"Applied Science, Faculty of"@en . "Community and Regional Planning (SCARP), School of"@en . "DSpace"@en . "UBCV"@en . "Shanks, Gordon Ross"@en . "2010-05-02T23:27:05Z"@en . "1983"@en . "Doctor of Philosophy - PhD"@en . "University of British Columbia"@en . "Students of public policy have, until recently, centred their attention on the process by which policies are formulated, based on the implicit assumption that a well-formulated policy will be faithfully implemented. Disillusionment with policy outcomes in many areas has led to a concern for understanding the factors which influence the implementation of policy. As a first step, this study develops a theoretical role for an identifiable implementation process within a larger public policy process.\r\nThe study develops two related models. The first identifies four structural components in the implementation process: policy output, initiation of implementation, implementation action and information feedback. The second model hypothesizes the important elements which characterize an implementation process and influence the movement from a policy output to a policy outcome. Eight elements are identified: implementing actors, policy objectives,\r\nresources, interested actors, policy environment, incentives and sanctions, stakes, and rules. The hypothesized linkages among the elements are described. Based upon these two models, the determinants bf policy outcome are posited. In\r\n\r\naddition to the eight process elements, these include: technical tractability of problem, policy environment, decision-making environment, and uncertainties.\r\nThe theoretical framework is applied to a case study bf the Canada-British Columbia Okanagan Basin Implementation Agreement (OBIA). The stages leading up to implementation of the recommendations bf an earlier framework planning study are described. The initiation of implementation culminated in the signing of a joint federal-provincial Implementation Agreement which responded to the recommendations of the plan but re-interpreted many bf these. The analysis demonstrates the importance of a pre-implementation phase wherein policy objectives and intentions are re-examined, interpreted, and operationalized prior to implementation action.\r\nAction under the OBIA is described and analysed for four specific cases concerning water quality, water quantity, international aspects, and public participation. The empirical conclusions indicate the technical aspects of the OBIA have been implemented according to the obligations of the Agreement. Departures from the Agreement were based on careful technical analysis. Implementation was viewed by the implementers as a technical, mechanistic process with little regard to social value uncertainties.\r\n\r\nThe study provides an examination of the utility of the theoretical models. It concludes that the hypothesized variables can describe the functioning of an implementation process and provide a comprehensive analytical picture. The highlights of the conclusions are: the jurisdictional breakdown between the federal and provincial governments as interpreted by and reflected in the objectives of the key implementing actors was very significant in shaping the outcome. The specificity of the policy output in terms of intentions and articulation of uncertainties had an impact as did the rigidity of the implementation mechanism. Resource constraints were a significant determinant of outcome, supporting a proposition that resource availability be carefully analysed in a pre-implementation phase. Interested actors had an influence in proportion to the\r\ndegree of direct impact implementation measures had upon specific interests. Uncertainties in technical and quantitative areas appear to have been well managed, whereas value uncertainties were generally not considered. The study evidence suggests if an implementation process is inflexible and cannot adapt to changing social circumstances by embracing uncertainties, it will become irrelevant, and the current issues will be considered outside of the implementation process."@en . "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/24360?expand=metadata"@en . "IMPLEMENTATION OF P U B L I C P O L I C Y A \" C A S E STUDY I by GORDON ROSS SHANKS B . A . , U n i v e r s i t y o f S a s k a t c h e w a n , 1969 M . A . , U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1972 A T H E S I S SUBMITTED I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE S T U D I E S S c h o o l o f C o m m u n i t y a n d R e g i o n a l P l a n n i n g We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE U N I V E R S I T Y OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA (c) G o r d o n R o s s S h a n k s , 1983 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements fo r an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by h i s or her representatives. I t i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s thesis f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Community and Regional Planning The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date September 30 r 1983 DE-6 (3/81) ( i i ABSTRACT Students of public policy have, u n t i l recently, centred their attention on the process by which p o l i c i e s are formulated, based on the i m p l i c i t assumption that a well-fbrmulated policy w i l l be f a i t h f u l l y implemented. Disillusionment with policy outcomes in many areas has led to a concern for understanding the factors which influence the implementation of policy. As a f i r s t step, t h i s study develops a theoreti c a l role for an i d e n t i f i a b l e implementation process within a larger public policy process. The study develops two related models. The f i r s t i d e n t i f i e s four s t r u c t u r a l components in the implementation process: policy output, i n i t i a t i o n of implementation, implementation action and information feedback. The second model hypothesizes the important elements which characterize an implementation process and influence the movement from a policy output to a policy outcome. Eight elements are i d e n t i f i e d : implementing actors, policy objectives, resources, interested actors, policy environment, incentives and sanctions, stakes, and rules. The hypothesized linkages among the elements are described. Based upon these two models, the determinants bf policy outcome are posited. In i i i addition to the eight process elements, these include: technical t r a c t a b i l i t y of problem, policy environment, decision-making environment, and uncertainties. The t h e o r e t i c a l framework i s applied to a case study bf the Canada-British Columbia Okanagan Basin Implementation Agreement (OBIA). The stages leading up to implementation of the recommendations bf an e a r l i e r framework planning study are described. The i n i t i a t i o n of implementation culminated in the signing of a j o i n t f ederal-provincial Implementation Agreement which responded to the recommendations of the plan but re-interpreted many bf these. The analysis demonstrates the importance of a pre-implementation phase wherein policy objectives and intentions are re-examined, interpreted, and operationalized prior to implementation action. Action under the OBIA i s described and analysed for four s p e c i f i c cases concerning water quality, water quantity, international aspects, and public p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The empirical conclusions indicate the technical aspects of the OBIA have been implemented according to the obligations of the Agreement. Departures from the Agreement were based on careful technical analysis. Implementation was viewed by the implementbrs as a technical, mechanistic process with l i t t l e regard to s o c i a l value uncertainties. i v The study provides an examination of the u t i l i t y of the th e o r e t i c a l models. It concludes that the hypothesized variables can describe the functioning of an implementation process and provide a comprehensive a n a l y t i c a l picture. The highlights of the conclusions are: the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l breakdown between the federal and provincial governments as interpreted by and reflected in the objectives of the key implementing actors was very s i g n i f i c a n t in shaping the outcome. The s p e c i f i c i t y of the policy output in terms of intentions and a r t i c u l a t i o n of uncertainties had an impact as did the r i g i d i t y of the implementation mechanism. Resource constraints were a s i g n i f i c a n t determinant of outcome, supporting a proposition that resource a v a i l a b i l i t y be c a r e f u l l y analysed in a pre-implementation phase. Interested actors had an influence in proportion to the degree of dir e c t impact implementation measures had upon sp e c i f i c i n t e r e s t s . Uncertainties in technical and quantitative areas appear to have been well managed, whereas value uncertainties were generally not considered. The study evidence suggests i f an implementation process i s i n f l e x i b l e and cannot adapt to changing so c i a l circumstances by embracing uncertainties, i t w i l l become irre l e v a n t , and the current issues w i l l be considered outside of the implementation process. V TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT i i : LIST OF FIGURES x i i l ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS x i i i CHAPTER 1 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION - THE NEGLECTED PROCESS 1 1. 1 PURPOSE OF STUDY 1 1.2 BACKGROUND 5 1.3 A STUDY OF IMPLEMENTATION 8 1.4 THE PUBLIC POLICY PROCESS - THE CONTEXT FOR IMPLEMENTATION 10 1.4.1 P o l i c y Formation Process 13 1.4.2 P o l i c y Output 14 1.4.3 P o l i c y Implementation Process 16 1.4.4 P o l i c y Outcome 19 1.4.5 P o l i c y Environment 21 1.4.6 Summary bf P o l i c y Process 22 1.5 PERVASIVE THEMES - VALUES AND UNCERTAINTY 24 1.5.1 A p p l i c a t i o n of Values 24 1.5.2 Uncertainty 26 1.6 SUMMARY 34 CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION AND RELATED LITERATURE 35 2. 1 INTRODUCTION 35 2.2 IMPLEMENTATION AS A TOPIC OF INQUIRY 40 v i TABLE OF CONTENTS - CONTINUED Page 2.3 UNDERSTANDING IMPLEMENTATION 43 2.4 ELEMENTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 51 2.4.1 P o l i c y Standards and Objectives 53 2.4.2 P o l i c y Resources 58 2.4.3 I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l Communication 64 2.4.4 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s bf Implementing Agencies .... 72 2.4.5 D i s p o s i t i o n of Implementors 83 2.4.6 P o l i c y Environment 95 2.5 KIND OF PROCESS 96 2.6 POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 99 2.6.1 Implementation A n a l y s i s 100 2.6.2 Implementation Assessment 101 2.7 CONCLUSIONS 114 CHAPTER 3 DETERMINANTS OF POLICY OUTCOME - A BASIS FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 115 3. 1 INTRODUCTION 115 3.2 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION - SOME HYPOTHESES 115 3.3 A STRUCTURE FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 118 3.3.1 P o l i c y Output 120 3.3.2 I n i t i a t i o n of Implementation 124 3.3.3 Implementation Action 128 3.3.4 Information Feedback 129 3.3.5 Summary of Structure for P o l i c y Implementation 132 v i i . TABLE OF CONTENTS - CONTINUED Page 3.4 MODEL OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 133 3.4.1 Implementing Actors 135 3.4.2 Objectives 143 3.4.3 Resources 145 3.4.4 Interested Actors 146 3.4.5 P o l i c y Environment 150 3.4.6 Incentives and Sanctions 151 3.4.7 Stakes 152 3.4.8 Rules 154 3.5 DETERMINANTS OF POLICY OUTCOME 155 3.6 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN 158 3.6.1 Case Study Approach 158 3.6.2 Data A c q u i s i t i o n 162 3.6.3 L i m i t a t i o n s i n the Scope of the Case Study .. 164 CHAPTER 4 DEFINING THE POLICY OUTPUT 167 4. 1 INTRODUCTION 167 4.2 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE PLANNING STUDY 169 4.3 A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK PLANNING STUDY 173 4.3.1 Comprehensive Water Management 177 4.3.2 Study Time Horizon 180 4.3-3 Study Management 181 4.3.4 Study Target Population 182 4.3.5 Requirement for Implementation 184 4.4 STUDY OUTPUT 185 4.4.1 Regional A u t h o r i t y 187 V i i i . TABLE OF CONTENTS - CONTINUED Page 4.4.2 Framework Plan Implementation 190 4.4.3 Water Quantity 195 4.4.4 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Aspects 197 4.4.5 Water Q u a l i t y 199 4.4.6 Monitoring Framework Plan 203 4.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 205 CHAPTER 5 INITIATING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK PLAN 208 5.1 PURPOSE 208 5.2 DEVELOPING AN IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT 208 5.3 THE IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT 213 5.3.1 Non-Coordinated Water Management - A Change i n Objectives 216 5.3.2 Limited Local P a r t i c i p a t i o n - A Change in I n s t i t u t i o n a l Arrangements 219 5.3.3 Flood Control Works - A Change i n A c t i v i t i e s 224 5.4 STRATEGIES FOR UNCERTAINTY 228 5.5 FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR CHANGES 230 5.5.1 P o l i c y Objectives 231 5.5.2 P o l i c y Stakes 232 5.5.3 Implementing Actors 241 5.5.4 Interested Actors 246 5.5.5 Decision-Making Environment 249 5.5.6 P o l i c y Environment 253 5.5.7 Resources 254 5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 255 i x TABLE OF CONTENTS - CONTINUED Page CHAPTER 6 ACTIONS UNDER THE OKANAGAN BASIN IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT 259 6. 1 INTRODUCTION 259 6.2 ORGANIZATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION 260 6.3 CASE 1 - WASTE'TREATMENT AND THE REGIONAL AUTHORITY 264 6.3.1 B a s i n Waste Management Plan 277 6.4 ANALYSIS 292 6.4.1 P o l i c y O b j e c t i v e s 293 6.4.2 Implementing A c t o r s 296 6.4.3 I n t e r e s t e d A c t o r s 300 6.4.4 S t a k e s 301 6.4.5 Resources 303 6.4.6 Other F a c t o r s 305 6.5 CASE 2 - ALTERING OPERATING LEVELS ON THE MAINSTEM SYSTEM 307 6.6 ANALYSIS 326 6.6. 1 P o l i c y Output 327 6.6.2 Resources 328 6.6.3 U n c e r t a i n t i e s 329 6.6.4 P o l i c y O b j e c t i v e s 330 6.6.5 Implementing A c t o r s 331 6.6.6 Other F a c t o r s 335 6.7 CASE 3 - THE OSOYOOS LAKE REFERENCE 337 X TABLE OF CONTENTS - CONTINUED Page 6.8 ANALYSIS 3 4 9 6 . 8 . 1 P o l i c y O b j e c t i v e s 3 4 9 6 . 8 . 2 S t a k e s 3 5 0 6 . 8 . 3 I m p l e m e n t i n g A c t o r s 3 5 1 6.9 CASE 4 - PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 3 5 3 6. 1 0 ANALYSIS 3 6 4 6 . 1 0 . 1 I m p l e m e n t i n g A c t o r s 3 6 5 6 . 1 0 . 2 P o l i c y O b j e c t i v e s 3 6 7 6 . 1 0 . 3 I n t e r e s t e d A c t o r s 3 6 8 6 . 1 0 . 4 R e s o u r c e s 3 6 9 6 . 1 0 . 5 O t h e r F a c t o r s 3 7 0 6 . 1 1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 3 7 2 CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 3 7 7 7. 1 INTRODUCTION 3 7 7 7 . 2 EMPIRICAL CONCLUSIONS 3 7 7 7 . 2 . 1 P o l i c y O u t p u t 3 7 8 7 . 2 . 2 I m p l e m e n t a t i o n Agreement 3 7 9 7 . 2 . 3 I m p l e m e n t a t i o n A c t i o n 3 8 3 7 . 3 ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS 3 8 7 7 . 3 . 1 F a c t o r s R e s p o n s i b l e f o r B a s i c Changes 3 8 8 P o l i c y O b j e c t i v e s 3 8 9 P o l i c y E n v i r o n m e n t 3 9 0 x i TABLE OF CONTENTS - CONTINUED Page Implementing Actors 393 Interested Actors 399 7.3.2 Factors Accounting for Implementation Actions 401 Technical T r a c t i b i l i t y b f a Problem 401 P o l i c y Output 403 Implementing Actors 405 P o l i c y Objectives 408 Resources 409 Interested Actors 412 Stakes 414 Rules :\". . . 414 P o l i c y Environment 415 Decision-Making Environment 416 Un c e r t a i n t i e s 418 7.3-3 Indeterminancy b f Process Outcome 421 7.3.4 Further Research 423 7-3.5 C o n t r i b u t i o n b f Study 425 BIBLIOGRAPHY 428 APPENDIX 1 CANADA - BRITISH COLUMBIA OKANAGAN BASIN AGREEMENT APPENDIX 2 OKANAGAN BASIN IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT x i i LIST OF FIGURES Page 1.1 A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM 11 1.2 MODEL OF POLICY PROCESS 12 2.1 A MODEL OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 52 2.2 MODEL FOR DOSRAP 107 3.1 STRUCTURE OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 119 3.2 MODEL OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 134 4.1 THE OKANAGAN BASIN 168 4.2 ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 176 4.3 COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK PLAN MANAGEMENT 182 6.1 IMPLEMENTATION ORGANIZATION 261 x i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Irving K. Fox for his excellent c r i t i c i s m and insights into the questions covered in t h i s study. Thanks are due to many people for providing comments and information during the formulation and undertaking bf the study. In p a r t i c u l a r , the s t a f f s at Inland Waters Directorate, Environment Canada in Vancouver and the Water Resources Branch, B r i t i s h Columbia Department bf Environment, V i c t o r i a gave substantial time for which I am indebted. The study was supported for one year by the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Council. The manuscript was typed many times over by Annette G i r l i n g often under unreasonable conditions and deadlines. Her assistance has been invaluable and i s g r a t e f u l l y acknowledged. F i n a l l y , I would l i k e to sincerely thank my wife, Marilyn, and sons, Gareth and Robert, for a l l bf those weekends and evenings. Without their understanding and encouragement, th i s would not have been possible. 1 CHAPTER 1 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION - THE NEGLECTED PROCESS \"Canadians r e a l i z e that i t i s no longer p o s s i b l e to take for granted clean a i r and pure water, the p r o d u c t i v i t y of our s o i l and sea resources, or the charm of the countryside ... This concern has developed i n t o a consensus that environmental management i s a major problem that demands p r i o r i t y a t t e n t ion . Research can c e r t a i n l y devise t e c h n o l o g i c a l answers to t e c h n o l o g i c a l problems. It can also increase the vast array of environmental management s t r a t e g i e s now a v a i l a b l e . The need for t h i s i s evident and the past decade has seen growing p u b l i c demand for c l e a r and strong government i n t e r v e n t i o n . \" J. W. M a c N e i l l , Environmental Management, Prepared for The Privy Council O f f i c e , Government of Canada ( 1 9 7 1 , p. 8 ) . 1.1 PURPOSE OF STUDY Environmental management as a p u b l i c o b j e c t i v e does not seem to a t t r a c t the wide coverage and generate the pu b l i c enthusiasm that i t did only a few years ago. There are undoubtedly numerous hypotheses that could be put forward as po s s i b l e explanations for why the \"environment\" has sl i p p e d on the pu b l i c agenda. A c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s would, however, re v e a l that many of the environmental problems and concerns which surfaced in the pu b l i c consciousness i n the 1960s and 1970s are s t i l l very r e a l and, i n many cases, much more s e r i o u s . Moreso than ever, i t i s important to understand the processes by which these problems are addressed and d e a l t with . Planners have g e n e r a l l y been considered to be l e g i t i m a t e l y involved in addressing p u b l i c issues through the planning process by which a l t e r n a t i v e plans are formulated to achieve s p e c i f i c p u b l i c o b j e c t i v e s . In i t s most basic f o r m u l a t i o n , the planning model i n c l u d e s : (a) problem d e f i n i t i o n i n c l u d i n g statements of values and o b j e c t i v e s ; (b) information concerning the problem; (c) a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s ; (d) an accepted plan or course of a c t i o n ; and (e) implementation of the plan. This planning model as a problem s o l v i n g methodology also recognizes the i t e r a t i v e nature of the process and normally l i n k s the implementation phase back to the information generation phase. The l o g i c i s obvious; during implementation, information gaps become evident which may lead to a d i f f e r e n t array of s o l u t i o n s and choices or even might serve to s h i f t or a l t e r process o b j e c t i v e s . Through a s e r i e s of i t e r a t i o n s , the process should move toward desired ends. This i s , of course, a very s i m p l i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n of the planning process. Very r e a l questions, such as whose values and o b j e c t i v e s are or ought to be pursued; who determines what information w i l l be brought to bear ; who i s involved in formulating a l t e r n a t i v e s and in whose i n t e r e s t ; how are m i n o r i t y or opposing i n t e r e s t s considered and accounted; and so on, demonstrate that the processes which operate w i t h i n t h i s b asic model re q u i r e d e t a i l e d understanding. The purpose of t h i s study i s to add some a d d i t i o n a l i n s i g h t s to the already s u b s t a n t i a l understanding of t h i s complex process, s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the area of implementation. The basic normative premise of t h i s study i s not very r e v o l u t i o n a r y or bold but as a normative statement seems d e f e n s i b l e ; i t i s that the process of environmental management as p r a c t i s e d in Canada can be improved, understanding gained through research can be applied to the p r a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s f a c i n g s o c i e t y and improvements can be made. Even t h i s statement r e s t s somewhat on shaky ground; who i s to say what i s better or i s an improvement. I t i s tempting to o u t l i n e the features of a good or adequate process for environmental management against which to measure current or past performance. This would, however, go w e l l beyond the bounds of s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s i n t o ideology, philosophy and p o l i t i c s . This study cannot, and does not intend t o , comment on the r i g h t n e s s or adequacy of the p o l i c y process or any po r t i o n thereof. What i t can do i s analyse the process to under stand : (a) those v a r i a b l e s which are important i n s t r u c t u r i n g and moving the process and speculate how these could be influenced to change the p o l i c y outcome; and (b) the methods by which information i s generated and evaluated, values are accounted for and d e c i s i o n s are taken and implemented. I t i s quite d e f e n s i b l e to analyse a p o l i c y process from the viewpoint of how i t might be modified i f a p a r t i c u l a r outcome i s d e s i r e d . This does not lead to a conclusion that a process should be changed because i t would produce a b e t t e r outcome. A p o s i t i v e a n a l y s i s provides process p a r t i c i p a n t s with information as to how to a f f e c t the outcome. I t i s also l e g i t i m a t e to analyse the methods employed i n a process to determine t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n achieving the o b j e c t i v e . Again, t h i s does not question the o b j e c t i v e but rather brings information to bear which can suggest improved ways of achieving the o b j e c t i v e , for example, at a lower cost i n time or money, or with l e s s f i l t e r i n g and/or d i s t o r t i o n , e t c . While the u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e of the study, to improve the environmental management process, r e s t s upon a normative premise, the more l i m i t e d o b j e c t i v e of i n c r e a s i n g understanding can be defended as an a n a l y t i c a l undertaking. The study w i l l go about i n v e s t i g a t i n g the p o l i c y / p i a n n i n g process i n the f o l l o w i n g manner. I t w i l l consider the nature of the p u b l i c p o l i c y process and s p e c i f i c a l l y focus on the r o l e of implementation. I t w i l l argue that implementation has been neglected as a f i e l d of i n q u i r y but that s u b s t a n t i a l i n s i g h t s i n t o improved management can be gained through understanding how the various elements in the implementation process i n t e r r e l a t e to produce a p o l i c y outcome. The s t u d y w i l l a d o p t a c a s e s t u d y a p p r o a c h t o a p p l y t h e g a i n s i n t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e r e l a t i n g t o i m p l e m e n t a t i o n and t o d r a w o u t c o n c l u s i o n s w h i c h may i n c r e a s e t h e g e n e r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e r o l e o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n and t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e p l a n n i n g and p o l i c y p r o c e s s e s . W h i l e t h e c a s e s t u d y w i l l i n v o l v e a n a l y s i s o f a p a r t i c u l a r e n v i r o n m e n t a l managemen t s i t u a t i o n , i t i s n o t i n t e n d e d a s an i n - d e p t h s t u d y o f t h e s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e s o f t h a t s i t u a t i o n b u t u s e s i t o n l y a s a means o f i l l u s t r a t i n g s p e c i f i c p o i n t s r e l a t e d t o a g e n e r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p o l i c y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . 1 . 2 B A C K G R O U N D I f t h e 1960s and e a r l y 1970s w e r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a t i m e o f a w a k e n e d and h e i g h t e n e d a w a r e n e s s o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n c e r n s , t h e mid-1970s t o t h e p r e s e n t , b a s e d upon t h e e x p e r i e n c e , m i g h t be s e e n a s a t i m e o f s u b s t a n t i a l and i n c r e a s i n g d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t a s t o t h e a b i l i t y o f g o v e r n m e n t t o d e a l e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o b l e m s . The r e a s o n s f o r t h e c o n f i d e n c e c r i s i s a r e o b v i o u s l y c o m p l e x , b u t o n e f a c t o r a p p e a r s p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t t o p l a n n i n g c o n c e r n s , and t h i s i s t h e r a t e o f c h a n g e i n s o c i e t y . E . S . Quade (1976, p . 3) s u c c i n t l y makes t h e a r g u m e n t : \" I n t h e p a s t , when e v e n t s moved more s l o w l y , t h e c o r r e c t i v e e f f e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e p l a y e d a much l a r g e r r o l e t h a n t h e y do t o d a y . T h r o u g h t r i a l and e r r o r and p o l i t i c a l g i v e and t a k e , i t was p o s s i b l e f o r p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s t o d e v e l o p p o l i c i e s t h a t t o o k 6 into account the objectives, estimates, and values of everybody in society, or at least everybody who had influence. This i s no longer the case; technology and events move so rapidly that natural t r i a l and error - give and take processes can become too catastrophe-prone for comfort before the process approaches completion - not only war, but population pressure, resource shortages, and environmental deterioration are in t h i s category.\" Bertram Gross ( 1 9 7 1 ) in reference to th i s phenomena notes that in recent years there has been a marked acceleration in the rate of change. He points to acceleration in technological change, for instance, where not only are there more inventions and discoveries than ever before but the time lags between them and their p r a c t i c a l application and d i f f u s i o n have become much shorter. Many of the technologies and so c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s George Orwell was saving for 1984 were already f l o u r i s h i n g in the 1 9 7 0 s , well ahead of the mark. Does t h i s acceleration in the rate of change mean that society must become a captive of i t s own processes and therefore simply move according to s h i f t s in uncontrolled forces of change or can change be managed? A number of writers have addressed th i s question in recent years arguing that society must gain control (cf. Ferkiss, 1 9 6 9 ; Galbraith, 1 9 7 3 ; Jantsch, 1 9 7 5 ; Michael, 1 9 7 3 ; Vickers, 1 9 7 0 ) . The most prevalent method suggested for gaining control i s to manage by planning. A basic premise of those advocating management by planning i s that a l a i s s e z - f a i r e approach to the future i s e s s e n t i a l l y impossible. There i s no longer a choice i n the matter ; the question i s not one of management versus no management, rather i t i s one of who w i l l manage and in whose i n t e r e s t . Only a few years ago, i t would have been incumbent upon the w r i t e r of a planning t h e s i s to present and defend the i d e o l o g i c a l arguments for p u b l i c planning versus the idea of s o c i a l change being achieved through an i n t e r p l a y of unfettered market-type f o r c e s . The major i d e o l o g i c a l arguments concerning planning took place i n the period surrounding World War I I , engaging such w r i t e r s as K a r l Mannheim (1951), Von Hayek (1967, r e - i s s u e d ) , Barbara Wooton (1945) and K a r l Popper (1945), i n what has been termed i n planning c i r c l e s as the Great Debate. While the debate may not have been so conclusive as to s i l e n c e one or the other s i d e , western democracies (among many others) have embraced a model of s u b s t a n t i a l p u b l i c planning to achieve o b j e c t i v e s defined as being i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . Dahl and Lindblom (1953, p. 5) captured the essence of the argument which has seen planning e s t a b l i s h e d as a fundamental facet of modern s o c i e t y : \"Plan or no plan? Everyone b e l i e v e s in planning in the l i t e r a l sense of the word; and, for that matter, everyone b e l i e v e s that n a t i o n a l governments should execute some plans for economic l i f e . No 8 one favours bad planning. Plan or no plan i s no choice at a l l ; the pertinent questions turn on particular techniques: Who s h a l l plan, for what purposes, in what conditions, and by what device?\" 1.3 A STUDY OF IMPLEMENTATION Given the fundamental need for planning, i t i s tautological that improved planning w i l l result in improved management and therefore in improved soc i e t a l outcomes. How, then, i s a study directed to improved public planning and management to be approached; what facet of t h i s immensely complex subject should be considered? There are c l e a r l y many avenues of study which could generate f r u i t f u l r e s u l t s . Modern students v of public policy have attacked t h i s question in various ways using a variety of tools from every conceivable d i s c i p l i n e . But, by and large, the attack has centred on the process by which plans and p o l i c i e s * are formulated. Relatively l i t t l e attention has been focussed on the process whereby these p o l i c i e s are implemented. There appears to be a bias in policy studies toward the position that i t i s the process of deciding upon a policy which i s *For sake of brevity, the term policy w i l l be used to denote p o l i c i e s and plans as the products of authoritative public deliberat ion . c r i t i c a l . The i m p l i c i t argument i s that, i f a policy i s well defined through a v a l i d process, then the desired policy outcome w i l l surely follow. Centuries ago, Robbie Burns provided the c l a s s i c refutation of t h i s argument in his l i n e s r e f e r r i n g to the problems of the best l a i d plans of mice and men. Not only how a policy i s defined and decided upon i s important but also how i t i s implemented would appear to have a s i g n i f i c a n t bearing on the outcome. It follows that public management [the set of which environmental management i s a member] can probably be improved through improved policy implementation. A study of policy implementation ought to y i e l d s i g n i f i c a n t benefits in understanding the overal l policy/planning process and in establishing the role and importance of implementation in that process. Ideally, such a study would provide p r a c t i c a l guidance on the implications of modifying key elements of existing i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements to produce alternative outcomes. To achieve t h i s objective, the study must address s p e c i f i c questions: (a) i s implementation a separate and definable process? (b) i f so, how does i t relate to other parts of the public policy process? (c) what i s the d e f i n i t i o n and nature of t h i s process? (d) of what elements i s i t composed? and (e) how do these elements interact to produce a policy outcome? 10 As a means of setting and establishing the context for the study, the remainder of t h i s chapter w i l l be devoted to an , exploration of the f i r s t two questions: i s implementation a separate process, and i f so, how does i t relate to other parts of the policy process. To deal with the other key questions on a theore t i c a l basis, the next chapter of the study w i l l cover the implementation l i t e r a t u r e . This l i t e r a t u r e review w i l l be used in the t h i r d chapter as a basis for developing a d e f i n i t i o n of the implementation process and for hypothesizing the elements and interactions which are important in determining a policy outcome. The theory w i l l then be \"tested\" in a case study analysis. 1 . 4 THE PUBLIC POLICY PROCESS - THE CONTEXT FOR IMPLEMENTATION Where does implementation f i t in the larger policy process? In considering this question, the study w i l l present and discuss a simple conceptual model of the policy process which describes the major components and attempts to characterize the important questions regarding the linkages between these. Starting with basic concepts, i t i s assumed that the policy process i s part of the p o l i t i c a l system. Interactions within t h i s system are distinguished from a l l other kinds of s o c i a l interactions in that they are predominantly oriented toward the authoritative a l l o c a t i o n of values for a society (Easton, 1 9 7 9 , p. 2 1 ) . Because the p o l i t i c a l system is so 1 1 d e f i n e d , t h e r e a r e c o n c e p t u a l b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n what i s p o l i t i c a l and what i s n o t . That w h i c h i s n o t i s c a l l e d t h e ' e n v i r o n m e n t ' . But t h e s e b o u n d a r i e s a r e n o t c a s t i n s t o n e . As E a s t o n ( 1 9 7 9 , p. 6 7 ) a r g u e s : \"We do n o t need t o c o n c l u d e t h a t ( b o u n d a r i e s ) , o n c e e s t a b l i s h e d , a r e e t e r n a l l y f i x e d . I f i t s h o u l d t u r n o u t t h a t o w i n g t o some m i s t a k e n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r l a c k o f i n s i g h t , i n o r d e r t o i m p r o v e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s y s t e m , we must i n c l u d e w i t h i n i t some e l e m e n t p r e v i o u s l y a s s i g n e d t o t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , we a r e f a c e d w i t h no c r i s i s . We s i m p l y r e d e f i n e t h e s y s t e m t o meet o u r a n a l y t i c a l n e e d s . Each t i m e t h a t we e n l a r g e o u r s y s t e m we s i m u l t a n e o u s l y s h r i n k t h e e n v i r o n m e n t . \" ( E m p h a s i s added .) F i g u r e 1 . 1 d e p i c t s E a s t o n ' s s i m p l i f i e d f l o w m o d e l o f a p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s h o w i n g t h e e n v i r o n m e n t o f t h e s y s t e m and i t s i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . FIGURE 1 . 1 A S I M P L I F I E D MODEL OF A P O L I T I C A L SYSTEM Demands a. c The political system and actions Decisions S o u r c e : D. E a s t o n ( 1 9 6 5 ) p. 1 1 2 The environmental management p o l i c y system with which t h i s study i s concerned i s only a part or a sub-system of the p o l i t i c a l system, because obviously not everything included i n the p o l i t i c a l system has a d i r e c t bearing on environmental p o l i c y . Based upon the work of Easton and Ranney (1968), Figure 1.2 i s put forward as a model representing that part of the general p o l i c y process thought to be us e f u l i n understanding the environmental management p o l i c y process. Five major components are defined: (1) P o l i c y formation process; (2) Pol i c y output; ( 3 ) P o l i c y implementation'process ; (4) P o l i c y outcome; and (5) P o l i c y environment. FIGURE 1.2 MODEL OF POLICY PROCESS P O L I C Y E N V I R O N M E N T P O L I C Y J O U T C O M E The following discussion w i l l consider these fiv e components from the viewpoint of determining the relationship between each and the implementation of policy. 1.4.1 Policy Formation Process This process, which can be roughly equated with what i s often thought of as the decision-making process, can and usually does involve an extremely complex set of interactions to r e s u l t in the formation of a policy. Substantial scholarly e f f o r t has gone into describing policy formation processes ( c f . Bauer and Gergen, 1968; Simon, 1957; Hartle, 1979). These e f f o r t s have generally been concerned with questions of r a t i o n a l i t y and e f f i c i e n c y in decision-making with r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e e f f o r t directed toward questions of ef f i c a c y . The decision-making l i t e r a t u r e amply demonstrates that the policy formation process involves many level s and much of what appears on the surface cannot be taken at face value. For example, i t i s generally not adequate to simply accept an o f f i c i a l statement of policy as the actual policy intention. Accepted theory states that a multifaceted decision process usually r e s u l t s in a decision taken for a variety of reasons directed to a variety of purposes ( c f . Lindblom, 1959). The research problem i s to determine who i s involved in making the policy (the values represented) and what the real i n t e n t i o n s are. This i s not to suggest a cl a n d e s t i n e p l o t e x i s t s i n every p o l i c y process but rather that very often decision-makers make d e c i s i o n s that may produce an array of consequences, many of which may be unintended or i n c i d e n t a l to the intended purposes. I t i s important in terms of improving p o l i c y performance to know what was and what was not intended. Of i n t e r e s t to the study of implementation i s the extent to which the decision-making process i n f l u e n c e s the method and process of implementation and v i c e versa, and the extent to which i m p l e m e n t a b i l i t y i s considered in determining the p o l i c y . 1.4.2 P o l i c y Output The p o l i c y output i s the product of a p o l i c y formation process, r e s u l t i n g in what would commonly be termed a p o l i c y . To understand f u l l y the content of a p o l i c y , i t must be considered in terms of the problem i t addresses and the method by which i t proposes to solve t h i s problem. The d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of a p o l i c y i s 'a d e f i n i t e course of act i o n adopted for a designated purpose'. On the b a s i s of t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , a p o l i c y embodies wi t h i n i t a stated or implied theory or hypothesis about a means-end r e l a t i o n s h i p . For research purposes, i t i s c r i t i c a l to be able to define the hypothesis that i s to be tested through the process of implementation. An example from water resources management w i l l serve to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t . A p o l i c y might be adopted to attempt to reduce f l o o d damages on a r i v e r f l o o d p l a i n . The p o l i c y could be f u r t h e r s p e c i f i e d to include that i t w i l l be implemented by e s t a b l i s h i n g a system of dykes along the r i v e r . This p o l i c y output embodies the hypothesis t h a t , i f the dykes are constructed to p a r t i c u l a r s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , then a defined degree of f l o o d p r o t e c t i o n w i l l be afforded to the a d j o i n i n g lands. Consideration of the p o l i c y output i n t h i s manner f a c i l i t a t e s c l e a r ex post e v a l u a t i o n . I f , i n June, lands, that were thought to be protected, are flooded, research i n t o the s h o r t f a l l can proceed by d i s s e c t i n g the hypothesis. Were the dykes constructed to the standard implied in the p o l i c y ? Was some degree of p r o t e c t i o n provided, a l b e i t l e s s e r than a n t i c i p a t e d ? Is the hypothesized r e l a t i o n s h i p between dykes and p r o t e c t i o n v a l i d ? Did the p o l i c y i m p l i c i t l y assume s t r u c t u r a l methods of f l o o d c o n t r o l are the most e f f e c t i v e means of reducing flood damages? These and other r e l a t e d questions flow from the p o l i c y when i t i s seen i n the l i g h t of an \" i f - t h e n \" hypothesis. From a p r a c t i c a l viewpoint, however, i t must be remembered t h a t , while the p o l i c y output defines the wishes of the policy-makers, i t remains an a b s t r a c t i o n u n t i l a c t u a l l y implemented. Action i s required to b r i n g the p o l i c y into the mode where behavioural responses and effects can be observed. Since the effects of a policy are c e r t a i n l y as interesting and important as policy intentions, i t i s obviously important to understand policy as i t i s implemented as well as how i t was intended. 1.4.3 Policy Implementation Process This i s the process which turns a policy, an intended action, into concrete r e s u l t s . It can be thought of as a test of the hypothesis referred to in the previous section. Ideally, the policy statement which i s equated with the policy output f u l l y explains the intentions with respect to a particular problem. In such a case, implementors know what is to be implemented and are able to evaluate the extent to which success i s attained. R e a l i s t i c a l l y , t h i s i s rar e l y the case, and implementors may not be aware of the f u l l intentions of policy-makers and therefore might interpret a policy in terms of their own objectives or their perceptions of the policy-makers' objectives. It may well be that the policy implemented (or the hypothesis tested) i s not the one intended by the policy-makers. Even i f the implementors are aware of the policy-makers' intentions, they s t i l l may not implement the policy in accordance with the instructions i m p l i c i t in the policy statement. It i s conceivable that the implementation organization would pursue i t s own objectives which may c o n f l i c t with those of the policy-makers and thus subvert the intentions of the policy-makers and frustrate attainment of the real or ostensible objectives. Going back to the flood control example, the policy of constructing dykes i s obviously not self-implementing. Appropriate s i t e s must be designated, structures must be designed and actually b u i l t , and cost-sharing formulae generally must be negotiated. It i s conceivable that substantial changes over the o r i g i n a l policy intentions could r e s u l t because of implementation procedures. Physical l i m i t a t i o n s in s p e c i f i c s i t e s may rule out protection to the degree anticipated by policy-makers. Cost-sharing negotiations may modify the scale of the works projected and thus greatly reduce the overall effectiveness of the p o l i c y . It i s possible that inter-agency r i v a l r y may cause a particular aspect of the policy to receive r e l a t i v e l y more attention than others to the detriment of the t o t a l solution. In a society characterized by p l u r a l i s t decision-making, i t i s quite l i k e l y that there i s not a unique set of intentions respecting any policy. The values and objectives of the various participants in a policy formation process do not need to converge in terms of implementation expectations in order for them to arrive at an agreed-upon policy. This complicates the task of implementation and seems to precipitate a separation in kind between policy formation and policy implementation. In analyzing i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements, i t i s c r i t i c a l to define structural aspects of the arrangements which lead to s p e c i f i c conclusions. For example, does a p l u r a l i s t decision-making process require a p l u r a l i s t implementation process wherein the intentions behind the policy process need to be re-examined i t e r a t i v e l y by the implementation participants in order to produce f a i t h f u l implementation of the policy hypothesis? Or, a l t e r n a t i v e l y , does a p l u r a l i s t decision-making process purposely leave the implementation of decisions (however they are arrived at) to a separate technical or professional process as a kind of safety valve, providing an outlet for the resolution of uncertainties which w i l l be viewed by those impacted quite separately from the process by which decisions were o r i g i n a l l y taken? These kinds of questions point to a strong theoretical linkage between policy formation and policy implementation. This study w i l l need to be concerned with defining that linkage. In addition to the question of the linkage to policy formation, the i n t r i c a c i e s of the implementation process i t s e l f require an understanding of who i s involved with implementation and therefore the range of values represented, the procedures used to interpret policy (e.g., i t e r a t i v e with the policy-making participants, mechanistic, technical/ professional, e t c . ) , the process by which implementation action i s undertaken, and the evaluation procedures used to test the attainment of policy objectives. In a study of implementation, i t w i l l be important to determine the r e l a t i v e importance of these variables in order to appreciate the potential for their manipulation to produce alternate outcomes . 1.4.4 Policy Outcome The actions embodied within the implementation process would normally produce tangible results and effects called the policy outcome. As alluded to in the previous section, the actual outcome could d i f f e r from the intentions defined in the abstract policy output. The outcome provides the basis for an objective measure of the degree to which the policy, as defined in the output, has been implemented [assuming the policy i s not changed in the process of implementation]. It also provides the basis for a measure of a related aspect, the degree to which the policy impacts upon the problem to which i t has been applied. It i s quite conceivable that a policy could be flawlessly implemented but have r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e impact upon the problem. While this i s not an implementation question per se, i t i s important to 20 keep in mind that e f f e c t i v e implementation of a policy does not necessarily r e s u l t in e f f e c t i v e action respecting the policy problem. I l l u s t r a t i n g the concept of a policy outcome using the previous example, the anticipated degree of flood control provided by the dyking program may not have materialized when tested under the conditions of a flood. Or perhaps the actual severity of the flood may have been greater than considered possible in the policy design. In such cases, the policy outcome d i f f e r s substantially from that which was anticipated by the policy output. What could cause this? Were there uncertainties which existed but were not accounted for in the formation or implementation processes; were the wrong variables in the hypothesis manipulated; was the hypothesis proved incorrect by the policy outcome; did the implementors choose not to f a i t h f u l l y implement the policy? Each of these questions i l l u s t r a t e s the importance of considering the substance of the policy outcome for comparison with the output and the problem d e f i n i t i o n . To guage the importance of implementation actions, an explanation of any variance between these i s in order. This explanation should involve analysis of the variables considered c r i t i c a l in policy implementation and, to some extent, the consideration given to implementation in problem d e f i n i t i o n and policy design within the policy formation process . 21 1.4.5 Policy Environment As noted e a r l i e r , i t i s a basic concept of systems analysis that a l l phenomena outside of the s p e c i f i c system under examination are considered to be the system's environment. This concept p a r t i a l l y explains the notion of a policy environment, although what i s intended i s somewhat more s p e c i f i c . Most public p o l i c i e s are directed toward particular segments of the population or target groups, even though some of these groups may be very large, such as the low-income, the eld e r l y , the wealthy, etc. The policy environment re f e r s , in part, to the target groups and their related a c t i v i t i e s . Those affected by a policy are invariably involved in shaping the outcome, even though perhaps very i n d i r e c t l y . The impactees manifest symptoms of the impact, but i t depends upon the process feedback loops as to whether these manifestations result in positive policy change or in f r u s t r a t i o n . It seems l i k e l y that, i f the impacts are s i g n i f i c a n t , either positive or negative, the environment w i l l impinge on the policy system to some extent. Clearly, the perceived strength of the impact would be a major determinant. In addition, i t could be expected that the \"power\" and resources of the impacted groups would be a factor in determining the amount of influence on the implementation of a polic y . In a d d i t i o n to the r o l e of the p o l i c y t a r g e t groups, the events surrounding any p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y system would seem to exert an i n f l u e n c e on the p o l i c y process. I t seems reasonable that the behaviour of the actors i n p o l i c y formation or implementation would be influenced to some degree by the s e r i e s of events o c c u r r i n g in the wider s o c i e t y . This i s a very complex subject area as evidenced, for example, i n the observed tendency for s o c i a l movements to gain a c c e p t a b i l i t y i n a wide range of s o c i a l circumstances and c u l t u r e s . While the d e t a i l s of p o l i c y environment e f f e c t s may i n t o t a l be extremely complex, i t i s nonetheless important to recognize the existence of t h i s set of v a r i a b l e s and to be open to accepting t h i s concept as part of a p o t e n t i a l explanation i n a given p o l i c y process outcome. 1.4.6 Summary of P o l i c y Process The foregoing d i s c u s s i o n , based upon the model i l l u s t r a t e d in Figure 1.2 (p. 10), leads to the conclusion that p o l i c y implementation i s i d e n t i f i a b l e as a d i s t i n c t component of a l a r g e r p o l i c y process. The d i s c u s s i o n suggests that many of the v a r i a b l e s important i n formulating a p o l i c y are also key i n implementation, such as the values represented by the p a r t i c i p a n t s , the range of values represented, the information generation and evaluation procedures employed, and others. But there are aspects which c l e a r l y define two separate processes. Policy formulation i s the act of creating a policy, generally involving the interplay of competing values and objectives and resulting in a consensus decision on what to do, but not necessarily agreement on how or why i t i s to be done. Implementation involves acting on the po l i c y , and t h i s action manifests policy impacts. The decision on how to carry out a policy cannot be avoided, and as the impacts become evident, the various reasons for why the policy was formed may also become clear. The two evaluation touchstones in the process, policy output and policy outcome, help us to see the linkages between formulation and implementation. If the output c l e a r l y defines policy intentions and f o r c e f u l l y lays out implementation procedures, implementation can be straightforward [e.g., many t r a f f i c laws f a l l into t h i s category]. If, however, policy intentions and implementation guidance are minimal or even s l i g h t l y ambiguous, a myriad of i n s t i t u t i o n a l and behavioural variables can come into play and the outcome becomes much less determinate. If the outcome does not match the intentions of the policy, however defined, through a comparison of output and outcome, then a n a l y t i c a l procedures can be undertaken to dissect the problem. This can concentrate on implementation decisions and procedures on the one hand, and policy formation on the 24 other, and the i n t e r p l a y of these through feedback channels. The p o l i c y environment may impinge on both the formation and implementation processes. 1.5 PERVASIVE THEMES - VALUES AND UNCERTAINTY The above d i s c u s s i o n on the p o l i c y process i s , of course, only i n t r o d u c t o r y and serves but to whet the appet i t e for an in-depth look at the v a r i a b l e s at play. I t merely demonstrates the u t i l i t y of studying implementation and serves as a r a t i o n a l e for l i m i t i n g the scope of the a n a l y s i s . It sets the stage for fu r t h e r a n a l y s i s by suggesting important r e l a t i o n s h i p s which can be subjected to research. In p a r t i c u l a r , the d i s c u s s i o n points to what appears to be two pervasive themes or dimensions in understanding implementation and i t s r o l e i n the p o l i c y process; these are: (a) the a p p l i c a t i o n of values, and (b) d e a l i n g with u n c e r t a i n t i e s . These w i l l be discussed in a p r e l i m i n a r y manner at t h i s point to help guide a review of the l i t e r a t u r e and the subsequent development of a theory of implementation. 1.5.1 A p p l i c a t i o n of Values The p u b l i c p o l i c y process i n v o l v e s the a p p l i c a t i o n of values (among other things) to questions of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and concern. A major question i n p o l i c y l i t e r a t u r e has centred on whose values ought to determine the p o l i c y output. Policy-making could be viewed as a mechanistic exercise i f the objectives were simple and straightforward (ignoring, for the moment, major uncertainties). The thing that makes public policy-making so d i f f i c u l t i s not only the fact that outcomes are d i f f i c u l t to predict but also the fact that there i s frequently only vague agreement (or no agreement) on what the outcome should be. It was suggested in the previous discussion that the policy formation stage does not necessarily d e f i n i t i v e l y guide the implementation of po l i c y . Frequently, decisions must be made during implementation which have the substance and force of policy choices. Such choices are not often purely technical [value-free] in nature and therefore involve the application of values to the alternatives open to those making the decisions. It i s , therefore, c r i t i c a l to consider how values are or can be brought to bear at the implementation stage. This l i n e of reasoning leads to the proposition that a comprehensive study of implementation must consider two kinds of questions related to values. F i r s t , are implementation procedures and strategies designed to optimize [that i s , minimize the s h o r t f a l l between output and outcome] in l i g h t of the presumed values/objectives of the implementors? Or, second, are the processes of implementation organized so as to r e f l e c t the range of values of the legitimate participants; i . e . , the public which i s impacted by the policy and therefore has a legitimate interest in the outcome? In terms of the l i t e r a t u r e and theory, e x p l i c i t consideration must be given to behavioural factors that determine who i s involved in the implementation process and how these actors can be expected to perform. It can be expected that the particular behaviour of those involved w i l l influence or determine the policy outcome. Equally important, the neglect or non-involvement of major value stances in the implementation process w i l l be a determinant in the outcome. In terms of a positive analysis, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to determine whose values govern the outcome. From a normative viewpoint, i t i s necessary to establish whether the values pursued are appropriate. As noted at the outset, by and large t h i s study w i l l be r e s t r i c t e d to a positive approach. However, some concluding statements at the completion of the study w i l l be made regarding some of the options available should alternative arrangements be considered desirable. 1.5.2 Uncer tainty Environmental p o l i c i e s invariably involve substantial uncertainties. The discussion of the policy process suggests that, i f uncertainties exist in the policy output, i t w i l l be in the implementation stage where these uncertainties must be resolved or at the very least accounted for in concrete ways in terms of their impact upon the policy outcome. Understanding how uncertainty i s dealt with in the implementation process i s c r i t i c a l to understanding the functioning of the process in terms of feedback as uncertainties are resolved and how t h i s resolution in turn leads to new action. The discussion above concerning values can be p a r t i a l l y conceptualized in terms of uncertainty. One of the major uncertainties a f f e c t i n g any public implementation process i s how values w i l l have changed over time and thus perhaps s h i f t the d i r e c t i o n of the policy outcome from that which might have occurred in the absence of a value s h i f t . The point w i l l be further elaborated in the following discussion. Uncertainties are defined as the u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t i e s in factors which aff e c t the success or di r e c t i o n of a course of action. There are d i f f e r e n t kinds of uncertainties with variances in both nature and degree. A clear explanation of these w i l l be useful for further analysis related to policy implementation . 1.5.2.1 Kinds of Uncertainty The most common type of uncertainty i s lack of information or knowledge. It i s also the easiest to remedy, and some might argue that t h i s i s not uncertainty at a l l . Lack of information simply means that s u f f i c i e n t e f f o r t has not been expended to acquire the information, not that i t i s unknowable. For purposes here, however, this w i l l be considered uncertainty because in many instances, i f not most, policy i s formulated under conditions that force a decision before complete information can be secured. Additionally, i t must be remembered that information acquisition has a real cost which must be accounted for in the decision calculus. It i s conceivable that policy-makers would develop a policy under less than f u l l information on the assumption that the marginal cost of acquiring the information was higher than the marginal return to the policy process. This sort of decision i s usually based upon the perception of an outcome probability derived from the current stock of information. Lack of information type of uncertainty can be erased by the expenditure of resources to acquire the necessary information. In many cases, however, substantial time lags exist between the time of deciding to obtain the information and the actual acquisition of the data in a useable form. For example, basic research may have to be undertaken to f i l l some gaps in knowledge. Therefore, while t h e o r e t i c a l l y simple, t h i s kind of uncertainty can cause considerable p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y . The policy process response in such situations, as suggested above, i s to view the future in 29 probablistic terms, making a decision based on the probable outcomes given the information currently a v a i l a b l e . In theory, i f the research i s undertaken, the information flowing from i t can be fed into the policy process, probably during the implementation stage. The information i s compared with anticipated/projected information and adjustments are made accordingly. Posing substantially more d i f f i c u l t y for policy-makers are the more genuine uncertainties that cannot be eliminated except through the passage of time. Quade ( 1 9 7 6 , p. 2) c i t e s an example which admirably demonstrates the uncertainties associated with environmental policy in what appeared to be a rather straightforward problem and solution: \"... Consider the problem of c o n t r o l l i n g southern C a l i f o r n i a ' s photochemical smog. The contribution of automobiles to th i s problem was recognized more than twenty years ago, when Haagen-Smith showed how unburned hydrocarbons and oxides of nitrogen were both required for the photochemical reactions which produce smog. It was decided very early to try and control hydrocarbons as being easier. It was also decided at the same time by the other authorities that health problems might be associated with the existing emission l e v e l s of carbon monoxide, which has no known connection with smog. Regulations resulted curbing both carbon monoxide and unburned hydrocarbons. The natural response of the automobile industry was to raise the flame temperatures in engines to maintain the so-called high performance of cars, thereby increasing the emission of the oxides of nitrogen and largely cancelling the benefit of the regulation of hydrocarbons. If we include the increase in car population, we find that smog has not been reduced at a l l . \" This example i l l u s t r a t e s the point that u n c e r t a i n t i e s e x i s t r e s p e c t i n g the i n t e r a c t i o n of v a r i a b l e s which cannot be predicted i n advance. One could have hypothesized the response of the automobile i n d u s t r y and made p o l i c y ' a c c o r d i n g l y , but the passage of time would be required to t e s t the a c t u a l response of the system to the p o l i c y . Quade (1976, p. 214) d i v i d e s passage of time u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n t o two types. The f i r s t , s t o c h a s t i c u n c e r t a i n t i e s , i n v o l v e s random events, many of which can be reduced to a r i s k s i t u a t i o n by computing a p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n of the p o t e n t i a l outcomes. Flood c o n t r o l i s the c l a s s i c case of u n c e r t a i n t y t r e a t e d as r i s k . Records over long periods of time are used to determine the p r o b a b i l i t y of p a r t i c u l a r kinds of n a t u r a l occurrences happening. For example, stream flow records over time are used to p r e d i c t the r e t u r n i n t e r v a l of a given amount of water, f o r example, once i n 100 years. Whether t h i s s o rt of r e - d e f i n i t i o n of un c e r t a i n t y to r i s k i s u s e f u l or even e f f e c t i v e i n the long run i s another question. The second type, for which p r o b a b i l i t i e s cannot be c a l c u l a t e d , are c a l l e d r e a l u n c e r t a i n t i e s . These can be fur t h e r s u b - c l a s s i f i e d i n t o s t r a t e g i c u n c e r t a i n t i e s that are 31 due to ignorance about factors under the control of another decision-making unit (the smog example above), and environmental uncertainties involving factors under natural control. An example of strategic uncertainty might be how the fi s h i n g industry might react to the imposition of new equipment regulations cannot be determined in advance because those imposing the regulations have no real knowledge as to how important fi s h i n g industry decision-makers, e.g., individual fishermen, w i l l behave in response. They may ignore the regulations, they may appeal for changes, they may change their behavior in seemingly unrelated areas and so on. In noting the response to treating flood situations, i t was questioned how useful i t i s to consider the problem in terms of p r o b a b i l i t i e s . It may be more appropriate to view the matter as one of environmental uncertainty. It cannot be known in advance, or at least not very far in advance, what the weather pattern w i l l produce in terms of flood waters, and consequently, only after the fact i s the uncertainty l i f t e d . But the event does not a l t e r , in any way, the environmental uncertainty for the future. This being the case, much d i f f e r e n t policy responses than those commonly applied would probably be forthcoming, but that's a topic for another and quite d i f f e r e n t study. 32 1.5.2.2 Response to Uncertainty The example on flood c o n t r o l r a i s e s a d e f i n i t i o n a l problem i n environmental p o l i c y a n a l y s i s concerning u n c e r t a i n t i e s . Because there i s a strong d e s i r e to \" s o l v e \" the problem at hand, the way a problem s i t u a t i o n i s defined i s important i n d i r e c t i n g i t s r e s o l u t i o n . Two things can happen. The f i r s t r e s u l t s i n devoting most of the a n a l y t i c a l e f f o r t toward q u a n t i t a t i v e c a l c u l a t i o n to the neglect of l e s s q u a n t i f i a b l e or q u a l i t a t i v e aspects of the i s s u e . As Quade (1976, p. 216) points out: \" U n c e r t a i n t i e s that can be c a l c u l a t e d i n one way or another tend to absorb the a t t e n t i o n of an analyst a l l out of proportion to t h e i r importance. One reason i s that to take them i n t o account properly can be such a challenge to h i s ingenuity. This sometimes leads to the neglect of the more serious u n c e r t a i n t i e s that are not s t o c h a s t i c i n nature, the r e a l u n c e r t a i n t i e s . \" The second r e l a t e d point i s that a n a l y s t s tend to view the problem from the perspective of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n and often apply, for example, p r o b a b i l i t i e s to phenomena that are not a c t u a l l y amenable to such a for m u l a t i o n . Defining a s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v i n g u n c e r t a i n t y as s t o c h a s t i c when i t i n f a c t i s more r e a l i s t i c a l l y a problem of environmental u n c e r t a i n t y can lead to serious e r r o r s and questionable or misleading p o l i c y c o n c l u s i o n s . I t should be recognized, however, that s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s does provide a means of rec o g n i z i n g environmental u n c e r t a i n t y which can be a p p l i e d . It was suggested in the f i r s t section of t h i s chapter that public policy processes have not been very successful in anticipating and responding to change in a manner which has created a desirable future. This amounts to being i n e f f e c t i v e in dealing with uncertainty. Why does t h i s appear to be the case? I n i t i a l indications suggest that the policy process i s more or less i n e f f e c t i v e because i t does not s o l i c i t / r e c e i v e and/or use adequate information on changes in the policy environment (that portion of the world impacted by the policy) which occur as uncertainties are resolved over time. Stated another way, i n s t i t u t i o n s tend not to take account of deviations from the path charted in the policy formulation process (at least not in the short run), even though t h i s path i s based upon uncertainties. Such deviations are termed policy ' f a i l u r e s ' and the process i s geared to succeed, not to f a i l . This suggests a b u i l t - i n bias against correcting for the resolution of uncertainties. Given the prominence in environmental policy situations, c r i t i c a l questions involve consideration of how policy processes respond to uncertainty and how t h i s response might be improved. The answers l i e at the very heart of policy analysis for much of the relevance of the policy process depends upon them. 34 1.6 SUMMARY This chapter provides the basis for a study of policy implementation as part of a concern for understanding the environmental management policy process. It argues that r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e attention has been paid to implementation and that a study of t h i s ought to yield s i g n i f i c a n t benefits in a better general understanding of public policy processes. The arguments in t h i s chapter lead to the proposition that a d i s t i n c t implementation process can be defined within a larger policy process. Two pervasive themes, the application of values and the presence of uncertainties, were defined as major organizing variables for understanding implementation . The next stage of the analysis i s to develop further the concept of an implementation process. What variables or factors are important in determining the process, and how does i t s o l i c i t and process information on policy performance? As a step toward structuring research to consider these questions, a comprehensive review of the l i t e r a t u r e concerned with policy implementation follows. This l i t e r a t u r e assessment w i l l be used to define s p e c i f i c models of the implementation process which w i l l be \"tested\" in an empirical case study. 35 CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION AND RELATED LITERATURE 2.1 INTRODUCTION In 1973, Pressman and Wildavsky wrote: \"There i s (or there must be) a large l i t e r a t u r e about implementation in the s o c i a l sciences - or so we have been told by numerous people Nevertheless, except for the few pieces mentioned in the body of t h i s book, we have been unable to find any s i g n i f i c a n t analytic work dealing with implementation. How s h a l l we persuade others that i t i s f r u i t l e s s to look for a l i t e r a t u r e that does not ex i s t , or that we cannot connect our work with nonexistent analyses by others: i t i s a l i t t l e l i k e searching for the l i t t l e man who isn't there. While we cannot hope to provide conclusive evidence we do hope to be persuasive beyond the mere assertion that there i s no analytic l i t e r a t u r e on implementation.\" (Emphasis added.) In the years since t h i s pronouncement, a few studies s p e c i f i c a l l y concerned with policy implementation have been published so that a body of l i t e r a t u r e on the subject i s beginning to emerge. Even so, i t must be recognized that, although the number of published studies i s growing, the present l i t e r a t u r e i s s t i l l of a modest siz e . The l i t e r a t u r e review for t h i s study i s considered to be comprehensive with respect to the subject of policy implementation in the s o c i a l sciences. It i s recognized that questions of policy implementation are of d i r e c t concern to legal scholars and there exists a substantial legal 36 l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s subject. This has not been reviewed here because i t i s concerned largely with s p e c i f i c legal questions for which the writer does not have the background to judge competently the substance and c a l i b r e of the arguments. From discussions with legal experts, i t would appear that the thrust of t h i s study does not c o n f l i c t with the legal l i t e r a t u r e on points respecting policy implementation. In the past f i v e or so years, a great deal has been written about regulation reform in Canada. This l i t e r a t u r e w i l l not be reviewed in the study even though regulation i s a widely used mechanism for implementing public policy. There are two main reasons for t h i s exclusion. On the one hand, regulation studies are to a very large degree concerned with the substantive issues of particular regulations, for example, the impacts of egg marketing regulations on economic e f f i c i e n c y or the price impacts of air c a r r i e r regulations. These studies are not concerned with the factors that shape implementation decisions. On the other hand, the regulation studies which do address decision-making questions are invariably concerned with the process of developing regulations. There i s scant attention paid to what happens after the regulation i s adopted. It would appear that these studies follow the t r a d i t i o n of assuming that a policy/regulation well-constructed w i l l be f a i t h f u l l y implemented. This i s in no way intended as a c r i t i c i s m of the regulation studies. They provide excellent analysis of the important questions centred on developing new or revised regulations. This study should be viewed as a complementary work. It i s being undertaken precisely because most studies of implementation mechanisms do not consider the factors which influence how p o l i c i e s are actually implemented.* *The reader i s referred to the following studies for an overview of recent regulation l i t e r a t u r e in Canada: G. Bruce Doern, \"Rationalizing the Regulation Decision-Making Process: The Prospects for Reform\", Working Paper No. 2 , Economic Council of Canada, Ottawa, 1979; Robert D. Cairns, \"Rationales for Regulation\", Technical Report No. 2 , Economic Council of Canada, Ottawa, 1980; Michael J. Trebilock, et a l . , \"The Choice of Governing Instruments: Some Applications\", Technical Report No. 12, Economic Council of Canada, Ottawa, 1981 ; Hushron, Ogilvie Assoc. Ltd., \"An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Government Decision-Making Processes in the F i e l d of Occupational Health and Safety\", Technical Report No. 5 , Economic Council of Canada, Ottawa, 1981 ; Science Council of Canada, Regulating the Regulators, Science Values and Decisions, Minister of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1982; Economic Council of Canada, Reforming Regulation, Minister of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1981; The reader i s also referred to Fred Thompson and L. Jones, Regulatory Policy and Practices, Praeger, New York, 1982. This work i s concerned with issues in the United States, but i t provides numerous th e o r e t i c a l insights applicable to Canadian conditions. With the p r e v i o u s l y stated caveats, as of mid-1982, a l l m a t e r i a l s d i r e c t l y r e l a t i n g to implementation published i n book form and i n a v a i l a b l e academic j o u r n a l s were i n c l u d e d ; and as w e l l , e f f o r t s were made to obtain r e l e v a n t unpublished m a t e r i a l referenced in published papers and monographs. The o v e r a l l impression i s that the l i t e r a t u r e i s very uneven and poorly s t r u c t u r e d i n t h e o r e t i c a l and conceptual terms. I t i s simply not p o s s i b l e to produce a s i n g l e accepted v e r s i o n of implementation r e a l i t y from the l i t e r a t u r e . The few w r i t e r s who have addressed implementation questions have been very s e l e c t i v e i n t h e i r arguments, and none can be said to be comprehensive. Even now, one cannot b r i n g together the diverse points of view and present a status quo opinion or even a s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t . Enough work has not yet been published to provide a r e a l i s t i c b a s i s for doing t h i s . Alexander (1982, p. 134), a f t e r reviewing f i v e of the most recent renderings on implementation, asks the question: \"... does t h i s l i t e r a t u r e , i n c l u d i n g i t s l a t e s t increment reviewed here, add up to a body of theory which can e x p l a i n why some a c t i o n s i n a p a r t i c u l a r set of circumstances produce c e r t a i n outcomes?\" And h i s answer: \" I suspect - a s u s p i c i o n which our authors seem to share - that we are s t i l l far from such a theory.\" 39 What then can be expected? The l i t e r a t u r e w i l l be used to raise what are considered to be the central issues of policy implementation research and w i l l be discussed with a view to ide n t i f y i n g p r a c t i c a l research questions and dire c t i o n s . The presentation w i l l be comprehensive in that a l l of the central points raised in the l i t e r a t u r e w i l l be considered and structured into s p e c i f i c arguments concerning various aspects of implementation. The arguments w i l l be summarized in the chapter following the review and used to develop a model of the implementation process. Nakamura, et a l . (1980, p. 1,090) summarize the context: \"The l i t e r a t u r e on policy implementation i s a new and growing one. While particular case studies of governmental programs have been with us for some time, the e x p l i c i t focus on 'implementation' as a research perspective has not. This l i t e r a t u r e i s new because i t addresses a common core of policy questions through the adoption of a common perspective. The major and d i s t i n c t i v e concern of implementation research i s to produce pr e s c r i p t i v e , or policy-relevant, studies.\" It should be noted that the l i t e r a t u r e on implementation per se does not cover a l l of the aspects which seem important in advancing our understanding in t h i s area. Relevant questions respecting individual and organizational behaviour, including s e l f - i n t e r e s t , perceptions, role expectations and r a t i o n a l i t y , w i l l be covered through a review of some public choice theory and organizational l i t e r a t u r e . Three general sections w i l l be presented i n c l u d i n g the i n t r o d u c t i o n of implementation concerns i n t o the p o l i c y a n a l y s i s l i t e r a t u r e , important elements of the implementation process, and approaches for improving upon current p r a c t i c e s . 2.2 IMPLEMENTATION AS A TOPIC OF INQUIRY While not a b s o l u t e l y c e n t r a l to the a n a l y s i s , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that only very r e c e n t l y has implementation been recognized as a bona f i d e process worthy of s c h o l a r l y concern. This r e c o g n i t i o n seems to be based on a n a l y s i s of what appear to be i n c r e a s i n g l y i n t r a c t a b l e s o c i e t a l problems. A p o l i c y a n a l y s i s framework which excludes or does not c o n s c i o u s l y i n c l u d e implementation i s incomplete, and as Hargrove (1975) argues, serious c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the r o l e of implementation may provide the \"missing l i n k \" . Concern for the question of implementation has appeared in the l i t e r a t u r e covering a range of substantive p u b l i c p o l i c y i n t e r e s t s . For example, Fox (1976, p. 756), i n an overview a n a l y s i s of water management i n s t i t u t i o n s , s t a t e s : \"one of the major problems evident i n the United States and Canada i s the d i f f i c u l t y of designing implementation arrangements which achieve p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s \" . In the s o c i a l p o l i c y area, Williams (1976) s t r e s s e s that \"the l a c k of concern for implementation i s c u r r e n t l y the c r u c i a l impediment to improving complex operating programs, p o l i c y a n a l y s i s and experimentation i n s o c i a l p o l i c y areas\". Some general reasons why implementation has not been adequately researched and considered are put forward i n the l i t e r a t u r e . Berman (1978) argues that s i g n i f i c a n t s h o r t f a l l s from the expectations of many for the environmental p o l i c i e s of the 1960s r e s u l t e d because planners focused on t r a n s l a t i n g the best and b r i g h t e s t ideas i n t o p u b l i c p o l i c i e s but not on implementing these p o l i c i e s . Why not? Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 450) suggest that t h i s neglect may r e s u l t from a deep-seated b i a s . They argue t h a t : \"The implementation process i s assumed to be a s e r i e s of mundane d e c i s i o n s and i n t e r a c t i o n s unworthy of the a t t e n t i o n of scholars seeking the heady s t u f f of p o l i t i c s . Implementation i s d e c e p t i v e l y simple; i t does not appear to involve any great i s s u e s . Most of the c r u c i a l p o l i c y issues are often seen to have been resolved i n p r i o r d e c i s i o n s . \" Pressman and Wildavsky (1974) demonstrate the f o l l y of accepting such assumptions: \"we are s u r p r i s e d about (implementation) f a i l u r e s because we do not begin to appreciate the number of steps i n v o l v e d , the number of p a r t i c i p a n t s whose preferences have to be taken i n t o account, the number of separate d e c i s i o n s that are part of what we 42 t h i n k of as a s i n g l e one\".* Alexander ( 1 9 8 2 , p. 1 3 5 ) argues that \"complexity ... i n h i b i t s smooth implementation of p o l i c i e s , however c l e a r l y s t a t e d , and l i m i t s our understanding of what went wrong\". In a d d i t i o n , and perhaps more important, p o l i c y implementation has been avoided by schol a r s because of the methodological d i f f i c u l t i e s posed. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 451) point out t h a t : \" R e l a t i v e to the study of p o l i c y formation, the an a l y s i s of the implementation process r a i s e s serious boundary problems. I t i s o f t e n d i f f i c u l t to define the r e l e v a n t a c t o r s . Furthermore, many of the v a r i a b l e s needed to complete an implementation study are d i f f i c u l t - i f not impossible - to measure. Unlike l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l arenas where votes are often recorded, d e c i s i o n s i n an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s e t t i n g are fre q u e n t l y d i f f i c u l t to i s o l a t e . \" The consensus i s c l e a r ; implementation has been neglected but i s an important t o p i c and worthy of study. It i s , however, complex and d i f f i c u l t to analyse. Undaunted by these warnings, some w r i t e r s have attempted to understand the process. The next s e c t i o n w i l l consider these w r i t i n g s . *The a r i t h m e t i c of complexity i s impressive. As Behn ( 1 9 8 0 ) points out, i f there are only ten points i n an implementation process where something could go awry, then even with only a 10 percent chance of error or f a i l u r e at each of these, the cumulative odds that the implementation process w i l l succeed are only 35 percent. 43 2.3 UNDERSTANDING IMPLEMENTATION The general purpose of the implementation process i s obvious; i t i s to implement p o l i c i e s . As noted e a r l i e r , a policy (defined in the output) i s an abstraction u n t i l i t i s actually implemented. Assuming that the purpose of a policy i s generally to bring about certain effects or outcomes, i t i s reasonable to analyse a policy, at least i n i t i a l l y , in terms of i t s success in bringing about anticipated outcomes. Any s h o r t f a l l between anticipated and actual outcomes i s usually termed 'policy f a i l u r e ' , and c l e a r l y there can be degrees of policy f a i l u r e . The dominant question to be asked after a case of policy f a i l u r e has been diagnosed i s why did the policy f a i l ? Williams (1976) derives three related categories of policy f a i l u r e , as follows: (1) Failure of Theory - A s p e c i f i c program i s carried out, but t h i s program does not activate the causal process that i t was hypothesized would have culminated in the intended goals. (2) Failure of Program - A program i s undertaken, and i t sets the presumed causal process into motion, but the process does not cause the desired e f f e c t s . (3) Failure of Specification - Related to number one, t h i s refers to the case when a policy may be accurately defined in program terms, but i t s implementation i s not sp e c i f i e d . Specification could include what i s to be done, how i t i s to be done, what organiza-t i o n a l changes are possible or expected, what s p e c i f i c expectations exist, and so on. 4 4 Of these three, only f a i l u r e of s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s related to the implementation process. Even so, i t would seem that f a i l i n g to specify the implementation of a policy does not necessarily lead to policy f a i l u r e . More accurately, assuming neither of the other two conditions ex i s t , what might lead to f a i l u r e would be carrying out a program in a manner contrary to the objectives of the policy. This typology of policy f a i l u r e i s useful, however, because i t d i r e c t s analysis to questions of policy substance within the context of action. In order to conclude either a f a i l u r e of theory or program, the analysis considers the policy [transformed into program] as carried out. It i s not possible to argue that a program did not activate a hypothesized causal process unless there i s data on how the program was implemented. One must be sure that the program was actually implemented in accordance with the expectations of those hypothesizing the particular causal process. The category ' f a i l u r e of s p e c i f i c a t i o n ' might usefully be renamed and redefined as f a i l u r e of implementation. This would refer not to nonspecification of what i s to be done, how i s i t to be done, etc., but rather what was done and how did t h i s relate to the expectations of the policy output. Such a r e d e f i n i t i o n moves the a n a l y t i c a l d i r e c t i o n from a preoccupation with decisions taken in the policy formation stage to a view that decisions taken during actual implementation of a policy can play a dominant role in i t s success or f a i l u r e and b a s i c a l l y d i r e c t events to an outcome. This i s not to say that the policy formation stage is not important. Clear s p e c i f i c a t i o n of implementation in the policy output would usually ease the process of acting on the policy (but not nec e s s a r i l y ) . Overt f a i l u r e of s p e c i f i c a t i o n leaves open the important questions and the variables of the implementation process are forced into play. Irrespective of the l e v e l of s p e c i f i c a t i o n , however, in any implementation involving even a very few actors and decision points, a process involving human beings representing value positions must be entered into, and thi s being the case, an e s s e n t i a l l y p o l i t i c a l process i s involved. Eugene Bardach ( 1 9 7 7 ) reviews the l i t e r a t u r e with respect to the concept of implementation as p o l i t i c s . He argues: \"Implementation p o l i t i c s i s , I believe, a special kind of p o l i t i c s . It i s a form of p o l i t i c s in which the very existence of an already defined policy mandate, l e g a l l y and legitimately authorized in some prior p o l i t i c a l process, affects the strategy and t a c t i c s of the struggle. The dominant effect i s to make the p o l i t i c s of the implementation process highly defensive. A great deal of energy goes into maneuvering to avoid r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , scrutiny, and blame.