"Arts, Faculty of"@en .
"Vancouver School of Economics"@en .
"DSpace"@en .
"UBCV"@en .
"Nguyen, Quoc Hung"@en .
"2009-10-27T20:08:02Z"@en .
"2009"@en .
"Doctor of Philosophy - PhD"@en .
"University of British Columbia"@en .
"This dissertation consists of three chapters about business cycles in open economies. The first chapter addresses the question of why housing investment is so volatile, especially in economies with developed mortgage markets. To this end, the chapter develops an augmented Real Business Cycle model with a housing collateral constraint. The collateral constraint creates a link between the housing market and borrowing capacity, a link that amplifies the response of housing demand to shocks and becomes stronger in economies with deeper mortgage markets. The second chapter examines an anomaly between international business cycle models and empirical evidence in cross-country employment correlation. It shows that the wealth effect on leisure plays a determining role in generating a negative employment comovement in the models, hence proposing a solution to the anomaly. The last chapter compares macroeconomic consequences of dollarized emerging countries under two alternative monetary policies: the inflation targeting rule and the fixed exchange rate regime. It shows that the floating exchange rate regime can be dominated by the fixed exchange rate regime in the role of cushioning shocks and in welfare terms."@en .
"https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/14202?expand=metadata"@en .
"749897 bytes"@en .
"application/pdf"@en .
"Essays on Business Cycles in Open Economies by Quoc Hung Nguyen B.A., Kobe University, 2002 M.A., The University of Tokyo, 2004 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Doctor of Philosophy in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (Economics) The University Of British Columbia (Vancouver) October, 2009 c Quoc Hung Nguyen 2009 \u0002 \u000CAbstract This dissertation consists of three chapters about business cycles in open economies. The \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst chapter addresses the question of why housing investment is so volatile, especially in economies with developed mortgage markets. To this end, the chapter develops an augmented Real Business Cycle model with a housing collateral constraint. The collateral constraint creates a link between the housing market and borrowing capacity, a link that ampli\u00EF\u00AC\u0081es the response of housing demand to shocks and becomes stronger in economies with deeper mortgage markets. The second chapter examines an anomaly between international business cycle models and empirical evidence in cross-country employment correlation. It shows that the wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on leisure plays a determining role in generating a negative employment comovement in the models, hence proposing a solution to the anomaly. The last chapter compares macroeconomic consequences of dollarized emerging countries under two alternative monetary policies: the in\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ation targeting rule and the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate regime. It shows that the \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating exchange rate regime can be dominated by the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate regime in the role of cushioning shocks and in welfare terms. ii \u000CTable of Contents Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii List of Tables vi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Housing Investment in OECD Countries . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Stylized Facts 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2.1 Data 2.2.2 Stylized Facts Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.3.1 Household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.3.2 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.3.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.3.4 Benchmark: Free Borrowing Economy . . . . . . . . . 27 2.3.5 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.3.6 Housing Investment Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 iii \u000CTable of Contents 2.3.7 Mortgage Market Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.3.8 Asymmetric Productivity Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Extended Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2.4.1 Capitalist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 2.4.2 Borrower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 2.4.3 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 2.4.4 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 2.4.5 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2.4.6 Model Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3 International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination . . . . . 51 2.4 2.5 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 3.3 Quantitative Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4 Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating . . . . . . . . . 70 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Model Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Model 4.2.1 4.2.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 4.2.3 Production Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 4.2.4 Price Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 4.2.5 Importers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 4.2.6 Monetary Policy Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 4.2.7 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 4.3 Calibration and Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 4.4 Dynamics under Alternative Monetary Rules . . . . . . . . . 85 4.4.1 Impulse Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 4.4.2 Welfare Evaluation 89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv \u000CTable of Contents 4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 5 Conclusions Appendices A Solution Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 B Chapter 2 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 B.1 Basic Model Steady State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 B.2 Extended Model Steady State B.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 C Chapter 3 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 C.1 Solving Bond Economy Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 C.2 Solving Complete Market Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 D Chapter 4 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 D.1 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 D.1.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 D.1.2 Production Firms D.1.3 Importer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 D.1.4 Monetary Policy Rules D.1.5 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 D.2 Derivation of External Finance Premium . . . . . . . . . . . 115 D.3 Derivation of A(\u00C2\u00B7), A\u0002 (\u00C2\u00B7), B(\u00C2\u00B7) and B \u0002 (\u00C2\u00B7) . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 v \u000CList of Tables 2.1 Statistics I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.2 Statistics II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.3 Statistics: Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2.4 Statistics: Extended Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 3.1 Model Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3.2 Business Cycles Statistics: GHH Preferences . . . . . . . . . . 66 3.3 Business Cycles Statistics: Cobb-Douglas Preferences . . . . . 67 3.4 Business Cycles Statistics: Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 3.5 Business Cycles Statistics: Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 4.1 Model Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 4.2 Standard Deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 vi \u000CList of Figures 2.1 Mortgage Market Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.2 Mortgage Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.3 Mortgage Market Index and Mortgage Depth . . . . . . . . . 12 2.4 Mortgage Depth Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.5 GDP Volatility and MMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.6 GDP Volatility and MD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.7 Housing Investment Volatility and MMI . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.8 Housing Investment Volatility and MD . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.9 Non-Housing Investment Volatility and MMI . . . . . . . . . 19 2.10 Non-Housing Investment Volatility and MD . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.11 IRs to Productivity Shocks: Benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.12 IRs to Productivity Shocks: Borrowing Constraint . . . . . . 32 2.13 IRs of Housing Investment and Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.14 Housing Investment Volatility and \u00CF\u0086 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.15 Non-Housing Investment Volatility and \u00CF\u0086 . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.16 IRs: Free Borrowing and Asymmetric Shocks . . . . . . . . . 38 2.17 IRs: Borrowing Constraint and Asymmetric Shocks . . . . . . 38 2.18 IRs: Housing Investment and Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2.19 IRs: Extended Model with Borrowing Constraint . . . . . . 47 2.20 IRs of Housing Investment and Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2.21 Investment Volatilities and \u00CF\u0086 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3.1 IRs: Complete Markets, Investment with Adjustment Costs . 62 3.2 IRs: Bond Economy, Investment with Adjustment Costs . . . 63 vii \u000CList of Figures 3.3 IRs: Complete Markets, Time-to-Build Investment . . . . . . 64 3.4 IRs: Bond Economy, Time-to-Build Investment . . . . . . . . 65 4.1 IRs: Terms of Trade Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 4.2 IRs: World Interest Rate Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 viii \u000CAcknowledgements I am especially grateful to my thesis advisor, Professor Michael B. Devereux, for continual support, guidance, and encouragement. I would like to thank Professor Paul Beaudry, Professor Viktoria Hnatkovska, Professor Amartya Lahiri, and Professor Henry Siu for their useful comments and feedback. I thank the Bank of International Settlements for providing data. I also derived bene\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ts from talking with colleagues at UBC, particularly David Freeman and Subrata Sarker. ix \u000CDedication For my parents x \u000CChapter 1 Introduction This dissertation consists of three chapters about business cycles in open economies. The \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst chapter addresses the question of why housing investment is so volatile, especially in economies with developed mortgage markets. The chapter begins by presenting two stylized facts for OECD countries that standard RBC models with perfect credit markets fail to explain: (i) housing investment is about \u00EF\u00AC\u0081ve times as volatile as GDP, and (ii) housing investment is more volatile in economies with deeper mortgage markets. This chapter then develops an augmented RBC model in which these facts are reconciled with the existence of a housing collateral constraint. The collateral constraint creates a link between the housing market and borrowing capacity, a link that ampli\u00EF\u00AC\u0081es the response of housing demand to shocks and becomes stronger in economies with deeper mortgage markets. Meanwhile, since mortgage market innovations also o\u00EF\u00AC\u0080er the prospect of increased credit supply and eventually reduce the demand for collateralizable housing, this model predicts a non-monotonic impact of mortgage market depth on the volatility of housing investment. This chapter concludes by calibrating collateral constraint models to the U.K. It is well known that several quantitative properties of international business cycle models are at odds with empirical data. First, the cross-country correlations are higher for consumption than for output, while in the data the opposite is true. Second, cross-country correlations of employment and investment are negative whereas in the data they are positive. In literature, while the ranking of the consumption correlation has been explained by models with incomplete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets, Baxter (1995) admits that: \u00E2\u0080\u009CIt 1 \u000CChapter 1. Introduction has proved particularly di\u00EF\u00AC\u0083cult to write down plausibly-parameterized models which can generate positive comovement of labor and investment across countries...Thus a major challenge to the theory is to develop a model which can explain international comovement in labor input and investment.\u00E2\u0080\u009D The second chapter quantitatively shows that the wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on leisure plays a determining role in generating the cross-country negative correlation of employment. As a result, a positive cross-country correlation in employment can be obtained by using preferences with zero income elasticity of leisure. The last chapter compares macroeconomic consequences of alternative monetary policies to explore the idea that fear of \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating can be justi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ed as an optimal discretionary monetary policy in a dollarized emerging economy. Speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cally, I consider a small open economy in which intermediate goods importers borrow in foreign currency and face a credit constraint. In this economy, exchange rate depreciation not only worsens importers\u00E2\u0080\u0099 networth but also increases \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancing amounts in domestic currency, therefore exaggerating their borrowing \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance premium. Besides, because of high exchange rate pass-through, \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations in the exchange rate also have strong impacts on domestic price levels. These e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects, together, magnify macroeconomic consequences of the \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating exchange rate policy in response to external shocks. The last chapter shows that the \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating exchange rate regime can be dominated by the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate regime in the role of cushioning shocks and in welfare terms. 2 \u000CChapter 2 Housing Investment in OECD Countries 2.1 Introduction \u00E2\u0080\u009CWhy is housing investment so volatile, especially in economies with developed mortgage markets?\u00E2\u0080\u009D The question is of interest because of several reasons. First, the current global \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial meltdown has generated wide interest in the impact of recent mortgage market innovations on the housing sector and the overall business cycle, particularly the concern that these innovations may destabilize the housing market. Second, housing investment shocks account for a large share of variance in GDP in many economies and housing investment o\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ers the best early warnings of an oncoming recession among GDP components. 1 Therefore, it is important to understand the dynamics of housing investment in order to control business cycles. Third, in the US, housing investment has been documented to be both pro-cyclical and highly volatile and while the pro-cyclicality has obtained satisfactory 1 For example, housing demand shocks account for 20-25% of variance in GDP in the U.S and Japan (IMF, 2008) and in the past 60 years, eight out of ten recessions in the US were preceded by substantial problems in housing (Leamer, 2007). 3 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries explanations 2 the highly volatile behavior has not. 3 Data from OECD countries \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst indicate that the highly volatile behavior of housing investment is not a distinguishing feature of the U.S economy. Across 17 OECD countries, housing investment is on average about \u00EF\u00AC\u0081ve times as volatile as GDP and signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly more volatile than non-housing investment.4 Housing investment also tends to be more volatile in economies with deeper mortgage markets like Australia, the U.K, and the U.S. In these economies, the standard deviation of housing investment is about two times as large as its non-housing counterpart and is about six to seven times as large as GDP. This positive association is interesting.5 If housing is just a durable consumption good and consumers tend to smooth consumptions then the more developed mortgage market, which implies a broader access to credit markets, should allow households to smooth more e\u00EF\u00AC\u0083ciently against \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations. Nonetheless, consumption smoothing for housing is not supported by empirical evidence. Standard business cycle models with perfect credit markets are at odds with these empirical \u00EF\u00AC\u0081ndings. First, these models are unable to explain the positive correlation between housing investment volatility and mortgage market depth since the degree of mortgage market development should be 2 The regularity that housing investment co-moves with other investments and is pro- cyclical with GDP. The co-movement in multi-sector models is not as straightforward as it might appear, since there is a strong incentive to switch labor/production between sectors in response to sector-speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081c productivity shocks. See Charles Leung (2004) for further literature review and explanations. 3 The existing literature has limited success in explaining the volatility. The exception is Davis and Heathcote (2005), which explains the high volatility from the supply side, but does not address the mortgage market. The paper will review this later. 4 The volatility of these non-housing durable goods is already very high from the business cycle perspective; it is about four times that of GDP. 5 The positive correlation is not limited by cross-country evidence but is also re\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ected by time series data. The volatility of housing investment relative to GDP has signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly risen along dramatic innovations in the mortgage market. The paper discusses more in the empirical part 4 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries immaterial under a perfect credit market assumption. Second, standard models are also at odds in reconciling the high volatility of housing investment. I shows in this chapter that a quantitative two-sector model with free borrowing fails generating a realistic volatility of housing investment. To explain the aforementioned stylized facts, I develop an augmented Real Business Cycle (RBC) model with a housing collateral constraint. Speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cally, I consider a limited obligation environment in which borrowers do not repay unless debts are secured by collateral and housing plays the collateral role for household debt.6 The collateral constraint is inspired by the evidence that the major part of household borrowing has been in the form of collateralized debt. For example, the shares of mortgage debt in total outstanding household debt are about 80% in the US and 70% in Canada. There is also evidence of borrowers\u00E2\u0080\u0099 limited obligations. For instance, when the subprime mortgage market worsened, many borrowers just walked away from their housing collateral without any further obligations. Housing collateral is rationalized by the fact that housing is a very good store of value and an important component of wealth for most households.7 The mechanism through which a housing collateral constraint a\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects the dynamics of housing investment goes as follows. The value of housing collateral is endogenously determined by the housing stock and prices, which in turn de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ne households\u00E2\u0080\u0099 borrowing capacity. As a result, the housing collateral constraint creates a link between the housing market and borrowing capacity, a link that ampli\u00EF\u00AC\u0081es the response of housing demand to shocks and explains the high volatility of housing investment. Intuitively, increased demand for housing in good times drives up both the housing stock and 6 7 This includes, but is not limited, to mortgage debt. The value of housing structures excluding land is similar to the combined value of private non-housing structures and equipment, similar to annual GDP, and three times as large as the total stock of all other consumer durables. Moreover, the median value of a house is often much higher than the annual income of a typical household even in advanced countries, therefore, the owner usually has to access mortgage credit to purchase a house. In mortgage lending, housing naturally becomes collateral. 5 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries housing prices. These increases in turn raise the collateral value, enabling households to borrow more from capital gains to consume and further invest in housing, thereby creating a borrowing-consuming spiral. In other words, a boom in the housing market increases the collateral value, allowing households to borrow more to consume more. However, increased consumption including housing purchases in turn fuels the housing boom further, making housing investment highly volatile. Moreover, by anticipating the value of collateralizable housing in relaxing the borrowing constraint, credit constrained households rationally purchase a greater amount of housing in good times, which also accounts for the high volatility of housing investment. The housing collateral constraint can also account for the positive correlation between housing investment volatility and the degree of mortgage market development. Up to a limit, mortgage market development enhances instability in the housing market. The underlying reason is that in economies with more \u00EF\u00AC\u0082exible and developed mortgage markets, creditconstrained households can borrow a higher amount for the same value of collateral and easily withdraw equity from increased collateral for consumption.8 As a result, more developed mortgage markets intensify the collateral role of housing, thereby encouraging credit constrained households to purchase more houses in good times. Besides, more developed markets also strengthen the link between the housing market and the consumption decisions, hence creating a stronger borrowing-consuming spiral. But does the model imply that greater mortgage market depth leads to higher volatility in housing investment forever? The answer is \u00E2\u0080\u009Cno\u00E2\u0080\u009D and the reason goes as follows. Mortgage market innovations o\u00EF\u00AC\u0080er the prospect of increased credit supply and a relaxation of the borrowing constraint, thereby creating the credit e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect. In contrast to the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect above, the credit e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect reduces the incentive to invest in collateralizable housing for the pur8 It is applied even under the case that households don\u00E2\u0080\u0099t directly acquire debt or with- draw equity for consumption since by accessing more mortgage debt there would be more credit available for general consumption. 6 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries pose of relaxing the borrowing constraint. This paper shows that because the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect and credit e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect work against each other, mortgage market depth has a non-monotonic impact on the housing investment volatility. At low and medium levels of mortgage market development, the household\u00E2\u0080\u0099s credit constraint is relatively severe, so the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect prevails. Consequently, a marginal advance in mortgage market depth leads to relatively higher housing demand in good times, causing higher volatility in housing investment. By contrast, when the mortgage market is highly developed so that households have much broader access to credit and the credit constraint is much eased, the credit e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect takes over the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect and households substitute housing for other consumption goods. As a result, the volatility of housing investment declines. This work is related to the business cycle literature that incorporates the housing sector. This literature documents regularities, distinguishes housing investment from its non-housing counterpart, and attempts to explain the co-movement between the two types of investment.9 These authors, however, often have di\u00EF\u00AC\u0083culty in accounting for the relatively high volatility of housing investment. For example, Baxter (1996) \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nds that consumption of durables that include housing investment is less volatile than business investment; Fisher (1997) is unable to generate household investment more volatile than business investment for all speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cations. Davis and Heathcote (2005) explain the co-movement and the high volatility by building a model where housing and the other sectors all use three intermediate goods, albeit in different proportions. The high volatility mainly results from their calibration that the housing construction sector uses a relatively higher proportion of in9 Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) and Baxter (1996) assume reversibility between housing and business capital and also assume/calibrate the same or highly correlated productivity shocks between two sectors. Fisher (1997) assumes complementarity between the household and business capital in goods production. Chang (2000) argues that if there are adjustment costs in capital accumulation and substitutability between leisure time and durable goods in home production, then when households work more in periods of high productivity they also demand more durables. 7 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries termediate goods which are relatively more volatile. It is, however, unclear whether their estimate of the Solow residual of housing construction production is due to productivity shocks or the mixed equilibrium outcome of supply and demand in the housing sector. By contrast, this paper explains the high volatility from the demand side, particularly from the imperfect credit aspect of the housing sector. The housing collateral constraint, the key ingredient of this paper, originates from the seminal work of Kiyotaki and Moore (KM) (1997) and Kocherlakota (2000). These authors show that collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects can be a powerful propagation mechanism by which relatively small, temporary shocks can generate large, persistent \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations in output and asset prices. Campbell and Hercowitz (CH) (2005) develop a one-sector real business cycle model to address the impact of credit market innovations on macroeconomic volatility. Their mechanism is through the labor supply: less tight collateral constraints weaken the connection between constrained households\u00E2\u0080\u0099 housing investment and their hours worked. Iacoviello (2005) incorporates the New Keynesian monetary policy framework into the work of KM. Collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects enable his model to match the positive response of spending to a housing price shock. Calza et al. (2007) extend Iacoviello\u00E2\u0080\u0099s work to allow production of new housing and endogenous asset price movement. They also model institutional features of the mortgage market and argue that the correlation between consumption and house prices increases with the degree of mortgage market development, and the transmission of monetary policy shocks to consumption and to housing prices is stronger in countries with more developed mortgage markets. More recently, Monacelli (2008) argues that introducing a collateral constraint into the New Keynesian framework can reconcile the co-movement of durable and non-durable spending in response to monetary shocks. My work di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ers from these in many key aspects. Unlike the CH work, it develops a two-sector model and incorporates asset price movement to 8 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries explore the ampli\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cation mechanism of collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects. In contrast with the others, which are New Keynesian models with nominal sticky prices and nominal debt, this paper is based on an RBC model with \u00EF\u00AC\u0082exible prices and real debt to study the impact of the productivity shock. Moreover, the existing literature considers a closed economy model with heterogeneous agents where patient savers lend to impatient borrowers; this paper considers an open economy model in which domestic agents can access international credit markets, which captures the increasingly global credit market.10 The paper also incorporates capital to better characterize the dynamics of the current account. Particularly, it is shown in the quantitative section that collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects improve the performance of the model in terms of generating the counter-cyclicality of the current account compared to models in the existing open economy literature such as Backus et al. (1992) and Mendoza (1991). Finally, the small open economy model allows the paper to have a representative agent, which makes the model simple.11 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data, particularly two mortgage market depth indicators, and documents stylized facts about housing investment and its association with mortgage market depth. Section 3 explains the empirical \u00EF\u00AC\u0081ndings using a basic model with a borrowing constrained representative household. Section 4 extends the basic model to include heterogeneous households, discusses the model\u00E2\u0080\u0099s dynamics, and calibrates it for the U.K. Section 5 concludes. 10 This is also rationalized by the fact that this paper studies 17 OECD countries, most of which can be regarded as small open economies in the global economy. Even for the U.S economy, thanks to recent dramatic \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial deregulation, the major part of mortgage debts has been held by international investors. 11 In an extended model, I also consider an economy with heterogeneous households. 