"Arts, Faculty of"@en . "Classical, Near Eastern and Religious Studies, Department of"@en . "DSpace"@en . "UBCV"@en . "Caprio, James Alexander"@en . "2009-12-17T20:57:38Z"@en . "2004"@en . "Doctor of Philosophy - PhD"@en . "University of British Columbia"@en . "Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea became members of the Peloponnesian League at its inception in 506, although each had concluded an alliance with Sparta much earlier. The initial arrangement between each city-state and Sparta was reciprocal and membership in the League did not interfere with their individual development. By the fifth century, Elis, Mantinea, and Tegea had created their own symmachies and were continuing to expand within the Peloponnesos. Eventually, the prosperity and growth of these regional symmachies were seen by Sparta as hazardous to its security. Hostilities erupted when Sparta interfered with the intent to dismantle these leagues. Although the dissolution of the allied leagues became an essential factor in the preservation of Sparta's security, it also engendered a rift between its oldest and most important allies. This ultimately contributed to the demise of Spartan power in 371 and the termination of the Peloponnesian League soon thereafter."@en . "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/16902?expand=metadata"@en . "An Allied History of the Peloponnesian League: Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea By James Alexander Caprio B.A. Hamilton Co l lege , 1994 M.A. Tufts University, 1997 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE F A C U L T Y OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Classical, Near Eastern, and Religious Studies) T H E UNIVERSITY O F BRITISH C O L U M B I A January , 2005 \u00C2\u00A9 J a m e s A. Capr io , 2005 Abstract Elis , Tegea, and Mantinea became members of the Peloponnesian League at its inception in 506, although each had concluded an alliance with Sparta much earlier. The initial arrangement between each city-state and Sparta was reciprocal and membership in the League did not interfere with their individual development. B y the fifth century, El is , Mantinea, and Tegea had created their own symmachies and were continuing to expand within the Peloponnesos. Eventually, the prosperity and growth of these regional symmachies were seen by Sparta as hazardous to its security. Hostilities erupted when Sparta interfered with the intent to dismantle these leagues. Although the dissolution of the allied leagues became an essential factor in the preservation of Sparta's security, it also engendered a rift between its oldest and most important allies. This ultimately contributed to the demise of Spartan power in 371 and the termination of the Peloponnesian League soon thereafter. 11 T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Abstract i i Table of Contents i i i List of Maps iv List of Abbreviations v Acknowledgements v i i i Introduction \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 1 Chapter One: El is 20 Chapter Two: Tegea and southern Arkadia 107 Chapter Three: Mantinea and northern Arkadia 181 Conclusion 231 Bibliography , 234 i i i Maps Map 1: El is 21 Map 2: Tegean Territory 108 Map 3: The Peloponnesos 109 Map 4: Phigalia 117 Map 5: Mantinea and Tegea 182 Map 6: Mantinea and its environs 182 Amit , Poleis Cartledge, Agesilaos Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia CPCActs CPCPapers Dusanic, Arkadian League Forrest, \"Themistokles\" Forrest, Sparta Fougeres, Mantinee GHI Hamilton, Bitter Victories Abbreviations M . Amit , Great and Small Poleis, part 3, (Brussels: Latomus, 1973). P. Cartledge, Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta. (London: Duckworth, 1987). P. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 2 n d ed. (1979: reprint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 2002). Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre Papers from the Copenhagen Polis Centre S. Dusanic, The Arkadian League of the Fourth Century (Belgrade: Belgrade University Press, 1970). W . G . Forrest, \"Themistokles and Argos.\" CQ n.s. 10 (1960): 221-241. W . G . Forrest, A History of Sparta. (New York: W . W . Norton and Company, 1968). G . Fougeres, Mantinee et 1' Arcadie Orientale. (Paris: A . Fontemoing, 1898). M . N . Tod, ed., Greek Historical Inscriptions, 2 vols., (1946, 1948: reprint, Chicago: Ares, 1985). C D . Hamilton, Sparta's Bitter Victories, Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979). Hamilton, Agesilaus HCT Hodkinson, Mantinike Kagan, Outbreak Kagan, Archidamian War Kagan, Peace Lazenby, Peloponnesian War LSAG ML C D . Hamilton, Agesilaus and The Failure of The Spartan Hegemony. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). A . W . Gomme, A . Andrewes, and K . J . Dover. HistoricalCommentary on Thucydides. 4 Volumes. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950-6). S. Hodkinson, and H . Hodkinson, \"Mantinea and Mantinike: Settlement and Society in a Greek Polis,\" ABSA 16 (1981): 242-6. D . Kagan, The Outbreak of The Peloponnesian War. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). D . Kagan, The Archidamian War. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). D . Kagan, The Peace ofNicias and the Sicilian Expedition. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). J.F. Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War. (London: Routledge, 2004). L . Jeffery, Local Scripts of Archaic Greece, 2 n d Edition, revised by A . Johnston, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). R. Meiggs, and David Lewis, eds. A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). v i Moggi , I sinecismi Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis \" Nom. Pritchett, Greek Topography RE Robinson, First Democracies Roy, \"Perioikoi\" de Ste. Croix, Origins Wickert, peloponnesische Bund M . Moggi , I sinecismi interstatali greci (Pisa: Marl in , 1976). T . H . Nielsen, \" A Survey of Dependent Poleis in Classical Arkadia.\" CPCPapers 3 (1996): 63-105. H . , Van Effenterree, and F. Ruze. Nomina. Recueil d inscriptions politiques et juridiques de I'archaisme grec. 2 Volumes. (Rome: Collection de l'Ecole francaise de Rome, 188 1994 -1995). W . K . Pritchett, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, part 2, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). A . Pauly, G . Wissowa, and W , K r o l l . Real-Encyclopddiea des klassischen Altertumswissenschaft. (Stuttgart: A , Druckenmuller, 1894 - ) . E . W . Robinson, The First Democracies. Historia ism. 107(1997), 108-11. J. Roy, \"The Perioikoi o f E l i s , \" CPCActs 4 (1997): 282-320. G . E . M . de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War. (London: Duckworth, 1972). Wickert, K . Der peloponnesische Bund von seiner Enstehung bis zum Ende des archidamischen Krieges. (Diss. U . Erlangen-Niirnberg, 1962). v i i Acknowledgements I wish to extend my thanks to my advisor, Dr. Phil l ip Harding, whose patience, guidance, and constant support have made this work and my whole graduate career at The University of British Columbia possible. I would also like to thank Dr. Hector Will iams and Dr. Fracno De Angelis for their prompt and insightful remarks and corrections. I am also extremely grateful to the entire Department of Classical, Near Eastern, and Religious Studies at U B C for providing me with their valuable time and energy and for allowing me to continue my studies. Thank you to Dr. E d Kadletz for being a great friend and colleague while I was at Ba l l State University, and to Dr. Walter Moskalew for all of his assistance and guidance. To my friends at U B C , in Bellingham, San Francisco, and Vancouver, thank you for your trust, understanding, hospitality, and patience. I would like to thank my father, Tony, who never stopped believing in me, and I would like to remember my mother, Rosemary, who never let anything get in the way of my pursuits. I cannot express in words my gratitude to my wife, Megan, who supported and encouraged me, waited patiently, and sacrificed so much so that we could be together. This dissertation is as much hers as it is mine. Jim Caprio, 2004 v i i i Introduction The Evolut ion and Structure of The Peloponnesian League Sparta's decision to prohibit its allies from maintaining individual regional alliances while they were members of the Peloponnesian League was a failure of Spartan policy and eventually led to the Peloponnesian League's demise. B y limiting the expansion of its Peloponnesian allies and their regional leagues, Sparta alleviated a significant threat to its safety within the Peloponnesos. Rather than bolstering Sparta's alliance, however, this policy of limiting the existence of leagues within the Peloponnesian League led to dissension among League members. During periods of peace, the members of the Peloponnesian League were not restricted by their membership in the League or by their alliance with Sparta from expanding and developing their own alliances and leagues. After the inception of the League in 506 B C E , city-states pursued their own interests despite growing Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnesos. A s long as the basic agreements of the League were met and Sparta's safety at home was secured, an ally's regional symmachy could and did exist. This consociation changed, however, during the latter half of the fifth century. The proliferation of these leagues and the threat Sparta believed they would eventually pose to its security prompted Sparta to take a much more aggressive approach and it began to dissolve the regional symmachies. Unt i l now, there has been little emphasis placed on the presence of these smaller, regional leagues within the larger alliances and not enough examination of how these smaller symmachies operated within the larger. coalitions of ancient Greece. This dissertation 1 focuses, therefore, on three small, yet important regional leagues within the Peloponnesian League: the Elean League, the Tegean League, and the Mantinean League. This study investigates the origins of each regional symmachy and their relationships with Sparta and traces the development of these smaller regional alliances as they existed under the larger system of the Peloponnesian League from its inception in 506 B C E to its dissolution in 369 B C E . This approach illuminates the importance of the smaller communities in the Peloponnesos and how they were united by local and regional concerns.1 The three city-states studied herein shared common characteristics in respect to their development and relationship with Sparta. El is was the first of the three to develop its own symmachy and to incorporate unwilling communities into its alliance. Although the Mantineans and Tegeans constructed their alliances much later, by 420 all three states had established regional alliances and acted as hegemons of their respective leagues. N o previous study has placed significant emphasis on the importance of these leagues within the politics of the Peloponnesos and Sparta's Peloponnesian League. Nor has any study demonstrated the extent to which the smaller communities were able to influence Spartan policy by forming their own leagues. This dissertation, therefore, is a study of leagues within leagues, or more specifically, three regional Peloponnesian alliances within the Peloponnesian League. A n d so, it seems appropriate, to begin with an explanation of the larger organization and the circumstances under which each state developed its own regional symmachy. 1 Malkin also adopted what he called a polis approach when he studied the connection between the myths of Sparta and its colonization in the Mediterranean. Rather than look at a set of myths, he chose to focus on one city-state and its foundation myths. See Malkin, I. Myth and territory in the Spartan Mediterranean, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 8ff. Like Malkin, I have taken this individual polis approach. The political situation within the Peloponnesos included more than just the larger coalitions; the smaller 2 The complete history of the Peloponnesian League, previously examined by several scholars, is difficult to ascertain due to the indeterminate nature of the sources. Even though Herodotus refers to \"The Peloponnesians\" more than thirty times and Thucydides clearly notes the existence of the Peloponnesian League, including its bicameral character, no documentary evidence regarding the League's origins exists. 2 Furthermore, the precise relationship between each member and Sparta is insufficiently represented. For example, the only extant Classical Spartan treaty inscribed on stone is not only fragmentary and difficult to date, but also includes an unknown partner, the Aitolian-Erxadieis. 3 This lack of evidence has prompted scholars to dispute whether or not the League existed prior to the Peloponnesian War and i f it had, at any time, any formal constitution. M y own opinion, based upon the work of numerous scholars, is that the League did exist prior to 432 B . C . , that it began with a series of alliances between individual states and Sparta in the sixth century, and that in 506 it regional leagues were prominent and influential despite the fact that they have not, until now, been examined in detail. 2Relevant passages from Thucydides include the following: the Megarians leaving the Spartan alliance in 457/6 B.C. (1. 103); the Spartan symmachy and its members (2. 9. 2); the assemblies and the voting procedure for war (1. 67-87); the 'old oaths' of the allies (5. 30). Herodotus' use of the term \"The Peloponnesians\" was in reference to the Peloponnesian League (see Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 36-40). Wickert (38) thought that the members of the Peloponnesian League may have, prior to 480, decided in their congress how to defend against the Persians. Cawkwell, on the other hand, questioned whether Herodotus' use of the term \"Peloponnesians\" is synonymous with The Peloponnesian League. According to him, the term was used as a geographical division of the Hellenic League (G. Cawkwell, \"Sparta and her Allies in the Sixth Century,\" CQ 43 [1993]: 375-376). Contrary to his thesis, the League was already formed by the time of the Persian Wars, since the speech of the Spartan delegates at Athens in 479 (Hdt. 8. 142), in which the Spartans try to dissuade the Athenians from going over to the Persian side, is delivered on behalf of the \"Lakedaimonians and the allies.\" See also Hdt. 7. 139; 7. 157. 2; 9. 19. 1; 9. 114. 2; for examples of the use of \"Peloponnesians\" in reference to the League. Cf. Hdt. 7. 137. 1; 9. 73. 3 for \"The Lakedaimonians and their allies.\" 3 The text of the treaty has been included in the addenda to ML, p. 312. Cf. SEG xxvi 461; xxviii. 408; xxxii. 398. The restoration was first completed by W. Peek, \"Ein neuer Spartanischer Staatsvertrag,\" AbhSdchsAkad, Phil. HistKl 65.3 (1974): 3-15. See also,.F. Gschnitzer, Ein neuer spartanischer Staatsvertrag (Verlag Anton Hain: Meisenheim am Glan, 1978). The restoration of these lines was accepted by P. Cartledge, \"A new fifth century Spartan treaty,\" LCM 1 (1976): 87-92; and by D.H. Kelly, \"The new Spartan Treaty,\" LCM 3 (1976): 133-141. The date of this treaty is questionable. The proposed dates range from c. 500-475 (Peek and Gschnitzer), to 388 (Cartledge and Kelly). The editors of GHI accept a date no earlier than 426 when the first known diplomatic activities between the Aitolians and Spartans took place (Thuc. 3. 100). Kelly's argument for a date in the fourth century, in 388, after Agesilaos' first Akarnanian expedition (Xen. Hell. 4. 6. 14) but before the King's peace in 387/6 may be correct. 3 developed a common allied assembly. There was a constitution which, although rudimentary at the outset, progressed to include some rules that were developed on an ad hoc basis. 5 Whether these rules were strictly adhered to or enforced often depended upon, as Kagan noted, the political and military realities at the time. 6 The name of the Peloponnesian League was formally \"The Lakedaimonians and their allies.\" 7 During the first half of the sixth century, Sparta formed a series of alliances with dozens of poleis and by 540, it involved the entire Peloponnesos, with the exception of Argos and A k h a i a . 8 The agreements were of an indefinite duration and secession was not 4 All dates are B.C. 5 The origin, nature, and mechanics of the League have been discussed by many prominent scholars. The most thorough discussion of the origin and history of the League is that of Wickert. J. Larsen provided the first discussion for an established League in 506 and its basic constitution, \"Sparta and the Ionian Revolt: A study of Spartan foreign policy and the Genesis of the Peloponnesian League,\" CP 27 (1932): 136-150; \"The Constitution of The Peloponnesian League,\" CP 18 (1933): 256-276; The Constitution of The Peloponnesian League II,\" CP 19 (1934): 1-19. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix has provided an extremely detailed account of the League's nature and mechanics (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 101-123). Cawkwell's more recent article presents the view that no League existed prior to the First Peloponnesian War, op. cit. n. 1. D. Kagan has also provided an excellent account of the League's nature, his points are considered below (Kagan, Outbreak, 9-30). Other important works include: G. Busolt, Die Lakedaemonief und Ihre Bundesgenossen (Leipzig: Teubner, 1878); U. Kahrstedt, Griechisches Staatsrecht I: Sparta und seine Symmachie (Gottingen: Vanderhoeck and Ruprech, 1922); Hans Schaefer, Staatsform und Politik: Untersuchungen zur griechischen Geschichte des sechsten und filnften Jahrhunderts (Leipzig, Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung,1932), 63ff.; L.I. Highby \"The Erythrae Decree,\" Klio 36 (1936): 59-102; G.L. Huxley, Early Sparta (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), 65ff.; A.H.M. Jones, Sparta (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), 44-47; W.G. Forrest, A History of Sparta (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1968), 76ff; Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 29-31; J. Rhodes, \"Demes, Cities and Leagues,\" in M.H. Hansen, ed., The Ancient Greek City-State (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1993), 166; J.E. Lendon, \"Thucydides and the 'Constitution' of the Peloponnesian League,\" GRBS 35, n.2 (1994): 159-177; Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis,\" 63-105; P. Cartledge, \"The Origins and Organization of the Peloponnesian League,\" (henceforth \"Origins\") reprinted from Agesilaos (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1987) in Whitby, M., (ed.) Sparta, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 223-229; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 126ff.; The Spartans (Woodstock, NY: Regina Books, 2003), 84-85. 6 Kagan, Outbreak, 21. Ste. Croix disagreed (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 101-102), citing Thuc. 5.30.1 as proof that some rules must have existed. Cf. HCT IV, 25-26. Consequently, Kagan softened his stance: \"I would merely emphasize that the rules were few and the occasions when they were ignored or overridden many\" (Kagan, Peace, 41, n.21). Lendon, \"Constitution,\" defended Kagan's view and argued that there was no constitution despite the references to allied assemblies and oaths. Instead, according to him, the Spartans often needed to gauge allied support for a campaign or persuade them to vote along the same lines as Sparta, and any agreements were made before a campaign or war and were not part of a constitution (\"Constitution,\" 171-173). 7 See Thuc. 1. 115. 1; 5. 18. 5. At Thuc. 2. 9. 3 the coalition is called a symmachy; auxri |_IEV AaKe8aip.ovicov f,uuuaxia. 8 Hdt.l . 68. See also, de Ste. Croix, Origins, 96-96; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia 139; Forrest, Sparta, 74; Kagan, Outbreak, 11. 4 permitted. 9 Since the alliances were between Sparta and each individual polis, no direct obligations existed amongst the numerous allies. Sparta agreed to defend each ally with \"al l its strength in accordance with its ability,\" and i f Sparta were attacked, the same was expected from the a l l y . 1 0 The relationship was, in this respect, reciprocal. 1 1 Despite Herodotus' statement that c. 550 the majority of the Peloponnesos was \"already subjected\" to the Spartans, an alliance with Sparta did not mean a complete loss of autonomy. 1 2 In theory, each ally was able to pursue its own domestic policy, choose its own political constitution and government, form its own laws, and dispense justice without Spartan interference.1 3 In fact, there is good reason to believe that in the sixth century, a clause protecting the autonomy of city-states was included in the terms of these alliances. 1 4 9 de Ste. Croix, Origins, 107. Cf. Larsen, \"Constitution I,\" 265-276. 1 0 The treaty between Sparta and the Aitolians (see Cartledge, Gschnitzer, and Kelly, op. cit. n.2), includes this typical clause of fifth-century alliances, \"rravxi OOVEVI K C U T O BuvaTov. Similar forms are found in the Spartan-Athenian alliance of 421 and the hundred year treaty between Mantinea, Elis, Argos and Athens; du S U V C O V T C U i o x u p o T d T c p ' K a x c t T O S U V C T T O V (Thuc. 5. 47. 2). See Thuc. 1.44.1. Cf. de Ste. Croix, Origins, 112-3; Cartledge, \"Origins,\" 225. 1 1 For the obligations of these sort of treaties, see T. Pistorius, Hegemoniestreben und Autonomiesicherung in der griecheschen Vertragspolitik klassicher und hellenistischer Zeit (Frankfurt, 1985), 87-93; 120-5. 1 2 Hdt. 1. 68; f |or] 5e 091 KCU fj TroAAf] Tfjs TTEAoTrovvfjoou rjv K c c T E O T p a u u E v r i . The use of KCX T E O T p a Li LIE vr| is too harsh and is not appropriate to the situation at this time. Cawkwell is correct that the allies, \"could only be termed 'subject' by the stretch of the fifth-century imagination,\" \"Sparta and her Allies,\" 373; cf. G. Crane, Thucydides and Ancient Simplicity, (Berkeley, 1998), 77. Membership in a symmachy was not in itself the limiting factor on autonomy. See P.J.Rhodes, \"Demes, Cities and Leagues,\" in M.H. Hansen, ed., The Ancient Greek City-State (Copenhagen, 1993), 166-7; Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis,\" 77-78. 1 3 de Ste. Croix, Origins, 98-9. For a discussion of autonomia see M.H. Hansen, \"The Autonomous City-State: Ancient Fact or Modern Fiction?\" CPCPapers 2 (1995): 21-43. R. Sealey, Demosthenes and His Time, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); 242-4, notes that almost always context determines the meaning of autonomia. According to him, it is often contrasted with another condition, is always the more preferable choice, and is best translated as \"self direction.\" According to Bosworth, autonomy was strictly, \"the capacity to enact and implement one's own laws, (A.B. Bosworth, \"Autonomia: the Use and Abuse of Political Terminology,\" Stud. Ital 10(1992): 123). 1 4 Cawkwell, \"Sparta and her Allies,\" 373. The Spartan-Argive treaty of 421 includes T a g 8E TroAias T a g EV r fEAoTrovvdocp' , KCU n i K p d s KCU U E y d A a s , a u T o v o n c o s rJnEv -rrdaag K a n a T r d T p i a (Thuc. 5. 77. 5). The final terms have: ' K a T T d S E E S O ^ E T0T5 A a K E S a i n o v i o i s K C U ' A p y E i o i g oTTOvSdg KCU \u00C2\u00A3up.uaxt 'o :v r j p E V T r e v T r i K o v T a ETTI, ETTI T0T5 '10015 KCU 6|_ioiois SiKag SISOVTOLS K a n a T r d T p i a - T C U 8E dAAai TT6AIE$ T O U EV TTEAoTrovvdacp K O L V Q V E O V T C O T Q U oTrovSav 5 Herodotus' observation is more pertinent to the end of the century when, indeed, allied freedom was becoming \"subjected\".to Spartan pol icy . 1 5 More pervasive than any infringement on autonomy was the requirement that allies swear \"to have the same friends and enemies and follow the Spartans whithersoever they might lead.\" 1 6 A consequence of this military practicality was the limitation of the allies' freedom to follow an independent foreign policy {eleutheria)}1 This became apparent when, in 506, Kleomenes, the Spartan king, gathered an army \"from the entire Peloponnesos\" Ken T S S ^unuaxicts a u x o v o L i o i K C U O U T O T T O A I E S , x d y auTcov E X O V T E S , K c t T T a T r d T p i a (5. 79. 1). Nevertheless, there is some validity to the notion t h a t allied freedom w a s limited by Sparta in t h e sixth century, and certainly in the last half of the fifth century and during Sparta's supremacy (404 to 369). Although i n theory the states w e r e autonomous, as t h e alliances progressed it became apparent t h a t Sparta did interfere i n the internal affairs of its allies. Sparta w a s careful to preserve the original oligarchies, or at least t h e pro-Spartan governments, of its allies. Although this interference w a s a limitation a n d infringement upon autonomy, it was also part of the moral agreement between aristocratic governments to help o n e ' s friends a n d harm o n e ' s enemies. See Cartledge, \"Origins,\" 224. There w e r e e v e n Spartan sympathizers living i n other states a n d Sparta w a s most likely careful to ensure the safety of these laconizers. See T. Braun, \" X P H 2 T O Y Z TTOIEIN,\" CQ 44 (1994): 44-45. 1 5 Cartledge writes t h a t in t h e alliances with Sparta, Sparta eventually infringed upon the freedom a n d autonomy of a polis because it n e e d e d to be sure that an ally would comply with its wishes (Spartan Reflections [London: Duckworth, 2001], 370. 1 6 These w e r e the terms presented to Athens after it had b e e n defeated a n d forced to terms by Sparta in 404: T O V auTov EX0p6v KCU 91'Aov V O U I ^ O V T O S AaKE5ai|_iovioi$ ETTECJOCU KCU K O T O y f j v K C U K a r a SdAaTTav OTTOI d v r i y c o v T a i (Xen. Hell 2. 2. 20). The Spartans did not swear to these same terms, and i n this way the relationship w a s not reciprocal. According to Herodotus, Kleomenes swore in the Arcadians (c. 492) with the following terms; &AAou$ T E 6pKous T r p o o d y c o v 091 rj [lkv E^EoSai C K p E a s O U T G O xf j d v E \u00C2\u00A3 r i y E r ) T o u (Hdt. 6.71). The terminology is so similar to t h e formula found in Xenophon that it w a s most likely current in t h e late sixth century (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 110). The Spartan-Aitolian treaty, see note 3, confirms t h a t - s u c h terminology w a s not reserved f o r those who had b e e n conquered in w a r . Lines four through t e n have b e e n restored to t h e following:!.. 3\"4]vp.ovos U O V [ T . 1-2. /7ETTO][[U]EVOS 776-rrui Ka A O [ K E 8 O I U 6 V I ] I [ O ] I ^ a y i o v x a i K C U K O [ T O ydv]|![K]ai Ka8dAa9av T[6V auTov]|9i'Aov KCU T O W O U T [ 6 V Ex8p6v]I E X O V T E S rjoov Trep [KCU AaKEMSainovioi. 'Cooperative measures w e r e needed in times of war, a n d for practical reasons certain rules w e r e developed (Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 26-33). It seems likely that the most powerful military state, Sparta, would either assume or be given the leading position. In the fourth century, this requirement became a burden o n the allies because Sparta used it to promote its supremacy. In 389 B.C. , the Akhaians in Calydon w e r e besieged by t h e Arkadians a n d i n response sent ambassadors to Sparta. They began their speech with the following: 'HLIETS MEV y d p , I < p a a a v , u | i iv, c o av8pES, OTTGOS d v OHETS T r a p a y y \u00C2\u00A3 A A r | T E o u o T p a T E u o n E 9 a KCU ETTOUE 6a OTTOI d v riyfjoOE (Xen. Hell. 4. 6. 2). During the peace conference of 371 B.C. , Autokles accused the Spartans of interfering with a n d not allowing for autonomia a n d noted the formula of allied oaths to Sparta: O U V T I O E O S E U E V y d p Trpos T & S ounuaxiSas T T O A E I J T O U T O T r p c o T o v , O K O A O U O E T V OTTOI d v UHETS riyfja8E. (Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 7). Finaly, before t h e invasion o f Laconia in 369, Lykomedes spoke to the Arcadians a n d said: ETV ocbv oco9povDTE T O C O U K O A O U S E C X V OTTOI U V T15 TrapaKaAS 9 E E O E O 0 E - fjs T r p c p T E p c p v T E A O K E B O I H O VE015 U K O A O U 6 O C O V T E S E'KEEVOUS ricb^cbaaTE, (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 24). See also Bosworth, \"Autonomia,\" 125ff. 6 without disclosing the purpose of the campaign to the allies. 1 8 The Korinthians came to the conclusion that the purpose of the campaign was not \"just,\" and consequently refused to follow Kleomenes any further.1 9 After the withdrawal of the Korinthians, the other allies also returned home and the expedition never reached Athens. 2 0 The following year, the Spartans decided to plan another Athenian campaign but instead of first levying troops from the allies, they invited delegates to Sparta for a conference. 2 1 According to Herodotus, the Spartans sought a \"common decision\" (KOIVO$ Aoyoc) in order to launch a \"common campaign\" (KOIVOC O T O A O S ) . The input from the allies had a profound effect on the Spartan plan in that 22 the campaign never happened. 23 What began as a loose association of allies was now a bicameral system. If Sparta wanted allied support for any external wars, it would now have to consult the allies in advance. The most appropriate and efficient way to do this was to provide a common assembly where the allies could discuss and vote on Spartan proposals. 2 4 The League 1 8 Hdt. 5.74. 1 9 KopsvGioi [ikv T r p l T o i 0 9 6 0 1 a c o T o q o i 8COVTES Acpyov \" 5 o c b TTOIOCCEV T T S E K C U O : H E T E P ' I A A O V T C O T E K a d i / T r a A A ' i o o o v T o (Hdt. 5. 75. 1). 2 0 The actions of the Korinthians and other Peloponnesians show their independence from Sparta but this freedom was consequently limited when the allies agreed to the join in an alliance with Sparta and to the terms of the Peloponnesian League. 2 1 Despite the fact that the Korinthian envoys knew in advance about the plan to install Hippias (Hdt. 5. 92), it is uncertain whether the delegates were mandated. See also, A. Missiou-Ladi, \"Coercive diplomacy in Greek Interstate Relations,\" CQ 37 (1987): 336-345. 2 2 The passages from Herodotus are the following: KCU T C O V dAAcov auwadxcov dyysAous E A s y o v 0 9 1 i T r a p T t f j T c u Ta8E -\"AvSpES aup .p .c ( X O L > o u y y i v c b a K O U E V auToToi f)pTv ou T r o i r | o a a i 6 p 8 c o s . . . KOIVGO T E Aoycp' K C U KOIVCO O T O A C O ' E o a y a y o v T E S a u T o v E$ T a g 'AOvrjvas a T r o S d b n E V ra K C U d i T E i A o u E S o : ( 5 . 9 1 ) . 2 3 According to Forrest, \"when we next hear of a Spartan proposal for joint action with her allies there is no question of the king leading out an expedition ignorant of its purpose. There is a meeting of delegates, a debate and in effect a vote, the first hint that the Spartan alliance had become a League,\" (Sparta, 87-88). According to Larsen, this allied congress was an innovation and as such was the first \"regular\" meeting of the assembly of the Peloponnesian League. Larsen stated that this meeting, \"set an example that was followed later until finally the assembly became a recognized institution; or else the first meeting may mean that something like a definite constitution for a league was adopted . . . (143). . . symmachies follow patterns and their example favors the belief in the adoption of constitutions. . . why should one suppose that it alone failed to adopt its constitution formally at some definite time and instead believe that it just grew?\"(\"Genesis,\" 136-144). 2 4 References to allied meetings where votes were taken are the following: in 440 (Thuc. 1. 40. 5, 43. 1); in 432 7 assembly provided Sparta with the means to gauge allied support for future campaigns and 25 provided the allies with the means to participate in the decision-making process. In addition to the formation of an allied congress, there arose the obligation that a majority vote of the allies be obtained to approve any Spartan proposal that involved them in an external war. Furthermore, the allies swore an oath that any passed proposal was binding upon all allies.26 The requirement that allies abide by a majority vote was created by the Spartans in response to their concession to gain the assembly's approval for any foreign campaigns.27 The creation of the allied congress came first, followed closely by these agreements.28 The Peloponnesian League officially came into existence when the assembly (Thuc.l. 119-25); in 404 (Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 8). A decree of the allies (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 37) must have come from a vote. For other meetings, see Hdt. 5. 91ff; Thuc.l. 67.-72; Thuc. 3. 8-15; 4. 118. 4; 8. 8. 2; Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 2; 5. 2. 11-23; 5. 4. 60; 6.3.3-10). 2 5 Cf. Lendon, \"Constitution,\" 17Iff. 2 6 The oath is found in Thuc. 5. 30; E i p r i p e v o v K u p i o v ETVCU OTI dv TO TrAfjOos TGOV f,uwjdxcov y r|9 i \u00C2\u00B0 r | T a i , f\v \xr\ TI 9ecbv f\ ripcbcov KcoAuna de Ste. Croix stated, \"the oath subjecting the foreign policy of each ally to Sparta's dictation and thus depriving the ally of an essential part of its freedom (eleutheria) led to the adoption of that feature of the League constitution which I regard as the hallmark of League membership in the fifth and fourth centuries.\" The moment when the allies first took the oath (see Thuc. 5. 30) was, in his opinion, the inauguration of the Peloponnesian League, c. 505 to 501 (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 109,116-119. 2 7 Lendon argues that Sparta's right to go to war and levy troops from the allies was not limited, there was not a majority vote, and the allied assembly was convened only when it was convenient for Sparta (\"Constitution,\" 159-177). I agree with Lendon that Sparta chose whether or not to convene an assembly; in fact only Sparta could call the allied synod together (see also de Ste. Croix, Origins, 110-111). But the majority vote benefited Sparta more than the allies because it provided Sparta with a means to unify the allies before a campaign. As Lendon notes, Sparta could persuade or coerce allies into voting (\"Constitution,\" 171-173). So, the majority-vote rule was not on most occasions a limiting factor for Sparta but a tool to solidify allied support. Second, Lendon's main argument is that there was not a majority vote rule for all members; instead the reference from Thucydides to \"old oaths\" (Thuc. 5. 30) refers to a pre-Peloponnesian War agreement (\"Constitution,\" 159-165). But even Kagan admits that the \"old oaths\" are \"well before\" the outbreak of the war (Kagan, Peace, 41). The proofs that Lendon cites to show that Sparta did not have to consult its allies are the campaign to install Isagoras in 507 (Hdt. 5. 74ff.) and Agis' march to the Arkadian border in 419 (Thuc. 5. 53) are not persuasive. In 507 no League assembly existed yet (see below), and in 419, Agis was marching against two revolting allies, Mantinea and Elis, and did not need to call an assembly (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 112-115). Although Lendon is correct that Sparta used the assembly for its own advantage, the evidence suggests that there were rules such as majority vote and that in theory, the majority vote was binding. In fact, the majority vote became a tool to secure the participation of the allies who were not always reliable. Perikles noted about the allies; \"each strive to accomplish their own ends\" (1. 141. 6). For the unreliability of the allies, see Hdt. 9. 77; Thuc. 3. 15. 2; 8. 9. I; Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 30; 3 .2. 25. 2 8 Larsen stated that the allies who \"realized that at times common action would be desirable,\" were also those who had disagreed with Spartan policy at that time because Kleomenes was acting inappropriately. These were the allies who were the major influences on the development of the League. Larsen attributed this initiative to 8 was formed and the oaths were taken. The inception of the League began when the allies refused to follow Kleomenes c. 506 and the League itself proceeded to take shape in the years that followed so that by the end of the century, there was an assembly of allies with a 29 rudimentary voting and decision-making procedure. The League congress provided the allies with protection against being committed to an external war that was decided for them solely by the Spartan authorities. On the other hand, Sparta provided the allies with a level of involvement adequate to secure their 30 willingness to follow and acknowledge Sparta as the hegemon (leader) of the League. The allied synod (assembly) was egalitarian in that each ally, regardless of the size of the polis, had one vote. 3 1 The allies were involved in the decision-making process, but Sparta's influence still outweighed that of the allies; only Sparta could call a League assembly, it was usually held in Sparta, and a Spartan presided over the assembly. Once a proposal was the Korinthians. The failed attempt to place Hippias back in Athens was the second setback for Kleomenes. A third setback followed when the allies refused to follow Sparta in the assembly meeting, \"it was clear that a power that had been so humiliated could not count on a general support of the Peloponnesos for a venturesome foreign policy.\" In order to gain support in the future, Sparta would need allied consent (Larsen, \"Genesis,\" 146-148). Cf. Cartledge, \"Origins,\" 226. See also Ehrenberg who stressed that in these types of alliances, a duality between the allies and the hegemon was a fundamental feature and this duality \"rested on oaths and on treaties concluded by the leading state with each of the allies,\" The Greek State, 112. 2 9 Larsen was the first to propose that in 506, with the formation of the congress, the League came into existence. De. Ste Croix agreed with Larsen, but emphasized that it was a process that happened over the years 505 to 501. According to him, the reason for this was that the true origin of the League was not the formation of the assembly, but the oath (found in Thuc. 5.30) that resulted from the allied congress. Those who agree with this view are: Andrewes, HCT IV, 26; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 139; Jones, 44-47; Highby \"The Erythrae Decree,\" 59-102; Huxley, Early Sparta, 65ff. and most recently J. Rhodes, \"Demes, Cities and Leagues,\" 166. For a completely different view, see Hans Schaefer, Staatsform und Politik: 63ff; and more recently Cawkwell \"Sparta and her Allies,\" 364-376. Both Cawkwell and Schaefer deny the existence of a League in the sixth century. Cawkwell, for example, placed the inauguration in the First Peloponnesian War, between the land battle between the Epidaurians and Korinthians (Thuc. 1. 105. 1) and the sea battle between the ships of the Athenians and the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 1. 105). As shown above in note 1, the League was in existence by 480, and both Schaefer and Cawkwell are incorrect to believe that the League was a product of the period after the Persian invasions. See Highby for a detailed rejection of Schaefer's arguments (op.cit. supra). 3 0 According to Rhodes, the Peloponnesian League was one of the first examples of a specific type of alliance; an hegemonic symmachy. He also noted that the hegemon maintained its position and control over other communities in a manner that was accepted by the dependents (Rhodes, \"Demes, Cities and Leagues,\" 166-167). 3 1 Thuc. 1. 141. 1; Cf. de Ste. Croix, Origins, 116; Cartledge, \"Origins,\" 226. 9 approved by the League assembly, Sparta levied troops from the allies and assumed the 32 supreme command o f all forces. In these matters, Sparta possessed executive power. Despite the dominant position of Sparta in the League, the allied assembly was able to refuse Spartan proposals that would involve the League in a foreign war. On the other hand, i f the allies were in favor of a foreign campaign, the assembly could assist in convincing Sparta to decide to go to war. For example, in 376/5 the allies addressed the conflict against Athens that began in 378 and convinced the Spartans to man sixty triremes under the command of Po l l i s . 3 3 Similarly, the majority decision of the allied assembly was needed before the League could conclude a peace treaty. 3 4 Although the majority decision was binding upon all allies, there was an exception that allowed an ally to remain exempt from the consequences of League decisions. If, \"some impediment to the gods or heroes,\" was applicable to either the terms of a peace or a situation of war, then an ally was freed from any obligation that was required by its membership. 3 5 Aside from this, there was no legal justification for abstaining from a League enterprise. This was also true regarding secession; no ally was allowed to leave the League or act against i t . 3 6 If an ally acted contrary to the League (for example, by allying with the enemy), it was considered an insurgent city and Sparta could, without having to call an assembly, 3 2 de Ste. Croix, Origins, 109-112. 3 3 Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 60. 3 4 The peace of 446/5, for example, was made by the \"Lakedaimonians and their allies.\" Cf. Cartledge, \"Origins,\" 227; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 115. Lendon shows that Sparta alone was recognized as having the right to make peace on behalf of the League (\"Constitution,\" 168-169, n.23). 3 5 In 421, the Korinthians applied this exemption-clause (Thuc. 5. 30. 1). Agreeing to the terms of the Peace of Nikias would have forced them to break their existing treaties with allies in Thrakia, which would have created a conflict with \"the gods.\" Since oaths and treaties were religious in nature, it is safe to conclude that this was taken seriously as a legitimate reason to abstain from League obligations, de Ste. Croix noted that there were different contexts in which this oath could be used: an oracle from Delphi, an unfavorable sacrifice, a bad omen, a festival or sacred truce, or a reason accepted by a majority (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 118-121). 3 6 Larsen, \"Constitution I, \" 268-270; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 114-115. 10 muster a League army and use force to coerce the ally back into the League. In reality, the relative powers of the dissenting member and Sparta, as well as changes in circumstances, were taken into consideration before Sparta chose to act. For example, Sparta was in no position to force Elis back into the League in 421, but in 400, after its victory in the 38 Peloponnesian War, was free to launch an invasion and, \"bring the Eleans to their senses.\" The same situation applied i f an ally failed to uphold its oath and any obligations required by the alliance. In these instances, the Spartans made the decision themselves whether or not to go to war with a delinquent ally with the use of a League army. The allied assembly was not convened. While the relationship between the allies and Sparta concerning foreign wars was bicameral (there were two assemblies that decided whether or not to go to war, the allied synod and the Spartan assembly), it was not the case regarding internal conflicts. For the most part, the Spartans led and the allies followed. A n alliance with Sparta also required that each ally provide aid to Sparta in the case of a Helot revolt. This was either stipulated separately in the terms of a treaty, as was the case with the Spartan-Athenian alliance in 421, or it was assumed under the \"having-the-same-3 7 de Ste. Croix, Origins, 112-115; Larsen, \"Constitution I,\" 268-270; Kagan, Outbreak, 15; Cawkwell, \"Sparta and her allies,\" 366. Cf. Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 30; 3. 5. 5-7; 4. 6. 1-3. 3 8 In 400, Sparta did not call an assembly to deal with Elis, Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 21-25; The Phliasians and Mantineans were also dealt with in a similar manner in the 380s, Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 1-11. The Boiotians, on the other hand, were not treated as harshly in 420, Thuc. 5. 39. For more on Sparta's leniency toward some allies, see Cartledge, Agesilaos, 274-313; 242-73. Sparta did concede at times to some allies. For example, in 432 Korinth threatened to enter another alliance if Sparta did not decide to go to war against Athens, Thuc. 1.71.4-5. A similar threat was made by the Akhaians in 389, Xen. Hell.4.6.2. 11 friends-and-enemies\" clause. This concurs with the basic principle set forth by Thucydides that \"most Spartan institutions have always been designed with a view to security against the Helots.\" 4 0 The League was used by Sparta to preserve this important and vulnerable source of power 4 1 3 9 The Spartan alliance with Athens in 421 specifically required Athenian assistance in the case of a Helot revolt;fiv S E T\ S O U A E I O E T r a v i c r r f i T a i ETTIKOUPETV 'A8r|vaious AaKESaipoviois T T O V T I O9EVEI K O T O : T O 5uvaTOV. (Thuc. 5. 23. 3). Cf. Thuc. 4. 118. 7. Lines fourteen to sixteen of the Spartan-Aitolian alliance have been restored by W. Peek: 9EuyovTa$ pi OEKE0oJ[]/*av KEKOIVQVEK[6TCC5 d 8 i K ] [ n a T o v . Cartledge agreed with this restoration and with the identity of the \"exiles who have participated in illegalities\" as Helots who had escaped from Laconia or Messenia, or more likely, those who had been settled at Naupaktos. Cf. Thuc. 1. 103. 3; ML 74. In Thucydides' statement, also y a p i a TroAAd AaKEoaiiaoviois Trpos T O U S EiAcoTas Tfis 9uAaKfJs T T E p i uaAiOTa Ka8EiaTf|K\u00C2\u00A3i (Thuc. 4. 80. 3), \"Taking precautions\" could include requirements in treaties for allies to aid Sparta if the Helots revolted. In the terms of the Tegean-Spartan treaty of c. 550, the Tegeans were required to expel all Messenians: MEOOEvious EK(3O:AETV EK Tfis X \" P A S K C U nn. E ^ E i v a i X p n O T \u00C2\u00B0 u s TTOIETV. E ^ r i y o u p E v o j ouv 6 ' A P I O T O T E A U S T O U T O q>r\ai SuvaoBai T O \XT\ aTroicnvvuvai (3or|8Eia5 X \u00C2\u00B0 P I V T O L S AaKcovi^ouoi T C O V TEysaTcov (Rose, Aristoteles, Nr. 592 apud Plutarch Quaest.Graec.5 = Mor. 292b). Jacoby interpreted x p r p T O U S (\"useful\") to mean \"citizen,\" and this view has been accepted by some scholars, cf. Forrest, Sparta, p.79; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 138. F. Jacoby, \" X P H I T O Y I \" TTOIEIN,\" CQ 38 (1944): 15-16; Cf. V. Ehrenberg, \"An Early Source of Polis-constitution,\" CQ 37 (1943): 16. For a different translation and interpretation, see Thomas Braun, \" X P H I T O Y I \" TTOIEIN,\" CQ 44 (1994): 41. Although the date of this treaty is disputed, the sixth century, c. 550, is the most plausible. Cawkwell argues for a later date, \"Sparta and her Allies,\" 369-370. The traditional view is that the policy of the Spartans, in the sixth as well as the fifth centuries, was dominated by its preoccupation with the Messenians, \"Spartan policy throughout the sixth century was dominated by the fear of a Messenian or Helot revolt being instigated by one or more of her neighbors,\" (Cartledge, Agesilaos, 13). See also, Cartledge, Spartan Reflections, 36-37. According to him, this view requires a sixth-century date for the Spartan-Tegean treaty. On the other hand, Cawkwell has argued that the treaty is a fifth-century document, and feels that there is no other sufficient evidence to prove that in the sixth century Sparta was preoccupied with the fear of a Helot revolt in Messenia. In fact, he points out that, on two separate occasions, Sparta was either ready to send or had sent a considerable army from Lakonia without fear of Helot revolt. See Hdt. 1.83; 3.56.1. Cawkwell believes that after the Second Messenian War the Helots remained quiescent and were not a problem or concern (\"Sparta and her allies,\" 369). Cawkwell is erroneous in thinking that the Helots were \"quiescent\" in the sixth century. Prior to 490, there is evidence that there had been considerable encounters between Helots and Spartiates, and that the Spartans did realize the potential threat. In his study of the Helot system, Ducat interpreted Herodotus as having portrayed an open state of war between Sparta and the Messenians before 465. J. Ducat, \"Les Hi\otes,\"Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique Supplement X X [Paris: Boccard, 1990], 141-3). In 470, the Spartan king Pausanias was accused of collaborating with the Helots, and it seems probable that there were other Helot troubles prior to this, (cf. Thuc. 1.123). In his speech to the Spartans in 499, Aristagoras mentioned the fact that the Spartans were at war with Messenia, \"But here you are fighting for land that is neither large nor fertile but of small bounds. Ought you to risk such a fight? It is against the Messenians, who are as good men as you\" (Hdt. 5.49). Cf. Wallace, \"Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia.\" JHS 74 (1954): 32-35. Wallace believes that Kleomenes' intrigues in Arkadia involved a Helot revolt in addition to an Arkadian insurrection. 4 0 Thuc. 4. 80. 3. 4 1 Cf. Cartledge, \"Origins,\" 229; Agesilaos, 160-79; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, chapter 10. 12 In return for its allegiance, a member of the League could expect that i f it were attacked by a non-member, Sparta would, without having to call an assembly (which took time), raise a League army and come to its defense. Unlike the members of the Delian League, allies were not forced to pay a yearly tribute to Sparta. 4 2 Instead, once a war was decided, allies were required to respond to the Spartan levy by providing their proper contingent to the League force, as well as the proper supplies needed to support troops on a campaign. 4 3 Later, due to the decimating effect that prolonged years of war had on populations, this system was altered so that allies could provide money to support mercenary troops. 4 4 When the League was not at war, the allies were freed from any of these obligations. The League itself did not interfere in the autonomy of the members (though, as shown above, Sparta did) . 4 5 When the League was at peace, allies were permitted to pursue their own external wars and foreign policy, but Sparta was not required to support them in these endeavors. 