"Arts, Faculty of"@en . "History, Department of"@en . "DSpace"@en . "UBCV"@en . "Chem-Langhe\u00CC\u0088e\u00CC\u0088, Bongfen"@en . "2010-02-12T19:58:22Z"@en . "1976"@en . "Doctor of Philosophy - PhD"@en . "University of British Columbia"@en . "The Kamerun Plebiscites of 1959-1961 were crucial to the rise and development of Western Kamerun nationalism. Some of the factors which shaped the events connected with that phenomenon can be traced' back to the pre-colonial period. Others emerged from the activities of the colonizers in the region during the colonial and trust period. But, it was against the British activities that a few Western-educated Southern Kamerunians, the political leaders, reacted and, in the 1940s, developed a nationalist movement. In 1953, these new leaders, who had made little headway in their demands of the British, involved the traditional leaders, the a-Fon, in the nationalist movement. The a-Fon who commanded the loyalty and support of most of the region's inhabitants, significantly strengthened and influenced the movement henceforth.\r\nDuring that crucial period, however, the movement witnessed several conflicts over policy regarding the future of Western Kamerun. In Northern Kamerun, the local authorities advocated integration with Nigeria while some dissident local Fulani and the a-Fon demanded secession from it. In Southern Kamerun, some political leaders stressed integration with Nigeria, others favoured secession from it and ultimate reunification of Kamerun, and, yet, others emphasized immediate secession and reunification. On the other hand, the a-Fon requested secession without reunification. Thus, there were fundamental differences among the political leaders and between them and the traditional rulers. During this period, the political leaders defined and redefined their varying programmes in an effort to win over the Crowned Princes who refused to budge.\r\nRealizing the firmness of the a-Fon, backed by massive support from the electorate, the organizers concentrated their efforts at the United Nations where they manipulated, confused, and engineered a split within its members. The division within the United Nations and among the organizers forced that organization to concentrate on reaching a compromise rather than finding out what the majority of the Western Kamerunians desired. The outcome of this approach was adverse decisions: in the case of Northern Kamerun, where the electorate, after the first plebiscite, had mistaken the reformed local administration for secession from Nigeria, the United Nations refused to postpone the second plebiscite, and, in the case of Southern Kamerun, it left out secession without reunification, the most popular view, from the plebiscite despite numerous appeals and protests from both regions. In the ensuing confusion in the North and dissatisfaction in the South, the electorate asked and answered their own questions at the plebiscites, interpreting the United Nations' questions to suit their local conditions and circumstances.\r\nThis interpreting process was to be expected. In most plebiscites and elections, electors ask and answer their own questions, often with little reference to the larger issues, but the timing of the second plebiscite in the North and the unfortunate wording of the plebiscite questions in the context of politics in the South, contributed not only a good deal of confusion to the proceedings, but also significantly impeded the process of self-determination. Moreover, the conduct of the plebiscites, themselves, was characterized by the abuse of power by those interested groups in and out of authority, and by suspicion and accusation which were sometimes justifiable and sometimes not. Furthermore, the plebiscite undermined the Concert of the Crowned Princes, the symbol of Southern Kamerun unity, and left sections of the region standing at a distance from, and threatening, each other. Not only had the trust system ended in Western Kamerun on an uncertain note, but the United Nations had been less than effective in applying the principle of self-determination."@en . "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/20199?expand=metadata"@en . "THE KAMERUN PLEBISCITES 1959-1961: PERCEPTIONS AND STRATEGIES by Bongfen Chem-Langhee B.Ed. (Sec) Hons., University of British Columbia, 1973 M.A., Carleton University, 1974 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Department of HISTORY We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 1976 (c) BONGFEN CHEM-LANGHEE 1976 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i thout my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f /\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date i i THE KAMERUN PLEBISCITES 1959-1961: PERCEPTIONS AND STRATEGIES ABSTRACT The Kamerun Plebiscites of 1959-1961 were crucial to the rise and develop-ment of Western Kamerun nationalism. Some of the factors which shaped the events connected with that phenomenon can be traced' back to the pre-colonial period. Others emerged from the activities of the colonizers in the region during the colonial and trust period. But, i t was against the British a c t i v i -ties that a few Western-educated Southern Kamerunians, the p o l i t i c a l leaders, reacted and, in the 1940s, developed a nationalist movement. In 1953, these new leaders, who had made l i t t l e headway in their demands of the British, involved the traditional leaders, the a-Fon, in the nationalist movement. The a-Fon who commanded the loyalty and support of most of the region's inhabitants, significantly strengthened and influenced the movement henceforth. During that crucial period, however, the movement witnessed several conf-l i c t s over policy regarding the future of Western Kamerun. In Northern Kamerun, the local authorities advocated integration with Nigeria while some dissident local Fulani and the a-Fon demanded secession from i t . In Southern Kamerun, some p o l i t i c a l leaders stressed integration with Nigeria, others favoured secession from i t and ultimate reunification of Kamerun, and, yet, others emphasized immediate secession and reunification. On the other hand, the a-Fon requested secession without reunification. Thus, there were funda-mental differences among the p o l i t i c a l leaders and between them and the tra-ditional rulers. During this period, the p o l i t i c a l leaders defined and redefined their varying programmes in an effort to win over the Crowned Princes i i i who refused to budge. Realizing the firmness of the a-Fon, backed by massive support from the electorate, the organizers concentrated their efforts at the United Nations where they manipulated, confused, and engineered a s p l i t within i t s members. The division within the United Nations and among the organizers forced that organization to concentrate on reaching a compromise rather than finding out what the majority of the Western Kamerunians desired. The outcome of this approach was adverse decisions: in the case of Northern Kamerun, where the electorate, after the f i r s t plebiscite, had mistaken the reformed local administration for secession from Nigeria, the United Nations refused to postpone the second plebiscite, and, in the case of Southern Kamerun, i t l e f t out secession without reunification, the most popular view, from the plebiscite despite numerous appeals and protests from both regions. In the ensuing confusion in the North and dissatisfaction in the South, the elec-torate asked and answered their own questions at the plebiscites, interpreting the United Nations' questions to suit their local conditions and circumstances. This interpreting process was to be expected. In most plebiscites and elections, electors ask and answer their own questions, often with l i t t l e reference to the larger issues, but the timing of the second plebiscite in the North and the unfortunate wording of the plebiscite questions in the context of p o l i t i c s in the South, contributed not only a good deal of confusion to the proceedings, but also significantly impeded the process of self-determi-nation. Moreover, the conduct of the plebiscites, themselves, was charac-terized by the abuse of power by those interested groups in and out of autho-r i t y , and by suspicion and accusation which were sometimes justifiable and sometimes not. Furthermore, the plebiscite undermined the Concert of the i v Crowned Princes, the symbol of Southern Kamerun unity, and l e f t sections of the region standing at a distance from, and threatening, each other. Not only had the trust system ended in Western Kamerun on an uncertain note, but the United Nations had been less than effective in applying the principle of self-determination. V TABLE OF CONTENTS page ABSTRACT 11. TABLE OF CONTENTS v LIST OP. MAPS vi GLOSSARY vii*' PREFACE x ACOOWLEDGEMENT xxvii CHAPTER ONE THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN WESTERN KAMERUN 1 The Northern Kamerun Situation 1 The Southern Kamerun Situation 14 CHAPTER TWO THE RISE AND EVOLUSION OF NATIONALISM IN SOUTHERN KAMERUN 1939-1953 33 CHAPTER THREE THE ROAD TO THE PLEBISCITES 1953-1959 65 The Road to the Northern Kamerun Plebiscites 1953- 1959 65 The Road to the Southern Kamerun Plebiscite 1; 1954- 1959 90 CHAPTER FOUR A TIME OF NO COMPROMISE 1958-SEPTEMBER 1959 135 The Nationalist Leaders at the United Nations October 1958-March 1959 137 The Nationalist Leaders at Home April-September 1959 160 CHAPTER FIVE STRIKING A COMPROMISE 185 I n i t i a l Reaction to the Foncha-Endeley Com-promise in Southern Kamerun October 1959 199 vi Delayed Response to the Compromise 1960-1961 201 CHAPTER SIX THE CONDUCT OF THE PLEBISCITES 1959-1961 220 The Conduct of the Northern Kamerun P l e b i s c i t e s 1959-1961 220 The Conduct of the Southern Kamerun P l e b i s c i t e 1959-1961 257 CHAPTER SEVEN THE MEANING OF THE VOTES 285 The Meaning of the Votes i n the Northern Kamerun P l e b i s c i t e s 287 The Meaning of the Votes i n the Southern Kamerun Plebiscite:: 304 CONCLUSION 340 BIBLIOGRAPHY 350 MAPS The Trust T e r r i t o r i e s of Kamerun and the United Nations V i s i t i n g Mission of 1958. 128 The Northern and Southern Kamerun P l e b i s c i t e D i s t r i c t s of 1961. 334 v i i GLOSSARY a-Fon P l u r a l of F o n \u00E2\u0080\u0094 a t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r . The B r i t i s h r e f e r r e d to the more powerful of these t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s as eit h e r 'Fons' or 'Paramount Chiefs.' Those the B r i t i s h regarded as less powerful were c a l l e d 'Chiefs' while the l e a s t powerful of them, according to the B r i t i s h were simply ' V i l l a g e Heads.' But i n Kamerun, a Fon i s a Fon and receives any respect due to a Fon. I t should be remembered, however, that the pronunciation and s p e l l i n g of the word d i f f e r from one t r a d i t i o n a l state and/or ethnic group to another. AG CCC Action Group. A Western Nigeria-based p o l i t i c a l party. Cameroons Commoners Congress. A Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l party formed i n 1959 by Fon Stephen E. Nyenti. I t s p o l i t i c a l goal was the creation of an independent state of Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration. CDC Cameroon Development Corporation. A Corporation of the Nigerian Government which ran the German plantations i n Southern Kamerun. CFU Cameroons Federal Union. A p o l i t i c a l organization of Southern Kamerun which operated i n the l a t e 1940s. CIP Cameroons Indigenes Party. A p o l i t i c a l party of Southern Kamerun formed i n l a t e 1960 by Fon Jesco Manga-Williams. Its p o l i t i c a l goal was the creation of an independent state of Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration. CNF Cameroons National Federation. A p o l i t i c a l organization of Southern Kamerun founded i n 1949. CPNC Cameroons People's National Convention. A p o l i t i c a l party of Southern Kamerun formed i n mid-1960 out of a fusion of the KNC and the KPP. Its p o l i t i c a l goal was the in t e g r a t i o n of Western Kamerun with Nigeria. CWU Cameroon Welfare Union. O r i g i n a l l y a Bakweri c u l t u r a l organiza-t i o n founded i n 1939 i n Southern Kamerun but, a f t e r a short time, i t became a p o l i t i c a l pressure group which then included both Bakweri and non-Bakweri members. CYL Cameroons Youth League. A p o l i t i c a l organization of Southern Kamerun founded i n Lagos, Nigeria, i n 1940 by a group of Kamerun students. I t superseded the CWU, Lagos Branch. EKWU Eastern Kamerun Welfare Union. A s o c i a l and, to some extent, p o l i -t i c a l organization of the Eastern Kamerunians resident i n Southern Kamerun. I t superseded the FCWU. v i i i FCWU Fon Fondom KFP KNC KNDP KPP KUNC KUP Lion NCNC NEPU NKDP French Cameroons Welfare Union\u00E2\u0080\u0094the original name of the EKWU. A traditional ruler in Kamerun. A traditional state in Kamerun. The plural i s 'Fondoms.1 Kamerun Freedom Party. A p o l i t i c a l party of Northern Kamerun founded in 1960 to fight the second Northern Kamerun Plebiscite. Its p o l i t i c a l goal was secession from Nigeria and ultimate reuni-fication of Western Kamerun with Eastern Kamerun. Kamerun National Congress. A p o l i t i c a l party of Southern Kamerun founded in 1953 out of a fusion of the CNF and KUNC. Its p o l i t i -cal goal altered with time and circumstances. Kamerun National Democratic Party. A p o l i t i c a l party of Southern Kamerun founded by John Ngu Foncha between late 1954 and early 1955. Its p o l i t i c a l goal was secession of Western Kamerun from Nigeria with no clearly defined end. Kamerun People's Party, founded in 1953 by Paul time and circumstances. A p o l i t i c a l party of Southern Kamerun M. Kale. Its p o l i t i c a l goal altered with Kamerun United National Congress. A p o l i t i c a l organization of Southern Kamerun formed by Jabea R.K. Dibonge in 1951 during a sp l i t wihtin the CNF. Kamerun United Party. A p o l i t i c a l party of Southern Kamerun founded in 1959 by Paul M. Kale. Its p o l i t i c a l goal was the creation of a Smaller Kamerun State, a state of Western Kamerun. A term of respect by which Kamerunians address their traditional rulers. National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. based p o l i t i c a l party. An Eastern Nigeria-Northern Elements Progressive Union. A Northern Nigeria-based p o l i t i c a l party with l e f t i s t inclinations. Northern Kamerun Democratic Party. The f i r s t p o l i t i c a l party of Northern Kamerun founded in early 1959 to fight the f i r s t Northern Kamerun Plebiscite. Its p o l i t i c a l goal was secession of Northern Kamerun from Nigeria, unification of Northern and Southern Kamerun, and ultimate reunification of Kamerun. NPC Northern People's Congress. The major p o l i t i c a l party of Northern Nigeria with conservative inclinations. One Kamerun. A p o l i t i c a l party of Southern Kamerun formed in 1957 by Ndeh Ntumazah. It was a disguised rejuvenation of the UPC and i t s p o l i t i c a l goal, among others, was the reunification of Kamerun. United Middle Belt Congress. A p o l i t i c a l party of the middle belt of Nigeira. Union des Populations du Cameroun. A p o l i t i c a l party of Eastern Kamerun which operated in Southern Kamerun between 1955 and May 1957. Its p o l i t i c a l goal, among others, was the reunification of Kamerun. X PREFACE The Kamerun Plebiscites of 1959-1961 were crucial to the rise and evolution of nationalism in Western Kamerun.* The participants in these plebiscites were of two main categories: the organizers and the res-pondents. The organizers included the United Nations, the Administering Authority (the British), the Western Kamerun Western-educated p o l i t i c a l leaders, and the Western Kamerun traditional leaders who acted in some respects as organizers and in others as respondents. The respondents *The choice of the name and the spelling need some explanation. The name given to the whole territory, of which a part i s the subject of this study, by i t s f i r s t colonizers was Kamerun. After the partition of this German Kamerun Empire in 1919 between France and Britain, the French called their own section Cameroun and the British called their own part the Cameroons. O f f i c i a l l y the French section was referred to f i r s t , as the Mandated Territory of the Cameroons under French Admini-stration and, later, as the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under French Administration. The British section was referred to as the Mandated Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration and, later, as the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration. But the o f f i c i a l nomenclature was hardly ever used. The French simply referred to their section as Cameroun and the British referred to theirs as the Cameroons and occasionally as i f i t were part of Nigeria. The world population, even up to today, refers to the two sections as the French Cameroons and the British Cameroons. The Kamerunian populace themselves, to a man, pronounce the word as Kemerun; because the British version had an 's' at the end, the English speaking Kamerunians pro-nounced i t Kameruns. The choice of the name \"Kamerun1 by this study i s in conformity with the way those to whom the word refers pronounce i t . The standard use of the word in this study i s therefore as follows: Kamerun to stand for the German Kamerun Empire; Eastern Kamerun to stand for the section under French administration un t i l independence in 1960; Northern Kamerun to stand for the northern portion of Cameroons under British Administration and Southern Kamerun to stand for the southern portion of that section; and, Western Kamerun to refer to both Northern and Southern Kamerun. When quoting, however, the exact words of those quoted would have to be adhered to. xi consisted mainly of the Western Kamerun traditional leaders and their subjects, literate or i l l i t e r a t e . Both the organizers and the respon-dents had their objectives involved in the plebiscites. This study dwells upon the objectives of the organizers, on the one hand, and the aspirations and reactions of the respondents they polled, on the other. But, since the plebiscites occurred during the last three years of the rise and development of Western Kamerun Nationalism, attention i s also paid to the period preceding the plebiscites. Sources for this study reflect the fact that there were many groups of actors at the plebiscites. Basically, the sources are. . the United Nations' documents although they came from a variety of sources. Some of them originated with the United Nations General Assem-bly, the Trusteeship Council, and the United Nations Visiting Missions to Western Kamerun. Others came from the British and are mainly the United Kingdom Annual-Reports f i r s t , to the League of Nations and, later, to the United Nations, and statements made by British o f f i c i a l s in West-ern Kamerun, in Nigeria, in the United Nations, and in London concerning Western Kamerun. S t i l l other sources came from the Western Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders consisting mainly of their policy statements in Western Kamerun, Nigeria, London, and the United Nations, of the petitions they addressed to the United Nations, and of the arguments they made at the United Nations and elsewhere. There is no problem with these sources originating from the organizers. The same thing cannot be said regarding sources originating from the respondents. Originally, this study was to use interviews as a means of obtaining information at the grass-roots level while making allowance for x i i human inab i l i t y to recollect feelings and ideas held fifteen or seven-teen years earlier and for human tendency to colour the facts after the event. But the present writer had to confine himself to the petitions which these actors at the grass-roots level addressed to the United Nations during the plebiscites period.* These petitions are, therefore, the main sources at the grass-roots level. Nevertheless, there are a number of problems involved in this source. Many of them are direct translations of phrases and idioms from the various Western Kamerun languages into English. As a result, someone whose f i r s t language is English might not be able to understand exactly what the petitioner is attempting to communicate. This was not, however, a major problem to the present writer. To be sure, a few of these peti-tions were troublesome but, after some consultation with Nigerian and Kamerunian students, the petitioners' ideas were easily understood. Secondly, the petitioners were actively involved with the plebiscites. This is both an asset and a l i a b i l i t y . Because the petitioners were active participants, their feelings, sentiments, objectives, in short, *Although oral evidence always has i t s limitations, interviews would s t i l l have performed an important and useful part in this study. But, a number of problems and considerations stood in the way of the present writer conducting such interviews. F i r s t , the writer found i t financially d i f f i c u l t to make the attempt. Secondly, for such interviews to be exhaustive and f r u i t f u l , a lengthy period would have to be allotted to them, and such an amount of time was not available to the writer. Thirdly, and more importantly, even i f money and time were available, such interviews would have been of limited value when conducted by either the present writer or any Kamerunian at this point in time. At a time when most former Southern Kamerunians claim to have voted for the reunification of Kamerun, i t is unlikely that many would be willing to say earnestly to any Kamerunian interviewer how they f e l t at the time of the p l i b i s c i t e and how they perceived the phenomenon. xlll their perceptions of the plebiscites at the time were preserved; this gives a more accurate picture of the situation to the scholar. But, because they were active participants with differing objectives and perceptions, there was bound to be a high degree of suspicion and exag-geration in whatever was reported. However, having been active at the plebiscites himself, and having read through these petitions disinter-estedly, the present writer has come to the conclusion that, when the petitions are stripped of the elements of suspicion and exaggegation, the basic ideas reported were for the most part, accurate. Experience has thus enabled the writer to cope with this second problem. The next problem might be put in form of a question: who wrote the petitions for the i l l i t e r a t e ? The literate did. How can one then be sure that the ideas expressed were those of the i l l i t e r a t e rather than those of the writer? Letter-writing in Western Kamerun of the time was not a commercial aff a i r . Moreover, the i l l i t e r a t e did not just pick any literate from the street and ask him to write his letter; letter-writers for the i l l i t e r a t e were usually family members (of whatever level of education), trusted friends and close associates, some of whom were teachers. Perhaps more importantly, the majority of the petitioners,other than those written by the literate for themselves, were written on a group basis. The secretaries of these groups shared the objectives and attitudes and more or less transmitted these to the United Nations. The next problem, possibly the most important, has to do with those petitions which the United Nations o f f i c i a l s summarized. Usually, when one event occurred in Western Kamerun, say the arrest of one p o l i t i c a l leader, the United Nations could expect to receive between 3,000 and 4,000 xiv petitions dealing with the event as the major issue but including other complaints not always related to the main event. In such cases, the United Nations would declassify the petitions, summarize them into one petition of about ten pages, and then destroy the originals. x This was unfortunate because f i r s t , the United Nations in the process might have destroyed just those ideas that could be crucial to the student in under-standing better the plebiscites and, secondly, by merely stating \"some of the petitioners argued that,\" the summaries make i t d i f f i c u l t to know just whom these petitioners were and what they supported. This is a problem which the student may regret but which he can do nothing to remedy. Closely related to this problem is that of not being able to decide easily which objective held during the plebiscite the petitioner was supporting. In some cases, this i s indicated either by the organization issuing the petition, or by the ideas advocated in the petition. Where this is not the case, the present writer uses his personal experience by looking at the geographic area from which the petition originated and makes his decision on that basis. But where this too is not helpful, unless the petition i s crucial, i t i s l e f t out. More than 600 categorized petitions (about 8,000 were declassified and destroyed) were read although not a l l of them are included in the study.* The last problem involved those peti-*The present writer has endeavoured to bring nearly a l l the ideas ex-pressed in the petitions into the study. Petitions l e f t out either ex-pressed ideas already taken from other petitions or they were so vague and so exaggerated as to be of l i t t l e value. For example, two or three po-:'. l i t i c a l leaders in Western Kamerun, originally from Eastern Kamerun, might be arrested by the British and repartriated to Eastern Kamerun where they were, for the most part, executed. One petitioner would report the X V tions written in French. This would have been a big problem for the present writer. But the United Nations solved the problem by translating them into English. Other primary sources which ought to have been included in this study are Western Kamerun dailies and memoirs particularly those of Western Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders. There were no dailies in Western Kamerun unt i l late in 1960 when the p o l i t i c a l parties began to campaign. Then, the particular daily published almost always the contents of the p o l i t i c a l programme of the party which owned the press, and rehashed only the offers which the party was already making verbally. This has been taken account of from other sources. Memoirs have not been published or even written. Only P.M. Kale, one of the p o l i t i c a l leaders, wrote some-thing in form of a book but which i s actually a mixture of his memoir, a chronological cataloguing of events, and a book of documents. This piece of work has been very useful. The only other sources included in the study are secondary materials. These include mainly books and journals. Generally, the articles in journals and periodicals exhibit a very poor understanding of the plebis-cites and are not, therefore, very useful. The situation i s not very different with books. Except for one book, books are useful insofar as incident stating the time of the arrest, the time .of repartriation, the names of the victims, and the time of the execution. The other petitioner would report that 'the British are going around arresting every Eastern Kamerunian refugee in Western Kamerun and sending them to Eastern Kamerun to be k i l l e d . ' The arrest, the repartriation, and the execution are common to both petitions, but in such cases, the present writer leaves out the latter petition, and makes use of the former as a fact, when supported by other evidence, or as an allegation when there is no further evidence to substantiate the ideas. x y i they describe the major events in their chronological order and make use of some important documents, and also direct the student to major sources of the plebiscites. It appears that these secondary sources are not very useful because the authors ignored almost completely sources from the grass-roots level. The introduction of these grass-roots sources into the study re-presents the f i r s t major change from the existing approaches to the study of the Kamerun Plebiscites. The current literature on the subject has concentrated on the organizers; nearly a l l of them have studied the subject from the viewpoint of the organizers. Nearly a l l the authors have con-centrated on sources originating from the organizers. Nearly a l l of them have disregarded the sources originating from the grass-roots level. Nearly a l l of them have written on the subject from above. Finally, nearly a l l of them have limited themselves to the number of votes without any serious attempts to find out the meanings of the votes. The outcome of this common approach has been the establishment of several theses which lend themselves to challenge. With the introduction of this long existing, but never-before-used evidence from the grass-roots sources, this study differs from the existing literature. The evidence from both the organizers and respondents i s exploited to i t s maximum. The subject i s studied from the point of view of both the organizers and the respondents. The respondents, for the f i r s t time, are given their adequate role in the events. The subject i s studied, therefore, both from above and from below. Finally, this study looks at the number of votes but goes beyond the number to find out what the votes actually meant. The outcome of this approach is the establish-x v i i ment of several theses which run contrary to what exist in the current literature. But, since these new theses are the subject of the present study, this preface limits i t s e l f to identifying the theses currently existing in the literature. The f i r s t of these assertions depicts a p o l i t i c a l l y disorganized pre-colonial Kamerun. In 1884 the rest of what is now the Cameroon was inhabited by a multiplicity of t r i b a l groups having l i t t l e in common with one another, but sharing a general suspicion of and h o s t i l i t y to strangers. Only in the Cameroon north, beyond the tropical rainforest, was there any sense of p o l i t i c a l cohesion, but i t was a cohesion imposed by the Fulani conquests of the early nineteenth century. 2 It is important to note that sources from the grass-roots level are not very useful as a means of challenging this assertion. But there are very good and useful secondary sources which did not concern themselves with the plebiscites but which question every aspect of this assertion. With this perception of Kamerun in mind, i t was d i f f i c u l t for i t s author to acknowledge or even attempt to find out what role the traditional rulers of Western Kamerun played in the development of nationalism therein. The second assertion claims that neither Nigeria nor Cameroun Republic was interested in acquiring Western Kamerun between 1959 and 1961. Adding to this uncertainty is the publicly-optimistic, privately-pessimistic attitute of responsible Nigerian and Camerounian politicians. Publicly, they favour integration or unification, depending on whether they speak from a Lagos or Yaounde rostrum. Privately, they admit that anyone who gets the Southern Cameroons acquires an economic and finan-c i a l l i a b i l i t y , and almost come to wishing i t on someone else.3 Following an assertion like this, one would expect to see no Nigerian or Cameroun authorities involved in anything that would secure any part of x v i i i Western Kamerun for either Nigeria or Cameroun. A third assertion makes John Ngu Foncha, one of the earliest Southern Kamerun nationalists, the rallying point of the reunification-i s t s . When the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), an Eastern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l party, was banned in 1957, the UPC l e f t \"unification\" behind as the rallying cry of the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), 4 Foncha1s p o l i t i c a l party. If the KNDP was the rallying cry of the reuni-ficationists, and Foncha a strong reunificationist, one should, f i r s t , expect to find Foncha and the KNDP pursuing a very vigorous reunification policy, and secondly, one would not expect to find another p o l i t i c a l party claiming and convincingly demonstrating that i t was really the only reuni-ficationist party. The fourth assertion states that reunification as a p o l i t i c a l idea and objective and nationalism were imported into Western Kamerun from Eastern Kamerun. Cameroon nationalist sentiment developed f i r s t in the French Cameroun and then gradually found i t s way into the British Cameroons as i t grew in strength and intensity. Two dominant themes in the growth of Cameroonian nationalism can be traced in each part of the Cameroon: (1) in the French Cameroun, Cameroon nationalism per se and i t s outgrowth, the demand for the 'reunification' of the two Cameroons (to use Cameroun nationalist terminology); (2) in the British Cameroons, f i r s t , Southern Cameroonian separatism (from Nigeria) and later, under the impetus of ideas and pressures from the east, a mounting pressure in that territory for 'reunification' with the French Cameroun.^ To assert that nationalism was imported into Western Kamerun from Eastern Kamerun i s to assume four things at least: that there were close p o l i t i c a l contacts between Western Kamerun and Eastern Kamerun in the late 1930s; that Western Kamerunians did not have any p o l i t i c a l problems of their own which could force the rise of nationalism; that nationalism rose in Western Kamerun in about 1947; and, that nationalism rose in Western Kamerun in form of either separation or a demand for independence. To assert also that reunification was imported into Southern Kamerun is to assume that there were no Western Kamerunians who were either bothered by the inter-Kamerun boundary line or saw i t as unacceptable, and that an idea cannot be indigenous to two or more different parts of the same territory or region. The birth and origins of ideas are too d i f f i c u l t to prove or disprove in history. But the existing evidence suggests very strongly that the idea of reunification was as indigenous in Western Kamerun as i t was in Eastern Kemerun. To be sure, when the Eastern Kamerunians crossed over to Western Kamerun, the idea became more poli t i c i s e d and gained new strength, but that is no reason to assume that the idea was imported into Southern Kamerun. When the f i r s t real attempt at studying the Kamerun plebiscites by Claude E. Welch, Jr. pointed out that the idea was not imported into Western Kamerun,6 the author who originally made the asser-tion, without further research, argued simply that there was no way of knowing \"for certain either way: what is sure is that i t seemed to have found expression in both French and British Cameroons about the same time 7 \u00E2\u0080\u0094 that i s , between 1947 and 1949.\" After this implicit admission of error in a footnote, this same author continued to reassert the error in g the same book in which he admitted i t . Had this author made further research before reasserting his position, he would have served the academic world much better. The last of these assertions is the most popularized probably because XX i t i s central to the study. Although different authors have stressed different aspects of i t , they have one thing in common, namely, the acceptance of the main assertion: that there were freely and democ-rat i c a l l y conducted United Nations plebiscites in Western Kamerun between 1959 and 1961. Following a United Nations supervised plebiscite in which the southern part of the British protected Cameroon voted for Federation with i t s Eastern French-speaking neighbour, the Federal Republic of Cameroun was formed on October 1, 1961. What this unidentified author asserted was the existence of a United Nations free and democratic plebiscite in Southern Kamerun in 1961 in which the Southern Kamerunians voted in favour of reunification on a federal basis. The form and nature of reunification was thus known before the electorate went to the polls. In 1961 a plebiscite was held in the British Trust Territory of Cameroon under the auspices of the United Nations, the . result being that the Southern Cameroon opted for unification with the former French Cameroon while Northern Cameroon chose union with Nigeria.-1-0 The existence of two United Nations plebiscites in Western Kamerun in 1961 in which the meaning of the votes coincided with the meaning of the United Nations plebiscite questions is thus s t i l l asserted. In February 1961, the Northern and Southern Cameroons voted separately in a plebiscite, by which the 'Southern Cameroons' elected to join 'Cameroun Republic,' and the 'Northern Cameroons' to join the Federation of Nigeria.H The preceding assertion has once more been repeated. The result of the plebiscite was a clear victory for Foncha's programme in the south, and a decision in favour of Nigeria in the north.^ Foncha's programme to which this author refers was reunification. Thus th author asserts that the votes in Southern Kamerun were votes for reunifi-z x i cation and those in Northern Kamerun were votes for Nigeria. In insisting on a showdown on the question of reunification versus integration, the British and the U.N. forced on Cameroonians only what they themselves had f i r s t and continually demanded.13 This author actually has two assertions here: that reunification was one of the United Nations plebiscite questions; and that the majority of the Western Kamerunians demanded reunification and continually for that matter. One author, however, propagated this assertion once too often. The alternatives put before the electorate were identical \u00E2\u0080\u0094 t h a t i s , a choice between joining the Cameroun Republic or Nigeria . . . the Southern Cameroons opted for the Cameroun Republic by a vote of 233,571 to 97,741, while the Northern Cameroons chose to join the Northern Region of Nigeria by a vote of 146,296 to 97,659 . . . The huge margin with which the Cameroun alternative won in the South Cameroons was undoubtedly mainly due to the s k i l l with which Prime Minister John Foncha of the Southern Cameroon managed the plebiscite campaign.^ . . . the fact remains that when in 1961, the issue of u n i f i -cation was put to the electoral test in the British Cameroons, a large majority of the voters consciously chose to implement the 'Kamerun idea.' 1^ The 'Kamerun Idea' as far as this author was concerned, had reunification as i t s hub. As he also indicates, in another assertion, the results of the plebiscite in Southern Kamerun were \"an overwhelming vote for uni-fication with the Cameroun Republic.\" 1^ One author directed his attention only to Northern Kamerun and came out with the most highly sophisticated explanation of the plebiscites in that region but the conclusions s t i l l f e l l within the conventional wisdom. . . . the issue of the apparent reversal of position in the second plebiscite was, in fact, not a reversal. The Marghi and their pagan neighbours maintained an unchanging position of self-interest throughout. To be sure, they voted more x x i i 'against' a choice than 'for' i t s alternative, but far from f a i l i n g to understand p o l i t i c s , they adapted party p o l i t i c s -to :their .own institutions, and understanding fu l l y that the party was only a device for achieving goals, they switched parties when the leadership proved insensitive to their w i l l . 1 7 The sad thing about these assertions is that they soon get incorporated into text books and they begin to take on the aspect of facts or reality. This has already happened in the case of Northern Kamerun. In fact there should have been no surprise that Northern Cameroons joined Nigeria. There had never been a strong, leader, or a powerful p o l i t i c a l party, in favour of a merger with French-speaking Cameroon. The people had many things in common with Northern Nigeria, including a language, Hausa. Similarly the fact that most people in Northern Cameroons profess Islam made i t easier for them to want to join Northern Nigeria. Before the advent of the British or Germans, Northern Cameroons had been part of the Emirate of Bornu and later when the British administered Adamawa and Benue Provinces as part of this system, they were in fact preserving a 'status quo' which the people saw no reason to a l t e r . 1 8 This strong explanation i s a consequence of accepting ideas from books that are in themselves suspect. It is true that the contents of votes, that i s , the meaning of votes as opposed to the assumed meaning of them, in most plebiscites and general elections for that matter hardly ever correspond to the larger issues at stake. But, i f the authors of these assertions had made any real attempts to find out just how much the contents of the votes in the Kamerun plebiscites differed from the obvious implications of the United Nations' questions, the assertions might not have been questioned. Yet, the majority of these authors failed to do just that. Their conclusions are derived mainly from the number of votes cast for each alternative at the plebiscites. The present writer does not ignore the number of votes z x i i i but he attempts to go beyond that and find out the hard contents of 19 20 those votes. As Johnson and Welch suggest, what i s crucial in understanding the Kamerun plebiscites are the issues involved in the plebiscites at the time they were conducted. It may also be added that not only the issues are crucial, but also the way the plebiscites were organized and conducted, how the electorate perceived the plebiscites generally, and the circumstances under which the plebiscites were conducted, namely, the timing of the plebiscites and the questions put to the electorate. Until these aspects are pursued more intensively, the Kamerun plebiscites would have to remain largely unstudied. The approach adopted in this study i s just a beginning in the right direction. The organization and conduct of the plebiscites are probed. The perceptions of the electorate and the meaning of the votes are looked into more carefully. This of course means using sources from the grass-roots which existed and were available to the public as early as mid-1961 but which the existing literature has ignored. The main purpose of this approach, and indeed of the whole study, i s to take another look at the plebiscites, to i n i t i a t e a more intensive study of the plebiscites, to aid scholars in their approach to the study of Kamerun affairs, and more importantly, to attempt to give a more accurate picture of the Kamerun plebiscites by showing what role the traditional leaders and tradition played i n the events. The focus of the study is mainly the Western Kamerun scene and the contact of the Western Kamerunians with the United Nations. Nigeria, Britain, Eastern Kamerun, and France are brought into the study occasion-all y where appropriate. But the main purpose of the study i s to depict xxiv the roles played i n the ; p l e b i s c i t e s by Western Kamerun's Western-educated p o l i t i c a l leaders, i t s t r a d i t i o n a l leaders, and i t s voting c i t i z e n s . In an attempt to accomplish t h i s purpose, the study i s organized i n seven chapters. Chapter one provides the background to the events: i n the case of Northern Kamerun, i t i s the background to the p l e b i s c i t e s ; and, i n the case of Southern Kamerun, i t i s /the background to both the r i s e and development of nationalism i n Southern Kamerun and the p l e b i s -c i t e s . Chapter two dwells on the r i s e and evolution of Southern Kamerun nationalism from e a r l y 1940scl953. Chapter three handles the road to the p l e b i s c i t e s i n both Northern and Southern Kamerun from 1953-1959. Chapter four looks at the process leading to the United Nations' decisions. Chapter f i v e handles the United Nations' decisions and the response to them. Chapter s i x dwells of the conduct of the p l e b i s c i t e s i n both Northern and Southern Kamerun. The l a s t chapter attempts to examine the meaning of the votes i n both Northern and Southern Kamerun. There i s a conclusion which attempts to p u l l the main findings together, and to pose three questions on larger issues which are r a i s e d i n d i r e c t l y by the study. X X V Footnotes - Preface U^.N., T.C., Examination of Petitions, T/SR.943, Apri l , 1959, pp. 11-12. 2 Victor T. Le Vine, \"The Poli t i c s of Partition in Africa: The Cameroons and the Myth of Unification,\" Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1964, p. 205 and passim. 3Victor T. Le Vine, \"A Reluctant February Bride? The 'Other Cameroons',\" Africa Report, Vols. 6-7, 1961-1962, February, 1961, pp. 6, 12. 4 Ibid., p. 6. 5Victor T. Le Vine, The Cameroon Federal Republic, Ithaca and London, 1971, pp. 16-17. 6 Claude E. Welch, Jr., Dream of Unity, Cornell University Press, N.Y., 1966, p. 159. 7 Le Vine, The Cameroon Federal Republic, London, 1971, p. 17, Foot-note 9. Q Ibid., pp. 16-17. 9 \"The Last Federation,\" West Africa, Nos. 2535-2565, 1966, April 2, 1966, p. 371. x^Peter H i l l , \"Cameroon Microcosm of African Unity,\" The Times, Monday, June 30, 1975, London, p. v i . 1 1Edwin Ardener, \"The P o l i t i c a l History of Cameroon,\" The World Today, Vol. 18, 1962, p. 342. 12 Neville Rubin, Cameroun: An African Federation, Praeger, London, 1971, p. 88. 13 Willard R. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: P o l i t i c a l Integration in a Fragmentary Society, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970, p. 152. 14 Victor T. Le Vine, \"Calm Before the Storm in Cameroun?\" Africa Report, Vol. 6, No. 5, May, 1961, p.-3. \"^Victor T. Le Vine, \"The p o l i t i c s of Partition in Africa: The Cameroons and the Myth of Unification, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1964, p. 209. x 6 V i c t o r T. Le Vine, The Cameroon Federal Republic, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1971, p. 15. p xxvi James H. Vaughan, Jr., \"Culture, History, and Grass-Roots Politics in a Northern Cameroons Kingdom,\" American Anthropologist, Vol. 66, Menasha, Wisconsin,'U.S.A., 1964, p. 1094. 18 T. Eyongetah and R. Brain, A History of the Cameroon, Longman, London, 1974, p. 158. 19 Johnson, op. c i t . , pp. 47-48. Welch, op. c i t . , p. 225. x x v i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I am very grateful and indebted to the following for the varying assistance I received from them in the course of this study: the University of British Columbia, which gave me financial assistance, and i t s Library staff, particularly Government Publications and Inter-Library Loan Divi-sions, who put in a great deal of time trying to locate United Nations documents and to loan documents and secondary sources respectively for me; Joseph N. Lafon, Paul Mdzeka Ndzegha, Francis and Celine Fai Mbuntum,. and Lawrence Bongfen Jumbam who provided me with information and some primary sources from Cameroon; the Nigerian and Cameroonian students who helped me make meaning of some of my primary sources; Sandra Archer who sympathized with and morally encouraged and pushed me forward when I was getting discouraged and leaning backwards; and, f i n a l l y , Dr. Robert Vincent Kubicek who allowed me to think freely, supervised and quided this study, whose penetrating, insightful, and searching criticisms were instrumental in reshaping my ideas and structuring this study, and without whose guidance, sympathy, sacrifices, patience, understanding, and encouragement this study might have been a total disaster. in memory of my father shey chem-langhee 1 CHAPTER ONE THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN WESTERN KAMERUN Northern and Southern Kamerun were technically and legally one and indivisible trust territory under the administration of the United Kingdom. But the societies of these two regions, before and during the colonial period, differed greatly in some respects from each other. As a result, some of the factors which influenced the rise and evolution of nationalism in both regions differed from each other. It seems more appropriate, therefore, to treat each region separately in this chapter. The Northern Kamerun Situation Prior to the Fulani (Fulbe) intrusion of the early nineteenth century, the geographic region which later became Northern Kamerun comprised four main groups of people. These included the aborigines, the Korofa, the Batta, and the Mandara. Three of these groups acted as invaders and con-querors at one point or the other. The Korofa invaded and conquered the aborigines. The Batta invaded and conquered both the aborigines and the Korofa. The Mandara were the last invaders and conquerors of the society they found in Northern Kamerun.1 There appears to have been no assimilation after each conquest. What seems to have happened is that, after each conquest, the conqueror settled separately in one area of the region and, in line with most of Africa of the period, demanded tribute and recognition of authority from the conquered. Before each invasion, the previously supreme group appeared 2 t o have been under one c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . But a f t e r each i n v a s i o n , t h e conquered s u f f e r e d some d i s i n t e g r a t i o n r e s u l t i n g i n t h e m u l t i p l i c a t i o n o f independent a u t h o r i t i e s w i t h i n t h e same group. A l l t h i s i s what, a f t e r an i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a B r i t i s h a n t h r o p o l o g i s t employed by the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e seemed t o s u g g e s t . S u c c e s s i v e waves o f K o r o f a , B a t t a , Mandara, and F u l a n i i n v a s i o n s have had a d i s i n t e g r a t i n g e f f e c t , which the broken n a t u r e o f the c o u n t r y has f u r t h e r a g g r a v a t e d , so t h a t i t i s not u n u s u a l t o f i n d groups o f p e o p l e l i v i n g a l o n g s i d e each o t h e r , s p e a k i n g the same language and s h a r i n g a common c u l t u r e , y e t f i e r c e l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and m u t u a l l y d i s t r u s t f u l . 2 But t h i s d i d n o t mean p o l i t i c a l d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r t h e r e g i o n . I f a n y t h i n g , i t meant p o l i t i c a l f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f the r e g i o n . Each fragment was a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y r u l e d o v e r by the Fon o r monarch. Some o f t h e s e monarchies o r Fondoms were l a r g e r t h a n the o t h e r s . Some o f them were i n t e g r a l p a r t s o f l a r g e r p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s which were i n themselves v i r t u a l l y empires. In some, the a u t h o r i t y o f the Fon was u n l i m i t e d . In o t h e r s , t h e Fon s h a r e d a u t h o r i t y w i t h the e l d e r s o f t h e s t a t e e i t h e r i n a c o u n c i l o r o t h e r w i s e . In e i t h e r c a s e , the p o l i t i c a l l o y a l t i e s o f t h e i n h a b i t a n t s o f t h e v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s were t o the a-Fon. The p o l i t i c a l power o f t h e h e r e d i t a r y a-Fon was enhanced i n some cases by t h e i r f u n c t i o n as r e l i g i o u s and m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s . Many o f them would a l s o band t o g e t h e r t o f a c e e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s . 3 One o f t h e s e e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s , which a l t e r e d the i n t r a - r e g i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , was p r e s e n t e d by the F u l a n i About the e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , the F u l a n i began t o p e n e t r a t e the r e g i o n as p e a c e f u l immigrants who p a i d t a x e s t o th e i n d i g e n o u s i n h a b i t a n t s they found i n N o r t h e r n Kamerun f o r g r a z i n g t h e i r c a t t l e on t h e l a n d . D u r i n g the J i h a d s , many o f the F u l a n i , who had now s e t t l e d i n N o r t h e r n Kamerun, 3 embraced Islam and came under the leadership of Modibbo Adama. By 1823, a l l the Fulani enclaves in the region owed allegiance to Adama. Whenever Adama conquered any area of Northern Kamerun, he installed a Fulani as the supreme authority of the area. The peaceful relations between the indigenes and the Fulani had begun to alter. The Fulani had become masters over their previous masters. Worse s t i l l , the Fulani began to enslave many of the indigenes both for themselves and for the yearly tribute to Sokoto. Consequently, the indigenes came to \"see Islam as a threat to their cultural identity\" and lives, a threat personified by the , . 4 Fulani. However, while this was the general perception of the Fulani held by the indigenes, during and after the Jihads, not a l l the indigenes f e l l under the suzerainty of the Fulani. A good number of them refused to embrace Islam and to f a l l under the authority of the Fulani. Yet, the Fulani penetration and invasions accelerated the disintegrative process. The effect of the Fulani penetration was to dismember [the indigenous] Kingdoms. With some the invaders made treaties, others were converted to Islam, while many withdrew to the sanctuary of the h i l l s . In.a few cases a Fulani governor of tact and character acquired some personal influence with his pagan subjects, more especially i f he had married the daughters of important local chiefs or had himself been born of such a union.^ It appears that the complete domination by the Fulani of the region, which Le Vine has asserted, and the wide-spread adoption of Islam as the religion of the area, which Eyongetah and Brain have stressed, were s t i l l a far cry from reality. Indeed, as late as the 1930s, non-Muslims outnumbered the Muslims in Northern Kamerun. While out of an estimated population of 200,000 in what later became Dikwa Emirate, only about 66,666 were non-Muslims, out of an 4 estimated population of 208,322 in what later became Adamawa, north and south, about 142,660 were non-Muslims. The grand total of the population then was 408,322, of which 198,996 were Muslims and 209,326 non-Muslims.6 What seemed to have existed in the region, before the Germans came, was a form of compromise: \"Pagan lands in the plains were held on . . . a compromise: the Fulani refrained from harrying the farmers on the under-standing that the pagans allowed cattle to graze unmolested up to the 7 foot of the h i l l s and to the broader valleys during the dry season.\" It was this compromise which characterized the Northern Kamerun society before the New Imperialism, not the domination of the region by Islam and the Fulani. However, that society had more characteristics than the accommodation between the other groups on the one hand, and the Fulani on the other, before the New Imperialism. There were already five indigenous groups of inhabitants: the aborigines, the Korofa, the Batta, the Mandara, and the Fulani. The f i r s t four were organized into several Fondoms which, though probably independent of each other, could come together in the individual groups to face an external enemy. These Fondoms were mutually suspicious and individualistic. But they co-existed with each other. The last, the Fulani, owed allegiance to Yola, the capital of Adama's empire, and through Yola to Sokoto. They attempted to establish an overlordship over the other four groups and to convert them to Islam. But the attempt was not yet completely successful. The relations between the other four groups on the one hand and the Fulani on the other were generally bad because of the latter's slaving a c t i v i t i e s . However, because the Fulani dominance was far from complete, there existed a form of compromise between the 5 Fulani on the one hand and the other groups on the other. Unfortunately, the features of the Northern Kamerun society were lost to the new conquerors. When the Germans subdued Northern Kamerun between 1885 and 1901, they perceived a \"well-organized, unified, and extensive\" p o l i t i c a l system ruled over by the Fulbe princes in a g \"quasi-feudal machinery.\" Here lay the basis of the German administ-rative Adamawa Creed: to administer Adamawa well, one must gain the !. loyalty of i t s traditional rulers; to gain the loyalty of the traditional 9 rulers, one must recognxze their authority and rule through them. What this Creed or rather policy involved was simple. The supreme authority in Northern Kamerun, aside from the Germans, would be the Fulbe princes. The German residents or commissioners in the region \"were not supposed to interfere with the internal management\" of the peoples. They were expected \"to confine themselves to keeping the peace between [the peoples] and maintaining German rule.\"\"*\"^ But there could be no peace between the other groups on the one hand and the Fulani, who continued to raid for slaves, on the other. Without investigating the cause of the apparent disorder, the Germans instead provided the Fulani princes with guns which they used to effectively enslave and suppress the apparent rebels.\"''\"'\" With the guns in their hands, the Fulani now regarded the other groups \"as f i t t i n g objects of numerous slave raids.\" Indeed, even in 1914, the Fulani took guns from the Germans to fight the British but instead 12 used them to enslave and k i l l the other indigenous groups. The Germans had, thus, increased the tension in the region before the British came to the scene. During the British period, the situation was modified but not altered. 6 This was a consequence of the British reorganization of the region and of British administrative policy. The British perceived and reorganized Northern Kamerun* as part of the Northern Region of Nigeria (Northern Nigeria hereafter). But Northern Kamerun was not an entity within Northern Nigeria. It was fragmented into three parts, each of which had l i t t l e to do with the others. Except Dikwa Emirate, and that after the 1930s, a l l the fragments were parts of different Northern Nigerian Provinces ruled, aside from the British, by the Fulani. Since British administrative policy in Northern Nigeria was to rule through the local traditional rulers, and since the various parts of Northern Kamerun f e l l under the authority of the Northern Nigerian Fulani traditional rulers, a l l Northern Kamerunians now f e l l under Fulani rule. What the Fulani had failed to accomplish during their period and during the German period had now been accomplished for them by the British. The non-Fulani inhabitants of Northern Kamerun were now closer to the Fulani and to Islam, which they perceived as a threat to their lives and cultural identity, than they were ever before. Fortunately, however, the British administrative policy differed from the German in one respect. The Germans completely denied the existence of any traditional rulers, other than the Fulani, in Northern Kamerun. In-r. i t i a l l y , the British made the same error but soon discovered the real s i t u -ation. After some investigations, the British came to realize that the a-Fon (plural of Fon) existed. However, they s t i l l made one error; they came *The terms Nigeria, Northern, Eastern, and Western Nigeria, Kamerun, Northern, Southern, Western, and Eastern Kamerun are convenient l a b e l s p a r t i c u l a r l y during the 1920s and the 1930s. These were geographic ex-pressions with no r e a l p o l i t i c a l meaning at the period. 7 to believe that a l l the a-Fon i n Northern Kamerun had f a l l e n under the suzerainty of the F u l a n i . Or was i t t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l preference for the Fulani as was the case with Nigeria? Whatever the case, the B r i t i s h attempted to leave the a f f a i r s at the grass-roots l e v e l i n the bands of the?a-Fon. Nevertheless, the F u l a n i remained i n control of the a f f a i r s at successive l e v e l s higher than the a-Fon. The attempt f a i l e d p a r t l y because the experiment was new to both the F u l a n i and the a-Fon, p a r t l y because the F u l a n i found i t d i f f i c u l t to avoid i n t e r f e r i n g , and p a r t l y because the B r i t i s h were unwilling to bear the f i n a n c i a l burden involved 13 i n the experiment. When the experiment f a i l e d , the B r i t i s h a l t e r e d the approach. They confirmed the F u l a n i as the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n Northern Kamerun and then channelled t h e i r energies i n two d i r e c t i o n s . F i r s t , they attempted to protect the non-Fulani from F u l a n i oppression and abuses by deposing the tyrants and to improve the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the F u l a n i and the non-F u l a n i . Although the attempt was not very successful, i t earned for the B r i t i s h the goodwill and admiration of the non-Muslims who now thought of 14 \"the B r i t i s h as t h e i r protectors from the F u l a n i . \" This admiration would leave a great impact on the p l e b i s c i t e s . Secondly, the B r i t i s h attempted to t r a i n some of the a-Fon and t h e i r subjects i n the a r t of Western administ-r a t i o n so that one day the trainees might be able to handle t h e i r own l o c a l 15 a f f a i r s within the framework of Nig e r i a . By 19 34, the t r a i n i n g had had some r e s u l t s . Out of fourteen d i s t r i c t heads of Adamawa, eleven were Muslims; three non-Muslims had thus become d i s t r i c t heads. Even \"some of the 105 v i l l a g e headmen i n pagan areas were also pagans.\" 1 6 I t i s s i g n i f i -cant that some non-Muslims now had authority beyond that of the a-Fon. 8 What seemed to have r e s u l t e d from the B r i t i s h approaches to the problem can now be suggested. The B r i t i s h almost completed the process of Fulani domination i n Northern Kamerun through t h e i r p o l i t i c a l ree~ organization of the region. But, by pursuing c e r t a i n p o l i c i e s , the B r i t i s h reduced t h e impact of that F u l a n i domination on the other inhabits ants of the region. While t h i s , however, d i d l i t t l e to reduce the apprehensions of the non-Fulani f o r the F u l a n i , i t d i d win for the B r i t i s h the goodwill and admiration of the non-Fulani. The F u l a n i and the non-; Fulani co-existed tenuously under Pax B r i t a n n i c a , but the suspicion of the non-Fulani for the F u l a n i remained. A l l these factors would have an important bearing on the Northern Kamerun p l e b i s c i t e s . But, other fa c t o r s , stemming out of B r i t i s h educational, s o c i a l , administrative, economic, and p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s a lso l e f t a mark on the p l e b i s c i t e s . B r i t i s h educational p o l i c y i n Northern Kamerun between 1922 and 1961 was not vigorous. By 1925, there were three elementary schools i n the 17 region with a t o t a l population of 31. The year 1930 saw only one school located at Mubi with 28 c h i l d r e n i n attendance. There was another unassisted and unrecognized school at Dikwa D i v i s i o n supervised from Ni g e r i a . Five Northern Kamerunians were undergoing t r a i n i n g i n Nigeria to become elementary school teachers. The same year, there were about 619 Koranic schools which 18 had l i t t l e , i f anything, to do with Western education. This was another influence of the F u l a n i and a further threat to the non-Fulani which the B r i t i s h encouraged. By 1938, there were four recognized elementary schools 19 i n the region. Shute, the B r i t i s h representative to the Trusteeship Council, gave an accurate d e s c r i p t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n as i t existed i n the early 1950s. In \"the remote part of the north [North Kamerun] i l l i t e r a c y 9 20 i s almost one hundred per cent.\" The s i t u a t i o n was improved by the late 1950s. By 1958, there were three primary schools i n Adamawa north and south, and a fourth was under construction. However, there was no secondary school i n Northern Kamerun by the time the B r i t i s h l e f t the region. Nor was there a g i r l s ' school. There was a Teacher Training Centre at Mubi. The missionaries ran several elementary schools. The region had one u n i v e r s i t y graduate (supposed to be the f i r s t Northern Nigerian to acquire that q u a l i f i c a t i o n ) , B.Sc.Hon., Ibadan, i n 1958, and t h i s was \"the f i r s t time a Northerner . . . attained such a q u a l i f i c a t i o n . \" In addition, two Northern Kamerunians \"obtained 21 diplomas i n administration and native treasury accounting.\" I t i s very important to note that the s i t u a t i o n which existed i n 1958 was described by members of the Consultative Committee* who regarded i t as a great educational advancement for the region at t h i s period i n time. B r i t i s h welfare p o l i c y was perhaps even les s vigorous than the education p o l i c y . The B r i t i s h neglected a l l the leper settlements the Germans had 22 l e f t behind and established one c e n t r a l one at Maiduguri, Nigeria. This was a t e l l i n g d i f f i c u l t y for the Northern Kamerun lepers. However, l a t e r on i n t h e i r period, the B r i t i s h r e-established those they had neglected i n the 23 region. Between 1919 and 19 39, there was no permanent medical service i n Northern Kamerun. However, by the 1950s, three medical doctors from *The Consultative Committee, whose function was to advise the Northern Nigerian Government on matters concerning Northern Kamerun, was established by the B r i t i s h i n 1955 and, between 1957 and 1958, i t was constituted a formal Committee of the Northern Regional Government. It s a c t i v i t i e s and perceptions w i l l be seen again i n chapters three - f i v e . 10 Nigeria attended to the region only one of whomvwas on a regular b a s i s . 24 Attempts were also underway to b u i l d three permanent h o s p i t a l s . The year 1958 saw major improvements. The Northern Nigerian Govern-ment and the Native A u t h o r i t i e s provided regular medical services. But for a population of about three-quarters of a m i l l i o n , there were s t i l l only two h o s p i t a l s , the one operated by the government and the other by the missionaries. There were ten Native Authority dispensaries and four 25 mission owned and operated ones. Once more, i t must be stressed that the 1958 s i t u a t i o n was greatly praised by the members of the Consultative Committee. B r i t i s h economic p o l i c y , or lack of i t , i n Northern Kamerun was one of t o t a l neglect. The B r i t i s h undertook no s i g n i f i c a n t economic operations i n the region. B r i g a d i e r Gibbons, B r i t i s h s p e c i a l representative to the Trusteeship Council, explained, during the trusteeship period, that \"Lack of economic j u s t i f i c a t i o n continue[d] to re t a r d the development of a l l -26 season motor-roads i n the Northern Cameroons.\" However, the B r i t i s h d i d 27 b u i l d two roads, t o t a l l i n g 35 miles, to l i n k up some areas. The only other means of communication were the seasonal roads b u i l t and maintained by the Native A u t h o r i t i e s . In 1958, the Northern Kamerunians who sat i n the Nigerian l e g i s l a t u r e s , and who praised the B r i t i s h , had very l i t t l e to say i n economic terms. There were \"numerous numbers of mixed farmers\" who were \"constantly a s s i s t e d by the a g r i c u l t u r a l o f f i c i a l s stationed i n 28 nearly every b i g v i l l a g e to give help and advice.\" When Gardinier studied the s i t u a t i o n , he came to the conclusion that there were few attempts, i f 29 any, to improve even the quantity or q u a l i t y of native food. Administratively, the Northern Kamerunians di d not have an adequate 11 share of the o f f i c e s i n t h e i r region. B r i t i s h administrative p o l i c y i n Northern Kamerun cannot be understood without the p r i n c i p l e upon which i t was based. Generally, B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l p o l i c y was to have the colonies pay for themselves. Yet, the B r i t i s h spent more time administering t h e i r colonies rather than developing them. I f the colonies must pay f o r t h i s administration, the cheapest e f f i c i e n t administrators must be sought. Naturally, such administrators must know both the Eng l i s h language and the B r i t i s h system. During the f i r s t decade of B r i t i s h r u l e , no Northern Kamerunian commanded these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . The Nigerians who, because of t h e i r e a r l y acquaintance with the B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n , already had these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , were then used i n the administrative service of Northern Kamerun. Reinforced by the B r i t i s h educational neglect of Northern Kamerunians, the employment of Nigerians as administrators i n Northern Kamerun became c r y s t a l i z e d i n t o a self-perpetuating system. Moreover, by making the F u l a n i , both Kamerunian and Nigerian, l o c a l administrators, the non-Muslim Northern Kamerunians were e f f e c t i v e l y excluded from any form of administration. Perhaps the s i t u a t i o n would best be i l l u s t r a t e d by looking at the descriptions of two groups i n Northern Kamerun, the one admiring the s i t u a t i o n and the other condemning i t i n 1958. Those who praised the s i t u a t i o n described i t as follows. Out of the seventeen members o f the Lamido's cou n c i l i n Adamawa Province, seven were Northern Kamerunians. Four Northern Kamerunians of Adamawa Province were members of the Nigerian l e g i s l a t u r e s . Local government bodies which i n -cluded D i s t r i c t Councils, Outer Councils, and V i l l a g e Councils were \"equally placed accessible to the natives of the Northern Cameroons as to any other persons.\" Out of the fourteen d i s t r i c t heads, eight were Northern Kamerunians, 12 while seven other Northern Kamerunians held \"important Native Authority posts. On the other hand, like those who praised the situation, those who condemned i t limited their comments to Adamawa Province. From the beginning of the mandate system, \"the ruling institutions of the indige-nous people of the territory [had] been abolished or made into a non-entity.\" The Districts, except perhaps Belel, had become \"a Colony of Adamawa Emirate [Nigeria] under the Lamido of Adamawa in Yola.\" The Lamido was appointing \"men of his own choice or his own kin to rule the Districts\" rather than the \"indigenous inhabitants of the area.\" The dist r i c t s had become \"a place for adventure of the few ruling families from Yola,\" Nigeria. A l l the \"influential administrative posts\" in the Districts were held by people from Yola. As a result of this Yola monopoly, the indige-nous inhabitants of the area were l e f t \"behind without adequate training 31 to man their own affairs by themselves.\" As suggested above, the so-called 'Yola monopoly' of administrative posts in Adamawa Emirate was due to the fact that there were few Northern Kamerunians who understood the British system and the English language. If the desire to have the colonies fend for themselves governed the British administrative policy in Northern Kamerun, the reason the British acquired Western Kamerun governed British p o l i t i c a l policy in that region. Indeed, a l l Br i t i s h policies in Western Kamerun as a whole were governed by that reason. The British acquired Western Kamerun in order to extend the Nigerian boundary eastwards and, in so doing, correct the a r t i f i c i -a l i t y of the Nigeria-Kamerun boundary line. Yet the British did not take into consideration, as might be expected, cultural and h i s t o r i a l factors 13 32 which would have helped them correct the a r t i f i c i a l i t y of the l i n e . Whatever the case, having acquired Western Kamerun for t h i s reason, the B r i t i s h attempted to f i n d out the best Nigerian p o l i t i c a l units with which to administer the various segments of Northern Kamerun. This attempt res u l t e d i n the following reorganization of the region. Dikwa Emirate, the northernmost area of the region located around Lake Chad, was administered by the B r i t i s h Resident of Bornu, N i g e r i a . This Resident was responsible to the Lieutenant-Governor of Northern Ni g e r i a . Yola Emirate North of the Benue River, the area south of Dikwa Emirate to the northern end of the Benue Val l e y , was administered by the Resident of Yola who was also responsible to the Lieutenant-Governor of Northern N i g e r i a . Yola Emirate South of the Benue River, the area from the southern end of the Benue V a l l e y to the Mambilla escarpment, the boundary with Southern Kamerun, was also administered by the Resident of Yola. As mentioned e a r l i e r , although a l l these segments were united i n the Lieutenant-Governor of Northern Nigeria, they had very l i t t l e to do with each other. To be sure, there were minor modifications, but Northern Kamerun developed i n these associations r i g h t i n t o 1960. By 1959, Dikwa Emirate had become Dikwa Emirate D i v i s i o n of the Bornu Province of Northern Ni g e r i a . One of the Yola Emirates had become a D i v i s i o n , Adamawa Emirate D i v i s i o n of the Adamawa Province of Northern Ni g e r i a . The other Yola Emirate had become 33 Wukari D i v i s i o n o f the Benue Province of Northern N i g e r i a . By 1959, therefore, the three fragments had become parts of three d i f f e r e n t adminis-t r a t i v e e n t i t i e s o f Northern Nigeria and s t i l l had l i t t l e to do with each other. The i m p l i c a t i o n of these arrangements was s i g n i f i c a n t . In p r a c t i c e , 14 there was no Northern Kamerun administration between 1919 and 1960 although the region was legally and technically a part of Western Kamerun which was i t s e l f a territory distinct from Nigeria. Any Nigerian proper or any Northern Kamerunian could represent Northern Kamerun outside or within the region; there was no distinction made in the region between a Nigerian and a Northern Kamerunian. Had the Northern Kamerunians, or at least the majority of them been satisfied with these arrangements, no real serious reaction against them would have been expected. But, as i t turned out, many of them were not happy with the way the region had been reorganized, and when the opportunity arose would register their dissatisfaction. The Southern Kamerun Situation The nineteenth century p o l i t i c a l organization of the geographic region which later became Southern Kamerun was not unlike that of contemporary Europe. It consisted mainly of empires and nation states. Nso (Nsaw, Banso, Bansaw), Bafut, and Kom for instance were empires. Some of the Bali 34 states and many of the Wimbum (Nsungnin, Nsungli) states were nation states. Each of these p o l i t i c a l entities, whether with an elective leadership or not, had at i t s head a^Fon. The authority of the Fon was a tricky question. When making a decision involving his personal interests, unless curbed within his Council, the Fon was inclined to be dictatorial. Bflt,.. when making a decision involving the interests of the whole Fondom, he consulted with his Councillors who, in turn, consulted with some of the important commoners who, in their own turn, sounded the opinion of the rest of the society. In decisions involving the interests of the whole Fondom, therefore, the statement of the Fon usually reflected a consensus of the Fondom. 15 Consequently, i f the statement or policy of a Fon conflicted with that of any person who was not himself a Fon, that of the Fon must be taken more seriously, i f other things remained equal. The traditional states, Fondoms hereafter, were very intricately organized particularly the empires. More significantly, they had diplo-matic relations among themselves and even with intruders. Bali Nyonga had diplomatic and trade relations with Babessong and with Babungo. The Germans, represented by Dr. Eugen Zintgraff entered into diplomatic relations with the same Bali Nyonga. Central to the treaty between the Bali Nyonga and the Germans was authority. The Bali would help the Germans to subdue the rest of the grasslands; of Southern Kamerun and then establish German overlordship. In their own turn, the Germans would make the Bali Nyonga the supreme local authority of the grasslands. To face this unholy alliance of the Bali and the Germans, the Bafut and the Mankon formed a military alliance which gave the Bali-German alliance a 35 thorough thrashing several times. There was also an intriguing diplomacy between five Fondoms with Tikari (Tikar) and Nodobo* origins. These Fondoms included Nso, Kom, Bafut, Bum, and Ndu. The smallest of them, Bum (about 5,000 people in 1953), was commercially and strategically situated. It was the entrepot for the Kolanut trade between Northern Nigeria and the grasslands of Southern Kamerun. It was in intermittent h o s t i l i t y with Kom lying on i t s southern border. But, Bum was \"in pacts of friendship with^Nso and Ndu.\" *Tikari and Ndobo are actually the same ethnic group. 16 The population of Ndu in 1953 was estimated at 8,300 and that of Nso in the same year was 50,000. Nso and Ndu were for the most part hostile to each other. But Nso and Kom were ( s t i l l are) in alliance. Kom, with an estimated population of 27,000 in 1953, was competing with Bafut (19,000 estimated population in 1953) \"for the allegiance of tiny village chief-3 6 doms\" (Fondoms). This diplomacy smacks of the Bismarckian diplomacy of the late nine-teenth century. The Bum-Kom hos t i l i t y was neutralized by the Nso-Kom and Nso-Bum friendships; Nso protected Bum from Kom aggression. The Nso-Nd'U h o s t i l i t y was neutralized by the Ndu-Bum and Nso-Bum friendships. The isolation of the Bafut in the group was neutralized by the Mankon-Bafut alliance. While this diplomacy maintained peace among these Fondoms, i t gave Nso, Kom, and Bafut virtually a free hand to subdue their weaker neighbours and create empires. Considering a l l this, i t would appear that Le Vine's idea of disorganized, unruly \"tribes\" warring with each other before the New Imperialism leaves much to be desired. Indeed, the problem of the period appears not to have been the relation-ship between Crowns and Crowns. It does not appear to have been the problem of the relationship between peoples and peoples. It was the problem of the relationship between the Crowns and their subjects. There was an international conspiracy of the a-Fon against their subjects: \"there was a pact of friend-ship [between Nso and Kom] involving royal g i f t exchange and mutural return 37 of run-away wives and slaves.\" With such pacts, the subjects of the a-Fon could do l i t t l e more than obey royal decrees without question. To be sure, Western intrusions, education and ideas, did threaten tradition. But, by the time of the plebiscites only a very generous e s t i -mate would have put Southern Kamerunians at 20 per cent Western-educated. 17 Consequently, any decision any Fon made regarding the plebiscites, was more representative of local opinion and would command greater support among the electorate than decisions made by the new p o l i t i c a l e l i t e . This situation, of course meant that no Western-educated p o l i t i c a l leader of tact could act without his eyes looking over his shoulders at the a-Fon. Here l i e s the key to the understanding of the major part of the nation-a l i s t movement i n Sourthern Kamerun. Here l i e s the key to the under- .. standing of the conclusion of that nationalist movement, the Southern Kamerun plebiscites. The fourth and f i n a l United Nations Visiting Mission to Kamerun immediately before the plebiscites was aware of this situation. As the Mission saw i t , although the authority of the a-Fon varies in extent and influence, many of the a-Fon \"appear to play a part in public a f f a i r s \u00E2\u0080\u0094 not only in local administration but also in the shaping of opinion on the main p o l i t i c a l issues\u00E2\u0080\u0094which none of the p o l i t i c a l parties proper can afford to ignore.\" The a-Fon of the grasslands in particular included in their persons \"the strongest traditional authorities in the country.\" The a-Fon submitted that their role was traditional. But, nevertheless, they reserved \"the right to interfere with and correct the affairs of the country 38 when i t [was] realized that things [were] going radically wrong.\" The statement of the a-Fon that they reserved \"the right to interfere with and correct the affiars of the country . . .,\" would seem to suggest their authority and influence over the Southern Kamerunians. Nevertheless, the Mission mentioned one important point which should be borne in mind always. This was that tradition was more pronounced in the grasslands. The grasslands were the most populous areas of Southern 18 Kamerun. Indeed, Bamenda D i v i s i o n alone i n the grasslands could win the p l e b i s c i t e i f only i t s a-Fon took the same p o s i t i o n . T r a d i t i o n was not very pronounced i n some parts of the f o r e s t zone. Mamfe D i v i s i o n , mainly i n the f o r e s t zone and p a r t l y i n the grasslands, was a watershed between the s i t u a t i o n i n the grasslands and that i n the f o r e s t zone. The majority of i t s a-Fon were s t i l l very i n f l u e n t i a l . But others had begun to see a decay i n t h e i r authority. Further south, i n Kumba D i v i s i o n i t appeared that the majority of the a-Fon sat sadly watching the decay of t h e i r au-:::. t h o r i t y . In the southern end of the region, V i c t o r i a D i v i s i o n , the a-Fon had almost v i r t u a l l y l o s t t h e i r authority by the time of the p l e b i s c i t e s . A l l t h i s was the r e s u l t of Western i n t r u s i o n i n t o Southern Kamerun. The f i r s t of these i n t r u s i o n s came i n the form of slave trade. But t h i s did not seem to have l e f t any s i g n i f i c a n t impact. To be sure, the introduction of slave trade by the West di d lead to some skirmishes between some of the Fondoms, but i t d i d not shake the f a b r i c s of the t r a d i t i o n a l systems.* Even the Fu l a n i attempts to conduct slave raids i n Southern Kamerun were e a s i l y r e p e l l e d . What seemed to have begun the threat to the t r a d i t i o n a l systems was the long contact of the coastal areas with the whiteman. This means that the dismantling of the authority of the a-Fon was going on i n the coastal areas while the grasslands were i n t a c t . The f o r e s t zone and the grasslands had, thus, begun to move i n d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s long before the Germans came to the scene. * P h i l i p D. C u r t i n , The A t l a n t i c Slave Trade: A Census, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Milwaukee, 1969, p. 255 shows that some of the slaves were\"captured from the Bamenda'area of Southern Kamerun. Yet, i t i s here that we have the t r a d i t i o n a l systems i n t a c t t i l l today. 19 The movement in different directions by the two areas was aggravated when the Germans colonized Southern Kamerun. German occupation and effect-ive rule of the region began from the south and proceeded gradually north-wards. Because the traditional systems of the coastal areas were already weakening, the Germans attempted to rule the area directly and Victoria became one of the most important centres of administration. But, in the interior, that i s in some parts of Kumba, Mamfe, and nearly a l l of the grasslands, the Germans discovered many powerful a-Fon through whom they ruled indirectly. The Germans entered into treaties with these a-Fon and gave them German flags. Central again to these threaties, particularly when the Bali-German attempts had failed, was authority. The a-Fon pledged to \"recognize German rule, to supply workers, and to refrain from inter-ference with trade.\" In one case, the German agent \"followed native customs and swore blood friendship with the tr i b a l chieftain, the for-mality requiring the participants to drink each other's blood mixed in water.\" On their own part, the Germans promised to uphold the authority of the a-Fon over their subjects. Where there was some struggle for power within any empire, the Germans recognized one of the a-Fon and placed him 39 \"in authority over rivals.\" This policy had some significant bearings on the p o l i t i c a l develop-ment of Southern Kamerun. By ruling coastal areas directly, the Germans further weakened the traditional systems and, with them, the influence of the a-Fon. The inhabitants of the coastal areas began to make decisions on major issues individually. This process became self-perpetuating with increased Western education, increased literacy, and increased penetration of the area by Western ideas. 20 On the other hand, the situation in the interior, particularly in the far north, the grasslands, was different. Here, the Germans recognized and confirmed the authority of the a-Fon over their subjects and rivals. The traditional systems, the authority of the a-Fon, and the loyalty of their subjects remained intact. It i s thus easy to understand why Western ideas found more receptive ears in the coastal areas and struck no responsive chords in the mental make-up of the grasslanders for so long a time. Indeed, i t was not unt i l the end of the thirty-two year German imperium in Kamerun that Western ideas began to penetrate the grasslands. The end of the German Kamerun Empire came in 1916 as the Franco-British-Belgian forces gathered in for a k i l l on the Germans in Kamerun. It occurred when the kamerunians, who saw no reason to get involved in a European family a f f a i r , refused to fight: \"as far as the Cameroons was 40 concerned there was l i t t l e or no fighting at a l l . \" Without any re-sistance from Kamerunians, who concentrated their efforts in protecting the Ger-mans in Kamerun from the invading forces,the British gratuitously moved in as peace-makers rather than conquerors. The bitter and long-drawn out wars which the a-Fon of the grasslands fought with the Germans, before being subdued, were thus absent at the time of the British occupation. Due to this peaceful occupation, the a-Fon began to perceive the British as friends rather than conquerors. This friendship would continue as long as the Brit i s h did not attempt to undermine tradition. Fortunately, the British attempted to uphold tradition through their administrative policy. British administrative policy in Southern Kamerun followed that of the Germans differing only in one major respect. The Germans accepted the status quo without any qualms. They accepted the fact that there were 21 central authorities in the interior and that central authority in the coastal areas was decaying. It was not their fault that things were as they were. The best they could do was to accelerate the course of history in the same direction. This was not the way the British saw i t . The British thought quite differently. They agreed that the status quo must be maintained. But what was the status quo? In their.minds, the status quo was the situation which obtained in the grasslands. The situ-ation which obtained in the coastal areas was the fault of the Germans. It was their duty to correct this German blunder and preserve the traditions of the people. As they put i t themselves, As regards native affairs, the B r i t i s h policy in the Cameroons follows that of Nigeria, and i s an endeavour to rebuild the t r i b a l and ethnological institutions which had to some extent suffered disintegration during the period of direct German administration, to find the hereditary native rulers and to educate them in their duties in that capacity, and to seek their co-operation and help, and to maintain their prestige in a l l matters concerning the areas under their c o n t r o l . 