9 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries 2.2 Stylized Facts This section documents major stylized facts about housing with emphasis on housing investment and the mortgage market in 17 advanced OECD countries from Q1-1980 to Q3-2007.12 2.2.1 Data All time series data are quarterly, except Germany\u00E2\u0080\u0099s annual and Italy\u00E2\u0080\u0099s halfyear house prices. House prices are mainly provided by the Bank of International Settlements, and other missing values are \u00EF\u00AC\u0081lled and updated via Datastream. Real house prices are then obtained by de\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ating nominal house prices with the consumer price index (CPI). Housing investment or residential investment, non-housing investment, total investment, and GDP are in real values, i.e., in constant or chained prices, and obtained via Datastream and OECD Stat.13 I utilize two speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081c indicators to measure the degree of mortgage market development in these OECD countries. The \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst one is a synthetic mortgage market index constructed by the IMF.14 The second measure is the ratio of total outstanding amount of mortgage debt over GDP, the mortgage-debtto-GDP ratio or the mortgage depth, which is often used in literature.15 12 The choice of 17 OECD countries is mainly based on the availability of data. They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the U.K, and the U.S. I choose post 1980s period since most of innovations in mortgage markets of these countries began in the early 1980s. 13 For more details about the code of each speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081c variable, see the Data Appendix. 14 They are taken from Table 3.1 of Chapter 3 of IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) April 2008: \u00E2\u0080\u009CThe changing housing cycle and the implications for monetary policy\u00E2\u0080\u009D. 15 For example: Warnock and Warnock (2008) use this ratio or maximum possible of this ratio to measure mortgage market depth or market size. Some other series of OECD working papers also use this particular measure. The data for mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio (2001-2006 average) for all countries except New Zealand is taken from the IMF. Data for New Zealand are taken from Warnock (2008). 10 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries In particular, although most of advanced OECD countries have moved toward more competitive and developed housing \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance markets thanks to recent deregulation and innovations in the mortgage market, there are still signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cant cross-country di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erences in the level of mortgage market development in terms of market liberalization, legal procedures, and regulatory structures. The cross-country di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erences in mortgage market development are re\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ected through: (1) The typical ratio of a mortgage loan to property\u00E2\u0080\u0099s value or loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the standard length of mortgage loans; (2) The ability to make home equity withdrawals and to prepay mortgages without a fee; (3) Developments of secondary markets for mortgage loans. These di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erences then imply di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent households\u00E2\u0080\u0099 access to housingrelated \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancing in each country. To summarize cross-country di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erences in mortgage market development, a synthetic mortgage market development index is constructed.16 The index lies between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating easier household access to mortgage credit. The IMF\u00E2\u0080\u0099s mortgage market index (henceforth MMI) and the mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio or the mortgage depth (henceforth MD) are closely positively correlated, i.e., the economies with a higher mortgage market index often have a bigger or deeper mortgage market size (Figure 2.3). Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show evidence that there are signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cant di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erences in the degree of mortgage market development and mortgage size, even among advanced OECD countries. Since the IMF\u00E2\u0080\u0099s index is a one-period time indicator, which may be able to capture precisely only the current degree of mortgage market development, I extend data for the second indicator, the mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio, to the last 10 years in order to examine the development of the mortgage market over time.17 Figure 2.4 suggests that the degree of mortgage market depth has been increasing for most of these countries but the rank 16 17 For more detail about the construction method, see Chapter 3 of WEO 2008 Sources: European Mortgage Federation, IMF, FRB release, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, OECD, and Keen (2007). Although some countries like the U.S, U.K and Australia have data before 1997, I could not \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nd longer data for some European countries. 11 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries UK US US Sweden Sweden UK Spain Spain Norway Japan Netherlands Italy Germany France Finland Denmark Canada Austria Australia Belgium .2 Mortgage Market Index .4 .6 .8 1 Figure 2.1: Mortgage Market Index Norway Japan Netherlands Italy Germany France Finland Denmark Canada Austria Australia Belgium Mortgage\u00E2\u0088\u0092debt\u00E2\u0088\u0092GDP\u00E2\u0088\u0092ratio 20 40 60 80 100 Figure 2.2: Mortgage Depth 1 Figure 2.3: Mortgage Market Index and Mortgage Depth US Mortgage Market Index .6 .8 Denmark Netherlands Australia Sweden Norway Canada UK .4 Finland Japan Spain Belgium Corr:0.8, R^2=0.64 Austria Germany Italy .2 France 20 40 60 Mortgage\u00E2\u0088\u0092debt\u00E2\u0088\u0092GDP\u00E2\u0088\u0092ratio (%) 80 100 12 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries remains the same, i.e., those countries that currently have deeper mortgage markets also possessed deeper ones in the 1990s. Therefore, I conclude that the IMF\u00E2\u0080\u0099s index re\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ects the comparative degree of mortgage market development, at least from the 1990s. 2.2.2 Stylized Facts The \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst stylized fact about housing in OECD countries is that its real prices are signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly pro-cyclical with real GDP, which is contrary to the countercyclicality of non-housing investment\u00E2\u0080\u0099s real prices18 (The 2nd Column of Table 2.1). The 3rd and 4th Column of Table 2.1 present evidence that housing investment co-moves with non-housing investment and is pro-cyclical with GDP. The co-movement property is prevalent in these advanced OECD countries and has an important implication for theoretical models that this paper will address later. Note that the pro-cyclicality of both real housing prices and housing investment makes it challenging for those models that try to explain the high volatility of housing investment from supply side, particularly the housing sector speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081c productivity shocks. Compared to its non-housing counterpart, housing investment is also di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent in terms of volatility and cross-country dispersion. According to Table 1 (Column 10 and 11), the standard deviation of housing investment relative to GDP is not only signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly higher than that of non-housing investment but also varies widely across countries. The former ratio ranges from 2.56 in Italy to 6.67 in the U.S, whereas the latter ratio is stable at 3.8. The F-test for variances of the two groups is rejected with signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cant level (p-value is 4%) and the t-test for equality of the two ratios is strongly rejected (p-value=0.2%). I obtain the same conclusions when comparing 18 As documented by Greenwood et al. (1997) and Fisher (2006), the real non-housing investment price measured by the business equipment de\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ator divided by consumption de\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ator is signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly counter-cyclical with GDP: The unconditional correlation for the U.S economy is -0.54 13 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Figure 2.4: Mortgage Depth Development 100% M o r t g a g e \u00CD\u00B2 D e b t \u00CD\u00B2 G D P 80% 60% 40% r a t i o 20% 0% 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Belgium Denmark Germany Spain France Italy Netherlands Austria Finland Sweden UK Norway U.S Canada Japan Australia New\u0003Zealand 2007 Sources: DataStream, European Mortgage Federation, Federal Reserve Release (2008), Federal Reserve of New Zealand (2008, 2004), IMF, Keen (2007), OECD Outlook 14 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries the housing investment with aggregate investment: housing investment is, on average, much more volatile and varies widely across countries than aggregate investment. With regard to the mortgage market, Figures 2.5 and 2.6 \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst show signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cant positive correlations between the volatility of GDP and the two mortgage market indicators. More interestingly, Figures 2.7 and 2.8 present evidence that the volatility of housing investment relative to GDP is higher in economies with more developed mortgage markets, i.e., economies with higher mortgage market indices and larger mortgage market size, while there is no signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cant correlation between the volatility of non-housing investment and degree of mortgage market development (Figure 2.9 and 2.10). In other words, these \u00EF\u00AC\u0081gures show that while GDP tends to be more volatile in economies with deeper mortgage markets, housing investment is still more volatile. Therefore the volatility of housing investment to GDP signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly increases in these countries. Finally, I explore housing investment from a historical perspective. Since most deregulation and innovation in the housing \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance system in advanced OECD countries just began in the early 1980s, and it is evident that the current system has been much developed compared to that in the early stage of deregulation and innovation, I divide samples into 2 periods: prior and post Q1-1995.19 Table 2.2, \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst, presents evidence of the so-called Great Moderation in the last decade. Particularly, the volatility of output has dropped dramatically over time across advanced OECD countries: post 1995, the average standard deviation of GDP is about two times as low as that prior to 1995. However, the volatility of housing investment has not fallen by that much so that the volatility relative to GDP has risen signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly. 20 In short, housing investment has become relatively more volatile along with 19 I use 10 out of 17 countries that have relatively long enough observations before Q1- 1995. 20 The volatility of housing still varies widely among countries. The t-test for the equality of the two ratios of relative volatility is rejected with 10%. 15 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Table 2.1: Statistic I Correlation with GDP Country HP RES NRES Std.dev relative to GDP INV RES NRES INV Australia 0.41 0.65 0.66 0.79 6.50 5.47 4.87 Austria 0.23 -0.12 0.81 0.85 4.00 3.13 2.00 Belgium 0.38 0.58 0.40 0.58 3.89 2.89 2.78 Canada 0.52 0.48 0.66 0.73 4.09 3.57 3.07 Denmark 0.53 0.39 0.58 0.65 5.08 4.50 3.83 Finland 0.74 0.62 0.70 0.78 3.11 3.37 2.84 France 0.49 0.71 0.86 0.88 2.89 3.22 3.00 Germany 0.23 0.55 0.75 0.76 3.33 3.78 3.22 Italy 0.26 0.20 0.76 0.96 2.56 4.11 3.22 Japan 0.64 0.63 0.80 0.87 4.73 2.18 2.18 Netherlands 0.68 0.57 0.63 0.75 4.00 4.00 3.30 New Zealand 0.30 0.72 0.78 0.84 5.86 4.43 4.29 Norway 0.49 0.23 -0.08 -0.01 4.85 5.08 4.31 Spain 0.33 0.11 0.51 0.54 4.50 4.33 3.33 Sweden 0.77 -0.44 0.78 0.60 6.15 2.85 2.23 U.K 0.58 0.57 0.48 0.72 6.44 3.60 3.16 U.S 0.40 0.64 0.78 0.91 6.67 3.57 3.40 Average 0.47 0.42 0.64 0.72 4.63 3.77 3.24 Notes: HP is real house prices, RES is real housing investment, NRES is real non-housing investment, INV is real aggregate investment, GDP is real GDP. Correlations are correlation with GDP. RES/GDP, NRES/GDP, and INV/GDP denote the relative volatility of RES, NRES, and INV to that of real GDP, respectively. All series are in logs and Hodrick-Prescott \u00EF\u00AC\u0081ltered 16 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries 1 1.5 2 Figure 2.5: GDP Volatility and MMI .5 Corr:0.47(p\u00E2\u0088\u0092value:0.06), R^2=0.22 .2 .4 .6 Mortgage Market Index GDP volatility .8 1 Fitted values 2 Figure 2.6: GDP Volatility and MD .5 1 1.5 Corr:0.22 (p\u00E2\u0088\u0092value:0.4), R^2=0.07 20 40 60 Mortgage\u00E2\u0088\u0092debt\u00E2\u0088\u0092GDP\u00E2\u0088\u0092ratio GDP volatility 80 100 Fitted values 17 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries 3 4 5 6 7 Figure 2.7: Housing Investment Volatility and MMI 2 Corr:0.74 (p\u00E2\u0088\u0092value:0.0) R^2=0.56 .2 .4 .6 Mortgage Market Index .8 Volatility of Housing Investment to GDP 1 Fitted values 3 4 5 6 7 Figure 2.8: Housing Investment Volatility and MD 2 Corr:0.6 (p\u00E2\u0088\u0092value:0.01) R^2=0.4 20 40 60 Mortgage\u00E2\u0088\u0092debt\u00E2\u0088\u0092GDP\u00E2\u0088\u0092ratio Volatility of Housing Investment to GDP 80 100 Fitted values 18 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries 3 4 5 Figure 2.9: Non-Housing Investment Volatility and MMI 2 Corr: 0.33 (p\u00E2\u0088\u0092value:0.3) R^2=0.11 .2 .4 .6 Mortgage Market Index .8 Volatility of Non\u00E2\u0088\u0092housing investment to GDP 1 Fitted values 3 4 5 Figure 2.10: Non-Housing Investment Volatility and MD 2 Corr:0.4 (p\u00E2\u0088\u0092value:0.09) R^2 =0.21 20 40 60 Mortgage\u00E2\u0088\u0092debt\u00E2\u0088\u0092GDP\u00E2\u0088\u0092ratio Volatility of Non\u00E2\u0088\u0092housing investment to GDP 80 100 Fitted values 19 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Table 2.2: Statistic II Prior 95 Post 95 Country RES GDP RES/GDP RES GDP RES/GDP Australia 9.12 1.78 5.12 8.59 0.61 14.08 Austria 3.99 0.78 5.12 2.51 0.80 3.14 Canada 7.63 1.94 3.93 4.19 0.87 4.82 Finland 5.70 2.50 2.28 6.00 1.05 5.71 France 3.15 0.97 3.25 1.99 0.74 2.69 Italy 2.39 1.04 2.30 2.16 0.76 2.84 New Zealand 8.07 1.77 4.56 8.40 1.05 8.00 Norway 7.60 1.53 4.97 5.00 0.98 5.10 U.K 9.67 1.51 6.40 3.90 0.38 10.26 U.S 10.42 1.53 6.81 5.01 0.87 5.76 Average 6.77 1.54 4.47 4.78 0.81 6.24 Notes: RES is real housing investment, GDP is real GDP. RES/GDP denotes the relative volatility of RES to that of real GDP. All series are in logs and Hodrick-Prescott \u00EF\u00AC\u0081ltered 20 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries dramatic innovations in the mortgage market in these OECD countries. 2.3 Basic Model To explain the aforementioned stylized facts, I construct a two-sector RBC model in which a representative household faces a borrowing constraint and housing plays the collateral role. A two-sector model is necessary to analyze housing which is a durable and non-tradable good. 2.3.1 Household The representative household maximizes its expected lifetime utility de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ned over random sequences of non-durable consumption goods (ct ), housing services from the housing stock (ht ), and labor disutility (lt ): U = E0 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0002 \u0003 \u0004 \u00CE\u00B2 t U ct , ht , lt (2.3.1) t=0 The budget constraint of the representative household is given by: ct + qt [ht \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )ht\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ] + \u00CF\u0086h (ht \u00E2\u0088\u0092 ht\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )2 + ict + iht + (1 + rt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )dt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 2 ht\u00E2\u0088\u00921 c h \u00E2\u0089\u00A4 wt lt + rtc kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 + rth kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 + dt c + ict = ktc \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4k )kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 h + iht = kth \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4k )kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 c )2 \u00CF\u0086k (ktc \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 c 2 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 h )2 \u00CF\u0086k (kth \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 h 2 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 (2.3.2) (2.3.3) (2.3.4) Each period, the household can borrow internationally traded debt,21 dt , subject to a constraint described later, at an exogenous real interest rate, rt . It supplies labor, lt , at the real wage rate, wt , and lends sector speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081c c , k h , to capital markets at prices r c , r h , where k c , k h capital, kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 t t t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 are 21 This includes, but is not limited to, mortgage debt. 21 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries capital for non-durable and durable production, respectively. The household then spreads its income on non-durable consumption goods, ct , debt repayment, (1 + rt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )dt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 , investments on two types of non-housing capitals ict , iht , housing investment, qt (ht \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )ht\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ), and its adjustment costs, \u00CF\u0086h (ht \u00E2\u0088\u0092ht\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )2 , 2 ht\u00E2\u0088\u00921 where qt is real housing prices and \u00CE\u00B4h is the depreciation rate of housing stock. In addition to the budget constraint, the representative household faces the following collateral borrowing constraint: (1 + rt )dt \u00E2\u0089\u00A4 \u00CF\u0086Et (qt+1 ht ) (2.3.5) which means that at any time the amount the household can borrow, (1 + rt )dt , is limited by the expected future value of his property. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kocherlakota (2000), this borrowing constraint is rationalized by the borrower\u00E2\u0080\u0099s limited obligations. If the household repudiates its debt obligations, the lenders can foreclose the property after paying the transaction costs, (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0086)Et (qt+1 ht ). The parameter \u00CF\u0086, which presents the fraction of collateral value a household can use for borrowing, re\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ects market liberalization, legal procedures, and regulatory structures or institutional features prevailing in the mortgage market, therefore indicating the degree of the mortgage market \u00EF\u00AC\u0082exibility and development. A higher \u00CF\u0086 corresponds to a higher mortgage market index and indicates a more developed and \u00EF\u00AC\u0082exible mortgage market in the model. In this paper, I specialize preferences as below: l\u00CF\u0089 (xt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BA \u00CF\u0089t )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CF\u0083 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1 U (ct , ht , lt ) = 1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CF\u0083 1 \u00CE\u00B7\u00E2\u0088\u00921 1 \u00CE\u00B7\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CE\u00B7 xt = [(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B3) \u00CE\u00B7 ct \u00CE\u00B7 + \u00CE\u00B3 \u00CE\u00B7 ht \u00CE\u00B7 ] \u00CE\u00B7\u00E2\u0088\u00921 (2.3.6) (2.3.7) This is the GHH preference function introduced by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu\u00EF\u00AC\u0080man (1988) and is widely used in small open economy literature.22 xt is the composite consumption, the CES function of nondurable 22 GHH preferences have the property that the marginal rate of substitution between 22 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries consumption, ct , and housing services from the housing stock ht . \u00CE\u00B3 > 0 is the share of housing services in the composite consumption index. \u00CE\u00B7 \u00E2\u0089\u00A5 0 is the elasticity of substitution between non-durables and housing services. \u00CF\u0083 denotes the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution, \u00CF\u0089 determines the elasticity of labor supply, and \u00CE\u00BA determines the amount of leisure in the steady state. Let\u00E2\u0080\u0099s denote the multiplier on the borrowing constraint at time t by \u00CE\u00BBt then the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst order conditions for the representative household read: Uct [1 + \u00CF\u0086k ( Uct [1 + \u00CF\u0086k ( c c ktc \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0086k kt+1 c (( )] = \u00CE\u00B2E {U [1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4 + r + )2 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1)]} t ct+1 k t+1 c kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 2 ktc h h kth \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0086k kt+1 h (( )] = \u00CE\u00B2E {U [1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4 + r + )2 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1)]} t ct+1 k t+1 h 2 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 kth wt = \u00E2\u0088\u0092 Ult Uct Uct \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BBt = \u00CE\u00B2Et {Uct+1 (1 + rt )} ht \u00E2\u0088\u0092 ht\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ) =Uht + \u00CF\u0086\u00CE\u00BBt Et {qt+1 } ht\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0086h ht+1 2 (( ) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1)]} +\u00CE\u00B2Et {Uct+1 [qt+1 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h ) + 2 ht (2.3.8) Uct (qt + \u00CF\u0086h (2.3.9) The \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst two equations are standard optimality conditions for capital with adjustment costs while the third one is a standard labor supply equation. The last two equations present distinguishing features of the borrowing constraint model. Equation (2.3.8) is a modi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ed Euler equation and is reduced to a standard Euler equation in case of a non-binding constraint, i.e., \u00CE\u00BBt = 0. When the constraint binds, the shadow value of borrowing is positive, \u00CE\u00BBt > 0, so there is an intertemporal distortion in non-durable goods consumption between two di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent times. In other words, when \u00CE\u00BBt > 0, this consumption and leisure is independent of the consumption level within the period or there is no wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on labor supply. GHH preferences provide a better description of consumption and the trade balance for small open economies than alternative speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cations (see, for instance, Correia, Neves, and Rebelo (1995)). 23 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries equation implies that Uct > \u00CE\u00B2Et {Uct+1 (1 + rt )}, which means the marginal utility of current non-durable consumption is higher than the marginal gain of shifting one unit of non-durables to the next period. A higher \u00CE\u00BBt implies a tighter constraint, hence encouraging the household to purchase more collateralizable housing to relax the borrowing constraint, enabling it to increase current consumption. Equation (2.3.9) is the e\u00EF\u00AC\u0083ciency condition for the intratemporal choice of durable housing that requires the household to equate the marginal utility of non-durable consumption, weighted by the relative housing prices and adjustment costs, to the marginal utility of housing services. The marginal utility of housing service consists of three components: (i) the direct utility gain of an additional unit of housing; (ii) the marginal gain from relaxing the collateral constraint; (iii) the expected utility derived from expanding future consumption by means of re-selling the amount of housing invested in the previous period. When the constraint doesn\u00E2\u0080\u0099t bind, \u00CE\u00BBt = 0, the distortion component \u00CF\u0086\u00CE\u00BBt Et {qt+1 } vanishes, hence the marginal bene\u00EF\u00AC\u0081t of housing consists of only terms (i) and (iii), which is the standard intratemporal optimality condition. For the sake of exposition at the moment, let\u00E2\u0080\u0099s assume away adjustment costs. After integrating (2.3.9) forward, I obtain the following demand function for housing: qt Uct = Et \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0005\u0002 \u0006 \u0005\u0002 \u0006 [(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )\u00CE\u00B2]j Uht+j + Et [(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )\u00CE\u00B2]j \u00CF\u0086\u00CE\u00BBt+j qt+1+j j=0 j=0 (2.3.10) The \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst term in the RHS of (2.3.10) is the discounted stream of utility from housing services.23 The second term is the current and expected bene\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ts from the opportunity to increase consumption by the additional borrowing enabled by increased collateral value. This term depends on the degree of mortgage market development represented by parameter \u00CF\u0086, the ex23 This term is set to current marginal utility of housing Uht when \u00CE\u00B4h = 1. 24 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries pected prices of housing, and the tightness of credit constraint \u00CE\u00BBt+j . When the constraint doesn\u00E2\u0080\u0099t bind, \u00CE\u00BBt = 0 for all t, this term is equated to zero, hence, the weighted marginal utility of non-durable consumption in the LHS equates to the discounted stream of utility from housing services. To explore further, I follow Manacelli (2008) to express the equation as a condition where the marginal rate of substitution between housing and nondurable goods consumption Uht Uct is equal to the user cost (Zt ) of housing, which in this case can be expressed as: Zt \u00E2\u0089\u00A1 qt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0086\u00CE\u00BBt Uct+1 Et {qt+1 } \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )\u00CE\u00B2Et { qt+1 } Uct Uct (2.3.11) When the constraint binds, \u00CE\u00BBt > 0, the user cost of housing is determined not only by current and expected real housing prices but also by \u00CF\u0086 and the movement of the shadow price of borrowing, \u00CE\u00BBt . This is one of the distinguishing features of the model. For example, suppose that \u00CE\u00BBt rises, that is the constraint becomes tighter, then the household has more incentives to purchase more collateralizable housing to relax the borrowing constraint and increase non-durable goods consumption. However, when \u00CE\u00BBt rises Uct also tends to increase, thereby raising the (opportunity) cost of acquiring an additional unit of durable housing. Moreover, increased housing demand also often drives up housing prices, qt , hence raising the user cost as well. 2.3.2 Firms At time t, representative \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms in the tradable non-durable sector rent prec , and labor, lc , from the household to produce viously installed capital, kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 t goods with the production function: c )\u00CE\u00B1c (ltc )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1c yt = At (kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 (2.3.12) Output from the tradable non-durable sector can be used as non-durable consumption ct or investments in either type of capital goods ktc , kth or can h , be exported with tbt . Firms in the construction sector combine capital, kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 25 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries with labor, lth , to construct buildings (structures) for non-tradable durable housing with the following technology: h )\u00CE\u00B1h (lth )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1h bt = At (kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 (2.3.13) At is an aggregate exogenous stochastic productivity shock with law of motion:24 log(At+1 ) = \u00CF\u0081A log(At ) + t+1 (2.3.14) Optimality conditions for tradable goods \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms imply: wt = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c ) rtc = \u00CE\u00B1c \u0007 kc \u0008\u00CE\u00B1c yt t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1 )A c t ltc ltc \u0007 kc \u0008\u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u00921 yt t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 = \u00CE\u00B1 A c t c kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ltc (2.3.15) (2.3.16) Optimality conditions for the construction sector imply: wt = qt (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h ) rth = qt \u00CE\u00B1h 2.3.3 \u0007 kh \u0008\u00CE\u00B1h bt t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 = q (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1 )A t t h lth lth bt h kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 = qt \u00CE\u00B1h At \u0007 kh \u0008\u00CE\u00B1h \u00E2\u0088\u00921 t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 lth (2.3.17) (2.3.18) Equilibrium Given the interest rate, rt , a competitive equilibrium in this economy is characterized by a sequence of allocations {ct , lt , ht , dt , ktc , kth , ict , iht , yt , ltc , lth , } and a sequence of prices {qt , wt , rtc , rth , \u00CE\u00BBt } that satisfy the household and \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms optimality conditions, the budget constraint, the binding borrowing constraint, production functions, and the following market clearing conditions. 24 I assume that an exogenous productivity shock has the same e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on both production sectors and will consider an asymmetric case later. Notice that the symmetric productivity shock implies a perfect correlated productivity shock between two sectors, as in Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), I do not assume reversibility between housing and business capital and housing is produced separately. 