Arts, Faculty of
Sociology, Department of
DSpace
UBCO
Behroozi Nobar, Pegah
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
University of British Columbia
The housing crisis for low-income and vulnerable groups has been a significant challenge, particularly in socio-political contexts lacking social housing policies, such as Iran. In the absence of formal governmental support, the urban poor had no choice but to build their own shelters, mostly on common lands, to meet their housing needs. These self-built settlements are labeled as informal housing by state authorities. However, they have partially addressed the housing crisis for vulnerable populations. While it is the state's responsibility to adopt a custodian role and provide social housing, the Iranian government's hostile approach towards these self-built settlements needs critical examination. This research focuses on ZoorAbad, an informal housing settlement in Iran, to investigate the following questions: 1) How and through what grassroots strategies have the urban poor in ZoorAbad addressed their housing needs over the past 45 years? 2) What has been the government's response and the dialectical relationship between the state and ZoorAbad's self-built housing? Additionally, this study categorizes different groups of the urban poor in ZoorAbad and examines the power dynamics among them. A qualitative, extended-case methodology was employed, encompassing multiple layers of data collection: 1) Reviewing relevant policies, urban planning documents, academic articles, and theses on ZoorAbad and the national context; 2) Analyzing written and oral histories of grassroots neighborhood development, 3) Gathering the viewpoints of ZoorAbad's urban poor regarding their housing challenges and their interactions with the state, particularly concerning the Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad. The methods used include semi-structured interviews, walking, observing, and ethnographic analysis. Based on the extended-case method, two key conclusions emerge: 1) Self-built housing should be recognized as a viable alternative to social housing in socio-political contexts like Iran; 2) The concept of the "squatter government" reveals how modern (neoliberal) states, in specific settings like Iran, exploit urban planning and policymaking tools to confiscate common and private resources. To elaborate on this concept, this research presents another case â Roshankouh village â in Iran with a distinct socio-geographical context. It argues that such governments, rather than acting as custodians, expropriate, speculate on, and extract common resources, dismantle communities and advance oppressive agendas â such as the elimination of minority groups, like Baha'is in Iran.
SELF-BUILT SETTLEMENTS IN IRAN AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SOCIAL HOUSING: URBAN POOR HOUSING STRATEGIES & THE STATE'S ROLE IN THE EXPROPRIATION OF INFORMAL SPACES A CASE-STUDY OF ZOORABAD-KARAJ by Pegah Behroozi Nobar B.A., Baha'i Institute for Higher Education (BIHE), 2011 M.Sc., Herriot Watt University, 2017 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE COLLEGE OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Interdisciplinary Studies â Urban and Regional Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Okanagan) June 2025 © Pegah Behroozi Nobar, 2025 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the College of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a dissertation entitled: Self-built Settlements in Iran as an Alternative to Social Housing: Urban Poor Housing Strategies & the State's Role in the Expropriation of Informal Spaces; a Case-study of ZoorAbad-Karaj submitted by Pegah Behroozi Nobar in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy . Dr. Nathan Lauster, The University of British Columbia (Vancouver) Supervisor Dr. Paul Shipley, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Science Co-supervisor Dr. Kaveh Ehsani, DePaul University Supervisory Committee Member Dr. Carlos Teixeira, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts and Sciences Supervisory Committee Member Dr. Jonathan Cinnamon, Irving K. Barber Faculty of Arts and Sciences University Examiner Dr. Richard Harris, McMaster University External Examiner iii Abstract The housing crisis for low-income and vulnerable groups has been a significant challenge, particularly in socio-political contexts lacking social housing policies, such as Iran. In the absence of formal governmental support, the urban poor had no choice but to build their own shelters, mostly on common lands, to meet their housing needs. These self-built settlements are labeled as informal housing by state authorities. However, they have partially addressed the housing crisis for vulnerable populations. While it is the state's responsibility to adopt a custodian role and provide social housing, the Iranian government's hostile approach towards these self-built settlements needs critical examination. This research focuses on ZoorAbad, an informal housing settlement in Iran, to investigate the following questions: 1) How and through what grassroots strategies have the urban poor in ZoorAbad addressed their housing needs over the past 45 years? 2) What has been the government's response and the dialectical relationship between the state and ZoorAbad's self-built housing? Additionally, this study categorizes different groups of the urban poor in ZoorAbad and examines the power dynamics among them. A qualitative, extended-case methodology was employed, encompassing multiple layers of data collection: 1) Reviewing relevant policies, urban planning documents, academic articles, and theses on ZoorAbad and the national context; 2) Analyzing written and oral histories of grassroots neighborhood development, 3) Gathering the viewpoints of ZoorAbad's urban poor regarding their housing challenges and their interactions with the state, particularly concerning the Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad. The methods used include semi-structured interviews, walking, observing, and ethnographic analysis. Based on the extended-case method, two key conclusions emerge: 1) Self-built housing should be recognized as a viable alternative to social housing in socio-political contexts like Iran; 2) The concept of the "squatter government" reveals how modern (neoliberal) states, in specific settings like Iran, exploit urban planning and policymaking tools to confiscate common and private resources. To elaborate on this concept, this research presents another case â Roshankouh village â in Iran with a distinct socio-geographical context. It argues that such governments, rather than acting as custodians, expropriate, speculate on, and extract common resources, dismantle communities and advance oppressive agendas â such as the elimination of minority groups, like Baha'is in Iran. iv Lay Summary This thesis explores urban inequalities and housing crises in Iran, focusing on an informal neighborhood called ZoorAbad. The research aims to identify the key players in the housing market, identify the diverse groups of urban poor in ZoorAbad, and examine grassroots strategies they have used to cope. The study highlights how government actions, using urban planning tools, have played a central role in exacerbating the housing crisis in this area. In ZoorAbad, informal housing has emerged as an alternative to social housing. The idea of the "squatter government" sheds light on how state interventions often exploit housing markets, worsening conditions for marginalized communities. This research offers a detailed look at housing informality through the perspective of political economy, combining both theoretical ideas and real-world evidence. v Preface â¢ In this research, I utilized artificial intelligence (AI) â specifically ChatGPT â only to proofread my thesis. As English is not my first language, I used the AI to ensure the grammar and sentence structure were correct. I did not use AI for any other purposes in my thesis, such as elaborating on ideas, summarizing, or for any other reason, apart from proofreading. â¢ I published an article titled "ZoorAbad, a Neighborhood on the Shoulders of the Urban Poor" in the City Journal. I was the sole author of the article, and I have used its content primarily in the first chapter and to a lesser extent in the third chapter. The citation for the article is as follows: Behroozi Nobar, P. [2023]. âZoorAbad, A Neighborhood on the Shoulders of the Urban Poorâ, City Journal (London, England), ahead-of-print, 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2023.2230020 â¢ The certificate from the Behavioral Research Ethics Board of UBC, with Certificate Number of H22-00071, was obtained on October 31, 2022, for conducting this research. vi Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary ..................................................................................................................... iv Preface .................................................................................................................................. v Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vi List of Tables ....................................................................................................................... xi List of Figures .................................................................................................................... xii Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... xiii Dedication .......................................................................................................................... xv 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 1.1. Rationale and Background ......................................................................................... 1 1.2. Research Objectives and Situating the researcher in the context ............................ 10 1.3. Theoretical Background and Structure of the Thesis ............................................... 15 2. Methodology .................................................................................................................. 23 2.1. Ethnography - Extended Case Methodology ........................................................... 25 2.2. Semi-structured Interviews ...................................................................................... 27 2.3. Walking .................................................................................................................... 37 2.4. Observation .............................................................................................................. 41 2.5. Research Methods for Roshankouh Research.......................................................... 44 3. Informal (Self-built) Housing as an Alternative to Social Housing in Iran ............. 46 3.1. Housing Crisis for the Urban Poor in Iran ............................................................... 47 3.1.1. Housing Crisis in Iran ....................................................................................... 47 3.1.1.1. Housing Situation in Iran: 1900-1979........................................................ 47 3.1.1.2. Housing Crisis in Iran Since the 1979 Iran Revolution ............................. 55 3.1.1.3. Urban Growth and the issue of self-built settlements in Tehran ................ 58 3.1.2. Iran's Policies and Planning .............................................................................. 61 3.1.2.1. The Urban Land Code (ULC, Qanun-e Zamin-e Shahri) & The Urban Waste Land Ownership Abolition Law (UWLOAL) .............................................. 66 3.1.2.2. New Towns ................................................................................................ 67 3.1.2.3. The Mehr Affordable Housing Project (2006-2016) .................................. 69 vii 3.1.2.4. Saving, Mass housing, and Downsizing policies, as new Housing Market Regulation ............................................................................................................... 71 3.1.2.5. Empowerment Policy ................................................................................. 72 3.1.2.6. Social Housing Policy (2016-2020) ........................................................... 73 3.2. Informal (Self-built) Housing as an Alternative to Social Housing: The history of ZoorAbad ........................................................................................................................ 76 3.2.1. Conceptualization of Informality ...................................................................... 76 3.2.2. Quiet Encroachment, an alternative to housing movement .............................. 86 3.2.3. Government Approaches and Tactics Regarding "Informality"........................ 93 3.2.3.1. Negative Government Responses to Quite Encroachment (Self-built Settlements)............................................................................................................. 94 3.2.4. Self-Built Housing: The case of ZoorAbad ...................................................... 97 3.2.4.1. Contextual history of Karaj region ............................................................ 97 3.2.4.2. Housing Shortage in Karaj ....................................................................... 101 3.2.4.3. ZoorAbad ................................................................................................. 104 3.2.4.3.1. Name of the Settlement ..................................................................... 105 3.2.4.3.2. Evolution of ZoorAbad ..................................................................... 106 3.2.5. Grassroot Housing Strategies in ZoorAbad .....................................................117 3.2.5.1. Grassroot Strategies Before the Improvement Plan ..................................119 3.2.5.1.1. Self-built settlements .........................................................................119 3.2.5.1.2. Grassroot urban development and provision of urban utilities ......... 120 3.2.5.2. Grassroot Strategies after Implementation of the Improvement Plan ...... 124 3.2.5.2.1. Resistance and Negotiating with the government ............................. 124 3.2.5.2.2. Remaining in ZoorAbad â in lower parts of the neighborhood ........ 126 3.2.5.2.3. Evicted people: Expanding informal neighborhoods in other parts of the city ............................................................................................................... 127 3.2.5.2.4. Bypassing the law ............................................................................. 130 2.2.5.2.5. Afghanâs strategies â renting entire dilapidated buildings and accepting higher rate of rent .............................................................................................. 131 3.2.5.2.6. Shared Housing ................................................................................. 133 3.3. Concluding Notes................................................................................................... 134 4. Market, de/regulation, and the issue of use-value vs exchange-value of housing . 135 viii 4.1. Housing Right & Political Economy Approach ..................................................... 136 4.2. Neoliberalism and the issue of de/regulation ......................................................... 140 4.3. Gentrification and de/regulation ............................................................................ 149 4.4. Defenders of Exchange Value of Housing ............................................................. 155 4.5. Use-value vs Exchange-value and the Issue of Privatization ................................ 162 4.5.1. Use-value vs exchange value .......................................................................... 163 4.5.2. Dominance of Exchange-value and the Privatization Debate in contemporary Iranian History .......................................................................................................... 172 4.5.3. Characteristics of ZoorAbad Neighborhood through the lens of use-value vs exchange-value ......................................................................................................... 183 4.5.3.1. Spatial Characteristics of the Neighborhood ........................................... 183 4.5.3.1.1. Housing ............................................................................................. 187 4.5.3.1.2. Shops ................................................................................................. 194 4.5.3.1.3. Streets ................................................................................................ 195 4.5.3.2. Socio-economic Characteristics of the Residents of ZoorAbad .............. 200 4.5.3.2.1. Ethnic characteristics ........................................................................ 200 4.5.3.2.2. Social bonds and solidarity ............................................................... 202 4.5.3.2.3. Security ............................................................................................. 204 4.5.3.2.4. Local/social surveillance ................................................................... 206 4.5.3.2.5. Stigmatized neighborhood & Bullying by individuals ..................... 206 4.5.3.2.6. Drug dealing...................................................................................... 207 4.5.3.2.7. Racism (against Afghans specifically) .............................................. 208 4.5.3.2.8. Distrust of the Government ............................................................... 209 4.5.3.3. Changing socio-economic fabric & various contradictions ..................... 210 4.5.4. Housing Challenges in ZoorAbad through the lens of use-value and exchange value .......................................................................................................................... 213 4.5.4.1. Accessibility to the Housing (Difficulty in accessibilities: steep terrain, taxis) ...................................................................................................................... 214 4.5.4.2. Violence (verbal and physical) ................................................................. 216 4.5.4.3. The Risk of Demolition (and insecurity due to demolition) .................... 216 4.5.4.4. Inefficiency in Construction .................................................................... 217 ix 4.5.4.5. Issue of Informality & deeds (lack of sufficient incentives for getting deeds) .................................................................................................................... 220 4.5.4.6. Crowd and lack of space in housing ........................................................ 221 4.5.4.7. High rate of rent (unaffordability of housing in ZoorAbad) .................... 223 4.5.4.8. Racial and ethnical issues against Afghan immigrants and refugees ....... 226 4.5.4.9. Stigmatized Neighborhood ...................................................................... 229 4.6. Concluding Notes................................................................................................... 231 5. "Squatter" Government ............................................................................................. 234 5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 234 5.2. Footprints of the Squatter Government in Housing Market and Urban Planning in ZoorAbad ...................................................................................................................... 236 5.2.1. Squatter government as the key player of housing market in ZoorAbad ....... 236 5.2.2. Urban Planning as a Powerful Tool in the Hands of the Squatter Government................................................................................................................................... 243 5.2.2.1. ZoorAbad in the Blueprints plans ............................................................ 244 5.2.2.2. âImprovement Plan for ZoorAbadâ, since 1992 ...................................... 251 5.2.2.2.1. Implementation Phase ....................................................................... 255 5.2.2.2.2. Demolition and Clearance................................................................. 256 5.2.2.2.3. Mindset of the Squatter Government in the Current Situation of Improvement Plan in ZoorAbad ....................................................................... 258 5.3. The Case of Roshankouh: Dispossession of a religious minority group by the squatter government ...................................................................................................... 268 5.3.1. The Babi and Baha'is in Iran; A History of Persecution ................................. 272 5.3.2. The Case of Roshankouh ................................................................................ 273 5.3.2.1. Claim of illegal constructions in Roshanakuh ......................................... 274 5.3.3. The State's Intervention: Comparing ZoorAbad and Roshankouh Cases ....... 276 5.4. Squatter Government ............................................................................................. 280 5.4.1. Government approaches towards informal settlements and the issue of prioritization of exchange-value ............................................................................... 281 5.4.2. Concluding Notes on Squatter Government ................................................... 286 6. Concluding Chapter ................................................................................................... 297 6.1. Essence of the thesis .............................................................................................. 297 x 6.2. Limitations of the research ..................................................................................... 304 6.3. Further Research Directions and Possible Applications of the findings ................ 306 Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 309 xi List of Tables TABLE 1: INTERVIEWEES INFORMATION AND PSEUDONYMS. .................................................................... 37 TABLE 2: TABLE OF POPULATION CHANGE IN ZOORABAD .................................................................... 114 TABLE 3: SIGNIFICANT PHYSICAL CHANGES IN ZOORABAD OVER TIME .................................................... 117 TABLE 4: PROJECTS BY THE DYNAMIC NEIGHBORHOOD PROGRESS PLAN FOR ZOORABAD SINCE 2018 .......... 250 xii List of Figures FIGURE 1: CURRENT VIEW OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD.. ............................................................................. 3 FIGURE 2: TOPOGRAPHY OF THE AREA AND ITS SPATIAL CONTEXT. .............................................................. 4 FIGURE 3: ORGANIC, GRASSROOTS, HUMAN-SCALE ARCHITECTURE OF ZOORABAD. ....................................... 6 FIGURE 4: CLOSE UP OF AZIMIYEH WITH TALL FORMAL APARTMENT BUILDINGS. ............................................ 7 FIGURE 5: ZOORABAD IS IN THE FOREGROUND WITH AZIMIYEH IN THE BACKGROUND.. .................................. 7 FIGURE 6: MAP OF THE TEHRAN-KARAJ METROPOLITAN AREA ............................................................... 10 FIGURE 7: LOCATION OF ZOORABAD ................................................................................................. 33 FIGURE 8: LOCATION OF ROSHANKOUH .............................................................................................. 44 FIGURE 9: THE LOCATION OF KARAJ WITHIN THE MAP OF IRAN ................................................................ 98 FIGURE 10: AERAL IMAGE OF KARAJ IN 1956 ..................................................................................... 100 FIGURE 11: KARAJ IN 1940S ........................................................................................................... 100 FIGURE 12: AERIAL IMAGE OF KARAJ IN 1964 .................................................................................... 101 FIGURE 13: KARAJ IN 1966 AND THE LOCATION OF AZIMIYEH IN COMPARISON WITH ZOORABAD .................. 102 FIGURE 14: LOCATION OF ZOORABAD IN IRAN, KARAJ MAP .................................................................. 105 FIGURE 15: ZOORABAD IN 1970 ..................................................................................................... 107 FIGURE 16: ZOORABAD IN 1977 ..................................................................................................... 108 FIGURE 17: AERIAL IMAGES OF ZOORABAD IN 2000, 2004, 2009, 2015 ................................................... 115 FIGURE 18: COMPARING AERIAL IMAGE OF ZOORABAD IN 1970 WITH 2008 .............................................. 121 FIGURE 19: LACK OF ACCESS TO WATER IN 1979, ZOORABAD. ............................................................... 122 FIGURE 20: LAND USE IN ZOORABAD AND DISTRIBUTION OF SERVICES IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD. ................... 124 FIGURE 21: DISTRIBUTION OF THE DISPLACED RESIDENTS OF ZOORABAD. ............................................... 129 FIGURE 22: A FEW EXAMPLES OF REMAINED UNDEMOLISHED HOUSING IN ZOORABAD ............................... 130 FIGURE 23: THE AVERAGE PRICE PER SQUARE METER OF APARTMENTS IN TEHRAN ......................................... 182 FIGURE 24. ZOORABAD BOUNDARIES AND SURROUNDING STREET ........................................................ 184 FIGURE 25:TOPOGRAPHY OF ZOORABAD IN A COMPARISON WITH GREATER KARAJ .................................... 186 FIGURE 27: HOUSING CONGESTION AND POOR ACCESSIBILITY IN ZOORABAD ............................................ 192 FIGURE 28: LOCATION OF ZOORABAD COMPARED TO THE MAIN BORDER STREETS TO THIS NEIGHBORHOOD ..... 195 FIGURE 29: NEIGHBORHOOD STREET AND ALLEY MAP ........................................................................ 196 FIGURE 30: THE WIDTH OF STREETS AND ALLEYS IN ZOORABAD.. .......................................................... 197 FIGURE 31: SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ZOORABAD NEIGHBORHOOD DURING 1980S. ............................. 199 FIGURE 32: THE SIX ZONES IN ZOORABAD IN THE VIEWPOINT OF RESIDENTS OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD. ............ 202 FIGURE 33: THE DETAILED PLAN OF KARAJ CITY - ZOORABAD NEIGHBORHOOD ........................................ 245 FIGURE 34: CURRENT LANDUSE AND POTENTIALS OF ZOORABAD FOR NEW PHASE OF "IMPROVEMENT PLAN" .. 259 FIGURE 35: THE FINAL SPATIAL ORGANIZATION OF ZOORABAD .............................................................. 259 FIGURE 36: PROPOSED ACTIVITIES SUCH AS SKY RESORT, AMUSEMENT PARKS IN ZOORABAD ....................... 260 FIGURE 37: THE SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN VIEWS OF ZOORABAD. ........................................................... 261 FIGURE 38: A FEW SPECIFIC RECREATIONAL PROJECTS BASED ON THE "IMPROVEMENT PLAN" ....................... 262 FIGURE 39: MAIN ACCESS ROAD IN ZOORABAD .................................................................................. 263 FIGURE 40: UNCOMPLETED PROJECTS IN ZOORABAD FOR MORE THAN ONE DECADE. ..................................... 264 FIGURE 41: PROPOSED SECTION OF THE MAIN STREET IN ZOORABAD. ..................................................... 266 FIGURE 42: PROPOSED PLAN FOR NEW RESIDENTIAL COMPLEXES IN ZOORABAD. ....................................... 267 FIGURE 43: PROPOSED SECTION OF A RESIDENTIAL COMPLEX IN ZOORABAD ............................................ 267 xiii Acknowledgements I dedicate my sincere, heartfelt, and deepest appreciation and gratitude: â¢ To my parents, Parvin Haghar and Nooreddin Behroozi, who raised me to embody an endless passion for selflessness and meaningful contribution to the world. They have been my role models in sacrificing for the wellbeing of others, enhancing my capacity for critical thinking, and encouraging a lifelong pursuit of learning. Their unconditional supports, love, and encouragement made it possible for me to initiate, pursue, and accomplish my Ph.D. journey. â¢ To my spouse, colleague, mentor, and love of my life, Sina Ruhani, who selflessly has supported me emotionally and intellectually in every way throughout the past three years of our marriage. Sina enriched my thesis by contributing to the emergence and development of its main arguments during our daily conversations, accompanying me during my fieldwork in Iran, assisting with my articles, and embracing the challenges of relocating to Canada to support my education. Our ongoing discussion on the concept of "common" greatly crystallized the arguments in my thesis. â¢ To my sisters and lifelong best friends, Aidin Behroozi and Roza Behroozi, who have been a source of inspiration and unconditional support throughout my life, especially during the challenging past five years. From our childhood dreams about addressing societal challenges to our current roles as environmental and social activists and scholars, their attitudes and passions have inspired my commitment to socio-environmental justice in Iran and beyond. Their selfless love and perseverance have been invaluable to my journey. I would like to truly appreciate my supervisor, Dr. Nathan Lauster, whose extensive knowledge and humbled guidance supported me throughout the process of writing my thesis. Although I did not begin my thesis under his supervision, his insightful feedback xiv significantly reorganized my dissertation and helped refine its core arguments with his extensive knowledge of social science. I am profoundly grateful to Dr. Kaveh Ehsani, my brilliant mentor, for expanding my vision of urban studies and for his unwavering support throughout my Ph.D. program. His generous permission to attend his courses at DePaul University provided me with a precious opportunity to deepen my theoretical framework in critical urban studies. I also truly appreciate Dr. Paul Shipley, whose administrative and financial support during my final year was invaluable, and to Dr. Carlos Teixeira, for his insightful comments on my thesis. I deeply appreciate Dr. Azam Khatam for her guidance, her time, and her introduction to prominent scholars and connections in Iran, which facilitated my interviews. I also wish to thank Joanne Carey and Dr. Christin Schreyer at the Institute for Community Engaged Research (ICER) at UBCO for providing a welcoming atmosphere for writing over the past two years. I also appreciate all my teachers and students at the Baha'i Institute for Higher Education (BIHE) in Iran. They gave me the opportunity to begin my higher education and serve as a volunteer instructor for the "Urbanization and Marginalization" course, which greatly enriched my knowledge in this field. Finally, I deeply appreciate the residents of ZoorAbad for warmly and generously sharing their time, stories, and experiences with me, which broadened my perspective and provided a tangible context for rethinking the role of self-built settlements in Iran. xv Dedication To my parents, Parvin and Nooreddin, Who taught me to be sensitive to injustice, to listen to the voices of the marginalized, to be their voices, and to take humble action â no matter how small my ability â to contribute to a more just society. 1 1. Introduction 1.1. Rationale and Background A definition of courage has arisen from the women and girls in Iran who initiated an inclusive feminist uprising. Their aim is to reclaim basic civil rights for all citizens. While the movement's pivotal focus is on womenâs rights, these activists also represent broader marginalized communities and discriminated groups who, over the last four decades, have endured the surveillance and oppression of the Islamic government in Iran, including low-income households. Although the current uprising has the characteristics of a revolution, during previous decades marginalized groups in Iran have reclaimed civil rights in different ways. One such form of resistance is known as âquiet encroachmentâ â a political action and grassroots movement by low-income people to reclaim the right to housing as a basic requirement for living. Made necessary by the absence of social housing services and other relevant facilities, the urban poor in Iran have taken it upon themselves to reclaim their rights as citizens by taking over public lands informally, through occupation or purchase, and by making their lifestyles and economic situations visible, in plain view of governors and policy makers in the Tehran-Karaj metropolitan area. Following the 1979 revolution, the Iranian government promoted pro-poor policies, but in practice, the lives of millions of poor people across the country remain challenging. Much like Iranian women who demonstrate their dissatisfaction by removing the hijab in public spaces, the urban poor in neighborhoods such as the ZoorAbad also demonstrate their dissatisfaction by disobeying rules through visible informal construction. The term âquiet encroachmentâ was coined by Asef Bayat (2013, 51), a prominent Iranian-American sociologist, to describe the efforts of the urban poor in producing and utilizing new spaces to improve their living conditions, especially in the realm of affordable housing. ZoorAbad, a neighbourhood near Tehran, has been closely tied to the quiet encroachment 2 movement since the 1960s, when rural migrants moved to the capital in pursuit of a decent life. I have a personal connection to this neighborhood, as I completed my elementary education at a school located there. This experience has given me a unique perspective and a deep understanding of the community and its inhabitants. My familiarity with the area has also allowed me to observe the changes and challenges faced by its residents over time. This thesis explores the contemporary grassroots strategies employed by the urban poor in ZoorAbad to address their housing needs, focusing on the dynamics among various groups, including Afghan refugees, Iranian tenants, second- or third-generation squatters, and newcomers. The findings highlight the role of the state as a dominant actor in the housing crisis. By adopting a speculative approach toward common and public lands, the state has confiscated grassroots developments that the urban poor had achieved over several decades. Before delving into the study, I would like to introduce the two case-studies examined in this research: the ZoorAbad neighborhood and the village of Roshankouh. The primary case-study is the ZoorAbad neighborhood, and all research objectives have been developed with this case in mind. The main arguments of this thesis are grounded in findings from field study conducted in ZoorAbad. However, by employing the extended case method, I draw on the supporting case of Roshankouh to extend and deepen the analysis and arguments developed from the case of ZoorAbad. The case of Roshankouh offers additional supporting evidence for the thesis's arguments concerning the concept of a squatter government. To understand the relevance of this secondary case, it is important to ask: How are these two cases related, and in what ways do they support each other in this dissertation? What shared aspects of these cases contribute to the research's central argument? In the case of ZoorAbad, the issue centers on addressing the housing needs of the urban poor through grassroot construction of self-built (informal) housing in the absence of social housing services. So, one of the key objectives of this research is to explore the dialectical relationship between self-built housing â understood as a form of marginalized settlement â and the state. Based on the findings from ZoorAbad, I extended my argument to examine the broader dialectical relationship between modern governments and marginalized settlements. 3 The case of Roshankouh, on the other hand, tells the story of a minority rural community in Iran and reveals how the state engages with such marginalized settlements. It illustrates how the modern state, through mechanisms like urban planning and policymaking, not only speculates on common resources but also encroaches on the private properties of marginalized groups â be they the urban poor in ZoorAbad or rural residents in Roshankouh. However, as emphasized, ZoorAbad remains the primary case study, and the following paragraphs will provide a detailed introduction to it. Proximate to Tehran and adjacent to the affluent neighbourhood of Azimiyeh, a hill with steep alleyways is home to numerous tiny houses featuring unique organic architecture (see Figures 1 and 2). This colony of hilltop houses spans an area of 165 hectares, forming the informal neighbourhood of ZoorAbad, which has become an iconic landmark in the Tehran-Karaj region. Figure 1: Current view of the neighbourhood. July 5, 2022. Photo by the author. 4 Figure 2: Topography of the area and its spatial context. July 5, 2022. Photo by the author In 1969, the hill was designated as national public land. However, during the 1970s, the growth of agriculture, food, and steel industries, along with the establishment of veterinary serum and vaccine laboratory firms near Karaj city, led to an industrialization boom. As a result, impoverished individuals migrated from small towns and villages to Tehran and its proximities. Unable to afford housing prices, they settled in ZoorAbad and constructed their own homes on this public land (Qasemi, 2011). According to the dominant Iranian government discourse, the residents of ZoorAbad are categorized as "squatters". However, a deeper explanation is necessary to understand the power dynamics within this community. It is important to recognize that the residents of ZoorAbad are not homogeneous group; rather, they possess diverse characteristics, histories, and needs. Broadly speaking, two main groups can be identified in ZoorAbad: landowners and tenants. The category of landowners can be further subdivided into three groups: 5 1- The first group of landowners, mostly not low-income individuals, consisted of a select few powerholders with extensive networks within institutions and among factory investors near Tehran. Their aim was to secure access to cheap labor for these factories. Using their connections, they divided the hill's land into several portions, which were then illegally sold at low prices to the urban poor and migrants. This group unlawfully seized public land during the 1960s and in subsequent years. In my view, these affluent powerholders could be considered the initial squatters in ZoorAbad. Furthermore, they profited significantly from the sale and rental of public lands to the urban poor. 2- The second group of landowners in ZoorAbad consists of individuals who purchased land from the initial squatters or powerholders at low prices between the 1960s and 1980s, intending to build their own home or shelters. This category also includes urban poor individuals who acquired housing from the original builders in ZoorAbad. 3- The third group of landowners in ZoorAbad consists of urban poor squatters who confiscated parcels of land in the area without payment, primarily during the 1960s and later, particularly in the first decade following the Iranian revolution in 1979. It should be noted that the differentiation among these groups is not always clear-cut. Residents of ZoorAbad do not always openly share their histories in this regard. However, the similarities among these groups of landowners are notable: all managed to save money by circumventing the formal housing market. Moreover, each group was required by the government to pay for the land and their buildings at various phases, the details of which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Additionally, the majority of buildings possess both informal and formal deeds, meaning all residents are regarded as landowners and have the ability to rent or sell their property. In addition to the aforementioned landowners, the most vulnerable group in this neighborhood is tenants who pay monthly rent to their landlords for housing and suffer from a lack of tenure security. These tenants often include migrants, both Iranian and Afghan, who lack sufficient financial resources to afford housing in the formal market. The grassroots informal architecture of the buildings in ZoorAbad has created a unique human-scaled space that is simultaneously "semi-urban" and "semi-rural" (see Figure 3). By 6 "semi-urban," I mean the use of some "modern" architectural materials such as concrete or cement, or, in some cases, anti-reflective glass for windows. By "semi-rural," I mean incorporating some characteristics of rural architecture without fully adopting them, such as connecting with nature â for example, allowing trees to be part of the architecture and buildings. In other words, the neighborhood presents a blend of rural and urban architecture, materials, and construction methods. These self-built informal housing units are much more human-scaled compared to the typical formal buildings constructed according to municipality codes and standards. The contrast is clear when compared to the neighboring affluent town of Azimiyeh, where formal building complexes dominate the landscape (see Figures 4 and 5). Figure 3: Organic, grassroots, human-scale architecture of ZoorAbad. July 5, 2022. Photo by the author During the 1970s and 1980s, the population of ZoorAbad reached 120,000. Since then, due to various socio-economic shifts, the social composition of the settlers in ZoorAbad has also changed. One of the main forces driving this change has been the âImprovement Plan of ZoorAbadâ, developed by the Iranian government during the 1990s. This plan led to the demolition of more than 4,000 housing units and the forced displacement of local settlers. In 7 addition, an economic crisis and a sharp rise in land and housing prices in Iran have contributed to population movement in ZoorAbad. The political crisis in neighboring country, Afghanistan, specifically after the return of Taliban to power in 2021, has also resulted in a significant influx of Afghan migrants to ZoorAbad, in search of affordable housing. Figure 4: Close up of Azimiyeh with tall formal apartment buildings and residential complexes, contrasting ZoorAbad through their lack of human scale. [Photo retrieved from mrestate.ir on April 19, 2022]. Figure 5: ZoorAbad is in the foreground with Azimiyeh in the background. There is evidence of slum clearance in ZoorAbad through the national âimproving planâ. July 5, 2022. Photo by the author. 8 At the end of an alleyway, in the middle of a sunny summer afternoon, Na'na1, a 33-year-old woman, sits on the ground, under the shade of a willow tree, cleaning vegetables and herbs. She wears fashionable clothing, with tattooed eyebrows. Na'na was born in ZoorAbad and got married at the aged of 17. She, her husband and four children are tenants living in a 40 square meter unit. Their monthly income is around $140, and they pay half of this â $70 per month â in rent. They also had to pay a one-time deposit of $280 when they moved in. Na'na says: "Although the reason for living in ZoorAbad is the lack of choice for us, air quality in this neighbourhood is remarkable! Also, I love how secure the neighbourhood is. Itâs like living in a village. All neighbors know each other, and that sense of security comes from this." But there are trade-offs. âMost of the housing in this neighborhood suffers from bugs and dampness. Also, the steep slopes of the alleyways, which make transportation a challenge, and low water pressure, are among the deficiencies of the neighborhood,â Na'na said. Na'na also talks about the negative effects of the âImprovement Planâ in ZoorAbad during the 1990s. She said: "The Karaj municipality was in charge of implementing the plan, and its main intention was slum clearance: to eradicate the neighborhood and demolish the housing in order to create a more âbeautifulâ and âformalâ area within Karaj city." As will be discussed throughout the thesis, there is ample evidence (Qasemi, 2010) that the government's primary priority has been to pursue a speculative approach toward both public/common lands and private ones, in the name of improvement. After the implementation of the "Improvement Plan" in ZoorAbad, around 30,000 individuals who had lived there for more than two decades were forced to move out and be displaced from the neighborhood and had no other choice but to move to more remote, low-income settlements, a few were forced to move to their own hometown villages. This force, combined with other coinciding factors such as inflation, currency devaluation, and sharp increases in land prices in Iran â particularly since 2000 â has altered the neighborhood's 1 All the names of interviewees used in this thesis are pseudonyms. The choice was motivated by the political situation in Iran, and I have opted to use pseudonyms to protect the interviewees from the potential risks of detention. 9 demographics2. As a result, previous housing, shops, and households have been replaced with new land uses and individuals. For instance, first-time homebuyers, mostly young adults with savings who sought to purchase their first home, typically individuals or couples aged between 35 to 45 â became newcomers to ZoorAbad due to inflation and sharply rising housing prices. Unable to afford housing in âformalâ neighborhoods, they had no choice but to buy homes in âinformalâ neighborhoods like ZoorAbad. For example, in 2020, Zar, a 37-year-old woman with a university degree, purchased a 40-square-meter basement studio in ZoorAbad for $5000. Secondly, the immigration of refugees3, particularly in recent years, must be considered another force driving changes in the demographic of ZoorAbad. Rents and deposits have also increased, more than double in some cases. However, Iranian native settlers of ZoorAbad often blame Afghan refugees and other migrants, who are also moving into the neighborhood, for the price increases. Unwelcome in many formal neighborhoods, refugees have limited housing options, which landlords take advantage of by charging them higher rents. These tensions are further exacerbated by competition within the labor market. In the absence of affordable housing plans and policies, market-oriented and speculative activities, such as the âImprovement Planâ in ZoorAbad, represent the dominant approach of the government to address housing issues within informal neighborhoods. These sorts of plans can erode the financial capital of the residents by forcing them to sell their homes to the municipality at prices lower than the market value. They can also reduce the opportunities for displaced settlers, whose access to educational, economic and medical facilities is limited in the more remote neighborhoods to which they are forced to move. Additionally, the social bonds built in ZoorAbad over four decades are destroyed as households are displaced. The ZoorAbad neighbourhood, nevertheless, retains its attractiveness for the urban poor, drawing settlers from all over the Tehran-Karaj metropolitan region (Figure 6). However, the 2 This change in the demography is related to people who had to sell their homes and shops to the government. Also, lower middle-class young families who wanted to buy their first home, some of whom could only afford to buy in neighborhoods like ZoorAbad â contributed to the shift. These socio-economic forces have changed the demographics of ZoorAbad over the past few decades. 3 While most of these refugees are considered "illegal," there are no specific figures on this matter. Different sources report varying data. Some claim that around 5 million Afghan refugees live in Iran, but there are no reliable sources on this topic, as the government does not allow free access to information, and the available data may be manipulated by the government. 10 settlersâ experiences clearly indicate the need for a better understanding of the socio-spatial inequalities across the urban landscape as informal settlements change their character and are impacted by government policies. In the absence of social policies that can provide adequate housing for low-income groups, it is important to recognize self-built housing as an alternative to social housing. Instead of resorting to demolitions and displacing these communities, urban policies and plans need to uncover the motivations behind them and determine whose interests will be served by these plans. By doing so, the implications of such policies can be better understood, and alternative ones can be developed to ensure that the rights and needs of these vulnerable communities are protected. Figure 6: Map of the Tehran-Karaj Metropolitan Area (sourced from Google Maps) 1.2. Research Objectives and Situating the researcher in the context As we all know, when you start your own research journey, you choose your destination. However, the process of conducting research may lead you to other interesting and astonishing routes that you did not intend to explore. I must declare that my journey over these past years has not only helped me meet the initial goals of the research but has also, fortunately, encouraged me to go beyond the original destinations and objectives of the research, which will be elaborated upon further. The initial main aim of this research was to identify and categorize diverse urban âpoorâ groups within the ZoorAbad neighborhood; and to investigate various grassroots strategies 11 employed by urban âpoorâ4 and marginalized groups in the city of Karaj, Iran, to address their housing needs. To clarify the meaning of grassroots strategies for the urban poor in Iran, it may help to think of activities such as squatting, home sharing, renting a bed, or sleeping in Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) stations. I have addressed the aim of the research over eight months of field study within the neighborhood, and I will explain the reasons for choosing this topic and case, as well as try to situate myself within the research. The objectives of the research are as follows: â¢ Document, analyze, and evaluate the relevant policies and plans of the state (government, municipality, local councils, public banks, foundations), as well as journal articles, academic thesis, and documentaries regarding different housing facilities for the urban poor that apply to the neighborhood. â¢ Identify and evaluate key housing market actors in ZoorAbad (such as state, realtors, property owners, developers, the constructions sector, financial institutions [formal and informal credit networks], landlords, etc.). â¢ Document and evaluate the grassroots strategies (such as squatting, living in informal settlements, shared housing, etc.) used by the urban poor in Iran over the past 40 years to address housing issues. âª Identify and categorize diverse urban poor groups within the neighborhood (such as illegal/legal foreign refugees, second-generations squatters, young first-time homebuyers, tenants, etc.); document the housing-related power relations between them; ascertain the challenges each group faces in accessing affordable housing; and document the similarities and differences among various urban poor groups and their strategies within the neighborhood. In this research, I aimed to contribute to updating the housing strategies adopted by the urban poor to address their housing needs. These temporary strategies in the current era are likely to be more diverse, creative, and widespread than those of the 1970s and 2000s, decades during 4 According to Bayat (1997), by initiation of the modern era of Iran and employment of modernized policies by Pahlavy dynasty since 1925, a new âclassâ of the poor has emerged in Iran (pp. 23-25). 12 which two Iranian researchers conducted their Ph.D. and master's theses on this neighborhood. To contribute to tackling the housing issue for vulnerable working-class groups, there is a need to examine the current housing situations of the poor and their strategies in the era of economic crisis in Iran, particularly for the 20 million individuals who live in "informal settlements" in the country (Joulaei et al., 2023). This figure needs to be multiplied if we consider the government's broader definition of slums or informal settlements5, as well as unregulated housing types and the homeless refugees and provincial migrants not included in this count. In the remaining paragraphs of this section, I aim to situate myself within the research and clarify my personal, emotional, and social ties to this topic and case. As a member of a religious community in Iran, I have encountered various forms of persecution and injustice. With a background in architecture and urban planning, I have sought to find my role in addressing aspects of socio-spatial inequalities in my home country. These educational and social discriminatory experiences, combined with my understanding of the inequalities in the city where I lived, influenced my decision to select ZoorAbad as the field study site for my Ph.D. thesis. I was born and raised in a middle-class family in Karaj, Iran. Our family consists of my mother â whom I lost only six months after starting my Ph.D. â my father, and two sisters. My mother, who was 16 years old at the time of the revolution, loved learning and education but was deprived of her right to continue her studies solely because of her belief in the Bahá'í Faith. Similarly, my father, who was in the final term of his physics degree in Tehran during the revolution, was expelled from his job and denied the right to complete his studies and earn his bachelor's degree for the same reason. Thanks to several years of hard work and saving, my parents were able to buy our home, which was located on the southernmost street of Azimiyeh, a middle-class neighborhood in Karaj. Beyond this southernmost street was a boulevard that marked the border between Azimiyeh and ZoorAbad. 5 In Iran, there are numerous institutions with parallel agendas regarding housing issues. Each institution has its own definition of housing for vulnerable groups. In some cases, dilapidated buildings have been included in this category, while in other cases, only buildings constructed without municipality permission, or those built in the peripheral areas between cities, have been considered. 13 My parents' dedication to our education knew no bounds; they did everything within their power to help us grow, learn, and use our education to contribute to society. Despite my mother's strong sensitivity to the quality of our education, she made a decision that went against prevailing trends among friends and acquaintances. It was my mother who decided that my sisters and I should spend our elementary school years at a school in ZoorAbad. Most families, friends, and acquaintances sent their children to schools in the northern part of Azimiyeh, where the more affluent children studied. Even though attending a school in ZoorAbad might not initially seem like the best choice for someone deeply concerned about their child's education, it turned out to be one of the most valuable experiences of my life. My mother's decision was brilliantly wise! I lived near ZoorAbad for over 30 years, but it was only during those five school years that I had the most interaction with the people of the neighborhood. Truthfully, I had not ventured far into ZoorAbad until just two years ago because our school was located at the base of the hill, where residential development had not yet started. Nevertheless, this childhood experience, despite the many labels associated with ZoorAbad, even from those who socially interacted with its residents, allowed me to better understand my peers there and played a significant role in shaping my societal awareness and concerns. Furthermore, another significant aspect of my life that shaped my approach to this research and my efforts to understand the various dimensions of inequality in my surroundings was my experience as a Bahá'í in Iran. Born into a Bahá'í family, I chose to embrace the Bahá'í faith at the age of 15. Bahá'ís in Iran are considered a religious minority and have systematically faced institutionalized discrimination in many aspects of life for decades, particularly after the Islamic government came to power. As mentioned earlier, my parents were denied the opportunity to pursue higher education at Iranian universities because of their religious beliefs. This systematic discrimination extended to the next generation, depriving my sisters and me of the right to continue our education at state and official universities in Iran. About 10 years after the 1979 revolution in Iran, the Bahá'í community spontaneously established an informal institute for Bahá'í youth who had been denied access to education. This institute, known as the Baha'i Institute for Higher Education (BIHE), operated through 14 the resources and facilities of Bahá'í community members. Most courses were conducted via correspondence or online, with students attending 2-4 classes per semester. Classes were often held in the living rooms of Bahá'í homes in Iran, hosted by homeowners. Professors and instructors at this institute volunteered their time and expertise, teaching students without any pay or compensation. My sisters and I pursued our undergraduate degrees at BIHE and later contributed by teaching when we could. I earned my bachelor's degree in architecture through BIHE. During those years of education and study, I constantly reflected on my role in addressing socio-spatial inequalities, initially as an architect and later as someone aspiring to influence the spatial aspects of cities and the built environment. My spouse also pursued a degree in sociology at BIHE, and in recent years, we have co-taught two courses for students majoring in sociology and architecture. The experience of studying at an underground, informal, and unofficial university, one unrecognized within Iran, has profoundly shaped my awareness and concern for the needs of vulnerable communities. It has fostered within me a deep commitment to addressing social and spatial inequalities. Moreover, one of the primary forms of discrimination against Bahá'ís in Iran has been the confiscation of their properties and lands, both in urban and rural areas. This systematic act aimed to weaken the Bahá'í community and exert maximum pressure on its members. Virtually all the lands owned by my maternal grandparents and paternal great-grandparents, which were part of our family's inheritance, were confiscated by the government and never returned. Even my paternal grandfather's retirement pension was terminated, leaving him without savings or benefits after 30 years of service. All of this was solely due to their belief in the Bahá'í Faith. These systematic discriminations have significantly highlighted spatial inequality, which is why I decided to focus my research on housing for urban poverty, in the absence of government support policies. While I could have chosen Baha'i neighborhoods in Iran as my main case-study, I decided to amplify the voices of other marginalized groups I am familiar with, striving to represent them rather than focusing solely on my own community. In other words, I believe that after experiencing discrimination or persecution, we have a responsibility to dedicate ourselves to promoting justice and addressing inequalities â not just 15 for those who share our beliefs or belong to our community, but for all individuals affected by various forms of discrimination and injustice. It is essential to amplify their stories and advocate for their rights. These motivations played a pivotal role in inspiring me to choose this topic and case study for my research. Regarding the selection of a case study from the Global South, I must emphasize that contributing to the study of urban processes and phenomena in Iran â a non-Global North country â has been particularly compelling for me. As Lees (2018) highlights, there is a âneed to learn from the ânew sharp edge formsâ of gentrification emerging in the cities of the Global Southâ (p. 52). Ruth Glass draws attention to the dominance of Western thoughts in urban studies and encourages us to adopt a ânewâ comparative urbanism approach that goes beyond Western âmodelâ cities such as London or New York (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, 1-3). Similarly, critical urban scholars like Robinson and Roy argue that there is much to learn from the stories of various ordinary cities (Robinson, 2006, 109; in Lees, 2018, 49-50). The housing crisis among the urban poor is a significant yet underexplored subject of study in the Middle East, where there is a notable lack of comprehensive research and data on this topic (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, 14). In conclusion, a combination of personal motivations and a commitment to adopting a critical approach to urban studies inspired me to select Karaj, Iran, as the focus of my PhD project. 1.3. Theoretical Background and Structure of the Thesis Millions of people worldwide face tenure insecurity due to rising mortgage rates, increasing rents, or being forced to leave their neighborhoods as they can no longer afford the costs. Sources of tenure insecurity include escalating rents, the impact of mega urban infrastructure projects or global prestige events such as the Olympics on housing availability and prices, political or natural catastrophes, and sheer âeconomic exploitationâ. According to the Center on Housing Rights and Eviction (COHRE), approximately 18 million individuals were displaced by forced eviction between 1998 and 2008. These processes significantly affect the social, psychological, and physical aspects of their lives (Rolnik, 2019, 110). 16 There is a dialectical relationship between informal settlements and tenure insecurity. On one hand, the emergence of informal settlements is a product of tenure insecurity. On the other hand, living in informal settlements and facing the risk of forced displacement or demolition further intensifies tenure insecurity. Due to the informal status of such housing, there is a persistent threat of demolition by authorities and governments. As a result, these vulnerable groups live under constant conditions of contingency and uncertainty, which produce and perpetuate various personal challenges for those affected. Tenure insecurity can manifest in various forms and living conditions. For instance, tenants who previously enjoyed long-term and stable rental contracts may face tenure insecurity when forced into short-term rental agreements. Another example is living in informal settlements, slums, favelas, and other âunregulatedâ settlements6. According to UN-Habitat estimates, approximately 924 million people were living in slums globally (UN-Habitat, 2003b. P. 24). However, it is important to recognize that those affected by tenure insecurity are not limited to urban settlers. A wide range of groups experience insecure tenure, including refugees, internal and international migrants, minorities, nomads, unhoused people, âworkers in regime of servitudeâ (p. 111), âowners of mortgaged housesâ, and the growing ranks of unemployed, precarious, and casualized workers. In Iran, slum dwelling has been a grassroot response by the urban poor to address tenure insecurity. For example, during the first decade following the Iranian Revolution, homeownership rates accelerated through practices such as squatting and land seizure, as seen in areas like ZoorAbad. In 1966, approximately 78% of households in Tehran owned their homes. This rate dropped to 53% in 1976 but rebounded to 63% in 1986 (Piran, 1997). These statistics highlight the role of squatting in increasing homeownership during the early years of the revolution. Piran (1997), a prominent Iranian sociologist, argues that informal settlements, often perceived negatively, are actually grassroots planning efforts by the urban poor in a society lacking a comprehensive social housing policy. I have expanded on Piran's perspective and used it as a foundation for one of the main arguments in my dissertation. 6 UN-Habitat has labeled these sorts of settlements as âslumsâ defined as âthe most intolerable of urban housing conditions, which frequently include: insecurity of tenure; lack of basic services, especially water and sanitation; inadequate and sometimes unsafe building structures; overcrowding; and location on hazardous landâ (UN Habitat, 2003a, p. vi). 17 The main arguments and findings of the thesis are presented across three chapters. While the following chapter focuses on the methodology and methods employed in this research, the subsequent three chapters form the main body of the thesis and articulate its primary arguments. Chapter Three, titled "Self-built Settlement as an Alternative to Social Housing in Iran," provides a historical background on the Karaj-Iran region and examines the spatial implications of the modernization process in Iran. It aims to argue why and how self-built settlements â commonly referred to as informal housing â can be regarded as an alternative to social housing in the specific socio-political context of Iran. Self-built settlements, often referred to as informal settlements, are typically regarded as illegal in mainstream perspectives, but this characterization requires clarification. âIllegalityâ is not an absolute characteristic of all informal settlements â or as I prefer to call them, "self-built" settlement. In fact, a significant portion of residents in such housing live under legal or semi-legal tenure systems. In many cases, âthe land was an object of dispute between various partiesâ (Rolnik, 2019, p. 127), making it difficult to classify these settlements as strictly legal or illegal. Instead, they exist as in-between entities. There are various types of housing or land tenure arrangements not officially recognized by prevailing norms but are nonetheless âmuch more common than land squattingâ (Rolnik, 2019, 127). These include communal lands belonging to a group, which can serve as transitional tenure forms, moving from collective to individual ownership (Rolnik, 2019, 127). Overall, when discussing the âinformalityâ of self-built settlements, it is crucial to understand that formal or informal attributes are not fixed qualities. Instead, they are shaped by specific policies and economic regulations within each unique context. Chapter Four, titled "Market, De/Regulation, and the Issue of Use-Value vs Exchange-Value of Housing," aims to provide the theoretical foundation for the arguments presented in this thesis. This chapter introduces the key characteristics of the housing issue and outlines the theoretical framework adopted for this study. Utilizing a political economy lens, I have examined the housing crisis faced by the urban poor in Iran, with a focus on the informal settlement of ZoorAbad. This approach facilitates a 18 critical analysis of the dominance of a specific form of neoliberalism and privatization, which primarily serves the interests of those in power and affluent individuals and groups in Iran, particularly since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The lens of political economy highlights the importance of examining the role of the state as a key driver of housing issues across various contexts, shaped by historical, geographical, social, political, and economic processes. For instance, âsocial housingâ is conceptualized differently in various countries (Aalbers, 2016, 31-33). Based on the specific political economic context of Iran, I argued in the chapter three that self-built settlements should be considered as an alternative to social housing. The housing issue is fundamentally a âpolitical-economicâ matter, shaped by the significant influence of state policymaking and the dominant economic systemâs impact on housing (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, 12). Rolnik (2019) elaborates on how decision-making processes related to real estate, relevant laws, land management, and the collective âjuridical-administrative webâ that affects tenure security exemplify why housing issues must be understood through the lens of political economy (Rolnik, 2019, 112). Through this perspective, the housing crisis stems from a conflict between two opposing conceptions of housing: as a âhomeâ versus as âreal estateâ (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, 12). The predominance of viewing housing as real estate, which generates profit for affluent individuals, has exacerbated the crisis (p. 16). A defining feature of housing in this system is its âcommodification,â which is contingent upon the âprivatization of the commonsâ7 (pp. 19-20). This hyper-commodification of housing leads to outcomes such as âcontingent livingâ and forced evictions, both of which are linked to various mental and physical illnesses (p. 43). Overall, market-driven urbanization operates as a growth machine that has prioritizes exchange value over use value and social needs, imposing significant costs on ordinary people and their well-being (Logan & Molotch, 2007, xi). The consequence of this growth machine is the acceleration of inequalities in life chances, particularly for poor and 7 There are various means of privatization, including: selling social housing to private property enterprises; or selling individual housing to their tenants (Glymm, 2009b, 45). 19 marginalized populations who suffer from both low-incomes and a lack of âsocial capitalâ (pp. xii-xi). In the final section of the fourth chapter, we will examine the Islamic regime's approach to the privatization of public lands and its prioritization of exchange-value over use-value. Despite the pro-poor rhetoric of the Islamic Revolution, the long-term policies, plans, and strategies implemented often proved detrimental to low-income groups and individuals. My investigation into the effects of neoliberalism on housing in Iran aims to shed light on the country's unique situation. While the implementation of neoliberal ideology may vary, the overarching approach of the Iranian state reveals striking similarities to neoliberal principles. This observation highlights the importance of understanding the broader trends and ideologies shaping housing policies and practices in Iran. Chapter Five, titled "Squatter Government", explores the emergence of what I term a "squatter government", which seeks to appropriate both public and private properties under the guise of "improvement," "legibility," and "standardization." This concept resonates with Scott's (2020) argument in "Seeing Like a State," where he examines how modern states aim to make individuals, communities, and environments legible to facilitate control. To fully grasp the situation in Iran, particularly in the case of ZoorAbad, it is essential to integrate a critical political economy framework with perspectives like Scott's, which highlight the role of governments â beyond market forces â in deepening housing challenges for the urban poor. According to Scott (2020 [1998]), modern states often overlook activities on public or common lands as long as these resources remain abundant. However, when such resources become scarce, modern states tend to adjust their policies accordingly. For example, during the first decade of the Islamic revolution, the government pressured landowners â whether of agricultural or abandoned properties â to develop their land by constructing buildings. This policy was enforced coercively, with the government threatening to revoke ownership rights if landowners failed to comply. In my view, the Islamic regime's decision to permit the urban poor to seize land and construct their own housing during the early years of the revolution can be attributed to several factors. 20 The first reason is to relinquish the responsibility of providing social services, as part of the rhetoric of a pro-poor regime that promised to improve the situation for all Iranians, especially the impoverished. By allowing the urban poor to seize land and construct their own shelters (later recognized as informal settlements or slums), the government absolved itself of its primary responsibility to meet the basic needs of the most marginalized groups. The second reason stems from the abundance of undeveloped land in the vicinity of major cities. Thus, it was not a critical or costly decision for the Islamic regime to allow the urban poor to establish shelters on these inexpensive, marginal lands. However, after a few years, particularly during the presidency of Hashemi-Rafsanjani in the 1980s, the Islamic regime, influenced by neoliberal approaches and strategies, recognized the value and scarcity of land and real estate. In this regard, the regime began to act more like a "modern state," as described by Scott (2020), which seeks the legibility of environments and cities. So, the Islamic regime could not tolerate the existence of 'informality' and informal settlements, which were illegible and organic, and did not conform to standardized norms. Additionally, with the growth and sprawl of cities, the previously marginal lands (where the urban poor had constructed their shelters) came to be regarded as part of the formal sector of cities, leading to a significant increase in their exchange value. In this context, the Islamic regime, seemingly shifting its strategies towards pro-market ideology, could not overlook the potential exchange value of these lands in cities. As a result, the process of slum pacification, beautification, and 'improving informal settlements' began, aiming to demolish these grassroots, illegible properties to make space for speculative activities through new construction and gentrification. The third reason pertains to how these informal settlements facilitated and provided the basic infrastructure for new speculative activities. These informal and illegible settlements spurred grassroots development in these areas. For instance, urban utilities such as water and electricity were connected to these settlements, often through the efforts and sometimes at the expenses of the urban poor. Therefore, these areas were not merely vacant lands devoid of development. Rather, some infrastructure was established and constructed over the years through the resistance of the urban poor in these settlements. 21 As a result, the modern government, represented in this case by the Islamic regime, confiscated not only the lands and real estate but also the grassroots development that these people had contributed to the neighborhoods. In other words, the modern state's decision to allow the urban poor to construct their shelters on undeveloped lands was motivated by the readiness of these lands for new, legible development at lower costs for providing infrastructure. In the fifth chapter, another case-study from Roshankouh, an Iranian village, will be introduced, as a supporting case study for the argument surrounding the squatter government. This case tells the story of the state's demolition of six housing units belonging to Baha'is in the village. Through interviews and extensive research on secondary sources, I investigated the demolition of Baha'i houses in Iran in recent times. I believe this research is of great importance and relevance to my PhD, as it reveals how the state, under the guise of urban planning and policies, demolished housing belonging to marginalized Iranian individuals and households solely because of their religious beliefs. This case-study demonstrates the government's expropriation and dispossession of marginalized and disadvantaged groups in the name of implementing urban planning policies. To conclude the introduction and transition into the main body of the thesis, I will briefly summarize the two key arguments that will be developed throughout the work: 1- Self-built settlements in Iran need to be considered as an alternative to social housing, both in Iran and in other similar socio-political contexts, particularly in Middle Eastern countries. 2- The concept of the "squatter government" will be explored by examining the state's approach to the cases of ZoorAbad and Roshankouh, extending the empirical findings of this thesis into a broader conceptual discussion. This extractive, confiscatory, and authoritarian characteristic of states toward public and common resources highlights the need to challenge dominant approaches and policies of states. Such approaches not only lead to the eradication of common resources but also have broader implications, including the destruction of social bonds and the dismantling of communities. To preserve common and public resources and protect disadvantaged groups, 22 civil society must critically review and question the policies and approaches of "squatter governments". 23 2. Methodology In this chapter, I outline the methodology and methods employed in the research, providing an overview of the qualitative approach, which is primarily based on fieldwork. Detailed research questions are introduced, forming the basis for semi-structured interviews conducted with local residents and planners. The chapter also describes the extended case method, as proposed by Michael Burawoy (2009), which serves as a key theoretical framework incorporating case studies, comparisons, self-reflexivity, and participant observation. Additionally, methods such as observation and walking, both distinct yet interconnected approaches, are elaborated upon. While the primary focus of this study is on the ZoorAbad neighborhood, the thesis also draws on the case of Roshankouh village, where government-led demolition of housing contributed to extending one of the main arguments of this research. The methods used to study Roshankouh are discussed in the final section of the chapter. Key methods utilized in this research include semi-structured interviews, a review of official housing documents for ZoorAbad, an examination of academic and journalistic literature on ZoorAbad and Karaj City, and ethnographic observation and walking. Together, these approaches provide a comprehensive understanding of the socio-spatial and political-economic dynamics of informal housing in Iran. In this research, I conducted an in-depth investigation over twelve months of fieldwork, between December 2021 and December 2022. The first step involved surveying relevant academic and policy literature, including journal articles, masterâs and PhD dissertations, media documentation, and urban policies and plans. Next, I conducted 40 semi-structured interviews with various stakeholders, including residents of the ZoorAbad neighborhood, urban planners, property owners and landlords who rent out their properties but may not live in the area, and real estate agents. Interviews with real estate agents were particularly insightful, as these key informants provided valuable narratives about changes or continuities in the socio-ethnic composition of the neighborhood over recent decades. They offered a holistic perspective on the socio-24 economic characteristics of tenants and landlords and shared historical accounts of housing gentrification in ZoorAbad. Additionally, I carried out street-by-street walkthroughs of the neighborhood at different times of the day, observing social activities, and documenting evidence of grassroots strategies employed by ZoorAbadâs residents to navigate challenges. This involved taking detailed notes and photographs to address the research questions. Each of these methods contributes a unique and significant layer to the ethnographic narrative developed in this research. One of the primary methodologies employed is the extended case method, as conceptualized by Michael Burawoy (2009). This approach emphasizes situating the local object of study within its historical, social, and political contexts and extending it to a broader global scale. This methodology not only provides depth to the ethnographic narrative but also allows for the extension of conceptual frameworks and theories related to the phenomenon under study. One key limitation of this research was the socio-political situation in the country, which prevented me from engaging with relevant state institutions, such as Karaj municipality and the âCommittee for the Organizing Plan for ZoorAbad Neighborhood''. However, this limitation prompted me to reflect on and elaborate upon the state's dominant approach â not only in manipulating and controlling the everyday lives of individuals and communities, but also in extracting public/common and private resources, particularly those belonging to marginalized and disadvantaged groups. Regarding how academic and governmental policy studies, interviews, walking, observing, and visualizing, contributed to my learning, I must emphasize that these methods allowed me to produce a new quotidian narrative of poor neighborhoods and their strategies for addressing housing needs â one that contrasts with the dominant governmental narratives. As Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift (2002, 9) suggest, the contributions of flaneurs in observing and interpreting the city enable us to move beyond dominant knowledge about spaces, with their participation generating ânew everyday urbanismâ (Shortell & Brown, 2014, 29). The primary role of the flaneur is to provide critical and insightful interpretations for other citizens and inhabitants about various aspects of âthe cityâ. It is important to clarify that through these methods, I excluded other forms of learning, such as obtaining policymakers' opinions, conducting a critical analysis of policies and plans, or designing a housing model 25 for the urban poor. In the following subsections, I describe the selected methods in greater detail. 2.1. Ethnography - Extended Case Methodology Ethnography is a fundamental tool social scientists to craft and interpret social realities in their work. As a methodology widely used in sociology, anthropology, human geography, and other fields, ethnography investigates socio-cultural phenomena. In this research, ethnographic methods have been employed. Geertz (2001 [1973]) introduces ethnography as going beyond basic tasks like âtranscribing texts, selecting informants, or mapping fields, which he calls âthin descriptionâ. Instead, he emphasizes the need for "thick description," where ethnographers reflect on and interpret the data gathering during the initial phase of observation. Geertz argues that ethnography involves constructing multiple layers of interpretation to situate a social reality within broader socio-spatial and historical contexts (pp. 5-7). This process requires clarifying the relationships between phenomena and the macro and micro forces shaping them, while also incorporating other layers of analysis to enrich the understanding (p. 9). Ethnography, as Geertz points out, is not merely the study of places like villages, tribes, towns, neighborhoods, but an exploration of the forces and dynamics circulating within these socio-spatial entities (p. 22). In the current postmodern era, characterized by fluid, interconnected networks and contexts, âfixedâ traditional methodologies often require broadening and adaptation. Michael Burawoy (2009) addresses this need through the concept of the extended case method. As a Marxist scholar, Burawoy argues that theoretical frameworks should not only explain social phenomena but also shape the research methods and tools employed. He highlights the importance of consistency and integration between theoretical lenses and methodologies, asserting that theories and methods must inform and enrich each other (Burawoy, 2009, 6). For instance, while Marxism addresses large-scale historical transformations (macroprocesses), ethnography enables the study of how these macroprocesses manifest at the micro level (pp. 6-8). This dynamic interplay allows for fluid movement between macro-level theories and micro-level phenomena, illustrating their dialectical relationships. 26 Burawoy (2009) explains: âBy ethnography I mean writing about the world from the standpoint of participant observation; by science I mean falsifiable and generalizable explanations of empirical phenomenaâ (p. 23). He regards the extended case method as a form of âreflexive scienceâ (p. 23). It appears that Burawoy broadens the concept of reflexive ethnography by integrating a more structured and positive approach. In other words, ethnography is not purely reflexive; the ethnographer employs specific methods and techniques to construct her/his interpretations of the subject under study. Burawoy also highlights the existence of dialectical relationships between various elements of the research project (p. 8): â¢ Participant and observer (Role of the ethnographer): The ethnographer's presence as an entity extends into the realm of the study, creating a dialectical relationship between their personal experiences and the subject and object of study (Burawoy, 2009, p. 9 & 27). Even as an observer, the ethnographer shares space and time with the participants, which, in the sense, positions the observer as a participant (p. 27). â¢ Micro (time and/or space) and Macro (time and/or space): Due to the interconnected networks between micro phenomena and macro contexts, Burawoy highlights the dialectical relationship between âstudying the micro-foundations of macroprocesses [â¦] and studying the macro-foundations of microprocessesâ (pp. 10-11). â¢ History and sociology: Burawoy (2009) highlights that history can be employed to understand present phenomena through a theoretical framework (p. 9). â¢ Theoretical tradition and empirical research: The dialectical relationship between theory and empirical research can âimproveâ and âreconstructâ the theoretical framework (p. 13). As mentioned earlier, these dialectical relationships are not limited to the four categories outlined. Instead, they can be extended to other realms. Burawoy (2009) narrows down this idea into four principles of the extended case method: 1) Dialectical relations between observer and participants; 2) Extension of observation across âtime and spaceâ; 3) Extension from microprocesses to macro-forces; 4) Extension of theory as the ultimate goal of the extended case method (p. 17). 27 Employing ethnography as a method of âreadingâ and constructing social reality presents both challenges and opportunities. One significant challenge lies in the power dynamics inherent in the process, such as the impact of the ethnographer's presence on participants' thoughts and interactions. As a researcher, I found the concept of the extended case method truly inspiring. Throughout the research process, I aimed to uncover different layers of the reality of the housing issue in a particular neighborhood and extend these findings to broader historical, political and social contexts. By conducting interviews with settlers of ZoorAbad and extracting insights from their narratives, critically examining relevant state plans, reviewing documents and journals on the neighborhood's history, and illustrating a holistic image of the historical, social, and political contexts at local, national and broader scales, I have constructed multiple layers of the ârealityâ of housing phenomenon for the urban poor in Karaj, Iran. The two main arguments of this thesis â self-built settlements as an alternative to social housing and the concept of "squatter government" â emerged from my efforts to extend the current understanding of housing issue for the urban poor in Iran, into broader theoretical and practical dimensions. 2.2. Semi-structured Interviews One of the primary categories of qualitative data collection is asking questions through unstructured and/or semi-structured interviews (Balakrishnan & Forsyth, 2018, p. 147). âIn contrast to informal interviewing, the purpose of semi-structured interviewing is to gain detailed and focused insights into how individuals perceive a topic of interest to researchers.â This method aims to achieve an in-depth understanding of how key informants comprehend a particular challenge or issue (Silverman, 2014, p. 149). Semi-structured interviews provided the foundational material for constructing thick descriptions. These narratives were complemented by the researcherâs observation and interpretations and were cross-referenced with historical, political, and social documents. Ultimately, I extended these thick descriptions into a broader, multilayered context (local-28 national-global) to achieve a more holistic understanding of the phenomenon. In this research, I employed a combination of methods to address the research objectives. On one hand, I conducted 32 semi-structured interviews with the residents of ZoorAbad (17 tenants, 7 owners, and 3 realtors) and five urban scholars familiar with this neighborhood (please see pages 34-37). During these semi-structured interviews and observations, I explored the following questions: â¢ Identify who are the tenants, landlords, property owners and homeowners; â¢ Identify what kinds of solidarity exist among various groups and how they are manifested and exercised; â¢ Identify if there are still any solidarities among diverse communities in this poor neighborhood; if not, why and how were they undermined and weakened; â¢ Identify what sorts of barriers have been faced by the tenants in these neighborhoods to access affordable, adequate, decent, safe housing; â¢ Identify the demographic characteristics of tenants and landlords in different sectors of the case study area; â¢ Identify if there exist any specific zones that are occupied by specific groups (such as female tenants, refugees, LGBT+, disabled, drug dealers, etc.); â¢ Identify the characteristics of housing in different zones of this neighborhood; â¢ Identify if there exist similarities and dissimilarities between housing quality in the area; and, â¢ Identify if gentrification has been starting in the neighborhood (and if yes, who are the new tenants and landlords?). In semi-structured interviews, âpredetermined thematic questionsâ play a critical role. This method is characterized by its conversational nature, where the interview progresses based on the interviewee's responses. Initial questions often focus on the biographical details of the interviewees, while themes and topics align with the research objectives. According to Silverman (2014), in semi-structured interviews, the âinterview guide is the primary tool used by a researcher to keep the conversation flowingâ (p. 150). This guide typically includes three components: 29 â Informed consent statement: Often, âinformed consent statements are written out and either verbally administered or read by an interviewee and signed.