4 1 The main difference between the British and the German administrative policies lay in the fact that the Germans interfered more in the coastal areas of Southern Kamerun than the British did. But, both the British and the Germans were willin g to rule through the a-Fon i f possible. This British administrative policy was not to be as easy for a l l the areas of the region as the British might have thought. In the grasslands and in some parts of Mamfe and Kumba, the hereditary traditional rulers with authority were not in doubt. Here, the British did maintain and uphold their authority and prestige in a l l matters in the areas under their jurisdiction. The German approach had been replicated in this area. Better s t i l l , the B r i t i s h were not conquerors, just the liberators of the 22 a-Fon and their subjects from :the German iron rule. On the other hand, even when the British discovered the hereditary a-Fon in the south, the British realized that the authority of the a-Fon had, :;tio some extent, been sapped. In that area, the British established local councils which made decisions for the people under the council's jurisdiction. Membership in these councils included the a-Fon and some Western-educated e l i t e , many of whom could not, traditionally speaking, s i t with the a-Fon in the same council. L i t t l e republics had emerged in the south. To be sure, these councils almost always invariably corresponded with the jurisdiction of either the decaying Fondoms or Fondoms which claimed the same ethnic origins. But, there was nothing traditional in them or in their authority. In time, these republics were introduced in the grasslands, the South Eastern Federation, Ndop, for instance. But, they differed from those in the south in two major respects. The councils had no .authority whatsoever over the subjects of the a-Fon. The councils might take d e c i \u00E2\u0080\u0094 sions but unless the a-Fon agreed to the decisions, they could never be implemented. Furthermore, the councils could not even take decisions contrary to the views of the a-Fon. Indeed, in the South Eastern Federation, the Western-educated councillors spent more time wooing the Fon.of Bafut and the Fon of Nso than they spent thinking about the problems of the Federation. These two a-Fon must agree on any decision before the South Eastern Fed-eration could attempt to implement i t . Like the Germans, therefore, the British modified the situation and the difference between the forest zone and the grasslands, but did not change them. The south and the north were s t i l l moving in different 23 directions with differing outlooks. This situation would have an important bearing on the nationalist movement and on the plebiscites. However, the nationalist movement i t s e l f , as a new phenomenon in the region, was the product of the Bri t i s h p o l i t i c a l reorganization of Southern Kamerun and of the results of that p o l i t i c a l reorganization. The B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l reorganization of Southern Kamerun reflected British perceptions of the region. The British perceptions of the region themselves were anchored in the principles upon which the British based their acquisition of Southern Kamerun. As was the case with Northern Kamerun, the British acquired Southern Kamerun in order to extend the Eastern Nigerian boundary eastwards and, in the process, f i l l in the missing 42 links of Eastern Nigeria. Southern Kamerun,lin the British mind, was 43 ethnologically a natural part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, Eastern Nigeria hereafter. As a result of these perceptions, the British Integrated Southern Kamerun with Eastern Nigeria p o l i t i c a l l y and otherwise. In practice, therefore, the terms Southern Kamerun and Southern Kamerunians, except in legal and technical ways, did not have any real meaning. British economic policy in Southern Kamerun was almost the antithesis of the German economic policy in the region. Before the British came, the Germans had lai d down a well-developed infrastructure for the economy off the region comparable to none in colonial Africa of the time. Witness the intra-regional trade system, the plantations, the s c i e n t i f i c experiments on a l l aspects of the economy, the search for ivory, the experiments with and development of palm o i l and palm kernels, cocoa, rubber, cotton, ramie, tobacco, coffee, and Kolanuts. Witness the botanical garden, the buildings, the network of roads and railroads, the seaports, the telephone line, the 24 44 a i r s t r i p s and many others. Indeed, \"A student cannot escape the conclusion that everything was being done by Germany to get the maximum from- the 45 colony.\" Southern Kamerun stood to gain much i n the long-run had the B r i t i s h done the same thing to get the maximum from the t r u s t t e r r i t o r y . But the B r i t i s h d i d not. Things began to decay as soon as the B r i t i s h took over control of Southern Kamerun. German roads went i n t o disuse. By 1938, the B r i t i s h 46 were maintaining only a t o t a l of 185 miles of road. The United Nations ( f i r s t ) V i s i t i n g Mission to Kamerun on October 31, 1949, found roads poor, 47 unsatisfactory, and inadequate. Brigad i e r Gibbons, B r i t i s h s p e c i a l representative to the Trusteeship Council, i n d i c a t e d that improvements could not even be expected. Plans to develop roads were underway, he said , \"but i n view of the f a c t that i t costs fel,000 to b u i l d a single mile of simple gravel road, he was unable to say how f a r such projects would be 48 c a r r i e d out i n the near future.\" The B r i t i s h d i d not even t r e a t the plantations, the basis of the Southern Kamerun economy as such. At f i r s t , the B r i t i s h sought non-German buyers for the plantations. When such buyers were not a v a i l a b l e , the B r i t i s h sold them to t h e i r former owners. Later on, a f t e r the Second World War, the plantations became the property of the Nigerian Government run by 49 the Cameroons Development Corporation (CDC). Even the very existence of the plantations was of l i t t l e b e n e f i t to the Southern Kamerunians. \"In 1936 the Permanent Mandates Commission learned that 95 per cent of the p r o f i t s from the banana trade, the t e r r i t o r y ' s c h i e f export, were going to 50 Europeans.\" In the f i r s t year of i t s operation, the CDC made a p r o f i t of 1178,275 net and 6158,000 was set aside as taxes for the Nigerian Government. The next year, the CDC made a p r o f i t of 6343,396 net and 6209,000 was 51 also set aside as taxes for the same Government. Even labour i n the CDC was not equitably d i s t r i b u t e d . Between 1955 and 1959, the years for which there are figure s , two groups of Nigerians, the Ibo and the E f i k -I b i b i o , were always the l a r g e s t single ethnic groups employed at the CDC. 5 2 On t h e i r own part, the \" B r i t i s h undertook no large scale economic program\" i n Southern or rather Western Kamerun e i t h e r through \"grants or loans.\" No attempts were made \"to improve the q u a l i t y or quantity of native food or cash crop production, despite the f a c t that cocoa production 53 was l a r g e l y i n the hands of A f r i c a n s , mainly i n the Kumba d i v i s i o n . \" The unemployment o f the Southern Kamerunians who were i l l i t e r a t e could not, therefore, be solved by self-employment on the farms. Worse s t i l l , commercial and tradesman a c t i v i t i e s were monopolized by the Nigerians, the 54 Ibo i n p a r t i c u l a r . The neglect of the Southern Kamerunians who were i l l i t e r a t e was also matched by the neglect of the Western-educated Southern Kamerunians. O r i g i n a l l y , the only Southern Kamerunians who were l i t e r a t e were German speaking. Beyond the t r a d i t i o n a l systems, t h i s group had an idea only of the German systems. This meant they could not be of much use i n the B r i t i s h administration. Yet, administration was the main B r i t i s h industry i n Southern Kamerun. For example, out of a t o t a l expenditure of 6188,427 i n 1938, 6142,484 (about 76%) went to administratively r e l a t e d functions: 55 Armed Forces 612,396, Police 617,817, and Administration 6112,271. Since the l i t e r a t e Southern Kamerunians were not acquainted with English and with the B r i t i s h system, they were v i r t u a l l y , i n the beginning, excluded from 26 this industry. Administrative posts i n Southern Kamerun became f i l l e d with B r i t i s h , Nigerian, and other non-Southern Kamerunian administrators, a s i t u a t i o n which became c r y s t a l i z e d i n t o a self-perpetuating system. Indeed, i n the late 1930s, there were only 71 Southern Kamerunians who held any substan-t i a l posts i n Southern Kamerun. These included: one Supervising Teacher, one Assistant Medical O f f i c e r , two A s s i s t a n t A g r i c u l t u r a l O f f i c e r s , t h i r t y i n the c l e r i c a l s e r v i c e , twenty teachers, twelve midwives and nurses, and 56 f i v e t e c h n i c a l s t a f f . I t i s important to note that the majority of these 71 Southern Kamerunians were from the coastal areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Bakweri. In the plantations, the \"Bakweri and the Ibo are again 57 numerous\" i n the \" c l e r i c a l grade\" of workers. The d i s p a r i t y i n employ-ment between the f o r e s t zoners and the grasslanders would contribute to the varying p o s i t i o n s taken by the two areas during the p l e b i s c i t e s . The exclusion of Southern Kamerunians from w h i t e - c o l l a r jobs could have been rescued had the B r i t i s h paid much attention to the education of Southern Kamerunians and taken steps to h a l t the employment of Nigerians i n Southern Kamerun. But that was not the case. By 1925, there were seven government elementary schools i n Western Kamerun (North and South) holding 785 pupils with a s t a f f of 25. The Native A u t h o r i t i e s had ten schools i . with an average attendance of 2,848. The compulsory subjects taught were reading, w r i t i n g , English composition and grammar, English d i c t a t i o n and c o l l o q u i a l E nglish. The s i t u a t i o n , however, began to improve i n the 1930s. By 1930, the number of government schools had reduced to s i x with an increased population of 1,256. There were twelve Native Authority schools with a population of 27 990. The Missions had 459 schools, about 90 per cent of which were 59 unassisted. The majority of these unassisted schools, however, taught nothing beyond the Prayer Book. By 1938, the number of government schools was s t i l l s i x . The Native A u t h o r i t i e s now had nineteen schools. The Mission schools were d i s t r i b u t e d as follows: Catholic M i s s i o n \u00E2\u0080\u0094 4 7 , seven of which were assis t e d ; Basel Mission\u00E2\u0080\u0094161, ten of which were as s i s t e d ; German B a p t i s t Mission\u00E2\u0080\u009419, two of which were assis t e d ; and, one Native B a p t i s t school which was also a s s i s t e d . ^ I t was not u n t i l 1939 that the Roman .Catholic Mission opened the f i r s t secondary school at Sasse, V i c t o r i a D i v i s i o n . This example was followed ten years l a t e r when the Basel Mission opened another secondary school at B a l i Nyonga i n 1949. These were the only secondary schools i n Southern Kamerun at the end of the period i n which the B r i t i s h administered Southern Kamerun. Indeed, atcthe end of the period, only a very generous estimate, as s a i d e a r l i e r , could put the popu-l a t i o n at 20 per cent l i t e r a t e . Moreover, t h i s estimated 20 per cent was concentrated i n the coastal areas. The p l e b i s c i t e s thus came when the grasslands, which housed more than one h a l f of the t o t a l population of Southern Kamerun, were i l l i t e r a t e and t r a d i t i o n a l i n outlook. The a-Fon themselves, indeed nearly a l l the Southern Kamerunians were not at ease with the B r i t i s h welfare and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s i n the region. In 1925, and several years thereafter, Southern Kamerun had four h o s p i t a l s and three medical o f f i c e r s . These h o s p i t a l s were d i s t r i b u t e d as follows: V i c t o r i a \u00E2\u0080\u0094 5 6 beds, Buea\u00E2\u0080\u009425 beds, Mamfe\u00E2\u0080\u009420 beds, Bamenda\u00E2\u0080\u009432 heds, and a dispensary was soon to be opened at Kumba. 6 1 V i c t o r i a and Buea h o s p i t a l s , both i n V i c t o r i a D i v i s i o n , one of the l e a s t populated areas of Southern Kamerun had a t o t a l of 81 beds whereas Bamenda D i v i s i o n , which had more 28 than half the population of Southern Kamerun, had 32 beds in the hospital. The Buea hospital, only about 20 miles away from Victoria, was exclusively for the 281 Europeans in Southern Kamerun, a disproportional majority of whom were resident in Victoria Division. To be sure, the hospital went by the name 'Senior Service' hospital. But, there were not many Southern Kamerunians who could claim to be in the Senior Service grade; the only Southern Kamerunian who could claim to belong to this category came several years later and was himself an Assistant Medical Officer.* In general, therefore, British policies in Southern Nigeria, in particular Eastern Nigeria, and this term in practice included Southern Kamerun, were detrimental to the interests of the Southern Kamerunians. The Southern Kamerunians who f e l t the impact of those policies most were the Western-educated because they were largely excluded from administrative jobs in the region they perceived to be theirs. It i s l i t t l e wonder, therefore, that the f i r s t reactions to these policies came from the Western-educated Southern Kamerunians. The reaction began with a search for .' identity and food. *An Assistant Medical Officer was actually a fully qualified medical doctor who was given this t i t l e mainly for two reasons: to assert his inferi o r i t y to a white medical doctor; and, to hold him down from aspiring for promotion to the Senior Service category. 29 Footnotes David E. Gardinier, \"The B r i t i s h i n the Gameroons, 1919-1939,\" P. G i f f o r d and W.R. Louis, eds., B r i t a i n and Germany i n A f r i c a : Imperial Rivalry and C o l o n i a l Rule, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1967, p. 540. 2 I b i d . 3 A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa: Past and Present, Oxford University Press, London, 1958, pp. 147-149 and passim. 4 James H. Vaughan, J r . , \"Culture, History and Grass-roots P o l i t i c s i n a Northern Cameroons Kingdom,\" American Anthropologist, V o l . 66, 1964, pp. 1985-1088. ^Kirk-Greene, op. c i t . , p. 148. ^Computed from David E. Gardinier i n G i f f o r d and Louis, eds., op. c i t . , pp. 532-538. 7 Kirk-Greene, op. c i t . , p. 149. g Harry R. Rudin, Germans i n the Cameroons 1884-1914: A Case Study i n Modern Imperialism, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 186. 9 Ibid . Great B r i t a i n , Foreign O f f i c e H i s t o r i c a l Section, Handbooks No. I l l , H.M. Stationary O f f i c e , London, 1920, pp 27-28. ^ G a r d i n i e r i n G i f f o r d and Louis, eds., op. c i t . , pp. 536-538. 12 Vaughan, J r . , i n American Anthropologist, Vol. 66, 1964, pp. 1085-1088. 13 Gardinier i n G i f f o r d and Louis, eds., op. c i t . , pp. 527-238. 14 Vaughan, J r . , \" i n American Anthropologist, V o l . 66, 1964, p. 1088. 15 Great B r i t a i n , Report by His B r i t a n n i c Majesty's Government on the B r i t i s h Mandated Sphere of the Cameroons for the Year 1923, H.M. Stationary O f f i c e , London, 1924, p. 36. 1 6 G a r d i n i e r i n G i f f o r d and Louis, eds., op. c i t . , pp. 538-543. 17 Great B r i t a i n , Report of His B r i t a n n i c Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of the B r i t i s h Cameroons for the Year 1925, H.M. Stationary O f f i c e , London, 1926, pp. 63-74. 30 18 Great Britain, Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations, on the Administration of the Cameroons under British Mandate for the Year 19 30, H.M. Stationary Office, London, 1931, pp. 80B89. 19 Great Britain, Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations, on the Administration of the Cameroons under British Mandate for the Year 1939, H.M. Stationary Office, London, 1939, pp. 81, 144-148. 20 U.N., T.C., United Nations Bulletin, Vol. 6, February 15, 1949, p. 147. 21 U.N., T.C., Extracts from Memorandum Dated 25 September 1958 of Elected Representatives of the Northern Cameroons in the Nigerian Ligislatures, T/1426, Annex IV, January 20, 1959, p. 5. 22 British Report for the Year 1930, p. 97. 23 U.N., T.C., T/1426, Annex IV, January 20, 1959, p. 5. 24 British Report for the Year 1930, p. 97; U.N., T.C., United Nations Review, Vol. 4, April, 1958, pp. 33-41. 25 U.N., T.C., T/1426, Annex IV, January 20, 1959, p. 5. 2 6 B r i t i s h Report for the Year 1938, p. 109. 27 British Report for the Year 1930, p. 105. 28 U.N., T.C., T/1426, Annex IV, January 20, 1959, p. 4. 29 Gardinier in Gifford and Louis, eds., op. c i t . , p. 551. 30 U.N., T.C., T/1426, Annex IV, January 20, 1959, pp. 3-4. 31 U.N., T.C., Extracts from Memorandum Dated 5 November 1958 from the United Middle Belt Congress/Action Group Alliance (UMBC/AG), T/1426, Annex IV, January 20, 1959, pp. 8-10. 32 Edwin Ardener, \"The P o l i t i c a l History of Cameroons,\" The World Today, Vol. 18, Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 343-344. 33 U.N., T.C., Report of the United Nations Commissioner for the Super-vision of the Plebiscites in the Southern and Northern Parts of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, T/1556, April 3, 1961, p. 176. 34 An analysis of many of these p o l i t i c a l entities deserves an independent study by i t s e l f . The scope of such a study f a l l s beyond the bounds of this study. Consequently, the interested reader is directed to some of the 31 studies o f the subject which already e x i s t . Elizabeth M. C h i l v e r on the B a l i (Nyonga) i n Prosser G i f f o r d and Win. R. Louis, eds., B r i t a i n and Germany i n A f r i c a : Imperial R i v a l r y and C o l o n i a l R u l e , New Haven and London, 1967, pp. 479-511. P.M. Kaberry on the Nsaw (Nso) i n A f r i c a , V o l . 29, No. 4, October, 1959, pp. 366-383. P.M. Kaberry, Women of the G r a s s f i e l d s , London, passim. M. McCulloch, M. Littlewood, I. Dugast, Peoples of the Central Cameroons, Ethnographic Survey of A f r i c a , West A f r i c a , Part IX, Vols. 9-11, London, 1954, pp. 11-172. E. Ardener, Coastal Bantu of the Cameroons, Ethnographic Survey of A f r i c a , West A f r i c a , Part XI, Vols. 9-11, 1956, pp. 9-108. Paul M. Kale, P o l i t i c a l Evolution i n the Cameroons, Government P r i n t e r , Buea, August, 1967. 35 Eliza b e t h M. Ch i l v e r , \"Paramountcy and Protection i n the Cameroons: the B a l i and the Germans, 1889-1913,\" P. G i f f o r d and W.R. Louis, eds., B r i t a i n and Germany i n A f r i c a : Imperial R i v a l r y and C o l o n i a l Rule, New Haven and London, 1967, pp. 483-486. 36 E.M. C h i l v e r and P.M. Kaberry, \"The Kingdom of Kom i n West Cameroon,\" D a r y l l Forde and P.M. Kaberry, eds., West A f r i c a n Kingdoms i n the Nine- teenth Century, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 127-128. 37 Ibi d . , p. 133. 38 U.N., T.C., United Nations V i s i t i n g Mission to Trust T e r r i t o r i e s i n West A f r i c a , 1958, Report on the Trust T e r r i t o r y of the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration, T/1426, January 20, 1959, pp. 54-55. 39 Rudin, op. c i t . , pp. 183-187. 40 Paul M. Kale, P o l i t i c a l Evolution i n the Cameroons, Government P r i n t e r , Buea, August, 1967, p. 7. 41 B r i t i s h Report for 1923, p. 36. 42 Ardener i n The World Today, V o l . 18, Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 343-344; Gardinier i n G i f f o r d and Louis, eds., op. c i t . , p. 521. 43 Gardinier i n G i f f o r d and Louis, op. c i t . , p. 521. 44 Rudin, op. c i t . , pp. 222-296 and passim. 45 Ibid ., p. 277. 46 B r i t i s h Report for 1938, p. 108. 47 U.N., T.C., United Nations B u l l e t i n , Vol. 8, March 1, 1950, pp. 208-209. 48 U.N., T.C., United Nations B u l l e t i n , Vol. 8, A p r i l 1, 1950, pp. 322-323. 49 Gardinier i n G i f f o r d and Louis, eds., op. c i t . , p. 549. 32 50 Ibid ., p. 550. 51 U.N., T.C., United Nations B u l l e t i n , V o l . 8, March 1, 1950, pp. 209-211. 52 C.D.C., Annual Report[s] of the Cameroons Development Corporation for the Year[s]: 1955, p. 25; 1957, p. 27; 1958, p. 25; 1959, p. 23, Bota, V i c t o r i a . 53 Gardinier i n G i f f o r d and Louis, eds., op. c i t . , p. 551. 54 U.N., T.C., P e t i t i o n from the A l l - N i g e r i a n Union Concerning the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration, V i c t o r i a , 21 September, 1959, T/PET 4/L 42, September 30, 1959, pp. 1-2. 55 B r i t i s h Report for the Year 1938, p. 115. ^^Kale, op. c i t . , p. 52. 57 Edwin Ardener, \" S o c i a l and Demographic Problems of the Southern Cameroons Plantation Area,\" Aiden Southall, ed., S o c i a l Change i n Modern A f r i c a , Oxford University Press, London, 1961, pp. 90-91. 58 B r i t i s h Report for the Year 1925, pp. 63-74. 59 B r i t i s h Report for the Year 1930, pp. 80-89. 60 B r i t i s h Report for the Year 19 38, pp. 81, 144-148. 61 B r i t i s h Report for the Year 1925, p. 76. 33 CHAPTER TWO THE RISE AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONALISM IN SOUTHERN KAMERUN 1939-1953 I t i s very d i f f i c u l t to be so precise as to suggest that such an i l l u s i v e phenomenon as nationalism rose on a d e f i n i t e date. I t i s not even easy to trace the development and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h i s phenomenon very accurately. The d i f f i c u l t y becomes even greater when a reaction or reactions against s p e c i f i c grievances transform, i n time,into nationalism as we know i t . However, the d i f f i c u l t y must not be allowed to stand i n the way of attempts to suggest roughly when t h i s phenomenon began i n a p a r t i c u l a r region, how i t developed, and what i t s main features were. The a v a i l a b l e sources suggest that the- f i r s t reactions to B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s i n Southern Kamerun occurred i n 1939, and a few years l a t e r , the reactions became transformed i n t o Southern Kamerun nationalism. These sources and evidence also suggest that the reactions were a challenge to the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l reorganization of that region, to the r e s t of B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s therein,and to the r e s u l t s of those p o l i c i e s . The re-actions, the r i s e and development of nationalism were p a c i f i c and c o n s t i -t u t i o n a l a l l through. In the middle o f 1939, G.J. Mbene, a schoolmaster i n V i c t o r i a , formed a Bakweri c u l t u r a l organization c a l l e d the Cameroon Welfare Union (CWU). I n i t i a l l y , i t s membership included only the Western-educated Bakweri. But, when i t s branches were soon established i n the main towns of Southern Kamerun, i t s membership was extended to include many of the non-Bakweri Western-educated Southern Kamerunians. Through an appeal from Mbene, 34 Paul* M. Kale, a Bakweri who l e f t Southern Kamerun for further studies at S i e r r a Leone but who soon found himself teaching at Lagos, founded a branch of the CWU i n that Nigerian C i t y . t The formation of the Lagos Branch, the establishment of i t s branches i n the main towns of Southern Kamerun, and the extension of i t s membership to include the non-Bakweri, soon a l t e r e d the character of the CWU. From a c u l t u r a l organization i t 1 became a pressure group. However, i t was a branch outside Southern Kamerun, the Lagos Branch, which set t h i s pressure group i n t o action. This branch prompted the mother branch i n V i c t o r i a to write a p e t i t i o n to the B r i t i s h requesting representation for Southern Kamerun i n the Nigerian c e n t r a l l e g i s l a t u r e 2 located at Lagos. This request was a dxrect reaction and challenge to the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l reorganization of Southern Kamerun. Ni g e r i a had been carved out into three p o l i t i c a l u n i t s , namely, the Western, Eastern, and Northern Regions. Only these three p o l i t i c a l units could be represented at Lagos i n t h e i r own r i g h t . Southern Kamerun was a part of Eastern Nigeria and could not, therefore, be represented at Lagos i n i t s own r i g h t . I t was r u l e d from Enugu, the headquarters of Eastern Nigeria, where i t d i d not have separate representation. The Southern Kamerun request for *Le Vine, The Cameroon Federal Republic, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1971, p. 22, has i n c o r r e c t l y substituted Peter f o r Paul. t N e v i l l e Rubin, p. 83 and W i l l a r d Johnson p. 117 have confused t h i s Lagos Branch with the Cameroons Youth League, to be seen presently, founded at Lagos i n 1940 by the members of that Lagos CWU branch. The confusion i s probably due to the f a c t that the CYL soon superseded the CWU. 35 representation at Lagos was, therefore, fundamentally a request for the constitution of Southern Kamerun as a p o l i t i c a l unit equal in a l l respects to the other p o l i t i c a l units of Nigeria. In essence, i t was an attempt to assert the identity and unity of Southern Kamerun within the frame-work of Nigeria. Such an assertion struck at the very heart of the British p o l i t i c a l reorganization of the region. British reaction to the request could be expected. \"In this the Administering Authority and the Union were 3 at daggers drawn.\" British reaction to the request did not, however, discourage the Union. Indeed, the Union was soon to carry the assertion one step forward. On June 20, 1940, the representatives of a l l the branches held a meeting at Victoria. There they decided on three names from which the British could choose at least one to represent the region at Lagos. These names included P.M. Kale\u00E2\u0080\u0094a schoolmaster at Lagos, Charlie Ndobide\u00E2\u0080\u0094a businessman in Kumba, and Dr. Barber\u00E2\u0080\u0094a native of Fernando Po.* The British instead argued that \"because the Cameroons did not enjoy the franchise,\" the matter of Southern Kamerun representation at Lagos was a privilege and not a right. It is not readily known what the British did with the three names thereafter, but they were never used. So discouraged was the Union that i t began to 4 dwindle into oblivion. In spite of this discouragement and disappearance of the CWU, i t registered two important points. By demanding the representation of Southern Kamerun at Lagos, i t challenged the way the British had reorganized Southern Kamurun. By selecting names to give to the British, i t served *Fernando Po was a Spanish colony. 36 notice to the B r i t i s h that Southern Kamerunians existed and that they had spokesmen who could make decisions f o r them. A l l i n a l l , the CWU asserted a d i s t i n c t i v e i d e n t i t y f o r Southern Kamerun and i t s inhabitants. This was too important f o r the Union to be forgotten. Furthermore, the i n t e r -action between the Union and the B r i t i s h set the tune f o r the r e s t of the period. The Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders for the most part, despite disagreement among themselves, would continue to assert t h i s i d e n t i t y . The B r i t i s h seldom responded sympathetically, and even then belatedly. But, the i n t e r a c t i o n would, f o r the most part, be p a c i f i c and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . The CWU was dying out j u s t when another n a t i o n a l i s t organization was emerging. This was the Cameroons Youth League (CYL), a possible trans-formation of the CWU Lagos Branch, founded at Lagos on March 27, 1940. It s members included the Southern Kamerun students and workers i n the v i c i n i t y of Lagos. I t s motto was \"Unity and Co-operation.\" I t had several aims. I t was out to develop Southern Kamerun i n a l l respects, to work towards the in t e g r a t i o n of a l l the Southern Kamerun Fondoms i n order to create a Southern Kamerun nation, to preserve a l l the Southern Kamerun cultures and t r a d i t i o n s , to f a c i l i t a t e female education, and to act as a l i a i s o n between the Southern Kamerunians and the B r i t i s h , making the .. l a t t e r aware of the desires of the former. 5 The main p o l i t i c a l objective of the CYL was thus the creation of a Southern Kamerun state. Here was the beginning of nationalism. This objective was, perhaps, the greatest early challenge to the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l reorganization of the region. The CWU had asserted the i d e n t i t y of Southern Kamerun and i t s inhabitants, i n i t s e l f not a mean feat. But, t h i s i d e n t i t y was to be within the framework of Nigeria. The 37 desire of the CYL to have a nation for Southern Kamerun went beyond that. To be sure, a Southern Kamerum nation could s t i l l remain within the frame-work of Nigeria in form of either a federation or of a confederation. But i t could also exist completely outside the framework of Nigeria. British policy did not intend to administer Western Kamerun as a separate p o l i t i c a l entity from Nigeria. Yet, the CYL decided to work in co-opera-tion with rather than in opposition to the British. This approach was faulty. The British were under no illusions as to the ultimate objective of the CYL. \"The case for separate or autonomous legislature for the Cameroons was i n i t i a l l y championed by the Cameroons Youth League.\"6 To have championed such an objective when the British f e l t that the region was best administered as an integral part of Eastern Nigeria, and to have expected the British to co-operate with i t , was for the CYL to take delight in self-delusion. The British could concede some-thing, but not that which could stand i n the way of the effective admin-istration of the region. Indeed, the British did concede something in 1942. In this year, the British selected Fon Jesco Manga-Williams, one of the Western-educated a-Fon of Bakweri land whose traditional role had 7 been undermined, to 'represent' Southern Kamerun at lagos. Some authors, Neville Rubin for instance, have made too much of this Manga-Williams' seat at Lagos. Rubin suggested that the seat gave Southern 8 Kamerun representation at Lagos. But, the British intention was to have Manga-Williams at Lagos as a delegate from the Eastern Region of Nigeria and not to represent a particular p o l i t i c a l unit. Whatever the case, i t is important to note, f i r s t , that Manga-Williams was not among those the CWU recommended to the British in 1940 and, second, that only the already 38 constituted p o l i t i c a l units of Nigeria could be represented at Lagos in their own right, and Southern Kamerun was not yet such a unit. Nevertheless, two years after .the nomination of Manga-Williams to the legislature at Lagos, the CYL which raised the f i r s t nationalist voice channelled i t s efforts in another direction. In 1944, the E l l i o t Commission, which established the University of Ibadan and several Colleges of Arts, Science and Technology some years after in Nigeria, visited Southern Kamerun. There, Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, Leader of the CYL, presented i t with a comprehensive memorandum on education and the conse-quences of the educational situation on the employment of Southern Kame-runians. The message was simple: Southern Kamerunians had been neglected educationally; this neglect had made i t impossible for them to gain admission into the Nigerian C i v i l Service; and, the remedy lay in the establishment of post-primary institutions of learning in Southern Kamerun and in the 9 award of scholarships to Southern Kamerunians to these institutions. What this memorandum seems to suggest i s that the CYL sought education in the name of employment, an indication, f i r s t , that the Western-educated el i t e were not happy with British employment policy, and, second, that they saw education as the best means of correcting the situation. In essence/ i t was a request for Jobocracy\u00E2\u0080\u0094the idea that jobs in Southern Kamerun should be in the hands of Southern Kamerunians. The demand for food had been added to the demand for identity and the demand for a separate or autonomous status for the region. The demand for a nation, although already in a programme, had not yet been raised. But this would not be long in coming. Nevertheless, for the moment, efforts were concentrated elsewhere. 39 In 1944, some members of the CYL, Kale and Endeley for example, participated in the formation of Dr. Nnamndi Azikiwe's p o l i t i c a l party for Nigeria, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). This p o l i t i c a l party i n i t i a l l y was made up mainly of Southern Nigerians \u00E2\u0080\u0094Yoruba, Ibo, and Southern Kamerunians. But the NCNC was not formed without an impetus. Basically, i t was a response to the Richards Consti-tution* and i t s four \"obnoxious b i l l s . \" The idea was to have organized agitation against the Constitution. During this agitation the Southern Kamerun members of the NCNC are said to have played a leading part but concentrating on the interests of Southern Kamerun. Endeley pointed out the \"special features of the b i l l s which affected the Cameroons.\" For his own part, Kale went to London as a member of the'.NCNC \"to seek revision of the constitution and repeal of the legislation in an interview with the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones. \" x^ The important part the Southern Kamerun members of the NCNC played in the agitation was justifiable. \".The constitution abolished Manga-Williams' seat at Lagos. On the other hand, i t provided for thirteen elected members of the Eastern Regional House and for the representation of the Region at the central legislative council at Lagos. Two of these thirteen elected members were Southern Kamerunians.xx The number of Southern Kamerunians who could now s i t in the Nigerian legislatures had been increased from one to two, a number which seemed to recognize the role of the Southern Kamerunians in the agitation. Furthermore, there *Sir Arthur Richards was Governor of Nigeria, 1943-1947, and the Constitution introduced during his Governorship was named after him. 40 was a net gain for Southern Kamerun. The elective principle which also applied to the selection of the Southern Kamerunians for the Regional House was very significant: i t involved an acknowledgement that from then, Southern Kamerunians would have to s i t in the Eastern Regional House, i f other things remained equal; and, i t also gave the Southern Kamerunians the opportunity to choose their own 'representatives.' Although the Southern Kamerunians did not mak.e.'.full use of.the elective principle in selecting their two representatives,* the Richards Constitution which came into force in 1946 and lasted un t i l .1951, was the f i r s t time the British ever came close to enfranchising, in principle, Southern Kamerun. This was the significance of the Richards Constitution to Southern Kamerun. In 1946, when the Richards Constitution came into force, Endeley and his groups founded a p o l i t i c a l discussion group called the Cameroons Federal Union (CFU). The relationship between the formation of the CFU and the coming into force of the Richards Constitution is not readily known. But the objective of the CFU was clear. It was out to acquire \"a separate regional status\" for Southern Kamerun; Endeley and his group saw a regional status as the surest way to reduce Ibo influence in Southern 12 Kamerun. A \"separate regional status\" for Southern Kamerun, of course, carried with i t the implication of a Southern Kamerun identity. As a discussion group, however, the CFU did not have the impact comparable to that of the CWU and the CYL. However, while i t kept alive the objective, *There were no elections in Southern Kamerun before 1949. What probably happened is that the Native Authorities in the forest zone chose one 'representative' and those of the grasslands chose another. 41 f i r s t suggested by the CYL, a separate regional status, in the minds of i t s members, i t prepared the groundwork for i t s successor, the Cameroons National Federation (CNF). The CNF was a p o l i t i c a l organization founded by Endeley in 1949. The impetus behind i t s formation was the impending f i r s t v i s i t of the United Nations Mission to Kamerun on October 31, 1949. The Federation consisted mainly of the various Improvement Unions and/or Associations 13 of nearly a l l the Fondoms or ethnic groups. These Unions and Associa-tions were based mainly in the Urban areas. The Unions were of two kinds: the majority of them corresponded exactly with the jurisdiction of the Fondom whose name they bore, for instance, Nso Improvement Union would be limited to the Nso\u00E2\u0080\u0094these were the smaller Unions; others embraced several Fondoms and ethnic groups in the same vi c i n i t y , for example, Bamenda Improvement Union\u00E2\u0080\u0094these were the larger ones. In either case, the membership of the Unions consisted mainly of the Western-educated e l i t e and a few businessmen\u00E2\u0080\u0094literate or i l l i t e r a t e ; the i l l i t e r a t e businessmen were wooed into the Unions by the e l i t e in an effort to make use of the former's wealth for the improvement of the areas under the jurisdiction of the individual Unions. The Unions were located either at the capital of the Fondom or at the agreed capital of the area: Nso Improvement Union was located in Kimbo (Kumbo) while Bamenda Improvement Union was located in Mankon Town. The attention of the Improvement Unions was almost always invariably directed at the education of those under their jurisdiction and the building of roads to f a c i l i t a t e communication. The Associations differed from the Unions in many respects. They were composed, in the main, by the labour force, literate and i l l i t e r a t e . 42 Their main functions were social: helping members in times of d i f f i c u l t i e s , setting squabbles among their members, meeting once every week or every other week or monthly to drink and exchange ideas, acting as credit societies, disciplining and advising members believed to be acting contrary to tradition or exposing themselves unnecessarily to certain dangers. As organizations of the workers, they were based in the main centres of economic activity such as c i t i e s , towns, and the plantations. The CNF was thus composed of groups whose purposes were originally non-p o l i t i c a l . But Endeley did not mean the amalgamated group or i t s parent branches to remain that way. From now on, many of the branches as well as the CNF would be p o l i t i c a l . The CNF in particular, although numerically tiny, embraced representatives from nearly a l l the Fondoms and surely a l l the ethnic groups in Southern Kamerun: i t thus had a national character. Furthermore, i t was manufactured in readiness for the United Nations Mission to Kamerun, the f i r s t time Southern Kamerunians would meet with the organiza-tion that was said to rule them. More significant, however, was the ambitious objectives of the CNF. The CNF had three main p o l i t i c a l objectives, two of which were very am-bitious. The f i r s t was to assert the identity of Western, not merely Southern, Kamerun. The second was to bring about the unification* of Northern and Southern Kamerun into a single p o l i t i c a l entity. Finally, the CNF stood for the reunification* of Western and Eastern Kamerun, and this *The words 'unification' and 'reunification' have confused many authors on Kamerun. I n i t i a l l y , Southern Kamerun leaders used the former in relation to Northern and Southern Kamerun and the latter in relation to Western (or Southern) Kamerun with Eastern Kamerun. But later on, they began to use both at different times for either of the relations. They were thus respon-sible for the confusion of scholars. 43 \"during the years when the Southern Cameroons was less easily d i s t i n -14 guishable . . . from Eastern Nigeria.\" A l l the elements of Southern Kamerun nationalism were evident. The CWU agitated for separate identity. The CYL agitated for food, but p o l i t i -cally demanded AUTONOMY, NATIONHOOD or INDEPENDENCE. The CFU advocated the overthrow of Ibo influences and possibly discussed unification and reunification. But, i t was the CNF which expli c i t l y made UNIFICATION and REUNIFICATION national issues. In a sense, therefore, i t was the f i r s t contact of the Southern Kamerun nationalist leaders with the United Nations which indicated the mix bag of the Southern Kamerun nationalist programme. The rest of the period would be dominated by agreement and disagreement over which of these elements should be stressed and at which time. This disagreement and agreement would not be long in coming; the leader and founder of the CNF did not himself believe in reunification. Endeley advocated reunification mainly as a means of developing Southern Kamerun. If he could develop Southern Kamerun without the instrumentality of reunification, he would have nothing to do with reunification. As he himself explained in 1959, the issue of reunification \"had originally been raised in 1949\" by the CNF, \"of which he had been the f i r s t President.\" The motive behind i t \"had been that the Cameroons under British adminis-tration was lagging behind both Nigeria and the Cameroons under French administration.\" It was believed that reunification would make Kamerun \"an economic unit with better prospects of standing on i t s own feet.\" But subsequent events had shown the f u t i l i t y of that hope and made re-unification a \"barren p o l i t i c a l instrument in the hands of irresponsible and ambitious people.\" 1 5 This explanation suggests very strongly, f i r s t , 44 that as far as Endeley was concerned, reunification was a means to an end, not an end in i t s e l f , and secondly, that reunification was indigenous to Southern Kamerun. Le Vine's assertions that nationalism and reunification were imported into Southern Kamerun from Eastern Kamerun do not seem to stand too well in light of what has been said so far and in light of Endeley's explanation of reunification. In either event, the CNF made several demands and statements to the Mission when both groups met in 1949. The system of administering Western Kamerun as an \"appendage to Nigeria\" was not \"in the best interest of the people.\" Instead of receiving the attention which \" i t s special status i s said to require,\" the territory had been \"grossly neglected\" because i t was being administered as a part of Nigeria. It was necessary to reunite a l l of Kamerun as i t was before 1914. Northern and Southern Kamerun should be united to form a distinct Region of Nigeria under the High Commissioner who should be directly responsible to the Governor at Lagos. Western Kamerun should either be ruled directly by the United Nations or be given independence. Everywhere, the \"Mission encountered the cry for more and better education, for compulsory primary education, for secondary schools and for the expansion for vocational and trade training.\"'*\"6 Southern Kamerun nationalism was now off the ground. But the Southern Kamerunians appeared confused in their f i r s t encounter with the United Nations. On the one hand, they advocated autonomy within Nigeria. On the other, they asked for the reunification of Kamerun which implied severance from Nigeria. Yet on the other, they demanded either direct administration by the United Nations or independence. The Mission's recommendation possibly reflected this confusion. The Mission 45 emphasized \"the need for a careful examination of the desirability and practicability of some administrative, legislative, and budgetary autonomy 17 being established for the Trust Territory.\" But, i t was in the Trusteeship Council that the British reorganization of Western Kamerun as a whole was cr i t i c i z e d . A member of the Trusteeship Council, after studying the British report to the United Nations on the administration of Western Kamerun for that period, c r i t i c i z e d what he described as British \"continued segmentation and scrambling\" of Western Kamerun. This policy, he went on, impeded \"progress towards unity and self-government\" for the territory. He was not very certain how the British could \"give an assurance that the integrity of the Trust Territory would, in fact and not on paper, be preserved.\" Brigardier Gibbons, British special representative to the Trusteeship Council replied that, \"In actual fact, whether or not unification was possible must depend entirely upon the wishes 18 of the people.\" This was the f i r s t hint that some form of consultation might be employed to find out what the Western Kamerunians really wanted. Meanwhile, other events to which the nationalists of Southern Kamerun could not be indifferent were taking place in Nigeria. Sir John MacPherson, who replaced Richards as the Governor of Nigeria, was reviewing the Richards Constitution and introducing local reforms as early as 1948. These reforms increased p o l i t i c a l activity in Nigeria including Southern Kamerun. Desirous of avoiding the mistake which Richards made by producing a constitution without any consultation with the Nigerian leaders, MacPherson sought recommendations from the various Regional Houses of Nigeria. The Enugu House met in 1949 to draw up these recommendations. During the discussions, the Southern Kamerunians demanded a separate region 46 for Southern Kamerun. But -the Nigerians argued that such a region would be p o l i t i c a l l y and economically unviable. Being in the majority, they subsequently decided that the demands of the Southern Kamerunians \"might satisfactorily be met by representation of the Trust Territory in both the regional House of Assembly and Executive Council and in the new central executive and legislature.\" The Southern Kamerunians later described the decision as an \"imposition\" adding that, due to \"their minority position . . . they could not press effectively for a separate 19 regional organization for the Trust Territory.\" This decision was accepted in January, 1950, by both the all-Nigeria Conference at Ibadan and by MacPherson. The next thing was to show how many Southern Kamerunians would be 'representing' Southern Kamerun in the Nigerian legislatures. The MacPherson Constitution, named after the Governor,provided the Eastern Region with \"a single legislative chamber, which comprised eighty elected members, together with six o f f i c i a l s and three who were nominated.\" Thirteen of the 80 elected members were to be 20 Southern Kamerunians. The MacPherson Constitution was of no p o l i t i c a l significance to Southern Kamerun. Its identity had not yet been recognized ex p l i c i t l y . It was s t i l l only recognized as part of a p o l i t i c a l unit of Nigeria. The fact that six of i t s thirteen elected members would s i t in the House of Representatives at Lagos, and one would be in the Eastern Regional 21 Executive Council made l i t t l e difference. The best that can be said for the MacPherson Constitution i s that i t increased the number of Southern Kamerunians in the Nigerian legislatures. However, since the MacPherson Constitution was to come into force in 47 1951, Southern Kamerun had to take steps in 1950 to select i t s members of the legislatures. The selection of these persons would demonstrate the different directions in which the forest zone and the grasslands were moving. Some elections did take place in the forest zone where tradition had been undermined. But even here, the turn-out was disappointing. Only 25 to 30% cast their votes and the figures were sometimes as low as 10%. In Mamfe Division, for example, out of f i f t y primary units, only nine were contested and in Kumba Division the number was as low as two and in Victoria three.^ 2 In the grassland, however, the 'representatives' were merely selected by the Native Authorities. In both areas of the region, therefore, the elective principle was not adequately exploited.* Nevertheless, the selection had been done and the thirteen persons had become the acknow-ledged p o l i t i c a l leaders of the region under the leadership of Endeley. A l l of them were members of the CNF. But the CNF i t s e l f included strange bed-fellows in i t s membership. The confused demands i t made to the United Nations Mission in November 1949 reflected the elements of i t s programme which i t s members,'individually or in groups, stressed. Some of i t s members stressed autonomy for Southern Kamerun, in a Region equal in status to the other Nigerian Regions, within the Nigerian framework. These were the autonomists and, later, inte-grationists and associationists. Others stressed the creation of a Southern or Western Kamerun state (Smaller Kamerun). These were the separatists or secessionists. A third group stressed the reunification of *It is not readily known why there was such a low election turnout. However, i t could be due to the fact that the nationalist movement was s t i l l confined to the Western-educated e l i t e . 48 Kamerun (Greater Kamerun). These were the r e u n i f i c a t i o n i s t s and, l a t e r , a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t s . Some of them were simply opportunists. Such an amalgam of p o l i t i c i a n s required an astute p o l i t i c i a n or a 'supreme e q u i l i b r i s t ' at i t s helm to keep i t together. Unfortunately for the unity of the CNF, Endeley was neither a c a l c u l a t i n g p o l i t i c i a n nor a 'supreme e q u i l i b r i s t . ' Too soon he l e t h i s a n t i - r e u n i f i c a t i o n i s t sentiment show. He d i d not even give h i s r e u n i f i c a t i o n i s t c r i t i c s an opportunity to have doubts about h i s sentiments. For example, during the preparations for the 1950 e l e c t i o n s , he was opposed to the enfranchisement of Eastern Kamerunians resident i n Southern Kamerun. The sentimentally pro-reunif--c a t i o n i s t of the time, R. Jabea K. Dibonge f o r instance, could not f a i l to see the i n t e r n a l c o ntradiction between accepting r e u n i f i c a t i o n and opposing the enfranchisement of the Eastern Kamerunians l i v i n g i n Southern Kamerun. Furthermore, Endeley became involved i n personal feuds with some of the important leaders of the CNF. For example, he quarrelled with Nerius 23 Namaso Mbile the Secretary of the CNF. By not being able to c a l c u l a t e p o l i t i c a l circumstances, and to balance the apparently unnatural union of p o l i t i c i a n s and p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s , Endeley was also playing into the hands of p o l i t i c i a n s who had those q u a l i t i e s , John Ngu Foncha for instance. Endeley's behaviour at t h i s time and the composition of the CNF were a possible source for disagreement. Indeed, a s p l i t within the CNF occurred i n 1951. The clash was e s s e n t i a l l y between Endeley and the p r o - r e u n i f i -c a t i o n i s t s . Supported by Mbile, and under some pressure from the members of the French Cameroons Welfare Union (FCWU), l a t e r Eastern Kamerun Welfare Union (EKWU), and smugglers who traded i n goods smuggled across the Inter-Kamerunian boundary, Dibonge founded another p o l i t i c a l organization, the 49 Kamerun United National Congress (KUNC). Its objective was \"to consider 24 the question of reunification.\" After a short period of calculation, Foncha broke away from the CNF and joined the KUNC. Including in i t s membership Dibonge from Eastern Kamerun, Mbile from Kumba Division, and Foncha from Bamenda Division, and with smugglers supporting i t , * i t was obvious that KUNC would soon have more backing than the CNF. The KUNC's programme revolved around independence and reunification. Its motto was \"Towards self-government or independence for a United Kamerun.\" It was determined to create a \"cohesive Kamerun nation\" to tackle the \" p o l i t i c a l , social, economic, educational and any other problems which may confront the indigenous inhabitants of the Kamerun.\" Once Greater Kamerun had been established, i t s inhabitants would have the \"status of citizenship of the Kamerun.\" A l l this would be achieved peace-fu l l y and constitutionally: \"the Congress shall engage in a sustained fight in a constitutional manner\" to achieve these goals. With these lofty objectives, the KUNC l e f t the CNF with almost no clearly definable objectives and claimed for i t s e l f the greater support of those involved in 25 the nationalist movement. The year 1951 was, therefore, a turning point in the nationalist movement. From that year, more splits and reunions could be expected in time. But not u n t i l the reunificationists had had an opportunity to test their programme. The opportunity for such a test came in 1952. In June, 1952, the *Kale, p. 57, reported that the KUNC \"attracted a large following of petty traders who were many [sic] in the British section and who traded heavily in almost 75% of smuggled goods from the French Cameroons.\" 50 British made an attempt to bring Southern and Northern Kamerun together in a conference at Buea, the headquarters of Southern Kamerun. The purposes of the conference, which the British described as a \"striking\" event, were twofold: to see how best to expend the profits made available from the CDC for the development of Southern and Northern Kamerun; and, to find out whether the two regions desired unification. Discussions at the conference were amicable and f r u i t f u l . Delegates from both regions agreed that unification was something to be effected. The representative of New Zealand praised the attempt and the Trusteeship Council urged the British to arrange many more such conferences. The British promised the Council that the next one would be held as soon as the profits from the 26 CDC for the year 1950 came up for consideration. But, as i t turned out, the 1952 conference was the f i r s t and the last. Later on in 1952, the Southern Kamerunians came in contact for the second time with the United Nations via the Visiting Mission. The difference between the p o l i t i c a l objectives of the CNF and the KUNC came out very clearly in their individual demands from the Mission. The KUNC demanded everything to be found in i t s programme concentrating on immediate reunifi-cation. On the other hand, the CNF was pleased at the \"greater p o l i t i c a l representation\" gained in the MacPherson Constitution, but wondered whether this gain \"would lead to the realization of the Trust Territory as a p o l i t i c a l entity.\" It f e l t that \"a separate region\" should be established 27 \"for the whole of Cameroons,\" that i s Western Kamerun. Autonomy within Nigeria for Western Kamerun in a Region separate from Eastern Nigeria was thus the goal of the CNF and i t s members; these were now the autonomists. The establishment of Greater Kamerun was the goal of the KUNC and i t s 51 members; these were now the reunificationists. The question then was which of these goals had greater support. If the two p o l i t i c a l organizations had wished to know which of the two opposing objectives commanded greater support among the p o l i t i c a l l y active Southern Kamerunians in 1952, they had ample opportunity. The Victoria Federated Council\u00E2\u0080\u0094a union of a l l the Native Authorities in Victoria Division (Bakweri land) including the Bakweri Native Authority and the Bakweri Land Committee, the Mamfe Divisional Memorandum Committee, the Mamfe Improvement Union, and the Bali Improvement Union were autono-' mists. They demanded (from the Mission) \" t e r r i t o r i a l autonomy for the Trust Territory.\" They also f e l t that the rights of the Commissioner for the Cameroons should be extended to include those of the Lieutenant-Governor. They saw a \"separate regional status\" for Southern Kamerun \"as a step towards the achievement of self-government.\" The Bamenda Branch . of the CYL was silent over the two issues. (By this time, Southern Kamerun had been divided into two administrative units, the forest zone and the grasslands. The forest zone, Mamfe, Kumba, and Victoria Divisions, assumed the name Cameroons Province, a name previously given to a l l of Southern Kamerun as a Province of Eastern Nigeria. The grasslands, Bamenda, Wum, and Nkambe Divisions, went by the name Bamenda Province.) On this occasion, the Bamenda CYL demanded that the two Provinces be administratively reunited and given i t s former name, Cameroons Province, in order \"to restore the conception of a Cameroons entity.\" Surprisingly enough, surprising because Endeley and some members of the CNF were included, when acting as a group, a l l the thirteen 'elected' leaders demanded reunification albeit none of 28 them had any concrete proposals for bringing i t about. 52 I t i s now possible to suggest which of the two ideas, autonomism or reun i f i c a t i o n i s m , enjoyed greater support among the p o l i t i c a l l y active Southern Kamerunians. Had the majority of the Southern Kamerunians joined the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, one could suggest that, because a l l the 'elected' leaders supported r e u n i f i c a t i o n as a group, r e u n i f i c a t i o n enjoyed greater support. But, even here one has to be c a r e f u l ; i t i s not r e a d i l y known how the 'elected':i.members of the CNF would have behaved when acting e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l l y or as a CNF group. Nor i s i t r e a d i l y known how the oppor-t u n i s t s and/or astute p o l i t i c i a n s , members of e i t h e r the CNF or KUNC, would have behaved. The preceding paragraph suggests very strongly that autono-mism was more popular i n 1952 or thereabout. I t seems, therefore, that the popularity which Kale, who was himself very active at the time, awarded to the KUNC was due to the idea of independence, not r e u n i f i c a t i o n . The B r i t i s h , the French, and the Mission i n 1952 also concluded that r e u n i f i c a t i o n had l i m i t e d appeal. According to the Mission, the idea of r e u n i f i c a t i o n \"was c l o s e l y l i n k e d i n the minds of the [thirteen] represen-t a t i v e s with concern over t h e i r minority p o s i t i o n i n the Nigerian l e g i s l a t i v e organs and r e f l e c t e d the apprehensions that the in t e r e s t s of the Trust T e r r i t o r y might be subordinated to those of Nigeria.\" The French and the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s i n Kamerun came to the conclusion that only a few Kamerunians r e a l l y wanted r e u n i f i c a t i o n . The Mission's conclusion over the issue was that r e u n i f i c a t i o n was l i m i t e d to ce r t a i n areas of the region and 29 was not even popular i n those l o c a l i t i e s . Whatever the case, r e u n i f i c a t i o n would prove to be the most d i v i s i v e element of a l l the elements of Southern Kamerun nationalism. But not u n t i l the 1953 events i n Nig e r i a and t h e i r subsequent r e s u l t s had given i t the opportunity to play i t s r o l e . 53 In 1953, there was a p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s within the leadership of the NCNC. E s s e n t i a l l y , the clash involved a c o n f l i c t over NCNC p o l i c y and a challenge to Azikiwe's authority over the issue. Members of the NCNC i n the Eastern Regional House were s p l i t i n t h e i r support. Some supported the leader of the NCNC i n Eastern N i g e r i a . Others supported Azikiwe, the national leader of the NCNC. On the other hand, the t h i r t e e n Southern Kamerunians decided to form a neutral bloc. But Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo\u00E2\u0080\u0094leader of the Action Group (AG), a Western Nigeria-based p o l i t i c a l party, thought they saw an opportunity to secure the allegiance of the Southern Kamerun bloc i n t h e i r own r i v a l r y i n the a l l - N i g e r i a p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . The contest f o r the allegiance of Southern Kamerun had begun i n earnest. I t was Azikiwe who i n i t i a t e d t h i s contest on A p r i l 14, 1953. In a p o l i c y statement issued from Lagos, Azikiwe declared: The NCNC recognizes the p e c u l i a r p o s i t i o n of the Cameroons as A Trust T e r r i t o r y and supports the Cameroons peoples' demand for separate Regional status i n c l u d i n g a separate l e g i s l a t i v e assembly f or the Cameroons with f u l l budgetary autonomy. The National Council also recognizes and supports the desires and ~ aspir a t i o n s of the people of the Cameroons for u n i f i c a t i o n of the two sections of the t e r r i t o r y under the B r i t i s h and the French, i n t o a single p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y as existed before 1914. 3 0 Two weeks l a t e r , A p r i l 25, 1953, Awolowo joined i n the contest and declared i n a speech from Ibadan: I t i s the p o l i c y of the Action Group to be independent i n a l l things but not to be neutral i n anything a f f e c t i n g the destiny of any part of A f r i c a . We are not i n d i f f e r e n t to the a s p i r a - \u00C2\u00B0 tions of the people of the Cameroon. The Action Group supports the demand of Cameroons people f o r a separate Legislature and a r i g h t to self-determination to remain i n or outside N i g e r i a . I t i s an i n s u l t for a country l i k e the Cameroons to remain perpetually, against i t s w i l l , a Trust T e r r i t o r y . 3 1 These two speeches were s i g n i f i c a n t i n many respects. The national 54 NCNC and the AG aimed at breaking the Southern Kamerun n e u t r a l i t y i n each other's favour: Azikiwe, i n order to have more support i n the Eastern Regional Parliament; Azikiwe and Awolowo, i n order to boost t h e i r strength at the national l e v e l . In these attempts, Azikiwe and Awolowo overdid themselves. They offered Southern Kamerun much more than they had of f e r e d i t i n 1949 at the Enugu and Ibadan conferences. The speeches f i r s t had t h e i r impact on the Southern Kamerun bloc and n e u t r a l i t y . Before the c r i s i s , two members of the bloc, both from the CNF, held responsible p o s i t i o n s i n the Nigerian l e g i s l a t u r e s . Endeley was Minis t e r without P o r t f o l i o i n the Central Executive at Lagos. Solomon Tandeng Muna was Minister of Works i n the Eastern Regional Executive. Endeley's p o s i t i o n was not a f f e c t e d by the c r i s i s because i t was i n the c e n t r a l l e g i s l a t u r e whereas the c r i s i s involved mainly the Eastern Regional l e g i s l a t u r e . But, p o s s i b l y because of h i s n e u t r a l i t y , Azikiwe's r i v a l i n the Eastern Regional House dismissed Muna from h i s ministry. A f t e r these speeches, four of the t h i r t e e n Southern Kamerunians\u00E2\u0080\u0094Mbile, Charlie , S.C. Ndi, P.N. Motomby-Woleta, (the Four h e r e a f t e r ) , broke the b l o c and 32 t h e i r own n e u t r a l i t y by supporting the l o c a l NCNC leader against Azikiwe. Neither Azikiwe nor Awolowo had set out to break the bloc, j u s t the n e u t r a l i t y i n each other's favour. But i t w a s the bloc which broke f i r s t and i n favour of the l o c a l NCNC leader who had something concrete, a ministry at l e a s t , to o f f e r . Whoever would have the r e s t of the bloc (the Nine hereafter) would depend on the turn of events. When i t looked l i k e the Parliament would once more function normally, the Nine refused to break t h e i r n e u t r a l i t y . Instead, they demanded that Muna be r e i n s t a t e d i n h i s ministry. On May 5, 1953, the demand was rejected 55 by a vote of 45 to 32. During the vote, the Four joined with the members of the NCNC who supported the l o c a l leader and voted against the demand. On the other hand, the Nine combined forces with those who supported Azikiwe and voted for i t . The break between the Four and the Nine was now d e f i n i t e l y confirmed. On May 6, 1953, the Four took t h e i r usual seats i n the Parliament. On the other hand, the Nine abandoned t h e i r seats and sat on the p u b l i c g a l l e r y . I t i s not r e a d i l y known what e f f e c t the action of the Nine had on the Parliament. But, that same day, May 6, 1953, the Parliament came to a s t a n d s t i l l and, when i t moved, chairs flew across the f l o o r . The lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Nigeria had no choice but to 33 dissolve the Parliament by proclamation on May 6, 1953. The Nine then set about seeking support i n Southern Kamerun. In a message dated May 6, 1953, but published i n the Outlook, a Nigerian d a i l y , on May 7, 1953, they reported Muna's dismissal and the r e f u s a l to r e i n s t a t e 34 him, and the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Parliament. A f t e r t h i s i n i t i a l reporting the Nine suggested what ought to be done-and, i n the course of t h i s sug-gestion, they set about inflaming p u b l i c sentiment. The r e f u s a l to r e i n -state Muna, they said, was \"a deliberate disregard for the wishes and a s p i r a t i o n s of the people of the Cameroons.\" They had broken t h e i r connection with Eastern Nigeria because, \"as a minority;' group,\" they could not \"make the wishes of Cameroons people respected\" i n that l e g i s l a t u r e . Southern kamerun must press immediately \" f o r a separate Region.\" A l l Southern Kamerunians should be \"prepared to make s a c r i f i c e s . \" Future e l e c t i o n s to the Eastern Regional House would have to be boycotted u n t i l Southern Kamerun received \"a Cameroons House of Assembly.\" Every Southern Kamerunian must be fiEm and l o y a l to the cause of h i s \"dear country.\" Every Southern 56 Kamerunian should \"have f a i t h i n the future of the Cameroons.\" Every Southern Kamerunian who could make i t was i n v i t e d to a conference at 35 Mamfe between May 22 and May 24, 1953, to discuss the issues. A f t e r i n v i t i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s and t h e i r subjects on May 6, 1953, to j o i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement,* the Nine l e f t for home to i n t e r -pret the message. In t h e i r Land Rover, on t h e i r way home, an incident occurred i n Ibo land, an incident which d i d much to help them and to heighten a-Fon-Ibo.tensions;t No wonder then that the response to t h e i r message was massive and spontaneous as they toured Southern Kamerun l e c t u r i n g , meeting with the a-Fon, and explaining what ought to be done. (The opportunity to chase away the Ibo had been given to the a-Fon and t h e i r subjects.) The Mamfe Conference was held on the scheduled dates and the decision was unanimous: a p e t i t i o n should be addressed to the Sec-retary o f State for the Colonies \"demanding the creation of a separate and autonomous Legislature f or the Trust T e r r i t o r y . \" On May 28, 1953, Endeley, *Eyongetah and Brain, Op. c i t . , p. 134, have t h i s to say about the i n v i t a t i o n . \" A l l native a u t h o r i t i e s , t r i b a l organizations, chiefs [the a-Fon] and the people of every v i l l a g e and town were asked to send two representatives each to a conference to be held i n May, 1953.\" tAs they drove through Ibo land, the Ibo, who had probably read the message i n the Outlook or who knew what was happening and were probably i n f u r i a t e d at the decision of the Nine, stoned t h e i r Land Rover i n some towns. Once they reported these incidents i n t h e i r p u b l i c l e c t u r e s , the Southern Kamerun latent, anti-Ibo sentiment was turned i n t o Ibophobia. Later on, the r e u n i f i c a t i o n i s t s and s e c e s s i o n i s t s would c i t e t h i s i n c i d e n t to run down the i n t e g r a t i o n i s t s . The l a t e n t anti-Ibo sentiments i n Southern Kamerun was perceived d i f f e r e n t l y by the various sections of society: to the Western-educated, i t was Ibo domination of white-collar jobs; to the p l a n t a t i o n workers, i t was against Ibo domination of higher grade o f f i c e s ; to the traders, i t was against Ibo domination of commercial a c t i v i t i e s and t h e i r r i v a l r y with the Ibo on t h i s aspect; and to the a-Fon, i t was against the lack of respect f o r Southern Kamerun t r a d i t i o n s by the Ibo. 57 the acknowledged leader, l e f t Lagos for London where he submitted the 36 P e t i t i o n to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Secretary set about studying the P e t i t i o n . One of the issues discussed at Mamfe was the amalgamation of the CNF and the KUNC. The Conference c a l l e d upon the two organizations to merge 37 i n t o one. When Endeley returned from London, steps were taken i n that d i r e c t i o n . In June, 1953, the Four were r e l e i v e d of t h e i r membership i n e i t h e r the CNF or the KUNC. Mbile was thus r e l i e v e d of h i s secretaryship of the KUNC. Having purged the already known opportunists from these organizations, t h e i r leaders proceeded to e f f e c t a merger. The product was the f i r s t p o l i t i c a l party i n Southern Kamerun, the Kamerun National 38 Congress (KNC). Endeley was at i t s head. Like ,fehe CNF, the KNC included strange bed-follows i n i t s membership. To be sure, the opportunists had been purged, but, opportunism was not the only problem of the unity of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Indeed, i t was the l e a s t of the problems. The bone of contention was the objectives of that movement and leadership was the r e a l problem. As an amalgam of the CNF and the KUNC, the opposing objectives of the two organizations were to be found i n the KNC programme. Except for the already known opportunists, the KNC included leaders who stressed d i f f e r e n t aspects of i t s programme. Worse s t i l l , Endeley was at the head of the KNC. The s i t u a t i o n of thfe CNF had been l a r g e l y r e p l i c a t e d . Another s p l i t could be expected whenever Endeley would act as he did e a r l i e r . He was soon to do so but not u n t i l the opportunists had found a home: for themselves and other events had occurred to give him some j u s t i f i a b l e confidence. As soon.as the KNC was formed, Kale, an admirer of the parliamentary 58 system and of the democratic p r i n c i p l e , saw the existence of only one p o l i t i c a l party i n the region as incompatible to what he admired. This i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y l e d him to form another p o l i t i c a l party, the Kamerun People's Party (KPP) i n June, 1953. He wished to s e t the KPP against the KNC \" i n order to make parliamentary democracy a r e a l i t y i n the 39 Southern Cameroons.\" Standing poorly dressed and with nowhere e l s e to go, the Four were the f i r s t to j o i n the KPP. Indeed, Mbile became i t s f i r s t secretary. But, because Kale came from the same constituency as Endeley and could hardly be elected over Endeley, Mbile was the spokesman for the KPP i n the Parliament* while Kale represented the party outside Parliament. The objectives of the KPP were i n t e r e s t i n g . \"The primary objective of the KPP was regional autonomy f o r the Trust T e r r i t o r y and secession from Nigeria when the l a t t e r became an independent country.\" But to achieve t h i s objective, the KPP would work \" i n partnership as f a r as possible with Nigeria and other A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . \" I t would also f i g h t to preserve \"Cameroons i d e n t i t y within the United States of West *Rubin, p. 86, l o s t s i g h t of t h i s f a c t and i n c o r r e c t l y stated that the KPP was formed by the f i v e Southern Kamerunians, inc l u d i n g Mbile, who broke t h e i r n e u t r a l i t y and voted against Muna's reinstatement. F i r s t of a l l , there were four of these Southern Kamerunians, not f i v e . Secondly, the founder of the party, Kale, was not one of the t h i r t e e n Southern Kamerun 'representatives'; Kale was a supervising schoolmaster at Eket, Calabar, Nig e r i a , and received a l e t t e r from Foncha written on May 6, 1953, describing the events connected with the n e u t r a l i t y of the bloc and the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Parliament. See Kale, pp. 35-40. The questions which should be asked i s : was Kale as d i s i n t e r e s t e d as he claims i n forming the KPP? The present w r i t e r i s i n c l i n e d to think that the f a c t that Kale and Endeley came from the same constituency and Kale could hardly be selected over h i s cousin, Endeley, i n the same party, might have had something to do with the formation of the KPP. 59 40 Africa, and Africa for that matter.\" The objectives of the KPP were, therefore, threefold and were expected to evolve in time. The immediate objective was to make Southern Kamerun an, autonomous Region within Nigeria as long as Nigeria remained a colony. When Nigeria became independent, Southern Kamerun would secede from i t and form a state of i t s own. In time, this state would be part of either the United States of West Africa or the United States of Africa whichever was possible. Reunification was no part of i t s programme. Like i t s counterpart, the KNC, the KPP included strange bedfellows in i t s membership. A l l of them were agreed that reunification was out of the question; Mbile had run away from reunification. Some of them, Mbile for example, talked secession but, like Endeley and reunification, they did not believe in - i t . On the other hand, others, Kale for instance, appeared to believe in the programme of the KPP. However, the test for the sincerity of the members of the KPP for i t s programme would come only when Nigeria was about to become independent. For the moment, the party must concentrate on i t s immediate objective and test i t s popularity against that of the KNC. The opportunity for a l l this came in 1953. By August, 1953, the British had come to a definite decision regarding the Nigerian situation in which the c r i s i s of the NCNC had caused the collapse of the MacPherson Constitution. In that month there was a consti-tutional conference in London. A l l the major Nigerian p o l i t i c a l parties including those in Southern Kamerun were represented. Endeley went as a delegate of Southern Kamerun and Mbile as that of the NCNC. Mallam Abba Habib was selected by the British authorities in Nigeria as the spokesman for Northern Kamerun. As one of those Northern Kamerun Fulani who supported 60 the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l reorganization of the region, Habib declared at the conference that Northern Kamerun wished to remain a permanent part of Northern Ni g e r i a . Chosen as leader by the Mamfe Conference, Endeley demanded an autonomous Region f or Southern Kamerun equal i n a l l respects to the other Regions of Nigeria but within the Nigerian framework. While t h i s demand d i d not involve Southern Kamerun separatism from Nigeria, i t d i d assert that Southern Kamerun should not be i n t e g r a l part of Eastern Nigeria. At the conference, the C o l o n i a l Secretary responded f u l l y to the Northern Kamerun request, and, i n p r i n c i p l e , p a r t i a l l y to the Southern Kamerun request. He was prepared to award.Southern Kamerun a Region, on condition, but not a f u l l one. As he put i t , i f the KNC won the e l e c t i o n s to be conducted following the collapse of the MacPherson Con s t i t u t i o n , \"the issue of a Southern Cameroons Legislature would be a foregone conclusion.\" The e l e c t i o n s were held soon a f t e r i n the same year and the KNC won a l l the seats i n Southern Kamerun except one i n Mamfe Overside* which S.E. Ncha 41 gained f o r the KPP. 1953 proved to be a turning point i n the h i s t o r y of Southern Kamerun i n many respects. For the f i r s t time the B r i t i s h recognized e x p l i c i t l y a separate i d e n t i t y f o r Southern Kamerun a l b e i t on a condition. The condition was f u l f i l l e d . There could be no going back. More would have to be gained not l o s t . The a-Fon had been brought i n t o the n a t i o n a l i s t movement e f f e c t -*Mamfe Overside l i e s on the Western side of the River Mfum which acts at some points as the Nigeria-Kamerun boundary. This area of Kamerun i s separated from the mainland by t h i s r i v e r . From time immemorial the i n -habitants of t h i s area i n t e r a c t e d more with Eastern Nigeria than with the r e s t of Kamerun. Their nearest Nigerian neighbours are part of t h e i r ethnic group. These factors might help to explain the way they voted. 61 i v e l y . At Mamfe, the decision to form a p o l i t i c a l party was made i n the presence of the a-Fon who, from then, would give that party t h e i r support. This important support was responsible for the overwhelming v i c t o r y of the KNC over the KPP i n the 1953 e l e c t i o n s . From now on, no astute ; p o l i t i c a l leader would act without h i s eyes looking over h i s shoulder at the a-Fon. In other words, the a-Fon as t r a d i t i o n a l leaders who had the l o y a l t y of the majority of t h e i r subjects, l i t e r a t e or i l l i t e r a t e , would be a powerful force to reckon with i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. These t r a d i t i o n a l leaders i n t h e i r turn would never abandon any p o l i t i c a l leader u n t i l he had f i r s t abandoned them. They had already ind i c a t e d t h i s i n 1953 (and 1954).* By declaring that i t would work i n partnership with Nigeria and a c t u a l l y forming an a l l i a n c e with the NCNC, the KPP abondoned the a-Fon who had seen the opportunity to rescues t h e i r t r a d i t i o n s by chasing away the Ibo. When the e l e c t i o n s came, the a-Fon abandoned i t . Perhaps, the s i t u a t i o n was best described by Kale who was active at the time and whose p o l i t i c a l party, the KPP, opposed the KNC which the a-Fon supported. The KNC was at t h i s time a very popular p o l i t i c a l party which from every i n d i c a t i o n enjoyed the confidence of a cross-section of the population, i n c l u d i n g the various 'Native A u t h o r i t i e s ' and n a t u r a l r u l e r s , [the a-Fon].*. I t s counterpart, the KPP, no l e s s a m i l i t a n t and dynamic p o l i t i c a l party for the cause of freedom for the Cameroons, embraced the cream of the society, that i s , the majority of the educated elements i n the T e r r i t o r y , but i t suffered tremendous setbacks. I t was badly misplaced and misinterpreted as being i n favour of the Cameroons perpetuating i t s a s s o c i a t i o n with Nigeria. This was amplified by the f a c t that *As shown i n chapter one, the a-Fon were members of the Native Authorities and, indeed, where t r a d i t i o n was s t i l l very powerful, the a-Fon had the f i n a l say i n those councils, f or instance, the South-Eastern Native Authority (or Federation). 62 the KPP was an al l y of the NCNC which again did not help the situ-ation because the NCNC was labelled as an Ibo-inspired organization and at this material time the Ibos were not popular with Cameroonians. So popular had the KNC become that when in 1954 elections to the House of Representatives were held the party won a l l the eight seats.^ Later on in the book, Kale re-emphasized this point. The language of the KPP \"did not create a ferment in the minds and hearts of the massesr>t who controlled the votes,\" particularly as the KPP was branded an Ibo-dominated 43 party. Even the 1958 United Nations Visiting Mission to Kamerun recognized the support the a-Fon gave the KNC at this time. \"In the past 44 these [a-Fon] gave their support on the whole to Dr. Endeley.\" Endeley would continue to enjoy this support as long as he paid attention to the wishes and desires of the a-Fon. tWhat Kale refers to here as the \"masses\" were the a-Fon and their i l l i t e r a t e subjects since he says in the larger quotation footnoted 42 that the KPP \"embraced the cream of the society, that i s , the majority of the educated elements in the Territory...\" 63 Footnotes - Chaper Two \"'\"Kale, op. c i t . , p. 21. This source i s a c t u a l l y a book of documents and an o u t l i n e of the chronology of events; t h i s chapter depends heavily on i t i n these respects. 2 I b i d . 3 Ibidv, pp. 21-22. 4 I b i d . 5 Ib i d . , p. 50. 6 I b i d . , p.55. 7 Ibi d . , pp. 21-22. Q N e v i l l e Rubin, Cameroun: An A f r i c a n Federation, Praeger Publishers, London, 1971, pp. 75-76. 9 Kale, op. c i t . , pp. 50-54. 1 0Rubin, op. c i t . , p. 83. x x I b i d . , p. 76. 1 2 I b i d . , p. 84. 13 U.N., T.C., T/1426, January 20, 1959, p. 42. 1 4 I b i d . , pp. 42-43. x5U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons P e t i t i o n e r s , A/C.4/SR.846, May, 1959, pp. 554-556. 16 U.N., T.C., United Nations B u l l e t i n , V o l . 8, March 1, 1950, pp. 204-211. 1 7 I b i d . 18 U.N., T.C., United Nations B u l l e t i n , V o l . 8, A p r i l 1, 1950, pp. 324-325. 19 Tambi Eyongetah and Robert Brain, A History of the Cameroons, Longman, London, 1974, pp. 129-130. 20 Rubin, op. c i t . , pp. 84-86. 21 Ibi d . , p. 76. 22 Eyongetah and Brain, op. c i t . , pp. 131-132. 64 23 Rubin, op. c i t . , p. 85; W i l l a r d R. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: P o l i t i c a l Integration i n a Fragmentary Society, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970, p. 122; Claude E. Welch, J r . , Dream of Unity, C o r n e l l University Press, N.Y., 1966, p. 177. 24 Johnson, op. c i t . , pp. 122-123; Kale, op. c i t . , p. 57. 25 Kale, op. c i t . , pp. 38, 56-57. 26 U.N., T.C., United Nations B u l l e t i n , V o l . 13, September 1, 1952, pp. 269-270. 27 . . U.N., T.C., United Nations V i s i t i n g Mission to Trust T e r r i t o r i e s i n West A f r i c a , 1952, Report on the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administ-r a t i o n , T/1042, March 16, 1953, pp. 25-27. 28 Ib i d . , pp. 25-28. 29 Ibid . 30 Kale, op. c i t . , p. 39, 31 Ibi d . , pp. 38-39. 32 -Ibid., pp. 38-40. 3 3 I b i d . 3 4 I b i d . 35 Ibid . 36 Ib i d . , pp. 40-41. 37 Eyongetah and Brain, op. c i t . , p. 135. 38 Kale, op. c i t . , pp. 42, 58. 39 Ibid . 40 Ibid. , p. 58. 41 I b i d . , pp. 42-43. 42 Ibi d . , p. 43. 43 Ibi d . , p. 58. 44U.N., T.C., T/1426, January 20, 1959, p. 54. 65 CHAPTER THREE THE ROAD TO THE PLEBISCITES 1953-1959 The t r a d i t i o n a l leaders joined the n a t i o n a l i s t movement at a time when the differences i n viewpoint among the p o l i t i c a l leaders regarding the future of Western Kamerun were growing deeper. The t r a d i t i o n a l leaders, except perhaps those of Mamfe Overside, i n the case of Southern Kamerun, and some of the Fulani princes, i n the case of Northern Kamerun, were not par t i e s to these disagreements. But, coming i n contact with the p o l i t i c a l leaders, i t was obvious that, sooner or l a t e r , these a-Fon would come to take sides. Once the a-Fon d i d become involved i n the various n a t i o n a l i s t programmes, i t became d i f f i c u l t for the n a t i o n a l i s t leaders to s e t t l e t h e i r differences and agree on a p o l i t i c a l future. In a sense, therefore, i t was the a^-Fon's involvement a f t e r 1953 which opened up the road to the p l e b i s c i t e s . Nevertheless, l i k e the h i s t o r i c a l background, the road to the p l e b i s c i t e s i n Northern Kamerun d i f f e r e d from that i n Southern Kamerun. I t would appear more appropriate, therefore, to t r e a t the s i t u a t i o n i n each region quite separately although i n the same chapter. I t would also appear more appropriate to begin with Northern Kamerun where the process began e a r l i e r . The Road to the Northern Kamerun P l e b i s c i t e s 1953-1959 I t was the response to the MacPherson i n v i t a t i o n i n Northern Nigeria o which f i r s t e x p l i c i t l y showed that there was a difference of opinion about the. future of Northern Kamerun. In response to the MacPherson i n v i t a t i o n , 7 66 Northern Nigeria held a Provincial Constitutional Conference. The Emir of Dikwa and his secretary went to .the. Conference as spokesmen for \u00E2\u0080\u00A2'\u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Northern Kamerun. At the conference, a l l the delegates from Northern Nigeria proper declared that Northern Kamerun should permanently be integrated with Northern Nigeria and that trusteeship for that region should be terminated to that effect. On the other hand, the only two delegates from Northern Kamerun, the Emir of Dikwa and his secretary, rejected the idea. Instead they called for the continuation of trustee-ship in Northern Kamerun.1 The positions taken by the delegates at the Conference were sig - . i nificant in several respects. They showed that there were people in Northern Kamerun who were opposed to integration with Nigeria. They showed that, the Northern Nigerians proper were interested in absorbing Northern Kamerun. (Le Vine's assertion that Nigerians almost came close to wishing Northern Kamerun on Cameroun would appear to make no sense in light of this.) They showed that not a l l the Northern Kamerun Fulani wished to be permanently integrated in Northern Nigeria. (Eyongetah and Brain's ex-planation that the Northern Kamerunians voted the way they did because of their cultural a f f i n i t i e s with Northern Nigeria does not appear supported). More importantly, they showed that there were people in Northern Kamerun who preferred the trusteeship status of Northern Kamerun to integration with Nigeria. Furthermore,, and this too is very important, they registered a clash of ideas between the British and Nigerians on the one hand, and the Emir of Dikwa on the other. But, the Emir of Dikwa was not alone in this respect. In June, 1952, as seen in the preceding chapter, the British brought 67 delegates from Northern Kamerun to Buea to discuss with the delegates from Southern Kamerun how to expend the profits from the CDC and whether u n i f i -cation was possible. Delegates from both regions f e l t that unification was worth pursuing. This desire by the delegates of both regions to . pursue unification conflicted with the British p o l i t i c a l reorganization of Western Kamerun. The second contact of Northern Kamerun delegates outside that region had, like the f i r s t , produced results that might not have been expected. From now on, whether fortunately or not, and whether intentionally or not, the spokesmen for that area would be those who had the same mind, those who supported the way the British had reorganized the region. This situation would give the i l l u s i o n that there was no conflict of opinion in Northern Kamerun regarding i t s future. The appearance that there was no conflict of opinion in Northern Kamerun regarding i t s disposition began to take the form of reality in late 1952. The incident was the United Nations Mission to Kamerun in that year. During that v i s i t , the Mission met several people but wrote i t s report mainly from the ideas received from the local authorities of Northern Kamerun, authorities who were in-support of the status quo for the region. The Mission had thus l e f t the area with the impression that the Northern Kamerunians were satisfied with what obtained in the region adding that i t \"received no demand for unification from that part of the Trust Territory administered with Benue Province?' However, the Mission was not unaware that there was a conflict of opinion over the issue of unification since i t reported that the demand for unification was limited to certain l o c a l i t i e s and was not even popular. Yet, a communication from 2 Adamawa demanded the unification of 'French' Adamawa to Nigeria. 68 The year 1953, however, confirmed and challenged the idea that the Status quo i n Northern Kamerun was almost u n i v e r s a l l y popular. The confirmation took place i n the outside world and the challenge came from within Northern Kamerun. As seen i n the previous chapter, during the August 1953 London C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Conference, Mallam Abba Habib, the spokesman f o r Northern Kamerun declared that Northern Kamerun \"would 3 prefer to remain within Northern Nigeria.\" But Habib was not Northern Kamerun. The Emir o f Dikwa, himself a F u l a n i , by r e j e c t i n g the recommen-dations of the P r o v i n c i a l Conference at Kaduna that Northern Kamerun be permanently integrated with Northern Nigeria and that trusteeship be terminated to that e f f e c t , became the centre of a t t r a c t i o n f o r l i k e -minded Northern Kamerunians. In 1953, some Northern Kamerunians, under the banner of an obscure organization c a l l e d the \"Kamerun S o c i a l i s t Con-vention\" with the Emir of Dikwa at i t s head, demonstrated against the 4 status quo and demanded the separation of Northern Kamerun from Nig e r i a . The f u l l scope and form of t h i s a g i t a t i o n i s not known. But several a-Fon as well as the Emir of Dikwa were involved.* The response to t h i s p r o t e s t by the B r i t i s h and the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s *What i s reported here and i n the next paragraph i s based p a r t l y on the report by the Association of A f r i c a n Students studying i n France at the time. These students named only the deposition of the Emir of Dikwa. But, Fon V.H. Bang who was also involved i n the a f f a i r s , reported from h i s hide-out i n Southern Kamerun, l a t e r on, how he and seventeen other Mambilla a-Fon had been harassed and then named a large number of them that had been deposed because of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l ideas; see, U.N., T.C., T/PET.4/L.15, February 20, 1959; T/PET.4/L.18, September 1, 1959. Furthermore, as w i l l be seen l a t e r i n chapter four, when the Fourth United Nations Mission to Kamerun recommended that Northern Kamerun be permanently integrated with Nigeria without any consultation because there was \"no difference of opinion\" i n the region regarding the issue, the Soviet representative i n the Trusteeship Council asked the Chairman of the Mission whether the l a t t e r had considered the events of 1953 before w r i t i n g h i s report; and, as f a r as the a v a i l a b l e sources i n d i c a t e , no other p o l i t i c a l disturbance occurred i n the region i n 1953. 