26 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Labor market clearing: lt = ltc + lth (2.3.19) Non-tradable durable housing market clearing: bt = ht \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )ht\u00E2\u0088\u00921 (2.3.20) Tradable non-durable goods market: ct + ict + iht + \u00CF\u0086h (ht \u00E2\u0088\u0092 ht\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )2 + (1 + rt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )dt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 = yt + dt 2 ht\u00E2\u0088\u00921 (2.3.21) The trade balance, housing investment, and aggregate output can be expressed as: 2.3.4 tbt = yt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 ct \u00E2\u0088\u0092 ict \u00E2\u0088\u0092 iht (2.3.22) resit = qt bt (2.3.23) Yt = yt + qt bt (2.3.24) Benchmark: Free Borrowing Economy For comparison, I also consider a benchmark: a small open economy model augmented by the presence of the non-tradable durable housing sector with free borrowing. In this economy, the borrowing constraint does not bind so the multiplier \u00CE\u00BBt = 0 \u00E2\u0088\u0080t. Therefore, two optimal conditions for non-durables and housing can be written as:25 \u00C2\u00AF = \u00CE\u00B2Et {Uct+1 (1 + rt )} Uct (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0086d (dt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 d)) (2.3.25) qt Uct = Uht + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )\u00CE\u00B2Et {qt+1 Uct+1 } (2.3.26) Hence, the demand function for durable housing becomes: \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0005\u0002 \u0006 [(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )\u00CE\u00B2]j Uht+j qt Uct = Et (2.3.27) j=0 25 All other conditions remain the same as before. The introduction of asset adjustment cost is to induce stationary dynamics in a small open frictionless economy but it does not a\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect the quantitative results of the model since \u00CF\u0086d is very small. For more details, see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) 27 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries The RHS of equation (2.3.27) is the shadow value of durable housing. According to Barsky et al. (2007), there are two reasons that keep this value roughly constant against moderate-lived shocks. First, durable housing with low depreciation rates has high stock-\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ow ratios,26 which implies that even relatively large changes in the production of the housing over a moderate horizon have small e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects on the total housing stock, therefore, causing only minor changes in the service \u00EF\u00AC\u0082ows. Second, if \u00CE\u00B4h is su\u00EF\u00AC\u0083ciently low, the shadow value will be mainly a\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ected by the marginal utilities of service \u00EF\u00AC\u0082ows in the distant future. Since the e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects of the shock are temporary, the future terms in this equation remain close to their steady-state values. Thus, even if there were signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cant changes in the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst few terms of the expansion, they would have a small percentage e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on the present value as a whole. The two observations together suggest that under the benchmark, demand for durable housing displays an almost in\u00EF\u00AC\u0081nite elasticity of intertemporal substitution: even a small rise in housing prices today relative to tomorrow would cause people to delay their housing purchases. 2.3.5 Calibration The model period is a quarter. Preference: Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), the inverse of elasticity of substitution in consumption \u00CF\u0083 and the elasticity of labor supply \u00CF\u0089 are set to 2 and 1.6, respectively, which are in range of literature. The elasticity of substitution between non-durable goods and housing service, \u00CE\u00B7, is set to unity, implying the Cobb Douglas form of the composite consumption. 26 27 27 The parameter \u00CE\u00B3 is set so that the ratio of In this model, the steady-state stock-\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ow ratio is 1/\u00CE\u00B4h There is no consensus about this elasticity of substitution yet. Piazzesi et al. (2007) argue that if \u00CE\u00B7 is su\u00EF\u00AC\u0083ciently less than unity then the equity premium puzzle is resolved while Davis and Martin (2005) show that the value should be no less than 1.25 in order to be consistent with U.S housing stock and price data. This paper takes a neutral stance to set the value to unity. I got similar qualitative results when the value is assigned in the neighborhood of unity 28 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries private residential investment over GDP is equal to 3.5%, the average level for the U.K private residential investment over recent 20 years. Discount factor \u00CE\u00B2 is chosen as 0.985, which is a bit lower than the value implied by the foreign real interest rate 1 1+0.01 = 0.9901 to assure the binding credit constraint at steady state. The parameter \u00CE\u00BA is selected so that a fraction 40 24\u00C3\u00977 of household\u00E2\u0080\u0099s one unit time endowment is used for working in the labor market. Technology: The share of capital in the production of non-durables and housing construction, \u00CE\u00B1c , \u00CE\u00B1h , are both set to 0.3. These parameters together with depreciation rates will determine the investment rate, which is 20% of GDP. The depreciation rate of non-housing capital is chosen at 12% per year or \u00CE\u00B4k = 0.03 whereas \u00CE\u00B4h is set to 0.003, which implies the depreciation rate of housing is 1.2% annually.28 The parameter of capital adjustment costs \u00CF\u0086k is chosen such that volatility of non-housing investment matches the data and that of housing investment \u00CF\u0086h is set equal to \u00CF\u0086k . Steady state value of the real interest rate is set at 4% per year or r=0.01. The persistence coe\u00EF\u00AC\u0083cient \u00CF\u0081A in the motion equation of the productivity shock log(At+1 ) = \u00CF\u0081A log(At ) + t+1 is set to 0.9 and the variance of the innovation is selected to match the volatility of output. For U.K : I set borrowing constraint parameter \u00CF\u0086 to 0.4 compared to 0.6 of the U.S economy. The reason for assigning 0.6 to the U.S economy is as follows. First, for the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst-time homebuyers, the down-payment rate is typically less than 20%, which means these households can borrow more than 80% of the housing collateral value. 29 For existing homeowners, Mian and Su\u00EF\u00AC\u0081 (2009) show that these households on average extract 30 cents for every dollar increase in home equity. I take an average of these numbers, which implies a value of 0.6 for the US. Then I scale down the IMF mortgage market development index so that 0.98 is scaled to 0.6 and obtain the number 0.4 for the U.K accordingly. At the same time, the standard deviation of technology 28 29 Monacelli sets it to 1% while Davis and Heathcote and others use 1.56% per year In the U.S, the Loan-to-Value ratio can reach 100% during the recent housing boom. 29 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries innovation and capital adjustment cost parameter \u00CF\u0086k are calibrated to 0.002 and 0.33, respectively in order to match the standard deviation of output and non-housing investment in the U.K over the past 30 years, 1.15% and 4.10% respectively. 2.3.6 Housing Investment Dynamics I \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst \u00EF\u00AC\u0081x \u00CF\u0086 to explore the borrowing constraint model\u00E2\u0080\u0099s impulse responses to a positive aggregate productivity shock. I focus on the dynamics of housing investment and compare the credit constraint model and the benchmark. In both cases, a favored productivity shock reduces production costs, encouraging \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms to hire more labor to extend production in both durable and non-durable sectors, 30 thereby raising wage rates and capital returns. Also because of the positive productivity shock, the housing supply curve shifts down to the right. From the demand side, aggregate consumption increases due to the income e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect. Since housing is normal goods, its demand also increases, leading to an upward shift in the demand curve, which applies for both free borrowing and credit constraint cases. The di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erences, however, lie on the interaction between the income e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect, the substitution e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect, and potentially the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect of each demand\u00E2\u0080\u0099s structure. Figure 2.11 presents impulse responses of the free borrowing model. In a free borrowing environment, housing is just a durable consumption good so the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is almost in\u00EF\u00AC\u0081nite for long-lived housing.31 As a result, increased demand from the income e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect is partly o\u00EF\u00AC\u0080set by the high intertemporal substitution e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect resulting from rising house prices. Consequently, the housing investment volatility is relatively low and unable to exceed that of non-housing investment under all reasonable parameter calibration.32 Nonetheless, it is shown that perfect/high correlated 30 The amount of capital was already determined from the previous period This also implies a very \u00EF\u00AC\u0082at housing demand curve at any given time. 32 Recall in the empirical section shows that housing investment is on average signi\u00EF\u00AC\u008131 30 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries productivity shocks combined with an exogenous interest rate (small open economy framework) can produce the correct co-movement of housing investment in this type of two sector model, consistent with Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), and Baxter (1996). Intuitively, the income e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect together with an increased housing supply originating from a positive productivity shock can o\u00EF\u00AC\u0080set the high substitution e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect of the housing demand but at the same time, they are not strong enough to generate the high volatility of housing investment documented from empirics. By contrast, Figure 2.12 presents impulse responses of the collateral constraint model in which housing plays the collateral role. There are notably two main di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erences from the demand side of housing. First, unlike households that smooth consumption over time in the free borrowing benchmark, borrowing-constrained households are impatient, hence tend to locate consumption toward the current period. The impatience, therefore, produces a higher demand for both durable and non-durable goods compared to the benchmark. Second, since housing plays an additional role as a collateralizable asset and rising collateral value will enable credit constrained households to expand consumption through further borrowing, households will have more incentives to invest in housing. In other words, besides the direct utility gain from housing services, households will also bene\u00EF\u00AC\u0081t from relaxing the borrowing constraint by an additional housing purchase. This is shown in the RHS of the demand equation (2.3.10): In addition to the standard discounted stream of utility from housing services, there is the second term presenting the current and expected bene\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ts from the opportunity to expand consumption thanks to rising collateral value. The collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect implies a steeper demand curve and will shift the curve upward to a greater extent, therefore, leading to a greater response for housing investment on impact of productivity shock compared to the free borrowing benchmark. More importantly, the collateral constraint creates a borrowing-consuming spiral: cantly more volatile than non-housing investment in the majority of OECD countries. 31 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Figure 2.11: IRs to Productivity Shocks: Benchmark Non\u00E2\u0088\u0092durable and Hours to A Housing Stock to A 1.4 c l 1.2 1 Housing Investment to A 0.35 4 0.3 3.5 0.25 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.15 3 2.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.05 2 1.5 h 0 0 10 20 30 40 0 0 10 Capital to A 20 30 reinv 40 1 0 10 Employments 3.5 3.5 3 3 2.5 2 1.5 30 40 Productions to A 4 3 2.5 2 1.5 20 2 1 1 k 0.5 0 0.5 kh 0 10 20 30 1 lc c y b l h 40 0 0 10 Housing Price to A 20 30 40 0 0 10 Wage to A 0.15 20 30 40 Trade Balances to A 0.8 1 q w 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.05 0.4 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00921.5 0.2 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 tby \u00E2\u0088\u00920.05 0 10 20 30 40 0 0 10 20 30 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00922.5 0 10 20 30 40 Figure 2.12: IRs to Productivity Shocks: Borrowing Constraint Non\u00E2\u0088\u0092durable and hours to A Housing stock to A 1.2 Housing investment to A 0.7 c l 1 7 h reinv 0.6 6 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.3 5 4 3 0.2 0.4 0.2 2 0.1 0 10 20 30 40 0 0 10 Capital to Ac 20 30 40 1 7 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 40 y b 1 0 10 Housing Price and wage to A 20 30 40 0 0 10 Trade Balances to A 0.8 q w 0.6 40 h 5 30 30 6 l 5 20 20 7 lc 6 kh 5 10 10 Productions to A 7 kc 6 0 0 Employments 0 8 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.2 6 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.4 0.4 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.6 0.2 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.8 20 30 40 lambda to A 4 2 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 \u00E2\u0088\u00921.2 \u00CE\u00BB tby \u00E2\u0088\u00920.2 0 10 20 30 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00921.4 0 10 20 30 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00924 0 10 20 30 40 32 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries initial increases in housing prices and stock raise the collateral value, enabling credit-constrained households to borrow more for consumption, which in turn will reinforce rising housing prices and housing stock. As shown in Figure 2.12, a higher demand on impact of the productivity shock and the ampli\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cation from the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect can account for highly volatile housing investment. In other words, the income e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect, increased housing supply, and the decisive collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect combined can dominate the substitution effect, hence reconciling the realistic volatility of housing investment. (Figure 2.13) Figure 2.13: IRs of Housing Investment and Prices Housing Price to shocks Housing Investment to shocks 0.2 7 Benchmark 6 0.15 5 0.1 4 0.05 3 0 2 Benchmark \u00E2\u0088\u00920.05 2.3.7 0 10 20 30 40 1 0 10 20 30 40 Comparative Analysis of Mortgage Market Development Second, I impose di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent values of parameter \u00CF\u0086 to study the impact of mortgage market development on housing investment in the borrowing constrained economy. In deeper mortgage markets, i.e., higher \u00CF\u0086, households can borrow a higher amount of debt for the same value of collateral and withdraw more 33 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries equity from increased collateral value for consumption and investment.33 This is the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect from mortgage market development. The collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect increases the volatility of housing investment because a higher \u00CF\u0086 intensi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081es the collateral role of housing, thereby encouraging credit constrained households to purchase more houses in good times. A higher \u00CF\u0086 also strengthens the link between the housing market and consumption decisions, therefore creating a stronger borrowing-consuming spiral. On the other hand, mortgage market innovations, by raising \u00CF\u0086, also offer the prospect of increased credit supply and a relaxation of borrowing constraints, therefore creating the credit e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect in the borrowing constrained economy. In contrast to the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect, the credit e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect lowers the volatility of housing investment because higher \u00CF\u0086, by providing more credits to the economy, reduces the incentive to invest in collateralizable housing for the purpose of relaxing the collateral constraint. In other words, the credit e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect relatively increases the user cost of housing, hence inducing the household to substitute housing with non-durable consumption. The two e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects are partly re\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ected through the second term in the housing demand equation (2.3.10): A higher value of \u00CF\u0086 directly increases the value of this term but at the same time eases the tightness of the borrowing constraint, thereby endogenously decreasing the current and future shadow value of borrowing \u00CE\u00BBt+j . Moreover, a higher \u00CF\u0086 also leads to changes in the housing demand, hence a\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ecting future expected housing prices qt+1+j , which then in turn have impacts on the second term of RHS of equation (2.3.10) as well. Therefore, the aggregate e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect of a higher \u00CF\u0086 on housing demand is ambiguous. It turns out that at low and medium levels of mortgage market development, when the household\u00E2\u0080\u0099s credit constraint is relatively tight, the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect prevails. Consequently, an improvement in the mortgage market development leads to a relatively larger increase in housing 33 It is applied even under the case where households don\u00E2\u0080\u0099t directly acquire debt or withdraw equity for consumption, since by accessing more mortgage debt there would be more credit available for consumption. 34 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries demand, causing a higher housing investment volatility. By contrast, when the mortgage market is highly developed, households are much less credit constrained, so the credit e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect takes over from the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect, and the household starts to substitute collateralizable housing by non-durable consumption; therefore, housing investment volatility tends to decline. Figure 2.14 presents an inverse U-shape in the relative volatility of housing investment with respect to the degree of mortgage market development. 2.3.8 Asymmetric Productivity Shock I have assumed that the aggregate productivity shock At has a symmetric impact on both durable and non-durable sector production as in (2.3.12) and (2.3.13). In this section, I consider an asymmetric case where the aggregate productivity shock does not have any impact on the durable housing production. By assuming the asymmetric shock, I attempt to exclude the e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect of increased housing supply from a positive productivity shock and therefore be able to focus on the demand side, particularly the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect. The production function of non-durable goods remains the same as in (2.3.12) but that of durable housing has the form: h )\u00CE\u00B1h (lth )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1h bt = (kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 (2.3.28) When a favored aggregate productivity shock hits the economy, since there is complete productivity spillover to nondurable production, \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms in this sector will take advantage of favored productivity to hire more labor and extend production, therefore raising wage rates and the capital returns. However, since labor is freely mobile, rising wage rates will hurt the housing construction sector that does not bene\u00EF\u00AC\u0081t from the increased productivity. Consequently, housing production costs will increase and the housing supply curve will shift upward. This is the di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erence in the supply side compared to the symmetric productivity case.34 34 Recall that the housing supply curve shifts downward in this case the complete spillover to housing production in (2.3.13). 35 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Table 2.3: Statistics: Basic Model Data Standard Model Basic Model output 1.15 1.14 1.12 consumption 1.18 0.83 0.88 nres 4.1 4.15 2.3 tb/y 0.54 0.73 0.16 res 7.57 3.51 6.55 sd(res)/sd(y) 6.58 3.1 5.85 hp 5.13 0.075 0.11 consumption 0.73 0.94 0.98 nres 0.48 0.55 0.85 tb/y -0.31 -0.07 -0.63 hp 0.58 0.93 0.79 res 0.57 0.85 0.7 Standard deviation Correlation w/ ouput Notes: Data is obtained from time series for the U.K from Q1-1981 to Q3-2007. Standard model is free borrowing model. Std() is standard deviation. nres: non-housing investment, tb/y: trade-balance output ratio, res: housing investment, hp: real housing prices. All numbers are in percentage, which is the standard deviations from trend and is obtained from Hodrick-Prescott \u00EF\u00AC\u0081lter. 36 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Housing Investment Volatility 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 Figure 2.14: Housing Investment Volatility and \u00CF\u0086 0 .2 .4 phi .6 .8 2 Non\u00E2\u0088\u0092housing investment Volatility 2.5 3 3.5 Figure 2.15: Non-Housing Investment Volatility and \u00CF\u0086 0 .2 .4 phi .6 .8 37 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Figure 2.16: IRs: Model without Borrowing Constraint: Asymmetric Shocks Non\u00E2\u0088\u0092durable and Hours to A Housing Stock to A 1.4 Housing Investment to A 0.05 4 c l 1.2 3 0 1 2 0.8 1 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.05 0.6 0 0.4 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.1 0.2 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 h 0 0 10 20 30 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.15 0 10 Capital to A 20 30 reinv 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00923 0 10 Employments 4 20 30 40 Productions to A 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 k \u00E2\u0088\u00922 \u00E2\u0088\u00923 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 c lc 10 20 30 y b \u00E2\u0088\u00922 l kh 0 h 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00924 0 10 Housing Price to A 20 30 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00923 0 10 Wage to A 0.3 20 30 40 Trade Balances to A 0.8 1 q w 0.5 0.25 0.6 0 0.2 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 0.4 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 0.15 \u00E2\u0088\u00921.5 0.2 0.1 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 tby 0.05 0 10 20 30 40 0 0 10 20 30 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00922.5 0 10 20 30 40 Figure 2.17: IRs: Model with Borrowing Constraint: Asymmetric Shocks Non\u00E2\u0088\u0092durable and hours to A Housing stock to A 1.2 Housing investment to A 0.4 c l 1 6 h reinv 5 0.3 4 0.8 0.2 3 0.6 0.1 2 0.4 0 0.2 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.1 1 0 10 20 30 40 0 0 10 Capital to Ac 20 30 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 6 40 y b h 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 30 30 4 l 3 20 20 5 lc 4 kh 4 10 10 Productions to A 5 kc 5 0 0 Employments 40 0 10 Housing Price and wage to A 20 30 40 0 10 Trade Balances to A 0.8 q w 0.6 20 30 40 lambda to A 0.5 10 0 5 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 0.4 \u00E2\u0088\u00925 \u00E2\u0088\u00921.5 \u00E2\u0088\u009210 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 0.2 \u00E2\u0088\u009215 \u00E2\u0088\u00922.5 \u00CE\u00BB tby 0 0 10 20 30 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00923 0 10 20 30 40 \u00E2\u0088\u009220 0 10 20 30 40 38 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries With a negative impact from the supply side, we now witness a significant di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erence between the free borrowing benchmark and the borrowing constraint model with the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect. In the benchmark, because of the high elasticity of intertemporal substitution, households substitute housing for relatively cheap non-durable goods. As a result, housing \u00EF\u00AC\u0082ow/investment falls on impact of the productivity shock and keeps falling for a while before gradually increasing. Intuitively, the positive income e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on housing demand helps to mitigate the negative substitution e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect at the beginning but it weakens rapidly against the latter, causing a deeper fall in housing \u00EF\u00AC\u0082ow/investment. However, a fall in housing investment amid rising output and non-housing investment, i.e., the so-called co-movement problem, is at odds with empirical facts. Hence, it has been shown that under an asymmetric productivity spillover to housing production sector, a standard small open economy model is unable to correct the co-movement problem. (Figure 2.16) By contrast, Figure 2.17 presents the dynamics of the economy with the collateral constraint. It is shown that the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect can help to produce a correct co-movement even without highly correlated productivity shocks. Anticipating the collateral role of housing and speculating on rising property prices, households rationally increase investing in housing in good times despite its high elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Initial increases in turn fuel the spiral, making housing investment pro-cyclical. In other words, the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect together with the income e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect can o\u00EF\u00AC\u0080set the intertemporal substitution e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect, hence producing pro-cyclical housing investment as documented in the empirical work. (Figure 2.18) 2.4 Extended Model The basic representative household model is simple but su\u00EF\u00AC\u0083cient to explain the impact of the collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on housing investment dynamics. This model, however, has a weakness. It implies that the volatility of non39 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Figure 2.18: IRs: Housing Investment and Prices Housing Price to shocks Housing Investment to shocks 0.45 6 Benchmark 0.4 5 0.35 4 0.3 3 0.25 2 0.2 1 0.15 0 0.1 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 0.05 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00923 Benchmark 0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40 housing/business investment increases in economies with a more developed mortgage market, at odds with empirical evidence. (Figure 2.15) The underlying reason is that in the representative agent model, business capital is also owned by those who face the borrowing constraint, hence, it is a\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ected by their borrowing capacity. In particular, because of the credit constraint, the rate of capital return is always kept higher than the borrowing interest rate, which induces credit-constrained agents increasingly to invest in business capital when the credit constraint is relaxed and the access to credit becomes broader. In reality, business capital is often owned by corporations or capitalists who have much more freedom to access \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets than a typical credit constrained household.35 Therefore, to separate business investment decisions from credit-constrained households, I consider an extended model 35 For example, using data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finance, Diaz and Luengo- Prado document that in the U.S, households in the top 20% of the wealth distribution hold 98.9% of all \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial assets while housing wealth represents 96.3% of total wealth for those in the bottom 80% of the wealth distribution. 40 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries in which there are two types of households, named capitalist and borrower with measure and 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 , respectively. The former groups own business capital and have free access to both domestic and international \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets. In contrast, the latter groups don\u00E2\u0080\u0099t own business capital and face the collateral borrowing constraint as in the basic model. A necessary condition for this type of heterogeneous household model is that capitalists are more patient than borrowers and at equilibrium borrowers will borrow from capitalists.36 2.4.1 Capitalist The representative capitalist maximizes his expected life-time utility de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ned over random sequences of non-durable consumption goods (c1t ), housing services from housing stock (h1t ), and labor dis-utility (l1t ): U = E0 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0002 \u0003 \u0004 \u00CE\u00B21t U c1t , h1t , l1t (2.4.29) t=0 The budget constraint of the capitalist is given by: c1t + qt [h1t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )h1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ] + b + (1 + rt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )d1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 + \u00CF\u0086h (h1t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 h1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )2 + ict + iht + (1 + rt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )df t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 2 h1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0086d \u00C2\u00AF 2 \u00E2\u0089\u00A4 wt l1t + r c kc + r h kh + d1t + df t (df t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 d) t t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 t t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 2 (2.4.30) c + ict = ktc \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4k )kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 c )2 \u00CF\u0086k (ktc \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 c 2 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 h iht = kth \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4k )kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 + h )2 \u00CF\u0086k (kth \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 h 2 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Each period, the capitalist can either pay adjustment cost, \u00C2\u00AF 2 ,37 d) 36 \u00CF\u0086d 2 (df t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 to borrow internationally traded foreign debt at an interest rate, rt , When \u0005 = 1, this extended model is reduced to a standard representative model under free borrowing. However, when \u0005 = 0, this model is not the same as the basic model. 