â The primary aim of consent form is to inform interviewees about the objectives of the research, ensure their confidentiality, and explain the ârisks and benefits of their participationâ as well as details of the research process (Silverman, 2014, p. 150). In this study, considering the specific socio-cultural characteristics of the ZoorAbad neighborhood, the consent process was conducted verbally. â Grand-tour questions and follow-up probes: Grand-tour questions encourage interviewees to share their perspectives on the general themes of the research. Probes are more detailed, open-ended follow-up questions that delve deeper into specific topics. While a researcher organizes questions and their corresponding probes, the order of the questions may vary depending on âthe flow of an interviewâ (p. 150). Below are examples of some questions I asked interviewees: â Please tell me about when you moved to the ZoorAbad neighborhood. â How long have you lived/been there? â Please provide me with a brief life history of yourself. â Age, number of your household, occupation, ethnicity, hometown, educational background, etc. â Please tell me about your tenure of residence. â Tenant; owner; squatter; sharing a home; temporary settler; homeless and living in a tent; etc. â Describe where you live. â Indicate the location on map, and describe its social-spatial characteristics. â Describe the place where you lived before moving to ZoorAbad. â What was your tenure of residency there? Why did you move to ZoorAbad? â Tell me about the story of renting/buying a home in ZoorAbad. â How did you find housing in ZoorAbad? (through realtors; or acquaintances, family members, siblings, etc.) 30 â How did you make a tenancy contract? Or how did you own your housing? (through legal contracts or verbal and informal ones)? â Do you consider yourself as a member of a particular ethnic community/group in ZoorAbad, and as a whole? â If yes, what has been their role in facilitating your residency (especially in buying or renting a home) there? â If you are an Afghan refugee/immigrant, please describe how did you cope with the systemic discrimination regarding buying or renting a unit? â What was the role of realtors in this regard? What about your Iranian acquaintances? â What is your plan for the near future regarding housing? â If you are a tenant, what is your plan for the next year? â Do you have any plan for coping with inflation and devaluation of the deposit? â If you are a landlord, what is your plan for moving or investment in other lands? â What if you own your unit? â How did you find ZoorAbad as a neighborhood? â Give examples of the pros and cons of this area? â To what extent do you find similarities and differences between yourself and other proximate neighborhoods like Azimiyeh? â Do you know anyone in the ZoorAbad neighborhood who temporarily lives there (ex. living in a tent)? â To what extent do you find similarities and differences between your home and other neighbors in ZoorAbad? â Are there any âbetterâ or more âaffluentâ housing in ZoorAbad? Which parts of ZoorAbad neighborhood are considered as more attractive in terms of living? In other words, which zones of this neighborhood are 31 considered as the most suitable zone for living? Are there any difference between the price of land in ZoorAbad in different zones? â How did you find your units (personal connections, networks of people from the same region, etc.)? â What are the conditions of your units? â What kinds of services do you get? â Are these formal or informal services (ex. Bootlegged electricity, no running water, etc.)? â Who lives in your home/house (maybe several families in the same house, each occupying a room; maybe extended family)? â Could you tell me about the quality of your home? â As a woman what is your experience of living in this house? Do you feel safe? â What is your occupation? And where do you work? â Where do you shop and get your needs? â Have you and other settlers of ZoorAbad ever tried to organize a club/association to set rules/regulations for renting or selling/buying housing units in the neighborhood? â How did you find the role of real estate agents in facilitating finding a proper unit (as a tenant or owner)? â What is your opinion on Afghan refugees? Do you accept them as tenants? Do you agree to settle a unit that in their proximity Afghan refugees live? â Do you see any changes in social-economic-ethnic configuration of your neighbors or slum dwellers of ZoorAbad in recent years? For instance, do you know newcomers and where did they come from? â Do you know any sex-worker at ZoorAbad? Is there any zone in the neighborhood where they are gathered? What about drug dealers? Questions for Realtors/ real estate agents: â When did you begin your job as a realtor in ZoorAbad? â Do you live in ZoorAbad? If not, where do you live? 32 â Why did you choose this job? For instance, did you figure out a sort of increase in the price of housing or renting in this neighborhood, and thereafter you figured out this job as a lucrative one? â During the previous decade, did you find any change in the socio-economic characteristics of tenants in ZoorAbad (a move in social status of residents)? What about landlords? â What zones of the neighborhood are more expensive than others? And why? â What zones of the neighborhood are the cheapest ones? And why? â Are there any gentrified housing in ZoorAbad? Is there any difference in terms of price of rent or for sale between gentrified and non-gentrified units? Please explain with approximate numbers. â Since when did real estate agencies in the ZoorAbad neighborhood begin to increase? What did the residents do in absence of real estate agencies? â Could you please tell me about Afghan tenants and landlords in the area? â Have they been there since the beginning of the Iran revolution in 1979? If not, when did they begin to live here? â Is there any difference in your role when you want to rent a unit for an Afghan household vs an Iranian one? If yes, could you please explain in detail? â Is there any difference in terms of the price of rent for Afghans vs Iranians? Why? â What is the viewpoint of Iranian landlords if they give an offer to rent their unit to an Afghan household? â Is there any particular zone in the ZoorAbad neighborhood where Afghan refugees and migrants are concentrated? â What about sex workers? Is there any particular zone in the neighborhood which belongs to them? â What about drug dealers? 33 â Demographic questions and a closing statement: Some ânon-observable demographic characteristics of an intervieweeâ need to be clarified, such an educational background, age, hometown, and ethnicity. Closing questions encourage interviewees to share or discuss âany other issues they would like to addressâ. Also, within the debriefing statement, the researcher expresses appreciation for the interviewee's contribution and provides information about the process for disseminating the research results (Silverman, 2014, p. 151). For recruiting participants/interviewees, an introductory letter was used to explain the main aim of the research to potential interviewees. Following this, I personally contacted them to arrange face-to-face interviews at locations convenient for them. Each semi-structured interview approximately took around 45 minutes. Initially, I identified prospective interviewees through my personal network and acquaintances. To expand the pool of participants, I employed a snowball sampling technique to identify additional contributors. The interviewees represented a diverse range of individuals in terms of age, gender, residential status, education, and economic situation. Semi-structured interviews (32 in total) were conducted in the ZoorAbad neighborhood of Karaj, Iran (Figure 7), with residents from various social, ethnic, and economic backgrounds. These included foreign refugees, female heads of households, Iranian ethnic minorities, second-generations squatters, first generations squatters, tenants, young couples, and individuals with disabilities. This diversity helped create a comprehensive understanding of the varied groups living in the self-built settlement and their grassroot strategies. Figure 7: Location of ZoorAbad (Sourced from Google Maps, 2025) 34 Eligibility for informal interviews required participants to be residents of ZoorAbad, except for the five urban scholars who were not residents of ZoorAbad. Additionally, landlords who owned property in ZoorAbad but lived elsewhere and rented out their homes were also included. Realtors working in ZoorAbad were interviewed as well and served as key informants, providing valuable insights into housing conditions for the urban poor in the area. I selected the âsnowballâ technique as the primary recruitment method for this research because no comprehensive lists of ZoorAbad residents in Karaj were accessible to me. Consequently, participants were primarily recruited through my personal contacts. My community network, developed over the past 25 years since my elementary school years, along with my close connection to the study area (as my home neighborhood of was near ZoorAbad), helped me compile a list of current ZoorAbad residents. Those interested in participating in the study were contacted by the co-investigator and invited to take part in the research. To recruit residents of ZoorAbad, I first conducted interviews within my community network and inquired if they knew anyone interested in participating in a semi-structured interview. Additionally, while walking around the neighborhood, I randomly encountered ZoorAbad residents on the streets and engaged in brief conversations with them. The groups I reached out to include the following: â¢ Groups of women sitting on the ground in front of their homes, engaged in conversation or socializing. â¢ Shop owners and salespeople, whom I approached to ask if they were available for a brief discussion. â¢ Realtors stationed in their small stores, speaking with potential tenants and landowners. â¢ Friends, family members, and acquaintances of the individuals interviewed in ZoorAbad. 35 â¢ My own network of friends in ZoorAbad, with whom I walked through the neighborhood several times, reaching out to them on the streets and asking if they were available for a conversation about the neighborhood. Table of Interviewees is as follows: Pseudonyms Gender and age Nationality and Ethnicity Ownership status Other details 1 Mary Female - 55 Iranian - Turk Tenant Baha'i (minority group), 17 years lived in ZoorAbad. Now she moved to other low-income neighborhood. 2 Khadan Female - 38 Iranian - Turk Owner (second generation) Bachelor degree â she and her family moved to Azimiyeh, few years ago and still has shop and a housing there. 3 Zohri Female - 38 Iranian - Turk Owner (newly moved ZoorAbad) Bachelor degree â she recently bought a housing unit in ZoorAbad and move from Azimiyeh to there. 4&5 Rahman & Akram Male& female 50s Iranian â Gilaki (Rasht) Owner Poet - Lived in ZoorAbad for 35 years moved from ZoorAbad 10 years ago. 6-8 Na'na (and her mother and their neighbor) Females 32&50s&50s Iranian - Turk Tenants 9 Nahid Female â 70s Iranian - Turk Owner She and her family own various properties in ZoorAbad. 36 Pseudonyms Gender and age Nationality and Ethnicity Ownership status Other details 10&11 Gandom (and her sister) Female â 30s Afghan - Pashtun Tenant Recently moved from Afghanistan . 12-13 Noor and her sister-in-law Female â 25s Afghan - Tajik Tenant 14 Gol Female â 20s Afghan - Pashtun Tenant 15 Bala Boland Female - 35 Afghan - Pashtun Tenant Her husband worked in Azimiyeh and she moved from south of Tehran to ZoorAbad to be nearer to their family members. 16-18 Ziba and her sisters Female â 30s Afghan - Pashtun Tenant They had a wedding ceremony in their home but accepted us in that situation! 19 Pari Female â 40s Iranian - Owner She is researcher as well and she did her masters thesis on ZoorAbad. She lived in ZoorAbad more than 30 years. 20 Hossein Male â 40s Iranian Realtor and owner 21 Mehraboon Male â 60s Afghan â Tajik or Pashtun Tenant He moved recently to ZoorAbad and he looked like Turks! I interviewed him in the real estate store. 37 Pseudonyms Gender and age Nationality and Ethnicity Ownership status Other details 22 Zarif Female â 25 Afghan - Pashtun Tenant I met her in Hossein's shop. She was looking for a housing in ZoorAbad. 23-24 Mazloom & her daughter-in-law Females - 60 & 30 Afghan - Pashtun Tenant Recently moved to ZoorAbad and they fled Afghanistan due to her son's political positions. 25-26 Amoo Bongahi & his colleague Males â 70s Iranian - Turk Realtors and owners 27 Shiri Male â 50s Iranian Shop owner He owns a diary store in ZoorAbad. 28 Giti Etemad Female â 80 Iranian Urban scholar 29 Iman Vaghefi Male â 45s Iranian Urban scholar 30 Yazdani Male â 60s Iranian Urban scholar 31 Hosseinfar Male â 60s Iranian Urban scholar 32 Mohsen Habitat Male - 37 Iranian Urban scholar Table 1: Interviewees Information and pseudonyms. Regarding the protection of participants' identities, I will safeguard their information by storing it on my personal USB memory card, and in hardcopies within my personal file, kept in my office at home. 2.3. Walking Another method I employed in this research was walking. I explored the neighborhood as a âflaneurâ, observing and analyzing the areas through a critical lens. In social sciences, the concept of âflaneurâ has been a significant framework for understanding various aspects of 38 modern society. Each theorist highlights distinct characteristics of the flaneur based on their conceptual approach. For instance: âFor Anthony Giddens (1990) Baudelaireâs flaneur is a symbol of advanced modernity and urban anonymity. For Zygmunt Bauman (1997) the flaneur symbolizes uncertainty, fragmentary and episodic relationships; he experienced urban life in what could be named an âas if'' based on imagination and simulation. In the 19th century, the flaneur was running the game, while in contemporary society, he became a buyer (a passive actor), or even the sandwich man, as described by Benjamin, or a privatized cyberflaneur (Shortell & Brown, 2014, p. 22). The concept of the flaneur is rooted in four key activities: âwalking, observing, thinking, and creatingâ. Walking, as a fundamental human action, plays a critical role in connecting the flaneur with urban spaces. It provides a fluid experience, allowing the flaneur to flow through the veins of the city, encountering, adventuring, and perceiving the âcityâ (Shortell & Brown, 2014, p. 25). The flaneur is not a âpassiveâ observer consuming ârealityâ; instead, they hold significant agency in translating and deciphering spaces that encompass diverse phenomena and processes. In other words, the flaneur rewrites spaces by observing them through their theoretical lens and subjective perspective (p. 23). As they walk and experience the city, they produce a unique narrative (p. 24). In the postmodern era, the significance of the flaneur lies in the value of their narratives (Shortell & Brown, 2014, 23-25) which contribute to the diversification of perspectives and challenge dominant metanarrative8 (Duignan, 2009). When an ethnographer chooses âwalkingâ as a method of gathering information and understanding the various layers of a phenomenon, to the approach should not involve only walking âintoâ a neighborhood, which may result in kind of âface-to-face confrontationâ. Instead, the ethnographer should walk âwithâ local people, sharing the same routes and perspectives. This approach provides an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the 8 There are various prominent flaneurs in literature such as âBaudelaire and Honore de Balzac for Paris, Charles Dickens and Virginia Woolf for London, Nikolaj Gogol for Saint Petersburg, James Joyce for Dublin, Alfred Doblin for Berlin, Fernando Pessoa for Lisbon, Robert Musil for Wien, Joao do Rio for Rio de Janeiro, John Dos Passos and Paul Auster for New York, Orhan Pamuk for Istanbul, Nagib Mahfuz for Cairo, and Carlos Ruiz Zafon for Barcelonaâ. (Shortell & Brown, 2014, p. 25). 39 fears and hopes, as well as the challenges and opportunities, experienced by the community (Lee & Ingold, 2006). I also scheduled several walks throughout the neighborhood. There were occasions when I walked as a flaneur to observe and understand the socio-cultural characteristics of the area: to examine the façades of homes, the plots demolished by the government, the daily activities of the neighbors, and their interactions with one another. Given the specific socio-political conditions of Iran, particularly during the "Woman, Life, Freedom" uprising, walking as a female flaneur in ZoorAbad required careful considerations. For example, like many women in Iran, I resisted wearing the hijab in public spaces as a show of solidarity with the socio-political movement, despite the risk of arrest or detention. However, during my fieldwork in ZoorAbad, I chose to wear the hijab and conform to the dominant norms of the neighborhood in terms of my clothing. Initially, I walked accompanied by my spouse, Sina. Although I had received elementary education in ZoorAbad, I had not previously explored the entire neighborhood due to its stigmatization, which unintentionally deterred us, as Azimiyeh residents, from mingling there for safety reasons! After a few initial walks with Sina, I decided to invite my friends from ZoorAbad to join me for a walk around the neighborhood. During these walks, we discussed their living experiences, the challenges and opportunities they faced, their feelings, the characteristics of their housing, and their personal histories in the neighborhood. As we walked and observed the streets, they recalled and shared memories and insights about ZoorAbad with me. This methodological approach helped me gain a more tangible understanding of the space and the firsthand experiences they shared. Apart from the walks I took with a few residents of ZoorAbad, I also walked several times on my own to observe the neighborhood, view the façade of buildings, understand the relationships between people in the public spaces, and see how they used their private and public spaces in the neighborhood. Walking alone helped me experience the area, assess its safety, and reflect on my feelings about being in that informal self-built neighborhood. Additionally, it allowed me to contemplate the differences and similarities between ZoorAbad and other neighboring areas such as Azimiyeh. These experiences could not be 40 replicated by travelling through the neighborhood by car, which I also did. The slower pace of walking allowed for better observation and appreciation of the surroundings. âIn walking, we are on the move, seeing and feeling a route ahead of us and creating a path around and behind us. We can often explore a new place most fruitfully by walking through and around it.â (Lee & Ingold, 2006). Walking with others also fosters shared feelings and understandings, creating a sense of âcloseness and bondâ. Due to our slower pace, we pay more attention to the details of the environment and context. Walkers have the opportunity to look around. This traditional habit is gradually fading in modern lifestyle (Lee & Ingold, 2006). Another advantage of âwalkingâ is that it provides the chance to perceive changes over time. If a walker repeats the same route in a neighborhood, she can construct her own narrative of the place based on her observation and the ongoing changes in the environment. âExploring, wandering, foraging or approaching a goalâ are diverse ways of âmaking and remembering routesâ that a walker can adopt to become informed about a city (Lee & Ingold, 2006). There are different ways of socializing with other people. The most acceptable one is âtwo people standing or sitting and giving each other their full attention. But walking was often described by our informants as an excellent way of being âwithâ other people, a very rich way of socializingâ (Lee & Ingold, 2006, 79). âFace-to-face interaction of the kind Simmel describes, is much more confrontational and less companionable, for while one sees the other personâs eyes, one does not see what he or she sees. A shared point of view is harder to come by. The conversation that goes on in this context is more like an interview, in which points are batted back and forthâ (p. 80). Talking whilst walking is also encouraged by Anderson (2004), based on an investigation of environmental activism in southern England (Lee & Ingold, 2006). To conclude, one of the methods employed in this research was walking and taking notes in the field sites. Through walking, I applied the intervieweeâs narratives about the everyday life of the neighborhood. Consequently, this activity added a layer from my own viewpoint regarding the socio-spatial context of ZoorAbad neighborhood. In addition to âobservingâ the physical aspects of housing and the neighborhood, residents of ZoorAbad shared their personal understanding of actual living conditions, providing a broader view of the 41 relationships between tenants and owners. While this method by itself could not meet the objectives of the research (due to its inherent limitations and the characteristics of the research questions), it added another layer to our understanding. 2.4. Observation Since I was familiar with Jane Jacobsâs (1962) urban studies works, I have been intrigued by âobservingâ urban phenomena and speculating around them. As mentioned in the prior subsection, I observed and walked through ZoorAbad, documenting my observations through visual means (taking photos) and by taking notes in the field. Having grown up and attended school in and around this neighborhood, I also incorporated my personal history, familiarity, and networks as much as possible through visualization and narration. This could be considered another layer that enriches and thickens the description of the neighborhood. The visualization method and âusing photographs as a set of data (Moore et al., 2008, p. 61) in social study has a long history. âSome sociologists have been taking photo Methodology - Barriers and Opportunities Graphs for decades, of course, among them no less a figure than Pierre Bourdieuâ (Rose, 2014, p. 25). Margaret Mead and Bateson conducted this method to study the cultural aspects of the Balinese in 1942. Photographs and images can be used in various ways during the research process. For instance, a researcher can take existing images as data that need to be analyzed; a researcher can take photos herself during the data collection process; and/or during the research, participants may take photographs. Ibanez (2004) states that there is a profound difference between âresearch-drivenâ (which could be considered âtheory-drivenâ) and âparticipant-drivenâ photographs, the latter of which are categorized as âinductive researchâ (Moore et al., 2008, p. 51). In this research, aside from the daily pictures I took during my walks, in the final days of my field work, I selected a day and invited one of the interviewees â who is also a photographer and artist living in ZoorAbad â to accompany me and take photographs. I would like to emphasize that the contemporary images used in this thesis were captured by me, the researcher of this project. 42 Researchers can reframe sophisticated situations by taking photos. This is helpful for the public or audience who intend to visually experience the specific situations that occurred there. Additionally, the public often accepts the researcher as an âeyewitnessâ who has firsthand experiment with the issue of the research. This approach is highly influential in the media and can contribute to shaping âpublic opinion and policyâ (Gaber & Gaber, 2020, p. 46). Researchers use this method to measure the value, amplitude, and scope of a matter, such as âsuburban residential development moving into neighboring farmlandâ (Gaber, 2020, p. 48). Besides the aforementioned advantages and potentials of visualization, various urban issues cannot be effectively demonstrated or conveyed through this method. Furthermore, in some cases, ethical problems or barriers may prevent the use of this method (Moore et al., 2008, p. 60). Additionally, while photographs are objective entities, they are products of subjective practices. To overcome the limitations of this method, it can be merged with other methodologies (p. 61). Gillian Rose (2014) also highlights the interrelation between contemporary âvisual cultureâ, âin which meaning is increasingly conveyed visually and provisionallyâ (p. 40)â. She identifies photographs as the most popular method in visual research methodology. This popularity is due to the fact that photographs âare a trace of what was really there when the shutter snappedâ and âprovide a more direct record of the actual events being investigated than any of the other major forms of data collection used by social researchersâ (p. 33). Initially, I intended to collect data (and visualize them) by addressing the following question: Are there any visual characteristics that could be attributed to specific strategies (such as shared housing, new squatting housing, temporary settlements like tents, living in abandoned housing, etc.)? For instance, is there visual evidence of a shared housing zone through population density or the number of parked cars in front of a unit? Are there particular characteristics that could be attributed to a specific ethnic zone (such as Afghan or Azari zones) in ZoorAbad? If so, is there any relationship between these specific characteristics and the socio-economic situation of those ethnic groups? In this research, I intended to trace the following evidence or visual variables: - Recording the visual characteristics of different strategies within the neighbourhood; 43 - Investigating visual differences and/or similarities between squatting, co-housing, and temporary strategies, such as living in tents; - Visual characteristics of Afghanâs housing and their occupied zone in the neighborhood. During the field work, I found it challenging to address the aforementioned questions solely through observation. Due to the socio-political situation in Iran, taking photographs presented various complications. Personally, I hesitated to capture images of buildings belonging to individuals who perceived a difference between themselves and me. Consequently, there were instances when I intended to take a photograph but refrained from requesting permission to photograph their homes. To the best of my ability, I limited my photography to public spaces or building facades, opting to do so when streets or alleys were empty or in busy areas where I did not stand out. Another significant point in this method, regarding organizing the data, is the number of pictures you need to take. In other words, numerous images must be captured to select the most convincing ones for conveying the desired meanings. Also, it is also vital to document the relevant data for each image: such as the date and location of the photos, along with accompanying descriptions from the field notes (Gaber & Gaber, 2020, p. 52). In this research, I took around 100 photos, each accompanied by the specific date and location of capture. These were also documented with descriptions explaining their significance. Out of the 100 photos taken during my fieldwork, only approximately 10 were used in this research. The reason for choosing these numbers of photos is related to selecting the most relevant items for the argument. Additionally, the scope of the thesis was another factor influencing the decision to choose around 10% of the photos taken. Concerning taking fieldnotes, Goffman (2001) explains the significance of the first day due to the freshness of everything, which allows you to observe and conceive new things more than at any other time. During the fieldwork, I made it a habit to take notes shortly after returning home, typically withing a three-hour window. Throughout interviews, walks, and observations, I carried a notebook to jot down the most important points conveyed by interviewees or noted during observations. Upon returning home each day following fieldwork, I elaborately transcribed and typed the conversations into individual files on my 44 laptop, assigning pseudonyms to interviewees and organizing them accordingly. Additionally, I supplemented the notes with brief descriptions of the interview settings, specifying the time of day or night, the atmosphere of the location, and any other pertinent details. 2.5. Research Methods for Roshankouh Research In this subsection, I will elucidate the methodologies I employed for researching Roshankouh in chapter 5, section 3, titled "Dispossession of Baha'is in Iran â the case of Roshankouh Village". This investigation took place during my field study in ZoorAbad, Karaj, Iran. In the summer of 2022, a governmental institution conducted a raid on Roshankough village (Figure 8), predominantly inhabited by Baha'is with an approximate population of 100 people, resulting in the demolition of homes in this Baha'i community. Recognizing certain parallels between the ZoorAbad case and that of Roshankouh, I chose to undertake a concise research endeavor on this matter and allocate a dedicated section of my thesis to this matter. Figure 8: Location of Roshankouh (Sourced from Google Maps, 2025) The main methodological approach in researching Roshankouh paralleled my work in ZoorAbad. Although I had previously visited the village 10 years ago, unfortunately, the heightened policing atmosphere in Roshankouh in 2022 prevented me from visiting to conduct direct interviews with locals. Consequently, leveraging my networks, I connected with a family from Roshankouh who had travelled to Tehran. Through a thorough semi-structured interview with them, I obtained insights into the village's oral history and the 45 treatment and persecution faced by Baha'is in terms of access to "space" and facilities due to their religion beliefs. Additionally, I enlisted their help to conduct interviews with several Roshankouh residents during their travels between Tehran and the village. This family provided firsthand accounts of the events in Roshankouh during the summer of 2022. In addition to conducting interviews, I have conducted surveys of various historical documents, urban policies, and secondary sources that extensively explore the issue of Roshankouh. One of the primary secondary sources I utilized was an article from Factnameh regarding the Roshankouh raid. Factnameh "Launched in 2017 by Asl19, a private company registered in Toronto, Canada, is a fact-checking team offering timely multimedia content to help Iranians make informed decisions and hold officials accountable."9 (Factnameh, 2024). The Factnameh article on Roshankouh is rich in both information and evidence, demonstrating that the Housing Foundation, a state organization responsible for addressing housing issues for low-income groups in Iran, falsely claimed that the construction activities of villagers in Roshankouh were illegal. Therefore, this source plays a pivotal role in providing data and information regarding Roshankouh. 9 https://factnameh.com/en/about 46 3. Informal (Self-built) Housing as an Alternative to Social Housing in Iran The modernization narrative often suggests a linear decline in housing informality as societies modernized. However, this framework fails to capture the complexities of informal housing evolution in Iran, particularly within the context of ZoorAbad. In this chapter, I explore the intricate relationship between modernization, socio-political conflicts, and housing informality, challenging the assumption that modernization inevitably resulted in decreasing informal housing. Instead, I argue that modernization itself can generate and exacerbate housing informality, particularly in suburban areas where the convergence of dispossessed rural migrants and opportunistic entrepreneurs creates a volatile environment for property claims. This chapter traces the historical development of housing informality in Iran, beginning with pre-modern communal housing practices deeply rooted in ethnic and tribal bonds. The centralization of the nation-state and the shift towards a market-based economy disrupted traditional modes of life, marginalizing nomadic and rural lifestyles and fostering a wave of rural-to-urban migration. As Tehran and other major cities expanded, the traditional Mahalleh system, once based on ethno-religious similarities, gave way to neighborhoods increasingly defined by socio-economic class segregation. This chapter also examines the dual forces of modernization and conflict, particularly how political upheavals and revolutionary movements disrupt and reshape property regimes, leading to further housing informality. The influx of rural migrants into urban centers since around the middle of the 20th century, driven by industrialization and land reforms, often resulted in the growth of self-built settlements. These settlements, characterized by their informality, reflect a deeply ingrained mindset among migrantsârooted in communal and self-reliant housing provisionâthat clashed with the state's urban planning ideals. As we move towards understanding the post-revolution housing crisis in Iran, the chapter sets the stage for a critical analysis of the stateâs approach to informal/self-built housing. The 47 subsequent sections will delve into the socio-political dynamics of land redistribution, the impact of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) on urban migration, and the stateâs response to the burgeoning self-built settlements. By reconceptualizing informality as grassroots, community-based solution, this chapter argues for its potential as an alternative to social housing, particularly in contexts lacking robust social housing infrastructure. The case of ZoorAbad, serving as the focal point of this research, exemplifies these dynamics, revealing the persistent struggle between self-built housing efforts and state intervention. 3.1. Housing Crisis for the Urban Poor in Iran 3.1.1. Housing Crisis in Iran To understand the housing crisis for the urban poor in Iran, this section provides an overview of the contextual, socio-political, and economic drivers that have implicitly or explicitly influenced the housing situation. The narrative follows a chronological pattern, beginning in the early 1900s, even though the historical focus of this research is on the post-Islamic revolution period. This brief review of socio-political contexts is essential for understanding the roots of the housing crisis in Iran and how it emerged. In other words, it helps us to grasp the various modernization process in Iran and their impact on housing for vulnerable groups, specifically the urban poor. Additionally, we examine how these modernization processes clashed with traditional conceptions of housing and neighborhoods. 3.1.1.1. Housing Situation in Iran: 1900-1979 Historically, in pre-modern Iran three main modes of life - migratory pastoral tribal, rural, and urban â existed (Piran, 1988). Nomadism in Iran historically functioned as a robust and competitive economy, operating alongside agriculture and various urban economic activities. The nomadic tribe comprised 2-3 million10 individuals, accounting for a significant portion â between one quarter to one half â of the total population of 6-8 million (Ehlers, 2011). This tribal lifestyle influenced the population's mindset regarding housing and neighborhood 10 In the 19th century. 48 spaces. On one hand, their tribal and ethnic characteristics played an important role in constructing social bonds in Iran at that time, which is reflected in the emergence of the first pre-modern neighborhoods. On the other hand, migratory tribal people as well as rural communities, had a specific approach towards "housing provision". In their view, housing or shelter is a 'self-built' entity, mostly constructed as a household initiative with the help of relatives and other community members. Therefore, reviewing the housing situation in Iran during the pre-modern historical period is critical for the purpose of this thesis. This review helps us understand the tradition of informal socio-economic relationships concerning housing, particularly among the majority of the Iranian population, who experienced a migratory tribal and rural lifestyle. In the late 18th century, Shah Agha Muhammad Khan declared Tehran the capital of Iran. The force of segregation in Tehran during that time was based on ethno-religious similarities, leading to the emergence of the MAHALLEH (Quarter system), which shaped and constructed identities (Bayat, 2013, 153-154). Generally, each Mahalleh (or residential quarter) was separated from other Mahallehs by walls and gates, creating a homogenous space for people with similar ethnic, religious, and/or professional characteristics to gather and live (Ehlers, 2011b). The social importance of Mahalleh lies in the dominant lifestyle of that era, which was largely migratory tribal and rural. In both modes of life in pre-modern Iran, ethnic and religious similarities and bonds played a crucial role, which was reflected in the construction of Mahalleh. The ethno-religious segregations and arrangements persisted until the second half of the 19th century when Naser Eddin Shah expanded the city walls to integrate diverse populations (including the poor and migrants), influenced by Haussmannâs work in Paris (Bayat, 2013, 153-154). During the first years of the 20th century until the initiation of the Pahlavi dynasty (1910-1925), 'old Tehran' covered an area of approximately 21 square kilometers with a population of 250-300 thousand people. It was surrounded by ditches, approximately 12 meters wide and 5.5 meters deep, and connected to its surroundings through 13 gates (Shahri, 2002, pp. 8-14). Due to the expansion of the city walls during Naser Eddin Shah's era, more diverse people lived in the neighborhoods. The ratio of landlord-to-tenant in Tehran during those days shows indicates the significant influx of newcomers seeking housing and needing to 49 settle in Tehran. The landlord-to-tenant ratio was approximately 1.7, with 7,200 rental housing units and 12,430 private houses. While this ratio suggests the presence of new groups and migrants in the city, Shahri (1987) believes it reflects the popularity and simplicity of tenancy compared to ownership during that time. For example, tenancy was preferred due to its simplicity, as tenants were exempt from repair costs. Rent for houses with 3-8 rooms ranged from 1-2 Tomans, which was very cheap and affordable11. (the price of one meter of land was equivalent to the price of one meter of fabric). (Shahri, 2002, pp. 240-243) (Shahri, 1987, pp. 240-247). Based on this data, it seems that the concept of land ownership was relatively insignificant for people at that time. One implication of this was the informality in landlord-tenant relationships. Regarding tenant-landlord power dynamics, informal and pleasant relations between them were observed in traditional courtyard housing. Renting a room involved a simple process of direct negotiation without formal contracts or deposits12. Tenants were expected to pay rent nightly, with landlords occasionally forgiving missed payments as gestures of goodwill, especially during holidays (Shahri, 2002, pp. 487-488). Interestingly, tenants had no fixed lease terms and could stay as long as both parties agreed, and often spanned generations. Shahri (1987) believes that the informal relationships between landlords and tenants stemmed from trustworthiness and adherence to ethical norms. He argued that this situation was paramount in this social framework until the First World War, which was disrupted by subsequent wars and the coup of Reza Shah, marking of the beginning of the modernization process in the country. As strangers flocked to Tehran, these dynamics altered significantly. Constructing houses was straightforward as land was inexpensive and regulations were 11 The rent price for a 3.m*5.m room with a cuddy/closet was around 2 Rials or less (0.2 Toman). For renting two rooms, the price was around 3 Rials. The price of renting a courtyard housing with five or six rooms was between 10 Rials (1 Toman) and 12 Rials. The price of owning (buying) a 104 square meters housing with two or three rooms were around 12-13 Tomans. The price of housing between 416 and 520 square meters with 6 or 7 rooms was between 15-20 Tomans. Also, for buying a 1040 square meters housing the maximum price was around 100 Tomans (Shahri, 2002, p. 489). Jafar Shahri sheds light on the reluctance of people (Iranians) to buy housing. He provided an example of a baker who was offered to buy a house in ÛØ·Ø­Ù ÙØ§Ø³. The area of the house was 780 square meters with the price of 25 Tomans. The seller offered instead of money, the baker was responsible to bake 3 kilograms bread daily. This was an eye-catching offer, but the baker did not accept to buy the house. In his viewpoint (and many other people there), being a tenant was much easier than being a landlord. In addition, the relationship between tenants and landlords (according to the similar cultural and religious belief) was appropriate and respectful and consequently, all of these factors are associated with the reluctance of tenants to buy housing (Shahri, 2002, pp. 489-491). 12 Interestingly, the way to rent a room was the tenant went door to door and ask the household is there any available vacant room in this house? When she or he admitted the availability, they agreed on rent price and then they moved to the room. 50 minimal; permission was not required for construction (Shahri, 1987). However, after the 1921 coup â which led to the founding of the Pahlavi dynasty â a housing crisis ensued due to a surge in migration13 from rural areas to the city (Shahri, 2002, pp. 240-243) (Shahri, 1987, p. 247). Due to the centralization of the nation-state in the 1920s and the shift to a market-based national economy, the traditional symbiosis between migratory tribal, rural and urban modes of life was disrupted (Piran, 1988). In the early 1920s, only around 11% of Iran's population was urban (Khatam, 2001). However, from that point onward, the urban mode of life began to dominate, surpassing rural and nomadic lifestyles, with the country's resources increasingly absorbed by urban centers, especially Tehran (Piran, 1988). The initiation of large-scale urbanization in Iran began in the 1920s as part of Reza Shah's modernization project. This transformation was profoundly influenced by the burgeoning oil industry, which, from the 1920s onward, reshaped Tehran from a center of production into one focused on consumption and capital accumulation. This shift not only led to the emergence of new social classes, but also to the development of new socio-spatial segregations (Shahri, 1987, p. 14). These emerging divisions were evident in the evolving urban landscape and the structure of neighborhoods. Along with changes in cities and the urban mode of life, these political, social, and economic shifts in Iran have significantly contributed to the marginalization of nomadism. The decline of major nomadic tribes like the Bakhtiari was primarily due to conflicts with the Iranian government. Until the 1930s, nomads, particularly the Bakhtiari tribe, held considerable military power and controlled key trade routes. However, in the 1930s, the Iranian government decisively weakened the upper level of nomadic leadership, although tribal functions at the micro-level remained intact (Ehlers, 2011). As a result of these processes, a considerable population of nomads were forced to adopt a sedentary lifestyle in villages or cities, leading to a steady rise in the urban population since 13 "There were only minor changes in the rural-urban distribution of the Persian population between the beginning of the 20th century and the outbreak of WWII. On the other hand, during the same period Persian cities grew more rapidly (54%) than did rural areas (45%), owing partly to the superior social infrastructure and resulting longer life expectancy for newborns and partly to steadily increasing migration from rural areas." (Ehlers, 2011) 51 the 1930s, with an annual growth rate of 4.5%14. This marked the onset of modern urbanism. This trend spurred significant industrial development and the expansion of infrastructure (Khatam, 2001) (Ehlers, 2011b), including the construction of new residential areas adjacent to traditional city centers. These new districts were distinct from older neighborhoods characterized by "sun-dried brick or mud architecture". Instead, they featured predominantly one- or two-story buildings made of baked bricks with flat tin roofs. In major cities, multi-story buildings with rental apartments also become prevalent (Ehlers, 2011b). Additionally, the first streets of Tehran15 were constructed during this period over the ditches. Interestingly, Tehran municipality encouraged people to fill the remaining ditches surrounding the newly constructed streets, allowing them to occupy those lands (Shahri, 1987, p. 14). Along with altering the architectural characteristics of Mahalleh, the demolition of the city walls led to the end of the Mahalleh system based on ethno-religious similarities. It was replaced by zoning based on class segregation and the construction of boulevards (Bayat, 2013, pp. 155 & 176). Ehlers (2011) argues that the most significant driver for the expansion of old cities was "intra-urban shifts" rather than rural-urban migration. He elaborates that new quarters and neighborhoods were built by urban elites, affluent individuals, and "urban-based rural landlords" who invested their resources in real estate and engaged in speculative activities in older Mahalles. Consequently, these affluent individuals preferred to settle in new quarters and rented out their old housing in the traditional Mahalles experienced changes in their social and economic configurations (Ehlers, 2011b). This narrative adds another layer to the reality of urban modernization and neighborhood transformation. Alongside rural-to-urban migration, which is a significant socio-economic force in modern cities in Iran, another key driver of the transformation of traditional Mahallas was the intra-urban shifts from old neighborhoods to newer, affluent residential quarters. In line with Tehran's modernization, many workers migrated to the city to work in nearby industrial factories. From 1934 to 1938, the worker population in Tehran grew 25-fold, reaching 540,000 by 1939 (Shirazi, 2013). Aligned with this trend, internal urban movement also significantly contributed to the expansion of older neighborhoods in Tehran. Wealthier 14 Previously, the urban population growth rate was 1.4%. 15 ShahReza (Enghelab), Shush, and Shahbaz (17 Shahrivar). 52 inhabitants, such as merchants and landlords, invested in real estate and relocated to new districts. Consequently, their former homes frequently accommodated rural immigrants. This dualism between old and new urban spaces during the 1930s and 1940s shaped Tehran's development (Ehlers, 2011b). Following the economic downturn after World War II, urban development paused temporarily but regained momentum from the late 1950s onwards16 (Ehlers, 2011b). With the increase in oil revenues after 195317, there was a notable rise in public sector investment in urban services, alongside the facilitation of industrial activities within or near major cities. These shifts, combined with rural underdevelopment, strongly drove rural-urban migration after the late 1950s (Alaedini, 2015), leading to Tehran's population reaching 1.5 million by 1956 (Shirazi, 2013). Rural migrants arriving in major cities typically lacked skills, could only secure low-paying jobs, and could not afford standard housing in the formal market. As a result, many were drawn to informal settlements (Alaedini, 2015). In addition to this, it should be noted that these rural migrants, who had previously experienced a nomad lifestyle, as well as other rural people, had a strong informal approach to housing. These individuals, accustomed to self-built housing solutions, viewed housing as a self-constructed entity that needed to be provided with the help of relatives and friends. Therefore, the growth of 'self-built settlements', or informal settlements, during this decade, should also be understood within the broader context of rural and nomadic attitudes towards housing. The subsequent socio-economic and political driver behind urban migration in Iran is related to the Land Reform between 1962 and 1972. This reform dismantled feudal structures in Iran paving the way for a new class of independent farmers engaged in both small-scale18 and large-scale agriculture. Approximately 58 percent of agricultural land was redistributed during this period, benefiting around 1.7 million rural families (58 percent of rural families) nationwide. However, the remaining 42% of rural families, left without land, were compelled 16 Particularly after the 1960s. 17 The 1953 coup in Iran overthrow Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh' government, which had nationalized the country's oil industry. 18 With an average holding size of about 4 hectares per household, well below the estimated 7 hectares minimum required for subsistence. 53 to migrate to cities in search of job opportunities. Young rural residents sought education in the cityâs schools, further contributing to the migration of rural labors (Ehsani, 2006, pp. 83-89). The impact of land reform extended beyond rural and urban life, significantly influencing nomadic communities during the 1960s. The nationalization of forests and pastures in 1963 led to the expansion of farmland into traditional nomadic territories, which promoted growth in rural and urban animal husbandry. Notably, the privatization of collective pastoral property rights fragmented these rights into individual user rights with limited durations, dismantling collective organization at the micro-level and isolating individual nomads. Moreover, all uncultivated pastures and forests were nationalized, becoming government property. In the 1960s, nomads comprised an estimated 10-15% of Iran's total population, or approximately 2-4 million individuals (Ehlers, 2011). In light of the new socio-economic landscape, migrations toward cities led to the spontaneous growth of urban areas and the emergence of self-built settlements, also known as informal settlements. In response, municipal and central governments in the mid-1960s adopted a mixed approach of denial and attempts to either eradicate or relocate settlement residents. For instance, the Ministry of Housing and Development attempts to resettle residents from informal settlements like Behjatabad, Rahahan, South Mehrabad, and North Rudaki by constructing the 3,600-unit Kuy-e Nohom-e Aban. However, these initiatives19 largely failed to achieve their intended outcome (Alaedini, 2015). One reason for their failure was the significant disconnect between the conceptions of housing held by designers and planners and those held by the rural and nomadic migrants, who were considered urban poor. Planners envisioned housing in ways that often conflicted with the migrants' experiences, particularly in construction methods â where rural practices were collective and self-built â and in the functional use of different spaces within residential units. 19 In order to address the informal settlement issues, a special commission, formed by the Social Affairs Department of the Plan and Budget Organization, developed activities for informal settlements under the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (PBO, 1971, 1972). 54 In addition to land reform, by 1964, over half of national investments and industrial activities were concentrated in Tehran, which was another key driver of population growth in the city and the subsequent emergence of self-built/informal settlements. In response to counterbalance Tehran's dominance, the national government implemented the 1968 policy that banned new industrial activities within 120 km of Tehran, sparking suburbanization, particularly to the south and west of the capital. This led to a significant increase in the number of cities in Tehran province, from 4 in 1956 to 15 in 1976, and 25 in 1996. For example, Karaj's population surged from 44,000 to 1 million between 1966 and 1996, transforming the city into a sprawling multi-nuclear urban region (Shirazi, 2013). Industrialization in Iran, particularly in Tehran, gradually expanded from the early Pahlavi era, but intensified significantly in 1973, culminating in Tehran becoming the primary industrial center, employing about half of the nation's workforce by the mid-1970s. The sharp increase in national income following the rise in oil prices in 1973, attributed to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), prompted the Persian government to launch an extensive urban renewal initiative. However, it also exacerbated social and economic inequalities within urban areas, creating a stark contrast between the wealthy and the poor, upscale neighborhoods and slums, industrialists and workers, as well as between the educated and the illiterate (Ehlers, 2011). To sum up, the modernization process initiated by Reza Shah during the Pahlavi dynasty had various implications, some of which were likely unintended. The three modes of life in Iran â nomadic, rural, and urban â underwent significant changes due to modernization, with the dominant lifestyle shifting to an urban mode of life. However, these new urban residents retained strong rural and nomadic socio-cultural backgrounds, which influenced their mindset about many aspects of life, including housing. Their conception of housing was closely aligned with informal housing practices, where housing provision was seen as grassroots, communal activity, and the house itself as a self-built entity. Consequently, due to the high rate of migration to cities and urban areas, these rural and nomadic newcomers engaged in constructing their own housing in or near urban centers. Furthermore, the structure of Mahallas (traditional neighborhoods) was impacted by the modernization process in Iran. Mahallas, which were originally organized based on ethnic and religious similarities, were 55 gradually replaced by modern neighborhoods based on the socio-economic classes of residents. Iran with its oil20-agricultural economy, faced numerous challenges due to top-down land reforms, rising oil prices, and the concentration of investment in urban spaces. These factors led to the evacuation of numerous villages, the decline of nomadic way of life, and a high rate of migration from villages to cities (Katoozian, 1985) (Piran, 1987). One of the spatial consequences of these converging forces and circumstances was the emergence and growth of self-built settlements within or near large cities. 3.1.1.2. Housing Crisis in Iran Since the 1979 Iran Revolution In this subsection, we will review how the modernization process initiated by the Pahlavi dynasty was affected by the socio-political conflicts of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The pro-poor rhetoric, coupled with the social justice propaganda of the Islamic regime, had a significant impact on land redistribution and property regimes, leading to controversy after the revolution. The urban population experienced dramatic growth due to rural-to-urban migration, resulting in the emergence of 'rural' architectural and cultural manifestations within large cities, primarily through the construction of self-built settlements. Additionally, the socio-political turmoil and the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s affected households and individuals in western, southern, and southwestern cities of Iran, causing migration from those war-affected provinces to large central cities like Tehran. Reviewing these factors provides a broader understanding of why, in the absence of housing plans and social housing policies, self-built settlements (through squatting and public land seizure) proliferated during the first decade after the revolution. Following the 1979 Revolution, the Islamic government's approach to land and its redistribution remained controversial and had significant impacts on the three modes of life in various ways (Ehsani, 2006, 87). Initially, the Islamic government persistently viewed all 20 Oil exploitation in the Middle-East was initiated by the beginning of the 20th century, and the first major exploitation occurred in Iran. By the end of the 1960s and the 70s, due to some political and financial transformation on the global scale, the oil producing countries took the entire control of their oil resources. Consequently, the Iran state had been considered as the receiver of the oil revenue and by itself, it has the monopoly role in making the decision on how to consume these revenues. This approach provided multiple socio-political consequences (Katoozian, 1985). 56 pastures as state-owned and regarded nomadism as outdated, prioritizing modernization and adherence to Islamic principles. Nomadism was perceived as a potential risk due to the difficulty in controlling nomads, leading to an unfavorable reputation for nomads in the eyes of the Islamic government, as they were not seen as strictly observant (Ehlers, 2011). As a result, despite the Islamic government's initial claims, this mode of life became even more restricted and began to disappear after 1979. Between 1976 and 1986, urban population growth reached 72 percent21 (Bayat, 1997, 78-82), increasing from 15,715,000 to 26,991,000, respectively (Rabiei, 2019, p. 22). While Iran's rural population grew by a factor of only 1.61 between 1966 and 1996, the rural population of the most populus urban region in the country, the Tehran-Karaj Urban Region, grew by a factor of 4.95 (Shirazi, 2013). This urban population growth after the Islamic Revolution is mainly attributed to two key trends: first, rural-to-urban migration driven by the promises of the Revolution, and second, the migration of Iranian and Afghan war refugees to central cities like Tehran. Both migration trends occurred in a context of insufficient investment in Iran's housing sector after the 1979 Revolution, particularly the lack of social housing policies. Regarding the first trend, in villages, former landlords sought to reclaim lost land, while small-scale farmers aimed to obtain more land (Ehsani, 2006, p. 87). These by-products of Land Reform, coupled with the pro-poor rhetoric of the Islamic government, incentivized rural-to-urban migration. So, in the lack of affordable housing, under the label of "revolutionary housing", âspontaneous popular land occupations22â occurred and it resulted in a dramatic growth of cities. A large portion of this population selected southern neighborhoods of Tehran and âsettled down in suburbs in poor homes,â due to the attraction of the largest labor market in the country and the low cost of housing there (Rabiei, 2019, p. 22). All these caused a dramatic decrease in housing in various cities23. âTehran boundaries doubled within two yearsâ between 1979-1982 (Ehsani, 2013, p. 157). This process 21 comprised of mass rural migrants, Iran-Iraq war refugees (2.5 million people), and Afghan migrants (2 million individuals). 22 There are numerous terms for referring to the self-built housing, including spontaneous housing, slums, informal housing, deteriorated housing, illegal housing and so on. In this thesis, I have chosen to primarily use "self-built housing" in this writing. However, different phrases may be used depending on the context. 23 For example, a demand for 300,000 homes per year in Tehran. 57 intensified after 1981 due to worsening the socio-economic situation which resulted in accelerated migration into cities (Ehsani, 2013, p. 158). The second trend emerged during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Families living in Western and South-Western cities of Iran who were affected by the war were forced to move towards the peripheries of safer central cities. As an example, in Khuzestan alone the war created about one million refugees within the province. Migration increased the number of slum dwellers around big cities such as Mashhad, Tehran, and Zahedan (Shaltuki, 2016). Around 2.5 million Iran-Iraq war refugees were forced to live in temporary tents and needed housing. By 1985, around 2 million Afghan refugees had also fled the Russian Mujahedin war to safety in Iran, settling mostly in large cities where they sought work and an income. Contrary to Afghan refugees in Pakistan who were supported by the UN, US, and the rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf, Afghan refugees in Iran had no such international support due to international sanctions and Iranâs isolation. They had to rely on the formal and informal labor markets to support themselves and eke out a living (Bayat, 1997, 78-82). Due to the abovementioned processes, along with urban population growth during the first decade of the Islamic revolution, another notable phenomenon was the acceleration of homeownership. In 1966, about a decade before the revolution, 78% of Tehran households owned their homes. This figure dropped to 53% by 1976 but rose again to 63% by 1986. The increase in homeownership during this decade can be attributed to widespread squatting, land seizure (Piran, 1997), and mass encroachments by the poor on public and private properties following the Islamic Revolution, which marked a turning point for informal settlements in Iranian cities (Bayat, 2013, 80). Abandoned lands, formerly owned by individuals connected to the previous regime24, were occupied by various groups, leading to the emergence of informal settlements (or spontaneous housing25) within and around urban centers (Alipour, 2015, 21-22). Despite the dominant negative view of informal settlements, Piran (1997), one of Iran's prominent urban sociologists, argues that self-built/informal settlements are actually grassroots planning efforts by the urban poor in a society without a social housing plan. 24 who had left the country or whose ownership was questionable. 25 "Spontaneous housing" refers to those settlements that urban poor in developing countries illegally construct their housing on public or private lands - on the peripheries of cities - over a night (Piran, 1987 b). 58 I completely agree with Piran's view, and in my opinion, it is crucial to consider these self-built settlements as grassroots planning. However, this argument alone is not sufficient. While the main argument of this thesis shares similarities with Piran's viewpoint, the key difference is that, in my view, these settlements should not only be seen as grassroots planning but also as alternatives to social housing in the absence of formal housing programs. I have also discussed the similarities and differences between these alternatives to social housing and public housing projects in Iran, such as the Mehr housing project, particularly in terms of the use of public land in both types of settlements. 3.1.1.3. Urban Growth and the issue of self-built settlements in Tehran In this subsection, we will examine the growth of self-built settlements in Tehran after the revolution and explore the reasons behind this phenomenon. We will also examine the state's response to the expansion of informal/self-built settlements in Iran, including efforts to increase housing stock in the market. Finally, we will discuss whether this strategy was effective or not. The first comprehensive plan of Tehran, developed by American architect Victor Gruen between 1963-1967, coincided with the 1963 land reform, which spurred mass rural26-to-urban migration27 and the growth of informal settlements on the city's outskirts. It was estimated that by the 1970s, around 200,000 new homes would be needed (Bayat, 2013, 156). Bayat (2013) argues that the failure to implement and follow through with the comprehensive plan resulted in 35% of Tehran's population living in self-built settlements (also referred to as slums) by 1979 (p. 156). At the time of the 1979 revolution, Tehran's population was 5 million, with a socio-economic hierarchy28 reflecting the city's north-south topography, where the poorest residents lived in the lowest-lying areas. The low-income neighborhoods began from Mawlavi Avenue, extending to the southern plain, and contained dense slums (Bayat, 1997, pp. 25-33). With a 26 Some three million farmers had become landless (Bayat, 2013, 156). 27 By 1955, 50% of Tehranâs population were tenants, with 40% being rural tenants occupying one or two rooms (Bayat, 2013, 156). 28 The first affluent Middle Eastern gated neighborhoods emerged in northern of Tehran neighborhoods such as Darrous, Tajrish, etc. In the southern part of the city such as Naziabad, Javadieh, Moftabad, Zagheh, dense poor rural migrants were settled (Bayat, 2013, p. 158). 59 sharp decline in private housing investment during the early years of the revolution29, and an influx of 1.2 million people into the Tehran-Karaj Urban region between 1976 and 198630 (Shirazi, 2013), the demand for housing surged to 300,000 homes per year. Bayat (2013) argues that in response to the situation, many sought practical solutions by claiming state or public land or occupying vacant apartments. As a result, in 1980, homeownership increased to 63%, up from 53% before the revolution (pp. 159-161), partly due to the legalization of illegally squatted slums. From the viewpoint of urban planners and policymakers, one of the challenges facing the Tehran-Karaj region is the proliferation of self-built/informal settlements on the outskirts of cities (Shirazi, 2013). Between 1980 and 1992, Tehran's land area tripled from 200 to 600 square kilometers (Bayat, 2013, p. 80), mainly due to squatting activities and subsequent legalization. Between 1975 and 1995, the area of informal settlements in this region increased from 5% to 19%, accommodating 1,980,000 individuals by 1995 (Shirazi, 2013). Squatters constructed more durable homes in these settlements. To the west, Tehran expanded toward Karaj, encompassing diverse towns and formal/informal settlements. Interestingly, villages were affected by this urban growth and experienced a transformation into semi-urbanized-rural areas. This process occurred as a result of the lower price of rural land, which became attractive for many urban poor seeking to build dwellings. Islamshahr and Bagherabad are two examples of these rural communities near Tehran (Bayat, 1997, pp. 78-82). The description of these informal settlements, even by critical scholars, is notable and highlights how these areas were stigmatized. Bayat (1997) characterized these slums as overcrowded, muddy, and dirty, with narrow alleys and one- or two-story houses (pp. 25-33). While these features may reflect some aspects of the conditions in these settlements, this description alone demonstrates the stigmatized perspective towards these areas. There is no mention of any positive attributes. Bayat (1997) further describes that each room belonged to a tenant family with three or more children, and kitchens and bathrooms were shared with the landlord. Due to the high density of these neighborhoods, the distinction between public and 29 the number of housing construction with permission in 1982 âwas only one-tenth of that in 1979. 30 Over the next 10 years, this number increased to 1.9 million (Shirazi, 2013). 60 private spaces was blurred. In the southern zone of Tehran, some slums (self-built settlementxs) emerged within the brick-making industrial zone (Bayat, 1997, pp. 25-33). In terms of the infrastructure in these slums, conditions varied widely: 63 percent of slum dwellers occupied a single room of 2.5 square meters. However, many self-built/informal settlements that emerged after the revolution in Tehran were in proximity were larger, with homes averaging 18.5 square meters, much bigger than those in Nairobi or Tunis, which ranged from 5 to 6.7 square meters. The size of these communities also varied, from 10 units to more than 600 households. For instance, in 1979 around 56,000 people squatted in ZoorAbad area, primarily a working-class community. By 1980, about 1 million poor slum dwellers lived in Tehran (Bayat, 1997, pp. 25-33). The issue of self-built/informal housing does not arise solely from a lack of housing stock in the market. Even if there is sufficient housing, without government regulation, the rental market cannot adequately address the housing needs of the urban poor. For instance, in Iran, inflation has made housing a secure investment with better long-term returns than other sectors, encouraging developers to build new homes and increase the housing stock in the formal market (Asadi, et al., 2020). However, without regulation, these new housing units are often rented out for speculative purposes, with owners aiming to profit from their investment. As an example, in 2020, one individual in Iran owned over 2,000 residential units, giving them the power to manipulate housing prices (Aslani, 2020). This demonstrates that merely building new homes without proper regulations does not solve the housing crisis for low-income groups. According to statistics, in 2017, there were approximately 500,000 empty residential units in Tehran, "registering a 13% increase compared with" the previous five years. In Iran "there is currently one vacant house for every 10 occupied houses. The situation is much worse in the capital" (Financial Tribune, 2017). The housing crisis for the poor cannot be addressed by simply constructing more homes, as most of these units remain unaffordable for low-income households. 61 3.1.2. Iran's Policies and Planning This section is dedicated to reviewing social policies after the Islamic revolution and understanding the government's approach to social issues, particularly how the pro-poor and social justice rhetoric is reflected in the constitutional articles of the Islamic regime and how these were implemented. We will also examine urban and land policies directly related to housing for low-income groups, which contributed to the emergence and growth of self-built/informal housing after the revolution. These policies include urban land codes, the abolition of urban wasteland ownership, the development of new towns, and the Mehr housing project. Over the past 200 years, Iran has lacked comprehensive social policies (Rabiei, 2019, p. 18). Historically, Middle Eastern states like Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran provided social services using oil revenue, either through nationalist populist regimes or pro-Western rentier systems (Bayat, 2013, 56-57). During the 20th century, particularly under Pahlavi rule (1925-1979) and the onset of modernization in Iran, social policies saw significant development in various sectors. The centralized state experienced rapid economic growth, which led to increased urbanization and population growth. Social, educational, and cultural institutions were Westernized, transforming the class system. The land-reform program of the 1960s dismantled the traditional landowning class, altering rural socio-economic structures. The expansion of education led to the rise of a new middle class, that played a key role in modernization. Women's status improved through reforms such as universal suffrage and family protection laws, though these benefits were largely concentrated in urban areas. Despite improvements in living standards and the expansion of public services, economic inequalities persisted. The modernization process, while advancing economic and social development, also created tensions and disparities that shaped Iran's socio-political landscape (Ashraf & Banuazizi, 2011 [1992]) (Alaedini, 2015). Emerging from a on tense socio-political context, the Islamic Revolution promised a just society. From 1979 onward, the new Islamic regime promoted a rhetoric of pro-poor and âdowntroddenâ approaches (Rabiei, 2019, p. 16). While the new constitution reflected these ideals in certain articles, other sections perpetuated multidimensional discrimination against 62 minorities. Even the articles aimed at promoting justice and pro-poor policies were not effectively implemented or enforced. A decade after the revolution, the influence of neoliberal ideology began to mark another stage in Iran's modernization, reducing state support and social responsibilities, including rent control and land laws. According to Bayat (2013), the neoliberalization of policies in Iran progressed more slowly than in other Middle Eastern countries due to labor resistance and political factionalism (Bayat, 2013, 56-57). In Iran's new constitution, established after the 1979 revolution, Article 3, Clause 12 states that the government is responsible for âcreating prosperity and eliminating povertyâ and âabolishing the lack of essential needs in housing'' (Chapter4, Article 43, Clause 1) (Mozaffari & Westbrook, 2018, pp. 5-6). Most notably, Article 31 recognizes the right of every Iranian to access suitable housing according to their needs, with the government responsible for ensuring this, particularly for vulnerable and marginalized groups (Alipour, 2015, 51-52). This implies that residents of informal settlements are entitled to certain public rights. However, despite the Islamic Revolutionâs political rhetoric about providing housing for the poor (Khatam & Haas, 2018, 5), Athari argues that the housing needs of the urban poor have been largely ignored in Iran's spatial planning and housing policies (Dalil et al., 2021). In addition to neglecting the provision of affordable housing for economically marginalized groups, such as low-income households and individuals, the Islamic regime also violates the rights of other vulnerable and marginalized groups â such as racial, ethnic, and religious minorities â to housing and land ownership, as outlined in Article 31. A prominent example is the Baha'i community in Iran, a religious minority that has been systematically deprived of various human rights (Baha'i International Community, n.d.). According to Article 13 of the Constitution, "Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities who are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies", thereby excluding Baha'is from recognition as a religious minority. As a result, their basic civil and human rights, including access to education or land ownership, have been denied in various forms since the Islamic regime took power in 1979. Although Article 14 of the Constitution declares that "the Islamic government and all Muslims are duty-bound to treat non-Muslims in conformity with ethical norms and Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human 63 rights," the systematic discrimination and persecution of Bahais by the Islamic government stands as a direct violation of this article. Chapter 4 of this thesis includes a section discussing a contemporary case where the Islamic regime systematically dispossessed Baha'is in an Iranian village, demolishing their homes and confiscating their agricultural lands. To critically examine the housing situation of the urban poor, it is essential to highlight the role of the state in the production of space in Iran. According to the Article 44 of the Constitution, "the economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to consist of three sectors: state, cooperative, and private", with "the state sector encompassing all large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major minerals," as well as physical transportation and infrastructures. At first glance, the dominant ideology of the Iranian Islamic state appears to be a conservative-Islamic one, seemingly distant from neoliberal approaches to urban management and planning. A second characteristic of the Iranian government's approach to urban issues is its significant intervention in the economy and planning, again seemingly in opposition to the neoliberal paradigm. Third, âthe built environment in Iran is barely financialized. However, planning practice has a distinctly entrepreneurial outlook, as speculation in land is the cornerstone of most developmentâ (Vaziri Zadeh, 2016). Clearly, the Iranian state's role in organizing and constructing urban spaces is undeniable, playing a significant role in the reproduction of uneven spaces and spatial inequalities (Dalil et al., 2021). Reviewing Iran state's approach to addressing housing issues after the revolution reveals the significant role of "privatization", a characteristic of neoliberal states, as a pivotal feature in numerous state plans and policies from the early years of the revolution. Bayat (1997) argues that during the 1980s, amidst the Iran-Iraq War, civil unrest, and social and political turmoil, the government's strategies for addressing housing issues included: 1. âselective housing provisionsâ by the Housing Foundation (p. 100); 2. âhalting rural-urban migrationâ through Mosque Associations and religious leaders (p. 102); 3. âformalizing the informalâ by forcing squatters to pay for urban services like electricity and piped water (p. 103); and 4. slum 64 pacification31 (Bayat, 1997, 105&158). In my opinion, specifically, the last two strategies, particularly formalizing the informal (settlements), were implemented through the privatization of common lands previously occupied by the urban poor. Furthermore, slum pacification is a typical urban strategy used by modernized and neoliberalized governments to facilitate speculative activities and gentrification, making newly released lands available for fresh investment and urban projects. These neoliberal strategies, employed by the Islamic regime post-revolution, can be interpreted as part of the modernization process and a gradual transition toward establishing a property regime. The initial attempts at privatizing certain common/public resources such as urban skyline, public lands, and pastures, significantly influenced the housing crisis in Iran after the 1979 Revolution. It is important to note that the privatization of urban skylines is a more complex concept compared to pastures or public lands, due to the ambiguity of land ownership in relation to dimensions. This raises questions, such as whether land ownership is perceived as a two-dimensional surface, with the vertical space regulated as public property? Privatizing the 'skyline' thus challenges traditional notions of land ownership. While these topics are intriguing, their scope extends beyond this section and warrants further research in an academic context. Ehsani (2013) argues that âRevolutionary housingâ led to dramatic urban growth; for instance, âTehran boundaries doubled within two yearsâ from 1979 to 1982. Approximately 90 percent of this urban expansion â equivalent to half a million hectares â resulted from the occupation of previously unoccupied public lands by individuals, which were then converted into private properties and housing. This expansion mostly occurred outside formal municipal borders, leading to âsprawling suburbs.â The role of the state in this process should not be dismissed. The government was unable to adequately address affordable housing, contributing less than two percent of the new housing constructed during this period. Consequently, newly established governmental and revolutionary institutions, such as Housing Foundation32 (HF) of the Islamic Revolution and the Urban Land Organization (ULO), facilitated or legalized the process of public land occupation and its subsequent 31 During the summer of 1992 around 2,000 informal buildings in Tehran were destroyed which was considered as a huge number. 32 Inaugurated by a decree by Ayatollah Khomeini 65 privatization. This process intensified after 1981 due to worsening socio-economic conditions, which accelerated migration into cities (Ehsani, 2013, pp. 157-158). The privatization of public land extended beyond housing issues; remaining public land was sold below market value to middle-class state employees by government institutions (ULO and HF), serving as a crucial source of income for the state. Financial activities and subsidises from banks, which were intended to promote pro-poor and low-income housing, mostly benefited state clients and the middle class (Ehsani, 2013, 158). As Bayat (1997, 158) and Ehsani (2013, 158) note, âsquatter migrants brought urban land under development both long before the Islamic revolution and after, creating new communities''. Despite the overall rhetorical propaganda, the Islamic regime did not propose any effective projects to address housing issues for the most vulnerable groups. For instance, in 1986, the Ministry for Housing organized multiple mass housing competitions for various Iranian cities33. However, none of these competitions resulted in realized projects; instead, they served as test-cases to explore the impact of revolutionary Islamist ideology on architectural conception and representation (Mozaffari & Westbrook, 2018, 4-5). While the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) is often cited as a key obstacle to the government's effectiveness in addressing housing issues for the vulnerable during the first decade of the Islamic revolution, the concept of "the state of exception" provides additional insight. Agamben's (2005) theory of "the state of exception" explores how governments can suspend normal legal frameworks in response to emergencies or crisis, creating a legal vacuum where standard rights and protections are suspended, leading to authoritarianism and the erosion of human rights. According to Ghiabi (2019), crisis also shapes political landscapes and governance structures, justifying exceptional measures or policies, such as the provision of housing for vulnerable populations. In this case, the Iran-Iraq war served as a convenient justification for the inefficiencies and deficiencies of the Islamic government during the first decade of the revolution. Overall, within this socio-political context, the Islamic Republic of Iran was unable to effectively address housing issues for the urban poor and was unsuccessful in establishing a "modern" property regime during its early years. 33 Such as, Hamedan, Isfahan, Tehran, Shahr-e Kord, Garmsar, Khorram Abad, Rasht, Khuzestan and Mashhad. 66 After the Iran-Iraq war, various governments since 1989 have adopted different approaches towards pro-poor social policies. For instance, during Rafsanjani's presidency (1989-1997), social policies were treated as a marginal concept rather than a focus of economic development. While Khatami (1997-2005) promoted social policies, he was not successful in their implementation during his presidency (Rabiei, 2019, p, 16). National projects such as New Towns and Mehr Housing, although proposed to address housing issues, have proven ineffective for the urban poor communities (Hosseini & Beigli, 2017, pp. 2-9). Overall, as a "state of exception", the Islamic government has exploited crisis to justify its deficiencies in addressing housing for the vulnerable at various stages. Additionally, planners in Iran, influenced by the Islamic Revolution, often adopt a problem-centered approach, focusing on past or present issues without adequately considering future challenges (Asadi, et al., 2020). The following section will review some of these affordable housing plans and policies. 3.1.2.1. The Urban Land Code (ULC, Qanun-e Zamin-e Shahri) & The Urban Waste Land Ownership Abolition Law (UWLOAL) Since the 1979 revolution in Iran, spatial development in the country has been guided by National Development Plans (NDPs). Additionally, âsome major spatial planning laws were passed during the early years after the Islamic Revolution to reduce housing prices for the working classâ (Dalili, et al., 2021). The first of these was the enactment of the "Urban Waste Land Ownership Abolition Law (UWLOAL) by parlement in June 1979. This law designated all urban wasteland (unused land) as public (governmental property), abolishing private ownership of such land. Landowners were restricted to retaining a maximum of 1000 square meters if they did not own a house (Azizi, 1998). Another major legal tool enacted by the state in 1982 for a five-year period was the Urban Land Code (ULC, Qanun-e Zamin-e Shahri) aimed at providing affordable housing. "According to this law, the Urban Land Organization (ULO) could possess bayer land, which was currently unused but had a previous history of development. Additionally, Article 9 67 allowed the ULO to acquire dayer34 land or farms in 32 cities, that were experiencing housing and land issues." (Azizi, 1998). Accordingly, landowners near cities were granted permission to construct or renovate their buildings; otherwise, the state would seize or confiscate their land (Tarh-e Jame-e Maskan). During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the government, through the five-year National Development Plans (NDPs), provided another context for its involvement in land management (Dalili, et al., 2021). Azizi (1998) argues that "the main objectives of these laws were to provide land for housing, as well as for other public uses, and to curb land speculation. The major points of the urban land laws were to restrict the amount of land held by landowners and to prohibit land transactions, except to or from the government. Between 1982 and 1992, 329,952 hectares of land were acquired and over 17,044 hectares of net residential land were distributed among applicants" (Azizi, 1998). Based on this information, less than 5% of the confiscated land was distributed, but it is unclear who received this land and whether it went to vulnerable groups. Furthermore, what happened to the remaining 95% of the land acquired in the name of providing housing for the urban poor, without any specific plan for its use. 3.1.2.2. New Towns Since 1946, Iran has initiated its first affordable housing projects35 (Hosseini & Beigli, 2017). Additionally, the 1977 National Spatial Strategy Plan, formulated two years before the revolution, emphasized new towns as a means to address housing shortages, foster urban growth, promote balanced economic development, and manage migration. Prior to the 34 Dayer lands refers to lands with a history of development which still exist and works, such as gardens or farms, as well as housing building with its relevant infrastructures. 35 For instance, Chaharsad-Dastgah was established in 1946 with different neighborhoods including one-story building houses and two-story houses. Narmak was constructed in 1952 in northeastern Tehran, and targeted middle- and low-income classes (Hosseini & Beigli, 2017, 1-6). Another project is related to Kuy-ye-Nohom-e-Aban, south of Tehran, that is considered a successful example of large-scale affordable housing in Iran. However, its success is exceptional due to favorable conditions during its construction in the 1960s, low labor and material costs at the time. The project replaced the Behjatabad shanty area with profitable high-class apartment towers, benefiting from the demand for prestige. It's worth noting that few original occupants remain, and houses have changed ownership multiple times (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 134). 68 revolution, these new towns were primarily created for political, military, or economic purposes, or to provide housing for state employees (Basirat & Arbab, 2022). Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, housing provision strategies shifted, with the state promoting 'horizontal urban growth' until 2005 (Hosseini & Beigli, 2017, pp. 1-9). In 1985, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MHUD) assumed responsibility for new town planning and construction (Basirat & Arbab, 2022). One reason for establishing new towns after the revolution was the expectation that Iran's population would reach 130 million, based on the total fertility rate of 6.5 in 1986. However, by 1996, the growth rate had decreased to 1.96% (Ziari & Gharakhlou, 2009). The Iran New Town Development Company was established in 1986 to work alongside the MHUD in implementing these projects. Feasibility, location and design studies for over 30 new Towns across the country were conducted, with some construction beginning in the mid-1980s. These New Towns served as a tool for intervention during the reconstruction period following the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) (Basirat & Arbab, 2022). In 1986, around 16,000 hectares of land were dedicated to the New Towns aimed at creating satellite cities near major cities like Tehran (Hosseini & Beigli, 2017, 1-9). As a result, 17 new towns, known as the first generation of new towns in Iran, were proposed around major cities, approximately 30 km away, to alleviate population pressure and accommodate overflow (Basirat & Arbab, 2022). Iran's 17 first-generation new towns collectively house 767,000 people, representing nearly 1.3% of country's urban population. By 2017, these new towns began attracting more residents, meeting 33% of the population targets set in the first comprehensive plan and 20% of those in the latest plan. Success in attracting populations varied among towns. For instance, Parand and Andisheh, near Tehran, exceeded their original population projections, achieving 122% and 113% of their targets, respectively. In contrast, Sahand reached 92% of its target, while Pardis only reached 49%. A few new towns, such as Alavi, Ramin and Shirinshahr, have struggled to attract the planned population. Currently, 17 first-generation new towns, designed to accommodate approximately 4 million people across 420,000 hectares of public land, are under construction (Basirat & Arbab, 2022). 