during 1958-1961- due to their large size.^ In the uDraft of Regulations for the Operation of Rural Peoples' Communes\" issued in March, 1961, the size of commune was indicated as follows: The sThe scale of the people's commune at the various levels should in every case be such as to benefit production, opera-tion and management, and organizational life, and ought not to be excessively large... In general, the people's commune should be equivalent in scale to the original xiang or large xiang.. . . The readjustment of commune size no doubt started at that time. In 1963, China's Minister of Agriculture officially gave 74,000 as the number of People's Communes in China (Peking Review, No. 44, 1 November, 1963). No figures of the number of people's communes in each province have ever been published. However, Hong Kong ^ Skinner has pointed out that \"the many and grave difficulties encountered by the communes during 1958-61 stemmed in significant part from the grotesquely large mold into which they had in most cases been forced, and in particular from the failure to align the new unit with the natural socioeconomic systems shaped by rural trade\" (Part III : 394). 1 1 2 newspapers provide some clues to this change in Shandong. The Da Gong Bao (Ta Kung Pao) of Hong Kong published an article by Lu Hong-bin, Director of the Aiguo (Patriotic) People's Commune, Ju County, Shandong Province, in 1959. Lu said that his commune had 94 natural villages with more than 10,000 households or a population of more than 47,000, and managed more than 10,000 mu of land (DGB, 4 October, 1959). But in 1962 thefXhina News (Zhongguo Xinwen) in Hong Kong reported that the same commune had 25 natural villages with 2,520 households (ZGXW, 10 February, 1962). The size of Aiguo People's Commune was thus reduced before 1962 to one-fourth of its size of 1959. A recent book published by the Economic Report News (Jing-ji Dao-bao) in Hong Kong revealed that there are more than 300 communes in Yantai Administrative District of Shandong (Shen-zhou Ju-b?an, 1976 : 87). It is known that the nine Administrative Districts are roughly equal in size. Accordingly, Shandong should have approximately 2,700 communes (300x9) at the present time, an increase of 42% over the total number of 1958. In comparison with the number of xiang in 1958, the size of the commune is still a little larger at a ratio of 1 : 1.38. Skinner's theory which places the progress of the modernized transport system as the basic pre-requisite of the enlargement of marketing area may account for the difference between the present commune size and the size of township in 1958. From this point of view, it is reasonable to consider that the actual commune size corresponds roughly to the natural social system. Using tradi-tional solidarities for new organizational ends has no doubt great benefits. However, it also has disadvantages, as William Parish points out, \"natural communities are potentially more resistant to outside intervention than artificially imposed communities might be\" (Parish, li9/75d). The paradox is that the structural innovation of the People's 113 Commune seems to be confined to a traditional framework. Skinner's conclusion may better illustrate this paradoxical process of the interplay between continuity and change: While traditional marketing communities have given shape to the Communists' chosen instrument for rural transforma-tion, that transformation inevitably and quite literally reshapes them in turn (Skinner, 1964-65, Part II : 399). II ORGANIZATION The process of establishment of the people's communes was primarily an opera-tion of organization. The organizational issues have a special meaning in the Chinese historical context. In the traditional stage, organization of production was done within the family framework while the socialization process was carried out through the channels of kinship relationships. Any kind of organization aiming at production in economic life and socialization in social life beyond the family and kinship network did not exist and was unfamiliar to the Chinese people. The inability to organize non-kin groups is still clearly reflected in the Overseas Chinese communities in North America, although they are found in societies predominated by the spirit of entrepreneurship and all kinds of social and economic organizations. It is important to point out that the Chinese communists attempted a kind of organization without social and historical background. This is the special meaning that the organizational operation of collecti-vization conveys. This kind of social innovation could be achieved only under some specific historical conditions. First, the pre-existing social structure must be already broken down or debilitated enough to be easily pulled down. Secondly, a well organized 114 force equipped with some definite goals takes charge of the action. Due to the western impact, these two conditions were met exactly before the revolution in China. Traditional Chinese social structure was gradually disintegrating along with the in-cessant military and economic invasions by imperialist, powers. This provided the pre-conditions for a social revolution. A social revolution means more of a sudden change than a gradual one, more a qualitative change than a quantitative one. At the very beginning, the revolutionary program of the CCP already aimed at a radical restructure of the Chinese society. The means of restructuring society was none other than \"organization\". Franz Schunmamrtesaifd: When a revolution destroys a social system.. .the new revolutionary regime can only pull society together again through organization... The one great organizational product of the Chinese Revolution has been the Chinese Communist Party... . One may say that almost the entire literature of Chinese communism since Yenan has revolved around two questions: organization and action (Schurmann, 1970 : Iii). The organizational operation of setting up the communes was rather a reorgani-zation than an innovation, because it was based on a succession of organizational opera-tions from the Land Reform to cooperativization. However, it still met no less resist-ance than in the previous steps of collectivization. This is just because this new social organization had no root in the traditional society, and its base built up during the collectivization movement was not solid enough to sustain a smooth progression. Therefore, this organization had to rely heavily on leadership and ideological indoctrin-ation. The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to the organizational framework of the people's commune, the leadership which made organization possible and ideological education which sustained the dynamism of action. 115 A . Administrative Organization The commune was organized according to the principle of \"mass line\". A c -cording to the \"Revised Draft of Regulations for the Operation of Rural People's Com-munes\" of 1962, the highest authority of a commune was vested in the Congress of the Representatives of the Commune Members which was transformed from the former People's Congress of the Representatives of the Township. The representatives were elected by the members of the commune in each production team and must proportionally represent all categories of people (e.g., women, youth, aged, educators, medical men, tech-nicians, local industrial entrepreuneurs, commercial agents, national minorities, etc.). The main function of the Congress of the Representatives of the Commune Members was to discuss and to make the decisions concerning the basic political, economic and social problems of the commune, and to choose the members of the Administrative Committee which constituted the highest functioning organ of the commune. The Administrative Committee of the commune is the organ of united leadership of the commune. All work in connection with the execution of policy, formation of plans, financial cont-rol, and management of means of production and the fixing of plans for distribution, will all be concentrated in the Administ-rative Committee (Chen Zheng-ren, 1959). The organization of the Administrative Committee might vary from one commune to another. But, in general, it followed the original idea about the nature of the Com-mune system, i.e., a commune is an all-embracing unit which combines the sectors of agriculture, industry, commerce, education and military service into one, and makes an over-all development of agriculture, forestry, husbandry, sideline production and 5 See also Wu Ren, \"Ren-min Gong-she he Gong-jia\" (The People's Commune and the State), GRRB, 20 October, 1958. For an historical account of People's Congress at different administrative levels, see James R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (1967), Chapter 5. 116 fishery. The Administrative Committee had one director and a number of vice-directors according to the size of the commune. The committee delegated special functions to a range of departments and each of them assumed a specific function. The Weixing People's Commune in Honan had been taken as a model in the matter of organization. It maintained twelve functional departments for agriculture, irrigation, forestry, husbandry, industry and transport, finance and food, commerce, culture and education, internal affairs and labor, militia and defense, planning, and scientific research. The communes in other provinces followed this model in modifying some specific:sectors according to their own particular conditions. For instance, the Xingfu People's Commune in Yantai substituted the irrigation, commerce, internal affairs and labor, planning and scientific research departments with fishery, supply service, vege-table culture, sanitation, and politics and jurisdiction departments (YTRB, 27 August, 1958). Besides the Administrative Committee, a Supervisory Committee was composed of members also elected directly by the Congress of the Commune. Its function was to supervise and check whether the Administrative Committee properly implemented the de-cisions of the Congress. This organ was a vestige of the supervisory system independent from the administrative bureaucracy found in Imperial China. In practice, it was super-fluous and almost impotent because of the vigorous leadership and supervision on the part of the Party. The officers of the Administrative Committee and the Supervisory Committee as well as the representatives of the Congress of the Commune were elected to hold their office for two years. 117 As an economic unit, the commune was subdivided into production brigades. Each brigade maintained its own congress analogous on a lower level to the Congress of the Commune, which elected the brigade commander, vice-commanders, members of the brigade Administrative Committee and members of the brigade Supervisory Committee. The two brigade committees were constituted in miniature according to the structure of the communal committees. The production brigade was again subdivided into production teams which rep-resented the lowest level of communal organization. Each team had in turn its congress of members which elected the team commander and vice-commanders. B. Party Control In China, as in other socialist countries, the Communist Party has played a key role in leadership and supervision.0 The Panty has been organized parallel to every echelon of the administrative organizations, in the commune as in the county, in the county as in the province, and in the province as in the state. The Party and the adminis-trative organizations are not identical although they are closely linked together. Franz Schurmann's explanation on the distinction between state and Party may help us better understand the position and function of the Party in a socialist country. The state is a conscious contrivance. If is the most important element of the superstructure of society, the instrument of the rul-ing class; in the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is the instrument of the proletariat. As an instrument it has \"structure\"... The state is bureaucracy, army, IaW; the body of organized formal instruments from which command flows. The Party, on the other hand, is the organized expression of the will of society... For the Chinese it represents \"the interest of the people\". The Party actualizes the control of society over the state. But the Party, theoretically, does not command, for For Party control in the commune see also Townsend (1967 : 113). 118 formal command must flow from some instrument of the state. The Communist Party may produce policy, but technically it cannot issue orders. These must come from an organ of the state. As long as this fine distinction is maintained, the Party cannot be regarded as an instrument of the structure of state power (1970 : 109-110). As there had already existed a Party Committee at the township level, it was convenient to transform it into a communal Party Committee when a commune was set up in accordance with the size of a township.; While the communal Party Committee was composed of Party members who held administrative offices at the same time, the Party organization was, however, clearly separated from the administrative system. The Party Committee of the commune was headed by a secretary and several vice-secretaries. Under the Committee's authority, there were a few departmental divi-sions. In most cases, they were Party committee's general office, organization department, propaganda department and supervision commission. At the brigade level, there was either a Party general branch or a Party branch according to the size of the brigade. At the team level, there might be either a Party branch or a Party group according to the size of Party membership. A brigade Party branch was headed by a secretary (and vice-secretary) and a team Party group by a head of the group. Besides the Party organization, there were also a Communist Youth League (CYL) and a Women's Federation in each commune and their branches at the lower level of the communal organizations. Although their members were not necessarily Party members, these two organizations could be considered as ramified members of the Party body. The following charts will show the parallelism of Party organization and adminis-trative organization in the communes. Although there were variations in the organizational division from commune to commune, the general framework of every commune was always in accordance with the two Chart 5.1 : Organizational Division of Xingfu People's Commune 119 Communal Party Committee: Secretary & Vice-Secretaries Party Committee's general office Organization Dept. -[ Propaganda Dept. \\" Supervision Commission Communist Youth League \u00E2\u0080\u00941 . - . - - j Womenfe'Fddehatib'niE Congress of the Rsprevsm fatly as Representatives of Commune miim-l Communa strative Committee: Director & Vice-Directors Communal buper-visory Committee: Director & Vice-Directors r-\u00E2\u0080\u0094I Agriculture Dept.l | Finance & Food DepT Forestry Dept. .Fishery Dept. Industry & Transport Dept. Veg;etdb;reUGu Culture S t . Education Dept. Sanitation Dept. Politics & Jurisdiction Dept. } Militia & Defense Dept. L J Supply Service Dept. Brigade Farty branch: Secretary brigade branch] Brigade branch i\u00E2\u0080\u0094 i Team sub-branch or group: Secretary or Head learn branch Team branch Husbandry Dept.\"| Brigade Congress Production brigade Commander & Vice-Commander Team Congress Production team Commander & Vice-Commanderl -formal belongong Party control Source: YTRE, 27 August, 1958. 120 Chart 5.2 : Organizational Division of Taiqidh People's Commune (Shouzhang County) Communist Youth \u00E2\u0080\u0094 Brigade branch \u00E2\u0080\u0094'Team branch I 1 League Communal Party Committee: Secretary & Vice-Secretaries J. .] Women's Federation Federqtib'nori! of tCpmmunesi of rSjhouzhang Countyg Courl -|Organizati on Dept. Congress of Commune Communal Administra-tive Com-mittee: Director & Vice-Directors Party Committee's [general office j-JPropaganda Dept. Supervision iCommission Supervision Committee: Director & Vice-Directors [_Jlndustry& Transport Dept. \"jSupply Dept. HFinance Dept. -\u00E2\u0080\u00A2[Agriculture Dept. [Culture & Educa-tion Dept. Credit Dept. Labor & Welfare Dept. UPeoplels Affairs Dept. -[Militia DepTT 4 brigade branchl-Zfteam branch! brigade Party] branch: Secretary \u00E2\u0080\u009E-.\u00E2\u0080\u0094 , 1 Team Party pranch: (Secretary or Head Production brigade: Commander & Vice-Commander Brigade Congress HBasic Construction Dept. \"*jpianning Commission I\u00E2\u0080\u0094Scientific Research Commission! I i Production team: Commander & Vice-Commander J Team Congress 3 formal belonging Party control Source: Jihua Jingji (Planned Economy Monthly), No. 11, 9 November, 1958. 121 principles governing the functions of the commune: they were all-embracing unit and over-all development. These two principles constituted the innovative part of the re-organization from cooperatives into communes, because the former had been a unit of mere agricultural production. The setting up of the organizational framework could only pave the way for some possibilities in a new direction of development, but could not by any means ensure a successful functioning. This last should rely heavily on the efficiency of leadership. Ill LEADERSHIP A . Definition and Categorization of Leaders For the purpose of this thesis, leaders are defined as the formal office-holders with authority, power and influence in both ideological and administrative spheres with-in the commune. The result of analysis of my data conforms with Oksenberg's categorization of the local leaders in rural China (cf. Oksenberg, 1969). His eight types of local leaders ( i .e., old cadres, land reform cadres, collectivization cadres, demobolized members of the People's Liberation Army, middle school graduates, cadres sent to local areas from higher levels, influential individuals whose leadership credentials were established under the.pre-communist political system, and retired cadres) are largely, except the fourth and seventh ones, reflected in my data. However, my approach to leaders' functional categorization will bedifferent from Oksenberg's, due to a different consideration. Oksenberg's study includes leaders above the commune, up to the county level. At the county level, the functional division in terms of specialization seems to be more im-portant than within the commune, because the main activities in the commune were still agricultural while those at the county level were focused on specified non-agricultural sectors. This may be the reason which makes Oksenberg categorize the leaders in the way of functional specialization. So, hedivided the leaders into five categories: politics, administration, finance and trade, coercion (e.g., militia, defense, etc.), and education and technology. This mode of categorization is likely more meaningful in the analysis of changing structure in leadership and in that of a changing society than in the analysis of a static organization, because this categorization is not intended to point out the big line of power distribution in the communal organization. In this chapter I am focusing on the issue of the power holder. This issue, which bears primary importance in ensuring a smooth functioning of the commune system, may cause some confusion due to the dual nature of the organi-zational structure in the commune as has been shown in the former section. It is legiti-mate to ask the questions: Who was the real chief of a commune, or a brigade, or a team, as there existed two parallel two systems of leadership? Between the secretary of the communal Party committee and the director of the commune, who had the last word? And how did they allot their functions? In view of these crucial questions, the leaders should be first of all divided into two broad categories: Party leaders and ad-ministrative leaders. In her study of the rural people's communes in China, Therese Pang distinguishes the two kinds of leaders as follows: Le chef \u00E2\u0082\u00AClu (directeur de la commune, chef de la brigade ou de I'equipe) est un paysan. II doit posseder de solides qualites personnelles, car il sera un guide pour tous les membres de la commune.. Ses qualites sont d'ordre politique et moral... 123 Le secretaire.de I'organe du Parti au contraire est un functionaire. II n'est pas toujours de la region; il a ete designe a\" son poste par I'organe du Parti de I'echelon superieur. La bonne marche de la commune depend de la bonne entente entre le chef-paysan et le representant du Parti. Le cadre de la commune transmet les directives de I'autorite superieure, tandis que le chef elu connait les conditions locales. La rencontre des points de vue est necessaire (1967 : 85). Pang's distinction between Party leaders and administrative leaders can represent the per-ception of many foreign visitors who travelled in China from one commune to another and had conversations about this issue with the leaders or members of the commune. This distinction is not inaccurate, but is too over-simplified to reflect the reality. My data shows a more complex nature and a larger variation of the allotment of power between Party leaders and administrative leaders. Usually, the leadership of the Party secretary was paramount.7 This has been a general rule in all socialist countries at all administrative echelons. This is also a tradition of the collectivization movement in rural China. The first article in the collec-tion, Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside, compiled by Mao-Tse-tung himself, was entitled \"The Party Secretary takes the lead and all the Party members help run the ca-ops;\" (1957). The role of the Party secretary in leadership has been recognized nationwide in all echelons from the provincial Party Committee downward. In 19 cases of leadership, from my data, 14 were reported to have the Party secretary take command (Table 5.2). The 5 cases where the role of the director of commune or commander of brigade over-shadowed that of the Party secretary were under special conditions. In the case of the Xiyou People's Commune, Ye County, the director, Xiu Jian-chun, was a For a thorough analysis of Party leadership, see John W. Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (1963). 124 national model agricultural laborer. She climbed the ladder from head of mutual did team, through director of elementary cooperative and of advanced cooperative, to the director of her commune. Her name was widely recognized while the Party secretary was a relatively unknown person. In the case of the Gaocun People's Commune, Wendeng County, and in that of the Fugui Brigade of the same commune, the director of the commune, Zhang Fu-gui who was,aatiithe same time, commander of the Fugui Brigade, was also a model agricultural laborer. Like Xiu Jian-chun, he had been put forward by the press as a hero in the front of agriculture, so he en-joyedcundoubted leadership in his commune. In the case of the Second Production Team, Caopo Brigade, the Zhuyou People's Commune, Ye County, the commander of the team, Zhang Dian-dortg, was himself the head of the Party group. In the case of the Tenth Production Team, Chaijia Brigade, the Lou jia People's Commune, Licheng County, there was no Party group at all in the team, the commander of the team, Zhu Chun-jing, was a member of the Communist Youth League. 125, Table 5.2 Leadership Standing Out in Relief (reported by the press) ' ' ' Party 'Administra-County Commune Brigade Team Leaders tive Leaders Changqing Wande X Ye Xiyou X Ye Zhoyou X Ye Zhuyou Caopo Second X Yishui Xiawei X Licheng Loujia Chai jia X Licheng Loujia Chai jia Tenth X Jining Anju Zhuzhuang X Qiho Chengguan Sanli X Teng Longyang Shicun X Fen Mazhuang Xianiutian X Fei Shi jing Dcfan X Pingyi Difang Qiandonggu X Zou Chengqian Xiamoshi X Wendeng Gaocun Fugui. X Wendeng Gaocun Fugui X Linyi Zhuli Xiaogezhuang X Shi ping Xiuzhuang X Qufu Changguan X Sources: various Chinese newspapers between 1958 and 1965. The fact that most of the administrative leaders were Party members and they were obligatorily placed themselves under the Party secretary's influence according to the discipline of the Party also made the position of Party secretary more important than any administrative leader at the same echelon. Students of modern China have been familiar enough with the index of importance of political personages according to the order of their names in the press. This can also be seen at the commune and brigade levels. The formula for a commune is \"under the leadership of the Party secretary,,xxx, vice-secre-tary, and the director xxx. . . \"; for a brigade, \"under the leadership of the Party branch 126 secretary xxx and the commander of the brigade x x x . . . \" . B. Functions of Party Leaders and Administrative Leaders Therese Pang says that the iPantly secretary transmitted the directives of superior authority whereas the director of the commune or the commanders of the brigade and the team implemented them (Pang, 1967 : 85). This is only one aspect of the division of labor between the Party leaders and the administrative leaders. My data shows that the division of their functions was not always so clear and could vary from one locality and one time to another. Generally speaking, the functions of administrative leaders were more definite than those dfethe Party leaders, because the former's job was oriented to-ward productive activities in a conceete manner. The job of a Party secretary was more subtle. First of al l , he was responsible for the transformation and shaping of people's thought and for stimulating people's enthusiasm in socialist construction. This is not to say however that he should be in charge of educational and cultural programs only. As he was responsible for the effective functioning of the whole unit under his responsi-bility, he could not avoid intervening in the productive activities as well as the daily life of the members. Sometimes problems occurred in a more acute and urgent manner than remoulding people's thought so that the Party secretary had to tackle the immediate prob-lems first. They had usually been called by their superiors to \"grasp the crucial points\" (zhua zhong-dian) in a given situation. For instance, at the beginning of the commune movement in Shandong, in many areas at the urging of over-zealous leaders, peasants destroyed their brick beds and wooden beds in order to turn them into manure and rails for transportation. When winter came, keeping warm became an immediate problem. The Party secretaries at all echelons were called by the provincial committee of the CCP 127 to take urgent measures to solve the problem during the winter (RMRB, 6 December, 1968). Another example shows that the principal concern of the Party secretary of a commune in a mountainous region was to \"conquer the mountains\" and to plan the irri-gation system. The Party secretary of the Xiawei People's Commune, Yishui County, Wang Heng, is a widely known model in leading the control of mountains. He has climbed mountains every day to investigate, plan, labor and teach techniques. Even in the cold-est winter time he left for some remote areas under the storm of snow in the morning and returned late in the night, day after day. In a short span of a few months, he has passed by every corner of these mountains. Last year he finally worked out a model of utilization of water power which laid the basis of a comprehensive system of irrigation (RMRB, 2 September, 1959). In many cases the Party branch secretary of a brigade did just the same work as a brigade commander. Yang Zhong-lu, a retired communist veteran, was elected Party secretary of his brigade branch in the Difang People's Commune, Pingyi County. He was praised because of his leading role in improving soil conditions (RMRB, 30 March, 1963). Another Party branch secretary, Li Ru-lan, of Da'an Brigade, Shijing People's Commune, Fei County, became a national model agricultural laborer (ibid.). Sometimes, Party secretaries and directors of communes divided their tasks ac-cording to both specialization and locality. This is the way of division of labor among leaders in the Aiguo People's Commune of Ju County. This commune had one Party sec-retary, one vice-secretary, one director, two vice-directors and one administrative sec-retary. The leading boand at the commune level was composed of these six leaders. They adopted a method of \"solving big problems together and small problems separately. \" In this way, each of the six cadres took charge of 3-5 villages in order to supervise closely and to help to solve problems at the brigade and team levels (RMRB, 20 October, 1963). The importance of the role of Party secretaries in the commune or in the brigade just lies in the indefiniteness of their functions. The daily administrative and productive 128 functions were shared by the administrative cadres in each specific sector. The Party secretary was responsible for none and, at thesame time, for all of those functions. Not being specifically in charge of a specific function would give him a free hand to tackle what was most crucial at a given time. It can be said that every institutionalized organization is a bureaucracy. In order to keep the spirit of revolution going on in an institutionalized organization, it is necessary to have some elements which are outside the functional routine, but still powerful enough to influence this routine. This is the case of the role played by the Party secretary. Because he is not in the functional routine, he is better able to judge the needs of the masses and can evaluate the functioning of routine from the point of view of masses. In this way, he represents not only the authority of his superiors, but also the masses for whom he is responsible. In his capacity as representative of the masses, he will be equipped with more authority and power vis-a-vis the administrative cadres. Of course, this is an ideal model of the role of the Party secretary in the com-mune or brigade. In reality, there existed a large variationliin Party secretaries accord-ing to different circumstances and different personalities. However, in spite of excep-tions in which some Party secretaries could play a role no more than that played by an administrative cadre while a director of commune, or a commander of brigade or team, could also accumulate the quality of a Party secretary, the general line of keeping the Party leaders outside the functional routine was of primary importance in regard to their quality of representative of \"the interest of the people\". 129 C. Social Origin and Emergence of Leaders In order to keep the revolution going on, the social origin of leaders had always been a constant concern of the CCP. This issue was specially acute in the countryside, because the land reform was a landlord-elimination movement and the cooperativization an anti-rich-peasant-economy movement. Both the former landlord class andrfhe rich peasant class must be carefully excluded from leadership. Needless to say, practically it was a big loss for the rural development in purely economic terms, because the offspring of the former landlords and rich peasants were more healthy and better educated than those stemming from poor families. However, from the revolution-ary point of view, this loss was not only inevitable, but indispensable for ensuring the sucess of revolution and the transformation from a feudal society to a socialist and communist society. One RMRB editorial clearly made the point: The leading power of production team must lie within the tight grasp of laboring peasants who belong to the classes of poor peasants or lower-middle peasants and who are equipped with socialist awareness, abilities in work, and experiences in agricultural production. The reason for picking up cadres among comrades from the classes of the poor peasants or lower-middle peasants is that their social status and economic position makes socialism, relatively speaking, more acceptable to them and frees them, also relatively speaking, from the bondage to the institution of the private ownership of the means of produc-tion dear to small landholders (RMRB, 11 January, 1963). Generally speaking, people who came from landlord, rich peasant or upper-middle peasant classes could only hope to fill the leader positions of a secondary import-ance such as accountant, school teacher, agricultural technician, etc. . . The posts of the Party secretaries, directors of commune and commanders of brigade and team were jealously kept for the people who had poor or lower-middle peasant origin. The Sanli Brigade of the Chengguan People's Commune, Qiho County, can offer a typical example 130 in this matter. The Party branch committee of the brigade was composed of five members, four of them having poor peasant origin and one lower-middle peasant origin. Among the 26.cadres above the team level 20 were poor peasants and 6 lower-middle peasants (RMRB, 11 January, 1963). Another example can be seen in the composition of leader board of the Xia Dingjia Brigade of Da Lujia People's Commune, Huang County. Amongst the 135 cadres above team level, 78 were from poor peasant families, 18 from lower-middle peasant fami I iess( together 71.1%), and only 39 from middle peasant families (28.9%) (JJYJ, December, 1964 : 55). Family origin (jia-ting cheng-fen) was an important prerequisite for becoming a leader in a commune. Other prerequisites included loyalty to the Party (and to Chair-man Mao) and to the socialist enterprise, being an activist and enthusiastic in the socialist construction, and having some talent in leading the masses or in productive tech-niques. These prerequisites had to wait for a proper moment to be manifested. As Oksenberg has stated, after the military actions of the revolution, the land reform and the cooperativization movement were two crucial moments for new activists to show their talents. TiheyAiwe'r.eidlso two crucial moments for the CCP to recruit new leaders. In the areas liberated before 1949, the key posts were usually occupied by the old cadres (lao ganbu) who had been recruited during the Sino-Japanese war or the civil war. For instance, in the vast region of the Mountains Yi and Meng which embrace six counties: Yishui, Yiyuan, Yinan, Mengyin, Pingyi and Fei, and had been the revolu-tionary base since the Sino-Japanese war, the old cadres were still in charge of leading o functions at the level of commune and that of brigade. According to a survey, only ^ Three Party branch secretaries, Yang Zhong-lu, Donggu Brigade, Difang People's Commune, Pingyi County, Ma Xue-sheng, Taitou Brigade, Daigu People's Commune, Mengyin County, and Li Rui-lan, Da'an Brigade, Shijing People's Commune, Fei County, got their Party memberships respectively in 1938, 1938 and 1943 (RMRB, 30 March, 1963). in Yishui County were there more than 7,000 old cadres occupying the posts of Party branch secretaries at the brigade level and commanders of brigades and teams, corres-ponding to 87% of the total posts at the same levels (RMRB, 30 March, 1963). In the areas liberated around 1949, the key posts were held mostly by cadres who merged in land reform and cooperative movements. This is the case of the Sanli Brigade of the (Ghengguan People's Commune, Qiho County, which I have just cited above. All the 26 cadres above the team level had emerged during the land reform and cooperative movements (RMRB, 11 January, 1963). In the new developed areas such as the Xiyou People's Commune in Ye County, the young elementary and middle school graduates played important roles in the leader-ship. The director of the Xiyou People's Commune, Xiu Jian-chun, was only 25 years old when she was chosen as the director of the commune in 1960. In 1951, 16 years old and an elementary school graduate, she was called back home and was elected head of a mutual-aid group which was composed of only five households. Afterwards, she took the initiative in setting up successively an elementary cooperative and then an advanced cooperative of more than one thousand households. Due to her remarkable competence in agricultural production and in leadership, she had always been elected director in the former two steps of collectivization. Before :comi,ng .torthealeadership^of a commune of0O02house in Peking toiireceiveTaiinlnerrmohth training in the special training class for commune management. According to her experience, she can also be classified in the category of cadres who emerged during the cooperative movement. However, because of her relative youth, she had always been considered by her countryfellows as a young intellectual. Her younger brother, after having finished two years of middle school, returned to the village to become the head of a scientific research group in agriculture. In the Houl'u Brigade of this commune 9 out of 16 cadres at the brigade level and 32 out of 55 team cadres (commanders of teams, accountants and material keepers) were intellectual youth (ZGQNB, 22 July and 2 October, 1961). In 1960 there was a nationwide movement of \"down to the countryside to settle down\" (xia-xiang luo-hu) for urban youth,. In Shandong Province, it was reported that more than 1,100,000 young workers responded to the call of the CCP and went to the first front of agricultural production from multiple professions such as industry, finance and trade, education and culture, sanitation, etc. (ZGQNB, 13 October, 1960). There were, however, two kinds of these downward-transferred (xla-fang) ;youth: one for learning from the peasants for a definite time and another for settling down permanently. In the latter case, if the youth had come from countryside, they were usually sent down to their native villages. Although many young people were disappointed in rural condi-tions and tried to seize the first occasion to return to the cities, a portion of them settled down permanently. For instance, among 107 downward-transferred youth in the Chengguan People's Commune, Feicheng County, 53 had been praised because of their zeal in working and 25 had been elected commanders of teams, branch secretaries of the Communist Youth League and accountants (ZGQNB, 21 December, 1960). This downward mobility was not confined merely to young people, it touched also the experienced cadres. Because the competent low ranking cadres used to move upward, the basic units such as brigade and team constantly faced the problem of lacking competent leaders. The natural process should be, of course, to form younger cadres to replace the positions left by the promoted cadres. But in the 1960's, the reorganization in the countryside was so drastic and the production tasks were so urgent that there was 133 no time to follow the regular process of the formation of younger cadres. The only way remaining was as an emergency measure of sending down a part of middle rank cadres to the lower units. That is what was done in Qiho County. At the beginning of 1962, it was reported that 20% of the brigades in the county had difficulties in both production and living, to such a point as to impede the normal speed of spring cultivation. It was said that after analysis, apart from the natural calamities of the previous years, the principal cause was the weak leadership which profoundly affected the implementation of the Party's policies and could not sufficiently stimulate the enthusiasm of the masses. When the first secretary of the CCP of the county went investigating in the villages, the masses unanimously requested that their experienced old cadres who had been promoted to the offices of county and commune be sent back to their villages. Their request was granted. 44 cadres from the offices of the county and 66 cadres from different communes were sent to their native villages. This decision was later praised as an appropriate measure to support the basic productive units and to enhance and replenish the spirit of the cadres who had sat too long in the bureaucracy (RMRB, 28 April, 1962). D. Procedure of Becoming Leaders Some people could emerge during certain crucial moments such as land reform and cooperative movement. This meant that they demonstrated their talent and became potential leaders. To hold office, it was necessary to pass through a formal procedure. I have already mentioned that the administrative leaders were elected by the representa-tives of the commune members. How about the Party leaders? Therese Pang said that they were appointed by their superior organ of the Party. It was probably true for the Party secretaries at the commune level, because the communal committee of the CCP 134 was transformed from the township committee for which the secretaries had been presum-ably appointed by the county committee of the Party. But it is questionable so long as there is no information on the procedure of appointment of Party cadres available.' As for the branch secretaries at the brigade and team levels, some evidence indicates that they were elected by the members of the Party in their units. A report about the models of old cadres made clear that the Party branch secretary was not ap-pointed by the superior organ of the Party. \"Yang Zhong-lu, a Party member since 1938, the report said, retired and went back to his native place, the Donggu Production Brigade, Difang PSopPe'sjGbmmune, Pingyi County, in 1958. As soon as he arrived at home, he started immediately going to the mountain and insisting on ploughing the field. The next year he was elected the Party branch secretary of the brigade\" (RMRB, 30 March, 1963). A second example is an intellectual youth who was said to be elected Forty branch secretary of a brigade when the Party branch committee expired in 1963, and the re-election was carried out (RMRB, 27 November, 1963). Another case tells that if the masses lost their trust in cadres (Party and/or ad-ministrative), they could complain to the superior organ. After investigation, if the cadres in question were found at fault, they must be dismissed from their positions and a new election would be carried out. In 1962, a few members of the Zhuzhuang Brigade of the Anju People's Commune, Jining Municipality, accused their Party branch secretary, Shi Yue-lan, commander of Brigade Guo Qing-yu, and the accountant, Zhang Qing-chen, of corruption. After the investigation by the Party committee and This sort of information has been kept secret in China. 135 Administrative Committee of the Municipality, although no proof of corruption was found, the cadres were dismissed from their positions because they were divorced from the masses in their style of work. The Party committee and the administrative committee of the com-mune gave permission to the brigade to call a meeting of Party branch members and the Congress of Representatives of the Brigade to elect respectively a new Party branch sec-retary and new brigade commander and accountant (RMRB, 22 June, 1962). Although the procedure of becoming officers was by formal election, the influence of the superior organ was strong. This is not only because congresses and meetings at a lower level were often supervised by representatives of a superior organ (by cadres specially sent down for the meetings or by the \"squatters\"), but also because of the direct leading role and influence of the Party members upon the masses. E. Disciplines of Cadres According to the \"Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of Rural People's Communes\", cadres in every echelon in the commune must be placed under the discipline of the \"Three Big Rules\" and \"Eight Remarks\" of the Party and administrative cadres. The three big rules were (1) seriously implement the policies of the Central Com-mittee of the Party and laws of the state, and actively participate in socialist construc-tion; (2) carry out the system of democratic centralism; (3) report the situation as it is. The eight remarks were: (1) be concerned with the living condition of the masses; (2) participate in collective labor; (3) treat others equally; (4) take counsel with the masses and do things fairly; (5) be together with the masses and never make oneself spe-cial; (6) without investigation, no right of speaking; (7) do things according to the reality; (8) enhance the class consciousness of the proletariat and the political standard. 136 Besides this formal discipline, the cadres in the commune were especially warned to have a democratic style of leadership and not be oppressive and commandist. They were severely prohibited from indiscriminately giving people political \"hats\", beating or insulting the people and punishing members by retaining the grain ration, rebating work-points and refusing to give work (Chapter 7 of the \"Revised Draft\"). F. Methods in Leading In order to keep a good and close relationship with those led, some techniques and methods in leading had been adopted and developed by the communal leaders. A part of the methods were based on the long revolutionary experience since the Yan'an period; another part was first worked out by some local cadres during the collectivization process and then taken as models by the CCP to spread on a nationwide scale. 