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No. 1144-C P\u00b0ge 1 \"Details R'i-j.^.rding lovenents of airAtist .Boclics in Co.i lcction \u201dith Chan^g of Government. (.T.N. Cabinet chanses.)\" \u300c\u4e28\u8b70\u95e8 \u5e7f\u5e7f,_ Bcc^usc there \u2022\u5e7fre natters in the present political situation r;liicb differ frcm ny beliefs, I took steps for presenting r.iv rns-i .-n^tio i vcs^crd^v. the 22nd, There .-re snia to be soiac people 1 -ho sn.y tlir\\t \uff1a 'r a TIA 1 '^DA \u2018 s speech is the cause of rr-t cgj'S Ji-\u0302 v? n\uff1a-.; core to p\u00bb slnje, but th\u00b0t is not the re-son. rt ill. It is bcc\u7236us\u3064 I ascertained the fr.ct th \u3063 t the vie-> -s on the \/ T . p r e sent\/ situation by the pnrty vhich h:lly\uff0c\"ith o u r s . This is clcn.r i\uff0ci vle^i of the declaration c d e at their pnrty prior to the opening of the Diet session, tho speech of the party loader, .thu sp-jcch of the party r\u2019\u2022\u30c1present\u3063tivc \u3057.\uff0c.i the iirst d^.y vhe.:.i the Diet rscoaveled ni'tcr the rocoss, tho atmosphere in tho K p u s e . \u3001.tc. I think ., . . \u30d5 I I II J\u2014'Sillmilmiiiii\u00bb||.1 nr IIImilmil\u2026-n\u2014[-r*J,ft- \u30de ' 1 M \" \"r \" *\"\u2022., ,. it is \"utter\u4e04y lrapossible to tice over one present situation by temporizing under coiapromise bct-X'Gn those \u201dho fund\u201d.\u4e00 nontftlly vr.ry in their ccg -\"I tion cf t.hc present sitantion. In short, uador such circuust,prices, I believe it to be ,absolutely ir\u3057possible to carorcc rn 11 it^rv disciu 1 ine. the completion of nrtiqn.^l d o f c n c c , -n r.l\u4e04\u4e00out ndifliaistrrtivo reform, etc., \"to \u201dliich \u30a8 hnv3 ox..rtcd utnost e71\"orr;s sinoc ^I took office\u3002 This is vhy \u30a8 hrvc hiiLibly tendered ^y resign\u3072tion \/ T . M. to His jesty\/, Pep.cc Bcction, Police Burer.u, Ilono \"Uniatry \" \"'1 '\" 1 \u5c71 I ht n I I I n iniifTi'nCTmriii<8il>iy April 1 9 3 7 . (b) Public-tioa of \u2018'r.r '\"inistcr MiT\u3057TCIII^s Talk Doo, No. 1144-B Page 1 Taken from V\u300f Y SECRET Di:T^TL3 REGARDING I 07, J T N T S OF RIGHTIST BODIES IH CON CAI . \u4eba . flTII CHANGE OF GOVrS\u00a5: ENT \/T,N APRIL 1937 pr^nn \uff1bwm:\u3001\u3078 \u2026\u3001r\u4e28\u4e01\u5369\uff1a\uff1a\u5369rrm\u300d HOI'E niJisjsr. ViG.T s o-jpreoscd lj.>Vi\uff1araiv r\u2014v.uhoriti.ss Cm^r\uff1b \u201d oT p i s F T \u2122 W ' T ^ r n \\H3l Under the provoiling atmospherfc it is nbsclutely impossible to discuss \u30d5 ny qll-cut idiiiiaistrntive reform with the present- dny politic \"'.I The politic?.! Dirties nr.ke it their sole business to attack tRe m n f^rv nit^nnl^fps a n th^ ri^ie \u30eeifliou^k reiTecxing o n their orn conductT. r>nl 1 ti on\/ np]y'-\"^g ^-rc advocatinr-: rn \u3064]1-out \u2022-d^i-i-gtrntivo reform, bv.t thoy do not possess :ny coacrcce plans, The\u30cb.;^..pXc^S. t h e y e nro \u300f\u30cb . ^ y i , ,\u300f\uff1a - w , i j ^ l i ^ d. to the . \u5606 \u4e59 o i \u4e03he status quo, \u2022 A n \u3063\u4e04J.-oirt \u30cf.dministrntivc reform to creatc a Jonservativc CHsti'o^r^ssjve) J^pan runs ccmplotelj'' counter to the loud cry for nil-cut administrative reform that \uff1f.rose imciedig>i^elv ri'tor the ^GDru.i.rv g^rEFi rnmc^ent. Sucti a rei'orm is T U c e c r v m g w m n , \u30cf 11 \u3078\u308c\u30ce y-'^P.c^r. and our 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ots cannot be sr.Lisfit.'i Lh o^^ic, s net e posi t ivc v-'ho 1 c \u00a3 rx \uff1b \u2022 dtiJ al. y \uff1b - V \u3057\u2019 Or\\L ai; ^Aid \u5de1 P C J\u4e61 i\u3007 l\u5305 \u4e04 a \u30cb i l , - . : \u8fb9 . A M M \/ . . \u829f \u2026 \u2014 \u5c71 . \u4e04 \u30e1 \uff0c th\u540e.stabii^in^ por;. \u201d cf ..AST ASIA, a\u4e04w.iys been the very cry oi ^ir 100.000.(yjfi cov^r.-Liiio-tai W^ffi noi: Ihc A 6 A m P M u h i o\u4e04 n\uff1a m m m m t 'r cramced xid rri Gcuia W e thsre\uff1b\/., over t'tTTT \u3069 ) \u30b6 \u30d3 \u65bc . . \u300fol1 c. \u2022 : *. iply h(:.i\u2018T; crrapod up , T lthin 111,31.1.1. >.r Jp.pnri? \u4e00 thsre,A eve-^ f^TTTn Thr. '^n^-nvn^i^ JPi^mn qt' tho YA1 AT0 !; iaco? v . T e .ngree indeed to\u3002. positive all-out pdmin- ^ i v c rcioiTji as the ccnerpl rrill of the_4:.aQ,ElG. but \u30ede cannot ^groe to a \u3066ler^.tivc nil-out o.dministrnti.ve reform. Ought - c not to \u8fc7 v^g of \u8fb9 \u3075 \u3076 \u5982 \u9109 t st^e,.. of, J ^ r l i a m e n t uh- .t s hithr rto \uff1a\u2022; vo - i '\uff1a 3 If in\uff1a to p-^rty i:it, rest \u300cnd r\u300crty poll tic3 - j. \uff1b-:ior'\"d n..tion \u4e04\u30ec'\u3001-\u3001cr\u3066::;ts w d th \u2022 T '.'clf \u0302 ro of the Doorre, \/er-iivn to \u4e04 l a f e ' e i ^ n f y politics conforming to i^R? Constitution.^^.a, h a n c T T n E F M , cln.rirv tho\"r\/.tion.^.X polity, d:?vcT6p Inciust?'^ con^letc\uff1b n^tiO'i-nl dofonce. stabilize tho livin\uff1a; oi tho pcoolo,\u3072\u20191J s__t'';nd2j!j:\u2014JIl\u0302 \u00a3S5i\u00a3lSr:...il\u0302 i2r.!;'\u2019jjfe questions?\" -IIM.\u3057\u308a. 11 y (Jlbcctijd. to coir.e ho.s \/T\uff0cK. finrlly\/\u201c conc; tna.t is, tho collir.ion bet^oen the \/ T . N ^ ndvoc.^tes of the\/ status \u8fba:\u30e5 \/\u00a3,\u201c\u2022. ..i\u0302 n \u3076 , r \/ ..thfc. ds^\u30a7\u4e04'wc.tip\u3002 oi tM str.jus qjip. jAFAN st\u30cf\u30f3ids no\u30de nt th(. turning-point '\"here sho should rop.lize a positive all-out\u3002.dni:iistrntive policy in order to cvercone the nr^sft-if, difficulties ^.nd tide over the existing lntornp.Eion^T c r i s i s . D o c . N o , 1144-A ' Page 1 V'' Declaration issued by the s3^IYIJKAI Party M a s s Meeting (.\u00b00th of Jpnun.ry\" l ^ V i \u2022 \u2022 ' J m l Excerpt fi'Oin P a g e s\u300b 8 of \"Retails Re (yarding Movements of Rightist Bodies T n conr^.^M^fi \u30cf\u30c7 Goyernment\" Published by Ponce Section, Police Bureau \"Some M i n i s t r y , April 1 9 3 7 . \u3044J O v d n g to the multiplicity of the G o v e r n m e n t 1 s diplo p o l i c y , it is not \u308bl,\u2018r\u3001\u30bb\u3044\u3058 rojpcnsxcilitics rest. \u201dorcover. the Government fin.s persistently n.aherjd. to sccrot diplomacy, originating in nucp.- 3 tic se 1 f-compl^ceney, thereby T?TiIMg t\u3057 carry out \u4e04 diplom\u3002,CY char-?.ct\u2014eristic of a Modern Str.tc. The p u r p o H of tho \u52a0 \uff01 V ] P.^ct d s defence ngainst, the flnr.ri nt.r.rn. t-;h '.ch desires to destroy our Sta^e organization through 6oniiminisir. But the Government bungled the matter so .\u0302s to cause othr>r Potdps t.9 fjmspfiet the forms\u2014 tinn nf n r) f;hti \uff1fjit \u30d1 i \u30a5+\u2022\u3064\u308c;\"O ar.r,t.P. The Government can never be. n.bsolved fro:a r, sponsibility for d^.plcm^tic failure as to procedure, tii,e and method in concluding the Pact. Our Pr.rty is very p.nxious about the nr'tter, and h e r e i n lies the reason rrhy vie r.re going to seek thorough ci^.rifiction of the matter at the D i e t . y^lf ^^^-^'nPnt. f y ^ n l t\u0302.Pri m.^nv nl^ns dOgEint.tc.-lly con- cluding t h n t\u3002 s c K i - ^ r ^ i m o orr-niy.^tion is n^ns.qnrv. If those pirns, h o n o v e r , ^^.sgoii-a\u308be industrial develbuiaont nnd result in a m c e to ii\" tionr-l litelilEaad\uff0c. the nation \u201dill turn frcn its pros :nt attitude to grud,;c and re sentiment r.g-^.inst the GovernaiGrit, \u2022 nd lixitv of . . . \u3057 . s p i i - i j : r;ill be caused thereby. Our p.^.rty \"TT^aeterrjinod Y o s u b ' e c F Governruent pl\u00b0ns\u3001 to strict examin-tion in the D i e t , r.nd rectify their demerits relentlessly. T;he present Cabinet co.l^s the \u00a7tato control of elcctria- I ,. \u4e04\u3014 .\u4e04 o \u2022 - .J , \u201c * \u30cb;.- ] \u2019. Of Ill-out ' :].pia str \u3067 \u3057 r c \u2014 O u r F\u30de\u3050 is \u3078 . \u300d \u300d t o agree to the Governmen-c 1 s claiis in principle. But pure burerui\u2014 nrnt.in rnntrnl of r\u3067nnnnv is h^.rnfui without being useruT xn any w.-y. Anto:iouo-:s control should be v.\/lUi bl\/ay conlrcl exercisoS t ion n e c e s s a r y . Only tirus may free progress promo ted. It. hns Ion.\u3066 bce:i our desire to elevnte the Gd-uco.tional level of the n a t i o n . r Jhich is more u r g e n t , h o w e v e r , the exten- sion of the period or the repletion of tLe substance? \u2018 oreovcr, necessity of s^eopirg reforrs 5 the educational system h\"S for many ye^.rs been the public opinion of the n).t;ion\u3002 If the Governrent disrec^rds it -at this tiire, it \"i.il bring discredit on aivil idninistr-tion. Measures adopted by tho present Doc. No. 1144-A Page 2 Cabinet are not generally based on the n^tica-f but .\u3063re in- fluenced by the doeni^.tic proiudices of the bureaucrats and f h T n i l i t a ^ The burcaucr^ts rrc vedded to sclf-conpl^ccncy. ...Jhe Kilitrrv.....QYrirflQV 1 Bg S B B i p i ^ i t y ^ n m p ] r AncL they. \u3066\u2026\uff1ait tc i:itcrfcrc ia every jj^cre. of ,\u00a3t?to fu.i?t:.on. If this evil ^ro^'s the rill of tlie people rill be prevented, from free realization, constit^-t-ional jovci-amcjit becone nominal, and oligarchic tyranny i.itroducea. This, \u201de I'oar, is contrary to the fundn.r;e;it^l r)r1rinip1p q Q f - 7 ..r hl\u3067h \u3064\u4e28yp. b ^ S G d r V ^ f ^ o on the Fholo u p o n tho national ^-11 c-? in nee, to tho \u2022^nb^vr'A^ ^HM HHI.MA^ nrfno. i dI ft thr.t t^e cIvii nna ijillitary. ^crvicos should keep to thoir respective duties, U r e lierenith intend to live up to the spirit of tho Constitution, strengthen par 1 ianent.qry politics rith solemn determination\uff0c to devise (T.\u4e00 nc\u30de departure for our F.' rtv tr fort^ nhend to regcnfir.atiQH, find to make strenuous efforts d.\".y and iigli\"t, tuereoy to requite Imperial favour and to serve the St-^.te. V;.v \"\u201c\"\u537f\"\"\"\u300a\u00bb\u2022\u00bb\u00ab\u2022 I \u4e28\u4e28_\u4e281\u4e28___\u00bb\u4e28_\u4e28\u2018 Z.GC. No. 2954 Page 1 jJCTilACTS FRO?\uff1a. \uff1a \uff1bINUTE^JSHO.^TIIAJD . OF S^COKD JOINT CF S: 1 .\u30cbTIO:\u3043IS I\u300111^ III and IV of the jC- \"'''\uff1a' O\uff1a- \/OCl UNTS of the HOUSE OF REPIi^Si^TATIV.-jS, \u3054\u3088\u3057 _\u3087\u300d\uff1a\u2015.\u2022 c-C t>e. I\uff1a PORTAL DILIT on ^lAlHGK .l7.th_2i.4-0. \u30de 0 (taken from \u30f3\u30a8\u30d0UT:\u30d0S OF CO.TITTii\uff1a^ U T I N G S OF T K ^ HOUSE OF U.PRrloy^TATIV^S, 75th IH?]ilIAL DI^T SESSION, ACCOUNTS, PLTI'TIO\u4e28 1 S, PROPOSALS 0 j ' m A L X'^ID.^\uff1a^ OF K \u3002 K x l ! ^ ^ T N T ^ \u2122 , . . FOJIIIACHI-EDj, TGir\/O C I T Y j CO,:\/.?ITTKtii-r:AlJ FUrJDA:-\/T.N. in part\/ \u2014_\u2022\u4e28 For instance, as regards DaVAO in thg PHILIPPINES, the population, has not decreased al'\u20acFougK' a ^ o x i m a t e l y over 35 years have elapsed till the present d a y . Business is reported as tMourishing, and the people here are presently engaged in the cultivation of h e m p . Moreover it is said that fertilizer has never been used for the past thirty y e a r s . For instance, in tue LAIC}\uff1a\uff1b TOiDANC \/PHONETIC\/ region in C^L.'BJS, v h e r e rice, lias been tiarvested three ti^es annually for more than ten years, it is said that fertilizer, if used even fo\u00a3_ once, ^-culd. \"spoil every thin\uff1b,. There are such places as these la^Sd,\u2018 i.-ic.Qaceivatl,e from the agricultural viewpoint hf., T. hpn .] hQJ\uff1b about .^ing. ahead and seizing these l^lacgs- Of coui!.^ Caj^fl\u7684 <3,9 n p v p r t h p 1 \u2026 - \u2022 derelou- ^ n t Of the ii;;GT9\u53e9 r i l l not, necessarily a n i m p o s s i b i U t v , if we shall be tn-epareri to suffer such hard snips nsiri\"\"a^al\uff1a.\/!\u2022' -ith . iL.dl:\/i or \uff1btuSSIA, or if possess an ecoial i m o u A t cf aetermln.atign, effort and financial po^^r reaui-eG' in overcoming the difficulties of the Nu:aTh .^.IfiA \u30ce i n a r c r ^ r r S u c h beln- tlie '6ase,- hp K^l 1 \u0302 vr l ^ a t JSPaM r i l l be ^ \u904d \u3059 \u3067 \u8b49 \u4ee3 \u300f j f \u6eab \uff0c \u3075 \u76df ^ \u76df \u800d \u2022 \u4e28 ffitu?e Tlati'ohal \"policy in such a ^ay as to nake some trc-fo\u4e04a i . o l i c v . - - ^ for dei'er.ce, and \u3066he. other .for advance. rio-, as xor TAI ^ \/T.>J. FOR'- 03A\/ or the HOTTTH a],.A ISLAVIDS vere ap.ije. \"to \"bee \u5fc3v-\u2476\u5413\u30b6t nfWTJ\"\" \/T.i J . \" H M I Y U - C L P 1 \/ they - l le W !)etoiiie independent:, jfeprtl^ after its. occupation\u3002r its^inauguration o f > \/ o v e r a v . e ^ As regards CUOS.^: and \" though . \uff1aANCIimiA is an independent n a t i o n , JAPlrTls ai: present QDliried ; to defray_ enormous su:n of money in accordaxice with. axmamfcijT^ a H O l L e r \" p yreemenls. T E i s ^^y nnssi fTTv l a s ~ o r scores 01 years to c o m e . c; T 03. ras the firs_t to be annexed .to .JAPA\uff1a\uff1a, but sKe is sLill vnabio to become inclependeat, a ad e lormous g 1 \u3075d\u30cf\u2022fpq V M M fo ^pntftd to hfii-. ouch G.re the ccnJiti\u30cb\uff0cs even in so nice a place like C H 0 3\uff1a \u00ae .\u30e4 v n . ^ f.6 t^aiTTt is^aXr-'the nBre\/unnafuril\u2014\u73a9 seaa'Tarn-ors -- c o n s t i t u t i - J A P A ^ s hi, her-class labours \u2014 tQi \uff1a A\/CilU^IA vhere even. cooTies frnS m . \u5538 Ire^lmStle to \u201c0. The policy that tliey must Doc. Mo. 2954 Page 2 be sent over is all very fine, but, as this unnaturalness is very hard to overcome, I v;ish you will kindly \u00a3ive your con- sideration to this point. Our future national policy should be such that \u7d00e shall have to endure preseverance no matter what difficulties it may lead us tc, \uff1bust as we have in continuing many years of devotion after having initiated the so-called Sino-Japanese Incident of tcday. Therefore, if w e have that determination to go through hardships, \";e snail . find a real treasure chest in the Southern Paciijc, where deposits of coal, gold, silver, iron and petroleum v,ill probably amount to 20C times more than those found in the 400 or so provinces in China. If JAPAM Hill be in possession of such resources, she shall no Ion er have to suffer from her present pli ht of being unable to wage a v'ar e.s she v;ould like just because of the scarcity of resources. Therefore, v. r e must- for the sake of establishing the national policy of the State, have a chan e m a d e , at this .juncture, in the principles of the traditional national policy or the past. 1; i T e are extremely pleased at the fact that Minister of State KO130 h a s , at Cabinet meetings and. the like, expressed his opinion several times fairly strongly in that line, or duelled u p o n the policy in that line. So, althougn things may not go so easily as I say -- although it would \"be oplenaid if they did -- things w i l l be difficult. Nevertheless, even if v;e are to sacrifice a great deal of our national po\u3067er, what will follow shall not be comparable to the results of the efforts in \uff1a\u2022 iANCHU,.1IA or CHINA.\" This is w h a t re have been thinking,about. Jf^ peace is restore! jiot\/, it is need\u4e04ess to say that Japan vill suffer from over-population. As you have just m e n t i o n e d , most of our farmers have only five tans of land \/T.EL approximately 1.2 acres\/. As they cm.i only that much of l a u d , -- let us say five children are born to a far.-ier, \u2014 rour of them, cither male or female, must leave tne family to \u30d3et jobs outside, according to the faicily system among the farming class. The eldest son is left to take over \"hile the rest must be abandoned as u n n e c e s s a r y . The Japanese nr.tion is unable to make a living. This is the phenolorion araoiig the fariiiin^ class of present day J a p a n . This fact alon'..\uff0c I believe, \uff0c\"ill make you. realize that \u2019\u5382e shall suffer from over-popalation rlien peace is restored. liHipt should ve do about it? It is quo.te clear that we shall fe^d on each other and fall together if v.\uff0ce stick to the five Tan farm!n^. ''o must establish a \u00a3rort national policy right ro?j-. H e r o i n , lies the Dasis for our discussion. Therefore, re have been trying to send people over to Manchuria -- v\/e have hoard about your ideals of sending 200,000 or 1,000,000 familjbs over there but its realization has been very d i f f i c u l t . Much money is spent ^. 7 ith no results, m o r e o v e r , people are not interested in going inspite of our encouragcmunt to go, I v;ould \u4e04 i k e to inform you that unless you take into consideration,\uff0c':hen establifh:nj our national policy, some places \u753ahere people? \uff0c\"il\u4e04\u30ec\u30d5 all maans even if tliey are told not to go, .vather than piac, s -\"here people i\/xll go and return, the ^ruat task of revivin;: Japan,\u3064\u3067 ccnstructin^ Z.GC. No. 2954 Page 3 State j..,mister rill study that direction -- Committeeman FUICUDA\uff1a \"I hope further V c have) become members of tho Accounts C c\u68da i t t e e , and have studied the Ministry for Overseas Affairs 1 (mormons budget for the coming y e a r . As it Till be difficu\u30cbt to get any resxilfe if you put your efforts to things that r :ill not possit.. y have any cffect, ve shall have to take a neutral stand on this point, and I believe \u30a8 shall have\u2018to ask you to put your 'efforts on the true attainment of an object, even in the exGcution of this budget. As regards such m a t t e r s , however I believe the Ministry for Overseas Affairs has great under- standing as to the South5 and great efforts have been afforded both the Formosan and the South Seas Govc.:rnments from vhich t;c cxpoct developments in economics and varicAis o^hor fields. HavG you any opinion in. this line? \u2018'e shall be most obliged if the Minister for Overseas Affairs rould inform us 1 r ith his opinions regarding these national polices. Minister of State KOISO\uff1a- \"I fully agroo vith . FUIIUDa ' s remarks regarding tho construction of \"both the NCi ; ITH and the SOUTH. The OVERSEA AFFAI\u3066IS ministry is also advocating the idoa of constructing both the NORTH and tho S\uff1a UTII. There is, ho'\/cvor, a slight difference in vie\u30ees in. regard to the path to be foilovod and its substance. I shall give you very roughly the important points of the opinions of the OVISS\uff1b k AFFAIRS Ministry v.iiich rdll carry out th& idea of constructing both the NORTH and the SOUTH. As towards the CONTINEi-IT, we must enforce the movement of population, w h i c h must naturally be accompanied by economic development, and as torards tho SOUTH, 1 \u30dee irast cnforce economic Japan rill never be accomplished. In this r e s p e c t , the m i l i t a r y , so f a r , has been concentrating too m u c h upon the N o r t h . I wonder if this is not slightly mistaken? 'Then I say m i s t a k e n ,\u30a8 mean mistaken as J a p a n 1 s national policy. I do not k n o w v\/hat you rould say x'rora the viewpoint 01' national defence, but this is, I think, a little mistaken i hen ve consider the groat task of truly .rovivinr; Japan, of constructing Japan. Therefore, our policy must' be to advance both to the Nortli anS SKIFD^S \u201dAH SrIIEATORI Toshio, Former \uff1forei^n Office adviser and Am\"bassador to Italy, in Magazine of -Today (G'skoAI) 1 Jime 1942 S.ecbion 1. Talcing a general view of the present war situation, vre can not- onl\uff1a\/ sav that the Greater Asia. w r a,r is progressing most satisfactorily,\"but also that tho European \"' T ar is o\u0302iiif\uff1a very well for the ixis nations. It is now .ai\u0302LL\uff1b\/\"\" a, .juat te.r of jbinie \"before \u4e03 he malign infliiRnce of the ^Jnited States and G-reat Britain will \"be expelled from the territories of Greater Sast Asia, an\u5df1 Chungking, now ,-aspine: licr last \"breath, Kill no dou*bt capltulatc soon. On tho other side of the vorld, the Axis armies of 3-crmany and Italy c^n. \"be oxpectnd to_achiove supremacy in Europe this 7\/ear. 7von the ins.?tia,\"blr\uff1a British S ^ p i r m u s t oxpoct lior inevitable doom within the following year at the latest. The so-called \"Old Powers\" of the world vrill in all pro\"ba,\"bility_ floe to the \u30e0nrrioan continent^ whiCil-tl^y- i^lan to use as a \"base for tlicir final roBistanc\u00a3U Mop.nwhilc Amcrica, rich, in resources, protoctrd \"by the Atlantic and the \"Pacific\uff0c is desperately oxoanding her a.rT!m.nents. Thus if arc to \"bring her completely to lior lcncos, mo will need a consicT-r^.'blr^ amount of time. It ip for this rnasoi?. that evrryone predicts p. long i \u30be L o n g war though it nay be, vith tlzr. fall of Britpin p.rr,ed hostilitios will wano and \"become chiefly series of delaying actions, sulDs^quentl:\/ dovoloping into economic and idpological wrrfrrp # Thcrr^forn tlio question \"becomcs: How mticli forcr\uff1a the -J.liod \uff01 7 at ions \"briiif to \"b^ar \"apon the \/jcis? In otiior vrords, how rr-^at is Ar.orica 1 s i-.tcrnal atr^n^th? On the answer to this will depend tho ontcono of a lonv \u2022 In studying tho w.,.r from this -point of view, one can only concludo thr.t t;:.o iucis enjoys \u5305 docidod advantage\uff1a\u2022 intcr:i?,l striicturo of G-crmany and Itp.ly\uff0c plrr?.d.y tested through nairr j'oars, is sounder than over C \u3073IfiDiLTr:UX Doc, N o . 2427 \u30d6 KFI \u30e0 I2\u2018?TLJL page 2 although the strength of these tTO nations has been sapped in many respects by the par, their successes have given them more than enough in the way of resources. This means that the remainder of their stru^^le should be considerably easier, l.s for Japan, her internal unity and the morale of' her people are, needless to say, unmatched by any other nation in the v. or Id \u2022 Furthermore t in the matter of resources \u2022 she has the vast and rich territories of Greater East Asia at her disposal\u2022 If she progressively develops this source, she need have 110 concern on this score regardless of how long the war may l^st. Japan 1 s might will become ever greater, her morale ever higher. In contrast, what ijvill te the future developiTients in America 1 internal conditions? If we study her present trends we see that \/inerice \u2022 as has ever been the c a s e ,\u30d2\u30e6 ri^ti^ri f\u30cf\u3011\u3064\u30cf n - r - r ^ o p n n f f e \u2022o\u3007licy\u00ab a r^X^nn harglv np.-nHjir\uff1b hr ^ 11 \u0302 r^ \u30cb\u30cbg\u5341\u30d1\u3002\u201d i, in the true sense of \"the rare.\u2022 T r) + imfrS of peace and nrvrrrT\u00bbf_|iP\/r p ^ o p ^ rtf\/ content, but under the Qixress of modern 7.ar tutlr strength for resistance is feeble Today, \u30cbirxrica\uff0cs\u2014finances are actually on the verge of baniLr ru^i^-. Not even the cleverest manipulation by the most able financial experts can ex\"fcri^te her from this condition^. Even should the iTar end today, no malrcchll 1 t\"inB&\u00a3\"ures couIq be devised \u8ba1 \u30ec \u5373 v a >if.r fron::\u300fan^rimtcv\u2022 T\u30cf put it n.ildly, v.ith her budget rafigir3g into astronomical figures, the burden on her reople can only increase \u2022 bf.r. debt grow larger, pn^ h^r fit.RTir'pr^ of 11ving hrr.r^ r>orr^spondirtglv \u4e04oj\uff1a !\u0302\u0302 In a situation rhere America has both of her oceans blockaded, ajidjfinds _herself eut o f f ^ T\u30b6 L h e I'e^Cof the 10rid v ith her supply, ol' critical niitcrials gi^a^ally diminishing, her J.caccrc v.ill be proric_ to -.ose vvhatever c^r.fidence they have in their ability to continue jtla^-^aiLj'or iengthy poriod\u2014 There is no longer any doutt whatsoever that ai^^terna^l collapse is ineYitabl\u30ec In this light, even should t h e _ \"old powers\" of the v. or Id establish themselves behir.d the walls of ijneric^, tITeir power to resist d]\u4e04 hA , The Axi5 nations have only to continue their steady appj.icction of pressure, and calnily '.ait for i-irerica to bring about her ovu destruction. ThuSt altiiough the concensus of opinion tends to favor a long war* the above factors just ify t\u308ce belief thg t the yi^r vill. not last t\u0302 vo \u3055o\u53d6\u2022 If the present v.ar were anything like r.ars in the past \u2014 merely a clesh of iiiaterial interests -- peace negotiations could be comriencecl immediately upon the enemy 1 s capitulation, and with this ell armed hostilities should cease. But this wcr is \"rriankind 1 s last i\u00bbar\u201d \u2014 a war to end all wars --. ^ s e objective is the complete eradication n f the old \uff1b.nglc-American ^orld policy, and the establishment of en idealistic uorld based on a new policy.\u53b6ny makeshift varic of peace is unthinkable, J'oreover, between the old order the Lxis, there are no grounds upon which a compromise coul\u30e5 be considered\u2022 F\u3002r these reasens, the v;ar to establish v.orld order and peace will inevitably require \u306c considerable amount of t ime 9 COI^ILI.OTL'L cc. N o . 2427 COKFTLEMTI\/JL. page 3 Sectdon 2 The immediate objective is to repulse and destroy the enemy and to gain the final victory. Victory alone, hov;ever, does not insure the v;ar f s end. Only when we have completely realized all our new undertakings along vjith victory can vce rejoice in triumph\u2022 Every citizen accepts the brilliant successes and the heroic efforts of the Imperial armed forces with gratitude and praise f We need not harbor any fear of our armed forces letting us fiov\/iu Before us, v;ho shoulder the responsibility of exploitation, still lies the important portion of the task. It will demand from us the utmost in effort. We cannot forget that, aside from the important duty of producing and supply- ing, directly or indirectly, the materials necessary to war, have the heavy responsibility of establishing the New Torld Order. Though the words \"New World Order\" have been heard frequently enough, it scenes th\u00a3 t their exact meaning has yet to be author it at i ve ly explained \u2022 Up to nov; it has been generally chorused thet the Ne^ World Order based on totalitarianism must be introduced in the place of the An^io-AiDerican individualism, but the outbreak of the Greater last Asia Yibt has made this inadequate\u2022 The ne\\\uff1a Italo-German Order in place of the old Anglo- xjnerican Order explains only the character of the Wer in lurope. That \u30a8\u3066alo\u4e00Gennan political principles and economic systems are far superior to those of \u30e0nglo-American and are extremely close to Japan 1 s Nationalism, we T\/ill for the moment agree \u2022 Yet to make this wer the vrsr to end all v;ars, the \u30a8talo-German totalitarien ideals in themselves do not provide an ad equate f oundat ion \u2022 With vast economic spheres in Europe, the Ameritc.n and Greater East Asia existing and opposing each other in the future world, can a permanent peace en this earth be guaranteed? Even though this is a great step forw&rd when compared to the v;orld of the past, r;e must conclude that tliot is still far from perfect. There is an order in all things\u2022 First to establish the Greater East Asia Sphere\u2022 then to strive for its co-prosperity with the European-Amorican economic sphere, is certainly a logical procedure\u2022 If there is no other way out, this set-up can be considered temporerily satisfactory. Howeveri an ideal situation will require even more than this. Section \u30b9\u30fc \u30e0t,this point muct re-examine our national polity. KOKITTAT MEIdHO (Clarificetion of Japanese National Polity) is e phrase that has been quoted in relation only to Japan proper, and used in a very limited sense. The MEIJI Restoration, which overthrew the T O K T O m Shogunate, ^as introduced, as to be expected, by KOEUl\u30bd.1 laiCIIO. The present members of the faction supportir; M K0KI.Tr'\uff1b..I MEICHO\" reason that, since in the Japan of today there exists l kind of force quite similar to the TOKIIL:W\u2018 ShogunateI such a frrce must be erediceted by the olarificction of national polity. C O m W I N T U L Ioc f NOif 2lj.27 page k COI^ILElvTI.'