69 The first generation of Iranian new towns was primarily developed to address housing shortages and rapid population growth. However, many experts argue that the new town policy has become more problematic than effective (Basirat & Arbab, 2022). Key challenges facing these new towns include poor location choices, inadequate public transportation, shortages of facilities and services, difficulties in attracting the target population, social segregation and marginalization of certain demographic groups (Basirat & Arbab, 2022) (Shirazi, 2013), a dormitory function of these settlements (Ziari & Gharakhlou, 2009), reliance on land sales for funding, unstable national urban planning policies, frequent changes in housing and urbanization strategies, and the emergence of informal settlements in the proximity of new towns, particularly around metropolitan areas (Basirat & Arbab, 2022). However, I disagree with Basirat and Arbab's last point. The emergence of informal/self-built settlements near new towns is not inherently a challenge for these towns. Instead, it reflects the unaffordability of new towns for low-income households, leading them to establish self-built settlements nearby to benefit from the available basic infrastructures. New Town projects exemplify discriminatory policies in land allocation based on individuals' employment status. The construction of New Towns created lucrative opportunities for government employees and technocrats through subsidized land allocation, which can be seen as a form of privatization favoring technocrats. These new towns were primarily designated for public sector employees, offering little in terms of housing for the urban poor (Alipour, 2015, 58). In other words, while this policy did not address housing for the urban poor, it represents a discriminatory urban policy in Iran that excludes the issue of housing for low-income groups and privatize public lands to benefit technocrats and government employees. 3.1.2.3. The Mehr Affordable Housing Project (2006-2016) In Middle Eastern cities, mass housing is often employed as a large-scale response to housing needs. This approach can economically address housing issues. For instance, in Turkey, especially since the 1960s, detached housing types have been replaced by midrise and high-rise residential units, which have become the dominant forms of social housing in the region. 70 In contrast, in Iran, with its oil dependent economy, between 1979 to 2007, the government promoted âhorizontal urban growthâ and 'small-scale housing production' from 1979 to 2007. However, since 2008, the Iranian government has shifted its approach to affordable housing with the Mehr project, which involves mid-rise residential blocks (Kılınç & Gharipour, 2019, 8-9). Between 2005 and 2013, under President Ahmadinejad, one of the most contentious initiatives was the âMehr Housing Planâ. This plan aimed to provide social housing with several objectives: âhelping to provide housing for low-income groups, improving the quality and quantity of housing production and supply, reducing inequalities in affordable housing, enhancing the metropolitan environment and improving environmental standards, attracting small-scale investments, preventing the rise in land and housing prices, curbing the development of informal settlements, and promoting social justiceâ (Abdolahpour, Sharifi, Ghazi, 2021). In the Comprehensive Housing Plan developed for the Fourth Plan, several measures were introduced, including efforts to separate land costs from housing prices. These measures were formalized into the Mehr Housing program during the Fifth Plan, which received full government support as the primary means of offering standardized housing to impoverished households. Implemented on publicly owned land, Mehr housing projects were exempt from construction taxes and fees (Fardanesh, 2013, as cited in Alaedini, 2015). The key concept behind Mehr Housing was the "zero land" policy, which eliminated the land value component â typically 45-60% of the total housing price (Rabiei, 2019, 36). By focusing solely on construction costs, the pricing of Mehr Housing apartments in mid-rise buildings was intended to remain affordable for low-income families, especially when paired with subsidized bank loans (Fardanesh, 2013, as cited in Alaedini, 2015). Notably, new homeowners under the Mehr housing program were granted a 99-year lease (Abdollahpour, Sharifi, Ghazi, 2021). The Housing Foundation was responsible for the Mehr Housing projects in cities with populations under 25,000. Consequently, these projects began in the peripheries and marginal areas of towns and cities, emerging in 2007 (Rabiei, 2019, 36). Approximately 2.18 million Mehr units were planned for development between 2010 and 2012, with 56% of them 71 completed and ready for occupancy by the end of that period (Fardanesh, 2013, p. 28 as cited in Alaedini, 2015). According to the âimplementation plan of housing supply programs in 2007â, Mehr housing units were intended to be constructed in New Towns. This initiative resulted in Tehran province housing the most Mehr housing units (100,000 units), earning the city the nickname âthe capital of Mehr Housingâ (Abdolahpour, Sharifi, Ghazi, 2021). Notable Mehr Housing projects in proximity to Tehran and Karaj include Parand New-Town Mehr housing with 95,000 units in five-story blocks constructed in 2007; Andisheh New-Town Mehr housing with 3,093 units constructed in 2008; Hashtgerd New-Town Mehr housing with 55,000 units in 2008; and Pardis New-Town Mehr housing with 80,000 units constructed in 2008 (Hosseini & Beigli, 2017, pp. 1-6). The low construction standards of Mehr housing, combined with the neglect of socio-cultural aspects in these complexes â such as residents' interactions in public spaces, lack of a sense of belonging and identity, disorganization in streets and main roads, insufficient access to green and open spaces, and inadequate public transportation â pose significant challenges for the Mehr housing plan (Abdolahpour, Sharifi, Ghazi, 2021) (Rabiei, 2019, p. 36). 3.1.2.4. Saving, Mass housing, and Downsizing policies, as new Housing Market Regulation In 1995, the Council of Ministers, following a proposal by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, approved the framework for establishing a unified planning system for the country's major cities, including Tehran. This decision was based on the recognition that many of the major urban problems, including the issue of informal settlements, were caused by an inefficient regulatory system (Alipour, 2015, 56-57). During the period from 1996 to 2000, the government â under the policy of "saving, mass housing, and downsizing" â aimed to increase home ownership among low-income groups. The three pivotal elements of this policy were "supplying housing to the vulnerable class, renovating urban decay, and encouraging mass housing", along with promoting housing cooperatives to build new housing stock. However, these cooperatives had limited success, constructing few homes and primarily serving specific community groups rather than vulnerable populations (Zarghamfard, Rezaei, & Gholipour, 2024). 72 Another key strategy included coordinating tax policies and allocating subsidies to regulate the housing market. Regarding housing management, more responsibility was shifted to local institutions. However, by 2007, the government resumed control due to poor coordination and ineffective management by housing authorities (Zarghamfard, Rezaei, Gholipour, 2024). 3.1.2.5. Empowerment Policy The Empowering Urban Dilapidated Tissue policy for the reorganizing of informal settlements relies on three main pillars: empowerment, institutionalization, and capacity-building. In Iran, a document titled the "National Empowerment and Regularization of Informal Settlements Document" was prepared upon the recommendation of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and was approved in 2003. This document represents the principles and political strategies for government intervention, providing guidance for the empowerment of and organizing informal settlements. Following the approval of the document, a national body called the "National Headquarters for Empowerment and Regularization of Informal Settlements" was formed in 2004 (Alipour, 2015, 59). A decade later, the National Strategy Document on Revitalizing, Upgrading, Renovating, and Enabling Deteriorated and Underutilized Urban Fabrics (NSDRURE) was approved in 2014 to coordinate efforts among national and local stakeholders for sustainable urban regeneration (Habibi, Basirat & Razavi, 2020). Based on this, a new policy named Urban Regeneration has been introduced by the Ministry of Urban Development. This policy aimed to prioritize projects and programs for prevention of growth of informal settlements, focusing on bottom-up planning approaches for understanding local challenges, and diversifying financial facilities for developers36. The focus is on revitalizing historical urban districts, irregular inner-city zones, and informal settlements. By August 2014, the Urban Development and Renovation Organization of Iran (UDRO) had identified 76,442 hectares of deteriorated urban fabrics housing 11 million people across 495 cities and an additional 52,443 hectares of informal settlements with 6 million residents in 77 cities (Habibi, Basirat & Razavi, 2020). 36 https://urban-planner.ir/urban-district/ 73 While there have been some policies addressing informal settlements, they have proven ineffective for several reasons. These policies and plans were not integrated with the broader housing policies of the country. Additionally, although revitalization projects may appear to be positive steps toward improving living conditions in these neighborhoods, they have often led to gentrification and the displacement of the most vulnerable groups within these communities. Generally speaking, in modern states, such projects and policies have often served as alternatives to new development projects aimed at profit-making, rather than leading to genuine improvements in living conditions. 3.1.2.6. Social Housing Policy (2016-2020) This policy aimed to provide low-income housing without segregating these groups from the broader community. It focused on three principles: creating sustainable policies, leveraging private sector and community involvement, and minimizing government interference. Unlike previous policies, social housing was to be built within cities' old, worn-out areas to utilize existing infrastructure and reduce costs. However, despite being a key campaign promise, the program was never implemented (Zarghamfard, Rezaei, Gholipour, 2024). Another aspect of this policy is its emphasis on minimizing government interference. Although the policy was not implemented, it reflects the government's prevailing approach to housing provision for low-income groups. In this policy, the private sector was considered the primary provider of 'social' housing, with an emphasis on profit making. In other words, this policy implies empowering the private sector and construction companies by possibly providing extra incentives from the government to specific private sector entities. This policy could also serve as another platform for oligarchs and connected "private" sectors and companies to exploit construction in the name of social housing. By the way, this policy was not implemented. In addition to the lack of coherence among housing policies and plans for the urban poor â and the failure to implement these plans effectively â the absence of a functional housing finance system is another key driver of the housing crisis in Iran, further exacerbating the situation for low-income households. 74 In Iran, the housing finance system is severely constrained by structural and macroeconomic limitations, resulting in restricted access to affordable, long-term credit. Most housing purchases depend heavily on household savings, as access to bank loans or alternative financing options remains limited, revealing the inadequacy of financial intermediaries (Atefi, Minooei, & Dargahi, 2010). Even households with adequate income often struggle to purchase a home due to the absence of supportive financial mechanisms and long-term loan options. As of 2004, housing and construction loans accounted for only about 7% of Iranâs GDP, with a mere 2.5% to 3.3% dedicated to long-term housing creditâan essential factor for enabling sustainable homeownership. Furthermore, high inflation, coupled with interest rate controls set below inflation levels, has resulted in negative returns on savings. This has discouraged deposits and further limited the funds available for lending, creating a scenario in which housing prices frequently exceed average household incomes and access to long-term loans remains critically insufficient (World Bank, 2004). The institutional framework of Iranâs housing finance system is dominated by Bank Maskan, a state-run institution established following the nationalization of banks in 1979. Bank Maskan manages a segregated financial circuit dedicated solely to housing, often representing 30% to 40% of the total housing finance market, and in some years up to 90%. However, its financial tools are limited, with only 40% of its lending allocated to long-term home purchase loans, while the remaining 60% supports short-term construction finance. The lack of access to market-based funding mechanisms further restricts Bank Maskanâs ability to manage liquidity and interest rate risks effectively. Other banks, lacking the privileges afforded to Bank Maskan, primarily offer short-term construction loans, reinforcing the systemâs bias toward short-duration, developer-focused credit (World Bank, 2004). In parallel, several public and quasi-public financial institutions offer subsidized housing programs aimed at specific social groups, such as government employees, military personnel, and low-income families. These programs, often carried out in collaboration with ministries or state organizations, include interest subsidies, discounted land, and co-financing schemes. For instance, Bank Refah partners with the government under the Ghadir Project, Bank Sepah provides targeted loans to military staff, and Bonyad Maskan administers low-income housing initiatives. While these programs offer some relief, they are not broadly accessible 75 and depend on oneâs affiliation with specific sectors or institutions, leaving the general population reliant on personal savings and informal financial arrangements to afford housingâparticularly in high-cost urban areas like Tehran (World Bank, 2004). In conclusion, a comprehensive review of Iran's housing situation from 1900 to the present, particularly focusing on the period after the 1979 revolution, reveals the socio-political and economic complexities that have driven the country's housing crisis. The clash between modernization efforts and traditional housing concepts and rural-nomadic lifestyles, not only affected housing itself, but also transformed neighborhood structures, shifting from ethnic and religious divisions within traditional Mahalleh to socio-economic class-based segregation in modern neighborhoods. The modernization process combined with socio-political changes and conflicts, further exacerbated the housing situation. Land reforms in the 1960s, along with the concentration of national investments and industrialization in Tehran and a few large cities, deepened inequalities and, when coupled with rapid rural-to-urban migration, significantly contributed to the rise of self-built settlements in major cities. Post-revolution policies, though framed within a pro-poor, social justice rhetoric, saw certain articles of the new constitution perpetuate multidimensional discrimination against minorities. As a "state of exception", the Islamic government has often exploited crisis to justify its failure in addressing housing for the vulnerable. Urban planning and housing policies post-revolution adopted a problem-centered approach, focusing on past or present issues without adequately considering future challenges. Despite numerous housing policies, a lack of coherence and integration among them, failure to implement plans, and the profit-driven nature of housing plans remains a defining characteristic of Iran's housing landscape. According to Zarghamfard et al. (2024) several factors contributed to the failure of these policies, including "stratification and classification; inconsistency with environmental conditions, non-indigenous nature of housing policies, exclusion of local institutions in the decision-making process, and dominance of a populist perspective on housing" (2024). Policies related to "informal" settlements or self-built housing, largely aimed at pacification of low-income self-built neighborhoods under the guise of empowerment and revitalization. 76 3.2. Informal (Self-built) Housing as an Alternative to Social Housing: The history of ZoorAbad In the prior section, we explored the modernization of the built environment and transformation of diverse lifestyles, with urban living becoming dominant. We reviewed how the concept and function of informality have been embedded in the heritage of housing provision, particularly in rural and tribal migratory communities. The modernization process manifested in urban projects and reshaped the built environment, altering the structure and organization of neighborhoods, and driving migration from rural to urban areas, leading to the emergence and growth of self-built settlements. We also examined housing policies for low-income groups since the revolution, noting that most were inadequate for low-income families and the urban poor. One possible reason for this failure is the lack of recognition by the government (specifically the Ministry of Urban Development) and urban planners at consulting firms of the historical roots of informality in housing provision. The following section of this chapter presents one of the pivotal arguments of the thesis. I will argue that there is a need to reconceptualize "informality", and reimagine its potential as grassroots, community-based solution that can serve as an alternative to social housing in socio-political contexts lacking proper social housing infrastructures. The discussion will then shift to the dominant characteristics of Iran's housing movement, known as 'quiet encroachment,' which significantly contributed to the rise of self-built settlements, particularly after the Islamic revolution. Following this, the government's approach to informality will be examined. Finally, the case study of ZoorAbad will be introduced, illustrating how informal or self-built settlements were constructed and how the government has attempted to confiscate their grassroots efforts. 3.2.1. Conceptualization of Informality Every day, various forms of 'informal' shelter are emerging: graveyard dwellings, rooftop sleeping, bus sleeping, cardboard sleeping, container sleeping, and other temporary informal shelters. These have arisen due to the absence of supportive government housing policies in 77 Iran. Very few national projects, such as the Mehr Housing initiative, have been introduced as social housing projects in Iran. However, due to their inefficiency in various aspects â including poor quality, failure to meet the needs of the most vulnerable, and lack of continuity â social housing remains an unfamiliar concept in Iran, unlike its European counterparts. In Iran, and perhaps across the Middle East, there is a longstanding tradition of self-built homes (informal settlements) by people seeking affordable shelter. However, it is essential to investigate the meaning of "informality," and explore the underlying causes of the emergence of such settlements. Harris (2018) argues that there is a significant interconnection between the concept of "informality" and the role of institutions in "modern" states. In other words, there is a dialectical relationship between "informality" and "regulation or institutional rules" (Harris, 2018). As mentioned earlier, since the initiation of the modernization process in Iran from 1920 onward, traditional approaches to housing provision, such as those found in migratory tribal and rural lifestyles, have been classified as "informal". Another manifestation of this dialectical relationship is seen in the evolving status of certain urban areas. Areas that were once developed but later classified as "informal" as the modern state grew illustrate how these marginal or peripheral spaces are affected by changing regulations. Roy (2011) describes informality as a form of urban development that was not legitimized by any specific government during a particular historical period. Harris (2018) argues that as regulations change, a specific "formal" urban space can come to be regarded as "informal", and vice versa. Thus, the dichotomy between "formality" and "informality" is entirely dependent on state regulations, which are not fixed and can be altered (Harris, 2018, 5). Roy (2011) further interprets informality as a socio-political construct, produced and reproduced by state agents such as urban planners and policy makers who have the authority to determine which urban spaces are considered formal or informal (Roy, 2011). However, Roy's interpretation raises concerns about the lack of consideration for the agency of people. From my perspective, in cases like Iran, various traditional heritages regarding housing provision by rural or tribal communities have been preserved intentionally by these communities. They shape their neighborhoods to reflect their desired heritage, demonstrating 78 that informality can also be a deliberate choice by communities to maintain their cultural identity. Through the viewpoint of Harris (2018), the agency of people is indeed taken into account. Harris identifies four main reasons for the emergence of informality: "residents' inability or unwillingness to comply with regulations, and the state's potential lack of capacity or will to enforce them. These factors often interact, with all four occasionally manifesting simultaneously (2018, p.7). In the case of ZoorAbad in Iran, as with many self-built (informal) settlements in Iran and the Middle East, we can observe the influence of both forces in the emergence and persistence of this neighborhood. Due to the lack of access to affordable housing, residents of ZoorAbad gathered and shaped their community in response to their housing needs. Simultaneously, these residents, particularly the first generation, strongly preferred to maintain their social bonds in a cozier neighborhood like ZoorAbad. This preference is reflected in the architecture and organic design of the area. To sum up, while the primary trigger for the emergence of ZoorAbad was the inability to access affordable housing, the desire to preserve their heritage and lifestyle in the face of urbanization and modernization played a significant role in shaping the identity of ZoorAbad. My interviews support this view. For instance, the first-generation residents of ZoorAbad mentioned during interviews that they prefer to stay in ZoorAbad because it more closely resembled their ideal neighborhood compared to modernized and affluent urban spaces. A few of the interviewees mentioned this. For example, Nan'a's mother said, "If I had enough money, I would still stay and live in ZoorAbad. I actually prefer this neighborhood to other affluent ones, such as Azimiyeh." This sentiment was echoed by other interviewees such as the father of Khadan. One of the physical manifestations of "modern" states and their pursuit of legitimacy, according to Scott (2020) is the urbanization process, which significantly transforms rural, marginal, and pre-urban landscape surrounding urban hubs. In other words, Harris (2018) argues that 'informality' can emerge through the clash between market-driven urbanization and rural areas near urban centers, where traditions practices and local consensus are challenged by rules and legitimacy. These suburban (pre-urban) lands often lack a clear status regarding 'development' processes and construction. As regulations are enacted for specific 79 areas, the likelihood of classifying these suburban areas as informal increases. Harris (2018) asserts that "informality is always in flux, its growth or decline being generated passively by new regulations or through the actions of the regulated" (p. 2). In other words, âpolitics of propertyâ (Blomley, 2004, p. xviii) can change; they are not fixed or static. Urban activists, including ordinary people and the urban poor as "silent" activists, can contribute to reshaping urban ownership politics, thereby transforming the culture and social relations surrounding property ownership (Glynn, 2009, p. 25). According to Harris (2018), the fluidity of regulations impacts the emergence of different modes of informality as follows: 1) Latent informality which is "highly visible but open to debate", such as building an extension for a property or renting out a basement without a permit37 (Harris, 2018, 9); 2) Diffuse informality38; 3) Embedded informality which occurs when informal activities become organized, physically concentrated, and gain popular legitimacy. For instance, squatters who organized neighborhoods "at the fringe of American cities in the 1950s and 1960s" demonstrated a form of embedded informality by supporting each other; 4) Overt Informality when "large numbers of people are manifestly flouting the law, and governments often find it difficult to ignore them" (p. 11); 5) Dominant Informality "where many such settlements grow up, and begin to shape the mode of state governance itself" (Harris, 2018, 12) such as the practice of selling density by local governments in Tehran. While this categorization can help avoid confining the concept of "informality" to specific forms, such as slum dwelling, there are overlaps between these modes. For example, one characteristic of dominant informality â where informal practices "begin to shape state governance" â can also apply to other forms of informality. In other words, all modes of informality have dialectical relations with and influences state governance to varying degrees and in different ways. Thus, the self-built settlements in ZoorAbad can be considered as "embedded informality", being both physically concentrated and organized. 37 For instance, in San Francisco around 75% of Airbnb listings are illegal. The similar situation in New York City which in 2015 "around 21,000 units were listed on Airbnb, even though state law prohibits the rental of entire homes." (Harris, 2017, 7). 38 Informality at this mode as well as latent mode is geographically dispersed (Harris, 2017, 10). 80 In the case of ZoorAbad, in Iran, the urban poor have actively reshaped the politics of land ownership, particularly concerning public lands that the Iranian government has historically used to support low-income housing projects. The government has approached the use of common/public lands in two main ways: (1) Utilizing these lands for the direct construction of low-income housing without charging land fees; (2) Use public lands as a financial support to support low-income housing projects. Both approaches will be elaborated upon by introducing two distinct housing projects that illustrate each method. An example of the first approach â using public land for constructing low-income housing projects â is the Mehr Housing Project39, which has been the closest government initiative to a social housing scheme over the past two decades. To reduce housing costs for low-income groups, the government allocated public lands, particularly on the outskirts of cities and metropolises, to these projects without charging land fees. This allocation of public land for housing represented the government's most significant effort to address the housing crisis faced by urban poverty-stricken populations. An example of the second approach â providing financial resources for low-income housing projects â can be seen in ZoorAbad Improvement Plan. One of the primary financial resources for this plan was expected to come from the allocation of lands, as well as from income generated by commercial and residential developments in newly created townships. The plan aimed to use this revenue to fund the relocation of 20,000 residents living above 1,400 meters altitude in ZoorAbad. It was agreed that 640 hectares of urban public land, valued at 12 billion tomans, would be transferred to the ZoorAbad hill Organization by the Ministry of Housing. Of this land, 25% was designated for land preparation and relocation efforts. This proposal was approved by the Presidential Office, and the 640 hectares of adverse possession land, previously registered under the Land Affairs Organization, were transferred to the Improving Plan organization. The free transfer of land by the Urban Land Affairs Organization took place in 1993. These lands included 115 hectares in Sofiabad-Karaj, 249 hectares in Chenarak-Karaj, 240 hectares in Ghazalhasar-Karaj, and 36 hectares in Baghestan-Gohardasht. However, since these lands were located outside the official 39 However, this scheme has proven largely unsuccessful, highlighting the need for a different approach and deeper analysis. 81 boundaries of Karaj, incorporating them into the city's designated area involved significant time and financial costs for the municipality. While the disputes over Baghestan's lands were resolved in the early years, the lands in SofiAbad and Chenarak remain under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Qasemi, 2010, 79). Currently, all expenses related to purchasing homes for the residents of ZoorAbad are being financed through the sale of lands owned by the project in Baghestan, Karaj, and Simindashat-e Mehrshahr (Ghazalhasar). 95% of these lands, after receiving the necessary approvals from the Article 5 Commission and completing the stages of road preparation, municipal zoning, and registration, were sold through public auctions. Aside from the financial resources generated from these land sales, only 3% of the total project costs have been covered by other sources, such as funds from the Presidential Office and the allocated budget from the Supreme Leader's Office (Qasemi, 2010, 79-80). As discussed earlier, the primary financial and physical resources for low-income housing projects (akin to social housing) in Iran have come from the government's utilization of public lands. In recent decades, under the presidency of Ahmadinejad, public lands were provided at no cost for the construction of low-income housing âMehr Housing Projects. Based on the case-study of ZoorAbad, I argue that self-built housing in Iran should be considered an "alternative to social housing" in the country, drawing upon three key definitional aspects: 1) understanding the concept and function of social housing; 2) utilizing public lands; and 3) rethinking the privatization process. Understanding the concept and function of social housing The term "social housing" is often regarded as a "floating signifier," lacking a clear, universally agreed-upon definition. There is no consensus on its meaning, even within Europe (e.g. Braga and Palvarini 2013; Scanlon, Whitehead, and Fernandez Arrigoitia, 2014, as cited in Hansson & Lundgren, 2019), where there is a strong history of social housing provision. As a result, it remains a diverse, value-laden concept with multiple interpretations tailored to specific contexts. Broad attempts to define it have not gained wide acceptance, 82 making its usage dependent on key criteria of social housing, such as 'type of provider', 'tenure', 'target group', 'subsidies', and 'public intervention'. (Hansson & Lundgren, 2019). For example, the Cambridge dictionary (2017) defines social housing based on key criteria such as type of provider, tenure, and targe group, as "homes provided by the government for people with low incomes to rent cheaply". The Construction Industry (Hansson & Lundgren, 2019) definition, on the other hand, incorporates additional criteria such as subsidies. It defines social housing as: "Housing excluded from the common housing market, which is publicly subsidized, owned by non-profit companies and reserved for low-income groups connected to an allocation system" (Hansson & Lundgren, 2019). This type of definition emphasizes the distribution of housing outside of the market, implying state intervention in the provision of resources. Another definition is provided by Social Housing in the EU (European Parliament, Braga & Palvarini, 2013) which states: "There are three elements in defining social housing across EU Member States: a mission of general interest, the objective of increasing the supply of affordable housing and specific targets defined in terms of socio-economic status or the presence of vulnerabilities". On the other hand, some scholars, such as Bengtsson (2017) and Haffner et al. (2010) as cited in Hansson and Lundgren (2019), focus solely on the 'target group' as a key criterion in defining social housing. Bengtsson defines it as "a system that provides long-term housing to households with limited resources through some form of means testing", or "Social housing is that which is administratively allocated on the basis of need". In the case of ZoorAbad, if we adhere to definitions that focus on the key criterion of the target group, then the self-built housing in ZoorAbad fits well with this definition of social housing. This neighborhood aimed to address the issue of housing for vulnerable populations. In addition, if we consider the key criteria of 'subsidies', this case also aligns well with the definition, due to the residents of ZoorAbad having access to common land at zero or affordable prices. In the case of Mehr Housing projects, the state subsidized these projects by providing public/common lands for both financing the projects and constructing housing on them. Different interpretations of social housing involve the utilization of public or common resources, which can include various forms such as, providing free public lands to 83 developers, selling public lands to finance low-income housing projects, offering rent vouchers, constructing public rental housing, tax incentives, and more. In the case of ZoorAbad, in the absence of "official" social housing during the first decade of the revolution, the urban poor utilized these common lands informally to provide housing for themselves. Thus, under this interpretation, the housing in ZoorAbad, subsidized by the government provided land, can be considered an alternative form of social housing. Moreover, if we consider the key criterion of 'public intervention', the housing in ZoorAbad fits this well, due to the grassroots activities of the urban poor in constructing their own housing. The residents' involvement in the development process reflects a form of self-organization and intervention that addresses their housing needs, thereby aligning with the broader concept of social housing through community-led efforts. Regarding the key criterion of 'tenure', it is crucial to consider how it impacts social housing. In my opinion, this criterion is important for preserving common and public resources from privatization. For ZoorAbad, state intervention is needed to address this issue effectively. Regulations such as 99-year leases or ownership models, similar to those implemented in the Mehr Housing Project, would be beneficial in protecting ZoorAbad from the privatization of common lands and resources. With appropriate steps and state intervention, this key criterion can be successfully addressed and integrated into the neighborhood. Utilizing public lands to address housing issues for the poor Squatting represents a communal claim to land, often occurring when the state is absent or insufficiently involved in land allocation. It is a form of property claims that lacks legal status 40 and is neither private nor public (Blomley, 2004, p. 20). Highlighting the potential of common resources in addressing various social issues, particularly for the most vulnerable groups, is crucial. When the government allocates land for social or affordable housing projects, it uses a common/public resource to meet household needs, which can inadvertently 40 âGarden encroachmentâ is one of these forms in which private gardens extend onto the municipal property. (Blomley, 2004, p. 17). Community garden is another example of these vague form of claiming to property. Most cities grant short-term leases to these places but they are neither clearly private or public. It is debate in NewYork how to categorize hundreds community gardens in the city; private or public. (Blomley, 2004, p. 19). 84 lead to privatization. In case of squatting, where adequate social services from the government are lacking, the use of common land by the urban poor can be viewed similarly to the government-initiated housing projects. However, regulating these lands by the state is necessary. While grassroots activities by the urban poor to utilize common/public land for self-built housing can be seen as an alternative to official social housing projects, it is essential that the next phase for these self-built settlements includes establishing regulations to prevent the privatization of common resources. These regulations should still allow current residents and other urban poor to use the land and housing as public resources, thereby maintaining their role as an alternative to mainstream social housing projects. Rethinking the privatization process Privatization for power holders vs. privatization for the urban poor (as a social services): When discussing social housing (or, in this case, alternatives to social housing), we encounter a spectrum of definitions and corresponding activities and initiatives. By evaluating their proximity to these extremes, we can assess how each initiative might be considered an alternative to social housing. In the case of ZoorAbad, the current self-built settlement can be interpreted as a privatization initiative benefiting the urban poor. Within the spectrum of social housing versus market-driven housing, initiatives that led to privatization in favour of the urban poor are, in my opinion, much closer to the alternative to social housing extreme. However, it is crucial to regulate the use of confiscated lands, such as implementing 99-year leases or other regulatory measures to preserve common lands from privatization. Kaveh Ehsani (2013) claims that in Iran, following the 1979 revolution, various phases of privatization have occurred. He explains that during the 1980s, the first decade of the revolution, privatization involved the confiscation of public lands by the urban poor in various large cities, particularly in Tehran and its surrounding areas. However, Ehsani did not differentiate between the initial intentions behind each privatization process (whether in favour of the urban poor or power holders), the beneficiaries of each process, or their different final consequences and implications. Regarding privatization in favour of the urban 85 poor, the government often aims to alleviate pressure and shift responsibility by formalizing and then privatizing informal squatting activities on the 'margins' of cities (Harris, 2018, 4-8). This approach has been observed in various countries, such as Venezuela, where the government ignored squatting from the 1960s onward. This shows how state regulations can be violated by their own rules (Harris, 2018, 4-8). As previously mentioned, privatizing self-built settlements in favour of the urban poor aligns more closely with the extreme end of social housing spectrum, rather than other forms of privatization. According to definitions of social housing that focus primarily on the target group, this type of privatization can be viewed as an alternative to social housing. It benefits urban poor and disadvantaged groups and has implications beyond providing shelter, including reducing crime and addressing other socio-economic challenges. However, the redistribution of national resources or commons, even when in favour of low-income groups, requires regulation. Thus, the use of common lands for self-built housing, in the absence of government-provided social services, should be considered an alternative subsidized housing solution, with state intervention necessary to regulate and preserve common resources. According to Holston (1999), the construction of alternative and "informal" spaces within urban areas by disadvantaged groups â such as new migrants, squatters, and homeless people â can be seen as a reclamation of their rights to the city and a contribution to its transformation. These alternative spaces introduced new identities and characteristics that not only challenged dominant histories (p. 167), but also, according to Bayat (2013), facilitated the formation of solidarity and collective identity (p. 13). Bayat (1997) argues that 'passive networks' among disenfranchised individuals connect them through a common threat (pp. 15-20). By comparing grassroot 'alternative' spaces created by disenfranchised groups with their 'legal' "formal" and planned counterparts, several unique characteristics emerge. An interesting observation is the considerably lower effectiveness of government initiatives, such as the "Mehr Housing" project, compared to self-built housing neighborhoods. Interviews with residents of ZoorAbad, as well as the documentary film This is ZoorAbad produced by Ms. Parvin Qasemi, reveal genuine contentment with the relatively secure environment and convenient, affordable amenities of ZoorAbad. Over five decades of residence in this 86 neighborhood, despite government attempts at demolition and eviction, residents have enjoyed relative security and access to various urban facilities. As an example, Akram, one of the interviewees, said, "Access to everything, such as groceries, medical services, schools, and parks, is very easy and accessible. When I compare ZoorAbad with my new neighborhood, where I recently moved, without a doubt, I prefer ZoorAbad due to its great accessibility to various facilities and the safety I feel." This indicates that self-built housing and neighborhoods like ZoorAbad are significantly more successful than national housing projects for low-income people, such as Mehr housing. These "self-built" settlements in the Middle East, particularly in Iran, serve as a substitute for what is known as "social housing," a concept largely neglected by the government. These self-built settlements, as an example of alternative "modes of 'estate in lands'"41 (Blomley, 2004), expand our understanding beyond the "public" or "private" modes of ownership and towards a more just mode of access to property 42 (Blomley, 2004, p. 16). From this perspective, self-built houses, or what are colloquially termed "informal settlements" in Iran, can be seen as an alternative to "social housing," having organically and locally evolved over decades to address the housing needs of the urban poor through grassroots methods. 3.2.2. Quiet Encroachment, an alternative to housing movement In the above subsection, we discussed the concept of informality and why self-built housing should be considered an alternative to social housing. In this subsection, we will focus on the processes that led to the emergence of self-built housing. These processes share some characteristics with housing movements, displaying both similarities and differences. Asef Bayat coined the terms "non-movements" and "quiet encroachment" to describe these processes that led to the emergence of self-built housing (or alternative to social housing). Before that, we will briefly review the discourse on self-built housing, beginning with the iconic figure of Turner in the 1960s. As we refer to self-built housing as an alternative to 41 such as: ecosystem management, corporate estates, Indian lands, common property estates (forms of collective private ownership). 42 For instance, âcommunity land trust modelâ and/or third sector housing like limited equity condominium are different forms which their distinctions lie on how it is owned, controlled, and conveyed, and not on the process of production or financing (Blomley, 2004, p. 16). 87 social housing, we will consider the process of quiet encroachment as an alternative to mainstream housing movements, given the similarities between quiet encroachment and housing movements in their outcome. The discourse on self-built housing in urban studies emerged in the 1950s as a response to rapid urbanization and housing shortages, not only in the Global South but also in industrialized urban settings in the Global North. Turner is a central figure in the self-help housing movement, though other scholars, such as Abrams, and Mangin, also contributed. Abrams's "land-and-utilities" model focused on service provision without fully endorsing self-help housing (Mathey, 1991; Rodell & Skinner, 1983; in Harris, 2003). Influenced by Mumford, Geddes, and Kropotkin in the 1940s, Turner developed his ideas further through fieldwork in Peru in the late 1950s. By the late 1960s, he and Mangin reframed squatter housing as a solution rather than a problem (Mangin, 1967; in Harris, 2003). Though his ideas aligned with conservative political economy (Harris, 2003), Turnerâs framework leaned toward anarchism (Ward, 1976), centering on three points: the value of self-help housing, state support for owner-builders, and a positive view of informal settlements. Earlier contributors like Jacob Crane had critiqued top-down housing approaches in the 1940sâ50s, followed by similar arguments from Atkinson, Frieden, and Stockes, who also saw self-built housing as a viable solution (Harris, 2003). John Turnerâs concept of self-help housing centers on the principle that housing is most effective when people have control over its design, construction, and management. He defines autonomy as the âsubstantial freedom of actionsâ that enables the urban poor to maximize limited resources and address basic life needs (Turner, 1972). Turner views housing not as a finished product, but as a dynamic process, emphasizing the psychological and social benefits of self-directed actionâsuch as pride, satisfaction, and well-being (Turner, 1972; Turner, 1976, pp. xxxiiâxxxiii). He argues that in transitional economies, informal self-built settlementsâoften tolerated by weak or resource-strapped governmentsâprovide a pragmatic and empowering alternative to state-delivered housing (Turner, 1972; Turner, 1976, p. xxxiv). Turner critiques top-down, centrally administered housing systems for generating alienation, wasting resources, and failing to meet the actual needs of low-income populations, as 88 illustrated by the failure of the Pruitt-Igoe project (Turner, 1976, pp. xvi, xxiv). Instead, he advocates for network-based systems, where local communities have access to land, materials, credit, and technical knowledge. These systems, he argues, are more just and efficient but remain vulnerable to disruption by hierarchical institutions (Turner, 1976, pp. 1â34, 53). Turnerâs policy recommendations include decentralized governance, equitable resource distribution, and proscriptive planning that enables diverse and incremental housing solutions while avoiding rigid prescriptions (Turner, 1976, pp. 161â162). John Turner's perspective in the 1960s and 70s profoundly influenced both policy and academic discourse, laying the foundation for future debates. Among those who initially built on this legacy was Hernando de Soto, whose The Other Path (1989) and later The Mystery of Capital (2000) proposed that informal settlements represented untapped economic potential. By formalizing land through titling programs, de Soto argued that the urban poor could access credit and fully participate in capitalist markets. While echoing Turnerâs attention to local initiative, de Sotoâs neoliberal framework drew criticism for commodifying land and ignoring structural barriers to equity. Also, Mitchell (2009) highlighted another implication of De Soto's neoliberal project has been increasing control over previously autonomous informal settlements. As the field matured, critical urban scholars began to interrogate the structural forces and power relations underpinning informal housing. Ananya Roy and Nezar AlSayyad, in the influential volume Urban Informality (2004), redefined informality as a mode of urban governance rather than simply a grassroots or peripheral phenomenon. Roy (2005) challenged the Turnerian dichotomy of formal versus informal by showing how informality is produced and managed by state actors through selective enforcement of regulation. Also, she highlighted the functionality of informal spaces in cities not only for the poor, but also for middle class households of the Second World. And she argues that there are different variations of informality which need to be differentiated and take into account. These perspectives shift attention from Turnerâs normative celebration of user autonomy to a more critical analysis of the institutional processes that sustain informal urbanization. Simultaneously, scholars working within grounded and ethnographic traditions explored the socio-political and experiential dimensions of self-help housing. James Holstonâs Insurgent 89 Citizenship (2008) examined how Brazilâs peripheral urbanites, through decades of self-construction, developed new political subjectivities and asserted claims to urban citizenship. Janice Perlmanâs research in Rio de Janeiroâfirst in The Myth of Marginality (1976) and later in Favela (2010)âchallenged earlier notions of urban informality as isolated or dysfunctional. She highlighted capacities of residents of favela, so they and their types of housing should not be considered as problems, while they suffer from problems. She documented both the adaptive strategies and enduring vulnerabilities faced by favela residents, reinforcing Turnerâs insight into local agency while critiquing the long-term consequences of state neglect. AbdouMaliq Simone (2004) introduced the concept of âpeople as infrastructure,â focusing on how residents of informal settlements across African cities create relational systems of support that sustain urban life. These works move beyond housing as a technical or physical process and emphasize its relational, social, and insurgent character. Another category of contributions has further problematized the limitations of both Turnerian optimism and market-based interventions by emphasizing the intersections of law, governance, and global capitalism. Teresa Caldeiraâs City of Walls (2000) similarly explores how informal urbanization in São Paulo is bound up with fear, criminalization, and spatial segregation. Raquel Rolnik (2019), in Urban Warfare, critiques the financialization of housing and insists that the solution lies not in market integration or self-help, but in reclaiming housing as a fundamental human right. In the context of Iran, one of the prominent Iranian American scholars who elaborated on this concept and explained the phenomenon of self-built housing in the Middle Eastern context is Asef Bayat. In the Middle East, Western Orientalist perspectives often view socio-political changes and improvements as rare or impossible, typically occurring through socio-political and economic elites. However, scholars like Bayat (2013) propose a different notion, arguing that the characteristics of socio-political changes in this region differ from those in the Western context (2013, 3-5). While the Western context often stereotypes social movements as organized and collective, the 'silent' everyday struggles that have reshaped urban socio-spatial features in the Middle Eastern context require much more consideration. 90 Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the intensification of the urban housing crisis in Iran43 has led to a rise in squatting as a form of informal settlement. Due to the failure of the central government, marginalized groups (disenfranchised) have exploited the lack of police control to illegally occupy around 150,000 dwelling units, including hotels, villas, vacant homes, and unfinished buildings (home-squatting), as their original owners fled to the West or went into hiding. The control of these units was assumed by Bonyad-i Mustazafin (the Foundation of the Dispossessed). People also engaged in land-squatting by constructing their own homes overnight on unoccupied land and demanded urban amenities collectively by bribing employees of relevant institutions (pp. 1-6). Additionally, landless farmers illegally took over various agribusiness estates. This period marked the largest squatting era in the history of Tehran (Bayat, 1997, 60-61). One example of quiet encroachment at the beginning of the revolution, as described by Bayat, occurred in December 1979 when 30 poor households confiscated unfinished units in Islamshahr, in the southeastern part of Tehran. These core members sought out vacant housing and connected homeless people with those buildings. Through spreading the news, around 400 families eventually squatted and occupied 308 housing units. This method of squatting was not limited to Tehran and could be traced to other regions of the country, such as Mashhad, Abadan, Sanandaj, Kermanshah. Additionally, some luxury hotels were invaded and squatted by university students demanding adequate dormitories. These new squatters, by organizing and addressing the issues in their neighborhoods, formed âmore structured organizations: the shuras, elected or appointed councilsâ (Bayat, 1997, pp. 60-66) Bayat (1997) coined the term âsilent/quiet encroachmentâ to describe this process, the scope of which is not limited to housing but extends to economic activities. In his view, due to the effects of globalization â particularly the neoliberal era and deregulation approach â on the economies of developing countries, marginalized and vulnerable groups who need state support are often forced to rely on themselves to meet their housing needs through alternative strategies, such as âquiet encroachmentâ (Bayat, 2013, pp. 33&35). Additionally, many unemployed members of the urban middle-class, who lost their jobs, encroached on the 43 due to the following three forces: 1) Iran-Iraq war refugees of around 2.5 million; 2) two million Afghan refugees in 1985; 3) rural migrants (around 2.2 million) who moved to the cities between 1976 and 1986 (Bayat, 1997, 82). 91 streets to run businesses as sidewalk vendors. These practices are prevalent in various developing countries. For instance, in Cairo, squatters quietly claimed cemeteries, rooftops, or encroached on public lands at the urban peripheries. A similar process occurred in South Korean cities, where pushcart vendors reclaimed land. Bayat proposed a new perspective on the Third World poor, traditionally seen as âpassive, hopelessâ groups, arguing that these marginalized citizens engaged in âeveryday forms of resistanceâ to reclaim their right to the cities (Bayat, 1997, pp. 1-6). Bayat (2013) argues that state surveillance in the Global South is much softer than in industrial countries, providing more opportunities for autonomy (informal activities) and quiet encroachment by disenfranchised individuals. Consequently, as the Global South became exposed to the new global economy, many marginalized individuals who could not join the restructuring met their needs through individualistic quiet encroachment (Bayat, 2013, 51-54). While this argument makes sense to some extent, it may not be entirely convincing and holistic. For instance, the current Islamic regime in Iran does not provide opportunities for autonomy, particularly in terms of labor right, women's rights, and human rights. This regime actively opposes and eradicates, at the earliest stages, any actions or behaviors that contradict its ideals, swiftly suppressing them at their inception. In this context, Bayat's interpretation may not fully capture the complexities within Global South states, especially Iran. Bayat (1997) argues that the lack of institutional frameworks in these countries, including Global South, motivates marginalized citizens to turn to more informal alternatives for living and working (pp. 7-9-20-21). However, in my view, the emergence of alternative living and working spaces during the first decade of the Islamic revolution, may not have been solely due to the absence of institutional setting. Instead, it could be considered a deliberate part of the institutional structure itself. I want to emphasize that the Islamic government intentionally allowed the emergence of informal and self-built housing, thereby shifting the responsibility of housing provision from the state to the urban poor. Thus, I argue that the Iranian state has only permitted the development of alternative living and working spaces when they did not conflict with its own interests and ideals. 92 Bayat (2013) argues that quiet encroachment can be considered as âsocial non-movementsâ. Non-movements are dominant in Middle Eastern countries and are linked to the authoritarian characteristics of these states, which do not tolerate any organized dissent (Bayat, 2013, p. 27). Social non-movements refer to atomized (noncollective) actors, such as the urban poor, who due to socio-political or ideological forces, can engage in collective action (Bayat, 2013, p. 15). For instance, consider the mass movement of rural migrants or urban poor who individually squat on land and shelters, continuing this as a non-movement to demand urban amenities. Another example is street vendors, who create a parallel or alternative economic system by reclaiming urban spaces and sidewalks. This type of non-movement has occurred in various Middle Eastern countries, such as Cairo, Egypt, and Turkey (Bayat, 2013, p. 16), demonstrating that organization is not necessary for movements. Movements can arise spontaneously or gradually among individuals and ordinary people to meet their basic needs, rather than as a result of political intent. According to Bayat (2013), the characteristics of non-movement, or Quiet Encroachment, in Iran are as follows: It is action-oriented and silent, but not ideologically driven; actors directly practice and enact what they claim without waiting for or asking authorities; it consists of everyday practices carried out by millions of atomized individuals, who on the ground normalize and legitimize illegal activities (pp. 20-21); it involves gradual, molecular changes over a long-term process; it is driven by necessity rather than a conscious political strategy; it avoids collective, large-scale activities, focusing mainly on atomized individuals. Most actors are migrants, refugees, the unemployed, squatters, and street vendors, who suffer from a lack of institutional capacity to make legal requests or claims (Bayat, 1997, p. 7-9). According to Bayat (1997) these disenfranchised individuals and groups pursue the following goals: first, improving their living conditions through physical movements (Bayat, 1997, p. 98), and second, the âredistribution of social goods and opportunities,â often through illegal acquisition of lands, shelter, or public spaces. Another aim is achieving âautonomyâ from rules imposed by the state. These two goals are interconnected, as marginalized citizens can only address redistribution through the vehicle of autonomy (Bayat, 1997, 10-12). In my opinion, in Iran, most disenfranchised people primarily aimed to improve their living conditions and lacked sufficient resources to risk seeking autonomy. This contradicts Bayat's 93 own characterization of non-movements as being driven by necessity rather than a conscious political strategy. If their basic need for adequate housing was not met, how could they aspire to autonomy from state-imposed rules? In reality, these disenfranchised people had no choice but to protect their basic needs from government surveillance for survival. Given Iran's socio-political context, these people engaged in a non-movement, which functioned as an alternative to formal housing movements and led to improvements in their housing situation. In this research, I argue that while their self-built housing should be considered an alternative to social housing, the processes by which the urban poor achieved this self-built housing must also be viewed as an alternative to housing movements, which ultimately improved their housing conditions. 3.2.3. Government Approaches and Tactics Regarding "Informality" After reviewing the characteristics of housing non-movements in Iran as an alternative to formal housing movements, it is necessary to examine the government's approach to these self-built settlements, which Harris (2018) categorizes as "embedded" and "overt" modes of informality. While some tactics of the Islamic regime intensify and reinforce each other in relation to these modes of informality, not all tactics and approaches have been consistently aligned. For example, tactics such as 'denouncing and tagging', 'disconnecting urban services', and 'eviction and pacification' support one of the government's primary approaches to self-built housing in Iran: elimination. 'Limiting housing programs', and 'lack of specific plans' represent another government approach toward these settlements, characterized by neglect and lack of prioritization. Another tactic, 'formalizing informal settlements', aligns with the government's profit-oriented approach. Overall, local and central governments have adopted varied approaches towards informality and these self-built settlements, depending on the situation. These tactics illustrate how the government, rather than providing facilities and social services for vulnerable groups or improving self-built settlements, assumed the role of a "squatter government" to speculate and confiscate resources. This concept will be further explored in the final chapter. 94 3.2.3.1. Negative Government Responses to Quite Encroachment (Self-built Settlements) The first tactic of the Iranian government has been "formalizing informal settlements". The government faced mass illegal occupation of land by squatters who did not pay for urban amenities. Consequently, the approach of integrating slums into the legal city was adopted, which guaranteed âboth state control and compensation for the use of collective servicesâ (Bayat, 1997, p. 88). As a result, some of the occupied lands in Tehran were formalized and âplaced under awqaf,â forcing slum dwellers to pay yearly rent in exchange for urban services in poor neighborhoods (Bayat, 1997, p. 88). Through this approach, the government achieved two goals: first, limiting the autonomy of the urban poor in slums; and second, increasing the financial budget of the municipality. The next tactic is denunciation and tagging. It should be noted that there were counterforces against squatters, such as the Pasdaran, who denounced squatters as âcommunist counterrevolutionariesâ (Bayat, 1997, p. 68). Various players at both local and national levels affected the squatting movements, including âleftist allies, the local Pasdaran, local mosques and mullas, and the owners of the occupied homesâ (p. 68). The interactions between these groups explain the differences in outcomes across squatting activities. âSome squatters managed to stay on; others lasted over six years; and some, like those in the occupied hotels, were evicted after a few weeks.â (p. 68). Furthermore, the government and the Pasdaran did not have a consistent or uniform approach toward squatters. In some cases, they used religious warnings, such as tagging the occupants' actions as âun-Islamicâ. Other tactics included âdivide-and-rule, cutting water and electricity, arrests, and armed raidsâ (Bayat, 1997, p. 69). High-ranking clergy such as Marâashi and Qomi issued fatwas stating that squatting and occupation were not acceptable religious action. However, the poor and squatters argued that the provision of housing was a duty of the Islamic government, as had been promoted during the 1979 Iranian Revolution (p. 69). The third tactic is "disconnecting urban services (water and electricity)". As part of the government's efforts to stop squatting and eliminate its presence in Tehran, the Pasdaran disconnected the water supply in Dowlatabad to force the squatters to leave. This tactic failed, leading the Pasdaran to attack the squatters and arrest five women. In response, 500 squatters protested in front of the Pasdaran headquarters, demanding the release of those 95 arrested. In 1985, in Dowlatabad, as a reaction to the Pasdaranâs eviction efforts, protesters blocked the Beâsat highway. As a result of this confrontation, many âsquatters and Pasdaran were injuredâ (Bayat, 1997, p. 70). Another tactic of the government has been the "vague approach and lack of a certain plan towards squatters". In Kianshahr, a Southern township of Tehran, squatters selected local representatives to request security for their occupied housing from the prominent clergy, Ayatollah Montazeri. The squatters were connected to the municipalities and were eventually told to present their requests âat the Friday prayer sermonsâ to the prime minister (Bayat, 1997, p. 70). Simultaneously, the Council of Apartments (shura-ye apartimaan), which gathered the squatters at the local mosque to discuss their issues, assured them that eviction would not be required and that their request would be addressed at the Friday prayer session. The prime minister also acknowledged that they could remain there until new legislation was enacted. Despite this verbal agreement, one year later, the Pasdaran attacked the squatters` home. However, the squatters managed to resist (Bayat, 1997, p. 71). Another government tactic in this regard has been "limited housing programs". While some housing programs for the poor existed, such as the Fund 100 program, and local projects run by Jihad-i Sazandegui, their limitations, along with the high-cost real estate and rent, made squatting and occupation the most viable option for the urban poor (Bayat, 1997, p. 72). "Eviction and relocation" have been one of the government's dominant tactics regarding informal settlements. In Mashhad, in the 1980, squatters at Aabkouh, who had occupyied various housing units since the Iran Revolution in 1979, were attacked by security forces, resulting in the eviction of more than 500 occupants (Bayat, 1997, p. 71). Additionally, the government's various relocation projects, which aimed at formalizing informal settlements, largely failed. The new housing units dedicated to the poor did not adequately meet their needs, and in many cases, squatters returned to the shacks of Pol-i Mudiriyat and Halabshahr of Tehran Pars (Bayat, 1997, p. 103). Another example is the pacification of an informal neighborhood in Mashhad in 1992, known as Kooy-e Tollab. In 1960, Ayatollah Sabzevari, a prominent religious figure in Mashhad, rented Kooy-e Tollab (a neighborhood) from Astan Quds Razavi, a political-religious institution managed the Imam Reza shrine, to provide housing for low-income religious 96 students. This large area was divided into 2,500 small plots. After Ayatollah Sabzevari's death in 1970, Kooy-e Tollab neighborhood became the largest slum settlement in Mashhad. The religious students began selling their housing units to other poor residents, leading to a change in the neighborhood's socio-cultural fabric. Due to its proximity to the shrine of Imam Reza, Kooy-e Tollab was considered as a potential site for the shrine's expansion. Despite this, the municipality and provincial government systematically refused to provide urban services to the neighborhood, as part of an effort to force the settlers to leave (Shaltuki, 2016). In June 1992, Kooy-e Tollab was identified by Touliat Aramgah-e Imam as a potential area for the expansion of the shrine. The provincial government in Mashhad had long-held plans to evict the residents and demolish the informal settlement. However, due to the widespread poverty among the households and the state's failure to provide a resettlement solution, the plan to bulldoze the neighborhood was postponed. When bulldozers were eventually sent to demolish the informal buildings, the poor residents collectively resisted. Tragically, a child was shot and killed by the police, sparking a riot. The unrest quickly spread to other neighborhoods in Mashhad. Over two days of rioting, hundreds of citizens were arrested, and between three and ten people were killed. The Iranian judicial system subsequently sentenced four rioters to death (Kiani, 2017). In conclusion, the emergence of self-built housing in Iran represents a unique adaptation to the challenges of housing crisis. These self-built settlements not only offer an alternative to traditional social housing but also underscore the complex interplay between grassroots responses and state policies. The government's varied tactics â ranging from formalization and integration to outright eviction and disconnection of utilities â highlight its inconsistent approach toward informal settlements. While some strategies aim to regulate these spaces, others seek their elimination, revealing the tension between accommodating informal housing and maintaining control. 97 3.2.4. Self-Built Housing: The case of ZoorAbad In this subsection, we will review the history of the modernization of Karaj city, one of whose implications was the emergence of the self-built settlement of ZoorAbad. We will examine how, during the modernization of Iran and the establishment of numerous factories near Tehran and other large cities, the migration of rural populations to these urban areas led to a housing shortage emerged in Karaj. Additionally, the modernization of property regimes, while establishing rules and regulations for land and space, simultaneously contributed to the growth of "informality" and "informal" spaces. According to new regulations, many areas near urban centers and within " legal urban spaces" were categorized as "informal". In this subsection, we will explore how the intersection of the Islamic revolution with the process of modernization of cities and property regimes disrupted the legitimacy of property ownership, shifting the on-going modernization and urbanization towards the dispossessed population in need of housing. The case of ZoorAbad will be examined in this context to provide a more specific example in which these historical processes and dynamics can be situated geographically. 3.2.4.1. Contextual history of Karaj region Karaj is located in the foothills of the Alborz Mountains at an elevation of 1,300 meters above sea level, featuring varying elevations due to its mountainous north and flat southern plain, with a general slope from north to south (Alipour, 2015, 75) (Figure 9). Archaeological findings in Karaj highlight its historical significance as a strategic outpost for the ancient city of Rey, particularly in the area of ZoorAbad (MoradAb hill). Karaj played a pivotal role in the trade routes connecting Rey to the west during the early Islamic era. The influence of the Qajar dynasty, following the establishment of Tehran as the capital in 1796, affected Karaj's growth and later contributed to alleviating Tehran's 19th-century water shortages. 98 Figure 9: The location of Karaj within the map of Iran The changes that took place in Karaj during the reign of Reza Shah (1925-41) were pivotal, leading to significant agricultural and industrial transformations (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 46). Scholars propose multiple interpretations of the name Karaj, including "hollow-middled," while "shout" or "loud sound," and "Kerzoll" or "Kurz," referring to the cultivation and terracing of foothills. Given its geography, agricultural importance, and the historical role of the Karaj heights as warning posts, all these interpretations may hold relevance (BahramBaygui, 1978, pp. 46&47). In the 19th century, the Qajar Royal Family designated Karaj and its surroundings as crown lands (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 225-226). During Reza Shah's Reign, new land regulations were established that significantly impacted Karaj's land. Previously, land ownership was unclear, with most lands classified as âState Landâ (Khaleseh), and some villages near Karaj were purchased by the royal family for future development (p. 57). Although the sale of crown lands to the public was approved in 1937, Karaj followed a different trajectory. The government acquired fertile plots for industrial facilities, research institutions, and the Industrial Model Town, which included the Agricultural College, Veterinary Institute, and Sugar Factory (p. 225-226). 99 The construction of Tehran-Chalus Road44 facilitated Karaj's development, leading to the establishment of a new roundabout in the city center, considered pivotal for the city's expansion. ZoorAbad is in proximity to this center (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 57). After World War II, the First Seven Year Development Plan of 1949 fueled national economic growth, resulting in a significant population influx that tripled the size of the capital between 1940 and 1956. Karaj, benefiting from affluent individuals purchasing rural lands under the 1937 "Law for the Sale of State Lands", experienced notable growth (figures 10&11). In 1955, Karaj legally separated from Tehran, gaining local decision-making authority and establishing itself as a central administrative hub45. During Iran's "Second Seven Year Development Plan," industrial growth in Karaj continued. By 1956, 200 hectares of Karaj's land were allocated for industrial redevelopment. Between 1957 and 1960, new factories were established, further exacerbating the housing shortage for workers in the area (BahramBeigui, 1978, pp. 61-64). 44 This road connects Tehran via the north of Karaj to the north of the country. 45 By 1956, Karaj's population reached approximately 14,526, making it Iran's 70th most populous city according to the first national census. 100 Figure 10: Aeral image of Karaj in 1956 [Retrived from BahramBaygui, 1978] Figure 11: Karaj in 1940s [Retrived from BahramBaygui , 1978] 101 3.2.4.2. Housing Shortage in Karaj The establishment of these factories and industrial activities in Karaj and its surroundings led to a housing shortage in the early 1960s. To address this, the Khalajabad residential neighborhood was constructed during this period, located 1.5 kilometers from the main Karaj roundabout (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 65). The construction of the Amir Kabir Dam in Karja region in 1961 led to the displacement of several rural settlers from nearby villages. As a result, âa new residential quarter called Razkan-e-Naw in the southern part of Karajâ was built to address the housing needs of the displaced families (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 65). The aerial image of Karaj in 1964 (figure 12) shows the extent of development the city experienced in less than a decade, compared to figure 10. Figure 12: Aerial image of Karaj in 1964 [Retrived from BahramBaygui , 1978] Following the 1962 Land Reform in Iran, Tehrani landlords viewed Karaj as a lucrative investment opportunity due to its lower land prices. This population influx led to increased housing construction, most notably in the establishment of Azimiyeh neighborhood in 1964 102 (figure 12), marking the city's first planned residential development (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 67). Figure 13: Karaj in 1966 and the location of Azimiyeh neighborhood in comparison with ZoorAbad (or Tappeh-e-Moradab) [Retrived from BahramBaygui, 1978] The initial phases of the Karaj Master Plan46 were completed in 1967, and that year, the Karaj-Tehran highway was constructed to facilitate transportation between the two cities (BahramBaygui, 1978, pp. 69-70). The development programs and industrial activities in Karaj attracted many migrants. However, physical obstacles such as the complex path of the Karaj River and land-related 46 During the Third Development Plan (1963-67) a new map of âGreater Tehranâ was created which includes Karaj city as well. According to the 1966 census, the population of Karaj was around 44,243 citizens which was twice the 1956 figure. Also, the number of housing units were reported around 5,521 in Karaj and 65% of them were constructed between 1956-66. 103 issues limited housing expansion. As a result, unauthorized settlements, particularly in ZoorAbad, highlighted a severe housing shortage47 (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 72). Squatters constructed more durable homes in informal settlements. To the west, Tehran extended towards Karaj, encompassing a variety of towns and both formal and informal settlements. Interestingly, villages in this region were influenced by these urban growths, experiencing a blend of urbanized and rural characteristics (Bayat, 1997, 78-82). Housing affordability in suburbs like Karaj attracts middle-class individuals who are priced out of Tehran. This trend results in issues such as daily commuting between work and home (Atlas of Tehran Metropolis, n.d. 4). It reflects changing demographics in both Tehran and Karaj, with rising rental prices in Tehran pushing middle-class tenants to migrate to nearby cities like Karaj. Karaj, initially a town with a population of 14,529 in 1956 and 44,000 in 1966, burgeoned into a city of 1 million by 1996, 1,386,030 in 2006, and 1,892,492 in 202148 closely linked to Tehran's growth (Statistical Center of Iran). Analyzing this massive demographic growth regionally, and in conjunction with neighboring Tehran, provides a clearer perspective on the urban dynamics of this formative period. The combined population of the Tehran-Karaj region in 1966 was around 3.5 million, increasing to 10.3 million by 1996. By 2006 and 2021, this figure had risen to 13.3 million and 17.7 million, respectively. The Tehran-Karaj region was among the most attractive areas for migration within the country (Shirazi, 2013). Tehran has played a significant role in attracting migrants; for instance, between 1976 and 1986, around 60% of inter-provincial migrants chose Tehran as their destination. This trend has continued to the present day (Atlas of Tehran Metropolis, n.d. 1). These data illustrate that Karaj and other formerly agricultural towns effectively became bedroom communities for Tehran. Greater Karaj with an area of 12,457 square kilometers, became the sixth largest metropolitan area in Iran by 2010. Its notable topographic feature, ZoorAbad (Moradab Hill), is situated in 47 The 1976 census recorded a population of 138,774 in Karaj, a 3.1-fold increase from 1966, making it the country's 16th largest city. 48 Shakarami, K., & Rahnama, M. R. (2023). Spatial analysis of the impacts of the urban form on the energy consumption of Karaj over the Covid-19 era (2019-2022). Energy and Buildings, 113568. 104 the northeastern part of the city. Karaj's northern region, including the Azimiyeh town and ZoorAbad neighborhood, features a steep slope that creates an open and favorable landscape. However, according to AliPour, the self-built housing structures on the hill have compromised this natural quality! (Alipour, 2014, 75-77). In addition to ZoorAbad, there are 20 low-income neighborhoods in Karaj49 (Qasemi, 2010, p. 90). 3.2.4.3. ZoorAbad The ZoorAbad neighborhood is located in the northeastern of Karaj city (Figure 14). The area of this neighborhood is approximately 165 hectares. To the south, it borders Baraghan street, while to the North, it reaches Azimiyeh Town, an affluent neighborhood in Karaj (Qasemi, 2014). Its proximity to one of the national access roads constructed during the reign of Reza Shah, the Chalus Road, has made ZoorAbad Hill an important location (Qasemi, 2010, 48). According to some narratives, ZoorAbad was one of the signal hills where residents in the region would alert each other to the presence of enemies by lighting fires (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 16-17). The hill has three peaks, with the tallest reaching an elevation of 1,480 meters, and the other two peaks ranging from 1,380 to 1,450 meters in height. Among ZoorAbad's significant geographical features are its notable slope, low soil permeability, and the risk of landslides (Qasemi, 2010, 48). 49 Including Sofiabad, Zoorabad, Husseinabad Afshar, Hassanabad, Heydarabad, Qalamstan, Khalajabad, Malekabad, Torkabad, Hasar-e-Payin, Hasar-e-Bala, Hasar-e-K Payin, Sohrabiye, Hasar-e-K Bala, Kalak-e-Nou, Chenarak and Bidarcheshmeh, Sepid Dasht and Eskooyi, Kalak Bala, and Mahmoudabad. Nine of these neighborhoods, including Zoorabad, Ehterabad, Sohrabiye*, Hasar, Chenarak and Bidarcheshmeh, Mahmoudabad, Kalak Bala, Sepid Dasht and Eskooyi, have informal settlements, and some of them are located outside the legal boundaries of the city (Qasemi, 2010, 90). 105 Figure 14: Location of ZoorAbad (IslamAbad) in Iran, Karaj map [Retrived from Google Maps in 2021 June ] 3.2.4.3.1. Name of the Settlement The hill has been known by various names throughout its history, including "Islamabad," "Zoorabad," "Moradab Hill," and "Ariyamehr." Each name reflects different circumstances. Generally, specific names are assigned to slums based on the socio-political contexts in which they emerged and their process of evolution, highlighting the uniqueness of their configurations and the contexts of their emergence50. These different names illuminate the diverse characteristics of these areas (Rolnik, 2019, 126). For instance, Istanbulâs term "gecekondus" refers to homes or shelters that are quickly built overnight. The construction of these buildings often suffers from a lack of permissions and proper materials. If Turkish land squatters managed to build their shelters overnight, the state could not demolish their housing 50 In following, some of them will be introduced: âKolkataâs bustees, Mumbaiâs chawls and zopadpattis, Karachiâs katchi abadis, Jakartaâs and Surabayaâs kampung, Manilaâs iskwaters, Khartoumâs shammasas, Durbanâs umjondolos, Rabatâs intra-murios, Abidjanâs bidonvilles, Cairoâs baladis, Ankara and Istanbulâs gecekondus, Quitoâs conventillos, Brazilâs favelas, Buenos Airesâs villas miseria, Caracasâs barrios and Mexico Cityâs colonias popularesâ (Rolnik, 2019, 126). 106 the next morning once it was completed. This context, led to the term "gecekondus" for Turkish slums (Neuwirth, 2005). Despite the differences among the terms used for slums in various countries, they share similarities in occupying land that exists in-between: between formal and informal, planned and unplanned, center and periphery etc. (Rolnik, 2019, 126). The officially registered name of this hill is Moradab. However, due to widespread construction activities and despite government opposition, the name "ZoorAbad" Has become commonly used for this informal or self-built settlement in this area. In the late 1980s, at the request of a Karaj official, the neighborhood was named "Islamabad" to honor the services rendered by its residents during the Iran-Iraq war. Additionally, within the theocratic ideological context of the Islamic Revolution, this name reflects the role of Islam in the development of the area. While "Islamabad" is commonly used in newspapers, magazines, and by younger residents, others still refer to it as ZoorAbad. The name "Moradab" was not widely used by the public, either before or after the revolution, and today, it remains largely unfamiliar and used primarily among officials (Qasemi, 2010, 52). The most well-known name for the hill is ZoorAbad, which means "built by the force". This name reflects a dialectical relationship between the government's efforts to demolish homes and evict residents, and the grassroots resistance of the people who have built, lived, and fought to remain and maintain their neighborhood. The residents themselves adopted this name to signify their determination in constructing the area despite these challenges (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 123-124) (Qasemi, 2010, 52). In this research, I use "ZoorAbad" consistently, changing all other names in official documents or other resources to ZoorAbad. This provides a uniform and simplified reference for audiences who may not be familiar with the context. Another reason for choosing this name lies in my approach to studying the neighborhood. According to Asef Bayat's concept of non-movement, the residents of ZoorAbad have facilitated informal grassroots development through their resistance to government attempts to demolish the neighborhood at various points in its history. 3.2.4.3.2. Evolution of ZoorAbad The period during which ZoorAbad emerged coincided with a decade of dramatic population growth in Karaj (figures 15 & 16). Karaj experienced unprecedented population growth from 107 1966 to 1976. During this decade, the population tripled to 138,774 individuals, growing at a rate of 12.1% annually. By 1978, nearly 22% of Karaj's urban population (30,000 individuals) lived in ZoorAbad51. The affordability of land and housing in Karaj, compared to Tehran, increasingly become a significant factor contributing to its transformation into a burgeoning residential satellite of the capital city (BahramBaygui, 1978, 93-127). Some residents of ZoorAbad, who had previously lived as tenants in low-income neighborhoods of Tehran, faced high rental prices and thus moved to ZoorAbad. Another form of migration involved direct movement from rural areas to these settlements. Initially, men would enter the neighborhood, find work and housing, and then bring their spouses and children. Subsequently, their extended families would migrate from the village to ZoorAbad. Figure 15: ZoorAbad in 1970 and its development compared to Azimiyeh neighborhood [Retrived from BahramBaygui, 1978] 51 The current population of Metro Karaj is approximately 1,600,000 and the population of ZoorAbad is around 36,000. 108 Figure 16: ZoorAbad in 1977 [Retrived from BahramBaygui, 1978] According to reports from the Ministry of Interior and the Research Institute of the University of Tehran in 1932, Moradab Hill (ZoorAbad area) was registered as a common pasture for the village of Bilghan, obtained a power of attorney in 1949, for tree planting, canal construction, development, and settlement from other village residents and acquired a share of ownership through bribery (Qasemi, 2010, 48) (ParsaPajouh, 2003, 161-197). During the 1950s, disputes over ownership of a site arose between the inhabitants of the nearby villages of Bilaqan and Sarjub. Eventually, some individuals from Bilaqan, with the support of influential figures from Tehran and Karaj, acquired the land in the early 1960s. The land was divided into 50 shares: 36 shares were allocated to supporters, while the remaining 14 shares were distributed among approximately 50 people from Bilaqan (BahramBaygui, 1977, 124-126). A few oral history narratives acknowledge the disputed ownership of ZoorAbad. One of the most recent academic studies on the ZoorAbad neighborhood is the master's thesis of Parvin Qasemi, a graduate of Tehran University in 2010. Her research was conducted under the supervision of prominent Iranian urban sociologists such as Parviz Piran. In her thesis, Parvin Qasemi includes a transcript of an interview with Hassan, one of the early land sellers in ZoorAbad. Hassan described the disputed land ownership and its sale on Moradabad Hill: 109 "The lands of Moradabad Hill belonged to the ancestors of Bilaghanis. Since they didn't use the land, a military commander named Arteshbod Minbashian claimed them as his own. Two or three of my friends, who were originally Bilaghanis, argued that this place was our ancestral heritage, so how could Arteshbod claim ownership? They began constructing a large house with several surrounding rooms and lived there. Shortly afterwards, they sold their house to others and wrote on a piece of paper that the land belonged to them. They were also impoverished individuals. Later, they sold the land at low prices, for example, a large plot might be sold for 1,000 Tomans. At that time, the lands along the Qazvin and Karaj roads had little value and were primarily agricultural, priced at 25 to 100 Rials per square meter. Over time, more people joined in and gradually sold the lands. As a soldier with no income, I acquired several plots and began selling them. Eventually, many people became landowners and started selling land themselves, and it was no longer just me and my friends. In 1977-1978, I was exiled to Zahedan due to my involvement in selling these lands" (Qasemi, 2010, 49-50). Hassan's narrative highlights the contentious land ownership situation in the area and shows how, prior to the revolution, land sales were considered illegal activities, leading to the exile of those involved. This account aligns with Piran's interpretation in Qasemi's documentary about ZoorAbad (2011). Piran describes how illegal groups subdivided land with various intentions, including profit for power holders and establishing industrial centers, while providing low-cost housing for the working class near industrial zones. In this narrative, Hassan and other ordinary people, how were initially agents of a broader group of power holders, became influential figures in ZoorAbad after the revolution, continuing the legacy of these illegal activities. ParsaPajouh (2003) suggests that the new legislation, which designated MoradAb Hill as national land in 1969, may have contributed to the acceleration of informal or self-built settlements in ZoorAbad. Since 1966, MoradAb hill, which was originally common pastureland, had transformed into an self-built (informal) neighborhood due to unauthorized housing construction on the hill. However, in 1969, new legislation by the Ministry of Natural Resources designated MoradAb Hill as national land. This designation accelerated the process of informal settlement, as municipal control over the hill was effectively removed by the new legislation (ParsaPajouh, 2003, 161-197). 