"Arts, Faculty of"@en . "Asian Studies, Department of"@en . "DSpace"@en . "UBCV"@en . "De Jesus, Abraham Marier"@en . "2010-04-14T16:21:52Z"@en . "2010"@en . "Master of Arts - MA"@en . "University of British Columbia"@en . "Chad Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s interpretations of Warring States (475 B.C. \u00E2\u0080\u0093 221 B.C.) Chinese logic have long dominated the field. While Hansen has had his critics, there has been a general acceptance of many of his important contributions. In addition, the development and criticism of his interpretations have generally tended to create further confusion over the key philosophical concepts in Chinese logic. Among Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s many contributions to the field of Chinese logic a few are foundational to the study of logic: one, that Chinese thought has no concept of truth; two, that Classical Chinese nouns are analogous to mass nouns in English; three, that, because Chinese philosophy is nominalistic, it has no role for abstract theories like essences, Platonic forms, or ideas; four, that Chinese ontology is mereological and without a concept of membership or class. \nUsing Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s body of work this thesis provides a critical reexamination of the foundations of Chinese logic. It ultimately demonstrates that, contrary to Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s theories, Chinese thought can be plausibly interpreted to have the following characteristics: first, there is a concept of truth that may be identified as a \u00E2\u0080\u0098na\u00C3\u00AFve correspondence theory of truth\u00E2\u0080\u0099 in Later Mohist thought; second, nouns in Classical Chinese are neither mass nouns nor count nouns; third, some concept of \u00E2\u0080\u0098essence\u00E2\u0080\u0099 plays an important role in Xunzi\u00E2\u0080\u0099s thought; and, fourth, that Chinese thought, in general, has a notion of class and class membership. These conclusions are demonstrated by using a dual methodology of pluralism and embodied cognition to interpret key claims by important Warring States thinkers."@en . "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/23495?expand=metadata"@en . "THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHINESE LOGIC by ABRAHAM MARIER DE JESUS B.A., The University of British Columbia, 2007 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Asian Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) April 2010 \u00C2\u00A9 Abraham Marier De Jesus, 2010 ii Abstract Chad Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s interpretations of Warring States (475 B.C. \u00E2\u0080\u0093 221 B.C.) Chinese logic have long dominated the field. While Hansen has had his critics, there has been a general acceptance of many of his important contributions. In addition, the development and criticism of his interpretations have generally tended to create further confusion over the key philosophical concepts in Chinese logic. Among Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s many contributions to the field of Chinese logic a few are foundational to the study of logic: one, that Chinese thought has no concept of truth; two, that Classical Chinese nouns are analogous to mass nouns in English; three, that, because Chinese philosophy is nominalistic, it has no role for abstract theories like essences, Platonic forms, or ideas; four, that Chinese ontology is mereological and without a concept of membership or class. Using Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s body of work this thesis provides a critical reexamination of the foundations of Chinese logic. It ultimately demonstrates that, contrary to Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s theories, Chinese thought can be plausibly interpreted to have the following characteristics: first, there is a concept of truth that may be identified as a \u00E2\u0080\u0098na\u00C3\u00AFve correspondence theory of truth\u00E2\u0080\u0099 in Later Mohist thought; second, nouns in Classical Chinese are neither mass nouns nor count nouns; third, some concept of \u00E2\u0080\u0098essence\u00E2\u0080\u0099 plays an important role in Xunzi\u00E2\u0080\u0099s thought; and, fourth, that Chinese thought, in general, has a notion of class and class membership. These conclusions are demonstrated by using a dual methodology of pluralism and embodied cognition to interpret key claims by important Warring States thinkers. iii Table of Contents !\"#$%&'$((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((())! *&\"+,-./-0.1$,1$# ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((( )))! !'21.3+,45,6,1$#((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((( 7! 8(-91$%.4:'$).1((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((8! 8(8! ;<&$-)#-0<)1,#,-=.5)'> ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((( 8! 8(?! 0<&4-@&1#,1-&14-0<)1,#,-=.5)'(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((( A! 8(B! *<,#)#-C%5&1)D&$).1 (((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((( E! ?(-F,$<.4.+.5)'&+-G,/+,'$).1#((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((H! ?(8! @&1#,1I#-J0.<,%,1$-*<,.%K-./-F,$<.4.+.5KI(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((( H! ?(?! L:,$$I#-0%)$)')#6-./-$<,-M##,1$)&+)#$NM7.+:$).1&%K-F,$<.4.+.5)'&+-- O%&6,3.%2# (((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((8?! ?(B! F,$<.4.+.5)'&+-P:55,#$).1#(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((8E! \"#$#%!&'()*'+,-############################################################################################################################################### %.! \"#$#\"!/-012+32!4156+7+16 ######################################################################################################################## \"%! B(-*%:$<((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((( ?Q! B(8! 0<&4-@&1#,1I#-!''.:1$-./-*%:$<-)1-M&%+K-0<)1,#,-*<.:5<$ ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((?Q! B(?! !-G,7),3-./-$<,-0%)$)')#6#-./-@&1#,1I#-!''.:1$-./-*%:$<(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((?R! B(B! *<,-JS&T7,I-0.%%,#U.14,1',-*<,.%K-./-*%:$<-)1-0<)1,#,-L<)+.#.U?@A+8BCD>EF0G)\u00C2\u0085=#<,\u00C2\u0086\u00C2\u0081A8\u00C2\u00877\u00C2\u0085>0\u00C2\u0088\u00C2\u0080<}\u007F\u00C2\u00800\u00C2\u0089u <-\u00C2\u008A\u00C2\u008B\u00C2\u0088,\u00C2\u008C>\u00C2\u0088\u00C2\u00808\u00C2\u008DI/01+2A8,\u00C2\u0086\u00C2\u008E0\u00C2\u008F>8 57 second part suggests that there is something more to similarity than just physical characteristics. In the second part Xunzi explains what he means by \u00E2\u0080\u0098overall knowledge.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 It is quite clear that Xunzi creates a mild form of dualism for the xin (}) \u00E2\u0080\u009Cheart-mind.\u00E2\u0080\u009D In many ways, this passage is a stereotypical instance of xin as both \u00E2\u0080\u0098heart\u00E2\u0080\u0099 and \u00E2\u0080\u0098mind.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 The \u00E2\u0080\u0098heart\u00E2\u0080\u0099 function serves to differentiate emotions and the \u00E2\u0080\u0098mind\u00E2\u0080\u0099 function serves the purpose of \u00E2\u0080\u0098overall knowledge.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 Moreover, if we look more closely at the metaphor Xunzi is using in this passage to describe the \u00E2\u0080\u0098heavenly organs\u00E2\u0080\u0099 we begin to notice that he is also creating a hierarchy between the sensory organs and xin: Xunzi uses guan (7) as the word for \u00E2\u0080\u0098organ\u00E2\u0080\u0099 but its basic meaning is \u00E2\u0080\u009Cofficial.\u00E2\u0080\u009D While it could be argued that Xunzi\u00E2\u0080\u0099s word choice is incidental, a key phrase from the second part makes it clear that Xunzi purposefully chose this metaphor: \u00E2\u0080\u009C,0\u007F\u00C2\u0080\u00C2\u0082\u00C2\u0083\u00C2\u008467>)\u00C2\u0085=#\u00E2\u0080\u009D (\u00E2\u0080\u009CIf it is thus, overall knowledge will necessarily take the correspondence of the heavenly organs [to their objects] before noting [the object\u00E2\u0080\u0099s] class\u00E2\u0080\u009D). The word bo (\u00C2\u0085) is generally used as a verb to indicate the recordkeeping by bureaucratic officials. There are many other words Xunzi could have chosen to express the same notion but his choice here reflections the metaphoric or conceptual domain that he had in mind. \u00C2\u0090 It is the inherent duality combined with the hierarchical arrangement of these \u00E2\u0080\u0098sensory officials\u00E2\u0080\u0099 that makes it very clear that classification is a two-step process for Xunzi. Moreover, it is a two-step process that involves some kind of similarity that goes beyond physical characteristics. If what the eyes see was enough to determine similarity, then no higher level of explicit cognition (as perceived by the heart-mind) would be necessary. Rather, we would always implicitly know which colours are similar or 58 different, and it certainly would not require explanation (as claimed in the second part of the excerpt above). Of course, it is difficult to determine which parts of Xunzi\u00E2\u0080\u0099s argument are intended to be descriptive and which are intended to be normative. However, this does not actually matter, since both Fraser and Hansen claim that Pre-Qin thought was nominalistic by virtue of not using \u00E2\u0080\u009Cmeanings, abstract concepts, essences, universals, or Platonic forms\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Fraser 2007, 440).20 5.4 Shi (!) as \u00E2\u0080\u0098Innate Potential\u00E2\u0080\u0099 and as Analogous to \u00E2\u0080\u0098Essence\u00E2\u0080\u0099 in Cognitive Science and Folkbiology If we continue reading Xunzi\u00E2\u0080\u0099s account of similarity and difference, we encounter a term that seems to play the same role as the Western concepts that Fraser and Hansen believe are absent in Chinese philosophy: If [things] are similar then group them; if they are different then distinguish them. If unit names are sufficient to be used for distinguishing then [use] unit names. If unit names are insufficient for distinguishing then [use] compound names. If unit or compound names lack that which is mutually avoidable then [use a] general name. Although [they] are general, they cause no harm. Knowing the different names of different shi makes all different shi have different names, and they cannot be disordered. It is similar to causing similar shi to have the same name.21 [My translation] The key term in this passage\u00E2\u0080\u0094\u00E2\u0080\u0098substance\u00E2\u0080\u0099 (shi, or !)