.i If such a force does exist within Japan, it must be predicated. However, in the SIIOV^ Restoration, this force does not ezist 7;ithin the nation. It comes from the outside, The American-\uff1b.nglo Jewish Influence is this force. To preach renaissance at this time v;ill only invite public cencure, since it is evident the.t those v.ho preeoh it do not fully understand the national structure of Japan. If the Ancient Chronicle (KOJB:I) and the Nippon \u53b6\u8108Is (NIPPON SHOKI) ere correctly interpreted anu understood, you \u2022will probably be able to realize th'.t the rule of tue ;:.un Godde\u00a3\u00a3 \uff1b 1 7 T . T E \/ . S U OFHUT'I was not restricted to the narrow island\u00a3 of the J^penese Archipelcgo. Her direct descendants t the Imperore, who are the incarnation of God, extended their \/.ugust Virtues not only to the Jepcnese nction and the Jcpaiuesc people but t \uff1a tht anivurse. The Imperor ic ceeply concerned about the world for the sake of hutnanity. He said in his Impericl Rescript at the conclusion of the Axis AgreernEnt, \"The v;orld shall be united w , ond again, \"Lach nation shall have its place in the \u00a3un and all human beings shall live in peace. w ^e nust thoroughly clarify the origin of Japan, the true r.ieaning of the descent tn earth of the descendents of the \u00a3un-Goddess, and the true nature of the Emperor, the incarnation of God\u00bb Imperor JB\/MJ^ prior to his departure on a expedition to subjugate Eastern Japan# said, \"Since the descent of Prince NINIGI sbcut 1,7$2>470 years ago, we heve unobtrusively lived in Western Japan, and have there, developed our culture and promoted justice, etc\". Since then, for a period of 2>600 years, the history of Japan sho\\T\u00a3 thet she has unobtrusively developed her culture and promoted justice only v ithin the last Asia Sphere\u2022 In keeping v;ith divine policy, the authority of the Emperor hos been restrained while japan has fully absorbed foreign culture\u2022 Throughout this tine, she has been earnestly av:aiting the fulfillment of her destiny. If a philosophic view is taken of world conditions today, it i\u00a3 evident that the t: me for that fulfillment has come\u00bb This Holy can be saia to be something greater than the Eastern Ixpeoition of Imperor JM.OJ, that is, this is the prelude to the opening of the Rock Ccve\u2022 (TN: The opening of the Rg-.;K\uff1a \"eve is on allusion tcken from Japanese mythology^ \uff1b . c c o r d i n g to the legeiAcry account, the fun Godc\".ess hid in a cave after being insulted by her brother. This plunged the whole world into dcrkness and the evil deities became active, \"'hen she y:ss \u30a8^!ally persuaded to come out cf the cave by the good deities the universe again enliglitened. The m o d e m anelogy is that the v. or Id is 8gcin in darkness 9 and Japan's mission is to bring light once inore to a rorld overcone v.lth evil.) If the Japanese polity is fully interpreted, this is the only possible conclusion. COWIDLNT 1.1 Doc. No # 2427 COLIFIDEMTL'.I page 5 Today t foi* this reason\u2022 our nctional polity should be clerifiec3 and shov.n to the v\/orld\u00bb I firmly believe that t he time has come to advocate peraanent v.orld peace and world co-prosperity. This i\u00a3 the real pur rose of the present \u301c..Gr \u2014\u4e00 the bssic idea behind the establishment of the Nev; Order. It is the mission of the Japanese people. KOKXt[\u2022\u30d6\u2022\u30a8 H I O H O today is the ir.otivating force of World Restoration, With this stupendous task confronting the Japanese people 9 it should be clear to you hov; you must be prepared to meet any internal or external emergency. It is undoubtedly necei'\u00a3ary to undertake a complete reform of our national polity. However, the foreign materialistic reforrs of the past cannot accon: x rlish this purpose\u201e R&ther, they tend to obscure the national polity\u3001 Section k In the past,\u30a8 have resided in foreign countries for a long time and have aceociated Vvith all clashes of people -- intelligentsiat proletariat, students 1 etc. and \u30a8 have found the Japanese tc b e superior to all foreigners^ Physical characteristics such as flat nose and yellow skin inatter little, since these are due to the influences of v.eether, custom andfood. They naturally cennot be taken as standards\u2022 The value of man lies in his soul\u2022 The soul is invisible 9 but it is in evidence v;henever a crisis occurs. On the battle field, v;here risk of life is great\u00ab the ezittence of the soul is especially evident. In this v;ar, the Japanese spirit has been thoroughly displayed ever^here\u2022 Through numerous praiseworthy deeds end miracles on the field of battle and the home front the Japanese people heve adnirably proven they are a superior race unequalled in this v;orld. If the Japanese oonfonii to their inherent nature, they inevitobly rill be endov.od t. ith the divine blessing of Providence\u2022 Tho^e \u5207ho do not believe in Providence are not true Japanese\u2022 \/nd if we do not receive the divine blessing, it is bec&use v;e are acting contrary to the national polity. K0KUT...I KEI.OHO 011 the home front is very important. The duty of the Japanese on the home front is primeriiy to clarify the national polity\u2022 Lately, there have been niany v;ho fc.\u30deor using the Diet to assist the Lroperor f a^d cdvocate assistsnce to Imperiel Rule. Regrettably, there are still some who do not comprehend the true significance of Imperial Rule, \u30a8.t is Imperial Rule v;hen the Irr-nercr graciously presides over the government \u2022 I11 * ir.erica f where 'Rooseve.lt cseuiriec the reins of goverriment, it is simply politics\u2022 The tv;0 forms of government differ in essence and signinc&nce. There is a basic difference between the essence of foreign goverimonts and the significance of the \u30a7 i m p e r i a l Rule of Jepan. COKFIDIJ\\TTIi.L Loc # No, 2\u308c27 GCXNFIELNTLM psge 6 The benevolent rule of His \u00a5:e jesty, The Emperor, is not only bestowed upon J&pan itself, but extends to all mankind. This is the reason why it is defined as \"The Divine rission\". Ycu ere to assist in this Tivine Lixsion w ; so, as Japanese v you must Iisvc a superior F.ental attitude\u00bb If you ere to employ a foreign politic\u3057 1 ideology to afcist this \"Divine Ki.ssion, n it v;ill be merely ail exercise of the privilege of suffrage\u2022 The basic principle of Inperi&l Rule is that it be extended over the earth. Therefore, since you are to assist in this, it must tc.ke on a deeper significenoea Not comprehcTiding its essence there ere sore who have lost their interest in aseistirg the Imperial Rule. The present G-reatcr la^st Asia War is the Divine Vi-ill of God. The tine has cone new to open the Rock Cave on this e\u00a3rth\u00bb Jap8n 9 during this v.cjt , is able to nurture her strength end spirit, \\.hiie lTBter ialictic foreign countries: \\re faced with Jaclinec That is natural since, from 8 materielistic viev,poin\"'; f v\/ar exhausts a n&tion's strength\u2022 Therefore, the loiter the v;ai' is,prolonged? the greater will he the difference betueen the strength of cur country end that of foreign countriec, until finally the stage Trill probably be reached v.here their only hope rill be to respectfully request the sovereignty^ of HiG Vc jecty, The rmperor, the Incaraation of Godv V e Japanese must not vie^ this Vvcr r^.tericlictically \u0302 This Holy Vvbr is not a vcr cf inen and. matericls\u2022 \u4e01f this \\T\u00a3r ie fought on a basis of :vanpov:er end m\u00a3.terial strength alone > the ettrition of v.cr will exhaust friend and foe alike^ end eyentualiy ell menkind x ill be ^rostrcte. But if there should, be e race of people vhe hove a true God presiding rvcr the:;., arjd v\/ho are fighting a holy v;ar in his nane \u2022 these ncble people r.ill inevitebly be bestov.ed -with the Divine 31ess\u00b1ng of Providence,. Therefore, there v.ill be a ni-rked difference in the national strength of countries which are guided by God end those which ere not \u2022 The race which is fighting under the guidance of God must be Japan. Otherrise, there would be no justification for the i:anctification of the Japanese national polity. In this light our national polity should be thoroughly understood by ail Japanese^ \u2022\u2018 hen Lmperor JIM\/iU went on a punitive expedition to \uff1b.da\uff01 the rebel resistance was strong. roreover, inany of his soldiers fell ill, and Prince v;ac pathetically killed in action. Iven the lmperor him^olf Decani sick and \u3075:,\u201c 1 erv.ent terrible hrrdships. Lt this point he solemnly offered supp.lication to the Sods of Heaven and Earth, end as g result lie Vvas able to successfully conclude the expedition against ^-da without heving io depend on COKFILriTTI\uff1b.! Doc. No. 2427 C0NIIDZI7TKL page 7 In order to conclude the war successfully, r;e must first follow the historical example of Emperor riMMTJ end ofi>r supplication. The Ein\uff1a eror- is the incarnation of God a and is the personification of the Sun Goddess, iJv'nm.\u00a3U O Y H . Therefore, if the Jepenese people worship their Imperor, they are, in re&.li*ty, worshipping God. If prefer state of mind is developed to perfection, the \u2018 spir\" tual \u00b0nd nirteriaiistic aspects of the will take care of thera- selves; the ir-ternil structure \u30cff '^apan will be strengthened and the Ne\"w World Or-.er \u8035ill be firmly established. Fach nation will have its place under the sun, end for the first time a permanent peace and security will be assured all nankind. C-Ol^IDUJLZLl Doc, No. 2427 C E R T I F I C A T E page W.D.C. N o . U . S . No. 2127 Statement of Source and Authenticity \u30a7 \uff0c \u4e00 K ^ e a b u r o , hereby certify that \u30a8 am official]^ connected with the. Japanese Government in the following capacity: 2nd Class Secretary of Komejyy-nisjtrx and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 272 pages, dated June \u00bb 194?\u00bb and described as follows: \"GENLAL\"\u2014 Magazine\u4e00 \u30a8 further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government 5 and that it is part of the official archives arji files of the following named ministry or depart-nBTiv (specifying als^ the file nuniber or citation, 11 any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the ar 3hives or files) \uff1a Home Ministry Signed at .JTokyo on this 7 day of Jaiu , 1947 \u2022 \/s\/ Kosaburo Shibata Signature of Official SIA1 Witness: I2J\u2019._Jo A ? Curtis 2nd Class Secretary of Home Ministry 2d, Lt. Official Capacity ^xatement of Official Prqcurement I, \u4e00 \u3080 A\u3002\u4e00 Qy^i\u65e6^ , hereby certify- that \u30a8 am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, andthat the above certification was obtaineu by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduefc of my official busiiness. Signed at Tr\u00bblcy\u3064 on this JZ day of , 1947 \/s\/ J , A . Curtis Lt. MI, imiE Witness: \/s\/ B , E . Lareh Invest igator IPS Official Capacity DI\uff1a C U ^ I O N OF THE ja^AN-C?-'. n m T A r kxir \uff1f , Toehio \u30c0 Special advisor to the Foreign Ministry- Nazi Series Publishers B S v ( . c. \u2018 \u2018 ^ luriT \/9'uo Document No. 1616 Page Nc. L, Preface I am prerontfng to my friends these various lectures I have given all over the country and which have a^peered in newspapers and magazines r ince my return to JA^AK last autumn. They are here organized under one cover for publicat.ion c \\ - Seen in todr; 7 r light, they consti^iTte o^ini.oris which might :ell be revised and since in the lirht of later f^ots there \u3053:re several cheaters that ere \u30c7 a \u4e04 s e , \u30a8 should perhaps he ashamed to o^fer this to the public as it stands. However, it required considerable \"courage\" for me to offer them at the \u3066lme I returned in &n atmc phere :.rj which such ideae were being ridiculed by certain groups saying n Is it not like making a landirv\u3002in the face of the enemv? tl Feen from such an historical viewpoint, this may sti 1 1 have so\u30c9e reference value, However, now th?:t the Tripartite -\u2022llien.ce has become a reality, fg should, of course not wander aimlessly over particulars of the The Forldwi.de significance of this Alliance, Vc rticulp.rly as regards the new vie\u5de7 of the world and the New Order which is to govern human society in the future, requires profound e^lan\uff1a t 5 o n I t is hoped the t through such eftorts \"by competent persons those results will one after another be achieved in the world. \u30a8 shall be ha\u201dpy if this book results in presenting a s\u670d.11 beginning to that end in the future\u2022 FHI^ATORI, T o s M o November 1940 Document No. 1616 \"DI.Gir.SION CF TIIE J7\u2022\uff1f\u30e0\u30c8GF \u2022\uff1a. WY-ITi)\u4e01\u3054 JlHi TEE I The Nece?f.ity of \u2018 T .':1'T-ITAIY \u201c TJI'NCE (December 1939) Document No. 1616 Page Nc. L, Doforo \u2018 e d.i \uff1fcur\uff1a-: present f'ore: gra policies, re raust firstly know the fcxt that t:.e world ic nor on the eve of a great -r. The last world wf-r vas not four ht as the result of o^riosf.ticr ^ etFeen new po ers ard old ones, bit countries of siraiL r chf rt cter determired their attitude to\u0302 r- rd the wcr according to old ideas about the.ir respective c5.rci\"!metwees s.rd 5nt. rec-ts. Therefore, countries that were \"basically un c ble to ooor-jrate f.ou\u4e8cht on tl.ie ScJ-e side. A conspicuous cxam'ole is that Japan and Italy took sides with the old powers irclnding the IJNITFD ST\/TES, and Ho. ever, the Versailles Treaty revvrsed the coiirse of history \uff1fnd returned the order of the v\/orld to the.t of on3 or t^o cei?turies : 5 o, thus \uff1ftirnulating tbe rise of new powers \u2022 s launching tror hrr continerts.l Policies, \u00a3 rd ITi v lY'p \u3057r.'d ;T ! s completion of their tct^Jitc.rian systems cre videnco of this, it fir^t the-?G new \u30cf o m s could not \u30c8e said to hevc awakened to their commcn mission, but\uff0cas the old \"oovers, from the irst^ net of sclf-preservt'.tJ-on, showed a tGnder'cy to combination and este % 0iehracnt \u2022 of l united front, the n ^o^'-rs were ir\u00abc\u2018vl\u5341.\u30d2\"hi\u3066, r compe]led to cooperate Fith each other * Such is the \u2022orc?er't situat?' or) of the world. Hitherto, th se two sddcs hc.vc been d^.stirf ul.sbca n s have rk to oris ar.'d he ve-nct nzt: oris \u2022 This .1 s quite right, for 'iioet of tho rising rct^ons h.ve poor resources with living spheres confired to too narrow \u00a3 rrc c\uff1a rd ltq greatly diss, tisfied vdth condition?. \u2022 However, \uff1f' t x,he dc\u3066\uff1aIre? of these countries ^erc for \u0302 mere i'nrirovemc nt o.t? their economic oc' iditions, tb re \\vculd he no d:! fforerce bet^eer?. the eyo stir.g struggle f.i\u2019d \u201d\u3057st irt- rnctioral stru.'\u2022\u3053IGS for ru^rcmtcy. However, I think WC can find higher efigr-ificar.cc in the present od\u30cfosition .ir the - ,r orld. \u2022Tor ell our Dcople know thc.t JA\" : 'AF T s advcrce in the continent if, not the of a desire for ^cr^ nu- t c r n d gain, hut airas \u3069.t the rcr\uff1f.5zet.ion r \u201c the c\u0302\uff1b arioso r)oorjlc r s rrci-1 5.dei\uff1a 1 oeti shed , t the timr. o:\u300c the foiiDdu ti m of our iictic.ru Th5 s is clesrly pho^^r r the phre se Ti the new order in A c 11 n . i.s is knovn, the concopt of the nr. tior: 1 str-icturos of IT\/IY f.nd GSRiU\u3078-lies so-ncthirg in cornmoD with tho b,.sic principle 0 1 the f oundr t5 on of our - mviro. It is ne ocllees to sej tht t tho vier T s of vb-t iri brief m.,7 bo c: \uff1f 3 ed t-otr 13 t^ric n iu t.5.ors rcgcrding the um.vcvsc \u3068\u2022 nd the Ft. te form \u3069.\uff1f!.;.\uff1a. rp cor trr. st to those of so-c.. H o d dcmocrrtic ne\u5341.ions, rhosc kejmctc is irdividuf lism. When ve cxc -:dne the present sit\u201d\u30e0tior of tho \u30c9\u3064rid divided j.rjto \u308f.\u30520 povers, the; now c.nd tho old, ^e must focus our 1: tt. ntj 011 on the co:\u3050. f \"\\ict of thceo idc-. s. Fo\u2014\uff0c prob- bly the most cortrovLrsial \u201droblcm is the attitude of S07IET : .!J5 \uff1a IA, ConMunism 1 s vi ev of the universe is on the se:re pl^nc thc.t of d e m o c r a c y and is utterly 5nconsistcrt with the totality vii-.m vie,5 of \uff1atho y\u3064rid, Therefore, ttg ' car scj that the. f o n tion of the so-eall cd Document Kb. 1616 'r\u00a7e No. 5 povulur front res nature 1. If the TTIO^, ho^cv^r, stick? to tho Mc rxie.r. :.rirci^ o, closc coovorr t.\u0302 o bet'^ e \u0302 \"t rnd the totelj t. rian co\\irtrios m 1 1 be very difficult to . GE \u3075;.iY and tho S0\\.r[ET \u2022P r \\r-' h> vc co?- eluded \u3057 sort of fil 1 5r ncc r.nd formed a united frort g a i n s t \uff1bthe- old ''O-\u2022 pf. If this coo^or. tion \u00a3 ime \u2018:t d\u3057 c trrction of the old po \u2022 cr? out o f co \u201dor interests,\u30eco c\u3057\uff1arnot flrd -nuch signifj c.\uff0cco 5r it from the v 5 . \u4e8c 0 \u5e7f rorld hietory. Very i^irortc.rt it ie, ho\u30ee\u3057v\u3001?r, if it n^ivs or th . cor tr\u00a3 rj the SCVIEI TJi.j.OI\u3001.] r ab\u3057ndoiamc\u30b6t of h:r fornu r design rpr\u3001::\u30a6\uff1a'1 \u3050 rcvplutfoi? throufh co;\u3067 uri:.em, r.nd a .oeificrtion of her ideology ^hich v- ould Ic^.d to hu r- g.rr,ciur 1 trc ns.for^c tior 'nto r t^t \u0302 1 it, rd^m f t r . t c . ^ H h 1 structure si^r l^r to th:: t of GJ \u00ab\uff1a nd \u30c8 \u201d , e \u2022nurt\uff0c-\u3057tch ^uture d. vclopnu. : ritr j^ost cc:rc;fu~\" \"\"y. \uff0c\uff0c\u3001 \uff1ftud\uff1a- tho ur.tt-r .fro\u2019\uff0ct\u3001.c. v\u2019\u3001.\u30de:\uff1a)cr.rt of wo;-Id hlstciy, ^c can t-t t\u0302 c\uff1b frCL-rc time c Iso vicv it fro i \u3057.di\"'f :rc.r:t -iLglc, ^hcuph it 5 s reL: ted to the foregoing. The : 7roim life of humc.n bcirgs sho^c r. corristcnt trend to brosdc n its sco\u0302 -r\uff1b f:r du\uff1a: lly. It If. t . oof.rd zod thrt thj' r i? due r.icJnJ.y to ccovomi.c uoccc^itj'j on tho ot:K;r hi.rd tl\\. tote\uff1a.lite vie-- of life rutursl.l:, must stimulr tc th^ \u00a3 t. nekney. J.\u2022\u3001.\u4e86. \uff01 s intention o^ \"crying an\/eccr.ouii^ bloc of JAP\u4eba\u3089 il'\uff1b K C H U R H , urd CHI\u201d\/.\uff0cG^A;T r s demand for lehc.j-'streiun, r.d ITAIY f e idail of crtc ''v J.rh- ng grc. t e-vriro on the i-icditorrr-loc.n F w ell he at '..ribv.ted to the bl^c c-.urc. As if 1 -ell kror'n, 3 r lIT\/.r: T gcv^ up h. r tr cation\/ 1 pri:rcir>l\uff1b- of fro\u4e8c trade :rd r.t a Drc cedcnt of bloc \u3057cor>o,:_y \u2019\"hu n cortractcd t; c O T ^ v^ Agro, .-'ort. T \"c c- n rcg;- rd bcr, the found, r oi, tb.o ^rirci-^ e of froc. trc do, c.\u0302 hrv^ng ^ cr- cc pe? ] cd b; r ccoro r :t5 c rcccssj ty to dopt in n: rt the , cti.u\" 1 \u3064rirci_nlo of tot..l^ ^\uff1f^\uff1a-i'ni. The fr ct tht t rhA 1 e the \u201drir\u00bbc5_ple of r o\u00b1iJ srlf-dctcrv.iinction upon JV7..\u201d\uff0cm\uff1a ard I T \u6211 PHI\u2022\u3067If? hcrrc];? \uff1f obviously it ir h r r-^.tior:.! stn\u201dtu\u3054c \u201dirl'es bor \u2022porj.tiar c x t r d l y \u201dcrk. If B^IT\uff1a!^ F^ICA, FPJ:. G}' 9 c,nd others virh to \u53e9 . . t h e i r i \u0302r iGHso t;.:cor-c.:ij.c s-olirrc 'wlii cS xa^y them \u3069\":v ,.t \"orcs^rt \u3057njcr\u3001\uff0cirg, is pot. \uff1b-roprr for then ip. .\u5341 i i v c q\u307e a d t\u3001\uff1a ^mcvior. r..cc, rp luf-? r?.or to th. \uff0c should hold r r c\u3064\uff1aon,-:c rph,;rc of_.th-\uff1b z^.o d c Tlic \"hurt!: of a r.cy v or Id carrot \u30c8\u3001r\uff1b p 1.: ?,vd ^.thout this. This, T iovc, is the. immediate t)roblo r a cor f rortirg the \"\"orld. To b:rirg forth this world, ruch idc^.s l c tur:.l rights of mzr, r:.c::J rolf- detcrrain\u3068.tion, a^d sov. rcigr vi^.l-ts of n\u300a.\u5341 ions must bo co2:side^rbly reformed \u3057 t the p-. .at ti^e the so-ci lied h\uff1a. vc n. toors sh?uld ho m-coi r'd to sccrif5cc th\u3054:\u3066c].ve, c . \u2022 To : t \u2022\u30cf1 \u30cb t h e world hi\u5341hr;rto \u2022r.c.s be. r \u2022''.ivj.dcd irto some sixty odd r,i tiors, c. ch r?gj ptir.\u00a3^ unon tho abgolytonose of her roversifn n p F t g ^ wbicFlii s 155 a!D tho obrt.rnction of the growth i re 1 , dove 3 o\u0302 nic n.t of h n w d society ^orc to Roughly, the Do cunv nt No. 1 \u3089 16 6 T . 0 G c c v . . \u3057in\u3001 o r totr.litc ri: n countri . s c\uff1b .n be. a.id to lie in the rrmcdyirg of thir i rrc.tionc. lity. Ir other \u2014ord?, their v-Ilu ic to divide the \u300corld \"-.r:to co:\u2022\u2022\u3064 rcitivdy fcr groups or blocc rr\u30bc T \"ith?r> their ror^octivc rrh\uff1a rer to cr\uff1a. 1 \uff1f o c... ch rr.ee to l e d h. m o t i o n s 1 \u0302 f c\uff1a of cor \u5341.rt\u3001:nt \u3057:nd \u3067'\u3050 c c'. \u2022 In the old cor-c'. D\"t of t-hoTipht, \"thir ir r dr\uff1a c r voTutior . .rd r rli' ^F it c: nrot h,\u3057 r\uff1a- \u0302 'zed thout rr t ctrif: \u2022 oxtcrrivc \u5e7f.r h. s \u3001\u3001\u3066\u30bdrc\u2022\u3057d TB'\"7. \u0302 \u2019 for the\u3066.c t\\ o und \u3057\u4e59.If \u30c7\u30b3 rr, -hjl,. in ... grc:.::.t conflict hi.e co'io into cxirtcrco betWCD the nc y - end the old oorcr?\u3057-rd it ir mor-t likely to ircrc. rc its irtensit\u30de end pccJc. Ho* rr cvur, r Euro^ccr union hi ? 1:\u3057on rdvoc\/ ted c-.monf\uff1a the bcJ?-i?\u3002\u3001rent co^ntri< c of ETJ\u3001\u3066.\u5de7\u3001and in the Oti CRT \u3063IPO there ir \u306f nd for \u30cbD V C T U A' DC.RR T5.on or 1 \u3064.oc. Thus, bcli\u3057vc, future - orlc 1 hirtor\uff1a\/ r i 1 1 n cc rs-. ri?y -nrocccd along \u5341he bovo- rr^mtior.ed coursc.. Ir tho\uff0cight of the ^.forc^cntion^. d p.(.\u30afiir\u3002r s a rhoL\u3001\u3001I f-r cl there if ro ,ncjjd\u201e for hocitr tion in dc t\u3057riiring J.' T T! s ::uturc forrifr policy. In i\uff1a ct, ever sincc JAF\/.i r cmb. rkc-d on her covtin..rt' 1 r>oJ.icy v?* th the \uff1b:.r}churi;..n Incident, h<_r forcigr\u3011 ^oli-.cy k s ^ -c.n rt..Mirhed \/;.r?d to K ck out of or sp..rw from it nor ir- not \u3064\u3001\u3001ridf , Still, the pi\\: r \u3057r?c\u3057 of t*\"o di \u0302 ^crcr.t ovirAor^ 5n J.' T \u2019 T tod: 7 end th\u3001 fi ct th. t thv\uff1a \"orotic rrc he sit: tir-g bct-c en then \uff1f.r tvvly \u3057 v-ondcr of this v.orld. Ho' ever, this Is c tr\u3057rritory Dh\u3057nomcnon \u2022 The i n\u3057 v l t\u3057 i t y of birtoiy crnnot be\uff1a altered by humr.n \uff1b00.'cr. In the lonp run, th t j'hich bound to- \u0302 .T ^ ^T - 1 *! 1 1 - prob. bly k.-open. Ho: over, the do'iiG +ic \u3057nd .foroifr r: tu. tiers :.t -prc.r^nt ^ i\" 1 ! *x)ot \u3001\u201dllo \u30f3 he sit tion :rd. ind. cision \u30cf or long \u2022 r\u3002-:-\uff0c 1 t ur rurr)o:-e th t j - \u0302 rji.ll cucc. . d \u2019*n h\u3057r rc-\u3057 iifnv rt j:ith trcrd of jniftoiy, :;nd confid r thu \u3063 y rhich J,:.\uff0c.:.\u30c9 1 f \u30c7\"u\u5341ur\u3057 for' ign pol icy should follov- . Then, there should o:\" r.ovv^i \"*\u3001c no chaiif.G in her for\u3057igr policy T^hich c imr rt th\u3057 crt.: b\"' iv^hn rt of \u5341he nc- order ir Fi.st \/\u2022\u5382\u30a8\u5e7f. Ho r ov r, it poos? without rrying thr t the m i i ^ t to e\u3053riy thir out r. cnir, \u0302 ^r \u3014 vig-or ::.nd rlrc rity. ri The plrr\u3057so fI thc rev order ir> Er ft \u2018 \uff1a-1: v vie\uff0c\u2022\u3093d from the etf rd^oint of the Tiber\uff1a 1 clcmcntr- in the m.tior i s i?\u4e00ducd e. trouble ?o c He rc \u3057\uff0cthev xrv to :.voicT thir ox-Turr^ or \u3057 p much vs rx>pgib3 e \u2022 Foreign \u201dcr crp of the old order t* r\uff1a ( vviy o^rorturity to cr^ticizc c nd ortr* cizc n thc ncv: order in C\u4e86\u4e86\u30a8\u2022\u30d1 !t . rnd^ r prcv^, rt dom- \u2014tic circus^ti rcc e, it ie quito \"oo c :rib]\u3057 th\uff1a t this for-.igr nd do.\u2019\u3001.\u5e7ftic m? cchicf-making \u2026i\uff0cl ru.ee. d. ^c vc rtholcrF, hirtory ir r .1 \u3058ntl.\u3066rly \u201droc.\u3066 dirg* \u3015.t\u3050 o r r fi xcc 1 conrrc. \u3001 The coopcr\uff1a tion \u30c8\u30b5\u3066\u3001.n Jy 'GER : T.Y,\u3057 nd IT\/.IY, ch farmed to hc.vc m, t_^ith c hi.tch .tiSnor\u2014ril^ \uff1a 1 cxirts L.r 1. rolc.mn f c t ir the v orld of tode'v, ro m\uff1b .tt,r ' hcth\uff1b.r it h t r ..r t-'ken tho for ! of \u3054n :.]li: ncc or r?ot. The .\"Ivsro-G. r \/.i .n p t ct did rot T'cc.ker. thir t >>ut, or the cortr:.ry, Document No. 1616 Page No. 7 helped strengthen rrd Je^oan^ e interne.tioral poc ? tion har become aore secure. It is l:.r'o\uff0c.\uff1an th:, J the iec ,tion of JAPf.N once rumored abroad and vhich Japanese peop] themrelves \uff1a ere concerned about \u53eff.s after all nothiDg but the result of ar iniper:\u0302 ect gre.cv of the l&rr of history t.rd a Tac> of confidence. Therefore, rot on 1 2 r \u3066 it i necesrarv for J \"AN to chanre any of her program for estt.blish:' vs the nev order \uff1f m E&pt ' TIA 7 hut row she need not he?: tc'te in expc ndinf\uff1a completing thorn, The ne.F order of Es.rt \u30ba\u30d9 : IA ic lir'.ed Fith the nev\uff1a order of the T orld. The. ner order cannot be realised *.n thj 3 Dart of the -orld alone, if the .nart of the vo^ld adherer to the. id order, or goes hack ir. the op-oofite direction. It \u3073\u3089\u201df tb,, t JA P AF Is p o i\uff0c t o v^ithdra^ utterly from the problems of FT:.:\u2018.;IY: ahi \u4e28\u30d6\uff09e effo-t-' to ret\u5341,le the C rT Jl. Ir.cidert. Unable to understand e.r.d ex lain corrcctly the r]e rT phenomena\uff0c:Mch cron up one after another throughout EiHOPI., she di; '::n.rcod then ^itb the ri.pfle coniment \"Complicated e.rd inco] rchensi\u2022\u535c\u3001le r \u2022 Thi? amountF to ncthir^ more then seeking refuge ir the iciu-lc r but co nmon r-oli 07 of devoting herself i.\" the future entirely to the \u201drobleni of C- JTJ\u3001. \u2022 Ho T T ovor, the preFer-t sr\u2022\u5341\"ir.tion of the vorld does 1 ot permit ruch ar evasion, Problems of - \u3001 e IA are inevitc*. blv tho?e of FU.iOPE and AJ;' RICA. A bold ar\/Fbrave foreigr policy for ne\u65bc J\/PAN shou3d fco entaol]\u2022\u3067hed in a dignified marijier end should dispicy unders--te.nd.irg of the torrrtiori\u00a3.l politi ccl sitiu tior rhich ic now r\u30cbt a turrtinf:-poi.rt ir \\ orld 1 tory. Document No. 1616 Page Nc. L, II THE EUROPE\" M m.R ard The \uff1b-ttn tudc of JI-\u0302 l.V In udclreFs in Ncvwiub r, 1939 DocTUicnt No. 1616 Page No, 9 Before I \u201d er't to I r : \uff1b LY, every one in J7:.P\/.N tu^' cd of tote J itcriani^m crci of r.r crti-co-idrt' rn r.xir \u2022\u803d\u3072ry neonle thought th\u3068 t the re- let: onship anorg J\/\uff0c\/.\u3066.,G.\u98de\uff1fT Lr.d IT'VI d:d not erd ir the i nti-Co' irter\uff1a' Pact, but th; t thir tcL'tionph^ id t;ou.1cI bo further rtrcrgthcnod. One of tho v a sor c ir probably thr. t the Decrp\u4e04e themrelver keenly felt, in the l?ght of prcrcrt int rn\u3014 tior\u4e04.1 rc 1' t^ onr, tht.t tho settlcnent of the CHII.U. Incidcrt \u2022 onn.d o, 'c much to GIRVll\uff1a ar.d IT\/ JY. Before I \u3066 cr.t rfcrOc d, T obrcrv( d \u3057 r\uff1a thcr ' d o r p r c a d feeling anorg the pcodIc thc.t it rov]d, the r for'.\uff0c be ,\u4eba]]i:\" this \u3057nti-Co\u2022\u30d1ricrn r o L tior^hir \".ore further developed \uff1f.r:to \u3057 t?.ilit,.ry t H i t r.ce. I s rogrrdr the concl-upior of \u3057 generally uncorc^ t5or\/1 milit. r^ r\uff1a \u0302 1 larce of \u2022\u4e86\u4eba?\/: \uff0c \u2022\uff1a. IT, ar.d IT\/LY, i t d , f?ritcTy recogDizcd the t J h e people j r- general dor ire d ai ir.rco,the type of c.llic.r.ce beirg a sccond- ry ^cXttr. Thereupon,\u30a8 le^'t for IT\/.LY with the thought of d\u3002'ir.g my huuifclc bc rt ir this m\uff1a ttL.r. J. F, ho. ever, ^cc^od to c\u0302- ;or the ^ttl o^icrt o\u2022\u30de tho CHJ^V Incidcr-t by coopcr, tirg \u201dith BRj T 7' r . Such\u3001(^ g the attitude of JilPAK, C T R ,\uff1b PY i.rd IT\uff1b T Y beg^n to mi?trust J - o n thir Point und, If irx\uff1a!!\u0302 >ivinp ur_Ji\uff0c\/\u3001\u2022 cnt \u3057s fc.r r,r the \u3067:'S\u3007-\u95e8\uff1a\u5403\u5e7b 1 Mor-\/ ggrersion ^c ct. s there is not err .\u0302 h time tn cxvlcir ir detail the cir-cunirferxes.i^hich led th\u3001\u201d \u3088\u8fbd thi\u306b T r t y - :.nd r.r H\u3075l\u3014o\u4e00 r :( sonpi^hat inr)rov>. r to r-nlcc the > c.,11 frankly \u30a7\u3058\u2022. to omit t h\u3063 r ^ r U Ho-\"ever, I ccn ci p firrn hcr^ the irdirouti blc f ; ct th. t J; - \u3001.\u201d T -as rcrhc \u0302 s roeporsiblc c.r.d choul d ir.dulpo in intros'occtior for the coirr?e vhich led to corclurior of the \u30d5U c S0-C-E?.i\u3072.i T rcrrior. ^ ct, It isxcrorc.].;y corfiid.md th^t G? \uff1b ; Y bctr:.jcd Qrd is, troLciiorouc, but in ny o\u304cnion y neither K t r ^ y e d J'^'N nor T'c'.s gu lty of trc^chcry. Considering the circumrt, rccs locding to her c.ction, - ,c ci.nnot \uff1f rc Ce ll FY tror cherouc. Vorcov\uff1b r , Gcrrne.ny allied herself \u2014itli t.hc ..IET \u4e240:.\uff0c\u30dfor:ti,\u3053ry\u2014HJ^u\u536birit of the Ixiti-Gouiir.tcrr F ct \u2022 hich turc ] ly roc. ncd nituclly . dvaritagcou? to both JAP\/F und herself. Furthcraorc, rircc thip c step ncrrcr to an tl\" 1 i, rcc \u3057rd not c. nu-ru non-c.\u00a3^rc6sion trer.ty, it see^r pc-nriblc thc.t G.::2i'ri rt s fuelir.f tcr , rd J P. '. T -ill h e c ^ cool. Kovevor, the truth ir quite the ot> o-:ite,\" 1 c. n rtr tc r? an i,\"?\uff1a- olute fret th\u201ct Q.\u4e01:.\/ KL, ir rpite of he r clli^rce \u201dith tb\u4e09JJ\u30f3:. \uff1a \u5e7f\u30ea is rou still off- ring J; her fricrdrhip c? prol'ound \u2022\uff1a. s ever. Of cour.