69 was sw i f t . The B r i t i s h and the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s \" s w i f t l y damped down on them,\" deposing many of the a-Fon and the Emir of Dikwa. New a-Fon were hand-picked and i n s t a l l e d i n the places of these deposed. These new a-Fon were e i t h e r those already known to be supporters of the status quo or those who promised to support i t . They used t h e i r powers \"to menace any attempts of a r t i c u l a t i n g p o l i t i c a l opinion that [was] not i n favour of the goals of the Administering A u t h o r i t y . \" 5 The demonstration and the B r i t i s h response were s i g n i f i c a n t i n many respects. The B r i t i s h and the :Northern Nigerians could no longer be under any i l l u s i o n s about the r e a l s i t u a t i o n . There were many people i n Northern Kamerun, Fulani and non-Fulami, who desired the separation of Northern Kamerun from Northern N i g e r i a . But, there were also many, mainly Fulami or at l e a s t Muslims, who preferred i n t e g r a t i o n with Northern Nigeria. The B r i t i s h response was very e f f e c t i v e i n undermining attempts to make p u b l i c statements against the p o l i t i c a l reorganization of the region. Those Northern Kamerunians who had demonstrated had not had enough of freedom of speech and action to want more. More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , however, was the damping down on a S o c i a l i s t organization, an inc i d e n t which would not be l o s t to the S o c i a l i s t countries i n the United Nations. Whatever the case, the mistake which the 1952 Mission made, was r e p l i c a t e d by the 1955 Mission. Before the Mission a r r i v e d i n Northern Kamerun, the B r i t i s h had constituted the f i r s t ' p o l i t i c a l ' body for that region c a l l e d the \"Consultative Committee for the Northern Cameroons,\" (Consultative Committee from now on). This Committee had twelve members (at t h i s time and even four years a f t e r ) : s i x were selected by l o c a l c o u n c i l s . One was the Lamido of Adamawa, the highest l o c a l authority i n Adamawa 70 Province of Northern Nigeria. 6 Five were the Northern Kamerunians who by now were si t t i n g in Nigerian legislatures. These included Abdullahi Dan Buram, Ibrahim Demsa, and T. Idirisu a l l members of the Northern Regional House, and Mormoni Bazza and Abubadar Gurum Pawo both members of the 7 central legislature at Lagos. The 1955 Mission drew i t s conclusions mostly from the ideas expressed by the members of the group. Though the Mission encountered the cry for unification and reunification, i t reported that \"this request emanated only from the Southern Cameroons, there being Q no such desire expressed in the Northern Cameroons.\" The 1952 mistake had thus been repeated in 1955. Nevertheless, the Haitian representative to the Council, despite the Mission's report, was skeptical. As he saw i t , the \"leaders of the Northern Cameroons who desired integration with the Northern Region of Nigeria represented a traditional oligarchy which was not necessarily 9 representative of the masses.\" As far as the British representative to the Council was concerned, however, the report of the Mission on Northern Kamerun was accurate. As he saw i t , the Administering Authority could not assume the responsibility of pressing for . . .an a r t i f i c i a l division between the northern part of the Trust Territory and the Northern Region of Nigeria. So far there had been no manifestation on the part of the Northern Cameroons representatives of the desire for separate p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . ^ Essentially, the British representative was supporting the position taken by the Visiting Mission. He was, however, very careful when he confined his remarks to the views expressed by the \"Northern Cameroons representatives.\" Whatever the case, the 1955 Mission like i t s 1952 predecessor, failed 71 to pick up l o c a l d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the Nigerian connection. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , however, the s i t u a t i o n of 1953 reproduced i t s e l f between 1957 and 1958. There was another review of the Nigerian Constitution at London i n May and June, 1957. A l l the major Nigerian p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were once more represented. With no indigenous p o l i t i c a l party i n Northern Kamerun, the B r i t i s h once more selected Habib as the spokesman for that region. During the Conference, Habib again declared that Northern Kamerun would rather remain integrated with Northern Nigeria than separate from i t . When the Conference resumed on September 29, 1958, Habib stood firm on h i s previous p o s i t i o n . He congratulated Southern Kamerun f o r gaining a Regional status but declared that Northern Kamerun wished to remain integrated with Northern N i g e r i a . 1 1 With the 'representative' of Northern Kamerun cons i s t e n t l y taking t h i s p o s i t i o n over the future of the region, the C o l o n i a l Secretary could do no more than ' s a t i s f y ' Northern Kamerun. Northern Nigeria would become self-governing on March 15, 1959. Northern Kamerun would remain an i n t e g r a l part of t h i s self-governing region. But the Governor of Nigeria would \" r e t a i n general reserve powers i n r e l a t i o n to the Northern Cameroons . . . to ensure the discharge of [Britain's] o b l i g a t i o n s under the Trusteeship 12 Agreements\" for Western Kamerun. Mallam Habib had had what he wanted and the C o l o n i a l Secretary was l e f t with the impression that he had acted i n conformity with the wishes of the majority of the Northern Kamerunians. However, the events associated with the 1958 Mission to Kamerun, i n Kamerun and i n the United Nations, would soon begin to cast doubts on the p o s i t i o n so c o n s i s t e n t l y taken by Habib. The fourth and f i n a l United Nations Mission to Kamerun came i n 1958 and stayed i n Western Kamerun 72 (Northern and Southern Kamerun) for only two weeks. This Mission was l e d by Benjamin Gerig, the representative of the United States of America. This p a r t i c u l a r Mission was regarded by those involved i n the aUTfairs of Kamerun and the Kamerunians themselves as the most important Mission to the T e r r i t o r y . Before the Mission had time to meet those i n authority i n Northern Kamerun, i t f i r s t came i n contact with those who were not i n authority and whom the Mission would t r e a t as inconsequential. These were the a-Fon of Mambilla. Since they dare not express t h e i r views p u b l i c l y or even p r i v a t e l y to the Mission while i n Northern Kamerun f o r fear of deposition, these a-Fon s l i p p e d across the Northern Kamerun-Southern Kamerun border and, i n Southern Kamerun, NKambe D i v i s i o n , handed p e t i t i o n s to Gerig. They were led by Fon V.H. Bang of Bang, Mambilla. Their . message was simple: i f Northern Kamerun could not be separated from Northern Nigeria and made part of Southern Kamerun, then the Mambilla area alone should be separated from both Northern Nigeria and Northern Kamerun and made part of Southern 13 . Kamerun. Instead of preserving these p e t i t i o n s f o r h i s own report, Gerig brought them to the attention of the Anglo-Nigerian a u t h o r i t i e s i n Northern Nigeria and Northern Kamerun.* The response of the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s to the p e t i t i o n s by now could be expected. Whether under i n s t r u c t i o n s or not, the D i s t r i c t Head of Gembu, as Fon Bang reported,* went about a r r e s t i n g a l l those i n Mambilla who were *In document U.N., G.A., A/C.4/400, February 26, 1959, pp. 1-2, the Northern Kamerun l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s stated that they came to know about the Mambilla request that the area be transfered to the Southern Kamerun administration from the Mission which received the p e t i t i o n s from two Membilla a-Fon while i n Southern Kamerun. No reason was given f o r the 73 connected with the p e t i t i o n s . Fon Bang, with one of h i s sons, Joseph Noubuin, was forced to escape to the Southern Kamerun sanctuary. Another of h i s sons, John Tonga, was arrested and imprisoned i n Gembu. Many of the Mambilla a-Fon were forced to sign a renunciation s l i p to the e f f e c t that they d i d not desire to be part of Southern Kamerun. Those of them who refused to sign t h i s s l i p were dethroned. Caught i n t h i s cleaning up operation were the a-Fon of Mbach, Tamya, Bukudeh, Capbrih, Karah, Titong, Mbamngah, Kumah, Kilayan, Ndumyaji, Tep, Warowar, and Hainan. Fon Bang himself was on the l i s t of those to be dethroned; three Fulani men were waiting at h i s home to a r r e s t him should he return from h i s 14 sanctuary i n Southern Kamerun. This cleaning up a f f a i r , however, occurred while the Mission had l e f t the region. But i t was the Mission which c a r r i e d the information (as shown i n document A/C.4/400, February 26, 1959, pp. 102) to the Northern Kamerun and Northern Nigerian a u t h o r i t i e s . One of those the Mission con- _ s u i t e d was the' Lamido of Adamawa, A l h a j i Mustafa. Mustafa f e l t that the Northern Kamerunians were p e r f e c t l y happy with the status quo because they were with \" t h e i r brothers l i v i n g i n that p a r t of Adamawa which [was] non-t r u s t , \" (that i s Nigeria Adamawa). His people of Northern Kamerun would never \"support any proposal of separation from Nigeria,\" although they would welcome the idea of t h e i r \"brothers i n the French Cameroons\" r e u n i t i n g presentation of the p e t i t i o n s i n Southern rather than i n Northern Kamerun. Furthermore, i n these p e t i t i o n s , Fon Bang named the v i l l a g e s whose Crowned Princes had been:dethroned. Moreover, Bang followed up these p e t i -tions with another one while s t i l l i n Southern Kamerun complaining that he was s t i l l i n e x i l e and that the f i r s t Northern Kamerun p l e b i s c i t e might be conducted while he was away from home. See documents U.N., T.C., T/PET.4/L.15, February 20, 1959; T/PET,4/L.18, September 1, 1959. 74 15 with them i n N i g e r i a . The f i v e Northern Kamerun 'representatives' to the Nigerian l e g i s l a t u r e s would also say the same thing. They wished to be allowed to decide to l i v e with t h e i r brothers of Northern Nigeria \"whether by referendum, p l e b i s c i t e or any other means.\" They were opposed to any move \"to break away Northern Cameroons from Northern Region and from Adamawa Province.\" They wished to have nothing to do with Eastern Kamerun which was \"merciless\" and 16 which had \"coup-ets-ats\" [ s i c ] , that i s , coups d'etat,a reference to the terrorism i n Eastern Kamerun.* I t was, however, the l o c a l branch of the r u l i n g p o l i t i c a l party of Northern Nigeria, the Northern People's Congress (NPC), which pushed home the p o i n t more f o r c e f u l l y . I t was t h e i r \"earnest desire, or wish or hope,\" and t h a t of any \"responsible\" people i n Northern Kamerun \"to always stay with Adamawa within the Northern Region\" as they were before the European occupation. I t was the Europeans who di v i d e d them. Before t h i s d i v i s i o n , they were \"one and the same thing.\" No responsible Northern Kamerunian would \"ever support a contrary idea or view i n s t i g a t e d by outside p o l i t i c a l partiest' brought i n by outsiders a t t r a c t e d by the Mubi b i g market.\" No doubt, there were contrary views, but these were \"the views of a few d i s -gruntled people of the descendants of autocratic tyrant German-time chiefs *When the French outlawed the Union des Populations du Cameroun, a p o l i t i c a l party of Eastern Kamerun, i n 1955, as w i l l be seen l a t e r i n t h i s chapter, many of i t s leaders and supporters crossed over to. Southern Kamerun and established the party there while others went underground and became^involved i n t e r r o r i s t s a c t i v i t i e s . tThese \"outside p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s \" were the l o c a l branches of other Nigerian p a r t i e s such as the NCNC and the AG, which were considered outside the framework of Northern Nigeria. 75 who were stopped from unjust and cruel treatment of the people of this area, 17 and never of the views of the Trust Territory people.\" This statement suggests one of the sources of the Northern Kamerun Fulani opposition to the British policy. Those of them the British found firmly entrenched in power under the Germans did not like their subordination to the Nigerian Fulani such as the Lamido of Adamawa. Nevertheless, i t was precisely again one of these Northern Nigerian Fulani, the highest authority, other than the British, in Northern Nigeria, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, to whom the Mission went to hear about opinion in Northern Kamerun. Ahmadu Bello saw i t quite moderately but the idea and the inclination were substantially the same. . . . i t i s d i f f i c u l t for anyone who knows the Territory to con-ceive of any p o l i t i c a l future\u00E2\u0080\u0094taking into account the factors of history, geography and economics\u00E2\u0080\u0094which could bring greater benefits to i t s inhabitants than that they should throw in their lot with an independent Nigeria and within the Northern Region. However, that i s for them\u00E2\u0080\u0094and for them alone\u00E2\u0080\u0094freely to decide for themselves.-1-9 The Premier of Northern Nigeria could not, therefore, conceive of any bene-f i c i a l future for Northern Kamerun other than within Northern Nigeria. However, since he f e l t that the Northern Kamerunians should make the choice themselves, he proceeded to suggest how they could make that choice. It was advisable to have a plebiscite in Northern Kamerun. But -.the questions of the plebiscite should be as simple as possible because the Northern Kamerunians were \"simple minded farmers, often liv i n g in the remote h i l l s and not closely in touch with affairs.\" The question should be: \"Do you want union with the Northern Region of an independent Nigeria?\" In the event of a negative answer, trusteeship should be continued and \"alternative choices\" such as unification and/or reunification would \"be the subject of a second 76 plebiscite.\" However, these choices should not yet be sought \"until the 19 \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 people have expressed their views on the f i r s t question.\" The alter-natives for the second plebiscite which Ahmadu Bello suggested are indicative of the confidence the Northern Nigerians had in the popularity of the status quo in Northern Kamerun. Despite this apparently popular view about the future of Northern Kamerun, there were groups, other than the Mambilla ethnic group, which saw things quite differently. These were the local branches* of the AG and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC)\u00E2\u0080\u0094 a Nigerian p o l i t i c a l party based in the Munchi area, an area of Northern Nigeria typically inhabited by the non-Fulani. As these two parties saw i t , Northern Kamerun had become a colony of Northern Nigeria. A l l the rulers in the region were either Northern Nigerians or Northern Kamerunians who, traditionally, had no right to rule. Their traditional ruling institutions had been reduced into a \"nonentity,\" and although these institutions could s t i l l be traced, they no longer stood any chance of \"ruling their own subjects,\" [sic]. A l l the influential administrative posts in the region were monopolized by Northern Nigerians. The Northern Kamerunians had no opportunity for training in order that they could \"man their own affairs by themselves.\" It was time for Northern Kamerun to be separated from Nigeria and Northern Nigeria and the Nigerian usurpers forced to abandon their colonization of the region. In this way, Northern Kamerunians would be able to handle their own affairs *Unlike in Southern Kamerun where there were no local branches of the p o l i t i c a l parties of Nigeria proper, there were local branches of Nigerian parties in Northern Kamerun. Indeed, i t was only in 1959 that the f i r s t indigenous p o l i t i c a l party was formed there and the second and last was formed in 1960, both for the purpose of the plebiscites. 77 20 themselves. These groups further indicated how they would like to see Northern Kamerun reorganized. But, because their own segment of the region had nothing to do with the other segments, they.limited their recommendations to their own area, Adamawa Emirate. They f e l t that the five Districts of the Emirate should be combined into a Federation under one Native Authority. The name of the Federation would be \"Waila Federal Native Authority Division.\" The Federation would be \"absolutely quite independent from Adamawa Native Authority,\" (that i s , quite independent of the authority of the Lamido of Adamawa). Failing this, the area should form \"an independent state under the absolute control of the Federal Government of Nigeria.\" However, i t s a-Fon would be members of the Northern House of Chiefs under special pro-visions. In either case, the British should rule the area directly u n t i l the indigenes had been trained to run their own affairs. The self-govern-ment promised to Northern Nigeria for March 15, 1959, should have nothing to do with Northern Kamerun or at least with Waila Federation. Since there was a conflict of opinion in Northern Kamerun, a plebiscite was required to 21 determine the wishes of the people. But a free and meaningful plebiscite would have to f u l f i l certain conditions. It would have to \"be administered absolutely by an independent body, that is by the United Nations personnel.\" A l l d i s t r i c t heads, influential and other workers of the Native Authorities would have to go home to Nigeria in order that they may not use \"their influence to i n t i -midate the people.\" Any use of influence, bribery, and a l l other i l l e g a l means of influence must be considered \"a severe offence.\" P o l i t i c a l parties must be guaranteed freedom of speech and of campaigning \"without victimization.\" 78 The British must be ruling the region directly and p o l i t i c a l cases tried by magistrates courts during the plebiscite. A l l the Native Authority police must be removed during the plebiscite. Finally, there should be a 23 secret ballot. These conditions provide some interesting and important points to note. Although opposed to the British policy, these groups showed confidence in the United Nations, in the British, and in courts presided over by Bri-tishers. On the other hand, they distrusted the local authorities particu-l a r l y the Nigerians, Fulani or non-Fulani. Furthermore, there was some confusion as to what they really wanted: possibly, what they meant by a state controlled from Lagos actually meant an autonomous Region equal in a l l respects to the other regions of Nigeria and represented at Lagos in i t s own right. But one thing was very clear; they demanded separation from Northern Nigeria. Finally, with f i r s t hand knowledge of Northern Kamerun, they advised the United Nations on what had to be done to make the plebiscites meaningful. These important and interesting points notwithstanding, i t i s now possible to summarize the situation which obtained in the region when the Mission was conducting i t s investigation. There was a clear conflict of ideas over the disposition of Northern Kamerun. Some supported the status quo while others were opposed to i t . Those who supported i t belonged to two interchangeable groups: the five who sat in the Nigerian legislatures and the Lamido of Adamawa were the most important members of the Consultative Committee; the Consultative Committee and the Sardauna of Sokoto were members of the NPC; to be a member of the NPC was a prerequisite for being in autho-r i t y in Northern Kamerun. It was thus either the members of the NPC or the 79 local authorities who opted for the status quo. On the other hand, three diffetent groups\u00E2\u0080\u0094.the Mambilla, the local branches of the UMBC and the AG opposed the existing situation. Whether this important point was lost to the Mission or not, one thing is certain: the evidence i t had before i t showed that there was a clear conflict of ideas regarding the disposition of Northern Kamerun, a conflict which an impartial researcher or investi-gator could not afford to ignore. Nevertheless, the Mission presented the United Nations with a con-clusion which contradicted evidence in i t s own report. There i s certainly no evident feeling that the Northern Cameroons has a distinct identity [from that of the Northern Region of Nigeria] . . . The Mission has come to the conclusion . . . that there i s no difference of opinion on the principal question of the future of the Northern Cameroons which would require or justify the holding of a formal consultation on the subject. It believes i t to be manifestly the opinion of the northern popu-lation as a whole, as far as i t can be expressed at present and in the foreseeable future, that they should become permanently a part of the Northern Region of the Federation of Nigeria when the latter attains independence. The Mission accordingly recom-mends that i f the General Assembly accepts such a union as the basis for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement, no further consultation need be held.23 Essentially, the Mission denied the existence of a conflict of ideas over the future of Northern Kamerun. Either the a-Fon of Mambilla and the local branches of the UMBC/AG did not exist or they did not matter. Only those in authority were forces to reckon with, that i s to say, the Missions' recommendation reflected the veiws of those in authority. As the Mission put i t , the Mission \"had seen hundreds of persons, had met the most important o f f i c i a l s and had been greeted along the roads by crowds,\" and nearly a l l persons questioned in Northern Kamerun \"considered that their future was 24 linked to that of the Northern Region of Nigeria.\" In paragraph 149 of the report, the Mission declared that \"the views of 80 the opposition parties related to matters of internal policy and admini-strative method and . . . they did not c a l l into question the continued 25 association of the Northern Cameroons with the Northern Region of Nigeria.\" As seen earlier, the local branches of the UMBC/AG demanded the creation of the Waila Federal Native Authority which should be separated completely from Northern Nigeria or from the Authority of the Lamido of Adamawa. Alternatively, this Waila Federation should be constituted into a \"state\" controlled from Lagos, that is the Federal Government. More importantly, however, the local branches of the opposition parties did not want the self-government promised for Northern Nigeria for March 15, 1959, to have anything doing with the Waila Federation. How best could these parties show that they had rejected their association with Northern Nigeria? The Mission alone has the answer. In paragraph 178, the Mission stated that the Consultative Committee informed i t that \"they would accept a plebiscite i f i t should be considered 26 necessary\u00E2\u0080\u0094but that they did not so consider i t . \" A search for a written document by this Consultative Committee has not been f r u i t f u l . But, the following points should be placed basides the statement of the Mission. The Lamido of Adamawa, the most important member of this Committee was ; silent over the issue of the plebiscite. The five Northern Kamerunians who were members of the Nigerian legislatures and of the Consultative Committee, as seen earlier, demanded a referendum /plebiscite, or other means to decide to remain in Northern Nigeria and in Adamawa. The NPC which included a l l the non-British members of the Consultative Committee demanded a plebiscite, as seen earlier. A l l in a l l , although the l i s t i s by no means complete, the few examples cited here suggest that the Mission's report and recommendations 81 contradicted some of the important evidence included in the same report. It is not easy to understand why this was the case. But, the available sources show that the Mission did not consider views from those not in 27 authority important. Andrew Cohen, the British Representative at the United Nations, was quick to accept the recommendations the Mission had made. He selected precisely those parts of the report shown above to have contradicted im-portant evidence and used them to support the Mission:'s recommendations. He then praised the experience and thorough investigation of the Mission which helped i t to arrive at accurate conclusions. This representative \"found the arguments presented by the Mission very convincing and endorsed i t s conclusions.\" The United Kingdom, although completely impartial, was \"per-fectly ready to agree to a plebiscite being held on the Northern Cameroons had that been shown to.be necessary.\" Considering the Mission's thorough investigation, \"he did not think that the Trusteeship Council would wish gratuitously to burden the people of the Northern Cameroons with the paraphernalia of a more formal consultation.\" It was, therefore, necessary for the Trusteeship Council to give f u l l weight to the recommendations of . . 28 the Mission. But, the representative of the Soviet Union, Lobanov, saw i t quite differently. He wondered whether the Mission had considered \"the wish for separation which had been expressed by the people of the Northern Cameroons in 1953\"* before stating that \"nobody in the Northern Cameroons had raised *This appears to be an allusion to the 'damping down on the Kamerun Socialist Convention1 in 1953. 82 the question of separation of that region from Nigeria.\" The Mission had not considered i t : \"The Mission had not, in the northern part of the Cameroons . . . observed any important opposition to an association with 29 the Northern Region of Nigeria.\" The word \"important\" in this citation must be recognized for i t seems, for the moment, to explain the contradic-tion between the Mission's recommendations and the evidence in the report. Except for this one relevant question, no other thing about Kamerun was discussed on this day, February 10, 1959. Cohen frustrated a l l other attempts made by Lobanov to question Gerig on the report and recommendations and the whole day was spent on arguments involving procedural issues and technical questions therein. By the time the debate had come to an end, the Trusteeship Council was clearly divided into three groups, the sup-porters of Cohen, the supporters of Lobanov, and the uncommitted, regarding the procedural questions. But, even on the major issue, whether there should be a plebiscite in Northern Kamerun or not, the Council emerged in three groups. The British, supported by the rest of the Administering Authorities in the Council, except France,* f e l t that a plebiscite was unnecessary. The Soviet Union stood almost alone in asserting that there must be a plebiscite. France was ambivalent*.but showed a strong inclination in voting with the Soviet Union. The others had not yet made up their mind by the time the 30 meeting rose. Later on, in 1961, after a l l the plebiscites had been con-31 eluded, France explained her inclination in 1959 in terms of principle. *The United Nations documents used in this study, whether issued by the Trusteeship Council or the General Assembly, and dealing specifically with the question of Kamerun Reunification, depict French attitude as follows. Between 1949 and 1958, they sympathized with the British position, namely, that Western Kamerun could not be effectively administered without reference to Nigeria, that Northern and Southern Kamerun were ethnologically and 83 After this disagreement, the Council adjourned for a week. Whatever happened during this one week interlude might, i f not w i l l , never be known. But on February 18, 1959, when the sittin g resumed, a draft resolution, manufactured during the one week interval, was introduced to the floor. This draft resolution was co-sponsored by Burma, Haiti, Italy, New Zealand, culturally distinct regions from each other, and that Northern Kamerun tended to prefer i t s integration in Northern Nigeria to separation from i t . In 1959, the French became ambivalent: sometimes, they would make statements in favour of the British position; in other cases, they would take the middle course and remain uncommitted; and yet in other instances, they would make cynical statements regarding the British position; but generally, they were gradually losing sympathy for the British position over the issue of Kamerun reunification. Between 1960 and 1961, the French spoke out in favour of Kamerun reunification; indeed, they were hostile to both the United Nations and British (while disclaiming any quarrel, with Nigeria) in 1961 during the discussions as to whether the results of the Northern Kamerun plebiscite, which they charged had many irregularities in i t s conduct should be adopted or not. See, as examples, the following documents for the following periods: 1949-1958\u00E2\u0080\u0094U.N. , T.C., T\"/1042, March 16, 1953, passim; U.N., GA. A/3170 and Supplement No. 4, 1956; A/3595 and Supplement No. 4, 1957; 1959\u00E2\u0080\u0094U.N., G.A., A/4313, 4348, December, 1959; U.N., T.C., T/1426, January 1959; T/1491, Nov-ember, 1959; T/SR. 943, 953-962, April-May, 1959; A/C.4/SR. 775-776, 779-780, 792, 794, 807, 846-849, 885-892, 901-903, January-December 1959; 1960-1961\u00E2\u0080\u0094 A/4726, April.1961;'A/4354 and Supplement No. 16, 1960; T/1526, May 1960; A/C.4/SR. 1148-1153, August 1961. French attitude i s understandable. Between 1949 and 1958, the Admin-istering Authorities in the Council sympathized with each other's policy against criticisms from non-Administrators therein. Moreover, during this period, as pointed out in chapter four, while the rest of the major p o l i t i c a l parties in Eastern Kamerun were indifferent to reunification, the UPC(the bogey of the day in French eyes) advocated reunification very forcefully; i t was therefore d i f f i c u l t for the French to support reunification which would bolster the prestige of the party which wanted France out of Kamerun immediately when the parties which sympathized with the French presence were indifferent to i t . But between 1959 and 1960, these other parties showed a great interest in effecting reunification. After the results of the 1961 Northern Kamerun plebiscite, the Cameroun Government was unhappy and even challenged the conduct of the plebiscite both at the United Nations and at the International Court of Justice. French attitude thus appears to have been opportunist in character which explains their h o s t i l i t y to the United Nations and Britain in 1961. 84 Paraguay, and the United States of America. E s s e n t i a l l y , the d r a f t re-s o l u t i o n recommended to the United Nations that there should be a. p l e b i s -c i t e i n Northern Kamerun to decide on the d i s p o s i t i o n of that region when trusteeship came to an end.* The a v a i l a b l e sources suggest very strongly that t h i s d ecision was a function of disagreement, and compromise among various members of the Trusteeship Council. One element of disagreement was indicated by Davin, the representative of New Zealand. As he saw i t , although \"his delegation thought that the c a r e f u l findings of the V i s i t i n g Mission warranted the Council's endorsement, i t was aware that some members did not share that 32 view.\" Those that were p a r t i a l to the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n , V i t e l l i , the representative of I t a l y for example, were led by the representative of New Zealand, Davin. These accepted every part of the Mission's report and recommendations but wanted to use a p l e b i s c i t e i n Northern Kamerun as a means of i n f l u e n c i n g opinion i n Southern Kamerun i n favour of i n t e g r a t i o n with Nigeria. As Davin saw i t , i n \"view of the v i r t u a l unanimity of opinion i n the North the only r e s u l t of a consultation of the T e r r i t o r y as a whole would be to strengthen the proportion of those throughout the T e r r i t o r y who 33 wished to accede to Nigeria.\" The other element i n the disagreement was stressed by Lobanov, the Soviet representative, who was firm i n h i s opposition to the idea that there need not be any p l e b i s c i t e i n Northern Kamerun. He abstained form voting on the d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n because i t . di d not r e f l e c t the conclusions of the V i s i t i n g Mission or deal with the substance of the question. Had i t done so, he would *The r e s o l u t i o n w i l l be seen presently at a more appropriate place. 85 have been obliged to vote against i t , in view of the fact that his delegation did not agree either with the approach of the Council to the question of the future of the Cameroons as a whole or with the Mission's conclusion. 3 4 The Council members seeking a compromise were led by the representative of Burma, U. Thant. These accepted the draft resolution, as U Thant saw i t , because i t was \"the most r e a l i s t i c step that the Council could take in 35 the circumstances.\" Even before the British attempts in the Trusteeship Council to pre-vent the holding of a plebiscite in Northern Kamerun had failed, the British had arranged, during the one week interval, to send a Northern Kamerunian who supported the status quo to the General Assembly to argue the case. On February 16, 1959, Cohen informed the Trusteeship Council that The Minister for Northern Cameroons Affairs in the Northern Regional Government of Nigeria, who was coming to the United Nations, would no doubt make a statement to the Fourth Committee* on the question and would inform the General Assembly of the extent to which the objectives of the Trusteeship System would be achieved by the Northern Cameroons by i t s obtaining independence as part of the Northern Region of the Federation of Nigeria.36 Unfortunately, the Minister, Mallam Abdullahi Dant Buram Jada arrived at the United Nations to find himself facing a plebiscite the British had wished away. Although he himself\u00E2\u0080\u0094as one of the five 'representatives' in the Nigerian legislatures\u00E2\u0080\u0094had asked for a plebiscite, referendum or any other means of consultation, Dan Buram Jada opted out of i t before the Fourth *The Fourth Committee was a sub-committee of the General Assembly in charge of a l l affairs connected with Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing Territories. Its decisions, except for the formality of another vote by the General Assembly, were decisions of the General Assembly. t'Dan' is the equivalent of Mac or Mc; Dan Buram Jada = Son of Buram Jada. Jada is a name of a place. 86 Committee. He stated that the Government of Northern Nigeria and the Consultative Committee were \"most gratified\" to see that, after ascertaining the views of \" a l l the elements of the population, including the views of the opposition parties,\"* the Visiting Mission recommended that \"there was no need for further consultation on the question of the integration of the Northern Cameroons with the Northern Region of Nigeria when Nigeria became independent on 1 October, 1960.\" It was, therefore, commensurate for the 37 United Nations to approve the recommendations of the Mission. Dan Buram next turned his attention to reunification. To be sure, the \"short-lived\" German Kamerun Empire had existed. But there was \"no geographical, economical or racial unityV within the Empire. The talk of unification and reunification, therefore, had no foundations. The previous Nigeria-Kamerun boundary \"divided into two parts the old Adamawa Emirate\" which included a large part of what was now Eastern Kamerun. \"It was accordingly a matter of v i t a l importance to the people of the Northern Cameroons that they should remain with the Northern Region of Nigeria.\" While the Northern Kamerunians had always had everything in common with Northern Nigeria, they had nothing in common with either Southern Kamerun or Eastern Kamerun. To separate the Northern Kamerunians from Northern Nigeria \"would be a direct negation of a l l the principles for which the 38 United Nations stood.\" When members of the Fourth Committee asked Dan Buram questions, Cohen answered them for Dan Buram,t and the latter brought back the answers two *The Mission heard the views of the opposition but did not make any use of them. tThe language, the style, the approach, and the passages selected from the 87 days later. The representative of Iraq asked how Northern Kamerun could have everything in common with Northern Nigeria and some Northern Kamerun-ians would address petitions to the United Nations requesting that the region be separated from Northern Nigeria and made part of Southern Kamerun. Dan Buram f e l t that these were a few Fondoms on the Southern Kamerun-Northern Kamerun border, but before the arrival of the Visiting Mission in the Northern part of the Trust Territory, the Regional Government knew very l i t t l e about this matter since we have never received any communication thereon from the Southern Cameroons; nor have any persons from our side of the border expressed to us a wish to transfer to that area. The two communications were made to the Mission when i t was in the Southern Cameroons.3^ The question and the answer are significant in several respects. Some of the members, i f not a l l , of the Fourth Committee were aware of the Mambilla petitions. This awareness might have been behind the reasons why the Fourth Committee upheld the recommendations of the Trusteeship Council. Finally, i t was clearly the Mission which informed the authorities about the petitions and then failed to make use of them. Like the Mission, Dan Buram did not even consider the petitions important. As he saw i t , the \"communication from Mambilla was from three village Heads li v i n g close to the Southern Cameroons' border\" and they could 40 not \"be held to speak for the Mambilla people as a whole.\" It might be true that only three a-Fon did the writing, but in his petition complaining about the attempt on his l i f e and the deposition of the numerous Mambilla Gerig Report to answer the questions in written form, were so identical to Cohen's statements on February 16, 1959, T/SR. 959, May 1959 and other previous statements as to leave no doubt about the author of the answers. 88 a-Fon, as seen earlier, Fon V.H. Bang indicated that seventeen other Mam-b i l l a a-Fon supported and encouraged him to carry on the fight. The number of the a-Fon alleged dethroned also raises doubts about Dan Buram1s assertion that only three a-Fon were really involved in the request. The representative of the United Arab Republic tried to find out whether Northern Kamerun \"possessed i t s own representative institutions\" and what measures the British had taken towards \"the development of p o l i t i c a l institutions\" in that region. As Dan Buram saw i t , the region was administered as an integral part of Northern Nigeria, the only practical way of administering i t . * Ten Northern Kamerunians sat in the Nigerian legislatures. He was a Minister and one of them. He was assisted by the Consultative Committee which acted as a.liaison body between the Government and the region. This Consultative Committee was consittuted in 1957 \"a formal committee of the Executive Council of the Northern Region\" of Nigeria. It consisted of twenty-three members: sixteen were the elected members to the Nigerian legislatures; there were two a-Fon; and, \"five 41 special members drawn from the remoter areas of the Trust Territory.\" Essentially, Dan Buram's answer was that Northern Kamerun had no representa-tive institutions and that the British were doing nothing to provide the region with i t s own p o l i t i c a l institutions. The representative of Indonesia did not leave the question of u n i f i -cation to pass unnoticed. He wondered whether Northern Kamerun would like to unite with Southern Kamerun under trusteeship provided that Southern *A11 the United Nations documents dealing with this issue show that more often than not the British defended their p o l i t i c a l reorganization of Western Kamerun in terms of the practicality of the effective administration of the Trust Territory. 89 Kamerun remained part of an independent Federation of Nigeria. Dan Buram thought the suggestion ano impossibility. For the reasons given in my statements to this Committee on Monday, the people of the Northern Cameroons would not be willing to unite with the South, whether i t remained inside or outside the Federation, since for very weighty reasons of history and geography, and of close ethnic and cultural ties with the people of the Northern Region of Nigeria, they feel that their true destiny l i e s in joining this region when the Federation becomes independent.4 Unification was, therefore, out of the question under any circumstances. The question of the plebiscite, the main reason for Dan Duram's journey to the United Nations, was pursued by the Indonesian representative. This representative wished to know whether the Consultative Committee would accept a plebiscite i f the United Nations decided in favour of one. Considering the author of these answers, the reply could be expected. [The] Visiting Mission has recorded in paragraph 178 of i t s report that i t was informed by the Consultative Committee for the Northern Cameroons that they would accept a plebiscite i f :'. i t should be considered necessary\u00E2\u0080\u0094but that they did not so consider i t . This was before the Mission made i t s recommendation to the effect that no plebiscite was in fact necessary, for reasons which the Regional Government finds entirely convincing. 4 3 In this way, Dan Buram quoted from a huge document which he probably had not ready* or read only partially, to deny that the Consultative Committee in 1958 demanded a referendum, plebiscite, or any other means to confirm that the Northern Kamerunians wished to remain Northern Nigerians. Dan Buram's efforts, however, could not be expected to be f r u i t f u l . *Either Gerig began writing the report on January 20, 1959, or he finished i t on that day. Whatever the case, Gerig introduced i t on February 10, 1959 By February 16, Dan Buram had not arrived at New York. He probably came between February 20 and 22 when the Southern Kamerunians came, made his statements on February 23 and answered these questions on February 25, 1959. 90 The source of the decision to have a. plebiscite was too powerful for the United Nations to act otherwise simply because a Dan Buram, Minister for Northern Cameroons Affairs in the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, wished i t that way. On March 13, 1959, the General Assembly went ahead and endorsed the Trusteeship Council Resolution 1926 (XXIII) adopted on February 18, 1959. It then became General Assembly Resolution 1350 (XIII). This resolution asked the British \"to organize, under the supervision of the United Nations, separate plebiscites in the Northern and Southern parts of the Cameroons,\" in order \"to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the Territory concerning their future.\" The Northern Kamerun plebiscite: should take place in the middle of November 1959. The questions to be put at the plebiscite should be: \"(a) Do you wish the Northern Cameroons to be part of the Northern Region of Nigeria when the Federation of Nigeria becomes independent? Or (b) Are you in favour of deciding the future of the Northern Cameroons at a later date?\" It was permissible to use the electoral register for the Nigerian elections to the House of Representative 44 at Lagos. Northern Kamerun was thus keyed for a plebiscite in 1959 while the imbroglio in Southern Kamerun remained unresolved. The Road to the Southern Kamerun Plebiscites 1954-1959 If 1953 was a turning point, the events of 1954 gave that turn in history a distinctive stamp in two respects. The f i r s t respect involved the concrete award of an identity to Southern Kamerun. Following the results of the late 1953 elections, the London August Constitutional Conference was continued in Lagos in January, 1954. It was this conference at Lagos which 91 made Southern Kamerun a quasi-region, a region unequal i n a l l respects to the other Nigerian Regions. The i n f e r i o r i t y of t h i s quasi-region to the other Nigerian Regions was g l a r i n g l y c l e a r . While i t s Nigerian counterparts were Regions, i t was o f f i c i a l l y named 'Quasi-Region.' While i t s Nigerian counterparts had at t h e i r head 'Premiers,' Dr. Endeley, i t s leader, was o f f i c i a l l y 'Leader of Government Business.' Furthermore, i t could only r a i s e revenues from \" s p e c i f i e d sources.\" While the other Nigerian Regions had Lieutenant-Governors, i t had the Commissioner. While these Lieutenant-Governors could approve laws passed by the Parliaments of t h e i r own Region, i t s own laws had to be approved by the Governor-General. Moreover, the other Nigerian Regions had responsible indigenous Executive members. But, i t s Assembly consisted of the Commissioner as President, three e x - o f f i c i o members\u00E2\u0080\u0094the Deputy Com-missioner, Legal Secretary, F i n a n c e \u00E2\u0080\u0094 , t h i r t e e n elected members, s i x repre-sentatives of the Native A u t h o r i t i e s , and not. more than two Special Members appointed by the Governor-General to represent s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s not otherwise 45 represented. None of the Southern Kamerunians i n the Assembly, including the Leader of Government Business, was an o f f i c i a l member of the Executive Council. Some of them, not more than f i v e were u n o f f i c i a l members of t h i s \u00E2\u0080\u00A2-, 4 6 Council. The provisions and i n f e r i o r i t y of t h i s Quasi-Region to those of the other Nigerian Regions have produced two e f f e c t s . F i r s t , they have i n v i t e d a great deal of c r i t i c i s m s , not u n j u s t i f i e d , from many authors. Perhaps, the best known c r i t i c i s m was provided i n a t o p i c a l sentence before the analysis 47 by Eyongetah and Brain: \"Regional status was lacking even i n nomenclature.\" Secondly, they have made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r some authors, Eyongetah and Brain for example, to see the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Quasi-Region to Southern 92 Kamerun and to the nationalist movement. To be sure, the limitations demonstrated the British reluctance at making the award, but i t s sig-nificant aspects are too important to be buried under a storm of criticisms. F i r s t , this offer made a hole in the policy the British had clung to for 35 years, the policy of administering Southern Kamerun as a part of Eastern Nigeria. Secondly, and this too is very important, the Southern Kame-runians received the identity they had sought for 15 years in concrete form. The quasi region was a landmark in the history of Southern Kamerun. From then on, Southern Kamerun became a p o l i t i c a l unit within Nigeria. The second respect in which the turn in history was manifested in 1954 involved two different elections, one to the House of Representatives at Lagos and the other to select the six representatives of the Native Authorities to the new Southern Kamerun House of Assembly. The results of the elections could be expected. The Ibo-dominated or influenced party, as the KPP was stigmatized, lost every seat i t contested. On the other hand, the KNC, the party supported by the a-Fon won a l l the eight seats to Lagos 48 and a l l the six Native Authority seats. The a-Fon had, in no uncertain terms, firmly established their influence in the nationalist movement. The KNC had become the 'people's' party, but i t had one serious defect; i t lacked an effective leader capable of retaining the support of it s membership. This was an unfortunate l i a b i l i t y for a leader who was dealing with Western-educated colleagues, some of whom had strong feelings and beliefs, and many of whom were opportunists. The break in the Southern Kamerun neutral bloc of 1953 should have warned him at least of opportunism within the ranks. Had Endeley been a calculating p o l i t i c i a n , he would have realized, following the outcry against the Ibo and the results of a l l the 93 elections since 1953, that secession from at least the Eastern Region gave the KNC i t s popularity. What would happen after secession from Nigeria, was not the problem of 1953-1954. The problem was secession. Unfortunately for the KNC, Endeley began to pay less and less atten-tion to secession following his three great victories of 1953-1954. He began to perceive Southern Kamerun developing into \"a self-governing region within an independent Federation of Nigeria\" and to accept the integration of Northern Kamerun with Northern Nigeria as inevitable. He began to relegate unification and reunification increasingly to the background. These tendencies 49 became stronger with txme and circumstances. Furthermore, possibly in order to counter the KPP-NCNC alliance, Endeley broke the neutrality of the 50 KNC in Nigerian p o l i t i c s and carried the KNC into an alliance with the AG. Endeley's autonomism was transforming into integrationism\u00E2\u0080\u0094the idea that Southern Kamerun should remain an integral part of Nigeria. This was a transformation which the calculating politicians, members of the KNC, except i t suited the desires of their a-Fon, could hardly tolerate. Indeed, these tendencies and transformation of Endeley were instrumental in forcing Foncha out of the KNC in 1954. Once out of the KNC, Foncha proceeded to form another p o l i t i c a l party, the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP). Augustin Ngom Jua, one of the thirteen elected members of the KNC also got out of the party immediately after Foncha and joined the KNDP. Four years after, 1958, Muna also severed his links with the KNC to join the KNDP. Some scholars, Rubin for instance, have attempted to explain the emergence of the KNDP in some respects accurately and in others inaccurately. According to Rubin, Foncha's break-away from the KNC occurred ostensibly because Endeley failed to maintain an attitude 94 of 'benevolent neutrality' in Nigerian p o l i t i c s ; . . . But there is l i t t l e doubt that ethnic allegiance also played a part in the decision of Foncha, A.N. Jua and other supporters in the grass-lands to break away from the KNC and form the Kamerun National Democratic Party.^1 Rubin's only evidence i s that Foncha, Jua, and Muna were grasslanders. Rubin's explanation i s an inaccurate reading of the situation. F i r s t , while Foncha and Jua came from the same ethnic group, Tikari, and two different Fondoms that were not even close to each other socially and p o l i t i c a l l y , and even in distance, Muna came from an entirely different ethnic group. Secondly, Vincent T. Lainjo who represented the largest Fondom in Southern Kamerun, Nso, Rev. J.C. Kangsen who represented a large area of Wum Division, and J.T. Ndze who represented Nkambe Division were a l l grasslanders. A l l these stayed with the KNC, Kangsen and Ndze up t i l l their premature death, and Lainjo un t i l the dissolution of the KNC. More-over, Ndze and Lainjo were from the same ethnic group, Tikari, with Jua and Foncha. More importantly, Jua and Lainjo came from two Fondoms, Kom and Nso respectively, which considered (and s t i l l consider) each other brothers. This analysis of their ethnicity and p o l i t i c a l identifications would appear to invalidate Rubin's assertion. Southern Kamerun nationalism did not consider ethnicity u n t i l during the plebiscite period particularly in the year 1960. This was a function, as w i l l be seen later, of the United Nations decision and the activities of the p o l i t i c a l leaders in 1959. Even when this occurred, people thought more in terms of the interests of the Fondoms rather than in terms of ethnic groups. The decisions of the majority of the p o l i t i c a l leaders, as w i l l be seen later, reflected the ideas of their a-Fon. At this time, Nso, Wum and Nkambe were largely autonomists which also implied integration with Nigeria. 95 So also were the Bakweri of Victoria Division. On the other hand, Bamenda central from where Foncha came and Kom from where Jua came talked secession and reunification. The emergence of the KNDP was a function of the talk of secession and reunification in Bamenda central and Kom. That is why Muna joined the KNDP after up to four years from the time that i t was formed; Muna's area was autonomist during these four years and when i t changed i t s ideas, Muna followed i t . Foncha's two personal reasons for quitting the KNC were accurate. He l e f t the KNC because Endeley refused to be neutral in Nigerian p o l i t i c s ; involvement in Nigerian p o l i t i c s was incompatible with secession and reunification. Kale who was involved in the affairs of the time and recorded some of them adds that the founders of the KNDP \"accused the leaders of the KNC of deviating from the policy 52 of Unification of a l l the sections of the Cameroons.\" The behaviour of the leaders of the KNDP was grounded in p o l i t i c a l calculations. Reunifi-cation, defined in their own special terms, was very popular in Bamenda and even among the autonomists at this time. The popularity of reunification too played a not insignificant part in the demands the various p o l i t i c a l parties made to the third United Nations Mission to Kamerun in 1955. The KNDP demanded unification and reunification from the Mission. So also did the KNC and KPP. The Mission, right from i t s entry into Southern Kamerun, was \"confronted with the demand for . . . [re]unification both as a slogan on the banners of and in the communications addressed to i t by the three principal p o l i t i c a l parties and some other groups.\" But none of these parties and groups provided any sound argument in favour of reunification. Nor did they provide any concrete proposals for bringing about reunification. The only argument was that, before 1914, \"the 96 two territories had been administered as one by the Germans.\" Nevertheless, the Mamfe Native Authority suggested that the United Nations should consult with the British and French authorities and \"set up machinery for the working out of the method of [re]unification.\"* The KNC and KNDP f e l t that road links between Northern and Southern Kamerun would lead both to unification and to the spread of ideas from the latter to the former. The KNC even went further and demanded the immediate establishment of a joint 53 council of Northern and Southern Kamerun. The demand for reunification, however, was based on calculations which differed from group to group according to the Mission. The p o l i t i c a l leaders used the idea of reunification and unification as an instrument to obtain more constitutional advancement for Southern Kamerun. Moreover, the idea had been spread by the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), an> Eastern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l party forced into Southern Kamerun when the French outlawed i t in that region. There was a sentimental feeling of racial and linguistic identity with Eastern Kamerunians especially among \"small tradesmen and exporters of controlled agricultural produce\" who f e l t that \"frontier regula-54 tions were too stringent.\" These calculations definitely played an important part in the\"calculations of these groups, but the most important factor lay elsewhere. Although i t did not emphasize i t , the Mission did put i t s finger on the reason for which even the KNC and KPP demanded unification and reunification. *The popularity of reunification in Mamfe Division this time must be under-stood also within the background of i t s representative, S.A. George. George's father was a Southern Kamerunian from Mamfe. But, his mother was an Eastern Kamerunian from Douala. As w i l l be seen in later chapters, as soon as he died, Mamfe turned i t s back to reunification. 97 Put very simply, many of the a-Fon were behind the actions of these p o l i t i c a l parties. By 1955, this group was either indifferent to unification and reunification or accepted the ideas with i t s own special definition. As the Mission discovered during the investigation with regard to the questions of the complete integration of the Nothern Cameroons in the Northern Region of Nigeria, of the united administration for the North and Southern Cameroons and of the Unif-cation of the Trust Territories, [that is reunification] the . . . Mission . . . found that the mass of the people, unaware of the p o l i t i c a l implications of these questions, was somewhat indifferent to them and interpreted them merely as an attempt to draw together the members of tribes separated by incomprehensible barriers.55 Although the KNC and the KPP leaders did not believe in reunification, they could not s i t back and watch the KNDP snatch popularity away from them by advocating an idea to which the electorate was indifferent, an idea which involved secession from Nigeria. Like the KNDP which was founded on secession and. . reunification, the KNC and the KPP showed that they did not understand what the electorate meant by unification and reunification. They would know the truth in 1957. But not un t i l the events of 1956 had taken place. In 1955, while the Mission was in the region, Endeley advocated seces-sion, reunification, and immediate unification. But as soon as the Mission departed from Kamerun, Endeley, in 1956, followed i t to New York where he denounced a l l these ideas at the United Nations. There, he demanded only rapid constitutional advancements to bring Southern Kamerun to the status of a f u l l y self-governing region within the Nigerian context. Foncha was quick to counter this move. On March 1, 1956, he dissociated himself and the KNDP from Endeley's \"private\" and \"personal\" views. Foncha argued that Endeley's v i s i t was ostensibly that of a representative of Southern Kamerun but, in fact, i t was private and personal because Endeley had no mandate from the 98 \"people.\" He had gone to the United Nations \"without consulting the opinions 56 of the people through the p o l i t i c a l leaders and the Native Authorities.\" While later events would prove Foncha wrong\u00E2\u0080\u0094the views were not Endeley's personal and private views\u00E2\u0080\u0094he, Foncha, did indicate the basis, as early as 1956, upon which his p o l i t i c a l philosophy was grounded. He must liste n to the voices of the 'people' and be their sounding board, not the other way round. The KNDP was not the only p o l i t i c a l party committed to reunification by this time in Southern Kamerun. By 1956, the UPC was getting well- . established and well-organized as a p o l i t i c a l party to reckon with in Southern Kamerun. So also were i t s Youths' and Women's organizations. In Southern Kamerun, i t s p o l i t i c a l programme remained the same as that which was responsible for i t s dissolution by the French in Eastern Kamerun. There were three aspects to i t s programme: immediate reunification, immediate independenceand the freedom of the reunified Kamerun nation from foreign 57 influences. These three aspects were one and indivisible and there could be no distinguishing between them. Indeed, i t was the fusion of these three elements that gave reunification an.! anti-imperialist character in Southern Kamerun among those who supported the UPC and i t s later successor. With the establishment of the UPC, four p o l i t i c a l parties, with over-lapping programmes, operated in Southern Kamerun by the end of 1956. The KNC and the KPP s t i l l paid tribute to unification and reunification but i t was becoming obvious that they believed only in integration and autonomy within Nigeria. Indeed, they had transformed into integrationists although they did not like being branded that way. Secession, unification, and reunification, a l l having equal emphasis, provided the core of the KNDP programme. In other 99 words, the KNDP was basically reunificationist at this point in time. So also was the UPC, but with a difference; everything must be immediate. Until these positions had been tested at a general election, i t was d i f f i c u l t to know which of them was, in reality, the most popular. The test came in 1957 during that year's March 15 elections to the Southern Kamerun House of Assembly. During the campaigns, the UPC vigorously offered immediate reunification; i t \"was the only significant party that 58 demanded the recreation of Kamerun as quickly as possible.\" Unfortunately for the UPC and the cause of reunification, the other parties, the KNC and the KPP in particular, had combined forces in 1956 to warn the a-Fon against reunification, identifying i t with the UPC, violence, and communism. For example, after the plebiscite, the women of Essimbi;. complained that reunifi-59 cation might lead to the death of their husbands and to Communism. The fact that the a-Fon would not deal with Communism and violence also influenced the actions of the other p o l i t i c a l parties during the compaigns for the 1957 general elections; the rest of the parties played down reunifi-cation. The KNC and the KPP compaigned vigorously for a f u l l and autonomous self-governing region for Southern Kamerun within the framework of Nigeria. The KNC in particular avoided the question of reunification totally but by maintaining \"useful contacts\" with Eastern Kamerun authorities, i t gave the l i e that i t had not abandoned reunification. The KNDP called for \"benevolent neutrality\" towards Nigeria, for the separation of Southern Kamerun from Nigeria, for \"direct administration\" of Southern Kamerun by \"Great Britain,\" for peaceful co-existence among the ethnic groups of Southern Kamerun and \"natives of t r i b a l groups extraneous to the Cameroons,\" and for ultimate reunification \"on the basis of mutual consent.\" 6 0 The shifting opinion among 100 the a-Fon against reunification had forced Foncha to introduce the f i r s t condition to reunification. Considering the shifting opinion of the a-Fon against reunification and previous experiences with other parties, the results of the elections, based on these various offers, could be expected. The KPP, the 'Ibo dominated party' was discredited as early as 1953. It was fighting a losing battle. It won two out of the thirteen contested seats. The UPC, by offering reunification, lost a l l i t s deposits. The KNC, by avoiding reunifi-cation totally, won six out of the thirteen contested seats. The KNDP, by talking reunification with less emphasis than the UPC, and with a condition, and by stressing secession was able to win the rest of the seats, that is the five remaining seats. 6 1 It appears that i f the KNDP had avoided reunification altogether, the electorate would have chased the KNC away from power for trying to take them to Nigeria. Whatever the case, after the elections, the UPC met the fate, which i t had experienced in Eastern Kamerun, in Southern Kamerun. Ten weeks after the elections, on May 30, 1957 the British banned the UPC and outlawed i t with i t s members. The o f f i c i a l explanation was simple. There existed \"a grave possibility that in order to achieve i t s p o l i t i c a l objectives the Party may 62 have to resort to violence in the Southern Cameroons.\" This explanation, however, is questionable. Western Kamerun was the last place where the UPC would adopt violence; the UPC could not be working for reunification and at the same time frighten Western Kamerunians away from i t through violence. The British explanation was tantamount to saying that the UPC would work against the goal i t had set for i t s e l f . Not surprisingly, however, the dissolution of the UPC was greeted with 101 joy by many Southern Kamerunians. As early as 1956, almost a l l the \"poli-t i c a l factions\" in Southern Kamerun \"had come to consider the exiled UPC leadership an unwanted, troublesome influence\" in the region. 6 3 When the UPC rejuvenated under the disguised name One Kamerun (OK), almost a l l the 64 rest of the p o l i t i c a l parties wished to see i t banned. So unpopular was the UPC that Foncha, on February 11, 1958, f e l t compelled to deny any con-nections with the UPC in the Southern Kamerun House of Assembly, 6 5 although his own programme was the closest to that of the UPC. Indeed, the British were very accurate when, at the United Nations, they refuted the charge made by the UPC to the effect that the British had caused the crushing defeat of the party at the elections. As the British saw i t , \"the fact that the party failed to secure a seat was a reflection of the w i l l of the people.\" 6 6 This popular wish notwithstanding, there were people in Southern Kamerun who not only sympathized with but also supported the UPC and i t s programme. The majority of them were Eastern Kamerunians resident in Southern Kamerun, many of whom were opposed to the French in Eastern Kamerun and had sought sanctuary where the Pax Britannica was apparently king. Furthermore, nearly a l l Southern Kamerun graduates and students in higher institutes of learning, no matter where these institutes were located in the world, were with the UPC. There were also a handful of other Southern Kamerunians, who had either been politicized or who merely loved adventure, that supported the UPC. As soon as the UPC was outlawed, these groups r a l l i e d behind Ndeh Ntumazah of Mankon, Bamenda, as President and Joseph Innocent Kamsi, an Eastern Kamerunian livin g in Southern Kamerun, as Vice-President, to form the OK. As a rejuvenation of the UPC, the objectives and style of the OK remained the same. Immediate reunification, immediate independence, and the creation 102 of a Kamerun nation free from foreign influences were the objectives of the OK. These elements were one and indivisible and there could be no distinguishing between them. Like the UPC, the style was propagandists and pacific. It devoted less of i t s arguments to i t s objectives and more to \"recriminations about the past and to demands for complete amnesty for everybody connected with the UPC and i t s a f f i l i a t e s . \" It attracted attention through \"standardized banners, demonstrations by men and women dressed in uniforms, songs and chants, and packages of 'petitions,' the great majority of which consisted of similar texts and slogans written or mimeographed in French.\" While the OK was getting off the ground in 1957, events to which Southern Kamerun could not be indifferent were taking place in Nigeria. By this time, i t had become obvious that independence for Nigeria was a matter of time. The Lyttleton Constitution which came into effect in 1954 after the collapse of the MacPherson Constitution, and which made Southern Kamerun a Quasi-Region was ill-equipped as an instrument for Nigerian independence. The necessary review of the constitution took place between May and June, 1957, at London. Endeley, Ndze, and the Fon of Bali Nyonga, Galega II, represented the KNC. Kale represented the KPP, his party. Foncha went for the KNDP. The UPC was busy disappearing. The OK had not yet organized or rather reorganized i t s e l f properly. It is even doubtful whether the OK could bring i t s e l f to s i t at a conference table with Nigerians to discuss Kamerun affairs. As seen earlier, Habib 'represented' Northern Kamerun. The positions taken by these Western Kamerunians at the conference remained substantially the same. The KNC and the KPP which were now in alliance, KNC-KPP Alliance (KNC-KPP hereafter), demanded a separate and 103 f u l l y autonomous region for Southern Kamerun within the Nigerian Federation. The KNC-KPP no longer mentioned u n i f i c a t i o n or r e u n i f i c a t i o n . The KNDP admitted that Western Kamerun would have to e x i s t within the Nigerian framework f o r a short time. But a f t e r t h i s interim period, u n i f i c a t i o n would take place as a preparatory step to r e u n i f i c a t i o n . As seen e a r l i e r , Habib could perceive no other future for Northern Kamerun than that i t 68 remain permanently an i n t e g r a l part of Northern Nigeria. The. o f f e r the B r i t i s h made t h i s time was more i n favour of the i n t e g r a t i o n i s t s than i t was for any other group. Southern Kamerun would become a f u l l y autonomous, not self-governing, region w i t h i n N i g e r i a . The Leader of Government Business would now become Premier. The Assembly would have a Speaker appointed by the Commissioner i n consultation with the Premier. Ministers would be appointed by the Commissioner i n consultation with the Premier. Southern Kamerun would be represented at Lagos by twelve elected representatives. But, t h i s was not to take e f f e c t immediately. I t s t i l l had to be confirmed by the Resumed Conference to be held f i f t e e n months l a t e r . 69 Habib got what he wanted. When making the o f f e r to Southern Kamerun, the C o l o n i a l Secretary indicated where h i s own sentiments lay. As he saw i t , the B r i t i s h Government f u l l y recognized \" t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n to the Cameroons under the Trusteeship Agreement.\" One of these was \"to administer the T e r r i t o r y as an i n t e g r a l part of Nigeria.\" The Agreement would have to be modified when Nigeria became independent. One of two choices would then be open to Southern Kamerun. The region might remain part of Nigeria but i t would have to do so f r e e l y . I t might continue under trusteeship, but i n that instance, the Secretary \"must i n fairness add the warning that you [Southern Kamerunians] would not thereby 104 be given the golden key to the Bank of England.\" While the decision rested wholly in the hands of Southern Kamerunians,. \"many of the best friends of the Cameroons do not foresee a destiny more lik e l y to promote 70 her happiness and prosperity than continued association with Nigeria.\" The Secretary had no word for both unification and reunification; these were not among the alternatives he had for Southern Kamerun. Indeed, the warning against continued trusteeship and the statement about the \"best friends of the Cameroons\" meant that the Secretary had only one alternative for Southern Kamerun. That was integration with Nigeria. Although the grant of a f u l l Region to Southern Kamerun did not involve the immediate introduction of a ministerial system of government, and indeed, as w i l l be seen presently, the Governor-General was opposed to i t , the KNC_ KPP called an emergency session on February 11, 1958, to introduce a motion to that effect. Had Southern Kamerun been a Self-Governing Region, this attempt would have been understandable. But, at this point in time, i t was not. Nevertheless, the opportunists within the KPP pushed Endeley into an action that would cost him his already uncertain Government. This action was the successful attempt to introduce a ministerial system of government in Southern Kamerun in 1958, despite strong opposition to i t from several, quarters. The 1958 Diary of J.T. Ndze has a lot to say about the introduction of this ministerial system of government. As the second top-ranking member of the KPP in the KNC-KPP, and as an opportunist who saw the opportunity for becoming a minister, i t was Mbile who, on February 11, 1958, introduced the motion in the House of Assembly that a ministerial system of government be 7 introduced. Mbile's motion was \"Seconded by Array who beat about the bush.\" 105 The reaction of the Opposition, the KNDP, was bitter. The f i r s t in this group to react was the Deputy Leader of the KNDP, Jua. He f i r s t complained that he did not understand the wording of the motion and then rejected the idea of saying prayers to Her Majesty's Government. After this, he proceeded to argue against the motion. Southern Kamerun was already a Region. Fresh elections were necessary before the introduction of the ministerial system of government. What the Region needed were \"amenities,\" not a ministerial system of government; and,a ministerial system of government was not a prerequisite for \"amenities.\" The introduction of this system of government involved a change in the constitution, and, a change in the constitution must be referred back to the electorate. He ended 72 by calling upon the British to interfere and stem the move. Jua was followed immediately in his opposition to the motion, respec-tively, by Mua and Muna* who had just crossed the carpet. Mua described the motion as \"Thoughtless [and] untimely.\" He f e l t that a \"Cabinet\" could only be introduced after \"fresh elections.\" He wondered how a government with only eight, elected members would want to have five ministers and five Parliamentary Secretaries. He accused the non-elected (Special Members) Parliamentarians of being weak by refusing to oppose the motion and, indeed supporting i t because they wished to s i t on the governing side of the House. Muna was \"Happy to s i t with [the] KNDP,\" and his KNDP colleagues had \"made a l l [the] points on the motion.\" He did not understand why Mbile failed to *Before Muna crossed the carpet in 1958, he was Deputy Leader of the KNC. The Alliance between the KNC and KPP thus reduced him to third place instead of his second place. While the secessionist mood in his Fondom played a major part in forcing him out of the KNC, his reduction in rank might have had something to do with i t . 106 introduce this motion during the London Conference as Mbile himself was present there. He saw no \"need for the emergency meeting of the House for Cabinet Government.\" Anyway, the fast coming elections would prove which was the government of the \"people.\" Moreover, the Governor-General had rejected the idea of a ministerial system of government for Southern Kamerun. It was obvious that the KNC Government had lost the confidence of the people. The KPP was being deceived by the KNC. Finally, the Southern 73 Kameruninas did not want ministers at this time. The next opposition to the motion came from the Leader of the KNDP and, after he had spoken, something unusual in Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c s occurred. Foncha supported a l l that his KNDP colleagues had said and asked the Govern-ment Party to reconsider the motion. When he attempted to show how the motion was incompatible with the London agreement, he was \"Ruled out of order.\" Nevertheless, he demanded that the motion be withdrawn \"or else we stage a 74 walk out.\" When the motion was passed, with two non-elected members, Ambrose and Manga-Williams, voting for i t , Nsakwa, a non-KNDP member, \"walked 75 out with the KNDP.\" The passage of the motion and the walk-out by the KNDP were responsible for Foncha's February 20, 1958, telegram to the United Nations. On February 20, 1958, that i s nine days after the walk-out, Foncha dispatched a telegram to the United Nations arguing that Self-Government for Southern Kamerun was not possible in 1958. It was not wise for the minis-7 6 t e r i a l system of government to be introduced un t i l 1959. Central to this opposition, however, was the fear, later j u s t i f i e d , that the KNC-KPP would take advantage of the new system of government to manipulate the January 24, 1959, general elections in favour of integration with Nigeria. 107 The student wing of the reunificationists was even more outspoken in the protest to the introduction of this system of government than Foncha was. On March 19, 1958, the Southern Kamerun students in the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, stated that the situation in Southern Kamerun was \"grave\" because the British were \"endeavouring to use certain personalities in the undemocratically installed Southern Cameroons House of Assembly to swindle the territory into integration with an independent Federation of Nigeria.\" It was not democratic \"to implement decisions of a conference\" which were \"so dependent on other decisions taken by the same conference, where such 'other decisions' have not yet been f u l f i l l e d . \" Nor was i t in the interest of Southern Kamerun to strive to have ministers before the elections. Since the 1959 elections would be \"decisive on the integration-secession issue,\" the United Nations i t s e l f should supervise them \"in 77 order to prevent irregularities and ensure f a i r play.\" Perhaps more importantly was the position the a-Fon, who were now working in concert, the Concert of the a-Fon, took in the controversy. Although by this time many of them supported Endeley while the majority were tending towards Foncha, in a conference held in Mankon Town, a conference in which both Foncha and Endeley were present, these Crowned Princes decided that the ministerial system of government should not be introduced before the 78 crucial elections of January 1959. Instead of heeding this timely warning, Endeley decided to reply to the a-Fon on the day he was to introduce the ministerial system of government. This reply came in May, 1958. On the day Endeley was installed as Premier, he issued a policy statement, at a banquet marking the occasion, which was a direct confrontation of the a-Fon. His Government would preserve 108 the Fondoms with the role of the a-Fon \"as a valuable traditional institu-tion.\" The a-Fon had \"a useful stabilizing influence among the people, and the Government would seek to co-operate with them in everything i t did.\" But we shall also expect that in their own interest, Chiefs and traditional rulers must keep clear of party p o l i t i c s . . . as this w i l l only expose them to the disdain of a section of their subjects. Any Chief who persists, despite this timely advice, to participate in party p o l i t i c s does so at his own risk.79 Endeley had lost the 1959 elections in May, 1958. The introduction of the ministerial system of government against the desires of the a-Fon was to serve notice to these Crowned Princes that he was the authority, besides the British, in Southern Kamerun. The a-Fon took note of i t . By warning the a-Fon, he was virtually putting a wound in the hand that feed him. Indeed, his whole policy was asking, i f not commanding, the a-Fon to surrender their crucial role in the nationalist movement established since 1953. The a-Fon had no wish to surrender a role that was naturally theirs. They must continue to significantly influence the nationalist movement. But before they showed this in practice, they had a reply for Endeley. They recognized that their role was traditional, and that the Fondom was \"a traditional institution.\" But they reserved \"the right to interfere with and correct the affairs of the country when i t is realized that things are going radically wrong.\" The time had come for such \"interference\" because \"they and their people wanted not to be 'integrated' with Nigeria but to 'secede' from i t . \" They were demanding \"secession\" from Nigeria. The purpose of secession was \"to concentrate on much harder work towards self-government and independence outside the Federation of Nigeria as a direct member of the British [sic] Commonwealth of Nations.\" They said nothing about unification 80 or reunification. Endeley had had his reply, a parcel he least expected 109 or wished to receive. He had apparently pushed the a-Fon, reluctantly to Foncha. \"Southern Cameroons Chiefs' Conference convening from time to time issued pronouncements that, at least during 1958, were hostile to the KNC/KPP Alliance and gave support to the 'secessionist'* policy of the KNDP,\" although in \"the past these chiefs gave their support on the whole to Dr. 81 Endeley,\" Endeley f i r s t abondoned the a-Fon, as the UPC did, before the a-Fon abandoned him, as they did to the UPC. The a-Fon-Endeley confrontation had two important elements to i t and both parties knew i t . The f i r s t element, which initiated the confrontation, involved Endeley's policy of integration to which the a-Fon were, at this time, opposed. The second element, equally important, i f not more so at this time, was authority. Put very simply, i t was, who ruled Southern Kamerun, Endeley or the Concert of the a-Fon? Or, to put i t more accurately, who ruled Southern Kamerun, the Western-educated e l i t e or the traditional rulers? These two elements came out very clearly in both Endeley's policy statement vis-a-vis the a-Fon and in the reply of the a-Fon to that statement. However, Endeley gave more weight to the authority issue than to the conflict over his policy regarding Southern Kamerun and Nigeria. Later on in the year (1958), he continued to confront the a-Fon on this issue. Before the London May-June, 1957 Constitutional Conference rose, i t was agreed that the conference would resume on September 29, 1958. In readiness for the 1957 conference, Endeley selected (possibly in consultation with the a-Fon) the Fon of Bali Nyonga as one member of the KNC delegation. During the con-frontation, the Fon of Bali Nyonga was on the side of his colleagues; *Foncha's policy at this time was too cumbrous to be called secessionist. Secessionism was the policy of the a-Fon, not of Foncha. 110 Endeley was, as the a-Fon c a l l every person other than a Fon, a \"small boy,\" or, in pidgin English, a 'small pikin.' Although the Fon of Bali Nyonga sub-sequently came with Endeley to London, Endeley saw an opportunity to assert his authority over Southern Kamerun. This opportunity came when he was about to select the next Fon for the Resumed Conference. Endeley refused to consult with the a-Fon, by-passed the Fon of Bali. * one of the four more powerful a-Fon of JSouthern Kamerun, and selected the Fon of Bum, one of the least powerful a-Fon of Southern Kamerun, to come with him to London as a member of the KNC delegation. The Concert of the a-Fon took note of Endeley's challenge and replied to i t in words. Later in the year, however, after the KNC had appointed a grass-lands chief, the newly promoted Fon of Bum, as i t s adviser at the resumed London Conference, and l e f t the Fon of Bali (who had participated in the 1957 conference) out of i t s delegation, the 'Chiefs Conference' protested that this had been done without consultation with them and that they had no confidence in the KNC/KPP Government.82 This confrontation had thus cleared away the doubts which some of the a-Fon might have had regarding Endeley's attempts to assert his authority over them. During the Resumed Constitutional Conference, the various p o l i t i c a l parties clearly outlined their objectives. The KNC-KPP, represented by Endeley and Kale, stood for the attainment by Southern Kamerun of \"the status of a region equal in a l l respects with the other regions in the independent Nigeria.\" To that effect, they requested \"rapid constitutional progress\" in order that the region might \"take i t s rightful place 'pari passu 1 with the *The Diary of J.T. Ndze for 1958 indicates that the leadership of the KNC discussed the Fon of Bali Nyonga before Endeley took this action. I l l other regions when Nigeria attained independence.\" (these parties had now full y transformed from merely autonomists to integrationists.) The KNDP, represented by Foncha, was silent over unification and reunification. But i t demanded the secession of Southern Kamerun from Nigeria. It made i t clear that i f i t won the January, 1959, general elections, i t would take steps to pull Southern Kamerun out of Nigeria. It was opposed to any constitutional advancement for Southern Kamerun \"which led to, or had as i t s 83 objective, closer association with Nigeria.\" At London, in late 1958, therefore, the KNDP, in line with the position of the a-Fon, had transformed from reunificationist to secessionist. As suggested earlier, Ntumazah, or rather the OK, could not bring himself to s i t at a conference table to discuss Kamerun affairs with the Anglo-Nigerian imperialists. It is not surprising, therefore, that the OK was not represented at this Resumed Conference. The decisions of this Resumed Conference weighed very heavily in favour of the Integrationists. The Secretary of State for the Colonies agreed \"in principle\" to self-government for Southern Kamerun. As he saw i t , the \"undertaking\" of 1953 \"to accord self-government to any Region that request i t , \" did not apply to Southern Kamerun and \"there was therefore no commitment on the United Kingdom Government to agree to further constitutuional advance-ment\" for Southern Kamerun. Nevertheless, he was \"prepared to accept in principle [that] at the appropriate time,\" Southern Kamerun should become \"a region fu l l y equal in status to the other regions of Nigeria.\" He then enumerated a l l the elements of the new Southern Kamerun Region of Nigeria,* *For the outline of the constitution of this new Region, see U.N., T.C., T/1426, Annex III, January 20, 1959, pp. 1-4 112 elements which made Southern Kamerun a Region equal to the other Regions of Nigeria. (But he made one concession to the secessionists.) It was 84 l e f t for the new Government to bring the changes into effect. In other words, .the changes would not be effected u n t i l after the January 24, 1959, general elections. It appears, therefore, that the British were willing to go along with those Southern Kamerun nationalists who expressed a position closest to their own. This Resumed Conference was followed almost immediately by the fourth, f i n a l , and most important United Nations Mission to Kamerun. The Mission arrived in Western Kamerun (North and South) on October 29, 1958, and l e f t 85 for Eastern Kamerun on November 14, 1958. The Mission was, thus, in Western Kamerun, for such an important mission, for only two weeks. In spite of this time limit, the various leaders of Southern Kamerun did meet with the Mission, outlined their programmes, and suggested what ought to be done and how. The f i r s t to do so was Endeley and the KNC-KPP. Endeley began by stating accurately\u00E2\u0080\u0094where this means in a l l his contacts with the Mission, 1949, 1952, 1955\u00E2\u0080\u0094that he had \"consistently championed the cause\" of u n i f i -cation to recreate the pre-1914 Kamerun. While he s t i l l upheld the idea, \"new events and circumstances\" had overtaken him and had \"removed the question of [re]unification out of the realm of urgency and priority\" in which he \"had earlier placed i t . \" Reunification was not provided for in the Trusteeship Agreement. Western and Eastern Kamerun had developed separately with d i f -ferent p o l i t i c a l and cultural systems and prejudices. Northern Kamerun had been \"absorbed\" into Northern Nigeria. Eastern Kamerun had been \"assimilated into .the French Union.\" A l l this considered, i t was \"unlikely that the 113 Cameroons would ever return to the status i t was before 1914. Other factors too s t i l l had to be considered. Reunification would be unpractical and retrogressive for Southern Kamerun; \"the organic incompatibilities in the cultural and p o l i t i c a l systems of the two sectors [of Kamerun would] evoke such violent eruptions that the act of union [was] most li k e l y to be rendered s t e r i l e , and progress . . . brought to a stand-s t i l l . \" Had reunification been based on a gradual and evolutionary prin-ciple, from time past, through a \"sustained and unfettered contact\" between the two sectors, reunification would have been possible; the approach would have led to \"a gradual process of mutual assimilation over the years.\" Moreover, freedom of expression, of p o l i t i c a l activity, and of movement which characterized Southern Kamerun were lacking in Eastern Kamerun. It was clear, therefore, that the \"Colonial oneness\" of Kamerun had been weakened by the enforced partition \"and the passage of time\" had but forced the partition \"to assume a regrettable degree of permanence.\" Southern Kamerun could not forego the advantages i t had derived from the British Government. Rather than leap into \"an uncertain French Cameroons Federation,\" Southern Kamerun would continue \" i t s already and assured progress as a self-governing 87 State in the Federation of Nigeria.\" Endeley was now thinking more in terms of a State of Southern Kamerun. He anticipated the various Regions of Nigeria evolving into states to form the United States of Nigeria. But, before this should happen, Nigeria would be a Federation which would include the State of Southern Kamerun. Thus, Southern Kamerun particularism would be maintained in the Federal univer-salism of Nigeria. This was the f i r s t indication that Endeley was once more beginning to transform from an integrationist to an associationist. 114 On the other hand, the reunificationists, or rather the anti-imperialists, had nothing into which to metamorphose. Kamsi, (Ntumazah was at the United Nations) using authentic, but deceptive evidence, argued that the \"Kamerunians of both zones and of a l l classes of society,\" had decided \"in favour of the unity and independence of the country.\" The UPC and i t s a f f i l i a t e s were outlawed and dissolved because they favoured \"the unity and independence of the Kamerun.