4 6 For example, during the armistice of 423/2, Tegea and Mantinea fought against one another in southern Arkadia, each with its own set of all ies. 4 7 Sparta did not involve itself nor had it been asked by either party to send military support 4 8 I f an ally was attacked as a 4 2 See W.T. Loomis, The Spartan War Fund: IG V.I.I, and a New Fragment, Historia Ein. 14 (1992): 81-83. 4 3 An ally was required to provide two-thirds of its total army with supplies (Thuc. 2. 10). Later this was revised, Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 20. See Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 37 for evidence that the allies were required \"in accordance with oaths\" to supply troops. 4 4 Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 20. 4 5 Hamilton noted that from the time of the League's inception there were two major principles: \"cooperation of interest in foreign policy under Spartan leadership, and preference for oligarchic constitutions within individual states,\" (Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 29-30). Sparta interfered at times to ensure that governments acted according to Spartan interest. See G.E.M. de Ste. Croix \"The Character of the Athenian Empire,\" Historia 3 (1954): 20, n.5 for situations where Sparta replaced a government with oligarchies. See also, Thuc 1. 19, 144. 2; 4. 126. 2; 5. 31. 6; Powell, Athens and Sparta, 101-2; Cartledge, \"Origins,\" 224. 4 6 According to de Ste. Croix, an ally could not call upon other members to come to its defense, de Ste. Croix, Origins, 114. 4 7 Thuc. 4. 134. 4 8 Thuc. 4. 134. Kleitor and Orchomenos also were fighting when Agesilaos called out the ban in 378. They were ordered to cease all fighting and hand over their troops until his campaign was over (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 36-13 consequence of its actions outside of the League, Sparta was not obligated to defend the member. 4 9 In addition to pursuing their own policy during times of League quiescence, allies did quarrel amongst themselves. In the case of an inter-allied dispute, there is no evidence that Sparta had to be appointed as arbitrator.5 0 Soon after the establishment of the allied congress, there arose a distinction among the allies. There were those who belonged to an inner circle of allies, who were invited by Sparta to vote in the allied assembly and who were bound by League rules and decisions. These states were the official members of the League. 5 1 The other allies were those who had bilateral alliances with Sparta and were not members. Together they made up the larger organization, the Spartan Al l iance . 5 2 But even amongst official members of the League, there were differences between the allies based on their relative strength and proximity to Sparta. For example, Korinth was able to maintain more independence from Sparta than the states of Tegea or Phlious as a result of its strength and influence, and also because of its maritime 38). After this, a League rule was adopted to ensure that whenever a League force was in the field, no allies were warring. 4 9 Elis, for example, had involved itself in the first Korinthian campaign against the Kerkyraians, and in return was attacked by the Kerkyraians and its harbor, Kyllene, was burned (Thuc.l. 27. 2; 1. 30. 2). Sparta was not involved even though Elis was an allied member of the League. The phrase \"Korinthians and the allies,\" (Thuc.l. 105. 3) does not include the Spartans (cf. Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 62), and the Korinthians were often seen acting independently from the League. Sparta did not give aid to Korinth in any of these instances. See also Thuc. 2. 83. 2; 3. 114. 4. An ally could not count on Spartan support unless it was attacked, and judged the victim, not the aggressor. 5 0 de Ste. Croix, Origins, 122. 5 1 It is not clear what the prerequisites were to be included in this \"inner circle.\" Power and importance, most likely, were the deciding factors. 5 2 de Ste. Croix, Origins, 101-104. This sort of system was more apparent in the Second Athenian Sea League where there were definite members, such as Thebes, who was distinguished from the bilateral allies, such as Jason of Pherae, whose alliance with Athens was very short-lived. See J. Cargill, The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981): 83-96. De Ste Croix's approach is related to an earlier one advanced by G. Busolt and H. Swoboda in Griechische Staatskunde II (1926), 1330, who stated that any state that had concluded a treaty with. Sparta was automatically an ally and part of \"die lockere Organisation.\" This \"looser organization\" was partly based on treaties between Sparta and each state, but also governed by \"gemeinsamen,\" decrees made in common. Together, the decrees and the treaties made a League constitution, or what Busolt-Swoboda called, the \"Bundesrecht.\" In addition, only those poleis that 14 connections. Although the League had established rules and an egalitarian voting system, geography and individual allied strength were more influential in dictating how the League operated and how Sparta treated the different allied members. 5 3 Korinth, for example, had the largest system of maritime connections among Peloponnesian League members and it must have had more leverage among allied members because of this naval preeminence. 5 4 League memberships were based on the pre-League, sixth century alliances. 5 5 The first alliance was with El is around 600, shortly after the final capitulation of the Messenians. B y allying with Elis , or more precisely with the Elean aristocracy, Sparta gained influence at Olympia and a friend in the West. 5 6 Afterward, Sparta suffered a few defeats at the hands of the Arkadians, until it ended hostilities and formed an alliance with the major, southern Arkadian power, the Tegeans, around 5 5 0 . 5 7 Other Arkadians became allied to Sparta contributed to discussions and operations were part of the League. 5 3 D. Kagan agreed with the view previously put forth by Kahrstedt in Griechisches Staatsrecht I (1922), 81-82, that the League was a set of separate alliances with the same city, Sparta. But he stressed the need to abandon the search for constitutional law. Kagan believed it was not according to legal structure that Sparta carried out its function as hegemon of the league, rather, \"the truth is that Sparta interpreted her inevitably conflicting responsibilities in accordance with her needs and interest\" (Kagan, Outbreak, 19). It was political and military realities, therefore, that were the decisive factors in the affairs of the League, not federal regulations. Thus, poleis were not all treated the same by Sparta or by the League, and the League consisted of three distinct classes of so-called members; those small and relatively weak poleis close to Sparta and easily disciplined (such as Tegea, Phlious, and Orchomenos), those states who were either strong or remote enough to have some clout but not enough to escape immediate punishment (such as Mantinea, Elis and Megara), and finally those who were strong enough to maintain a certain independence in respect to foreign policy (such as Korinth ). Kagan, Outbreak, 15-22. Cf. Cawkwell, \"Sparta and her allies,\" for a similar view of the League in the sixth and early fifth century. See also, Lendon, \"Constitution,\" 59-77, who defends Kagan's view. 5 4 Korinth's allies included, Kerkyra, Sicily, Epidamnus, Anaktorion, and Potidaia. Most of Korinth's connections were in the West, and it traded with Italy, Africa, and Sicily. Korinth was by far the greatest maritime power among the Peloponnesian League allies. For more on Korinth's maritime connectiosn, see J. B. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth : a history of the city to 338 BC. (Oxford : Clarendon Press 1984), 27-280; 390-396; 95ff. 55Larsen stated, \". . '. when the League was organized, the old treaties connecting individual cities merely with Sparta were replaced by treaties embodying the constitutional law of the League.\" Larsen, \"Constitution I,\" 260. For the reception of new members, see de Ste. Croix, Origins, 340-1. 5 6 Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 15. Wickert was right to point out that Elis had been making treaties with other communities in the sixth century, cf. IvO 9 (the Elean-Heraian Treaty, also ML 17). The treaty is traditionally believed to be between the Heraians of Arkadia and Elis, but a more recent interpretation has shown that the treaty may be between Elis and an unknown Elean community (J. Roy and D. Schofield, \"IvO 9: A New Approach,\" Horos 13 [1999]: 155-165). 5 7 The sixth century treaty with Tegea, c. 550, (apud Plut.Mor. 292b) proves that Spartan influence in the 15 following Tegea. The Arkadian poleis were important allies to Sparta not only because of their geographic location along the the main route north out of Lakonia, but also because they shared a border with Argos, Sparta's chief rival in the Peloponnesos. In 545, the Spartans defeated the Argives in the region of the Thyreatis, and the area was incorporated into Spartan territory. 5 9 With Argos defeated and a majority of the Peloponnesos subdued, Sparta concluded alliances with Korinth in 525/4 and Megara, probably by 519 . 6 0 Other northern Peloponnesians may have also become Spartan allies during the sixth century. 6 1 In addition, the island of Aegina was by 491 allied to Sparta via the aristocratic oligarchy that ruled the island. 6 2 In 494 Sparta again defeated its old rival in the Peloponnesos, Argos. The Peloponnesos and its gateway, the Isthmus, were now secured. 6 3 Around 481, with the threat of a pending Persian invasion, the Peloponnesian League was replaced by the need for a united, defensive front from all Greek states. Sparta was chosen as the commander of operations, but as the nature of the war effort shifted from defensive to offensive, Sparta's strong position became threatened by a new power, Athens. southern Peloponnesos was made possible by diplomacy and that alliances were made between Sparta and other Peloponnesians during the sixth century. For a sixth-century date, see Highby, \"The Erythrae Decree,\" 73; Forrest, Sparta, 76. For a fifth-century date, Schaefer, p.203; G. Cawkwell, \" Sparta and her Allies,\" 43 (1993): 364-376; Braun dates it to the end of the Second Messenian War, when Messenian exiles were still frequent (Braun, \"XPH2TOYI\",\" 42-43). The treaty should come on the heels of a Spartan-Tegean conflict and at a time when Sparta was concerned about fugitive Helots. The best possible date is c. 550 and is accepted here. See Forrest, Sparta, 74-78 for the dating of Chilon and his association with this treaty. 5 8 Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 11-12; 29. The other Arkadians were the following; Mantinea, Orchomenos, Kleitor, Heraia, and the communities in the Parrhasia and Mainalia. 5 9 Hdt. 1.82 6 0 For Korinth see Hdt.3. 48. 1; Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 15-6, J.B. Salmon, Wealthy Korinth, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 240,248-9; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 97, Forrest, Sparta, 74. Will, Korinthiaka, (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1955), 626-7. For Megara see Jones, Sparta, 49; Legon, 137-5; Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 19-20. 6 1 For Sikyon and Phlious, see Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 15-19. Sikyon was likely an ally, but the evidence for Phlious is inconclusive. 6 2 T.J. Figueira, \"Aiginetan Membership in the Peloponnesian League,\" CPh 76 (1981): 1-24. Cf. Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 23-26. 6 3 Hdt. 6. 74-82. Sparta was concerned with securing the northern road to the Isthmus and it sought to control or 16 Argos was simultaneously regaining some of its former power. In 446/5, the Thirty Years ' peace restored stability to Greece and the threat to Spartan power was removed. 6 5 This stability would last for around fourteen years until the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The events of the Peloponnesian War and the subsequent Spartan supremacy revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of the League. Membership in the League provided members with protection against Athenian aggression. Sparta was given, or at first assumed, the position of hegemon complete with executive powers. This relationship between the allies and Sparta was made possible because the benefits for all parties involved outweighed the obligations. After the Peace of Nikias in 421 the situation changed, however, and it became clear that the relationship became less useful for the allies. The threat that the League presented to their eleutheria and autonomia became more evident and as a result, between 421 and 371 various allies disputed with Sparta and attempted to remove themselves from the alliance. 6 6 In 369, after the battle of Leuktra, two of the most important and long-standing allies of Sparta, Elis and Tegea, planned an invasion of Lakonia, with the help of Thebes, in order to topple the Spartan power. A s a result, Sparta's influential puissance over its allies was weakened to the point that the Peloponnesian League officially dissolved. Sparta's ability to force states to \"follow withersoever it might lead,\" had vanished. It is against this brief outline of the evolution and structure of Spartan dominance in the Peloponnesos that the following study wi l l trace the relationships of El is , Tegea, and Mantinea with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. In this study, I w i l l argue that these three Peloponnesian city-states were able to develop their own symmachies (leagues) that co-ally with those poleis that were situated on this north-south axis (Amit, Poleis, 121). 6 4 Thuc. 1. 107. 1. 6 5 Thuc. 1. 115. 1. 6 6 Elis and Mantinea, for example. See Thuc. 5. 18-47. 17 existed with the Peloponnesian League. This was possible because the rules that governed the Peloponnesian League were most often created on an ad hoc basis, and also because the initial arrangement between all three of these city-states and Sparta was reciprocal. Hence, each city-state was not restricted by its membership in the Peloponnesian League or its alliance with Sparta from expanding and developing its own alliances and symmachies. These small leagues were able to operate independently of the Peloponnesian League. In an examination of each city-state's relationship with Sparta, I w i l l contend that after the inception of the League in 506, each city-state pursued its own interests, and despite growing Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnesos, developed its own regional league. In the following investigation of these small, regional leagues (such as the Elean symmachy), I w i l l argue that as long as the basic agreements of the League were met and Sparta's safety at home was secured, an allied symmachy could and did exist between each of these city-states and Sparta. This changed, however, during the latter half of the fifth century, specifically in 420, when Sparta began the dissolution of these symmachies by supporting the autonomy of the dependent communities of Tegea, El is , and Mantinea. In the following investigation of these city-states and their history with Sparta, I wi l l demonstrate that the growth of these leagues and the potential threat Sparta believed they eventually posed to its security, prompted Sparta to take a much more aggressive, preponderant, and controlling attitude toward its allies. Consequently, Sparta felt the need to dissolve those leagues that were a threat to its safety in order to preserve its dominant position in Greece. Tension between these states and Sparta was evident by the early fifth century, but it was not until the Peloponnesian War that the demands made by Sparta on these allies caused 18 a rift between the Spartans and both the Eleans and Mantineans. El is and Mantinea sought support from other allies to help preserve their independence and consequently, they defected from the Peloponnesian League. Tegea, on the other hand, was not a perceivable threat to Sparta until after 371. Finally, I w i l l assert that with the additional support of larger allies such as Argos, each city-state was temporarily able to remain independent from Sparta. 6 7 But when this allied support waned and each polis was left to tend to its own foreign policy, Sparta was able to eliminate the threat to its security and bring the defectors back into its alliance. Eventually, Sparta emerged as the victor of the Peloponnesian War and adopted an /TO even more aggressive approach to maintaining its security and safety. Both the Elean and Mantinean symmachies were dismantled. Oddly, only Sparta's immediate neighbor, Tegea and its league, remained unscathed by Spartan aggression. Eventually, though, all three city-states supported the invasion of Lakonia in 370/369 and the subsequent destruction of Sparta's supremacy. 6 9 On the power of foreign allies to disrupt hegemonies, see B. Strauss, \"The art of alliance and the Peloponnesian War,\" in Charles D. Hamilton and Peter Krenz, eds., Polis and Polemos, (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1997), 130-132. 6 8 Cf. Cartledge, Spartan Reflections, 37; Bosworth, \"Autonomia,\" 124ff. 6 9 Regarding the sources, most of the supporting materials are the literary works, and those works we do have do not originate within the Elis, Tegea, or Mantinea. Because of this and the late nature of many of these sources, the history of the Peloponnesian states is difficult to ascertain. But by relying on an examination of all the sources that are extant, it is possible, I believe, to reach an informed speculation of the events that led up to the formation of the Peloponnesian League and the origin and development of the regional leagues. In addition, because of the silence of the sources for certain events and periods, it is at times difficult to discern precise relationships, whether states were friendly or hostile, or what the precise nature was of each of these regional leagues. For the events during these periods, we can only surmise what seems reasonable from an investigation of all the sources. In regard to choice of texts and translations, I have provided the Greek text where I believe that it is important for the reader to see the terminology and where it is necessary to see the correlation between the regional leagues and the other larger coalitions of ancient Greece. Where the Greek is not necessary, I have provided English translations so as to provide a quick and easy reading of the text. Finally, in a few special cases where scholars differ in their reading of the text, I have provided both the Greek and an English translation. 19 Chapter One El is The Development of the Elean State Bound by Akhaia in the north, Arkadia in the east, Messenia in the south, and the Ionian Sea in the west, the large and fertile area of the western Peloponnesos was, in antiquity, called Eleia ('HAEIOC).70 The area is now known as El is because the Eleans, those who lived in the northwest on the Peneios river, came to dominate the rest of the region. The entire territory was divided into four districts: Koile Elis (\"Hollow Elis\") , Akroreia, Pisatis, and Triphylia. During its greatest period of prosperity and expansion, E l i s ' borders reached north to Akhaia, east to Psophis, and south to the Neda River . 7 1 The land was very fertile with large, flat plains and an abundance of rivers and, as a result, was known for its agricultural potential and ability to support cattle. Small villages, 72 unfortified communities, and farms occupied a major portion of the territory. These rural communities became connected to the major city, El is , which served as the political, economic, and religious center for the entire region. 7 0 Cf. Strabo 8. 3. 33; Thuc. 5. 31. Cf. Swoboda, Elis, in RE 5.2 (1958): 2368-2437; Meyer, Pisa, in RE (1964): 1732-1755. See also articles in Der Kleine Pauly (Stuttgart: A, Druckenmuller, 1864-1975), 2.249-251 (Elis); 4.866-867 (Pisa); 5.962-963 (Triphylia). 7 1 N. Yalouris, \"The City-state of Elis,\" Ekistics 33 no. 194 (1972): 95-96. Eleia was estimated to be around 2660 sq. km: Koile Elis occupied 1160 sq. km., Akroreia 405 sq. km., Triphylia 540 sq. km., and Pisatis 555 sq. km. Cf. Roy, \"Perioikoi,\" 298. 7 2 Yalouris, \"Elis,\" 96. This is supported by both Strabo and Diodorus who state that before the synoikism of Elis in 471, the people of this region lived in small poleis, villages, and demes. See Strabo 8. 3. 2 and D.S. 11. 54. 1. 7 3 According to Yalouris, there were forty-nine communities mentioned by the ancient sources as belonging to the country of Elis (\"Elis,\" 95). Polybius (4. 73) stated that in the second century, Elis was a larger territory that was more thickly inhabited by slaves and farm stock than the rest of the Peloponnesos, and that many Eleans never took part in urban affairs, such as politics and law. 20 Map 1: Elis* 'From James Roy, \"The Frontier between Arkadia and Elis in Classical Antiquity,\" in P. Flensted-Jensen, T.H. Nielsen, and L . Rubinstein, eds., Polis and Politics. (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), 134. 21 B y the end of the sixth century, this polis had formed alliances with these communities and was the hegemon of an Elean symmachy. 7 4 75 Although the literary tradition does not date the synoikism of El is until 471, there is evidence that suggests the site was occupied as early as the late-eleventh century. 7 6 There is also evidence of a large, sixth century public building and an inscription that has been dated to the first half of the sixth century, indicating that there was some form of a judicial process present in the city of E l i s . 7 7 This information leads us to believe that by the end of the sixth 78 century, Elis may have served as a political center for the entire region. The Eleans extended their control over the rest of the territories, either by force or by concluding alliances. Elean expansion began with the communities neighboring the city of 7 4 The Copenhagen Polis Centre has collected an inventory of Archaic and Classical poleis in an attempt to define what the ancient Greeks thought a polis was. The word polis, according to the Centre, has several meanings. The predominant meanings are \"town\" and \"state\" with \"territory,\" and can be easily rendered as \"city-state.\" The Lex Hafniensis de civitate was written by the director of the Centre, M.H. Hansen, to ensure that these two meanings, \"town\" and \"state,\" would not describe different objects: \"in Archaic and Classical sources the term polis used in the sense of 'town' to denote a named urban center is not applied to any urban center but only to a 'town' which also was the center of a polis in the sense of political community. Thus, the term polis has two different meanings: town and states; but even when it is used in the sense of town its reference, its denotation, seems almost invariably to be what the Greeks called polis in the sense of a koinonia politon politeias and what we call a city-state\" (for bibliography and discussion, see the recent article by M.H. Hansen, \"Was Every Polis State Centered on a Polis Town,\" CPCPapers 7 (2004): 131-132). 7 5 The main evidence for the synoikism comes from Strabo 8. 3. 2 and D.S. 11. 54. 1. Strabo clearly states that there was no settlement on the site of Elis before the synoikism and Diodorus implies this as well. Homer (//. 11. 672) referred to a settlement there. Pausanias (5. 4. 3) reported that the synoikism of Elis occurred under the legendary king Oxylos, and although Pausanias' account may be largely based on legend more than fact, it does, as Roy notes, indicate that people believed that there were several communities which unified to become the city of Elis. For a complete and recent discussion of the synoikism of Elis, see J. Roy, \"The Synoikism of Elis,\" CPCPapers 6 (2002): 249-264. Although Roy concludes that nothing definite can be said about the synoikism, his work shows that the city of Elis began as a group of separate communities that united and developed over a long period of time, and eventually extended its influence over the whole country. 1 6 Roy, \"Synoikism,\" 253-5; Yalouris, \"Elis,\" PECS (1975): 299; B. Eder and V. Mitsopoloulos, \"Zur Geschichte der Stadt Elis vor dem Synoikismos von 471 v. Chr.\" JOA 68 (1999): 1-40. Cf. C. Morgan, Athletes and Oracles, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 48-9. 7 7 P. Siewert, \"Inschriften und Geschichte der Stadt Elis,\" in V. Mitsopoulos-Leon (ed.), Forschungen in der Peloponnes. Akten des Symposions zur 100-Jahr-Feier des Osterreichischen Archaologischen Instituts Athen, Athens 5-7, March 1998 (Athens: Osterrreichisches Arhcaologisches Institut, 2001): 245-52. See also,. B. Eder and V. Mitsopoloulos, \"Zur Geschichte der Stadt Elis,\" 1-6. 7 8 See C. Morgan, Early Greek States Beyond The Polis (London: Routledge, 2003):75-6; 80-1. Cf. C. Morgan, \"Politics without the Polis. Cities and the Achaean Ethnos, c. 800-500 B.C.,\" in R. Brock and S. Hodkinson, eds., Alternatives to Athens. Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 189-211. There is also evidence of the existence of other communities around 22 Elis in \"Hol low E l i s \" and then continued east to the area of the Akroreians. Beginning in the eighth century and continuing into the sixth century, Elis extended its influence south toward the Alpheios River valley, the territory of the Pisatans. 7 9 Furthermore, the two port towns of Kyllene and Pheia, were also incorporated into the Elean state, probably during the sixth century. 8 0 According to Roy, both Kyllene and Pheia were not perioikoi but were incorporated directly into the Elean state because of their maritime importance and proximity to Koile E l i s . 8 1 El is also founded three colonies in Epirus: Bouchetion, Elatria, and Pandosia. Hammond has dated the foundation of the colony at Bouchetion to the seventh century, and Elatria and Pandosia to the sixth century. 8 2 A l l three were relatively close to the sea. 8 3 the area of Elis prior to the fifth century (see Roy, \"Synoikism,\" 253-254). 7 9 Roy, \"Perioikoi\" 282. It is uncertain when Elis expanded into Akroreia, but certainly by the sixth century it had moved south into the Alpheios River valley and the area around Olympia. It is reasonable to conclude that by the time Elis conquered the Pisatans, it had already secured the loyalty of the communities north of the Alpheios. According to Xenophon (Hell. 3.2.30), the Akroreians, Letrinoi, Amphidolians, Marganians, and Lasionians were all perioikoi c.400. Unfortunately, he did not provide any dates for when they became perioikoi of the Eleans. 8 0 Strabo (8. 3. 4.) noted Kyllene was located north of cape Araxus. It served as the naval station of the Eleans and was connected to Elis by an established road which separated them by a distance of 120 stades (24 Km, or approximately 14 miles). Pausanias mentioned that Kyllene, \"faces Sicily and affords ships a suitable anchorage. It is the port of Elis . . .\" (Paus. 6. 26. 4). Homer also mentioned Kyllene; when Polydamas was running among the Greek ships, he killed, \"the Kyllenian, Otos, a captain of Epeians,\" (II. 15. 518). The second harbor at Pheia (Strabo 8.3.12) was 120 stades from Olympia. As will be shown below, Olympia became a political and commercial center for Elis. 8 1 Roy, \"Perioikoi,\" 301-5. 8 2 There is no literary evidence that provides a date for the Elean colonies in southern Epirus, but Bouchetion, Elatria, and Pandosia all pre-dated the arrival of the Korinthians in the area. According to Hammond, Bouchetion was an ideal location for a colony. Its port was close to the Gulf with a hill nearby that could offer a good position for defense. Furthermore, a river from its port was easily navigable. Hammond dates the colony of Bouchetion to the seventh century, and those at Elatria and Pandosia to the sixth based upon pottery found at the sites. See N.G.L. Hammond, Epirus. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 427; 481-2; 723. Hammond notes that the colonies had a close connection with both Olympia and Dodona and similarities between dedications at Dodona and Olympia help prove that these colonies continued their close relationship with Elis via Olympia. An inscription found at Olympia commemorating Apollonia's victory over Thronium was written in an Elean script but not, according to Jefferey, the normal Elean script used at Olympia (LSAG 228). Hammond states, \"Apollonia probably employed a craftsman from one of the Elean colonies in Epirus, which had regular contacts with Olympia but individual characteristics\" (433). 8 3 See N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 498; C. Falkner, \"Sparta and the Elean War, c. 401/400 B.C.,\" Phoenix 50 (1996): 19. The colonies were, from Elis, about 200 km. See also, C. Morgan, \"Corinth, the Corinthian Gulf and Western Greece during the eighth century B.C.\" ABSA 83 (1988): 313-338. 23 But it was the southern expansion into the Pisatis that was especially important to the development of El is and its regional league since it provided Elis with the supervision of the 84 Olympic Games. The Olympic sanctuary served the Elean state in three influential ways. First, it was used to guarantee the terms of laws and treaties.8 5 Second, Olympia was used as a means to express Elean dominance over other communities. For example, the treaty between the Ewaoioi and the Eleans used Olympia as the guarantor of the treaty with fines payable to the god. Since Elis was at that time in control of the shrine, the fines would have been more damaging to the Ewaoioi than to the Eleans . 8 6 In another inscription, two unknown communities, the Anaitoi and Metapioi, concluded a fifty-year treaty and the Olympic officials ensured that the terms of this alliance were adhered to. El is was in control of the sanctuary at the time and as a result, may have had some influence over this treaty and, subsequently, over these communities. 8 7 Third, control of Olympia provided the Eleans with direct contact with the neighboring communities and states, including Sparta. During the sixth century, around the same time that El is was solidifying its control of Olympia, an Elean alliance was developing. 8 8 The existence of this Elean symmachy in the sixth and early fifth centuries and the presence of formal alliances between Elis and other 8 4 M . H . Hansen notes that Elis was unusual because it had a political center both at Olympia and Elis; he applied the term \"bicentral\" to denote this (\"Kome. A Study in How the Greeks Designated and Classified Settlements Which Were Not Poleis,\" 59-60). See also Roy, \"Synoikism,\" 257. C. Morgan does not believe that Olympia played a greater role in Elean politics than the city Elis (Early Greek State, 76; 242, n. 113). 8 5 C. Morgan, Early Greek State, 80-1. The sanctuary guaranteed sacred laws, such as those concerning xenoi and the protection of theoroi, rules of conduct during the games, and the terms of treaties between foreign states. See Nom. I. 36; 4; 108, respectively. For state decisions that were protected by Olympia, see Norn, I. 23 and 24. 8 6 See below, pages 26-27, for the discussion of this treaty and how it subordinates the Ewaoioi. 8'IvO 10, c. 475-450. B. Virgilio's analysis of the treaty has shown that Olympic officials played a role and ensured that the terms of the treaty were upheld by both parties (\"A proposito della f pdxpa tra Aneti e Metapi e alcuni uffici publici e religiosi ad Olympia,\" Athenaeum 50 [1972]: 68-77). IvO 16 with Paus. 5.6.4; 6.22.4, dated c. 450-425, suggest that Skillous was also subordinate to Elis at the time since payments to Olympian Zeus were required. 8 8 From the dialect, script, and content of bronze inscriptions, Siewert has shown that the Eleans were dominant in Olympia by the sixth century, \"Triphylien und Akroeia. Spartanische 'Regionalstaaten' in der westlichen 24 communities in Eleia is supported by the epigraphic evidence. The first inscription, dated c.500, concerns rules for the Olympic Games.89 Lines five and six provide evidence of an The T O I f aAeToi K C U aupaxia refers, as Siewert notes, to a collective of communities that was allied to and dominated by Elis. 9 1 The common designation for the Peloponnesian League and Delian League were, respectively, AO.KE8CUU . 6VIOI K C U oi auu.u.axot and 'A0r|vaToi K C U oi auppaxoi. This clause may be the equivalent of oi H A E T O I KOCI oi ouppaxoi, 9 2 and in this case the situation that Thucydides described for the late-fifth century was also true for the sixth century. According to Thucydides, Elis did complete treaties and alliances for its allies. For example, in 420, the Eleans joined The Hundred-Year treaty and concluded it, u T T E p C K p e o v auTcov K C U T C O V ^uppaxcov cbv apxouoiv E K O t T E p o i (Thuc. 5. 47. 5). 9 3 It is reasonable t o conclude that a hegemonic symmachy led by Elis began during the sixth century and continued until its dissolution in Peloponnes,\" Peloponnesiaka Supp. 13 (1987-8): 7-12. 8 9 Line one of the inscription forbids an Olympic wrestler from breaking his opponent's fingers, line two orders the referee to penalize a wrestler if he does this, lines three and four concern the readmission of a delinquent to the games, lines five and six forbid the people of the Elean state and its alliance to do or suffer anything, and lines seven and eight mention fines. 9 0 Text taken from Siewert \"Symmachien,\" 257-258. 9 1 Ibid., 260-1. 9 2 See Thuc. 1. 108. 1; 2. 7. 1; 1. 109. 1; 3. 90. 3; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 102. 9 3 For a discussion of Thuc.5.47.5 see Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 82. Like Sparta, Elis was the leader of an alliance that deprived allies of part of their freedom in return for their membership in a larger organization. Further proof of this unequal relationship is found in the terms of peace between Sparta and Elis c. 400 where the Spartans demanded that the Eleans restore autonomy to the perioikoi. (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 23). Cf. Nielsen, \"Triphylia,\" 140-142. According to Siewert, the perioikoi were also symmachoi of the Eleans (\"Symmachien,\" 260-261). It seems that both the perioikoi and the symmachoi were deprived of part of their autonomia by Elis. 9 4 A symmachy can be defined as any military alliance or comradeship in arms. For certain types of these organizations, there was a decisive hegemon (leader) who had all the executive power. In this way, the hegemon maintained its position and control over other communities. This control was accepted by the dependents Elean symmachy: [ OUT ccvBpcc FOCAEIOV KCC]I TCCC oupccxiccs OUTE yuvalka. ai U.EV fei86c VCCTTOt lV dv]5pa faAsiov KCU TUC. aupaxias OUTE KOPJCCAOC. O P Y . ' 25 A sixth-century alliance between Elis and the Elean community of the Ewaoioi, provides further evidence that Elis concluded treaties of alliance with other communities in the sixth century. The exact circumstances under which the treaty was concluded are unknown, but the treaty has recently been dated to c. 500, well after Elis had gained control of the shrine.95 This is the covenant between the Eleans and Ewaoioi. There shall be an alliance for a hundred years, and this (year) shall be the first; and if anything is needed, either word or deed, they shall stand by each other in all matters and especially in war; and if they stand not by each other, those who do the wrong shall pay a talent of silver to Olympian Zeus to be used in his service. And if anyone injures this writing, whether private man or magistrate or community, he shall be liable to the sacred fine herein written.96 If either party failed to uphold their obligations, a fine payable to Olympian Zeus was levied. As previously mentioned, this penalty was more detrimental to the Ewaoioi and seems to put them in a subordinate position. This is not difficult to accept seeing that the Ewaoioi were most likely the inhabitants of a small, neighboring community. Aside from this, the alliance was reciprocal in that both sides agreed to provide aid to one another, especially in matters of war. Alliances with the neighboring communities were the formal means by which Elis enrolled communities into its symmachy and unified the whole of Eleia under its leadership. In this light, Elis' motivation to conclude a treaty with the Ewaoioi c. 500 is understandable. Elean expansion continued into the fifth century during which time Elis stretched its territory as far south as the Messenian border. Allies became members of the symmachy because the hegemon extended involvement and influence in the decision-making process of the larger organization to them. (Rhodes, \"Demes, Cities and Leagues,\" 166ff.). 9 5 The original connection to Heraia has been removed and instead the treaty is believed to be between Elis and a small unknown community of the Ewaoioi, not the Arkadian city. The treaty was originally believed to have been concluded around 571, which would make it contemporary with the final Elean defeat of Pisa. But Jeffery lowered the date to the end of the sixth century, and Roy (see note above) shows that it belongs to c. 500 (LSAG 219,no.6). 9 6 Translation taken from ML 17. The most recent discussion of this treaty is J. Roy and D. Schofield, \"IvO 9: A 26 through alliances with the city of El is that were likely written in a fashion similar to the treaty with the Ewaoioi. Some of the allies were considered to be perioikic in status, while others were incorporated directly into the Elean state. The former were assigned subordinate roles, while.the latter were granted full Elean citizenship. 9 7 Elis clearly claimed control over both types of communities, but the obligations that the allies agreed to when they entered into an alliance, either by force or voluntarily, remain unclear. I f there were obligations o f membership, military and financial support were the most likely demands that Elis would have made of its allies. The Lepreans once offered half of their land to El is in return for military aid against some Arkadians. They were allowed to keep their land and instead required to pay one talent of silver a year to Olympian Zeus. 9 8 In addition, the imposition of a tribute is attested to by Strabo who notes that the Eleans destroyed several poleis and then imposed tribute on those that showed a desire for independence. 9 9 Aside from these two examples, there is no convincing evidence that El is exacted tribute from all of its dependent allies. The evidence supporting the existence of military requirements or obligations is slightly stronger. Mili tary support was a requirement of the treaty between the Ewaoioi and the Eleans, and the use of the term sym(m)achia in the sixth-century inscription published by Siewert implies a military alliance. A s noted above, this inscription, c.500, provides proof that the relationship described by Thucydides during the fifth century was also present during the sixth. In 420, the Eleans signed a military alliance with the Argives, Athenians, and New Approach,\"Horns 13 (1999): 155-165. See also Roy, \"Perioikoi\" 293;ML 17 (GHI5) =IvO9. 9 7 Roy has established that the following were perioikic in status: Triphylia, Akroreia, Letrinoi, Amphidolia, Margana, and Lasion. Pisatis was treated differently and, like Pheia and Kyllene, was incorporated directly into Elean territory (Roy, \"Perioikoi,\" 282-283; 293ff). 9 8 See Thuc. 5. 31. 9 9 Strabo 8. 3. 30; Cf. Roy, \"Perioikoi,\" 292-295. According to Roy, Elis may have expected some sort of financial return for the thirty talents it spent to buy Epion (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 30-31). 27 Mantineans, \"for itself and on behalf of its a l l ies .\" 1 0 0 Lastly, Lepreon had become an ally of Elis in return for military support. 1 0 1 There is no further evidence that the allies were required to provide troops, even 102 though the perioikoi and other Elean towns clearly did have troops to supply. Lepreon supplied enough troops during the Persian Wars to be included on the war memorial dedicated after the victory at Plataia. 1 0 3 A t the battle of Nemea in 394, troops from Triphylia, Akroreia, Lasion, Margana, and Letrinoi fought for the Spartans. 1 0 4 But when Elis was invaded by Sparta in the years 402 to 400, El is failed to organize any defensive force from its perioikoi, and according to Diodorus' account of the invasion, the Eleans had to hire one thousand mercenaries from Aitol ia to help defend the c i ty . 1 0 5 Although, there was military potential among the various allies of El is , there is little evidence that El is took advantage of it. Although Elis was successful at maintaining its dominance over the rest of the region for at least a century, 1 0 6 the precise means by which this was achieved remain obscure. One possibility is through the use of religious officials as managers and enforcers of treaties. El is might have also extended citizenship to perioikic communities in order to secure their 1 0 0 Thuc.5. 47. 1 0 1 Thuc.5. 31 .2. 1 0 2 In addition to supplying troops, some places, such as Lasion, also had fortifications to defend against invasion (Roy, \"Perioikoi,\" 295). 103 ML 27. 1 0 4 Xen. Hell. 4.2. 16. 1 0 5 Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 21-31; D.S. 14. 17. 4-12. 1 0 6 The territories such as Akroreia and Triphylia contained many individual poleis and small communities. Individually these did not pose a threat to Elis, however, they formed associations with each other and fostered a collective identity (Roy, \"Perioikoi,\" 289). Akroreia formed an independent community after the Elean War of c. 400, Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 12, and dedicated a bronze bowl to Olympia in the 360s, SEG 32.411. The Triphylians and Pisatans were other communities. See Nielsen, \"Triphylia\" and Roy, \"Perioikoi,\" 289-230 for the emergence of these states after c. 400. When Sparta invaded Elis c.400, many of the southern communities joined the invading force rather than support the city of Elis (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 25-31). As Strauss notes, the desire for freedom and competition obstructed a polis' quest for hegemony (Strauss, \"The Art of Alliance,\" 128-132). 28 loyal ty . 1 0 7 A third possibility is through the use of force. 1 0 8 It seems likely that given the size of E l i s ' military vis-a-vis the rest of the country, it could and did use force to keep some of its allies under its control. Despite the lack of information concerning the mechanics of the Elean League, it is clear that the Elean government was prepared to use force i f necessary to maintain the solidarity of its symmachy. The early Elean government was a narrow oligarchy. According to Aristotle, a group of ninety gerontes (\"elders\") ruled within the ol igarchy. 1 0 9 During the late-sixth century, however, the Eleans developed their government with more democratic tendencies. 1 1 0 Although the literary evidence supporting a late-sixth or early-fifth century democratic Elis is lacking, the epigraphic evidence suggests that by the end of the sixth century, the Eleans may l 0 7For a discussion of both see Roy, \"Perioikoi,\" 296. The evidence that Olympia was used in managing Elean territory comes from two fragmentary texts. The first, between the Anaitoi and Metapioi, was a treaty that was to last fifty years; IvO 10, c. 475-450 B.C. Cf. B. Virgilio, \"A proposito della fpaxpa tra Aneti e Metapi e alcuni uffici publici e religiosi ad Olympia,\" Athenaeum 50 (1972): 68-77. The second text, IvO 16 with Paus. 5. 6. 4; 6. 22. 4, dated c. 450-425, suggests that Skillous was subordinate to Elis at the time and payments to Olympian Zeus were required from one party for crimes committed. The granting of citizenship is far less certain. Lepreates who won at the Olympic festival were called Elean, (Paus. 5. 5. 3; 6. 7. 8 with IvO 155). This does not prove that they were Elean, only that they were called Elean at the Games by Elean officials, perhaps in order to promote Elis. 1 0 8 If it were not for the arbitration of Sparta in 421, Lepreon would not have been able to resist the Eleans who were prepared to use force to coerce Lepreon to resume payments to Olympian Zeus. Furthermore, much of southern Eleia, for example the Pisatis, was taken by force. 109 Arist. Polit. 1306a 14ff. Aristotle also described the government of Elis as one where, \"the husbandmen and those who have moderate fortunes hold the supreme power and the government is administered according to law . . . where the citizens being compelled to live by labor have no leisure, and where therefore they set up the authority of the law and attend assemblies only when necessary (Arist. Pol. 1292b. translated by H. Rackham. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, vol. 21 [Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; 1944] ). A.H. Greenidge described Elis in similar terms as, \"a democracy consciously preserving aristocratic elements, and still more aristocratic in practice than in theory from the fact that it was based not on a close civic but on an open country life\" (A Handbook of Greek Constitutional History, [London: MacMillan, 1928], 213). 1 1 0 The Elean synoikism of 471 described by Diodorus and Strabo may have been one step in this transition, but there is no evidence to suggest a close association between a democratic revolution and this event. Roy has shown that although the proposal for a synoikism had to have been a political issue, there is no evidence that in itself the synoikism was closely linked to a change in the political constitution (\"Synoikism,\" 258). For more on the association between the synoikism and constitutional development of Elis, see H. Gehrke Stasis. (Munich: 1985), 52-4; 365-7; U. Walter, An der Polis tielhaben, Historia Einz. 82 (1993), 116-125. For views against any connection between democracy and synoikism in Elis, see J.L. O'Neil, \"The Exile of Themistokles and Democracy in the Peloponnesos,\" CQ 31 (1981); 339-40; 345-6; The Origins and Development of Ancient Greek Democracy (Lahnam, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995); 32-3; 38-9; Robinson, First Democracies, 108-11. 29 have adopted a democratic constitution. Nevertheless, when Elis began to expand into the 112 east and south, the elite families still made up the ruling class. The elite Elean corps were known as the Three Hundred. These were logades (\"picked troops\") and were most likely an aristocratic unit composed of members from the leading families of the state.113 Stratolas, one of the oligarchic leaders of the 360s, died in 1 1 1 See Robinson, First Democracies, 108-11. Three treaties from Olympia all make reference to the damos. The treaty between the Ewaoioi and Elis (IvO 9 = Nom. I. 52, discussed above) mentions that the sacred fine will be imposed upon the transgressor of the treaty, whether it be a man, magistrate, or the damos. In another inscription, IvO 3 (DGE 410), the term zamon plathyonta appears next to a boule, and in a third inscription, IvO 11 (Nom. I. 21), a man named Deukalion was granted Khaladrian citizenship and only the damos could change any punishment that violators of this decree incurred. According to Jeffery, the letter forms of these inscriptions suggest a date c.500 or perhaps the first quarter of the fifth century (LSAG, 217-20). Furthermore, according to Pausanias (5.9.4), the Eleans raised the number of Olympic judges (Hellanodikai) from one to two in 580 (at the 50lh Olympiad). One of theses Olympic inscriptions (IvO 2 = Nom. I. 23) mentions only one Olympic judge, and so this inscription and those similar to it, i.e. those with references to the damos as a ruling body, are dated to the first quarter of the fifth century. Although the other dates are possible, I accept the dates suggested by Jeffery and supported by the editors of Nomina. These inscriptions show that the demos was a ruling body in Olympic decrees at the end of the sixth and first quarter of the fifth century. See also Roy and Schoefield, \"IvO 9,\" 162-4. As Robinson notes, Elis was in control of the Olympic sanctuary at the end of the sixth century, and therefore the government of Olympia was Elean. According to the literary sources (D.S. 11.54.1; Strabo 8.3.2) the Elean synoikism took place in 471. During the Peloponnesian War, it seems that some sort of popular government was in place in Elis (Thuc. 5. 47. 9 with Andrews HCT IV, 60-1). Some scholars have tried to connect the rise of democracy with this synoikism. One idea is that Themistokles after his ostracism from' Athens in 470, helped to stir up democratic governments in the Peloponnesos. But the main problem with this is that the epigraphic evidence, dated to c. 500, would have to be dated much later and it does not seem realistic that any pan-Peloponnesian, democratic movement was engineered by Themistokles. For example, see O'Neil, \"Exile of Themistocles,\" 335-46; Robinson, First Democracies 111. As Roy points out, the references to damos in these inscriptions are not only indicative of a move towards a democracy, but also show that a move away from an oligarchy began before 471 (\"Synoikism,\" 258). 1 1 2 Thucydides (5. 47. 9) provides the most detailed outline of the hierarchy of Elean magistrates. According to him, when the Eleans agreed to the terms of the hundred year treaty in 420, it was sworn, \"at Elis by the demiurgi, the magistrates, and the Six Hundred, the demiurgi and the thesmophylakes administering it\" (See also IG i 2 86 [GHI 72] ). The title of the magistrates, oi TOC TE\T\ E X O V T E S (Thuc.5. 47. 