1. Si-tong (four togethernesses): \"Si-tong\" means to eat together, to live together, to labor together and to take counsel together. 1 0 These four togethernesses were con-sidered as a model style of leadership in both factories and communes. In the commune, the last two togethernesses (to labor together and to take counsel together) were especi-ally emphasized. The director of the Gaocun People's Commune, Wendeng County, Zhang Fugui, was elected as a national model because he labored harder than a regular commune member. He was always the one who chose the heaviest and dirtiest work to do. Seeing he was growing in age, the members of the commune advised him not to do so much. He res-ponded: \"If a cadre does not participate in labor, how can he discover problems? If he 1 0 For origin and explanation of the term see T. A . Hsia, \"A Terminological Study of the Hsia-fang Movement\" (Summer, 1963 : 34-35). 137 cannot- discover problems, how can he lead in production?\" (RMRB, 12 May, 1963). The director of the Aiguo People's Commune, Ju County, Lu Hong-bin, also a model, did more than 100 days of manual labor in the First Team of Aiguo Brigade during the first eight months of 1963. Some members had thought a cadre like Lu did not need to participate in manual work. Lu was not at all influenced by this opinion. As a matter of fact, it was through manual work that Lu found the key to solving the problem of how to increase grain output (RMRB, 20 October, 1963). Being divorced from laboring was considered serious. According to the \"Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of Rural People's Communes\", cadres at the team level were not allowed to rid themselves of manual work. They should labor in the same way and for the same duration of time as a common member. Cadres at the brigade level were allowed to rid themselves of a maximum of half of their manual work. Their labor days could not be less than a minimum time of 120 days per year. Cadres at the commune level should also participate in manual work in a team of their choice. The minimum labor days were 60 annually (Chapter 7 of the \"Revised Draft\"). Taking counsel together can be seen in a concrete example of the Xiao Gezhuang Brigade, Zhuli People's Commune, Linyi County. In the spring of 1959, the cadres of the brigade spent 153 yuan to buy a bicycle without consulting in advance the opinion of the members. Later on, during the Congress of the brigade, the masses criticized the cadres so severely that the latter were obliged to recognize their fault and apologize. After this lesson, a democratic financial system was established in the brigade (XHDX, 26 January, 1963). 138 2. Si dao-tian (four coming-to-the-fields): Just at the beginning of the commune movement, the biggest Shandong newspaper, the Da-zhong Ri-bao(the Masses Daily) called through an editorial to spread the method of leadership by coming to the field for four purposes: to labor, to tend official business, to sleep and to make criticism by big character posters (DZRB, 10 August, 1958). This method did not spread largely due to the real difficulty in realizing the purposes such as to sleep and to tend official business in the field. 3. Dun-dian (to squat on a spot,(cf. Hsia, 1963:49): \"Dun-dian\" had a long story behind it. During the revolution there was an approach which was termed as shen-ru ji-ceng (to penetrate deeply into the basic layers) for the communist cadres to discover the basic problems of the society. Mao's famous articles such as \"The Analysis of the Classes of the Chinese Society: (1926) and \"The Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan\" (1927) can be seen as the result of his penetrating into the basic layers of the society. In the commune this means that cadres at the commune and brigade levels must go down to the production teams to discover problems. For in-stance, the Party secretary of the Xuzhuang People's Commune, Shiping County, Yan You-yi, went down working in the Third Team of the Zhuzhuang Brigade and found that the ratio of active laborers was high but the finished works did not increase. From here, he set out to investigate and found the contradiction. The solution of the contradiction resulted in a new arrangement of the labor distribution which rendered the conditions favorable to increasing the yi:eld of grain per unit (RMRB, 12 May, 1964). In the framework of the commune, the tradition of \"penetrating deeply into the basic layers\" had developed into a system known as \"Two-Five System\" for the 139 rural cadres. China Quarterly (1960) described it as follows: The regime is popularizing a new method of implementing the \"mass line\" of getting rural officials out of their offices to do manual labor. Under the \"Two-Five System\", cadres spend two days a week on meetings, inspections and political studies, and the other five actually in the fields. During the five days, the cadres spend the early morning inspecting work, the bulk of the day in manual labor, and the evenings helping production team leaders plan the following day's schedule (No. 4, Oct .-Dec. 1960 : 136). \"Squatting on a spot\" can be seen as a variation of the \"Two-Five Systern'with-out definite proportion of time. Presumably because of a question of convenience, \"squatting on a spot\" had become more prevalent later on than the original \"Two-Five System\". \"Squatting on a spot\"was a kind of fieldwork for cadres for an indefinite dura-tion of time. It was a systematic obligation for all high ranking cadres in the commune between 1960-1965. For example, in the Chengguan People's Commune, Qufu County, amongst; the 23 communal cadres who did not directly engage in manual labor, all but one who remained to keep the office went to \"squat on a spot\" in different production teams for ten days (Liu Cong-xian, 1963). Another example shows that a Party branch secretary of the Da'an Brigade, Shijing People's Commune, Fei County, squatted in a backward team for two years to help increase the output (RMRB, 30 March, 1963). 4. Chi ku zai xian, xiang luo zai hou (to eat the bitterness first and to enjoy one-self the last): This kind of behavior can be seen as a continuity of the Confucian spirit. The phrase is a semantic variation of the famous phraseology of Fan Zhong-yan, a Confucian minister of the Song Dynasty: \"to worry before anyone in the world, and to enjoy oneself after (everybody in the world\". The Party branch secretary Zhu Qun-shan and the Sbmmander Zhu Li-ji of the Sanli Brigade, Chengguan People's Commune, Qiho County, were praised for having the spirit of eating bitterness the 140 first and enjoying themselves the last. In 1961, the brigade suffered from the natural calamities. During the hard time, they always took the lead in the hardest work. But when the state sent relief food and money, they refused to accept any, although their houses had collapsed during the flooding (RMRB, 11 January, 1963). 5. Qun-zhong jian-du (under the supervision of the masses): In 1960, the Shicun Brigade of the Longyang People's Commune, Teng County, passed a motion to build a new brigade office of six units. When an old peasant heard of it, he hurried to see the Party branch secretary Xue Zheng-xiang to put his veto. He said: \"Money should be spent on the due place. A new office certainly cannot grow grains. If this money be used to build two mechanical wells, how much dry fields will be carried into irrigation? and how much yield will be increased?\" Secretary Xue thought the old peasant's suggestion was correct and cancelled the plan of office building. It was reported that this was a regular occurrence in this brigade. The brigade Party branch encouraged the masses to supervise and criticize the cadres. Besides the regular Congress, the Party branch called a meeting of representatives of members and a conversazione of old peasants every two months in order to listen to mass opinions. After this, the Party branch paid much attention to family inter-views, private chats and women's gossip. \"It was under this method, \" said the reporter, \"that the cadres could avoid committing many mistakes and defaults\" (RMRB, 19 March, 1963). 6. Ren-ren dou-shi Zhuge Liang 1 1 (\"Everybody is a Zhuge Liang\"): A good cadre was not the one who only knew how to solve problems for the masses, but the one who ^ Zhuge Liang was a minister of the period of Three Kingdoms, widely known for his wit and intelligence. 141 knew how to urge the masses to solve problems by themselves by stimulating initiative and creativity of the masses. In Xiyou People's Commune, Ye County, this method was utilized in amelioration and creation of farm implements. In a time span of more than one year, more than fifty kinds of farm implements and tools such as mechanical mill, seed planters, densely spacing drill, foot-stepped water wheels, had been made by creation or imitation (RMRB, 21 May, 1959). G . Shortage of Rural Leaders Before 1958, it was already reported in Shandong that the xiang level cadres were not sufficient. According to the official regulations, one township (xiang) could have ten cadres: 3 Party secretaries, one member of Party Committee in charge of organization and propaganda, one secretary of CYL, one administrative clerk, 3 chiefs and vice-chiefs of the township, one member of the Township Committee in charge of finance and grain. The ten cadres could have one cook who was not a cadre but was also on the state payroll. Ten cadres were considered too few as a number to handle the administrative affairs in a township. It was reported that in Holuo Township, Laiyang County, the ten xiang cadres must handle the daily administrative affairs of 34 villages with 2,300 households and a population of 11,500. The limited number of cadres meant that one cadre must serve several functions at a time. For instance, the secretary of CYL was at the same time in charge of security and defense. The cook was in charge of the mailman's task. As he could not deliver mails and cook at the same time, the delivery of mails fell on the back of one vice-chief of the township. The daily busi-nesses were many. Cadres of the cooperatives came very often to the township to demand help in their difficulties in production. Family problems such as disputes between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, division of property between brothers, divorce, breaking of engagements, and other problems such as the relief fund for invalid veterans, employment of the demobilized PLA soldiers etc., all these needed to be solved by the township cadres. But these constituted only one aspect of their tasks. They had also to face the increased demands of their superiors. In Laiyang County, there were 89 cadres of the County Committee and 47 ramified organs. 'Everyone could give orders to the town-ship cadres. The county security office demanded that township cadres participate in their training program. The county Party school demanded that the township send cadres to receive ideological training. The county finance office wanted township cadres to assist in their accounting training classes. The transport office asked the township cadres to lead the construction of highways. The New China Book Store requested the township cadres to sell books for them. The forestry office demanded that the township cadres in-vestigate how many tree-sprouts the township could supply, and so on and so forth. According to the statistics of Holuo Township, they received on the average 60 letters of such requests every month. At the end of 1956 they even received 18 letters in one day. The only way they could handle all this, said the reporter, was to pigeonhole those letters and never touch them again (DZRB, 10 February, 1957). The above example shows the gravity of the shortage of cadres under the county level even before the establishment of people's communes. In the commune, all the above-mentioned businesses existed still. But, the cadres of a commune must, in addition, devote themselves to leading production. The problem of insufficiency of rural cadres could also be an important factor which determined the size of the commune. If the commune size was the same as, or a little larger than the township size, it was no difficulty to transfer the township cadres to commune cadres. If the commune size had been smaller than a township, it would have aggra\rated the problem of rural cadre insufficiency. About this point, one may ask why the leaders of the cooperatives could not be transferred to the positions of commune cadres? There were two reasons which made it difficult. First, the cooperative leaders had to fill the ranks of brigade and team cadres. Secondly, it was difficult to choose one Party secretary among many cooperative secre-taries to be Party secretary of the commune, to lead the other secretaries who had been at the same rank as he had been. This could be seen as a promotion without merit. It was the same for the position of director of the.commune. That is why, except for a few national models like Xiu Jian-chun in Xiyou People's Commune and Zhang Fu-gui in Graocun People's Commune, who had personal prestige in the surrounding areas and could be easily raised to the position of director of commune from that of cooperative, the general rule was that the Party secretaries and chief and vice-chief of the township were transferred to the corresponding positions in the commune. H. Morale Maintenance of the Rural Leaders After having seen a variety of aspects concerning the leadership in the commune, we may realize how important a role the rural cadres in China have played! But at the same time we must also realize how difficult a role it was! Generally speaking, for the low-ranking rural cadres as a whole, rewards (especially material rewards) were meagre, promotion was scant, but the tasks were heavy and moral requirements were overriding. One may raise questions such as how could the Party make the recruits willing to accept a task of this kind? And how to maintain the cadres' zeal in a totally devoting enterprise with so little personal gain? In fact, the maintaining of rural cadres' morale was not without problems since the land reform. In his study about rural leadership in China, 144 Thomas P. Bernstein has drawn attention to two major elements which made rural cadres frustrated and led them.to withdraw from political involvement after the land reform in the beginning of the 1950's (Bernstein, 1970). \"One threat arose as the interests of the peasants in the maintenance of the small-producer economy affected the attitudes and behaviour of village leaders...The other threat arose as the rural administrative system became increasingly burdened by munerous tasks and assignments. As pressure to produce results increased, rural leaders, oriented towards getting each task done quickly, tended more and more to mobilize peasants by issuing commands and using coercion\" (ibid. : 239). The first issue raised by Bernstein was considerably diminished, if not yet comp-letely eliminated, since the establishment of the people's communes, because the pros-pect of becoming a rich peasant was close to zero in the communal framework. The second did however still exist, and still manifested itself in the form of commandism and bureaucratism. It constituted one of the causes which held the commune movement back during the years d958\u00C2\u00A7ill961. In order to correct this phenomenon, the CCP adopted a variety of approaches and techniques, such as the purge, the cultivation of a sense of threat, e .g . , the U.S;.\u00C2\u00BBthreat at the beginning of the 1950's, the Soviet threat and the capitalist restoration since 1960, and educational work. Among the approaches cited above it was the educational work or ideological indoctrination which constituted the permanent method of the CCP for forming, reforming and revitalizing cadres, and maintaining their morale. It was also the educational work which kept the revolutionary dynamism of development in the countryside. 145 IV SOCIALIST EDUCATION Following the leadership, it is necessary to give a brief description about the socialist education, because the latter has been the principal method of forming and revitalizing cadres. A . Definition Before going into detail of socialist education, a few words concerning its conception are judged necessary. First, in a large sense, all the approaches utilized by the CCP for cadre formation cited above can be seen as forms of socialist education. Furthermore, it is well known that any kind of Chinese mass media has always been ideologically oriented. To some extent, the whole process of socialization can be seen as an educational process. That is why the scope of \"socialist education\" which we will discuss hereshould be clearly defined. In this section, \"socialist education\" will be treated in its narrower sense, implying only what concretely happened in rural commune'suin Shandong Province between 1958-1965 under the terminology \"jiso-yu\" (education). Secondly, there was a political campaign named \"socialist education\" launched first in the rural areas in 1957, concomitant with the xid-fdng (downward transfer) movement and renewed in 1962. z Afterwards, all educational actions, with or without this official title, were implicitly related to this campaign. Thirdly, there was no clear distinction in the content between education of the masses and that of 12 Following the anti-rightist movement in the cities in 1957, the \"socialist education\" movement broughfc.abdut a revival of attacks on the former landlord and capitalist elements. For a thorough account of the \"socialist education\" movement from 1962 see Richard Baum, Prelude to Revolution - Mao, the Forty and Peasant Question, 1962-1966 (1975). the cadres, because the content and program of education as well as the approaches and techniques utilized for the two categories of people were the same. When education was carried out by cadres for educating the masses, the cadres themselves were educated too; and vice versa. Finally, it has to be pointed out that the positive aspect of the socialist education rests on creating and consolidating the identification of the cadres as well as the masses with the causes and goals of the socialist transformation. B. Policy If ideology and organization were the essential components of the CCP as Franz Schurmann viewed it, education would play the role of glue to cement the two component parts together. It was through education that ideology could play its role of guidance and keep the dynamism of organization. It was also through education that organization defined its goals and values. That is why education has been viewed by the Chinese com-munists as the principal method of propagating ideology and consolidating organization. The philosophy of the function of education is based on the belief of malleability of human nature, a belief rooted in the ancient Confucian thought. Because the peasants were believed to be educable, the transformation from individual small-farm economy into collective communal economy was logically possible. From this point of view, education was really considered by the decision-makers as a motor of all socioeconomic changes. In the \"Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes\", education was one of the important policies of the Party within the commune. After the role of leadership and that of organizer, another essential role which the Party organ had to play was educator. It is formulated that \"the Party organ in the people's 147 commune must do ideological worksi\" \"It is needed to utilize all possible forms to propagate, separetly to members of the Party, members of the CYL and the masses, Marxism-Leninism, the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the General Line of the Socialist Construction, GLF and the People's Commune, and to carry out the education of social-ism, patriotism, collectivism, the alliance between workers and peasants, current occur-rences and policies in order to consolidate the people's commune ideologically and politically \"\" (Chapter 9 of the \"Revised Draft;\") Education for the members of the Party and the CYL and the cadres was especi-ally emphasized. \"Among the members of the Party and of the CYL education about the proletarian class and that about the Regulations of the Party and CYL must be constantly carried out. It is necessary to educate the members of the Party and CYL and the cadres to be constantly concerned for the difficult problems in life and production of the masses and to reflect the opinions of the masses. It is necessary to educate the members of the Party and CYL and the cadres to correctly implement the 'class line' of the Party in the countryside, to rely on the old peasants and the poor and lower-middle peasants, and to solidly unite the other middle peasants. It is necessary to enforce the unity of the laboring people of all nationalities\" (ibid.). C. Principle Although \"politics in command\" was not confined only to the sphere of social-ist education, it was the supreme principle in all ideological and educational actions. The slogan of \"politics in command\" was originally raised to oppose economism. The purely economic viewpoint had long been regarded by the leading force of the CCP as a danger for development. Therefore \"politics in command\" must be carried out in all sectors as a principle to ensure the correct orientation of socioeconomic development in China. Socialist education aimed at changing peasants' world outlook and value system. It was considered that only under the principle of \"politics in command\" could the aim of socialist education be fulfilled. \"Politics in command\" in the sphere of socialist education contains two mean-ings: theoretically it meant the socialist and communist ideology must be put in command; practically, it implied that the Party leaders in any sector of the society must take com-mand. This can be illustrated by the example of Dongjiao People's Commune of Licheng County which was put forward as a model in the experience of socialist education. It was reported that \"the socialist education was of great success in the Dongjiao People's Commune, mainly because the insistence of the members of the Party Committee of the commune upon \"politics in command\" was explicit and firm, and they strung together all the tasks such as high tide in production, state purchase, distribution and rectifica-tion of Party, commune and CYL with one red string of socialism and communism\" (QDRB, 18 October, 1959). D. Methods The methods utilized in socialist education were of great variety. The follow-ing are examples of the most familiar, but represent only a few of the full number. 13 1. Da-ming da-fang (great contending and blooming) : The term started to be used during the \"Hundred Flowers\" Movement in 1956-57 in order to encourage people ^ A brief account is found in T .A. Hsia, \"The Commune in Retreat : As Evidenced in Terminology and Semantics\" (1964 : 25). to speak frankly and freely their opinions. Although the \"Hundred Flowers\" Move-ment ended in an \"Anti-rightist\" Movement, this term continued to be used in the communes, especially during the rectification of the commune in 1959. As a method of socialist education, it was presented in the form of \"ming-fang hui\" (contending and blooming meeting). According to the experience of the People's Commune, the characteristics of the ming-fang hu? were that in the meeting the speakers were mainly low-ranking cadres and the masses. The leading cadres spoke little in this kind of meeting (QDRB, 18 October, 1959). The ming-fang hui had a twofold aim: it at the same time encouraged the masses to critize the cadres in order to educate them and to discover the erroneous points of view such as rightist and revisionist etc. on the part of the masses in order to correct them. Yi-ku si-tian (remembering the bitterness of the past and thinking about the sweet-ness of the present): This method was to raise the masses' awareness of the changes occurring in the socialist transformation process by comparing the present with the past. The Donjiao People's Commune's experience tells us that yi-ku si-tian was a flexible approach according to different circumstances. For instance, in 1959 in this commune, the theme was \"remembering the changes and achievement during the last ten years since the establishment of the People's Republic, then during the last three years of cooperativization, and finally during the last year of communization\" (QDRB, 18 October, 1959). The emphasis was placed on the comparison between the changes of the last ten years and the tremendous achievement in one year since the establishment of the people's commune. \"The comparison was processed through concrete facts from remote events to present occurrances, from big things to small 150 ones from production to living, from collectivity to individuality, from revolution to construction, from economy to culture, from the tremendous changes in the nation and in the commune to the increase of living standards in material items such as gum-shoes and thermos bottles\" (ibid.) 3. Model approach: The method utilized in the Xiwangzhung Brigade, Gufengtai People's Commune, Yishui County in socialist education was electing models of \"five-good\" members. This activity started in 1961 as a response to the appeal of the Party Committee of Yishui County. During the years of 1961-1964, meetings of criticism wer.e held regularly every 10 days. For the collective benefit, it happened that father criticized son and son criticized father. Under the criticism and encouragement of models, people became more and more concerned with the interest of collectivity. After work, instead of taking rest at home, some members went gathering manure to throw into the brigade fields). During the summer harvest season, when rain started, members were hurried to cover the collective grain first \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 and then to cover grain belonging to themselves. When members found lost money or other things, they would immediately behhanded to the brigade office so that they could be returned to the losers. At the end of 1963, 85% of the brigade members became \"five-good\" members and 76% of the households became v\"five-good\" families (XHDX, 26 May, 1964). In the Liangquan Brigade of the Xujia zhuang People's Commune, Yiyuan County, the model approach was also utilized in electing \"excellent\" members. The method was seconded by mutual and self criticism which the local people called \"zhao jingzi\" (looking at oneself in the mirror). When criticisms were made (in most cases) by members of one's own family, they called this situation \"self-education 151 of the masses\" (XHDX, 2 November, 1964). 4. Record of the Village Histbry: From 1962 to 1966 the term \"si-shi yun-dong\" (Four-history Movement) appeared quite often in Chinese newspapers.1^ The com-pilation and publication committees of four histories were established in many provinces, cities and counties. It is said that the four histories comprise \"family or clan history\", \"village history\", \"commune history\" and \"factory and mine history\".1^ The principal theme of those histories was \"class struggle\". This method can be seen as utilizing traditional bottles to contain revolutionary wine. In the Julingzhuang Brigade of the Qiujiadi People's Commune, Tai-an County, under the socialist education movement, the poor and lower-middle peasants destroyed thestone steles of \"official honors\" and \"filial piety and faithful wives\" of the landlord class for establishing the stele of the village history on the theme of class struggle. One face of the stele was a record of one thousand five hundred words on the \"tearing and blooding\" history of how the poor peasants in the old society suffered from exploitation and how they struggled against the feudalist domin-ation and were finally emancipated and came on the road of socialist collectivity. On the other face was engraved \"Never Forget It! \" (GMRB, 10 December, 1964). 5. Learning from Lei Feng: In March, 1963, Mao Tse-tung appealed to the Chinese people, especially to the youth to \"learn from Lei Feng\". Lei Feng was a soldier who died at young age. During his short legendary life, he was said to devote himself without any reservation to serving the people. The movement of learning ^ For a detailed account of the Four-History Movement see Shi Cheng-zhi (Shih Ch'eng-chih), \"Shi lun Si-shi yu Wen-ge\" (On the Four-History and Cultural Revolution) Ming Pao Monthly, Nos. 72-80 (Dec. 1971-August, 1972). ^ In some parts of China, there appeared compilation and publication committees of five histories. The fifth one was said in some place to be \"army history\", in others, \"street history\" (Shi OCheng-ghi, 1971-72). 152 from Lei Feng was for a rime (1963-65) of special importance amongst the members of CYL in the countryside. In the Lijiazhuang Brigade, Chengguan People's Commune, Linju County, there was a high tide of learning from Lei Feng amongst the youth in 1963 (Gong- qing-tuan, 1965). In one month the youth of the village did more than three hundred good things in serving the people. But the zeal of the youth gradually decreased with time. The secretary of the CYL realized that to learn from Lei Feng was to learn how he learned from Chairman Mao's works. Lei Feng used to say: \"I study Chairman Mao's books, I listen to what Chairman Mao said, and I do things according to Chair-man Mao's directives\"'1 The spirit of Lei Feng was rooted in Chairman Mao's works (ibid.) 6. Learning from Chairman Mao's Works: If Marx's, Engels' and Lenin's works were important for the intellectuals and high ranking cadres in the cities, Chairman Mao's works were rimporiitdnMorneverybody in China, but especially for the peasants who had difficulty in understanding translated works. However, as a movement of \"learning from Chairman Mao's works\" started only in 1963 when the renewed social-ist education movement reached its high tide in the countryside. To learn Chairman Mao's works peasants were organized by the Party or the CYL in studying groups. For instance, in the Lijiazhuang Brigade which I have cited above, among the 156 young people, except one who was a dumb person, 155 participated in the studying group of learning from Chairman Mao's works (ibid.) Among Mao's works, the most studied were the so-called \"lao san-pian\" (old three articles): \"Serving the People\", \"In Memory of Norman Bethune\" and 153 \"The Foolish Old Man who Removed the Mountains\". ^ \u00C2\u00B0 This is because these three articles are simple in form and heavily moral-laden in content. They aptly fitted the taste and intellectual level of the peasantry. In the three articles, there were three models to be; learned from. In \"Serving the People\", there was a soldier, Zhang Si-de, a type of Lei Feng, who knew nothing else than serving and helping the others. In \"In Memory of Norman Bethune\", the spirit of Bethune was praised in the phraseology: \"working not for the benefit even a little bit of oneself, but for the benefit of others. \" In \"The Foolish Old Man who Removed the Mountains\", the spirit of iron will was praised. As moral lessons, they were very encouraging and useful in the socialist construction under hard conditions. The movement of learning from Chairman Mao's works was intensified in 1965, as a prelude to the Cultural Revolution. In Shandong, conference of exchanging experience in learning from Chairman Mao's works was organized at the provincial level and models were elected. The model of the models was Chen Lan-hua, a countrywoman of 36 years old from the West Shuyuan Brigade, Shuyuan People's Commune, Junan County. Coming from poor peasant family, she was almost illit-erate. She was director of the Women's Federation Branch, and member of the Party branch committee. Although the mother of five children and laborer in the field (because her husband worked elsewhere), she managed to have studied all important works of Mao, including the philosophical article \"On Practice\", with the help of her daughter who studied in the high school (SHDX, 29 May, 1965). 16 \"Serve the People\", Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, Vol. Ill, pp. 227-228; \"In Memory of Norman Bethune,\" Vol. II, pp. 337-338; \"The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains\", Vol. Ill, pp. 321-324. The focus of learning from Chairman Mao's works was \"learning for using\" (huo-xue huo-yong) and \"learning with problems\" (daizhe wenti zue). For example, Chen Lan-hua once urged some women who were not active in participating in har-vest to go to the field. But nobody listened to her. She was very frustrated. Only when she read the sentence \"cadres must be concerned with the life of the masses and pay attention to working method\" in Mao's work, did she realize her mistake of not being concerned with the life of the masses and of not paying attention to her working method. She then changed her working style by starting to visit individually those women who were not active in laboring so she could understand their problems. She found that there really existed many reasons such as having too many children at home, being dissatisfied with the low work-point for women, etc. She began by organizing a nursery for the children and arranging to get \"equal pay for equal work\" for women. Finally, more than one hundred women laborers in the brigade all participated actively in collective laboring. Within 10 days, the women labor force had gathered three thousand carts of manure and leveled three hundred mu of land (ibid.). V SUMMARY Since the size of the commune was reduced between 1959 and 1963, the com-munal unit has become, as Skinner suggested, closer to the traditional marketing com-munity. The average households of the commune in Shandong Province can be estimated as around 4,000 (or about 16,000 people). This figure is larger than the average for China as a whole (between 7,000 and 8,000 people),^7 but smaller than that in the 1 7 The relatively large size of commune in Shandong was mainly due to its high population density (360 per sq. kms. in 1958, only ranged after Jiangsu Province in China). 155 double-cropping rice region, for example, in Guangdong the average population of a commune is over 30,000 (Buchanan, 1970 : 130). In comparison with the size of co-operative which had on the average 200 households (or some 800 people), the commune was twenty times larger. This sudden change in the size of economic unit in so short a time as within one year (1958-1959) can largely account for thedifficulties faced by the organizers of the communes during 1959-1961. It is not surprising to see regression and failure in some sectors of the commune system. What is surprising was that this system did not collapse under so much pressure as we have shown in the former chapters, but was gradually consolidated. Without sufficient prerequisites in infrastructure, the establishment of the commune system relied mainly on organization. The core of the communal organization was the CCP which is, as Franz Schurmann said, an organization itself. The success of the CCP in revolution owed much to its efficiency in organization, especially in the transformation of peasants into revolutionary fighters. The authorities of the CCP were enough aware of this quality to continue to utilize it in social and economic development. The organizational structure of the com-mune was based on the Party organization. The parallelism of the Party and administra-tive lines within the commune framework is a crucial organizational feature. Administra-tive organization was jpnjy a kind'of bureaucracy, a functional tool under the strict control of the Party. This control was systematically established by the leadership structure: First, the position of the secretary of the commune was endowed with power by both the CCP and the people (because of the practice of mass line). Secondly, the fact that most of the administrative leaders were chosen among the members of the Party made them subordinate to the authority of the Party secretary. However, there were two difficulties in leadership which faced the organizers of the commune system at the beginning of its establishment. One concerned the shortage 156 of the rural leaders at every echelon, especially at the commune level. The idea of yi-x?ang yi-she (one township for one commune) contains only a partial solution of leadership. The second difficulty concerned the qualification of rural cadres. There were two aspects concerning a cadre's qualification: red and expert. The former was related to the cadre's political stand and ideological outlook while the latter related to his technical know-how in administration and production. Since the establishment of the communes, the know-how in production of the leading cadres had become increasingly important. The problem is that many commune cadres who had been administrative leaders of the townships were not familiar enough with production skills. The transfer of a great deal of technical tasks in production downward to the brigade and team levels may be seen as a temporary solution of the inexperience in production of these commune leaders. But no important measures, except for the \"squatting on a spot\", were adopted to resolve this problem. While the ^expert\" aspect was overlooked, the \"red\" aspect was at any rate.con-sidered of paramount importance in order to carry on the socialist transformation and to formaa new type of peasantry. As Mao repeated again and again: \"man first\" and \"man determines matters\". M gong-zuo)zhi-dao zhan (work direction station) > sheng-chan dui (production brigade) (communes in Tangshan Special District, Hobei) b. The commune 7 * sheng-chan da-dui (large production brigade) sheng-chan dui (production brigade) (Weixing People's Commune, Honan) c. The commune > da-dui (large brigade) >-7rxiaojdu i I( smd 11 brigade) (communes in Tangshan Special District and Qiliying People's Commune, Xinxiang County, Honan) d. The commune da-dui (large brigade)>\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 zhong-dui (medium brigade) (Chaoyang People's Commune, Shangcheng County, Honan) e. The commune >\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 zuo-ye qu (farm-work district) sheng-chan dui (production brigade).7 '4>\u00C2\u00B0c':; c . i ,ncf V ' n;-1 to represent \u00E2\u0080\u00A2\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Hsia, 1964: 36. By virtue of uniformity, I have changed Hsia's original Wade-Giles transliteration into pin-yin system. 179 Hsia's data cannot be said to represent the whole picture of the county. The real scope of variations must be larger than his. In Shandong Province, according to the available data which cannot represent the whole picture of Shandong either, three variations are found in the years 1958-1959 (after 1959 the names were unified): a. The commune >guan-li qu (administrative district) or geng-zuo qu (plowing and farm-work district) >\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 sheng-chanddui( (.pno'ducltiionhteam) (Chengguan People's Commune, Shouzhang County, DZRB, 19 September, 1958) (Laoguanzhai People's Commune, Linqing Municipality, RMRB, 19 August, 1959) b. The commune :j\u00C2\u00BBsheng-chan dui (production brigade)^ sheng-chan xiao-du? (small production brigade or production team) (Dongjiao People's Commune, Licheng County, QDRB, 18 October, 1959) c. The communesheng-chan da-dui (large production brigade or production brigade^ sheng-chan-dui (production team) (most of the communes) In December, 1958, the Wuchang Resolution reaffirmed the principle of \"unified leadership and management at different levels\" which had been advanced by the Weixing People's Commune. According fothe Resolution, the second level unit was called quan-li qu or sheng-chan da-dui; and third level unit, sheng-chan;dui (Wen-hu? Bao, 1969 : 33). After 1959, the appelations of the communal sub-units were gradually unified by following the example of the Weixing People's Commune which was at the very beginning divided into sheng-chan da-dui (for the second level) and sheng-chan dui (for the third level) 180 The complication with regard to the names of the second and the third levels of the communal units was caused not only by the diversify of the Chinese terminology used during 1958-1959, but also by their English translation and the change in size of these units. Sheng-chan dui was originally a subdivision of the advanced cooperative. It was translated in the Chinese official documents as \"production brigade\". However, in theofficial English version of the Wuchang Resolution, sheng-chan da-dui was translated as \"production brigade\" and sheng-chan dui as \"production team\" (Hsia, 1964 : 38). The English terms were standardized since the time of the English version of the Wuchang Resolution and students of China in other countries quickly became familiar with them, although the standardization of the Chinese terms came out much later. The change in size of these units was another cause of confusion. In December, 1958 when the Wuchang Resolution was made, the sheng-chan dui (third level unit) was almost as large as an advancec cooperative of 1957, and the sheng-chan da-dui or guan-li qu (second level unit) referred to an organization much larger than the advanced cooperative. However, after the reduction in size of the communes during 1959-62, only the sheng-chan da-dui (production brigade) has a size comparable to the advanced co-operative of 1957.' According to the Wuchang Resolution, after the commune, the power of manage-ment was alloted as follows: g According to Hsia (1964), the Chinese terms started to be standardized since the RMRB's editorial on the 2nd April, 1961. ' A detailed statement can be found in Bai Zhen, \"People's Communes in Dissolution\", China Weekly, Hong Kong, Vol. 37, No. 10, 5 March, 1962 (quoted by Hsia, 1964 : 82). In this thesis I have followed and continue to follow the standardized terminology in English translation, \"production brigade\" indicating the second level unit; and \"production team\" the third level unit, regardless of their Chinese titles. 181 The administrative district (or production brigade) is generally the unit which manages the industry, agriculture, trade, edu-cation and military affairs in a given area and forms an econ-omic accounting unit, with its gains and losses pooled in the commune as a whole. The production team is the basic unit of labor organization. Under the unified leadership of the com-mune administrative committee, necessary power should be given to the administrative district (or production brigade) and the production team over such matters as the organization of production work and basic construction, finances and welfare, in order to bring their initiative into full play (Chapter 6). During this period, the unified leadership of the commune administrative com-mittee was emphasized. The requirement was that necessary powers should be given to the production brigade and production team is tantamount to an admission that the prod-uction brigade and production team had not enough necessary powers in management over either the organization of production work or other matters. The crucial role in management played by the leadership at the commune level during this period can be seen in the report of the premier secretary of the CCP of Liaocheng Special District on the Laoguanzhai People's Commune. The following is a selection of relevant paragraphs of the report: As soon as you arrived in the fields of the Laotuanzhai People's Commune, immediately you felt the high tension of the commune members who were struggling for a bumper autumn harvest. The leading cadres, from the Party secretary of the commune to the cadres of the production teams, all worked together with the members... In order to overcome the natural calamities of drought and flood-ing, water conservancy, wells and ditches were planned to be built under the unified planning of the commune... Under the unified leadership of the commune, a \"field army corps\" of ten thousand people was organized to conquer nature... Under the unified leadership of the commune, all the production teams promoted a movement of making fertilizer and accumulating manure... 