\" The Southern Kamerun Parliament on February 19, 1958 had called for \"the independence of the country in 1959.\" On March 13-14, the OK demanded \"the reunification of Kamerun and the immediate proclamation of i t s independence.\" On April 6, 1958, the a-Fon of Southern Kamerun \"unanimously\" called for '\"immediate secession\" of the region from Nigeria and for \"the immediate independence of the country.\" On May 19, 1958, the Assembly of Kamerunian Women, (a rejuvenation of the a f f i l i a t e Women's Organization of the UPC which the British dissolved on May 30, 1957) demanded \"the immediate unity and independence of Kamerun.\" Finally, on October 20, 1958, the Eastern Kamerun Parliament demanded \"the termination of the Trusteeship in a reunified Kamerun on 1 January 1960.\" In light of a l l this, the United Nations should respect the wishes and desires of the Kamerunians. . Reunification and immediate independence should 88 be effected for Kamerun. Unfortunately, Kamsi, or rather the OK, did not apparently see through the evidence he himself had amassed. As far as Southern Kamerun was con-cerned, the evidence showed that only the OK and i t s a f f i l i a t e Women's Organization demanded reunification. The Parliament called for independence. The Concert of the a-Fon called for secession and independence. Were the United Nations to respect the views and desires of Southern Kamerunians, as 115 Kamsi advised, secession and independence would have carried the day. However, Kamsi was not thinking in terms of Southern Kamerun. He thought in terms of Kamerun and in this, his advice, i f accepted, would have given the OK reunification and independence, but not immediately. While the OK thought in terms of Kamerun, the Concert of the a-Fon thought in terms of Southern Kamerun. In i t s policy statement the Concert made this and i t s programme absolutely certain. The United Nations would recall and appreciate that \"the repeated appeals\" of the region had always been \"for economic, educational, social and p o l i t i c a l development.\" But this time, the \"paramount concern\u00E2\u0080\u0094'OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH AN IN-DEPENDENT NIGERIA'\u00E2\u0080\u0094[had] been made complicated, upsetting and ruinous.\" It was neither the fault of the British nor of the United Nations. It was not even the fault of the Nigerians. It was the fault of \"a few Cameroons beneficiaries.\" The Southern Kamerunians \"honestly and relentlessly demand secession from the Federation of Nigeria,\" as a f i r s t step to \"Self-Government and Independence outside the Federation of Nigeria.\" This new state, (Smaller Kamerun) would have direct membership in the Commonwealth. Endeley's programme did not \"reflect the wishes of the masses of this Territory.\" The Southern Kamerunians no longer had any confidence in the KNC Government. Endeley could no longer speak for the people. They had voted into office the KNC Government \"because of i t s secession doctrine in the event of Nigeria becoming independent.\" But, now, Endeley had changed from \"secession\" to \"integration\" and again to \"association.\" They were not prepared to tolerate this inconsistency and dictatorial government of Endeley. Nor were they prepared to \"achieve independence within the Federation of Nigeria.\" Endeley's request that trusteeship be terminated, was \"not in 116 89 keeping with the desire of the people of this Territory.\" The a-Fon had no time, no place, and no word either for unification or reunification. This would weigh very heavily in Foncha's calculations. Foncha's policy, or rather that of the KNDP, was anchored mainly on the position of the a-Fon and slightly on Foncha's sentiment and the position of the University students and graduates. The KNDP saw three problems of the day: the relationship between Western Kamerun and Nigeria, the relation-ship between Northern and Southern Kamerun, and the relationship between Western and Eastern Kamerun. The last two problems were a \"consequence of the f i r s t . \" The Mission was \"free to take i t s own decision,\" but i t should be that which would \"set the Cameroons free from i t s entanglement in the Federation of Nigeria.\" There was no question that the region wanted \"secession\" from Nigeria. Northern Kamerun might be silent on the issue, but that was due to the fact that i t \"had no true representatives.\" Moreover, the \"degree\" of i l l i t e r a c y in that region was too high and i t s inhabitants were unaware of what was \"happening to them.\" Those people should be educated by the United Nations \"to understand the grave situation of having themselves implicated in an independent Federation of Nigeria.\" The desire for seces-sion in Southern Kamerun came \"from the masses\" and had \"influenced the stand now firmly taken by the KNDP.\" It was not \"the other way round as the few advocates of integration asserted that i t was the KNDP which was influencing opinion in favour of i t . \" Secession was sought to maintain a \"national iden-t i t y \" and there could be no \"appeasement\" about i t . Since the Southern Kameruninans desired secession in order to build \"a Cameroons nation,\" the 90 KNDP.hadno choice but \"to respect their wishes.\" There was no alternative. Foncha next turned his attention to reunification. Reunification was 117 predicated on secession. It was, therefore, \"proper to make secession the beginning of reunification.\" It could not be \"imposed.\" The desire for i t was obvious on both sides of the Mungo* but, i t would s t i l l have to be confirmed by the Southern Kamerun Parliament. When the Eastern and Southern Kamerun Governments both would begin to speak \"in favour of the move,\" the British and the French should lend them \"their co-operation.\" Reunification was an easy thing i f desired by \"two self-governing States.\" The KNDP preferred reunification to be on a federal basis, but the issue would s t i l l have to be discussed. No matter what form i t took, the Southern Kemrun Government would f i r s t have to pass a motion in the House \"to con-91 firm the consent of the people\" on this side of the Mungo. Like Endeley, Foncha had transformed two times. Between 1954 and 1956, he was a reunificationist. Between 1957 and September 1958, he was a secessionist. Now between October and November, 1958, Foncha was something without a name. He was f u l l y committed to secession. He also appeared ful l y committed to reunification but he guarded i t with so many conditions as to make one wonder where he actually stood on the issue. The best that can be said for Foncha's policy at this time is that i t was a fusion of secession and reunification, strongly inclined to secession without ruling out reunification. Foncha was attempting to be a sounding board of both the a-Fon and the university type Southern Kamerunians. For want of an adequate name 'to describe this position and attitude, this study refers to *The Mungo is one of the rivers in Kamerun which previously acted at some points as the Inter-Kamerunian boundary line. The former Southern Kamerunians today, more often than not, use the expression, \"on the other side of the Mungo\" to refer to former Eastern Kamerun in an effort, humourously, to mitigate the fact that Kamerun had once been partitioned. 118 i t as Fonchaism and to i t s supporters as the Foncharians. These leaders were aware that, i n view of the c o n f l i c t i n g programmes they advocated and the involvement of the a-Fon i n the c o n f l i c t , some form of consultation with the electorate would have to take place. Consequently, they d i d not f a i l to show the form of consultation which they i n d i v i d u a l l y or i n groups preferred. Endeley f e l t that the January 1959 general e l e c -tions should decide the issue and i f h i s party won, \" i t would be taken for granted that our Party p o l i c y has the f u l l support of the majority of our people.\" However, f a i l i n g t h i s , he would accept a p l e b i s c i t e which the B r i t i s h had recommended, provided that the \"referendum be as simple as possible and be conducted with the minimum of expense and inconvenience to the i l l i t e r a t e masses of our people.\" Furthermore, there should be \"safe-guards to prevent the i n f i l t r a t i o n of saboteurs from the French sector i n t o our own sector i n order to influence the referendum i n favour of the 92 [ r e ] u n i f i c a t i o n i s t s . \" Although Endeley used the words p l e b i s c i t e and referendum interchangeably, i n the Kamerun context, he r e a l l y meant a p l e b i s c i t e which would have no question about excluding Eastern Kamerun from p a r t i c i p a t i o n . On the other hand, the a-Fon and the r e u n i f i c a t i o n i s t s i n p a r t i c u l a r used the two words quite d i f f e r e n t l y . The a-Fon stated simply that \"A p l e b i s c i t e w i l l be the only medium through which the free wishes of the 93 people on t h e i r future can d e f i n i t e l y be ascertained.\" As w i l l be seen l a t e r , the a-Fon used the word to mean that only Southern Kameruninas would be involved i n the p l e b i s c i t e whereas Endeley would l i k e any person resident i n Southern Kamerun, a f t e r a t t a i n i n g c e r t a i n q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , to p a r t i c i p a t e . The OK preferred u n i l a t e r a l action by the United Nations, that i s that the 119 United Nations should reunite Kamerun without any consultation. Failing this, there should be a referendum in which the votes from a l l of Kamerun would be treated as one. But, i f the United Nations should in s i s t on separate plebiscites, then the votes in Northern Kamerun should be treated separately from those of Southern Kamerun. Whatever the case, \"The future 94 of our country should in no event be decided by an election.\" The OK did not thus use the words in the same way as Endeley did. Like the OK, the KNDP considered several-alternatives. These included a plebiscite, opinion, and elections. A plebiscite was only necessary when the Mission f e l t that there was \"no sufficient proof from the people in favour of secession or integration.\" Where the people were f u l l y aware of the implications of the issues raised during a general election, \"the result could be taken to reflect the wishes of the people\" provided that the conduct of the elections was \" f a i r and just and free from fraud,\" and the winning issue did so with a \"big majority.\" Should the Mission be convinced that there was \"an overwhelming public opinion in favour of one of the issues,\" and this was supported by \"the results of a general election,\" the Mission 95 was free to make \" i t s conclusions accordingly.\" Like Fonchaism, i t is d i f f i c u l t to say with absolute certainty where the KNDP stood on this issue. But, i t appears that i t preferred opinion for the test. Whatever the case, the programmes which the Mission found in Southern Kamerun in 1958 can now be summarized. The KNC-KPP stood for integration or rather association with Nigeria in a Southern Kamerun State. They also wanted, to use only the preferred alternative, to see the issues resolved by a general election. The OK stood for reunification and immediate independence. It f e l t that the United Nations should unilaterally reunite Kamerun. The 120 a-Fon stood for secession, continued trusteeship, independence, and member-ship in the Commonwealth successively. They demanded a plebiscite to settle the issues. The KNDP stood for a fusion of secession and reunifi-cation with more emphasis on secession. It preferred that public opinion be used as a means of consulting with the Southern Kamerunians. It appears that the Mission was aware that the view of the a-Fon was the most popular. As the Mission saw i t i t s e l f , \"loyalty to the tribe, rivalry between tribes, and the influence of powerful chiefs,\" were factors 96 to be reckoned with in Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c s . Loyalty to the Fondom, except where there was rivalry within an empire, meant that in case of a conflict between a Fon and a p o l i t i c a l leader' over policy, even i f both came from the same Fondom, the Fon would more probably be voicing.the opinion of the majority of his subjects who would stand behind, him. Decisions involving the interests of the whole Fondom are grounded on a consensus within the Fondom and the Fon himself is there to maintain tradi-tion. At the time the Mission was in Southern Kamerun, the a-Fon acted in concert and agreed on a programme. But despite evidence that the a-Fon were both influential and representative of large numbers of people, the Mission ignored the Concert's programme. Unfortunately, the Mission's report was not in line with the situation as described above and based mainly on the evidence the Mission i t s e l f gathered. On the one hand there was the view that the future of the Southern Cameroons lay in continuing the course which had brought i t to the threshold of regional self-government, and in becoming one of the self-governing regions of the independent Federation of Nigeria in 1960. On the other side there was the view that the time had arrived for the Southern Cameroons to be separated from Nigeria\u00E2\u0080\u0094 for the purpose not yet clearly resolved, but depending heavily 121 on a belief in unification with the Cameroons under French administration.97 In this way, the Mission l e f t out the two most clearly defined position, that of the a-Fon and that of the reunificationist. It attempted to identify the view of the integrationists but did so incorrectly. The integrationists talked of a self-governing \"State\" of Southern Kamerun in \"association\" with Nigeria, not a self-governing region. The Mission attempted to identify Fonchaism but, again, did so incorrectly. Fonchaism depended more on the state of Southern Kamerun than i t did on reunification; that was why reunification was guarded with so many conditions. At the time the Mission was in Southern Kamerun, campaigns for the January 24, 1959, general elections were under way. The OK did not contest any of the seats. When questioned at the United Nations why the OK did not take part in the elections, Ntumazah replied that i t was \"because the pro-Nigerian party seemed to be gaining ground so the OK decided to support 98 the KNDP which opted for reunification.\" There appeared to have been no hard content to this excuse. The integrationists were not gaining ground. The a-Fon had talked, but they had not yet acted against Endeley over the authority and policy confrontation. Ntumazah had nothing to offer the a-Fon except reunification, the bogey of the day. Ntumazah had not forgotten the fate of the UPC in 1957; the reunifcationists would lose their morale i f they suffered another crushing defeat just when they needed more encourage-ment. Moreover, the OK, as w i l l be seen later, was undergoing some frust-ration in Southern Kamerun. Furthermore, realizing their i n a b i l i t y to influence opinion at home, the leaders of the OK, the UPC, and the students concentrated their efforts at influencing opinion at the United Nations. 122 Indeed, while the Mission was in Southern Kamerun when campaigns were under way, the leaders of these groups were at the United Nations. It was Ntumazah who informed the Trusteeship Council that the Mission was in Western Kamerun for only two weeks, and when the Council checked, the information was confirmed. During the campaigns, however, no party offered the electorate the exact content of i t s programme. The integrationists compaigned on \"associ-ation\" with Nigeria. They had now transformed form integrationists into associationists. The analysis made by Welch seems to suggest that the Foncharians offered different things to different sections of the society depending upon whom they were addressing. To some, they offered secession and self-government outside Nigeria. To others, the offer was secession, a period of trusteeship, and independence. Yet to others, they made integ-ration versus secession the issues at the elections. S t i l l to others, reunification was offered. For example, to the students, reunification was \"a simple matter for a round-table discussion by the two governments,\" and any person who predicated secession on reunification was \"an enemy working 99 in favour of integration in the Federation of Nigeria.\" On the whole, however, the KNDP kept reunification in the bakcground and concentrated on secession. But the OK campaigned for the KNDP. The KNDP approach to the campaigns was both an asset and a l i a b i l i t y . But i t was more a l i a b i l i t y than an asset. To be sure, the Foncharians told their listeners what their listerns wanted to hear. But Foncha did not need to do this in January 1959. Endeley had already lost the election in May, 1958, as a result of his confrontation with the a-Fon on the policy-authority issue. Between 1959 and 1960, Southern Kamerun was boiling and information 123 spread like wild f i r e . By the time the information had travelled over ten miles, only the substance of the information was s t i l l accurate. Infor-mation about the differing offers the Foncharians were making at different places spread as soon as the offers were made.* The net effect was to confuse the electorate and discredit Foncha and the KNDP. Indeed, two expressions emerged at this time meaning the same thing. These were \"KNDP Talk\" and \"Foncha's Language\"; they stood for either of unreliability, un-certainty, deception, and trickery.t Aided by the decision of the OK to campaign for Foncha, and the introduction of the ministerial system of government, some of the a-Fon identified Foncha with reunification. Others were uncertain but s t i l l believed that Foncha was! only a secessionist.. . Yet others became so completely'.uncertain .and confused about Foncha's position: on reunification that they did not know where to place him. The KNDP approach, indeed, gave Endeley more votes than he was to receive in the January, 1959, election. Out of the twenty-six contested seats, Endeley won twelve and Foncha claimed the remaining fourteen. But, i f Foncha had come out and talked only secession, i t is possible that only the KNC-KPP candidate at Mamfe Overside would have gone back to the parlia-ment. By even mentioning reunification and not dissociating themselves from the OK publicly during the campaigns, the Foncharians weakened the Concert of the a-Fon and their decision to overwhelmingly chase Endeley away from *In a later chapter dealing with the Foncha-Endeley Compromise, the reader w i l l see\i both the speed with which information was travelling in Southern Kamerun at that time and how the information was being distorted. tThere is no written evidence to this except the writers experience. In Nso, Foncha was being referred to as \"Wanlentoh,\" l i t e r a l l y meaning \"Place Steward\"; Idiomatically, i t means one who asks for more on errands than his master had demanded in order to pocket the difference. 124 the Premier's Lodge. The results of the elections were a function of several things which only indirectly reflected the programmes of Endeley and Foncha. The vote for Endeley was more a vote against reunification with which the KNDP had been identified and the uncertainty Foncha l e f t in the minds of many of the a-Fon than a vote for Endeley's programme. The vote for Foncha was more a vote against Endeley's integration programme and his attempt to substitute his authority over Southern Kamerun for that of the a-Fon than a vote for Foncha's programme which included a possible reunification. In either event, i t was a vote for the policy of the a-Fon: those who voted against Foncha were protecting themselves from reunification; those who voted against Endeley were protecting themselves from integration with Nigeria. But, except perhaps in Mamfe Overside, few of them, i f any, voted for either integration or reunification. Whatever the case, the integrationist were involved in some irregu-l a r i t i e s intended to procure a pro-integration vote during the campaigns. The introduction of the ministerial system of government had a lot to do with the votes. Indeed, i t was precisely the a-Fon whose subjects \"were ministers that were f i r s t convinced that Foncha was a reunificationist and they voted against reunification. The desire to have their subjects as ministers cannot be dismissed although i t was the fear of reunification which convined them to vote otherwise. During the campaigns, government vehicles, and the Government Information Service for that matter were used extensively for the associationist cause.* 1 0^ On the other hand, Foncha and his group, *J.T. Ndze was an integrationist and in his diary he mentions how the person in charge of the Information Service was complaining to him during the campaigns that the Land Rover the latter was using had broken down and that he needed money as soon as possible to put i t on the move. 125 who had no opportunity to use government vehicles (the KNC-KPP were in power) travelled mainly on foot and bicycles, and only occasionally on chartered vehicles; as a party of teachers, the KNDP was the poorest party at the time. Furthermore, the police, as government employees, were used extensively to harass any person opposed to integration with Nigeria; even the treasurer of the OK and many others, as w i l l be seen later in the chapter on the conduct of the plebiscites, were arrested during the campaign perrod. More important, however, was the manipulation of the electoral d i s t r i c t s . These d i s t r i c t s were arranged in such a way as to favour the KNC-KPP. Before the elections, the d i s t r i c t s were thirteen in number. But after the elections, twenty-six rather than thirteen elected persons would be in the Parliament. The electoral d i s t r i c t s thus had to be rear-ranged to suit the enlarged Parliament. In the rearrangement of these d i s t r i c t s , areas with apparently known integrationist tendencies received a disproportionate share of seats to the detriment of areas with known seces-sionist tendencies. It was easy to know which area might have which senti-ment. Those areas where the traditional systems, at this time, Mamfe and the grasslands, were s t i l l strong, secession was the general tendency. Those areas where the a-Fon existed but with l i t t l e authority such as Kumba and Victoria Divisions, apparently had associationist tendencies. With this knowledge, Victoria Division, from where Endeley and Kale, the integ-rationist leaders, came, had four seats with a population of 70,000. On the other hand, the South Eastern Federation or rather the South Eastern Native Authority of Bamenda, with a population of 130,000 had only three 126 seats. *1(\")2 There i s l i t t l e wonder then that there was a great disparity between the number of seats on the one hand and the popular vote on the other. The difference in the number of seats was two (12 to 14). That in the popular vote was very great. A total of 137,174 votes were cast at the elections. Foncha received 75,326 (55%) of them. Endeley received 51,42.5 103 (37%) of them. The rest, 10,423 (8%) went to independent candidates. The difference between the KNC-KPP and KNDP was thus 23,901 votes (18%) while their popularity ratio was 2:3 in favour of the KNDP. In terms of popular vote, therefore, the results of the elections were a crushing defeat for Endeley. The 1959 general election was significant in several respects. It resolved the authority issue; the a-Fon, although not a l l of them did the job, chased Endeley away from the Premier's Lodge and, in so doing, re-established their authority in Southern Kamerun. There was no longer any squabble between Endeley and the a-Fon over authority in the region. But the election failed to resolved the policy issue. The policy of the a-Fon remained unchanged. So did those of the p o l i t i c a l leaders. The basic and fundamental conflict between the a-Fon and the p o l i t i a l leaders thus remained intact. The a-Fon were open for the taking but whoever wished to take them must be ready to pay the price. That price was their policy. Circumstances arising from the manipulation of the election by both Endeley *The 1961 plebiscite voting figures which shows twice as many people voting in the . South-eastern Native Authority (Bamenda North, East, and Central West plebiscite districts) as in the Victoria Division confirms Ntumazah's1 assertion. See Table on the voting pattern in chapter seven. 127 and Foncha, and the decision of the OK to support Foncha weakened the Concert of the a-Fon. But the Concert was not destroyed. After the election, the Concert was now made up of three groups. Those who now believed firmly that Foncha was a reunificationist\u00E2\u0080\u0094these were to be found in Kumba and Victoria Division, and a few of them in Bamenda Division. Those who had doubts, but s t i l l believed largely that Foncha was a seccessionist, pure and simple\u00E2\u0080\u0094these were to be found in Mamfe Division and the larger part of Bamenda Division. Those who were so confused as to be unable to know where to place Foncha\u00E2\u0080\u0094these were in Wum and Nkambe Division. Nevertheless, although not as solid as i t was before the election, whenever the Concert would take a unanimous decision, the p o l i t i c a l leaders would have to heed i t . But, as long as the Concert remained divided, the p o l i t i c a l leaders would find no reason to discard or modify their policies; they might argue and manipulate, but they would reach no compromise. A time of no-compromise was at hand. THE TRUST TERRITORIES OF KAMERUN AND THE UNITED NATIONS VISITING MISSION OF 1958.* 128 129 Footnotes - Chapter Three xEyongetah and Brain, op. c i t . , p. 129. 2U.N., T.C., T/1042, March 16, 1953, pp. 27-28. 3 -Kale, op. c i t . , pp. 39-43. 4 ^ U.N., T.C., P e t i t i o n from the Federation des etudiants d'Afrique noire en France Concerning the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration and the Cameroons under French Administration, P a r i s , 21 February, 1959, T/PET.4 and 5/L.42, March 4, 1959, pp. 8-9 and passim. 5 I b i d . 6Rubin, op. c i t . , p. 103. 7U.N., T.C., T/1426, Annex IV, January 20, 1959, p. 6. g U.N., T.C., Report of the Trusteeship Council Covering the Period from 23 J u l y 1955 to 14 August 1956, T/3170, Supplement No. 4, 1956, pp. 120-124. 9 U.N., G.A., Report of the Trusteeship Council Covering the Period from 15 August 1956 to 12 J u l y 1957, A/3595, Supplement No. 4, 1957, pp. 102-104. 1 0 I b i d . l x K a l e , op. c i t . , pp. 44-48. 12 U.N., T.C., Decisions of the Resumed Nigeria C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Con-ference, 1958, Concerning the Southern\"and Northern Cameroons, T/1426, Annex I I I , January 20, 1959, p. 5. 13 U.N., T.C., P e t i t i o n from Chief V.H. Bang Concerning the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration, Kaka, Nkambe, 8 January, 1959, T/PET.4/ L.15, February 20, 1959, pp. 1-2. 14 Ibid.; See also T/PET.4/L.18, September 1, 1959, passim. 15 U.N., T.C., Extracts from Address of the Lamido of Adamawa, T/1426, Annex IV, January 20, 1959, pp. 1-2. 16U.N., T.C., T/1426, Annex IV, January 20, 1959, pp. 2, 6. 17 U.N., T.C., Extracts from Memorandum of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), T/1426, Annex IV, January 20, 1959, pp. 7-8. 18 U.N., T.C., Extracts from Address of the Premier of the Northern Region, T/1426, Annex IV, January 20, 1959, p. 11. 130 19 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 20 U.N., T.C., Extracts from Memorandum Dated 5 November 1958 from the United Middle Belt Congress/Action Group Alliance (UMBC/AG), T/1426, Annex IV, January 20, 1959, pp. 8-9. 21 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 22 Ibid., p. 10. 23 U.N., T.C, United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa 1958: Report on the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under British Administration, T/1426, January 20, 1959, pp. 67, 82-83. 24 U.N. , T.C, Discussions of the Visiting Mission's Report on Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, T/SR. 953, April, 1959, p. 77. 25 U.N., T.C, Discussions of the Visiting Mission's Report on Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, T/SR. 959, May, 1959, pp. 106-107; see also paragraph 149, T/1426, January 20, 1959. 26U.N., T.C, T/1426, January 20, 1959, paragraph 178. 27 U.N., T.C, T/SR. 953, April, 1959, passim; T/SR. 959, May, 1959, pp. 105-107. 28 . , Ibid. 29 U.N., T.C, T/953, Apr i l , 1959, p. 80. 30 U.N., T.C, T/SR. 953, April, 1959, p. 80. 31 U.N., G.A., A/C.4/SR. 1150, August, 1961, pp. 357-360. 32 U.N., T.C, General Debate on the Cameroons under United Kingdom Admini-stration, T/SR. 962, May, 1959, p. 116. 3 3 I b i d . 34 \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Ibid. 3 5 I b i d . , p. 117. 36 U.N., T.C, T/SR. 959, May, 1959, p. 197. 37 U.N., T.C., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C.4/SR. 847, May, 1959, p. 557. 38 , . , Ibid. 39 U.N., G.A., Statement Made by Mallam Dan Buram Jada, Minister for Nothern \u00E2\u0080\u00A2131 Cameroons Affairs in the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, at the 850th Meeting of the Fourth Committee, 25 February, 1959, A/C. 4/400, February 26, 1959, p. 1. 40 Ibid., p. 2. 41 Ibid., pp. 3-4; i f this number and composition are accurate, then the changes were made after November, 1958. 42 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 43 Ibid., p. 5. 44 U.N. , T.C, Trusteeship Council Resolution 1926 (XXIII) Adopted on February 18, 1959, Year Book of the United Nations, Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 368. 45 U.N., T.C, United Nations Review, Vol. 2, May, 1956, pp. 28-29; this reference i s for the constitutional set-up, not for the comparison. For another c r i t i c a l look at the constitutional set-up, see Eyongetah and Brain, op. c i t . , pp. 135-137. 46 Kale, op. c i t . , p. 43. 47 Eyongetah and Brain, op. c i t . , p. 137. 48 Kale, op. c i t . , p. 43. 49 U.N., T.C, T/1426, January 20, 1959, p. 43. 50 Rubin, op. c i t . , p. 87. 5 1 I b i d . , p. 87. 52 Kale, op. c i t . , p. 58. 53 U.N., G.A., A/3170, Supplement No. 4, 1956, pp. 119-120. 54 Ibid., p. 121. 55 . n Ibid. 56 U.N., T.C., Petition from Kamerun National Democratic Party Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Mankon, 1 March, 1956, T/PET. 4/L.4, March 15, 1956, p. 1. 57 U.N., T.C, T/1426, January 20, 1959, p. 45. 58 Welch, op. c i t . , pp. 195-196. 59 U.N. , T.C, T/PET. 4/L.138, April 13, 1961, p . l . 132\" 60 Welch, op. c i t . , pp. 195-196. 61 . Ibid.; only for the results and not for the interpretation of the vote. 62 U.N., T.C, T/1425, January 20, 1959, p. 45. 63 Johnson, op. c i t . , p. 131. 64 U.N., T.C, T/1426, January 20, 1959, p. 45. 65 The Diary of Late J.T. Ndze for the Year 1958. 66 U.N., T.C, British Observations on Petitions, T/OBS. 4 and 5/13, August 15, 1957, p. 1. -6 V U.N., T.C, T/1426, January 20, 1959, p. 45. 68 Kale, op. c i t . , pp. 43-46; Rubin, op. c i t . , pp. 87-88. 69 Kale, op. c i t . , pp. 44-46. 70 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 71 The Diary of Late J.T. Ndze for the Year 1958, February 2, 1958. 72 . Ibid. 73 , . , Ibid. 7 4 I b i d . 7 5 I b i d . 76 . . U.N. , T.C, Petition from the President of the KNDP Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Kumba, 20 February, 1958, T/PET. 4/L. 7, March 18, 1958, p. 1. 77U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Ibadan Kamerun Students' Association Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, 19 March, 1958, T/PET. 4/L. 9, May 2, 1958, pp. 1-5. 78 U.N. , T.C, T/1426, January 20, 1959, p. 54. 79 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 80 Ibid., p. 55. 81 Ibid., p. 54. 82 Ibid., p. 55. 133 83 Kale, op. c i t . , pp. 47-48. 84 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 85 U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 807, February, 1959, pp. 341-342. 86 U.N., T.C., Extracts from Main Policy Statement of the KNC/KPP in a Memorandum Dated 31 October, 1958, T/1426, Annex II, January 20, 1959, pp. 3-5. 87 Ibid., underlining added. 88 U.N. , T.C, Extracts from Memorandum Dated 29 October 1958 from J.I. Kamsi on Behalf of the One Kamerun Party, T/1426, Annex II, January 20, 1959, pp. 11-14. 89 U.N., T.C, Extracts from Memorandum by the President of the Southern Cameroons Chiefs' Conference Dated 10 October 1958, T/1426, Annex II, January 20, 1959, pp. 10-11. 90 . . U.N., T.C., Extracts from a Memorandum by the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) Dated 2 November 1958, T/1426, Annex II, January 20, 1959, pp. 6-7. 91 , . , Ibid. / PP- 7-8. 92 U.N. , T.C , T/1426, Annex II, p. 5. 93 Ibid. > P- 11. 94 . , Ibid. > PP- 13-14. 95 Ibid. , PP- 8-9. 96 U.N. , T.C. , T/1426, January 20, 1959, pp. 41-42. Ibid. , P- 42. 98 U.N. , 1959, p. G.A. 35. , Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, 99 , Welch , op. c i t . , pp. 200-206. 100 The Diary of Late J.T. Ndze for the Year 1958. \"'\"^''\"U.N., G.A. , Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 775, January, 1959, p. 156. 102 Ibid. 134-U.N., T.C., Petition from the Federation des etudiants d'Afrique noire en France Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration and the Cameroons under French Administration, Paris, 21 February, 1959, T/PET. 4 and 5/L. 42, March 4, .1959, p. 8. 135 CHAPTER FOUR A TIME OF NO COMPROMISE 1958-SEPTEMBER 1959 The idea of some consultation with the Western Kamerunians regarding the issues of u n i f i c a t i o n and r e u n i f i c a t i o n emerged i n 1950 and was kept a l i v e i n t e r m i t t e n t l y through 1958. For example, i n answer to a question by the I t a l i a n member of the Trunsteship Council, i n v o l v i n g continued \"segmen-t a t i o n and scrambling\" of Western Kamerun i n 1950, Cohen, the B r i t i s h representative i n the Trusteeship Council, stated that the p o s s i b i l i t y for u n i f i c a t i o n depended \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 on the wishes and desires of the people concerned. But Cohen d i d not say how the wishes and desires of the people concerned would be ascertained. However, i n 1952, the B r i t i s h indicated what kind of consultation they had i n mind. That year, the B r i t i s h brought the Northern and Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders together i n a conference to discuss two issues, one of which was u n i f i c a t i o n . The i n d i c a t i o n was that the p o l i t i c a l leaders alone might be enough to s e t t l e the issue of u n i f i c a t i o n . But the break within the ranks of the CNF and the formation of KUNC suggested that the issue was no longer u n i f i c a t i o n alone; r e u n i f i c a t i o n had been added to u n i f i -cation. Both' ideas c a r r i e d with them sepa r a t i s t undertones. The demon-s t r a t i o n i n Northern Kamerun and the involvement of the Southern Kamerun a-Fon with the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Southern Kamerun, both i n 1953, suggested that the B r i t i s h idea to have the p o l i t i c a l leaders s e t t l e the issue, now issues, was no longer tenable. Another approach might be sought. One of the e a r l i e s t approaches was suggested i n 1954 by Urn Nyobe, an 136 Eastern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leader and Secretary-General of the UPC. In 1954, Urn Nyobe argued at the United Nations that a \"referendum\" should be held in Kamerun regarding the issues of \"reunification\" and \"independence.\" Um Nyobe f e l t that the consultation could not be limited to the Western Kamerunians alone because i t affected a l l the Kameruninas; Eastern Kamerunians should take part in the consultation. 1 Between 1955 and 1956, the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders offered two different approaches which had one thing in common. In 1955, a l l the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders requested the United Nations to go ahead and effect reunification without any consultation. But in 1956, the KNC and the KPP opted out of reunification while the KNDP suggested that the Southern Kamerunians should be consulted through their elected represen-tatives. Uniting these two approaches was the attempt to exclude direct consultation with the Southern Kamerun electorate. Although the p o l i t i c a l parties kept on grumbling over the issues after 1956, the form of consultation once more became a l i v e l y issue only in 1958. The impetus for this discussion on the form of consultation was the British suggestion to the United Nations that a plebiscite be held in Southern Kamerun and the United Nations Visiting Mission to Kamerun in that year. When the Mission came, the KNC-KPP f e l t that a general election would serve as a medium of consultation. The a-Fon, like the British, asked for a plebiscite. The OK preferred unilateral action by the United Nations to effect reunification; a general election was out of the question. The KNDP fe l t that the Mission should conduct direct interviews with the people and make i t s decision on the basis of i t s findings. However, i f circumstances altered, those groups most affected would 137 change their tactics. The f i r s t to do so was the KNC-KPP Alliance. As soon as the Alliance lost the general elections of January 24, 1959, i t opted out of a general election as a medium of settling the issues. On February 3, 1959, Endeley and Mbile (Mbile was now the real leader of the KPP) dispatched a telegram to the United Nations to the effect that the elections were not decisive enough to be regarded as having settled the issues of secession and reunification. They f e l t that the policy of the KNDP which won the elections should be defined clearly, discussed, and tested in the Parliament before Endeley, as Leader of the Opposition, and Foncha, as the new Premier, should proceed to the United Nations. The question of secession from Nigeria had too far reaching consequences to be carried by the United Nations without prior sanction by the Southern 2 Kamerun Parliament. But i t was at the United Nations that a l l the leaders argued their cases more forcefully. The Nationalist Leaders at the United Nations October 1958-March 1959 While the integrationists and those who were at the cross-roads of secession and reunification were busy scheming towards the general elections of January 24, 1959, between mid-1958 and January 1959, the OK, which had no chance of capturing power was busy at the United Nations with the other reunificationists. In a sense, i t was the reunificationists who began the f i r s t wave of argumentation and manipulation at the United Nations. Between October and November 1958, the OK, the UPC, and the students attempted to influence opinion at the United Nations in favour of their objective. Abel Dookingue, who represented the Kamerun Students' Union, identi-138 fied the objectives of the reunificationists. These included immediate reunification and immediate independence. The damand for these objectives was unanimous in Kamerun and the students were merely acting as a sounding board for the Kamerun populace. A general amnesty should be declared for a l l Kamerunians to be followed by a referendum on the issue of reunifica-' c 3 tion. The issue, therefore, was only reunification and the medium of consultation would have to be a referendum. Ntumazah's argument in favour of the objectives of the reunifica-.. tionists was anti-imperialist in character. He reveiwed the history of Kamerun from the period immediately preceding the colonization of the territory in 1884 to 1958. Essentially, he pointed out how the inhabitants of the territory had been carried away, into slavery, how the territory had become a nation during the German period,* how the wicked Anglo-French knife had torn the nation apart in 1919, and how, since 1919, the British great \"design\" had been to have Nigeria swallow Western Kamerun while the French \"design\" was to annex Eastern Kamerun and make i t part of the French community. During the Second World War, the Kamerunians fought to free the British and the French from the Germans and for the cause of freedom. But now that the Kamerunians were peacefully asking for their own freedom, the French and the British were persecuting the leaders of that cause and denying the people their own freedom. The British, contrary to expectation, were arresting nationalists and handing them over to the French for execu-tion. It should be remembered that the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Britain were thinking of Kamerunt when they signed an There was in reality no Kamerun nation during the German imperium. 139 agreement on June 29, 1954, declaring that \"in the case of nations divided against their w i l l the United Kingdom and United States Governments would continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations.\" Pan-Africanism was an internal a f f a i r to be dealt with after African states \"had attained independence.\" The Franco-British attempts to influence Kamerunians \"in favour of integration with other countries before independence . . . represented a new form of imperialism.\" The British attempt to coerce Western Kamerunians into union with Nigeria 4 was imperialism which was unacceptable. After this argument, Ntumazah turned his attention to the issues at stake and to the form of consultation, i f any, to be pursued. He was surprised that integration with Nigeria could be considered as a means of terminating the Trusteeship in Western Kamerun when there was nothing in the Charter to suggest such a procedure. The issues at stake were reunifi-cation and independence, and the United Nations should at once reunify Kamerun and then give independence to that nation. Failing unilateral action by the United Nations, a referendum should be conducted in a l l of Kamerun to decide the issues of reunification and independence. The fact that the United Nations \"was considering a consultation\" in Western Kamerun alone, and on the \"issue of integration with Nigeria was disturbing.\" A plebiscite was not a f a i r means of consultation because the integrationists would manipulate i t as they were already busy manipulating the general elections. However, a plebiscite was acceptable provided that: the British remained t l f Britain and the United States had any nation in mind, i t was Germany, not Kamerun. 140 aloof from the contest; government vehicles now under the control of the integrationists (the integrationists were in power) were withdrawn six months before the voting day; there was an international police force six months before the voting day in Western Kamerun to supervise the conduct of the plebiscites; non-Kamerunians did not participate in the plebiscite; Western Kamerun was separated from Nigeria completely; and, the ban on \"certain p o l i t i c a l parties\" l i f t e d and their exiled leaders were allowed 5 unconditionally to return home and participate in the plebiscites. When Ntumazah finished with this his argument, several members of the Fourth Committee asked him many questions. One of these was crucial to the issues involved in the argument. The Iraqi representative asked whether, given that the United Nations decided on a plebiscite, three issues, namely, integration with Nigeria, separation from Nigeria with separate independence for Southern or Western Kamerun, and reunification of Kamerun, could not be involved. Ntumazah f e l t that, and he was supported in this by Dookingue, 6 only reunification should be involved in the plebiscite. The idea then was to make sure that integration, and separate independence for. Western Kamerun were excluded from the contest. While Dr. Felix-Roland Moumie, leader of the UPC, added l i t t l e that was not yet known, he helped to confuse the situation further. He recited a l l the instances in which various groups in Kamerun had requested either in-dependence, reunification, or both\u00E2\u0080\u0094a repeat of the instances Kamsi had cited to the Mission in Kamerun\u00E2\u0080\u0094and then declared that i t was the \"invincible w i l l \" of the Kamerunians to be reunited and to have independence. The issues at stake were independence and reunification and only a referendum could be 7 used to settle them. When speaking for the Women's Organization, an a f f i l i a t e 141 of the UPC, Moumie asserted that President Wilson was thinking of Kamerun* in 1919 when he said at the Paris Peace Conference that \"nothing was more dangerous or more fraught with consequences for the future than the 3 arbitrary division of nations.\" When a member of the Committee asked why Moumie was insisting that the United Nations should conduct a general election in Kamerun before terminating trusteeship, Moumie linked the issues with a democratic over-throw of the Government of.Alhaji Ahmadu Ahidjo, Prime Minister of Eastern Kamerun. He f e l t that trusteeship could not be terminated un t i l independence had been achieved, reunification effected, harmony in the territory restored, citizens assured of their freedoms, and independence \"established by a democratic transfer of powers.\" The Government in Eastern Kamerun was not democratically elected. It was the place of the United Nations to conduct a referendum on the issues of reunification and independence, and to \"organize elections to a constituent assembly which would appoint a Government competent 9 to negotiate\" the termination of trusteship. The programme of the reunificationists was now complete and can be summarized here. These reunificationists wanted immediate reunification, immediate independence, and the establishment of a democratic government in Kamerun. This last aspect implied the ousting of Ahidjo's Government through a freely conducted general election. In an attempt to realize these objectives, they tried to influence the United Nations into acting unilaterally. Failing this unilateral action on the part of the United Nations, they asked *It is more probable than not that Kamerun never crossed Wilson's mind when he made the reported declaration. 142 for a referendum which would involve a l l the Kamerunians. But they were not totally averse to a plebiscite limited to Western Kamerunians alone provided certain conditions conducive to a pro-reunification vote were f u l f i l l e d . They were very unwilling to see integration with Nigeria and separate independence for Western Kamerun involved in the Consultation. On the other hand, the integrationists f e l t quite differently. At the United Nations, Endeley began by claiming the f u l l authority to speak for the KNC-KPP Alliance and by asking the United Nations to weigh his views against the background of his struggles in and achievements for Southern Kamerun between 1939 and 1959. The struggles he referred to was his role in the nationalist movement during the period, and his achieve-ments were the constitutional advancements Southern Kamerun gained during his leadership. He went on to say, with some justification, that he had never suggested \"complete\" secession from Nigeria by Southern Kamerun. He f e l t that Southern Kamerun depended on Nigeria for developmental finance and there was no alternative \"process whereby the Southern Cameroons could be rendered financially viable and s t i l l maintain the pace of i t s develop-ment.\" The parties he represented wished to see Southern Kamerun achieve independence as a Region equal in a l l respects with the \"other Regions of the Federation of Nigeria\" within the Nigerian framework, that i s , as an integral part of N i g e r i a . 1 0 It was no longer a State of Southern Kamerun in association with Nigeria. Endeley then turned his attention to reunification. The issue of reunification was pushed \"into the background\" during the January 24, 1959, general elections. He had once advocated reunification but he did so in the name of development and development was now irrelevant. While reunifi-143 cation was not provided for in the Trusteeship Agreement, i t was not even supported by \"responsible opinion\" in Eastern Kamerun. Only the irrespons-ible people were s t i l l pursuing the \"barren\" idea. No programme for re-unification had ever been worked out. The intentions of the reunifica-::. tionists were to \"separate the Southern Cameroons from a friendly Nigeria in order to use the Territory as a base from which subversive doctrines could be launched against Nigeria and the rest of West Africa.\" Reunifi-cation, aside from i t s f u t i l i t y and impracticability, would re-establish an a r t i f i c i a l boundary twice as long as the Inter-Kamerunian boundary line. Moreover, reunification was based on hollow sentimental ideas. It could be advantageous only in a West African Union in which Southern Kamerun was an integral part of Nige r i a . 1 1 Thus, while the integrationists objected to the reunification of Kamerun, they were ready to accept a West African Union. Endeley next turned his attention to the form of consultation. He agreed with the Mission that the. results of the general elections could not be regarded as decisive over the issues at stake. A plebiscite, conducted under certain conditions, was required to settle the issues. These condi-tions included: the absence of local prejudices and propaganda; the provision of impartial information to the voters regarding the issues at stake; the revision of the register for the plebiscite to include a l l those qualified to vote; the selection of \"men of integrity\" free from \" t r i b a l bias\" as regist-ration officers; the use of \"simple and easy to understand\" questions at the plebiscite; the plebiscite questions to be \"association with Nigeria\" versus reunification; the exclusion of secession and separate independence for Southern Kamerun from the contest; the assessment of the results of the plebiscite on ethnic group lines or on the basis of the votes in each Fondom; 144 a change in the \"existing status\" to be effected only by a \"substantial majority\" in each Fondom or ethnic group; and, the exclusion of continued 12 trusteeship from the plebiscite.. . After this statement, Endeley answered several questions from members of the Fourth Committee. The representative of New Zealand asked Endeley who should vote at the plebiscite. Endeley f e l t that the precedent of Togoland ought to be followed. Any person who could prove, by producing tax slips, that he had lived in Western Kamerun for at least two years was qualified. He agreed that the same proof could not be used in the case of women, but he had no ready solution for the problem. When asked to explain why the results of' the plebiscites should be assessed as he suggested, he f e l t that i t was because the Administrative Divisions \"roughly correspond[ed] to ethnic groups,\" (a largely unfounded assertion); \"an analysis of the ethnic grouping would give a better view of the feelings and wishes of the people.\" The Iraqi representative then asked Endeley whether a l l the p o l i t i c a l parties in Eastern Kamerun wished to make Southern Kamerun a base of \"sub-versive doctrines\" in West Africa. Endeley's statement \"was specifically directed to the UPC.\" The Iraqi representative further asked what Endeley meant by \"substantial majority\" and Endeley f e l t that \"only a two-thirds majority would be decisive.\" Failing this, a second plebiscite would be necessary. The Iraqi representative also questioned Endeley on why more than two questions could not be asked at the plebiscite. It was because, Endeley argued, the electorate would not decide \"rightly i f three choices [were] put before them.\" Moreover, i t was not necessary to have three choices because a negative vote for \"association\" with Nigeria would be \"indicative of a desire to secede,\" and a negative vote for reunification 145 would be \"indicative of a desire for continued association,\" (not secession). A third question would only go to confuse the voters.\"'\"3 This f i n a l statement indicated Endeley's strategy, the desire to exclude secession with separate independence for Southern Kamerun from the plebiscite but to accept i t i f integration with Nigeria was rejected by the electorate. Reunification was out of the question. That was why a negative vote for reunification could be taken as a vote for integration with Nigeria whereas a negative vote for integration with Nigeria could be regarded as a vote for secession, not reunification. \"If the members of the Fourth Committee were attentive enough, they would have recognized two important facts. Endeley saw secession and continued trusteeship leading to separate independence for Southern Kamerun as the greatest threat to his objective of integration with Nigeria; that was why he sought to exclude i t from the contest. Secondly, he sought to include reunification in the contest, not because he believed in i t or because he thought i t could win, but because he wanted i t to influence the electorate into voting for integration with Nigeria; the inclusion of reunification in the contest was thus an attempt to procure a pro-integrationist vote. Endeley was thus attempting to get the United Nations to decide in favour of integration with Nigeria. Whatever the case, the position of the integrationists can now be summarized. They wanted Southern or Western Kamerun to be integrated with Nigeria. They wanted to see only integration1 with Nigeria and secession with reunification take part in the contest. They now wanted the plebiscite used as a means of settling the issues. A general election and a referendum were out of the question. Finally, they wished to give the vote to as many non-Kamerunians, who were mature and have lived in Southern Kamerun for at 146 least two years, as possible. This was a position which the Foncharians could hardly accept. Foncha came to the United Nations more powerful than he was when he met the Mission between October and November 1958 in Southern Kamerun. He was now the Premier representing the party that had won the January 24, 1959, general elections. His party had fought and won the elections, he said, on a specific programme. This programme included: the separation of Southern Kamerun from Nigeria before Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960; the constitution of Southern Kamerun as a separate p o l i t i c a l entity administered, for a short period, under a modified form of trustee-ship by the British outside the framework of Nigeria; after the short period of trusteeship, Southern Kamerun would gain \"complete independence\"; and, during the period of continued trusteeship the \"possibility of unification\" of Kamerun on a federal basis would be explored. \"Reunion\" with Northern Kamerun would be welcomed provided that that region had already \"worked out i t s own separation from the Federation of Nigeria.\" As the popular vote of the elections showed, his programme was widely supported. He, therefore, called on the United Nations to endorse the wishes of the majority of the 14 Southern Kamerunians. Foncha's programme and position regarding the issues at stake and the form of consultation, as he argued, reflected the conduct and results of the 1959 general elections. A plebiscite should be the medium of consul-tation and the issues of the plebiscite should be \"separation from the Federation of Nigeria or of remaining with i t . \" Reunification was predicated on secession and on discussions to be held with the government of Eastern Kamerun and, therefore, \"should not be a question in the plebiscite.\" There 147 was no reason to believe that Southern Kamerun would depend on Nigeria for economic v i a b i l i t y because the region \"was potentially richer than any comparable area in Nigeria.\" His programme, which had been endorsed by the majority of Southern Kamerunians whom he was representing, consisted of separation of Southern Kamerun from Nigeria, continued trusteeship outside the framework of Nigeria for a short time, the exploration of the possibility for reunification during the short period of trusteeship, independence, and, i f discussions were successful, reunification. His Government had already passed a motion calling for the separation of Southern Kamerun from Nigeria and the continuation of trusteeship un t i l the \"possibility of unification had been explored.\" It had also taken a l l \"constitutional, legal and peaceful measures to ensure respect for the wishes of the people.\" Since the British and the integrationists had facili t a t e d the registration of Nigerians in the-last general elections, the register would have to be revised and the vote given only to Southern Kamerunians at home and abroad.''\"5 Foncha's programme was sufficiently involved as to invite many ques-tions from the members of the Fourth Committee. The Iraqi representative asked whether Foncha envisaged a second plebiscite on the question of reunif cation after the f i r s t involving secession from Nigeria had taken place. Foncha answered negatively adding that reunification was \"consequential upon secession,\" and, \"in our mind, secession [could] only end in unification.\" When this representative asked whether Foncha f e l t that a plebiscite was necessary in Northern Kamerun, Foncha answered affirmatively. The Iraqi representative further wished to know how Foncha would define a Southern Kamerunian. Foncha f e l t that a Southern Kamerunian was any person born in 148 16 Southern Kamerun. The representative of Iraq was followed by the representatives of the United Arab Republic and New Zealand in questioning Foncha. When the representative of the United Arab Republic asked whether the modification of the Trusteeship Agreement should be made immediately, Foncha f e l t that priority ought to be given to the medium of deciding the future of Southern Kamerun, that i s , to the plebiscite. The representative of New Zealand, asked several questions: how long was Foncha's short transitional period of trusteeship? did Foncha envisage three solutions to the Southern Kamerun problem, namely, separate and f u l l independence for Southern Kamerun, reunifi-cation, and unification after Northern Kamerun had seceded from Nigeria? and, did the statement of the a-Fon demanding secession, continued trusteeship, separate and f u l l independence for Southern Kamerun, and membership in the Commonwealth reflect the views of the voters who supported the KNDP candidates in the last elections? The short period was \"the period after separation from Nigeria and before independence and [re]unfication,\" the length of time being determined \"after the plebiscite and the negotiation for [re]unifi-cation.\" Any of the named solutions was acceptable. The statement of the a-Fon reflected the true wishes and desires of those who had voted in the 17 KNDP candidates. The Indonesian representative, was the next to question Foncha. This representative wished to know how Foncha envisaged the unification of Northern and Southern Kamerun and whether i t was possible only after separation from Nigeria. Foncha f e l t that unification could take place whether before or after Southern Kamerun had separated from Nigeria. When the Indonesian representative asked whether Foncha wanted reunification before or after 149 unification, Foncha replied that reunification did not depend on u n i f i -cation; i t was \"a process\" which would \"go on despite other sections of the Cameroons.\" This representative further wished to know how the electorate would express their views on reunification i f i t was not made part of the plebiscite, or whether Foncha wanted reunification to form the subject of the second plebiscite, and i f so, would the second plebiscite deal with the \"prospective issue between the Northern and Southern Cameroons.\" Moreover, was reunification to take place before or after Eastern Kamerun independence, and would \"the wish of the Southern Cameroons people be known?\" Foncha did not suggest that the Southern Kamerun plebiscite be \"mixed up with the affairs of Northern Cameroons.\" Reunification would, hopefully, be achieved after independence. It was not necessary to know the wishes of the Southern Kamerunians before Eastern Kamerun independence although that 18 was a possibility. The representative of Ireland, concentrated his questions on the terms for reunification. He wished to know the terms on which Southern Kamerun would seek reunification and whether federalism was the basis 'sine qua non' of reunification. If not, would \"Foncha agree to a unitary form of govern-ment?\" Did Foncha think that the plebiscite questions \"should more precisely reflect a l l the p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to the inhabitants, which were: integ-ration with Nigeria, unification with :the new State of the Cameroons, con-tinuation of the Trusteeship, or an independent State of the Southern Came-roons?\" Did Foncha agree that negotiations for reunification were a \"Neces-sary preliminary to the questions to be put before the electorate,\" and i f 19 so, when would such negotiations begin? In essence, this representative questioned Foncha on two issues: the terms under which Foncha would seek 150 reunification; and the alternatives which should be put to the electorate at the plebiscite. In response to the terms of reunification issue, Foncha had this to say. The terms for reunification would \"be discussed\" by the two Govern-ments; and un t i l then, i t was \" d i f f i c u l t for any party to fix the form i t 20 should take.\" However, the KNDP Government preferred a Federation. Essentially, Foncha was ambivalent over the issue, an ambivalence which did much to confuse members of the Fourth Committee and to weaken his bargaining position thereafter. To be sure, he indicated that his Government would prefer a Federation but, this too, was s t i l l to \"be discussed\". What would happen i f , after discussion, . Ahidjo rejected a Federation and insisted on a unitary state to which, as w i l l be seen shortly, Foncha was against? Foncha would have been more helpful to himself and to the United Nations i f he had made Federalism a condition 'sine qua non' of reunification. Three courses then would have been open to the United Nations: i t would make that condition part of the question on reunification; i t would then approach Ahidjo to see whether he could accept the condition; and, i f Ahidjo rejected the condition, the United Nations might have considered Foncha's second alternative for the plebiscite. Even on the issue of the alternatives to be put at the plebiscite, Foncha was not helpful to himself or to the United Nations. In response to the Irish representative's question, Foncha f e l t that, while the plebis-cite questions should express \"what the people want,\" they should also be \"understood by the people.\" Because more than two questions would confuse 21 the people, there should only be two alternatives at the plebiscite. This answer was not in Foncha's interest. Of a l l the four alternatives before 151 the United Nations, Fonchaism was the most cumbersome. The associationists asked simply for the integration of Southern Kamerun with Nigeria in a Region of i t s own. The anti-imperialists demanded only the reunification of Kamerun without conditions. The Crowned Princes advocated secession, a period of trusteeship in order to build Smaller Kamerun which would be part of the Commonwealth. Fonchaism requested secession, a period of trusteeship during which negotiations for reunification would be carried out, and reunification effected preferably on a federal basis. But, Foncha did not state definitively what would happen i f negotiations for reunification foundered. What a l l this amounts to i s that, i f 'easy to understand' was to be the criterion for selecting the plebiscite questions, Fonchaism would have been the last to be chosen. Indeed, in this answer, Foncha failed to avoid the trap the integra-tionists and the reunificationists were setting for him and his programme. Both- groups of adversaries had sought to exclude his programme from the competition because they thought i t was, aside from that of the a-Fon, the most popular and, therefore, a threat to their differing objectives. Had Foncha agreed to have more than two alternatives at the plebiscite, the integrationists and the reunificationists would have modified their posi-tions; the integrationists would have sought to limit the contest to integ-ration versus secession in the hope of avoiding reunification altogether; the reunificationists would have sought to limit the contest to secession versus reunification in the hope of avoiding integration altogether. The substitution of the attempt to exclude the most undesirable alternative for that of the greatest threat would have occurred; and Foncha would have had what he was advocating for as the second alternative. But, Foncha failed 152 to see through a l l this. Nor was Foncha helpful in answering other questions. When the Mexican representative asked whether in the \"unitary central State\" produced by reunification Foncha would allow each of the present six Administrative Divisions of Southern Kamerun to be administrative units of the new state, Foncha replied negatively. The representative of India wished to know whether, should the electorate reject reunification, Foncha would like to have an independent state of Southern Kamerun or \"a further indefinite period of trusteeship,\" and, i f the former, whether such.a state would be economically viable. Under such circumstances, Foncha would prefer a sovereign independent state of , . Southern Kamerun and he believed that such a state would be p o l i t i c a l l y and economically viable. Finally, the representative of Malaya, asked Foncha two straightforward questions: did Foncha mean to give \"the impression that what was envisaged was perhaps the emergence of an independent Southern Cameroons?\" Could Foncha clear up the \"confusion\" with regards to his programme by saying \"precisely\" at what stage that reunification negotiations would take place? Foncha was silent over the f i r s t question and refused to be precise over the second; negotiations for reunification would take place \"as soon as possible,\" but 22 i t was \" d i f f i c u l t to say precisely the time.\" Some members of the Fourth Committee, the representative of Malaya for instance, found Foncha's programme confusing. This was not so. Foncha's programme 'per se' was not confusing. It was clearly committed to the secession of Southern Kamerun from Nigeria and to the emergence of the region as a state in i t s own right. Foncha sought a period of continued trustee-ship for two reasons: to work out the emergence of a Southern Kamerun State; 153 and, to use that period in negotiating favourable conditions for the state of Southern Kamerun in a reunified federal state of Kamerun. Should negotiations succeed, reunification would be effected. But, should negotiations founder, Southern Kamerun would, Foncha's attitute seems to suggest, emerge as a sovereign fu l l y independent state. Foncha was committed to reunification but to reunification which would not alienate the majority of his electorate and, at this stage, he was ready to forego reunification should i t threaten to lose him his supporters. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 A H this comes out very clearly in the outline of Foncha's programme, in his posi-tion statements vis-a-vis the issues of the plebiscite, and in his answers, or lack of them, to the questions. The worst that might be said of Foncha's programme is that i t was cumbersome enough to be able to confuse those who had to make the decision. Nevertheless, there were certain short-comings in Foncha's behaviour at the United Nations. Foncha was not the man to read people's minds and to handle d i f f i c u l t questions on the spot. Some of his answers appeared contradictory and others were not very helpful. Worse s t i l l , he was silent in some cases and vague in others over questions which he should have used to t e l l the members of the Fourth Committee in no uncertain terms what his programme was actually aiming at. Furthermore, he was most unhelpful to himself and to the Fourth Committee when he unwisely also stated that there need only be two questions at the plebiscite. If Foncha i s to be accused of confusion, i t was on this issue not on his programme. Whatever the case, the situation had become more intricate at the United Nations than i t was in Southern Kamerun. Four alternatives were 154 before the United Nations: integration with Nigeria; secession from Nigeria, a period of continued trusteeship, f u l l independence, and member-ship in the Commonwealth; secession from Nigeria, a period of continued trusteeship, f u l l independence, and either reunification in a Federation or sovereignty for Southern Kamerun in i t s independent state; and, reunifi-cation pure and simple. At the United Nations, while no one argued clearly in favour of the second objective, Foncha informed the Fourth Committee in no uncertain words that i t was the most popular objective. On the other hand, the p o l i t i c a l leaders argued forcefully and schemed in favour of the other alternatives. The integrationists and the Foncharians asked for a plebiscite while the reunificationists demanded unilateral action by the United Nations or a referendum and accepted a plebiscite, like the integ-rationists, with specific conditions. The integrationists sought to exclude the second and third alternatives from the plebiscite and to limit the contest between integration with Nigeria and reunification. The foncharians sought to exclude reunification from the contest and to limit the contest to inte-gration with Nigeria versus secession with continued trusteeship without a clearly defind end. The reunificationists sought to exclude every other alternative from the consultation but reunification. The integrationists wished to give the vote to any person born or who had lived in Southern or Western Kamerun for at least two years. The Foncharians wished to give the vote only to Southern or Western Kamerunians at home or abroad. The reunifi-cationists f e l t that the vote should be given only to the Kamerunians, Western and Eastern Kamerunians. If there was any confusion at the United Nations, i t was not on the programmes and positions of the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders. Their 155 programmes and positions on the various issues at stake were well-defined. Their arguments in favour of their programmes at the United Nations were intricate and intriguing although Foncha proved not to be the equal of the others. The confusion lay with the Fourth Committee: how, given that a l l i t s members were impartial, to square these conflicting positions with the unanimity of the two leading Southern Kamerunian p o l i t i c a l leaders on having only two alternatives at the plebiscite and how to leave out reuni-fication when one of the two insisted on i t and the other indicated i t was a future possibility. Nevertheless, there was actually nothing too d i f f i c u l t in the situation. The United Nations Charter was there to solve the problem. It states clearly that in anything concerning a trust t e r r i -tory, the wishes, desires, and interests of the inhabitants must be decisive. Since the inhabitants themselves best know what their interests are, par-^ ticu l a r l y when even the imperialists consider them already f i t to govern themselves, the Charter actually hinges on their wishes and desires. To be sure, the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders were s p l i t in their wishes and desires but they were not the majority of the Southern Kamerunians. In spite of himself, Foncha, the Premier of Southern Kamerun, '.indicated at least two times at the United Nations what the wishes and desires of the majority of the Southern Kamerunians were. When he agreed, although this was only indirectly accurate, that he came to power because of the policy of the a-Fon, no other leader contested i t at the time. This meant, therefore, that the majority of the Southern Kamerunians had,given that their votes spoke the language of the alternatives, determined their interests and aspired for Smaller Kamerun. Furthermore, Foncha-argued his case on the basis of the popular votes at the elections, figures of which he produced. This meant, 156 even i f the majority of the votes were not for Smaller Kamerun, then they were for Fonchaism. Whether the meanings of the votes at the p l e b i s c i t e would coincide with the meanings of the p l e b i s c i t e questions or not, to deny the electorate the choice of Smaller Kamerun and/or Fonchaism, would be tantamount to saying that although they ere f i t to rule themselves, they d i d not know what t h e i r \u00E2\u0080\u00A2interests were\u00E2\u0080\u0094-an i n t e r n a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n . In short, i t would be to deny them the r i g h t to self-determination, an important aspect of the trusteeship system. No matter how one looks at i t , considering the Charter, the objective of Smaller Kamerun would have been the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e chosen f o r the p l e b i s c i t e . But, the Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Council had t h e i r own i n t e r n a l problems and perceptions. Even before Foncha and Endeley made t h e i r statements at the United Nations, many of the Trusteeship Council members had made up t h e i r minds based mainly on the report of the 1958 Mission. The B r i t i s h representative, Cohen, was the f i r s t to do so. On February 16, 1959, he asserted that the report was thorough and accurate. I t had advised that the January e l e c t i o n s should not be taken a s c e c i s i ^ - and that a p l e b i s c i t e was required at a future date to s e t t l e the issue. The report had shown that \"the average p o l l had been 70 per cent of the r e g i s t e r e d voters; 40.4 per cent of the votes had been cast i n favour of candidates pledged to support association with the Federation of Nigeria and 55.3 per cent i n favour of the candidates supporting 'secession' by the Southern Cameroons from N i g e r i a . The r e -maining votes had gone to independent candidates.\" He, Cohen, was now, therefore, asking the Council to endorse the Missions report and to recommend 23 a future p l e b i s c i t e f o r Southern Kamerun. Cohen had, thus, made up h i s mind against a referendum or u n i l a t e r a l r e u n i t i n g of Kamerun by the United 157 Nations long before Foncha and Endeley made their statements between Febrr ruary 23 and February 25, 1959. Two days after Cohen's speech, on February 18, 1959, other members of the Council also indicated where they stood and what had influenced their decisions. After considering Cohen's statements and the Circumstances, U Thant, the representative of Burma, f e l t that the decision should be l e f t to the General Assembly. The representative of New Zealand, \"was in general agreement with the views of the Visiting Mission,\" which were a product of \"careful findings.\" The Mission's recommendations of a future plebiscite for Southern Kamerun \"warranted the Council's endorsement,\" although he \"was aware that some members did not share that view.\" It was, therefore, necessary to leave the decision to the General Assembly, while he accepted without \"hesitation\" the Mission's view that there should be no plebiscite in Northern Kamerun, he nevertheless f e l t that a plebiscite should take place in that region in order to \"strengthen the proportion of those throughout the Territory [that i s , Northern and Southern Kamerun] who 24 wished to accede to Nigeria.\" The New Zealand representative had already taken sides with the integrationists and was already disposed to favour integration long before Endeley came to the United Nations. The situation was not very different among the other members of the Trusteeship Council. The representative of Haiti, agreed with U Thant's statement and \"saw no alternative but to leave the discussion of the sub-stance of the issue to the General Assembly.\" Sears, the representative of the United States, f e l t that un t i l Foncha and Endeley came, \"the Council could not draft a resolution with the kind of recommendations i t would normally have made to the General Assembly.\" Montero de Vargas, the 158 representative of Paraguay, agreed with Sears and co-sponsored the draft resolution because \" i t did not touch upon the substance of the question.\" The Italian representative, co-'sponsored the draft resolution because of the British neutral attitude on the af f a i r and because of the Mission's \"thorough investigation\" in the Territory. He was in agreement with the representative of New Zealand, that i s , that the Northern Kamerun plebis-cite be used to influence opinion in Southern Kamerun in favour of inte-gration with Nigeria. The Australian representative accepted the draft resolution because of British neutral attitude. Finally, Labanov, the Soviet representative, did not vote against the draft resolution because i t reflected neither the views of the Mission nor dealt with the \"sub-25 stance of the questions;\" had i t done so, he would have voted against i t . It appears, then, that the.Mission report, the disagreement over the validity of i t s conclusions and recommendations vis-a-vis the substance of the issue within the Trusteeship Council, and the p a r t i a l i t y and impartiality, as the case may be, of the members of the Trusteeship Council over the future of Western Kamerun, were responsible for Resolution 1926 (XXIII) of the Trusteeship Council adopted on February 18, 1959. This resolution recom-mended a plebiscite for Northern Kamerun at the end of 1959. About Southern Kamerun, i t shifted the decision to the General Assembly pending the arrival of Endeley and Foncha. But the arrival of Endeley and Foncha and their statements at the General Assembly did not alter much. The General Assembly included the same countries whose representatives had disagreed and taken different positions in the Trusteeship Council. It is no. surprise, therefore, that the General Assembly on i t s own part evaded the problem and passed a resolution which was 159 a confession, not so much that the imbroglio could not be resolved, as i t was that i t s members were too interested and too divided to resolve the conflict themselves. The General Assembly Resolution 1350 (XIII) adopted on March 13, 1959, essentially shifted back the decision to the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders who had come to the United Nations, in the f i r s t place, because they could not resolve the conflict themselves. It stated that a plebiscite would take place in Southern Kamerun between December 1959 and April 1960. The alternatives to be put to the voters and the qualifications for voters would be considered by the General Assembly during i t s fourteenth session. But the General Assembly hoped that \" a l l concerned in the Territory [would] endeavour to reach agreement . . . on the alternatives to be put in the plebiscite in Southern Cameroons and the 26 qualification for voting in i t . \" After the long journey to and scheming at the United Nations, the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders had only one issue resolved for them, namely, that the form of consultation would have to be a plebiscite. The most important issues, the voters' qualification and, in particular, the plebiscite questions had been l e f t unresolved. They were asked to come home and resolve the problems them-selves. But they were coming back into a confused society, a society in which some of the a-Fon were already decided, wrongly, that Foncha was a reunificationist, while others, though uncertain, believed this same Foncha to be a secessionist pure and simple, and others were so confused as to be unable to place Foncha. Generally, the coastal belt was going in one direction and the grasslands were moving in another direction. 160 The Nationalist Leaders at Home April-September 1959 Three groups which together embraced the Bakweri, the indigenous i n -habitants of Victoria Division, the home of Dr. Endeley, showed very clearly, in 1959, that they endorsed the integrationists' programme and positions completely. The Bakweri Women's Union, on September 21, 1959, argued that Southern Kamerun had \"been tied into the apron strings of Nigeria for Administrative convenience,\" and i t had developed \"together socially, edu-cationally, economically and otherwise\" with Nigeria. Their kith and kin were in Nigeria. The idea of continued trusteeship was out of the question. The vote at the plebiscite should be given to every tax-payer in Southern Kamerun. The plebiscite questions should involve \"association\" with Nigeria versus secession from Nigeria with reunification as a condition for seces-27 sion. The a-Fon, Councillors, and Members of Tiko constituency declared a vote of confidence for Endeley and denounced Foncha. They were in agree-ment with whatever Endeley had said and the positions he had taken at the 28 United Nations. At a meeting held some time before May 20, 1959, the Bakweri, who were present at the meeting, endorsed everything Endeley stood for, and declared Fon G.M. Endeley, Dr. Endeley's uncle who had signed the policy 29 statement of the a-Fon in 1958, \"taboo\" and dethroned. These petitions clearly indicated that the majority of the indigenous inhabitants of Victoria Division were integrationists.* Endeley was aware of his support in Victoria Division. *A good search has not produced any petition from any Bakweri person or group of persons holding contrary views. The petitions that held contrary views and came from this Division were those of the OK and Youths Associations, both of whose members need not be Bakweri. 161 The indigenous inhabitants of Kumba Division, the home.of Mbile, also endorsed the integrationists' programme. The Ngolo-Batanga Union (Southern Bakundu\u00E2\u0080\u0094the Bakundu command about two-thirds of Kumba Division area wise) argued that they shared the same boundaries, market places, fishing waters, to name only these, with the people of Calabar, Nigeria. Their only means of communication, the Ndian and Meme rivers, emptied their waters in the Calabar Sea and served, a l l their needs. While Calabar and Nigeria were their only means of contact with the outside world, they had \"never seen a mile of road\" in their area. Secession from Nigeria would destroy them. The Efik and the Ibibio of Eastern Nigeria were their kith and kin. Reunification was a sentimental issue which would \"lead to chaos and con-3 fusion since the two sectors had lost contact for the last 40 or more years.\" The Northern Bakundu blamed the mess in which Southern Kamerun had found i t s e l f on British lack of policy and definite direction in the region and then asserted that the British and British democracy had failed in Southern Kamerun. However, they f e l t that the issues at the plebiscite should be \"association\" with Nigeria versus secession with reunification. Every person who voted in the 1959 elections should be allowed to vote at the plebiscite. Furthermore, the results of the plebiscite should be treated on Divisional basis and only a two-thirds majority in each Division should alter the \"status ,31 quo. The Bakossi of Kumba, possibly the only group in that Division that does not belong to the Bakundu ethnic group, were also integrationists. On March 6, 1959, they suggested that the plebiscite be conducted with adequate safeguards to prevent one ethnic group from making a decision for another 32 ethnic group. In a telegram on September 29, 1959, the same Bakossi 162 argued that Southern Kamerun was too small to be \"sandwiched between two large territories,\" and strongly recommended that the questions of the 33 plebiscite should be union with Nigeria versus reunification. On August 15, 1959, the Balondo, another Bakundu group, condemned the idea of con-tinued trusteeship, identified the issues of the plebiscite to be reunifi-cation against association with Nigeria, and suggested that every person who voted in the January, 1959, general elections should have a vote at the 34 plebiscite. The integrationists were, thus, sure of support from the indigenous inhabitants of another Division. Unlike Victoria and Kumba Divisions, Mamfe Division was generally in favour of secession and separate independence and sovereignty for Southern Kamerun. Perhaps the situation in Mamfe Division i s best illustrated by i t s spokesmen. Either on or before September 14, 1959, a l l the a-Fon of Mamfe Division came together in a conference and decided against the integrationists 1' ideas. They asked the United Nations to make integration with Nigeria and secession from Nigeria the issues at the plebiscite. They f e l t that only 35 indigenous Southern Kamerunians should have the vote at the plebiscite. Foncha could, thus, count on support from Mamfe Division provided, and this is very important, he either abandoned reunification completely or l e f t i t always in the background as he did during the January 24, 1959, general elections. Although Bamenda Division was one of the most divided areas, sentiment there was largely against integration with Nigeria, generally in favour of secession pure and simple, and to some extent in favour of reunification. Being the home of Premier Foncha and Ntumazah, and the home of the most power-ful a-Fon, and commanding about half the population of Southern Kamerun, 163 interest was centered there particularly in the Fondoms of Nso, Bafut, Kom,* and Bali Nyonga. Unfortunately, the four more powerful a-Fon of Bamenda did not bother themselves arguing or writing petitions at this time. It was, however, known at the time that the a-Fon of Bali Nyonga and Bafut were for secession pure and simple. The a-Fon of Kom and Nso (brothers as their subjects like to c a l l them and as they refer to each other) supported integration with Nigeria but local p o l i t i c s , in the case of Nso, and the fact that the second in command of the KNDP hierarchy was a Kom, in the case of Kom, made that support not as important as i t should have been. Nevertheless, some of the less powerful a-Fon of Bamenda did indicate where their support lay. As early as 1958, S.M.C. Mbipefa, Fon of Bangola, identified only two views in Southern Kamerun which he thought the consul-tation might involve. These were association with Nigeria and secession from i t . 3 6 On September 10, 1959, the a-Fon of Widikum West, who claimed to have 39,209 subjects, suggested that the plebiscite questions should be permanent integration with Nigeria against secession with a future determination of fate. They f e l t that only indigenous inhabitants of Southern Kamerun should 37 have a vote at the plebiscite. One thing Foncha knew, and everyone in Southern Kamerun knew i t too, was that Foncha could count on Bamenda, i f only he played down reunification. This was not easy for him to do either what with the most vocal reunificationists on this side of the Mumgo based in Mankon Town,t the largest city in Bamenda Division. *The Fondom of Kom was actually in Wum Division but ethnically i t belongs to the Tikari of Bamenda and has more contacts with Bamenda than with the rest of Wum. tThis point w i l l become obvious to the reader in the next chapter in the sec-tion dealing with i n i t i a l reaction to the Foncha-Endeley Compromise. 