^o ITALY hz.s no rcc ton to ch\u3053:ngG her feeling to r i rdr\" JA- ' She \uff1ftill fcolr z.\u20ac oxcecdir.gly friendly r:.s ev\uff1a r , Horoovcr, the. r- 1; tion bLt T . ecn IT'JI crd Q-'E \u0302 \uff1f' irj:Qt\u300dt 1 vc ted thi? ^hn-' ggrc\uff1a r rion Pe ct. The feet ir th t I'7J-Y preferred a Gr\u30d9.\u2022\u5382MJ\u2022\u3072.\u2022 r;.pproch^i.nt, and Document No. 1616 No. 10 had hitherto beer- reco-^ending it to GERMANY. The J A P \/ 4 F - G J 1 ; :\u300c\u306b.. A x i s , therefore, has not really undergone a change even today. However, JAP\/T seem? to think GFTT'iAN^ in son?e rev betrayed her, and tb:t the IrtterVs alliance with the 50VIFT TUT\uff1aOH is suspect. In viev r of the 5rternato\" onal\u300ctuation in wh^ ch J\u2022\u30cf\uff1fAN stands today, and fro .a practical nece\u5de7ity, it is de^ir^ble tir.t, JAPAN cooperate r.ith GJiJfeiK? and also go hand in hand rith IT\u30d6 Ty. Horever, tbe general sentiment of JAPAN seems to be that she cannot ag&in Dut . out her once-rejected hand to Gn.J.FY. Neverthelew^s, the biaa of JAPAN, is such thtt the relationship between JAPAN ? G E P i S M an^ ITAI.Y can be brought back again to the past not orJy \u2022>r\u00bb form but ir fact. The .R. \uff1fact, coi:eluded in this way, is rot due to i]l vrii 1 against JAPAN and GE* W \/ alone must not be denounced for a betrayer. Then, I \u30e3eel 9'e mift corsidfr cooly vhetber the conclusion of this RU^SO-Gi'RMAN Pact is advantageous to JAPAN or not. The first fruit of the GL .\u4e04NY-TJ\u2022\uff1f \u2022\u3014\u2018\u2022\u3066 Pact is the current B^ITIPH- F \u80a5\u3001!GH War against GF^MAPY. If the fE^ANY-U.f .r\uff1a .R, Pact he A not been oor.cluded, C\u2019r:\u6230\u30b3 7 Y would probably not teve adopted such a strong policy. It may he said thc t the GEFM\/ Pact \u5de7:. s a direct :'.r?centive to this var . \u30a8 do not \"blind\u30cb\uff1b7 consider the present rar in EUROPF c.s being a divine tempest or pro^rldential hel'f for JAPAN. However, I fir^ily b.e 1 ieve thc.t the fact the.t(\"this wer has broker out cag. be developed in favour of Ji\u3001\u3067\/..N according to her aims ar-d Dolic?ue\u00a3 \u2022 Further, it vt s federally he!loved that rith the conclusion of the RITSSO-C^'.\/^.N Pact, the U.\"L.\u7ce7\u201d\u3057\u30141 be able to turn all her energies towards the F'R EA-T since she voxxld feel secure in the ^est, and, consequently, rould be more sub;]ected to her pre?sure^ However, we find the fs'cts to be thr contrc.ry. The U . r , '1. at present desires to adjust the relrtnotiw^hiD bet^^een herself J'^P\/y. In fe.ct, the NOMOKHAN Ceaso-Fire \u2018\u2018gree\u0302 ient has already been concluded. It see^s that on sue\u30c8 matter? as the deli-nVtction of the border, or b. no T \"\" commercial treaty, or the problem of concessions, the ne^ otia\"6Ion\u00a3 aro progressing steadily. In one or another, re can recognize the fact that the sentiment of the U \u30d0 i s becorr*ng favourable torerds J \uff1b Pi H. In all likelihood, they i.ve ever ready- to corcTucte a nOn\u2014aggress ion treaty, if Jf.?l\uff1a^ wishes to do so. It is r.17 strong be J ief thrt she is even prepared to stop her assi, c tance to CHINA and the C H U G KM-^KF- regime. * 'It present, they cre trying to Docuiaent 1616 ?t\\ge No, 11 separeito the National Party &nd the\uff1b CHI^EfE Communist Party. It soems to -ne thr t tho .R. lost hope in CHL\/^ T G Kf I- r:EEY and her effort to feparr.tc them is for the purpose of preventing the CHJfTEcE Communist Pcrty from becomir.-g inv lved \uff1f n the ctenger of a co'imon ruin with the National Pt.rty, If it be true, hero arises the importart fact that\uff0cc.s e. result of the conclusion of the nTJSSO-'E'^^F Pc,ct, the relations betrcon J'APAN and the U.^ \u2022\" .R. h^ve been improved. From thi s point of view, \u30a8 feel the conclusion of the OJGSO-GKR\u4e01':iF Pact is definitely not dis- advantr. eons to J\/ P \/1 T . Furthermore,\u30a8 think\u30bf various a^wirtcges will probrbl.y accrue to J\/ from this rclf.it ion shir?. For Tr^-ferce, \u00a3s a rosvJ.t of the r betreen Qm^rN\uff1a, and BRIT\uff1b IF' and IT\u4e28\/.?:CE\uff0cdue to the conclusion of tho HTTSSO-CERMAN fTOlv-Aggression P'ict, BRITAIN todcy ccnnot support CIIIAKG KAI- C HEK and exert pressure on JjTJ}\uff1a^. In short, the disappearance of the U.-S-\uff1a .R. ! s pressure tes grcc.tly relieved jA\u30d5\/N. Tnc position of JI.VI-N has boco^.e stable. Consequertly, re can say that BRITAIN is at hor wit^s end. The s\u3057p!e thing iay be scid about \/W1RICA\uff0cI think. \/r-ERIC A ; is nou very anxious c bout JAPAN'vS rapprochemcnt Fith the U. c .S.'\"l^ With BRITAIN,,\u817f:EC;, elwajrs hopes for deterioration o\u30cf rolrtiqns. This is because she fears JA^LlVs Dositioi)\u2018 in the FIR E\uff1b5'T v:ill be strengthened. If J\/J^IJ were to fight with the U . c . f . she v r ould he.vo to relax her cortrol of construction in C T T I ^ \/ T h e y \"Tiope that JilP\/ N villi find It nccessar\uff1a\/ to give up GFI\u30c9\/\u2022 The Possibility \uff01 of r\uff1a coiimropiisc between J\/. p f'N r?.nd the FOVIFT U W Q N is truly armoying to them. The rcc.son \u30d6..\u30cfE\u3055IGA suddenly rccognizod the U.?. after sixteen ycc.rs ? rcfiisol is this: After the outbreak of the. Incident, JAPiiN vrould not listen to AMERIC\/ in every matter, and\uff0c moreover, \/ i 'M'x 1ICA can do hf.rd3.j anything to J\/^\/N, The is the only country rithin roc..ch of JA^AN. Therefore, AME3IC\/ adopted a policj- of lending money, supplying materials, and furnishing technical exports to the U.F.f.S, in order to make her powerful so that I^miG\uff1a could o wess J7.?AF. The cbove \"oolicy has worked successfully, c.nd the tels. tion betvecn Ji PAN and the U.S^S.R. has boon aggravated until todry. \u00b0ince JAPAN, has ur) to noY\uff1b been exhausting her n:- tional strength in the CHJ ?,T A Incident ard her re\u4e04\u3053ti\u77f3ns with the SuVIET UNION are strained. v r \u00a3.r may come at c.nj tirne_. BlilKII^s attitude to7.\u300crrds JAPAN is as firm c.s ever. If, in addition, ^ \u2019 : \u2018 : \u30a8 0 ? , should press it is thought thr.t JT^AH would be entirely dcferteci. It \\ms due to such ideas thf.t \/.MERJ.GA abandoned the Commercial Treaty\u2022 Document I'o\u00bb Iblb P^go Fo c \u4e04 Ho\" ever, if J.\\.?AIT sccuro in h\uff1a r :*cL^tions v:ith the U.S.S.E., even the abanctonricnt of the Commercial Treaty rould not cruse her to the slightest heed. \/^FIJCA must regret rov* thc.t hg-r trick proved disamointing^ Therefore, she is greatly concerned rbout the Doesibi^ity of conclusion of a non-r.ggrcssion tr\u3057:,ty betv. T ecn J.APAN r.nd the IT. :\uff1b . c , when their rclr.tionshir) improves, and she desires to prevent it one r;ry or \u3053r:othcr. \/1 present, as the public opinion of JJ.-fni is not yr.t perfectly unitod in thrt respect, AMEBIC\/ thinks the t hj; tc.I-Ing \u3053..rc thcr firm' stcnd 9 JA^-N may pive up her rclcti onship lith th^TJ.f .jS.l.., .so. -SRJC.?. will prob hlj follor the t course. Thereafter, .^ERIC\/ rill contiruo to show such an attitude for a wha\u4e04\u2022 i'n the C o i m i r r c i c t y e.nd ir. the CPU TV. Incid .nt. Hovcvr.r, -e nvu^t not thoughtlessly bo taken in by thrt; rh^t\uff1a:vcr \u3053ttit\u201ddc thc; r majr take, vc need -ot fr;c,v. r: c sh^-uld crrry nut our \u30cfo\u4e04:icy Irdo^ r)dcni:ly # Thus, JAPAN 1 s present dip]oi\u30eb.tic 'oosition in the T*orld ir being r h o U y i^roved^ no anxi.\u2018:ty if felt t orGScrt in rcpr rd to the U.S.S.U., r.nd the pressure fro,a 3'U^TF\" and the tTHTED ' r T. r TF? is diminishing\u2022 In \u3057-'ord,\u30dec ove this to the BJJSSO-GFmil^ Treaty. For l.3.1 thct, there prevail expressions and fecllnf-e among J,.Pf.K\"\" r E people to the effect thr t GE^. i;.NY is susDcct for shewing hards with the TJ, \u2022 \u2022 I. \u0302 thrt G..\u0302 7- 1 ! is being dragged \u3057roiind \u2014\"by the V .todc-y t nd thi't should the T :C.r be i^rolonpod, GFI&LM v:ould be beaten for l\u00a3,ck of.rn -ncy. I think this rjuet bo qrite disagreeable to G'P^l'M. At any rato ; such a\u2018 vaj of thinking hes dr r k m e d the p\u3053th JI Pi{ \u0302 should U.ke in the future. It is bece.usc thejr r.re thus b: sicrlly wrong in their thinking, th\u3057 t they do not kno^ 7 irhr.t to do. In the first vlo.co, ivgcrding the events lending to the conclusion of the \"UJ\u0302fO-GL\uff1b\u30d1.\u3075.\u3010\u4e86 r act, \u201d.c must not only take mcny of the, conditions . of G\"\". int\u2022\u2022 consideration, but from the w i n t of vicr of - T orld history, the coopcr:.. tion b:\u308f\u201deon cvd the U.\u3078. C V':\u201c ne-ccsr:: ry < nd this would he ve boun eimil^..r]y c.chicvcd, I thi nk, even if cry allii rce among J\/P\/ F, G\u30deU v. NY and T U U hr.d been concludcd. JL r 'AN, cs \uff1a. c r \uff1b r o u l d hrvc done so., Fur th- m o r e , this is not : n i so step, for aft. r concluding a Ji\u0302 \/J'T\u4e00GE'\u0302 M\/NY-IT.\u30cfJ.Y Allir.ncc, could further cooper tc rith the U. - .S.R. I believe it proper thc t \u98de-.c confront the \uff1f >\"'VI\uff1a' T rith the- r>o:\u201d\uff0ccr of three c our trie? rr)d go op urate v\u0302 i th h. .r under udvantcgcons conditions for Ji':\u3078\u201d\u3057 i.nd ITA1Y, rospoctivoly. . Jit the beginning of JuTy^ 1939\u30ea\u30a8 definitely submitted the above opinion to tho Govcrnnicnt \u2022 Docuiacnt Ncu l6lo , ^c.go No. 13 In Pl^r 4 , It is no :..\uff0cdcr th\/..t the RUSSO-Cmi:\u4e01 ^>act t\u3067.s corcludod, vo \u2022\u2022-.nist not blr \u0302\uff1a\uff1b fcr thf..t. As I h\u3057vc just mentioiiGd, it tes rorked to greet c.dv\/nttpc for JI.^LtL Therefore, JAPAN has no rorsori to feel diss; tisficd uith G F H I think ro \u30b3ust not forge t the good rill rho^rj to J\uff1b\uff1f;K by G E ^ V N Y and othors during the OKI 7. Incident. Of coiirsc. \"under pr:tcnt intern?\uff1a-1^'om 1 rolatlnr.sbips, the J,\u5369\u2019\u4ea7\uff1f\u4e01ESE \u2022people\uff1b nust r>ot \"b\u3044 so rr.ivc as to be vainly sTTiyud by sentiment. I l not r nsipting th:..t just boc^usc and ITALY ucrc nicc t? us dnving the CHJ\"7. Incident, should he deeply moved by it end rcocy 'i:i'icm ho v :rVv-.r d?\u2022\u3067\uff0cdvLrt^gcoup it \u2022\u2019ight be to J'.^M. Forever, tmdor the iorr-scrt inte rn\u3057tj on.\u3069.1 condi tioriF, if such totr litarian countries \u30cb\uff1f \u00a9 : IVY^ IT;i,Y ; \u3054\u4e28nd others aro tryir.g to crush th^\"\"oldT^orld \"rdcr _ i.'d \u3066,.oiretract a r\\ev one, i.erc defeated by th(. doTnocr;vtic countries of B\u3082\u4e01\uff01 1?:\uff0cjU?\u3066!.CA\uff0c ard FR\" \uff01: 7 CE T:hich tvyir^ to'-i\u00a3,intt.in t, 0 present corditioD of the r\u3002rld\uff0c r :h'- t \u3066:ou\uff0c.d \u30c8 c\u3063ne of J\uff1b r AN? I rant you \"t'\u3001consider this point \u2022\u201d\u2022:\u3001 would he\u3066\u306eui if J\/^AF \uff01r d ^lrvcd for the so.ko. of the dc noCr. tic countri^r to destroy the totalit. rir.r. n-: tiors, c.nd if the ! old r>0' crs of dj ocr.-.cy hr d. conu to do^iin-'te the v r orld c To the eye? of EHTT?r:, the UT1TED T K , ard others, Ji'^N, today, is a ^rcpod n^t i{\uff1bviov t\u30cf ar.d ITALY, and is considered c.s c.n j^ggros^or, thf.^vin the result will not bo cs \u2018 simple i.s .th-.t,of t!:o li.^t C c n f c r c n c c .\u30a8\u803b sure thc.t they -ould (force J\/TxJ T to ^ithdrar hc.r rrrry from CH\u4e01\u5de7\uff0cto r e t u r n ' H d , fvrihormTi^ W rot out of WhiilA arid . 1 JUjiss\uff1a ^'ould probo.blv oven insict thrt bcT surk off 0\u3068EI\u3086 lFlr.nd\uff1b Such i * ? \u4e00 - \u2014 . \u201c .rd jrt V V \u3064 . \u53c8 c \\ Ho- uvcr, if OE :i\/lA?IY really ir \u201drr.blc to def\u3057&t B ^ I T\uff1b. a n d FPu FCE, it if need]\u3057ps \"to sr.y thr.t JAPAN muet think tho ri'.t^er over acct)iy. It 'Oi.-ild be urf'irtunr.tt\uff1b, but irre cannot support those rho arc destined \"lEo be aci'jc.xoa. He .:v(..r\uff0cas for my forocrrt on th-i f ---r r, I cmn.ot bc;liovG thrt G V \u7336 I T Fill be bcr ten .-.rain this tine. In the first pL.cc\uff0c\u3066111 Gf +.V\/.FY continue this rr.r by h\u2022\uff0crclf to the lest? No, TT\/TI prill join tho_v\/\uff1b. r, f.nd, I c.r\u2019i quite rare, on the side of GI 7 :.\u3054.\u30cf\uff1a. Bt.sides, her relations T.i.th the U.5.S. U r.rc not es v;c-..k and unccrtr.in as people thirlc, ai)d th SOVIET doubtlc.FP rill in pn.ct.ico f>ivc -.-orttehijk rfsistc-rsce ta...hor, over. \u2018 i'thput cl*.clc.rirr. vrc.r. In tho preeont situation, such rrutral countraf;8 n.e the .rl.Il nrc-fcr to tc.kc jthe side of GF'iM\/.NZ after all. Might not others such \u00a3:S Tin\/EI, cocrccd \u6caa tho Joint forces of GEKiifn, ITALI end the U\u4e28\u2022\uff1f\uff1ai. Ic 6sir- nged f'ror\uff1a\uff1a fentil^ end P ^ W f i ^ S?\/IN Fill c.1fo side rith GERMAN\uff1b I Document No. 1616 \u30cb\u30ecg:.: \uff01\uff1a\u3063\u2022 1 \u2019 1 \u2018 I.T r \u30cb L-.t. r3 I believe. In short, quite cor)tr\u30cbrj\u5c38 to \u2018 . . - - .r. : r,\u3064r. v scy th \u3053 t no countiy rill bo r-n ally -f E ill'\uff1a 11\uff1a ai.d x'\u2022\u2022\u3057:\u2022 ^ Q \u00a3 I M people r.ro quick c.t bus^ncs\u00a3 > tliq s m l l countries in Ml fTE L.TQ very sensitive to the povcr of \"L.rg\u3057 UF^OPR\" corintrios or to tho tones \u3053rd ::iovci!icnts of the big po^ orr, so thr\u00bbt thr.ir cttitud^s cf.v be the hi romc-tor of the reel .\u30c8\u201d U 5 \u3073 of B ' F , \/\"GEp C N Y and I T \/ J Y : The ^orc\uff1b f-ct thr\u4e04 ' r u.ll F :\u3001CP?AIT c\u3064\uff01:ntricr arc \u30cfbsurvir)\u8272 ci rtrict neutrality, contrary \"I \u3064 t.lx ti e- of the. laft rar, i\"1 lurtrc.tcr th c diecAvi rtc^c of BRITAIN F X \" GE. \/\u2022oreovcr, tbir tine contrary to the pr-. vious ti-ic, is .\uff1avoiding exl^.u^ion c.s nuch as t)ossiblor It ir i\uff0c\", three months f5.hcg the ^utbi'rrjc of tho vjcr, and she has not ^et or\u2022 gaged in ^hat night bo callGd \u3058 t:cr of attrition. This ic dul t^ the SJSGPRIED Line. Shutting thens: lvcs up in thct fortress, the Gcr\uff1b^ ns have pn clt.stic DGv\u00b0ition; th\u3053.t is , vhonuvrr tho hi ttle is pr.\u30cf\u201ciising\uff0c th'y emerge, but if not, they oor-frort tholr .^neny fron their fortrces grrris^n \u201dithout usir.g up c.ny nvt<. rials, no irttcr hor nonths and ycr. rs it nay t\u00a3.ke# L\u3067\u3067\u3057owr, the\uff1a b. ck routes of food ruirjJy arc quite un- rcrtrict d todr^y, thrt I f , the b\u3057ckyr rd bes boon cnlcrgod, B\u00ab sides, tho matv.r:\uff1a Is vrof-^rvLd by ^ thir tine c.rc quit\u3057 c. groc.t deal . . ^ I L . r i ^ \u2014 \u2022 A i U i ^ time,. She also hes a good stock ^ munitions She is not t oukened \u3053.rd she has nany more \uff1fuoply routes the n tino. Ill the -c thj ngs r.rc rdvmtr.ecous to her \u2022 \/ .Ifo , h'::\u3067 political and conr^r.ilc \uff1fti^ucturc\uff1b \u3064ost puit.\u3053b\u3011c to a prolonp'cd rc-r, She is quite ^\u2022-\u2022rfident \u30cff victory whether it be in a rTar of nerver or of ordurancc. Ir r.dditijr. to all these, th\u30cf gror t development of her air forces \u3057 r\u3044 - . r c r t r i o t r the action of tho BRITISH nav\u2022\u3057 1 dot-or. ^o'rcrr of subtle rint.s - rc also grcc tly inprovod \u2022 It \u201drust be ^oi ntcd nut thc.t the old nc.vy jb no more irvinciblo 3 n pre sort-day EU 'OPE. If IT.^TY then ^T'\/..I!7 should join the i:ar, it \u30c9\/ould be a serious affrir for B a?\/JT, There vould bo gra:.t d.\u3053\u201dngcr nf her ciefcc.t not onHy in tho ^orc cndnr::.rcc. c ^''.to^t, but alro in tl' c actual y:ct\u2022 Under such circunrt^ncos, C M J ^ ? todcy T\/ill never b o defeated^ cvc.r. \\md:.r the '\"^r^tjnos^iblo conditions. Thcrcfo\"rr, ^c rccich the conclusion the t th\u3001:r..j vili ro g.ro\u3014 t danger, if today, docs ph\u3050\u3001\u2019-:good-;vill to GJ\":\u3076...:and fights or hor siac\uff1a. Furthormoro, if the couniTiog frr.r are trying to c\\ c Lr..blish \u00a3\uff1b now order in KUH\u30cfPE should not b-. able tq_vdn, it y'ould be impossible for the J \/ . H E P E people to construct a n\u3057!\uff1f order ir.\u53b6&\u30a8\u53b6\uff0cGenerally \uff1fpoakirg, the old ^rder in H F ; r.nd AriA is rcprc^or.tod by B.lTTiJN end \uff1f3J VCE. I f the countries Dcciincnt Nc, I 6 l 6 Pago No. 15 that r.re ordcc.vourir.g to naintc.in thir old ord\"-r carnot be dcfcr.tod f \u3057 o r d - r c - n n r t fco ert: ,blidi;d either ^r. tho Occidcrt or in the Orient. J\/\u3081\/\u4e86 7 , GF1 7NY ard IT:\"Y arc e.ll countric? v:ho?c m f ? i o n it is to build in cocpcra.tion the hot; rorld order. Even without cor\uff1aeluding a treaty, the a in of the three r>rr''..,rs is one\u00ab. The used to say, uBy no ncuns d \u3002 ; c ask for J I^ IV to co i\u0302ie ard help us ir. >J T R(PE. She\uff1a has her or:n mission to cariy out # Her ofcligr.tion t\u3002\u3068\u2022 trot ty vculd be d? pchargcd u\u0302 j deftroy-'rg tho old ord . r and ostr.bHshing a nov; or.o in t'TA. ^urging Br: tirh r)0'\"\u00ab. r fro r n ' c IA by r.ny is actually rh..t \u201d\uff0ce -ould cxpoct fron J:\\PI.V. as her duty in thir Treaty. Wc require rothin^ aorc\uff1a thar that . \" Le lorf i.e t-'i. F carrics out ihc.t obligr ti^.n, thr.ro ip r \u3001 \u3067 r o need IV'r an aTn.aij(jt i ^ l T o lilo a T H e F ^ r to fight solely for the crtr.n .istacnt of \u3053 nc\u5e7f ^rder in !\\ c IA and rruf? on tor\/crdf\uff1a tho rct-Gloracrt of thc\u3001CTTIf,',: Incident ^ith a fir\u306e r^rolvc rover to coupr\u2022'\u3084\u3011isc vith the old po: r .ere or rarjikc c^nccssior-s to thcr\u3057 Document No. l6l6 Page l6\u201e This is to 7\/it, the oosition of JAPAN and the duty of JAPA.N whether or net GEE T T ANY and JkPMi conclude an allisncs. 'We need not involve ourselves in the war in E U R O P E . J a p a n 1 s pushing for- ward. to 3 solution in the true sense of the word of the CHINA Incident w i l l result in her helping GERM\u4e45NY\u3002 Purthermors, what QEJHkNY is doing at present will in effect aid in the se.t^iecen\u30e2 of the CM TIC Tncideni:\u3002 At present no one in J^PAF h\u3002s any ob.iso- tlcn\u30b3 to the establishment of 3 new crder in ^ 1ST \u3093SI\/\u3057 Thorefo \u3066 be Licv?-\u30d2[-\u306e only ne csssnry and adoqi^n ta policy Is for J\/IP.'J? to exert hsr utmost to carry it out successfully by embracing it and insisting upon it c However h,?.rd she raay exert herself for the establishment of new order in CHII^, there is a limit ta. I 1 P M ' s p.c\u00aeer. She has engnged in a war of attrition in the CHIN\/V Incident for more than two years now. J1P4N must avnlrt as \u6293\u2026\u308c cossiblft the waging \\ of an even ^ r g e r smle. w a r , in ordsr to consarve h~-r national S\u00bb resources an- 1 - to make. provisions f'cr the great efforts to coir,3, J Furthermore, I think that only in a war witB' the\"SOVIET tTMION wil.3 J\/IPA.N be liable to a wpr of at^ritioru Moreover, the F.S .S .R. wants to compromise with and \\va3n her hands of the F\u5902R EASTc T\u76caere is an oD^ortunitY for her ag-ain to tfike pi.rt .ia.EUS.QPE- A chance nas coma for tier \u4e47 o play an active pnrt to the w e s t and sot. of EUROPE. Under these circ-\"u\u5566tances 5 it is ridiculous for har tc be hostile with and keep lar.ge \u00a3oiiaes. in the F.\\R 5 A S T . She hopes, therefore ? to conclude imiredlately a non-aggression Treaty or the like, and withdraw^ For JAP.!VN, ii: is m excellent foreign policy which should be begun first of a l l . To set the U.S.S.R, at easg in the F\/iH E\/VST w i l l be a great factor, I believe, to make the EUROPEAN W a r more active. T:ie T. T . S . S . Ii \u201e . \u201d'ith the fores to be \u2022\uff1bithdr^v\/n from the F lR E\\GT, v\u0302 .'if emerge in the NEAR .EAST or the E E H 3 T O ' GULF, g^obafely G^H 7 IkWI expects it and the U 4 S . 3 h o p e s , for it. lurtherinore^ it would \u4e00\u2018 I. In such a case, G'^MAWii! would ! e e l ie a great menace t a B\u00a3ITaIN. secure and IT\\LY might .join the war earlier than we expected at first. Thas the w^r \uff1f:oiild become a reRi one. However, as the sittiation stands now, when nsither (F:R:\u2018:ANY nor the U.3.S.R. can exert thsinselves sufficiently in EUROPE, IT;\\LY w i l l remain neutral for the time b e i n g . A.nd some d a y , if 1 and when finds out tla.it. th\u00ae claa\u00abce&, of winrxing are pgainst Ixar\uff0c sKe might rirobably propose Da^c,^,. to tfiie present d a y 2 hns always \"be\u30e2n prc-pnre\u4e92\u2014for such^a , \"\"JhlTig\", '.f&ey, if \u4e03 h e war sfiould n.:.t continue to the last, ana if it slir.uld end in recv.nf\u00bbn T lation\u00ab _an international conference w o u l d , be sure to ne held. J1F.O would ta\"ke cnrFT.!! I'D., and the CITS Document Wo. l6l6 P?.gs 17. vmiild^-tCLQ^. If in JilPAN' s policy to^ird GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED T..\\T?]S, she neither compromises nor cooperates, and in her policy toward GEFJ7VNY, ITALY and the IT.S.S .R., she does not make concessions,\u30dend \\f she follows the so-cnlled independent no! icy m d makes no friends, J^.PiN\" will be\" completely 1 sola ted in \\nis peace conference. Although we do not know w h s n such peace will come, there is jiojg^r without reconciliation. W a l s o do not know whether peace w i l l come early or late, bjat it may come soqn,er than we expect. It unjr end in a draw without srrrender on either .g.ide. In that case, if J,\\P\\N isolated, the problems of ths East w i l l be sacrificed and the settlement of problems of other are^s will be ^Uispmpli shed in the sacrij-ice of .\\SIL. Therefore, I think that today we should not affirm the\" autonomous policy of JfiPAN' s diplomacy or press forward in the CHINA Incident, but should first of all readjust relations w i t h G H K Y and IT.1LY and build friendl. ralations_v^ith the U.S.S.B. Moreover, there is neither dnngsr nor ^3s\"eHTfity for JfVP\\N by so doing. It is my firm ronvictlon that by thir,\u30bbhe rood to achisveirent of our mission of establishing the new order in \"SiVST \/ISL\\ will be opened. There are many things which confirm my conclusion, but hav- ing no time to explain them in detail, I shall omit them. In fine, the SOVTET-G^PJ'^IN coalition his been -chieved. Accordingly, since the European War has broken out, it is certain that JAPilN' s international position h? s be coma very advantageous, nnd it would improve increasingly if only the government does not p.dont wrong policy. It is necessnry to utilize thase favourable circumstances, make them better, and establish here on a solid foundation a great and far-sighted policy for the Fir E a s t . It is unthinkable thnt the people do not know whnt to do, although it is the rarest of oDPortunities. \u2018Vbove a l l else, tile -unification of rv^t.inrinl viotjs is a pressing need, \"'ith that only can jAFTNSSE diplomacy return to its original course. Taking the most of J t \\P4N f s presant fnvorable situp.tion, I think we should exert our utmost for the nation to establish s permnnant foundation. Document No. l6l6 Page l18\u201e 3 \u3007 V I E T \uff0c ( B m C O A L TION PLOBLEM :U\u4e01D G E R W N P O W E R ( L E C T T T V S G I V E N 4T T H E I^IPEEIAi U M I V S R S I T Y I L m i K I \u5074 O C T C \/C \\KUSHI-K;1I\/ I N I S B R U A R Y 1 Q 4 0 _ _ .\u3001 \/SHO^i 15\/). The recent dioloraacv of before I w e n t abroad, was b-.sed on the .\\nti-Ccmintern A x i s ,\u5de7 h i c h the government constantly loroclaimed \"ind v\/hich all of the people balisved. H o w e v e r , i s the CEIW.i Incident g n d n a l l y progressed, tlis people in genar\".! renli.zad thnt Gerrrr.n nnd Italian rid to J'.PAN 'ms extremely sffectiva so that tha opinion caroe to be expressed thnt a further step should be taken to mnks it into a militTry llll-'.noe. I think th\uff0c\u2018t ths feeling of irnny people In J:\\P:iN was in '^gres^snt vzith this. \\t any r - t s , I left J.\\P:UT \"rhan praises for the Gsrtnnn-Ital-.in ^nti-Comintarn axis were being sung the loudes - ! T left for IT^LY \u201d'ith ths feeling thnt I w.-anted to render some service in tha matter by doing ir : y hv.nble best from abroad. The rel-tionship betw33n the othsr parties, GEF(\u30de^NY and ITiLY, has gr^.d'u.nlly asstimed importance in EUROPE r.nd they h'ivs co^e to recognize the gra.it im\"oort\")ncs of tying tir> \uff0c..7ith J \u4e8c i n the Orient. Of course, GEP*^NY nnd ITALY also hnd \u30bb h e same, or strongar, feeling ns J\u301cPAN to strengthen ths J.\\PAN-GEB\"\uff1aANY-ITALY ^oalition. Sines boch sides hnd the snme foeling, I, too, had the hooa of suece3ding without much difficulty in tha natter of a J A ,P;\\N-GEB'^NY-IT\\LY military allinnce. However, T sensed upon my nrrivnl that there s considerable discrenancj^ bstvsen GEP^*\\MY \u3001nd TT\u5165LY wanted, nnd what JL?>\\11 raquirsd. Th?t is, thsrs \\vhs \u3063 vsry widespread fdbTin? to shake hands \u3078\u2018nd compromisa with BE U N \uff1f, nd ^ M t i W l i desoits their intsrf srenca^itli JiP.M in the \u2022 ' H m Incid-nt. Tin., only .point uoori 'vrhich n a t i o n a l opinion -vos agnaad \u2022,ts ttat n.f ralntionR \u30d5ith SOVIET FTVS3I.V. In r3gird to _ FiFS8I:\\ T 0 grng t m a n y p a o p l o o u a n l Y s^ id t f e t _she w?. s J^P.IN' s e n a m y . .\\ccordingly, th:\uff1a\" l i ^ i t to whicti J a p a n e s e ^ b m a t d e c is 10115 could\"ngr \u2018: wns \u3001 J1P.12-GSEI'112C\u00bb.II 1LI military alliance nlme3 chieflv at tho U.S.S.H. Doc i. 'Cut TTo. I6l6 Page 19. H o w a v a r , upon going to GSR 1,T iNY and IT;iLY,\u30a8 found their viaw? as regards this aim of th tre&ty were slightl\uff1a\/ differ~nt. For example, h 1 d no cT-ish of interests w i t h RUSSIt\\,\u3063.nd, more- ov-jr, sine a G^Ti^^WY \u2019 s pol i fv v\/ \u0302 s to comuromise with BRITAIN a n d\u2019 \uff1f R A N C E In tho west and. to ti^rn eyoFi?.^vqiv to the east at a time w h e n tbe J . \\ P . \\ N - G I F \\ n t i - C o m i i ' i t a r n Pact Lmd b 5-n' conclraedj QSHMaHYVs eastern policy w n s gr\u00b0dually making hs^V\/oy. C D I 1 rrnde with \/VUSTF.Ii\uff0cdisniGniber 3d CZECH0oL0V ( \\LI l naxt, and then w h e n trying to s e t t l e the Polish q.-aastion, hor path wns at this point obstructed by BRrT:\\IN ^nd S h o l l w\u767e c.nll it d^Siiny or txaditinnal troubla. tin it not vntil nftajr W3stsriL vrob 1 oms are solved, c^.n GSBI-^KY 1 s o?.stnm policy bo settlsd? \u30deis -.g-in confrcntad with this fact. Thc-rjfor.3, GEKLUKY mnj 3ither cotnbini ^itti JA.P ; \\N to. attack, tiie S0YI3T UNION or alse 'i~r starn policy of eliriimting \"-.he Roviot obstacle v\/ill suffer .\u2019 serious sst-b^.clL, Accordingly, the der.idGratvm of a Garman- \u30a8t\u2018\u98de 15..in co'Uiticn with J.'vPlN is noi to attack the U . S . S . E . but to nse us in dealing with BKIT4IN and FFiMCE who reprasont tho. old European povror.s. It is in this regnrd thnt they desire ths co- operation of J.\u301cP\/W. S t n n o , on -ne J.\\?aN dssiras to compro- miss with_BRITAIN nnd K3ANCE\u4e00to. rr^vent Soviit aggression in the Orient, there vras considerable difference in fc-eling between them. Of course, in event of the outbreak of war botviresn JAP'iN and RtTS'SI.A., b o t h GI.RI.A:':.,\u2014\u2022 nnd IT^LY Dlnn to aid J\\P\/\\N, .but this vns not th- ir chiof \u3064 in. T J.s fnr^nm^nt.^l fHffQrsnn\u3001_ T think, is the reason ths \uff1bLY allinnco could not t ^ n bi concludec It ennnot ba dsnisd thnt in the CIIIHA qjiestion J\\P.\\N\u2014\u4e00 e m dually bec?.m2 clsnrlv pitted a g a\u30ca\u2018 ^V'TTATN^ Thg nnti-British m o v ^ - n t s throughout tiia. country r..l\\tiv_ to tho TIbJTSIW question f^^nyOy \u5f0b>y;s r Particularly \u30a5.t that tlmp 1t wns- J'\\?: n ,N' s disDo-ition to aim sxciiisivQly a t tho SOVIET IIHIQR^ but hovld. no\u4e03 J:\\P.'iN olt^r thnt iciar. in the course of tlie CHIN.\\ ques- tion? Jn visw of th3 inevitability of a clash be two en J'.P^N and BRITaIN -nd the af orsTrsntion-d - ctitudc of GSR:,:.\u305fNY and I felt thnt s hor Id -Itc-r c'islc:,ll7 forrr^r nttitudo H o w e v e r , JiVEAI^s foelinj w^js still dc-termined to qim nt the TT.^.R.'P. Sine3 it was tria tctan of inr\u4e04fenfTul auortars to compro- mi \u3044 wi th \u4e3d r m i-r Dossiblo ind in certnin cases to be friendly viith \u304c.\u4e11BIC\u3078,I thought thnt it would ba oxtremely difficult to pux ny ideas into tiractics. In short, Gorm.illJ^- uril i^r;.-.,TA?AW, h ^ Britain nnd_Jr-inc^ JIS th^^T chi3f objects inst3Mcl of \u5369 \u30e0 \uff1f \u4e04 . I could havo nss^rtad that nlthoiTgh G \u2022\u2022rmnnv would fighi:\u3066!ig T T . S . S . R . if nbsclutoly nacss sary..