\" (p. 37 ) 4 6 Bardach (1977, p. 38) argues that what goes on in the policy formation stage i n i t i a l l y a f fects the implementation stage. He points out that: \"Die hard opponents of the policy who lost out in the adoption' stage seek, and fi n d , means to continue their opposition when, say, administrative regulations and guidelines are being written. Many who supported the o r i g i n a l policy proposal did so only because they expected to be able to twist i t in the implementation phase to suit purposes never contemplated or desired by others who formed part of the o r i g i n a l c o a l i t i o n . \" * This characterization Bardach c a l l s \"implementation as pressure p o l i t i c s \" . It i s clear from the empirical evidence that pressure p o l i t i c s does describe some of the dynamics of the implementation process, but he points out the danger of making i t the central organizing concept because i t does not account for the d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered when there i s agreement on objectives. Lindblom's (1959) d e f i n i t i o n of a good decision i s one that can be agreed upon. This notion of policy-making has held a great deal of sway in recent thinking and, in terms of effectiveness, i s c l e a r l y at odds with Bardach's description of implementation. There are obvious problems with t h i s decision r u l e ; for instance, the decision may not include or *This i s a resu l t of what Fox (1982b, p. 1) c a l l s cognitive c o n f l i c t defined as deriving from a difference in judgement or understanding of what the consequences of a policy or program w i l l be. take account of important int e r e s t s . More importantly, however, with respect to implementation, i s the fact that i f individual actors or groups reached a consensus based upon divergent objectives, that i s , the same decision but with d i f f e r e n t intended r e s u l t s , then the consensus would tend to f a l l apart as the actual policy outcome i s r e a l i z e d . It i s not necessarily a good decision at a l l i f the agreements are based upon divergent objectives. Recognition of thi s problem was f i r s t discussed in the l i t e r a t u r e by Bunker ( 1 9 7 0 ) . Bunker, in fact, suggests that a simple massing of assent i s a l l that i s required for successful implementation. He proposes to do thi s by locating a l l actors p o t e n t i a l l y involved in the implementation task in a three-dimensional space defined by the variables: issue salience, power resources, and agreement. These, when i d e n t i f i e d , are combined and added to get some estimate of the required values for a minimum ef f e c t i v e c o a l i t i o n to achieve implementation. Bardach takes great issue with t h i s approach arguing f i r s t l y the actual d i f f i c u l t y of the method; for example, ident i f y i n g those groups p o t e n t i a l l y involved with the implementation task. There may be some p r a c t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s , but generally, the problem would not appear to be insurmountable. But more importantly, he rejects the notion that c o a l i t i o n s are important in implementation. As stated before, Bardach argues that implementation does not resemble the p o l i c y adoption process c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o a l i t i o n s but r e s u l t s i n \"defensive p o l i t i c s \" , wherein actors are more concerned with what they might lose rather than what might be gained. It would seem, however, that t h i s p o i n t , while important, should not be overstated. There are many instances where there i s agreement on the p o l i c y and the o b j e c t i v e s , but implementation problems s t i l l e x i s t . Bardach (1977, p. 42) argues that \"implementation p o l i t i c s i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from po l i c y - a d o p t i o n p o l i t i c s by the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c absence of c o a l i t i o n s and the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c presence of fragmented and i s o l a t e d maneuvers and countermaneuvers\". But t h i s need not be g e n e r a l l y s u b s t a n t i a b l e . I t does not f o l l o w that because the c o n f l i c t over the terms of a p o l i c y on which agreement i s made or withheld i s c r i t i c a l to implementation processes, that c o a l i t i o n s cannot e x i s t or be forged. In f a c t , the opposite would seem more l i k e l y . . As i t becomes more obvious that a p o l i c y outcome i s moving in a p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n , c o a l i t i o n s i n support of or against that d i r e c t i o n could more ably be formed because much of the u n c e r t a i n t y i s removed. I t has long been observed that i n d i v i d u a l s (or groups) r a r e l y perceive t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t i n the a b s t r a c t and, consequently, are driven to a c t i o n only upon the r e a l i z a t i o n of r e a l or consequential impacts. I t i s often p o i n t l e s s to ask someone to p r i o r i z e h i s values, but i t i s u s u a l l y quite obvious to both the observer and the value holder when some ac t i o n n e g a t i v e l y impacts a h i g h l y regarded value. David Lowenthal (197?, p. 1 2 9 ) makes t h i s p o i n t : \"... you cannot express l u c i d opinions about t h i n g s u n t i l you have experienced them. Many personal preferences are inchoate, d i f f u s e , i r r a t i o n a l , and can hardly be formulated c o n c r e t e l y even to our s e l v e s . Views about the environment are not the only ones that are d i f f i c u l t to communicate, but many are of t h i s nature. That i s why a t t i t u d e s are often e x p l i c i t l y stated only a f t e r an environmental d e c i s i o n has been acted on - a d e c i s i o n that s i g n i f i c a n t l y changes the world people l i v e i n and forces them to take conscious note of the m i l i e u . \" When a p o l i c y i s being implemented, the impacts of that p o l i c y or the immediacy of impacts become very evident. Consequently, i t can be expected that those a f f e c t e d by the actions w i l l m o b i l i z e according to t h e i r perceived i n t e r e s t s . (This point w i l l be elaborated l a t e r i n a d i s c u s s i o n of s e l f - i n t e r e s t motivations i n the s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d ' d i s p o s i t i o n of implementors' .) Hargrove (1975, p. 110) points out that the short time horizon of both the general p u b l i c and p o l i t i c i a n s r a r e l y y i e l d s the p e r s i s t e n t w i l l necessary for implementation, and as a consequence, contrary to Bardach's argument, i n t e r e s t groups t y p i c a l l y have more i n f l u e n c e over the implementation than the p o l i c y formation stage of p o l i c y . Those groups who lose the p o l i c y b a t t l e can n u l l i f y or even reverse p o l i c i e s as they are implemented. 50 In support of t h i s p o i n t * , Bardach (1977, p. 51) s t a t e s : \"The implementation process i s ... c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the maneuvering of a large number of semi-autonomous a c t o r s , each of which t r i e s to gain access to program elements not under i t s own c o n t r o l while at the same time t r y i n g to e x t r a c t better terms from other actors seeking access to elements that they do not c o n t r o l . \" The r e c o g n i t i o n of awakened or thwarted i n t e r e s t s as having an important r o l e i n implementation adds an i n t e r e s t i n g and c h a l l e n g i n g dimension to understanding the process. I t suggests t h a t , while the p o l i c y formation process and output may i n f l u e n c e implementation, i t by no means c o n t r o l s or determines how the process w i l l evolve. C l e a r l y , u n c e r t a i n t y r e s p e c t i n g outcomes w i l l be a major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the process. A n t i c i p a t i n g Bardach, what we have i s a whole new b a l l game. Bardach agrees that u n c e r t a i n t y i s pervasive and argues to a p r o p o s i t i o n that the outcome of an implementation process i s indeterminate and therefore by d e f i n i t i o n u n p r e d i c t a b l e : \"(This) leads us to a c r i t i c a l i n s i g h t about the implementation process: the maneuvers of the several p a r t i e s both express c o n f l i c t and create i t *There does not seem to be any t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s for arguing that these actors need to be semi-autonomous. The argument concerning the process would p r e v a i l even i f the actors were groups. I n t e r e s t groups, la r g e or s m a l l , g e n e r a l l y cannot represent themselves as groups and, t h e r e f o r e , r e q u i r e s p e c i f i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . These r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s can then f u n c t i o n as Bardach's semi-autonomous a c t o r s . 51 and with every maneuver aimed at reducing i t there i s the associated r i s k of a c t u a l l y making matters worse. In an important sense, t h e r e f o r e , much of the implementation process moves along 'out of c o n t r o l ' , d r i v e n by complex forces not of any party's making .\" Bardach's l i t e r a t u r e review leads him to the conclusion a n t i c i p a t e d above that the implementation process can be described using the metaphor of a game. He suggests i t has u t i l i t y as a s t r u c t u r i n g metaphor: \" I t d i r e c t s us to look at the p l a y e r s , what they regard as the stakes, t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s and t a c t i c s , t h e i r resources for p l a y i n g , the r u l e s of play (which s t i p u l a t e the c o n d i t i o n s for winning), the r u l e s of ' f a i r ' play (which s t i p u l a t e the boundaries beyond which l i e fraud or i l l e g i t i m a c y ) , the nature of the communications (or lack of them) among the p l a y e r s , and the degree of u n c e r t a i n t y surrounding the p o s s i b l e outcomes. The game metaphor also d i r e c t s our a t t e n t i o n to who i s not w i l l i n g to play and for what reasons, and to who i n s i s t s on changes i n some of the game's parameters as a c o n d i t i o n for p l a y i n g . \" The metaphor of implementation game i s indeed u s e f u l for the d i r e c t i o n i t provides. I t w i l l , i n f a c t , be used as a guide to the l i t e r a t u r e c o n s idering elements of the implementation process serving as a check for missing components. 2.4 ELEMENTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS The b a s i s for the d i s c u s s i o n on the important elements that compose the p o l i c y implementation process and shape p o l i c y outcomes i s contained i n an a r t i c l e by Van meter and Van Horn (1975). Their statement i s summarized in the form 52 of a model, a diagram of which i s shown i n Figure 2.1. The model p o s i t s s i x v a r i a b l e s which shape the li n k a g e s between p o l i c y and performance. Each of the elements of the model w i l l be d e f i n e d , and the s i g n i f i c a n t features and questions h i g h l i g h t e d . To t h i s s k e l e t o n , arguments developed i n other w r i t i n g s w i l l be added with a view to developing a more comprehensive implementation process model. FIGURE 2. 1 A MODEL OF THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS Source: D. S. Van Meter and.C. E. Van Horn (1975) f 53 2.4.1 Policy Standards and Objectives Given the purpose of the implementation process i s to implement policy, i t i s fundamental to understand c l e a r l y what a policy i s intended to achieve. Without t h i s , i t i s not possible to determine the degree to which a policy has actually been implemented. To compete successfully in any game, the players need to know the object of play. In b i l l i a r d s , for example, i t does not matter how many h i t s i t takes to put the b a l l in the hole, so long as you are the f i r s t to accomplish t h i s ; in golf, i t i s very important to minimize the number of h i t s . The objective does make a difference. In some cases, understanding the objective i s not a problem, but often in the public policy arena, there i s , as Mead (1977, p. 137) c a l l s i t , the problem of the \"lack of self-evident goals\". A study of federal education projects in the United States (Nakamura, 1980, p. 1,096) concludes that \"time, resource and information constraints lead policy-makers to i n i t i a t e vague p o l i c i e s which implementors are expected to define\". This suggests that policy formation i s only a f i r s t step in actual policy d e f i n i t i o n . It i s recognized that ambiguity in objectives may be delib e r a t e l y fostered by policy-makers in order to transfer r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for any impacts [perhaps thought to be negative] to those responsible for implementation. If the objectives of the policy are not clear, the implementors are 5 4 forced to make an interpretation which can permit policy-makers s u f f i c i e n t verbal f l e x i b i l i t y i f the res u l t s do not measure up to the expectations of whoever. In research terms, th i s requires in-depth analysis of what i s actually expected of the implementation process by policy-makers and implementors a l i k e . Some recent l i t e r a t u r e does not f u l l y support the generally accepted position (cf. Lowi, 1969) which argued for the normative imperative that policy-makers should d e f i n i t i v e l y state the intent of p o l i c i e s prior to implementation . Rawson (1980, p. 1,109) argues the r e a l i t y of implementation with respect to the need for clear d i r e c t i o n : \"The models of the policy implementation process that have been posited frequently c i t e organizational goals as an important independent variable in explaining the l e v e l of implementation success. Most research asserts that successful implementation requires a c l e a r l y stated organizational goal. ... one requirement for successful implementation i s (the) basic policy decision contains unambiguous policy d i r e c t i v e s . ... Such models are, by d e f i n i t i o n , oversimplifications of r e a l i t y . In r e a l i t y , the relati o n s h i p between organizational goals and the implementation process i s far more complex. If policy analysts are to contribute to the optimizing of public p o l i c i e s , i t i s essential that relationships such as t h i s one be scrutinized in great d e t a i l . By examining the relat i o n s h i p between goals and implementation success and f a i l u r e , a better understanding of the conditions necessary for successful implementation may emerge.\" 55 What t h i s says i s that we cannot be sure that a clear d e f i n i t i o n of objectives necessarily r e s u l t s in better or more f a i t h f u l implementation. One can envisage a situation where overzealous concentration on defined policy objectives during implementation could lead to less than optimal results such as in the case of a clear s h i f t in values from the time of policy formation to implementation. There can undoubtedly be degrees of c l a r i t y in terms of stated objectives. Courtner (1976), in her analysis of the United States National Environmental Policy Act, notes that, not only i s adopted policy not self-executing, administrators must apply the policy to a problem, but in so doing, they exercise d i s c r e t i o n as to how and to what extent their actions comply with statutory provisions and policy-makers intentions. It i s obviously better to have a good idea of what was intended, but no matter how clear the policy-makers may think the objectives have been spelled out, implementors s t i l l have to apply their own process to these objectives, and in some sense, the outcome of the process w i l l r e f l e c t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the implementation participants. Courtner makes the point that \"because of interactions in the administrative system during the implementation process, actual policy impacts may d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the l e g i s l a t i v e a r t i c u l a t i o n of objectives\". Interactions between participants w i l l invariably cause some consideration of the objectives of implementation and result in some form of accepted d e f i n i t i o n irrespective of the c l a r i t y of stated objectives . Related to the question of determining objectives i s the problem of defining an abstract policy into an operational mode so that i t can be implemented. It was suggested e a r l i e r that a policy can be usefully thought of as an \" i f - t h e n \" hypothesis. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) argue that the implementation problem relates to the a c t i v i t y after the i n i t i a l policy conditions have been achieved and that lack of implementation should not refer to f a i l u r e to get going but to the i n a b i l i t y to follow through. It i s helpful in t h i s regard to distinguish between policy and program. A program consists of governmental action i n i t i a t e d in order to secure the attainment of objectives. It exists when the \" i f \" conditions of the policy hypothesis have been f u l f i l l e d . The word program thus s i g n i f i e s the conversion of a hypothesis into action. There are problems with viewing implementation as starting only after i n i t i a l conditions have been met. It suggests that program d e f i n i t i o n i s part of the policy formation process rather than implementation. Logical l y , I think t h i s i s incorrect. Policy output, the d e f i n i t i o n of the policy, i s a more reasonable cut-off point. The process of p u t t i n g that p o l i c y i n t o operation includes i t s r e d e f i n i t i o n i f necessary i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l terms and i s the f i r s t step i n implementation. Thinking back to Bardach's d e s c r i p t i o n of die-hard opponents of a p o l i c y who l o s t i n the adoption stage but seek and f i n d means to continue t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n when a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s and g u i d e l i n e s are being w r i t t e n , supports the view of p o l i c y o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n as a feature of implementation. The e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s of t h i s study w i l l show i t to be a very c r i t i c a l f i r s t step. While p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s can perhaps be purposely vague, o p e r a t i o n a l [program] o b j e c t i v e s cannot. The process of d e f i n i n g an o p e r a t i o n a l program must r e s u l t i n s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s p e r m i t t i n g implementation and, i d e a l l y , e v a l u a t i o n as w e l l . McLoughlin (1974) argues that the v a r i a b l e s used i n c o n t r o l of a p o l i c y must be compatible with those of a p o l i c y ; (McLoughlin uses the word plan but p o l i c y i s interchangeable i n the context) and a l l key v a r i a b l e s used in the p o l i c y must be measurable by those c o n t r o l l i n g (implementing) i t . P o l i c i e s / p l a n s can be implemented only i f measures of a c t u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s of these v a r i a b l e s are a v a i l a b l e to be compared with the p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n . Thus, two concurrent problems must be faced: the p o l i c y must be s p e c i f i e d at an o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l and performance i n d i c a t o r s for the o b j e c t i v e s must be s p e c i f i e d ( i f implementation i s to be evaluated). In sura, the statement of p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s i s of importance to the implementation process. This forms the b a s i s for the d e f i n i t i o n of o p e r a t i o n a l and thus implementable o b j e c t i v e s . But we should not expect a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two. The r e d e f i n i t i o n of the p o l i c y i n v o l v e s i n t e r a c t i o n s of process actors and thereby renders the outcome somewhat indeterminate. The f a c t o r s which are thought to be important i n i n t e r a c t i o n w i l l be discussed i n the l a t e r s e c t i o n concerned with ' d i s p o s i t i o n of implementor s'. 2.4.2 P o l i c y Resources The concept of p o l i c y resources includes the e f f o r t committed and/or expended to achieve the p o l i c y r e s u l t s . I t includes the more v i s i b l e aspects such as l e v e l of funding and personnel commitment to a program as w e l l as i n c e n t i v e s that might encourage e f f e c t i v e implementation. I t can be expanded to include l e s s obvious aspects such as the p r i o r i t y given the p o l i c y w i t h i n the l e g i s l a t i v e , p o l i c y or implementation o r g a n i z a t i o n . Mead (1977, p. 122) r a i s e s the question of attempting to define misuse of resources. Implementation problems a r i s e because agencies have to coordinate t h e i r a c t i o n s with other 59 agencies that have d i f f e r e n t goals and procedures. The e f f o r t to work together consumes resources, but each agency may commit more resources to defending i t s t u r f against the incursions of others than i s r a t i o n a l from an o v e r a l l s o c i a l point of view. An implementation process which can be designed to structure cooperation/competition constructively can probably make better use of the policy resources and di r e c t them toward the policy goals rather than interorganizational goals. While not discussed in the policy l i t e r a t u r e , i t would seem that the mechanism used to implement the policy might be an important component of the policy resources components. There i s some water resources l i t e r a t u r e concerned with implementation mechanisms, but there i s c e r t a i n l y no comprehensive evaluation of the range of implementation mechanisms. One of the contributions of t h i s study might be to consider the degree to which the mechanism affects the outcome of the implementation process. As background for this question, from the available l i t e r a t u r e , six general categories of implementation mechanisms can be i d e n t i f i e d , as follows: ( 1 ) Regulation - Regulation i s the predominant mechanism used to implement public policy. This involves regulating the a c t i v i t i e s of public and private enterprises and individuals generally through the application of negative rules such as minimum o r maximum r e q u i r e m e n t s . W h i l e t h i s g e n e r a l m e c h a n i s m i s w i d e l y a p p l i e d , t h e r e a r e numerous k i n d s o f r e g u l a t i o n . E x a m p l e s i n c l u d e l a n d use z o n i n g , p o l l u t i o n d i s c h a r g e p e r m i t s and f l i g h t t i m e r e s t r i c t i o n s . ( 2 ) E c o n o m i c I n c e n t i v e s - I n a m a r k e t economy, i t i s g e n e r a l l y c o n c e d e d t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n o f e c o n o m i c i n c e n t i v e s b a s e d upon m a r k e t - t y p e i n f o r m a t i o n i s t h e most e f f i c i e n t means o f d i r e c t l y i n f l u e n c i n g p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s and some p u b l i c o r q u a s i - p u b l i c o n e s a s w e l l . The p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f t a x a t i o n and s u b s i d i e s t o a c h i e v e e n v i r o n m e n t a l p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s h a s , h o w e v e r , n o t been p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f i c i e n t o r e f f e c t i v e ( c f . S t e p h e n s e n , 1 9 7 7 ) . A m a j o r r e a s o n c i t e d i s t h e i n h e r e n t d i f f i c u l t y f a c e d i n d e v e l o p i n g a sound s y s t e m t h a t a c t u a l l y g e n e r a t e s t h e d e s i r a b l e r e s p o n s e s i n t h e m a r k e t p l a c e . (3) P r o p r i e t a r y - P u b l i c a c q u i s i t i o n and d i r e c t p u b l i c d e v e l o p m e n t a l a c t i o n c a n be u s e d t o i m p l e m e n t p u b l i c p o l i c y . W h i l e t h i s m e c h a n i s m i s o f t e n t h o u g h t t o be a p a n a c e a , i n p r a c t i c e p u b l i c a g e n c i e s a r e o f t e n s u b j e c t t o p o l i t i c a l c o m p r o m i s e , i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s , i n t e r a g e n c y r i v a l r y , e t c . , and a r e o f t e n v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o c o n t r o l o r d i r e c t i f their developmental actions c o n f l i c t with environmental policy. The ongoing c o n f l i c t between the federal Ministry of Transport and Department of Environment over expansion of the Vancouver International Airport i s an example of serious problems a r i s i n g under a situation of t o t a l public owner ship. ( 4 ) Class and Individual Legal Standing - In instances where environmental impairment i s alleged to have occurred, an American mechanism used to implement pollution abatement p o l i c i e s has been to grant certain classes of c i t i z e n s and individuals standing before the courts to seek s p e c i f i c damages from pollutors. While these mechanisms have not been used in Canada, i t would be interesting to speculate on their u t i l i t y for implementing policy. (5) Vesting Property Rights in Common Property Resources - The 'tragedy of the commons' i s that i t is in every common owners individual economic interest to exploit a common property resource to the greatest extent possible with the long-term result that the resource becomes seriously degraded. Vesting some ownership rights in such resources (for example, exclusive use) can be used in some instances as a means of providing particular groups or individuals with a long-term economic interest in a resource and thus help ensure e f f e c t i v e long-term management. An application of t h i s mechanism i s the entry r e s t r i c t i o n s invoked with respect to the west coast commercial salmon fishery [cf. Christy and Scott ( 1 9 6 5 ) and Dales ( 1 9 6 8 ) ] . ( 6 ) Education/In format ion - Altering public perceptions and/or attitudes through education and information programs i s often used as a p r i n c i p a l means of implementing environmental policy. An example i s the dissemination of flood hazard information to those l i v i n g on flood plains. Heberlein ( 1 9 7 3 ) suggests, however, that t h i s mechanism may be overrated and, i f used, ought to be integrated with other mechanisms. In considering the effectiveness or impact of an implementing technique, the standard approach has been to test how well i t meets the immediate management objectives. This i s c e r t a i n l y an important consideration, but in many instances, i t may not be the most important one. As noted in Chapter 1 , p r i o r i t i e s may change so that an important question with regard to any implementing mechanism i s whether i t f a c i l i t a t e s adaptation to changing p r i o r i t i e s so that inordinate costs are not incurred because i t fosters continued production of an inappropriate set of services or makes erroneous adaptations; i . e . , uses are changed when soci a l preferences do not warrant i t . The design of implementation processes requires therefore that mechanisms be adopted which not only bring about immediate re s u l t s but also f a c i l i t a t e the modification of p o l i c i e s to r e f l e c t new s o c i a l p r i o r i t i e s . For example, a mechanism for the purpose of implementing a policy to maintain a supply of a g r i c u l t u r a l land must not only be capable of establishing a g r i c u l t u r a l use in the f i r s t instance, but i t must also structure a process to consider f u l l y future c o n f l i c t s such as a professed need to s h i f t the land to urban uses. Policy resources are linked to at least three other components of the model i l l u s t r a t e d in Figure 2 . 1 . The type and extent of resources committed to implementation d i r e c t l y affect the strength of interorganizational communication. Simi l a r l y , the di s p o s i t i o n of implementors may be influenced by the l e v e l of commitment as evidenced by the resources applied to a poli c y . When resources are perceived to be inadequate, implementors may lack enthusiasm for careful implementation and vice versa. The relationship of resource commitments to the policy environment may be important in mobilizing affected i n t e r e s t s . If commitments are large, affected interests may perceive the need to be involved and thus create a heightened interest on the part of the implementors to carry out a policy. 64 2.4.3\u00E2\u0080\u00A21 I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l Communication The implementation of p u b l i c p o l i c i e s i n v a r i a b l y r e q u i r e s the i n t e r a c t i o n of a number of o r g a n i z a t i o n s . I t i s common p r a c t i c e amongst a l l l e v e l s of government to reference any s p e c i f i c issue to various agencies or o r g a n i z a t i o n s that may have some i n t e r e s t i n the problem. This may be among government departments at the same l e v e l o r , not uncommonly, among m u n i c i p a l , p r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l l e v e l s . The f i r s t i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l communication problem i s that of t r a n s m i t t i n g the p o l i c y from the policy-making o r g a n i z a t i o n to the implementing o r g a n i z a t i o n . This subject was touched on i n the e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n of p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s wherein i t was noted that t h i s avenue may be purposely l e f t clouded; however, i f we were to assume that c l e a r o b j e c t i v e i n t e n t i o n s e x i s t , then i t i s d e s i r a b l e to have an accurate and c o n s i s t e n t communication of these o b j e c t i v e s . But communication between o r g a n i z a t i o n s i s complex and d i f f i c u l t . Downs (1967) points out that any communication, be i t between or w i t h i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s , r e s u l t s i n d i s t o r t i o n s of information - i n t e n t i o n a l and u n i n t e n t i o n a l . We w i l l r e t u r n to t h i s point s h o r t l y . Downs ( 1967, p. 113) , On Decision-Making in Large 65 following William Jones in Organizations, distinguishes between formal and subformal communications: \"The formal communications network transmits messages e x p l i c i t l y recognized as ' o f f i c i a l ' by the bureau. At t h i s l e v e l , one finds published organization charts, standard operating procedures, formal orders and d i r e c t i v e s , periodic reports, o f f i c i a l correspondence, and so on. Formal messages make certain actions, decisions, or p o l i c i e s 'legal' within the framework of the bureau's powers. Therefore, in almost a l l large organizations, the formal channels of communication substantially coincide with the formal authority structure. Subformal channels transmit those messages ari s i n g from the informal authority structure existing in every organization ... Subformal communications are of two kinds: those that flow along formal channels, but not as formal communications, and those that flow along purely informal channels. Both types have the great advantage of not being o f f i c i a l ; hence they can be withdrawn, altered, adjusted, magnified, or canceled without any o f f i c i a l record being made ... In fact, the vast majority of a l l communications in large organizations are subformal.\"* Recognizing the d i s t i n c t i o n between formal and subformal communication, one can suggest that the use of formal communication w i l l be d i r e c t l y related to the s t a b i l i t y and c l a r i t y of the message. On thi s basis, one can expect r e l a t i v e l y less d i s t o r t i o n for formal communications than for *This factor obviously complicates any research involving organizational a c t i v i t i e s since much of what i s important in determining outcomes i s u n o f f i c i a l and not recorded. The motivations and behaviour of the individuals involved i s therefore of c r u c i a l interest to the researcher. subformal ones. Since the communications are formalized, there i s less p o s s i b i l i t y of d i s t o r t i o n . But since most communications are subformal, i t i s possible that organizations would communicate informally. Downs (p. 115) argues that t h i s i s indeed the case: \"In many instances, formal communications between bureaus are inappropriate for several reasons. F i r s t , i t takes a long time for a formal message from a low-level o f f i c i a l in one bureau to pass to a similar o f f i c i a l in another. Second, formal messages are on the record; whereas the o f f i c i a l s concerned may want to discuss things t e n t a t i v e l y . This i s es p e c i a l l y important in the generation of new ideas. Third, low-level o f f i c i a l s may not want to expose their ideas to their superiors for the time being, even in rough form; yet any formal communication i s immediately routed through the originator's superior.\" While this would appear r e l a t i v e l y straightforward, i t is not always easy to operate informally. This i s why personal l e v e l interactions between o f f i c i a l s of d i f f e r e n t organizations i s so important. By developing a system of personal contacts throughout a system of organizations, o f f i c i a l s are able to communicate e f f e c t i v e l y through informal channels. But as Downs points out, there are obstacles when two bureaus are in strong c o n f l i c t : \"informal networks of one may be substantially closed to members of the other by orders of top echelon o f f i c i a l s , a feeling of mutual h o s t i l i t y at a l l l e v e l s , or a t a c t i c a l need to keep procedures and ideas concealed so as not to yield any competitive advantage in the c o n f l i c t ... However, substantial closure of information communications cThannels probably occurs only when two bureaus are in unusually strong d i r e c t c o n f l i c t \" . (emphasis added) . The question of information d i s t o r t i o n through communication i s c l o s e l y related to the concept of complexity in organizations. Pressman and Wildavsky ( 1 9 7 3 ) coined the phrase \"the complexity of j o i n t action\". They i l l u s t r a t e the concept by providing an example where numerous decision points exist between various organizations requiring a large number of clearances for what outwardly appear to be a single decision. Downs reviews Gordon Tullock's model of information d i s t o r t i o n . If one considers a h i e r a r c h i a l system, those at the top must receive only a p a r t i a l amount of the t o t a l information generated in the hierarchy. Otherwise, the top echelons would be absolutely swamped with information. How i s information screened and how much d i s t o r t i o n can be expected? Downs argues: \"The quality of information f i n a l l y received by A (at the top) - the substantive content - w i l l probably be very d i f f e r e n t from that o r i g i n a l l y put into the communication system at the lowest l e v e l . The selection p r i n c i p l e s used by o f f i c i a l s below A to determine which data to pass on and which to omit w i l l always d i f f e r from A's, their specialized modes of perceiving r e a l i t y vary from h i s , their stocks of current information are not the same as h i s , and they may a l t r u i s t i c a l l y i d e n t i f y themselves with a certain part of the bureau rather than the whole structure under A. In fact, the selection p r i n c i p l e s used by o f f i c i a l s at each l e v e l are l i k e l y to be d i f f e r e n t from those used by other lev e l s for the same reasons. This process w i l l tend to d i s t o r t information in such a manner that A receives reports that t e l l him primarily what his subordinates believe he wants to hear ...\" 68 There are, however, checks on information d i s t o r t i o n which can be employed.* Duplicate sources of information can be used. Counter-bias techniques can be used. As Downs reports, a decision-maker develops a counter-biased attitude toward most reports received from his subordinates and adjusts these reports to counteract the d i s t o r t i o n s . Insofar as he can estimate the d i s t o r t i o n s , he can restore the information to i t s o r i g i n a l form. This method i s obviously fraught with problems because of the i n a b i l i t y to determine the exact nature and extent of bias applied to the information. Organizations can be structured to reduce the number of screening points, but t h i s i s severely limited by the scale of operations. For example, top federal government o f f i c i a l s requiring detailed subprovincial information w i l l invariably require a complex network, even i f attempts are made to minimize t h i s . End-runs by senior o f f i c i a l s downward or by low-level o f f i c i a l s upward can be employed, but such t a c t i c s have a high cost and can be used only infrequently. Mead (1977) observes that, viewed from the top, the communication problem i s that leaders cannot generate signals clear or strong enough to reach a l l levels r e l i a b l y . Viewed *Downs (1967, pp. 119-127) provides a very r i c h discussion of various methods of reducing d i s t o r t i o n . It would be redundant to duplicate t h i s here, but the reader i s referred to Downs' work for the f u l l depth of the points. 69 from the ranks, the reverse i s tr u e . Information overload at the top means subordinates cannot get a t t e n t i o n for c r i t i c a l areas of guidance. Leaders tend to discount much information and are unable to d i s t i n g u i s h the r e l a t i v e importance of a message u n t i l a c r i s i s r a i s e s the s i g n a l s above the volume of the competing noise. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 466) conclude on t h i s p o i n t : \"... i f d i f f e r e n t sources of communication provide i n c o n s i s t e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of standards and o b j e c t i v e s or i f the same source provides c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s over time, implementors w i l l f i n d i t even more d i f f i c u l t to c a r r y out the i n t e n t i o n s of p o l i c y . Therefore, the prospects of e f f e c t i v e implementation w i l l be enhanced by the c l a r i t y with which standards and o b j e c t i v e s are stated and by the accuracy and consistency with which they are communicated.\" While no one would deny t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , based on the l i t e r a t u r e , i t i s a somewhat naive pronouncement. It i s not l i k e l y that the basic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s that r e s u l t i n information d i s t o r t i o n w i l l be e l i m i n a t e d . Therefore, i n designing implementation processes and i n researching them, i t i s e q u a l l y important to look for the d i s t o r t i o n f a c t o r s and account for them rather than n e c e s s a r i l y minimize them. 2.4.3-2 P o l i c y Incentives and Sanctions An important f a c t o r i n p o l i c y implementation i n v o l v i n g more than one agency or l e v e l of government i s the a b i l i t y of one o r g a n i z a t i o n to e f f e c t i v e l y i n f l u e n c e another; that i s , 70 to exercise power. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 466) point out t h a t : \"Successful implementation often r e q u i r e s i n s t i t u t i o n a l mechanisms and procedures whereby higher a u t h o r i t i e s ( s u p e r i o r s ) may increase the l i k e l i h o o d that implementors (subordinates) w i l l act i n a manner co n s i s t e n t with a p o l i c y ' s standards and o b j e c t i v e s ... Orders are not s e l f - e x e c u t i n g : they r e q u i r e the presence of an a c t i o n - f o r c i n g mechanism.\"* Two p r i n c i p a l kinds of i n c e n t i v e s a v a i l a b l e to p u b l i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s attempting to implement p o l i c y i n an i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s e t t i n g are: (1 ) P r o v i s i o n of Technical Advice and Assistance -For example, t h i s could take the form of f e d e r a l research f i n d i n g s being disseminated to p r o v i n c i a l governments i n exchange for some p o l i c y conformance. These f i n d i n g s may be the r e s u l t of a major research e f f o r t that could not have been funded by a s i n g l e province. (2) Financial Participation - He who pays the piper c a l l s the tune, and in many instances, single organizations cannot afford to implement p o l i c i e s in a manner they might find desirable. Financial p a r t i c i p a t i o n of other organizations in a * I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to see that Van Meter and Van Horn have f a l l e n i n t o the t r a p of considering implementors i n f e r i o r to policy-makers. This s o r t of c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n supports the notion they have been t r y i n g to d i s s p e l l , that implementation i s a simple e x t r a p o l a t i o n of policy-making. comprehensive program at the expense of modifying some elements of that program may provide the answer to achieving implementation. Martha Derthick (1972), in a study of the perceived f a i l u r e of the United States government's New Towns Program, argues that uncertainty with respect to the effects of policy incentives i s an important element in understanding policy implementation. In her case study, the United States government incentive to l o c a l government to participate in a new towns program was to offer large tracts of federal lands at nominal prices. But t h i s incentive does not appear to have s u f f i c i e n t l y outweighed what were perceived to be l o c a l costs; for example, an influx of low-income residents into an area . The problem l i e s not necessarily in the incentive but in i t s e f f e c t i v e use. Given uncertainty with respect to the values associated with the policy, i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to plot a strategic use of the incentive and therefore i t s effectiveness can only be determined in hindsight. This argues for an i t e r a t i v e policy implementation approach.' Incentives are r e a l l y the reverse of enforcement sanctions. However, the withholding of an incentive operates as a sanction i f , and only i f , the implementing organization i s committed to the implementation program. It i s not very e f f e c t i v e to offer funding to an organization only weakly interested in the results and then to withdraw or threaten to withdraw t h i s i f events do not proceed i n a d e s i r a b l e f a s h i o n . The r e s u l t of t h i s i s l i k e l y to be a r e t u r n to the p r e - i n c e n t i v e c o n d i t i o n but only a f t e r the costs of the a p p l i c a t i o n and removal of the i n c e n t i v e . The l i t e r a t u r e contains numerous examples of f i n a n c i a l i n c e n t i v e s , but i n g e n e r a l , i t would appear that the e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the strength of commitment to some implementation o b j e c t i v e s on the part of i n c e n t i v e r e c i p i e n t s . * 2.4.4 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Implementing Agencies It i s often p r a c t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t to separate the i n f l u e n c e of the i n d i v i d u a l from that of an o r g a n i z a t i o n composed of i n d i v i d u a l s , but c o n c e p t u a l l y , t h i s can be done and can lead to a c l e a r e r understanding of the i n t e r a c t i o n s i n a process. There are a number of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s which i n f l u e n c e t h e i r a b i l i t y to implement p o l i c y . Van Meter and Van Horn l i s t the f o l l o w i n g s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : (a) the competence and s i z e of an agency's s t a f f ; *The 1980s has seen the problem of p r o v i n c i a l compliance i n implementing a number of f e d e r a l programs. The s i t u a t i o n had evolved to the point where the f e d e r a l government simply t r a n s f e r r e d monies to the provinces for a number of purposes i n c l u d i n g medicare, w e l f a r e , and secondary education but d i d not 'require' that the funds a c t u a l l y be expended on these programs. Very r e c e n t l y , the f e d e r a l government served no t i c e that i t would expect much more s t r i n g e n t compliance with n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s i f the funding was to be maintained. 73 (b) the degree of h i e r a r c h i a l control of subunit decisions and processes; (c) an agency's p o l i t i c a l resources; (d) the v i t a l i t y of an organization; (e) the degree of 'open' communication (that i s , networks of communication with free horizontal and v e r t i c a l communication, and a r e l a t i v e l y high degree of freedom in communications with persons outside of the organization); and (f) the agency's formal and informal linkages with policy-making or policy-enforcing bodies. Their work does not elaborate on how these factors influence the process and therefore has limited u t i l i t y for further study. There i s a very substantial l i t e r a t u r e covering the theory and behaviour of organizations. A l l of th i s l i t e r a t u r e has not been reviewed, but a number of the major pieces have been read, and from t h i s , a number of points can be made respecting how organizations might respond in an implementation s i t u a t i o n . It should be noted that none of t h i s l i t e r a t u r e deals s p e c i f i c a l l y with implementation. It i s generally concerned with how decisions are taken, but i t i s thought that the factors which influence how an organization operates w i l l be applicable in situations involving implementation decisions. A caveat common to v i r t u a l l y a l l studies discussing organizational behaviour must be stated: the subject i s very complicated and subject to extreme va r i a t i o n . For every 74 g e n e r a l i t y or t r u i s m , many exceptions can be found. Fox (1982d) s u c c i n c t l y summarizes t h i s p o i n t : \"Although the study of human behaviour has made enormous advances i n recent decades, the complex motivations that u n d e r l i e human behaviour make i t hazardous to p r e d i c t how a given i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement w i l l , i n f a c t , f u n c t i o n . \" Fox (1971), i n a d e t a i l e d p o l i c y a n a l y s i s of a water resources management system o f f e r s three major points r e s p e c t i n g the a b i l i t y of an agency to implement p o l i c y . (1) Once a formal o r g a n i z a t i o n i s e s t a b l i s h e d , i t tends to pursue o b j e c t i v e s that r e f l e c t the a s p i r a t i o n s of the s t a f f of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . A p u b l i c agency, then, may not n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w goals mandated by a l e g i s l a t i v e body. (2) An agency seeks to carve out an area of a u t h o r i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that w i l l be accepted by other agencies, groups, and i n d i v i d u a l s with power to i n f l u e n c e i t s f u t u r e . This concept i s c a l l e d domain consensus. Related to t h i s i s the point that an agency's perception of values and goals w i l l be, i n l a r g e measure, influenced (determined) by i t s c o n s t i t u e n c y . (3) An agency must achieve an accommodation with those that serve i t , which i t serves, or which i t r e g u l a t e s . This phenomenon has been coined as \" c l i e n t capture\". Respecting the point that the i n d i v i d u a l s of an agency determine the o b j e c t i v e s the o r g a n i z a t i o n pursues, Downs (1967, p. 50) points out t h a t : \"Every o r g a n i z a t i o n i s o r i g i n a l l y formed to achieve some purpose that cannot be a t t a i n e d without the coordinated e f f o r t s of a number of persons working on d i f f e r e n t t a s k s . This i m p l i e s that each member of the o r g a n i z a t i o n must be w i l l i n g to modify h i s own behaviour so that i t f i t s in with the behaviour of other members.\" 75 But c l e a r l y , such behaviour does not happen \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 a u t o m a t i c a l l y . Because an o r g a n i z a t i o n i s composed of a number of people, c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t may and indeed w i l l a r i s e . Downs discusses the nature of these c o n f l i c t s : \" C o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t spring from d i f f e r e n c e s in the e x p l i c i t goals o f f i c i a l s pursue, and i n t h e i r modes of pe r c e i v i n g r e a l i t y . In any o r g a n i z a t i o n , no two members have e x a c t l y the same e x p l i c i t goals and, as a r e s u l t , may disagree about what the o r g a n i z a t i o n ought to be doing, even i f they possess the same information and face no un c e r t a i n t y ... Diff e r e n c e s i n modes of p e r c e i v i n g r e a l i t y spring from the value s t r u c t u r e s i m p l i c i t i n the t r a i n e d outlooks associated with various t e c h n i c a l s p e c i a l t i e s . \" I t i s c l e a r l y not a simple matter as to what o b j e c t i v e s an o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l pursue. But one point would seem c l e a r . I f we accept d i f f e r e n c e s i n pe r c e i v i n g r e a l i t y as a major f a c t o r i n d e f i n i n g a value or a t t i t u d e o r i e n t a t i o n and t h i s i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y sculptured by one's p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a i n i n g , then an o r g a n i z a t i o n dominated by i n d i v i d u a l s with a p a r t i c u l a r p r o f e s s i o n a l background would tend to pursue the o b j e c t i v e s defined by that background. An o r g a n i z a t i o n must develop and maintain an area i n which to operate. In t h i s regard, Downs has formulated \"The Law of I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t \" which s t a t e s that \"every o r g a n i z a t i o n i s i n p a r t i a l c o n f l i c t with every other s o c i a l agent i t deals with\". The ver b a l proof of t h i s law i s Downs statement (p. 276): \"There i s an incessant jockeying for p o s i t i o n i n p o l i c y space by means of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l disputes as each bureau s t r u g g l e s to defend or extend the e x i s t i n g borders of i t s various t e r r i t o r i a l zones.\" Domain consensus must be viewed as a dynamic concept under constant attack and probably change. But what i t t e l l s us i s that an organization w i l l be very aware of i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n and w i l l , in a l l l i k e l i h o o d , guard i t s borders strenuously and, i f the opportunity presents i t s e l f , expand i t s purview. In thi s respect, Downs suggests that bureaus would normally adopt or at least seek strategies to minimize the amount of c o n f l i c t engendered in modifying their behav iour. There i s a l i m i t a t i o n on the dynamics of change, and th i s Downs c a l l s the \"Law of Increasing Conservatism\" , defined as: \" a l l organizations tend to become more conservative as they become older, unless they experience periods of very rapid growth or internal turnover\". For thi s \"law\" to hold, i t i s necessary that dominant actors within the organization also become conservative. This point suggests that an organization that has been active in a particular policy area for a long period of time w i l l tend to avoid new solutions and w i l l become r i s k averse respecting i t s decisions and operations. This i s what Mead ( 1 9 7 7 , p. 1 2 1 ) c a l l s bureaucratic i n e r t i a . Mead does not e x p l i c i t l y recognize increasing conservatism but does note that i t i s problematic for organizations to implement new solutions because of the costs of learning new methods and the psychological investment the organization has in established procedures. Development of standard procedures economizes an organization's energies in the short run, but i t l i m i t s i t s range of response. Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t problem an organization faces i s partly a r e s u l t of the above noted tendency to s c l e r o t i c behaviour, and that i s i t s long-run s u r v i v a l . Downs ( 1 9 6 7 , p. 2 3 7 ) notes that an organization: \"... can exist only so long as i t can persuade external agents with control over resources that i t deserves continued funds even though i t does not provide services d i r e c t l y to those agents.\" Given that survival i s the basic goal of a l l organisms, and here organizations are included, i t i s fundamental to di r e c t behaviour to attain at least t h i s goal. Downs suggests that organizations develop and espouse ideologies to cut down on the costs of constantly making their benefactors aware of the organization's u t i l i t y and value. The organizational ideology provides a capsulized image of what i t stands for and what i t w i l l do. Downs (p. 242) l i s t s seven c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of organizational ideologies as follows: F i r s t , each emphasizes the positive benefits that can accrue from bureau action and de-emphasizes the costs of achieving them. Second, any changes indicated by a bureau's ideology w i l l almost invariably involve maintaining or expanding i t s a c t i v i t i e s rather than contracting them. These two t r a i t s occur because top-level o f f i c i a l s wish to j u s t i f y continuing the bureau at i t s present size ( i f i t i s dominated by conservers) or at a larger size ( i f i t i s dominated by advocates, zealots, or climbers). Third, the precision with which the bureau's ideology defines i t s proper sphere of a c t i v i t y w i l l depend upon whether i t s sphere i s being invaded by others or extended through \"functional imperialism\" by the bureau i t s e l f . When other agencies are trying to capture the bureau's function, i t s ideology w i l l demarcate the borders of i t s proper a c t i v i t i e s quite sharply. This implies that the other agents are beyond the legitimate bounds of their l o g i c a l functions. Conversely, when the bureau i t s e l f seeks to invade the t e r r i t o r y of other agencies, i t s ideology w i l l be quite vague about the location of the borders between i t s proper functions and those of the other agencies. Fourth, each bureau's ideology w i l l emphasize the benefits i t provides for society as a whole, or for large numbers of c i t i z e n s , rather than those provided for special i n t e r e s t s . This w i l l be true even when the bureau's actual base of support consists mainly of small special interest groups. These groups are well aware of how the bureau benefits them. But i t s ideology i s designed primarily to evoke support from persons who do not have detailed information about i t s benefits. Moreover, emphasizing special interest benefits would weaken the c r e d i b i l i t y of the bureau's claim that i t s a c t i v i t i e s should be continued or expanded so that the public at large (which pays the b i l l ) can receive worthwhile returns. F i f t h , each bureau's ideology stresses both the d e s i r a b i l i t y and the high present state of i t s e f f i c i e n c y and centralized coordination. E f f i c i e n c y i s widely accepted as a desirable quality; emphasizing i t makes the bureau seem more worthy of support. Also, insofar as ideology actually improves e f f i c i e n c y and centralized control within the bureau, i t w i l l increase the r e l a t i v e power of the bureau's top-level o f f i c i a l s v i s - a - v i s lower-level o f f i c i a l s . However, organizations designed to encourage innovation (such as research laboratories) require a r e l a t i v e l y permissive atmosphere. Their ideologies stress the personal freedom of their members rather than centralized control and e f f i c i e n c y . Sixth, although bureau ideologies are more s p e c i f i c and elaborate than party ideologies, they s t i l l must remain rather general. Inclusion of detailed p o l i c i e s would destroy their a b i l i t y to act as inexpensive means of thinking about the bureau's a c t i v i t i e s . Seventh, every bureau's ideology emphasizes i t s achievements and future c a p a b i l i t i e s and plays down i t s f a i l u r e s and i n a b i l i t i e s . The resulting over-sanguine view of the bureau's competence i s inevitable, since i t s ideology i s designed by o f f i c i a l s responsible for i t s behaviour , not by objective observers. Ideology can become a powerful force in d i r e c t i n g decision-making and of course i s partly the motivation for increasing conservatism. But a strong ideology also i s a potential l i a b i l i t y . So long as the ideology of the organization i s in general favour i t i s b e n e f i c i a l . However, should attitudes move from such a position, i t may be very d i f f i c u l t to alter general perceptions of the value of an organization i f the organization can no longer be accurately characterized by the ideology. What t h i s means i s organizations in general have problems of adapting because of their inherent s t a b i l i z i n g mechanisms. In a society being more and more characterized by rapid change, t h i s becomes a serious d i f f i c u l t y . In terms of policy implementation, i t suggests that organizations w i l l have d i f f i c u l t y learning and t h i s w i l l increase, depending upon their age and the strength of the ideology which characterizes them. 81 Related to t h i s , Wildavsky (1982, p. 5) observes that p u b l i c agencies do not seem to p r o f i t from t h e i r mistakes. The question he poses i s why agencies do not use e v a l u a t i o n as a means of l e a r n i n g and subsequently i n t r o d u c i n g change: \"The easy answer i s that o r g a n i z a t i o n s don't want to rock the boat: they e s t a b l i s h i n t e r e s t s -b e n e f i t s , c a r e e r s , c l i e n t e l e - apart from any supposedly d e s i r a b l e o b j e c t i v e s . The hard answer i s t h a t , i n order to do good t h i n g s , o r g a n i z a t i o n s need sources of support that encourage s t a b i l i t y as w e l l as change. Resistance to evaluation i s part of s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n . Skepticism clashes with dogma in o r g a n i z a t i o n s as w e l l as i n thought.\" In order to avoid o r g a n i z a t i o n a l change as a r e s u l t of s o c i a l change, an o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l attempt to s t r u c t u r e i t s a c t i v i t i e s to minimize m o d i f i c a t i o n to i t s o b j e c t i v e s and methods. I t i s c r i t i c a l to recognize that an o r g a n i z a t i o n responds to i n c e n t i v e s , but i t s primary goal i s [and perhaps must be, from i t s perspective] s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n . Under t h i s regime, t h e r e f o r e , i f an o r g a n i z a t i o n i s to embrace a change-oriented or l e a r n i n g stance, then i t must perceive c l e a r b e n e f i t s . I f the reward i s based on accurate f o r e c a s t i n g of future events, then an o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l operate so as to r e i n f o r c e things that i n d i c a t e the future i s unfolding as predicted and downplay information that suggests things have changed and behaviour should t h e r e f o r e be modified. I f , on the other hand, an o r g a n i z a t i o n perceives rewards for innovation and l e a r n i n g , i t may be more w i l l i n g to r i s k mistakes i n order to 82 l e a r n new t h i n g s . But even t h i s i s a r i s k y business, and an o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l attempt to manage circumstances, as Wildavsky (1982, p. 6) points out: \"To recognize e r r o r i s one t h i n g : to become a side-show example of error that cannot be corrected i s q u ite another. I f governmental agencies are asked to change people's behaviour (health h a b i t s , reading scores, c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s ) that no one can c o n t r o l , agencies w i l l be g u i l t y of f a i l u r e even before being so charged. No one l i k e s to be dubbed a f a i l u r e , so p u b l i c agencies t r y to escape by transforming what they can do i n t o what they are supposed to do. I f the change i s w i t h i n the agency, c o n t r o l l a b l e resources may become the agency's o b j e c t i v e s ; what agency would f a i l to seek s a l v a t i o n by spending? Or i f the change i s i n the c l i e n t , an agency can f i n d c l i e n t e l e (reading-ready c h i l d r e n , employable a d u l t s , healthy e l d e r l y ) who w i l l be able to achieve those o b j e c t i v e s . Making what one can do i n t o what one i s supposed to accomplish, or choosing capable c l i e n t s who are already accomplished, are means of c o n s t r u c t i n g a benevolent environment. But escaping e x t e r n a l censure i s not the same as an i n t e r n a l d e s i r e for s e l f - c o r r e c t i o n . \" This phenomenon suggests that an o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l attempt to define i t s c l i e n t e l e , l e g i t i m i z e t h i s d e f i n i t i o n and tend to avoid expansion of i t s mandate beyond that which i t b e l i e v e s , on the b a s i s of past experience, that i t w i l l be able to implement s u c c e s s f u l l y , success being defined as achieving the o b j e c t i v e s i t sets out. As i s evident from t h i s d i s c u s s i o n on o r g a n i z a t i o n s , the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an o r g a n i z a t i o n are i n l a r g e measure those of the i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n i t . The next s e c t i o n w i l l d iscuss the important aspects of i n d i v i d u a l behaviour as they r e l a t e to the f u n c t i o n i n g of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . 83 2.4.5 D i s p o s i t i o n of Implementors A l l of the elements discussed so far have one important f a c t o r i n common, they a l l inv o l v e the i n t e r a c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n the p o l i c y process. At the end of the day, i t i s the behaviour of the actors involved that determines how a process f u n c t i o n s and i t s outcome. Some of the most i n f l u e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l s may not f o r m a l l y be part of the process i n question but, because of t h e i r a c t i o n s , impact upon events and other i n d i v i d u a l s . But more g e n e r a l l y the case i s that the most important actors can be determined and t h e i r a c t i o n s can be observed. What f a c t o r s are l i k e l y to in f l u e n c e the behaviour of the major players i n the implementation game? G i l b e r t White (1966, p. 108) introduces t h i s t o p i c by d e s c r i b i n g the co m p l e x i t i e s i n v o l v e d : \"Adequate models are l a c k i n g to describe the i n t r i c a c i e s of decision-making and, thereby, to i n d i c a t e c r i t i c a l p oints i n the process. There seems no doubt that an i n d i v i d u a l manager of a sector of the environment takes i n t o account i n some fashion the range of po s s i b l e uses, the character of the environment i t s e l f , the technology a v a i l a b l e to him for using the environment, and the expected gains and los s e s to himself and others from the p o s s i b l e a c t i o n . His perception and judgement at each point i s bound to occur i n a framework of h a b i t u a l behaviour and of s o c i a l guidance exercised through c o n s t r a i n t s or i n c e n t i v e s . When the d e c i s i o n i s lodged i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n , there i s added the strong motivation of i t s members to seek e q u i l i b r i u m and to preserve 84 the o r g a n i z a t i o n while accommodating i t s s t r u c t u r e to changes required by s h i f t s i n preferences, environment, or personnel.\" Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 473) add to t h i s general d i s c u s s i o n by noting that a l l of the elements of t h e i r model of implementation must be f i l t e r e d through the perceptions of the implementor. They suggest the f o l l o w i n g : \"Three elements of the implementor's response may a f f e c t t h e i r a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s to c a r r y out the p o l i c y : t h e i r c o g n i t i o n (comprehension, understanding) of the p o l i c y , the d i r e c t i o n of t h e i r response toward i t (acceptance, n e u t r a l i t y , r e j e c t i o n ) , and the i n t e n s i t y of that response.\" This statement contains some important elements, but i t misses the underlying reasons for the behaviour c i t e d . I t w i l l be more u s e f u l to step back a b i t and discuss some behavioural assumptions r e s p e c t i n g p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s and other i n d i v i d u a l s involved i n p u b l i c p o l i c y processes as described i n the l i t e r a t u r e . The view of the i n d i v i d u a l g e n e r a l l y accepted in the l i t e r a t u r e i s based upon l i b e r a l democratic theory which i s of m u l t i p l e r o o t s . I t s expression has become widely known through n e o c l a s s i c a l economic consumer theory. There are two basic assumptions about the i n d i v i d u a l which are fundamental i n d i r e c t i n g h i s behaviour: one, he i s assumed to act i n h i s own s e l f - i n t e r e s t ; and two, he i s assumed to be r a t i o n a l i n h i s d e c i s i o n s , that i s , he w i l l consider h i s perceived pros 85 and cons of h i s options i n a r r i v i n g at a d e c i s i o n . * A c o r o l l a r y of the point on r a t i o n a l i t y i s that an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r a t i o n a l i t y i s bounded. Each of these concepts i s worthy of el a b o r a t i o n i n an e f f o r t to define t h e i r u t i l i t y i n analysing and understanding the behaviour of i n d i v i d u a l s implementing p u b l i c p o l i c i e s . 2.4.5.1 S e l f - i n t e r e s t T u llock (1979, p. 31) describes some of the background to the concept of s e l f - i n t e r e s t and points out that only r e c e n t l y have ana l y s t s adequately perceived the nature of t h i s concept i n terms of p u b l i c p o l i c y processes [which he a t t r i b u t e s to the work of p u b l i c choice t h e o r i s t s ] : \"The t r a d i t i o n a l view of government has always been that i t sought something c a l l e d 'the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ' ... H i s t o r i a n s w i l l r e c a l l that most of the d i s c u s s i o n on economic matters before 1700 was e s s e n t i a l l y e t h i c a l . Businessmen were e i t h e r assumed to be attempting to generate good for t h e i r customers or they were l e c t u r e d on the d e s i r a b i l i t y of doing so . *Buchanan and Tullock (1967, p. 33) describe the r a t i o n a l economic man i n the f o l l o w i n g way: \"... the average i n d i v i d u a l i s able to rank or to order a l l a l t e r n a t i v e combinations of goods and s e r v i c e s that may be placed before him and that t h i s ranking i s t r a n s i t i v e . Behaviour of the i n d i v i d u a l i s said to be ' r a t i o n a l ' when the i n d i v i d u a l chooses 'more' rather than ' l e s s ' and when he i s c o n s i s t e n t in h i s choices.\" ... Many p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , u n t i l very r e c e n t l y , took t h i s same a t t i t u d e toward government. The p u b l i c i n t e r e s t was the goal of government a c t i o n , and t h i s depended upon 'good men' i n government ... We tend to th i n k of bureaucrats and p o l i t i c i a n s as no b e t t e r , but also no worse, than businessmen. The voter i s thought to make d e c i s i o n s not i n terms of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t but i n terms of h i s own i n t e r e s t s , j u s t as he does when he i s i n the supermarket. ... Pub l i c choice students said that the bureaucrats, p o l i t i c i a n s , and voters were r e a l l y very s i m i l a r to businessmen and p r i v a t e c i t i z e n s ... The emphasis i n pu b l i c choice was the design of i n s t i t u t i o n s which would lead s e l f - s e e k i n g bureaucrats or p o l i t i c i a n s to generate p u b l i c welfare i n the same sense that the market leads some s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d businessmen to produce a s o c i a l s u r p l u s . \" Downs (1967, p. 87) elaborates t h i s p o i n t : \" I t may seem strange to assert that most o f f i c i a l s are s i g n i f i c a n t l y motivated by s e l f - i n t e r e s t when t h e i r s o c i a l f u n c t i o n i s to serve the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t (or some o r g a n i z a t i o n a l purpose of t h e i r bureau). Although many o f f i c i a l s serve the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t as they perceive i t , i t does not n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w that they are p r i v a t e l y motivated s o l e l y or even mainly by a d e s i r e to serve the pu b l i c i n t e r e s t per se. I f s o c i e t y has created the proper i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements, t h e i r p r i v a t e motives w i l l lead them to act i n what they b e l i e v e to be the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , even though these motives, l i k e everyone e l s e ' s , are p a r t l y rooted i n t h e i r own s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Therefore, whether or not the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t w i l l i n f a c t be served depends upon how e f f i c i e n t l y s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are designed to achieve that purpose.\" 87 Chamberlin (1979, p. 162) r e i n f o r c e s t h i s point arguing that i t i s market f a i l u r e i n the pu b l i c domain which r e q u i r e s i n t e r v e n t i o n to improve the r e s u l t s : \"Nonmarket decision-making i s concerned, almost by d e f i n i t i o n , with s i t u a t i o n s in which p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s d i f f e r from 'the pu b l i c i n t e r e s t ' . Indeed, much of the p u b l i c choice l i t e r a t u r e c o n s i s t s of demonstrations that p u r s u i t of s e l f - i n t e r e s t by p o l i t i c i a n s , bureaucrats, or voters r e s u l t s i n i n e f f i c i e n t a l l o c a t i o n s of resources i n a democratic s o c i e t y , and attempts to design i n s t i t u t i o n s which can channel the pu r s u i t of s e l f - i n t e r e s t to produce l e s s i n e f f i c i e n t a l l o c a t i o n s ... (emphasis added). S e l f - i n t e r e s t i n terms of behaviour generates an axiom which Downs st a t e s as \"that every o f f i c i a l acts at l e a s t p a r t l y i n h i s own s e l f - i n t e r e s t , and some o f f i c i a l s are motivated s o l e l y by t h e i r own s e l f - i n t e r e s t \" . * He points out, however, that the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the axiom are sometimes ambiguous: \"In those cases where an o f f i c i a l ' s short-run s e l f - i n t e r e s t i s i n c o n f l i c t with h i s long-run s e l f - i n t e r e s t , i t i s not always p o s s i b l e to p r e d i c t a p r i o r i which time horizon w i l l dominate h i s behaviour. Nevertheless, i t i s u s u a l l y p o s s i b l e to i d e n t i f y a great many courses of a c t i o n *Downs notes that s e l f - i n t e r e s t p u r s u i t i s not the same as assuming every o f f i c i a l maximizes u t i l i t y . A u t i l i t y maximizer responds e f f i c i e n t l y to changes i n the r e l a t i v e p r i c e s of the things he considers 'goods' so that he always gets the greatest p o s s i b l e amount of 'goods' from a given income. But t h i s says nothing about what the i n d i v i d u a l considers a 'good'. 88 that he w i l l reject because they are not in his interest at a l l , or are c l e a r l y less advantageous to him than others. Furthermore, we can often formulate hypotheses about how he w i l l weigh his short-run and long-run s e l f - i n t e r e s t s where these c o n f l i c t . \" S e l f - i n t e r e s t i s often discounted as a motivation because many, i f not most, actions of public o f f i c i a l s serve interests other than what appear to be those of the o f f i c i a l . This does not, however, detract from the u t i l i t y of the concept as Downs (p. 84) points out: \"That a l l o f f i c i a l s are partly s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d does not mean that they never take account of the interests of others in their behaviour. Even s e l f - i n t e r e s t narrowly conceived may lead a man to serve the interests of others i f doing so advances his own in t e r e s t s . Moreover, sel f - i n t e r e s t e d o f f i c i a l s have multiple goals, some of which may lead them to s a c r i f i c e their own short-run interests to benefit others under certain circumstances ... Under normal conditions, men accept certain constraints on their pursuit of s e l f - i n t e r e s t imposed by the widely shared e t h i c a l values of their own cultures. For example, an o f f i c i a l interested in increasing his wealth may s t i l l indignantly refuse to accept monetary bribes. Thus the prevalence of s e l f - i n t e r e s t in our theory does not e n t i r e l y exclude other types of behaviour, or imply that people w i l l pursue their own interests without any e t h i c a l or other r e s t r a i n t s . \" The s e l f - i n t e r e s t must not, of course, be construed as the only structuring concept for behaviour. It has lim i t a t i o n s which w i l l be discussed later in considering aspects of bounded r a t i o n a l i t y . 89 2.4.5.2 Bounded R a t i o n a l i t y As noted at the outset of t h i s s e c t i o n , the second basic premise res p e c t i n g the behaviour of i n d i v i d u a l s i s that they act r a t i o n a l l y . But r a t i o n a l i t y i s l i m i t e d and 'bounded', using Simon's (1957) terminology. A decision-maker i s l i m i t e d i n r a t i o n a l i t y because, i n a l l but the most t r i v i a l of examples, the amount of information required to be comprehensive i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a problem renders i t impossible to use a l l information. And he i s bounded because the decision-maker i s a c a p t i v e of himself and can r e l a t e to information only as he perceives i t . His perceptions are a complex r e s u l t of h i s t o t a l i t y of experience. This w i l l be described i n greater depth l a t e r . Downs (1967, p. 75) l i s t s what he considers to be the most important l i m i t s to r a t i o n a l i t y : \"1. Each decisionmaker can devote only a l i m i t e d amount of time to decisionmaking. 2. Each decisionmaker can mentally weigh and consider only a l i m i t e d amount of i n f o r -mation at one time. 3. The f u n c t i o n s of most o f f i c i a l s r e q u i r e them to become involved in more a c t i v i t i e s than they can consider simultaneously; hence they must normally focus t h e i r a t t e n t i o n on only part of t h e i r major concerns, while the r e s t remain l a t e n t . 4. The amount of information i n i t i a l l y a v a i l a b l e to every decisionmaker about each problem i s only a small f r a c t i o n of a l l the information p o t e n t i a l l y a v a i l a b l e on the s u b j e c t . 90 5. Additional information bearing on any particular problem can usually be pro-cured, but the costs of procurement and u t i l i z a t i o n may r i s e rapidly as the amount of data increases. 6. Important aspects of many problems involve information that cannot be procured at a l l , e s p e c i a l l y concerning future events; hence many decisions must be made in the face of some ineradicable uncertainty.\" In addition to the l i m i t s to r a t i o n a l i t y , an individual's behaviour i s directed by a number of factors which in e f f e c t bound his a b i l i t y to be f u l l y r a t i o n a l . Gilbert White (1966) has reviewed the l i t e r a t u r e concerning attempts to understand the e f f e c t of attitudes on decisions in the environmental management area. With the caveat that generalizations are d i f f i c u l t because of the inadequacy of models of personality and attitude formation, he observes that d i f f e r e n t people may view the same segment of the environment d i f f e r e n t l y but concludes that three factors* appear to be important in defining an individual's attitudes and thus behaviour: (1) the decision s i t u a t i o n ; (2) the individual's experience with the environment; and ( 3 ) the individual's perception of his r o l e . *White l i s t s a fourth factor - the individual's competence in dealing with complexity - but he admits no studies have been undertaken to understand t h i s and thus i t i s not possible at t h i s time to even hypothesize the significance of t h i s factor . Each of the factors w i l l be discussed b r i e f l y with the objective of understanding their relevance in influencing the behaviour of individuals involved in the implementation process . (1) Decision Situation The circumstances surrounding the decision process in question appear to play an important role in influencing perceptions and attitudes. This factor w i l l be discussed separately under the section e n t i t l e d \"Economic, Social and P o l i t i c a l Conditions\". . ( 2 ) Perception and Experience Studies in resource management tend to agree that the experiences of the individual govern his perception of a si t u a t i o n . * White ( 1 9 6 6 , p. 1 2 2 ) notes: \"Experience counts, but does not have a simple linear r e l a t i o n with either perception of the environment or willingness to deal with i t . \" *The reader i s referred to the following a r t i c l e s for additional detailed analysis on t h i s point: H. Marshall, \" P o l i t i c s and E f f i c i e n c y in Water Development\", in A. V. Kneese and S. C. Smith, Water Research, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1966; W. R. D. Sewell, \"Environmental Perceptions and Attitudes of Engineers and Public Health O f f i c i a l s \" , Env ironmental Behaviour, Vol. 3, 1971 ; and W. A. Thomas, \"Attitudes of Professionals in Water Management Toward the Use of Water Quality Indices\", Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 4 , 1976. 92 Such a pronouncement may sound t r i v i a l , but i t i s c r u c i a l to recognize that any two i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l perceive a stimulus d i f f e r e n t l y depending upon t h e i r experience. Common experience, t h e r e f o r e , provides some b a s i s for hazarding a p r o j e c t i o n about behaviour. Insofar as o f f i c i a l s have common experience, one can hypothesize that t h e i r perception of a s i t u a t i o n w i l l tend i n the same d i r e c t i o n . I t i s , of course, quite a d i f f e r e n t matter to determine which experiences w i l l produce which perceptions. The concept of c o g n i t i v e dissonance i s important i n understanding the r o l e of perception. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 473) point out t h a t : \"... implementors may screen out a c l e a r message when the d e c i s i o n seems to c o n t r a d i c t deeply cherished b e l i e f s . Under circumstances of c o g n i t i v e dissonance, the i n d i v i d u a l may attempt to bring the d i s p l e a s i n g message i n t o balance with h i s perception of what the d e c i s i o n ought to have been . \"* Downs (1967, p. 180) describes t h i s process: \"His [ o f f i c i a l ' s ] perception apparatus w i l l p a r t i a l l y screen out data adverse to h i s i n t e r e s t s , and magnify those favouring h i s i n t e r e s t s ... In formulating a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i o n s , each o f f i c i a l w i l l tend to give undue precedence to a l t e r n a t i v e s most favourable to h i s i n t e r e s t s , and to those about which adequate consensus can most e a s i l y be e s t a b l i s h e d .\" *For a complete d i s c u s s i o n of the concept of c o g n i t i v e dissonance, see Leon F e s t i n g e r , A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Harper and Row, New York, 1957. 93 (3) Perception of Role White (1966, p. 122) argues: \" I f a major aspect of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s perception of the world around him i s r e l a t e d to h i s sense of h i s own r o l e i n that world, then i t becomes important to seek out h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of himself.\" C e r t a i n l y , stereotypes of i n d i v i d u a l s e x i s t , and these are often hollow shapes with l i t t l e substance. But i n resource management, there i s evidence that s p e c i f i c backgrounds do r e s u l t i n behavioural b i a s and t h i s b i a s i s c o n s i s t e n t enough to o f f e r some b a s i s for p r e d i c t i o n ( c f . Shanks, 1972). The t r a i n i n g and education for p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s can i n f a c t be thought of as part of the experience of the i n d i v i d u a l and t h i s supports the previous point r e s p e c t i n g the r o l e of experience. White (1966, p. 124) notes: \"One s t r i k i n g f a c t i s that a large number of environmental q u a l i t y d e c i s i o n s are made by people who f e e l a strong p r o f e s s i o n a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Their view of themselves as c o n s e r v a t i o n i s t s , economists, engineers, f o r e s t e r s , e t c . , may be expected to shape t h e i r perception of the environment and t h e i r competence to handle i t . In these r o l e s , they not only i n h e r i t customary ways of d e f i n i n g s i g n i f i c a n t parts of the environment but they are disposed to d i s t o r t or ignore phenomena that they regard as beyond t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or competence. ( I f you can't measure a diseconomy, sweep i t under the rug.) Their perceptions and preferences become the i m p l i c i t and u s u a l l y unchallenged determinants of plans presented for p u b l i c choice.\" 94 Chamberlin (1979, p. 164) a l l u d e s to strength of r o l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n d i s c u s s i n g experiments designed to t e s t the importance of c e r t a i n f a c t o r s i n decision-making. He notes: \"... subjects may not act i n accordance with the payoff schedule they are assigned, but impose value judgements of t h e i r own on outcomes. The f a c t that one must be very c a r e f u l (and very r e s t r i c t i v e ) i n designing experiments i f one i s to avoid such behaviour i s a strong testament to the w i l l i n g n e s s and a b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s to act u n s e l f i s h l y i f the context seems to c a l l for i t . \" In other words, i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l often l i v e up to the expectations of others. They may modify t h e i r behaviour i n accordance with how they perceive others expect them to behave on the b a s i s of t h e i r perceptions of t h e i r c l i e n t s ' values. White (1966, p. 109) adds to t h i s p o i n t : \" S t r i c t l y speaking, there i s no s i n g l e expert opinion about a t t i t u d e s ... there are the opinions each person holds, the opinions he t h i n k s others hold, and the opinions he thinks they should hold.\" C l o s e l y a l l i e d to t h i s argument i s the p r o p o s i t i o n that the p o l i t i c a l and socioeconomic m i l i e u i n which the implementation process i s set has a s u b s t a n t i a l impact on the i n d i v i d u a l s involved and the outcome. This w i l l be explored in the next s e c t i o n . 95 2.4.6 P o l i c y Environment The Van Meter/Van Horn model [Figure 2.1] l i s t s a component of the implementation process c a l l e d \"economic, s o c i a l , and p o l i t i c a l \" c o n d i t i o n s . They conclude (p. 471) t h a t : \"Although the impact of these f a c t o r s on the implementation of p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s has received l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n , they may have a profound e f f e c t on the performance of implementing agencies.