164 Perhaps Wum Division was the most confused at the time. The majority of the inhabitants of Wum were certain about three things: they were against integration with Nigeria; they were equally against reunification; and they wanted secession from Nigeria and separate and f u l l independence for Southern Kamerun in a Southern Kamerun State. But, none of the p o l i t i c a l parties in the region gave them precisely what they wanted; they stood well-dressed but with nowhere to go. The outcome was confusion. Some time in August, 1959, the a-Fon of Wum Division\u00E2\u0080\u0094Fungom, Aghem, Beba-Befang, and Essimbi\u00E2\u0080\u0094, writing individually or in small groups, seemed to be on the side of the integrationists. They argued that Southern Kamerun in the foreseeable future could not form a viable economic and p o l i t i c a l entity by i t s e l f . The problem of the day was between joining \"our brothers\" of Eastern Kamerun and joining Nigeria, with which Southern Kamerun had developed in the same direction together socially, p o l i t i c a l l y , educationally, culturally and otherwise. Continued trusteeship was not acceptable because i t was a new form of imperialism. Every person born in Southern Kamerun was qualified to vote. The questions of the plebiscite should involve association with 38 Nigeria versus reunification. But, less than one month later, September, 1959, these same a-Fon came together in a conference and their decision appeared to be in favour of Fonchaism or at least in line with the normal position of the a-Fon. They requested that the plebiscite questions be inte-gration with Nigeria versus secession, continued trusteeship system, and a decision in the future. They f e l t that only indigenous Southern Kamerunians 39 should have the vote at the plebiscite. The rather contradictory evidence from the a-Fon of Wum suggests the Division's inhabitants were either confused or undecided about their p o l i t i c a l fate. 165 The situation in Nkambe Division i s not easy to handle. It appears that Nkambe Division was either as divided as Bamenda\u00E2\u0080\u0094except that i t s own division was between integration and simple secession, not between simple secession and reunification as was the case with Bamenda\u00E2\u0080\u0094or the people were indecisive as was the case with Wum Division. The thirteen a-Fon of Tang and Wiya, on August 29, 1959, were convinced of the \"grave implications\" of secession from Nigeria. Direct administration by Britain under continued trusteeship was a retrograde step while secession and reunification were fraught with dangers for Southern Kamerun. A plebiscite was welcomed provided the register was revised. They wished to secede from Southern Kamerun and to continue in their association with Nigeria. In case of a plebiscite, the alternatives should be association with Nigeria versus secession from i t with reunification as a condition for secession. A l l foreigners in Southern Kamerun, young and old, including even those just coming into the region as well as the indigenous inhabitants should have 40 the vote at the plebiscite. Two days later, August 31, 1959, twenty-three a-Fon of Nkambe Division spoke differently. They suggested that the alterna-tives at the plebiscite should be integration with Nigeria versus secession pure and simple and they f e l t that only the names of the indigenous Southern 41 Kamerunians should be in the revised register of the plebiscite. If the second group of the Nkambe a-Fon included the former thirteen a-Fon, then the thirteen changed their minds two days after in a larger group and, i f not, then Nkambe was divided between integrationists and secessionists. In either event, neither Foncha nor Endeley could be sure of definite support from Nkambe. Aside from this Dividional distribution of support, the integrationists 166 and Foncharians could tap some support from some of the Associations in Southern Kamerun. These Associations were located in the urban areas in Southern Kamerun. They were, in the main, Youths' Associations. The available sources so far suggest that only one of these Associations, surprisingly from Mamfe, was with the integrationists at this time. On September 22, 1959, the Etemetek Youth Association of Mamfe suggested that the alternatives of the plebiscite should be secession with reunification against remaining \"as you are now in the Federation of Nigeria after her independence.\" The vote should be given to a l l those who voted in the last 42 general elections. The behaviour of this Youth Association should not be overlooked, i t suggests the extent to which the young and urban dwellers and the literate were attempting to free themselves from the influence of the a-Fon. The majority of the Youths' Associations, however, were against inte-gration with Nigeria. On September 17, 1959, the Bota Youth Association identified the \"main objective\" of the KNDP, their party, as \"secession from Nigeria without bitterness.\" They f e l t that only citizens of Southern Kamerun \"SHALL vote during the forthcoming plebiscite.\" Reunification was \"purely\" an internal af f a i r and ought not be part of the plebiscite. It was not even 43 right, for the United Nations to be discussing reunification. The Youths and Elders of Nkambe resident in Mutengene, Victoria Division, argued for immediate secession, continued trusteeship, and a future decision. Reunifi-cation was an internal issue and should not, therefore, be part of the plebis-cite. The issues of the plebiscite were to be secession alone versus inte-gration with Nigeria and only the indigenous inhabitants should have the 44 vote. The Njindom Youth League went further and asserted that the vote 167 45 should be given only to \"100 per cent blood free born Southern Cameroonians.\" To sum i t up, the Youth League, that i s the totality of a l l the Youths' 46 Associations, rehashed the arguments and positions of Foncha. It i s important to note that, while the indigenous inhabitants of Victoria Division were integrationists, a l l these Youths' Associations were based mainly in Victoria Division and were anti-integrationists. Although the university students and graduates were reunificationists, an insignificant number of them supported Fonchaism in i t s entirety. M.N. Sabum, a holder of an L.L.B. Hons., London, was one of the few who did so. In a long, logical, well-written memorandum he argued essentially that reunification was predicated on secession, i t s antecedent, and, therefore, could not become part of the plebiscite u n t i l after secession had been achieved. While the intervening variable, secession, could be skipped in a largely literate'society, i t could not be skipped in a society like Southern Kamerun without throwing the i l l i t e r a t e masses into confusion. The issues of the plebiscite should, therefore, be integration with Nigeria versus secession \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 47 from i t . On the other hand, not a l l those who supported Foncha bought every part of Fonchaism. Again some of these were to be found in Mamfe Division. On September 25, 1959, the Mbang Development Association stated that Southern Kamerunians resented \"any p o l i t i c a l bondage from any quarter in the territory.\" They elected Foncha to office on the platform of secession and not that of reunification. Had the electorate known that \"the territory would be drafted to join the French Cameroon,\" which differed from Southern Kamerun culturally and otherwise, \"they would have voted against the KNDP during the last general election.\" Reunification would \"expose\" the Southern Kamerunians \"to the 168 people who believe in mass atrocities without the slightest provocation.\" If the choice must be made between integration and reunification, the Association would \"appreciate the policy of liv i n g with the devil you know [Nigeria] than [with] the devil you did not know [Eastern Kamerun].\" Southern Kamerunians had suffered a setback in education after the F i r s t World War and would not see that repeated \"after they have been brought up in the British way of l i f e . \" Continued trusteeship was out of the question because i t was a means of nursing and perpetuating \"colonialism and imperial-ism in the territory.\" After forty years of i t s operation, the Trusteeship Agreement brought no benefits to Southern Kamerun and ought to be terminated 48 immediately.\" This once more demonstrates the tenuous relationship between the a-Fon and the lit e r a t e : they both wanted secession pure and simple but, while the a-Fon wanted a short period of trusteeship, the literate were opposed to that short period. It must have become obvious by now that a-Fon of the six Administrative Divisions did not support reunification. But this does not mean that the reunificationists had no support at a l l . Indeed, the supporters of reunifi-cation were the most vocal in the region, i f only to make up for their inferior numbers. Before the dissolution of the UPC, this group , was to be found mainly in the urban centers of Kumba, Victoria, and Bamenda Divisions. But, after the outlawing of the UPC, they were concentrated in Bamenda Division under the banner of the OK and in many ci t i e s and universities abroad including Nigeria. A few of their numerous petitions should help to demonstrate the ideas of the supporters of reunification and where they were to be located. Using as evidence the 45,000 petitions which were addressed to the United 169 Nations (mainly by the UPC) within three months in 1955 demanding reunifi-cation and independence, the Kamerun students in Khartoum in 1958 challenged the British, the French, and the Missions' statements that reunification was not popular. After this challenge, these students requested the United 49 Nations to reunify Kamerun unconditionally and without any consultation. On November.24, 1958, on behalf of the Kamerun students in the Univeristy of Ibadan, A.W. Mukong argued that there should be simultaneous referenda in Northern, Southern, and Eastern Kamerun over the issue of reunification. The referenda may involve only integration with Nigeria and reunification but any vote cast against integration \"means automatic acceptance of reunification.\" Only persons of Kamerun origin \"by birth or nationality\" may take part in the referenda. The age limit of voters should be eighteen and over. However, a l l the Kamerun \"students who have reached the fourth form [grade 12] in college should be given the right to vote irrespective of their age.\" The votes in each of the three sections of Kamerun should be interpreted separately with special consideration for the backwardness of Northern Kamerun. The over-all results, however, would be interpreted after the simultaneous \u00E2\u0080\u0094 50 referenda had been conducted. The way these students wanted the votes treated must, be understood against the precedent of Togoland. They were not sure of the situation, in Northern Kamerun and were afraid that that region could carry Southern Kamerun with i t into integration. The next group of the supporters of reunification were non-students abroad. On December 29, 1958, the Kamerun Union in Calabar, a group of Kamerunians resident in that part of Nigeria, asserted that i t was a good exercise of power for the United Nations \"to award Kamerun [re]unification without the so-called plebiscite.\" But, i f the United Nations was unwilling 170 to pursue the unilateral action, they would \"unanimously\" seek the \"approval of the Secretary-General for Voting By Post In the Said Plebiscite Or In Alternative Voting By Proxy [ s i c ] . \" 5 1 On July 17, 1959, The Kamerun National Union, Lagos, Nigeria, suggested that, in Northern Kamerun, \"con-sideration should be given to their relative backwardness,\" which was a consequence of \"earlier want of educational f a c i l i t i e s . \" The people ought to be well-educated on the two issues involved in the 1959 plebiscite; The register ought to be revised because i t contained \"only a few names of the population.\" While women should be given the vote there, colours should not be used to identify the alternatives* because of their \"psycho-52 logical stigma.\" The other supporters of reunification were within Southern Kamerun and were almost always invariably connected w i t h t h e 0 K . I n l a t e 1 9 5 3 , the sup-porters of reunification in 121 petitions argued that the consultation \"should be in the form of a referendum or plebiscite under the sole responsibility of 53 the United Nations.\" The Ibo should be precluded from participation. Others argued that there should neither be a referendum nor a plebiscite u n t i l a general amnesty had been granted to a l l those against whom proceedings had 54 been instituted since 1955. Beginning on February 20, 1959, the World Federation of Democratic Youth addressed hundreds of petitions to the United Nations, coming mainly from East Germany and Czechoslovakia, with the same message: \"We support the youth and the people of Kamerun in their fight for 55 immediate reunification and national independence for Kamerun . . . \" *Even in Southern Kamerun, detractors interpreted the White Box\u00E2\u0080\u0094reunifica-tion\u00E2\u0080\u0094as a coffin and the Green Box\u00E2\u0080\u0094integration\u00E2\u0080\u0094as a green snake considered cunning and dangerous. 171 On April 1, .1958, the Tiko Branch of the OK complained about the dis-crimination in voters' qualifications which made i t easier for Nigerians to vote and too d i f f i c u l t for Eastern Kamerunians to vote. 5 6 On March 25, 1959, the Ntchou-Santa Branch of the OK argued that Kamerun was a single country during the German period, and since i t was divided without consul-tation with i t s peoples, i t should be reunited in the same way. Kamerunians had \"no further use for the fake and reactionary government\" under trustee-ship. If the nation could not be reunited unilaterally by the United Nations, they would accept a referendum in Western Kamerun to \"open the way to the 57 [re]unification of the two Kameruns.\" The question then was not whether, as Endeley, Foncha, and Ntumazah (Dookingue and Moumie were in exile) returned home from the United Nations, there was support for each leader's programme. The relevant question was how much support did each of them command and from whom. Endeley (and Mbile) commanded the support of the a-Fon and indigenous people of Victoria and Kumba Divisions. Foncha commanded the support of the a-Fon and indigenous inhabitants of Mamfe Division and of the majority of the a-Fon of Bamenda Division including their subjects. Ntumazah had no Fon behind him but he had support from the university students and graduates wherever they were and he commanded the support of nearly every Eastern Kamerunian resident in Southern Kamerun. Endeley and Ntumazah had some significant support in Bamenda Division. Wum was unpredictable; while Ntumazah was out of the race there, Endeley and Foncha could gain or lose Wum depending on who was the better p o l i t i c i a n . Nkambe too could not be definitely ascribed. Either Endeley and Foncha had control over specific areas of the Division or the better p o l i t i c i a n might claim the whole Division. The Youths' Associations 172 were generally for Foncha. Secondary school students shared their support between Foncha and Ntumazah. Students from Teacher Training Colleges and teachers shared their support between Endeley and Foncha, with a large part of i t going to Foncha. With so much support coming to each leader and with so many people widely distributed and urging the leaders to be firm in their positions and programmes, i t was very li k e l y that the agreement the United Nations hoped they would reach would be unobtainable. Indeed, Endeley and Foncha made several attempts between April and July, 1959, in the presence always of a British o f f i c i a l , to reach agreement on the questions of the plebiscite and the qualifications for voting in i t , but a l l these attempts foundered. When i t became obvious that these private attempts would never succeed, the High Commissioner decided to extend the scope of the attempts and to involve a 58 wider section of the society and make the attempts public. The outcome of this decision was the Mamfe Plebiscite Conference of August 10-11, 1959. Although i t s nature was agreed upon by both Endeley and Foncha, the organization of the Plebiscite Conference was largely unfavourable to the integrationists' cause. Eight seats were alloted to the KNDP, six-to the KNC-KPP Alliance, one each to the OK, the Kamerun Society\u00E2\u0080\u0094an organization of some Western -educated Kamerunians livi n g mainly in Victoria Division, the National Union of Kamerun Students, and the Kamerun United Party (KUP)\u00E2\u0080\u0094 a p o l i t i c a l party formed by Kale in mid-1959 after he abandoned the KPP to Mbile, seventeen to the Native Authorities, and ten to the a-Fon.* The total *The number of seats allotted to the a-Fon, a number even more than that given to the Governing Party, should not be overlooked. It seems to demon-strate the recognition by a l l the organizers in the region that the a-Fon were a powerful force to reckon with. 173 was f o r t y - f i v e but, because two of the a-Fon f a i l e d to come, the number was reduced to forty-three. The four more powerful a-Fon had automatic seats and were known as e x - o f f i c i o members. The administrative o f f i c e r s of the s i x Administrative D i v i s i o n s used population s i z e and selected one Fon each 58 from each of the D i v i s i o n s . (This meant Bamenda sent i n four a-Fon and Wum two while the others had one each.) Unfortunately for the a s s o c i a t i o n i s t s , one of the a-Fon who d i d not show up was the Fon of Nso who was very i l l at the time. The Conference was presided over by a B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l who i d e n t i f i e d three a l t e r n a t i v e s opened to the Southern Kamerunians a f t e r the p l e b i s c i t e . These included: \"(a) the status of a self-governing Region within an inde-pendent Federation of Nigeria; (b) separation from Nigeria, with a period of trusteeship; (c) separation from Nigeria, to be followed by early negotia-tions with the future Republic of the Cameroons with a veiw of [ r e ] u n i f i c a t i o n 69 on accepted terms.\" \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 A f t e r performing t h i s r o l e , the Chairman i n v i t e d the representatives to state t h e i r cases. As the Premier, i t was Foncha who began the d e l i b e r a t i o n s . This time, his p o s i t i o n regarding the a l t e r n a t i v e s of the p l e b i s c i t e was c l o s e r to Fonchaism. \"Our objective for the immediate future as f a r as the p l e b i s c i t e i s concerned should be, e i t h e r remaining an i n t e g r a l part of an independent Nigeria or separating from i t and working out our independence a f t e r under-going a: short period of the United Kingdom Trusteeship.\" R e u n i f i c a t i o n was s t i l l a future p o s s i b i l i t y (but t h i s time i t had more conditions): i t was \"only . . . possible by negotiation between those who agree to i t \" ; i t could only be \"achieved by common agreement among those sectors of Kamerun which want i t \" ; i t could not be \"imposed by any of the sectors\"; i t could not be 174 i n i t i a t e d from without; and, i t \"must come from the people.\" As a r e s u l t of a l l t h i s , i t could not be \"one of the a l t e r n a t i v e s to be put at the p l e b i s -c i t e . \" As for voters' q u a l i f i c a t i o n , only the \"indigenes [sic] people of the Southern Cameroons should r e g i s t e r and vote\" because i t was t h e i r future that was at stake.6\"'\" I t i s important to note that at Mamfe Foncha appeared to have even excluded using the period of trusteeship f or negotiating u n i f i -cation. Instead, the period would be used to work out the independence of Southern Kamerun. THis major deviation from what he said at the United Nations must be understood against the background of the presence of the a-Fon. The presence of the a-Fon also a f f e c t e d Endeley. He admitted that there were people who believed i n Secession. He understood that h i s \"people would l i k e to cut away from Nigeria, no [ r e ] u n i f i c a t i o n , \" but, i t was for him \"to advise them on which course [was] good for t h i s country.\" The i n t e g r a t i o n i s t s had \"been bold.\" The KNC-KPP A l l i a n c e d i f f e r e d \"fundamentally with the KNDP\" over the issue of the French Community; the former d i d not want Southern Kamerun to \"be i n the French Community.\" I f Eastern Kamerunians had to reunify with the Southern Kamerunians, \"we should a l l remain i n the B r i t i s h [sic] Commonwealth.\" Nevertheless, the vote should be given to any person i n Southern Kamerun who had a stake at the p l e b i s c i t e and the a l t e r n a t i v e s 62 should be a s s o c i a t i o n with N i g e r i a versus r e u n i f i c a t i o n . While Endeley d i d not a l t e r the programme and p o s i t i o n s of the i n t e g r a t i o n i s t s , he attempted, not unsuccessfully as w i l l be seen presently, to set the a-Fon against Foncha. He d i r e c t l y told-the a-Fon that Foncha was for the French Community and offered them the Commonwealth. He knew what they wanted but i t was h i s place to advise them on the r i g h t course for the country, an<. advice which needed a bold person to give. He might consider any other a l t e r n a t i v e to int e g r a t i o n 175 provided i t would leave them i n the Commonwealth and out of the French Community. Even the r e u n i f i c a t i o n i s t s , who had never had any Fon with them, s t i l l f e l t the presence of these Crowned Princes at Mamfe. The OK or rather Ntumazah, \"would have l i k e d to reach an agreement with the party proposing 'secession' only\" but an examination of the issue had revealed that i t f e l l \" f a r short of the objectives\" f or which the OK stood. He d i d not understand why the KNDP dropped \"the word 'Reunfication' one month a f t e r i t came into power.\" The OK stood for the \"Reunification of Kamerun.\" However, he was i n agreement with the KNDP over the voters' q u a l i f i c a t i o n s but he f e l t that the a l t e r n a t i v e s of the p l e b i s c i t e should be int e g r a t i o n 6 3 with Nigeria versus cesession with r e u n i f i c a t i o n . Ntumazah's statement that he would have l i k e d to reach agreement with the KNDP on the issue of \"Secession\" alone should not be overlooked. Considering what had been s a i d so f a r about Ntumazah and the OK on the issue of r e u n i f i c a t i o n , t h i s was too much a statement for the leader of the r e u n i f i c a t i o n i s t s to make at a Conference where agreement was not a c t u a l l y the r e a l issue. If:', further demonstrates how the presence of the a-Fon was conditioning the atmosphere of the Conference. Even the students, another wing of the r e u n i f i c a t i o n i s t s , deviated s i g n i f i c a n t l y from t h e i r previous stance. They stated that Southern Kamerun \"wisely desire[d] r e u n i f i c a t i o n . \" They were aware that \"secession without r e u n i f i c a t i o n may be used for p o l i t i c a l ends which otherwise may not be nat i o n a l . \" They f e l t that secession alone might end i n making a Southern Kamerun State that would become e i t h e r a B r i t i s h dependency or \"a small unstable state which w i l l serve as a f e r t i l e spot for Communist i n f i l t r a t i o n 176 into Africa.\" As was the case with Newfoundland in relation to Canada, secession alone might end \"in the integration of the territory into the Federation of Nigeria long after the latter had attained independence.\" A l l this considered, the alternatives of the plebiscite should be inte-gration with Nigeria versus \"secession and ultimate reunification\" and the vote should be given only to Kamerunians, Eastern or Western, resident in 64 Western Kamerun. The deviations of these students seem to suggest that they were more concerned with the Crowned Princes than with agreement. The example of Newfoundland was used to scare the a-Fon away from Endeley and integration. The fear of Communism was used to scare the a-Fon away from secession alone and to assure them that reunification (ultimate) was the best way of avoiding Communism. Suspicion of Foncha was used to explain why they did not support secession alone. Nevertheless, and this i s very important, they modified their position; i t was no longer immediate reunification but ultimate reunifi-cation. The a-Fon were thus given a breathing space between secession and reunification. The only other p o l i t i c a l party, the KUP, came close to the position of the a-Fon but s t i l l differed with them in several important respects. Kale argued that time had come for \"the Cameroonians to manage their own ship of state . . . without ties or apron strings either way.\" If the \"marriage\" between Nigeria and Southern Kamerun was \"to be dissolved, the only one question to be asked [was] simply association with or secession from Nigeria.\" Reunification was out of the question \"entirely\" because i t had \"no bearing on the issue involved.\" What was at stake was \"continued associa-tion with Nigeria or secession.\" Continued trusteeship was \"out of the 177 question\" because i t was \"not a qualification for self-government.\" The KUP stood for separate and f u l l independence for Southern Kamerun in i t s own state. It f e l t also that the vote at the plebiscite be given to \"the 65 people of the territory who [had] a stake in the matter.\" Kale's state-ment seems to offer the a-Fon the state of Southern Kamerun they were looking for, and to deny them a period of trusteeship while being quiet over the issue of the Commonwealth. But he agreed with them on the voters' q u a l i f i -cations and on the alternatives of the plebiscite. The difference between Foncha and Kale or rather between the KNDP and the KUP was that the former l e f t the door to reunification open albeit with important conditions whereas the KUP completely closed that door. The other participants were divided in their support of the various programmes and positions. The Kamerun Society supported, either Kale or Foncha. Using the results of a l l the general elections in Southern Kamerun from 1953 to January 1959,..it argued that the majority of Southern Kamerunians had indicated that they desired either integration with Nigeria or secession alone from i t . Moreover., i t was not f a i r to ask the Southern Kamerunians to vote on reunification about which they knew nothing. It was, therefore, necessary to make integration with Nigeria and secession alone from i t the issues at the plebiscite. It f e l t that only \"indigenous persons ;should be allowed to vote as the plebiscite [was] a purely Southern Cameroons a f f a i r . \" 6 6 Eleven of the seventeen Native Authorities supported Foncha on the issue of the alternatives of the plebiscite, namely, that they should be integration with Nigeria versus secession with a period of trusteeship in which Southern Kamerun independence would be worked out. The other six supported Endeley, Ntumazah, and the students; they wished to have secession 178 with reunification as the second alternative of the plebiscite. Likewise, eleven of the seventeen Native Authorities wished to give the vote only to indigenous Southern Kamerunians whereas the other six f e l t that people in Southern Kamerun who had a stake at the plebiscite should be given the 67 vote. The a-Fon who attended the Conference made their position abundantly clear. It was summed up by their spokesman, the Fon of Banfut. We believe on two points during a conference in Bamenda in which Dr. Endeley and Foncha were present. I was chairman of that conference. We rejected Dr. Endeley because he wanted to take us to Nigeria. If Mr. Foncha tries to take us to French Cameroons we shall also run away from him. To me the French Cameroons i s 'f i r e ' and Nigeria i s 'water'. Sir,* I support secession without unification.^8 The a-Fon had both stated their preference and complicated the situation. They were out for secession without reunification, possible, ultimate, or immediate. Kale or any other p o l i t i c a l leader that could advocate the posi-tion could get their support. But, i f the Southern Kamerunians were forced to choose between integration with Nigeria and reunification, the a-Fon would, other things remaining equal, choose the former (water) and reject the latter ( f i r e ) . The Mamfe Plebiscite Conference had changed a lot but changed nothing. Indeed the situation had become more confused. The British o f f i c i a l acting as chairman had introduced extraneous issues. Kale had introduced something new, namely, separate independence for Southern Kamerun with neither a period of trusteeship nor a possibility for reunification. Foncha substituted the working out of independence for that of negotiating reunification during the *The 'Sir' referred to here was probably the Chairman, the Britisher. 179 period of trusteeship. The students substituted ultimate reunification for immediate reunification. Only Endeley and Ntumazah, after some confusion stood firm on the alternatives of the plebiscite they had previously advocated. But the fundamental problems remained unsolved. The represen-tatives were agreed that only two alternatives should be involved in the plebiscites but they disagreed as to what should be the second alternative and who should vote at the plebiscite. It was their turn to confess to the United Nations that they too were too interested, too divided, too self-serving, and too confused to reach agreement and, therefore, to shift the decision back to the United Nations. 180 Footnotes - Chapter Four \"'\"U.N., T.C, Petition from the Bureau of the Union des Population du Cameroun Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration and the Cameroons under French Administration, Douala, 30 April, 1954, T/PET. 4 and 5/1. 6, May 13, 1954, pp. 1-2. 2 U.N. , T.C, Petition from Messrs. Endeley and Mbile Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, 3 February, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 14, February 4, 1959, p. 1. 3 U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 775, January, 1959, p. 156. 4 Ibid., p. 155. 5Ibid., pp. 155-156. 6U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 780, January, 1959, p. 183. u. N. , G. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2A., A/C. 4/SR. 775, January, 1959, P- 153. 8u. N. , G. .A., A/C. 4/SR. 780, January, 1959, P- 183. 9 U. N. , G. .A., A/C. 4/SR. 775, January, 1959, pp. 153, 155 10U.N., G.A., Hearing from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C 4/SR. 846, May, 1959, pp. 554-556. i : LIbid. 12 , . , Ibid. 13 U.N., G.A., Statement Made by Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, Leader of Opposition in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly at the 850th Meeting of the Fourth Committee on 25 February, 1959, A/C. 4/399, February 26, 1959, pp, 1-3. 14 U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 846, May, 1959, pp. 553-554. 1 5 , \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 , Ibid. 16 U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 848, May, 1959, pp. 561-564 for questions, and A/C. 4/398, February 26, 1959, pp. 1-8 for answers. 17 . Ibid. 18 . \u00E2\u0080\u009E Ibid. 181 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 2 1 I b i d . 22 . Ibid. 23 U.N., T.C., Discussions on the Future of Cameroons under British Admini-stration, T/SR. 959, May, 1959, pp. 105-106. 24 U.N., T.C., Discussions on the Future of Cameroons under British Admini-stration, T/SR. 962, May, 1959, pp. 116-117. 2 5 I b i d . 2 6 U.N., G.A., Resolution 1350 (XIII) of the General Assembly, March 13, 1959, Year Book of the United Nations, Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 368. 27 U.N., T.C., Petition from the Bakweri Women's Union Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Victoria, 21 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 43, September 30, 1959, pp 1-2. 28 U.N., T.C., Petition from the Chiefs, Councillors and Members of the Tiko Constituency Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Tiko, 24 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 53, October 2, 1959, pp, 1-2. 29 U.N., T.C., Petition from Mr. G.E. Wose, Hon. Secretary of the Bakweri Clan Meeting Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, May 20, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 19, September 1, 1959, pp. 1-4. 30 U.N., T.C., Petition from the Ngolo-Batanga Improvement Union Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, T/PET. 4/L. 77, January 18, 1960, pp, 1-2. 31 . U.N., T.C., Petition from the Northern Bakundu Native Authority Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Kumba, 16 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 41, September 30, 1959, pp. 1-3; U.N., T.C., T/PET. 4/L. 16, April 16, 1959, p. 1. 32 U.N. , T.C, Two Petitions Concerning the Plebiscites to be held in the Cameroons under British Administration, T/PET. 4/L. 16, April 16, .1959, p. 1. 33 U.N. , T.C, Petition from the All-Bakossi Union Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Kumba, 29 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 54, October 2, 1959, p. 1. 34 U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Balondo People's Convention Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Dikome Balue, 15 August, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 22, September 17, 1959, passim. 182 35 . . U.N., T.C., Petition from the Mamfe Divisional Chiefs Conference Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Mamfe, 25 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 69, November 7, 1959, pp. 1-2. 36 U.N. , T.C, Petition from Chief S.M.C. Mbipefa (Fon of Bangola) Con-cerning the Cameroons under British Administration, 9 November, 1958, T/PET. 4/L. 12, December 29, 1958, pp. 1-3. 37 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Natural Rulers and People of Bamenda Widikum West Constituency Concerning the Cameroons under British Administ-ration, Widikum, 10 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 51, October 2, 1959, p. 1. 38 U .N. r T .C , T/PET. 4/L. 37, September 28, 1959, P- 2; u. N. , T. c. r T/PET. 4/L. 27, September 18, 1959, pp. 1-2; u. N. , T. c. t T/PET. 4/L. 27, September 18, 1959, pp. 1-4; u. N. , T. c. r T/PET. 4/L. 28, September 18, 1959, pp. 1-2; u. N. , T. c. r T/PET. 4/L. 36, September 28, 1959, pp. 1-2; u. N. , T. c. r T/PET. 4/L. 55, October 2, 1959, pp . 1-2. u. N. , T. c. t T/PET. 4/L. 68, November 7, 1959, p . 1. 39 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Natural Rulers of the Fungom, Aghem, Beba-Befang, and Essimbi Clans in the Wum Division Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Wum, 8 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 50, October 2, 1959, pp. 1-2. 40 U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Tang and Wiya All-Chiefs' Conference Con-cerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Ngarum, 29 August, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 24, September 17, 1959, pp. 1-2. 41 U.N., T.C., Petition from Chiefs and People of Nkambe Division Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Nkambe, 31 August, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 31, September, 1959, p. 1. 42 U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Etemetek Youth Association in Mamfe Con-cerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Mamfe, 22 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 52, October 2, 1959, p. 1. 43 U.N., T.C, Petition from the President of the Youth Association, Kamerun National Democratic Party, Bota Branch, Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, 17 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 32, September 26, 1959, p. 1. 44 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Nkambe Youths and Elders Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Mutengene, 28 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 63, October 8, 1959, p. 1. 45 U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Njindom Youths' Association Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Victoria Branch, Victoria, 14 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 40, September 30, 1959, p. 1. 183 46 U.N., T.C., Petition from the Southern Cameroons Youth League Associa-tion Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Buea, 28 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 46, October 1, 1959, p. 1. 47 U.N., T.C., Memorandum? on the Issues before the General Assembly Con-cerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration Submitted through the O f f i c i a l Southern Cameroons Representation to the United Nations, 23 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 33, September 26, 1959, pp. 1-5. 48 U.N., T.C., Petition from Mbang Development Association Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Mamfe, 25 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 44, September 30, 1959, pp. 1-3. 49 U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Jeuness Democratic du Cameroun Executive Committee Abroad Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration and the Cameroons under French Administration, T/PET. 4 and 5/L. 19, March 25, 1958, p. 2. 5\u00C2\u00B0U.N., T.C, Petition from the Ibadan Kamerun Students' Association con-cerning the Cameroons under British Administration and the Cameroons under French Administration, 24 November, 1958, T/PET. 4 and 5/L. 32, December 29, 1958, pp. 1-6. 51 U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Kamerun Union Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, 29 December, 1958, T/PET. 4/L. 13, February 4, 1959, p. 1. 52 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Kamerun National Union Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Lagos, 17 July, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 23, September 17, 1959, pp. 1-3. 53 U.N., T.C, One Hundred and Twenty-one Petitions Raising General Problems in the Cameroons under British Administration and the Cameroons under French Administration, T/PET. 4 and 5/L. 27/Add. 3, November 12, 1958, pp. 2-3 and passim. 54 U.N. , T.C, Sixty-five Petitions Relating to General Questions Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration and the Cameroons under French Administration, T/PET. 4 and 5/L. 25, June 13, 1959, passim. 55 U.N.,. T.C, Fifty-one Petitions Dealing with General Problems Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration and the Cameroons under French Administration, T/PET. 4 and 5/L. 39, February 20, 1959, pp. 1-2. 56U.N., T.C, Petition from the Central Committee of One Kamerun, Tiko, Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, T/PET. 4/L. 10, May 2, 1958, pp. 1-3. 57U.N., T.C, Four Petitions Dealing with General Problems Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, T/PET. 4/L. 17, April 22, 1959, pp. 1-3. 184 \"\"U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 885, November, 1959, p. 14. 59 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 60 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 61 Documents on Cameroun Affairs in Microfilm Compiled by the University of Chicago, I l l i n o i s , Centre for Research Libraries, Circulation Department, and Attached to the KNDP Secession Charter as Appendix IV, pp. 4-5. 62 , Ibid., pp. 4-5, 15. 6 3 I b i d . , pp. 7-9. 64 . , Ibid., pp. 12-13. 6 5 I b i d . , P- 15. 66 , Ibid., pp. 10-12. 67 U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 885, November, 1959, pp. 13-15. 68 , Kale, op. c i t . , p. 69. 185 CHAPTER FIVE STRIKING A COMPROMISE SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1959 At the United Nations, i t was Cohen, the British representative, who opened up the discussions. He introduced the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders, except Ntumazah, and the British Commissioner for the Cameroons, J.O. Field. He then assured the members of the Fourth Committee that the Southern Kamerun problem was not a \"Colonial\" problem because no \"issue arose between the Administering Authority and the dependent people.\" The real problem was how to \"resolve certain differing views held by different p o l i t i c a l parties operating democratically within the Territory.\" The Southern Kamerunians \"looked to the United Nations to help them to solve the problems connected with their future.\" His own task was, \"as a pro-logue to a play, to introduce those principal actors to the Committee.\"1 After the introduction, i t was Foncha who f i r s t spoke. He described the various attempts he had made with Endeley between April and July, 1959, to reach agreement over the alternatives of the plebiscite and the voters' qualifications and how a l l these attempts foundered. He then gave an accu-rate description of the organization and representation at the Mamfe Con--, ference. Unfortunately, however, he was not accurate in identifying the positions taken by the various groups vis-a-vis the alternatives. The error was not in describing the cleavages; i t was in identifying what the alter-natives were. He offered the alternatives which the chairman of the Con-ference had identified as those upon which the discussions revolved. But he was accurate in showing where each representative or group of representa-186 t i v e s stood regarding the two fundamental issues: the second a l t e r n a t i v e 2 and the q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r voting at the p l e b i s c i t e . Foncha then based h i s p o s i t i o n on the democratic p r i n c i p l e . \"The KNDP held that i n any matter of national importance the wishes of the majority should p r e v a i l . \" He then c a l l e d upon the United Nations to endorse the wishes of the majority of the Southern Kamerunians. These wishes, as shown by the r e s u l t s of the Mamfe P l e b i s c i t e Conference included: (a) that there should be only two a l t e r n a t i v e s at the p l e b i s c i t e ; (b) that the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e should be i n t e g r a t i o n with Nigeria; (c) that \"the second a l t e r n a t i v e should be separation from the Federation of Nigeria and determination of the future of the T e r r i t o r y at a l a t e r date\"; and, 3 (d) only indigenous Southern Kamerunians should vote at the p l e b i s c i t e . Foncha next turned his attention to r e u n i f i c a t i o n . R e u n i f i c a t i o n was a p o s s i b i l i t y which could be achieved \"only by negotiation by those who were ready for i t , \" and, \"no one section\" of Kamerun \"was yet ready for i t . \" I t would not work i f i t were \"imposed by an external influence or by only one of the sections.\" I f i t could not be imposed on the i n t e g r a t i o n i s t s , i t could not also be imposed on \"those who wished to have i t otherwise.\" The i n t e g r a t i o n i s t s were pushing r e u n i f i c a t i o n because they intended to use i t to \" f r i g h t e n the people\" i n t o voting for i n t e g r a t i o n with Ni g e r i a . Southern Kamerunains wished to have an opportunity to see what would happen a f t e r t h e i r neighbours had achieved independence. They would then decide which way to f a l l . The independence the Southern Kamerunians aspired to was that \"provided for i n the Charter of the United Nations.\" To compel them to accept \"a form of independence which was not i n accordance with t h e i r wishes would be tantamount to a v i o l a t i o n of that instrument and of t h e i r fundamental 187 4 human rights.\" Foncha made no mention of negotiations for reunification. When Foncha was questioned, he added l i t t l e to what he had said although he provided some useful information. He needed a period of trusteeship in order to ensure a smooth withdrawal of Southern Kamerun from Nigeria, to develop the Southern Kamerun economy, and to establish a sound Southern Kamerunian system. The period before independence and negotiation for reunification would have to remain indefinite. It was not yet neces-sary for negotiation to begin. Southern Kamerunians would not vote for the second alternative i f i t involved reunification because of terrorist activ-t i t i e s in Eastern Kamerun. The majority of Southern Kamerunians would prefer continued trusteeship to either integration with Nigeria or reunifi-5 cation. It i s important to note that Foncha had preferred not to talk about negotiations for reunification at this time but members of the Fourth Committee forced him back into i t with questions. The suspicion of the reunificationists for Foncha at the Plebiscite Conference appeared well-founded. Although committed to reunification, circumstances had forced Foncha to abandon i t by this time. To be sure, he l e f t the door to reunification open, but, he also l e f t the door to integration open; an opportunity was needed to see which way Southern Kamerun would f a l l . Foncha was at this stage of the proceedings more inclined to a Smaller Kamerun State forced on him, at least, by the warning of the a-Fon at Mamfe. The die-hard reunificationists were under no illusions. They wanted neither integration with Nigeria nor a Smaller Kamerun State. But they could read through Foncha and Foncha gave them enough reason to be suspicious and to insist on reunification. They were not, however, wise in doing so because they could even ruin the cause of the possibility of reunification, had 188 circumstances not altered. Endeley did not challenge or refute Foncha's description of a l l the attempts at agreement in Southern Kamerun including the Mamfe Conference; instead, he offered an explanation of why they had failed to reach agree-ment. Foncha's \"equivocal stand\" on the issue of reunification, and his impugning and intimidation of those who did not support his ideas made agreement impossible. Foncha had \"no real plan for the country's future\" and was seeking to hide his \"incompetence under the cloak of a continued trusteeship administration.\" Trusteeship was only a means to independence, and the \"Opposition could not subscribe to the idea of the Territory standing alone as an independent state.\" Consequently, one alternative of the plebiscite must indicate that Foncha's \"ultimate goal\" was reunification. Nevertheless, the United Nations should study the problem \"with complete impartiality\" and \"exercise the utmost discretion and patience,\" and work out \"a lasting solution on the basis of the aspirations of the inhabitants 6 regardless of the conflicting interests of the p o l i t i c a l parties.\" This last sentence was perhaps the most important sentence Endeley made at the United Nations. He agreed that the p o l i t i c a l parties had d i f -ferent interests and views. But he asked the United Nations to ignore these and use the aspirations of the populace as the guiding principle for i t s decision. Although this w i l l become more obvious later on, i t was at this juncture that Endeley f i n a l l y surrendered, t a c i t l y opted out of integration with Nigeria, and began to think in terms of a Smaller Kamerun State. With-out contesting Foncha's description of the results of the Mamfe Conference and asking the United Nations to use the guiding principle he offered, Endeley virtually asked the United Nations to adopt Foncha's second alternative. 189 Nevertheless, the Mamfe situation repeated i t s e l f at the United Nations. At Mamfe, Endeley acknowledged that he knew his people aspired for secession from Nigeria with no reunification. But he insisted that the alternatives of the plebiscite be integration with Nigeria versus reunification. This was almost precisely what he did at the United Nations. He requested the United Nations to use the aspirations of the majority of the Southern Kamerunians as a measuring rod for i t s decision. At the same time he asked the United Nations to make integration with Nigeria versus secession to effect reunification the issues at the plebiscite. The reason was that reunification \"had been discussed in the General Assembly repeatedly and could not be brushed aside now in deference to the claims of a Government that might well have fallen before the plebiscite took place.\" It was necessary to refer reunification back to the electorate in order to ascertain i t s popularity. As to the voters' qualification, he f e l t that Nigerians and Eastern Kamerunians resident in Southern Kamerun should also have the vote in order not to \"jeopardize relations with the neighbours on whom the Territory would depend for trade i f i t separated from the Federation.\" This last phrase again indicates that Endeley was preparing for the even-tuality of secession alone but not of reunification. A second major deviation from his policy which Endeley made at this time was to contemplate the postponement of a decision through the medium of a general election rather than a plebiscite. I t would appear from the Government Party's present attitude that i t had now realized that a plebiscite might not, after a l l , be the most appropriate means of ascertaining the views: of- the~-inhabitants since i t would constrain them to take an irrevocable . decision regarding matters on which they might later wish to . reverse their judgement. Hence there might be widsom in finding a less binding method of consultation. 8 190 This was not, as Endeley claimed, the attitude of the KNDP. It was without question Endeley's current attitude. Either he was attempting to postpone the plebiscite, capture government, and then demand and manipulate the plebiscite in favour of integration or he was sensing defeat for his programme and looking for a face-saving way out of i t . Later events suggest that the latter suggestion was the more li k e l y . When answering three of the questions put to him by members of the Fourth Committee, Endeley seemed to suggest: that he expected the f a l l of Foncha's Government; that he was inclined to accept the second alternative Foncha was insisting on; and, that he was no longer strongly committed to integration with Nigeria. About Foncha's Government, he said, \" i t was possible that there could be a change of government in the Southern Cameroons before the date set for the plebiscite.\" About the second alternative Foncha provided, Endeley said: i f Southern Kamerun \"were to be separated from Nigeria, he did not think that [re]unification should necessarily take place at once, but considered that the population should be consulted before any negotiations for [re]unification were opened.\" On the question of inte-gration, Endeley \"was moved by a desire to see the Southern Cameroons become 9 independent at the earliest opportunity and with the minimum of d i f f i c u l t y . \" What a l l this seemed to suggest is that at the United Nations, at this time, Endeley had become so confused that he did not seem to know what exactly i t was that he wanted. But Ntumazah was never so confused. As he did one year earlier in 1958 at the United Nations, he reviewed the history of Kamerun and said almost exactly what he said one year earlier. He condemned the idea of continued trusteeship as an attempt to perpetuate imperialism and then argued that 191 Southern Kamerun could not form an independent viable state, economically and p o l i t i c a l l y . He f e l t that Western Kamerun should reunite with Eastern Kamerun. Since the Charter provided only for \"self-government or indepen-dence,\" any other solution would violate the Charter. The alternatives at the plebiscite should, thereofre, be self-government wihtin Nigeria versus independence through reunification; continued trusteeship was neither self-government nor independence. Moreover, the majority of Kamerunians wanted reunification. Nigerians should not have the vote. On the other hand, Eastern Kamerunians who had lived in Western Kamerun \"continuously for one year,\" because they were Kamerunians, should be given the vote. A l l the Kamerunians living abroad should also \"be allowed to vote by proxy.\" Foncha's report on the results of the Mamfe conference was correct but i t was that way because \"the Premier himself had organized the Conference and 10 selected the participants.\" Thus Ntumazah conceded nothing. But he s t i l l had to face some questions. The Ghanaioorepresentative, wished to know whether Endeley and Foncha enjoyed the support of the majority of the Southern Kamerunians. Ntumazah thought that i t ' \"was d i f f i c u l t to estimate the support enjoyed by the p o l i t i c a l leaders who had abandoned the positions that had brought them to power.\" Nonetheless, i t was the elec-torate and not the p o l i t i c a l leaders who should be consulted regarding the future of the region. There was no doubt that, when consulted, the people would vote for reunification; that was why no p o l i t i c a l party in Southern Kamerun \"had completely excluded the possibility of [re]unification, knowing that i f i t had done so i t would have lost the support which i t enjoyed among the populations.\" 1 1 The next representative who asked relevant questions of Ntumzah was 192 that of Czechoslovakia. He wished to know what Ntumazah thought of Mbile's statement that Kamerun was \"an a r t i f i c i a l creation of the Berlin Conference of-: 1885.\" Ntumazah thought that \"the same could be said of many African countries, including Nigeria.\" He could not understand why another a r t i f i c i a l creation should be included in another like Nigeria. Ntumazah was further asked whether he would continue to oppose the postponement of the plebiscite even i f Foncha and Endeley agreed to i t . Ntumazah f e l t that i f i t were possible to rely on the views of the Government and Opposition, 12 then a plebiscite was not even necessary. In retrospect, a student cannot avoid the conclusion that, coming from Bamenda\u00E2\u0080\u0094the home of tradition, and insisting so much on making reunification part of the plebiscite, Ntumazah was playing into the hands of the integrationists. Whatever the case, i t was the turn of Mbile, Endeley's Deputy, who came to New York some days after the others had made their statements, to state his own case. After a long, tedious, and unplausible argument, Mbile came to the following conclusions. A plebiscite was not necessary. He was \"ready to accept a solution which would allow each tribe or division to make it s own choice between the two alternatives.\" The more numerous votes of the grasslanders should not be used to force \"the people of the coastal belt\" to a choice they did not want. The majority of the Southern Kamerunians were p o l i t i c a l l y immature and too ignorant to make a rational decision on their own. But, i f a plebiscite must take place, the alternatives should be association with Nigeria versus \"joining the Cameroons under French admini-stration.\" It would not be f a i r to have a period of trusteeship while the others were marching into independence. In either event, every person liv i n g in Southern Kamerun should have the vote. There was no question of forcing 193 13 Southern Kamerunians into Nigeria for they were already Nigerians. It is important to note that after struggling for twenty years with his colleagues to assert the identity of Western Kamerun and Western Kame-runians at least, and to assert the unity of the region, Mbile, at long last, denied the existence and validity of the fruits of their labour. Whatever the case, Mbile proved to be the most contradictory and the most confused of the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders when he was ques-tioned by members of the Fourth Committee. The Liberian representative, wondered whether, since the populations were p o l i t i c a l l y immature and did not understand the problems involved in the plebiscite, more time was not needed to make the populations more aware of the problems; and, i f so, then she wondered why Mbile was so opposed to a period of continued trusteeship. Mbile agreed that patience was needed but f e l t that secession from Nigeria \"would cause lasting wounds and i t would be impossible for the Territory 14 to re-enter the Federation of Nigeria once i t had broken away.\" The major part of Mbile's answer had very l i t t l e , i f anything, to do with the question. However, by agreeing that patience was needed, Mbile t a c i t l y submitted that a postponement of the plebiscite was necessary. When the representative of the Philippines, realized that Mbile had not expl i c i t l y answered the question, he pursued i t further. He asked Mbile whether a period of trusteeship was not needed to ensure that the populations understood the implications of the issues involved in the plebiscites, and whether Mbile would like to see Southern Kamerunians forced into union with Nigeria. Mbile's answer to the f i r s t question was again irrelevant and the answer to the second question once more repudiated the identity of Southern Kamerunians. As he saw i t , without Nigerian financial tutelage, Southern 194 Kamerun could not achieve independence, and Southern Kamerun was already a part of Nigeria and there was, therefore, no question of f o r c i n g . 1 5 It appears that either Mbile did not understand the f i r s t question or he chose to avoid i t . But his handling of the next question showed that there was a basic inability in Mbile to understand questions. Another member of the Committee, asked Mbile by which means, other than a plebiscite, Mbile would like to see the wishes of the populations ascertained. Mbile f e l t that a Mission could be sent to Southern Kamerun to \"enquire into the problems li k e l y to arise as a: result of secession and ascertain whether in fact the Cameroons had any 16 basis for existence as a separate country.\" This answer had nothing to do with the question. After this fumbling from Mbile, the hearings adjourned for a week. During this week, a lot was happening behind the scenes. It is not readily known what was happening and who was making i t happen. But there is strong evidence that private discussion took place during this week f i r s t , between Endeley and Mbile, and, secondly, between a l l the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders and Cohen, except Ntumazah who, probably because of their constant confrontation particularly over Northern Kamerun, Cohen could not bring himself to deal with. That these discussions were going on is indicated by what happened after the week ended. Fir s t , Mbile asked the General Assembly for time to c l a r i f y a l l that he had said a week earlier. This time, i t was a series of self-contradic-tions. As he saw i t , the 1959 general election had caused feelings in Southern Kamerun to run \"too high for them to be able to express their wishes freely and objectively.\" The plebiscite should, therefore, be postponed for 195 \"one year or at most eighteen months from now,\" that i s from 1960. The Iraqi representative, at once pointed out that Mbile was contradicting what he said earlier and then asked whether Mbile was not in effect sup-porting Foncha's second alternative. Mbile replied that the Committee should decide on \"what was just rather than who was right.\" Furthermore, contrary to his previous statement, Mbile now declared that \" i t was equally wrong to claim that the people of the Southern Cameroons had not yet attained p o l i t i c a l muturity; the same situation could arise even in more advanced 17 countries.\" To cut a long story short, before the next scene occurred, Mbile had contradicted most of the major points he made one week earlier. More often than not, when a member of the Fourth Committee pointed out the contradiction, Mbile would seek refuge in the phrase, the Committee should decide on \"what was just rather than who was right.\" It i s more than li k e l y that Endeley had a great deal to do with these Mbilean contradictions. As Mbile was busy contradicting himself, Endeley and Foncha, as well as Cohen and the representatives of the African states\u00E2\u0080\u0094Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, and Libya to name only these,--were making a last minute private attempt to reach agreement. Before Mbile had time to complete contradicting himself, Cohen asked for a suspension of the meeting \"because of the private discussions taking place between Mr. Foncha . . . and Mr. Endeley . . . with 18 a view to reaching agreement more rapidly.\" Although Ntumazah was care-f u l l y excluded from these private discussions and attempts at agreement, he had only very l i t t l e to lose. Foncha was about to play Ntumazah's game for him. It is not readily known what happened or who made i t happen, but either Foncha surrendered or he was squeezed out of his position with an inadequate 196 offer. An agreement was reached. The text of the Agreed Statement said that both Foncha and Endeley wished to see Southern Kamerun achieve i n -dependence as early as possible, that is in 1960. But since the Goven-ment and the Opposition did not agree to have the plebiscite in 1960, they thought that \" i t would be wiser to defer consultation with the people for the time being.\" Southern Kamerun would have to continue under trusteeship (and this was the inadequate offer to Foncha) \"but separate from Nigeria.\" The separation of Southern Kamerun from Nigeria should be completed by October 1, 1960, the day when Nigeria would \u00E2\u0080\u00A2become independent. Indepen-dence for Southern Kamerun should take place not later than October 26, 19 1962. This was not, however, the major part of the agreement; i t was what would happen after the trusteeship and separation. When Cohen, Foncha, and Endeley introduced the Agreed Statement to the Committee on September 30, 1959, there was some i n i t i a l reaction for and against i t . Those who reacted against i t stated merely that the affairs of the Committee.should not have been settled at private discussions. Those who favoured i t , indeed those who took part in the discussion, argued that, in light of the circumstances, the approach they took appeared to be the most appropriate; they were merely attempting,successfully, to f a c i l i t a t e the work of the Committee. After these i n i t i a l reactions, the representatives of Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Sudan, Tunisia, the United States, and the United Arab Republic drafted a resolution. This resolution set out the major part of the Agreement which Foncha and Endeley accepted \"as a compromise.\" Later on, after reading through the text, Cuba, Iran, and Panama asked to be included as co-sponsors of the resolution with a slightly revised preamble. 2 0 197 This compromise between Endeley and Foncha which settled the problems of the alternatives to be put at the plebiscite and the voters' q u a l i f i -cations was put out as Resolution 1352 (XIV) of the General Assembly. The compromise stated that the arrangements for the plebiscite should begin on September 30, 1960, and end not later than March, 1961. The questions to be put at the plebiscite should be: \"(a) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria? (b) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of the Cameroons?\" Only persons born in Southern Kamerun should vote in the plebiscite. The Administering Authority should consult with the Southern Kamerun Government and take steps to separate the administration of Southern 21 Kamerun from that of Nigeria not later than October 1, 1960.\" The im-broglio had come to an end as far as the United Nations and these parti-cular Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders were concerned. But not without some major implications for a l l concerned. Fi r s t , Foncha's behaviour. By accepting this settlement as a compromise, Foncha had behaved exactly as the other Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders. After 1955, there was a basic and fundamental conflict between the Western-educated p o l i t i c a l leaders of Southern Kamerun on the one hand, and the traditional leaders, the a-Fon, on the other. What the a-Fon stood f o r \u00E2\u0080\u0094 a Smaller Kamerun State with membership in the Commonwealth\u00E2\u0080\u0094was never actually supported by any p o l i t i c a l leader between 1955 and 1959. When forced by c i r -cumstances, Foncha, and to some extent Endeley, were inclined in that direc-tion but never without leaving some doors open. When Kale formed the KUP, he came very close to the position of the a-Fon but he was quiet over member-ship in the Commonwealth. By 1956, a l l the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders, 198 except Foncha, had abandoned the a-Fon. Foncha held on tenuously, unt i l joined by Kale in mid-1959, alone with the a-Fon. But now, in late Sept-ember, 1959, he completed the trend; he abandoned the a-Fon by accepting the compromise. This action of the Western-educated Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders would have major consequences for the plebiscite and for the trusteeship system as a whole in Southern Kamerun. The United Nations contributed to i t . Secondly, the compromise had at least one major consequence for the Charter. The resolution adopted was inconsistent with the views expressed at the Mamfe Plebiscite Conference and, therefore, with the views of the majority of the Southern Kamerunians. By leaving out the alternative which would either allow Southern Kamerunians to achieve f u l l independence and make a decision later on or which would allow them to achieve f u l l and separate independence in a permanent state of their own, the United Nations acted contrary to expectation. The interests, wishes, and desires of the majority of the Southern Kamerunians were not used by that organization as the guiding principles for i t s decisions. Instead, this unguided decision was adopted with an overwhelming majority: the Fourth Committee adopted i t on October 9, 1959, by a vote of 74-0-2 abstentions; and, the General Assembly 22 adopted i t on October 16, 1959, by a vote of 76-0-2 abstentions. Although so overwhelmingly accepted by the United Nations, the Foncha-Endeley Compro-mise was an unexpected and uncertain parcel to the majority of the Southern Kamerunians. There i s l i t t l e wonder, therefore, that the i n i t i a l reaction to the Compromise at home was generally unfavourable, and the subsequent reaction to the resolution, to say the least, bitter and massive. 199 I n i t i a l Reaction to the Foncha-Endeley Compromise in Southern Kamerun October 1959 The Compromise was greeted in Southern Kamerun with mixed reactions. The reunificationists did not like the delay of independence embedded in the Compromise. Even before the Fourth Committee adopted the resolution, Ngwa of Bafut on October 6, 1959, had already described i t in a telegram 23 to the United Nations as \"further colonialism\" which was unacceptable. John Foku of Mankon Town, Bamenda, who claimed he wrote on behalf of the Metzam (Mankon) population, in another telegram on October 2, 1959, condemned the proposal and requested that the plebiscite take place between 1959 and 24 1960. Mrs. Magny claimed to write on behalf of the Bafreng women (Foncha's birthplace) and protested, in a telegram on October 2, 1959, \"vehemently\" Endeley's* ideas that the plebiscite be postponed un t i l 1962 and that trustee-25 ship be continued un t i l then. Awasong, on behalf of the Bamenda Improve-ment Union, in a telegram strongly opposed the Compromise and stated that the Union wished to see both sections of Kamerun achieve independence at the 26 same time, namely, January 1, 1960. Tagne Messac, on behalf of the Bassang OK, Bamenda, was opposed to the Foncha-Endeley extension of trusteeship 27 in Southern Kamerun. On behalf of the Bandeng population and the OK, Tchoula, on October 7, 1959, condemned the compromise because i t delayed 28 independence. The compromise was, thus, unpopular in the vic i n i t y of Mankon Town, Bamenda. It is important to note that these opponents of the compromise . .*This.should help to indicate how fast information was travelling in Sou-thern Kamerun and how much i t was being distorted. The Compromise was intro-duced at the United Nations in New York on September 30, 1959, and by October 2, 1959, telegrams were already leaving the region protesting against the Compromise. It was no longer the Foncha-Endeley Compromise, but \"Endeley's ideas.' 200 were the OK supporters writing from Bamenda, the home of the OK. It is also important to note that they had nothing against .the alternatives to be put at the plebiscite; that was a victory for them. However, there were groups within Southern Kamerun which approved the compromise. The f i r s t of these was the Kamerun Society. In a telegram on October 2, 1959, just two days after the compromise was introduced to the Committee, the Society applauded the compromise with i t s interim period.of 29 trusteeship which was needed to build up the sectors of the economy. On October 8, 1959, the Cameroons Youth League Association of Buea supported the decision reached by Foncha and Endeley to the effect that Southern Kamerun should secede from Nigeria by April 1, 1960. While the Association was opposed to any plebiscite before September 1962, i t f e l t that the alter-30 natives of the plebiscite would have to be decided later on. It is sig- . nificant to note that this Association apparently did not actually know the exact contents of the compromise they were supporting. It appears that these youths were simply supporters of Foncha. Or had the facts been distorted before reaching them? Some further support for the compromise came much later, on April 12, 1960. This time, i t was Mallam L.T. Sale of Nso, Leader and Founder of the Muslim Congress, a p o l i t i c a l party whose objective was integration with Nigeria. It was founded in the middle of 1960, possibly in early Ap r i l , and i t was based on religious principles. Its members were mainly local converts (so was i t s leader) and Nigerian Muslims resident in Southern Kamerun.* The *The Congress was not active during the plebiscite campaigns, a fact which suggests i t had l i t t l e following. 201 Congress \"wholeheartedly\" accepted the two alternatives the United Nations had provided for the plebiscite. Its argument was essentially that, as a l l the British authorities had pointed out, Southern Kamerun could not 31 constitute a viable economic and p o l i t i c a l entity by i t s e l f . The Congress was, at this time, however, reacting more to the storm and confusion in Southern Kamerun than to the Compromise. Delayed Response to the Compromise 1960-1961 Speechlessness, inaction, confusion, and the tendency to disbelieve the fact are among the common i n i t i a l reactions of most people when something unexpected and undesirable happens to them. The majority of the Southern Kamerunians were no exception. The decision of the United Nations to make reunification one of the two alternatives of the plebiscite and to exclude Smaller Kamerun from the contest was both unexpected and undesirable to the majority of the Southern Kamerunians. Consequently, i t took time before those most affected in the region responded to the decision. The f i r s t concrete response to the decision was the emergence of new p o l i t i c a l parties advocating, under modified circumstances, the policy of the a-Fon. Or, i f such parties already existed, they became more active at that time. The KUP had already been introduced in relation to the Mamfe Plebiscite Conference. Two Western-educated a-Fon also founded their own p o l i t i c a l parties. The f i r s t of these was the Cameroons Commoners Congress (CCC), which the integrationists and reunificationists called \"Cameroons Cheap Cargo.\" It was founded around the same time as the KUP by Fon Stephen E. Nyenti of Mamfe. But i t stayed in the background and dormant in the 202 hope that Foncha would get for the Crowned Princes the second alternative they had requested. It was not until Foncha abandoned the second alter-native he was advocating that this party became very active. The second of these princely parties was the Cameroons Indigenes Party (CIP) which i t s detractors stigmatized 'Cameroons Ignorants' Party'. It was founded in early October, I960, by Fon Jesco Manga-Williams of Victoria, the same Fon whom the British chose in 1942 to s i t in the Nigerian Central Legislature 32 at Lagos. It was no accident that the CCC and the CIP were founded by Crowned Princes and that the founder of the KUP, Kale, was related to a royal family. The aims of these parties were the same as those of the a-Fon in general modified only by the circumstances. They stood for a Smaller Kamerun State with membership in the Commonwealth. But when they became active, they attempted to influence the United Nations to change i t s mind by occasionally stating that, after f u l l independence, Southern Kamerun would then decide which way to f a l l ; i t would join either Nigeria or Cameroun Republic but, in order to be respected in such a union, i t must f i r s t achieve i t s own 33 independence. Due to i t s late-coming, the CIP did not approach the United Nations unt i l January 19, 1961. On this date, Manga-Williams informed the United Nations about his party, when i t was formed, and what i t stood for. His party was formed in response to the mood of the country. While the \"people\" demanded a third alternative, they were opposed to the two alternatives already provided. If the United Nations did not provide the third alter-native which was separate independence for Southern Kamerun, they would have i t by abstaining from voting on the voting day. The United Nations 203 should, therefore, regard the number of registered voters who did not vote as representing the third alternative. It was d i f f i c u l t to understand why Endeley and Foncha committed the people to the two alternatives without f i r s t consulting with them. Plans were already underway in the forest zone to begin a \" c i v i l war\" on the voting day because Southern Kamerunians wanted a third alternative as a way out of the imbroglio. Neither Nigeria nor Cameroun Republic received independence with a condition of joining another territory. It was, therefore, d i f f i c u l t to understand why Southern Kamerun had that condition. The absence of a third alternative would produce chaos like that in the Congo. The United Nations would be wise to grant indepen-dence to Southern Kamerun unconditionally or, at least, provide a third alternative at the plebiscite. Otherwise, a f i f t y - f i f t y s p l i t vote on the two alternatives should be recognized as a demand for a Smaller Kamerun State. One year before Manga-Williams joined in the struggle, Kale was already out in the f i e l d . On January 26, 1960, Kale, or rather the KUP, told the United Nations that a plebiscite was no longer necessary. The Parliament was capable of settling the issues without \"undue pressure from external forces such as a plebiscite.\" A plebiscite based on the two alternatives already provided was an outright violation of the Charter because the two questions denied the Southern Kamerunians the right of self-determination. A third question, \"Irrespective of V i a b i l i t y or not, do you wish the Southern Cameroons to become a Republic of i t s own with U.K. Govern-ment assistance\u00E2\u0080\u0094financial and otherwise before joining the Federation of Nigeria or the Cameroons Republic,\" was imperative. In case the United Nations did not provide this third question, the KUP would mobilize public 35 opinion to boycott the plebiscite. Kale himself was thus confused on two 204 counts. He demanded the cancellation of the plebiscite while at the same time, requesting a third alternative for the plebiscite. He wanted Southern Kemerun to become an independent Republic and at the same time he added that the Republic would decide in the future to join Nigeria or Cameroun. However, the idea of the Republic joining either Nigeria or Cameroun must be understood in light of the fact that kale was attempting, as Manga-Williams later did, to talk the United Nations into changing i t s mind. On September 20, 1960, when i t was becoming obvious that the United Nations would not budge through appeals to the Charter, Kale became more threatening. Although the KUP would allow the people to register for the plebiscite, they would be instructed either to abstain from voting or to mutilate their ballots. In short, the KUP would sabotage the plebiscite. This was the only means l e f t for the people to approach the issue. A plebiscite based on the existing issues was undemocratic and i t was condemned 36 in i t s entirety. There could be no better assessment of the situation; a plebiscite based on these two alternatives could be expected to be the most undemocratic elections the Western Kamerun electorate had ever witnessed. The most p r o l i f i c of these parties, however, was the CCC led by Fon Nyenti. Because he said nearly the same thing to whoever he contacted, i t serves no useful purpose treating each contact in i t s own right. What w i l l be attempted here i - s to identify whom he contacted and when in one para-graph and then summarize his ideas in another. Fi r s t , the contacts which were as follows: the United Nations on January 1, 1960; Sir James Robertson\u00E2\u0080\u0094the Governor-General of Nigeria, Dag Hammarskjoeld\u00E2\u0080\u0094the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Hon. Tufton Beamish\u00E2\u0080\u0094a British Member of Parliament, and J.O. F i e l d \u00E2\u0080\u0094 B r i t i s h Commissioner 205 for the Cameroons on April 4, 1960; the Governments of Nigeria and of the Cameroun Republic on May 10, 1960; H.A. Wieschhoff\u00E2\u0080\u0094Director, Division of Trusteeship at the United Nations, Hon. Ian Macleod\u00E2\u0080\u0094Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sekou Toure\u00E2\u0080\u0094President of Guinea, Krishna Menon of India, J.O. Field, and Tufton Beamish again on June 10, 1960; H.A. Wieschhoff again on June 20, 1960; Dr. Djalal Abdoh (whom he called Abdul Abdoh)\u00E2\u0080\u0094 United Nations Commissioner for the Plebiscites in the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration on September 9, 1960; and, the United Nations 37 on January 24, 1961. This amount of writing and number of contacts should throw some light on what would have happened i f the majority of the a-Fon had been Western-educated. Nyenti's ideas were set out in three different approaches. Almost always invariably there was a c a l l for a separate independent state of Southern Kamerun free from any connections with either Nigeria or Cameroun Republic other than diplomatic and trade relations. This Southern Kamerun State would be a member of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations in i t s own rights. Occasionally, Nyenti, like Kale and Manga-Williams, would say that this state would decide in an indefinite future, i f need be, to join either Nigeria or Cameroun Republic. People could not be asked to vote on reunification about which they knew nothing. I n i t i a l l y , Nyenti directed his appeals to the conscience of those he contacted adding arguments in favour of providing a third alternative for the plebiscite. When this approach proved unsuc-cessful, Nyenti resorted to threats which were intensified as time wore on. The threats consisted mainly of boycotting the plebiscite and of mutilating the ballots. When i t became obvious once more that this new approach was f u t i l e , Nyenti resigned himself into shaming the United Nations, showing how 206 that organization had blatantly insulted the Charter, denied the Southern Kamerunians the right to self-determination, and how, because of a l l 38 this, the plebiscite was meaningless and dishonourable. Nyenti's attempts, like those of Manga-Williams and Kale, to have the United Nations change i t s mind and provide a third alternative failed. Unsuccessful attempts were also made by others. The a-Fon of Ntenako and Ndekwai of Mamfe, together with their Councillors, on July 30, 1960, pleaded with the United Nations to change i t s mind. The two alternatives already provided, they said, were an imposition against which .they protested very strongly. The Southern Kamerunians desired neither integration with Nigeria nor reunification. The idea that Southern Kamerun could not form. a viable economic and p o l i t i c a l entity was irrelevant. Britain could always come to their aid financially. The integrationists and the reunificationists including Foncha had become very unpopular because the people wanted their 39 own fu l l y independent and sovereign state. If these protests against the two alternatives already provided struck no responsive chord in the United Nations, they did bother the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders with the possible exception of Ntumazah and the university students and graduates. No matter how hard Foncha tried, he could not avoid being questioned nearly every day as to what arrangements reunification would entail. Worse s t i l l , these questions came more and more often from the Western-educated supporters and opponents of Foncha. Particularly when teachers began to question Foncha on the same issue, i t was becoming obvious that Foncha would have to produce a constitution or find himself alone. The Kamerun Society had even raised the issue at the Mamfe Conference saying people could not 207 vote on reunification about which they knew nothing. Furthermore, J.O. Field, the British Commissioner for Cameroons, requested Foncha to arrange a meeting between a l l the p o l i t i c a l parties in Southern Kamerun and the Government of Cameroun Republic to discuss the nature reunification would take should i t be voted for. Foncha could ignore neither the Com-missioner's request nor the questions from these Western-educated Southern Kamerunians, particularly the teachers. However, Foncha decided, in partial disrespect of the Commissioner's request and went i t alone. . The outcome 40 was the Foncha-Ahidjo discussions on the nature of eventful reunification. These discussions were also in line with what Ahidjo, President of Cameroun Republic, had said previously at the United Nations when he was s t i l l Premier of Eastern Kamerun. On February 25, 1959, Ahidjo said at the United Nations that Eastern Kamerunians \"were unanimous in their desire for [re]unification.\" But he saw one \"real problem\" of a \"practical\" nature involved in the issue. This problem was how \"to ascertain the most appro-priate means of achieving [re]unification.\" The means, however, \"would depend above a l l on the position to be taken by the populace of the zone under British administration.\" Eastern Kamerunians \"did not wish to bring the weight of their population to bear on their brothers\" of the zone under British administration and had no desire to \"impose integration\" in disregard of the wishes of the latter. He had taken note of the statement Foncha made at the pervious meeting of the Fourth Committee. (The statement was to the effect that the KNDP would prefer a Federation in the event of reunification although the issue would s t i l l have to be discussed by the two Governments.) If Southern Kamerunians desired reunification, the Eastern Kamerunians \"were ready to discuss with them, on the footing of equality, 208 methods of achieving [ i t ] . \" But the discussion would best be conducted 41 \"on Cameroonian s o i l . \" When the time came for the discussions to take place \"on Cameroonian 42 s o i l , \" Foncha and Ahidjo met at least four times in 1960, but failed to reach f u l l agreement on one of the two most important issues, and any agree-ment on the other. On December 20-21, 1960, Foncha, Ahidjo, and Charles Assale, the Prime Minister of Cameroun Republic, met at Douala and agreed that reunification would be in the form of a Federation; possibly, this had been agreed to earlier. After this meeting Foncha came home with a document called \"United Cameroons\u00E2\u0080\u0094Federal Constitution.\" The contents of this document, which indicated i t was a Confederation they had talked about, was reported as having been agreed upon. When Endeley raised an alarm against i t pointing out that the contents had only been discussed but not agreed upon, Foncha was forced to alter paragraph 3 which had made the assertion. Before Endeley's alarm, this paragraph read in part: \"It i s at this juncture, therefore, only possible to indicate in broad outline what the Southern Cameroons and the Republic of the Cameroun have agreed are the basic provisions of a Federal Constitution.\" After the alarm, both the t i t l e and paragraph 3 of the document were altered to read: \"United Cameroons\u00E2\u0080\u0094Federal Constitutional Proposals by KNDP\"; the text of paragraph 3 now stated that the \"proposed outline indicated what the KNDP considers 43 are the basic provisions of the Federal Constitution.\" What these provisions aimed at was indicated by what Foncha told Ahidjo on the issue in one of their earlier meetings. Foncha has said that he seeks a Cameroons Federation in which the Southern Cameroons would remain much the same as i t is now, with the powers presently held by the Administering Authority to be vested in the 209 central government of the Federation. This i s not an arrangement which i s favoured by President Ahidjo; as a matter of fact, when Foncha f i r s t suggested i t in Yaounde* last year [1960] he was turned down out of hand.44 In essence, Foncha was thinking in terms of a Confederation and i t is very significant that he was s t i l l looking for i t after the plebiscite. Ahidjo was prepared, in spite of his preference, to accept a Federation but not a Confederation. Consequently, although they agreed on a Federation, when Foncha insisted on a Confederation, he became very Tukewarm about reunifi-cation. At no time did Ahidjo come close to wishing Southern Kamerun on Nigeria. His lukewarmness was due to Foncha's perception of the Federation and not because Southern Kamerun was perceived as a financial l i a b i l i t y from.the Yaounde rostrum.. Another issue discussed was the relationship between the proposed 'Confederation of Kamerun' on the one hand, and France and Britain on the other. On this issue, Foncha presented the viewpoint of the reunificationists in Southern Kamerun and, to some extent, that of the majority of the Western-educated Eastern Kamerunians. The majority of the Kamerunians, including many of the Parliamentarians, were opposed to Kamerun membership in the French Community. The position in Northern Kamerun is not readily known. But, the Southern Kamerunians, to a man, including Foncha, the students, and Ntumazah were opposed to membership in the French Community. What Foncha perceived was a Confederation of Kamerun free of any control or influence by either Great Britain or France. Foncha \"has stated that during the talks [with Ahidjo and Assale in mid-1960], they w i l l discuss the eventual setting up of a Cameroon Federation, 'outside the Commonwealth and the French Com-45 munity'.\" In this way, Foncha sought perhaps to allay the concerns of the 210 a-Fon in 1960. In order to do so, Foncha sought the co-operation of Ahidjo by requesting that they both sacrifice the Commonwealth and the French Community in the interest of reunification. But, unfortunately, Ahidjo was too committed both to France and to the French Community. On May..10, 1958, in a speech marking the f i r s t celebration of the f i r s t 'national' holiday of Eastern Kamerun, Ahidjo declared We shall never forget, when the time comes, the innumerable bonds which unite us to France . . . With the same ideals, free from a l l hindrances, we shall be able to determine with f u l l c l a r i t y , on a plane of equality but also of friendship, the conditions of our association with a vaster organization which w i l l be, we earnestly hope, inspired by France. 4 6 Eastern Kamerun, or rather Ahidjo, had been united to France by \"innumerable bonds,\" and, the \"vaster organization\" with which Eastern Kamerun would associate on the footing of \"equality\" and of \"friendship,\" and which would be inspired by France, could be nothing other than the French Community. Even more important was the military alliance between France and the Cameroun Republic which allowed French-officered troops under French command to be 47 stationed on Cameroun s o i l . With these commitments, i t was d i f f i c u l t for Ahidjo to contemplate Foncha's demand that the reunified Kamerun pull-out of the French Community. This was possibly the more important basis for Ahidjo's lukewarmness to reunification with Southern Kamerun. Foncha's two conditions for reunification to Ahidjo were not made for their own sake. Foncha was looking at the a-Fon over his shoulder. Now ; . that he had abandoned them, .like the rest of the Western-educated Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders had done much earlier, he sought to soothe their fears and confusion. If Foncha could assure the traditional leaders (and 211 even many Western-educated Southern Kamerunians) that in the event of reunification, Southern Kamerun would remain as i t was at the time, out of Nigeria, but reunified with^Eastern Kamerun, yet ruled from Buea rather than from Yaounde, perhaps they could be satisfied. To be ruled from Yaounde was interchangeable with the French Community. If Foncha could assure the a-Fon that in the event of reunification, Kamerun would pu l l out of the French Community, the loss of the Smaller Kamerun State would not have been too much for the a-Fon to take. No Fon could take the French Community. But Ahidjo did not co-operate. The outcome of the failure of the Ahidjo-Foncha Talks was a last minute attempt by the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders, in response to local protests, to reach an agreement. This attempt took place in London in November 1960. Endeley, Foncha, Kale, J.O. Field, and two or more unidentified a-Fon met with the Colonial Secretary. At the conference, i t \"was observed that the questions were too r i g i d and that since plebiscite decisions were generally irretrievable the matter required careful handling.\" It was also f e l t that a request should be made to the United Nations to review the whole situation \"with a view to cancelling the plebiscite altogether and embarking on the 'middle course,' that i s , separation from Nigeria and independence of the Cameroons as a separate entity.\" At one point, i t seemed that agreement on the issue was around the corner, \"but after some time the atmosphere changed dramatically with a diversity of views and so these other [sic] 'round table' talks also 48 ended in smoke.\" The last chance to alter plebiscite questions had been lost. The present writer has made several attempts, through correspondence, to find out what happened before this last chance was lost. Unfortunately, 212 only one of h i s correspondents, Joseph N. Lafon\u00E2\u0080\u0094former Mini s t e r of Local Government (whose \"Government [was] hot l i k e pepper\"*), former Minis t e r of Education, and former Minister of Lands and Surveys, a l l i n the KNDP Govern-ment\u00E2\u0080\u0094was kind enough to write back. Lafon's explanation was not very help-f u l . He states that \"The B r i t i s h Government, misled by the Cameroonian 49 Opposition, opposed the t h i r d question for the modified Trusteeship.