\u62f3 sha took tha old powers of d s n i o o r a c y t h e gr - : \",tost ilindranci^ But sine:.\u3015 the circumstancos the country w a r n s I have tDantionod b o f o r s , I submitted to ttie Govornmerrt my opinion Document No. l6l6 Page l20\u201e tint Germany jao.uld in2vit?.bly_ 'illy w i t h tha IJ.S.S.R., only if JAPAIi-bssltntod to contract this a l l i a a c f . Hov\/evor, a n ition-y;ld2 anti-British mcvsnvv. 1 : b r o ^ mrh wfth r-^^pp^t to tiia.-TT'^TJT.STN pr )bTam^ And ns I sr\u00abv that this wns suprtprted. b y the whol3 nnti gn- I tliou^ht h^t it was no time to hesitate and in onrly_July I notified the \"ovornmant twice in dotails ns follows: \"Garnnny and. Itnlv ar3 not cont^inDl^ting a wp.r against the^ U S\u660e. If the Govornroant is going to conc\u4e04utfe a T r e a w on thp> ngq^mpti nn th\/ii.__rn-r will b^ T ^ , ^ ljjaa- h.?.d b\u4e18tti^r be givsR u p ^ I believe the intantion of G\uff1b-rm-.nv It o >lv is to dr.H,\/ I : ;\"us:.5\u4e00i\u3063 to thsir Fido nftar con- r n 1 \u89d2:n\u3002ng g R P T . ^ ^ and l^KLY. fn order to sst^blish n now orc^r in CI.IN\uff1b, tod;iy, -73 wust drive \u2022 out from Ca'CNi t:io ol i or vhicii is r.cpr3S \u0302 ntad by B r i t a i n ^ Therefore ? I believe tint Ja \u308a.nn shonld concl-uds a tr en ty. 3 s soon - s nos^'ble th Gorir-.n\uff1a,'' nnd Itnl v ' in opposition to B r i t a i n rr.-i \uff01\u30b2nnee. 1 r_5 furth -ruiors., for her to confront the ITSSE with tho combined powors of JaP\/iNj Germany and \u4e04tolyj w i t h the aid of ^MEsi\"\uff1a wash thair hands off of the Er.st^ to hova USSR s\u3001od the id to CLI: V G Xai-siiak t .and to I1-Y2 USSR wlthdra)\/ th- r forcos from tha WiNCIIIT1\\11M-Sov 1 et b o r d e r , and grcidually effect the solutic.i of the pending, PXoblenis favorabl,y, I boliovo that this policy is bost siii\u4e03c.d to the ocr-iPion for JaPlN. x A t this noTPjnt if wo do not ^nnfin^A \u536f fj] 1 i-gnoR w i t h Gayman;, \u2019 \u3001\uff1fmd ItTl v T RrtnaHV w i l l r nhnhly 1 pie w 1 t n U S S R . M\u3002r \u65af Qfr-\u2018 it is clrwin\u5e7a no\"\uff1a]\uff1a. It not tha tiras for nasit^xion. II: JiP^N tri-d to solve th..\u3015 n r o bl;?m bctwo3n har and USSR \u4e00 \uff0c , \u00a3 1 ; s r . tlie alii\u5e7fncc- ''lotwaGii Gork' n,y a n d USSR bas bs^n conclpded, - \u804a 1\u5982 1 1 thi.: s bG^QTra iirr TVor^.bl\/5 for J'.PAN r>s the sitii?.ti01 I w i l l h-ivj. c h u jsd by ttion?\" Bv.t the Gcvarnn:ant__ c 4 cor.rss vras anr\\blo to from tha beginnin' giv\u3053 thought to my ooinion, bec^uss they hnd in vi^w a treaty fox. fighting w i t h U S S R , w h e r ^ s \u30a8 w p s in f-^vor of a treaty for making po.ncc with har -- nn id a a vory dif'\u2018 ;r3it fron the original on 3. Moraovor, it was in ch.? r dst of il\" t^iat hoatcd puTr.i- opinion of the whole m t l o n QF^iT BP IT'.IN on tha ocrnsi.cn of the TIENTSIN Incident the Anglo-Japgnaso Conf^rGnco at Tokvo was ha Id. And, strnngj to sny, ^(E'' T B H I T i l N made conconsion to In tho vicinitv of TIENTSIN, ilQiilishmon ware su'b;.3ct3d to groal _ insults in full vior- of thi w.oi \u201c 1 ^. Tho o M \uff1fi\u201dmi\u3015r C F ^ ^ ^ P L a T H \"ilso rrndo a r ^ m r k rat tho Fnrli;.ro^nt to the 2l\"foct thot his bloOff\" w-r,. bo- - ling w U h indign? o ^ n . Th-s^-rcry n^xt m o r m t GREAT BB.tT\\ITT \u2018 1 do gro^.t concession, ^h? t is tt\u3064r\u3014\u30e1, it came to the knowledge of the German Foreign Nfinistjr ps \u3064 report, from 3 reliable source that tho JnTD-nose GovGrn^ont OTomisod to C m \\ T E R I T M N th-t they Document No. l6l6 Page l21\u201e would under no circumstancos g a n e n l i z e the Tripartite T r e a t y , on c o n d i t i o n t h n t she s h o u l d m o k e a c o n c e s s i o n t o J\/IPA.N in CHINzl\u3002 Now GUi'VJH\uff1a and ITA.LY were of tho oDinion that the rjclicy \" d o p t o d b y J \\ P \\ N o n 1;hs c o m . i n - it s i n c e the Mar\u4e04\uff1fhurian I n c i d e n t hid for its object the destruction of the old order in the EVST and ths establishment of a now ordor in its pl.ice \uff1b in other words, that it was JaPfiU T s rontinc-ntTl policy to overthrow first in tha EAST the status en\u3064o of the world, established by ths VERSAILLES Trsnty -- VERSAILLES ordar which in\u4e00tiio E]st is ixprossod n s _ tho W A S H I N G T O N O r d 3r JLs w h n t J-iP,\\N is t r y i n g t o o v e r t h r o w . T h o y \/ baliovo th-.t tho ^nnchurian Incident, tha renunciation of the DisnrmmGrrc Pict^ the aa-taDlis^raont of 3 new order in CHINA. \\ now in question ars all directed to tli,?\u30bb object. T h o r a f o r e , I n o t h i n g s e e m e d to t h e m to b e m o r a n a t u r a l that~J\/lPA.N, G E R M A W Y a n d IT'xLY s h o u l d antc-r i n t o a n n l l l a n c e t o o v a r t h r o w t h e old o r d e r of the world in concort. Thay littla dreamsd of difficulty in t,hg r\u2018 eotin t i o n . \"H'a.iy l o o k i d lu.on thr.t tr.-.nty \uff1f. s ill too m t i - T i l r.nd r. nnttor of rovxso, ?n.t th.) n.:)gotiat5_ons clrnggod on, u n t i l at I\uff1a 1 st in Jims- t h o y C 3 m e into n c s - o s s i o n of a r e p o r t t h a t JiiPAN w i s g o i n g to ranks t-.rms w i t h G R E A T B R I T A I N , h e r c-nsmy n a t i o n , g r o ^ t l y to their astonishm^nt. B^sidas, this situation wns brought about i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r n a t i o n - w i d e a n t i - B r i t i s h m o v e m e n t . I s u p p o s e t h a t J ^ P L F ' s a c t i o n s a n d h a r m t i o m l f e3\u4e04ings. m u s i h a v e s t r u c k them n s strange and. complcx. Such b2in;3 the caso, an impression grew with the Gormans thn.t thoy cou.ld jjcpoct little . su.D\"ort from JiPlN, th-,t they could not expect J.lPi'iN' s*\"heiD in sotting up agninst GREAT BRITAIN and. FHaNCE. On the othar hind, in connection with ths DANZIG problem, tho En.ropGan situation grew so acute thn t the ro lit ions between G S K T m N Y and GRE4T BEIT<\\IM and Pli^NCE wore strained to the breaking p o i n t . A\u3068th\u3002t_ tim,\u3015_\u2014ilEEi r J\uff1a BfilTAIK a n d F R A N C E t r i e d to w i n .DSSIL ov^r to thair^sirln by- sending lhair_r \u3064 pre sent a 11.VQ P tn -iilD^nDW-. Jio. n e e o t i n t o f o r a t r m t y of a l l i n n c s . It is n o w o n d e r t h n t n t t h e .^I^ht of th\u3015s-: n - ^ o t i ^ t l o n s , IT:VLY f. It r o s t l ^ s s , I T \\ L Y has a clos.) t r 3 p t y of a l l i a n c o w i t h G E R I ^ N X . i f GEIIM^NY c o u l d n o t j o i n hnfi3s w i t h J^PATf, a n d U S S R s h o u l d b o s n i n o d o v o x b y GES\/iT.-BEITilK ajid FR'l- T CE, hor enemies, ITALY would have to struggle batween - onimiGS on both sldos. It w n s n a t u n l t h a t ITA.IT s h o u l d f d o l n l n r m e d , w h o s h a r e s tha Xato__with \u201eGEF;' A N Y - I think it w\u3002.s not imnatririi oven if I T \\ L Y hid p r o D o s e d to G E R R \\ N Y - n i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the a l l i a n c o of GRS.1T B R I T A I N -,rid F R 4 N C S a n d TJSSR. If GER?. T ANY is b o u n d b y t h s p r o m i s e mnele w i t h JA.P\/IN, t h a t i s , tha p r o m i s e t h n t tho t w o n a t i o n s wust not coneluds nnv non-'iggrossion pact ivith. tho SOVIET UNION, nnd clarify her isol\"ted position by mcroly looking on the current Document N o . l6l6 Euro pa in .situa tion 3 s tr -ingan to \u30b3\u53e3\u3064. r o\u3002c h nnd ITALY, thnt is to S3V, th.?t tii9_T T SSH begnn to hold out hor hnnd to thG ^nti-Comintsrn T o ^ r d s Upril this ya'ir, Foreign Minis tor PIBBSNTIiOP positively daclnrod to us that if JlPiN would not enter into nlliancj w i t h GSH Tr :,NY, thiy must combino with tha US S B ;\u3063 nd thst, if J \u301c w o u l d \u3002lly, thoy could offar 100\u30c0 cooperntion, w h i l e , if n o t , thnt sh3 conld offsr 50% cooperntion. Of courso, this t a l a g n D h o d to tho Go'\/arnmant, b u t , in JAPA.N, it w i s s.nid that we h^vo baon thra^tenad by GEEM\/INY. Such bains the c^.so, th..3 RTJSSO-aERMA.N Trenty wns concludod list, \/\u0302 t thnt time tho Gormnn authorities s~;id that thoy folt dasply r3gr\u30b3ttnblG nnd thnt thoy should h:.'.ve had JfiP^F's understanc ing'bofor^hand, but if thoy hnd s-^id such thing to J'iP.IN, it w o u l i s-ur3]v Tpp^nr in all the- pnpor^ of the world 'vithin 48 h o u r s A Sin( such cTsas Ir.ve\u4e00\u201dbosn axjBor_l\u00a7ac.ed_ numbor of times in ths p?.st, thoy wsre unable^ to notify JA_PAN ba fore hand.. Ttioy u n t r e a t e d us not tlQ_ think ill of this action. Thjy violnt^d the p^ct b3c?us2 thoy adhorod to Isgnlitios nnd formnlitios. Thoy nl-v^od us. not to say., that it \u30der\u3002s n. branch of fnith. In the pressing situation, it n^icassity that .r-ompolled tH5m., so do not think 5.11 of them. Thc-y asstirod'us th\u3063t their f20lings towards J.IP^N tod\u3063y hnvo not change tho least. Th^y still hold Gxpectntions of bringing about intimac of th\u30cf rsIntions batween the two m t i o n s . Thsy havo often and rapsnt^dly si?^g2st3d to J;\\P:\\N to corprornise w i t h tho USSR\u30ca nnd if J\/1PAN is in th^.t m o o d , thoy w i l l off jr t'noir sarvicas ns modiator. In short, os I h^ve stated in tha boginning this trny be enough to confirm the supoosod intontion th-t GEKr^\\NY tins no thought of fighting the USSR -nd whan tha JfiPiN-GEFJ'^NY-IT.\\LY .lllianco is found, G U N Y h-.id in mind to attract tho USSB into this camp. . \u4e00 I (1\u30eb w i t h folded \u3064 r m s , it would mean th-it sh.3 would, 'lly IT\\LY from h..rs \u201elf. Purthorrnurj, since S o o n aftsr the Riisso-German Trj^.ty wis concluded, ITALY also graatly WGlcoirod this traat-\/, st-ting t h n t , b y this no vnr w i l l Document No. l6l6 P-\u201c\u30bf\u3063\u3064\u3002 brc-3k out in EUROPE, nnd that hors^ftor Russo-JnpnnasG relations w i l l improve and things v\/ill turn out vory favornbls to JAPilM. During my stny there, I could not concoive anything in imprassion that TT.\\LY wnve sOK?tiling of \u3064 vnsruo fsoling towards C-ERKdY backus3 of thnt T r e a t y ; should thjy not enst \u3064side such fooling? N a y ,\u30a8 think thnt thoy shor.id be- thnnkful LO I K B ^ N Y . There not a singles cnus.3 for rasantriGrit^ Tlrvc is whnt I w i s h to sr.y. H o ^ o v o r , is nov; ^t v.'Tr. Tharo ^.ra sorio \u5de7ho s?v th-.t if GE1-\uff1b : I ? Y\u300d U 1 1 b , d e f - t e d c o c n \"s p r o p - g ^ i d i z o d b y B M T .r\uff1a, t \u30d2 TTT-'vTES. \uff1f n d T K ^ I ^ i t \u8173 \u30c8 \u30cb - d\u30cf n g \u30der\u3002\u201ds to. b 2 _ q n intin-to,, tjyrrs th n-\u0302 rf \\ W . 11 though it is an unDl3\".s-?nt w ^ v of spying things T I do nnt. n i v n h ^ ^ t to ir ^ b J W M w o r e\u300b o 1t f ^ould not D3 i\u3064 oni int-r^st to friunis w i t h Jiax. Hc'^ajarv I\u2014.jar, ..sm-a .GST\uff1b\"l^H...Till not b a b.aat.\u3001iru Thora nro sorrs of those who rororb-T tho 1 \u30de st , *vlio st^ite th\u00b0t if the r\/nr bo p r o t n e t a d , GlFiiiAKY w i l l siiro bo dof an tod econonicr.lly. Bi\u3015t thoy s'l.v it boc\u00b0us3 t m y do not cons id or fully the rcnl DO'.vor of OTGScnt d.nv GER T \".\\HI r . Doc. No. 1616 P?ge 27 Some in Japan s\u3002y th-.t it is only ^ix years since EITLiiR came into porer. Thoy say that tho economic porrer and military preparations -re still fr.r f r o m being sufficient, but GE.R' A.:\u3001JY today greatly differ from v;hat these people wade ont of GS\u0302 I\u2022\u2022\uff1bANY. GERMANY of today possess several times in power compp.rGd \u201dith 1914-. In economics and Eilitr.r. preparations, she possossos several times of those compared to 1914. As a \u30deiiole, in the last European \u201d\u30cfr, not only GI]R;.:ANY but BRITAIN and FRANCE also suffered blo^s, BRITAIN'S por.-er \u201d\/as for the most pprt wealth accumulated i the past, n.nd that had been. gre^vLly dir.r* nished by the ivr.r. The extant cf the dnmnge may be seen, frora the fact thr.t i\u52f9 is s\u2014: 11 rot being componsntGd until tod\u201d.y, GILRJ-UANY' s P C - R E R , hc-ever, 1 \u201c.es in her people. The damages received \u2019VCITC\uff1b chiofly her human lives. This H N S B O E N completely restored during the l.ist t^onty years. In tli?t \u30dear, not \ufffd bit of German territory, not mentio'iing hor to'-ais and cities, \u201d'ere being ravaged. Only cort \\n limits \uff0c\u30d6ere imposed:, such \"s tho limitation of her ar. ed forces to IOC,000 men by the VERSAILLES Treaty, nnd t.h\u3057 possession of subnprinos bei^g ob jectionable, etc, chile thnt of r c h a M l i t r t i c n steadily progressed from the following day of tho T\"\"uce. Although auourvt in reparations almost reached astronomical figvu?GS, I reiperibtT thr-1 \u201dh\u3002t G-EHKANY actually paid w'.s a little more thin 30C million yen in money rad goods. l oroover, BRITAIN and the U^TT^J) STATES, especially, loaned silm pfter sum of money to GER. ANY so r.s to keep GERl'ANY from collapsing. The UNTTLD STATES alone loaned GSRI'ANY 400 to 500 million dollars. In results, it seencd q.s if GERTANY rcceivod reparations '\\niOu:itiag to 400-500 million dollars instead of p^y.5 ag. Ago in, some say th\u3054 t Gj^'A^Y hn.d beon reduccd to a state of cmptino.:s by the \u30deell-kno\uff0c:n inflation. It is true tho inflation dealt a heavy b l c on the German middle classes and brought about a very bad offect on the general soci-1 life; b u t , it \u201das not nil adversity, for all the German joint stock companies h^d their lobts cnncelloa because of that ixiflation. Th^.t is r.hy the Gorman companies h?d up-to-date machines installed pftor the \u7af9\u305fr. Ooasoque.atly, post-\u2022\u2022\u30dear German industrial power became such that ERITAIK and FRANCE could not rival. L- e to that industrial po\u201d'.r, German rchabili- ta'-ion sn\uff0c\" strikiag progress, pnd the merchant r;^.rine th t \u201d\u3064.s con.px. 'tely uiped out by the T -\/ar, sudde.ily found itsc\u2014lf to possess 4 - 5 million to is, \u2022.\u3057lmost sruue in tonnage .\u0302s JAPAN. Aside from this, tho farming villages rohrbilitatod rc-ranrkr:\"bly\u2022 '7hcn HITLER took the reigns of g o v e r n m o a t G U M Y had -lre.-dy c o n p l G t c l y r e s t o r e d its nntioiirl p o T r o r . O n l y f r c m the p c i n t of formality iras she bound b: the V\u3076;ISAILLES Treaty. As HITLii? crime for T \\'p.rd, he severed one by one tha yoke of this Treaty. T \u00a5ith the severance of each bond, G.ERrANY's replenished po-er leaped upwards, and oventuclly extricating itself of all restraints enabled her to display her full nosers. This is the GEH::AJ>1Y of today. Doc. No. 1616 Pnge 28 \"'e i:rus+: P.r \u0302 forgot th'it Gc^uinu ;.5tor\u3084 tion rn.s not the Ir \u2018 of 1 I j ,11 : 3 s.. , \u2022 rule 3 buL tho yerrs \u2022 \u0302 .nd ::\uff0c\u3002iths ex j . riu ing 20 .rj \u30b2\u3057\u4e04lo tho rro.r. Fnrthorrnorc, it vrp.s thought th?.t expulsion cf the Jc'\u30ees froEi tho country UP.S ^.scribcd to his n\u3053tioncilism x'\/hich dGBinnded racial p u r i t y . W o did disapprove such extremity in the expulsion of alien rroc, but, the g o n c m l opinion of the Germans wore that tho defeat ia the Inst Gret t. V\/\u3001r \u201d\u201d,.s due to the Jews. The Jews disturbed the home fr nt. \uff1fhey sn~y th.\u00b0t unless this parasitic evil is removed completely from the country, they cannot fight. In other rrords, tho expulsion of Jev\/s rmist bo seen ns thoir preparation for r n r , Nor.\u3001looking at this today, ve find the German home front to be jrently strengthened because of tho.t, a ad m o r e o v e r , the O-c-riQan Dcoplc have pli h a r b o u r e d , should rc 3ay, retaliatory\/ spirit a-ainst GK ,1T BHITAIK and FRAr\u4e28CE, and \u2018 so n deep dissatisfaction towards the VERSAILLrS Treaty. She m s much .ridiculcd by nerly-born petty noightor-stp.tes find, F R A N C E , loading these small nations oncirclcd and oppressed GSRI'fAWY. With the advent of H I ^ L E l , this dissatisfaction rms totally romovod. rhe i\u3001.\u3001r.\u4e04ings c. L the ^-hole popuineo tom.rds HITLHR is n.mazing, Ever\uff1a great scuolars believe him to be a God- sent saviour of the Gorman people. Agn.in, sowc people say that GERMANY is dost\uff1a' tutr of resources and th^.t tho livelihood of the people is m i s o r c b l e . That ilt may be so, since huge ^rmnEcnts hav. been, conpl -.tod in n short space of timo, and pressure on. national life is heavy r.nd \u3001-\u3015ntrol exhrustivo, Ko\uff0c\u4e86ever, liveli- hood of tho people todr,y gi or.tly differ from r :hit is being told by outsiders. It h\u3002s been grently ameliorated r \/hen compared to those prior to the Nazi R e g i m e , It can never be s^.id that they arc d e s t i t u t e . Into.^'ially, all are in good order. Even in uiihoard of and na; '.elcs^ touns, there are forests of chimneys protruding vrhich \u3057;;MI.c briskly COILILUIS of black smoke. In rural railray strt:' ons find surprisingly mn.nv locomotives and freight cn.rs. Unless one actually seos it v'ith his own eyes, the German real po^cr is beyond ccinprohension. Tho intcm.?.l state of affairs in GERMANY arc as s\u30bbntcxi. Her foreign rcintions nlso stnnd roraarkr.bly favourable to h o r . For example, the USSR is nor: in a state of alliance r;ith GEIH A N Y . During the Inst \u201dr.r GSR\u30d6ANY allotted tuo million of her force against RUSSIA for throe years. F o r o o v o r , nsido from fighting rniTAIN and F R A N C E , she uad to fight ITALY, SLTtBIA, ..{0UHA.WIA -nd others. But today, she is able to concentrate her entire jtrc igth on p single front in the \\.ost. F u r t h e r m o r e , GliiRI\"ANY h \u2018 3 her Siegfried Liic here raid it is inpciic-tratable. If she defends herself by this l i a o , she can relieve hor foars however long the '-rnr ra-\u0302.y prolong. In this section, &ER\uff1a\uff1a'IANY is not raging any ^7ar of attrition. If necossary, sho can coatiauG fighting at this i-.\u0302 .te fcr nny lc... -th of time, ^hr.t sin\uff1a lv\\d Doc. No. 1616 P\".go 29 stocked from the outset no\uff0c\u2022\u2019 rcnchos sevorr.l times of those of tho list V\/ar. No\u201d, she can rc-coive supplies freely from the USSR and from the BALKANS nnd SCANDINAVIA. The extent of attrition could be properlv adjusted. This is quite favour- able for GLRI.A T Y. GISIANY is' taking utmost caution in this W a r , sr.ying thrt the time has nor; arrived for her to fight decisively in this currcat v;ar for the suprorcney of EUROPE against BillTAIW mid FRANCE. GERMANY should have fought a short tern \u30dear during the last VJ e.r\uff1b thrt is, she should h\u5e7f.vc bcaton FRANCE by r-.n inpetuous attack \uff1f.nd \u201dith tho\uff0c\"ithdrp.\u201d\uff0cn s'-;ord, attack R U S S I A . In the lr.st 'var, no \u30ef\u5e7f 11 scpr.rntcd FRANCE from GER?^ANY. GERJ' r AMY v;rts forced to T 7rgc n t \u30d6nr of attrition soon after tho cormencc- mcnt of hostilities. Even today if the Siegfried Line did not exist, G E R \u537f Y \u2019 \"ill be forccd to fight fncing a vast force of British and French troops. If it beenme thus, ITALY, her ally, v;ould not bo able to look on v'ith folded. n.rKS. A l.?.rgo-sc?ilG Tvnr rould imriediately follor. But no\uff0c\u2022\u2019 th-\u0302 .t there is the Siegfried. Line, G:.i.\u3066 ADTT is in no haste. Sho is slowly making preparations as she fights. Consequently, she docs net ask for I T A L Y 1 s assistrmce. This is v-hy ITALY is observing neutrality. To begin \u201dith the totalitarian system of G.^RIIANY and ITALY is, to then, the representation of tho nptural progress of history,\u30efhilc' tho system of liberalistic individualism of the British and French should perish. It v , ill porish even if it is loft untouched. I bGlievo tliey are of tho vi\u4e28\u30a1 thn.t mere confrontation by the powerful Gorman-Italinn Neu Order against the declining likrp.listic order of GHLAT BRITAIN and FRANCE \u30deill c?use BRITAIN and F^A^CE to lose faith. It seens that GEK.Ai^Y r;ill take stand ia the Siegfried Line and bent to oxhnust the nerves of BRITAIN and FRANCE, r;hilc on the other hand, she will aim to deal a finishing blot: on then \u30deith her p.ir forccs nnd submarines. Of coursc, in practice natters \u2022\u2022ill not bo so simple, but I hold th.nt a coiifi-ontation of the old pgainst nc\uff0c\u2019' forces today \u5e7fill give sufficient chances to the nev; powers to -\u2022-in this v n r . Of c our so, if the USSR, ITALY o.nd JAPAN side r T ith the British \u3063nd French, it rill be cf grave consoquence to G]]HI\"ANY; but today, such things \u30deill not happen. As to ITALY, the people sr.y thnt she is r.gain sitting on tho fencc, She h.-d to side \u201dith GRI.AT BIIITAU\\T in 1914 because of her various -.'oaknosscs, HOT\u30deever, ^ITH tho result cf ':^oS0LIWI'S rise, things have assumed \ufffd aspect. Today ITALY poeaossos enough po'\"er thfit BRITAIN nnd FRANCE cc-imot onnily s Tr '\\y her. The situation h^.s changed so that ITALY of today is not 'ii^t she had been in the l\u3002.st T .7hon she forcod to run to the Allies by BRITAIN and FRANCE. ITALY mnae full developments in her political powers under 17 years of Fascist rule. For further devolopinents, there remains but territorial expo.:asion. As TUSSOLINI puts it, Doc. No. 1616 P?ge 30 ITALY rust expand or explode. There is no first-class por\/er so destitute of resources r.s ITALY. Her population sho'-'s a yearly increase of 450,000. She must e-ither expand or explode. The surroundings of the ] :editcrranean Soa, hor-evor, are costly spheres of influence under BRITAIN and F R A N C E . Con- sequently, ITALY'S expansion will oust the British and French influence the J T oditerrrLiiean S e - . There is no alternative but to achieve this aiu. at tho sacrifice of the British \u3064.\uff1aid F r e n c h . ITALY enn ntver think of riding th BRITAIN r.nd FRANCE unless given a sufficient rcrcrc 1 . V\/hen t\uff0cie ticie arrives, I cxpc-ct ITALY to enter into the War jji accordance r 'ith her treaty rath G:::]R:![ANY. ITALY's entry into the 1 \u30e4r \u201dill be very favourable to GERI'[ANY, bc.c.use BRITAIN imports 20 percent of her resources by the Mediterranean route. This inportntion \u201d\u3050ill be completely stopped. F R A N C E , also,\u30ec -ill bo cut off from AFRICA. It \u30edill bo a iaatter of grave concern to BlilTAIN and \"RA'TCE. If ITALY join h^nds r 'ith the USSR and participate i:i the ri 'ar r'hile GERMANY is holding her ground against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE using the Siegfried Line as a shield, it rill be a mp.tter of grave c one c m to BRITAIN, Most Japanese r.re of the simple opinion thnt tho deciding factor in is the N a v y . Not so in EUROPE of today. To BRITAIN, the loss of her N?.vy means tho instant collapse . of her entire EITIHE. The N'ivy, therefore, is an absolute necessity to h e r . Consequently, hc-r K:,vy is not much effective ns a combat weapon in event of a '.Var against GERMANY and ITALY. GE.:CANY can exist without a Navy nnd therefore, she can dispense vrith it freely.- Hor N.\u305fvy is lighter th\u30cf.!\uff01 that of GREAT B R I T A I N . The treasured British Fleet cannot nove rctively i'i too free a manner in the nr.rrcr I-uropen.n Theater. It vrculd be too risky for h e r . BRITAIN dares not expose her to such dniger bocr.use its loss \u2019.'ill effect the very existence of the nation. For instance, the British ^avy is at n. disadvantage in the Mediterranenn S c . ITALY posse. 3S aircraft carriers thp.t i \u30de:ill never sink. The snail islp.nds dotting the Sen are those carriers. I,:oreover, she h\u201d.s over ICO submarines at her disposal. It is n gre^.t menace to the British N^.vy in a place so snail as a lake.- GREAT BRITAIN cannot be too optimistic of the current . This is indeed a dangc-rous. Then nhy is it that she started this war? It is because thr.t BRITAIN of today although being a democratic nation is in reality under an rligarchy. Among the British statesraen of today, there r.re ^aixy of Jarrish descent, r h i c h i n c l u d e s C a b i n e t noiiilDers. A n t i p a t h y a g a i n s t H I T L J S v r ho rejected the Jor;s is cxtreniely intense. The present attitude of BRITAIN scorns much under cmctional influence. Hatred against HITLER soenis to be the C\u3002USG of her bringing '-nr recklessly Doc. No. I6l6 Page 31 against G U A I f Z . In ndclition, there seems to be a misunder- standing on hor pr.rt on the p.ctur.l Gernan strength and the p.ttitude of RUSSIA. In the present st-te, GREAT B3ITAIW may not resolve to fight it out to the last as some think here in J A P A N . Locking pt the British diplomacy since the ETHIOPIAN W a r , ve do not knov- trhen they change. It goes without spying that if she succeeds in isolating G:CRKANY, GRSAT BRITAIN will fight it out to the l\u201d.st. The most inport^nt is the Russo-German relations, rind * e must ncknoT.rleige that G.:JK;_ T AKY-USSR relation is ruuch closer th^n expected. Seeing that GERTANY is desirous O F adjusting R U F S O - Japanese relations, GlCRi'fAKY seens to feel at e?.se about tho U S S R . If JAPAN and the USSR compromise and tho.t there is no fc\u201d.r whatsoever for the USSR to exert its full porer on the EUROPEAN Theater, it could be said thnt G j U T i \" places a gre^.t deal cf faith in the U S S R . The GER\u201dAN attempt to relieve USSR in the PAR KA3T may be ncccunted fcr by iier desire to hp.ve Russian po\u201der directed t o ^ r d s the SOUTH of S J ^ O P E . Some say that Russian and ITALIAN i n t o e s t s '\u2022-ill clash in the BALL'ANS, but if the USSR advance to the IIRM j;.A3T instead of to the BALKANS\u3002 I do net pgree '.'ith theso' vho clr.im thrt duo to ITALY 1 s active denunciation of USSR, the friendship between GIwirAIIY r.nd ITALY must h-VG coo].ed. Tbe relations of G E T :AWY o.iid ITALY are the relations cf HITLER \u3078.nd 1,\u4e28:.\u4e28\u4e86SSOLIiH, and thr.t heroes, -rhothcr they are in the EAST or the WlDST, arc the same\u3001 They do net easily become friends or enemies\u3002 Then \u30a8 think it , r culd not be so easy for the BHITISH to sever USSR and ITALY from GER 7 ,ANY. \u2022e \u201dere sent on n uiss ion to EUROPE r.nd \u2019\u201dQ did. \u2022\uff01iint ve T , ere able to forci the Triple A l l i a n c e , Since n a allianco is\u3002.n \u571fK..port'?nt nffair affecti-ig the fate cf a S t a t e , \ufffd e did ell our best to investigate pnd study fully their conditions u As a result, T , e arrived nt the conclusion p.s v .\u2019e h^ve explained \".bove on the actual strength - , .nd attitude of the povrors involved. As JAPAN did not jcia the Alliance ->.nd, on the contr.n^, the irvusso-Gornan rapprochement has been brought nbout, thus leading to the outbreak of tho ^'ar, the European situation Liay h^ve norc or less chnaged si ace my return heme\u3002 I ,r ill not decidedly oiHrui th^t nil future devolopnents \u30cfill becomc as ,_r hnt I h\u3002ve stated. Wh\u00b0.t I c^.n sny ,T it.h confidence tcday is tli-\u0302 t \uff0c,'h,.t JAPAN is doing in the EAST GERMANY and ITALY are trying to do i;i EUROPE bear rs^criblancc on the point thn.t both possess the gre.-.t historic mis si on to establish n ner, order in the EAST i-iiich is r. m t i c n\u3053 1 conviction in ccnnoction , r ith the CHINA Incident,; vill help r.uch, in n larger sense, G m i Y nnd ITALY arc trying to do in \u817f O P E , Consequontly, should JAP\/iN ccnpromise rith the old forces because of her considorntion fcr rescurces r.:.id ethers, the spiritual bier's that \"\"ill r.ffect the ne-\" rising po , T or of EUROPE such as GERMANY and ITALY r;ill be indeed g r e n t . Furtherncre, it may tend to weaken thoir detcnainntion. As p.bove explained, it is true that the Rus so-German Pact the current hostilities Doc. No. 1616 P?ge 32 hr.vc relieved JAPAN's internrtional position for the time being. Hov;ever, to ent or tn in the idea thr t J A P A N should n e i t h e r side vith GIB:'ANY and ITALY, nor bind itself\uff0c\"ith BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, but utilize the present easy position and go on settling the CHINA Iicide-rt '\"ith the so-called principle of Independence nnd Self-Reliance \u30de\u2018ill be opportune if they actually go on fighting forever, but tiier\u3057 is no such m r that has 110 end. There is \u3072l\uff0c.