\u00E2\u0080\u0094is introduced towards the end. Later on in the chapter, Xunzi writes, \u00E2\u0080\u009CNames being heard and their shi (!) being known is the function of names\u00E2\u0080\u009D (\u00E2\u0080\u009C$\u00C2\u00910!\u00C2\u0092<$>\u00C2\u0093A\u00E2\u0080\u009D). Fraser translates or understands shi as \u00E2\u0080\u0098stuff\u00E2\u0080\u0099 (Fraser 2007, 440). However, I am not alone in observing that names in Pre- 20 However, part of Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s argument is that Pre-Qin thought is pragmatic (by which he means they only discuss language in relation to its users). This extract from Xunzi also seems to stand as a counter-example to that claim since, by Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s argument, similarity is a language-to-world relation (that is, similarity is an independent and perceptible quality inherent in the appearance of objects). 21 +-+><2-2>8\u00C2\u0094\u00C2\u00951\u00C2\u0092-\u00C2\u0094<\u00C2\u0094\u00C2\u0088\u00C2\u00951\u00C2\u0092-\"S\u00C2\u0094\u00C2\u0096\"\u00C2\u0089IL\u00C2\u0097-JS\u00C2\u0098J\u00C2\u0088\u00C2\u0099\u00C2\u009A\u00C2\u009B8 \u00C2\u00802!;>2$A\u00C2\u00A4O~\u00C2\u00A5=!8\u00E2\u0080\u009DDi Du,\u00E2\u0080\u009D Decade of Lu Ming, Xiao Ya chapter. \u00C2\u00A6\u00C2\u00A7 \u00C2\u0090\u00C2\u00A8>\u00C2\u00A9\u00C2\u00A9O~\u00C2\u00AA=!8\u00E2\u0080\u009DTao Yao,\u00E2\u0080\u009D Odes of Zhou and South chapter. \u00C2\u00A6\u00C2\u00AB \u00C2\u0090\u00C2\u00AC~\u00C2\u00ADO=!\u00C2\u00AE\u00C2\u00AF8\u00E2\u0080\u009DPiao You Mei,\u00E2\u0080\u009D Odes of Zhao and South. 62 is considered as being one shi. This is the method to check substances and fix numbers.28 (Xun zi, \u00E2\u0080\u009CZheng Ming\u00E2\u0080\u009D chapter) [My translation] Makeham interprets this passage as an indication of Xunzi\u00E2\u0080\u0099s understanding of shi as \u00E2\u0080\u0098particular object.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 However, considering one of the statements\u00E2\u0080\u0094namely, \u00E2\u0080\u009C[t]hose things whose form changes and whose shi is unchanged, yet are considered different, call this \u00E2\u0080\u0098change\u00E2\u0080\u0099\u00E2\u0080\u009D\u00E2\u0080\u0094it seems rather clear that shi is an internal quality (and not an external one). Moreover, this passage suggests to me that Xunzi had a robust notion of shi as \u00E2\u0080\u0098essence\u00E2\u0080\u0099 or \u00E2\u0080\u0098innate potential,\u00E2\u0080\u0099 since shi is used both as an individuating principle, as well as the principle for grouping objects together\u00E2\u0080\u0094which is exactly the function that essences serve in cognitive science. This is evident when one remembers that our discussion of what shi means was sparked by Xunzi\u00E2\u0080\u0099s use of the term for the basis of similarity and difference. It has quickly become apparent that working out the precise nature of shi and its development as a concept in Pre-Qin thought is a complicated task beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, we can draw three worthwhile conclusions from this discussion: (1) the scholarly focus on the theories in naming in Early Chinese thought have done us a disservice by not paying greater attention to this key concept; (2) the basic meaning of shi is \u00E2\u0080\u0098fruit,\u00E2\u0080\u0099 and it later comes to be metaphorically extended to mean \u00E2\u0080\u0098innate potential\u00E2\u0080\u0099; and (3) shi (at least in Xunzi\u00E2\u0080\u0099s thought) seems to serve the exact role that essences, Platonic forms, ideas, meanings, etc., do in Western thought; thus, shi can plausibly be interpreted as the Pre-Qin notion that explains how the one is related to the many. The last two conclusions provide the initial motivation for identifying an alternative to the nominalistic interpretation of Chinese thought. Indeed, there is a context for 28 @~+\u00C2\u00B002I;<~2\u00C2\u00B00+I;<\u00C2\u0081\u00C2\u00B1A8\u00C2\u00B0+0\u00C2\u00992I;<\u00C2\u0098\u00C2\u0081\u00C2\u00B2<\u00C2\u008C>\u00C2\u00B3!8\u00C2\u00B0\u00C2\u00B40! \u00C2\u0089\u00C2\u00B10\u00C2\u00992;<\u00C2\u008C>\u00C2\u00B58~\u00C2\u00B50\u00C2\u0089\u00C2\u00B1<\u00C2\u008C>\u00C2\u00B6!8\u00C2\u008D\u00C2\u00B7>I1\u00C2\u00B8!\u00C2\u00B9\u00C2\u00BAA8\u00C2\u008D\u00C2\u00BB$>\u00C2\u00BC\u00C2\u00BDA8\u00C2\u0086\u00C2\u00BE >\u00C2\u00BF$<\u00C2\u0088\u00C2\u0081\u00C2\u0088\u00C3\u0080A8\u00C2\u0090 63 interpreting shi that is both empirically feasible and does not require attributing any type of unwarranted ontological commitments to Pre-Qin thinkers. This context is the cognitive science theory of psychological essentialism (also simply referred to as \u00E2\u0080\u0098essentialism\u00E2\u0080\u0099 in the literature). However, it should be clear that psychological essentialism is very different from the philosophical theory that every object possesses an essence unique to it. Rather, psychological essentialism is defined as \u00E2\u0080\u009Cthe psychological belief that certain kinds of objects or substances have something like a constitutive yet unknown essence\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Gelman and Wellman 1991, 216). It should be immediately clear that I am offering this as a supplement to Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s theory of behavioural nominalism, for they are not mutually exclusive. This definition of psychological essentialism fully fits within Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s notion of pragmatism in Early Chinese thought. It even fits into his notion that no abstract concepts play a role in Chinese theories about language, since psychological essentialism is about our attitudes and behaviour towards objects, and is not an ontological theory about objects themselves. (Notably, much of the evidence for essentialism in our cognition of categories and objects is taken from studies involving children, who generally have no theories about philosophically-defined essences.) Gelman and Wellman\u00E2\u0080\u0099s 1991 article, \u00E2\u0080\u009CInside and Essences: Early Understandings of the Non-obvious,\u00E2\u0080\u009D which outlines how psychological essentialism applies to our reasoning about categories, has particular relevance to this discussion of the possible interpretation of shi. The purpose of their study was to test whether or not young children only attend to physical appearance when reasoning about categories, and also to gauge if non-obvious properties play any significant role in children\u00E2\u0080\u0099s formulation of categories (Gelman and Wellman 1991, 215). Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s earlier characterization of similarity for the 64 Later Mohists and for Xunzi suggests that he thinks their notion of similarity is based on surface-level physical attributes. However, Gelman and Wellman\u00E2\u0080\u0094and many others since\u00E2\u0080\u0094have strongly suggested that psychological essentialism may become part of our cognition of categories from the age of three or four. Perhaps the least controversial claim of Gelman and Wellman\u00E2\u0080\u0099s paper is that they found empirical evidence to support the notion that children have a clear understanding of the inside-outside distinction: \u00E2\u0080\u009CWe have shown that young children distinguish insides of objects from their outsides, even when the two conflict, and believe that insides can be more essential to an object\u00E2\u0080\u0099s functioning and identity\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Gelman and Wellman 1991, 239). I would imagine that even Hansen would be willing to grant that Pre-Qin thinkers also possessed a clear inside-outside distinction, while also believing that insides are more relevant to an object\u00E2\u0080\u0099s identity than outsides. Furthermore, this conclusion involves no ontological claims whatsoever (since the claim is about the physical insides of things)\u00E2\u0080\u0094 or, if it does, it merely attributes recognition of the relevance of the insides of things, as well as the outsides. Gelman and Wellman\u00E2\u0080\u0099s study suggests the plausibility of psychological essentialism in children, since the theory of essentialism had not yet been widely tested in cognitive science with either children or adults (1991, 242). Thus, their 1991 article alone was not enough to motivate a more general or universal claim of psychological essentialism as a part of the cognition of categories. Nonetheless, the possibility of children being essentialists also points to the possibility of adults being essentialists. Nine years after Gelman and Wellman\u00E2\u0080\u0099s study, and after more studies had been published providing empirical evidence for essentialism, Strevens published an article arguing 65 against psychological essentialism (Strevens 2000). His argument was that the data is better explained by attributing beliefs in causal laws than by essentialism (Strevens 2000, 150). Indeed, there is an even more relevant criticism of essentialism, which also applies to the cognition of categories: \u00E2\u0080\u009CResearch in cognitive psychology almost exclusively targets a single, highly selected subset of a single culture and population\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Medin and Atran 1999, 2). Strevens\u00E2\u0080\u0099 criticism is relatively easy to deal with by referring to a defence of essentialism against Strevens\u00E2\u0080\u0099 criticism by Ahn et al. (The list of co-authors for this paper includes the major researchers of essentialism: Atran, Gelman, Medin, Coley, etc.) Their counter-argument is that Strevens\u00E2\u0080\u0099 account of causal beliefs does not adequately explain all of the relevant data (Ahn et al. 2001, 59). In particular, one of their major criticisms is that Strevens\u00E2\u0080\u0099 account does not distinguish between which causal laws children believe in when categorizing (Ahn et al. 2001, 60). If it were the case that children only need to believe in some causal laws in order to correctly reason with categories, then it would follow that any causal change (natural or unnatural) would be more or less equivalent and children would make no distinction between the two. A usual test for essentialism is whether or not children use artificial or natural changes to inductively generalize from a member to a class (Ahn et al. 2001, 60). It turns out that children make a sharp distinction between natural and artificial changes. Notably, Strevens\u00E2\u0080\u0099 account cannot explain why children would select a natural or biological cause over an artificial one. The easiest way to address the problem of sample diversity is to look at Atran\u00E2\u0080\u0099s research in the related field of folkbiology. Folkbiology often studies how different cultures understand and classify their natural environment (but this is not its sole focus). 