37 The introduction of adjustment costs in a small open economy framework is to induce stationarity. 41 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries which is exogenous, or access the domestic bond market, d1t , at an interest rate, rtd . He supplies labor l1t at the real wage rate, wt , and lends capital, c , kh c h kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 to capital markets at prices rt , rt . The capitalist then spreads his income on non-durable tradable consumption goods, c1t , debt payment d )d (1 + rt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )df t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 , (1 + rt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 , investments of two types of non-housing capital ict , iht , housing investment, qt [h1t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )h1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ], and its adjustment costs, \u00CF\u0086h (h1t \u00E2\u0088\u0092h1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )2 . 2 h1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 The \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst order conditions for the capitalist, which are standard, read: U1ct [1 + \u00CF\u0086k ( U1ct [1 + \u00CF\u0086k ( c c ktc \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0086k kt+1 c (( )] = \u00CE\u00B2 E {U [1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4 + r + )2 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1)]} 1 t 1ct+1 k t+1 c kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 2 ktc h h kth \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0086k kt+1 h (( )] = \u00CE\u00B2 E {U [1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4 + r + )2 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1)]} 1 t 1ct+1 k t+1 h 2 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 kth wt = \u00E2\u0088\u0092 U1ct (qt +\u00CF\u0086h 2.4.2 U1lt U1ct \u00C2\u00AF = \u00CE\u00B21 Et {U1ct+1 (1 + rt )} U1ct (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0086d (df t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 d)) (2.4.31) U1ct = \u00CE\u00B21 Et {U1ct+1 (1 + rtd )} (2.4.32) \u00CF\u0086h h1t+1 2 h1t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 h1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ) = U1ht +\u00CE\u00B2Et {U1ct+1 [qt+1 (1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B4h )+ (( ) \u00E2\u0088\u00921)]} h1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 2 h1t (2.4.33) Borrower The representative borrower maximizes his expected life-time utility de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ned over random sequences of non-durable consumption goods( c2t ), housing services from housing stock (h2t ), and labor dis-utility (l2t ): U = E0 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0002 \u0003 \u0004 \u00CE\u00B22t U c2t , h2t , l2t (2.4.34) t=0 The budget constraint of the borrower is given by: c2t + qt (h2t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )h2t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ) + \u00CF\u0086h (h2t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 h2t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )2 2 h2t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 b + (1 + rt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )d2t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00E2\u0089\u00A4 wt l2t + d2t (2.4.35) 42 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries I assume that the borrower is more impatient than the capitalist or \u00CE\u00B22 < \u00CE\u00B21 . The borrower does not hold capital.38 Each period, he supplies labor l2t at the real wage rate, wt , borrows from the domestic bond market, d2t , at the interest rate, rtd , but is subject to a borrowing constraint mentioned below. The borrower then spreads his income on non-durable tradable consumption d )d goods, c2t , debt payment (1 + rt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 2t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 , and housing investment, qt [h2t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )h2t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ]. I also assume that the borrower is not able to access to the international foreign debt. The borrower is also subject to the following collateral borrowing constraint: (1 + rtd )d2t \u00E2\u0089\u00A4 \u00CF\u0086Et (qt+1 h2t ) (2.4.36) Let\u00E2\u0080\u0099s denote the multiplier on the borrowing constraint by \u00CE\u00BBt , the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rstorder conditions for the borrower read: U2lt U2ct (2.4.37) U2ct \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BBt =\u00CE\u00B22 Et {U2ct+1 (1 + rtd )} (2.4.38) wt = \u00E2\u0088\u0092 U2ct (qt + \u00CF\u0086h 2.4.3 h2t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 h2t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ) = U2ht + \u00CE\u00BBt \u00CF\u0086Et {qt+1 } h2t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0086h h2t+1 2 (( ) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1)]} + \u00CE\u00B2Et {U2ct+1 [qt+1 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h ) + 2 h2t (2.4.39) Firms Representative \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms in the non-durable sector produce goods with the following technology: c )\u00CE\u00B1c (ltc )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1c yt = At (kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 (2.4.40) Structures of the non-tradable durable housing are produced with following technology: h )\u00CE\u00B1h (lth )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1h bt = At (kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 38 (2.4.41) It can be shown that because of being relatively impatient, the borrower will not hold capital. 43 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Optimality conditions of non-durable goods \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms imply: \u0007 kc \u0008\u00CE\u00B1c yt wt = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c ) c = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c )At t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 lt ltc \u0007 c k \u0008\u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u00921 yt rtc = \u00CE\u00B1c c = \u00CE\u00B1c At t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ltc (2.4.42) (2.4.43) Optimality conditions of construction \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms imply: \u0007 kh \u0008\u00CE\u00B1h bt t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 = q (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1 )A t t h h lt lth \u0007 kh \u0008\u00CE\u00B1h \u00E2\u0088\u00921 bt rth = qt \u00CE\u00B1h h = qt \u00CE\u00B1h At t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 kt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 lth wt = qt (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h ) 2.4.4 (2.4.44) (2.4.45) Equilibrium Given the interest rate, rt , a competitive equilibrium in this small open economy is characterized by a sequence of allocations {c1t , c2t , l1t , l2t , h1t , h2t d1t , d2t , df t , ktc , kth , ict , iht , yt , ltc , lth , l1t , l2t }, and a sequence of prices {qt , wt , rtc , rth , rtd , \u00CE\u00BBt } that satisfy the household and \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms optimality conditions, the borrower\u00E2\u0080\u0099s budget constraint, the binding borrowing constraint, production functions, and following market clearing conditions. Labor market clearing: l1t + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 )l2t = ltc + lth (2.4.46) Non-tradable durable housing market clearing: bt = (h1t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )h1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ) + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 )(h2t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )h2t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ) (2.4.47) Domestic bond market: d1t + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 )d2t = 0 (2.4.48) Tradable goods market: c1t + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 )c2t + \u00CF\u0086h (h1t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 h1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )2 \u00CF\u0086h (h2t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 h2t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )2 + 2 h1t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 2 h2t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 + ict + iht + (1 + rt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 )df t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 = yt + df t (2.4.49) 44 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries 2.4.5 Calibration Preference: Basic parameters like \u00CF\u0083, \u00CF\u0089, and \u00CE\u00B7, are chosen the same as those in the basic model. Both capitalists and borrowers have the same share of housing services in the composition consumption and \u00CE\u00B31 , \u00CE\u00B32 are set so that the ratio of total housing investment over GDP is equal to 5%. Capitalists\u00E2\u0080\u0099 discount factor \u00CE\u00B21 is pinned down by the steady state value of the exogenous interest rate, 1 1+r . Borrowers are more impatient or \u00CE\u00B22 is set to be 0.985. \u00CE\u00BA1 , \u00CE\u00BA2 is selected such that in steady state both capitalists and borrowers supply a fraction 40 24\u00C3\u00977 of household\u00E2\u0080\u0099s one unit time endowment for working in the market. I set the fraction of capitalists in total population equal to 0.2, which implies that about the top 20 percent of the wealthy population in the economy own capital, have free access to both domestic and international \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance markets, which is consistent with the results of Diaz and LuengoPrado that the top 20% in the wealth distribution holds 98.9% of total \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial assets. Technology: All parameters pertaining to technology and productivity side of the model are kept the same as those in the basic model. I calibrate the model such that steady state trade-balance-to-GDP ratio is equal to 1%, which then pins down the level of foreign debt at steady state \u00C2\u00AF 39 I also follow Schmitt-Grohe et al. (2003) to set the portfolio adjustment d. cost \u00CF\u0086d to 0.0007. 2.4.6 Model Dynamics When a favored productivity shock hits the economy, \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms in both sectors hire more labor to extend production, driving up the wage rate and capital returns. Due to the positive income e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect, the capitalist and the borrower both increase their aggregate consumption, hence raising non-durable consumption. However, there is a contrast in the housing demand between the capitalist and the borrower. For the capitalist, since housing is just a durable 39 Although varying this ratio does not have much e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on our results. 45 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries good, his elasticity of intertemporal substitution for long-lived housing is almost in\u00EF\u00AC\u0081nite so even a small rise in price relative to future will lead him to delay current purchase. Facing an increase in the relative housing prices, the capitalist optimally substitutes his durable consumption with non-durable goods, therefore reducing his housing stock in the early stage after shock and then gradually accumulates it back later on. By contrast, to the borrower, housing is not just a durable good but also plays a collateral role for future borrowing, which therefore makes him increasingly invest in housing in good times. As shown in the simulation, the increase in the borrower\u00E2\u0080\u0099s housing demand not only is able to absorb the sale of the capitalist\u00E2\u0080\u0099s housing but also drives up the overall economy housing investment. Figure 2.19 Moreover, since business capital is owned by capitalists who are not subject to borrowing constraints, its dynamics are not a\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ected by the development of the mortgage market. As a result, unlike housing investment whose volatility relative to GDP increases in economies with a higher mortgage market index, the volatility of non-housing investment remains almost unchanged, consistent with the empirical evidence. Figure 2.21 Finally, I calibrate the extended model for the U.K and Table 2.4.6 presents the result. For comparison, I also calibrate a standard two-sector RBC model with free borrowing and the basic model. Despite its simplicity, calibrated models\u00E2\u0080\u0099 second moments match data relatively well.40 In particular, the implied volatility of housing investment in the credit constraint model can match data quite well, whereas the volatility of housing investment in a standard free model is two times lower than the data. Although the implied volatility of housing prices from the credit constraint model is about 2-3 times higher than that in the free borrowing model, it is far below that of the data, which re\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ects the di\u00EF\u00AC\u0083culty of business cycle models in accounting for the high volatility of asset prices. Furthermore, unlike the free borrowing benchmark, the credit constraint models also can account 40 It is not that surprising since Mendoza (1991) uses a standard model without housing and can match data for Canada quite well. 46 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Figure 2.19: IRs: Extended Model with Borrowing Constraint Non\u00E2\u0088\u0092durable to A Housing stock to A 1.4 c1 1.2 Housing investment to A 0.8 7 0.6 6 0.4 5 0.2 4 reinv c 2 1 0.8 0.6 0 0.4 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.2 0.2 0 3 2 h1 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.4 0 10 20 30 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.6 1 h2 0 10 Capital to A 20 30 0 40 0 10 Employments to A 6 k c k h 30 40 Productions to A 6 5 20 7 lc 5 y b 6 l h 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 5 4 3 0 0 10 20 30 0 40 2 1 0 10 Housing Price, wage 20 30 0 40 0 10 Trade Balance to A 0.8 30 0 \u00CE\u00BB 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00925 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 0.4 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 0.2 \u00E2\u0088\u00921.5 40 c 0.5 q w 0.6 20 lambda to A \u00E2\u0088\u009210 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 0 \u00E2\u0088\u009215 \u00E2\u0088\u00922.5 tby \u00E2\u0088\u00920.2 0 10 20 30 \u00E2\u0088\u00923 40 0 10 20 30 \u00E2\u0088\u009220 40 0 10 20 30 40 Figure 2.20: IRs of Housing Investment and Prices Housing Price to shocks Housing Investment to shocks 0.35 7 Benchmark 0.3 6 0.25 5 0.2 4 0.15 3 0.1 2 0.05 0 1 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.05 0 Benchmark 0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40 47 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Table 2.4: Statistics: Extended Model Data Std. Model Basic Model Extended Model output 1.15 1.14 1.12 1.15 consumption 1.18 0.83 0.88 0.86 nres 4.1 4.15 2.3 4.13 tb/y 0.54 0.73 0.16 0.71 res 7.57 3.51 6.55 6.03 sd(res)/sd(y) 6.58 3.1 5.85 5.3 hp 5.13 0.075 0.11 0.18 consumption 0.73 0.94 0.98 0.97 nres 0.48 0.55 0.85 0.53 tb/y -0.31 -0.07 -0.63 -0.2 hp 0.58 0.93 0.79 0.9 res 0.57 0.85 0.7 0.8 Standard deviation Correlation w/ ouput Notes: Data is obtained from time series for the U.K from Q1-1981 to Q3-2007. Extended model means heterogeneous household model with credit constraint, standard model is free borrowing model. Std() is standard deviation. nres: non-housing investment, tb/y: trade-balance output ratio, res: housing investment, hp: real housing prices. All numbers are in percentage, which is the standard deviations from trend and is obtained from Hodrick-Prescott \u00EF\u00AC\u0081lter. 48 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries Volatility 4.0 5.2 Figure 2.21: Investment Volatilities and \u00CF\u0086 0 .2 Housing Investment .4 phi .6 .8 Non\u00E2\u0088\u0092housing Invest. 49 \u000CChapter 2. Housing Investment in OECD Countries for the signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cant counter-cyclicality of the current account. The reason is that since households are credit-constrained they tend to borrow more (from foreigners) to consume in good times and the borrowing-consuming spiral also reinforces borrowing as explained above. 2.5 Conclusions This chapter begins by documenting stylized facts regarding housing investment and mortgage market depth in OECD countries. Housing investment is highly volatile, especially in economies with more developed mortgage markets. The chapter demonstrates that standard RBC models with a perfect credit market assumption are at odds with these empirical facts but the introduction of a housing collateral constraint can help reconcile the models with the facts. Collateral e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects also enable the models to produce signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cant counter-cyclicality of the current account and the co-movement of di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent types of investments even without highly correlated productivity shocks. The chapter predicts a non-monotonic impact of mortgage market depth on the volatility of housing investment. In the quantitative section, calibrated models with a housing collateral constraint can match the data in the U.K quite well. 50 \u000CChapter 3 International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination 3.1 Introduction It is well known that several quantitative properties of international business cycle models are at odds with empirical data. First, the cross-country correlations are higher for consumption than for output, while in the data the opposite is true (the Backus-Kehoe-Kydland cross-country consumption correlation puzzle). Second, cross-country correlations of employment and investment are negative whereas in the data they are positive. In literature, while the ranking of the consumption correlation has been explained by models with incomplete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets, 41 Baxter (1995) admits that: \u00E2\u0080\u009CIt has proved particularly di\u00EF\u00AC\u0083cult to write down plausibly-parameterized models which can generate positive comovement of labor and investment across countries...Thus a major challenge to the theory is to develop a model which can explain international comovement in labor input and investment.\u00E2\u0080\u009D An important reason for the negative comovements is that in a one-good model with the internationally mobile capital there is a strong tendency to move capital to the most productive location in response to persistent productivity shocks. The movement of capital to the more productive country leads to a rise in labor returns there accompanied by a fall in labor returns in the other country, hence inducing the negative comovement in 41 See for example: Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Kollman (1996). 51 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination labor input in the model. As a result, employment in di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent countries is negatively correlated unless the cross-country correlation of the innovations to the country-speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081c shocks is very high. Baxter (1995) argues that although the innovations to Solow residuals are positively correlated across countries, this correlations is not strong enough to overcome the natural mechanisms leading to negative comovement. However, a common feature of two-country international business cycle models in literature is the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences. This type of preferences implies a signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cant wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on leisure even at high frequencies, which in turn plays a critical role in generating the negative comovement of employment in international business cycle models. Intuitively, when a positive productivity shock hits the foreign country, there is an increase in wealth at home because of risk sharing through \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets. Therefore, consumers at home raise their consumption goods and leisure levels. The positive wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect, combined with the substitution e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect that already helps raise leisure (reduce labor supply) because of the decline in wage rates at home, magni\u00EF\u00AC\u0081es the decrease of the home country\u00E2\u0080\u0099s labor supply in response to a foreign country\u00E2\u0080\u0099s positive productivity shock. As a result, labor inputs are negatively correlated across country despite positive correlations in productivity innovations. This chapter quantitatively shows that without the wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on leisure, relatively small positive correlations in cross-country productivity innovations, as suggested by empirical studies, are su\u00EF\u00AC\u0083cient to generate signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cant positive comovement in employment. The result is robust with both complete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets with perfect risk sharing and incomplete markets with only partial risk sharing. In other words, the positive comovement in employment can be obtained even under the partial risk sharing environment, where, according to Baxter and Crucini (1995), only limited wealth is transfered between regions in response to asymmetric shocks. 42 42 In the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal steps of completing this chapter, I became aware that Johri, Letendre, and Luo are also working on cross-country correlation anomalies. In a version of their 52 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination Devereux et al (1992) is the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst to introduce preferences with a zero wealth elasticity of leisure into two-country one good models. 43 They quantitatively show that there is a realistic cross-country correlation of consumption even with complete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets but did not examine the possibility of the positive comovement in employment and output. My model di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ers from theirs in one critical ingredient. I consider a di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent productivity shock structure: there is persistence in productivity shocks and positive correlations in cross-country innovations, as suggested by empirical studies whereas they assume independently random productivity shocks. Under the complete market structure, I obtain a similar result for cross-country consumption correlation, hence, con\u00EF\u00AC\u0081rming that their quantitative result is robust to the curvature parameter of preferences. 44 At the same time, I show that by using this type of preferences, the cross-country consumption correlations can also be signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly reduced with incomplete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets. working paper, they show that GHH preferences along with learning-by-doing and incomplete markets are su\u00EF\u00AC\u0083cient to generate positive cross-country correlations of hours and investment. Although we both focus on the wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on leisure, the important di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erence between complete and incomplete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets, as pointed out by Baxter and Crunini (1995), is the degree of wealth transfer across country in response to asymmetric productivity shocks. Therefore, a di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial structure will have a di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent impact on employment dynamics. In other words, my research shows that in order to generate a positive comovement in employment, GHH preferences are su\u00EF\u00AC\u0083cient and we don\u00E2\u0080\u0099t need incomplete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets. Moreover, as shown by Letendre (2004) and Boileau and Normandin (2008), with incomplete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets, the quantitative results/predictions of international business cycle is very sensitive to parameters like discount factors,degrees of persistence and spillover in productivity shocks, and more importantly the modi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cations to generate stationarity. I thank Kang Shi for the pointer. 43 Ro\u00EF\u00AC\u0080o (2006) introduces home production through the same type of preferences to generate the fact that domestic spending is more volatile than output, hence, being able to explain the counter-cyclicality of net exports in two-country real business cycle models. Those models with Cobb-Douglas preferences fail to generate these facts. 44 To obtain the closed form of solution for the model, Devereux et al (1992) had to assume a speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081c value for the curvature. 53 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination There has been a growing literature focusing on the role of credit market imperfections in explaining the positive comovements. Backus et al. (1992), Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Heathcote and Perri (2002) assume \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial autarky, i.e. countries cannot trade \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial claims. These papers \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nd that extreme restrictions in the trade of \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial assets, by largely reducing international capital mobility, can generate the positive cross-country correlation in output. Kehoe and Perri (2002) analyze a model where a country faces an endogenous borrowing constraint. In particular, the borrowing capacity of a country depends on the value that the country would obtain from future access to international \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets. The borrowing constraint requires that in each period and state, allocations can be enforced only if their value is greater than it would be if the country were excluded from all further intertemporal and international trade. When the foreign country is hit by a positive shock, its output cannot increase too much otherwise the value of defaulting would become higher than the penalty of being excluded from international \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets in the future. Therefore, the \u00EF\u00AC\u0082ow of capital from the home country to the foreign country is limited, which help to account for the positive cross-country correlations under relative small correlations in productivity innovations. My work takes a di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent approach from the above literature in explaining the comovement of employment. It shows that the employment comovement anomaly can be reconciled with the data by simply assuming a zero wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on leisure at high frequencies, hence attempting to provide insights from di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent point of view. The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 introduces models\u00E2\u0080\u0099 setting and calibration. Section 3 discusses quantitative results. Conclusions follow in section 4. 