182 For the sake.of strengthening the management of the field work and ensuring a bumper harvest of wheat, 105 teams (4,426 people) for special management on wheat were organized in the whole commune. After the communalization, it has become more convenient for the Party committee of the commune to lead the production. The Party Committee.of the Municipality \u00C2\u00A3of Linqi'ng;V) has a ' s o been able to lead the production in an immediate and concrete manner. The first secretary of the Party Committee of the Municipality, the comrade Zhang Jing-hy, planted an \"experimental plot\" in the commune and gave directives on the management of the field work. The director of the rural work bureau of the Municipal Committee, the comrade Xi Guang-shi, permanently stays in the commune to help in a concrete manner the direction and directly participates in labor work and in leading the production. The Party secretary of the commune, the comrade Zhang Zeng-yu, and the director of the commune, the comrade Yan Zhen-ding, are leading the commanders of the production teams and the Party branch sec-retaries of the whole commune as well as the masses in the manage-ment of the wheat field work day and night (RMRB, 19 August, 1959) In this report, it can be seen that not only did the phrase \"under the unified leadership of the commune\" appear many times, but the planning of crop planting and the organization of labor force were directly managed by the commune cadres. Not merely the commune cadres, but even their superiors, the cadres of the municipality, came down to give their directives. It is really doubtful that the directives of those cadres who had been more familiar with administrative and ideological affairs than with agronomy, were effective for production or heartily accepted by the peasants. Such a situation certainly brought about negative results as was proved by the decrease in output during the years of 1959-1961. In the later resolutions on commune affairs, \"xia zhi-hui\" (blindly issuing directives) was prohibited and the management moved downwards. 2. Three level management with emphasis on the production brigade and production team\" The moment in 1958 was likely to be immature for realizing such a grandiose enter-prise mainly because there were not enough well-trained rural cadres who were capable of 183 leading such a gigantic and comprehensive organization as I have mentioned in the previous chapter. The shortage of rural cadres, especially the shortage of competent cadres in rural areas, seemed to be the main cause of the deterioration of the rural economy during 1959-1961. Under pressure from their superiors, the rural cadres at each echelon had to do things they did not understand well, were not familiar with and, worst of al l , had never experienced in their lives. But they had enough enthusiasm and zeal. Their ignorance and fanatic attitude inevitably resulted in the blind issuance of directives, resulting in enormous disturbances of the normal routine of agricultural prod-uction. The Lushan Resolution in August, 1959 was a turning point in commune move-ment due to its decision to rely once again upon the leadership of the cooperative move-ment by downward transferring the. powers. Together with the downward transferred owner-ship, the powers of management were also gradually transferred from the commune level to its two lower level units: production brigade and production team. It has to be pointed out that in practice the realization of such a transfer must be much later than the time, of the issue of the resolution and must also be a very slow process on an unequal scale in the whole country. By virtue of this reasoning, it can be estimated that the transfer was proceeding between August,; 1959 and some date later than September, 1962, the month when the \"Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes\" was issued. Hereafter the allocation of the rights of management will be recounted at three levels: commune, production brigade and production team, basically according to the \"Draft of the Regulations for the Opera-tion of the Rural People's Communes\" issued in March 1961, and supplemented by the \"Revised Draft\" (September, 1962). 184 a. Commune: (1) Administration: The Administrative Committee of the Commune (ACC), corres-ponding to the People's Council of the former township, was under the jurisdiction of the People's Committee of the county (County Government). In the management of civil administration, production and construction, finance and trading, culture, education and sanitation, security, militia and civil suit etc., it exercised the official power of the former Township Council. ($) Agricultural production: The ACC had the right to give suggestions to the prod-uction brigades on the planning of agricultural production according to the general plan-ning of the state and the concrete conditions of each brigade. It could also reasonably readjust the production brigades' plannings with the agreement of these brigades. Any imposition was not allowed. Demanding statistical figures from the brigades and \"blindly issuing directives\" were prohibited. The ACC couldextend the methods of increasing output which had been proved successful, and could improve the farm implements. But this could only be carried out by establishing models or by giving suggestions. Any imposition upon the production brigades or production teams was not allowed. The ACC could organize collaboration in production between the production brigades on the grounds of mutual agreement. It was not allowed to transfer and use man-power, means of production and other materials belonging to the production brigades or team without paying. The ACC had to supply seeds, farm implements, fertilizer and pesticide, and to maintain the large agricultural machines in order to help the production brigades to realize their production planning. In supplying the above items, their quality must be 185 guaranteed. The production brigades had the right to refuse any farm implement, any fertilizer or pesticide which was not of good quality. (3) Basic construction and irrigation: According to the needs of production and the possibility of manpower, material conditions and finance, the ACC could be engaged, with the permission of the superior organ and the agreement of the production brigades concerned, in construction of irrigation systems or other basic constructions which were beneficial to the agricultural production in the realm of the commune or for the common interest of several production brigades. However, it was not allowed to do this at the expense of the regular production work or at the.\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 . 7 5 7 , \u00E2\u0080\u00A2\u00E2\u0080\u00A2\u00E2\u0080\u009E.cv r ^ l d ' thv 4 c* i ' i v o 241 480,000 tons over 1955, two-fold that of 1949. 3. Electricity There were only 16 electric power factories in 1936 in Shandong. After 1949, five new electric power factories were built and 46 units were equipped with generators. By 1956, electric power had achieved an increase of 38,000kWh over 1955, and five-fold that of 1949. 2 4. Light Industries The year of 1956 marked an expansion in light industries. The gross value of the output of textiles had an increase of 350 tons over 1955 and doubled that of 1949. The gross value of the output of the food industry had a six-fold increase over 1949, and that of the paper industry eight-fold. The gross value of the output of consumer goods in general increased 18.5% over 1955 and 223.2% over 1949. 5. Private Industrial Enterprises and Handicraft The socialist reform of private industrial enterprises and handicraft was comp-leted by 1956 in Shandong. The 2,300 private enterprises were all converted into co-owned and co-managed enterprises between the state and the owners. 368,000 handi-craftsmen (98.7% of the total) joined either a handicraft cooperative, or a group. The gross output value of the co-owned enterprises had an increase of 32.22% over 1955, and that of handicrafts reached 690,000,000 yuan in 1956. According to an investigation in Liaocheng Special District, the per capita value of handicrafts was 1,817 yuan, ^ The coal production in China as a whole was 105,900,000 tons in 1956, and 130,000,000 tons in 1957 (see Grossman, 1960 : 137). 2 Electric power production in China as a whole was 16,600,000,000 kWh in 1956 and 19,300,000,000 kWh in 1957 (ibid.). ^ They produced 15,900 tons of wheat flour and 1,880 tons of vegetable oil more than in 1955. 242 double that of 1955. 1956 was a year where the industrial development in Shandong had its greatest growth since 1949. The gross output value of industry as a whole had an increase of 318.7% over 1949, with an average annual increase of 22.8%. The gross value of production goods (means of production) grew faster than that of consumer goods, and had a ten-fold increase over 1949, rising to 46.8% of the gross output value of the in-dustry as a whole from only 20.9% in 1948. By 1956, the industrial production repres-ented 45.8% of the gross output value of industry and agriculture combined. It should be noted that it represented only 29.1% in 1949. From 1956 to 1959, each year represented a leap forward in industry. The gross output value of industry in Shandong for 1957 was 3,640,000,000 yuan. This sum was doubled in 1958, amounting to 7,600,000,000 yuan. The estimate for 1959 was 12,500,000,000 yuany(Qian Chang-zhao, 1959). B. Development of the Local Industry Before the Establishment of the People's Communes 1958 was a crucial year in Chinese socioeconomic development. Aside from the creation of the people's communes, it was also the year of the famous Great Leap Forward (GLF) movement, launched just after the Anti-rightist Movement of 1957. Ideologically, the GLF was an anti-elitist and anti-intellectual movement, just as Schurmann has said: The professional intellectuals were denounced for their tech-nological fetishism, for their arrogant conviction that modern scientific and technical learning was only accessible to the educated. The \"mass line\" rapidly took on concrete content as simple peasants and workers were enrolled in \"worker-243 peasant universities\" and told that they too could participate in administration, accounting, designing, and scientific experimentation. Reducing the gap between mental and physical labor, an old Marxist drean, was taken seriously during the Great Leap Forward (197Q : 91). During the GLF, it was a logical consequence that in the industrial sector of the economy the local industry - which would need a larger mass participation and which could stimulate the masses' pi.ative and creativity - was strongly encouraged. All the 'hang-ups' on the part of the middle-ranking leaders with regard to relying on the masses, and hesitation in leading them to join the industrial corps in favor of the agricultural development were criticized as conservative and rightist attitudes. The bureaucrats in the Bureau of Industry of Shandong Province had to make a maximum effort in pushing local industry forward. The director of the Bureau of Industry of Shandong said: The upsurge in agricultural production has appeared and continues to develop in the whole country. This new situation brought about new tasks for us, the ones who are in charge of the local industry. Agriculture urgently needs the support of materials of production. But, at the beginning, in facing this new situation, we did not have any clear idea. For instance/ myself, I had insufficient knowledge of the policy of uniting industry and the rural economy, and of how to utilize the local resources to solve the problems of supply food, clothes and other consumer goods, how to increase the peasants' income, and of how to activize the rural economy. Because of our insufficient knowledge, we have not implemented the policy energetically... On the other hand, we have had some serious conservative thoughts with regard to developing the production of the materials of agricultural production. This can be seen in our attitudes when dealing with this problem in the past. We have always looked too much at the disadvantages and neglected the advantages. We have always thought that it was difficult to manage the local industry well because of its professional multiplicity and geographical dis-persion, but we have not taken enough consideration of the fact that the basis of the local industry in Shandong which is better than most other provinces could be a favorable condition.. .(Liu Qing, 1958). The local industry in Shandong, under the name of xiang-she gong-ye (township-and-cooperative industry) thus developed at full speed. In April, 1958, at the enlarged meeting of the provincial CCP Committee, it was decided to develop immediately the township-and-cooperative industry in great volume (GRRB, 4 June, 1958). Every county was required to use 70% of their forces in township-and-coopera-tive industry and 30% in county industry. The original plan of building up and en-larging 46,000 factories and mines in the province for 1958 was revised upward to 190,000 (ibid.). This was no sooner said than done; according to the statistics for 101 counties and municipalities (outside the urban area) for the month of May, 43,000 units of the township-and-cooperative industry were built up at the rate of 1,400 units per day. Gao-tang county alone established 1,143 units in nine days (see Appendix III, Table 4). It was said that the newly established units effectively resolved the shortage of the farm implements and fertilizers badly needed during the summer season. The official statics show that in Changwei, Laiyang, Hoze and Liaocheng special districts, 2,470,000 rudimentary water-carrying instruments, 370,000 farm implements and / 39,850,000 jin of various kinds of fertilizers were produced in a short span of time (GRRB, 4 June, 1958). By the end of June, 1958, the newly created units amounted to more than 180,000, almost achieving the number of 190,000 established for the year in the revised plan (DZRB, 7 July, 1958). However, the development in the different special districts was unequal. For instance, the Changwei Special District had built up 46,000 units, whereas the Linyi Special District had only finished 10,000. The contrast between counties was also considerable: 5,400 units in Wei County versus 220 in Guan County (ibid.). 245 In July, 1958, just before the spread of the commune system in Shandong, the established units of the township-and-cooperative industry had reached a total of 250,000. 4 II A N UPSURGE IN THE BUILDING OF LOCAL INDUSTRY (1958-1959) During the first two years of the People's Commune, the local industry was heavily emphasized. The term xiang-she gong-ye (township-and-cooperative industry) was out-of-date following the establishment of the People's Communes. At the end of 1958, another term, xian-she gong-ye (county-and-commune industry) was substituted. The development of the xian-she gong-ye began to be called a movement (yun-dong) almost as soon as the term appeared (Peking DGB, 30 November, 1958). This section will deal with this movement by an analysis of the state and provincial policies and the methods used in the building of local industry, which will be followed by five case-studies. A . Policies When Liu Shao-q\u00C2\u00AB> proclaimed the general line of socialist construction at the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress in May, 1959, he quoted Mao Tse-tung's \"Ten Great Relationships\" and said: Comrade Mao TseStung laid down a series of important policies for the realization of the general line of more, faster, better and more economical socialist construction. Of these, numbers one and five suggested the principle of simultaneous development of industry and agriculture under conditions of preferential develop-ment of heavy industry, as well as the principle of unifying the 4 At the Conference of the Local Industry in June, 1958, it was decided to build up 500,000 units with an average of 5,000 per county (see Lai Ke-ke, 1958). 246 concentrated authority of the center and the divided authority of the regions (RMSC, 1959 : 21). Two points are Crucial in Liu's proclamation in regard to the development of local in-dustry. One is the \"simultaneous development of industry and agriculture\"(one aspect of walking on two legs), and another, \"unifying the concentrated authority of the center and the divided authority of the regions\", (another aspect of walking on two legs). Local industry was thus viewed as an important sector in industry, because it would not only lend support to agriculture in the most direct and economicaIsmanner, but would also have the function of decentralizing the existing industrial centres. The Second Five-year Plan which was shadowed by the GLF called for the output value of local industry to catch up with the level of the needs of the agricultural sector (Liu Qing, 1958). The GLF carried this requirement still further. The general policy of the state at that time can be summarized into the following statement: every county and every township must develop its own industry by relying on the masses (DZRB, 7 July, 1958). Based on the general policy of the state, the Provincial Committee came to work out its own policies on how to develop the local industry. First, it was required that each echelon attend to its own affairs, no xian (county) relying on the province, and no xiang (township) relying on the county (ibid.) Second, the cadres at every echelon were required to grasp agriculture with one hand and industry with the other (yi-shou zhua nong-ye yi-shou zhua gong-ye) ((paillK'e-Ike, 1958). Third, local (or tradi-tional) methods should 'mount the horse' before mechanization (tu-fa xian shang-ma ran-hou ji-jie-hua) (Ya Q i , 1958). Fourth, methodologically, the s?-wei (four fors), san-jiu (three on-the-spots), er-zhu (two chieflys) and yi-zi (one self) were given as a guiding principle. (The four fors mean \"for the agricultural production, for the people's 247 livelihood, for the big industry and for exportation\"; the three on-the-spots mean \"taking raw materials on the spot, producing on the spot and selling on the spot\"; the two chieflys mean \"chiefly on small scale and chiefly in handicraft\"; and the one self means \"to solve the problem of capital by oneself\") (Lai Ke-ke, 1958). The above policies were required to be carried out in Shandong just at the same time as the spread of the commune movement ( i .e., between July and September, 1958). The two movements were seen as mutually supporting and reciprocally beneficial. During the conference on the spot (xian-chang hui-yi) of local industry in November, 1958, in Gaotang County, which was a model county in developing county-and-com-mune industry, the provincial first secretary of the Party, Bai Ru-bing, gave the follow-ing concrete directives for the immediate tasks in the winter of 1958 and spring of 1959: 1. The locality with mineral resources has to spare no effort in exploiting them. It has to build up small coal mines and other mineral units or small iron factories and other metallurgical units. 2. It has to rapidly develop the mechanical industry in order to produce mechanical instruments and equipment. It has, above all, to produce simple machine tools in great quantity for the purpose of increasing the capacity of production of the mechanical in-dustry so that the agricultural production can be better served and the technical revo-lution in industry and agriculture can be promoted. 3. It has to develop the chemical industry and to produce in great quantity rudimentary fertilizers and pesticides in order to satisfy the needs of agricultural production and the needs of the people's livelihood. 4. It has to develop the electrical industry, notably that based on marsh gas. Small electric power-stations with marsh gas, water force, combustive force, wind force and 248 any other mechanical forces have to be built up in order to gradually solve the problems of electrical supply in agricultural production and in livelihood. 5. It has to develop the construction industry, and the industry of materials of construc-tion. Every county and every people's commune has to form its own team of construction and installation workers, and to set up kilns of brick, tile and lime, and factories of cement and tno\"nfil'dmmaB;l;e> materiail's:., 6. It has to spareano efforts in developing light industry and the food industry. It has to plan urgently for setting up factories for agricultural and sideline products processing. If conditions permit, it has also to build up factories for water products, fruit processing, and particular handicrafts. 7. It has also to develop the service industries, such as clothing and quilt-making factories, shoe and hat making factories, children's toy-making factories, etc. (Peking DGB, 30 November, 1958). The guiding line for developing the abovementioned industries was xiao (small), tu (local or rudimentary) and gun (prolific) (ibid.). B. High Tide of 5\u00C2\u00A3JaJ22*l2?Jndustry - Five Case-Studies 1. Gaotang County^ The upsurge of the development of local industry started in Gaotang, a county in the Liaocheng Special District to the west of Shandong Province, in May, 1958. It was not long before this county became a model, due to the quantity and quality of 5 This case-study is based on a report by Liu Hua-zhong, the secretary of the CCP Committee of Gaotang County, entitled \"Fa-zhan xiang-she gohg-ye de ji-dian ti\u00E2\u0080\u0094hui\" (Some points of Reflection on Developing Township-and-Cooperative Industry), DZRB, 7 July, 1958. Other sources will be noted. 249 local industry built in its area. a. Decision-making through thought struggle: After the call of the central government for the developing of local industry, among the leading cadres of the counties and townships two contradictory thoughts emerged: one was conservative, the other revolutionary. The conservative faction had expressed much doubt about the capacity of the peasants to develop industry, and raised five impossibilities (wu-ge bu-x?ng) to oppose the implementation of state policies. They said that it was impossible to develop industry without machinery, engineers or technicians, capital provided by the state or the province, work-shops and offices. In order to fight against this kind of conservative thought, the Party organized the cadres and workers to study the general line in socialist construction and the policies and directives of the Provincial Committee of the CCP. The masses were also educated through conferences on the spot, broadcasts and public debate. But the most spectacular and convincing example was the one provided by the Yinji Township (later the Yinji People's Commune). In Yinji Township, the measures adopted to increase agricultural production had not been fully realized due to the shortage of labor and fertilizer, and the back-wardness of the farm implements. To resolve these contradictions between the production plan and production capacity, the cadres and masses of Yinji concentrated their forces on developing industry. They spent a total of 17,500 yuan to set up 38 workshops, among them a sewing service of 15 workers costing them only 14 yuan. In the Hongming Cooperative, an iron-forge group of three youths had successfully readjusted 10 water-wheels, made 30 instruments for transplanting, and repaired more than 200 farm imple-ments with a few simple tools such as pincers and hammers. 250 It was reported that the conservative thought in Gaotang County was finally changed by education through learning the directives and public debate and by the demonstration of the successful model of Yinji. b. What kind of industry should be created first? After the decision to develop) local industry had been made through thought struggle, the second question faced by the people of Gaotang County was what kind of industry should be created first. The state policy was clear - that the local industry must directly serve agricultural production. From this point of departure, they found first three major contradictions in agricultural production that needed to be resolved. These were a shortage of labor, lack of fertilizer, and backwardness of farm implements. Taking this consideration as a guideline, three kinds of local industry were created in the county: ( 1 ) factories which could directly serve agriculture, such as iron-forge, carpentry, manure processing, and animal feed processing; (2) those which could liber-ate the labor force, such as the \"three processings\" (food grain processing, oil proces-sing, and clothes processing); and (3) agricultural and sideline products processing such as cotton processing, papermaking, osier plaiting, winemaking, cement, brick and tile, electrical power and hemp processing. c. How to set up local industry? The following problem was how to accumulate enough capital and manpower to build up those factories and workshops. The guiding principle in solving this prob-lem was self-reliance. The Party called on the cadres and the masses of the county to offer whatever they had: money, materials, manpower and techniques. At the same time debates were organized to increase people's awareness so that individual interest was identical with the interest of the state. 251 (1) Capital: 3,150,000 yuan was quickly raised; (2) Materials: timber, brick and tile, lime, of a total value of 260,000 yuan were accumulated; (3) Techniques: The masses were required to report talented people. In a short time 50 technicians in different fields, and 218 skilled workers were found. The 20 townships of the county were divided into four cooperative areas. Technical conferences in each area were to be regularly held in order to exchange experiences. In addition, the county sent out 179 workers to learn techniques in other counties*; \u00C2\u00B0 Fifty-six workers went to other townships to learn techniques under an exchange program within the county. Up to the end of 1958, the number of workers increased from barely 1,000 to more than 18,000 (RMRB, 9 January, 1959). d. Management; (t) Production planning: Each factory had to make a production plan for one year ac-cording to the needs of agricultural production and those of the people. This plan would include the kinds of products, the quantity of production, and the annual output value. Within the framework of the annual plan, the seasonal sequences of agriculture had to be taken into account. (2) Apart from a few technicians, the factories did not hire permanent workers. Workers were hired temporarily under contract from the cooperatives (latercommunes). Workers were peasants and peasants were workers. When there was work in the factories, peas-ants came there to work; when no work was available, peasants went back to the fields. (3) The wagescof workers were paid in three ways: First, they were paid by unit of time, such as in the wheat flour, cotton processing and fertilizer factories. Second, 252 they were paid by piece-work, such as in the iron-forge and carpentry workshops. Third, the workers took a share of the profit. In all three cases, the wages of workers were a little higher than the average peasants' income. (4) Competition between workers in the same factory, and between factories, was promoted in order to increase the quantity and quality of the products, e. Volume of local industry and output value: Between May and July, 1958, 2,441 small-scale factories and workshops were built up in Gaotang County. Of those units, 5 were run by the county, 44 by the townships, and 2,392 by the cooperatives. This constituted a gain of eleven-fold over the total volume of local industry built since 1949. The gross output value from January to June, 1958 amounted to 12,180,000 yuan (57.4% was produced in May and June), five times the gross output value of 1957. (It should be noted that the estimate of the gross output value in agriculture of Gaotang County for 1958 was 65,400,000 yuan). According to the statistics at the end of June, 38,200 water-carrying instruments and 78,900 farm implements were produced or repaired during the previous six months. In May and June, the various factories and workshops idahly r^ndde 410 water-carrying in-struments, produced in total 270,756,000 jin of fertilizers of varied kinds, 15,000,000 pieces of brick and tile, 62,200 jin of cement and 35,700 articles of clothing and, in addition, processed 2,550,000 jin of grains and 2,200,000 jin of forage for the members. The Yinji Township was converted into a people's commune on 19 October, 1958. From that date to the end of November of the same year, in only 40 days, 66 units of 25 kinds of local industry were either enlarged or newly created. The members of the commune supported the industrial construction both by their labor and by offering materials. 762 cubic metres of timber, 760,000 pieces of brick, 85,700 pieces of tile, 253 55,670 jin of lime and 822 big earthenware vessels were gathered by and from the members. In addition, 218 units of houses were turned into workshops by their inhabi-tants (Qian Chang-zhao, 1959). 2. Jiao County ^ a. How to resolve the problems in thought? l-itf the beginning, the cadres of the townships and cooperatives were said to have made industry a mystery, and to have neglected the existence of the large number of small-scale handicrafts found everywhere. Some of them thought that to develop local industry was against the best interests of agriculture. In order to resolve this kind of problem thinking, the CCP Committee of the county chose the Yinghai Township as an experimental point. A conference on the spot was held in Yinghai to spread its ex-perience of setting up 85 small factories in 12 days. The cadres were finally convinced of the advantages in developing local industry through debate and demonstration of the Yinghai model (this model will be presented as a separate case-study). b. Raising of capital: It was laid down that the capital of local industry must be raised within the locality of a given industry. The masses of Jiao County were called upon to invest either money or materials. In June, 1958, 5,000,000 yuan was gathered for county industry and 273,000 yuan for township-and-cooperative industry. With regard to raw materials, three methods of collection were adopted: (1) Offices, schools and factories were required to clean up their warehouses. 7.5 tons of waste materials were procured This case-study is based on the report by Zhong-gong Jiao-xian wei-yurin-hu? (the CCP Committee of the Jaio County), \"Fa-zhdh xiang-she gbng-ye de yi-xie zuo-fa\" (A Few Ways of Developing the Township-and-cooperative industry), Peking, DGB, 26 July, 1958?.- Other sources will be noted. 254 in this way. (2) The people of the county were called upon to promote a movement of selling scrap metal. One hundred and seventy tons of scrap-iron was collected. (3) another TOO tons of materials was obtained by exchange for substitute products. c. Technical resource: There were three ways to resolve the problem of technical personnel: (1) The people with some skills were called upon to register themselves. According to incomplete statistics of 17 townships, 1,334 technicians were registered. (2) Old factories were required to train new technicians. For instance, the iron-forge factory of the county was planning to train 140 technicians in this field. (3) 300 people were sent out to learn techniques. d. Wages: The workers' wage was counted by the same work-point system as that of the peasants, except that the former was a little higher than the latter. That is to say, the workers did not earn a money wage, because most of the local industry at the time was run by the cooperatives and were covered by the same accounting system. e. Volume of local industry in J\u00C2\u00AB5ao County: Up to the middle of June, 1958, the 26 townships (and towns) had developed 4,329 factories and workshops, and most of them had gone into production (DZRB, 7 July, 1958). It was reported that those factories and workshops had provided great support for agricultural production. For instance, in Licha Township, because of short-age of labor force and transporting instruments, the original plan of fertilizing each mu of land with 15,000 jin of manure could not be fulfilled. Under such circumstances, the 240 newly established factories and workshops promoted a movement for making small flat carts. In only one week more than 2,000 carts were produced. With these 255 not only was the problem of transporting vehicles resolved, but 3,400 laborers and 3,300 draught animals were freed for other purposes (ibid.). The plan of a leap forward in local industry of Jiao County for 1958 required an increase in gross output value of 498.8% over 1957, and that 54.8% of the gross output value of agriculture be reached. 3. The Yinghai Model 7 The Yinghai Township of Jiao County was a model of models in the leap for-ward of local industry (because the county was already one of the models in Shandong province). This township was composed of 31 natural villages (26 agricultural coopera-tives and one fishery cooperative) with a population of 16,746 representing 3,524 house-holds. It had 35,000 mu of arable land with a favorable man-land ratio of 1:2. To the east is the Yellow Sea and to the west a highway leads to the Jiao County seat, an important station on the Jiao-ji railway. Furthermore, it was easy to gain access from Yinghai to Qingdao - the industrialized port and the second largest city in Shandong -by boat across the Jiaozhou Gulf, a short distance of 25 kilometres. As a result 40% of the peasants of the coastal villages worked in Qingdao in 1958. This resulted in a crucial shortage of labor force in the township. During the years of cooperativization, a few workshops were built up along with the development of sideline production. There had been only two iron-forge furnaces, four carpenter workshops, two sewing services and one stone-cutter workshop as of 1957. The services were so inadequate that people of the township had to go to the county seat for repairs or to replenish the stock of farm implements, and for the purchase of other handicraft products. This case-study is based on Ya Q i , 1958 : 29-31. 256 When the GLF movement started, new requirements in agricultural produc-tion became evident: more than 10,000 mu of land needed to be deeply ploughed, 320 reservoirs were planned, and in order to achieve the production target of 900 jin of yield per mu, each mu of land had to be fertilized with 15,000 |in of manure. How to resolve the contradictions between the requirements of agricultural production and the shortage of labor force, the inefficiency of farm implements and means of transport, had become more and more of an urgent problem. Under the guidance of the general line, the CCP Committee of the township organized meetings for debate. The conclusion reached was that the resolution of the contradictions did not lie in developing agriculture alone, nor in relying on the suppprt-of rhe big industries in the cities, but in developing small-scale local industry. The plan for local industry development had been revised four times. Finally, during the 12 days from 21 April to 3rd May, 1958, 85 factories and workshops were set up. Capital, personnel, equipment, materials all in all were solved by \"self-reliance\" (zi-li geng-sheng). The details are given as follows: a. Capital and material resources: A movement to support local industry by investing money and materials was launched. The cadres of the township and 54 elementary school teachers together invested 6,000 yuan (500 yuan from the chief of the township). The fishery cooperative alone invested 10,000 yuan. The scrap iron invested by the masses was worth 3,000 yuan. An old woman even offered her preciously conserved candle-' sticks and copper coins more than one hundred years old. b. Personnel: Technicians and skilled workers were required to register. In a short span of time, 240 workers in a variety of areas such as iron-forges, carpentry, elect-ricity, machine tool and rubber had been registered. c. Wages: The salary scale in the township industry was lower than in the state fac-tories, but higher than in cooperative industry, and than the income of the peasants. The wage of a worker varied between 28 and 36 yuan; that of an apprentice between 10 and 20 yuan. The salaries of the Party secretary, director of the factory, and account-ant were the same: 31 yuan. Personnel were under contract and still kept their coopera-tive or commune membership. Their wages, after the necessary costs of living, had to be invested in the cooperatives. The wages of the workers in the cooperative industry were in general paid with work-points, a little higher than or equal to a peasant's in-come. The value of work-points was dependent on the yearly agricultural production. d. Factory plants: The problem of factory plants was resolved principally by transform-ing existing offices or houses. For instance, the iron-forge and carpentry factory were installed in the newly-built theatre of the Haizhuang'Cooperative in which no theatrical performance had ever been presented. Sometimes the workers themselves built their plants. One carpentry plant was built in 10 days by its 13 workers assisted by members of the cooperative. e. Equipment: No important equipment was available. The tools were provided by the workers themselves. f. Variety of factories and workshops: The 243 factories and workshops of the Yinghai Township could be classified in three categories: (1) those which directly served agricul-tural production such as iron-forge, carpentry, fertilizer and cement; (2) those which served the members' livelihood such as brick kiln, the manufacture of shoes and cloth-ing; and (3) those which produced merchandise for export, such as sea salt, paper and handicraft goods. 258 g. Scale: The type of factories and workshops still resembled the handicraft type on a small scale. The largest, such as salt production, had 20-30 workers, whereas the smallest had only 3-5 workers. For instance, the iron-forge and carpentry factory had a work force of 32 people: 1 Party secretary, 1 director, 1 accountant and 29 workers divided into two groups: iron-forge and carpentry. The three leading cadres also participated in manual work. The equipment and tools consisted of one steam engine, one drilling machine, one six-foot machine tool, one steel mill, three furnaces, three pairs of pliers, and small tools provided by the workers. The property was valued at 5,971 yuan. The investment totalled 7,000 yuan with which the steam engine and steel mill were purchased, and with which six ^workshops were built. The factory could produce and repair small farm implements. It could also mount and repair bicycles, carts and \u00E2\u0080\u00A2steam engines. In two months, the factory produced 1,520 farm implements and transport instruments of 13 kinds with a total value of 2,016 yuan, hi; Summary: The experience of Yinghai Township provided the development of local industry with the following advantages: (1) The small scale local industry could supply more efficient farm implements in time for seasonal tasks to be fulfilled. (2) It could produce the kind and quantity in accordance with the need. The price was only one-third of the market price. (3) It could gradually improve farm implements and create favorable conditions for the mechanization of agriculture. (4) When the members pur-chased or repaired farm implements, they did not require money; they could pay with work-points. (5) The service factories such as manufacturers of clothing and shoes could liberate a large part of the female labor force. Yinghai's plan for development of local industry for 1958 was to build 669 factories and workshops in order to \"meek the increasing requirements of agricultural 259 production.' It was hoped that the gross output value of local industry would reach 93.29% of that of agriculture in 1958. 4. Liaocheng Special District Having presented case-studies at the county and township levels, I will now turn to a case at a higher level, namely, the special district. Shandong was divided into eight special districts in 1958, each of which was composed of 1 \u00E2\u0080\u009414 counties (and municipalities). Liaocheng was at the west boundary of Shandong and was composed of ten counties and two municipalities. One of its counties was Gaotang, the model in the development of local industry at the time. Liaocheng Special District was thus called a \"flag\" in the development of local industry in Shandong Province (RMRB, 9 January, 1959). a. Leadership in the movement: \"Politics in command\" was emphasized during the movement of greatly develop-ing the county-and-commune industry. In Liaocheng Special District, at every echelon, it was always the first secretary of the CCP who took command, grasping agriculture by one hand and industry by the other (GRRB, 23 December, 1958). b. Large scale propaganda: Every county of Liaocheng Special District had made efforts in spreading prop-aganda for developing local industry. The principal slogan was \"learning from Gaotang\" (xue Gao-tang). The common approaches were: broadcast, telephone meetings, mass meetings of one thousand and ten thousand people (qian-ren hui, wan-ren hui), meeting of red-and-expert activists (hong-zhuan ji-ji feh-zi da-hui), army of educational prop-aganda of communism (gong-chan zhu-yi jiao-yu xuan-chuan dd-juh) and blackboard posters, big character posters. It was said that there were more than 300,000 people 260 listening to the broadcast organized by Fan County (Peking DGB, 13 December, 1958). c. Conference on the spot (xian-chang hui-yi): An on the spot conference in Gaotang County was held at the end of November, 1958 for the purpose of setting up the model of Gaotang and learning from its experience (GRRB, 23 December, 1958). d. Mass support: Because of large-scale propaganda, an upsurge of mass support in developing local industry took place just after the on the spot conference in Gaotang. Incomplete statistics of the 12 counties and municipalities show that the masses transformed 36,100 units of their houses for the use of local industry, offered 280,000 cubic metres of timber, 36,000,000 pieces of brick and 57,000 earthenware vessels. Capital invested by the masses of Liaocheng, linquing and Guan counties amounted to 8,800,000 yuan (Peking DGB, 13 December, 1958). e. Volume of local industry at the end of 1958: During the two weeks from 25 November to 10 December, 1958, 14,846 factories were created or enlarged (13,000 newly created) of a great variety such as mechanical industry, food-grain processing, clothing manufacture, shoes and hat manu-facture, food, oil pressing, paper, textiles, glass and construction materials (GRRB, 23 December, 1958). The number of workers increased from 272,700 at the end of October to 397,000 at the beginning of December, 1958 (Peking DGB, 13 December, 1958). f. Capacity of local industry/ at the end of 1958: During 20 days at the end of 1958, the county-and-commune industry of Liao-cheng Special District produced 459,200 iron tools, 766,100 wooden tools, 9,740,000 261 pieces of brick, 2,893,000 jin of wheat flour, 575,000 suits of clothes (GRRB, 23 December, 1958), and 6,300,000,000 jin of rudimentary fertilizers (RMRB, 9 January, 2959). 5. Xiyou People's Commune in Ye County Neither Xiyou Township nor Ye County was a model during the movement for developing local industry in 1958. However, the Xiyou People's Commune directed by the famous national activist Xu Jian-chun was a model in agriculture in 1959. As early as 1956, when Xu Jian-chun was the director of a collective farm, it was said that her farm was specially aided by the CCP Committee of Ye County to build a candy factory which brought a net gain of 50 yuan daily in order to keep both her and her farm as advanced figures (ZGQNB, 19 November, 1956). That is why when the Xiyou People's Commune wh'ichishe headed became a model in agriculture, the industry run by the commune was also an object of interest. Xiyou People's Commune was composed of 35 natural villages (21 agricultural cooperatives and one fishery cooperative before the formation of the commune) with 10,000 households and a population of 39,170 (RMRB, 2 May, 1959). Before the for-mation of the commune, {local industry in Xiyou Township was not well developed. There were only a candy factory and a few iron-forge and carpentry workshops. The only products were smajl farm implements. The take-off of local industry rather took place after August, 1958 when the commune was formed. With the larger funds handled by the commune, 2 motors, 6 lathes and 5 textiillie machines were purchased. With the larger labor force at the disposition of the commune, 500 youths who had parti-cipated in the iron-furnace movement were drawn from the production brigades to serve the commune industry. 