6) was the same as in former times (see Aristotle Pol. 1306a; Greenidge, Constitutional History, 214). The demiurgi may be a \"survival of the old aristocratic constitution,\" (Greenidge, 214). Aristotle (Ibid.) also said that demiurgi and theoroi were two examples of \"ancients magistrates\" who, in the 'old days', held their positions for long periods of time and had the potential to form tyrannies. The Six Hundred was a general council and the thesmophylakes were probably in charge of preserving the law code of the city. If anti-Spartan actions were any indication of the presence of democracies, then an early-fifth century, democratic Elis is plausible. The late arrival to Plataia and the story of Hegistratus help place doubt on Elean loyalty to Sparta. From 420 to 400, Elis and Sparta were not on favorable terms and this may also suggest a democratic Elis, although Thucydides nowhere explicitly says so. During the Spartan invasion of c.400 the democratic party, under Thrasydaios, successfully defeated a revolt by the oligarchs and their leader, Xenias. See Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 27. The fact that Xenias had to lead his party in a revolt in order to hand the city over to Sparta indicates that the Elean democrats may have been in power during this period. Although Elis showed signs of a democratic constitution, according to Greenidge, \"it never developed an extreme democracy\" (Ibid.). 1 1 3 Meyer, Elis, in RE 2428. Thuc. 2. 25. 3; Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 13;16. 30 364 fighting as the commander of these Three Hundred. 1 1 4 Furthermore, the Three Hundred seemed to have been used for special, military assignments. 1 1 5 In addition to this elite force, the Elean cavalry may have also been garnered from the leading families. In 365, Andromachos, another leading statesman, was the hipparchos and led the Elean cavalry against the Arkadians . 1 1 6 The Elean military was the most powerful force in Eleia; only Lepreon seemed to have had a comparable force during the Persian Wars . 1 1 7 Elis and Sparta Sometime during the early period of Elean expansion, from the middle of the eighth century to c.500, El is formed an alliance with Sparta. Unfortunately, the exact nature of their early alliance is obscured by a lack of detail and, at times, conflicting reports. The terms of the treaty between Elis and Ewaoioi stipulate, \"and i f anything is needed, either word or deed, they shall stand by each other in all matters and especially in war .\" 1 1 8 These \"other matters\" may be a promise to recognize Elean control of Olympia. I suggest that the same agreement might have existed between Elis and Sparta. What began as friendly associations between aristocrats developed into a more formal agreement based upon a general pact to help one's friends and harm one's enemies. Olympia provided the setting for the Elean and Spartan aristocrats to form friendships. Olympia had political significance both within and without the western Peloponnesos. In the eighth century, in addition to being a local sanctuary, Olympia appears to have served \" 4 Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 31. 1 1 5 See Thuc. 2. 25. 3; 3. 22. 7; 4. 70. 2; 4. 125. 3. There was also another \"picked\" force, the Four Hundred, though less is known about them Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 13. 1 1 6 Xen. Hell 7. 4. 19; D.S. 15. 85. 7. 1 1 7 Lepreon was able to send two hundred men to Plataia (Hdt. 9. 28. 4) and was included on the serpentine 31 as a place for the elite of other emerging states to meet and conduct business and pol i t ics . 1 1 9 A t the Olympic festival, El is and Sparta fostered connections via their aristocracies, both of which were very influential in their respective state's foreign policy. A s Ehrenberg notes in his study of Greek states, \"noblemen and aristocratic ways of life found correspondents in 121 other areas and formed relations.\" Gabriel Herman echoed this sentiment and stated that \"the elite of the ancient world were not confined to their immediate communities . . . On the contrary, they participated at one and the same time both in [foreign] networks and in their immediate communities.\" 1 2 2 Recently, Stephen Hodkinson has pointed out that Spartiates were thoroughly involved in \"guest-or ritualized friendship,\" known as xenia. In fact, almost a quarter of the known guest-relationships in the classical world involved Spartiates. 1 2 3 Closely related to xenia was the institution of proxenia. Here, a local person acted as the \"diplomatic representative for another state,\" 1 2 4 and Herodotus (6. 57) noted that the appointment of a proxenos was made by one of the k ings . 1 2 5 In the sixth century, there is column of 479 (ML 27). 1 1 8 MI 17. 1 1 9 Through a detailed study of the archaeological evidence, Catherine Morgan has shown that wares from Messenia, Argos, and Arkadia were used as votive offerings in Olympia in the pre-eighth-century sanctuary and that in the eighth century, Olympia developed this dual role (Morgan Athletes, 49-96). See also Morgan's third chapter for Peloponnesian Wares in Olympia and Appendix 1 for the Iron-Age material from Elis. See also Roy, \"Synoikism,\" 257. 1 2 0 See de Ste. Croix , Origins, 94 - 101; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 116-178; 242-274. 1 2 1 V. Ehrenberg, The Greek State, 103. 1 2 2 G. Herman, Ritualized friendship and the Greek city. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 8. Moreover, later in the spring of 378, Archidamos, son of Agesilaos, approached his father on behalf of Klenymos, the son of Sphodrias, who stood accused of military misconduct. S. Hodkinson has shown that in this episode Sparta, \"is thus revealed as a place in which patron-client relationships played an essential role\" (S. Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta [London: Duckworth, 2000], 335). 1 2 3 Hodkinson, Property and Wealth, 337-7; table 14, p. 338. Some of these relationships were perpetuated through their descendants, so that individual families could control the political relations between Sparta and other states. 1 2 4 Ibid. 339. 1 2 5 Usually a state chose the proxenoi but according to Mosley, the choice of the king was meant to supplement, not replace, the choice of the state (D.J. Mosley, \"Spartan Kings and Proxeny,\" Athenaeum 49 [ 1971 ]:433-5). 32 proof that there were proxenoi in Sparta who represented Elis : Gorgos in 550 and Euanios in 500 . 1 2 6 In addition to proxenoi in Sparta, citizens of other states acted as proxenoi for Sparta in their respective communities. Xenias, for example, was a proxenos for Sparta in Elis c.400.127 The proxenoi were usually those who had prior relations (xenid) with leading citizens of the polis that they represented. 1 2 8 Hodkinson concludes that proxenoi \"were frequently employed by their native polis to conduct the diplomatic negotiations with the foreign polis whose interests they represented.\" 1 2 9 One of the benefits to this system of foreign connections was the influence it allowed over decisions and foreign pol icy-making. 1 3 0 For example, the campaign against Polykrates of Samos c. 525 was most likely the result of the relationship between Spartiates and their aristocratic xenoi in Samos. 1 3 1 With respect to the Peloponnesian League, xeniai between the elite Spartans and the aristocracies of other states often formed the backbone of the political relationships between the Spartan government and the governments (which tended to be oligarchies) of the allied states. 1 3 2 It was through the interaction of the elite Spartiates and the aristocracy of Elis that the relationship between Sparta and Elis most likely began, and the 133 Olympic Games provided the perfect venue. 126 SEG xi. 1180a; xxvi.476. See also Hodkinson, Property and Wealth, 340. 1 2 7 Xen. Hell. 3.2.27; Paus. 3.8.3. See also, Cartledge, Agesilaos, 256. 1 2 8 Herman, Ritualised friendship, 138-2. 129 Property and Wealth, 341. Hodkinson has also convincingly shown that wealth was an integral part of these relationships (Ibid. 342-4). 1 3 0 Ibid., 348-352. 1 3 1 See P. Cartledge, \"Sparta and Samos; a special relationship,\" CQ n.s. 32 (1982): 243-65. 1 3 2 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 243-6; cf. 139-159. See also C.J. Tuplin, \"The Athenian Embassy to Sparta 372/1,\" LCM2 (1977):51-6; Hodkinson, Property and Wealth, 345-348. 1 3 3 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 248; The Spartans, 84-5. 33 But the Eleans were not the original superintendents of Olympia; this was originally the jurisdiction of the local inhabitants, the Pisatans. 1 3 4 The Pisatans resisted Elean expansion and were at times successful in maintaining their independence and control of the Olympic shrine. When the games were first recorded in 776, the Elean influence in Olympia was underway and the Pisatan control was waning. 1 3 5 During these early struggles, Pheidon of 1 3 4 According to Pausanias (5. 4. 5; 5. 8. 2; 6. 22. 1.), the Eleans were the original supervisors of the games. Cf. Hdt 2. 160. But Xenophon (Hell. 7. 4. 28) mentioned that the Pisatans were the first to administer the Olympic games and that at some undetermined time, Elis had taken control of them. See also Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 31; Strabo 8. 3. 31;. D.S. 15. 78; Pindar, Olympian Ode 10; Phlegon FGrH II. F 257. Grote suggested that logical notion that geography was the important factor and assigned to the Pisatans the original presidency of any Olympic games, for the site of Olympia was in the middle of the Pisatid and \"with its eight small townships is quite sufficient to prove that the inhabitants of that little territory were warranted in describing themselves as the original administrators,\" (G. Grote, Greece [New York: Peter Fenelon Collier, 1899] 317. Despite the discrepancy in the sources concerning the original jurisdiction of the games, we can deduce that the inhabitants of Elis were not the original presidents of the first Olympic games. The traditional date for the founding of the Olympic games is 776 B.C. This was not the first celebration of the games, but rather the first year the games were recorded. Previous games were celebrated, but they were small, local events. The games might have existed before the first victor was recorded but they did not carry the prestige and fame that the later games carried. Cf. Paus. 5. 8. 5-6. Pausanias source was Hippias of Elis whose Olympic victor list has been preserved by Eusebius (cf. Eusebius Chron. 1.194 (Schone, ed.). Eusebius and Phlegon of Tralles both attest that Koroibus was merely the first victor to be recorded, and Eusebius noted that there were twenty-seven victors before him. See H. M. Lee, \"The 'first' Olympic Games of 776 B.C.,\" in W.J. Raschke, The Archaeology of the Olympics, (Madison, 1988), 112-113. Lee demonstrated that Pausanias' version of the games developing over time and gradually gaining significance is plausible. See also C. Morgan, Athletes, 48-65. 3 5 Although the history of the Pisatans before the Persian Wars is not reliable, one common feature can be accepted; early Pisatan history was dominated by struggles over the control of the Olympic games. For Pisatan struggles with Elis, see Paus. 6. 22. 1-4; Strabo 8. 3. 30-33. See also J. Roy, \"Pisatis,\" especially p.240; Meyer's article Pisa in RE (1950), 1747-1752. The Eleans may have seen the Olympic games as the key to the unification of Eleia under its leadership. The use of a religious center for political purposes was not new. The Argive intrigues in the western Peloponnesos, for example, displayed, according to Tomlinson, the use of religion and festivals for political aggrandizement (R.A. Tomlinson, Argos and The Argolid (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972], 201). See also K. Adshead, Politics of the Archaic Peloponnesos [Hampshire: Avebury Publishing Company, 1968. 34); J. Bury, The Nemean Odes of Pindar (London, 1890), Appendix D. According to Strabo (8. 3. 30) the Eleans controlled the games from the victory of Koroibos in 776 until 676, when the Pisatans gained control of the games continuously until the fall of Pisa, c.571. The fall of Pisa is, however, uncertain, and there is a great amount of confusion over when all of the Pisatans were finally defeated by the Eleans. Pausanias (6. 22. 3-4.) described that in 588 the Eleans, fearful of a Pisatan offensive, invaded the land of Pisa and returned after receiving \"oaths and entreaties\" (dTTEAOElv O'I'KC<8E aTrpcticrous ETTEIOE SEr]Eai T E KCU 6 p K o t $ ) . Years later, the Pisatans invaded Elis and were joined by other communities that were described as o u v a T T E c r r r i a a v 5E acpiaiv euro 'HAsicov. Elis defeated these communities and also conquered the communities of Macistos, Skillous, Triphylia, Dyspontium, and Pisatis. According to Pausanias (6. 22. 2) this was c. 572. Cf. Eusebius Chron. 1. 198, 206. But not all of Pisa was conquered at that time. Pausanias states, \"the temple and the image of Zeus were made for Zeus from the spoils, when Pisa was crushed in war by the Eleans, and with Pisa such of the subject peoples as conspired together with her\" (Paus.5.10.2). Jacquemin has recently shown that the Temple was begun in the 470s and was finished c. 457, hence the with the Pisatans ended prior to the 470s (A. Jacquemin in M. Casevits, J. Pouilloux, 34 136 Argos may have usurped the presidency of the games with the support of the Pisatans. Having recently been defeated by the Argives at Hysiae, the Spartans allied with El is to force 137 Pheidon out of Eleia and Olympia. According to Strabo (whose source was Ephoros), it was at this juncture that El is and Sparta formed an alliance: . . .and the Lakedaimonians cooperated with them, either because they envied them the prosperity which they had enjoyed on account of the peace, or because they thought that they would have them as allies in destroying the power of Pheidon, for he had deprived them of the hegemony over the Peloponnesos which they formerly held (Strabo 8. 3. 33). 1 3 8 Strabo reveals here that El is was becoming \"prosperous\" because of its association with O l y m p i a . 1 3 9 Sparta recognized the economic and political potential of allying with El is . Over the next ninety years, the Pisatans regained control of the shrine intermittently. During this and A. Jacquemin, Pausanias. Description de la Grece V. [Paris: Bude edition, 1999], 147. See Roy, \"Synoikism,\" 249-264. Elis continued to expand in the south even before all of the Pisatis was firmly Elean. The confusion over the precise territory of the Pisatans and the existence of a city Pisa may have lead to the confusion regarding the dates of its official fall. The term Pisa most likley refers to the whole area around and including Olympia. As Roy notes, there is no reason to suppose that a town of Pisa existed (\"Pisatis,\" 233). Meyer's opinion (RE 1736-43), accepted here, is that the area of Pisatis did not extend far from Olympia. Its southern boundary was the river Alpheios and its eastern border was either the river Eurymanthos or the Arkadian border. Its western and northern limits are not as easy to determine, but it seems that the Pisatis extended to the area just west of Olympia and north to the area near Mt. Pholoe. See Map 1 and Roy, \"Pistais,\" 229-232 for more on the area of Pisa and the controversy. According to Strabo (8. 3. 31-2), there were eight communities in this area (although he mentions only four by name). Roy provides a discussion on the other possible four communities that made up the Pisatis and a map of the local of these communities (\"Pisatis,\" 233-238,231). 1 3 6 The most suitable period for Pheidon to have taken control of the games was the seventh century, c. 668. By this time, Argos had most certainly become involved in Olympia (Morgan, Athletes, 49-56; 85-88). For some views about Pheidon and his dates, see A. Andrewes, \"The Corinthian Acteon and Pheidon of Argos,\" CQ 43 (1946): 71-73; T.Kelly, \"The Traditional Enmity between Sparta and Argos: The Birth and Development of a Myth,\" AHR 75 (1970): 971-1003; \"Did the Argives defeat the Spartans at Hysiae in 669 B.C?\" AJPh 91 (1970): 31-42; A History of Argos to 500 B.C. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 112ff; Tomlinson, Argos, 70ff. According to Pausanias, the Pisatans asked for Argive help and presided with Pheidon over the games (Paus. 6.22.1). Pheidon had forced his way into Olympia and it may have been with the Pisatans that he was able to act as president, since, as Strabo (8.358) notes, the Eleans refused to recognize him and the games as official (just as they also refused to recognize the other Pisatan games as official Olympics). Pheidon seems to have tried to exploit religion as a means to Peloponnesian political dominance. It may have been at Olympia that Sparta first realized the importance of religion and, like Pheidon, recognized the political significance of the Olympic Games. Later, during the sixth century, Sparta also began to use religion as a means to further its position in the Peloponnesos through the Bones of Orestes campaign (Hdt. 1.67). 1 3 7 Ephoros is cited by Strabo at 8. 3. 33. 1 3 8 All Strabo translations by H. L. Jones, The Geography of Strabo (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1924). 35 same period, Sparta completed its conquest of Messenia, most likely with the help of their new \"friends,\" the Eleans and in return (see below for this discussion), the Eleans may have hoped for help in securing southern Eleia as part of their league. In the Second Messenian War, Elis and Lepreon supported Sparta while Pisa, 1 4 0 Argos, Sikyon, and Arkadia supported the Messenians.141 Meyer explains that the inclusion of the Pisatans with the anti-Spartan grouping of the Second Messenian War (cf. Strabo 8. 355) as an addition by later writers to help legitimize Sparta's aid to Elis against Pisa. 1 4 2 But it is not historically impossible for the Pisatans to have fought in the Second Messenian War, especially i f it lasted until 600 and ended on the Elean border, near the Pisatis. 1 4 3 Prior to the annexation of Messenia by. Sparta, Messenia did have extensive relations with Olympia. 1 4 4 If the Messenians were active in Olympia prior to the seventh century, then they would have come in contact with the Pisatans during their years as supervisors. At the end of the seventh century Messenian resistance to Sparta ended. Thirty years later, Pisatan resistance to Elean control of Olympia also came to an end, and c. 571, the 1 3 S See also, Strabo 8. 3. 30; Polyb.4. 73. 1 4 0 Apollodorus, FGrH 244 F 334 (apud Strabo 8. 362). 1 4 1 Strabo 8. 4. 10 (8. 362) writes: TT\V 5e Ssuxspav K a 0 ' f|v E A O H E V O I auup.dxous 'Apysious T E KCU 'HAEIOUS K C U TTtadTas K C U ' A p K a S a j aTTEOTrioav. Pausanias (4. 15 .7) also noted that the Eleans fought on the side of the Messenians, M E O O E V I O I S p i v O U V 'HAETOI K C U 'ApKdSEg. But Forrest states that Elis was not part of the anti-Spartan coalition (Sparta, 70), and Meineke changes the name Eleans to Arkadians. I follow Forrest here in thinking that there is no reason to believe that Elis was part of the anti-Spartan coalition. Although Both Strabo (8. 4. 10) and Pausanias (4. 15. 7) allege that Elis fought on the side of the Messenians during the Second Messenian War, I prefer Forrest's analysis of the sources and his assertion that Elis was not part of the anti-Spartan group. 1 4 2 The literature supports a friendly Elean-Spartan relationship, but there is no indication that the Pisatans and Spartans were ever friendly. In fact, when Sparta defeated Elis c. 400, it allowed the Eleans to keep the presidency of the games, rather than hand this job over to the Pisatans whom the Spartans believed were unfit for this duty. Spartans were active at Olympia during the time of Pisatan control and must have had some contact with the Pisatans, but they chose to befriend the Eleans instead. According to Apollodorus, the Pisatans fought against the Spartans during the Second Messenian War. If this is not true, as Meyer believes, then it is an example of how later generations believed that the two states were unfriendly toward one another from the early Archaic period (Elis, in RE 1751). 1 4 3 See Chapter Two for a discussion on the dates of the end of the Second Messenian War. 1 4 4 For a discussion of the sources see Morgan, Athletes, Chapter 3. 36 Eleans gained, permanent control of the games. They held this distinguished position continuously until 364 . 1 4 5 The epigraphic evidence indicates that the sanctuary might have served as a political center for the settlements in the Alpheios River valley and the rest of the communities of southern Eleia.146 Elis had expanded to the Alpheios River valley and acquired Olympia, but it had not yet succeeded in controlling Triphylia, the region in southern Eleia that stretched to the Messenian border. 1 4 7 It is reasonable to conclude that the Eleans were able to gather Spartan support prior to the conquest of Pisatis and Triphylia. Strabo's account (8. 3. 33) that the Spartans helped Elis conquer Pisa and Triphylia following the fall of the Messenians fits nicely into their pattern of mutual support. In return for E l i s ' aid in the Messenian Wars and against Argos, Sparta helped Elis conquer the Pisatans and gain control of the area south of the Alpheios River, known in the fourth century and afterward as Tr iphy l ia . 1 4 8 Ma lk in , in fact, has argued that the Spartans colonized the area just south of Triphylia earlier than the sixth century and that the intention was to provide protection along the Messenian border. 1 4 9 Hence, following Malk in , it would have been beneficial to Sparta that El is , its friend, controlled the area long the Messenian border and not the Triphylians. 1 5 0 B y the end of the sixth century, Olympia, Pisatis, and its environs were securely in Elean control. Also , Messenia was firmly controlled by Sparta, and Argos was no longer a 1 4 5 Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 28. 1 4 6 R. Osborne, Classical Landscape with Figures, (London: G. Philip, 1987), 124-6. 1 4 7 Herodotus (4.148) stated that the conquest of many of the Triphylian towns (which he calls \"Minyan\") of Lepreon, Makistus, Phrixa, Epion, and Noudion happened during his lifetime. Elean expansion into Triphylia may, however, have started as early as the sixth century and continued into the fifth. See Roy, \"Synoikism,\" 260; Roy, \"Perioikoi,\" 282-283. For the conquest of Triphylia, see Roy, \"Perioikoi,\" 282-285; \"Synoikism,\" 259-262; \"Frontier,\" 139-146; and T.H. Nielsen, \"Triphylia,\" 131-144. For the Spartan involvement, see Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 13. 1 4 8 Nielsen, \"Triphylia,\" 133-44; cf. Strabo 8. 3. 30; 33; N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece, 136-7. 1 4 9 Malkin, Myth and territory, 86-87. 37 rival of Sparta or a threat to the western Peloponnesos. With Argive influence removed and the power of Pisa diminished, the only threat to Elis came from its eastern neighbor, Arkad ia . 1 5 1 Conflicts between Elis and Arkadia indicate that Elean growth and the expansion of its league was not only an infringement upon communities in the south-eastern part of Eleia, but upon Arkadian communities as well . Tension between Elis and Arkadia may have been present long before the fifth and fourth century. 1 5 2 This tension was yet another burden on the Elean state and proved to be problematic when it tried to preserve its symmachy. In addition to maintaining control of its dependent allies, it also had to cope with border issues and problems with Arkadia. According to Herodotus (1. 68), Sparta also had problems with Arkadia, and it was not until the middle of the sixth century that conflicts with Arkadia, specifically Tegea, were brought to an end. A n early friendship between the two enabled Elis to remain in control of Olympia, pursue its hegemony in Eleia, and call on Sparta for support and military aid when needed. 1 5 0 Ibid., 88. Malkin also argues that the Triphylians may have been Arkadian, thus this identity would have given the Spartans another reason to support Elean control of Triphylia (My'hj'and territory, 86). 1 5 1 Although both the Eleans and Arkadians were allies of the Spartans and members of the Peloponnesian League, they rarely cooperated. In the fourth century, the Arkadians joined together with the Pisatans and gained control the Olympic Games (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 28). The Arkadians may have also provided support to the Pisatans against the Eleans prior to the fourth century (see Paus. 5. 4. 7). Describing the sanctuary of Eileithyia and the etymology of the god Sosipolis Pausanias (6. 2. 20) wrote that the Eleans defeated certain unnamed Arkadians, and Pausanias even recorded their burial site (who these Arkadians were and when this occurred, Pausanias does not specify). Roy noted that the use of cults institutionalized the tension between the Arkadians and the Eleians ( Roy, \"Frontier,\" 146-7). In addition, most quarrels between the two regions of Eleia and Arkadia concerned possession of border towns and rights to these communities. For example, during the Elean War Xenophon reported that Arkadia claimed a right to the community of Lasion. Lasion changed hands during the fifth, fourth, and third centuries (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 12; D.S. 14. 17, 15. 77; Strabo 8. 338. Cf. Roy, \"Frontier,\" 138). Recently, Roy has documented the border conflicts between Eleans and Arkadians and specified seven communities, such as Lepreon, that changed allegiances from Elean to Arkadian or vice-versa. The seven were, Heraia, Phrixa, Epion, Lasion, Alipheira, Psophis, and the area of Triphylia. According to Roy, the border between Elis and Arcadia was not firmly established. It was, in fact, a series of frontiers between city-states, and when a polis changed its allegiance the border consequently changed. (Roy, \"Frontier,\" 133-156. The Triphylians, for example, proclaimed themselves to be Arkadians and the Arkadians in 369, opposed the Eleans on their behalf (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 26; Strabo 8. 337. Cf. Polybius 4. 77). 1 5 2 Even Homer (//. 7. 133-6) made a reference to Elean-Arkadian conflicts. 38 Sparta, in return, gained as a friend the president of an important religious center, as well as another source of military support and security along the north western Messenian border. 1 5 3 Elis had succeeded in becoming the hegemon of Eleia and, with Olympia, had become a prominent Peloponnesian state. But with its position came the pressure to preserve its symmachy and signs that an alliance with Sparta could interfere with this became apparent during the fifth century. The Persian War In the autumn of 481, Sparta and the other loyalist Greek states (those that had not medized or remained neutral) 1 5 4 met at the Isthmus of Korinth and formed what is known as \"The Hellenic League.\" 1 5 5 This was a different alliance from the already existent Peloponnesian League. 1 5 6 From Herodotus' narrative of the events, the Hellenic League was both a defensive and offensive alliance. Sparta was recognized by the other Greeks as the leader and it held supreme command of the allied forces, on land and at sea. 1 5 7 The position of Sparta as commander of the Greek forces is proven by the fact that when Athens, Argos, and Gelon of Syracuse all asked for either joint or total command in return for their involvement, their claims were rejected by both Sparta and the other allies. In this way, the Hellenic League See also Cartledge, Agesilaos, 248ff. 1 5 4 See Hdt. 7. 138. 2. See 8. 73. 3 for Herodotus' view that remaining neutral was the equivalent to medizing. Cf. 8. 142. 2. 1 5 5 See Hdt. 7. 205.3. 1 5 6 Cawkwell, \"Sparta and her allies,\" 375-376. Unfortunately, Herodotus did not provide details, but there does seem to have been some sort of understanding or agreement among the Greeks. For example, the Greeks collectively decided to suspend any inter-Hellenic disputes and to send ambassadors to Argos,, and Crete to ask these states to join the alliance (see Hdt. 7.145). 1 5 7 See Hdt. 1.69.2; 141.4; 152. 3; 5. 49. 2. Cf. Thuc. 1. 18.2. 1 5 8 Hdt. 7. 145. 39 did resemble the Peloponnesian League, but there is no further information regarding the requirements and responsibilities of these al l ies . 1 5 9 Although the Spartans supported the decision to defend Greece by making a stand at Thermopylae, the defense of the Peloponnesos was still a primary concern to them. 1 6 0 In fact, Sparta may have been compelled by the situation in the Peloponnesos to adopt this narrow, Peloponnesian po l i cy . 1 6 1 There is evidence that there was trouble between Sparta and the rest of the cities in the Peloponnesos and that Sparta's system of alliances was stressed. For 1 5 9 See also, Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 173-174. l 6 0The decision to defend Thermopylae was made, according to Herodotus, because it was a narrower pass than the one at Tempe and because it was relatively close to the Greeks' own country (Hdt. 7. 175. 1). Hignett notes that there is no indication that the Greeks thought that Thermopylae was not defendable by a small army. In fact, Thermopylae was thought to be impregnable by a direct attack if defended properly (C. Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion of Greece, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), 114-115. Herodotus (7.175) did record that there were some Greeks who did not agree with sending their forces so far north and instead believed that the Isthmus of Korinth was a much more suitable place to make a stand. The Spartans were not among those dissidents (Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion, 115). Furthermore, Herodotus noted that if the Greeks were beaten at sea, then the positions at either Thermopylae or the Isthmus would be turned by landing forces behind Greek positions (Hdt. 7. 139. 2-4). Herodotus stated more than once that this policy to defend the Isthmus may not have been successful against the Persian navy (see Hdt. 7. 139; 7. 235. Cf. Thuc. 2. 73 .4). So long as the Greeks could hold their position at sea, Thermopylae was a good tactical position. See also Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion, Chapter 2; Appendix 4; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 171-180. Still, the number of Spartan troops sent north does seem small (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 176-7; Hignett, 116-126). According to Herodotus, the entire force numbered 3,100 and was composed of 500 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Mantinea, 120 from Orchomenos, 1,000 from the rest of Arkadia, 400 from Korinth, 200 from Phlious, 80 from Mykenai, and 300 Spartiates. Simonides described in an epigram that the force numbered 4,000 (apud Hdt. 7. 228. 1), and Diodorus added one-thousand Lakedaimonians (D.S. 11. 4. 5). Hignett noted that Herodotus must have forgotten some contingent, perhaps the Eleans, \"but they (the Eleans) may have delayed to send their contingent until the Olympic festival was over\" (Xerxes' Invasion, 116). But as Hignett and Cartledge both have shown, the Spartan force sent to Thermopylae under King Leonidas was sufficient. In fact, 4,000 men seems to have been sufficient to defend the pass since it was not until Xerxes learned about the back-door (the path of Anopaia) that the Greek position was compromised. Hignett even proposes that the Spartan King, Leonidas, was counting on help from the northern and central Greeks and because of this took only a small contingent with him (Ibid. 117-118). He also notes that Herodotus' account does not suggest that the Greeks failed because lack of troops. The Greek leaders knew the positions at Artemesium and Thermopylae were inextricably linked and that one could not be abandoned without the other (119-121). Consequently, it would have been a waste to not wholeheartedly defend one and not the other. The mistake, if a one was made, was assigning the defense of the path of Anopaia to untrustworthy troops, the Phokians, whose failure eventually led to the defeat of the Greek troops at Thermopylae. See also, Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 175-176. But regardless of the intention to defend Thermopylae, Hignett states that whatever the Spartans said later, they could never have intended to send their entire League so far north; the Isthmus was closer to their base and as long as the fleet held its position, as a good a position as Thermopylae (Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion,126). In regard to the position at Artemesium, Hignett (141) has shown that Artemesium was vital because it provided protection against a Persian landing in northern. Only when Thermopylae was lost did the fleet leave Artemesium. See Hignett, Xerxe's Invasion, 152-4; 255-7; 189-92. 1 6 1 See also, Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia , 176-177. 40 example, Tegea was hostile to Sparta sometime during the 480s, 1 6 2 and in 471, El is may have taken a step towards democracy, a possible affront to Sparta. 1 6 3 Another indication that some people in El is were inimical to Sparta is that c. 491 K i n g Demaratos chose to flee to Elis after his exile from Sparta. 1 6 4 It is likely that he had friends in El is that could help him while in exile. Lastly, according to Vitruvius, the Periokic community of Karyai had already medized before Xerxes' invasion. 1 6 5 This unrest in the Peloponnesos is supported by Herodotus who (see 9. 35) reports that around fifteen years after the victory of Plataia, Sparta was fighting to preserve its hegemony against the other Peloponnesians at the Battles of Tegea and Dipa ia . 1 6 6 These battles were the result of tension that had been growing in the Peloponnesos even before the battle of Plataia. 1 6 7 Even the Helots of Messenia presented Sparta with trouble during this per iod. 1 6 8 E l i s ' late arrival at Plataia (see below) may indicate that either its generals or its government were not in favor of supporting the Spartan-led forces. 1 6 9 The government of Elis may have been democratic by the end of the sixth and beginning of the fifth centuries, and it ' b l Hdt. 9. 37. 4. 1 6 3 See pages 49ff. for a discussion on the Elean synoikism of 471. 1 6 4 Hdt. 6. 70. 1 6 5 1. 1. 5. See Cartledge, Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 176. Huxley discusses the medism of Karyai, and argues that this was a certain sign of trouble in the Peloponnesos (\"The Medism of Caryae,\" GRBS 8 [1967]: 29-32). See also, Moggi, I sinecismi, 134-135. 1 6 6 Andrewes dates these battles to the year 465 (A. Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arcadia in The Early Fifth Century,\" Phoenix 6 (1952): 1-5). The crisis in the Peloponnesos is referred to by Herodotus when he described the character of Teisamenos, the Elean seer. Teisamenos predicted five victories for the Spartans, \"one - and the first - was the win here at Plataia. Next, that at Tegea, a victory over the Tegeans and Argives; then the victory at Dipaia over all the Arcadians except the people of Mantinea; then that over the Messenians at Ithome; and the last one at Tanagra, over the Athenians and Argives.\" 1 6 7 Tegea, for example, was hostile to Sparta around 480 (Hdt. 9. 37). See Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 176-179. 1 6 8 The Helots were, most likely, always a thorn in the side of the Spartans. There is a good possibility that before Marathon they had even tried to revolt. See Plato Laws 698 D-E. Cf. Hdt. 6. 106-7; Ducat, \"Les Hilotes,\" 141-3. See above, Introduction. See also Powell, Athens and Sparta, 99-101; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 91; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 184; 185-191 (on the earthquake and Helot revolt and secession to Mt. Ithome in 465). 1 6 9 Other excuses can be thought of, such as poor organization and planning. This was what the Elean authorities wanted the rest of the Greek World to think, since it exiled the generals after the fact. Nevertheless, I 41 is known that Sparta generally opposed democracies. 1 7 0 Although there is no concrete proof that the synoikism of 471 brought an Elean democracy, there must have been some political change due to the population becoming more concentrated and communication more easily facilitated. According to Powell, while the Spartans were distracted with a war against the 171 Tegeates (see Hdt. 9. 35), the Eleans seized the opportunity to change their government. Because of this change towards democracy, Elis has been connected to the anti-Spartan movement of the early fifth century. 1 7 2 Although the evidence is not overwhelming, the possibility does exist that some Eleans were not supportive of Sparta's leadership during the Persian wars . 1 7 3 A t Thermopylae (c. 480), the Spartans initially sent off only an advanced guard, intending to reinforce it with their regular army once they had finished their celebration of the Carnean festival. According to Herodotus: . . . the rest of the allies had similar thoughts and were minded to do just the same themselves. For in their case there was the Olympic festival which fell at just the same agree with Cartledge that their actions were \"suspicious\" (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 176). 1 7 0 Thuc 1. 19; see also A. Powell, Athens and Sparta, 2nd ed, (London: Routledge, 2002), 101-2. Cf. Thuc. 4. 126. 2. 1 7 1 Powell, Athena and Sparta, 108-9. 1 7 2 Forrest, for example, believes that Elis formed an alliance against Sparta with Argos (Forrest, Sparta, 100); Cf. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185. There is reason to suspect that the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnesos was assisted by the Athenian Themistokles. Ostracized from Athens, he stayed in Argos during the early 460s (though the dates are controversial) and according to Thucydides, made, \"frequent visits to the rest of the Peloponnesos\" (1. 135. 3). Sparta coerced Athens to persecute Themistokles and he eventually was forced out of the Peloponnesos to Persia (Thuc. 1. 135. 2-138). See also de Ste. Croix, Origins, 173-8; 378f; Powell, Athens and Sparta, 109- 110; O'Neil \"Themistokles,\" 335-46; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185-6. On the chronology of his flight from Athens. The reaction of Sparta indicates that Themistokles was thought to be working against Spartan interests. This is supported by the fact that Themistokles was based out of Argos, the rival of Sparta in the Peloponnesos. His \"frequent visits,\" to the Peloponnesos,\" may also have been intended to stir up anti-Spartan sentiment among the Peloponnesians. Herodotus noted that the Tegeans, Argives, and Helots fought against the Spartans between 479-465 (9. 35). These battles coincided with Themistokles' visits to the Peloponnesos. See also Tomlinson, who notes that Themistokles was not merely \"sightseeing\" on his visits to the Peloponnesos (Argos, 201). In addition, according to Strabo (8.3.2) the synoikisms of Mantinea and Elis were brought about by Argos. The date of Elis' synoikism is c. 471, and if this was when Elis adopted a democratic constitution, then it is possible that Themistokles played a part in the rise of democracies in the Peloponnesos, such as at Elis. (The Tegean and Mantinean connections with Themistokles and Argos are discussed in chapters two and three, respectively). Cf. Adshead, Politics, 95-101; Forrest, \"Themistokles,\" 227-232. 1 7 3 Cartledge notes that the whole history of Elis and Sparta was \"chequered,\" (Agesilaos, 249). 42 time as this outbreak of war. They never dreamed that the war at Thermopylae would be decided so quickly, and so they sent off their advanced guards (7. 206). 1 7 4 Unlike the other Peloponnesians who sent off their advanced troops, the Eleans did not send any. The Eleans might have used the Olympic festival as an excuse for not participating since they were the supervisors of the event. 1 7 5 The religious excuse for the Elean absence was one which the Spartans might have respected. 1 7 6 It is, on the other hand, possible that Elis was not in favor of the Spartan-led defense of Greece. For example, Demaratos, the exiled Spartan king, had initially fled to Elis , and after being chased out of El is by Sparta, went to As ia where he was well received by the Persian K i n g Darius and became an advisor to Xerxes . 1 7 7 His choice to seek refuge in El is must have been based on personal ties he had with certain Eleans. 1 7 8 It is very possible that the Elean government was reluctant to help Sparta before Demaratos fled to Persia. Furthermore, the Eleans, it seems, may not have shared the same opinion that Thermopylae was a suitable place to defend against the Persian invasion. Herodotus did not mention the Elean contingent at Thermopylae, because they had not sent one. When the Greeks began to fortify the Isthmus, on the other hand, the Eleans supported this effort (see below). 1 7 4 Herodotus' citations translated by D. Greene, The History, Herodotus (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987). 1 7 5 The Eleans were exempt from fighting during an Olympic year in order to supervise the games. According to Phlegon (A.D. 138), a freedman of Hadrian who wrote an Historical Introduction to the Olympic register, the Eleans had received instructions from the Pythia at Delphi, \" 'strictly keep to the law of your fathers, defend your country, keep away from war, treating Greeks with impartial friendship whenever the genial quinquennial arrives.' Due to this oracle they refrained from going to war and devoted themselves to the Olympic Games.\" FGrH 257 fr.l. For a more detailed account of the Olympic truce see, E. N. Gardiner, Olympia, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 73-76; 83-90; 112. 1 7 6 Herodotus writes, \" . . . the Lakedaimonians thought God rated higher than men\" (Hdt. 5. 63. 2). Also, the Spartans told the Athenians that they could not march to Marathon right away because of a religious obligation (Hdt. 6. 106). They tried to use a similar excuse before Plataia (Hdt. 9. 11). 1 7 7 Hdt. 6. 70. 2; 7. 104. 2; 7.235. 1 7 8 The leading Spartiates, such as the kings, were frequently involved in xenia (guest-friendship) with the elite persons of other states. States such as Sparta often used these personal relationships to carry out diplomacy and form their foreign policy (Hodkinson, Property and Wealth, Chapter 11, especially pp. 345-8). 43 In the same year, the Lakedaimonians furnished ten ships at Artemesion, but the Eleans were also not mentioned by Herodotus. 1 7 9 The total number of ships at Artemesion 180 was two hundred and seventy-one. A month later, at the battle of Salamis, Herodotus reported that from the Peloponnesos came, \"the Lakedaimonians with sixteen ships, the Korinthians, with the same as at Artemesion, the men of Sikyon with fifteen ships, the Epidaurians with ten; the Troezenians with five, the men of Hermione with three . . . These came with the armament as Peloponnesians.\" 1 8 1 El is was either not present at Salamis, or they were included in the sixteen \"Lakedaimonian\" ships. When compared to the sixteen ships furnished by the large, maritime city of Korinth, it does seem plausible that the Eleans were included in the Lakedaimonian contribution. Although this also could have been the case for the first sea battle at Artemesion, it is unlikely since the total number of Lakedaimonian ships at Artemesion numbered ten, a fourth of the Korinthian contingent. Furthermore, Herodotus used the term \"Lakedaimonian\" over two hundred and thirty times and never used it to refer 182 to anything more than the Spartiates, their own perioikoi, and helots. It seems safe to conclude that El is was not part of either sea battle. Once word reached the rest of the Peloponnesians that the Greek troops at Thermopylae were dead, the Peloponnesian poleis rallied to defend their land: Those who came forward to the isthmus in full force on the Greek side were these: The Lakedaimonians and all the Arkadians, and the Eleans, Korinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Troezenians, and men of Hermione. The rest of the l 7 9Hdts. 8. 1-2. l80Presumably, the Lakedaimonian ships were manned by Perioikoi and Helots (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 177). It seems natural for Spartiates to be used in hoplite warfare not waste their training on naval warfare. 1 8 1 Hdts 8. 44. 1 8 2 The Helots and Perioikoi (three thousand hoplites) were part of the Spartan army that went to Plataia (Hdt. 9. 10-11), and at 9. 19, are referred to as, \"The Lakedaimonians.\" See also, Hdt. 9. 29; 9. 61. The allies of Sparta were designated collectively as either \"Peloponnesians\" or \"allies\". For example, see Hdt. 9. 19 quoted above on page 30. See Hdt. 7. 137 for the use of \"allies\" to designate those at the Isthmus, including the Eleans. 44 Peloponnesians gave it never a care, and now their time for the Olympian and Camean celebrations had passed them by (Hdt. 8. 72). The Eleans were now included as part of the force. Provided that the Greek fleet held its 183 position, this policy to defend Greece at the Isthmus was a real and legitimate strategy. There is even evidence that Eurybiades, the commander of the Greek fleet, considered withdrawing from Artemesium before the pass at Thermopylae was lost and, according to Herodotus, remained only after being br ibed. 1 8 4 Most likely, though, he also shared the Spartan view to defend the Isthmus. 1 8 5 Herodotus stated, \"those who were in the Isthmus were engaged in such labor because they were running the risk of losing their all , and they had no further hope of distinguishing themselves with the fleet\" (Hdt. 8. 74). The Eleans were not part of the Greek fleet at Artemesium or Salamis, but they were part of the forces that fortified the Isthmus. Elean work at the Isthmus was due to the fact that like the other Peloponnesians, El is recognized the danger of the Persian host making its way 186 past the Isthmus, especially since it had not given \"earth and water\" to the Persians. Herodotus criticized this policy of defending the Isthmus and made note of the Peloponnesian preoccupation with i t . 1 8 7 For Elis , however, the fortification of the Isthmus may have seemed like a worthy plan: El is and Olympia were without walls or fortification, there is no evidence that Elis possessed a great navy or army that was large enough to defend 1 8 3 Hignett states, \"the Isthmus position was their last line of defense, nearer to their base and with a better claim than Thermopylae to be regarded as impregnable, provided that the Greek fleet was able to hold its own against the enemy\" (Xerxes' Invasion, 126). 1 8 4 Hdt. 8. 4. 2; 8. 5. 1. Later, he voted to fight at the Isthmus (8. 49 .1; 8. 56) but was persuaded to stay at Salamis (8. 64. 1). 1 8 5 Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 177. Hdt. 8. 40. 2; 8. 71. 1 8 6 Those who medized were required to make this symbolic gesture, see Hdt. 7. 138. 1 8 7 The Peloponnesians had been reluctant to join the other Greeks and fight at Salamis (Hdt. 8. 75.-79); were insistent upon building the wall across the Isthmus (Hdt. 9. 8. 1); and even showed a reluctance to march north beyond the Isthmus (8.40.2). At 7.139-140, Herodotus criticized the strategy of defending the Isthmus. 45 all of Eleia,188 and the Isthmus was narrow enough to defend effectively. Herodotus noted that this may not have been the best policy,1 8 9 but leaving the Isthmus unfortified left the entire Peloponnesos more vulnerable to the Persian invasion. Furthermore, the Greeks had shown at Thermopylae that given the proper defensive position, they could repel the Persian land force. The Spartans immediately sent out at night the normal contingent of two-thirds of their entire fighting force, or five-thousand Spartiate warriors, under the command of Pausanias.190 The army went to the Isthmus where it waited for the other Peloponnesians. When the Spartans marched north to Plataia in 479, Herodotus stated: the rest of the Peloponnesians - those who were for the better cause - seeing the Spartans gone out upon their expedition, did not think fit to stay behind them. And so, having sacrificed, and with favorable results, they all marched from the Isthmus and came to Eleusis (Hdt. 9. 19). Shame, fear, and, possibly, their oaths to protect Greece prompted their action.191 The Eleans did send troops, but unfortunately these troops arrived too late for the battle. The Elean army 192 subsequently returned home and the leaders were banished. There is no documented explanation as to why the Eleans were late. Before the decisive battle of Plataia, the Eleans were fortifying the wall at the Isthmus. Here, the Eleans would have been among those who were stirred to action when they witnessed Pausanias' In the fifth century, Elis did have its own force of hoplites and they commonly fielded three thousand of them (Thuc. 5. 58. 1; 75. 5; Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 16). Thucydides (2. 10. 2) said that allies were required to provide two-thirds of their entire force to the League army. If Elis adhered to this same requirement regarding the anti-Spartan alliance, then the entire Elean forces in 420 were around 4,500. At the battle of Nemea, the Elean dependents of Margana, Letrinoi, and Amphidolia supplied four hundred light-armed men (Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 16). 1 8 9 Hdt. 7. 235. 1 9 0 Hdts. 9. 9-12. 1 9 1 Herodotus said, \"when all the Greeks who were of better persuasion assembled together and exchanged their judgements and their pledges with one another, their first resolution was that they would utterly do away with all enmities and wars with one another . . . they determined to send spies into Asia . . . messengers to Argos, to form an alliance against the Persian . . . the thought behind all this sending was that the entire Greek people might somehow unite and take common action, since the invaders threatened all Greeks alike\" (7. 145). 1 9 2 Hdts. 9.77. 46 army march north, but for some reason, they left later than the others. It seems that the Elean generals (or their government) may not have supported the war effort, and their late arrival is indicative of this. Additional proof that some Eleans were not eager to support Spartan leadership during the fifth century is found in the story about Hegesistratos, a seer from Elis who was eager for Sparta's defeat and so had hired himself out to the Persian army. 1 9 3 He had been incarcerated by the Spartans for what Herodotus stated were \"the many grievous wrongs\" he had done to the Spartans. He escaped to Tegea and from there entered the service of the Persian general Mardonius . 1 9 4 Hegesistratos was an important and influential person, \"the most notable of the Telliadae\" (Hdt. 9. 