110 The new legislation that designated MoradAb Hill as national land in 1969 may have contributed to the acceleration of land subdividing described by (1978). By 1969, small landholders from Bilaqan had begun subdividing and selling smaller plots of land, sparking speculative activities and land ownership disputes that led to a tenfold increase in land prices (BahramBaygui, 1978, 124-127). He argues that several factors influenced the choice of ZoorAbad's location for initial squatters, including the vagueness of land ownership in ZoorAbad, the low and affordable price of land, proximity to public transportation and job opportunities, and its location just 500 meters from the Karaj roundabout (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 124). Despite being largely ignored by authorities, ZoorAbad's growth accelerated in 1974 due to an influx of immigrants, which prompted large landholders to recognize the land's economic potential. Despite residents possessing written documents, legal ownership remained with the landowners (BahramBaygui, 1978, 124). According to BahramBaygui (1978), the lack of clarity in ownership in ZoorAbad represented both an opportunity for the growth of self-built settlements and a risk of demolition. Thus, throughout ZoorAbad's history, the ambiguity of ownership created tension between legal landlords, governments, and informal small-scale self-built homeowners and tenants. In 1978, squatter settlements persisted despite the lack of legal recognition, with Karaj authorities sporadically demolishing dwellings. By 1978, approximately 30,000 people lived in developed areas of ZoorAbad, accounting for nearly 22% of Karaj's urban population. In 1977, ZoorAbad had a population density of 100-120 dwellings per hectare, with the number of self-built housing units rising from 2,500 to 6,000 between 1974 and 1977 (BahramBaygui, 1978, pp. 124-127). According to Parviz Piran (Qasemi, 2011) in the documentary film Here is ZoorAbad (Qasemi, 2011), there is a richer narrative regarding the emergence of the neighborhood. Piran challenges the dominant narrative that attributes the formation of this slum solely to the forceful actions of impoverished individuals. Instead, he highlights structural factors, such as the presence of factories and industrial firms on the peripheries of Karaj and their need for low-wage labor during that period. As a result, some individuals, including landowners or possibly industrial firm owners, speculated on providing labor by organizing informal settlements on these peripheries to house workers for the nearby industries. Piran emphasizes 111 that illegal criminal networks played a significant role in facilitating the sale of land at low prices to poor individuals (Qasemi, 2011). According to a strand of Marxist literature originating in the 1970s in Latin America, slums or other marginal types of settlements are described as âperipheral models of capitalist accumulationâ (Rolnik, 2019, 115). In this model, there is a need for a spare labor force that remains inactive, with minimal âreproductive conditionsâ - especially those who are landless and lack housing or other means of production. In other words, all slum settlers are considered part of an âindustrial reserve armyâ. The low cost of their housing âone of the major reproductive expenses â enables the maintenance of low wage levels, creating conditions for the super-exploitation of their labor by capital (Rolnik, 2019, 115). While we cannot definitively prove or disprove this claim, Piran's narrative suggests that alongside the agency of the urban poor in providing self-built housing, structural forces imposed by industries owners may have played a significant role in the emergence of this neighborhood. Constructing company towns around industries requires substantial financial resources, and since industry owners generally seek to maximize profit, Piran's narrative offers not just an alternative, but a complementary perspective. This narrative illustrates broader possible factors that contributed to the rise of ZoorAbad. In this view, while migrants exercised agency in improving their living conditions, industrial owners also benefited greatly by facilitating the creation of informal, low-cost housing for workers without incurring the considerable expenses involved in building company towns, which demand more direct investment from industrial owners. To summarize the diverse narratives on the emergence of ZoorAbad, whether we accept Hassan's account of the informal sale of legitimately owned and traded lands, the illegal sale of public land, or Piran's argument about industrial firm owners intervening through a criminal network to provide affordable shelter for their low-wage labor force, the key point for this thesis is the ambiguity of ownership in ZoorAbad. This ambiguity created a context that facilitated the emergence of self-built housing or affordable informal housing for disenfranchised people who migrated from villages to the outskirts of the capital in hopes of improving their living conditions. According to narratives such as those of Piran and Rolnik, this ambiguity of ownership benefited not only the urban poor but also industrial owners in 112 the vicinity of Tehran, who gained access to lower-wage workers living in affordable housing. The low price of land due to ambiguity of land ownership in ZoorAbad, combined with its excellent accessibility to various services, provided a significant opportunity for the urban poor, who lacked affordable housing and social protections from the government. In other words, this situation presented an alternative to social housing for the urban poor, which both the government and industry exploited by spending far fewer resources on housing provision for their vulnerable citizens and labor force, respectively. These self-built housing units, which served as alternatives to social housing, emerged in response to severe housing shortages caused by rapid population growth in Karaj, during the 1970s and 1980s. The population surge in ZoorAbad is closely linked to Karaj's rapid expansion52 (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 93). The dramatic population growth in ZoorAbad is evident in aerial photos from 1970 (figure 15) to 1977 (figure 16), with over 3,500 housing units built between 1974 and 1977, consisting mainly of one or two rooms (p. 120). The population of ZoorAbad peaked at 120,000 during the 1970s and the 1980s (Ghasemi, 2014). In 1976, household sizes in ZoorAbad were notably larger, averaging 6.1 persons per household compared to the Karaj average of around 4.9 persons (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 93). This dramatic population growth and density caused various challenges, particularly regarding access to urban utilities such as water and electricity. These issues were addressed through grassroot movements (or ânon-movementsâ according to Bayat) (Qasemi, 2010, 71), which will be elaborated upon in the upcoming chapter. While detailed plans for this neighborhood were provided by the government before the 1979 Iranian revolution, they were not implemented (Qasemi, 2010, 81-82). The area's tenure issue involves allegations by the Urban Land Organization53 that residents illegally seized the land (Qasemi, 2014). This assessment marked the beginning of government plans for neighborhood "improvement" and "legalization" during the 1990s. 52 Situated strategically, Karaj experienced unprecedented population growth from 1966 to 1976, outpacing all other Iranian cities. During this decade, the population tripled to 138,774 individuals, growing at a rate of 12.1% annually. Also, the number of households increased from 3,300 units in 1956 to 9,136 units in 1966, and further expanded to 28,484 units in 1976 (BahramBaygui, 1978, 93). 53 Urban Land Organization is a state institution established in 1982 by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and one of its duties is to provide master, detailed and housing plans and to preserve and control the national lands. 113 The first state initiative to "improve" living conditions in ZoorAbad after the Islamic Revolution began in 1994. Named the âImprovement plan for ZoorAbadâ, it was proposed by President Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) as part of his market-oriented approach. Managed by Karaj municipality, the plan aimed to renovate the hill by demolishing self-built housing units above 1400-meters altitude, relocating residents, and developing a 72-hectare park along with various residential and administrative complexes. Initially met with resistance, the state employed various strategies, ultimately leading to the eviction of slum dwellers. The plan originally included a "key-to-key" relocation strategy, but this was soon abandoned in favour of a "house-for-money" approach due to residents' financial limitations. This shift resulted in the demolition of over 3,988 homes and the displacement of around 30,000 residents over 18 years. These strategies will be further elaborated in the following sections. One notable tactic involved persuading a household with a higher offer in a particular street or zone of ZoorAbad to sell their property to the government. The government aimed to disrupt the organic structure of the neighborhood by demolishing one building in a street or alley, causing a significant decrease in safety for neighboring properties. Consequently, neighboring residents had no choice but to sell their homes and relocate to a safer area (Qasemi, 2010, 2011). The plan faced criticism for its approach of compensation, which often excluded land value, resulting in inadequate support for displaced residents. During the initial stage of the Improvement Plan, when the government adopted the "key-to-key" strategy, it planned to construct new residential complexes. While this strategy was not continued by the government, even the early attempts, such as the construction of the Baharestan residential complex, were aimed more at middle-class tenants than at serving the residents of ZoorAbad. The financial compensation strategy further disrupted social and ethnic networks in ZoorAbad, leading to a gradual exodus of residents to other impoverished areas (Qasemi, 2010) (Qasemi, 2011). In later phases, the Improvement Plan evolved into a gentrification effort, erasing the history and presence of ZoorAbad's long-term residents. Mega projects like the construction of parks and tourism centers further emphasized this shift, transforming the neighborhood's socio-spatial context without addressing the underlying challenges faced by its original inhabitants. 114 As previously mentioned, Rolnik (2019) illustrates how âinformal settlementsâ serve as reservoirs for speculative activities. This narrative aligns with Piran's viewpoint, a prominent Iranian urban sociologist, who noted (Qasemi, 2011) that the latent goal of ZoorAbad's âImprovement planâ was aligned with the market-driven urbanization process and speculative activities in the neighborhood. Since the 1990s, due to the Improvement Plan, a trend of displacing residents of ZoorAbad to areas outside the neighborhood has continued. The population decreased to around 55,000 in 2012 (AhadNejad & AliPour, 2013), a trend that persists today. Table 2 and figure 17 show how the population of ZoorAbad has changed since 1960. Year Early 1960s 1968 1969 1973 1977 1979-1980s 1990s 2012 2016 Population Subdeviding the lands of ZoorAbad into 50 shares of 25,000 square meters.54 300-400 individuals (40-50 households) Bilagani people started to sell small plots of 40-60 square meters Commencement of population growth in ZoorAbad (BahramBeigui, 1977, p. 120-127) 30,000 (BahramBeigui, 1977, p. 126) 120,000 individuals Implementation of Improvement Plan in ZoorAbad and forced displacement. 55,000 (Maarefvand & Tofigh, 2014) 35,000 Table 2: Table of Population Change in ZoorAbad 54 36 shares were given to 8 people who supported Bilaghani's claims regarding their ownership on ZoorAbad's land. Remaining 14 shares being devided among 50 people from Bilaghan (BahramBeigui, 1977, pp. 120-127). 115 Figure 17: Aerial images of ZoorAbad in 2000, 2004, 2009, 2015. Through these imagesthe demolitions in the name of "Improvement Plan in ZoorAbad" is obvious during around two decades [Retrived from Dynamic Plan of ZoorAbad, p. 18 ] To conclude, the history of the emergence and evolution of informal settlements in the ZoorAbad neighborhood can be summarized in the below table. 1932 Registration of the hill as a common grassland for Billaghan rural people (ParsaPajouh, 2003, 161-197) 1939 Obtaining deed for MoradAb Hill lands by one of the rural settlers through bribing (ParsaPajouh, 2003, 161-197). 1960s and early 70s Migrating from villages toward Tehran and Karaj due to the land reform (ParsaPajouh, 2003, 161-197). 1966-67 Initiating the informal construction process in ZoorAbad. Farmers and landowners of Moradab Hill assigned three individuals from the villages of Bilaghan, to divide and sell the lands of this hill. After the sale of these lands, uncontrolled construction began (ParsaPajouh, 2003, 161-197). 1968 The Ministry of Housing and Urban Development introduced this area with 40-50 residential households. After that, the population of the 116 neighborhood, mainly consisting of migrants from Zanjan, started to increase. 1969 Designation of ZoorAbad area as a national land (AhadiNejad & Alipour, 2013) 1973-1977 Accelerating construction on the hill and migration process toward ZoorAbad. â¢ Since 1973, government investment in assembly factories in the Tehran-Qazvin area spurred migration to urban centers, driven by high housing costs in Tehran and Karaj. This led to a significant rise in populations in ZoorAbad. â¢ In 1977, less than half of the hill was developed, leaving adundant vacant land for construction. Due to police restrictions, construction primarily took place at night, with completed roots sparing buildings from demolition. 1978 Reaching its full capacity regarding construction (AhadNejad & Alipour, 2013) 1979-80s Accelerating the squatting trend in ZoorAbad due to Islamic revolution (Maarefvand & Tofigh, 2014). 1979 Construction of several high-pressure water pipelines and the approval for selling of Karaj municipality lands in ZoorAbad to the owners of houses built on those lands. 1987 The impact of an Iraqi missile hitting Zone 3 of Zoorabad in Karaj and the death of 40 people from Zoorabad residents. 1991 Formation of the Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad after the visit of the then President (Hashemi Rafsanjani) to the neighborhood55. 55 The plan was implemented under the supervision of the Board of Trustees, composed of the Governor of Karaj, the representative of the Executive Deputy of the President, the representative of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, the Friday Prayer Imam of Karaj, the representative of Karaj in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Mayor of Karaj, the head of the Karaj City Council, the Chief Justice of Karaj, the Chief Prosecutor of Karaj, and the representative of Zoorabad residents (by the appointment of the Governor of Karaj). This group was responsible for determining the policies and general objectives of this plan, and the executive manager of the plan is obligated to implement these decisions. 117 1996 Slum pacification was executed for 72 hectares of ZoorAbad (Ahadinejad & Alipour, 2013) 1997 Water storage tank was placed on the summit of ZoorAbad, resolving the water issue of this neighborhood. 2001 Identification of residential units on hilly terrain with slopes exceeding 40% for demolition in order to implement the Improvement Plan in ZoorAbad. 2004 Through the Ministry of Interior, a loan of $10 million is approved by the Economic Council for implementation of the Improvement Plan for ZoorAbad. 2009 Construction of a cultural complex in ZoorAbad, and installation of a 300-meter pipeline to strengthen the water transmission line to the area. 2012-2013 Demolishing 3978 housing units and displacing around 30,000 individuals. 2013 Around 4000 housing units were demolished, under the Improvement Plan; Around 30,000 individuals were displaced according to this plan. Zoorabad is introduced as a pilot neighborhood for national urban regeneration in the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development (AhadiNejad & Alipour, 2013) Table 3: Significant physical changes in ZoorAbad over time 3.2.5. Grassroot Housing Strategies in ZoorAbad According to Parviz Piran (1988), the issue of housing for the poor in Iran has been studied by academics since 1962. One significant report on this topic was produced by the Urban Studies sector of Tehran Universityâs Social Research Institute in 1972, focusing on slum dwellers in Tehran. This and similar reports led to the categorization of various forms of shelters in Iran and the different strategies adopted by the poor to address their housing 118 needs. Categories include Aloonak56, Zagheh57, Kapar58, Tent59, Maghbareh60, and homelessness, which involves living and sleeping on public lands (Piran, 1987). Reviewing the case of ZoorAbad will update our understanding of how urban poor strategies for addressing housing needs have evolved in this neighborhood and across the country. The history of the ZoorAbad neighborhood over the past six decades has been closely tied to resistance against government demolition projects and the residents' efforts to defend their right to remain in the area. The introduction of the âImprovement Plan in ZoorAbadâ marked a significant turning point in the strategies employed by ZoorAbad settlers. Prior to the Improvement Plan, their strategies primarily focused on building and improving their self-built settlements and fostering grassroots development within the neighborhood. However, after the implementation of the âImprovement Plan,â these strategies shifted. Since then, the living conditions for the ZoorAbad settlers have changed dramatically. One of the key reasons for this was the demolition of more than 4,000 housing units in ZoorAbad, which led to the forced displacement of approximately 30,000 residents (see Table 2). This had a major impact on numerous small-scale grocery stores in the area, as many of the self-built homes had dedicated a room to these stores or other small businesses. According to the semi-structured interviews with residents, the number of local small-scale grocery stores has significantly decreased since the Improvement Plan. For instance, Mr. Shiry, a shop owner in ZoorAbad, said: "Since the Improvement plan was implemented in ZoorAbad and numerous families were forced to leave, many grocery stores in this neighborhood lost their main customers and could not continue, forcing them to close their stores." As a result, remaining settlers were forced to seek employment in other neighborhoods or even in other cities, which added extra expenses for transportation and renting, often with lower income. More importantly, after the implementation of the Improving Plan, displaced residents had to determine where they would relocate. It is important to note that these displaced individuals did not possess equal bargaining or negotiating power, nor did they have equal access to 56 One room shelter constructed by poor and unconventional materials like cans, mud and clay, brick and stones. 57 A sort of shelter which is located underground with no extra material and it is a caved space underground. 58 A sort of shelter made of straw (or mat). 59 A sort of settlement which is separate outside and inside only by fabric and cloth. 60 Tomb mausoleum; squatting in the family mausoleum. 119 financial and social capital. For instance, landowners differed from tenants, Iranian tenants from Afghan tenants, and those with strong socio-cultural bonds in neighborhood from those without. Similarly, the younger second or third generations of settlers had different experiences compared to the older, first-generation residents of ZoorAbad. These differences have contributed to a range of new housing strategies in the neighborhood in recent years. As a result of these disparities, different strategies for finding new housing emerged. Some settlers chose to remain in the lower parts of ZoorAbad, outside the demolition zone, while others returned to their home villages, or were forced to move to other informal neighborhoods with fewer opportunities than ZoorAbad. Additionally, the number of Afghanâs refugees and immigrants in Iran has significantly increased particularly in the past two years due to geopolitical crisis in neighboring countries. These newcomers, under Iranian law, do not have the right of ownership. Consequently, their strategies for addressing housing issues in ZoorAbad and other parts of Iran represent another important category. Based on interviews and documents I have collected, I will elaborate on these categories in the following subsection. Each strategy will be described using a combination of ethnographic information and historical analysis. As mentioned in the methodology section of the first chapter, the ethnographic information was extracted from 35 semi-structured interviews I conducted in ZoorAbad, with the shared questions provided in the methodology section. All names used in this thesis are pseudonyms to protect the confidentiality of ZoorAbad residents I interviewed. 3.2.5.1. Grassroot Strategies Before the Improvement Plan 3.2.5.1.1. Self-built settlements Nahid Khanoom, a 65-year-old shopkeeper selling hygiene and hair products in ZoorAbad, shared the story of how she and her family built their home about 47 years ago. After getting married, she and her husband moved from a village in Toiserkan (Hamedan Province) to a neighborhood in Tehran called "Abbasiyeh," near the Imamzadeh Ma'sum shrine. When they arrived in Zoorabad, they bought a 75-85 square meter plot of land for 15,000 tomans. Iran explained that they raised 12 tomans by selling their belongings and borrowed the remaining 3 tomans. Nahid shared that they have demolished and rebuilt their current house three times. 120 The first time, they built a very modest single-room structure. At that time, they had four children, so the entire family of six lived together in one room. She mentioned that, back then, there was no government organization, like the municipality, to build walls around their land. Instead, the authorities would demolish the walls, intending to create a main road along this street. Now, their house includes a hall, a bedroom, a kitchen, and a bathroom. 3.2.5.1.2. Grassroot urban development and provision of urban utilities âIn 1979 some people used donkeys to transport water to ZoorAbad, carrying ten barrels on the back of a donkey and distributing the water. They stored the waters in reservoirs. There was electricity from the beginning, but no water supply. Two years after the revolution, that people of ZoorAbad blocked Chalous Street to demand a water pipeline from the municipality. Finally, in 2007-2008, the area was equipped with a water pipeline. However, gas and telephone services were provided much later,â said Rahim, one of the interviewees and a resident of ZoorAbad, who has lived there for more than 50 years. During the first 25 years of the emergence of the informal ZoorAbad settlement, residents faced significant challenges due to the lack of access to urban services such as piped water and electricity (Qasemi, 2010, 59). The steep slope of the hill and the absence of paved roads made life particularly difficult for the residents. The migrants began their lives by constructing informal buildings on the vacant land of the hill (Qasemi, 2010, 54) (figure 18). However, these settlers did not passively wait for government intervention to improve their neighborhood. By comparing the aerial images of ZoorAbad from 1970 â the beginning of its history â with those from 2008 (Figure 18), we can gain a clearer understanding of how the urban poor developed the neighborhood on vacant land, without support from the government or other institutions, starting from the arrival of ZoorAbad's residents. 121 Figure 18: Comparing aerial image of ZoorAbad in 1970 with 2008, by Pardaraz Consulting Company [Retrived from Qasemi, 2010, p. 54] The struggle for access to water in ZoorAbad must be situated within the broader context of the Islamic revolution and the contestation over land and services. The residents' efforts to secure water reflect their desire for formal recognition and access to basic services, but on favorable terms. This dynamic can be seen as part of a larger movement, a form of entrepreneurship, or even a "quiet encroachment" on state authority, showcasing the flexible nature of such grassroots initiatives. Before the revolution and during its early years, ZoorAbad's ambiguous land ownership and lack of recognition as a residential area by the authorities, until 1985, meant that city water supply lines did not extend to the neighborhood, forcing residents to meet this basic need with limited resources (figure 19). During this period, residents relied on natural springs for drinking water, using springs located on the southwest and southeast sides of the hill. Although the local health department eventually facilitated the installation of piped water in certain parts of the neighborhood, it remained limited for drinking purposes. Residents collected drinking water using buckets and devised various strategies for water storage, such as storing water in homes, purchasing water tanks, and transporting water with donkeys, and later on. As the neighborhood's population grew, and the political and economic instability of the government became more pronounced in the late years of the monarchy, the threat to their homes diminished (Qasemi, 2010, 55). In 1976, as part of a spontaneous collective movement, some residents in the older parts of the neighborhood connected a branch pipeline from the main city water supply to a reservoir, which they purchased and installed overnight at the top of the neighborhood. At the time and 122 before the revolution, any construction activity was considered illegal, so these initiatives had to be carried out discreetly at night, hidden from government agents. This nighttime project involved digging trenches and laying pipes to supply water to participating households. Remnants of these early water sources can still be visible in certain areas of the neighborhood (Qasemi, 2010, 55). Figure 19: Lack of access to water in 1979, ZoorAbad. The image was taken by a local photographer named Soleyman Moghadam [Retrieved from Qasemi, 2010, p. 56] Buying water from tankers was also common, particularly for women and children. As Asef Bayat writes in his book Street Politics, purchasing water from water carriers costs more than ten times the price of piped water, while only 12% of residents had access to piped water. Digging deep wells and installing sewage pipes posed significant challenges for the residents. Moreover, carrying heavy buckets of water up the hill was especially difficult for women. As a result, residents frequently resorted to buying water from tankers and storing it in reservoirs (Qasemi, 2010, 56). After the Islamic revolution, especially in its early years, the pro-poor rhetoric of the Islamic regime provided the urban poor with more opportunities to demand services and facilities. However, this approach shifted over time, and the historical contestation over landownership between the authorities and the urban poor re-emerged. In 1982, the women of ZoorAbad, after several days of mobilization and organizing, successfully pressured city authorities to extend urban services to their neighborhood. This effort continued until 1985, when the 123 municipality finally approved the development of water supply facilities. However, residents did not wait for official action. Taking matters into their own hands, they began digging channels and installing pipes themselves. This act of defiance led to the arrest of some residents (Qasemi, 2010, 57), but it also demonstrated their determination to secure essential services and formalize their claims to the land and its resources. Initially, electricity in the neighborhood was privately owned. Wealthy individuals would purchase electric generators and sell electricity to the neighborhood's home to generate income. In 1985, ZoorAbad was finally connected to the public electricity grid. As for fuel supply during the winter, residents initially relied on coal, later switching to oil, then gas cylinders, and eventually natural gas to heat their homes (Qasemi, 2010, 59). Over time, as the population grew and slogans such as "The country belongs to the working class" by Khomeini gained prominence, residents of ZoorAbad took advantage of the political climate to push institutions towards providing services and welfare. As a result, the neighborhood expanded and now includes four primary schools, two middle schools, one high school, and two bank branches that offer services to the community (figure 20). Each of these schools was built through the efforts of the neighborhood residents, with support from philanthropists outside the area. Additionally, the construction of a health center â eventually turned into a clinic and later a maternity hospital â was another self-initiated project by the residents, also aided by outside philanthropists (Qasemi, 2010, 63). 124 Figure 20: Land use in ZoorAbad and distribution of services in this neighborhood. The yellow color represents residential buildings, and dark red color represents residential ones [Retrived from Qasemi, 2010, p. 62 ] 3.2.5.2. Grassroot Strategies after Implementation of the Improvement Plan 3.2.5.2.1. Resistance and Negotiating with the government When the residents of ZoorAbad were confronted with the Improvement Plan, which required the relocation of those living in homes built above 1400 meters in altitude, approximately 4,000 houses were demolished, displacing around 30,000 people. In response to the threat of being uprooted and losing both their homes and social networks, various groups of relatives and families within the ZoorAbad community developed strategies to preserve the social solidarity and capital they had cultivated. Determined to protect their socio-cultural bonds, they made numerous efforts to maintain these vital connections. It is worth noting that when discussing the strategies of the urban poor in ZoorAbad, we must situate them within the socio-cultural context of the neighborhood. By "strategy", I refer to any effort undertaken by a group of people in the neighborhood who shared strong social networks. Through grassroots consultations and discussions, these groups decided on 125 solutions to protect their networks. Similar to the traditional Mahalleh in pre-modern Iran, which were organized around ethnicity and fostered strong socio-cultural bonds, the residents of ZoorAbad also placed great importance on these connections. They were determined to make efforts to protect these networks. In some cases, these strategies succeeded, but for others who were forcibly displaced, they did not work. Most of these strategies focused on staying close to relatives with similar ethno-tribal backgrounds. After surrendering their homes, many displaced residents searched for housing in the lower parts of the neighborhood, which were not affected by the âOrganizing Plan. Generally, this displacement resulted in various economic, social and emotional disadvantages for the majority. Parvin Qasemi (2014) demonstrated a direct relationship between the length of time residents lived in the neighborhood and the social solidarities they experienced. For those with strong social ties and integration, displacement was significantly more difficult, as it served deep-rooted connections with their community. Nahid Khanum, one of the interviewees, pointed to a building across the street and said, "my husband built that one as well. We converted the ground floor into a tea house where our sons worked. It was almost two stories tall, and we constructed four residential units above it". She mentioned that two years ago, some government agents came and offered to buy the four residential units and one shop for 1 billion and 200 million tomans. However, Nahid and her sons were not satisfied with the offer, so they decided not to sell. The Improvement plan initially faced resistance from the locals, which slowed the process of buying and demolishing houses. However, as people witnessed the buying and demolition activities carried out by the project's implementers and experienced worsening living conditions, they began writing letters to higher government authorities to seek improvements. They also constructed temporary walls between the demolished area and their residential areas to enhance security, although this measure had only a minimal and temporary impact. Additionally, locals opposed the demolition of neighboring houses due to concerns about losing both physical and psychological security (approximately 2003-2004) (Qasemi, 2010, 88-89). Overall, resistance to selling their self-built housing to the municipality and negotiating with municipal agents regarding the price and process of selling their housing 126 have been key strategies of the urban poor following the implementation of the Improvement Plan in ZoorAbad. 3.2.5.2.2. Remaining in ZoorAbad â in lower parts of the neighborhood Those who remained in ZoorAbad can be divided into two groups: those who are unwilling to leave under any circumstances and those who have rented out their homes and moved to other neighborhoods. Families with unmarried daughters and children who have higher education but lack strong ethnic ties within the neighborhood are more inclined to leave, falling into the second group. Additionally, commercial units that were previously located in the area also desire to leave the neighborhood due to a significant decrease in population and a decline in their livelihoods. Furthermore, another group includes those whose homes are situated on the boundaries between demolished and undemolished areas. They face various risks such as theft and a sense of insecurity, prompting them to consider leaving ZoorAbad (Qasemi, 2010, 134). People in ZoorAbad are unclear about the government and municipality's plans and projects for the future of their neighborhood. Some have stated that if they were confident about the government's proposed development projects, they would never have sold their property to the government (Qasemi, 2010, 148). Others emphasized the value of their land and property, asserting that its worth was the reason they were forced to leave the neighborhood (p. 149). There is also the issue of how self-built housing can be rented or sold as informal housing. In some interpretations, while such housing can be rented or sold, it is still considered formal housing and tradable in the formal market. In Iran, and possibly in the broader Middle Eastern context, informal housing can also be traded in the housing market, though the major difference lies in the price. Even realtors handle both formal and informal housing transactions. Another difference is in the official deeds or informal documents available for these properties. The program to clear 80 hectares of land in the city's main area could have provided economic justifications for urban planners and the government over a period of three years. Furthermore, research by Parvin Ghasemi indicates that 38% of the studied sample resettled in the lower parts of the hill, while the remainder dispersed into the deteriorated area of Karaj. This suggests that the plan played a significant role in reinforcing and expanding 127 informal settlements elsewhere in Karaj. The reintegration of 38% of Ghasemi's sample back into ZoorAbad shows their preference for settling in this neighborhood. Moreover, those who were forced to leave their homes and live with relatives due to the emergency, after selling their properties to the municipality, experienced a loss of social capital and significant psychological distress (Qasemi, 2010, 152-154). Regarding their new destinations (Figure 21), most displaced individuals moved to other informal settlements near Karaj and Tehran or built their self-built housing on the peripheries of cities with very limited access to facilities. In other words, these new areas for displaced residents of ZoorAbad have minimal access to public transportation, educational and health services, and job opportunities. Their departure from service, medical, and security centers has increased their living expenses. The lack of basic facilities in most new areas has led to water-related illnesses, higher mortality rates due to the distance from healthcare centers, and interruptions in their children's education (Qasemi, 2010, 152-154). Based on this information, the decision to resettle in the lower parts of ZoorAbad and the inclination to remain in the neighborhood highlight that, despite government efforts to demolish the area, their socio-cultural ties motivated them to find ways to stay in ZoorAbad. 3.2.5.2.3. Evicted people: Expanding informal neighborhoods in other parts of the city One of the strategies employed by evicted residents of ZoorAbad has been the expansion of informal settlements on the peripheries of Karaj. In the absence of affordable housing options, one consequence of forced eviction and the pacification of slums can be the growth of informal settlements in other parts of the city. Even Mehr housing, the only available subsidized housing option for vulnerable people in Iran, could not meet the needs of the evicted population. Maria one of the interviewees who lived in ZoorAbad for over 15 years as a tenant, and left the neighborhood about 10 years ago, now reside in another low-income area near Karaj. She mentioned that Mehr housing has not been an adequate substitute for the evicted residents: "One of my old neighbors moved to a unit in Mehr Housing near Mehrshahr, Karaj. I visited them in their new apartment, which, although beautiful and new, is in a semi-abandoned building with inadequate security. Moreover, it is far from everyday shopping centers and other educational and health services, requiring residents to travel to Mehrshahr. The high prices of goods there 128 force residents to commute considerable distances daily for shopping. The lack of access to public transportation further complicates commuting, affecting her daughter's daily travel and imposing significant cost on the family." The opinion should be considered as second-hand information from an interviewee who left ZoorAbad and describing her old neighbor's experience with Mehr housing. While some aspects of her opinion, such as commuting challenges and distance from various services, align with professional assessments of Mehr housing discussed earlier, it is important to note that this perspective is based on her personal observations and may reflect her individual experience. Regarding the relocated individuals from ZoorAbad, by 2009, 54% of them, including those from 1,014 residential units, have relocated to satellite towns around Karaj (figure 21). Additionally, 24% settled outside the demolition plan area. Another 4% moved to similar areas, such as Kalaak and Hesar. Eight percent were unable to purchase new homes and currently reside in rented accommodations on the outskirts of Karaj or within what remains of ZoorAbad. Five percent returned to their hometowns. Notably, approximately 10% of this population had sold their houses to the Urban Planning Office two or three times â an action considered 'illegal' â and subsequently resettled in the lower parts of ZoorAbad. These individuals were unwilling to leave the neighborhood under any circumstances. Among those who had left, there were also individuals who had previously purchased homes in ZoorAbad but, due to compulsory relocations resulting from the resale of their properties to the planning office, had agreed to move to another areas (Qasemi, 2010, 98-99). One of the neighborhoods where displaced residents of ZoorAbad have relocated is Hasaar neighborhood which is close to ZoorAbad. This neighborhood is characterized by densely populated and unstable housing, as well as high poverty levels, closely resembling ZoorAbad. The forced migration of ZoorAbad residents has led to the development of informal housing in line 4 of Hasar neighborhood. This area began to develop recently, between 2002and 2008. It features an irregular and scattered structure, with many barren lands. Although the mountainous terrain hinders construction progress, it has become a suitable location for the expansion of informal settlements (Qasemi, 2010, 102). Other neighborhoods where displaced ZoorAbad settlers have relocated include Hesarak, Sohrabiyeh, KamalShahr, Pishahangi, HeidarAbad, HasanAbad, and SarAsiyab. Many of 129 these marginalized areas shared characteristics such as poor housing quality, informal housing, and limited access to urban services. In other words, the displacement of ZoorAbad residents contributed to the expansion of other informal neighborhoods, often with even poorer housing quality and living conditions (Qasemi, 2010, 114). Figure 21: This map shows how the displaced residents of ZoorAbad forced to move to other informal or low-income settlements in Karaj [Retrieved from Qasemi, 2010, p. 112]. Parvin Qasemi (2010, 123) points out that although some displaced families moved into larger homes than those they had in ZoorAbad, this did not lead to an improvement in their overall living conditions. In most cases, access to urban services such as education and health centers, as well as job opportunities, was dramatically reduced for these displaced individuals. For the residents who remained in the neighborhood, the situation worsened as their community was dismantled (figure 22). 130 3.2.5.2.4. Bypassing the law Another strategy employed by the urban poor following forced eviction involves bypassing the law in various ways. This includes reconstructing their previously sold and demolished housing, selling homes to the municipality, and then constructing new shelters to sell back to the municipality through bribery. These actions illustrate how bypassing the law became a survival strategy following the implementation of the Improvement plan in ZoorAbad. Mr. Rahim, one of the interviewees, mentioned: âPeople who were living on Shariati Street (the main street of ZoorAbad) and had abandoned their houses in ZoorAbad, after being evicted, went to Hashtgerd. However, they returned after a few years and began rebuilding houses in their old location in ZoorAbad." Although reconstructing their sold and demolished housing is illegal, it clearly demonstrates how the urban poor in ZoorAbad bypass legal restrictions as part of their survival strategy. Another interviewee, a Real Estate Agent and a dairy seller in ZoorAbad, mentioned that âaccording to the urban planning regulations, a person who hands over their property to this organization cannot buy another house in ZoorAbad". However, he claims that some individuals, after transferring their homes to the municipality, would bribe the organization and then buy land in ZoorAbad. After constructing one or two rooms, they would sell the property back to the municipality.â Figure 22: A few examples of remained undemolished housing in ZoorAbad, after the implementation of Improvement Plan [Retrieved from Qasemi, 2010, p. 133]. 131 Furthermore, he continued, "the current market is stagnant, and property sales and purchases are not happening. The exodus of the population from ZoorAbad has negatively impacted businesses in the neighborhood. Given this situation, many residents are interested in renovating or selling their properties to the municipality, but they lack permission". While the municipality does not cooperate and prohibits the sale or renovation of frozen properties, one strategy residents employ to improve their living conditions is to bypass the law. 2.2.5.2.5. Afghanâs strategies â renting entire dilapidated buildings and accepting higher rate of rent Afghan refugees have been resettling in Iran since the communist coup in Afghanistan in 1978, with their population estimated to have reached up to three million individuals of various ethnic backgrounds before 2008. The Afghan refugee population in Iran grew steadily during the 1980s, peaking at an estimated three million people in 1991, according to Iranian government estimates (Olszewska, 1982). Estimates of the Afghan diaspora in Iran varies, and exact figures are difficult to determine because many Afghans avoid official registration to evade deportation and other consequences. Most are economic migrants seeking to support families back home amid Afghanistan's economic crisis61 (Iran International Newsroom, 2023). Following the Taliban's invasion, Afghanistan experienced significant internal turmoil, resulting in widespread displacement of its people. The influx of Afghan refugees into Iran surged significantly after the Taliban assumed control of Afghanistan in August 2021 (Mohammadsadeghi, et al., 2022). In 2022, the UNHCR reported that Iran conducted a census of all unregistered Afghan nationals, including recent arrivals after the Taliban's takeover in 2021, registering approximately 2.6 million Afghans. Official Iranian data indicated that around 500,000 undocumented Afghans did not participate in the census62 (Iran International Newsroom, 2023). According to Iran International, "more than 70% of the 3.6 million Afghans who left their country after the Taliban militants seized power in August 2021 fled to Iran." 61 https://www.iranintl.com/en/202309275945 62 https://www.iranintl.com/en/202309275945 132 Despite their long-standing presence in Iran, Afghan refugees have faced various forms of systematic discrimination, including limited access to housing. According to a letter dated April 30, 2022, from the Tehran Governor regarding property transactions involving foreign nationals, "leasing properties to Afghan nationals without the permission of the Foreign Nationals and Immigrants Affairs Offices of the provincial government is considered a violation" (April 30, 2022). In this case, Afghan refugees have employed strategies to address the challenges they face in accessing housing. One of the interviewees, a real estate agent and a dairy seller in ZoorAbad, discussed the issue of Afghan refugees and their renting habits. He said, "Over the past two years, the number of Afghans in ZoorAbad has increased, and most of them are renting independent houses". He continued: "Afghans are generally "willing" to pay a higher deposit but less in rent, which is above the usual rates in this neighborhood". He also noted that Afghan workplaces are often located outside of ZoorAbad, as many are involved in construction work or employed as security guards, both of which require them to work outside of ZoorAbad. One of the UN volunteers in Iran who has worked with Afghan refugees for several years said during an interview: âSingle Afghan men in Tehran are living in partially built sites, workshops, or collectively in old rental houses. Being a caretaker is an ideal job for Afghans because it helps address the housing issue. Many Afghan families prefer to live collectively in the same building, often with an Afghan caretaker, which helps with housing problems. For example, in Shemshak, most houses have Afghan caretakers. One of the housing issues for Afghans is that many rent storage spaces with poor housing conditions. These homes often lack proper lighting and ventilation, and they frequently lack private spaces, creating challenges for children with special needs. Most Afghans maintain strong social networks among themselves, such as in Lavasan in Tehran. It used to be common practice, until about a decade ago, for Afghans to register their homes under Iranian names. However, when the Iranian homeowner passed away, the Afghan residents were often evicted. Furthermore, after the death of an Afghan resident, an Iranian trustee was usually unwilling to cooperate with the deceased person's family." 133 3.2.5.2.6. Shared Housing Shared housing in ZoorAbad has been a common strategy for the urban poor living there. When I asked Na`na, one of the interviewees, if she knew anyone living in tents or temporary arrangements in ZoorAbad, she responded, âthere were some a few years ago, but they were evicted and went to a shelter provided by a charity, and we haven't heard from them since. However, there are many households that have been forced to live with other families in one house due to high rent". She added: "If I had to, I would move in with my father-in-law. However, my 16-year-old daughter wouldn't agree because she says she can't focus on her studies in such a crowded environment.â One of Na'na's neighbors had a similar experience. The lady, who is about 60-65 years old, said âI have been in ZoorAbad since I was 8 years old, when my parents and siblings (a family of 15-16 people) moved here from Khalkhal, a village in the western provinces of Iran, and bought a house. This house had two rooms and a kitchen. After my marriage, I initially lived in one room of my husband's brother's house, with each of us having our own rented room. Eventually, we bought a house together with my husband's brother, and a few years later, we bought out his share, making us the sole owners of our own house." However, she mentioned that about 10 years ago, the Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad forced them to move again, and the cost of regularizing the house were substantial. This subsection discussed the various strategies employed by the urban poor to address housing needs over different time periods. It also illustrated how these strategies are adaptive, emphasizing that they are not fixed but dynamic, changing in response to specific circumstances and forces at play. The case of ZoorAbad exemplifies this dynamism, as residents' strategies have evolved over time in response to changing conditions. 134 3.3. Concluding Notes In conclusion, the evolution of housing informality in Iran, particularly in the case of ZoorAbad, illustrates the dynamic interplay between modernization, socio-political conflicts, and grassroots responses to urban challenges. Contrary to the linear narrative of modernization reducing informal housing, this chapter demonstrates that modernization has often generated or exacerbated informality, especially in suburban areas affected by rural migration and land speculation. The shift from communal, ethno-religious housing structures to class-based neighborhoods, combined with the influx of rural migrants into urban spaces, has driven the expansion of self-built settlements. These settlements emerged as pragmatic responses to the housing crisis, reflecting the socio-cultural backgrounds of their residents and the limitations of state-led housing policies. The self-built settlements in Iran, such as ZoorAbad, have become a form of alternative social housing, addressing the needs of the urban poor where formal housing policies have failed. These grassroots, community-based efforts challenge the stateâs control over land and property, reflecting a form of quiet encroachment. The government's inconsistent responsesâranging from formalization to evictionâreveal the tension between regulating informal spaces and eliminating them. As Iranâs urban landscape continues to evolve, these settlements not only highlight the resilience and adaptability of the urban poor but also underscore the need for a reconceptualization of informality as a legitimate, alternative solution to the housing crisis. Considering these findings, this chapter calls for a more nuanced understanding of informal housing as a potential pathway for addressing housing shortages in contexts lacking robust social housing infrastructure. By recognizing the historical roots and socio-political complexities of informality, planners and policymakers could reimagine informal settlements not merely as problems to be eradicated, but as valuable, community-driven solutions to housing challenges. The case of ZoorAbad exemplifies this potential, offering a lens through which to analyze the broader implications of housing informality in Iran's urban development trajectory. 135 4. Market, de/regulation, and the issue of use-value vs exchange-value of housing In the previous chapter, I explored the dialectical relationship between Iranâs modernization process and the rise of self-built settlements, with a particular focus on the Islamic regime's approach to informal housing after the 1979 revolution. I examined how these settlements, such as ZoorAbad, represent a socio-politically alternative to state-provided social housing. This chapter delves deeper into the theoretical frameworks essential for understanding the core arguments of this thesis, using ZoorAbad as a case study. I will explore the role of the housing market, the state's involvement in regulating it, and how these dynamics have shifted from the pre-modern era to the neoliberal era. Despite the neoliberal claim of minimal state intervention, I argue that modern states continue to play a significant role in either regulating or deregulating housing markets. While the state is expected to safeguard the use-value of housing for low-income populations, historical regulations have predominantly favoured the exchange-value of housing, benefiting landlords and the affluent. The chapter begins by outlining the political economy framework used in this study, followed by an analysis of housing market regulations and their relationship to neoliberal ideologies. Gentrification, as a significant urban phenomenon resulting from these policies, will also be introduced. Finally, the focus will shift to the dominance of exchange-value over use-value in Iran's housing policies and its connection to privatization. By the end of this chapter, I will analyze the case of ZoorAbad through this theoretical lens, reviewing the challenges faced by its residents and how these challenges influence the neighborhood's use-value and exchange-value of housing. 136 4.1. Housing Right & Political Economy Approach In this section, we will briefly explore the concept of the right to housing, examining its significance and whether it holds a universal meaning and expression across different socio-cultural and political contexts. Given the strong interconnection between housing and socio-political and economic settings, we will discuss the rationale for using political economy and critical urban studies as theoretical frameworks to understand housing issues affecting the urban poor. These frameworks will be applied specifically to analyze the case of ZoorAbad, offering insight into the unique housing issues faced by this self-built settlement. Generally speaking, urban areas are becoming major centers of population concentration, and this has led to increased forms of inequalities (Davis, 2008, 2&7). One manifestation of these inequalities is the varying access to housing for the urban poor63, which differs globally â from the demolition of favelas in Brazil to mortgage foreclosures in the U.S., and slum dwelling and bulldozed shack lands in South Africa (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, p. 19). While many political leaders agree on the importance of states ensuring adequate housing â evidenced by the incorporation of Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into the constitutions of 69 countries â there is no single solution to the housing crisis (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, p. 141). This is largely due to the unique socio-political and economic contexts of individual cities. In this thesis, the question of housing is examined through the lens of political economy and critical urban studies, particularly in the context of market-driven urbanization. The political economy perspective seeks to situate housing within the broader socio-economic context, encouraging researchers to consider housing theories, empirical data, and policies in relation to political-economic forces rather than in isolation (Aalbers, 2016, p. 31). Building on this theoretical framework, the previous chapter reviewed the socio-political history of Iran over the past century. By examining policies and urban plans, we added 63 For example, mass migration to Europe since 2015 has pressured local governments to provide refugees housing (Fermin & Wassenberg, 2020, p. 23). 137 another layer of understanding to the housing issue in Iran. It became clear how the cultural characteristics of rural and tribal communities during the early stages of modernization in Iran contributed to the rise of self-built settlements on the outskirts of major cities. Additionally, the country's industrialization acted as a catalyst for increased rural-to-urban migration. This political economy lens thus deepened our understanding by encouraging a multifaceted approach to the housing issues faced by the urban poor in Iran. Another theoretical lens employed in this thesis is critical urban studies, developed in the 1960s and 1970s by Lefebvre, Castells and Harvey. This perspective argues that cities are not merely sites of consumption but are themselves commodified entities that influence various socio-political issues (Brenner, Marcuse, & Mayer, 2012, 2-5). Drawing on the language of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (Latour, 2005) (McFarlane, 2011), urban spaces, due to their agency, are not only shaped by socio-political and economic contexts but also significantly impact these contexts. I see critical urban studies as a complementary framework to political economy. This lens helps us understand why self-built or informal settlements should be considered alternatives to social housing. The process of housing production, as one form of urban space, also possesses an agency. In the case of ZoorAbad, self-built housing has a dialectical relationship with socio-political context. Therefore, to fully grasp the case of ZoorAbad, we apply the critical urban studies framework, which highlights how urban space (including housing) can influence socio-political, economic, and cultural aspects of life in a given context. As discussed in the previous chapter, urban movements and non-movements can be seen as examples of the agency of urban space. Another key point emphasized by the critical urban studies framework is its critique of market-driven urbanization, which has emerged as a phase in the evolution of modernization and capitalism. While much of the focus has been on neoliberalism and the era of neoliberalized urbanization, these demands have a much longer history. The call for âcities for people, not for profitâ dates back to Engels' (1892) concerns about working-class housing in Manchester, and is echoed by Jane Jacobs (1962) and Henri Lefebvre (1968), who critiqued the anti-social implications of postwar Fordist urban planning. This demand challenges the marketized model of urban development, which prioritizes exchange-value 138 over use-value, thereby undermining the basic need for housing. Critical urban scholars aim to analyze the interlocking dynamics of capitalism and urbanization, considering shifts in power relations and the multidimensional inequalities that arise in the context of capitalist urbanization. They seek to highlight the complex, interlocking forms of marginalization present in the contemporary urban landscape (Brenner, Marcuse, & Mayer, 2012, 2-5). Marcuse (2012) asserts that the primary goal of critical urban theory is to advocate for âthe demand for a right to the city. But whose right is it about, and what right is it, and to what city?â (Marcuse, 2012, p. 24). In Lefebvreâs framework, the concept of "right" encompasses two dimensions: addressing the deprivation of basic needs and highlighting the alienation and discontent that extend beyond mere necessities (Marcuse, 2012, p. 30). In the case of ZoorAbad, we observed how these two dimensions of housing rights are intertwined. The need to address basic needs while simultaneously protecting the urban poor from alienation â especially after experiences of demolition â demonstrates how these two aspects of the right to the city can merge and integrate. In response to the question âwhat rightâ, Marcuse (2012) explains that while a straightforward answer might be the right to basic needs such as housing, contradictions arise between the rights of different groups, leading to varied approaches to housing. This complexity underscores the need for the "right to the city", a moral claim rooted in justice (Marcuse, 2012, p. 35). In this chapter, we will explore the contradictions between the rights of diverse groups in ZoorAbad. For example, we will examine the tensions between Iranian landlords and Afghan tenants, as these tensions shape the general mindset regarding the right to housing among different groups in ZoorAbad. Regarding âwhat city,â the vision encompasses a future democratic city and a âjustâ society that embodies principles âsuch as justice, equity, democracy, beauty, accessibility, community, public space, and environmental quality,â thereby fulfilling citizens' potentials (Marx 1844 as cited in Marcuse, 2012, pp. 36-37). But what constitutes the criteria for social justice? Harvey argues that âsocial justice is a normative conceptâ (Harvey, 2009, 96) and since there is no universally acceptable criterion for social justice, we must develop our own standards. He argues that the liberal approach, which focuses on the distribution of income among individuals, fails to adequately address social justice because capitalist mechanisms 139 prioritize capitalist objectives, thereby obstructing the achievement of social justice (Harvey, 2009, 96-113). Ruth Glass highlights the dominance of Western epistemologies in urban studies and encourages us to adopt a ânewâ comparative urbanism that extends beyond Western âmodelâ cities like London or New York (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, pp. 1-3). Comparative Political Economy emphasizes the need to pay closer attention to the role of the state as a key driver in housing issues across different settings, considering historical, geographic, social, political, and economic factors. For example, the concept of âsocial housingâ is conceptualized in diverse ways across countries. Furthermore, the comparative political economy approach aims to challenge existing global structures by exploring alternatives to replace commodified housing under capitalism with new models (Aalbers, 2016, pp. 31-33). Although this study focuses on ZoorAbad, an informal/self-built settlement in Iran, and does not compare it directly with another case due to the scope of the research, I believe it can still be framed as a comparative political economy study. The analysis underscores both the differences and similarities between this case and the dominant literature on the subject, while also highlighting an alternative to commodified housing. To sum up, by adopting both the âcomparative political economyâ and 'critical urban studies' theoretical lenses, this research âaddresses questions about the extent and manner of similarity and differenceâ (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, pp. 8-9) between the case of ZoorAbad and the "Western model cities" that heavily influence the literature in this field. Investigating one site â in this case, ZoorAbad â raises questions about other sites, ultimately contributing to the elaboration of the theoretical framework (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, pp. 8-9). According to Lee (2018), comparative urbanism sheds light on overlooked aspects of urban theories, demonstrates new dimensions of urban practices, enriches historical narratives, and situates similarities within specific geographies. It âdestabilizes dominant procedures around comparability,â and brings to the forefront the urban histories of cities in the âGlobal South,â which are often neglected. There is much to learn from the stories of different ordinary cities (pp. 49-59), including ZoorAbad that move beyond top-down planning and highlight grassroots initiatives, such as self-built settlements. These grassroots efforts represent solutions that deserve greater consideration by the state, not for 140 improving the exchange-value of these self-built houses, but for enhancing their use-value. In the following sections, we will briefly review how the processes of regulation and deregulation affect housing for low-income groups under the broader framework of neoliberalism. 4.2. Neoliberalism and the issue of de/regulation As discussed in the previous section, this study adopts the political economy framework to understand the specific context in which ZoorAbad is situated. Although Iran, as an Islamic regime, is officially isolated from global markets and interactions, the country has been significantly influenced by dominant global economic and cultural paradigms. Neoliberalism, in particular, has had both implicit and explicit effects on Iran's socio-economic and cultural landscape. To better understand this, it is essential to briefly review the principles of neoliberalim and examine how regulation and deregulation, influenced by this framework, have unfolded as part of the modernization process, both globally and within Iran. The promotion of regulation through modernization projects ultimately leads to deregulation, marking a shift in the modernization process, often referred to as neoliberalism. A good starting point is to consider the relationship between land/place, and regulation. Logan and Molotch (2007) argue that place and housing are deeply intertwined with âregulation,â and that the exchange of housing and land cannot occur without some form of government intervention (p. 27). Polany (1994) similarly contends that "market" and "regulation" historically emerged simultaneously. He illustrates this interdependence by narrating the history of English land enclosure â "a revolution of the rich against the poor" â where laws passed during the 15th and 17th centuries led to a dramatic rise in land prices (Polanyi, 1944, p. 36). During this time, the rich and landlords manipulated social and cultural laws to seize the commons from the poor (pp. 36-37). Legislators and landlords, supported by the Crown, secured the future of Parliament and constitutionalism. Constitutionalism and political revolution then worked together to transform the system for their benefit (p. 41). 141 Polanyi's (1944) historical account is valuable for highlighting the merger and interdependence between legislators (agents of the state) and landlords (agents of the housing market). It underscores that the regulation of the housing market has a long history rooted in power structures that have historically benefited the elite. This narrative also shows how legislators and landlords, often part of the same class, shaped laws to secure profits for themselves. Today, urban planners and policymakers, often from the middle-upper classes, continue to protect their own interests, making planning decisions and policies that primarily serve their class. Various scholars argue that the regulation of the housing market has historically played a significant role in shaping social life and can serve the oppressive goals of dominant systems such as patriarchy, racism and capitalism64 (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, pp. 63 & 58-59). For instance, Hayden (1984) notes that following World War I, industrialists, who had previously focused on production rather than consumption, sought to expand their domestic markets for manufactured goods. Both union leaders and manufacturers recognized the need for spacious, mass-produced housing to facilitate consumption by workers and their families. As a result, many employers began to mass-produce suburban homes primarily for their white, male, skilled workers (28-33). In this context, Marcuse and Madden (2016) argue that the separation of the domestic economy from the political economy, as well as the division of public spaces from private ones, has intensified a patriarchal and oppressive system65 as a legacy of industrial capitalism. For racial minorities, housing has served as a discriminatory tool that restricts access to democratic rights, as evidenced by the well-documented experiences of African American citizens in the US (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, p. 63). Thus, based on the discussions of Haden, Marcuse and Madden, the issue of housing has 64 for instance, Baron Haussmannâs destruction of the working class in Paris or the redevelopment of Taksim Square (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, pp. 58-59). 65 While it is commonly believed that women's rights have progressed alongside their involvement in industrial capitalism, it is important to recognize that these advancements are not solely attributable to industrial capitalism alone but rather the result of various multifaceted forces and movements, such as feminism and civil rights movements. 142 historically been intertwined with political economy, wherein legislators and policymakers maintain a strong relationship with the housing market. Some scholars argue that the relationship between regulation and the housing market has changed significantly with the emergence of neoliberalism. For example, Aalbers (2016) asserts that from the 1970s onward, the regulation of the housing market has been heavily influenced by the dominance of neoliberal ideology. Neoliberalism, a new form of liberalism that arose in response to the Keynesian critique of free markets, emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s due to events such as âthe end of the Bretton Woods system of monetary management of the gold standard in 1971; the sudden hike in interest rates invoked by US Federal chairman Volcker in 1979; the 1973 and 1979 oil/energy crisis; and election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister of the UK in 1979 (Aalbers, 2016, p. 69). In the following discussion, we will explore how the intervention of the modern state in the housing market has been shaped by neoliberal ideology. We will argue that this deregulation represents a form of re-regulation of the housing market, used as a tool to diminish the state's responsibility to provide affordable housing for the urban poor and low-income households. Before discussing neoliberalism, it is essential to adopt a broader perspective on capitalism as the foundation and context of neoliberalism. Harvey (2001) argues that over the past three centuries, capital accumulation has been the primary force driving changes across various aspects of the world, including urban geography. While this âprocessâ may appear unique and straightforward globally, the production of difference â diverse urban spaces â is a common outcome of capitalism (121-122). Harvey (1989) posits that there is a dialectical relationship between capitalism and urban practices: the surplus of capital and labor (outcomes of capitalism) contributes to the emergence of socio-physical infrastructures, which represent a form of urbanization. These newly developed urban contexts, in turn, create fresh opportunities for capital circulation and subsequent accumulation (Harvey, 1989, 3). According to Harvey (1989) (2001), under the capitalist mode of production, growth occurs through the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and production for the sake of production (Harvey, 2001, p. 237-8) through three distinct stages. Harvey (1985) discusses how the accumulation process impacts urbanization and urban spaces. He emphasizes that once over accumulation occurs during the initial stage of 143 industrial production, capitalism must identify a new frontier for capital accumulation. Consequently, capitalism has no choice but to urbanize. In the second stage, surplus capital produced during the first stage, which caused the crisis, is directed to and absorbed by urban spaces, leading to significant implications for urbanization and its citizens (Harvey, 1985, ch.1). âUrbanizationâ relies on the uneven characteristics of capitalist development (Harvey, 1989), which manifest in alterations to the geographical and built environments. These changes respond to the need for further accumulation. Historically, geographical expansion creates new opportunities for capital accumulation, with transportation playing a crucial role in this process (Harvey, 2001, p. 244-248). This uneven development, as seen in the case of ZoorAbad in Iran, was a key factor in the emergence of self-built settlements near the capital, factories, and affluent neighborhoods like Azimiyeh in Karaj. Harvey (2001) elaborates on several characteristics of capitalism that significantly impact surrounding urban spaces. The foremost characteristic is âgrowthâ, often pursued without regard for its consequences. The accumulation process can lead to crises at various stages, such as overproduction (an excess of commodities with no buyers in sight), or overaccumulation (Harvey, 2001, 239-240). To address these crises, there is a push to expand the accumulation process into a ânew and higher planeâ through 'growth' in various dimensions: generating new social wants (creating new demands) and subsequently developing new product lines or commodities; promoting population growth; and expanding geographies of trade (Harvey, 2001, pp. 239-242). Thus, the impact of "growth" is evident in different phases of capitalism, particularly in the growth of needs, population, and urban development through new developments. Harvey (2001) asserts that the second interrelated characteristic of capitalism is âchange,â particularly in terms of innovative technologies and lifestyle (121-123). Low (2017) similarly argues that these changes have been initiated since the late 19th century, when capitalism facilitated the globalization of spaces through the rapid flow of capital, labor, and information â enabled by deregulation and reregulation processes â that transformed localities (Low, 2017, p. 176). These changes have implicit and explicit impacts on living spaces, both urban and rural. Harvey (2001) emphasizes that the scope of these changes extends to economic and cultural aspects as well. From the 1970s onward, time-space 144 practices were radically altered and compressed66 through advancements such as electronic banking and telecommunications. The impact of these changes is not limited to the economic and geographic aspects of life (Harvey, 2001, pp. 122-124). Harvey (2001, 2005) argues that for capitalism to sustain itself, it must expand its influence into various aspects of life, including the cultural sphere. In other words, capitalism requires a shift in societal mindset, reshaping perceptions of the role of the state and the responsibility of individuals for their own well-being. According to Harvey (2001, 2005), postmodernism represents the 'cultural' production of contemporary capital accumulation, which, from 1973 onward, has replaced the welfare state and traditional Fordism with a focus on free markets, individualism, and privatization. This shift encourages new forms of profit-making through the discovery of niche markets and the stimulation of diverse lifestyles, promoting a reality characterized by deregulation, separation, fragmentation, and heterogeneity while neglecting systemic structures. As a product of neoliberalism, postmodernism asserts that human welfare can be achieved by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms, empowering private property ownership, free markets, and free trade through deregulation. Since the 1970s, this neoliberal framework has shaped both practices and theories, positioning the state's role as fostering an environment conducive to market activities with minimal intervention. While this perspective highlights the empowerment of individuals and grassroots initiatives, it has also led to the reduction of social services by modern neoliberal governments, shifting the burden onto individuals and often blaming the poor for their circumstances (Harvey, 2001, pp. 122-124) (Harvey, 2005, pp. 2-4). This perspective, which emphasizes the importance of individualism, carries two distinct implications. On one hand, it can foster a more inclusive platform for diverse voices and grassroot initiatives. However, the other side of individualism involves the elimination of social service responsibilities from modern neoliberal governments, shifting the burden onto individuals and often blaming the poor for their perceived shortcomings. Harvey (2005) highlights another consequence of this perspective â its inherent suspicion of democracy. Majority-rule governance is viewed as a potential threat to individual rights and 66 This âtime-space compressionâ can implicitly lead to âexclusionary territorial practicesâ such conceptions as protecting the locality or position of home against foreign global forces (Harvey, 2001, p. 126). 145 constitutional freedoms. Consequently, neoliberals tend to be "profoundly suspicious of democracy", often advocating for governance by experts and elites (Harvey, 2005, pp. 65-66). While neoliberalism has arguably imposed constitutional limitations on certain degrees of state autonomy, it is crucial to recognize the risk of replacing state autonomy with corporate autonomy through state-regulated cooperation. Harvey (2005) highlights several additional implications of the neoliberal context, including the consolidation of monopolistic enterprises under the guise of competition; the neglect of socio-environmental costs; monopolistic control over access to information; a reductionist view of technology that treats it merely as a tool without regard for its socio-environmental impacts; and the erosion of social solidarity through the promotion of individualism and authoritarianism (pp. 67-70). The issue of 'social irresponsibility', which arises from individualism, is particularly significant as it serves the interests of authoritarian power holders â whether in the name of the market or the state. Neutral 'alienated' individuals exhibit indifference towards 'others', including engaging in speculative activities that undermine common resources and affect fellow citizens. This environment is ideal for the emergence of "squatter government," a topic that will be explored in greater detail in the upcoming chapter. Additionally, as discussed in the previous chapter, the modernization of neighborhoods in Iran has led to the elimination of traditional Mahalles, disrupting the socio-cultural bonds among residents and replacing them with economic class similarities. Consequently, one of the effects of capitalist urbanization in Iran has been the rise of 'neutral alienated' citizens. During interviews with residents of ZoorAbad, many participants expressed this distinction between their self-built neighborhood and nearby affluent areas, such as Azimiyeh. For instance, Mari, who lived in ZoorAbad for more than 15 years, mentioned, "Neighbors in ZoorAbad, during the time I lived there, were like family. In time of happiness or grief, neighbors in ZoorAbad supported each other, which I have not seen in the new neighborhood where I live. On the other hand, the opposite is true in more affluent neighborhoods like Azimiyeh, where people do not even know their next-door neighbors." The implications of each phenomenon or force can lead to the emergence of additional issues. For example, social irresponsibility, a consequence of neoliberalism, can exacerbate socio-spatial and economic inequalities at various levels and through different mechanisms. 146 On a local scale, the neutral attitudes of citizens toward one another can contribute to growing disparities. On a large scale, the lack of social responsibility from corporations can further intensify inequalities across multiple dimensions. Between the 1980s and 2000s, socio-spatial and economic inequalities increased significantly in many countries (Aalbers, 2016, p. 75). Sassen (1999) states that the emergence of urban hubs and global cities has intensified these inequalities due to the concentration of resources, opportunities, and services in downtown areas and other high-demand locations, while marginalizing others67 (Sassen 1999, 183). Harvey (2005) blames the dramatic decrease in funding for the welfare state, along with international deregulation aimed at achieving open financialization and facilitating capital movement (pp, 88-118), as the primary consequences of the dominance of the neoliberal context, which has greatly affected the quality of life for marginalized groups. The intensification of inequalities within the neoliberal context has been perpetuated by prioritizing financial interests over social solidarity and the welfare of citizens68 â in other words, prioritizing exchange-value over use-value. Harvey (2005) argues that the role of governments has shifted from one of social protection to that of a provider of a âgoodâ business climate, which is not a class-neutral approach. This shift represents a contradiction within neoliberalism69. The working class bears the costs and is treated as âmere commodities,â exploited to generate profits for a few affluent individuals or corporations70 67 Because of exposure to the international political economics of cities because of diverse processes such as immigration, places in cities had been changed and some centralized places has been shaped as a center of âtop-level management and controlâ (Sassen, 1999, p. 179). These new geographies are not limited to metropolises such as New York, Tokyo, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, but also affect southern metropolitan areas, including Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Taipei, etc. (Sassen, 1999, p. 183). One of the other implications of the new international political economy is denationalization of national territories because of the rule of âderegulationâ through the dominance of monopolistic firms and corporations (Sassen, 1999, p. 186). As a whole, globalization could be considered as a production machine of âcontradictory spacesâ (Sassen, 1999, p. 193) 68 This approach can be traced in diverse scales. For instance, international institutions, including IMF or World Bank, support the financial interests of lenders to accumulate capital becomes an updated mode of imperialism towards the borrower countries (Harvey, 2005, p. 74). 69 The contradictions of the neoliberal state could be stated as follows: In theory, the state should not intervene in market dynamism, but in practice the state should actively provide a good business climate69 (Harvey, 2005, p. 71). Secondly, individual freedom which is promoted in theory is opposed by the authoritarianism as a product of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005, p. 79). Thirdly, individualism results in a social irresponsibility and âspeculative volatilityâ. Fourthly, competition results in monopolistic power and finally, âmarket freedoms and commodification of everything results in social incoherenceâ and negative freedom of everything (Harvey, 2005, p. 80). 70 One of the requirements of a 'good' business climate, in neoliberal context, is promoting âflexibilityâ of labor markets which brings disadvantages for the working-class, and has resulted in decline in job opportunities for most labourers who cannot easily migrate due to limited funds (Harvey, 2005, 71-78). 147 (pp. 71-78). Caldeira (2000) situates this issue within urban spaces and provides evidence of how deregulation and elite control over the regulatory process in urban contexts have led to increased segregation and the emergence of "alienated" citizens. She explains that the rising number of closed condominiums between 1975 and 1995 in various cities, including Sao Paulo and Los Angeles, reflects the desire of the middle and affluent classes to create isolated islands as a means of escaping and protecting themselves from the realities of urban life. Affluent neighborhoods organized housing associations âto lobby for zoning regulations,â thereby gaining power to enforce isolation or segregation. This illustrates how local democracy, governance, and modernist city planning can serve as vehicles for reproducing individualism and socio-spatial segregation (120-137). While the neoliberal mantra advocates for 'deregulation' and reduction in the role of the state, Polanyi (1944), a prominent political economist and economic sociologist, challenges the myth of the self-regulated market. He explains why a market that emerged from the direct intervention of power holders cannot be truly âself-regulatedâ (p. 71). In this context, Harvey (2005) provides historical evidence illustrating how enterprises and public-private partnerships rely on political power for their survival. For instance, the Republican Party constructed an alliance between enterprises and conservative Christians to organize a right-wing electoral force, particularly after the 1990s. This coalition facilitated the circulation of substantial financial capitals and provided incentives for financial activities. Following Reagan's election in the 1980s, the dominance of monetary policies was solidified by the Volcker turn (pp. 48-51). This example demonstrates how enterprises and big businesses play a significant role in shaping policies and legislation to serve their interests, while the state assumes the associated risks. Interestingly, the concept of governance emerged during a time when central governments shifted their focus towards a developmental state, primarily aimed at safeguarding the financial interests of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). In this context, new entities â such as NGOs â were created to address the protective role that governments have largely abandoned in the neoliberal era (Harvey, 2005, pp. 76-78). While the emergence of NGOs indicates a need for institutions to protect vulnerable groups, these organizations often lack the authority to manage and organize common and public resources for the benefit of all individuals who live in a country. Thus, the absence of authority, holistic jurisdiction, 148 and inclusivity within NGOs cannot be considered a viable replacement for the protective role of governments. Polanyi (1944) argues that the concept of a âmarket economyâ has been constructed since the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century. A defining feature of this system is âself-regulation,â which has led to significant consequences, including the erosion of social cohesion and various interrelated economic disruptions (Polanyi, 1944, p. x). He contends that the history of the 19th century was shaped by a âdouble movementâ: the expansion of market organization on one hand, and the efforts to restrict and regulate the commodification of fictitious commodities â land, labor, money â on the other (Polanyi, 1944, p. 79). He elaborates that âregulationâ and the âmarketâ developed hand in hand, and therefore, the idea of âself-regulating marketâ contradicts the actual process of market development (Polanyi, 1944, p. 71). In a market economy, âall productionâ elements, including labor, land, and money â have been commodified with no regulation over price, supply, and demand â an unprecedented shift in history. For instance, under feudalism, land and labor were integral to the social fabric; the military, judicial and political systems were rooted in landownership (Polanyi, 1944, p. 72) with its function governed by legal rules and customs (Polanyi, 1944, p. 73). Mercantilism, unlike the self-regulating market, did not commodify âlabor and land,â the primary elements of production. For example, national labor legislation in 1563 and anti-enclosure policies under Tudors and Stuarts aimed to prevent the commodification of these resources. Both mercantilism and feudalism, though differing in their approaches, regulated the market to avoid commercializing labor and land (Polanyi, 1944, p. 73). Polanyi argues that the âself-regulating marketâ seeks to separate the âeconomic' from the 'political,â a division that did not occur in tribal, feudal, or mercantile systems (Polanyi, 1944, p. 74). Furthermore, he explains that inserting land, labor, and money into the âmarket mechanismâ subjects the fundamental elements of society â labor and land â to the laws of the marketâ (Polanyi, 1944, p. 75). Since land (or nature) is not produced by humans but is essential to industry, it should not be commodified for speculative purposes (Polanyi, 1944, pp. 75-76). According to Polanyi, the commodification of these essential elements in a self-regulating market can lead to the destruction of the economy. The commodification of land 149 and nature results in environmental degradation and, in the long term, not only undermines productive capacity but also threatens to destroy society itself (pp. 76-78). However, the following points suggest a different perspective that encourages us to move beyond the simplistic dichotomy of state and market: 1- 'Regulation' and market have emerged simultaneously. 2- States/governments act as regulatory entities. 3- 'States' facilitate the dynamics of the market 4- The market is considered a self-regulating entity. 5- Elites (legislators, power holders, land/business owners, etc.) have historically been in charge of 'regulation'. Given these points, the 'state' and the 'market' function as a unified, integrated entity. The intertwined nature of the state and the market challenges the dichotomy often presented between these entities. Regulation and market mechanisms have historically emerged together, guided by elites who operate within both realms to shape policies and processes for their benefit. As discussed, the commodification of fundamental elements such as labor and land under the guise of self-regulating market has not only led to socio-economic inequalities but also environmental degradation. This historical trajectory underscores that markets are not truly self-regulating but are deeply embedded in political and social structures, with governments and policymakers often serving as facilitators of elite interests. Understanding this relationship is crucial for analyzing the impacts of neoliberal policies, particularly in contexts like ZoorAbad, where socio-economic inequalities are compounded by the stateâs alignment with market-driven priorities. 