66 Perhaps the biggest contribution that folkbiology makes to the present discussion is that folkbiological research is frequently cross-cultural (Atran et al. 2001, 6). Moreover, it has found that \u00E2\u0080\u009CThere is evidence for universal folkbiological principles that are transtheoretical, transcultural, domain-specific, and complex in design\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Atran et al. 2001, 6). One of the major findings shows that there is a basic level of biological classification amongst all people, a finding that has been shown to be true in many different cultures (including a study with Cantonese fishermen) (Berlin et al. 1973). This cross-cultural applicability will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this thesis. There are also recent studies that support the notion that essentialism may be a universal part of our categorical reasoning (Atran et al. 2001; Sousa et al. 2002). While the cultural net for research on essences does need to be widened before a confident claim about its universality can be made, the evidence from cognitive science (together with the evidence from folkbiology) gives not only plausibility to the essentialist hypothesis, but also strong reason to believe that essentialism is a general feature of reasoning with categories. Perhaps what is most relevant to the discussion of psychological essentialism in early Chinese thought is that the studies in cognitive science and folkbiology intersect using one specific test regarding the innate potential of living things. This test is first used in Gelman and Wellman\u00E2\u0080\u0099s 1991 study, but is also used by Atran et al. (2001) and Sousa et al. (2002). Gelman and Wellman describe the test as: For many living kinds, an individual can have a certain intrinsic potential even before it manifests that potential in any visible way. For example, a tiger cub has the potential to grow into something large and fierce, even though when born it is small and helpless. To explain developmental changes of this sort, we as adults often appeal to something like an intrinsic category essence. In other words, all tigers have an underlying nature or 67 essence that is responsible for how they grow. If children, too, believe that immature creatures have intrinsic potentials that are not yet visible but will become manifested over time, then this would constitute evidence of one kind of essentialism. The belief in an essential nature or a determining but non-manifest predisposition. To test this notion, we conducted a study that can be thought of as a \u00E2\u0080\u009Cnature- nurture\u00E2\u0080\u009D study. On each of a series of items, children were told about an immature being, a baby animal that was brought up in an environment more suited to a different species. The question is how children believe this animal will grow. Will it show as yet invisible, undeveloped potentialities intrinsic in its category membership, or will it instead display the properties associated with its environment of upbringing? (Gelman and Wellman 1991, 230) This study found that \u00E2\u0080\u009Cchildren are essentialists, at least concerning how animals grow and mature. They assume that members of a category share something like an innate or intrinsic potential that will be realized even when an animal is reared by members of a different species\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Gelman and Wellman 1991, 234)). I quote this study at length because it is the key study that extends beyond the inside-outside distinction discussed earlier. Moreover, it is particularly relevant to making a positive interpretation of shi as a concept similar to essences. Earlier, we saw that shi, at its most basic level, means \u00E2\u0080\u0098fruit.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 If one keeps in mind its basic or literal meaning of \u00E2\u0080\u0098fruit,\u00E2\u0080\u0099 than it would be easy to see how this term comes to serve the same explanatory role that essences, Platonic forms, ideas, etc., do in the West. It can be seen that the meaning of shi as real, stuff, actuality, or substance is a metaphorical extension of its meaning as \u00E2\u0080\u0098fruit.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 A belief or understanding of innate potential explains how shi came to have this metaphorical extension. It can also be seen that a thing\u00E2\u0080\u0099s shi determines what it will become. For example, to speak only of fruit, if we take a seed from an apple and plant it, than we can expect to get an apple tree that will produce apples (and not oranges) as its fruit. This is the extent of the interpretive context 68 that I am advancing: it is both plausible and empirically viable that Early Chinese thinkers would possess the same beliefs and expectations for seeds or young animals. Furthermore, it is highly plausible that shi is the concept or word that fulfills this explanatory role in their theory of naming, and that it informs their construal of the similarity relation. 5.5 Conclusions Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s theory of behavioural nominalism states that Chinese thinkers were committed to no entities other than names and objects (Hansen 1983, 31). Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s nominalism, furthermore, is a restriction on a standard Goodman formulation, in that Hansen specifically claims that \u00E2\u0080\u0098objects,\u00E2\u0080\u0099 for Chinese thinkers, were only concrete things and not abstract concepts (Hansen 1983, 175). Bao erroneously construes Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s position as claiming that there were no abstract entities in Chinese thought. This reminds us that when Hansen makes such claims, he is generally asserting that Chinese thinkers were not committed to abstract entities in their philosophic theories\u00E2\u0080\u0094not that there were no abstract entities. Fraser develops Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s argument in one important respect by noting that Chinese thinkers appealed to a notion of similarity instead of appealing to essences, Platonic forms, meanings, ideas, etc. Similarity, however, as presented in Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s argument, is far too vague a notion to serve as a useful guide for classification (identifying different things that belong to the same kind). It turns out that while Chinese thinkers may not appeal to any of the usual Western solutions to the one-many problem, they did appeal to shi (!). Shi, which is a key concept in Chinese philosophy, seems to have been under-researched in the theories of naming in Early Chinese thought. As an additional or alternative interpretation, I posit 69 that if we understand shi in the context of psychological essentialism provided by folkbiology and cognitive science, then we are able to explain the role of shi without attributing any additional ontological commitments to Chinese thinkers. At this stage, however, shi requires more research to determine whether it can be interpreted as \u00E2\u0080\u0098essence,\u00E2\u0080\u0099 in the cognitive science or folkbiology sense, or if it simply demonstrates the Chinese understanding of how different things can be called by the same name. 70 6. Ontology 6.1 Logic, Sets, and Individuals Set theory is the foundation of modern mathematical logic: \u00E2\u0080\u009CLogic is concerned with classes of things\u00E2\u0080\u00A6classes are more often referred to as SETS\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Tarski 1995, 68). Set theory, as a proper part of mathematics, finds its origins with Georg Cantor and his investigations into transfinite numbers (Stoll 1961, 1). It later became a crucial part of the logic created by Gottlob Frege, and plays an important role in his influential definition of number in the Foundations of Arithmetic. Set theory is so ubiquitous in mathematics and logic that its principles and theory are often assumed to be common knowledge. This can be startling to a beginner in logic. Nonetheless, sets and set theory cannot be assumed in our study of the philosophical foundations of Chinese logic, since one can have logic without sets. Thus, an argument needs to be made for why sets may be necessary (or, at the very least, useful) for motivating a deductive interpretation of Chinese logic. Additionally, whether or not Pre-Qin ontological commitments or philosophical theories preclude any notion of sets must be investigated, especially in light of Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s mass noun hypothesis and its implications. The notion of sets, though, can only be indirectly understood as a part of Pre-Qin ontology. It can be said with a fair amount of confidence that no Pre-Qin thinker or mathematician had any notion of the mathematical concept of \u00E2\u0080\u0098set.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 Even in the West, sets are a fairly recent development in mathematics and, it can be argued, are not necessarily the easiest mathematical notion to understand (this is particularly true considering Cantor\u00E2\u0080\u0099s motivation for rigorously developing the notion). However, as 71 Tarski notes above, sets do have a non-mathematical counterpart\u00E2\u0080\u0094classes\u00E2\u0080\u0094which are often considered as being equivalent to sets. However, it is the case that the notion of \u00E2\u0080\u0098classes\u00E2\u0080\u0099 is more broadly used than the mathematical notion of \u00E2\u0080\u0098sets.