\uff0cays pence t\/ith xr^r. JAPAN '-ill surely be osked to participate in that Po?.ce Conference. In such a case, JAPAN 1 s principle of Indepandcnce and Sclf-Belianco; that is, siding vrith neither r'ill m o a n isolation and ritnout assistance at the con- ference meeting. JAPAN should be most careful th^t the T\u4e86hite people should 101 form a united front and ntter:pt solution of their problems at the sacrifice of the EAST. Should they suddenly arake and find thnt it is futile to fight n.nong therasclves in EIROPE\uff1b p.nd renlizo r:hichever side mr.y \u30efin, resources r.re short in EUROPE. Fortua-tcly, there\u3002.re nuch resources in the HAST, and that the p e o p l e r.re r'cr.lc. J A P A N is just b u t n f l e d g l i n g stntc. If it bee ones such that they cone to .\u5de7 ree upon op.rrying cut \u30cf joint e x p l o i t a t i o n of the E A S T , r-here B R I T A I N h a s u n t i l n c r m<\u3002de it hor domain rejecting other countries nnd herself not fully utilizing it, nnd th- t before JAPAN-s po rr cr could be naint?.inGd, JAP\u3076W munt confront an .indeed difficult situation. The reason ^hy v:e \u30cf.dv^.nced the forcing of an rlliance rith the far-a^ay powers of G}.Ii\u30ecANY p.nd ITALY is because v e gave thought tc this question. I believe th-\u0302 .t this should bo the fund^in^nt^l policy of JAPAN 1 s diplomacy. In practice, our seniors hnve also t,.}'.en up such policy. The pecplo r.nd government aay have been unconscious of this fact, but for exanples, the Anglo-Jr.panesc Alliance ^.s a r e s u l t of t h ^ t - - i n other w o r d s , the r r hite innn' s w o r l d r, T as d i v i d e d into tv;o nnd T -c h-^.ve b o u n d o u r s e l v o s \uff0c-ith one of t h e n , T h e r e is no reason \"hy r :o should let then IDocerne o n e . IndepeadGiice :,.nd s o l f - r o l i a n c c is a q u e s t i o n thr.t should be c o n s i d G r o d a f t e r J A P A N ' S pc; T .jr hns b e e n f u l l y d e v e l o p e d . To J A P A N of tcd.?y, nc a - ir 1 pi i c 01 i 0 n s to cither cf thera s e e m s , at n gl.nnce, m o s t snfe b u t , in. f\u3064.ct, it is a n c s t d a n g e r o u s p o l i c y . N e v e r h n s JAPAN s u o c o c d e d u n a i d e d at an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e cf rrhito pecplo. It r ;r.s enly ^hevi she h\u3064.d allies thnt her assertions v ;ent heeded. Take the present CHINA probien, JAPAN can never settle it by sogrcgp.t.ixig it .is a CHINA problcn in itself. JAPAN can never p.tt-^.in a satisfactory solution, unless the ulterior situation devolcps in J A P A K 1 s favour. Unless the ulterior situntion is settled, nothing cculd really be decided no m t t e r \u300chr.t JAPAN decided uith CHINA. It \u2019\u30a1ill surely be u p s e t . There nre the bitter ordeals r-hich our seniors hr.d tine to tine experienced. Such r. r as the cn.se n.t tho tiDo cf tho Si.iXTTr'.pr.nese 7nr -\".nd the R u s so - J n p i n e se '^nr. It \u2019 \u2022.'\u3078 s the snme d u r i n g the lr.st '\"orld Wai T '*hat h- n d been in our custcdy once r :ill be tnVeii b\"ck. The current CHINA Incidont rill \u305f Iso never 1 nil or' u s to bo off our guard. WG shall NGP.in h- V G to suffer Eisery if \u2019:'e pursue the policy '-c h^d been pursuing. If re don't, it is pie\u3078snnt, but \u30a8 d e n 1 t think t h a t this is ever a prera-turc \u201dorry of r.y c\u30c9n. Doc. Fo. 1616 T - \u30de IT .UHT TSEKD OF TET; GKTmI WAS (DL-M01D Marazine, June 1940) The Trond of the Great War. \"\uff1b0 \u4e03oldL th?t the Gr.rr.ipn which invadocl 37ILGIUM .?.nd HOLL\/ll'D crushed tho Allied Armies i^ith irr^Bisbi\"blr forcc and has already omoTrr r \\ at tli\u0302 IS^LISH Rcflcctin^ on this, it socms th^.t the Allied forccs imTinoring u-owrrd^ of one million on tho Front will not Tdc ^\"ble to csc\u3078pc anniliil^tion,\u30cfnd thn final issuo i3 alro^clj* certain. Hov- v--.r, youlci thr G^rr^r. . .r^y, miich hn.n over^helno^. BTuLGIM anc -Bsunocl control if t'.\\c STILxIC'S of DOT^R make rn rttr.ck on th\u3053.British noJ.nland without othnr \u2022\u2018 rcp-r^tinn? G-crnany vrould pro\"b?i\"bly think onriously \u3078bout tho rAv'r.tavr. of cronsin^ the \uff01C07ZS. Straits without diBoosing of tho l^.rge \uff1frcnch \u201crny. Sho ^ul^.- \u2022oro'b^ljr do t\u5e7f turn to thr South .\u0302nd. plan to conquor : r CT firot 'by joining forcc s \uff0c-rith ITALY. Jnd^i^r from thr ro^.ilta u- ir the ^rrsort tho c c l i r - h i m n t of this ohjnct nu^t \"be rcgar\u3054In\u3053\u3078n inv^lvi\uff1a!^ nn difficulty. conquorin^: in p, Phort while .t:\u3067 ono:.\u0302 - cciL-itrios in ]!30?\u30b3 st\u3078rtixi\/? vith , T 0EHY and thon HOLLASD, ITILJIUM\uff0c :.nd in ^uccosni i^, ni^-.t \u201d\u30cft OEUM\/^IY \"by oet-\"bliGhinr a continrntrl v lcc in co-o-ov^ration with ITALY clolivor in easy fashion a fatal \"blow to Vc who rrr net military spoci^ligts5 cr,nnot cay definitely that ITUGLuiT cnr. \"bo coiiqurro\u30c8y tho-^-rTny. Howovrr, it is :ir t at \u3078 11 difficult for t\u3001G rp.^.tly Rtipnri^r J c r r m rdrforce to deliver sovoru o.tt^cks on M5L\/JID t .- , :.ich lies on thr- f\u6c14r shorn of a nr,rro\\-; stri\u3064 of wr.ter. Koroovcr, even the British cr.nnot lii\u0302 .o itP^lf \"behind ICBLnlTD, aloof from the ^Ji^or to hor h\u3064nnl\u201dr:1,'\u308a\uff1b.c\" 1 must therefore fr.co the G-orrn^n r.irforce no ratter wtrt the risk i:,. t M s critical nonont whrin tlin cotmtry nr.y strmd or fp 11. In such c^ar, \u3088j\/\uff0cin,: fr\u3064r. *n\u201dA\u4e03 oxpoTio.ncc, thn \uff1fritish Ikvy w : f?oon suffer 1ohsp3 \u30d6 1 T\u0302 c rer,?.rka\"bl\uff1b- i . \u3067 ' M o r c o v n r , with \u4e03 1 \u201cicv prrticiprtion of ITALY in tho w\u3002r, hor airforcc \u5de7nd GU\"brir.rinos? c\u3002n \"bo used to join tlio attack on E1TGLA1ID. Tliore- fore, it c-^n \"\u0302 r IFGrLilED 1 s chrziccs of defo^t in tho navnl \"battle \u2022\u2022rc ttc^t. \uff1fc that r.n it nny, thn hope of thr>. British and. Fronch to conquor G\u3002rnar-y IT^LX mist con^iclerod entirely IT\u3078\u30b6 the q^ucsti \u0302 n is will 3Hl7Air\uff1b 'fit 1 *, p.n oyo t) such r dofcp.t imodiatcly propose pop.ee with ( i r ? ,\u30cf\u30cf c : will G ^ l O i T oncl ITaIY r c c o t this? T ' r o Stated tho follo^rinc \u3001\u30cfIf n-ini\u3064 11 ir. the oarly stairs of tho w^r: ITOffiEB. HITLER clp.imod ho h\/\u0302 - no i-tor.tinn of roir to war against BFwITixIIT and I^iJTCE; that it wp.s D\u3078 c \u2022 1 \u4e8c\u3001 1616 not nrccRBarilr correct, ir. criitr of his proposals for po^.co, to view thrt ns s tmo o>>joct: that it \u30cf,rvnoprs to hp.vo \"boon his policy to try to shift \u4e03\u3001o rn8^onpji*bility for wr.r to the 3ritish \"by proposin\u5382 pcac^; and that 3\u5f50IT\u30cbIU is FT) to \u8dc3\uff0ccr,k falling into his trn- \u2022 S.'\u3001mo -:GO\"1O M ICORC^ at THLR for \"boin,^ R. naive viciw of d i \u4e00 - \" o v r c v e r , wr firmly belirvoc. thr.t si:\".c.\u3001 the two hcrors, HITLSP.\u3078r.cl MUSSOLIITI, ostr^lishcd tlio (TT^IAIT \u2014 IILJTf axir ^ni ^c^r.r. th- rn\u2014\u4e43uil\u53cain\u00a7 of ^!UHOPS f th\u3054 wcuir ^o nrtisfiorl morol\uff1a\" with rv trivial rocovory of lost territories ^r c3c;--?Jif3ion of their territories. r-IITLm s\u3078. t o his \u30cfmy nn^o tir^c ago, \"\u30cb to \"loci^o th? clostii^y cf tlio G-cr::ian racn for n thous-^nd in the future h\u0302 .s \"be'Tin. ,f A er^okes- r-\u4e8c\u3076 for MUSSC\u30cbIITI saicl -lno, \u201c T.xc' tinic to c 1 o c i 3 x ; d e s t i n y of EUEOPI! for thxco liun-ircd yc-^rs in thn future has come. tT ITr^n thiB it is o^.sy to inr\u3067ir:.e \\rhr,t ^oth c-tmt-ioa, SL3I\/JTf ITALY, r.ro thinking of. \u30e0\u5382 r result of this i? it r.ct \"ro\u30c8a\/hln ttin.t a cruol, rrvthor h\u0302as-ul\uff1a\/ \"TGP.t liquicV.ti^:-. tr^kc ^l^cr? Fov; t3\\c quenti r. is: will ERITAIH .\u0302r\". \uff1fHiMTCE, vrhich h-vo \"bno:.i banking ir. the. fpvors of tho world for countless conturios -erst,\u30b9\u3050 p \u0302 raittne. to n i i t \u3078g -rrc^t ^owors or not? i\\irthorrioro, can tho former ^nurf. sittv.tim whoroirx tlir \uff1f3mall conntri.^B of i\u0302 IIROPE hold p^soluto Bovorci'tir\/\uff1a\/ m c . F5tp.ndll hnvo a influence or. ASLa as a natter cf cotirsr. >~ow ^o'olc 1 . t>.c colonics of BPJTAI1T ancT \u301c\"CI], nncl those of HoLi^-lT) Ion dij?r->orcd of? This is n question of \uff1bgrort si^nificar.co fron s standpoint. Tha rlostiiiy of soyern.1 hur.clrod r.illion Asiatic ccrnr.triot^ is now \uff1f.t a fTo.^t trjirni\u30cb\u30de p\u30fcoin\u4e03. \u30derule\" 1 , it \"ho t^tov^t for this ^rcab --ro\u0302 lcr.i t' ^o :' n rcidGd in t'lc \uff0c-.rosoncc \u3078f J.-PAiT without listening to J\u00abAP\/J: T ? t Gi\u3001::r.ificnnc\u3001 c,.o.,s now order i:i Enut cor.tain, rjicl T^iat si -ni- ficraco \uff0chonlfl it hr.\u30der? Our ^rn-lc nu3t this tino c^rcfully conni;Vr this \u3064oir.t r?,nov\/. - \/ Siacr- t3\".c \u30c8 o f th\u30cf socond I^iroj o^n war Ji\u0302 P-JT has ,?\/lo;otod a p J.icy of :?.oil--- -rticipation hrif? s\u201d,i(\"l will nrosr, oxclusivoly for the nolntior. nf t\u3001,\u4e00 C\u30b9\u30a8\u4e04I. ci'lort* >\u2022 o w v n r , this is n point of vicv \"Iiich ..iniv\u3002..\uff0c tl'.o tro\".:T of wcrlrl liietory. Inasnuch as tho .\"^r^rjcan T \u2022\u2022\u3078r is i vj.\u0302 r\u3001\u3001tvor\uff0c,. prir.ci-nlcs, it nust \"hr consic.crcd a ^rc^t nist^kr for JilTAl\u4e86\uff0c which launchorl \u308a rrc^t imdrrt^kir.^ in ASIA to dostroy tho ol\uff0c or dor ^NTR^lish P. one, to think NHE CAN stay out of tho ruropc.?;i t-\u0302 v\u0302 .r irry 3\u3078irl of this, J,\u3002JJi is n.ctunlly involT^d the Znro-; or 3 \uff1a\" 1 . 'Mr. S\u201cr\u0302 :irv\u30cb c \u30de or. no rc \"briofly f it is not too nuch to \u4e03hat tho fuse of tho T: rr first ^ttachod the CHIlIil Incident. Tfco m:\\son is th\u30cft thx war \"brtwnc.n tho Unst anc\uff0c t\u3001\u3002\"fost contorcr \u5e7f'n thn.t conmo\uff1a- tar, \u2022\u4e03\u2022 Tlio f^rcoB which st^nd i:*i tho WA.T* of \u82a6\uff1a,\u3067w or\u5c3a.\u3078r in Sant ASI\u30e0 tim onomics \u3078f (JZT\u2022\u4e00\uff1a]\u2022\u30cb\u2019.7 ancl ITALY ore these not the \u2022nowrs of t. v .c c:l'?. order in th\u3002worlrl? Our aclv^cacy of the \uff1fJlirncc \uff1f \u301c K . 1 6 \u30de5 \u30c8otwcor. JAP.J?, K ^ K A I T and IT\u30e6Y \u30c8\u5e7f\u30cc'basc^ upor\u4e00 thio -ooint of Moreover for this ronton also tlic assertion in nn.cle that in npitc of the fn.ct thr.t an ^llirnco rss not v c o n c^ncl 11 \"d r.nd apprt fron the question of R tr\u3050\u2022\u3078\u4e03\u30de\uff0cJ.:JVJ\"\uff0c OCSU'H,\u30cf:,\uff0c.ITaLY st\u201d,ndl ir rjiz ir.sop^r^*blo relationship. \uff1f-r this rcr so::, ir. \")rrticnlar w .i\u0302 .v-- ^nor. cr^ir.^ lonclly that we nur>t r.ot vr^jrcl the lur-operii \"vnr vrith iiidiffor \u3001cc, \u4e03]!\u0302 t JAPiii-\u3063ust not lot GTTHK^TY IOSG. Tho INGCPR.T^'BLO R E L A T I O N N H I P IDOTVIOEN J ^ I ? , GKEiM\/JT -ncl ITALY is historic?'\u30cflly \u2022\u2022lthr'u\u5e7f:h it looks outwr.rdly as if JiiPilvf, nis'miclod \"by the inflnnnco of \u305f cor tain -?r .u\u201d in the country, ir> inclined tovrard ITITL.nr r.n^ the T J. S. A . ,rr.thor than tov-rd &HR:\u4ecfFi\" rxd IT\u30e5xLY,\u4e03ho path of world political tronir> cannot V\/ this \"he chan^of\uff0c nvon JA?AT, in s^itc of the\uff1a opinion of forcc^ if the old or\uff0ci.\u3001r r \\t L'.TIG, is a -rroat cor.trilmtion to GISimY\uff0c ^hic-h io i\u201d oxtronoly aclvantri^oous poGitioia, in tho letter\uff0cn\uff0crognciition of the wnr. Ho on\u3002dou v ta that the. Eusso-G-ornr.n Pr.ct w\u3064,s n, prino requisite for thin war. However, the fact that nn.de the SOVIET IllflO^ BI\u0302 ICO with hor olcl o-.cmy, CrICHArr, so easily is \u4e03lie -xistance of the J - i T ^ l\u4e86\u4e00 \u2014 ITALY \u3078xis, p.lthough the progress of negotiations for the three pov\/^r ,\u3078llirvncc is the r^An reason. PortherniGrG, it canr.ot \"b\u3054 denied tlir.t rnnainir.\u201d noutrp.l for eight months contrary to pre-war ox^octr.tion nnrl h.~r wr.\u3002r,\uff0clin\" with JAPA1T over the Incident hns mado lv\u3001r Tiiir,\"hlo to \uff1b)prticip-^to ir. the Pur\u3064pc^n . Therefore, rJtliou^h wc t\u30cblk a^ont r.^h-^articipp.ti'n, J\u30cb?\u30d6J? p.cturdly plr-yocl a rrcr.t role in the Jjuropc^n Wrr r\\nd it \"bo B^id th\u0302 -t GiT^IA: 7 ! owes JiiP.JT r, gro&t r.owrv,nr, policy r^thor \uff0c)\u3002en inclir.o.* 1 . t^vrr^s \uff1fIITLIiT and the U . S .\u30e0. ^ i d if the' Gori^.n invasion cf ^LGIU!I -r.d HOLLllD Bhculd \u30c8e a little c i c j i n y e\u3053 ,\u4e01 woulc\uff0c\"be in \uff1fi popition to est^^liGh ar\uff1a irrevoca\"Mc rclati^5iship vith BIlITAIi^ If so, GTSMAHT woul'\" 1 . r\u30cf t \"bo r^.lc J :o exr;prens hor -^rrtituclc to J^ill\", over, if she no desiroi. \"\"ho ha? ^rnu>ht JilPAiT to this unfavorable position in which nho will incur ill vill oven while rnnrl^rin^ \/rroat scrvicco? The victory of the forcng of tho now ot^.cv in the wr^r^oliticp.1 situation coulcl pro'bp.^lv in due.3 the total retreat of tho forcos of the old ordor in JiiPAlT willy-nilly. There is no nltorn^tivc \"but that uho io>ni\u2014 f^ll of li\u3001or*ilisn r\u0302jp.C. cn\u4e8citalism in JAPAF will l\")o inovitn\/bl:\/ hastonccl. In addition, C'AIC to tho three yearf? } duration of tho CHIIJLA IncicTont, this situation hp.G ^ecn r o ^ r a r a g inovitp. v ,lo , --ut thnt which has \"hn\/roly supportec\". tho old order on tho thrrnhol'1 of collr.pso W\u0302 .B the conr.cction with, forcos of the olf. or Cy'v a'broncl. A rr jority of the peoiDl^ firmly T^oliovc tr iro n democratic forcn in the 1 \u3067.ck--\uff0crounrl of the br.IHA Incident, \"but wc must s^y thc,t tho ole\": powors ir tho co^ir.try lir.vc triocl to conprorxiso an?- speak 8T-7eotly with enoqy foreign powers, lir.ve \"boon supported \u30c8y 8chemes of nssistanco fron foreign pewors, anc 1 hrvo \"b^.rolr kor)t alive. \u53b6s a result of the Sec on- Iniroponj\uff1a \"irr, thi s sup\u4e00\u3078 rt is even mow withdrawn. For this reason wo rust nry that the rocont prorreos of tho y^r in tlio :Jbst lzrA in cxtroncly inroorta3.it offoct v^horo Japan, is concnrnor\uff0c. \u4e04i w . tm^orstpjic-. foroi.-;n donostic proMc^ns in this way, it is clear at \u3072 lanco \u305florx\u5e7f courso ir. tho future JARAIPs funrTamont.^l diplomatic policy mist \"be n\u0302iiclocl. Mcroovor, as an r-ntccc^ont condition, th\u3054 rolmildinfr of h.cr d o m s t i c orrr\u30cb:tizntion in roq[uircd. 1616 \u3001\uff1a\u2026 Y. T ~ 1177:J OT,mii IH m o r s JTD J\u4e8c\uff1a^\u4e86, g POLITICS- \u4e04\u2022lkTOFJ Tonhio , . \u0302 m o r iunV.sp^dor ?lc\uff1a:p^i-ontir,ry to Itr.ly; FOKUSA Shi.-.orr.i, Chiof of thr Invontira.tinn S.\u2018cti\u3078n, Spiritual Mo^ili^r.ticn Hc^clq^rtcrg \uff1b ICOILUT\u3075S\u30f3I &oro, Pr.-pi^.ont of tlio l^.tional rUrvinw \u4e8c c-\u3066 rtor. (July, 1940) 1. J m T t B SrlFJTlLlX AS?IS : I^-\"Cr\uff1a TO d . T \ufffd\ufffd i n KOrilYAS\uff1a-1 \u2022 \u30a8 c llnd on y^ti t o ^ -r-c\/^nso I vish to listen to \u3078 11 of your opinions concornin:\uff0cthr\uff1a intornnti^nrl predion. SHISAT0HI: Until now, I hryn dor:\u3067 wiant \u30a8 coul\/. for tho renovation of Jr\u00bbj)r.ncso ciplon^cy, ^pc 1-. ir. the\uff1a vjtI:. siturvtion, whr.t vro h^ivc n.clvocatr:l in tho p^st li?.vo ^cnorall^ ^oconc factual. -wovor, sine, the situation in Luropo hn.vc chaivcoc 1 . with such r^i^.ity, vro cannot norcly \"bor.st of our far \u2014 sifhtcdL views\u2022 Uhnt vo nust firstly consi^Tor is whether Gnrnn.ny air 1 . Italy who h^vc w n r. -rcrt victory nay chrj^c\uff1b tlicir r.ttitu-.c. This would tc a certain dc^roo, \u2022onr.voida'ble. Tho end of tho wc.r is now in si^ht, ancl I dooply foel that the ^ronent ia inclo^d tcr lr,tc for JV^oan,\u30c9lio hr.s ^c^n rreatl3 r li\u201ditlo course of world historj\u3001it i\u66f0 ro.vrott^le that Japan has sorcT^.t doviatod from this coursc. Irro^arcllo^s of whr.t one nay sny\uff0c thn c-iirso which Jrrrp.n has followed sinco the China Incid.-nt coulcl not \"bo c o n t r o l l e d \ufffd \ufffd r ar^ll nuriber of pr.oplo^ Wo oucht to follow znc course which vc nust follow. An Ion,-\uff1a as Jnr.an follows this courno, sli3, as a nr.tion, nust r.p.coss.irily join tho course follox^oc 1 Germany .\u0302 nd Italy. IPnr inst^iicc, for t:ie rors.\")ri thp.t th^.t rLlliarco waB not osta'blishcr 1 . Jrv^an, of ccTirsG, hr.s r.o o^li^ation to \uff1f S c r n a n y Italy. ITotvithstr-nc^.iiy\uff1a \u4e03hn 'fr.ct t-hr.t tlie (JoTprnnrnt hp.s v^ctually Qtat\u0302 c*. its policy of 110n- intorfor^nco, ^irt J\u3012\uff1fn is doinc is \u30c8ccmir.-:: of rrcp.t help to Germany pviic 3 . Ital\uff1a\/. \u2022 t tho^ r >rrnted of Jnp^ri in tho r\u30e6li\u30cfnco \"botwocn Jrmr^n, Gornnny, rnd Itr.ly rzr.inly that Ja^an weaken British rnd ^rrnch positions in tho Orient a::.d to chcck tlio United Str.tc a and altho-i was not - n ,sked to do thir, she has, in fact, Aonc so. cvor. if tho United Strtes Doc. rv\u3001 1616 37 wishes to ipartici^r'.tc i\u30cb. tho she cn,n\u4e8cot d.o so. th?sc nir.a months, they, \"hein\u3050\uff1acheckrd ^y Japan, have nselected Ii>ixrope.\u30e0Itlvni\u5de7h diplona.tically, they spe^.k ill of G-crnsny, ar.A \u3078re ,'oro or les c ai\u5df1in\u3054 Jiln^land and \uff01Franco niateriall; r , their actual power concentratec 1 . in tho \uff1fs,cific, \"Tor &crnaj.i^ r , this is a ^reat help. Before the war, it wr-.s ^ n c r a l l y said that iunorica, i-roulcl -Darticipa,te in the earl;- gta^ea of this ^e.x, \"hut if that wer^ trtie the United StatoB vrould hp.ve furaished \u30d5n\u3069land a:id with \uff1bnlp.nes. Although. has ^rndoninant -avy powcr ? it s ^ m s t^.at her forcrs is still insufficient. If the ^.morican ITavy hac cooperated with th?.t of Grrat Britain, it would pro^a^ly havr. >>een very acra-ita^eoub for r-n^laiad ana Prance. Eirstly\uff0c it would have \"been a \u30d3rea\u4e03 spiritual -encoura^enent to Tln.cland and. France. Such, a country a^ Italy wouldl have hesitated to enter the war. If thr\uff0c Ub^ited States Fa,v?\/ \u30ec-,.1 oiperate? together with that of Sugland ar.d Frarce i\u201d. tho MeditcTr?.:-ean Sea, Italy w\u3064ulfl not havn ^ecn \uff1f-Me to make any moves. If viewed in this :.;anner, the situation would pro^.^ly have \"b\u3002er_ considerably different from t-hc \u3064resent. 7CT one tiling, America, hff.d \u2022\uff0crc&tly under-rate'-\" ^rTnar-.y7s stror.^th. She had thought tha\u4e03.^rrope was \u308a afe if out rusted to 3r.^land n,nd \uff1franee. Slio for.lin.? th^.t chec]:inj\uff1a Japan wa.s her chief mission, is now conoontratins: her roal powrr in the Pacific Ocean. If viewed \"by Japan it is extremely \"bothersome, l?at if vieweci \"by Germany, it is an extreme \"blessing. It is B, \u0302 rreat role tha.t J a,pan has played for the sake of Germany. '-ow^vnr since tho fact thr.t tho con.centTO.tion of the main power of the U. S. in tlic Pacific was painful to thr political loaders of Japan, in try in.\uff1a- to ir.iprove rcL-.i:io:is i:i some vra:\/, ar.d to rosch ar. economical understaxi-diii^, they have followed a. course whicii is contraiy to G-crinany 1 s intnntions^ Consequently, althou \u30de 1: Gernaxiy im s r.o \"'.on^er an^r n a s on to \u30c8\u300a thankful tc Japan, actually, Japan has rondcred services compara'ble to that extended \"by Italy. 2- THS Oircsil 13 EUEOPS ^ r T:\u3011OPPCSITIOr 0T;: T:\u4e00::5 U. S. By the above fact, it can seen \u4e03hat lookin\/r from tho standpoint that the position of Japan, Germany, a.nd Itrly lies in e mission aiming at \u4e03he esta^lishmoiit of a new order in the Spft \uff1f:o.c tho '\u2022ost, wb.p.t each nan ion is doin^? se-Darate^ is concoutraged to\u803d\uff1fris achieving tho goal. \u3067lat OP.ch does independently \"bee\u3064mos in effect mu\u4e03UP\u4e04 s i s \u30ed i s \u4e03 I think that the rcl .tionship \"botvrcjen the tlirce nations lies in such P\uff1a fMnd3mente.l relationship. Viowed from tliat standpoint\uff0c it is t V t , G-ermany, 'nd Italy can continue to cooperate, and even if Germany shoulv. oxf.-oll Snglish. and \uff1french influences from Suropo, it does not Tnoni that from thrt rev\ufffd\/ monent, a new order in jHurope cp.n \"bo esta_\u3064lisheiU ^ tl\\? factors ^elon^in^ to old order in Throve will i\u0302 .Bser.\u0302 lo in thp, An.^rican continent. Kio \u30d9old;, \"bullion, wliich is most typical of the old ord^r, has r.lrcady '\u0302 eeii quickly ccncrntrated in thr United Strt^s. Of courso tlm JP^S, who \u30cdrp thr frrat^st rncny of thp. \",evr order, have ali-ead^ the intention of novinr* to th\u3067 Uni\u4e03nd States, all the ousted ruline: classes of En\u3054lan\u53ca\uff01France f vi 13. alro \u30cb-o to tho United State\u3001\" . Sirxc thoep rl\uff0cments h^vn formprlv fcllowrd. individualistic and liVeralistic philosophies, they ca.nnot a^solut^iv rcnain in \uff1f\".iropo ru\u4e04odl under toto.lita.rianism. \"^enccforth, thny will novo in croitof? to thr United States P.B the Puritpji did in oldoti timrs. As F r^ r, ult of this, ell tho old Doc. Fo, 1616 ^are 38 elements of the world will ^e conce.ntrr.tod in thr United States, i-mrica, vhich has \"been ce.llr.d_ tho new worlc 1 . will ^comc old world, rnd liuropo of thr old world vrill >cconG thr new world, p,rA this st^te of opposition will continue for a considerable period of time. Until tl:r old olenentB in America are finallv drivrn out, thr stru^lr will contirue. On tho onr> li^nd, if tho national system of Jrpan is atruptly convrrt'd to tho nov ordor, and procoods rp.pidly towards tli\u30cf - nt of th- new order in Sast \u4e04sin, it would natural ly \"be for hor to collr>orr.t \u30cf coop orate with Suropc' g nnw order. On t'm other h^.nd, in th.^ Pacific, she will ha.vn to sta.\u0302 .d 111 opposition with ricr T g old order, .\"ookin^ at it from its rou.-?h outline, it irry \u3058'-said tli\u0302 b P.^tcr all, th^ coalition of Jar an, G-o rmrny, ancl. Ital? r and rrlp.t.io , of rnu\u4e03\uff1f.id a^d comir.unicp.tion will continue. 3. \u30cb\u3011 C 0 M 5 I K T D FOvHR 01 \uff1a\u2022 ...GLPJTD, \u0302 laJTCH, U17ITID STAT7-S kTD THE \u78b0 EAST, 1 \u4e01OMUTiA:\u2014 Generally I t:iink that your -orcdiction that the old clcneizts of tho worl-L woula all \"bo concoiitrr.tcd in \u4e03lio Tnitod States is an interesting o\"bs3rTab?.on. Sincc the outbreak of this war, I could not \"beliovc that thn \u6237xistinr -oov\/er of En^lrvnd and France could suppress the newly formed Italo\u2014Gerirrji Axis. In s^ite of that, tho rulin\u5e7f clashes oi j^n^land and ^r^nc? themselves have \uff1f. Gtron^ feolinr cf firfitinr p,,\uff0cai:st Germany and Italy. Vinwod from this respect, I h^.d the feolin^ that it was tho influence of the Jews, who aro thn rulinc\uff1b class of Ei\/.cland end. \uff1fr?nce, vho provoked this hcroelrss war, aiminr only at thn dnaling of even a little \u30c8low against .inti Jewish countries liko G-er^ipny and Italy \"by sacrificing ^n.^land and Prance, In the c our so of later dovclo^ments, howovor, the situation is likely to move tcwr rds such \uff1f.. dircctior. ITor instanco, tho capital of Ib^land a.nc.\u30deranee will flo^- to thr Unitrcl Strtos. The Gov r n ^ n t would also pro\"HaT)ly sonk shelter in iiir'erica. rrsidos, r)ro\"ba\u30c8ly, Jrwish li\"bcra.lists will also <:o\u2022 In such a cace, whr.t will \"bnccne of thr world? Tho re >rill contirari, for r, cor-ieidpra^lo ^^riofi of tiiiir, e stru^cle hrtwecn the newly arisen influence in \uff01 r , n d thr old inf]ji.a?icn centrred in the United States. This t imp,\u3067s.st Asip. will \"be the sconr of \u4e03\u3001e conflict. In all cases, \uff1a\u2022\u3067 a . n c ' Tr ra nco ^ill he.v - to maintain .Impnrialistic domination of thoir colonien in thr> Crior.t, erd. the- Unitod States which is w^lcoirin^ and providinci\uff1a shcltrr to Sn\u5382land and ^rar.ee, also ca:. u disregard Ar.^lo- American domination of these colonies. Thus, all \u4e8crelish and Trench fleets which escapnd damage wi* ! 1 assem\"bl^ in the Pacific. If the \u4e01Jni\u4e03f.c\uff0c Statra find-- it futile to s^.vo \u2022.\u30e6rope, aho will concontrp.te her entire forces in thr. ..\/r.c-ric ard vdll cl^frnd ii.ustr-lia, French Ir^do China, or British India. Sli-\u3001will also invadr Chin?. It is u n m i s t a b l e that t-?e United States will tekc. such pn action. Since thp situatio?\u30e6 would \"bn such that the forces of Italy and thr Soviot Union and American forccs which was unitnd to those of ^m^land a\u0302 .c 1 . \uff1francp will nvnr.tually clash in. the \uff1far Ifest, thr \"\"ra ::]ast wi\u4e04\u4e04\u308f\u3054 forcea into the \u3064,?mo -po \u4e03ion as the modern ~rlfe..ne. In such a case no one cp,n tell in vrhrit v\/.:-y the United States, w M c h is suppressing Japan with a ilrn attitude for thn m a s o n that what has \"hoen done \u3001y Japan since the Manchurian Iiicidcnt and the China Incident, namely tho establishment of the P'oc. H 1616. Pae-e 39 nrv order in Z?.st Asia., is contrary to America 1 s prir.ci-oles f will pltrr her ^ar Eastern policy accordinr to the situation ^t the crucial momenta In oth<=r words, sh.', mp.y cha-n^o to a, policy in which she intends to return Japan to the status of a, wrtchclog a.s at th\/* time. o: f f thpi An^lo-Japanese Alliance ?:od to use Japaji as \u00bbdx r ancod prarri troops for the dnnocratic countries in the .last in the spr\/? c\u0302 r as Poland p:id. \u30cf lit\u4e03 entente conn.tries. Ir. such a case there sef rr;s to oxist particr.lrr da:iro'ald \u3011n?ke' Japan a tool. If such f sit^r.tiorn. drvolo-os, thp actual novpir^nt in ruro-.oe and Japan r \u0302 movonnnt in East Api?. arr a.T the prest-nt s u v s t t i a l l y a.iT.cJ, \uff1f.t t:,\u30cf esti5?iunnnt of t!v n^w world order. \u30f6 f r o m \u4e03\u5e7fomenl;\uff0c \u0302 oth parties ^ i l l \ufffd \ufffd contrao.ict jry to tho mov^mont, aad it is fnarod that Japan vould suvoo\u3075\u3001t tho maintenance of. the old order. Doc. No. 1616 P?ge 40 4 . ENGL\/.ND AFTIK DEFEAT A N D TFL CRISIS IN TPE UNITID S T A T L S SFIKAT01.J: If the present political rulers of Jrpr.n continue to be in control of Jrpfn' s ?dninistrr>tion, whrt vcu hr.ve just sr.id noy o c c u r . Tre United ^xntcs is now taking a v e r y lenient attitude tov\/crds JV.prru Pp.rticulrrly, the ruling clnss of Joprn Is r.rJcntly ^opinr f-r t>c free inper\u30e2ation of Ancricrn goods ? or the cstrblisfecnt of credit rnd is trying to ccncluJe p new trpde t r e r t y . AltT-cugh there is a tendency omong then to cccpcr?te with the United S\"CP tcs with con pic tc disregrrd of t\u30c8e D r s t , in p.ccrrdr.nce witr the sentincnt expressed by t\u30c8e grent nrjcrity of the people of todry, t> is should not be a l l o w e d . I crnnct possibly inrginc t v ?.t Jrprn will reverse t^c coursc cf world h i s t o r y , c^eck the progress of civilization\uff0c end check her ov;n development by clisrcgnrding YCT present nission in the Asirtic continent rnd tie role s!hc m u s t trke in the vast A sir.tic sphere. In this rcspcct, wc need not be so pessinistic but r.s you \u30c8 p v e s pid, Englr.nd end Frrncc wbn hrvc been expelled frcm Europe, by cooperating wit\u30c8 tVe United S t a t e s , w i l l rinkc u p in \u30e0 s i ? , whp.t they lost in E u r o p e . It is cert?in thnt the NctVcrlrnd Indies, Frcnch I n d o - C M n ? rnd BritisV I n d i a , v&lcY t v c y VitV^rto friled to develop and utilize sufficiently u n d e r their spheres of influence, w i l l bococc nore precious to then thrn b e f o r e . Cnnsequenxly, there is likely tc exist dnnger tVat they will ccncentratc t^cir influences tVere. But I think tYrt it v:ill be P long tir.c before ijnglr.nd d F r a n c e , if tl-cy rrc expelled fron E u r o p e , will be?r tVi& silently rnd F. bend on her return to E u r o p e . Lven though the ruling clrss itself should cvrcurte. to t^e United Ste.tcs with gold b u l l i o n s . w a r s M p s \uff1fnd mcrc^r-nt skips, there would still remain in Inglr.nd 4-5,000,000 people. There wc'ulcl else rennin in Frrncc 40,000,000 people. It is inpossiblt for then to trkc ti en r.ll ^ith then\u3002 They will leave xiifb great reluctance. For inst-ncc, who w i l l support the populr-tion of 45,000,000 r-cr.irining in Englrnd? Thcrt is only tVrte or four m n t V s 1 supply of f o o d , Fitlcr hss no ^bligpticn tr support t>cn with nrtcrirls in Continental E u r o p e . Furthernnrc,\u30c8^; is u n ^ M e t\u0302 - do s o . TVey cpnnot live unless tVey depend \u300c n t]\uff0cc C< ntincnt of ^.ncricr.. In any ense, the people in Englrncl r.mst depend on the Anoricp.n c o n t i n e n t . Even if t^c snr 11 n m b t r of people vYo hrd o b m d o n e d \u20acrvx,ryt T \u3001ing' nnd Yv.d ncvod to Cpnoda should cc operate with the United States to nrnagc the colonics in the Orient, nuch cr.nnot be cxpcctcd of t h e n . T^c novemcnt for restoring Europe v\/ill be c< nsiderpblo \uff1fnd vigorous for t v c next five or ten y e r r s . During t>r.t p e r i o d , they wculd not be able to exert their power in tYa O r i e n t , During that tine, V'c nrvrl power r f Gcrr.r.ny rnd Itcly will increr.se rrpiclly. Docc No, 1616 Psge 41 Then tYL continent of A n c T i c 1 v i l l be in \uff1f defensive pcsition\u00ab W h a t e v e r one nr,y s\"y 5 t^c p'-pulrtion of Luropc is increasing, rnd one c r n n o t supix.rt h i m s e l f n Gcrnr.ny rnd I t a l y v;ill d e v o t e trcr.sclvcs s o l e l y in e x p l o i t i n g A f r i c n\u3002 B u t e v e n in thr.t ense. it is n<^t probable t v f:t t\u30c8c.y '!rcvc no ccnnectirn Vvity tVe A n c r i c p n c o n t i n r n t l y i n g r.cross the \u3088 t l r n t i c Occpru T h e i r i n n t d i ^ t c o b j e c t is S o u t h Aricric?., w ^ i c h is r br-pnc^ of E u r o p e e Hrcinlly sper.king,\u30a6side frori the n r t i v t s , only S p a n i s h , Gcrri^ns and I t ^ i i ^ n s r r c t h e r\u201c Th e r e \uff1f r c o n l y p fov\uff1b Anflo~S*^xrns\u00ab T > o s c porplc do n: t l i k e the U n i t e d St? tea.