37), and perhaps others within the Elean oligarchic government shared similar, anti-Spartan views. In regard to their participation at Plataia, the Eleans either deliberated too long about whether to send their troops north of the Isthmus, marched too slowly once en route, or else deliberately waited to survey the outcome of the battle. 1 9 5 Herodotus reported that after the victories at Plataia and Mykale c. 479, the allies dedicated thank-offerings to Poseidon at the Isthmus, to Zeus at Olympia, and to Apol lo at Delphi. A t Delphi they dedicated a gold tripod resting on a bronze stand that represented three intertwined serpents. 1 9 6 The total number of states commemorated at Delphi were thirty-one, while according to Pausanias, the list at Olympia was twenty-seven. El is was 1 9 3 Cartledge says that he traded his service to help free his own city of Elis from Spartan domination (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 179). Herodotus clearly noted Hegistratos' hatred for the Spartans but unfortunately did not explicitly say that Hegesistratos, according to Cartledge, \"put the liberation of his own city from Spartan domination before the 'common good of Greece,' and so hired himself out to the Persians\" (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 179). Certainly Hegesistratos' prophesying on Zakynthos to the Eleans was anti-Spartan, for which he was captured and executed. 1 9 4 Hdt. 9. 37-38. 1 9 5 See also, Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185. 1 9 6 Hdt. 9. 81. 47 included on both lists. The war memorial seems to have been a dedication for all those who fought during the war, not just at Plataia where the booty was acquired. 1 9 7 For example, the Tenians, who were not part of the battle, were included because they had deserted the Persian 198 armada and reported their whereabouts to the Greek generals before Salamis. The Mantineans arrived at the battle of Plataia before the Eleans, but were also too late and, like the Eleans, had worked on the wall at the Isthmus. 1 9 9 Unl ike El is , Mantinea had sent troops to Thermopylae but they were not included on the memoria l . 2 0 0 Their exclusion has been explained by both their absence at Plataia and their troops having left Thermopylae before the final battle. 2 0 1 Their work on the defense of the Isthmus did not provide the Mantineans the honor of being included on the memorial any more than it had the Eleans. Instead, the Elean position as the supervisors of the Olympic Games provided them with a place on the memorial, especially since this was where one of the memorials stood. But the decision to include Elis and not Mantinea may also have been an attempt by Sparta to antagonize the relationship between its Peloponnesian a l l i es . 2 0 2 In an effort to maintain its dominant position, Sparta adopted a 'divide and rule' policy and engineered resentment amongst the allies. Combined with the Elean-Arkadian tension over border issues and ethinic differences, 2 0 3 this policy also helped to prevent the Eleans from working together with their Arkadian neighbors. Despite Sparta's effort to maintain E l i s ' loyalty, Elean support of Sparta during the Persian wars remains suspect. In fact, Elis showed few signs of wanting to be part o f a larger 1 9 7 Cf. ML 27, p. 59. Many of the island states, for example, were not part of the battle but were included on the memorial. 1 9 8 Hdt. 8. 82. 1. 1 9 9 Hdt.8. 72. 2 0 0 Hdt. 9. 77. 2 0 1 See ML 27. 2 0 2 A. Powell, Athens and Sparta, 107. 48 organization, whether it was the Hellenic or the Peloponnesian League. Rather, it responded to the threat to the Peloponnesos, and not necessarily the threat to Greece. Moreover, Sparta's role in the Persian invasions does not seem to have had any prohibitive effect on the development of the Elean League, and Elis continued to expand within Eleia and increase its symmachy. 2 0 4 In the years following the Persian Wars, Elis continued to show independence from Sparta. In 471, Elis may have changed its constitution or developed a government with democratic features. But the Eleans were not yet so discontent with the Spartans to risk war with them as the Arkadians and Argives d i d . 2 0 5 After the Persian Wars, while the Spartans were pre-occupied with Helot troubles and conflicts with the Arkadians and Argives, the Eleans continued to increase their control over the other western Peloponnesians. 2 0 6 It was also at this time that the synoikism of El is occurred. Diodorus recorded that, \"when Praxiergus was archon at Athens (471/0) . . . the 207 Eleans, who dwelt in many small cities, united to form one state which is known as El is .\" Strabo also recorded this synoikismos: \" A t some late time they came together into the present 2 0 3 See Roy, \"Frontier between Elis and Arkadia,\" 13 3ff. 2 0 4 If the growth of the Elean symmachy was in response to Sparta's leadership during the Persian Wars, there is no direct evidence of this reaction. Elis did, indeed, continue to expand, but this was not in reaction to Sparta's role during the Persian War but rather the continuation of its sixth century growth. 2 0 5 Hdt.9. 35. 2 0 6 For Helot troubles, see Thuc.l.lOlff; XenHell.5.2.2. For troubles with the Arkadians, see Hdt. 9.35, Paus.8. 6. 6; Isok. .6. 99. For conflicts with Argos, Hdt. 9. 35, Paus. 1. 15.If. See also, J.H. Schreinder, Hellanikos, Thucydides, and the Era of Kimon (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1997), 30ff. According to Forrest, Elis joined Argos in 470 (Forrest, Sparta, 100). If Elis was so interested in seizing opportunities to break away from Spartan domination, then joining the combined forces of the Arkadians and Argives at the battle of Tegea (or with the Arkadians at Dipaia) would have been an opportune time to do so. If the Eleans were allied to the Argives and \"the bulk of the Arkadian cities,\" as Forrest postulated (Sparta, 100), then where were the Eleans at these battles? Forrest does not say, but the likelihood is that they were not allied to Argos or the Arkadians. Instead, the Eleans simply capitalized on their remote location and focused on domestic issues. 2 0 7 D.S. 11.54.1 See also Gomme's note on Thuc.5.47.9 for the rise of Elean democracy at this time. 49 polis El is , after the Persian Wars, from many demes\" (8. 3. 2). Roy has recently surveyed the evidence in an attempt to discern the nature of this synoikism and has found that there were many settlements in the vicinity of the city Elis before 471; according to the archaeological proof, the synoikism created nothing new. The synoikism did not create a more defensible town or bring all of the political and economic activity to El is ; Olympia remained an important political center and Elis remained without wa l l s . 2 0 9 Nor was military expansion a result of or reason for the synoikism, since the war with Pisa and the subsequent Elean expansion in the south happened over a period of time and began before the fifth century. Finally, there is no evidence that the synoikism itself brought about a change in the Elean constitution. 2 1 0 Despite the lack of details concerning the synoikism, El is did expand into the south so that in the fifth century, its territory stretched all the way to the River Neda. It acquired more perioikoi and, i f the two were different, symmachoi.2U This expansion and extension of its league undoubtedly affected E l i s ' relationship with Sparta. Herodotus wrote that most of the following southern towns, Minyae, Lepreon, Makistos, Phrixa, Pygrus, Epion, and Nudion were, \"in my time sacked by the Eleans\" (Hdt. 2 0 8 Cf. Ps.- Skylax 43; Leandrios, FGrH 492 F13. 2 0 9 Roy, \"Synoikism,\" 256-261; Roy, \"Perioikoi,\" 300-2. 2 1 0 The act of synoikism, nevertheless, must have been preceded by an active, political decision. For a discussion of what the synoikism may have included, see Roy, \"Perioikoi,\" 256-258. On the constitutional development of Elis, see also U. Walter, An der Polis teilhaben: Burgerstaat und Zugehorigkeit im archaischen Griechenland. Historia Einz. 82(1993): 116-125. Greenidge wrote, \"with union came the impulse to popular government which usually accompanied it . . . this union must have involved some alteration in the original constitution, but when the latter assumed a form that could justly be described as popular, we do not know\" (Constitutional History, 214). Phormio of Elis was described by Plutarch as a reformer who, much like the Athenian Ephialtes, limited the power of the Elean aristocratic council (Plut.Praec. ger. Reip. 10). Because he was known as a reformer, Phormio was associated with a major change in Elean history, the synoikismos, and consequently the synoikismos was associated with political change and the rise of Elean democracy. But as shown above on page 30, evidence for Elean democracy predates 471, the year that the synoikism occurred. The evidence for democracy in Elis comes from the inscriptions (LSAG, 218-219).The reference to a Sfjuos TrXr|9ucov and a BouAfj of 500 resemble the Athenian model. Adshead sees the similarity as evidence that the Elean democracy was modeled on the Athenian, and therefore was the result of Themistokles' interference (Adshead, Politics, 96). It is very likely that Themistokles visited Olympia and Elis during his 'visits' to the Peloponnesos, but he was not responsible for brining democracy to Elis. 2 1 1 Siewert, does not believe that the two are different (Symmachien, 260-1). 50 4. 148). He did not specify any exact times, but it seems likely that they were conquered prior to 4 3 2 . 2 1 2 The most prominent of these towns was Lepreon, and as later events show, Lepreon was an important acquisition. In 479, Lepreon was not under Elean control and was certainly an independent polis.2n It was included on the serpentine column (the war memorial) of 479 and was able to send two hundred men to Plataia . 2 1 4 Thucydides recorded how, but not when, Lepreon became an ally of El is , \"Some time previously Lepreon had been at war with some of the Arkadians, and had gained the alliance of El is by promising them half their land.\" 2 1 5 In addition to Lepreon, the remaining southern communities were also made Elean dependents. Unfortunately, we cannot date with precision the inclusion of these states into the Elean symmachy except to say that by 432 they were part of the Elean League. There is no indication that Elis suffered any threat to its autonomia during the period prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. It maintained control of the Olympic shrine and continued its leadership of what had become a large region, Eleia. It had also developed its own regional league with its own allies and possibly collected tribute from some of its members. In addition, there are no indications that Elis , despite its own position as hegemon of the Elean symmachy, did not maintain its alliance with Sparta and its enrollment in the Peloponnesian League . 2 1 6 Nor is there any evidence that Sparta prohibited Elis from 2 1 2 Lepreon, for example, had certainly become an ally of Elis by 432 (Thuc. 5.31). 2 1 3 Nielsen, \"Triphylia,\" 143. 2 1 4 ML 27 (GHI19); Hdt. 9.28.4 2 1 5 Thuc. 5. 31. 2. 2 1 6 Forrest states, \"by 460 the old Peloponnesian alliance was more or less restored\" (Forrest, Sparta, 104). In 459, the so-called First Peloponnesian War began. The Athenian fleet engaged the Peloponnesian fleet off of Kekryphalia (Thuc. 1. 105. 1). Later, Thucydides mentioned the Peloponnesian League when he recorded the battle of Tanagra (c. 457): Y E V O U E V T I J 8E udxns Tccv&ypg Tfis BoicoTias EVIKCOV AaK\u00C2\u00A38aip.6vioi K C U oi ^ U H H O I X C H KOCI (p6vo$ E y d v E T O a p c p c T E p G o v TTOAUS (1.108.1). The fighting force was made up of ten thousand allied hoplites (Thuc. 1. 107. 2), though Thucydides had not specified the states. In 446, the Athenians concluded the Thirty-Year Peace with \"The Lakedaimonians and the allies\" (Thuc. 1. 115. 1). Elis was certainly 51 expanding its league to incorporate other communities, even those that had fought during the Persian Wars as independent cities, such as Lepreon. Elis, Korinth, and Kerkyra Elean activity in the Ionian Sea and the region around the Ambrakian G u l f brought El is and its symmachy into contact with Kerkyra. Pausanias recorded that the Eleans built a portico in their marketplace from the spoils of a war with the Kerkyraians: \"The Eleans call it the Kerkyraean, because they say the Kerkyraians landed in their country and carried off part of the booty, but they themselves took many times as much booty from the land of the Kerkyraians, and built the portico from the tithe of the spoils .\" 2 1 7 Pausanias did not provide a date for these conflicts and it is impossible to determine i f he was referring to the same 218 Kerkyraean affair that Thucydides recorded as having taken place in 435. There is no mention in Thucydides of the Kerkyraians doing anything more than destroying Kyllene, the port of El is , and Thucydides does not suggest that El is retaliated and stole enough booty from 219 the Kerkyraians to build the portico described by Pausanias (quoted above). Most likely, the Kerkyraean victory over the Korinthians and their allies in 435 near Epidamnus, and in 433 at the battle off Sybota, provided them with the command of the Ionian Sea. During this time, the Kerkyraians raided the lands of the Korinthian allies, and an ally of Sparta, but the first Peloponnesian War did not concern Elis. The fighting concerned Sparta's northern allies, as well as Megara and Delphi. If Elis was part of this war, then it supplied troops to the League forces. For more on Sparta and the first Peloponnesian War, see Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 194-195; Forrest, Sparta, 106-7; A.J. Holladay, \"Sparta's Role in The First Peloponnesian War,\" JHS 97 (1977): 54-63; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 211-224. 2 1 7 Paus.6.24.4 and mentioned again at 6. 25. 1. 2 1 8 Thucydides wrote that after the battle off Leukimme; \"Defeated at sea, the Korinthians and their allies returned home and left the Kerkyraians masters of all the sea. . . . and they (the Kerkyraians) burnt Kyllene, the harbor of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to Korinth\" (1. 30. 2). See also HCTl, 65. 2 1 9 It is not possible to say when the portico was built. See R.S Yalouris, \"Finds from the bay of Pheia in Elis,\" 52 sacked the Elean port of Kyllene in 435, just as Thucydides reports. It is possible that Elis reacted to the burning of Kyllene (described by Thucydides) by attacking Kerkyra and carrying off enough goods and treasure to build the portico, just as Pausanias described. The second possibility is that these conflicts between Kerkyra and El is occurred before 435 and Thucydides made a mistake in placing the burning of Kyllene in the period soon after the initial quarrel between Korinth and Kerkyra in 435. The references to Kerkyraean dominance of the Ionian Sea and the destruction of Kyllene (sometime between 471 and 435), suggest that Elis did not have sufficient means to defend against or confront Kerkyra and obtain by plunder enough money to build the portico after 435. Second, there is no proof that the synoikism of El is in 471 led to a new building program, but in the 450s, the Eleans completed the temple of Zeus and it seems reasonable that other buildings, such as the Kerkyraean Portico, might have been built during the same period. It is possible then that these confrontations occurred after 471 and before 435. Before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Elean and Korinthian foreign policies were driven by similar interests. L ike Korinth, Elis opposed Athenian support of Kerkyra and expansion into the western waters. 2 2 0 The strategic location of Kerkyra was stressed in the debate at Athens prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian W a r . 2 2 1 In addition to Kerkyra, AEph (1957): 31-43; \"Excavations at Ancient Elis,\" AEph (1973): 113. 2 2 0 Forrest, Sparta, 108. 2 2 1 After the Korinthian speech before the outbreak of the war (see Thuc. 1. 43), the Athenians held a second assembly that concluded the following about Kerkyra: \". . . the island seemed to them admirably situated for a coasting voyage to Italy and Sicily\" (Thuc. 1. 44. 3). During their speech to the Athenians, the Kerkyraians reminded the Athenians of their strategic location, adding that the island's military potential had the capacity to, \"bar the passage of naval reinforcements from there to the Peloponnesos and from the Peloponnesos to there\" (Thuc. 1.36.2). If Athens could add Kerkyra to its list of allies then it would be in a strong position to control the western trade routes and check the movements of the Peloponnesian navy. See G.B. Grundy, Thucydides and the History of his Age. (Oxford, 1948): 324-6. The Peloponnesian navy had already fought the Athenians in The First Peloponnesian War (Thuc.l. 105. 1). There is also proof that the Athenians seriously considered expanding into the western waters long before they launched the Sicilian expedition in 415. In his Life of Perikles (20.4), Plutarch wrote; \"but there were other instances when he would not give way to the Athenians' more reckless impulses. He refused to be swept along with them, when they became intoxicated with their 53 the islands of Kephallania and Zakynthos were crucial locations for western endeavors. They were located south of Kerkyra, due west of the entrance to the Korinthian Gulf, and, as previously noted, close to the Elean dependent town of Kyllene. A n y vessels sailing from the gulf would have passed by one of these islands before heading either north to the Ambrakian G u l f or west to S i c i l y . 2 2 3 In 435, the citizens of Epidamnus, a Kerkyraean colony were beset by c iv i l strife, and after being refused aid by Kerkyra, sought aid from Korinth. Korinth immediately organized a relief force and asked for volunteer colonists to increase Korinthian influence in Epidamnus: Megara prepared to accompany them with eight ships, Pale in Kephallenia with four, Epidaurus furnished f ive, Hermione one, Troezen two, Leukas ten, and Ambrakia eight. The Thebans and Phliasians were asked for money, the Eleans for unmanned hulls as well as money; while Korinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand hoplites (Thuc.l. 27. 2 ) . 2 2 4 Thucydides later (cf. 1. 29) provided the total number of ships at seventy-five, of which Elis provided seven. This was a Korinthian enterprise which Elis assisted with the provision of ships and money, a considerable contribution. Elis might not have supplied rowers and troops in an attempt to maintain that it had not made war upon the Kerkyraians. Another possibility power and good fortune, and talked of recovering Egypt and attacking the sea-board of the Persian Empire. Many people, too, even, as early as this, were obsessed with that extravagant and ill-stared ambition to conquer Sicily.\" See also, HCT\, 171. Kerkrya was essential to any Athenian policy that intended to involve Athens in the west. In addition, triremes sailing to Sicily would need to take a coastal route by which they could adequately set into port every night. Merchant ships, on the other hand, could sail directly to Sicily from Greece via Kerkyra. See Gomme HCTl, 19-20, and Dem. 32. 5-8. See also, Thuc. 6. 42, 44; Plut. Dion. 25. 1-2. See Thuc. 6. 42 and 6. 44 for the use of Kerkyra as the last anchorage for the ships that headed to Sicily. From Kerkyra it was a direct voyage across the Ionian Sea to Italy and Sicily. There was not much room for sleeping or even carrying supplies on triremes (Thuc.l. 52; 4. 26; 6. 44), and because of special circumstances, Thucydides needed to explain how the Athenians made the voyage to Mytilene without stopping (3.49). 2 2 2 See also Thuc. 2. 7. 3 and 2. 9. 4. 2 2 3 For the Peloponnesians, the Ionian Sea was crucial for the importation of grains from Sicily, and any port city on the west coast would have been an important, commercial harbor. Cf. Thuc. 3.86.4; pseudo-Xen. Const. Athen. 2.3. 2 2 4 All translations of Thucydides by R. Crawley, revised and edited by Robert Strasller, The Landmark Thucydides. (New York: The Free Press, 1996). 54 is that El is had the cash to donate, possibly acquired from the tributes taken from its dependent allies, but not the rowers to offer. This fleet and the second larger armada (see below, and Thuc. 1. 46) are the only two references in Thucydides to Elean warships, which may indicate that El is did not have a large navy. E l i s ' position on the west coast, its two good harbors, and the fact that it had founded colonies in Epirus indicate that it was a sea-trading state. Most of its ships may have been merchant vessels and not triremes. 2 2 5 Before 435, Korinth was the most powerful influence in the western waters. A n alliance with Korinth would help Elis to expand further its activity in the Ionian Sea and possibly as far north as the Ambrakian Gulf. Elis founded several colonies that were close to K e r k y r a . 2 2 6 It may have been in order to facilitate communication with and to secure the safety of these colonies that Elis had originally decided to ally itself to K o r i n t h . 2 2 7 Elean membership in the Peloponnesian League did not prevent El is from becoming an ally of Korinth, and hence it was not in violation of any oath to Sparta. 2 2 8 The Kerkyraians defeated the Korinthian armada near Epidamnus. In the same year, they attacked El is : \". . . and they burnt Kyllene, the harbor of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to Korinth\" (Thuc. 1. 30. 2). This retaliation by the Kerkyraians supports the possibility that Elis was either an ally of Korinth by the time it had joined in this 2 2 5 It was not possible to change the hull of a merchant ship into a trireme because the dimensions greatly differed, see Gomme, HCT I, (note on 1. 27). Thus, even if Elis had several merchant vessels, they would not have been useful for battle. 2 2 6 These were located in Epirus at Boucheta, Elatria, and Pandosia (in Cassopaea). See note 83, above and, N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece , 498; C. Falkner, \"Sparta and The Elean War, ca 401/400 B.C.\" Phoenix 50 (1996): 18-19. These were not heard of after the outbreak of the war and this may have been a result of the destruction of the Elean port of Kyllene and the dominance of the Kerkyraean navy in the western waters. 2 2 7 According to Hammond, Elis supported Korinth because Kerkyra's actions affected Elean colonies (Hammond, Epirus, 498-9). We cannote, unfortunately, date the alliance with any certainty, but it is probable that the alliance was initiated by the Korinthians and began in the period just prior to the affair concerning Epidamnus, c. 435. 2 2 8 Nevertheless, Sparta must have been concerned over these alliances. The larger Peloponnesian League members, such as Korinth, could use their preeminence within their own alliances with these smaller members, such as Elis, to coerce them and thus influence League policy. 55 expedition or else had its own interests to look after. Sparta and the Peloponnesian League did not come to Elis ' aid because this had not been a League enterprise, nor did Elis appeal for i t . 2 2 9 After the sea battle near Epidamnus in 435, the Kerkyraians were masters of the Ionian Sea and harassed the allies of Korinth, including Elis . Eventually, Korinth became involved: At last Korinth, roused by the sufferings of her allies, sent out ships and troops in the fall of the summer, who formed an encampment at Ac\ktium and about Chimerion, in Thesprotis, for the protection of Leukas and the rest of the friendly cities (Thuc. 1. 30. 1). With these camps, Korinth was able to provide aid to El is by patrolling the waters around the G u l f of Ambrakia and between Kerkyra and K y l l e n e . 2 3 0 I f Kerkyra attempted another raid on Elean territory, it would now have to engage Korinth's navy. Kerkyra became alarmed by the new Korinthian movements and sent envoys to Athens to ask for help. 2 3 1 Korinth, meanwhile, began preparations for a second expedition against Kerkyra. The fleet was twice as large as the first and Elis furnished ten out of the one hundred and fifty ships. Korinth was the leader of the force but this time, El is sent its own troops and commanders. 2 3 2 The armada sailed from Leukas to Chimerion which was, \"in the territory of Thesprotis, above which lies the city of Ephyre in the Elean district.\" This area 2 2 9 Sparta was not required to defend members should they act outside of League decisions (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 114-5). See also Introduction, pages 11-12. Sparta could, however, involve itself if it thought its own interests were at stake. Interstate relations were very arbitrary and often decided more by personal interest than by legal considerations. States could interpret rules and act according to their own interests (Holladay, \"First Peloponnesian War,\" 55). See also de Ste. Croix, Origins, 16ff. 2 3 0 A camp was essential for naval activity since it allowed vessels to patrol waters daily and provided refuge for ships. 2 3 1 This is the Kerkyraean Debate recorded by Thucydides in 1. 32 - 44. 2 3 2 \"Each of these contingents had its own admiral, the Korinthian being under the command of Xenokleides son of Euthykles, with four colleagues\" (Thuc.l. 46. 1). 2 3 3 Thuc.l. 46. 4. The area was centered around a city called Elaea, not to be confused.with Elis. See HCT I, 178-182. 56 lay just to the north of Elis ' colonies and, as Thucydides reported, just across from Kerkyra. After the subsequent battle, both sides set up trophies. 2 3 4 The Peloponnesian League was still not involved, for this was a Korinthian enterprise that involved its own group of allies, 235 including the Eleans. The Archidamian War and the Invasion of Elis Pausanias recorded that the Eleans participated in the Archidamian war, but he added that they had done so against their w i l l . 2 3 6 During the opening years of the war, El is suffered more from the war than the other members of the Peloponnesian League and Pausanias' comment may be a reflection of E l i s ' later dissatisfaction with the war and Sparta's leadership. In the first year of the war, the Athenians sent a fleet around the Peloponnesos and invaded Elis . This invasion was a significant campaign, designed to put fear into the 237 members of Sparta's alliance and force the withdrawal of Archidamos' army from Attika. Thucydides reported that the fleet set sail from Athens while the invading Peloponnesian force was still in A t t i k a . 2 3 8 Diodorus' version explicitly provides a reason why the Athenians sent off a fleet while the Peloponnesian land force was in A t t i k a . 2 3 9 According to Diodorus (12.42.7) 2 4 0Perikles promised that he would dveu K I V B U V C O V eKPjaXeTv T O U C 2 3 4 Thuc. 1. 50-54. 2 3 5 Korinth had operated independently from Sparta and The Peloponnesian League in the past. In 459 a force of Korinthians and Epidaurians fought the Athenians near Halieis and Thucydides referred to KopivSioi |_i\u00C2\u00A3Ta T c o v ^uundxcov. This does not include the Spartans. Cf. Thuc. 1. 105. 3. See also, Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 62. Later, in 429, the K o p i v 0 i o i K C U oi \u00C2\u00A3u|_iucor)0Ei'as Xapiv T O I S AaKcovi^ouai T C O V TEyEaTcov.) Plutarch repeated Aristotle's statement in his Quaestiones Romanae: Kai y d p 'ApiOTOTEAris (fr. 5 9 2 ) EV TCC\C 'ApKctBcov Tfp6c A O : K E 5 C U U . O V ( O U C auv0fiKais y \u00C2\u00A3 y p a 9 0 a i S Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 119-120. 4 8 8 Translated by T. Braun, \" X P H I T O Y I TTOIEIN, CQ 44 (1994): 40. Braun explains that \"not to kill for the sake of help to the pro-Spartan party,\" means that the pro-Spartans and their friends were protected by the terms of this treaty (Braun, 44). 125 A a K c o v i ^ o u o r T C O V TeyeaTcbv, o i T E p ETVOCI ur|5Eva a T T O K T i v v u v a i . (Quaest. Rom.. = Mor. 277bc). \"Aristotle says that in the treaty with the Spartans it is written to make no-one xPHOTOug for the sake of aid to the pro-Spartan party of the Tegeates, which (he says) means not to kill \u00E2\u0080\u009E 489 anyone. For Aristotle, the term \"useful\" was associated with death (oiTEp ETVOU U X | 8 E V C C diTOKTivvuvai). Jacoby, however, interprets x P r l O T O , J S (useful) to mean \"citizen,\" and many have accepted this interpretation. 4 9 0 Jacoby bases his conclusion on a seventh-century law from Dreros, where a kosmos who had taken office within ten years of his first appointment was declared dxpn ,OTOc, \"useless.\" Jacoby believes that this meant he lost his citizenship, thus the opposite, XP T 1\u00C2\u00B0 T\u00C2\u00B0S would mean, \" c i t i z en . \" 4 9 1 This interpretation has been accepted because it fits well into the general pattern of Spartan expansion in the Peloponnesos and its Messenian endeavors: to maintain the Messenians as Helots and prevent their inclusion in any neighboring community. T. Braun has since challenged this interpretation and has shown that a common valediction on Greek gravestones was x p n \u00C2\u00B0 T \u00C2\u00A3 Xa^PE> a r*d that this was a way to honor the dead. 4 9 2 In addition, Plutarch would not have added Aristotle's comment i f it did not pertain to and answer the question of who the x p T l O T O ' were. A s a result, according to Braun, it is hard to dismiss Aristotle's statement as Jacoby has done, and instead, Aristotle's explanation, found also in the second passage from Roman Questions, needs to be taken into account 4 9 3 4 8 9 Ibid. See also W.R. Halliday, The Greek Questions of Plutarch, new edition, (New York: Arno Press, 1975), 50-51. 4 9 0 For example, Forrest, Sparta, p.79; P. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, (1979), 138. 4 9 1 F. Jacoby, \"XPHITOYI T70IEIN,\" CQ 38 (1944): 15-16; Cf. V. Ehrenberg, \"An Early Source of Polis-constitution,\" CQ 37 (1943): 16. 4 9 2 T. Braun states, \"there are few instances where it means no more than that the dead had been more useful in life . . . it is clear that people are thought of as having become revered and xpn a T 0 1 ' by virtue of their death\" (\"XPHITOYI TTOIEIN, 41). 4 9 3 If one accepts Jacoby's statement, then Aristotle's explanation is ignored. Jacoby solved this by saying,\" 126 Furthermore, the treaty first stipulated that the Messenians be expelled, but i f this had happened, then there would have been no Messenians around to extend citizenship to . 4 9 4 According to Braun, in the first passage taken from Plutarch's Greek Questions, M E O O E V E O U C is not the object of both infinitives (as Jacoby's interpretation has it). Instead, those who laconized were the understood object of u.n, E^ETVOI X P T I G T O U C , TTOIETV; no Spartan sympathizers should be put to death. This, Braun believes, was made explicit by Aristotle who explained that nfj EF^ETVCCI xpna T \u00C2\u00B0vs TTOIETV meant: ur)8Evcc X P T I O T O V TTOIETV [3ori0Eia$ x&Plv TO[S AaKcov(\u00C2\u00A3ouai T C O V T E Y E C C T C O V . 4 9 5 Although this interpretation is novel and may be correct, it must be admitted, however, that the passage from the Greek Questions does not connect the Spartan sympathizers with the actual treaty. In fact, it seems that the Messenians are the only concern. Aristotle's explanation of xpnOT\u00C2\u00B0vS does not necessarily imply that the pro-Spartans were included in the actual terms of the treaty, only that Plutarch used Aristotle's explanation of the term \"useful\" (which pertained to Tegean laconizers) to explain the same term as it pertained to the Messenians. But i f Braun's interpretation is correct, then the treaty states that the Messenians were to be expelled from Tegea and that it should be illegal to k i l l anyone who provided aid to the pro-Spartan party; not, as Jacoby's version has it, to expel the Messenians and that it should be illegal to make any Messenians citizens. Furthermore, i f Braun's interpretation stands, nobody will believe that the Spartans were so solicitous of the welfare of their hated enemies as to enjoin on the Tegeatans not to kill them, while insisting on their being driven from the town\" (Jacoby, \" X P H I T O Y I , \" 15-16). 4 9 4 Braun, \" X P H I T O Y I , \" 48. Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the refugees would have been made citizens en masse before they were expelled from Tegea. Since there were very few instances of such events in the entire Greek world, this does not seem to have been likely. 4 9 5 See Braun, \" X P H I T O Y I TTOIEIN,\" 40-1. 127 then the Spartan apprehension over Messenians gaining citizenship in Tegea was replaced by the need to protect Spartan sympathizers in foreign cities. If, on the other hand, Jacoby's interpretation stands, then the Messenians did indeed find refuge in Arkadia and inclusion in society and Sparta wished to bring an end to this. The one certainty is that the Messenians were to be expelled from Arkadian s o i l . 4 9 6 So, with either interpretation, it is evident that the topic of the Messenians was an important one between Sparta and its Arkadian neighbor, Tegea. In addition to the terms of the treaty, the place where it stood is also uncertain. Plutarch noted that this treaty was set up ETT' 'AX9EIC0 (\"on the Alpheios R ive r ) . 4 9 7 Bolte was the first to suggest that the stele was put up on what was the frontier between Tegea and Sparta, the Vurvura River, since this is where the treaty would have had the greatest influence. 4 9 8 But Pausanias had noted that the natural boundary was, \"the river Alpheios\" (Paus. 8.54.1-3), exactly where Plutarch said the stele stood. The Vurvura stream, a natural boundary between Tegean territory and Lakonia, is not part of the Alpheios river, so Bolte's argument does not agree with Pausanias' testimony. The only place where the Alpheios is a boundary lies further upstream, in the area later known as the plain of Megalopolis, which has not been considered to be part of Tegean territory. There are three possibilities regarding this problem: Pausanias made a mistake and thought that the Vurvura was the Alpheios, and that this was the natural Tegean-Spartan frontier, or the stele was on the Alpheios but not on the boundary between Tegea and Sparta (in contrast to Bolte), or the stele was set up on the 4 9 6 Paul Cartledge notes that there is a difference between the sixth century military alliance between Tegea and Sparta and this stele erected on the banks of the Alpheios River, which may or may not have been set up in the sixth century, (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia [1979], 138-139). See also, for example, O. Murray, Early Greece, 2nd edition, (London, 1993), 263; A.Toynbee, Some Problems of Greek History, (Oxford, 1969), 182. 4 9 7 Plutarch Quaest.Graec.5 = Mor. 292b. 4 9 8 Sparta in RE 1308. 128 Alpheios, but further upstream where it did indeed form a natural boundary between the Tegea and Sparta (in territory that was not necessarily Tegean). Pausanias recorded that the Alpheios River began in Phylace, was joined at Symbola by another stream, and was known to disappear underground in many places and emerge at others. It emerged from the ground at Asea, sank into the earth where it joined the Eurotas, flowed underground beneath the Tegean plain, and emerged again at Pegae and then entered E l i s . 4 9 9 Polybius, whose father was from Megalopolis and was most likley familiar with the area, wrote that after travelling ten stades from its source, the Alpheios emerged and passed through the territory of Megalopolis above ground. Pritchett has proven that in antiquity the Sarandapotamos, which emerged next to the Vurvura stream, was believed to have been the Alphe ios . 5 0 0 Pausanias mistakenly called the Vurvura the Alpheios and so, according to Pritchett, he had the right place but the wrong name. Pritchett believes that the stele must have been set up along the ancient Tegean-Spartan road where it crossed the Sarandapotamos; \"otherwise,\" he wrote, \"we must extend the Tegean territory far to the west of its attested l imi ts .\" 5 0 1 Contrary to Pritchett, this is exactly what must happen and Pausanias was correct to say that the natural boundary was the Alpheios and that here the stone was set. Tegea did control this area of Arkadia, which was later called the plain of Megalopolis. It was situated between Leuktron and Oresthaion, where the Eurotas valley and Megalopolis plain merged. 5 0 2 A n d it was here on the boundary 4yjPaus.8. 54. 1-3. 5 0 0 Pritchettt. Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, part 1, 122-130. A bronze water bucket with the inscription AXcpios was found near the springs which issue forth to form the Sarandapotamos River. This may suggest that someone in antiquity also believed that the Sarandapotamos was the Alpheios River. 5 0 1 Pritchettt, Greek Topography, 125, n.16. 5 0 2 Wade-Gery, \"Rhianos- Hypothesis,\" 297-298. 129 between Spartan and Tegean territory that the stele stood. Placing this treaty on the fronitier may have, as Leahy suggests, dissuaded Messenians from finding refuge in Tegea. 5 0 4 The two commonly suggested periods for this treaty are the sixth century, after the Tegean Wars, c. 550, and sometime during the fifth century, either in the 490s or 460s. The treaty could be applicable to any of these. Furthermore, the treaty could have been first set up in the mid-sixth century, after the wars referred to by Herodotus, and continued to be functional into the 460s. Conversely, the treaty could have been set up in the 460s and re-used terms that were applied to the earlier fifth-century agreement. Unfortunately, the testimony of Plutarch and a quick reference by Pausanias are the only sources we have that attest to this treaty, and neither specifies a date or even a general period for when it was established. For the treaty to make sense there must have been a conflict between Spartans and Tegeans which necessitated a treaty, and this conflict must have happened at a time when Messenian refugees were in Arkadia. The major Messenian-Spartan conflicts were the First and Second Messenian Wars in the eighth and seventh centuries respectively, the fall of Hira c. 600, a possible revolt in 490, and the major revolt recorded by Thucydides in the 460's. 5 0 5 The Tegean-Spartan conflicts were the Tegean Wars in 580 to 560, and the battles of Tegea and Dipaia in the 460s. 5 0 3 Leahy was, I believe, the first to propose this idea, followed by Wade-Gery. Leahy, \"Spartan Defeat,\" 163, note 68; Wade-Gery, \"Rhianos-Hypothesis,\" 298. 5 0 4 Ibid. 5 0 5 According to Plato, (Laws 698D-E) the Lakedaimonians were at war with the Messenians when Darius' troops invaded at Marathon. Cf. Hdt. 6.106-107. See Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 132-133, for discussion of the evidence for a Helot revolt in the 490s. Among those who believe in the revolt of 490 are: Wallace, \"Kleomenes, Marathon, and the Helots;\" 32-3; Forrest, Sparta, 91-92; J. Ducat, \"Les Hilotes,\" 141-3. Cartledge cautiously notes that although the evidence is not overwhelming, \"they do at least add up to an arguable case\" (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 133). 130 Cawkwell has recently argued for a later date, specifically after the Messenian revolt of 490 but before the 460s. According to him, the treaty was contemporaneous with a well-known Messenian refugee. Before the 460s, Mikythos, the slave of Anaxilas of Rhegion and later the regent and steward of his property, returned to the Peloponnesos and settled in Tegea, where he dedicated offerings to O lympia . 5 0 6 Fragments of them have been restored and Cawkwell believes that with these dedications he \"flaunted his flouting of the clause of the Spartan Tegean treaty.\" 5 0 7 After all , he was a former Messenian refugee who had returned to Greece, lived in Tegea, and was not forced to leave as he would have been required to do according to the terms of the treaty. Furthermore, according to Cawkwell , since there is no record of a large Helot revolt around 550, the possibility that a mid-sixth century treaty dealt with individual Messenian refugees is dubious, and the fifth century is a better choice for a treaty that concerned both Messenians and Tegeans. 5 0 8 There is some evidence to support Cawkwell 's theory. Herodotus noted that sometime before 479, the Spartans and the Tegeans were not on friendly terms. The Tegeans had harbored the seer Hegistratus, who had previously been caught by the Spartans and put in bonds. The Spartans were about to put him to death for the \"many grievous wrongs\" he had done to them, when he broke free of his bonds and escaped to Tegea: \"which was then not friendly to the Lakedaimonians.\" 5 0 9 Herodotus does not say why they were unfriendly to 5 0 6 Hdt. 7. 170. 4; D.S. 11. 66. 1-3; Paus. 5. 26. 4-5. Anaxilas, of Messenian decent, was tyrant of the Sicilian town of Rhegion from 494 to 476. In the 490s, he captured and renamed the town of Zankle in Sicily to Messana, and may have provided refuge to Messenians who revolted from Sparta when the Persians invaded at Marathon. Thucydides (6.4), on the renaming of Zankle, stated, \"and not long after this Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium, drove out the Samians, colonized the city with people of mixed races, and renamed it Messana after his own home country.\" See also Paus. 4. 2. 3; E . G . Robinson, \"Rhegion, Zankle, Messana, and the Samians,\" JHS66 (1946): 13-21; I.G. 51 1562. 5 0 7 Cawkwell, \"Sparta and her Allies,\" 369-370. 5 0 8 There is little evidence that small groups and individuals defected; when there was a recorded Helot revolt, it was en masse (Ibid., 369). 131 Sparta, but did state that this affair and Tegea's enmity occurred before the Battle of Plataia. In addition, according to Plato, the Messenians had been problematic in 490 (before the Battle of Marathon) and as a result, caused the Spartans to refuse to send troops immediately to Marathon. 5 1 0 Messenian problems continued after Marathon and during a time when the Tegeans were also at war with the Spartans. Finally, the Spartan king Kleomenes had been exiled shortly after the Ionian Revolt in 494 and was stirring up resistance to Sparta in Arkadia. Kleomenes was recalled to Sparta, where he went mad and died by self-mutilation, and thereafter the Arkadians remained quiet. 5 1 1 Another plausible fifth-century date for this treaty is the 460s, during which time Sparta fought against the Tegeans at the battles of Tegea and Diapaia. Concurrently, the Messenians had revolted following the great earthquake of 465. I discuss the possibility that the treaty belongs to the 460s below together with the synoikism of Tegea in the 470s and the battles of Dipaia and Tegea in the 460s. The traditional view is that the policy of the Spartans during the sixth, as well as the fifth centuries, was dominated by its preoccupation with the Messenians: \"Spartan policy throughout the sixth century was dominated by the fear of a Messenian or Helot revolt being instigated by one or more of her neighbors.\" 5 1 2 This sentiment was echoed by Thucydides: \"the majority of Spartan institutions with regard to the Helots have always been concerned with defense\" (Thuc. 4. 80). According to Cawkwell (see comments above), the traditional view is dependent upon dating the treaty to the sixth century, and there is not sufficient 5 1 0 Plato stated: \"This account \u00E2\u0080\u0094 whether true, or whatever its origin \u00E2\u0080\u0094 struck terror into the Greeks generally, and especially the Athenians; but when they sent out embassies in every direction to seek aid, all refused, except the Lakedaimonians; and they were hindered by the war they were then waging against Messene, and possibly by other obstacles, about which we have no information, with the result that they arrived too late by one single day for the battle which took place at Marathon (Laws 698D-E). 5 1 1 Hdt. 6. 74-75. See also, J. Roy, \"An Arcadian League in the Earlier Fifth Century B.C.?\" Phoenix 26 (1972): 132 evidence to prove that Sparta was preoccupied by the fear of a Helot revolt in Messenia during that time. He notes that on two separate occasions, Sparta was either ready to or did 513 send a considerable army from Lakonia without fear of Helot revolt. Although the possibility that the Helots posed a major problem in the sixth century is questionable, Cawkwell is wrong to place the emphasis on this part of the debate. The Helots did not have to revolt en masse in order to be problematic for the Spartans, or for Sparta to include a clause regarding them in any treaty with bordering cities such as Tegea. The Messenians were a continual problem, and were never entirely quiescent. So, an agreement with a neighboring state that prohibited the protection of slaves quite possibly could have been made during a period when there was no great Messenian War or revolt in progress. For example, in the Spartan-Athenian alliance of 422/1, the Athenians agreed to help the Spartans in the event that the slave population rose up against them. 5 1 4 The revolt of the 460 's was the last great Helot war and yet forty years later, Sparta saw it fit to include this in an alliance with Athens. Hence, a similar situation could have arisen c. 550. The Messenian War had ended over fifty years earlier, but Sparta was still concerned with controlling the slave population, especially along the Arkadian border. Aristotle's explanation of a sixth-century phrase xpwrous TTOIETV to a younger audience (for example, a late fourth-century reader) supports this hypothesis. 5 1 5 In addition, it was in the middle of the sixth century that Sparta had rescued the bones of Orestes, gained 334 -341. 5 1 2 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 13. 5 1 3 Hdt. 1. 83; 3. 56. 1. Cawkwell believes that after the Second Messenian War, the Helots remained quiescent and that there was not any fatal weakness inherent in the Spartan system that Croesus, Maiandrios, or Aristagoras were made aware of. He states, \"perhaps it is Herodotus who was ignorant,\" (\"Sparta and her allies,\" 369). 5 1 4 Thuc. 5. 23. 3. 5 1 5 Plutarch had cited Aristotle in another passage where Aristotle explained other sixth-century terms (Babyka and Knakion which appeared in the text of the seventh-century 'Great Pdietra.' See Aristotle fr. 536 [Rose, ed.] 133 mastery over the Tegeans, and dominated a greater part of the Peloponnesos. Highby's conclusion sums up the argument for the sixth century: \"The inscription seems to harmonize better with the conditions of the earlier time, when we consider how natural it would be for the Spartans to stipulate in connection with the first treaty which they made with a neighboring state that it should cooperate in the matter of controlling the Messenians.\" 5 1 6 The fall of Hira brought Sparta into conflict with the following Arkadians: Phigalia, Oresthasion, and possibly Orchomenos. These conflicts led to subsequent Tegean Wars, which ended fifty years after the fall of Hira. A treaty signed after these wars, while the memory of Messenian conflicts was still alive, seems plausible. 5 1 7 The other party addressed in this treaty, \"those who were Spartan sympathizers,\" could also be pertinent to all three dates. Although there is no evidence of any internal' discord in Tegea, war and internal stasis were often connected with one another, even in the 518 seventh century. Due to the indeterminate nature of the sources, all three dates are plausible for this treaty. 5 1 9 M y own opinion is that the proposal for the 490s, argued by Cawkwell , is not apud Plut. Lyk.6.) to a fifth century audience. 5 1 6 Highby, Decree, 73. See also Adcock CAHW 72, where such a stipulation became a regular requirement of Spartan treaties, such as in Thuc. 5. 23. 3. But this comes after the Pylos affair, where Thucydides noted the potential for Helot desertion and revolt. 5 1 7 Braun may be correct in believing that a post-Second Messenian War period is likely: \"All the cities of Arkadia are supposed to have helped the Messenians in the third year of the war, but to have been bought off just before the battle of the Trench\" (Braun, \"XPH2TOYI,\" 42-43). A fragment from Tyrtaeus in which references to Arkadians and a trench are found confirms the possibility of a treaty soon after the Second Messenian War (P. Oxy. 3316, apud West, 23a, lines 15-19). There is no mention of Tegeans and the reference to the Arkadians could refer to those who were closer to the Messenian border, such as Heraians and Phigalians (Braun, \" X P H Z T O Y Z , \" 42-43).Braun did not rule out a fifth century date either; he advocated that the treaty could have been set up in the sixth or fifth centuries (Ibid., 43f). 5 1 8 Braun, \" X P H Z T O Y Z , \" 44. 5 , 9 L.I. Highby, \"The Erythrae Decree,\" Klio 36 (1936): 73; 66-74. Cf. U. Karhstedt, Sparta und seine Symmachie (Gottingen, 1992), 109; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia (1979); 138; Meyer G. d. A. II, 766. For a fifth century date see: Schaefer, p.203; Hiller von Gaertringen (IG V , 2,2p.3); G. Cawkwell, \" Sparta and her Allies,\"Cg 43 (1993): 364-376; Forrest, Sparta, 76. Braun dates it to the end of the Second Messenian War, when Messenian exiles were still numerous (Braun, \"XPHZTOY2,\" 42-43). 134 persuasive. Since the terms found in the treaty are indicative of the relationship between the Tegeans and Spartans in the 550s and the 460s, both periods are credible. But I believe that the actual treaty, as I discuss below, should be considered part of the settlement between Sparta and Tegea in the 460s. Just as the Spartan alliances contained terms that were utilized throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, an early alliance with Tegea could have provided 520 later generations with terms that were repeated from an original, sixth-century agreement. The early history of Tegea and Sparta is very different from the history between Elis and Sparta. Instead of cooperation, the Tegean-Spartan relationship was filled with conflicts. An early alliance with Tegea in 550 and its membership in the Peloponnesian League at its inception in 505 led to Tegea's friendly relationship with Sparta. Nevertheless, Tegea still displayed some signs of anti-Spartan activity in the early fifth century. In the 480s, for example, the Elean seer Hegistratus escaped to Tegea which, Herodotus said; 5 2 0 The alliance with Athens in 420 stipulated that r |V 8E r\ SouAeia e u a v i a T f J T a i , E T r i K O u p e d v 'A6r|vaious AaK\u00C2\u00A35ai iaoviois T T O V T I OOEVEI K O T O T O S U V O T O V . (Thuc. 5. 