\" Indeed, these f a c t o r s can be important. It i s an e a s i l y observable f a c t that many l a r g e - s c a l e s o c i a l phenomena sweep the conciousness of a v a r i e t y of c u l t u r e s and s o c i e t i e s v i r t u a l l y simultaneously. The concern for environmental c o n d i t i o n s so prevalent i n the l a t e 1960s and e a r l y 1970s i s an example of such a phenomenon. The i n f l u e n c e of the world-wide r e c e s s i o n of the e a r l y 1980s on p u b l i c p o l i c y making i s another. These phenomena seem to spawn, or at l e a s t i n f l u e n c e , ' p u b l i c ' perceptions as to the d i r e c t i o n p u b l i c p o l i c y ought to take. Once these have taken hold i n the p u b l i c mind, they appear to be r a p i d l y t r a n s f e r r e d to o f f i c i a l a c t i o n . I t was noted in the previous s e c t i o n that a powerful f a c t o r i n f l u e n c i n g the behaviour of o f f i c i a l s i s t h e i r perception of the opinions and a t t i t u d e s of oth e r s . The c o n d i t i o n s surrounding p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y questions can i n f l u e n c e p u b l i c opinions and thus the behaviour of 96 individuals involved in d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y related policy processes. For example, an overwhelming concern for economic conditions can quite conceivably influence implementors of an environmental policy to modify their actions because of perceptions that the public views would want them to change. (The public values may in fact s h i f t during the course of an implementation process but that i s another question.) Equally so, the economics of s p e c i f i c actions may be disregarded or downplayed in the face of public preference for environmental objectives. It i s not clear from any of the l i t e r a t u r e how i n f l u e n t i a l these factors are v i s - a - v i s the arguments respecting policy resources, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s or implementing agencies, or the d i s p o s i t i o n of implementors, etc. As noted at the outset, t h i s point has received r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e study and can perhaps be illuminated in t h i s current work. 2 . 5 KIND OF PROCESS In addition to the factors described above, an important consideration in understanding policy implementation would seem to be the way in which the process functions; that i s , how the participants are determined, the methods of information generation and evaluation, the methods of resolving disputes. Fox ( 1 9 8 2 b ) analyses t h i s problem in a paper e n t i t l e d , \" C o n f l i c t Resolution in Resource Management\". 97 His analysis centres on resolving c o n f l i c t s between public o f f i c i a l s and those with an interest in their actions, but i t has general u t i l i t y in describing alternate ways of managing a process and appears to be adaptable to implementation process concerns. E s s e n t i a l l y , there are two general options respecting process management. The f i r s t method i s to control a process by l i m i t i n g information. In such a process, Fox (1982b, p. 3) notes: \"Consultation with affected interests may be limited to those who are either too powerful to ignore or who are supportive of the action contemplated. This approach i s a quite natural and often unconscious response to a potential c o n f l i c t situation by any bureaucratic organization ... This approach i s widely practiced by government organizations, because they are motivated to achieve their organizational objectives, and frequently they have the authority and the resources to control the generation and communication of information.\" He notes that t h i s approach has weaknesses from a p r a c t i c a l viewpoint and can be expected to have ramifications in implementation: \"... It i s not always practicable to control the generation and communication of information. An interest group may have i t s own information generation c a p a b i l i t y or information may be 'leaked'. Either of these actions may create d i s t r u s t , and thereby aggravate c o n f l i c t ... Although c o n f l i c t may be suppressed while a decision i s in process, i t may emerge in more virulent form when the decision i s implemented and i t s consequences are revealed. This too creates d i s t r u s t and destroys confidence in decision-making author i t ies . \" 98 An alternative management approach i s to \"open up\" the policy process. In Fox's words: \"This involves i d e n t i f y i n g the range of alternatives for dealing with a problem as dictated by the preferences and p r i o r i t i e s of the affected individuals and groups. It also requires that the e f f e c t s , including the incidence of e f f e c t s , be communicated to the individuals and groups affected ...\" The open process also includes conscious recognition of c o n f l i c t s and concerted e f f o r t s to resolve these. These two process management methods would seem to influence the outcome in d i f f e r e n t ways. The information control method would point to an outcome which approximates the objectives of the dominant individuals or groups managing the process. It would not l i k e l y lead to any new solutions since information would be r e s t r i c t e d to a narrow interest band. The open method would seem to point toward a more indeterminate outcome but one that would be capable of embracing new and d i f f e r e n t solutions. In the absence of otherwise convincing evidence, these propositions would seem to be worthy of an empirical test and w i l l therefore be considered in t h i s study. The question of the influence of the kind of process pursued i s , of course, d i r e c t l y related to many of the other variables discussed previously. The policy resources concept included recognition that the method of implementation i s l i k e l y important and th i s w i l l influence and be influenced by the kind of process. The individuals involved and the organizations of which they are a part w i l l be c r i t i c a l determinants of the process method. Some organizations have a history of c o n t r o l l i n g information, while others have been more open. The objectives of the policy w i l l influence how the process operates. Some p o l i c i e s probably require a higher degree of information and participant access control than others. Nonetheless, i t i s clear that t h i s i s a separable component and one that can be considered independently and then related to the other process influences. 2.6 POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS The l i t e r a t u r e characterizes the policy implementation process by emphasizing the elements in the process and the int e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s and interactions between these. The implementation l i t e r a t u r e generally makes the assumption that because i n f l u e n t i a l variables can be defined, these can be manipulated to 'improve' the implementation process. A number of techniques designed to achieve t h i s improvement are put forward in the l i t e r a t u r e . These w i l l be described below, and some attempt w i l l be made to assess their v a l i d i t y and u t i l i t y . Williams (1976) presents a summary of the thinking about techniques of implementation analysis and assessment. 100 2.6.1 Implementation Analysis Implementation analysis begins with a consideration of the c l a r i t y , precision, comprehensiveness, and reasonableness of preliminary policy s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . This means analysing the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s prior to adoption of the policy so as to provide useful input in the formation stages. S p e c i f i c a l l y , implementation analysis should investigate: (1) technical capacity to implement; (2) p o l i t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y ; and (3) technical and p o l i t i c a l strategies for implementation . Technical capacity involves two considerations: f i r s t l y , does the organization possess the requisite expertise and procedures to move the policy from the formation stage to the arena of implementation (often a l o c a l area)? And secondly, does the l o c a l operation possess the s k i l l s to e f f e c t i v e l y administer the policy? P o l i t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y refers to the opposition and support that a policy would face in implementation. Related to both of these i s the idea of a strategy for coping with perceived problems. Analysis of technical and p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i s pointless unless e f f o r t s are undertaken to devise ways of getting around or eliminating the problems. Whether a reasonable strategy exists i s the c r i t i c a l f i n a l question in implementation analysis. 1 0 1 Williams stresses that the c r i t i c a l need i s not for overpowering a n a l y t i c a l techniques but rather for reasonableness, s e n s i t i v i t y , and the a b i l i t y to order and synthesize diverse pieces of information that are often fragmentary and c o n f l i c t i n g . 2 . 6 . 2 Implementation Assessment The purpose of implementation assessment i s to determine the extent to which the actual outputs of an organization have changed in the expected d i r e c t i o n after the introduction of an innovation. Williams suggests the expansion of two techniques, demonstration projects and monitoring, as means of assessing implementation prior to t o t a l program complet ion. (i ) Demonstration Projects - These are put forward in l i e u of controlled experiments. In most planning or resource management situations actual experimentation i s out of the question. There are many obvious and f a t a l problems with such a method including the problem of control, the inequity created as the resu l t of experimental benefits accruing to only a portion of the population, the d i f f i c u l t i e s of actually determining cause and effect and so on. However, i t i s reasonable to attempt some small-scale e f f o r t s prior to implementing a major f u l l - s c a l e p o l i c y . It i s very important in designing a demonstration project that i t bear a reasonable resemblance to the r e a l i t y of the f u l l policy so that i t provides a test of t h e o r e t i c a l , administrative, and p o l i t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y and a useful implementation experience. Nonetheless, a substantial question has to do with whether demonstration projects can, in practice, be carried out. While the requirements are less severe than in an experimental s i t u a t i o n , the technical problems d i f f e r in degree rather than in kind. The time lags incurred create major p o l i t i c a l and bureaucratic problems. The normal budgetary process being what i t i s usually takes substantial time to bring an item on stream. The lag between the re s u l t s of the demonstration project and the implementation of a funded f u l l - s c a l e program may be enough to render the results suspect. Even so, the idea has appeal and may offer some avenue for desirable improvements to the policy process. ( i i ) Monitor ing - The idea of monitoring as discussed in the implementation l i t e r a t u r e generally refers to the notion of f i n a n c i a l accountability in cost-shared programs. Assessment involves ex post analysis of how a policy i s being implemented in accordance with the funding requirements. According to Williams, the two major d i f f i c u l t i e s in i n s t i t u t i n g a monitoring function are: (1) the actual feedback mechanisms for intermediate implementation assessment, and 103 ( 2 ) the determination of appropriate points at which to assess implementation. Neither of these d i f f i c u l t i e s should be taken l i g h t l y . It i s d i f f i c u l t to judge how much time should pass before one can reasonably assess a policy. The claim that \" i t ' s too early for an assessment\" i s a common manifestation of the problem. The actual techniques to employ are equally problematic especially because i t goes against the grain of experience in most organizations to even have assessments of policy ( c f . Wildavsky, 1 9 8 2 ) . As can be seen, the p r a c t i c a l i t y of Williams' suggestions appears somewhat limited because of the multitude of problems presented. An appropriate c r i t i q u e must cast his suggestions in the l i g h t of the policy process model upon which they are founded. The i m p l i c i t assumption of implementation analysis and assessment i s that there exists a definable path which can be determined and ought to be strived for in order to achieve policy success. This approach to policy i s based on a mechanistic concept of the policy process which defines a path. The deviation from the path i s given various names including \"policy d r i f t \" , \"goal s h i f t \" , and \"goal displacement\". As Palumbo ( 1 9 8 0 , p. 1 , 0 3 8 ) points out: \"Most of these concepts imply that the changes that develop during implementation are not legitimate and that, somehow, we must find a way to put p o l i c i e s back on the course intended by the dec ision-maker s .\" The d i f f i c u l t y with the 'improvement' measures discussed above results because the model upon which they are founded i s , in part, an inaccurate and misleading representation of r e a l i t y . Its drawback i s that i t represents only part of the process and does not deal with the c r i t i c a l element of uncertainty in an up-front manner. As a means of simplifying a complex r e a l i t y , however, i t has considerable merit. It i s generally useful to attempt to the best of one's a b i l i t y and resources to predict policy impacts. This i s a major a n a l y t i c a l technique for sharpening policy and w i l l remain a cornerstone of policy analysis. But at the same time, i t i s c r i t i c a l to recognize that implementation assessment deals with r e a l i t y in a mechanistic fashion. This i s generally not the way the human world operates, and therefore, policy conclusions based upon such a conceptualization may be mislead ing . Williams states in one instance that \"the movement toward successful operations may not be along a straight path of improvement without setbacks\"; but his implication i s clear, the path may not be smooth but i t i s there, and rigorous analysis w i l l p r e v a i l . This model of analysis works only i f one i s dealing with a situation that includes substantial variables which do not change s i g n i f i c a n t l y over time in an indeterminate fashion. If such a situation 105 e x i s t e d , i t may be adequate to p r e d i c t an outcome, implement a p o l i c y , assess the impact, r e d e f i n e the p o l i c y and t r y again . But the problems which t h i s study i s addressing g e n e r a l l y do not f a l l i n t o t h i s category. Planning and resource management problems are what R i t t e l and Webber (1973) have termed 'wicked problems' i n t h a t , among other t h i n g s , they are poorly s t r u c t u r e d , do not contain stopping r u l e s , and do not have c o r r e c t answers, only more or l e s s acceptable s o l u t i o n s . To consider ways of d e a l i n g with p o l i c y implementation i n v o l v i n g these kinds of problems, we have to move out of the l i t e r a t u r e s o l e l y concerned with implementation back to the decision-making l i t e r a t u r e with a view to applying t h i s t h i n k i n g to the implementation process. Ruth Mack (1971), drawing h e a v i l y upon Dunn (1971), provides a very well-reasoned approach to the decision-making side of d e a l i n g with wicked problems. I t would be un n e c e s s a r i l y r e p e t i t i v e to describe the t o t a l i t y of her persuasive arguments here, but i t w i l l be u s e f u l to h i g h l i g h t the major p o i n t s . The background p r o p o s i t i o n of Mack's work 106 i s that the p o l i c y problem i s not to remove or reduce the l e v e l of u n c e r t a i n t y but rather to reduce the costs of u n c e r t a i n t y . In some cases, these may be equated but i n complex s i t u a t i o n s , t h i s i s u s u a l l y not so. For example, G i l b e r t White (1979, p. 4) p o i n t s out: \"There i s a general b e l i e f among both s c i e n t i s t s and n o n - s c i e n t i s t s that by expanding knowledge we reduce u n c e r t a i n t y . The f a c t i s that the opposite occurs. The more knowledge we have about processes in the world, the more u n c e r t a i n t y we have as to what w i l l be the outcome of i n t e r v e n i n g i n those processes. The more knowledge we have about technology, the more options we have to exercise and therefore the greater the range of p o s s i b l e expression the human race has i n making i n t e r v e n t i o n s . So I contend that we must expect the realm of u n c e r t a i n t y w i l l widen rather than decrease as we c a r r y on . more research and develop more t e c h n o l o g i c a l o p t i o n s . \" The costs of u n c e r t a i n t y can be reduced, not by a simple d r i v e for information and knowledge, but by adopting an i t e r a t i v e approach to policy-making. Mack's c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of such an approach in v o l v e s what she c a l l s a d e l i b e r a t i v e , ongoing, staged, r e c u r s i v e , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e process (DOSRAP). Figure 2.2 below i s a graphic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h i s process. FIGURE 2.2 MODEL FOR DOSRAP alternatives proper Time \u00E2\u0080\u0094 . \" Source: R. Mack ( 1 9 7 1 ) p. 176 How i s this approach to be employed? Mack suggests six attributes of a problem must be considered in devising the strategy of problem solving under conditions of uncertainty. These, in fact, structure the analysis so as to determine the amount of uncertainty involved. Written under the t i t l e 'intendedly r a t i o n a l conduct of deli b e r a t i v e processes' the attributes are described as follows: \" 1 . Homogeneity - Homogeneity versus divergence, dispersion or lack of focus, can apply to time (duration of the decision process) , place (geographic spread of the c o l l e c t i v e ) , and constitution of the decision agent (complexity of the intrapersonal and interpersonal c o l l e c t i v i t y ) . Divergence exacerbates the problem of analyzing and achieving agreement about both r e a l i t y and goals. 2 . Rational Capacity - Opportunity for highly ra t i o n a l behavior on the part of the c o l l e c t i v e contrasts with situations l i k e l y to make un r e a l i s t i c demands on capacities to retain and process information and with situations l i k e l y to involve selective perception and developmental aspirations. These two attributes r e f e r , in e f f e c t , to the intrapersonal and i n t r a c o l l e c t i v e control over the decision process, over and above d i f f i c u l t i e s associated with inadequate information about consequences or u t i l i t i e s . The d i f f i c u l t i e s can be si t u a t i o n a l (physical or temporal dispersion of the c o l l e c t i v e ) ; conceptual (excessive demands on cognitive processes); or interpersonal (serious need to overcome i n e r t i a or to resolve disagreements and c o n f l i c t ) . These d i f f i c u l t i e s c a l l for resolution partly in terms of behavior which i s broadly p o l i t i c a l in nature. Dealing with the f i r s t two stages of DOSRAP, deciding to decide and nominating alternatives, can emphasize each of these types of d i f f i c u l t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the interpersonal ones. However, the process of deliberation can achieve improvement, and indeed must, i f the outcome i s not simply to resort to some least common denominator or the status quo. 3. Information Bearing on Outcomes - This may range from r i c h and sharp to sparse and ambiguous information. The l a t t e r makes p r o b a b i l i s t i c , objective, r e a l i t y judgements vague and even s h i f t y . 4. C l a r i t y of U t i l i t i e s - Goals and the u t i l i t i e s which they incorporate may be sharply delineated, quantified concisely, comprehensively, and associated with s p e c i f i c outcomes; or they may be d i f f i c u l t to st i p u l a t e , cover a range and thus be p r o b a b i l i s t i c , complex, vague, unstable, c o n f l i c t i n g , and unpredictable. 109 Attributes 3 and 4 imply knowledge at decision stages 1 and 2 about matters bearing on the f i n a l evaluated consequences of DOSRAP. However at each stage such knowledge, and the p r o b a b i l i t i e s associated with each consequence, need only be adequate to make i t worthwhile to proceed with the deliberative process. Hence, i f at an early stage information i s f e l t to be inadequate to assess the d e s i r a b i l i t y of the f i n a l outcome, part of the decision to continue the decision process must imply the b e l i e f that the requisite information w i l l become available l a t e r . To make i t available i s then part of the strategy of the process. 5. S e r i a b i l i t y - High s e r i a b i l i t y implies an actuarial basis for dealing with r i s k or uncertainty, in contrast to a t o t a l l y nonseriable problem which cannot in whole or part be dealt with as a member of a ser i e s . The averaging necessary to achieve an actuarial basis can cover not only a number of i d e n t i c a l acts but a number of very d i f f e r e n t ones providing the estimates of consequences are unbiased. But are not outcomes of long deliberations always biased in some degree by the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the individuals and organizations that are involved in the deliberative and indeed the effectuation processes? If so, t h i s bias must be covered in the evaluations. To get results free of t h i s bias, d i f f e r e n t organizations would need to pool their bets (as in commercial insurance). 6. Potential for Advancive Behavior - Advancive behavior raises the c e i l i n g of achievement. It i s explorative, experimental, and innovative, both with respect to improving goals and actions. Since high potential implies indeterminancy and therefore lack of structure in the decision problem, a high rating for attribute 6 tends to be associated with a low rating for the other a t t r i b u t e s . \" Mack suggests, for i l l u s t r a t i v e purposes, that in any given si t u a t i o n each st r u c t u r a l attribute w i l l apply to some degree and t h i s can be formalized on a scale from 1 (applying 1 1 0 to perfect structure) to 100 (applying to extreme lack of structure). For example, she points out: \"In situations for which a l l six attributes tend to c l i n g to the well-structured side, from start to f i n i s h of DOSRAP, the process of decision from stage to stage of administrative processes as a whole can be guided by r e l a t i v e l y highly r a t i o n a l and informed considerations in the c l a s s i c economic sense of optimizing behavior. When the p r o f i l e crowds the poorly structured side of the continuum, a highly judgemental, developmental approach is called for, one in which p o l i t i c a l behavior may v i r t u a l l y submerge task-oriented prescription. Indeed, at the farthest side, d e l i b e r a t i v e procedure, however loosely defined, may be quite impossible. However, most situations f a l l within the two extremes, with some attributes r e l a t i v e l y well structured and others poorly structured. Then the broad strategy appropriate to the conduct of the ongoing decision process must depend on which attributes are well structured and which poorly structured, to what degree, and at what stages of the process as a whole. What i s the significance of Mack's work to the questions r e l a t i n g to the policy implementation process? In essence, her work involves a refinement of the basic policy/implementation analysis put forward by Williams. As well as being a refinement, i t i s also an improvement. Uncertainty i s recognized in the policy design stage, and an i t e r a t i v e a n a l y t i c a l approach i s pursued to define and c l a r i f y the problems. As in the case of Williams' work, t h i s i s a useful procedure to undertake, but i t i s also an extremely dangerous approach unless one i s f u l l y cognizant of i t s shortcomings. One must not get caught in the same trap 111 as those accepting or pursuing a s i m p l i s t i c mechanistic approach to policy . Because uncertainty i s recognized and accounted for to the best of a b i l i t i e s in the policy formation stage does not mean that a c t i v i t i e s can be pursued as though the predictions made are absolute. Mack's DOSRAP takes account only of perceived uncertainties and presents an approach for understanding these. In ref e r r i n g to Figure 2.2, she describes how the model works: \"Information flowing through the central shaft of the diagram i s of several sorts - both information flowing into the decision locale from the l e f t or away from i t toward the r i g h t . F i r s t , i t concerns the progress of the deliberative process i t s e l f . Second, i t conveys expectations bearing on the intermediate and also the f i n a l outcomes of the process and their p r o b a b i l i t i e s . Third, i t bears on the values sought, their expected u t i l i t i e s , and the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of each. A l l three must profoundly affect how the decision process develops. The information about how things have gone in the past affects aspiration l e v e l s as well as the par t i c u l a r s of what i t seems useful to do next. Likewise the la s t two types of messages, those that convey expectations about outcomes and, viewed in the l i g h t of the changing value system, their consequences, can profoundly influence the step-by-step course of the deliberative process i t s e l f . This feedback of expectational material i s shown by the dotted arrows returning from the goal area to the several decision stages or substages indicated by the disks . The expected consequences are in the dotted c o i l at the right of the diagram. The several rings of the c o i l are, sequentially from the outside i n , the result of the expectations generated at each stage and conveyed to the r i g h t . The rings become progressively smaller, thereby indicating how the course of deliberation narrows 112 the p o s s i b i l i t i e s which are expected to accrue. The narrowing i s p a r t l y a f u n c t i o n of the focusing of the actions that are contemplated and the u t i l i t i e s sought, and th e r e f o r e of the consequences that may reasonably be expected; decreasing u n c e r t a i n t y ( i n c r e a s i n g peakedness of the p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s ) also has t h i s e f f e c t . The narrowing i s p a r t l y a f u n c t i o n also of a s p i r a t i o n s that adjust to changing r e a l i t i e s . Deepened shading suggests increased c l a r i t y - l e s s d i f f u s i o n and ambiguity about expected consequences.\" The DOSRAP model i s intended to improve p o l i c y formation. Shades of Lindblom are revealed i n Mack's words \"the good outcome i s achieved v i a the good process\", or turned around \"a good consequence i s what a good d e l i b e r a t i v e process achieves\" (Mack, 1971, p. 187). Arguments presented e a r l i e r suggest t h i s may not be the case. F i o r i n a (1979, P- 47) warns against the f a l l a c y of good process: \" P o l i t i c a l science as a d i s c i p l i n e has h i s t o r i c a l l y accepted the f a l l a c y of p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n : a l l good things go together. The general presumption i s that good people operating in good ( i . e . , democratic) processes n e c e s s a r i l y produce \"good\" outcomes. The f a l l a c y has been so widely accepted that u n t i l r e c e n t l y few p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s even looked at government outcomes, simply presuming that they were as s a t i s f a c t o r y or u n s a t i s f a c t o r y as the processes which produced them ... But the s o c i a l choice people have d i s i l l u s i o n e d us about m a j o r i t y r u l e and i t s v a r i a n t s . Democratic p o l i t i c a l processes simply have no o p t i m a l i t y p r o p e r t i e s , even i n the simple models analogous to those of c l a s s i c a l economics which generate the \"hidden hand\" ... In d e c e n t r a l i z e d s i t u a t i o n s o r d i n a r y people l i k e us, a c t i n g in p e r f e c t l y 1 1 3 natural fashion, may produce rotten c o l l e c t i v e outcomes. No conspiracies of e v i l people need be posited, just each of use acting as we find natur a l . \" But Fiorina takes the easy way out. He does not offer any d e f i n i t i o n s of what i s a good process or what i s a bad outcome. A good process may well produce a bad outcome, but t h i s can only be judged from a particular point of view. It i s unlikely that Fiorina i s suggesting that a good process i s not important, but the import of his statement i s not c l e a r . We have argued previously that there are no absolutes in terms of a policy process. A l l decisions respecting process and outcome are defined and interpreted with reference to human values. Mack's statement concerning a good process/outcome and those of Fiorina are examples of the d e f i n i t i o n a l looseness in the l i t e r a t u r e respecting process. The contrast between the two demonstrates the need to be clear about normative assumptions in our analysis. They show that a positive analysis describing variables in a process is p a r t i c u l a r l y susceptible to hidden normative assumptions. We must be careful about points which are intended to improve the process and instead look for points which indicate the r e l a t i v e importance of a factor in determining an outcome and indications as to how the outcome would change i f the factor were modified in s p e c i f i c ways. 114 2.7 CONCLUSION A f a i r l y wide ranging l i t e r a t u r e has been reviewed in an attempt to determine the important factors in a policy implementation process. The review indicates that the implementation process per se has received r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e systematic study, and consequently, a f a i r l y e c l e c t i c approach has been employed to develop relevant points respecting key implementation variables. No summary of the l i t e r a t u r e has been attempted, but rather, the next chapter w i l l make use of the l i t e r a t u r e analysis in a summary fashion to outline a hypothesized structure and theoreti c a l model of the implementation process. 115 CHAPTER 3 DETERMINANTS OF POLICY OUTCOME A BASIS FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 3.1 INTRODUCTION The two previous chapters have presented arguments and evidence r e l a t i n g to the p u b l i c p o l i c y process g e n e r a l l y and have zeroed-in on a po r t i o n c a l l e d the p o l i c y implementation process. This chapter has two purposes. F i r s t l y , i t i s to organize the arguments and evidence i n t o two r e l a t e d models which w i l l provide hypotheses r e s p e c t i n g the make-up and fu n c t i o n i n g of the p o l i c y implementation process. And secondly, i t w i l l propose a method to describe an a c t u a l implementation s i t u a t i o n from which the experience can be analysed i n r e l a t i o n to the hypothesized models. The o b j e c t i v e of the a n a l y s i s w i l l be to i d e n t i f y and assess the r e l a t i v e importance of the various determinants i n br i n g i n g about the outcome. On the b a s i s of the a n a l y s i s , the l a s t chapter of the study w i l l present conclusions r e s p e c t i n g the value and u t i l i t y of the models. 3.2 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION - SOME HYPOTHESES The background arguments and the l i t e r a t u r e review demonstrate that p o l i c y implementation i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y more complex than any one source might i n d i c a t e . It i s conceptua l l y complex because i t can be i n t i m a t e l y t i e d to 116 policy formation and yet i s demonstrably a quite separate process. The c r i t i c a l variables shaping and determining these processes may be quite d i f f e r e n t , and t h i s i s often not recognized or i s misunderstood. It i s important to c l a r i f y the differences but also maintain cognizance of the s i m i l a r i t i e s and linkages. Policy implementation i s also p r a c t i c a l l y complex because the forces which shape policy outcomes are very diverse and often i l l - d e f i n e d . The factors that bear on a discretionary decision, which results in r e a l , and often i r r e v e r s i b l e , impacts, are usually subtle and not open to substantial scrutiny. Because implementation involves action, time i s usually c r i t i c a l and the process can get hurried along for the sake of expediency. This makes i t d i f f i c u l t to intervene e f f e c t i v e l y during implementation and d i f f i c u l t to analyse in a post-action phase. Given the complexity of policy implementation and the p a r t i a l treatment afforded i t in the l i t e r a t u r e , i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y hazardous to put forward a model purporting to explain how a policy i s implemented.* Two models w i l l , *Buchanan and Tullock (1962, p. v) present a nice metaphor describing work at the edge of knowledge. They liken i t to a farmer working his f i e l d at the fence-row. There are benefits and costs to working the fence-row; the s o i l along here i s l i k e l y to be more f e r t i l e and more productive, when properly c u l t i v a t e d , than land in the more readi l y accessible centre of the f i e l d . But t h i s potential tends to be of f s e t by the enhanced pro b a b i l i t y of error and accidents in unfamiliar t e r r a i n . Many more stumps and boulders are l i k e l y to be encountered which makes unconscious and unintended diversions almost in e v i t a b l e . I fear t h i s may be an apt analogy for the current e f f o r t as well. 117 nonetheless, be developed. But rather than presenting these models as representing a comprehensive explanation of implementation, the components and the relationships among them w i l l be set out as hypotheses which can be used to guide empirical research. It seems useful to develop two models involving sets of hypotheses r e l a t i n g to implementation, one set defining the structure in which a policy i s implemented, and one for specifying the variables important in making the process function. Each of these models has been developed making use of a variety of sources. Obviously, the l i t e r a t u r e cited in the previous chapter i s a major source, but also the arguments put forward in Chapter 1 have been i n f l u e n t i a l in suggesting a structure for implementation. Hayek warns that the consideration of general rules cannot be undertaken with particular cases in mind. Bearing t h i s warning in mind, the hypotheses have s t i l l undoubtedly been influenced by the s p e c i f i c , and as yet unreported, experiences related to the case study. These experiences were no doubt also i n f l u e n t i a l in d i r e c t i n g the search for l i t e r a t u r e to explain various observat ions . In discussing the components of the models and hypotheses, I w i l l not attempt to define the s p e c i f i c source of the i n s p i r a t i o n , but i t i s safe to say that the 118 p r o p o s i t i o n s put forward are o r i g i n a l i n that they i n v o l v e the o r g a n i z a t i o n of f a c t s and ideas i n t o concepts not discussed elsewhere. 3.3 A STRUCTURE FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION Figure 3-1 summarizes a hypothesized s t r u c t u r e for p o l i c y implementation. This model o u t l i n e s four major s t r u c t u r a l components from the point when a p o l i c y i s discussed in the p o l i c y formation stage to the point of an ac t u a l outcome. Each of these components can be thought of as an i d e n t i f i a b l e subset or process, each g e n e r a l l y t a k i n g place i n sequence. They define the s t r u c t u r e of implementation, and each i s given l i f e and d i r e c t e d by the v a r i a b l e s described i n the process model. It i s hypothesized that four components make up the implementation process and s t r u c t u r e the actions that lead from a p o l i c y output to a p o l i c y outcome. These components are : (1) p o l i c y output; (2) i n i t i a t i o n of implementation; (3) implementation a c t i o n ; and (4) information feedback. I t i s tempting to argue that an implementation process would be more or l e s s e f f i c i e n t i n moving to an outcome depending upon the comprehensiveness of e f f o r t devoted to each of the processes. For inst a n c e , i f u n c e r t a i n t i e s are not c a r e f u l l y LONG-RUN FEEDBACK SHORT-RUN FEEDBACK POLICY FORMATION POLICY OUTPUT May sp e c i f y i n t e n t vaguely or p r e c i s e l y May s p e c i f y implementation mechanisms i n general or spec i f i c a l l y May undertake implementat ion a n a l y s i s INITIATION OF IMPLEMENTATION \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 E s t a b l i s h implementation organi zation \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 May redefine or determine inte n t - May define and p r i o r i z e implementat ion actions - May develop s t r a t e g i e s to deal with u n c e r t a i n t i e s f IMPLEMENTATION ACTION E s t a b l i s h a s p e c i f i c implementation program May r e d e f i n e various components as a c t i o n proceeds POLI OUTC E s t a b l i s h implementation mechan i sms STRUCTURE OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION FIGURE 3 .1 d o c u m e n t e d i n t h e p o l i c y o u t p u t s t a g e , t h e y w i l l have t o be c o n s i d e r e d a t some l a t e r p o i n t and a t a g r e a t e r c o s t t h a n i f c o n s i d e r e d a t t h e o u t s e t . Such an argument b o r d e r s o n , i f n o t a c t u a l l y i n t r u d i n g i n t o , t h e s p h e r e o f n o r m a t i v e c o n j e c t u r e . The t e m p t a t i o n t o u n e q u i v o c a l l y a s s e r t t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n w i l l be r e s i s t e d . R a t h e r , we w i l l be c o n t e n t w i t h h y p o t h e s i z i n g t h a t t h e s e f o u r s u b p r o c e s s e s a p p e a r t o d e f i n e t h e s t r u c t u r e o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a c t i o n s and t h a t an e m p i r i c a l s t u d y s h o u l d e x a m i n e t h e e v i d e n c e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e c o m p l e t e n e s s o f t h e m o d e l . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t i c e t h a t some o f t h e e l e m e n t s l i s t e d u n d e r t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o m p o n e n t s may o r may n o t be i n c l u d e d i n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s u n d e r t a k e n a t t h e v a r i o u s s t a g e s o f m o v i n g f r o m a p o l i c y o u t p u t t o an o u t c o m e . From a r e s e a r c h p o i n t o f v i e w , t h e r e i s no b a s i s f o r a r g u i n g t h a t p a r t i c u l a r e l e m e n t s o u g h t t o be i n c l u d e d o r a c t i o n s o u g h t t o be u n d e r t a k e n . The p u r p o s e o f t h e r e s e a r c h i s t o u n d e r s t a n d w h e t h e r t h e i r i n c l u s i o n o r t h e f a i l u r e t o i n c l u d e them i n f l u e n c e d t h e o u t c o m e . P o l i c y O u t p u t P o l i c y o u t p u t i s c l e a r l y a c o n c e p t a t t h e b o r d e r o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , i t i s t h e r e s u l t o f d e l i b e r a t i o n s i n t h e p o l i c y f o r m a t i o n s t a g e and d e f i n e s t h e s t a t e m e n t o f i n t e n t . But i t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t a p a r t o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f p o l i c y i s v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o i m p l e m e n t a t i o n b e c a u s e i t i s h e r e t h a t t h e s t a g e must be s e t a n d , o n c e s e t , 121 i s v e r y i n f l u e n t i a l i n much o f what f o l l o w s . P o l i c y o u t p u t i s c o n s i d e r e d t o i n c l u d e a s t a t e m e n t o f c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n t o be p u r s u e d i n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p r o c e s s . T h r e e s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s e t s a r e t h o u g h t t o be i m p o r t a n t : ( 1 ) may s p e c i f y p o l i c y i n t e n t v a g u e l y o r p r e c i s e l y ; ( 2 ) may s p e c i f y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n m e c h a n i s m s i n g e n e r a l or s p e c i f i c a l l y ; and (3) may u n d e r t a k e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a n a l y s i s , i n c l u d i n g s t r a t e g i e s f o r d e a l i n g w i t h u n c e r t a i n t i e s . ( 1 ) P o l i c y I n t e n t - The p o l i c y i n t e n t d e f i n e s t h e p r o b l e m t h a t i s t o be a t t a c k e d by t h e w h o l e p o l i c y p r o c e s s and t h e o b j e c t i v e s t o be a c h i e v e d . A p o l i c y p r o b l e m c a n , o f c o u r s e , r a n g e f r o m b e i n g v e r y s i m p l e t o b e i n g v e r y c o m p l e x . T h i s f a c t o r i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e o utcome o f a p o l i c y p r o c e s s . I f a p o l i c y p r o b l e m p r e s e n t s a f a i r l y s i m p l e s e t o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e n i t f o l l o w s t h a t i t m i g h t be f a i r l y s i m p l e t o i m p l e m e n t a s o l u t i o n . I f t h e p o l i c y s e t s o u t t o s o l v e an i n t r a c t a b l e p r o b l e m , t h e n i t w o u l d s u g g e s t t h a t a c o m p l e x p r o c e s s w i l l f o l l o w . R e c a l l W i l d a v s k y ' s a n a l y s i s c i t e d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e r e v i e w w h e r e i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s f a c e d w i t h i n t r a c t a b l e p r o b l e m s w i l l make g r e a t e f f o r t s t o r e d e f i n e t h e p r o b l e m t o one w h i c h t h e y c a n manage. The t r a c t a b i l i t y o f t h e p r o b l e m , t h e r e f o r e , c a n be e x p e c t e d t o e x e r t a s t r o n g i n f l u e n c e on t h e outcome and may c a u s e t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p r o c e s s t o p e r f o r m i n p a r t i c u l a r ways. I f t h e p r o b l e m i s an i n t r a c t a b l e o n e , a c t o r s w i l l b e h a v e d i f f e r e n t l y t h a n i f t h e y a r e i n i t i a l l y p r e s e n t e d w i t h a p r o b l e m w h i c h t h e y c o n s i d e r t o be w i t h i n t h e i r means. 122 Closely related to t h i s point i s the degree to which the policy objectives are known by the implementors. The objectives can be precisely stated or they can be l e f t very vague. A precise statement of objectives would seem to structure the actions of the implementors more so than i f the objectives are subject to interpretation. The necessity of making subjective interpretations sets into motion processes of information generation and analysis which are open to the various influences of any decision-making process. Such a situation i n v i t e s interested individuals and groups to influence the interpretations in a favourable manner. Consequently, the degree to which intentions or objectives are specified i s an important structuring element in implementation. ( 2 ) Implementing Mechanisms - At the policy output stage, no concrete action toward implementation has taken place, but c l e a r l y i t i s at t h i s point that a decision must be taken to undertake actions to carry out the policy intent. This may sound t r i v i a l , but conceptually, i t i s c r i t i c a l to recognize that policy i s rarely self-implementing. Specific decisions to act must be taken. In a discussion of an implementation process, i t i s assumed that such decisions are taken and i t then becomes important to consider how a policy i s to be implemented. If a decision i s made not to take action, then we are in a quite d i f f e r e n t process. At the policy output stage, the s p e c i f i c approach or mechanisms to be employed can be i d e n t i f i e d in a general fashion or they can be i d e n t i f i e d s p e c i f i c a l l y . Again, as noted in the previous section, a s p e c i f i c orientation w i l l tend to r e s t r i c t the a c t i v i t i e s of the implementors, whereas a more general designation w i l l create room for and demand maneuvering. The course chosen w i l l nonetheless influence the outcome. (3) Implementation Analysis - Implementation analysis refers to a n a l y t i c a l procedures designed to predetermine the course of the implementation process. Of paramount importance in such an undertaking i s the determination of uncertainties. The a n a l y t i c a l procedure must consider those facets which are d e f i n i t e in the future and those which are uncertain under any given set of actions. At the policy output stage, decision-makers may engage in defining alternate implementation strategies which would include strategies for dealing with uncertainties. If implementation analysis i s undertaken at the policy output stage, t h i s would have to be based upon f a i r l y d e f i n i t e ideas concerning policy intent and implementation mechanisms. Both of these are necessary preconditions. It does not, of course, follow that implementation analysis w i l l be undertaken in a l l situations when the policy intentions and implementation mechanisms are c l e a r l y s p e c i f i e d . But should these three elements be present, i t suggests that the following implementation process w i l l be s t r i c t l y bounded. If implementation analysis i s not undertaken at a l l or to any s i g n i f i c a n t degree, t h i s implies that policy formulators have not placed any d e f i n i t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s on the a c t i v i t i e s of the implementation process. This i s not to say that the policy-makers do not have any expectations regarding a policy outcome, but rather they have not considered how the outcome is to be achieved. 3.3.2 I n i t i a t i o n of Implementation How does implementation actually begin? It i s suggested that i t begins by designation of implementors who then undertake s p e c i f i c actions to move out of the realm of abstract policy into concrete a c t i v i t y . It i s here where resources are allocated and mobilized in a preliminary manner to implement policy. Five action sets respecting the process of i n i t i a t i n g implementation have been i d e n t i f i e d : ( 1 ) establish implementation organization; (2) may redefine or determine d e f i n i t i o n of intent; (3) may define and p r i o r i z e implementation actions; ( 4 ) may determine uncertainties and may develop strategies to deal with uncertainties; and (5) establish implementation mechanisms. ( 1 ) Implementation Organization - The designation of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for implementation i s c r u c i a l . Depending upon the s p e c i f i c circumstances, the focus of t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y could range from a single individual to a very large group, and the complexity of the res u l t i n g organization would vary accord ingly. Who should d i r e c t an implementation process and who should participate in that process are questions of the utmost s i g n i f i c a n c e . The attributes of the implementing actors, determine a great deal of what the process considers important and are most i n f l u e n t i a l in a l l of the process decisions. The decision as to choice of implementors also reveals a great deal about the intentions of the policy-makers and can be very instr u c t i v e in speculating on the outcome of events. The f u l l significance of the choice of implementors w i l l be discussed in the section concerning implementing actors. The establishment of the implementation organization also requires a f i r s t - c u t analysis of resource requirements and commitments for the use of these resources. This w i l l involve organizational commitments in terms of process, personnel and funding to carry out projects. (2) Redefinition of Intent - Depending upon the c l a r i t y or forcefulness with which the policy intention has been communicated to the implementors, they may need or choose to redefine or define the policy intention at t h i s stage where actions are being planned. The degree to which implementors 126 c l a r i f y or plan their actions for the course of the implementation process w i l l influence the process and the policy outcome. (3) Define and Priorize Implementation Actions - The policy output may or may not be developed in a way amenable to immediate action. If i t i s set out in abstract terms, i t may be d i f f i c u l t to define operational c r i t e r i a for implementation. Prior to action, the implementors may put some e f f o r t into operationalizing the policy output into an action-oriented mode. The degree to which t h i s i s done or avoided w i l l influence the implementation process. It i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine operationalizing a policy without also establishing an operational plan of action which pr i o r i z e s future a c t i v i t y . The implementors may at t h i s stage make the f i r s t important decisions. Some things flowing from the policy output w i l l be possible while others may not be. Depending upon the depth and results of t h i s f i r s t a n a l y t i c a l process, the course of the process w i l l be i n i t i a l l y charted. ( 4 ) Determine Uncertainties - Part of the an a l y t i c a l process of defining and p r i o r i z i n g implementation actions might involve determining uncertainties and may involve developing strategies to deal with these uncertainties. This element may have been covered in the policy output stage in a general or s p e c i f i c fashion. If so, that analysis might be reviewed by the implementors. If no uncertainty analysis has been undertaken, the implementors may consider the policy problems in a framework of determining c e r t a i n t i e s and uncertainties. Use of such an a n a l y t i c a l procedure i s by no means a foregone conclusion. The degree to which uncertainty analysis i s applied to a complex set of problems w i l l undoubtedly be a s i g n i f i c a n t factor in shaping the implementation process and the policy outcome. (5) Establish Implementation Mechanisms - At t h i s stage of an implementation process, decisions must be taken respecting s p e c i f i c mechanisms for implementation. This i s not an optional step. Implementation mechanisms can be chosen consciously or they can be a res u l t of action without s p e c i f i c regard for or analysis of the options. By virtue of undertaking any action, implementors are de facto employing an implementation mechanism. Different problems may require d i f f e r e n t approaches. But the choice of the implementing mechanism used in any particular case w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t in structuring the implementation process. It w i l l d i r e c t the analysis along certain l i n e s and thereby avoid other d i r e c t i o n s . The degree to which the options are assessed and the choice made are important determinants of the outcome. 128 3 . 3 \u00C2\u00AB 3 Implementation Action Once the actions required to i n i t i a t e the implementation process have been completed, the process moves into implementation proper. This i s the stage where resources are applied to carry out implementation. Two major action sets can be delineated for t h i s component: (1) establish s p e c i f i c implementation programs; and (2) may redefine various components as action proceeds. (1) Implementation Program - The s h i f t from i n i t i a t i o n of implementation action to undertaking action i s subtle but involves d i s t i n c t differences in degree as well as in kind. The i n i t i a t i o n phase ends with a firm decision to proceed and then a l l of the preliminary analyses take on a new meaning. The preliminary commitments of resources must be c a r e f u l l y assessed as they w i l l involve real budgetary expenditures. The establishment of a s p e c i f i c implementation program is v i r t u a l l y a mandatory step, but i t can be a basic program, general in nature and thus provide limited guidance [and conversely, limited r e s t r i c t i o n s ] , or i t can be s p e c i f i c , laying out a d e f i n i t e course of actions. The s p e c i f i c i t y of the program w i l l be a variable in shaping the policy outcome. (2) Redefine Implementation Components - Irrespective of the implementation program agreed to as the i n i t i a l step, as action proceeds, the implementors may revise the various 129 components including the d e f i n i t i o n of intent, the implementation program, alter p r i o r i t i e s and mechanisms, and alter strategies for dealing with uncertainties. It i s l i k e l y that the analyses undertaken in the policy formation stage and the i n i t i a t i o n of implementation stage w i l l be viewed as preliminary. The purpose of such analyses was to establish orders-of-magnitude. In the action phase, implementors may undertake more detailed policy and project evaluations to provide a d e f i n i t i v e basis for action. They may make a more careful analysis of uncertainties and look at the various options for dealing with uncertainties. As the various elements concerning evaluation and re-evaluation come into play and shape the policy outcome, the implementors may alter previous decisions. Their f l e x i b i l i t y or determination [depending upon your point of view] w i l l be a major factor in determining the kind of policy outcome. 3-3-4 Information Feedback The structure of implementation described so far characterizes the process as dynamic with many opportunities for analysis, decision-making, further analysis, revised decisions, and so on. This characterization suggests the existence of information feedback mechanisms or information flow channels within an implementation process. 1 3 0 The information feedback component i s not structural in the same way as the previously discussed policy output, i n i t i a t i o n of implementation and implementation action. It does not have an organizing function in terms of achieving concrete actions, but nonetheless, i t does have a powerful role in f a c i l i t a t i n g the flow of information between the various structural components and may well be a c r i t i c a l determinant of the policy outcome. Within t h i s component, three s p e c i f i c subsections can be i d e n t i f i e d : ( 1 ) may systematically monitor r e s u l t s ; (2) may feed back information to the action stage (short run); and ( 3 ) may feed back information to the policy formation stage (long run). ( 1 ) Monitor Results - It has been argued that most policy problems in the planning f i e l d are complex, messy problems that do not lend themselves to straightforward solutions. The best l a i d plans of mice and men go oft astray, and t h i s being the case, i t i s useful to follow an action to see i f i t does produce the intended r e s u l t s . The r e s u l t might be transmitted back to the decision-makers either as positive reinforcement or as negative information useful for a correction in d i r e c t i o n . It should be recalled that implementors appear to have a bias against receiving negative data concerning their actions. There seems to be a desire on the part of implementors to see their established course of action bring about the r e s u l t s they predicted or intended. The strength of t h i s bias in the face of negative information w i l l be a factor in determining the course of an implementation process as w i l l the propensity to establish and use monitoring a c t i v i t i e s . As described below, monitoring information can be used in a short-run or a long-run capacity. ( 2 ) Short-Run Feedback - The feedback information described above might provide information concerning the resolution of uncertainties which may suggest a d i f f e r e n t course of action from the one being pursued. Such information might be fed back to the action stage and adjustments made to s p e c i f i c actions. (3) Long-Run Feedback - Information concerning the o v e r a l l impacts or effectiveness of the policy outcome may be fed back to the policy formation stage of the policy process. This i s undoubtedly beyond the scope of implementation, but there may be mechanisms, formal or otherwise, which provide information used in the next generation of p o l i c i e s . In the planning f i e l d , problems are r a r e l y solved, but actions are taken which change the nature of the problems and thereby create the need for new responses. The propensity of an implementation process to generate this kind of long-run information would seem to be dependent upon the l e v e l of monitoring undertaken during implementation and the degree of ex post evaluation of implementation a c t i v i t i e s that are undertaken. While i t l i k e l y has a minimal effect on a 132 s p e c i f i c policy outcome, the possible existence of long-run feedback i s interesting insofar as i t provides the l i n k back to policy formation and thereby completes the c i r c l e so that the policy process as a system can continue to function. 3 \u00C2\u00BB 3 - 5 Summary of Structure for Policy Implementation A structure for the policy implementation process has been described, and particular actions have been hypothesized as\" important in direc t i n g the movement from policy output to policy outcome. Three major structural components or stages (policy output, i n i t i a t i o n of implementation, and implementation action) have been described in some d e t a i l . A fourth component, information feedback, has also been described, and i t s influence on the action taking place within the three main stages has been hypothesized. This structure w i l l provide the basis for describing and analysing an implementation case. It w i l l d i r e c t the research toward determining the degree to which the process in question exhibited the hypothesized structure and the degree to which the various elements described were present and the significance of the presence or absence of these. Based upon a structural analysis, i t would be possible to argue the importance of the various structural elements in shaping a policy outcome. But such an analysis would be of l i t t l e value in terms of understanding why particular elements were or were not present and why the process decisions took the shape they did. A second a n a l y t i c a l model is necessary to explore these questions. The next section w i l l describe what i s called a process model. It w i l l delineate the s p e c i f i c factors that come into play in the myriad of decisions that must be taken in the various stages of policy implementation. The structural model outlines the kinds of decisions that must be or might be taken, and the process model provides some ideas on what w i l l influence the dir e c t i o n of the decisions. 3.4 MODEL OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS Figure 3.2 provides a diagrammatic representation of what are hypothesized to be the key variables in influencing decisions which change a policy output into a policy outcome. These variables influence and determine the actions discussed in the str u c t u r a l model concerning the policy output, i n i t i a t i o n of implementation, and implementation action. It must be recognized that the substantive d e f i n i t i o n of the variables w i l l not necessarily be i d e n t i c a l for each of the implementation phases, nor w i l l they l i k e l y exhibit the same degree of influence in each phase. Nonetheless, i t i s suggested that i t i s these variables that combine to determine the various decisions in the implementation process . POLICY POLICY OUTPUT i i \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 MODEL OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS FIGURE 3-2 INTERESTED ACTORS POLICY OUTCOME Each element of the model w i l l be discussed s e p a r a t e l y , and the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among v a r i a b l e s w i l l be emphasized so that i t i s c l e a r how the model, i f a p p l i e d , w i l l e x p l a i n i n an appropriate way why the p o l i c y outcome i s what i t i s . This d e s c r i p t i o n w i l l also serve as a b a s i s for i n d i c a t i n g what changes i n the elements would be required to produce a s p e c i f i e d d i f f e r e n t p o l i c y outcome. 3.4.1 Implementing Actors The l i t e r a t u r e describes two c a t e g o r i e s of actors who are involved i n the implementation process. One category i s engaged d i r e c t l y i n t r y i n g to implement the adopted p o l i c y . These w i l l be termed the 'implementing a c t o r s ' . The other category c o n s i s t s of those who are a f f e c t e d by the p o l i c y or who have an i n t e r e s t i n i n f l u e n c i n g i t for i d e o l o g i c a l reasons. These w i l l be termed ' i n t e r e s t e d a c t o r s ' . Each of these c a t e g o r i e s of a c t o r s i s important i n shaping a p o l i c y outcome. In t h i s s e c t i o n , the r o l e of implementing actors w i l l be discussed. The r o l e of i n t e r e s t e d actors w i l l be discussed i n a separate s e c t i o n (3-4.4) f o l l o w i n g . The model of the implementation process posited i n Figure 3-2 i n d i c a t e s that the implementing actors and the o r g a n i z a t i o n of which they are a part are the c e n t r a l v a r i a b l e and the dominant i n f l u e n c e on a p o l i c y outcome. V i r t u a l l y a l l other elements are influenced to a s i g n i f i c a n t degree by the preferences and perceptions of the key implementing actors. For purposes here, concerns respecting organizations w i l l be subsumed under the more general term of ,actors. It i s how individuals within organizations behave that i s of interest. There are quite l i k e l y differences between types of organizations which could influence policy implementation one way or another, but t h i s study w i l l not develop any hypotheses in t h i s regard, i S e l f - i n t e r e s t Motivation S e l f - i n t e r e s t has been defined as an important organizing concept for determining the behaviour of implementing actors. A behavioural model must also formally recognize that, while individuals tend toward rati o n a l behaviour, their r a t i o n a l i t y i s c l e a r l y bounded and l i m i t e d . Rationality i s bounded because individuals are inherently limited in their a b i l i t y to synthesize information which might have a bearing on a decision, and organizationally, there are l i m i t s on the amount of time and other resources that can be devoted toward c o l l e c t i n g enough data to be f u l l y r a t i o n a l . Psychologically, an individual's r a t i o n a l i t y i s limited because he i s a prisoner of his perceptions. Every individual must process information through his mental f a c u l t i e s , and i t i s clear that each individual receives d i f f e r e n t information depending upon his perceptions. 137 Percept ions Individuals can be expected to formulate a position, based on perceptions of their i n t e r e s t , and pursue actions designed to enhance t h i s position. This i s a most complex area, but i t seems evident that perceptions of interest w i l l be defined by a combination of the individual's experience including formal education and training and his interactions with others within his organization and others outside of his organization. An individual's behaviour i s also affected by his perception of his r o l e . What he perceives he ought to do (defined by d e f i n i t i o n s of s e l f - i n t e r e s t ) and what he perceives others expect of him in his role influences his behaviour. An individual can be expected to l i v e up to the expectations of his stereotype, within l i m i t s . Based upon t h i s , actors with similar backgrounds in terms of experience and training can be expected to behave in b a s i c a l l y similar ways . Objectives/Values Organizations w i l l pursue objectives that r e f l e c t the aspirations of their dominant members insofar as these are consistent with established organizational goals or 1 3 8 mandates.* Organizations that are composed of individuals with similar backgrounds w i l l tend to pursue vigourously their objectives because of limited internal c o n f l i c t . Likewise, i t would be expected that organizations with similar objectives would tend to interact in a cooperative manner . It appears that attitudes, once formed, are d i f f i c u l t to change. Since they are based on the individual's t o t a l history, t h i s i s not hard to understand. Because of t h i s , i n d i v i d u a l s , and the organizations they compose, tend toward conservatism. An organization that has been involved in e s s e n t i a l l y the same kind of a c t i v i t i e s for a long period of time w i l l have d i f f i c u l t y trying new methods or aiming toward new solutions. They become r i s k averse, and their behaviour i s directed toward s t a b i l i t y . Survival of the organization i s the overriding organizational objective. Because of the inherent conservative bias, organizations w i l l try to define the problems with which they deal to suit their particular a b i l i t i e s . If they can make the problem suit their s k i l l s , *In the case of public organizations, the basic objectives are often mandated in l e g i s l a t i o n or at least a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l niche i s indicated to provide a basis for a c t i v i t y . For example, the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l positions of the federal and provincial governments in water resource management are considered basic objectives in t h i s analysis. 1 3 9 then they w i l l l i k e l y be able to 'solve' the problem and be viewed by their patrons as successful and worthy of maintaining. Related to t h i s , an organization w i l l seek strategies which minimize c o n f l i c t . This suggests that behaviour w i l l be directed toward cooperation and compromise in order to achieve objectives. Depending upon the length of time i t has been involved in the problem area, i t should be expected that an organization w i l l have some very basic objectives on which i t w i l l not compromise, but most aspects w i l l be open to some modification to maintain a minimum of c o n f l i c t . But because survival i s so important, an organization can be expected to respond to incentives which might involve change, even s i g n i f i c a n t change, i f i t i s perceived that, by adopting a new position, the future of the organization w i l l be enhanced, ensured or whatever. This kind of behaviour w i l l , however, s t i l l f a l l within the bounds of the interests of the key actors in the organization. Communication How individuals within an organization communicate and process information i s an important element in understanding behaviour. Because perceptions are so c r i t i c a l in defining behaviour, they dominate information processing. Information i s screened and distorted according to the biases of the individuals in the organizations based upon their a b i l i t i e s to receive and transmit information and their perceptions of how s p e c i f i c messages impact their s e l f - i n t e r e s t s and the objectives of the organization. Consequently, in r e l a t i n g to policy objectives, defining resources, or interacting with interest groups or the policy environment, communications w i l l be channelled and altered to f i t the perceived needs of the individual actors. This i s not to say that information w i l l necessarily be consciously dist o r t e d , but rather the mechanisms for screening information, separating those messages which are important from those which are not, w i l l function so as to enhance information which serves the purposes of the actors and w i l l downplay information inconsistent with their objectives. Organizations w i l l tend to use informal methods of communication wherever possible because th i s tends to be the most e f f e c t i v e method of achieving objectives. Organizations encourage individuals to develop personal communication networks within organizations and between organizations. These w i l l probably be based upon personal relationships between individuals founded upon common objectives, experiences, or through long-standing association in the problem milieu. The presence or absence of such communication networks w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t factor in shaping a policy outcome. Linkages to Other Model Variables 1 4 1 As shown in the diagram, the implementing actors are central to the implementation process. They are linked to a l l other variables in the model. The forward linkages w i l l be described below. The policy objectives as developed in the policy output partly determine who the actors w i l l be, but the perceptions of the actors are very important in interpreting and operationalizing the objectives. They w i l l tend to mold the policy objectives to their individual and organizational objectives. The actors are a major part of the resources, but they determine how resources w i l l be deployed, including personnel (their time and energy), what p r i o r i t y w i l l be given s p e c i f i c pieces, when more or less resources are required, and the s p e c i f i c kinds and mix of resources to be used. The actors exert a primary influence on the type of implementation mechanisms to be used to implement the policy output. The implementing actors, through their interpretation of the policy problem and perceived in t e r e s t s , define, to a s i g n i f i c a n t degree, the involvement of interested individuals and groups. Because the key actors control the a c t i v i t y in the implementation process to a large degree, they are in a position to manage the access and p a r t i c i p a t i o n of those interested in the process and the outcome. They can establish communication channels with outsiders and can e s s e n t i a l l y control the information flow. It can be one-way or two-way, largely depending upon the di s p o s i t i o n of the implementing actors. To a s i g n i f i c a n t degree, the nature of these channels w i l l be defined by the actors' perceptions of whether their s e l f - i n t e r e s t s and those of the organizations w i l l be b e n e f i c i a l l y served or adversely affected by the pa r t i c i p a t i o n of others. The implementing actors do not influence the policy env ironment, nor do they influence the incentives and sanctions which can have an impact upon their behaviour. They do, however, play a major role in defining the rules under which the process functions. The actors have a major say in how the implementation process w i l l proceed and how they w i l l transact the business at hand. The actors also have an influence on the stakes involved in the implementation process. Since organizations and individuals w i l l try to move the process in a d i r e c t i o n supportive of their i n t e r e s t s , they w i l l attempt to s h i f t the stakes up or down according to their perception of their chances of winning. The actors can try to s h i f t the stakes by communicating information concerning the r e l a t i v e importance of the process at hand. If the import of the 143 process i s to be downplayed, the implementors can merge the process with a l a r g e r scale e f f o r t and thereby bury the d e t a i l s of the process at hand. I f i t s importance i s to be enhanced, the actors can s t r i p a t t e n t i o n from surrounding a c t i v i t i e s and h i g h l i g h t the a c t i o n s flowing from the process to be upgraded. 3.4.2 Objectives The o b j e c t i v e s of the p o l i c y are key determinants of the implementation process. As described above, the implementing actors have a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n i n t e r p r e t i n g and d i r e c t i n g o b j e c t i v e s , but there are l i m i t s to the degree to which c l e a r statements and i n s t r u c t i o n s can be i n t e r p r e t e d . The extent to which o b j e c t i v e s are c l e a r and d e f i n i t i v e w i l l shape how the a c t o r s can and w i l l respond to them. The o b j e c t i v e s determine, to a degree, the kind and l e v e l of resources that w i l l be devoted to the process. Most importantly i n t h i s regard, the o b j e c t i v e s w i l l define to a l a r g e .degree the actors to be involved in implementing a p o l i c y . Because the actors play such a c e n t r a l r o l e , i t i s important to recognize a l i n k between p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s and the a c t o r s . The o b j e c t i v e s also help define the stakes involved i n the process and thereby impart some determination of the resources that ought to be devoted to the process. The objectives of the policy define who the interested parties are l i k e l y to be. Manipulation of the objectives or keeping hidden the real objectives of a process may well serve to l i m i t the interest of individuals or groups and/or s h i f t the attention from one set of interests to another. The objectives p a r t i a l l y define the incentives and the sanctions that exist within the implementation process. They may - specify particular benefits which can be achieved or provide penalties for f a i l i n g to undertake particular actions. It might be noted that the implementing actors have no d i r e c t l i n k to these but may have influence in t h i s regard because of their a b i l i t y to shape the objectives. Lastly, the objectives define to a certain degree the rules of the implementation process. E s s e n t i a l l y , the objectives w i l l define what i s in bounds and what i s not. The policy-makers, through the objectives, can also influence the kinds of actions and a c t i v i t i e s that constitute the process. If the objectives are very s p e c i f i c , they might specify what should take place and how i t should be done. On the other hand, very vague or loose objectives would be much less able to d i r e c t the action along s p e c i f i c l i n e s . The less that the rules are strongly influenced by the objectives, the more free play the actors w i l l have in establishing the rules and managing the action in accordance with their perceptions of how things ought to proceed. 145 3.4.3 Resources The resources of the process are the backbone of the implementation act i o n and thus exert a major i n f l u e n c e on the outcome. I t has been noted that the resources are influenced s t r o n g l y by the o b j e c t i v e s and the ac t o r s . But the absolute l e v e l of resources a v a i l a b l e also has a powerful i n f l u e n c e on the substance of the o b j e c t i v e s . What can be done i s a major determinant of what ought to be done, perhaps even the most important determinant. In t h i s sense, the resources exert a strong i n f l u e n c e on the behaviour of the a c t o r s . They act as a c o n s t r a i n t on a c t i o n , both i n terms of l e v e l and substantive d i r e c t i o n . The resources a v a i l a b l e may d i r e c t the a c t o r s ' decision-making along p a r t i c u l a r paths, paths that might not be pursued with a d i f f e r e n t set of resources; for example, the kind of implementing mechanism used may be determined i n t h i s manner. The kinds of resources the implementing actors use to conduct the implementation process i s s i g n i f i c a n t . The degree to which they devote resources to communication among themselves and with other i n t e r e s t s and to n e g o t i a t i o n for the purpose of r e c o n c i l i n g d i f f e r e n c e s are s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s i n shaping the outcome. The kind and l e v e l of resources have an e f f e c t upon the involvement of i n t e r e s t e d i n d i v i d u a l s and groups. One of the major c o n s t r a i n t s to outside p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n environmental management processes i s limited resources on the part of outsiders such as the interested actors. The a v a i l a b i l i t y of resources to outsiders provides them with access to information which provides one of the necessary conditions for i n t e l l i g e n t involvement in the implementation process. It i s very l i k e l y that the outcome i s shaped by the l e v e l and kind of p a r t i c i p a t i o n by interested actors, and thus the l e v e l of resources available to the interests i s a s i g n i f i c a n t factor to be investigated. The d e f i n i t i o n of resources as used in the process model includes the kind of mechanisms used to implement polic y . There i s not enough evidence available to hypothesize a particular r e l a t i o n s h i p between kinds of implementation mechanisms and policy outcome, but the limited discussion in the l i t e r a t u r e suggests that such a relationship does e x i s t . Part of the study analysis should seek to uncover the influence of the implementation mechanisms employed in determining the policy outcome. 3.4.4 Interested Actors A policy i s normally formulated and implemented with a view that the re s u l t s of implementation w i l l have some effect on particular individuals, singly or in groups. This being the case, these individuals and groups have an interest in the outcome of the process. The process model is not intended to describe the r a t i o n a l e for group decision-making. This i s accomplished in some of the works discussed in the l i t e r a t u r e review (see Downs, 1964; Buchanan and T u l l o c k , 1962). The important points for understanding the implementation process are the extent of i n f l u e n c e that i n t e r e s t e d i n d i v i d u a l s or groups have i n shaping the outcome and the f a c t o r s that determine the extent of i n f l u e n c e . I n t e r e s t groups can have a strong i n f l u e n c e on the behaviour of the implementing a c t o r s . It was discussed e a r l i e r that how the implementing actors perceive what others t h i n k they ought to do i s an important determinant of t h e i r behaviour. By having and v o i c i n g a c l e a r conception of what actions they t h i n k the actors ought to undertake, the i n t e r e s t e d actors can exert a powerful i n f l u e n c e on the outcome. By d e f i n i t i o n , the i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s are a f f e c t e d by the p o l i c y process. This s p e c i a l s t a t u s can be i n f l u e n t i a l i n shaping the p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . I t can be a r e s u l t of ac t u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to o f f i c i a l s or as a r e s u l t of the i n t e r e s t s of those a f f e c t e d being considered i n the development of p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s by the p o l i c y formulators. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the impacts on the various i n t e r e s t s l a r g e l y defines the stakes of the implementation process. I f the outcome w i l l have an enormous e f f e c t on even a few, then the process takes on a greater import than i f i t s impacts were lesser. It i s , of course, not always obvious what the impacts of a policy w i l l be, nor i s there necessarily agreement between the parties. It i s commonplace for the proponents of a development project to stress the benefits to be derived from their project with r e l a t i v e l y less emphasis placed on the external costs which might be borne by individuals displaced or adversely affected by the project. The interested parties can have a d i r e c t e f f e c t upon both the incentives and sanctions which exist in an implementation process. They can provide support for either of these and, through public communication, influence the application of either an incentive or a negative sanction to actual or contemplated actions of the implementing actors. The interested actors can also have an effect on the kind and l e v e l of resources which w i l l be applied in an implementation process, p a r t i a l l y through the objectives which have an influence upon resources, but also d i r e c t l y through lobbying for particular resources. It was noted previously that interested parties may be b e n e f i c i a r i e s of particular kinds of resources, such as access to information or resources to generate information, but these often come about only through a concerted e f f o r t on the part of the in t e r e s t s . In addition to t h i s kind of d i r e c t b e n e f i t , interests may well attempt to have s p e c i f i c resources applied 149 to an implementation question so that their particular point of view w i l l receive a f u l l hearing. For example, i t i s l i k e l y that particular implementation mechanisms w i l l affect interests in d i f f e r e n t ways and thi s being perceived may resul t in groups attempting to force the use of s p e c i f i c mechanisms or techniques for implementation. In summary, by d e f i n i t i o n , interested actors have a stake in the outcome of a policy process, but the degree to which that stake i s recognized and/or acted upon i s dependent upon a number of factors. The f i r s t factor i s the access interested actors have to the implementation process. Access means having access to the same kind and l e v e l of information that the implementing actors do. And i t also means having opportunities and resources to communicate with the implementing actors so as to present their point of view. The degree to which access i s enhanced or r e s t r i c t e d w i l l p a r t i a l l y determine the extent of influence that interested actors can bring to bear. Related to the point on having access to information i s the factor of the interested actors being able to generate information on the policy question. There are c e r t a i n l y no guarantees that the implementing actors w i l l generate a l l of the information and analysis to represent the range of viewpoints that might legitimately receive a hearing [by 150 v i r t u e of being impacted by the p o l i c y outcome]. Consequently, the i n f l u e n c e of the i n t e r e s t e d actors w i l l be enhanced i f they have the resources to develop a d d i t i o n a l .analysis [ i f necessary] and the o p p o r t u n i t i e s to present t h e i r f i n d i n g s to the implementation decision-makers. The f i n a l point concerns the i n f l u e n c e of the i n t e r e s t e d a c t o r s . The c a p a b i l i t y they have to confer b e n e f i t s or impose burdens on implementing actors i s a s i g n i f i c a n t determinant of t h e i r i n f l u e n c e i n the implementation process. This c a p a b i l i t y i s enhanced by access to information and the a b i l i t y and resources to generate information independently. The i n t e r e s t e d actors may also d e r i v e i n f l u e n c e from r e l a t i o n s h i p s with i n d i v i d u a l s who have a u t h o r i t y over the implementing actors such as p o l i t i c i a n s . The use of i n f l u e n c e i s a complex s o c i o l o g i c a l concept. The i n t e n t here i s not to t r y to understand the manifold c o m p l e x i t i e s but simply to recognize that i n t e r e s t e d actors may have the c a p a b i l i t y to confer b e n e f i t s or impose burdens and t h i s would undoubtedly be a determinant of the extent of t h e i r i n f l u e n c e i n the implementation process. 3.4.5 P o l i c y Environment Events i n the world at l a r g e undoubtedly play an important r o l e i n shaping the a c t i v i t i e s of a p a r t i c u l a r process. I t has been stressed that perceptions of the world held by key actors i s a major force in determining how they behave and thus influence the policy outcome. An individual's perception of larger events w i l l influence his attitudes and perhaps, though even only imperceptibly, modify his behaviour. In some cases, outside events w i l l have a very large and noticeable e f f e c t on behaviour, such as a nation-wide economic depression or a large-scale catastrophe such as an earthquake, flood, or drought. Outside events affecting the policy stance of a government may impact on a pa r t i c u l a r , although seemingly unrelated, implementation process. Such a relat i o n s h i p i s c l e a r l y not open to s i g n i f i c a n t manipulation since i t tends to be only in one di r e c t i o n . This i s a f a i r l y d i f f i c u l t topic to include in a sp e c i f i c research study, but i t does seem worthwhile to attempt to discern the existence of s i g n i f i c a n t external events and id e n t i f y whether these had an i d e n t i f i a b l e influence on the course of events. 3.4.6 Incentives and Sanctions Incentives and sanctions are opposite sides of the same coin. Incentives are positive instruments which promote the achievement of objectives. These are described in the l i t e r a t u r e review as ranging from f i n a n c i a l assistance to sharing of information and technical advice. Incentives can have a d i r e c t impact upon the behaviour of actors because they define a course of action which can be evaluated by the 1 5 2 actors in terms of their interests. They provide a kind of touchstone upon which to guage the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the alternatives being considered by the implementors. Sanctions are negative instruments which serve a similar purpose. The actors can determine what i s defined as negative action to determine the l i m i t s to the actions and the costs which would be incurred by stepping out of the bounds of 'acceptable' behaviour. Both incentives and sanctions can be influenced and established by the policy-makers through the policy objectives and by others outside of the public sector. Interest groups can offer rewards and punishments through their influence in the general society. These should not be taken l i g h t l y since i t has been noted that organizations are acutely aware of their need to maintain a u t i l i t y to society. It can be expected, therefore, that the actors in an implementation process w i l l be aware of actual or potential incentives or sanctions and w i l l constantly weigh the benefits and costs of responding to incentives or incurring negative sanctions. 