\" This statement does not explain why Foncha and Endeley i n p a r t i c u l a r f a i l e d to seize on the chance. A p l a u s i b l e explanation was hinted at by Kale, one of the p a r t i c i -pants, i n h i s book. He observed that, at the conference, \" I t was also 50 pointed out that there was confusion and a great deal of misunderstanding.\" What seemed to have happened, and t h i s for the moment i s only a suggestion, i s that these leaders, p a r t i c u l a r l y Endeley and Foncha, had become too confused to know exactly what they wanted, and they had also become too suspicious of each other's motives to achieve a new agreement. Whatever the reason, the very occurrence of the London November Talks had i t s e f f e c t on some of the Southern Kamerun electorate and on what happened thereafter. Kale reported simply that the s i t u a t i o n \" i n c i d e n t a l l y l e d to 51 a s h i f t i n p u b l i c opinion.\" But he d i d not say i n which d i r e c t i o n the s h i f t was except that i t was a product of confusion and misunderstanding. Although the London Talks had f a i l e d , some of the a-Fon and t h e i r subjects came to believe that, because of the conference, the second a l t e r n a t i v e had *Lafon i s best remembered by h i s constituents of Nso for t h i s h i s noto-rious phrase, \"Govmin worn yur moo shishur beiy\u00E2\u0080\u0094My Government i s as hot as pepper,\" and for h i s mastery of Nso proverbs and idiomatic expressions. 213 been altered; i t was now secession without reunification. The source of the misinformation is not known, but i t was d i f f i c u l t to talk any of them out of i t once he had i n i t i a l l y accepted i t . Although not an impartial observer, Fon Nyenti reported the situation* to the United Nations on January 24, 1961. As a result of the London November Talks most natives-believe that voting for the white box [reunification] means Southern Cameroons is breaking away from Nigeria in order to be a separate sovereign state. It had never occurred to them that voting for the white box means Southern Cameroons has been swallowed by Cameroun Republic Empire.-*2 This was the high-watermark of confusion, confusion of some of those who held the destiny of Southern Kamerun in their own hands. As a result of this confusion, some of the a-Fon, would interpret the plebiscite questions to mean what they perceived and not what the questions actually implied. The p o l i t i c a l leaders would take advantage of i t . The situation might have been averted i f the Concert of the a-Fon was s t i l l alive. But, between November 1959 and February 1961 (and even thereafter), i t had ceased to operate: the general elections of 1959 i n f l i c t e d i t with a malaise; the United Nations' decision on the two plebiscite questions weakened i t further; and the London November Talks almost la i d i t to rest. Indeed, between 1960 and..1961, the a-Fon were acting either individually or in groups, taking into consideration only the interests of the individual Fondoms or groups of them. The break-down of the Concert had one significant implication for *Nyenti reported this about three weeks before voting and from Mamfe (see map). As w i l l be seen in chapter seven, after the plebiscite, some groups from Wum and Nkambe Divisions, the extreme north of the region (see map) reported that some people were already complainig that they voted for Smaller Kamerun, not reunification. This would seem to give credence to Nyenti's earlier report. 214 Southern Kamerun and for the trusteeship system in that region. The f i r s t nationalist organization, the CYL, which embedded in i t s programme the idea of building a 'Cameroons Nations', predicated i t on the unity of the various Fondoms in Southern Kamerun (see chapter two). The emergence of the Concert f u l f i l l e d that promise; indeed, the unity of Southern Kamerun was symbolized by the Concert of the a-Fon. Consequently, the break-down of the Concert meant the disunity of Southern Kamerun. By taking an adverse decision, therefore, the United Nations undermined the most sig-nificant achievement i t could point to in Southern Kamerun. Nevertheless, as far as the plebiscite was concerned, the break-down of the Concert was advantageous to some p o l i t i c a l leaders and disadvantageous to others. To be sure, the situation gave a l l the p o l i t i c a l leaders the opportunity to set one Fondom against the other, one ethnic group against the other, and one area of the region against the other, and, to exploit local p o l i t i c s of the various Fondoms in their favour. But, the question was, who would gain more by doing so, the integrationists or the reunifi-cationists including Foncha. Circumstances were in favour of the reunifi-cationists: i f Bum was set against Bali Nyonga, the integrationists would . be at a loss; i f local p o l i t i c s of Nso were exploited, the integrationists would be at a loss; and, i f Bamenda Division was set against the rest of the region, the reunificationists would s t i l l come on top. What a l l this amounts to is that by the middle of 1960, the Southern Kamerun Plebiscite had been lost and won; reunification had defeated integration. There are strong indications that a l l the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders knew this would be the case. Ntumazah seemed to know i t . That might have been why, during the campaigns, the OK avoided the electorate 215 as much as possible and directed i t s appeal,, in written form, to the Western-educated,assuring them that the constitution, which this group was most concerned about, would be drafted after the plebiscite and that they 53 themselves would have a hand in drafting i t . Endeley and Foncha seemed to have known i t . That might have been why, as the United Nations Plebis-cites Commissioner reported, Endeley approached Foncha during the campaigns and requested that both of them renounce their programmes and jointly demand a Smaller Kamerun State from the United Nations, and that might have been 54 why Foncha turned down the request. That might have been why, as the Plebiscites Commissioner reported, the Cameroons People's National Conven-tion (CPNC)\u00E2\u0080\u0094a fusion, in early 1960, of the KNC-KPP\u00E2\u0080\u0094entered the plebiscite 55 compaigns reluctantly and late. That might have been why, as Welch said, almost \"to the eve of the plebiscite, both the KNDP and the CPNC hoped that the terms of the General Assembly resolution could be reinterpreted in more favourable terms . . .[with neither] willing to admit the f i n a l i t y of 56 the choice between Cameroun and Nigeria:\" the CPNC, perhaps because i t knew i t had lost,.and, both, perhaps because they knew they had schemed, confused, and abandoned those who supported them and forced the majority of their countrymen to vote for what they did not want. The only group of organizers who did not seem to have known i t were the British. That was why they proceeded with the organization of the plebiscite which had almost been settled. 216 \"'\"U.N., G.A. , Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 885, November, 1959, p. 13. 2 . Ibid., pp. 13-15. 3 Ibid., 4 Ibid., 5U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 888, November, 1959, p. 30. 6U.N., G.A., A/C. 4/SR. 885, November, 1959, p. 16. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., pp. 16-17.; 9 U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 888, November, 1959, pp. 29-30. 10 U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 889, Nov-ember, 1959, pp. 33-34. \"'\"\"'\"Ibid. , pp. 34-36. 1 2 , Ibid., 13 U.N., G.A., A/C. 4/SR. 885, November, 1959, p. 17. 14 Ibid., p. 18. 1 5 I b i d . 1 6 I b i d . 17 U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 890, November, 1959, pp. 37-38. 18 Ibid., p. 38. 19 U.N., G.A., Agreed Statement by Mr. John Foncha, Premier of the Southern Cameroons, and Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, Leader of the Opposition in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly, A/C. 4/414, September 30, 1959, pp. 1-2. 20 U.N., G.A., Year Book of the United Nations 1959, Office of Public Infor-mation, United Nations, New York, 1960, pp. 363-364. 21 U.N., G.A., Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during i t s Four-teenth Session, September 15-December 13, 1959, Supplement No. 16, A/4354, 1960, p. 26. 217 22 U.N., G.A., Year Book of the United Nations 1959, New York, 1960, pp. 363-364. 23 U.N., T.C., Petition from the Bafut Population Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Bamenda, 6 October, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 64, October 8, 1959, p. 1. 24 U.N., T.C., Petition from Mr. John Foku on Behalf of the Population of Metzam Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Eamenda, 2 October, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 59, October 6, 1959, p. 1. 25 U.N., T.C., Petition from Mrs. Magny on behalf of the Bafreng Women Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Bamenda, 2 October, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 58, October 6, 1959, p. 1. 26U.N., T.C., Three Petitions Dealing with General Problems Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, T/PET. 4/L. 66, October 12, 1959, pp. 1-2. 27 . , Ibid. 28 . , Ibid. 29 U.N., T.C., Petition from the Secretary of the Cameroons Society Con-cerning the Cameroons under Br i t i s h Administration, Buea, 2 October, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 57, October 6, 1959, p. 1. 30 U.N., T.C., Petition from the Cameroons Youth League Association Con-cerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Buea, 8 October, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 67, November 7, 1959, p. 1. 31 U.N. , T.C, Petition from Mr. Mallam L.T. Sale, President of the Muslim Congress Party Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Banso, 12 April, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 82, April 28, 1960, pp. 1-5. 32 U.N., T.C, T/1556, April 3, 1961, pp. 107-108. 33 Ibid. 34 U.N. , T.C, Petition from Mr. J. Manga-Williams, Leader and Founder of the Cameroons Indigenes Party, Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Victoria, 19 January, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 103, February 1, 1961, pp. 1-4. 35 U.N. , T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 79, February 25, 1960, pp, 1-3. 36 U.N., T.C., Petition from the Kamerun United Party Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Buea,, 20 September, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 96, October 13, 1960, pp. 1-2. 218 37 U.N. , T.C, Petition from Mr. Stephen E. Nyenti on Behalf of the Cameroons Commoners Congress Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Admini-stration, Mamfe, January 1, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 81, April 11, 1960, pp, 1-2; U.N. , T.C, Petition from Mr. Stephen E. Nyenti on Behalf of the Cameroons Commoners Congress Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Admini-stration, Mamfe, April 6, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 81, Add 1, April 28, 1960, pp. 1-4; U.N. , T.C, Two Petitions from Chief Stephen E. Nyenti, Leader, Comeroons Commoners Congress Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, T/PET. 4/L. 85, September 2, 1960, pp. 1-7; U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Central President of the Cameroons Commoners Congress Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Mamfe, 9 September, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 94, October 12, 1960, pp. 1-3; U.N. , T.C, Petition from Mr. S.E. Nyenti, Central President, Cameroons Commoners Congress Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Mamfe, January 24, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 106, February 25, 1961, pp.1-2. 38 , Ibid. 39 . . U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Ntenako-Ndekwai Community Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Mamfe, 30 July, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 86, September 2, 1960, pp. 1-2. 40 . . U.N. , T.C, Petition from Mr. J. Manga-Williams, Leader and Founder of the Cameroons Indigenes Party, Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Victoria, 19 January, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 103, February 1, 1961, pp. 1-2. 41 U.N., G.A., Hearings from Cameroons Petitioners, A/C. 4/SR. 849, May 1959, p. 566. 42 Rubin, op. c i t . , p. 107. 43U.N. , T.C, T/1556, April 3, 1961, pp. 111-112. 44 Le Vine, \"Calm Before the Storm in Cameroun,\" Africa Report, Vol. 6, No. 5, May, 1961, p. 4. 45 \"Yaounde,\" West Africa, July 16, 1960, p. 795. 46 Guy Devernoxs, \"Cameroons 1958-1959,\" Civilizations, Vols. 9-10, 1959-1960, p. 234. 47 \"Cameroun under Strain,\" The Economist, Vol. 196, July-September, 1960, p. 175. 48 , Kale, op. c i t . , p. 70. 49 Letter from Mr. Joseph N. Lafon, September 26, 1975, p. 1. 50 Kale, op. c i t . , p. 70. 219 5 1 I b i d . 52 U.N., T.C., T/PET. 4/L. 106, February 25, 1961, pp. 1-2. 53 U.N., T.C, T/1556, April 3, 1961, p. 115. 54 Ibid., pp. 112-113; i t is d i f f i c u l t to explain Foncha's behaviour at this time, except to suggest that he was sentimentally inclined to reunifi-cation, saw the opportunity at no cost to his power, and no longer had scruples in getting i t . 55 Ibid., p. 114. 56 Welch, op. c i t . , pp. 227-228. 220 CHAPTER SIX THE CONDUCT OF THE PLEBISCITES 1959-1961 Because there were two plebiscites in Northern Kamerun and only one in Southern Kamerun, and because those in Northern Kamerun were organized separately, by the British in conformity with the United Nations resolution, from that in Southern Kamerun, i t makes sense to deal with this aspect of the phenomenon in Northern Kamerun separately from that in Southern Kamerun. The Conduct of the Northern Kamerun Plebiscites 1959-1961 Before the United Nations informed the Northern Kamerunians that they would have a plebiscite in November 1959, there was no indigenous p o l i t i c a l party in the region. With the knowledge that there would be a plebiscite organized by the British and supervised by the United Nations, some Western-educated Northern Kamerunians, a l l of whom were Muslims, formed a p o l i t i c a l party for the purpose of fighting the plebiscite. This was the Northern Kamerun Democratic Party (NKDP). It was formed in February, 1959, the month in which the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly decided that there would be a plebiscite in Northern Kamerun. But. i t was not launched unt i l April, 1959. The NKDP had several aims, mostly directed against the way the British had reorganized Northern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l l y . In essence, the aims involved secession from Nigeria, independence for Northern Kamerun either in a state of i t s own or in a state of Western Kamerun, unification of Western Kamerun, and the ultimate reunification of Kamerun. Closely a l l i e d with these goals 221 was the desire to develop Northern Kamerun in a l l aspects of l i f e , the desire to put Northern Kamerunian affairs in the hands of Northern Kamerun-ians, the desire to overthrow Fulani domination and reinvigorate Northern Kamerunian traditional institutions, and the desire to ask the Nigerian workers and administrators to go back home.1 These goals made the NKDP suspect in the eyes of the local authorities who were mainly in favour of the integration of Northern Kamerun with Nigeria. On July 26, 1959, over thirty-two of i t s members were arrested at Sugu and locked up in several prisons in Jada and Yola.* They were neither charged nor tried. The incident had to do with permits. There was a 'law' that persons wishing to campaign in an open or public lecture must acquire permits before doing so. The NKDP in this area attempted several times unsuccessfully to acquire these permits. Having failed, i t s members went to the Chief of Sugu to find out why permits were being granted to branches of the Nigerian parties in Northern Kamerun and denied to the NKDP. This Chief at once ordered the arrest of these NKDP members. Soon after, the area was ransacked and \" a l l in possession of [the] party's registration cards were arrested and 2 locked up.\" The attempt to intimidatetthe advocates of secession from Nigeria had thus begun, but many more would follow. The NKDP leaders also alleged that they and their supporters were being taxed heavily because of their p o l i t i c a l ideas. They saw the heavy taxes as an attempt to dissuade them from opposing the Northern Nigerian proposi- - ... 3 tion. There is no way of knowing whether this was a mere allegation or a *British observations on what was reported in this petition confirm what this paragraph reports. See, U.N., T.C., T/OBS. 4/68, December 15, 1959. 222 fact, but that i s how the NKDP reported whatever happened. However, in order to redress the situation, the NKDP requested the United Nations to depose a l l Northern Nigerian rulers in Northern Kamerun, to expel Nigerian administrators and Dan-dogas* from the region before the plebiscite, to not permit the headquarters of the plebiscite to be in Yola, Nigeria, where the British had tried to set i t , and to ensure the plebiscite be conducted 4 on a provincial basis. , The United Nations, in response to these complaints and requests, did relocate the plebiscite headquarters at Mubi. Non-Northern Kamerunians campaigned in the plebiscites. Dr. Djalal Abdoh, the United Nations Plebiscites Commissioner, was informed on August 28, 1959, by the British Mission at the United Nations that \"action could not be taken to exclude Nigerians and Southern Cameroonians from the Trust Territory unless they broke the law or endangered law and order.\" The Governor-General of Nigeria later on repeated the same information in identical words, adding that even Eastern Kamerunians could do the same thing 5 \"provided they did not break the law or endanger law and order.\" Neverthe-less, when Ntumazah suggested, after the f i r s t plebiscite, that integration with Nigeria should no longer form part of the second plebiscite, Cohen, the British representative in the Fourth Committee reacted sharply: \"Ntumazah is not of course in any way entitled to speak for the people of the Northern Cameroons ... . he i s not somebody from the Northern Cameroons or qualified or I believe deputed to speak for the people of Northern Cameroons.\"6 This statement raises the question why non-Northern Kamerunians were allowed to *A kind of local police force responsible to the local authorities; i t was also called dogari. In Southern Kamerun they were called Fon's messengers. 223 participate in the plebiscite. Indeed, out of the five p o l i t i c a l parties that campaigned in the f i r s t plebiscite, four were Nigerian parties with local branches in Northern Kamerun while only one was an indigenous p o l i t i c a l party. These local branches of Nigerian p o l i t i c a l parties included the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), the NCNC, the UMBC, the AG, and the NPC. Out of these, the NCNC, the UMBC, and the AG joined forces to campaign in favour of the second alternative, which was to make a decision later on. The NPC alone campaigned in favour of the f i r s t alternative which was to be inte-grated permanently with Northern Nigeria. Aside from the fact that non-Northern Kamerunians participated in the plebiscite and that Nigeria-based p o l i t i c a l parties also took part, instructions from the Governor-General of Nigeria concerning the conduct of the plebiscite were distorted by the Northern Nigeria authorities before they reached Northern Kamerun. For example, on June 18, 1959, as Dr. Abdoh reported, the Governor-General instructed the Governor of Northern Nigeria to the effect that those in authority charged with the conduct of the plebis-cite \"should be at pains not only to ensure the complete impartiality of the plebiscite but also make the impartiality obvious and unassailable.\" Ministers involved in the plebiscites should \"deny themselves the public expression of partisan views on the matter to be decided as the result of 7 the plebiscite.\" When the instructions reached Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello dis-torted them. On September 16, 1959, his government recognized that i t \"should not participate actively in the campaign preceding the Northern Cameroons Plebiscite.\" Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries \"other than those who represented constituencies in Trust Territories,\" should not 224 attend meetings and r a l l i e s connected with the plebiscite. However, they could hold private meetings with the representatives of their parties, and were \"at liberty to express their personal views on the plebiscite publicly\" although they should make i t clear that they were not speaking \"as members of the Government,\" but as \"elected representatives of the 8 people.\" In these words, the Sardauna of Sokoto virtu a l l y n u l l i f i e d the Governor-General's instructions. There is l i t t l e wonder then that the arrests and harassment of those connected with the NKDP occurred at the grass-roots level. When the British did not f l a t l y deny the existence of the arrests, they defended them in legal terms or issued warnings against the crimes. This is how the British defended the arrests of NKDP members. On July 26, a representative of the NKDP applied for a permit to the District Head of Sugu. The permit was neither granted nor denied, but as the conduct of the NKDP leaders led the District Head \"to apprehend a breach of the law, he ordered the arrest of the applicant and two of his supporters.\" Then a noisy sequel and \"provocative demonstration of some f i f t y persons before the Distr i c t Head's house\" followed. As a result, \"twenty-six persons were arrested for conduct 9 l i k e l y to cause a breach of the peace.\" On July 29, the three leaders > arrested and the four leaders of the demonstration were arraigned before the Court of the Lamido of Adamawa. They were charged with \"conduct li k e l y to cause a breach of the peace.\" A l l the twenty-six were convicted and 10 fined with sums ranging from 61 to 610. As said in the preceding paragraph, sometimes the British merely issued warnings against the harassment of the NKDP leadership and supporters and, then, proceeded to offer an explanation seemingly in defence of the harassment. 225 One example w i l l suffice. The local authorities defied the neutrality appeal and Sir John Dring, the British Plebiscite Administrator, issued warnings \"again\" and then indicated the legal impossibility of controlling them. Dring informed Dr. Abdoh that the Resident of Yola \"had again warned Native Authority O f f i c i a l s \" to be impartial \"when carrying out their o f f i c i a l duties.\" But that those \" o f f i c i a l s could not be barred from taking part in p o l i t i c a l activities in their personal capacities.\" Furthermore, there was \"no constitutional authority for vesting the issue of permits in British o f f i c i a l s . \" Arrests could continue provided they were made only \"in cases where i t was necessary in the interests of the law and order.\" Those already in prisons would be interviewed and released \"on b a i l \" u n t i l the plebiscite was over. 1 1 Issuing warnings, of course, is one thing but en-forcing the regulations effectively i s quite another. That the warnings were issued \"again\" would seem to suggest that they were never heeded. Indeed, an incident which Dr. Abdoh reported occurred during the voting process would seem to suggest that, i f the allegation was a fact, then the warnings were simply ignored. As Dr. Abdoh put i t , A delegation of leaders from the areas alleged to the United Nations observer that the presiding officer had instructed the people to put their ballots in the white box [Nigeria proposition] at the opening of the station and that the polling officers accompanied the voters into the booths and directed them to put their ballots in the white box . . . This complaint had been lodged with the plebiscite Administration [the British team] and concerns the Chigide Registration Area . . . The United Nations observer remarked that Chigide was the only mountain area in the Gwoza Circle which had a majority for white (677-33)\u00E2\u0080\u0094the other areas voted over-whelmingly for the second alternative. 1 2 It i s important to note that Gwoza, and indeed the Chigide area, was inhabited mainly by-the.non-Fulani Northern Kamerunians. Whatever the case, i t is now possible to attempt a summary of the con-226 ditions under which the f i r s t Northern Kamerun plebiscite was fought. Nigerian and Northern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l parties participated in the plebis-cite. Of these parties, only the NPC campaigned in favour of integration with Northern Nigeria; the others campaigned in favour of making a decision in the future. During the conduct of the plebiscite, the majority of the local authorities, i f not a l l of them, were in favour of integration with Nigeria. These local authorities defied the Governor-General's appeal for Neutrality and influenced opinion in favour of their p o l i t i c a l ideas. But, because the p o l i t i c a l ideas of the NKDP ran contrary to those of the local authorities, the latter harassed the former mainly by denying them permits to lecture and by arresting them and their supporters for alleged breaches of the law. The British Plebiscite Administrator issued warnings again and again against the activities of the local authorities but apparently did l i t t l e to enforce the regulations; instead he offered explanations which seemed to defend the conduct of the local authorities. In spite of a l l this, one thing seems to come out very clearly. The harassment was directed against the leaders of the NKDP and a few of their supporters. The majority of the Northern Kamerun populace were thus l e f t free to take their own decisions. This meant the a-Fon and their subjects and the dissident Fulani were allowed to decide which way they wanted to f a l l . They did; and the outcome was apparently.* an overwhelming victory for a future decision. 133,859 people registered for the plebiscite. Eighty per cent of them cast ballots. 42,788 (about 36%) of these voted in favour of remaining a permanent part of Northern Nigeria. 70,546 (about *See next paragraph. 227 64%) of them apparently voted in favour of making a decision in the future. The United Nations' team\u00E2\u0080\u0094the Plebiscite Commissioner, his staff, and the observers\u00E2\u0080\u0094were agreed, however, that the votes of the majority at least spoke a peculiar language. As they saw i t , It would appear that the majority of the voters made use of the opportunity offered by the plebiscite to register what was in effect a protest vote against the system of local administration prevailing in the Northern Cameroons. The information that [they] gathered in the Territory supports the view that the people desire the introduction of reforms in the system of local government\u00E2\u0080\u0094 which to them is synonymous with Government\u00E2\u0080\u0094and that one of the reasons why the majority,voted in favour of the second alternative [Future Decision] was to express the wish for a speedy introduction of these reforms.14 This, of course, meant that, like in most plebiscites and general elections for that matter, the majority of the Northern Kamerunians had interpreted the United Nations' questions in light of their local conditions and circumstances. Whatever the case, the results of the plebiscite surprised the British delegation at the United Nations. As Cohen put i t , the British were very surprised by the results of the vote; they expected \"quite a substantial vote for the second alternative,\" but not a majority in favour of that alternative. He then proceeded to offer an explanation. According to him, Northern Kamerunians, under the trusteeship system, \"secured an exceptional share of development finance for roads, schools and hospitals,\"* and were, therefore, \"well disposed to the trusteeship system.\" By deferring their decision, they hoped to gain more of this development finance under the con-tinued trusteeship system. However, \"Northern Cameroons i s s t i l l to be wooed *The reader should make his decision about this statement by looking at the historical background. 228 and much may be won during courtship that may not be offered after marrr.'. riage.\" The vote was the consequence of the \"dissatisfaction\" of the people \"at not being able to play a larger part in the system of local admini-stration* . . . which to them is synonymous with Government\". It was the local Native Administrations, not the Northern Nigerian Government, that was unpopular. The vote in the plebiscites was \"emphatically not to be regarded 15 as a vote against Nigeria.\" Cohen thus indicated that he did ;not believe the Northern Regional Government or the Nigerian Government for that matter could be unpopular among the majority of the Northern Kamerunians. However, i t was during this explanation that the impartiality Cohen professed for so long at the United Nations was negated. The Northern Kamerunians were \" s t i l l to be wooed.\" Who was to do the wooing, when, how, and for what reason? Much \"may be won during courtship that may not be offered after marriage.\" Who was to win what, and what would be offered that may not be delivered? After this explanation, however, Cohen stated his point of view regarding the organization of the next Northern Kamerun plebiscite. He suggested a second plebiscite which sould be conducted at the same time with that of Southern Kamerun, and whose questions should be identical with those asked the Southern Kamerunians; \"Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria? or Do you wish to achieve indepen-dence by joining the independent Republic of the Cameroons?\" The votes in Northern Kamerun should have nothing to do with those of Southern Kamerun and *Here, Cohen was merely reiterating the conclusion of the United Nations Plebiscite^ team in Northern Kamerun, although Cohen stretched \"it to suit his own interest. 229 the future of each section of the territory should be decided according to i t s own number of votes. The voters in Northern Kamerun should \"include genuine residents of the Trust Territory, even those who might have been excluded from the Federal register on grounds of nationality\"; 1 6 (the qualifications for voting in Northern Kamerun should thus be different from those of Southern Kamerun and non-Nigerians as well as non-Northern Kame-runians should vote). In either event, the Nigerian Government must be 17 consulted before the voters' qualifications are determined. The voting qualifications which Cohen suggested here, before the United Nations, must be borne in mind. Cohen's suggestion not withstanding, with the results of the plebiscite apparently in favour of a future decision, one might have expected the United Nations to consult with the Northern Kamerunians before making a further decision. This consultation could take the form of another Visiting Mission. But, without further consultation, the United Nations acted. Its decision was set out in the General Assembly Resolution 1473 (XIV). The British should organize a further plebiscite beginning from September 30, 1960, and ending not later than March 1961. The two questions for the plebiscite, in this order, should be \"(a) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of the Cameroons? (b) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria?\" The plebis-cites should be conducted \"on the basis of universal adult suffrage, a l l those over the age of twenty-one and ordinarily resident in the Northern Cameroons being qualified to vote.\" The British should separate the admini-stration of Northern Kamerun from that of Nigeria not later than October 1, 1960. Northern Kamerunians may participate in the general elections to the 230 Nigerian Federal Legislative Assembly, but, this \"should in no way interfere with, or influence, the free choice of the people of the Northern Cameroons 18 in deciding their future in the forthcoming plebiscite.\" It is surprising, however, that the United Nations s t i l l put the organization of this second plebiscite in British hands. Cohen's statement that Northern Kamerun would s t i l l have to be wooed and that much might be promised during courtship that might never be delivered was enough to warn the United Nations that the British could not be expected to be impartial in the next plebiscite. There is l i t t l e wonder, therefore, that the Northern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders who favoured secession from Nigeria became suspicious, not only of the British and local authorities but also of the United Nations' :decision. Before the United Nations adopted Resolution 1473 (XIV) Mallam Ibrahim Abba, Founder and President of the NKDP, and Mallam Iya, General-Secretary of the NKDP, were already at Buea, capital of Southern Kamerun, making arrangements for the unification of Western Kamerun. They apparently did not expect a further plebicsite, at least not un t i l after a period of five years. As soon as i t was remoured in Southern Kamerun that the United Nations was planning an immediate plebiscite for Northern Kamerun, these two leaders, in a telegram from Southern Kamerun at once protested to the United Nations. On December 7, 1959, five days before the adoption of the resolution, they told the United Nations what was required at the time. Northern Kamerunians should abrogate the Nigerian Federal elections. A separate administration for Northern Kamerun should be established and administrative.reforms begun. They considered \"completely unacceptable British intention that [their] plebiscite take place at same time as that of Southern Cameroons which [was] much more p o l i t i c a l l y developed.\" Time was needed before the next plebiscite 231 to study the problems at stake and to educate the people. The British had an obligation to develop them and bring them up to the level of their 19 neighbours before they could be ready to make a f i n a l decision. The same day, these leaders followed up the telegram with a petition. But because they knew that i t would take time for the letter to reach New York, they gave their Mubi address. This petition clearly indicated what was discussed at Buea. They did not want the Minister for Northern Cameroons Affairs to represent or speak for Northern Kamerun. This Minister was representing Nigerian interests and himself. Northern Kamerun should be separated at once from Nigeria because i t s inhabitants were Kamerunians, not Nigerians. The region should be given i t s own Government and after 1960, the Governor-General of Nigeria should not have anything to do with \"British Cameroons,\" that is Western Kamerun. The Commissioner for Western Kamerun would then deal directly with London and Northern Kamerun would be under the authority of the Commissioner at Buea. In this way, Northern and Southern Kamerun would be linked together. This was to be the f i r s t step to the ultimate unification of Western Kamerun. In either event, the Southern Kamerun plebiscite should take place before the second plebiscite of Northern Kamerun. Western Kamerun should constitute an independent 20 state before the ultimate reunification of a l l Kamerun. When the Northern Nigerian Government decided to send someone to speak for Northern Kamerun, the NKDP reacted sharply. The NKDP reminded the United Nations that i t was the only indigenous party of Northern Kamerun and, therefore, the only party qualified to speak for the region. It called on the United Nations to reject whatever that delegate would say. The Northern Nigerian Government had been deceiving the United Nations for a 232 long time. Northern Kamerunians wished to manage their own affairs with their own government and legislatures. To f a i l to listen to these pleas would be an indication of the United Nations' intentions to force Northern Kamerun to vote under fear and suppression in the next plebiscite^ \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 21 Furthermore, only Northern Kamerunians should vote at the plebiscite. It is important to note here that the NKDP was, indeed, the only p o l i t i c a l party qualified ot speak for Northern Kamerun. It was the only indigenous p o l i t i c a l party and that explains why the local authorities directed their efforts mainly against i t . Its supporters were only Northern Kamerunians, Fulani and non-Fulani, Muslims and non-Muslims. On the other hand, the rest of the parties operating in the region were branches of Nigerian parties and took instructions from their headquarters in Nigeria.* It was because *Vaughan reported that these local branches of Nigerian parties refused to take instructions from their headquarters in Nigeria. This appears to be incorrect; there are indications to the contrary. Document U.N., T.C., T/1491/Add. 1, Annex VIII, November 25, 1959, pp. 1-8, makes, among other things, the following points. Some time before August 4, 1959, a \"two-day conference of a l l p o l i t i c a l parties in the Northern Cameroons has decided on further period of Trusteeship. The decision was contained in a joint decla-ration signed by representatives who attended the conference.\" These parties included the \"Northern People's Congress . . . UMBC-Action Group . . . Northern Kamerun Democratic Party . . . NEPU . \u00E2\u0080\u00A2. .[and] Bornu Youth Movement.\" Before August 5, 1959, \"The UMBC delegates to the Conference said that i t was their policy to break away from the North, especially those in Adamawa Province.\" After this declaration, the \"Northern Working Committee of the NPC\" at the headquarters \"dissociated i t s e l f from the decision of a l l the p o l i t i c a l parties in the Northern Cameroons that a further period of trusteeship should be sought for the Territory.\" Before August 10, 1959, the local branch, that i s , \"The Adamawa branch of the NPC also dissociated i t s e l f from the conference decision in a statement issued at Yola.\" Some time before October 19, 1959, Malam Tanko Yakassai, National Publicity Secretary of NEPU declared that \"his party would not 'dive into the internal affairs of the Northern Cameroons' . . NEPU was of the view that the people of the Trust Territory were dissatisfied with the NPC Government policies . . . i t was desirable to allow the people complete autonomy to constitute their own Native Authority in order to bjtirug^ improvements in the area [for what] the people wanted was not secession as such but a recognition of their stutus with their own Native Authority.\" (continued) 233 of these instructions that the other parties combined forces with the ' 22 NKDP i n 1959 in order to weaken the NPC in Nigerian p o l i t i c s . Further-more, these parties included both Nigerians and Northern Kamerunians. Whatever the case, the protests against an immediate plebiscite continued. This time, i t was one of the Northern Kamerunians who sat in the Nigerian House of Representatives, Hon. Mr. Philip Maken, who protested. On April 26, 1960, he asked for the postponement of the second Northern Kamerun plebiscite. Trusteeship should be continued u n t i l the people were ready to make a decision. Before this decision, however, Northern Kamerun should have independence either in a Northern Kamerun state or in a \"British Cameroons\" state. A l l of Western Kamerun should be separated from Nigeria and given a separate and single House of Assembly as from October 1, 1960, the day when Nigeria would become independent. He was quite aware that the two alternatives of the plebiscite were a \"trick\" from the Northern Nigerian Government. So also was the government's demand for an \"immediate\" second plebiscite. It was surprising that the United Nations failed to see through these \"tricks\" and failed also to list e n to the pleas of the NKDP and i t s associate parties. Nevertheless, he and his colleagues were only concerned with the postponement of the second plebiscite u n t i l \"British Cameroons\" had Before November 5, 1959, Malam Aminu Kano, Leader of NEPU, \"reasserted his party's belief in the right of any people to self-determination. The people of the Northern Cameroons, he pointed out, do not want to secede from Nigeria but they only wanted a Provincial Administrative [sic] set up for themselves.\" On October 26, 1959, the Publicity secretary of NEPU again, \"said his party refused to issue directives to i t s branches in the Northern Cameroons . . . because it. believed that the issue was purely a matter for the local people to decide. He added: 'We of NEPU are of the opinion that the people of the Northern Cameroons have decided to vote against continued association with the North because they are fed up with the present tyranic at [sic] [i.e. tyrannical] rule of the NPC.\" 234 been ruling i t s e l f after a period of trusteeship. Only then could the people in their own House of Assembly decide which way to f a l l . The immediate ple-biscite was a Northern Nigerian scheme to \"swallow the Northern Cameroons.\" Worse s t i l l , the Northern Nigerian Government was already twisting the 23 questions of the second plebiscite and making a mockery of the f i r s t . Nor were the branches of the Nigerian parties in Northern Kamerun which co-operated with the NKDP in 1959 silent on the issue. On July 13, 1960, they informed the United Nations that the future of their* \"dear father land the Northern Cameroons\" was uncertain. The general problem had produced a \"great anxiety\" among the Northern Kamerunians. The \"British and Nigerians [had] already prepared a great trap for the people of Northern Cameroons.\" They, the leaders of the Kamerun Freedom Party (KFP)\u00E2\u0080\u0094a second indigenous Northern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l party formed in the middle of 1960 to fight the second plebiscite, the AG, the NKDP, and the NEPU wished to t e l l the United Nations \"the exact position\" before things became \"too late.\" If the United Nations wished to see the second plebiscite conducted in a free atmosphere, the present British \"Resident, British and Nigerian Administrative Officers\" in the region should be \"removed without delay and replaced by other Admini-24 strative Officers direct from the United Kingdom or somewhere else.\" These leaders followed their demands with accusations. The British Resident and the Nigerian administrators, they said, were already \"freely campaigning for Northern Nigeria,\" and thereby taking an \"active part in po l i t i c s . \" They were setting \"one tribe against another\" and making the *It should be remembered that these branches had members who included Nigerians and Northern Kamerunians. 2 35 plebiscite \" t r i b a l i s t i c . \" They were oppressing, victimizing, and threatening those:.in favour of the Cameroun proposition. They were s t i l l appointing d i s t r i c t heads that were not Northern Kamerunians, and they were employing \"mostly those who did not support the separation of Northern Cameroons from Northern Region of Nigeria.\" About 90 per cent of \"the workers in Northern Cameroons [were] Nigerians\" while those \"who fought to free Northern Cameroons 25 from Northern Region\" were no longer employed. These accusations were followed by suggestions regarding what ought to be done. A l l Nigerian soldiers and policemen in the region should be removed at once before the plebiscite ever took.place because they would \"do their worst there.\" The proposal to make Northern Kamerun a Province of Northern Nigeria was totally unacceptable because the region had \"rejected Northern Nigeria in the last Plebiscite.\" The proposal i t s e l f was an indication that Northern Kamerun had \"no place in Nigeria except in Northern Region.\" The name \"Trusteeship Province\" was an attempt to obliterate the name \"Cameroons\"; Northern Kamerunians were Kamerunians and wished to maintain their \"national identity.\" The United Nations should treat Northern and Southern Kamerun \"as one State.\" The British policy of \"divide and rule\" was unacceptable. Northern and Southern Kamerun should be unified before independence as was the case with Togoland. The world knew that there was \"only one British Cameroons not two British Cameroons.\" It was d i f f i c u l t to understand how Southern Kamerun with a population of 753,000 had a'Government and Northern 26 Kamerun with a population of 800,000* had none. *These figures were taken from an o f f i c i a l demographic survey record of 1953 and are probably accurate. It should be noted that in 1919, Southern Kamerun had a larger population than Northern Kamerun. The change of position now is hard to explain. 2 36 On July 25, 1960, another branch of a Nigerian p o l i t i c a l party, the NCNC, joined the group to register yet another charge. This time i t involved the alleged n u l l i f i c a t i o n of the results of local elections by a British Resident. When the local reforms, to be seen presently, were undertaken in Northern Kamerun after the f i r s t plebiscite., elections were held to the newly-formed numerous councils. In the Mubi Dis t r i c t , i t was alleged, NEPU won 16 out of the 24 contested seats and the NPC won 8. In the same District NEPU secured 14 seats out of the 19 contested seats to the Town Council, the NPC won 4, and one went to an independent candidate. This meant the party in favour of the Nigeria proposition had lost control of those two councils. On July 22-23, the Dist r i c t Officer vir t u a l l y n u l l i f i e d the results of the elections by nominating village heads and traditional rulers, 27 the a-Fon, to the councils.* The NEPU members staged a walk-out. As the Northern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders were busy protesting against the immediate second plebiscites, making recommendations about what ought to be done, and accusing the authorities in the region of malpractices, the British were busy introducing the administrative reforms in conformity with the United Nations' resolution. Northern Kamerun was carved into four administrative Divisions located entirely within the region. The four Divisions constituted one Province of Northern Nigeria. This new Province was under the Authority of a British Resident, the f i r s t time a British O f f i c i a l of this rank was resident in Northern Kamerun. Each Division had a *The regulations connected with the administrative reforms gave the Dist r i c t Officers the right to appoint Special Members to the various councils. The choices of Special Members in this area might have been such as to make NEPU leaders suspicious and to regard the situation as a deliberate attempt to nul l i f y their majority in the named councils. 237 Native Authority and under the Native Authorities were District Councils. Each Native Authority comprised several Districts. Both;': the Native Authorities and the District Councils were supervised by Administrative 28 Officers, the British. The groundwork for wooing had been set and indeed wooing had begun. Northern Kamerun administration had been separated from that of Northern Nigeria; although Northern Kamerun was, as a Province of Northern Nigeria, part of the Northern Region of Nigeria, the majority of the Northern Kamerunians, the a-Fon included, had not reached that level of understanding\u00E2\u0080\u0094local government, as Dr. Abdoh observed, was synonymous to them with government. Furthermore, the British Resident and Administrative Officers were now present in the region to protect the non-Fulani from the Fulani while the dissident Fulani thought they had recovered from their subordination to the Nigerian Fulani. In their minds, the separation of Northern Kamerun administration from Northern Nigeria, which was synonymous with the separation of Northern Kamerun from Nigeria as a whole, and the present direct administration by the British was tantamount to: in the case of the non-Fulani, the overthrow of the Fulani domination, and the overthrow of Islam which was a threat to their cultural identity and lives; and in the case of the dissident Fulani, the 'German time tyrants', i t was the recovery of their authority and freedom from subordination to the Northern Nigeria Fulani. What remained to be done was to put their local affairs in their own hands. There were two steps which must be taken to accomplish this. The f i r s t step was to determine how and who should s i t in the governing bodies of the Native Authorities and the District and Town Councils. A l l the previous councils \"which had been established under the method of indirect elections,\" were abolished, and the new c o u n c i l s \u00E2\u0080\u0094 d i s t r i c t , town, 238-and outer\u00E2\u0080\u0094had democratically \"elected members,\" as well as the \"nominated and ex o f f i c i o members.\" In some cases, \"former d i s t r i c t heads found to be unacceptable to the people were withdrawn and were replaced.biy temporary appointments.\" In either event, the District Councils were given an opportunity \"to confirm their acceptance of the d i s t r i c t heads.\" The members of the Native Authority Councils were elected from the members who were already members of the Dis t r i c t Councils. The heads or chairmen of the Native Authority Councils were approved by the Dis t r i c t Councils. A l l the elections for these positions were based on adult male suffrage and secret ballot. The Dis t r i c t Councils were composed of \"a majority of elected memebrs, a number of ex o f f i c i o village heads [the a-Fon] and a number of nominated members representing special interests and minority groups.\" The Native Authority Councils were composed of \"elected members (except in Dikwa), ex o f f i c i o d i s t r i c t or village heads [the a-Fon] and nominated members.\" A l l the ex o f f i c i o members of the councils \"were appointed in consultation with the d i s t r i c t councils within the particular Native Authority and with the elected members of the Authority.\" Each council was responsible for 29 choosing i t s own Chairman or President. Free, direct, and secret elections in Northern Kamerun proper, without reference to Nigeria, had never been heard of. Now i t happened. Northern Kamerunians as a whole for the f i r s t time had been consulted in their local affairs. Northern Kamerunians, a-Fon and their literate or i l l i t e r a t e subjects, were now in control of their local affairs, a thing to be protected. The undesired \" d i s t r i c t and village heads and staff were dismissed or re-.:'. ... 30 tired.\"; this meant the previously dismissed true a-Fon of Mambilla came back. At the grass-roots level, therefore, the people of the particular area 239' had both their affairs in their hands and those they desired over them. Twenty a-Fon from the former regime were dismissed and 15 of them imprisoned 31 during the time of the second plebiscite. A l l this came by the grace of the British who now would administer the region directly. The a-Fon and their subjects and the dissident Fulani had been effectively wooed. But, a l l this would have no meaning unless the people actively participated in the administration. The next task was, therefore, to provide the new authorities with functions. The Native Authorities had some lucrative functions. In general, they were \"responsible for the levying of taxes for local services, the appointment of local government staff, local education and health services, maintenance of law and order, agriculture and veterinary services,\" and the appointment of numerous committees to help them in their functions. The Dist r i c t Councils could \"levy rates for certain public services, engage, control and discipline their staffs,\" and they could make recommendations to the Native Authorities regarding \"adult education, reading rooms, communal forests, nurseries, roads, sanitary services.\" The newly created Mambilla council had more powers than the others; \"besides having an important advisory function to the Gashaka-Mambilla Native Authority, [it] levies tax for local services.\" The a-Fon, \"the lowest ranking Native Authority o f f i c i a l s , \" collected taxes, and assisted in the \"maintenance of law and order, reporting 32 deaths, births, marriages,\" to name only these. The task was complete. The wooing process, one of the two most important aspects of the second plebiscite, can now be summarized. In the minds of the Northern Kamerunians, the a-Fon and their subjects and the dissident Fulani, Northern Kamerun was separated from Northern Nigeria and Nigeria. They were thus surely protected 240 from the Northern Nigerian Fulani and Islam. The British administrators in the region had come to protect them from the local Fulani and Islam. They were now actively masters of their own affairs. The British had given them a l l this and the British must be retained to protect the g i f t . In any event, the reforms were now completed and the Northern Kamerunians had received what they asked for in the 1959 plebiscite. As soon as the reforms were completed, the campaigns for the second plebiscite got off the ground. As was the case during the 1959 campaigns, Sir John Dring, the British Plebiscite Administrator for Northern Kamerun, allowed the local branches of Nigerian p o l i t i c a l parties to participate. This might have been acceptable i f three conditions were f u l f i l l e d : i f these local branches which came together and formed a Consortium, camprising NPC, NEPU, NCNC, and AG,* for the purpose of the plebiscites cut off links with their mother branches; i f their Nigerian supporters in Northern Kamerun had not taken part in the campaigns; and, i f Dring had treated the NKDP/KFP as he treated them. But, as w i l l be seen presently, none of these conditions was f u l f i l l e d . Instead, Dring allowed the Northern Nigerian Minister of Local Government in the Northern Region of Nigeria to take leave of absence from his post, come to Northern Kamerun, organize and direct the acti v i t i e s 33 of the Consortium \"working for the Union of the Territory with Nigeria.\"t This did not take place in Southern Kamerun. *It i s important to note that these local branches in 1959 supported a future decision but in the second plebiscite, they received instructions from their headquarters and joined forces with the NPC with whom they were in opposition'in 1959. This shows Nigerian interests in the plebiscite. tSee footnote 33. 241 The Plebiscite Administrator himself seemed to have been particularly interested in the integration of Northern Kamerun with Northern Nigeria. One of the instruments he used to this effect was the law. The law dealing with permits, which was the only one used in 1959, has already been indicated. In 1961, another law was added to the l i s t to reinforce the f i r s t . As Dr. Abdoh described i t , . . . section 393 of the Penal Code of the Northern Region of Nigeria . . . refers to 'injurious falsehood' and gives the Native Authorities the power to punish with imprisonment for terms of up to two years ' any person who, by words either spoken or reproduced by mechanical means or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any false statement of fact, intending to . . . harm the reputation of . . . the Government or of any Native Authotiry . . . or of any local government authority. [It] places the burden of proof that a statement is substantially true on the accused and confers on the Court the power to decide whether a statement is a statement of fact or a mere expression of opinion and, consequently confers on the Native Authorities, and through them on the Native Courts, virtually arbitrary powers of adjudication. This law was f i r s t applied during the second plebiscite against six known supporters of NKDP before Dr. Abdoh arrived in Northern Kamerun. According to Dring's explanation, the majority of them were simply cirminals. One was arrested for contempt of court; (what brought him to court in the f i r s t place was not indicated.) Another was arrested for cutting down with-out permission a protected tree. A third was arrested for delivering a lecture without a permit (a continuation of the 1959 situation). The fourth threatened to k i l l the son of a man who had k i l l e d his father. A f i f t h made trouble and misinformed the people \"concerning the Native Authority Court.\" The sixth, \"the Organizing Secretary of the NKDP at Jada, on charges of subversion and sedition.\" If i t was by accident that a l l these six 'crimi-nals' were supporters of the Cameroun proposition, then accidents in the 242 Northern Kamerun of the plebiscite period had a logic of their own. When Dring's attention was drawn to the continued arrests, on November 21, I960, he merely asked for the transfer of the charges \"at the dis-cretion of the Resident and the Senior District Officer, from the Native Court to the Court of next appellate instance.\" Prosecution under section 393 would then take place \"only with the advice of the Legal Secretary of the Northern Cameroons\". When the t r i a l s subsequently took place, the following were convicted for the following offences. Suleiman Salihu, Organizing Secretary of the NKDP at Jada, for making a speech on October 10, 1960, and \"inciting his listeners to violence and r i o t against the constituted authority of the Government, quoting the Congo as an example to follow\"\u00E2\u0080\u0094he was sentenced for one year, hard labour; (the main p i l l a r of the NKDP campaign had been removed and denied the vote). Mallam Hamman Jalo was arrested for drinking* and later for holding a public meeting without a permit; his sentence i s not known. Usuman Bake Micika received six months for holding a public meeting without a permit; (he was thus denied the right to campaign and to vote). Saidu Gulak received six months for an offence under section 393 of the Penal Code; (he too lost the rights to campaign and vote). Zira Baki Zaggara was sentenced for six months for refusing to answer a summons. Tumba was sentenced for three months for holding a public meeting without a permit. Fayamu Gulak and Abba Gana Gulak were \"arrested by the police in Mubi on the charge of assault on the son of a Head Man who had been sent by his father to enquire about the meeting which the local leaders of the NKDP *Muslims are not supposed to drink alcohol in public. 243' in the Gulak-Madagali area had organized\"; their sentences are not known. Daniel Njenwe, Vice-President of the KFP, was charged1, under section 393 with uttering falsehood but was released on b a i l . While a l l these were supporters of the Cameroun proposition, a search has not produced a single case where any supporter of the Nigeria proposition was either arrested or tried under similar conditions; at least, none of them reported i t . Dr. Abdoh became worried over this situation and suggested to Dring that cases involving p o l i t i c a l offences should be punishable by fines instead of prison sentences, \"in order not to deprive persons charged with such offences from participation in the campaign.\" On December 2, 1960, Dring turned down the request. He, Dring, \"found i t d i f f i c u l t to expose his views on the Native Courts, because, as with any judicial organ, they should be independent. At the same time he wished to avoid giving p o l i t i c a l parties an opportunity to undermine the authority of the Native Authorities and Native Courts.\" There are many examples of such arrests and imprisonment,* but they :'. involved mainly the most effective campaigners of the NKDP/KFP. Due to want of space the discussion of them would be summed up by the United Nations Plebiscites Commissioner himself. It i s an inescapable fact that prior to the introduction of the modifications concerning the application of section 393, i t was open to Native Courts to use the provisions of this section as a powerful weapon. If they so wished, they could arrest and bring speedily to t r i a l persons a f f i l i a t e d with or supporting p o l i t i c a l views which were different from those held by the Native Authorities. This section, frequently misunderstood by Native Courts, had created particular confusion when applied to cases involving the issuance *See for example, U.N., T.C., T/1556, April 3, 1961, pp. 199-204 which involved 29 persons and a further 47 persons. 244 of permits for public meetings and to cases involving the allegations of 'injurious falsehood' attributed to the speeches made by members or adherents of the NKDP and KFP. Arrests, t r i a l s , and imprisonment were not, however, the only way by which the proponents of reunification were frustrated. As in 1959, the refusal of permits to them was used extensively. At best, they were delayed. This occurred so often that both the United Nations Liaison Officer and Plebiscites Commissioner were forced to make repeated appeals to Dring to remedy the situation. Dring refused to respond for a long time. When he acted, he merely promised to issue \"a proclamation whereby Native Authorities were required to grant a permit for any public assembly.\" However, he immediately n u l l i f i e d the proposed proclamation with \"unless the Native Authority was satisfied that a breach of the peace was li k e l y to arise from such an assembly.\" Aside from this phrase which rendered barren the proposed proclamation the process was so long as to be of no use. Within twenty-four hours, applicants for permits would be informed about the decision by the District Head or appropriate Native Authorities. If this was unavailing, the applicant could appeal to a Superior Police Officer (who was Nigerian). If there was \"no question of a threat to or the break-down of the maintenance of peace, security and order,\" the Police Officer could overrule the Native Authority and force a permit to be granted. \"No permit could, however, be issued to persons who were ineligible to register in the plebiscite.\" This procedure took so much time that the proclamation was almost useless. If Dring was willing to remedy the situation, he would have merely abrogated the law. Not surprisingly, however, the proclamation remained on paper. The Liaison Officer in Mubi continued to receive complaints from the NKDP/KFP .'. 2.45 leaders that they were being denied permits. On November 21, 1960, the Liaison Officer brought the continued problem to Dring. \"As i t happened, the proclamation had not even been issued, although the text had been in the hands of the printer for a f u l l month. It was not un t i l 2 December that the proclamation and instructions of the Administrator were published and distributed to the Native Authorities.\" Thus the proclamation was issued only six weeks to the voting day. The proclamation, when i t came, did not mean the problem was solved. As late as January 21, 1961, three weeks to voting, the NKDP/KFP were s t i l l refused permits on the grounds -\u00E2\u0080\u00A2that the lectures would take place on market days and market places. Nonetheless, referring to the Southern Kamerun, his headquarters, the Plebiscite Commissioner remarked that, \"Once the campaign was in f u l l swing, hardly a market day went by without a lecture being given by either group of parties.\" Indeed, market days and market places in a l l of Kamerun are precisely best suited for messages to reach mass audiences. Furthermore, the Plebiscite Commissioner made an investi-gation and found that in two d i s t r i c t s , Mubi and Cubunawa/Madagali, the NKDP/KFP made 35 applications and 12 of them (34%) were denied them. On the other hand, the Consortium made 86 applications in the same di s t r i c t s and only 2 of them (about 2%) were denied them. As close as two weeks to the voting day, the supporters of the Cameroun proposition continued to be harassed. On January 28, 1961, three women supporters of the NKDP visited one of the NKDP leaders. On their way back home, they were accused of creating \"a disturbance grave enough to lead to their arrest.\" The next day, January 29, 1961, when they were being tried, their husbands and numerous men came to listen to the t r i a l but were accused 246 of attempting \"to force their way\" into the court. None of the United Nations Plebiscite team was able to ascertain either \"the reasons for trying the women in the Native court, or . . . the dispositions made in their cases.\" Nevertheless, a l l the 34 people who had come to listen to the case were arrested, tried, and \"found guilty of attempting fo intimidate the native court by a show of force.\" Four of them were sentenced to two months imprisonment on each of the two counts (enough time to deny them the vote). The remaining 30 were fined 630 each on each of the two counts and given fourteen days to raise the money. Indeed, section 393 of the Penal Code \"did not appear to be applied with restraint\" against the \"supporters of the proposition favouring the Republic of Cameroun.\" In his proposed proclamation on the issue of permits, Dring insisted that no permits would be given \"to persons who were ineligible to register in the plebiscite.\" Yet, the Information Department of the Government of Northern Nigeria was campaigning in the plebiscite. The NKDP protested to the Plebiscites Commissioner that this \"constituted an interference by the Northern Regional Government.\" When Dr. Abdoh brought this to Dring's attention, the latter argued that the posters from that Department which exhorted people in Hausa to vote for Nigeria were printed prior to the separation of Northern Kamerun administration from that of Northern Nigeria. It was, therefore, d i f f i c u l t , \"at that stage, to remove a l l such posters.\" It should be noted that Dring's explanation hinged on the d i f f i c u l t y of removing a l l such posters at that stage of the game. This d i f f i c u l t y would not apply i n the case of the proponents of the Cameroun proposition. Early in December 1960, the NKDP produced two posters, possibly printed in Cameroun Republic but translated into Hausa. The posters 247 outlined the advantages of reunification and the proposed constitution of a reunified Kamerun. One of these posters mentioned Nigeria to the effect that Northern Kamerun did not benefit from i t s association with Nigeria and asked the electorate whether they wished to be deceived to stay in the same situation. None of these posters bore either the author's name or the place of origin. The Consortium complained about the posters and Dr. Abdoh drew Dring's attention to i t . Dring went in search of a law to apply against the posters. He touched on the matter lightly on December 22, 1960. But on January 3, 1961, he pursued the matter further and argued that, in the Commonwealth, \"printing presses were required to make a declaration to the authorities [and], every paper printed within the Territory concerned was required to bear the name and address of the printer and, i f the paper was to be published, the name and address of the publisher.\" The law did not apply to \"papers printed outside the Territory.\" Ordinarily, however, such papers would be \"prohibited imports under the Penal Code.\" Though such a measure would be open to objection on several counts, \"he would have to insi s t that posters and pamphlets circulated . . . should bear the printer's and publisher's identity . . . no extraneous factors should be permitted to interfere with the free expression of wishes of the people of the Territory.\" Dring's personal ac t i v i t i e s , those of the Northern Nigeria Minister of Local Government, and those of the Nigerians and Northern Nigerian Information Department in Dring's view were not extraneous factors. Since no law existed which could be used to harry the NKDP over the posters, Dring, overnight,on January 7, 1961, manufactured one called \"A Law to Provide'- for the Regulation of P o l i t i c a l Publications.\" This law \"required persons or organizations wishing to publish printed matter of a 248 p o l i t i c a l nature to, n o t i f y the Administrator of the name and address of the persons wishing to conduct a meeting, and to deposit with him two copies of the text p r i o r to p u b l i c a t i o n . \" The p u b l i c a t i o n i t s e l f should bear the name of the p r i n t e r and publisher upon i t s face. This was followed by an enumeration of penalties \"to be meted out to offenders.\" The purpose of the new law (a law without Royal Assent) was to i d e n t i f y \"those responsible for:.publishing and p r i n t i n g p o l i t i c a l p u b l i c a t i o n s . \" I t remains to be added that i t might have been meant to i d e n t i f y those who would pu b l i s h \" i n j u r i o u s falsehood.\" The purpose of the law and those against whom i t was fabricated were soon to be known. Ea r l y i n February, 1961, a few days to voting, the NKDP came out with a poster which, according to Dring, broke the Law of January 7, 1961, because i t was d e l i b e r a t e l y intended, so he said, to mislead the population. The text of the poster was i d e n t i c a l to one of those mentioned above. Indeed, except for i t s mention of Nigeria to the e f f e c t that the association of Northern Kamerun with Nigeria was unb e n e f i c i a l to Northern Kamerun and that Northern Kamerunians should not be misled i n t o voting f o r the Nigeria proposition., the poster concentrated on the advantages to be gained from r e u n i f i c a t i o n . But.'.its authors d i d break the law i n one respect. They refused to deposit two copies with Dring p r i o r to i t s p u b l i c a t i o n . Apart from t h i s aspect, they complied with every other aspect of the law. Nevertheless, Dring summoned the NKDP/KFP leaders at once \"and asked them to remove immediately a l l such posters already exhibited i n the T e r r i t o r y and to d e s i s t from e x h i b i t i n g the others.\" The d i f f i c u l t y of removing a l l such posters which obtained with the posters of the Northern Nigerian Infor-mation Department at an e a r l i e r stage of the game no longer existed at a 249 later stage i n the case of the NKDP/KFP. This was, however, just one way of making sure the NKDP/KFP campaign did not benefit from extraneous factors. Early in the campaign, the NKDP/KFP campaign went badly because i t had no financial and transportation f a c i l i t i e s . When their leaders appealed to Ahmadu Ahidjo, President of the Cameroun;!. Republic, he provided them with these f a c i l i t i e s . Dring i n i t i a l l y allowed vehicles with Cameroun plates to travel freely into and within Northern Kamerun. This did a lot to improve the campaign situation of the NKDP/KFP. But, a new regulation appeared. These vehicles now had to produce \"certain documents issued by authorities in Yola and Maiduguri,\" both in Nigeria (and at the other end of the region separating Nigeria from Cameroun Republic). The documents included registration cards, insurance policies, and driving permits. This was an effective way of excluding these vehicles from Northern Kamerun. Since these vehicles must be l e f t at the border unt i l the documents were produced, the drivers must trek for days to obtain the documents from Nigeria. This took time. Moreover, there was no guarantee that the documents would be provided; i f they could, then what was the necessity for the regulation? Furthermore these vehicles were being required to have double registration, one in Nigeria and the other in Cameroun. Due to this regulation, \"vehicles being used in the Northern Cameroons by advocates of the Cameroun proposition and coming from the Republic of Cameroun [were] systematically detained at the border after 1 October, I960.!' It i s important to note that this was occurring when Northern Kamerun was o f f i c i a l l y administratively separated from Northern Nigeria and Nigeria as a whole. Dr. Abdoh brought this situation to the attention of Dring who \"by that 250 time, was already apprised of the complaint.\" Dring then asserted that instructions \"had been issued to the police to permit vehicles from the Republic of Cameroun to enter the Northern Cameroons freely.\" But there was a catch: \"subject to the registration of vehicles . . . with the Resident of the Northern Cameroons.\" Nothing substantially was, therefore, altered. The Resident was resident in Mubi. To be sure, the trekking distance was shortened. But the trekking, the probability of not receiving the registration, and the loss of time remained. At the same time that Dring was barring Cameroun vehicles from the region, Nigerian vehicles operated in the region. The Northern Nigerian Information Department established a centre operated by a British expatriate o f f i c i a l (no longer an extraneous factor) employed by the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria. This centre promoted the Nigeria proposition, distributing posters and leaflets to that effect,, and i t s \"loudspeaker vans\" visited, \"under i t s auspices, the various d i s t r i c t s of the Territory for the same purpose.\" When Dr. Abdoh suggested that the centre be abolished, Dring refused to do so and instead retorted that Cameroun could establish a similar centre in the region i f i t wished. Dr. Abdoh also heard from the Plebiscite Liaison Officer of the Cameroun Republic on February 7, 1961, that eight days to voting, February 3, 1961, the Resident, the highest British Authority in Northern Kamerun, accompanied by the Senior Dis t r i c t Officer, visited Siguel, called the people to a meeting, campaigned for the Nigeria proposi-tion, and warned that punishment \"would be meted out to village heads [a-Fon] whose people voted in favour of union with the Republic of Cameroun.\" On February 12, 1961, Dring described the \"allegations' as \"completely unfounded and untrue.\" The Resident \"had called the meeting to explain to the people 251 the importance of the plebiscite and the value of the vote.\" Since both Dring and the Plebiscite Liaison Officer of the Cameroun Republic were interested parties, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to say for sure what really happened. Unlike in Southern Kamerun where voting took place in one day, February 11, 1961, voting took place in Northern Kamerun in two days, February 11 and 12. The British gave two reasons for this approach. Northern Kamerun husbands were-\"unwilling that their villages be l e f t unguarded through-out an entire day when the population went to vote, and the men did not want their wives meeting in close proximity with other men around the polling stations.\" One would have therefore expected the men to vote on one day and the women on another. But, \"Generally speaking men and women voted on both days in most areas, although there were a few stations where men voted on the f i r s t day and women on a second day.\" John Ngu Foncha, Sam Mofor, and Benedict S. Lawon, a l l of Southern Kamerun, later charged that the two-day 34 plebiscite allowed Nigerian residents in the region to vote twice. Despite the fact that Dr. Abdoh's impartiality was widely acknowledged both at the United Nations and in Kamerun, Dring attempted to involve him in some uncertain activity. This took the formiof another suggested law. About January 16, 1961, Dring suggested to the United Nations Plebiscite Commission that No petition based upon the grounds specified in sub-paragraph (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 shall be entertained by the Court unless the Admini-strator, after consultation with the United Nations Commissioner, certifies that i t i s a petition, the determinationcof \u00E2\u0080\u00A2.which might meterially affect the results of voting in any registration area. The existing law or regulation did not give Dring the power to certify that a petition was a petition before i t could be heardcby the court. Any person who\u00E2\u0080\u0094(a) complains that any person who was not a registered 252 voter voted i n the p l e b i s c i t e ; or (b) being a r e g i s t e r e d voter, complains that h i s vote was only accepted as a vote on the tendered votes l i s t ; or (c) complains that any corrupt or i l l i g a l p r a c t i c e , bribery, t r e a t i n g or undue influence, within the meaning given to those expressions i n the Regulations has taken place i n any r e g i s t r a t i o n area may p e t i t i o n the Court which exercises j u r i s d i c t i o n i n respect of the area to which the p e t i t i o n r e l a t e : Provided that no p e t i t i o n may include matters which r e l a t e to more than one r e g i s t r a t i o n area.35 Dring's attempt to n u l l i f y t h i s regulation with h i s new proposition speaks for i t s e l f and needs no further comment. In any case, Dr. Abdoh refused to be party to the suggestion. The only modification Abdoh agreed to was that the decisions o f the courts be transmitted to Dring who should forward a copy to Abdoh. A f t e r the p l e b i s c i t e , Dring informed Abdoh \"that he.'had received no voting p e t i t i o n s within the time l i m i t established.\" I t i s thus d i f f i c u l t to escape the conclusion that Dring\"s personal a c t i v i t i e s , i f personal they were, rendered the conduct of the p l e b i s c i t e almost s t e r i l e . But i t was not Dring's a c t i v i t i e s alone which i n t e r f e r e d with the free and e f f e c t i v e conduct of the p l e b i s c i t e s . The l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s of Northern Kamerun contributed greatly to the i r r e g u l a r i t i e s involved. Furthermore, aside from the suspicion and a l l e g a t i o n s involved i n the p l e b i s -c i t e s on the part- of the opponents of the Nigeria proposition, the campaign speeches of a l l the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s bore but l i t t l e resemblance to the p l e b i s c i t e questions. Two u n i d e n t i f i e d posters, with strong i n d i c a t i o n s that they were un-wisely put up i n 1959 by the NPC, the only party which campaigned i n favour of the Nigeria proposition, made Government the issue at the p l e b i s c i t e . The headline of one of them read, \"IT IS YOUR DUTY AS A CITIZEN TO VOTE IN THE PLEBISCITE SO THAT YOU CAN DECIDE HOW THE NORTHERN CAMEROONS WILL BE 36 GOVERNED.\" The second one seems to in d i c a t e the authors. I t began by 253 asking who was then \"responsible f o r the government\" of Northern Kamerun. Then the answer followed. I t was \"governed under a Trusteeship Agreement\" drawn up by B r i t a i n and the United Nations. Under the Agreement, the region was \"administered as an i n t e g r a l part of the Northern Region because [ i t ] was not large enough to be a country on i t s own.\" Six elect e d Northern Kamerunians were 'representing' the region i n the House of Assembly at Kaduna. One of them was the Minist e r f o r Northern Cameroons A f f a i r s whose function was \"to look a f t e r the i n t e r e s t s of the people of t h i s area.\" Other Northern Kamerunians had been e l e c t e d to the \"Federal House of Representatives at Lagos to represent the people of the Northern Cameroons i n the Federal Government.\" The Northern Nigerian Government was admini-37 s t e r i n g Northern Kamerun only \"as the agent of Her Majesty's Government.\" Unwisely again the NPC added that when Ni g e r i a became independent, the 'r: < Trusteeship Agreement would be modified, Northern N i g e r i a would cease to administer Northern Kamerun, and the region would be administered \" f o r the 38 well-being of i t s peoples under Trusteeship Agreement.\" I t was unfortunate that the NPC made government the issue of the 1959 p l e b i s c i t e s . As Dr. Abdoh explained, government at the grass-roots l e v e l was interchangeable with l o c a l administration. The a-Fon had had more than enough to worry about i n the l o c a l administration c o n t r o l l e d e i t h e r by the Fulani or the usurpers of the Fondoms. In making government the issue of the p l e b i s c i t e and adding that i f Nigeria became independent Northern Kamerun would continue under trusteeship, the NPC played i n t o the hands of the UMBC/AG. The Nigerian Daily Times, Lagos, August 4, 1959, reported that i n a two-day conference, a l l the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n Northern Kamerun, except the NPC, decided that Northern Kamerun must continue i n a p e r i o d of 254 trusteeship, and the UMBC i n p a r t i c u l a r declared that \" i t was t h e i r p o l i c y 39 to break away from the North.\" Although the NPC sent out a campaign team of Northern Nigerians to campaign for \"two weeks i n the northern portion of the Trust T e r r i t o r y , \" centering t h e i r campaign \"on the advantages 4 to be derived by the Trust T e r r i t o r y , i n continued association with Nigeria,\" these advantages had no meaning for the a-Fon under the Fulani and without the B r i t i s h protectors. Nor did the advantages mean anything to the dissident Fulani who resented t h e i r subordination to the Nigeria F u l a n i . I f the NPC made government the issue of the 1959 p l e b i s c i t e , the p a r t i e s which campaigned apparently i n favour of makings decision i n the future, amplified the disadvantages of continuing under the e x i s t i n g government. Fon V.H. Bang reported i n 1958 that no one i n Northern Kamerun could hold a contrary idea \"under Fulani r u l e , \" and that he l e d the Mambilla a-Fon to 41 separate from Northern Kamerun because of \"too much [Fulani] suppression.\" But, i t was the NKDP which, i n 1959, made much out of the Fulani oppression and made government the c e n t r a l issue of the p l e b i s c i t e . Northern Kamerun administered as a part of N i g e r i a , was \"the^most i l l - t r e a t e d people i n the whole Federation of N i g e r i a . \" Some of the l e g i s l a t o r s who represented Northern Kamerun i n the Nigerian l e g i s l a t u r e s were Nigerians. Their a-Fon \"had been deposed and replaced by Northern Nigerians.\" These new c h i e f s d i d \"not care about the welfare of the people.\" Their e n t i r e wish was to \"secede from the Federation of Nigeria,\" and to \"continue under a modified form of U.K. Trusteeship agreement during which time [they would] determine [their] future.\" Every authority i n Northern Kamerun was a Nigerian. 42 Their a-Fon were being ignored. Two weeks a f t e r the vote, they requested the United Nations to develop them p o l i t i c a l l y , s o c i a l l y , c u l t u r a l l y , and 255 educationally. This was because their \"long link with Nigeria\" brought 43 them nothing good but \"backwardness, poverty and sickness.\" In one word, the parties which favoured the idea of a future decision in 1959 centred their campaign on local issues around local administration and the under-development of the region. The situation was identical in 1961. The parties which campaigned for the Nigeria proposition offered the electorate the government of the period, the reformed administration. That is the government in which the British were involved as protectors, in which the councils\u00E2\u0080\u0094Native Authority, District, Town, and Outer\u00E2\u0080\u0094were almost f u l l y controlled by the Northern Kamerunians, Fulani and non-Fulani alike, with the a-Fon sittin g as equals of the former Fulani rulers, in which even the a-Fon had to be consulted before any decision, and in which even the a-Fon and their subjects had active functions to per-form in the administration. As these parties put i t themselves, when i t was rumoured that Cameroun Republic was attempting to have the results n u l l i f i e d , \"We have elected our Native Authorities and want to keep them. We do not 44 want the Cameroon Republic.\" The democratic element in the existing govern-ment, actually local administration, was stressed. \"MUBI NATIVE AUTHORITY DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT OBJECTS ATTACK ON ITS SERVANTS IN CAMEROUN 45 BOOK* REJECTS CAMEROON CLAIM TO THIS TERRITORY.\" On the other hand, the NKDP/KFP offered the electorate a constitution and advantages to be gained from reunification. The proposed constitution \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 *After the 1961 plebiscite, the Cameroun Government compiled a l i s t of irregularities involved in the conduct of the plebiscite in an effort to have the plebiscite mullified. Sections of this booklet accused the current local authorities of some irregularities. This .is probably the BOOK referred to here. 256 provided for a reunified Kamerun outside the Commonwealth and the French Community. A reunified Kamerun would be an independent Federation with \" i t s own emblem, i t s own National Anthem, and i t s own flag.\" None of the Regions of the Federation would have power over the other and a l l would be equal. Each Region would have i t s own Government and House of Representa-tives. Northern Kamerun could either have i t s own Region or unify with 46 Southern Kamerun. The advantages to be gained from reunification were set out in the poster which Dring described as 'intended to mislead the public.' In the event of reunification, Kamerunians would rule their country themselves, Northern Kamerun would continue i t s education in English, and i t s \"customs\" and position of service in their country would not be changed. Its children would have more education because they would be given \"scholarships to different countries in the world.\" Kamerun was previously one country and Northern Kamerunians had been given a chance \"to join with [their] brothers.\" The last forty years brought nothing to Northern Kamerun \"except suffering.\" The Northern Kamerunians should not be deceived \"to return to the former position\" of suffering. A l l taxes then paid were too high and a vote for Cameroun would reduce the taxes. There was no reason to return to Nigeria after rejecting i t in 1959. Cameroun was a rich country which would share i t s wealth with Northern Kamerun. A vote for Cameroun was a vote for their 47 country and a vote for themselves as well. The conduct of the second Northern Kamerun plebiscite was now over. It was l e f t for the electorate to play their part. However, i t i s important at this juncture to note the conditions and characteristics of the conduct of the plebiscite. The second plebiscite was 257 fought, as shown by the available evidence, when the reformed local admini-stration was largely in the hands of Northern Kamerunians, Fulani and non-Fulani; or at least, the local inhabitants were actively involved in the administration. Britishers were present in the region more than ever before as administrators\u00E2\u0080\u0094Resident and Di s t r i c t Offivers. This gave the impression that Northern Kamerun had been separated, i f not from Nigeria as a whole, then from Northern Nigeria at least and, that the British were now ruling the region directly. The conduct of the plebiscite was characterized: by the abuse of power directed mainly against the p o l i t i c a l leaders who supported the Cameroun proposition and a few of their outspoken supporters; and by suspicion and accusation directed against the British and the local autho-r i t i e s . The Conduct of the Southern Kamerun Plebiscite 1959-1961 I f suspicion, accusation, and the abuse of power were elements in the conduct of the Northern Kamerun plebiscites, these same elements were much more common in that of Southern Kamerun. A l l the organizers in Southern Kamerun, except the leaders of the OK, which had no power to abuse, took ad-vantage of their positions or authority. Moreover, far more accusations and much more distrust were evident during the campaign in Southern Kamerun. It was the Southern Kamerun integrationists who began to take advantage of their positions or authority when they were in power. Their target was the UPC and, later, the OK. Even before the dissolution of the UPC, that party had gone through strange experiences in the p o l i t i c a l history of Southern Kamerun. On June 3, 1956, the authorities confiscated a large 258 amount of i t s funds. On August 4, 1956, i t s offices in Bamenda were destroyed by f i r e . On December 12, 1956, those in Santa suffered the same 48 fate. The UPC blamed everything on the British agents i n Southern Kamerun. The British, on their part, denied any involvement and tended to biame everything on people coming across the border from Eastern Kamerun. Those involved were never actually known but, i t appeared that the culprits were Southern Kamerunians themselves; the UPC was becoming very unpopular. But the confiscation of the funds was not in doubt; i t was the authorities who searched UPC offices and confiscated funds and materials. When more of these searches were carried out in early 1957 and the UPC stormed the United Nations with petitions, the British were forced to offer an explanation. The searches which took place on February 25, 1957, were carried out because the \"Police had reason to believe that a number of typewriters which had been reported stolen from the Cameroons under French Administration might be found in the offices of the UPC in the Cameroons under British Administration.\" No typewriters were found, \"but during the search prohibited literature was found, and a number of documents, most of 49 which were in French, were removed for examination.