23. 3). Likewise, during the truce between Sparta and Athens in 423, neither side was to provide haven for refugees (Cf. Thuc. 4. 118. 7). Furthermore, lines fourteen to sixteen of the Spartan-Aitolian alliance of c. 387 (see addenda to ML, page 312, have been restored by W. Peek to read: 9 E u y o v [Ta$ pi BEKsOoJI^av KEKOIVC(VEK [6TC (5 d8tK]IndTov. (The text of the treaty has been included in the addenda to Russell Meiggs and David Lewis (eds.), Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford, 1988), p. 312. See also W. Peek, \"Ein neuer Spartanischer Staatsvertrag,\" (1974). P. Cartledge agreed with this restoration and with the identity of the, \"exiles who have participated in illegalities\" as Helots who had escaped from Laconia o r Messenia, or more likely, those who had been settled at Naupaktus (see Thuc. 1.103.3; ML 74); P. Cartledge, \"A new 5th-century Spartan treaty,\" LCM 1 (1976): 87-92; D.H. Kelly, \"The new Spartan Treaty,\" LCM 3 (1976): 133-141.) Thucydides stated: cdei y d p T d TroAAd AaK\u00C2\u00A38ai|iovioi$ irpos T O U $ Fi'AcoTas Tf)s 9uAaKfJs T r e p i udAioTa KaGeioTriKEi (Thuc. 4. 80. 3). \"Taking precautions\" could include the insertion of a clause in treaties that gave Sparta added protection against possible \"exiles.\" These two examples are similar to the terms of the Spartan-Tegean treaty, and all three concur with Thucydides' statement. The typical oath that Sparta expected allies to swear is provided by Xenophon, who recorded the terms given to Athens in 404 upon its capitulation to Sparta: K C U T0O5 9uyd8as K O O E V T O S T O V a u T o v ExQpov K a i 9iAov voy . i\u00C2\u00A3ovTas AaKE8ai|_ioviois ETTEoOai K a i K O T O yfjv K a \ K O T O BdAaTTav OTTOI dv r i y c b v T a i (Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 20). Cf. Hdt. 6. 71, which refers t o the 490s; Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 7; 7. 1. 24. See also the text of the Spartan fourth-century treaty with the Aitolians in ML addenda p. 312, lines 4-10: [.. 3-4jvpovo$ p a v [ T . 1-2. r7ETro][[[u]Evo<; 776TR/1 Ka Aa[KE8ai|_i6vi][[o]i ^ayiovxai K a i K a [ T d y a v M M a i Ka0dAa0av T[6V auTov][J9iAov K a i T O V O U T [ 6 V EX0p6v][ E X O V T E S rjov m p [ K a i AaKE][8a iL i6v io i . Spartan oaths, it seems, used typical terminology in the fifth and fourth centuries, and it is probable that characteristic features were present in the sixth as well. See appendix 6 for more details o n typical Spartan oaths. 135 eoOoccv OUK dp6nir|V AccKESccipovioioi TOUTOV TOV x p d v o v (Hdt. 9. 37. .4). Andrewes proposes that the death o f Kleomenes who had fled to Arkadia and stirred up trouble amriong the Arkadians and Helots, upset those Arkadians who had agreed to follow him in the 490s (see Hdt. 6.74-5). Consequently, the Tegeans were still unfriendly toward the Spartans in the 521 early 480s. ' But i f this were the case, it was not long before the Tegeans were 'friendly' once again with Sparta and fought valiantly beside their Lakonian neighbor. The Persian Wars Unlike their Elean neighbors to the west and the other Arkadian communities to the north, the Tegeans supported Sparta throughout the entire Persian Wars. A t Thermopylae, the Tegeans sent five hundred hoplites, 5 2 2 and at Plataia they put 1,500 hoplites and the same number of psiloi in the field. O f all the Greek forces, the Tegeans supplied the sixth greatest number of hoplites. 5 2 4 A t the final, decisive land battle of Plataia, the Tegeans fought valiantly beside the Spartans. 5 2 5 According to Herodotus, the Athenians were given the command of the left wing and the Spartans appointed the position next to themselves, \"to the Tegeans, on account of their courage and of the esteem in which they held them\" (Hdt. 9. 28). Before the battle of Plataia, the Tegeans argued with the Athenians over the right to command the left wing of the Greek army (the Spartans commanded the right wing). The Tegeans reminded the Spartans that when Hyllus, son of Herakles, returned to the 5 2 1 Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arcadia,\" 2. 5 2 2 Hdt. 7. 202. 5 2 3 Hdt. 7. 202; 9. 28. 3; 9. 61. 2. There was one light-armed man for every Tegean hoplite, Hdt. 9. 29. 5 2 4 Hdt. 8. 43-8; 9. 28-30; 77. 136 Peloponnesos, the Tegean king Echemus defeated him in combat, thus deciding who should remain in the Peloponnesos: For that deed we have had from the Peloponnesians among other great privileges of honor the right of leading the other of the two wings when there is a common expedition of the Peloponnesians forward. Of course, men of Lakedaimon, we will not oppose you in any way; we will concede to you whichever of the two wings you choose to command; but we claim that the command of the other wing comes to us as it always has in the past. And apart from what we have related, we are worthier than the Athenians to have this post. For we have had many glorious conflicts with yourselves, you men of Sparta, and many with others also (Hdt. 9. 26). Although the Tegeans displayed deference to Sparta, the speech revealed that the Tegeans were worthy of distinction in any Peloponnesian or Spartan army. 5 2 6 Tegea, though wil l ing to concede to Spartan leadership in the field, did not consider itself inferior. According to Herodotus, whenever there was a \"common expedition\" of Peloponnesians, the Tegeans were employed on the left w i n g . 5 2 7 But in those battles where the formations were recorded, the Tegeans were not placed on the wing. Instead, they were 528 stationed next to the Spartans at the battles of Mantinea in 418 and Korinth in 394. In addition, at the Second Battle of Mantinea in 362, the Tegeans (grouped among the Arkadians) were next to the Theban forces and their elite troops. 5 2 9 It seems that at least in the classical period, the Tegeans were always positioned next to the corps of the leading troops. According to the Tegean' speech in Herodotus, the successful stand against the Heraklidae, combined with the reputation of the legendary Tegean general Echemus, 5 2 5 Hdt. 9. 61-62; 70. 5 2 6 Wickert doubts that the Tegeans were defeated in a single battle and believes that Herodotus 1.68 is misleading for he was not thinking about one particular war, but the constant state of war between Sparta and Tegea. Wickert concludes, \"Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, DaB er schon an der hier besprochen Stelle an diese Kampfe gedacht hat,\" Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 11. I am in agreement with Wickert that Tegea and Sparta had fought numerous battles and through the various battles with Sparta, Tegea won their respect and recognition. 5 2 7 The right wing always belonged to the Spartans, so it is the left wing that is open for debate. See Hdt. 9. 28; Thuc. 5. 71; Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 19 for the Tegeans posted next to the Spartans on the right. 5 2 8 Cf. Thuc. 5. 71; Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 19. 137 provided Tegea with the proper credentials to command the important left wing of the army whenever the Peloponnesians fought together. 5 3 0 Regardless of the historicity of the speeches, 5 3 1 the evidence shows that the Tegeans enjoyed a favorable relationship with the Spartans. 5 3 2 The reason for such a friendly relationship was due, I believe, to two factors. First, the Spartans had come to respect the military prowess of the Tegeans and had experienced their abilities in hoplite warfare. Second, like the Eleans, the Tegean aristocracy fostered relations with the Spartan authorities. 5 3 3 During the battle of Plataia, when the Greek army repositioned itself, the three thousand Tegeans became isolated with the Lakedaimonian army. 5 3 4 The Tegeans led the attack against the Persian army. The Persian commander, Mardonius, was soon killed by a Spartan and the Persians fled. The Tegeans were once again in the front and were the first to enter the encampment. 5 3 5 They had remained beside the Spartan army and fought as bravely 5 2 y D . S . 15. 85. 2. 5 3 0 Besides the invasion of the Heraklidae, the battle of Plataia and defense of Greece against the Persian Invasions were the only other pan-Peloponnesian affairs. The campaigns of Kleomenes were pan-Peloponnesian affairs, but there were no battles fought. The first campaign ended prematurely and the second never left Sparta (Hdt. 5. 74-7; 5. 94). It is uncertain to what pan-Peloponnesian War the Tegeans were referring. 5 3 1 See W.J. Woodhouse, \"The Greeks at Plataia,\" JHS 18 (1898):41-43. It was the Spartans, the recognized military leaders, who decided that the Athenians were the most deserving troops to be stationed on the other wing. The tactical reality supports this view, as the Tegean troops were too few to command a wing, while the Athenian contingent of eight thousand men plus archers would have been the better, strategic choice. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the Korinthians, who fielded five thousand men, were not offended by the notion of being moved from the place of honor (next to the Spartans) in order to make room for the Tegeans. Instead, the speeches may have been, as Woodhouse suggests, fabricated. 5 3 2 Hdt. 1. 68. The words used to describe why the Spartans placed the Tegeans next to them, Tiufjs E'I'VEKO K a i d p E T f j s , show that the Tegeans had previously won the respect of the Spartans. The intention of this remark may have been to lessen the insult of losing the position on the wing, but if the speech was solely for the benefit of the Athenians, there is no reason why Herodotus had to include this detail. It seems that there is some truth in Herodotus' comment that the Tegeans were respected for their military capabilities. 5 3 3 Many of the Spartan kings who were exiled found haven in Tegea. For example, Leotychidas (Hdt. 6.72.2) in 470s and Pausanias (Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 13-15) in 394. See also, G. Herman, Ritualised friendship, 8; S. Hodkinson, Property and Wealth, 335ff. One of the reasons was that Tegea was Sparta's next-door neighbor and because of this, many aristcratic Spartans would have had the opportunity to foster relations with certain Tegeans. 5 3 4 Hdt. 9. 28; 9. 62. 5 3 5 Hdt. 9. 70. 138 as the Spartans, losing only sixteen men during the battle. This valiant effort, in addition to their logistical support of the war, won the Tegeans the continued respect of Sparta. For its role in the war, Tegea's name was included on the dedicatory column (the bronze triple serpent) at Delphi in a particularly high position. Tegea's name was listed first on the eleventh coil , which actually placed it fourth, since the inscription began on the thirteenth coil and ended on the third. Tegea's position as first in the second grouping may have been in recognition of its contribution. This list on the column, however, differs from the list presented by Pausanias, who provided the names as he saw them on the statue of Zeus at O l y m p i a . 5 3 6 According to him, the first eight names were inscribed in the following order: Lakedaimonians, Athenians, Korinthians, Sikyonians, Aeginetans, Megarians, Epidaurians, Tegeans. If, like the column from Delphi, there were generally three names per coil , then the Tegeans came in the middle of the third coi l . O f the first eight names listed by Pausanias, only the Aeginetans and Epidaurians furnished fewer troops to the war effort than Tegea. They furnished five hundred and eight hundred men, respectively, but they also provided money. The Epidaurians contributed ten talents and the Aeginetans supplied thirty. The placement of their names before Tegea's on the column at Olympia could be explained as a reflection of this contribution. But the Khalkidians provided four hundred troops and twenty talents and were listed last by Pausanias. 5 3 7 It is hard to accept that monetary contributions alone gained a city-state status. In fact, of the first fourteen names, only Tegea's changed position and perhaps Pausanias (or the engraver at Olympia) had made a mistake. This was not, in other words, a deliberate rearrangement. 5 3 6 Paus. 5. 23. 5 3 7 They were listed as the third name on the sixth coil. 139 Despite Tegea's loyalty during the Persian Wars, during the 470s and 460s something changed in Tegea that led to a rift between it and Sparta. 5 3 8 We know that the Tegeans fought the Spartans on at least two different occasions. Moreover, the evidence suggests that Tegea was the leader of a group of communities that included all the Arkadians with the exception of Mantinea. A s was typical of the relationship between Tegea and Mantinea, both were seldom united in their attitude toward Sparta. When Mantinea was friendly to Sparta after the Persian Wars, Tegea was not. The Tegean anti-Spartan movement: 479 to 460 Although the Tegeans fought valiantly beside the Spartans at Plataia in 479, a few years later they provided haven to the exiled Spartan king, Leotychidas. Cartledge suggests that the exiled king may have helped to stir up the anti-Spartan sentiment in Arkadia while he was in ex i le . 5 4 0 The presence of an exiled K i n g does not prove that Tegea was unfriendly to the Spartans, but taken in consideration with the fact that in the 460s it did fight Sparta on two different occasions, it seems likely the anti-Spartan attitude was there as early as 475, 5 4 1 when Leotychidas traveled there after his ex i le . 5 4 2 The chronology of the battles between the Tegeans and Spartans is, however, uncertain. Herodotus said that Tisamenus, another Elean seer, helped the Spartans to win five contests: \"the battle of Plataia, a battle at Tegea which was a victory over the Tegeans and 5 3 8 Sparta's actions during the Persian Wars established Sparta as the leader of the Greeks, especially its Peloponnesian Leage allies. It did not, however, alter the exisiting alliances. Instead, it solidified Sparta's position as hegemon of the allied members. 5 3 9 Hdt.6. 72. 2. 5 4 0 Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 184. 541 Ibid. 5 4 2 Cf. Paus. 3. 5. 6. See also, Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arkadia,\" 2. 140 the Argives, then a victory at Dipaia over all the Arkadians except the people of Mantinea, a victory over the Messenians at Ithome, and finally the last one at Tanagra over the Athenians and Argives\" (Hdt. 9. 35). The battle of Plataia, the victory over the Messenians, and the battle of Tanagra are in chronological order and it seems logical that the other two battles were also listed chronologically by the historian. Andrewes' account of these incidents places the battles of Dipaia, Tegea, and the Messenian revolt to Mt . Ithome all to the year 465 . 5 4 3 Since, as stated above, the battles (not revolts) are in chronological order, according to Andrewes the battle of Tegea came after Plataia, but before Dipaia, and Dipaia came after the Messenian revolt to Ithome. 5 4 4 But the Tegeans were not alone; the Argives joined them at the battle of Tegea but left them to fight with only their Arkadian allies, except the Mantineans, at Dipaia. There must have been, according to Forrest, changes in Argos to explain their desertion before Dipaia, and there needs to be some time between these battles for the changes to have taken place. Hence, the battles were not in the same year. 5 4 5 Despite Andrewes' persuasive arguments, Forrest is right that there were changes and so the battle of Tegea, I believe, came a few years earlier, c. 469. Forrest has convincingly shown that the Argive campaigns against Mykenai and then Tiryns were related to the Tegean battles against Sparta at Tegea and D i p a i a . 5 4 6 According to him, the campaigns against Tegea and Mykenai belong to the same year and political situation in the Peloponnesos, while the attack on Tiryns and the battle of Dipaia belong to a different year and different political phase. 5 4 7 5 4 3 A . Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arkadia,\" 1- 5; Cf. H.T. Wade-Gery CQ 38 (1944): 126; Forrest, \"Themistokles,\" 229. 5 4 4 Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arkadia,\" 5-6. 5 4 5 Forrest, \"Themistokles,\" 229ff. 5 4 6 Ibid. 230-32. The ancient sources do not provide much for chronology here, but Forrest has shown that the sack of Mykenai came first (Ibid.). See Paus. 5. 23. 3; 8. 27. 1; D.S. 11. 65. 5 4 7 Forrest, \"Themistokles,\" 232. 141 According to Diodorus, Mykenai was besieged by both Tegea and Argos. Sparta was unable to help Mykenai , \"because of her own wars and the earthquake disaster\" (D.S. 11. 65. 4). The disaster was clearly a reference to the great earthquake of the 460s and \"her own wars\" was most likely a reference to the battle of Tegea in 469. A s was typical of the relationship between Tegea and Mantinea, Mantinea, it seems, was Sparta's a l l y . 5 4 9 Sparta was victorious at the battle of Tegea and according to Cartledge, there was a change to an oligarchic government in Argos following the defeat. 5 5 0 In 466, according to Forrest's chronology, the slaves at Tiryns were incited to revolt from Argos by a Tegean seer. 5 5 1 Not surprisingly, when the Tegeans faced the Spartans' on the battlefield at Dipaia the next year, c. 465, the Argives had left their all iance. 5 5 2 The anti-Spartan faction was now broken up and the Tegeans and their Arkadian allies were left to fight the Spartans alone at D ipa i a . 5 5 3 The Spartans faced great odds at D ipa i a . 5 5 4 We are told that they formed up in a single line: E T T I uiac aoTriBoc. According to Wade-Gery, this was due to deficit of Spartan warriors following the earthquake and Helot revolt that same year . 5 5 5 Nevertheless, the Spartans were victorious. Two events led to the change in Tegea's attitude from 479 to the 460s. The first event was the synoikism of Tegea, the second the change to a democratic government. 5 4 8 See also Strabo 8. 6. 19. 5 4 9 The Mantineans helped Archidamos II against the Messenians (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 3). 5 5 0 Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 186. 5 5 1 Hdt. 6. 83. 5 5 2 The proof that the battle of Dipaia occurred in 465, after the Helot revolt, is found in Isokrates, Archidamos 99. See Wade-Gery, \"The Spartan Rhetra in Plutarch Lycurgus VI,\" CQ 38 (1944): 125). See also, Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arkadia,\" 3; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185-6. 5 5 3 Forrest, Andrewes, and Cartledge, all agree that Mantinea and Elis were part of this anti-Spartan movement in the 470s (Forrest, \"Themistokles,\" 229; Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arkadia,\" 1-5; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185-6. 5 5 4 See Isokrates, Archidamos 99. 5 5 5 \"The Spartan Rhetra in Plutarch Lycurgus VI, CQ 38 (1944): 125). See also, Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arkadia,\" 3; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185-6. 142 Strabo does not provide a date for the synoikism but according to Moggi ' s study, it occurred during the early 470s, c. 478-473 . 5 5 6 This synoikism, then, coincided with Themistokles' visits to the Peloponnesos. According to Forrest, followed by Cartledge, 5 5 7 Themistokles was behind the anti-Spartan activity in the Peloponnesos, and he may have influenced Tegea by supporting democratic rule over oligarchy. 5 5 8 Polyainos recorded that in the 460s, when the Spartan Kleandridas, advisor to K i n g Pleistoanax, 5 5 9 fought the Tegeans, the aristoi betrayed the city (we can assume it was ruled by a democracy) to the Spartans. 5 6 0 If democracy can be associated with synoikism and anti-Spartan activity, 5 6 1 then it seems that Tegea was a democracy in the early 470s. This change from an oligarchic government to a democratic one can explain Tegea's change of political attitude toward Sparta. Tegea was friendly to Sparta while oligarchy ruled in 470, hostile to Sparta while democracy reigned, but after the battle of Dipaia and the betrayal of the city by the laconizers, Tegea was most likely ruled by the pro-Spartan oligarchic faction (the aristoi). A s long as Tegea had help from Argos, it was able to contend with Sparta but once Argos left the alliance with Tegea, it was not powerful enough to remain free from Spartan coercion. A s Nielsen has aptly pointed out, i f the betrayal of the city led to a shift in political 5 5 6 Moggi, I sinecismi, 131-135. Moggi bases his conclusion on the following: Vitruvius (1. 1. 15) records that the people of Karyai were punished for their Medism during the Persian Wars and that their village was dispersed. Pausanias (8. 45. 1) notes that Karyai was one of the villages that took part in the synoikism; Herodotus (9. 35) records a battle between the Tegeans and Spartans that is dated to c. 473/2. Hence, Moggi places the synoikism after the Persian Wars but before the battle of Tegea. (See Moggi for all the literary evidence. See also Nielsen, \"Arkadia, \" 44-47). 5 5 7 Forrest, \"Themistokles,\" Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185ff. 5 5 8 As shown above (see 172) he was not responsible for brining democracy to Elis in the 470s. 5 5 9 The most likely time frame for these events would be during the Tegean War of the 460s referred to by Herodotus (see 9. 35). Kleandridas' career had lasted well into the 440s, and, since the seventies seem too early for him to have been operating, he was most likely Pleistoanax's advisor during the Tegean Wars of the 460s. See Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arkadia,\" 2. If his career lasted into the 440s, then he would have had to have been general and advisor for over twenty years to have operated before the 460s. 5 6 0 Polyainos 2.10, although the exact date is not certain. 5 6 1 Forrest, \"Themistokles,\"229; See also C. Callmer, Studien zur Geschichte Arkadiens bis zur Griindung des arkadischen Bundes, (Lund, 1944), 86; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185ff. 143 power, then this was proof that Sparta violated the autonomia of Tegea . b b l This was, of course, acceptable to the ruling classes, who must have been prepared to accept Spartan interference in their city. N o conflict between Tegea and Sparta is recorded again until 370, when a revolution brought about a change in Tegea's government and the oligarchs were expelled to Sparta. The dismantling of a democratic government, or any anti-Spartan government, would be repeated by Sparta again; with Elis in 400 and then with Mantinea in 385. In the case of El is , its entire league was dissolved, its walls ( i f it had any) torn down, and its harbors opened to Spartan use. In the case of Mantinea, its walls were also destroyed and its city deconstructed so that the people had to disperse into their villages. In both cases, pro-Spartan oligarchies ruled afterwards. 5 6 4 This was the intended effect and it seems logical that after getting rid of Themistokles, 5 6 5 Sparta focused its efforts on coercing Tegea to give up its democracy. The Spartans may have also forced the Tegeans, as they later did the Eleans, to give up their influence over those Arkadians who fought with them at Dipaia. Unfortunately s there is no evidence that suggests a Tegean symmachy earlier than the 430s. But I think it is likely that it was the leader of at least some Arkadian communities that were unified by their common resistance to Spartan aggression. 5 6 6 It is certain, nevertheless, that the Spartans ensured that the Tegeans would from this point forward agree with Spartan policies. 5 6 2 Nielsen has aptly noted that the treaty was a limitation of Tegean autonomy (Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 88). 5 6 3 Cf.Thuc. 1. 19. 5 6 4 See Cartilage, Agesilaos, 250; de Ste. Croix, \"The Character of The Athenian Empire,\" 20. 5 6 5 See Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185. 5 6 6 See Forrest who agrees with Wallace that Tegea was the leader of an Arkadian Confederacy (Forrest, \"Themistokles,\" 229; Wallace, \"Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia.\" 32-35). Although Nielsen has shown that the possibility of an Arkadian Confederacy in the fifth century is not credible (T.H. Nielsen, \"Was there an Arkadian Confederacy in the Fifth Century B.C. \"CPCPapers 3 (1996): 41-61), I believe that the 144 In the fifth century, there were clearly Spartan sympathizers in Tegea. Polyainos' narrative (2. 10. 3) is evidence that those who lakonized were associated with the term aristoi: KAeavBpiBas TOUC, dpiaTouc, TeyeaTcbv AccKcovi^eiv U T T O T T T E U O U E V O U C E T r o i r ] O E V u T r o T T T O T E p o u c ra T O U T C O V xcopicc p.6vov \xv\ Sr)cbaac. Furthermore, these Tegeans were not in control of Tegea's government at the time. Almost one hundred years later, at the time of the Elean War (402-400), there was a strong democratic party led by Thrasydaios that expelled the aristocratic party, which in turn fled to Sparta. Democratic parties in a Peloponnesian city were generally not made up of people who were laconizing and often were evidence of dissatisfaction with Sparta. Rule by the upper classes, however, resulted in a more loyal polis and those who laconized were found among the aristoi of Peloponnesian poleis.561 Thucydides' statement that Sparta secured oligarchies among its allies is clear on this matter (see Thuc. 1. 144. 2). So it seems that there did exist a pro-Spartan faction in the city of Tegea in the 460s. This party was challenged by the demos for control of Tegean affairs. During the fifth century, when Spartan supporters (those who laconized) where l iving in areas such as Tegea, it would have been important for Sparta to provide a safeguard for their lives. After the city was betrayed to the Spartans, the treaty referred to by Aristotle (Aristoteles, Nr . 592 apud Plutarch Quaest.Graec.5 = Mor. 292b, discussed above) was concluded. It came at a time when the Helots had revolted, when the Spartans were victorious over the Tegeans, and when the pro-Spartan laconizers were trying to effect a possibility of a Tegean symmachy is suggested by the presence of other Arkadians at Dipaia. Admittedly, these Arkadians could have been part of the battle on an ad hoc basis, but given the evidence of a Tegean symmachy in the 420s, I believe that there was a group of Tegean dependents that fought alongside them at Dipaia. 5 6 7 See also, Braun, \" X P H I T O Y I , \" 44. When Elis finally accepted Spartan terms after the Elean war, Thrasydaios' democratic party was in power. Cf. Thuc. 5. 29. 1. 145 political change within Tegea. The victory at Dipaia gave Sparta the leverage it needed and within the terms of the treaty with Tegea, it included clauses prohibiting aid to the Messenians (adapted from a general sixth century agreement) and providing safety to Spartan sympathizers within Tegea. With this treaty, Sparta alleviated the fear of Helot defection to Tegea and found a way to support and promote pro-Spartan sentiment in an Arkadian city. N o further anti-Spartan activity at Tegea is recorded until after the Peloponnesian War. Without any evidence to the contrary, we must assume that the pro-Spartan oligarchs remained in power and Tegea remained a loyal ally. Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and Tegean support for the war After the Spartan assembly voted that the Thirty-Year Peace had been broken and that Athens was guilty of aggression, Sparta asked the allies to vote on the matter. The allied assembly agreed that Athens had broken the Peace, but unfortunately Thucydides did not enumerate who the participating allies were. 5 6 9 Athenian aggression and expansion had not yet become a direct threat to Tegea and Arkadia, as it had to Korinth and El is . Tegea's rivalry with Mantinea showed that parochial issues were more impotant than larger pan-Peloponnesian concerns. So, it is possible that Tegea's decision to jo in others in voting for war (see Thuc. 1. 87. 4) may have been influenced by its domestic and local factors. When the allied delegates met in 432/1, the Korinthians spoke first and talked directly to those cities that either had no interest in naval enterprises or had not yet felt the presence of Athenian expansion. The Korinthians began by addressing them as: cb dv5pe$ ^ u p p a x o i . 5 6 8 See also, Callmer, Studien zur Geschichte Arkadiens, 86. 5 6 9 Thuc. 1. 87.4. 146 This was the allied assembly and did not include the Spartans. Korinth began its speech in this fashion not only for reasons of formality, but to remind those present that there existed a special oath that had brought them all together: \"the states more inland and away from the main routes should understand that i f they omit to support the coast powers, the result w i l l be to injure the transit of their produce for exportation and the reception of their imports from the sea\" (Thuc. 1. 120. 2). The Korinthians continued by saying that those who were brave went to war when they were attacked, and returned to peace when the issue was settled. To remain inactive, though it might seem to be the wisest course for maintaining a sweet life, was in fact, the quickest way to lose such a life (Thuc. 1. 120. 4). Korinth also expressed its understanding that to enter into war with faulty plans or fear was risky, but that it had reason to expect success in this endeavor. The allies had a strong and experienced military, and although the navy was unproven, Korinth planned to build one large enough to rival the Athenian fleet. The purpose of the Korinthian speech was to unite the alliance and secure the military cooperation of the a l l ies . 5 7 1 Since the Arkadians displayed, along with the Spartans, an affinity for attending to matters that only directly affected them and the Peloponnesos during 572 the Persian Wars, the Korinthians were directly addressing the Arkadians in this speech. See de Ste. Croix, Origins, 111-112 regarding the address to an assembly. See also Thuc. 1. 68. 1; 69. 4; 71. 1 for examples of addressing a Spartan assembly; Cf. Thuc. 3. 9. 1; 13. 1 for non-member; Cf. 1. 120. 1; 124. 2 for fellow allies. 5 7 1 Lendon, \"Constitution,\" 276ff. 5 7 2 The attitude of Eurybiades, the commander of the Spartan ships at Artemesion, reflects the Spartan/Peloponnesian attitude. Rather than fight at Artemesion or even Salamis, he and other Peloponnesians preferred to run to the Peloponnesos and hold the line at the Isthmus (see Hdt. 8. 4. 2; 8. 5; 8. 49; 8. 56; 8. 64). The fact that the Peloponnesians decide to fortify the Isthmus is perhaps the most convincing proof: \"For they (the Athenians) thought that they would find the Peloponnesians, in full force, awaiting the onset of the barbarians in Boiotia, but not a particle of this was true; instead, they learned that the Peloponnesians were fortifying the Isthmus, which showed that what they were really concerned with was the survival of the Peloponessos\" (Hdt.8. 40). When the Spartiates learned of the death of Leonidas and the force at Thermopylae, they immediately began fortifications on the Isthmus (Hdt.8. 71). And so, because of the Spartiates' relatively ambivalent attitude, Herodotus was sorry to mention that, \"a man who declares that the Athenians were the 147 Korinth's speech revealed its lack of tolerance for an isolationist policy and disunity, and it admonished the allies to abandon such tendencies. Furthermore, in the first half of the speech, Korinth touched on a point that was very pertinent to the Peloponnesians: remaining idle could potentially jeopardize overseas trade and hinder the importation of goods. Local economies were at risk. Tegea and the rest of Arkadia relied on the security of sea-trade routes for commerce, especially since Sici ly was a source of grain to the entire Peloponnesos. 5 7 3 The author of the pseudo-Xenophontine Constitution of the Athenians noted that there was not a city in Greece that did not need to import something, and that the smaller states were often forced into subordinate roles by those who controlled the commercial routes. 5 7 4 While Tegea was not forced into any subordinate position by Korinth, Korinth did remind the inland cities that they did not possess any direct control of the sea routes. The trade that they relied upon was dependent on those cities that were threatened by Athens. De Ste. Croix has shown that the Peloponnesian War did not arise from a commercial rivalry between Korinth and Athens in S i c i l y . 5 7 5 Megara's decision to jo in Athens and leave the Peloponnesian League in 461-460 removed the possibility of a Peloponnesian invasion through the Isthmus, since it left Sparta with only one ally in the Isthmus, Korinth: according saviors of Greece would hit the very truth\" (7.139). 5 7 3 Thuc. 3. 86. 4. 5 7 4 Psuedo-Xen. 2. 3. The date of this text is uncertain. For a fifth century date, see J .M. Moore, ed., Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 208-210. If so, then it is contemporary with the events discussed here. In the terms of the one-year truce of 423, there was a clause that allowed the Spartans to sail only merchant vessels which did not exceed 500 Talents of tonnage from their own coast and the coasts of their confederates. Sparta and its allies were concerned with sea trade and so the clause provided Athens with security against Sparta using ships for military purposes. But S. Hornblower has recently argued for a fourth century date, not later than 390 (\"The Old Oligarch (Pseudo-Xenophon's Athenaion Politeia) and Thucydides. A Fourth-Century Date for the Old Oligarch?\" in P. Flensted-Jensen, T .H. Nielsen, and L . Rubinstein, eds., Polis and Politics. (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), 361-396. 5 7 5 The 'commercial rivalry' theory that the great hatred (see Thuc. 1.103.4) between Korinth and Athens began because of a trade rivalry between the two over western commercialism has been challenged by de Ste. Croix. See F. M . Cornford, Thucydides Mythhistoricus, (1907), 1-76; G.B. Grundy, THA (1911), 322ff. See also, de 148 to de Ste. Croix, this was \"sufficient to cause 'the great hatred' between Korinth and Athens.\" This animosity stemmed from Korinth's apprehension concerning the growth of Athenian sew-power in the west and the G u l f of Korinth and in continued Athenian interference in the Megarid. In 433/2, this \"great hatred\" (see Thuc. 1.103.4 for this term) was rekindled due to Athens's support of Kerkyra and its defeat of the Korinthians at Potidaia. 5 7 7 The threat to the Korinthian G u l f was a serious concern to Korinth. In addition, this threat was enhanced by the resettling o f Helots from Ithome at the mouth of the G u l f to CIO Naupaktos. Korinth could not defeat Athens alone: it needed a Peloponnesian League expedition. 5 7 9 In order to secure the majority vote of the League assembly, Korinth spoke directly to the allies in terms that they would understand. The threat to their economic stability may have been enough to secure their vote in favor o f war. Thucydides did not state that all the allies voted for war but that the majority did. We should assume that the pro-Spartan government in Tegea, perhaps convinced by the Korinthians, voted in favor of the war . 5 8 0 It took less than a year for the Spartans to assemble a Peloponnesian force and invade Attika. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must assume that Tegea supported the war effort in accordance with its obligation to the League. Tegea would have been required to supply both troops and provisions necessary for Ste. Croix, Origins, 214-220. 5 7 6 de Ste. Croix, Origins, 213. 5 7 7 See Kagan, Outbreak, 79-81. 5 7 8 See G.F Hill, Souces for Greek History between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950, 1.4.7); Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 193-194. Cartledge agrees that the threat to the Korinthian Gulf induced Korinth to anxiously await a war with Athens, but only if it could secure the involvement of the Peloponnesian League (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 194). 5 7 9 de Ste. Croix notes that Korinth needed to be certain that the majority would vote for war (de Ste. Croix, Origins, 113ff). See also HCTl, 305. 5 8 0 Thuc.l. 125. 1. 149 this campaign. 5 8 1 Proof of Tegea's loyalty to the Spartan leadership was proven soon after the outbreak of hostilities. The Archidamian War In the second year of the war, a Peloponnesian embassy heading to Persia to solicit 582 the King's aid was arrested in Thrakia, sent to Athens, and then executed without trial. The embassy consisted of three Spartans (Aneristos, Nikolaos, and Protodamos), 5 8 3 a Korinthian (Aristeos), Pollis from Argos , 5 8 4 and Timagoras from Tegea. The inclusion of delegates from various members of the League was not unusual, especially since this was a League endeavor. 5 8 5 Such diplomatic cooperation was welcomed by the Spartans during this period, for the allies were all in agreement that the League would need funds to sustain the war effort. 5 8 6 Mosley notes that because \"the members of the Peloponnesian League encompassed a comparatively small area rendered it easier for Sparta [as opposed to Athens] to take them into co-operation and it was also easier for Peloponnesian states other than Sparta to join together their diplomatic efforts.\" 5 8 7 The selection, a Tegean and not, for example, a Mantinean or Elean, may have been due to the reputation of Timagoras. Nevertheless, in other instances where allies participated in embassies, it is clear that those cities that sent 5 8 1 Thucydides (2. 57) stated that this was an extraordinarily lengthy campaign and lasted forty days. In the agreement between Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, cities providing relief support for a member in need were required to supply provisions for the troops for thirty days (Thuc. 5. 47. 6-7). Gomme, HCT, believes this to have been a normal procedure and therefore ought to be applicable here during the invasion of Attika. 5 8 2 Thuc. 2. 67. 5 8 3 See Hdt. 7. 137 and How and Wells, vol. 1, 395-6. 5 8 4 Regarding the inclusion of a representative from Argos, which was not a member of the League, Gomme states: \". . . Pollis (the Argive) doubtless was intriguing for an alliance with Sparta. Argives might be well received in Persia for their neutrality fifty years before\" (HCTW, 200). 5 8 5 See Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece. (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1973), 63ff, esp. 65. 5 8 6 See, for example, the speech of the KorinthiansfThuc. 1. 121) where the speaker noted that in order to raise a fleet, more than allied contributions would be needed. Also, King Archidamos (Thuc. 1. 83) noted that the League had less money to use for the war than the Athenians did. 150 envoys did so because they had a vested interest in the negotiations. Thucydides mentioned a Tegean in the embassy to Persia because Tegea backed the war effort and Sparta's leadership, and because Tegea was a larger state than Mantinea. Thus, it is certain that Tegean support for the Archidamian war was sincere, and that it could be counted on by Sparta and the League. Since there is no mention of any anti-Spartan or democratic movements in Tegea until 423, we can assume that since Tegea was still ruled by an oligarchy, it supported Sparta's leadership during the Archidamian War. Furthermore, the Spartans seem to have let the Tegeans expand within Arkadia and contend with Mantinea over control of Mainalia and Parrhasia. This may have been a conscious Spartan choice as part of its divide-and-rule policy. Rather than interfere in Arkadia and check the expansion of Mantinea or Tegea, Sparta remained detached and watched as they fought for control of southern Arkadia. The Tegean 'Symmachia' During an armistice between the Athenians and the Spartans in the ninth year of the war, c. 423/2, Tegea and Mantinea, acting as independent, autonomous city-states, battled near a place called Laodokeion in Oresthis (southern Arkadia): MavTivfjc 8E Kai TeyeaTai Kai oi ^unuaxoi EKaTEpcov ^uvsPaAov EV AaoSoKEi'cp Tfjs 'OpEO0i8o$, Kai VIKTI du.cpi8fjpiToc, s y E V E T O - KEpas ydp EKaTEpoi TpEvuavTEc T O K a 8 ' auToug TpoTtaTd T E du.q>oTEpoi E O T n a a v K a i OKuAa EC AsAcpoug diTETTEm^av (Thuc. 4. 134. 1). Despite suffering numerous losses, the Tegeans were-able to remain on the battlefield. The Mantineans also remained and so, perhaps they, like the Tegeans, did not suffer as much as 5 8 7 Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy, 65. 151 their allies who fought beside them. They most likely occupied the right wings of their respective armies with the Tegeans facing the Mantinean allies and the Mantineans facing the Tegean allies. This is all we know, for Thucydides did not specify the reason for this battle, why both the Tegeans and Mantineans were content with the results and set up trophies, or who the Tegeans and Mantineans called upon as a l l i e s . 5 8 8 Nevertheless, the Mantinean expansion into the south was checked. 5 8 9 This passage lends credibility to the fact that Mantinea and Tegea were leaders of their own respective, regional leagues: the 'Mantinean League' and the 'Tegean League' (MavTivfjg 8e Ka i T e y E a T a i Kai oi \u00C2\u00A3uu.u.axoi EKaTepcov). Furthermore, Tegea was the obvious rival of Mantinea and, as previously noted, had a long-standing quarrel. 5 9 0 But the battle was a result of the fact that both Mantinea and Tegea had, realistically, only one direction to chose for expansion: the southwest. Conflict of interest, it seems, was a typical feature of the history between Mantineans and Tegeans. Both had established a network of dependent allies in Arkadia and formed their own leagues, and it was only a matter of time before they fought for the rights to the same area. The location of the battle, Laodokeion, was situated south of the future site of Megalopolis, near the Mainalian area of Oresthaion. 5 9 1 To reach this area, the Tegean army had to march southwest past Asea and Pallantion. It is likely, but not definite, that both cities were on friendly terms with Tegea. 5 9 2 According to Pausanias, Pallantion and Asea were two 5 8 8 Concerning this battle, Gomme states: \"it is almost a parody of the foreign policy of the small autonomous city for both had set up a trophy and sent spoils to Delphi, they (both Tegea and Mantinea as opposed to their allies) were happy.\" HCT III, 625. 5 8 9 See also Kagan, Archidamian War, 334. 5 9 0 Thuc. 5. 65. 4. 5 9 1 See Andrewes, HCT TV, 92. Pausanias placed Ladokeis near Megalopolis (8.44.1) and on the road to Asea and Pallantion. See also Polybius 2.51.3, 55.2, and Plutarch (Kleom.6, Arat. 37) who placed the location of the battle just outside of the city. 5 9 2 Nielsen, The Polis Structure, 246-249. Cf. HCTW, 32. 152 of the communities that were supposed to have relocated to Megalopolis in 369 (8. 27. 3). Even later, at the Battle of Mantinea in 362, \"Epameinondas reflected, however, that his people had supporters in the Peloponnesos also - the Argives, the Messenians, and such of the Arkadians as held to their side. These were the Tegeans, the Megalopolitans, the Aseans, the Pallantians, and whatever cities were constrained to adopt this course . . .\" (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 5). Both Pallantion and Asea were Mainalian communities and like Tegea, were thought of by the Thebans as supportive of the anti-Spartan movement during the 360s. During the Peloponnesian War, both of these states were part of the Peloponnesian League via Tegea or its symmachy, which, although much smaller than the Peloponnesian League, is referred to hereafter as the Tegean League. 5 9 3 A t the battle of Mantinea in 428, the Mainalians were collectively stationed next to the Tegeans. 5 9 4 Tegea's symmachia included these two towns, as well as other Mainalian communities in the southeast. According to Nielsen, Oresthaion and Eutaia, two other southern Mainalian communities, were also members of this Tegean symmachia.595 Tegea's symmachy then included a great portion of Mainalia which, as Forsen had shown, could have had a population equal to that of Mantinea. 5 9 6 I f this was the case, then the rest of Mainalia would not have been able to resist Tegea's influence and domination. Since Messenia was situated to the south of Mainalia, and Parrhasia was to the west, Tegea to the east, Lakonia to the southeast, and Mantinea to the northeast, the only possible immediate allies for the Mainalians were the Parrhasians and the Mantineans. There is no indication who controlled Parrhasia at this point, but Forsen may be correct in believing that Sparta controlled this area 5 9 3 Cf. Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 86-89; and 78-79; \"Arkadia,\" under Pallantion and Asea. 5 9 4 Thuc. 5. 67. 1 . 5 9 5 Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 80-83; Cf. Nielsen, The Polis Structure, 246-9. 5 9 6 Forsen, \"Population and Political Strength,\" 52. 153 prior to 423. Even i f Parrhasia was independent, it is unlikely that it would have been powerful enough to provide the Mainalians with sufficient support to prevent Tegean domination. Mantinea was, therefore, the only choice for any Mainalians who felt that membership in the Tegean symmachia was undesirable. According to Forsen, these Mainalians did ask Mantinea to intervene in 423 and the Mantineans responded by sending troops. Both Tegea and Mantinea were conducting their own campaigns of liberation and subjugation in Mainalia, and hence the two fought near Orestheion. After the battle in Oresthis, Tegea's symmachia included a major portion of Mainalia, though not all of it. More specifically, the southern communities were members of the Tegean symmachia. Mantinea, on the other hand, maintained control of a few northwestern communities, such as Haimonia and Paraitheis.599 In 421, the Parrhasians were clearly allies of the Mantineans,600 and, as Nielsen has pointed out, the Mantineans would have had to have controlled some northwestern Mainalians communities, such as Haimonia and Paraitheis, in order to have marched into Parrhasia.601 The battle at Laodokeion showed that the smaller Arkadian communities were divided in their allegiances.602 It is safe to conclude that if any Arkadian cities joined another, large coalition, such as the Peloponnesian League, they would have done so under the aegis of either Tegea or Mantinea. Beyond that, although it has been suggested that an Arkadian League existed in the fifth century, Nielsen 5 9 7 Forsen, \"Population and Political Strength,\" 53. Nielsen believes that during the opening years of the Peloponnesian War, Mantinea took control of Parrhasia (Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 80-82). 5 9 8 Ibid., 54. 5 9 9 Forsen, \"Population and Political Strength,\" 53; See also Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 86. 6 0 0 Thuc. 5. 33. 1; Forsen, \"Population and Political Strength,\" 53; Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 80-3. 6 0 1 See T . H . Nielsen, The Polis Structure, 246. See also, J. Roy, Studies in the History of Arkadia in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods (diss. Cambridge, 1968), 183. 6 0 2 The evidence proves that hegemonic symmachies did exist in Arkadia, but it is uncertain if the northern cities, such as Orchomenos and Kleitor, had similar regional organizations during the Peloponnesian War. For Kleitor see G. Richter, \"Archeological Notes,\" AJA 43 (1939) 200. See also Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 11 ff; 84-86. 154 has recently demonstrated that the evidence does not show that this was the case. Instead, Arkadia was divided internally by these relatively small, regional leagues that were wil l ing to jo in the larger leagues headed by Athens, Sparta, and A r g o s . 6 0 4 Despite the fact that there was no fifth-century Arkadian Confederacy, a great number of coins were minted in the fifth century with the legend APKAAIKON (or some form of this) . 6 0 5 A s shown above, Tegea was the head of its own regional symmachia by 421 and its hegemonic intentions may not have been confined to southern Arkadia. Nielsen has suggested, correctly I believe, that during the fifth century, the Tegeans used this \"Arkadikon\" coinage in place of its own civic coinage in order to promote themselves as the major Arkadian polis. This coinage seems to have been abandoned during the Peloponnesian War (c. 430) during which time the Tegeans switched to their own civic coinage. 6 0 6 If, according to Nielsen, Tegea did in fact use the \"Arkadikon\" coinage, then it suggests that Tegea did aspire to lead all of Arkadia. During the period from 479 to 465, Tegea was not on favorable terms with Sparta. In fact, Tegea may even have been the leader of an anti-Spartan movement at that time, as has been suggested by N i e l s e n . 6 0 7 The \"Arkadikon\" coins are dated to the first half of the fifth century, during which time took place the battles of Tegea and Dipaia and Kleomenes' attempts to unify Arkadia against 6 0 3 For example, Wallace, \"Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia,\" JHS 74 (1954): 32-35; Forrest, Sparta, 91; J. Roy, \"An Arcadian League in the Earlier Fifth Century?\" Phoenix 26 (1972): 334-341. 6 0 4 T .H. Nielsen has recently argued that the epigraphic, numismatic, and literary evidence does not prove there was a united Arkadian Confederacy in the fifth century. Instead, the evidence proves the opposite. In the fifth century, the Arkadians were generally independent, and if organized at all, were joined together for military reasons in smaller leagues without any federal characteristics or machinery (Nielsen, \"Was there an Arkadian Confederacy in the Fifth Century B.C.,\" PCP 3 [1996]: 41-61). The difference between a confederacy and league has been clarified by Larsen who defines a confederacy as something in which; \"there is a local citizenship and in which the citizens are under the jurisdiction both of federal and local authorities\" (J.A.O. Larsen, Greek Federal States (Oxford: 1968), xv.). For the fourth century League, see also Larsen, Greek Federal States, 180-195; Dusanic, Arkadian League. 