262 Within half a year, 80 factories and workshops were either built or enlarged. The most important were those manufacturing mechanical goods, fertilizer, clothing and textiles (ZGQNB, 9 October, 1959). The mechanical factory hired 150 permanent workers (ZGQNB, 19 August, 1959). During one year, 600 large farm implements such as corn huskers, drills, mechanical mills, wind-power water-wheels;, 7,800 small farm implements, 2,296 tons of rudimentary fertilizers and other consumer goods were produced (ZGQNB, 9 October, 1959l). Considerable capital was accumulated as well by the com-mune industry. The gross output value of industry amounted to 680,000 yuan in 1958, an increase of 41.8% over 1957 (RMRB, 2 May, 1959). From January to August, 1959, the four largest manufacturers of mechanical goods and textiles had a net gain of 10,000 yuan (ZGQNB, 9 October, 1959). Ill THE EBBING OF LOCAL INDUSTRY (1960-1962) A . New Contradictions versus old contradictions As has been mentioned, the movement of greatly developing local industry was launched for the purpose of removing the three contradictions in agricultural production, namely, the shortage of labor force, the lack of fertilizer and the backwardness of farm implements. According to Mao's dialectical approach to analysis of both natural and social phenomena, contradictions are viewed as the fundamental causes of the former's development (Mao, 1967:311-347). Theoretically speaking, when old contradictions are resolved new contradictions come into being, and in this way a thing (no matter whether it is a matter or a social phenomenon) develops towards a higher stage. This constituted the basis of Mao's dialectical thinking as well as the theoretical foundation 263 of the CCP's policy-making, especially during the period of GLF. Under the influence of Mao's dialectical thinking, the movement of developing local industry was analyti-cally considered as one - maybe the only - correct measure for removing the contradic-tions in agricultural production and raising it to a higher developmental stage. Today, when we look back at the events which really took place at the time, we still cannot say that the basic analysis was wrong. But the fact that the consequences were not exactly what had been expected shows that something was wrong either with the policy-making, or with the implementation of the policy. Hereafter I will try to provide a brief analysis in explanation of the change of policy vis-a-vis the development of local industry from 1960 onward. 1. Competition for the Labor Force Between Local Industry and Agriculture If local industry was to be seen as a means of resolving the shortage of labor force in agricultural production, a minute calculation in the matter of increase in labor force was necessary. Two factors have to be taken into account for such a calculation: one is quantitative increase of manpower, the other is time. For instance, in a given commune, first the industry will help to resolve the shortage of labor force in agriculture only if the products of the industry create an economy of manpower greater than that which is absorbed by industry. Secondly, industry will help only upon the condition that its products can immediately, or in a short time, be transformed into manpower. Otherwise, not only will local industry not lend any support to the resolution of short-age of manpower in agriculture, but the former will become a keen competitor of the latter in the utilization of labor force. That is why there must be some limits to the development of local industry. 264 The mass movement is one means which has been used most frequently by the Chinese communists to fulfill their goals since the Yan'an period. Long experi-ence shows that when mass is added to movement, it can be characterized by a fanaticism which makes people, the leaders and the led, spare no efforts to push the movement forward. The fear of not being able to fulfill the tasks usually pushed people into going far beyond the limits. It has never been possible to keep just balance in a mass move-ment. This was also the case with the movement of developing local industry (or county-and-commune industry) in 1958-1959. As we have seen, the number of workers in local industry suddenly increased by 120,000 in only one month (from 272,700 at the end of October to 397,000 at the beginning of December 1958) in Liaocheng Special District (Peking DGB, 13 December, 1958). Three causes made the number of workers increase at such a pace. First, the number of factories and workshops was rapidly increased. Second, the pay of workers was better than that of peasants. Third, the peasants were encouraged by the local o cadres to become workers during the upsurge of the movement. When so many pea-sants (often the best ones) left the fields to enter industry, it is not difficult to imagine that the agricultural labor force, which was said to be in short supply, was greatly affected by the movement. In other words, the unbalanced development of local industry absorbed a much larger manpower than that which could be economized in agriculture by the contribution of this local industry. 8 The slogan at the time was \"when there is work in the factory we work in the factory, when there is no work in the factory we work in the fields.\" It is obvious that industry took precedence over agriculture. 265 2. Waste of Capital Investment The capital available for investing in local industry was gathered entirely from the masses and local cadres. The capital consisted of both money and materials. During the movement, to invest either money or materials was almost compulsory under political pressures. In general, the cadres invested money, whereas the masses usually invested materials instead. For instance, in the Yinghai Township, the 30 cadres and 54 elementary school teachers invested 6,000 yuan (Ya Q i , 1958), being more than 70 yuan each. It should be noted that 70 yuan was almost half the yearly income of a peasant in 1958, and the whole year's income from the sideline production of a household. It corresponded to the savings of a peasant for several years. The available cash of both the cadres and the masses was soon exhausted, and no further investment would be made. Moreover, because only a part of the newly created factories and workshops could keep functioning and have some gains, most capital invested disap-peared with the breakdown of the factories. This caused discontent among a large range of people. As for capital in the form of materials, it was recognized by the press that the waste was considerable. For example, in the Yinghai Township again, amongst the scrap metal valued at 120 yuan invested by the masses were found two antique candle-sticks, three jin of copper coins and 38 copper washing basins in perfect con-dition (ibid.). 3. Quantitative Pursuit of Local Industry Under the pressures of the GLF in general and the movement of developing local industry in particular, the local cadres could not help but sacrifice quality to quantity in setting up as many factories and workshops as possible in order to catch 266 up with the number of the models and to match the requirement of plans at every echelon. Gaotang County built 1,300 factories and workshops in 9 days (DZRB, 7 July, 1958). To catch up with Gaotang, Teng County, for instance, built 20,977 factories and work-shops in three months (DZRB, 16 August, 1958). In an article published in September, 1958, the director of the Bureau of Industry of the CCP Committee in Shandong expressed his hope of seeing the realization of a plan of 500,000 units of local industry in the province with 5,000 in each county (Lai Ke-ke, 1958). The result was that 828,990 were built before 1959 (RMRB, 9 January, 1959). It is not surprising that Rene Dumont commented on this by saying: \"Such numbers make us doubt the importance of factories of so many kinds and so quickly built by so few workers! \" (Dumont, 1965 : 68). Just as Ya Qi reported in his article on the Yinghai experience, .'three or.four peasants brought a few pincers or hammers into a shed and Presto! a factory is built! (Ya Q i , 1958). Most of these kinds of factories and workshops which could not produce anything of value resulted in a squandering of energy and time at the expense of agricultural production. 4, Multiple Movements Dispersing Human Force The upsurge of local industry was not the only movement which competed with agriculture. During the GLF, the famous campaign of small blast furnaces (in the cities they were called, in English, \"backyard blast furnaces\") was also pushed to its extremity under the slogan of \"overtaking Britain in fifteen years\". It was reported that in September, 1958, the very month of the spread of the commune movement, the campaign of small blast furnaces reached its peak with an iron-and-steel army of 1,400,000 people in Shandong Province fighting night and day to refine steel (DZRB, 9 September, 1958). In Laiwu county alone, 138,000 blast furnaces were built, an 267 average of one furnace per household (DZRB, 29 September, 1958). It was hardly possible for the masses or the cadres to direct their energies to or concentrate their attention on so many things at a time. Consequently, the three competitive movements jeopardized each other. 5. Confusion of Leadership in the Industrial Enterprises During the GLF, the administrative and managerial structure in industry was dismantled because of over-emphasis on \"mass line\" and on \"politics in command\". On the one hand workers were called to participate in direction and on the other the Party secretary, a red but usually not an expert, started to directly handle management. The Liang-can yi gai (two participations: participation of cadres in labor and partici-pation of workers in direction, and one correction: correcting the old regulations in industrial enterprises) became the fashionable slogan at the time. A Chinese writer said in an article on the GLF: In the industrial production of today, there exist, no doubt, some shortcomings such as the confusion in both administrat-ive and productive managements. In some industrial and mineral enterprises, it has become a situation of no system, no order, no discipline and no government. The system of responsibility of the director under the leadership of the Party secretary has not been effectively implemented in many enterprises... The waste of material is serious, the maintain-ing of equipment is neglected, the productivity decreases, the quality of products is low, the cost of production is high and the transport cannot meet the need of industrial develop-ment... (Deng Chen-oc'i/, 1959). The big industry in the cities had been expected to lend some.support to local industry, at least in the technical sphere. Since most of the industrial enter-prises found themselves in a confused situation, they could consequently give little help . . \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 .-, dnoughrt,ftod water conservancy is considered as a complete failure. 287 areas in Shandong was already considerable.) Obviously, afforestation was needed. However, unless combined with an effective system of water conservancy, both appli-cation of fertilizer and afforestation could not be appropriately effected. This is another reason why construction of water conservancy became an urgent task in the fifties and sixties. B. Construction by the Masses 1. Construction of Water Conservancy Before the Establishment of the People's Communes Since 1951 in China as a whole there had been an anti-drought campaign launched somewhere almost every year. Even if there was no drought during the year, the winter and spring were usually dedicated to some kind of water conservancy pro-jects. It was reported that in Shandong *1>0O,OOO irrigation wells were sunk in 1951, 200,000 in the spring of 1952 (Carin, 1963 : 24), and 160,000 in 1955 (ibid. : 45). No information is available for other years. However, one source gives the total number of wells in Shandong as 2,110,000 by 1955 (Shandong Sheng Tong-ji Ju, 1956). It seems that a certain number of wells were sunk every/year. In addition to wells, in the year 1955, 245 small-scale dams, 737 irrigation cannals and more than 5,000 reservoirs were built((ibid.). If a drought occurred, a substantial amount of labor was committed to the construction of wells and other kinds of water conservancy. In 1958, during the summer drought, a total of 15,000,000 man-days was utilized daily in Shandong in the campaign of anti-seenras.acneeessariily organizational restructure to cope with the large-scale construction of water conservancy. The peasants in the newly established communes all over the country are demonstrating even greater enthusiasm in produc-tion. They are.. .building irrigation projects... The people's communes, which have far greater manpower and financial re-sources and a higher level of collectivization than agricultural producer cooperatives, have displayed their advantages from the outset of their operations (quoted by Carin : 85). With the greater manpower and financial resources handled by the communes, larger scale water conservancy was made possible for the masses to undertake themselves without state investment. At present, a new change has emerged, under which people's communes have been set up practically throughout the country-side/ Compared with individual agricultural economy, agricul-tural coooerativization is far more superior; yet people's com-munes are still superior to agricultural cooperatives. Formerly agricultural cooperatives could undertake comparatively small water conservancy projects covering several hundred or several thousand of mu of land, nowadays people's communes can handle wafer conservancy construction covering tens and hundreds of thousands of mu; formerly agricultural cooperatives could resist comparatively small floods and droughts, now people's communes have the strength to resist much larger floods and droughts; formerly water conservancy projects undertaken by agricultural cooperatives were centered on resisting drought and and fighting water-logging, now if is possible for people's communes to draw up overall plans for irrigation, water-logging prevention... (RMRB Editorial, 14 October, 1958). 290 The winter of 1958 was an extremely busy season for the peasants. The estab-lishment of the people's communes, the movement of developing local industry, the blast furnace campaign and the campaign of water conservancy all came together. They were all of an urgent nature. All required full participation of the peasants who had, as human beings, only limited time and energy. In consequence, all the movements and campaigns werejjeopardized by keen competition between them. The disorder of the commune movement, the feverish advance of the blast furnaces campaign, and the move-ment of developing local industry, have already been discussed in previous chapters. Now it has to be noted that the campaign of water conservancy which was launched in the winter of 1958 with the intention of pushing it on a larger scale by relying on the greater disposition of the people's commune was far from fulfilling its objective. It was reported that in Shandong, the area of wheat fields under irrigation totalled only little more than 30 percent of the wheat acreage, whereas in the corresponding period of 1957 53.4% of the wheat fields were reported to have been irrigated (Carin, 1963 : 89), probably because of the competition from all these movements. 1959 was a bad year in Shandong because the drought was so serious that at its worst point, 73,070,000 mu of crops were damaged (ibid. : 95). Shandong was only one of 17 provinces hit by that unprecedented drought. When most of the other affected provinces began to have rainfall in August, the drought in Shandong was lessened in intensity or ended in very few places only (ibid.). The painful experience of the drought of 1959 warned the masses as well as the state to pay more attention to the construction of water conservancy. The RMRB declared that the struggle against the natural calamities in 1959 greatly inspired the masses to develop greater ambition to reform nature and that a large-scale mass water 291 conservancy construction should be carried out this winter (1959} and next spring \u00C2\u00A3l960) (RMRB, 7 September, 1959). The labor force required in building water conservancy projects was expected to reach approximately 10 percent of the rural labor force in 1960. But, as water conservancy projects have a strong seasonal character, the labor force had to be concentrated within 80-120 days during the winter and spring. The number of laborers used during this period was expected to reach 20 to 40 percent of the total number of rural laborers depending on the magnitude of the works (Carin, 1963 : 91). In Shandong, where no large or medium-sized projects were built before 1958, over 21,000 kilometres of ditches for irrigation purposes were dug (ibid. : 101), 139 large and medium reservoirs were under construction, and more than 94,000 small re-servoirs, ponds and canals were completed, and 14,100 wells were built or repaired by the commune in 1959 (ibid. : 106). In 1960, Shandong was, as had happened before, one of the areas worst hit by the drought. The DGB of Hong Kong reported: The provinces hit in wide areas by the drought were Hobei, Honan, Shandong and Shanxi. It is estimated that over 60 percent of the cultivated land in the four provinces fell victim to natural calamities with the longest spell of drought lasting for six or seven months. In some areas, the dry spells lasted for more than one year. At the most serious stages of drought in spring and autumn this year, there was no water in eight of the 12 principal rivers in Shandong Province (Hong Kong DGB, 30 December, 1960). This serious drought resulted in a mobilization of about 13,580,000 persons in Shandong in the struggle against drought for the protection of the wheat crop (XHDX, 19 April, 1960). Thanks to the completed works of wafer conservancy, the peasants of the province succeeded in bringing water to 40,000,000 mu of wheat in the tilling 292 stage (ibid., 9 March, 1960). Since the construction of water conservancy absorbed so many laborers as to sometimes hinder the tasks in the fields, a halt seems to have been put to the campaign of wafer conservancy construction in the winter of 1960. This was witnessed by the RMRB: q This winter\u00C2\u00A3l960) , since rural areas will spend much less manpower on such construction tasks as building water con-servancy works and levelling farmland as compared with the previous two years, more manpower can be devoted to agri-cultural and subsidiary production (RMRB, 14 November, 1960). But in the winter of 1960, there was still very little snow and rain in all parts of Shan-dong, as well as in other provinces in North China. With the exception of some counties and communes in three special districts and municipalities of Qingdao, Yantai and Changwei, in the other six special districts and municipalities drought to varying extent has emerged. In some counties and communes in Liaochengg- Special District and Jinan Munici-pality where the drought situation is most serious, the water content of the soil is less than 10 percent (RMRB, 3 March, 1961). In 1961 the four provinces of Shandong, Honan, Hobei and Shanxi in North China were menaced by serious drought for the third year in succession. In such a situ-ation, the Chinese government was forced to stress renewal of water conservancy con-struction (cf. Carin, 1963 : 120-122). The climate became favorable only in the winter of 1961 in North China (see Table 9.1). However, the construction of water conservancy has since then been considered as one of the most crucial tasks in agricultural production, especially for a province so vulnerable to climatic changes as Shandong. The halt to the release of statistics in China during 1960-1961, and since then, makes research for the period between 1961 and 1965 difficult. However, some occasional information gives indications that the construction of water conservancy constituted 293 during this period a regular task in the winter and spring when agricultural work was not heavy. The kind of water conservancy which was emphasized varied in accordance with the physical conditions of each area. For instance, in the river basins dams were constructed, whereas in the plains wells were sunk as the main water sources. In the mountainous areas, reservoirs and pumping stations were the most crucial. The Yi River was one of the most destructive rivers in the history of Shandong with frequent changes of its main course. Up to 1962 fourteen dams had been built along the course of this river in three counties, Yishui, Yinan and Linyi (ZGXW, 2 March, 1962). To the west of the Yi River basin is Meng Mountain which was one of the poorest mountainous areas in Shandong. In the total area of 2,140,000 mu of Mengyin County, the arable land amounted only to 590,000 mu toTawljich 540,000 mu was piecemeal and in hilly land. During the winter of 1964 and the spring of 1965, 100,000 laborers in the county were mobilized in water conservancy projects and field levelling. More than 100 reservoirs, ponds and pumping stations were constructed and more than 50,000 mu of hilly land was improved (ibid., II June, 1965). In 1963-1964, the production brigades which had low output in agricultural production in the nine special districts of the province found that one of the causes of low output was the soil salinization and alkalization in the water-logged areas. The emphasis was thus placed on the improvement of soil conditions. In Qiho County alone, even the production brigades which were in difficulty dug 1,600 ditches to shift 80,000 mu of water-logged land into good land. In the meantime, the sinking and repairing of 1,000 new and old wells brought the area under irrigation from 20,000 mu to 30,000 mu. The Yuzhuang Brigade; Biiaingguantun People's Commune, Gaotang County had improved 150 mu of alkaline land and 300 mu of water-logged land. In the whole province, the 294 brigades in difficulties had improved a total of more than 4,000,000 mu of water-logged, alkaline and sandy land in 1962-1963. It resulted in raising the output in 80% of these brigades in difficulties to the average level (XHDX, 5 January, 1964). C . Efforts of the State The policy of construction of water conservancy was to mobilize the masses in order to make full use of labor instead of capital investment. This policy was declared through one editorial of the RMRB: We should firmly implement the \"three primary\" policy, that is, the water conservancy projects should be primarily designed to store water, should be primarily of a small scale, and should be built primarily by the people themselves... We can only expect to solve manpower, material, financial and technical problems by fully mobilizing and relying on the masses (1 November, 1959). However, this does not mean that the state made no effort in the construction of water conservancy, or that it did not invest in it at al l . On the contrary, while the masses were busy with the small-scale works, the state concentrated its efforts on large works, especially in some strategic points that would benefit a large area such as an irrigation system, and thus needed more materials and labor, larger financial resources, and more complex techniques. Up to 1962, there were eight irrigation systems constructed o in North China, o'fawhich three were partially or entirely in Shandong. The eight irrigation systems are North Jiangsu, Bi-Shi-hang (Carin mistook as Shi \u00E2\u0080\u0094 bi-hang), Baisha, People's Victory, Sanyizhai People's Victory, East Wind, Dayuzhang and Weishan (see Carin, 1963 : 129-158). 295 1. Sanyizhai People's Victory Irrigation System4 The construction of this project started in March, 1958. It was anticipated that this irrigation system would be the biggest in China. 220,000 workers were emp-loyed in the construction. The project consisted of a main trunk canal connected with the Yellow River in Lankao County of Honan Province, small irrigation canals, and a sluice gate 72 metres long to regulate the flow from the Yellow River (Carin, 1963 : 145-146). The construction was completed in August of the same year. It was said that this system could bring the waters from the Yellow River to 9,000,000 mu of parched land in the adjoining Honan and Shandong provinces (DZRB, 16 August, 1958). It could also supply water for the Wanfu River leading to eastern Shandong (ibid.). 2. Dayuzhang Irrigation System Construction of this system began in October 1956 and was completed in 1958 (Carin, 1963 : 147). The objective and capacity of this project can be seen in the follow-ing report: The irrigated area covered by the water system spreads over the plains of Guangrao and Boxing counties near the seacoast in Shandong Province where the land has turned saline and alkaline, due to saline underground water. Part of the area now to be irri-gated, covering 93,000 hectares has been wasteland for a long time because of its heavy saline and alkaline content. More than half a million people in these two counties have had to drink salty water all the year round. The new irrigation system will not only bring the water of the Yellow River to end drought, but will also gradually wash away the saline and alkaline content of the land and increase its output. The 93,000 hectares of wasteland will be made arable and reclaimed. Newly built drainage canals will relieve the area of the menace of water-logging in the rainy season... Irrigation canals and drainage ditches, totalling Carin gives the name as \"Sanyizhai People's Leap Forward\", but the DZRB, the chief local newspaper in Shandong called it \"Sanyizhai People's Victory\". I follow the latter. 296 22,000 kilometres in length, have been built in addition to numerous sluice gates, bridges and culverts. A total of 107 million cubic metres of earthwork was involved (quoted by Carin, 1963 : 147). 3. Weishan Irrigation System This irrigation system started in May, 1958, and was completed in December of 1959 (ibid. : 148-149). The system consisted of a trunk canal running from the main course of the Yellow River at Dong'a County to link up with the Grand Canal. A big reservoir was to be built in Dong'a County. The whole irrigation system was expected to bring the irrigated area up to 1.5 million hectares and to control the flow along the lower reaches of the Yellow River so that the menace of spring ice flow and summer torrents might be eliminated (ibid.). During the serious drought spell in 1958 it was reported that the Weishan Irriga-tion System had played a crucial role even before its completion: Four ;trunk canals of the Weishan Irrigation Project have been completed, which cut across seven counties and the cities of Liaocheng, Shi ping, Gaotang, Xiajin, Pingyuan, Linqing and Qiho. Wherever the trunk canals go, the people's communes in various counties have excavated more than 7,800 large and small canals, and constructed more than 10,000 control gates and irri-gation gates, scattered in various fields like blood vessels. The result is that 3,600,000 mu of farm land is now automatically irri-gated, and another 1,290,000 mu is partially automatically irrigated with water brought by watercarts. In places automatically irrigated, once the gate is open, the water of the Yellow River then flows to the foot of the farm (quoted by Carin, 1963 : 149). 297 II; CONSTRUCTION OF WATER CONSERVANCY IN THREE PRODUCTION BRIGADES OF THE GUFENGTAI PEOPLE'S COMMUNE, YISHUI COUNTY : A CASE STUDY O N LABOR ACCUMULATION 5 In the previous chapters I have mentioned that one method used successfully by the Chinese for economic development is to turn labor into capital. Hereafter I will illustrate this method by a concrete example in water conservancy and show the relation-ship between labor and capital, on the one hand, and the significance of labor accumu-lation in the Chinese experience of rural economic development on the other. But before making the presentation it is necessary to give a definition of the term \"labor accumula-tion\" in the framework of the development of Chinese rural economy. Labor accumula-tion can in general mean capital in the form of reserve funds and/or in the form of collective property accumulated by labor. However, a particular usage in some context means an extra capital accumulated entirely by labor beyond the regular labor utilization in agriculture. In other words, the labor accumulation in some particular context, such as in this study, means to turn the underemployed labor into capital by means of non-agricultural activities. A . Construction of Water Conservancy and Field Works in Three Production Brigades (Zhangjiarongren, Shagou and Xiwahgzhuahg) The natural conditions for the three brigades were not good. Eighty percent of the land of the Zhangjiarongren Brigade consisted of water-logged fields, whereas 70-80 percent of the land of both Shagou Brigade and Xiwangzhuang Brigade was hilly fields where losses of water and soil were serious. Up to the year of the establishment of the ; 5 ^pThis.st^ dyjJjSJpased on the report by Shandong sheng Jing-ji Yan-jiu-suo Nong-ye-jing\u00E2\u0080\u0094ji-zu (the Group of Agricultural Economy of the Economic Research Institute of Shandong Province), J?ng-j? Yan-jiu Yue-kan (The Economic Research Monthly), No. 107, 20 September, 1965 : 1-13. 298 people's communes, the grain output in the three brigades had been low and unstable, varying from 150 to 250 jin per mu. Changes of natural conditions in the three brigades started after the agricultural collectivization, but were intensified after 1958 when the commune system was introduced. These changes were brought about mainly by the construction of water conservancy, field works and afforestation. The results of these basic constructions between 1958 and 1964 in the three brigades can be seen in Tables 9.2 and 9.3 over. The construction of water conservancy could not be effective without being combined with field works and afforestation. The basic construction made by the three brigades had laid the foundation of their irrigation systems. By 1964, the acreage under irrigation of Zhangjiarongren, Shagou and Xiwangzhuang reached, respectively, 1,200 mu (61.6% of the total cultivated land), 1,800 (41.4%) and 1,100 (34.7%). B. Utilization of Underemployed Labor Force In the countryside, the labor force suffered from both shortage and underemploy-ment, in shortage during the busy seasons and underemployment during the leisure seasons, i.e., the winter and part of spring of each year. The water conservancy and other basic construction used to be done during the winter and spring by utilizing the underemployed labor force. However, this underemployed labor was not unlimited. In order not to < hamper the agricultural production and sideline production, the labor force available to basic construction could not be beyond the residual of the total available labor force in a productive unit after the needsoof the main productive activities had been met. There-fore, the potentiality of the labor force in a productive unit and the level of labor utiliza-tion in production would be the two determinants of the extent of this underemployed labor Table 9.2 Construction of Water Conservancy reservoirs pond embank-ments ponds ditches (metres) river harn-essing (metres) river embank-ments (metres) utilization of river for irrigation Zhangjia-rongren 2 1 6,000 1,500 1,500 1 Shagou 9 28 7 6,250 2,200 Xiwang-zhuang 3 2 7,000 3,500 Table 9.3 Construction of Field Works an d Afforestation (unit: mu) \"three-in-terraced tifi'elds * \u00E2\u0080\u00A2one\" deeply turned and levelled fields soi bHfmpnov.i fields! ds ed;d regularized total field fiellds:;as works afforesta-tion Zhangjia-rongren 250 800 870 1,416 3,336 260 Shagou Xiwang-zhuang 1,500 681 1,565 1^200 800 50 3,865 1,391 2,200 3,150 * \"Three-in-one\" means the combination of three field works: embankment, deeply turned and levelled, and drainage ditches. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2\u00C2\u00BBo NO 300 force which can be used for basic construction works. The extent of the underemployed labor force available to the basic construction should vary from one place to another according to the different natural conditions and the level of development of production in each place. The success in basic construction depended to a large extent upon the maximized utilization of the underemployed labor force within the extent limited by both the potentiality of available labor force and the level of production in a given productive unit. What was done in the three brigades in this connection provides a relative successful model based on a rational distribution of labor force. The actual situation of the labor force for 1964 in the three brigades is shown in Table 9.4. Table 9.4 Population, labor force and cultivated acreage in the three brigades in 1964 cultivated acreage (-mu) Population Labor force total acreage per capita per laborer Zhangjia- 860 356 1,715 2 4.8 rongren Shagou 2,428 750 4,344 1.8 5.8 Xiwang-zhuang 1,280 563 3,165 2.5 5.6 From 1961 to 1964 the amount of labor used in production in the three brigades increased year by year. In the meantime, the amount of labor used in basic construction increased at the same rate except for Shagou Brigade for the years 1962 and 1963 (see Table ,9.5 over). iTable 9,'S Labor Utilization in Production and Basic Construction from 1961 to 1964 in the Three Brigades Unit: Labor-day 1961 7962\" 7963\" 1964 amount amount % of the lost year amount % o f the last year amount % of the % o f last year 1961 Zhang jia- Production 38,890 41,915 rongren Basic construction 9,610 11,230 108 117 43,029 11,660 103 104 48,385 18,835 112 162 125 195 Shag ou Production 91,470 103,000 Basic construction 35,000 300130 113 86 126,135 22,215 123 73 131,313 53,030 104 239 144 152 Xiwang- Production 52,497 55,354 zhuang Basic construction 14,140 15,349 105 109 86,260 15,380 156 100 101,565 27,100 118 178 194 192 CO o 302 Table 9.5 shows thai- the level of production in the three brigades continued to rise during the years 1961-1964 and, at the same time, the scale of basic construc-tion was increasingly enlarged. During the four years, the total amount of labor utiliza-tion in the three brigades increased respectively from 48,500, 126,470 and 66,637 to 67,220, 184,343 and 128,665 labor days. The increased percentages are respectively 39%, 45.7% and 93%. Where did this increased labor come from? There were two sources: natural increase of the labor force and utilization of underemployed labor. During the four years the labor force in the three brigades naturally increased respectively 3.2%, 12% and 10%. Therefore, the major part of the increased labor force was not provided by natural increase, but by the utilization of underemployed labor. Because production required an increasing amount of labor force year by year, competition was inevitable between production (mainly agricultural production) and'bbsrecconstructiqnfor the available underemployed labor. Although agricultural production must take precedence over other sectors in labor utilization, the basic construction could not be neglected - it being the funddmental effective means of rais-ing the agricultural output. Therefore, a balanced distribution of labor force between the sector of production and that of basic construction was necessary. When many other units had suffered from the disproportional distribution of labor force among various sectors, the proportion of distribution of labor force between the sector of production and that of basic construction in the three brigades furnished a successful model for the agricultural development in the communes. The following table will show this proportion of labor distribution: 303 Table 9.6 Labor Distribution in the Three Brigades for 1961-1964 1961 1962 1963 1964 Zhangjia- Total amount of rongren labor-days 48,48 .^500 53,145 54,689 67,220 oL for production 79'52 2 78.9 78.7 72 \u00C2\u00B0 for basic const. 7920.8 21. . I 2 1 . 3 28 Total amount of 20 8 T~r~ ;...r. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 ~^~-\u00E2\u0080\u009E Shagou labor-days 126,470 133,130 148,350 184,343 for production 72.3 77.4 85 71.2 \u00C2\u00B0 for basic const. 27.7 22.6 15 28.8 Total amount of X i w c m g _ labor-days 66,637 70,703 101,640 128,665 zhuang n , for production 78.8 78.3 85 78.9 /ufor basic const. 2~T72 iTj B 2171 It can be seen that the labor force used in the basic construction in the three brigades varied between 20%-30% of the total amount of labor utilization. Sometimes it was less than 20%, but it never exceeded 30%. This proportion of labor force could be used in the basic construction only upon the condition that the underemployed labor force was fully extracted out during the leisure seasons. The maximized utilization of underemployed labor relies on the effective organization of the labor force. In the three brigades labor used for the basic construction was organized in two forms: mass shock teams and special task teams. Responsibility for the completion of the main body of basic construction rested with the mass shock teams during the winter time (usually concentrated in 100-120 days between the end of September and the middle of February). The special task teams were responsible only for the maintenance 304 of the works and technique services. Because the special task teams needed a permanent labor force withdrawn from the agricultural production, it could not be large. The proportion of special task teams to the total labor force in the three brigades was res-pectively 4 .2%, 7.8% and 3.6%. This labor force of the special task teams had to be poured into agricultural production during the height of the busy seasons. Therefore, it can be said that more than 15% of the 20-30% of the total labor force was the result of concentrated use of underemployed labor during leisure seasons. In order to maximize utilization of underemployed labor force organization and the ideological motivation by socialist education of which I have given many examples in the previous chapters and have considered as an important means in mass mobilization were not enough. Some rational incentive measures were also called for. That is why the relationship between the utilization of the underemployed labor force and income distribution should be rationally regulated. C . Labor Accumulation and Members' Income Distribution 1. Financial Responsibility for Basic Construction The basic construction (water conservancy, field works and afforestation) was usually centered on the brigade level. For instance, among the 99,905 labor days that the Zhangjiarongren Brigade had employed in basic construction from 1955 to 1965, 16.3% was used for work at the state level, 3.5% at the commune level and 80.2% at the brigade level. One part of the work at the brigade level was done directly under brigade direction, and another part done by production teams under the brigade's unified planning and supervision. 305 As we have already seen, the labor force for basic construction was organized in two forms: the mass shock teams and special task teams. In the former case, the pro-portion of labor force which each production team should provide as its share was set according to two norms: (1) the size of the labor force of the production team, and (2) the extent of the benefit the production team would derive from the work to be constructed. In the latter case, only the size of labor force of the production team was taken into account. If one production team could not provide the due proportion of the labor force, it should either pay off with labor in other sectors or with money calculated according to the work-points or labor-days to the team that shared the extra portion of the labor force. Once the work was accomplished, it would become the collective property of the brigade. However, the financial burden did not rest on the brigade. The problem of laborers' wages was solved in two ways: (1) For the mass shock teams, wages would be counted in work-points and charged to the production team's account. This was practiced in all three brigades. (2) For the special task teams, the wages were either charged in work-points to the production team's account (Zhangjiarongren and Shagou), or paid in cash by the brigade (Xiwangzhuang).0 As the special task teams accounted for only a very small portion in the total labor force used in basic construction, it can be said that the main financial responsibility rested on the production teams. Because the income from forestry and sideline productioncofrthis brigade was larger than the other two. 306 2. Labor Employment for Basic Construction and Income Distribution There would be three methods to repay the laborers employed in the basic construction: One was to count one part of their labor-days contributed to the basic construction as voluntary labor, and to count the rest in work-points within the normal rank of income distribution. The second was to count all of their labor-days; in regular work-points. The third was to repay the laborers with the brigade's reserve funds. In 1962 the Shagou Brigade adopted the first method. The voluntary labor accounted for 3% of the basic labor-days of every laborer in one year. The advantages of this method lay in keeping a higher value of work-point by eliminating 3% of the work-points, and being favorable to the households who had not enough labor force. The dis-advantages were to lower the laborers' motivation and to complicate the account system. The Shagou Brigade abandoned this method and adopted the second method in 1963 as the other two brigades had always done. The advantages and disadvantages of the second method were complementary to the first one. However, although the value of the work-point was lowered due to the addition of those supplementary labor-days used in basic construction, the actual final income of the households that had laborers participating in these works could not be lowered because of their additional work-points. Only those households that did not have enough laborers to participate in the basic construction would be affected by the lowered value of work-points. Table 9.7 will show the difference of income between households with different categories of labor force. 307 Table 9.7 Income of Households by Strength of Laborers for 1963 in the Second Produc-tion Team, Xiwangzhuang Brigade Number of Households Total Income (yuan) Average income by Household (yuan) Strong laborers 6 2,291.3 381.9 Relatively strong laborers 6 1,691 281.8 Normal laborers 5 1,407 281.4 Weak laborers 6 1,606 267.7 Without laborers 6 352 58.7 Note: Classification of households by strength of laborers was done according to the system of \"basic labor-days\" (for this system see Chapter Seven, Section II). The total labor-days of a household are divided by the number of members of the household: (1) households of strong laborers (90-118 labor-days); (2) households of relatively strong laborers (70-89); (3) households of normal laborers (55-69); households of weak laborers (under 55); (5) households without laborers (five-guarantee households). In order to guarantee that those unfavor.edd households (unfavored due only to the fact that they were weak in labor force) would not be affected, the Xiwangzhuang Brigade paid special attention to arranging light work in other sectors for those house-holds. The result of the income for 1964 (see Table 9.8) shows that this kind of disad-vantage brought about by the practice of the second method could be easily corrected, if attention was paid to it. 308 Table 9.8 Income of Households by Strength of Laborers for 1964 in the Second Produc-tion Team, Xiwangzhuang Brigade Number of households Total income (yuan) Average in-come by house-hold (yuan) % of 1964 over 1963 Strong laborers 6 2,518 419.7 10 Relatively strong 6 1,900 316.7 13 Laborers Normal laborers 5 1,615 323 14.7 Weak laborers 6 1,871 311.8 17 Without laborers 6 421 70.2 19.6 The third method, although used elsewhere, had never been adopted by any of the three brigades. There were two reasons which made this method difficult for adoption: First, the reserve funds of the brigade were still not large enough to pay the wages of basic construction. Secondly, to pay with the reserve funds would diminish the amount of collective accumulation at the brigade level. The second method guaran-teed a rational payment for the laborers who worked during their leisure time, but at the same time, made the financial burden rest on the production teams. In consequence, the reserve funds and collective property at the brigade level would be accumulated more and more by the unpaid laborer (from the brigade's point of view). This is not only a way to turn labor into capital, but also to turn low level collective property into higher level collective property. 