3.4.7 Stakes The stakes of the implementation process refer to the benefits or gains to be had from being successful in the implementation process. Success in t h i s instance must be defined from the viewpoint of the actors involved. Actors in one organization may have a quite d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n of success from their colleagues in another organization involved in the same implementation process. Whether the process involves high or low stakes i s instrumental in defining the amount of e f f o r t that w i l l be devoted toward ar r i v i n g at a policy outcome. The import of the policy objectives i s , of course, the major determinant of the stakes, and t h i s feeds d i r e c t l y into the resources component. But also, the actors have a say. They can c e r t a i n l y downplay the stakes as described previously in section 3.4.1. However, the actions of the implementing actors can be severely constrained i f the stakes are deemed high enough by those formulating the policy objectives and by outside int e r e s t s . These could s i n g u l a r l y or in combination exert a powerful influence counteracting any actions that the actors may take to the contrary. Thus, i t seems that the stakes of the process are subject to manipulation and could quite conceivably be used by particular interests to develop and achieve a s p e c i f i c position. From a research point of view, any d i f f e r i n g perceptions of the l e v e l of the stakes among process participants should be i d e n t i f i e d . If possible, i t would also be interesting to 154 determine the degree to which the stakes may have been manipulated to achieve p a r t i c u l a r ends i n order to understand the r e l a t i v e importance of t h i s concept i n shaping a p o l i c y outcome. 3.4.8 Rules The r u l e s of the implementation process define how actions w i l l be ordered and provide a degree of c e r t a i n t y r e s p e c t i n g i n t e r a c t i o n s between p a r t i e s . The concept of r u l e s as used here does not include s t r u c t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements which form the b a s i s for i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a c t i o n s but rather means the procedures which are developed to o p e r a t i o n a l i z e a process. In an a c t u a l process, i t would be most unusual to f i n d anything w r i t t e n down i n the form of r u l e s of p l a y , but there are a number of surrogates or i n d i c a t o r s . S p e c i f i c numbers of decision-makers are u s u a l l y defined and s p e c i f i c d e c i s i o n r u l e s may be o u t l i n e d . I f more than one actor i s involved i n making d e c i s i o n s , then a procedure for m a j o r i t y r u l e or whatever i s set out. S p e c i f i c processes for generating and evaluating information are d e f i n e d , and these are followed except i n unusual c ircumstances. What i s c r i t i c a l for understanding the implementation process i s not the a c t u a l r u l e s , but how these r u l e s are inf l u e n c e d and s e t . Again, the p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s provide the basic s t a r t i n g p o i n t . Depending on the degree of s p e c i f i c i t y 155 i n the p o l i c y statements, the r u l e s may be w e l l or i l l d e f i n e d . Judging from the l i t e r a t u r e review, i t i s l i k e l y that the p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s w i l l play a f a i r l y minor r o l e in e s t a b l i s h i n g the s t r u c t u r e for a c t i o n . The implementing actors w i l l , on the other hand, exercise the major i n f l u e n c e . It i s , of course, i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t to ensure that they can c o n t r o l the process and therefore w i l l make s u b s t a n t i a l e f f o r t s to e s t a b l i s h r u l e s that allow them to maintain e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l . I n t e r e s t groups can also be expected to ass e r t themselves i n d e f i n i n g the r u l e s . They can be expected to recognize the s i g n i f i c a n c e of being able to c o n t r o l how the process f u n c t i o n s and w i l l attempt to ensure that they are afforded a place whereby t h e i r i n t e r e s t s can be protected and advanced. 3.5 DETERMINANTS OF POLICY OUTCOME The previous two se c t i o n s of t h i s chapter have described the components of two r e l a t e d models which hypothesize the key determinants of p o l i c y outcome and the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among these v a r i a b l e s . A p o l i c y outcome i s determined by two sets of f a c t o r s . One i s the s t r u c t u r e of the implementation process i n c l u d i n g the various stages of decision-making. The second set of f a c t o r s i n v o l v e s v a r i a b l e s r e l a t i n g to process of implementation decision-making. Together, these two sets of f a c t o r s i n t e r a c t to determine the l e v e l and kind of a c t i v i t y which transforms a p o l i c y output i n t o a p o l i c y outcome. 156 The purpose i n developing these models of p o l i c y implementation i s to provide a b a s i s for research which w i l l be able to i d e n t i f y and assess the r e l a t i v e importance of the various f a c t o r s i n b r i n g i n g about the outcome. In order to sharpen the focus for research, a point-form summary of the determinants of p o l i c y outcome has been developed. The headings used do not co i n c i d e a b s o l u t e l y with those i n the models but have been devised to provide a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d i n d i c a t i o n of the research d i r e c t i o n and key questions. There are some minor ov e r l a p s , but these are necessary to cover the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the various f a c t o r s . Summary of Determinants of P o l i c y Outcome 1. Technical T r a c t a b i l i t y of Problem a. Problem may be e a s i l y remedied or very d i f f i c u l t to r e s o l v e from a t e c h n i c a l stance. 2. P o l i c y Output a. S p e c i f i c i t y or g e n e r a l i t y of p o l i c y i n t e n t . b. Extent to which implementation mechanisms are spec i f i e d . c. Extent to which u n c e r t a i n t i e s are taken i n t o account. 3. Implementing Actors a. Values, o b j e c t i v e s , and motivations of a c t o r s . - tendencies toward conservatism. - tendencies toward c o n f l i c t m i n i m i z a t i o n . b. Perceptions of actors as determined by experience. c. Perceptions of actors as determined by environment. d. A u t h o r i t y of actors to take a c t i o n to implement. e. Methods of communication used by a c t o r s . - preference for informal i n t e r a c t i o n . - extent of screening and d i s t o r t i o n of information based on perceptions of a c t o r s . f. C a p a b i l i t y to use i n c e n t i v e s and sanctions among implementors and with i n t e r e s t e d a c t o r s . 157 4. P o l i c y Objectives a. Extent to which they are c l e a r and d e f i n i t i v e . - determines degree to which they are subject to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . - p a r t i a l l y determines the implementing a c t o r s . - i n i t i a l l y d efines degree of outside i n t e r e s t . b. Extent to which o b j e c t i v e s define the process stakes. c. Extent to which o b j e c t i v e s define r u l e s and procedures. 5. Resources a. Kinds and l e v e l of resources a v a i l a b l e to implementing actors to take and implement d e c i s i o n s . feb^ Resources a v a i l a b l e to implementing actors to negotiate and communicate among themselves and with other i n t e r e s t s . c. Resources a v a i l a b l e to i n t e r e s t e d actors to be informed and to negotiate and communicate. d. Kinds of implementation mechanisms employed. 6. Interested Actors a. Extent to which they hold and communicate a c l e a r conception of what implementors ought to do. b. C a p a b i l i t y to generate information and o p p o r t u n i t i e s to present t h e i r point of view. c. C a p a b i l i t y to confer b e n e f i t s and/or impose burdens on other actors . d. C a p a b i l i t y to i n f l u e n c e the establishment and r e d e f i n i t i o n of the r u l e s governing conduct of the process. 7. Stakes a. Level of stakes perceived by implementing actors and i n t e r e s t e d a c t o r s . b. Extent to which stakes are manipulated by a c t o r s . 8. Rules a. Extent to which r u l e s are subject to change and manipulation by a c t o r s . 9- P o l i c y Environment a. Existence of s i g n i f i c a n t e x t e r n a l events and extent to which these i n f l u e n c e implementation dec i s i o n s . 158 10. Decision-Making Environment a. A d v e r s i a l or c o n c i l i a t o r y . b. Extent of access by i n t e r e s t e d actors to a u t h o r i t a t i v e processes. c. Extent of linkages to p o l i c y formation and other p o l i t i c a l processes. 11. U n c e r t a i n t i e s a. Extent to which s t r a t e g i e s are pursued to minimize s h o r t f a l l s i n a t t a i n i n g p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . - amount of f l e x i b i l i t y i n changing course. The above points s p e c i f y the key determinants of a p o l i c y outcome based on models of the implementation process and o u t l i n e how the models, i f a p p l i e d , would e x p l a i n the outcome. These are e s s e n t i a l l y the research questions that should be posed i n a study of p o l i c y implementation. The next step i s to o u t l i n e such a study. 3.6 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN 3.6.1 Case Study Approach In 1976, Williams (p. 288) argued the f o l l o w i n g : \"The biggest research need i s to focus d i r e c t l y on p o l i c y implementation, probably through c a r e f u l case s t u d i e s . At the same time, case m a t e r i a l becomes more u s e f u l when ordered by a t h e o r e t i c a l framework, but probably no s i n g l e best t h e o r e t i c a l framework w i l l emerge. Rather i t i s more l i k e l y that sound case m a t e r i a l w i l l be more valuable when approached by people with d i f f e r e n t d i s c i p l i n a r y perspectives and frameworks that provide diverse i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . So l e t v a r i e t y flower.\" 1 5 9 In 1980, Harder (p. 1,087) echoed t h i s argument: \"In t h i s formative stage of implementation theory, a number of h e u r i s t i c models and p r i m i t i v e t y p o l o g i e s have been devised. None i s considered d e f i n i t i v e , but most are accepted as appropriate c o n t r i b u t i o n s to a continuing s c h o l a r l y dialogue. In 1980, case study d e s c r i p t i o n and a n a l y s i s remains the dominant methodology for understanding implementation processes. Cases are u s u a l l y t r e a t e d d i a g n o s t i c a l l y . \" The purpose of t h i s study i s to make an a d d i t i o n a l con-tribution to the continuing s c h o l a r l y dialogue on p o l i c y implementation, and the case study methodology i s put forward as the approach most able to meet t h i s o b j e c t i v e . The question of immediate concern i s the choice of a case study which w i l l adequately i l l u s t r a t e the challenges of implementation and provide a comparison i n terms of the t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s put forward in the study. A number of c r i t e r i a were e s t a b l i s h e d to f a c i l i t a t e choosing a case for study, as f o l l o w s : (1) The case must inv o l v e a p o l i c y s u f f i c i e n t l y advanced i n t o implementation so as to provide an adequate t e s t of the p r o p o s i t i o n s advanced in the t h e o r e t i c a l argument. Many p o l i c y s i t u a t i o n s which appear on the surface to o f f e r good study p o s s i b i l i t i e s do not reach an i d e n t i f i a b l e implementation stage, but are a c t u a l l y only r e - i t e r a t e d w i t h i n the p o l i c y formation stage. I t i s c r i t i c a l to d i f f e r e n t i a t e cases i n v o l v i n g only p o l i c y formation from those advancing to implementation. 160 (2) The problem situation must be s u f f i c i e n t l y complex to include most ( i f not a l l ) of the relevant variables posited to be important in the implementation process. (3) The situation must be s u f f i c i e n t l y dynamic to demonstrate the mechanisms and approaches used to deal with uncertainty. ( 4 ) Given the complexity of the web of interests in most environmental management sit u a t i o n s , i t i s c r i t i c a l that a case be chosen where i t i s possible to understand the interactions taking place. A common problem in doing the kind of research proposed i s that the situation must be so simplified for a n a l y t i c a l purposes that resemblance to r e a l i t y i s largely l o s t , and consequently, any conclusions flowing from the analysis are often of questionable value. It i s worthwhile to chose a situation where the c r i t i c a l factors can be isolated with minimal loss to their context and to the scale of interactions. (5) At least as important as the other factors, the case must be one amenable to research in that adequate data can be generated. Related to t h i s i s the question of research a c c e s s i b i l i t y . In p r a c t i c a l terms, t h i s means choosing a case which can be researched with the available research resources. In t h i s instance, t h i s meant choosing a case which could be rea d i l y researched from a base at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia in Vancouver. The indices of major B r i t i s h Columbia newspapers* were reviewed to i d e n t i f y the most s i g n i f i c a n t environmental management policy issues in B r i t i s h Columbia over the past decade. A short l i s t of three potential cases was drawn up, including: the Okanagan Basin Comprehensive Framework Plan, the Fraser Estuary Management Plan, and the B r i t i s h Columbia Ag r i c u l t u r a l Land Commission Act. The selection c r i t e r i a discussed previously were applied, and the Okanagan case was selected. The Fraser Estuary case was rejected because i t did not appear to be s u f f i c i e n t l y advanced into implementation. The A g r i c u l t u r a l Land Commission case met the c r i t e r i a but was rejected largely because i t has received a good deal of attention recently r e s u l t i n g in a number of research studies. The Okanagan, on the other hand, with the exception of the public p a r t i c i p a t i o n aspects, has received scant attention in the published l i t e r a t u r e . This undertaking was put forward as a p i l o t program which would serve as a model for further comprehensive water management programs in Canada. Because of t h i s objective alone, i t merits serious academic investigation . *0n microfilm in the Government Publications Division in the University of B r i t i s h Columbia l i b r a r y . 162 3.6.2 Data A c q u i s i t i o n For the case study p o r t i o n of the research, four sources were used i n combination to provide the information for a n a l y s i s : (1) newspaper r e p o r t s ; (2) published r e p o r t s and documents; (3) i n t e r v i e w s with key a c t o r s ; and (4) government records. The information from newspaper r e p o r t s and published documents tends to provide basic information of a f a c t u a l nature; for example, times, dates, l e g i s l a t i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s , and so on. These published m a t e r i a l s were c a r e f u l l y studied to provide a d e t a i l e d background to serve as a b a s i s for fur t h e r in-depth i n q u i r y v i a i n t e r v i e w s . Interviews were held with key p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the p o l i c y implementation process i n c l u d i n g f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l s , r e g i o n a l government o f f i c i a l s , and members of the p u b l i c involved i n the formal process i n a st r u c t u r e d manner. Interviews were conducted during the period from October 1977 to March 1980 i n the f o l l o w i n g c a t e g o r i e s and numbers: Category of Interviewee Number of Interviews Federal ( p u b l i c servants) 8 P r o v i n c i a l ( p u b l i c servants) 8 Regional ( e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s and p u b l i c servants) 6 Interested p u b l i c 6 163 The interview technique was to discuss the implementation process so as to cover the variables described in the process model. Each interview was unique in that no set sequence of questions was followed. Dean, et. a l . ( 1967 , p. 275) describe the merits of such a procedure: \"A major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of interviewing in the f i e l d i s i t s non-standardization. It aims to make a virtue of non-standardization by frequently redirec t i n g the inquiry on the basis of f r u i t f u l data being col l e c t e d . Changes in research d i r e c t i o n are made to chase down more c r i t i c a l data for emerging hypotheses.\" This procedure makes the most e f f e c t i v e use of the relationships the researcher establishes with subjects in the f i e l d and allows him to c a p i t a l i z e on unique circumstances that may arise in any s i t u a t i o n . The greatest drawback of using t h i s method i s the high l i k e l i h o o d of bias of information being introduced. The argument i s that because the f i e l d researcher often redirects his research in s i t u he may make the o r e t i c a l or conceptual alterations on the basis of the f i r s t few contacts which may be unrepresentative of r e a l i t y . In the case under discussion, bias of t h i s sort was not a problem since the interviewer was also the researcher and thus able to exercise judgement as to the v a l i d i t y and comprehensiveness of the information transmitted in an interview. As noted above, much basic information was available and digested prior to the interviews so that i t was d e t a i l and perceptions which were being obtained through the interviews. 164 I t should be noted t h a t , throughout the remainder of the study, reference w i l l f r e q u e n t l y be made to points e s t a b l i s h e d i n the i n t e r v i e w s . These w i l l be c i t e d only as in t e r v i e w data and w i l l not r e f e r to a s p e c i f i c i n t e r v i e w i n order to r e t a i n the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of the i n t e r v i e w sources. A check on the i n t e r v i e w data was made p o s s i b l e because the researcher was afforded v i r t u a l l y complete access to f e d e r a l ( B r i t i s h Columbia Region) and p r o v i n c i a l government records concerning the Okanagan Basin Implementation Agreement. This information base was c r i t i c a l to a s c e r t a i n i n g the d e t a i l s of events over time and i n determining o f f i c i a l and i n d i v i d u a l opinions on these events as they were happening. Post-hoc r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s of actions are extremely commonplace and very d i f f i c u l t to avoid. The 'true' nature of i n t e r a c t i o n s can be much better e s t a b l i s h e d using the record produced at the time. Using the combination of sources, i t i s considered that the research i s based upon a complete and, to the extent p o s s i b l e , an unbiased documentation of the case. 3.6.3 L i m i t a t i o n s i n the Scope of the Case Study At the ou t s e t , i t i s important to s p e c i f y the boundaries and scope of the case study. I t i s intended to serve as an e m p i r i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n of the conceptual p r o p o s i t i o n s concerning the s t r u c t u r e , v a r i a b l e s , and dynamics of the implementation process. To t h i s end, the study i s concerned with how the policy output has been defined and implemented and, to a very limited extent, with how the policy was formulated and the impacts of the policy on the substantive problem. The study i s not intended as a t r e a t i s e on water resources management in the Okanagan in general or integrated resource management in the Basin, although i t i s c l e a r l y a subsection of both of these. This may lead to the c r i t i c i s m that the output of the study may provide nothing of p r a c t i c a l value to the real problems in the Okanagan which appear to r e s u l t because of the concentration on managing single resources. The reply to t h i s c r i t i c i s m i s that the study on implementation of the p o l i c i e s contained in the Implementation Agreement w i l l , by necessity, include consideration of the comprehensiveness of policy analysis, consideration of the interagency contacts, as well as consideration of the interplay between the policy system and the policy environment. Therefore, while i t may not address the issues d i r e c t l y , the research w i l l cover these important topics by way of context. The objective of the study i s not to determine whether the planning p o l i c i e s decided upon were the correct p o l i c i e s but how those involved in the process undertook the policy analysis and arrived at decisions. The research w i l l 166 concentrate on describing the process with a view to explaining why the implementation process functioned the way that i t did and not in some other fashion. The case study analysis to follow w i l l involve three major steps: Step 1 - Compare policy outcome with policy output and i d e n t i f y : (a) s p e c i f i c changes that occurred during implementation; and (b) at what point each change occurred in the process. Step 2 - Describe the sequence of events leading to each s p e c i f i c change. Step 3 - For each s p e c i f i c change, indicate how and to what extent each determinant of policy outcome was responsible for the change. It may not be possible to answer f u l l y the question posed in Step 3 in every case because of the d i f f i c u l t y in dissecting the influence of many variables in a complex s i t u a t i o n . Nonetheless, t h i s general method w i l l be applied to the extent possible. CHAPTER 4 DEFINING THE POLICY OUTPUT 4.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter has two main o b j e c t i v e s . F i r s t l y , i t o f f e r s an h i s t o r i c a l perspective on the substantive p o l i c y i s sues considered i n the case study. And secondly, i t i s to provide a c l e a r overview of the set of p o l i c i e s that emerged from the planning study so as to f a c i l i t a t e comparison with the p o l i c i e s which were implemented. The case study i n v o l v e s a d e s c r i p t i o n and a n a l y s i s of the implementation of p o r t i o n s of a water resources management plan e s t a b l i s h e d i n the e a r l y 1970s for the Okanagan Basin i n c e n t r a l B r i t i s h Columbia. The geographic area under c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s i l l u s t r a t e d in Figure 4.1. The p o l i c y process included a major planning study of the water resources and r e l a t e d problems i n the Okanagan Basin and a formal implementation of many of the recommendations flowing from the planning study. 168 '(-FIGURE 4.1 THE OKANAGAN BASIN IN BRITISH COLUMBIA - CANADA Source: Okanagan Basin Implementation Board - F i r s t Annual Report 4.2 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE PLANNING STUDY 169 The water resource s i t u a t i o n i n the Okanagan Basin i n the 1950s and 1960s was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an i n c r e a s i n g concern for both water quantity and water q u a l i t y . The water supply i n the Basin f l u c t u a t e s widely because of the v a r i a t i o n s i n runoff from snowmelt and r a i n f a l l from year to year. A j o i n t f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l f l o o d c o n t r o l agreement was signed on March 16, 1960, p r o v i d i n g for the c o n s t r u c t i o n of s t r u c t u r a l works which would permit fine-tuned r e g u l a t i o n of the water l e v e l s , e s p e c i a l l y the r e g u l a t i o n of high waters. However, o f f i c i a l s i n the p r o v i n c i a l Water Resources Se r v i c e , r e s p o n s i b l e for r e g u l a t i n g water l e v e l s i n the mainstem l a k e s , (see Figure 4.1) perceived p o t e n t i a l water shortages. On the average, the net i n f l o w to the lake system (under 1970 c o n d i t i o n s ) i s 332,000 a c r e - f e e t . In a flood year, the flow i s greater than 500,000 a c r e - f e e t , and in drought years, the net i n f l o w may be l e s s than 100,000 ac r e - f e e t . A drought i s defined as those years when the net i n f l o w to Okanagan Lake i s l e s s than the water requirements along the mainstem system, namely 244,000 a c r e - f e e t . Natural c o n d i t i o n s i n the Okanagan Basin gave good cause for concern. An extreme flood occurred i n 1928, i n the order of a 1 i n 200 year f l o o d . A 1929-32 drought was e x c e p t i o n a l l y severe with an estimated recurrence i n t e r v a l of about 200 years. Given the water use f i g u r e s i n the e a r l y 1960s, the Water Resources Service was very concerned that a t h i r d year of the s e v e r i t y experienced i n the 1929 -32 period could not be sustained i n the Basin without imposing hardship. At that time, no p o l i c y e x i s t e d which would p r i o r i z e water a l l o c a t i o n s i n the mainstem. There was r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e o f f i c i a l concern over floods as the s t r u c t u r a l works put i n place under the 1960 j o i n t f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l f l o o d c o n t r o l agreement gave reasonable confidence of handling most f l o o d s i t u a t i o n s . In a d d i t i o n to the concern over a p o s s i b l e drought, doubt was expressed as to the a v a i l a b i l i t y of s u f f i c i e n t s u p p l i e s of water i n normal years to meet a l l f u t u r e demands i n c l u d i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l , municipal and i n d u s t r i a l uses, plus f i s h e r y requirements. The s o l u t i o n to both of these perceived problems appeared to l i e i n the a c q u i s i t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l q u a n t i t i e s of water. Discussions began w i t h i n the p r o v i n c i a l Water Resources Service and w i t h i n the Okanagan communities regarding the p o s s i b i l i t y of l a r g e - s c a l e importation of water i n t o the Basin, feeding water from Shuswap Lake i n t o Okanagan Lake v i a a canal of some 20 miles i n l e n g t h . In 1967, the Shuswap-Thompson River Research and Development A s s o c i a t i o n , a group set up i n o p p o s i t i o n to the p o s s i b l e d i v e r s i o n 171 scheme, was formed. In p a r t i c u l a r , Shuswap residents opposed t h i s as a scheme which would leave them in a d e f i c i t water supply situation in the future. The provincial and federal governments began discussions in 1967 for a comprehensive study of the water resources in the Okanagan Basin to include s p e c i f i c consideration of the Shuswap diversion scheme.. Quinn (1977) points out that these discussions were i n i t i a t e d by the federal Department of Energy, Mines and Resources (later to be part of Environment Canada) to promote a demonstration project which would embody the s p i r i t of the forthcoming Canada Water Act designed to provide s o c i a l l y oriented and comprehensively planned basin development. Prior to t h i s , according to Quinn ( 1979 , p. 40): \"the federal l e v e l extended f i n a n c i a l assistance, collected data, undertook research, but did not join in the f u l l planning process, except infrequently in boundary water questions\". The Province of B r i t i s h Columbia entered discussions with the federal government cautiously, believing most of the problems f e l l well within the scope of provincial authority. They were equally suspicious of getting involved in a 'planning' study, p a r t i c u l a r l y one so wide ranging as to be called comprehensive. Two f a c t o r s appear to have swayed p r o v i n c i a l t h i n k i n g toward p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n such a study. F i r s t l y , i n the l a t e 1960s, water q u a l i t y also became a p u b l i c i s s u e . Algae blooms appeared with r e g u l a r i t y i n various areas of the Basin. In order to provide a forum for a u n i f i e d f r o n t , the ten major Okanagan m u n i c i p a l i t i e s formed the Okanagan Watershed P o l l u t i o n Control Council i n 1966. This evolved i n t o the Okanagan Basin Water Board, formed i n 1969 as an advisory body to the three r e g i o n a l d i s t r i c t s i n the Okanagan Basin. I t i s s t i l l i n existence and i s comprised of elected o f f i c i a l s of the r e g i o n a l d i s t r i c t s and maintains a s t a f f and o f f i c e in Kelowna. This move toward a r e g i o n a l perspective on water q u a l i t y made a basin-wide study seem reasonable. The f e d e r a l government was becoming involved i n p o l l u t i o n i s sues nation-wide, and consequently, a r o l e i n the Okanagan would not be viewed as p a r t i c u l a r l y unusual. The second f a c t o r that appears to be important was the f i n a n c i a l i n c e n t i v e of a 50/50 cost-sharing formula o f f e r e d by the f e d e r a l government. Even though the Province was concerned about inroads i n t o i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n , the perception was that a 50 percent share enabled the Province to have an equal share i n the c o n t r o l over the d i r e c t i o n and output of the planning study. 173 4 . 3 A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK PLANNING STUDY In October 1 9 6 9 , the governments of Canada and B r i t i s h Columbia signed the Canada-British Columbia Okanagan Basin Agreement with the objective of \"developing a comprehensive framework plan for the development and management of water resources for the social betterment and economic growth in the Okanagan Basin\". The Agreement i s reprinted in Appendix 1. The Agreement placed f i n a n c i a l control of the study in the hands of a Consultative board, with the provision that the t o t a l study costs should not exceed $2 m i l l i o n , shared equally by the two senior governments. The study was scheduled for completion by October 2 9 , 1 9 7 3 , but through mutual agreement was extended to March 3 1 , 1 9 7 4 , with no increase in funding over the o r i g i n a l $2 m i l l i o n . The Agreement noted that increasing demands were l i k e l y to be placed on the water resources of the Okanagan Basin for municipal, i n d u s t r i a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l and recreational uses and for f i s h and w i l d l i f e management. In view of t h i s and the perceived deterioration of water quality, disturbance of ecological balances, and diminution of water quality in the Basin, the study was to focus on \" i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and analysis of these problems and the evaluation of economic, engineering, e c o l o g i c a l , f i n a n c i a l and organizational 174 a l t e r n a t i v e s for water resource u t i l i z a t i o n s i n the s o l u t i o n to these problems\". The time scale of the study was to be 50 years from 1970 to 2020. The Agreement also s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r r e d to the Shuswap d i v e r s i o n controversy which was, i n pa r t , instrumental i n c r e a t i n g the study: \"the study w i l l also embrace any areas l i k e l y to be af f e c t e d by the adoption of various a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s i n c l u d i n g , but not l i m i t e d t o , the p o s s i b i l i t y of d i v e r t i n g water from the Shuswap-Thompson Basin\". Flowing from the o b j e c t i v e s of the study agreement, the terms of reference were intended to be comprehensive i n c l u d i n g the f o l l o w i n g aspects: (1) Economic Growth Studies - to understand the r e g i o n a l resource base and the economic v i a b i l i t y of e x i s t i n g and p o t e n t i a l i n d u s t r i e s ( i n c l u d i n g a g r i c u l t u r e ) as a b a s i s for determining water demand p r o j e c t i o n s . (2) Water Demand Studies - r e l a t e d to (1) above, to determine present and a n t i c i p a t e d water demand by s e c t o r s . (3) Water Supply Studies -( i ) Water Qua l i t y - to determine sources and l e v e l s of p o l l u t i o n ; n u t r i e n t c y c l i n g ; devise models of n u t r i e n t balances and p o l l u t i o n e f f e c t s ; and determine future sources and l e v e l s of p o l l u t ion . ( i i ) Water Quantity - to evaluate the hydrologic regime of the Basin; evaluate means of r e g u l a t i n g flows; and evaluate means of augmenting water supplies w i t h i n the Basin. 175 (4 ) Ecological and Aesthetic Studies - to determine the e f f e c t s of water resource developments on f i s h and w i l d l i f e and on aesthetic values. (5) Water re-use and p i l o t projects for advanced treatment of waste water . ( 6) Studies of Financial and Organizational Structures - to broaden the scope of the planning process to include a l l p r a c t i c a l alternatives for e f f i c i e n t u t i l i z a t i o n of the water resources of the Basin . (7) Public Involvement - to enable a comprehensive plan to be t r u l y responsive to the wishes of the people for which i t i s designed while r e f l e c t i n g the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the people in the Basin and surrounding region. In terms of administrative structure, a Canada-British Columbia Consultative Board was established consisting of three senior l e v e l public servants from each government. The role of t h i s body was largely supervisory with the bulk of the work being delegated to an Okanagan Study Committee, consisting of three professional l e v e l public servants from each government. Figure 4.2 shows the administrative structure and reporting procedure established and followed in the study. There are a number of interesting points related to the t h e o r e t i c a l base of the study agreement which should be discussed because of their importance in defining the expectations of the comprehensive framework planning study. 1 7 6 FIGURE 4.2 GOVERNMENT OF CANADA n BOARD E X E C U T I V E SECRETARY I \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 CONSULTATIVE BOARD -\u00E2\u0080\u0094 STUDY C O M M I T T E E -COORDINATOR W a t e r Q u a n t i t y S t u d i e s \u00E2\u0080\u0094 STUDY DIRECTOR COORDINATOR W a t e r Q u a l i t y a n d W a s t e T r e a t m e n t S t u d i e s COORDINATOR L i m n o l o g y A n d F i s h -e r i e s S t u d i e s I 1 E V A L U A T I O N -TEAM GOVERNMENT OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA T \ 7 / ^ P / F I N A L REPORT ( E d i t o r i a l R e v i e w C o m m i t t e e ) COORDINATOR S o c i o-E c o n o m i c S t u d i e s COORDINATOR O f P u b l i c I n v o l v e m e n t TASK FORCES \"AND THE P U B L I C ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE Source: Summary Report of the Consultative Board 177 4.3-1 Comprehensive Water Management I t i s c l e a r that the study was concerned with the comprehensive development and management of water resources as a major way of f u r t h e r i n g s o c i a l and economic development i n the Basin. This point may seem to be rather obvious, but i t s f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e must be appreciated as i t i s undoubtedly one of the most c r i t i c a l assumptions of the study which d i r e c t e d many of the events f o l l o w i n g from the study. The impetus for the comprehensive water management approach came from the experience of the United States. In the 1960s, water resources planning i n the United States took on a more comprehensive f l a v o u r , as Fox (1976, p. 11) notes: \"Senate Document 97, published in 1962, announced new planning and e v a l u a t i o n p r a c t i s e s for water resources p r o j e c t s to be followed by the Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . This statement which i n t e r p r e t e d b e n e f i t s and costs more broadly than previous pronouncements was the f i r s t o f f i c i a l break with t r a d i t i o n a l b e n e f i t - c o s t a n a l y s i s i n terms of a n a t i o n a l economic development c r i t e r i o n . This break led to what i s now r e f e r r e d to as m u l t i - o b j e c t i v e planning.\" Howe (1977, p- 24) points out the b a s i c document r e l a t i n g to water planning in the United States i s Public Law 89-90 of July 22, 1965, known as the \"Water Resources Planning Act\". T i t l e 11 of t h i s Act authorizes the c r e a t i o n of River Basin Commissions with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , among other t h i n g s , preparation and keeping up to date of a comprehensive coordinated j o i n t plan for f e d e r a l , s t a t e , and l o c a l development of water and related resources, expressly evaluating a l l reasonable alternative means of achieving the optimum use of these resources. There i s a close s i m i l a r i t y between the American approach and that followed in the Okanagan. The American model was very clear, and therefore, the study was provided with a s o l i d source for guidance. There i s , however, no evidence to suggest that American planners were consulted d i r e c t l y in the formulation of the Okanagan study. O'Riordan (1971) presents the arguments for the approach used in the Okanagan study, noting p a r t i c u l a r l y the differences between multipurpose planning and multiobjective planning (which was being pursued in the Okanagan). Multipurpose planning i s generally concerned with only one objective, usually to manage the water resource to stimulate economic development, which could be realized in several complementary ways such as i r r i g a t i o n , flood control, hydro development, and navigation. Multiobjective planning i s expected to achieve a number of d i f f e r e n t objectives including, for example, economic development and enhanced environmental quality, and again possibly through a variety of means. 179 Interviews with o f f i c i a l s involved in formulating the study agreement empasized that the Okanagan must be viewed in the proper l i g h t , as a bold new approach and experiment in resource management in B r i t i s h Columbia. O'Riordan ( 1 9 7 1 , p. 6) points out: \"whereas planning in B r i t i s h Columbia used to be undertaken by engineers, in t h i s study we have b i o l o g i s t s , ecologists, economists, s o c i o l o g i s t s as well as engineers working on the problem\". The .composition of both the Consultative Board and the Study Committee reflected a cross-section of substantive i n t e r e s t s . Comprehensiveness in water management was the objective. The studies attempted to bring in a l l related a c t i v i t i e s which influenced both the demand and supply of water. This in i t s e l f was considered a major step forward. Interviews with members of the Study Committee revealed that the Committee recognized that water management alone was limited in i t s prescriptive e f f e c t s . They recognized that, in projecting supply and demand for water, a future was being assumed, a future which included many accessory factors over which water managers had no control. But the tenor of the times in resource management c i r c l e s was such that, i f more had been v attempted in terms of integrative control and management, the process would l i k e l y have bogged down completely. To deal with water in a comprehensive fashion was considered a s i g n i f i c a n t achievement. The resource 180 management system at the time could simply not have coped with a plan which attempted to manage water and other resources i n an in t e g r a t e d manner. 4.3.2 Study Time Horizon The second important point r e l a t i n g to the t h e o r e t i c a l base of the study i s the extremely long time horizon of the study. Again, along the l i n e s of American p r a c t i c e , Technical Supplement X of the Comprehensive Framework Plan, Economic Growth P r o j e c t i o n s notes: \" f o r e c a s t i n g economic growth,. p a r t i c u l a r l y in small regions such as the Okanagan, w e l l endowed with n a t u r a l resources, has many u n c e r t a i n t i e s . This l e v e l of u n c e r t a i n t y increases r a p i d l y with the length of the time horizon for planning. Because of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved in p r o j e c t i n g economic a c t i v i t y i n any region over a 50 year p e r i o d , e s p e c i a l l y i n view of r a p i d changes i n technology and i n s o c i a l values, a range of economic growth patterns were analysed.\" What t h i s e s s e n t i a l l y means i s that any p r o j e c t i o n over a long period of time such as 50 years i s going to be very u n r e l i a b l e , and i n an attempt to get around t h i s problem, ranges have to be considered. This approach i s c e r t a i n l y questionable. Developing a l t e r n a t e future scenarios may have the outward appearance of generating more p o s s i b i l i t i e s , but i t i n no way decreases the u n c e r t a i n t y . Choices s t i l l have to be made as to the a c c e p t a b i l i t y and p r o b a b i l i t y of some set of assumptions. This i s true of environmental and s o c i a l value projections as well as economic projections. It can be expected that the time horizon of the study w i l l cause some d i f f i c u l t i e s . 4 . 3 . 3 Study Management The t h i r d point relates to how the study was managed. The federal o f f i c i a l s responsible for i n i t i a l l y promoting the study and the federal members of the Consultative Board were senior c i v i l servants based in Ottawa and, consequently, were somewhat removed from the regional s i t u a t i o n , both in terms of B r i t i s h Columbia and the Okanagan Basin. (See Figure 4 . 3 for membership on the Board and Committee.) In p r a c t i c a l terms, t h i s meant that i t was d i f f i c u l t to arrange Consultative Board meetings except at infrequent i n t e r v a l s , and the l e v e l of information of the federal members tended to be constrained because of their intermittent exposure to the regional problems. It should be pointed out, however, that this was the l e v e l of involvement anticipated by the Agreement, which required only that the Board meet at least once a year and that their primary role was to supervise the Study Committee. 182 FIGURE 4.3 COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK PLAN MANAGEMENT CONSULTATIVE BOARD STUDY COMMITTEE Canada Canada J. O'Riordan F. C. Bo yd J. L. Mason AT T~. Pr ince E. R. Tinney R. L. McLaren B r i t i s h Columbia B. E. Marr H. D. Debeck W. N. Venables B r i t i s h Columbia T. A. J. Leach E. H. Vernon M. W. Slezak The Study Committee played the major role in dir e c t i n g the study. The individuals were involved in the study on a day-to-day basis and controlled i t s progress. The Consultative Board adopted the role of senior consultants and es s e n t i a l l y guided the study from a broad policy viewpoint. This point i s important for comparison to the management model followed in the Implementation Agreement to be discussed in the following chapters. 4.3.4 Study Target Population The fourth basic point of interest i s the question of the target group for the study. While i t might be thought that the target group would obviously be the population of the Okanagan Basin, t h i s i s not necessarily so. The federal government became involved because i t perceived some national concerns respecting the Okanagan. The preamble to the study agreement l i s t s the stocks of Pac i f i c Salmon and the national 183 and p o t e n t i a l l y international significance of possible solutions to perceived problems as reasons for federal involvement. The section of the study agreement e n t i t l e d Public Involvement i s i t s e l f ambiguous in stating that the study i s \"to be t r u l y responsive to the wishes of the people for which i t i s designed while r e f l e c t i n g the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the people in the Okanagan Valley and surrounding regions.\" It i s not clear from t h i s statement who the people are 'for which i t i s designed'. Given a 50 percent involvement by the Government of Canada, i t i s reasonable to expect some involvement of the Canadian public outside of the immediate region. But t h i s does not appear to have been the case. Technical Supplement XI of the Framework Plan on Public Involvement explains in great d e t a i l the pa r t i c i p a t i o n program pursued, and i t i s clear that no e f f o r t was made to even inform the public outside the Okanagan Basin, much less to encourage p a r t i c i p a t i o n . This point w i l l take on added significance when considering the a c t i v i t i e s under the Implementation Agreement, s p e c i f i c a l l y with regard to the relevance of federal l e g i s l a t i o n and par t i c i p a t i o n in the policy issues in the Basin. It i s also s i g n i f i c a n t to note that there was no public involvement in the detailed formulation of the study i t s e l f . Thus, the public was, at least i n i t i a l l y , constrained to 184 participate within the bounds established by the two levels of goverment. O'Riordan ( 1 9 7 6 , p. 1 7 9 ) points out: \" i n l i g h t of the uncertainty of the senior governments regarding the concept of public involvement in 1 9 6 9 the agreement was written in very general terms ... thus, while studies in hydrology, limnology, economics and f i s h e r i e s biology were launched immediately according to well-tested techniques and approaches, the public involvement program floundered because of lack of p r a c t i c a l precedent in program development. This situ a t i o n was compounded by the reluctance of the Consultative Board to accept a program with which i t had no experience and over which i t had l i t t l e d i r e c t control.\" This o f f i c i a l stance meant a f a i r l y lengthy start-up of rea l p a r t i c i p a t i o n which was to be guided, not by the terms of reference of the study, but by the concerns of the public. The fact that these two aspects were not well synchronized i s important in understanding events. This point w i l l be expanded shortly in describing the output of the study. 4 . 3 . 5 Requirement for Implementation And f i n a l l y , of direct interest to t h i s paper i s the relat i o n s h i p of the comprehensive framework study to implementation. The f i n a l section of the study agreement, Section 8 ( f ) , states: \"the Board may make recommendations to both parties regarding further p a r t i c i p a t i o n in detailed studies beyond the terms of t h i s Agreement and regarding the implementation of the comprehensive plan.\" T h e r e i s no r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a p r o p o s a l o r s t r a t e g y f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n be i n c l u d e d i n t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e p l a n . The o n l y i t e m i n t h e t e r m s o f r e f e r e n c e t h a t a l l u d e s i n any way t o i m p l e m e n t a t i o n i s 3 ( f ) w h i c h c a l l s f o r an i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f f i n a n c i a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s t o i n c l u d e a l l p r a c t i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r t h e s u b s e q u e n t e f f i c i e n t u t i l i z a t i o n o f t h e w a t e r r e s o u r c e s o f t h e B a s i n . 4 . 4 STUDY OUTPUT The s t u d y r e s u l t e d i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f 14 d o c u m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g a Summary R e p o r t o f t h e C o n s u l t a t i v e B o a r d , a M a i n R e p o r t o f t h e C o n s u l t a t i v e B o a r d and 12 T e c h n i c a l S u p p l e m e n t s t o t h e M a i n R e p o r t . The T e c h n i c a l S u p p l e m e n t s p r o v i d e t h e d a t a and r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e f r a m e w o r k p l a n p r e s e n t e d i n t h e M a i n R e p o r t o f t h e C o n s u l t a t i v e B o a r d . The M a i n R e p o r t was s u b m i t t e d as a d r a f t f o r p u b l i c comment and was f i n a l l y i s s u e d a s a Summary R e p o r t on M a r c h 3 1 , 1 9 7 4 . The Summary R e p o r t s t r e s s e s t h a t i t i s b a s e d upon p u b l i c c o n s e n s u s d e r i v e d o u t o f t h e p u b l i c i n v o l v e m e n t p r o g r a m , t h e p u r p o s e o f w h i c h w a s , i n p a r t , t o \" d e v e l o p m e n t a c o n s e n s u s r e g a r d i n g t h e p r e f e r r e d f u t u r e l i f e - s t y l e f o r t h e v a l l e y c o m m u n i t y \" . The Summary R e p o r t n o t e s : \" I n t h e i r f i n a l r e p o r t t o t h e O k a n a g a n S t u d y C o m m i t t e e ( e n t i t l e d \" T o Our C h i l d r e n ' s C h i l d r e n \" ) , t h e s e ( c i t i z e n ) t a s k f o r c e s u n a n i m o u s l y s u p p o r t e d 1 8 6 Projection III involving a lower pace of economic growth, protection of a g r i c u l t u r a l lands and maintenance of a high quality environment. The primary recommendation of t h i s valley consensus i s that: \"Future planning in the Okanagan should place primary emphasis on environmental protection, giving due emphasis to maintaining the economic v i a b i l i t y of the val l e y . \" Consequently, i t i s upon th i s premise, in concert with Projection III (Low Economic Growth Rate), that the framework plan outlined in this report i s recommended .\" The comprehensive plan was presented in two parts. The f i r s t part presented basic recommendations which structured the approach to water resources management in the Okanagan Basin. The second part presented detailed recommendations which were e s s e n t i a l l y a set of actions \"proposed to improve or protect the environment while maintaining the economic v i a b i l i t y of the Valley\". Appendix 2 i s a reprint of the recommendations of the Summary Report. There are a t o t a l of 45 recommendations in the Report. The recommendations are broken down into a number of major substantive areas including: - water management - implementation - water quantity - water quality - IJC reference Osoyoos Lake - water-based recreation - f i s h e r i e s - monitoring the framework plan. 187 I t i s necessary to be s e l e c t i v e i n order to provide an in-depth a n a l y s i s of the experience i n t h i s case. For t h i s reason, not a l l of the areas could be st u d i e d . Water-based r e c r e a t i o n and f i s h e r i e s have not been included i n the study. I t i s considered that t h i s does not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d e t r a c t from the study as a record of the experience nor as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of implementation theory. A few explanatory comments on the main recommendations f o l l o w s to provide a b a s i s for a n a l y s i s of the implementation of the p o l i c y . 4.4.1 Regional A u t h o r i t y The f i r s t recommendation argues that a s i n g l e r e g i o n a l d i s t r i c t should be e s t a b l i s h e d to be res p o n s i b l e for water management fu n c t i o n s i n the V a l l e y and p a r t i c u l a r l y to implement recommendations r e l a t i n g to waste treatment, the o r d e r l y development of s h o r e l i n e r e c r e a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s , and f l o o d p l a i n zoning. The basic recommendation of the plan was: 1 11. 'That the boundaries of the present Regional D i s t r i c t s of North Okanagan, Central Okanagan and Okanagan-Similkameen be redrawn to create a s i n g l e Okanagan Basin Regional D i s t r i c t having boundaries coi n c i d e n t with those of the watershed, to be res p o n s i b l e for those water resource management fun c t i o n s that p e r t a i n to the V a l l e y as a whole and i n p a r t i c u l a r the implementation of those recommendations i n t h i s report that are Valley-wide i n scope, e s p e c i a l l y waste treatment, the o r d e r l y development of s h o r e l i n e r e c r e a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s , and f l o o d p l a i n zoning.' ...It appears to be the consensus of the Okanagan Community that a single authority be established to coordinate the implementation of the framework plan. As much use as possible should be made of existing i n s t i t u t i o n s , for neither the public nor the senior governments desire the creation of a new intervening l e v e l of government. The success of the task forces during the study in bringing together people from a l l parts of the basin v e r i f i e s that valley-wide consensus on water management problems i s possible. Provincial l e g i s l a t i o n i s available to establish a regional d i s t r i c t for the watershed. While the process of setting up such an authority normally provides for the assignment of a number of functions, i t i s f e l t that certain c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and functions essential to the success of t h i s new body should be i d e n t i f i e d in the documents establishing i t , for example, in the l e t t e r s patent. These are: (i) that a l l residents within the watershed be required to share in the burden of costs, or to undertake necessary common actions, that c l e a r l y a f f e c t the valley as a whole, for example, upgrading the quality of the main lakes. ( i i ) that standards set by governments for such things as water quality be considered as minimum standards for the Basin and may need upgrading to provide a superior quality of the environment, in s p e c i f i c locations. ( i i i ) that the Regional D i s t r i c t should be supported by a technical resource advisory committee representing the resource agencies concerned. The establishment of such a group i s now provided for in provincial l e g i s l a t i o n . (iv) that continuing public p a r t i c i p a t i o n , which has been a p r i n c i p a l feature of t h i s study, be imbedded in the future planning process and be b u i l t into the i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements proposed herein.\" 189 The report noted that: \"The above recommendation was the subject of considerable discussion after release of the DRAFT report with l o c a l p o l i t i c a l leaders, in p a r t i c u l a r , taking the position that such a major re-organization of l o c a l government was at least premature and would raise very d i f f i c u l t administrative problems.\" To counter t h i s problem, the plan included an optional arrangement as put forward by the affected Regional Distr i c t s : \"That the Okanagan Basin Water Board be reconstructed and Letters Patent amended to give the Board authority to carry out water resource management functions described above.\" Relating to t h i s i s the f i n a l comment of the basic recommendation which states: \"The (Consultative) Board believes that a regional authority could, with the benefit of d i r e c t experience gained over time, solve most of the problems ... This i s the heart of the Board's conclusions; namely that the future of the Valley rests primarily in the hands of l o c a l residents, with the support and assistance of senior governments .\" The form of the regional body i s not d e f i n i t e l y specified in the Summary Report as i t leaves an option for restructuring the Okanagan Basin Water Board to carry out regional water resource management functions. It should be noted that, while the recommendation sp e c i f i e s regional r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , there i s no recommendation to s p e c i f i c a l l y transfer actual authority for these functions from senior governments to the regional body. 190 4.4.2 Framework Plan Implementation The second recommendation addresses the question of implementing the framework plan. It was noted e a r l i e r that the only a l l u s i o n to implementation in the terms of reference of the study i s with regard to an investigation of organizational structures for the subsequent e f f i c i e n t u t i l i z a t i o n of the water resources of the Basin. The manifestation of t h i s reference i s found in Section 7 . 5 of Technical Supplement XII, e n t i t l e d \"Implementation and Monitoring of Plan\". Section 7 . 5 is extremely short and r e a l l y says nothing about how to implement the plan, only that i t should be implemented: \"The development of a comprehensive plan for water management in a basin completes the planning phase of the water management cycle. However, under good water management practices t h i s plan should then be implemented, and an ongoing monitoring program developed to ensure that the plan implemented i s e f f e c t i v e in meeting the stated planning obj ectives.\" The second recommendation of the framework plan, on the other hand, in comparison to the Technical Supplement, i s very s p e c i f i c with respect to implementation. It expresses the concern that there should be continuity from planning to implementation and, to t h i s end, that Canada and B r i t i s h Columbia should establish an Implementation Task Force which 191 has l o c a l representation, before the end of March 1974. The purpose of the Task Force i s : \"to advise and recommend to the federal and provincial governments and to l o c a l governments, actions required to implement the comprehensive plan and to submit on or before 30 June 1974 a draft implementation agreement. This agreement sh a l l take into consideration the actions on recommendations of t h i s report that may be taken by l o c a l government, and by either senior government. Where j o i n t action i s required the agreement s h a l l include provisions for equitable cost-sharing as developed by the senior governments.\" The recommendation also s p e c i f i c a l l y stated that nothing in the recommendation should be construed so as to i n h i b i t ongoing programs presently in progress or to i n h i b i t the implementation of recommendations where r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are clear . It appears that public pressure was a major force in moving the study toward implementation. A public seminar held on June 9, 1973, in Penticton raised the question of implementation. It was agreed amongst the participants that: \"a special body charged with implementation should be set up, but that the membership of such a body needed much more thought. In any event, the continual involvement of the public was a must to keep t h i s authority viable and relevant\" (Technical Supplement XI, p. 6 9 ) . 192 On July 26, 1973, the Public Task Force met with the Co n s u l t a t i v e Board to discuss the Task Force's recommendations with respect to the study. At that time, apart from a general agreement on the recommendations, a t t e n t i o n again focused on implementation. The report of the meeting (Technical Supplement XI, p. 75) notes: \"to make things c l e a r , Mr. Marr (Co-Chairman of the Con s u l t a t i v e Board) v e r i f i e d that nothing i n the Agreement provided for implementation, although there was p r o v i s i o n for f i n a n c i a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t u d i e s to document areas in which there might already be appropriate l e g i s l a t i o n . Although the task force and the p u b l i c i n general expressed a strong d e s i r e for a separate a u t h o r i t y , i t was suggested by the Board that present agencies and changes i n l e g i s l a t i o n could a f f e c t any recommendation. Consequently, the task force decided to attempt to r e v i s e and more c a r e f u l l y define t h e i r p o s i t i o n and submit i t to the Board for comment p r i o r to presentation of t h e i r f i n a l r e p o r t . \" On October 1, 1973, a workshop i n v o l v i n g the Task Force and members of the study s t a f f was held. The report of the meeting notes: \"a good deal of d i s c u s s i o n t r a n s p i r e d regarding future resource management. While t o t a l agreement was not achieved on t h i s p o i n t , there was a consensus on both sides that the study had made enough f i n d i n g s to warrant serious a c t i o n i n the very near f u t u r e . \" Subsequent to the October 1 meeting, two a d d i t i o n a l meetings were held between the Task Force and senior study personnel, i n c l u d i n g members of the Consult a t i v e Board, 1 9 3 regarding content and format of the Board's f i n a l report. The main focus of these meetings was: \"to hammer out an acceptable recommendation regarding the implementation strategies that should be followed to insure that the Study was activated as soon as possible and as extensively as possible\" (Technical Supplement XI, p. 7 6 ) . The Public Task Force f i n a l report argues that: \"an authority should be established with real powers to effect positive changes. As well, through continued involvement of the valley community changing attitudes, perceptions and goals could constantly be taken into consideration in modifying, a l t e r i n g or expanding in the future the present plan as decisions, or events might indicate such would be desirable, or in fact, at times even necessary.\" This authority i s futher described and defined as: \"a creature both responsible to the various levels of p a r t i c i p a t i n g governments on the one hand and responsive to the community i t s e l f on the other . . . th i s authority would be both watch-dog and cat a l y s t : i t would ensure that a l l l e g i s l a t i o n was enforced while also attempting to encourage and coordinate discussions regarding potential new options that, i f acted upon, could improve existing conditions of the valley at thi s particular moment.\" This idea i s c l a r i f i e d by pointing out that the authority i s r e a l l y a body to coordinate and assist the authorized governmental agencies in the execution of their expanded duties r e s u l t i n g from the Okanagan Basin study. They point out: \" i t s structure and format could even be somewhat similar to the Okanagan Basin Study i t s e l f . It would be expected that the two senior governments 194 would be the major participants in such an authority. Moreover, they would provide t h i s authority special funding to enable i t to carry out i t s duties; in addition, t h i s authority would be able to a s s i s t l o c a l governments in obtaining presently available f i n a n c i a l assistance for projects necessary as a r e s u l t of the acceptance and implementation of the recommendations.\" The overriding concern of the Public Task Force was not merely in proposing an implementation structure, but in promoting action of any kind. It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the recommendations of the study would be acted upon. They emphasized: \"in any event the important issue remains: following the conclusion of the Study the recommendations make their way into action and not onto shelves.\" To t h i s end, the following was recommended: \"Upon conclusion of the Canada-British Columbia Okanagan Basin Agreement an Okanagan Basin authority be established by the Provincial and Federal Governments with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for management of water and other resources in the val l e y . (a) That such an authority be given real powers in the f i e l d of water management and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a r i s i n g therefrom. These r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to include implementation of the recommendations of the Okanagan Basin Study and the recommendations of the Public Involvement Program. (b) That such an authority be responsible for the development and coordination of a t o t a l l y comprehensive plan for the future orderly development of the Okanagan Water Basin. (c) That provision be made for continuing public p a r t i c i p a t i o n so that changing attitudes, perceptions and goals of the v a l l e y residents would continually be taken into consideration in the planning process.\" 1 9 5 It can be seen that the public was very involved in dir e c t i n g the study toward implementation. It i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note the extent and l e v e l of d e t a i l provided by the public. It i s evidence of a deep commitment to solving the problems in the Okanagan and to long-term resource management in the Basin. 4 . 4 . 3 Water Quantity Recommendation 3 states that there i s s u f f i c i e n t water in the Okanagan Basin for a l l present and projected uses so that a diversion scheme i s not required. This i s based on the assumption that Okanagan Lake be controlled within a wider operating range and that there may be some cut-back in releases to the Okanagan River for nonconsumptive uses, e.g., f i s h e r i e s requirements, during a prolonged drought cycle (meaning the t h i r d year of a drought). This recommendation i s based upon the assumption that water can be more e f f i c i e n t l y used in the future. More e f f i c i e n t water allocations were to be based on a revised management plan for the tributary basins around Okanagan Lake. Specific basins were to be managed for consumptive purposes while others were to be designated for f i s h e r i e s . Multiple purpose management on two creeks was recommended. The ba s i c water qu a n t i t y recommendation i s also based on the assumption that the l e v e l of future growth w i l l not g r e a t l y a f f e c t the l e v e l of water consumption. In 1970, approximately 85 percent of the consumptive water demand was for i r r i g a t i o n and about 15 percent for urban development uses. The t o t a l consumptive use from t r i b u t a r i e s and d i r e c t l y from areas adjacent to Okanagan Lake was 69,000 a c r e - f e e t , of which i r r i g a t i o n accounted for 57,000 acre-feet and urban development for 12,000 a c r e - f e e t , with a population of 113,480. The proposed economic development future (low growth) shows a population of 290,000, two and a h a l f times the 1970 l e v e l , with an increase i n t o t a l water consumption to 105,000 a c r e - f e e t , of which approximately 60 percent would be for i r r i g a t i o n use and 40 percent for urban use. A p r o j e c t i o n of high economic growth with a population of 430,000 would s t i l l use only 107,000 acre-feet because t h i s l e v e l of economic development n e c e s s i t a t e s s u b s t a n t i a l u r b a n i z a t i o n which occurs at the expense of the i r r i g a t e d acreage. Under these c o n d i t i o n s , the i r r i g a t i o n demand drops from the 1970 f i g u r e of 57,000 acre-feet to 48,000 a c r e - f e e t . A c o r o l l a r y point r e l a t e s to the consumption of water for urban uses. Water used, for example, i n the household i s , i n l a r g e measure, returned to the system i n a useable form v i a the waste treatment f a c i l i t i e s . For example, i n the 197 Okanagan, water 'consumed' in Kelowna i s returned to the system after treatment, reconsumed in Penticton, returned to the system, reconsumed further down and so on. The same water may be diverted several times and 'consumed', assuming adequate treatment. It should be noted that, in developing the water supply and demand equations used in the Okanagan Study, i t was assumed that, on the average, return flow i s reused only once; although, in fact, i t i s quite possible to be used three or four times from i t s entry into a tributary in the Basin to i t s discharge through Osoyoos Lake. These figures demonstrate that, under average climatic conditions, the water supply i s adequate for v i r t u a l l y any growth scenario possible. 4.4.4 International Aspects Recommendation 6 states: \"that the Government of Canada and B r i t i s h Columbia immediately take the necessary steps to refer a study of Osoyoos Lake l e v e l regulations to the International Joint Commission.\" This recommendation came about because of the changes proposed for the operation of the Okanagan system as follows: \"adjustments to intakes along Okanagan River w i l l allow reduction in flows in the river to conserve water but these flow reductions may create problems of maintaining desirable lake l e v e l s on Osoyoos Lake during drought periods unless control at the outlet of Osoyoos Lake i s improved.\" Osoyoos Lake straddles the Canada-United States border, and thus, i t s outlet i s in the United States. Its management is under the control of the International Joint Commission. At the time of the study recommendation, Osoyoos Lake was controlled by a privately-owned structure at the outlet, known as Zosel Dam. It was an outdated wooden structure b u i l t in 1 9 2 7 to provide a log pond for the l o c a l m i l l at Or o v i l l e , Washington. For the majority of time in normal years, the dam does control the l e v e l of Osoyoos Lake reasonably well, but under conditions of heavy inflow, i t i s p a r t i a l l y or t o t a l l y drowned. But as Technical Supplement III (p. 13 ) points out, because of the age of the structure, there i s considerable leakage during low flow periods which has to be compensated for by additional releases from Okanagan Lake to maintain Osoyoos Lake at i t s normal summer water elevation of 9 1 0 . 7 G.S.L. To deal with t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the study proposed in recommendation 6 would consider how to: (i) maintain Osoyoos Lake l e v e l s during drought periods; and ( i i ) reduce flood damage around the Lake. This recommendation i s introduced and highlighted here because the implementation of i t i s interesting and provides particular insights into federal-provincial policy implementation. 199 4.4.5 Water Quality There are two components to water quality addressed by the framework plan, one deals with quality in tributary streams and the other deals with quality in the mainstem lakes. Recommendation 7 stresses the need for watershed management in order to reduce the l e v e l of pollutants in the t r i b u t a r i e s . Analysis of the streams showed problems caused by high coliform counts, oxygen d e f i c i e n c i e s , t u r b i d i t y and concentrations of iron, manganese and phosphorus. These affect the quality of water supplies for drinking, f i s h e r i e s , and aesthetics. In order to control these, the recommendation c a l l s for: \"a program of pollution control for tributary streams by i n s t i t u t i n g s t r i c t regulations on feedlot and septic tank developments, removing a l l d i r e c t discharges to streams of i n d u s t r i a l and municipal wastes causing pollution and protecting streams with appropriate green s t r i p s in areas where logging or c u l t i v a t i o n i s practiced or where there are concentrations of c a t t l e , horses, or other livestock.\" A n c i l l i a r y recommendations to r e a l i z e t h i s objective are: \" 2 1 . That a l l municipal and i n d u s t r i a l waste discharges causing pol l u t i o n be prevented from entering tributary streams. 2 2 . That forest management and a g r i c u l t u r a l practices be reviewed by the B r i t i s h Columbia Forest Service and B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Agriculture, and greenbelts established where necessary to reduce nutrient loadings from erosion. 2 0 0 2 3 . That regulations c o n t r o l l i n g surface drainage from c a t t l e feedlots, and other livestock operations be established and enforced by the B r i t i s h Columbia Water Resources Service by 1 9 7 5 . \" Recommendation 8 i s concerned with improving water quality in the Okanagan lakes by reducing the amount of phosphorus going into the water: \"that a waste management program aimed at reducing phosphorus loadings to control rooted aquatic plant and,., algae growth in the main valley lakes be undertaken immediately by the regional authority.\" The water quality problem referenced in t h i s recommendation i s the negative impact on the enjoyment of the lakes created by the existence of aquatic weeds along the shorelines. Recommendation 8 i s based on the premise that phosphorus i s \"one of the key nutrients promoting undesirable aquatic plant and algal growth in the main valley lakes and the nutrient which may be most successfully controlled to reduce t h i s growth and the r e s u l t i n g deterioration in water quality\". Back-up studies on the nutrient load in the lakes were concerned with l e v e l s of both phosphorus and nitrogen. The Final Report of the Consultative Board (p. 1 3 3 ) notes: \"Based on limnological findings and recommendations, phosphorus was subsequently determined to be the element which should be limited to control lake enrichment and b i o l o g i c a l growth. Studies on loading sources of these nutrients support t h i s choice. The estimated amount of nitrogen entering the main valley lakes 201 i s about s i x times greater than t h a t of phosphorus, and only about 25% of t h i s l o a d i n g can be considered as c o n t r o l l a b l e by c u r r e n t t e c h n o l o g i c a l method s. Approximately 60% o f the phosphorus l o a d i n g s are considered c o n t r o l l a b l e , the major p o r t i o n s o f which come from m u n i c i p a l o u t f a l l s and s e p t i c tanks. Further e v a l u a t i o n s i n d i c a t e that the c o n t r o l of these two sources w i l l probably meet the d e s i r e d o b j e c t i v e o f m a i n t a i n i n g or enhancing the q u a l i t y of the main v a l l e y l a k e s over the study h o r i z o n of 2020. This does not i n f e r t h a t long-term measures to c o n t r o l other sources of n u t r i e n t s should not be examined, t e s t e d and i f f e a s i b l e , implemented.\" A n c i l l i a r y recommendations e s t a b l i s h phosphorus l o a d i n g o b j e c t i v e s for each of the main v a l l e y l a k e s r e l a t e d to an a s s i m i l a t i v e c a p a c i t y f o r each lake which w i l l provide a water q u a l i t y l e v e l c o n s i s t e n t with maximum r e c r e a t i o n a l and a e s t h e t i c b e n e f i t s . The Summary Report (p. 24) notes: \" N u t r i e n t sources are many and v a r i e d , but one source, m u n i c i p a l o u t f a l l s , c u r r e n t l y c o n t r i b u t e s approximately 50% o f the t o t a l phosphorus l o a d i n g to the main v a l l e y l a k e s . The immediate c o n t r o l of t h i s one source has t h e r e f o r e been given p r i o r i t y over other sources, which are more d i f f i c u l t to manage. Because waste treatment technology and methods for the removal of phosphorus are dependent on c o n v e n t i o n a l treatment f a c i l i t i e s , the requirements and c o s t s f o r such treatment have been in c l u d e d i n the e v a l u a t i o n s . The b e n e f i t s obtained from removal of phosphorus, a decrease i n rooted a q u a t i c p l a n t growth and a l g a l blooms, should however only be compared to the c o s t s of phosphorus removal i t s e l f . Primary and secondary waste treatment processes are normally r e q u i r e d for p r o t e c t i n g the h e a l t h of the v a l l e y community. 202 Urban developments serviced by septic tanks also represent a s i g n i f i c a n t source of phosphorus to the main valley lakes. The s o i l s of the Okanagan Valley are generally poor in respect to nutrient removal and in densely populated areas, high percentages of nutrients can return to surface waters from these diffuse sources. Such sources can affect a lake as a whole - e.g. Wood, Kalamalka and Osoyoos, or in the case of Okanagan Lake, shoreline areas which may have high recreational values. Therefore, the next p r i o r i t y for nutrient control i s sewage c o l l e c t i o n and waste treatment in urban areas serviced by septic tanks adjacent to the main valley lakes. The rapid growth of some of these unsewered areas appears to have created serious l o c a l i z e d weed and algal problems rather than health problems.\" The presentation of s p e c i f i c recommendations for phosphorus loading reductions was done in the s p i r i t of regard for the uncertainty involved in the establishment of loading objectives. The Summary Report cautions that because of t h i s \"the implementation of these recommendations should be c a r e f u l l y monitored to ensure the desired results are being r e a l i z e d \" . This caveat i s read to mean that the monitoring should involve checking to see whether the predicted reduction l e v e l i s accurate, but there does not appear to have been concern with respect to the policy i t s e l f ; that i s , whether phosphorus removal i s an e f f e c t i v e water quality improvement polic y . 203 4 . 4 . 6 Monitoring Framework Plan The l a s t basic policy recommendation of particular concern to t h i s study i s recommendation 11 dealing with monitoring the framework plan. It reads: \"That the response of the water resources to management measures implemented under the framework plan be monitored continuously, with a f u l l review of the plan to be undertaken by 1980 to ensure that the plan continues to meet the s o c i a l and economic goals of the valley community.\" This recommendation appears to r e f l e c t a concern for uncertainty in the policy formation stage. The rationale in the Summary Report argues that: \"despite the large investment involved in preparing the comprehensive plan, there are many uncertainties in the development of water management alternatives, e s p e c i a l l y in waste treatment requirements to reduce phosphorus loadings to the main lakes (for example, technological advances in waste treatment may improve opportunities for waste management in the future). Consequently, i t i s important to monitor how the water resource responds to management measures implemented under the plan on a continuing basis, with a f u l l review by 1980 to make necessary corrections to the plan.\" The back-up documentation and the published reports provide l i t t l e information regarding the background of t h i s recommendation. If i t i s to be taken at face value, however, i t must be read very c a r e f u l l y . The recommendation c a l l s for monitoring the response of the water resource to management measures. It does not suggest monitoring the response of the 204 socioeconomic system to the management measures, but at the same time, the recommendation does reco g n i z e a need to review the plan to r e d e f i n e i t s consonance with s o c i a l and economic g o a l s . S e c t i o n 7.5 of T e c h n i c a l Supplement XII d e a l i n g with i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i s w r i t t e n i n much broader terms. It argues: \"Monitoring should i n c l u d e not o n l y the e v a l u a t i o n of data from long term water q u a n t i t y and water q u a l i t y s t a t i o n s i n the b a s i n , but a l s o study reviews at a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r v a l s throughout the planning h o r i z o n o f such f a c t o r s as economic growth, changes i n the t r o p h i c s t a t e o f major l a k e s , p a r t i c i p a t i o n and c a t c h - r a t e s i n s p o r t s f i s h e r i e s , and changing demands on water based r e c r e a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s . The frequency o f such monitor reviews w i l l depend to a great extent on the r a t e o f economic growth, but i t would seem d e s i r a b l e whenever p o s s i b l e to t i e these reviews to such long term government assessments as the po p u l a t i o n census which i s c a r r i e d out every 10 years .\" The recommendation i n the Summary Report does not a c t u a l l y c a l l f o r monitoring these a s p e c t s , but i t could be read as i m p l i c i t , inasmuch as such monitoring would provide the data for the plan reviews. This recommendation r e c o g n i z e s u n c e r t a i n t y and makes some e f f o r t toward a response, but i t does not s p e c i f y an i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework f o r c a r r y i n g out the monitoring or reviews. A d d i t i o n a l l y , i t does not appear to r e c o g n i z e s o c i a l value u n c e r t a i n t i e s . For example, the study recommendation i s concerned about u n c e r t a i n t i e s with r e s p e c t 205 to t e c h n o l o g i c a l methods for waste treatment. It i s e q u a l l y p o s s i b l e t h a t s o c i a l values could change r e s p e c t i n g the l e v e l of waste treatment r e q u i r e d . The s i g n i f i c a n t point with r e s p e c t to recommendation 11 i s t h a t i t i s ambiguous and open to s u b s t a n t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s ambiguity f o r implementation w i l l be explored i n the a n a l y s i s o f the implementation experience. 4.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The comprehensive framework plan was developed to respond to a range of environmental and economic c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t i n g i n the l a t e 1960s and e a r l y 1970s in the Okanagan Ba s i n . The b a s i c recommendations o f the plan e s t a b l i s h e d the need f o r l o c a l c o n t r o l over the f u t u r e of the V a l l e y and a comprehensive approach to water management which would i n c l u d e q u a n t i t y , q u a l i t y , nonconsumptive uses (e.g., f i s h e r i e s , r e c r e a t i o n ) and r e l a t e d land-based a c t i v i t i e s . The framework plan recommended a very s p e c i f i c course of a c t i o n i n some i n s t a n c e s and a more general course i n o t h e r s , but i n most cases, these recommendations were couched in terms which l e f t a s i g n i f i c a n t degree o f ambiguity. The policy-makers are not d e f i n i t e on the exact form and a u t h o r i t y t h a t a r e g i o n a l management body ought to encompass. The plan recommends in favour of implementation and provides 206 a process to i n i t i a t e action but leaves completely open questions of how to implement. During the course of the study, v i r t u a l l y no implementation analysis was undertaken to consider implementation issues or techniques. In terms of water quantity, the policy output i s very s p e c i f i c and d e f i n i t e . A changed operating regime for the mainstem lakes i s recommended based upon detailed quantification of the problem in current terms and on the basis of projections for future water use. Detailed works to implement t h i s regime are provided. The plan i s much less d e f i n i t e on management aspects, p a r t i c u l a r l y as i t relates to 1 Osoyoos Lake with i t s international implications. The intentions of the policy-makers in t h i s case are unclear. Water quality i s a much more uncertain area. The policy output attempts to be d e f i n i t e in i t s approach by recommending a program of phosphorus removal, but i t e x p l i c i t l y recognizes the uncertainties concerning the chemistry/limnology involved and the technology for managing water quality. This e x p l i c i t recognition of uncertainties leads to a recommendation for a strategy to monitor the situ a t i o n and to deal with the uncertainties. In terms of socioeconomic aspects, the policy output i m p l i c i t l y recognizes some uncertainties in i t s recommendation for a f u l l review 10 years after the study. But i t i s very vague on what t h i s means and leaves much to the imagination of implementors in terms of what should be reviewed and how t h i s might be undertaken. Overall, i t appears that the policy output i s f a i r l y d e f i n i t i v e in areas which lend themselves to quantification and physical engineering. It i s much less d e f i n i t e in areas where chemical/biological uncertainties exist and vague in areas r e l a t i n g to management structures and socioeconomic concerns. The framework plan represents the policy output which i s the sta r t i n g point for a study on implementation. The next chapter explores how the study output was put into action and considers the factors which explain differences between the plan and the basis for action under the Okanagan Basin Implementation Agreement. 208 CHAPTER 5 INITIATING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK PLAN 5.1 PURPOSE The s t r u c t u r a l framework of the implementation process described i n Chapter 3 hypothesizes i n i t i a t i o n of implementation as the second major s t r u c t u r a l element i n the process, the f i r s t being p o l i c y output. The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to describe how implementation of the comprehensive framework plan was i n i t i a t e d . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t w i l l consider the f o l l o w i n g questions: 1. What s i g n i f i c a n t d e c i s i o n s were taken during t h i s phase? 2. How were the o b j e c t i v e s , i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements, and implementation a c t i o n s changed from those recommended or assumed in the p o l i c y output? 3 . What s t r a t e g i e s were adopted to deal with u n c e r t a i n t i e s ? 4. What f a c t o r s account for the d e c i s i o n s which r e s u l t e d in the observed changes and the s t r a t e g i e s adopted? 5.2 DEVELOPING AN IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT The Comprehensive Framework Plan was submitted by the Co n s u l t a t i v e Board to the re s p o n s i b l e m i n i s t e r s of the senior governments on March 3 1 , 1974. The l e t t e r of t r a n s m i t t a l implied that immediate a c t i o n ought to be taken r e s p e c t i n g the recommendations of the plan: \"We would p a r t i c u l a r l y draw your a t t e n t i o n to Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 11 which concern implementation of the plan. The d e t e r i o r a t i n g q u a l i t y of water i n the main v a l l e y 209 lakes and the water quantity problems that may arise should a prolonged drought period occur are continuing problems that require immediate consideration.