- Trc. v.'orld hrs been u n d e r r b s c l u t e A n g l o - S ? x m deninntion up to nov; s c-nc. beer use of this, t'rey VCTC controlled ty ilnitcd States r\/ith reluctances \"however, if the T\/orld siturtion should suddenly o( cone such tYr.t tVc ^ n g l o - S a x o n s r r c d t f c r t c d , t)\u2019cy \u8035raild r r t v c r f r v c r E u r o p e , \/.ncricp \\;311 be in m c x t r t r c l y d e f e n s i v e p c s i t i ^ n ^ The v e r y f m i n d r t i o n of the l:(hnrne Dc ctrinc w i l l crurblc\u30de\u3002 TVc s i t u r t i c n v i l l \"bcconc v e r y grr.vc f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s , S i n c c trc U\u00ab.E S h e r s e l f \u30c8 r s r i c h c s in e x c e s s r f h e r n e e d s , she. will net be furt-'rer tenpted by t>x nrtcri?ls of \u30e0sir 0 If a n \uff1f.fitntion should brt--k cvt in S^ut'r \u30e0 r i c r i c r , v;Mc'h is so closc b y fron trc s t ^ n d p r i n t of s c l f - d c f e n s e . v n u l d not t M s be cf cxtrci e dUm?\u3057r t^ the U . , herself? Therefore \uff1ft tVis r.oncnt it crnnot be inrgined that the United Strte.s r;lrno vr'Uld incrcpsc hor pov;cr in t>x O r i e n t rs y o U V r v c rr-\u3066,srid c \u30e0lti^nig\u5c38 Onrd'- Yvs p. population of only 10,000^000, people v\/h- csc?ped fron England will grpclt^lly grt'^cr t > c r c 0 Since O n r d r rlonc is not copr.blt cf r-^intr ining t^e pr\u201d,cr cf r. grcrt npticn, England ? T'hr Yr.s cscnpcd fr^n Eurc pc , r i l l c\u3002nsidcr India, Austrrlin . New Z t r l s n d , ttc,, \u201d s bcct-ning \u3078f grcr tcr v\u300cluc e Fcv;cver, it is que sti^nrblt rs to v:Vether t.\u30c8c Britis\u30c8 Ir pirc, hr?s lost Lnglrncl r.nd > r s n^ved tr C^nr.dr , c-n n'\u30cf intrin the srnc po\\7cr sre Y^s Veld before 0 \u30e0 1th\u3078ugl\" there is pn cxtrexic view t^rt E-titlmd Proper, sr. tc spcrk, is like t>~e site of office fcr t v c British Lr'piro, no nrtt\u3057r v.'^at cnc m i g h t spy, it hr.s been tl\u0302 t' -'.otive power, rnd the ccntincnt vv.s ccrtrolled frrn t h c r c 0 \u30a8 t\u30c8ink tYc-.t tYc surviving inflTicnco of the Britisr Enpiro, w v 'ic]\u00b0 Yrs icst her frot hold in Eurrpc r.nd v; v icb ^ps tscr.ped fr.\u3078n Englp.nd Pr... p e r , should nrt bt ft.^red by us., h t r ny r?.tc, t v c dispute bctr\/ccn the new influcncc in Europe rnd tYc \u2022 lei influcncts vj^ich cscrpcd t^ \/-ncricp \u30d5ill bo in n ficrcc struggle for trc next five or ten y e n r s . During t\u3001rt tine\uff1a, rt l e r s t ? f-cy probnbly will be 'unr.bic t exert nuc\u30c8 pressure in fbc P a c i f i c A r c r , TV is p e r i o d cf fr\"r.i f i v e t\" ten y e a r s is v e r y prccicus fc r c asir tic r^cc c If t\u3001is period is idled \uff1fv\/ry, it is c l c n t h r t o p p r e s s i o n of vr.rious n r t u r c w i l l be inflictcc 1 . u p e n t v c n e A f t e r r.ll, L u r ^ p c ^lsc rrust depend on \/.si? 1 . T\u30c8\u3057y rrc dcsir'us ^f nrtcrirls fr -n AsiPo Doc. No. 1616 P?ge 42 Sine\u3057 t\u30ecc British Lnipirc , F r m c t . , ?nd Lnglrnd In. rstlf, v\u30ebo rrc depend,nt upon American continent, Fill \uff1fftri all cndcrvor to rnncx A sir. to the old infTutnct ? it is ncccsspry for J?prn during t\u30ecis period to utilize to t^e utmost degree tT-c extra time given Vcr\u00ab T v i s must be c grcrt subjcct for tVc: J-\"prncsc p e o p l e 8 I t M n k t v rt t h . reason t^c Jrprnc sg people hod scmcwlrt felt t v r t \\ r n. had renewed the critical turning point is due to F ccrtrin kind of intuition concerning this grcrt significance. 5 . T^T POSITION OF TT t L PRO-BKITISF FACTION IN OUB COUNTRY . \u2022 ' \" \u201c 1 - - \u201c \u2015 * \u2014 \u201c \u201c \u2018 - \u2018 1 \" \u2019 \" 1 \u201c 1 1 \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 \" \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 \u77a7 I\u2022\u753b1 \u2018 \u2014 KOBAYAS^I\uff1b No one in t>c political rnd business \u53eaorld\u3002 and rlso Imptrirl University professors in t\u30c8\u3057 rcadermic w o r l d , seems to u n d e r s t m d rnyt\u30c8ing in t v r t sense\u3002 Still, their views rrc opposite. F i r s t , the opinion t v n t Gcrmeny \uff1f'ould be dcfcrtcd S ^encro.lly prevalent until recently, but new it seens t--rt Gcnnrny is likely to w i n t't-c t;fr. Wc crnnot fig>t reality, TV-cy rrc sr.ying t\u30c8rt victory in wrr is unimportrnt\uff1b t h P t victory over militnry power is unimportant:; rnd that it is r.n enemy of civilizetion c TVcir words imply\u2014t>rt justice still exists in t v c dcmocrr.cy of Frrncc nnd Englrnd\u3002 A c t u f l l y , the discrse is too f^r \uff1f d v r n c c d for remedy\u3002 TV\u3057y rrc r group \u30c8 should go to t v c Continent of A n c r i c n . Fron Jcp- n S r If l AT0KI: T h r c arc rir.ny persons v: h o should r-lso lcrve J?prn e NOMURA: TVc point tYct tYc nrtional feeling v\/ould not ptri.it Jr.pan to trkt p cotrsc contrary to enrr\u3057nt Vistory of you spcrk is r mpttcr of coursc, tut as M r 0 K0BAYAS^ T I \u30c8rs just strted \uff1b, sincc t^crc rrc some peoplc v\/ v o vie\u301c7 the progress of history from the opposite point of vicv?, SFIKATORI: \u3057vcr 5 it crnnot be conccivca thr.t suc>\" people will govern Jrp?n f o r e v e r . It should not be p.llov^cd. K0BAYAS T T Is T v t y ?t)pcr.r to be possessed vith such idcr.s. S T T I M I O h I : No m?ttcr v\/hrt you sr.y ? t v c y rrc people: t\/Vo have bcc.n thoroughly imbued wit:\u30c8 tT\u00b0c mr.rrov? of tones vit\u30c8 tradition, in br.d sense prejudicc trrdition, oi to mat it more strongly., vith prejudice, is vtry difficult to s v r.ke off\u00ab Under such r \u7814orld t'~cy rre nfint^ining their present positien\u3002 The c>rngc of suc\"h r\uff0c.7orld inimc.dirtcly nxr.ns the loss of tVcir position. If t^rt sitiiFtion develops, t M s would bt \"sclf-prcscrvr tion u \u201c T>~\u3066r\u3001. is \uff1f pro-Britis^ fret ion in Jr:prn\u00bb \u30a8 think the pro-Britis \u30c8 feeling rill rcmrin even if Ejigla.nd is e m s h e d 6 The pro-Britis>~' feeling is one v; v icV expresses self-love,, It is on\u3057 tVrt syovis love for one s self\u00bb Dcc. N'\u3001I6l6 P r g c 43 K O B A Y A S F I : T K . b u s i n e s s w o r l d is g e n e r a l l y l i k e t v r t . ST T Ilv\/,TOI.I: It is n o t o n l y the busint ss Y;orld. F i t h c r t o t h r y h r v c b e e n inbuc.d i n t h p t n m n e r , Ti _ cy a r c \u30cfs\u3057 h r v c tr.Ufe\"ht t\u30c8is s c n t i n c n t to o t h e r s r.nd tl^osc v&o Ye.vc T\/rittcn b\"c;ks ^ n t\u30c8is s u b j e c t i n cr0.cr t\u30cf s r f c - g u r r d tVicir p o s i t i o n s . If the pre sent w o r l d c c l l r p s c s f \" c i r p o s i t i o n v:ill \"bt lcst\u00ab K0BAYAS7TI: T h r t is t r u e . \/.It^r.ugh v;c. i n c l u d i n g S T T IKAT0h\u30a8\u30bf rrrc l o c k e d u p o n r.s the. pro--Gv:rnr:n f a c t i o n b y t>\"c p r ^ - B r i t i s r f r c t i o n , I do n e t t h i n k t ^ r t n-ur grc \"up is p r r t i c n l - r l y p r o - G c m m . S F I I ^ T O B I : S i n c o v,c c r l l t V e n the i r c - B r i t i s b F r c t i o n , t h e y p r o b r b l y c.\u3002ll u s the P r ^ - G c r n ~ n g r c u p o KOB\/.Y\u30e0S TT I: Acc-rcling t V c n rltV'oug.V' l i s t e n i n g to tYc pro-Ge.rnrn f a c t i o n is v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g , -:&r,t tl^cy \u30c8 c r . r f r o n o t r c t u r l l y t r u e , N O M U L A : T h e y zpy t v r t v;-; r.re t a k i n g ? c o u r s c in t v c e p p r s i t e d i r e c t i o n fror. c i v i l i z n t i c n c K O B A Y A S F I : \/ . f t c r\u300c 1 1 , t ^ o s'urec cf the p r e s e n t e x t e n t of G c r n r n y ' s nig?\"t l i e s in \u30c8 t r p o s i t i v e p o s s e s s i o n of n e w culture\uff0c n e w i d c r s , n c v ^ c r l d -^utlock, KOI.ttJIii 1 -.\uff1a\u30a8\u5382noring n e w d c v c l o p n c n t s in p r e s e n t d r y G c r n r n y , t h e y r.re r f t c r ?11 , t r y i n g tc j u d g e G e r n p n y PCcarding to t v o piinciiDlt rf \"\/light n r k e s M g l - t \" of t ^ e M i d d l e A g e s . \u30a7 fc.lt j u s t rs the C r t V r l i c s did c t tVc t i n e ^f t^c K t r i r i s s m c c , ^s f h e y v i e w e d the p r o g r e s s i v e e l e m e n t s wh\u30cf\uff1fdnircd t^c r r t s \u2018nd l i t e r ? t u r o of Grc.ec\u3057 r.nd R ^ n c , w i f h n f e e l i n g t>r.t r. grcr.t h e r e s y K\".c\uff1b r.risen, b c c r u s c . r l t > o u g h the u c r l d vr.s n o w p r o g r t s s i n g tcv;rrds tYc cc-untry c f G o d , t\u30c8crt o D p c r r e d hen the r s v'tTt t r y i n g t\u2018. wr r s > i p t v c s n v r g c g o d s cf Grcx.cc. I think thrt it is sinilrr tr t M s . KOB\/.yAS T T I\uff1b T ^ o r c f T c , t\u30c8c s i t u a t i o n v;ill n e t be clcr.r u n t i l t i n e cltapsc s\u00ae S i T n\u4e04 T O R I : f r c n t're. M s t o r y cf n p n k i n d , the Ecnrissr.nce is r- r e v i v r l of t\"K e u l t u r e of G r e e c e \uff0c w M c h is t^c o r i g i n of dcnocrr.cyj Wr V ;cver, tYc n e w v'crld o u t l o r k of Gc.rnrny rnd I t a l y is n n e v e n e n t v&icY e n d e n r s t ^ go b r c k to t^c p r t - G r c c i m c r n c i-lsc i n J n p n n 5 R c s t o r r t i c n r l u ^ y s nc'\u3078ns.r r e v i v a l , T T ot T cvcr it g e e s f u r t h e r br.ck tc tYc n y t ^ c l o g i c r l f.gc 0 Totrlitrrir.nisn. t h c r c f c r c . is P. r e t u r n to t h i n g s funclr.ricntr.l r.nd csscnti'-i v i e w e d f r ^ n c u l t u r a l h i s t o r y cf r-rnkind. TYc e u l t u r e t c t h e y r e f e r is n e t r c r l l y c u l t u r o . T h e y n u s t be spcr.king a b o u t supcrci^-1 c i v i l i z r t i - n or s c n c t M n g of tYrt nr t u r c . I s n ' t Dcc. Nc. u 1616 P?g( 44 th?.t vnrifus r;T.n-nr.do institutions or supcrcial civilizfitirn thrt -nly greets t\"hc eye, The G c m m por-plc nrkc a distinction betv\/ecn eulture \u3053 civilizr t i o n . \/ccrrding to t\u30c8linglis\u30c8 5 \/rcricr.n and J^pr.ncsc per pic, it is t M s supcrficirl civilizp- tion t^pt Gcrr^rny will rlxlisl-\u2018 fr^n t M s cr.rtv if she v.ins t v c w n r . Culture\uff1a w i l l not perish; cn the contrary it \u3067ill flourishe Up t: ncTv ? \uff0c\u30de>Tt Jrprn rr s been tclcl as being nest vr.lur.ble v;r.s t\u30c9is V\/cstern civilization brsc.d on libcrr.lisr.i 0 6 , OKIGIN OF LUIxOPLilN CIVILIZATION NOMURA: Concerning t^vt p ^ i n t ,\u30a8 oncc wrote r short article in t>c \"Ncticnr.l K c v i c v \/ , I t can gcncrrlly be sr.id thnt n o a e r n luroptr.n civi\u4e04iz?ticn originated in F c l l c n i s n a T T n^tvcrj He\u4e04lenisn is r. ncv; civilization v; v icl\" originr.ttc\uff1b in a Grccirn colony fit t\u30c8c_ tine v;Vcn the Aryans entered the Greek Fcninsulr , rcr cVcd the 'M&diueroncon Sea, rnc! erne in ccntr.ct uit\u30c9 z v c \"\uff01c^r.nic civilizr.tiru of tl-c M c d i t c r r n e r n . For tT~c A r y r n s , it v.t.s r foreign civilizrtion t is the culturc cf tlx I.:ccitcrr.nc8n? The pirates of the Pcrsir.n Gulf v&o entered the r c C i t c r r a n c m \uff1fnd r.ssinil?tcd v;itT^ t?e Phocnicirns established one cf the nctrc p o l i t m civiliza- tions\u00bb Is n^t its origin in tlK crrnvr.n civilization cf t^c L r r b i r n desert\u3064. T'fc cf.rrv^.ns nsclo tl-'c.ir living by ^ccr.sicnplly Icrving t\u30c8\u3057 ir brrrcn lr.nd rnd robbing r.nd chcr tine t v c ferncrs f\u3001f fertile M c s c p o t r n i p . These per pie Irtcr c:st\u30cfblis\u30c8\u30ecd t^c corincrcirl enpirc crllcd Bnbylcnie cnc: r i s e , tvc nilitrristic crur.tr\uff1a' Lssyriv., In either cr sc 5 t^cy nr.de t\u30c8\u3057ir living ne t \"by producing anything thensclves, tut by exploiting t'^o frrncrs w^Fc v;crc producers- The religion t>-r t developed \u5c38 t r c XIP S B^bylcnirn r.nd \/.ssyii^n n^nrthtis\uff1a\"', rnd t\u30c8rt r\/p.s developed intc\uff1b Judoisri w v ic\u30c8 in turn, be.cmt _ Christianity\u3002 WhT.t is v e r y intc resting rb^ut J'uclrisn rnd Christianity is thrt r contract of f I t Y is nrclc bctv\/cen Gnd r.nd nnnkinclo T\u30c8is idor \u30cff r r.utur 1 rncl rc.ciprccrl contrr.ct Y.TS inhcritccl by Europe t v r o u g > t>c Fcllcn.irn \u3002nc1 ^cbrcvisn t>rt I just ricnticnccl. These nrc t>~c nedern thcrics sccirl crntrrct rnd t^e cntrrct cf srverci\u3068nty B In such r socicty, either c ^ m c r c c or spclip.ti,-n exists, m d in sucV \uff1f v;r,y, tv^csc tv;c f r n s rapper.r in ecrnr.nics* A n d , in t v e c ns true tion of sr cicty sincc the powers r.re in o p p o s i t i m , it t?.kcs the fc m of r dcr.ircmcy if the prvjers opposing c?.c v ctYf-i ^.rc in b r l n n c c . Few ever, if tVis brl^ncc is destroyed rnd one of t\u30c8csu p r \\\/crs beccncs very pc Tjcrful, r n cxtr\u3057ne cUsprtisn v,'ill d e v e l o p . The se tcndcncics hr.vc r.Dpcp.rcd in GrccC L end Kcr.x. Fur\u4e03}-em\u5e7frc., even in intcr- nr ti'^nrl s' cicty, tVcrc will develop such unstable inter- nrticnrlisn r.nd ppcifisn rs rrned ptnee cr t\"he L c p f u c\u3002 f Nrtions 'r sue? principles cf Fggrcssi^n rricl idcp.s cf tT-.e n\u5e7fTlcl r.s rnc nrtir.n r.s it die\uff1b in Urccd^nin rnd K o n c . D o . Nc. 1616 Page 45 Mc clcrn Luropc. is \u30cf.v\/crld representing conflicting principles in w \u30c8 r . l l of these principles \uff1frc\uff1a n i x e d a A s r result, p l t V c u g h ecnnor.icr.llj'' it is crllccl c n p i t r l i s n , it is a r e f i n e d fr\u3001;m r ' c nncrci^lisn,, A f t e r t v i s cririn.<:rcir.lisri \uff1f exi.iloitcd \u3044.,.\u3057 stic rgricxilturrl districts tc t v o l m i t it will t 1 'cn utilize; tc the utnest trc rgriculturrl districts of sue\u30c8 c v e r s c p s c o u n t r i e s p.s IncIir nnd A u s t r a l i a S i n c e . that woulc: not Tdc sufficient, it \uff0c,.'ill oxplr.it Mrnchurip. rnd China. TV is is t\u30c8 c s r -called \u30a8 npi rir-lism, Sincc Ii.iptrir'listic c s untrics ct^t r thr.n Fnglmci r.rc appcrring here t v crt , disputes rnd ri^trgonn sn v;ill elf v elep c- nccrning t v c prf blt.r.i \u3078f colonics. T c situr vion w i l l be prss?blf as leng rs \uff1f'.rncc\uff1b per.ee is r.rintnincC, tut senner r r l?.tcr, r siturtion will develop in wrich trcse countries will clr.sh in rn ir.ipcrirlistic v. 7 .\u0302r struggle f r vr v;rrld d o n i n r t i o n , T ? i s is t u c substr.ncc cf t ^ c Eur^ncsnfii v;rr B SucV nanncr \u3044f l i v i n g , w r y rf existcnee, or ferr53 nf c i v i l i z c t i c n r r c r.tmcrnp.litics that d c v u c p c c l in u n s u i t a b l e crcr.s such r s in deserts rnd scr s w M c h , in esse ncc 5 crnnot intciin hunr'n life by Inbcr\" The \u2022 odcrn wc.rld is a product \u2022\"f the rcr:r.rkrtlc d t v e l o p n e n t c f t h i s p \" b n\u308a m l c i v i l i z a t i o n \uff1fnc! t v e. rtttr.pt t,:. return tc. t>is rbn'jrnr 1 civilization is t v e downfrll of V o Occident,, EnliK'htcnritnt crrncs fron the E a s t . Nrzisn, in r. ccrtrin sense , is return t\u95e8 t>*c Orient \u2022\u00b0nci t v c restoration of pgricultural civilizr.tir'ru F'or i n s t a n c e e v e n t\u30c8c Nr\uff1azi nr.tionrl l^-nd p i r n hr.s r tondcncy- t^vjr.rd Jpp^nisn rnd is # r.ftc'r r l l , tryinf\uff1a t\u95e8 return t\u300c the s p c c i r l c f T.rr'ctcr mc 1 \uff1a nr.turc c f hur.r.n l i f e scd o n tYc s o i l . 7 . J A P A N ' S L L B L K S U 1 U M A N D ^ K B L O C T T T O K Y S^ILAl'Oi.I: Indcc\u2022\u3053j it r.mst be s o . In thr c n v c r s i o n of \u3066\u5e7f(.present T\/crld it mist be s( \u00bb In short, it is not nrtur.\u00b0 1 to \u3057strblis.\u535c\uff1fn er.pire pci^ss f\"C seven scrs 0 I t'^ink t v r t the ^uturc world T\/ill ncccssr.rily be divided into lrrgc spheres. Generally, t>csc zones- rrust \"be c^nnt.ctcd tc \uff1b. cfhor b,y irui\u3053\u3002 Jr.prn nust slso crnsiccr- herself as conncctcd by lrnc t^ t v c Asiatic continent instepc\uff1b of considering v c r s c l f as r scr-bound c c u n t r y , On n a p , t^c Jr pr n-IJr nc Pulmc - C^ inn b l o c s y s t e m t h p t Jrpr.n is n o w o p c r r t i n g . is indeed v\/idesprend^ But I think that the sj^crc riry be a littlt. snnllo If the \u3069 ut'\u535c Scr, s e.rce. is r.dced to t V i s , it uill bec r 'nc \u3053 splendid Icbf \u2022nsrrm \u2022 I tVinL that t M s is net a n c c o m i c enpire dul r splcnaiJ lebensrrtin conncctcd by rnd v;Vich \u30c8p.s t v c ferns rf t:\u535ce tFccry \u30cf\u30a7\"\"T\u0302 c. \"bloc s y s t e m of tl-c ncv\/ w\u300crlcl 0 \u30a8 t y i n k t h a t v.'c rrust c o n s i d e r the 1 cb ens rr. Tin of the A sir tics or t h ostrblis'rncnt c. f r. b l o c f r o n t v is T h t e x i s t i n g c\u3078nncrciplisn n u s t , o n t M s occr siorij be conplett\u2022\u4e04y liquidrtcd\u00ab It sccns tc nc thr.t .r.ctivitics br.scd o n t V c s c i l , such r s p r i m i t i v e inclustiri\u3057s\uff0c v;ill b c c i i c fundr.ncntclo If t\u30c8is is n c c r n p l i s h c d , the tcr. p t r t i o n of u r g i n g T \u00bbv?r w i l l be grc r.tly clccrcrsoc]. In t> is sense, t v c intcrvitvr given to t^e Ancricrn press by Fitlcr is very inttrtstingo Fc denrnded fhrt sincc . , P?g\u00a3 4-6 r-c. N o . 1616 he does net infringe on tVc sp>\"cr\u3057 nf cxistencc cf utlners, others rrust net. int erf crc rity- M s own Itbi. nsrFur.. F o r this purrv.se, vc rrust gcncrrlly V r.ve\uff1a t v c essentials frr scli\u3001\u4e00sufficl'-.ncy, Trc Urit\u3057rl Stc.tv.s rdvc crtcs the Monroe doctrine 5 t'\" \u30f3s\u3067\uff1ais zri t f c Unite .f. States is n'\u3001t desirous of being invpdeel by tro old u ^ r l d . Fc snid tVrt it \\7culd tt tclc;rf>t(d if the United Strtes e n f i n e d herself to this drctrinc, but he rcprinrndocl the United St&tcs ps bcinf unrcf s' nr.blc in intcrf crinp in c v c r y t v i n g thrruch- cut the u( rid t KOB\/.YASPI\u2022\u2022 T?t.is:fc.r.c\uff0c unless J.^ppn's strtcsr.cn either folic\uff0c,, En\u00a3l?.nU rnd t'he U , S 5 cr else r b c l i s v this c\u3001.ursc, she crnnot rcccrnplisJi nny\u3066\u30c8inc -n \uff1f. l^rgc scrle. A grort nrticn-T\/iclt plrn conccntrrtccl \u30cfn nrticnr.l defense, in t>c f u t u r e , nust fi 11 or: sue\u30c8 r c u r s c , SKLHATOLI: Wc r.vust frllci: sue\u30c8 r c ursc even th ugh it is \u3072gr.inst cur \"\/ill ] 1 ust f O I I C T t v r t c r ursc. r p p i d l y . 8\u00bb CP\/J\u30e0CTEE OF GIL:\u3075.\u4ebaN l.\\CE N O M U M : I rnly t^ink t^rt nctv;ithstrncling t^o fr.ct t\u30c8pt t^c\uff1b situr.ticn is pcturlly so ? t^crc rrc r grcrt nr.ny per pic Who trkc r-n opposite view\u3002 it rrust be trken frr grrntcd thrt intcrtsts crusc t\u30c8cr: tc t, o ke this enpnsite vic?r 9 But r.f tcr - 1 1 , ur nincls, wMcl\" arc new ccntrelied \"by pp st t'^caights pnd idcr-.s, r.rc influenced in this w r y , T\" crc is r-lso the rise' nccpt5.rn tVrt world civilizrtion '-'ri\u5382inrted in Grcccc ^ncl Hone rnc tlr.t nodcrn civilizoti n wr5 pcrfc ctcd in France r ncl E n g l a n d , r.ncl thrt sincc t^is m.s saia to \"be of tVc hi.L^cst leve], r.ny ir..pr>- v e n e n t in t \u30c8 is direction is c nsidcrcd nr-'grc ss. f tcr rll ? t 1- is ac.cs n.:\u3001t differ f 11110:rncnte 11 y '\"it\u3001 t v c intcrprctrti' n r f Vistr ry by H f r x . In t M s i m n c r , Europe is ccnsidcrcd rs the ccntcr of rll T\"istc:iy. ^c\/zcvcr, r l t v Jp pnn sparks of r rxcw ordt r in Erst , s^c Vrs not cnntcrplr.tc d rt rll rs to the nature of the v i s t ^ r i c ? l brsis on v;>-ic>\" t^c ncv order strnds. T M s is n>: t only r ^rcblcn r.f M s t ^ r y o T v c clcl world cutlcck pt.rncp.tes tVc field, of philos^p 1 - y . rnd politics, econf;riics. Ipv;, mr\uff1b society. A s 1'\u3064n\u3069 rs things r.rc viewed with such\u2018r w r l c ontlrrk, t) (.\u4e86 w i l l be \u3014list\u30cfrtccl c It sccns to nc t v s t \uff1f f t c r rll ? p nev; cnlturrl n^vcricnt is e.bs olutcly nc c C s SP r y . x^lty-cugh the Nrzis in Gcrnr.ny hrvc r fine new \uff1frorld cutic^k, it t\u3002r die 1 , net rppcnr siKldenly \"but nrosc in Gcrnrriy rftc r the rrc\u3057 rnd str.tc v-crc u n i f i e d . For c x n n p l c , ^ c tl v'cr\u3057 V l culture 1 struggle cf Bisnr.rk hrs r deep pr.liticrl significance, rnd sucV things ps Doc. No. 1616 Page 4-7 ^t-gclirnicm in t v e p\u30c8ilosop\u30c8icsl f i e l d , movement of romantic Irr t\u30c8inking from the standpoint of litcrrry thought. t v c histori vr1 s c v o o l of economics, end proponents of ancient Gcrmcn lrv\uff1b \u4e00 11 t>~e legal school. Therefore, it is so id t>? t tht movement \u571f , o r t v e estptlisVirent of the new culturc, w^ioh is brsed on p. v . r v wiac scope rnd 'wVicV 5 would give t^c Nr:zi' s w o r l d or clooi' s foundrtion, arose\uff1b in Germpny from c nine tec lit - !' ccntury e Since, t f. t inoveincnt ciicJ not fully rttain s u c c e s s , it VTs defertcd by democracy or liberalism r.t V't tir g of t v c Irst v:orld w s r 0 Fow\u3057vcr 5 t> is time, under N r z i dor.in?tion, tVis movement Vr s completely floviis^cd, On c o n t r a r y , ID C C P U S G of tVc cxistcnce of sue\u30c8 r cultural f o u n d r t i o n , tVc ' s clominr .ion tcc^nc f i r m . TVr.t is a y line of 1 ' thought- S^IRATORI: The >\"cynott of tVf chrrecter of tT-e Gcrmm rpce varic a grert? y f\u300fir t \u30c8 r.t of t'e A n g l o - S a x o n s . I t^ink + v r t principr-lly, their rrcirl cVf.rrctcristic has r v e r y strong totplitari- n tend'\u3001icy. A t the spmc tine, sine\u3057 t v c y ^ o v e pccomplifVed sue\u30c8 ogrtss in scitricc t v t y V p v c . of c o u r s e , ? rtspcct for tl-c.ir individuality \u3002s on\u00ab of their strong p o i n t s e F o w c v o r , tot\u3063litnrirn is whrt m?kc s up t v i s foundrtion. TT-cr,. fore , t\u30c8t DrrlirEicntPry govcrnnitnt of tVt Anglo-Srxons c^ not possibly trkc root on t v a t p o i n t . I believe t v - 1 Jrprn is similar on tYet point. I rm inclined to believe t^r.t t'^c v^-olesoriic instinct of rix t^e rrccs \uff1fre princiDFlly totrlitrrir.n. \u30a8 t\u30c8ink V'pt t> is v\u30d6e. s distorted rnd beepme v;>-\u00a3t it is t o c r y . \u30e0-rn differs fror\u30d1 pnimrls on tl'c point thrt m ? n overcomes nr t u r c , end p. 1 though God diffcrcntir-ttd between \u30c8 u m r n Icings \uff1fnd rnimr 1 s by giving m r n cxccllcnt cri-orbili'oics, V^.stcrn civilizrtj.on, in order to ovcrcork. npturt\u2022\uff0c rtrlizcd ont ti'iunipy rf tcr rnot> e r in scitncc, r.nd in its process fell victim to ttirptrtion, T \u30c8 pt field vr s grc? tly ovcr-c r:.p v e sized rnd ovcr-rr ted. At tVt present, t v i o evil \uff1fdvc-ncca to t v c pcint rt it hr s destroyed the collectivc livelihood of prnkirid ? and \u30a8 btlicvt. tV?t it is t v c ncv; \"world outlook of G c m r n y rnd Itely t\u30c8\uff1ft < :\u5373\u201d sized the originrl colic ctivc instincts of mrnkind to countcrpct t\u30c8is evil\u3002 It is r rrlrtivcly s 1 ort tine since t> c individurlistic tendtney vr s ir.trociiiccd in J r p r n . Therefore, it is not so difficult for Jrp'\u3002n, vYosc rrci^l r?ctcristic s originrlly br std on tVc fr.r'ily systcnx rnd totPlitarirnism, to return to nrtionrl polity in its e n t i r e t y . Consequently, I believe t^rt t^c ?.\\\"?kcning of Jrp?n in the period of t\u30c8\u5e7f presort world evolution wi]1 be very rppidi },0:TTA i Unle ss t \u3001 \/ T . N , ne tionr.l\/ orgrniz? tion is con.pic.ti d by t v c time of chc awakening K O B A Y A S F I : It must bf- completed PS soon \uff1fs possible. W V p t do you think \uff1f\"bout tvis m a t t e r , conccrning t v c treatment of tVis problem? Doc. --c. I6l6 P a 3 e \u7d05 8 9 , National Organization c\u30ec i ^rincs IC0N0Y2. ShJiurOnis \uff1b f o r the problem of t.\u0302 .e reorgani ' on of the net ion, I think th-t it' must; bo fund 0 mentally \uff1a thought Diovenent rliicli aims at r:turning to t.::e V ,:ic priacipls of Japan's nrtional structure. If vio aro e:i\u2018rossed only in the problem of the forn of government, it Till result in \u30cf distortion. Formerly, divino inspiration nnd the li v 3 rcis scorned by tlie intellisentsin, so XJQ must cons idor methods of persuasion stifficlant to gain the assent c? the in- telligDiitsi?.. Ho'.'evrjr, t] -3 imlearnod \".\/ill not reqairo such methods\u00bb They ri.!! understand at once if ne merely sa; r that re shovld do our best to serve the Smperor. If v:e, tho ttIioIg \/ p . 115 \/ soventy millions of bhe nation ? begin by writing to offer our all to His i^hjostjr, since TO o\"?e it ill to him, and actually practice SHIi i.IEJDO .\/ l IKi*\uff1a tho rrny of 1 subjict\/, then the questions of govern- ment, econoiijy, euuoation, and leadership of 3^-ouns men v;ill nat- urally teles the proper course r % Zl is also unnecess-r3 r to em- phasize tiiafc vjlieri everyone rilarns to that frame of mind, existing p olit\u4ebacians, r.rd partisans \u948cill be out. l7eryone nill hr.ve th:,t frame cf nind ai}d 011 such o b\u3054sis, tae govarrcnent r i l l get along. \u2022 -ccordingly, Japan's socio.1, economic, educational, and all otbsr struci^\u201des will be reformed e Then, \"Vestorn individunl- istic or libera^.istic and capitalistic structures Trill, ns a mcittor of course, be completely regulated. Thc.t will be fnyorable. If things are den^ th'-1 vay, since ^e are all o'aildren of His Majesty th- Impercr, should not be blr-med so severely for \u30d5hat v\/e ma\uff1a\" h:\u30de3 thought, said, r.nd done before. Let us forget the p antirely tc at her g.3t on v;ith \uff1f. move ment of service to the Sinpsrcr. Let u?? establish an crganization in keeping viih this. For this all can ngr^e it ^ill be entirely natural to hrve Irince K0N0Y3, \\jh_o is of the noblest family of the 3&v2nty millions cf the nntion, lead and direct tlie movomentc, looking\u3002.t \/ p , lib\/ it vtic.t vry\uff0c ther.- is 110 one vrho can take Irince KOi-iOYTC 9 s pl^ce. In ability, Irnorladse, nd psrsonr.lity there rzey bo many among the seventy millions T:bo surpass him. However, r\/hen consider the nen movoment ? or its organ^ation, T7hich aims to unite all sub- jects in a return to offering th3ir services to His Unjcsty the \u2018 Enpsror, PrincG KDNOYE, b:\uff0ctha very position his family holds in Jap\u3054',ese history, is the one v;e nr\u30ecst hovs to lead it. T say this chiefly because we should build a ne^r Jcjp--n by demanding upon Prince \u4e04\u300f ^ 3\uff0c XO^'-Yi'SHI: Then, in short, you mean he is the i^epresantatiT-e of the r:hole nation? \u3043iCU\u201cGRIj \u30a8 mean reprosentcitiTe or flaf, ;an. Later, all the poople \u30efill follor -iim. KOB \u30e0YiSHIi \"ith th\u00b0.t in mind, existing political parities or former politicians- if such groups then truly perceive their neT7 mission nnd abandon thejr for ior p3 \u0302 .tforms, n :urally thc.t will be goodc Page 49 10% Ixfethcds cf Reform and ths National Structure, 3HEEUJT0HI: It be unreasonable for us to require that of all of them. It also \"be unreasona-ble fcr the rhole seventy m: 11 ions of the nation to demand it at onee. Since ve aim at establishing a nev: organization and effecting a noTement of ssrrice to the E m p t o r rhich rrili embracs all cf the peo Is, it rill probably be v;ell to incept for the time being those who venture to join it\u00ab I thii'i 1 ' r:e should not be so critical as tc say that this or that person 13 objectionable bocnuse of his past connsctions^ It is, houevsr, another question \u3066\u3057 should plaj^ the 1 \uff1fad in the nev organization and\uff0c\u4e86 rrhom in t\".3 future the n\u3002u policies should be made. Thsre have Ixen seme peopls, of course.\uff1a studying de-votedly a3oag this line, so th-^sa people, I th.;.nV v \uff1a\u30ea\u30d3U oo have the Icadcr^iiip^ r . n he p.?