309 D. Significance of Labor Accumulation in the Development of the Rurd I Economy The accomplishment of the works of basic construction relying mainly upon labor accumulation does not mean that no capital was invested at al l . A minimum amount of capital was always necessary. For example, construction tools, vehicles, cement, TNT and the like had to be purchased. This capital was usually raised by sideline production. The significance of labor accumulation is to minimize the capital investment and to maximize the labor investment. Let us take Xiwangzhuang Brigade as an example: during 1963-1964, the brigade employed a total of 72,975 labor-days in basic construction. If one labor-day was counted at 0.80 yuan (the labor price at that time), it would be worth a total of 58,380 yuan. During the same period, a capital of only 10,184 yuan was invested. The capital-labor ration is 15%: 85%. This means that 85% of the basic construction is represented by labor accumulation alone. We may ask: why should this underemployed labor force be mainly used in basic construction, especially water conservancy projects? The answer is that the basic construction was considered as the crucial taking-off point for the Chinese rural economy. For centuries, the latter, just like the cyclic evolution of dynasties, had been caught in a vicious circle dominated by nature. The efforts of the peasants for several years had always been suddenly destroyed by the cyclic natural calamities. After a few years, the peasants had to start again from almost nothing. This was the greatest tragedy of the Chinese peasants, which did not seem soluable by the small farmer economy. The hope of winning this struggle against nature depended upon collective forces. The experience of the three brigades presented in this case-study represents merely a prelim-inary step in the battle. Yet the result can be said to be encouraging. Owing to the 310 improved irrigation system which was the direct result of basic construction, agricultural output has steadily increased as can be seen in the following table. Table 9.9 Comparison of Output in the Three Brigades Between 1957 and 1964 (unit: jin) per mu 1957 total'?} per mu 1964 total % over 1957 per mu total Zhangjiarongren 243 387,620 608 993,683 197.6 156 Shagou 162 914,202 496 1,210,286 206 87 Xiwangzhuang 160 474,575 443 823,304 176.8 73.4 The indirect result of the basic construction was manifested by forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and fishery. In 1964, the Zhangjiarongren Brigade had an income of 26,000 yuan from these sectors, which accounted for 20% of the gross revenue of that year and largely doubled that of 1957. The other two brigades also had increases in these sectors. There was also a remarkable improvement in living standards. The food grain per capital had an increase of 97%, 45.8% and 31% in 1964 over 1957 respectively for Zhangjiarongren, Shagou and Xiwangzhuang. The respective increases in personal income were 133.6%, 73% and 135%. But the most perceivable improvement was ref-lected by the accumulation of reserve funds which increased between three and five times during the eight years as shown in Table 9.10. 311 Table 9.10 Comparison of Reserve Funds between 1957 and 1964 in the Three Brigades (unit: yuan) 1957 1964 Of the year % in Of the year % in gross Accumul- gross Accumul- % over revenue ation revenue dfion 1957 1,862 3 3,958.5 6,749 5 75,597 262 1,321 3 5,506 8,843 5.2 77,367 571 1,800 1.8 14,928 10,217 5 152,108 468 More reserve funds means a bigger capacity for further basic construction, but above all had a paramount significance in the collective economy. If the basic construc-tion could reach the level capable of resisting most of the disastrous natural calamities, the battle would be won. It had obviously not yet reached such a level by 1964 in the three brigades, but it can certainly be said that they were advancing along a promising path. E. Summary The experience of the three brigades provides us with a concrete example of how to turn the underemployed labor force into capital, how to maximize the utilization of this underemployed labor and of how to make this accumulation a collective property at the brigade level as much as possible in order to gradually raise the level of collective ownership. Zhangia-rongren Shagou Xiwang-zhuangj-7.huana 312 III CONSTRUCTION OF WATER CONSERVANCY IN THE XIA DINGJIA PRODUCTION BRIGADE, DA LUJIA PEOPLE'S COMMUNE, HUANG COUNTY : A CASE STUDY O N WATER CONSERVANCY 17 A . Physical Setting The Da Lujia People's Commune is situated in the middle of Huang County, some thirty kilometres to the south of the Bohai Gulf in the north-eastern part of Shan-dong. The Xia Dingjia Production Brigade was one of its brigades and was composed of eight natural villages (21 production teams) and had a population of 2,653 representing 560 households. It possessed 2,368 mu of cultivated land (0.93 mu per person) located in the Shashi Mountain area. A short river called Yongwen passes through it. In the cultivated land, mountainous and hilly fields amounted to 74%. Before the liberation, the area was known as a calamitous place due to its physical setting. The layer of soil was so thin that high output crops could not be planted. In nine out of ten years the harvests were affected by drought. The per mu yield was so low as to vary only between 100 and 200 Jin. Consequently, living was extremely hard in this area. At that time, out of 450 households in the eight villages, 84 households had gone to the north-east and 48 households went to beg elsewhere. Among the rest, thirty percent lived by hiring themselves to outside landlords and sixty/percent made their living either by selling their daily labor to the ten percent of well-to-do, or by cutting trees and grass in the mountain and selling them in the market. The land reform changed the relationship of production. But the transformation of the earth in this area actually began in 1954 with the start of the construction of wafer conservancy (XHDX, 17 November, 1963)V T7 This case-study is based mainly on the report by Shandong sheng Jing-ji Yan-jiu-suo Nong-ye-jing-ji-zu (the Agricultural Economy Group of the Economic Research Insti-tute of Shandong Province), Jing-ji Yan-jiu yue-kan (Economic Research Monthly), N . 98, 20 December, 1964 : 48-56. Other sources will be noted. 313 B. Construction of Water Conservancy The formation of elementary cooperatives on the basis of mutual-aid groups in 1954 initiated the construction of water conservancy by sinking wells. The emergence of advanced cooperatives in the following year (1955) pushed the sinking of wells to a higher level. Up to 1957, the number of wells sunk amounted to 72. However, the drought in the spring of 1957 dried up almost all of them. Be-cause the level of underground water was low, to sink a new well required too many laborers and too much time. Moreover, the wells were found not to fit very well into the terraced fields which constituted the bulk of Xia Dingjia's cultivated land. There-fore, the people of Xia Dingjia were forced to search for other more efficient ways of conserving water. After having learned from experiences in other places and owing also to the help of the Bureau of Water Conservancy of the county, the Xia Dingjia people shifted the emphasis from sinking wells to conserving water by constructing reservoirs (Qi Zhe-wen, 1966). The first reservoir was completed in only one month and displayed its capacity in the same year. The irrigated land could therefore be increased from 400 mu in 1954 to 642 mu in 1957. The maize fields which were irrigated by the reservoir yielded 230 jin more per mu (the other maize fields yielded only 150 jin per mu). This result encouraged the people of Xia Dingjia to undertake 12 small projects of water con-servancy in the winter of 1957 and spring of 1958. They began with the easily accessible places and gradually moved to the high mountains. Fbllowing establishment of the people's commune in the autumn of 1958, they constructed the first high mountain reservoir in order to automatically irrigate the higher placed terraced fields. Owing to these invested efforts, in spite of the serious drought in 1957-1958, the annual per mu yield was increased to 500 jin. 314 Between 1958 and 1963, three reservoirs, six pond-embankments, one river-dam, two pumping stations, 64 wells and 5 kilometres of ditches had been built. Another 762 mu of land were thus brought under irrigation and 240 mu of irrigated land was improved. In 1963, another two reservoirs and three pond embankments were constructed. The number of wells amounted to 150. The irrigation system could irrigate in this year 53.4% of the total cultivated land (XHDX, 17 November, 1963). By 1964, the irrigated area was increased to 1,380 mu or 58% of the total cultivated acreage. Among the 1,380 mu, 892 mu were automatically irrigated, 165 mu mechanized in irrigation and 323 mu by wells. In the same year another three high mountain reservoirs under construction were expected to bring 500 mu of high placed terraced fields under irrigation. This would increase the irrigated area to 80% of the total cultivated acreage. However, the construction fof water conservancy was not an isolated work. Its effectiveness was conditioned by many other sectors. For instance, the Minister of Water Conservancy and Electric Power, Fu Zuo-yi, has pointed out that \"the irrigated areas could completely demonstrate the benefit of irrigation only after the land was levelled and field works were built\" (RMRB 11 October, 1959). This was what the Xia Dingjia Brigade had taken into account. In the meantime while water conservancy was being con-structed, the people of the brigade set out to undertake basic field works. C . Basic Construction of Field Works During the nine years 1955-1964, 1,534 mu of farmland had been levelled and improved, and 30,000 metres of stone embankment of terraced fields had been built. The methods of the field works carried out can be included in the following three kinds 315 according to the adaptation to a variety of topography and soil. 1. Deeply turning over and levelling earth: this method was used in the hilly land of different levels and different depths of soil. 2. Changing soil: this method was used in the river-side land the layer of soil of which was too thin to plant high output crops. The method consisted of changing the stone and sand underground with earth to thicken the layer of soil. 3. Terracing the hilly land: This method was applied in two ways: the first, called \"changing big into small\" (da gai xiao), was to transform a large hilly land into small terraced fields in order to reduce the degree of slope and to prevent soil erosion. The second one, called \"changing small into big\" (xia ga? da), was to level the lower terraced fields in order to transform them into larger fields. Thecchanged fields on which in the past only sweet potatoes could grow were now suitable for planting of maize and wheat owing to the increase of at least six inches to one foot in depth of soil and the improvement of soil conditions. But above all, they were more suitable to irrigation. The change in per mu yield of the harnessed fields is shown in the following table. Table 9.11 Comparison of per unit yield by crops, soil condition and field work in Xia Dingjia Brigade Crop SoiI Yield per mu (jin) Percentage of Before field works After field works increase wheat sandy-loamy 200-250 300-350 40-50 wheat clay 200 260-270 30-35 maize loamy 450-500 700-750 50 sweet potato gravelly 600-700 800-900 33 peanut sandy 200-250 300-350 40-50 316 Besides the basic field works, the Xia Dingjia Brigade also paid attention to reforestation in order to prevent further losses of water and soil. D. Reforestation The brigade possessed 7,540 mu of mountain land. Owing to uncontrolled lumber-ing before the revolution, the mountain was almost bare of trees. At the beginning re-forestation was not effective due to a lack of unified planning and suitable investment. In 1956, a plan of reforestation was set up and the mountain was closed to peasants. In the following years it was only periodically opened to those who came to cut grass. By 1964 the \u00C2\u00A9mountain was no longer barren. Apart from 860 mu of a mixture of red pine, oak and locust trees, only red pine was planted. There were 6,600 mu (92.8%)^whibhihadTmonevlthan(?400 trees per mu. Now the forest could perform the function of retaining the mountainous torrents during the rainy season. E. Other Measures for Increasing Oufputj The comprehensive arrangement of nature created the conditions for the appli-cation of Chairman Mao's \"Eight-Point Charter\" for agriculture ( i .e., soil improvement, water control, rational application of fertilizer, improved seed strains, rational close planting, plant protection, field management and improvement of farm implements). The measures adopted by the Xia Dingjia Brigade in accordance with the \"Eight-Point Charter\" were as follows: 1. Increasing Fertilizer application Although the chemical fertilizer supplied by the state increased yearly, the farm manures still constituted the principal fertilizers. There were two types of farm manure: 317 non-organic and organic. The first consisted of old-wall-earth and hay-ash, and the second consisted of grass and human and animal excrement. The accumulation of or-ganic manure by raising pigs was especially important, because it is a 'one-stone-kills-two-birds1 method. By 1964 the Brigade had reached the ratio of 1.2 pigs per household. The system of \"basic fertilizing\" ( i .e., applying fertilizer before planting) was applied. Manure used for one mu had been increased from 3,000 jin before the cooperative movement to 8,000 jin in 1964. After the \"basic fertilizing\" three applications of supple-mentary fertilizer for wheat a ndt\vo> applications for maize. 2. Increasing the Index of Double-Cropping and the Acreage of High Output Crops Before the cooperative movement, 70% of the farmland of the brigade had only one crop a year, and 30% had either three crops every other year or two crops a year. The index of double-cropping was only 125-130%. By T!963, this index was increased to 167%. In other words, 60% of the farmland could yield two crops per year. In the area of the brigade, maize was a high output crop. With sufficient water and fertilizer, the per mu yield of maize could reach 600-800 jin, sometimes 1,000 jin at the most. This is why the acreage of maize had a tendency to rise every year. In 1964 it increased almost 40% compared with the previous years. 3. Applying Inter-Planting and Rational Close Planting There were inter-plantings of maize and soybean, of summer millet and summer maize, of sweet; potato and maize and soybean, of wheat and peanuts, of cabbage and wheat and the like. The advantages of inter-planting were that nutriments of the soil could be fully absorbed by the different kinds of crops and light and air could reach everywhere because of the different heights of the crops. All these factors could 318 contribute to raising the per mu yield. As for close planting, the per mu plants for maize were increased from 2,000-2,500 to 3,000-3,500 and those for sweet potato from 2,500-3,000 to 3,500-3,800. The per mu bunches for millet (each bunch comprises 3-5 plants) were increased from 13,000 to 18,000. The per mu seeds for wheat were increased from 7-9 jin to 13-15. The degree of density was determined by three factors: air circulation, depth of soil and the quantity of water and fertilizer. The different seed strains required different density. For instance, the \"Double No. 1\" maize could be planted closer together than the \"Gold Queen\" maize/ 4. Seed Selection and Introduction of Better Strains On the one hand the Xia Dingjia Brigade introduced better strains from outside, on the other hand it selected and cultivated the better strains by setting up seed fields. By 1964, 90% of the maize fields and 80% of the wheat fields had been planted with the better strains introduced from outside, or cultivated by the peasants of 'the brigade. 5. Careful Field Management Before sowing, no matter whether in spring or summer, the earth of the fields was always turned deeply over once again and the fields were levelled. The summer crops were hoed 3-4 times. Preventive measures were taken for plant protection. 6. Establishing \"three fields\" for Improving Agro-Techniques The \"three fields\" (san-tian) means \"experimental fields\" (shi-yan-tian), \"model fields\" (yang-ban-tian) and \"seed fields\" (zhong-z?-tian). The first was used for experimentation. For instance, when the \"qian-jiao\", a new strain of wheat seed, 319 was first introduced into the brigade, it was only planted in the \"experimental fields\" in order to determine its quality, and to gain experience. The second field aimed at showing to the peasants a model and a standard in production. The third was used especially for the purpose of raising better strains. Up to 1964, more than ten new and better strains of eight crops had been cultivated in the \"seed fields\" of the brigade. The Xia Dingjia Brigade ,vvb.y the case of Xia Ding-jia Brigade can provide in this connection, ancinstance. Xia Dingjia was one of the poorest areas in Shandong. Materially, it started with almost nothing. It succeeded in barejy a decade in creating a relative prosperity and welfare for its people without aid from the outside. As I have shown in the previous section, the leadership and socialist education had played a crucial role in the development of the Xia Dingjia Brigade. In other words, it can be said that ideology had been transformed into material force through organization and education. The lack of technical personnel and capital had largely been offset by the ideological indoctrination. Let us use the 326 commune members' language: \"when we rake the correct line, no difficulty cannot be overcome\". This is not to say that ideological indoctrination is a panacea. It certainly has its limitations and it also needs certain preconditions before it can be effectively carried out. The Chinese had bitterly experienced these limitations during the years 1958-1961. They have also endeavored to create such preconditions, the process of which is just an aspect of what I am trying to describe in this thesis. The particular model of development in China has begun to attract the atten-tion of western economists (Richman, 1969; Deleyne, 1971), and has even been recog-nized as a possible and valuable model of development (cf. Wheelwright and McFarlane, 1970). Western economists have also begun making an attempt to study the Chinese way of developmentnwith some new approaches other than the conventional theories (cf. Gurley, 1971; Gray, 1973). That is why a study such as Carin's, which sticks closely to the pure economic mechanism, has!difficulty in grasping the Chinese reality. The construction of water conservancy in China was not a failure, but a suc-cess. The efforts of both the masses and the state have in fact brought about some aston-ishing consequences. This can be seen by two major factors: the changes of the land-scape and the drastic increase in agricultural output in the late sixties and the early seventies. For the former, many visitors from outside have witnessed the changes of land-scape in China. I cite only two cases hereafter to support my argument. Rene Dumont has pointed out in his book that aucun paysage rural n'a jamais change, dans tout I'histoire de I'agriculture mondiale, autant que la chine orientale de 1955 a 1964(1965 : 12). 327 Another witness is Ping-ti Ho. During a lecture at the University of British Columbia in 1975, he vividly threw light upon the contrast between the green landscape he had seen during his recent visit to China and the image of barren land he was used to see-ing before 1949. As for the latter, the change can be said to be unprecedented. In the Chinese history, North China had always depended on South China for grain supply. This longtime dependence came to an end in 1973 (New China's First Quarter-Century : 41). Shandong Province achieved its self-sufficiency in food-grain in 1970 by increas-ing the irrigated areas to 54,310,000 mu out of 113,000,000 mu and by increasing the output of food grain to 120% over that of 1949 and 44% over that of 1965 (Jing-ji Dao-bao, 1976 : 90-91). All these achievements in agricultural growth relied, for the most part, on the basis of water conservancy constructed between 1957 and 1962. The astonishing results of water conservancy were also related to the commune system. The commune structure made the organization of the labor force more effect-ive than cooperatives in the connection of construction of water conservancy. In the meantime, the labor accumulation embodied by the irrigation system has enormously enriched the collective property and reserve funds which would no doubt have a far-reaching influence in strengthening the commune system and in enabling the system to advance to a higher level. That the capital was often in the North was another reason to transport the grain from South to North. 328 Chapter Ten ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNES (THREE CASE-STUDIES) This chapter consists of three case-studies on the development of the people's communes. Various aspects of economic and social development within the communal framework will be discussed. But emphasis will be given to the economic sectors and the significance of the commune system as a socioeconomic unit in the rural development of Shandong. 1. Mi THE CASE OF XIYOU PEOPLE'S COMMUNE, YE COUNTY The Xiyou People's Commune was established in august 1958 by merging 21 advanced agricultural cooperatives and 1 fishery cooperative. It included 35 natural villages with a population of 39,170 representing 10,100 households. The director of the commune was one of the national woman models and activists in Shandong Province, Xu Jian-chun (Xu Jian-chun, 1959a). A . Economic Development 1. BasifeConstruction, Commune Industry and Mechanization During the period of GLF in 1958 the Xiyou Commune had poured almost half of its labor force (6,500 of its 14,018 laborers) into commune industry and the construc-tion of water conservancy and field works (ibid),). On the eve of the establishment of the commune, it had only 2,349 wells (none mechanical), 6 pumps and 922 water-wheels. But one year later, 481 wells, 72 mechanical wells, 47 pumps and 74 water wheels were 329 added to the original number. In addition, one ditch for drawing the river water was dug to bring 300 mu under automatic irrigation. Four out of the seventeen production brigades had mechanized their irrigation equipments (Xu Jian-chun, 1959b). The small blast furnaces of the commune produced 140 tons of iron and 96 tons of steel in 1958 (ibid.). The commune industrial enterprises increased rapidly during the first year of communiza-fion to more than 80 units representing a variety of projects such as mechanical, chemical, material for construction, textile and candy (Sun Li-chao and Xu Zhi-cheng, 1959). This brought the commune to a point of producing small farm implements and even larger machines such as water-wheels, maize hullers, generators and mechanical mills, and increased the capacity of fertilizer production to 2,000 jin per year (ibid.). The gross output value of commune industry for 1958 amounted to 680,000 yuan, an increase of 41.8% over 1957 (Xu Jian-chun, 1959a). Though the problem of competition for labor force between local industry and basic construction on the one hand and agriculture on the other also arose in the Xiyou Commune, it seems that agricultural production was not as seriously affected by it as other communes. This was partly because local industry had a better foundation in this commune, anducouldjlend more support to agriculture, and partly because the commune, as an advanced model in agriculture, could get some help from the county as well as the state in resolving its difficulties. In order to resolve the shortage of labor force in agriculture, the Xiyou Commune made a great effort to'mechanizenbyjcimproving farm implements. It constituted one of the successful models in effectively using commune industry for mechanizing agriculture, just as the policy makers of the local industry movement had expected, during the years of 1958-1959, a time when the majority of communes failed in this area. 330 The most salient results in mechanization were the creation and copying by commune members of agro-machines such as mechanical mills, sowers, planters for close-planting, and mechanical water-wheels. This improvement of farm implements greatly increased labor productivity. For instance, the four grinders made by the com-mune factory, with a capacity of grinding 5,000-7,000 jin of grain each per day, could daily replace 400-500 laborers. The 250 wind-power water-wheels could save 500 laborers a day. One mechanical mill with a daily capacity of producing 10,000 jin of wheat flour could spare 140 women laborers plus 140 draught animals a day. One potato-cutting machine could spare another hundred laborers daily (ibid.). Apart from the self-made machines, the mechanization of agriculture was also represented by the increase in purchased larger farm machines. Before the creation of the commune, the people of the township had only 200 new model plows, 3 sowers and 4 diskers as large machines. One year after the establishment of the commune, they bought another 82 new model plows, 7 diskers and 10 sowers. They then had 15 hullers, 1 header, 6 tractors and 1 truck. One-third of the total 64,000 mu of com-munal land was thus brought under mechanized cultivation (Xu Jian-chun, 1959b). By 1962, the number of tractors was increased to 14 and the number of pumps to 95. Other machines such as sowers and hullers amounted to more than one hundred (RMRB, 4 July, 1962). 2. The Technical Revolution Xiyou was one of the communes where the technical groups for agronomic re-search had an earlier and better development. In order to carry out the technical revolution in agronomy, every brigade of the commune created its own technical group 331 composed mainly of downward transferred youth. In general, the technical group had a size of about 10 persons. The emphasis of their research was on cultivation of better strains of seeds and the control of insect plagues (Sun Li-chao and Xu Zhi-cheng, 1959). For example, in the Houlu Brigade, the technical group had introduced in a few years more than two hundred wheat strains and thirty maize strains from outside for the pur-pose of experimentation. Nine better strains of wheat and maize were chosen to be planted in the brigade. This contributed greatly to the increase of grain output (ZGQNB, 2 October, 1961). In the Wangjia Brigade, Zhang Huan-ying, a graduate of elementary school, found two better wheat strains by hybridizing different wheat strains to their sixth generation (RMRB, 4 July, 1962). In the Xiyou Brigade, one youth of the technical group by the name of Zhang Bao-ji had studied 29 kinds of crop insects. His research had far-reaching influence in the prevention and control of insect plagues (Xu Jian-chun, 1959a). The technical groups also brought about important improvements in the methods of cultivation, especially in close-planting, intercrop planting and double-cropping planting. In Xiyou commune there used to be three crops every two years. Due to the selection of better strains, and improvement in methods of cultivation, most of the land could have two crops per year. The index of double-cropping was thus greatly increased (RMRB, 4 July, 1962). Besides his research, each member of the technical groups took charge of technical counselling of one or two production teams. They often worked together with team agronomic technicians in the team's fields (ibid., 27 November, 1963). Some brigades, such as Zhufeng, Houlu and Wangjia, set up mechanic's training classes, technical night schools and stations of domestic animal breeding 332 (Sun Li-chao and Xu Zhi-cheng, 1959). In 1953 no Technician existed in this area. Houlu Village bought a pump for irrigation, but had difficulty finding someone capable of operating it (ibid.). By 1963 the Xiyou Commune had trained 43 tractor drivers (12 of them were sent to the tractor station of the county), 125 diesel operators, 123 agro-technicians, 3 truck drivers and 6 animal breeders (RMRB, 27 November, 1963). 3. Development of Agricultural Production and Improvement of Members' Income The Xiyou Commune had 64,000 mu of cultivated land (Xu Jian-chun, 1959a). In 1950 the average per mu yield was only about 300 jin. It rose to 440 jin in 1957 (Qu Hong-zao, 1959). In spite of the serious drought, the per mu yield was raised to 621 jin in 1958 (Xu Jian-chun, 1959a), and 846 jin in 1959 (RMRB, 28 December, 1959). With the increase in grain output, the living standards of the members rose accordingly. In 1957 the distributed quota of grain per person was 391 jin. This quota was increased to 401 and 430 respectively by 1958 and 1959. In the quota of grain distributed there was 71 jin of wheat in 1958 and 90 in 1959. The total income of a memberswas 55 yuan in 1958 and 80 yuan in 1959 (income from household sideline pro-duction was not included) (Sun Li-chao and Xu Zhi-cheng, 1959). The living standards of members could also be reflected by the purchasing power and bank deposits. The value of the purchasing power between January and June, 1958 was 693,681 yuan, but that of the same period in 1959 was increased to 908,069 yuan. The total bank deposits of members between January and August of 1959 tripled those of the same period in 1958. The percentage of households having bank deposits rose from 50% of the total number of households in 1958 to 80% in 1959 (ibid.). 333 B. Social Development 1. Welfare and Health Services In 1958, the Xiyou Commune also implemented the system of semi-wage and semi-supply for a while, as had been done elsewhere. Mess halls were set up to provide the members with ready food in order to liberate the women labor force. As in other places, this system did not succeed in Xiyou for the reasons I have given in Chapter Seven (see Chapter Seven, Section II). However, some other kinds of welfare and health services created at the same time did survive. By 1959 the number of kindergartens was increased from 15 to 54, and the number of asylums for old people increased from 2 to 6. In addition, 72 nurseries were created. In the sector of health, due to the larger public funds provided by the commune, a hospital and ten health stations were built (ibid.). 2. Education With the establishment of the commune, education was integrated into the commune system. The schools newly established by the commune in 1959 were: three half-work-half-study agronomic schools, two leisure-time middle schools, one red-and-expert school and one elementary school (Xu Jian-chun, 1959b). In the same year more than 400 peasants had graduated from the wiping-out-i I literacy classes (Xu Jian-chun, 1959a). The graduates from both elementary and middle schools and the students who could continue their education, greatly increased in number. The following table will show the change in this connection in the Houlu Brigade. 334 Table 10.1 Comparison of Elementary and Middle School Graduates Between 1949 and 1960 in Houlu Brigade Elementary School Graduates Middl e School Graduates Total number continue studying took a job total number continue study i ng took a job 1949 45 5 40 8 6 2 1960 138 58 80 121 100 21 Source: Wei Wen-hua, 1961. 3. Change in Leadership The large number of downward transferred intellectual youth (xia-fang zhi- qing) and those who returned horn (hui-xiang) inevitably brought about changes in the countryside. The most discernible ones were found in technical improvement in agri-culture and in leadership. These two sectors were inter-influenced. The graduates from both elementary and middle schools who returned home or stayed at home to participate in agriculture production were sharply increased in Xiyou Commune during the years of 1957-1963. In 1952, there were only about 200 graduates from elementary school working in agriculture in the area. By 1957 this number was increased to 1,005. In 1963 the total number of intellectual youth amounted to 3,527 (among them 39 had graduated from high school), accounting for 95% of the young people of the commune and more than 50% of the full laborers (RMRB, 27 November, 1963). I have mentioned that the agro-technicians and mechanical operators in the countryside were mostly intellectual youth (Chapter Eight, Section IV). Many other positions 335 which required a certain degree of literacy, such as school teachers, editors of black-board newspapers and organizers of rectional activities were also filled by the intellec-tual youth. Because of their two major qualities - literacy and youth, which the old peasants obviously lacked, they became a very active force in the life of the commune. In 1963, among the 3,527 youths of the commune, 280 were given the title of \"five-good youth\" (wu-hao qing-nian), 222 got the title of \"five-good member\" (wu-hao she-yuan), 561 were absorbed into the Youth League and 57 became Party members. In such a situ-' ation, leadership could not help but absorb them into its ranks. By the same year, the positions of 5 brigade Party branch secretaries, 8 brigade commanders and vice-com-manders, 24 brigade accountants and 270 team commanders, vice-commanders, account-ants and material keepers had been filled by intellectual youth (ibid.). The process of becoming a leader was usually through a long process of talent demonstration in some sectors and by gradually gaining the trust of the members. The case of Xu Jian-min could be a typical example. He was the younger brother of Xu Jian-chun, the director of the Xiyou Commune. When he graduated! from elementary school in 1954 the only thing he intended to do was continue studying. For some unknown rea-son, he could not enter the middle school in his native place. He went to Jinan, the capital of Shandong, to study at night school for two years. Then under the pressure of the returning home movement, he willy-nilly went home to be enrolled in the technichal group for strain cultivation. A few years later, owing to the brilliant results he obtained in the cultivation of maize strains, he was given the title of peasant researcher by the Shandong Agronomic Academy and became the chief of the technical group (ZGQNB, 2 October, 1961). Finally he was elected Party branch secretary in 1963 and became the most powerful leading cadre of the Houlu Brigade (RMRB, 27 November, 1963). At 336 the time of his elevation to this position, he was only 25 years old, relatively young, though he had already spent seven years working in the technical group. The commander and the accountant of the Houlu Brigade were also young fellows. The former was 24 and the latter 20 when they were elected to their positions in 1961 (ZGQNB, 2 October, 1961). Because the development of the commune was oriented to a more sophisticated form of management and to a larger variety of methods in production, the people who had more technical knowledge and higher literacy were needed for leadership. It can be said that the further development of the commune would create more opportunities for intellectual youth and, in the meantine, the elevation of intellectual youth in the power echelons would help a quicker development. C. Significance of the Commune System in the Socioeconomic Development of the Xiyou Commune From the Xiyou case, we can see that the formation of the commune enabled the rural socioeconomic development to reduce some unfavorable conditions and to create some favorable ones. 1. Regularization of land During the cooperative period, many of the fields which belonged to different cooperatives were interlocked with each other. They amounted to more than 5,000 mu, representing almost 9% of the total cultivated land of the commune. Members of one cooperative often had to pass through the land of another cooperative to reach their own fields. Needless to say, the small pieces of land did not fit mechanization. It was once suggested that the related cooperatives might make some exchange in order to 337 regularize their fields. However, the exchange could not easily be carried out, be-cause the members of every cooperative always thought that their land was better than the others and any exchange represented a loss. The land could only be regularized after the emerging of cooperatives into communes. The regularization of land resulted in^a saving of 15,000 labor days per year (Sun Li-chao and Xu Zhi-cheng, 1959). 2. Unified Arrangementcof Labor lEorce as Being in Favor of Multiple Productions Owing to the unified arrangement of labor force, the commune could locate an important number of laborers in blast furnaces and commune industry without too much effect on the agricultural production. For example, in the winter of 1958, 51,000 mu of wheat was sown on time due to unified arrangementof labor. On the other hand, the commune industry had better development under the commune structure. Fishery production was increased in gross value from 480,000 yuan during the coopera-tive period to 1,100,000 yuan in 1959 (Xu Jian-chun, 1959b). 3. How the Larger Labor Force Facilitated the Construction of Water conservancy and other Basic Field Works In one year, from August 1958 to August 1959, the Xiyou Commune sank 481 wells and 72 mechanical wells and dug one ditch to bring 300 mu under automatic irrigation by river water (ibid.). 4. The Commune as Paving the Way to Mechanization Most of the large agricultural machines of the commune were purchased after the establishment of the commune (see Section I, sub-section A of this chapter). 338 5. The Way in Which the Commune Created Favorable Conditions for Collective Welfare Enterprises The establishment of nurseries, kindergartens and asylums for old people freed women from housework to a large extent. The creation of hospital and health stations could improve members' health which is, as Gunnar Myrdal has said, an investment in man, a crucial condition of economic growth (Myrdal, 1972 : 353-376). The increased number of schools in which 6,600 regular and part-time students were enrolled in 1959 (ZGQNB, 29 August, 1959)llY0.i!et'pl:e.bka^ together in the same lot with her elder son's. In prac-tice the old woman cooked apart by herself and received 600 workpoints, 30 yuan and 50 jin of wheat from each of her two sons yearly. She lived much better in this way than eating together with either of the two sons. The difficulty in defining her household situation is that she lived in the same house as her younger son and was registered in her elder son's household, but lived alone in practice. For the old generation the notion of family and that of household were distinct. But for the younger generation, according to my informants, this distinction began to become somewhat blurred. This is because the land which had been both the common property and the symbol of union of a family was no longer there. But for the duty of supporting aged parents, once a married son made his own household, he had no special 351 duty nor had little claim on his brothers, uncles and other relatives. On the other hand, the conception of family which had always been a product of the male's point of view might be subject to change when the female had more to say in the family's affairs. The woman's perception of family which was very different from that of the man had to be considered to some extent when they could earn work-points too. For instance, the husband could continue to consider his separated brother as a member of the famMy while his wife might not. Therefore, a household in the commune system tended to become closer than ever before to a family from the subjective point of view, especially from that of a woman. This phenomenon can, however, be seen only as a tendency, but was still far from being a dominating feature. The type of nuclear family with a variety of stem family was the main trend in Mazhuang. Nobody dreamed any more of having a large family, because it was no longer the mark of prestige and status. On the contrary, it could be the symbol of feudalism or the mark of the notorious landlord class. II KINSHIP NETWORK It is premature to say, in my view, that the lineage organizations were stronger or more widespread in South China than in the North as Freedman asserted (1964) before the latter had been thoroughly studied. My informants said that lineage was very import-ant in the social and economic life in their villages before the revolution. My personal observation tends to suggest the same thing. The majority of the Shandong villages still bear today the names of lineages which were either the only group or the principal group living in these villages. 352 The majority of fhe inhabitants in Mazhuang naturally had Ma as surname. There were nevertheless a few households having the names of Zhang and Wang. The ancestor temple of the Ma lineage was now transformed into a warehouse. Needless to say, the ritual activities of lineage had ceased and the formal organization had been dissolved long ago. However, it is interesting to note that the agnatic kinship ties were still mani-fested on ritual occasions such as marriages and funerals. The informant A's grandfather was classified as landlord. But at this death all the people named Ma, including important brigade and team cadres, came to pay their respects to the dead man and to give a hand to the family as though they had forgotten the latter's notorious position. On such occa-sions, the highest ranking cadre took the traditional position of lineage head which had 5 earlier been determined by wealth, generation and age. As lineage was considered as the product of feudal society, nobody would overtly show his kinship inclination in public affairs. The power hierarchy was determined more by Party affiliation than by kinship or otherwise. Party membership, social position (e.g., poor or lower-middle peasant position) and personal competence were the main criteria of holding power. However, the members of the brigade still had a secret pref-erence to see their own kinsmen selected as cadres. In Mazhuang Brigade, both the Party branch secretary and the commander were named Ma. It was difficult for the cadres to favor their own kinsmen in public affairs under the strict supervision of the Party. On the contrary, in order to show their impartiality and loyalty to the Party, the cadres sometimes needed to favor the people with other surnames. \u00C2\u00B0* In Guangdong the old lineage still seems to have life in the production brigade and teams. See William L. Parish, \"The Commune as a Social System : Kwangtung Province, 1970-74\", 1975. 353 Relationships with the relatives of mother's or wife's side experienced little change in Mazhang, due to the fact that the village had few households of other sur-names and no endogamy had ever been known. In contrast, in informant C's village, there were some intra-village marriages. A new kind of solidarity unknown before bet-ween the two related households within the same village came into being. Because it was not a very frequent practice, it is still too early to observe any significant con-sequences. Because of the shift in the channel of loyalty, the change in the ideal type of family and fewer occasions of ritual gatherings, the solidarity between kinsmen of the same lineage was considerably weakened. However, as the brigade was a stable socio-economic unit and the children continued to carry on the father's surname, the aware-ness of a distinct agnate group was still there. Whether there will be a complete dis-appearance of lineage or a renewal is still to be seen. Ill MARRIAGE A . Age of Marriage According to the marriage law (Meijer, 1971),\u00C2\u00B0 the legal age of marriage is 20 for men and 18 for women (Article 4). But after 1958 when the birth control problem had \u00C2\u00B0 The effectiveness of the marriage law seems to be partial. It had an impressive impact on divorce and familial disputes around 1953, but since then it has gradu-ally retreated and left much ground for the revival of traditional mores. Gen-erally speaking, it has been more effective in application to minimum marriage age and divorce than to free choice of partners and rights of heritage for women. 354 become increasingly serious, the age of marriage was gradually raised. It seems that the late marriage was only advised by different social and political organs, but was never regulated by law. Therefore, in different places there were different ages to be proposed. Informant A gave 27-28 for men and 23-24 for women in Mazhuang Brigade around 1965, whereas informant C gave 28 for men and 26 for women in Yangjiagao around 1975. The severity of the application of the age standard in marriage was not equal in different periods. Generally speaking, it was more severe during the political movements than at other times. If there were some adequate reasons, exception could be made. Moreover, only one of the engaged parties needed to reach the recommended age for a marriage to be contracted. This allowed women to be married at a younger age. For example, in Mazhuang, a girl of 19 years old got married because her fiance reached 27. However, in most cases the recommended age of marriage was respected. The effectiveness of the application of late marriage was not only the result of efficient implementation of the Party's policies, but was also influenced by economic changes. Now unmarried girls were no longer merely second hands for housework, but could earn workpoints. Hence, the parents liked to keep them longer at home. The girls were also willing to earn some money for their parents and themselves before getting married. On the other hand, a marriage cost the bridegroom a lot (hwill explain the reason a little later). It was often difficult for a man to contract a marriage at a young age unless his parents were rich. B. Betrothal The betrothal in the commune of 1965 was completely different from some twenty years ago, before the revolution. Informant B, the mother of Informant A , gave me a detailed description of betrothal and marriage in her time. According to her information, 355 and what I know myself, the betrothal before the revolution was contracted at a very young age, usually between one and sixteen years old for both boy and girl. The en-gagement was determined not only by the fitness in terms of wealth of the two families, but also by that of the astrological elements of the two parties. As the betrothal was contracted at so early an age, it was entirely an affair of parents. However, it was not arranged directly by the parents, but was always done through a go-between who could be either a professional matchmaker or a relative, or a friend. The time between the betrothal and marriage could last many years. During the engagement period, the fiance and fiancee had to avoid meeting each other. That is why, in many cases, the wedding day was a point of surprise for both bride and groom. The bride-price, which would be called in Chinese ca?