\" When the UPC was declared i l l e g a l , the authorities once more confiscated i t s funds and property. After the Trusteeship Council received several petitions protesting the act, i t asked the British to explain what happened with the confiscated funds and property. The explanation was readily avail-able. Section 67 of the Criminal Code provided that \" a l l property of a society declared to be unlawful becomes invested in an officer appointed by the Governor-General who is required to wind up the affairs of the society and, after defraying a l l debts and l i a b i l i t i e s of the society and the cost 259 of winding i t up, to apply the surplus assets in such a manner as the Governor-General may approve.\" When the debts of the UPC and i t s associate organizations were paid off, and their property sold, the cash assets amounted to approximately fel,000 and 115,000 francs. The amount was used in transporting \"the thirteen leading members of the societies who were 50 deported\" to the Sudan. While this amount of money appears to be too large for the transporting of thirteen persons from Kamerun to Sudan at the period, i t i s also doubtful whether the way the money was used might not also be queried. Except for this isolated case of the confiscated funds and property, the British refused to offer any observations on any petitions originating from any member of the UPC or i t s associate organizations after May 30, 1957. The rationale was that these were already i l l e g a l organizations with which the British could not deal. That was the excuse, for instance, that the British used to refuse to comment on a petition written by Ngambus, Vice-51 President of the Cameroons Democratic Youth, Kumba Branch. Once the UPC had been dissolved as a p o l i t i c a l party, i t s former supporters were s t i l l subjected to arrests which usually ended in their execution, not by the British but by the French. Very often policemen moved into villages without wearing police uniforms and acted as 'agents provocateurs' in order to identify undesirables. Once identified, their arrests followed. This was how Tenguia Richard Reclus was arrested in December 1958, in his Tombel shelter where he was avoiding the French. This 52 was how Isaac Tchoupe and Pierre Simo were also arrested. These arrests were followed by repatriation to Eastern Kamerun. There Pierre Simo was executed on or about June 10, 1959, and Isaac Tchoupe on Friday, August 14, 260 53 1959. This was also how Kamto Donald, Kemden Justin, Marcus Mondi, James Pega, and Jean Djomo who had sought asylum in Southern Kamerun sanctuary also died. The British explained their action of sending people to their death in legal terms. Kamto Donald was arrested on March 2, 1958, \"for the unauthorized carriage of [private] mails, in contravention of section 176 of the Criminal Code.\" Kemden Justin was arrested the same day for \"being in possession of poisonous drugs in contravention of section 59 of the Pharmacy Ordinance.\" The rest who were repatriated were prohibited immig-rants who had entered Southern Kamerun i l l e g a l l y . Others were imprisoned for criminal offences. Marcus Mondi and James Pega were arrested at Santa on December 13, 1958, \"detained and given two weeks and a l l necessary f a c i l i t i e s to make their own arrangements to leave the Southern Cameroons.\" After that, \"they would be placed on the f i r s t convenient ship, aircraft, 54 motor or other vehicles to leave Nigeria.\" If i t was by accident that a l l these 'criminals' were former supporters of the UPC, then accidents in the Southern Kamerun of the time had a special logic of their own. When the UPC transformed into the OK, i t s leader, Ntumazah, also went through some strange experiences. One of these involved the d i f f i c u l t y of obtaining a passport to travel to the United Nations. He, as was the case with Moumie, alleged that he was usually denied passports to the United Nations. When given, they were usually delayed in such a way as to make the journey useless. Moreover, when given, they had very unreasonable conditions such as requiring him to deposit his passport with the Government in Lagos, 55 Nigeria, and to start a l l over again when he wanted to travel the next time. The British answered this charge very easily. Ntumazah applied for passports 261 to the Nigerian Government and received them. (The British were quiet about the delay and the conditions therein.) Moumie was denied passports because 56 he was not a British subject. The integrationists also entered into informal alliances with some of the a-Fon to frustrate the leaders of the OK. An example was the informal alliance between Endeley and the Fon of Nso. In this alliance, Endeley's Government undertook to support the Fon against his traditional rivals on the understanding that the Fon supported integration with Nigeria. Nso was the largest Fondom in Western Kamerun with an estimated population of 80,000 in early 1960 (126,000 voted in the 1973 general elections in Nso). The Fon was facing some challenge from Shufai Ndzendzevf,* whose name was Njodzeka, and who was.second to the Fon in command of Nso. Endeley took sides in favour of the Fon. It was, i t seems, because of this alliance, which lasted un t i l the Fon Sehm III (his real name was Mbinglo) died in 1972, that Sehm III prevented the OK of Nso from meeting the United Nations' Mission of11958. Sehm III ordered the seizure of the OK placards, and prevented J.T. Lawong, Nso OK leader, and i t s supporters both from presenting 57 petitions to the Mission and from having interviews with the Mission. In this way, a Nso family affair was exploited in favour of integration with Nigeria. It is important to note that no serious attempts were ever made during this period to settle the problem. Indeed, i t was only in 1969-1970 that the squabble was settled. One further way the OK was harassed was subjecting i t s offices-.' to *Shufai means Lord and Ndzendzevf is the name of the family; Shufai Ndzendzevf, therefore, means Lord of Ndzendzevf. 262 arbitrary searches, and, i t was alleged, over-taxing some of i t s supporters, seizing some of i t s funds, and arresting some of i t s leaders on the grounds 58 that they belonged to an organization which no longer existed. The British gave explanations for some, not a l l , of these charges. Jean Djomo, Treasurer of the OK, was arrested and the funds he had with him seized, because he transgressed \"some specific provision of the law and not because of [his] membership of the OK Party which is not an i l l e g a l organization\"; he was \"charged with being a member of an unlawful society (the proscribed 59 UPC).\" Epeye Bulu Yoko was originally assessed the f l a t tax rate of '. 6l.10s.0d. Later on, because he did not give particulars about ,:his income, he was assessed 66.lis.3d. on an income of 6320 per year. He did not appeal. Alphonse Njomo was originally assessed 62.5s.Od. on an income of 6120 per year. Later, this was changed to 65.16s.3d. on an income of 6310 per year. He appealed, \"but i t was out of time and was not heard.\" Bufok Ofan John was assessed to pay 62.5s.Od. on an income of 612- per year and he lodged no , 60 . appeal. It is important to note that a l l these were workers in the OK offices. Patronage, which was unknown in the Southern Kamerun system, was also practised. For example, the constitution provided that Special Members would be appointed to represent interests otherwise not represented in the Parliament. One of such appointees was to be a woman representative. Some time between July and August, Endeley recommended the appointment of Dorcas Ekowole Idowu and she was appointed to the Parliament. Idowu was a Southern Kamerunian born in 1903 and was married to a Nigerian in 1919. The Southern Kamerun Women's organization, a rejuvenation of the dissolved UPC women affiliate., organization, mistook Idowu for a Nigerian and challenged the 263 61 appointment. The British had no problem proving that she was a Southern Kamerunian. But, they argued that she was appointed because she was active in public l i f e , being the \"Leader of the Victoria Branch of the Kamerun National Congress [KNC] Women's Section.\" Her appointment was advised by \"the Commissioner of the Cameroons and the Leader of Government Business 62 in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly.\" As an active supporter of the KNC, this Special Member was expected to vote in favour of integration with Nigeria in the Parliament. As the January 24, 1959, general elections drew nearer, the integratio-nists did several things to prevent the KNDP from winning the elections. Since these have been dealt with in chapter three, the reader w i l l only be reminded here about them. The introduction of the ministerial system of government was a step in that direction. The use of government vehicles and Government Information Service for campaign by the Government Party was unjustifiable. The manipulation of the electoral d i s t r i c t s was one of these acts. One of those attempts which has not yet been dealt with was the discrimination in voters' qualifications for that election. Nigerians with two years of residence in Southern Kamerun registered and voted with ease. On the other hand, Eastern Kamerunians resident in Southern Kamerun had to be in the region continuously for ten years and produce tax slips to that effect before being allowed to vote. Even when they satisfied these require-ments, i t was alleged, registration forms were always exhausted when they 63 were around and available when Nigerians came. In spite of a l l these frustrations and alleged frustrations Foncha s t i l l arrived at Government House and much of this power now f e l l into his hands. But, before Foncha began to abuse his own power, the OK had issued 264 several accusations against the way the British were organizing the plebis-cite. The f i r s t accusation involved the revision of the register for the plebiscite. It was alleged that everything possible was done to employ only people with integrationist sympathies to act as registration clerks. These clerks then did everything possible to register or rather give the vote to as few secessionists and reunificationists as possible.* One way of doing this was to continue pretending, when the undesirables came 64 around, that registration forms were not available. When the British were questioned in the Trusteeship Council about the charge, they argued accurately that the majority of \"registration clerks were Cameroonians but in a few cases, where there were large numbers of non-Cameroonians resident, persons of Nigerian descent but resident in the Southern Cameroons, were appointed. The clerk in the Misselele registration d i s t r i c t [where 65 the charge originated] was one of these.\" The OK was also very suspicious of the limited time allotted to regist-ration for the plebiscite.- For a vast area like Southern Kamerun with very poor means of communication and transportation, only a few weeks for regist-ration were allotted. The OK protested against the limited time. The OK looked with \"suspicion at the fact that the Registration for the February, 1961, plebiscite which starts on October 26, 1960, w i l l last only a few *The secessionist and reunificationist registration clerks handled this act very effectively. When they went to areas known to be secessionist or reunificationist, they registered people who died several years earlier and babies in the womb. Who voted for these groups of people and how is s t i l l mysterious. The present writer discovered this personally at Ibar, Oku, Nso, when he went there as a presiding officer during the f i r s t Presidential elections of the Cameroon Federal Republic when the plebiscite was over and reunification effected. 265 weeks.\" It f e l t that since one and a half million people would be deciding their fate, the registration period should last between October 15 and December 15, 1960. This extension of time would \"give every mature person\" the opportunity \"to contribute to the decision.\" 6 6 Nor did the OK look kindly on the supervisors of the plebiscite. These were, in the main, British expatriates, administrators, and missionaries, a l l of whom, i t was alleged, had': integrationist sympathies.* On September 15, 1960, the OK protested against the appointment of antir-reuhi'ficationists such as missionaries and British administrators as supervisors of the plebiscite. The OK f e l t that the selection of such officers should be the work of an impartial body. As the British were not impartial, the United Nations should n u l l i f y the existing selection and start from the beginning 67 again. The United Nations, however, had had enough problems with Southern Kamerun to want more. The reunificationists were also very suspicious of the Enlightenment Officers whom, in comformity with the United Nations recommendations, the British recruited from Nigeria and Britain to help instruct the Western Kamerun populace on the p o l i t i c a l implications of the plebiscite questions. On July 19, Omar B.B. Sendze, who was pursuing a masters programme in Britain at the time, described these officers as \"a large army of p o l i t i c a l agents\" sent to Western Kamerun to deceive the populace into voting for integration with Nigeria. He then asked the United Nations to study carefully *The OK's suspicion i s understandable. Even the Colonial Secretary had stated earlier, see chapter three, that the best friends of Western Kamerun did not see a brighter future for the region other than in association with Nigeria. Furthermore, the headquarters of the missions were in Nigeria, a fact which could give the missionaries integrationist tendencies. 266 the British plans for the plebiscite because,the British had \"a v i t a l 68 interest in the results.\" A few months later, Sylvester N. Dioh (who was also pursuing a masters programme in Nigeria), leader of the Kamerun Students in Nigeria, asked the United Nations to \"take immediate steps to prevent Britain from sending out i t s numerous Plebiscite Enlightenment Officers and i t s m i l i t i a . \" These officers, he charged, were \"already misleading the masses on the disadvantages of voting for Re-unification.\" Britain was opposed to \"Reunification\" and the local British agents were supporting \"the reactionary forces to sabotage the smooth running of the 69 unificationist government.\" Although British and Nigerian forces were in Western Kamerun probably to ensure the smooth running of the plebiscites, the reunificationists and secessionists saw i t quite differently. As soon as the f i r s t con-tingent of the forces landed in the Territory, some time around March, 1960, they were accused of compaigning and intimidating the populace into voting 70 for Nigeria. Later on, some time before or around July, 196.0, when a contingent of British soldiers from Britain arrived in Western Kamerun, Sendze charged that the reason for these troops was to put pressure on the \" i l l i t e r a t e masses\" to vote for integration. He f e l t that i f there was any need for these troops, and he found no need, troops could be raised locally or provided by the United Nations; such United Nations' troops should exclude 71 British troops. On August 22, 1960, George B. Mbanga, speaking for the OK, requested that a United Nations police force, rather than the British army, should be stationed in Western Kamerun during the plebiscites i f there was \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 72 any need for i t . Even the British local o f f i c i a l s were suspected of threatening and 267 intimidating the Southern Kamerunians in an effort to procure a pro-Nigerian vote. On January 26, 1961, the OK sent a telegram to the United Nations requesting i t to \"intervene urgently\" and halt the intimidation of the 73 Southern Kamerunians by the British troops. Some British local o f f i c i a l s , i t was alleged, had threatened their junior employees with loss of jobs should they vote for the second alternative. When the issue was reported to the Commissioner for Cameroons, he apparently did nothing to redress 74 the situation. It must be added, however, that these allegations had no concrete evidence. As these accusations were being made against the British, Jabea Dibonge, founder of KUNC, who by now had transformed into an integrationist, pleaded with the leaders of the major p o l i t i c a l parties of Nigeria\u00E2\u0080\u0094NCNC, AG, NPC\u00E2\u0080\u0094 to contribute to the cause of integration.* The appeal met receptive ears. These leaders promised (and did send) propaganda materials to the integ-rationists. These included Land Rovers and trucks, campaign funds, and a 75 large, number of progapanda experts. Dibonge made the request some time in February, 1960, from Lagos where he was working at this time. The United Nations gave the vote to persons born in. Southern Kamerun. Secessionist and reunificationist registration clerks read that to mean persons born of Southern Kamerun indigene parents. At Wum Division, such registration clerks attempted to deny the vote to the Fulani on the grounds *In a letter (a copy of which the reunificationists sent to the United Nations to back up their charge of Nigerian interference,) addressed to Endeley, but intercepted by the reunificationists, Dibonge described his i n i t i a t i v e and the f r u i t f u l talks he had with the Nigerian Leaders and the promises these leaders had made, adding that a l l the leaders expressed surprised that \"for one reason, or the other\" the Kamerun integrationists had not approached much earlier. Dibonge also requested Mbile and Endeley to stop squabling with each other. 268 that they were Nigerians. Consequently, i t was no surprise that on September 8, 1959, thirteen Ardo* of Wum Division lodged a complaint to the United Nations concerning the new Government1s attempt to deny them 76 votes which they had had in a l l previous elections. Around the same time, too, the KNDP Government was determined to deny any other Nigerians, whether born in Southern Kamerun or not, the vote. On September 21, 1959, these other Nigerians asked the United Nations to intervene and redress the balance on the grounds that they were responsible for the development of Southern Kamerun in a l l aspects and that they had always voted in the 77 previous elections. With Governmental power and power over the police in Foncha's hands, i t was obvious that any Nigerian who was qualified to vote had to register through a registration clerk who was integrationist in sentiment. If Endeley used patronage to make circumstances conducive to a pro-Nigerian vote, Foncha used i t more extensively to procure a pro-Cameroun vote. As soon as Foncha took over power, he pressed for the promotion of Southern Kamerunians as Heads of Departments. These newly promoted 'big guns' became active supporters of reunification i f they were not already that. More importantly, however, since employemnt and promotion of junior workers in their respective departments were now in their hands, i t was alleged, they made sure these went to those who agreed to promote reunifi-78 cation morally and financially. In other areas, Nkambe Division for instance, where the people were certain they wished to secede from Nigeria *Ardo, plural unknown by writer, is a Fulani t i t l e , a rank below Sardauna and Lamido but higher than Garidima. 269 but were more against reunification than integration with Nigeria, the KNDP Government, so i t was said, threatened them with loss of jobs and 79 positions i f they persisted against reunification. The Southern Kameru-nian C i v i l Servants and Police who also campaigned actively for the second alternative promised jobs and promotions, the accusation went on, to those 80 who supported the second alternative publicly. Closely linked with patronage was direct bribery and corruption.* At Babessiy in Ndop and at Oku in Nso, two Native Authority Dispensaries were summarily built and opened for use without adequate equipment; (the local KNDP leaders now had something to show as an example of what would follow should the second alternative win). In Bafut, Ngie, and Ngwo, the KNDP distributed salt, blankets, money, and alcoholic beverages to men and women 81 in order to buy their votes. (There was such an outcry against this aspect of bribery that even some of Foncha's supporters were forced to admit that i t was a p o l i t i c a l blunder. But at a time of confusion which characte-rized the period, only few, i f any, could have time to think properly about i t s effects). Many resigned themselves to the remark that the plebiscite cam-82 paign was:marked by \"Corruption of the Highest Order.\" Before the campaign period, the Wat and the rest of Nsungli, Nkambe Division, were under the jurid-diction of one Court. But the Wat had been demanding a separate Court for them-selves. The NKC-KPP Government refused to grant this request because i t had about a 90 per cent hold on the Nsungli who were opposed to reunification. During the campaign period, the KNDP Government granted this request in order to buy *The present writer, from experience, t e s t i f i e s to what this petitioner-is reporting in this paragraph. 270 83 the votes from the Wat area. Even taxes, i t was alleged, were paid for those who indicated they wished to vote for the second alternative but who also complained that they might not even vote because they were hiding 84 away from the tax collectors and police for overdue taxes. Another weapon the KNDP used was organized hooliganism. The KNDP organized a \"system of hooligans\" whose duty was to intimidate, prevent from lecturing, and, i f very necessary beat up \"lecturers of the opposing parties, but mainly those of the CPNC.\"85 The actions of these p o l i t i c a l saboteurs was so r i f e that A.A. Tamasang, leader of the KNC in Foncha's own village, Sarki* Sula Manu, a Hausa Fon in Mankori'VTown, and V.T. Lainjo, leader of the KNC in Nso, reported on February 7, 1961, four days to voting, that b.hobliganism by the KNDP was \"the order of the day.\" Here and there, hooligans, backed by Eastern Kamerun immigrants and \"Police Constables,\" were disturbing and preventing the supporters of integration from lecturing or campaigning. During lectures given by the KNDP, the police were around to maintain order but the police were hardly ever around during the lectures given by the other parties. Out of the nineteen reported cases of hooliganism 86 m one area, only six arrests were made. It should be added that V.T. Lainjo was so trustworthy a po l i t i c i a n that everything he said was always accepted even by his opponents although they might disagree with the logic behind his reasoning. Perhaps the most effective weapon the KNDP used was that of preventing some of the a-Fon and their subjects from knowing what the second alter-native actually involved and from being influenced by the so-called Anglo-*Sarki i s a Hausa equivalent of Fon. 271 Nigerian \"large army of p o l i t i c a l agents\". On January 23, 1961, the KNDP hooligans prevented the integrationists from lecturing at the Bambui market and drove the lecturers out of the market place despite the permit they had. When these lecturers threatened to bring in the police, the hooligans complacently replied, so i t was reported, \"The police is KNDP. The Court 87 is KNDP, so do not trouble youselves. Go or we w i l l k i l l you.\" Of course, these hooligsns merely said e x p l i c i t l y what had become obvious and these lecturers had to leave the scene i f they wished to avoid some time in a hospital. The idea of preventing people from attending these lectures was so widespread that only a few places can be mentioned as examples. At Ndop and Bafreng, the KNDP campaigned strongly to prevent the people from attending the enlightenment lectures; indeed, in these :two areas, the 'enlightenment officers' were expelled from the scene. Any other person who attempted to 89 explain the two alternatives was threatened and forced to be silent. The a-Fon of Mukuru, Kom,* Fungom, and Bafut prevented their subjects from 99 attending and listening to lectures given by the 'enlightenment officers.' On February 22, 1961, that i s after the plebiscite, the a-Eon of Beba-Befang-Essimbi, a l l from Wum, informed the United Nations that they prevented their 90 subjects from attending the ehlithenment lectures. Even A.N. Jua openly told Edwards, the Plebiscite Supervisor for Wum East, so i t was alleged, 91 that \"he had ordered his [Kom] people not to listen to [Edwards'] lectures,\" In this way, the KNDP made the enlightenment campaign ineffective. *At Kom, i t was not the Fon who gave the instructions but Augustin N. Jua who wa Foncha's lieutenant inthe KNDP. 272 The last, and possibly the most important, way in which the KNDP was accused of abusing i t s power involved i t s relationship with the a-Fon. When Endeley began to alienate the a-Fon with his integrationist i n c l i -nations, Foncha began to woo them. When Endeley collided with the a-Fon in 1958, many of the a-Fon began to look forward to Foncha to come to them. That brought him indirectly to power in 1959. Once in power, Foncha attempted to consolidate the confidence of the majority of the a-Fon in him: he began to avoid any mention of the word 'reunification,' at least in public, just one month after he came to power; at the United Nations and at the Mamfe Plebiscite Conference, at the pleasure of the a-Fon, he argued vigorously for the exclusion of reunification from the plebiscite. A l l this should have become obvious to the reader by now. It is true, after the United Nations had decided on the two plebiscite alternatives, the Concert of the a-Fon petered away. The breakdown of the Concert became an assert not a l i a b i l i t y for Foncha; i t prevented some of the a-Fon from knowing that the choice to be made now was between \"water\" and \" f i r e . \" This was later reinforced by the unfortunate belief, following the November, 1960, London Talks, that the second alternative was now secession without reunification. Many of the a-Fon, therefore, though .individually, began to regard Foncha and the second alternative as representing their true.desires. But Foncha also contributed to his hold on the majority of the a-Fon in some other ways when he came to power. In areas, Nkambe Division for instance, which were strongly opposed to reunification, he gave some of the a-Fon membership in the Native Authority and other Councils, dismissed inte-grationist Councillors, and promoted people with at least strong secessionist 92 tendencies as Councillors. In areas, Nso for instance, where there were 273 power struggles between the subjects of the other a-Fon within the empire and those of the supreme Fon, the KNDP sided with the opponents of the Fon of Nso including Shufai Ndzendzevf* since i t was well-known that Sehm III 93 and his central subjects were in alliance with Endeley and the British. If Foncha used the carrot to get the majority of the a-Fon behind him, he also used the stick against those who were, in his mind, intransigent. At a meeting in Victoria with the a-Fon, i t was alleged, Foncha threatened a few who had integrationist tendencies with either deposition or depor-94 tation, none of which he could actually carry out. This threat, i f i t happened, was probably his least effective weapon, which he could use only because the Concert was dead; he had nothing to lose by threatening these few. However, Foncha's good relations with most of the a-Fon did pay a lot of dividends. A few days to voting, many a-Fon assembled their sub-jects and asked them to vote for the second alternative.t Areas for which 95 there i s written evidence included Mukuru, Kom, Fungom, Bafut, Ngolo-Bolo, 96 Kombone, Dikome, and Ngbanji. The KNDP advised the a-Fon and their subjects not to attend and list e n to those so-called enlightenment lectures because they were more campaign lectures in favour of the Nigeria proposition than what they were supposed to be. But there was more to i t than that. The KNDP had i t s own inter-pretations of the two questions which i t did not want to conflict with what *This w i l l be elaborated upon and given more evidence in the next chapter. t i n Nso, and as a threat to the subordinate a-Fon within the empire and those who opposed integration for various reasons, at the Kimbo market, a live white cock was hung on a pole to die. 274 the a-Fon and their subjects had heard elsewhere. In some areas, the questions were, 'Do you like Dr. Endeley, the Bakweri man? Or, Do you like Foncha, the Bamenda man?' In others, indeed, the majority of areas, the questions were, 'Do you wish to stay in your country, the Cameroons? Or, Do you wish to s e l l your country to the Ibo who w i l l dethrone your 97 a-Fon and take away a l l your land and property?' It was around this last question that Foncha's, or rather the KNDP's, campaign offers revolved. As Dr. Abdoh reported, the KNDP claimed that \"a vote for Nigeria meant the domination of Cameroonians and the occupation of the Southern Cameroons by the Ibos.\" (Ibo had been substituted for Nigeria.) But, \"to join the Republic of Cameroun meant unification of a l l the Cameroons as a national state, independent from either the Commonwealth or the French Community and freedom from Ibo domination.\" A vote for Nigeria also \"meant the continu-ation of the influence of the Commonwealth and the domination of the Cameroonians by the Ibos.\" (Ibo again had been substituted for the Common-wealth.) The \"Germans had done a great deal for the Southern Cameroons, but l i t t l e progress had since been made during some forty years of British Administration.\" In the event of a vote for Nigeria, Southern Kamerun would lose i t s identity and, worse s t i l l , i t would not be able to resist domination by Nigeria. (When addressing areas with apparently known reuni-fic a t i o n i s t sentiments), the KNDP would argue that the plebiscite was the last chance for Southern Kamerunians to realize their \"national identity . . . 98 through reunification with their kin in the Republic of Cameroun.\" If the KNDP saw nothing good in the Nigeria proposition, the CPNC thought the other way. As argued in the preceding chapter, the CPNC entered the campaign very reluctantly because i t was already aware of i t s defeat. 275 This awareness was further .indicated when i t began i t s campaign. The f i r s t statement of i t s campaign was that, \"in the event of a vote in favour of the Cameroun Republic the CPNC .- . . w i l l request unconditionally that the United Nations PARTITION the territory between the group of persons desiring a union with the independent Federation of Nigeria and those seeking a union with the Cameroun Republic.\" As the campaigns progressed, however, i t showed the advantages of \".association\" with Nigeria. Southern Kamerun would be a \"self-governing Region within the Federation\" of Nigeria. The House of Chiefs would be retained; (an attractive but belated offer). The \"system of land ownership without European settlers would be preserved; (again, an offer which could only make sense to the Bakweri and the indigenous inhabitants of Kumba Division). The existing monetary system would be retained. Moreover, while \"freedom of association, of speech and religion would be guaranteed,\" the existing \"Legal and judicial systems would remain unchanged.\" Furthermore, Southern Kamerun would continue \"to share in the economic prosperity of the Federation of Nigeria\" and enjoy \" f u l l indepen-dence.\" Finally, Southern Kamerunians should \"Choose Green* and Remain British 99 \u00E2\u0080\u0094White i s French.\" Nor did the OK play a different game. It askedt voters to vote for the second alternative which was \"independence and reunification of the Kamerun.\" The plebiscite was the Southern Kamerunians' \"last resort\" by which they could \"return or surrender\" their \"identity.\" A vote for Nigeria constituted the *Green meant Nigeria proposition and White meant Cameroun proposition. tThe OK avoided contacting the majority of the electorate in their own rights and instead addressed mainly the literate populace through written material. 276 \"continuation of the 'imperialistic relationships' with the Commonwealth.\" The OK was in favour \"of a Republic which would be entirely cut off from any p o l i t i c a l association with the 'Colonial Powers'.\" An \" a l l Kamerunian Constitutional Conference\" composed of the representatives of Northern, Southern, and Eastern Kamerun would be arranged immediately after the plebiscite. This conference, assisted by the United Nations, would draft . . . . 100 the reunification constitution. If the OK talked about a constitution, i t was because i t addressed i t s e l f to the literate Southern Kamerunians. During the plebiscite period, this section of the society, including those who supported Foncha, became very worried about the constitutional arrange-ments for reunification. Indeed, they played a major part in the breakdown of the talks between Foncha and Ahidjo; they were firm on the idea that Southern Kamerun would not be part of the French Community. The OK was attempting to t e l l them that they themselves would be involved in the working out of a constitution. The other p o l i t i c a l parties, the KUP, the CCC, the CIP, and the Muslim Congress played no significant part in the campaign, 1 0 1 the f i r s t three because what they stood for was not involved in the plebiscite, and the last . because, founded on a religious principle, i t could not stand the pressure of loyalty to the Fondom. Whatever the case, the conduct of the Southern Kamerun plebiscite was over. As was the case in Northern Kamerun, this aspect of the phenomenon was characterized by suspicion, the abuse of power, and accusations which were sometimes factual: and sometimes not. But, these elements were more common and frequent in Southern Kamerun than in Northern Kamerun. Furthermore, while in Northern Kamerun the suspicion and accusation were a possession of 277 the reunificationists and the abuse of power that of the organizers and authorities, in Southern Kamerun, except the OK regarding the abuse of power, a l l the organizers were involved in the three elements. More importantly, however, while in Northern Kamerun these elements were directed mainly against the organizers, in Southern Kamerun they were directed against both the organizers and the respondents. Nevertheless, the orga-nizers in both regions interpreted.the United Nations' questions to suit their interests. It would not, therefore, be surprising i f the conduct of the plebiscites coupled with the limitations of the questions posed in both regions and the timing of the plebiscite in the case of Northern Kamerun made voter, response anything but straightforward,- and clear cut. 278 Footnotes - Chapter Six \"'\"U.N. , T.C. , Report of the United Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the Plebiscite in the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, T/1491, November 25, 1959, p. 70. 2 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Organizing Secretary of the Northern Kamerun Democratic Party Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Jada, August 1, 1959, T/PET. 4/190, August 21, 1959, pp. 1-2; See also T/PET. 4/201, December 14, 1959. 3 U.N., T.C., Petition from Members of the Northern Kamerun Democratic Party in Yola Concerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Yola, 18 August, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 25, September 18, 1959, p. 1. 4 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 25, September 18, 1959, pp. 1-2; T/PET. 4/L. 30, September 26, 1959, pp. 1-2. 5 U.N., T.C, T/1491, November 25, 1959, p. 49. 6 U.N., G.A., Statement Made by the Representative of the United Kingdom at the 988th Meeting of the Fourth Committee, A/C. 4/438, December 7, 1959, p. 8. 7U.N. , T.C, T/1491, November 25, 1959, pp. 48-49. 8Ibid. 9 . . U.N., T.C, British Observations on Petitions, T/OBS. 4/68, December 15, 1959, p. 1. 1 0 I b i d . l:LU.N., T.C, T/1491, November 25, 1959, p. 80. 12 Ibid., pp. 84-85. 13 Ibid., pp. 86-90; for figures only. 14 Ibid., p. 89. 15 U.N., G.A., Statement Made by the Representative of the United Kingdom at the 988th Meeting of the Fourth Committee, A/C 4/438, December 7, 1959, pp. 1-6. 16 Ibid., pp. 7-10. 1 7 I b i d . 279 18 . . . U.N., G.A., Organization of a Further Plebiscite in the Northern Part of the Territory: Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly during Its Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 16, A/4354, December 12, 1959, pp. 38-39. 19 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Northern Kamerun Democratic Party Con-cerning Cameroons under British Administration, Buea, 7 December, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 74, December 8, 1959, p. 1. 20 . . U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Northern Kamerun Democratic Party Con-cerning the Cameroons under British Administration, Mubi, 7 December, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 78, January 18, 1960, pp. 1-2. 21 U.N. , T.C, Petition from Mr. Muhammadu Iya, Secretary of the Northern Kamerun Democratic Party, Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Mubi, 6 May, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 84, May 23, 1960, pp. 1-3. 22 U.N., T.C, T/1491/Add. 1, Annex \yillj November 25, 1959, pp. 1-8. Vaughan reported that these Nigeria-based parties refused to take instruc-tions from their headquarters in Nigeria. This i s incorrect. The pages cited in this footnote show clearly that they acted on instructions from the headquarters. 23 U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Honourable Philip Maken Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Gurum, Yola, 26 April, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 89, September 6, 1960, pp. 1-2. 24 U.N., T.C , Petition from Leaders of the Kamerun Freedom Party/AG Alliance, NKDP, and NEPU Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Admini-stration, Mubi, 13 July, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 90, September 6, 1960. pp. 1-2. 2 5 I b i d . 26 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 27 U.N., T.C, Petition from NEPU/NCNC, KFP/Action Group, NKDP Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Mubi, 25 July, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 91, September 6, 1960, pp. 1-2. 28 U.N., T.C, T/1556, April 3, 1961, p. 176. 29 Ibid., pp. 177-178. 30 Ibid., p. 177. 3 1 I b i d . , p. 179. 32 Ibid., pp. 178-179. 280 33 U.N., T.C., Report of the United Nations Commissioner f o r the Super-v i s i o n of the P l e b i s c i t e s i n the Southern and Northern Parts of the Tust T e r r i t o r y of the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, T/1556, A p r i l 3, 1961, pp. 9-11. Because what w i l l be s a i d from here onwards to the end of t h i s section, unless otherwise indicated, depends very heavily on t h i s comprehensive source, i n order to avoid unnecessary Ibids, only the pages from which the information i s taken w i l l be indi c a t e d here: pp. 186-189, 165, 191-217, 247-248. 34 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the Kamerun National Democratic Party Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Buea, 30 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 147, A p r i l 7, 1961, pp. 1-8. 35 U.N., T.C, T/1491/Add. 1, Annex 111(b), November 25, 1959, p. 1. 36 U.N., T.C, T/1491/Add. 1, Annex V(a) , November 25, 1959, p. 1. 37 U.N., T.C, T/1491/Add. 1, Annex V(b) , November 25, 1959, p. 1. 38 Ibi d . , question 2 and i t s answer. 39 U.N., T.C, T/1491/Add. 1, Annex VIII, November 25, 1959, p. 1. 40 Ib i d . , p. 5. 41 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 15, February 20, 1959, p. 1. 42 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the Northern Kamerun Democratic Party Concerning the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration, Mubi Town, Adamawa, T/PET. 4/L. 21, July 13, 1959, pp. 1-4. 43 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the Northern Kamerun Democratic Party Con-cerning the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration, Mubi, 18 November, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 71, December 4, 1959, p. 1. 44 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the Federated P a r t i e s f o r Union with Nigeria Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Mubi, 5 A p r i l , 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 162, A p r i l 21, 1961, p. 1. See also T/PET. 4/L. 168, passim. 45 , . U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the Mubi Native Authority Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, 8 A p r i l , 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 150, A p r i l 17, 1961, p. 1. 46 U.N., T.C, T/1556, A p r i l 3, 1961, pp. 208-209. 47 Ibi d . , pp. 209-210. 48 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4 and 5/L. 17, November 5, 1957, p. 2; U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4 and 5/L. 17 Add. 1, 1957, passium; U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4 and 5/L. 17/Add. 2, 1957, passim 281 49. p. 1. 50 U.N., T.C, 1959, p. 1. B r i t i s h Observations on P e t i t i o n s , T/OBS. 4/46, January 30, 51 U.N., T.C, B r i t i s h Observations on P e t i t i o n s , T/OBS. 4/39, January 8, 1958, p. 2. 52 U.N., T.C, Six P e t i t i o n s Protesting Against the Repatriation to the Cameroons under French Administration of Three P o l i t i c a l Refugees, Who Had Sought Asylum i n the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration, Tombel, 12 December, 1958, T/PET. 4 and 5/28, February 5, 1959, pp. 1-3; U.N. , T.C, T/PET. 4 and 5/62, November 3, 1959, pp. 1-2. 53 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4 and 5/28, February 5, 1959, pp. 1=2/ 54 U.N., T.C, B r i t i s h Observations on P e t i t i o n s , T/OBS. 4 and 5/19, August 20, 1958, p. 1. 55 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4 and 5/8, i l l e g i b l e date, vpassim. 56 U.N., T.C, B r i t i s h Observations on P e t i t i o n s , T/OBS. 4 and 5/14, Sept-ember 24, 1957, pp. 1-2. 57 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from One Kamerun (OK), Banso Branch, Concerning the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration, Banso, 4 November, 1958, T/PET. 4/170, December 29, 1958, pp. 1-2. 58 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4 and 5/8, i l l e g i b l e date, passim; U..N.', T.C.., T/PET. 4/175, i l l e g i b l e date, passim; U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/191, November 3, 1959, passim; U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/191/Add. 1, January 15, 1969^ passim; U.N., T.C, T/OBS. 4/58, July 10, 1959, pp. 1-2. 59 U.N., T.C, B r i t i s h Observations on P e t i t i o n s , T/OBS. 4/58, J u l y 10, 1959, pp. 1S2. 60 U.N., T.C, B r i t i s h Observations on P e t i t i o n s , T/OBS. 4/75, March 28, 1960, pp. 1-2. 61 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/132, i l l e g i b l e date, passim. 62 U.N., T.C, B r i t i s h Observations on P e t i t i o n s , T/OBS. 4/34, August 12, 1957, pp. 1-7. 63 . . U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the President of the KNDP Concerning the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration, Kumba, 20 February, 1958, T/PET. 4/L. 7, March 18, 1958, p. 1; U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/102, May 7, 1954, passim; U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/102/Add. 1, August 30, 1954, passim; T/PET. 4/102/Add. 2, September 8, 1954, pp. 1T2. 282 64 U.N. , T.C, P e t i t i o n from the Secretary of the Women's Section of One Kamerun, Modeka Branch, Concerning the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration, Tiko, 3 July, 1959, T/PET. 4/189, August 17, 1959, p. 1. 65 U.N., T.C, B r i t i s h Observations on P e t i t i o n s , T/OBS. 4/67, December 8, 1959, p. 1. 66U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 9 3, October 12, 1960, pp. 1-2. 67 U.N. , T.C, P e t i t i o n from Mr. M.B. Achini on Behalf of One Kamerun Con-cerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Bamenda, 15 September, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 95, October 12, 1960, p. 1. 6 8 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 87, September 6, 1969, p. 2 and passim. 69 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4.L. 97, October 13, 1960, pp. 1-6. 70 Ibid., p. 1. 71 . . U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the National Union of Kamerun Students (Gt. B r i t a i n and Ireland) Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Admini-s t r a t i o n , London, 19 July, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 87, September 6, 1960, pp. 1-2. 72 . . U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the Organizing Secretary of One Kamerun Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Kumba, 22 August, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 9 3, October 12, 1960, pp. 2-3; see also, U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the National Union of Kamerun Students (Nigeria) Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Enugu, 14 September, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 97, October 13, 1960, pp. 1-2; U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from Mr. Johnson Awandom Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Molyko, 19 December, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 105, February 10, 1961, pp. 1-2. 73 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from One Kamerun m Bamenda Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Bamenda, 26 January, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 104, February 3, 1961, p. 1. 74 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 113, March 9, 1961, p. 2. 75 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from Mr. S.N. Musie, Secretary of Kamerun Federal Party Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, V i c t o r i a , 16 March, 1960, T/PET. 4/L. 80, A p r i l 11, 1960, pp. 1-4. and passim. 76 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the Leaders of the Fulani and Hausa of Wum D i v i s i o n , Concerning the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration, Wum, 8 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 36, September 28, 1959, pp. 1-2. 77 . . U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the A l l - N i g e r i a n Union Concerning the Cameroons under B r i t i s h Administration, V i c t o r i a , 21 September, 1959, T/PET. 4/L. 42, September 30, 1959, pp. 1-2. 283 78 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the Cameroons People's National Convention, Bamenda, Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Mankon, 7 February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 110, March 9, 1961, p. 4. 79 U.N. , T.C, P e t i t i o n from the Nobles and Youths of Nkambe East Con-cerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Ndu, T/PET. 4/ L. 120, March 21, 1961, p. 2. 80 U.N. , T.C, P e t i t i o n from Ngaw Iwise Njesi and Others Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Wum, 11 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 143, A p r i l 13, 1961, p. 2. 81 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 110, March 9, 1961, p. 3. 82 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 120, March 21, 1961, p. 2. 83 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from Mr. E.N. A l l on Behalf of Nkambe Aborigenes Resident i n Wum D i v i s i o n Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Wum. 19 February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 115, March 21, 1961, p. 3. 84 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from Mr. Mallam L.T. Sale, President of the Muslim Congress Party Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Banso, 24 February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 123, March 21, 1961, p. 1. 85 . U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the A n t i - U n i f i c a t i o n Movement, Bamenda, Con-cerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Bafinge, 29 January, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. I l l , March 9, 1961, p. 1. 86 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 110, March 9> 1961, pp. 3\u00C2\u00A74. 87 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 112, March 9, 1961, p. 2. 88 U.N., T.C., T/PET. 4/L. 110, March 9, 1961, pp. 3-6. 89 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from Mr. J.M. Boja, M.H. A., Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Beba-Befang, Wum, 17 February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 118, March 21, 1961, p. 2. 90 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from Chiefs and Peoples of Wum West (Beba-Befang-Essimbi) Clans P l e b i s c i t e D i s t r i c t Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, 22 February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 137, A p r i l 13, 1961, p. 1. 91 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the Cameroons People's National Convention, Belo, Kom Branch, Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Belo, 10 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 165, A p r i l 25, 1961, p. 1. 92 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 120, March 21, 1961, p. 2. 284 93 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from the Fon of Nsaw Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Kumbo, 3 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 132, A p r i l 13, 1961, p. 2 and passim. 94 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 118, March 21, 1961, p. 1. 95 , . , Ibid. , p. 2. 96 U.N., T.C, P e t i t i o n from Mr. S.E. Nyenti on Behalf of the Cameroons Commoners Congress Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Kumba, 14 February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 125, March 28, 1961, p. 3. 97U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 110, March 9, 1961, pp. 4-5. 98 U.N., T.C, T/1556, A p r i l 3, 1961, pp. 111-112. \" i b i d . , pp. 113-114. \"*\"\u00C2\u00B0\u00C2\u00B0Ibid., p. 115. Ibi d . 285 CHAPTER SEVEN THE MEANING OF THE VOTES\"' Despite the i r r e g u l a r i t i e s , the suspicions, and the accusations involved i n the conduct of the p l e b i s c i t e s , i n spite of the f a c t that the United Nations refused to postpone the Northern Kamerun second p l e b i s c i t e and denied the Southern Kamerunians a t h i r d choice, namely, Samller Kamerun, the Western Kamerunians appeared e n t h u s i a s t i c about the p l e b i s c i t e s . About the 1959 Northern Kamerun p l e b i s c i t e , the P l e b i s c i t e Commissioner, Dr. Abdoh, had t h i s to say. P o l l i n g was scheduled to commence at 8:00 a.m.; but well i n advance of t h i s time crowds began gathering at the p o l l i n g stations and by opening time had attained r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e proportions. There was some shoving and pushing and j o s t l i n g f o r p o s i t i o n by some of those eager to vote but the crowds were for the most part good-natured and well-behaved. Voting was orderly a n < ^ p o l l i n g was completed i n most i cases by e a r l y afternoon, but, i n accordance with the requirements oftthe p l e b i s c i t e regulations, p o l l i n g stations remained open t i l l 5:00 p.m.1 The p o t e n t i a l e l e c t o r s i n the region were estimated at 142,400. But, the number which a c t u a l l y r e g i s t e r e d was 129,549 ,representing 91 per cent of the estimated number. 113,859 (88%) of the r e g i s t e r e d voters cast t h e i r 2 votes. Dr. Abdoh a l s o had t h i s to report regarding the 1961 p l e b i s c i t e i n the same region. The weather on both p o l l i n g days -.was'-bright and c l e a r . Throughout the Northern Cameroons, people turned out i n large numbers and the majority of the voters, both men and women, had cast t h e i r votes on both days well ahead of the c l o s i n g of the p o l l s . . . . P o l l i n g on both days proceeded i n an exemplary manner and with the exception of minor errors made by p r e s i d i n g and p o l l i n g s t a f f at a few of the 286 p o l l i n g s t a t i o n s , voting proceeded without major i n c i d e n t s . 292,985 voters re g i s t e r e d f or the p l e b i s c i t e . Of these, 243,955 (83%) cast v a l i d votes. Regarding the Southern Kamerun s i t u a t i o n , the P l e b i s c i t e Commissioner s a i d The weather on p o l l i n g day was fin e throughout the Southern Cameroons. Long before the p o l l s opened at 8:00 a.m. on 11 February large numbers of people were seen walking to the stations and by 7:00 a.m. many of the p o l l i n g stations were already crowded with people eagerly waiting to cast t h e i r votes . . . Voting was extremely heavy through-out the T e r r i t o r y and, generally speaking, by mid-day most of the e l i g i b l e voters fhad cast t h e i r b a l l o t s . . . . In other places, l o c a l c h i e f s [-.the a-Fon] had seated themselves outside the p o l l i n g s t a t i o n s , and were requested to move away i n order to avoid g i v i n g the impression that t h e i r presence was intended to sway votes i n one way or another.^ The t o t a l number of r e g i s t e r e d voters was 349,650. Of these, 331,312 (94%) cast v a l i d v otes. 6 What a l l t h i s seems to suggest i s that the Western Kamerunians of a l l l e v e l s of the societ y took the p l e b i s c i t e s very s e r i o u s l y and, to say the l e a s t , were more' than e n t h u s i a s t i c about them and t h e i r r e s u l t s . The presence of the a-Fon at the p o l l i n g stations and the absence of major incidents should be noted c a r e f u l l y . Both suggest (a) the presence of l o c a l consensus and, (b) the fear of some a-Fon that some persons might be d i s l o y a l to the Fondom. The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to investigate the basis of t h i s enthusiasm and to determine what the electorate hoped to gain by voting one way or the other. To achieve t h i s goal, the b a l l o t i n g w i l l be analyzed separately f or each region. In addition, the votes are analyzed by d i s t r i c t and i n some cases by D i v i s i o n and/or Fondom. 287 The Meaning of the Votes i n the Northern Kamerun P l e b i s c i t e s Unfortunately, the only group, other than the p o l i t i c a l leaders i n Northern Kamerun, which used to write, the Mambilla, were so s a t i s f i e d with the 1960 reforms and protective of them that they no longer wrote. Indeed, the very few p e t i t i o n s , already used, that came from Northern Kamerun between 1960 and 1961 were from the p o l i t i c a l leaders. This section has, therefore, been denied the opportunity to see what the e l e c t o r a t e , i t s spokesmen or i t s leaders i n Northern Kamerun had to say i n w r i t i n g , as opposed to the interviews which Vaughan conducted, about the way they perceived the p l e b i s c i t e s . This section of t h i s chapter, therefore, depends almost e x c l u s i v e l y on the two reports of the United Nations P l e b i s -c i t e s Commissioner, Dr. D j a l a l Abdoh. Since Dr. Abdoh wrote h i s report on t h i s issue on the d i s t r i c t b a s i s , the same approach i s adopted here. But, i n order to handle t h i s issue more e a s i l y for both p l e b i s c i t e s , the same d i s t r i c t for 1959 and 1961 i s treated i n one place. However, since i n 1959 there were s i x p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t s and nine i n 1961, the l a t t e r would have to be regrouped to correspond with the 1959 s i t u a t i o n . Dikwa p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t was made up of that area i d e n t i f i e d i n chapter one as Dikwa Emirate, the area around Lake Chad. I t s western boun-dary with Nigeria was j u s t as long as i t s eastern boundary with Cameroun Republic. Located i n the extreme north, i t was flanked on both sides by mainly Fulani dominated neighbours. But, i t should be remembered that i t was the centre of the 1953 demonstration whose Emir was the f i r s t to be de-posed. I t was, therefore, an area dominated by the d i s s i d e n t F u l a n i . In 1959, the NPC was the most active p o l i t i c a l party i n t h i s d i s t r i c t . 288 The party's a c t i v i t i e s were organized and ledlby Abba Habib who had become Minister of Trade i n the Northern Nigerian Government. The four p a r t i e s , :NKDP, UMBC/AG, NEPU, supporting the idea of a future decision were not s i g n i f i c a n t l y active i n t h i s d i s t r i c t . During the campaign, i n the d i s t -r i c t , \" i n t e r e s t centred on l o c a l issues and on d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with l o c a l administration.\" There was \"very l i t t l e understanding of the broader issues involved i n the p l e b i s c i t e . \" Nevertheless, when the votes were t o l d , there was a t o t a l of 45,780 votes. 19,822 of these were f o r the Ni g e r i a proposi-7 t i o n and 25,958 were for making a future d e c i s i o n . The d i s t r i c t had, therefore, voted to make a future decision. A f t e r the 1959 p l e b i s c i t e s , Dikwa Emirate D i v i s i o n remained i n t a c t as i t was before the p l e b i s c i t e . But i t s administration was reformed r a d i c a l l y . The B r i t i s h established committees such as education, finance, appointments and d i s c i p l i n e , development, general purpose, and Shuwa Land Disputes. There was also a Tender Board f or the granting of contracts to advige i t s Native Authority. The members of these committees were elect e d annually and included members from the Native Authority s t a f f , some c o u n c i l l o r s , and \" q u a l i f i e d persons from the p u b l i c . \" There was a woman on the education ): Q board. The l o c a l people themselves were now a c t i v e l y involved i n , and were i n c o n t r o l of, t h e i r l o c a l a f f a i r s because they themselves e l e c t e d the members of these committees and the Native; Authority. During the 1960-1961 campaign, posters urging people to vote f o r Nigeria were the f i r s t to appear i n t h i s d i s t r i c t . During t h i s e a r l y period, \"No posters urging union with the Republic [of Cameroun] were seen anywhere.\" When the supporters of the Cameroun proposition entered the race, they d i s t r i b u t e d \"gowns with the p o r t r a i t of President Ahidjo p r i n t e d i n the 289 f a b r i c , \" and concentrated on areas bordering on Cameroun. As the voting day drew closer, the \"Emir of Dikwa* and h i s entourage v i s i t e d many v i l l a g e s to r a l l y the people i n support of union with Nigeria.\" Deputies from Cameroun Republic d i d the same thing i n favour of the Cameroun pr o p o s i t i o n . This was also the area where the B r i t i s h Resident; was alleged to have campaigned f o r Nigeria and warned that the a-Fon whose people voted f o r Cameroun would be punished. This d i s t r i c t had the l a r g e s t e l e c t o r a t e . The Consortium worked hardest i n t h i s d i s t r i c t . The voting pattern was i n t e r e s t i n g ; \"Areas along the Republic's border, as well as large population centres, went against union with the Republic and areas close to Nigeria went against union with Nigeria.\" A t o t a l of 106,896 votes were cast. 9 69,577 of these were for Nigeria and 37,319 for Cameroun. Dikwa had, therefore, reversed i t s decision and voted f o r Ni g e r i a . Adamawa North (a combination of Adamawa North East and Cubunawa/Madagali) consisted of that area described i n chapter one as Yola Emirate North of the'Benue River. I t was the narrowest part of Northern Kamerun. I t was flanked on the west by Nigeria and on the east by Cameroun Republic. The boundaries shared with e i t h e r neighbour were of equal length. Its.population was a mixture of Fulani and non-Fulani and i t contained very many non-Fulani Muslims. I t was the most developed area of Northern Kamerun. Before the 1959 p l e b i s c i t e , i t was part of Adamawa Province of Nigeria. Consequently, i t was located p a r t l y within Northern Kamerun and p a r t l y within N i g e r i a . * I t i s not r e a d i l y known whether t h i s was the f i r s t person who was deposed a f t e r the demonstration of 1953 or not. But, i f he was s t i l l a l i v e , i t i s p o s s i b l e \u00E2\u0080\u0094 o n l y a s u g g e s t i o n \u00E2\u0080\u0094 t h a t the wind of appeasement which swept over Northern Kamerun i n 1960 could have brought him back. 290 In the 1959 p l e b i s c i t e , p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n t h i s area was intense, with a l l the pa r t i e s very a c t i v e . Campaigning i n t h i s d i s t r i c t was b i t t e r but with no\"\"untoward incide n t s . \" Here, the Native Authority o f f i c i a l s used t h e i r influence to campaign i n favour of Nigeria. Most of the arres t s took place here and the r e f u s a l of permits to the proponents of Cameroun was r i f e . \"The campaign was fought mainly on l o c a l issues.\" The p a r t i e s supporting the idea of a future decision \"made f u l l use of the f e e l i n g of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among the people about what they considered to be mal-r administration by the Native Authority . . . They also made c a p i t a l out of the arrests . . . i n presenting the Native Authority i n an unfavourable l i g h t . \" The t o t a l number of votes cast was 33,763. Out of these, 10,367 10 were for Nigeria and 23,396 for a future decision. Adamawa North p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t had,' thus, apparently voted to make a decision i n the future. A f t e r the p l e b i s c i t e , t h i s Adamawa North p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t became a f u l l D i v i s i o n of i t s own, the Northern Trust D i v i s i o n , located e n t i r e l y with-i n Northern Kamerun. Its headquarters was Mubi. For the f i r s t time i n h i s t o r y , i t had i t s own Native Authority and D i s t r i c t s under i t . For the f i r s t time i t s l o c a l a f f a i r s were i n the handsoof i t s inhabitants who were consulted and took active part i n administration. Perhaps more importantly, besides other B r i t i s h D i s t r i c t O f f i c e r s , i t was the home of the B r i t i s h Resident, the highest B r i t i s h authority i n Northern Kamerun. 1 1 In the 1961 p l e b i s c i t e , t h i s d i s t r i c t (now a combination of Mubi and Cubunawa/Madagali) saw an active and l i v e l y campaign. Campaigning began here much e a r l i e r than i n Dikwa and the two groups of p a r t i e s were w e l l estab-l i s h e d . This was the home of the President and General Secretary of the 291 KFP. I t was also the home of the Vice-President of NKDP. Campaigning was intense and there were \"numerous and well-attended; mass meetings.\" Door-to-door campaigning was al s o t r i e d here. The NKDP/KFP supporters continued to be arrested and to be denied permits. This d i s t r i c t had the second larges t number of re g i s t e r e d voters. This was where the Northern Nigerian Government established i t s Information Service. A t o t a l of 65,133 votes were cast i n t h i s d i s t r i c t . 24,431 of these were f o r 12 Cameroun and 40,702 for Nigeria. The people of the Northern Trust D i v i s i o n , thus, apparently voted f o r Nigeria. Adamawa South (Chamba) lay immediately south of 'the Benue V a l l e y . I t was bounded on the west by Nigeria and on the east by Cameroun Republic. Its western boundary with Nigeria was equal i n length with i t s eastern boundary with Cameroun. I t was inhabited mainly by the Chamba, a non-Fulani group. I t was the nearest of the non-Fulani-dominated areas to the Fulani-dominated areas. Indeed, i t separated Fulani-dominated Northern Kamerun from the non-Fulani-dominated area, a gateway to both. P r i o r to the 1959 plebiscite.,, i t was administered as part of Nigeria Adamawa Province and was, therefore, r u l e d by a Native Authority located i n Nigeria. I t was the home of the Minist e r f o r Northern Cameroons A f f a i r s and the home of the NKDP leader. In 1959, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were very active i n the d i s t r i c t and used vehicles to penetrate even the most remote v i l l a g e s . The NKDP leader, as a native of t h i s area, had the people under h i s control and although the UMBC/AG and NEPU campaigned with the NKDP i n t h i s area, the leader of the NKDP had an ascendancy over them. The NKDP directed i t s appeal to the Chamba, \"emphasizing that a vote f o r the second a l t e r n a t i v e [future decision] 292 would free them from non-Chamba c o n t r o l and so pave the way for b e t t e r roads, more hospita l s and schools and better jobs for the Chamba.\" I t played on l o c a l issues and \" d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s with the e x i s t i n g adminis-t r a t i o n . \" The NPC campaign here was also vigorous, wide-spready and centred on l o c a l issues. The NPC campaign was l e d by the Minister f o r Northern Cameroons A f f a i r s . The people saw the p l e b i s c i t e i n the l i g h t of l o c a l issues and \"not s t r i c t l y i n terms of the questions they were being asked.\" No wonder then that \"there was l i t t l e r e a l understanding of the wider issues involved i n the two questions.\" D i s t r i c t heads, the next highest a u t h o r i t i e s over the a-Fon and the lowest i n the o l d regime aside from the a-Fon, used t h e i r influence to secure a pro-Nigeria vote. They also refused permits for meetings to the p a r t i e s i n favour of a future decision. A t o t a l of 16,190 votes were cast i n the d i s t r i c t . Out of 13 these/ 4,539 were for Nigeria and 11,651 for a future decision. A f t e r the p l e b i s c i t e , Chamba became part of the Southern Trust D i v i s i o n located e n t i r e l y i n Northern Kamerun. I t also received i t s own Native Authority with headquarters at Ganye. Its l o c a l inhabitants were thus i n 14 c o n t r o l of and a c t i v e l y involved i n t h e i r l o c a l a f f a i r s . But, because i t was a new Native Authority, i t had not quite got o f f the ground beforev.the 1961 p l e b i s c i t e although i t had e l e c t e d i t s c o u n c i l l o r s . In 1961, the p l e b i s c i t e campaign i n Chamba \"got o f f to a slow s t a r t . \" During this period, the Consortium was joined by another party, HABE, \"which drew i t s main support from the pagans i n Chamba,\" and was an a l l y of the AG. It s centre of a c t i v i t y was i n Bauchi. Both groups of p a r t i e s here received a l o t of propaganda material from N i g e r i a and from Cameroun::. as the case may be. The Consortium d i s t r i b u t e d medals \"commemorating the attainment 293 of self-government by the Northern Region of the Federation of Nigeria.\" On the other hand the NKDP/KFP supplied t h e i r supporters with \"gowns imprinted with a likeness of President Ahidjo.\" Once the campaigns reached t h e i r peak, \"hardly a market day went by without a lecuture being given by e i t h e r group of p a r t i e s . \" Campaigns were i n t e r e s t i n g and extensive. Neither Nigerians nor Camerounians campaigned i n t h i s d i s t r i c t . \"Party organizers and speakers of both p o l i t i c a l groups moved f r e e l y about the area and, on the whole, met with f r i e n d l y receptions. The conten-ding p a r t i e s \"held processions i n which they displayed t h e i r banners.\" A \"substantial number of D i s t r i c t and V i l l a g e Heads, as well as Councillors were known to be members or sympathizers of the NKDP/KFP A l l i a n c e . \" The t o t a l number o f votes cast was 34,881. Of these, 9,704 were for N i g e r i a 15 and 25,177 for Cameroun. The Chamba had, thus, c o n s i s t e n t l y voted against Nigeria. The P l e b i s c i t e s Commissioner d i d not say what the campaigns were centred on. But he brought out c e r t a i n points which helped explain the vote par-t i c u l a r l y as t h i s was the only d i s t r i c t which voted for Cameroun i n 1961. There was no outside interference and no major complaints. There was no harassment of the supporters ;of the Camerounzproposition and both groups of p a r t i e s campaigned f r e e l y and held processions. Campaigns were conducted on every market day; t h i s means the message reached a large audience which might have received accurate information about the p l e b i s c i t e questions. More importantly, D i s t r i c t Heads, V i l l a g e Heads, and Councillors were e i t h e r members of supporters of the NKDP/KFP; t h i s explains the absence of arrests and r e f u s a l of permits. In addition, although t h i s was not brought out by Dr. Abdoh, i t was the home of the M i n i s t e r for Northern Cameroons A f f a i r s 294 and the home o f the founder and President of the NKDP. The Adamawa South (Toungo and Gashaka) p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t was, i n geographic terms, the l a r g e s t d i s t r i c t . I t was bounded on the west by Nigeria and on the east by Cameroun. Its eastern and western boundaries were almost of equal length. P r i o r to the 1959 p l e b i s c i t e i t was part of Adamawa D i v i s i o n and was located p a r t l y i n . N i g e r i a and p a r t l y i n Northern Kamerun. The road s i t u a t i o n i n t h i s d i s t r i c t was so bad that p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n 1959 was r e s t r i c t e d to the main centres of Sugu, Torungo, and Gauye. Except f o r one p o l i t i c a l meeting held by the NKDP at S e r t i , there was \" l i t t l e organized p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y elsewhere.\" Nowhere i n the d i s t r i c t d i d the people understand the issues involved i n the questions of the p l e b i s c i t e . Continued r a i n f a l l and poor communication aggravated the d i f f i c u l t y . The majority of the people were \"influenced by t h e i r leaders.\" The t o t a l number of votes cast was 4,351. Of these, 2,252 were for Nigeria and 2,099 for a future decision.^\" 6 The d i s t r i c t had thus voted with a s l i m majority f o r union with N i g e r i a . A f t e r the p l e b i s c i t e , ' t h i s d i s t r i c t became the l a r g e s t portion of the Southern Trust T e r r i t o r y with i t s own Native Authority separated from Adamawa Native Authority and D i s t r i c t , Town, and Outer Councils. The head-quarters of i t s Native Authority was at Gembu. Its Native Authority, esta-b l i s h e d i n September 1960, had a general purpose committee which was the executive, and \"an established committee whose task i t [was] to make recom-mendations to the Native Authority Council on a l l matters i n respect of 17 Native Authority s t a f f . \" Its l o c a l inhabitants were thus very a c t i v e . In the 1961 p l e b i s c i t e , the campaign of the Consortium was very l i v e l y , 295 vigorous, and extensive. The Consortium displayed posters counting the advantages f o r union with Nigeria and \"warning against the ' e v i l s of j o i n i n g the Republic 1.\" The NKDP/KFP concentrated on heavily populated areas of the d i s t r i c t . The NKDP/KFP had fewer posters but \"directed t h e i r appeal to i n d i v i d u a l s and small groups.\" Occasionally they held large meetings. Deputies from Cameroun toured the area but d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c a l r a l l i e s . The NKDP d i s t r i b u t e d about 200 gowns to i t s supporters with Ahidjo's picture imprinted i n the f a b r i c . A t o t a l of 8,107 votes were cast, 18 4,999 for Nigeria and 3,108 for Cameroun. This d i s t r i c t had thus voted consistently i n favour of N i g e r i a . I t i s not known what the issues were. The Adamawa South (Mambilla) p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t was the only d i s t r i c t which had no boundary with Ni g e r i a . I t had an extensive boundary on the south with Southern Kamerun and- on the east with Cameroun. From time imme-morial, i t was always i n touch with Southern Kamerun. Indeed, many of i t s people emigrated to Southern Kamerun and many were working with the CDC. Except f o r the super-imposed Fulani r u l e r s , i t was inhabited almost wholly by non-Fulani and non-Muslim. P r i o r to the 1959 p l e b i s c i t e , i t was admini-stered /-by the Emir of Admawa. There were no roads i n Mambilla and i l l i t e r a c y was highest i n a l l of Northern Kamerun. But i t had many a-Fon who, as usual, had the l o y a l t y of t h e i r subjects, or were t h e i r spokesmen In 1959, despite the lack of roads and h i l l y nature of the area, the NPC and NKDP had agents campaigning i n the area. \"The NKDP di r e c t e d i t s appeal to the Mambilla t r i b e s and t h e i r fear of the F u l a n i , based on memories of s l a v e - r a i d i n g i n times past.\" Local issues dominated the campaigns of both the NPC and the NKDP. The NKDP also appealed to the Fulani c a t t l e owners who paid heavy j a n g a l i ( c a t t l e tax) to Yola. \"The observer f e l t 296 that there was l i t t l e understanding of the broader issues of the p l e b i s c i t e The s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l organization of the Mambilla i n t e r f e r e d \"with a free i n d i v i d u a l vote and votes [were] cast according to the wishes of the elders . . . simply because i t had always been the customof these people to accept the advice of t h e i r elders.\" 10,098 votes were cast, 2,745 f o r Nigeria and 7,353 for a future d e c i s i o n . 1 9 Mambilla D i s t r i c t was the most s a t i s f i e d a f t e r the 1959 p l e b i s c i t e . Its l i n k s with Adamawa were severed and the Mudagas were sent back to Yola. Some of i t s deposed a-Fon returned, and some of the usurpers were j a i l e d . I t became part of the Southern Trust D i v i s i o n whose Native Authority was c a l l e d Gashaka-Mambilla Native Authority. I t had i t s own D i s t r i c t with s p e c i a l powers: \"besides having an important advisory function to the Gashaka-Mambilla Native Authority, l e v i e s tax f o r l o c a l s e r v i c e s . \" I t s a-Fon c o l l e c t e d taxes and maintained law and order. This \"had f u l f i l l e d the desire of the Mambilla people to receive l o c a l authority i n t h e i r own d i s t r i c t and to be separated from the administration of the Adamawa Emirate The response was not disappointing. At the beginning of the campaign, there was l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , \"except f o r an extensive tour under-taken by the D i s t r i c t Head, who lectured to the people i n favour of the a l t e r n a t i v e f o r j o i n i n g the Federation of Nigeria.\" Later on, the two groups of p a r t i e s began to campaign a c t i v e l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y the NKDP and the NPC. The new r u l e r s began to refuse permits to the NKDP u n t i l forced by the United Nations observers to dosso. 20,990 votes were cast, 7,467 for 21 Cameroun and 13,523 for Nigeria. Likewise, Mambilla reversed i t s 1959 p o s i t i o n and voted for Ni g e r i a . The l a s t p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t , Wukafi East (United H i l l s ) was the only 297 one that had no boundary with Cameroun. But i t had an extensive boundary on the south with Southern Kamerun and on the west with Nigeria. P r i o r to the 1959 p l e b i s c i t e , i t was a D i v i s i o n of the Benue Province of N i g e r i a and thus had no Native Authority i n i t s own r i g h t . C u l t u r a l l y i t seemed to have more l i n k s with i t s Nigerian neighbours than with the Southern Kamerunian and Mambilla neighbours. This was the area which i n 1959 had the l e a s t p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . The NPC was r e l a t i v e l y more active than the other p a r t i e s . But there was no understanding of the issues involved i n the p l e b i s c i t e questions. There was a \"fear that t h i s area might be t r a n s f e r r e d to the Southern Cameroons i f the second a l t e r n a t i v e [future decision] won, an eventuality repugnant to many who f e l t p e r f e c t l y s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r present status.\" When the votes were t a l l i e d , they t o t a l l e d 3,152. Eighty-nine of these were 22 for a future decision and 3,063 for Nigeria. The United H i l l s d i s t r i c t had voted with the highest majority for Nigeria. I t appears that i t voted against Southern Kamerun. Af t e r the p l e b i s c i t e , the d i s t r i c t received i t s own Native Authority independent of the Wukari Native Authority Federation. The members of the previous three d i s t r i c t councils i n the area became members of the new Native Authority. I t had \"an appointed administrative c o u n c i l l o r a s s i s t e d by a t o t a l of 22 s t a f f i n managing i t s day-to-day l o c a l government a f f a i r s . \" I t created a Finance Committee \"composed of f i v e of i t s e l e c t e d members and 23 the Administrative C o u n c i l l o r . \" The NPC was the only member of the Consortium that campaigned here and i t s compaign agents were members of the l o c a l branch. The NKDP was not very active i n t h i s d i s t r i c t . The\"? votes were 157 for Cameroun and 7,791 for 298 24 Nigeria, a t o t a l of 7,948. There i s no i n d i c a t i o n of what the issues were. But with the NPC as the major campaigner, there might be no question about the issues. They were p e r f e c t l y s a t i s f i e d with a D i v i s i o n i n 1959. In 1961 they had a Native Authority independent of Wukari. In 1959, they voted against Southern Kamerun. In 1961, \"French Community\" was added to the already repugnant Southern Kamerun. These appear to have been t h e i r issues and t h e i r votes remained consistent. \ i What then:,is the conclusion? In the absence of sources from the electorate i t s e l f , t h i s study must depend heavily on Dr. Abdoh's report for i t s a n a l y s i s . Dr. Abdoh reported that i n the 1959 p l e b i s c i t e , the majority of the Northern Kamerunians voted to make a decision i n the future; only i n one p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t was there a majority against that a l t e r -native. But when he took a look at the meaning of the votes f o r that p l e -b i s c i t e , he came out with a conclusion which, although already c i t e d , must be repeated here for emphasis. As he put i t , I t would appear that the majority of the voters made use of the opportunity o f f e r e d by the p l e b i s c i t e to r e g i s t e r what was i n e f f e c t a p r o t e s t vote against the system of l o c a l administration p r e v a i l i n g i n the Northern Cameroons. The information that I gathered i n the T e r r i t o r y supports the view that the people desire the introduction of reforms i n the system of l o c a l government\u00E2\u0080\u0094which to them i s synonymous with government\u00E2\u0080\u0094and that one of the reasons why the majority voted i n favour of the second a l t e r n a t i v e was to express the w i l l f o r a speedy introduction of these reforms. 2^ The d e s c r i p t i o n embedded i n t h i s section of the study regarding the 1959 p l e b i s c i t e would seem to add credence to Dr. Abdoh's conclusion. In the only d i s t r i c t that voted against a future decision, Dr. Abdoh suggests that i t was a'vote more against Southern Kamerun than anything e l s e . E s s e n t i a l l y , therefore, the votes i n that p l e b i s c i t e not only had l i t t l e reference to the United Nations' questions but were votes for l o c a l 299 administration which was interchangeable with government, whether of the Northern Region or of the Federation of Nigeria. This s i t u a t i o n , however, i s not s u r p r i s i n g . H i s t o r i c a l l y , at the time of the p l e b i s c i t e s , Northern Kamerun was composed of f i v e main groups of people: the Fu l a n i who f e l t they had c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t i e s and a f f i n i t i e s with Northern Nigeria, many of whom were i n authority, and nearly a l l of whom preferred the status quo; the dis s i d e n t F u l a n i who probably recognized t h e i r a f f i n i t i e s with Northern Nigeria but d i d not l i k e e i t h e r t h e i r sub-ordination to the Northern Nigeria F u l a n i or the f a c t that t h e i r \"German \u00E2\u0080\u00A2-. time i r o n r u l e \" l o s t them t h e i r power; the non-Fulani Muslims who had accepted Islam i n the f i r s t place as a means of pro t e c t i n g themselves against F u l a n i slave r a i d i n g ; the c h r i s t i a n s , the majority of whom were non-Ful a n i , who had never forgiven the Fulani s l a v i n g a c t i v i t i e s and the threat of Islam to t h e i r c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y ; and, those whose r e l i g i o n was paganism, the majority of whom were the a-Fon and t h e i r subjects, who s t i l l i d e n t i f i e d Islam and the F u l a n i of whichever region with the threat to t h e i r l i v e s and c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y . Furthermore, there was numerically an i n s i g n i f i c a n t minority, the Western-educated, who were unhappy with the fact that the only B r i t i s h industry i n the region, administration, was mainly i n the hands of Nigerians proper, Fulan i and non-Fulani. A l l these groups, except the f i r s t which was i n a disproportional minority, therefore, saw the 1959 p l e b i s c i t e , not as a means o f making a future decision, but as a way of redressing what they considered undesirable; the grievances were centered on l o c a l admini-s t r a t i o n which was perceived as the Governments of the Northern Region and of N i g e r i a . A f t e r the 1961 p l e b i s c i t e i n that region, Dr. Abdoh stated the r e s u l t s 300 of the p l e b i s c i t e but refused to venture an opinion on the meaning of the votes. However, he did indic a t e that the meaning of the vote i n that p l e b i s c i t e might have had l i t t l e connection with what the United Nations had intended i n the two questions. As he put i t , The p l e b i s c i t e i n the Northern Cameroons, as a whole, has to be viewed i n the context of the circumstances p r e v a i l i n g i n the T e r r i t o r y as set for t h i n the chapter of the present report devoted to the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . [These circumstances included the \"Separation of the administration of the Northern Cameroons from that of the Northern Region and l o c a l government reforms, P o l i c e forces i n the Northern Cameroons, [and] The p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n the p l e b i s c i t e * ] , I t should also be mentioned that, although the majority of the people of the Northern Cameroons may not have grasped the i n t r i c a t e and complex c o n s t i t u t i o n a l implications of the two a l t e r n a t i v e s , they were aware, nevertheless, that the decision they were c a l l e d upon to make at the p l e b i s c i t e meant j o i n i n g one or the other of the two neighbouring countries.26 This statement i s c r u c i a l to the understanding of the meaning of the votes i n the Northern Kamerun 1961 p l e b i s c i t e . For the purpose of t h i s study, Dr. Abdoh brings out four main points: the electorate was aware that i t was c a l l e d upon to make a choice between Nigeria and Cameroun; the same electorate might not have grasped the implications for j o i n i n g Nigeria or Cameroun; the a c t i v i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and the p o l i c e who were Nigerians played a r o l e ; and, t h i s .is most important, the separation of Northern Kamerun administration from that of Nigeria and the introduction of reforms i n l o c a l government, which was synonymous to government, i n 1960 played a r o l e . The factors which could have influenced the voting pattern as described e a r l i e r i n t h i s section included: geographic l o c a t i o n of each d i s t r i c t and the composition of i t s inhabitants, the boundary r e l a t i o n s of each d i s t r i c t to e i t h e r Nigeria or *See U.N., T.C., T/1556, A p r i l 3, 1961, p. 5. 301 Cameroun, the a c t i v i t i e s and o f f e r s of the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s as shown i n the preceeding chapter, f a i r play, the separation of Northern Kamerun admini-s t r a t i o n from Nigeria, and the reforms of l o c a l government as in d i c a t e d i n the l a s t chapter. These factors seem to suggest only two main differences between the si t u a t i o n s of 1959 and of 1961. One of these, and that which was universal f o r the region, was the separation of the Northern Kamerun administration from that of Northern Nigeria and the introduction of reforms i n the new administration. The second, f a i r play, was unique to the Chamba p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t . I t i s i n these two factors that the meaning of the vote i n the 1961 p l e b i s c i t e must be sought. ;?i F i r s t , the Chamba p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t , the only d i s t r i c t which voted i n favour of Cameroun i n 1961. Although the factors which might have influenced the vote i n t h i s area had been stated e a r l i e r , the reader must be' reminded about them here. There was no outside interference and no major complaints. There was no harassment of the supporters of the Cameroun proposition and both groups of p a r t i e s campaigned f r e e l y and held processions. Campaigns were conducted on every market day. D i s t r i c t Heads, V i l l a g e Heads [the a-Fon], and Councillors were e i t h e r members or supporters of the NKDP/KFP. I t was the home of both the Ministe r f or Northern Cameroons A f f a i r s and that of the founder and President of the NKDP. Three points i n p a r t i -c u lar are c r u c i a l here: the p o l i t i c a l ideas of the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s ; the absence of harassment; and the lectures given on market days. The t o t a l i t y of these three factors suggest that the electorate was well-informed about what would happen a f t e r the plebiscite:,, namely, that the B r i t i s h would leave and with them the trusteeship system and that Northern Kamerun would then be e i t h e r part of Nigeria or of Cameroun. Consequently, the electorate 302 of the d i s t r i c t confirmed t h e i r desire to q u i t N i g e r i a . On the other hand, the constant arrests and harassment of the out-spoken supporters of the Camerounoproposition, and the a c t i v i t i e s o f S i r John Dring during the conduct of the p l e b i s c i t e denied the electorate of the r e s t of the p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t s the knowledge that, a f t e r the p l e b i s -c i t e , the B r i t i s h would leave, trusteeship would be terminated, and Northern Kamerun would then be e i t h e r part of Nigeria or of the Republic of Cameroun. Consequently, the Consortium which campaigned i n favour of Nigeria s o l d to the electorate of those d i s t r i c t s the idea that what was at stake was the reformed administration with i t s democratic element, the administration i n which the d i s s i d e n t F u l a n i would be free from subordi-nation to the Nigerian F u l a n i , and i n which the non-Fulani Muslims, the c h r i s t i a n s , and the a-Fon together with the r e s t of t h e i r subjects would not only have t h e i r l o c a l a f f a i r s i n t h e i r own hands but would also be ruled and protected by the B r i t i s h from the F u l a n i . As the Consortium i t s e l f put i t , i n a telegram to the United Nations, when i t was numoured, c o r r e c t l y , that Cameroun Republic was attempting to have the r e s u l t s of the 1961 p l e b i s c i t e i n Northern Kamerun n u l l i f i e d : We have e l e c t e d our Native A u t h o r i t i e s and want to keep them. We do not want the Cameroun R e p u b l i c . 2 7 As seen i n the preceding chapter, the democratic element i n the e l e c t i o n of 28 the Native A u t h o r i t i e s was stressed. I t would appear, therefore, that the majority of the votes i n Northern Kamerun, i n 1961, for N i g e r i a were votes for the reformed l o c a l administration. Indeed, the apparent r e v e r s a l of the 1959 decision i n 1961 by the Northern Kamerunians was,;Mn f a c t , not a r e v e r s a l . In 1959, the majority 30 3 of them voted tb?have t h e i r l o c a l administration i n t h e i r hands, to have the B r i t i s h stay, r u l e , and protect them, and to free themselves from subordination to the Nigerian Fulani as the case may be. The vote gave them a l l they looked f o r . In 1961, they voted to r e t a i n and protect the reformed l o c a l administration, gained i n the l a s t vote, with i t s advantages. That i s why, as Vanghan found out, \"Indeed, the proposed withdrawal, of the B r i t i s h from the area with the end of the [1961] p l e b i s c i t e was matter of 29 gravest concern to many pagans,\" i n the case of the non-Fulani. B r i t i s h withdrawal threatened a l o t : to subordinate the dis s i d e n t F u l a n i to the Nigerian F u l a n i ; to take away administrative jobs from the Western-educated Northern Kamerunians and give them to the Nigerian i m p e r i a l i s t s ; to take away the control of l o c a l a f f a i r s from the a-Fon and t h e i r subjects and give them to the Yola monopolists; and, to remove B r i t i s h protection of the non-Fulani from the threat to t h e i r l i v e s and c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y . Freedom from subordination to the Nigerian F u l a n i i n the case of the d i s s i -dent Fula n i , control of l o c a l a f f a i r s by the Northern Kamerunians, (Fulani and non-Fulani), continued trusteeship by the United Kingdom with i t s implied protection of the non-Fulani by the B r i t i s h , a l l form a continuum of what was promised during courtship that was not deli v e r e d a f t e r marriage. 