\u2018r\u4e04\uff1a\u3066\uff1aas an era of vain s t r I x i c h has been d:lsci!ssed among the members of existing bureaucratic political parties. Therefore, wouldn't it ba r\/ell if in th3 future every- one could become \/p# 118\/ of congenial sp;rit f fianicly delve into the matter, and cooperate as a \"body, start in 3 from a nerr founda- tion? A nation-\u30deide organization v7ill be useless, if re leave out political parties^ After all vre must build a firm organiza- tion like t-\u30d9:-\u2019 of the Nazis and Fascists. Such arguments \u8035ill probably ari. As for the formation of the cr^ani^ation, in all probability those which have been v\/orkad out by Gerir.any and Italy should te tal*en into consideration. After many failures, great sacrifices, and much hard v\/crk, these have at last shovel good re- sults. I think that Jai\uff1aan, hov;ever, will be able to mal:e use of their \u2022 ocd features viii !x>ut paying that price. Althoush there is no need to reject tliem because they are of *3Stern natura, the spirit of Japan,s national structure must be based fun dar\uff1b on tally and permanently on the view of the world ^rhich has been traditional in Japan from time itmnemorial. Take the problem uf economic reorganisation for instance, ve should of course avoid Marxism, but T7e should also avoid the Fascist economic theory as far as possible\u2022 'By dint of th\u3002\uff0cattributes deriving from the ba3:; .\u3015principle undeiOying Japan's national structured think xre shall be able to shake o\u3054:\uff1f all the evils of capitalism and libera-lAoin, In the ex torn a\" form by T7hich the reform can be car- ried out, it is protaLlo th\u5e7fre \u53e3ill be things resembling \/p # 119\/ those dona by CroviLPi^ and \u30cb N e v e r t h e l e s s , I believe the fundamental concept vill he different, NOIviUHA: Among the arguments vaiich are in vosue these days f \\7hile their egression takes tbe form of constant references to the CIDKOICU \/TO; founding of the country\/ spirit and the basic principles of natiordl otructra^i their content seems still to contain a great many feature of the old order. For instance, though they speak of the gove ment cf linperial Japan and eiiphasize such expressions as. Imper:3... Pule assistance, actually there are a great many arguments in \u8035hich democratic features are advocated. Moreover, Doc. No, I6l6 r a S e 50 they claim it is necessary to liquidate things feudalist ic so as to pave the way for assistance to the Imperial Rule. They brand as feudalistic things which rather ought to be in essence Ja- ancse, and thus reject them. In the final analysis, there is a tendency uhicli se\u3002\ufffds to lean toward things '\/estern. 3Eu-iiiTCHI\uff1a I also believa that there are terns 5 ailing; those old slogans and expressions, v;hich need scrutiny. For exainple, there are many people T\/ho, by ignoring the Errperor, interpret such phrases as IKKUJ B ^ IvIIN \u0302 TNi the Trhole \/p. 120\/ nation under one sovereign\/ to mean the Ani-^rican idea of natural rights of man and the equality of all men, Iroreover, theiohrase EAI.IH0Y0KJJ \/TN; assistance of the \u3066. r bole nation\/ is liable to be interpreted as majority rule\u00bb Sucli things must not be. 11# Shortcoming of the Reform Faction in Our Country. SHIRATORI: \ufffd'!e must criticize such t'.ings closely. Those ^rho advocate clari- fication of the national structure lsy great stress on ideological aspects . They have empiiasiz^d only the national structure of Japan and have had little concern for tho actual and the economic life of the people. It has been said that the so-called advocates of national structure, have no interest in economy, Th\u30e9 group which lays so much stress on the irrjr.ediate evils of Western capi- talism tries to correct this by economic theory borrowed chiefly from Europe\u2022 This group calls the advocates of national structure unscientific and the latter call the former left-wing or red, so that they reject one another. Actually, hovrevsr f in order to clarify\" the national structure , the spiritual and material aspects are correlative \u0302 and an economy and a government which are 121\/ based on the main principle of rule b\uff1a- the Ifcperor must be realized - In economics, furthermore, those who advocate socialism, completely fargst the national structure and say let us have ail economic re- organization by relying exclusively on .'estern theory and by re- ferring to Western precedents. I can not admit either of them\u00ab These tr;o must be reconciled,\u30a8 thinlc, if ve would lay the founda- tions of Japan in the proper place^ So-called reform factions and pov\/ers for reform should be united, provided that they are sincere* On this ground 5 I think the right path of Japan's government, diplomacy, and economy coulcl \"becDine clear. Fundamentally, the emphasis should not be laid only on the material side, nor only on the spiritual side. Hitual hostility ancl strife among those who aim similarly at reform, I think, is one of the causes that have allov\/ed the s o - c a l l a d v o c a t e s of the status quo to survive until r .w. It is because they offset each other that their strength is nullified. See\u3078rrbly, nauy 7;ho belisve in Japanism have be^un to advocate sornd ling called Imperial VJay Sconoiny. It is a good tendency. \u201d ,\/n\/ fage 51 toe. No, 1616 KOK^YASIII: It is extremely difficult to secure their reconciliation c\u300d\u3066\u2019 them over, but \/p. 122\/ vie must arrange it without del ay \u2022 As has been previously discussed it will be possible for U3 to dc t is v\/hen\uff01 in a broad sense, the national reorganization is carried, outr For this, as you say, KCNOYE is very important\u00bb V\/e v:ish him to malce the great decision himself\u2022 SEEUTORI: E0N0Y-2 is himself determined, I think. If he does participate this time, he is intelligent enough not to say thet he vill resolve this vain strife. Since he ought to know v\/hat is r;ater and t:hat is oil, he probably won't venture to unite the tuo. 1 d o n 1 1 believe he wil l come out vith any superficial determination^ ICOBAY^SHI: Upon KONOIJL \u2022 s coming cut in such a right direction to organize th^ nation, the present so-called politicians uould join him. I11 such; a ce^e^ will mean vq urost give consider \u4e03le thought as to their intentions\u2022 12\u00ae The Objectives and Form of the NST\/ Government. \/p \u30e5 23\/ 3HIBATC)HIs \"hen the politicians join, I do not know what sort of position they v U l be givenv but, after a l l , the irnportant thing is touard T7hat objectives vrill the new govsrrrnent advance and viiat sort of things will it undertake. If these are male perfectly clear, it \u3066,ill oe all right to accept those who come with that knowledge\u2022 Hen of old beliefs ps^haps wil l lack new ideas and will be unable to work out nev; ones. Men of the old order perhaps can not cope \u3066ith told policies of reform. \u30a8 think, at any rate, so-called nev\/ elements may be anticipated. It viould be well if those who have formerly aimed for reform in Japan \u3067ould assist sincerely this movement regardless of newspaper reports, etc*, and unanimously participate in it so as to alio\u753a Prince KONOYE to discharge fully and irithout ' any error the duties that will be his. Furthermore, affiliation by all is the way, I \"think, for the new organization to achieve the desired results\u2022 KCB\/iYiiSHI^ This differs greatly from the new party movement as traditionally thought of, doesn ! t it? SHXRATOHI: The ner party movement seems to have undergone a \u2022 great change compared i\/ith the time when Prince KONOYE organized his last cabi- \u3001 nst. T.7hon h e u n d e r t o o k the formation of his last cabinet f it uas , I thinlc, \/ p 0 l 2 4 \/ uith the prime object of resolving all vain strife and I believe he thought the emerGency could o n l y bs weathered thro ugh national unity. In an effort to achieve this, he organized a cabinet f and since fortunately or urtfortunately the China Incident occurred, national unity was for the time being realized. However, in the duration of war for one year or more, national unity reached its utmost limit- Thus th\u00a9 fueling came about that a national re- \u30be\u3001 N o . I6l6 Page 52 organization in a new sense had to be made# The first thought might have been to unite political parties. However, this TOuld make the cleavage between the new and the old all the greater. He knev\/ that would not be feasible^ He might have resigned in order to v. r ithdraw and organize his ideas. For this, I think many people criticized him saying that he shunned responsibility for solution cf the Incident and that he had resigned v:ithout any reason, I suppose the reason \"crhy Primce KDNOYE retired Has that if lie had gone 0x1 as before, the national reorganization could net possibly have been achieved, ulspecially, being in a position of authority in the government and hard-pressed with various daily affairs, he could not organize his ideas, and I think he decided tc withdraw and wait until circumstances became favorable* As a dix-ect and indirect effect of the uar, there arose \u30bap^ 125\/ in ti.3 \u3044\u3064:rid a situation in rrhich this was no longer feasible. Foreigi a:\u2022\u30cb European situations have undergone sudden changes, and a power- ful impulse has daily been given this\u2022 He might have, I think, made up his mind because he may perhaps be\u30b8 successful this time. KOBiffASHI: Such men as ^HB^A and Mrv KAZJiMI, vho are nov devoting them- selves to this \"by K0W0Y2 s side, should apprehend the meaning clearly,\u30a8 fctdnkc SIHUTORI: \u30e03 for that ? 1 reo2 ly don't knovr to what extent It. KiTAMI acts in Prince Iv^U^TS's \"behalf, but I doubt that their ideas are in con>- plebe agreement<\u2022\u3054o r \u3067hat those persons say perhaps can not be said to be exactly rhat Ir in ce KONCYiS intends. The most sincere el01\u0302 .6x1 ts cf the so-called reform faction are what JTince KONOYE now d e s i r e s most of all# Probably w h a t he i^ants most of all is for such elements, even in small numbers, to unite and put themselves at his disposal. It vould. be well at this time for those uho are confident to make themselves known. ICOB^YiiSHIs \/p 0 126\/ CSKIRiiTORI: NC:\u76bf A: 3EIIUT0RI: K0BAYi^3HI: Sven if numbers are required, by no means If there are too maqy they i;ill not agree, I think* If many persons irho differ totally in vie?jpoint come together and agree only superficially, it w \u4e04 b e of no value. After all, if the greatest ccrinon msasnre is not called for - - - - Iii a parliamentary body, only the supporters f after all, a\u3061tend meetings, It will b^ very coninxjiiplace and Immaterial whether we have it or not. The smaller the number f the better the quality. Tc speak in the extreme, one is the tas\u2022\u201c ^a for scholars, as previously discusssd, v\/hen we look for them ainong the Imperial universriles all \u3054:T3 of no value, and, conse- quently, if v\/e examine them too carefully - - - - xjocc No* l6l6 Pag\u6237 53 SEIKATORI: ^ven if we examine a great many, it \u948cill avail nothing as far as the old system of national unity is concerned. 2T0I\/HHA: At the beginning of the last European\uff0c,ar no one in G-erraary was opposed to the T\/ar for the time being. At any rate, all were united in support of,the war. However, the phenomenon appeared that they all differed as to the reason for the war. \u3093\u30e5\u30b2\u4e04TOR\u4e04\uff1a Uhen the uar \u3066. 1 as prolonged for so long a time and the situation turned unfavorable f general strikes took place\u2022 13o Conversion of the Foreign Policy of Our Country\u2022 KOBiCfiiSIiIs If \ufffd:e do not rebuild the interior of our country, a trouble is imminent\u00ab. According tc the papers, Great Britain and America seeiii to support Lutch East Indies and Stench Indo-Ouina# How about the information you received? SlilRATOHIi NOMURA.: \/p, 128\/ SEUUTORIJ trance as \u301c73*11 as Great Britain can not afford to attend \u5341he prob.1 era,3 of Dutch East Indies and French Ic.do-China. America alsp can not afford to do bo, 31ther, for tins baing. Their minds are full of aDxiety of hov to combat Hitler r s menace. I heard that German\/ 1 s reply concerning Dutch East Indies had raised a serious issue. T\u0302iat was that? Genrany is not intenastsd in Dutch East Indies\u2022 But she rouldn 1 t like it if Japan, Great Hri^ein, America, and Stance should play intc each other's hg.ad on Datca East Indies. If T \/e shcu3.3. consult a\uff0cjoirb Dutch Sast Indies, Gsnnany would like to \"be first informed \u2022 I tLnik it is q.uite naturals ZOBi^ASHIi sn:R \u30e0TORI; Indeed,\u30a8 can noi soon as Dcssible. help thinking that ue must make up our ndnd as though Japaa's foreign policy must be converted thoroughly\uff0c 180- dejree turning round can not be made under the present ayjtem, and it ought not to be made under the present government system, can nofc tolerafev for the grace of c\\xr Srriperor 1 s righteous diplo- macy , t h a t tb.3 present G-oVermont adopt a strong policy without c hanging its const it ution,, It is Dot right that v;e take Dutch 3ast Indies by taking advaritage of the bustle simply because Germany won victory \u30d5hen adopt our righfcecms policy arising from a rexicvated constitution, it is natural that \u4e86apan should collaborate v:ith Germany arrl Italy, so that Japan may, by the negotiations with themi\/p, 129\/ settle the probieirs of the colonies in Asia . ^-fter all it is a question of a renovation of governmental system of Japan, or of the intenlor reconstruction. 3. No. 1616 Page 54 SlxIRATCHIs That must be the premise. Editor\uff1a \u30de\/hat \u8035ill be the extent of A m e r i c a ^ supply of resources to Great Britain and France? SWii^rORI: I thin\uff1a: it can not be done sufficiently under the present circam- stances, itaerican T\/ar industry is spoken about quit9 in e^a-^gera- tioiu However t the scale of industry v;hich has been deve\u4e04opod naturally by dint of activities based upon pursuit of individual profits in the society of capitalism, is not large enough as is supposed, judging from the present day standard\u2022 Take the produc- tion capacity, for instance\u201e of airplanes or of tanks, Amarica is considerably inferior to .Sermany. And, America is now rapic.\u4e04y enlarging her armamentsf' having the \"budget passed in the Congress, But t that only because America fears for her own safety. The main object is to defend herself 9 There is not big enough surplus to supply to Great Britain and 'France. America seeans tc have sent old-fashioned uoapons v:hich v:ere used in the last war. \u306f any raje, she can not cope v>rith the urgent necessity. EDBAYiiSHI: Cur F c r e i g n Office lias changed quite \/p.130\/ bit. Once there irere those vho said that o a j H u ^ R I \u30efas misleading the country. SHLIATCRI: Eyen at ths present time, there are those vrlio say that king of tiling, A man can not convert his thought so suddenly partly be- causs cf his feeling- He can hardly sey that his prospect was TTTong but inclines to think up some pretext or other\u2022 He c'oes not uant to confeGs pi inly that he v:as v^rong. KOBAYiCHIs The situation is getting on as extractly as foretold by Mr\uff0c S :\u5b64 iTC3I\u3002 oHtRATCRI: Since October last , I have teen saying that the British Si^ire was 011 the eve of doTmfall* Peapls at th\u00a9 Foreign Ministry \u30deere astonished by my prophecy. \ufffd!Jhat deep blind fai\u2022\u3058!\uff01 (in Britain) they have J KOBAYii^HIi Yovn^or people, however, seem to be changing in their thougnt\u2022 NGLIRA: \".\/hat do you think of Ambassador s opinion? Old-fashioned, isn^t it? Editor: In tlie event of Germany 1 s victory, I think our people in general lirill teccme much \u3067ore interested \/p\u2022 131\/ in Crermany and come to believe in downfall of democracy. SIHRATORI: That \u00a5ill spur the interior renovation of Japan. N C m : In the same sense as the Soviet revolution once had great influence on us. Doc. Koi l6l6 Pago 55 SIIIR.^TL'^I: The Ccrcmunist revolution of Russia has changed g r e a f y in. cualit^% After all, it lias been proved that \"iiat \"arx \"fc Ci \"U3 JJH\u2014 possible in practice. But, that revolution as well as the French Hevolution, had undoubtedly great influence on human society. Both 3-ermany and Italy were drastically affected by it, Japan \"vvas also inf If v\/e v\/ish to sup lores s it, ve can do so as tb Tdshc \u4e8c \uff1a\uff0cafter all, it is an achie\u30deGment of Marxism that it hns ointed out its ovaa illogicality and defects, and at the same t m e it is a fact that capitalism itself has become impossible That Bolshevik revolution took place as a direct result of the nar\uff0c Eut the real cause of the revolution was the deadlock of capital ism So t any other country cc\u201dla not escape from this influence\u2022 It accords uith the fundrmental characters cf Japan,and it means to create a to tally new character of state. If such a science and systematic thought should ba born general public \u3066\u2019ill come to understand sraiu.ally, lepving the intelligentsia behind. oHIRi^TOHIj For instance, the saying of Bolshevism that one vbo does not TOrk should not eat v does not apply to the conditions of our country. The Japanese people being equally His Majesty the Em- peror l s children\uff0cnone of them should starve* _'e must not have even one person, has been torn as a subject of \"lis Majesty, starved. must p.ake every one live. \u30a8 do not necessarily mean that every one should eat equally. \/p.132\/ KCDAYiiSHI: ZOB-VYiiSHIs 3KIRAT0RI: One hundred million people are the same, dividual ism that \\:e live in* Not materialistic in- % cpinion is that man does not live to eat. But, vie eat to ful- fill the duty as a subject of His Majesty. His life jesty enabl ss us to eat and livs. Some people think they liye by their OY;II ability, hut \/p. 133\/ that is \\7rong, and that is the cause of old evil. Since even those i:ho can net serve His Majesty are supplied \u3066:ith necessity\uff0cwe can be carefree for living. ,e cfo not like such a 3old-hearted saying as n 0ne who does not work shoiilu not eat\u30ce ICOBAY^SKI: j^ven in Soviet Russia, some sort of spiritualism must bo added to their principle. Otherwise, Soviet rill cone to a deadlock* IKilURAi On a rrhole, KarxiJm is an abstract argument thought out with contemplation of capitalistic society purei than England and with a'kind of ccnceptional process. Th at is, I\u4e5frxism is a theory thought out \u3066:ith presumption that almost all portion of the nation would become proletariat. And it uas clear at the very beginning that, if such ons uere a)plied to agricultural \u2022 country lil'e Russia, certainly unreasonableness will be caused. In other r;crds f as there \u30d5ere no settlement of agricultural problem \/ p . 134\/ should Marxism be applied in accordance with the formula, Leninism found a different thought in connection Doc. No. I6l6 Page 56 with the farmers. This is quite an unnatural theory that the farmers are considered as the ally of tho proletarians. Furthermore, Marxism can not solve racial problems^ Soviet Republic was harassed by these 9 but a more difficult problem ras tbat she could not make such leaders as engineers and clerks her frienrls\uff1b and consequently she could not utilize their teclmics tc the full extent\u2022 T .'\/hen she tried to put the five years plan into practice in order to. enlarge her productive poorer, she iras harass 3d with shortage of engineers and she could do nothing unless he brought engineers from Oermaiiy, These points will \"be gradually rec fcified in the face cf realitjr, and coasequently its class theory v\/ill failn Relations Between Hdkr:o-ichi-u vthe ideal rhich lets all nations live peaceably unde\uff1a' one roof) and Sphere of Livelihood. As to Living sphere to T^nich ycu referred a moment ago, some people say, for exauplo, that although the aim of this holy rrar is said to te Hakko\u2014iclii\u4e00u, they can not understand it well be- cause it is so abstract and covered \/p\u00ab 135\/ ^'ith mystic cloud. On the other hand, seme people regard it a3 Imperialism. On the contrary, the Germaias hare a clear insistence of \"Living Sphere,\u201c so it is easy to unders\u4e03andU Sometimes people say that we had better have clearer aims of this holy vor\u2022 V\/hat are the rela- .tions bexween Hal:ko-iahi-u and Li vi ng Sphere? SHIRiiTOIO\uff1a: I understand \"that Hal:ko-icb.i_u stands for the ultimate object that the benevolence of the \uff01liiiperial rule blesses all the nations alika. This is because His ?-.Tajesty, great father of Japanese people as \u30eeell as great father of all mankind* It resembles \"ISiiversal Brotherhood 11 of Christian creed in form, but it is different in principle. I think it right to deal with China \u2022 vrith this ultimate object. It does not mean affiliation of China to Japan nor territorial annex of China to Japan. Halcko-ichi-u has been advocated to make a clear distinction between our ideal and T?estem imperialism or aggressive policy. The so-called Japan--anchnkuo -Oiiina Bloc is ? I thin 1 \uff1a., of the same nature Trith \/po 136\/ Hitler's w Lebeiisraum n \u2018> That is, Japan, Fanchoukuo and China are to liaye tha coiraion \"Living Sphere\u201c. This is not the capital1stic exploitation which has been committed by western \u3001 people. At the base lies the idea of Hakko-ichi-u, the spirit of the foundation of Japan\u00ab The naw order of the Orient must te of this kind, \u201dhat kind of new order could be established T7ith the old T;estern-typ e treaties bet re en China irith the TJestern- type prsronative right, Manclioukuo rrith the same prerogative right, and 3'apan? The old ideas and the old methods bring nothing nev. These three nations must be united with a new idea \u3067ith v\/hich the existing international law can not deal* 14- Edi tor: No, 1616 Page 57 As a matter of fact, Japan and tdanchoukuo recognize each other's indeperdenee in the light of international lasr, but there .exist some special relations between tiiem which can not be explained by intevxiationa] la\\\/7 t This fur\/damental principle should te applied to OhIna rt 7'his scope i^rj he exbei\u3015dft(i to aDy degree- The .iue\u00abtion of tho concrete relatio:as between China and Japan, we may stuoy in vx-ious i>i future and .decide the matters gradually also wi'';h concent o:? t ic- \/p^ 13^\/ Otlr.iese people. \u5de5\u4e03 is not necessary to felloe tile exaq^las ol Manshoukuo in e'rery rsspect. There may bs la^cb. to be amejjdeo. in the case of Manchouicuo\u2022 The only tiling \"r:a have to do is to clear off che old order es- tab?i&Iisd by we0tarn countries in China as a preamble to build tip the order. This must ba done at any cost. If this was sac.-ss.?.! 11LI7 done, the New East Asia Order will be ^rt^.biished octanes. This does not- mean only to s^eop away sg^>?essive a:.cJ. '-:q\\!oitative syste\/ii of ^eaior:a nations out of Giiina- 'Phe clci order is not jn;-furred cnl\/ \u3057o the materialistic corx.itio:.t3 9 but alao to the spiritual, conditions\u2022 It m^it also be a prea-i^lf5 to the crd^r tnat western icoas be cleaned up out of ths Ohi^e^e mind > But it should \"oe necessary to syjsu: or^ay \u2022\u4e28,he o:la ideas first froin. the Japanese mind-. On accG.jr-i: of 'I'hssc\uff1a L say that new order of China Fill not be established -unless and until the interior constitution of our c c n ' y is re^uilu. Dcc. Nc. 1616 Page 58 1 5 . Foroc^st of the World 7\u3002r. Editor: You will ple-sc tell us ycur forecast of the '.Yorld \\- t ?r i:i the neo.r future. SHrRATORI: As I h-ive given nn outline n. moment \"go, Frr.nce \u5de7ould be disposed of in the very nonr future. As for Grer.t Britain, she \u30d5ould bo subdued shortly if Gernany should succeod in her landing operrtions. There nre \u2019 aany difficulties involved in landing operations. If it should be tcc dangerous to c.-irry o u t , it \u201dGi.;ld net bG necGss\u30cf.ry for Gernany to attack by her land forces. Suppose that Gernmiy should control the sca-coast ranging from Nor^\/p.y to Spain, -\".nd establish the bases f o r \uff1f.ir f o r c e s ind subr-\u00b0.rinGS r.long t h e s\u306bid c c ^ s t and should effect continuous \u5382.ir raids on Grer.t Britain on \uff1f large scr.le. All the harbour facilities and the Liuniticn factories r.'culd becone targets. As Gernany has excellent air fcrcos the result \u201dill be very effective. Itnly, 1 suppose, '.'ill h^ve the coEr\u300dprid of the M^diterraninn p.nd she rill, in cooperation r 'ith Germany, attack h^r encji^y '7ith submarines in the Ai\u4e04sntie\uff0c especially \u201dt; the rcuths of harbours T .,here sub; q.rlne ^tt^ck is conparatively easy\u3002 Thus Grent Britain\uff0c\"culd be actually bloc^adcd, Being confronted rith these, G:.e\u3002.t Britain ^jould necessarily be stiroped. By landing opom.ticns, tho eng^gorient \"ill cone to en ond by August, P.S Hn.tlyr s?id. In rmy r ;r..y, Great Britain, r-ould. not be r>ble to be-\u0302 .r her suffer ings till the Gild cf this yer.r. The r *orst conditions on the p-\u00b0.rt of Geriiiany \"ill be thnt, if Great B r i t a i n should rap-e decisive resolution to held out her resistance \u3064.t the cost of her \u201dhole Navy, the term of resistance Trill be prclcnged. But in spite of this, Grant Eritnin. \"ill be h o p e l e s s . The questjen is vhother Great Britain r'ould subrnt on cruel conditions rrliich rill bo proposed by Gernany or \u5e7fGuld go cn fighting \".ftor having dra^a br,ck tc O - n a d n , In the l-'tter c.se, hor\/ever, she T *\/ill bo unable to resist \u2018 ithout the cooporaticn \u2019\u201dith Aiierica, With France destroyed first nnd --ith Great Britain in a narrcv escape to \u2022\u2022-culd Anerica still venture- to declare r.frr u p o n Gernany? In cr.se America should not aid Groat Britain tho l^.ttor rculd gradually be corupeiled to boo.r her unfortunntu d e c l i n e . If so, I think, Gernany, Itr.ly r.nd U.S.S.R. ^ould renain -.3 the three big nations in E u r o p e , ^hilc Grcr.t Britain \u3054nd France would necessnrily De compelled to fall do\uff0c\u2019'n to the second and third clnss nations u i t h culturc ^ad c. No. 1616 Pr- ge 59 poaco but \u2019\u30deithcut .nny arnaneats. In \u30cf 11 eve : ^ . - . Great Britain possesses sc nany colcnies in e-vcri c o m e r of the ucrld, she rrill keep on resisting for a long poriod find exter:icilly the state of '\u201dar \u201dill ::.\u3001t tc.rnin\u3063 tc at once. But even if she should vish to ..\u3044.'-p \u3044ri rcsist?i..ice, it is beyond imagination that cnl2 r the Government and. the governing class v r ith stratp.gen and geld bullion should desert the rorlm cf England leaving the forty five millions of people behind. Her colonies in Africa rill be taken fimy 0 id. in the future India rill become independent frcn Great Britain and these facts v . T ill nake her quite powerless. Canada is not rich in resources, pind is supposed to becone naturally a part of the United States. But r.s this \\;culd be unbearr-ble tc English people, it is nore probable thnt they ^ould koop resisting br.rvoly to heroic death in defence of their country. In any \u201d n y i t uill be inevitable that, cn';ing to the nnrked inferiority in military strength, Grer.t Britain T r ill finally subnit. The situation, however, T ill becoiiie cler.rcr '\"ithin next cno cr t r :o veel-s. Suppose Go m a n y should venture landing operations, the rar r.iay cone to an end eririier thnn expected. Some nilitary experts r.re in the cpinion thnt there is little possibility of l-indin^ operatic 113. But G e m a n y herself s^.ys thnt she '\/ill crrry cut it without fail. NOKUHA: Tha forecasts cf nilit^.ry experts have often fr.ilcd. The North European opernticn. had not been imagined. The parachute troops had not been expoctod to be used till thoy n-ore enplcyed in Holland nnd Belgium, r.nd r:ilit-\\ry experts still sny th^t the c pern tion ^as unsuccessful even after the operation took pln.ee in Holland.