6 0 5 The authoritative work on this coinage is R.T. Williams, The Confederate Coinage of the Arcadians in the Fifth Century (New York, 1965). 6 0 6 Nielsen, \"Arkadian Confederacy,\" 56-7. 155 Sparta. They are not per se evidence of an Arkadian Confederacy, but one polis could have used them as a means to gain regional hegemony. Since Tegea was a hegemon of a regional, Arkadian symmachia by 423, and lacked its own coins for the period between 470 and 430 (at the earliest), 6 0 8 it could have minted these coins with a pan-Arkadian attitude to augment its own league. Later, near the end of the fifth century, Tegea's civic coinage with the legend TEyeaTav began to be used in its place. 6 0 9 Tegea's attitude toward Sparta was much different from E l i s ' and Mantinea's defiant and abrasive position. Tegea seems to have found a way to expand within Arkadia and develop a small league without drawing too much attention and without threatening Sparta's security. Possible personal ties between the Tegeans and Spartan Kings could have allowed Tegea to remain free from Spartan interference while its oligarchic constitution gave the Spartan authorities a sense of security. The Peace of Nikias In 422/1, Sparta and Athens ceased hostilities and formed an alliance. Some of Sparta's allies, including Elis , Korinth, Boiotia, and Megara, were decidedly against the proposals put forth. 6 1 0 Argos was intent on challenging Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnesos and, upon seeing an opportunity, \"prepared to receive into alliance any of the 6 0 7 See also Nielsen, \"Arkadian Confederacy,\" 56. 6 0 8 Tegea began its own civic coinage with the legend TEyeaTav around after 430, perhaps even as late as 400 (Nielsen, \"Arkadian Confederacy,\" 56). 6 0 9 See Nielsen, \"Arkadian Confederacy,\" 56-7. Although Nielsen does not provide a reason for Tegea's abandonment of the \"Arkadikon\" coinage for its own coinage, it may have been due to Tegea's increased influence in Arkadia and its relationship with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. The affair between Lepreon and Elis displayed Sparta's disdain for these regional leagues. The choice of Tegean civic coinage, instead of the \"Arkadikon\" coinage, could have blurred the association between Tegea and its league so that it could escape reproach from Sparta. 6 1 0 Thuc. 5. 19-23. 156 Hellenes that desired i t . \" 6 1 1 Mantinea soon left the Peloponnesian League and entered into this new alliance with Argos . 6 1 2 Thucydides noted that the rest of the Peloponnesos, fearing that a Spartan-Athenian alliance might intrude upon their liberties, considered similar moves. Korinth joined into an alliance with Argos, and together with Mantinea, approached the Tegeans in an attempt to bring them into their new alliance: \"thinking that i f so considerable a state could be persuaded to join, all the Peloponnesos would be on their side.\" 6 1 3 Korinth, as Kagan has shown, needed a war in order to recover its losses (Kerkyra and Potidaia), and so it manipulated poleis in order to strengthen the new league and renew the war . 6 1 4 Tegea's location was crucial for Sparta's economic and military secur i ty . 6 1 5 Furthermore, Tegea had been a valuable contributor to League forces. Consequently, Tegea was recognized as an influential city-state for its position and influence within Arkadia, and its position as leader of the communities of southern Arkadia gave it more leverage. If Tegea could be persuaded to join this new League, then certainly the pressure on Sparta would be great and Korinth would be in a position to renew the war with sufficient resources. 6 1 6 But Tegea did not desert the Peloponnesian League and instead it told the Korinthians that it would do nothing to harm Sparta. 6 1 7 Shortly thereafter, Sparta attacked one of the southern communities, Parrhasia, and ended Mantinean control of the area. Thucydides wrote that Sparta had done this at the request of a certain faction among the Parrhasians. 6 1 8 The 6 1 1 Thuc. 5. 28. 3. 6 1 2 Thuc. 5. 29. 2. 6 1 3 Thuc. 5. 32. 3. 6 1 4 See Thuc. 1. 46-7; 66-67; HCT, I, 190-194); Kagan, Peace, 34; 43-45. See also, Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 212-216. Powell, Sparta and Athens, 113-118; R.J. Seager, \"After the Peace of Nicias: Diplomacy and Policy, 421-416 B.C.\" CQ 26 (1976): 249-69. 6 1 5 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 11. 6 1 6 See also, Kagan, Peace, 44. 6 1 7 Thuc. 5. 32. 4. Kagan notes that this was a certain blow to the new anti-Spartan movement (Kagan, Peace, 44). 6 1 8 Thuc. 5. 33. 1-2. These may have been the oligarchs who were wishing to free themselves from a democratic 157 Parrhasians may have been freed from the Mantineans, but they were now members of the Peloponnesian League, either as part of the Parrhasian tribal state or, perhaps through Tegea, since this area was most likely under Tegean influence again. Either Tegea's loyalty to Sparta was rewarded with the removal of Mantinean influence in Tegea's domain or its loyalty was the result of a Spartan promise to interfere in Arkadian affairs that would benefit Tegea. Even i f Parrhasia remained outside of Tegea's symmachy, the Mantinean power in southern Arkadia was removed. The policy of Sparta had been to keep at least one o f the two cities, Tegea and Mantinea, loyal; by supporting Tegean suzerainty of the area, Sparta could rely on its military support. After this, Tegea figured more prominently in the war as one of the major Peloponnesian powers. 6 1 9 Tegea was loyal to Sparta while its rival, Mantinea, quickly joined the new coalition. The Anti-Spartan Alliance The terms of the treaty between Mantinea, El is , Argos, and Athens included a promise to protect not only those cities but also the territories they ruled (cf. Thuc. 5. 47. 4; UTTEp ocpcov a u T c o v K a i T C O V F,uppdxcov cbv d p x o u a i v E K a T E p o i ) . For El is and Mantinea, this new arrangement provided the autonomy that the Peloponnesian League threatened. Tegea d id not enter into the alliance, although it too possessed dependent allies and a regional hegemony. Either the arrangement between Tegea and its allies d id not deprive the smaller communities of their autonomy or threaten their freedom, or Sparta Mantinea. 6 1 9 See, for example, Thuc. 5. 40. 3 where Tegea was counted among those who were potential threats to Argos: \"In this crisis the Argives, afraid that, as a result of refusing to renew the treaty with Sparta and aspiring to the supremacy of the Peloponnesos, they would at the same time be at war with the Spartans, Tegeans, Boiotians, 158 overlooked Tegean policies because it had remained loyal to Sparta and Sparta could not risk Tegea's defection, especially since Mantinea had already left the Peloponnesian League. After the capitulation of Orchomenos to the anti-Spartan coalition, the Argive alliance decided to attack Tegea. 6 2 0 Mantinea, in fact, had insisted on this course of action. Tegea was an obvious target of the coalition because of its geographic location and its importance to Sparta's security. In addition, the coalition counted on a victory, for they would have had help from the democratic (anti-Spartan faction) within the city. A s Thucydides noted, there were some who were wil l ing to betray the city to the new alliance. 6 2 1 This episode reveals the fact that an oligarchic government was in control of Tegea and promoted Spartan policy over the wishes of the democratic minority. The mere threat to Tegea was enough for the Spartans to respond. K i n g Agis led his forces to the frontier. 6 2 2 He did not reveal the purpose of his campaign, not even to the supporting allies. He positioned his army in a way that enabled him to be able to march west to El is , or north to Mantinea and Argos. The secrecy of this deployment kept the allies uncertain of the Spartan ojective and thus prevented the allies from joining forces. Kagan believes that some pro-Spartan oligarchs in Argos were planning a revolution and Agis waited at the frontier to see i f they succeeded. 6 2 3 If so, the revolution did not take place and Agis marched back to Sparta. But since the threat to Sparta's alliance was not over, the Spartans had to defend their allies or else risk losing their League: and Athenians. . .\" 6 2 0 Thuc. 5. 63. 1-2. The loss of Orchomenos was a severe blow to the Spartans, and King Agis blamed: the Spartans threatened to destroy his house and fine him 10,000 drachmas (Thuc. 5. 63. 4) One of the major roads that lead from the north into southern Arkadia was now controlled by the enemy (Kagan, Peace, 107). 6 2 1 Thuc. 5. 62. 2. 6 2 2 Thuc. 5. 54. 1-3. 6 2 3 Kagan, Peace, 85. 159 The Spartans, seeing the Epidaurians, their allies, in distress, and the rest of the Peloponnesos either in revolt or disaffected, concluded that it was high time for them to interfere if they wished to stop the progress of evil . . . the Tegeans and the other Arkadian allies of Sparta joined in the expedition. The allies from the rest of the Peloponnesos and from outside mustered at Phlious (Thuc. 5.57. 1-2). The \"other Arkadian allies\" must have included the Parrhasians, whom the Spartans had liberated, as well as the Heraians and Mainalians, who were all part of the Peloponnesian force at the upcoming battle of Mantinea. The Spartans raised an army, \"on a scale never before witnessed,\" which was composed of Spartiates and Helots . 6 2 4 The army marched first to Orestheion in Maini l ia where Agis ordered the remaining Arkadians to join them at Tegea. 6 2 5 He then sent the \"sixth part\" of the army, composed of the eldest and youngest men, back to guard Sparta. The rest of the army moved to Tegea where it was met by the rest of the Arkadians. The Spartans included even the oldest and youngest men at first, something they did only when they needed every Spartan warrior to fill the ranks of the army. They may have done this as a show of force to the rest of the Arkadians; they needed Arkadian support from the southern communities of the Mainalians before they marched north to protect Tegea. If the Arkadian support for Sparta in Mainalia was suspect and Tegea fell to the new Argive alliance, then Sparta's frontier would be seriously compromised, and the war, as Kagan noted, would be over . 6 2 6 Once assured of their support, he sent the oldest and youngest back 6 2 4 Thuc. 5. 64. 2. Kagan is quick to show that this was no mere show of force, the Spartans meant to fight a decisive battle to decide the fate of Peloponnesian politics (Kagan, Peace, 91). The Helots were becoming an increasingly utilized resource for the Spartan military. They were usually used however when there was a dearth of other soldiers and Sparta was in dire circumstances. The Brasideioi were experimental and were employed outside of the Peloponnesos. When Lakonia was invaded in 369, Sparta liberated any Helot that chose to defend Sparta against the Theban army. Here in 418, as Sparta faced the possibility of losing its hold on the Peloponnesos, the wellspring of Helot manpower was tapped. Thus, the use of Helots in this instance is indicative of the panic that the Spartans felt at the prospect of losing Tegea. 6 2 5 Coincidentally, this was the same area that the Tegeans and Mantineans had fought one another a few years earlier. It seems that Orestheion was an important center for gathering southern Arkadian support or, at least, a nexus of routes from the other southern Arkadian towns. 6 2 6 Kagan, Peace, 133. 160 to Sparta as a rear guard. Meanwhile, Mainalian hostages remained at Orchomenos, an Arkadian city that had recently fallen to the Argive alliance. With these hostages, Argos had leverage with which to coerce the Mainalians. The Spartans were obviously concerned with the defense of Lakonia and with southern Arkadia's loyalty, and so they sent messengers to the rest of their allies, including Boiotia, Phokia, and Lokria , asking for their immediate help. Cartledge's view that from a Spartan point of view, Tegea was the most essential territory outside of Lakonia because of its location is proven by the Spartan response to the possibility of losing Tegea. 6 2 9 Swift, decisive action was taken. The Battle of Mantinea630 The Spartans set out in July, but unfortunately Thucydides did not provide the figures for the Tegean and Arkadian contingents. We do know that the Heraians, Mainalians, and Tegeans, who were placed on the right wing next to a few Spartans on the extremity, were part of this force. According to Lazenby, there were probably 2,000 Tegeans, and 1,000 other Arkadians. 6 3 1 The Mantineans and their allies had arranged themselves in a strong position, 6 2 7 Another plausible reason, proposed by Kagan, was that Agis needed as many troops as he could get in order to defend Tegea, but he also wanted to protect the Tegean fields; this required more troops. According to Kagan, when Agis received news that the 3,000 Eleans had refused to march against Tegea, he sent his excess troops home (Kagan, Peace, 108-11). 6 2 8 See Thuc. 5. 61. 5; Kagan, Peace, 104-105. 6 2 9 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 11. 6 3 0 For more on the battle of Mantinea, see Chapter Three. I follow Lazenby's reconstruction of the battle (Lazenby, Peloponnesian War, 129ff.) Some discussions concerning the battle and used here are the following: A.J. Woodhouse, King Agis of Sparta and His Campaign in Arcadia in 418 B.C. (Oxford, 1933), 18-125; Pritchettt, Greek Topography, 4Iff; Forrest, Sparta, 131-7; A.J. Tonybee, Some Problems of Greek History (Oxford: 1969), 365-404; J.K. Anderson, Military Theory in the Age of Xenophon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970; 228-37; Andrewes (1970) 93-119; G. Cawkwell \"The Decline of Sparta,\" CQ 33 (1983):.385-6; Figuiera (1986) 187-92; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 216ff; Singor, \"The Spartan army at Mantinea\"235ff. See Singor's article for a complete bibliography concerning the Spartan Army at Mantinea. 6 3 1 Lazenby, Peloponnesian War, 113; Singor, \"The Spartan army at Mantinea,\" 250. 161 probably on the slopes of Mt . A le s ion . 6 3 2 A t first, Agis began to attack the allied position, but after being admonished by a one of the older soldiers not to \"cure wrong with wrong,\" retreated. 6 3 3 Although this move may have seemed rash, and the admonishment of the older Spartiate seems to imply foolishness on the part of Agis , he needed to engage the enemy before the Eleans changed their minds and the Athenians arrived. Both showed up the day after the battle, hence they were probably en route. He had arrived in July, after the crops were harvested, so he could not draw the Mantineans out by ravaging their f ie lds . 6 3 4 A s Kagan says, \"the burden of attack, moreover, belonged to Agi s . \" 6 3 5 According to Woodhouse, A g i s ' withdrawal was a deliberate ploy intended to draw the Mantineans and their allies out onto level ground, but both Kagan and Lazenby dismiss this on account of the character of Agis and the madness of such a maneuver. Instead, Agis ' s tactics were the sign of desperation. 6 3 6 Agis retreated to Tegea where he began to divert the Sarandapotamos River into the Zanovistas, thus flooding the Mantinean plain. It may have been the Tegeans who, in fact, advised Agis on this matter since their rivalry with Mantinea began with the issue of water rights. A s mentioned above, the Tegeans were accustomed to diverting the Sarandapotamos in order to save their own crops and, according to Kagan, they had kept a trench dug so that they could perform this whenever needed. b i l Thuc. 5. 61. 1; Kagan, Peace, 113. 6 3 3 Thuc. 5. 65. 1-2; Lazenby, Peloponnesian War, 119. 6 3 4 Woodhouse, King Agis, 110. 6 3 5 Kagan, Peace, 114; see Thuc. 5. 75. 5 for the later arrival of the Eleans and Athenians. Without the Eleans and Athenians, the Spartans had a slight advantage in numbers (Singor, \"The Spartan army at Mantinea,\" 25 Iff). 6 3 6 Woodhouse, King Agis, 111-113; Kagan, Peace, 115; Lazenby, Peloponnesian War, 120. This despair is proven by the fact that Agis now called upon those soldiers he had sent home from Oresthasion to march to Tegea (Thuc. 5. 75. 1). 6 3 7 Kagan, Peace, 117. See also, HCTW, 98. 162 The next day the Spartans found that the enemy had descended from their strong 638 position to level ground and so they quickly formed their battle line. The Spartan right wing, occupied by the Tegeans, Arkadians, and a few Spartans was successful in circling the left wing of the Argive army and was partly responsible for the Spartan victory. The losses were very severe on the Argive side, especially amongst the Mantineans, while the allies of the Spartans suffered very little. After the battle, the dead were carried back to Tegea, where they were buried. 6 3 9 The Arkadians were an important part of this Peloponnesian League army. This was partly due to the rapid decline of Spartiates in the fifth century, 6 4 0 and partly due to the fact that the control of Arkadia was at risk: i f the Argive army won, then Arkadia would surely Lazenby proposes that since this is what Agis and his men wanted, they were delightfully 'surprised' (Lazenby, Peloponnesian War, 120-121). See below, Chapter Three, for more on the Mantinean role in the battle. 6 3 9 Thuc. 5. 70-74. 6 4 0 Remarking on the decline of Sparta, Aristotle stated, u i a v y d p TrAriyfiv oux u T r n v e y K e v r\ TTOAIS, dAA' a T T c b A E T o 8id T T I V 6Aiyav6pcoTriav; \"the state was not able to endure a single defeat, and it perished because of the smallness of its population (lack of men).\" (/Jo/.1270a 36). Aristotle was saying that the cause of Sparta's demise was not due to an overall population decline, but to the dearth of the Spartiate population. Before Plataia, there were some 5,000 Spartiates (Hdt. 9. 28. 1) but only fifteen hundred Spartiates were present at the battle of Leuktra in 371. Aristotle's' theory (cf. Arist. Pol. 1270a 38) was that the decline in the population of Spartiates was due to the system of land tenure, and that in the fourth century the gap, between the rich and poor widened as the wealth and land was in the hands of very few, because of which Spartiates were reduced to Hypomeiones. Also for discussion on Aristotle's theory see: de Ste. Croix, Origins, 331-2. Forrest, Sparta, 131-7. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 307-317. The next figures that can confidently determine the size of the Spartiate population are derived from Leuktra. There have been attempts to figure out the strength of the Spartiates at the First Battle of Mantinea, but Thucydides himself admits the difficulty in trying to figure out the Spartiates numbers (5.68). Attempts by Toynbee (1913), 246-75, Andrewes in Gomme HCT IV 110-7, are disproved by G. Cawkwell, \"The Decline of Sparta,\" (1983), 385-440, who accepts Thucydides' account which, when examined, counted no more than 2,500 Spartiates. In 369, Kinadon counted no more than 80 Spartiates present in the market place (See Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 5-10 on the conspiracy of Cinadon). Although the exact population is too difficult to ascertain, the ratio was in favor of the Helots, which Herodotus repeated to be almost 7:1 (Hdt. 9. 28. See also G.B. Grundy, Thucydides and the History of His Age [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961], 211-218.) Instead of neglecting this store of manpower, and because offering degrees of integration into the society lessened the threat of revolt, the use of Helots and other 'Lessers' in the place of regular Spartiate troops became a more frequently employed policy. By the first half of the fourth century, large portions of Spartan armies were composed of Helots, Neodamodeis, Brasideioi, and other non-Spartiates: e.g. Thibron's army, which consisted of a thousand Neodamodeis (Xen. Hell. 3. 1. 4); a contingent of Neodamodeis in Byzantium serving under Klearchus (Xen. Hell. 1. 3. 13); Lysander's army for the invasion of Asia, consisting of two thousand of these emancipated Helots (Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 2); and the relief army sent to Olynthus, composed of Perioikoi, Skiritans and Neodamodeis (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 24). 163 have been dominated by Mantinea, an Argive ally. Tegea, furthermore, would have been left unprotected. This could have led to the end of the war and the dissolution of Sparta's supremacy within the Peloponnesos. 6 4 1 On the importance of this battle Thucydides remarked that it was \"the greatest that had occurred for a very long while among the Hellenes, and joined by the most considerable states\" (Thuc. 5. 74. I ) . 6 4 2 The battle was so important because the Spartans did not lose and were, therefore, able to maintain their position in the Peloponnesos and preserve their Peloponnesian League. The Tegeans, in addition, benefited from this victory. Soon after, the Argive support of Mantinea was removed when the Argives and Spartans agreed to terms. The terms of the treaty between Argos and Sparta did concern the other Peloponnesians: (the allies) may be included in this treaty and alliance, as independent and sovereign, in full enjoyment of what they possess; all disputes being decided by fair and impartial arbitration, consistent with the customs of the said cities . . .(3) If any cities, whether inside or outside the Peloponnesos, have a question of frontiers or of other matters, it must be settled; but if one allied city should have a quarrel with another allied city, it must be referred to some third city impartial to both parties (Thuc. 5. 79). The treaty provided autonomy for the Peloponnesian cities and allowed for the other allies to swear the oath for themselves. It also allowed for cities to have territorial disputes and, i f needed, submit to arbitration. As a result, Tegea could have taken advantage of the victory at Mantinea as well as the terms of the Spartan alliance by challenging Mantinea's right to any southern Arkadians still loyal to Mantinea. Tegea continued to benefit from Spartan dominance in the Peloponnesos, for Mantinean power remained in check as long as Sparta continued to prohibit its expansion 6 4 1 Kagan, Peace, 133. 6 4 2 See also Andrewes translation of this HCT IV, 126, \"This was an exceptionally large-scale battle, involving an exceptional number of important cities. . . \" 164 into southwestern Arkadia. Without Argive support, Mantinea was left to its own devices to defend its independence from Sparta. After the battle of Mantinea and the treaty with Argos, Tegea was used by Sparta as a base of operations. 6 4 3 From here, Sparta directly influenced Arkadia and not surprisingly, Mantinea soon made peace with Sparta. When it did, Mantinea was forced to relinquish its dominance over its dependent a l l i e s . 6 4 4 Although there is no definite proof, without a powerful Mantinea to rival it Tegea most likely gained predominance over the other Arkadians. Its loyalty, combat experience, proximity to Sparta, and oligarchic government were all reasons why Tegea was allowed to gain such a position within Arkadia. The factional nature of Arkadian politics seems to have come to end after the Battle of Mantinea.- Prior to the Battle of Mantinea in 418, the Tegeans were mentioned separately from the other Arkadians, but following it, they were incorporated into the designations \"Arkadians\" and \"Peloponnesians.\" 6 4 5 Similarly, the Mainalians who were also mentioned separately from the other Arkadians at the Battle of Mantinea, 6 4 6 were incorporated into the designation \"Arkadians\" or \"Peloponnesians\" after 418. It can be assumed that the Mainalian tribal state became an official member of the Peloponnesian League as a result of the battle of Laodokeion and the subsequent liberation of the Parrhasia by the Spartans in 4 2 1 . 6 4 7 Since there is no evidence to prove the contrary, the Mainalians must have remained members of the Peloponnesian League until its dissolution in 369. See Thuc. 5. 76. Thuc. 5. 81. Cf. Thuc. 5. 57. 2; 5. 64. 3-5; 5. 67. 1-2. Thuc. 5. 67. 1. See also, Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 77-79. 165 Membership in the Peloponnesian League did not, however, remove the Mainalians from the Tegean symmachia; the two could and did co-exist. Sparta allowed Tegea to maintain its position as leader of the southern Arkadians and may have, in fact, promoted it rather than allow the Mantinean League to dominate Arkadia. Although Tegea was the hegemon of its own league, Sparta and the Peloponnesian League recognized some of Tegea's dependents as individual poleis. For example, prior to the Battle of Mantinea, Orestheion and not Tegea was used as levy-center for Ma ina l i a . 6 4 9 B y the end of the fifth century, we know for certain that the following Arkadian poleis were members of the Peloponnesian League: Tegea, Kleitor, Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Hera ia . 6 5 0 Although it is not explicitly stated, Methrydrion, and Orestheion may have also been members of The Peloponnesian League . 6 5 1 In addition, the Parrhasians and Mainalians were probably members of the Peloponnesian League. 6 5 2 According to Pausanias (8. 27. 3), the following were the Mainalian communities: Pallantion, Eutaia, Soumateion, Asea, Peraitheis, Helisson, Oresthasion, Dipaia, Lykaia, and Iasaia. Pausanias (8.27.4) also provides a list o f the Parrhasian communities. These were, Lykosoura, Thoknia, Trapezous, Proseis, Akakesion, Akontoin, Makaria, and Dasea. 6 5 4 The League itself did not interfere in the autonomy of the members. When the League was at peace, allies were permitted to pursue their own external wars and foreign policy, but Sparta was not required to support them in these endeavors. See Introduction for more. 6 4 9 Thuc. 5. 64. 1. Nielsen assumed that Orestheion was a member of the League because of its importance in levying troops (Nielsen, \"Arkadia,\" under Orestheion). See also Hdt. 9. 11.2. 6 5 0 Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 87-89. See also Nielsen, \"Arkadia,\" for each polis. 6 5 1 Ibid. 6 5 2 See also Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis,\" 87-89. 6 5 3 For Dipaia, see also Paus. 6.7.9. For Oresthasion, see Thuc. 5. 64. 3. See Nielsen, \"Arkadia: City-Ethnics,\" 147-8 for a list of these. Based on the views of modern scholarship, Nielsen includes Haimoniai and Manailos. The location of Soumateion is unknown and Nieslen's inventory does not inlcude the following as definite poleis: Soumateion, Peraitheis, and Lykaia (\"Arkadia,\" 2-5). 6 5 4 See Nielsen, \"Arkadia: City Ethnics,\" 148. The locations of Akakesion, Akontion, and Proseis are unknown and in addition to these, Nielsen does not include Dasea, Makaria, and Thoknia in his list of definite poleis (Nielsen, \"Arkadia,\" 2-5). 166 Many of the Mainalians and Parrhasians listed above were also members of the regional league, the Tegean symmachy. 6 5 5 Certainly the southern most Mainalian communities, because of their proximity to Tegea, should be considered dependent allies of the Tegean symmachy. According to Nielsen, these were Oresthasion, Asea, Eutaia, and Pallant ion. 6 5 6 Membership in the Tegean symmachy is assumed because after the Spartan invasion of Parrhasia in 421, Mantinea no longer influenced southern Arkadia. Instead, Tegea extended its influence into the regions of Parrhasia and Mainalia which were now void of Mantinean influence. 6 5 7 A s long as the dependent communities of southern Arkadia did not complain about Tegean leadership, and as long as Tegea supported Sparta and Peloponnesian League campaigns, there was no reason for Sparta to forcefully interfere. The threat to Tegea, and Sparta's safety, was over and the loyalty of Tegea secured. The End of the War and the beginning of the Spartan Hegemony After the Athenian defeat at Aegospotami in 405, the Spartan ephors called together an assembly of the Peloponnesian allies to decide the fate of Athens. 6 5 8 Without any evidence to the contrary, we have to assume that Tegea and its allies supported the Spartan decision not to destroy Athens. Furthermore, Tegea and the rest of Arkadia showed no signs of dissension from the Peloponnesian League and Spartan policy, even when Sparta refused to share the war booty. Tegea had certainly expended its share of war costs, and its loyalty saved Sparta from defeat, but there is no indication that Tegea was given any of the post-war 6 5 5 See Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 87 to 93. It is possible that since the Spartans liberated the Parrhasians from Mantinea, they enrolled the Parrhasians directly into the Peloponnesian League. 6 5 6 Ibid., 86. 6 5 7 See also Forsen, \"Population and Political Strength,\" 5Iff. 6 5 8 Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 19. 167 boon. Perhaps its prize was Spartan support for its position in Arkadia vis-a-vis M a n t i n e a . 6 6 0 This compliant attitude began to change when Spartan policy became dominated by imperialism and aggression during the period known as the Spartan Hegemony (400 to 369). Tegea and The Korinthian War During the first year of the Korinthian War (c. 395/4), K i n g Pausanias of Sparta used Tegea as his headquarters before he marched north to Haliartus. Tegea was a convenient and logical military location, and the Spartan king may have had personal ties with the Tegean aristocracy. 6 6 2 It was not unusual for a Spartan king to build personal relations with other leaders. But i f Pausanias and the Tegean government were friendly and cooperative, this 6 5 9 Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 6-7. According to Hamilton, the Spartans ignored any allied claims to share in the fruits of victory (Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 64-65). The Thebans did later complain about this (Plut.Zys.27). Furthermore, Diodorus said that Spartans also set up tribute for the first time, collecting 1000 Talents a year (D.S.14.10.2). See also, Isok. 12.67-9; Poly.6.49.10. See H.W. Parke, \"The development of the Second Spartan Empire (405-371 B.C.),\" JHS 50 (1930): 55-7. The total income at the end of the war may have been as much as 2000 Talents (E. David, \"The Influx of Money into Sparta at the end of the fifth century,\" SCI 5 (1979/80): 299-308. See also, Cartledge, Ageilaos, 90ff. 6 6 0 There is some evidence of Tegea and Arkadia's support for Sparta in exchange, unofficially, for territorial rights. When Sparta invaded Elis c. 400, Agis first invaded by way of Akhaia along the Larisus River. In order to have done so, Agis had to march through Arkadia, either on the road past Karyai to Tegea, or west along the Alpheios and then north into the area of Kleitor. During Agis' second invasion of Elis, only Boiotia and Korinth abstained. The Arkadian support was followed by the pillaging of Elean territory by Arkadians after the Elean communities began to defect. See Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 21-31, and Chapter One. 6 6 1 The Peloponnesian League was a military concept and as such it failed to secure the peace after the war. Instead, the Spartans formed an imperial state (Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 182-208). Bosworth says that the Spartans were \"radical and aggressive\" after the war (\"autonomia,\" 131). The combination of harmosts, oligarchies, and tribute (associated with Lysander) contributed to the general feeling of ill-will toward Sparta's aggressive policies (Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 2; 12; Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 25; Perlman, S. \"The Causes and Outbreak of The Corinthian War.\" CQ n.s. 14 (1964):64-81; cf. Bruce, I.A.F. \"Internal Politics and The Outbreak of The Corinthian War.\" Emerita 28 [I960]: 75-86; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 91 fi). Although the dekarchies were removed (Xen. Hell.3A.2; A. Andrewes \"Two notes on Lysander.\" Phoenix 25 [1971]: 206-26; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 238). The allied coalition that formed in 395 was united by one common goal, to check Spartan imperialism (Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 211-232). See also Smith, R.E. \"Lysander and the Spartan Empire.\" CP 43 (1948): 145-56; C. Hamilton, \"Spartan Politics and Policy, 405-401 B.C.\" AJPh 99 (1978): 210-227; \"Lysander, Agesilaus, Spartan Imperialism and the Greeks of Asia Minor.\" AncW 23 (1992): 35-50. For primary sources and more bibliography concerning the causes of the Korinthian War, see Harding, From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Ipsus, no. 11. 6 6 2 Xen. Hell. 3.4. 6-7. 168 personal tie did not necessarily make the Tegeans and their allies more wi l l ing to serve in the Peloponnesian Army. After Pausanias was blamed for the debacle at Haliartus and forced into exile by the Spartan authorities, he fled to Tegea where he lived until his death. 6 6 4 Although the Spartan king may have enjoyed a good rapport with the Tegean government, 6 6 5 once Pausanias was no longer king, the Tegean government and aristocracy may have felt a rift developing between them and the Spartan government. 6 6 6 Hamilton has argued that after the fall of Athens, three factions within Sparta were trying to implement their own foreign policy. Two of these factions were imperialists, one led by Lysander whose decarchies promoted imperialism beyond Greece, the other led by Agis , whose policies urged for imperialism within Greece. The third party promoted the traditional Spartan approach of establishing friendly governments. This was, according to Hamilton, the policy of Pausanias and was considered anti-imperialistic. 6 6 7 The Tegeans, being close neighbors and friends of Sparta and because Pausanias lived there after his 668 exile, must have been aware that without Pausanias in power and with the death of Lysander at Haliartus, the imperialistic policy of Agis , championed by his successor 6 6 3 Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 23. Pausanias may have even been opposed to this aggressive policy (Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 206-207). 6 6 4 Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 23-25. 6 6 5 There remains the possibility that Pausanias was protected under the terms of the Tegean-Spartan treaty. According to Braun's interpretation, Spartan sympathizers were protected under the terms of the treaty (Braun, \"\"XPH2TOYZ,\" and pages 133ff. above). 6 6 6 There is the possibility that the Spartans continued their influence in Tegea and wanted Pausanias to go into exile there so that they could keep an eye on him there. 6 6 7 Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 82ff. Smith believes that there was no decline in Lysander's power, only that. Pausanias rose to his level. Hence, Pausanias' moderate policy was popular (\"Lysander and the Spartan Empire,\" 145-56). Cf. Thompson, W.E. \"Observations on Spartan Politics.\" RSA 3 (1973): 47-58. Cartledge does not agree that the sources are explicit regarding Pausanias' faction (Agesilaos, 86). Andrewes, in addition, notes that the ultimate failure of each faction was the lack of whole-hearted commitment to Empire (\"Spartan Imperialism?\" in Imperialism in the Ancient World. Ed. P.D.A Garnsey and C R . Whitaker. London, 1978, 91-102). See also, E. David, Sparta Between Empire and Revolution, 404-243. (New York, 1981), for support of Hamilton's views. 6 6 8 Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 25; Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 206. While in Tegea, Pausanias wrote a treatise that attacked the ephorate. 169 Agesilaos, would predominate in Spartan foreign po l i cy . 6 6 9 The other Greeks believed this, and after Haliartus formed another coalition unified by the common goal to check Spartan imperialism. These were the Thebans, Athenians, Korinthians, and Arg ives . 6 7 0 But the pro-Spartan oligarchy still remained loyal while the other Greeks prepared for war. Hence, no schism between Tegea and the Peloponnesian League happened and the Tegeans continued to provide troops to the League army. 6 7 1 A t the battle near the River Nemea, there were approximately 13,500 Peloponnesian foot soldiers. During the battle, both armies moved to the right and Xenophon recorded that the Tegeans found themselves placed opposite four tribes of Athenians, or approximately 2,400 hoplites. 6 7 2 Despite the defeat of the Tegeans and other allies, the Spartans were able to force a vic tory, 6 7 3 and as Hamilton notes, the psychological effects were damaging to the anti-Spartan alliance; the Spartans could still field the best army in Greece. 6 7 4 In 394, after K i n g Agesilaos returned from Asia , he entered Greece in the north. He was met by the confederate army at Koronea in Boiotia. A t the subsequent battle at Koronea, a regiment of Lakedaimonians crossed over from Korinth to join Agesilaos' force. A s was the case at Nemea, the Lakedaimonian contingent consisted of Tegeans, Mantineans, and other Arkadians. Once again, the allies failed to defeat the Spartans. But when Agesilaos decided to face the retreating Thebans head-on, he was eventually beaten and forced to allow them to pass between his lines to safety. Since 6 6 9 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 87ff; 97ff. For more on Agesilaos' polices, see Rice, D .G. \"Agesilaus, Agesipolis, and Spartan Politics.\" Historia 23 (1974): 164-182.G. Cawkwell, \"Agesilaus and Sparta,\" CQ 26 (1976): 62-84; J. DeVoto \"Agesilaus, Antalcidas, and The Failed Peace of 392/1 B.C.\" CP 81 (1986): 191-202. Hamilton, \"Lysander, Agesilaus, Spartan Imperialism and the Greeks of Asia Minor.\" AncW. 23 (1992): 35-50. 6 7 0 Xen. Hell, 4. 2. 13; 16. 6 7 1 See Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 20, 21; and Xen. Hell. 4. 3. 15. According to Roy, the Tegeans and Mantineans each supplied around 2,500 hoplites to the battle of Nemea (J. Roy, \"Tegeans at the Battle near the Nemea river in 394 B.C. ,\" PP 26 (1971): 439-441; Cf. Pritchettt, Greek Topography, 73ff; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 239. 6 7 2 There were ten tribes of Athenians and six thousand hoplites, thus about six hundred per tribe. 6 7 3 Xen. Hell. 4. 2-3 for the battle. See also, D.S. 14. 83, 84; Plut. Ages. 18; Polyainos 2. 1.19; Pausanias 3. 9. 13. For discussions on the battle, see Lazenby, The Spartan Army, 135-143; Pritchettt, Greek 170 Thebans had beaten the Spartans at the end of the battle they succeeded in barring the way north. 6 7 5 Agesilaos retreated with his army to Delphi. But the Spartans remained on the battlefield long enough to erect a trophy. Hence as Pritchett notes, as far as Greek standards were concerned, the Spartans were the victors . 6 7 6 Tegea had no incentive to jo in the coalition and the course of the war was proving that staying with Sparta meant remaining on the winning side. Soon Sparta did, however, experience its own setbacks, but the terms of the King ' s Peace in 387 provided it with the means to continue its imperialistic po l i cy . 6 7 7 In order to alleviate allied apprehensions concerning Spartan domination and secure the much needed allied support, Sparta provided the League assembly with a false sense of equality and power; the allied assembly still convened, was addressed by representatives from foreign states, deliberated, and advised Sparta on what course of action ought to be adopted. 6 7 8 Certainly Tegea was part of this process and it is possible that it represented its Arkadian allies. Topography, 73 ff. 6 7 4 Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 222. 6 7 5 Xen. Hell. 4. 3. 15. See also, Xen. Ages. 2. 9-16; Paus. 9. 6. 4; Plut. Ages. 18-19; D.S. 14. 84. 1-2. See Pritchettt, Greek Topography, 85ff; Lazenby, The Spartan Army, 143ff.; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 22Iff. 6 7 6 Pritchettt, Greek Topography, 94-95. 6 7 7 The terms of the King's Peace were presented to the Greeks by the Persian Satrap Tiribazus, although it was the Spartan statesman Antalkidas who was the catalyst for the Peace. Xenophon wrote, \"King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace, upon them I will make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and money\" (Hell. 5. 1.31). Xenophon recorded that Sparta benefited greatly from this peace as the, \"champion of the treaty imposed by the King\" (Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 36). Sparta began this new phase of interstate relations by punishing those former allies who had fought against Sparta in the Korinthian War in order to secure their allegiance (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 1.). For the use of this autonomy clause as a tool for Spartan imperialism, see Bosworth, \"autonomia,\" 133. See also, Cartledge, Agesilaos, 223-226. Other important works used here include the following: T.T.B. Ryder, Koine Eirene. London, 1965; R. Seager, \"The King's Peace and the Balance of Power in Greece, 386-362 B.C.\" Athenaeum 52 (1974): 36-63; E Badian, \"The Peace of Callias,\" JHS 107 (1987): 27ff. 6 7 8 In 383, representatives from Acanthus and Apollonia approached Sparta and requested aid against the oppressive actions of Olynthus. Kleigenes of Akanthus spoke first and addressed both the Spartans and the allies in the following manner: \"Men of Lakedaimon and of the allied states . . .\" (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 12, and again at 5.2.18). After he had spoken: \"the Lakedaimonians gave their allies permission to speak and bade them 171 Furthermore, in 383, the Spartans reorganized the Peloponnesian League for military purposes. Sparta began allowing members to provide cash in lieu of men for campaigns and a penalty system was developed so that i f a member neglected its payment, fines were imposed upon the delinquent. 6 7 9 The composition of the League army did change and this alteration of the League army would eventually affect Sparta's hegemony in Greece. 6 8 0 In 383 the Spartan Eudamidas was sent out with a total force of two thousand men, including Neodamodeis, Skiritai, and Perioikoi. N o allied contingents joined him. Instead, he requested that his brother Phoebidas be allowed to gather the remaining troops which, \"were left behind.\" 6 8 1 It is not clear who these troops were, but Xenophon later refers to the entire force as \"Lakedaimonian,\" which refers to the Spartans, the Perioikoi, but not necessarily the al l ies . 6 8 2 It seems likely that Tegea still supported league campaigns and was among those that were \"left behind.\" These were left behind as a rear-guard or reinforcement force while those who had gone with Eudamidas were perhaps the professional soldiers. This had obvious benefits for both Sparta and Tegea. B y not using the Tegeans and other Arkadians in the expeditionary force, Sparta alleviated the allies' concern that their troops were being advise whatever course anyone of them deemed best both for the Peloponnesos and for the allies. Thereupon many, especially those who desired to gratify the Lakedaimonians, advocated raising an army, and it was decided that each state should send its proportionate contingent for an army of ten thousand\" (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 20). See also, Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 60. 6 7 9 Xen. Hell 5.2.21-22 6 8 0 The use of mercenaries was coupled with the increased use of Helots and the lower classes in the military as hoplites indicates the problems in Sparta. There was an intense pressure on the declining population of elite rulers as they struggled to maintain their social integrity and position as a first rate Hellenic power. After the disasters which befell the Spartiates in the fifth century, as well as the drain on manpower from a century of warfare, they adopted new ways with which they could successfully maintain their army. In the fourth century, Helots and other lower Spartan classes (Hypomeiones and Neodamodeis) became increasingly important in the Spartan army. But that which provided the Spartiates with more numbers weakened the capability of the army, as it was no longer filled with Spartiate hoplites. The result was an army lacking the patriotism for Sparta and the combat training received by Spartiates. See Cartledge, Agesilaos, 160-179 (Chapter 10: Agesilaos and the Spartan Class struggle); 271-273; Hamilton, Agesilaus, 67-85 (The Socioeconomic Crisis of Fourth-Century Sparta). 6 8 1 Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 24. 6 8 2 Xen. Hell. 5. 3. 30, for example. 172 exploited for Spartan interests. A t the same time, the homeland was protected by the reinforcement army made up of, most likely, Arkadians and other Peloponnesians. The Dissolution of the Peloponnesian League But tensions within the Peloponnesian League began to erupt. According to Diodorus, five revolutions occurred within the Peloponnesos prior to the peace conference of 374. 6 8 3 Roy has aptly shown that although the events described by Diodorus properly belong to the period after the battle of Leuktra and the subsequent peace conference in Athens in 371, there is reason to believe that these revolutions were the result of a pre-existing strain in relations between Peloponnesian democrats and oligarchs. According to Roy, this tension was present as early as 374, but was only a prelude to the events of 3 7 1 . 6 8 4 The dissolution of the League commenced with the Spartan defeat at Leuktra in 371 and was confirmed by the peace conference at Athens in the same year. 6 8 5 The terms of the peace in 371 at Athens contained the same guarantee for autonomy that was found in the terms of the King ' s Peace of 386, the peace of 374, and the peace of 371 in Sparta. 6 8 6 Before the peace conference at Athens, but after the battle at Leuktra, the Tegeans and Mantineans remained faithful supporters of Sparta and K i n g Agesi laos . 6 8 7 After the peace conference at Athens, this Tegean support eventually waned. This was due not only to the defeat of Sparta at Leuktra but also to the existing tension in cities where the democratic party was prevalent, and the autonomy clause inherent 6 8 3 D.S. 15. 40; See also Isok. 6. 64-9; Xen. Hell. 7 .2. 5-9. 6 8 4 J. Roy, \"Diodorus Siculus XV.40 - The Peloponnesian Revolutions of 374 B.C. , \" Klio 55 (1973): 135-139. See also, Dusanic, Arkadian League, 284ff; Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 196-202 for a narrative; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 252-253. 6 8 5 For the battle of Leuktra, see note 404. 6 8 6 See T.T. B. Ryder, Koine Eirene, (Oxford, 1965), 122-3; 124; 128; 131. Cf. Roy, \"Diodorus Siculus X V -40,\" 136-7. 173 in the peace in 371 at Athens. 0 8 It was the democratic party in Tegea that seized the opportunity afforded by this new peace and the autonomy clause to free themselves from Spartan supremacy. Incidentally, this democratic party also supported a Pan-Arkadian policy, and eventually (see below) the establishment of the capital at Megalopol is . 6 8 9 But Sparta did not abandon its once loyal ally, and when 800 pro-Spartan Tegean refugees arrived at Sparta, the authorities decided, \"in accordance with their oaths\" to avenge them. Although the League was in disarray and Sparta's empire had collapsed following the defeat at Leukt ra , 6 9 0 it still maintained its alliance and obligations to Tegea. Xenophon presented the \"oath\" as the cardinal reason behind Sparta's involvement. 6 9 1 Realistically, however, the Spartans could not afford to lose the loyalty of Tegea, especially at such a turbulent time. A s Cawkwell has noted, that Spartan support of oligarchies and landed aristocracies was the best policy for Sparta to have adopted, for it was this policy that allowed Sparta to spread its power and influence throughout the Peloponnesos. 6 9 2 It had led to the expulsion of the Tegean democrats in the 460s (see Poly. 2. 10), and the establishment and preservation of an oligarchy until 370. A s was the case in 418, the potential threat of losing Tegea was frightening to the Spartans and Agesilaos' campaign was a necessity. Lucki ly for Sparta, not all of Arkadia revolted from the Peloponnesian League. Orchomenos, for example, refused to join Mantinea, Tegea, and the nascent Arkadian League, and along with the Heraians and Lepreans, may have promised support to Sparta. In addition, the Eutaians and other Mainalians continued their support of Sparta and the 6 8 7 See Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 18. 6 8 8 This dissension from the League and Sparta was highlighted by the Mantineans who began to erect walls around their city. Despite Agesilaos' attempt to halt their construction, other at Arkadian cities, as well as Elis, sent help to Mantinea to establish the walls (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 4-5). 6 8 9 See Hamilton, Agesilaus, 215-220. 6 9 0 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 241; 3 82ff. 6 9 1 Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 10. 174 Peloponnesian League, despite the fact that their Arkadian hegemon, Tegea, was now controlled by an anti-Spartan government. 6 9 4 These Arkadians had a long standing relationship with Sparta, and it is logical that they were ruled by oligarchies and pro-Spartan governments. These resisted the new democratic movement at Tegea, preferring the Spartan leadership over the new Arkadian Confederacy. Both Dusanic and Thompson have also recorded that in the early years, the Confederacy was not organized or stable, and the Eutaians could have chosen the stability of an alliance with the Spartans over the Arkadians. 6 9 5 In addition, the Eutaians may have suspected that they would be incorporated into the new city, Megalopolis, and thus resisted assimilation. 6 9 6 According to Dusanic, the Heraians may have remained apart because they had been defeated earlier by the people of K l e i t o r . 6 9 7 Thus, Sparta did have some Arkadian support. I f Tegea could be retaken and forced back into the Peloponnesian League, the region could be stabilized. So, the Spartans did not recognize that their relationship with the city had ended, only that it needed to reinstall the pro-Spartan party in Tegea. B y marching against Mantinea, Agesilaos hoped to put an end to the formation of a united Arkadia, which would have left Tegea isolated and more apt to accept the return of the pro-Spartan party. 