4.3. Gentrification and de/regulation In this subsection, we will examine a well-known phenomenon that arises from the deregulation or re-regulation of urban policies in favour of exchange value of housing, rather than its use value: gentrification. We will provide a brief review of gentrification, its various forms and types, and how this process impacts people. Additionally, we will explore the 150 occurrence of gentrification within slums, often under the guise of beautification or improvement, as a global phenomenon. Since the 1970s, the âpolitical economyâ of Western cities has undergone significant changes due to various interconnected processes, such as deindustrialization, the growth of the service economy, the globalization of property markets, and the increasing dominance of market-driven and entrepreneurial approaches (Blomley, 2004, pp. 29-30). Neoliberalism as âa language of property that places private property as the foundation for individual self-interestâ (p. 30) manifests itself in multiple ways within the urban landscape. One prominent manifestation is gentrification, which can encompass a range of practices and terms such as ârevitalization, renaissance, regeneration, renewal, redevelopment, rejuvenation, restructuring, resurgence, re-urbanization, residentializationâ (Peck & Tickell, 2002) (Slater, 2012, p. 172). Slater (2012) defines gentrification as the process of transforming working-class or vacant spaces into middle-class residential or commercial areas (Slater, 2012, p. 173), often through buying up âoccupied tenements by speculators, forcing out rent-regulated tenants, and significantly raising rents' (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, p. 106). Although this is the conventional model of neighborhood gentrification, the phenomenon takes on different forms depending on context, which will be explored in the following section. One important but often overlooked category is the gentrification of informal or self-built settlements, where they are converted into parks and recreational spaces under the guise of beautification and urban development. However, this form of gentrification often serves the purpose of pacifying and displacing specific socio-economic or racial populations from targeted geographic zones. The concept of gentrification was introduced by Ruth Glass in 1964 (Glass, 1964, cited in Slater, 2012, p. 171). Lees, Shin, and Lopez-Morales (2016) define gentrification as a displacement process triggered by the reinvestment of capital into the built environment, which leads to the replacement of a lower socio-economic population with a wealthier one. The impact of gentrification goes beyond mere physical changes in a neighborhood â it also transforms the lifestyles of previous residents. Interestingly, in her writing titled âGaps in 151 Knowledge,â Ruth Glass highlights the diminishing urban-rural dichotomy71. Consequently, the geography of gentrification should not be confined to inner cities; it also affects rural areas and suburbs worldwide, including in the global south (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, pp. 5-6). The broader process of market-driven urbanization can be understood through the lens of gentrification, where capital and the state collaborate (often through deregulation) to target urban poor or lower-middle-class neighborhoods, converting them into âdecentâ and upscale areas neighborhoods for upper-classes (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, p. 7). Marcuse and Madden (2016) argue that from the perspective of corporate investors, gentrification is essentially a business plan that heavily relies on deregulation. Investors exploit the gap between current rents and a buildingâs âhighest and best useâ. Firms purchase buildings with the expectation that rents can be doubled or tripled, which often results in removing units from rent-regulated systems and displacing lower-income tenants (p. 31). While I largely agree with the arguments presented by Lees et.al., (2016) and Marcuse and Madden (2016) regarding the impact of market-driven urbanization as a major force behind gentrification, I believe that gentrification should be seen as a more intersectional phenomenon, where market incentives are not the sole driving factor. In other words, modern states often utilize urban planning and projects to achieve multiple goals simultaneously. One of these goals is indeed the pursuit of profit through the capital accumulation process and the search for potential urban spaces with high profit margins. However, in addition to profit-making, other motivations â such as racial and ethnic pacification â can also be intertwined with speculative interests. According to Lees, Shin, and Lopez-Morales (2016), gentrification driven by capital accumulation occurs across various scales â whether in city centers, peripheral areas, neighborhoods, or mega-projects within metropolises â resulting in multidimensional displacement of both the physical and social fabric. Unlike the Haussmann era, we now face a process of neo-Haussmannization, where the boundaries between city centers and peripheries are increasingly blurred. Affluent neighborhoods and gentrification can emerge anywhere, leading to the displacement of lower-income residents not only in peripheral area 71 Recently presented by Brenner and Schmid under the umbrella of âplanetary urbanization,â or by Keil as âplanetary suburbanization.â 152 but also in urban centers (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, p. xxxviii â xxxvii). As a result, suburbs have also become spaces experiencing gentrification. One form of gentrification, according to Peck and Tickell (2002), is âdispersed sub urbanismâ (DS), which emerged after World War II in North America and later spread globally. Filion (2015) argues that this form of gentrification is deeply rooted in Fordism and neoliberalism, as it is linked to the mass production of cars, the rapid expansion of the middle class, and the reliance on government funding to build transportation infrastructure. It also encourages individuals to become independent from public and collective services, a process facilitated by deregulation. The DS model, characterized by the spatial scattering of various activities such as jobs and healthcare services, leads to the polarization of settlements, excluding those who cannot afford cars and this suburban lifestyle. Marginalized groups, often displaced from city centers, are pushed into older parts of DS areas, creating a form of segregation. As an urban growth model, DS is driven by deregulation, benefiting elites while posing significant challenges for low-income populations (pp. 635-636). âMassive suburbanizationâ is another force driving gentrification. According to Guney, Keil and Ucoglu (2019), drawing on Lefebvre's (2003) concept, massive suburbanization can be understood as the result of the implosion and explosion of urbanization. This process is characterized by deregulation, financialization, and a speculative approach to the land market, which has led to insecurity in homeownership (pp. 12&17) for the dominant residents. Traditionally, the suburbs were home to the white middle-class, primarily through single-family homeownership. However, they now accommodate more diverse racial groups and laborers, marked by inadequate infrastructures, unaffordable housing, and evictions (Guney, Keil, & Ucoglu, 2019, pp. 12-15). While the contemporary model of suburban development is often condos, other types of housing can also be found, including high-rise buildings, townhouses, and even illegal housing (Guney, Keil, & Ucoglu, 2019, pp. 17-18). Since the early 2000s, new settlements with diverse characteristics have emerged in the surrounding areas of large cities, towns, and even villages. Guney and his colleagues refer to this global process as massive suburbanization. These settlements range from slums, state-built high-density public housing, and gated communities, to newly built homes, large-scale rental or condo suburbs, renewal of high-rise suburban buildings, low-rise developments, 153 new towns, and auto-constructed neighborhoods such as Grands Ensembles, Toplu Konut (pp. 7&10). The concept of âperipheryâ can have two different meanings: 1) geographical periphery, and 2) peripheral urbanization, which refers to the illegal production of spaces as a result of inequality, such as squatting or self-constructed settlements (Guney, Keil, & Ucoglu, 2019, p. 4). The growth of financialization has been a key driver in transforming peripheral land into urban areas, as seen with the efforts of institutions like TOKI and Canada Housing Trust (Guney, Keil, & Ucoglu, 2019, p. 9). Interestingly, this perspective can be applied to the case of ZoorAbad, a self-built settlement considered an example of peripheral urbanization. The state's efforts to gentrify ZoorAbad bare rooted in the rising value of the land, as part of the broader process of massive suburbanization in Tehran-Karaj metropolitan region. The state's aim to pacify this neighborhood reflects its desire to capitalize on the increased value of ZoorAbad's land as part of the peripheral development process. Lees, Shin, and Lopez-Morales (2016) elaborate on this issue more clearly. From this perspective, one form of gentrification occurs under the guise of âslum pacification,â âbeautificationâ and âtourism,â aimed at capital accumulation through âregulationâ and âsecuritization of spaceâ. Olympic events and other temporary megaprojects often have permanent consequences for urban spaces (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, p. 10), and historically, they have been used as justification for slum clearance72 (Davis, 2008, p. 106). Slum gentrification refers to the process of eradicating slums to expand middle-class consumption area through the entrepreneurial spatial agenda of governments. âSlum redevelopmentâ policies, promoted by international NGOs like UN-Habitat, glorify âsocial mixingâ while overlooking the potential displacement and eviction of slum dwellers (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, pp. xcii-cix). In many parts of the Global South, urban centers containing slums have been sites of conflict between urban planners and authorities, particularly since the 1970s, with a focus on slum clearance. These Haussmanian approaches, both financially and professionally, have been supported by the World Bank as a lender. The term âinfrastructure provisionâ often conceals 72 which happened in Seoul, Mexico City, Athens, and Barcelona and resulted in the mass relocation of poor people â in 1988, the Seoul games relocated 720,000 people (Davis, 2008, p. 106). 154 the brutality of clearing poor housing. For instance, the destruction of Maroko in Lagos in 1990 left more than 300,000 people homeless (Davis, 2008, pp. 99-101). Another example the contradiction between Chinaâs âsocialistâ ideology and its practices that follow the urban growth machine rationale. In Shanghai, between 1991 and 1997, more than 1.5 million residents were relocated for the construction of skyscrapers, luxury housing, malls, and similar developments. A similar process occurred in Beijing during the same period, resulting in the eviction of over one million people and their displacement to peripheral areas (Davis, 2008, p. 103). Thus, slum gentrification emerged as a lucrative form of real estate investment, often surpassing other options. For example, in Nairobi, a significant number of landlords renting out slum dwellings were middle-class individuals and politicians (Davis, 2008, pp. 86-87). In summary, property-led investments in slums forced the displacement of former low-income settlers, while âsocialâ upgrading occurs as new wealthier residents move in (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, pp. xcii-cix). Deregulation and re-regulation produce unprecedented spaces for capital accumulation through gentrification. The revaluation of land occurs via adjustments to local public policies â such as land upzoning, social cleansing, real estate privatization, and improved transport accessibility. Global gentrification has increasingly replaced local markets. The most visible consequence of all forms of gentrification â whether global, local, in slums, downtown areas, or suburbs â is housing unaffordability, which leads to socio-spatial displacement (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, pp. xxxix-lvi). The phenomenon of gentrification, driven by deregulation and re-regulation, reflects a complex interplay between capital accumulation, urban planning, and socio-political agendas. Across global contexts, gentrification has reshaped the urban fabric, displacing lower-income populations and prioritizing exchange value over use value. From slum "beautification" to suburbanization, and from urban renewal projects to mega-events, these processes are not confined to specific geographies or socio-economic conditions. Instead, they operate as tools of neoliberal urbanization, perpetuating housing unaffordability, socio-spatial displacement, and the erosion of community networks. Examining the intersection of capital interests, state-driven agendas, and socio-economic inequalities highlights the far-155 reaching consequences of gentrification and underscores the need for equitable urban policies that prioritize social justice and inclusion over profit-driven development. 4.4. Defenders of Exchange Value of Housing Both micro and macro forms of gentrification significantly reshape the characteristics of our settlements and communities. But who is driving these changes, or for whose benefit? In this section, we will explore the key players behind housing inequalities, breaking down the different roles they play and clarifying how they contribute to the issue. Drawing primarily on the work of Molotch and Logan and their concept of the "growth machine," in this section we will first examine this idea and investigate its relevance to the housing crisis and unaffordability. Molotch (1976) uses the metaphor of the growth machine to describe cities, that consist of various interlocking âpro-growthâ associations and governmental units (J. R. Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 32). We will then discuss Logan and Molotch's categorization of the key players in the urban growth machine, with a few insights on how these dynamics may manifest in the context of Iran. These key players of the growth machine prioritize growth and profitability above all else. As a result, this machine opposes âany regulatory interventions that prioritize use valueâ over exchange value. In other words, cities face âgovernments for growthâ where local governments facilitate speculation and development. Because investment resources are limited and scarce, growth elites compete to secure them. Access to government and public authorities plays a crucial role in securing these resources. Lees, Shin, and Lopez-Morales (2016) argue that gentrification does not occur solely within a neoliberal framework dominated by the free market. Instead, even states with strong intervention policies, including dirigiste states like those in East Asia, play a significant role in the gentrification process (Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2016, pp. xxxix-lvi). Alongside governments, another unexpected player in the growth machine, according to Logan and Molotch (2007), is âcommunity organizations.â These organizations facilitate the growth 156 machine by influencing the âdistribution of exchange valueâ through the maintenance of common places and the provision of services". Molotch and Logan argue that the long-term consequence of this growth is the increase in inequalities, which âaffect the distribution of life chancesâ (Logan & Molotch, 2007, pp. 34-36). Regarding community organizations, I want to emphasize that while maintaining common spaces and providing basic, necessary services are important, such activities alone do not necessarily fuel the growth machine. I acknowledge the state's role in shaping policies that often prioritize the exchange value of housing over its use-value, but community organizations are not inherently part of this process. However, when these organizations provide luxury or unnecessary services, or engage in excessive maintenance, their activities can indeed contribute to gentrification, aligning them with the growth machine's agenda. Moreover, systems of individual and place hierarchies are interconnected rooted in the âmarket among individualsâ (access to higher education, better health care, etc.) and the âplace market.â Both hierarchies are socially and politically constructed. Affluent individuals can easily dominate competition, leading to higher educational achievements, better health, and overall better life outcomes. They also influence the shaping of places and the distribution of resources to their own benefit (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 48-49). Better and more qualified places further reinforce the advantages of the wealthy, highlighting how these interconnections exist and reinforce the growth machine. Logan and Molotch (2007) argue that the growth machine has long been a driving force in U.S. urban development, shaping the histories of American cities during the 18th and 19th centuries. Communities competed to attract federal land offices, colleges, and academies as a means of stimulating development. The expansion of transportation infrastructure, particularly railroads, was another area where communities vied for investment to promote growth (Logan & Molotch, 2007, pp. 52-53). According to Logan and Molotch (2007), urban founders played a significant role in manipulating cities and towns to profit from real estate. In contemporary times, there are three sorts of place entrepreneurs: 1) Serendipitous entrepreneurs, who inherited property; 2) Active entrepreneurs, typically middle-class individuals seeking investment opportunities; 3) Structural speculators, who not only seek profitable locations but also actively intervene to 157 shape the future for their benefit, such as influencing freeway routes or lobbying for favorable zoning changes (Logan & Molotch, 2007, pp. 29-31). Urban founders, often considered âstructural speculators,â were primarily engaged in manipulating places for their exchange values, with occupations in real estate or banking (Logan & Molotch, 2007, pp. 52-53). This growth often favoured speculators at the expense of the working class. For instance, in industrializing Detroit, city authorities extended utility services to uninhabited areas to promote development, while existing working-class residential zones went without services, even though they bore the costs of the new infrastructure (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 57). Logan and Molotch (2007) argue that the growth machine has evolved from a system dominated by local heroes, to a more complex multifaceted matrix of influential social institutions. Modern cities now pursue growth in fundamental economic sectors, particularly those that create jobs, which leads to the migration of labor and increased demand for services, such as housing, retail, and wholesale (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 58). Cities create a âgood business climateâ by intervening in areas like taxation, labor laws, unemployment compensation, government scale, and public debt (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 59). Local populations are encouraged to support growth and adopt an ideology of value-free development. Additionally, the growth machine aligns itself with âbuilding localityâ and often backs cultural institutions as part of this process (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 61). Business leaders and local governments work closely together, granting landowners systemic power and enabling them to influence land-use decisions (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 62). In the following paragraphs, the different actors and elements of the growth coalition will be introduced according to Logan and Molotch's categorization. 1. Politicians: Marcuse and Madden (2016) challenge the myth of the benevolent state, arguing that state intervention in housing policy is often seen as a solution to the housing crisis (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, p. 73). However, under capitalism, they assert that the state has historically used the housing system to maintain political stability and facilitate the accumulation of private profit (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, pp. 73-74). State actions can either democratize and redistribute housing resources or perpetuate inequality and support profit-making for private entities (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, pp. 88). Local politicians play a key 158 role in growth distribution decisions and rely on national-level support to achieve those objectives (Logan & Molotch, 2007, pp. 68-69). Free-market advocates often argue that deregulation is the best way to address the housing crisis, suggesting that âunleashing the cranesâ is the answer. However, Madden and Marcuse reject this view for several reasons. First, the state cannot fully withdraw from housing markets because it is one of the primary institutions that create and shape them. Deregulation simply shifts power from residents to capital (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, p. 33-34). Second, globalized and deregulated housing markets widen the gap between market signals and the actual social need for affordable housing. Poor and working-class households often require more housing than they can afford, but profit-driven developers ignore these needs (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, p. 34). While I agree that states have historically used housing policies to facilitate private profit accumulation, I believe there is a crucial need for an institution that safeguards the rights of vulnerable groups to access housing as a basic human need. States should serve as the key institution responsible for protecting common resources and ensuring citizens have equitable access to housing. Ley (2020) provides a compelling example of how government policies facilitate the flow of global capital into local housing markets, specifically highlighting the role of the British Columbia government in Canada. Through policies like the BIP (Business Immigration Program) and favorable tax returns, the government has encouraged international investment, particularly from affluent global buyers (p. 8). In addition to policymaking, the government has organized âregular trade tours to the Asia Pacific to prime the investment pump.â However, this approach has been met with denial from the BC government itself, due to concerns about the commodification of housing by affluent global individuals. One interesting government tactics in these cases has been âpaucity of data,â (Ley, 2020, 305) which strengthens the growth machine. For example, in BC, the provincial government stopped collecting data on the citizenship of property buyers in the 1990s. Another tactic was to create a âcriticalâ discursive link between limiting foreign investment (especially Chinese) and accusations of racism. The key players in BC's growth machine extend beyond the provincial government and the real estate sector. Other influential participants include âlegal, real estate, and banking sectorsâ (p. 310). These encompass institutions such as the Bank and 159 Real Estate Council of BC (private sector), Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), and the anti-money-laundering Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC) (public sectors)73 (Ley, 2020, 301-306). As illustrated above, governments play a critical role in shaping housing equity or inequity, both through direct policies and by enabling private sector activities. 2. Local Media: Logan and Molotch (2007) implicitly identify newspapers and local media as another key players in housing issue. They explain how local media benefit from expanding their audience, which allows them to âsell a larger number of ad linesâ and profit from growth (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 70). As a result, local media may support growth and new developments in cities, as doing so can increase their audience and, in turn, their potential for generating profit. In the context of Iran, we should consider that the majority of media and newspapers are largely under the control and surveillance of the central government, which often leads them to promote the government's agenda and plans. 3. Utilities: Logan and Molotch (2007) identify urban utility providers as significant players in housing inequity within cities. In some countries, like Iran, these agencies are parts of government bodies, while in places like North America, they may operate as private institutions. I believe Logan and Molotch (2007) are referring primarily to countries where utility providers are independent from the government or operate privately. They argue that agencies such as water suppliers, transportation authorities, and major airlines have a vested interest in growth and thus support it (Logan & Molotch, 2007, pp. 70-71). For example, in 1835, under the leadership of Mayor William Ogden â who was both a major railway developer and the largest real estate owner â Chicago became the âcrossroad of Americaâ. Ogden and a select group of influential individuals strategically chose these cross-roads to reap enormous financial benefits. Ogden's property, for instance, skyrocketed in value, rising from $8,000 to$3 million in just eight years (Logan & Molotch, 2007, pp. 54-55). In 73 âEach Chinese citizen has been limited to exporting US$50,000 a year to an overseas account. However, by amalgamating the permitted allowances of individual family and friends, the figure may be multiplyingâ (Ley, 2020, p. 10). Banks in Vancouver were giving preferential loan terms to foreign home-purchasers without full disclosure (in terms of money laundering and anti-terrorism issues). This case applies to international students; that in a well-off part of Vancouver, nine students with no documented income sources received CA$57 million in mortgage money for home purchase from three Canadian banks (Ley, 2020, p. 10). 160 countries like Iran, however, utility providers are not independent actors in housing inequalities and urban development but are instead closely tied to government structures. 4. Auxiliary Players: Another key group identified by Logan and Molotch (2007) includes auxiliary players such as museums, theaters, universities, symphonies, and professional sports teams, whose interests align with urban growth. These institutions benefit from an increase in the number of clients or visitors, which supports growth (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 75-77). While Logan and Molotch focus on the U.S., their insights are also relevant to Iran. In Tehran, for example, university development plans have significantly impacted surrounding neighborhoods through gentrification. In Tehran, for example, university development plans have significantly impacted surrounding neighborhoods. These projects often freeze nearby residential zones, reserving them from future expansion, thereby contributing to housing inequalities. Thus, these institutions can be seen as key players in shaping housing inequalities within cities. 5. Organized Labor: The growth machine relies on labor union leaders to support a âbring jobsâ approach, framing opponents of growth as âselfish elitistsâ (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 81). While organized labor has played a significant new development in many parts of the world, this is not the case in Iran. Due to the political situation, labor unions in Iran lack the authority and power to influence urban development or housing policies. 6. Small retailers and self-employed professionals: Logan and Molotch (2007) argue that small retailers play a role in growth by seeking increased sales and profits for themselves (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 82-83). However, in ZoorAbad, small retailers have expressed concerns about the lack of profitability the demolition of certain zones in the neighborhood. A few retailers have complained about the sharp decline in consumers due to the displacement of former residents to other parts of the city. In this context, small retailers in ZoorAbad may not be viewed as supporters of pro-growth projects or the pacification of the neighborhood. It is important to note, however, that new developments in ZoorAbad have not yet been implemented or constructed. 7. Corporate Capitalists (nationals and/or foreign): Corporate capitalists, both domestic and foreign, are significant players in marketized urbanization, promoting market-driven urbanization. Global investment, along with wealth from foreign migration, has constructed a 161 âwall of capitalâ (Albers, 2016) in gateway cities, attracting property investors from both inside and outside the countries (Ley, 2020, p. 2). Ley (2020) argues that the massive investment by these corporations in housing stock has dramatically increased housing unaffordability in these cities (Ley, 2020, p. 2). China, in particular, plays a key role as a foreign investor, especially in cities around the Pacific Rim. In Vancouver, for instance, a combination of the âtrans-Pacific real estate sectorâ and the neoliberal policies of the British Columbia government, coupled with migration and capital flows, has reshaped the Vancouver property market. This has resulted in increased homelessness and housing unaffordability for low-income residents. By the 1980s in Canada, facing economic crisis, unemployment, and recession, neoliberal policies were adopted as a solution, facilitating foreign trade agreements like the FTA (ratified in 1988) and NAFTA (ratified in 1993). Notably, non-resident homeownership plays a significant role in gateway cities, with foreign buyers particularly interested in central cityâs properties, such as condos. For instance, between 2001 and 2017, approximately 15-18% of condo units in Vancouver were owned by non-residents. As a result, the combination of âwealth migration and offshore investmentâ has reinforced the transnational real estate industry (Ley, 2020, 2-6). While Iran's political situation limits the role of international corporations and investors in its housing market, small- to medium-sized corporations exert significant influence. In parts of Tehran and other large cities, developers and corporate entities have control over housing prices, directly affecting housing stocks and contributing to unaffordability through their dominant role in setting real estate price. In the case of ZoorAbad, the same situation exists, with housing prices determined by investors and/or property owners. However, due to the legal issues and "informality" of real estate in ZoorAbad, most new constructions have been carried out by local investors and current residents of ZoorAbad, who, over the past few decades, have escaped the cycle of poverty and are now able to invest in new developments. Aside from small-scale developments by local owners, the majority of interventions in the physical structure of ZoorAbad have been carried out by government agents and relevant organizations. In this section, we reviewed the key players in the housing market, particularly focusing on the defenders of exchange value of housing. Central to this discussion is the concept of 162 "growth machine" as described by Molotch and Logan. They use the metaphor to depict cities as composed of various interlocking âpro-growthâ associations, including governmental units (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 32), local government, real estate, and banking sectors (p. 52-53). Modern cities prioritize economic growth, particularly in job-intensive sectors, which drives migration and increases demand for auxiliary services such as housing, retail, and wholesale (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 58). In summary, the key players of the growth machine â or the defenders of housing's exchange value â include politicians, legislators, the real estate and banking sectors, local Media, utilities, auxiliary institutions, organized labor, small retailers, self-employed professionals, and corporate capitalists. It is important to note that these key players may vary across different socio-political contexts. While this section provided a general framework for understanding, each case must be explored individually to identify its specific actors within the housing market. 4.5. Use-value vs Exchange-value and the Issue of Privatization In this chapter, we explored the deep involvement of modern states in regulating and deregulating the housing market. We began by applying a political economy lens to better understand housing rights and issues within varying socio-political contexts. We then examined the influence of neoliberalism and the effects of de/regulation on housing accessibility. Additionally, we analyzed the historical relationship between land and regulation, which developed concurrently. We argued that this historical interdependence between legislators and landlords often resulted in benefits for these groups, which were frequently one and the same â with the primary objective of serving the interests of landlords, either directly as legislators or by holding considerable influence over them. Next, we examined gentrification as a consequence of both deregulation and regulation in market-driven urbanization. Beyond its speculative and profit-driven motives, we also discussed how gentrification can be employed as a tool for the pacification of racial, ethnic, or religious minority groups, serving key socio-political purposes. 163 We then examined the key players contributing to housing inequalities, identifying a range of groups that support pro-growth urban plans, policies, and projects. These include politicians, local media, utility providers, universities, small retailers, corporate capitalists, and others. In this section, we will explore the relationship between the use-value and exchange-value of housing through the lens of political economy, focusing on how urbanization's "growth machine" shapes these two distinct functions. We will also examine how, in the Iranian context, the exchange value of housing often outweighs its use-value. Although the state's role should ideally be to protect the use-value of housing, especially for low-income households and individuals, housing regulations and urban codes â particularly in the case of ZoorAbad â have historically favoured the exchange-value, benefiting landlords and wealthier citizens. 4.5.1. Use-value vs exchange value In relation to social justice, 19th century political economists primarily focused on two key concepts: use-value and exchange-value. Marx situated these concepts within the Capitalist mode of production, emphasizing the dialectical relationship between the two aspects of a unified commodity (Harvey, 2009, pp. 153-157). These two conflicting types of value â exchange and use â are inherent in every commodity, including âplace or housingâ: Housing can be seen either as a "home" or as "real estate" (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, p. 12) (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. viii). Proponents of âexchange valueâ aim to generate profit by developing housing, and preparing it for the market, while those focused on âuse valueâ seek to fulfil basic needs and maintain their daily social lives (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. viii). Logan and Molotch (2007) argue that speculative urbanization operates as a growth machine, prioritizing exchange values and placing a burden on the use values of housing, thereby negatively impacting the wellbeing of ordinary people (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. xi) (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, 16-17). According to Glynn (2009b), this is a key driver of housing inequalities (Glynn, 2009b, pp. 40 & 43), particularly for marginalized populations who not only have low incomes but also lack âsocial capitalâ (Logan & Molotch, 2007, pp. xii â xi). But why does prioritizing the exchange value of housing over its use-value 164 exacerbate inequalities and directly affect the wellbeing of ordinary people? In other words, how do different approaches to land use impact on the socio-economic wellbeing of individuals? Harvey (2009) argues that the response to the abovementioned question lies in a few unique characteristics of land and housing that distinguish them from other commodities. These include their immobility, attachment to human beings, infrequent transactions (except in the rental sector), permanence with long life-expectancy, and a variety of potential uses (Harvey, 2009, pp. 157-159). Logan and Molotch (2007) also emphasize another distinct feature: the âmonopolistic characteristic" of land. This refers to the uniqueness of each piece of land in the real estate market. While this uniqueness is not a product of the landowner, the owner has considerable control over the land's future (Logan & Molotch, 2007, pp. 23-24). Because land is fixed to a specific geographic location and cannot be moved, every parcel becomes unique, shaped by its particular view, surrounding socio-environmental conditions, and economic. Logan and Molotch (2007) describe this as the "monopolistic characteristic" of land (p. 20). Unlike other commodities, consumers cannot bring real estate into their own environment. To "use" it, they must move to the specific geographic location where the land is situated. As a result, the demographic composition of a neighborhood can be significantly affected by new "users" of land, whether in a neighborhood, city, or rural area. However, an important question arises: Do all "users" of land and housing share the same purpose? To answer this, we must reconsider the two contradictory values attached to land and housing. We can categorize "users" into two groups: those who view housing as a "home" and those who see it as "real estate". According to Molotch and Logan (2007), another significant characteristic of land and housing as commodities is the specificity of their âuse-valueâ compared to other commodities (p. 20). The use-value of housing connects an individual to a wide network of institutions, neighborhood communities, and public or private resources, such as access to schools and social networks. This specificity generates an âasymmetrical market relationâ between tenants and homeowners, whose interests are often opposed. Tenants, for example, must align themselves with the preferences of homeowners to preserve the social and community-based use-values attached to neighborhoods â such as maintaining their social life (Logan & Molotch, 2007, pp. 18-20). In addition, the exchange-value of 165 housing is tied to the unique characteristics of âlandâ, a fundamental element of housing. Land, according to Polanyi, is a âfictitious commodityâ because it is not produced by labor but is instead a âsubstantiveâ element essential to industrial production. Polany argues that land should not be treated as a market commodity (Polanyi, 1944) (Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 23). I believe Polanyi's point is crucial: "land" is not only a substantive element of industrial production, but a civilization as a whole. Therefore, there is a need for 'regulation' by a macro institution, such as the state, to protect land from the multi-dimensional impacts of key players in the housing market, who primarily focus on the exchange-value of housing. Through the lens of micro-economic urban land-use theory, Harvey (2009) argues that different key players in the housing market follow various âvaluesâ of housing, which are categorized as follows: 1. Occupiers, who consume housing based on their personal needs and are concerned with use-value; 2. Realtors, who are focused on exchange value; 3. Landlords, who primarily operate based on exchange value; 4. Developers (housing construction industry), who are concerned with producing new use-value to realize exchange value; 5. Financial institutions, which are primarily concerned with exchange value; 6. Government institutions, which play multidimensional role, balancing both use-value and exchange value (Harvey, 2009, pp. 162-166); 7. Housing activists, who defend the âuse-valueâ of housing, and prioritizing it over exchange-value for the benefit of residents (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, pp. 89-90). This distinction can be seen in historical examples such as the labor movement of 1916, which resulted in Cooperative housing in New York City 74, as well as more contemporary achievements like tenant movements that led to a rent freeze in Manhattan New York in 2015 75. While I agree with the idea that each key player in 74 Cooperative housing in New York City was achieved (constructed) as a result of the movement of working-class and immigrant communities in New York. History of non-profit cooperative housing dated back to 1916 in Sunset Park, Brooklyn. Between 1920s and 1970s, 40,000 housing units were constructed or financed by Jewish labor unions and cooperative associations. Red Vienna public housing is the Austrian counterpart of cooperative housing in New York City. Between 1919 and 1930, more than 60,000 apartments had been built by the social democrat city council (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, p. 70). 75 Rent Guidelines Board, in Manhattan New York, in 2015, which has been responsible for regulating the rent for more than one million ârent-stabilized leasesâ since 1969, voted for ârent freezeâ, despite of the previous years that tenants were required to bear an increase in rents yearly. The reason of this achievements lied in various factors such as dramatic increase rents, reflection on media, âwell-organized campaignâ, role of mayor who cared about the tenantâs demand. This case shows tenants have power and agency for changing the situation, impacting the government plans and actions (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, p. 89). 166 the housing market follows a specific value of housing, and there is a need to distinguish and explore their goals, in practice, the intentions of these players can evolve over time. For instance, in ZoorAbad, a few squatters who initially occupied land for their own use, prioritizing the use-value of housing, eventually shifted their focus to exchange value. After a few decades, some of them became landlords seeking more profitable tenants. This shows that the approach of key players in the housing market can change over time. According to Marcuse and Madden (2016), the dominance of the economic exchange-value over the use-value of a commodity, stemming from its âdual natureâ as both an âobject of utility and bearer of value,â leads to the commodification of that object. The commodification of housing is a relatively new phenomenon in the history of human settlements, as housing was historically embedded in socio-economic relations. For example, under feudalism, housing was tied to the land and labor of farmers, merging work and living spaces (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, pp. 19-20). Regarding the commodification of housing, Marcuse and Madden (2016) argue that the prerequisite for the commodification of housing (land) was âthe privatization of commons,â which facilitated âprimitive accumulationâ in Marxâs terms. The enclosure movement in England during the 15th to 18th centuries set the stage for the commodification of land. Farmers were suddenly detached from their means of subsistence and forced into the labor market as unprotected proletarians. Although in early commercial-capitalist societies housing was often tied to workâ such as American colonial cities where slave housing was provided by landlords â by the 19th century, this connection between housing and the workplace was detached, becoming âa sign of class privilegeâ. Since then, individuals have had to seek dwelling on the market, paying for it with cash. The shift laid the foundation for the commodification of housing (pp. 20-21). The significance of this argument lies in the idea that if we aim to move toward the decommodification of housing, we must reconsider how we can protect common resources and land from privatization. Additionally, it calls for collective rethinking of how to regulate already privatized lands and how to reclaim them as common resources. When we consider privatized common resources, we need to expand our understanding and think beyond conventional stereotypes. Glynn (2009) highlights various forms of 167 privatization, including selling social housing to private property enterprises, or selling individual homes to their tenants, as seen in British council housing model transferred to the housing association sector (p. 45). Another example is the deregulating of government subsidies, such as in the Dutch housing sector, where since 1995, housing association have operated without subsidies and with deregulated rent rules, forcing them to borrow from the private financial market (p. 46). Privatization also blurs the boundaries between social and private rental housing by cutting supply-side subsidies, increasing social rents, and pushing working-class families to rely on demand-side subsidies like housing benefit (p. 46). Additionally, subsidies are sometimes allocated disproportionately to more affluent social housing families, promoting private interests rather than supporting the poorest households (p. 47). Public-private partnership in providing social housing further blur these lines (p. 48). While Glynn focuses mainly on the privatization of social housing, there are other forms of privatization of common lands, such as the pacification of slums and self-built settlements. Even the existence of self-built settlements on common lands without a regulated legal framework, for example, transferring ownership of those lands with their self-built housing, can be another form of privatizing common resources. However, it is important to distinguish between privatization that benefits the urban poor and that which favours power-holder individuals. Marcuse and Madden (2016) argue that even the legal frameworks governing housing can be affected by privatization and therefore need preservation. They claim that when all the structural elements of housing â such as âbuilding, land, labor, property rightsâ â are commodified, hyper-commodification occurs, exacerbating inequalities. The three driving forces behind the hyper-commodification of housing are 'deregulation', 'financialization', and 'globalization'. Deregulation involves the state's active role in rewriting regulations to facilitate the liquidation of real estate. Financial institutions play a crucial role in profit accumulation through services like mortgage lending and other financial transactions. Globalization expands the housing market from local to global scales, making housing markets in some cities more sensitive to global trends than local ones (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, 24-28). 168 What are the implications of hyper-commodification in the housing market? Do they extend beyond the physical, spatial, and financial aspects of urban life? Marcuse and Madden (2016) argue that one of the significant implications is alienation, which they define as âestrangement, objectification, or otheringâ â a process that facilitates privatization. According to Marx, alienation occurs when the capitalist class exploits labor's creativity for its own benefit (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, p. 40). In their view, hyper-commodification of housing strips residents of their ability to shape their own dwellings, which are now alienated from them and controlled by investors, such as landlords, sublessors, real estate developers, and banks. (p. 41). Another related consequence of hyper-commodification is âcontingent living.â. Forced eviction â which often lead to homelessness, are tied to various mental and physical illnesses. In the UK, the eviction rates have increased by 50% over the last four decades. Similarly, in Rio de Janeiro, around 22,000 households were displaced due to the 2016 Olympic Games (Marcuse & Madden, 2016, pp. 40-44). This demonstrates how prioritizing the exchange-value of housing over its use-value leads to alienation from one's home or place of residence. Alienation manifests in several layers. First, when residents are excluded from the process of designing or constructing their homes, with all decisions made by "professionals", a layer of alienation forms. Another layer of alienation emerges from contingent living, where tenants do not have the stability needed to build connections with their neighborhoods and cannot establish long-term socio-cultural networks. But can alienation be addressed by promoting private homeownership? While some scholars and politicians argue that private homeownership can address alienation, Marcuse and Madden (2016) explain why this solution is insufficient. In their view, simply changing tenure from a lease to a deed cannot provide true security. Instead, housing regulations and social safety nets offer more secure conditions than an expensive mortgage (pp. 49-50). Additionally, private homeownership does little to foster a sense of community in segregated environments such as condominiums and gated communities76 (Madden & Marcuse, 2016, p. 51). Lastly, homeownership fails to bridge the gap between 76 The emergence of âgated communitiesâ or âfortified enclavesâ is a socio-spatial segregation that has been justified by fear of violence. The main characteristics of these fortified enclaves are as follows: private property for collective use; physically isolated; turned inward and not to the street; controlled by armed guards; socially homogenous space for the middle and affluent classes (Caldeira, 1999, p. 119). 169 exchange-value and use-value, which is at the core of housing commodification and alienation (p. 54). Marcuse and Madden (2016) argue that private homeownership primarily benefits the socio-economic interests of dominant classes, reinforcing the existing political system (p. 61). While I agree that privatization alone cannot resolve alienation, I question the notion that residents of segregated contexts like condominium or gated communities lack a sense of community. In today's urban environments, according to Wellman (1979), residents often cultivate their own socio-cultural networks that are not necessarily tied to their physical neighborhoods. In other words, the sense of community in a post-modern lifestyle is not always geographically based (pp. 1201-1231). Therefore, while private homeownership may not fully address alienation, the concept of community has evolved beyond geographic boundaries, and it is inaccurate to assume that those living in condominiums lack a sense of community. Alienation, stemming from prioritization of exchange-value for the profit of a few at the expense of the use-value of housing for the majority, creates an unequal situation where some people bear significant economic, social and mental costs. The question that arises is: in this speculative game, who are the winners and losers? Glynn (2009) argues that the winners include homeowners with multiple properties, real estate business such as developers, financial service77 industries, and large monopoly firms skilled subcontracting and outsourcing. On the other hand, the losers include âmortgage homeownersâ who shoulder the burden of debt, and low-income individuals or households suffering from poor housing conditions, including health issues, inadequate diet, cramped living spaces, stress, and lack of resources for education and employment. Additionally, evicted residents displaced by gentrification or large-scale redevelopment projects (e.g., student housing) are also among the losers (Glynn, 2009b, pp. 41-44). While Glynn's categorization of winners and losers is helpful in identifying the groups most directly impacted, alienation and the stressful life it fosters weakened social bonds and has 77 For instance, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT) is at the same time the vehicle for large scale international investment/development, which resulted in large-scale eviction, and these are winners as well. REITs in US bought public housing and put pressure on tenants to leave their homes and finally win the game and make profit (Glynn, 2009b, p. 44). 170 long-term effects, on the quality of life for society as a whole. Ultimately, the social fabric of entire communities suffers, leading to a significant decline in the overall quality of life. In addressing the question of who has benefited from the speculative activities in ZoorAbad throughout its history, further clarification is needed. Different groups have profited at various times. For example, as described in Table 2 (see Chapter 3, page 111), between 1960 and 1969, 50 people from the village of Bilaghan, along with 8 others who supported their claims of ownership over ZoorAbad's lands, profited from sub-dividing and selling the lands. In my opinion, after the 1990s, the central government, with assistance from the municipality, benefited from planning speculative activities through the implementation of the ZoorAbad Improvement Plan, carried out under the guise of organizing the neighborhood. The consequences of these speculative activities varied depending on the period. The action of the Bilaghanis in the 1960s led to an increase in the population of the urban poor in ZoorAbad, while the government's speculative efforts in the 1990s resulted in a decline in the neighborhood's population. When discussing the groups that have benefited throughout ZoorAbad's history, it is essential to distinguish between those who have profited from the exchange-value of real estate and those who have gained from its use-value. The two groups mentioned earlier benefited primarily from the exchange-value of real estate. In contrast, the urban poor, who accessed affordable housing in ZoorAbad, also benefited, but their gains were based on the use-value of housing. Moreover, society as a whole has benefited in the long-term from the self-built settlements established to address the housing shortage for the urban poor. These grassroots efforts in utilizing the use-value of real estate helped mitigate various social risks and challenges that could have arisen from homelessness. By providing housing solutions initiated by the urban poor, many potential social dilemmas, including safety concerns and instability, were effectively addressed, benefiting society at large. Marcuse and Madden (2016) argue that living in hyper-commodified cities, where the exchange value of housing is prioritized over its use-value, leads to the emergence of luxury housing as a new global currency. This shift results in a significant portion of the housing 171 market being owned by the super-affluent78 (pp. 28-29), contributing to the creation of antisocial luxury dwelling with minimum connections to neighborhoods. In the context of Iran, the prioritization of exchange-value over use-value has not only affected luxury housing but has also turned ordinary housing and real estate into a form of global currency, making it a reliable investment in Iran's unstable economic landscape. Madden and Marcuse (2016), along with Logan and Molotch (2007), emphasize that this prioritization creates various challenges related to fiscal issues79, employment80(pp. 89-90), job and income81, social dynamics82, environmental concerns83, and accommodating natural increases84 in population (Logan & Molotch, 2007, 85-96). Furthermore, we have examined the importance of preserving land as a fundamental resource of civilization, highlighting the need to protect it from privatization and commodification, which manifest in various forms across different geographies. To sum up, this section focused on the dual nature of housing as both a commodity and a basic need, exploring how prioritizing its exchange-value over use-value exacerbates socio-economic inequalities and alienation. Theories from Logan and Molotch, Harvey, and Polanyi highlight the monopolistic and unique characteristics of land, its central role in civil and social life, and its susceptibility to commodification through privatization, deregulation, and financialization. Housing's commodification disconnects residents from their social networks, alienating them from their homes and communities. The winners in this speculative game include real estate developers and financial institutions, while the losers are low-income households burdened by debt, eviction, and poor living conditions. These trends 78 In this atmosphere, the housing market turns to be a context of money laundering and tax evasion, which could be seen in Central Park in Manhattan or the Bishops Avenue in Hampstead (Madden & Marcuse, 2016, pp. 28-29). 79 âIf local gov provides special tax incentives to attract new industries, the fiscal costs of development will be higher. While, growth can save a local government money, even small increases in demand can have enormous fiscal costs if the increases entail major new public expendituresâ (J. R. Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 86). 80 Despite the claims of the growth proponents, growth machine does not make jobs, it only distributes jobs. Newcomers or migrants mostly have been employed in these jobs because of their broader skills or more education. 81 While urban growth may lead to increase in the family income, the living costs rise as well, âwhich offset the higher wagesâ 82 Increase in the scale of the urban area intensifies the socio-economic inequalities, such as racial segregation, because of the fact of difficulty of controlling and managing. 83 Growth brings clear negative impact on environment, such as pollution of air and water sources 84 Consuming the right of next generations for their homes or jobs. 172 are mirrored in Iran, where housing has become a reliable investment amid economic instability, creating additional challenges for societal wellbeing. 4.5.2. Dominance of Exchange-value and the Privatization Debate in contemporary Iranian History After examining the theoretical aspects of the relationship between use-value and exchange-value in urban contexts, and their impact on social bonds and community cohesion, this subsection shifts from theoretical concepts to explore the historical and political evolution of how exchange-value has been prioritized over use-value under the Islamic regime over the past four decades, despite its pro-poor rhetoric. We will then focus on the case of ZoorAbad, a notable exception where the use-value of housing has been prioritized through grassroot activities led by the urban poor. By exploring the unique characteristics of this self-built neighborhood, which emerged from the dominance of use-value over exchange-value, we will analyze its socio-spatial features and highlight the contrasts between these two approaches to housing. In 1979, Iranâs revolution fundamentally transformed the socio-political structure of the country from a monarchy to a republican-theocratic regime. While the significance of the institution of âprivate propertyâ was acknowledged and preserved by the conservative factions of the theocratic regime, radical factions advocated for state control over various domains, including property (Ehsani, 2013, 153-156). Since the 1980s, Iran has embarked on various privatization processes, each with its own unique goals and characteristics. This section will examine these privatization processes in each decade from the 1980s onward. Privatization in the 1980s: Ehsani (2013) argues that urban land redistribution was one of the most challenging issues during the first decade of Iranian Revolution. The phenomenon of ârevolutionary housingâ led to a dramatic growth of cities; for instance, âTehran boundaries doubled within two years.â Approximately 90 percent of this urban expansion â equivalent to half a million hectares â resulted from the occupation of public lands and their conversion into private properties and housing, primarily occurring outside the city's formal borders and contributing to the emergence of âsprawling suburbsâ (Ehsani, 2013, 157). 173 According to Ehsani (2013), we should not dismiss the role of the state in the process of public land occupation and its transformation into private properties. The government was largely unable to address the issue of affordable housing, contributing less than two percent of the total new housing constructed during this period. Consequently, government institutions such as the Housing Foundation (HF) and the Urban Land Organization (ULO) facilitated the process of public land occupation. This process intensified after 1981 due to worsening socio-economic conditions, leading to accelerated migration into cities (Ehsani, 2013, 157-158). Ehsani (2013) argues that the privatization of public land and the subsidies promoted as pro-poor services predominantly benefited state agents. In addition to the privatization of public land for housing, the remaining public land was sold below market value to middle-class state employees by government institutions like the Urban Land Organization (ULO) and the Housing Foundation (HF), creating a vital income stream for the state. Financial activities and subsidises from banks that were touted as supporting pro-poor and low-income housing mostly benefited state clients and the middle class (Ehsani, 2013, p. 158). While the state profited considerably from these privatization efforts, the benefits of the privatization process also extended to the urban poor during the first decade of the Islamic regime. Interestingly, the privatization process related to self-built settlements during this period resulted in a prioritization of the use-value of housing for those suffering from inadequate housing. Privatization in the 1990s: Bayat (2013) states that during the 1990s, following the end of Iran-Iraq War and the passing of the radical revolutionary phase with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, a more market-friendly political atmosphere emerged. This shift was facilitated by constitutional amendments that paved the way for structural adjustment and other neoliberal policies during the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani from 1989 to 1997. According to Bayat (2013) and Ehsani (2013, p. 159; 1999, p. 22), the privatization of urban governance was encouraged during this pro-market period through several key drivers, including decentralization of authority, reductions in subsidies, and the adoption of technocratic approaches (Bayat, 2013, 163-164). Ehsani (2013) also argues that during this period, the discourse surrounding the merging of diverse ârevolutionary institutions into the state 174 bureaucracyâ was promoted, with a primary focus on becoming âeconomically self-sustainingâ through privatization (Ehsani, 2013, 159). In this period, the five-year development plan (1989-1994) was proposed to reconstruct the economy, requiring the support of the urban middle-class (Ehsani, 2013, p. 160). The goals of this plan included addressing the consequences of over-population, meeting infrastructure and housing needs, criticizing the provision of free-public facilities, privatizing urban governance, and providing financial resources through public-private partnerships (Ehsani, 1999, p. 22). Ehsani (2013) argues that Tehran can be viewed as a laboratory for the âReconstructionâ period and the implementation of neoliberal policies (Ehsani, 2013, p. 161). Notably, during this time, the central government also initiated the Improvement Plan for ZoorAbad, aimed at pacifying the self-built neighborhood and promoting more profitable urban development activities. These governmental actions in ZoorAbad align with neoliberal ideology and serve as a prime example of Ehsani's (2013) interpretation of Tehran as a laboratory for the deployment of neoliberal policies. In 1990, Tehran, with a population of 7 million and a growth rate of 100,000 per year, required an additional 20,000 new residential units annually (Ehsani, 2013, p. 161). Consequently, the Tehran Municipality, under Mayor Karbaschi, who was appointed in 1990, needed financial resources for urban renewal projects. As a result, the municipality began selling density to developers and privatizing the skyline (Ehsani, 2013, 162). Ehsani (2013) (1999) notes that the municipality decided to extract fees and taxes from developers in exchange for exemptions from zoning laws, redirecting liquid capital from Tehranâs shadow economy (i.e., the untaxed and unregulated economy) into construction and physical development projectsâ (Ehsani, 2013, 161) (Ehsani, 1999, 23). This approach by the Tehran municipality during this period further illustrates attempts to prioritize the dominance of exchange value over use-value in housing, with significant implications for the affordability of housing, particularly for urban poor and vulnerable communities. Ehsani (2013) states that during 1990-1998, more than 75 percent of Tehran municipal revenue came from the sale of density and the privatization of the skyline, a public asset (P. 162). These funds were invested in urban physical infrastructure. The Tehran municipality absorbed liquid capital from untaxed speculative financial activities and provided facilities 175 and incentives, such as construction permits for large plots and restricted areas, to channel these investments into the construction sector and physical urban infrastructure (Ehsani, 1999, p. 23). It is important to note that the municipality faced challenges in selling land due to various limitations, yet it successfully sold the potential development rights above each parcel of land in the city. In this context, when discussing the "privatization" of the skyline, Ehsani seeks to elaborate on the idea that before the municipality began "selling the density," there were fixed regulations governing the allowable construction density on each parcel. However, prior to this deregulation, the airspace above each parcel was considered common property, accessible to all. Enjoying sunshine and blue skies is part of the right to the city and significantly impacts the mental and physical health of its residents. In other words, deregulation and prioritization of exchange-value over use-value not only make housing increasingly unaffordable and exacerbate the housing crisis for vulnerable groups, but they also significantly affect the quality of life in cities and the rights of urban residents in the medium and long term. In response to the question of where people, the additional population from migration and natural growth, would have lived in Tehran without densification, two key points need to be highlighted. Firstly, it is essential to recognize the role of both local and central governments in effectively "regulating" and "managing" resources to ensure equal access to services such as housing and job opportunities. The approach of selling skyline rights and density reflects a form of "deregulation" that contributes to the privatization of Tehran for the benefit of affluent individuals. Secondly, it is essential to consider the abundance of housing stock in Tehran's market. Media reports and government sources indicate that there are over half a million vacant housing units in Tehran (MP of Iran, Bijan Nowbaveh, Shahre Ma Telegaram Channel), with a significant portion â approximately 350,000 units â located in the northern districts. High-rise buildings in these areas have vacancy rates ranging from 30% to 40% (Barzan News). Additionally, nearby New Towns in close proximity to Tehran, such as Pardis, have over 65,000 empty units, along with 18,000 in Parand and 45,000 in the westernmost district of Tehran (Barzan News & Eskan News, Sep 2023). Across the country, there are over 4 million 176 empty units, and this trend has been increasing since the implementation of the new density-selling policy in 2005 (EcoIran). The prevalence of vacant housing stock can be attributed to the lucrative nature of the housing market, which stands out as the most reliable investment sector in Iran. Consequently, the trend of selling density primarily benefits real estate investors, prioritizing the exchange-value of housing. This has led to the eviction of the urban poor in areas near the capital. Confronted with unaffordable housing within the formal city borders, the urban poor have been left with no choice but to seek shelter outside the city's "formal" boundaries, closer to the "center of opportunities" in Tehran. Ehsani (1999) argues that the sale of vertical density led to a significant increase in the value of real estate and land (p. 23). Ehsani (2013) elaborates that this trend enabled the construction of high-rises, subsequently increasing the supply of residential units through vertical expansion. Interestingly, this exacerbated the North-South divide within the city. Between 1987 and 1997, the Tehran municipality successfully absorbed the flux of accumulated capital and invested in the private construction sector, which grew 15-fold. Additionally, the proportion of buildings over four stories in Tehran rose sharply â primarily in the northern districts â growing from 20% in 1992 to 64% by 1997. This process conferred significant advantages to the privileged social classes while making living in Tehran increasingly unaffordable for many working- and middle-class residents. Consequently, the suburbs and agricultural lands on the periphery of Tehran transformed into informal settlements, which expanded significantly (Ehsani, 2013, p. 162). This narrative underscores the dialectical relationship between the rise of self-built settlements and the prioritization of exchange-value over use-value in the Iranian context after the revolution. It highlights how speculative real estate practices not only displaced vulnerable populations but also intensified urban inequalities, pushing marginalized communities to the city's outskirts. Since 1999, the construction of high-rises has been restricted following the imprisonment of Karbaschi on corruption charges. However, due to the Tehran municipality's lack of financial resources to address affordable housing, the process of privatizing public spaces continued. The ongoing speculative activities in Tehranâs housing sector have made the city increasingly unaffordable for the majority of working individuals. In this context, the Tehran municipality 177 shifted its approach from selling permits for luxurious high-rise buildings to a model of âdemocratized speculation,' which involved âselling permits for smaller buildings ranging from four to six floors throughout the cityâ. The trend of residential housing growth in Tehran persisted, tripling between 1990 and 1998, then tripling again between 1998 and 2003, and this upward trajectory has continued (Ehsani, 2013, p. 163). According to Ehsani (2013), the implications of privatizing public assets included the unaffordability of housing, a reduction in the average size of homes to sixty square meters since 1990, the enrichment of middle-class citizens, and the marginalization of laborers (pp. 163-164). In addition to selling density, Bayat (2013) argues that slum clearance during these years was another manifestation of prioritizing the exchange-value over the use-value of housing. This trend was observed in cities such as Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad, Arak, and Khoramabad. As a result of this approach, the growth of informal settlements within Tehran was halted, but informal housing began to expand in nearby villages like Bagherabad, located south of Tehran (p. 165). This narrative illustrates how speculative activities have played a key role in reshaping the urban landscape (p. 166). Privatization in 2000s: Ehsani (2013) argues that since 2005, under the presidency of Ahmadinejad, Iran entered a new phase of implementing neoliberal policies, albeit with a populist approach. This phase was characterized by the removal of subsidies for essential goods and services, as well as the privatization of public properties in exchange for cash payments to segments of the population in need of financial support (Ehsani, 2013, pp. 154-155). But what exactly constitutes public properties or public resources in the Iranian context? Ehsani (2013) argues that the dichotomy between âprivatizationâ and ânationalizationâ became the central ownership debate following the 1979 revolution, largely due to the ambiguity in the Iranian Constitution on this matter (Article 44). In this context, the concept of "public" has been reduced to the opposite of private, and has become synonymous with the state, which often acts as a private owner (p. 155). Throughout different periods, the privatization of public lands and assets has been justified in various ways. In the 1980s, it was framed as âdistributive justiceâ for the benefit of the landless. In the 1990s, the privatization of skyline rights and urban zoning changes were justified as a solution to economic challenges, 178 resulting in the âspeculative commercialization of urban spaceâ and the empowerment of the middle-class (p. 156). The lack of clear definitions of terms such as "public", "private", "national resources", and "common" has created an environment ripe for exploitation by those in power. This ambiguity allows policymakers to adjust policies for their own benefit, extracting resources that not only belong to the people, but should be preserved for future generations. As a result, political parties in power often transform policies to secure short-term profits for themselves and their allies, without regard for long-term societal or environmental impacts. During Ahmadinejad's presidency, a new regulation mandated that the state reduce its involvement in the ânonessential sectorsâ by 20 percent and privatize 80 percent of its assets in âessential sectorsâ such as energy, large-scale industries, banking, and communication (Ehsani, 2013, 165-166). While this regulation may have appeared to promote privatization and reduce the central state's authority, Ehsani (2013) argues that due to the lack of democratic legal infrastructures and transparency, the state's domination was not diminished. Instead, it intensified, transforming into what he describes as a âstate mafia with a private oneâ (pp. 165-166). He argues that another populist policy during Ahmadinejad's era was the introduction of the "Justice Share" program, which aimed to distribute up to 40 percent of public assets slated for privatization to the poor. However, this initiative ultimately failed to achieve its goals (Ehsani, 2013, p. 166-7). Ehsani's analysis highlights how policies â regardless of their rhetoric framing âcan combine seemingly contradictory values, such as promoting both pro-poor measures and privatization, which is a striking feature of Ahmadinejad's governance approach. Privatization in the 2010s: Mehr Housing Project (MHP) faced numerous challenges and, after eight years, was deemed a failure. Of the promised 2.3 million units, only 500,000 were completed by the end of Ahmadinejadâs term. Despite continued support from parliament, the Rouhani (2013-2021) administration abandoned the program but committed to finishing the units already under construction. As part of efforts to relieve financial pressure, the government ended the 99-year land lease system and decided to sell land directly to applicants. To complete the construction, the government brought in two major developers: Kayson Inc., an Iranian construction company, and Kuzu Group, a Turkish developer. 179 However, these larger developers increased construction costs by producing higher-quality units, raising home prices beyond original affordability (Farahani & Yousefi, 2021). To address rising costs, the government also increased personal loans from the Housing Bank, but these loans never covered more than 30% of the final price. As a result, many applicants who could not afford the escalating costs sold their units, while others rented them out. The program's shift in focus to middle-income families, who sought to use the units for secondary housing, further deviated from the original intent of assisting low-income applicants. Additionally, many larger developers failed to meet the applicants' expectations, with Kuzu Group delivering smaller units than promised and Kayson Inc. constructing new, higher-quality, and more expensive residential complexes in Tehran's Pardis and Parand townships (Farahani & Yousefi, 2021). The programâs shortcomings were further exposed after the 2017 earthquake in Kermanshah, when 90% of two newly built MHP townships were destroyed. This failure led President Rouhani to criticize state intervention in housing construction. The MHP's inability to meet its initial promises, both in terms of quality and quantity, was clear. The target group, low-income families, could not afford the rising costs of the homes, and the state was unable to provide sufficient subsidies. The result was a landscape of abandoned MHP buildings, surrounded by more expensive non-MHP properties. This transformation attracted private developers hoping to capitalize on the increasing land value in these areas, further highlighting the program's failure to address its intended goals. Ultimately, the MHP's marketized structure and the financial limitations of the public sector led to its inability to fulfill its promises for the lowest-income applicants (Farahani & Yousefi, 2021). Apart from the Mehr Housing project, other housing plans during Rouhani's presidency (2013-2021) were not fully implemented and remained as propaganda tools, without any positive impact on housing for the urban poor. According to Alaedini (2021), the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development drafted the Revised Comprehensive Housing Plan (RCHP) to address rising housing costs, inadequate affordable housing, and expanding informal settlements. Key proposals included creating a housing fund, offering mortgage finance to low-income families and slum dwellers, and supporting rental housing programs. A 2017 180 document outlined initiatives for social housing, including rent subsidies and 100,000 low-income units. The Sixth National Development Plan (2016-2021) also supported rebuilding slum areas and providing affordable finance and land. However, due to implementation challenges, these plans were not executed. Instead, the government launched the National Housing Production Action Plan (NHPAP) in 2019, aiming to build 400,000 homes by 2022. Despite including some low-income units, the NHPAP's scale and pricing are unlikely to effectively address Iranâs housing issues, similar to the Mehr Housing Project. Also, this program was not implemented (Alaedini, 2021). During Raisie's presidency (2021-2024), the promise of mass housing construction for young people, particularly young couples struggling with housing issues, has been promoted. He promised to build four million housing units during his term, which would require construction of one million units per year. To many, this promise seemed highly exaggerated, and this project was never implemented. Raisi named this initiative the "national housing project," which according to some scholars, was similar in approach to the earlier Mehr housing project. However, Raisi shifted blame for the project's failure onto developers, claiming that their irresponsibility was the reason for the project's lack of progress or even initiation. At the start of his presidency, the price per square meter of an apartment was around 31 million Toman. One year later, this price had risen to 53 million Tomans, and by March 2024, it had soared to over 81 million Tomans. These figures demonstrate the dramatic rise in housing prices during Raisi's three-year term. This means that during his three years in office, housing prices increased by approximately 2.6 times. To put this into perspective, in 2013, the price per square meter was 3.95 million Tomans, meaning that over the course of a decade, housing prices increased by roughly 22 times. This data highlights that despite Raisi's promise to address crisis by building one million units per year, not only did he fail to resolve the issue, but his tenure saw a significant worsening of the housing situation for the majority of Iranian85. Since the early 1990s, land and housing prices in Iran have risen over 100 times faster than the consumer price index. This surge in housing costs and decreasing affordability has contributed to the growth of informal urban settlements. According to the Sixth Development 85 https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c2ee5lnjn64o 181 Plan, around 3.2 million households, or nearly 12 million people, live in informal settlements, which account for 25-30% of the urban housing stock (Alaedini, 2021). In Iran, many state-owned urban services, particularly in residential development, are commodified and driven by market forces rather than functioning as public services. The public economy faces challenges, notably due to a chaotic tax system with extensive exemptions, including military-affiliated companies, which control a significant portion of economic activity. While some sectors, like oil and communications, are nationalized, housing is not. Municipalities rely heavily on outsourcing development projects to private developers, who are compensated with floor space ratio (FSR) allowances. As a result, municipalities increasingly depend on income from selling these FSR allowances (Farahani & Yousefi, 2021). Ehsani (2013) argues that, in reality, the privatization process in Iran was a populist tactic that ultimately strengthened the government's dominance rather than reducing it. More than 65 percent of Iranian industries and approximately 85 percent of Iranâs stock exchange remainder under state control, suffering from significant issues of transparency and lack of competition. The ambiguity surrounding the boundaries and definitions of public versus private ownership allowed the privatization process in Iran to consolidate the state's position and provide enormous advantages to politically connected groups affiliated with or vaguely linked to the government. As a result, this privatization scheme has intensified multi-dimensional inequalities in Iran (Ehsani, 2013, p. 168-169). The unaffordability of housing in Iran is a critical issue that has not be taken seriously by various governments of the Islamic regime. It is important to note that governmental statistics in Iran are not reliable, as the regime often attempts to present a more favorable image of itself. However, even within these skewed statistics, the housing crisis is glaringly apparent. In 2023, a member of Iran's parliament stated that the waiting period for Iranians to afford a home had reached an astonishing 90 years. Government media reported that while housing prices in Iran had increased by 9.5 times over the past five years (Figure 23), wages for the working class had only grown by 5.9 times. It is important to note that these figures were provided by government sources and may not fully reflect the actual living conditions in 182 Iran86. The prioritization of land speculation and the exchange value of housing over its use value in Iran has led to extreme housing unaffordability, even for middle-class individuals. Figure 23: The average price per square meter of apartments in Tehran from 2013 to 2024. Reference: https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c2ee5lnjn64o To sum up, this section analyzed the prioritization of exchange-value over use-value in housing across various periods under the Islamic regime in Iran. The discussion traced the historical and political evolution of privatization policies and their consequences for urban development, housing affordability, and social equity. Starting with the revolutionary housing policies of the 1980s, which redistributed urban land but largely benefited middle-class state employees, it examines the shift to neoliberal policies in the 1990s under Rafsanjani, which further entrenched speculative real estate practices. The sale of skyline rights and densification policies exacerbated inequalities, displacing vulnerable populations and prioritizing exchange-value over social housing needs. By the 2000s, Ahmadinejadâs populist 86 https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cedev509ykwo 183 policies intensified privatization while consolidating state dominance, worsening inequalities under the guise of pro-poor rhetoric. Under Raisiâs presidency (2021â2024), housing affordability declined dramatically, and housing prices increased by 2.6 times over the three-year period. Despite promises of mass housing, the crisis deepened, highlighting the regimeâs systemic prioritization of exchange-value in housing policies. 4.5.3. Characteristics of ZoorAbad Neighborhood through the lens of use-value vs exchange-value In the previous subsection, we explored how the exchange-value of housing has been prioritized over its use-value, leading to increased housing unaffordability. While government initiatives often claimed to address housing needs, their implementation perpetuated inequality, unaffordability, and displacement. Amid this landscape, self-built settlements like ZoorAbad emerge as critical sites where grassroots efforts have prioritized the use-value of housing. These neighborhoods offer an alternative model of urban development. In this section, we will examine the characteristics of this self-built housing model. We will analyze both the spatial and socio-economic features of these self-built homes and the neighborhood in which they are located. 4.5.3.1. Spatial Characteristics of the Neighborhood When aiming to understand the characteristics of a neighborhood, it is essential to recognize that descriptions vary across a spectrum of perspectives. For ZoorAbad, this spectrum ranges from the official narratives provided by the state and relevant institutions to the viewpoints of ordinary residents. In this subsection, we will consider both narratives to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the neighborhood, highlighting different aspects as well as the contrasts between these accounts. Examining these differences and similarities will also help us explore the dominant approach of the state and reflect on its underlying intentions. Prior to the Islamic Revolution, construction on this hill was illegal and carried out without official permits. Many buildings were demolished by government authorities, citing corners over security and the negative impact on the urban landscape. After the revolution, with ZoorAbad's population growing rapidly and increased pressure from residents for welfare services and resolution of land ownership issues, the government was compelled to allocate 184 land in ZoorAbad to property owners under special conditions. However, only a small percentage of residents were able to obtain legal documentation for their properties. Today, ZoorAbad's urban fabric is fully established, with no vacant land or opportunities for future growth and development. The area is bounded by the Chalous Road and Karaj River to the east, the Azimiyeh residential complex to the north, and Baraghan Street to the west and south, which restricts further expansion (figure 24) (Transportation Report of ZoorAbad - NaghshClick Consulting Company, 2018). One state report estimates the area of ZoorAbad to be approximately 168.7 hectares, with around 9,000 plots (Transportation Report of ZoorAbad, 2018, p. 18). However, another official document, titled the Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan (2021), lists the area of ZoorAbad as 80.8 hectares, comprising 10,453 residential plots and 567 non-residential plots (p. 13). While both documents were written after the demolition of 4,000 housing units in ZoorAbad, I assume the difference in the estimated area arises from the fact that one document included the demolished area in the neighborhood's total area, while the other did not. At the same time, the number of plots in ZoorAbad differs by around 1,500. Unfortunately, due to the lack of a single, clear document about the neighborhood and the Figure 24. ZoorAbad Boundaries and Surrounding Street [Retrived from Naghsh-e Click, 2019, p. 36, and edited by the author]. 185 involvement of numerous parallel institutions in the neighborhood's Improvement Plan, there is no way to access more accurate statistics on this matter. According to the most recent official census in 2017, ZoorAbad had a population of about 35,000 people (Transportation Report of ZoorAbad, 2018, p. 18). However, another document lists the population at 40,000, with around 11,000 households residing in the neighborhood. The population density is 488.5 individuals per hectare, and the average household size is 3.54. The northwestern part of ZoorAbad has a higher population and more households compared to other areas (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, 2021, p. 13). The government's and municipality's view of ZoorAbad's spatial characteristics highlights high occupancy levels, lower land prices, use of problematic lands (figure 25), lack of recreational facilities, unsustainable construction methods, inadequate infrastructure, illegal construction, and an overall unfavorable appearance (Alipour, 2014, 88-91). They also describe the neighborhood as having "non-standard facilities, narrow and unhygienic streets with hazardous traffic conditions in winter, open sewage flowing downhill, limited water supply available only two to three nights a week, requiring storage in low-quality reservoirs, limited living space, dampness in houses with the risk of collapse, and the possibility of collapse, and a rural lifestyle" (Qasemi, 2010, 75). While some of these issues are valid, ZoorAbad's informal architecture also offers a distinct, human-scaled environment that contrasts with the formal buildings in more affluent areas (Behroozi Nobar, 2023). Many of the attributes assigned to the self-built neighborhood by government institutions serve to stigmatize the area, justifying attempts at dismantling, pacification, and forced eviction of its residents. 