-li (gift of marriage) was found amongnthegpo'or people, but was not a common practice above the middle-class, because only the poor families dared to lose face by accepting money for \"marrying out\" their daughters. But gifts for the bride or for ritual usage could be accepted without a loss of face. Now (1965) in Mazhaung Brigade, no one was betrothed at a very young age. The average age of betrothal was around 20 for women and 23 for men. It was always arranged by parents of the two parties through a go-between - a relative or friend. There were no more pfofessional matchmakers; but there were semi-professional ones who took the advantages of receiving gifts in the form of meat or cakes. The informants have never heard of any engagement in this village stemming from romantic love. This is because not only had romantic love no root in tradition, but it was frowned upon by the authorities. A Hong Kong newspaper stated: 356 A recent refugee from mainland China summed up the official attitude there toward romance and marriage. Young love in Communist China is under fire because it diverts attention from assigned jobs, and under an all-embracing \"austerity\" drive initiated by Peking, personal happiness is categorized as a \"bourgeois-aspiration\" (HKS, 27 November, 1963). Another reason why romantic love wasrare is that most of the young people who met each other in the village were related by agnatic ties. The few youths of other surnames also looked for their potential mates beyond the village boundaries due to the old custom of exogamy. That is why romantic love could not occur in the countryside as easily as in the cities. This is not unique to Shandong. Jack Chen reported the same situation in the 1970's in the countryside in Honan Province. He said: \"The idea of romantic love followed by personal courtship and marriage never crossed their minds except as something that happened in operas\" (1973 : 72). With regard to the principal of exogamy, informant A remembered only one case of village endogamy between two families of different surnames in her mother's village. She considered it as unusual. However, informant C said that there were more cases of intra-village marriage in her village because it is multi-surnamed. According to informant C , most of the young girls nowadays preferred to remain in their native village by getting married to a countryfellow of the same village. Another informant from Guangdong Province told me that there were cases of marriage between people of the same surname in Guangdong, but all the informants from Shandong have considered this impossible. Although the betrothal was arranged by the choice of parents, the two parties . had the right of veto. But they seldom used this right, simply because they were still not accustomed to thinking that to be engaged was a personal affair. The most obvious change is that the two engaged parties no longer avoid seeing each other before or 357 after the betrothal. As a rule, before the engagement the would-be fiancee came to pay a visit to the would-be fiance's family in order to ensure that there were enough rooms in the house and that the position of the family was not in the dangerous categories (landlord, rich peasant, counter-revolutionary, etc.) lest she should be fooled by the go-between. On this occasion the would-be fiance was not necessarily present. If there were not enough rooms, and if there was another married brother at home, to build a new house, and to ensure the^division of the household after marriage were common conditions imposed by the would-be financee. This kind of visit could last several days, because the would-be financee had to make sure that the house she visited had not been borrowed from a relative or a neighbor.^ On this occasion the mother of the would-be fiance had to giveca present of \"first view\" (jian-mian li) which was usually 30-40 yuan, to the would-be fiancee regardless of the possibility of engagement. If the girl was satisfied with this first visit, the betrothal could be planned. A bride-price and/or presents of betrothal from the fiance's family to the fiancee were indispensible. Informant C gave the sum of 200 yuan as an average bride-price. If presents, they were in general repre-sented by \"three wheels\" (san-zhuan) which meant bicycle, watch and sewing machine, as well as dresses. The value of the presents depended upon the \"quality\" of the fiancee and the economic situation of the fiance's family. Generally speaking, without 1,000 yuan (including expenses of the wedding and house building) a man could not marry a woman. As romantic love was almost unknown in the countryside, the material condi-tions became all the more important. Though the practice of bride-price was officially discouraged (ZGQNB Editorial, 19 November, 1964), it seemed that it could not entirely disappear when the social and economic conditions had not yet favored such a disappearance. ^ It should be noted that dupery in marriage has frequently occurred in China and has not been considered as too immoral. One of the duties of a matchmaker is to conceal the drawbacks of both parties and to reveal only the advantages. 358 The main reason why women had the advantage over men in the marriage bargain 8 was that there were many more men than women in the countryside. This was partially due to the traditional preference on the part of parents for boys over girls, and partially due to the fact that the young girls in the countryside looked to the cities for their possible mates. For instance, the secretary of the CCP Committee of Ding County (Ting Hsien), Hobei Province, has revealed that: The conditions for marriage mate selection of many young girls in the countryside in our county consist only of the size of the income of the partner and the possibility of being brought into cities or towns. For instance, when a military officer of a cer-tain village went home to see his parents, more than twenty young girls in the village as well as from the nearby villages came to talk to him. The first question they asked was how much he earned a month; and the second question was if he could bring his future wife to live in the city. In many villages young girls write to relatives or friends who work in the cities entrusting them with the task of introducing partners. Some went to cities by them-selves in search of a mate. In doing so not only did they desert their agricultural tasks, but wasted much money. There have even been cases that girls abandoned their boyfriends in the village by getting others from the city. This is the case of a girl of the Chang-wang village. She was engaged to a young man of the same village. When they were preparing their wedding, the girl met a worker from the city. After having talked a short time with this worker in the maize field, she decided to marry him. This made her fiance lose his senses (Liu Chao-yen, 1957). The girls of the villages near cities had some chance to marry men in cities. The girls of the remote villages tended to marry the men in the villages nearer cities. Consequently, in the remote villages, women were lacking. 0 A man from a politically low-ranking family, if he was poor at the same time, had little chance of finding a bride. In informant Os village, there were 40 poor or politically low-ranking men over 30 years old who There were more men than women in the countryside of Honan Province too. (see Jack Chen, 1973 : 73). This pattern of marriage mobility toward cities was also confirmed by one of my informants from Guangdong Province. 359 who remained bachelors. My informant thought there would be little chance for those men to get married. Informant A's cousin (the son of her father's brother, whom she still referred to as \"brother\" instead of \"cousin\" to make the distinction from a couson on the mother's side) is another instance. Although his family had enough rooms, he failed five or six times in the \"first visit\" of the would-be fiancee, because his grandfather had been the landlord. Finally, the family duped a girl coming from a distant village by telling her that the family was in a middle-peasant's position. After the betrothal, the fiancee began to hear some rumours about the fiance's family and became.suspicious that she had been fooled. While she was attempting to demand a dissolution of the engagement, informant A came horn to interfere in the affair by offering presents brought from the cities, and arranged a quick marriage. According to informant A , this young wife was not happy at being fooled before the marriage and still tried to get a divorce, after having had two children, but she said that it was difficult to get divorced because of the children. C . Weddings The time between betrothal and wedding could last one to three years. During thistii'meyth'eifiancee often paid visits to the fiance's family. Each time, the mother of the fiance had to give the fiancee some money as a present. By contrast, the fiance came seldom, if at al l , to the fianceVs house. This is because of the patrilocal practice. No man, except for special reasons, was willing to go to live in his wife's village. The wedding ceremony is very simple now in comparison with the sophisticated and complex rituals before the revolution. There existed a large range of variations according to different circumstances. The only indispensible formality was to go to register in the commune in front of an officer and to get the marriage certificate. The bride and groom wore new clothes on this special occasion. The bride's dowry was no longer common practice. According to informant D, in Qiho County, a dowry of \"five-items\" (wu-jian) was the maximum which had been the minimum for a married daughter in a middle peasant family before the revolution. After the registration, the common practice was to invite a few relatives and close friends to a banquet. Whether to have or not to have the banquet, and the degree of its opulence, were dependent on the economic situation of the groom's family on the one hand, and the generaleeconomic situation of the year on the other. For instance, between 1959 and 1961 there could hardly have been a banquet on any occasion. But in 1975, according to informant C, the banquet of marriage was very opulent with at least twenty dishes, because vegetables and meats were not expensive. Sometimes the family of the groom could exhaust its savings of many years and could even run into debt because of a wedding banquet. That is why a new style of wedding, with tea, candy and cigarettes, was strongly recommended by the press. 1 0 However, this new style of wedding remained only within a small circle of activists for the purpose of demonstration. The old custom of \"ndo-fang\" (making jokes in the bridal chamber) was still ob-served, but was said to be practiced to a lesser extent than before the revolution. How-ever, some accidents could happen. It was reported that once in a village of Jimo County, For;example, \"Hun-shi xin-ban\" (A Wedding in a New Style), GRRB, 4 July, 1964. 361 the youths who came to make fun in the bridal chamber found the door closed because the couple had already gone to bed. They angrily broke down the:door and made the bride \"taking airplane\" by throwing her in the air and finished by breaking one of her arms (ZGQNB, 28 March, 1958). There was some change in regard to the bride's residence after marriage. Before the revolution, the common practice in Shandong was that the bride passed at least eight months a year in her own family-during the first three to five years of marriage. She took her husband's family as permanent residence only when she had had several children and had become familiar with both her husband and his family. 1 1 Now, in Mazhuang, the wife stayed a longer time in each year with her husband if they had set up a separate household after marriage. However, the old practice was still not uncommon. - Accord-ing to informant C, in her village most of the youngrmarirJie'd/wvomenywent to their husbands' families only during the busy season and on some important occasions such as the New Year and mid-August during the first year of marriage. Under such conditions, the mutual affection between husband and wife was neither necessary nor expected. The overt affec-tion between young couples usually received a critical eye, whereas coldheartedness was considered normal behavior. For example, here is a report about a model worker: This custom seems not to be common in all China. C. K. Yang has said: \"except for ceremonial occasions, frequent visits by the wife to her own parents' home were dis-couraged\" (Yang, 1959b : 111). I do not know to what extent this custom has been prevailing in China. ^Another source\" gives indication that in Hui'an County, Fujian Province, the similar custom was practiced under the name of \"zuo-jia\" (staying at home). A Chinese writer quoted from the History of Marriage in Hui'an County of Fujian Province: \"According to the local custom, a married woman had to go back to her own family on the third day after the wedding. Since then she would go to her husband's home only during the busy season and on the occasion of the new year and other important festivals until she gave birth to a child. In some cases married women could remain in their own families for twenty years. That is why no real affection existed between husband and wife\" Yang Wen, \"Xin Zhong-guo de huh-yin Zhi-du\" (The Marriage System in New China), ZGXW (Guangzhou), 10 March, 1966. 362 Chen Zhong-wan, a young worker of the magnesium mine in Ye County of Shandong Province, has always insisted on full atten-dance at work since he came to the mine in October, 1958. The National Holiday of last year was the third time he and his fiancee decided to get married. The first time they chose for the ceremony was on the new year day 1959. Because Chen was too busy in the mine, he finally persuaded his fiancee to postpone their marriage to the 1st May holiday in 1960. Unfortunately on that day Chen was still too busy to take a holiday. The date of their marriage thus was changed to another time on the National Holiday in 1961. Three days before the holiday Chen made an extra effort to accomp-lish the target of September so that he could go home to get married. The day of the wedding was precisely the last day of his holiday. As soon as the wedding finished, he insisted immediately on going back to work. The members of his family all said that it was not important to miss one working day for a marriage. He responded: \"It is indeed not important to miss one working day for one person, but it will certainly be catastrophic if everybody misses one working day!\" He explained to his brother, sister-in-law and his bride the reason why the production task had to take precedence over private affairs and promised that he would come home to visit them when possible in the future during holidays. Understanding that they could not hold him, the brother proposed to carry him back on his bicycle early the next morning in order that heico'uldapdsstthe wedding night, at home. At three o'clock the groom awoke his brother and asked him to accompany him to go back to work. When he arrived at the mine it was not yet day (GRRB, 4 February, 1962). Though this report relates an extreme case and was published with the intention of spread-ing some pro ing some propaganda, it indicates the normal pattern of relationship between young married couples which the public could expect and praise. IV WOMEN'S POSITION 1 2 The women's position will be seen at two levels: within the family and in the society at large. For the situation of women's position in China after the period of my study a brief account was done by Norma Diamond based on first hand information. N. Diamond, \"Collectivization, Kinship and the Status of Women in Rural China\", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Special Issue : Asian Women, Vol. 7, No.~H January-March, 1975. 363 A . Women's Status in the Family In the traditional Chinese family stratification of status was based on the difference in sex and in age: women were subordinate to men and younger to older. Since the revolution, both the Party and the government had concentrated much effort, including the promulgation of marriage laws, to reverse the trend. Some salient results 13 have been gained. With the establishment of the people's communes, some additional conditions in favor of the ascendancy of women's status in the family has been created. In Mazhuang Brigade, no maltreatment of daughter-in-law by mother-in-law, the symbol of women's tragedy in old China, was possible because of the actual separation of households after the son's marriage or the possible separation in case of dispute. Some-times the separation of households could be limited by material considerations such as lack of lodging space. That is Swhy this problem was so important in the eyes of a girl when a marriage was being negotiated. Not having enough room in a family meant great difficulty in finding a wife for the son. The position of wife vis-a-vis her husband was raised too, although to a lesser extent. The possibility of divorce greatly reduced the husband's arrogance. However, the wife was still somewhat subordinate to her husband because he was chief of the house-hold by tradition and the principal income earner. In Mazhuang, after the over-hasty mess-hall movement in 1958-1959, no mess halls actually survived. There were no nurseries either. Only during the busy season were some old women mobilized to take care of the small children. As a rule the housework fell on the shoulders of the wife while the husband was working in the field. After the wife had several children it was impossible for her to work regularly in the field. Only the mature daughter could go to 1 3 See C. K. Yang, 1959, Chapter VI : The Ascendance of the Status of Women, pp. 105-116. 364 the field and work as much as a son. As a result, the unmarried daughters were much better treated than before, although parents' preferences were still for a son. As for the inheritance of property, custom was still stronger than law. At any rate, it was not very meaningful without land. In general, daughters did not inherit the parents' house or furniture if there was a son. B. Women's Status in the Society C. K. Yang gave three elements symbolizing the low status of women in the traditional society: loss of their name, seclusion and lack of education (Yang, 1959b : 105-116). All three had changed to varying degrees since the revolution. After the promulgation of the marriage law, officially, the wife had the right to use her own sur-name (Chapter three, Article II). This became common in the cities when women worked in offices or factories, but still was not common in the countryside. For example, in Mazhuang, most families were related to each other by agnate ties, so they usually ad-dressed each other in kinship terms without necessarily mentioning the surname. As for people of other surnames, they addressed each other in fictive kinship terms in which only the husband's surname was involved. As a result, married women's own surnames were not currently used in the countryside. By contrast, women's seclusion was completely broken down. As a matter of fact, before the revolution women's seclusion was only applied to the people above the middle peasant families. The poor peasants had no economic means by which to keep their women in seclusion. First, the poor peasants had no large houses in which to hide their women from view. Secondly, they needed their women in the field. Now, in the commune, apart from the enforced propaganda of women's liberation, the material 365 foundation for women's seclusion no longer existed. There were no large size families and no big houses which had constituted one of the conditions necessary to seclude the women. But above all everybody must participate in outdoor work during the busy season. This made any seclusion impossible. In Mazhuang, girls had an almost equal opportunity for elementary school edu-cation. However, if a family could not afford to send all its children to school, it preferred to send the boys first and kept the girls for housework. At the level of middle school, because it was in another village, the parents also preferred to send boys first. As a result of tradition, women still lagged behind men in education, though women's access to education had been greatly improved in comparison with the pre-revolution situation. In spite of remaining unfavorable conditions for women, the fundamental change in women's social status since the commune movement lay in their economic in-dependence. In the traditional society, the property (mostly in the form of land) was in the hands of men from generation to generation, whereas women had, in the normal case, no right of inheritance. Moreover, the forced seclusion and ignorance of women deprived them of occupational opportunities. Therefore, women's dependency on men was total. But in the commune, land belonged to the collectivity and women were en-couraged to work on the same footing as men, so women actually were and, above all, psychologically felt independent from men. In Mazhuang women were usually assigned to lighter work than men, but a few unmarried adult women who had enough physical strength could earn as many work-points as men under the principle of \"equal pay for equalvwork\". It should be noted that in a 366 different place the situation could be different. For instance, in informant Os village, because the villagers had lace embroidery as sideline production, the unmarried girls used to do embroidery at home while the married women went to the field. Generally speaking, in the commune system women had the same access to work as men if they were physically able?,, and wanted to work. This opening up of work opportunity made it no longer necessary for women to live under the threat of hunger which had forced them to submit to an inferior status in the old times. As for leadership, women still were not equal to men, In Mazhuang, only one out of five cadres was a woman. The vice-commander of the brigade was a woman. In informant Os village, the proportion of female leaders was still smaller. This is because, firstly, the traditional conception of women's incompetence was still strong and, secondly, the patrilocal practice did not work in favor of women's prestige. ?r> Xu Jian-chun, the woman director o'f the Xiyou Commune was one of a few exceptions. V THE COMMUNAL LIFE IN MAZHUANG Mazhuang Brigade was-neither a model (never mentioned in the press) nor a very poor unit, and can be seen as average. It is situated four kilometres from the county seat and 90 kilometres from Jinan, the capital of Shandong, to which it was linked by a highway. In addition, a special railway communcated with the coal mine which is about 2.5 kilometres to the south of Mazhuang and Jinan. There were two coal mines: a big one and a small one. The big mine belonged to the state with workers recruited from everywhere. The coal was extracted to support the industrial centres and could not be consumed on the spot. The small mine was exploited for local consumption under the supervision of the county. Workers in the small mine were recruited temporarily 367 from the neighboring communes. Workers' wages were paid to the brigades and the latter Transformed them into work-points. Owing to the exploitation of coal mines, an electric power station was set up about 1966. But Mazhuang was not equipped with electric light until the late 1960's. However, in 1965, the Wangguadian People's Commune to which the Mazhuang brigade belonged had a tractor station. Every brigade had its own pumping stations. The people of Mazhuang were far from rich, but had enough to eat and to wear. Almost all households that had young people had bicycles and transistors. A large number of households had sewing machines. The people purchased their secondary necessities in the periodicasl-market (every 5 days according to the lunar calendar) in Yixian Village which was 1.5 kilometres distant. A big market was in the county seat where more varieties of goods were found and the prices were also a little cheapter. The peasants usually went to the market to sell small quantities of grain, vegetables, fowl and eggs and to buy small tools, clothes and other articles of daily use. The brigade could kill pigs to sell meat. More women than men went to the market because the men were busier in the fields. The work time for the peasants was usually from 5 to 8 A M , from 11 AM to 2 PM and from 3 to 6 PM. During the busy season, the peasants started for the fields at 4 A M , at 11 AM they took a break to eat and have a nap, and started again at 3 PM. Then they continued to work until very late in the night. But work under such pressure lasted only one week to ten days. Usually, the peasants took two meals, but during the busy season they could take three or four. Following the creation of the people's commune, the peasants had a sense of security. They knew that provided they worked they would be compensated. If they 368 were really short of anything, the collective could help them. They were also aware that the collectivity was much stronger than small.farmers in resisting natural calamities. They could no longer quit their native places during the hard years to beg elsewhere. The old people especially were relieved from the threat of being deserted by an unfilial son. As in the old times, peasants in Mazhuang still placed importance on the con-tinuation of family lines. Generally speaking, they worked hard in the hope of improv-ing their living standards. However, they were used to a frugal life. The rise in living standards was far more manifested in the form of savings than in comsumption. The pea-sants had to build savings in order to construct new houses and to prepare in advance for the necessary expenses of son's betrothals and weddings. As a matter of fact, building a new house was not for oneself but for the sons and their future households. It has to be recalled that having a new house was a favorable condition for getting a daughter-in-law. The cost of a house of three units varied from 700 yuan (in sunburn brick) to 1,000 yuan (in kiln made brick). It represented the savings of many years for an average household living a frugal life. While they could anticijpate the continuation of the family line, the peasants were not unhappy with the hardships of their life. VI TRENDS OF FAMILY LIFE IN THE COMMUNE Marion J . Levy thought, after his analysis of the family revolution in modern China, that the particularism based on the kinship system was a major obstacle to the spread of modern industry in China, and the western pattern of family organization would triumph in China more probably than any others (see Chapter One, Section I, pp. 14-15). 369 Levy's analysis, like the analyses of many other sociologists and economists on the societies of the Third World, was based on the assumption that China would and must take the same way of development as the western societies had passed through. Since the establishment and the stabilization of the people's communes, it can be said that China has definitely taken a different path of development from the western model. Therefore, in the commune framework, the approach of particularism versus universalism advanced by Talcott Parsons as a conceptual tool, is not so meaningful as in the develop-ing countries that have taken the western model of development. Let us try to explain the reason. It is true, as Marion Levy has pointed out, that \"the family organization is in all societies an ineradicable stronghold of particularism and functional diffuseness\" (Levy, Jr., 1949 : 317). The larger the proportion of the total social structure covered by the family structure, the stronger and more permeating is the particularism in the society. The western developmental experience indicates that evolution of human be-havior from particularism towards universalism went along together with the weakening of family structure. The weakening of family structure which has been interpreted as a condition favorable to industrialization has been manifested in the first place by the replacement of the family by other social organizations in its functions of satisfying human needs, and in the second place, by the reduction of family size as well as the size of the kinship network. According to my study on the family organization in France and Switzerland, the most detrimental force in breaking down the large family and family community was much less the industrialization itself than its concomitant: the urbanization. 1 4 Because of the rapid spread of urbanization in the last centuries, in France, for example, the large families in the countryside could not survive the ac-celerated and continuing reduction of their members. By contrast, in China, the Chinese model of development is an industrialization without urbanization (see Chapter Two, Section III, p. 47). The creation of the People's communes not only stopped the mobility of rural population toward cities, but enabled the countryside to absorb a part of the urban population. We have some evidence to suggest that within the commune framework the traditional family structure is essentially preserved though changed in some important respects. Even the kinship network seems to be able to perpetuate itself without the formal lineage organization. Particularism will not necessarily be replaced by universal-ism, but it can certainly be balanced by the comradeship between members of the Party on the one hand, and by the notion of the \"state\" indoctrinated through political cam-paigns on the other. In this case, the Chinese particularism would not be so detrimental to the industrialization as it might have been in other circumstances. To study the Chinese family in the commune framework, Michael Ames1 dimen-sional approach in studying Indian families could be a useful conceptual fool (Ames, 1973). Although the economic development in India and in China is different, there are many common traits in the family structure in the two societies (Gore, 1968). If the Indian family has not changed along the line from joint family to nuclear family under the impact of modernization, there is little chance to expect the Chinese family to do so. The small 1 4 See for example, Louis Delzons, La Tamil le franchise et son evolution, 1913; Henri Mendras, La fin des paysdns : innovations et changement dansTagr i cuItuVia franqaise, 1967; E. H. Lacombe, Les chahgemehfs de la sociSte' francaise, 1971; Walter Sorell, The Suiss : A Cultural Panorama of Switzerland, 1972; andArmin Gretler and Pierre-Emeric Mandl, Values, Trends and Alternatives in Suiss Society, 1973. 371 size of household in the Chinese commune alone cannot indicate any meaningful change in the family structure, just as the similar situation did not change the Indian families. K. Ishwarari said: \"It has been shown that at any given point of time, the composition of most Indian households is not joint. This fact in itself does not prove that great changes have occurred, since even in the past, most households were not joint. Despite the pre-valence of a large number of residentially nuclear families, empirical evidence suggests that Indian values and attitudes are still generally in favor of the joint family: (Ishwaran, 1971). Kapadia's statement is as meaningful to the Indian family as to the Chinese family. He said: \"Even in those cases where the property is divided and the income of the members of families is not pooled...the constituent families maintain their connec-tions through mutual cooperation and rights and obligations other than those or property,\" (Kapadia, 1959)* Reuben and Hansen Hill have classified households into five types of jointness (1963) which have been adopted by I. P. Desai in the study of the Indian family (1964). Similar to Hill's classification, the dimensional approach suggested by Ames is defined with reference to messing, residence, property, kinship network and ideal, an approach which goes beyond the types of households into the sphere of the family. So a five-dimensional approach (the commensal dimension, residential or house-hold dimension, property or coparcenary dimension, network dimension and ideal dimen-sion) has been worked out for his study on the Indian family of Jamshedpur (Ames, 1973). With this approach as a conceptual tool, we will see that the trend of the changes of the Chinese family in the commune was not similar to the trends in the industrialized societies. The following are the major trends drawn from the limited data obtained by interviews. 372 A . Size of Family The size of family cannot be defined only by the size of the household, because the household tended to be either as small as nuclear or as large as famille souche. In-deed, the young married wives mostly preferred to live independently of their parents-in-law. But when they grew older and became mothers-in-law themselves, they would prefer to live with one married son. Insofar as the welfare funds of the brigade or team could not support all old persons, the responsibilitycof supporting old parents would rest on the sons (or daughters if no son). Insofar as the social services such as nurseries and mess halls were not widely available, an old grandmother was always a helpful hand in looking after children and doing other housework in order that the daughter-in-law might earn work-points. Therefore, it can be said that the present conditions in the commune favor the household of the stem family (famille souche) type. The present lodging condition can also be seen as a kind of limitation to large size households. Before the revolution, the size of the house matched the amount of the wealth and the number of the members of the family. After all land and foundations of houses had been collectivized, the family that wanted to build a new house had to apply for permission to do so from the brigade or the commune. The place of new building was in general under the unified planning of the brigade or commune. A new house built for a married son might not necessarily be next to the father's dwelling. The new archi-tecture tended to set up small units of residence. However, a separate married son's household could not be seen as a separate family, because all the married sons had the responsibility of supporting their parents both by turning work-points over to them, and by giving services in case of necessity. For instance, informant A who worked in a city was,obliged to ask for a year-long leave 373 to serve her mother-in-law who was sick in the countryside. If the parents lived with one married son, the other married sons were considered as members of the same family. When both parents were dead the relationship between brothers became somewhat dif-ferent, but both sides were still bound by mutual obligations. As the commune structure had stabilized the population mobility in the countryside, these mutual obligations among close kin would certainly be reinforced by the togetherness of work and living. Should the intra-village marriage prevail under the influence of easy contact between young people of the same village, the traditional agnatic kinship network would suffer from the emergence of kinship by affinity. According to my informants, the rela-tives on the wife's, mother's, daughter's and sister's side had already acquired an un-usual importance in the urban areas. The weakening of paternal lineage would certainly open up the possibility of closer interdependence between affinal kin who had been ex-cluded from the circle of family in the traditional society. It is not improbable that the conception of family would be affected by such a change. Limited by data, no conclusion can be drawn in this connection. It can only be suggested that a family can, at the present time, include several households. The size of family should be studied because the notion and conception of family is in full evolution. Two variables can be singled out as important agents of change: women's perception of the family which has been mentioned in the former section and village endogamy as mentioned above. B. Pattern of Marriage Under the commune structure, it is doubtful that the principle of exogamy could be maintained indefinitely as an absolute rule. Informant C has given evidence that in 374 her village (multi-surnamed) girls began to have preference for infra-village marriage. The cases of village endogamy have been even more frequent in Guangdong Province than in North China according to my informants from this province. Any quantitative change from exogamy to endogamy will have far-reaching influence on both the family institution and marriage patterns. Insofar as the marriage pattern is concerned, the essence has changed little; what was visibly different from the traditional pattern is rather a question of form. The essence of marriage can be seen in three components: choice of partners, contract of marriage and place of residence of married couple. In the first place, the choice of partners was no longer forced because the two parties had the right of veto which was guaranteed by law. However, they were not really free in comparison with the pattern of mate choice in the western countries. With few exceptions, the general pattern of the choice of partner and the decision-making in contracting marriage in the countryside was still handled by parents through a go-between. Secondly, the contract of marriage was accompanied, or can even be said to be symbolized, by a bride-price (or bride presents). This indicates the continuity of patriar-chal dominance in marriage, especially in connection with the patrilocal practice and the position of women in the family. Thirdly, the residence of married couples was still patri local. If the newly married couple did not live under the same roof of the husband's father's house, they would live in the husband's village in a house built by the husband's family. All the three components of the marriage pattern could be affected by the change from exogamy to endogamy. This is because ( 1 ) village endogamy could have more chance 375 to be based on real \"free choice\" (or romantic love); (2) endogamous marriage enabled the bride to stay close to her family so that she could continue to help her family in case of need; the bride-price which was mainly a compensation for the loss of a member on the part of the bride's family would no longer be very meaningful in such a case; (3) en-dogamy would make the patrilocal practice lose some of its characteristics by the equal physical closeness to the families of both partners. However, although the commune structure seemed to favor the endogamous mar-riage, the old trend could not be easily changed when the economic development was un-equal in different places. While people were bound by the communal organization, one of few possible ways of moving to a better place was through marriage. Women could not miss the opportunity of taking advantage of the old exogamy practice. C . Family hierarchy and interpersonal relationships The traditional hierarchy in the family based on the differentiation of sex and age was in general retained with some modifications. As a rule, the nominal head of a household was always the oldest male. A widow-mother who lived with her married son recognized the latter as the nominal head of the family. The stratification of status and allocation of authority in the family was thus always structured along the double criteria of sex and age. The modifications of this hierarchy came from two sources: the Party (or political power) and the financial contribution to the family. A member of the family who held an important Party or administrative position in the commune, though he or she was not the nominal head of the family, had more weight in the decision-making in family affairs than without such a position. It is also true of a member who made a large financial contribution to the family. This member, in either of the above 376 cases, was likely to be a male between 25 and 65 years old. Only in a few cases could this member occasionally be an adult daughter or a daughter-in-law. Therefore, the family power was still held in the hands of an adult male under 65 years old. Owing to the present pattern of marriage which was not founded on \"romantic love\", the relationship between parents and children always took precedence over that between husband and wife. In spite of the dissolution of the formal lineage organization, the family was still viewed more as an institution to carry on the patrilineal line than a simple union of a man and a woman for a common life. However, if you ask your in -formants the question: \"What is a family?\" the answer might be: \"A family is the union of a man and a woman with their children working together for the cause of revolution. \" But if you continue your interview in depth, you will soon find that this answer is but an easy sentence learned from the political courses and does not correspond either to the reality or to the informant's real feelings. I have said previously that the old habit in which a married woman lived with her own family for most of the time during the first years of marriage still prevailed in some places, so the affectional tie between husband and wife was rather loose at the beginning of the marriage. The: worker who cold-heartedly left his bride behind the day after their wedding to rush to his work is a mean-ingful example. This tie could only be gradually strengthened as time went on after the wife's bearing of children into the family. The loose relationship between husband and wife was both the cause and con-sequence of the strong link between parents and children, especially between father and son. Because the young people were not used to expressing their affection toward their spouses, they expressed more toward their parents and other persons including siblings and friends of the same sex . 1 3 On the other hand, the parents-children tie was too strong (a consequence of the loose tie between parents themselves) to allow the young to indulge themselves in the \"romantic love\" of the western style before and after the marriage. As the sons (sometimes daughters too) were still the most reliable support in old age, the affection and hope that the parents poured into children (especially sons) were so intense that the children would have felt like traitors if they had not been able to return that effection at the same level of intensity due to their attention being absorbed too much by their spouses. Thorns why the father-son relationship was not only a dominant figure in the family, but also one in the society at large. There is no sign of significant change in this sphere in the near future so long as the marriage pattern has not shifted and the welfare system for the old people is not im-proved to the point of releasing the son from the duty of supporting old parents. The data from Mazhuang (informants A and B) combined with those from Yangjiagao (informant C) and Qiho (informant D) show that the traditional family structure was, in the main, maintained in the commune framework with some changes which might have far-reaching influence on an eventual new orientation. But so far no significant changes within the family structure have yet become definitive. It is of some interest to note that the result of my analysis is very similar to that of William L. Parish, Jr. 