\" To ef f e c t immediate action, the plan called for the immediate establishment of an Implementation Task Force with l o c a l representation and that the Task Force should, within three months, submit a draft Implementation Agreement. In response to the c a l l for immediate action, a Task Force was established shortly after submission of the framework plan. It was set up as a two-tiered structure. The f i r s t t i e r , known as the Okanagan Implementation Committee, was composed of senior federal and provincial o f f i c i a l s . Its function was to develop the policy perspective for moving into the implementation stage. There i s no question that both l e v e l s of government were committed to implementing some policy in the Okanagan, but as discussed previously, the procedures for doing so and the d e t a i l s of exactly what would be done were not c l e a r l y spelled out in the framework plan. The second t i e r of the Task Force, known as the Okanagan Task Force or the Working Group, was composed of three senior professionals: Murray M. Wiggins Chief, Water Planning and Management Branch Inland Waters Directorate B r i t i s h Columbia and Yukon Region Environment Canada 2 1 0 T. A. J. Leach Assistant Director Water Investigations Branch B r i t i s h Columbia Department of the Environment William Parchomchuk (nonvoting participant/observer) Seeretar y-Manager Okanagan Basin Water Board The purpose of the Working Group was to develop the d e t a i l s of an Implementation Agreement based on the framework plan. The Group had to carry out i t s functions within the confines of the respective departmental operating budgets; that i s , a special cost-shared implementation study budget did not exist and any additional s t a f f required to work on th i s aspect had to be provided from existing program budgets. The Task Force did not submit a draft Implementation Agreement within three months of i t s establishment as specified in the framework plan. It took approximately 13 months for an agreed-upon draft and about 22 months u n t i l the signing of the Okanagan Basin Implementation Agreement on February 9 , 1 9 7 6 . By January 1 9 7 5 , some eight months after the Okanagan Implementation Committee had been established, a draft Implementation Agreement was circulated amongst senior o f f i c i a l s of both the federal and provincial Departments of the Environment. The draft was reviewed in February 1 9 7 5 , at the 2 9 t h meeting of the federal Interdepartmental Committee on Water (ICW). After revisions, i t was reviewed at the 3 0 t h 211 meeting of the ICW on February 21, 1975. At t h i s meeting, i t was stated that the f e d e r a l Inland Waters D i r e c t o r a t e a n t i c i p a t e d submitting the d r a f t agreement for Cabinet approval w i t h i n a month. A c t i v i t i e s r e l a t i n g to various matters continued, p r i m a r i l y i n the area of informing other agencies of proposed r o l e s . From February to A p r i l , budget f i g u r e s were r e v i s e d and escalated for i n f l a t i o n . A memorandum from the i r e s p o n s i b l e p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l , dated A p r i l 29, 1 9 7 5 , noted an a n t i c i p a t e d s i g n i n g of the Implementation Agreement on July 20, 1 9 7 5 . The d r a f t Agreement was f u r t h e r discussed i n t e r n a l l y and was presented by the Implementation Task Force to the Okanagan Basin Water Board on May 28, 1 9 7 5 . S t a r t i n g i n June 1975, the d r a f t Agreement ran i n t o l e g a l problems. Whether the f e d e r a l F i s h e r i e s Act would be mentioned i n the preamble caused a major f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l disagreement. After t h i s was sorted out, Schedules A and B of the d r a f t Agreement (the p r o j e c t s and proposed costs) were submitted by the r e g i o n a l o f f i c e of Inland Waters to Ottawa i n a form for submission to the f e d e r a l Treasury Board. On August 5, 1975, the Legal Services D i v i s i o n of the f e d e r a l Department of the Environment i n t e r j e c t e d and argued that 2 1 2 adequate l e g a l involvement had not been maintained and s u b s t a n t i a l work from t h i s viewpoint was r e q u i r e d . This was completed with a ' f i n a l ' d r a f t being submitted on August 2 7 , 1 9 7 5 . During t h i s time, s u b s t a n t i a l pressure was coming from the f e d e r a l m i n i s t e r ' s o f f i c e to move the d r a f t Agreement to the Treasury Board. On September 16, 1 9 7 5 , the Province requested an amendment to the d r a f t to include the replacement of the Kalamalka Lake o u t l e t s t r u c t u r e i n the Agreement. The f e d e r a l government opposed t h i s , and the Province dropped the issue for the time being. On November 4, 1975, the r e g i o n a l o f f i c e of the f e d e r a l Inland Waters D i r e c t o r a t e informed the Province that the d r a f t Implementation Agreement was to be submitted to the f e d e r a l Treasury Board on November 6, 1975. On December 2 , 1 9 7 5 , by Order-in-Council No. PC 1 9 7 5 - 3/2821, the Governor-in-Council authorized the f e d e r a l M i n i s t e r of the Environment to sign the Agreement on behalf of Canada. On December 3 1 , 1 9 7 5 , by Order-in-Council No. 3 8 7 2 , the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council authorized the p r o v i n c i a l M i n i s t e r of the Environment to sign the Agreement on behalf of B r i t i s h Columbia. The signed Orders-in-Council were taken as a go-ahead for the Agreement, and procedures were put in motion to execute the conditions. The Agreement was f i n a l l y signed on February 9 , 1 9 7 6 , at which time the Okanagan Basin Implementation Board was formally established. The Board f i r s t met in V i c t o r i a on March 3 1 , 1 9 7 6 , wherein i t established i t s operating procedures and formally commenced i t s duties as established by the j o i n t Implementation Agreement. 5 . 3 THE IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT The Okanagan Basin Implementation Agreement between Canada and B r i t i s h Columbia, which went into effect in February 1 9 7 6 , (reproduced in Appendix 2 ) was established for the purpose of substantively implementing the comprehensive framework plan submitted to the two governments in March 1 9 7 2 * , in order to achieve the following objectives: (a) ensure a viable economic base in the Okanagan Basin by the development of water and related resources; (b) maintain and enhance the quality of the natural environment by the management and protection of water and related resources, such as f i s h e r i e s , w i l d l i f e and recreation areas; and (c) enhance s o c i a l betterment by creating a more equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of income, employment, and opportunity between regions in the Okanagan Basin. 214 The Agreement embodies the set of recommendations contained in the comprehensive framework plan but are to be implemented as p a r t i c u l a r s as redefined i n Schedule B of the Implementation Agreement*. Each party to the Agreement agreed to c a r r y out or cause to be c a r r i e d out those p a r t i c u l a r s for which i t was given r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as o u t l i n e d in Schedule B. ,The Implementation Agreement also contains p r o v i s i o n s for e s t a b l i s h i n g an Implementation Board to c a r r y out j o i n t f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l aspects, the co s t - s h a r i n g of p r o j e c t s , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Agreement, and p r o v i s i o n s r e s p e c t i n g r e l a t e d programs undertaken by the p a r t i e s to the Agreement. The Agreement i s to be implemented by a f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l Implementation Board composed s o l e l y of equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n from the f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l p u b l i c s e r v i c e . * P a r t i c u l a r s are the recommendations of the framework plan couched i n s p e c i f i c o p e r a t i o n a l terms. I t i s the p a r t i c u l a r s that are to be implemented i n the Agreement, not the recommendations of the Plan. For example, i f the recommendation stated that a s p e c i f i c a c t i o n be undertaken, the p a r t i c u l a r would probably read that the r e s p o n s i b l e l e v e l of government agrees to undertake a study to determine the f e a s i b i l i t y , e t c . of undertaking such an a c t i o n . See Recommendations 13 I I I , 13 IV, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 31, 34, 36 I I , 37 and 38. i 215 The Agreement was put forward to implement p o l i c i e s developed i n the framework planning study. A l l of the recommendations o f the framework plan are i n c l u d e d i n Schedule B of the Implementation Agreement, but the Agreement r e - i n t e r p r e t s these and, i n many i n s t a n c e s , puts a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t emphasis than was envisaged by the framework p l a n . The f i r s t major d i f f e r e n c e between the framework plan i i and the Implementation Agreement i s the s h i f t away from comprehensive water management i n v o l v i n g c o o r d i n a t i o n among three l e v e l s o f government to the s t a t u s quo s i t u a t i o n o f each l e v e l pursuing i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s with l i m i t e d c o o r d i n a t i o n among the p a r t i c i p a n t s . Related to t h i s i s the v i r t u a l l y nonexistent p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f l o c a l government i n the Implementation Agreement. The framework plan s t r e s s e d , as the b a s i c t e n e t , major involvement of l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n managing the water r e s o u r c e , but t h i s was not recognized to any s i g n i f i c a n t degree i n the Implementation Agreement. The f i n a l major d i f f e r e n c e i s the emphasis given i n the Implementation Agreement to s t r u c t u r a l works concerned with f l o o d c o n t r o l i n the Okanagan. This was a minor aspect o f the framework plan but accounts f o r over 50 percent o f the budget o f the Implementation Agreement. These changes between the framework plan and the implementation Agreement w i l l be discussed i n d i v i d u a l l y in d e t a i l . 5 - 3 - 1 Noncoordinated Water Management - A Change in Obj ectives The framework plan envisaged comprehensive management of the water resources in the Okanagan through a continuing process involving federal, pr o v i n c i a l and l o c a l governments. The Implementation Agreement simply established a contract between the federal and provincial governments for the cost-sharing of particular public works. The Agreement sp e c i f i e s various authorities to be responsible for undertaking particular actions related to the framework plan recommendations but does not provide for o v e r a l l coordination of the implementation of these non-cost shared aspects. It establishes a s p e c i f i c time frame for policy implementation and does not place t h i s in the context of a process for ongoing water resources management. This represents a very s i g n i f i c a n t change in objectives from the framework plan. Four sections of the Agreement deal with recommendations/particulars which are not cost-shared. Section 3(a) is a general clause covering agreement to the p o l i c i e s in general: \"3(a) Each party s h a l l carry out or cause to be carried out the particulars with respect to the recommendations set out in Schedule B for which i t 2 1 7 undertakes r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in the said Schedule which i s attached to and constitutes a part of t h i s Agr eement;\" Section 4 ( 3 ) weakens 3(a) considerably by providing each party with the option of changing the timing for implementing a p a r t i c u l a r . The bureaucratic or p o l i t i c a l costs for making such a change would appear to be small judging from the wording of the clause: \" 4 ( 3 ) Where, as stipulated in Schedule B, the cost of implementation i s to be borne by one Party only, i t s h a l l be implemented by the target dates shown therein, or where such date must be changed by the Party undertaking the implementation due to unforeseen circumstances, by the changed date, provided that such Party, (a) informs the Implementation Board of the change and the circumstances requiring i t , and (b) gives serious consideration to any recommendation by the Implementation Board.\" In e f f e c t , what t h i s section does i s put a moral obligation on the Province to inform the federal government i f i t a l t e r s the timing of i t s policy implementation in the Okanagan. This section i s not overly strong in i t s wording. Section 1 0 refers to p o l i c i e s and programs not covered by the Agreement. While i t i s worded in a strong negative tone, there i s no mechanism provided to deal with noncompliance with t h i s section: \" 1 0 ( 1 ) Neither Party s h a l l undertake any program in the Okanagan Basin that i s incompatible with any recommendation in Schedule B or i t s implementation under th i s Agreement. 218 (2) Each Party s h a l l , p r i o r to i n i t i a t i n g a new program that may a f f e c t the implementation o f t h i s Agreement i n the Okanagan Basin, inform the Implementation Board of i t s i n t e n t i o n o f so doing, so t h a t the f e a s i b i l i t y and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of program c o o r d i n a t i o n by the Board i s enhanced.\" S e c t i o n 16 d e a l s with the d u t i e s o f the Implementation Board. One o f the areas f o r which i t has been given r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s the c o o r d i n a t i o n o f non-cost shared programs. This s e c t i o n i n s t r u c t s the Board to maintain c o o r d i n a t i o n with other programs. But i t only provides for B r i t i s h Columbia to c o o r d i n a t e p r o v i n c i a l involvement through the Department of the Environment and for Canada to c o o r d i n a t e f e d e r a l involvement through i t s Department o f Environment. The mechanism for c o o r d i n a t i o n o f a j o i n t e f f o r t would presumably be the r o l e o f the Implementation Board, but the Agreement does not s p e l l t h i s o ut: \"16(j) With r e s p e c t to measures t h a t , as s t i p u l a t e d i n Schedule B, i i i ) are not to be cost-shared and are to be c a r r i e d out by the departments of B r i t i s h Columbia or e n t i t i e s c r e a t e d by i t , be r e s p o n s i b l e , through i t s B r i t i s h Columbia members, for the maintenance o f c o o r d i n a t i o n by the Department o f Environment with and among such departments and e n t i t i e s , except where the duty f o r m a i n t a i n i n g c o o r d i n a t i o n i s , according to Schedule B, s p e c i f i c a l l y assigned to the r e g i o n a l a u t h o r i t y , and i v ) are not to be cost-shared and are to be c a r r i e d out by departments and agencies o f Canada, be r e s p o n s i b l e , through i t s Canada members, f o r the maintenance o f c o o r d i n a t i o n by the Department o f Environment with and among such departments and agenc i e s . \" 219 T h e r e i s no m e c h a n i s m i n t h e I m p l e m e n t a t i o n A g r e e m e n t t o c r e a t e o r f o s t e r t h e s p i r i t o f o v e r a l l c o o r d i n a t i o n b e t w e e n l e v e l s o f g o v e r n m e n t o r f o r c o m p r e h e n s i v e managemen t o f t h e w a t e r r e s o u r c e . 5 . 3 . 2 L i m i t e d L o c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n - A Change i n I n s t i t u t i o n a l A r r a n g e m e n t s I t was t h e f u n d a m e n t a l f i n d i n g o f t h e f r a m e w o r k p l a n t h a t m o s t o f t h e p r o b l e m s i n t h e O k a n a g a n B a s i n c o u l d be e f f e c t i v e l y t a c k l e d b y l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s w i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f t h e s e n i o r g o v e r n m e n t s . I t r e c o m m e n d e d a s an o p t i o n t h a t t h e O k a n a g a n B a s i n W a t e r B o a r d be r e c o n s t r u c t e d t o g i v e t h e B o a r d a u t h o r i t y t o c a r r y o u t t h o s e f u n c t i o n s t h a t p e r t a i n t o t h e v a l l e y a s a w h o l e a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s o f t h e O k a n a g a n B a s i n S t u d y t h a t a r e v a l l e y - w i d e i n s c o p e , e s p e c i a l l y w a s t e t r e a t m e n t , t h e o r d e r l y d e v e l o p m e n t o f s h o r e l i n e r e c r e a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s and f l o o d p l a i n z o n i n g . T h i s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n i s v e r y w i d e r a n g i n g . I t s u g g e s t s t h a t a r e g i o n a l a u t h o r i t y s h o u l d c a r r y o u t t h o s e f u n c t i o n s t h a t p e r t a i n t o t h e v a l l e y a s a w h o l e . A l l o f t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s h a v e v a l l e y - w i d e i m p l i c a t i o n s . The w h o l e i d e a o f a B a s i n s t u d y i s t o c o n s i d e r t h e b a s i c p h y s i c a l u n i t w h i c h i s i n f l u e n c e d b y t h e w a t e r r e s o u r c e . The more s p e c i f i c 220 l i s t i n g of water treatment, shoreline development and flood plain zoning i s read as providing examples but by no means as a d e f i n i t i o n of valley-wide functions. It seems clear that the policy-makers envisaged a central role for a regional authority \"with the support and assistance of senior governments\". One envisages a regional implementation authority charged with a l l aspects of water resources management, perhaps including provincial and federal o f f i c i a l s but only as a minority. The Implementation Agreement that emerged from the Implementation Task Force and the negotiations surrounding their work bears l i t t l e resemblance to the i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement for water management envisaged in the framework plan. The Implementation Agreement i s a contract between the federal government and the prov i n c i a l government. The l o c a l governments, either as municipalities or regional d i s t r i c t s , are not included in the arrangement. They are not a party to the Agreement, and they are not represented on the Implementation Board established to implement the Agreement. As noted previously, the Secretary-Manager of the Okanagan Basin Water Board (OBWB) was a nonvoting participant/observer on the Implementation Task Force. The 2 2 1 records of meetings of the Task Force and correspondence among members indicates that the Secretary-Manager represented l o c a l views only in a narrow technical sense, more as an advisor on l o c a l biophysical conditions than as a participant in reformulating water management objectives and actions. There was no e f f o r t to involve the l o c a l governments in the formulation of the Implementation Agreement. The Agreement was presented to the OBWB when i t was v i r t u a l l y a f a i t accompli. The Implementation Agreement proper makes reference to the regional authority when re f e r r i n g to sewage treatment grants under the National Housing Act wherein i t requires projects \"be included in the applicable program of the regional authority 1 1.* This gives the regional authority no authority at a l l since the same part of the Agreement requires that the federal and provincial governments consider a l l projects. The only reference l i n k i n g l o c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s with federa l - p r o v i n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i s Section I 6 ( j ) ( i i ) which charges the Implementation Board with the *It also includes regional authority in the d e f i n i t i o n s section wherein i t i s defined as the water management agency referred to in Recommendation Kb) as set out in Schedule B of the Agreement. 222 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to consult with and maintain coordination on measures for which the regional authority has r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in Schedule B. What implications does the Implementation Agreement have for l o c a l participation? Recommendation 1(b) i s restructured into a particular wherein B r i t i s h Columbia agrees to issue supplementary Letters Patent to the three Regional D i s t r i c t s in the Okanagan Basin so that the OBWB \"may e f f e c t i v e l y carry out water resource management functions that pertain to the Okanagan Basin as a whole, e s p e c i a l l y waste treatment, the orderly management of shoreline recreation and flood plain zoning. The B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Municipal A f f a i r s , upon a request by the three regional d i s t r i c t s , s h a l l issue these supplementary Letters Patent [see Recommendations 13 II, 13 IV, 30 and 41].\" But in the Agreement, the regional authority i s very s p e c i f i c a l l y limited to precisely these three areas. The Implementation Agreement requires that: 1. The regional authority s h a l l be responsible for acting as the coordinating agency in the implementation of flood plain zoning in the Okanagan Basin. 2. The regional authority, in consultation and cooperation with the responsible provincial department or agency and the Implementation Board s h a l l be responsible for the following duties with respect to sewage treatment projects and sewerage c o l l e c t i o n and disposal f a c i l i t i e s in the Okanagan Basin: (a) coordinating l o c a l planning and the development and scheduling of p r i o r i t i e s ; (b) considering and making recommendations to the Implementation Board concerning the adequacy of financing; and (c) determining that required treatment levels are being achieved and maintained. This particular gives the regional authority r e s p o n s i b i l i t y only for coordinating l o c a l planning and scheduling [ l o c a l in t h i s case meaning individual m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ] . This i s compared with the recommendation from the framework plan that stated: \"The regional authority for water resources management be given the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the construction, operation, maintenance and financing of a l l sewage treatment plants in the Basin, subject to permits issued by the Government of Canada.\" The reduction in r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in th i s instance i s very great indeed. 224 3. The r e g i o n a l a u t h o r i t y s h a l l act as the c o o r d i n a t i n g agency i n the implementation of those recommendations of the framework plan i n v o l v i n g s h o r e l i n e r e c r e a t i o n a l management. The Agreement also r e q u i r e s the r e g i o n a l a u t h o r i t y to e s t a b l i s h L i a i s o n Committees for ad v i s i n g i n the areas of land use management, n u t r i e n t c o n t r o l , erosion and s h o r e l i n e management [see Recommendations 22, 36 I I I and 41]. The Implementation Agreement r e q u i r e s that the r e g i o n a l a u t h o r i t y implement p o l i c i e s i n waste treatment, s h o r e l i n e management and flood p l a i n zoning. These are t r a d i t i o n a l areas of l o c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . A l l r e g i o n a l d i s t r i c t s i n B r i t i s h Columbia were charged with these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s so that the Implementation Agreement breaks no new ground i n t h i s area. The Agreement does not provide a r o l e for r e g i o n a l involvement i n water q u a n t i t y management at a l l , nor any e f f e c t i v e r o l e i n water q u a l i t y management [ i t s r o l e merely one of c o o r d i n a t i n g l o c a l a c t i v i t i e s ] . The Implementation Agreement e s s e n t i a l l y disregards the promise of the framework plan of r e g i o n a l c o n t r o l of r e g i o n a l problems and instead simply r e - a s s e r t s the status quo. 5.3-3 Flood Control Works - A Change i n A c t i v i t i e s Almost 50 percent of the cost-shared budget a l l o c a t i o n i n the Implementation Agreement i s for s t r u c t u r a l works which f a l l i n t o the category of Okanagan fl o o d c o n t r o l works. The 225 p o r t i o n of the framework plan which r e l a t e s to t h i s aspect i s recommendation 13'-\"that the gates on Okanagan and Skaha Lakes be improved to avoid i c i n g during the winter and erosion and bank p r o t e c t i o n works be b u i l t around some drop s t r u c t u r e s along Okanagan River.\" This seemingly minor recommendation became the b a s i s for the major focus of the Implementation Agreement. The o r i g i n a l Okanagan f l o o d c o n t r o l works were constructed i n the 1950s under a Canada-British Columbia fl o o d c o n t r o l agreement cost-shared on a 50/50 b a s i s . The Province of B r i t i s h Columbia contended that the works were not properly constructed, that i s , the design standards of some s p e c i f i c p r o j e c t s were not met, and consequently, the Province was faced with higher than necessary operation and maintenance c o s t s . Based on t h i s argument, another j o i n t Canada-British Columbia agreement was signed. The new agreement, known as the Okanagan Flood Control P r o j e c t Agreement, signed on March 16, 1960, provided for the f e d e r a l government to reimburse B r i t i s h Columbia annually for h a l f of the operation and maintenance costs of the f l o o d c o n t r o l system. By the mid-1970s, the annual c o n t r i b u t i o n of the f e d e r a l government for t h i s program, through the Department of Public Works, was $50,000. The annual c o n t r i b u t i o n of funds for operation and maintenance of p u b l i c works under p r o v i n c i a l 226 ownership was contrary to f e d e r a l p o l i c y i n the 1970s. When recommendation 13 came up for n e g o t i a t i o n , the f e d e r a l o f f i c i a l s viewed t h i s as an opportunity to b r i n g the Okanagan in t o l i n e with f e d e r a l p o l i c y . They proposed to the Province t h a t , under the Implementation Agreement, they would go much fur t h e r than contemplated i n the framework plan ( i . e . , recommendation 13) and would b r i n g a l l of the substandard f l o o d c o n t r o l works i n the Okanagan up to a mutually acceptable l e v e l to be funded on a 50/50 cost-shared b a s i s . In exchange for t h i s , the 1960 operation and maintenance cost - s h a r i n g agreement would be d i s s o l v e d . The i n c e n t i v e s for the Province to agree to t h i s were: (a) the works would probably have to be upgraded to the proposed l e v e l i n the future and there was no guarantee of f e d e r a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n such an undertaking, and (b) the t o t a l cost of operating and maintaining the works a f t e r c o n s t r u c t i o n to the new standard would probably be l e s s than the current p r o v i n c i a l share. While the records i n d i c a t e that t h i s d e c i s i o n was based p r i m a r i l y on the d e s i r e to standardize f e d e r a l p o l i c y , i t was not the only reason. An i n t e r n a l f e d e r a l document, dated August 28, 1975, argued that while the t o t a l cost of the fl o o d c o n t r o l aspect was estimated at $2.0 m i l l i o n ($1.0 m i l l i o n f e d e r a l share), the long-run f i n a n c i a l saving to the f e d e r a l government was estimated to be $900,000, and economic b e n e f i t s of a reduction i n p o t e n t i a l f l o o d l o s s e s estimated at $1.8 m i l l i o n would also be achieved. On May 29, 1975, the Implementation Task Force reported to the Senior Committee that agreement on t h i s point had been reached and the 1960 Agreement would be terminated on March 31, 1976. However, when the Implementation Agreement was in i t s f i n a l draft stage (September 1975), the Province wanted to change t h i s decision so as not to terminate the Agreement u n t i l the modifications to the flood control system had been completed. The Province argued that recent events and circumstances suggested that the proposed works may not be completed on schedule because of funding d i f f i c u l t i e s and thus the Province may be l e f t with nothing: incomplete works and no operation and maintenance cost-sharing. This scenario suggested they would have to shoulder the t o t a l annual operation and maintenance costs and the works would s t i l l be substandard. The federal government argued that the March 31, 1976, date had been previously agreed to, and since the federal government had every intention of proceeding d i r e c t l y with the works agreed to in the Implementation Agreement, the March 31 date should be maintained. The Province concurred providing, in exchange, there was federal agreement to a clause which stated that the Province would have sole d i s c r e t i o n as to the manner in which a l l the works pertaining to the flood control project would be operated. Agreement was reached with the provision that the federal government 228 was advised of the operating plan of the system and that t h i s plan took into account the recommendations r e l a t i n g to operating l e v e l s contained in the Implementation Agreement. f Structural flood control works thus became the major focus of the Okanagan Basin Implementation Agreement. A planning study which came about through a concern for water shortages and water quality was to be implemented as a program of flood control works. 5.4 STRATEGIES FOR UNCERTAINTY In terms of recommendations which touch on the area of managing uncertainties, the Implementation Agreement e s s e n t i a l l y embodies the p o l i c i e s recommended in the framework plan and does not go beyond the thinking described in the previous chapter. The par t i c u l a r s require that monitoring programs be undertaken which are capable of producing data such that the response of the water resource to the management measures implemented pursuant to the Agreement can be adequately assessed. But the Implementation Agreement does not specify what aspects should be monitored nor any d e t a i l s on what kinds of monitoring a c t i v i t y might be pursued. These decisions are l e f t to the d i s c r e t i o n of the Implementation Board. In terms of socioeconomic uncertainties, i t i s clear that the decision-makers involved in developing the Implementation Agreement did not wish to encourage any change. The Agreement was negotiated from the viewpoint that the decisions on what to do had been taken in the planning phase and the purpose of implementation was to undertake s p e c i f i c actions. The o f f i c i a l s involved viewed the implementation phase as , a technical exercise requiring technical expertise. There were no questions of views or values on emerging issues. In fact, there was some concern that allowing l o c a l representation in the process of developing the Agreement would muddy the water with the introduction of new problems and elements and thereby constrain the a b i l i t y of the authoritative public agencies to get on with the job. Es s e n t i a l l y , the i m p l i c i t strategy respecting a f l u i d s o c i a l s ituation was to treat the problem as s t a t i c and simply not accept any new information. In essence, the Implementation Agreement embodied the thinking on uncertainties developed in the framework plan. There was recognition that not everything was known, and therefore taking the pragmatic approach, the Agreement was written so that the parties, upon a recommendation of the Implementation Board, could modify any recommendation/particular and add new items i f they so agreed 230 (Section 2.2). This provided an avenue for change, but there is no evidence to indicate that the decision-makers had a coherent strategy for dealing with uncertainties. By and large, most things were firmly established. At the end of 10 years, the situation would be reconsidered and a new set of decisions taken. This was r e a l l y the sum t o t a l of a strategy for dealing with uncertainties. 5.5 FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR CHANGES The process model presented in Chapter 3 hypothesizes a number of variables which are important in determining the decisions taken in the various stages of the implementation process. This section w i l l attempt to define the influence of particular variables in bringing about the observed changes which resulted during the negotiations toward the Implementation Agreement. It i s clear from the following discussion that these variables are in t e r r e l a t e d , and in practice, i t i s often d i f f i c u l t to i s o l a t e s p e c i f i c variables. Nonetheless, the discussion w i l l attempt to specify individual influences recognizing that the d e f i n i t i o n s may apply p a r t i a l l y to other variables as well. The order of discussion w i l l proceed from s p e c i f i c points to more general influences. 231 5.5.1 Policy Objectives The recommendations of the framework plan seemed clear enough when the plan was presented to the respective governments for implementation. Interviews with members of the Consultative Board responsible for developing the framework plan indicated their s i n c e r i t y in putting forward p o l i c i e s aimed at providing a pivotal role for regional authorities in a comprehensive water management process and implementation of the recommendations outlined in the plan. But the objectives of the p o l i t i c a l decision-makers are not so clear. There i s no record of either the federal or provi n c i a l government accepting the recommendations of the framework plan. There i s evidence to indicate federal p o l i t i c i a n s were anxious to have something implemented in order to have a concrete example of a c t i v i t y under the Canada Water Act. But there are no indications of s p e c i f i c intentions . The Task Force established to negotiate an implementation agreement was given very loose i n s t r u c t i o n s . They were to negotiate an operational agreement based on the framework plan. As discussed previously, the recommendations of the framework plan were, in many instances, ambiguous and thus open to interpretation. Since the negotiators were not bound by s p e c i f i c constraints, they were able to interpret 232 a l l of the framework plan, and in the s p i r i t of operationalizing planning recommendations, they were free to alter the plan as deemed necessary and as could be agreed upon. The lack of clear d i r e c t i o n respecting policy objectives meant that i t could be expected that the Implementation Agreement would be a pragmatic document shaped by the other factors which determine policy decisions. These are discussed below. 5.5.2 Policy Stakes The changes that occurred from the framework plan to the Implementation Agreement appear to have been influenced to a considerable extent by the perception of the bureaucratic actors that the stakes involved in the Okanagan were high. There appears to have been a perception that the framework plan was recommending a r a d i c a l change in the way water management was undertaken in B r i t i s h Columbia. The most important item of concern respecting t h i s high stakes game was the question of j u r i s d i c t i o n . Responsibility for implementation of the various recommendations of the framework plan was assigned during the negotiations using the conservative c r i t e r i o n of current j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . This meant that the l i o n ' s share of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y went to the Province. This d i v i s i o n 2 3 3 of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was put forward very early in negotiations as a f i r s t - c u t working base but was maintained throughout the negotiation phase and formed part of the Implementation Agreement. Out of a t o t a l bf 6 3 p a r t i c u l a r s l a i d out in the draft Agreement, 42 were deemed to be solely p r o v i n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . This amounts to two-thirds of the t o t a l program. There are no p a r t i c u l a r s for which the federal government i s solely responsible. There are 12 p a r t i c u l a r s in which B r i t i s h Columbia and Canada are j o i n t l y involved. Of these, eight relate to the provision of sewage treatment f a c i l i t i e s , and here the federal involvement i s limited to funding a portion of the c a p i t a l cost under a national program pursuant to Part VIII of the National Housing Act.* In addition, eight particulars to be implemented by the Province also require that the federal government, through the Department of Indian A f f a i r s and Northern Development, recommend to the Indian bands in the Okanagan Basin that they adopt p o l i c i e s similar to those being implemented by the Prov ince. *In t h i s respect, federal involvement i s no d i f f e r e n t than in any other part of Canada where NHA funds are provided to a s s i s t in the construction of municipal sewage treatment plants. Only programs to be carried out j o i n t l y , under the auspices of the Implementation Board, (nine p a r t i c u l a r s in tot a l ) were to be cost-shared. This r e s p o n s i b i l i t y breakdown meant that the fears expressed by the Province prior to i n i t i a t i n g the framework plan study respecting j u r i s d i c t i o n a l intrusion were being r e a l i z e d . The Province was being put in the position of providing funding for and implementing p o l i c i e s over which i t has sole j u r i s d i c t i o n , but p o l i c i e s which had been j o i n t l y formulated and, consequently, bore the mark of federal influence. As noted in Chapter 4, the Province of B r i t i s h Columbia had long viewed any overtures from Ottawa with a very suspicious eye. It was clear early in the negotiation of the Okanagan Agreement that the federal government had l i t t l e j u r i s d i c t i o n r e l a t i n g to the policy issues in the Okanagan Basin. It would appear that the Province recognized t h i s and pursued a strategy to maximize i t s gains from federal involvement and minimize federal intrusion into i t s policy-making sphere. In an attempt to counter what was viewed as an unwelcome federal influence in i t s policy domain, the Province insisted that the Implementation Agreement be drafted in such a manner that i t would be the par t i c u l a r s of a recommendation that would be implemented rather than the recommendation i t s e l f . In practice, what t h i s meant was modifying recommendations which required s p e c i f i c policy action into p a r t i c u l a r s which stated only that a study on the problem would be undertaken or that discussions would be i n i t i a t e d to consider a solution to the problem alluded to in the study recommendations. In t h i s way, the Province agreed only to look at the problem and thus avoided federal involvement in deciding the outcome. The second step in the provincial argument was to argue that, in those areas where implementation r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was clear-cut, i t was l o g i c a l that the responsible l e v e l of government ought to be solely responsible for funding the implementation of those s p e c i f i c p a r t i c u l a r s for which i t had sole j u r i s d i c t i o n . The c o r o l l a r y of t h i s argument was that there ought to be j o i n t implementation of those aspects in which there i s c l e a r l y j o i n t interest and thus j o i n t funding. This argument had i t s drawbacks in that the appeal of 50 percent cost-sharing was removed from the majority of the recommendations. But the Province was c l e a r l y anxious to maintain u n i l a t e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n and was w i l l i n g to forego t h i s benefit. 236 Even w i t h i n the terms of the Agreement r e s p e c t i n g cost-shared programs, f e d e r a l involvement was c l e a r l y c i rcumscribed. Of a t o t a l budget for cost-shared programs of $5 m i l l i o n , one-half i s a l l o c a t e d to the Okanagan fl o o d c o n t r o l works, and the other h a l f of the funds a l l o c a t e d as f o l l o w s : A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Implementation Agreement $ 640,000 Monitoring Water Q u a l i t y 570,000 Monitoring Impact Of Plan 578,000 Adjusting Intake Levels ., 646,000 Water Quantity Model Studies 41,000 Bank S t a b i l i z a t i o n Studies 25,000 TOTAL $2,500,000 Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n of a j o i n t agreement would obviously be cost-shared. Monitoring of water q u a l i t y c o n d i t i o n s i n the Basin over time involves few p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and t r a d i t i o n a l l y , the f e d e r a l government had played a research r o l e i n t h i s area. Monitoring the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the planning and implementation processes i s again a reasonable a c t i v i t y to be j o i n t l y undertaken since the Agreement under review i s f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l . This does not, i t turns out, inv o l v e much i n the way of policy-making, although the p o t e n t i a l for t h i s c e r t a i n l y e x i s t s . The water qu a n t i t y model s t u d i e s and bank s t a b i l i z a t i o n studies were agreements for s t u d i e s only and did not in v o l v e any agreement as to a c t i o n . Only the item regarding adjustment of intake l e v e l s involved concrete a c t i o n . This i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the flo o d c o n t r o l system i n that the operating range of the lake system was to be expanded, and t h e r e f o r e , j o i n t funding of p r o j e c t s to a l l e v i a t e problems created by t h i s was a reasonable expectation. Federal o f f i c i a l s had d i f f i c u l t y countering the strong p r o v i n c i a l views because they had l i t t l e of substance upon which to base an argument for a stronger f e d e r a l presence i n water resource management. The Okanagan was but a s i n g l e case i n a general longer running c o n s t i t u t i o n a l disagreement r e s p e c t i n g water resources between Canada and B r i t i s h Columbia, which surfaced again during the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the Canada Water Act (CWA). Woodrow (1974, p. 273) points out t h a t , i n the l a t e 1960s, even before the f e d e r a l M i n i s t e r of Energy, Mines and Resources had been able to present h i s proposals with regard to the CWA, there was evidence that p r o v i n c i a l o p p o s i t i o n was c r y s t a l l i z i n g . He w r i t e s : \"The province c i t e d 'inadequate f i n a n c i a l support' as the main obstacle to undertaking water management and p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l a c t i v i t i e s and expressed concern over any i n v a s i o n of t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y i n these f i e l d s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the provinces argued that they should r e t a i n 'the sole r i g h t to i n i t i a t e , develop and maintain' water resources w i t h i n t h e i r boundaries and they objected to 'the i n c r e a s i n g trend on the part of the f e d e r a l government to move i n t o the f i e l d s of water resources and p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l with l a r g e amounts of money to run d u p l i c a t e or p a r a l l e l programs' ... A tug-of-war between the f e d e r a l government and c e r t a i n provinces, p r i m a r i l y Ontario, B r i t i s h Columbia and Quebec, was c l e a r l y developing.\" 238 B r i t i s h Columbia's opposition to increased federal p a r t i c i p a t i o n was consistent. At a federal-provincial conference in December 1967, the Premier of B r i t i s h Columbia argued that the major federal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y regarding water management and pollution control ought to be in research and the improvement of technology. Woodrow ( 1974 , p. 298) notes that, in August 1969, when the substance of the Canada Water Act was made public: \"the province of B r i t i s h Columbia, through i t s Minister of Lands, Forests, and Water Resources, Mr. Ray W i l l i s t o n , described the federal proposals as another Ottawa intrusion into the provincial f i e l d but indicated that his province would cooperate with the federal government, although only in the manner as 'when someone points a revolver at your head'.\" Provincial opposition continued, and although the federal government made strenuous attempts to oversee the water management function in Canada, i t achieved a much lesser goal as Woodrow ( 1974 , p. 541) describes: \"The rapid r i s e of the pollution issue brought pressure to bear on the federal government to intervene more d i r e c t l y in matters of pollution control and as a consequence to impinge upon matters of established p r o v i n c i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . Increased reliance on the federal 'spending power' and on i t s modest regulatory authority offered one possible course of action while the use of the 'peace, order and good government' clause to pursue joi n t f ederal-provincial solutions to pollution problems represented a more r a d i c a l and far-reaching intervention. In p a r t i c u l a r , p r o v i n c i a l governments in Ontario, Quebec and B r i t i s h Columbia found themselves under very much the same pressures , as the federal government to 2 3 9 respond to the pollution issue but, for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l as well as more pragmatic reasons, they found i t necessary to raise s t i f f opposition to any hint of federal intervention. While the p r o v i n c i a l governments could not d i r e c t l y block federal policy and programs, they were able to exercise a powerful influence on their development and e s p e c i a l l y on their implementation. The p r o v i n c i a l governments were able to frustrate federal e f f o r t s to effect c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change in the handling of pollution control along the l i n e s of a de facto \"concurrent power\", although the federal government was somewhat more successful in reconstructing the machinery for f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l r e l a t i o n s in t h i s area. As well, resistance on the part of p r o v i n c i a l governments was instrumental in prompting the federal government to retreat from i t s o r i g i n a l managerial strategy for c o n t r o l l i n g pollution and in gaining greater recognition of p r o v i n c i a l interests and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in regard to the federal government's regulatory strategy. In e f f e c t , increasing integration of the decisional system at both l e v e l s of government gave r i s e to substantial c o n f l i c t between the federal and p r o v i n c i a l governments but eventually resulted in accommodations which worked primarily in favour of the l a t t e r . \" By the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , the Canada Water Act had shifted in purpose from comprehensive water management to a preoccupation with pollution control.* This s h i f t in emphasis created a vacuum in water management. Nonetheless, evidence from interviews indicates that federal o f f i c i a l s on the Inland Waters Directorate considered i t very important that an implementation agreement covering the Okanagan be *The fact that the CWA has never been used for pollution control does not detract from the evidence that i t s purpose c l e a r l y shifted to a concern for pollution c o n t r o l . signed as evidence that the CWA was ali v e and functioning in the area of water resources management. The substance of such an Agreement was of secondary importance. This explains, in part, why federal negotiators were w i l l i n g to forego a broader federal presence in managing the Okanagan s i t u a t i o n . Aside from the point that i t i s v i r t u a l l y certain that the Province would not have allowed a greater federal r o l e , signing an Agreement which provided for a federal-provincial Implementation Board met the federal objective of maintaining a CWA flagship. The fact that the Agreement in no way furthered federal-provincial cooperation from the status quo situation was c e r t a i n l y not enunciated and perhaps has not been appreciated by many participants and observer s. Thus, the stakes were considered high. The Province was unwilling to allow s i g n i f i c a n t federal intrusion into water resources management. This was a s i g n i f i c a n t factor leading to the maintenance of a status quo s i t u a t i o n . The federal government also perceived high stakes. They wanted and needed an Implementation Agreement to which they could point as evidence of cooperative federalism f a c i l i t a t e d through the Canada Water Act. In concert with pr o v i n c i a l objectives, they were s a t i s f i e d with achieving the objective of a signed agreement and did not strenuously contest the substance of that agreement in terms of policy j u r i s d i c t i o n . 241 5.5-3 Implementing Actors The influence of the values, objectives, perceptions and communication methods of those involved in the Implementation Agreement negotiations were very s i g n i f i c a n t in bringing about the observed changes. The objectives of the actors were c r u c i a l . These objectives embodied the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l stances of the two leve l s of government. Based on interview data, i t i s evident that the negotiators i d e n t i f i e d with the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l positions of their respective lev e l s of government. The individuals had a long history of involvement in federal-provincial water management issues, and the records covering the negotiations indicate that the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l positions were ably represented. As just described under the heading of 'stakes', the federal negotiators had the primary objective of reaching an agreement. They were f u l l y aware of the weakness of their position in j u r i s d i c t i o n a l terms and therefore had to devise an agreement which the Province would consider worthy of j o i n t signature. The desire to f a i t h f u l l y implement the recommendations of the framework plan does not appear to have been a major federal objective. The major incentive to the Province to sign an implementation agreement was the a v a i l a b i l i t y of federal funds to cost-share implementation. Consequently, i t was a f a i r l y easy step to move toward a program which envisaged cost-sharing in areas not involving policy issues. In t h i s regard, a secondary federal objective came into the l i m e l i g h t . It was discussed previously that the federal government wished to extricate i t s e l f from an undesirable arrangement with the Province concerning the Okanagan flood control works. This federal objective became a central feature in shaping the Implementation Agreement. It was successfully argued that the federal proposition was also in the best interests of the Province. The objective of the provincial actors to maintain pr o v i n c i a l control of water resources v i s - a - v i s the federal government was also a s i g n i f i c a n t factor as just discussed. It i s c r i t i c a l to understand the importance of t h i s factor. The objectives of the framework plan were devised to optimally manage the water resources in the Okanagan, but when i t came to developing an implementation program, the more important objective of maintaining provincial j u r i s d i c t i o n surfaced and thwarted attempts for greater federal influence. [This i s not to say that optimal water management necessarily required a greater degree of federal p a r t i c i p a t i o n but only that provincial o f f i c i a l s were not w i l l i n g to contemplate federal p a r t i c i p a t i o n in policy areas which they considered to be in the provincial domain.] 243 The same i s true for the limited p a r t i c i p a t i o n of l o c a l interests in the Implementation Agreement. The objective of provincial o f f i c i a l s was to maintain an e s s e n t i a l l y status quo s i t u a t i o n . They were not opposed to the regional d i s t r i c t s in the Okanagan Basin forming a single authoritative organization for water management purposes but were not w i l l i n g to give t h i s organization any authority beyond that afforded to other regional d i s t r i c t s in B r i t i s h Columbia. In terms of the values of the actors, based upon interview data, i t i s evident that there existed a consensus among the federal and provincial participants that water resources management was e s s e n t i a l l y a technical problem best handled by those with technical expertise. The s h i f t from a broad-based comprehensive water management process to a contractual arrangement for providing public works i s consistent with the value framework of the key implementing actors. These values appear to stem from their training and exper ience. The organizations and the individuals involved in negotiating the Agreement were experienced in water resources engineering, and thus, i t i s not surprising that the Agreement evolved into a program dominated by engineering problems and solutions. The process model hypothesized that the values of the dominant actors would shape the process to 244 f i t t heir view of the world. The problem in the Okanagan was redefined to match what the key actors considered most important and redefined to an area where they had expertise and a reasonable hope of successfully solving the problem. The t r a c t a b i l i t y of the water resource management problem was e s s e n t i a l l y bounded by the Implementation Agreement. It was defined so as to permit solution. Those parts of the larger problem that were uncertain or more d i f f i c u l t to manage were, by and large, l e f t out of the Agreement. The more d i f f i c u l t questions of nutrient control, land use management, nitrogen removal and aquatic weeds were not subjects addressed to any extent by the Implementation Agreement. The other side of the coin i s obviously that the negotiation process was r e s t r i c t e d to the engineering viewpoint of the implementing actors. Whereas the framework plan involved a range of d i s c i p l i n e s in i t s formulation, the Implementation Agreement lacked t h i s input. This was undoubtedly s i g n i f i c a n t in r e s t r i c t i n g the range of the Agreement. Given the r e l a t i v e l y antagonistic relationship between the federal and provincial governments, i t was not unexpected that there would be strenuous negotiations, but i t i s perhaps more surprising that an agreement was reached at a l l . There 245 appeared to be r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e dissension among the actors as to what ought to be done or how i t was to be accomplished t e c h n i c a l l y . The negotiations l a r g e l y centred around who was going to do what and what the timing ought to be. The common value stance of provincial and federal negotiators c l e a r l y f a c i l i t a t e d negotiations. In addition to providing a common understanding of the problem, i t provided a common language for discussion. The actors were able to communicate e f f e c t i v e l y on an informal basis to some extent. Personal and long-standing relationships between negotiators c e r t a i n l y f a c i l i t a t e d discussions. Most of the individuals involved in the Okanagan were also involved in other j o i n t f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l projects in the water resources f i e l d . These other projects, including the Fraser flood control program as well as work in the Nicomekl and Serpentine Rivers system and beginnings of work on managing the Fraser estuary, gave the o f f i c i a l s the opportunity to get to know one another better but also the chance to understand each other's agenda and p r i o r i t i e s . The t o t a l agenda facing the two governments was c r i t i c a l in shaping the ultimate outcome. In terms of negotiations, i t was also c r i t i c a l for the individuals to be aware Of the other's commitments and work p r i o r i t i e s . It would appear that such an understanding was in effect during the negotiation of the Implementation Agreement. This i s not to 246 suggest that the n e g o t i a t o r s were weakened i n any way because of t h i s atmosphere of understanding. There i s no evidence to suggest the p o s i t i o n s taken changed because of personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; but the n e g o t i a t i o n process i t s e l f proceeded because of a good working r e l a t i o n s h i p between the various i n d i v i d u a l s . While an agreement was reached i n l a r g e part because of the l i m i t e d and mutual viewpoint of the p a r t i c i p a n t s , t h i s f a c t o r must also be considered a major drawback. The lack of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a range of agencies and l o c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the n e g o t i a t i o n process meant that the Agreement was l i m i t e d i n scope and did not f u l f i l l the promise embodied i n the framework plan. 5.5.4 Interested Actors The change from a c e n t r a l r o l e for a r e g i o n a l a u t h o r i t y to a r e l a t i v e l y minor r o l e can, i n p a r t , be traced to a c t i o n s of i n t e r e s t e d a c t o r s . It w i l l be r e c a l l e d that the main recommendation of the framework plan i n t h i s regard was: \"That the boundaries of the present Regional D i s t r i c t s of North Okanagan, Central Okanagan and Okanagan-Similkameen be redrawn to create a s i n g l e Okanagan Basin Regional D i s t r i c t having boundaries coi n c i d e n t with those of the watershed, to be. r e s p o n s i b l e for those water resource management fun c t i o n s that p e r t a i n to the V a l l e y as a whole and i n p a r t i c u l a r the implementation of those recommendations i n t h i s report that are Valley-wide i n scope, e s p e c i a l l y waste treatment, the o r d e r l y development of s h o r e l i n e r e c r e a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s , and f l o o d p l a i n zoning.\" 247 and an option which was stated in the plan and based on a proposal developed by the three Regional D i s t r i c t s in the Okanagan was: \"That the Okanagan Basin Water Board be reconstructed and Letters Patent amended to give the Board authority to carry out water resource management functions described above.\" This option came about because of strenuous objections from the l o c a l p o l i t i c i a n s concerning the former recommendations. They did not want another regional body with authority and were absolutely unwilling to go along with plans to remove powers then vested with the individual municipalities in the Okanagan Basin. The l o c a l residents' groups as represented by the Pa r t i c i p a t i o n Task Force, on the other hand, were the major proponents of Recommendation 1. The l o c a l p o l i t i c i a n s won their point. They c l e a r l y articulated a position to the federal and provincial decision-makers arguing the problems of another l e v e l of government and the confusion of overlapping j u r i s d i c t i o n s for water and not other resources. These arguments were put forward at a time when the Province was reviewing two major policy areas: one, the reg i o n a l i z a t i o n of integrated resource management; and two, the role and functions of regional d i s t r i c t s . Because of t h i s , the Implementation Agreement opted for the simplest solution which was the optional recommendation which e s s e n t i a l l y maintained the status quo. The c i t i z e n groups did not seem to maintain their momentum after the framework plan was completed. A plausible explanation for t h i s put forward in interviews by some Of the ci t i z e n s involved i s that the interested public in the Okanagan had expended v i r t u a l l y a l l of i t s available 'discretionary' energy on the framework planning study and simply assumed that implementation would be a f a i t h f u l representation of that study. It i s quite l i k e l y that they f e l l into a variation of the f a l l a c y of good process, which might be called the f a l l a c y of assuming f a i t h f u l implementation. They did not continue to make clear representations to the implementors whereas their adversaries did, and consequently, the l o c a l c i t i z e n s l o s t much of the ground that had been won in the framework plan. The records do not indicate that the negotiators actually put up ba r r i e r s to communication with outside inter e s t s , but i t i s clear they were not receptive to hearing new ideas and therefore did not a c t i v e l y s o l i c i t input. Rather, i t appears that members of the public did not r e a l l y attempt to participate in the negotiation process. The l o c a l representative on the Implementation Task Force was given no instructions or di r e c t i o n and was not lobbied by l o c a l i n t e r e s t s . It was not the lack of c a p a b i l i t y to communicate with implementors, but rather the lack of communication per se which resulted in the loss of influence that l o c a l groups had exhibited in the planning phase. To a s i g n i f i c a n t degree, therefore, the major change that came about in terms of proposed i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements resulted from s p e c i f i c l o c a l interests successfully arguing against the proposal, and i t appears they were not countered to any s i g n i f i c a n t degree by arguments in favour of the o r i g i n a l recommendation. 5.5.5 Decision-Making Environment The negotiations culminating in the Implementation Agreement seem to have been e f f e c t i v e l y dominated by pro v i n c i a l i n t e r e s t s . What sort of negotiating environment existed, and how did t h i s influence decisions? The evidence indicates that the Province was able to maintain a very tight policy front by involving only a very few senior o f f i c i a l s in the Environment department. Two or three senior o f f i c i a l s made a l l the key decisions respecting negotiation points, and these same o f f i c i a l s composed the front l i n e in dealing with the federal government. There was no leakage of authority nor any possible loss of context through communications or interpretation of meaning. The Province's policy position was very clear with respect to water resources v i s - a - v i s federal involvement, and thi s was consistently maintained throughout the negotiation process. Agencies other than those d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the 250 negotiations were not consulted on policy matters and were not involved in any decisions respecting the Implementation Agreement.* The Province operated on the assumption that those agencies involved in the study phase would also p a r t i c i a t e in the implementation phase. But there was no mechanism established for t h i s to take place in a smooth fashion. The cost estimates for programs to be carried out by such prov i n c i a l agencies as Recreation and Conservation, e.g., boating regulations, Fish and W i l d l i f e , and Pollution Control, were devised by Water Investigations Branch s t a f f with l i t t l e or no consultation with these other agencies. It appears that the Environment Department maintained a monopoly on involvement in the negotiation process and in terms of information respecting i t s outcome. *This meant that the provincial Department of Environment made tentative commitments for action without direct consultation with the s p e c i f i c implementing agencies. Leach ( 1 9 7 8 , p. 8 ) notes: \" i t was assumed at the time that each of the two senior governments would undertake the required l i a i s o n work with the responsible federal or provi n c i a l and/or l o c a l government agencies in getting the programs underway. A number of these responsible agencies had participated in the development of the recommendations under the Okanagan Study and i t was assumed they, in turn, would be prepared to finance the programs through normal budgeting.\" 251 Provincial o f f i c i a l s revealed during interviews that, rather than exhibiting a blind reluctance to inform other provincial agencies, there was a recognition that, at the negotiation stage, no real commitments could be exacted from potential participants. It was suggested that involvement at t h i s stage would lead to excessive expectations because the commitments made are not taken seriously, and consequently, agencies may agree to a program, which on the outside appeared worthwhile, but one which they could not r e a l i s t i c a l l y d e l i v e r . The Province took the view that r e f i n i n g of programs takes place only when the programs are operating and s p e c i f i c individuals have r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for carrying out particular actions. The federal negotiators adopted a more interdepartmental consultative management s t y l e . The federal Interdepartmental Committee on Water was the policy body responsible for clearing decisions on the draft Agreement. Consequently, substantial e f f o r t had to be devoted to coordinating the concerns Of departments involved in t h i s committee and feeding information to the Committee for decisions. Within the federal system, some controversy arose over the singular involvement of the Department of the Environment. The Department of Indian A f f a i r s and Northern Development perceived that i t had a large stake in the 252 Implementation Agreement and, consequently, wanted r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on the Implementation Board e s t a b l i s h e d under the Implementation Agreement. This request was expressed through the ICW, and i t was resolved at t h i s l e v e l t h a t , for reasons of e f f i c i e n c y , i t was deemed best that only one M i n i s t e r be given f e d e r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for implementing the Agreement. The Environment P r o t e c t i o n Service of the f e d e r a l DOE was brought i n t o the p i c t u r e i n A p r i l 1975, because of i t s perceived r o l e i n water q u a l i t y monitoring and f i s h e r i e s . Throughout the n e g o t i a t i o n process, numerous f e d e r a l agencies were contacted i n c l u d i n g the Small Craft Harbours Branch of the Department Of Public Works, the Department of Regional Economic Expansion, the P a c i f i c Environment I n s t i t u t e and the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, but these agencies played a very minor r o l e i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s . Discussions i n previous s e c t i o n s concerned with the f a c t o r s accounting for the observed changes from the plan to the Implementation Agreement have shown that the n e g o t i a t i o n s took place i n an atmosphere of s t r o n g l y held p r o v i n c i a l views but between i n d i v i d u a l s who \"spoke the same language\". The n e g o t i a t i o n s were, by and l a r g e , amiable, designed to move i n t o the a c t i o n phase where the dominant actors f e l t more comfortable. But the outcome does also appear to have been molded to some extent by the a c t u a l s t y l e of decision-making within the individual organizations. The p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l s appear to have been able to dominate the decisions because of their unified and unrelenting positions. The federal o f f i c i a l s , on the other hand, were weakened somewhat by water management policy s h i f t s that occurred during the course of the negotiations and by their more cumbersome decision-making process. 5 . 5 . 6 Policy Environment As just noted, the outcome of the negotiations was influenced by changes in the policy environment. The actual impact of t h i s was f e l t by the federal negotiators in the d i f f i c u l t i e s they experienced in defining a federal water management position. But perhaps of more significance to the whole implementation process was the general cooling of environmental concerns from being on the p o l i t i c a l front burner to a much less prominent position. The implication of t h i s cooling was a greatly reduced commitment to comprehensive water management on the part of the federal government and a reduced resources commitment from both leve l s of government. The impression from the framework plan was that the Okanagan situation was pressing and extraordinary e f f o r t s had to be taken to turn the situation around. By 1976, the governments were not w i l l i n g to make large commitments to the 254 process. Half of the expenditures committed to the Implementation Agreement were to be used to solve a previous Ongoing problem concerning f l o o d c o n t r o l works. The remaining expenditures represented a f a i r l y small commitment given the scale of the problem o r i g i n a l l y envisaged. Thus, the s h i f t i n the p o l i c y environment had a d i r e c t impact on plans to implement the framework plan. I t i s not p o s s i b l e to document what would have happened i n the absence of such a s h i f t , but i t i s l i k e l y that a l a r g e r p o l i t i c a l and resource commitment would have been forthcoming and would have l i k e l y r e s u l t e d i n a d i f f e r e n t process. 5.5.7 Resources The Implementation Agreement was negotiated by f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l s w i t h i n the c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e i r normal operating budgets. Two i n d i v i d u a l s were assigned the task and given three months i n which to complete i t . But as described e a r l i e r , the time span expanded g r e a t l y and s i g n i f i c a n t l y l a r g e r amounts of bureaucratic resources were afforded to the process. Bureaucratic resources do not appear to have been a dominant f a c t o r i n shaping the n e g o t i a t i o n s as they were expanded to meet the demands of the n e g o t i a t i o n program. [This i s not to say that other resource c o n s t r a i n t s d i d not a f f e c t implementation, as discussed above. ] 255 One a d d i t i o n a l element i n t h i s category should be s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned. The framework plan recommended that a f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l implementation agreement should be developed. The use of an implementation agreement as the implementation mechanism was never questioned. The Implementation Task Force d i d not i n v e s t i g a t e a l t e r n a t e methods or arrangements for implementation. The fa c t that a formal agreement was used does not appear to have influenced the d e c i s i o n s r e s p e c t i n g what to implement. The Implementation Agreement was draft e d to meet the requirements of the Canada Water Act. Section 4 of the CWA r e q u i r e s a formal agreement and r e q u i r e s that such an agreement inc l u d e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t i m i n g , funding and implementation r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . But the Act does not i n any way s p e c i f y the substance of implementation a c t i o n s , and the ne g o t i a t o r s would not have been constrained or received guidance from the CWA i n n e g o t i a t i n g the Agreement. 5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS This chapter has demonstrated that the Implementation Agreement signed in February 1976, d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the Comprehensive Framework Plan i n terms of i n t e n t and emphasis. While the Implementation Agreement responded to a l l Of the recommendations i n the framework plan, these were r e - i n t e r p r e t e d through f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . The major differences included an erosion of the concept of comprehensive management of the Basin's water resources, erosion of the concept of l o c a l involvement and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the resource problems of the Okanagan Valley, and a major pre-occupation with structural flood control works designed to manage water l e v e l s but more importantly as a means of solving a bureaucratic anomaly. Analysis of the events and circumstances surrounding the negotiations of the Implementation Agreement which led to these differences suggested a number of factors which were responsible for shaping t h i s outcome. The stakes involved in the Okanagan situation were perceived by the participants to be s i g n i f i c a n t , and therefore, t h i s factor directed the behaviour Of the key actors to a large measure. The ambiguity of the policy objectives was important in allowing the negotiators a free hand to interpret the p o l i c i e s of the framework plan. The objectives and values of the implementing actors were found to be a major determinant in the decisions. The domination of the process by actors with a structural engineering viewpoint led to decisions oriented towards t h i s bias. The objectives of the actors and the organizations they represented dominated the negotiating process and led to abandoning many of the framework plan objectives and the substitution of their s p e c i f i c objectives. The interested actors did not represent a unified front, but rather two d i s t i n c t segments were i d e n t i f i e d which resulted in one viewpoint being accepted to the neglect of the values stressed in the framework plan. The decision-making environment, the policy environment and resources were also found to have played a role in shaping the decisions that resulted from the negotiation process. In terms of the structure of the implementation process, t h i s chapter has discussed the i n i t i a t i o n of implementation phase. The most s i g n i f i c a n t feature of t h i s phase was the r e d e f i n i t i o n of policy objectives and intentions. The p o l i c i e s of the framework plan were re-evaluated from an operational viewpoint and modified to f i t the needs and objectives of the implementors. The implementors were i d e n t i f i e d and they were able to cast the p o l i c i e s to be implemented into a mold with which they were comfortable. The objectives of the p o l i c i e s were modified very s i g n i f i c a n t l y , and i t i s these new objectives which would be pursued in the implementation action phase. A s p e c i f i c program for implementation was established based upon the r e d e f i n i t i o n of policy intentions. This program provides a d e f i n i t i o n of resources to be applied to the implementation e f f o r t and indications of timing for the actions. It w i l l serve as the basis for evaluating the adequacy bf the implementation process. In addition to a s p e c i f i c program for action, t h i s phase encompassed the establishment of the implementation mechanism. A formal fe d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l agreement was adopted to implement the Okanagan p o l i c i e s . This mechanism structures the actions Of the implementors, establishes some of the rules for the decision-making process, and defines the boundaries of the problem and the means which are to be applied toward i t s solut ion . i The next chapter w i l l describe the action that has been so c a r e f u l l y prepared and seek to understand the extent to which the scr i p t has been followed and the factors which account for f a i t h f u l a r t i c u l a t i o n or any observed deviations. S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t w i l l review in d e t a i l four s p e c i f i c cases of policy implementation within the framework of the Okanagan Basin Implementation Agreement.* The experience of implementing these p o l i c i e s w i l l be documented and analysed from the viewpoint of understanding why events turned out the way they did (and not some other way) and what factors might explain the outcome. *It w i l l be recognized that the examination of the four policy cases w i l l not cover the whole experience of implementation in the Okanagan. The cases were selected after consideration of the t o t a l experience as representative of the range of implementation concerns. Again, i t must be borne in mind that the purpose of t h i s research i s not to c r i t i c i z e water management in the Okanagan but to use the situa t i o n to i l l u s t r a t e important features of a policy implementation process. ! 259 CHAPTER 6 ACTIONS UNDER THE OKANAGAN BASIN IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT 6.1 INTRODUCTION The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to describe the implementation action phase of the implementation process. The structure model presented in Chapter 3 hypothesized that, during t h i s phase, a s p e c i f i c implementation program would be established and the various other components such as the objectives, p r i o r i t i e s , strategies for uncertainties and the implementation organization may be redefined as the action proceeds. S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s chapter w i l l document the a c t i v i t i e s undertaken regarding four policy areas. It w i l l provide a comparison between the policy outcome and the policy output to i d e n t i f y changes that occurred during implementation and describes the sequence of events leading to s p e c i f i c changes. It w i l l then indicate how and to what extent the determinants of policy outcome hypothesized in Chapter 3 were responsible for the observed outcomes. In order to set the stage for an examination of s p e c i f i c cases, i t w i l l be useful to describe the organization put in place to implement the Agreement. The organizational arrangements had some overriding influence in determining s p e c i f i c outcomes in each of the cases to be discussed. 260 6 . 2 ORGANIZATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION The f i r s t a n n u a l r e p o r t o f t h e O k a n a g a n B a s i n I m p l e m e n t a t i o n B o a r d , d a t e d J u n e 3 0 , 1 9 7 7 , d e s c r i b e s t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s s e t up t o i m p l e m e n t t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e I m p l e m e n t a t i o n A g r e e m e n t : \" F o l l o w i n g t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e A g r e e m e n t t h e M i n i s t e r s e a c h a p p o i n t e d t w o members t o f o r m t h e I m p l e m e n t a t i o n B o a r d . T h i s B o a r d was made r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e v a r i o u s c o s t s h a r e d p r o g r a m s r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e A g r e e m e n t , and f o r m a i n t a i n i n g c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s and a u t h o r i t i e s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r n o n - c o s t s h a r e d p r o g r a m s . In e a r l y 1977 t h e B o a r d e n g a g e d a P r o g r a m C o o r d i n a t o r and s e t up an i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f f i c e i n P e n t i c t o n , B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . \" The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s e v e n t u a l l y a g r e e d u p o n t o mee t t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e I m p l e m e n t a t i o n A g r e e m e n t i s shown i n F i g u r e 6 . 1 . I t c a n be s e e n f r o m t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r t t h a t t h e I m p l e m e n t a t i o n B o a r d m a i n t a i n s d i r e c t c o n t r o l o v e r t h e v a r i o u s p r o g r a m s t h r o u g h t h e P r o g r a m C o o r d i n a t o r ' s o f f i c e . The I m p l e m e n t a t i o n B o a r d r e c e i v e s t e c h n i c a l a d v i c e t h r o u g h t h e A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e w h i c h i s c o m p o s e d o f s e n i o r t e c h n i c a l p e r s o n n e l f r o m e a c h l e v e l o f g o v e r n m e n t s i g n a t o r y t o t h e A g r e e m e n t . The A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e i s n o t l i n k e d i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r t t o t h e a c t u a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f p r o g r a m s . REGIONAL AUTHORITY (OKANAGAN WATER BASIN BOARD) Representing Regional D i s t r i c t of North Okanagan Regional D i s t r i c t of Central Okanagan Regional D i s t r i c t of Okanagan Slmiikameen IMPLEMENTATION BOARD CANADA BRITISH COLUMBIA G. E. SXmmoni, ChtuAman E. M. CtaAk, lAice-CfouAman 8. A. HeAkin C. H, L. Olooduxuid LIAISON COMMITTEE PROGRAM COORDINATOR A. M. Thornton ~rn (REGIONAL D ISTRICT I I TECHNICAL' P U N N I N G I | COMMITTEES | \"1 PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 8 INFORMATION PROGRAMS G. L. Punn Ministry was that t h i s would be considered in 361 t h e f u t u r e \" h a v i n g due r e g a r d t o t h e p r o p o s e d M i n i s t r y o f E n v i r o n m e n t A c t and i t s p r o b a b l e r e f e r e n c e t o B a s i n Managemen t A g e n c i e s \" . The T a s k F o r c e met w i t h t h e I m p l e m e n t a t i o n B o a r d a g a i n on May 1, 1 9 7 9 , w h e r e i n a number b f p o i n t s r e l a t i n g t o s p e c i f i c r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s w e r e r a i s e d . At i t s J u n e 1 5 , 1 9 7 9 , m e e t i n g , t h e I m p l e m e n t a t i o n B o a r d d i s c u s s e d t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d and c l a r i f i e d i t s p o s i t i o n f o r t h e r e c o r d and f o r t r a n s m i s s i o n t o t h e T a s k F o r c e . The I m p l e m e n t a t i o n B o a r d a p p e a r e d t o t a k e t h e T a s k F o r c e ' s c o n c e r n s s e r i o u s l y and i n i t i a t e d a c t i o n on t h e m a t t e r s t h e y c o n s i d e r e d t o be w i t h i n t h e i r p u r v i e w . The q u e s t i o n was r a i s e d a s t o t h e T a s k F o r c e c o m m u n i c a t i n g w i t h v a r i o u s M i n i s t r i e s , b u t members o f t h e B o a r d n o t e d , w h i l e s u c h c o m m u n i c a t i o n may n o t a l w a y s b e d e s i r a b l e f r o m t h e B o a r d ' s v i e w p o i n t , t h e y d i d r e c o g n i z e t h e y had c o u n s e l l e d t h e T a s k F o r c e t o e x p a n d i t s i n f l u e n c e a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , mus t a c c e p t t h e r e s u l t s . The B o a r d met a g a i n w i t h t h e T a s k F o r c e e x e c u t i v e o n J u l y 2 5 , 1 9 7 9 , f o r a r e v i e w b f p r o g r a m s and c o n c e r n s . A g r e e m e n t s w e r e r e a c h e d c o n c e r n i n g t h e t i m i n g o f T a s k F o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e r e v i e w o f t h e f r a m e w o r k p l a n , an u p - d a t e o f s t a t u s o f t h e w h o l e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p l a n , a w o r k s h o p on f l o o d p l a i n z o n i n g and o t h e r i t e m s . The meeting was continued on August 29, 1979. At t h i s meeting, the Board was concerned with how the Task Force could best a s s i s t the Implementation Board i n achieving p u b l i c input in the review process. The d i s c u s s i o n centred on methods of d i s t r i b u t i n g information and r e c e i v i n g feedback. A second item at t h i s meeting was the question of a c t i o n s concerning recommendations with respect to f l o o d p l a i n s . i In response tb the f l b o d p l a i n concern, the Implementation Board met with the Okanagan Basin Water Board on October 24, 1979, tb discu s s progress bn f l o o d p l a i n zoning i n the Basin. The Water Board minutes bf that meeting i n d i c a t e that the Implementation Board stressed the seriousness bf the concern with the Board chairman emphasizing that \"recommendations i n the study were more than normal p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y . A s p e c i a l tag was placed bn the study recommendations meaning that the f l o o d p l a i n should r e a l l y be r e t a i n e d for r e c r e a t i o n a l pur poses\" . During the f i r s t h a l f Of 1980, the Task Force concerned i t s e l f with d e f i n i n g i t s r o l e and methods i t could use to review progress toward implementing the framework plan. A number of meetings were held tb determine a f i n a l p o s i t i o n which was presented tb the Implementation Board on May 21, 1980. I t was agreed t h t the Task Force would form f i v e subcommittees covering the components of the Implementation Agreement. Each committee would prepare a nontechnical report analysing the recommendations of the planning study, evaluating the progress toward implementing these recommendations and making suggestions for the future. The role f i n a l l y developed by the Task Force for i t s e l f d i f f e r e d quite substantially from that set out by the Implementation; Board in 1978. The Task Force did view i t s e l f as providing public feedback to the implementors but as representatives of public viewpoints not as a group constituted tb canvass the public continually. They did not see a role for themselves in the dissemination of information and at t h i s stage did not commit themselves to an involvement in reviewing the framework plan. The Task Force declined tb take a major role in \"a high p r o f i l e information program leading up to a public involvement program during the review of the framework plan\" because they believed t h i s was best handled by the Program Coordinator's o f f i c e which had the funding and the expertise to carry i t out. The Program Coordinator's o f f i c e has maintained a public information program and in 1982 i n i t i a t e d a public survey designed tb obtain a \"public response to various water resource issues which have been br s t i l l appear to be a concern tb Okanagan residents\". The r e s u l t s of t h i s are not yet available. As of mid-1982, the Task Force was in the process of putting together their report concerning their views on the implementation program and i t s progress to date. This was to be presented to the Implementation Board. The case i s c l e a r l y not complete, but s u f f i c i e n t a c t i v i t y has been observed to provide some interesting insights into implementation theory. 