186 Figure 25:Topography of ZoorAbad in a comparison with greater Karaj. Based on this map, it is obvious that the topography of ZoorAbad makes this neighborhood a special one that provides opportunities and challenges for this neighborhood [Retrived from Transportation Report] The ethnic diversity and cohesion in ZoorAbad, as a community comprising forty factions from various ethnic groups, is reflected in the establishment of Hosseiniyahs (Shia religious gathering places), with each ethnic group maintaining its own religious gathering space. Ethnic, kinship, neighborly, friendship, and neighborhood ties are deeply interwoven into the social fabric of the area â connections that are not easily visible to outsiders, contrary to their physical appearance (Asset Assessment Report of ZoorAbad, 2020). In this subsection, I will introduce the spatial characteristics of ZoorAbad by focusing on three key categories: housing, shops, and streets. The content presented will be a blend of insights derived from interviews I conducted in ZoorAbad, along with secondary resources. Do not be surprised if much of the information comes from my own ethnographic notes, based on my observations 187 and semi-structured interviews with ZoorAbad residents. My aim is to provide an alternative perspective on the reality of this self-built neighborhood, illustrating how the prioritization of the use-value of housing â constructed by the urban poor â manifests itself in the spatial characteristics of the area. 4.5.3.1.1. Housing I climbed up the hill of ZoorAbad and, as usual, continued along the main street. It was a summer evening in July 2022, and the weather had become a bit more bearable, cooler than the earlier scorching heat. Women sat in front of their homes or shops, chatting in pairs or small groups. As I walked a little further, I noticed a woman â whom I will call Noor â sitting on the steps of her home. She appeared to be about 33 years old, wearing a loosely draped, flowery white chador over her head and body, and her eyebrows were tattooed. I approached her and asked if we could talk for a few minutes about ZoorAbad and the housing situation. After she agreed, I sat down on the stone stairs beside her. At the beginning of our conversation, I mentioned that I had attended Tehzeeb School here in ZoorAbad during my elementary years. To my surprise, we discovered that we had been classmates. Noor then shared that she got married about 16-17 years ago, and her son is now 15-16 years old. Noor was born near Zanjan and moved to ZoorAbad when she was just one year old, which means she has lived there for 34 years. Her father initially bought a house at the top of the hill in ZoorAbad, but they later moved. After her marriage, she and her husband purchased a home and have never been tenants. She mentioned that ZoorAbad was better in the past, apparently during her childhood. Because she dislikes apartment living and wants to be close to her parents, they have chosen to stay in ZoorAbad. It appears that her family does not face financial barriers, yet they still prefer to remain in the neighborhood. When I asked her what aspects of ZoorAbad were better in the past, she pointed to the issue of trash, stating that people don't follow the rules and simply throw their household waste outside. From my perspective, her concern seemed somewhat exaggerated. I wondered if she was particularly bothered by the sight of scattered trash near her home. 188 Noor's house was renovated about nine years ago. It is a two-story home on a 145-square-meter plot, one of the better-quality houses in ZoorAbad, with a stone facade. When they moved in, they made some minor changes, such as adding railings and updating the interior walls, but the overall structure remained unchanged. The upper floor has two bedrooms, a hall, and a bathroom, while the lower floor has one bedroom, a hall, and a bathroom. Each unit also has a separate toilet located in the yard. Noor prefers the outdoor toilet, believing it to be more hygienic in that setting. This view, shared by a younger resident representing the second generation in ZoorAbad, reflects how cultural preferences among residents have shaped their individual living spaces. Noor's parents, who moved to ZoorAbad in the 1970s, built their homes immediately after purchasing land, with the help of neighbors and family members. BahramBaygui (1978) notes that migrants who settled in ZoorAbad from various cities and villages tended to live close to others from their ethnic backgrounds. For example, migrants from Gilan settled in the northeastern part of the neighbourhood, while Azari people gathered in the northwest of ZoorAbad. During the 1970s, nuclear families in ZoorAbad typically consisted of parents and 6 to 8 children (p. 129). Numerous families in Karaj and Tehran rely on the squatter area for housing, including some who are not financially disadvantaged. Some use these dwellings as second homes while renting out their primary residences in Tehran. During the 1970s, BahramBaygui (1978) provided evidence of television antennas on most houses, suggesting that these families were not very poor, as they could afford such luxuries. He also noted that the majority of household heads in this area were employed or self-employed (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 130). This claim, that not all landlords in ZoorAbad were among the urban poor, is supported by one of the interviewees, Mari, whose father owned a housing unit in ZoorAbad, as a second home and an investment. Additionally, Guiti Etemad, an urban planner I interviewed, mentioned that one of her affluent relatives owned a tidy, well-maintained house in ZoorAbad before the revolution. Another notable aspect of housing in ZoorAbad is the human-scaled housing construction of the homes and the built environment. This stood out to me during my numerous visits, and one of the main implications of this characteristic was the sense of security I felt as a woman 189 walking through the streets and alleys. The human scale, combined with winding streets that adapt to the individual houses, creates a sense of visual beauty and a personal touch. Compared to other neighborhoods in Karaj or Tehran, and even to the nearby affluent area of Azimiyeh, the attention to flowers, greenery, and decorating facades with plants was striking. I recall seeing a house where a mulberry tree extended from its wall, illustrating the kind of coexistence that is often advocated in contemporary architecture, yet is naturally present in ZoorAbad. These observations contradict the stigmatized perceptions of ZoorAbad, showing that when housing is constructed with a focus on use-value, it reflects positively on the spatial characteristics of the neighborhood. The residents, as the primary users of their homes, adapt their surroundings according to their desires, transforming the space into a more pleasant and welcoming environment. The characteristics of housing in ZoorAbad can be better understood through a comparison with its neighboring area, Azimiyeh, particularly in terms of poverty and affluence, which are relative concepts. In a 1970s study on ZoorAbad, BahramBaygui (1978) noted that during the 1960s, rural migrants in ZoorAbad were predominantly employed in low-paying service, retail, or unskilled labor positions in factories or construction, often on a temporary or part-time basis, in comparison to other residents of Karaj (p. 110). The quality and size of housing in ZoorAbad were also contrasted with those in Azimiyeh. In ZoorAbad, small, self-built dwellings typically covered less than 100 square meters, while houses in affluent areas like Azimiyeh or Jahanshahr often exceeded 500 square meters (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 111). While this comparison highlights the socio-economic gap between ZoorAbad and its affluent neighbors, some of these differences have changed over time. In Azimiyeh, for example, the average size of housing units has decreased due to lifestyle shifts and the rise of speculative real estate activities. This led to the demolition of villa-style homes in Azimiyeh and the construction of apartments with smaller units. Additionally, the demographic makeup of ZoorAbad has evolved. The second generation of residents, benefitting from self-built settlements that reduced their housing costs, have pursued higher-paying jobs, often due to improved access to education in high schools and universities. These shifts reflect changing socio-economic dynamics within ZoorAbad. 190 Regarding construction materials in ZoorAbad's housing, it is important to note that while some of the self-built homes have renovated their façades, others have not undergone reconstruction in the last five decades, making it possible to rely on older studies for certain observations. BahramBaygui (1978) states that in 1966, the primary construction materials for buildings in Karaj were kiln-dried brick and iron (49.1%) or kiln-dried brick and wood (27.6%) (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 111). This can likely be applied to ZoorAbad, especially for those self-built settlements that have not seen significant changes over the past decades. However, when discussing the newly renovated housing in ZoorAbad, it raises the question: what kinds of renovations have occurred, and what materials have been used in these updated constructions? During a walk in June 2022, I noticed that a significant number of houses had either recently undergone renovation or were newly constructed. Many renovated facades, and some may have had interior work done, like cement rendering. A few of these homes used typical materials and structures found in formal housing, such as concrete for building four-story apartment buildings, although such examples were relatively rare. In several cases, only the facades were updated, often finished with white cement or stone. One house, in particular, stood out with its pristine façade. Strangely, one of its windows opened onto a staircase, and another on the upper floor had nothing behind it. This highlights a trend among ZoorAbad's residents: the desire to present their homes as decent to counter the stigma surrounding the neighborhood and their socio-economic status. Even when such renovations do not significantly improve their quality of life, residents allocate their limited resources to upgrade the façade, aiming to appear more in line with 'formal' neighborhoods. Based on my observations, most houses in ZoorAbad have one or two stories, although I did see a few with more than three stories. Over the past five years, a few plots have been completely reconstructed to build four- or five-story apartment buildings. This trend is particularly noticeable in alleys near major roads in Karaj, such as Chalous road, where it marks the early stages of grassroots gentrification. One building, approximately seven stories high, was located next to a real estate agency. According to the agent, the owner and contractor of this building are currently in prison due to violations of several building codes during construction, though the specific violations were unclear. Additionally, I noticed 191 another building under construction, around five to six stories tall. There were also two or three buildings that had been entirely demolished and rebuilt, with clean exteriors and modern designs. During the 1970s, typical residential plots (figure 26) in ZoorAbad had the following characteristics: they were between 40-60 square meters, usually consisting of one or two rooms. The more recent housing included indoor toilets, while older constructions had toilets in the yard. None of the houses in 1977 had a separate kitchen. Most units had a small yard (or hayat) ranging from 10 to 15 square meters. In terms of construction materials, sundried bricks and stones were the most common, with iron posts and cement used for roofing and walls (figure 27). This demonstrates that the squatters in ZoorAbad used durable materials, making these self-built houses relatively sturdy compared to other squatter settlements worldwide (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 127). Regarding urban services and utilities, most homes in 1977 had an âabanbarâ (water reservoir) with a capacity of 10-12 cubic metres, filled by mobile water tankers, with water costing 12 times more than the cityâs piped water. In the southern part of the neighborhood, residents used a public water tap on Karaj Street (p. 129). In recent years, some houses accommodate entire extended families, including married sons and daughters living together. The design of both houses and public spaces naturally fosters close social interaction among residents (Asset Assessment Report of ZoorAbad, 2020). Figure 26: area of residential plots in ZoorAbad [Retrived from Naghsh-e Click, 2019, p.21]. 192 Figure 27: Housing congestion and poor accessibility in this neighborhood, as one of the spatial characteristics of the neighborhood [Retreived fromBahramBaygui , 1978, p. 131]. 193 However, since the 1990s, the spatial and visual characteristics of the neighborhood have changed due to the initiation of the Improvement Plan, which resulted in the demolition of around 4000 housing units in ZoorAbad. The integrity of the neighborhood's spaces has been significantly affected by this plan. During my visit to ZoorAbad in 2022, I observed a few isolated housing units scattered throughout the designated demolition area. After climbing steep staircases (more than 50 steps), I encountered a house at the top of the hill. It appeared that the neighboring houses had been demolished as part of the Improvement Plan, which meant that I saw some homes that remained untouched despite the extensive demolition around them. I was unsure how these houses, and their landowners, manage to resist and remain in the neighborhood. Despite asking local informants, I did not receive any clear responses regarding this situation. Regarding housing differences in ZoorAbad, one resident noted that the houses primarily varied in square footage rather than in amenities. However, he added that homes located on the main streets (along the avenue) were generally better than those at the end of the alley, which tended to be cheaper. The story of Zahra provides an interesting perspective on the housing characteristics utilized by younger generations in ZoorAbad. Zahra shared, "I was born in ZoorAbad in 1985 and lived there until I was nine years old. After that, we moved to Azimiyeh, where we bought a villa-style house. About 15-20 years ago, we renovated it. In May 2021, using the money I had saved from my father's inheritance and my years of work, I decided I wanted to buy a house. I had been searching for a home since 2018, but I couldn't find anything within my budget. I looked in various areas of Karaj, such as Mohammadshahr and Mardabad. I even found a house in Mardabad that I could afford. Later, I found out that my sister was selling her house in ZoorAbad, which she had purchased in 2018 for investment purposes. I decided to buy it; it was a cozy basement with ten steps leading down to it. The biggest issue is the lack of light. There are light wells in the ceiling that provide illumination, but they cannot be opened for ventilation. Overall, it's a 40-square-meter suite with a kitchen, a bedroom, and a bathroom. Initially, it had no dampness, but now I can smell it, and the walls are showing signs of moisture". 194 Zahra shared her experience: "I bought this suite for 170 million tomans in May 2021, but since I didn't have enough money, I decided to rent it out for 40 million tomans. The tenant came from Heydarabad, an area near Karaj-e Now known for its criminal activities. We found the tenant at the agency where we went to sign the contract. Initially, the tenants were supposed to be a woman heading the family and her three children. However, it turned out there were six of them living in the suite. They lived there from April 2021 until January 2022, but later, due to family problems, they decided to leave. Afterward, I decided to move to ZoorAbad myself. I borrowed 30 million tomans from my mother and earned an additional 10 million myself. In any case, I became a resident there". Zahra explained that her house "is not ideal for a housewife, as it lacks natural light and can feel depressing". However, she believes it works well for a young couple who are out during the day and need a private place to rest at night. Zahra's suite is on the second underground floor, and she notes that the walls are very thin, easily transmitting conversations from her neighbors. Her story is significant for several reasons. First, as a young woman who lived in Azimiyeh for more than 30 years, the housing crisis and unaffordability forced her to move to a lower-income neighborhood in order to live independently. Second, despite having other options in low-income but formal neighborhoods, she chose to live in ZoorAbad. Based on her childhood experiences there, she prefers the socio-spatial characteristics of this self-built neighborhood over the formal ones. Additionally, the neighborhood's accessibility to various facilities and its favorable location further highlights its appeal. In summary, the housing characteristics of ZoorAbad can be categorized into physical and social aspects. These include limited square footage per unit, insufficient living space for residents, low quality construction, damp interiors, human-scale grassroots architecture, diverse and beautiful facades, and early signs of gentrification in the neighborhood. 4.5.3.1.2. Shops During my fieldwork in ZoorAbad, a significant number of shops caught my attention. I particularly noticed one or two industrial workshops, including a tailoring shop specializing in embroidery. This led me to consider whether we might be witnessing a trend of residences being replaced by industrial establishments and workshops, driven by rising rental costs and 195 housing prices for lower-income groups. This potential shift warrants further exploration as a possible trend in the area. During my one-hour walk, I also noticed numerous hairdressing and beauty shops. It is important to acknowledge the longstanding tradition in ZoorAbad, where homeowners often establish small shops beneath their homes from the beginning. For this reason, when exploring the possibility of a growing trend of replacing residential houses with workshops, we must keep in mind the tradition in ZoorAbad of integrating shops into homebuilding. 4.5.3.1.3. Streets While walking with Mari, who had lived in ZoorAbad for years, she too was amazed by the intricate layout and organic formation of the neighborhood's physical structure. The streets interconnected in an organic, flowing manner as we made our way through them. The neighborhood's outer boundaries are defined by Baraghan Street to the south, with Chalous Street and Kaj Boulevard marking its eastern and western limits (figure 28) (Qasemi, 2010, 51). Figure 28: Location of ZoorAbad compared to the main border streets to this neighborhood [Retrived from Naghsh-e Click, 2019, p. 36]. 196 ZoorAbad has approximately 52 kilometers of streets and avenues, laid out in an organic chaotic pattern, with narrow streets and winding alleys intertwined with low permeability (figure 29). The main thoroughfares are primarily located along the northern and eastern edges of the neighborhood. Shariati Street, the longest in ZoorAbad, encircles much of the area, stretching approximately 2,994 meters. While the street network in ZoorAbad is well distributed, the narrow width, poor traffic design, and steep slopes make pedestrian access challenging (figure 29 & 30). Many streets are in need of asphalt repairs, as the lack of proper drainage systems has caused surface water to deteriorate the pavement. Pedestrian paths are inadequate, often made from materials such as asphalt, mosaic, or a mix of these with cement. More than 54% of the streets are less than 6 meters wide, and 14% are between 6 and 8 meters wide. In total, over69% of the streets are less than 8 meters wide, resulting in low or non-existent permeability. This poses serious challenges during crisis or natural disasters due to a lack of emergency access routes (Transportation Report of ZoorAbad, 2018). Figure 29: Neighborhood Street and Alley Map [Retreived from Naghsh-e Click, 2019]. 197 Figure 30: The width of streets and alleys in ZoorAbad. The blue lines represent alleys with a width of less than 6 meters, red lines represent streets with a width between 6 and 8 meters, and green lines represent streets with a width between 8 to 10 meters [Retrived from Transportation Report of ZoorAbad, 2018, p. 47]. Before the Islamic Revolution in 1979, most of the avenues and streets in ZoorAbad were named after âmembers of the Royal Familyâ. This was a strategic move by the community to protect their neighborhood from being demolished as an informal settlement (BahramBaygui, 198 1978, p. 130). This strategy has persisted, and after the revolution, the names of the avenues and streets were changed, with many now named after prominent figures of the Islamic government. Although the entire ZoorAbad neighborhood has access to electricity, not all streets are equipped with streetlights, leading to insufficient illumination at night. The streets in ZoorAbad have varying slopes in different areas. The eastern side of the neighborhood has the steepest gradient, ranging from 30 to 16 percent, while the central area has a slope of 15 to 9 percent, and the western side has a gentler slope of about 8 to 4 percent. The drainage system for surface water is inadequate due to unsuitable gutters and drains. As a result, rainfall often leads to street flooding and water seepage. ZoorAbad is connected to the municipal sewage system, and all residential and commercial units discharge their heavy sewage into this system. However, light sewage is typically disposed of directly onto the streets via drains, which poses significant problems. Pedestrian walkways are obstructed by various obstacles, including electric poles, building protrusions, charity boxes, and power transformers. Most streets also lack dedicated pedestrian pathways, meaning the pedestrian and vehicular areas are not clearly separated, which comprises pedestrian safety. Due to the neighborhood's topography and street conditions, there are no dedicated bus or taxi stations within ZoorAbad itself., However, most parts of the neighborhood are within close proximity to bus and taxi stations in Karaj (Transportation Report of ZoorAbad, 2018). In conclusion, the housing and urban development of ZoorAbad reflects a complex interplay of socio-economic dynamics, historical contexts, and grassroots initiatives. The neighborhood, initially shaped by informal settlement and self-built housing, has evolved through multiple phases, marked by both resilience and transformation. While some families have improved their homes through renovations and the construction of more formal housing structures, the impact of the Improvement Plan has significantly altered the spatial integrity of the area. Despite challenges like limited infrastructure, inadequate services, and the gradual onset of gentrification, ZoorAbad retains a unique sense of community, characterized by human-scaled architecture, diverse facades, and a mix of residential and commercial functions. The ongoing affordability issues and shifting demographics, exemplified by the experiences of residents like Zahra, highlight the persistent appeal of the neighborhood, 199 particularly for younger generations seeking independence within a familiar socio-spatial environment. As ZoorAbad continues to navigate these changes, it remains a critical site for examining the intersections of informality, urban planning, and social mobility in the context of rapid urbanization and housing crises. Figure 31: Spatial characteristics of ZoorAbad neighborhood during 1980s [Retreived fromBahramBaygui, 1978, p. 128]. 200 4.5.3.2. Socio-economic Characteristics of the Residents of ZoorAbad 4.5.3.2.1. Ethnic characteristics ZoorAbad served as a gateway to urban life for rural migrants (Maarefvand & Tofigh, 2014). The neighborhood is characterized by a diverse ethnic composition, with the largest group originating from the predominantly Turkish-speaking western provinces87. Many of these settlers did not speak Farsi as their mother tongue and had low literacy rates. This linguistic and educational background sets the residents of ZoorAbad apart from those in nearby affluent neighborhoods, such as Azimiyeh (ParsaPajouh, 2003, 161-197). In her thesis, Qasemi (2010) highlights several socio-cultural characteristics of ZoorAbad, based on a governmental report. "High social cohesion among the residents of the hill due to shared language and ethnicity, suspicion of outsiders, the firm dignity of the majority of the hill's residents, engagement in unproductive activities exacerbating vulnerability, prevalence of northwestern and western rural culture, feigning urban culture due to the availability of video rentals and multiple beauty salons, illiteracy among the majority of the hill's residents, and low interest among young people in education" (Qasemi, 2010, 75). As mentioned earlier, government narratives regarding the characteristics of this neighborhood should be viewed critically and with skepticism. For instance, the claim that ZoorAbad residents engage in unproductive and vulnerable activities warrants reevaluation. This raises important questions: What activities are being labeled as "unproductive" and "vulnerable"? If these issues do exist, do residents have access to better opportunities for using their free time? What kinds of facilities and resources have been provided to support these individuals? In several interviews I conducted, some participants emphasized the different ethnic characteristics of ZoorAbad residents. While, such information may not always be deeply insightful, it does underscore the significance of ethnicity in this neighborhood. According to Rahman, "the Turks and Azerbaijanis in ZoorAbad have a different approach to selling or investing in land compared to other ethnic groups. As the majority and dominant group in ZoorAbad, Turks generally do not sell their houses; instead, they tend to buy more properties 87 (from their villages) of Zanjan (34 percent of ZoorAbad population) and East Azerbaijan (about 24 percent). Others came from the following provinces: Gilan (%8), Ardabil (%9.1), Kordestan (%2.3), Lorestan (%5.7), Sistan O Baluchestan (%3.4), etc. (ParsaPajouh, 2003, 161-197). 201 within the neighborhood". He contrasted this with the Kermanshahis and Gilanis, stating, "they are more likely to seek ways to leave ZoorAbad, whereas the Turks prefer to remain". According to the Asset Assessment Report of ZoorAbad (2019), nearly 70 percent of the population in ZoorAbad is ethnically Turkish, and large extended families and close-knit relationships are common. Aside from Sunni Afghans, almost 99 percent of the neighborhood's population are Shia Muslims. This dominance of an ethnic group like the Turks plays a significant role in shaping the socio-cultural dynamics and relationships within the community. For example, the language you may hear during a walk in the neighborhood is Turkish, and the residents follow their own cultural rituals, which may differ slightly from those of other ethnic groups. Even in the context of religious rituals, the Turkish population has its own religious practices and groups, and their presence has influenced the cultural characteristics of the neighborhood. Qasemi (2010) noted that ZoorAbad is divided into six urban areas from the residents' perspective (figure 32). This division is based on local mosques, each associated with a specific ethnic community in ZoorAbad, and the intersections known as "Tagh-e-Nasr," which are scattered along Shariati Road (Qasemi, 2010, 51). This account emphasizes the significance of ethnicity among the neighborhood's residents and reflects the characteristics of traditional Iranian neighborhoods, known as Mahalleh, which were historically formed based on socio-ethnic and religious similarities rather than economic class â unlike the modern neighborhoods in Iran today, where economic factors have become the primary distinguishing feature. 202 Figure 32: The six zones in ZoorAbad in the viewpoint of residents of the neighborhood; By Bavand Consulting Company in 1387 [Retrived from Qasemi, 2010, p. 50 ]. Mari explained that when they first moved to ZoorAbad three decades ago, there were no Afghans living in the neighborhood. She attributed this to the lack of acceptance of newcomers, especially those from rural areas in Ardabil and Azerbaijan. However, this attitude has changed over time. Mari mentioned that today, the appearance of Afghans is much more common, not only in ZoorAbad but also in her new neighborhood, which is another low-income settlement in Karaj. 4.5.3.2.2. Social bonds and solidarity One of the defining characteristics of ZoorAbad is strong social bonds and solidarity, particularly within ethnic communities, fostered through daily face-to-face interactions with local shopkeepers and in religious spaces. The religious carnivals during the month of Moharram are especially popular in ZoorAbad, demonstrating the strong religious connections among its residents (Qasemi, 2010, 67). The central role of mosques, local charity funds, and the involvement of neighborhood elders in personal matters reflect community participation and grassroots interpersonal connections in ZoorAbad (Asset Assessment Report of ZoorAbad, 2020). Zahra, one of the interviewees, shared her personal experience: "I was born in ZoorAbad in 1985 and lived there until I was nine. I spent my 203 childhood there. In the 1980s, it was a very close-knit, tribal area. My mother and the neighbors would do household chores together, sitting by the door, cleaning vegetables." ZoorAbad is characterized by multi-layered, intertwined social relationships. According to Qasemi (2010), nationality, kinship, friendship, and neighborhood relations are tightly woven together within a shared space, making them difficult for outsiders to perceive. Intra-neighborhood marriages have reinforced significant connections between individuals from different ethnic and rural groups. At the same time, ethnic groups are maintained through regular gatherings at members' homes or ethnic community centers in the neighborhood. Despite these deep connections, the spatial concentration of each ethnic group remains distinct, often centered around a Hussainiya (a Shiite religious gathering place) or a weekly community center. For instance, migrants from Hashtrud-Tabriz predominantly live in the higher elevations of District 4, while migrants from Bostanabad occupy the higher parts of District 2, and migrants from Hamedan reside in the lower areas of District 2. Alleys in ZoorAbad serve as semi-private, secure spaces where children play and women and girls gather (Qasemi, 2010, 68-69). The neighborhood's economic relationships primarily revolve around work connected to factories, offices, construction, small-scale businesses within the area, and street vending outside the neighborhood, mainly involving men. Qasemi (2010) notes that from the mid-1990s, local rotating saving groups, often referred to as "periodic banks," began to emerge. Each member of these groups contributes a predetermined sum of money on a specific day âmonthly, biweekly, or weekly â at a designated location, often a member's home. In a gathering with other members, a lottery system is used to determine which member will receive the collected money. This process continues until all members have received their share of the fund. While initial contributions started at one million rials, the neighborhood now has funds that lend up to 50 million rials. If someone is in urgent need, they can request the recipient of the month to withdraw the money early and defer their turn to a future round. These local saving systems are also supported by the spouses of the members. Additionally, women in the neighborhood help each other by creating short-term funds. In cases of immediate need, such as illness, dowry preparation, or house construction, a resident who is active in the mosque's Quranic sessions or women's gatherings may provide a loan to those in need (Qasemi, 2010, 70). 204 Mari, one of the interviewees, also, noted a strong sense of solidarity among the various individuals and groups living in the area. She observed that residents maintained close relationships and were quick to help each other during life's challenges, special occasions, or events like illness or the loss of loved ones. However, Mari mentioned that her husband discouraged her from walking in ZoorAbad because of his negative perception of the neighborhood. He believed that men in ZoorAbad held gender-biased attitude toward women. She also described the process of renting or subletting a house in ZoorAbad, which primarily happens through housing agencies or personal connections. She explained that when someone wants to rent out part of their home, they often prefer not to rent to a stranger. Instead, they typically seek tenants from within their own ethnic community, neighborhood, or circle of friends. To highlight the social characteristics of ZoorAbad, one of the interviewees, Rahman, compared it to the neighboring area of Azimiyeh. He said "in ZoorAbad, people answer each other's questions, whereas in Azimiyeh, they either respond briefly or do not know each other. For example, if you ask someone in ZoorAbad about a particular house, they will personally take you there, but it's not the same in Azimiyeh." His wife added that women in ZoorAbad used to form close friendships, but this is not the case in their current neighborhood, Fardis. Rahman elaborated further, saying "in areas where people face hardships, they may be further removed from a modern lifestyle, but they are much warmer and more willing to help one another". He explained, "In a place like ZoorAbad," people don't respect personal boundaries as strictly, but they support each other more. For example, if you are a woman carrying a heavy load, someone will help you carry it to your doorstep". However, both Rahman and his wife acknowledged that, with the expansion of social networks, many of these cultural differences have begun to fade. 4.5.3.2.3. Security According to residents of ZoorAbad, security is an important characteristic of this self-built neighborhood. Several interviewees highlighted this aspect. For instance, Mari mentioned that while many, especially the youth, openly showed off their ability to steal by displaying stolen items among their friends (which may boost their social standing in ZoorAbad and serve as an indicator of relative insecurity), she believed that the overall level of security 205 within the neighborhood was quite high. Mari recalled an incident where her family accidentally left their front door unlocked and half-open for several hours at night. When they returned, nothing had been stolen. Maria explained that residents of ZoorAbad do not steal from each other, which is a unique characteristic of this self-built Mahalleh (neighborhood). Even those who engage in thefts seem to feel a sense of belonging to the community and avoid causing trouble within their own neighborhood. This dynamic is partly driven by strong social control, as residents know and see each other daily, creating a sense of accountability. This social control helps reduce insecurity and crime among the residents. Zahra also believes that security in ZoorAbad is quite high because people view the neighborhood as an extension of their home. Just as one would not harm their own home, residents feel that they should not do anything destructive within their neighborhood. According to Zahra, they share a sense of collective ownership, having supported each other through various stages of life. As a result, ZoorAbad, which they consider somewhat like their home, experiences fewer criminal activities. Zahra notes that while boys in the area might commit crimes against girls outside of ZoorAbad, they would not do so against local girls. To them, a local girl represents part of their community's honor, and they must protect her. Zahra explains that due to social pressure in ZoorAbad and the fact that everyone knows each other, if a boy says something derogatory to a local girl or harasses her, she can tell her brothers or father, provide the boy's details, and they will address the situation. This is one reason street harassment of local girls is less common. Zahra notes "it's not the same in lower-income neighborhoods, such as Heydarabad, where everyone seems transient â people come and go, and nobody considers themselves natives. Consequently, in those areas, people don't feel a sense of belonging or that they are under social control. As a result, harassment and sexual assault are more common, and overall security is lower." Zahra was recently the victim of sexual assault. About two years ago, during the Persian New Year holiday, near a hill in ZoorAbad by a dirt road and a building under construction next to the observatory, a group of boys were gathered around a fire. One of them who was drunk, attacked her. The others tried to stop him, telling him not to bother a local girl because she represented the neighborhood's honor, but he persisted and assaulted as he was drunk. Overall, the residents of ZoorAbad believe that their neighborhood benefits from a relatively 206 high level of security, attributed to social control and a strong sense of community. However, the crime rate among residents is an issue that requires further critical study by experts, which is beyond the scope of this research. 4.5.3.2.4. Local/social surveillance Social surveillance is closely linked to the aforementioned 'security' characteristic in ZoorAbad. As mentioned earlier, the socio-ethnic and religious bonds among the residents of this self-built neighborhood, along with its spatial characteristics and compact layout, have led to a high level of social surveillance. Zahra, one of the interviewees, mentioned that she observes people in the neighborhood and is aware of being observed herself. She explained that in ZoorAbad, everyone keeps an eye on each other, tracking who comes and goes. As a painter with a distinctive appearance, she felt the need to establish herself from the beginning, believing that "you have to set your boundaries early on; otherwise, it becomes difficult to manage later". Khadan, another interviewee, also acknowledged the presence of social surveillance in the neighborhood, although she found it undesirable as a young woman. She and Mari both noted that while this constant observation limits personal freedom, especially for women, it also contributes to the sense of security among the residents. In ZoorAbad, nearly every action is under scrutiny, which, while restrictive, offers certain protective aspects for the community. 4.5.3.2.5. Stigmatized neighborhood & Bullying by individuals Mari mentioned that "labeling and categorizing individuals within the neighborhood is common, with each resident being recognized by a specific trait or characteristic". Beyond individual instances of bullying, there is a broader social reality: the residents of ZoorAbad, along with their neighborhood, have been stigmatized both by the state and by other Iranians who do not live in ZoorAbad. Various factors have prevented the neighborhood from shedding labels such as "occupied" and achieving any form of liberation. Qasemi (2010) argues that the stigma associated with "ZoorAbadis," perpetuated by the city and officials, has made it difficult for the younger generation to integrate into broader society. Employment opportunities, marriage prospects, and even social connections are often overshadowed by this negative perception. On average, there are 4 to 20 unofficial sell agreements (Qolnameh) for homes in this area, with each 207 family moving an average of four times during their 30-year residence in the neighborhood. This reflects the residents' consecutive displacements and dissatisfaction with their living conditions as they strive for a better quality of life (Qasemi, 2010, 71). Khadan and Mari both highlighted the persistent issue of stigmatization affecting marriage and job opportunities for residents of ZoorAbad, even years after relocating to escape the stigma. Despite moving away, this negative label continues to limit various life opportunities for them. 4.5.3.2.6. Drug dealing One of the stigmas associated with the residents of ZoorAbad revolves around drug-dealing activities in this neighborhood. "Some of the settlers of ZoorAbad worked as drug dealers because there were no jobs," said Rahman. He added: "The police claimed they were tracking smugglers, but you could find all kinds of drugs and alcoholic beverages in ZoorAbad. A zone known as "Serahi Zahedan" in ZoorAbad was famous for this â it is where they fill gas capsules, even today. There was also a well-known thug called "Ali Gorbeh" in the area. Pseudonyms were commonly used in ZoorAbad, and group fights were frequent. Many of the young people in Azimiyeh who were involved in drug-related activities and considered consumers would obtain their substances from ZoorAbad. The police couldn't do much and would often just take their share of the transactions." Zahra also acknowledged this situation in ZoorAbad. She said: "Many grocery stores in ZoorAbad stay open until 2-3 a.m. to sell drugs late at night, but there isn't much knife crime in ZoorAbad". Another interviewee, a 65-year-old woman, had a different perspective. Nahid khanoom stated, "all of my children are successful, and despite the negative rumors about ZoorAbadis, claiming that there are many thugs, drug dealers, and thieves in ZoorAbad, my children have all achieved success and hold positions and ranks in the Ministry of Intelligence, the IRGC, and other institutions". It seems that opinions on this issue vary, but it is clear to me that Nahid Khanum's view of her children's success is strongly tied to their connection with the Islamic government of Iran, that has provided them with job opportunities in the Ministry of Intelligence. For other 208 residents, who lack such opportunities or any other viable employment, involvement in drug dealing activities becomes a possibility. While this is not the case for the majority, it does apply to a minority. 4.5.3.2.7. Racism (against Afghans specifically) In the last two years ago, under the authorities of Taliban government, a new wave of immigration from Afghanistan towards Iran emerged. Since then, the number of Afghan's refugees in ZoorAbad have increased dramatically. But the attitudes of Iranian residents of ZoorAbad against them represent racism. During an interview with Nahid khanum she highlighted her concerns about the increasing number of Afghans in ZoorAbad over the past three years. She said "Afghan families have a lot of children, and I am concerned that their increasing numbers will eventually push us (Iranian) out of ZoorAbad. Despite Iranian children, Afghans children make lots of noise in the streets and make trouble and don't respect to my request." Another interviewee, named Noor, mentioned: "I don't rent to Afghans because they are not clean". However, Noor's neighbor, who was middle-aged, butted in and said she doesn't have an issue with Afghans. She mentioned that "Afghans are also human beings, and many of them are clean. Some Iranians can be seen as dirty as well. It doesn't make a difference." However, she complained about the job opportunities that Afghans get and said that her husband rarely finds work because employers often prefer to hire Afghans at lower wages. They mentioned that they are afraid of Afghans, as they believe Afghans are taking away their job opportunities. Because Afghans are willing to work for lower pay, they also easily find housing at higher prices. Noor's niece mentioned that the company they were going to tells them that Afghans are willing to pay a higher price for the same house. They believed that the high rental prices in ZoorAbad nowadays were due to Afghans coming here and being willing to pay more rent than them. They also mentioned that "Afghans rent houses for 2-3 people and then 10-12 people come later and join them, as if they are bringing their entire families houses are no longer available in ZoorAbad because Afghans have taken them over". While here was discussed more about discrimination which separates and excludes informal settlements from affluent and formal neighborhoods, ethnocultural discrimination among different groups in a neighborhood is one such common trait, which disconnects some groups 209 from the dominant ethno-culture population. For instance, Rolink (2019) argues that in urban Brazil, collective housing of Afro-Brazilians were denounced and prevented by urban housing standards. Roma people in Europe are one of the other minorities traveling communities who are discriminated against and considered as âillegalâ based on the dominant urban planning criteria. In Slovakia around one out of ten Romani housing suffered from lack of electricity and 81 percent have trouble with âno sewage disposalâ. In Italy, the Romani community are affected by forced eviction and housing demolition, and in Turkey their settlements in Istanbul were demolished to make room for large scale âurban renovation projectsâ (Rolnik, 2019, 136-138). In ZoorAbad, the stereotype racism imposed by Iranian citizens against Afghan refugees in ZoorAbad. The housing crisis, lack of job and economic crisis all in ZoorAbad has one blamable in the viewpoint of Iranian residents of ZoorAbad: Afghans. This dominant viewpoint while may come from various drivers, it also highlights the significant signs of racism in Iran and in this neighborhood towards Afghans refugees. 4.5.3.2.8. Distrust of the Government One of the similar items among a group of interviewees viewpoints is their distrust of the government. Based on their firsthand experience of lack of support and lack of good intent from the government which represent itself on the main approach of the Improvement Plan which resulted in destruction of housing and pacification of the neighborhood in a considerable zone of the neighborhood, and displacement of around 30,000 people from there, these people in ZoorAbad do not have trust to the government. Although there is not a unique image about this matter which we can extend to all different groups in ZoorAbad, the history of ZoorAbad has been tied to a controversial relationship with the government, and one of its direct consequences is distrust to the government. An interviewee named Amoo Bongahi is a real estate agent. He has been the shopping owner in ZoorAbad since 1981. He said, "The people of ZoorAbad are financially weak but strong in spirit. They are educated.". He said that "the affluent of Karaj and the supporters of Hashemi Rafsanjani want to keep the residents and the welfare level of this area down". He talked about the advantages of ZoorAbad, mentioning that the land here is firm, and they don't have settlement problems. Amoo Bongahi mentioned that the municipality keeps land 210 prices low, saying, "The municipality says it will take 3 million tomans per square meter, and this keeps land prices low." Numerous of interviewees believe in speculative approach of the government, and especially after the implementation of Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad and the personal experiences of interviewees regarding demolition of their housing by the state and displacement, the residents of ZoorAbad do not trust to the government. To sum up, the socio-cultural characteristics of the neighborhood and their interactions with use-value and exchange-value are as follows. Several aspects of the use-value of housing are relevant to the social characteristics of the neighborhood. Security, surveillance, local control, and social bonds are among them and show how the use-value of housing in this self-built settlement has been improved by the abovementioned characteristics. Other characteristics, such as stigmatization, drug dealing, and violence have a negative effect on the exchange value of housing in ZoorAbad. The municipality justifies its "improvement plan" by addressing these issues, which in reality increases the exchange value of housing there. In other words, while the Improvement Plan must address the issues for residents and its goal may be in the direction of improving the living conditions for residents which are related to those characteristics relevant to the use-value, but in reality and on the ground their efforts have been relevant to the exchange value of real estate there. 4.5.3.3. Changing socio-economic fabric & various contradictions ZoorAbad neighborhood, as one of the self-built settlements or even as any type of space, has been encountered with various changes. Urban spaces as a living and active entity are in the process of changing, as they grow or as people live and interact with it. These settlements, even more than formal ones, have been faced with changes, as they have been involved in grassroots activities and have been changed by residents who use the space daily. ZoorAbad, as part of the broader context of Karaj city, alongside with spatial changes, has been changed even in terms of socio-economic fabrics. According to the political context of a broader region, for example the political crisis of Afghanistan during the previous years, the socio-racial characteristics of the region affected ZoorAbad neighborhood as well. For example, this caused a growing trend of immigration of Afghan refugees to Iran and subsequently, due 211 to the informal situation of various refugees, they preferred to stay in self-built settlements or informal settlements due to the lower price of rent as well as less required documents for renting a housing unit. Apart from foreign refugees, there is a change in economic situation of residents of ZoorAbad after passing a several decades for next generations who initiated living there, also, the economic situation of the whole country and economic crisis which led to housing crisis in the whole country, also have some reflections on this neighborhood as well. In this subsection, we will review changes that occurred in the socio-economic aspects of the neighborhood. Generally speaking, academic scholars and public opinion (citizens of Karaj) attributed several characteristics to this neighborhood, including poverty concentration, dominance of rural lifestyle â that could be observed through their clothes/outfits, social interactions and reliance on each other as a community (ParsaPajouh, 2003, 161-197), illegal and informal residency tenure, and high rate of illegal activities (Maarefvand & Tofigh, 2014). Based on my own observations, there is no longer a significant difference between the residents of ZoorAbad, particularly the second and third generations, and those of Azimiyeh. The shift can be attributed to several key factors, such as capital accumulation by the first generation of urban poor who gained access to free land or low-cost land for housing. This has opened up opportunities for subsequent generations, including exposure to the dominant culture (fashion) in their vicinity, access to university education, and broader job opportunities. In recent years, due to various economic crises, the socio-economic fabric of ZoorAbad has changed. For instance, young people with limited means for investing in housing has chosen to settle in ZoorAbad because of its lower land prices. One interviewee, Zahra, a 38-year-old educated artist and painter, is an example of this group. Zahra mentioned that in "our dead-end alley with about 10 houses, one of the neighbors, a family, has an SUV with a dog. They've also renovated their building's facade." She adds, "You see a lot of SUVs in ZoorAbad. In this dead-end alley, everyone is a homeowner, and neighbors believe that tenants undermine the neighborhood's security." According to Zahra, not everyone in ZoorAbad is poor. She says, "You don't only find lower-income people in this neighborhood." This could be seen as a sign of capital accumulation by earlier generations who began living in ZoorAbad, which eliminated or significantly reduced 212 housing costs. As a result, residents were able to accumulate resources, which can now be seen in new cars or the purchase of homes in formal neighborhoods like Azimiyeh. This was the case for Khadan's father, who owned several plots in ZoorAbad. Over the last two decades, the family bought another home in Azimiyeh, a more formal neighborhood nearby. Zahra believes that ZoorAbad is undergoing significant changes in its social fabric. She attributes part of this shift to the new generation and changing beliefs, such as attitudes towards the veil (hijab), which are contributing to broader transformations. "It is as if a new generation is emerging, and today's ZoorAbad is not the same as the old one. Some of the conflicts and challenges are tied to these evolving social norms." According to her, traditional societal perceptions are fading away. However, Zahra emphasizes that ZoorAbad remains a place of stark contrasts. "In ZoorAbad, you can see both wealthy and poor people. There is a very high level of contrast and contradiction." One of the main drivers of these social changes is the educational opportunities available to the younger generation, made possible by the elimination or reduction of housing costs. His has allowed many to pursue higher education and better job opportunities, gradually influencing the neighborhood's socio-cultural characteristics over time. To sum-up, ZoorAbad has undergone significant transformations, reflecting the dynamic interplay of socio-economic, cultural, and political changes over time. As a self-built settlement, the neighborhood's evolution is shaped by the grassroots activities of its residents and broader regional dynamics, such as the influx of Afghan refugees due to political crises and economic migration driven by Iranâs housing affordability challenges. While earlier generations in ZoorAbad faced stigma and poverty, capital accumulation from access to low-cost or free land has allowed subsequent generations to achieve socio-economic mobility. This shift is evident in improved living standards, higher education levels, and cultural integration with adjacent formal neighborhoods like Azimiyeh. However, the neighborhood remains a site of contrasts, hosting both affluent and impoverished residents, reflecting its evolving yet diverse social fabric. The ongoing changes in ZoorAbad underscore its transition from a stigmatized informal settlement to a more integrated urban space, while also highlighting the resilience and adaptability of its community amidst broader societal pressures. 213 4.5.4. Housing Challenges in ZoorAbad through the lens of use-value and exchange value This section explores the housing challenges in this neighborhood from both governmental and local perspectives. These challenges are categorized into several key areas: housing accessibility, violence, the threat of demolition, construction inefficiency, informality and the absence of formal property deeds, overcrowding, housing unaffordability, racial and ethnic issues related to Afghan immigrants and refugees, and the stigmatization of the neighborhood. Most of these challenges were identified through semi-structured interviews conducted in ZoorAbad in 2022. It is essential to view homes not just as investments but as vital living spaces, emphasizing their socio-psychological significance for the residents. Therefore, the challenges discussed in this chapter go beyond the economic value of physical spaces, shedding light on the diverse and multifaceted issues faced by the residents of ZoorAbad. Several governmental documents aim to review and address the housing challenges in ZoorAbad. These challenges include the lack of access to property deeds, the slow implementation of the detailed plan, inconsistencies among key institutions (such as the municipality, and Urban & Road Office in Alborz, and other relevant bodies), and the disconnect between these institutions and local activists. Other issues include the absence of basic urban services, widespread poverty, addiction, an increasing number of refugees and foreigners (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 49-52), poor environmental hygiene; high rates of domestic violence, local resistance to refugees, and the lack of proper identification for refugees (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 60-70). Furthermore, the accumulation of waste in the narrow, stair-filled, and winding alleys of ZoorAbad, environmental pollution, difficulties in providing emergency services due to the neighborhood's narrow passageways, and the use of unfinished urban development projects as gathering places for drug addicts (Social Resiliency Report of ZoorAbad, 2019, p. 24) are additional housing challenges highlighted by the state in various reports. It is important to critically review each state document that addresses the deficiencies and housing disadvantages in ZoorAbad and compare them with firsthand accounts from local 214 residents. For example, regarding the lack of property deeds in ZoorAbad, in the Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan cites the lack of formal property deeds as a major issue in ZoorAbad, attributing it to the low land prices, despite the neighborhood's favorable location in the city of Karaj. This raises several questions: should the low land prices in ZoorAbad truly be considered a deficiency of the neighborhood? Moreover, is the focus on informal property deeds linked to speculative incentives in the area? These aspects require closer examination to understand the full context. In the following subsection, I have categorized the challenges of ZoorAbad based on the perspectives of its residents, drawn from the interviews I conducted with them. 4.5.4.1. Accessibility to the Housing (Difficulty in accessibilities: steep terrain, taxis) It is worth noting that while the challenge of accessibility to housing units in ZoorAbad negatively affects both the use-value and exchange-value of housing, its impact on the everyday lives of residents appears to be even more significant. Several interviewees, including Khadan, Mari, Mrs. Gol, and Rahman, emphasized the issue of accessibility, citing the neighborhood's difficult topography and the lack of public transportation as major obstacles. Mari, a 55-year-old woman, along with her husband and son, lived in a house in ZoorAbad for 17 years, until 2012. They originally resided in Boukan, a city in western Iran, before migrating to Karaj for her husband's work. Unable to find a suitable house, they moved into her father's second house in ZoorAbad, hoping to find a suitable house, expecting it to be a temporary arrangement while they searched for their own place. However, not only did they fail to find a house the following year, but even after 17 years, they were eventually forced to vacate and relocate to another neighborhood called "Karaj-e New." Maria noted that "Karaj-e New" has a social structure similar to ZoorAbad, except for the topography. From her perspective, "one of the major problems in ZoorAbad was its steep terrain, with challenging ascents and descents in both the streets and pedestrian pathways". Regarding the state's perspective on this issue, it appears that the government has acknowledged the challenges faced in the neighborhood. According to the Transportation 215 Report of ZoorAbad by the Governorate of Alborz province, the organic street network patterns have resulted in narrow, winding, and congested alleys that complicate access. With a total of 858 alleys spanning 52 kilometers, the majority exhibit low permeability. Among the five primary alleys in the neighborhood, four are located along ZoorAbad's borders, facilitating connections with neighboring areas. However, only Shariati Street runs entirely within ZoorAbad, stretching approximately three kilometers and traversing the neighborhood's full expanse (Transportation Report of ZoorAbad, 2018, pp. 11-26). Another interviewee, Mrs. Gol, an Afghan refugee who recently migrated to ZoorAbad last year, identified this issue as a major challenge in the neighborhood. She stated, âthe house has dampness, and the terrain is quite steep, which makes it difficult to go out and return homeâ. In the Transportation Report, the governorate noted that despite these challenges, ZoorAbad's alleys are relatively well-distributed. However, due to their limited width and steep gradients, pedestrian accessibility remains a significant concern. None of the roads are equipped with sidewalks (Transportation Report of ZoorAbad, 2018, pp. 26-50). Mari and I climbed steep steps, numbering approximately 70 to 100, with small steps in between. Mari noted that "all taxis pass only through the main street in ZoorAbad, and they have to navigate these steps and steep slopes to reach our home". The lack of public transportation has also been acknowledged in the Transportation Report by the Governorate of Alborz province (Transportation Report of ZoorAbad, 2018, pp. 50-78). The Transportation Report also highlights the narrow width of the alleys in ZoorAbad as a significant factor contributing to the lack of accessibility in the neighborhood. Over half of the alleys measure less than 6 meters in width, and more than 70% are narrower than 8 meters. The incline of the alleys varies throughout the neighborhood, with the steepest gradients reaching approximately 16% to 30% on the eastern side (Transportation Report of ZoorAbad, 2018, pp. 26-51). The Transportation Report also addresses the obstacles hindering pedestrian pathways in ZoorAbad, such as traffic light poles, building columns, and protruding structures that obstruct movement (Transportation Report of ZoorAbad, 2018, pp. 50-78). One interviewee, Pari, mentioned that the narrow alleys have led to frequent conflicts among residents who 216 want to park their cars in the streets and alleys. This has become a daily source of tension due to the lack of adequate parking space. 4.5.4.2. Violence (verbal and physical) Violence is another challenge in the ZoorAbad neighborhood that negatively impacts the quality of life for its residents. It is often a byproduct of various factors, such as the compactness of space, economic pressure, and other social stressors. Many interviewees, particularly women, emphasized how this issue severely affects the use-value of housing for the residents. Mari highlighted the prevalence of verbal and physical violence among the residents. According to her, conflicts and altercations are common in the neighborhood. She also noted that verbal abuse has seemingly become ingrained in the local culture, with frequent use of words carrying sexual connotations. In her view, this creates a particularly challenging environment for raising children. Pari, one of the interviewees, mentioned that she could not recall a single night without a fight breaking out in the alley over parking spaces. "Due to the narrowness of the alleys, accessible parking was scarce, leading to frequent incidents of personal violence among the residents." This challenge has also been acknowledged in governmental reports. According to the Social Report of ZoorAbad, the destruction of public property, harassment of women and girls, and conflicts among neighbors â particularly over parking due to space constraints â are cited as common forms of violence in this self-built settlement (Social Report of ZoorAbad, 2019, p. 17). 4.5.4.3. The Risk of Demolition (and insecurity due to demolition) One of the main housing challenges for the residents of ZoorAbad over the past three decades has been the constant threat of demolition, which has imposed significant mental and economic pressure. This challenge stems from the prioritization of exchange-value over use-value, severely impacting the quality of life and diminishing the use-value of housing for 217 current residents. For instance, the house Mari and her family lived in belonged to her father, a two-story building with ownership documented through an informal agreement. They rented out the lower floor, but Mari explained that her father eventually decided to sell the house for two key reasons. First, the rental income in the area was very low, and many tenants struggled to afford even that, making it more trouble than it was worth. Second, the constant threat posed by the ZoorAbad Improvement plan kept them in a state of uncertainty, always fearing their house could be demolished and their investment lost. This led her father to sell the house after 17 years. Among the interviewees, Na'na, her mother, and her friend also mentioned that the risk of demolition created a strong sense of insecurity. Following the launch of the ZoorAbad Improvement Plan, many residents sold their properties to the municipality, driven by uncertainty about the future of their homes. Interestingly, the most recent reports from the Alborz Province governorate make no mention of demolition risks as a challenge in the neighborhood. This suggests a tendency by the state to avoid acknowledging how their plans may contribute to difficulties or disruptions in the area. Only in the Participatory Problem-Solving Report of ZoorAbad (2021, p. 11) by the Alborz Province governorate is there mention of the "neglect of properties within the ZoorAbad Improvement Plan", emphasizing the need to expedite the demolition of buildings that remain standing. Interestingly, this report, too, fails to acknowledge the risk of demolition or its potential impacts on the residents of ZoorAbad. 4.5.4.4. Inefficiency in Construction Since the majority of housing in ZoorAbad is self-built, one of the primary challenges facing these structures is inefficient construction. The urban poor have constructed their homes with very limited resources and skills, often needing to erect a shelter overnight to protect it from government demolition as an informal settlement. Consequently, the housing in this neighborhood suffers from substandard construction. This challenge significantly affects the use-value of the homes, as the exchange-value primarily depends on the size of the land plot 218 rather than the quality of the buildings themselves, particularly for these self-built housing units. One of the interviewees, Rahman, a 60-year-old man, emphasized this issue. Around 1979-1980, Rahman's father purchased a piece of land in ZoorAbad measuring approximately 40-50 square meters for about 10 million Iranian Rials (Toman). His father originally owned land in Gilan but fled to ZoorAbad in Karaj after suffering losses from betting. At that time, Rahman's uncle was already living in ZoorAbad and temporarily housed them before they settled in the area. When they arrived, there was not even a title deed for properties in ZoorAbad. Rahman continued: "Due to its favorable location, more immigrants began moving to this area. When ZoorAbad was first established, there was no electricity, and the residents had never experienced it before. Everyone built their own homes, but for daily tasks and repairs, they relied on local builders. These builders lacked formal training and experience; for example, they often did not know that plumbing should be installed before pouring cement for floors. Most of the buildings were constructed by skilled Turkish workers." Another interviewee was an Afghan woman, approximately 25 to 30 years old, who mentioned that they had been in Iran for a year. They rented a house in Malard last year but had been living in ZoorAbad for the past 20 days. Their current rental home is 110 square meters and includes a bedroom, a hall, a bathroom, and a kitchen. When we asked if she was satisfied with the house, she smiled and replied that she was satisfied, despite some issues like cracked plaster and broken tiles. The landlord doesn't spend money on repairs, but she was grateful nonetheless. The family consists of five members, and her husband works as a janitor in Azimiyeh, Karaj. He only comes home about once a week. Her husband's employer rented this place for them from a company, providing a full deposit of 100 million Tomans, while her husband's salary is 5 million Tomans. She expressed concern about living on top of a hill in ZoorAbad due to the difficulties in accessing their home, but they moved here because it was further from her husband in Malard. She appered to have a Tajik background. Another interviewee was a 32-year-old woman, named Ziba, who lived in ZoorAbad. She and her family held an engagement ceremony for one of her younger sister in the house and invited us into their home. The house has three stories: Two Afghan families occupy the first 219 two floors, while an Iranian man lives on the third floor. They have been in Iran for a year. She was born in Shiraz, Iran, where she obtained her diplomas, and in Afghanistan, she earned a teaching degree and taught for several years. Ziba shared that her salary in Afghanistan was decent, equivalent to 7 million Tomans in Iranian currency. When asked about their house in Afghanistan, she described that "most houses there as having courtyards and being villa-style, with apartment-style buildings being less common. The tallest buildings in Afghanistan have around six stories". She noted "our house in Afghanistan was a villa with a courtyard and a garden, and it had a balcony. In Afghanistan, we didn't have gas or water pipelines. Most houses are quite large, and most people own their homes because properties are often inherited from their fathers, who continue to live there". Ziba expressed dissatisfaction with the thin walls of their current home. She explained that wedding ceremonies in Afghanistan last up to a week, which often leads to complaints from neighbors about the noise. She also mentioned that the ceilings in ZoorAbad are very low and that the paths are steep, making it difficult to navigate. Additionally, the houses are closely packed together, resulting in a lack of privacy. Another challenge they face in their ZoorAbad home is that the bathroom is located inside the bedroom and is poorly insulated, causing leaks and crumbling plaster. Ziba mentioned that when they walk, the house trembles and makes a lot of noise. She complained about the lack of ventilation and windows, noting that although there is a small window in front of the house, it doesn't provide proper airflow. The family of 12 occupies the two floors, with six people on each floor, each covering anarea of about 50 square meters. They paid a full deposit of 40 million Tomans for the upper floor and 400,000 Tomans in monthly rent, while they paid 30 million Tomans for the lower floor and 350,000 Tomans monthly. Ziba works as a tailor in Karaj and is also a spinner. She had been teaching in Afghanistan for 16 years. When asked how they found their current house, she explained that they have relatives in ZoorAbad who introduced them to the area. However, their rental contract will expire in two months, and they will need to renew it. Ziba stated that they would definitely leave ZoorAbad and this house next year because they are not satisfied at all. 220 4.5.4.5. Issue of Informality & deeds (lack of sufficient incentives for getting deeds) The challenge of informality and property deeds is one of the major issues that primarily impacts the process of exchanging properties. While residents spoke about the stigmatization that comes with informality, they did not express significant concerns about the lack of deeds or the informal nature of their housing during my interviews. In other words, the issue of informality and deeds appears to mainly affect the exchange-value of the housing, and it seems to be more of a concern for the government, which may have objectives beyond simply improving the living conditions of people in this neighborhood. In 1979, the Revolutionary Council decided to allocate land on Moradab Hill (ZoorAbad), owned by the Karaj municipality, to the builders of houses on those lands. Prior to this, because the land was government-owned, house builders on the hill owned only the structures they had built, not the land itself. However, under this new law, residents were given the opportunity to acquire ownership of the land in exchange for receiving official ownership documents. According to audit statistics from the Karaj municipality, by 1987, only 3.3% of residential units had begun the process of obtaining these official documents. However, this decision facilitated the provision of services to the Moradab Hill area, allowing for the establishment of legal utility connections such as water and electricity, which had previously been obtained illegally before the revolution (Qasemi, 2010, 74). The issue of informality and property deeds remains a challenge in ZoorAbad. Rahman explained: âSome houses in ZoorAbad have title deeds, and since 2011, a few more have acquired them. However, the price difference between properties with title deeds and those with informal written contracts is minimal â about 2 million Toman. For example, in Mohammadshahr, a house with a written contract costs 8 million Toman, while one with a title deed costs 10 to 11 million Toman. In ZoorAbad, it is similar; a house with a written contract might cost around 9 million Toman. The authorities didn't issue title deeds for houses smaller than 100 square meters in ZoorAbad, and the government (municipality) encouraged property owners to merge their plots. In such cases, an external builder would approach neighbors who owned four plots, and if they build new houses, a title deed would be issued to the property.â 221 Hossein, a real estate agent in ZoorAbad for over 16 years, emphasized this issue. He pointed out that there is little price difference between properties with formal deeds and those with informal documents in ZoorAbad. As a result, there is not a strong incentive for landowners to invest in obtaining a formal deed. Additionally, in Report on Participatory Problem Solving in ZoorAbad (2021, p. 10) prepared by the governorate of Alborz province, the lack of access to formal deeds was ranked as the 11th of the 15 issues raised by "local people". This evidence suggests that while informality does not significantly affect the use-value of housing in ZoorAbad, it impacts the exchange-value of properties, particularly in the long-term and for large-scale projects the government intends to implement. 4.5.4.6. Crowd and lack of space in housing Due to the high number of households in ZoorAbad, many families face overcrowding and a lack of space in their homes, significantly affecting the use-value of housing in these self-built settlements. Rahman, for example, mentioned that his father's family, consisting of seven members (the oldest son, 20, Rahman, 15, a 17-year-old sister, two younger siblings, and their parents), lived in a 40-50 square meter house, after migrating from a village in Rasht, northern Iran. The house had a living room and a water storage area. Rahman's wife continued: âAfter I got married, from 1986 to 1991, we lived in my father-in-law's house â a 40-50 square meter room. Besides my husband and I, my father-in-law, mother-in-law, two sisters-in-law, and two brothers-in-law also lived there." After moving out they rented for a year, spending six months in each of two different houses. In 1994, they bought their own 75 square meter home for 1,200,000 Toman. The house had one room on the ground floor and another upstairs but lacked a kitchen. Instead, it had a shop and a restroom. The shop's ceiling and the staircase were made of wood, and the ceiling also served as the yard. In the 2000s, they demolished the shop's ceiling and used funds from a company to reconstruct it. By 2004, they had expanded the shop to about 8 square meters. The children lived on the ground floor while the parents stayed upstairs. In late 2011, they sold their house in ZoorAbad for 55 million Toman to another resident of ZoorAbad. In 2012, they purchased a new home in Park-e Chamran. 222 Two Afghan Tajik women, both around 25 to 35 years old, were also among the interviewees. They had been living in ZoorAbad for two years, having fled Afghanistan. It appears that one of their stepfathers had been working for years in a large kiosk, possibly a car showroom, in the nearby Azimiyeh neighborhood. Their house in ZoorAbad was 80 square meters and consisted of two floors. The upper floor had two bedrooms and a living room, while the lower floor had one bedroom and a living room. The kitchen and bathroom were inside the house, but the toilet was located outside in the courtyard. A total of 12 people lived in this 80-square-meter house, divided into two families â 8 people upstairs and 4 downstairs. In their first year, they paid 80 million tomans as a deposit with a 200,000-toman monthly rent. By the second year, the deposit increased to 120 million Tomans, with the same 200,000-toman rent. This year, the landlord demanded 100 million Toman as deposit on top of the 200,000-toman rent, bringing the total deposit to 220 million tomans. They mentioned that life in Afghanistan was somewhat similar to life here, although slightly better in ZoorAbad. The only significant difference was the lack of gas in Afghanistan, but otherwise, they had all other amenities there. Another interviewee, Na'na, a 33-year-old woman, was born and raised in ZoorAbad. Her parents were tenants until about 10 years ago, when they were finally able to buy a house. Na'na, however, along with her husband and their four children, are still tenants, living as a family of six in a rented home. They have rented since they got married, which was about 16 years ago. She mentioned that their first rented house required a deposit of 500,000-tomans, with a monthly rent of 40,000-tomans. Currently, they are renting their house with a 10 million toman deposit and a monthly 2.5 million tomans. The house has two rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom, and a toilet. She noted that when she was a child, the water pressure was stronger, but it has weakened over the years. She also complained about the lack of gas and the ongoing issue of ants and cockroaches in their homes. Her mother joined us while cleaning vegetables, dressed elegantly and carrying herself with grace. Na'na mentioned that her parents moved to ZoorAbad in 1989, the same year she was born. Before that, they lived in a village in Ardabil. Their husbands worked in Tehran and 223 Karaj, and for about eight months of the year, the woman stayed in Karaj to be closer to them, only returning to the village for two months when their husbands came home. Na'na's mother expressed frustration, saying her daughter's house felt like a pigeonhole. Na'na's husband, who was standing nearby, motioned for her not to say that, as it might upset him. Na'na then explained that they were forced to live there, and her mother agreed, saying they had no other choice. Despite this, her mother added that she loved living in the area and would stay in her house if she had the means. However, Na'na disagreed, saying she would leave if possible, especially for the sake of her 16-year-old daughter, as one must do whatever they can for their children. Another interviewee, an Afghan Pashto woman named Mrs. Gole, shared her experience. She, her husband, and their two children, were renting a 24-square-meter space consisting of a single room, bathroom, and kitchen.) They paid a 10-million-toman deposit and a monthly rent of 1.5 million tomans. When asked to compare their home in Afghanistan to their current one, Mrs. Gole said they had rented a 140-square-meter house with two bedrooms in Herat. Despite the high rent in ZoorAbad, s she felt it was better than Afghanistan, as long as they can find job. To sum up, the lack of space in ZoorAbad significantly affects the use-value of housing for residents, especially given the limited amenities available. 4.5.4.7. High rate of rent (unaffordability of housing in ZoorAbad) Another significant issue in ZoorAbad, is the high rate of rent, even within this self-built neighborhood. This problem, which greatly impacts on the use-value of housing, has emerged and exacerbated due to the macroeconomic and political context of the country, which prioritize exchange-value over use-value. Within this self-built neighborhood, the situation is not equal for everyone, as previously discussed. Tenants are adversely affected by the high rent compared to landowners. Numerous interviewees emphasized this issue as a major challenge affecting their daily lives. One of the interviewees, Mr. Amir, the owner of a real estate agency, discussed the impact of the housing crisis and rental rates on the social and demographic changes in the 224 neighborhood. At 37 years old, Amir is a native of ZoorAbad and has been assisting his father in this business since he was 14. He has worked as a real estate consultant in ZoorAbad for 22 years and is considered one of the most trusted professionals in the area, with many residents turning to him for assistance. When I asked about the social changes among tenants and landlords in ZoorAbad, particularly regarding education levels and other factors, Amir hesitated briefly before responding: "Most of the children from families have left ZoorAbad, while their parents remain. We've also had tenants from Tehran and Azimiyeh. Some have even come from Baghestan Karaj to rent houses here. Additionally, some who once owned homes here but decided to rent in other parts of Karaj, like Baghestan, due to rising rental prices, have returned to ZoorAbad. Even those without homes in ZoorAbad are coming here to rent because of increased rental prices in areas like Baghestan Karaj". Amir discusses the rental price differences across various areas of ZoorAbad, noting that Zone 1 is the most expensive. He highlights that houses near the hospital tend to have higher rental rates. For instance, renting a 40-square-meter room with a kitchen cost 20 million Toman in advance and one million Toman per month. Similarly, the rent for a 70-square-meter house is 50 million Toman upfront, with a monthly rent of 1.5 million Toman. Amir emphasizes that there is no price difference between houses with legal documents and those with informal contracts in ZoorAbad, estimating that only about 5% of the houses poses legal documents. He points out that one of the challenges facing ZoorAbad's is the lack of apartment construction. However, newly built houses in the area can reach up to 14 million Toman per square meter. According to Amir, Afghan tenants have been present in ZoorAbad since the early days of the revolution, but their numbers have notably increased in the past 3-4 years, approximately from 1997 to 2022. Another interviewee was an Afghan male tenant who recently moved to the neighborhood. The man around 50 years old and of Tajik descent, was originally from northern Afghanistan but had lived in Kabul for many years. Notably, in terms of appearance, he had fair, wheat-colored skin and blue eyes, resembling Azerbaijani Iranians more than others. He mentioned that in Iran, people often mistake him for a Turk, and that he does not reveal that he is Afghan. Throughout our conversation, he expressed fear and concern multiple times, asking 225 whether these discussions could lead to trouble for him, emphasizing that they were illegal refugees. Regarding his housing situation, he said: "A few years ago, about 13 years back, I lived in Iran when I was single. I worked in Seyedkhandan-Tehran, doing construction work and serving as a guard in Ahmadabad Mostofi - Islamshahr. At that time, when I came to ZoorAbad, another compatriot and I rented a room together, which included a kitchen and toilet. We did not have a bathroom, as ZoorAbad homes relied on public baths. We paid 10,000 Tomans as a security deposit and 800 Toman in monthly rent for the room. This was a few years ago. Now, it has been 20 days since we arrived here from Kabul with my family. I have five children, so we are a family of seven. I am Tajik and Sunni. Currently, the house we have rented has the following specifications: one room, a hall, a reception area, a bathroom, a toilet, and a kitchen. The rental price is 100 million Tomans as a full security deposit, with no additional monthly rent." Another Afghan woman, aged 30 to 35, visited the real estate agency and seemed to be making daily inquiries about newly available houses. She said: "It has been three years since I came to Iran, and almost from the beginning, we have settled in ZoorAbad. My husband and I have five children, so we are a family of seven. My husband recently fell ill and can no longer work, which is why we are looking for a house that does not require rent. I cannot find a house that requires a full security deposit of 100 million Tomans because I only have 60 million Toman, and I will need to borrow the remaining 40 million Tomans. However, I cannot afford to pay any monthly rent because I am struggling to provide dry bread for my children." According to another real estate agent in ZoorAbad, Amoo Bengahi, âland prices in ZoorAbad fluctuate between 5 million to 18 million tomans per square meter. The rent for a room starts at a 10 million toman deposit and a monthly rent of 1 million tomans, while for a house, the deposit is typically around 200-300 million tomans.â Another interviewee was an Afghan refugee woman living in a two-story house. She shares that she and her family moved directly from Afghanistan to ZoorAbad two years ago and have been in their current home in 10 months. This house has one bedroom, a living room, a 226 bathroom, and a kitchen. She explained that their primary reason for migrating was the safety of their children, as children are often killed in the war in Afghanistan. In contrast, here in Iran, they can go to school and receive an education. The house consists of two stories, with one Afghan family living on each floor. The upper floor contains two rooms of about 6 square meters each and a kitchen and living room of approximately 30 square meters. Six people reside on the upper floor, while three live on the lower floor. They pay a rent of 40 million Tomans for the upper floor, which includes utilities. She expressed a desire to stay here in their current home this year as they will need to renew the contract in two months. She explained that it is better to remain where they are because every time they move, they incur damages that can range from 2 to 5 million Tomans. For instance, she mentioned that they repaired the broken staircase themselves to prevent their children from falling. She also noted that her young son is blind, around 4 years old, with only 10% vision. They have been unable to afford a visit to the hospital for him in the past few months due to financial constraints. Additionally, she mentioned that her husband works for someone else in a grocery store in Karaj's square. The housing crisis and high rental rates significantly impact the use-value of housing and the daily lives of residents. I asked Na'na, another interviewee, if they had any plans for their home next year. She replied, "What plans? How can you make plans in this country with these prices? I only know one thing: keeping my children's stomachs full. When a 5-kilogram bottle of oil costs 800,000 tomans, and I must focus on how to keep my children from going hungry, how can I think about our house? I just try to do whatever the landlord says to ensure we can stay here." Na'na also mentioned that this year, due to the high cost of living, no one can afford to move, and all the tenants are staying put out of fear that they might have to pay even higher rents. 4.5.4.8. Racial and ethnical issues against Afghan immigrants and refugees One of the challenges in ZoorAbad regarding access to housing is the racial discrimination faced by Afghan immigrants and refugees. This issue significantly affects the use-value of housing in the neighborhood. The Hazara ethnic group in Afghanistan, characterized by distinct facial features, has experienced various forms of racial and ethnic discriminations. 