6 9 8 Unfortunately for Sparta, Agesilaos failed and Tegea remained free from the League and Spartan influence. G. Cawkwell, \"Agesilaos and Sparta,\" 75-76. See also Hamilton, Agesilaus 218-219. 6 9 3 Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 10-15; D.S. 15. 59. 4; 62.1-3. 6 9 4 With the exception of the Tegean refugees (the expelled oligarchs) who were now stationed with the Spartan Ischolas at Oion, the rest of the Tegeans were no longer sympathetic to Sparta (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24). 6 9 5 Dusanic, Arkadian League, 291; W.E. Thompson, \"Arcadian Factionalism in the 360s,\" Historia 32 (1983): 149-160. 6 9 6 Paus. 8. 27. 3; Dusanic shows that the idea for Megalopolis was present long before the 370s, perhaps a product of the Mantinean democrats in Athens after 385. The Eutaians could have gotten wind of their future. The Confederacy itself began in the summer of 371 (Dusanic, Arkadian League, 284ff; 317ff). 6 9 7See SEG XI 1045; Dusanic, Arkadian League, 291. Orchomenos remained apart because of a personal hatred for the Mantineans (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 11). 6 9 8 Hamilton notes, \"it is tempting to think that the Spartans were glad of a pretext to punish the Mantineans for their assertion of independence in rebuilding their city and its walls against Sparta's wishes (Hamilton, Agesilaus, 218). See also Cartledge, Agesilaos, 202 and 262. 175 The loss of Tegea must have then seemed permanent to Sparta. Despite this, Agesilaos feigned a moral victory by implying that he had invaded the enemy's land without opposi t ion. 6 9 9 With this assertion, Agesilaos wanted to maintain the support of those Arkadians who were still loyal to Sparta (such as Eutaia, Orchomenos, and Heraia) . 7 0 0 It is clear that Tegea's defection from the Peloponnesian League did not bring about the defection of all southern Arkadians. Furthermore, Tegea's symmachy came to an end during the aftermath of Leuktra and revolution in Tegea. N o w that the Tegeans were actively pursuing a united Arkadia, the smaller regional league was superfluous. The Invasion of Lakonia Tegea now displayed an aggressive hostility towards its former ally and hegemon and was one of those who, according to Diodorus, decided to \"lay waste to all of Lakonia , \" 7 0 1 A s Hamilton notes, since Agesilaos had retired to Sparta, Arkadia was no longer threatened by a Spartan invasion. Instead, the forces were summoned at Mantinea for a major offensive into L a k o n i a . 7 0 2 Although some exiled Tegeans remained faithful and fought alongside their Spartan friends, 7 0 3 the Peloponnesian League itself was in shambles. O f the ten districts that had supplied troops to League campaigns in 378, six were no longer allies of Sparta. 7 0 4 The 699 Xen.Ages. 2. 23; Plut. Ages. 30. 51; Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 21. 700 Agesilaos may have also needed to garner support among the Spartan authorities for his own leadership (Hamilton, Agesilaus, 219). See Hell. 6. 5. 22 f o r the b u r n i n g o f Heraia. 701 Hamilton, Agesilaus, 223. See Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 22-23; D.S. 15. 62. 4-5;PluUge.s. 31. 1-2. 7 0 2 The size of the force that met w a s i m m e n s e , n u m b e r i n g more t h a n f i f t y thousand. The t e x t o f Diodorus Siculus w a s e m e n d e d b y Wesseling f r o m E T T T C t K i a u u p i c o v to T T E V T a K i a u u p i c o v . See a l s o Plut.Pe/op. 24. 2; Ages. 31.1. The Mantineans a n d the Eleans w e r e the instigators behind the i n v a s i o n . See Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 19. See also, Hamilton, Agesilaus, 220-223; Dusanic, Arkadian League, 292. 703 Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24. 704 According to Diodorus in 378, Sparta had drawn up a list of districts that were required to supply troops to Sparta a n d its allies. The Lakedaimonians, w h i c h m u s t h a v e i n c l u d e d t h e p e r i o i k i c c o m m u n i t i e s , w e r e the f i r s t d i s t r i c t . The Arkadians comprised districts t w o a n d t h r e e . The r e s t o f t h e districts w e r e a s f o l l o w s : \"the f o u r t h the Eleans, t h e f i f t h the Akhaians. Korinthians a n d Megarians s u p p l i e d the s i x t h , t h e s e v e n t h the Sikyonians a n d 176 Spartiates were desperate and had to fall back upon their last resource, the Helots. It was not until aid from the remaining allies arrived that the anxiety of the Spartans was alleviated. 7 0 6 Within the Peloponnesos, most of the allies were now part of the Theban-led offensive. But as a result of the defensive strategy of Agesilaos, (as well as the rising of the river Eurotas), the Theban general Epameinondas was unable to lure the Spartan army out of the city in order to defeat the Spartans once and for all . B y the early spring, the Theban invasion force was back home in B o i o t i a . 7 0 7 Although its territory had presumably been ravaged, the city of Sparta was saved from destruction. But its control over Tegea, Arkadia, and the rest of the Peloponnesos was over. This was confirmed by the establishment of Megalopol is . 7 0 8 According to Dusanic, the establishment of Megalopolis had as its predecessor the fort o f Kypsela (see Thuc. 5. 37) which the Mantineans established for its defensive aspect Phliasians and the inhabitants of the promontory called Akte, the eighth the Akarnians, the ninth the Phocians and Lokrians, the last of all the Olynthians and the allies who lived in Thrakia\" (D.S. 15. 31. 2). In 369, only the districts of the Lakedaimonians, Akhaians, Korinthians and Megarians, Sicyonians and Phliasians remained. See also Hamilton, Agesilaus, 222-223. 7 0 5 Xenophon once noted, \"for what instrument is more serviceable in war more than men?\" (Xen.Ways and Means, 4. 41). The Spartiates were simultaneously pressured by the need for soldiers and the possibility of Helot revolt. The enlisting of the Helots solved both problems. It is remarkable that there were still six thousand Helots at this time who would rather serve in the Spartan army and risk death than flee to the other side (as many Perioikoi had done). Xenophon did not say whether these Helots were Messenian or Lakonian, but other evidence leads us to believe that a majority of them must have been Lakonian. Xenophon and Pausanias both stated that after Leuktra, the Messenians deserted (Pausanias 4. 26. 3, Xen. Hell 7. 2. 2.). In 370-369, the city of Messene was built, most likely with the use of Messenian manpower. Furthermore, in 369 the city was well populated and had adequate forces for defense. Therefore, it makes sense that by 370/69, most, if not all, of the Messenian Helots had revolted and deserted to help build the walls of their national city. With the invasion of Lakonia, the Spartiates would have been too preoccupied to keep the Messenian Helots in line. The Helots must have also known this. It is, therefore, a fair assumption that those Helots who remained in Lakonia were most likely not Messenian. 7 0 6 \"But when the mercenaries from Orchomenos remained true, and the Lakedaimonians received aid from the Phliasians, Korinthians, Epidaurians, Pelleneans, and likewise some of the other states, then the Spartiatae were less fearful of those who had been enrolled\" (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 28). 7 0 7 Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 50-52. 7 0 8 See also, S. Hornblower, \"When was Megalopolis Founded?\" BSA 65 (1990): 71-77. 177 and as a deterrent to Spartan movements north out of Lakonia. The Tegeans played a major role in the establishment of Megalopolis as members on the board often oikists.710 The establishment of the city checked Sparta's movements and provided the Arkadians with what the Spartans had for so long feared and worked to prevent, a united Arkadian front. Similar to the 470s, while democracy ruled in Tegea its actions were deliberately anti-Spartan. But the rivalry with Mantinea was stronger and in 363, the Mantineans and Tegeans quarreled over this misappropriation of sacred funds. As a result, the Mantineans tore themselves away from the Arkadian League.711 The irony of the relationship between Tegea, Arkadia, and Sparta, was that in 362 a democratic Tegea, joined by Megalopolis, fought against an oligarchic Mantinea and Sparta at the Second Battle of Mantinea. Xenophon's words (referring to the outcome of the battle) aptly summarized the mood in Peloponnesian politics: \"there was even more confusion in Greece after the battle than before\" (Hell. 7. 5. 27). Summary Prior to the invasion of Lakonia in 370/369, Tegea's relationship with Sparta was marked at first by conflict and resistance, and then by compliance and loyalty. Like Elis, Tegea had formed an alliance with Sparta during the sixth century. This alliance was the result of the conflicts between the Tegeans and Spartans which, I have argued, were an extension of the Spartan expansion into Messenia and southwestern Arkadia. This area 7 0 9 Dusanic, Arkadian League, 296, 317ff. 7 1 0 See Paus. 8. 27. 8; D.S. 15. 72. 4. See Nielsen, \"Arkadia,\" under Megalopolis and Tegea; Nielsen, \"DependentPoleis\" 93-95. 7 1 1 Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 33-35; D.S. 15. 82. 1-2; See J. Roy, \"Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs 370-362,\" Historia 20 (1971): 569-599. See Hamilton, Agesilaus, 242ff for a narrative of events. 178 bordered Tegean land and soon after the fall of Hira c. 600, Sparta began to expand into Tegean territory. L ike Elis , Tegea was already a Spartan ally when the Peloponnesian League came into existence. Tegea was more loyalty to Sparta than Elis had been during the Persian Wars and it fought valiantly beside the Spartans during the battle of Plataia. After the war, however, this loyalty diminished and there are indications of anti-Spartan sentiment in Tegea during 479 to 460. This attitude can be explained by two factors: democratic influence in Tegea in the 470s and a continued rivalry with Mantinea over territory. The tendency of this rivalry was that when one state supported Sparta, the other did not. But after the Spartans installed a pro-Spartan government in Tegea, c. 460, the Tegeans supported the Spartans during the entire Peloponnesian War, regardless of Mantinea's allegiance. During the Peloponnesian War, and perhaps earlier, Tegea developed its own symmachy. Tegea's allies were those communities that were situated in the area of Mainalia, located southwest of Tegea. This region was the only area that Tegea could expand into without offending Argos or Sparta. But by expanding into Mainalia, Tegea did interfere with Mantinean expansion. Although the two city-states did fight for control over the area in 423, neither state gained complete control of the area. I have shown that although Tegea bordered Lakonia, this Tegean symmachy did not threaten Sparta and was, therefore, left relatively free to continue its expansion. Tegea's pro-Spartan government was the main reason why Sparta did not feel threatened; after 460 there is no indication of any Tegean discontent with Spartan leadership. Furthermore, after the Peace of Nikias, when both Mantinea and Elis left the Peloponnesian League and joined the new Argive coalition, Tegea remained faithful to Sparta. Its loyalty was rewarded in 418, 179 when the new coalition was defeated at Mantinea and, subsequently, the Spartans dissolved the Mantinean symmachy. The Mantineans no longer posed a threat to the Tegean dependents in Mainalia. The Tegeans remained faithful to the Spartans throughout the Korinthian War, but after the peace conference in Athens in 371 that followed the battle of Leuktra, the democrats in Tegea expelled the pro-Spartan oligarchs. Although the Spartans tried to re-instate them, the Tegeans were now run by an anti-Sparta government. With this shift in political power, the Tegeans supported an anti-Spartan policy and became a major promoter of the founding of the city of Megalopolis. Similar to El is , the Tegean symmachy existed at the same time that Tegea was enrolled as a member of the Peloponnesian League. But Sparta never felt pressured to dissolve the Tegean symmachy because it was assured of Tegea's loyalty to Sparta via its pro-Spartan government. Tegea's Arkadian rival, Mantinea, on the other hand, had a different history with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. L ike Tegea, it was a close neighbor of Sparta and was also situated on the route that led north out of Lakonia. But Mantinea's relationship with Sparta and the development of its own regional symmachy resembled the Elean model more than the Tegean. L ike El is , Mantinea was not always supportive of Sparta's leadership and it had a developed symmachy that it was intent on expanding. For example, during the Peloponnesian War, Mantinea directly opposed Sparta in order to preserve its symmachy and was eventually forced by Sparta to dissolve this alliance. Mantinea's symmachy and its history with the Peloponnesian League is considered in Chapter Three. 180 Chapter Three Mant inea and Northern A rkad ia Mantinea and Northern Arkadia Mantinea occupied the northern portion of the largest valley in eastern Arkadia, known today as the valley of Tripolis. It shared the southern portion of this valley with Tegea. 7 1 2 According to Pausanias, the mountains Skope and Kobriza marked the border between Mantinea and Tegea, 7 1 3 and the Artemesian mountain range separated Mantinean territory from Argive land in the east. 7 1 4 On the eastern edge of Mantinea were the valleys of 715 Louka and Nestane, the latter being accessible only through Mantinea. Nestane was situated on a hi l l and overlooked the \"fallow plain,\" called so because of the frequent flooding that prevented it from being farmed. 7 1 6 The western border of Mantinean territory (not including its later expansion into Maina l ia ) 7 1 7 was marked by the valley of Kaps ia . 7 1 8 The territory of Mantinea was bound in the north by the Anchisia hills and Mt . Armenias, beyond which lay Orchomenos and Stymphalos. 7 1 9 The most appealing direction for 7 1 2 For the details given below, see Hodkinson, Mantinike, 239-96. See also, W. Loring, \"Some Ancient Routes in the Peloponnesos,\" JHS 15 (1895): 25-89; Adshead, Politics, 12-14; Paus. 8.6.4-12.9; Bolte, Mantinea in RE (1930): 1289-1344. According to Thucydides, the border with Tegea changed from time to time due to conflicts over the water that frequently flooded the plain (Thuc.5.65.4). For a discussion of the quarrel over water, see Chapter Two, pages 118-120. 7 1 3 In the fourth century, a watchtower may have been built on the ridge just north of the settlement. (Hodkinson, Mantinike, 244). For more on the archealogy if Mantinea, see Fougeres, Mantinee, 485ff. 7 1 4 Paus. 8. 6.4-6. 7 1 5 Hodkinson, Mantinike, 248. 7 1 6 Paus. 8.7. 1. This was where King Agesilaos was caught between two Arkadian armies in 370 (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 17-19). According to Hodkinson and Hodkinson, walls and two semicircular towers were built in the same period that Mantinea was reconstituted, c.370 (see Hodkinson, Mantinike, 246-7). 7 1 7 See J. Roy, \"Tribalism in south-western Arcadia in the Classical Period,\" Acta Antigua 20 (1972): 43-51. 7 1 8 Hodkinson, Mantinike, 244-5. 7 1 9 Paus. 8. 12. 8-9. For the topograhy of Mantinea, see Fougeres, Mantinee, 1-129. For Stymphalos, see H.Williams, \"Stympahlos: A planned City of Ancient Arcadia,\" EchCl 27 (1983): 194-204; Nielsen, \"Arkadia,\" 181 Mantinea to expand was southwest, into Parrhasia and Mainalia through the valley of Kaps i a . 7 2 0 This was the same area that Tegea expanded into. Map 6: Mantinea and its environs' Major routes connected Mantinean territory with Lakonia in the south, Messenia (via Megalopolis) in the southwest, Argos in the east, and Orchomenos and northern Arkadia in the north. Mantinea's position on these roads enhanced its development as an important 44-45. 7 2 0 Forsen, \"Population and Political Strength,\" 52-53. * Map 5 from Hamilton, Agesilaus, 247; Map 6 from Hodkinson, Mantinike, 243. 182 military focal point. Moreover, for reasons of security and hegemony, Sparta was preoccupied with domination over its immediate neighbors and those cities, such as 721 Mantinea, that were located on the main route north to the Isthmus and central Greece. Because it was very important for the Spartans to secure their loyalty, the development of a walled Mantinean polis was important to Sparta since the presence of a walled town could jeopardize Sparta's control over Mantinea and other Arkadian a l l i e s . 7 2 2 But Mantinea's attitude toward Sparta was directly influenced by its rivalry with Tegea over the water rights and over territorial rights as well . The polis of Mantinea had two periods of existence. The first ended with the dioikismos in 385, when Sparta forced Mantinea to tear down its walls and break into separate villages. 7 2 3 This Mantinea was contemporary with the existence of the Peloponnesian League. The second period began with the decline of the Spartan hegemony in 370 and the dissolution of the Peloponnesian League in 369, when the Mantineans 724 reconstituted their city and helped form the Arkadian Confederacy. Strabo (8. 3. 2) recorded that the original synoikism of Mantinea from five demes was initiated by the Argives. He did not, however, provide a date for i t . 7 2 5 Hodkinson and Hodkinson have shown the difficulties in trying to date the synoikism of Mantinea and although they feel that the archaeological and literary evidence is inconclusive, they prefer, with reservations, a fifth century date (between the years 470 and 460 when Sparta was pre-7 2 1 Amit, Poleis, 121. 7 2 2 See Hodkinson, Mantinike, 241. In J. Camps opinion, walls helped to define a polis (\"Walls and Polis,\" in P. Flensted-Jensen, T.H. Nielsen, and L . Rubinstein, eds., Polis and Politics. (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), 41-51. 7 2 3 For the dioikismos, see Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 7; D.S. 15. 12. 2; Isok. De Pace 100. 7 2 4 Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 3-5. See also Moggi, I sinecismi, 140-56; 251-56. 7 2 5 See also D.S. 15.5.4; Xen. Hell. 5.2.7. 183 occupied by a Helot revolt and wars against Tegea). Accepting a fifth century date for the synoikism does not preclude the idea that the Mantineans entered into an alliance with Sparta J 727 without having a large centralized city. Concerning the motivation for the synoikism of Mantinea and the connection to its date, the theory advanced by Amit , that during the sixth century a walled and united Mantinea was better prepared to deal with a fast-growing Sparta that aimed to dominate its neighbors, seems log ica l . 7 2 8 But fear of Spartan growth and interference in Mantinea were equally applicable to the fifth century as it was to the sixth century. Although the city was rebuilt in the fifth century, according to Hodkinson and Hodkinson, there is no indication or 729 vestiges of walls in Mantinea that predate the fifth century. The other possible rationale for the synoikism of Mantinea is the connection with democracy. Although Robinson has shown that the possibility for a democracy in Mantinea during the sixth century exists, the evidence is far from overwhelming. 7 3 0 Moreover, there is no explicit proof that a desire for democracy was the impetus for synoikism, even i f the two were, in fact, contemporaneous and reciprocal. Although the sources do not say when exactly the synoikism occurred and what the specific reasons were for it, I prefer, following Hodkinson and Hodkinson, a fifth-century date for the synoikism, and Moggi ' s dates of c. 7 2 6 Hodkinson, Mantinike, 257-61; especially 259-260. See also, Moggi, I sinecismi, 150-1. See also Amit, Poleis, 124-8, for more on the literary and numismatic evidence for a sixth century date. 7 2 7 According to Hodkinson and Hodkinson, a rural population with what they refer to as \"village habitation\" would have promoted rule by the aristocracy, the sort of government that worked well with the Spartan authorities (Hodkinson, Mantinike, 241). Thucydides is explicit that the Spartans favored oligarchies and governments similar to theirs. See Thuc. 1. 19, 144, 1; 5. 31. 6. See also Cartledge, \"Origins,\" 224; Powell, Athens and Sparta, 101. 7 2 8 Amit also links the synoikism of Mantinea to the same period as the Tegean-Spartan Wars fought during the sixth century (see Hdt. 1. 68). Furthermore, according to Amit, the synoikism was sponsored by Argos at a time when Sparta and Mantinea were hostile, thus no later than 494 (Amit, Poleis, 124-127). 7 2 9 Amit, Poleis, 124. Hodkinson, Mantinike, \"Mantinea,\" 259. 7 3 0 Robinson, First Democracies 113. 184 478-473. 7 3 1 This, in fact, fits nicely into the pattern of Peloponnesian politics. The evidence that Mantinea was part of the Arkadian league led by Tegea in the early 470s is not persuasive. 7 3 2 Instead the synoikism of Mantinea happened at a time when its rival, Tegea, and much of Arkadia was warring with Sparta. 7 3 3 Mantinea took advantage of the fact that both Tegea and Sparta were pre-occupied to complete its synoikism. 7 3 4 A date in the early 470s is also contemporary with Themistokles' tour of the Peloponnesos, during which time he is thought to have encouraged democracy and, i f the two are related, urbanization. But it is 735 not certain that he introduced democracy at this point. According to Aristotle, Mantinea was a great example of an early democracy because of its socio-economic structure. It was an agrarian-style democracy (which Aristotle believes was the oldest style of democracies) in which the common people, the farmers and herdsmen, maintained the right to deliberate on policy but were content to relinquish the ability to elect magistrates. These officials were, \"elected by a special committee selected in turn out of the whole number\" (Arist. / W . 1318b 6-27). 7 3 6 The limitation on the election of officials was, therefore, balanced by the inclusion in the deliberation of policy. But even this limitation did not prohibit Aristotle and others from perceiving the Mantinean system as a democratic one, 737 however moderate it may have been. 7 3 1 Moggi, I sinecismi, 140-151. 7 3 2 Both Andrewes and Forrest assume this (Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arkadia,\" 1-6; Forrest, \"Themistokles,\" 232); cf. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 185. 7 3 3 See also Polybius (2. 56. 6) who, when recounting the destruction of Mantinea in 223 by Antigonus Doson, quoted Pyhlarchus as saying that it was the oldest city in Arkadia. 7 3 4 Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arkadia,\" 2-3. 7 3 5 Forrest, \"Themistokles,\" 229-232; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 85ff. 7 3 6 Translated by H. Rackham, Aristotle, vol. 21, (Cambridge University Press, 1944). 7 3 7 More recently, Amit has shown that the election of officials was democratic Amit, Poleis, 144). See also J.A.O Larsen, \"Aristotle on the Electors of Mantinea and Representative Government,\" CPh 45 (1950): 180-183. See also Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 4-5. See also Fougeres, Mantinee, 337ff and 534. 185 Unfortunately, Aristotle did not provide a date for the establishment of this system. Although his use of the past tense (\"and this also must be considered as a form of democracy as it once existed in Mantinea\") implies that it was no longer in use during his own time, it is uncertain how long this form of government was defunct. Thucydides, on the other hand, was 738 clear that in the fifth century, Mantinea was governed by a democracy. According to Robinson, Aristotle's reference suggests that Mantinea may have been run by a democratic constitution as early as the sixth century. 7 3 9 Other scholars have argued for a fifth-century date for a democracy in Mantinea based on the association of the lawgiver Nikodoros with the reference in Aristotle, and then Aristotle with the democracy noted by Thucydides. 7 4 0 Nikodoros the Mantinean was indeed a fifth-century lawgiver, but as Robinson and Ami t have argued, the evidence is not convincing that Nikodoros ever specifically developed a democracy and, Aristotle's reference should not be connected with the figure Nikodoros and the fifth century. 7 4 1 Finally, Herodotus tells the popular story about the Mantinean reformer Demonax who, c. 550, was invited to Kyrehe to help with the reconstruction of their city. Demonax, according to Herodotus, divided the people of Kyrene into three tribes and limited the power of the king by assigning all of his former functions, except religious tasks, to the people. 7 4 2 Similar to the reforms of Kleisthenes in Athens, the redistribution of the people into new units provided them with more equality. This was certainly a step toward democracy. 7 4 3 A s both Ami t and Robinson have noted, it seems logical that his reforms were 7 3 8 Thuc. 5. 29. 1; 47. 9; See also Andrewes HCT1V, 59-60. 7 3 9Robinson, First Democracies, 113. 7 4 0 For Nikodoros see Aelian Varia Historia 2. 22-3. For a fifth century date, see Andrewes HCTW, 59-60; RE (1930) 1320. 7 4 1 Amit, Poleis, 136-147, and Robinson, First Democracies, 113-114. 7 4 2 Hdt. 4. 161. 7 4 3 See also Amit, Poleis, 127-8; 144. 186 based on or similar to his home government at that time, and so a sixth-century Mantinea with some democratic institutions remains a possibil i ty. 7 4 4 Despite the inconclusive evidence concerning Mantinea's synoikism and its constitution during the sixth century, it is known that many communities within the Mantinean territory, like most of Greece, relied primarily on an agricultural economy. 7 4 5 Since Mantinea was removed from the major ports and centers of trade, its economy was geared toward satisfying the local needs. Finally, the Mantineans relied heavily upon imports, such as metals necessary for hoplite equipment. 7 4 6 Like the Tegeans, the Mantineans were well adept at hoplite warfare and at various times displayed their courage and discipline. According to Ephoros, the Mantineans trained themselves in the military arts. 7 4 7 During the Persian invasion, the Mantineans supplied as many troops to the defense of Thermopylae in 480 as the Tegeans despite the fact that the overall population of Mantinea was considerably less than that of Tegea and its city was not yet bui l t . 7 4 8 Moreover, in the later fifth century, as a result of the many years of warfare and the drastic environmental conditions in Arkadia, rather than rely on the land for sustenance, many Mantineans hired themselves out as mercenaries. 7 4 9 Thucydides also attested to the 750 military training and ability of the Mantineans. 7 4 4 Robinson, First Democracies, 114. If the democracy and synoiksm were contemporaneous, then a repartitioning of the people into new political units would, therefore, provide each unit that took part in the synoikism with an equal allotment of power (Amit, Poleis, 127-8). 7 4 5 These farmers and less wealthy people who made up the majority of the hoplite forces formed the backbone of the Mantinean political system (see F.W. Walbank, An Historical Commentary on Polybius, vol. 2, (Oxford, 1957-79), 286). 7 4 6 Hodkinson, Mantinike, 265-70. 747 FGrHist 70 F 54. 7 4 8 Hdt. 7. 202; 203. 7 4 9 Most of the mercenaries who signed up with Klearchus and fought for Cyrus in 400 were from Arkadia, according to Xenophon's account. The Arkadians were even regimented in their own division within the ten thousand troops, having both hoplites and peltasts (See Xen. Anab. 4. 8. 18). 7 5 0 Thuc. 5. 69. 1; 3. 108; 5. 33. 2. 187 In regard to the population of Mantinea, Forsen has provided four different models based on: army figures, l iving space and the possible urban population, the number of people the land could support (Hodkinson and Hodkinson's approach), and population numbers from an 1896 census. Whichever model was used, Mantinea turned out to have a smaller population than Tegea, and a larger one than Orchomenos, 7 5 ' which were the closest Arkadian neighbors of Mantinea. Northern Arkadia and Mantinea Mantinea's position in the northern portion of the valley of Tripolis allowed it to come into contact with the other northern Arkadians, particularly Kleitor and Orchomenos. The literary evidence suggests that prior to 506, by which time it has been assumed that all Arkadians were members of the Peloponnesian League, Sparta fought against the northern Arkadians, specifically the Kleitorians and Orchomenians. A s was the case with Tegea, Sparta focused on the larger poleis that controlled the smaller neighboring communities of a specific region in order to control an entire area. This method was ideal for Sparta because of the extensive territory and numerous and diverse communities present in Arkadia. If Sparta did intend, as Herodotus mentions, to control all of Arkadia, then it would have to control each regional leader and not just one polis.753 Although there is no direct evidence for a symmachy in the north lead by Kleitor, a late-sixth-century inscription from Olympia, recorded by Pausanias (5. 23. 7), provides 7 5 1 Based on military strength, Mantinea's population was 14,000 to 18,000 (See Forsen, Population and Political Strength, 36-39). 7 5 2 See Hdt. 1. 68 and Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 87; de Ste. Croix, Origins, 123; Wickert, peloponnesische Bund, 12. 7 5 3 Contrast this with Sparta's association with Eleia where Elis was the only city Sparta had to deal with in 188 evidence that Kleitor had fought and conquered many cities: \"The Kleitorians dedicated this image to the god as a tithe/ From the many cities that they had reduced by force. . . \" 7 5 4 Although it does not mention specific communities, those mentioned by Pausanias as being within the territory of Kleitor are plausible candidates. These were Soron, Argeathae, Lycuntes, Scotane, Palis, and the village of Seirae. 7 5 5 In addition, Polybius mentions that in 220 B . C . , the area up to Kaphae was under Kleitorian influence: dvaaTpeyavTEs y a p EK TT\S KAsixop ias KaTEOTpaTOTrsSEuoav TTEpi Kacpuas (Polyb. 4. 11. 2 ) . 7 5 6 The possibility exists that Kleitor was the leader of a small regional league, 7 5 7 and i f Kleitor became an ally of Sparta then so too did its dependents. A reference in Plutarch to an early conflict between Sparta and Kleitor in the tenth century in the time of the legendary K i n g Sous is unlikely to be correct for chronological reasons. Instead, according to Nielsen, we can only assume that, like the rest of Arkadia, Kleitor was a member of the Peloponnesian League at the end of the sixth century. 7 5 8 Plutarch's reference, although chronologically inaccurate, still indicates that Sparta involved itself in northern 759 Arkadia by the time of the first meeting of the Peloponnesian League assembly in 506. order to influence all of Eleia. 7 5 4 Translated by W.H. Jones and H.A. Ormerod. See also J.Roy, \"Orchomenos and Cleitor,\" CQ n.s.22 (1972): 78-80. 7 5 5 Paus. 8. 23.8 -24. 3. 7 5 6 \"They left the territory of Kleitor and encamped at Kaphae.\" 7 5 7 Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis,\" 86-87. In Roy's opinion, both Orchomenos and Kleitor developed their own set of dependents in 378 (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 36-7), because their spheres of interest overlapped, fought for the control of northern Arkadia (Roy, \"Orchomenos and Cleitor,\" 79-80). 7 5 8 Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 87. 7 5 9 \"Among his ancestors Sous was particularly admired: under him the Spartiates both made slaves of the Helots and won further extensive Arkadian territory which they annexed. There is a story that when Sous was being besieged by the Kleitorians in a rugged waterless spot, he agreed to surrender to them the territory which he had gained in the fighting if he and all those with him might drink from the spring nearby The story continues, \"Not one, however, possessed such self-restraint, but they all drank. Soiis went down after everyone else, and with the enemy still there just splashed himself. Then he moved off, but retained control of the land because not everybody had drunk\" (Translated by R. Talbert, Plutarch on Sparta, [Penguin 1988], 9). Plutarch stated that the Helots were made slaves, but he did not specify whether they were Messenian or Lakonian Helots. Thucydides noted that not all Helots were Messenian (see Thuc. 1. 101. 2. See also Theopompos FGrH 115 fr. 122; Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 96. K . M . T . Chrimes, Ancient Sparta. (Manchester: Manchester 189 Pausanias (8. 3. 3, 36) recorded that the eponymous founder of Orchomenos also founded Methydrion. According to Hejnic, Orchomenos was prominent in the Archaic period, and this position lasted until the early fifth century. When Megalopolis was established c.371, three of Orchomenos' synteleia (partners in a company), Teuthis, Thisoa, 761 and Methydrion were incorporated into the new city. These may have been dependents of Orchomenos during the Archaic period. 7 6 2 The literary tradition indicates that Orchomenos fought against the Spartans prior to the last quarter of the sixth century. In the Second Messenian War, K i n g Aristocrates of Orchomenos gained fame for his treachery at the Battle of the Great Trench. According to Diogenes, he was the father-in-law of Procles, the tyrant of Epidaurus, and through marriage, a relative of Periander. 7 6 4 These familial relationships provided Aristocrates with political connections beyond Orchomenos and northern Arkadia, perhaps even into the southern Peloponessos. He was involved in the Battle of the Great Trench in northern Messenia because the Arkadian territory that was adjacent to Messenia (what was later the plain of Megalopolis) was under his control. After the battle, Orchomenos suffered a loss in prestige and power in southwestern Arkadia and Tegea assumed suzerainty of the area. 7 6 6 University Press, 1949), 285. In his life of Lycurgus, whenever Plutarch referred to the former, he called them Messenians (For example, Plut. Lyc. 28. 6. 4; 7. 2. 7, 11). Consequently, we can deduce that he was referring to Lakonian Helots, those Achaean inhabitants of Lakonia who were enslaved by the Spartans when they expanded within Lakonia. But the tenth century is too early for Sparta to have been annexing territory in northern Arkadia. According to Forrest, the Lakonian Helots were, at the very earliest, enslaved at the end of the eighth century (Sparta, 33). 7 6 0 J. Hejnic, Pausanias the Perieget and the Archaic History of Arcadia, 70-71. 7 6 1 Dusanic, Arkadian League, 317; Roy, \"Orchomenos and Cleitor,\" 78. 7 6 2 Roy, \"Orchomenos and Cleitor, \" 79. 7 6 3 Kallisthenes, FGrH 124 F 23, apud Polybius 4.33.4. See also Paus. 4. 17. 2; 22. 5-7; 5. 13; Plut.Mor 548F. 7 6 4 Periander was Tyrant of Korinth from 627 to 587. 7 6 5 For the Battle of the Great Trench, see Paus. 4. 6. 2; 17. 2; 22. 6. The Spartans bribed the leader of the Arkadians, Aristokrates, to betray the Messenians. Aristokrates convinced the Messenians that they were in a bad position and to wait until he gave the signal to retreat. Instead, as soon as the battle lines were formed, he led his Arkadian troops, who were stationed in the center and on the left, back into the ranks of the Messenians. Not only did this disrupt the Messenian formation, but it left the Messenians helpless to prevent the Spartans 190 After 550, there is no mention of any Spartan-Arkadian conflicts. It is assumed that by the end of the sixth century, Tegea was certainly not the only Arkadian a l l y . 7 6 8 For example, when Kleomenes summoned a force from the entire Peloponessos (Hdts 5.74.1), most of Arkadia was included. Hence, by 506 (and certainly in the fifth and fourth century), Mantinea, Kleitor, and Orchomenos were all members of the Peloponnesian League. 7 6 9 Unlike the other Arkadians, the Mantineans were not reported to have fought against the Spartans in the sixth century. In fact, Mantinea's relationship with Sparta prior to the Peace of Nikias in 421 seems to have been a friendly one by which Mantinea supported from encircling their army. The Messenians that survived fled to Hira (Eira) where they held out for another eleven years. See Pausanias 4. 17. 2ff. 7 6 6 D.M. Leahy, \"The Spartan Defeat at Orchomenus,\" Phoenix 12 (1958): 162-165. The lack of further evidence of Orchomenian activity in Arkadia may be a result of a decline in its power following the Battle of The Great Trench. 7 6 7 In addition to the Orchomenian influence in southern Arkadia, the Arkadians defeated a Spartan army near Orchomenos. This defeat, recorded by Theopompos, was most likely the same event described by Herodotus (Hdt. 1.66) during the time of the kings Agesicles and Leon (c. 580 to 560) and commonly known as the Battle of Fetters (Forrest, Sparta, 73f). Since the battle was most likely the same event referred to by Herodotus, it remains to be explained why Theopompos recorded that the battle took place \"near Orchomenos.\" From all other accounts, Tegea or the environs of Tegea, was the location of the battle. Deinias placed it (FGrH 306 F4) in the Tegean plain, as did Herodotus (1.66.). Nevertheless, these do not preclude that the battle took place near Orchomenos, but in order for the battle to have taken place here, one would have to envisage a Spartan army advancing into eastern Arkadia, past Tegea to the city of Orchomenos. This does not seem plausible. Instead, Leahy's suggestion that a Tegean army counterattacked by positioning itself north of the invaded area and in territory controlled by Orchomenos is acceptable. The Tegeans attacked the Spartan army or drew it into unfavorable ground, and the result was the defeat of the Spartans by the Tegeans near Orchomenos, later known as the Battle of the Fetters (Leahy , \"Spartan Defeat,\" 158-165). The evidence provided by Herodotus and Deinias is explicit that the Spartan army was defeated in the Tegean plain. Thus, the Spartans could have attacked Tegea by two roads, one from Leuktron and the other from Karyai. They did not need another road, so this eliminates any cause for them to have been drawn into a conflict near Orchomenos. Cf. Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24-25 where he noted that to guard against an invasion by the armies at Mantinea (north of Tegea), Sparta had placed a garrison at Leuktron, while the Thebans eventually pushed their way into Lakonia through Karyai. Thuc. 5. 54. 1; 55. 3 also noted Karyai and Leuktron as places through which Sparta would have marched if it intended to attack in the north. Yet another possibility is that the Spartans were defeated near Orchomenos in a smaller confrontation not recorded by any of the other historians. The traditions later became confused and Theopompos' source was influenced by this version. This is how Adshead views Arkadian conflicts, \"At Tegea, at Orchomenos, and at two other unknown places in Arkadia the Spartans were defeated and their soldiers were taken prisoner,\" (Politics, 28). 7 6 8 Wickert states, \"Man kann daher wohl mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit annehem, daB spatestens seit der Zeit um 550 wenigstens einige arkadische Gemeinden, darunter bestimmt Tegea, lakedaimonische Bundesgenossen gewesen sind.. . .Diese sind anscheinend als politische Einheiten angesehen worden und selbstandige Bundesgenossen der Lakedaimonier gewesen. Wahrscheinlich muB man also mit mindestens zehn vershiedenen arkadischen Staatswesen rechnen.\" Wickert Der peloponnesische Bund , 12. Or else Tegea spoke for the other Arkadians. 191 Spartan policy. While Sparta expanded aggressively and extended its control over Tegea and the other Arkadians during the sixth century, it seems that Mantinea remained neutral or at least did nothing to prohibit this. The local rivalry with Tegea was more persuasive than the possible threat to Mantinean freedom, especially since Mantinea did not border Lakonia. Following Hodkinson and Hodkinson (see above), there is no evidence to prove that there were walls to protect the city of Mantinea in the sixth\" century. Given the fact that there were no hostilities reported between Mantinea and Sparta in the sixth century, it is safe to 770 conclude that the governments of Mantinea and Sparta were on friendly terms. A s Thucydides made clear, Sparta tended to support governments most like its own and not democracies. Since Aristotle's reference to democracy in Mantinea presented a moderate one, it is probable that during the sixth century, as Hodkinson and Hodkinson suggest, the Mantinean government was still dominated by an aristocracy. 7 7 1 Concordant governments, no fortifications, and the local rivalry with Tegea promoted a pro-Spartan attitude among the Mantineans. This friendly relationship persisted until 421. The only aberration was Mantinea's failure to support the Greek forces at the battle of Plataia in 479. 7 6 9 Mantinea and Orchomenos, see Hdt. 7.202 and Syll. I331. Kleitor, see Xen. Hell. 5.4.30-37. 7 7 0 Herodotus may not have all the details, but I believe that his silence on any further Arkadian and Spartan hostilities does indicate a period of calm between the two and this may have been due to congruent governments. 7 7 1 Even Robinson himself notes that the evidence is not overpowering that democracy did exist in the sixth century {First Democracies, 114). 192 The Persian Wars During the Persian Wars, Mantinea initially supported the Spartan-led defense of Greece. It had sent its own commander and five hundred hoplites to Thermopylae, but 772 because of its late arrival to the battle of Plataia, it was not included on the memorial: there came immediately Mantineans, to find everything in the.war finished, and, learning that they had arrived late for the engagement, they lamented greatly and declared that it was only fit that they should punish themselves for the offense. But, hearing of those Medes who had fled with Artabazus, they were for pursuing them to Thessaly; but the Lakedaimonians were against their pursuit of the fugitives. When the Mantineans came back to their own country, they banished their leaders of the army from the land (Hdt. 9. 77). Herodotus insinuates that the generals were simply incompetent but according to one theory, it may have been that the Mantinean government was not in support of Sparta's leadership of the war . 7 7 3 The possibility that Mantinea was governed by a democracy (or had some democratic tendencies) at the time lends support to this notion since it is believed that anti-Spartan policy was a typical characteristic of democratic governments. 7 7 4 The Battle of Plataia was a considerable victory for all Greeks, and the Mantineans immediately recognized their mistake. They tried to atone for their error by urging the other Greeks to 775 pursue the fleeing Persian army. Although it is possible that Mantinea was weary of Spartan leadership, this error seems to be the only deviation from Mantinea's friendly relationship with Sparta. After the 7 7 2 Another major Arkadian town, Orchomenos, sent one hundred and twenty hoplites to Thermopylae and contributed six hundred hoplites to Plataia. There is no record of any further activity, but it was included on the war memorial and there is no indication that it did not support the war effort (Hdt. 7. 202-203). 7 7 3 A. Powell, Athens and Sparta, 2nd ed, (London: Routledge, 2002), 107. See also A. Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arkadia\", Phoenix 6 (1952): 2. 7 7 4 For anti-Spartan policy of democratic governments, see Thuc 1. 19, 144. 2; 4. 126. 2; 5. 31. 6. See also Powell, Athens and Sparta, 101-2; Cartledge, \"Origins,\" 224; Ste. Croix, \"Sparta's Foreign Policy,\" 221. 193 expulsion of the generals, Mantinea seems to have been on favorable, or at least neutral, terms with Sparta. It seems more reasonable to follow Herodotus rather than the conspiracy theorists; the generals did not collect their troops and march quickly enough to Plataia. 7 7 6 When the Tegeans and the other Arkadians fought the Spartans at the Battle of Dipaia in the 460s, Mantinea was not one of the belligerents. Although Mantinea was obviously not part of the anti-Spartan movement that included Tegea, it was also not listed as a supporter of Sparta. If the Peloponnesian League was operational, then either Sparta did not call upon its allies to come to its aid, they were not Peloponnesian League campaigns, or Herodotus omitted any details involving any of these conflicts. 7 7 9 Most likely, by not fighting on the side of the Arkadians, Mantinea supported Sparta. Furthermore, Xenophon records that the Mantineans helped the Spartans during the Helot revolt of the 460s. During the opening years of the Peloponnesian War, Korinth tried to solidify the unity of the allies, especially those in the interior. L ike Tegea, Mantinea may have voted for the war out of fear that its 781 imports and exports would be compromised. According to Powell, in pursuing a \"divide and rule\" policy, the Spartans purposefully left Mantinea out of the memorial but included Elis, in order to create tension amongst the allies [Athens and Sparta, 107). 7 7 6 Or, the people of Mantinea took too long in deliberating how many troops to send. 7 7 7 According to Andrewes, the battle of Tegea occurred early in the year 465, the Messenian Revolt and great earthquake at Sparta in 465, and the battle of Dipaieis in late 465/464 (Andrewes, \"Sparta and Arkadia,\" 1-5). 7 7 8 \"Next, at Tegea, a victory over the Tegeans and the Argives; and next the victory at Dipaia over all the Arkadians except the people of Mantinea\" (Hdt. 9. 35). 7 7 9 See Introduction, pages 2-3. 7 8 0 Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 3. 194 Mantinea and The Archidamian War In 426/5, the Spartans were persuaded by the Aetolians to attack Naupaktos. The Spartans assembled a force at Delphi, under the leadership of the Spartan commander Eurylokhos. 7 8 3 Among these troops were three thousand men from the Peloponnesian allied states. 7 8 4 Eurylokhos' attempt to take the city failed and after retiring to the area around Kalydon, he was persuaded by the Ambrakians to attack the Amphilokians. His Peloponnesian force was, eventually, lured into an ambush and defeated by an Athenian-Akarnanian a rmy . 7 8 5 On the Spartan side, the left wing of the army was occupied by Eurylokhos' troops, the elite Spartiate warriors. Next to them were the Mantineans: \"The Peloponnesians and the Ambrakians were drawn up together, except for the Mantineans, who were massed on the left, without however reaching to the extremity of the wing where Eurylokhos and his men confronted the Messenians and Demosthenes\" (Thuc. 3. 107. 4 ) . 7 8 6 7 8 1 Kagan thinks otherwise (Kagan, Archidamian War, 334). 7 8 2 Naupaktos was a town in western Lokris with a small harbor with coastal mountains to separate it from the main interior. Its position was influential in commanding the entrance to the Korinthian Gulf. Athens recognized this and settled exiled Messenians there in 465 (Thuc. 1. 103. 3). During the Peloponnesian War, it served as a major Athenian base in the west (cf. Thuc. 2. 69. 1). 7 8 3 Thuc. 3. 101. Gomme also believes that Eurylokhos did have a contingent of Aitolians and Lokrians (Gomme, HCT IV, 92). 7 8 4 Thuc.3. 100. 2. 7 8 5 Thuc.3. 106-109. 7 8 6 It is likely that not many Spartiates were in the force itself: only the three commanders (Eurylokhos, Makarios, and Menedaios) and some Spartiate warriors were mentioned (Thuc. 3. 109. 1; 3. 107. 4). Menedaios was the only one of these three to survive (Thuc. 3. 109). The men with Eurylokhos on the wing were a small contingent of Spartiate hoplites. Gomme does not think these were the same as those mentioned in Thuc. 3. 108. 1, \"the division of Eurylokhos and their best troops.\" According to Gomme these, \"should include the Mantineans\" (HCT 11, 421). But there is no reason to believe that his division included the Mantineans. The two groups were drawn up next to each other in battle but were not the same regiment. The confusion stems from Thucydides' description of the forces, from which the Mantineans are mentioned separately. The rest of the Peloponnesians could have been positioned with the Ambrakians, perhaps for the benefit of added strength and their knowledge of Peloponnesian military tactics. But Thucydides (see Thuc. 3. 108. 2) wrote that the Ambrakians were separated from the Peloponnesian troops that were stationed on the right wing. I believe that Eurylokhos had his own contingent of Spartiate and Perioikic warriors, that the Mantineans were regimented separately because they supplied a large number of troops and their own commnander, that the Ambrakians were also separated into their own regiment, and that the rest of the Peloponnesians were stationed on the right 195 The Mantineans comprised the only contingent that was brigaded as a unit and they were stationed on the left wing next to the elite troops. They were also the only Peloponnesian contingent named separately by Thucydides. After Eurylochus and his men were cut to pieces , 7 8 7 the Mantineans maintained their discipline: \"(after the battle) they dashed on without discipline or order, except for the Mantineans, who kept their ranks better than any . of the other troops in the army during the retreat.\" 7 8 8 The Mantineans were also present when, after the death of Eurylokhos and defeat of his army, Menedaios concluded the truce. Thucydides seems to imply that the truce was made not just with Menedaios who was the leader of the army, but also with the Mantineans themselves; O H E 8 O V T C ( I MccvTiVEuai Kai MeveSaicp (Thuc. 3. 109. 2). Ami t believes that their presence 789 was in recognition of their valor and to honor them among the other Peloponnesians. It is also possible that they were included in the truce because they were the only major unit to retreat from the battle intact and thus had the most left to lose i f a truce was not granted. L ike the rest of the Peloponnesians the Mantineans and others, \"who were included in the agreement,\" were able to find refuge in Agraia, located southeast of the Ambrakian gulf and wing under the command of one of the Spartan commanders. Also, there was never any mention of atimia for the soldiers who returned from this defeat. One way in which a Spartiate forfeited citizens rights and became \"lesser\" (hypomeiones) was to be accused of atimia or cowardliness in battle. This was an old Spartan tradition which was inflicted upon any Spartiate who returned from a battle alive when the Spartan army had lost (see Plut. Sayings of Spartan Women; \"Lykourgos caused his people to choose an honorable death in preference to a disgraceful life.