6.10 ANALYSIS The framework plan study included a substantial degree of public p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and the records show that public views had considerable weight in many policy areas. Those involved in developing the framework plan contemplated an ongoing water management process with continuing public input. The Implementation Agreement contemplated that the Okanagan Basin Water Board would provide the major focus for public p a r t i c i p a t i o n . However, the Water Board had no c a p a b i l i t y nor any interest in leading a public p a r t i c i p a t i o n program for the Implementation Agreement. The Implementation Board did not wish to get the public involved in decision-making but rather interpreted their role as providing information to the public on what was being done and on being receptive to public comment on the adequacy bf the work. In accordance with i t s interpretation of a role for the public, the Implementation Board r e - i n s t i t u t e d the Public Task Force which was active in the development of the framework plan. Terms bf reference for the Task Force were established by the Implementation Board, but the Task Force viewed i t s e l f as independent and defined i t s interests and undertook a c t i v i t i e s which did not necessarily coincide with the terms of reference br the scope bf the Implementation Agreement. The documentation suggests that the Task Force was not p a r t i c u l a r l y i n f l u e n t i a l in shaping events to conform with i t s views. What factors account for the observed outcome? 6.10.1 Implementing Actors The implementing actors appear to have been the dominant force in determining the outcome described above. The implementors had a particular perception of what their role ought to encompass. Implementing the framework plan was viewed as a professional undertaking for the purpose of implementing decisions. Their perception was that, by and large, the policy decisions had been taken and were not subject to further negotiation and change. This perception of the implementbr 1s role as non-policy makers led to the position that public p a r t i c i p a t i o n was out of place in an implementation process. The public were quite c o r r e c t l y 366 considered as representing points of view on issues. Since, in the view of the implementors, no issues were at stake, no public views were required. However, the implementors also perceived their role as administrative public servants and therefore were concerned that public information be available concerning their progress. But they very c l e a r l y distinguished information from p a r t i c i p a t i o n based bn their perception of their role as implementors. This perception bf implementation was reinforced by the objectives of the implementors and their technical bias. The primary objective of the Implementation Board and i t s s t a f f was to carry but the provisions bf the Implementation Agreement and more s p e c i f i c a l l y to implement those part i c u l a r s for which the Implementation Board was given r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . This meant that the Board had a very narrow focus on a few projects. Its main concern was that i t be able to complete i t s projects within i t s budget. Consequently, any contemplation of public involvement by the implementors was viewed within t h i s framework. The projects for which the Board was responsible were engineering projects, and the decisions tb be taken regarding these projects were e s s e n t i a l l y technical. This being the case, public involvement seemed tb have l i t t l e place. Because the Implementation Board viewed i t s task as primarily technical, i t perceived a need t b inform rather than to involve the public. The Board did not extend i t s purview beyond i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and consequently had no interest in public a c t i v i t i e s surrounding issues for which i t was not responsible. 6.10.2 Policy Objectives The Objectives b f the Implementation Agreement regarding a role for the public are not at a l l clear. A section of the Agreement cited previously requires that the Board encourage public comment and reasonably r e f l e c t public views in implementation. The objective might have been t b ensure that the public have some access to the o f f i c i a l implementation process, but i t i s not cl e a r . The case documentation demonstrates that the Implementation Board e s s e n t i a l l y carried out the l e t t e r of the Agreement. Had the Agreement been more s p e c i f i c , a d i f f e r e n t public role may have resulted and perhaps a d i f f e r e n t l e v e l b f influence may have been observed. The generality of the Agreement and i t s rather soft language meant that i t s terms were subject to interpretation, and consequently, the Board was well within i t s authority to arrive at the indicated interpretation. 368 6 . 1 0 . 3 Interested Actors The role of the Public Task Force as interested actors was obviously important in t h i s case. The Task Force was composed of a group of Okanagan residents representing a wide range bf inte r e s t s . It considered that i t s major strength was that i t included a spectrum bf interests and therefore could not be accused bf representing only one side bf an issue. The Task Force had some c a p a b i l i t y to generate information, but i t was e s s e n t i a l l y a volunteer group working on i t s members* personal time. It had no s t a f f resources, and therefore, any information generation had to be undertaken by Task Force members and was limited tb the expertise available in the Task Force. The Task Force was not given access to any 'inside' information concerning implementation questions prior to decisions and not involved in the technical a n a l y t i c a l processes in any way. They were limited to information respecting decisions that had been taken. The group did have access to the Implementation Board to make i t s views known, but as discussed above, the Board had a de f i n i t e perception bf a role for the public and t h i s did not include issues outside of the Board's dire c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The Task Force did present i t s views to other agencies and tb p o l i t i c a l decision-makers, but they appear tb have had l i t t l e 369 impact. The Task Force had a very limited c a p a b i l i t y to confer benefits or to impose burdens on the implementors or the p o l i t i c a l decision-makers. Because of t h i s , they were unable to influence the rules of the implementation process that precluded them from the decision-making. 6.10.4 Resources As alluded to above, resources played a major role in determining the course bf events. The Task Force recognized a need for s i g n i f i c a n t resources i f i t was to play the role that i t perceived i t ought to. Independent resources were denied the Task Force by the Implementation Board, and t h i s constrained their a b i l i t y to function outside of the role established by the Board. The Implementation Board controlled the public resources available to the implementation process and used t h i s control to accomplish i t s objectives. The Board applied i t s resources to a public information program which met i t s aims. By keeping the information program inside i t s organization, the Implementation Board ensured i t s e l f control over the information concerning implementation a c t i v i t i e s . 370 6.10.5 Other Factors Some other factors c l o s e l y related to those already discussed also played roles in determining the outcome. The decision-making environment was very r e s t r i c t e d so that the interested actors representing the public had limited access to authoritative processes. They had very limited influence on decisions because of t h i s limited access and the limited I knowledge that resulted from t h i s position. The stakes involved in the public p a r t i c i p a t i o n area were not perceived by the implementors as very s i g n i f i c a n t , and consequently, t h i s area was a r e l a t i v e l y minor aspect of their concerns. This view stems from their perception of their role as implementors of decisions rather than as decision-makers. The Task Force perceived the stakes as high, but because of their diffuse i n t e r e s t s , i t was d i f f i c u l t for them to focus on particular issues and vigourously pursue the outcomes. This i s in marked contrast to the water quality case where a group perceived very high stakes and very s p e c i f i c a l l y focused i t s e f f o r t s in l i n e with i t s i n t e r e s t s . The rules for public involvement were established by the Implementation Board according to i t s interpretation of i t s mandate and these were not subject to change by the public. Consequently, the public was, by and large, forced to participate on the Board's terms which were established to ensure that the objective of public information rather than public involvement was achieved. 372 6 . 1 1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS This chapter has presented four s p e c i f i c cases of policy implementation representing a range Of the a c t i v i t y under the Okanagan Basin Implementation Agreement. Each case has been documented to indicate the decisions taken during implementation of the p o l i c i e s and the degree tb which the policy outcome deviated from that which was contemplated by the framework plan and/br the Implementation Agreement. The cases have been analysed from the viewpoint of determining the important factors that contributed tb the observed policy outcomes. The documentation shows that, in many instances, the policy outcomes deviated rather s i g n i f i c a n t l y from that which was contemplated by the policy-makers. The water quality policy area studied was d i r e c t l y affected by a s h i f t in provi n c i a l government policy which forced abandonment of the parti c u l a r s specified in the Implementation Agreement. Water quantity p o l i c i e s were implemented quite d i f f e r e n t l y than contemplated because of a serious miscalculation in the policy formation stage and a resultant severe budget constraint. The actual policy concerning Osoyoos Lake was never implemented, but the s p i r i t of the policy has been operationally implemented through an informal working arrangement between provincial and state water managers. The major role for l o c a l authorities and the public in implementation contemplated by the fbrmulatbrs of the framework plan never materialized. For various reasons, l o c a l authorities and Basin residents were not consulted or involved in developing the implementation framework or in implementing the p o l i c i e s . The implementation action phase has been shown to be a stage where various components of an implementation program are redefined as action proceeds and new information i s brought to bear during further policy analysis and d i f f e r e n t factors, or at least d i f f e r e n t weighting of factors, redirect decisions to the f i n a l outcomes. Implementation actions require implementors to make concrete decisions respecting the application of resources to particular ends. Gone i s the luxury of preliminary estimates, orders-of-magnitude assumptions, br disguised objectives. Analysis of particular actions i s required, and decisions based upon the perception of the information at hand lead to actions with empirical impacts. The r e a l i t y of t h i s situation renders implementation a weighty process where decisions cannot be taken l i g h t l y . The Okanagan experience suggests that during implementation a great deal of detailed policy analysis i s undertaken in an e f f o r t to understand the significance of the policy and the 374 consequences of implementation. The case studies suggest also that implementation i s not at a l l a straightforward process of matching resources to problems to produce policy outcomes. Implementation involves a great deal of analysis and fundamental decision-making which has the same substance and consequences as decision-making in the policy formulation process. Some of the decisions taken by the Okanagan implementors, such as deciding not to fund a l t e r a t i o n of the Okanagan Lake i r r i g a t i o n intakes and deciding to develop a public information program rather than a pa r t i c i p a t i o n program, were policy decisions. They changed the way in which the resources might have been allocated and set in motion events with far-reaching consequences. Other decisions, although less dramatic, were of the same sort, such as the decision to include the Village of Oliver water works in the federal-provincial funding. Implementation must be seen as a decision-making process in much the same way as policy formulation processes are viewed. The implementors took decisions based upon their perceptions, the available information and within the influences of the environment in which they operated. The importance of the various influences shaping the policy outcomes has been presented in t h i s chapter. Each policy instance i s a l i t t l e b i t d i f f e r e n t , but the major determinants of the policy outcomes are common in each case. 375 The implementing actors, their values, objectives and motivations are c r i t i c a l determinants. In the Okanagan, they were central to v i r t u a l l y a l l decisions concerning the purview bf the Implementation Agreement although because of the bounds of the Agreement, they were not involved in other decisions which affected water resources management in the Basin. The policy objectives, whether they are d e f i n i t i v e or ambiguous, determine the l a t i t u d e implementors and others have in shaping the purpose and outcome of the implementation process. The resources available to apply to the process determine to a large degree what can be attempted and the l e v e l of analysis that can be brought to bear and what can actually be achieved. The implementing mechanism, as an aspect of resources, structures implementation a c t i v i t y and f a c i l i t a t e s or precludes certain types of action or decisions. The interested actors, depending upon their l e v e l of organization and c a p a b i l i t i e s to generate and present policy information, can c e r t a i n l y become involved in implementation and, as shown in the Okanagan, be a major force in redire c t i n g policy during implementation. The concept of policy stakes has been useful in understanding the perceptions of various actors in terms of the importance of a particular implementation process and outcome to the actors and thereby the l e v e l of e f f o r t expended and vociferousness of a c t i v i t y . Other factors, such as the technical t r a c t a b i l i t y of the problem, implementation rules, policy environment and decision-making environment, were found to have some influence in the policy outcomes in most cases but were of less importance as determinants. The Okanagan did not provide a r i c h ground for studying the degree to which outcomes were influenced by d i f f e r i n g l e v e l s of strategies to deal with the costs b f uncertainties. One clear instance b f dealing with environmental uncertainties was documented. Based on t h i s , i t would be concluded that perception of uncertainties has a major influence on the type b f policy analysis undertaken and subsequent policy decisions in that particular area. Implementation action i s the culmination of a process involving problem d e f i n i t i o n , policy analysis, policy output and i n i t i a t i o n of implementation. The dynamic nature b f implementation action as a decision-making process affords i t an important place in any conceptualization of the policy process. The analysis has demonstrated linkages between implementation and formation and c l e a r l y supports a view of a continual, i t e r a t i v e policy process. This chapter has presented the documentation and analysis b f a representative range of implementation action experience in the Okanagan Basin. The next and f i n a l chapter w i l l relate the empirical and t h e o r e t i c a l analysis to arrive at the o v e r a l l conclusions b f the study. 3 7 7 CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 7 . 1 INTRODUCTION The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to summarize and draw together the conclusions of the study. It w i l l begin with the empirical conclusions developed from the substance of the case study and then proceed to a n a l y t i c a l conclusions concerned with theore t i c a l aspects of policy implementation. In addition to these conclusions, a more general statement w i l l be offered concerning the outcome of policy processes and a statement w i l l be provided regarding the contributions to knowledge made by the study. 7 . 2 EMPIRICAL CONCLUSIONS The water management experience in the Okanagan Basin documented in t h i s study covers three main items; namely, (a) the policy output as specified in the framework plan, (b) the Okanagan Basin Implementation Agreement and the negotiation process leading to that Agreement, and (c) the processes of carrying but the conditions of the Agreement. The empirical conclusions focus on the relationships between these items and provide the substance for the the o r e t i c a l conclusions concerning the factors which account for the observed s i t u a t i o n . 378 7.2.1 P o l i c y Output The o r i g i n a l set of s t u d i e s on the s i t u a t i o n i n the Okanagan was based upon at l e a s t three premises: (a) the water resources management program should be e x p l i c i t l y designed and implemented to serve the s o c i a l and economic needs of the Okanagan Basin: that i s , that i t be comprehensive i n scope; (b) the Basin p u b l i c should play an a c t i v e part i n d e f i n i n g t h e i r needs and choosing t h e i r f u t u r e . As part of t h i s , the p o l i c y output envisaged a r e g i o n a l e n t i t y , r e s p o n s i b l e and responsive to the p u b l i c , p l a y i n g a major r o l e i n water management with a s s i s t a n c e from the senior governments; and (c) water resources management i s a dynamic, ongoing a c t i v i t y responding to changing c o n d i t i o n s . In the p o l i c y output, as de.fined i n the f i n a l recommendations of the framework plan, the f i r s t cracks appear i n t h i s image of resource management. The plan does not provide c l e a r guidance on the i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework that should be es t a b l i s h e d to manage the water resources on a continuing b a s i s . At f i r s t b l u s h , i t appears that the plan makes a strong recommendation for a new and e f f e c t i v e r e g i o n a l a u t h o r i t y . But the recommendations also include an a l t e r n a t i v e to t h i s which suggests an amendment to the L e t t e r s Patent of the r e g i o n a l d i s t r i c t s i n the Okanagan Basin which simply adds to the f u n c t i o n s Of the Okanagan Basin Water Board enabling i t to be c a l l e d the r e g i o n a l a u t h o r i t y . The plan does not s p e c i f y how t h i s r e g i o n a l a u t h o r i t y should r e l a t e to other authoritative organizations involved in resource management in the Basin. It i s very vague on the rel a t i o n s h i p between the regional authority and the senior governments. There i s nothing in the plan suggesting a transfer of additional authority from either of the senior governments. The policy output does not actually focus on the question of ongoing water resources management. It e s s e n t i a l l y deals only with implementing the recommendations contained in the framework plan. They do not sum to an ongoing management process. The plan does include a recommendation for a review at the end of ten years, but i t does not specify the scope of the review and leaves open to interpretation the actual purpose of the review. 7.2.2 Implementation Agreement The Okanagan Basin Implementation Agreement was signed by the federal and provincial governments as an instrument to implement the recommendations of the framework plan. The Implementation Agreement outlines s p e c i f i c implementation actions and designates r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to various organizations to carry but these actions. But the Agreement v i r t u a l l y abandons the basic premises underlying the policy formation studies. Because i t follows the framework plan, the Agreement makes no attempts to develop a comprehensive approach to water management in terms bf r e l a t i n g to important socioeconomic processes and i n s t i t u t i o n s . If anything, i t takes steps away from t h i s concept. The p a r t i c u l a r s of the Agreement which are to be implemented are allocated to s p e c i f i c organizations for implemenation action. Various agencies within the federal, p r o v i n c i a l and municipal governments as well as the Implementation Board i t s e l f are involved in implementing various parts of the program. There i s no coordination mechanism among agencies involved in implementing particular recommendations. Each responsible organization i s considered to have authority in i t s area, and no blanket organization was established to oversee a coordinated response. The Implementation Agreement does not venture outside of the framework plan in any area and, consequently, does not l i n k agencies responsible for management of the various other resources which use and/or impact upon the water resource. The Implementation Agreement can be viewed as a management instrument only in the most general manner. Its primary function was to provide an instrument that would f a c i l i t a t e cost-sharing between the federal and provincial governments for s p e c i f i c works related to the water resources of the Okanagan Basin. The Agreement i s almost exclusively concerned with specifying the relationship necessary to undertake projects deemed to be of j o i n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Certainly, the Agreement outlines a series bf other projects but, as discussed above, does not provide any guidance on how these might be undertaken, nor does i t include any mechanism for c o n t r o l l i n g or coordinating projects which are not cost-shared. The Agreement does not in any way suggest a water management role in the Okanagan Basin for the Implementation Board. The Board was established for a set period of time, f i v e years, after which i t would be terminated, and for the express purpose bf carrying but e x p l i c i t l y defined tasks and a c t i v i t i e s . The Agreement provides for a very limited excursion into analysis concerned with water management problems other than the particular cost-shared projects. It includes the framework plan recommendation that the plan be reviewed after ten years to determine whether i t continues tb meet the needs of the Okanagan Basin. This i s the Agreement's contribution to ongoing water management. It appears that t h i s portion of the Agreement has been interpreted by the implementors as a technical, a n a l y t i c a l exercise to determine the effectiveness bf the measures put in place under the Agreement. 382 The leading role for the regional authority disappears during negotiation of the Implementation Agreement. A l o c a l representative i s afforded only observer status in the group charged with developing an agreement. The Agreement i s between the federal and pr o v i n c i a l governments; a t r i p a r t i t e agreement including the regional l e v e l was never even mentioned, much less analysed or considered. The Implementation Agreement establishes an Implementation Board composed solely of federal and prov i n c i a l o f f i c i a l s ; i t does not include l o c a l representation. The terms of reference for the Board include a loose requirement for public comment On implementation a c t i v i t y , but no formal l i n k or role for the public in the decision-making process i s indicated nor, i t would appear, contemplated. The Okanagan Basin Water Board i s designated as the 'regional authority' in the Agreement and i s allocated a number of tasks involving the coordination of other agencies to e f f e c t s p e c i f i c implementation p a r t i c u l a r s . But the Water Board was not given any new authority to discharge these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . The documented evidence suggests that regional p o l i t i c a l leaders did not want a unified and authoritative Basin-wide agency. The general public in the Okanagan which had been so widely represented and a r t i c u l a t e in the planning stage was absent from the negotiating table, and i t s viewpoint on t h i s or any other question was not represented and argued. Neither federal nor provincial government o f f i c i a l s expressed any concern over, t h i s seemingly major departure from the philosophy of the planning study. There appeared to be an overriding concern to agree on a budget for the cost-shared projects to the neglect of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l and organizational procedures for the rest of the framework plan recommendations and the abandonment of a concern for a process capable bf responding to changing conditions. 7.2.3 Implementation Action Chapter 6 bf t h i s study provides the documentation of four s p e c i f i c cases bf implementation action under the Implementation Agreement. This documentation shows that the actual experience of implementation involved some s i g n i f i c a n t departures from both the s p i r i t and l e t t e r bf the Agreement. These departures resulted from or were necessitated by new information received br developed during the course bf implementation and by other influences such as budget constraints, policy s h i f t s , and international r e l a t i o n s . By and large, the cost-shared components bf the Implementation Agreement have been implemented. Implementation has been viewed by the Implementation Board as a technical exercise which can be carried but in a mechanistic fashion. The view of the implementors has been that policy decisions were taken in the framework plan and the role of implementors i s to carry these out as s p e c i f i e d . As a technical implementor, the Implementation Board has been successful in carrying out the s p e c i f i c tasks assigned to i t by the Implementation Agreement. The techniques and procedures i d e n t i f i e d in the l i t e r a t u r e as as s i s t i n g in implementation in clear-cut problem areas (such as p i l o t studies, probability analysis, modeling) have been employed. The Board has been shown to be exceedingly careful in i t s project analysis and creative in terms b f technical solutions t b engineering problems. The examples of the solution to the questions b f lowering lake intakes and methods of attaining a minimal flow in the Okanagan River demonstrate the technical competence of the implementation organization. The conclusion i s that, within the confines of the view of implementation as a mechanistic process, the Implementation Board f u l l y meets i t s specified obligations. The aspects b f the implementation program not d i r e c t l y under the control of the Implementation Board have been implemented by the assigned agencies i f they have f i t the objectives b f the responsible organization and in such cases have been budgeted according t b the timetable of that organization rather than according to the structure b f the Implementation Agreement. Flood plain zoning, for example, 385 i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y bf the various m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . Each has followed i t s own particular path in terms of implementing the policy with seemingly l i t t l e regard for any Basin-wide scheme. The area of waste management f a c i l i t i e s was discussed in the case studies. In t h i s area, the individual municipalities have also been proceeding according to their l o c a l timetables. The Implementation Agreement has c l e a r l y structured the implementation of the recommendations of the framework plan in the case bf cost-shared projects. It has very c l e a r l y bounded the role for the Implementation Board but has had a r e l a t i v e l y minor impact on organizations which do not receive funding d i r e c t l y from the Agreement. The Implementation Board established s t r i c t a n a l y t i c a l procedures for carrying but i t s projects. These procedures tested the information base used to formulate the policy, and i f this was found wanting, adjustments to the solution br to the policy were effected. For the technical projects, the procedures employed did encourage the application of new information insofar as i t affected the technical operation of the project. For example, the decision not to lower water intakes bn Okanagan Lake was based on a technical analysis bf the p r o b a b i l i t y bf drought combined with a f i n a n c i a l assessment bf the engineering costs involved to undertake the project. Signi f i c a n t new information resulted in a d i f f e r e n t solution to that contemplated in the framework plan. But in 386 the case of a policy s h i f t in the water quality area, the Implementation Board could not accommodate a change in technical d i r e c t i o n because i t was based on a value decision rather than a technical necessity or advantage. The conclusion i s that implementation was viewed as a technical mechanistic process where l i t t l e purpose would be served by having procedures and processes for keeping abreast of changing economic conditions or public values. Social value uncertainties did not appear tb have a place in the implementors' views,, and consequently, no e f f o r t s were undertaken to resolve any of these uncertainties which may have existed and no e f f o r t s were made to adjust implementation in the l i g h t of new information bf t h i s sort. It i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that the Implementation Agreement served to r e s t r i c t the purview of water managers. The problem of aquatic weeds became important during the time when the Implementation Agreement was being negotiated. Its f u l l importance was not appreciated at that time, and i t was not included in the Agreement for reasons discussed in Chapter 4. But the Eurasian m i l f o i l weed problem became very s i g n i f i c a n t and was without doubt the most serious concern of Okanagan residents. The Agreement and the Implementation Board were completely s i l e n t on the issue. 3 8 7 The Agreement i t s e l f contained a clause which would have allowed an amendment by mutual m i n i s t e r i a l signature. It was considered by the o f f i c i a l s involved [ p a r t i c u l a r l y federal o f f i c i a l s ] that t h i s clause was i n e f f e c t i v e because of the complexity in actually exercising the perogative. In essence, i t must' be concluded that the Implementation Agreement was a r i g i d a r t i c u l a t i o n bf policy at one point in time'and was incapable bf being responsive to the dynamics bf the situation in the Okanagan. The Agreement as an instrument of the Canada Water Act [CWA] demonstrates the r i g i d nature bf the CWA respecting water management. In the Okanagan s i t u a t i o n , i t simply did not function to deal with water management as an ongoing, constantly evolving set bf problems. 7 . 3 ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS This overview of the case study gives r i s e to twb questions r e l a t i n g to the theory of policy implementation: 1. What factors accounted for the basic change in d i r e c t i o n from an ongoing socioeconomic process to a more mechanistic project-oriented process? 2. What factors accounted for the way the implementation process functioned [after negotiation bf the Implementation Agreement]? i 3 8 8 7 - 3 . 1 Factors Responsible for Basic Changes As documented in Chapter 5 and discussed above, the Implementation Agreement developed to implement the p o l i c i e s of the framework plan suggested a course s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from that charted in the plan. This phase bf the process has been termed ' i n i t i a t i o n of implementation'. The empirical evidence indicates that t h i s phase was very important in redirecting the policy process. It was not simply a time of determining budgets and establishing implementation procedures based bn i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t instructions in the policy output. It involved a great deal of decision-making related to basic policy questions. In the case study, the output of the negotiation phase in fact set the p o l i c i e s that were tb be implemented. Many of the procedures that were followed in the implementation action stage were established in the Implementation Agreement. A formal implementation agreement would not seem to be prerequisite tb implementing p o l i c i e s . But a pre-implementatibn stage would appear to be mandatory in order for implementation tb proceed. The theories and aspirations bf policy-makers must be operationalized so that the administrative arrangements for implementation can be developed. Some concept of the resources to be applied and methods tb be employed must be established prior tb implementation . 389 It i s conceivable that t h i s could take place in the l a t t e r phases of policy formulation, but the evidence from the case study suggests that t h i s i s unlikely. A decision to implement a set bf p o l i c i e s appears to set a d i f f e r e n t tone in the policy process than that of policy formulation and sets in motion a c t i v i t y geared to achieve demonstrable r e s u l t s . Implementation requires a much more operational approach to the problem area than does policy formulation. While i t was said that a formal implementation agreement i s not necessary, there would, nonetheless, appear a need for at least a concrete set bf decisions respecting implementation as a conclusion tb the i n i t i a t i o n of implementation phase. In the case study, a number bf factors were important in determining that f i n a l set of decisions. Policy Objectives The purpose bf negotiating an implementation agreement was tb implement the recommendations contained in the Okanagan framework plan. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, these recommendations were s u f f i c i e n t l y general and contained some ambiguities in terms bf intent leaving open tb interpretation precisely what was to be achieved by implementation. This meant that those concerned with establishing the operational framework had to make decisions about what they thought was intended. 390 In a d d i t i o n to working with a rather fuzzy p o l i c y output, those charged with developing implementation procedures were given l i t t l e s p e c i f i c guidance on what was to be done. An implementation agreement was to be developed. As discussed i n Chapter 5, the Canada Water Act provided very l i m i t e d guidance i n the sense that an agreement under the Act was required to contain c e r t a i n elements i n c l u d i n g the r e s p e c t i v e parts to be undertaken by the p r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l governments, the cost-sharing arrangements and the timing and manner i n which the program was to be c a r r i e d but. These requirements do not, however, touch on the substance bf the s p e c i f i c problem area so that they do not a c t u a l l y define or d i r e c t the p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . Those n e g o t i a t i n g the agreement were not o v e r l y constrained by the p o l i c y output but c a r r i e d out broad i n s t r u c t i o n s from the r e s p e c t i v e governments. They were able to e s t a b l i s h an agreement based on the framework plan i n t e r p r e t e d i n such a way that the s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s of the n e g o t i a t o r s were enhanced and entrenched. P o l i c y Environment During the mid-1970s, there appeared to be the beginning of a q u i t e d i s t i n c t s h i f t i n p o l i t i c a l p r i o r i t i e s away from environmental concerns toward economic i s s u e s . In 1974, Canada signed General Development Agreements [GDAs] with each of the provinces.* These Agreements were 10-year umbrella agreements which f a c i l i t a t e d s p e c i f i c sectoral or issue-oriented subsidiary agreements. The GDA mechanism was an instrument bf cooperative federalism designed tb f a c i l i t a t e j o i n t f ederal-provincial planning and policy implementation for the purpose bf achieving socioeconomic development. Environmental concerns received scant attention in t h i s major federal policy i n i t i a t i v e . By the mid-1970s, economic r e s t r a i n t became the dominant government polic y . Resources were allocated in accordance with government p r i o r i t i e s with very limited resources being applied tb programs which could not be shown to contribute d i r e c t l y tb socioeconomic development or f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t . The resource commitments made by the federal government tb the Okanagan c l e a r l y r e f l e c t the policy environment. More than half bf the f i n a n c i a l resources were allocated tb flood control works bn the basis of a f i n a n c i a l analysis which demonstrated a saving tb the federal purse through the elimination bf maintenance payments. The policy environment was such that i t was not conducive to undertaking policy analysis in areas which were not obviously in the purview of economic development. *With the exception of Prince Edward Island, which was already covered by a similar agreement called the PEI Comprehensive Development Plan. This s h i f t in the policy environment appeared to have l o c a l manifestations as well. Local o f f i c i a l s appeared to have less interest in the environmental quality issue and seemed to be obsessed with f i n a n c i a l concerns. Throughout the negotiation phase, the only s i g n i f i c a n t point raised by l o c a l p o l i t i c a l leaders in discussions with senior government o f f i c i a l s was the issue of funding for waste treatment proj ects . There i s no evidence to indicate s p e c i f i c a l l y that the general public was less concerned with the p o l i c i e s being implemented because bf a concern for economic issues. But i t was c l e a r l y documented in the case study that there was a very much reduced public involvement e f f o r t by interested c i t i z e n s . The evidence suggests t h i s was more related to the expectation that the Implementation Agreement would include s i g n i f i c a n t l o c a l representation through l o c a l authoritative i n s t i t u t i o n s ; e.g., regional d i s t r i c t s and the Okanagan Basin Water Board. The reduced public pressure could have been interpreted by the federal-provincial negotiators as indicating that a range of interests did not need to be included in the implementation process. The documented evidence, however, suggests that the negotiators never did perceive a need for including other i n t e r e s t s , and therefore, the s h i f t in the 393 policy environment perhaps only i m p l i c i t l y supported their perceptions and actions which would have held in the absence of a policy environment s h i f t . Implementing Actors The values and perceptions bf the implementing actors have been shown to be instrumental in d i r e c t i n g the course of events. The evidence indicates that the federal and provincial actors placed in control of the negotiations were individu a l s who because of their values and perceptions were very comfortable with a 'mechanistic' approach to implementation. They tended to view the problems as having concrete engineering solutions amenable tb technical analysis. As discussed in the case study, t h i s view led tb the exclusion of the public in implementation and obviated the need for processes and procedures designed to keep abreast of changing public concerns and wishes. Given the perceptions of the negotiators that implementation was e s s e n t i a l l y a technical undertaking and the fact that they were not constrained to any large degree by the policy output, the negotiators pursued an agreement which met their objectives. It i s bf paramount importance to recognize that the objectives bf the key implementing actors embody and interpret the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l framework respecting water 394 resource management in B r i t i s h Columbia. Because bf the importance of t h i s framework, i t might be argued that i t was the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l framework rather than the role of implementing actors that was a major determinant bf the character bf the Implementation Agreement and the process bf implementation. For purposes bf t h i s analysis, i t was considered more appropriate to describe the function of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements through their active manifestation, the objectives and, ultimately, the actions of the implementing actors. This approach serves to emphasize the degree bf f l e x i b i l i t y that has existed in federal-provincial water resource relationships whereby federal and p r o v i n c i a l agreements and a c t i v i t i e s have been negotiated On the basis of a shared j u r i s d i c t i o n . * It i s recognized that, i f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l basis for water management were tb change s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h i s would alter a federal-provincial implementation process; but for a n a l y t i c a l purposes, one *The con s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements have allowed for a variety of d i f f e r e n t federal-provincial water management agreements across Canada between the federal government and the various pro v i n c i a l governments. Each i s a product bf the interaction between the unique circumstances and objectives bf each provincial government and the federal government. The Qu'Appelle Valley Agreement in Saskatchewan, for example, includes a substantial t o u r i s t development component and allows for a much larger degree of p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the federal government. 395 could observe the impact bf the change because the objectives of the key actors representing federal and provincial organizations would change according to the new mandate. The important point i s that the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements were very important. This has been expressed in t h i s study using the factor bf the actors' objectives. It would be equally v a l i d in another type of analysis to express t h i s influence c i t i n g a separate i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements factor. The objectives which the key implementing actors pursued are as follows: (i ) Federal Objectives - The federal negotiators had the overriding objective bf producing an agreement under Section 4(f) of the Canada Water Act which provided for the implementation bf comprehensive water resource management plans, br parts thereof. The substance of such an agreement was of secondary importance. However, in terms bf substance, federal government p r i o r i t i e s dictated that resource commitments would be r e s t r i c t e d tb areas contributing to economic development or f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t . This context led to the federal proposal to upgrade the Okanagan flood control works under the Implementation Agreement. The p r i o r i t y for signing a CWA agreement was based in large measure bn the federal objective of maintaining a s i g n i f i c a n t presence in inland water resource management. 396 The reasons for federal involvement in the Okanagan are c e r t a i n l y not obvious. The issues respecting boundary waters [Osoyoos Lake] are not very s i g n i f i c a n t , and as demonstrated in Chapter 6, t h i s has been e s s e n t i a l l y managed by the pr o v i n c i a l government without federal intervention. Fisheries aspects are related mainly tb nonmigratbry species. The sockeye salmon component could have been managed through normal federal f i s h e r i e s procedures. The region cannot be viewed as a s i g n i f i c a n t national area in terms bf i t s contribution tb the welfare of the country as a whole. Consequently, in order to meet their objective of signing a j o i n t agreement, federal o f f i c i a l s had tb include elements in an agreement which were at t r a c t i v e to the provincial government. Federal o f f i c i a l s appear to have met their p r i n c i p a l objective in that an agreement was signed. This agreement, however, was extremely circumscribed in terms of federal involvement in managing Okanagan water resources. Federal involvement i s limited to those projects which are cost-shared and managed by the j o i n t Implementation Board. As described in Chapter 5, t h i s amounts to a f a i r l y small portion of the p o l i c i e s enunciated in the framework plan. ( i i ) Provincial Objectives - The fact that federal involvement in the Okanagan i s so limited i s d i r e c t l y due tb the e f f o r t s of the pro v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l s negotiating the 397 Agreement. As discussed in Chapter 4, provincial water resource o f f i c i a l s were very apprehensive about becoming involved in a federal-provincial water planning study in 1969. They were persuaded to become involved on the strength of arguments that they would probably have to do the study anyway, and with federal involvement, pro v i n c i a l costs would be halved . As documented and discussed in Chapter 5, the Province of B r i t i s h Columbia has a long history bf jealously guarding i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n over water resources in the province. The implementation negotiations were c l e a r l y another chapter in t h i s story. The Province was interested in minimizing federal involvement in the Okanagan while at the same time taking advantage bf federal financing to the extent possible. In the very e a r l i e s t negotiations, pr o v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l s i n s i s t e d on establishing the p r i n c i p a l bf current j u r i s d i c t i o n as the means bf allocating implementation r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the various recommendations of the framework plan. They were unwilling to contemplate any federal intrusion into their j u r i s d i c t i o n a l sphere. In addition, because the agreement was to cover a l l of the recommendations bf the plan and was to include a clause requiring that the signators carry out the p o l i c i e s according to the Agreement, the Province insisted that the p o l i c i e s be redefined into p a r t i c u l a r s . As discussed in Chapter 5, the p a r t i c u l a r s provided a great deal of room for discretionary action. This was done because the Province did not want tb have tb implement p o l i c i e s which were federal l y influenced. By changing to p a r t i c u l a r s , the Province re-established i t s policy-making role and a b i l i t y tb take f i n a l decisions bf what exactly i t would undertake in terms of implementation action. The Province was also not interested in delegating any of i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n tb the l o c a l l e v e l s of government. Its perception was that the expertise required for undertaking the engineering projects was within provincial agencies and could be best managed following the normal practice. Respecting environmental p o l i c i e s , the Province held the view that these must be province-wide in scope and consequently could not be delegated tb the l o c a l l e v e l . The areas designated for the regional authority in the Implementation Agreement were those areas bf r e s p o n s i b i l i t y currently within the authority bf regional d i s t r i c t s and m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . A l l the Agreement did was suggest that these be transferred from the individual regional d i s t r i c t s to the Water Board which was a creation bf the regional d i s t r i c t s and f u l l y under their control. At the same time, the Province was very keen bn cost-sharing particular engineering projects which were i t s own problems. These projects were noncontroversial and es s e n t i a l l y involved upgrading existing works. No policy decisions were perceived to be involved, and at the completion bf the works, federal involvement would nb longer be appropriate. Provincial o f f i c i a l s were f u l l y aware bf the federal objectives concerning the desire for a CWA agreement and recognized that the strong federal desire gave them some negotiating advantage. They drove a bargain that achieved their objective bf maintaining control over the water resources while at the same time extracting the largest possible commitment for federal financing. A role in the Agreement for the federal government in the area of water quality monitoring and f i s h e r i e s was based upon the t r a d i t i o n a l r elationship and did not constitute any departure from the normal r e l a t i o n s h i p . Interested Actors The framework plan c e r t a i n l y contemplated an increased role for l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s Over that which prevailed at the time of the study. Local p o l i t i c i a n s , however, made strong representations tb the policy-makers involved in formulating the framework plan indicating their disagreement with the idea of a strong regional authority. The framework plan 400 retained i t s view, but the implementation negotiations were forced tb deal with the matter pragmatically. As indicated above, the p r o v i n c i a l government had no intention bf delegating any further r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s tb the l o c a l l e v e l , and the federal government had no j u r i s d i c t i o n to delegate. This, coupled with the seeming reluctance of l o c a l leaders to take on any added r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , meant that the Implementation Agreement maintained the status quo. This arrangement appeared to s a t i s f y l o c a l o f f i c i a l s as well as the two senior governments. As discussed previously, the general public was not involved in negotiating the implementation procedures, and i t s views respecting an increased l o c a l role were not taken into account. The Implementation Agreement that was signed in 1 9 7 6 moved away from the concept of the l o c a l people managing their problems l o c a l l y with the help and advice of senior governments. Objectives of the two senior governments only i n d i r e c t l y related tb the s p e c i f i c management situ a t i o n in the Okanagan appear to have molded the Agreement so as to achieve their objectives with less regard to other p o l i c i e s . The Implementation Agreement established the program for implementation and, tb some extent, the procedures tb be followed in the implementation action phase of the process. 4 0 1 7.3-2 , Factors Accounting for Implementation Actions Certainly, the overriding feature of the implementation action phase in the Okanagan was the existence of an Implementation Agreement which established a precise program for action. But as discussed previously, this Agreement was substantively based largely upon the policy analysis undertaken in the framework planning study and upon the s p e c i f i c objectives bf the Agreement negotiators. The empirical evidence demonstrates that the Agreement served as a structure for implementation, but i t was by no means the single determining factor in the observed outcomes. In many cases, the p o l i c i e s did not proceed as contemplated in the Implementation Agreement due to the interplay of other factors. A number bf determinants of policy outcome were put forward in Chapter 3 as representing the key factors involved in d i r e c t i n g the implementation process to the policy outcome. Each bf these w i l l be discussed based upon the case study tb determine their individual and c o l l e c t i v e u t i l i t y in explaining how the implementation process functioned. Technical T r a c t a b i l i t y of a Problem Certainly, the degree of d i f f i c u l t y encountered in remedying a problem has an impact on the outcome. A te c h n i c a l l y simple problem lends i t s e l f to a more straightforward solution simply because the complexities bf interaction are avoided. On the other hand, a more complex problem requires greater policy analysis and by d e f i n i t i o n involves a larger number of decisions. The water quantity p o l i c i e s described in the case i l l u s t r a t e the procedures involved in a r e l a t i v e l y complex technical s i t u a t i o n . The i n i t i a l policy analysis was t e c h n i c a l l y inadequate and misleading. When faced with implementation b f the policy based on a poor technical analysis, the implementors were forced to reconsider the whole question. This required a substantial amount b f new analysis and policy-type decisions which resulted in a quite d i f f e r e n t course of action from that outlined by the Implementation Agreement. The key feature of d i f f i c u l t problems appears to be the higher degree b f uncertainties involved. A simple problem can be accurately defined and the solution plotted. A more complex problem generally requires the interaction b f events that cannot be specified in advance, and therefore, the r e s u l t of interactions cannot be d e f i n i t e l y plotted. An incorrect supposition can, b f course, s h i f t the outcome. The conclusion must be that implementation processes involving problems which cannot be e a s i l y remedied w i l l l i k e l y follow an irregular path depending upon the actual results obtained and decisions taken during the course b f applying resources to the problem. This suggests that i t would be d i f f i c u l t to predict accurately the outcome b f an implementation process involving complex problems. 403 Policy Output The question bf the policy intent inherent in the policy output w i l l be considered below in the section dealing with policy objectives. In the Okanagan case, implementation mechanisms and procedures were not defined in the policy output to any specifjic degree. For example, i m p l i c i t in the policy output was a s i g n i f i c a n t role for l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , but there were ambiguities and serious d e f i c i e n c i e s in t h i s regard in terms of operatibnalizing the intention. As a consequence, implementation mechanisms were developed according to the objectives bf those formulating the implementation arrangements. The a b i l i t y bf these individuals tb determine the implementation procedures c e r t a i n l y was important in di r e c t i n g the outcome. If the implementation arrangements had been specified in the policy output more d e f i n i t e l y with the purpose bf ensuring implementation bf the policy intentions, the implementors would have been more constrained in their freedom tb pursue their own objectives. The outcome bf the process would quite probably have followed more clo s e l y what was contemplated in the policy output. The Okanagan case provides few examples bf where uncertainties were consciously i d e n t i f i e d and taken into account in policy development. The policy output was 404 e s s e n t i a l l y put forward as a d e f i n i t i v e package without e x p l i c i t recognition that the p o l i c i e s may have been h a s t i l y formulated on the basis of a much less than perfect information base. Implementation negotiators did not 'test' the l e v e l bf uncertainty in the p o l i c i e s and e s s e n t i a l l y proceeded bn the same assumptions of certainty. The consequences bf t h i s set bf assumptions was that the implementation process required a great deal more e f f o r t in policy analysis than contemplated, and many p o l i c i e s turned out quite d i f f e r e n t l y than expected. Not considering uncertainties in the policy output d e f i n i t e l y had an impact bn implementation in the sense that many unexpected items had to be dealt with. The benefit of iden t i f y i n g uncertainties in the policy Output would appear to be that implementation processes could then be designed to generate and process e f f i c i e n t l y the information needed tb take decisions on issues that had been uncertain during policy formulation. Preparations in the form of adequate a n a l y t i c a l resources and procedures could be organized, and a more accurate view bf the potential decision-making a c t i v i t y would be possible. 405 Implementing Actors The objectives, values and motivations bf the implementing actors was the singular most important factor in di r e c t i n g the course Of events. The objectives of the implementing actors reflected the cons t i t u t i o n a l positions bf the federal and pro v i n c i a l governments respecting water management, and t h i s , tb a large extent, determined the*scope and shape bf implementation actions. Analysis of the decisions taken bn the various projects studied shows that the federal and provincial positions were maintained through the course of implementation. Whereas there were numerous deviations from the s p e c i f i c path charted in the Implementation Agreement, the fundamental d i v i s i o n bf authority did not change. The federal role was limited to p a r t i c i p a t i o n in cost-shared projects. If anything, during the course bf the implemention process, the Province of B r i t i s h Columbia re-emphasized i t s policy position by disregarding the Implementation Agreement in the case bf water quality management. The basic objectives set the tenor and major thrust bf the implementation process but of course were not so l e l y responsible for the shape bf the outcome. The technical orientation bf both federal and provincial implementors led them toward an implementation process designed to carry but particular projects in a te c h n i c a l l y 406 e f f i c i e n t manner. Their actions appear to be based upon their perceptions of their roles as implementors and public servants. These perceptions meant that the implementing actors viewed themselves as carrying out policy and did not consider implementation as a process of ongoing analysis and decision-making. These perceptions, coupled with a technical bias based upon experience in water management, led the implementors to a very circumscribed view on the role bf the public in implementation. E s s e n t i a l l y , the implementors were able to define the problems to f i t their perceptions of what ought tb be done which, in turn, f i t t e d with the operational c a p a b i l i t i e s bf their own organizations. The implementing actors acted on the basis of a fe d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l agreement which specified particular cost-shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and gave the implementors charged with those r e s p o n s i b i l i t e s the authority to act. The actors had substantial d i s c r e t i o n respecting the application bf resources (within upper bounds) to the various problems being addressed by the implementation process. In essence, the Implemention Board functioned as a policy-making body. Its decisions respecting r e - a l l o c a t i o n bf resources and tb not proceed with implementation of some p o l i c i e s redirected the policy outcome. The fact that the implementing actors could do so with f u l l authority was c r i t i c a l . This authority allowed the actors to apply their values toward objectives based upon their perceptions in a situa t i o n where the policy objectives were not necessarily c r y s t a l clear. The implementors were able tb define the rules of the process and exclude the involvement bf others who did not f i t with their perceptions of what the implementation process was supposed to achieve. The methods bf communication preferred by the implementors were accurately portrayed by the l i t e r a t u r e review. Informal interactions and communications and off-the-recbrd agreements characterized the process. The individuals involved tended to operate on an almost personal basis. This meant that access to the process and interaction with the key actors for individuals not d i r e c t l y involved in decision-making was more d i f f i c u l t than i f the process were more formal. But from the viewpoint of e f f i c i e n c y , i t i s l i k e l y that the process benefited from the informal methods. Decisions bn some matters could be taken more readi l y with less formal analysis i f the matter was one where the individuals had past mutual experience and where they could therefore r e a d i l y reach an agreement. The use of sanctions and incentives was important in establishing the Implementation Agreement but was a less important factor during actual implementation. Both parties tb the Agreement had the a b i l i t y tb impose rea l sanctions bn 408 the other, but these were not employed, i t would appear, because the costs were perceived to have been too great. The ultimate sanction bf the f e d e r a l government was to remove cos t - s h a r i n g from a p r o j e c t . I f t h i s had been employed, however, i t l i k e l y would have meant the end to the Agreement and with i t the demise bf the prime f e d e r a l o b j e c t i v e , a CWA implementation process. The p r o v i n c i a l government could e q u a l l y p u l l out bf the Agreement i f i t were unhappy with the views br a c t i o n s of i t s partner. But t h i s again would have r e s u l t e d i n the l o s s of 50 percent co s t - s h a r i n g for p r o j e c t s for which the Province was u l t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e . The implementing actors had the a b i l i t y to use i n c e n t i v e s and sanctions with i n t e r e s t e d a c t o r s . The sanction was tb exclude anyone from the process to any degree they saw f i t . This was used for the general p u b l i c hand-in-hand with the p r o p o s i t i o n to the p u b l i c Task Force that i t act as an information channel i n exchange for some access tb the process. This a b i l i t y to confer b e n e f i t s bn others meant that the implementors were able tb d i r e c t the e f f o r t s bf outside i n t e r e s t s tb a s i g n i f i c a n t degree. P o l i c y Objectives The o b j e c t i v e s i n the Implementation Agreement were derived from the framework plan but w r i t t e n according tb an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that f u l f i l l e d the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s 409 of the implementation negotiators. As established in the Agreement, the objectives were b a s i c a l l y clear and were intended to f a c i l i t a t e straightforward implementation. Their intentions made i t obvious who the implementing actors ought tb be, and i t was expected that the implementors could f u l f i l l the objectives without further recourse to policy discussions . The objectives as formal statements of actions defined the degree bf 'interest' in the implementation process and defined the stakes involved. This meant that i n t e r e s t s , including the implementing actors, were able to organize their a c t i v i t i e s on the basis of the importance tb them of s p e c i f i c objectives. Less s p e c i f i c i t y in objectives, as for example in the case of public involvement, meant that interest would be delayed u n t i l s p e c i f i c actions occurred (or possibly expected actions did not occur). The implementors were obviously allowed more f l e x i b i l i t y in areas where objectives were less clear and in such cases would function as policy-makers. Resources The l e v e l bf resources in terms of time, money and personnel available tb implement the framework plan was a constraint and did influence the observed outcomes. Resource a v a i l a b i l i t y largely defined what was implemented because the 410 options were narrowed to the point where the decision-makers had tb implement p o l i c i e s bn the basis bf what they could afford. The experience supports the proposition cited in the l i t e r a t u r e review that determination bf resource a v a i l a b i l i t y should be a f i r s t step in policy analysis so that only p o l i c i e s actually capable bf being implemented are seriously analysed. ) The implementation mechanism used to implement p o l i c i e s has been i d e n t i f i e d as an element bf resources. A formal federal-provincial agreement was used in the Okanagan. This kind bf agreement i s required under Section 4 of the Canada Water Act. As noted previously, the CWA requires time, money and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to be spelled out in the Agreement but does not dictate the form bf agreement br any substantive aspects. There i s nothing in the CWA, for example, to require the particular interpretation bf implementation as a technical process. The Act does not have a sunset clause l i m i t i n g i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y tb a specified period bf time and therefore does not preclude an ongoing water management process. The Agreement as a formal contract did make the implementation process r i g i d in the sense that the implementing actors had painstakingly tb assure themselves of the correctness bf any of their decisions which contravened 4 1 1 the provisions of the Agreement. This was very time consuming, but i t cannot be d e f i n i t e l y stated that decisions would have been more timely in the absence of the Agreement. Issues were not added tb the purview of the implementors on the basis that i t was too d i f f i c u l t to change the Agreement (even though a provision was included in the Agreement tb allow amendments by mutual consent). This i s the most serious c r i t i c i s m bf the mechanism. It was i n f l e x i b l e and therefore incapable of responding tb new problems and new s i t u a t i o n s . The example of the Penticton waste treatment plant i l l u s t r a t e s how the implementors were unable tb grasp a s h i f t in values and policy because of their adherence tb the written word of the Implementation Agreement. The Agreement was ignored by the provincial government and was largely irrelevant in terms of water quality and waste management after the policy change. A r i g i d mechanism such as t h i s appears to have limited u t i l i t y in a dynamic management situ a t i o n such as water resources in the Okanagan. This conclusion would seem to have a p p l i c a b i l i t y in other environmental situations as well where uncertainties exist both in terms bf the resources and values and objectives bf the managers and public. 4 1 2 Interested Actors The interested actors in the Okanagan Basin were found to be bf two types. The f i r s t group were those who deemed themselves tb be d i r e c t l y impacted by a particular policy. This group had a clear conception of what they wanted and what the implementors and policy-makers ought to do. They had the capacity to generate information regarding their interest and used a l l available access points to press their viewpoint. The N.E.W. group achieved success with the provincial Cabinet based on their c a p a b i l i t y as an i d e n t i f i a b l e c o a l i t i o n within the region to influence the p o l i t i c a l climate. These a b i l i t i e s tb make and present their case and to impose burdens bn the p o l i t i c a l process were important factors in shaping the outcome. The conclusion i s that well defined groups with the a b i l i t y tb impose burdens or confer benefits bn other actors can be an important factor in the policy outcome. Their concerns and e f f o r t s should not be ignored because decisions going against them have been taken in the policy formulation stage. Those that lose during policy formulation have an added incentive to change the decision during implementation. The second group of interested actors was represented by the Public Task Force. They did not have a concise and unified view on what the implementors ought to do. They had a diverse membership representing a p u b l i c - s p i r i t e d interest in the policy outcome. They did not perceive d i r e c t impacts on themselves but rather on the public good. They appeared tb have less incentive to generate information and in fact had d i f f i c u l t y in focusing bn exactly what they should be interested i n . They had very limited resources in terms of generating independent information. Although they had opportunities tb present their views, i t appears that the Task Force had l i t t l e c a p a b i l i t y to confer benefits or impose burdens bn other actors and therefore were not a s i g n i f i c a n t force to be reckoned with. Their i n a b i l i t y to generate substantial independent information may have been a factor contributing tb their weak performance. This suggests that access to the implementation process in i t s e l f i s not a s u f f i c i e n t condition for interested actors to influence events. It would appear that a capacity tb develop a d i s t i n c t point bf view based on an i d e n t i f i a b l e c l i e n t e l e i s also a prerequisite to becoming a determining factor in a policy outcome during implementation. 414 Stakes The stakes in the various cases studied varied among the implementors and the interested actors depending upon their objectives and the perceived impacts of the probable outcomes. The concept of policy stakes has been useful in ide n t i f y i n g the importance of the issues to the various actors involved. The l e v e l of stakes perceived by the actors (implementing and interested) determines to a s i g n i f i c a n t degree the e f f o r t they w i l l devote to achieving their particular objectives. This i s a useful concept in designing implementation procedures and in policy analysis concerned with i d e n t i f y i n g probable actions and outcomes. Rules The concept of rules as used in t h i s study does not include the i n s t i t u t i o n a l or consti t u t i o n a l arrangements which play a role in defining how an implementation process functions. These are considered as part of the objectives Of the implementing actors as described previously. Rules are defined in a more r e s t r i c t e d sense to mean the operating procedures used during the implementation process. The rules or procedures of the implementation process in the Okanagan were largely determined by the Implementation Board using the Implementation Agreement as a guide. The process was very closed respecting the involvement of any agencies other than those specified by the Board and to the public. This served the interests bf the Implementation Board d i r e c t l y in that they were able to control a l l information applied tb s p e c i f i c decisions. In t h i s way, the outcomes were v i r t u a l l y guaranteed to coincide with the objectives bf the implementing actors. No one outside bf the c i r c l e bf implementing actors had any opportunity br c a p a b i l i t y tb manipulate the rules in their favour. The conclusion i s that by being in a position to set the rules without regard for anyone else, the implementors established procedures which met their objectives to the exclusion of other objectives. Policy Environment A s h i f t in the policy environment in the mid-1970s toward economic concerns and away from the physical environment was described in the analysis. This s h i f t appears tb have had an impact on the implementation process in terms bf a reduced p o l i t i c a l commitment and concomitant 416 reduced l e v e l of resources being available v for implementation. During actual implementation, there i s no evidence to indicate that implementors made decisions on the basis of influences from the larger policy environment. The concept has proved useful in analysing the context for implementation and in helping to uncover the organizational objectives of the agencies involved in implementation. The ove r a l l policy environment involving Canada and B r i t i s h Columbia was c l e a r l y a c r i t i c a l factor in determining the policy outcome. The evidence suggests that no s h i f t s occurred in t h i s regard, and t h i s in i t s e l f was important in understanding the negotiations and stands taken by the implementors during the course of implementation. The conclusion i s that i t i s important to define the wider context in which an implementation process functions in order to understand the large or basic objectives that may be of overriding importance in dir e c t i n g a policy implementation process. Decision-Making Environment The decision-making environment has been alluded to in a number bf previous sections in t h i s discussion bf outcome determinants. The evidence from the cases studied indicates that generally decisions were analysed and taken in a co n c i l i a t o r y fashion among individuals with common values and 417 aspirations. This factor would seem to be quite important in terms of f a c i l i t a t i n g agreement on issues where the respective governments held opposing viewpoints. The lack of e f f e c t i v e access by interested actors, either the public or other agencies, tb the decision-making process had the consequence in the Okanagan of allowing the implementors tb e s s e n t i a l l y work singularly toward their objectives. The Implementation Agreement established the decision-making linkages to policy formation and the p o l i t i c a l process in general. E s s e n t i a l l y , the Agreement gave the Implementation Board f u l l authority to implement the Agreement and tb take a l l the decisions necessary without reference back tb their respective l e g i s l a t u r e s . This set-up delegated a substantial degree of policy-making authority to the public o f f i c i a l s with accountability confined to the constraint of operating within the established budget. The o f f i c i a l s were obviously accountable for their actions to the respective signatbrs bf the Agreement, but they were not accountable to those being d i r e c t l y impacted by their decisions. The conclusion i s that the decision-making environment and the rules that are followed in making decisions can be an important determinant in terms Of f a c i l i t a t i n g decision-making and in di r e c t i n g the course bf events. The evidence suggests that i f the implementors design and control 418 the decision-making environment, they w i l l do so in a manner to achieve their own objectives and further their own in t e r e s t s . Uncertainties The evidence cited in the case study indicates that many bf the p o l i c i e s devised in the planning study contained uncertain elements. Each bf the s p e c i f i c cases described and analysed in Chapter 6 i l l u s t r a t e d that the policy outcome diff e r e d from that which was contemplated in the Implementation Agreement or framework plan. New information was brought tb bear on the s p e c i f i c policy problems when implementors were faced with having to undertake action. In some instances, the uncertainties involved biophysical phenomena such as drought br impacts of low water flows. In other cases, the uncertainties respected public values or objectives . The implementation process in the Okanagan was able tb pursue strategies e f f e c t i v e l y to deal with uncertainty problems in areas involving technical and quantitative issues. Examples in the area of water quantity were cited in the case analysis i l l u s t r a t i n g t h i s point. However, the process did not develop any strategies to minimize policy s h o r t f a l l s in areas involving uncertainties respecting values. The explanation for t h i s performance l i e s within the 419 analysis of the objectives bf the implementors. Technical p o l i c i e s were implemented after accounting for the resolution bf uncertainties br developing a strategy for coping with uncertainties. Public value uncertainties, bn the other hand, were e s s e n t i a l l y carved o f f from the concerns bf the implementors and l e f t tb others. The case of the Penticton waste treatment plant i s an example of the disregard the Implementation Board showed in terms bf attempting to embrace the uncertainty of the situation or tb develop a strategy tb manage the problem. It i s d i f f i c u l t to draw a conclusion in t h i s case because the problem i s intimately tied into the perceptions and motivations of the implementors. It would appear that where the process can adapt tb the uncertainty and change course, policy implementation can proceed and an outcome resu l t s that i s related in some fashion tb the objectives. If the process i s i n f l e x i b l e and cannot adapt, then i t becomes irrelevant and the issue at hand must receive consideration outside bf the implementation process. The issue bf uncertainty pervades the implementation process and i s important in understanding the policy process in general. Because bf t h i s importance, a more general conclusion respecting the outcome of a process w i l l be presented in the next section. The models developed in Chapter 3 hypothesizing the structure bf the implementation process and the determinants bf a policy outcome have provided a sound basis for analysing the experience bf an implementation process. The analysis has indicated the importance of a pre-implementation or i n i t i a t i o n phase which sets the stage for implementation action. During the course bf actual implementation, the analysis has shown how various uncertainties forced implementors to generate and analyse information and take new decisions on policy issues. The factors hypothesized as important in determining a policy outcome have been discussed above i n d i v i d u a l l y , and the o r e t i c a l conclusions have been drawn respecting the value of each determinant in explaining implementation behaviour. Taken together , the determinants explain the observed outcomes in a comprehensive fashion. Although the models have been developed On the basis of the c o l l e c t i v e knowledge available in the l i t e r a t u r e concerning policy implementation, t h i s study i s the f i r s t attempt tb apply t h i s composite concept bf implementation tb an empirical s i t u a t i o n . It would, therefore, be presumptuous tb assert anything more than the fact that the hypothesized determinants and relationships do explain the outcomes examined in the case history. The theoret i c a l basis has, 421 however, been documented in a manner tb f a c i l i t a t e further empirical research tb refine the thinking and to improve upon t h i s basic t h e o r e t i c a l attempt. 7 .3 -3 Indeterminancy of Process Outcome It was noted at the outset bf t h i s study that policy implementation has often been viewed as a mechanistic process whereby a well-defined policy can be implemented according to instructions i m p l i c i t in the policy output and produce a predictable policy outcome. This may be possible in instances bf a s t r i c t technical nature involving purely quantitative considerations such as constructing a bridge br a bu i l d i n g . But even in these examples, i t i s not uncommon for the outcome to vary from that which was anticipated in the policy output. The Okanagan experience suggests that the outcome of a complex process involving human values i s e s s e n t i a l l y indeterminant. The outcomes of the water management policy process were determined by a variety bf factors. Some factors such as the interests bf the implementors were more important in some instances while other factors dominated in other instances such as the a c t i v i t i e s of interested actors. Given the range bf possible combinations of potential determinants and their potential v a r i a b i l i t y in strength, i t is not possible tb predict accurately the res u l t of the interaction bf these determinants. 422 Most determinants of the outcome of a complex implementation process involve human perceptions and/or values and human behaviour. Perceptions change according tb information, experience and environment. As an implementation process proceeds, new information can be brought to bear bn the problem. New perceptions br insights can r e s u l t . Different values can be brought into the process or have a di r e c t impact upon i t . These forces shape the implementation decisions, and the outcome i s the resu l t of the process. A l l bf the cases studied in the Okanagan i l l u s t r a t e the indeterminancy bf the process. In each case, new information or d i f f e r e n t objectives created behaviour which resulted in decisions somewhat di f f e r e n t than o r i g i n a l l y anticipated. These inherent uncertainties in human behaviour could not have been predicted in advance. In a l l the cases, the decisions could well have taken d i f f e r e n t directions i f a dif f e r e n t set of determinants had held the day. The fundamental conclusion bf t h i s i s that no matter how d e f i n i t e l y the future course bf events i s charted, the outcome i s indeterminate. The Okanagan experience also i l l u s t r a t e s a related point. There are no guarantees that a process founded on pr i n c i p l e s bf r a t i o n a l i t y [information, analysis, decision] w i l l observe the decision rules. The Penticton case provides an example where a p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n was taken based upon the value stance of what was perceived tb be an i n f l u e n t i a l group. The d e c i s i o n was not based on a n a l y s i s of the substance bf the problem. Such a n a l y s i s r e s u l t e d i n a d e c i s i o n tb remove 80 percent bf the phosphorus by chemical-, means and ret u r n waste water tb Okanagan Lake. The p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n ignored t e c h n i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and produced a p o l i c y based upon p o l i t i c a l c r i t e r i a . This does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean that the process i s not r a t i o n a l from the viewpoint bf the decision-makers, but rather the elements i n the d e c i s i o n c a l c u l u s and the various weights afforded these cannot n e c e s s a r i l y be predetermined. Process p a r t i c i p a n t s or those impacted by a p o l i c y can have no assurance that a p a r t i c u l a r outcome w i l l r e s u l t simply because a r a t i o n a l process bf information and a n a l y s i s l o g i c a l l y leads tb a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c l u s i o n . The outcome w i l l be determined by a v a r i e t y bf i n f l u e n c e s bf which r a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s i s but one. 7.3-4 Further Research The t h r u s t bf t h i s study has been p o s i t i v e i n nature i n that i t has been concerned with i d e n t i f y i n g and examining the f a c t o r s which determine how a p o l i c y implementation process f u n c t i o n s . It has avoided any questions br issues of a normative nature. No a n a l y s i s or comments have been provided concerning whether the implementation process i n the Okanagan 424 was a good or just process or even an e f f e c t i v e process. The analysis c e r t a i n l y raises some interesting normative questions, but these were considered to be beyond the scope of the current undertaking. Further research in the implementation area could f r u i t f u l l y consider the normative aspects of policy implementation. The explanatory model used in t h i s study provides a starting point o u t l i n i n g what appear to be the important factors determining a policy outcome. If an outcome i s considered undesirable because i t does not meet someone's expectations, then how could the process have been modified to produce the desirable outcome. A respectable l i t e r a t u r e exists concerning the design of public processes so as to adhere to p r i n c i p l e s bf l i b e r a l democratic theory. Given the experience in the Okanagan, what would have been the difference in the kind bf policy outcome that might have resulted i f l i b e r a l democratic pr i n c i p l e s had been adhered to in the design and operation of the implementation process? The case study provides a r i c h ground for developing normative hypotheses. Given the importance bf the interests bf the implementors in determining the outcome, serious questions might be raised concerning whether the implementors ought tb be involved in designing the process or setting the operating procedures. Who should design the process? Who ought tb be involved in implementation? Does the interaction 425 bf a range of i n t e r e s t s force new or c r e a t i v e approaches tb an implementation problem? Can c r e a t i v e approaches be defined i n the absence of the i n t e r f a c e and i n t e r a c t i o n of i n t e r e s t s ? These and many other i n t e r e s t i n g normative questions flow but bf the study. The t h e o r e t i c a l base and the documentation and a n a l y s i s provide a s t a r t i n g point for work in t h i s d i r e c t i o n . The a d d i t i o n of the normative aspects tb the p o s i t i v e a n a l y s i s bf implementation would provide a more s o l i d b a s i s for the design bf implementation i n s t i t u t i o n s and processes . 7.3.5 C o n t r i b u t i o n bf Study This study has concentrated on understanding how p o l i c i e s get implemented. I t s t a r t e d with a c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n bf the o v e r a l l p o l i c y process and argued that implementation can be defined as an i d e n t i f i a b l e component w i t h i n a p o l i c y process but r e l a t e d to other components such as p o l i c y formation, p o l i c y output and p o l i c y outcome. This c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n bf implementation i n a broad p o l i c y framework i s an o r i g i n a l a n a l y t i c a l undertaking based upon a r e o r g a n i z a t i o n bf work done by a number bf p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s with the a d d i t i o n of o r i g i n a l t h i n k i n g bn the r o l e and make-up bf implementation. 