304 The Meaning of the Votes in the Southern Kamerun Plebiscite It would have been more appropriate to analyse the meaning of the votes in the Southern Kamerun Plebiscites Fondom by Fondom or ethnic group by ethnic , group. But this approach, although best suited to reveal the accurate pic-ture of the situation, has many peoblems, some of them insurmountable. These Fondoms number in the hundreds and i t is very d i f f i c u l t to handle a l l of them in any detail in such a general study like the present one. Secondly, some of the Fondoms were integral parts of empires which have already been reduced here to large Fondoms, Kom, Nso, Bafut, Bali Nyonga for instance. Without any personal experience of the local p o l i t i c s of such large Fondoms, p o l i t i c s which the p o l i t i c a l leaders could and did exploit, i t would be very d i f f i c u l t for any author to read the accurate meaning into the votes of i t s component parts. In his book, Johnson hinted this of Nso, and with firsthand infor-mation of this empire, the present writer shall use Nso to*--show that Johnson's hint was more than a suggestion, to show scholars how much there is s t i l l to be investigated about the meaning of the votes in the Southern Kamerun plebis-cite, and to show the effectiveness of exploiting local issues for national events. Finally, written evidence i s not enough to permit such a thorough approach; future scholars, working specifically on the topic of this chapter, might find interviews helpful. This study is general and only leading the way and cannot handle a l l that. The approach adopted here, therefore, is one of looking at the i n d i v i -dual Administrative Divisions separately and, where possible, going beyond them and looking at the various plebiscite d i s t r i c t s within;such Divisions. The approach for each Division i s determined by the amount of evidence available. 305 This approach i s bound to cause some discrepancy i n the amount of time and space a l l o t t e d to each D i v i s i o n or p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t . But, on the whole, i t i s an improvement on the approaches adopted by current conven-t i o n s . By t r e a t i n g the p l e b i s c i t e on an all-Southern Kamerun l e v e l , the current l i t e r a t u r e had done a l o t to blur the p i c t u r e . I t does not matter from which D i v i s i o n one begins, but i t appears that the reader would have a c l e a r e r p icture i f the Div i s i o n s are analysed systematically from one end of the region to the other beginning from Nkambe i n the extreme north. Before t h i s i s done, however, i t might be better to p.ut the r e s u l t s of the p l e b i s c i t e ; i n a table i n order that the reader might see who apparently voted for what before reading the analyses. Results by Number of Votes i n the Southern Kamerun Plebiscite, 30 Administrative D i v i s i o n s and P l e b i s c i t e . D i s t r i c t s Number of Votes f o r Nigeria Number of Votes f o r Cameroun Nkambe D i v i s i o n * Nkambe North Nkambe East Nkambe Central Nkambe:~South To t a l 5,962 3,845 5,095 7,051 21,917 1,917 5,896 4,288 2,921 15,022 Wum D i v i s i o n * Wum North Wum Central Wum East Wum West To t a l 1,485 3,644 1,518 2,137 8,784 7,322 3,211 13,133 3,449 27,115 *Area or D i v i s i o n i n the grasslands. 306 Administrative Di v i s i o n s Number of Number of and Plebiscite\"! D i s t r i c t s Votes f o r Votes f o r Nigeria Cameroun Bamenda D i v i s i o n * Bamenda North (Nso) Bamenda East (Ndop) Bamenda Central West (Bafut) Bamenda Central East (Ngemba) Bamenda West (Menemo, Ngie, Ngwaw) Bamenda South (Ba l i Nyonga, Moghamo) 8,073 1,822 1,230 529 467 220 18,839 17,856 18,027 18,193 16,142 19,426 Total 12,341 108,485 Mamfe D i v i s i o n t Mamfe West 2,039 8,505 Mamfe North 5,432 6,410 Mamfe South 685 8,175 Mamfe East 1,894 10,177 Total 10,070 33,267 Kumba D i v i s i o n * * Kumba North-East Kumba North-West Kumba South-East Kumba South-West Tot a l 9,466 14,738 6,105 2,424 32,733 11,991 555 12,827 2,227 27,600 V i c t o r i a D i v i s i o n * * V i c t o r i a South-West V i c t o r i a South-East V i c t o r i a North-West V i c t o r i a North-East Total 2,552 1,329 4,744 3,291 11,916 3,756 4,870 4,205 9,251 22,082 Grand T o t a l \u00E2\u0080\u0094 S o u t h e r n Kamerun 97,741 233,571 *Area or D i v i s i o n i n the grasslands. tArea or D i v i s i o n p a r t l y i n the grasslands but mainly i n the f o r e s t zone. **Area or D i v i s i o n i n the f o r e s t z o n e \u00E2\u0080\u0094 c o a s t a l b e l t . 307 A swift look at the preceding table would reveal that two Admini-s t r a t i v e D i v i s i o n s , one i n the grasslands and the other i n the f o r e s t zone, voted f o r the Nigeria proposition while the region as a whole voted f o r the Cameroun proposition. What the Nigeria proposition or the Cameroun propo-s i t i o n a c t u a l l y meant to the voters i n each D i v i s i o n and/or P l e b i s c i t e D i s t r i c t i s the subject of the following pages. Fortunately, unlike the case i n Northern Kamerun, some of the voters did i n d i c a t e , a f t e r the p l e b i s -c i t e .; i n 1961, what these propositions meant to them. However, before the present w r i t e r takes a look at the meaning of the propositions to the various groups of electorate f o r which there are sources, he points out c e r t a i n factors which future researchers might wish to consider. The geographic l o c a t i o n of a l l the various p l e b i s c i t e d i s t r i c t s ( d i s t r i c t or d i s t r i c t s hereafter) i n Nkambe D i v i s i o n was as follows. Nkambe North shared boundaries with Northern Kamerun; i t voted with a huge majority for the N i g e r i a proposition., Nkambe East shared boundaries with Northern Kamerun and with Cameroun Republic; i t had about a 2,000 majority i n favour of Cameroun. No part of Nkambe had boundaries with Nigeria. Except f o r a very n e g l i g i b l e portion of Nkambe South which shared boundaries with Cameroun, Nkambe Central and Nkambe South had no boundary with any region outside Southern Kamerun. In both d i s t r i c t s , the number of votes were s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n favour of the Nigeria p r o p o s i t i o n . A f t e r the p l e b i s c i t e . , many a-Fon, some groups, and persons i n Nkambe D i v i s i o n i n d i c a t e d what the Nig e r i a or the Cameroun proposition meant to them i n general. I t appears that there was some l o c a l r i v a l r y i n Nkambe East which the p o l i t i c a l leaders of the d i s t r i c t e x p loited. A f t e r the p l e b i s c i t e , the a-Fon of Mbembe asked the United Nations not to bother about the outcry i n Nkambe 308 against r e u n i f i c a t i o n . . They were ready for r e u n i f i c a t i o n for which they had 31 voted. On the other hand, some of the a-Fon i n the same d i s t r i c t , who c a l l e d themselves 'Nobles,' and who apparently voted for Nigeria, c a l l e d upon the United Nations to p a r t i t i o n the region between those who voted for Nigeria and those who voted f o r Cameroun. Such a p a r t i t i o n was neces-sary \" i n order to avert a r e p e t i t i o n of the t r i b a l and c i v i l disorders 32 which are now taking place i n the Congo Republic.\" Without saying what r e u n i f i c a t i o n meant to him, but reacting more against the c a l l f o r p a r t i t i o n , a c e r t a i n Jabov H. Nkambe f e l t that any person who d i d not want r e u n i f i c a t i o n should \"leave our country and go to Nigeria following the other a l t e r n a t i v e . \" Jabov seemed to be concerned more with the land than with i t s inhabitants. Whether the boundary with Cameroun played an important r o l e i n t h i s d i s t r i c t or not, there i s strong i n d i c a t i o n that two groups of the a-Fon were involved i n some i n t e r n a l r i v a l r y . Whatever the case, some p e t i t i o n s from Nkambe are very useful i n helping the reader to have a c l e a r e r knowledge of what the Nigeria or Cameroun pro-p o s i t i o n meant i n general to the inhabitants of the area. The Women's Association of Nkambe voted en bloc against Cameroun and for Nigeria for several reasons. Without a c o n s t i t u t i o n r f o r r e u n i f i c a t i o n , the Republic of Cameroun was \"an uncertain destination.\" I t s future was \"uncertain,\" and i t s \"Government very unstable.\" On the other hand, there was the \"Rule of Law, respect for Human Rights and Freedom of p r a c t i c e of Democracy as the true form of Government,-\" i n N i g e r i a . Their k i t h and k i n were i n Northern Kamerun and had chosen to remain i n N i g e r i a . They had no wish to lose t h e i r 34 k i t h and k i n i n Northern Kamerun. T e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s which threatened the s t a b i l i t y of the Government of Cameroun, the absence of a c o n s t i t u t i o n 309 for r e u n i f i c a t i o n before the vote, s t a b i l i t y and democracy i n Nigeria, and the desire to be with t h e i r k i t h and ki n whom the B r i t i s h Western Kamerun boundary had put i n Northern Kamerun were factors to be reckoned with i n understanding the meaning of the vote of the Nkambe Women's Association. On the other hand, the a-Fon of the area emphasized ethnic i d e n t i t y which the Association had mentioned more than anything e l s e . As they saw i t , both i n the 1959 general e l e c t i o n s and i n the p l e b i s c i t e , they had voted \" s o l i d l y \" f o r \"association\" with N i g e r i a . They had c u l t u r a l , l i n g u i s -t i c , and ethnic a f f i n i t i e s and a f f i l i a t i o n s with Northern Kamerun and with t h e i r neighbours i n Nigeria.* I f the tea r i n g apart of Southern Kamerun through p o l i t i c a l s t r i f e was to be avoided, Nkambe D i v i s i o n should be 35 separated from Southern Kamerun and-made part of Northern Kamerun. The vote of these a-Fon and t h e i r subjects would appear to mean a vote f o r Northern Kamerun, not Nigeria, and s p e c i f i c a l l y a vote f o r t h e i r k i t h and ki n i n Northern Kamerun. This i s exactly what the p o l i t i c a l leaders of Nkambe\u00E2\u0080\u0094Ando, Tamfu, Nsame, Nyanjanji\u00E2\u0080\u0094seemed to have s a i d a t the same period. Even the Nkambe people who were at the time l i v i n g i n Wum D i v i s i o n had the same perceptions. As they saw i t , Nkambe should be separated from Southern Kamerun and made part of Northern Kamerun \"with whom we of Nkambe have everything, c u l t u r a l l y and administratively the same.\" In t h i s , they were merely seeking t h e i r n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y ; they had no \"brotherly, *The mention of Nigeria here i s very s u r p r i s i n g , because no part of Nkambe had boundaries with Ni g e r i a . However, i t might be, since they claim ethnic i d e n t i t y with the area of Northern Kamerun c l o s e s t to them and which had boundaries'with^Nigeria, that through that area of Northern Kamerun, they could claim Nigeria as a neighbour. 310 c u l t u r a l and administrative l i n k s with the Cameroun Republic.\" Furthermore, there was no s t a b i l i t y , progress, and s o l i d a r i t y i n Cameroun Republic. 37 Nkambe was part of Southern Kamerun only f o r administrative convenience. Again the meaning of the votes i n t h i s D i v i s i o n points to Northern Kamerun. However, although not a d i s i n t e r e s t e d party, i t was the CPNC of Nkambe which indi c a t e d why Nkambe as a whole voted for Nigeria and what the votes i n that D i v i s i o n for Cameroun a c t u a l l y meant. As i t saw i t , Nkambe D i v i s i o n had brothers and cousins i n Northern Kamerun whom i t would not \"miss\" and with whom i t must \"march\" to independence i n Nigeria. Should Nkambe not be separated from Southern Kamerun and made part of Northern Kamerun the Congo a f f a i r would be repeated i n Southern Kamerun. Perhaps i t may be worthy to mention at t h i s juncture that up to the moment . . . a su b s t a n t i a l majority of the people i n the t e r r i t o r y [Southern Kamerun] do not understand what they voted f o r . Most of them think that they voted for an Independent Southern Cameroons State and NOT [ r e ] u n i f i c a t i o n , i n the P l e b i s c i t e . 3 8 Here was the impact of the London November I960 Talks. Here too was the consequence of the United Nations decision on the two a l t e r n a t i v e s of the p l e b i s c i t e . Unlike Nkambe D i v i s i o n , only a small portion of Wum D i v i s i o n had boun-daries with Northern Kamerun. However, while Wum had an extensive boundary with Nigeria, no part of i t had any boundary with Cameroun Republic. While a very large but sparsely populated area of Wum had ethnic i d e n t i t y with the Tiv of Nigeri a , the l a r g e s t and heavily populated Fondom (ac t u a l l y empire) i n Wum, Kom, had more ethnic l i n k s with the Nso of Bamenda and i t s subjects i n t e r a c t e d more with Bamenda than with the r e s t of Wum. Jua, the deputy leader of the KNDP came from t h i s Kom Fondom. The extensive boundary with Nigeria i n t h i s D i v i s i o n was almost e x c l u s i v e l y shared by Wum North 311 which voted overwhelmingly for Cameroun. This D i v i s i o n , as seen i n chapter four, was the most confusedDbetween 1959 and 1961. I t was also one of those Divisions f or which there i s written evidence that the a-Fon, i n c l u d i n g the Fon of Kom, asked t h e i r subjects a few days before voting to vote f o r r e u n i f i c a t i o n . Fon John Yai of Bum (Wum Ce n t r a l ) , who went with Endeley the second time to London i n 1958 i n place of the Fon of B a l i Nyonga, was the f i r s t to indica t e the s i t u a t i o n i n Wum. A f t e r the p l e b i s c i t e Yai argued that he and hi s people voted for \"association\" with Nigeria \"within the B r i t i s h Common-wealth of Nations\" (the Commonwealth was thus a condition'sine qua non'for association with N i g e r i a ) . His Fondom had a boundary with Nigeria* and had \"been trading with the Federation long before the advent of the whiteman.\" His people shared the B r i t i s h educational, l e g a l , and c u l t u r a l systems with Nigeria. Reunification would only be detrimental and retrogressive i n 39 a l l aspects of l i f e . Yai's argument was repeated by the Fon of Bu (Wum Central) and ten of his C o u n c i l l o r s . This Fon, Chu, argued that h i s people voted f o r \"continued a s s o c i a t i o n with the Federation of Ni g e r i a i n the Commonwealth.\" His Fondom has had the same \"culture-, with Nigeria for over 45 years,\" the same \" j u d i -c i a l and l e g a l system,\" and the same land ownership system. A l l t h i s d i f f e r e d from what obtained i n the Cameroun Republic. The difference between the \" B r i t i s h and French laws\" would lead them i n t o confusion. They could not *Bum had no boundary with Nigeria but i t was an important i n t r e p o t of the Kolanut trade between Southern Kamerun and Northern Ni g e r i a . 312 \"leave from the B r i t i s h colony system to the French colony system\" ( s i c ) . The best course was to p a r t i t i o n Southern Kamerun between those who favoured as s o c i a t i o n with N i g e r i a i n the Commonwealth and those who voted 40 for r e u n i f i c a t i o n . The stress on the Commonwealth and the B r i t i s h t r a d i -t i o n and systems by Fon Chu i s i n s t r u c t i v e . Again, Fon Chu was among ^ p o s s i b l e combination of the a-Fon of Wum Central and Wum East\u00E2\u0080\u0094Chu of Bu, Tigha Nlua of Naikom, Achonji of Su, and Baunjia of Waindo\u00E2\u0080\u0094who, seven days before Chu wrote s i n g l y , opted out of r e u n i f i c a t i o n on March 3, 1961, something they had apparently voted f o r during the p l e b i s c i t e . These a-Fon argued that the p o l i t i c i a n s deceived and misled those of them who voted b l i n d l y f o r r e u n i f i c a t i o n \"without understanding the issues at stake.\" They abhored the idea and dreaded \"the very thought of u n i t i n g with the Cameroun Republic whose customs, way of l i f e and method of government\" d i f f e r e d from anything they had known. They wished to continue i n t h e i r association with Nigeria i n the Common-wealth which \"has Her Majesty the Queen as the Head.\" They l i k e d to continue to enjoy the freedom, the system of government and j u s t i c e which they had received from the B r i t i s h i n t h e i r \"association with the B r i t i s h Throne.\" Should the idea of r e u n i f i c a t i o n be pressed forward, they would secede from Southern Kamerun and j o i n t h e i r \"kinsmen the Munchis of T i v t r i b e of Nigeria.\" They voted f o r r e u n i f i c a t i o n because they were c a r r i e d away by the l i e that \"the White Box stood for the Southern Cameroons as i t i s without any change 41 i n administration.\" What these a-Fon were arguing f o r seems to suggest what the i n t e g r a t i o n i s t s were o f f e r i n g them during the campaign, and, of course, they i n d i c a t e d what r e u n i f i c a t i o n f o r which they voted meant to them: 42 \"Southern Kamerun as i t i s without any change i n administration.\" 313 Some men and women in these areas, other than the a-Fon, also comp- '. lained to the United Nations after the plebiscite. On March 12, 1961, a group of women from Su, Aghem, argued against reunification asserting that i t would change their peaceful l i f e and freedom, lead them to s t r i f e and confusion, and, because of the terrorist a c t i v i t i e s , lead to the death 43 of their husbands. The men of the same Fondom, on March 17, 1961, argued quite differently from the women. Their vote for reunification was a function of the threat they received from the KNDP Government. They were not ready to be led into reunification by \"the blind and t r i b a l votes of the Bamenda people.\" If the boundary was not adjusted to include them in Northern Kamerun, the United Nations could expect to find i t s e l f occupied; 44 they would take things into their own hands. The a-Fon of Wum West (Beba-Befang-Essimbi) were among those who asked their subjects to vote for reunification about which they themselves had l i t t l e , i f any, knowledge. As they put i t themselves, they wished \"to make i t abundantly clear\" that they \"were deceived by the KNDP politicians.\" These politicians told them that voting for reunification meant secession from Nigeria, joining the Republic, \"but remaining by ourselves under a similar regime as i s obtainable now\" (that i s , without any influence from the Cameroun Republic or any modifications resulting from reunification). The KNDP deceived them and they held back their subjects from going to listen to the enlightenment lectures. They thus voted for reunification without knowing what i t involved. It was now their determination not to 45 be pushed into reunification by the Bamenda people. This position of these a-Fon was echoed by some of their subjects. Boja, although not an impartial observer, argued that .the KNDP deceived 314 the people that the second alternative was secession without reunification and that the idea of gradual reunification after fifteen years was intended 46 to deceive the OK. The women of Essimbi argued that they voted 97 per cent for the \"British Commonwealth,\" and no matter what happened, they must remain in the Commonwealth where they would enjoy \"Freedom, Security, Liberty and Equality.\" Life in the Republic was \"very uncertain\" to them, and reunification might result in \"Commonism\" (sic) and in making them part of the French Community, both ideas they resented down to their marrow. They were happy and satisfied with the British way of l i f e which gave equality to men and women. That the Queen was the present ruler of Britain was indicative of the equality between men and women, something which would never happen in the Republic of Cameroun; a woman would never be head of 47 the Government of the Republic of Cameroun. Nigerian friendliness, the British tradition, the Commonwealth, and cultural identity might explain the meaning of the votes in Wum North. The a-Fon of Fungom area argued that they wished to be with Nigeria because Nigerians were their \"friends,\" and because that would prevent them from \"leaving the British Commonwealth\" with which they had been for many years. There was nothing wrong with Nigeria and the Nigerians had not .done any wrong thing to them.* Cameroun Republic was far removed from them and they did not understand the language of the Republic (French). Furthermore, 48 the Nigerians with whom they shared a boundary were their kinsmen. Although the majority of them voted for the \"White Box,\" reunification, (the votes were 1,485 for Nigeria and 7,322 for Cameroun), the votes were *This area was far removed from Ibo influences. 315 for \"Foncha, as a son of the grassland, and not for unification.\" Their 49 votes for the \"Green Box\" were votes for \"association with Nigeria.\" Wum North had thus asked and answered i t s own questions at the plebiscite-.' As one of the four most powerful a-Fon, the Fon of Kom did not bother writing any petition after the plebiscite. He and his loyal subjects voted for the second alternative and he, therefore, had no reason to complain; the votes were 1,518 for Nigeria and 13,133 for Cameroun. It i s thus d i f f i c u l t to know what the votes of Wum East stood for. Up to 1960, the Fon of Kom, like his brother the Fon of Nso, was an integrationist.* During this period, Jua, who was both a Minister and the Deputy Leader of the KNDP, worked hard to influence the Fon of Kom to change his mind. It is obvious that the Fon changed his mind since as Boja reported, and as seen in the preceding chapter, this Lion of Kom asked his subjects to vote for reunification. However, the three-point general offer the KNDP made to Wum as a whole might have had something to do with i t . These included the ideas that: a vote for the White Box meant a vote \"to regain our land from the Ibo people and not for joining the Republic of Cameroun\"; the \"White Box represented our Grassland son Mr. Foncha while the Green Box represented Dr. Endeley the Coastal man\"; and, any grasslander \"voting for 50 the Green Box dxd so against the tribe.\" Bamenda Division, the most populous area of Southern Kamerun, had no boundaries with either Nigeria or Northern Kamerun. On the other hand, i t had an extensive boundary with Cameroun Republic. It was the home of *I remember vividly while , as students, in St. Peter's College, Bambui, Lawrence Yen Chia from Kom informed me that the Fon of Kom might be dethroned i f he did not change his mind. I also remember warning him that Nso could ./ not be indifferent to the fate of the Fon of Kom. 316 two p o l i t i c a l leaders, Foncha and Ntumazah. I t also had a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a l share of extraneous factors i n Southern Kamerun, the Ibo and the Eastern Kamerunians i n addition to the Hausa of Northern Nigeria. I t was the home of three of the four most powerful a-Fon of Southern Kamerun, the Lion of Nso, the Lion of Bafut, and the Lion of B a l i Nyonga. As a r e s u l t , t r a d i t i o n and respect f or i t was paramount i n t h i s D i v i s i o n . A l l over Southern Kamerun, the majority of the electorate of each Fondom or ethnic group voted i n the same d i r e c t i o n . But t h i s s i t u a t i o n was more pronounced i n t h i s D i v i s i o n than elsewhere except where l o c a l p o l i t i c s made i t possible f or the p o l i t i c a l leaders to e x p l o i t the s i t u a t i o n and a l t e r the pattern. Bamenda D i v i s i o n was i n a curious s i t u a t i o n . Because of i t s dominant population s i z e , because of i t s strong t r a d i t i o n a l systems and -powerful a-Fon, and because i t was the home of the Premier, the r e s t of the D i v i s i o n s , Mamfe less so than the others, blamed i t for everything believed to have gone or going wrong.* I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , therefore, that, with no one else to blame, except perhaps i t s e l f , Bamenda D i v i s i o n was the area with the l e a s t number of complaints a f t e r the plebiscite'. Consequently, the attempt to f i n d out from the Bamenda people themselves, what r e u n i f i -cation, f or which they voted so overwhelmingly\u00E2\u0080\u009412,341 for Nigeria, 108,485 for Cameroun\u00E2\u0080\u0094meant to them has not been very f r u i t f u l . A.A. Tamasang, *During the N i g e r i a - B i a f r a War, r e u n i f i c a t i o n , f o r the f i r s t time, became SINCERELY very popular i n Southern Kamerun, then West Cameroon. The popular saying, with some j u s t i f i c a t i o n , was, \"We would have become the battleground. Then, everyone claimed c r e d i t f o r h i s wisdom i n voting f o r r e u n i f i c a t i o n ; Bamenda no longer received the c r e d i t . This was also the period when the popular myth depicting Foncha as the \"Champion of Reunicifaciton\" caught the imagination of nearly a l l West Cameroonians. 317 who was leading the KNC in Foncha1s own Fondom and was, indeed, Foncha *s cousin, and Mallam L.T. Sale of Nso, who was the leader of the Muslim Congress, mentioned direct bribery, coercive a c t i v i t i e s , and the mis-representation of the questions as discussed in the last chapter. 5 1 But neither of them nor their supporters voted for reunification anyway. Nevertheless, since, during the campaign period, the KNDP \"concent-52 rated i t s main efforts in the Bamenda highlands,\" in the absence of grass-roots sources, the meaning of the votes of Bamenda must be sought within the general offers of the KNDP. Although these offers had been indicated in the preceding chapter, they must be summarized here, i f only for emphasis. These offers included: a plea to the Bamenda peoples to free themselves from the Commonwealth, the French Community, Nigeria, and Ibo domination; a request to the people to regain their land, property, and control of Bamenda from the Ibo; a plea to the people to salvage their traditions from Ibo destruction; an invitation to the Bamenda people to carry foreward the development of the area which the Germans initiated but which the British retarded; a request to the Bamenda people to build a Kamerun nation, preserve the identity of that nation, and preserve the 53 identity of Kamerunians within i t . Mbile's idea that the plebiscite was a struggle between the \"ignorant\" people of Bamenda and the forest dwellers, and the.'idea of Foncha being a Bamenda son were also well publi-54 cxzed. A l l this would seem to suggest what reunification would give to the 'guilty' Bamenda people. But, there were other areas in Bamenda, Nso or Bamenda North for instance, where the KNDP exploited the local situation and the votes of the d i s t r i c t spoke a different language altogether. No one seemed to have 318 understood this better than the supreme Fon of Nso, Sehm III, himself. After the plebiscite, this Lion, on March 3, 1961, addressed a lengthy message to the United Nations (part of his empire had become disloyal for the f i r s t time) which brought out the following points. He ruled over 60,000 people, about 26,000 of whom had registered and voted at the plebiscite. Nso was \"virtually\" an \"empire with tributary chiefdoms [Fondoms] and lineage head systems.\" Because of confusion, fanaticism, and organized agitation created by \" p o l i t i c a l careerists, most people mainly the i l l i t e r a t e masses\" voted blindly and sentimentally \"without due consideration and appreciation for the purpose and implications of the plebiscite.\" The conduct of the plebiscite was characterized by \"Lust for money by the poor, jobs for those diasppointed in l i f e , apparent and vain prestige for the disgruntled class, 1' a l l of which found expression in \"organized hooliganism, pressure groups, lying groups, self seeking and other influences of personal and petty group pride and advantages.\" Lies about continued trusteeship and \"separate independence for Southern Cameroons,\" and the \"distortive propaganda\" that a vote for Nigeria meant \"selling the Southern Cameroons in slavery to the Ibo\" dominated the plebis-cite campaign. Many of the a-Fon within the Nso empire and some of the a-Talaah (plural of Shufai or any other Fai\u00E2\u0080\u0094lineage heads) in Nso voted for reunification as a means or sign of freedom from the \"Over-Lord\" (Sehm III, himself) whose \"nucleus people\" tended to vote for integration. Some of the a-Fon had been regarded as \"imperialists.\" Some politicians had tried to undermine traditional systems \"and long established central authorities\" in order to win votes. This was \"done by fanning old pre-judices, creating dissatisfaction and aggravating disgruntlement and pride 319 among subordinate chiefdoms [Fondoms] and lineage heads.\" He was very-skeptical about the going talk of partitioning the region, but, i f the United Nations should proceed with i t , Nso should be made part of Northern . 55 Nigeria. By requesting that the United Nations make Nso part of Northern Nigeria, in case of the partition of Southern Kamerun, the Fon ; virtu a l l y refused to recognize the results of the plebiscite' in Nso. This significant point should not be missed. The Fon's message was essentially a description of Nso local p o l i t i c s v f and the exploitation of the situation by the KNDP during the plebiscite-. There were (are) at least three ranks of the a-Fon in Nso. The Fon of Nso is the lone supreme authority; he is the Fon of Nso Central, the nucleus people of Nso, and the Fon of every other Fondom within the empire. The a-Fon of Mbiame, Oku, Nkar, and Ntseh* come next in rank and there i s no real distinguishing among them at their own level. Below these, there are numerous minor a-Fon some of whom were Western-educated at the plebiscite period. Nso Central i t s e l f is made up of many powerful villages and families (lineages), families whose members number in the thousands. The head, Shufai or Lord, of one of these families is actually a privileged second most powerful person in the Nso empire. Nso local p o l i t i c s at the time of the plebiscite . had at least three characteristics to i t . The rest of the Fondoms, Fon Philip of Noni in particular, within the empire were not always too happy with their subor-dination to the central Fondom although they always obeyed the proclamation *Very often, the Nsungli consider Ntseh part of them but the Fon of Ntseh considers himself and his subjects part of Nso. Nearly every person in Ntseh speaks both Nso and Nsungli languages. 320 of the Fon of Nso. For some reason, to be seen presently, the Fon of Nso was in an informal alliance with Endeley and the British. This meant he was to influence Nso to vote for whatever Endeley and the British stood. Realising the resentment of some of the a-Fon for their subordinate role in Nso affairs, the local KNDP leaders made i t easy for these a-Fon to interpret reunification as a means of gaining independence from, or at least acting independently of the wishes of the Fon of Nso. This was what Sehm III meant when he said the a-Fon in the empire voted for reunification as a sign of freedom from the \"Over-Lord\" whose nucleus people tended to vote for integration with Nigeria. It was also what he meant when he said politicians were \"creating disguntlement and pride among subordiante chief-doms.\" Within Nso Central i t s e l f , there was a family affair between Sehm III and his second in command, Shufai Ndzendzevf (the Lord or head of the Ndzendzevf family), Njodzeka. The squabble between Sehm III and Njodzeka was too complicated and too involved to be handled here. However, the problem in i t s most skeletal form was as follows. Nga, the Fon of Nso whom Sehm III succeeded, died at a very old age. During his last years, Shufai Ndzendzevf was virtual ruler of Nso and wielded power no Shufai had ever wielded before in Nso. At the same time Njodzeka began to show a preference for Shufai Gasah as the most lik e l y successor to Nga. When Nga died, Njodzeka and the other Fon-makers clashed over the successor; the mojority stood for Mbinglo, while Njodzeka apparently stood alone for Shufai Gasah. Against Njodzeka's opposition, Mbinglo came to the throne as Sehm III. On . the most important day for mourning over Nga, Njodzeka came to the Palace well-dressed in disregard of tradition; he had gone too 321 far too fast with the wrong person\u00E2\u0080\u0094Sehm III was a lion who put his words into immediate action. Njodzeka's act was annoying to many of the Nso subjects, some of whom seized the opportunity to inform Sehm III of Njodzeka's opposition to the former's enthronement, something the Fon was already apprised of through treachery and a desire to gain favours. The Fon and many of his Councillors interpreted Njodzeka's act as a challenge. On top of a l l this, Njodzeka attempted to play the role he had played during the last years of Nga in ruling Nso. Sehm III was not the man to share authority with any person in the Nso empire; he already had enough power but he wanted more. The stage for a clash had been set. It led to Njodzeka's exile to Baba. When he attempted to come back home, there was a c i v i l war in Nso\u00E2\u0080\u0094a seven hour war in which actual combat lasted for three hours. Njodzeka was next exiled to Mamfe where he took his own l i f e . During a l l this, the British and Endeley were on the side of Sehm III in an informal alliance: the Fon would ask his subjects to vote for whatever they stood and they would support the Fon over Njodzeka. On the other hand, the local KNDP leaders made the Ndzendzevf family to regard reunification as opposition to the Fon. This was what the Fon meant when he said some p o l i t i c a l \"careerists\" were \"fanning old prejudices, creating dissatis-faction and aggravating disgruntlement and pride among subordinate . . . lineage heads.\" But there was s t i l l another lineage head prejudice which these p o l i -ticians exploited. This involved Shufai Yuwar, originally a princely family but generations, according to tradition, had stripped i t of that princeliness. There was also a family af f a i r between Shufai Yuwar and the Fon of Nso. The problem began possibly during the early 1920s i f not during the German 322 period. It was also possibly during the reign' of Nga. Whoever was ruling ( i t might have been Tamanjo, but surely not Mapiri) exiled Shufai Yuwar to Nsungli (later in Nkambe Division) for reasons not readily known. In the late 1920s (about 1926) Shufai Yuwar was asked to return home with his family whose members numbered in the hundreds. But, either his son or his grandson, the present Shufai of Yuwar, never forgave the Fon of Nso for,, the exile. When he succeeded to the Yuwar headship, he was looking for an opportunity to retaliate. That the contemporary Fon was not res-ponsible for the exile made no difference. Encouraged by politicians, the plebiscite gave Shufai Yuwar the opportunity. Indeed, Yuwar was the headquarters of the KNDP in Nso. Shufai Yuwar was, thus, one of those \"lineage heads\" whose \"old prejudices\" had been fanned to whom the Fon referred. The votes of the Yuwar family for reunification were probably votes against i t s long forgotten exile which lived in the mind of the family head. Finally, although the l i s t of ri v a l r i e s in Nso could be multiplied indefinitely, there was a strong rivalry, which had nothing to do with the Fon directly, among the people of Nso Central themselves. Seated at the centre of Nso and in Kimbo,* (Kumbo) and always having the ears of the Fon f i r s t , the Kimbo people became the target of opposition from the various -.\u00E2\u0080\u00A2Originally; ..the word .'Kimbo,..1 when .pronounced correctly, meant the act:, of cheating\u00E2\u0080\u0094also called 'mbomi,' cheating. Since no person outside Kimbo could confer with the Fon, except the: more powerful a-Talaah, without passing through a Kimbo person, and this involved tipping also, the Kimbo people were soon described as cheaters; so came the name of the capital. But the Kimbo people soon succeeded in distorting the pronunciation of the name and thus made i t devoid of any meaning. Kumbo is the British anglicized version. 323 villages of Nso Central, particularly from the Western-educated and youths of those villages. When the plebiscite'. came and the Kirabo people indicated they would 'Kpu Fon mbov,' that i s , die by the side of the Fon, the Western-educated people and youths from these various villages of Nso Central, especially Meluf and Nkum, saw an opportunity for registering their opposition\"tp$ Kimbo. These were those the Fon referred to as hoolings, l i a r s , and organized agitators and opposition to Kimbo i s what reunification might have meant to them. The plebiscite had done to Nso what, i f the reader were careful enough he should have found out by now, i t did to Southern Kamerun as a whole; i t undermined Nso unity and threatened tradition just as much as i t undermined the unity of Southern Kamerun and threatened tradition a l l over the region. The KNDP i s best remembered in Nso for one notorious phrase which i t s local leaders coined at the time: \"Tiy y i mo-o yo wui a-ning eh y i mo-o k i t u \u00E2\u0080\u0094 No stone shall l i e on another.\" What this phrase meant actually was that: no Fon in Nso shall have authority over Nso; no Fon in Nso shall have authority over any other Fon within the Nso empire; the Fon of Nso shall not have authority over Shufai Ndzendzevf and Shufai Yuwar; and, Kimbo shall not dominate the other villages. But i t also meant much more than these opportunists would have admitted: no Fon shall have authority over his subjects; no po l i t i c i a n shall have authority over his constituents; and, perhaps more importantly, no government in Southern Kamerun or Cameroon shall have auhtority over the governed. In short, the phrase preached anarchism. It was this that led Sehm III to conclude that the, politicians or p o l i t i c a l careerists were attempting to undermine traditional systems \"and long established central authorities.\" Whatever the case, i t appears 324 that the Nso asked and answered their own questions at the plebiscite , interpreting the United Nations questions to suit their local p o l i t i c s . * Future and more specific studies would have to find out whether the Nso situation was replicated anywhere in Southern Kamerun. For the moment, this general study would have to proceed with i t s investigation south-wards . Mamfe Division had the longest boundary with Nigeria and a not in-significant boundary with Cameroun Republic. Although i t was significantly larger than Bamenda in geographic terms, i t was sparsely populated. It was partly in the grasslands but mainly in the forest zone. Its traditional systems were s t i l l relatively intact at the time of the plebiscite. It comes out as the most p o l i t i c a l l y well-organized Division\u00E2\u0080\u0094combining i t s traditional systems with the British system to produce a cohesive Mamfe system\u00E2\u0080\u0094at the time of the nationalist movement and plebiscite,'-\" \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 It was here that the choice was made to live with the devil one knew (Nigeria) than to li v e with the devil one did not know (Cameroun). It was also Mamfe which destroyed, by refusing to co-operate, the 'ViKuMa Movement'\u00E2\u0080\u0094the *It i s significant that when an outside observer, Willard R. Johnson, op. c i t . , p. 48 suggested casually that the votes in Nso might have spoken a peculiar language, he was immediately contradicted by Thaddius Kinga, who was studying in the U.S. at the time Johnson was writing, and who was a school-mate, in the same St. Theresia's School, Kimbo, of the present writer. \"The people remain competitive with the core clans of the original groups; the resulting cleavages can become important in p o l i t i c a l competition. Such cleavages may have, influenced the plebiscite vote in Nsaw [Nso], for example,\" op. c i t . , p. 48. Kinga claimed to have his information from Joseph N. Lafon, one of the local KNDP leaders. Johnson has been vindicated by this study. Kinga who came from one of the closest villages to Kimbo, Kikai, and who graduated from the biggest school in Kimbo should have known this with-out any consultation. 325 idea, possibly suggested by Mbile, that Victoria, Kumba, and Mamfe Divi-sions should band together, present a united front to the grasslands, and i f possible, and i f need be, expel the grasslanders from these Divisions by force of arms. Indeed, at one point in time (late 1950s) there was so much tension between the grasslanders and the indigenous inhabitants of Kumba and Victoria Divisions in these two Divisions that, had Mamfe co-operated, Southern Kamerun would li k e l y have experienced violent conflict. This was what Manga-Williams referred to, as seen in chapter five, when he said the people of the coastal belt had guns and cutlasses* ready for a c i v i l war and that the solution was either the provision of a third question for the plebiscite; or the creation of a Smaller Kamerun State. Unfortunately, the Mamfe people, who did not seem to blame Bamenda very much for everything that went or was going wrong, did not indicate what reunification meant to them after the plebiscite; The content of their votes for reunification must therefore be sought within the framework of the general KNDP campaign offers. Since these had been indicated above in the section on Bamenda, they need not be repeated here. However, ..the majority of those who apparently voted for Nigeria in Mamfe Overside or Mamfe North did indicate why they did so. The a-Fon of Mamfe Overside argued that the Nigeria-Kamerun boundary s p l i t their ethnic group with the greater portion of the group going to Nigeria. The time had come for them, the smaller portion, to be reunited with their kinsmen in Nigeria. That was 56 why the majority of them voted for Nigeria. It should be remembered that *See U.N., T.C., T/PET. 4/L. 103, February 1, 1961, pp. 1-4. 326 i t was in this area that the KPP won the only seat in the 1953 general elections while the KNC claimed the rest of the seats in Southern Kamerun. On March 16, 1961, these a-Fon argued that Takamanda, Assumbo, and Mesaga Ekol, their pre-colonial Fondoms had been s p l i t by the Nigeria-Kamerun boundary. They had cultural, linguistic, and ethnic a f f i n i t i e s with their Nigerian neighbours. They had never benefitted from the taxes they paid to Southern Kamerun and they had \"no cultural, linguistic, administrative, p o l i t i c a l and social relationship with the people of the Cameroun Republic.\" Essentially, then, the Boki votes of 4,920 for Nigeria and 1,088 for 58 Cameroun had very l i t t l e consideration, i f any, for the whole of Nigeria as a p o l i t i c a l entity. Kumba Division, possibly the largest administrative unit in Southern Kamerun in geographic terms, had a significant boundary with Nigeria on the west, and a more extensive boundary with Cameroun Republic on the east. It was the home of Nerius Namaso Mbile, Leader of the KPP after mid-1959, and later, Deputy Leader of the CPNC. It was sparsely populated. About two-thirds of i t s land was controlled by one ethnic group, the Bakundu. It had a considerable number of non-Kumba indigenous inhabitants mainly from Nigeria, Bamenda Highlands, and Eastern Kamerun. Its over-all votes, contri buted mainly by the Bakundu ethnic group, were in favour of Nigeria; i t was thus one of the Divisions which voted for Nigeria. Not surprisingly, i t was the Division which, according to the available evidence, complained most after the plebiscite.. Indeed, nearly a l l the major Fondoms of the Divi-sion complained to the United Nations after the declaration of the results of the plebiscite. . The Bakossi, probably the only ethnic group which does not readily f a l l 327 within the Bakundu ethnic group, complained very bitterly. Their complaint was raised by the 'Mwane-Ngoe Union,' a Union of apparently a l l the Bakossi speaking peoples, on March 4, 1961. The Bakossi argued that \" t r i b a l senti-ments rather than a clear understanding of the issues at stake had greatly influenced the voting at the recent Southern Cameroon Plebiscite in favour of the second alternative.\" There were \"hazards\" in the proposed \"vague p o l i t i c a l experiment of 'UNIFICATION' with the Cameroun Republic.\" The situation was fraught with \"discontent, rancor, bitterness and terrorism.\" They were calling upon the United Nations \"to make a l l appropriate arrange-ments whereby the Bakossi people [would] be administered with other kindred tribes who [had] voted solidly for Federation with the independent Fede-59 ration of Nigeria.\" Although the Bakossi did not spell out what the discontent, rancor and bitterness were a l l about, i t was , more probable than not, Bakossi-Bamileke Tombel Land problem which lay behind the Bakossi vote. The next people in Kumba to raise an alarm were the Bakundu. In Feb-ruary, 1961, the Bakundu People Convention argued that they had voted solidly for integration with Nigeria. A careful analysis of the results of the N plebiscite, \"from the t r i b a l units to the Divisional basis,\" would depict nothing \"but an enduring r e l i c of mass ignorance, fanaticism and hysteria on one hand and nostalgia, intimidation, deceit and intellectual amnesia on the other.\" The territory had been placed \"on the brink of a paroxysm,\" and the Congo situation was around the corner. There had never been any Kamerun Nation, and \"the rumpus that a Nation had been split, [was] sheer chicanery.\" Reunification could only pass on the score of sentiment. People voted without any information about the .implications of the two 328 questions in the plebiscite. Justice would not be made i f some ethnic groups were allowed to decide for others because of their superior numbers. They would never acquiesce in reunification and they were prepared to 60 fight against i t to the last man. After a l l this wasteful exercise in euphuism, threats, and accusations, H.N. Elangwe, President of the Conven-tion, and his countrymen failed to show what, in their own minds, the two plebiscite questions involved. Nevertheless, by asserting that justice would not be done i f one ethnic group were to decide for another, and that they would not accept the results of the plebiscite which were based on the votes of the majority, the Bakundu themselves denied that the ple-biscite was an all-Southern Kamerun issue. The Bafaw of Kumba joined in the Bakundu outcry against reunification while the Mbonge of Kumba embraced reunification. The Bafaw Youths Asso-ciation, on March 21, 1961, argued that Foncha led the slogans: \"Ibos must go\"; \"Kamerun na we country\"\u00E2\u0080\u0094Kamerun is our country or Kamerun for the Kamerunians; \"voting for the White Box meant retention of Our Cameroon s o i l for the Cameroons\"; and, \"a vote for a Green Box meant selling the Cameroon s o i l to the Ibos.\" 6 1 The votes in Kumba North-East where Bafaw was located were 9,466 for Nigeria and 11,991 for Cameroun. It is probable, therefore, that the majority in this d i s t r i c t for the Cameroun proposition represented these Foncharian slogans. On March 20, 1961, the a-Fon of Mbonge (Kumba South-East) \"solemnly and solidly\" declared their \"faith\" in the cause of their \"nation, which voted for unification with the Republic of Cameroun.\" They had nothing to do with integration with Nigeria and the proposed partitioning of Southern Kamerun. The plebiscite \"was not a t r i b a l issue but a national issue,\" and the \"two questions posed at the 329 62 plebiscite were intended to achieve this end\u00E2\u0080\u0094of identity.\" The Mbonge had thus interpreted the questions of the plebiscite- in terms of 'national identity.' It i s l i t t l e wonder then that Mbonge was located in the only d i s t r i c t i n Kumba that voted with an overwhelming majority (6,105 to 12,827) in favour of the Cameroun proposition. The last group of people to complain from Kumba were the Balondo. On February 27, 1961, the Balondo gave several reasons for voting for Nigeria. They had enjoyed \"a peaceful administration for over 50 years [an incorrect number of years] under the British, developed culturally, educationally, p o l i t i c a l l y and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y with Nigeria.\" The plebiscite \"was conducted s t r i c t l y on t r i b a l interests and sentiments.\" What lay beneath the \"superficial entity of the Southern Cameroons\" was \"a bitter struggle between the grasslands tribes of Bamenda . . . and the tribes of the Coastal area.\" The \"sinister motive\" of the grasslanders in'.voting for reunification was to \"drag\" the coastal peoples \"to a lawless society\" where they would then \"seize\" the Balondo's \" f e r t i l e lands\" which they envied. The next thing to do would be to \"enslave\" the coastal peoples and their children forever. Neither Ahidjo nor Foncha could provide a stable and peaceful government \"judging from their past performance.\" Independence in the chaotic Cameroun > Republic would have no meaning. The solution for the present out-turn of events would be the \"PARTITIONING\" of Southern Kamerun between those who 63 voted for Cameroun and those who voted for Nigeria. Vicroria Division was the smallest administrative unit in Southern Kamerun in both population size and in geographic terms. But i t contained the headquarters of the region and many economic activities of the country including some of the plantations and a l l the seaports. It was the home of 330 Dr. Endeley, Manga-Williams, and Kale. Its Original inhabitants were mainly the Bakweri. While i t had a small boundary with Nigeria', i t had a more extensive boundary with Cameroun Republic. :indeed, i t belonged to the same ethnic group with the Douala of Cameroun Republic. At the time of voting, there were probably more non-Bakweri people in Victoria Division than the Bakweri. As already indicated or asserted above, the majority of the voters in Victoria Division were probably non-Bakweri. The number of votes in this Division and the proposition for which the majority of the votes stood were probably the most deceptive in a l l of Southern Kamerun. After the plebiscite, the Bakweri themselves made a very careful study of the voting pattern in their land and came out with a more convincing conclu-sion. In fifteen villages predominantly inhabited by the Bakweri, a total of 6,546 votes were cast at the plebiscite. 5,706 of these votes were for Nigeria and 840 were for Cameroun. In seven areas\u00E2\u0080\u0094villages, major c i t i e s , and towns\u00E2\u0080\u0094of the Division in which there were large Ibo and Bamenda popu-lations, and which were predominantly inhabited by the non-Bakweri, a total of 11,185 votes were cast at the plebiscite. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 3,846 of these were for Nigeria and 7,339 were for Cameroun. In nine plantation areas, inhabited mainly by the non-Bakweri workers, a total of 11,280 votes were cast at the plebiscite,. 1,888 of these were for Nigeria and 9,392 were for 64 Cameroun. These figures would appear to support the claim of the Bakweri that they did not vote for reunification. At the same time, they question the claim of the Bakweri KNDP who used the total number of votes in the Division for reunification to assert that the Bakweri \"voted solidly\" for 65 reunification. 331 Indeed, the Bakweri, as an ethnic group, voted for the Nigeria proposition and that for several reasons. These reasons were clearly spelt out on February 17, 1961, by the Bakweri Molongo, a cultural society embracing a l l the Bakweri speaking people. As they, the Bakweri, saw i t , they had always feared the domination of the Bakweri by the non-Bakweri people liv i n g in Victoria Division, their home. These non-Bakweri in the Division, whom the Bakweri called 'native strangers\u00E2\u0080\u0094who shall go home with empty hands as they came,' were attracted to the Division by the fer-t i l i t y of the Bakweri land and the employment opportunities the plantations provided. The \"native strangers\" had developed a \"plot\" to \"deprive\" them of their \"land.\" The \"native strangers\" voted for reunification in Victoria Division in order to seize the Bakweri lands, and in order \"to spite and over-run the Bakweris.\" The Bakweri had voted for Nigeria because the Nigerian Constitution provided safeguards for the minorities which was what the Bakweri were. 6 6 It was therefore necessary for the Bakweri to remain a part of Nigeria. The United Nations should take immediate steps to partition Southern Kamerun and allow the Bamenda people to go on with 6 7 their Cameroun proposition. Nevertheless, some of the Bakweri were happy losers. These accepted the fact that the plebiscite was an all-Southern Kamerun issue, and that the majority had decided against what they themselves wished to see happen. Eleven a-Fon of the Bakweri and thirteen Bakweri elders denounced the proposed partitioning of the region and Dr. Endeley for advocating such a hideous idea. Any Bakweri man who advocated such an idea, they said, was speaking for himself and not for the Bakweri people. What the Bakweri now wanted was a strong one country, Kamerun, as the majority had decided at 332 the p l e b i s c i t e . Foncha now had t h e i r confidence and he was speaking for 68 them. I t was perhaps the presence of people l i k e these which made the aftermath of the p l e b i s c i t e end i n threats- and l i t t l e - e l s e ... On February 11, 1961, the United Nations asked the Southern Kameru-nians two questions: \"(a) Do you wish to achieve independence by j o i n i n g the independent Federation of Nigeria? (b) Do you wish to achieve independence by j o i n i n g the independent Republic of Cameroun?\" What the United Nations offered the Southern Kamerunians i n the two questions was a choice between Nigerian c i t i z e n s h i p and Camerounian c i t i z e n s h i p . The United Nations attached no conditions to the two kinds of c i t i z e n s h i p i t offered the Southern Kamerunians. That meant, for example, once Nigerians, the Southern Kamerunians would have to accept anything Nige r i a , as an independent country, decided. Or, i f Camerounians the Southern Kamerunians would have to accept anything Cameroun, as an independent country, decided. Generally, and i n the main, the Southern Kamerunians d i d not i n t e r p r e t the questions t h i s way. Generally, they attached conditions of t h e i r own to the questions. In the case of N i g e r i a , the conditions were, to name only a few: Nigeria must be a member of the Commonwealth; i t must r e t a i n and maintain the B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n and systems; i t must be a Federation; Southern Kamerun p a r t i c u l a r i s m must be retained and maintained i n the Nigerian Federal universalism v i a association; and, Nigeria must never go Communist or S o c i a l i s t . In the case of Cameroun, the main conditions were: Cameroun must get out of the French Community; the new state must be independent of any foreign influences, s p e c i f i c a l l y of France and B r i t a i n ; i t must not go Communist or S o c i a l i s t ; i t would have to be a Federation; and the Anglo-Saxon t r a d i t i o n and systems must co-exist with the G a l l i c t r a d i t i o n and 333 systems within the Kamerunian p a r t i c u l a r i s m i n a Federation. The Southern Kamerunians had thus asked and answered t h e i r own questions, i n t e r p r e t i n g the questions the United Nations asked to s u i t t h e i r l o c a l conditions and circumstances. THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN KAMERUN PLEBISCITE DISTRICTS OF 1961.* 334 1 V - _ ^ .,' 1 < ^-o DC \ / A l l \ i V * ^ - n o - f - \" H \u00C2\u00A3 y ^ CO Z co O H o y LU I\u00E2\u0080\u0094 ^ \u00E2\u0080\u0094 < Q <~> UJ Z b or u LD CO I\u00E2\u0080\u0094 LU IS \"1 *Map No. 1188 Rev. 2, March 196I (Northern Kamerun), and Map No. 1199 Rev. 1, March 1961 (Southern Kamerun) i n the United Nations Document T/1556. A p r i l 3 , 1961. Footnotes - Chapter Seven \"Sj.N. , T.C. , T/1491, November 25, 1959, p. 83. 2Ibid., pp. 39, 86. 3 U.N. , T.C. , T/1556, April 3, 1961, p. 244. 4 Ibid., pp. 172, 246,. 249. 5 . Ibid., pp. 137-138. 6Ibid., pp. 96, 140. 7 U.N. , T.C. , T/1491, November 25, 1959, pp. 78, 85. 8 U.N. , T.C. , T/1556, April 3, 1961, pp. 176- 178. 9 Ibid., pp. 188-190, 246. 10 U.N. , T.C. , T/1491, November 25, 1959, pp. 78-80. 11 U.N. , T.C. , T/1556, April 3, 1961, pp. 176 -178. 1 2 I b i d . \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 PP- 190, 246 -13 U.N. , T.C. , T/1491, November 25, 1959, pp. 80-81, 85 14 U.N. , T.C. , T/1556, April 3, 1961, pp. 176' -178. 15 U.N. , T.C. , T/1556, April 3, 1961, pp. 190--191, 246. 16 U.N. , T.C. , T/1491, November 25, 1959, pp. 82, 85. 17 U.N. , T.C. , T/1556, April 3, 1961, pp. 176 -178. -18 . , Ibid. , pp. 191-192, 246. 19 U.N. , T.C. , T/1491, November 25, 1959, pp. 82-83, 85 20 U.N. , T.C. , T/1556, April 3, 1961, pp. 176--178. 21 , . n Ibid. / PP- 192, 246 \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 22 U.N. , T.C. , T/1491, November 25, 1959, PP- 83, 85. 23 U.N. , T.C. , T/1556, April 3, 1961, pp. 176--179. 24 , . , Ibid. / PP- 192-198, 246. 336: 25 U.N. , T.C, T/1491, November 25, 1959, p. 89. 26 U.N., T.C, T/1556, April 3, 1961, p. 249. 27 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Federated Parties for Union with Nigeria Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Mubi, 5 April, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 162, April 21, 1961, p. 1. See also T/PET. 4/L. 168, passim. 28 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Mubi Native Authority Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, 8 April, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 150, April 17, 1961, p. 1. 29 Vanghan in American Anthropologist, op. c i t . , p. 1088. 30 Computed from U.N. , T.C, T/1556, April 3, 1961, p. 140. 31 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Mbembe Natural Rulers Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Mbembe Area, Nkambe Division, 17 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 175, June 7, 1961, p. 2. 32 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Nobles and Youths of Nkambe East Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Ndu, T/PET. 4/L. 120, March 21, 1961, p. 1. 33 U.N., T.C, Petition from Mr. Jabov H. Nkambe Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Nkambe, 17 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 176, June 7, 1961, p. 1. 34 U.N. T.C, Petition from the Nkambe Women's Association Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Ndu, T/PET. 4/L. 126, March 28, 1961, pp. 1-2. 35 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Wimbum Chiefs Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Tabenken, Nkambe, 17 February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 116, March 21, 1961, pp. 1-2. 36 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 108. i l l e g i b l e date, p. 1. 37 U.N., T.C, Petition from Mr. E.N. A l i on Behalf of Nkambe Aborigines Resident in Wum Division Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Wum, 19 February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 115, March 21, 1961, pp. 1-3. 38 U.N. , T.C, Petition from Cameroons People's National Convention, Nkambe, Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Tabenken, 15 February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 114, March 9, 1961, pp. 1-2. 39 U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Fon of Bum Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Lagabum, T/PET. 4/L. 133, April 13, 1961, p. 1. 337 40 . . U.N., T.C., Petition from Chief Chu and Ten Other . Residents of Bu Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Bu, 10 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 164, April 25, 1961, p. 1. 41 U.N., T.C., Petition from the Chiefs of Aghem Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Aghem, 3 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 129, March 28, 1961, pp. 1-3. 42 . , Ibid. 43 U.N. , T.C, Petition from Mrs. Bi Mbong and Others Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Su-Aghem, 12 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 144, April 13, 1961, pp. 2-3. 44 U.N., T.C, Petition from Mr. Leng Mbi Chung and Others Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Su, March 17, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 142, April 13, 1961, pp. 1-2. 45 U.N. , T.C, Petition from Chiefs and People of Wum West (Beba-Befang-Essembi) Clans Plebiscite District Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, 22 February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 137, April 13, 1961, pp. 1-2. 46 U.N. , T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 118, March 21, 1961, p. 2. 47 U.N., T.C, Petition from Madame Yitu Wambong and Enouru Andum on Behalf of the Esimbi Women Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administ-ration, T/PET. 4/L. 138, April 13, 1961, pp. 1-2. 48 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Chiefs of Fungom Palm Area Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Missong, Wum, 2 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 135, April 13, 1961, p.. 1. 49 U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Elders of Fungom Area Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, T/PET. 4/L. 134, April 13, 1961, pp. 1-2. 5 (\j.N., T.C, Petition from Mr. Ngaw Iwisi Njeisi and Others Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Wum, 11 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 143, April 13, 1961, pp. 1-2. 51 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 110, March 9, 1961, pp. 1-5; U.N. , T.C. , T/PET. 4/L. 123, March 21, 1959, pp. 1-4. 52 U.N., T.C, T/1556, April 3, 1961, p. 111. 53 Ibid., p. 112. 54 U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 110, March 9, 1961, passim. 338 55 U.N., T.C., Petition from the Fon of Nsaw Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Kumbo, 3 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 132, April 13, 1961, pp. 1-3 and passim. See also, U.N. , T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 123, March 21, 1961. While the Fon's desire to put Nso in Northern Nigeria in case of partition must be understood within the background of the desire to avoid the Ibo, and his tendency towards Islam, i t is important to note that he refused to recognize the results of the plebiscite in Nso. 56 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Boki Chiefs and Peoples Conference Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Ogoja, 18 May, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 121/Add. 1, June 24, 1961, pp. 1-2; see also, U.N., T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 121, 1961, passim. 57 U.N. , T.C, Petition from Mr. Asa Eno on Behalf of the People of the Western Overside, Mamfe, Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Mamfe, 16 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 166, April 25, 1961, pp. 1-4. 5 8 I b i d . 59 U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Mwane-Ngoe (Bakossi) Tribal Union Con-; cerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Muambong, Saturday, 4 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 140, April 13, 1961-pp. 1-3 and passim. 60 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Bakundu People Convention Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Boa Bakundu, February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 122, March 21, 1961, pp. 1-4. 61 U.N. , T.C, Petition from the Baf aw Youths Association, Kumba, Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Kumba Town, 21 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 173, June 7, 1961, p. 4. 62 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Chiefs and People of the Mbonge Clan Community Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Massaka-Bekondo Road Junction, 20 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 160, April 25, 1961, pp. 1-2. 63 U.N., T.C, Petition from the Balondo Speaking People s Convention Con-cerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Kumba, 27 February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 128, March 28, 1961, pp. 1-3. 64 . U.N., T.C, Petition from the Bakweri Molongo Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Buea, 17 February, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 117, March 21, 1961, pp. 7-8. 65 U.N., T.C, Petition from- the Bakweri Wing of the Kamerun National Democratic Party (Vanguard) Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Buea, 6 April, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 174, June 7, 1961, pp. 1-3. 66 U.N. , T.C, T/PET. 4/L. 117, March 21, 1961, pp. 1-3. 339 \"\"U.N., T.C, Petition from the Victoria Divisional Council Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Victoria, 21 March, 1961, T/PET. 4/L. 163, April 25, 1961, pp. 1-3. 68 U.N. , T.C, Petition from Chief S.M. Efesoa and Others on Behalf of the Bakweri People Concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, T/PET. 4/L. 146, April 13, 1961, pp. 1-5. 340 CONCLUSION Several factors shaped the events connected with the r i s e of nation-alism i n Western Kamerun. Some'of these factors, the r o l e of the t r a d i -t i o n a l r u l e r s and t r a d i t i o n for example, can be traced back to the pre-c o l o n i a l period. Others, the German administrative p o l i c y f o r instance, were a product of the German c o l o n i a l a c t i v i t i e s i n the region. S t i l l others, the B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s f o r example, came with B r i t i s h a c t i v i t i e s i n the regions during the period of the League of Nations mandate and the United Nations trusteeship. While the t o t a l i t y of these factors shaped the development of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, i t was the B r i t i s h presence which fostered the beginnings of national awareness i n Southern Kamerun i n the early 1940s. The B r i t i s h perceived Western Kamerun to be c l o s e l y l i n k e d with N i g e r i a . A l l t h e i r p o l i c i e s i n the T e r r i t o r y \u00E2\u0080\u0094 a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , economic, s o c i a l , educational, p o l i t i c a l \u00E2\u0080\u0094 r e f l e c t e d t h i s perception. But these p o l i c i e s , employment p o l i c y f or example, operated detrimentally to the welfare of the t e r r i t o r y ' s inhabitants. Consequently, a few Western-educated Southern Kamerunians reacted against B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s . I n i t i a l l y , t h i s reaction took the form of a p a c i f i c and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l search for a separate i d e n t i t y , and more jobs and education. By the e a r l y 1950s, the westernized e l i t e had made l i t t l e headway ei t h e r i n i t s demands of the B r i t i s h or i n i t s e f f o r t s to organize an e f f e c -t i v e n a t i o n a l i s t movement. But, i n 1953,Southern Kamerunian n a t i o n a l i s t s brought t r a d i t i o n a l leaders i n t o t h e i r movement. These leaders, the a-Fon, commanding the l o y a l t y or support of most of the region's inhabitants, were 341 able to influence s i g n i f i c a n t l y and strengthen the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. But, that movement, despite the strength the a-Fon brought to i t , continued to labour under several d i f f i c u l t i e s . The p o l i t i c a l leaders, who were almost to a man Western-educated, began to stress, i n d i v i d u a l l y or i n groups, a wide range of demands. Some stressed autonomy within Nigeria. Others emphasized secession with r e u n i f i c a t i o n but not immediate r e u n i f i c a t i o n . S t i l l others stressed immediate r e u n i f i c a t i o n pure and simple. The a-Fon, for the most part, advocated secession without r e u n i f i -c a t i o n . Thus, there were fundamental differences among the p o l i t i c a l leaders, and between them and the t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s . Between 1953 and 1959, the p o l i t i c a l leaders both at home and before the United Nations defined and redefined t h e i r programmes with an eye on personal or party advantages. In the case of Northern Kamerun, where the national awareness developed much l a t e r , matters were complicated by a s p l i t between the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , on the one hand, and some \"Local F u l a n i and t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s , on the other. B a s i c a l l y , the former wanted Northern Kamerun to remain integrated with Northern Nigeria while the l a t t e r d i d not. By 1958, i t became obvious i n the Trusteeship Council that Western Kamerunians would have to be formally consulted to f i n d out what they wanted. The B r i t i s h could point to the recommendations of the United Nations 1958 Mission when they anguad that there should be a p l e b i s c i t e i n Southern Kamerun, but that Northern Kamerun should be u n i l a t e r a l l y integrated with Northern Nigeria. However, as evidence i n the Mission's report c l e a r l y showed, there were Northern Kamerunians who demanded a p l e b i s c i t e or referendum. In Southern Kamerun several forms of consultation were advocated. The integra-t i o n i s t s who were i n power, i n a representative system recently established 342 by the B r i t i s h , preferred the medium of a general e l e c t i o n . The a n t i -i m p e r i a l i s t s , who commanded a very small following, demanded u n i l a t e r a l action by /the ^ United Nations to b r i n g about r e u n i f i c a t i o n . The Foncharians requested the United Nations to conduct opinion p o l l s and make i t s decision from them. The a-Fon, confident they had the support of most of the electorate, demanded a p l e b i s c i t e . When the United Nations reviewed the complicated s i t u a t i o n i n e a r l y 1959, i t s Trusteeship Council further complicated matters because of differences within i t . For example, the Soviet and B r i t i s h representatives disagreed over what should be done i n Northern Kamerun. The Soviet member objected to the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n that there should be no p l e b i s c i t e . Though the Council was able to recommend to the General Assembly that such a p l e b i s c i t e be held, i t provided l i t t l e guidance on what should be done i n Southern Kamerun. The Assembly then asked the Southern Kamerun p o l i -t i c a l leaders, who had come to the United Nations with c o n f l i c t i n g demands and recommendations, to return home and resolve t h e i r d ifferences. Once back home, a l l private attempts by some of the leaders to resolve the difference f a i l e d , p a r t l y because t h e i r differences were deep, p a r t l y because of mutual d i s t r u s t , and p a r t l y because most of them had su b s t a n t i a l support from some part of the region. When these private attempts had f a i l e d , they held a P l e b i s c i t e Conference at Mamfe i n August 1959. At Mamfe, the p o l i t i c a l leaders concentrated l e s s on attempting to reach agreement and more on wooing the a-Fon, who, i n any event, d i d not budge from t h e i r s e c e s s i o n i s t p o s i t i o n . The n a t i o n a l i s t leaders had to admit to the United Nations that they were too divided, and too interested to provide an agreed so l u t i o n . 343 The United Nations then concentrated i t s e f f o r t s , not at fi n d i n g out what arrangements would be most widely acceptable i n Southern Kamerun, but on working out an agreement acceptable to the two most important nation-a l i s t leaders, Endeley and Fonch. The net e f f e c t of t h i s approach was that the United Nations ignored the h i n t s , which nearly a l l the Southern Kamerun p o l i t i c a l leaders threw out occasionally, which indicated what al t e r n a t i v e would be the more popular among the e l e c t o r a t e . By ignoring or f a i l i n g to catch these h i n t s , and by accepting a compromise reached between Endeley and Foncha i n private t a l k s , the United Nations opted for a set of p l e b i s c i t e questions which prevent the majority of Southern Kamerunians from r e g i s t e r i n g t h e i r preference for secession. The United Nations was thus less than h e l p f u l i n implementing one of i t s most impor-tant objectives. I t denied the majority of the Southern Kamerunians the r i g h t of self-determination. Meanwhile, the conduct of the f i r s t p l e b i s c i t e i n Northern Kamerun was underway. The supporters of the a l t e r n a t i v e which postponed a decision suspected and accused, sometimes j u s t i f i a b l y and sometimes not, the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s of malpractices. These a u t h o r i t i e s sometimes abused t h e i r power and attempted to hinder campaigners who held opposing views. None-theless, the p l e b i s c i t e appeared to reveal a large majority of the people p o l l e d were i n favour of postponing a decision on t h e i r p o l i t i c a l future. More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the votes showed widespread d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the e x i s t i n g administrative arrangements. The next p l e b i s c i t e was arranged by the United Nations to follow with-i n a short time. During the i n t e r v a l , the B r i t i s h made the region a province of Northern Nigeria, and reformed i t s l o c a l administration. These 344 reforms, which removed a number of unpopular a u t h o r i t i e s and introduced more l o c a l representation i n government, were well received. At the same time, many Northern Kamerunians d i d not r e a l i z e that l i n k s with Northern Nigeria had been retained at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l . Northern Kamerunian p o l i t i c a l leaders, aware of t h i s confusion, t r i e d to have the p l e b i s c i t e postponed. They f a i l e d and i t was conducted when the majority of Northern Kamerunians s t i l l thought the l o c a l administrative reforms as separation from Nigeria and Northern Nigeria. The second Northern Kamerun p l e b i s c i t e was conducted at the same time as that of Southern Kamerun. In both regions, d i s t r u s t , a l l e g a t i o n , and the abuse of power were features of the p l e b i s c i t e campaign. But, t h e i r scope and frequency d i f f e r e d . They were more extensive and common i n Southern Kamerun. However, while i n Northern Kamerun the abuse of authority was l i m i t e d to l o c a l government o f f i c i a l s , and the d i s t r u s t and a l l e g a t i o n s confined to the proponents of the Cameroun proposition, i n Southern Kamerun a l l three elements were evident i n the behaviour of p a r t i e s both i n and out of o f f i c e . There were also comparable elements'in voter response to the questions put. In both regions the electorate asked and answered t h e i r own questions, i n t e r p r e t i n g the questions framed by the United Nations to s u i t t h e i r l o c a l conditions, i n t e r e s t s , and circumstances. This i n t e r p r e t i n g process was to be expected. In most p l e b i s c i t e s and e l e c t i o n s , electors ask and answer t h e i r own questions, often with l i t t l e reference to the larger issues involved. Nevertheless, the timing of the second b a l l o t i n Northern Kamerun and the unfortunate wording of the p l e b i s c i t e questions i n the context of p o l i t i c s i n Southern Kamerun contributed not only a good deal of confusion 345 to the proceedings, but also significantly impeded the process of self-determination. The trusteeship system had thus ended in Western Kamerun on an uncertain note. In Northern Kamerun, the electorate was denied the opportunity to know the difference between the reformed local administration and their relationship within the context of that administration and Nigeria. In Southern Kamerun, the electorate was denied the opportunity to vote for a Smaller Kamerun which most preferred. In the ensuing confusion, the Northern Kamerunians mistook the reformed local administration for separation from Northern Nigeria and Nigeria as a whole, while the disatisfaction forced many Southern Kamerunians to chose 'fi r e ' over 'water,' simply because 'milk' was not around; the 'devil' one did not know had prevailed over the 'devil' one knew. Consequently, the principle of self-determination, which was at the hub of the trusteeship system, and which was embedded in the Charter, was not applied to the majority of the Western Kamerunians. Furthermore, in the case of Southern Kamerun, the plebiscite was d i v i -sive. The trust system ended with the rest of Southern Kamerun, except perhaps Mamfe, blaming Bamenda. The grasslands and the forest zone stood at a distance from each other, pointing accusing fingers, and threatening each other. The Concert of the Crowned Princes, the symbol of Southern Kamerun unity, which emerged during the trust period, was i n f l i c t e d with a malaise between May 1958 and January 1959, broke-down in October 1959, and by the middle of 1960, i t had disappeared.* *After the plebiscite, the West Cameroon Government under Foncha re-established the Concert in form of the \"House of Chiefs\". With this peace made between Foncha and the a-Fon, the latter continued to lend their support 346 This has been a study of a specific region, Western Kamerun. But i t has looked at themes of broader application. The operation of the trust system, the role of the traditional rulers in the nationalist movements in Africa, South of the Sahara, and the devolution of power in Black Africa are among the major issues this study has touched upon at the micro-cosmic level. Put very simply, the questions are: which did less harm, colonialism pure and simple or colonialism through the trust system? was nationalism in Africa the monopoly of the Western-educated African e l i t e , as a majority of books have asserted, or did another group of leaders play an equally, i f not more, important role in that phenonemon? did the colonial powers devolve power in Black Africa to those who actually commanded the respect and loyalty of the populace or did they hand over power to an a r t i f i c i a l l y created class which had to make use of some authorities before expecting to have the respect and loyalty of the governed. The Western Kamerun example would appear to have suggested some tentative answers. Fi r s t , the trusteeship system and colonialism pure and simple. It appears that in the case where a trust territory was administered as an integral part of an adjoining colony, colonialism pure and simple fared better than colonialism via the trust system, although both l e f t much to be desired. It is readily accepted as a maxim that, because the international organizations had a restraining effect on the administrators of the trust territories, the trust system faired better than pure colonialism. There are at least three underlying assumptions to this axiom. F i r s t , i t i s to Foncha and to play an important part in the affairs of the country. Recently, however, they seem more to be a rubber-stamp of the Government. 347 assumed that the Administering Authority would no longer pursue i t s national interests i n trust territories vigourously because of the restraints from the international community. Second, and as a corollary, i t is assumed that the Administering Authority would respect the opinion and recommend-ations of the international organizations. Thirdly, i t is assumed that the members of the United Nations in their dealings with the Administering Authorities would serve more the interests of the inhabitants of trust territories rather.\_ than theirs. This study questions a l l these assump-tions and what they suggest. Where were the League of Nations and the United Nations before the British l e f t Western Kamerun so l i t t l e developed? How effective was the United Nations in implementing the right to self-determination? Why did the damping down of a Socialist organization in Northern Kamerun in\" 1953 lead to a clash between the British on the one hand and the Russians on the other in the Trusteeship Council? Why did the New Zealand's representative in the Trusteeship Council wish to use the f i r s t Northern Kamerun plebiscite to influence opinion in favour of integration in Southern Kamerun? Why did the British not sever administrative links between Northern Kamerun and Nigeria on October 1, 1960, as the United Nations resolution demanded? The next question to be considered is that dealing with the role of the traditional rulers in the nationalist movement. The Western Kamerun or, at least, the Southern Kamerun example questions the assertions that have made nationalism in Black Africa a monopoly of the Western-educated African elites. To be sure, these elites might have been responsible for the pise and development of nationalist movements in their early stages a l l over the continent. But,- the Western Kamerun example seems to suggest that at a 348 c e r t a i n point i n time, the t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s took an important part i n the movements. I t i s true, i n the end, the Western-educated e l i t e confused and manipulated the Western Kamerun t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s , but that strengthens rather than detracts from the suggestion. That t h i s group would res o r t to manipulative a c t i v i t i e s i n order to r e a l i z e t h e i r goals indicated the power which the t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s wielded. Nevertheless, i n the end, the r e s u l t s of the p l e b i s c i t e s were a function of t r a d i t i o n embodied i n the person of the a-Fon. What a l l t h i s seems to suggest i s that the current trend, although not yet as impressive as i t should be, to investigate what r o l e t r a d i t i o n and the t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s played i n the events of the c o l o n i a l period i n Black A f r i c a , i s i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n . But such u s e f u l studies must begin from the premise that A f r i c a was p o l i t i c a l l y and otherwise w e l l -organized and highly sophisticated before the advent of the New Imperialism. The f i r s t question touched on deals with the devolution of power. The Southern Kamerun example at l e a s t seems to suggest that power was devolved to an unrepresentative group of people. These were the Western-educated p o l i -t i c a l e l i t e who could not, 'ceteris paribus' claim the respect, l o y a l t y , and support of the governed without f i r s t making use of the t r a d i t i o n a l leaders. In other words, they could r u l e e f f e c t i v e l y only i n d i r e c t l y . Had the B r i t i s h transfered\ power to the Concert of the Crowned Princes, they would have transfered, i t to the a u t h o r i t i e s who could r u l e d i r e c t l y . Perhaps, p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s might l i k e to f i n d out the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s and the Western-educated non-tr a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s of many A f r i c a n coun-t r i e s on the one hand and the s t a b i l i t y of some of these states and the i n s t a b i l i t y of others on the other. This study would l i k e to o f f e r the following hypotheses: the greater the rapport between the p o l i t i c a l leaders* 349 and the traditional rulers* in any African country, the greater the stability of that country; conversely, the greater the f r i c t i o n between the p o l i t i c a l leaders and the traditional rulers in any African state, the greater the insta b i l i t y of that state. *Some of these p o l i t i c a l leaders are princes who could have succeeded to the various thrones had i t not been for changed circumstances while many of the a-Fon at present are Western-educated. Both these variables can con-tribute to either f r i c t i o n or accommodation between the p o l i t i c a l leaders and the contemporary traditional rulers. In either case, however, the independent variables offered in the hypotheses remain the same: the rapport and the f r i c t i o n between the traditional rulers and the p o l i t i c a l rulers. Likewise, the dependent variables remain the same: the st a b i l i t y and the ins t a b i l i t y of the states. 350 BIBLIOGRAPHY DOCUMENTS A. United Nations i . General Assembly (a) Printed and Published O f f i c i a l Records of the General Assembly. A/3170, Supplement No. 4, 1956. A/3595, Supplement No. 4, 1957. A.4094-4095, February-March, 1959. A/4113, December, 1959. A/4348, December, 1959. A/4354, Supplement No. 16, 1960. A/4686/Add. 1, Supplement No. 16A, Apri l , 1961. A/4726, April, 1961. (b) Printed and Published O f f i c i a l Records of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly. A/C.4/398-400, 404, 414-419, 420, 437-439, February-December, 1959. A.C.4/SR.775-776, 779-780, 792, 794, 800, 803, 807, 846-849, 857, 885-892, 894, 896-899, 901-903, January-December, 1959. i i . Trusteeship Council (a) Printed and Published O f f i c i a l Reco.rds of the Trusteeship Council. T/1042, March, 1953. T/1426, January , 1959. T/1491, November, 1959. T/1526, May, 1960. T/1556, April, 1961. T/SR.943, 953-962, April-May, 1959. (b) Printed and Published Observations on Petitions by the United Kingdom. T/OBS.4/1-86, 1954-1959. T/OBS.4 and 5/1-39, 1954-1959. (c) Printed and Published Petitions from Kamerun; T/PET.4/101-204, 1953-1961. T/PET.4/L.1-180, 1954-1961. T/PET.4 and 5/1-77, 1953-1961. T/PET.4 and 5/L.1-74, 1953-1961. 351 i i i . General United Nations Bulletin, Vols. 6, 8, 13, 1949, 1950, 1952. United Nations Review, Vols. 2, 4, 6, 1956, 1958, 1959. Year Book of the United Nations 1959, Columbia University Press, 1959. B. 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Chilver, Elizabeth M., \"Paramountcy and Protection in the Cameroons: The Bali and the Germans, 1889-1913,\" Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1967. , \"Native Administration in the West Central Cameroons, 1902-1954,\" K. Robinson and F. Madden, Essays in Imperial Government, Oxford, 1963. 354 Chilver, E.M., and P.M. Kaberry, \"The Kingdom of Kom in West Cameroon,\" Daryll Forde and P.M. Kaberry, West African KinndoDs \"in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford University Press, 1967. Devernois, Guy, \"Cameroons 1958-1959,\" Civilizations, Vols. 9-10, 1959-1960, pp. 229-234. Gardinier, David E., \"The British in the Cameroons, 1919-1939,\" Prosser Gifford and W. Roger Louis, Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1967. George, S.A.', \"Reunification in the Cameroons,\" West Africa, November 26, 1955, p. 116. H i l l , Peter, \"Cameroon Microcosm of African Unity,\" The Times, London, Monday, June 30, 1975, p. VI. Horner, George R., \"Togo and the Cameroon,\" Current History, Vols. 34-35, February, 1958, pp. 84-90. Joseph, Richard A., \"The German Question in French Cameroun, 1919-1939,\" Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1975, pp. 65-90. Kaberry, Phyllis M., \"Traditional Politics in Nsaw,\" Africa, Vol. 29, No. 4, October 1959, pp. 366-383. Le Vine, Victor T., \"The Politi c s of Partition in Africa: The Cameroons and the Myth of Unification,\" Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1964. , \"'P* Day in the Cameroons: 1, \" West Africa, March 4, 1961, p. 236. , \"A Reluctant February Bride? The 'Other Cameroons',\" Africa Report, Vols. 6-7, 1961-1962, February, 1961, pp. 5-6, 12. , \"Calm Before the Storm in Cameroun?\" Africa Report, Vols. 6-7, 1961-1962, No. 5, May, 1961, pp. 3-4. Roberts, Margaret, \" P o l i t i c a l Prospects for the Cameroun,\" The World Today, Vol. 16, Oxford University Press, 1960. Vaughan, Jr., James H., \"Culture, History, and Grass-Roots P o l i t i c s in a Northern Cameroons Kingdom,\" American Anthropologist, Vol. 66, Menasha, Wisconsin, 1964. "@en . "Thesis/Dissertation"@en . "10.14288/1.0093934"@en . "eng"@en . "History"@en . "Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library"@en . "University of British Columbia"@en . "For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use."@en . "Graduate"@en . "The Kamerun plebiscites 1959-1961: perceptions and strategies"@en . "Text"@en . "http://hdl.handle.net/2429/20199"@en .