\"). Atimia might also be inflicted for failure to perform honorably in battle. For example, the commanding officers at the first Mantinea, Hipponidas and Aristokles, failed to execute maneuvers and because of the near defeat of the Spartan army were blamed and banished (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 32). Those captured at Sphakteria were punished with atimia for surrendering (Xen. Rep. Lak.. 9. 4, Thuc. 5. 34, and Plut. Ages. 30). The Spartan government decided to reinstate the rights to the hoplites captured on Sphakteria. After Leuktra, Agesilaos did the same and decided to let the tradition of atimia rest for the day (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 15). 7 8 7 Thuc. 3. 106-109. 7 8 8 Thuc. 3. 108. 3. 7 8 9 Amit, Poleis, 135. 196 south of Amphilokia. Nothing more is said about what happened to the Mantineans and this force. 7 9 0 Presumably, they returned to their homes in Arkadia. There is no indication that the Mantineans were involved in this campaign for self-serving reasons. I f this was a League enterprise, then Mantinea's membership in the League would have required it to join in this expedition. 7 9 1 But the initial expedition was against Naupaktos and after the attempt to take the city failed, Eurylokhos undertook another campaign without consulting the Spartan authorities or the allied assembly. It seems that Mantinea's involvement in this second campaign (against the Amphilocians, see Thuc. 3. 109), was voluntary. 7 9 2 Regardless of the reason for their involvement, the Mantineans supported two campaigns that had failed miserably. More damaging to the relationship between the Mantineans and the Spartans were the actions of the Spartans following the defeat. Thucydides stated that Demosthenes had hoped to discredit the Spartans in the eyes of its allies in the region, and so he had only acquiesced to conclude the truce in secret while publicly, the truce was refused (Thuc. 3. 109. 2-3). 7 9 3 Thucydides did not realize that by this act Sparta also discredited itself in the eyes of its Peloponnesian allies. The Mantineans, as stated above, were present at the conference between Demosthenes and Menedaius and saw first hand how readily the Spartans betrayed their allies in order to save themselves. This betrayal could only have weakened Mantinea's confidence in its hegemon and ally. In the future, Mantinea was hesitant to lend support for extra-Peloponnesian endeavors and it is not 7 9 0 If any Spartiates did return to Sparta, surely they would have faced charges of atimia and forfeited their citizen rights. Although nothing particular is reported by Thucydides, the increasing number of Hypomeiones in Sparta at the end of the fifth and early fourth centuries is a sign that Spartiates were losing their full-citizen status (see note above). Whether Menedaios and his surviving Spartiate troops most likely were stripped of their status is not known since Sparta could not afford to lose so many Spartiates. 7 9 1 See Introduction for League rules. 7 9 2 There were mercenaries in this force, but the Mantineans were not among them (HCT III, 422ff). 197 surprising that there is no mention of the Mantineans fighting with the Spartans again until after the Peloponnesian War. Instead, after the fiasco in the north, the Mantineans were first seen fighting again with their own Arkadian allies against their closest neighbors, the Tegeans, as well as taking control of the territory of other southern Arkadians, the Parrhasians. 7 9 4 According to Amit , during the time when Mantinea was fighting Tegea and expanding in the south (in the 420s), 795 the constitution of the Mantineans was reformed and democracy was introduced. Thucydides clearly stated that in the 420s Mantinea was ruled by a democratic government. He does not state, however, how long Mantinea had been a democracy or i f this government was the result of constitutional reform. 7 9 6 In his Miscellany, Ael ian wrote that he had heard that the Mantineans were, \"no less law-abiding (EVVOHCOTCCTOUC) than the Lokrians or the Cretans or the Lakedaimonians themselves or the Athenians. . .\" (VH 2. 22) . 7 9 7 According to Aelian, this was because a boxer named Nikodoros became a lawgiver 7 Q S (nomothetes) and the Mel ian Diagoras helped him compose laws for Mantinea. According to Robinson, Nikodoros should not be associated with the democratic reform. 7 9 9 Nevertheless, by associating the reference from Aristotle concerning the election of officials in Mantinea with the reference in Thucydides, Ami t believes that in the fifth century Mantinea began to appoint magistrates in a special manner and that this system was in 7 9 3 See Powell, Athens and Sparta, 167; Amit, Poleis, 135. 7 9 4 See below for this discussion, pages 216ff. 7 9 5 Amit, Poleis, 136. 7 9 6 \". . .and consequently they were glad to turn to a powerful city like Argos, the historical enemy of Sparta, and a sister democracy\" (Thuc. 5. 29. 1). 7 9 7 The scholiast has EUVOUCOTCupu.axias Kai o i MavTivfjs , TO pEV T r p c b T o v CXVTEXOVTES, ETTEIT' OU Buvapsvoi dvsu TCOV 'ApyEicov, ^uvEPjriaav Kai auTois AaKsBaipov io i s Kai Tf]v dpxnv d9\u00C2\u00A3Taav TCOV TTOAECOV (Thuc. 5 . 8 1 . 1). The Mantinean symmachia did not last long, twelve years at the most. 8 5 8 It had gained its allies through force, and like Elis , witnessed firsthand that membership in the Peloponnesian League would limit its expansion. The former allies of Mantinea most likely became members of the Peloponnesian League. 8 5 9 But Thucydides does not state whether a peace between the two resulted from Mantinea's concession or i f Mantinea now rejoined the 8 5 8 1 believe that the earliest date for the inception of Mantinea's regional league was 423 and that this was dissolved in 418. 8 5 9 Amit, Poleis, 163. Fougeres thought that like Elis, Mantinea was brought back into the Peloponnesain 2 1 3 Peloponnesian League. But Xenophon (Hell. 5 .2 .2) records that in 385, the thirty-year peace (oTTOvScci) between Mantinea and Sparta expired. This is different from the arrangement with El is in 400, where Xenophon explicitly calls (Hell. 5. 2. 31) the agreement \"a peace and alliance\" (Eipfjvri . . . . K a i auppaxioc). The Peace between Sparta and Mantinea was most likely the arrangement agreed to after the battle of Mantinea in the winter of 417. Cartledge draws attention to the unusual and genuine autonomy that the Spartans allowed the Mantineans. Their democracy had been left intact, and rather than install an oligarchy that may or may not have survived, Sparta chose to ensure with a peace treaty that a democratic Mantinea would not seek the aid of Argos . 8 6 0 Amit is right to point out that after this peace, Mantinea did in a way maintain its independence. 8 6 1 For example, some Mantineans supported Alkibiades and the Athenians' Sicilian expedition. 8 6 2 They are also listed with the Arkadian mercenaries in Thucydides catalogue of Athenian allies in 4 1 3 . 8 6 3 Furthermore, there is no indication that the Mantineans provided logistical support to Sparta in the years following the battle of Mant inea . 8 6 4 In fact, it was not until after the capitulation of Athens that Mantinea was brought back into the Peloponnesian League. 8 6 5 The peace of 417 between Mantinea and Sparta did not enroll Mantinea back into the Peloponnesian League; the agreement between the two states was not an alliance. Instead, it League (Fougeres, Mantinee, 403). 8 6 0 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 258. Furthermore, King Pleistoanax, the father of Pausanias and grandfather of Agesipolis, was behind this lenient policy (Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 253ff). 8 6 ' Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 220; Amit, Poleis, 164. 8 6 2 See Thuc. 6. 29. 3; 61. 5; 67. 1; 68. 2 8 6 3 Thuc. 7. 57. 9. 8 6 4 In 412, Agis did accept ten ships from the Pellenians, Sikyonians, and Arkadians, but I there is no indication who these Arkadians were. See Thuc. 8. 3. 2. 8 6 5 Amit, Poleis, 164-165. 214 was a reciprocal arrangement that benefited both parties. Spartan fears concerning Arkadia were over and Mantinea was able to maintain its independence. But its hegemony was gone. During the period following the capitulation of Athens the Mantineans supported League campaigns.866 For example, they supplied troops to Pausanias' force that departed from Tegea in 394 and arrived at Haliartus after Lysander's fiasco. These troops were also present at the battles of Nemea and Koronea. 8 6 8 Although it is possible that the Mantineans voluntarily supported these endeavors, I think it is more logical to suppose that the Spartans coerced the Mantineans once again to perform their duties as members of the Peloponnesian League. They did it without re-writing the existing peace between them and the Mantineans. 8 6 9 Mantinea's detached attitude toward Sparta during the Korinthian War indicates that they reentered the League against their will. Xenophon, for example, singled out the Mantineans as those whom the Spartans derided during the War: for once, when the Mantineans went out against peltasts who had sallied forth from the wall that extends to Lechaeum, they had given way under the javelins of the peltasts and some of them had been killed as they fled; so that the Lakedaimonians were even so unkind as to make game of their allies, saying that they feared the peltasts just as children fear hobgoblins (Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 17). This tension was growing between Sparta and its Arkadian allies due to the increased burden the allies suffered for their support of Spartan war aims. Following the battle of Haliartus and Pausanias' subsequent exile, the sincerity of Mantinean support for Sparta and the League See Chapter Two, page 181, for bibliography on the imperialism of Sparta after the war. Xen. Hell. 4.2.13; 16. See Chapter Two, pages 183ff. See also-Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 9-23; 4. 3. 15-19. Amit, Poleis, 166-7. 215 decreased from the previous years, and like the other Arkadians, Mantinea did not support RIO the Spartans \"enthusiastically.\" In 391 and 390, Agesilaos invaded Korinthia and gained victories against the Argives and Korinthians at the Isthmus and at Piraeaum and Heraion.871 Despite these victories, a major Spartan defeat at Lechaeum by the Athenian commander Iphicrates and his peltasts subverted any advantage the Spartans had gained.872 After receiving news of this disaster, Agesilaos departed in anger. His anxiety was evident during his march south: he led his troops into cities as late in the day as he could and set out again in the morning as early as he could. When he approached Mantinea, by leaving Orchomenos before dawn he passed by that city while it was still dark: so hard, he thought, would the soldiers find it to see the Mantineans rejoicing at their misfortune (Xen. Hell. 4. 5. 18-19). Agesilaos' expected that Mantinea would rejoice at the Spartan misfortunes and Xenophon's portrayal revealed that his assumption was correct. Arkadians, especially those in the North, had indeed tired of Spartan dominance and interference within the Peloponnesos. The Mantinean War and the Dioikismos of Mantinea As soon as the Korinthian War was brought to an end and the terms of the King's Peace were delivered to Greece, Sparta turned its attention to its problematic allies, including those who had fought against it. 8 7 3 According to Diodorus (15. 5. 1), Sparta began this movement by supporting pro-Spartan parties in these cities. Only the cities that remained on 8 7 0 Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 23. See also, Cartledge, Agesilaos, 258-259; Hamilton, Bitter Victories, 285-286. Mantinea also sold grain to Argos (Xen?Hell. 5. 2. 1-2) while Sparta was at war with Argos (Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 19; 4. 7. 5-7). 8 7 1 Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 19; 5. 1-2; Ages . 2. 17. 8 7 2 Xen. Hell. 4. 5. 7-10; Plut.^ges. 22. 2-4. For the use of mercenaries in the war, see Harding, From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle oflpsus, no. 22. 8 7 3 These were Mantinea, Phlious, Olynthus, and Thebes during 386 to 379. For a discussion on Spartan policy during this period, see Hamilton, Agesilaus, 125-151; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 258ff. See also, Chapter Two. For the primary sources and bilbiography for the diokism of Mantinea, see also P. Harding, From the end of the 216 good terms with Sparta continued to enjoy their autonomy, so it is evident that the autonomy clause in the Peace was subject to Spartan interpretation. 8 7 4 The Mantineans had taken advantage of the opportunity that the King ' s Peace and its autonomy clause provided by rebuilding its walls. A s Cartledge notes, the walls were, \"a proud symbol of Mantinea's independence.\" 8 7 5 Knowing this and fearful of Mantinean independence, Sparta soon reproached them. 8 7 6 They charged Mantinea with the following: supplying grain to the Argives while Sparta waged war against them, declining to serve in League campaigns, serving half-heartedly when they joined the League army, and rejoicing at the disaster that befell the Spartan army at Lechaion. Regardless of the legitimacy of these charges, Sparta was clearly dissatisfied with Mantinea. 8 7 7 Sparta considered Mantinea an ally that was now defecting and since the peace of 417 had expired, the Spartans felt that they were within their right to punish the Mantineans. 8 7 8 Diodorus added that Sparta was jealous of Mantinea because it had prospered in recent years and that the city of Mantinea lay just beyond its northern border and was full of valiant men. 8 7 9 Obviously Mantinea's location was a concern to Sparta and with its walls, Mantinea would be able to resist Spartan interference successfully. Ambassadors were sent to Mantinea to insist that the walls be torn down. When Mantinea refused to acquiesce to Sparta's demands, Sparta collected troops and sent out its army against them. 8 8 0 Peloponnesian War to the battle oflpsus, no. 33. 8 7 4 Cawkwell, \"Agesilaus and Sparta,\" 71-77; Bosworth, \"Autonomia,\" 134ff and Chapter Two for more. 8 7 5 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 258. 8 7 6 Xen. Hell. 5. 2.2. 8 7 7 Sparta also claimed, according to Xenophon, that the truce made in 418, the Thirty-Year Truce, was now defunct (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 2). Sparta was making it clear to Mantinea that it was no longer protected, and perhaps the threat alone would persuade Mantinea to rethink building the city walls. 8 7 8 Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 1-2 indicate that Mantinea was, as far as Sparta was concerned, an ally. See also, Amit, Poleis, 169. 8 7 9 D.S. 15.5.3. 8 8 0 The sources are: Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 1-7: D.S. 15. 5. 1-5; 12. 1-2; Isok. 4. 126. 217 According to Xenophon, Agesilaos refused to lead the campaign against Mantinea because his father had once been aided by the Mantineans in wars against Messenia. The real reason, was that the situation within Mantinea was too complicated for there to be a favorable outcome and he wanted to embarrass his rival, K i n g Agesipol is . 8 8 1 In the city, the people were divided in two ways. First, in regard to domestic policy, there were the aristocrats who favored a return to an oligarchy and there were those who wanted to preserve the existing democratic government. Second, in terms of foreign policy, there were those who favored a pro-Spartan approach, those who favored a pro-Argive attitude, and finally those who wanted to remain independent of both powers. 8 8 2 Agesilaos was tied to the oligarchs. Agesipolis, although not pro-Argos, was connected to the Argive democrats because his grandfather, Pleistoanax, was behind the peace treaty between the Mantineans and Spartans in 417 and during this siege in 386/5, his father Pausanias secured the safe withdrawal of the leading democrats. 8 8 3 Politics, then, played a major role in the campaign and the settlement; the Mantinean democrats were allowed to leave. This made Agesipolis unpopular with his own troops. More importantly, Dusanic has shown that, possibly, these exiles made their way to 884 Athens where they began to plan the founding of a single Arkadian capital, Megalopolis. Mantinea, meanwhile, could not face Sparta alone, nor could it turn to the other Peloponnesians for help; El is had already been beaten into submission and Tegea and the rest of the Peloponnesos feared Sparta's heavy hand. A s a result, Mantinea turned to Athens, a fellow democracy. Unfortunately, the Athenians responded that they did not want to breach the King ' s Peace. Although Sparta did not call for the Mantineans to leave its dependent 8 8 1 Cartledge, Agesilaos, 260. 8 8 2 Hamilton, Agesilaus, 126-128. 8 8 3 See Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 6. 884 LG. 2.2. 33.7-8 for support of the notion that they may have gone to Athens; Xen. Hell 5. 2. 6; Dusanic, 218 cities, the Athenians' response is one hint that, as Bosworth suggests, Sparta used the autonomy clause as a pretext for the war . 8 8 5 There was, moreover, no protest against the 886 Spartans' actions and so Sparta was acting under the terms of the King ' s Peace. Mantinea 0 0 7 was, therefore, left to face the Spartans alone in 385. According to Xenophon's account, K i n g Agesipolis first ravaged the territory of the Mantineans, then encircled the city with a dirt w a l l . 8 8 8 But the decisive tactics was that he dammed the river that ran underneath the walls of Mantinea and through the city. The river flooded within the city and some of the mud-brick walls deteriorated. Without walls, the 889 Mantineans were forced to agree to terms and they expelled the pro-democratic faction. The Mantineans tore down their walls, their houses were dismantled, and they were ordered to separate into four vi l lages. 8 9 0 Other accounts do not present the Mantineans as acting so passively. Diodorus, for example, wrote that for the entire summer of 385, the Mantineans resisted the Spartans; Pausanias also mentions that a battle took place in which Agesipolis was eventually, but not immediately, victorious and the Mantineans retreated into their c i ty . 8 9 1 It appears that Mantinea continued its fight for independence despite the fact that it had no allies to support it against Sparta. Regardless of Mantinea's resistance, the water had destroyed the mudbrick portion of the walls and the Mantineans surrendered to the Spartans. Arkadian League, 285ff. 8 8 5 Bosworth, \"Autonomia,\" 134ff. See D.S. 15. 5. 5 for the Athenians response. 8 8 6 Poly. 4. 27. 6-7; Ephoros FGrH 70 F 79. See Ryder, Koine Eirene, Al; Cawkwell, \"King's Peace,\" 61-83. From a Spartan perspective, any state with dependents was the antithesis of autonomy, and so the terms of the King's Peace could be used in a variety of situations (Cawkwell, \"Agesilaus and Sparta,\" 71-77). 8 8 7 See also, Buckler, Theban Hegemony, 239. D.S. 15. 5. 5). 8 8 8 For Xenephon's account, see Hell. 5. 2. 4-5. 8 8 9 Amit, Poleis, 234ff. See also, Agesilaus, 125-129. 8 9 0 Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 7. According to Diodorus (15. 5. 4), the Spartans demanded this from the Mantineans before they invaded. According to Xenophon, this dioikismos was a return to the original settlement of, what he calls, four komai. According to Strabo (8. 3. 2), there were f i v e not four komai. Cf. D. S. 15. 5. 4. and Ephoros FgrHist. 70 F 79, where they are called komai. Regarding the dioikismos cf. Isok.. De Pace 100; Poly. 4. 27. 6. 8 9 1 D.S. 15. 12. 1-2; Paus. 8. 8. 7-9. See also, VM.Pelop. A. 5-8. 219 Just as in the war against Elis c.400, Sparta aggressively went after an ally that had revolted from the Peloponnesian League. The dismantling of the walls removed one of the factors that had allowed Mantinea to maintain its independence from Sparta.892 Forcing the Mantineans into their original villages may have been intended to hinder democracy and promote, once again, rule by the aristocracy. The promotion of a pro-Spartan aristocracy is supported by the fact that the democratic leaders were also banished. Although there was no further bloodshed, the city of Mantinea ceased to exist and the Mantineans were once again allies of the Spartans. Xenophon (Hell. 5. 2. 7), according to Cawkwell, aptly reveals the 893 secret of Spartan power: prevent urbanization and support the landed aristocracy. In addition to its deconstruction, the Spartans also ensured that the city of Mantinea was no longer the leader of any regional league. Rather than allow the Mantineans to govern the territory, they assigned a f , \u00C2\u00A3 v a y 6 c . (mustering agent) to each village and not one agent to the entire area. These agents were to be responsible for levying the proper amount of troops from each of the Arkadian villages.894 Although this system of collecting troops allowed Sparta more control over gathering a military force, it was a clear demonstration of Sparta's disregard for the autonomy clause in the King's Peace. In Elis, Sparta could assert that it had liberated the rest of Eleia from Elis' control, but here, Sparta explicitly forced Mantinea into a subservient position. Xenophon reported that Sparta was initially able to secure the loyalty of the Mantineans, who in turn, he says, enjoyed the aristocratic, pro-Spartan government. Because Mantinea was run by an aristocracy, Sparta presumably left the Mantineans alone and allowed them to govern their own affairs, provided that the Mantineans acted on the same 8 9 2 Amit, Poleis, 169. 8 9 3 Cawkwell, \"Agesilaus and Sparta,\" 72-73. 220 lines as the Spartans in regard to foreign policy. Xenophon also reported that Arkadian soldiers began serving more will ingly in the League armies. 8 9 5 Later, however, Xenophon expressed doubt as to whether the Mantineans were genuinely happy with the new situation: \"Thus ended the affair of the Mantineans, whereby men were made wiser in this point at least - not to let a river run through city wa l l s . \" 8 9 6 He deemphasized any pro-Spartan attitude of the Mantineans following the change in their government by focusing on the penalty for 897 dissension from the League and not any benefit this new stystem established in Mantinea. With the destruction of Mantinea's walls and the dioikismos into separate villages, Sparta had succeeded in removing a possible threat near its border. In addition, Mantinea served as an example for the rest of the League: defection from the League was not permissible. The other northern Arkadians seem to have remained faithful to (or terrified of) Sparta. For example, when Agesilaos was given command of the invasion of Thebes in 378; \"he therefore, upon learning that the Kleitorians were at war with the Orchomenians and were maintaining a force of mercenaries, came to an agreement with them that their 898 mercenary force should be turned over to him i f he had any need of it.\" Neither Kleitor or Orchomenos complained about Agesilaos' interference and it seems both were supportive Spartan a l l ies . 8 9 9 8 9 4 Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 7. 8 9 5 Xen. Hell 5. 2.1. 8 9 6 Ibid. 8 9 7 This change in government did not last, because in 370 the city was synoecised again and the town was re-fortified. See Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 3-5; D.S. 15. 5. 5. 8 9 8 Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 37. 8 9 9 Roy argues that the war between Kleitor and Orchomenos in 378 was a result of both cities expanding in the 221 After Leuktra: Mantinea and the Arkadian Confederacy One of the results of Sparta's defeat at Leuktra and the subsequent peace conference at Athens in 371, was the re-establishment of Mantinea and the birth of the Arkadian Confederacy. 9 0 0 With Spartan power humbled by Thebes at Leuktra, Mantinea took advantage of the opportunity and, with the reassertion of the autonomy clause at the peace conference at Athens in 371, immediately began to rebuild its polis.901 They began with their walls. El is contributed three talents to help pay for the work, and other Arkadians contributed to the rebuilding of Mantinea. The rebuilding of the walls was a direct challenge to Sparta, 9 0 2 and Agesilaos tried desperately to stop the work. Wary of Spartan diplomacy, Mantinea continued to reconstitute its polis, and soon became an important member of the Arkadian Confederacy which was influential in Peloponnesian affairs. 9 0 3 In Tegea, the factions of Stasippos (the pro-Spartan party) and Kall ibios (the democratic party) were fighting for control of the city. Kall ibios and Proxenos, who also same area (\"Orchomenos and Clitor,\" 78-80). 9 0 0 Although there were some allies that came to the defense of Sparta, the Peloponnesian League was not operational when Lakonia was invaded in 369. The defeat at Leuktra in 371 had initiated its sudden dissolution. The Arkadians clearly wanted political freedom from Sparta and so urged the Thebans to invade Lakonia shortly after Leuktra. Although it is out of the scope of this paper to discuss the formation and structure of the Arkadian Confederacy, I think that it is safe to conclude there was a close connection between the Mantinean and Tegean Leagues and the Arkadian Confederacy. In fact, the Arkadian leagues led by Mantinea and Tegea may have served as the basis or blueprint for the organization of the new Arkadian Confederacy. The Arkadian Confederacy was created in opposition to Sparta and was an attempt to unit Arkadia. As I have argued in Chapter Three, the Mantinean League may have been created in opposition to the growth of Spartan power in the Peloponnesos and, furthermore, was certainly an attempt by Mantinea to unite part of Arkadia under one polis. Although we do not know as many details concerning the Tegean League as we would like, it is also safe to conclude that it too aimed at uniting part of Arkadia under the control of one city-state. The Arkadian Cofnederacy, although not dominated by a single polis, also intended to unite Arkadia. 9 0 1 Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 3-5. 9 0 2 Hamilton, Agesilaus, 216ff; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 261. 9 0 3 See Dusanic, Arkadian League, 285ff; Larsen Greek Federal States, 180-195. 222 advocated the unification of Arkadia, requested aid from Mantinea. When the Mantineans arrived, Stasippos fled and was eventually captured, tried and put to death on charges of treason. 9 0 4 This move by Mantinea to support democracy in Tegea was a crucial blow to the power of the Spartans within the Peloponnesos. 9 0 5 Agesilaos immediately responded to this threat. A s noted above, and similar to the mood on the eve of the Battle of Mantinea in 418, without Tegea Sparta was confined within Lakonia. He was counting on the support of Orchomenos, as well as the support o f a force of mercenaries that was in the vicinity of Kor in th . 9 0 6 While Agesilaos was at Eutaia in Mainalia, the Mantineans attacked Orchomenos, the faithful ally of Sparta. Mantinea failed in its attempt to take Orchomenos but killed Polytropos, the leader of the mercenary force. His death led to the dismissal of his troops. 9 0 7 Once again, the resilient Mantineans were ready and able to defend themselves and their move against Orchomenos, as was the case in 418, was intended to unify Mantinea and deny Sparta's allies access south. Eventually, Agesilaos became caught between the Mantineans to the north and the Arkadians and Argives (who had joined the Arkadians at Asea) to the south. Hence, in order to avoid a potential disaster, he returned to Sparta. Meanwhile, the Mantineans were persuaded by the Eleans to await the arrival of the Theban forces and not to pursue the Spartan army. 9 0 8 Once the Thebans arrived, the Mantineans joined them in the invasion of Lakonia from Arkadian territory. 9 0 9 904 90S Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 6-10. See Hamilton, Agesilaus, 215ff. for a detaled narrative of these events. See Cartledge, Agesilaos, 26Iff. 9 0 6 For these events and those that follow, see Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 10-14; D.S. 15. 59. 4; 62. 1-2. 9 0 7 Ibid. 9 0 8 Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 16-12; Ages. 2. 23. 9 0 9 For a good Theban perspective, see Buckler, Theban Hegemony, 70-102. According to him, the Arkadians were the architects behind the invasion, and Epameinondas relied heavily upon them. See also, Hamilton, Agesliaus, 220ff; J. Wiesman, \"Epameinondas and the Theban invasions,\" Klio 51 (1969): 177-199. According to Cartledge, the Mantinean leader, Lykomedes, wanted to free Arkadia from Sparta once and for all (Cartledge, 223 A s a major polis within Arkadia, Mantinea had helped initiate the organization of Arkadia against Sparta. Sparta's failure to re-capture Mantinea signaled the end of Mantinea's membership in the rapidly disintegrating Peloponnesian League. The subsequent foundation of the Arkadian Confederacy began with the re-establishment of Mantinea, 9 1 0 and Xenophon noted that it eventually included all of Arkad ia . 9 1 1 A t its inception, however, this was not the case. Heraia and Lepreon both supported Sparta's campaign against the 912 Arkadians under Agesilaos, following the Tegean democratic revolution. Mantinea invaded Heraia and ravaged the city as punishment for its refusal to join the Arkadian Confederacy and for its continual support of Sparta. 9 1 3 Orchomenos also resisted Arkadian pressure to join the Confederacy. Like Heraia, it was attacked by the Arkadian Confederacy and forced into the organization. 9 1 4 Although it is uncertain what the exact constitution of this Confederacy was, there was a federal assembly that was seemingly open to all Arkadians. The following communities were members of this federal assembly: Tegea, Mantinea, Mainalia, Lepreon, Megalopolis, the Kynorians, Orchomenos, Kleitor, Heraia, and Thelpousa. 9 1 5 In addition, Sparta and Lakonia, 253ff). 9 1 0 According to Larsen and Nielsen, the Arkadian Confederacy began in 370 (Larsen, Greek Federal States, 183; Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis,\" 93-94; Dusanic places the foundation in the summer of 371 (Dusanic, Arkadian League, 284). See also Larsen, Greek Federal States, 180-195; J. Roy, \"Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs,\" Historia 20 (1971): 569-599. 9 1 1 Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 36. Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis, \" 95; Roy, \"Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs,\" 571. 9 1 2 Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 11 and 6. 5. 22. See Dusanic, Arkadian League, 285 ff. and Chapter Two above for why Orchomenos and Heraia stayed away at first. 9 1 3 Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 22. 9 1 4 Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 11; 6. 5. 22. 9 1 5 1.G. 52 1. This inscription (c. 369-1) is a decree by the council of the Arkadians (called the Ten Thousand (oi Mupioi) that bestowed upon the Athenian Phylarchos the tile of Proxenos. A list of fifty Bauiopyoi (\"magistrates\") is appended. The list is not representative of all Arkadians. For example, Stymphalos, a northern Arkadian town, is absent although it was certainly considered part of the Confederacy (Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 1). See also Larsen, Greek Federal States, 186-7; Dusanic, Arkadian League, 332. See also, Harding, From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Ipsus, no. 51 for list of damiourgoi and bibliography. 224 other sources imply that Lasion, the Parrhasians, Eua, Pallantion, and Tryphalia may also have been members of the Arkadian Confederacy. 9 1 6 Unti l 362, the policy of the Arkadian Confederacy was very stable. The Confederacy, not individual poleis, directed foreign policy. According to Nielsen, although this practice limited the autonomia of its members, the Confederacy did not force its policies on unwilling members, as Sparta and the Peloponnesian League had done. 9 1 7 There were dominant poleis, such as Tegea, Mantinea, and Megalopolis within this Confederacy, but there is no indication that the constitution favored these larger cities or that there was an actual hegemon of the Confederacy. 9 1 8 Although there was no constitutional basis for one city to dominate, there is, nevertheless, evidence that, in actuality, some of these cities may have indeed been more influential than others within the Confederacy. Mantinea, for example, provided Lykomedes as the strategos o f the Confederacy for two consecutive years, and Megalopolis had ten damiourgoi on the council, compared to Tegea and Mantinea which each had f ive . 9 1 9 The defeat at Leuktra had crippled Sparta's military, but the establishment of Megalopolis was, from a Mantinean perspective, the crucial blow to Spartan power and key to Arkadian freedom. Like its predecessor, fort Kypsela, the site where Megalopolis was founded, checked Spartan movements west and, at the same time, threatened Sparta's 9 1 6 For Lasion, see Xen.Hell 7. 4. 12. The Parrhasians were among those who contributed to the foundation of Megalopolis. Since Megalopolis was part of the Confederacy, Parrhasia was likely part of the Confederacy. See Paus.8. 27. 2-3; D.S. 15. 72. 4. For Eua, see Theopompos FGrH 115 F 61; on Eua see Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 12; D.S. 15. 59. 3 for Pallantion and Euataia; and for Lepreon (which may have represented all of Tryphalia) see Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 26. 9 1 7 Nielsen, \"Dependent Poleis,\" 98-99. 9 1 8 Ibid. See also, Roy, \"Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian affairs,\" 594-599 for a discussion of the treaties that were made by the federal organization. In fact, as Roy has shown, the Confederacy concluded treaties with Elis, Argos, Boiotia, Athens, Pisa, Sikyon, and Messene within a seven-year period. 9 1 9 See Harding, From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Ipsus, no. 51. 9 2 0 Buckler, Theban Hegemony, 107-109; Cartledge, Agesilaos, 262-3, 386ff; Hamilton, Agesilaus, 223ff; 225 But from a local viewpoint, the Arkadian rivalry between Tegea and Mantinea over territorial rights had been solved in a different way. The areas in which Mantinea and Tegea were expanding, Parrhasia, Manalia, and the Eutaia, were incorporated into the new city of Megalopolis . 9 2 1 The Aftermath of Leuktra and the Dissolution of the Peloponnesian League After Agesilaos failed in his attempt to restore the oligarchic party in Tegea, the anti-Spartan forces, led by the Thebans, met at Mantinea to discuss future war plans. The Mantineans were major proponents of the invasions of Lakonia late in 370 and again in the summer o f 369 . 9 2 2 In an act that was indicative of Arkadia's new aggressive attitude towards its former hegemon, Lykomedes led the Arkadians against Pellene in Lakonia: \"having taken the city by force, they slew the Lakedaimonians who had been left behind there as a garrison, over three hundred men, enslaved the city, devastated the countryside, and returned home before assistance came from the Lakedaimonians\" (D.S. 15 . 67 . 2 ) . 9 2 3 The psychological effect must have been felt in Sparta, seeing their former dependent allies now enslaving their own citizens. The Spartans tried to recuperate in the following years but the Arkadians successfully defended their territory from a resurgent Sparta, led by Archidamos, son of Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 256; Dusanic, Arkadian League, 285ff, 317ff. 9 2 1 See D.S. 15. 72. 4; Paus. 8. 27. 1-8. Diodorus recorded what happened and the areas that, all in all, about 20 komai were brought together. Pausanias, however, wrote about what the Arkadians intended to do, and that the synoikism involved 39 comunties. See Nielsan, \"Arkadia\" under the heading of Meglopolis. For a detailed analysis of the communties involved, see Dusanic, Arkadian League, 317ff. 9 2 2 The Mantineans and the Eleans were the instigators behind the invasion. See Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 19. Cf. Hamilton, Agesilaus, 220-223. D.S. 15. 68. See also, Hamilton Agesilaus, 232-223. 9 2 3 Pellene was on the road from Tegea to Sparta. This was a different Pellene than the one near the Isthmus of Korinth in the northern Peloponnesos (see Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 15-18). 226 Agesilaos. In 368, he invaded Parrhasia and ravaged the land. A s noted above, this area was crucial for Sparta because of its strategic location. Without securing Parrhasia, the Spartans could not leave Lakedaimonia and assume that Lakonia was safe from attack. The Arkadians, with the help of an Argive army, forced Archidamos to withdraw from Parrhasia. Despite a great victory over the Arkadians in 368, known as the Tearless victory, the establishment of Megalopolis and the Arkadian Confederacy signaled the end of Sparta's prominence in the Peloponnesos. 9 2 4 Its former dependent allies were now determining Peloponnesian politics, though with little success. 9 2 5 Politics within the Peloponnesos became more agitated and in 367 the king of Persia, Artaxerxes, reissued a script to Greece that affirmed the autonomy of all Greek ci t ies . 9 2 6 The terms were not, however, accepted by all states and as a consequence, El is and Arkadia both left the alliance with Thebes. In the next year, the leading Mantinean general and statesman, Lykomedes, was kil led in an ambush while returning from Athens. Although he succeeded in securing an alliance between the Arkadians and Athenians, his death heralded the end of 097 Mantinea's membership within the Arkadian League. His death was followed by further fragmentation of the Peloponnesians. Hostilities erupted when the Arkadian Confederation admitted the one-time Elean dependent Triphylia into the Arkadian Confederacy. At the initial confrontation in 364, the Arkadians invaded Olympia and prolonged fighting prompted some of the Arkadians to use Olympic funds to pay for their troops, the five thousand 9 2 4 Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 30-32; D.S. 15. 72. 3;.Plut. Ages. 33. 3-5. 9 2 5 Xen. Hell .7. 4. 33-35; D.S. 15. 82. 1-2; For a full discussion on these events, see W.E. Thompson, \"Arcadian Factionalism in 360s,\" Historia 32 (1983): 149-60; J. Roy, \"Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs 370-362,\" Historia 20 (1971): 569-599. 9 2 6 Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 33-35; Plut. Pelop. 30. 1-1. See also, Ryder, Koine Eirene, pp.80-82; Agesilaus, 237-239. 9 2 7 Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 2; Amit, Poleis, 181. 227 eparitoi. The Mantineans disapproved of this misappropriation of sacred funds and instead vowed to pay their share of the war costs. According to Xenophon, the other leaders of the Arkadian Confederacy accused the Mantineans of acting contrary to League interests and condemned them. As a result, Mantinea ended its membership in the Arkadian Confederacy and instead, allied itself to Sparta. Mantinea did not, however, regain its former symmachy or its former preeminence in Peloponnesian politics. All of Arkadia, in fact, became more fragmented and factional, and eventually the Arkadians fought against one another at the Second Battle of Mantinea in 3 62. 9 2 9 The Mantineans allied themselves to the Spartans while their rivals, the Tegeans, supported the Theban-led offensive. Although the victory went to the Thebans and their allies, their hegemony ended with the death of Epameinondas. After the battle, Mantinea maintained its friendly relationship with Sparta, 9 3 0 but its regional symmachy and prominence within Arkadia was lost. Summary Unlike Elis and Tegea, the approximate date of Mantinea's first alliance with Sparta remains uncertain. By 505, nevertheless, it too was a member of the Peloponnesian League. Similar to Tegea and Elis, Mantinea developed its own symmachy. Although this symmachy was dissolved by the Spartans in 421, it had been, at the least, in operation since the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. 9 2 8 Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 33-35; D.S. 15. 82. 1-2; For a full discussion on these events, see W'.E. Thompson, \"Arcadian Factionalism in 360s,\" Historia 32 (1983): 149-60; J. Roy, \"Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs 370-362,\" Historia 20 (1971): 569-599. 9 2 9 Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 38-39; Plut. Ages. 34. 2. See also, Agesilaos 245ff. 9 3 0 See, for example, D.S. 16. 39. 2. 228 The dismemberment of the Mantinean League in 421 was, I have argued, the first significant sign of tension between the Mantineans and the Spartans. In fact, with the exception of its late arrival to the battle of Plataia in 479, Mantinea seems to have enjoyed a friendly relationship with Sparta throughout the fifth century. L ike Tegea, it was positioned on the important road that led north out of southern Lakonia and was close to Sparta's Peloponnesian rival, Argos. Hence, it was important for Sparta to maintain the loyalty of Mantinea. Mantinean dissatisfaction with Spartan leadership originated with the failed campaign under the Spartan Eurylochos in Amphilokia in 426/5. After this fiasco, the Mantineans once again feuded with their neighbors, the Tegeans. A s I have argued, this recurring feud concerned the right to expand in Mainalia and incorporate the Mainalian communities into their own symmachies. The Mantinean symmachy and its growth worried the Spartans. In particular, the Mantineans controlled the Parrhasia (the area that bordered Lakonia to the northwest) and established a fort there at Kypsela. The Spartans quickly removed the threat to their security by invading the Parrhasia, destroying the fort, and freeing the communities from Mantinean control. This episode, I have shown, indicated to the Mantineans that the Spartans could and would interfere in their affairs. L ike the Eleans, the Mantineans sought allied support from another area and defected from the Peloponnesian League by joining the Argive-led coalition. After the anti-Spartan coalition was defeated at the battle of Mantinea in 418, the Mantineans tried to resist the Spartans on their own. B y 417, Mantinea was forced to agree to peace terms with Sparta. The Spartans had dissolved Mantinea's symmachy and instead of re-enlisting the delinquent ally back into the Peloponnesian League, the Spartans effected a peace treaty 229 instead. The Mantineans were, however, entered against their w i l l into the League before the Korinthian War. Their dissatisfaction with the League was apparent in their apathetic attitude and soon after the signing of the King ' s Peace in 387, they were punished by the Spartans for their lack of support. After the dioikismos o f Mantinea, an oligarchic party was reinstalled and the Mantineans seem to have served the Peloponnesian League more loyally. The defeat at Leuktra, however, provided the opportunity that the Mantineans needed and in direct opposition to Spartan wishes, they rebuilt their walls. They supported the invasion of Lakonia and were directly responsible for the unification of Arkadia against Sparta. The Mantineans aggressive attitude toward their former hegemon signaled a new phase in Peloponnesian politics. Together with the two oldest allies of Sparta, Elis and Tegea, Mantinea promoted the interference and involvement of Thebes in the Peloponnesos and the once great Peloponnesian League came to an abrupt end. 230 Conclusion The Peloponnesian League was created in the last decade of the sixth century, when the Spartan allies united to form an allied congress. Although the system was reciprocal, it has generally been recognized that Sparta infringed on the autonomy and freedom of its allies by preventing urbanization and promoting congruent oligarchies. By limiting the expansion of its Peloponnesian allies, Sparta alleviated any threat that a united Tegean, Elean, or Mantinean League could have posed to its security. Membership in the Peloponnesian League offered reciprocal protection and promised mutual aid in aggressive campaigns. During periods of peace, the Peloponnesian League was not needed and poleis were allowed to develop and act on their own. I have argued that the Eleans were the first of the three states studied here to develop their own symmachy and incorporate unwilling communities into their alliance. Although the Mantineans and Tegeans constructed their alliances much later, by 420 all three had established regional alliances and acted as hegemons of their respective leagues.931 This study has emphasized that the prosperity and preservation of these regional symmachies were significant factors in the histories of Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea and greatly contributed to Sparta's fear of losing its supremacy and the support of its allies. 9 3 1 The evidence does not indicate the reasons why Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea first established their own leagues. It is possible that because there was a difference between members within the Peloponnesian League, these three city-states established their own leagues in order to have more influence in League decisions. The growth of Korinth and its league may have also been a factor. As Korinth became more powerful and attatched more communities to itself, its value within the Peloponnesian League also increased. In fact, there may have been a direct correlation between the size of the smaller regional leagues and the clout of one of these leagues (or its hegemon) within the Peloponnesian League. I have shown, on the other hand, that local issues were significant factors in the development of the leagues. For example, the Eleans united the communities in Eleia in order to create a stronger and safer economic and military environment. Nevertheless, it is possible that the impetus behind the formation of a league within a league was to gain influence within the larger coalition. 231 Hence, I have argued that local issues were the main influences on Tegea's, Mantinea's, and Elis' attitude toward Peloponnesian politics. As the war against the Athenians became prolonged, allied support for Spartan leadership waned due to the threat that the war posed to their own symmachies. Since the support of each ally studied here was essential to the success of the Peloponnesian League and the security of Spartan power in the Peloponnesos, Sparta became increasingly apprehensive about the growth of each symmachy. The present study has focused on the expansion of these symmachies and the subsequent threat to the Peloponnesian League that was perceived by Sparta as a result. In particular, this study reveals that the Elean and Mantinean symmachies threatened Sparta's economic and military security. By 421, all of Eleia was controlled by Elis, including the Olympic sanctuary and the two best naval ports on the west coast. Likewise, Mantinea controlled a great portion of eastern Arkadia, some communities in the south, and with the capitulation of Orchomenos in 418, most of northern Arkadia as well. The threat this posed to Sparta was enormous. The first sign of discord involved the Eleans in the dispute over Lepreon, which excluded them from the Peace of Nikias in 421. Sparta asserted that it was merely protecting the right to autonomy for the Lepreans, but its invasion of Elis c. 400 exposed Sparta's true intention to dissolve Elis' symmachy and secure its loyalty. Then in 417, Mantinea's symmachy was the first to be completely dismantled by the Spartans. In chapter three I advanced the notion that both Elis and Mantinea attempted to preserve their respective symmachies and their own rights to autonomy. This led to their withdrawal from the Peloponnesian League. Despite their attempts to resist the Spartans, without sufficient support, the Mantineans and Eleans could not withstand the Spartan military. Both Mantinea 232 and Elis were reinstated into the League and suffered the dissolution of their symmachies by Sparta. Tegea, on the other hand, did not command the vast territory that El is and Mantinea did, and its government was much more agreeable to Sparta's. Begining in the 460s, Tegea was ruled by an oligarchy and although there were democrats within the city, they were the minority. Hence, the Tegean government and the Spartan authorities maintained friendly relationships well into the fourth century. The allies of Tegea were members of both the regional Tegean League and the larger Peloponnesian League. Securing the loyalty of the Tegean government provided Sparta with the safety it so desired. A s I have shown in Chapter Two, there was no need for Sparta to dismantle the Tegean symmachy, as there had been for the other states studied here. When the reciprocity of the Peloponnesian League became unbalanced and Sparta began limiting the growth of its allies and the expansion of their leagues, a rift between two 'of its oldest and most important allies resulted. It is my argument that the forbiddance of its allies to maintain their regional symmachies while they were members of the Peloponnesian League was a failure of Spartan policy that eventually contributed to the League's demise. The present study has been concerned with the three city-states and their symmachies under the Peloponnesian League and the influence they had on its ultimate failure. The impact of these symmachies on Greek history beyond the end of the Peloponnesian League can now be explored, as should the presence of these symmachies in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. 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"Graduate"@en . "An allied history of the Peloponnesian League : Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea"@en . "Text"@en . "http://hdl.handle.net/2429/16902"@en .