54 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination 3.2 Model The world consists of two countries: the home country and the foreign country. Consumers in each country value leisure and consumption of the single tradable produced good while labor is internationally immobile. Firms in each country produce the single good by identical Cobb-Douglass production functions and are subject to exogenous shocks to total factor productivity. In this model, the foreign country is distinguished from the home country by means of a star attached to all foreign-country variables. When there are no stars, the variable, parameter, or function is assumed to be identical across countries. All variables are in per capita terms. Preferences. The representative household in each country maximizes its expected lifetime utility de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ned over random sequences of consumption goods (ct ) and labor disutility (lt ): U = E0 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0002 \u0003 \u0004 \u00CE\u00B2 t U ct , lt , Home country; (3.2.1) \u0003 \u0004 \u00CE\u00B2 t U c\u00E2\u0088\u0097t , lt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 , Foreign country (3.2.2) t=0 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 U = E0 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0002 t=0 I consider two types of preferences in this paper. The \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst one is the Cobb-Douglas preferences, which have been commonly used in the international business cycle literature of one good two country models.45 \u0003 c\u00CE\u00B3 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 lt )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B3 U (ct , lt ) = t 1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CF\u0083 \u00041\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CF\u0083 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 (3.2.3) Parameter \u00CE\u00B3 will determine the value of hours at the steady state. The second one is non-separable GHH preferences: l\u00CF\u0089 (ct \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BA \u00CF\u0089t )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CF\u0083 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1 U (ct , lt ) = 1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CF\u0083 45 (3.2.4) The type of preferences was used by King, Plosser, and Rebelo, 1988 55 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination Similar to \u00CE\u00B3, parameter \u00CE\u00BA will determine the value of hours at the steady state and parameter \u00CF\u0089 determine the elasticity of labor supply. It is well known that GHH preferences imply zero elasticity of leisure to income. Technology. Production functions are in Cobb-Douglass forms, hence exhibiting constant returns to scale; production of the single \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal good requires the input of both labor and capital. Capital used in production in a speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081c country is not necessarily owned by residents of that country; thus, kt represents capital in place in the home country, not necessarily capital owned by residents of the home country. Labor is internationally immobile. yt = At (kt )\u00CE\u00B1 (lt )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1 yt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 = A\u00E2\u0088\u0097t (kt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 )\u00CE\u00B1 (lt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1 Home country; (3.2.5) Foreign country. (3.2.6) where At represents the stochastic level of productivity home country and kt is the capital stock installed the home country at time t. Productivity evolves according to the bivariate autoregressive process: log(At+1 ) log(A\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 ) = a1 a2 log(At ) a2 a1 log(A\u00E2\u0088\u0097t ) t+1 + \u00E2\u0088\u0097 t+1 (3.2.7) where a1 measures the persistence in productivity shocks and a2 measures the degree of international spillovers. The variance in the innovations is denoted by \u00CF\u0083\u00072 and the correlation between t and \u00E2\u0088\u0097 t is \u00CF\u008312 . I consider two types of investment technologies. The \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst one is a typical investment with adjustment costs. That is: kt+1 = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4)kt + it \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0086 it kt \u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B4 2 kt 2 (3.2.8) This law of motion includes investment adjustment costs governed by \u00CF\u0086 and is such that there are no adjustment costs in steady state. I also follow Kydland and Prescotts (1982) to assume time-to-build investment technology. That is, in the time-to-build models: it = \u00CF\u00891 s1t + \u00CF\u00892 s2t + \u00CF\u00893 s3t + \u00CF\u00894 s4t (3.2.9) 56 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination where it is the investment at time t and sjt is the volume of projects j periods away from completion at the beginning of period t and \u00CF\u0089j is the resource cost associated with work on a project j periods away from completion, for j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Investment projects progress according to sj,t+1 = sj+1,t for j = 1, 2, 3; and starts during period t are represented by s4t . The capital stock thus evolves according to: kt+1 = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4)kt + s1t (3.2.10) Notice that when \u00CF\u00891 = 1, \u00CF\u00892 = \u00CF\u00893 = \u00CF\u00894 = 0, we have the regular investment technology. Market Structure. I assume that there is frictionless international trade in output, so that there is an uni\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ed world resource constraint for the single produced good: (yt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 ct \u00E2\u0088\u0092 it ) + (yt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 c\u00E2\u0088\u0097t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t ) = 0 (3.2.11) Regarding the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial structure, I consider both complete-markets and bond economies. The di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erence of the two structures lies in the number of assets available to the agents. When markets are complete, the representative agents in both countries can trade a full set of contingent claims. Accordingly, the budget constraint of the home country\u00E2\u0080\u0099s representative household can be expressed as: ct + it + \u0002 p(st+1 , st )b(st+1 ) = yt + b(st ) (3.2.12) st+1 where st indicates the state in period t and b(st+1 ) denotes the quantity of contingent claims purchased in period t and paying o\u00EF\u00AC\u0080 one unit of consumption the following period, conditional on the state of the world being st+1 next period. p(st+1 , st ) denotes the price of these contingent assets. By contrast, in a bond economy, there is only a one-period real discount bond. Let bt+1 denote the per capita quantity of this discount bond purchased by the home economy, which mature in period t + 1, and pbt is its price at time t. 57 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination The \u00EF\u00AC\u0082ow budget constraints for the bond economy are: 46 \u00CF\u0080b (bt+1 )2 = yt + bt ; home country 2 \u00CF\u0080b c\u00E2\u0088\u0097t + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t + pbt b\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 + (b\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 )2 = yt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 + b\u00E2\u0088\u0097t ; foreign country 2 The world market clearing condition for bonds is: ct + it + pbt bt+1 + b(st+1 ) + b\u00E2\u0088\u0097 (st+1 ) = 0; complete markets (3.2.13) (3.2.14) (3.2.15) bt+1 + b\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 = 0 bond economy (3.2.16) Calibration. This paper follows closely calibration in Baxter and Crucini (1995), Kollmann (1996), and Kehoe and Perri (2002). See Table 3.1 for details. In particular, parameter \u00CF\u0089, which determines the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply, 47 is set to 2 as a benchmark. The unit benchmark elasticity is equal to the value implied by standard preferences as in form (3.2.3). For sensitivity analysis, \u00CF\u0089 is set from 1.58 48 to 6, which then implies the intertemporal elasticity of substitution varies from 1.7 to 0.2 accordingly. This is a range suggested by empirical studies. Parameters \u00CE\u00BA and \u00CE\u00B3 for GHH preferences and Cobb-Douglas preferences are chosen such that the hours of working in the steady state are 0.25, respectively. Portfolio adjustment costs parameter, \u00CF\u0080b is set to 0.0005 such that the implied volatility of the ratio of net exports to output in bond economy models is the same as in the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial complete market models. For regular investment technology, investment adjustment cost parameter, \u00CF\u0086 is set such that the ratio of investment volatility to that of output match the data, which is equal to 3.24. 46 Following Boileau et al (2008) and others, I impose quadratic portfolio adjustment costs to induce stationarity in incomplete markets. See Boileau et al (2008) for more details about other methods. 47 1 The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply is approximately \u00CF\u0089\u00E2\u0088\u00921 . 48 1.58 is the value used by Devereux et all (1992) in their two-country model; the value was \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst used by Greenwood et al (1988) in a closed-economy model. 58 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination Finally, for parameters of the productivity shock\u00E2\u0080\u0099s process, which are crucial to quantitative results of international business cycle models, 49 I follow Kehoe and Perri (2002) to set a1 = 0.95, a2 = 0 as the benchmark. These values imply that there are medium levels of persistence but there is no direct \u00E2\u0080\u009Cspillover\u00E2\u0080\u009D in productivity shocks. For sensitivity analysis, I choose high persistence (a1 = 0.99) (termed HP) and low persistence (a1 = 0.90) (termed LP). I also follow the original results of Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) (termed BKK) to set a1 = 0.906 and a2 = 0.088. Table 3.1: Model Calibration Parameters Preferences \u00CE\u00B2 = 0.99, \u00CF\u0083 = 2 hours at s.s l = 0.25 \u00CF\u0089 = 2 as benchmark Technology \u00CE\u00B1 = 0.3, \u00CE\u00B4 = 0.03 \u00CF\u00891 = \u00CF\u00892 = \u00CF\u00893 = \u00CF\u00894 = 0.25 Productivity shocks a1 = 0.95, a2 = 0 var( 1 )=var( 2 )=0.072 , corr( 1 , 2 )=0.25 Adjustment cost 3.3 \u00CF\u0080b = 0.0005 Quantitative Results I consider four types of models with di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial market structures and di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent investment technologies: models with complete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets and models with restricted one period state non-contingent bonds, models with investment adjustment costs and models with time-to-build investment. I solve and simulate these models by the perturbation method 49 50 and Fig- Accoring to Letendre (2004) and Boileau and Normandin (2008) parameters of the productivity shock\u00E2\u0080\u0099s process are particularly important for quantitative results in international business cycle models with incomplete markets. 50 For more details, see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) 59 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination ures 3.1-3.4 present impulse responses of these models with respect to one unit of positive shock in the foreign countries. For comparison, I combine impulse responses of models with Cobb-Douglas preferences and those with corresponding speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cations but with GHH preferences in the same \u00EF\u00AC\u0081gure. Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 provide business cycle statistics from data and those implied by these models. Figures 3.1-3.4 show di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erences between the impulse responses of models with GHH preferences and those with Cobb-Douglas preferences, particularly in consumption and labor input. In response to a positive shock in the foreign country, consumptions in both countries exhibit a relatively smooth and similar dynamic pattern for models with Cobb-Douglas preferences while for GHH preferences, the impulses are more responsive and move in opposite directions. This explains why the cross-country correlation in consumption is higher in Cobb-Douglas preferences. The impulse responses also present evidence of more risk-sharing in the complete markets, where consumption in the home country increases relatively more than it does in a bond economy. By contrast, employment (hours) in home country decreases signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly less in models with GHH preferences. The reason is straightforward. With a zero wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on leisure, consumers in the home country consume relatively less leisure in response to a positive productivity shock in the foreign country, hence reducing labor supply by a relatively smaller amount compared to a positive wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect case. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that the cross-country correlations in labor and output are positive in the models with GHH preferences whereas the correlations are negative in the models with Cobb-Douglas preferences. Figures 3.3- 3.4 show impulse responses of models with time-to-build investment. As pointed out in Kydland et al (1982), models with time-tobuild display a more persistence in all time series variables. I obtain similar quantitative results for consumption and labor input for models with time- 60 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination to-build investment.51 Table 3.4 presents the implied business cycle statistics of the model with GHH preferences, complete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets, and investment with adjustment costs when I vary the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply from 1.7 to 0.2. Table 3.4 shows that when the elasticity is lower. i.e., labor supply becomes less responsive to shocks the cross-country correlation in employment improves. However, since leisure becomes less responsive to shocks, the cross-country consumption tend to move together, hence, cross-country correlation increases, which is consistent with the results of Devereux et al (1992). Finally, Table 3.5 shows that without wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects on leisure the crosscountry positive correlation in employment is robust with various speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cations in the productivity shock process. In particular, when there is spillover in cross-country productivity shocks as in the BKK speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cation, cross-country employments almost move together. However, even under the same BKK speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cation, cross-country employments still signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly negatively co-move (the correlation is -0.63) with Cobb-Douglas preferences. These results recon\u00EF\u00AC\u0081rm that the wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on leisure plays the crucial role in determining the cross-country correlation in employment. 3.4 Conclusions This chapter quantitatively shows that the wealth e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect on leisure plays a determining role in generating the cross-country negative correlation in employment. As a result, a positive cross-country correlation in employment can be obtained by simply using preferences with a zero wealth elasticity of leisure. 51 The cross-country correlation in consumption increases in the incomplete market spec- i\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cation compared to that of the complete market speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cation because the cross-country correlation in employment is signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly improved in this case and also because of the non-separability property of GHH preferences. 61 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination Figure 3.1: IRs: Complete Markets, Investment with Adjustment Costs Productivity shock Consumption to Af 1 1 c cf 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.4 0 0.2 a af \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 0 5 10 15 20 0 0 5 Hours to Af 10 15 20 Investment to Af 1.5 20 1 i if 10 0.5 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00E2\u0088\u009210 h hf 0 5 10 15 20 \u00E2\u0088\u009220 0 5 Output to Af 15 20 TB to Af 2 4 y yf 1.5 2 0.5 1 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 0 5 10 15 tby 3 1 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 10 20 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 0 5 10 15 20 Solid line: GHH preference; Dashed line:Cobb\u00E2\u0088\u0092Douglas preference 62 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination Figure 3.2: IRs: Bond Economy, Investment with Adjustment Costs Productivity shock Consumption to Af 1 1 c cf 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.4 0 0.2 0 a af 0 5 10 15 20 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 0 5 Hours to Af 10 15 20 Investment to Af 1 20 i if 10 0.5 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u009210 h hf \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 0 5 10 15 20 \u00E2\u0088\u009220 0 5 Output to Af 10 15 20 TB to Af 2 4 y yf 1.5 tby 3 1 2 0.5 1 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 0 5 10 15 20 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 0 5 10 15 20 Solid line: GHH preference; Dashed line:Cobb\u00E2\u0088\u0092Douglas preference 63 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination Figure 3.3: IRs: Complete Markets, Time-to-Build Investment Productivity shock Consumption to Af 1 1.5 c cf 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 a af \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 0 5 10 15 20 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 0 5 Hours to Af 10 15 20 Investment to Af 1.5 20 1 i if 10 0.5 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00E2\u0088\u009210 h hf 0 5 10 15 20 \u00E2\u0088\u009220 0 5 Output to Af 15 20 TB to Af 3 3 y yf 2 tby 2 1 1 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 10 0 5 10 15 20 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 0 5 10 15 20 Solid line: GHH preference; Dashed line: Cobb\u00E2\u0088\u0092Douglas preference 64 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination Figure 3.4: IRs: Bond Economy, Time-to-Build Investment Productivity shock Consumption to Af 1 1 c cf 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.4 0 0.2 a af \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 0 5 10 15 20 0 0 5 Hours to Af 15 20 Investment to Af 1 10 0.5 5 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 10 \u00E2\u0088\u00925 h hf 0 5 10 15 i if 20 \u00E2\u0088\u009210 0 5 Output to Af 10 15 20 TB to Af 2 2 y yf 1.5 tby 1 1 0.5 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 0 5 10 15 20 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 0 5 10 15 20 Solid line: GHH preference; Dashed line:Cobb\u00E2\u0088\u0092Douglas preference 65 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination Table 3.2: Business Cycles Statistics: GHH Preferences Economy with IAC Statistics Time-to-build Data CM Bond CM Bond Consumption 0.79 0.71 0.81 0.72 0.88 Investment 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 1.83 Employment 0.63 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Net Exports/GDP 0.09 0.65 0.64 0.69 0.43 Consumption 0.87 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.91 Investment 0.93 0.5 0.5 0.43 0.7 Employment 0.86 1 1 1 1 Net Exports/GDP -0.36 0.17 0.06 0.22 0.21 GDP 0.51 0.2 0.19 0.21 0.51 Consumption 0.32 0.68 0.28 0.69 0.72 Investment 0.29 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 0.18 Employment 0.43 0.2 0.19 0.21 0.51 Std.dev rel. to GDP Domestic Comovement Corr. with GDP International Correlation Home and Foreign Notes: The statistics in the Data column are taken from Kehoe and Perri (2002), which are calculated from U.S. quarterly time series, 1970:1-1998:4 and an aggregate of 15 European countries. All relevant time series, except ratio of net exports to output, have been logged and HP-\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ltered. IAC means Investment with adjustment costs; CM indicates a complete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial market economy while bond indicates an economy where people can only trade one-period non-contingent bond. The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in leisure is set to 1 66 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination Table 3.3: Business Cycles Statistics: Cobb-Douglas Preferences Economy with IAC Statistics Time-to-build Data CM Bond CM Bond Consumption 0.79 0.41 0.51 0.4 0.63 Investment 3.24 3.24 3.24 4.33 3.47 Employment 0.63 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.49 Net Exports/GDP 0.09 0.78 0.81 1.10 0.83 Std.dev rel. to GDP Domestic Comovement Corr. with GDP Consumption 0.87 0.7 0.58 0.7 0.7 Investment 0.93 0.51 0.51 0.27 0.41 Employment 0.86 0.93 0.86 0.93 0.79 Net Exports/GDP -0.36 0.52 0.5 0.48 0.38 GDP 0.51 -0.45 -0.35 -0.5 0.04 Consumption 0.32 0.86 0.42 0.85 0.57 Investment 0.29 -0.76 -0.71 -0.88 -0.61 Employment 0.43 -0.87 -0.86 -0.9 -0.64 International Correlation Home and Foreign Note: The statistics in the Data column are taken from Kehoe and Perri (2002), which are calculated from U.S. quarterly time series, 1970:1-1998:4 and an aggregate of 15 European countries. All relevant time series, except ratio of net exports to output, have been logged and HP-\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ltered. AC means Investment with adjustment costs; CM indicates a complete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial market economy while bond indicates an economy where people can only trade one-period non-contingent bond. 67 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination Table 3.4: Business Cycles Statistics: Sensitivity to Elasticity \u00CF\u0089 Statistics Data 1.58 2 3 4 5 6 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.62 Std.dev rel. to GDP Consumption Investment 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 Employment 0.63 0.63 0.5 0.33 0.25 0.2 0.17 Net Exports/GDP 0.09 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 Consumption 0.87 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.89 0.87 0.85 Investment 0.93 0.46 0.5 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.57 Employment 0.86 1 1 1 1 1 1 Net Exports/GDP -0.36 0.14 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.27 GDP 0.51 0.14 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.27 Consumption 0.32 0.52 0.68 0.84 0.91 0.94 0.96 Investment 0.29 -0.76 -0.7 -0.61 -0.57 -0.54 -0.53 Employment 0.43 0.14 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.27 Domestic Comovement Corr. with GDP International Correlation Home and Foreign Note: The statistics in the Data column are taken from Kehoe and Perri (2002), which are calculated from U.S. quarterly time series, 1970:1-1998:4 and an aggregate of 15 European countries. All relevant time series, except ratio of net exports to output, have been logged and HP-\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ltered. The model statistics are computed from an model economy with GHH preferences, complete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets, and investment with adjustment costs. Omega is related to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply: the higher omega is the lower the elasticity 68 \u000CChapter 3. International Business Cycles: A Re-Examination Table 3.5: Business Cycles Statistics: Sensitivity Productivity Shock Process Productivity Shock Process Statistics Data Benchmark HP LP BKK Consumption 0.79 0.71 0.79 0.67 0.92 Investment 3.24 3.24 3.06 3.24 3.24 Employment 0.63 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Net Exports/GDP 0.09 0.65 0.69 0.58 0.67 Consumption 0.87 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.99 Investment 0.93 0.5 0.37 0.61 0.39 Employment 0.86 1 1 1 1 Net Exports/GDP -0.36 0.17 0.23 0.11 0.00 Std.dev rel. to GDP Domestic Comovement Corr. with GDP International Correlation Home and Foreign GDP 0.51 0.20 0.25 0.22 0.94 Consumption 0.32 0.68 0.76 0.65 0.99 Investment 0.29 -0.7 -0.81 -0.58 -0.72 Employment 0.43 0.20 0.25 0.22 0.94 The model statistics are computed from an model economy with GHH preferences, complete \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets, and investment with adjustment costs. HP denotes the productivity shock process with high persistence. LP denotes the productivity shock process with low persistence. BKK means the productivity shock process with Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) estimates. 69 \u000CChapter 4 Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating 4.1 Introduction There are two distinguishing features in emerging economies\u00E2\u0080\u0099 exchange rates and \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial systems: (i) fear of \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating, a phenomenon where authorities are reluctant to let their nominal exchange rates \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuate and (ii) increasing uses of the U.S dollar in debt denomination instead of these economies\u00E2\u0080\u0099 own domestic currencies or the so-called liability dollarization. This paper addresses the question of whether fear of \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating can be justi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ed an optimal discretionary monetary policy in a dollarized emerging economy. Fear of \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating has been seen as a prima facie phenomenon because most of recent exchange rate crises in emerging economies occurred in pegged exchange rate environments and the rigidity in nominal exchange rates has been perceived as one of main reasons. Calvo and Reinhart (2002), however, show that despite having experienced severe exchange rate crises, authorities in emerging economies have kept intervening to smooth exchange rate \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations and evidently there has not much variation in nominal exchange rates in these economies. In particular, they present evidence showing that interest rate and reserve variabilities are signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly higher in emerging market economies than in developed economies such as the U.S and Japan. The probability that the monthly variation of nominal exchange rates is in a narrow band of plus and minus 2.5% is more than 79% for all develop- 70 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating ing countries, 52 which is de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081nitely higher than that in developed countries. Given the fact that emerging economies often experience much more volatile shocks than their developed counterpart, relatively small variation in nominal exchange rates in emerging economies is remarkable. On the other hand, liability dollarization belongs to another broad feature that has recently obtained popularity in emerging/developing economies: dollarization. In these countries, it has become increasingly popular that governments borrow in the U.S dollar, individuals can hold U.S dollar denominated bank accounts, \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms and households can borrow in the U.S dollar both domestically and internationally. In particular, to quantitatively document dollarization, Reinhart, Rogo\u00EF\u00AC\u0080, and Savastano (2003) (RRS, henceforth) build a composite index of dollarization for a wide range of developing countries so are able to show that that the frequency distribution of the composite dollarization index has shifted markedly to the right between 1980-85 and 1996-2001. The shift indicates that the degree of dollarization in developing countries has risen signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly during these periods.53 By exploring the data further, RRS are able to show that by late 90s, more than half of 143 countries in their samples have at least 10% of broad money or of domestic public debt denominated or linked to foreign currency and one third of these 143 countries have more than 10% of external debts borrowed from private sector. They also \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nd evidence suggesting that higher level of dollarization tends to increase the exchange rate pass-through, thereby 52 In details, the probabilities are 79%, 87%, and 92% for those who claim to have freely \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating exchange rate regime, managed \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating, and limited \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating, respectively. The probabilities for developed countries like U.S and Japan is 59% and 61%. 53 Concretely, RRS de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ne a (partially) dollarized economy as one where households and \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms hold a fraction of their portfolio (inclusive of money balances) in foreign currency assets and/or where the private and public sector have debts denominated in foreign currency. The composite index is de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ned as the (normalized) sum of bank deposits in foreign currency as a share of broad money, total external debt as a share of GNP, and domestic government debt denominated in (or linked to) a foreign currency as a share of total domestic government debt. 71 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating reinforcing the fear of \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating in highly dollarized economies. This chapter attempts to shed light on the relationship between the two aforementioned notable features, particularly the question of whether fear of \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating can be justi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ed as an optimal discretionary monetary policy in dollarized emerging economy in response to external shocks. To this end, I consider a small open economy in which intermediate goods importers borrow in foreign currencies and face credit constraints. Foreign intermediate goods are required for \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods production. In this economy, interest rates that domestic borrowers pay to foreign lenders depend on the borrowers\u00E2\u0080\u0099 net-worth, which characterizes the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial acceleration, i.e., the higher the leverage is the higher the interest rates borrowers have to pay. Cespedes et al. (2002) and Devereux et al (2006) (henceforth DLX) have followed Bernanke et al (1999) (henceforth BGG) to take into account credit constraints in investment \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancing for liability-dollarized emerging economies. In these models, exchange rate \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations a\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms\u00E2\u0080\u0099 real net worth positions and investments through balance-sheet constraints, thereby having impacts on the macroeconomy. Despite di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent settings, the two papers reach quite similar conclusions: balance-sheet constraints in the presence of liability dollarization is an important propagation channel, it can magnify the e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects of external shocks, leading both real and \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial variables\u00E2\u0080\u0099 volatility to be greater than in an economy without these constraints. However, even under \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial imperfections and balance sheet constraints, the in\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ation targeting or the \u00EF\u00AC\u0082exible exchange rate regime still dominates the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate regime in both the role of cushioning external shocks and in welfare terms. Nonetheless, there is a common feature in Crespedes and DLX that limits the impact of exchange rate \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations on other macroeconomic variables. In these models, exchange rate \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations only a\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect the net worth of \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms and via this channel determine the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance premium of foreign currency borrowing. Emerging economies, most of which are relatively less indus- 72 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating trialized, have to rely heavily on imported intermediate goods for domestic production. Christiano et al (2006), for example, shows that in developing countries, more than 80% of the import is intermediate goods for domestic production. The heavy reliance on foreign intermediate goods implies a high exchange rate pass-through and high external exposure. Moreover, because of limited cross-border enforcements particularlly for emerging countries, import \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms are subject to borrowing constraints. As a result, when import \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms borrow in foreign currencies to \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance intermediate goods, exchange rate \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations a\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects not only the borrowers\u00E2\u0080\u0099 net worth but also the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancing amount. This very \u00E2\u0080\u009Cdouble-e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect\u00E2\u0080\u009D from exchange rate \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations leads to more profound impacts on the leverage of import \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms, causing much more \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations in \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance premium than those in Crespedes and DLX \u00E2\u0080\u0099models. The borrowing constraint imposed on import \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms is the main departure from to DLX\u00E2\u0080\u0099s paper. Under aforementioned di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cations, this chapter follows DLX to re-examine the macroeconomic consequences and compare welfare of alternative monetary policies: the in\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ation targeting regime and the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate regime 54 in response to external shocks: the world interest rate and terms of trade shocks. This chapter \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nds that fear of \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating can be justi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ed in highly dollarized economies. The volatilities of output, consumptions, and imported goods are higher under the in\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ation targeting rule than under the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate rule. The welfare of the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate regime also dominates that for the in\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ation targeting regime in a wide range of parameter speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cations. There are several other papers addressing fear of \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating. Lahiri and Vegh (2001) incorporate three key frictions into their model: an output cost of nominal exchange rate \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations, an output cost of higher interest rates to defend the currency, and a \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed cost of intervention. The model then 54 We follow the setting of endogenous monetary policy as in DLX, and use the pertur- bation method from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe\u00E2\u0080\u0099s paper to solve the model to the second order approximation in order to calculate the welfare. 