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 Whether or not classes are used (or even play a role in Pre-Qin philosophy) can be investigated because of their greater generality. Much of the same argument can be made for the concept of categories. Sets are \u00E2\u0080\u009Csimply a collection of things or objects\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Willerding 1966, 1). This definition is amusing because, while the notion of a collection of things is relatively easy to understand, it gives no indication about the nature of sets, their composition, or their qualities. That there is nothing really simple about the notion of \u00E2\u0080\u0098sets\u00E2\u0080\u0099 can be seen with the iterative concept of set, in which sets and set membership are organized in a strict hierarchy as a means to eliminate the paradox of na\u00C3\u00AFve set theory. While sets are \u00E2\u0080\u009Csimply a collection of things or objects\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Willerding 1966, 1), what exactly is this collection? Is it its own distinct thing, or just a manner of speaking (or thinking) about many objects? A different definition may add greater clarity to the notion. According to Robert R. Stoll, Cantor\u00E2\u0080\u0099s definition of set is \u00E2\u0080\u009Cany collection of definite, distinguishable objects\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Stoll 1964, 2). This definition gives a much better indication about the nature of sets and their composition. It can be noted that the only real difference between this definition and the one in the preceding paragraph is the inclusion of the words \u00E2\u0080\u0098definite\u00E2\u0080\u0099 and \u00E2\u0080\u0098distinguishable\u00E2\u0080\u0099: With regard to any pair of objects qualified to appear as elements of a particular set, one must be able to determine whether they are the same or different. The attribute \u00E2\u0080\u009Cdefinite\u00E2\u0080\u009D is interpreted as meaning that if given a set and an object, it is possible to determine whether the object is, or is not, a member of that set. The implication is that a set is completely determined by its members. (Stoll 1964, 3) 72 Now we have a much better understanding about both the nature of sets and their objects. It is helpful to note that sets are determined by their members, since we can be clear about the characteristics of the objects that belong (or can belong) to a set: these objects must be well individuated. They must exist such that they can neither be confused with another object nor belong ambivalently to a set. The requirement that objects belonging to a set be well individuated is crucially important to the usefulness of sets in logic (since sets are used in the semantics of logic). Their function in semantics explains why ontology is a significant philosophical concern. This is especially true in light of the fact that Pre-Qin thinkers have not only a concept of truth, but also a theory of truth, since \u00E2\u0080\u009COntologies are structures that facilitate the distribution of truth values over a theory\u00E2\u0080\u0099s interpreted sentences\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Woods and Peacock 2004, 268). Thus, since Pre-Qin philosophy has a theory of truth, it is of the utmost importance to discuss the nature of the structure that facilitates the distribution of truth- values for the interpreted sentences of early Chinese logic. In other words, the semantics of classical logic does not work if objects are not well individuated. A striking case of this can be found in quantum logic, where \u00E2\u0080\u009CSome logicians are of the view that since the basic entities of the quantum world are intrinsically stochastic, they lack the determinancy required for individuation\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Woods and Peacock 2004, 267). As such, \u00E2\u0080\u009CThe quantified sentences of QM [quantum mechanics] can\u00E2\u0080\u0099t be modeled classically\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Woods and Peacock 2004, 267). Of course, in some interpretations, this is not necessarily thought to be a problem, for interpretations are dependent on whatever theory of truth one is committed to. Those who hold a scientific view of truth do not want the best logical theory to be unable to determine the truth of sentences in quantum 73 physics. Those who hold a conventional or relativistic view of truth have no problem asserting that quantum physics has its own criterion for truth (as does any other system). Nonetheless, the question of whether or not Pre-Qin Chinese thought has an ontology that includes well-individuated objects must be settled before a deductive interpretation of Chinese logic can be considered feasible. 6.2 Chinese Ontology and Chad Hansen Generally, in philosophy, there are two basic interpretations of sets: we can either understand them as existent objects, or as not existing at all. The former position is that of metaphysical realism, and several different perspectives fulfill the latter position (e.g., an idealist would conceive of them as ideas, or a linguist might consider them simply a convention of language). The latter position can be represented by nominalism or physicalism (which are related, but slightly different, theories). There are various motivations for adhering to either interpretation; fortunately, in this case, only one kind of metaphysical realism and nominalism\u00E2\u0080\u0094the kind represented by Hansen and Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0094 needs to be considered (as no scholars hold the physicalist position). The metaphysical realist position requires the most minimal philosophical assumptions, while also being the most plausible position to assume in the absence of any textual evidence. In this sense, sets are real because they play a real functional role in our cognition. However, the metaphysical realist position (as represented by cognitive science) is also conceptually problematic because it views classes, categories, and sets as a part of our cognitive processes for understanding the world around us. Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s work is among the most developed, rigorous, and explicit ontologies for Chinese thought. It was explicitly developed as part of a larger interpretation of Chinese 74 logic. The general outline of Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s theory of Chinese ontology is expressed below: It is tempting and initially plausible to interpret mass nouns as singular terms naming fragmented objects scattered in space-time (e.g. Goodman individuals or collective classes as in Mereology). Essentially, I am theorizing that the Chinese thinkers more or less intuitively adopted just that picture of the world-language relation. (Hansen 1975, 248) Elsewhere, Hansen explicitly claims that \u00E2\u0080\u009CChinese ontology...is mereological\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Hansen 1983, 31). Mereology, according to Hansen, is coterminous with the nominalistic interpretation of Chinese logic: \u00E2\u0080\u009CI use nominalism because the Chinese philosopher is not committed to any entities other than names and objects\u00E2\u0080\u009D (1983, 31). Nominalism, in turn, is closely related to Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s theory that Chinese thinkers are not committed to any abstract entities (Hansen 1983, 31). 6.3 Mereology Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s objection to attributing the mathematical notion of classes to Pre-Qin thought is partially based on the claim that it would be paradoxical to attribute a notion of \u00E2\u0080\u0098class\u00E2\u0080\u0099 to Pre-Qin thinkers when they had no notion of \u00E2\u0080\u0098member\u00E2\u0080\u0099 or \u00E2\u0080\u0098membership\u00E2\u0080\u0099 (Hansen 1983, 113). When considering this piece of evidence\u00E2\u0080\u0094the lack of distinction between class and member\u00E2\u0080\u0094we see a basic methodological problem at play. Hansen takes the absence of an explicit theory or debate about class membership (known as the one-many problem) as evidence for mereology. However, I am quite unsure whether membership, if Warring States Chinese thought did have classes, would need to be a problem. This is especially the case considering the empirical evidence for a universal, non-linguistic, object-substance distinction and essentialism in folkbiology and cognitive 75 science.29 It could be the case that Warring States thinkers were simply untroubled about how the one is related to the many (or even that this was a question whose answer was too obvious to be worth study). Either explanation is at least as plausible as Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s ontological claim for mereology. Indeed, considering the empirical evidence, the explanation that they just didn\u00E2\u0080\u0099t care\u00E2\u0080\u0094that they simply had better things to worry about\u00E2\u0080\u0094is actually plausible. While Mou\u00E2\u0080\u0099s account is also motivated by the question of why the one-many problem was never posed in Chinese thought (Mou 1999, 45), it turns out that his complication of the issue at hand by invoking Lewis\u00E2\u0080\u0099s theory actually raises an important question: Is there any evidence that the part-whole relation is more intuitive or obvious than the one-many relation? We can see from the earlier discussion on psychological essentialism that some understanding of the one-many relation may simply be part of our cognitive resources for engaging and understanding the world. Lewis\u00E2\u0080\u0099s nominalistic set theory demonstrates that, given enough creativity and motivation, the part-whole relation and the member-set relation can be viewed as analogous (Lewis 1998). It is not my desire to argue the validity of Mou\u00E2\u0080\u0099s collective nouns or Lewis\u00E2\u0080\u0099s mereological sets, but rather to point out that it seems as if the part-whole relation is at least as complex as the one-many relation. Indeed, the part-whole relation is not nearly as obvious has Hansen presents it. Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s construal of the part-whole relation as both dominant and foundational in his interpretation of Chinese ontology goes beyond his interpretation of their logic. Mereology is a natural extension of the widespread understanding of the holistic nature of Chinese cosmology. Holism, in turn, is an interpretation that seems heavily influenced by 29 This evidence was presented in two earlier sections on the mass noun hypothesis (Section 4) and nominalism (Section 5), respectively. 