426 The l i t e r a t u r e review brings together diverse writings on the subject of policy implementation from a variety of d i s c i p l i n e s . Because the composite of the implementation l i t e r a t u r e was found to be wanting in some aspects, portions of l i t e r a t u r e concerned with organizational theory and public choice theory have been included to provide the basis for developing a view of how implementation takes place. The compilation and analysis bf the l i t e r a t u r e i s unique and may provide some insights to other scholars concerned with the top i c . The conceptualization bf the role bf implementation in the policy process and the l i t e r a t u r e analysis provide the base for a comprehensive explanatory model bf public policy implementation. Judging from the l i t e r a t u r e review undertaken for the study, no other implementation studies have attempted such a model and have generally been content to describe behaviour without the benefit of an in-depth or comprehensive explanation. The case study analysis demonstrates that the model including implementation structure and the determinants bf policy outcome i s useful as a means for organizing the study of an implementation process and for explaining the outcome. The model i s e x p l i c i t l y defined in terms bf assumptions and relationships so that i t is amenable tb c r i t i c i s m and variation in t h i s respect. The t h e o r e t i c a l components of the study provide a basis for further scholarly work in the area bf implementation. Others w i l l not need tb start at the very beginning tb place implementation in context br tb argue the importance or relevance bf an implementation study. The explanatory model is based on the work of previous scholars and represents a point for departure for new work. The case study follows in the current t r a d i t i o n of implementation research and as such may provide some insights in terms bf methodology. The study has not been intended as a substantive analysis bf water management in the Okanagan, but i t may well be bf value to those interested in implementing water management plans and designing i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements for resource management. 428 BIBLIOGRAPHY R u s s e l l L. Ackoff, The Design of S o c i a l Research, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953-Ru s s e l l L. Ackoff, \"Does the Qu a l i t y of L i f e Have to be Qu a n t i f i e d \" , General Systems, XXI ( 1 9 7 5 ) . Ernest R. 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Zapf, \"The P o l i t y as a Mo n i t o r o f the Q u a l i t y o f L i f e \" , American B e h a v i o r a l S c i e n t i s t 17 ( 1 9 7 4 ) : 6 5 1 - 6 7 3 -Nora M. Z n o t i n a s and K. W. H i p p e l , \" E v a l u a t i o n o f A l t e r n a t i v e s to the G a r r i s o n D i v e r s i o n U n i t \" , Water Resources B u l l e t i n 15 (1979): 354-368. Letter of Permission to Append Public Documents 444 APPENDIX 1 CANADA - BRITISH COLUMBIA OKANAGAN BASIN AGREEMENT C A N A D A - B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A O K A N A G A N B A S I N A G R E E M E N T 445 THIS A G R E E M E N T made as of the 29th day of October, 1969 B E T W E E N : THE G O V E R N M E N T O F C A N A D A represented herein by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources (hereinafter called \"Canada\") OF THE FIRST PART A N D THE G O V E R N M E N T OF THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA represented herein by the Minister of Lands, Forests and Water Resources (hereinafter called \"British Columbia\") OF THE SECOND PART WHEREAS the Governments of Canada and British Columbia recognize the growing need to plan water resources development on a comprehensive basis; and WHEREAS the economy of the Okanagan Basin is heavily dependent on the quantity and quality of its limited water resource for agricultural production, recreation and tourism, as well as for domestic, municipal and industrial water supply and for the assimilation of wastes; and WHEREAS the water supply problems in the Basin may involve the re-use of municipal waste water in irrigation systems, increased efficiencies in the use of water for irrigation, and the augmentation of water supply from groundwater and from diversion; and WHEREAS theShuswap-Thompson Rivers and the Okanagan River are important habitats for valuable stocks of Pacific Salmon; and WHEREAS the Shuswap-Thompson system is a potential diversion source for the Okanagan.Basin; and WHEREAS these problems and possible solutions may have not only municipal, regional, provincial, and national significance, but potential implications outside Canada; and WHEREAS His Excellency, the Governor-in-Council by Order-in-Council, P.C. 1969-7/2051 has authorized the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources to execute this Agreement on behalf of Canada; and WHEREAS His Honour, the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council by Order-in-Council No. 2423/1969 has authorized the Minister of Lands, Forests and Water Resources to execute this Agreement on behalf of British Columbia. NOW THEREFORE THIS AGREEMENT WITNESSETH THAT in consideration of the premises, covenants and agree-ments herein contained the parties covenant and agree with each other as follows: 1. O B J E C T I V E The purpose of this Agreement is to develop a compre-hensive framework plan for the development and management of water resources for the social betterment and economic growth in the Okanagan Basin. 2. S C O P E The Okanagan Basin is of major significance to the Province of British Columbia. Due to increasing demands likely to be placed on the water resources of this Basin for municipal, industrial, agricultural and recreational uses and for fish and wildlife management and in view of the deterioration of water quality, disturbance of ecological balances, and diminution of water quantity in the Basin, the study will focuson identification and analysis of these problems and the evaluation of economic, engineering, ecological, financial and organizational alternatives for water resource utilization in the solutions to these problems. The planning horizon of the study will be to the year 2020 A.D. The study will also embrace any areas likely to be affected by the adoption of various alternative solutions including, but not limited to, the possibility of diverting water from the Shuswap-Thompson Basin. The study may also include the expansion of the present hydrologic and water quality data collection systems and an implementation phase in the form of pilot advance treatment plants and an experimental program of effluent disposal in-cluding spray irrigation and other techniques. 3. T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E The studies leading to the formulation of a comprehensive framework plan for the Okanagan Basin are to be sufficiently broad in scope as to examine possible alternatives for the efficient utilization and provision of an adequate quantity and quality of water in the Basin and in those areas likely to be affected by a diversion. Consequently, the program will include: (a) ECONOMIC GROWTH STUDIES - as required, to provide a regional, national and international market perspective in which to view the emerging patterns of water demand for the Basin. The studies will focus on the regional resource base and on the economic viability of hew and existing kinds of industry and agriculture, including tourism and water-based recreations, upon which water demand predictions can be based. 446 (b) WATER DEMAND STUDIES - as required, to provide an estimate of current demands and a forecast of future water demands by sector \u00E2\u0080\u0094 municipal, industrial, agricultural, trans-portation, fisheries, recreational \u00E2\u0080\u0094 to the year 2020 A . D . (c) WATER SUPPLY STUDIES (i) Water Quality Studies \u00E2\u0080\u0094 as required, to determine present sources and levels of pollution, the relationships between inputs and outputs of nutrients and other chemical para-meters in the waters of the Basin; to devise mathematical models to express the nutrient balances and pollut ion effects; and to determine the extent and range of possible future sources and levels of pollution. (ii) Water Quantity Studies \u00E2\u0080\u0094 as required, to evaluate the existing hydroiogic regime of the Basin, including studies of runoff, lake levels, flows, groundwater and geological structure; climatology and meteorology; to evaluate means of regulating flows through storage and diversion; and to evaluate means of augmenting water supplies within the Okanagan Basin. (d) ECOLOGICAL AND AESTHETIC STUDIES - as required, to determine the effects of water resources development and utilization on the fish and wildlife, and on the aesthetic values of the Basin. le) WATER RE-USE AND PILOT PROJECTS FOR ADVANCED TREATMENT OF WASTE WATER - as part of the'water quality studies to determine practicability of augmenting water required for irrigation with the waste waters and to develop pilot plants for the control of nutrient discharges through the treatment of municipal and industrial wastes. (f) STUDIES OF FINANCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES \u00E2\u0080\u0094 as required, to broaden the scope of the planning process to include all practical alternatives for the subsequent efficient utilization of the water resources of the Okanagan Basin. (g) PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT-as required, to enable a compre-hensive plan to be truly responsive to the wishes of the people for which it is designed while reflecting the characteristics of the people in the Okanagan Valley and surrounding regions. 4. FINANCING (a) Canada and British Columbia shall equally share the entire cost of the study, including, but not limited to, the cost of collection of data, field surveys and the cost of consultants engaged as part of the program as well as an equitable share of the items described in (d) hereunder. Salaries of federal and provincial civil servants engaged in the program shall not be paid f rom funds approved under this Agreement excepting staff specifically assigned to and engaged in studies under this Agreement. (b) Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement and subject to the funds being voted by Parliament, the aggregate sum to which Canada shall be liabie in respect of the Agreement is not to exceed 51,000,000 of which not more than S250.000 will be available for financial assistance provided by Canada for the items described under (d) below. (c) Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement and subject to the funds being voted by the Legislative Assembly, the aggregate sum to which British Columbia shall be liable in respect of the Agreement is not to exceed S1,000,000 of which not more than $250,000 will be available for the items described under (d) below. (d) F r o m time to time during the life of this Agreement, and as part of the Program, Canada and British Columbia may approve and provide financial assistance to local communities and organizations for: (i) an experimental program of waste water reclamation by irrigation; and (ii) a pilot advanced treatment installation. A n y project thus approved and constructed shall be operated and maintained by the municipality or local authority. Access shall be provided at all times for personnel authorized to work on the Program. (e) This Agreement shall take effect on the date that the parties have executed this Agreement. No costs incurred prior to March 25, 1969 shall be eligible or considered for payment under this Agreement. This Agreement shall terminate four years from the date of signing. (f) Canada and British Columbia shall keep complete records of all expenditures made severally pursuant to the Agreement and shall support such expenditures with proper documentation. Canada and British Columbia upon request shall make these records and documents available to auditors appointed by the other. (g) British Columbia shall keep complete financial records of all costs incurred under this Agreement. U p o n request, British Columbia will make these records available to auditors appointed by Canada. (h) Subject to the cost-sharing provisions of this Agreement, Canada shall pay to British Columbia , Canada's share of expen-ditures made by British Columbia pursuant to this Agreement upon the submission of a claim in a mutually agreed manner and form by British Columbia , certified by a senior official of British Columbia , and bearing a British Columbia audit certificate. (i) Subject to the cost-sharing provisions of this Agreement, British Columbia shall credit Canada for expenditures made directly by Canada pursuant to this Agreement, upon the sub-mission by Canada of a claim in a mutually agreed manner and form. (j) Each party shall provjde the staff including any field staff and administrative facilities necessary to implement any portion of the program assigned to the respective parties. 5. L E G A L IMPLICATIONS A n y studies undertaken under the provisions of this Agreement shall take into account in an appropriate fashion any legal implications necessarily incidental thereto. 6 . ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF T H E STUDY Canada and British Columbia shall participate in a process of joint planning. T o facilitate this, the following shall be established: (a) A CANADA-BRITISH COLUMBIA CONSULTATIVE BOARD consisting of six members at a senior level in the public service, three of whom will be appointed by Canada and three by British Columbia . This Board shall be responsible for under-taking the program described herein; shall supervise the Okanagan Study Committee; shall meet at least once each year; and shall report to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources of Canada and to the Minister of Lands, Forests and Water Resources of British Columbia on progress of the Program and on the results of the investigation. (b) AN OKANAGAN STUDY COMMITTEE, reporting to the Canada-British Columbia Consultative Board, will consist of three members appointed by Canada and three members appointed by British Columbia . With the approval of the Board, the Committee may appoint a study director, various sub-committees and other staff to carry out specific portions of the Program. A l l staff appointments shall be through the Provincial Civil Service Commission on the advice and consent of the Consultative Board. A party hereto may, upon the recom-mendation of the Board, employ the services of private consulting individuals and firms as required for data collection, planning and implementation. 447 (c) The Okanagan Study Committee under the supervision of the Board, shall carry out the joint planning studies and pilot projects in accordance with the terms of reference. In addition, the Committee shall involve the public in the planning process. \u00E2\u0080\u00A27. FINAL REPORT The comprehensive plan resulting from this Agreement shall be accompanied by a final report including a full benefit-cost analysis of the alternative solutions and recommendations for further courses of actions. 8. G E N E R A L (a) British Columbia and Canada shall exchange copies of all reports and related available information from prior and current studies for use in the Program. (b) This Agreement shall not be construed as to vest in Canada any proprietary interest in projects constructed hereunder. ( c ) The Agreement may from time to time be reviewed by the parties hereto and with the approval of the Governor-in-Council and the Lieutenant Governor- in-Council , may be revised. (d) No Member of the Parliament of Canada or Member of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia shall hold, enjoy or be admitted to any share or part of any contract, agreement, commission or benefit arising out of this Agreement. (e) The Okanagan Study Committee will submit annual reports to the Consultative Board on its findings as well as a final report on or before the expiration date of this Agreement, and other reports as required by the Board. (f) The Board may make recommendations to both parties regarding further participation in detailed studies beyond the terms of this Agreement and regarding the implementation of the comprehensive plan. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Honourable J . J . Greene, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, has hereunto set his hand on behalf of Canada and the Honourable Ray Wi l l is ton, Minister of Lands, Forests and Water Resources, for the Province of Bri t ish Co lumbia . I n the Presence of Signed on behalf of the Government of Canada \" A . T . D a v i d s o n \" \" J . J . G r e e n e \" Oct. 29, 1969 In the Presence of \" V , Raudsepp\" Signed on behalf of the Province of Bri t ish Co lumbia \" R a y Wi l l i s ton \" Oct . 29 , 1969 I N T R O D U C T I O N The Canada-British Columbia Consultative Board has completed a four-year study of water resource management in the Okanagan Basin with the objective of preparing a comprehensive framework plan for the development and management of water resources for the social and economic betterment of the Okanagan community to the year 2020. The Okanagan Basin Study represents a new approach to water management, bringing together the combined skills of many experts in the Fields of water quantity, water quality, waste treatment, socio-economics, limnology and fisheries. Information on health, wildlife, forestry and land use was also included in the development of the plan. As the plan was specifically designed to provide for the social betterment of the valley residents, a sincere attempt was made by the study both to educate the public about water management problems in the Okanagan and to receive and consider ideas from citizens regarding their preferred future life-style. Being a pilot project in basin planning, many new approaches were developed, and many new problems encountered during the development of the framework plan. Within the limited terms of reference of the Okanagan Basin Agreement, the Board has endeavoured to produce a plan that represents a consenus of members of the community and study staff for good water management over the next fifty years. As it is the essence of good planning to obtain maximum public input, a draft of the comprehensive framework plan was released publicly on November 28, 1973, together with a draft of the main report. This was followed by public discussions to ensure that the plan reflected the desires of the public, or where necessary to amend the plan in view of comments and criticisms received. This publication in-corporates those changes desired by the majority of the public based on comments received and represents the final summary publication of the Consultative Board on the Okanagan Basin Study. Other more detailed publications that will be available later in 1974 are listed on the inside front cover of this report. G E N E R A L F I N D I N G S O F T H E O K A N A G A N S T U D Y The Okanagan Valley at present has a strong economic base and a generally high quality natural environment. Continuation of the recent rapid pace of economic growth could threaten this desirable balance and lead to a decline in the quality of natural and urban environments. Only through careful planning and integrated management of the basin's water, land and human resources can the present economic and environmental harmony of the basin continue. Due to the recent program of industrial incentive, the Okanagan economy is well diversified and can be expected to grow steadily over the next fifty years. However, as there is some uncertainty about the rate of growth, the Study developed three alternative projections of economic growth to the year 2020. One projection involved the continuation of existing economic policies, a second assumed that the rate of economic growth would be quickened through new industrial incentive programs after 1980 and a third projected a slowing down in the rate of economic growth, compared to that expected under current economic policies, through controls on industrial expansion. The main features of these three projections (to 2020) are compared to present (1970) conditions in the following table, which indicate that all economic indices such as population, employment, tourism and valley income should increase between 2.5 and 3.5 times during this planning period. 449 Examples of the Range of Economic Growth That May Occur in the Okanagan Basin to 2020 P R O J E C T I O N D E S C R I P T I O N POPULATION EMPLOYMENT IRRIGATED ACRES NUMBER OF TOURISTS P R E S E N T S I T U A T I O N 1 15,000 2 9 . 8 0 0 6 0 , 0 0 0 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 P R O J E C T I O N 1 CONTINUATION OF PRESENT ECONOMIC POLICIES 3 9 1 , 0 0 0 105,000 5 9 , 6 0 0 2 , 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 P R O J E C T I O N II H I G H E C O N O M I C G R O W T H 4 3 0 , 0 0 0 118,000 5 6 , 6 0 0 2 , 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 P R O J E C T I O N III L O W E C O N O M I C G R O W T H 2 9 0 , 0 0 0 7 6 , 0 0 0 7 3 . 7 0 0 1 ,800,000 Under good water management there is enough water in the basin to supply all projected with-drawals and meet proposed fishery and recreation requirements in the main valley and in the tributary sub-basins. This assumes the withdrawal of larger volumes of water from Okanagan Lake during prolonged drought periods, than has occurred in the past. Additional headwater storages will be required, and in selected streams reservoir operations will be modified to serve the multiple uses of sport fisheries and irrigation. There is no need for the large scale importation of water under any of the economic growth projections made in this study, provided that a greater range of operating levels is recognized for Okanagan Lake. This range should normally not exceed four feet in any one year, but a total variation of nine feet may occur between an extreme flood level in one year and an extreme low lake level following a suc-cession of drought years. Phosphorus has been identified as one of the major nutrients promoting undesirable algal blooms and rooted aquatic plant growth in the main valley lakes, arid also as the nutrient which can be most successfully controlled to reduce this growth and improve or maintain the quality of water in these lakes. Major waste management programs are therefore proposed over the next ten years to ensure the maintenance of lake water quality by reducing these phosphorus loadings. The capacity of tributary streams to assimilate pollutants is considered even more limited, due to extreme variations in flows, and complete removal of all direct polluting discharges to stream waters will be necessary if stream water quality is to be improved. With appropriate waste management, the quality of all major surface waters in the basin can be maintained to support both withdrawal and recreational requirements. Water-based recreation - swimming, boating, fishing - is dependent upon good water quality in the lakes and shoreline planning. It will continue to play an important role in the economic and social life-style of tourist and residents of the valley. The preservation of crown and public lands around the shorelines of the main lakes will allow the development of public beaches to meet projected recreation demands with little need to obtain private properties. Water resources management, though an important component in planning the valley's future, will not by itself ensure that the present desirable balance between economic growth and high en-vironmental quality will continue over the next fifty years. Other resources should also be carefully managed, on a valleywide basis, as forecast population growth will undoubtedly place pressure on such important factors as land, transportation and urban environments. In particular, land use will have a significant impact on future water quality, water-based recreation and fisheries. Planning these resources must be integrated with water management to ensure a continuation of the current prosperous economic and environmental balance in the basin. A number of citizen 'task forces' representing a wide range of public interests were established during the Okanagan Study to develop a consensus regarding the preferred future 'life-style' for the valley community. In their final report to the Okanagan Study Committee (entitled \"To Our Children's Children\"), these task forces unanimously supported Projection III involving a lower pace of economic-growth, protection of agricultural lands and maintenance of a high quality environment. The primary recommendation of this valley consensus is that: \"Future planning in the Okanagan should place primary emphasis on environmental protection, giving due emphasis to maintaining the economic viability of the valley.\" Consequently, it is upon this premise; in concert with Projection III, (Low Economic Growth Rate) that the framework plan outlined in this report is recommended. Economic benefits (or costs) in this report refer to those that can be expressed directly in monetary terms such as increased or more efficient agricultural and industrial production, land value enhan-cement, expenditures of recreationists, etc. Social and environmental benefits refer to those benefits that do not have a market value, such as employment opportunities, availability and enjoyment of beaches, water quality, etc. Some of these can be expressed in quantitative units however, and have been assigned dollar values based on opinion surveys. It should be emphasised that the framework plan is designed to improve the social and economic well-being of the Okanagan community. Consequently, not all the recommendations can be justified on the basis of economic benefits only, though the plan does become viable when quantifiable social and environmental benefits are included. This reflects the high value placed by the valley community on such benefits. Because the inclusion of social and economic values is a relatively new concept in comprehensive basin planning, it has not been possible to quantify all such values associated with various components of the plan. Attempts at expressing values placed on a day at the beach or a day fishing were made through the use of questionnaire surveys. However, values associated with benefits that may accrue from such factors as aesthetic enhancement, landscape diversity and decreased health hazards have not been assessed. It is not possible to total all benefits and costs of the framework plan as the implementation of some components is somewhat uncertain being dependent upon economic projections over 20 years into the future. However, a number of recommendations require immediate action (prior to 1980) to maintain good water resource management in the Okanagan. The major costs and benefits of these recom-mendations are summarized below and have been discounted to present (1970) values for comparison purposes. Phosphorus removal is only effective where sanitary sewers and conventional waste treatment facilities have been established. The costs of these have not been included in the following table as such facilities are required to protect the health of the valley communities. The additional capital cost of this program to 1985 has been estimated at S17 to $22 million dollars. SUMMARY T A B L E OF COSTS & BENEFITS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTIONS All values Discounted to 1970 Dollars A C T I O N C A P I T A L I Z E D C O S T E C O N O M I C B E N E F I T S S O C I A L . A N D E N V I R O N M E N T A L B E N E F I T S ' 1 . WATER QUANTITY - STRUCTURAL IMPROVEMENTS IN MAINSTEM SYSTEM S 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 (SIGN IFICANT VALUES NOT QUANTIFIABLE) 2 . WASTE TREATMENT - PHOSPHORUS REMOVAL FACILITIES TO 1 9 8 5 S 3 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 $ 4 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 S 9 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 3 . SPORT FISHERY MANAGEMENT \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 TRIBUTARY STORAGE AND REPRODUC-TION REQUIREMENTS $ 1 , 1 4 0 , 0 0 0 S 5 0 0 . 0 0 0 $ 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 BASIC RECOMMENDATIONS The following basic recommendations are made to establish a framework for developing the comprehensive plan for water resource management in the Okanagan Basin. More detailed recom-mendations are outlined in the subsequent section. /. \"That the boundaries of the present Regional Districts of North Okanagan Central Okanagan and Okanagan-Similkameen be redrawn to create a single Okanagan Basin Regional District having boundaries coincident with those of the watershed, to be responsible for those water resource management functions that pertain to the Valley as a whole and in particular the implementation of those recommendations in this report that are Valley-wide in scope, especially waste treatment, the orderly development of shoreline recreation facilities, and floodplain zoning.\" Good water management is essential to the maintenance of desirable lifestyles of the Okanagan community. Because all parts of the basins are linked by the flowing nature of water, it is important to avoid actions in one part that will adversely affect the environment in another or reduce the future potential of valley-wide economic activities, for example the attraction of tourists. As this feature of common interest throughout the valley affects many aspects of planning, a number of recom-mendations in this report cut across existing jurisdictions and apply to the basin as a whole. This valley-wide approach applies in particular to recommended upgrading of existing waste treatment facilities, and the provision of new ones where the benefits of improved lake quality are valley-wide and treatment on a regional basis is feasible in meeting objectives. It is considered unfair that under a particular scheduling program, certain communities could be asked to bear the major portion of the costs of a waste management program which benefits the basin as a whole. It appears to be the consenus of the Okanagan Community that a single authority be established to coordinate the implementation of the framework plan. As much use as possible should be made of existing institutions, for neither the public nor the senior governments desire the creation of a new intervening level of government. The success of the task forces during the study in bringing together people from all parts of the basin verifies that valley-wide consensus on water management problems is possible. Provincial legislation is available to establish a regional district for the watershed. While the process of setting up such an authority normally provides for the assignment of a number of functions, it is felt that certain characteristics and functions essential to the success of this new body should be identified in the documents establishing it, for example, in the letters patent. These are: (i) that all residents within the watershed be required to share in the burden of costs, or to undertake necessary common actions, that clearly affect the valley as a whole, for example, upgrading the quality of the main lakes. (ii) that standards set by governments for such things as water quality be considered as minimum standards for the Basin and may need upgrading to provide a superior quality of the environment, in specific locations. (iii) that the Regional District should be supported by a technical resource advisory committee representing the resource agencies concerned. The establishment of such a group is now provided for in provincial legislation. (iv) that continuing public participation, which has been a principal feature of this study, be imbedded in the future planning process and be built into the institutional arrangements proposed herein. One Regional District For Basin 452 Finally, this study has not examined all the implications outside the Valley that would be incurred in creating a single valley authority for the Okanagan watershed. A wider examination may reveal other alternatives for the boundaries of a Regional District more suitable for this broader multiple watershed region. In working out these boundaries, however, it is important to keep in mind the four characteristics listed above. To repeat, it is the opinion of the Board and the results of opinion surveys in the valley that a single valley authority is clearly the best option for the Okanagan Basin itself. The above recommendation was the subject of considerable discussion after release of the D R A F T report with local political leaders, in particular, taking the position that such a major re-organization of local government was at least premature and would raise very difficult administrative problems. The Board has reconsidered this matter and now puts forward two alternatives to recommendation #1, either of which could achieve the same objectives. Alternative 1 (a) takes care of certain local administrative problems arising from separation of certain communities, by selecting an appropriate boundary for the new Regional District. Alternative 1 [a]: Alternatives to \"That the boundaries of the present Regional Districts of North Okanagan. Central Recommendation Okanagan and Okanagan-Similkameen be redrawn to create a single Regional lm District, including within it's boundaries the total area of Okanagan Basin watershed in Canada; to be responsible for those water resource management functions that pertain to the Valley as a whole and in particular, the implementation of the recommendations in this report that are Valley-wide in scope, especially Waste Treatment, the orderly development of shoreline recreationalfacilities and flood plain zoning.\" The second alternative based on a proposal developed by the three Regional Districts is as follows: Alternative 1 [b]: \"That the Okanagan Basin Water Board be reconstructed and Letters Patent amended to give the Board authority to carry out water resource management func-tions described above, in Alternative 1 \a\\" The success of this alternative would depend upon the willingness of the Regional Districts to delegate powers to the Water Board and to work together in achieving Valley-wide aims clearly defined in this report. 2. \"That to ensure continuity from planning to implementation of the framework plan, Canada and British Columbia establish - on or before 31 March 1974 - an Implementation Task Force which has local representation.\" The Task Force is to advise and recommend to the federal and provincial governments and to local governments, actions required to implement the comprehensive plan and to submit on or before 30 June 1974 a draft implementation agreement. This agreement shall take into consideration the actions on recommendation of this report that may be taken by local government, and by either senior government. Where joint action is required the agreement shall include provisions for equitable cost-sharing as developed by the senior governments. Nothing in this recommendation should inhibit on-going programs presently in progress and the implementation of recommendations where responsibilities are clear. Implementation Task Force 3. \"That the water available be managed such that, without large scale importation of water, all present and projected future water uses around Okanagan Lake and along Okanagan River are satisfied: recognizing that during a prolonged drought cycle, increased drawdown of Okanagan Lake and some cutback in releases to Okanagan River for non-consumptive uses may be necessary.\" Through implementation of water conservation measures within the Okanagan, all water requirements can be met. Large scale importation of water into the Okanagan is not necessary based on present studies. In extreme drought conditions Okanagan Lake would have to be drawn down from time to time below the present minimum elevation of 1118.8 feet and fishery flows for sockeye salmon reduced. Such drawdowns should not create severe problems provided that a program of adjustments to water intakes around Okanagan Lake and along Okanagan River is undertaken immediately and the public is made fully aware of the consequences of such lake drawdowns. 4. \"That major conflicts in water use between irrigation and fishery requirements in tributary streams be avoided by managing Mission, Equesis and Trepanier Creeks for fisheries and irrigation purposes, and developing other major creeks primarily for domestic and agricultural water use.\" Some 4,300 acre-feet of headwater storage should be licenced and developed to meet fishery requirements on Mission and Equesis Creeks. An additional 25,000 acre-feet of headwater storage are available on these and other major tributaries to meet a possible expansion of 9,000 acres of agricultural land. Such agricultural expansion was given high priority by the valley community to enhance the economic and social environment of the basin. On certain creeks additional water will have to be obtained from other sources to supply potential agricultural demands, (e.g. Kelowna Creek). Capital costs of this storage development for agriculture, exclusive of water distribution costs are estimated and 6.9 million dollars, with capitalized economic benefits of 3.25 million dollars. The social benefits related to agricultural development have not been estimated. The costs and benefits of a sport fishery program are included in Recommendation 10. W a t c r 5. \"That potential flood damage around Okanagan and Osoyoos Lakes and along Quantity Okanagan River be minimized through the institution of flood plain zoning and Floods emergency protection measures.\" Flooding in the Okanagan, other than on Osoyoos Lake occurs about once every 15 years. On Osoyoos Lake major floods occur about once every 10 years. Large scale structural measures for flood control cannot be economically justified in Canada alone and thus occasional flooding will continue to occur around these two lakes. Flood plain zoning will avoid potential increases in shoreline property damage while implementation of protective measures on an emergency basis will reduce flood damage to existing properties. On Okanagan Lake the 200 year flood elevation has been estimated at 1125.5 feet and on Osoyoos Lake at 919.25 feet. Two feet of freeboard over and above this maximum flood elevation is also required for protection against wave action. It is therefore recommended that the flood plain zone for all undeveloped areas shall include all lands up to an elevation of 1127.5 feet for Okanagan Lake and up to elevation 921 feet for Osoyoos Lake. Land use within these flood plain zones would be limited to agricultural cropland, parkland for recreation and wildlife sanctuaries. An information brochure on emergency protective measures and flood proofing should be issued to all occupants on the flood plain as a measure of reducing the damage to properties already existing in the flood plain zone. Water Quantity Management Mainstem System Water Quantity Management Tributary Streams 454 6. \"That the Government of Canada and British Columbia immediately take the necessary steps to refer a study of Osoyoos Lake level regulations to the In-ternational Joint Commission.\" Adjustments to intakes along Okanagan River will allow reductions in flows in the river to conserve water but these flow reductions may create problems of maintaining desirable lake levels on Osoyoos Lake during drought periods unless control at the outlet of Osoyoos Lake is improved. Thus, this study should determine what measures need to be taken either in Canada or the United States to: (a) maintain Osoyoos Lake levels during drought periods. (b) reduce flood damage around the lake. . , 7. \"That a program of pollution control for tributary streams be established by instituting strict regulations on feedlot and septic tank developments, removing all direct discharges to streams of industrial and municipal wastes causing pollution and protecting streams with appropriate green strips in areas where logging or cultivation is practiced or where there are concentrations of cattle, horses, or other livestock.\" High coliform counts, oxygen deficiencies, turbidity and concentrations of iron, manganese and phosphorus in certain tributary creeks affect the quality of water supplies for drinking, fish propagation and other uses. The origin of these pollutants is primarily from industrial and municipal waste effluents, septic tank sources, concentrations of livestock, and erosion. The prevention of pollution from these sources through appropriate pollution control programs (see Detailed Recom-mendations 21 to 24) is required to improve the quality of water in tributary streams to meet the standards outlined in the final report. 8. \"That a waste management program aimed at reducing phosphorus loadings to control rooted aquatic plant and algae growth in the main valley lakes be un-dertaken immediately by the regional authority.\" Phosphorus was identified as one of the key nutrients promoting undesirable aquatic plant and algal growth in the main valley lakes, and the nutrient which may be most successfully controlled to reduce this growth and the resulting deterioration in water quality. The valley consenus stated that it is of prime importance to arrest this decline and reverse the process wherever possible. Consequently, the framework plan has established a waste management program for reducing the amount of phosphorus discharged from municipal, industrial and domestic sources, to control the growth of algae and rooted plants in the main valley lakes. The capital costs of this program over and above that required to protect the health of the valley community is estimated at 2.0 to 2.3 million dollars by 1985, with an-nual costs estimated at $490,000. In comparison, economic benefits associated with the maintenance of a high level of quality in the main valley lakes total $265,000 annually with social benefits estimated at $1,100,000 annually. Phosphorus removal is possible only where conventional waste treatment facilities are available. The additional capital cost of conventional treatment to 1985, including sanitary sewers and secondary treatment plants, has been estimated at 17 to 22 million dollars. The year 1985 was considered the limit to which meaningful projections could be made for waste treatment costs based on existing technology and water quality data. Programs for financial assistance to local governments for implementing waste management projects are available under the following acts: Federal National Housing Act Provincial Municipal Treatment Plant Assistance Act British Columbia Taxation Act. U . C . Reference OSOYOOS Lake Water Quality Tributary Streams Water Quality Main Valley Lakes 9. \"That shoreline recreation be enhanced through the protection and development of shorelines for beach recreation and maintenance of high levels of water quality.\" Due to trends towards increased leisure time and the unique recreation potential of the Okanagan, the valley community placed second priority (after human and agricultural consumptive use) in water and related resource management, to recreation planning. To meet the expected four-fold increase in demands for beach recreation, all public and Crown lands with good recreational potential should be preserved for that use. Some 40,000 linear feet of additional shoreline must be developed for public recreation by 2020 together with 4,000 linear feet of additional public access to the lakeshore and 10 to 12 new boat launching facilities; The economic value of these additional facilities totalled over the fifty year planning horizon is estimated at $13 million with social values totalling $47 million. herlei 10. \"That sport fishery resources [kokanee and rainbow trout] be enhanced by protecting existing habitat and improving both natural and artificial reproductive facilities.\" The valley community supports a sport fishery enhancement program for the headwater and main valley lakes. In addition to supplying water in selected tributaries, spawning beds should be rehabilitated and artificial stocking of headwater lakes increased. The total costs of this program are estimated at $3 million by 2020 (including the storage shown in Recommendation 4) with minimum economic and social benefits of $2.9 million and $4.6 million respectively for sport fisheries. 11. \"That the response of water resources to management measures implemented under the framework plan be monitored continuously, with a full review of the plan to be undertaken by 1980 to ensure that the plan continues to meet the social and economic goals of the valley community.\" Water Based Recreation Monitoring the Framework Plan Despite the large investment involved in preparing the comprehensive plan, there are many un-certainties in the development of water management alternatives, especially in waste treatment requirements to reduce phosphorus loadings to the main lakes (for example, technological advances in waste treatment may improve opportunities for waste management in the future). Consequently, it is important to monitor how the water resource responds to management measures implemented under the plan on a continuing basis, with a full review by 1980 to make necessary corrections to the plan. I N S T I T U T I O N A L A N D L E G A L C O N S I D E R A T I O N S In examining the legal and institutional aspects of water resource management in the Okanagan, it is apparent that certain deficiencies have hindered effective planning and utilization in the past. These ' weaknesses are summarized below. (a) No single agency has regulatory control over all pollutants from sanitary waste discharges to the ground of less than 5,000 gallons per day. (b) No one agency is impowered to enforce waste management, flood plain zoning and green belt measures recommended under the framework plan on all Indian Lands in the Okanagan. (c) There is a lag in the enforcement of legislation, regulations and guidelines affecting water resource management, (d) Prior to this study, the public has had no opportunity for participation in the planning process. 456 The common thread in these weaknesses is the lack of a basin-wide approach to managing water and water related resources at the local level. The Board believes that a regional authority could, with the benefit of direct experience gained over time, solve most of the problems. It could, for example, develop plans for the orderly use or phase-out of septic tanks that have both health hazard and nutrient loading problems; it could work directly with the Indian bands to help them solve their problems in a harmonious way; it could identify deficiencies in enforcement programs; and, it could be the focal point for continuing public participation. Specific answers to these problems are not proposed here. Indeed it is the Board's view that-a single regional authority will in time become more capable of providing effective and acceptable solutions. This is the heart of the Board's conclusions; namely, that the future of the Valley rests primarily in the hands of local residents, with the support and assistance of senior governments. 457 D E T A I L E D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S In the previous section, basic recommendations were presented dealing with broad management programs, institutions and processes affecting water resource development throughout the Valley. In the following section, a more detailed set of recommendations, in some cases with associated costs and benefits, is presented under general headings such as water quantity, water quality, fisheries, etc. Some of these detailed recommendations therefore duplicate the previous basic recommendations, but in a more specific manner. Hopefully, they will: permit the reader to see in a concrete way, the set of actions proposed to improve or protect the environment while maintaining the economic viability of the Valley. A. WATER QUANTITY Based on economic growth projections, future requirements for water in both consumptive and non-consumptive uses are only expected to increase by about 10% from 312,000 acre-feet in 1970 to about 345,000 acre-feet in 2020. With proper management, the existing water supplies within the Basin should be able to meet these requirements. During prolonged drought periods, such as has occurred once in the last 50 years, Okanagan Lake would have to be drawn down below its present minimum water elevation of 1118.8 feet, and certain non-consumptive water uses may have to be restricted. At the other extreme, flood conditions around Okanagan Lake are expected to occur about once every 13 years on an average. Provided Okanagan Lake elevations do not exceed 1124.8 feet*, i.e. one foot above normal high water elevation, flood damage will be relatively small and can be reduced by effective flood plain zoning policies. Although flooding around Osoyoos Lake is more frequent (once every 10 years on an average), resulting economic damage is too small to justify improved structural controls by Canada alone. Again, improved emergency protective measures and flood plain zoning to 921 feet can help reduce this flood damage over the next 50 years. In the eight major tributaries around Okanagan- Lake, additional storage reservoir capacities should be developed if increased demands for water in irrigation, domestic use and fisheries are to be met. Only two tributary basins-Vernon and Kelowna- would require supplemental water from outside their watersheds to meet potential water requirements for consumptive uses, while Trepanier Creek would require water pumped from Okanagan Lake to meet fishery requirements. Through use of multiple purpose management on Mission and Equesis Creeks, the more serious conflicts in water use between fisheries and irrigation should be resolved. To meet the water quantity planning objectives set out under the basic recommendations, the following components of the framework plan are recommended: Normal 12. \"That Okanagan Lake be regulated within its normal four foot range [elevation Conditions 1119.8 to 1123.8 feet] in all but anticipated extreme flood years [net inflows to Okanagan Okanagan Lake exceeding 500,000 acre-feet], and successive drought years [net Lake inflows less than 200,000 acre-feet per year\\" Estimated maximum elevation of Okanagan Lake under 200 year flood is approximately 1125.5 feet. 458 13. To minimize the impact of flooding around Okanagan and Osoyoos Lake and along Okanagan River, the following steps should be taken: \"Okanagan Lake should be drawn down below its normal low water elevation of 1119.8 feet prior to freshet, in an anticipated flood year, by up to one foot, that flood plan zoning be implemented and enforced by a regional water management authority up to 1127.5 feet elevation around Okanagan Lake. Further development on this flood plain should be limited to recreation, parks and agricultural activities [See also Recommendation 5]. that the gates on Okanagan and Skaha Lakes be improved to avoid icing during the winter and erosion and bank protection works be built around some drop structures and along Okanagan River.\" With these improvements the channel discharge capacity in Okanagan River at Penticton can be increased by 15% or 12,000 acre-feet a month, in flood years. This will have little effect on Osoyoos Lake where flooding is caused largely from backwater of the Similkameen River (see also Recom-mendation 6 on L L C . Referral). These works should be implemented jointly by the Federal and Provincial Governments. Their capital cost has been estimated at $739,000 with accumulated flood control benefits to 2020 (economic) of $90,000. No estimate was made of the social or environmental values of these improvements. IV \"That flood plain zoning around Osoyoos Lake be implemented by the Regional authority to 921 feet as soon as possible\" [See also Recommendation 5.] V \"That emergency protection measures and flood warning systems be further developed for Osoyoos Lake as soon as possible by the British Columbia Water Resources Service. These measures should be described in an information booklet and made available to all residents around the lake.\" 14. To minimize the impact of droughts in the mainstem, the following steps should be taken: \"That the level of Okanagan Lake be maintained at as high an elevation as possible during drought years, recognizing that in single drought years, all consumptive and non-consumptive water requirements should be met. Under prolonged drought conditions, the lake level may reach a low of 1116.8feet.\" The accumulated recreational benefits associated with this type of operation have been estimated at $140,000 to the year 2020. II \"That irrigation and domestic intakes along Okanagan River channel be lowered or altered so that they are fully operative under a base flow of 100 cubic feet per second [c.f.s.] in drought years.\" A base flow of 100 c.f.s. is required to support ecological and aesthetic resources. Water for con-sumptive uses and evaporation along Okanagan River and on Osoyoos Lake would be supplied in addition to this flow. This work will conserve 40,000 acre-feet in drought years and save an estimated $30,000 annually by removing the need to place stop-logs in the drop structures. This program should be undertaken jointly by the Federal and Provincial Governments. Lake Operation Under Flood Conditions n i n Lake I Operation Under Drought Conditions 459 The estimated capital cost of this work is $143,000 with capitalized savings in operation costs of S410,000. HI \"That once the intakes have been lowered or altered, water requirements for sockeye salmon in Okanagan River should be met in all years except consecutive drought years as follows: \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 FLOWS M E A S U R E D A T O L I V E R \" H Y D R O M E T R I C S T A T I O N August 1-September 15 300-400 c.f.s. September 26-October 31 350-550 c.f.s. November 1-April30 275 cf.s. In two or more consecutive drought years, these flows may have to be reduced.\" I V \"That all irrigation and domestic intakes around Okanagan Lake be adjusted as required to be operable at a minimum lake elevation of 1116.8 feet.\" The cost of these necessary adjustments is estimated at $100,000 and should be shared jointly by the Federal and Provincial Governments. 15. \"That all future intakes, wharves, boat ramps and other structures around Okanagan Lake be built to operate with a lake elevation range of1116.8 to 1125.5 feet. Similar structures around Osoyoos Lake must operate with a lake elevation range of 909 to 919 feet, with possible revisions resulting from the proposed IJ.C. review.\" 16..\"That contingency plans and costs be prepared by the Province of British Columbia for possible adjustments to the Kelowna Floating Bridge, so that the bridge can function within an operating range of 1116.8 to 1125.5 feet on . Okanagan Lake.\" 17. \"That the existing improved channel way used to maintain Tugulnuit Lake be supplemented by the addition of a pumping unit.\" The improvement will allow sufficient flexibility to control the lake within the desirable range and in the event of a mechanical failure still provide some inflow or outflow as required. . 18. \"That the stream monitoring program in the tributary streams to Okanagan Lake and the mainstem should be continued to improve inflow forecasts to Okanagan Lake and the major tributaries.\" This program, supported by soil moisture sampling should help to improve the accuracy of forecasts, thereby allowing for better regulation of both tributary stream storages and Okanagan Lake. 19. \"That multiple purpose water management be practiced in selected tributary basins to meet present and future consumptive and non-consumptive uses.\" Structural Requirement! R E Lake Levels Kelowna Floating Bridge Tugulnuit Lake Monitoring to Improve Inflow Forecasts Multiple Water Use In Tributaries 460 Studies indicate that the planned storages (see also Recommendation 4), will supply future con-sumptive and non-consumptive uses in all major tributary watersheds except Kelowna Creek. The British Columbia Water Resources Service, in cooperation with the present water licence holders, will work out modified releases from headwater storages in Mission and Equesis Creeks to improve flows for fisheries at the mouths of these streams. The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Conservation will arrange and finance additional water storages for fisheries at the sites indicated below, by 1980, while the development of additional storages for consumptive uses will be undertaken as required by the Municipalities, Improvement Districts or individual water users. The above agencies in consultation with the Regional authority, will be responsible for planning and coordinating future water resource development in tributary watersheds. Existing and planned storage on the eight most heavily utilized tributaries in the basin are as follows: PLANNED TRIBUTARY STORAGE FOR CONSUMPTIVE USE AND FISHERIES TRIBUTARY RESERVOIR STORAGE IN 1972 (ACRE - F E E T ) PROPOSED NEW STORAGE ( A C R E - F E E T ) CONSUMPTIVE USE FISHERIES TROUT CREEK PEACHLAND CREEK 10,300 9,500 1,700 \u00E2\u0080\u0094 POWERS CREEK EQUESIS CREEK 3,700 2,200 1,100 700 VERNON CREEK KELOWNA CREEK 46,700 5,700 15,800 1.600 MISSION CREEK PENTICTON CREEK 18,000 9,800 7,200 3,600 T O T A L S 105,900 27,400 4,300 The estimated capital cost of constructing these proposed storages is 1.1 million dollars for fisheries and 6.9 million dollars for consumptive use purposes, with annual costs of $110,000 and $730,000 respectively. The annual economic and social benefits accruing from sport fishery enhancement have been estimated at $500,000 and $800,000 respectively. Benefits were not estimated for consumptive use storage. Pumped 20. \"That the pumped diversion from Okanagan Lake to Vernon Creek be con-DlYerskra tinued.\" to Vemon Creek > ' ' This diversion, currently being made to meet industrial demands for water, returns the flow in lower Vernon Creek to historical levels (prior to agricultural development in the area), could provide sufficient water if operated continuously to eliminate consumptive use deficiencies along the lower reach of Vernon Creek, including fishery flow deficits. The development of some 16,000 acre-feet of storage on Vernon Creek would be used for the development of an additional 4,000 acres of irrigated land. Such development should be carefully considered because other available water supplies are located at some distance from potentially irrigable lands. . Further recommendations for the Vernon Creek Basin are anticipated under the Provincial Kalamalka-Wood Lake Study. B. WATER QUALITY I. Tributary Streams Generally accepted water quality standards for consumptive and non-consumptive uses are outlined in the main report of the Consultative Board. These are standards established by government agencies, particularly the B.C. Department of Health, and apply to specific uses of water such as for drinking purposes, aquatic life including fisheries, and water contact sports. Most streams do not meet water quality standards for drinking water purposes in one or more parameters, particularly color and turbidity, but of most concern are those pollutants which are harmful to the health of man or injurious to sport fish, including coliform, high turbidity levels, oxygen deficiencies and in some cases, high nutrient levels. Since most of the undesirable constituents in streams are also a major source of pollutants to the main valley lakes, any improvement in stream quality will also enhance lake water quality. Recommendations to meet water quality objectives in tributary streams are as follows: 21. \"That all municipal and industrial waste discharges causing pollution be prevented from entering tributary streams.\" Because the amount of waste material that various streams can assimilate varies from creek to creek, day to day, and month to month, depending on the size of the sub-basin and streamflow, it is impractical to establish meaningful receiving water standards. Few streams in the basin carry suf-ficient water on a year-round basis to assimilate any waste products other than natural pollutants from the basin itself. Therefore, the removal of all municipal and industrial discharges containing pollutants is required to achieve established water quality standards in most streams. However, where such waste discharges can be proven acceptable and free of pollutants, the additional water provided by such discharges is often beneficial, and should be encouraged. Community or regional treatment plants would be the most suitable in achieving the above objective, particularly with respect to industrial waste discharges. Erosion 22. \"That forest management and agricultural practices be reviewed by the B.C. Management Forest Service and the B.C. Department of Agriculture, and greenbelts established where necessary to reduce nutrient loadings from erosion.\" Logging road construction and land cultivation adjacent to streams are major sources of soil erosion from surface runoff. Eroded soils greatly increase the turbidity of water, and provide a base in lakebeds for rooted aquatic vegetation. They also contribute a substantial amount of nutrients and other chemical elements to the main valley lakes. Improved land use management over a period of time may reduce such erosion, but continued monitoring and surveillance of stream water quality may also indicate the need for appropriate green belts (strips of permanent vegetation), along the entire course bf streams where logging and cultivation are practiced. Such green belts must be maintained to ensure their effectiveness in minimizing soil erosion and stream pollution. 23. \"That regulations controlling surface drainage from cattle feed lots, and other livestock operations be established and enforced by British Columbia Water Resources Service by 1975.\" Municipal & Industrial Discharges to Tributaries Drainage Waters From Livestock Operations 462 Fertilizers Sprays and 24. \"That future regulations controlling fertilizers and sprays be reviewed by the B.C. Department of Agriculture following the completion and release of the report of the Royal Commission currently studying the matter.\" LT. Main Valley Lakes Algal blooms and rooted aquatic vegetation have become visually evident in many parts of all the main valley lakes in recent years. These conditions will continue to worsen under existing waste loading levels, and will have an increasingly detrimental effect on the enjoyment of these lakes from an economic, recreational and aesthetic viewpoint. The major cause of this type of pollution has been identified as nutrient loadings in excess of those which lakes can assimilate. In the Okanagan Basin, phosphorus has been identified as the nutrient which may be most suc-cessfully controlled to reduce this plant growth and resulting deterioration in water quality, and phosphorus loading objectives have been established for each of the main valley lakes. These objectives are related to an assimilative capacity for each lake that will provide a level of water quality consistent with maximum recreational and aesthetic benefits. Nutrient sources are many and varied, but one source, municipal outfalls, currently contributes approximately 50% of the total phosphorus loading to the main valley lakes. The immediate control of this one source has therefore been given priority over other sources, which are more difficult to manage. Because waste treatment technology and methods for the removal of phosphorus are dependent on conventional treatment facilities, the requirements and costs for such treatment have been included in the evaluations. The benefits obtained from the removal of phosphorus, a decrease in rooted aquatic plant growth and algal blooms, should however only be compared to the costs of phosphorus removal itself. Primary and secondary waste treatment processes are normally required for protecting the health of the valley community. Urban developments serviced by septic tanks also represent a significant source of phosphorus to the main valley lakes. The soils of the Okanagan Valley are generally poor in respect to nutrient removal, and in densely populated areas, high percentages of nutrients can return to surface waters from these diffuse sources. Such sources can affect a lake as a whole - e.g. Wood, Kalamalka and Osoyoos, or in the case of Okanagan Lake, shoreline areas which may have high recreational values. Therefore, the next priority for nutrient control is sewage collection and waste treatment in urban areas serviced by septic tanks adjacent to the main valley lakes. The rapid growth of some of these unsewered areas appears to have created serious localized weed and algal problems rather than health problems. In rural areas with low density populations located at a distance from surface waters, septic tanks will continue to be the most economical means for treating household wastes. In presenting the following specific recommendations to reduce phosphorus loadings to each of the main valley lakes within the limits of the established objectives, the relative accuracy of loading data and uncertainty involved in the establishment of loading objectives, requires that the effect of im-plementation of these recommendations should be carefully monitored to ensure the desired results are being realized. Further, while the projected loadings are shown to the year 2020, the costs and benefits of phosphorus control are shown for only the immediate future. [a] Wood Lake The present condition of this lake is very poor with almost continuous algal blooms in the summer months and heavy aquatic plant growth along the shorelines. The current phosphorus loading has been estimated at a minimum of 3300 pounds per year of which approximately 50% is attributed to septic tank sources. Future loadings based on low economic growth projections for this area are as follows: . YEAR P R O J E C T E D A V E R A G E ANNUAL PHOSPHORUS LOADINGS (POUNDS) MINIMUM REDUCTION REQUIRED TO MEET ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVES (POUNDS) 1980 500C 3000 2000 8200 6200 2020 11900 9900 The acceptable limits for phosphorus loading to this lake have been established at 2000 to 3000 pounds per year. Because of the existing high internal loading of phosphorus in this lake a significant decrease in phosphorus loadings is required to effect any change in its condition. Therefore, the lower loading objective of 2000 pounds has been used in estimating minimum phosphorus reductions for Wood Lake. Due to its physical characteristics (volume, mean depth,-and low volume of inflow) and uncontrollable sources of nutrients, the lake will continue to be biologically productive but clarity and oxygen levels will be improved and fisheries enhanced, if the above reductions are achieved. Recommendations to meet established loading objectives are as follows: Wood 25. \"That a sewage collection treatment system at the urban center ofWinfield, with L a k e facilities for 80% phosphorus removal, be installed by 1977.\" The estimated capital cost of this facility which would meet treatment requirements to 1985 based on projected population growth is shown below. (1970 Dollar Values) - SANITARY SEWERS 5530,000 - SECONDARY T R E A T M E N T S280.000 - PHOSPHORUS REMOVAL FACILITIES S 70,000 T O T A L 5880,000 The annual expenditures for phosphorus removal only, including the amortization of capital and operating costs, have been estimated at $10,000 to $15,000. Annual economic and social benefits to be derived from improving this lake quality have been estimated at $36,000 and 569,000 respectively to 1985. One alternative to the above would be to transport wastes to a central treatment plant at Kelowna, thus achieving 100% phosphorus removal from sewered areas at Winfield. The capital cost of a trunk main and phosphorus removal at Kelowna is estimated at approximately $680,000. Increased phosphorus removal either by spray irrigation or other means may be required by the year 2000 to meet established criteria. The exact amount of removal will depend on monitoring results to and beyond 1985. These cost figures and those shown for the other lakes are very preliminary and primarily for comparison purposes. Detailed studies and plans for a particular center should be carried out under the direction of the Regional authority to determine the most suitable treatment method and cost of such works prior to actual implementation. 464 [b] Kalamalka Lake The relative fertility of this lake is high, but good quality conditions have been preserved by a natural self-cleansing system. Some weed growth is now occurring at the mouth of Coldstream Creek and in the south end of the lake. The present (1971) phosphorus loading to this lake has been estimated at 5200 pounds per year, of which approximately 20% is from septic tanks. These septic tank in-stallations are nearly all located in the Coldstream area at the north end of the lake, and, along with nutrients from Coldstream Creek itself are the main reasons for weed problems in this area. Future loadings based on a low economic growth projection are as follows: YEAR P R O J E C T E D A V E R A G E ANNUAL PHOSPHORUS LOADINGS (POUNDS) MINIMUM REDUCTION REQUIRED TO MEET ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVES (POUNDS) 1980 7000 -2000 8300 600 2020 9300 1600 The acceptable range for phosphorus loading to Kalamalka Lake has been established at 6600 to 8800 pounds of phosphorus per year. Provided annual loadings are kept within this range, the quality of water in the lake as a whole should remain in excellent condition, particularly for recreation and aesthetic purposes. This will not however, protect the shoreline areas from declining in quality due to local nutrient inputs from such sources as septic tanks. The loading objectives for this lake are more stringent than for the other lakes because of the small volume of inflow and relatively long retention time of water in this lake. While total present loadings are below established objectives, curtailment of local sources of nutrients from septic tanks is considered necessary to protect beach and other recreational areas at the north end of the lake. Recommendations are therefore as follows: \". 26. \"That sewage collection for the urban center of Coldstream with a main pipeline to the treatment plant at Vernon be implemented by 1977. This would effect 100% phosphorus removal in serviced areas and reduce local phosphorus loadings to the Kalamalka Beach area.\" The estimated capital cost of this to meet treatment requirements to 1985 would be as follows: - SANITARY SEWERS 31,190,000 - PUMPING STATION AND PIPELINE TO VERNON REGIONAL TREATMENT PLANT.(WOULD SERVE BEYOND 1990). 250,000 - CAPITAL COST OF PHOSPHORUS REMOVAL FACILITIES . INCLUDED UNDER VERNON P L A N T . COLDSTREAM CONTRI-BUTION IS APPROXIMATELY 10% 35,000 TO 45,000 T O T A L 51,520,000 The annual expenditures for phosphorus removal only have been estimated at $10,000. The annual economic and social benefits associated with the removal of phosphorus, and resulting high quality of water for recreational pursuits, are S12.000 and S60,000 respectively. The above measure along with improved standards for new septic tank installations should reduce phosphorus loadings to within established objectives beyond the year 1985. Kalamalka Lake 465 [c] Okanagan Lake The main water mass of Okanagan Lake is still in excellent condition, but deterioration has oc curred around shoreline areas served by septic tanks or affected by wastewater outfalls. Projected loadings to Okanagan Lake are as follows: YEAR P R O J E C T E D A V E R A G E ANNUAL PHOSPHORUS LOADINGS POUNDS MINIMUM REDUCTION REQUIRED TO MEET ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVES POUNDS 1980 - 225,000 65,000 2000 280,000 120,000 2020 310,000 150,000 Over 40% of the current (1971) phosphorus loading comes from the two municipal outfalls of Vernon and Kelowna, while an additional 10% may be attributed to septic tank sources. The acceptable range for phosphorus loadings to Okanagan Lake has been established at 135,000 to 185,000 pounds of phosphorus per year. . . . Providing annual loadings are kept within this range, excellent water quality should be maintained in the main body of the lake. Additional measures however, may be required for localized problems in shoreline areas. A high quality of water in Okanagan Lake is the key to good water quality in the downstream lakes and maximum loadings for the south basin have therefore been set lower than the rest of the lake to provide an increased margin of safety against water quality degradation. The present (1971) loadings in all three areas either exceed or equal these established objectives. The removal of 80% of the phosphorus loading from the two municipal outfalls (Kelowna and Vernon) will reduce these loadings within acceptable limits beyond 1985, but local areas may still exhibit eutrophic characteristics due to local phosphorus loadings from shoreline development. - _ Recommendations to meet established objectives for phosphorus loadings to Okanagan Lake, and to control weed growth in local shoreline areas are as follows: \" 27. [i] \"That the city of Vernon remove all sanitary and industrial wastes causing pollution, from Vernon creek by implementing one of the two wastewater . management options detailed below: Okanagan Lake 466 OPTION A \u00E2\u0080\u0094 Removal of 80% of phosphorus by 1977 with discharge of treated ef-fluent into Vernon Creek. This option assumes a discharge effluent which will not degrade the quality of Vernon Creek water. Should continued monitoring indicate this discharge to contain pollutants which affect the quality of Vernon Creek and ,the North Arm of Okanagan Lake, an outfall sewer between the Vernon Sewage Treatment Plant and the main body of Okanagan Lake may be required. The cost of such an outfall sewer has been estimated at 1 million dollars. OPTION B \u00E2\u0080\u0094 Spray irrigation of secondary treated effluent by 1977. This measure would achieve over 90% phosphorus removal. [ii] \"That sewage collection and treatment with 80% phosphorus removal for the urban center of Okanagan Landing be started by 1977 to reduce loadings to the Vernon Arm of the lake. The option of constructing a trunk line to the central plant at Vernon should be investigated.\" [Hi] \"That 80% phosphorus removal from City of Kelowna waste effluents be im-plemented by 1977 to reduce loadings within acceptable limits beyond the year 1980 under a low economic growth rate. The inclusion of Rutland and new areas in the city of Kelowna sewer system should be undertaken immediately. Increased phosphorus removal may be required by the year 2000.\" [rv] \"That phosphorus removal at Westbank, Armstrong, Naramata , Summerland, Peachland and other urban shoreline developments be implemented as required by the B.C. Water Resources Service to improve water quality in local shoreline areas of Okanagan Lake.\" The capital cost of the first three recommendations to meet treatment requirements to 1985 has been estimated as follows (1970 dollar values): Vemon - Option A Sanitary Sewers Renovation of Existing Plant and New Activated Sludge Plant Phosphorus Removal Facilities TOTAL Annual cost of Phosphorus Removal Vernon - Option B While spray irrigation of secondary effluent has been studied and found to be an effective means of wastewater disposal, the health implications and costs of this type of treatment for phosphorus removal have not been fully evaluated for a specific center or site. Okanagan Landing Sanitary Sewers Batch Lagoon (to 1985) . Phosphorus Removal Facilities TOTAL Annual Cost of Phosphorus Removal $1,270,000 1,100,000 410,000 2,780,000 $ 100,000 $155,000 90,000 3,000 248,000 $ 2.500 Kelowna'[including Rutland] Sanitary Sewers Activated Sludge Plant excluding available facilities (good to 1985) \" Phosphorus Removal Facilities TOTAL Annual Cost of Phosphorus Removal $7,390;000 2,250,000 880,000 10.520,000 $ 200,000 Annual economic and social benefits, derived from maintaining a high water quality in Okanagan Lake through phosphorus removal at the above centers, have been estimated at $136,000 and $710,000 respectively. [d] Skaha Lake This lake has the highest relative fertility and biological growth rate of the main valley lakes, and its quality has deteriorated the most rapidly. High quality inflows from Okanagan Lake, and annual renewal of water in this lake have prevented a more rapid deterioration. The estimated phosphorus loading in 1971 was 48,000 pounds. This figure takes into account the average efficiency of the tertiary unit at the City of Penticton Sewage Treatment Plant at that time. (Note: Subsequent improvement in the efficiency of this treatment unit has provided an average phosphorus removal efficienty of 84% for the period September to December 1973). 7 Projected loadings are as follows: YEAR PROJECTED AVERAGE ANNUAL PHOSPHORUS LOADINGS (POUNDS) MINIMUM REDUCTION REQUIRED TO MEET ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVES (POUNDS) 1980 58,000 23,000 2000 71,000 36,000 ; 2020 . 78,000 53,000 Acceptable limits for phosphorus loadings to Skaha Lake have been established at 30,000 to 40,000 pounds per year. These somewhat high values take into account the very short retention time of water in this lake (one year) and the excellent source of good quality water flowing into Skaha from Okanagan Lake. If this objective is met, a good quality water should be achieved for recreation and body contact sports. Recommendations to reduce loadings within these limits are as follows: Skaha Lake 28. [/] \"That 80% phosphorus removal at the City of Penticton Sewage Treatment Plant be achieved and/or maintained.\" Increased removal of phosphorus may be necessary after 1980 as indicated by further monitoring. 468 The estimated capital cost bf this to meet treatment requirements to 1985 is as follows (1970 dollar values). Sanitary Sewers $1,330,000 Additional Activated Sludge Treatment Facilities (Good to 1990) 230,000 Phosphorus Removal Facilities Adequate to 1980 (Existing) Total 11,560,000 Annual Cost of Phosphorus Removal $ 84,000 The annual economic and social benefits associated with phosphorus removal are $48,000 and $135,000 respectively. [ii] \"That treatment and phosphorus removal at Okanagan Falls and other urban shoreline developments be implemented as required by the B.C. Water Resources Service to improve local shoreline areas, based on the results of monitoring programs.\" [e] Vaseux Lake Vaseux has always been a productive lake with its quality dependent on the quality of water from Skaha Lake and Okanagan River. The only applicable recommendation for this lake is that all septic tank system installations or equivalent, adjacent to the lake, be constructed to standards ensuring 80% phosphorus removal, where soil conditions are such that special measures are required in keeping with valley-wide recommendations. The cost of such installations has been estimated at $1,000 to $4,000 depending on the soil condition. The quality of Vaseux Lake waters may be expected to improve somewhat with improvements in Skaha and Okanagan River water, but the shoreline areas will continue to exhibit heavy aquatic growth due to the shallow nature of most of the lake and rich bottom sediments. This habitat is considered suitable for Vaseux Lake, as it has been established as a wildlife (bird) sanctuary. [f] Osoyoos Lake Approximately 60% of the nutrient loadings to Osoyoos Lake come from outflows from Skaha Lake and nutrient additions to Okanagan River between Skaha and Osoyoos Lake including the village of Oliver, drainage waters from agricultural lands and septic tank sources. The remaining loadings come primarily from groundwater return flows to the lake itself. The 1971 loading has been estimated at 37,500 pounds, which takes into account the 1972-73 effect of the tertiary treatment unit at Penticton. Projected loadings to Osoyoos Lake are as follows: YEAR \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 P R O J E C T E D A V E R A G E ANNUAL PHOSPHORUS LOADINGS (POUNDS) MINIMUM REDUCTION REQUIRED TO MEET . ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVES (POUNDS) 1980 51,700 20,000 2000 70,200 38,000 2020 78,200 47,000 Acceptable phosphorus loadings to Osoyoos Lake have been established at 26,000 to 37,000 pounds. These values allow for the very rapid water renewal rate of less than one year which prevents the accumulation of large amounts of nutrients. The maintenance of phosphorus loadings below 31,000 pounds per year should provide a reasonably good water quality for recreation and body contact sports but somewhat lower than that of Skaha Lake and Okanagan Lakes. The attainment of 80% phosphorus removal at Penticton will not be sufficient to maintain loadings within the above limits, and the following additional recommendations are therefore made which will ensure these local objectives are achieved: 29. [i\ \"That 80% phosphorus removal at Oliver is required by 1980 to reduce loadings to Osoyoos Lake.\" [ii\\"That 80% phosphorus removal at Osoyoos is required by 1977. Urban areas in Osoyoos adjacent to Osoyoos Lake and serviced by septic tanks should be sewered and included in the Osoyoos waste treatment program by 1980.\" The estimated capital cost of treatment at Oliver and Osoyoos to meet treatment requirements to 1985 (1970 dollar value) is as follows: Oliver Sanitary Sewers Present Treatment Facilities adequate to 1985 (exclusive of Sun Rype plant effluent) Phosphorus Removal Facilities T O T A L Annual Cost of Phosphorus Removal Osoyoos Sanitary Sewers Extension of Lagoon Treatment Facilities Phosphorus Removal by Spray Irrigation Annual Cost of Phosphorus Removal Annual economic and social benefits associated with phosphorus removal for improving the quality of Osoyoos Lake are estimated at 533,000 and $95,000 respectively. HI Waste Management Two general recommendations concerning waste management are included in the comprehensive plan as being necessary, if the objective for good water quality in the main valley lakes is to be achieved. 30. \"That the Regional authority for water resource management be given the responsibility for the construction , operation, maintenance and financing of all solid waste and sewage treatment plants in the basin, subject to permits issued by the Government of British Columbia.\" Osoyoos Lake $30,000 70,000 100,000 $ 9,000 $75,000 90,000 Not estimated Not estimated Regional Waste Treatment Septic Tanks 31. \"That all new septic tank installations be constructed to standards than ensure 80% phosphorus removal where soil conditions are such that special measures are required to control nutrients from this source.\" 470 Future beaches and recreation facilities should be developed by the Regional District in cooperation with local municipalities as follows: R E G I O N Y E A R R E Q U I R E D B Y A D D I T I O N A L P U B L I C B E A C H F E E T A D D I T I O N A L P U B L I C A C C E S S F E E T A D D I T I O N A L B O A T L A U N C H I N G F A C I L I T I E S C O M M E N T S . O S O Y O O S 1980 2020 1,500 14,000 TO 19,000 45 350 1 2 2400 feet of beach available near Osoy-oos. Large potential on I n d i a n Lands. P E N T I C T O N 1980 2020 4,000 14,000 TO 24,000 600 4 Beach Area Available near Penticton, Summerland and Nara-mata, shoreline rec-lamation on Skaha Lake possible. K E L O W N A 1980 2020 3,600 8,000 TO 18,000 300 1,800 1 5 ' L i m i t e d Natural Beach Area still Available. Develop-ment of beaches near Kelowna possible. V E R N O N 1980 2020 2,000 5 ,000 TO 10,000 200 1,100 4 Cozen's Bay on Kal-amalka Lake. Devel-opment of Kinsmen Beach on Vernon A r m . Public 44. \"That all existing public access points to the main valley lakes be inspected, A c c c s s maintained and clearly marked. This should be undertaken by 1975, by the responsible agencies at the provincial and local levels of government.\" Boat - 45. \"That additional boat launching facilities be built near Kelowna and Osoyoos by Launching 1975, and others built as indicated in the table above. All such facilities on Facilities Okanagan Lake should be constructed to accommodate a 9-foot lake level fluctuation from 1116.8 feet to 1125.5 feet, and on Osoyoos Lake a 9-foot fluc-tuation from 909 feet to 918 feet.\" 471 C. FISHERY MANAGEMENT Some 158,000 angling days were recorded in the Okanagan in 1971, and this total is expected to increase to 450,000 by 2020. Factors limiting sport fishery resources in Okanagan Lakes are hatchery stocking capacities for headwater lakes and adequate stream spawning habitats in the main valley lakes. Failure to protect and enhance the existing sport fishery will result in a decline in numbers of harvestable fish available and a rapid reduction in the number of fish caught as angling demands increase. This could result in an estimated economic loss of 2.8 million dollars and a social loss of 4.6 million dollars over the next fifty years (present values). The objective of the sport fishery management program is to maintain or enhance existing angling success rates in all Okanagan lakes to 2020. It appears that the lakes have sufficient capacity to support the increased populations offish required to meet this objective. Okanagan River supports an average of 19,000 Sockeye salmon spawners annually, which produced 70% of the present United States Columbia River Sockeye salmon catch. This resource is also an important source of food for Indians along Okanagan River. Adoption of water conservation . measures in Okanagan River will maintain the fishery at current population levels. The total cost of the recommended sport fishery management program is expected to exceed $3 -million by 2020 (in 1970 dollars). According to the surveys of resident and non-resident anglers, this investment should be justified through increased participation and satisfaction by anglers in the Okanagan. It is recommended: Fishery 32. \"That the fishery resource continue to be managed on a valley-wide basis by the Management British Columbia Department of Recreation and Conservation but a number of alternative means of financing this program should be investigated by this agency in cooperation with the Regional District. Moreover, additional programs related to zoning various particular lakes for restricted or specialized sport fishing should be evaluated.\" The following components of the framework plan to enhance the sport fishery to meet future angling demands are recommended: 1. Headwater Lakes ' Trout 33. \"That the rainbow trout stocking program should be increased from 1.7 million Stocking jjy annually at present [1971], to 2.1 million fry by 1980, using existing hatchery facilities.\" Fish 34. \"That studies be undertaken by the British Columbia Department of Recreation Hatchery . ancl Conservation by 1975 for locating and designing a new fish hatchery in the Southern Interior of the province.