227 During the interview, Amir, a real estate agent in ZoorAbad, stated: âAfghans are mostly looking for villa-style houses because their families are large, with many having more than 5 or 7 children. They often rent the older houses that Iranians are unwilling to live in, which have not been renovated for 30-40 years". Amir also noted that "some landlords refuse to rent to Afghans once they learn of their nationality. Additionally, they do not rent to singles in ZoorAbad; only Afghan families can rent". He discussed the restrictions on buying and renting by Afghans, explaining that while an Afghan with a passport can register a lease through the formal legal process, they still cannot purchase a house. For undocumented refugees, lease agreements are written manually." When asked about their distribution, Amir said that Afghans are scattered throughout ZoorAbad. I asked Na'na, one of the interviewees, about the Afghan community in ZoorAbad. She noted that in the last 4-5 years, particularly in the past year, the number of Afghans in ZoorAbad has increased significantly. According to her, Afghans are willing to pay higher rents than Iranians because they are open to taking any job and are often fit many people into a single house. She explained that Afghans typically start by renting a house for 2-3 people, but within a couple of months, the number can expand to 15-16, as if they are bringing their entire families. For instance, she mentioned that her husband's sister rented a house to Afghans, initially hosting only a few, but later their number grew to 15-16. Na'na remarked that "Iranians often can't afford these rents, but Afghans can." When I asked if we could visit one of her relatives who has Afghan tenants, she declined, stating that "ZoorAbad is full of Afghans, and in the evenings, you can see a man and a woman walking with a couple of kids trailing behind them. You can tell they're Afghans". This kind of negative perception toward Afghan refugees indicates tensions and power dynamics not only between Iranian landlords and Afghans in ZoorAbad but also between Iranian tenants and Afghan tenants. Due to various systemic socio-economic discriminations, Afghan refugees have become one of the most vulnerable groups in this self-built neighborhood and in Iran as a whole. Amoo Bongahi, another interviewee who works as a real estate agent in ZoorAbad, stated, "Until two years ago, there were about 10-20 Afghan families living in ZoorAbad, but now there are more than 150 Afghan families in this area. Land prices and rents have risen because of the influx of Afghans". Blaming vulnerable groups, particularly refugees and 228 immigrants, is a prevalent phenomenon worldwide, driven by various factors, including racism. Amoo Bongahi also explained that "if the head of an Iranian family is a woman, she puts the lease contract in her name. However, people should not sell or rent their houses to Afghans. If such an event occurs, the government should intervene." Others present in the real estate agency echoed his sentiments, expressing their reluctance to rent to Afghans. They justified their stance by saying, "Firstly, four Afghan people may initially rent a place, but then it becomes 24, and they are unclean. Secondly, there are around 25 million Afghans living in Iran, and they are consuming the rights of Iranians." Regarding the types of houses Afghans tend to rent, he noted that they mostly look for villa-style homes, accommodating as many as 10 people." He also commented, "The story of Afghans and Iranians in ZoorAbad (or Iran) is similar to the story of Palestine and Israel! They (Afghans) are gradually coming, working here, renting houses, and they are willing to pay a higher rent that will eventually force us out of here!" These statements highlight how racism and ethnic prejudice negatively impact the use-value of housing for foreign refugees in this self-built settlement. From the perspective of one Afghan interviewees, Mrs. Gole, the situation is not as dire. As a 30-year-old Afghan Pashto Woman, she shared that her family has been in ZoorAbad for four months after moving from Afghanistan. Her husband previously worked in Karaj, where he became familiar with ZoorAbad, prompting the family to relocate here. When I asked if it was easy for them to rent their current place, and whether the government restrictions on Afghans regarding renting, buying, and selling property posed any challenges, Mrs. Gol laughed and said, "Those issues were prevalent a few years ago, not now, when Afghans have taken over everywhere". She noted that the number of Afghans has increased significantly, which she believes has alleviated many of the previous problems. However, she also mentioned âI haven't ventured outside much to see the issues myself, but I haven't faced any problems with the Iraniansâ. Another point I discovered during the interviews was that racism exists even within different ethnic communities in Afghanistan. Among the various ethnic groups, there is racial discrimination based on facial differences. I asked two Afghan Pashtun women if they knew any Hazaras in ZoorAbad. They exchanged meaningful glances and chuckled, with one of them responding, "You mean the 'narrow-eyed' people? No, we don't know them." When I 229 asked if they identified as Pashtun, one replied, "No, we are Persian," and then added, "We are Tajik." It seems Afghan Pashtuns, due to their facial similarities to Iranian people, also seek to distance themselves from the Hazaras. Furthermore, racism poses another challenge that threatens the use-value of housing in ZoorAbad for vulnerable groups and immigrants. However, these threats vary across different groups. For example, for Hazaras, due to their distinct facial appearance, have faced greater discrimination when renting housing. Many Iranian landlords are reluctant to rent to families or individuals whose appearance identifies them as "others". As a result, their opportunities to secure decent housing are significantly reduced, directly impacting the use-value of housing for them. Furthermore, after renting, Afghan residents, particularly Hazaras, often face stigmatization due to racism. The reluctance of Iranians â both tenants and landlords â to build connections and relationships with them further diminishes the use-value of housing in their experience. 4.5.4.9. Stigmatized Neighborhood Stigmatization is another housing challenge in ZoorAbad that significantly impacts the residents' quality of life, or in other words, the use-value of housing in this neighborhood. It is important to note that this stigmatization also influences land prices in the short and medium term. However, in the long-term, some gentrification and renovation projects could potentially address this issue for the exchange-value of housing. The ZoorAbad neighborhood in Karaj, and in Iran more broadly, has a reputation for drug-related activities and violence, largely stemming from its low-income status. Throughout the various interviews I conducted, I encountered numerous comments reflecting the implications of this stigmatization. In a conversation with Amoo Bongahi, a real estate agent in ZoorAbad, he noted that "people mostly prefer to rent their houses to family members." He also remarked "No one from Baghestan comes to ZoorAbad to buy or rent a house because, after all, this is ZoorAbad!" This statement contradicts what Mr. Amir mentioned earlier, indicating that due to the housing crisis in the country, some individuals from formal neighborhoods have had to make the limited choice to move to ZoorAbad. Nevertheless, Amoo Bongahi's point underscores a significant concern: he wanted to highlight that, due to the stigmatization of this 230 neighborhood, residents from other parts of the city often avoid moving here because of its negative reputation. Maryam, a 36-year-old woman, explains that during the time of the âImprovement Plan,â her family sold three of the five housing units they owned in ZoorAbad to purchase a single property in Azimiyeh, the nearby affluent neighbourhood. While her father still works in ZoorAbad, her parents bought the unit in Azimiyeh to help their children escape the stigmatization associated with living in ZoorAbad. Moving to a less stigmatised, formal area remains the goal of many residents, with second and third generations of ZoorAbad settlers often leaving the neighbourhood. Both Maryam, and Basir, a 30-year-old man, shared how their stigmatized addresses in ZoorAbad have led to lost social and job opportunities, prompting them to plan their departure from the neighborhood. Similarly, Na'na wishes to relocate to provide her children with better opportunities. In many cases, residents have been able to realize their goals by benefiting from the financial capital accumulated by the first generation of squatter families, who saved money by avoiding the costs of renting or buying housing. As a result, the movement of the second and third generations of squatter and landlord households in ZoorAbad toward more âformalâ neighbourhoods has contributed to a recent outflow of young people, who are leveraging the inherited capital of previous generations to achieve social upward mobility. Another interesting point that came to my mind is the significance of stigmatization for Iranian residents of ZoorAbad, particularly for younger generations whose lives are more directly affected by this challenge. I did not hear any mention of stigmatization from the Afghan interviewees, which may be because they face numerous other challenges, such as racism and the struggle for acceptance within Iranian society. This could explain why they did not bring up this issue during their interviews. To sum up, the housing challenges faced by the residents of ZoorAbad are multifaceted, shaped by socio-economic, racial, and infrastructural factors. Stigmatization and racism are significant issues, particularly for younger Iranian residents, who often experience discrimination due to the neighborhood's negative reputation. Afghan residents, however, face compounded challenges, including racial prejudice and the struggle for acceptance in broader Iranian society. Difficulty in accessibility is another challenge, with ZoorAbad's 231 location in a marginal area, often far from key services and amenities. High rent prices, exacerbated by the limited availability of formal housing, further strain residents' ability to secure stable accommodation. Additionally, while some residents can move to more formal neighborhoods, leveraging capital accumulated through self-built housing, the affordability of such options remains a significant barrier. These challenges, combined with ongoing pressures from the state's gentrification efforts, highlight the complex dynamics between use-value and exchange-value in ZoorAbad's housing market. 4.6. Concluding Notes In this section, we had the opportunity to categorize the various challenges faced by ZoorAbad as a self-built settlement and discuss how each challenge influences the use-value and exchange value of housing. Additionally, when addressing these challenges, it is important to highlight the diverse groups within this neighborhood, each possessing varying levels of power and capacity to engage with these issues. Furthermore, we must acknowledge the power dynamics that exist both within the neighborhood and among the different groups of people living in ZoorAbad. For example, the ZoorAbad settlers were affected differently by the âImprovement Planâ because various groups of landlords and tenants possess differing levels of bargaining power and financial resources. Additionally, the desires among residents varied based on factors such as age and life stage. Landowners with multiple housing units had a greater capacity to reject the municipalityâs purchase offer or negotiate with the government. For instance, Vatan, a 70-year-old woman who owns a shopping store and a four-story building in ZoorAbad, refused the municipalityâs offer to buy her properties. Instead, she chose to remain in the neighbourhood to maintain her social connections. Meanwhile, other landowners in ZoorAbad sold some properties to purchase housing in a formal neighbourhood, which they viewed as a form of social mobility for their families. Moreover, tenants were also impacted differently by the Improvement Plan, with significant distinctions between Afghans and Iranian tenants regarding how they were affected by this national initiative. 232 Regarding the housing challenges in the ZoorAbad self-built settlement, the primary issues revolve around the use-value of housing, which significantly impacts the everyday lives of residents from various socio-economic and racial groups, each facing different levels of difficulty. While these challenges may also affect the exchange-value of housing in the neighborhood â such as issues related to violence, stigmatization, and inadequate constructions â it is essential to consider whether we prioritize the use-value or exchange-value of these challenges when formulating solutions. The results and recommendations differ greatly based on this focus. For example, if we prioritize the exchange-value of housing, one potential strategy to address violence in ZoorAbad, might involve gentrification, replacing the 'violent' urban poor with peace-minded 'upper-middle class' individuals. Conversely, if the use-value of housing is prioritized, responses would focus on education, mental health services, and the creation of more 'public' spaces for entertainment and sports. Ultimately, it is crucial to consider the following question before addressing housing challenges in any neighborhood: What takes precedence â the use-value of housing or its exchange-value? In conclusion, this chapter has explored the complex dynamics between the use-value and exchange-value of housing, particularly in the context of Iranâs neoliberal policies and the ZoorAbad neighborhood. Through a political economy lens, we examined how modern states, including Iran, regulate and deregulate housing markets to serve the interests of elites, often prioritizing the exchange value of housing at the expense of its use-value, especially for low-income communities. We analyzed the consequences of these policies, such as gentrification, alienation, and housing unaffordability, and highlighted how neoliberalism has influenced the socio-economic landscape of Iran. The case of ZoorAbad exemplifies how grassroots efforts by the urban poor, through the construction of self-built settlements, have successfully prioritized the use-value of housing. However, approximately three decades ago, the Islamic government launched an "Improvement Plan" aimed at pacifying and gentrifying ZoorAbad. The underlying logic of this plan was driven by land speculation and a clear prioritization of the exchange value of housing over its use-value. The perception of residents in ZoorAbad toward their self-built housing has also shifted over time. Initially, they seized public land to create shelter, prioritizing the use-value of housing. However, after a few decades, as land prices soared, they began to prioritize the exchange-value of housing in their 233 everyday activities. This shift reflects the influence of the broader, state-promoted approach to land, which increasingly emphasizes its speculative and economic value over its fundamental use as a place to live. Ultimately, this chapter underscores the importance of understanding housing not merely as an economic asset but as a vital social and psychological resource. The challenges faced by ZoorAbadâs residents reflect the broader struggles of marginalized communities living in self-built settlements. By shifting the focus from the commodification of housing to its use-value, this chapter calls for more equitable urban policies that prioritize human needs and social cohesion over profit. The future of housing policy, both in Iran and globally, must balance these competing interests to ensure that housing serves as a foundation for thriving, inclusive communities rather than merely a tool for capital accumulation. Regarding the recommendation for the future of housing policy, one possible contribution could be creating policies to prevent the privatization of public land used by the urban poor, ensuring it remains public/common land. The policy could also recognize these self-built settlements as an alternative to social housing. This would create a dual approach: both recognizing self-built settlements as an alternative to social housing, and preserving public land from privatization. Under this recommended policy, governments would not demolish these self-built settlements but would instead view them as an alternative to social housing. At the same time, public land used by the urban poor would not be converted into private property. While the urban poor can continue to use these spaces, if they are no longer willing to live in these buildings, the land could be transferred to other vulnerable households. Through this approach, I aim to highlight that governments have numerous potential tools and strategies for effectively addressing housing for the urban poor and improving self-built settlements, provided they prioritize the use-value of housing over its exchange value. 234 5. "Squatter" Government 5.1. Introduction In previous chapters, we examined how the modern government in Iran has faced challenges in the process of urban modernization. This process aimed to increase the illegibility and legality of properties and real estate on the one hand, while simultaneously grappling with the effects of industrialization, massive migration to urban areas, and a rapidly growing urban population. These dynamics made housing a critical issue. Numerous rural migrants were unable to access adequate housing, and in the absence of sufficient social services provided by the government, they were compelled to construct their own shelters. These temporary shelters, referred to as informal housing, are described here as self-built settlements. On the other hand, with the expansion and development of legal frameworks, areas on the outskirts of cities or those outside city jurisdictions came to be classified as illegal. Thus, while the modern government was expected to increase the formality within cities, in certain cases, such as in Iran, it has paradoxically contributed to the expansion of informality and the growth of informal settlements. Additionally, we discussed how, in the absence of government-provided social services to protect the living conditions of vulnerable groups, self-built settlements should be considered an alternative to social housing in Iran. These settlements often utilize common spaces, similar to those typically incorporated in government housing projects. In the second chapter, I discussed the tension between the use-value and exchange-value of housing in Iran, with a focus on the impact of neoliberal policies on the ZoorAbad neighborhood. Using a political economy perspective, I analyzed how the Iranian state, like other modern states, manages housing markets to favor elite interests, often prioritizing exchange-value over use-value. This approach negatively impacts low-income communities. The chapter highlighted the resulting issuesâgentrification, alienation, and housing 235 unaffordabilityâand examined how neoliberalism has shaped Iranâs socio-economic landscape. In this final chapter, we will explore the concept of the "exploitative squatter government." This refers to a government that not only exploits common resources, including public and common lands, for the benefit of its affiliated institutions and agents â those directly involved in policy making and mega projects â but also extracts the remaining resources of low-income and vulnerable groups for profit and other purposes. These purposes may include the pacification of specific racial, ethnic, religious, or economic minorities and disadvantaged groups. Additionally, we will examine the implications of this exploitative approach, particularly the elimination of social bonds and communities. This outcome arises from the privatization of common resources by the squatter government, which ultimately erodes the foundations of communal life. To this end, we will begin with the case of ZoorAbad, discussing the government's role in the housing crisis in this neighborhood. We will review the key players in the housing market in ZoorAbad and examine how government actions have exacerbated housing challenges for the urban poor in this area. This chapter will provide a detailed analysis of various documents and plans related to ZoorAbad that were developed by the government. Next, we will explore another case in Iran, offering convincing evidence of the government's exploitative role and the intersectional discrimination imposed on various vulnerable groups. In the subsequent section, we will compare the cases of Roshankouh and ZoorAbad, emphasizing the role of state intervention and highlighting the function of the squatter government in both contexts. Finally, as the concluding notes of the thesis, we will elaborate on the concept of the squatter government, clarify its relationship with modern governments, and synthesize insights from the cases discussed. 236 5.2. Footprints of the Squatter Government in Housing Market and Urban Planning in ZoorAbad In this section, we aim to review the dominant role of the government in the housing market in Iran, through the case of ZoorAbad. To achieve this, we will first examine the key players involved in the housing market within this neighborhood, identifying why the government stands out as the major actor in ZoorAbad. Following this, we will analyze various urban plannings implemented over the time in this neighborhood, with a particular focus on the most recent updated version of the Improvement Plan. This will provide insights into the ultimate goals of the squatter government. 5.2.1. Squatter government as the key player of housing market in ZoorAbad When discussing the various agents and drivers in a specific context, such as the housing market in a neighborhood, it is evident that these factors cannot be limited to just a few. However, given the limited scope of this research and the primary objective of identifying the key players in the housing market of ZoorAbad and Iran, this section, focuses on the most significant ones. we will begin by reviewing the roles of various housing market players in Iran, with a particular emphasis on the case of ZoorAbad. After a brief overview of these players â such as the government, property owners and the private sector, the construction industry, banks, religious institutions, and Afghan refugees â we will demonstrate why the 'state' has been the dominant force in ZoorAbad's housing market. Through its powerful tools, such as urban planning, space management, financial resource control, and decision-making capabilities for manipulating common, public, and even private lands, we will examine how the intervention of state-affiliated institutions have significantly impacted the structure and characteristics of ZoorAbad. Finally, we will explore how these activities have led to the dispossession and displacement of the neighborhood's residents. The players in Iran's housing market, including in ZoorAbad, can be outlined as follows: 237 â¢ Central government: Key entities such as the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, the Housing Foundation (a subsidiary of HUD) (Sepehrdoust, 2013, p. 68), and the Urban Land Organization have played significant roles, particularly through the privatization of public land (Ehsani, 2013, p. 158) and slum pacification efforts. Glynn (2009b) characterizes governments as facilitators (Glynn, 2009b, p. 53), implementing pro-business policies, fostering non-profit organizations (NGOs), promoting partnership models of local governance, and broadening the concept of âgovernanceâ to include ânetworksâ and âpartnershipsâ (Glynn, 2009, pp. 53-54). These strategies have been applied within the Iranian context. In the case of ZoorAbad, the central government has been the dominant actor in the housing market, notably through its initiation and financing of the "Improvement Plan" across multiple phases, as well as supporting other projects in the neighborhood. o Municipality: The municipality has facilitated the privatization of public assets, such as the sale of density rights and skyline privatization, to generate financial resources (Ehsani, 2013, p. 162). In ZoorAbad, the Municipality of Karaj was tasked with implementing the Improvement Plan, which led to the demolition of 4000 housing units and the displacement of residents. The municipality's speculative approach towards ZoorAbad, framed as urban development and improvement plans, has significantly influenced the neighborhood's housing market. â¢ Owners and private sector: In 2012, the sectoral rate of return for the construction sector was around 390, compared to the sectoral rate of return for the manufacturing and mine sector which was around 40 (Farahani & Yousefi, 2021). Also, according to Farahani and Yousefi (2021) "housing has been a predominantly private sector in modern Iran, with high levels of individuals ownership, development, sale, and renting out of land and dwellings (p. 50). Additionally, "the data broken down into residential and non-residential construction indicate that the share of investment in residential construction is significantly higher. In 2017, 70% of all investment in the construction sector, in all urban areas, was in residential construction" (p. 56). This shows how the construction sector has been considered as an attractive and prosperous sector for investment. âBetween 1971 to 2000, 33% of the total 238 investment in Iran was in housing, with the private sector contributing an average of 92.5%. Over the past four decades, housing has been viewed by Iranians as a relatively safe investment compared to stocks, foreign currency, and gold coinsâ (Sepehrdoust, 2013, p. 68). As discussed in previous chapters, there is a notable power dynamic between landowners and tenants in ZoorAbad's housing market, affecting their ability to negotiate in the context of new urban development projects, such as the Improvement Plan. Landowners can exert significant control by renewing rental agreements, raising rent prices, or driving gentrification processes. Thus, property owners in ZoorAbad are key players in shaping the neighborhood's housing market. o Urban poor: The urban poor have played a critical role by squatting on public land and pressuring the municipality to legally recognize their settlements and provide urban services, which has contributed to a form of suburbanization (Ehsani, 2013, p. 158). In ZoorAbad, the housing market has been shaped by the "silent encroachment" movement, where urban poor migrants from Tehran and its vicinity have settled in the area. These individuals have constructed self-built shelters overnight to secure housing for their families in the absence of government social support. Consequently, they have had a significant influence on the housing dynamics of the neighborhood. â¢ Construction sector â Technical and Engineering Services: According to Farahani and Yousefi (2021), the share of combination of construction and real estate services sectors in GNP was around 30% (p. 52). "In accordance with the statistics of the Population and Housing Census in 2016, there are a total of 2.5 million vacant houses in Iran (or 11% of houses) and this number is rapidly growing. Generally, a large portion of housing transaction in Iran is related to investment properties" (Zarghamfard, Rezaei, Gholipour, 2024). Between 1987 and 1997, construction investments in Iran increased approximately fifteen-fold (Ehsani, 1999, p. 23). Housing and construction were viewed by Iranian citizens as a stable and profitable sectors for investment. This led private investors, consulting firms, engineers, and technocrats to play significant roles in promoting a speculative approach to housing. 239 In ZoorAbad, urban planners and engineers employed by the state and municipality have been key drivers in shaping the housing market through their interventions in the built environment. â¢ Banks: Improvement Plans for informal settlements, such as the ZoorAbad plan, received both technical and financial support from the World Bank and the Housing Municipality. The âEmpowerment of Informal Settlementsâ document emphasized the importance of providing housing, urban infrastructures and utilities for low-income residents, with government support through land allocation and microloans (Khatam, n.d.). However, financial resources intended to address urban poverty were instead diverted to the Mehr housing project, which ultimately proved ineffective (Khatam, n.d., p. 3). â¢ Religious institutions, such as Mosque Organization: These institutions have played a role similar to that of the media by aligning with the interests of the state and the Bazaar to influence and persuade the majority Moslem population (Bayat, 1997, p. 102) â¢ Afghan Refugees: The role of Afghan refugees in housing market in Iran in my opinion has twofold effects. The first one is related to their involvement as low-cost and hard-working construction workers, and the second one is related to their role as tenants and consumers. According to Farahani and Yousefi (2021) "investment in capital-intensive industries (e.g., the manufacturing sector) in Iran has become less profitable in recent decades, and the investment shifts to labor-intensive sectors (e.g. the construction and other extractive sectors) with the lower organic composition of capital. [â¦]. Such a tendency has been intensified by the systematic suppression of organized labor and the resulting low wages, especially in the construction sector, which heavily relies on significantly weakened migrant labor" (p. 56). By 1979, Iran experienced a significant influx of Afghan refugees and workers, which led to a decrease in average wages, particularly in construction sector (the average income of Iranian workers was $195, compared to $172 for Afghan workers) (Sepehrdoust, 2013, p. 70). According to a few recently published articles, the estimated population of Afghan refugees in Iran, including undocumented individuals, is approximately 8 million, with most being undocumented (Amuzadeh-Araei, Takian, Jabbari, 2025). In 240 addition to their involvement in the construction sector, which was driven by speculative activities, the migration of Afghan refugees intensified the demand for affordable housing in Iran starting in the 1980s (Bayat, 2013, pp. 159-160). In ZoorAbad, over the past two or three years, Afghan refugees have become a significant tenant population. They employ specific strategies to secure housing, such as renting dilapidated buildings that Iranian tenants typically avoid. Furthermore, Afghan refugees are often blamed by Iranian tenants for the rising rent rates in the neighborhood, a sentiment fueled by anti-immigrant discourse. While the key players and intervening institutions in the ZoorAbad neighborhood are numerous and diverse, the most influential actor has been the state. Instead of assuming a custodial role in supporting vulnerable populations through various socio-economic programs, the state has instead actively facilitated their long-term dispossession. In the following paragraphs, we will explore the role of the state and its affiliated institutions in shaping the housing market of ZoorAbad. ZoorAbad has been a focus of the national plan for informal settlements for approximately 30 years. Various state institutions, both at national and local levels, have significantly intervened in the neighborhood. These include the National Headquarters for Empowering Informal Settlements, the National Headquarters for Sustainable Regeneration of Inefficient Urban Areas, and the municipality, particularly through the Deputy Office for the Renovation of ZoorAbad's Dilapidated Fabric, established within the Urban Development Organization of Karaj Municipality. Additionally, a service office for ZoorAbad's renovation88 is overseen by the municipality (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 35). One of the key tools and drivers of state intervention is urban planning, along with its financial provision and management. A major platform through which the state has intervened in the neighborhood is the "Improvement Plan in ZoorAbad". The state's role in planning, managing, and providing financial resources for the implementation of this large-scale project has created a prosperous opportunity for the government to pursue speculative and exploitative practices, particularly in the appropriation of common and public land. This 88 Which its responsibility has been reviewing the detailed plan. 241 approach, characteristic of the "squatter government" in Iran, has had a detrimental impact on the housing crisis facing the urban poor in ZoorAbad. In the following paragraphs, we will explain how the squatter government has exploited these commons for the benefit of a few well-connected government agents. Another major tool â arguably even more influential than urban planning â is the management of financial resources allocated to urban plans and projects. These financial management platforms are among the most powerful means for squatter governments to achieve their objectives. The financial resources for the Improvement Plan were intended to come from the following sources: the national budget; the national development budget; cash and non-cash assistance from Karaj municipality and surrounding municipalities; income generated from the implementation of the plan; cash or non-cash contributions from individuals and legal entities, and income from the allocation of land, as well as commercial and residential properties in the newly created townships (Qasemi, 2010, 79). However, in practice â based on the resources available to me â the primary source of funding for this Improvement Plan came from the transfer and privatization of common lands. According to Qasemi (2010), ninety-five percent of these lands89 were sold through public auctions. Apart from the funds raised from land sales and allocations, only 3% of the total project expenses were covered by other sources, such as the Presidential Office or the budget allocated by the Supreme Leader's Office (79-80). In the case of ZoorAbad, the process of 'government-facilitated real estate corruption' by the government has been particularly striking. For funding the Improvement Plan in ZoorAbad, the Presidential Office approved the transfer of 640 hectares of land90 registered under the Urban Land Affairs Organization to the ZoorAbad Improvement Plan organization through the Ministry of Housing in 1993. All expenses related to relocating ZoorAbad's residents were meant to be covered by the allocation of these 640 hectares of land. The allocated land included 115 hectares in Sofiabad-Karaj, 249 hectares in Chenarak-Karaj, 240 hectares in Ghazalhasar-Karaj, and 36 hectares in Baghestan-Gohardasht. However, since these areas were located outside the approved municipal boundaries of Karaj, incorporating them into 89 After obtaining approvals from the Article 5 Commission and undergoing stages of road preparation, municipal division, and registration office procedures these lands were sold. 90 Equivalent to 12 billion tomans. 242 the city's designated fabric incurred substantial time and financial costs for the municipality91 (Qasemi, 2010, 79). According to Qasemi (2010), to cover additional expenses associated with the plan â such as incorporating suburban land into the city's fabric â it was agreed that 25% of the allocated 640 hectares (equivalent to 160 hectares) would be used for land preparation and the relocation of 30,000 residents living above the 1400-meter altitude mark (p. 79). However, this raises significant questions about the remaining 480 hectares of land. While the cost of relocating residents was apparently covered by the sale of 25% of the total land (160 hectares), a shift in the government's strategy from a "key-to-key" housing exchange to providing monetary compensation left the remaining 480 hectares available for speculation. Initially, the 640 hectares were intended to provide constructed housing for 30,000 displaced residents of ZoorAbad. However, following the policy change, the surplus of 480 hectares became a lucrative asset for speculation, facilitating corruption through their vague integration into the housing market. In essence, developers gained substantial advantages by accessing these subsidized zero lands, which were effectively common resources. This allowed them to exploit the situation by injecting these subsidized properties into the housing market for profit, rather than serving the intended social purpose of housing the displaced. Currently, all expenses related to purchasing houses for the residents of ZoorAbad are being financed through the proceeds from the sale of project-owned lands in Baghestan (36 hectares), and Simindasht-e Mehrshahr (Ghazalhasar: 240 hectares). It is crucial to highlight that even if the government had kept its promise to implement the key-to-key strategy, providing equivalent land and housing for the displaced population, the 640 hectares allocated â even after deducting 25% (or 160 hectares) for land preparation expenses and relocating residents â would still have far exceeded the amount of land needed. Even after the deduction, the remaining 480 hectares would be nearly three times the entire area of ZoorAbad, which covers approximately 165 hectares. 91 The lands in Baghestan and Sofiabad, and Chenarak had adverse possession issues. Adverse possession issues of the Baghestan lands were resolved in the early years, but the lands in Sofiabad and Chenarak are still under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Qasemi, 2010, 79). 243 This significant allocation of public land raises questions, as 640 hectares were transferred under the pretext of financing property purchases for the targeted demolition and relocation. Instead, the government could have offered equivalent plots of land to the displaced residents, along with financial support for constructing new homes. The way financial resources were managed in this project suggests the possibility of speculative activities that benefited individuals within government institutions. This was achieved by privatizing vast tracts of public land under the guise of the "Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad". Thus, once again, the state's role as the primary driver of change in the neighborhood has not been that of a provider or custodian, but rather that of an initiator of speculative activities, ultimately leading to spatial and financial corruption. To capture the essence of these interconnected corrupt practices carried out by the government and its affiliated institutions, I have chosen the term "squatter government". This term reflects how these interventions have exploited public resources under the guise of development, prioritizing the profits of state-affiliated agents over the well-being of the community. 5.2.2. Urban Planning as a Powerful Tool in the Hands of the Squatter Government To understand the state's role in shaping the history of ZoorAbad, it is crucial to review the urban planning policies that have implicitly or explicitly impacted this neighborhood. This review will provide insight into the government's overarching approach through these plans. The Karaj Master Plan, developed prior to 1977, was the first legislative action targeting the ZoorAbad area. It proposed demolishing informal settlements and relocating residents to areas like Chenarak, approximately 10 km away, with the intention of transforming ZoorAbad into a park or preserved green space. However, the plan lacked a clear timeline or implementation strategy (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 132). Interestingly, BahramBaygui (1978) critiques this approach in his thesis, arguing that it was fundamentally flawed. Instead, he recommended a renovation plan that would provide residents with loans to improve their existing homes (p. 133). According to his viewpoint, a major drawback of choosing Chenarak as a relocation site was its significant distance from the center of Karaj (BahramBaygui, 1978, p. 134), which would have disconnected residents from essential services and economic opportunities. 244 One of the primary catalysts for the transformation of ZoorAbad has been the âImprovement Plan of ZoorAbadâ over the past three decades. In the early 1990s, as Iran sought to stabilize and reorganize in the aftermath of the revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, as the country focused on rebuilding its economy, politics, and urban infrastructure. During this period, significant urban development projects were launched in Tehran and other cities. Key projects from the 1990s include the construction of the Navvab Expressway in 1994, the development plan for ZoorAbad in Karaj in 1993, the revitalization and renovation of Jolan in Hamedan in 1994, and the modernization plan for Feizabad in Kermanshah in 1999. These plans significantly reshaped the urban landscape during that decade (Qasemi, 2010, 2). Therefore, it is essential to examine the impact of these planning policies and interventions at various scales in order to understand their influence on the transformation of ZoorAbad. 5.2.2.1. ZoorAbad in the Blueprints plans In this subsection, we will review the blueprint plans that have impacted this neighborhood, highlighting how both central and local governments have intervened as "squatter governments". By examining these plans, we will uncover how these governments systematically sought to dispossess the residents of ZoorAbad through various projects and initiatives. The Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan notes that the ZoorAbad neighborhood is governed by two main frameworks: 1) the detailed plan for Karaj city (figure 33), and 2) the special thematic and positional plan specific to ZoorAbad (p. 20). However, numerous urban planning projects have implicitly or explicitly influenced the socio-spatial context of ZoorAbad over the years. Many of these plans lack coherence with one another. The section will elaborate on several of these projects, highlighting their contradictions and inconsistencies. 245 Figure 33: The detailed plan of Karaj city - ZoorAbad neighborhood. Due to this detailed plan, the whole current neighborhood will be affected by gentrification (see page 244 and 245). The yellow color represents residential land-use,while the green color represents parks and recreational areas. [Retreived from Naghsh-e Click, 2022, p. 24]. The first detailed plans for organizing the ZoorAbad neighborhood were prepared by the Ministry of Interior and the municipality in 1976. In 1978, a "Renovation Plan for ZoorAbad Hill" was proposed by a construction consulting firm commissioned by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. These plans were developed before the revolution and before the challenges in the area reached their peak. However, due to the revolution, the practical proposals outlined in the plan were never implemented (Qasemi, 2010, 74). After the revolution, in 1989, a comprehensive development and construction plan was prepared by the Research and Construction Engineering Office. However, this plan did not offer any specific solutions for addressing the situation in ZoorAbad. It merely highlighted the need for a renovation plan and proposed the creation of a collector street in ZoorAbad, taking into account the hill's slope (Qasemi, 2010, 74). One of the key blueprints relevant to ZoorAbad is the Karaj Comprehensive Plan, which officially designated ZoorAbad as an informal settlement within the city of Karaj. This plan noted that: 246 âThe topography of the northern part of Karaj city features a steep slop that offers a scenic view and landscape. While this characteristic applies to ZoorAbad as well, the neighborhood's dense population, overcrowded conditions, and poor housing quality have diminished this potential.â (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 19). The Karaj comprehensive plan takes a strikingly speculative approach to ZoorAbad, viewing it primarily through the lens of land and housing values rather than addressing its social and physical characteristics. The plan's main concern appears to be the neighborhood's perceived negative impact on Karaj's urban landscape, framing ZoorAbad as an obstacle to the city's future development. The focus on aesthetics â particularly the assertion that "crowded, dense, poor housing quality" reduces opportunities for scenic views and landscapes â reveals a priority for beautification over the needs of the residents. This perspective underscores a bias within the plan, suggesting that the solution to Karaj's development challenges lies in the removal of low-income housing areas, rather than their improvement or integration. The 2008 strategic and Comprehensive Plan for Karaj, prepared by Bavand Consulting Engineers, presents yet another blueprint affecting ZoorAbad. This plan proposed the development of a multifunctional complex in the area, emphasizing recreational, sports, and cultural activities integrated with the city's historic core (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 20). In essence, the plan promotes gentrification under the guise of enhancing recreational and cultural amenities. However, these projects obviously resulted in displacing current residents and pacifying the neighborhood, potentially prioritizing new developments over the needs of the existing community. The dominant approach in both Comprehensive Plans for Karaj advocates for a gentrification process in ZoorAbad. To the planners, the neighborhood seems to be devoid of history, people, and homes. The proposed construction of recreational, sports, and cultural projects in this area not only fails to align with the current socio-economic context, but also facilitates the pacification of the neighborhood, leading to the displacement of its residents. Notably, the 2008 Comprehensive Plan was developed during the implementation of the Improvement Plan for ZoorAbad, at a time when the state claimed that the neighborhood did not meet safety qualifications due to its topography. As a result, approximately 4,000 buildings were demolished in the name of "improvement" and safety. Yet, in the Comprehensive Plan for 247 Karaj, planners chose to gentrify the area, attracted by its potential for profitability and perceived value. Another relevant blueprint is the Comprehensive Plan for the Organization of Informal Settlements in Karaj (2011-2021), which has had a significant impact on the ZoorAbad neighborhood. The plan proposed the following strategies for the city of Karaj: âSpatial organization and structural safety improvements, promotion of health and social welfare, enhancement of social security, improvement of residents' livelihoods, enhancement of cultural and civil status, capacity building for neighborhood empowerment and revitalization, and improvement of service levels (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 20). These strategies outlined in the âComprehensive Plan for Informal Settlements in Karajâ focus on improving the socio-spatial conditions of informal neighborhood through Karaj, including ZoorAbad. Interestingly, this approach contrasts with the goals of the âComprehensive Plan for the Karaj city,â which seeks to 'immunize' the area from the presence of the urban poor by relocating them from their neighborhoods and initiating a gentrification process through new construction projects aimed at attracting higher-middle-class residents. The "20-year Vision of Karaj City," another blueprint for ZoorAbad, outlines plan for the city up to 2035. A key weakness identified in this plan is the dilapidated condition of ZoorAbad. In this context, ZoorAbad is depicted as a significant obstacle to achieving the city's broader vision. Similarly, the Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan again views ZoorAbad as a barrier to realizing Karaj's urban goals (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 20). This reinforces the state's dominant approach towards ZoorAbad. It raises the question: How can a neighborhood be considered an obstacle to a city's goals while also claiming to âimproveâ these informal settlements? The central strategy for addressing issues in informal settlements seems to be the âremovalâ of both settlements and their residents. Furthermore, these blueprints lack consistency with each other. The most recent state intervention in ZoorAbad relates to national projects initiated in 2018 by the "Social Affairs Organization of the Ministry of Interior," aimed at developing 248 indicators for marginalized neighborhoods. To support this, Development Facilitation Offices were established in specific neighborhoods, including ZoorAbad, to provide neighborhood-specific development guidance based on the Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan. The responsible institutions for implementing this program include the Social Affairs Organization of the Ministry of Interior, the Governorate, the Municipality, and the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, pp. 1-2). The Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan (pp. 40-41) also highlights local Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and community groups in ZoorAbad as influential players in shaping the neighbourhood's-built environment. These include groups such as the Group of Trusted Individuals, the Neighborhood Peace Group (which addresses conflicts resolution), the Development and Environmental Improvement Group, the Clean Neighborhood Group, the Bright Neighborhood Group, and the Women Empowerment Group. However, their role on the ground remains peripheral, as they are directly supervised by the government, despite the need for them to operate independently. According to the Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan (pp. 35-36), several projects have been approved to improve and regenerate the ZoorAbad neighborhood (see Table 4 below). The majority of these projects have been assigned to the municipality, with additional involvement from two other governmental institutions: the Youth and Sport Institution and the Cultural Heritage and Tourism Department. Name of the project Activities Executing Institution Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad â Second Phase Spatial improvement and development of the public space Municipality Project for the preparation of executive plans for approved pioneering projects in the deteriorated urban area. Spatial improvement and development of the public space Municipality 249 Name of the project Activities Executing Institution Project for the construction, equipping, and establishment of neighborhood houses and health houses in 10 inefficient neighborhoods. Development of services Municipality Project for the completion, equipping, and development of an integrated operations management center. Development of services Municipality Acquisition and leveling of previously purchased properties with an area of over 2 hectares. Spatial improvement and development of the public space Municipality Ownership of nearly 35 unstable and dilapidated properties located in the public zone and surrounding ring road. Spatial improvement and development of the public space Municipality Engineering services project and Phase 1 of organizing the road network of ZoorAbad Hill. Spatial improvement and development of the public space Municipality Project for the ownership of dilapidated properties (85 collapsed properties in ZoorAbad and 280 properties in the 30-meter ring road of ZoorAbad). Spatial improvement and development of the public space Municipality 250 Name of the project Activities Executing Institution Empowerment in line with residents' skill training. Improving economic and social capacities Youth and Sport Institution Construction of a 30-meter roadway in ZoorAbad, with a length of 4,000 meters. Development of services Cultural Heritage and Tourism Installation of signboards introducing historical and cultural artifacts. Development of services Cultural Heritage and Tourism Provision of low-interest production facilities for trained students, artists, and craftsmen. Improving economic and social capacities Cultural Heritage and Tourism Table 4: Projects offered by the Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan for ZoorAbad since 2018 While the overall objective of the Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan is âto control and reduce social harms, empower residents, and improve the social, cultural, economic, physical, and environmental indicators of life in the targeted neighborhoodsâ (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 6), the plan for ZoorAbad â particularly the second phase of the Improvement Plan â has led to significant physical and spatial changes. These changes have transformed the current built environment and involved the construction of a new neighborhood with different users and characteristics. In other words, the squatter government, through the powerful tool of urban planning, created a context conducive to extracting the remaining resources from the urban poor in ZoorAbad. By viewing the neighborhood as empty of residents in various macro-level planning documents, and emphasizing its problematic characteristics, these plans implicitly and explicitly justified the clearance of the area. As noted in the previous subsection, the squatter government had access to both financial and spatial resources, and urban planning served as a tool to legitimize the confiscation of these resources. In the following subsection, we will focus on 251 one of such plans that has had the most significant relevance and impact on the history of ZoorAbad. 5.2.2.2. âImprovement Plan for ZoorAbadâ, since 1992 As mentioned earlier, numerous urban planning projects have affected ZoorAbad. However, the most direct urban development project that resulted in significant changes to the socio-spatial characteristics of the neighborhood and the displacement of ZoorAbad residents is the âImprovement Plan for ZoorAbadâ. According to Qasemi (2010), this plan rhetorically aimed to address deprivation and provide suitable housing for people, including migrants who had occupied the area since the 1960s and 1970s, while also addressing "their economic, health, educational, and training needs" (Qasemi, 2010, 1 & 76). However, despite this rhetoric from the squatter government, this subsection will explore how the plan led to activities far removed from "improving" the housing situation for the urban poor, ultimately undermining and eliminating the basic needs and grassroots welfare that these urban poor had achieved on their own. Initiated in 1992 and 1993 under the orders of then-President Hashemi Rafsanjani, the "Improvement Plan for ZoorAbad" was executed by the Islamic Revolution Housing Foundation through the establishment of the Coordination Office and the Board of Trustees (Qasemi, 2010, 76). A closer look at the Board of Trustees reveals how a wide and even irrelevant range of organizations and individuals were involved in this plan. According to Qasemi (2010), the Board of Trustees included the Friday Prayer Imam, the Representative of the Supreme Leader in Karaj, the Representative of Karaj in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Representative of the Executive Office of the President, the Representative of the Minister of Housing and Urban Development, the Revolutionary Prosecutor, the Public Prosecutor of Karaj, the Representative of the Judiciary, the Mayor of Karaj, the Governor of Karaj, and the Local Authority Representative appointed by the Governor (P. 76). The involvement of such a broad and seemingly unrelated group of individuals provided further evidence of how the squatter government set the stage for speculation and corruption. While figures like the Friday Prayer Imam and the Representative of the Supreme Leader in Karaj might seem irrelevant, each actor played a role in facilitating land speculation and financial 252 corruption in different ways. Additionally, each of these individuals sought their own credits and profits throughout the process. In the context of Iran's theocratic totalitarian regime, all these entities, which directly influenced the future of ZoorAbad by outlining the goals and objectives of the "Improvement Plan," can be considered key players under the umbrella of the "state" â or more aptly, the "squatter government." In the early 1990s, often referred to as the decade of informal urban fabric restructuring in Iran, the "Improvement Plan for ZoorAbad " was developed by the Office for the Renovation of Urban Structures of the Ministry of Housing. Karaj city officials conducted preliminary studies and assessments, concluding that addressing the issues of ZoorAbad required the relocation of its residents (Qasemi, 2010, 74) to newly constructed housing in the area. This objective was outlined in Article 1 of the Improvement Plan. However, due to financial constraints and the challenges associated with relocating the entire population of 120,000 residents and vacating the hill, the plan was initially limited to relocating those living above 1400 meters in altitude (p. 3). To achieve these goals, the proposed measures included: - issuing identification documents for residential units to establish a clear distinction between owners and tenants; - developing a relocation plan; - prioritizing the demolition of critical sections according to designated project blocks; - relocating residents by offering semi-constructed residential units rather than loans or land; - preparing and implementing a renovation and reconstruction plan for the neighborhood, within a maximum completion timeframe of 3 years; - providing public welfare and cultural services in the area as short-term measures; - Incentivizing residents to vacate the neighborhood through appropriate incentives; - Promoting cooperation among residents; - Developing an optimal land-use plan for the newly vacated area (Source: Bonyad Maskan, 1372, p. 145, cited in Qasemi, 2010, 76). This is yet another illustration of a key characteristic of the squatter government: the "constant alteration of plans". Initially, as described by Qasemi, the plan aimed to relocate the entire population of ZoorAbad. However, this was subsequently revised to only include those 253 residing above 1400 meters altitude. Also, the implementation of the plan, which was supposed to be completed within a maximum timeframe of three years, lasted for more than three decades and is still not completed. Another significant shift involved the promise of "relocating residents to newly constructed or semi-constructed houses" â an undertaking that never materialized and was altered in the early years of the plan. The significance of these changes lies in how they were used to secure financial resources. By presenting an initial, more ambitious project scope, authorities were able to access substantial spatial and financial resources, such as 640 hectares of common land. Once these resources were obtained, the frequent revisions to the plan served as a strategy for the squatter government. This tactic not only facilitated the confiscation of additional common resources for the benefit of government agents and their affiliates, but also depleted the small savings and basics means of the urban poor, effectively stripping them of their remaining assets. As previously noted, a significant change in the Improvement Plan involved altering the compensation strategies. Initially, the plan proposed a key-for-key approach, which was later replaced with a 'house-for-money' scheme after a few years. During the early stages of implementation, the plan included relocating residents to newly constructed houses that had been completed during the primary phase. However, this relocation effort was abruptly halted after only 8 households were moved, and the strategy shifted to the cash compensation model (Qasemi, 2010, 3-4). According to Qasemi (2010), the ZoorAbad Improvement Plan Office justified abandoning the key-to-key method by claiming insufficient support from ZoorAbad residents or other stakeholders, due to the high costs of newly constructed houses, which were beyond the financial reach of the residents. The cost of the newly constructed houses was set at 3.8 million Tomans, while an 80-100 square meter home in ZoorAbad was valued at approximately 1.2 million Tomans. This cost disparity led the government to deem the original relocation plan financially unviable, replacing it with a sale of units to individuals and organizations. This shift led to a destructive pattern favoring monetary compensation â a practice widely criticized since the 1970s for erasing cultural resources in urban areas (pp. 3-4, 81-83). This change not only marked a significant departure from the original plan but also 254 resulted in substantial profits for the squatter government, as it allowed them to monetize land and housing resources rather than fulfilling the promise of new homes for displaced residents. However, this justification appears misaligned with the sentiments of ZoorAbad's urban poor. Interviews conducted during field work and in the documentary "Here is ZoorAbad" reveal that residents were indeed interested in their original compensation plan, contradicting the office's claim. Furthermore, the argument of "financial inability" is questionable, as the office had been granted 640 hectares of land specifically to facilitate the relocation of 30,000 people using a key-for-key strategy in an area covering less than 72 hectares. This pivot towards a "house-for-money" approach seems to have been driven by the squatter government's priority to maximize its own financial gains. Over the first 18 years of the redevelopment plan's implementation, approximately 3,988 residential plots were handed over under the "House in Exchange for Money" program. However, due to Karaj's proximity to the capital, this extensive displacement largely went unnoticed compared to similar projects in Tehran during the 1990s, which coincided with the ZoorAbad Improvement Plan. For instance, the Navvab Expressway project in Tehran received significantly more attention, despite displacing only about 2,000 people â far fewer than the estimated 30,000 residents uprooted in ZoorAbad. As noted by one of the project's key agents, a mass eviction of this scale was unprecedented in the country (Qasemi, 2010, pp. 4&5, 41). This disparity in attention between the two projects highlights how the ZoorAbad redevelopment, despite its magnitude, was overshadowed by the focus on Tehran's urban projects. According to Qasemi (2010), the displaced residents were forced to relocate to various neighboring provinces and cities, like Azarbaijan, and Ardabil, or Zanjan. Some families moved to the lower parts of the hill, while others dispersed to different areas within the province or even farther afield. Due to their financial limitations, many of these displaced urban poor ended up settling in already deteriorated parts of the city, contributing to the expansion of those areas (p. 1). Over the first 18 years of the plan's implementation, the neighborhood transitioned from a residential neighborhood into a deteriorated, neglected area. The project failed to meet its 255 stated objectives, neglecting crucial infrastructure and cultural considerations (Qasemi, 2010, 1). In essence, the squatter government, through its so-called Improvement Plan, not only failed to enhance the neighborhood, but also exacerbated the conditions of the urban poor. Rather than improving their lives, the plan resulted in displacement and worsened socio-economic conditions for those already struggling. 5.2.2.2.1. Implementation Phase In the initial phase of the plan's implementation, efforts focused on preparing lands designated as the project's financial sources. This phase involved converting agricultural lands to residential use and incorporating them into the city's urban boundaries, with a two-year timeline set for ZoorAbad's redevelopment. The plan included constructing housing on these newly designated lands to relocate ZoorAbad residents into these new complexes. One such complex was the 214-unit Baharestan, which featured villa-style homes. However, only eight families from ZoorAbad were relocated to this complex. Project officials claimed that the reason for abandoning this relocation strategy was a lack of interest among ZoorAbad residents. Yet, accreting to the interviews, the residents refuted this claim (Qasemi, 2010, 81-83). Notably, the 214 residential units in Baharestan (Baghestan Karaj) were built on a portion of the 640 hectares of communal land. This illustrates how the squatter government altered its own plans, ultimately shrinking its responsibilities to provide adequate housing through a key-to-key program for displaced urban poor. Despite having access to 640 hectares of land, the project only constructed 214 housing units under the key-to-key approach, of which merely eight were used to relocate ZoorAbad residents. The remaining 206 units were diverted into the formal housing market for speculative purposes, generating profits for shadowy developers with close ties to the Islamic regime and its affiliated institutions. This reflects the underlying profiteering motives of the squatter government, prioritizing financial gain over the welfare of displaced communities. In her thesis, Parvin Ghasemi (2010) presents an example of a ZoorAbad resident who manage to exchange a 370-square-meter house for a much smaller 120-square-meter unit in Baharestan. While some residents of ZoorAbad expressed a genuine interest in moving to these villa-style houses, the ZoorAbad Development Organization ultimately rejected their requests, citing the residents' lack of financial capacity. However, it is clear that the majority 256 of the housing units in Baharestan were intended not for the urban poor but for middle-class tenants. The project shifted towards selling these units to housing cooperatives in Tehran province and private individuals. These buyers primarily viewed the properties as resident investment opportunities or as homes for middle class families, thus deviating significantly from the project's stated goals. As a result, the Baharestan villa complex was mostly occupied by non-ZoorAbadi residents, further highlighting how the project strayed from its original mission of addressing the needs of the urban poor (Qasemi, 2010, 81-83). All of this clearly illustrates how the squatter government in Iran not only commodified common land but also, through widespread corruption, generated substantial profits for specific, well-connected agents and developers by turning these common lands into the housing market for the middle-class. Ironically, these actions were carried out under the guise of the so-called "Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad". In reality, this plan offered nothing beneficial to the residents of ZoorAbad; instead, it resulted in their displacement, loss of homes, severed social ties, diminished sense of community, and, ultimately, greater impoverishment than before. 5.2.2.2.2. Demolition and Clearance Another tactic employed by the squatter government in Iran during the implementation of the ZoorAbad Improvement Plan involved strategically shifting its approaches during the demolition and clearance phases. These changes were designed not to benefit the residents, but rather to maximize profits for the government and its closely connected agents, further exacerbating the poverty and vulnerability of the community. According to the documentary âHere is ZoorAbadâ (Qasemi, 2011), at the start of the plan, residents of the neighborhood not only resisted but actively fought against selling their houses to the state. They sought to preserve the unity of their ethnic networks and extended families, who lived together in the same area of the neighborhood, by refusing to sell their properties (Qasemi, 2011). However, one of the state's tactics to force the settlers to vacate their homes involved offering higher prices to a few households and purchasing properties at random. This strategy encouraged residents to sell their homes and relocate to other neighborhoods, only for the government to later abandon these purchased properties. Over time, the safety of the surrounding area deteriorated as the abandoned homes were 257 demolished and turned into temporary shelters for individuals struggling with addiction. This tactic successfully weakened and disintegrated the ethnic and family networks that had previously bound the community together. In addition to dismantling social solidarity, this tactic also had significant spatial and physical consequences. Due to the neighborhood's morphology and steep slope and lack of an adequate drainage system, the random demolition of homes in various streets or alleys disrupted the grassroots sewage network, causing sewage to flow into the remaining homes from other alleys. This further pressured the residents of ZoorAbad to sell their properties to the government. As a result, many households began moving to other impoverished neighborhoods on the outskirts of Karaj. After the first decade of the plan, around 2000 housing units were handed over to the state. By the 20th anniversary of the plan's initiation, this figure had risen to 4000 units. It is important to note that while these properties did not have formal deeds, the residents of ZoorAbad held informal documents called Qol-Nameh, which served as proof of ownership. Properties in ZoorAbad were transferred to and bought by the state through these informal documents, which listed the owner's name. An additional 4000 units are expected to be submitted under this plan. The ongoing process of land acquisition by the state has had a significant impact, displacing the residents of ZoorAbad and causing many to migrate back to their original villages in rural areas of East Azarbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan, Qazvin, Rasht, Kordestan, Lorestan, etc. (Qasemi, 2014). It is worth noting that in one instance, during the demolition process, the government was forced to change its property acquisition policy due to civil resistance. In the early years of implementing the Improvement Plan, the squatter government did not include the land area of residents' properties in its compensation calculations. Initially, only the built-up area was considered, not the total plot size. This decision underscores how the squatter government tailored the plan to benefit itself, seeking every possible opportunity to extract resources from the urban poor. According to Qasemi (2010) several years after the plan's initiation and following the residents' inability to afford alternative houses on the city's outskirts, this policy was revised to include the price of the land (pp. 83-84). At the same time, the ZoorAbad development plan excluded parts of the land or buildings that fell within the scope of street or alley widening, which became a significant issue. In 258 other words, residents questioned whether they should bear the cost of a 72-hectare urban park development, from which they would not benefit. Eventually, this law was repealed, and homeowners were compensated for the total value of their land and properties. However, the compensation offered in exchange for their homes was still insufficient to purchase a house in a formal neighborhood, leading to various additional problems for the displaced residents (pp. 83-84). 5.2.2.2.3. Mindset of the Squatter Government in the Current Situation of Improvement Plan in ZoorAbad The most recent phase of the Improvement Plan in ZoorAbad was developed by Sharan Consulting Company in 2017. This phase continues the dominant approach of the previous phase of the Improvement Plan, focusing on the pacification of the neighborhood. However, in my view, this plan is much more important. With a more explicit approach, it exposes the underlying intentions of the squatter government: confiscating urban commons, commodifying them, and converting them into the real estate market for speculation and profit making by connected developers and governmental agents (under the guise of financing the project). Furthermore, this phase clearly proposes a gentrification plan, not only for the demolished areas, but also for the remaining parts of the neighborhood. In this section, we will examine the most recent phase of the Improvement Plan in ZoorAbad and discuss its implications through the role of the squatter government. The land-use and design guidelines proposed by the Improvement Plan treat the ZoorAbad neighborhood as an empty space, disregarding its historical significance and the presence of current residents. The plan explicitly advocates for a gentrification process within the neighborhood. According to the Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan (p. 29), it proposes constructing a tourism, cultural, and sport center (Figures 34, 35, 36, and 37) to be replaced with ZoorAbad (Figure 34) with the aim of at erasing the history and living space of the urban poor who have lived in this area for more than six decades. 259 Figure 34: Current landuse and potentials of ZoorAbad for new phase of "Improvement Plan" in ZoorAbad [Retreived from Naghsh-e Click, 2022]. Figure 35: The final spatial organization of ZoorAbad, based on the last phase of Improvement Plan in this neighborhood. Based on this organization, the users of these recreational, cultural, and tourism centers are among the affluent and middle-class groups [Retrived from Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 32]. 260 Figure 36: In this map, with more detailes various activities in the public 72 hectares park in ZoorAbad are defined, such as sky resort, amusement parks [Retreived from Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 33]. 261 Figure 37: The southern and northern views of ZoorAbad, after implementation of the final phase of "Improvement Plan" in ZoorAbad [Retreived from Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 34]. In essence, this latest phase of the Improvement Plan focuses on 'reconstruction,' whereas the earlier phases â demolition and clearance â were merely preparatory steps to pave the way for this stage. According to Qasemi (2010), the intent of this phase extends beyond demolishing the most deteriorated sections and relocating some residents; it also includes renovating other parts of the neighborhood and introducing new activities. Notably, the plan includes the creation of a 72-hectare park on land acquired from former residents. The park is 262 intended to host recreational amenities such as ski slopes, bike paths, parking lots, libraries, cultural centers, karting tracks, cable car stations, and restaurants (Qasemi, 2010, 77). The proposed amenities (Figures 34, 35, 36, 37) suggest a clear agenda for gentrification, aiming not only to erase the neighborhood's history and displace its urban poor residents, but also to transform the socio-spatial landscape into one that caters to an entirely different demographic. Facilities like sky resorts, karting tracks, and upscale restaurants are clearly designed for an upper-middle-class clientele, which starkly contrasts with the lifestyle of the current residents. What is particularly striking is that the squatter government initiated this project under the guise of the "Improvement" plan, claiming that its primary goal was to enhance the living conditions for ZoorAbad's residents. In reality, however, the true objectives were to confiscate whatever assets remained with the urban poor, leveraging this long-term gentrification process for significant financial gain. The project, marketed as a social improvement effort, in fact, serves to commodify the area for profit, benefiting only connected developers and government affiliates. Figure 38: This map introduced a few specific recreational projects (such as restaurants, Cafes, and cycling trails) within the 72 hectares park in ZoorAbad. The proposed projects highlight the intention of the "Improvement Plan" in this neighborhood that led to the gentrification of it. This map was prepared by Bavand Consulting Company in 2008 [Retrieved from Qasem, 2010, p. 78]. 263 The latest phase of the Improvement Plan for ZoorAbad includes numerous large-scale and small-scale projects. Although the Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan asserts that these proposed projects in the Improvement Plan are intended to address the existing challenges in ZoorAbad, there is little evidence that they are genuinely aligned with the needs of the current residents. Instead, it seems that the primary goal of these projects is to unlock the neighborhood's investment potential, a common thread that links both large and small-scale endeavors. For instance, the project to expand and widen the main access road, Mojahedin Road (Figure 39) (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 75) appears to be a foundational step towards the pacification of the area. While this road expansion may initially seem like a minor localized project, it plays a significant role in laying the groundwork for broader, large-scale developments. When considered in the context of the overall strategy, these seemingly modest interventions are essential in facilitating more substantial projects that ultimately serve the interests of investors rather than the needs of the existing community. Figure 39: Main access road in ZoorAbad named Mojahedin Road that has been considered in new Progress Plan of the neighborhood to be widened [Retreived Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 79]. Another small-scale project proposed in the Dynamic Neighborhood Plan involves deciding the fate of a half-built structure top ZoorAbad hill, which has become a symbol of the neighborhood (Figure 40). The Plan justifies addressing this unfinished building as a strategy to attract more investors to the area (pp.76-77). However, as previously noted, the absence of investors is not a concern faced by the current residents; rather, it reflects a challenge for the 264 squatter government, which is more interested in stimulating speculative activities in the neighborhood than addressing the actual needs of its inhabitants. A notable characteristic of the squatter government is its strategic use of a "gradual" approach to achieve its ultimate objectives. By implementing a series of incremental projects â both large and small â the squatter government steadily progresses toward its long-term goals. This gradualist strategy involves a combination of significant and minor physical interventions within the neighborhood, allowing it to reshape the area while minimizing immediate resistance. Figure 40: Uncompleted projects in ZoorAbad for more than one decade [Retreived from Naghsh-e Click, 2022, p. 80]. One of the mega projects proposed in this phase of the Improvement plan is the construction of two parks: "Park-e Tolou" and "Tapehaye Dogholoo" (Twin Hills) in ZoorAbad. According to the plan's claims, these parks are intended to enhance the spatial quality of the neighborhood. However, a closer review of the construction regulations and guidelines for both parks reveals a continuation of the plan's underlying agenda. The plan emphasizes increasing the efficiency of Tolou park by capitalizing on its tourism potential, which includes renovating a row of existing commercial units adjacent to the parking area on Janbazan Street (Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad, 2017, 2-4). Transforming this area into a tourism hub not only fails to address the existing challenges faced by local residents, but also intensifies them by accelerating the gentrification process. The replacement of local stores with gentrified commercial units aligns with the broader strategy of displacement, effectively eliminating small-scale commercial activities that currently support the livelihoods of ZoorAbad's residents. This shift further undermines the financial stability of the local community by pushing out their affordable, community-oriented businesses. 265 Another notable regulation for this project is the stipulation that no more than 5% of the park's total area can be developed (Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad, 2017). This %5 allowance translates to roughly 36,000 square meters designated for constructing a public cultural building within the 72-hectare park (Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad, 2017, p. 4-2). However, allocating such a substantial area without clear land-use guidelines creates a loophole, enabling the "squatter government" to appropriate these undeveloped lands under vague pretexts, ultimately profiting from their commercialization in the future. As part of the mega project to construct two parks in ZoorAbad, the Improvement Plan also includes proposals for new housing developments in the area (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 28 & 29). Although, the plan claims that existing residential structures in the lower parts of the neighborhood will be preserved to the greatest extent possible (Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad, 2017, p. 4-15), the building regulations outlined for the new housing suggest a push towards gentrification, effectively transforming the socio-spatial fabric of the neighborhood. A review of several building codes and regulations proposed in the latest phase of the Improvement Plan reveals how these policies are disconnected from the realities of ZoorAbad, clearly indicating an agenda for pacification and gentrification of the existing buildings and urban spaces (Figure 41). For example, the building code states that "there is no objection to increasing the number of floors up to six if plots larger than 270 square meters are merged, provided the adjacent street width is at least 16 meters" (Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 20). Additionally, it allows that "if the net floor area per unit is less than 70 square meters, the use of duplex or combined layouts is allowed to meet the specified minimum area". The plan further mandates that "all pedestrian access to the complex should consist of cul-de-sacs and non-through routes, and the entrances to the residential complexes must include guard booths". Moreover, the code stipulates that "the maximum allowable building height relative to the upper access road is three stories, with the option to extend this height by adding a pitched roof with a sloping ceiling (Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad, 2017, 4-19&20). The new housing regulations in ZoorAbad raises critical questions. Measures such as installing guard booths at the entrance of each residential building, constructing duplex 266 apartments, and designing sloping ceilings are clearly incompatible with the dominant architecture and lifestyle of current residents (Figures 41, 42, 43). These provisions signal a shift in the socio-spatial fabric of the neighborhood, preparing it for a more affluent demographic. The regulations suggest that urban planners and policymakers in the squatter government viewed ZoorAbad not just as a vacant and underdeveloped space, but as a lucrative opportunity for profit and resources extraction. Under this assumption, they have proposed the development of a middle-to-upper-class neighborhood on the hill, offering incentives to alter the spatial structure of ZoorAbad. This approach facilitates displacements and accelerates the gentrification of the area. Figure 41: A section of the main street in ZoorAbad, based on the final phase of Improvement Plan in ZoorAbad [Retreived from Dynamic Neighborhood Progress Plan, p. 35]. 267 Figure 42: Proposed plan for new residential complexes in ZoorAbad based on the new phase of "Improvement Plan" in ZoorAbad. Based on this, the whole grassroot spatial housing in this neighborhood would be totally demolished, that led to the gentrification and displacement of the current settlers. This map is prepared by Sharan Consulting Company [Retrived from Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad by Sharan Consulting Company, 2017, p. 17]. Figure 43: This sketch is prepared by Sharan Consulting Company as the second phase of Improvement Plan in ZoorAbad. This shows a section of a residential complex in ZoorAbad that are inconsistent with the current forms and types of housing in this neighborhood [Retrieved from Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad by Sharan Consulting Company, 2017, p. 21]. 268 In the earlier subsection, we reviewed how the squatter government aimed to extract both common and private resources from the existing residents, as well as resources allocated under the guise of providing financial support for the neighborhood's development. However, the key point is that at different stages of the Improvement Plan, the squatter government created various opportunities and tools for extracting these resources in multiple ways. At this stage, gentrification â along with fostering a favorable climate for gentrifying the neighborhood â has become one of the primary methods of extraction. One such approach involves the vagueness surrounding regulations related to the consolidation and merging of small land parcels and old buildings, as well as the absence of a specific timeline for implementing these plans (p. 4-24). Furthermore, on page 4-26 of the plan, it is stated that new buildings can be constructed in ZoorAbad as long as their function aligns with the dominant context of the area. Ironically, the entire new Improvement Plan for ZoorAbad, in various ways, contradicts the current dominant context of the neighborhood. 5.3. The Case of Roshankouh: Dispossession of a religious minority group by the squatter government This chapter intends to explore and elaborate on the concept of the squatter government, providing evidence of how such an entity has transformed various socio-spatial aspects of society, particularly affected vulnerable communities and extracted even their limited resources. While the focus of this thesis thus far has been on the case of ZoorAbad, this section introduces another case where the squatter government in Iran, through the tool of urban planning, initiated a project of intersectional discrimination and resource extraction under the guise of increasing legibility and legality in both urban and rural settings. To explain the relevance of the two casesâZoorAbad and RoshankouhâI highlight how the concepts of informality and marginality connect them within the context of this dissertation. ZoorAbad's informality and marginality are rooted in the countryâs modernization process, including urban industrialization, subsequent rural-to-urban migration, a shortage of affordable housing, and the emergence of grassroots, self-built settlements near the capital. 269 As discussed earlier, modern statesâthrough laws and regulationsâhave redefined certain spaces, lifestyles, and activities as informal. ZoorAbad, which developed through grassroots efforts without adherence to urban planning regulations, came to be labeled an informal and marginalized settlement, despite its geographically central location near Tehran. Similarly, in the modernization process, rural spaces and their associated socio-spatial practices were often deemed informal compared to urban centers. This was due to the absence of detailed construction standards and planning frameworks. As a result, villages not only became geographically marginal, but their histories and cultural identities were further marginalized by the dominance of modern, urbanized lifestyles. Drawing on the findings from the dialectical relationship between the state and ZoorAbadâas an informal, marginalized spaceâI extend my argument through the case of Roshankouh. This case illustrates how the state, by manipulating urban planning tools and policymaking, expropriates the scarce resources of the most marginalized communitiesâboth urban and ruralâto pursue its political and economic agendas, including the displacement or erasure of groups deemed non-citizens. The case of Roshankouh strengthens and deepens this analysis, helping to articulate the concept of the squatter government. This section will use the recent government attack on the village of Roshankouh in Iran as another case study to highlight some of the material and political-economic dynamics behind the systematic attacks on the Baha'i community. Through an examination of this case, we can expand our understanding of how the squatter government extracts both common and private resources in various contexts to achieve multi-dimensional profit and address its diverse goals. These include the silent genocide of a religious minority, socio-spatial pacification of a targeted group, the extraction of even limited financial resources from a community, and the deconstruction of their housing. While the animosity of the Islamic regime towards the Baha'is has its own historical and ideological particularities, the experiences of the Baha'i community in Iran are part of a broader struggle for democracy and full citizenship rights, a struggle that spans all sectors of Iranian society. Since September 2022 Iranâs ruling Islamist regime has been rocked by the ongoing âWoman, Life, Freedomâ protests against authoritarianism, corruption, and its policies of systemic discrimination based on gender, religion and ethnicity. The protests were initially triggered 270 by the killing in police custody of a young Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini, who had been arrested by the morality police for failing to wear a proper hijab in public. Soon after the protests spread to the Sunni majority province of Sistan and Baluchistan, where the police shot and killed dozens of unarmed demonstrators against the rape of a young Baluchi woman, also in police custody. While these ongoing protests have shed light on the struggles of women, students, labor and social activists, and ethnic and religious minorities (especially the Sunni Baluch and Kurds), there is little doubt that the Baha'i religious community of Iran has been the greatest target of the Islamist regimeâs animosity and systematic repression from the onset. The emergence of the Baha'i religion in the 19th Century was seen by the Shiâa clergy as a direct challenge to their monopoly over the religious life of the country, and they have treated Bahaiâs as despised apostates ever since. One of the main criticisms of the Pahlavi Monarchy by Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers was its seeming tolerance of the Baha'is, which they saw as a sinister plot to undermine Islam itself and the Shiâa clergy. Assaults on the Bahaâi community have been an ongoing feature of post-revolution Iran92. On August 2, 2023, the sensational headline âSaving national forest land from the claws of speculators in the village of Roshankouh!