76 the understanding of partly philosophical and partly religious concepts like dao (%). Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s mereological claim appears to be a simple extension from the holistic nature of something like Dao onto everyday objects. At first glance, this seems to be an entirely reasonable theoretical extension\u00E2\u0080\u0094particularly since all ordinary objects are thought to arise from Dao. However, there seems to be a large distinction between Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s conclusion that Pre-Qin ontological thought is exclusively devoted to mereology and the claim that mereology was simply one of many claims in Pre-Qin thought. There appears, however, to be a step missing between the holistic interpretation of early Chinese cosmology and a general mereological theory of everyday objects. From the above discussion on the nature of Dao, we have some idea about the possible relation that it bears to our everyday existence, but we still need to establish a better theory of this relation. Fraser, who explicitly develops this line of reasoning, claims that \u00E2\u0080\u009CThe \u00E2\u0080\u0098one body\u00E2\u0080\u0099 view and the cosmological idea that the myriad things arose through division out of a primordial whole both seem best explained by attributing a rough kind of mereological worldview to ancient Chinese thinkers\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Fraser 2007, 445). However, Fraser still provides no connection between a religious or cosmological theory and the Pre-Qin understanding of everyday objects. This is particularly the case concerning Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s understanding of how objects are related to other objects. At best, Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s claim only supports the theory that objects are parts of Dao, yet this still leaves room for the claim that objects can bear a membership relation to other objects (or, in other words, that while objects are parts of Dao, they are still entirely distinct from each other such that they fulfill the requirements for membership in sets). Importantly, in the introduction of his discussion, Fraser places a crucial caveat on 77 his abovementioned conclusion: \u00E2\u0080\u009CThe grounds for it are limited and mostly confined to Mohist and Daoist texts, and the exact extent and nature of Chinese mereological views are unclear\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Fraser 2007, 420). With this caveat in mind, I am willing to grant Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s conclusion, since my purpose here is only to demonstrate that Pre-Qin philosophy includes classes (and not that it excludes mereology). Moreover, my methodological stance makes me resist generalizations over Pre-Qin philosophy. 6.4 The Case for Classes in Pre-Qin Philosophy: Jian (\") While I am willing to grant that a mereological interpretation may be accurate for Daoist texts, Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s argument and evidence for this interpretation of the Later Mohists texts is not entirely convincing. Alternatively, if Fraser is right, he is not unrestrictedly correct. When presenting evidence for a mereological worldview in early Chinese thought, he writes, \u00E2\u0080\u009CI will argue for the part-whole interpretation, suggesting that jian [& ] is probably best explained as denoting a mereological whole whenever it is used as a noun in the later Mohist texts. Thus, I suggest that the Mohists probably employed a mereological ontology\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Fraser 2007, 441). When we look at Canon A2 and Explanation A2 from the Later Mohist \u00E2\u0080\u009CCanons\u00E2\u0080\u009D and \u00E2\u0080\u009CExplanations,\u00E2\u0080\u009D which Fraser uses as evidence, the opposite actually appears to be true: Canon A2: A unit is a division from a collection.30 Explanation A2: Similar to one of two, [a unit] is the starting-point of a measured length.31 Fraser interprets the two examples above by noting that: In the first example, the jian is a collection of two discrete items, something that could be described as a set. But in the second, it is a unitary object, such as a line or 30 \u00C3\u0081\u00C3\u0082\u00C3\u0083\u00C2\u0090(<\u00C3\u0084\u00C3\u0085\"A8 31 \u00C3\u0081u\u00C3\u0082\u00C3\u0083\u00C2\u0090(5\u00C3\u0086\u00C2\u00B3>\u00C2\u00B6<\u00C3\u0087>\u00C3\u0088A8 78 a measuring stick. This instance of a jian cannot plausibly be interpreted as a set\u00E2\u0080\u0094 for instance, the set of points in a line\u00E2\u0080\u0094because the example given of a ti ' (part) is duan ( (tip), which refers not to points in general, but specifically to a starting point. Both examples can be explained by interpreting jian as \u00E2\u0080\u009Cwhole\u00E2\u0080\u009D and attributing a mereological ontology to the Mohists. According to this interpretation, the pair of objects is regarded as a whole with two parts, not a set with two members. (Fraser 2007, 441-442) I concur with Fraser right up until he writes, \u00E2\u0080\u009CBoth examples can be explained by interpreting jian as \u00E2\u0080\u0098whole\u00E2\u0080\u0099 and attributing a mereological ontology to the Mohists\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Fraser 2007, 441-442). My desire has been to demonstrate that the best (and most plausible) interpretation of Classical Chinese ontology is one that has space for both mereological wholes and classes. Fraser, on the other hand, provides three reasons to support an exclusively mereological interpretation: (1) Canon A2 treats jian (&) as conceptually preceding ti ('); (2) ti and jian are interchangeable in a way members and sets are not; and (3) ti can refer to a group of objects (Fraser 2007, 442-443). Regarding Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s first claim that Canon A2 treats jian as conceptually preceding ti, it is hard to see why this is important. It is, of course, a problem if we accept Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s claim that there is no notion of \u00E2\u0080\u0098member\u00E2\u0080\u0099 in Pre-Qin thought\u00E2\u0080\u0094something we have little reason to allow. Fraser writes that \u00E2\u0080\u009CIt is difficult to see how jian can correspond to sets and ti to their members if ti are defined by dividing down from jian\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Fraser 2007, 442). Fraser, by taking logical priority as a problem for interpreting jian as a class, fails to consider why ti is being defined as a technical term in the first place. In this regard, it is possible that the Later Mohists are invoking an uncommon or extended definition of ti (as they often do with their definitions). The sentence \u00E2\u0080\u009C(<\u00C3\u0084\u00C3\u0085\"A\u00E2\u0080\u009D can be translated, as Fraser does, as \u00E2\u0080\u009CA unit is a division from a jian\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Fraser 2007, 441), or it can be translated as \u00E2\u0080\u009CTo be a unit is to be separable out of a jian\u00E2\u0080\u009D (My translation). The latter 79 translation implies exactly the sort of container metaphor that would imply a cognitive understanding of jian as being equivalent to classes.32 Furthermore, using the latter interpretation, we can plausibly understand the Later Mohists as creatively extending the common notion of ti to include membership (which could, in turn, imply that the general ontological theories of the time were mereological, and that the Later Mohists were arguing against such a construal of the world). This would, in fact, explain both the inclusion of ti as a technical term in the \u00E2\u0080\u009CCanons\u00E2\u0080\u009D and \u00E2\u0080\u009CExplanations\u00E2\u0080\u009D as well as the logical priority of jian in the definition. Fraser claims that in order to explain his second argument for the exclusive mereological interpretation, \u00E2\u0080\u009CThe notions of jian and ti seem interchangeable in a way that those of a set and its members are not. According to Canon A2 a starting-point (duan) is a ti that is part of a measured length, while according to Canon A61 it is the dimensionless tip of something that is itself a ti\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Fraser 2007, 442). Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s explanation indicates that he has misconstrued the analogy in Canon A2 and Explanation A2, for in A2, it is not the case that \u00E2\u0080\u009CA starting-point (duan) is a ti that is part of a measured length\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Fraser 2007, 442); rather, a ti is similar to the starting point of a measurement. Indeed, Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s language obscures the consistency in meaning of the term \u00E2\u0080\u0098starting-point\u00E2\u0080\u0099 in Canon A2 and Canon A62. A2 asserts that ti is similar to a starting point, and A62 asserts that a starting point is a ti without width. Thus, contrary to Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s interpretation, it seems that it is actually ti and duan ( ) that are interchangeable\u00E2\u0080\u0094not ti and jian. The conclusion that \u00E2\u0080\u009CAn object such as a measured length can be either a jian or a ti\u00E2\u0080\u009D fails in both my and Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s interpretation (Fraser 2007, 442). In Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s opinion, a 32 Container metaphors are discussed in greater detail Section 6.5. 