73 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the size of the shock. For large shocks, which are identi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ed for developing countries, the output costs resulting from exchange rate \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations become too large relative to the cost of intervening. Therefore, monetary authorities \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nd it optimal to stabilize the exchange rate. My research di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ers with this paper in several aspects. First, I incorporate stochastic environment and \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial constraints and its endogenous propagation mechanism via the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial acceleration to the macroeconomy while Lahiri and Vegh (2001) do not. Second, I address the external shocks, particularly the terms of trade shock while the paper addresses monetary shocks. My paper shares a key aspect with the paper by Devereux and Poon (2004): Intermediate good importers in developing countries face endogenous borrowing constraints so exchange rate adjustments might become destabilizing. The di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erence is that Devereux and Poon (2004) assume a collateral borrowing constraint like Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In their model, the constraint is not always binding; it binds only when shocks are negative and large so the model might be more suitable to address monetary policies in crises. By contrast, I follow the BGG framework in which exchange rate \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations always have impacts on the borrowers\u00E2\u0080\u0099 leverage, hence on the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial premium, regardless of the scale and direction of shocks. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 discusses calibration and the solution of the model. Section 4 develops the main results including impulse responses, volatilities of macroeconomic variables, and welfare evaluation under alternative monetary policies. Some conclusions follow. 74 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating 4.2 4.2.1 The Model Model Outline This is one sector model of a small open economy where \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods are domestically produced using labor and imported intermediate goods. Domestic agents consume only domestically produced \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods,55 they are, however, endowed with a \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed amount of tradable goods, which can be exported to the rest of the world with exogenous prices. The model has following characteristics: (i) rigidities in prices,56 (ii) credit constraints in foreign currency borrowing to highlight balance-sheet e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ects of liability dollarization, (iii) imperfect substitutability between domestic value-added goods and imported intermediate goods to capture the reliance of domestic production on foreign intermediate goods. There are four sets of domestic agents in the model: households, \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms, importers, and the monetary authority, vs. one foreign \u00E2\u0080\u009Cthe rest of world\u00E2\u0080\u009D where foreign-currency prices of imported intermediate goods are set and lending rates of foreign fund are determined. The rest of the world also demands domestically endowed tradable goods, which domestic agents do not consume. Domestic households have access to international \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets through two kinds of non-state-contingent bonds. Financing contracts are set up between foreign bankers and domestic importer \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms who need to borrow to \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance imported intermediate goods. Final goods \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms hire labor from households, re-buy intermediate goods from importers, and sell goods to both domestic households and importers for consumption. Finally, the monetary authority sets domestic nominal interest rates as a monetary policy instrument. 55 This assumption is justi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ed by empirical evidence that suggests in the majority of developing countries less than 17% of imported goods is for consumptions and other left are intermediate goods for domestic production. 56 To allow e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ective monetary policy under New-Keynesian framework 75 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating 4.2.2 Households There is a continuum of households of measure one. The representative household maximizes its expected life-time utility which is given as follows: U = E0 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0002 \u00CE\u00B2t t=0 \u0003 Ct1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CF\u0083 L1+\u00CF\u0088 \u0004 \u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B7 t 1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CF\u0083 1+\u00CF\u0088 (4.2.1) where Ct is composite consumption, and Lt is labor supply. Composite consumption is a function of only domestically produced di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erentiated goods Ct (i), Ct = ( index CP I is \u00CF\u0081\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0081 1 \u00CF\u0081 di) \u00CF\u0081\u00E2\u0088\u00921 , with \u00CF\u0081 > 1. The C (i) t 0 1 1 then Pt = ( 0 Pt (i)1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CF\u0081 di) 1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CF\u0081 , where implied consumer price Pt (i) is the price of dif- ferentiated good i. Households have access to \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets with non state-contingent bonds in the form of both domestic and foreign currency denomination. Trade in foreign currency bonds is, however, subject to small portfolio adjustment costs, \u00CF\u0088D 2 (Dt+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 D\u00CC\u0084)2 , 57 where D\u00CC\u0084 is an exogenous steady state level of net foreign debt and Dt is the amount of foreign debts. The household can borrow directly in terms of foreign currency at a given interest rate i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t , or in domestic currency assets at an interest rate it . Each period, the representative household\u00E2\u0080\u0099s revenue comes from \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms\u00E2\u0080\u0099 pro\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ts \u00CE\u00A0t , the supply of labor with wages Wt , incomes from \u00E2\u0088\u0097 X\u00CC\u0084, total debts he can borrow S D exporting endowment goods St PXt t t+1 + Bt+1 , less debt repayment from last period (1 + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t )St Dt + (1 + it )Bt , as well as portfolio adjustment costs. Therefore, his budget constraint can be expressed as: \u00E2\u0088\u0097 X\u00CC\u0084 Pt Ct =Wt Lt + \u00CE\u00A0t + St Dt+1 + Bt+1 + St PXt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t )St Dt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 (1 + it )Bt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 Pt (4.2.2) \u00CF\u0088D (Dt+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 D\u00CC\u0084)2 2 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 is the price of export goods in Here St is the nominal exchange rate, PXt foreign currency, Dt is the outstanding amount of foreign currency debt and 57 As shown in Schitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), portfolio adjustment costs induce sta- tionarity in economy\u00E2\u0080\u0099s net foreign assets. 76 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating Bt is the stock of domestic currency debt, X\u00CC\u0084 is the endowment amount of export goods. The household chooses each di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erentiated goods to minimize expenditure conditional on total composite consumption. Demand for each di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erentiated goods then can be derived as follows: Ct (i) = \u0007 P (i) \u0008\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CF\u0081 t Ct Pt The household\u00E2\u0080\u0099s \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst order conditions can be expressed as: \u000F \u000E \u0010 \u0011 \u00CF\u0088D Pt Ct\u00CF\u0083 Pt St+1 1 (Dt+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 D\u00CC\u0084) = \u00CE\u00B2Et 1\u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0083 P 1 + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 St Ct+1 t+1 St \u0012 \u0013 Ct\u00CF\u0083 Pt 1 = \u00CE\u00B2Et \u00CF\u0083 P 1 + it+1 Ct+1 t+1 \u00CF\u0083 Wt = \u00CE\u00B7L\u00CF\u0088 t Pt Ct (4.2.3) (4.2.4) (4.2.5) (4.2.6) Equations 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 represent the Euler equations for the purchase of foreign and domestic currency bonds. Equation 4.2.6 is the labor supply equation. 4.2.3 Production Firms Di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erentiated \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods Y (i) is a CES function of domestically produced value added V (i) and imported intermediate goods M (i). \u0014 1 \u0005\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u0005\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u0015 \u0005 1 Yt (i) = a \u0005 Vt (i) \u0005 + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 a) \u0005 Mt (i) \u0005 \u0005\u00E2\u0088\u00921 (4.2.7) Value added Vt is in turn produced using only labor input as follows: Vt (i) = Avt Lt (i) (4.2.8) where Avt is the productivity shock. Cost minimizing behavior of \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rm i implies that: \u0007 Vt (i) = a \u0008\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u0007 Wt Y (i) Avt M Ct (i) (4.2.9) 77 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating Zt \u0008\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u0007 Y (i) (4.2.10) M Ct (i) where Wt , Zt , M Ct is the nominal wage, the domestic price of imported \u0007 Mt (i) = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 a) intermediate goods, and the marginal cost, respectively. 4.2.4 Price Setting Firms in the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal sector set their prices as monopolistic competitors. I assume that each \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rm bears a small direct cost of price adjustment as in Rotemberg (1982), therefore, \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms will only adjust prices gradually in response to demand or the marginal cost shocks. Firms are owned by domestic households, hence \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms will maximize their expected pro\u00EF\u00AC\u0081t stream using households\u00E2\u0080\u0099 discount factor. The discount factor is de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ned as follows: \u00CE\u0093t+1 = \u00CE\u00B2 Pt Ct\u00CF\u0083 \u00CF\u0083 . Pt+1 Ct+1 (4.2.11) Using this, we can de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ne the objective function of the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rm i as follows: \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0002 \u0014 \u00CF\u0088P Pt (i) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 Pt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 (i) 2 \u0015 ( ) \u00CE\u0093t Pt (i)Yt (i) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 M Ct Yt (i) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 E0 2 Pt (i) (4.2.12) t=0 )\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CF\u0081 Yt represents total demand for \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rm i\u00E2\u0080\u0099s where \u00CE\u00930 = 1, and Yt (i) = ( PPt (i) t product, and the third expression inside the parentheses are the costs of price changes. Firm i chooses its price to maximize (4.2.12). Because all \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms are alike, after imposing symmetry, the optimal price setting equation can be expressed as: Pt \u0013 \u0012 \u00CF\u0081 \u00CF\u0088P Pt Pt Pt M Ct \u00E2\u0088\u0092 = \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0081\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0081 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1 Yt Pt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Pt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u0013\u000F \u000E \u0012 Pt+1 Pt+1 Pt+1 \u00CF\u0088P Et \u00CE\u0093t+1 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 + \u00CF\u0081\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Yt Pt Pt (4.2.13) Notice that when the parameter \u00CF\u0088P is zero, the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal good price is just a markup over the marginal cost. Otherwise, the price follows a dynamic adjustment process. 78 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating 4.2.5 Importers In this section, I follows closely BGG and DLX to describe credit constraints of import \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms (henceforth, importers).58 As mentioned by BGG and others, \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial market imperfections make external borrowing more costly than \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancing project out of internal resources and the borrowing premium depends on borrower\u00E2\u0080\u0099s network relative to total required borrowing. In particular, in order to \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance intermediate goods imports, importers need to borrow in foreign currency from foreign lenders. Each importer faces an idiosyncratic shock \u00CF\u0089 \u00E2\u0088\u0088 (0, \u00E2\u0088\u009E), drawn from a distribution F (\u00CF\u0089), with probability density function (pdf) f (\u00CF\u0089), and expected value E(\u00CF\u0089) = 1. Shock \u00CF\u0089 is observed by the importer, but can only be observed by the lender through monitoring that incurs extra costs. The borrowing arrangement between lenders and importers is then constrained by the presence of private information. The optimal contract is a debt contract speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ed by a given amount of lending and a state-dependent threshold level of shock \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084. If the importer reports shock exceeding the threshold, then a \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed payment \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 times the return on the import project is made to the lender, and there is no monitoring. But if reported shock is lower than the threshold, then the lender pays monitoring costs \u00CE\u00BC times the value of the project to monitor and receives the full residual amount of the import project. j units of An importer j, at the end of period t, plans to import Mt+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 Mj intermediate goods must pay nominal price St PM t t+1 to foreigners. Here, \u00E2\u0088\u0097 is the price of imported intermediate goods, which is given to him at PM t time t. If the importer begins with nominal net worth in domestic currency given by N Wt+1 , then he needs to borrow in foreign currency an amount given by j DM t+1 = 1 j j \u00E2\u0088\u0097 (St PM t Mt+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 N Wt+1 ) St (4.2.14) \u00E2\u0088\u0097 M The total expected return on the import project is Et (RM t+1 St PM t t+1 ), where RM t+1 is the return rate from importing and will be de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ned below. 58 See the Appendix for further details. 79 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating The optimal contract speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081es a cut-o\u00EF\u00AC\u0080 value of the importer\u00E2\u0080\u0099s shock, \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 , and an amount of imported intermediate goods, Mt+1 . Under this contract structure, the importer receives an expected share A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) of the total return on the import project and the lender receives a share B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ). In sum, A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) + B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) + \u00CF\u0086t+1 = 1, where \u00CF\u0086t+1 represents the expected cost of monitoring.59 As shown in the Appendix, the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst order conditions for the optimal contract can be expressed by the following two equations: \u0006 \u0005 A\u0002 (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) Et RM t+1 B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) B \u00E2\u0088\u0092 A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 ) \u0002 (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 t+1 t+1 ) = 1 + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 A\u0002 (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) St+1 Et B \u0002 (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) St N Wt+1 RM t+1 St B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) = (1 + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 )(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 ) \u00E2\u0088\u0097 M St+1 St PM t t+1 (4.2.15) (4.2.16) Equation (4.2.15) represents the relationship between the expected return from the import project (LHS) and the opportunity cost of funds for lender (RHS). Without private information(hence, no monitoring costs), the expected return would equal the opportunity cost of funds for the lender. However, the presence of moral hazard in the lending environment imposes an external \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance premium, so that the return Et (RM t+1 ) will be greater and the extent of this premium than the opportunity cost (1 + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 )Et SSt+1 t depends on the value of \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084. The key characteristic of the BGG \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial acceleration framework is that the borrowing premium is related to the borrowing amount. This relationship is re\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ected through the participation constraint equation for the lender (4.2.16). The smaller is the importers net \u00E2\u0088\u0097 M worth N Wt+1 relative to total required amount St PM t t+1 , the more the importer must borrow, hence the higher the share B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) for the lender. Equations (4.2.15) and (4.2.16) may then be used to show that the external \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance premium 59 E(RM t+1 ) (1+i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 )E St+1 St is increasing in the leverage ratio A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084), B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084), and \u00CF\u0086N may be written as follows: A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u0002 f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BC) \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 0 \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089, \u00CF\u0086t = \u00CE\u00BC show that A (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0089\u00A4 0, and B \u0002 (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0089\u00A5 0. \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 0 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089, \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089. It is straightforward to 80 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating \u00E2\u0088\u0097 M St P M t t+1 60 N Wt+1 . A fall in the importer\u00E2\u0080\u0099s net worth or an increase in the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nanc- ing amount or both will directly reduce the amount of imported intermediate goods by raising the external \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance premium. In other words, \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial acceleration implies that the more the importer borrows or the less net-worth he has or both then importer has to bear a higher cost of borrowing. The novel feature of this paper compared to the literature, is that a nominal exchange rate depreciation leads to both a fall in importers\u00E2\u0080\u0099 net-worth and a rise in the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancing amount, thereby accelerating the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance premium more than those analyzed in literature. Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and BGG, I design the importers so that they are always constrained by the need to borrow so that \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial acceleration always takes place. This can be obtained by assuming that a fraction of the existing stock of importers randomly die each period so that importers don\u00E2\u0080\u0099t build up wealth to the extent that the borrowing constraint is non-binding and at the same time a fraction of importers arrives to replace these exiting ones. At the beginning of each period, a non-defaulting importer j receives the \u00E2\u0088\u0097 return on the import project RM t St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 PM t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Mt (j)(\u00CF\u0089t (j) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t ). Importers, then, die at any time period with probability (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BD) and consume (all their net-worth) only in the period in which they die. Therefore, at any given period, a fraction (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BD) of the return on the import project is consumed away. Since shocks on importers are i.i.d., the functional forms here can be \u00E2\u0088\u0097 aggregated so that the average return on import is RM t St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 PM t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Mt A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t ). The consumption for the importer, therefore, can be expressed as: \u00E2\u0088\u0097 P Ctm = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BD)RM t St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 PM t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Mt A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t ) (4.2.17) where Ctm is the consumption level of importers when they die. And importers\u00E2\u0080\u0099 aggregate net worth is equal to: \u00E2\u0088\u0097 N Wt+1 = \u00CE\u00BDRM t St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 PM t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Mt A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t ) 60 (4.2.18) See BGG, Appendix 81 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating Using the de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081nition of A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) and the lender\u00E2\u0080\u0099s participation constraint equation, we re-write importer\u00E2\u0080\u0099s net-worth as: \u00E2\u0088\u0097 N Wt+1 =\u00CE\u00BD(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0086t )RM t St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 PM t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Mt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BD(1 + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t ) (4.2.19) St \u00E2\u0088\u0097 (St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 PM t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Mt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 N Wt ) St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Notice that an depreciation of current exchange rate reduces the importer\u00E2\u0080\u0099s net worth by raising the value of existing foreign currency liabilities. To conclude this section, we de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ne the return on the import project. Importers sell their imported intermediate goods directly to \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms. Therefore, the gross nominal return rate from importing is, \u00E2\u0088\u0097 RM t St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 PM t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 = Zt 4.2.6 (4.2.20) Monetary Policy Rules The monetary authority uses domestic interest rate as the monetary instrument. The general form of the interest rate rule used can be expressed as \u0013 \u0012 \u0013 Pt 1 \u00CE\u00BC\u00CF\u0080 St \u00CE\u00BCS (1 + i\u00CC\u0084) (4.2.21) Pt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0080\u00CC\u0084 S\u00CC\u0084 The parameter \u00CE\u00BC\u00CF\u0080 allows the monetary authority to control the CPI \u0012 1 + it+1 = in\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ation rate around the desired level of \u00CF\u0080\u00CC\u0084 whereas \u00CE\u00BCS controls the degree to which interest rates attempt to control \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations in the exchange rate around a target level of S\u00CC\u0084. I will compare the properties of alternative exchange rate regimes under two main di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent assumptions regarding the values of these policy coe\u00EF\u00AC\u0083cients. 4.2.7 Equilibrium Every period, each \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods market must clear. After imposing the symmetry between goods we obtain: Yt = Ct + CtM + \u00CF\u0088D \u00CF\u0088P Pt Zt Mt (Dt+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 D\u00CC\u0084)2 + ( \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1)2 + \u00CF\u0086t 2 2 Pt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Pt (4.2.22) 82 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating Equation (4.2.22) means demand for \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods comes from households\u00E2\u0080\u0099 consumption, importers\u00E2\u0080\u0099 consumption, portfolio adjustment costs, costs of price adjustment, and costs of monitoring loans. The aggregate balance of payments condition for this small open economy can be derived by adding the budget constraint of the household and the importer and can be expressed as follows: \u00E2\u0088\u0097 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 St PM t Mt+1 + St (1 + it )[Dt + DM t ] = St PXt X\u00CC\u0084 + St [Dt+1 + DM t+1 ] (4.2.23) Equation 4.2.23 indicates that total expenditures, which comprise of amount of importing and debt payments, must equal total receipts, which are the amount of exporting, plus new net foreign borrowing. 4.3 Calibration and Solution The benchmark parameter choices for the model are described in Table 1. Following literature, this paper sets the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption to 0.5 or \u00CF\u0083 = 2. \u00CF\u0088 is set to 1, implying the unity elasticity of labor supply, which is common in empirical literature.61 The elasticity of substitution between varieties of \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods determines the average price-cost mark-up, hence, this paper follows standard estimates from the literature in setting a 10 percent mark-up, so that \u00CF\u0081 = 11. One important thing in this paper is that I consider relatively low substitutability between domestic value-added intermediate goods and the imported intermediate goods in the production of \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods. Since developing countries often rely on imported intermediate goods, which are essential to domestic production but they have limited resources to produce for themselves, I follow Christiano et al (2007) and others to choose the elasticity of 61 For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) and set elasticity of labor supply to other values di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent from unity does not change the paper\u00E2\u0080\u0099s conclusions but the implied volatility of key macroeconomic variables. 83 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating substitution between imported intermediate goods and value added intermediate goods less than unity, = 0.9. 