's which was based on the data from Guangdong Province (Parish, 1975b). The most meaningful change in 1 5 A Chinese who died for the cause of friendship should not be mistaken as a case of b homosexuality. This is because the friendship is a very emotional experience in China, almost of the same intensity as love in the western culture. As for the re-lationship between husband and wife and that between siblings, I have two friends who have divorced just because their sisters did not like their wives. This is under-standable for a Chinese, but is rather strange for a westerner. this sphere was the external family relationship, in other words, the extension of the family, or the lineage and its corresponding social organizations such as fictive kinship organizations in the form of \"zong-qiri hui\" (kinship association) or in the form of secret societies. Two forces were functionally detrimental to the large network of kinship: the rise of the Party as a new centre of loyalty and the commune system as both the unit and organizer of production. The political functions and economic functions of line-age and the like were taken over respectively by the Party and the commune organizations. An individual could no longer rely merely on his family and his kin for satisfying his multiple needs. From this point of view, the change was tremendous. In consequence, the family was no longer so much the core of the Chinese social organization as was the case in the traditional society. However, its influence on human behavior in the society at large was still strongly felt. 379 Chapter Twelve CONCLUSION From the point of view of development, the Chinese experience since 1840 up to the commune movement of 1958 on can be seen as a restructuring of the fabric of the traditional Chinese society. This restructure has two determinants: the pre-existing structure and the agents of change introduced from outside in the form of both ideas and material forces (commercial goods and military invasion). As I have suggested at the beg-ginning of this thesis, the process of this restructuring has been viewed as having passed from the traditional stage, through the transitional stage, to the socialist stage (see Chapter Two). This division into different stages does not necessarily mean, however, that the fabric-of the society was fundamentally changed from one stage to another. Rather, it indicates that some changes occurred in the different stages and these can provide indi-cators pointing to a new direction. In the light of this argument, the development of the Chinese society can be seen as having shifted its orientation from one stage to another without the social structure being completely changed. During the \"transitional stage\", under the direct impact of the western powers, Chinese society began to move towards capitalistic development , in that developments in western societies, especially the American society, were taken as its model. But this orientation was diverted by the socialist revolution, and a new orientation, which can be called \"the Chinese road to socialism\", as Wheelwright and McFarlane have termed it, replaced western influence. As far as development is concerned, the century-long stage of transition was largely eclipsed by the quarter-century long stage of socialism in which the Chinese social fabric was shaped into a new form. Some sociologists, such as C. K. Yang (1959), 380 think that the achievement under socialism was a continuation of the transitional stage in terms of modernization. In my view, the third stage should be viewed as a departure from the transitional stage rather than a continuation of it. Though the transitional stage had paved the way for the arrival of socialism,'the socialist stage has retained more traits of the traditional stage than of the transitional one. I A THEORETICAL SUGGESTION FOR A N APPROACH TO TRADITIONAL CHINESE SOCIETY During the traditional stage, the Chinese society was composed of three elements: state, gentry and peasantry. The three elements were hierarchically linked together. This structural configuration has been directly or indirectly suggested by a variety of studies on traditional Chinese society by scholars such as Fei Hsiao-t'ung (1968), Hsiao Kung-cn'uan (1960), Ho Ping-ti (1962), Chang Chung-li (1955), and others. This vertical hierarchy was structurally intertwined with dchbrizontal network, namely, the lineage system. While the vertical force was working to polarize class differentiation, the horizontal force restrained it by establishing boundaries. An equilibrium was thus made up dialectically by two opposing and complementary forces. If we present it by a static schema, it can be conceived as a dual extension of which two forces (the class polariza-tion extends vertically while the lineage system extends horizontally) being neutralized by each other. Each of the two needed support from the other; therefore, neither could acquire ardominant position. I suggest we call this structural situation a \"coextensive structure \" . The structure of three elements characterizes functions of the traditional Chinese society and the \"coextensive structure\" indicates its social processes. 381 Within the former, the three categories, state, gentry and peasantry, were functionally related to each other. The state depended on the gentry for communication with and control over the peasantry as well as for recruiting its members to fill the state bureaucracy. The gentry depended on the state to grant it authority and to legitimate its social status. The peasantry depended.; on the gentry for economic means (land and/or loans) arid moral resources, and on the state for legal justice. Finally, both the state and gentry depended on the peasantry for material supplies. To maintain these relation-ships was the social goal. A breakdown would benefit none of the three. The balance between the gentry and the peasantry was however precarious when social status, econo-mic means and moral resources were almost entirely concentrated in the hands of the former. There was always, therefore, a force working to pull the two classes apart. They could have been so polarized in a relatively short time, say, one hundred years or so, if there had been no lineage system to restrain this force. Among others, two vari-ables in the lineage system can be seen as essential restraining forces on class polarization. First, the system of equal sharing of their fathers' property by sons after the abolition of the premogeniture system in very early times eliminated the possibility of concentrating wealth accumulated by generations. Second, owing common property by all members of the lineage was a general rule of all lineages, afule which also impeded the concentra-tion of wealth in one household. Before the western impact, class polarization in China had never reached the point of threatening to undermine the whole social system in spite of the rise and fall of dynasties. It can be suggested that traditional Chinese society had reached the point of material and moral self-sufficiency. All it needed to do was to maintain the structural framework within which the society developed according to its own orientation. This 382 orientation definitely did not point to an industrialized society of the modern western type. The abundance of scholarly works of the Confucian school since the Han Dynasty shows that the Chinese before the western impact were not unaware of or unconcerned with their destiny. A Confucian \"manifesto\", written two thousand years before Marx's manifesto, greatly stimulated the imagination of the traditional Chinese elite. This is the \"Datong Pian\" (The Great Union) in Li Ji (The Book of Rituals): When the Grand course was pursued, a public and common spirit ruled all under the sky; they chose men of talents, virtue, and ability; their words were sincere, and what they cultivated was harmony. Thus men did not love their parents only, nor treat as children only their own sons. A competent provision was secured for the aged till their death, employment for the able-bodied, and the means of growing up to the young. They showed kindness and compassion to widows, orphas, childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, so that they were all sufficiently maintained. Males had their proper work, and females had their homes. (They accumulated) articles (of value), disliking that they should be thrown upon the ground, but not wishing to keep them for their own gratification. (They laboured) with their strength, disliking that it should not be exerted, but not exerting it (only) with a view to their own advantage. In this way (selfish) schemings were repressed and found no development. Robbers, filchers, and rebellious traitors did not show themselves, and hence the outer doors remained open, and were not shut. This was (the period of) what we call the Grand Union. .^ It contained more detail in terms of an ideal society than Marx's work and had served as a guide for both moral and economic development in China for two thousand years. What is interesting is that the Confucian manifesto described a type of society similar to Marx's ideal except that this earlier one would be based on the cooperation derived from the extension of familism instead of cooperation between class brothers. It is unclear to us to what extent the development of the traditional Chinese society had been influenced Li Chi (Book of Rites), translated by James Legge, 1967 (reed.) : 364-366. 383 by such an ideal. Studies of the evolution of the Chinese lineage organizations, which are still, unfortunately, lacking, may shed a new light on this question. Nonetheless, what I have learned strongly suggests that the originally defensive structure of lineage organization had a tendency to move toward a relatively open structure and that con-flict between lineages gradually moved to cooperation. It is in the light of this hypo-thesis that I have suggested that the \"coextensive structure\" of the traditional Chinese society indicates its social processes. Despite the drastic deviation from its customary orbit, the modern Chinese society is likely to be still bound to some extent by the tradi-tional structural remains in its development. II FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE From the above schema, we can see that the peasants' problems and agricultural development in China could have occurred in a different order if there had been no inter-vening forces from outside strong enough to break down the existing social structure. But the expansion of the western powers forced China to open her doors since 1840. During one century, Chinese society experienced a process of disintegration which was symp-tomized by the ruin of the peasantry and the collapse of the rural economy. China is predominantly an agricultural country. The development of Chinese economy meant, for the major part, the need to solve the problems of the peasantry. I have already advanced the argument as to why the problems of the Chinese peasantry could not be solved only by modernizing the productive forces without changing produc-tion relationships (Chapter Four, Section III). The change of production relationships had been completed by a series of engineered policies and programs such as land reform, cooperativization and the people's communes. The commune movement was the last 384 step in collectivization. Its functional characteristics in regard to solving the peasant problems can be sketched in four aspects. A . Natural Calamities One of the peasants' problems in Chinese history was the cyclical nature calamities. Because of the climatic variations, droughts and floods frequently caused famine and important losses of harvests. Irrigation systems had been considered as a crucial factor in agriculture since early times, but had never succeeded in eliminating the major natural calami.tlifes?. The small farm economy had not only no effective means to under-take large projects of irrigation, but could even hardly benefit from the existing irrigation systems owing to the piecemeal structure of the Aullitiwdted Hand.. It is easy to understand that only the collective economy could provide large enough capital and manpower for the construction of large projects and make unified plans. It is also understandable\"that only the large extent of land would benefit better from the irrigation systems. B. Peasant Rebellions Another major peasant problem in Chinese history was the peasant rebellions which were sometimes caused by natural calamities and sometimes by man-made reasons. The people's commune offered a solution.iotthis problem by putting the political and econ-omic power into the hands of poor peasants, by making the peasant his own master and, above al l , by finding valuable outlets for releasing their potential of initiative and creativity. This is why Paul T.K. Lin called it a \"people-oriented\" development (1975). 385 C. Modernization There is no doubt that the only way for the contemporary thinking and imagina-tion to attain modernization is through industrialization. What remains is to choose how to achieve the industrialization. In contrast to the capitalist pattern in which capital and technology are concentrated in a few metropolitan areas, the Chinese pattern is des-cribed as \"walking on two legs\". That is to say, the concentrated use of capital and technology in industry is not neglected, but a decentralized development of industry has been advocated and carried out with great effort. The development of local industry is aimed at gradually eliminating the \"three big differences\" (the difference between pea-sants and workers, the difference between cities and countryside, and the difference bet-ween those who use brains and those who use brawn). For developing local industry, the commune system is not only superior to the small farm economy but also superior to the cooperatives. I have said in Chapter Eight that the changing direction of local industry in the 1960's does not mean that the local industry was abandoned for good. If was a deli-berate measure to make full use of the existing traditional handicrafts. When the latter reaches! maturity, it will be the time of better development of local industry. The increase of reserve funds of the brigades in the case-studies in this thesis can provide some indicators in the matter of capital accumulation which is one of the curcial prerequisites of industr-ial development. The commune system has no doubt formed the best framework so far as we can see for unified planning and concentrated use of capital and manpower on the scale of local industry. 386 D. Goals and Ideal of Development Students of Chinese society have argued that the family was a key aspect of social organization in the traditional stage. Though some aspects of familism might ob-struct modernization, \"family\" as a primary social group has been seen as central in China's \"modernization\". According to the western experience of modernization, nothing was more destructive to the traditional familial organization than the rapid urbanization and disintegration of rural communities. The family network and the rural communities in 2 China have not only been preserved by the establishment of the people's communes, but at the same time reinforced by a general strategy in economic development in the whole country (cf. Gurley, 1971). In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the rural communities were likely to be able to create new jobs for local youth, and to absorb some of the youth from urbanized areas.'- A communal life in which the family could still play an important role and which is less and less possible in the western industrialized societies has been sf.dbi;liizedcby the commune system. Some scholars think that the establishment of the people's commune brought a fatal blow to the traditional familial organization. Richard Hughes' description may be an extreme example, but certainly not the only one of this view. He said: \"Houses had either been commandeered or burned down and replaced by barrack-line dormitories. Husbands and wives had been segregated in different dormitories and were allowed to meet privately only once every two weeks - and only then if their work for the commune had been satisfactory. Couples lined up in deep humiliation for their brief reunion, after which they were required to separate once more. Families had been broken up and parents saw their children only once or twice a week. There were even reports that the children had been quietly removed from their native communes and that the parents did not know where they had been sent. \" (Hughes, The Chinese Commune, 1960). The study of Maurice Freedman (\"The Family under Chinese Communism\", 1964), that of William L. Parish Jr. (\"Socialism and the Chinese Peasant Family\", 1975b), and mine have all led to the same conclusion, although with different judgment, that the Chinese family structure had persisted in the commune system. Graham E. Johnson's impression during his numerous visits to Guangdong confirms this statement. He says: \"there is urban to rural migradtion, but not the reverse. \" (Johnson, \"Rural Economic Development and Social Change in South China,'' mimeo.\", (1973). 387 Goals and ideals of human life fostered by the traditional family system and cherished by the Chinese people for a long time, which were neglected or blamed for being an obstacle to modernization during the transitional stage, will probable reassume their place among other newly acquired goals in the framework of the people's commune. Cyril S. Belshaw has pointed out that goals constitute the determining factors of a social system (1969 : 39). From this point of view, both the traditional and new ideals can beseen as a crucial factor in determining the:development of the Chinese.social system as a whole. After the functional characteristics in solving the peasants' problems, we have also to examine that which formed the structural characteristics of the commune system. Ill STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE One of the special features of the old structure retained in the commune system is self-control and self-sufficiency. In the traditional stage, village life was charac-terized politically by self-control and economically by self-sufficiency.^ Generally speaking, the village was the unit of agnatic kinship network and served to satisfy the villagers' primary necessities, while the marketing area was the unit of the affinal kin-ship network and served to supply secondary necessities. Except for the landlord class and some of the rich peasants, the activities of the average peasants hardly went beyond the marketing boundaries. Only serious natural calamities and extreme poverty could force the peasants to migrate far away. in rhe r?*3orv.>'f econorii'c, growth, ss!f-;j\". sc.-Both Hsiao Kung-ch'uan and Franz Schurmann have expressed such a point of view (Hsiao,; 388 In the theory of economic growth, self-sufficiency has been viewed as one of the principal features of stagnation (Myint, 1964). The degree of economic growth has thus been seen as depending upon the degree of change from an economy of self-suffi-ciency to one of interdependence. From this point of view, Chinese development with the commune-system departs from western development both in practice and in theory, because the commune system brought about a reinforcement to the self-sufficiency in the rural economy. The emphasis placed on a diversified and overall development in each commune and even in each brigade clearly indicates the goal established for attaining an economic sufficiency in each productive unit. According to Marxist analysis, this is the way not only for getting rid of the western disease of turning interdependence into domination and exploitation, but at the same time for avoiding falling into individual \"alienation\" which has resulted from the advanced mode of division of labor in modern western industry. According to the Marxist ideal: In communist society where nobody has one exclusive field of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind/o ? without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic (Marx and Engels, 1939 : 22). Goal is an important factor especially in a planned economy of development. The Chinese preferred to push development forward by means of Aelf-reliance\" rather than by means of \"diffusion\" from a few technologically advanced metropolis to the wide countryside. Though any spectacular result of economic growth is still to be seen, the communal structure represents no doubt a model of development without necessarily breaking 389 down an economy of \"self-sufficiency\". However, the present \"self-sufficiency\" differs from the traditional one by the structure in which the economic \"self-sufficiency\" operates. In the traditional stage, social processes, as I have pointed out, submitted to the operation of the \"co-extensive structure\". The unit of \"self-sufficiency\" could not expand itself either in wealth or in population beyond the constraint of the forces of the \"co-extensive structure\". Now, one of the three elements which functionally composed the traditional social structure, namely, the gentry class, disappeared. Class polarization is in general no longer possible in the commune.system,^ hence the structure is no longer co-extensive. Each productive unit is a unit of economic self-sufficiency. This unit can expand itself in terms of increase in population and output. One unit can theoretically continue to expand itself until it meets the expansion of other units. The structural siitltjation has become more \"expansive\" through the unit of self-sufficiency than \"co-extensive\" between class polarization and population growth. Therefore, the nation-wide economic planning and birth-control programs will be all the more important in the future. IV DYNAMISM OF THE CHINESE MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT From the functional and structural characteristics of the commune system con-cluded above, it can be seen that with the communes, the development of Chinese society has clearly formed a particular developmental model in response to solving China's own problems. After having attempted to follow first the western model and then the Soviet model, the Chinese finally worked out their own model. The process of reaching such a _ There has existed disparity of incomes among peasants (see Chapter Seven, Section II, subsection D : Examples of Remuneration; also Whyte, 1975), but this disparity is limited and is fundamental Iy different from class polarization in the traditional society. 390 stage was a fumbling experimentation; success was succeeded by failure and failure by success; advance was followed by regression and regression by another advance. It is still at an experimental stage. Changes could intervene at any time to modify the exist-ing structure in some aspects; but the commune system as a whole is likely to. exhibit stability. What makes the communesystem so singular in comparison with the western model, the Soviet model and other Third World models is of great importance. The dyna-mic methods used by the Chinese to develop in a \"more, quicker, better and more econo-mical\" manner have several aspects. A . Turning Labor into Capital When capital is scarce, industrialization suffers. This is the common problem in all countries of the Third World. Many countries have adopted an easy way of either re-ceiving foreign aid in exchange for political or military alliances, or being open to foreign private investment at the price of being forcibly/ integraded into the international market system controlled by a few powerful nations. China is, so far, almost the only country which has relied on her own force to industrialize, except for limited Soviet aid for a short period in the 1950's. Chapter Nine of this study has illustrated the solutions which the Chinese found in relation to the scarcity of capital : turning labor into capital. Labor can be seen to have a \"capital value\". The real question lies in \"how\" to turn labor into capital. Accumulation of capital is the saving value of labor after con-sumption. In the rural areas where the productive force is still too low to make any mean-ingful saving for capital accumulation, the only possible solution is to extract the under-employed labor value and to turn it into the form of basic construction such as water con-servancy and field construction. The basic construction comprises a capital value in two 391 ways: First, the construction itself represents a capital value in economic development. Second, almost all the basic construction could produce added value in either agricul-tural production or in forestry, fishery and sideline production in a short span of time. A great part of this added value could be used in reinvestment as capital. The capital in the form of reserve funds at the commune level or the brigade level has been mainly used in agricultural mechanization and local industry development which will in turn increase the agricultural productivity. Thus, a larger labor force can be saved for basic construction. However, this cycle between labor accumulation and capital accumulation still cannot explain the whole dynamic schema. Without the following two elements this mechanism could not function normally. B. Directed Development To ensure an adequate operation of the above mechanism by means of target fulfillment in the short run, and to ensure the correct direction toward ultimate goals in the long run, development must be directed or planned. Planning work has become a routine at every level. However, the planning of the brigade should not conflict with that of the commune; and thepplanning of the commune should not conflict with that of the county, and so on and so forth up to the level of the centre. The ultimate guidance is not in the form of policy, but in the form of ideology. Policies could be wrong while ideology was always correct. That is why the ideological training and indoctrination have been considered so important both to the local leaders and to the masses as to penet rate through to the lowest organization. In Chapter Ten, Section III, an example of \"directed development\" has been given. The \"directed development\" functioned against 392 economism or the spontaneous forces of capitalism in the historical march of events. For instance, when a few units of production which were favored either by their geograph-ical situation or by their advanced technology pursued purely economic interest by turn-ing their productions into specialization of one economic crop or sideline production, this unit had to be brought back on the correct road of \"overall development with grain production as the foundation\". Otherwise, not only would the whole development schema of the commune.system be affected, it would be no different from capitalistic development. From the point of view of economy and that of ideology, the deliberate.diversion from the (capitalist development model has been viewed as a necessary measure adopted to avoid following the road on which the capitalist countries had moved. The principle of \"directed development\" serves to direct the economic mechanism to function along a planned path. Only in this way can the economic mechanism be effective in relation to achieving the ultimate goal. C . Emphasis on Man Rather than on MerelMaterial in Development It must be pointed out that the belief in the possibility of bettering human nature is both a Chinese conception and a Marxist one, though we are not interested here in the philosophical discussion about its justification. With this belief, man is viewed as both a subject for development and an agent of development. In the first place, man is believed to be able to improve qualitatively through education. The term \"development\" which means in the western countries socioeconomic growth contains in the Chinese case another element, namely, the betterment of human nature. Political courses and study groups of Mao Tse-tung Thought have been organized on the same footing as other productive activities in the communes. One of the focal 393 points of the political indoctrination has been the spirit of collectivism. Collectivism has been seen in China as more than a means of achieving economic goals. It has been believed that human virtue can be produced only through the relationship of at least more than two persons. The collective life is, from the Chinese point of view, an ideal milieu in which human nature can be improved. The several months' long discussion of a young peasant's behavior, organized by the Peking Chinese Youth Newspaper (ZGQNB) in 1956 (see Appendix II) exempli-fied the problem of education in a collective milieu. If Zhang Xi-yuan was not working in the collective, nobody could find what is wrong with him, nor could he find any wrong himself. Now he was working in a collective environment, he could not pretend not to pay attention to what the others thought of him. Even if he could do so, the others would not stay passive for long. Just as the old director of the cooperative-said: \"We certainly have some ways to help Zhang Xi-yuan progress. We cannot stand there just to look at him regress day by day. \" \"Help\" is one of the key words in the Chinese development. It can have an awful connotation for western people because excessive help can sometimes intrude into therealm of \"privacy\" or \"freedom\" which is so serious a matter as to be safeguarded by law. In the western societies, the meaning of \"help\" could be either positive.or negative, depending on the circumstances, whereas in China it can only be positive. This is because in a collective life, \"privacy\" and individual \"freedom\" mean little, if anything at al l . The mutual help, above all the help of an advanced|personor unit, for a backward one, no matter whether it be material or spiritual, isea uvirtue=\"'and constitutes the complementaryprinciple of \"self-reliance\". From this point of view, an individual is under constant \"help\" of everybody in his needs and progress. It is also true of a small productive unit in a large one. Of course, under 394 such circumstances, free choice beyond the model established by socialist ideology is impossible. However, in the final analysis it is doubtful that the scope of free choice beyond the social norms in other countries could be larger. The real question lies in the realm of the value system and self-satisfaction. If the pursued goal is highly valued by the common people and they can get satisfaction from the process of pursuing this goal, it will be all right. In conclusion, man's growth is not only a positive factor for economic growth but a goal in itself. In the second place, man is viewed as an important agent of development. The Chinese experience of development since the socialist revolution has never entirely relied on the purely economic mechanism. That is why leadership has been emphasized in the com-mune. Many successful models in production resulted from good leadership such as the examples of the Xiyou People's Commune (Chapter Five, Section III and Chapter Ten, Sec-tion I) and the Xia Ding-jia Brigade (Chapter Nine, Section III). In order to eschew becom-ing a bureaucratic routine, the double line of leadership has been established. Not being specially in charge of a special function, the Party secretary represents the initiative and driving force of the organism (Chapter Five, Section III, and Chapter Nine, Section III). On the other hand, the method of selecting models among the peasants is also an important approach to encourage peasant initiative and creativity (Chapter Five, Section IV). There-fore, according to the Chinese model of development, man is definitely not a product of socioeconomic evolution, but a being who can creatively intervene in and push forward evolution. Man is thus the last resource of the dynamism of development. In the above sections 1 have sketched a rough configuration and some crucial characteristics of what the Chinese model of development consists of. Now, let us turn to the regional implications of Shandong Province as regards the development in China 395 as a whole. V REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SHANDONG PROVINCE Insofar as the regional studies of the Chinese-society since 1949 are concerned, Guangdong Province is probably the most intensively studied area, due to its proximity to Hong Kong which has been the best point of outlet of information from China during the last three decades. Since research on the commune system of other regions is lacking, the only possible comparison that I can establish remains for the time being between Shandong and Guangdong. Both historically and geographically, Shandong and Guangdong represent two extremities in the diversity of China. Historically, Shandong was an important center of Chinese civilization and produced the most important Chinese philosophers and politi-cians, including Confucius and Mentha, in the early period of Chinese history. Guang-dong is an area of relatively recent settlement, presumably not earlier than the Southern and Northern Dynasties (420-589 A .D . ) . However, it has produced many important per-sonalities such as Sun Yat-sen, Kang Ycu-wei and Liang Qi-chao in recent history. From the point of view of geographical conditions, Shandong has'almost all the unfavorable factors for agriculture within agricultural China, such as frequent droughts and floods, infertility of the soil, scarcity of rainfall, and a short frost-free season, whereas Guangdong stands at the other extreme in this regard. Guangdong was classified by J . L. Buck as in thedouble cropping rice zone (1937 : 27). A great part of Guangdong has become in recent years a tripple-cropping area (Zhong-hua Ren-min Gong-ho-guo Fen-sheng Di-tu, 1974 : 83). By contrast, Shandong used to have only three crops every two years. Only lately could a limited area have double-cropping. Moreover, 396 Guangdong has seventy thousand square kilometres more than Shandong (Guangdong and Shandong have respectively 22 thousand square kilometres, and 15 thousand square kilometres as total area), but has 13 million less population (according to a 1974 source Guangdong had a population of more than 42 million while Shandong had more than 55 million). Another particularity of Guangdong with which no other provinces could com-pare, except only for Fujian Province to a lesser extent, is an important figure of remit-tances coming yearly from abroad since the last century when a sizeable population of this province migrated to America and South Asia. This made the province much better developed in many sectors such as transportation, education and residential buildings before 1949 than any other province in China. Needless to say, Guangdong was also the earliest province to come into contact with western countries and received more influence from the West. From the above comparison, we can see that Guangdong is rather a unique case in China 0 while Shandong shares many more common problems which resulted from the Chinese historical and geographical conditions with a large number of inland prov-inces. Many factors considered as a necessity, and justification in this study in relation to shifting a rich peasant economy or a small farmer economy into a collective type, cannot necessarily be applied to the Guangdong situation. That is why the emigres from Shandong usually have a very different view of the commune system from those from Guangdong. While a great many refugees from Guangdong had risked their lives to cross the gulf to come to Hong Kong, and swore theywould never go back again, the \u00C2\u00B0 Elizabeth and Graham Johnson have observed the distinctive cultural features (language, food, dress, music, etc.) of Guangdong and thought that the people of Guangdong were self-conscious about these particularities as a distinct sub-culture in China (Elizabeth and Graham Johnson, 1976 : 7). 397 few emigres from Shandong province whom I interviewed expressed their willingness to maintain good relations with the Chinese authorities in the hope of an eventual return to their native.place. As Shandong does not possess most of the advantages enjoyed by Guangdong, it might have experienced less resistance to the collectivization than Guangdong and could enjoy more the fruits produced by the collective mode of production. In the light of this comparison, the commune movement in Shandong may be more meaningful than that in Guangdong in regard to the solution of the Chinese peasant problems and the development of rural economy. Now let us turn to the final questions of this theses: What does a Chinese model mean among many other developmental models in the world? And what is the possibility for the Chinese model to be applied outside China? VI THE CHINESE MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT AND ITS APPLICABILITY A . What Makes the Chinese Model Differ from the Soviet cMta'de'l? The essential difference between the Chinese model and the Soviet model lies partially in the emphasis on economic sectors and partially in the technique of mass mobi-lization. The Soviet Union has placed emphasis on heavy industries and developed them with maximum speed regardless of human or economic cost. It has resulted in a remark-able dichotomy of advanced workers and backward peasantry. The Chinese development is characterized by \"walking on two legs\", that is to say, the agricultural sector is seen as being as important as industry. The success of the Soviet model in economic development 398 has relied greatly upon the efficiency of a centralized decision-making apparatus. The manner of mass mobilization carried out by the decision-making apparatus has been des-cribed as mandatory (Chopra, 1975). In China, though the centralized decision-making apparatus is also efficient, the technique of mass mobilization has been mainly participa-tive. In management, the tendency toward decentralization has become increasingly apparent. The grass-roots growth is emphasized in development. B. What Makes the Chinese Model Differ from the Japanese Model? Agricultural cooperatives started in Japan before the Second World War, but did not become a powerful institution until the war-time military government used them for its own aims. The post-war Japanese cooperatives functioned on the one hand as managers of market transactions, and on the other as credit unions to help the tenants become independent from their landlords. In the 1950's, the average size of a Japanese agricultural cooperative was about 400 households, but was enlarged to more than 700 in the late 1960's in order to be able to compete with other business firms in marketing. In comparison with the Chinese commune, the size of the Japanese cooperative is much smaller than a commune but larger than the average brigade. Among the 28,800 Jap-anese cooperatives in 1961, 58.8% were specialized in some particular crops. After the merging of small into larger cooperatives, the specialized cooperatives were increased to 64% of the total in 1968 (12,700 out of 19,700) (Shimpo, 1970). There are four characteristics of the Japanese agricultural cooperatives: (1) the cooperatives are based onnprivate land ownership; (2) they tend to be special-ized in one or a few special crops; (3) they function as agents of mechanizing agricul-ture by offering credit to the farmers; and (4) they function as marketing agents to 399 direct agricultural production according to marketing demands. It is clear from the above characteristics that the Japanese cooperatives were so strictly conditioned by industrialization and so involved in a monetary economy that they were moving toward an \"industry\" themselves. Therefore, it can be said that Japanese agricultural cooperativization was the by-product of Japan's industrialization and conveys all the essential characteristics of the western model of modernization. By contrast, the Chinese communization was not at all the by-product of in-dustrialization. On the contrary, it has imposed conditions on industrialization. By channeling the direction of industrialization the Chinese development aims at creating a stable communal life in the countryside, whereas the Japanese model tends to integrate the peasantry into the industrialized network in accordance with the requirements of the latter. C. What Makes the Chinese Model Differ from the Other Countries of the Third World? Most of the countries in the Third World have either chosen the western model of free economy by relying upon imported technology, foreign aid and investment, and sophisticated industry, or have used a combination of the western model with the central planning of the Soviet style. There have been some:successes during the last three decades such as the cases of Taiwan, South Korea and the Phillipines. It is not difficult to dis-tinguish the Chinese model from these areas. However, some experiences of cooperatives inithe Third World countries may arouse some interest when compared with the Chinese commune. For instance, in Mexico there has emerged a type of peasant cooperative in the form of recreational enterprises. I cite a case from my personal knowledge. Atotonilco, in the State of Morelos, was 400 originally a farm village. A few competent peasants took the initiative to make their land more productive. They organized themselves into a cooperative by pooling together their land. With the help or collaboration of bankers in the city, they built a modern hotel with a huge tropical garden on their land. The hotel was run by the cooperative and created a large number of jobs for the villagers. So, many peasants were transformed into servants and gardeners of the hotel. By attracting people who look for warm sunny weather, not only from the Mexican cities but also from places as far away as the United States, the hotel has made a considerable profit. Since then, the village has undergone a remarkable change. The villagers have been rapidly modernized and are certainly much better off in a material sense than before. The question is not how fast the modernization was introduced into the area, nor to what extent the income of the villagers has been increased, but that some nefarious consequences could be brought about by this change in the long-run development. In the first place, this transformation from small farmers into cooperative has reinforced the existing economic structure of dependence. In the second place, the independent and creative peasants have been reduced to an enslaved position by the relationship contained in this structure. The Chinese commune system aims at breaking any economic dependence of area upon area, and domination and exploitationoofrman by man. If the informant who blamed the commune cadres for ignoring the basic economic facts because they cut down the more lucrative orange groves to plant less lucrative food grain (see Chapter Ten, Section Illi)\ (The Finance Semi-monthly) DGB (Da-gone Bao^ Ki&M^ (The P u b l i c News),, Hong Kong DGB. (Da-goag Bao) k^Jik. (The P u b l i c News), Peking DZRB (Da-zhong Ri-bao) Js^JX i 3 ^ ( T h e Masses Daily),. J i n a n GMRB (Guang-mlng Ri-bao) $%k. (The L i g h t D a i l y ) , , Peking GRRB, (Gong-ren Ri-bae) : \u00C2\u00A3 $ ^ ( T h e Worker Daily),, Peking H1B, (Hobei Bl-bao) ^ J ^ L 3 (Hobei D a i l y ) Hong-qi 4 i . J r ^ ( R e Q S l a g ) , Peking J i - h u a J i n g - j i Yue-kan. - ^ f ^ j ^ : ; ^ r \"ft -f}\ (Planned Economy. Monthly), jpekang, JJDB ( J i n g - j i Dao-bao;) ^_y^\%^k. (Economic Report News),, Hong Kong J J Y J ( J i n g - j i Y a n -jiu ) ^ ^ ^ ^ j (Economic Stud i e s Monthly), Peking QDRB (Qingdao Ri-bao) Jfa ^ (Qingdao Daily),. Qingdao RMRB (Ren-min Ri-bao) A:$J$%L (The People's Daily),, Peking TJGZ ( T o n g - j i Gong-zuo) i^yf^ft ( S t a t i s t i c a l Work Semi-monthly), Peking\" WHB (Wen-hui Bao:) ^ g l ^ - (Wen-hui News),, Hong Kong Xin-hua Ban-yue-kan J f f : ^ ^ \u00C2\u00A3 ] ^ j (New fihina Semi-monthly) XHDX (Xin-hua Dian-xln) jfcfc -^Kh ^ (News of New China Agency), iiong Kong i x-Xin. Jian-she jfcffj^Jyj^ (New. C o n s t r u c t i o n ) , Peking Xin. Lun-yu (New Lun-yu Semi-monthly),, Shandong YTRB ( Y a n t a i Ri-baa) $ 4^ (^antai D a i l y ) , l a n t a i ZGQN (Zhong-guo Q.ing-nian) ^ l ^ ^ ^ f - (China Youth Semi-monthly), Peking 407 ZGQNB (Zhong-guo Q.ing-nian. Bao) iD -|- ty 4\"JL (China Yfouth News),, Peking ZGXW (Zhong-guo Xiff-wen) ^ \u00C2\u00BBD | i f V? (China News), Guangzfcojj B. Documents, Books and Articles \"Chaya Shan, Weixing Ren-min Gong-she s h i - x i n g jian-zhang (cao-gao).\" 1958 * t ^ v P l / f A / i ^ ^ i : ^ .*, c . ^ 1961 \"Meng-hu che-zhang Wu Chun-sheng...\"4^ Ri ^ - K - - ^ : ( T h e Tiger Tractor Driver Wu Chun-sheng.) XHDX,, 28 October.. J i n - j i Dao-bao ^ 1976 Sh en-zhou ju-bian^A M & (The Drastic Changes i n China). Hong Kong., 1 Lai, K e - k e ^ ^ & I 9 5 S iry/ao da-liang fa-zhan. xiang-she gong-ye.\" ^f-J%.R.m^ %i- 3- -SX~ (We Should1 Develop the TOwnship-and-cooperative Industry i n Great Quantity.) ZGQM, 2ifO(\"September). Lao Zhaozhuang Ren-min Gong-she\u00E2\u0080\u009E cai-mao-bu\u00C2\u00A3>r^j\u00C2\u00B1i A^^^L^^-^P 1959 \"Linqing shi Lao Zhaozhuang Ren-min Gong-she j i a n - l i j i n g - j i ae-suan-zhi de jing-yan.\" %^J$jL^_^r %\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 ^ ^}&L ' < T h e Experiance of Establishing the System, of. Economic. Accounting i n the Lao Zhaozhuang People's Commune,. Linqing Municipality.) Cai-zhehg Ban-yue-kan, 37' (9 April):2 1 - 2 2 . L i , Fa-jiu \u00C2\u00BB j - ^ f e - j -1958 \"Honan Xinyang l a i xin.