â was splashed across major news organizations of the Islamic Republic of Iran93. Located in the mountainous forests of the Caspian Sea province of Mazandaran, the small hamlet of Roshankouh was raided at dawn by more than two hundred policemen and government functionaries from the ministry of Agricultural Jihad, the Housing Foundation, and the Organization of Natural Resources. According to the villagers, the assault started at 4:00 am with bulldozers and heavy machinery blocking all access roads to and from the village. Officials confiscated all the mobile phones to prevent any visual recording and documentation of what was taking place. As a contingency, the raiding government party had mobilized an additional backup force of one hundred in the neighboring village of Haji Kolah. The purpose of this large operation was to confiscate 20 92 See the documentary âBahaei ha dar Iranâ (The Bahais in Iran) BBC Persian, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xdgkGQKkrEY&t=2s&ab_channel=BBCPersian . For ongoing recent cases see BBC Persian, February 17, 2023. âInternational Bahai Community Alarmed by Increasing Expropriation of Bahai Properties in Iranâ, https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-60411300 93 IRIB News Link 271 ha of agricultural land belonging to Bahaâi farmers living in Roshankouh, and to demolish six homes belonging to them. The director of the Organization of Natural Resources and Watersheds of the Sari District claimed that the raid had nothing to do with the religious beliefs of the residents but was âthe universal implementation of the law against all violators of public property.94â (iribnews, 2020). Within the Bahaâi community, this raid is seen as another step in the ongoing violent purges and dispossession of rural Bahai villages and communities across the country since the 1979 âIslamicâ Revolution. The events in Roshankouh showcase the systematic discriminations against the Bahaâis in Iran that range from the dispossession of assets, the expropriation of residential and agricultural properties, and the denial of basic civil rights and urban social. The aim of these systematic discriminatory policies is twofold: Politically, they intend to cleanse rural and urban communities of the presence of Baha'is across the country, while economically, the expropriation of Bahaâis assets is a powerful motive for corrupt and politically well-connected interest groups. Roshankouh is a mountainous village in the suburbs of Chahardangeh Sari in Mazandaran province with a population of over 100 mostly elderly people. There is a dispute about the population of Roshankouh village. On one hand, villagers claim that the population of the village is more than 100, while in the recent census, a population of around 25 was registered for the village. Villagers say that the government deliberately conducted the census in the winter season to ignore the real population of the village. Due to the lack of facilities in winter, some people are forced to go to Sari city or neighboring towns. Roshankouh has been a Bahaâi village for the past 150 years, according to historical documents. But, after the Islamic Revolution, the government has persistently tried to deny this historical presence and implemented various forms of harassment to push them out. The latest and most serious government effort to expel the Bahá'ís of Roshankouh was a lawsuit by the Department of Natural Resources in 2016 (will be elaborated in the following sections). This is one example of property deprivation of "marginalized" Bahá'ís in Iran and the most tangible example of violence and discrimination against them in this country. 94 IRIB News Link 272 5.3.1. The Babi and Baha'is in Iran; A History of Persecution The Bahaâi religion emerged out of the earlier messianic Babi movement in mid-19th Century Iran, before spreading to Iraq and internationally in the 20th Century. Led by the charismatic Seyyed Mohammad Shirazi (the âBabâ, or âDoorwayâ), Babism quickly claimed a new religion. Babismâs insistence on the continuity of divine revelation, as versus its finality (as embodied in the Qurâan) attracted a large and growing following among the rural and urban population seeking a new beginning. Threatened by the energy and enthusiasm of increasing converts rejecting their stifling monopoly of religious life, the conservative Shiâa clergy pushed their zealous followers and the ruling Qajar state, to violently eradicate the new religion. In the ensuing pogroms thousands of Babi followers lost their lives or had to hide or go into exile. Bahaism succeeded Babism as a new organized religion, attracting many remaining Babis as well as converts. In 1863 its leader Bahaâullah, fled into exile in Iraq where he declared himself the prophet of a new religion. Anti-Bahaism spread beyond the religious zealots and the authoritarian governments to the wider population, and even infected secular Iranian nationalism. While Baha'is and other religious minorities were relatively tolerated and left in peace under the Pahlavi Monarchy, they remained a target of constant suspicion and occasional violence and repression. The conservative Shiâa religious establishment was the most vociferous voice against the Baha'is, but the prejudice persisted among the intellectual and political elites, as well as the general population. According to Hooshang Chehabiâs article, Anatomy of prejudice: reflections on secular anti-Baha'ism in Iran in Bahaâis of Iran Socio-Historical Studies, the main accusations against Baha'is were threefold: That their beliefs were a threat to national unity, that they lacked loyalty to the Iranian nation and acted in service of hostile foreign powers, and that they had penetrated the higher ranks of the political and economic establishment and controlled the country (Chehabi, 2008). Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers were ardent anti-Baha'is. Following the consolidation of the Islamic Republic all the organized social and religious activities of the Bahaâis were declared illegal and ordered to cease. Bahaâi religious endowments, properties, holy places and places of worship, and community properties were confiscated across the country. 273 Baha'is were expelled from all public sector jobs and denied the right to enroll in schools and universities. All their local and national institutions were ordered to cease functioning, and thousands were arrested and imprisoned, or had to escape into exile. Some 180 were executed in the first years after the Revolution (Martin, 1985). 5.3.2. The Case of Roshankouh Despite the ferocious repression, many local Baha'i communities remained and struggled on. In the 19th Century, the Caspian province of Mazandaran had been a major center of conversion to Babism and later to Bahaism, and the small mountain village of Roshankouh with a population of 100 living in some 80 houses was a remnant of that past. Initially called Rashmangou (Red Cow), the villagers converted to Babism in 1848 shortly after Rostam Khan, their local lord, had joined the cause95. They changed the name of the village to Roshakouh (The Mountain of Light) to reflect this new identity. Like other Baha'i communities, Roshakouh was subjected to discrimination and violence after 1979. The gruesome murder of a woman was ignored by the police, and for years the government refused to provide otherwise available services such as electricity, gas, public transportation, etc. In 2016, a new offensive began against the village when the Office of Natural Resources and Watersheds launched a formal complaint against the village accusing them of having illegally occupied public forest land and converted it to residence and agriculture. The governmentâs legal case was based on aerial photographs of the area taken in 1965. The villagers demanded access to the evidence but were denied, and in September 2020 the court ruled against them. Soon after, in 2021 the authorities came in force and demolished three homes and confiscated and fenced off several agricultural fields (IRIB, 2020). The assault continued in August 2022 when six more homes were demolished, and another 20 ha of land were confiscated. Despite official claims that this latest land grab was unrelated to Roshankouh being a Baha'i village and was a legitimate legal action to free public land from criminal speculators, these raids 95 For the history of this period and Roshakouh see Zohour al Haq, vol.9 [Fazel Mazandarani, 1926, Zohour al Haq, Bahaâi Publication]. In 1930, a person named Bakhtiar, instigated by the opponents of the Baha'i community, arrested an old Baha'i man named QanbarAli in Roshankouh. After looting his house, they set him on fire in a way that his body burned, and he passed away after two days. 274 happened to coincide with the latest wave of coordinated mass arrests, harassment, and dispossession of Baha'is across the country. Forensic studies of the historical records and aerial photographs of the region by an investigative fact-checking team based in Toronto clearly supports the claims of the residents of Roshankouh (Factnameh, 2022). The governmentâs case against Roshankouh was based on a set of controversial laws dating to the 1960s delineating public land, and on the official Village Guiding Plan (Tarh-e Hadi-ye Rousta), a rather vague official document that outlines a ten-year development plan for each village in the country. The official press claimed that the raid on Roshankouh was a reaction to illegal constructions beyond the official boundaries of the village. However, the categories of legal/illegal are rather porous when it comes to historical or marginalized communities who live on the margins of official society or have been pushed there. A wide range of economic activities or claims to ownership that form the bases of local community livelihoods fall into this gray zone and fail to measure up to strict standards of formal legality. Thus far, the so-called âguiding plan of Roshankouhâ has only served as an instrument of the state to dispossess villagers of their lands and homes. This example shows that public policies, development plans, and legal frameworks are not neutral and benevolent instruments for improving social and material livelihoods for all. Paradoxically, they can also serve as coercive instruments to legitimize the purging of undesirable ânon-citizensâ. 5.3.2.1. Claim of illegal constructions in Roshanakuh Official news agencies in Iran attribute one of the reasons for the recent action in Roshanakuh to "illegal construction outside the legal zone of the village". Investigating the validity of this claim requires scrutiny of the Village Guiding Plan" (Tarh-e Hadi-ye Rousta) in Roshanakouh. Through these plans, the Islamic Revolution Housing Foundation is supposed to provide a fair basis for the long-term development of villages. According to the âCharter of Village Guiding Plan", the Housing Foundation is required to focus on "collecting the opinions of villagers and prioritizing construction projects based on those opinions" in the initial stage of plan preparation. Yet in interviews (conducted by the author) the villagers of Roshanakuh claim that at no point they were consulted by the Housing 275 Foundation in the process of cadastral surveys and mapping, nor the drafting the Guiding Plan for their village, in clear violation of the Foundationâs charter. If the Housing Foundation claims that the Village Guiding Plan for Roshankooh has been approved, and the demolition of the houses of the Baha'is occurred based on it, the Housing Foundation has committed multiple violations according to its own regulations. These violations include failure to provide financial resources for the approved Village Guiding Plan, attacking and assaulting instead of "demanding assistance from the local people", failure to provide an "executive plan/schedule," and not making the approved Village Guiding Plan available to the villagers. According to Article 7 of these regulations, the Housing Foundation is obliged to provide and secure the "necessary financial resources for the Village Guiding Plan projects" and take necessary measures "with the cooperation of the people" after the approved plan has been communicated. If the authorities were attempting to "implement the Village Guiding Plan" on August 2, 2002, how can we imagine a connection between the siege and demolition of the villagers' houses and "demanding assistance from the local people"? Another violation of the Housing Foundation is related to Article 10 of the executive regulations, which states that the Village Guiding plan must provide "a development plan based on the village's projected population for the next 5-10 years", along with a schedule for implementing the plan. Demolishing houses without announcing the "implementation schedule" of this plan on August 2, is a violation of this clause. In addition, ignoring the population growth of this village over the past decade and not issuing permits for new housing development in the legal zoning of the village is also contrary to this clause. These issues, along with the demolition and disintegration of the old nucleus of the village based on the Village Guiding plan, all indicate that the actions taken by the relevant foundations in Roshankouh are in violation of the executive regulations of the Village Guiding plans. The coincidence of the initiation of the Village Guiding Plan for Roshankouh and the start of legal action by the Iranian Natural Resources and Watershed Management Organization against 14 Baha'i families in the village is a notable matter. This issue raises the following question: Why has the only outcome of the Village Guiding Plan been limited to the destruction of 9 houses and the seizure of agricultural lands in this village? What groups' 276 interests are the rural and urban development plans serving? Has the Village Guiding plan for Roshankooh village become a conduit for pursuing discriminatory goals against the Baha'is of this village? In a situation where the existence of the approved Village Guiding plan for Roshankooh village is in a halo of ambiguity, the performance of the Housing Foundation regarding Roshankooh village has been in clear contradiction with its own regulations. 5.3.3. The State's Intervention: Comparing ZoorAbad and Roshankouh Cases The importance of reviewing the Roshankouh case lies in the fact that the role of the squatter government extends beyond cities and their proximate informal settlements near urban centers. It demonstrates how the squatter government, under the guise of increasing legibility and organizing urban planning, seeks to identify opportunities to confiscate both common and private resources, even from the most vulnerable groups and individuals. Furthermore, in both cases, we can observe how urban planning serves as a powerful tool in the hands of the squatter government to facilitate confiscation and corruption. Although, there are some differences between the two cases, which we will discuss below. At first glance, the cases of Roshankouh and ZoorAbad may not appear to have many similarities. However, the key similarity lies in the fact that, in both cases, the government targeted marginalized groups â religiously and economically marginalized, respectively. As a result, confiscating the properties and resources of these vulnerable groups carried little risk for the state, as they lacked the means to defend themselves or raise their voices in protest. However, the Roshankouh case differs from other cases involving religious and political minorities. The state's intervention in Roshankouh must be understood within the broader context of the Islamic government's action against the Baha'i community. one of the primary objectives of the squatter government in Iran has been to keep the Baha'is weakened in every possible way. The Islamic regime has consistently aimed to marginalize the Baha'i community, economically, socially, and culturally. According to Vahman (2010), the coercive economic repression of Bahaâi community during the first decade of the Revolution in the 1980s included âthe confiscation of companies and assets, including those of executed individuals, immediate dismissal from all public and private employment (affecting approximately 10,000 people), expulsion of Bahaâi farmers from villages and confiscation of 277 their lands, and confiscation of inherited Bahaâi assets and wealthâ (495-500). In 1984, the Revolution Court ruled, supported by senior clerics, that the payment of wages and salaries to Baha'is had always been illegal. Therefore, those purged from their jobs were not only denied compensation or benefits but also required to reimburse all previous wages received (Vahman, 496). By examining the Roshankouh case, we can better understand it within the larger context of the silent genocide of Baha'is in Iran. It becomes clear that one of the primary targets of the squatter government in Iran has been the confiscation of Baha'is communal and private properties. What happened in Roshankouh is part of an intersectional campaign of discrimination and persecution against a religious minority in Iran. The rural expulsions of ordinary Baha'i peasants and farmers from their ancestral lands and villages were particularly grievous and set them apart from some other dissident groups, who mostly had their leaders and activists persecuted by the state. There are many recorded and verifiable instances of overnight expropriation of Bahaâi farmers on the orders of local Friday Prayer Leader. According to Vahman (2010), violent raids occurred in Bahaâi villages in Boyer Ahmad, Sangsar, Semnan, Manshad, Yazd, and in Azarbaijan province. For example, in June 1986, two Bahaâi villagers from Motnaq were given an ultimatum by the Friday Prayer Imam of Bostan Abad to convert to Islam or leave the village permanently after harvest (p. 496). Similar events in the Mazandaran villages of Eival and Roshankouh indicate that this trend has continued for over four decades (Hein, 2021). Forced displacement and expropriations of ânon-citizensâ have been central strategies of ethnic-religious and racial-cultural cleansing. Examples include the demolition of Palestinian homes and expropriation of their properties by Israel, forced evictions of Afro-Brazilians from coveted urban areas, the mistreatment of Romani people in Europe, and the persecution of Baha'is in Iran. Several motives underpin the systematic expropriation of Bahaâi lands in Iran. Rural villages, as local communities bound by strong ties of geography, kinship, faith, and solidarity, can be perceived as a nuisance by authoritarian rulers who prefer to govern a more amorphous and compliant population. By destroying their spatial ties and material foundations â homes, places of worship and collective social life, cemeteries, and fields â these rulers terrorize and disintegrate non-citizen communities, forcing them to flee their ancestral homes and eradicates their identities. Another similarity between this case and 278 ZoorAbad lies in the concentration of non-citizens, whether in minority religious neighborhoods or urban poor settlements, which are viewed as threats by authoritarian state, leading to various attempts to disperse these communities into different spaces. In recent decades, central states have increasingly paved the way for housing and land use to become an economic arena for attracting speculative activities. In poor rural and provincial areas, this often happens through the denial of non-state sanctioned local and customary forms of ownership and the eventual expropriation of rural populations96. This was also the case for ZoorAbad. Loss of access to independent means of livelihood and production leads to chronic material insecurity for the urban poor and rural populations, who often must emigrate to cities where their precarious situation is shaped by dependency on the market and money income as the sole means of survival. Expropriated lands can be held by the state in temporary âreserveâ- as public land, national forest, etc.- before being rebranded as an economic âresourceâ and turned over to various forms of capital for exploitation and profit making97. This speculative motive has played a major role in the case of ZoorAbad as well as the systematic expropriation of rural properties of Baha'is in Iran. In the correspondence of the director of the Foundation of Downtrodden in Amol, a justification for the expropriation of Bahaâi cemeteries is given as âthe opportunity for building projects in these lucrative locations.â (Vahman, 2010, 488). Similarly, in Roshankouh, the parcels that were expropriated in August 2022 were the most fertile agricultural fields in this mountain village, located in a flat and sunny area that is also safe from the dangers of annual flooding. This toxic mixture of violent land grabbing and systemic legal and religious discrimination against the Baha'is is being legitimized by the stateâs so-called âGuiding [development] Plans.â In both the cases of ZoorAbad and Roshankouh, the squatter government, under the guise of urban planning tools, implemented 96 Marx and Polanyi unpacked the histories of enclosures across Britain and the Americas since the end of 17Th Century, referring to it respectively as âthe primitive accumulation of capitalâ, and âthe great transformation,â that led to the emergence of the modern nation states and market driven mature capitalism based on private ownership of the means of production. In the contemporary era, this ongoing process of dispossession has been analyzed by many scholars, such as the Brazilian urbanist Rachel Rolnik. See Karl Marx. Capital, volume 1; Karl Polanyi. The Great Transformation; Rachel Rolnik 97 A typical example is the granting of drilling rights in public lands to fossil fuel and mining companies by successive US governments in the name of national security, economic development, and energy security. Similar examples are quite common across the world. 279 its speculative motives by confiscating the lands and properties of the most marginalized groups, whose properties were considered profitable and lucrative. While there are similarities between the two cases, the differences are also considerable. One key difference relates to their geographical distance from urban hubs or centers. ZoorAbad, a self-built settlement, is located in the city center of Karaj, near the capital. This proximity to a major urban area means that ZoorAbad was constructed with a higher likelihood of attracting attention from urban planners and policy makers. The strategic location of ZoorAbad underscores its visibility and the sensitivity surrounding its development. In contrast, Roshankouh is located in a remote part of northern Iran, far from urban centers. It is an isolated village inhabited by a small group of Baha'is. Given this geographical difference, it is striking that the squatter government focused attention on this remote village, deploying professional resources such as urban and rural planners to prepare plans for expropriating resources from a vulnerable farming community in the middle of a forest. Another difference between the Roshankouh and ZoorAbad cases lies in the approach to compensation. In ZoorAbad, residents were displaced after being pressured by various implicit means to sell their properties to the government. In contrast, in the case of Roshankouh, the properties of Baha'i farmers and residents were confiscated without any compensation. The most significant difference between the Roshankouh and ZoorAbad cases is related to the religious characteristics of the Roshankouh community and the systematic discrimination they have faced over the past forty-five years. Discriminatory actions against ethnic, racial, gender, and religious minorities have resulted in a significant depletion of Iran's social capital. Among these marginalized groups, Baha'is in Iran, despite contributing to the social fabric, have endured ongoing persecution. The Bahaâis in the village of Roshankouh experienced "intersectional discrimination," as they not only face civil rights violations due to their religious beliefs, but also see their limited financial resources â tied to agricultural lands in the Bahaâi-populated village â targeted for confiscation by the authorities for speculative purposes. According to a report by Miloon Kothari, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Housing, "At least 640 cases of seizure of Bahaâi properties and assets were reported between 1980 and 2006" (Vahman, 2010, 498). Kothari also notes that from 2004 to 280 2006, the number of Bahá'ís âarrested without charges and released on heavy bails increased," Which, in his view, "may also be a means of seizing Bahaâi propertiesâ. The destruction of houses and land seizure in Roshankouh must also be understood within the broader context of the Iranian government's ongoing campaign of elimination against the Bahaâis. The government's focus on clearing Bahaâi settlements, seizing properties, confiscating valuable agricultural lands, and forcing villagers to move â all serve to dismantle their collective identity and sever their ancestral connection to the "land", leading to eliminating these non-citizens from Iran's geographical and social landscape. To summarize, this section expanded the discussion beyond the case of ZoorAbad by examining the case of Roshankouh. While the two cases differ in many respects, a closer look at the government's broader approach to these neighborhoods reveals a pattern of exploiting 'common' tools â such as urban planning and policymaking â to extract and confiscate not only common lands but also private properties belonging to the most marginalized communities and individuals. This approach reflects the government's intersectional discrimination against these groups. In the hands of the "squatter government," urban planning becomes a tool not only for exacerbating spatial inequalities but also for advancing broader, oppressive objectives, such as the pacification of specific religious minorities and other marginalized communities across the country. 5.4. Squatter Government In this concluding section, I will explore various aspects of squatter governments and discuss the broader implications of this concept. Additionally, I will examine the relationship between modern governments and squatter governments. Drawing from the narrative in the first chapter, which framed self-built housing as an alternative to social housing, I will connect it to the concept of the squatter government. The first subsection will analyze the similar approaches modern governments adopt toward self-built settlements and social housing. The final subsection will further elaborate on the concept of the squatter government. 281 5.4.1. Government approaches towards informal settlements and the issue of prioritization of exchange-value The case of ZoorAbad illustrates how housing informality in Iran has evolved through a complex interplay of modernization, socio-political upheavals, and grassroots resilience. Contrary to the dominant narrative that modernization reduces informality, state-led urban projects often intensified the growth of informal settlements, particularly in suburban areas that absorbed waves of rural migrants. This research highlights how, rather than diminishing informality, modernization efforts frequently exacerbated it, pushing communities toward self-built solutions to address acute housing shortages. The transition from communal, ethno-religious neighborhoods to class-based divisions, along with inadequate social housing policies, has positioned self-built settlements as essential alternatives for the urban poor. Beyond the initial phase of modernization in Iran, the state's approach underwent a significant transformation, following the Islamic revolution, evolving into what I refer to as "squatter government". The approach of this squatter government toward both self-built (informal) housing and social housing warrants close examination. The squatter government prioritizes the exchange-value of housing over its use-value, implementing plans and policies that effectively obstruct the creation of truly affordable housing on the ground. The second phase of the squatter government's influence extends to any constructed social housing or viable alternatives, such as self-built settlements. Specifically, its primary strategy for social housing involves integrating it into the formal housing market, driven by the principle of maximizing exchange value over use-value. This approach has been supported by the idea of prioritization of exchange-value to the use-value of real estate. In cases like ZoorAbad, where even informal, self-built settlements can be commodified within the informal housing market, the government's approach is characterized by a long-term gentrification strategy. This involves pacifying the area and increasing real estate values by transforming the socio-spatial characteristics of the neighborhood, thereby further marginalizing its current residents. These informal settlements expose a fundamental tension in Iranâs urban policy, which fluctuates between regulation and displacement, reflecting the stateâs ambivalent stance toward informality. ZoorAbad illustrates the potential of grassroots housing initiatives to 282 meet urban housing needs, while simultaneously highlighting the stateâs persistent efforts to assert control over these spaces. The continuous struggle between residentsâ rights and government interventions demonstrates the resilience of marginalized communities and calls for a reevaluation of informal settlements. Recognizing these settlements as valuable social infrastructure, rather than viewing them solely as problems, could guide urban policy towards more inclusive solutions. Such an approach would prioritize the use-value of housing, fostering greater equity and social stability within Iran's urban landscape. As discussed in the first chapter, self-built housing in Iran â commonly referred to as informal settlements â can and should be viewed as an alternative to "social housing." These settlements have effectively utilized public resources, such as state-owned lands, which the government was responsible for allocating to address housing needs for lower-income populations. Over previous decades, the government has informally endorsed this process by facilitating the transfer of land ownership after construction, often through payments in exchange for ownership documents. In the absence of sufficient government support, the urban poor have taken the initiative to create housing with their limited resources, effectively fulfilling responsibilities that the state failed to undertake. Despite these grassroots efforts to address Iran's housing crisis, the squatter government has sought to eliminate these self-built spaces. Its agenda prioritizes increasing the exchange value of properties and real estate in ZoorAbad through a deliberate process of pacification and gentrification, disregarding the critical role these settlements play in meeting the housing needs of marginalized communities. Over the past few decades in Iran, the government has made little efforts to provide adequate housing for urban poor. Even in large-scale programs like the "New Towns" initiative â originally intended to accommodate low-income individuals migrating to cities â there were no practical provisions made for these groups. As Alipour (2015) notes, the government's policy of constructing new towns aimed to manage urban population growth and address housing shortages. However, land allocation within these projects primarily favoured government employees, significantly limiting their impact on alleviating urban poverty (58). In the absence of government programs, the state's approach to self-built houses, or so-called informal settlements, becomes particularly noteworthy. In the 1990s, the "Improvement Plan 283 of ZoorAbad," aimed to demolish a significant portion of self-built houses in ZoorAbad and evict the urban poor from the settlement. Interestingly, a similar pattern can be observed in how governments in northern countries address social housing and self-built settlements: demolition, clearance, and eviction of the urban poor, pushing them to more peripheral and less visible areas â away from the scrutiny of government officials and the affluent middle and upper classes of society. These actions, whether targeting social housing or self-built/informal housing, are rooted in a shared logic: the prioritization of exchange-value over use-value. The speculative approach of the Iranian government towards ZoorAbad mirrors patterns observed in other international cases. During the 1970s, many Third World governments abandoned efforts to address slum issues, allowing the IMF and World Bank to impose neoliberal and market-driven approaches to urban housing policy, often under the guise of slum upgrading (Davis, 2008, pp. 71-72). The World Bank provided self-help loans for slum dwellers, but these initiatives failed to resolve the housing crisis in the Global South. By 1987, it was estimated that, on average, 50% of the poorest slum dwellers could not meet housing upgrading goals through such loans (p. 72-73). Despite their rhetoric, these programs primarily fostered clientelism and limited grassroots activism (Davis, 2008, p. 76). Peru exemplifies this phenomenon. In 2004, the World Bank supported a development program aimed at formalizing informal settlements. Hernando De Soto, a key figure in the project, characterized informal properties as "dead capital" with great potential that could be unlocked through legalization. He argued that a lack of property deeds forced slum dwellers to stay home to protect their property from occupation. Consequently, he proposed that poverty could be addressed by granting property deeds, enabling slum dwellers to secure loans and transition into entrepreneurship. However, one significant implication of De Soto's neoliberal project was increased government control over previously autonomous informal settlements (Mitchell, 2009). De Sotoâs idea of unlocking wealth through property formalization does not apply in the context of ZoorAbad, where the government's provision of formal deeds has not significantly improved the living conditions of the urban poor for several reasons. Historically, residents have transferred and exchanged their properties and often profited from these transactions, 284 even without formal ownership, relying instead on informal documents known as Qolnameh. Therefore, De Soto's concept of "dead capital" and the idea of unlocking financial potential through property formalization does not fully apply in this context. Iran's housing finance system does not rely heavily on mortgages, and more broadly, the financial system does not offer substantial support for microeconomic activities. Most residents of ZoorAbad work as daily wage labors in construction or as small-scale retailers. Thus, legalizing and formalizing property ownership has not provided meaningful financial benefits â such as access to mortgages loans â for the urban poor in ZoorAbad. Furthermore, efforts towards formalizing housing in ZoorAbad appear to stem more from government priorities than from the needs and requests of the urban poor. As discussed in Section 4.5.4.5, access to formal deeds was not ranked among the top concerns of ZoorAbad residents. At various points â particularly after the implementation of the Improvement Plan â the Islamic government facilitated the issuance of formal deeds and the legalization of properties. Although some new deeds have been issued since 2011, both local reports and interviews indicate that formalization remains a low priority for residents. According to the governorate of Alborz province, the lack of formal deeds ranked 11th out of 15 concerns in the 2021 report, based on community input. This suggests that residents have not faced significant barriers when exchanging or transacting properties through Qolnameh â informal written deeds. Even when formal deeds were obtained, the exchange-value of properties did not increase substantially. Thus, legalizing properties has neither improved the use-value of housing for residents of ZoorAbad, nor significantly enhanced its exchange-value for land-owners. This point was echoed by interviewees. For example, Rahman noted that "since 2011 and after the implementation of the Improvement Plan, a few more have acquired formal title deeds. However, the price difference between properties with title deeds and those with informal written agreements was so insignificant." Given the minimal price gap, there has been little incentive for landlords to invest in formalizing property ownership. The government's emphasis on formality appears to be tied to long-term development goals rather than the immediate needs of the community. Formalizing informal properties helps 285 facilitate and lay the groundwork for large-scale development projects, such as those proposed in the second phase of the ZoorAbad Improvement Plan. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the privatization of squatting on urban peripheries (Davis, 2008, p. 37) became a widespread strategy in countries such as Egypt, Turkey, South Africa, and Iran, primarily targeting low-value lands (p. 38). While this approach was farmed as a way to formalize housing, it facilitates speculative development in urban poor neighborhoods (Davis, 2008, p. 42), exacerbating inequalities and marginalization rather than addressing housing needs. Urban poor renters, the most marginalized among slum-dwellers, suffered greatly from the lack of tenant organizations and the commercialization of slum areas (Davis, 2008, p. 43). Approximately, two decades after global efforts at slum upgrading, the Iranian state, in the early 1990s, turned its attention to urban development plans, including slum pacification. During this period, the "Improvement Plan for ZoorAbad" was proposed (Qasemi, 2010, 2). While the stated aim of this plan was to improve the existing access network, infrastructures, and living conditions of ZoorAbad residents (Qasemi, 2010, 74), it ultimately led to the demolition of a 72-hectare area within the neighborhood (Alipour, 2015, 105-106), forcing residents to hand over their 'frozen' properties to the municipality at a dictated price (Qasemi, 2010, 1) The government's justification for demolishing ZoorAbad centered on the neighborhood's alleged unsafe conditions, citing its steep slope (Alipour, 2015, p. 94), and its proximity to Alborz Mountain range, an area reportedly prone to earthquakes based on tectonic maps. However, a tectonic report contradicts this claim, stating that there is no risk of landslides on the hill's surface in ZoorAbad, and the earthquake risk is comparable to that of other neighborhoods in the region (Qasemi, 2010, 48). Furthermore, the latest version of the Improvement Plan indicates that the government now intends to use this land for a new development project â residential complexes for middle- and upper-class residents. This directly undermines the earlier justification, as the same land previously deemed unsuitable for construction is now slated for development. This contradiction reveals the government's true intentions, which appear to be driven by speculative interests rather than genuine safety concerns. 286 In the absence of affordable housing plans and policies, market-oriented and speculative activities such as the âImprovement Planâ in ZoorAbad represent the dominant approach of the government to address the housing issue within informal neighborhoods. Such plans often deplete the financial resources of local residents by forcing them to sell their homes to the municipality at prices below market value. They also limit opportunities for displaced settlers, who face reduced access to educational, economic and medical facilities in the more remote neighborhoods to which they are relocated. The social bonds cultivated in ZoorAbad over four decades are destroyed as households are uprooted and dispersed (Behroozi Nobar, 2023). To sum up, reviewing the case of ZoorAbad highlights how modernization, socio-political upheavals, and grassroots resilience can significantly impact the evolution of housing informality in Iran. Contrary to expectations, state-led urban projects often intensified informal settlements rather than reducing them. Following the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian state prioritizing the exchange value of land and housing over their use value. This led to urban planning such as the "Improvement Plan for ZoorAbad," which aimed to demolish informal settlements under the guise of safety and urban planning, while facilitating gentrification and speculative development for middle- and upper-class residents. Similar patterns have been observed globally, where neoliberal and market-driven policies exacerbated inequalities and marginalized the urban poor. The destruction of self-built settlements like ZoorAbad not only displaced residents but also dismantled long-established social bonds and further marginalized vulnerable communities. This underscores the need for reimagining urban policies to prioritize inclusive and equitable housing solutions that recognize the value of grassroots initiatives. 5.4.2. Concluding Notes on Squatter Government The definitions of the term "squatter" highlight a few important points: someone who "settles on public land [â¦] with the purpose of acquiring title" (Merriam-Webester, 2024), or "someone who lives in a building or on land without the permission of the owner and without paying" (Britannica Dictionary, n.d.). In other words, this term typically refers to individuals â often low-income or part of the urban poor â who âconfiscatesâ or âunlawfully occupiesâ 287 public, common or unused lands. Such actions are often driven by the need to address housing shortages that governments are unable or unwilling to meet. In countries of the Global South, people living in self-built homes on public lands are commonly referred to as âsquattersâ. In this thesis, I use the term metaphorically as an adjective, introducing the concept of a "squatter government" to illustrate how governments and their affiliated bodies can engage in the confiscation of public lands and resources without the permission of their rightful owners â namely, the society and communities in those areas. To address the question, "What is a 'squatter government?'" we must first critically examine the concept and function of the modern state. While there is a distinction between the idea of a "squatter government" and the modern state, the concept of a "squatter government" cannot exist without the emergence of the modern state. In other words, a squatter government is an entity that overlays the modern state; without the tools and mechanisms at the disposal of the modern state, a squatter government could not exist. Drawing on Scott's perspective (2020 [1998]) on the modern state can be useful in this regard. In his book, 'Seeing like a State', Scott discusses how the state gradually asserts control over its citizens and their surroundings by implementing strategies â such as urban planning, population registration, and introducing freehold land ownership â aimed at making society more legible and simplified (pp. 2-6). He uses the history of scientific forestry, developed between 1765 and 1800, as a metaphor for the knowledge and manipulation seen in high-modernist state bureaucracies and large commercial firms. In this context, forests (as a metaphor of societies) are considered only as economic resources to be efficiently managed for profit, neglecting their ecological and social significance. Modern scientific forestry (as a metaphor of planners, policy makers, architects, and technocrats) facilitated the management of a legible, simplified, and uniform forest by organizing same-age trees in linear rows, clearing underbrush, and replanting. This legible forest was also easier to manipulate (Scott, 2020 [1998], 11-18). Legibility is one of the pivotal tools employed by modern states to justify various forms of manipulation and control. The centralized modern state implemented legible property systems designed to simplify land tenure (Scott, 2020 [1998], pp. 33-38). These systems are characterized by uniform, homogeneous, geometric properties that transform land into 288 standardized commodities, making them easier to buy and sell in the market (p. 58). Therefore, "formal order", such as straight lines and right angles, was considered essential for efficiency and legibility (106-109). Under the guise of pursuing legibility, the modern state underwent a significant transformation in its identity: from acting as a "custodian manager" to behaving as an "owner" of common and societal resources. Modern governments have a responsibility to protect them for the benefit of current and future generations, including vulnerable communities, migrants, and refugees who reside in a place out of necessity or choice. However, in practice, modern governments often act as private 'owners' of society, prioritizing profit motives under the pretext of achieving legibility. While these characteristics broadly apply to most modern states, certain socio-political contexts push some states into a further stage, which I term "squatter government". In this stage, the pursuit of 'legitimacy' becomes a tool for confiscating communal and private resources for profit, often at the expense of the most vulnerable and marginalized populations. Evidence from the ZoorAbad case-study and similar cases, such as Roshankouh, reveals a government that not only neglects its custodian role to protect the interests of its people, especially the most vulnerable, but also actively âconfiscatesâ common lands, as well as public and private properties. Such governments can therefore be described as âsquatter governmentsâ. The key characteristics of âsquatter governmentsâ include: 1- Confiscating common lands â achieved through urban development projects, privatization, and manipulation of urban policies and plans. 2- Engaging in financial corruption â particularly in the management of public resources and projects. âª "Government-facilitated real estate corruption" manifest in several ways: 1) the commodification of public land, presented as financial provision for socially-oriented urban development projects, such as social housing; 2) the shifting of strategies and plans over time to minimize the benefits that should have been allocated to the urban poor and vulnerable groups; and 3) the appropriation of common resources and benefits for the 289 gain of specific, well-connected agents and groups within the squatter government. 3- Frequent changes in planning â altering plans at various stages of the planning process to create additional opportunities for profit from resources allocated to specific projects. 4- Stigmatizing properties of marginalized people â especially targeting their self-built settlements. 5- Undermining âgrassroot developmentâ â discrediting efforts led by marginalized communities and the urban poor. 6- Confiscating properties and grassroot development initiatives â labeling and stigmatizing them as illegal to justify their seizure and suppression. As discussed in the previous subsection, the Iranian government exploited common lands to finance the "Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad". By shifting the strategy from 'key-to-key' to 'housing for money' the squatter government profited immensely by introducing the 640 hectares of land into the formal housing market, benefiting connected developers rather than addressing the needs of displaced residents. According to Qasemi (2010), Baharestan â a neighborhood built under the Improvement Plan to relocate ZoorAbad residents â included 214 villa-style houses, but only eight families moved there (81-83). Despite demolishing 4000 housing units in ZoorAbad and allocating 640 hectares of land for the plan, the squatter government blocked the transfer of these houses to displaced residents, renting most of them to middle-class, non-ZoorAbadi tenants. Several housing cooperatives from Tehran province and individual investors purchased residential plots in Baharestan for investment purposes or to accommodate the middle class, a significant departure from the plan's original intent (Qasemi, 2010, 81-83). To further illustrate this approach, consider an example of how the majority of the 640 hectares of lands was misused for speculative housing construction in the formal market, rather than being utilized to provide housing for the displaced residents of ZoorAbad. This example also sheds light on why the government shifted its initial strategy from 'key-to-key' to 'housing for money'. According to Qasemi (2010), one of the buyers of land plots designated for the ZoorAbad Improvement Plan reported purchasing a 75,000 square meter 290 plot from the allocated 640 hectares in 2001, at a rate of 10,000 Tomans per square meter. On this plot, residential units of 350 square meters each, spread across four floors with two units per floor, were constructed and sold to owners at a rate of 135,000 Tomans per square meter. By 2010, these units were being sold for 800,000 Tomans per square meter (Qasemi, 2010, 86). This case exemplifies how institutions of the squatter government and their technocrats engaged in significant corruption, exploiting common resources intended to subsidize housing for displaced ZoorAbad residents. The squatter government profited dramatically by shifting the strategy from 'key-to-key' to 'housing for money'. Beyond the questionable rationale for allocating 640 hectares of land to relocate 30,000 residents who originally occupied only 72 hectares of ZoorAbad, the transition from 'key-to-key' to 'housing for money' created a lucrative context for the state. This shift allowed governmental institutions and connected elites overseeing the ZoorAbad Improvement Plan to confiscate properties from low-income groups while generating significant profits for themselves. The explanation above reveals the dual intentions of the "squatter government" concerning the ZoorAbad neighborhood. Initially, allocating land approximately 12 times the area destroyed in ZoorAbad under the guise of the "Improvement Plan" marked the first step towards the primarily goal of the "squatter government". Although this allocated land was more than sufficient to implement the 'key-to-key' strategy for relocating ZoorAbad residents to new housing on designated lands, the "squatter government" shifted its strategy from key-to-key to a housing-for-money strategy, citing a lack of financial resources as justification for the change. The "squatter government" not only failed to use the 640 hectares of common land to improve the living conditions of ZoorAbad's residents but also misused these common resources on two distinct levels: 1) Misusing urban development programs: appropriating public resources and converting them into private properties for oligarchs and political elites under the pretense of urban development. 2) Exploiting ZoorAbad residents: confiscating land from ZoorAbad residents under the pretext of the "Improvement Plan," ultimately repurposing it for speculative profit-making ventures. 291 Regarding the confiscation of residents' lands and grassroot development in ZoorAbad, a few key points deserve emphasis. As previously noted, one characteristic of the squatter government is its frequent alteration of registered plans and strategies. In October 1979, the Karaj municipality allocated land in ZoorAbad to the individuals who had constructed building on them. Additionally, during the early years of the Islamic Revolution, the government informally issued permits to urban poor residents, allowing them to construct housing in the ZoorAbad settlement. As a result, ownership of these lands and the developments upon them was transferred to ZoorAbad settlers, thereby legalizing and formally recognizing the grassroots development initiated by the urban poor. Approximately a decade later, with the introduction of the âImprovement Plan of ZoorAbad,â the government took its first steps toward pacifying the neighborhood and confiscating the âgrassroot developmentâ achieved by the urban poor. This shift in approach can be better understood through Scott's (2020 [1998]) insights into the status of common properties: While "common property was abundant and had essentially no fiscal value, the illegibility of its tenure was no problem. But the moment it became scarce, it became the subject of property rights in law, whether of the state or of the citizens" (Scott, 2020 [1998], p. 39). Scott's theoretical framework helps explain the Islamic government's shift in policy a few years after the revolution. Initially, the abundance of land resources around Tehran allowed the Islamic state to permit the urban poor to build their own housing. However, a decade later, as resources became scarce, state policies shifted toward promoting more legible and orderly neighborhoods and urban spaces, directly opposing the spontaneous growth of informal settlements that had been tolerated in early years. This shift, along with the demolition of the ZoorAbad neighborhood, represents an attempt to make urban space legible, driven by a deeper intention to enhance control and profitability by producing uniform and efficient commodities for greater profit. Le Corbusier, an influential architect in high-modernist city design, criticized slums for their lack of discipline and order, as well as their potential to pose a revolutionary threat to governmental authority (Scott, 2020 [1998], p. 116). In this context, the modern state could not tolerate the informal, organic, heterogenous self-built settlements and their properties, which did not fit the ideal 292 commodities for the market. This is why, in recent years, both national and local governments have treated the ZoorAbad neighborhood in various urban plans as vacant land, disregarding its residents and presenting it as an attractive investment opportunity for the upper-middle class. This characteristic of the modern state is highly useful for the squatter government. In other words, the modern state's eagerness to create homogenous urban spaces enables squatter governments to carry out their confiscation plans under the guise of promoting homogeneity and legibility. Once again, squatter governments rely on fitting within modern states, exploiting their tools and mindset to pursue their own goals and projects. Jane Jacobs, a notable critic of high-modernist urbanism, argues that order arises from daily practices, contrasting with Le Corbusier's perspective that geometric order inherently leads to effective systems for meeting daily needs (Scott, 2020 [1998], pp. 132-136). In this context, while the Iranian state, through the Improvement Plan of ZoorAbad, aimed to make the neighborhood 'legible' and 'organized' by deconstructing the grassroots and organic urban space in the area, it may have overlooked the fact that "order arises from daily practices" in urban spaces, as Jacobs suggested. Aligned with this historical amnesia of the modern state, I strongly believe that this forgetfulness serves the modern state's profit interests. Apart from taking control over physical and social spaces, this modernist urbanism facilitates the emergence and strengthening of a squatter government. This type of government, instead of focusing on redistributing common resources among residents â especially vulnerable groups â prioritizes seizing control of these resources for speculative activities. What are the implications of a squatter government seizing control of common resources and converting them into private lands? While the consequences and implications are wide-ranging, I aim to frame a few key aspects through the lens of relationship between commons and community. Episode 50 of the Urban Political podcast, titled Community and Commons (Blokland, 2022), offers a thoughtful exploration of this interrelation, as elaborated by the episode's guests. Based on the discussion in the podcast episode (Blockland, 2022), common, community, and communing are three interrelated concepts, none of which can exist without the others (Volont, 2019). Communing activities â seen as a force opposing privatization and an act of 293 reclaiming spaces and commons98â must be centered around a common resource (as elaborated by Elinor Ostrom in 1990) and carried out by community of people (Volont, 2019). These three elements are clearly illustrated in tangible examples like urban Community Gardens99 and Community Land Trust (CLTs). In the case of CLTs, the common resource is the land, communing refers to the collective governance system designed to keep land and building prices stable, and keeping them out of the market, and finally, the community consists of the people actively involved in these communal activities (Volont, 2019). According to the podcast (Blockland, 2022), the critical element in the emergence of a community, is doing together â a communing activity â rather than owning together. Since commons always require a community to look after them, there can be no commons without a community, and no community without commons or communing (Blockland, 2022) (Volont, 2019) (Stavrides, 2015). Based on this discussion, I argue that the most significant implication of a squatter government lies in its elimination of the concept of community, driven by the eradication of common resources. As a squatter government targets common resources and seeks to privatize them, one critical consequence â beyond the numerous implications of such as approach â is the destruction of community and the social bonds that emerge from shared responsibility for caring for these resources. In other words, the consequences of a squatter government extend beyond the spatial aspects of cities â such as the lack of adequate social housing, the depletion of common resources, and the disappearance of inclusive public spaces. These implications also permeate the social fabric of societies, leading to weakened social ties and the gradual disintegration of communities. To sum up this section and the entire thesis, I would like to summarize the implications as well as the latent drivers of the squatter government, based on the information I have gathered from the ZoorAbad and Roshankouh neighborhoods in Iran. - The squatter government has been a dominant key player in the housing crisis for vulnerable groups: 98 According to Harvey in Rebel Cities. 99 In the example of Urban Community Garden, ground/land is a common resource), gardening is the activity of communing, and community of people are those doing the gardening. 294 o In the absence of social housing in Iran, not only did the squatter government fail to provide affordable options for vulnerable groups, but it also eliminated self-built housing, which could and should be considered an alternative to social housing. o The common characteristics shared by modern states and squatter governments lie in their emphasis on the uniformity of spaces, treating them as 'resources' to be transformed into 'commodities' for profit. âSquatter governmentsâ target vulnerable groups such as the urban poor and minorities, as well as common resources, with the aim of seizing citizens' properties. Informal settlements, as alternatives to social housing, do not easily integrate into the formal real estate market for speculative activities. Therefore, squatter governments seek to eliminate heterogenous spaces and replace them with more homogenous, profitable property commodities. In this context, marginalized groups have been considered the easiest targets for property appropriation and confiscation. - One of the major implications of the squatter government has been the eradication of common resources. o Destroying and eliminating common resources has numerous implications. The accessibility of common spaces for citizens is affected, and through the privatization of those common spaces, not only has the natural environment been increasingly impacted by a consumption-driven lifestyle, but social bonds among different groups and individuals have also been dramatically affected. These issues could be compounded by future generations and their rights to these potential resources. - Another implication of the squatter government is confiscation, elimination, and, in the long term, the banning of 'communing'. o Communing refers to collective activities conducted on common resources or lands. In the case of ZoorAbad, initiatives such as grassroot development of the neighborhood, including demanding and requesting the provision of urban 295 utilities and the construction of roads and alleys, could be considered examples of communing by the residents of ZoorAbad on a common basis. Unfortunately, the squatter government not only confiscated these acts of communing (which included achievements like urban utilities and grassroots development that facilitated future gentrification in the neighborhood) but also banned any possibility for the emergence of communing. This has also been observed in the case of Roshankouh. o Regarding the squatter government's approach to grassroots development in the context of lacking social services in ZoorAbad, the urban poor have significantly contributed to the neighborhood's grassroots "development" over the past five decades through what Asef Bayat terms "non-movement." However, under the guise of an urban development plan, the squatter government has also confiscated this grassroots development. For instance, through the initiatives of the urban poor in ZoorAbad, the area has been connected to urban utilities, providing proper infrastructure that the squatter government has subsequently used for market-driven development. - Another implication of the squatter government is the elimination of communities: o The squatter government not only eradicates common resources and communality but also destroys the very possibility of community existence. In my view, the government has systematically sought to privatize common lands in ZoorAbad through various actions, including policies that ignore opportunities to preserve these lands out of market for public use and instead enable their trade and exchange for profit. Furthermore, the government initiated a pacification process through gentrification, which serves as a way to immunize broader society from the perceived threat of the urban poor and their stigmatized representation. In essence, the squatter government eliminates the existence of community itself. This dynamic is evident in both the Roshankouh and ZoorAbad cases. In conclusion, the concept of the "squatter government" provides a lens to understand how modern states can exploit their authority and tools, originally designed for public 296 stewardship, to confiscate, commodify, and privatize common resources. As demonstrated in the cases of ZoorAbad and Roshankouh, this phenomenon not only exacerbates the housing crisis and marginalization of vulnerable groups but also undermines the social fabric by dismantling grassroots development, eradicating common resources, and ultimately, eliminating the foundation of communal life. The actions of the squatter government blur the line between governance and exploitation, replacing public responsibility with profit-driven motives. By targeting self-built (informal) settlements, seizing communal spaces, and stifling collective action, the squatter government perpetuates inequality and alienation while advancing speculative urban development. Understanding and addressing these dynamics is critical to advocating for equitable urban policies that prioritize the needs of marginalized communities and foster sustainable and inclusive urban environments. 297 6. Concluding Chapter 6.1. Essence of the thesis My personal concern with the issue of urban inequalities â or, more specifically, socio-spatial inequalities in our built environment â has crystallized in this Ph.D. research. One of the main manifestations of socio-spatial inequalities in contemporary cities is the housing crisis faced by the most vulnerable urban groups. Therefore, I chose to study how the urban poor in Iran have addressed their housing needs through grassroots initiatives. The decision to focus on an "informal" neighborhood, or what I refer to as self-built housing, stems from several reasons that I explain in the first chapter. Studying a neighborhood in an ordinary city in a Global South country provides valuable insights and adds new layers of understanding to urban studies literature, which is often dominated by case studies from the Global North. As an Iranian researcher from a non-Global North country, I saw this as a unique opportunity to study housing issues affecting the urban poor in Iran, a context I am personally familiar with. In this thesis, I conducted eight months of field-study in a neighborhood named ZoorAbad, where the urban poor â primarily rural migrants â have constructed their own homes over the past five to six decades. Through this research, I sought to explore the issue of informal housing through the lens of political economy, with a focus on uncovering the agency of the urban poor. The objectives of this research were: 1) Document, analyze, and evaluate the relevant policies and plans. 2) Identify and evaluate key housing market actors in ZoorAbad. 3) Document and evaluate the grassroots strategies used by the urban poor in Iran over the past 40 years to address housing issues. 298 In Chapter 1, the introduction, I provided a brief and holistic overview of the socio-spatial atmosphere of the neighborhood, the aims and objectives of the research, and my position as the researcher in this project. I explained how and why I became connected to the topic and the case study. Within this chapter, the issue of informal housing and slum dwelling is discussed under the broader concept of tenure insecurity. The concept of illegality as an absolute characteristic of self-built settlements is critically examined, with these self-built (informal) settlements positioned as in-between entities within the spectrum of legality and illegality. The concept of "legibility" and "standardization", as promoted by modern states, are explored through the lens of Scott's (2020) book Seeing Like a State. I extended Scott's arguments about the modern state to include the concept of squatter government. In this chapter, I also reflect on how my identity as a Baha'i individual, having experienced firsthand discrimination and oppression by the Iranian government, has shaped my concern for addressing socio-spatial injustice in society. In Chapter 2, the methodology and methods employed in this research are described. The primary approach of the thesis is qualitative. By employing Burawoy's extended-case method and an ethnographic approach, I sought to assemble multiple layers of information and understanding about the neighborhood and its history, relevant policies and urban plannings initiatives, as well as the ethnographic narratives of its residents. By employing the extended-case method, I situated each piece of data or narrative within the broader social, spatial, political, and economic contexts of Iran and its Middle Eastern regional network, of which the neighborhood of ZoorAbad is a part. This approach enabled me to construct the two main arguments of my thesis: first, that self-built settlements can serve as an alternative to social housing, as second, the concept of squatter government. The remainder of Chapter Two provides explanations of the methods used in this research, including semi-structured interviews, the questions for the interviewees, and a list of participants. It also discusses walking and observing as two interrelated methods for gathering data in the neighborhood. In the final section of the chapter, I describe the research methods employed in the study of Roshankouh, as extra supporting case. While ZoorAbad serves as the central case of this research, the supporting case of Roshankouh extends and strengthens the core arguments by illustrating the dialectical relationship between the state 299 and marginalized communities beyond urban settings. This comparative approach is made possible through the use of the extended-case method, which serves as the primary methodological framework of the study. Despite key differences â such as the urban nature of ZoorAbad versus the rural context of Roshankouh, and the urban poor's occupation of land in ZoorAbad versus the long-standing land ownership of Roshankouh's residents â both cases are united by their shared experience of state-imposed marginality. In both instances, informality plays a central role: ZoorAbad emerged through unregulated, self-built housing, while rural spaces generally, including Roshankouh, are often classified as informal due to their spatial illegibility. Another similar experience between the two cases is the demolition of housing by the state and its affiliated agencies. Chapter 3 critically examines the relationship between modernization and housing informality in Iran, focusing on ZoorAbad as a case study. It challenges the prevailing assumption that modernization leads to the gradual decline of informal housing, demonstrating instead that modernization has often generated and intensified informality. Although the primary focus of this research is on the past four decades, following the Islamic revolution, this chapter traces the historical development of housing practices since the 1900s. It reveals how the transition from pre-modern informal housing systems in traditional Mahallehs â rooted in ethnic and tribal bonds â to a centralized, market-based housing regime disrupted traditional power dynamics between tenants and landlords. This disruption, compounded by socio-political upheavals, fueled rural-to-urban migration, creating a demand for affordable housing for the new working class. In the absence of adequate facilities to meet this need, the number of "informal settlements" or as referred to in this thesis, self-built settlements in suburban areas increased significantly. The chapter focuses on the housing crisis following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, explaining how the pro-poor rhetoric and policies of the Islamic regime led to the increasing number of informal settlements. Despite these rhetorics, the chapter examines how the Islamic government's approach remained market-oriented and how these policies, along with the pro-poor rhetoric, actually incentivized rural-to-urban migration. In the absence of a sufficient and cohesive plan for providing affordable housing, this led to a dramatic increase 300 in informal housing, which resulted in doubling Tehran's boundaries during the first two years after the revolution, from 1979-1982. In the middle of the chapter, the constitutional articles of the Islamic regime are examined to understand how pro-poor and social justice rhetoric is reflected in them. Subsequently, some affordable housing plans and policies from this period are introduced â including Urban land codes, New Towns, the Mehr Housing project, and social housing policies â and their effectiveness is critically discussed. By advocating for a reconceptualization of "informality" through the theoretical framework of Holston (1999), this chapter reimagines the potential of self-built settlements as a grassroots solution. The chapter then examines the dominant characteristics of Iran's housing movement, known as 'quiet encroachment,' through the lens of Bayat (2013), which contributed to the rise of self-built settlements. By situating ZoorAbad within the broader narrative of Iran's urban development, the chapter argues for viewing informality as a grassroots response to systemic housing challenges. Also, it highlights how the government has sought to confiscate the grassroots efforts and developments of the urban poor through urban planning and policy making tools. The case of ZoorAbad, serving as the focal point of this research, exemplifies these dynamics, revealing the persistent struggle between self-built housing efforts and state intervention. Chapter 4 delves deeper into the theoretical frameworks and explores the dynamics of housing markets, the state's involvement in regulating them, and how these dynamics have shifted from the pre-modern era to the neoliberal era, resulting in a tension between use-value and exchange-value of housing. It situates its discussion within the broader theoretical frameworks of political economy and critical urban studies. Despite neoliberal claims of minimal state intervention, the chapter argued that contemporary modern states continue to play a significant role in regulating or deregulating housing markets. While the state is expected to safeguard the use-value of housing for low-income populations, historical regulations have predominantly favored the exchange-value of housing, benefitted elites and exacerbated socio-economic inequalities. Through the lens of ZoorAbadâs development, the chapter highlighted how grassroots initiatives have prioritized use-value, framing housing as a basic need and social good. Conversely, it highlighted how the Islamic state's intervention 301 in ZoorAbad have prioritized the exchange-value of housing, favouring speculative activities and further deepening inequalities. The chapter begins by examining housing rights and the political economy as frameworks for understanding the complexities of housing issues. Given the strong interconnection between housing and socio-political and economic contexts, it discusses the rationale for employing political economy and critical urban studies as theoretical frameworks to understand housing issues. The chapter highlights the role of global neoliberal ideologies in shaping local housing policies, even in contexts like Iran, which is relatively isolated from global markets. It explores the intertwined nature of the state and the market, as well as their historical emergence. Understanding this relationship is crucial for analyzing the impact of neoliberal policies, as seen in ZoorAbad, where socio-economic inequalities are exacerbated by the stat's alignment with market-driven priorities. The chapter argues that the promotion of regulation through modernization projects often leads to deregulation, marking a shift in the modernization process commonly associated with neoliberalism. In ZoorAbad, these policies have materialized in informal settlements, where residents face challenges such as gentrification, stigmatization, and displacement, rooted in the state's prioritization of exchange-value over use-value. A significant portion of the chapter is devoted to gentrification as a global phenomenon resulting from the prioritization of exchange-value in housing, framed within the growth machine theory by Molotch and Logan (2007). According to them, the key players in the growth machine â or defenders of housing's exchange value â include politicians, legislators, the real estate and banking sectors, local media, urban utilities, organized labor, small retailers, and corporate capitalists. The chapter discusses how these key players may vary across different socio-political contexts. The chapter concludes by discussing the dual nature of housing as both a commodity and a basic need, examining how prioritizing its exchange-value over use-value exacerbates socio-economic inequalities and alienation. In the short and medium term, the winners of this speculative game include real estate developers and financial institutions, while the losers are low-income households. Also, in this chapter, I applied this lens to understand the various 302 characteristics of the neighborhood and how each can be attributed to the use-value and exchange-value of housing. Challenges such as limited infrastructure, inadequate services, and the gradual onset of gentrification are integral to the neighborhood's reality and characteristics, affecting both the use-value and exchange value of housing â issues could be addressed by the government. Despite these challenges, the neighborhood is characterized by human-scale architecture, diverse facades, and a mix of residential and commercial functions. Additionally, the impact of the Improvement Plan on the neighborhood has been significant, affecting the spatial integrity of the area. Regarding the socio-cultural characteristics of the neighborhood, factors such as security, surveillance, local control, and social bonds have contributed to increasing the use-value of housing in ZoorAbad. On the other hand, stigmatization, drug dealing, and violence negatively affect the exchange value of housing and, in some cases, the use-value as well. However, the government interventions through the Improvement Plan were not designed to address these issues in ways that would enhance the use-value of housing for residents. Instead, the plan primarily aims to increase the exchange value of housing in the long-term through gentrification. Finally, I discussed how ZoorAbad has undergone significant transformations due to various factors, including policies like the Improvement plan, broader regional dynamics such as the influx of Afghan refugees driven by political crises, and Iran's ongoing economic challenges. These shifts have led to changes in the socio-cultural characteristics of the neighborhood. The housing challenges faced by the residents of ZoorAbad are multifaceted. Stigmatization and racism are significant issues, particularly by younger Iranian residents, while Afghan residents face compounded challenges, including racial prejudice. Accessibility is another difficulty, as ZoorAbad's location in a marginal area often places it far from key services and amenities. High rent prices further strain residents' ability to secure stable accommodation. The perception of residents in ZoorAbad toward their self-built housing has shifted over time. Initially, they seized public land to create shelter, prioritizing the use-value of housing. However, over the decades, as land prices soared, their focus increasingly shifted toward the exchange-value of housing in their everyday activities. This shift reflects the broader, state-303 promoted approach to land, which emphasizes its speculative and economic value over its essential purpose as a place to live. The challenges faced by ZoorAbadâs residents exemplify the broader struggles of marginalized communities living in self-built settlements. By shifting the focus from the commodification of housing to its use-value, this chapter calls for more equitable urban policies that prioritize human needs and social cohesion over profit. In chapter 5, I explored the concept of the "squatter government" and its implications for urban housing and planning in Iran. The squatter government refers to a government that not only exploits common resources for the benefit of its affiliated institutions and agents, but also extracts the remaining resources from low-income and vulnerable groups for profit and other purposes. These purposes may include the pacification of specific racial, ethnic, religious, or economic minorities and disadvantaged groups. The concept of the squatter government thus provides a critical framework for understanding the structural forces driving housing informality and urban inequality in Iran. In this chapter, I reviewed the players in the housing market in ZoorAbad, including the government, property owners (the private sector), the construction industry, banks, religious institutions, and Afghan refugees. I argued why and how the state has been the dominant force in ZoorAbad's housing market, making significant interventions through its powerful tools, such as urban planning, space management, financial resource control, and decision-making capabilities to manipulate both common and private resources. The state's role in the neighborhood has not been that of a provider or custodian, but rather that of an initiator of speculative activities, ultimately leading to spatial and financial corruption. This chapter provided a detailed analysis of various documents and plans related to ZoorAbad and illustrated how, at different stages of the Improvement Plan the squatter government created various opportunities for extracting these resources in multiple ways. The vagueness surrounding regulations, the absence of a specific timeline for implementing these plans, and a focus on gentrification were among the primary methods of resource extraction under the guise of improving the neighborhood. 304 Despite its differences from ZoorAbad, the supporting case of Roshankouh complements it by shedding light on the broader mechanisms through which the modern state engages with marginalized communities. ZoorAbad, as the primary case study, reveals the dialectical tension between grassroots housing practices and state interventions, demonstrating how informality is not merely a condition but a politically constructed category shaped by the state's selective enforcement of regulations. Roshankoush, though a rural and religious minority community, provides a critical extension of this argument by showing that similar patterns of marginalization and state-led expropriation occur outside urban centers as well. Together, these cases reinforce the central thesis that the state, through urban planning and policymaking tools, function not only as a regulator of space but also as a speculator and squatter â appropriating both public and private resources of marginalized populations to advance its own political and economic agendas. Moreover, these dynamics are not unique to Iran. Similar patterns of commodification and marginalization are evident globally, particularly in contexts where neoliberal policies dominate urban governance. However, the resilience of grassroots initiatives, as seen in self-built settlements, offers a counter-narrative to these exploitative practices. These informal spaces demonstrate the capacity of marginalized communities to create alternative social and spatial arrangements, highlighting the importance of inclusive and equitable urban policies. Ultimately, addressing the challenges posed by the squatter government requires a fundamental shift in urban governance priorities. Policymakers must reimagine housing solutions that prioritize use value over exchange value, empower grassroots initiatives, and foster communal bonds. By critically examining and confronting the exploitative practices of the squatter government, we can work toward sustainable and just urban futures that center the needs of the most vulnerable. 6.2. Limitations of the research In this section, I will reflect on the limitations of this research and evaluate its potential areas for further exploration. 305 One limitation of this research is that I was unable to conduct interviews or establish stronger connections with urban planners and policymakers directly involved in the Improvement Plan in Iran. This limitation was due to the socio-political situation in the country. As a Baha'i scholar affiliated with a "foreign" university, conducting research in Iran posed significant risks, including the possibility of being arrested by the Islamic government as a "foreign spy". Given these circumstances, I did not have the opportunity to connect with pertinent planning organizations or their affiliated planners. Secondly, due to the scope of the research, I was unable to dedicate more time to an in-depth theoretical review or explore additional theoretical concepts relevant to the thesis. For instance, further exploration of the conceptualization of the "commons" or a broader literature review on social housing could have enriched the study. Building on this limitation, reviewing more recent initiatives in urban literature, such as the concepts of "Common Land Trust", or DIY (Do It Yourself) Urbanism, could have expanded my understanding and undoubtedly enriched the arguments in this research. Another limitation of this research is related to my subjectivity as a researcher. My ethical and value framework, shaped by various forces throughout my life, has led me to engage with "Leftist" theoretical frameworks, theories, and scholars. This presumption may have limited my ability to see and understand the implications of self-built settlements, such as those in ZoorAbad neighborhood, or to analyze the broader housing crisis through alternative theoretical lenses. Additionally, the scope of this research prevented me from conducting a comparative analysis between the neighborhood of ZoorAbad and another similar low-income but officially planned and constructed neighborhood in Karaj or its vicinity. Comparing a self-built (informal) settlement with a planned (formal) neighborhood for low-income residents could have provided a clearer or more precise understanding of the unique characteristics, challenges, and opportunities of self-built settlements. Unfortunately, due to time constraints and the scope of this research, I could not carry out this comparison. Additionally, during my PhD journey, I faced difficulties with supervision, having to change two previous supervisors who, unfortunately, did not provide sufficient guidance during the research and writing process. I consider myself fortunate to have been supervised by Dr. 306 Nathan Lauster in the final year of my thesis. His guidance significantly helped me rearticulate the main arguments of my thesis, refine my writing, and reconsider various aspects of my work. This experience has provided me with a strong foundation to expand my academic activities and contribute to improving urban contexts and advancing the rights of ordinary people to their cities. 6.3. Further Research Directions and Possible Applications of the findings The findings of this research have the potential to be applied both implicitly and explicitly in housing policies and urban policymaking processes in Iran and in the Middle East region. Also, one of the broader implications of the findings of this research (especially the squatter government concept) would be the emergence of some civil society initiatives for observing and controlling state intervention in urban spaces. While this thesis aimed to shed light on certain aspects of the housing crisis faced by the urban poor in Iran and sought to identify the key drivers behind this crisis, it also opens the door to numerous avenues for further research in related areas. For instance, investigating urban legal processes is one such areas, focusing on the legal frameworks and procedures required to formally recognize self-built settlements as a viable alternative to social housing in Iran. Exploring the concept of the "squatter government" presents another avenue for further research. This investigation would examine the characteristics and implications of the "squatter government" concept in different contexts and across various regions. Another research area would involve studying legal conflicts in housing recognition. This research would focus on the legal challenges and conflicts surrounding the legitimization of self-built settlements constructed on common lands. It would also address the question: How can these settlements be integrated into formal housing policies as viable alternatives to traditional social housing? 307 Tracing squatter governments is another potential area of research. Conducting fieldwork and comparative studies across diverse societies and countries could help identify evidence of squatter governments. A central hypothesis is that modern states, particularly in the neoliberal era, exhibit squatter government tendencies characterized by the confiscation of common resources and the privatization of communal spaces such as forests, lakes, shores, mountains, and public parks. Refining the concept of the 'common' is another critical area of research that needs further exploration. This involves engaging in theoretical research to deepen the understanding of the "common" and distinguish it from the "public," shedding light on their respective roles in urban planning and resource management. These efforts represent significant avenues for further research. Finally, exploring alternatives to social housing could be another important area of research, focusing on community-driven and innovative approaches to traditional social housing across the globe. This research could provide insights into models that go beyond state-imposed solutions, fostering sustainable, community-driven, and inclusive housing practices. This research directions build upon the insights of this thesis and aim to contribute further to the discourse on housing justice, governance, and urban resilience. * In conclusion, this thesis was an effort to raise a critical inquiry into the socio-spatial inequalities that manifest through housing crises in urban Iran, with a focus on grassroots responses to these challenges, in ZoorAbad. This research contributes to the broader understanding of informal housing, reframing it as an alternative to conventional social housing rather than merely a symptom of urban poverty. The development of the "squatter government" framework sheds light on the extractive dynamics of state interventions in housing markets and their implications for marginalized communities. 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Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Interdisciplinary Studies
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Lauster, Nathanael Thomas, 1972-
Shipley, Paul
Self-built settlements in Iran as an alternative to social housing : urban poor housing strategies & the state's role in the expropriation of informal spaces : a case-study of Zoorabad-Karaj
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