80 measured length can be a ti or jian only when a measured length is assumed to be a mereological whole. If a measured length is a mereological whole, then a ti, as part of the whole, is also a measured length (in the same way that a part of water is still water). However, because Fraser is attempting to demonstrate his interpretation of jian as a mereological whole, his argument is circular. Moreover, his interpretation fails on two other accounts. First, it fails because, as Fraser himself notes, \u00E2\u0080\u009CSpeaking a language with mostly mass nouns need not incline thinkers to construe things as unindividuated, unstructured masses\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Fraser 2007, 429). It fails on a second count because, in addition to my interpretation that ti and duan are interchangeable, Canon A62 makes it clear that ti and duan have no width. Thus, neither can be considered to be measured lengths themselves, thereby implying that jian and ti are quite distinct and not at all interchangeable (not even metaphorically). The third and last argument Fraser makes for an exclusive mereological interpretation is that, \u00E2\u0080\u009CAccording to the \u00E2\u0080\u0098aggregate\u00E2\u0080\u0099 construal of the ti-jian relation, there are contexts in which ti must refer to a group or set. This use of ti is difficult to reconcile with the word\u00E2\u0080\u0099s basic meaning\u00E2\u0080\u0094roughly, \u00E2\u0080\u0098body\u00E2\u0080\u0099\u00E2\u0080\u0094and its use to denote the human body\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Graham 1978, as noted in Fraser 2007, 442-443). Fraser represents the aggregate construal of ti and jian, attributed to Graham, as claiming that: Commonsense, pre-theoretical discourse about the relations between things and their components might apply both part-whole and set membership relations. So it is possible that the notions of jian and ti might be general enough to cover both of these sorts of relations, without distinguishing sufficiently finely between them to count as exclusively mereological or set-theoretical notions. (Fraser 2007, 442) While I am not arguing for the \u00E2\u0080\u0098aggregate\u00E2\u0080\u0099 view, I am arguing for interpreting jian as \u00E2\u0080\u0098classes,\u00E2\u0080\u0099 and so Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s criticism still applies. The best way to address this criticism 81 is to look at Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s argument and the evidence he uses to defend it. Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s contends that \u00E2\u0080\u009CIf ti is sometimes used to refer to the group, not the individual items, then the case for the aggregate interpretation collapses, and only the part-whole interpretation satisfactorily explains all uses of ti and jian\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Fraser 2007, 443). He uses Canon B12 and Explanation B12 to affirm the antecedent of this claim: Canon B12: Explained by both being considered one, considered as only \u00E2\u0080\u0098this.\u00E2\u0080\u009933 Explanation B12: Both being considered one, is similar to how [both] oxen and horses have four feet; being considered as only \u00E2\u0080\u0098this\u00E2\u0080\u0099 accords to oxen and horses. If you enumerate oxen and enumerate horses, then oxen and horses are two [classes] but if you enumerate oxen and horses [together], then oxen and horses are considered one [class]. This is like enumerating fingers, fingers are five and five [fingers] are considered one [hand].34 Although this passage does seem to instantiate the antecedent of Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s conditional (especially in regards to the analogy of fingers and hands), a set theoretic interpretation also makes good sense in this case. Indeed, if we accept the earlier interpretation of A2 as introducing an extended notion of ti that includes membership, then B12 creates no problems for the class interpretation. There are two ways to interpret B12 as being about classes. Firstly, the oxen and horses can be considered as \u00E2\u0080\u0098one\u00E2\u0080\u0099 class, because the class of \u00E2\u0080\u0098four-footed animals\u00E2\u0080\u0099 includes the classes of oxen and horses. Alternatively, the union of the classes of oxen and horses can be considered to create a different class that includes all oxen and horses. The first interpretation creates no conflict of the kind that Fraser is commenting on, because my interpretation of ti implies a principle of individuation necessary for membership in a class. Indeed, the explanation of duan as being \u00E2\u0080\u0098without similarity\u00E2\u0080\u0099 is precisely the kind of individuation needed for class membership. Moreover, because sets 33 \u00C3\u0089@\u00C2\u00B6(A\u00C2\u0096\u00C2\u008A2#0\u00C3\u0098\u00C3\u0099\u00C3\u009A;<\u00C3\u009BA8 (Zhuang zi, \u00E2\u0080\u009CRen jian shi\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 41 \u00C3\u0093\u00C3\u009C\u00C3\u009D\u00C3\u009E1\u00C3\u009F\u00C3\u00A0\u00C3\u00A1>#AS\u00C2\u00BE>\u00C2\u0088\u00C2\u00BE#A8(Mencius, \u00E2\u0080\u009CLiang hui wang shang\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 42 \u00C3\u00A4\u00C2\u008A>\u00C3\u0085\u00C3\u00A5<\u00C3\u00A6#A8\u00C3\u00A7\u00C3\u0085=#<\u00C3\u00A8\u00C3\u0095=\u00C3\u00A9)(Mencius, \u00E2\u0080\u009CGong sun chou shang\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 43 \u00C3\u00AA\u00C2\u009Cc>\u00C3\u0085bA<=\u00C3\u00AB\u00C2\u0096\u00C2\u008A\u00C3\u00AC<\u00C3\u0086\u00C3\u00AD\u00C3\u008E>\u00C2\u0096\u00C3\u00AE\u00C2\u0088+#A<-6\u00C3\u00AF.\u00C3\u00B0\u00C3\u00B1\u00C3\u00B2\u00C3\u00B3\u00C3\u00B4>\u00C3\u0085b\u00C2\u0090\u00C2\u0090 A\u00C3\u0096 (Mencius, \u00E2\u0080\u009CGao zi shang\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 87 specific horse or tiger) as being names of specific lei. If it is the case that lei only denotes objects at the similar hierarchical level as \u00E2\u0080\u0098horse\u00E2\u0080\u0099 and \u00E2\u0080\u0098tiger,\u00E2\u0080\u0099 then it would fit the findings of cognitive science and folkbiology that there is a basic level of categories (Rosch et al. 1976; Berlin et al. 1973). Rosch et al. describe this level of categorization as \u00E2\u0080\u009Cone level of abstraction at which the most basic category cuts are made. Basic categories are those which carry the most information\u00E2\u0080\u00A6and are, thus, the most differentiated from one another\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Rosch et al. 1976, 382). The plausibility of this account, however, depends on the discussion about language acquisition and our cognition of the world in Section 5.3. Nonetheless, if it can be independently established that lei does refer to the basic object level of categorization, then it will be extra motivation to suspect that cognitive science is correct in its conclusions about how we understand the world. However, at this point, it is still equally plausible to understand lei as representing classes or kinds. There is an essential difference between the class or kind understanding of lei. The difference is found with the container metaphor, where \u00E2\u0080\u0098kinds\u00E2\u0080\u0099 are not a cognitive metaphor for a container, but \u00E2\u0080\u0098categories\u00E2\u0080\u0099 are. Thus, in order to make a feasible interpretation of lei as cognitive containers, we need to find evidence that lei has all (and not just some) of the three elements (e.g., insides, outsides, and a boundary). There is a very small selection of uses where lei is used with the co-verb yu (*) to indicate spatial relations. Two examples are presented below: 8. Sages, in regards to people, are also a lei. Going out of their lei, [they] are gathered in their group.44 [My translation] 44 +,-*./012)3*41/5647)(Mencius, \u00E2\u0080\u009CGong sun chou shang\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 88 9. Regarding those phrases that use lei to move, if [you] establish phrases and do not understand [them] in their lei, then this will necessarily cause difficulties.45 [My translation] The above examples are some of the clearest instances I have come across of lei being used in conjunction with a coordinating spatial relations term.46 While the sample is small (only two examples), they both work to support my theory that lei can be understood as the classical Chinese conceptual metaphor for containers. This is especially so when we look more closely at the examples. For instance, in example 8, yu is used with chu (3), a verb specifically used when the direction of movement is from inside to outside. This is exactly what we would expect to see if lei were at least sometimes being used to mean cognitive containers. Example 9 shows that things can be in a lei. Thus, these examples strongly support the initial hypothesis that lei is a Classical Chinese cognitive metaphor for containers. Another set of examples that supports the container metaphor theory is a locution that seems particular to Mencius. Although this use of lei does not explicitly invoke the directional concepts like the examples above do, it does suggest that Mencius conceives of lei as being some sort of container. The verb that Mencius uses twice with regards to lei is chong (\u00C3\u00B5), \u00E2\u0080\u0098to fill\u00E2\u0080\u0099: \u00E2\u0080\u009CIs this valuing of activity able to fill their lei?\u00E2\u0080\u009D47 and \u00E2\u0080\u009CRegarding those who, if they do not have it and yet select it, they are bandits, filling lei reaches to the limits of rightness.\u00E2\u0080\u009D48 The use of the verb \u00E2\u0080\u0098to fill\u00E2\u0080\u0099 in conjunction with lei is difficult to conceptualize unless you interpret the meaning by way of the container 45 89:1;<2/=9>?@*41/ABCD)(Mo zi, \u00E2\u0080\u009CDa qu\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 46 My method for finding examples was to employ key word searches of the Analects, the Mo zi, the Mencius, the Zhuan gzi, and the Xun zi. All keyword searches used the Gu Gong database, and sample selection was based on choosing the least ambiguous examples. 