\" j ^ \ \u00C2\u00A3 M S H J-/lt (a Letter From the Xinyang Dis t r i c t of Honan.) Hong-qi, 7 (September)':22. 409 Li\u00E2\u0080\u009E X i a n - a i a n ^ 1959 \"Zen-yang r e n - s h i nong-cun cai-mao g u a n - l i de g a i - j i n . \" It-til (How to. Recognize the Im-provement of. the C o n t r o l l i n g System of Finance and Trade i n . R u r a l Areas..) Pp . 1 J f 6 - l 6 0 i n Wen-hui Bao, Reh-min gong-she wen- t i z i - l i a o . Hong Kong., Liao,, Lu-yan $~-^t ~t 1959 \" Y i - j i u - w u - j i u n i a n nong-ye zhan-xian de ren-wu.\" 7^i_\u00C2\u00B1j&-;/iyJf-b^^Jfr- (The Task f o r 1959 on the A g r i c u l t u r a l Front.) Hong-qi t ; 1 (1 January) :.11-18. L i n , Cong ^ ^ . > , . 1962 \" I i n i a n da bian-yang.\" \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 - J f - A x f f (The B i g Change i n One Year..) ZGQNB,2? December.. L i n q i n g x i a n - z h i >)\u00C2\u00A3 >4f-J\ (Gazetteer of L i n q i n g County). 196? T a i p e i : Cheng-wen chu-ban-she. L i n ^ i ^ x i a n - z h i J & ^ r j ' J ^ ^ (Gazetteer of L i n y i Couifcty). 196? T a i p e i : Cheng-wen. chu-ban-she. L i u , ; Chaa-yan 3 ^ ^ , 1957 \" W o dui nong-cun. qing-nian hun-yin wen-ti de y i - j i a n . \" \u00C2\u00A3T tfL # 4 ^ t f > - 4 \u00C2\u00A9 (My Opinion About, the Marriage Problems or Youth i n the^Countryside.) ZGQK,,220 (1 December). Liu,, Cong-xian <[\ M ^ , *3 19&3 \" L a o - d o n g r i - j i . . \" j p # W (Diary of Labor..) RMRB, 29 J U l y . L i u , ; Hong-kui ^ \$^^t r Wang,. J u n - l i n g ^ A%J^ , Huang Tong-cunii is^f. Zhao, D i a n - k u i ^ ^ ^ ; , Qu, Guang-cai $2 and Wang, Z h o r i g - k i a n j j j ^ 1957 \" X i a j i n - x i a n Zhumiao-xiang Wangjing-cun de diao-cha.\" ^ j r - ^ M \"1$ ^ ( I n v e s t i g a t i o n on the Wahg's Well V i l l a g e , . Zhumiao Township,.. X i a j i n County.) DZRB, 6 J u l y . Liu, ;Hua-zh\u00C2\u00A9ng^5^ >+ , 1958 \"Fa-zhan^xiang-she gong-ye de j i - d i a n t i - h u l . \" K fe- & ^ i j A-> (Some P o i n t s of R e f l e c t i o n on Developing Township-and-cooperative Industry.) DZRB, 7 J u l y . Liu,.. Lu-mim \u00C2\u00A3/)o|> , Sun,. Ru-chunks ^ #\u00E2\u0082\u00AC> and Tu\u00E2\u0080\u009E Y i n g - m i n ^ - ] ^ $j 1965 \"Duo-zhong j i n g - y i n g g a i - b i a n l e Taojiakuang de mian-mao.\" (The M u l t i p l e Managements, Have Changed the Aspect of T a o j i a -kuang.) RMRB, 23 August-L i u , Qlng.fyj-^f 1958 \"Nong-ye xu-yao shen-mo wo-men j i u sheng-cftan shen-mo.\" %A\/l*$\\X$A > % ( W e W i l l Produce What the A g r i c u l t u r e Needs.) Peking DGB,, 6 March. 410 Mao Tse-tung si-xiang wan-sui yjL)a' Tj\" $ (Long Life Mao 1969 Tse-tung 1 s Thought.)*. Hong Kong.. \"Nong-cun ren-min gong-she gong-zuo t i a o - l i cao-an.\" *%L~%$J^$J 4\ 1961 ^ty^/\h\ 3. ^ (Draft of the Regulations for the Operation sis'\", -vtiv, !*a.fe.fche'\u00C2\u00AERu^ ^ Taipei.. \"Nong-cun ren-min gong-she gong-zuo ,tiao-li xiu-zheng c a o - a n A . 1962 fa2 ty \u00C2\u00A3 ty] Jif; jSl. & % (Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes). Reprinted in. Taipei.. Pel,, Wen-zhong ^ J C ^j2 x>a Jr j ^ h < /(V \ 19;54 Zhong-guo shi-qi shi-dai de wen-hua ll] /\u00C2\u00A3 4 i ^3-TO 3 >- ^ <-* (The Cultures of Stone Age i n China).. Peking:; the Chinese Youth Press.. Qiho xian-zhi -jfr'^\ & /\"f>N (Gazetteer of Qiho County). 1933 > 19'67 Taipei:. Cheng-wen chu-ban-she. Qi \u00E2\u0080\u009E Zhe-wen. ^ iC_ 1966. \"Xia Dingjia ren ba qiong shan-cun gai-bian-cheng she-hui zhu-yi de xint. shan-cun...\" -f ^ '% & %i #C $L ifyfo-^ %tf iH j$ (The Xia Dingjia People Transformed the Poor Mountainous: Villages into New Socialist Villages.) GMRB-, 25 March. Qian,, Chang-zhao ^ 1959; \"Shandong goag-ye yao-jin de ji-dian jing-yan.\" ^K^L^ ft] ,1 ^ 'jfyfc (A Few Points i n the Experience of the Leap Forward, i n Industry in, Shandong.) RMRB, 29 A p r i l . Qu,; Hong-zao \$ *| . x N . . 1959 \"Shui shit\u00C2\u00A9 gong-she ban zao-lel\" m I'fj^- 1 J (Who Says That, the Communes Are Premature?) ZGQNB,, 9 October. RMSC (Ren-mim shou-ce) A-j^/|f--#f^ , Peking* Shandong Da-xue Li - s h i - x i & ^J^y~\u00C2\u00A3-0) (The Department of History,, the Shandong University) , 1 ?1$60 Shandong di-fang-shi jiang-shou tl\u00C2\u00BBgaagiU^\^..W4%$*: IW (AB Outline of Lectures of the Local History of Shandong Province)\u00C2\u00BB. Jinan: Shandong ren-min chu-ban-she. Shandong-skeng Ji-wei Gong-zuo-zu & \ \" j $ r 3-^ \ CThe Work Group of the CCP of the Shandong Provincial S t a t i s t i c a l Bureau) 1958 \"Guan^yu Shandong Shouzhang Ren-rain Lian-she Taiqing Fen-she skeng-chaa fen-pei he shi-chang bian-hua qing-xing de.diao-cha bao-gao.\" & % & fa >i$ M~ M Q $ % %$-(Report of the latestigatiom on the Situation of Production, Distribution and the Change of Marketing i n the Taiqian Branch Commune of .^e^Bed^ratioii:. of Communes of Shouzhang County.) Ji-hua J i n g - j i Yue-kan, 11 (93'l\u00C2\u00A9\u00C2\u00ABsBbEi):3^-36... 411 Shandong-sheng J i n g - j i Yan-jiu-suo Nong-ye-jing-ji-zu 0-j ^ % %tffjiftii^i%->3f0- (The Group of. Agricultural Economy of the Economic Research, 'institute of. Shandong Province 1964 \"Muang-xian. Xia Dingjia Da-dui jian-she wen-chan gao-chan f\" % f~ tti&l-fc' Jf$~ %. (Report, on the Investigation About the Construction of. Stable Yield and High Yield Farm-land by the Xia Dingjia Production Brigade,; Huang County.) J i n g - j i Yan-jiu Yue-kan, 9,8 (20 September):48 - 5 6 . 1965 \"Yi-kao lao-dong j i - l e i jin-xing nong-tian s h u i - l i deng j i -ben j i a n - s h e . \" ^ * # ^ & \ f x i a t ^ # # ?u 1961 \"Nong-ye zhan-xizn. shang-de yi-dai xin-ren.\" ) ^ 5 X - t - \u00C2\u00BB 3 ~^4K J^l\" A~ (The New Generation on. the Agricultural, Front.) ZGQNB,, 2 October. Wen-hui Bao ^ \u00E2\u0080\u009E :> 1959 Ren-min. gong-she wen-ti z i - l i a o A-K/ 7^ A-^Him. (Materials of the Problems About the People's Communes). Hong Kong: Wen-hui Bao. Wu,. Ren ^A^- 2 v , ^ ^ 1958 \"Ren-min, gong-she> he guo-jia.\"AK^ A 7-\u00C2\u00A3 ^o-lSI (The People's Commune and the State.) GRRB, 20 October. Wu,: Zhi-pu %iL_\ u, ,, 1958 \"You.nong-ye he-zuo-she dao ren-min gong-she.\" <&. x^i/^ F A ^ / ^ f-i- (From Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives to People's Communes.) Hong-qi, 8 (16 September). Xiang,, Da-kun ffej K w 1966 Qong-fei ren-min gong-she wen-ti-?c m A-t*J^\ ft*- i a J (The Problems of the Chinese People's Commune). Taipei:Zhong-guo Da-lu Wen-ti Yan-jiu-suo. Xu, Jian-chun jjLjl^. ... 7 ^ , \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 1959a \"Wo-men chuang-zuo-le mei-hao sheng-huo.\"|^1iJ ^ j l ^ J J ^ - ^ - ^ ^ (We Have Created A Beautiful Life.) RMRB, 2 May.. 1959b \"Ren-min gong-she zai ji-xu yao-jin zhong hui fa-hui geng-da (The People's Communes Will Exert More Power i n the Continuing Leap Forward.) ZGQNB, 29 August. Ya Qi 2% > 1958 \"Tu ban-fa xiao gong-chang jie-jue da wen-ti.\" A-iJn >A / J n ^ ' A i\u00C2\u00BB) ^ (Local Methods and Small Factories Can Resolve Big Problems.) ZGQN,, 240 (1 September). 413 Yang,. Wen Al_ 1966 \"Xin Zhong-guo de hun-yin zhi-du*\"^f *f il) ^ J ^ N k ^ $ j $L (The Marriage System i n New China.) ZGXW\u00E2\u0080\u009E 10 March. Iue,; Qing-liaag 1958 \"Shi-Ium ren-min gong-she yun-dong de te-diam he fang-xiang.\" t # # & i^^M ( 0 n t h e Characte-r i s t i c s and Direction of the People's Commune Movement.) Xin Jian-she, 1 0 . Zhonggong Jian-xian Wei-yuan-hui ^ ^ ^ C^^r^k/^T (The CCP Committee \u00C2\u00A9flfJiiS Jiao County) V ' '\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 j .' ;. , 1958 \"Fa-zhan, xiang-'she gong-ye de yi-xie zuo-fa.\"^_^_^ ^ - i - i J i l ^ \u00E2\u0080\u0094 J$g^ ^ (A Few Ways of Developing the T.ownship-and cooperative Industry.) Peking. DGB,.. 26 July. \"Zhang-que shi-xing wu-bao zhi-du.\"i\u00C2\u00A3 \u00C2\u00A3 C i>- /f^ 19$>957 (Correctly Implemeniting the System of Five Guarantees.) RMRB,, 9 February. Zhongrgong Zhong-yang Ban-gong-ting ^ ^ ^? ^ ri> sJ. Articles Aird, John S. 1972 \"Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in the People's Republic of China\". PP. 220-231 in People's Republic of China : An Economic Assessment. U..S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Ames, Michael M. 1973 \"Structural Dimensions of Family Life in the Steel City of Jamshedpur, India.\" pp. 107-113 in M. Singer (ed.), Entrepreneurship and Moderni- zation of Occupational Cultures in South Asia. Duke University, Mono-graph and Occasional Papers Series, No. 12. \"Beidaiho Resolution\" see \"Zhong-gong Zhong-yang Guan-yu zai Nong-crjn ji'an-li Ren-min Gong-she Wen-ti de Jue-yi. \" Bernstein, Thomas P. 1970 ^Keeping the Revolution Going : Problems of Village Leadership After Land Reform\" in John Wilson Lewis (ed.), Party Leadership and Revolu-tionary Power in China, Cambridge^:University Press. 424 Buck, John Lossing 1965 \"Food Grain Production in Mainland China\" in J . L. Buck, V. L. Dawson and Y. L. Wu, Food and Agriculture in Red China. Stanford,:Stanford University Press. Chopra, Pran 1975 \"Some Political Facts of Economic Life.\" International Development Review. 17(4) : 2-8. 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R . 1936 \"Proposals for a Sociological Survey of Village Life in China.\" (in Chinese, translated by Wu Wen-tsao from English). She-hui Shueh-chih (The Sociological World), Yenching University, Vol. IX. August. \"Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes\", see \"Nong-cun Ren-min Gong-she Gong-zuo Tiao-li Xiu-zheng Cao-an\". Skinner, G . William 1964 \"What the Study of China Can Do for Social Science. \" in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol XXIII, No. 4 (August), pp. 517-522. 1964- \"Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China.\" 1965 Part I, The Bournal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, (Nov. 1964), pp. 3-43. Part II. Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, (Feb. 1965), pp. 195-228. Part III, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXIV. No. 3 (May, 1965), pp. 363-399. \"Twelve Articles\" see \"Guan-yu Nong-cun Gong-zuo Zhi-shi de jin-ji Tong-zhi\". Whyte, MartinkK. 1975 \"Inequality and Stratification in China. \" The China Quarterly 64 (December) : 684-711. \"Wuchang Resolution\". See \"Guan-yu Ren-min Gong-she Roe-gan Wen-ti de Jue-yi\". 428 APPENDICES 429 APPENDIX I THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERVIEWS IN HONG K O N G The method of inverview used in social science is not familiar in China. The reasons are many. First, social science was not a branch of the traditional scholarship. Anthropology and sociology began to be included in the curricula of Chinese universities in the early 1930's with the first generation of social scientists trained in Great Britain and the United States, such as Wu Wen-zab and Fei Hsiao-t'ung. However, their in-fluence was only in academic circles. Second, since 1949, anthropology and sociology are no longer in vogue in the programs of socialist education. Third, during the period of the nationalist government and that of the Japanese occupation, the term \"diao-cha\" (investigation) was always associated with politics. To be involved in \"investigation\" sometimes meant to endanger one's life. This tradition has changed very little. During all political campaigns in China the terms such as \"investigation\" and \"interview\" (tan-hua) have often been linked with cases of counter-revolutionaries, political con-spiracy, capitalist roaders, revisionists etc. That is why \"interview\" raises a very nega-tive feeling among the average Chinese in normal circumstances. However, \"interview\" of emigres in Hong Kong remains one possible method for research available to the students of social science since China is closed for field-work. Most of the students who came from North America and Europe gathered in the Universities Service Center in Kowloon. The center provides facilities for the researcher on China in many domains. One of those is to find informants. The center has a special room for interviews and has some liaison with a few unofficial organizations that re-ceive emigres from China. But the researchers who stay for some time in Hong Kong do not rely on the center for finding informants. Usually, a researcher first hires a 430 research assistant (who is often an emigre himself) with the help of the center, or through introduction by other research assistants in the center. Further informants can be easily found through the research assistants. In such a case, the only reason for an informant to consent to being interviewed is money. Most of the researchers are quite aware of this situation, and have worked out various ways to testify the validity of information gathered through interviews. In my case, I could not find an informant either with the help of the center or through research assistants, because the emigres whom the center could help to find were those who came from Guangdong Province, and none of the research assistants from that province had any acquaintance with the emigres from Shandong. By virtue of the distance between Shandong and Hong Kong, it could be assumed that if there were some emigres from that province, they must have come to Hong Kong legally. If they had come to Hong Kong legally, they were not in a position which would make them eager to be interviewed. This is partially because they might have family in Hong Kong, so they did not need money so badly as to accept money for being interviewed, and partially because they might want to remain on good terms with the Chinese authorities and were not willing therefore to run the risk of being interviewed by a stranger. The situation was, to say the least, rather dismaying for me. There were two problems I had to face: First, how to locate those emigres and, second, how to persuade them to be interviewed. In the beginning, I thought of the voluntary association of Shandong. There was such a group which included people of both Shandong and Hobei. But friends warned me that this association was known as a politically committed organization, and that if I told them the truth about looking for informants, they would suspect my real objective. Therefore, I decided not to go through 431 this association, but to first use personal relations. A friend of mine who was teaching at Hong Kong Chinese University was kind enough to introduce me to one of his colleagues who was of Shandong origin. This gentleman bravely promised me to find at least one lady whom he knew had come from Shandong recently. He said that as soon as he got in touch with her he would let me know. A few,days later he called to say that the lady wanted to know the real purpose of my wish to talk with her. He added: \"I know your purpose, but what do you want me to explain to her?1 I told him to tell her the truth -that I was preparing a Ph.D. thesis and would like to know something about the Chinese family. I did not mention the people's commune, which could sound political. After a couple of days, this friend said that the ladydid not want to meet me and appologized for his failure. I had to think again about contacting the Hobei and Shandong Association. After a few days of pondering over the matter, I finally decided to meet the people of the as-sociation. I was warmly received by its secretary. Because of the first experience, I did not tell Kim that I was preparing a Ph.D. thesis. I said that I was from Canada and wanted to visit China arid that it would be helpful if I could meet somebody who came from my native province. He told me that hedid not know any emigre from Shandong but he knew somebody who had recently visited Shandong. He was kind enough to write for me a short letter of introduction to two people. After having met the two persons, I felt disappointed because they had only toured in the big cities and knew no more than I had already learned from documentary research. The only way remaining to me was to look for people on my own. I began to frequent the few Shandong restaurants in Hong Kong. One day, one man approached me when I was talking with the restaurateur. He had overheard me say that I came from 432 Vancouver. This was an Englishman, who had been born and raised in China so that he spoke and behaved exactly as a Chinese. He asked me about Vancouver, and invited me to sit down with him and his friend, a man of Shandong origin. I seized the opportunity to ask the Shandong fellow if he knew anybody who came from Shandong because I badly wanted to learn something of my native place. Hesaid the daughter of one of his friends had recently come from Shandong,band that the family had the same surname as mine. \"You will certainly be welcomed by them as a relative,\" he added. In this way I met informants A and B. Through this family, I also met E, a friend of theirs. I was very careful at the outset. I spent two afternoons establishing a relationship before attempting to ask them anything I wanted to know. I interviewed Informant C also by chance. As everyone in the Universities Service Centre knew that I badly needed informants from Shandong, one research assistant told me one day that he had talked with the owner of a bakery not far from the Centre about my problem, because he chanced to know that this person was of Shandong origin. The wife of the baker had recently visited her natijve place in Shandong. He said the family would like to meet me because they were applying for immigration into Canada and hoped to know something about the country before leaving. The day I met informant C, her hus-band was also present. However, he asked me to carry on as if he was not there. \"A woman is not responsible for what she has said, \" he said. This was his reason for granting the interview. As a matter of fact, informants A and B reminded me again and again not to mention their names if my thesis was to be published. On my part, I promised at the begin-ning not to ask questions about politics. Id did not show much concern about economy either, although it is of importance for my thesis. I was fully aware that the Chinese 433 emigres were not only suspicious of pure research, but became very wary of anybody who had any interest in China, after having experienced so many political campaigns in China. Because of the facility in the Center, I also interviewed a few research assist-ants who came from Guangdong Province. The information gathered through interviews has only been used very sparingly in this dissertation. The following is a brief description of the backgrounds of my in-formants. Informants A . Female, 34 years old, married with three children, mathematics teacher in middle school in China. Her grandfather was classified as a landlord. She worked in a city, but went home to the countryside every year to see her family. She came to Hong Kong in 1974. I had three in-depth interviews with her. B. Informant A's mother. 60 years old, illiterate. She had lived a long time in the countryside. She came to Hong Kong in 1968. 1 had two in-depth interviews with her. C . Female, 52, elementary school education, housewife. Her family was classified as poor peasant during the land reform. She came to Hong Kong in 1952. She went back to visit her family in 1974 and 1975. I met with her three times for two-to-three hour interviews. 434 D. Female, 61, housewife. She is a relative of mine. She had lived a few years in the countryside before leaving China in 1966. I questioned her by correspondence. E. Female, 58, illiterate. She was a friend of informant B. She came to Hong Kong in 1962. I had only a short talk with her. (The above informants are all from Shandong). F. Male, 26. He was downward transferred to Sanjiang People's Commune, Zengcheng County, Guangdong Province between 1969 and 1971. He came to Hong Kong in 1975. G . Male, 25. He was downward transferred to Yuanzhou People's Commune, Boluo County, Guangdong in 1969. He came to Hong Kong in 1973. H. Male, 29. He was downward transferred in Hubei Province during 1968-70. He came to Hong Kong in 1971. I. Male, 27, Hakka origin. He succeeded in arriyingiihi Hong Kong in 1974, after having failed six times to escape. (Informants F, G , H and I are from Guangdong.) 435 APPENDIX II \"Wo-men zhi-dao de Zhang Xi-yuan\" (Zhang Xi-yuan Whom We Know) by Li Huai and Zhen-ye, was an article published on the 7th February, 1956, in the Peking China Youth News (ZGQNB), which brought about a series of articles discussing the behavior of the youth in the collective life in the country-side. I think this article is relevant to thedevelopment of \"new human behavior\" in the Chinese collective framework. Hereafter is the translation. In the autumn of-last year we made the acquaintance of a youth named Zhang Xi-yuan when we went to participate in setting up a cooperative in the Zhang Village. Zhang Xi-yuan was a young man of nineteen years old. Hisswas a lower-middle peasant family. At that time the masses of the Zhang Village all demanded to join the coopera-tive except for Zhang Xi-yuan's father. It was Zhang Xi-yuan who patiently mobilized his father to finally join the cooperative. Many people said at the time: \"After all, youth is more progressive than the o ld! \" We thought that in view of Zhang Xi-yuan's activeness., he>would certainly make quick progress in the cooperative and would be an excellent member. Was the result like we had expected? Recently we went again to the Zhang Village. When we were talking with the old director, Zhang Wan-cang, about the situation in the cooperative, we asked him about Zhang Xi-yuan. The old director shook his head and said: \"It is no use talking of him! There is no one single team which would like to accept him. He has never seriously looked at what he was doing, but kept his eyes greatly open when work-points were assigned! A few days ago, while we were building a pigpen, he was assigned to transport earth. To transport two hand-barrows of earth from the local god temple outside the village could earn one work-point. While everybody else transported a full barrow of earth, he brought only a little more than half a barrow each time. When I went to inspect \"at the spot'', he was there talking with old Fu-yuan. As I stood on the other side of the wall, he did not see me. He said to old Fu-yuan who was busy filling his barrow with earth: 'My uncle Fu-yuan, it is enough! Why do you put so much!' Then old Fu-yuan stopped filling. He continued to say: 11 won't come to transport earth tomorrow. I will go to construct walls. You know, that work cannot be counted by units. Provided they give work-points I will do anything! I have enough energy. We farmers lived on our labor in the past when we were working along; now, after having joined the cooperative, we still live on our labor. If we don't know how to earn more work-points for the time being, we can only eat fresh air in the future!' When he was about to leave, he said again to the old Fu-yuan: \"You have filled for me thirteen barrows and I have transported thirteen barrows. Is that right, Uncle Fu-yuan?' Fu-yuan responded with hesitation: 'It's not that many. I think you've done eleven barrows.' He hastily contradicted him: 'It's thirteen! You are wrong! I did seven bar-rows this morning, and I have already done six this afternoon!' The old Fu-yuan could not but say: 'Maybe I am wrong.' On hearing this, I really got mad. Look, for what purpose-does Zhang Xi-yuan work in a cooperative? When we fertilized the wheat fields, the others all carefully put the fertilizer into the pits which had been dug out for this purpose, except for Zhang Xi-yuan. He did not want to bend! He took a handful of soybean cake and threw it into the pits while standing. Much of the fertilizer was carried away by the wind. This was soybean cake! We hold it more precious than gold! But him, he just threw it away! That is why he quickly finished his assigned units. While others did more than one mu a day, 437 he did more than two. One day, when I saw him doing this, I said to him: 'Xi-yuan, it is not easy for the cooperative to buy this soybean cake. What a pity if you haven't put it into the field! 1 He giggled and said: 'It is not that much important when some has been carried away by the wind. It will fall into the cooperative's fields anyway!' I said: 'What nonsense you talk! Haven't you seen the soybean cake was carried by the wind into the ditch along the road? You don't feel sorry, do you? Are you assigned to fertilize the field or the ditch?'HeHelibllush'ed. To console him I said: 'You rest a while. I do some for you.1\" I did a few lines for the purpose of showing him the correct manner. He is not stupid. He said: 'Uncle Man-cang, I know how to do it now.1 He took a handful of soybean cake and carefully put it into the pit by bending himself. I thought that was O K . But when I turned my head back from a distance, I saw him 'just doing as he had done before I corrected him. The night during the meeting of work-point distri-bution, when others proposed to give him ten points, he insisted on giving himself thirteen! Last month the cooperative bought a dozen pairs of pottery jars to water the wheat. This Zhang Xi-yuan came immediately on hearing that to carry water two times could earn one work-point. In oneday he broke four pairs of jars, because he did not worry about knocking the jars against trees or stones. One pair of jars cost 1.4 yuan. This all comes from members' sweat! Look, what he said to the others: Mt does not matter if I break some jars. They belong to everybody. How little they cost you and me!' Not only did he not care for the jars, he did not care for our collective treasure, the draught animals. Last winter he was assigned an ox to cultivate the field. He dis-liked the slowness of the ox, because he could not earn as many work-points as he wanted with it. Therefore, he cheated another team by changing the ox for a mule. Unfortunately, 438 the mule was not much quicker than the ox. He whipped the animal with all his force as though he had had a deep-seated hatred for the animal. I knew the mule of six years old was a good animal. Before the day was half over the animal collapsed on the ground. If the mule could speak, it would come to complain to you. At the end of last year, we had a serious drought. Sinking wells became an urgent task. We planned to sink two. He was among the six young people sent to carry out this task. After a half day, he complained of the work being too hard. So, he did not show up that very afternoon. When the others went to look for him, they found him packing tobacco at home. Packing tobacco was a work for women and could earn cash. So he liked doing it too. The commander of the team came to call him to sink wells. He not only did not want to go, but got mad at the commander and shouted at him: 'Even in a cooperative I should have my freedom. I did not sell myself to the cooperative. I don't want to do that hard job. No matter whoever comes to mobilize me, I just do not go! 1 The cooperative could not but change the original plan in order to draw a laborer from another task. Because of him, the other five persons wasted a half day. Yesterday evening, I talked to the branch secretary of the Youth League and asked him to do someting to Zhang Xi-yuan. But he just said: 'Zhang Xi-yuan is not a member of the Youth League. He is a backward element. It is difficult for us to make him progress.' I don't think this is the right way to deal with it. We have so many good members in the cooperative and we have certainly some ways to help Zhang Xi-yuan progress. We cannot stand there just watching him regress day by day. What do you say?\" 439 APPENDIX III STATISTICAL TABLES Table 1; Cultivated Area in China by Province/ 1949 arid 1957 (10,000 mu) Province 1949 / 1957 Anhui 7,700 8,800 Fujian 2,100 2,233 Guangdong 5,192 5,740 Guangxi 3,306 3,796 Guizhou 2,697 3,050 Hei longjiang 8,546 10,930 Hobei (10,960) 13,503 Honan 13,100 13,460 Hubei (6,450) 6,430 Hunan (5,021) 5,741 Inner Mongolia 6,360 8,315 Jilin 6,860 7,078 Jiangsu 5,100 9,300 Jiangxi 3,542 4,220 Kansuu ((\u00C2\u00A3,400) 5,939 Liaoning 6,730 7,126 Qinghai 766 750 Shandong 13,797 14,000 Shanxi (6,400) 6,8il2 ShSnxi 5,348 6,700 Sichuan 11,340 11,530 Xinjiang 1,810 3,022 Yunnan 3,380 4,262 Zhejiang (3,380) 3,378 Source: Chao Kang, 1970 : 280. All figures without parentheses are from Provincial Agricultural Statistics for Communist China, 1969, and those in parentheses are estimates of Chao Kang. Table 2: Yields of Food Grains per Unit by Province, 1949 and 1957 1957 (jin per mu) 1949 Province Anhui 101 192.2 Fuji an 204 283 Guangdong 191 243 Guangxi 172 192.7 Guizhou (230.2) 285 Hei long jiang 160.5 178.9 Hobei 86 196 Honan 102.6 150 Hubei (170.5) 273 Hunan (272) 277 Inner Mongolia 81 89 Jilin 178 168.2 Jiangsu {I'M A) :1;98.8 Jiangxi (172.4) 249 Kansu 101 178.3 Liaoning 122 220 Qinghai 13!l 220.5 Shandong 116 179 Shanxi 92? 120.6 Shanxi (113) 157 Sichuan 211 277 Xinjiang 142.1 203 Yunnan (217.8) 252 Zhejiang 204 381 Source: Chao Kang, 1970 : 300. Figures without parentheses are from Provincial Agricultural Statistics for Communist China, and those in parentheses are derived by Chao Kang. 441 Table 3: Output of Food Grains/by Province, 1949 and 1957 (100 million jin) Province 1949 1957 Anhui 91 230 Fujian 55.6 87.54 Guangdong 160 244 Guangxi 74.4 107.5 Guizhou 58 105 Hei longjiang 101 123 Hobei 91 195 Honan 130 245 Hubei 104 219.3 Hunan 127.59 224 Inner Mongolia 39.9 56.2 Jilin 89 85.5 Jiangsu 133 236 Jiangxi 77.5 136.6 Kansu 46 103 Liaoning 71.4 118.7 Qinghai 5.9 12.8 Shandong 158 259 Shanxi 51.9 71.3 Shanxi 72 90 Sichuan 298.94 459.6 Xinjiang 19.9 40.7 Munnan 77 125 Zhejiang 84 156 Total 2,219.09 3,370.74 Source: Provincial Agricultural Statistics for Communist China, quoted by Chao Kang, 1970 : 302. Table 4: Development of the Township-and-cooperative Industry in Shandong Province up to the end of June, 1958. Number of Number completed Areas units in the by the end of June revised plan 1958 The whole province 537,649 180,355 Changwefe1v Special District 90,573 46,022 Weifang Municipality 225 Yidu County 6,000 2,282 Jiao County 3,613 4,329 Gaomi County 8,779 3,177 Pingdu County 10,000 4,594 Zhucheng County 8,000 3,385 Anqiu County 7,000 3,144 Linjuu County 3,210 1,574 Linzhi County 2,907 1,149 Jiaonan County 10,000 4,942 Changluo County 4,4,000 1,661 Changyi County 5,000 2,836 Wulian County 5,020 2,855 Shouguang County 8,000 3,570 Wei County 6,544 5,460 Boshan County 2,500 839 Laiyang Special District 59,918 39,240 Rongchang County 4,960 2,643 Muping County 4,668 3,107 Ye County 4,542 2,355 Penglai County 2,500 3,712 Zhaoyuan County 2,663 1,775 Huang County 5,933 1,184 Jimo County 11,035 6,241 Laixi County 4,204 3,816 Qixia County 3,323 2,244 Weihai Municipality 572 735 Laiyang County 4,705 3,058 Haiyang County 3,364 2,474 Fushan County 3,024 1,232 Wendeng County 1,992 2,436 Rushan County 2,417 2,139 Changdao County 16 89 Liaocheng Special District 64,555 22,291 De County 1,114 891 Wucheng County 5,657 1,207 Xiajin County 566 646 Pingyuan County 3,257 1,625 443 Number of Number completed Areas units in the by the end of June revised plan 1958 Yucheng County 4,575 1,671 Qiho County 4,000 2,570 Gaotang County 1,117 2,983 Linqing County 7,848 832 Guantao County 1,153 338 Guan County 9,359 220 Shen County 2,473 2,240 Fan County 3,121 1,529 Shouzhang County 8,496 1,200 Yanggu County 7,392 947 Dong'a County 1,340 675 Liaocheng County 2,132 1,446 Shiping County 856 1,168 Dezhou Municipality 26 26 Linqing Municipality 73 77 Hoze Special District 120,622 21,692 Juye County 18,356 3,095 Dingtao County 7/1888 1,437 Liangshan County 11,000 2,803 Cao County 14,422 3,756 Yancheng County 10,539 766 Dan County 20,000 3,286 Chengwu County 10,918 1,494 Yuncheng County 12,000 2,533 Hoze County 16,199 2,522 Tai'an Special District 37,000 14,064 Tai'an County 3,680 1,635 Laiwu County 5,720 2,151 Zhangqiu County 4,600 2,562 Xintai County 5,520 1,507 Feicheng County 4,600 676 Pingyin County 2,500 1,885 Dongping County 3,000 291 Changqing County 3,500 425 Ningyang County 3,680 2,817 Taishan Municipality 200 115 Jining Special District 52,517 13,479 Teng County 12,000 2,984 Zou County 5,000 2,446 Wenshang County 4,000 1,825 Jiaxiang County 4,500 1,508 Ziyang County 3,000 1,236 444 Number of Number completed Area units in the by the end of June revised plan 1958 Jining County 4,500 939 Yi County 4,500 691 Jinxiang County 6,000 630 Qufu County 3,500 532 Sishui County 3,000 512 Weishan County 2,300 144 Jining Municipality 217 32 Huimin Special District 86,804 12,804 Guangrao County 10,076 687 Huantai County 6,073 1,885 Zouping County 3,500 907 Qidong County 10,000 1,347 Yueling County 5,519 998 Boxing County 3,890 574 Zhanhua County 8,072 395 Jiyang County 4,000 439 Bin County 5,036 400 Huimin County 6,122 1,238 Linyi County 5,500 1,301 Wudi County 3,966 804 Yangxin County 5,000 390 Li jin County 4,680 544 Shangho County 5,370 991 Linyi Special District 25,660 10,763 IftnyihCountyunfy 3,326 2,178 'Taneheng County 2,745 528 Cangshan County 1,884 379 Fei County 900 394 Yishui County 2,579 1,012 Yiyuan County 1,519 828 Yinan County 1,650 493 Mengyin County 1,513 924 Pingyi County 2,291 479 Ju County 3,916 919 Junan County 2,759 984 Rizhao County 578 1,645 Notes: (1) The above statistics cover 109 counties (or municipalities) of eight special districts with the exception of Licheng County which did not appear in the original source. (2) The Statistical figures for the municipalities indicate only the rural areas. Source: DZRB, 8 July, 1958. 445 GLOSSARY* Names of Persons B a i Ru-bing ( P a l Ju-ping) fe-^ Chen Lan-hua (Ch'en Lanr-hua) f% j l % < - > Chen Yong-gui (Ch'en Yung-kui) f ^ L ^ C ^ . Chiang Kai-shek ^ j \" 7& Deng X i a o - p i n g (Teng. Hsiao-p'ing) ^ s ^ Deng Zi=-hui (Teng Tseu-hui) # f \Jk_ Fan Zhong-yan (Fan.' Chuag-yen) \^ Fu Zuo-yi (Fu Tsuo-yi) ^ A^'^L. Guo Qing-yu (Kuo Ch\u00C2\u00ABing-yu) f\ >fc & Han -/JL Hao Ran, (Hao Jan) >% #\ Haoi Yuan-jing (Hao Yuan-ching) Hao Yuan-xiao (Hao Yuan-hsiao) 7^ '4r\" J i (Chi) Kang You-wei (K'ang You-wei) L e i Feng. ^ ^ ^ L i Chun-ting ( L i Ch\u00C2\u00ABun-t\u00C2\u00BBing) ^ Jjk'ir 7 L i Rui-lan. ( L i J,ui-lan) ^jf? L i Yan-chun ( L i Yen-ch'un) Liang. Qi-chao ( L i a n g Ch'i-ch'ao) ^ $ C / ^ \u00C2\u00A3 L i u Feng-ming ^.J L i u Guan-qi ( L i u Kuan-ch'i) L i u Shao-qi ( L i u Shao-ch'i) jo] 'J/~ Lu Shi-da (Lu Shih-ta) J l ^ }\u00C2\u00A3_ LU Hong-bin (LU Hung-pin) J | Ma Xue-sheng (Ma Hs,ueh*sir<&Kg) % Ma Zhao-xia (Ma Chao-hsia) j i , 'JQ~ Mao Tse-tung ^ ^ Peng De-huai (P'eng Te-huai) Qin ( C h ' i n ) ^ Qin Shi-huang-di (Ch'in S h i h f h u a n g - t i ) j^-lfy JL ^ S h i Yu-guang ( S h i h Yu-kuang) ^ ^ *Transliteration in Wade-Giles will be found in parentheses, if it is different from pin-yin. Shi Yue-lan (Shin Yue-lan) j_ % z~ Shu Suit Yat-sen i f j / j k Sun* Zhi-ying (Sun, Chih-ying) ^ Jvo' ^ Tan, Qi-long ('fan Ch'i-lung) /^C^h Wang Jia-yun (Wang Chia-yun) \u00C2\u00A3 -J^ ^ Wang Guo-fan (Wang Kuo-fan) ^ >^ Wang\" Heng j\u00C2\u00A3 |L Wang Yong-xing (Wang Yung-hsing) 5-Xi Guang-shi (Hsi Kuang-shih) j | /\" 7^ Xu (Hsti) ^ Xu Jian.-chun (HsU Chien-ch'un).tifaiLJh Xu Jian-min (HsU Chien-min) ^^3\J Xue Zheng-xiang (HsUehSGhan^hMattg) ^ f ^ ^ ' f Yan You-yi (Yen You-yi) ^ JR. Yan Zhen-ding (Yen Chen--ting) ivC^^ Yang Zhong-lu. (Yang Chung-lu) ^ Zhang. Bao-ji (Chang Pao-chi) tfk.iii.Q-Zhang De-heng. (Chang Te-heng) tyfc^i* 'r \u00E2\u0080\u0094 Zhang Dian-tong (Chang Tien-Zhang Fu-gui (Chang Fu-kui) Vk~ % 'vt Zhang Huan-ying (Chang Huan-ying) \u00C2\u00A7 ^ L ^ Zhang Jing-nu (Chang Cning-hu) Zhang Lian-dQ)U (Chang Lien-tou) \u00C2\u00A7}t tfA Zhang Qing-chen (Chang Ch'ing-chi'en) t$L ^if Zhang Ru-iie (Chang Ju-chie^) ^L.y^^ Zhang Si-de (Chang Ssu-te) Zhang. Xi-yuan. (Chang Hsi-yuan) $k. 7 C A Zhang Z e n g - y u s (Chang Tseng-yu) . | $ L Zhao Yong-tai (Chao Yung-t \u00C2\u00ABai) ^jCjix. Zhou (Chou) )fl Zhu Chun--jing (Chu Ch'un-ching) %-M~3f* Zhu L i - j i (Chu Li-chi) Zhu Qun-shan (Chu Ch'ttn-shan) Mamies of Mountains and Rivers Bailang (Pailang) \3 Baisha (Paisha) :^)> Beidaiho- (Peitaiho) >k ^ >ll Bi-shi-hang, (Pi-shih-hang) Bohai (Ponai)CcilyO >fir Dagu (Taku) K. ]X L U ^ Lushan. VJJ Mong (Mung.) !\u00C2\u00A7<_ Sanyizhai (Sanyichai) >-A-Shashi (Shashih) Tai (T'ai) ^ Tuhai (T'uhai) %K Wanfu ^ %_\ Wei Weishan & Xiaoqing (Hsiaoch'ing) Yangzi (Yangtzu) ^Jf Yi ?<\ Yongwen (Yungwen) :/%\u00E2\u0080\u0094%. Administration. Units (provinces, counties and townships) Amhui jfgj^ Cangshan (Ts'angshan) Jjlh jjj Gao (Ts'ao) ^ Changqing (Ch'angck'ing) ^ 5^ Changyi (Ch'angyi) ^ ^ Chengdu (Ch'engtu) j ^ J ^ Dan (Tan) ^ Dezhou (Techow) -J4-J Ding (Ting) Dong'a (Tung'a) Dongchang (Tungch'ang) Dongping(Tungp'ing.) ^ iji-En. f , Fan Faagzi (Fangtzu) k% Fei ^ Feicheng (Feich'eng) $t\*m FuQian (Fukien) Guam (Kuan) ^ Guanzhuang (Kuanckuang) }\u00C2\u00A3. Guangzhou (Kwangchou, Canton) Hobei (Hopei) ;*f ^ Holuo ; f Honan. y$ Hou Zhaizi (Hou Chaitzu) Huang ^ Hubei (Hupei) i t Hui'an Jim\u00C2\u00A9 (Chimo) t\"p ^ Jinan (Tsinan) yJ?p t^ j) Jining (Chining) :/\% Jiangsu (Kiangsu) -/U Jiangxi (Kiangsi) yS^ v#7 Jiao (ChiaoO ^ Jiaotong (Cniaotung) J i a o l a i (Chiaolai) Jiaozhou (Chiaochow) l^.'j'H J i n l i n g (Chinling) ^ Ju (Chtt) ^ J.unan (Chttnan) S 'i Juye (Chttyeh) f. if Laiwu ^ Laixi (Laisi) JL. ^ Laiyang ^fl Lankao (Lank'ao) Licha (Lich'a) JL Licheng (Lich\u00C2\u00BBeng) $ ^ Liaocheng (Liaoch'eng) tftf-s-ifc Linju. (Linchu) >)& Linqing (Linch'ing) >)& Linyi jfe >rf Longshan (Lungshan Mengcheng (Mungch'eng) ^ iffa Mengyin (Mungyin) JjfL'ffcl Minhou Peking. 3-b ^ Pingdu: (P'ingtu) Jf~ Pingyi (P'ingyi) ip-Pingyuan (P'ingyuan) /j^ Pingyu (P\u00C2\u00ABingyu) ^ Qiho (Ch'ino) ^j- >C Qixia (Gh'ihsia) >j:{ ^ Qingdao (Ch'ingtao) J j | J^' Qufu (Ch'ufu) \# J j r QuJiang (Ch'ukiang) $ Shage (Shako) > Shandong (Shantung) xM Shanxi (Shansi) tU & Shanxi (Shemsi) J 5^. Shamg.ch.eng. (Suangch1 eng) $ ^ Shanghai -fc-Shi ping (Shihp^ing) / j * -f* Shoushang (Shouchang) Shulan i f $L Sichuan: (Sauch\u00C2\u00BBuan) \*9 \"j Suiping (Suip'ing) |\u00C2\u00A3c Tai'an (T'ai'an) ^ ^ Tangshan (T'angshan) jjj Teng (T'eng) Wango.ingcun. (Wangchingtsun) $4 Wei yjfc Weihaiwei j j ^ $f Wendeng (Went eng.) JC Wuchang (Wuch\u00C2\u00BBang) $t v i X i a j i n (Hsiachin) ^ yjjt Xinxiang (Hsinhsiang) \u00C2\u00A3(r % Xinyang (Hsinyang) tfg fQ Yan*an (lenan) Yantai (Yent'ai) j<\% \u00C2\u00A3 Yanzhou (Yenchow) ^-)f) Yangshao iip Yanggu (Yangku) f# Ye (Yea) ffc. Yi -U|-Yinan rf $j Yishui >rj A<-Yiyuan, }fo Yinghai Yucheng (Yuch'eng) ^ Zhejiang (Chekiang) yi. Zhengzhou (Chengchow) fty Zhichuan (Chinch \u00C2\u00AB.uan) >% \u00C2\u00BBij Zhuchang (Chuch'eng) ^ ZhumiaoxLang (Chumiaohsiang) %. jifc %t Zou (Tsou) | p Zouping (Tsoup'ing) j?p ip-Zunhua (Tsunhua) i l l <<0 Communal Units (communes and Brigades) Aiguo (Aikuo) l!3 Anju (Anchti) Bailing (Palling) <9 ^ Baipenyao; (Paip\u00C2\u00AB enyao) & %. Bei Luoyang (Pel Luoyang) 3 k *%r fQ Beiyuan (Peiyuan) )\u00C2\u00A3| Caopo (Ts'aop'o) j\u00C2\u00A3 Chaijia (Ch'aichia) ^ Ghengmen (Ch1engmen) ijjfa y^ j Chengguan (Ch.\u00C2\u00BB engkuan) Cheng j.ian (Ch.1 engch'ien) ^ ft\ Da'an (Ta'an) A Jir Dabu (Tapu) ^ Da LUj.ia (Ta LUchia) X \u00C2\u00A3 Dayu (Tayu) A *>i^-Dazhai (Tachai) j^. %\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Daigu (Taiku) $ j g) Difang (Tifang) b& ^ Dongguo (Tungkuo) \u00C2\u00A3f Dong Haa (Tung Hao) jff Dongjiao(Tungchiao) icf Ertun, (erkt \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 un) ^ ^ Eugui (Fukui) % Gaocun (Kaots\u00C2\u00BBun) #t Gufengtai (Kufengt'ai) \u00C2\u00A3 4Jr c? Haizhuang (Haichuang) ^ fh. Haosheng #~- ^ Hongming, (Hungming) ^ fJ8 Hongxiag (Hunghsing) %\u00C2\u00A3\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 ^ Houltt j& & -Jiangguantun (Kiangkuant\u00C2\u00BBun) $ f '& ^ Jingjxazhai (Chingchiachai) ^ ^ Julingzhuang, (Chtllingchuang) J | iw/^ Laoguanzhai (Laokuanchai) x% Lao Zhaozhuang, (Lao Chaochuang) fai Ji* Lijiazhuang (Lichiachuang) % $L jk L i l i n Liangquan. (Liangch-'uan) /\u00C2\u00A3, Linqian (Linchiiren) >)\u00C2\u00A3 jjjj Lingcheng, (Lingph*eng) ffc. ^ Liuying &fif >f Longyang (Lungyang) ja ?\u00C2\u00A31 Loujia (Louchia) |r Mazhuang (Machuang) % lh Mencum (Ments'un) j$ Moshan || >i) Pengj.i (P'engchi) % ^ Pingyuan. (P'ingyuan) ^ Qiandonggu (Ch'ientungku) ifa itj Qiliying (Gh,\u00C2\u00ABiliying) ^ _\u00C2\u00A3 ^ Qiuj.iadian (CK'iuchiatien) ji. Sanli Ss Sanfemgzhuang (Sanf engchuang) A fi-i Sang'azhen (Sang\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 achen.) ?lf $$; Shagou (Shakou) :/f ~'A Shicun (Shihts'un) Shijing (Shihching) %j. $f Shitun (Shiht'un) jfe-Shuyuan $ Taiqiam* (T\u00C2\u00BBaich:!iien) \u00C2\u00A3 ^\ Taitou (T'ait'ou) o >K Taojiakuang (T'aochiakl'uang) ?\u00C2\u00A3) \ Wande (Wante) ^ Wangguadiaa (Wangkuatien) fiis. fh. Wangjia (Wangchia) Wangliu (Wangliu) ^ $ Wangyuan, j\u00C2\u00A3_ j_ Weiguo (Weikuo) fff ^ Weixing (Weihsing) A Weizi (Weitzu) 1$ 4 * Xi Hao (Si Hao) ^9 if Xiwangzhuang (Siwangchuang) \& its 453 Xiyou (Siyou) $3 Xia Dingjia (Hsia Tingchia) \"P T Jc Xianiutian (Hsianiut'ien) \"fv ^ Xiamoshi (Hsiamoshih) \"T J|| 3a Xiawi (Hsiawei) T* l i * Xiao Gezhuang (Hsiao Kechuang) fiu Xinzhai (Hsinchai) ^ ^ Xingfu (Hsingfu)Ba. |-Xuzhuang, (Hsttchuamg) ^ Yangjiagao (Yangchiakao) i.% Y i n j i (YinckiX ^ \u00C2\u00A3 Yingzi (Yingtzu) ^ J^-Yoizhuang (Yuckuaag/)^) ^ jjb Zh a i l i (Chaili) jjL Zhangjiarongren. (Changchiajungjen) J c |^ ^ Zhangshi (Changshih) ^ ^ Shaoyang (Chaoyang) | f j ^ Zhufeng (Chuf eng) jfe >2) Znuli (Chuli) Zhuxinzhuang (Chuhsinchuang) jp- j\u00C2\u00A3. ahuybuai(iGh^Jbu^^af^ Zhuzhuang (Chuchuang) ^ |F. General Terms and Phraseology an jian an--zhi ji-gong (an-chien an-chih chi-kung) jfi |\u00C2\u00A3, Bai-liam-jia\u00C2\u00A9 (Pailiem-chiao) & ]dL bao=>cai-wu (paa~tslai-wu) Q baO' caeng-ben (pao ch*'eng-pen) ^ Jp^ bao-geag (pao-kung) -2-bao sheng-chan. (pao sheng-ch'an.) c a i - l i ( t s * a i - l i ) # *b Chang-qiang hui (Ch'ang-ch'iang. hui) ^ ^ chi-fan bu-^a\u00C2\u00A9 qian (ch'ih-fan pu-yao ch'ien) ^ $~ ffij chi ku zai Xian,; xianf. luo zai hou. & i_ , % & fa (ch'i ku tsai hsisn,, hsiang luo tsai hou) 454 chu-ji nong-ye-she (ch.'u-chi nung-yehr-she) Ik jfck da-dui (Ta-tui) fA. da gai xiao (ta kai hsiao) j^H. Jh da-ming da-fang (ta-ming ta-fang) jfti Datong Pian (Tat'ung P'ien) Daizhe wen.-ti xue (taiche wen-t\u00C2\u00ABi hsueh) ^ ^ f a ) | \u00C2\u00A3 dan-gan (tan-kan) ^ ^ di-fen- zni (ti-fen chin) )\ P] ding-e guan-li. (tingre huan-li) /\u00C2\u00A3_ ^ % V\u00C2\u00A3 ding-e zhi (ting-e ehih) )<-%&fy\ duzi wen-ti (tu-tzu, wen-t'i) 4- )\u00C2\u00B03 duo-chang ban. yi-she (tuo-ch'ang pao yi-she) f i*L \"~/f \u00C2\u00A3 duo-lao duo-de. (tuo-lao tuo-te) Jr % f^-dun-dian (tuttr-tien) 5 ^ er-sun. zi-you. er-sun fu,., bu-gei er-sun zuo ma-niu JU 34* \u00C2\u00A7 % )L^?&, T\u00C2\u00BB ( e r h r-sun tzu-you erh-sun fu pu-kei erh-sun tzuo ma-niu)^ ->L>fyl-^ Jj ^~ feng-chan tian (feng-ch'an t'ien) ^. JL ffl feng-shui J>b,*fC fu Fu-jvm (Fu-chtln) f$ Jf-fu-nong (fu-nung) % iK. gao-e feng-chan tian (kao-e feng-ch'an t'ien) $b *t ^ gao-ji nong-ye-she (kao-chi nung-yeh-she) v$j %L jk. /fi-geng-zuo qu (kengrtsou ch.'U) i\u00C2\u00A3 gong-chan zhu-r-yi jiao-yu xuan-chuan da-jun ^ f- s~ )L%\u00C2\u00A3 ^ $ - 1 ^ ^ . ^ (kung-ch'an chu-i chiao-yu hstian-ch'uan ta-chlln) gong-chan. feng (kung-ch'an feng) ^ f- i*b gong-fen piao (kung-fen p'iao) ^ % gong-fen. shou-ce (kung-fen, shou-ts'e) ^ 0 gong-ji j in (kung-chi chin) y A * ^v* \u00C2\u00A3 gong-yi jin (kung-i chin) ' j\u00C2\u00A3 ^ gong-you (kung-you) ^ ~% gong-zi gong-ji jie-he zhi (kung-tzu kung-chi chie-ho chih) 3~ ^ ^ %>\ 455 gong-zi wei-zhu (kung-tzu wei-chu) ^ y[ 6^ gong-zuo zhi-dao zhan (kung-tsuo chih-tao chan) % gu-gong diu-nong (ku-kung tiu-nung) fcfy 3~ ^ ^ guan-li min-zhu-hua (kuan-li min-chu-hua) ^ C ^ i - Z i L j guanli qu (kuanr-li ch*tt) % 1%. hong-zhuan. j i - j i fen-zi da-hui (hung-chuan chi-chi fen-tzu ta-hui) i & i% 4% -J- ^ hu bao kuai (hu pao k'-uai) / %b*-fc nui-xiang (hui-hsiang) ^ ^ Huo-xue huo-yong (huo-hstteh huo-yung) ^ i\u00C2\u00A3 ^ ji-ben. lao-dong r i (chi-pen lao-tung jin) % ^ & j i - f e n yuan (chi-fen yuan) \fe iiafi\u00C2\u00ABmiaM.lit:(chisn*miJen l i ) & ^ /?\u00E2\u0080\u00A2(_* Jiia\u00C2\u00A7-oU\u00C2\u00A7(iChi&0-OM^ jiao-yu. 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' zhuan--ye dui (chuan-yeh, tui) zi-bao gong-yi (tzu\u00C2\u00ABpao kung-i) Q JcX 1^-z i - l i geng-sheng ( t z u - l i kemg-sheng) fa JL f_ %. z i - l i u - d i (tzualiu-ti) & $ i_, zong-jia hui (tsong-ch^in hui) jfl MJ ^ Zou-jiao-i.ua. (Tsour-chiao-chun) ^ zu bao pian (tsu pao piien) y^-xJ $s zu-zhi junr-shi-hua (tsu-chin chun-shih-hua) \u00C2\u00A3ji p 4\u00C2\u00A3j zuo-jia (tsuo-cliia) J<. zuo-ye qu (tsuo-yeh ch'tt) ^ "@en . "Thesis/Dissertation"@en . "10.14288/1.0100230"@en . "eng"@en . "Anthropology"@en . "Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library"@en . "University of British Columbia"@en . "For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use."@en . "Graduate"@en . "The rural people\u00E2\u0080\u0099s communes in Shandong province, 1958-1965 : a model of social and economic development"@en . "Text"@en . "http://hdl.handle.net/2429/21629"@en .