\" This hatchery should be in production by 1985 and, though it would probably serve other locations in the interior of British Columbia, it should be able to supply an additional 1.7 million fry annually by 2020 in Okanagan headwater lakes. Total costs of supplying these fish in the Okanagan are estimated at Sl.3 million with minimum estimate of capitalized economic and social benefits of S1.6 million and $2.6 million respectively. (1970 dollar values). Boating 35. \"That federal boating regulations in headwater lakes be extended and enforced Regulations by the British Columbia Department of Recreation and Conservation in cooperation with the Regional Authority.\" These regulations should be administered to provide a wide range of angling experience from wilderness angling to family angling with power boats. 11. Okanagan Lake Okanagan Lake supports over 80% of all angling in the main valley lakes and this proportion could increase over the next fifty years as the smaller lakes in the main valley system become relatively more crowded. The Okanagan Lake fishery is supported by spawning areas in the tributaries and Okanagan River and these areas are considered a part of this resource. In addition to maintaining present levels of production from all tributary streams, the first \u00E2\u0080\u0094 but essential \u00E2\u0080\u0094 step in a total fishery habitat management program is the provision of adequate minimum flows for fish propagation on Mission, Equesis and Trepanier Creeks in all but drought years. Without adequate water supplies, stream bed improvements for spawning purposes are valueless. In addition, green belts must be preserved along the entire spawning areas of these creeks to provide shade and erosion control. Consequently, the framework plan sets out the following recommendations to enhance sport fishery resources in the Basin: Mission Creek Modified 36. [fl That a modified operation of headwater storage releases be established by 1975 by Operation t n e British Columbia Water Resources Service in cooperation with the irrigation of Existing . . . ^ 6 Storage districts. < \" Such a system of multiple use water management could support 4,000 harvestable trout annually. New Storage [ii-] That 3,600 acre-feet of headwater storage be licenced and developed for fisheries Mission Creek fry jggQ_ This measure would have a capital cost of an estimated $900,000 and would support an additional 80,000 harvestable kokanee and 28,000 trout annually. Stream Bed [ill] That rehabilitation of the streambed spawning habitat be undertaken after Spawning Habitat assured water supplies are available. This measure is estimated to cost approximately $440,000 and would support an additional 120,000 harvestable kokanee and 90,000 rainbow trout annually. Equesis Creek New Storage 37. That an additional 700 acre-feet of storage be made available to support the E q u e l \" Creek fishery in Equesis Creek. This storage can be obtained through modified operation of Pinaus Lake reservoir to meet fishery flows, the development of approximately 700 acre-feet of additional storage and, if necessary, com-pensation to existing water licencees. Total capital costs of these measures, together with rehabilitation of the streambed, are estimated at $175,000 to 5200,000. The combined investment would support an additional 43,000 harvestable kokanee and should be undertaken prior to 1985. 473 Trepanier Creek Pumped water- 38. [{] That 2200 acre-feet of water be pumped from Okanagan Lake to the lower reaches Trepanier Creek of Trepanier Creek by 1985. There is no available headwater storage in this creek and water must be pumped from Okanagan Lake. The cost of this system is estimated at 5173,000 with rehabilitation of spawning beds costing an additional $100,000. The combined investment would support an additional 83,000 and 1,000 har-vestable kokanee and Rainbow trout respectively. Other Creeks Incubation 39. That further consideration should be given to the development of an incubation Channel channel in one of the tributary creeks to South Okanagan Lake. The fishery enhancement program set out above should satisfy angling demands in the north and central basins of Okanagan Lake until at least the year 2000, but angler success rates will continue to be low in the south basin of the lake. Because of limited water supplies in the southern tributaries to Okanagan Lake, development of an incubation channel, which requires less water than natural spawning beds was considered. One such project was examined in Trout Creek, but the problems of siltation resulting from a natural slide in Trout Creek Canyon may prohibit the success of such a venture. These studies should be undertaken by the British Columbia Department of Recreation and Conservation, with cooperation from the Regional District and recommendations prepared by the time . of the full review of the Okanagan Basin Study, in 1980. Okanagan Lake Shore Spawning Shore 40. \"That due consideration be given to shore spawning kokanee when regulating Spawning Okanagan Lake water levels over the winter months.\" To minimize damage to shore spawning kokanee during the fall and winter months, the drawdown of Okanagan Lake between October 1 and February 28 should not normally exceed six inches. In anticipated flood years however, greater drawdowns may be necessary to accommodate the spring runoff. Harvest potential of the shore spawning kokanee should be further assessed to determine the value of this resource more accurately. D W A T E R B A S E D R E C R E A T I O N The importance of Okanagan beaches to the life styles of both residents and tourists was clearly demonstrated by the frequency of participation in shoreline recreation. Over 60% of summer holiday tourists spend part or all of each day in their visits, on the beaches, while residents on an average, spent 20 days during the summer months on the beach. Based on projected increases in tourism, and residents for Projection 111, the current total of 4 million beach days is expected to more than double to 10 million by 2020. The economic value of this resource was estimated at $4.5 million in 1970 and is expected to increase to $27.4 million annually (1970 dollars) by 2020. The value and demand for shoreline recreation is closely related to maintenance of high water quality in the main valley lakes, good access and opportunities to enjoy uncrowded conditions.All public beaches were declared safe from a health viewpoint in 1972, although Kinsman (Kin) Beach near Vernon exceeded coliform standards in some samples. Several public beaches were affected by aquatic plant growth and occasional algae blooms. Existing public and private beaches will basically meet projected demands to 1980. but substantial increases in the area of public beaches will be required beyond that date. In view of the economic and social values placed on shoreline recreation, it is important that this component of the framework plan be carefully managed over the next fifty years. Consequently, it is recommended: 41. \"That the Regional authority be responsible for coordinating the various responsible agencies at the Provincial and Municipal levels in the implementation of recommendations involving shoreline recreation management in the framework plan. Specifically, the Regional authority should perform the following duties by 1975 -Preparation of detailed shoreline recreation landuse plans for all main valley lakes. Collect recreation data such as the number of summer holiday visitors, number of beach days enjoyed by residents and visitors annually, preferences and attitudes of beach users for shoreline landuse management and other pertinent data. Manage recreation use ^ conflicts through implementation of boating regulations on main valley and headwater lakes. Undertake a full review of water-based recreation management needs as part of the re-assessment of the Okanagan Study in 1980.\" The following recommendations are made as components of the framework plan: 42. \"That water quality objectives for water-based recreation be met at all public and private beaches in all the main valley lakes, based on the following criteria: [i] Total mean coliform count not to exceed a most probable number [M.P.N.] of 240 organisms per 100 milliliters, based on a minimum of 10 samples per beach. [ii] Fecal mean coliform count not to exceed a most probable number [M.P.N.] of 100 organisms per 100 milliliters, based on a minimum of 10 samples per beach. [iii] Dissolved oxygen not be less than 5 parts per million. [iv] The water be free from floating debris, scum, weeds, oil slicks, and other ob-jectionable material that detract from its quality and appearance.\" 43. \"That further alienation of public or crown owned shorelines with moderate or high capability be prohibited. These areas which will be required to support future recreation demands are illustrated on the landuse plans accompanying the final report.\" Coordination of Water-Based Recreation Facilities [i] [iii] [iv] APPENDIX 2 OKANAGAN BASIN JiyrPLEMEJSITATION AGREEMENT 476 OKANAGAN BASIN\" IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT THIS AGREEMENT made this 9 day of Tzbiucuiy , 1976. BETWEEN: THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA hereinafter referred to as \"Canada\" OF THE FIRST PART AND THE GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA hereinafter referred to as \"British Columbia\" OF THE SECOND PART WHEREAS (1) on October 29, 1969, an Agreement was entered into by the parties providing for a program of studies leading to and including the formulation of a comprehensive framework plan for the development and management of water resources in the Okanagan Basin; (2) in March, 1974, the Canada-British Columbia Consultative Board, established pursuant to the said Agreement, submitted to the Parties a report which included a comprehensive framework plan; (3) i t is desirable that the said plan be substantively implemented to (a) ensure a viable economic base in the Okanagan Basin by the development of water and related resources, (b) maintain and enhance the quality of the natural environment by the management and protection of water, and related resources, such as f isheries, wildl i fe and recreational areas; and (c) enhance social betterment by creating amore equitable distribution of income, employment and opportunity between regions in the Okanagan Basin; -477 in accordance with an Agreement, to be entered into by the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation and British Columbia pursuant to the National Housing Act R.S.C. 1970 Ch. N-10, a amended, additional funds may be made available by Canada for loans and grants for sewage treatment projects undertaken to implement recommendations 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 as set out i Schedule B; Brit ish Columbia provides, pursuant to the Sewerage Faci l i t ies Assistance Act, grants to assist payment for the construction of sewerage collection and disposal f a c i l i t i e s . section 4 of Part 1 of the Canada Water Act faci l i tates the implementation of joint federal-provincial comprehensive water resource management plans; section 2 of the Canada-British Columbia Joint Development Act provides that British Columbia may enter into and carry out joint federal-provincial agreements respecting water and land development, flood control and other matters; by Order in Council No. PC 1975-3/2821 made the 2nd day of December, 1975, the Governor in Council has authorized the Minister of the Environment to execute this Agreement on behalf of Canada; and ^rnor by Order in Council No. 3872 made the 31st day of December, 1975, the Lieutenant Gover in Council has authorized the Minister of Environment to execute this Agreement on behalf of British Columbia; IT IS THEREFORE-AGREED BETWEEN THE PARTIES HERETO AS FOLLOWS: (1) In this Agreement, unless the context otherwise requires, (a) \"Implementation Board'! means the Board established pursuant to section 15 of this Agreement; (b) \"main valley lakes\" means the following lakes in the Okanagan Basin: Ellison Lake, Wood Lake, Kalamalka Lake, Okanagan Lake, Skaha Lake, Vaseux Lake and Osoyoos Lake north of the Canada-United States border; (c) \"Ministers\" means the Minister of the Environment for Canada and the Minister of Environment for British Columbia; (d) \"Okanagan Basin\" means the natural drainage area in Canada shown in Schedule A to this Agreement; (e) \"Okanagan Flood Control Project\" means the works constructed pursuant to the . Agreement between Canada and British Columbia dated August 8, 1950, and includes any reconstruction done during the term of an agreement between the said Parties dated March 16, 1960, respecting the said Project; 478 (f) \"regional authority\" means the water management agency referred to in recommendation 1 (b) as set out in Schedule B to this Agreement; y (g) \"sewage treatment project\" means a sewage treatment project as defined in Part VIII of the National Housing Act, R.S.C. 1970 Ch. N-10, as amended; and (h) \"sewerage collection and disposal fac i l i t ies\" means such fac i l i t ies as defined in the Sewerage Faci l i t ies Assistance Act, St. of B.C. 1974 Ch. 83. (2) Where a reference is made in this Agreement to any statute, the reference shall be deemed to be e reference to the statute as amended from time to time, whether the amendment is made before or after the execution of this Agreement. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK PLAN Recommendations The recommendations set out in Schedule B to this Agreement are hereby accepted in principle and are adopted for implementation in accordance with the particulars in the said Schedule and the terms of this Agreement. The Parties may, during the l i fe of this Agreement and upon a recommendation of the Implementation Board, (a) modify any recommendation or particular respecting its implementation set out in Schedule B; or (b) add to such recommendations, any other recommendation, including-any recommendation made in the provincial Kalarnalka-Wood Lake Study. Implementation 3. Subject to Section 4, (a) each Party shall carry out or cause to be carried out the particulars with respect to the recommendations set out in Schedule B for which i t undertakes responsibility in the said.Schedule which is attached to and constitutes a part of this Agreement; and (b) the Implementation Board shall carry out or cause to be carried out the particulars with respect to the recommendations set out in Schedule B for which i t is assigned responsibility in the said Schedule. 4. (1) Where any recommendation set out in Schedule B. or any particular respecting its implementation is modified by the Parties, the-recommendation shall be implemented in accordance with such modification. 2. (1) (2) 479 (2) Where, as stipulated in Schedule B, the cost of implementation is to be shared by the Parties, (a) the details of each measure to effect such implementation, to the extent that the same are not specified in Schedule B, shall be determined or approved, as the case may be, by the Implementation Board, and approved, as a separate proposal or as part of an annual program and budget, by the Ministers; (b) a measure to effect such implementation shall not be commenced before the funds therefor have been appropriated by Pariiament and the Legislative Assembly; and (c) the'implementation shall be completed by the target date shown in Schedule B or, where the date is changed by the Implementation Board, by such changed date. (3) Where, as stipulated in Schedule B, the cost of implementation is to be borne by one Party only, i t shall be implemented by the target date shown therein, or where such date must be changed by the Party undertaking the implementation due to unforeseen circumstances, by the changed date, provided that such Party, (a) informs the Implementation Board of the change and the circumstances requiring i t , and (b) gives serious consideration to any recommendation made by the Implementation Board. 5. A recommendation made pursuant to paragraph 2 (2) (b) by the Parties in addition to the recommendations set out in Schedule B shall be implemented i f , (a) the measures to effect such implementation have been approved by the Ministers as a separate proposal or as part of an annual program and budget; and (b) the funds necessary therefor have been appropriated by Parliament or the Legislative Assembly before implementation is commenced. 6. The participation by Indian Bands in the implementation of the comprehensive framework plan that Canada, as stipulated in Schedule B, undertakes to encourage its participation based on the local and individual concurrence of each Band in the Okanagan Basin. Construction of Works 7. (1)- Subject to subsection (2), British Columbia shall be responsible through its Department of Environment, for the construction of works to implement a recommendation where the cost of such implementation is to be shared by the Parties pursuant to this Agreement. (2) If the construction of any additional water quantity survey stations is approved, as required in paragraph 4 (2) (a), as a measure to implement the comprehensive framework plan, the construction and operation thereof shall be undertaken in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement between Canada and British Columbia, dated March 14, 1975, 480 concerning water quantity surveys, but the cost of such construction and operation shall be shared by the Parties as a cost pursuant to this Agreement. This Agreement, to the extent that i t provides, with respect to a work, for a payment by Canada to which section 5 of the Fair Wages and Hours of'Labour Act, R.S.C. 1970 L-3, is applicable, is subject to the terms, conditions and stipulations set out in Schedule C and effect shall be given to the same in the execution of such work. Implementation Financed Pursuant to Concurrent Programs (1) Subject to subsection (2), (3) and (6), the financial assistance that will be made available by the Parties for the construction of sewage treatment projects and sewerage collection and disposal fac i l i t ies to implement recommendations 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 shall be made pursuant to the following existing programs, namely (a) The Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation makes, pursuant to Part VIII of the National Housing Act and subject to its terms, loans and grants for the construction of sewage treatment projects; and (b) British Columbia provides, pursuant to the Sewerage Faci l i t ies Assistance Act and subject to its terms, grants to assist payment for the construction of sewerage collection and disposal f a c i l i t i e s . (2) Where a loan or grant pursuant to the National Housing Act is to be made for the construction of a sewage treatment project to implement a recommendation referred to in subsection (1), such project shall (a) be included in the applicable program of the regional authority; (b) contribute to the abatement of pollution; and (c) have been considered, prior to construction, by the Implementation Board. (3) The total amount of funds to be made available by Canada to the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation for the making of loans and grants pursuant to the National Housing Act for sewage treatment projects undertaken to implement recommendations referred to in subsection (1) is estimated to be $17,000,000. (4) Monies loaned or granted after April 1, 1975, but prior to the signing of this Agreement for the purposes described in subsection (3) shall be included in the figures shown therein. (5) Where, in the opinion of either Party, there is a significant change in the terms and conditions applying to loans and grants to be made pursuant to Part VIII of the National Housing Act or the Sewerage Facil i t ies Assistance Act, the Parties shall review al l sewage treatment projects and sewerage collection and disposal fac i l i t i es proposed under this Agreement. 481 (6) The Parties may, upon a recommendation of the Implementation Board, give consideration to providing joint financial assistance, pursuant to programs other than the programs referred to in subsection (1), for the construction of any individual sewage treatment project or sewerage collection and disposal fac i l i ty to implement a recommendation referred to in the said subsection. Programs Outside this Agreement (1) Neither Party shall undertake any program in the Okanagan Basin that is incompatible with any recommendation in Schedule B or its implementation under this Agreement. (2) Each Party sha l l , prior to ini t iat ing a new program that may affect the implementation of this Agreement in the Okanagan Basin, inform the Implementation Board of its intention of so doing, so that the feasibi l i ty and effectiveness of program coordination by the Board is enhanced. THE OKANAGAN FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT The Agreement between the Government of Canada and Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of the Province of British Columbia, dated the 16th day of March, 1960, respecting the Okanagan Flood Control Project shall terminate on March 31, 1976, excepting that i f there are expenditures (a) which were incurred by British Columbia prior to the 31st day of March, 1976, and (b) with respect to which Canada undertook pursuant to clause 4 of that Agreement to contribute payment, but has not done so by the said termination date. clauses 5 and 6 of the said Agreement shall remain in effect with respect to such expenditures until they have been processed in accordance with the terms thereof. Commencing the 1st day of A p r i l , 1976, British Columbia shall bear all the costs of (a) reconstruction of and alteration and additions to the said Project, other than the costs of implementing recommendation 13 III that are, as stipulated in Schedule B, to be shared by the Parties, and (b) operation, maintenance and repair of a l l the works constituting the Project, including the works constructed to implement recommendation 13 III. British Columbia shall have sole discretion as to the manner in which al l the works constituting the said Project, including the works constructed to implement recommendation 13 III, shall be operated, subject to the following: (a) due consideration shall be given in such operation to flood control and to consumptive and non-consumptive uses; (b) Br i t ish Columbia shall provide Canada, within six months after the signing of this 482 Agreement, with an in i t ia l operating plan that takes into account recommendations 3, 12, 13 I, 14 I, 14 III and 40 set out in Schedule B; and (c) British Columbia shall thereafter duly notify Canada of any proposed change in the operation of such works that is not consistent with the operating plan and any proposed change in the operating plan. Should any right-of-way, which has been provided equally by Canada and British Columbia in connection with the said Project, become surplus, the proceeds obtained from the sale of such right-of-way shall be shared equally by the Parties. IMPLEMENTATION BOARD (1) The Ministers shall establish the Implementation Board consisting of not less than four members, with an equal number appointed by each Party. (2) It is a prerequisite for the appointment of each member and for the continuance of such appointment that the person be a senior public servant employed by the Party who appoints him. (3) British Columbia shall designate one of its members of the Board to be chairman and Canada shall designate one of its members of the Board to be vice-chairman. (4) Four members, consisting of two members appointed by Canada and two appointed by British Columbia, constitute a quorum of the Board. (5) When a member of the Board is unable to vote or attend a meeting, an alternate may be appointed to act in this stead. (6) The Board shall meet semi-annually, or more frequently i f required by the Ministers or circumstances. Duties of the Board The Implementation Board shall (a) in carrying out or causing to be carried out the implementation referred to in paragraph 3 (b), determine or approve, as described in paragraph 4 (2) (a), the details of each measure to effect such implementation; (b) establish i) procedures for review and approval of contracts that British Columbia proposes to enter into pursuant to subsection 18 (2) or section 22, and 483 i i ) with respect to costs that are to be shared, details of financial procedures including advances, claims, payments and audits; keep minutes of its meetings and records of its decisions; prepare, for the consideration of the Ministers, proposals for any measures that, in its opinion, should be undertaken to achieve effective implementation of the comprehensive framework plan; ensure that al l measures necessary for the implementation of recommendations, where such implementation is to be cost-shared, are satisfactori ly carried out; report annually, on or before June 30 in every year of this Agreement, to the Ministers on the progress of the implementation of this Agreement up to the end of the fiscal year for which the report is made; on or before September 1 in every year of this Agreement, for the fiscal year commencing on the following April 1, submit 1 . i) to the Ministers for their approval, a program of the measures to be undertaken in implementing the recommendations set out in Schedule B, i i ) to the Ministers for approval of the Parties, a budget covering the expenditures that are to be shared, and i i i ) to the Parties through the Ministers, estimates of the loans and grants pursuant to the National Housing Act that are l ikely to be required; consider each sewage treatment project or sewerage collection and disposal fac i l i ty proposed for the implementation of recommendations 25, 26, 27, 28 or 29, and where a loan or grant pursuant to the National Housing Act or Sewerage Facil i t ies Assistance Act is to be made with respect to such project or fac i l i ty , consider whether satisfactory arrangements for its financing, planning and construction have been made; generally review and report to the Parties on i) the sequence and type of sewage treatment projects and sewerage collection and disposal fac i l i t ies . proposed by the regional authority to implement recommendations 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29, and i i ) the progress of the projects and fac i l i t ies already undertaken; 484 (j) with respect to measures that, as stipulated in Schedule B, i ) are not to be cost-shared under this Agreement, but may be carried out pursuant to other federal-provincial programs, maintain coordination with the administrators of such programs, i i ) are to involve the regional authority in their implementation, consult with and maintain coordination with the authority, i i i ) are not to be cost-shared and are to be carried out by the department of British Columbia or entities created by i t , be responsible, through its British Columbia members, for the maintenance of coordination by the Department of Environment with and among such departments and entit ies, except where the duty for maintaining coordination i s , according to Schedule B, specif ical ly assigned to the regional authority, and iv) are not to be cost-shared and are to be carried out by departments and agencies of Canada, be responsible, through its Canada members, for the maintenance of coordination by the Department of Environment with and among such departments and agencies; (k) encourage, in consultation with and with the cooperation of the regional authority public comment with respect to the implementation of this Agreement and ensure that the views of the public are reasonably reflected in such implementation; (1) refer to the Parties for decision any matter which i t i s , in discharging its duties, unable to resolve; and (m) . discharge such other duties with respect to this Agreement as may be assigned to i t by the Parties. Other Powers of the Board 17. The Board may (a) recommend modification of any recommendation or particular respecting its implementation set out in Schedule B or the addition of any recommendation thereto; (b) adjust the allocation of funds in the annual program of measures to be undertaken, where such adjustment proves necessary to carry out the program; (c) with respect to those recommendations whose implementation is to be cost-shared, change the.target date shewn thereof in Schedule 6; 485 (d) make a recommendation that the Parties provide i) joint financial assistance, as described in subsection 9 (6), for any individual sewage treatment project or any sewerage collection and disposal f ac i l i t y , or i i ) financial assistance, pursuant to any federal, provincial or federal-provincial programs existing at the time of such recommendation, for the undertaking of any measure to implement the recommendations set out in Schedule B or any recommendation added thereto; (e) establish such committees to assist i t in carrying out this Agreement, as in its opinion, are necessary; and (f) recommend to the Parties any amendment to this Agreement that, in its opinion, is necessary to implement the comprehensive framework plan. Support Staff and Expenses \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 18. (1) Brit ish Columbia may appoint (a) a Program Coordinator, subject to the approval, of the Implementation Board, who will report to the Chairman of the Board; and (b) such other staff as may be required from time to time to carry out the provisions of this Agreement. (2) British Columbia may, in accordance with an approved annual program and budget and procedures established by the Implementation Board, (a) engage consultants to assist the Board; and (b) authorize such expenditures on behalf of the Board as may be required including, but not limited to salaries and related expenses of the Program Coordinator and staff , the operating costs of an implementation off ice, the cost of collecting data and making f ie ld surveys and the fees of consultants engaged pursuant to paragraph (a). FINANCES 19.- (1) Subject to subsection (2), the costs referred to in subsection 18 (2) and any other costs incurred for administrative purposes with respect to this Agreement shall be shared by the Parties. (2) Each Party shall bear the entire cost of the salary and travelling and related expenses of each of its employees 486 (a) who, although engaged in a study or other activity under this Agreement, has not been specif ical ly assigned to studies or other activit ies being done for the Implementation Board; or (b) who is a member of the Board or of any committee established by the Board; and such costs shall not count against the l imit stipulated in subsection 20 (2). Where i t is stipulated in Schedule B or any term in this Agreement that costs are to be shared by the Parties, such costs shall be shared equally. The total sum payable by each Party under this Agreement with respect to the cost described in subsection (1) shall not exceed $2,500,000.00. The Parties may, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council and the Lieutenant Governor in Council, change the limit stipulated in subsection (2). Where a recommendation described in section 5 or subsection 9 (6) is approved, the proportion of the costs to be borne by each Party for its implementation shall be determined at the time of approval. 21. Subsections 20 (1) and (2) shall apply with respect to expenditures incurred by the Parties on or after April 1, 1975, but prior to the signing of this Agreement, providing that (a) the expenditures incurred relate directly to a measure stipulated in Schedule B and in respect of which the costs are to be shared by the Parties under this Agreement; and (b) approval of the expenditures for payment as shared costs has been given by the Implementation Board. 22. British Columbia may, in accordance with an approved annual program and budget and procedures established by the Implementation Board, enter into a contract with a third party (a) with respect to the construction of works described in subsection 7 (1); or (b) on behalf of the Board with respect to the carrying out of any measure for which the costs are to be shared by the Parties. 23. (1) Subject to subsection (2), British Columbia shal l , with respect to the costs that are to be shared by the Parties under this Agreement, (a) pay such costs as they come due, and (b) where the cost is incurred by Canada, reimburse Canada upon submission of the claim in accordance with the procedures established by the Implementation Board for such purposes. 20. (1) (2) (3) (4) 487 (2) Costs incurred for the construction of works described in subsection 7 (2) shall be paid in accordance with the procedures established in the Memorandum of Agreement between the Parties, dated March 14, 1975, concerning water quantity surveys. (3) Subject to subsection (4), Canada shal l , upon a quarterly, semi-annually or annual basis, as determined by the Board, and upon receipt of claims from British Columbia, pay its share of the costs paid by the latter as required in subsection (1). (4) Canada may, at its own discretion and for the purpose of providing to British Columbia interim financing for a particular measure, pay in advance, but not more than 90 days in advance, its share or part of its share of the estimated costs, as certif ied by British Columbia, of the measure and where such advance payment is made, British Columbia shall (a) within 90 days thereafter, submit to Canada a detailed statement, in a form and manner to be established by the Implementation Board pursuant to paragraph 16 (b) ( i i ) , the actual costs incurred and paid by i t ; and (b) when i t next submits claims pursuant to subsection (3) i) include as a claim the amount by which Canada's share of the actual costs incurred and paid exceeds the advance payment, or i i ) deduct from such claims the amount by which the advance payment exceeds Canada's share of the actual costs incurred and paid, as the case may be. (5) Canada shall not pay to British Columbia any share of the costs incurred, after the signing of this Agreement, with respect to a measure whose implementation had not been approved as required by this Agreement. (1) Each Party shall maintain adequate documentation and records of the costs which are to be shared by the Parties and which are incurred by i t and sha l l , upon request, make available such documentation and records for examination by auditors of the other Party. (2) Any discrepancy disclosed by audit between the amount paid by a Party and the amount payable by i t shall be promptly adjusted between the Parties. GENERAL Each Party shall take such steps as may be necessary to enable i t to discharge its undertakings in this Agreement. Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted in a way that may prejudice or in any way affect the settlement of unresolved native land claims in the Okanagan Basin. 488 27. This Agreement shall not operate to vest in Canada any proprietary right, interest or obligation that i t otherwise would not have. 28. Except where the l i a b i l i t y , loss, damage or costs hereinafter described result from (a) an act of God, or (b) an act of a public servant of Canada or any other person acting under the control and and direction of Canada. British Columbia shall save harmless and indemnify Canada for and against any and al l l i a b i l i t y , loss or damage resulting from the implementation of this Agreement and any and all expenses reasonably incurred to prevent or mitigate such l i a b i l i t y , loss or damage. 29. No Member of the Parliament of Canada or of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia shall hold, enjoy, or be admitted to any share, part or benefit from this. Agreement or any agreement, contract or benefit arising therefrom. Term of Agreement 30. (1) This Agreement, except for the provisions described.in subsection (2), and in subsection 9 (3), shall terminate five years from the date of this Agreement. (2) The provisions of this Agreement respecting the payment of costs that are to be shared by the Parties under this Agreement shall remain in effect for one year beyond the termination date described in subsection (1). IN WITNESS WHEREOF/ the Honourable Jean Marchand, Minister of the Environment for Canada, has hereunto set his hand on behalf of Canada and the Honourable J . A. Nielsen, Minister of Environment for British Columbia, has hereunto set his hand on behalf of British Columbia. Signed on behalf of Canada by the Honourable Jean Marchand in the presence of Original signed by \"J. Mcuichand\" Original signed by \" J . BlcuOi Smbofin\" Signed on behalf of British Columbia by the Honourable J . A. Nielsen in the presence of Original signed by \" J . A. Hlzlim\" Original signed by \"6. E. MOM.\" SCHEDULE B RECOMMENDATIONS & PARTICULARS No. RECOMMENDATION lib) | Thai ihe Okanagan Basin Water Board be reconstruct-ed and Letters Patent amended to give the Board authorily to carry out those water resource manage-ment function* that pertain to the valley as a whole and in particular, the implementation of the recom-mendations of the Okanagan Basin Study that are Valley-wide in scope, especially, waste treatment, the orderly development of shoreline recreational facilities and flood plain zoning. That the Governments of Canada and British Columbia immediately take the necessary iteps to refer a study of the regulation of Osoyoos Lake level* to the Inter-national Joint Commission. That the response of water resources to management measures implemented under the framework plan be monitored continuously, with a full review of the plan 10 be undertaken by 19HL) to ensure that the plan commute to meet the social and economic goals of the valley community. British Columbia British Columbia Implementation Board Implementation Board PARTICULARS British Columbia agrees to undertake to issue supplemen-tary Letters Patent to the Regional Districts of Okanagan-Similkameen, Central Okanagan and North Okanagan so that the Okanagan Basin Water Board may effectively carry out water resource management functions that pertain to the Okanagan Basin as a whole, especially waste treatment, the orderly management of shoreline recreation and flood plain zoning. The British Columbia Department of Munici-pal Affairs, upon a request by the three legional districts, shall issue these supplementary Letters Patent. [See Re-commendations 1311, 131V, 30 and 41. j British Columbia and Canada agree to take the neces-sary steps to refei a study of the regulation of Osoyoos Lake levels to the International Joint Commission. The Implementation Board will identify and approve monitoring programs that are to be cost-shared under this Agreement. The monitoring programs must be such that the response of the water resource to the management measures implemented pursuant to this Agreement can be adequately assessed. The Implementation Board will ensure that the necessary funds are provided to the appro-priate agencies for implementing these programs. The Implementation Board will undertake, during the final year of the Agreement, a comprehensive review to assess the response of the water resource to the manage-ment measures implemented pursuant to this Agreement. As part of the review, it will determine whether or not the plan continues to meet the social and economic needs of the valley community. It will recommend to the Ministers any further actions that may be required stibse* quent io the termination of (fits Agreement. ENABLING LEGISLATION Municipalities Enabling and Validating Act International Boundary Water Treaty Act Estimates of Costs to be Shored (* ,000 ) 570 578 COST SHARING 50/50 50/50 TARGET DATES Start Finish Underway Underway 1975 1980 O j WATKk | Q U A N T I T Y : A. Basic Roiorn-mer.dati'.>m B. Petailer) Recom--' niendalioris No. RECOMMENDATION Thai the water available be managed.Mich that, with-out large scale importation of water, ul! present and projected future water uses around Okanagan Lake and along Okanagan River are satisfied; recognising that during a prolonged drought cycle, increased drawdown of Okanagan Lake and some cut-buck in releases to Okanagan River for non-consumptive usts may be necessary. Tl'.i't major conflicts in water use between irrigation and fishery requirements in tributary streams are avoided by rruruging Mission, Equesis and Trepanier Creeks for fj>heiit*s :,nd irrigation purposes, and developing o(her major creeks primarily for domestic and agricultural water use. That potential Hood damage around Okanagan and Osoyoos Lakes and along Okanagan River be mini-mized throu;.*h 'lie institution of flood plain zoning and emergency protection measures. That Okanagan Lake be regulated within its normal four foot range (elevation 1119.8 to 1123.8 feeij in all but anticipated extreme flood years (net inflows ro Okanagan Lake exceeding 500,000 acre-feet J , and successive drought years (net inflows less than 200,000 acre-fett per year). That Okanag:m Lake should be drawn down below its normal low water elevation of 1119.8 feet prior to freshet, in an anticipated Hood year, by up to one foot. That flood plain zoning be implemented and en-forced by a regional water management authority up to 1127.5 feet elevation around Okanagan Lake. Further development on this flood plain should be limited to recreation parks and agricultural activities. British Columbia British Columbia British Columbia PARTICULARS See Detailed Recommendations 12, 131, 131!, 141, 1411, 14111, 141V, 15, 16, 17 and 18. See Detailed Recommendation 19. See Detailed Recommendation 1311, 131V and 13V. The British Columbia Water Resources Service agrees to regulate Okanagan Lake in accordance with this Recomen-mendation. The British Columbia Water Resources Service agrees to regulate Okanagan Lake in accordance with this Recommendation. The British Columbia Water Resources Service will de-fine, and advise the regional authority with respect to, the flood plain level around Okanagan Lake. The regional authority shall be responsible for acting as the coordinat-ing agency in the implementation of flood plain zoning in the Okanagan Basin (See Recommendation I (b).] ENABLING LEGISLATION Municipal Act Estimates of Costs to be Shared (* ,000 ) COST \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 SHARING TARGET DATES Start Already adopted in principle Already adopted in principle 4^-h-1 \u00E2\u0080\u0094 iii \u00E2\u0080\u0094 No. RECOMMENDATION PARTICULARS ENABLING LEGISLATION Estimates of Costs to be Shored (*,000 ) COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start Finish Canada The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development agrees to recommend and encourage that similar flood plain zoning be adopted and enforced on Indian lands. Indian Act 1976 1977 13111 That the gates on Okanagan and Skaha Lakes be improv-ed to avoid icing during the winter and erosion and bank protection works be built around some drop structures and along Okanagan River. PHASE I Implementation Board The British Columbia Water Resources Service shall under-take a study to determine detailed requirements, cost estimates and scheduling for modifications and repairs required to the Okanagan flood control system between Okanagan and Osoyoos Lakes to bring the system up to standard. 20 50/50 1975 1976 PHASE 11 Implementation Board The British Columbia Water Resources Service shall under take those modifications and repairs required to the Okanagan flood control system as determined in Phase I. - 2480 50/50 1976 1979 | 131V That flood plain zoning around Osoyoos Lake be implemented by the regional authority to 921 feet as soon as possible. British Columbia The British Columbia Water Resources Service will de-fine, and advise the regional authority with respect to, the flood plain level around Okanagan Lake. The regional authority shall be responsible for acting as the coordinat-ing agency in the implementation of flood plain zoning in the Okanagan Basin. [See Recommendation 1 (b).] Municipal Act Underway 1976 I Canada The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development agrees to recommend and encourage that similar flood plain zoning be adopted and enforced on Indian lands. Indian Act 1976 1977 13V That emergency protection measures and flood warning systems be further developed for Osoyoos Lake as soon as possible by the British Columbia Water Resources Service. These measures should be described in an information booklet and made available to all residents around the lake. British Columbia This Recommendation is currently being implemented as part of on-going programs of the British Columbia Water Resources Service. Underway 1976 No. RECOMMENDATION PARTICULARS That the level of Okanagan Lake be maintained at as high an elevation as possible during drought years, recognizing that in single drought years, all con-sumptive and non-consumptive water requirements should be met. Under prolonged drought conditions, the lake level may reach a low of 1116.8 feet. [ 1411 | That irrigation and domestic intakes alongOkanagan River channel be lowered or altered so that they are fully operative under a base flow of 100 cubic feet per second in drought years. That once the intakes have been lowered or altered, water requirements for sockeye salmon in Okanagan River should be met in all years except consecutive drought years as follows: F l o w s measured at O l i ve r H y d r o m a t r i c s t a t i o n August 1-September 15 300^t00 c.f.s. September 26-October 31 350-550 c.f.s. November l-April 30 275 c.f.s. In two or more consecutive drought years, these flows may have to be reduced. . | 141V | That all irrigation and domestic intakes around Okanagan Lake be adjusted as required to be operable at a minimum bke elevation of 1116.8 feet. That all future intakes, wharves, boat ramps and other structures around Okanagan Lake be built to operate with a take elevation range of 1116.8 to 1125.5 feet. Similar structures around Osoyoos Lake must operate with a lake elevation range of 909 to 919 feet, with possible revisions resulting from the proposed study by the International Joint Commission. Brituh Columbia Implementation Board British Columbia Implementation Board British Columbia The British Columbia Water Resources Service agrees to regulate Okanagan Lake in accordance with this Recommendation. The British Columbia Water Resources Service will under-take to have lowered all licenced irrigation and domestic intakes along Okanagan River channel in accordance with this Recommendation. The British Columbia Water Resources Service agrees, that once the intakes along Okanagan River channel have been lowered or altered, to operate the Okanagan flood control system to provide water requirements for sockeye salmon in accordance with this Recommendation. The British Columbia Water Resources Service agrees to consult and cooperate with the Fisheries and Marine Service of the federal Department of the Environment before reducing these flows. The British Columbia Water Resources Service will under-take to have all licenced irrigation and domestic intakes around Okanagan Lake adjusted as required to be oper-able at a minimum lake elevation of 1116.8 feet. The British Columbia Water Resources Service agrees to inform all those applying for a water licence to divert water from Okanagan and Osoyoos Lakes that these lakes axe operated over lake elevation ranges of 1116.8 to 1125.5 feet and 909 to 919 feet, and to advise them that intakes be constructed to operate effectively over these ranges. They also agree to inform them that the lake eleva-tion range for Osoyoos Lake is subject to possible revision ENABLING LEGISLATION Fisheries Act Water Act Estimates of Costs to be Shared (* ,000 ) 266 184 COST SHARING 5 0 / 5 0 5 0 / 5 0 TARGET DATES Start Already adopted in principle Already adopted in principle 1 9 7 5 KD \u00E2\u0080\u0094 V \u00E2\u0080\u0094 r No. RECOMMENDATION PARTICULARS ENABLING LEGISLATION Estimates of Costs to be Shared \u00E2\u0080\u00A2(* ,000 ) COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start Finish j subsequent to the proposed study of the regulation of Osoyoos Lake levels by the International Joint Commission. British The British Columbia Lands Service will inform all appli- Land Act NIL 1975 This will i Columbia cants applying to construct wharves, boat ramps and other structures around Okanagan and Osoyoos Lakes that these Lakes are operated as stated above, and may require that any such structures be built to effectively accommodate these lake elevation ranges. be a con- | tinuing B program 1 '.6. Thai contingency plans and costs he prepared by the Province of-British-Columbia for possible adjustments to the Kelowna Floating Bridge, so that the bridge can function within an operating range of 1116.8 to 1125.5 feet on Okanagan Lake. Phase I Implementation Board The British Columbia Water Resources Service will under-take to prepare contingency plans and costs for possible adjustments to the Kelowna Floating Bridge so that the bridge can be operated over a lake elevation range of 1116.8 to M25.5 feet on Okanagan Lake. 16 50/50 1975 1975 j 1 Phase 11 The British Columbia Department of Highways will under- _ 180 50/50 1976 1977 | Implementation take any adjustments required to the Kelowna Floating Board Bridge. 17. That the existing improved channel way used to maintain Tmuilnuti Lake be supplemented by the addition of a pumping unit. British Columbia The British Columbia Water Resources Service and the Tugulnuit Lake Improvement District shall continue to cooperate to implement this Recommendation. - NIL - 1975 1976 1 18. That the monitoring program of the tributaries to Canada The Atmospheric Environment Service and Inland Waters NIL Underway This will I Okanagan Lake and the ma ins t em be continued to im- Directorate of the federal Department of the Environment bc a con- | prove inflow forecasts to Okanagan Lake and the major British and the Water Resources Service of the British Columbia tinuing i tributaries. Columbia Department of Lands, Forests and Water Resources agree to continue their respective hydrometric and meteorologic monitoring programs subject to the conditions of concurrent cost-sharing and work-sharing arrangements. [See Recommendation 11.] program | 19. That multiple purpose water management be practiced in selected tributary basins to meet present and future consumptive and non-consumptive uses. British Columbia The Provincial Departments or Agencies and others identi-fied below, along with the regional authority, wilt be res-ponsible for planning, coordinating and implementing future water resource development in tributary basins within the Okanagan Basin. They shall be responsible for NIL 1975 This will | be a con-tinuing program No. RECOMMENDATION PARTICULARS ENABLING LEGISLAT ION Estimates of Costs to be Shared (* , 0 0 0 ) C O S T SHARING T A R G E T D A T E s l Start Finish | Implementation Board Canada British Columbia avoiding major conflicts in water use by managing Mission, Equesis and Trepanier Creeks primarily for fisheries and irrigation, and other major creeks primarily for domestic and agricultural purposesvSpecifically: (a) the British Columbia Water Resources Service, in cooperation with the present licence holders, agrees to work out modi-fied releases from headwater storages in Mission and Equesis Creeks to improve flows for fisheries at the mouths of these creeks. [See Recommendations 361 and 371.[ (b) the British Columbia Department of Recrea-tion and Conservation agrees to consider the development of additional headwater storage and other means to ensure adequate flows for the fishery in Mission, Equesis and Trepanier Creeks. [See Recommendation 3611, 371 and 381.) (c) the municipalities, improvement districts, and individual water users will be responsible lor the development of new headwater storages in the Okanagan Basin for consumptive uses. The British Columbia Water Resources Service will under-take studies to develop detailed water quantity models for Mission, Equesis and Trepanier Creeks. Canada and British Columbia agree to consider providing financial assistance for the implementation of new head-water storages on an individual basis as they become re-quired. Financial assistance will bc considered under the appropriate federal, provincial or federal-provincial pro-gram that may exist.at that time. 41 50/50 1976 l 1977 | jfe. ER A1.ITY: A. Basi.: Recom-memlali. ns No. RECOMMENDATION That the pumped diversion from Okanagan Lake to the-Kalamalka-Wood Lake system be established on a con-tinuous year lound basis subject to the return of Wood Lake to a mesotrophic state. That a program of pollution control for tributary streams be established by instituting strict regulations on feedlot and septic tank developments, removing all direct discharges to streams of industrial and municipal wastes causing pollution and protecting streams with appropriate green strips in areas where logging or cultivation is practiced or where there are concentrations of cattle, horses, and other livestock. That a waste management program aimed at reducing phosphorus loadings to control rooted aquatic plant and algae growth in the main valley takes be under-taken immediately by the regional authority. British Columbia British Columbia British Columbia PARTICULARS The British Columbia Water Resources Service, in,co-operation with the British Columbia Department of Re-creation and Conservation, local improvement districts and municipalities, shall commence negotiations with Hiram Walker and Sons Limited to ensure a continuous year-round supply of water within a temperature range acceptable to fish propagation and rearing. The continua-tion of this diversion shall be subject to an adequate improvement of the water quality in Wood Lake. The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Con-servation shall make application to the British Columbia Water Resources Service to have an adequate portion of the above mentioned water supply licenced for the purposes of fishery enhancement in middle Vernon Creek. The British Columbia Water Resources Service agrees to give consideration to the licencing of the above mentioned water supply for consumptive use purposes from Kalamal-ka Lake and Wood Lake only. See Detailed Recommendations 21, 22, 23 and 31. See Detailed Recommendations 25, 26, 271, 2711, 27MI. 271V, 281, 2811, 291, 2911 and 3(1. ENABLING LEGISLATION Water Act Fisheries Act Water Act Fisheries Act Water Act Estimates of Costs to be Shared (\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 ,000 ) COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start I Finis 1976. J-1975 1975 This wttl be a con-tinuing program <7t B. Detailed Recom-mendations No. RECOMMENDATION PARTICULARS That all municipal and industrial waste discharges causing pollution be prevented from entering tributary streams. That forest management and agricultural practices be reviewed by the B.C. Forest Service and the B.C. Department of Agriculture, and greenbelts established where necessary to reduce nutrient and sediment loadings from erosion. British Columbia British Columbia Phase II British Columbia Implementation Board The British Columbia Pollution Control Branch agrees to undertake a program to prevent municipal and industrial effluent discharges causing pollution from entering tributary streams. The British Columbia Forest Service and the British Columbia Department of Agriculture, in consultation, cooperation and coordination with the regional authori-ty, shall undertake a review of forest and agricultural land use management practices in the Okanagan Basin as they relate to nutrient and sediment loadings to the main valley lakes resulting from erosion. The regional authority shall be responsible for establish-ing a Liaison Committee consisting of persons appointed by such municipalities, regional districts, improvement districts and Government agencies as the regional authority may determine, and the Liaison Committee shall be res-ponsible for advising and recommending on matters con-cerning land use management practices and actions re-quired to reduce nutrient and sediment loadings to the main valley lakes resulting from erosion. Subsequent to the above mentioned review and the re-commendations of the Liaison Committee, those respons-ible will initiate a comprehensive program of regulations, gteenbelting, land use zoning, by-laws and/or policies to reduce the nutrient input from man's activities around the main valley lakes and to reduce nutrient and sediment loadings from stream channel erosion. The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Devel-opment agrees to encourage that similar actions, regula-tions, by-laws and/or policies be undertaken or established by local Indian bands in the Okanagan Basin. The British Columbia Water Resources Service will under-take a study to identify those areas adjacent to tributary streams that may require bank stabilization. The tmple-ENABLING LEGISLATION Estimates of Costs to be Shared (*,OOQ) Pollution Control Act Municipal Act Water Act Environment and Land Use Act Indian Act COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start Finish 25 50/50 1976 1976 1976 This will be a con-tinuing program 1976 1976 1979 1977 KD N o . RECOMMENDATION PARTICULARS That regulations controlling surface drainage from cattle feed lots, and other livestock operations be established and enforced by the British Columbia Water Resources Service by 1975. That future regulations controlling fertilizers and sprays be reviewed by the B.C. Department of Agriculture following the completion and release of the report of the Royal Commission currently studying the matter. That sewage collection and treatment for the urban center of Winfield, with facilities for at least 80% phosphorus removal, be implemented by 1977. British Columbia Canada British Columbia British Columbia British Columbia mentation Board will subsequently make recommenda-tions to the Ministers concerning any further actions that may be required. The British Columbia Water Resources Service and the \u00E2\u0080\u00A2British Columbia Department of Agriculture agree to initiate discussions lo improve policies and consider the establishment of regulations to control surface drainage from cattle feed lots and other livestock operations in the Okanagan Basin. The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Develop-ment agrees to encourage the adoption of the above mentioned improved policies and/or regulations where they may apply to any such operations on Indian lands in the Okanagan Basin. The British Columbia Department of Agriculture agrees to review, with intent lo improve, future regulations controlling fertilizers and sprays. In accordance with section 9 of this Agreement, Canada will make available funds for loans and grants for the con-struction of sewage treatment projects to implement this recommendation. British Columbia will cause to be constructed sewerage collection and disposal facilities to implement this recommendat ion. British Columbia provides, subject to certain require-ments, grants to assist payment for the construction of sewerage collection and disposal facilities. Pursuant to subsection 9 (6) of this Agreement Canada and British Columbia agree to consider providing joint financial assistance for the implementation of sewage projects and sewerage collection and disposal facilities ENABLING LEGISLATION Estimates of Costs to be Shared (* ,000 ) COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start Finish Pollution Control Act 1975 1977 Fisheries Act Indian Act - - 1977 1978 - - - 1975 1980 National Housing Act - - 1976 1978 Pollution Control Act - - - -Sewerage Facilities Assistance Act - - -\"its-\"\"' KD 00 No. 271. RECOMMENDATION ^ # 1 That sewage collection for the urban center of Coldstream with a main pipeline to the treat-ment facilities at Vernon by implemented by 1977. This would effect 100% phosphorus removal in serviced areas and reduce local phosphorus loadings to the Kalamalka Beach area. That the City of Vernon remove all sanitary and indus-trial wastes causing pollution from Vernon Creek by im-plementing one of the two wastewater management options outlined below: Option A - Removal of at least 80% phosphorus by 1977 with discharge of treated effluent into Vernon Creek. Option B - Spray irrigation of secondary treated effluent by 1977. That sewage collection and treatment with at least 80% phosphorus removal for the urban center of Okanagan Landing be started by 1977 to reduce loadings to the Vernon Arm of the lake. The option of constructing a trunk line to the central treatment facilities at Vernon should be investigated. That at least 80% phosphorus removal from City of Ke-lowna waste effluents be implemented by 1977 to reduce loadings within acceptable limits beyond the year 1980 under a low economic growth rate. Tne inclusion of Rut-land and new areas in the City of Kelowna sewer system should be undertaken immediately. Increased phospho-rus removal may be required by the year 2000. British Columbia Canada British Columbia Canada British Columbia British Columbia Canada British Columbia PARTICULARS in excess of that provided under the legislation cited above. Any additional financial assistance for these pro jects will be considered on an individual basis upon a rc commendation by the Implementation Board. Same as Particulars of Recommendation 25. Same as Particulars of Recommendation 25. Same Particulars of Recommendation 25. Same as Particulars of Recommendation 25. ENABLING LEGISLATION National Housing Act Sewerage Facilities Assistance Act National Housing Act Sewerage Facilities Assistance Act National Housing Act Sewerage Facilities Assistance Act National Housing Act Sewerage Facilities Assistance Act Estimates of Costs to be Shared (*,OOQ) COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start Finish 1975 1976 1976 1977 1977 T P S \" -KD KD <0 No. 271V. 30. RECOMMENDATION Thai phosphorus removal at Westbank, Armstrong, Naramata, Summerland, Peachtand and other urban shoreline developments be implemented as required by the B.C. Water Resources Service to improve water quality in local shoreline areas of Okanagan Lake. That 80% phosphorus removal at the City of Penticton Sewage Treatment Plant be achieved and/or maintained. That sewage treatment and phosphorus removal at Okanagan Falls and other urban shoreline developments around Skaha Lake be implemented as required by the B.C. Water Resources Service to improve water quality in local shoreline areas, based on the results of monitoring programs. That facilities for at least 80% phosphorus removal for the urban center of Olivei are implemented by 1980 to reduce loadings to Osoyoos Lake. That facilities for at least 80% phosphorus removal for the urban center of Osoyoos are implemented by 1977. Urban areas in Osoyoos adjacent to Osoyoos Lake and serviced by septic tanks should be sewered and includ-ed in the Osoyoos waste treatment program by 1980. That the regional authority for water resource manage-ment be given the responsibility for the construction, operation, maintenance and financing of all sewage treatment plants in the basin, subject lo permits issued by the Government of British Columbia. British Columbia British Columbia British Columbia Canada British Columbia Canada British Columbia PARTICULARS The British Columbia Water Resources Service agrees to determine, in consultation, cooperation and coordina-tion with the regional authority, when waste treatment and phosphorus removal at Westbank, Armstrong, Narama-ta, Summerland, Peachland and other urban shoreline de-velopments around Okanagan Lake should be undertaken. Same as Particulars of Recommendation 25. The British Columbia Water Resources Service agrees to determine, in consultation, cooperation and coordina-tion with the regional authority, when waste treatment and phosphorus removal at Okanagan Falls and other urban shoreline developments around Skaha Lake should be undertaken. Same as Particulars of Recommendation 25. Same as Particulars of Recommendation 25. The regional authority, in consultation and cooperation with the responsible Provincial Department or Agencies and the Implementation Board shall be responsible for the fol-lowing duties with respect to sewage treatment projects and sewerage collection and disposal facilities in the Okanagan Basin: (a) coordinatingJocal planning and the develop- ment and scheduling of priorities. ENABLING LEGISLATION Pollution Control Act National Housing Act Sewerage Facilities Assistance Act Pollution Control Act National Housing Act Sewerage Facilities Assistance Act National Housing Act Sewerage Facilities Assistance Act Estimates of Costs to be Shared (*,000 ) COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start 1975 1975 1977 1976 1 9 7 5 t n o o \u00E2\u0080\u0094 xii \u00E2\u0080\u0094 r ^ * No. RECOMMENDATION PARTICULARS ENABLING LEGISLATION Estimates of Costs to be Shored ( * ,000) COST SHARING TARGET DATES I Start Finish | (b) considering and making recommendations to i the Implementation Board concerning the i adequacy of financing, and 1 (c) determining that required treatment levels are I being achieved and maintained. i - \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 > (See Recommendation 1(b).j 1 -\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 British British Columbia will ensure that the regional authority Municipalities Enabling - _ Underway 1975 Columbia shall be empowered to require that all participating regional districts, except in respect of those municipalities, electoial areas or parts thereof lying outside the Okanagan Basin, contribute to the costs of constructing or up-grading sewage treatment facilities in accordance with a formula to be determined by the regional authority and approved by the Inspector of Municipalities. and Validating Act \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 The regional authority and other local governments shall _ _ _ 1975 This will I I be responsible for initiating the involvement of Indian be a con- 1 bands in the Okanagan Basin in matters concerning waste tinuing | \u00C2\u00A7 treatment. program ! Canada The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Develop-ment agrees to encourage cooperation between the local Indian bands and the regional authority in matters con-cerning waste treatment and the ability of the regional authority to carry out its responsibilities in these matters. Indian Act 1975 This will I be a con- j tinuing ! program 31. That all new septic tank installations be constructed to ensure maximum phosphorus removal where soil con-ditions are such that special measures are required to control nutrients from this source. British Columbia The British Columbia Department of Health and the British Columbia Water Resources Service, in consultation and cooperation with the regional authority, agree to initiate discussions to improve policies and consider the establishment of regulations to control nutrients from septic tanks in areas in the Okanagan Basin where soil and other conditions are such that special measures to control this nutrient source are required. Such measures may in-volve ensuring that all tile fields are well above ground-water levels, that they are a desirable distance from lake shorelines, that fine soils are imported where necessary to prevent excessive percolation and that in certain areas septic tanks are removed. 1975 1976 1 o r\u00E2\u0080\u00941 \u00E2\u0080\u0094 xiii \u00E2\u0080\u0094 1 \u00C2\u00AB\u00C2\u00AB. No. RECOMMENDATION PARTICULARS ENABLING LEGISLATION Estlmotes of Costs to be Shared (* ,000.) COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start Finish British Columbia The British Columbia Department of Health will consider incorporating the above mentioned improved policies and/ or regulations into its* Sewage Disposal Regulations. Health Act 1976 1977 Canada The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Devel-opment agrees to recommend to the Indian bands in the Okanagan Basin that they adopt similar policies and/or regulations. Indian Act 1976 1977 FISHERY 1 M A N A G E -MENT A . Basic 10. That sport fishery resources [kokanee and rainbow See Detailed Recommendations 33, 34, 361, 3611, Recom- troutj be enhanced by protecting existing habitat 36III, 371, 3711, 381, 3811, 39 and 40. mendations and improving both natural and artificial reproduc-tive facilities. B. Detailed 32. That the fishery resource continue to be managed on British The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Department of _ _ _ Recom- a basin-wide basis by the British Columbia Depart- Columbia Conservation shall continue to manage the sport fishery Recreation and mendations ment of Recreation and Conservation but a number of alternative means of financing this program should be investigated by this agency in cooperation with the regional authority. Moreover, additional programs re-lated to zoning particular lakes for restricted or specialized sport fishing should be evaluated. resource on a basin-wide basis. They also agree to investigate, in consultation and cooperation with the regional authority, a number of alternative means of financing this program and to evaluate additional pro-grams related to zoning particular lakes for restricted or specialized sport fishing. Conservation Act 33. That the rainbow trout stocking program should be increased from 1.7 million fry annually at present (19711, to 2.1 million fry by 1980, using existing hatchery facilities. British Columbia The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Conservation agrees to generally increase the rainbow, trout stocking program to meet expected increases in demand and that this increase will be provided using existing hatchery facilities. Department of Recreation and Conservation Act 1975 1980 34. That studies be undertaken by the British Columbia Department of Recreation and Conservation by 1975 for locating and designing new fish hatchery in the Southern Interior of the province. British Columbia The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Conservation agrees to undertake studies for locating and designing a new fish hatchery in the Southern Interior of the province and to prepare a detailed pro-posal by the time of the comprehensive review to be undertaken by the Implementation Board during the final year of this agreement. This hatchery will be required to supply fry to Okanagan headwater lakes after 1985. Department of Recreation and Conservation Act 1975 1980 -fcR-O tsj \u00E2\u0080\u0094 xiv \u00E2\u0080\u0094 No. .16.1 36.11 36.111 RECOMMENDATION That federal boating regulations in headwater lakes be extended and enforced by the British Columbia De-partment of Recreation and Conservation in coopera-tion with the regional authority. That a modified operation of headwater storage be established hy 1975 by the British Columbia Water Resources Service in cooperation with the irrigation districts on.Mission Creek. That 3.600 acre-feei of headwater storage be licenced and developed for fisheries on Mission Creek by 1980. That rehabilitation of the streambed spawning habitat in Mission Creek he undertaken after assured water supplies are available. British Columbia British Columbia British Columbia British Columbia British Columbia PARTICULARS The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Conservation, in consultation and cooperation with the regional authority, will propose the necessary regulations and, on request, the Ministry of Transport will recommend these be adopted under the Boating Restriction Regula-tions of the Canada Shipping Act. The British Columbia Water Resources Service, in co-operation with present licence holders, agrees to work out modified releases from headwater storages on Mission Creek to improve flows for fisheries at the mouth of the creek. The British Columbia Water Resources Service, upon application by the British Columbia Department of Re-creation and Conservation, agrees to give consideration to the licencing of up to 3,600 acre-feet of storage for fishery purposes on Mission Creek. The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Con-servation agrees to consider I lie development of additional headwater storage to ensure adequate flows for the fishery in Mission Creek. The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Con-servation, in consultation and cooperation with the British Columbia Water Resources Service and the regional autho-rity, agrees to consider rehabilitating the streambed spawning habitat in Mission Creek.The undertaking of this will be considered only after adequate Hows for the fishery have been ensured as provided for in Recommenda-tions 361 and 3611. The regional authority shall be responsible for establishing a Liaison Committee consisting of persons appointed by such municipalities, regional districts, and Government agencies, including the British Columbia Department of Recreation and Conservation, the British Columbia Water Resources Service and the British Columbia Department ENABLING LEGISLATION Canada Shipping Act Water Act Fisheries Act Department of Recreation and Conservation Act Department of Recreation and Conservation Act Estlmotes of Costs to be Shared (\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 ,000 ) COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start 1975 1977 1977 Finish 1976 1980 by 1980 1980 t n - \u00E2\u0080\u0094 o u> \u00E2\u0080\u0094 XV \u00E2\u0080\u0094 No. RECOMMENDATION PARTICULARS ENABLING LEGISLATION Estimates of Costs to be Shared (* , 0 0 0 ) COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start Finish r . \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 of Highways, as the regional authority may determine, and the Liaison Committee shall be responsible for advising on a comprehensive land use management program to protect Mission Creek from encroachment, erosion and any other activities along or adjacent to the creek that may have a detrimental effect on those areas determined to be impor-tant for fisheries purposes. 37.1 Thai an additional 700 acre-feet of storage be made available to support the fishery in Equesis Creek. British . Columbia The British Columbia Water Resources Service, upon appli-cation by the British Columbia Department of Recreation and Conservation, agrees to give consideration to the licen-cing of up to 700 acre-feet of storage for fishery purposes on Equesis Creek. Water Act 1976 1977 British . The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Con- Depaitment of - _ 1976 1979 Columbia servation agrees to consider undertaking to make available additional storage to ensure adequate flows to support the fishery in Equesis Creek. Recreation and Conservation Act Fisheries Act -Canada The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Devel-opment agrees to recommend and encourage that the local Indian band cooperate in any negotiations that may be required tb ensure the provision of adequate flows to support the fishery in Equesis Creek. Indian Act 1976 1977 3711. That rehabilitation of the streambed spawning habitat in Equesis Creek be undertaken after assured water supplies are available. British Columbia The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Con-servation, in consultation and cooperation with the British Columbia Water Resources Service, agrees to con-sider rehabilitating the streambed spawning habitat in Equesis Creek. The undertaking of this work will be con-sidered only after adequate flows for the fishery have been ensured as provided for in Recommendation 371. Department of Recreation and Conservation Act Water Act by 1985 Canada The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Develop-ment agrees to recommend and encourage that the local Indian band cooperate in any way that may be required to permit the undertaking of the above mentioned work. Indian Act O No. 38.1 38.11 39. 40. RECOMMENDATION K4\u00C2\u00A3 That 2200 acre-feet of water be pumped from Okanagan Lake to the lower reaches of Trepanier Creek by 1985. That rehabilitation of the streambed spawning habitat in Trepanier Creek be undertaken after assured water .supplies are available. That further consideration should be given to the development of an incubation channel in one of the tributary creeks to south Okanagan Lake and that a spawning channel or other means of artificial propaga-tion offish be incorporated into the middle Vernon Creek system. Thai due consideration be given to shore spawning kokanee when regulating Okanagan Lake water leveh over the winter months. British Columbia British Columbia British Columbia British Columbia British Columbia PARTICULARS The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Con-servation agrees to consider pumping water from Okana-gan Lake to the lower reaches of Trepanier Creek to ensure the provision of adequate flows to support the fishery. The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Con-servation, in consultation and cooperation with the British Columbia Water Resources Service, agrees to con-sider rehabilitating the streambed spawning habitat in Trepanier Creek. The undertaking of this work will be considered only after adequate flows for the fishery have been ensured as provided for in Recommendation 381. The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Con-servation agrees to undertake further studies to consider the possible development of an incubation channel in one of the tributary creeks to south Okanagan Lake and to pre-pare appropriate recommendations by the time of the comprehensive review to be undertaken by the Implemen-tation Board during the final year of trie Agreement. The British Columbia Department of Recreation and Con-. servation, in consultation and cooperation, with the British Columbia Water Resources Service, agrees to consider in-corporating a spawning channel or other means of artificial propagation of fish into the middle Vernon Creek system. The undertaking of this work will be considered only after adequate flows for the fishery have been ensured as pro-vided for in Recommendation 20. The British Columbia Water Resources Service agrees to give due consideration to shore spawning kokanee when regulating Okanagan Lake over the winter months. However, in anticipated flood years the lake may be drawn down rapidly with an attendant deleterious effect on the shore spawning kokanee. ENABLING LEGISLATION Department of Recreation and Conservation Act Department of Recreation and Conservation Act Water Act Department of Recreation and Conservation Act Department of Recreation and Conservation Act Water Act Estimates of Costs fo be Shared (* ,000 ) COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start 1977 Already adopted in principle Finish by 1985 by 1990 1979 This will be a con-tinuing program O U l \u00E2\u0080\u0094 xvii \u00E2\u0080\u0094 No. RECOMMENDATION PARTICULARS ENABLING LEGISLATION Estimates of Costs to be Shared (* ,000 ) COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start Finish WATER BASED R E C R E A -TION A. Basic 9. That shoreline recreation be enhanced through the See Detailed Recommendations 41 to 45. . Recom- protection and development of shorelines for beach mendations recreation and maintenance of high levels of water quality. B. Detailed 41. That the regional authority be responsible for co- British British Columbia will ensure that the regional authority Municipalities _ - Underway 1975 Recom- ordinating the various responsible agencies at the Columbia shall act as the coordinating agency in the implementa- Enabling and Validating \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 mendations Provincial and Municipal levels in the implementation of recommendations involving shoreline recreation management in the framework plan. Specifically, the regional authority should perform the following tion of those recommendations of the Comprehensive Framework Plan involving shoreline recreational manage-ment. (See Recommendation 1(b).J Act duties commencing in 1975: The regional authority shall be responsible for establishing - - 1975 This will (a) Preparation of detailed shoreline recrea- a Liaison Committee consisting of persons appointed by - be a con-tion land use plans for all main valley lakes. such municipalities, regional districts and Government agencies as the regional authority may determine, and the tinuing program (b) Collect recreation data such as the number Liaison Committee shall be responsible for advising on 1 of summer holiday visitors, number of beach such matters involving shoreline recreational management 1 days enjoyed by residents and visitors an- as may from time to time be referred to it by the regional 1 nually, preference and attitutes of beach authority. 1 users for shoreline land, use management and other pertinent data. Specifically the regional authority shall be responsible for the following duties: - 1975 This will be a con-(c) Manage recreation use conflicts through the tinuing implementation of boating regulations on (a) the preparation of detailed shoreline recreation program \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 main valley and headwater lakes. (d) Undertake a full review of water-based re-creation management needs as part of the re-assessment of the Okanagan Basin Study in 1980. land use plans around all main valley lakes, (b) the collection of various recreation data such as, the number of summer holiday visitors, the num-ber of beach days enjoyed by residents and vi-sitors annually, the preference and attitudes of beach users for shoreline land use management arid any other pertinent data as the regional authority may determine. (c) the management of recreation use conflicts by initiating the implementation of boating regu-lations on main valley lakes and headwater o CTl \u00E2\u0080\u0094 XVIII \u00E2\u0080\u0094 No. RECOMMENDATION PARTICULARS ENABLING L E G I S L A T I O N Estimates of Costs to be Shared ( * , 0 0 0 ) C O S T SHARING T A R G E T DATES Start Finish lakes, and (d) a full review of water-based recreation manage-ment needs as part of the comprehensive review to be undertaken by the Implementation Board during the final year of this Agreement. 42. That water quality objectives for water-based recrea- British The British Columbia Department of Health agrees to Health Act _ _ 1975 1977 i tion be met at all public and private beaches in all Columbia consider these criteria for their Water Quality Standards the main valley lakes, based on the following criteria: for water-based recreation areas in all the main valley lakes. (a) Total mean coliform count not to exceed a most probable number [M.P.N.] of 240 They also agree to consider monitoring all public beaches - - - 1976 This will organisms per 100 milliliters, based on a in accordance with the grid sampling method developed be a con-minimum of 10 samples per beach. for this purpose during the Okanagan Basin Study. tinuing program (b) Fecal mean coliform count not to exceed a most probable number [M.P.N.J of 100 organisms per 100 milliliters, based on a minimum of 10 samples per beach. (c) Dissolved oxygen not be less than 5 parts per million: (d) The water be free from floating debris, scum, weeds, oil slicks, and other objectionable material that detract from its quality and appearance. 43. That further alienation of public or crown owned shore- British The British Columbia Land Commission, in consultation Land Commission Act _ _ 1975 This will lines with miderate or high recreation capability be Columbia and cooperation with the regional authority and other be a con-prohibited. These areas, which will be required to Provincial Departments or Agencies, agrees to consider tinuing support future recreation demands, are illustrated establishing those public or crown owned shorelines with program on the land usc.plans accompanying the final report moderate or high recreation capability as park land reserve. of the Okanagan Basin Study. i The regional authority shall be responsible for advising 1975 This will i any municipality, regional district and any Provincial be a con-i Department or Agency that any action, regulation or by- tinuing f law is contrary to this Recommendation. program o \u00E2\u0080\u0094 XIX \u00E2\u0080\u0094 No. RECOMMENDATION PARTICULARS ENABLING LEGISLATION Estimates of Costs to be Shared (*,000 ) COST SHARING TARGET DATES Start Finish j Canada The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Devel- Indian Act _ 1975 This will opment agrees to encourage local Indian bands to co- be a con-operate in the implementation of this recommendation. tinuing In particular they agree to encourage the local Indian program bands to consider the development of their shorelines with moderate or high recreation capability to support future recreation demands. 44. That all existing public access points to the main valley British The regional authority, in cooperation with the British _ _ _ 1975 This will lakes be inspected, maintained and clearly marked. Columbia Columbia Department of Highways in rural areas and the be a con- j This would be undertaken by 1975, by the respon- various municipalities in urban areas, will be responsible tinuing \ sible agencies at the provincial and local levels of for ensuring that all public access points to the main val- program j government. ley lakes are regularly inspected, maintained and clearly i marked. 45. That additional boat launching facilities be built near British The individual regional districts in the Okanagan Basin 1975 This will i Kelowna and Osoyoos by 1975 and others built as Columbia and the Small Craft Harbours Branch of the federal be a con- j i required. AH such facilities on Okanagan Lake should Department of the Environment, in consultation, coopera- tinuing | i be constructed to accommodate a 9-foot lake level tion and coordination with the regional authority, will be program | i fluctuation from 1116.8 feet to 1125.5 feet and on responsible for providing additional boat launching facili- \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 I i Osoyoos Lake a 9-foot fluctuation from 909 feet to Canada ties as required in rural areas around the main valley lakes. E t 918 feel. The individual regional districts and municipalities in the i ' Okanagan Basin and the Small Craft Harbours Branch of I the federal Department of the Environment, in consulta-i tion, cooperation and coordination with the regional i authority, will be responsible for providing these facilities I as required in urban areas around the main valley lakes. i These facilities should be built to accommodate anticipat-0 ed fluctuations in lake elevation levels. ADMINISTRATION O F THIS A C R E E M E N T 640 50/50 1975 1980 T O T A L ESTIMATED COSTS TO BE SHARED UNDER THIS A G R E E M E N T 5000 tn -o co "@en . "Thesis/Dissertation"@en . "10.14288/1.0095907"@en . "eng"@en . "Planning"@en . "Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library"@en . "University of British Columbia"@en . "For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use."@en . "Graduate"@en . "Implementation of public policy : a case study"@en . "Text"@en . "http://hdl.handle.net/2429/24360"@en .