47 H\u00C3\u00B6\u00C2\u0099\u00C3\u00B7\u00C3\u00B5=#A\u00C3\u0095? (Mencius, \u00E2\u0080\u009CTeng wen gong xia\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 48 \u00C2\u00A1\u00C2\u008C\u00C3\u0093=~0\u00C3\u00B8>;\u00C3\u00B9A<\u00C3\u00B5#\u00C3\u00BA\u00C3\u00BB>\u00C3\u00BCA8(Mencius, \u00E2\u0080\u009CWen zhang xia\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 89 metaphor. Moreover, specialized locutions like this establish the plausibility of my hypothesis. It is interesting, though, that the majority of evidence in support of the container metaphor interpretation comes from examples from the Mencius. It may be the case, then, that this interpretation of lei might be most applicable to the Mencius. Indeed, further research is necessary to determine how widely this interpretive claim can be applied.49 The argument for the container metaphor rests on several different levels of interpretation. The first level is composed of a general theory of the mind and how it perceives the world. If cognitive science is correct about how the mind perceives the world (that is, as clusters of sensory information), and if folkbiology is accurate in its cross-cultural disposition towards categorizing living things into basic object categories, then we have a plausible context for interpreting lei as a container metaphor. Interestingly, cognitive science tends to treat \u00E2\u0080\u0098living kind\u00E2\u0080\u0099 and \u00E2\u0080\u0098class\u00E2\u0080\u0099 as essentially co- referential terms. Indeed, it is quite unclear what is generally meant when lei is interpreted as \u00E2\u0080\u0098kind\u00E2\u0080\u0099 as opposed to \u00E2\u0080\u0098class.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 Slingerland is able to avoid this uncertainty by interpreting lei as \u00E2\u0080\u0098species.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 This is a good contribution, for it captures both intuitions that lei refers to living kinds and is organized in terms of classes of individuals. However, in opposition to this interpretation are the more conceptual uses of lei, like in example 3 above (referring to language), or when it refers to different kinds of people (as in examples 2, 5, 6, and 7, above). 49 An interesting avenue of research would be to investigate the concept of tui lei (\u00C3\u00BD#) or \u00E2\u0080\u0098pushing\u00E2\u0080\u0099 lei. Studying this term, however, would go far beyond the focus of this thesis, since it is usually translated and interpreted as \u00E2\u0080\u0098analogic,\u00E2\u0080\u0099 which, in turn, invokes a whole other area of research in Chinese logic. All in all, it is possibly a subject worthy of its own thesis. Nonetheless, at a basic level, the use of tui is interesting since it invokes images of people pushing boxes around (at least it does with me). This is a possibly fruitful avenue for generalizing the container metaphor claim, since the term is used in several late Warring States texts. 90 All in all, however, there is no need to argue for only one interpretation of lei. Interpreting lei as \u00E2\u0080\u0098species\u00E2\u0080\u0099 when it refers to animals seems apt. Interpreting it as \u00E2\u0080\u0098kind\u00E2\u0080\u0099 when it refers to different types of people also seems perfectly suitable. Interpreting lei as \u00E2\u0080\u0098class\u00E2\u0080\u0099 in both cases seems to work as well. Indeed, in this case, taking Puett\u00E2\u0080\u0099s methodological suggestion that we treat each instance as an individual claim (instead of creating an interpretive context that automatically excludes some other interpretation) seems to be the best solution. As such, this section has been successful in seeking to demonstrate only that a class interpretation of lei is plausible on the basis of both textual and empirical evidence. 6.6 Individuation in Warring States Thought The previous discussions of the mass noun hypothesis, nominalism, and mereology have made discussing individuation unnecessary. If we find that Hansen and those who agree with him are not telling the whole story of Chinese philosophy, then it follows that there is room for individuals (as required by set theory). Indeed, the discussion of jian and ti in Section 6.4 essentially indicates that the Later Mohists had a robust notion of the kind of individuation needed for set theory. Nonetheless, I find it efficacious to take up Harbsmeier\u00E2\u0080\u0099s insight that quantification provides an important syntactic clue for how nouns divide their references in Classical Chinese. The difference, however, is that instead of treating Harbsmeier\u00E2\u0080\u0099s insights on a piecemeal basis for nouns, applying them to various instances of lei allows us to generalize about any noun that can refer to a lei. Perhaps the clearest examples of lei being associated with a syntactic principle of individuation are those sentences that use quantifiers, as in this example from the Xun zi: 91 10. Things each follow their lei.50 [My translation] The above example is particularly apt and clear because the sentence uses ge (E) as the quantifier. According to Edwin G. Pulleyblank, ge \u00E2\u0080\u009Cbelongs to a set of words\u00E2\u0080\u00A6which define the subject as individual members of a larger group or the members of such a group taken one at a time\u00E2\u0080\u009D (1995, 130). This example also demonstrates a practical application of container logic, since if things are inside a lei, they certainly must move as one with it. At this point it becomes fair to posit that the things going into a lei are well individuated. The kinds of things that seem to be placed in a lei further strengthens this conclusion. As we saw earlier in examples 4, 7, and 8, the objects inside of lei are things such as horses, hounds, tigers, and people. These are all nouns that customarily divide their references in English, and I think we have good reason (from a cognitive studies and folkbiological standpoint) to think they do this in Classical Chinese as well. In fact, none of the examples above uses lei in conjunction with anything that could be reasonably interpreted as a substance-mass noun. Furthermore, in other cases where the use of lei could be interpreted as a substance-mass noun on first inspection, they end up being clearly object-mass nouns: 11. Grass and trees grow in fields, birds and beasts live in groups, things each follow their lei.51 [My translation] In example 11 above, even though the Chinese mu (F) can be ambiguous between \u00E2\u0080\u0098wood\u00E2\u0080\u0099 and \u00E2\u0080\u0098tree,\u00E2\u0080\u0099 we can see that, as a count noun, there is no other way to view the character in conjunction with the verb sheng (G) as anything other than \u00E2\u0080\u0098tree\u00E2\u0080\u0099. For 50 @\u00C3\u00BE\u00C3\u00B2=#A) (Xun zi, \u00E2\u0080\u009CZhuan xue\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 51 \u00C3\u00BF!\"\u00C3\u0091<#$%&<@\u00C3\u00BE\u00C3\u00B2=#A8 (Xun zi, \u00E2\u0080\u009CQuan xue\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 92 \u00E2\u0080\u0098wood,\u00E2\u0080\u0099 as a mass substance, is not likely to be understood as something which grows (as is the case in English, so too is it probably the case in Chinese). Thus, we can see that in the absence of syntactic cues, semantic cues are occasionally sufficient to disambiguate between a substance or object noun. The final clue for the individuation of objects within a lei is that jie (H) often quantifies them. Harbsmeier says that \u00E2\u0080\u009Cjie H regularly quantifies over individual items, hardly ever over amounts of stuff\u00E2\u0080\u009D (1981, 80). Although there were few occurrences of jie in my sample set, it was often the only quantifier used in the same clause as lei, as is the case in the examples below: 12. Now those men who are palace officials are all (jie) [in] this lei.52 [My translation] 13. Those who dispute affairs of the people and officials, and leave their country, are all (jie) in this lei.53 [My translation] 14. Regarding the means by which Yan and Song kill their gentlemen, [they] all (jie) use lei.54 [My translation] 15. [Those] now wishing to take the government of previous kings, to rule the people of today, are all (jie) in the lei of guarding stumps.55 [My translation] With Harbsmeier\u00E2\u0080\u0099s analysis of jie, the most plausible way to understand these examples is that the objects in a lei are referred to individually (and most certainly not as atoms of an individual, as Goodman puts forth). I have only treated two of the quantifiers that are generally understood to refer to individuals. There are other possible quantifiers that could be tested for further examples in future research studies. However, the cases presented here are sufficient for my goal of demonstrating the plausibility of understanding lei as cognitive containers and 52 '\u00C2\u008A(>)7;\u00C3\u00B1H#A) (Han fei zi, \u00E2\u0080\u009CShuo lin shang\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 53 \u00C2\u008A(>*\u00C2\u00B70+=,;<\u00C3\u00B1-#A8 (Han fei zi: \u00E2\u0080\u009CShuo lin xia\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 54 \u00C2\u00A1.O/>I10=1;<\u00C3\u00B11#A8 (Han fei zi, \u00E2\u0080\u009CAi chen\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 55 '|12\u00C2\u00BE>3<\u00C3\u0094)4>\u00C3\u00A5<\u00C3\u00B156>#A8 (Han fei zi, \u00E2\u0080\u009CWu du\u00E2\u0080\u009D) 93 representing classes of well-individuated objects. It is possible that there are examples of lei being quantified by a quantifier, which would indicate that it was understood as a substance. However, since my methodology advocates interpretive pluralism, such examples would not serve to act counter-examples to my interpretation. On the contrary, they would actually vindicate my intuition that pluralism is the best methodological approach to Chinese philosophy. 6.7 Conclusions Mereology is the ontology that Hansen believes informs Early Chinese thought. Part of his motivation is that Chinese thought has no notion of \u00E2\u0080\u0098member\u00E2\u0080\u0099\u00E2\u0080\u0094without which, any notion of \u00E2\u0080\u0098class\u00E2\u0080\u0099 would be meaningless or unnecessary. Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s other major motivation is how Early Chinese theories posit that things arise from Dao. Fraser makes this motivation explicit, and further argues that the concepts of jian (\") and ti ( ) are best explained in mereological terms. Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s theory that Pre-Qin Chinese thought has no notion of \u00E2\u0080\u0098member\u00E2\u0080\u0099 represents his argument against the \u00E2\u0080\u0098class\u00E2\u0080\u0099 interpretation of lei (#). Contrary to Fraser\u00E2\u0080\u0099s conclusion about jian and ti, I argue that the geometric metaphor used in the Later Mohist Canons implies that these concepts cannot be unrestrictedly interpreted as \u00E2\u0080\u0098whole\u00E2\u0080\u0099 and \u00E2\u0080\u0098part,\u00E2\u0080\u0099 respectively. Moreover, the theoretical extension of the notion of ti in Canons further suggests that the Later Mohists, at least, did have a firm understanding of membership. Hence, I argue that lei is best understood as the Chinese cognitive metaphor for containers. I demonstrate this by noting that lei appears to have all of the trademarks of containers: insides, outsides, and a boundary between the two. Moreover, because it appears that lei is restricted to either living kinds 94 or to more abstract concepts, it seems that there is a basic level of categorization in human cognition (an argument that merges with the findings of folkbiology and cognitive science). This is followed by a brief discussion on the nature of quantification in Classical Chinese and how it provides for the individuation needed for objects to be counted as members of some class or other. Ultimately, it is concluded that Pre-Qin thought has the theoretical resources for classes, members, and membership, in addition to having wholes and parts. 95 7. Conclusions 7.1 General Concluding Remarks Although my thesis appears to be directed against Chad Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s influential theories of Chinese logic, my quibble with him is actually directed towards the generality of his conclusions. I have been working to demonstrate that there is a \u00E2\u0080\u009Cmore troubled, world of debate\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Puett 2002, 25). I happen to agree with Graham when he says that Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s part-whole interpretation of the \u00E2\u0080\u009CWhite Horse Dialogue\u00E2\u0080\u009D of Gongsong Long, \u00E2\u0080\u009Cis the breakthrough we have been waiting for\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Graham 1986, 92). Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s interpretation really does make the best possible sense of one of the most conceptually challenging texts from the Warring States period. I am even more inclined to agree with Hansen on this account because he is one of the few scholars willing to state outright that the statement \u00E2\u0080\u009CA white horse is not a horse\u00E2\u0080\u009D is false (and should be considered false) under any interpretation of the \u00E2\u0080\u009CWhite Horse Dialogue\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Hansen 2007, 487). Nonetheless, it is my sincere hope that I have accurately and faithfully represented Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s findings. His theories and arguments are detailed and complicated, making them at turns both exhilarating and frustrating to examine. Hence, my general method of engaging his arguments has been to take a few steps back from the specific details whenever possible in order to treat the general interpretive context of his claims (as I did with the mass noun discussion). Alternatively, I have done my best to attend to the most relevant details of his arguments and criticize them in Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s own terms (as I did with the discussion of truth). Ultimately, using both strategies has, I hope, allowed for my arguments and criticisms to succeed on several different levels. 96 It can be seen that my disagreement with Hansen is mainly methodological, and the arguments within this thesis are the consequences of this methodological disagreement. Still, I believe that my interpretations of the thinkers discussed within this thesis are defensible on account of the data provided by cognitive science and folkbiology. Hansen writes that interpretations \u00E2\u0080\u009Cshould rest on principles, semantic theories, background beliefs, and norms of use accessible to the Chinese readers of the time\u00E2\u0080\u009D (Hansen 2007, 487). My account rests on the assumption that, obviously, Chinese people of that time had the bodies and brains common to every other person, no matter what part of the world they resided in. Thus, we can reasonably assume that Classical Chinese thinkers\u00E2\u0080\u0099 physical brains operated in ways similar to how ours do today. My interpretation takes into account this basic fact, while Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s do not. I realize that my general invocation of \u00E2\u0080\u0098empirical evidence\u00E2\u0080\u0099 is certainly open to criticism. Indeed, it is true that science and scientific methodology are open to theoretical criticism and not without their own philosophic troubles. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in a debate over the status of scientific truths. Yet, for those inclined to hold such a view of science or empirical truths, I suggest that I have still accomplished the same feat that Hansen did in Language and Logic in Ancient China\u00E2\u0080\u0094 namely, I have suggested and used a \u00E2\u0080\u0098coherent\u00E2\u0080\u0099 interpretive framework that accounts for both linguistic and textual details of early Chinese thought in much the same way that Hansen does. Moreover, the burden of proof is on critics to demonstrate how an interpretation that does not account for empirical data is better than one that does. 97 7.2 Summation of Claims It has been my intention to demonstrate that, despite Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s philosophical roadblocks, a deductive interpretation of Chinese logic is not only plausible but also a worthwhile and fruitful avenue of research. I have tried to identify any potential deductive, philosophical foundations of Chinese logic, and in doing so discovered that not only do they exist, but also that they are stable and robust enough to support a deductive interpretation. These deductive, philosophical foundations are not the fictitious imaginings of a logician hoping to prove the worth and rationality of Chinese logic. It has been my assumption from the beginning that this research is inherently valuable, and also that Chinese thought is rational\u00E2\u0080\u0094an assumption based on the interpretive context of embodied cognition. Additionally, my methodology required that many of the claims made in this thesis apply only to particular thinkers (or even individual claims made by some thinkers). This characteristic is, I believe, a virtue and a necessary step away from making general statements based on insufficient data. The results of this paper are summarized as follows: 1. The Later Mohist theory of bian (*) has a significant role for truth, as represented by the Later Mohist use of dang ()) as a relational verb linking debates to states of affairs in the world. This use suggests that the Later Mohists did indeed have a concept of truth (in Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s understanding of the term \u00E2\u0080\u0098concept\u00E2\u0080\u0099). Moreover, this theory can be plausibly understood as a \u00E2\u0080\u0098na\u00C3\u00AFve\u00E2\u0080\u0099 correspondence theory of truth (na\u00C3\u00AFve by virtue of the Later Mohists willingness to treat dang as a primitive concept not requiring explanation). 98 2. The debate over Classical Chinese noun classification commits the basic error of applying a faulty and unwarranted analogy between nouns in Chinese and nouns in English. The question is not whether the lack of pluralization and the inability to directly take numerals suggests that Classical Chinese nouns are mass nouns; rather, the question is whether or not a mass-noun distinction can exist without syntactic markers for either mass nouns or count nouns. 3. Shi (!), as represented in the \u00E2\u0080\u009CZheng Ming\u00E2\u0080\u009D chapter of the Xun zi, serves the same role that Platonic forms, ideas, meanings, abstract concepts, essences, universals, etc. serve in Western accounts of the one-many distinction. It does so by being a metaphorical extension of its basic meaning of \u00E2\u0080\u0098fruit.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 This, in some ways, suggests a parallel with the current theory of psychological essentialism found in folkbiology and cognitive science. While I believe that shi can be interpreted as a concept related to the notion of essences, I think that it is actually a more specific term than \u00E2\u0080\u0098essences.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 It is possible that shi invokes only the \u00E2\u0080\u0098innate potential\u00E2\u0080\u0099 part of the \u00E2\u0080\u0098essence\u00E2\u0080\u0099 concept in cognitive science. Although this understanding of shi requires a great deal more research, it presents an exciting possibility for expanding our understanding of Pre-Qin theories of meaning. 4. The Later Mohist \u00E2\u0080\u009CCanons\u00E2\u0080\u009D define and use jian (\") and ti ( ) in a manner that suggests that they are understood to represent the concepts of \u00E2\u0080\u0098class\u00E2\u0080\u0099 and \u00E2\u0080\u0098member.\u00E2\u0080\u0099 Evidence for this interpretation is based on both the choice of the word ti and the geometric metaphor used to explain the concepts. It is also the case that Mencius provides the best examples for interpreting lei (#) as a cognitive container metaphor, which suggests that when lei refers to natural kinds, it 99 indicates the basic level of categorization posited by folkbiology and cognitive science. With the exception of conclusion 2, each of the conclusions above work together to establish the possibility (and plausibility) of a deductive interpretation of Chinese logic. Moreover, further research can\u00E2\u0080\u0094and should\u00E2\u0080\u0094be done in order to delve into the three positive conclusions (1, 3, and 4) to determine how applicable each may be to Chinese philosophy. Chad Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s theory of Chinese logic has long dominated the field. This thesis was intended to provide a critical re-examination of the foundations of Chinese logic. While it has been the case that many of Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s arguments have not been considered the strongest for his conclusions, it is the conclusions that have most influenced scholars. Furthermore, Hansen\u00E2\u0080\u0099s insights, when considered in its proper context, are the best and most elegant conclusions any scholar could hope to draw. Nevertheless, this thesis represents an important update on the methodology for studying Chinese logic: as this is the first study of Chinese logic to move beyond the old evolutionary and essentialist interpretive frameworks. 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