62 I also assume that this small open economy starts out in a steady state with zero consumption growth, therefore, the world interest rate must equal the rate of time preference. I set the world interest rate equal to 6 percent annually, an approximate number used in the macro-RBC literature, so that at the quarterly level, this implies a value of 0.985 for the discount factor. I set D\u00CC\u0084 so that steady state total debt 63 is 40 percent of GDP, approximately that for East Asian economies in the late 1990\u00E2\u0080\u0099s. The amount of tradable endowment X\u00CC\u0084 is chosen such that in steady state export is equal to 40% of GDP, which is also in the range of literature. I set parameter a in the domestic production function so that the share of imported intermediate goods in production is 40 percent, implying a is equal to 0.6. This is consistent with the estimates given for intermediate imports as a fraction of GDP in Christiano et al (2006) for Thailand. With respect to portfolio adjustment costs, I follow the estimate of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) to set \u00CF\u0088D = .0007. To calibrate the degree of nominal rigidity in the model, I set the parameter governing the cost of price adjustment, \u00CF\u0088P so that, if the model were interpreted as being governed by the dynamics of the standard Calvo price, adjustment process, all prices would adjust on average after 4 quarters. To match this degree of price adjustment requires a value of \u00CF\u0088P = 120. I choose a steady state risk spread of 350 basis points, which is higher than DLX and BGG but might be consistent with developing countries. I follow BGG to set leverage level to 2 and bankruptcy cost parameter \u00CE\u00BC equal to 0.12. Given the other parameters chosen, the implied savings rate 62 In another paper by Christiano et al (2004), when labor appears in production of value-added, they even allow no substitutability between value-added good and imported intermediate goods but this model does not include capital so I keep relatively high value of \u0005 63 Which include the debt of importer 84 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating of entrepreneurs is equal to 0.93. In this paper, I consider two types of shock as in DLX: a) shocks to the world interest rate, b) shocks to (inverse) terms of trade. In the model, a) is represented by shocks to i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t , b) is represented by shocks to \u00E2\u0088\u0097 PM t \u00E2\u0088\u0097 . PXt The general form of the interest rule (4.2.21) allows for a variety of di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erent types of monetary policy stances. This paper focuses analysis on two types of rules. The \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst rule is a CPI targeting rule (CPI rule), whereby the monetary authority targets the stability of domestic consumer price index so that he sets \u00CE\u00BC\u00CF\u0080 \u00E2\u0086\u0092 \u00E2\u0088\u009E. Secondly, I analyze a simple \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate \u00CE\u00BCS \u00E2\u0086\u0092 \u00E2\u0088\u009E, whereby the monetary authorities adjust interest rates so as to keep the nominal exchange rate from \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuating. The model is, then, solved numerically using a second order approximation to the dynamic stochastic system, where the approximation is done around the non-stochastic steady state by perturbation method. Since I later proceed to compare the two alternative monetary rules in terms of welfare,64 it is necessary to use a second order approximation. For example, as demonstrated by Kim and Kim (2002), in a simple two-agent economy, a welfare comparison based on an evaluation of the utility function using a linear/\u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst order approximation to the policy function may yield the spurious result such that welfare is higher under autarky than under full risk sharing, which is apparently wrong. Woodford (2003) also shows that a second order accurate representation of expected utility can be obtained only through a second order representation of the underlying dynamic system, except in special cases. 4.4 Dynamics under Alternative Monetary Rules I now examine impacts of external shocks under the two alternative monetary rules. I assume that all shocks can be described as AR(1) processes 64 Welfare in this economy is represented by the expected utility of households and importers. 85 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating Table 4.1: Model Calibration Parameter Value Description \u00CF\u0083 2 Inverse of elasticity of substitution in consumption \u00CE\u00B2 0.985 0.9 Discount factor (quarterly real interest rate is 1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B2 \u00CE\u00B2 ) Elasticity of substitution between value added goods and import goods in production \u00CF\u0081 11 Elasticity of substitution between varieties \u00CE\u00B7 1.0 Coe\u00EF\u00AC\u0083cient on labor in utility \u00CF\u0088 1.0 Inverse elasticity of labor supply a 0.6 Share on value added goods in production \u00CF\u0088P 120 Price adjustment cost \u00CF\u0088D 0.0007 Bond adjustment cost \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 0.5 Standard deviation of importers\u00E2\u0080\u0099 technology shocks \u00CE\u00BC 0.12 Coe\u00EF\u00AC\u0083cient of monitoring cost for lenders \u00CE\u00BD 0.93 Aggregate saving rate of importers and adopt the VAR results of DLX for the US interest rate, a proxy for the world interest rate, with persistence 0.46 and the standard deviation of 0.0122 and (log) term of trade shocks with persistence 0.77 and standard deviation 0.013. There is negligible correlation between innovations between the world interest rate and terms of trade. 4.4.1 Impulse Responses Figure 4.1 presents impulse responses with respect to a negative shock in terms of trade, i.e., an increase in the imported intermediate goods price relative to the export goods price. A key di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erence between the CPI rule and the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate rule is that the former attempts to stabilize \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal good prices and allows the exchange rate to \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuate whereas the latter attempts to \u00EF\u00AC\u0081x the exchange rate. In particular, under the CPI targeting rule, the monetary authority adjusts the domestic interest rate (hence, the exchange rate) so that \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods 86 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms don\u00E2\u0080\u0099t have incentives to change the price level. In other words, the monetary authority adjusts the monetary instrument so that the marginal cost of \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal good production stays unchanged in response to shocks. On impact of the terms of trade shock, since the cost of imported intermediate goods is already determined from the previous period, the monetary authority has to adjust the domestic interest rate so that labor costs (the wage rate) remains unchanged. Consequently, labor supply, consumption, and output remain unchanged on impact under the CPI rule. Nevertheless, the negative terms of trade shock will raise the cost of imported goods from the next period, hence having negative impacts on domestic production and consumption. Since households tend to smooth consumption, the interest rate has to be decreased signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cantly on impact so that households maintain the same level of consumption this period as opposed to future declines in consumption. As a result, the exchange rate relatively increases (depreciates) on impact. The depreciation of the exchange rate under the CPI rule, combined with an increase in the imported goods price, has a strong impact on the import sector by not only increasing the domestic price of imported good prices but also worsening the importers\u00E2\u0080\u0099 net-worth and thereby raising the borrowing risk premium. Consequently, from the second period after the shock, the exchange rate has to appreciate a lot to o\u00EF\u00AC\u0080set the initial depreciation and the increase in imported goods prices. Therefore, the domestic interest rate has to be increased accordingly from the second period, which then contributes to signi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cant drops in consumption, output, and imported goods. By contrast, under the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate regime, \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal good prices increase to adjust and households consume less consumption goods and more leisure (the substitution e\u00EF\u00AC\u0080ect) on impact of the shocks. The responses of other variables under the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate rule are straightforward. It is shown by the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081gure that consumption, output, and imported intermediate goods are more volatile under the CPI rule while employment is more 87 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuating under the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate rule. Figure 4.2 presents the impulse responses with respect to a positive shock in the world interest rate.65 In response an increase in the world interest rate, the monetary authority raises the domestic interest rate to \u00EF\u00AC\u0081ght against the depreciation of the exchange rate under the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate regime. An increase in the interest rate leads to decreases in consumption, output, hence in imported goods. By contrast, the exchange rate depreciates on impact under the CPI rule, which makes imported intermediate goods more costly. The \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial acceleration applies so that the drop in the imported goods is as profound as that in the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate regime. Nonetheless, the impacts of the world interest rate on real variables are small and there are not clear di\u00EF\u00AC\u0080erences under the two alternative monetary rules. Table 2 compares the implied standard deviations of key macroeconomic variables under the two alternative monetary rules when the model is driven by the two aforementioned shocks. It is shown that volatilities of output, consumptions, and imported intermediate goods are higher under the CPI targeting rule than that under the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate. However, labor input under the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate rule is more volatile than that under the CPI targeting rule. The reason goes as follows. Monetary policies under the CPI rule aim to stabilize the marginal cost of \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal good production, which consists of labor costs and imported intermediate good costs. Since the latter is determined from the previous period the monetary authority adjusts the domestic interest rate to stabilize the labor cost, which lead to a relatively stable labor market under the CPI rule. However, as explained above, exchange rate \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuations under the CPI rule with the presence of a high exchange rate pass-through and liability dollarization have strong impacts on output, consumption, and intermediate goods. High volatility in these key macroeconomic variables may explain the stylized-fact that emerging economies are reluctant to let their exchange rates \u00EF\u00AC\u0082uctuate or 65 I scale up the IRs by 100 times. 88 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating the so-called \u00E2\u0080\u009Cfear of \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating\u00E2\u0080\u009D. 4.4.2 Welfare Evaluation of Alternative Monetary Policy Rules I then proceed to compute welfare of the economy under each monetary policy regime. The solution method produces a second order accurate measure of expected utility. I follow DLX to modify the way taking into account the welfare of importers. The welfare of households, as usual, can be measured as follows: E0 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0002 \u00CE\u00B2 t U (Ct , Nt ) (4.4.24) t Since importers are risk neutral, gain utility only from \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal goods consumption, and consume at any time period with probability 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BD, we can express the utility of importers with unit measure in total as: E0 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0002 \u00CE\u00B2 t Ctm (4.4.25) t given the assumption that the monetary authority discounts the utility of future importers at the same rate that private households discount future utility. The last column of Table 4.2 shows the implied welfare results: The welfare of economy under the \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed exchange rate regime is higher than that under the CPI targeting rule. These results are consistent with above implied volatility of key macroeconomic variables and therefore con\u00EF\u00AC\u0081rming the \u00E2\u0080\u009Cfear of \u00EF\u00AC\u0082oating\u00E2\u0080\u009D phenomenon. 89 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating P\u00E2\u0088\u0097 Figure 4.1: IRs: Terms of Trade Shock PM\u00E2\u0088\u0097 t Xt Output to ToT Consumption to ToT 0 0.1 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.1 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.2 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.1 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.3 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.4 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.2 Fix E CPI 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.3 Fix E CPI 0 5 10 Employment to ToT 25 30 35 40 0 Fix E CPI 0.2 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.2 0.1 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.4 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.6 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.8 Fix E CPI 0 5 10 15 Real Wage to ToT 0.15 0 0.1 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.2 0.05 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.4 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 25 30 35 Fix E CPI 0 Fix E CPI 0 20 Price to ToT 0.2 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.6 20 Imported goods to ToT 0.3 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.1 15 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.05 0 5 10 15 Exchange rate to ToT 20 25 30 35 40 Interest rate to ToT 0.2 10 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u009210 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.2 \u00E2\u0088\u009220 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.4 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.6 Fix E CPI 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Fix E CPI \u00E2\u0088\u009230 40 \u00E2\u0088\u009240 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 90 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating Figure 4.2: IRs: World Interest Rate Shock i\u00E2\u0088\u0097 : Output to i* Consumption to i* 0.2 0.2 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.2 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.2 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.4 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.8 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.4 Fix E CPI \u00E2\u0088\u00920.6 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.6 Fix E CPI 0 5 10 * 0 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00921.5 0 0.05 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00922 0 5 10 15 10 15 20 20 25 30 35 40 25 30 35 Fix E CPI \u00E2\u0088\u00920.05 Fix E CPI 5 40 Price to ToT 0.1 0 35 Fix E CPI Real Wage to ToT 1 \u00E2\u0088\u00923 30 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 Fix E CPI 5 25 Imported goods to i 0.5 0 20 * Employment to i 0.5 \u00E2\u0088\u00921.5 15 40 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.1 0 5 10 15 * 20 25 30 35 40 * Exchange rate to i Interest rate to i 1.5 50 Fix E CPI 1 0 0.5 \u00E2\u0088\u009250 0 \u00E2\u0088\u00920.5 Fix E CPI 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 \u00E2\u0088\u0092100 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 91 \u000C0.61 CPI 0.60 0.46 Cons 1.62 1.47 Intermediate 0.25 0.51 Labor 0 0.10 In\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ation 1.08 0 Nom.ER 0.47 0.01 Nom. IR -144.96 -140.36 Exp. Utility Rate,In\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ation, Nominal Exchange Rate, Nominal Interest Rate, Expected Utility. nominal exchange rate \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed. Variables are Output, Consumption, Labor, Intermediate goods, Real Exchange Rate, Real Interest b Note: CPI refers to a monetary rule which keeps the CPI in\u00EF\u00AC\u0082ation rate \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed, and FER refers to a monetary rule which keeps the 0.46 Fix. ER Output Table 4.2: Standard Deviations Chapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating 92 \u000CChapter 4. Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating 4.5 Conclusions This chapter considers a small open highly dollarized economy borrowing in foreign currencies to import intermediate goods and facing borrowing constraints. 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[55] Zhu Haibin, 2006, \u00E2\u0080\u009CThe Structure of Housing Finance Markets and House Prices in Asia\u00E2\u0080\u009D, BIS Quarterly Review, December 2006. 100 \u000CAppendix A Solution Method I solve the models by the perturbation method.66 Particularly the set of optimality conditions of the economy can be expressed as follows: Et {F (Yt+1 , Yt , Xt+1 , Xt )} = 0 (A.0.1) Et is the mathematical expectation operator conditional on information available at time t, Yt is the vector of non-predetermined variables, and Xt = [x1t , x2t ]\u0002 is the state variable vector, x1t is endogenous predetermined state variables while x2t is exogenous state variables. Particularly, x2t follows exogenous process given as: x2t+1 = \u00CE\u009Bx2t + \u00CE\u00B7\u00CC\u0083\u00CF\u0083\u00CC\u0084 t+1 (A.0.2) where \u00CE\u00B7\u00CC\u0083, \u00CF\u0083\u00CC\u0084 are given parameter. The solution of the optimal plan is of the form: Yt = g(Xt , \u00CF\u0083\u00CC\u0084) Xt+1 = h(Xt , \u00CF\u0083\u00CC\u0084) + \u00CE\u00B7\u00CC\u0084\u00CF\u0083\u00CC\u0084 (A.0.3) t+1 (A.0.4) where \u00CE\u00B7\u00CC\u0084 = [\u00E2\u0088\u0085, \u00CE\u00B7\u00CC\u0083]\u0002 , these equations describe the policy and transition functions respectively. I compute a \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst order expansion of the two functions around the deterministic steady state for solutions in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 while solutions in Chapter 4 require a second order expansion. 66 For more details, see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) 101 \u000CAppendix B Chapter 2 Appendix B.1 Basic Model Steady State First, notice that the modi\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ed Euler equation at steady state which can be written as Uc \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BB = \u00CE\u00B2Uc (1 + r) \u00E2\u0087\u0092 \u00CE\u00BB = Uc (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B2(1 + r)) (B.1.1) Condition for binding borrowing constraint at steady state or \u00CE\u00BB > 0 requires that \u00CE\u00B2 < 1/(1 + r), where r is the steady state of real world interest rate. Benchmark: Free Borrowing 1 = \u00CE\u00B2(1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B4k +r c ) = \u00CE\u00B2(1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B4k +r h ); 1 = \u00CE\u00B2(1+r) \u00E2\u0087\u0092 r c = r h = r+\u00CE\u00B4k (B.1.2) r + \u00CE\u00B4k \u00CE\u00B1 1\u00E2\u0088\u00921 kc =( ) c ; c l \u00CE\u00B1c w = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c )( kh r + \u00CE\u00B4 \u00CE\u00B1 1\u00E2\u0088\u00921 = ( ) h lh q\u00CE\u00B1h c r + \u00CE\u00B4k \u00CE\u00B1\u00CE\u00B1\u00E2\u0088\u00921 r + \u00CE\u00B4 \u00CE\u00B1\u00CE\u00B1h\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ) c = q(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h )( ) h \u00CE\u00B1c q\u00CE\u00B1h \u00CE\u00B1 q= h \u00CE\u00B1 \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u0092 h \u00CE\u00B1 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 (r + \u00CE\u00B4k ) \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CE\u00B1h \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CE\u00B1c \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CE\u00B1h h 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h 1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1h (B.1.3) (B.1.4) (B.1.5) Mobile labor h ( kh )\u00CE\u00B1h lh (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c ) lh qb = q lkc =q ; y q(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h ) lc ( lc )\u00CE\u00B1c lc lc +lh = l = lh qb (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h ) = lc y (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h ) (B.1.6) 40 ic kc \u00CE\u00B1c \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0087\u0092 lc , lh \u00E2\u0087\u0092 kc , kh \u00E2\u0087\u0092 y, h; = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k c = \u00CE\u00B4k 24 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 7 y y r r + \u00CE\u00B4k (B.1.7) 102 \u000CAppendix B. Chapter 2 Appendix ih kh kh qb \u00CE\u00B1h rein \u00CE\u00B1h q\u00CE\u00B4h h = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k y y qb y r + \u00CE\u00B4k y r + \u00CE\u00B4k y ic ih tb c =1\u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00E2\u0087\u0092c y y y y q[1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 Uh (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h ) \u00CE\u00B3c ]= = 1+r Uc (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B3)h 1 \u00CE\u00B7 \u00E2\u0087\u0092\u00CE\u00B3 = 1+ (B.1.8) (B.1.9) c \u0003 1 + r \u0004\u00CE\u00B7 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 h q(r + \u00CE\u00B4h ) (B.1.10) Borrowing constraint 1 = \u00CE\u00B2(1\u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4k + r c) = \u00CE\u00B2(1\u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4k + r h ); r\u00CC\u0084 + \u00CE\u00B4k \u00CE\u00B1 1\u00E2\u0088\u00921 kc = ( ) c ; lc \u00CE\u00B1c w = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c )( rc = rh = 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1+ \u00CE\u00B4k \u00E2\u0089\u00A1 r\u00CC\u0084 + \u00CE\u00B4k (B.1.11) \u00CE\u00B2 kh r\u00CC\u0084 + \u00CE\u00B4k \u00CE\u00B1 1\u00E2\u0088\u00921 = ( ) h lh q\u00CE\u00B1h c r\u00CC\u0084 + \u00CE\u00B4k \u00CE\u00B1\u00CE\u00B1\u00E2\u0088\u00921 r\u00CC\u0084 + \u00CE\u00B4k \u00CE\u00B1\u00CE\u00B1h\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ) c = q(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h )( ) h \u00CE\u00B1c q\u00CE\u00B1h h \u00CE\u00B1 \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u0092 h \u00CE\u00B1 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 (r\u00CC\u0084 + \u00CE\u00B4k ) \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CE\u00B1h \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CE\u00B1c \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CE\u00B1h h q= 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h \u00CE\u00B1 1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1h (B.1.12) (B.1.13) (B.1.14) Mobile labor h ( klh )\u00CE\u00B1h lh (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c ) lh qb = q kc \u00CE\u00B1 =q ; y q(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h ) lc ( lc ) c lc lh qb (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h ) = lc y (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h ) (B.1.15) 40 ic kc \u00CE\u00B1c \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0087\u0092 lc lh \u00E2\u0087\u0092 kc , kh \u00E2\u0087\u0092 y, h; = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k 24 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 7 y y rc r\u00CC\u0084 + \u00CE\u00B4k (B.1.16) kh kh qb \u00CE\u00B1h rein \u00CE\u00B1h q\u00CE\u00B4h h ih = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k (B.1.17) y y qb y r\u00CC\u0084 + \u00CE\u00B4k y r\u00CC\u0084 + \u00CE\u00B4k y lc + lh = l = ic ih tb c =1\u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00E2\u0087\u0092 c; y y y y d qh rein y = \u00E2\u0087\u0092\u00CF\u0086= h y \u00CE\u00B4h qy Uc \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BB = \u00CE\u00B2Uc (1 + r) \u00E2\u0087\u0092 \u00CE\u00BB = Uc (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B2(1 + r)) qUc \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BB\u00CF\u0086q = Uh + \u00CE\u00B2Uc [q(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h )] 1 Uh \u00CE\u00B3c \u00CE\u00B7 = \u00E2\u0087\u0092 q[1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B2(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h ) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0086(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B2(1 + r))] = Uc (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B3)h (B.1.18) (B.1.19) (B.1.20) (B.1.21) 103 \u000CAppendix B. Chapter 2 Appendix \u00CE\u00B3 = 1+ \u0004\u00CE\u00B7 c\u0003 1 h q[1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B2(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4h ) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0086(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B2(1 + r))] B.2 Extended Model Steady State 1 = \u00CE\u00B21 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4k + r c ) = \u00CE\u00B21 (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4k + r h ); \u00E2\u0088\u00921 ; w=\u00CE\u00BA l\u00CF\u0089\u00E2\u0088\u00921 1 \u00E2\u0087\u0092 \u00CE\u00BA [(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B3) xc ] \u00CE\u00B7 (B.1.22) 1 = \u00CE\u00B21 (1 + r) \u00E2\u0087\u0092 r c = r h = r + \u00CE\u00B4k (B.2.23) kc lc =( w = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c )( r + \u00CE\u00B4k ) \u00CE\u00B1c 1 \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u00921 ; kh lh =( r+\u00CE\u00B4 ) q\u00CE\u00B1h c r + \u00CE\u00B4k \u00CE\u00B1\u00CE\u00B1\u00E2\u0088\u00921 r + \u00CE\u00B4 \u00CE\u00B1\u00CE\u00B1h\u00E2\u0088\u00921 ) c = q(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h )( ) h \u00CE\u00B1c q\u00CE\u00B1h \u00CE\u00B1 q= 1 \u00CE\u00B1h \u00E2\u0088\u00921 h \u00CE\u00B1 \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u0092 h \u00CE\u00B1 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 (r + \u00CE\u00B4k ) \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CE\u00B1h \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CE\u00B1c \u00CE\u00B1c \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CE\u00B1h h 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h 1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1h (B.2.24) (B.2.25) (B.2.26) Mobile labor h ( kh )\u00CE\u00B1h lh (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1c ) lh qb = q lkc =q ; y q(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h ) lc ( lc )\u00CE\u00B1c lc lh qb (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h ) = lc y (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1h ) 40 \u00E2\u0087\u0092 lc , lh \u00E2\u0087\u0092 kc , kh \u00E2\u0087\u0092 y, h 24 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 7 kc \u00CE\u00B1c \u00CE\u00B1c ic = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k c = \u00CE\u00B4k y y r r + \u00CE\u00B4k lc + lh = l = l1 = l2 = kh kh qb \u00CE\u00B1h rein \u00CE\u00B1h q\u00CE\u00B4h h ih = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k = \u00CE\u00B4k y y qb y r + \u00CE\u00B4k y r + \u00CE\u00B4k y ic ih tb c =1\u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00E2\u0087\u0092c y y y y (B.2.27) (B.2.28) (B.2.29) (B.2.30) (B.2.31) c1 + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 )c2 = c; h1 + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 )h2 = h; c2 + (q\u00CE\u00B4h + r\u00CF\u0086q)h2 = wl2 (B.2.32) c1 c2 c1 \u0003 1 + r \u0004\u00CE\u00B7 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 =\u00CE\u00B1 \u00E2\u0087\u0092 h2 , c2 , h1 , c1 \u00E2\u0087\u0092 \u00CE\u00B31 = \u00CE\u00B32 = \u00CE\u00B3 = 1+ \u00CE\u00B31 = \u00CE\u00B32 \u00E2\u0087\u0092 h1 h2 h1 q(r + \u00CE\u00B4h ) (B.2.33) 104 \u000CAppendix B. Chapter 2 Appendix B.3 Data House Prices: Bank of International Settlements via Markus Kramer 67 . In particular, (1) File Residential property prices.csv is used for most countries from \u00E2\u0080\u009CNational sources\u00E2\u0080\u009D as per detailed documentation, (2) Residential Prop prices IT.xls for Italy from Nomisma. Japanese house prices, however, are taken from Datastream with Code name JPLANDPIF. Consumer Price Index (CPI): Seasonally Adjusted (SA). GDP: constant or chained prices, SA. Sources: Datastream, OECD Stat.68 Housing investment, non-residential investment, aggregate investment: real values, SA. Sources: Datastream, OECD Stats. Code means Datastream Code. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Australia: Datastream. Housing investment: Private dwelling, code AUFXCPDWD. Aggregate Investment: Private Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), code AUPRFXCPD. Non-residential investment is obtained by subtracting housing investment from aggregate investment. Q1 1980-Q1 2008. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Austria: From OECD Stats, national currency, chained volume estimates. Housing investment: GFCF Housing. Aggregate investment: GFCF. Non-residential investment: GFCF subtract GFCF Housing. Q1 1988-Q1 2008. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Belgium: Datastream. Housing investment: GFCF-Housing, chained prices, code BGHOUINVD. Aggregate investment: GFCF, chained prices, code BGGFCFD. Non-residential investment: GFCF-Companies, code BGBUSINVD. Q1 1995-Q1-2008 \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Canada: Datastream. Housing investment: Business GFCF Residential Structures (CN100112). Aggregate Investment: Business GFCF, 67 68 Email: markus.kramer@bis.org http://www.oecd.org/home/ 105 \u000CAppendix B. Chapter 2 Appendix code CNGFCFD. Non-residential investment: Business GFCF NonResidential Structures, code CNINRSEQD. Q1 1981-Q3 2007. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Denmark: Datastream. Housing investment: GFCF-Housing, chained prices, code DKGFCFHOD. Aggregate investment: GFCF, code DKGFCFD. Non-residential investment: GFCF subtract GFCF Housing. Q1 1992Q1-2008. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Finland: Datastream. Housing investment: GFCF Construction-residential building, code FNGFCRESD. Aggregate investment: GFCF, constant prices, code FNGFCFD. Non-residential investment: GFCF subtract GFCF Housing. Q1 1990-Q1-2008. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 France: From OECD Stats, national currency, chained volume estimates. Housing investment: GFCF Housing. Aggregate investment: GFCF. Non-residential investment: GFCF subtract GFCF Housing. Q1 1980-Q1 2008. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Germany: From OECD Stats, national currency, chained volume estimates. Housing investment: GFCF Housing. Aggregate investment: GFCF. Non-residential investment: GFCF subtract GFCF Housing. Q1 1991-Q1 2008. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Italy: From OECD Stats, national currency, chained volume estimates. Housing investment: GFCF Housing. Aggregate investment: GFCF. Non-residential investment: GFCF subtract GFCF Housing. Q1 1981Q1 2008. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Japan: Datastream. Housing investment: Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (GDFCF) by type: DWELLINGS, constant prices, code JPGCFBLDD. Aggregate investment: GDFCF, code JPGFCFD. Nonresidential investment: GDFCF subtract GDFCF Dwellings. Q1 1994Q1-2008. 106 \u000CAppendix B. Chapter 2 Appendix \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Netherland: Datastream. Housing investment: GFCF DWELLINGS, constant prices, code NLGFRBCVD. Aggregate investment: GFCF, constant prices, code NLGFCFD. Non-residential investment: GFCF subtract GFCF Dwellings. Q1 1993-Q1-2008. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 New Zealand: Datastream. Housing investment: GFCF Residential building constant prices, code NZGFCFRBD. Aggregate investment: GFCF, constant prices, code NZGFCFD. Non-residential investment: GFCF subtract GFCF Housing. Q2 1987-Q1-2008. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Norway: Datastream. Housing investment: GFCF Housing investment, constant prices, code NWGFCHSID. Aggre. investment: GFCF, NWGFCFD. Non-housing investment: GFCF subtract GFCF Housing. Q1 1980-Q1-2008. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Spain: From OECD Stats, national currency, chained volume estimates. Housing investment: GFCF Housing. Aggregate investment: GFCF. Non-residential investment: GFCF subtract GFCF Housing. Q1 1995-Q1 2008. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 Sweden: From OECD Stats, national currency, chained volume estimates. Housing investment: GFCF Housing. Aggregate investment: GFCF. Non-residential investment: GFCF subtract GFCF Housing. Q1 1993-Q1 2008. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 U.K: O\u00EF\u00AC\u0083ce of National Statistics through Datastream. Housing investment: Private sector New Dwellings excl. Land, constant prices, code UKDFEAD. Aggregate Investment: GFCF, code UKNPQTD. Non-residential investment: Fixed Capital Formation, Non-dwellings, code UKTONDWLD. Output: constant prices GDP, code UKABMID. Non-durable goods is the household \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nal consumption excluding durable goods, constant price, code UKJSRVD). Trade balance is equal to net export of goods, constant prices, code UKBALGSVD. 107 \u000CAppendix B. Chapter 2 Appendix House price index, UK DCLG HOUSE PRICE INDEX (MIX ADJ.), code UKNSAQHPF. Q1 1980-Q3 2007. \u00E2\u0080\u00A2 U.S: Datastream. Housing investment: Residential Private Domestic Investment, constant prices, code USGPDRESD. Aggregate Investment: Private Domestic Fixed Investment, code USGFCFD. Nonresidential investment: Non-residential Private Domestic Fixed Investment, code USNRSINVD. Q1 1980-Q3 2007. 108 \u000CAppendix C Chapter 3 Appendix C.1 Solving Bond Economy Model The representative agent in Home country chooses sequences {} to solve the problem U = E0 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0002 \u0003 \u0004 \u00CE\u00B2 t U ct , lt (C.1.1) t=0 subject to \u00CF\u0080b (bt+1 )2 = At (kt )\u00CE\u00B1 (lt )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1 + bt 2 2 \u00CF\u0086 s1t = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4)kt + s1t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt \u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B4 2 kt ct + it + pbt bt+1 + kt+1 it = 4 \u0002 \u00CF\u0089i sit (C.1.2) (C.1.3) (C.1.4) i=1 sj,t+1 = sj+1,t for j = 1, 2, 3 (C.1.5) The Lagrangian associated with the Home agent\u00E2\u0080\u0099s optimization problem can be written as: L = E0 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0002 t=0 \u0016 \u00CE\u00B2 t U (.) + \u00CE\u00BBt At kt\u00CE\u00B1 lt1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1 + bt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 ct \u00E2\u0088\u0092 4 \u0002 i=1 \u00CF\u0089i sit \u00E2\u0088\u0092 pbt bt+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0080b 2 b 2 t+1 +\u00CE\u00BBt \u00CE\u00BD2t (s2t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 s1t+1 ) + \u00CE\u00BBt \u00CE\u00BD3t (s3t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 s2t+1 ) + \u00CE\u00BBt \u00CE\u00BD4t (s4t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 s3t+1 ) \u000E \u000F\u0011 2 \u00CF\u0086 s1t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt+1 +\u00CE\u00BBt qt (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4)kt + s1t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt 2 kt (C.1.6) 109 \u000CAppendix C. Chapter 3 Appendix The optimality conditions associated with the Home representative agent\u00E2\u0080\u0099s problem are: \u0003 \u0004 (C.1.7) Uc ct , lt = \u00CE\u00BBt \u0007 \u0008 (C.1.8) \u00CE\u00BBt pbt + \u00CF\u0080b bt+1 = \u00CE\u00B2\u00CE\u00BBt+1 \u0003 \u0004 yt (C.1.9) Ul ct , lt = \u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00BBt (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B1) lt \u0017 \u0018 \u0012 \u00132 \u0012 \u0013 \u00CF\u0086 s1t+1 s1t+1 \u00CF\u0086s1t+1 \u00CE\u00B1yt+1 \u00CE\u00BBt qt = \u00CE\u00B2Et \u00CE\u00BBt+1 + qt+1 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4k \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4k + \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4k kt+1 2 kt+1 kt+1 kt+1 (C.1.10) \u0010 \u000E \u0012 \u0013\u000F \u0011 s1t+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4k \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00891 \u00CE\u00BBt+1 = 0 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BBt \u00CE\u00BD2t + \u00CE\u00B2Et \u00CE\u00BBt+1 qt+1 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0086 kt+1 (C.1.11) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BBt \u00CE\u00BD3t + \u00CE\u00B2Et {\u00CE\u00BBt+1 \u00CE\u00BD2t+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00892 \u00CE\u00BBt+1 } = 0 (C.1.12) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BBt \u00CE\u00BD4t + \u00CE\u00B2Et {\u00CE\u00BBt+1 \u00CE\u00BD3t+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00893 \u00CE\u00BBt+1 } = 0 (C.1.13) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00894 \u00CE\u00BBt + \u00CE\u00BBt \u00CE\u00BD4t = 0 \u00CF\u0080b (bt+1 )2 = At (kt )\u00CE\u00B1 (lt )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1 + bt 2 2 \u00CF\u0086 s1t = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4)kt + s1t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt \u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B4 2 kt \u00CE\u00B1 1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1 yt = At kt lt ct + it + pbt bt+1 + kt+1 sj,t+1 = sj+1,t for j = 1, 2, 3 (C.1.14) (C.1.15) (C.1.16) (C.1.17) (C.1.18) Similar conditions for the Foreign representative agent. The world market clearing condition for bonds is: bt+1 + b\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 = 0 bond economy (C.1.19) In solving the system, I replace the budget constraint for Foreign representative agent: \u00CF\u0080b \u00E2\u0088\u0097 2 (b ) = yt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 + b\u00E2\u0088\u0097t ; foreign country (C.1.20) 2 t+1 by the uni\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ed world resource constraint for the single produced good: c\u00E2\u0088\u0097t + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t + pbt b\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 + (yt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 ct \u00E2\u0088\u0092 it ) + (yt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 c\u00E2\u0088\u0097t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t ) = 0 (C.1.21) 110 \u000CAppendix C. Chapter 3 Appendix C.2 Solving Complete Market Model When \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial markets are complete, the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Hence, we can derive the equilibrium system using an equal weight planner problem. The planner maximizes the sum of expected lifetime utilities U = E0 \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0002 \u0019 \u0003 \u0003 \u0004 \u0004\u001A \u00CE\u00B2 t U ct , lt + \u00CE\u00B2 t U c\u00E2\u0088\u0097t , lt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 (C.2.22) t=0 subject to: ct + it + c\u00E2\u0088\u0097t + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t = At (kt )\u00CE\u00B1 (lt )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1 + A\u00E2\u0088\u0097t (kt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 )\u00CE\u00B1 (lt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 )1\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B1 kt+1 = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4)kt + s1t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0086 s1t kt \u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B4 2 kt 2 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00B4)kt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 + s\u00E2\u0088\u00971t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 kt+1 \u00CF\u0086 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 s\u00E2\u0088\u00971t k \u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00CE\u00B4 2 t kt\u00E2\u0088\u0097 2 it = 4 \u0002 (C.2.23) (C.2.24) (C.2.25) \u00CF\u0089i sit (C.2.26) \u00CF\u0089i s\u00E2\u0088\u0097it (C.2.27) i=1 i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t = 4 \u0002 i=1 sj,t+1 = sj+1,t for j = 1, 2, 3 (C.2.28) s\u00E2\u0088\u0097j,t+1 = s\u00E2\u0088\u0097j+1,t for j = 1, 2, 3 (C.2.29) The Lagrangian associated with the social planner\u00E2\u0080\u0099s optimization problem can be set up similarly as the one in the bond economy above. The optimality conditions associated with this problem are straightforward. 111 \u000CAppendix D Chapter 4 Appendix D.1 Equilibrium D.1.1 Households The representative household\u00E2\u0080\u0099s budget constraint is described in the text of Chapter 4. The household optimality conditions for labor supply, domestic bond demand, and foreign bond demand are as follows: 1 1 + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 D.1.2 \u00CF\u0083 Wt = \u00CE\u00B7L\u00CF\u0088 t Pt Ct \u0012 \u0013 Ct\u00CF\u0083 Pt 1 = \u00CE\u00B2Et \u00CF\u0083 P 1 + it+1 Ct+1 t+1 \u000F \u000E \u0012 \u0013 \u00CF\u0088D Pt Ct\u00CF\u0083 Pt St+1 (Dt+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 D\u00CC\u0084) = \u00CE\u00B2Et 1\u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0083 P St Ct+1 t+1 St (D.1.1) (D.1.2) (D.1.3) Production Firms After imposing the symmetry condition, the optimality of production \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rms can be written as: \u0005\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u0015 \u0005 \u0014 1 \u0005\u00E2\u0088\u00921 1 Yt = a \u0005 Vt \u0005 + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 a) \u0005 Mt \u0005 \u0005\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Vt = Avt Lt \u0007 W \u0008\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u0007 t Y Vt = a Avt M Ct \u0007 Z \u0008\u00E2\u0088\u0092\u0007 t Y Mt = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 a) M Ct (D.1.4) (D.1.5) (D.1.6) (D.1.7) 112 \u000CAppendix D. Chapter 4 Appendix The price setting condition: Pt D.1.3 \u0013 \u0012 \u00CF\u0081 \u00CF\u0088P Pt Pt Pt = \u00E2\u0088\u00921 M Ct \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0081\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0081 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1 Yt Pt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Pt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u000E \u0012 \u0013\u000F \u00CF\u0088P Pt+1 Pt+1 Pt+1 + Et \u00CE\u0093t+1 \u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0081\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Yt Pt Pt (D.1.8) Importer The details of the optimal contract are derived below. Here we outline the speci\u00EF\u00AC\u0081cation of one importer\u00E2\u0080\u0099s behavior for the solution of the model. Each period, the importer borrows in foreign currency an amount: 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 (St PM t Mt+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 N Wt+1 ) St DM t+1 = (D.1.9) The \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst order conditions for the optimal contract are: \u0006 \u0005 A\u0002 (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 ) Et RM t+1 B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) B \u0002 (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 t+1 t+1 ) Et A\u0002 (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) St+1 B \u0002 (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) St = 1 + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 N Wt+1 RM t+1 St B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) = (1 + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 )(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 ) \u00E2\u0088\u0097 M St+1 St PM t t+1 (D.1.10) (D.1.11) A(\u00C2\u00B7) is de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ned as the expected fraction of the return on capital accruing to the entrepreneur as part of the optimal contract. We may write is as: \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u001B \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00E2\u0088\u009E f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 As shown later on this Appendix: \u0017 \u0017 2 \u0018 2 \u0018 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 1 \u00E2\u0088\u009A \u00E2\u0088\u009A \u00E2\u0088\u0092 erf c A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = erf c 2 2 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 113 \u000CAppendix D. Chapter 4 Appendix where erf c(z) = \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u00E2\u0088\u0092t2 dt z e \u00E2\u0088\u009A2 \u00CF\u0080 is the \u00E2\u0080\u009Ccomplementary error function\u00E2\u0080\u009D. Likewise the share of returns to the lender, net of monitoring costs, is \u001B \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BC) \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 B(\u00C2\u00B7) = \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 0 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 Also be shown later on: \u0017 \u0017 2 \u0018 2 \u0018 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 1 \u00E2\u0088\u009A \u00E2\u0088\u009A B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = erf c + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BC) 1 + erf 2 2 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 where erf (z) = \u00E2\u0088\u009A2 \u00CF\u0080 z \u00E2\u0088\u0092t2 dt 0 e is the \u00E2\u0080\u009Cerror function\u00E2\u0080\u009D. We de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081ne \u00CF\u0086t as the fraction of the return from importing that is wasted in monitoring: \u001B \u00CF\u0086t = \u00CE\u00BC \u00CF\u0089\u00C2\u00AFt \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 0 2 The case when \u00CF\u0089ti is log-normally distributed with E(ln\u00CF\u0089) = \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 and V ar(ln\u00CF\u0089) = \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 is described in detail below. The importer\u00E2\u0080\u0099s consumption: \u00E2\u0088\u0097 P Ctm = (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BD)RM t St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 PM t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Mt A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t ) (D.1.12) and the aggregate net-worth is: \u00E2\u0088\u0097 N Wt+1 =\u00CE\u00BD(1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0086t )RM t St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 PM t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Mt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BD(1 + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t ) St \u00E2\u0088\u0097 (St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 PM t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Mt \u00E2\u0088\u0092 N Wt ) St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 (D.1.13) Finally, the nominal return rate from importing: \u00E2\u0088\u0097 RM t St\u00E2\u0088\u00921 PM t\u00E2\u0088\u00921 = Zt D.1.4 (D.1.14) Monetary Policy Rules \u0012 1 + it+1 = Pt 1 Pt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 \u00CF\u0080\u00CC\u0084 \u0013\u00CE\u00BC\u00CF\u0080 \u0012 St S\u00CC\u0084 \u0013\u00CE\u00BCS (1 + i\u00CC\u0084) (D.1.15) 114 \u000CAppendix D. Chapter 4 Appendix D.1.5 Equilibrium Final goods market must clearing conditions: Yt = Ct + CtM + \u00CF\u0088D \u00CF\u0088P Pt Zt Mt (Dt+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 D\u00CC\u0084)2 + ( \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1)2 + \u00CF\u0086t 2 2 Pt\u00E2\u0088\u00921 Pt The aggregate balance of payments condition: \u00E2\u0088\u0097 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 St PM t Mt+1 + St (1 + it )[Dt + DM t ] = St PXt X + St [Dt+1 + DM t+1 ] The equilibrium of this economy is a collection of 18 sequences of allocation: (Wt , Lt , Pt , it , Ct , CtM , Dt+1 , DM t+1 , St , Mt , Yt , M Ct , RM t , \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t , Zt , N Wt+1 , Vt , Xt ) satisfying the equilibrium conditions 1.1-1.18. I use perturbation method from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe to solve this system of equations. D.2 Derivation of External Finance Premium In this section, I derive the external \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance premium used in the text. I closely follow the model of BGG and DLX. At the end of period t a continuum of importers indexed by j need \u00E2\u0088\u0097 Mj to \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nance the import of St PM t t+1 that will be re-sold to domestic producers in period t+1. Importers are subject to idiosyncratic shocks so that if one unit of funds in terms of domestic currency is invested by importer j, then the return is given by \u00CF\u0089 j RM t+1 , where RM t+1 is the gross return of importer, and \u00CF\u0089 j follows a log-normal distribution 2 with with mean \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 and variance \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 and is distributed i.i.d. across importers and time. The realization of \u00CF\u0089 j can be observed by importers but not by lenders. Lenders, however, can discover the true realization at a cost \u00CF\u0086 times the total return from importing. Since both lenders and importers are risk 115 \u000CAppendix D. Chapter 4 Appendix neutral, standard results establish that the optimal contract between an importer and a lender is a debt contract, where the importer pays a \u00EF\u00AC\u0081xed amount \u00CF\u0089\u00C2\u00AFj RM t+1 St P \u00E2\u0088\u0097 M j to the lender if \u00CF\u0089 j > \u00CF\u0089\u00C2\u00AFj . If \u00CF\u0089 j < \u00CF\u0089\u00C2\u00AFj , t+1 Mt the lender proceed to monitor the project, the importer gets nothing, and the lender receives the full amount of import net of monitoring costs. Therefore, the expected return to the importer can be expressed as: j \u00E2\u0088\u0097 RM t+1 St PM t Mt+1 \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E j \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 \u001B \u00CF\u0089 f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 j j \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 \u00E2\u0088\u009E j \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 j j \u00E2\u0088\u0097 \u00E2\u0089\u00A1 RM t+1 St PM t Mt+1 A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) (D.2.16) The expected return to the lender is then given by: \u001B \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084j \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E t j j j \u00E2\u0088\u0097 f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BC) \u00CF\u0089t+1 f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 RM t+1 St PM t Mt+1 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 j \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 \u00E2\u0089\u00A1 0 j j \u00E2\u0088\u0097 RM t+1 St PM t Mt+1 B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) (D.2.17) The lender should receive a return at least equal to the world op\u00E2\u0088\u0097 = 1 + i\u00E2\u0088\u0097t+1 . Therefore, the participation portunity cost, given by Rt+1 constraint of the lender in terms of the foreign currency can be written as: j \u00E2\u0088\u0097 M j B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 j ) \u00E2\u0088\u0097 Mj R\u00E2\u0088\u0097 (RM t+1 St PM RM t+1 St PM t+1 t t+1 t t+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 N Wt+1 ) = t+1 St+1 St (D.2.18) j i and Mt+1 to An optimal contract chooses the threshold value \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 solve the following problem: \u0008 \u0007 j \u00E2\u0088\u0097 i\u00C2\u00AF ) M A( \u00CF\u0089 max Et RM t+1 St PM t t+1 N t+1 (D.2.19) subject to the participation constraint (D.2.18). The two \u00EF\u00AC\u0081rst order condition implied by the contract is then: j \u00E2\u0088\u0097 Et RM t+1 St PM t A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 ) +Et \u00CE\u00BBt+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 j ) \u00E2\u0088\u0097 RM t+1 St PM R\u00E2\u0088\u0097 St PM t+1 t t \u00E2\u0088\u0092 t+1 St+1 St (D.2.20) 116 =0 \u000CAppendix D. Chapter 4 Appendix \u00CE\u00BBt+1 (\u00CE\u00B8) = j (\u00CE\u00B8))St+1 (\u00CE\u00B8) \u00CF\u0080(\u00CE\u00B8)A\u0002 (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t+1 \u00C2\u00AF B \u0002 (\u00CF\u0089 i (\u00CE\u00B8)) (D.2.21) t+1 where \u00CE\u00B8 \u00E2\u0088\u0088 \u00CE\u0098 is a state of the world, \u00CF\u0080(\u00CE\u00B8) is the probability of state \u00CE\u00B8 and \u00CE\u00BBt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation constraint. Substitute D.2.21 into D.2.20, we get: \u0017 \u0018 j\u00C2\u00AF j\u00C2\u00AF ) ) St+1 \u00E2\u0088\u0097 A\u0002 (\u00CF\u0089t+1 A\u0002 (\u00CF\u0089t+1 j\u00C2\u00AF j\u00C2\u00AF B(\u00CF\u0089t+1 ) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 A(\u00CF\u0089t+1 ) = Et Rt+1 Et RM t+1 \u00C2\u00AF \u00C2\u00AF j j B \u0002 (\u00CF\u0089t+1 ) B \u0002 (\u00CF\u0089t+1 ) St (D.2.22) Since \u00CF\u0089 j is i.i.d across entrepreneurs, every importer actually faces the same \u00EF\u00AC\u0081nancial contract, so we could drop the superscript j. Rearranging D.2.22 to get (D.1.10) in the text. The importers are assumed to die at any time period with probability (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BD). Thus, at any given period, a fraction (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BD) of importers\u00E2\u0080\u0099 net-worth is consumed. So the consumption of importers is given by D.1.12. And the net worth N Wt+1 is given by: j \u00E2\u0088\u0097 N Wt+1 = \u00CE\u00BDRM t+1 St PM t Mt+1 A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084t ) \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 0 Use the fact that B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BC (D.2.23) \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 and imposing the participation constraint, we get D.1.13. D.3 Derivation of A(\u00C2\u00B7), A\u000E (\u00C2\u00B7), B(\u00C2\u00B7) and B \u000E (\u00C2\u00B7) This derivation follows closely that on the Appendix of DLX\u00E2\u0080\u0099s paper. By de\u00EF\u00AC\u0081nitions: \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u001B \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00E2\u0088\u009E f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 (D.3.24) \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u001B f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BC) \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 (D.3.25) 0 117 \u000CAppendix D. Chapter 4 Appendix 2 Since \u00CF\u0089ti is log-normally distributed with mean \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 and variance \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 , we know that \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 = 1 E(\u00CF\u0089) = (D.3.26) \u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00E2\u0088\u009E where the density function f (\u00CF\u0089) is given by: \u0016 \u001C 2 (ln \u00CF\u0089 + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 )2 1 \u00E2\u0088\u009A exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 f (\u00CF\u0089) = 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 \u00CF\u0089 2\u00CF\u0080 Therefore, \u001B \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 = \u00E2\u0088\u009A2 \u00CF\u0080 \u00E2\u0088\u009E 1 \u00E2\u0088\u009A \u00E2\u0088\u009E \u00E2\u0088\u0092t2 dt z e Similarly, \u001B \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 = \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u0016 \u001C 2 (y + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 )2 exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 exp(y)dy 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 ln \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 2\u00CF\u0080 \u0016 \u001C 2 \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E (y \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 )2 1 \u00E2\u0088\u009A exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 dy = 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 ln \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 2\u00CF\u0080 \u0016 \u001C 2 2 \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E (y \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 )2 y \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 1 exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 ) d( \u00E2\u0088\u009A = \u00E2\u0088\u009A \u00CF\u0080 ln \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 \u0017 2 \u0018 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 1 \u00E2\u0088\u009A erf c (D.3.28) = 2 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 where erf c(z) = (D.3.27) is the complementary error function. \u0016 \u001C 2 (ln \u00CF\u0089 + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 )2 1 \u00E2\u0088\u009A exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 d\u00CF\u0089 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 \u00CF\u0089 2\u00CF\u0080 \u0016 \u001C 2 \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E (ln \u00CF\u0089 + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 )2 1 \u00E2\u0088\u009A exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 d ln \u00CF\u0089 = \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 2\u00CF\u0080 \u0016 \u001C 2 2 \u001B \u00E2\u0088\u009E (ln \u00CF\u0089 + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 )2 ln \u00CF\u0089 + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 1 \u00E2\u0088\u009A exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 ) d( \u00E2\u0088\u009A = \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 \u00CF\u0080 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 ln \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u0017 2 \u0018 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00E2\u0088\u009A erf c (D.3.29) = 2 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 As results: 1 A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = erf c 2 \u0017 \u00E2\u0088\u009E 2 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 \u00E2\u0088\u009A 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 \u0018 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 erf c 2 \u0017 2 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 \u00E2\u0088\u009A 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 \u0018 (D.3.30) 118 \u000CAppendix D. Chapter 4 Appendix At the same time, \u001B \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089 = 0 = \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = erf c 2 where erf (z) = \u0017 2 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 \u00E2\u0088\u009A 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 \u00E2\u0088\u009A2 \u00CF\u0080 \u001B \u0016 2 (y \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 )2 exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 \u00E2\u0088\u0092\u00E2\u0088\u009E \u0017 2 \u0018 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 1 \u00E2\u0088\u009A 1 + erf 2 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 1 \u00E2\u0088\u009A \u00CF\u0080 z \u00E2\u0088\u0092t2 dt 0 e ln \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 \u0018 1 + (1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BC) 1 + erf 2 \u001C 2 y \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 ) d( \u00E2\u0088\u009A 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 (D.3.31) \u0017 2 \u0018 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 \u00E2\u0088\u009A 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 (D.3.32) is the error function. Next, since: \u0017 (ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1 exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 \u0017 \u0018 2 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 1 \u00E2\u0088\u009A \u00E2\u0088\u0092 erf c 2 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 1 A\u0002 (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00E2\u0088\u009A 2\u00CF\u0080\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 However, \u0017 (ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 1 exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 2 \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 2 2 ) \u0018 \u0018 \u0017 (ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) + \u00E2\u0088\u0092 exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 1 A (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = \u00E2\u0088\u0092 erf c 2 (D.3.33) \u0017 2 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 \u00E2\u0088\u009A 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 \u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084 0 \u0017 (ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) + \u00CE\u00BC exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 B (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = \u00E2\u0088\u0092A (\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00E2\u0088\u009A 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 2\u00CF\u0080\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 \u0002 \u0018 \u0017 Note that E(\u00CF\u0089) = 1, so B(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) = 1 \u00E2\u0088\u0092 A(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CE\u00BC \u0002 2 \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 2 2 ) \u0018 2 (ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) \u00E2\u0088\u0092 \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 )2 = exp[\u00E2\u0088\u0092 ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084)] exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 \u0018 \u0017 2 (ln(\u00CF\u0089\u00CC\u0084) + \u00CF\u00832\u00CF\u0089 )2 (D.3.34) = exp \u00E2\u0088\u0092 2\u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u00892 Therefore, \u0002 2 \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 2 2 ) \u0018 (D.3.35) \u00CF\u0089f (\u00CF\u0089)d\u00CF\u0089, thus 2 \u00CF\u0083\u00CF\u0089 2 2 ) \u0018 (D.3.36) 119 "@en .
"Thesis/Dissertation"@en .
"2010-05"@en .
"10.14288/1.0067912"@en .
"eng"@en .
"Economics"@en .
"Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library"@en .
"University of British Columbia"@en .
"Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International"@en .
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"@en .
"Graduate"@en .
"Essays on business cycles in open economies"@en .
"Text"@en .
"http://hdl.handle.net/2429/14202"@en .