- M i t e r\uff1a People sp.y the sp.me things in America. NOIfURA: They s?.y that parachute troops \u201dere all captured and annibil^tcd. SHIRATORI \uff1a Tho pr\\r\u3002chute troops achieved a ccnsidorable success in Holland. It is in this\uff0c.r thnt the forecasts of -lilitnry experts ^re net reliable. Doc. Nc. 1616 p- r c f-c V I . Gonncrrt on Jrprn's Non-intcrfcrcncc. (TT-c Greater \/\u2018S\u30a8\u30e0 Ifegpzinc, June 1939 V \/ i t M n ten drys sincc t\"bc invasion of G c m m troops into Bcl^iuri r.nc! Follr.nd, they obtr incd t v c senc results rs in t v c first cnc ncnth or tv \u5e7f cf the F i r s t European Yirr-. T v c fnll c f \uff1frris rnd tVc c?pturo \u5e7f.f tvc scp.ccr.st cf Dcvcr r.rc nonr r.t h? na, r.nd it is c ens id crccl likely t^'rt GcrrT.n tr\u3078ods r.r.y p.lso proceed to t>c British \u30a8slcs t T\u30c8is is, literrlly, v;r:rld-shr.king\u00ab To tbc observers, Yovicvtr, v\/V- hrvc v\/itncsscd tjht Gernnnts incessant effrrts the Xcst y^ycrrs^p.nc\uff1b x&o properly epprccir.te trc c^err.cteristics \u30cff t^c G c m m pcop\u4e04c m a trc principles rnd structure rf t\u30c8c politics rnd eccnony cf their totrlitrrir.n rcginc, t\"hc present st?ntc cf pffrirs is. in fret., only y^rt v;a^ tc be pxpectcdo. It is tT%rc:f\u2018 rc only natural trrt trose v^c rnvc ricrerto btcn regr.rdmg libcralisn nnc! d c n r c r r c y e.s the pinnr.clc of hurp.n culturc r.nd believe in tYc ind^riitetaL:. pr^cr cf Englencl or the An^lo-Srxon rr co .^rvc cnric t: clcalit their cv;n obscrvrticns. Lnflmcl rnd Frrncc hrvt conpulsorily c v r.llcngccl G o m a n y t\u3002. fipht 3 W\u30c8y t\uff0c\u2019ey heve done so? Wc nr.y, in short 5 sr.Y trr.T trc rcr son for it is T ^ N T T H E Y \u30c8 P V C undcrcstinrted tho rc.^.l strcrgtv ^f Nr.ziist Gcrnr.ny 0 T\"hey thought tY'Pt Gernsny n r y be hclc\". d^vm r,t rrcsent, but nr.y bee one t-^o nuch for their powers t'\u3001do sc if they let her grcv; unnoticcd scvcrrl ycr.rs longer\u3002 B u t , rlrsi It vj?s r.lrcrdy fben toe letc for then, rs the strength of Gcrnrny hrcl rl redely be conc t\u306b.o rra.ch to be vr.nquis^ccl. Net only Lnplrnd rnd F r r n c c , but rise t>c U,SJ'-.^ in t^e sr.rx w r y , hr.cl been wrongly unCcrcstinr.ting the strcngfb \u5e7ff the Gcrrtrn ?nd Itrlir.n totrlitrrinn Axis countries by believing thr-1 tve nen^gc- rcnt of rll r.rttt.rs t v r t concerned Europe n i g h t , in general, bt cmductecl vrcll if entrusted rnly to Lngl^ncl rnd F r r n c e 5 \u3063s it rppcarcd to her thrt Itr.ly rnd Gcrnrny would surely be defcf:tec in the cnc, rnd rer cv.'n clirty wr.s to try? with rll her effrrts, to suppress J ^ p r n . the agorcsscr, totr-litrri?n str.tc in tl-c Orient. In t^c first plr.ee, t u t rnc v,'\u0302 - YcC r.ost v;ished for rn outbrcnk (f r in turope is Roosevelt hinself e It is net m exsggerr.tion thr.t, u p to t^c. \"b\u3057finning cf t>c U r r , the efforts of tvc U . S . , as s\u30c8ov\/n by the Gerr pn \"White Prpcr\" v;\u00a3rt' directed towrr\u3053s preveking r lurcpenn YJC.TC ^o^'evtr5 \u30cb'\u30c8cn tYc wrr rcturlly broke (\u3001ut, tVc g\u3057ncrr\u4e04 opinion of tVc U, S\u00ab turned out in f>v?oir of nrn-intcrfertneo. She did not rc\u3053ify \u30c8cr policy of cr s> settler cnt of tr-dc br.lmcc cnC\ufffd cf not lending her vessels to m y belli\u00a3crcn u powers, rltVoug}\" Vor vcrmient hr.d revised the Ncutrnlity L r u , sc tv?t t\u535cc degree of A n c r i c p 1 s PiC tc Lngl^nd rnd Frrncc s very luktwr.rn, w v ic\u30c8 grve rise t^ rn rtncsphere of considerable \u3058 i seen tent in t \u30c8\u3057 sr.icl two countries. It hpppcnccl t'RR.t, rs R WPT Fith-ut fighting lasted for oig^t n c n t ^ s , not only Inglrnd anC Frr.nco, but rlso \u3066\u5c38c U e S , wcr\u3057 unp.wp.re: of t v c rpprcrching d r n g c r . V\/c \"believe thr.t D o c . N o . I6l6 Ppgc 61 the it c a n , however, be said that\/North European W a r finally- served to open their e y e s , and only \"by the r e c e n t collapse of t v e Western Front did t^ey ? for the first time ? become fully awakened\u00bb It a p p e a r s } n e v e r t h e l e s s , as trough t \u2014 e y a r e still possessed of an optimistic view regarding tVe future\u3002 As until n o w , they seem to still have hopes of success in leading r : a fcters to s protracted war by anticipating that the battlr-front will fall into a state of stalemate . due to tVe sirc\/ening of t v e German A m y 1 s offensive, as was Fitnessed in the First European War. B u t , nov; that t\u30c8e stronghold of the Kiaginot Line w>ich took four years to construct.hos been penetrated In no time, no one } not even an amateur\uff0c could hardly think of the possibility of s deadlock in t^e front lines by resulting in mere trench w a r f a r e\u3002 T)~e o n l y \ufffday ouc cf the d i f f i c u l t y f o r E n g l a n d and France would te to decide upon a large-scale counter- attack, which, rowever, would no longer seem to be possible inasEruc\u30c8 as there appears to be a marked difference between the respective Air- Forces end Mechanized Troops * N o w , as for tl-e U . S . , she would by no means be able to render effective military assistance even if s v e should promptly participate in the Via r t o d a y A s Goering used to alwsys ssy ? there would be no spot for t\u30c8e landing . of the U\u00abS, soldiers even if t\u30c8e U.S. were to participate in tVe present W a r . Fis saying seems to have turned out true. Tbe \"best that could be done by the U . S . would seem to be the granting of an unlimited credit to England and France, t v e offering of hsr vessels for tVe trensporting of munitions 5 end to also s v ip a large number of no.ro superior planes tVan in t v e p ? s t , T^e withdrawal of tie U . S . fleet from t>e Pacific and despatching same to tVeir aid would possibly be fairly effective, but it may te impossible for t v e U S \u00ab at the present juncture w.\u30c9en her relations wit.\u535c J ? pa n have tec ore so aggravated. If Soviet Russia 5 a neutral power, sVould suddenly turn around to c, v e aid of England sr.d F re nee and attack Germeny from behind in full force, there iriig>\"t possibly be e c o m p l e t e c V ^ n g e in t\u3001e w a r s l t u a t i o n ? But t\u30ecis is absolutely inconceivable, Not only must it be considered that t v e r e m u s t be some sort of u n d e r s t e n d i n g b e t w e e n S o v i e t Russia and Gerneny so as to make Genrany feel perfectly e a s y 5 but G e r m a n y v\/ould cr:rteinly not V a v e w i t h d r a w n \uff01her mechanized troops entirely fror Poland in order to }\u00b0url her entire strength into tlhe W e s t e r n Front unless Gc-rm?ny had f e l t p o s i t i v e l y safe in doing so\u3002 It E-:.ist be e x t r e m e l y reassuring to Germany to t\u30ecink of t.^e millions of Itrlipn soldiers w> o are sufficiently prepared to rise up et a moment' notice\u3002 Doc. No. I6l6 PogC 62 A s for t v e future outlook of tVe present w ? r , astounding developments will doubtlessly have been made by the time t v i s article apnears in print\uff0c F u r t h e r m o r e , not much actual benefit migrt be derived from purposely trying to predict tre future outcome, however 5 we m a y nevertheless safely assert that t^e present war is destined to bring about a sort of solution unprecedentedly cruel and almost incredibly complete. FeuV-rer hitler a few days ago declared t'^rt t^e fete of t^e German rr.ee for a thousand years to con:e 'things upon t M s w a r , v\/>ile it is warned in Italy tVat the destiny of Europe for three hundred years to ccr ; :e is \uff1f.bout to be decided t o d a y . A t p.ny m t e 5 it Is apparent t\u2019-pt there is no longer r.ny room left for doubt th?.t what hitler end Mussolini rre planning is the fundamentp.1 reconstruction of Europe.- W h e n a. tendency o'f defeat on one side of the belligerent countries fcecr.me cleer in ?ny previous w e r , it was custor.?.ry for s?me to te brought to an end by peace negotiations defined t\u201de ceding of some territory and ppyment of reparptions 0 Hovifever, it cannot be imagined t v a t f-e present wft w i l l be terminrted in such c simple n r n n e r\u3002 In fact there even seems to be the possi- bility of Greet Powers w\u30c8o V?ve been borsting of their glory for several centuries past coming to e. sudden c o l l r p s e , It is rlso extrer.ely doubtful es to w\u30c8et^er tVe minor Fowers in Europe\uff1a m~e more so with tVe colonies of t'he minor Powers\u00ab, W e >rve been rdvocrting since the very beginning of tl\"\u00a3 present wer t\u30c8\uff1ft the world is just on the eve of a gigantic trpnsformption in tv-e Old Order b^sed upon Democratic O.pitr.lism will be d o o m e d , in lieu wV-ereof ti\"e New Order brsed upon Totplxtarirnism m u s t \"be set u p . As Jnprn hrs , ever since t\u2022\u30c9c 1\uff1apnclhurian Incident, been r.ssurging the leading role in cst?blisM.ng t\u30c8e New Order f-roug^out t>~e CVina Incident ? t^e J^ppncsc people should rcr.lize t^e New Order r.na ret in close concert wit 1 \" the Axis Powers vs Germany and \u30a8trly^ T v c supporters of t?e Old. Order in Jrpan have been reluctant in rer'lizing the true s i g n i f i c m c e of t^is gigantic world-wide tr?nsformption, and in fsct tbe conclu,sion of the Triple. A l l i a n c e .totween J a p ? n , Germany and Italy finally fell through duo to t\u30c8e Old Order elenent to both pt >ome p.nd r b r o r d , F o w c v e r ? no \"human power can do anything against tl-e inevi\u2014r.ble carrcnt of ^orld \u30c8 i s t o r y . T v e way for Jep?,n to pursue Yas plrcpdy been decided on\u00bb In f a c t , Japan has plrepdy been trod ding along the sr. id path for nearly ten years\u00bb T^ose Jpprnese w^o d\u3001o not know wcl} whcie t^eir wey is leading to pre looking on t\u30c8c. p r e s e n t war in Europe witr utter indifference F.nd wrongly t\u30ecink t^at \u8ba1 \u3073 c?n estpblis.^ tYe. New Order in Eastern Asia by merely continuing to ?ct in a conciliatory mrnncr v\/ith Doc. No. 1616 Prgt 63 those powers est?blis]'ed upon f-e Old Order, They m a y be likened to persons v;\u30c8o ere nncwere. of a fire in w>ic> tVcy sre si reedy jn t \u30c8 cr midst 0 They in.aginc they cen keep tv em- selves free from the world-wide g i g m t i c trpnsform?tion so long ss fhey p.re declaring t v e i r non-interfcrencc policy. Sonic of t\"he other Jr.psnese r.re ricking similar m i s t a k e s . For nstancc, thov ^^ink tT\"?t Jr.pan will not be drr \u0302 ged into t^e Y.\u2018\u30d5r as sre did not conclude the Triple Alliance wit\uff1a} Gcrmrnv &nd Italy., These persons do not Know trc f a c t t v r t Jr.prn contric-ated raucV t o w a r d s the; p t t e i n - m c n t s rnede M t h c r ^ o by G e r m r n v . B u t f o r t ^ e A l l i a n c e t c t w e e n Qcrmrny and Sovit. . Russia, Geimeny would ^robpbly net V?ve \u30c8\u30cben able to make ap her' mind to start t v i s war; r n d i n me!,' Soviet Bus sir Jric \"\uff1bdly tov\/erds Germany, the presence of Jappn in the East end tlhfc fair progress of the negotia- tions for concluding en Allir.ncc \"between tt^c Axis countries at T o k y o , Berlin and Rome arc factors w'^icV hr.ve contributed considerably. If the I -3. \"rad participated in tYc Wrr at its eorly stage, not only night it -oossibly encouraged tYc morale of British pnd French forces, but tVx-ir fig\u30c8ting power might nlso ^rvc beccmc ?ctu?lly enh?ncodf. Germany too, might not Vr.ve baen p.t)l\u3057 to sccuire > er absolute- supremacy in tVx a i r , rnd it :.s likely t^rt 'the pttitude of Italy might &lsc v\uff1a v c been grectly r.ffccttd. Is it net Jrprn tl-at fastened t\u30c8r U C S . down to the Pp.eif \u4e04c? T'^e U.S\u00ab, hrs not \uff1f.s yet been nble to assume e decisive rttitude. Is not tre prescncc of Jrprn pro.cticnl\u4e04y t^c m r i n reason for t v i s ? Gcrmnny owt s e mint of gratitude to J p p f n . In defiance of tVis closc relation betweon Joprn and Germrny, r certain group of J^prnesc 'h~:vc sought a ccrtrin kind of understrnding wltY Britain &t th Tokyo Pr.rley ffte-r the Tientsin A f f a i r . is f?ct v;rs promptly reported to Germany. Of course Jrpnn's attitude too \u30c8 s doubtlessly become clearly understood recently in Bcxlirir Under such circiimstances,\u30c8cw can we expect Germany to be grrteful towards Jppan? The Jn\u5382:\u2022.nes\u7592 nonle should not forget the fp.ct th?t the J'\uff1b p?ncs:; diplomacy \u30c8ss done sc.iretMng that docs not pr.y for Jrp-^n, it res done muc'r for Gcrmfny nnd yet lets itstlf oT.en to incur her wio.tY. If t v e v o r l d ' \u00a3 m a p Ye.s to be c.r?v;n r n e w e s r r e s u l t t European W r r , if \u5341 . e N t t h t r l m d s , for ins b?nce 5 should becomc merged as r \uff1a^rman territory, t) c Dutch Indies w o u l d , r.s \uff1f. m? uter of coarsc, btcorue rdcled to Gemir.n territory. If J?pan continues to behave as s^c has in c prst, Gcrm?ny will be pieced under no oblig? tion wyiatso'av T er to Jr pan jn giving tYi question of .\u30c8e tv.tc.\u30c8 Indies Ver special consider?- t i o n . It trust be remeniDercd > however, the.t t^e Sou\u30ec\u2019 Sc?s has become Jrp?n's Life Line econonicrlly nnd strrtcgicrlly. W e , in establishing the N.w O r d e r , do not raer.n to confine Doc. No. 1616 prge 64 Its r.rea onl.' to C u inp\u00bb Jeppn cannot renir in idle \uff1fs an c i 7 _ooker in event of P wVoltsrle cVrnge of territory taking place in t\u30c8e soutl cf st of Asia, o If t \uff1fprn sVoulc devute herself exclusively to the solutici, c,f C^ina Problem by &d>~ering merely to \"ber non-; nt ricr nee policy, matters vrill doubtlessly be come settled v\/it \u2022 in p s v o r t pc riod, f.nd subsequent to this Europee.n V\/nr, the Dutch Indies rs well rs the colonics of Enfl&nd ?nd Frrnce will T-PVC t v eir o\u30a2nc.rs\u30c8it) decided \u201d T it.h J?p?n looking on ps a mere spectator. Therefore, \uff1ft t M s important junct^iro, Jppan s v ciild realise the ultimpte si^nificrnce cf t>i? gigpjitic wc ^d-^\/idc reform rnd should not Te 11 to engage in active pn.cicipa\u30e2ion tVxreiru Docunient Vo0 1616 ^agc Nc\uff1a. 65 V I I C\u3078:^elusion of JA^AN-GE^ATT-TTiJ Y IJ ' i;XCE. (\/ eahi Shimbun Sc:pt\u2018:mhcr 29\uff0c1939 ) 1 \u2022 Ev^ rlasti ng Mutual Ik:\u4e04 1 \u3053irce The Fignif icmcc of the JA^A^-GE^tT-ITilY T'-J^\/RTITE T.\u305dEATI concluded last September 27 is extremely important hvt tho cortcntF arc simple and olear ard do not require ranch expli\uff1a.ration. 0rdinari3y, a protocol is* att^vched to the treaty but \u3057VGH this is not rcqvlred in this c. re. As stiDulc ted in the \u30cfrov?\u2022\uff1fiorF, dcte\u2014ls conccrring the oxo cut ion of the tro-r t^ r.rc to be dc cidod b ' a ccnrnittoe rhich is to be f-rmcd xatcr. Sincc the trccty not drrvm up by srDt,cialists, it? ctyle diffrs onrs: dv r-.bly fr'\u3001\u3064 the iisiic.1 f^rui. Viered from the \uff1f terdpoint of trecty spccic.li \u3089 ts , it :ic.y cor tain nc.ny pe.F sages that strike thorn ar strange \u2022 I f cnal;\/zod in dotri Is legally, it may give ri sc to v\u3014.ri\u3001us contcrtionc but ?ir.'cc the contcnt? of this treaty is unprcccdortod in hi story end bluntly, since the ^cllo^ nations, JAPAN, and ITALY pledged the coalition r ith their b i r d, it is -only n\u3057tur&l th\u3068--,t tho ^'ordir-g is simple c.:;d Dlain. I f a detailed irterprctr.tion is atti chcd beforehand legally or i f t psycholofdcr.l hold-ov.r exists in regard to mutu\u3054]rights ar-d dutior, tho value \u3078f the trcc.ty v*ill be dcsrtr\/ycd. Ir short ,\u30a8 think it ultibic.tcly depends or the single phrr so \"autucl rcli...rcc\". Therefore, in r^gcrd to tho treaty itrclf , the gener \u3055::]ST tuition ir clr ri.ficd b\uff1a\uff1b the Gov rmuo:-t rroclcu.k.tion \u3057rd there is nothir.f v:uch th: t Tould r.ccd adding. In the future f due to thip, tho probloni of T'hc.t effects T;ill it five rise to or hiT will the treaty itrclf' be carried out cr hor 7'ill its c h m cturics be developed c\u3057\uff1an only be judged \u3057r time progresses. Wh&t \u30a8 an going to ,cay in the fcl]\u30cfring is ertircly v.ithir! the limits of ny personal opinion ar.d. obferv? tions\u00bb It must be rcnG\u201dfbc,r\u3014.d th, t I \u3053rn not rcvcc.lirg \uff1fpcci rd 5 rfor y n:ti^n r gt.rding any agr .i nert aroorg tho three co-untric? nor \u30c9 v c I any relation rhatrocvcT in the Japc'.ncro Crovcrnricnt'e intentions rnd policice. 2 . Treaty of the 1\u2022\u30cf\"UD O W R . This treaty is foraallv callod the \"TRI-^\/ TITE TFcE\/TY\" but in general, it s\u3057\u308a\uff01is t*, be C e l l e d tho T . m : : ITE \/\u2018\u30d5\u30a8\u3073CE. Fron tho nrovisions in Article 3 of tho troe.tjy it c m be said that it is genuinely a defensive allic r-cc and may be called, a \"Security \/J.li\u3057.NCC\" OR A niV\/utir .l AesiL-TER.co Alli\\;R.con. ID S\uff0c\u2022\u30cfrt\uff0c it cz.r bo \u30e1 > # Doouniont No. 1616 No. 66 intcrprotGd a? havir-g its aim in pruvcr.tirg further cxror.nrion di the v:E-r in P'U ard .\u3078Sli... Defending upor the transition of inturnc tional noliticc.l conditions borc^ftcr, this Articlc 3 will be a l l i e d , Tliurcforc, this crticlc r:iay be consiDC^rcd in CO IE CC.SCE to be the substaroo of the tref-,ty but it is iy desire t\u3001Suck the c.^strucxaon of the nctr order as the chcractcristic of this trccty inctci.d. Historians of th \u3057 future gene rat?, --ns, I think, will proN b ^ ' call it the Treaty of Kev^ World Order \u2022 T!;e trecty drrwr up in tlio closing yctrs rf the liberclisui era considered, rt thct time\uff01 to be a ne\u30de treaty that broke t.\u0302 o bonds of tradition. But this New Order Tra.ty is no los-s inferior than tlicir treaty from tho standpoint of breaking thu bonds of convention. Similar to the anti-v;ar trcf.ty Phich tr^i.ty specialist? felt it 5 r-cludcd mi\\nj points th\u3057t Trcrc very ambiguous, the Ncr Order Treaty is also very untcchnic^l, Ir the first rlc..co, tho definition of Vcv! Order is not oxplaired. There is r\u30cf provision c^pcornirig the area in Grcc.t.^r Fast Asia \u00a3:nd KITtO^E \u3066,.he.re tho Kgv Order phall be c^tab\" 1 i s h o d .\u30a8 believe th\u3053 t tho^o mrttsrp Fill grt Am J. ly be cl?. rifled r \uff1f ti\u2022\u3001\uff1ac goes \u2019 n but from the development of affairs up to the pro sent, it is rot difficult to PCPX rally surniice fro\u3064-co r\u0302-'H pcnsc the signifies'ncc of the Ncr Order being pi?..rred by the throe com?tries cr.d \u3057ID the area aimed ct Tr\/ the ro^cctivc countries. The PO-G\u00a3,llcd NCT t Order is not norcly a passive e.^voot tn overthrow the status qno \u2018 but is suppov^cd to in elude a porltivc progrr.-- of hou xhc ncr ^orld should bc # The poDular use of the rtirt.se 11 new order\" seems to hc'.vo N'.gun ini th the d\u3067\u3064clamrti\u3064r conc rnlng the \"Construction of the New Order ir\uff1b E st \u30cf?I\/ TT by the Firrt K O W E Cabinet. But beginning ri th HITLF\"' ir.d \u5e7f:thor W\u30e0ZI loadc-rs of G r u y , they have tnken a fc.ncy t\u3001 tho use of this phri.se pircc lorg - go. As far e.s I knov:,\u30a8 do not think a \u3001rsiKlc cocci\u3057n.. t\u2022\u30ec\u3001r hes boon nude in J ; -\/IT as to rhc.t tho im^\u3064rt \u3002f the Fo- Order in F\u3054\u3066t , r I A should bc # The F'.F Order advoc^tcd by Gur v ir.ny \uff1feojig 5 r.lro t.r, prr.du^? ly c h m g e rith the transition of Eur,.\u3001\u3058ar \u2022oolitical ennd? tions . 3 . .\u2022 GCor;i T >lirh^c.r ! t '?f the Thr ; . Countries 1 Idr^ls. Sincc the Nov\uff1a Order rioturod ir\uff1a th\u3057\u30cfinds of the rcspcctivo countries, Jap:.n, Gc r ir.ny and \u30a8 , re such, it cannot rocL ?s: rily bo VE id that thoy ere undcrrtood by OLcb '^th.r clcr rl\uff1a\/. H\u3078\u3067ev\u3057r, is it rot cxtrcncly important tc d^f-' rite]y cl-\uff1a rlfy this poiiot? Of coLirsc, l s a trerty it \u30deill donE.rcc.te oc ch otlK r 1 s sphur\u3057 of irfl ucr.cc end the 4 . . - \/ \u2022 \u5f73 \u505c . fc \u30de \uff1b \u7e41 \u8fd3 f . Docurnort No. 1616 ^e No. 67 recognition of c. free\u2014he nd ^ithin thct sphere is in i t?c l f , a snr'\uff0c\u571f iciort sigr.ificr rce but thi? Fill h. vo a tarte of a uery old era. I do not xiish tc rcgr.rd the pr^Font v.orld hostilitj' as 'icrdy a contort for For Id supromi.cy or a cor test f\u00abr spheres of iiflucr.cc an^ng the big poFurs# It is insipid if the rising countries, Japan, Gcm^ny , Italy- end pcrhcips U.T struggle fnr povor c^xiii-st the old VOVCTS, Grcrt Britain, \/mc.Tica. ard Frrnce\u2022 It is also t:\u3001o si )pl\u3057-\uff1a1And\u3054d to n gc.rd. it as \ufffd rr cial feud botrocn the \u2018 nglo-Sc.xons arid the. Teutons' or betveen the yc 1 lor r^.ce' r m the Fhitc r?:.co. In bric^, L.ltb ugh this is a hackney, d exnrcpsior ,\u30a8 believe it p\/ust bo regarded i\\.? e culturevl Frrfc.ro \u3001rd a brttlc of ideology. In a word, it is a struggle votrcc n do ::ncrr.cy r..nd tot.:-li tarir,r\u00bbism but viewing it \uff01 o D D o s i t i o n \uff1bf ideology c,r.d \u3001f cultu?\"c, i t 5\uff1aj-gni^ios' c\ufffd grcc t revolution unprece-dcrtcd in tho history of r:if.:nkird. Tho ideology of nar r \"ird ^ron tho ft\u3057\uff1andf)\u3064ixt of cultur- 1 h?.story in the past ecvrrr.l thousand ycors hc,s s ven chr nges but 'rinco the Gr< cir.r era ur> to the present, the- fund? \u30edcmtr.l idea of the Occidcn-o nas alre.ys bcun hi sod m Tndividu\u00a3.lisr.i. Tho t^felitc .rio.n ider.\u30c8r.s bcor\u00ab r sleep for ai long tine during th^t period. Sirco such v\u2022\u3057s tho cr-ee of the rir.n ^ovc\u30b0unt strrtcd in Gcmicry \u00a3.ncl I taly , it di tes b' ck pri r to the G- \u2022\u2018 \u2022\u2018'\u3066.\u2019.d r,r t J-:\u3001..\uff1a\uff1a \uff0c it can be sr.id thnt 1 \u3066 is a r: v. rsion t^ tho fur.dcvmentc.l \u3057nd hoc.lthy ideology of or-rlj?-' mankind whr'ch hi.s beer) pru served c.rd f ostorcd th irtcgrity si ncc the founding \u30cff Jc-j)c.n. It ie f\u3002r this vu s r th\u00a3't the t\u3002talitcri:iris\u5de7\u3002f Gor^f..ny nd Itcly ircluciG nuch th:vt is Japr;EOFe. In \u00a9.dvocating the cstc-bl.ishricnt of the Now Ordc-r ir: tho Fcv Ec st thr :ugh the China Incidcrt, J \ufffd-.vr.r. is strongly c-iph\u00a3Lsizir.g the ideuls of CHnT,0\u2022\u306bU\/T\u2022\u5382\u2022 founding of tbo country\/ spirit \u3068.rid It ^KO \u30a8CJHIU anc! for this reason, it cr.n \"b.\u30ea stid thr t \u3075t follows the pr.\u3064e line of tho Ncr Ord^ r ^ovcrncrt in Gcrmny c.nd Itcly. In E'urcpo it is \u3067 \u30ea c t i v c , to dcys before tho Grecicn \u3068..nd in Jap^n, it is retrospective t'\u3001tho K; ego of GOCIF\/\uff1b Therefore,\u30a8 thirk it c:.r be s\u3057id thrt the I T \u3073\uff0cOrder ^-vc^crt in the Ec.st \u3054rd 7 y st iv c a n,\")VGncrt t) restore tho funcki\u0302 \u3057rt.\u3058 1 cbr.rr ct'.T of p.cinkind\u2022 For t!;is rc-asor^ British \u3078nd \/^cricc-n quarters arc rot altogether wrorg in identi \u3050\u2018yin.g Japan, Gv.rMany end \u30a8tnly under tho stnc C\u00a3itv.g?rj r m d cr I 1 ing thcr.\"> t^t:litc..ri: .r countries alike. Tho co^-l' b^rr.ti - n c n \u3053 l i t ] ' o f the three co-untri os is only rr turcl when seer from such a furjclr\/ncntal c.nd idool\u3078'f\u3015\u2022 stic \u5341\u3053rdpnint. For;, returning to tho roclistic \u3064r\u3064\u201cbl\u3057ns, c\u3002r:cr(jtcly, Fh-.t kind of nor cultu\u3001c \u30a2ill Dccuncnt Fo. 1616 ^age 6S Gem,\uff1a rsy c.rd Itr ly fvi:f\\c in E u m ^ c ? 'Vhet rill Japan d\u3078 in tho Grcrter Er.st \u201csi\u3053\u3014.ro\u3057\uff1f Furthornorc, in the int^ rrr.l orgenize t5.on of the three cvurtrics\uff1b r U l they c.]l t\u3057:kc c s\u30e9,\uff1ai].\u2018: r type \u5e7f.f \u3067\u30011\u2019:tic\u3058 1 \u3053rd cc T'^iiccJ th? Is it cpr>cr.rc ever tn the, general m b l 5 c end \u3054lso c.s ir rep,:rds t JV.prn, tbcpc r.re i v -iinc-nt problc.ns of vltrl importcncc, Recently in Jcnr.r, the fTcr Ordor v \"nvc :i\u3058nt if boc-nj r.g quit\u3057 r.otj.c.orblc but todc^r, it is the Djri^n ^f \u3057vrry^r.c tl: r t the CrOKOI^U s^ii'jt rh. uld bo rcrtorud c.r.d thc-t th,:. unc?crlj r ir:\u00a3 \u5c38rirciplc if the ric ti \uff1ftmctur, sh^ulrl\u3001\u3002clr.ri r i.cd t\u30cf.pr'\u3001\/o: r\u3057 the structuro f \u4e00.\uff1ar IVK'\u5e7fir-Y\u95e8\u30f3IIP\/. . T n o p u l \uff1a r \u3064jv'rt r.rrirtrrcc\/. Furthcraorc, the pr.\u3050olen is \uff0chrt \u3001 \u3057 f ? b ' uld be u?cd tr, actually cc.r\u30de,7 on.t the r\u3057\u3064h\u30cbrisrns of politics c.nd tc -nony\uff0c-.-hich ne nifest the prirci^lc cf natiore 1 structure. The Order thrt G\u30ecr\u3001\u3001\u00a3.ny r.rA It<;lv Is tiying t \u3078 i n Eur \u201c\uff1a-oc do-;... p r\u3001;rt iv: elude irly G x n v r.nd Itr.lv but the \u3057 ctiu.l problen of the greatest 1 \\port-: ncc \uff1f s t t.. d ' \u0302 .th the pollticc.l ard cc\u30cfr.\u3078\u3001-:ic\u3053 1 ctrncturc \uff0cf t\uff0c:c other Biir'po:r c^untric?. In r\u0302 . to thir, it i? ho 1 icvod th\/t todry pi rs c-nsj dcr^.bly definite h\u3053v\u3057\"HCG\u201d dr\u3053\u30b9ur, by Ccri\\.rj \u305frd ItcJ.y, On the oth:..r hr.nd, rhrt f\uff0crn ^f Ncv; Ord^r ip Jap\u30cb\u3064 g^ir^ to construct ir the Grortv r I tlr?nk v. ol^. r , rd d\u30ec f \u3046 rite pIL r rvgc.rdJng tho diF^fj.ti^r: \"f t\u30c80 ^cv Ord^r ir\ufffd rh* ch if t) be the v ckbr^no of tl c Ncr Order in Grzz t r \u201c \uff1fi\u3057.\uff0c''\".m t ^Mrrt be est blirhed. Rc?\u3001r \u2022.\u3057tion \uff1ff t\uff0c:-.c N r ^ r r . l Structure\u2022 Nor, if t\u30c8c. id\u3001.\u3054 f .rd rtrvctiTr^ ^f tlic old - rdcr, '-Mch r\u3057\uff1a.\/-ins crc \u3069.till \/inch -jn evidorevj in Jar)c.n, \".rt t be left ; rtc ct, cr.n the Ncr Ord.\u3001.r ir. Greater Ac:a ov^r be c stc.bliFhcrl? Assuni.rg th: t it re.r rncslhl\u3057\uff0ccc:: sr.ch r Fcr Order G r a t r \ufffd'ic. ret ir. conccrt \u201d.ith tbc Euro^ccn Nc'\uff1b: Order \u3064f G\u3054..r r \u30ec.;ny c.rd Itclj r ? I h:.vc been :.dv;>c. ting th : t tho c -nvc rsi f foreign p^lic; r and the Fr.ti'n r.l Tcr 0 d, r crc inr\u3001,p r.'blo, I thc ref \u0302 rc Drcdict th t ur.dc r the Dr. rrrt corr-iti cne, J ^ . f c\u5e7f\u3054.1:3 ti'.\u3001r \u301cith G rnc'r.y .rd \u30a8 + \u3014.]y is . It i? ny dc 5 ire th, t the pcTolx give., thi p cr reful enn- sidcrLti -\u0302 n. Ir -y \u3063:\uff1ao r 5\u3063r\u201d the c- urc Tvhich votive ted tlj.o crro:\\t -nrld c^n- Vv rsi. li t- c) i fl: r in t\u3001\u3057 rtf.lcn\uff0c'..tc of liVr- liv e tic c.c\u3001r.\u3064.\u201d-3\u3001 I h: vo v.o nr r t i m l c r rc rpoct f\u3001:r the bist^riccl m\uff1a t\u3057ridisn of K.'\"\\XI. r ;\u2022\u30f3 but I thirk t ] t ir\uff1a m\u3057ny c\u3053f\u2022\u3057 f , the nocev??i\"ciof of cc^roiric livclih^^d hc.vc b-.cn th c u?o \u30cff r\u3014 volutins \uff1ft. hun;.r r^c? cty. \/\u2022\u00a3 1 m f the ct pit' listic oxt)1-? tc.ti--r cc^r.T-iy f the \/rglo-S .x r. t ^ c is renpant D\u5e7fcuncnt T \u4e86\u3064\u2022 1616 69 cr.d as lor.g r s th-\u3002b\u30cf\u201dncp-\u3001ss r.ccurml\u300cti.'\u3009n :\u3001.f 1\u2022\uff1b\u4e04 1th is p fitted to fc 11 into th, Irnds ^f this n . l l ntimb.\uff1ar of 1 ndividuc*. Is, this \u3058\u3001rth rill \uff1fti] 1 be t .0 sni'\u30cb 11 \uff1b vor if , r-l\u3054 rpx.d five tines \u3064r ever tor. tinier. To n.'- kc e. lonf- st \u3054\u3067;7 sh \u30cf rt,\u3068 rrc?.. -f f irty rnd .^iTty million p<\u3002T)lc c \\rtrol \u3078 rn-f .\u201d\u201dtii \u3001f the rld T r torritnry c.r.d. pc,\u3001\uff0clcs r rd r^r the benefit of \u5382 p r ' - u p \u30cff rjlntocr- ts, they \uff1a. rc \u30c8\uff1a.ir.g exploited and t. 1 \" v'\u00ab5.tl\uff1a e.r un-^ rfjrornd rcr urcc-c ore lyirig r:r \u3054.tc, nv vented fron bcii g utiliZv..-d by \">th. \u2022 T Jnd\/r \uff1fuch c-ncHt: or.r, it is irovit. bl: , tiu t ^^Vc. rty pre v - 1 s t,\u3001d;\u4e8c7 i\u201d the \u2022\u30de t( ri\u2022\u5e7f- tic living str.ndc rd nf mc.nkind. T\u3002rectify this irr t\u0302 ' -rr^lity in the Eirr\u3064pc\u3057n and Grc^.tor \u30be Gia \u3053 r \u3044.\uff01\uff1f \u3001\u3001\uff01he tbj rrii ci'olc contort?'\u3001\u5c38 tho T : ow Order nicnt? oned ir. the Trio\u3069rtito r v c t , But i\u3050 puch is tho c?.\u00a3rc, the rcnuiriti'-ns \u30cff the N\u3057TT C:\u3050,r Treaty fc;, th.\u3001 three ^owcrr o^rcorncd riuet Tx. first, t ) uoh Id the t ylrJ.it-,.Ti r :.r< , ,\u3001rld idee. f cr\/l Fecund, hi 5:od \u30cfr. this idoc., t\uff1a) r..rouncc the rjF.ten \ufffd,rxrO\/\u3001i\u5341\u3093 ti\u3001n \u4e00-.f the stronge r vrcyirg upor. tho \u201d' \u3078.r\u2022 If \u2022\u5315h\u3057 iyrc.rry ^f Or \u2022 t 5r\u30e9\u3050,.in, A v 'ioricr r rd Fr r-co is \u30c9 horrcid and. oven if they \u3057re ovcrthrT'n, it \uff0cl\u4e04\u4e04 degenera te t\u3001th hor\u00ab. tofore \"battle f^r p ^ c r \" cmc! rrii:. not contrihutc to the\uff1a civili3\u00a3.ti.*)n ^f rie.nkir.d if the throe c'\u3001urtr:\u30ec f arc \u00a3 n ing t^ succccd th(x\\ ir. d irg the rc::ic thiri\u00a3. If th't \"-ir th .\u30ce cr r.o} a pcr r .k r ncrt r-^rld p'\u3001:. cc\u3001 can r?cvcr be gained c 5. Significr.nce 'of \u753b r \u3059 s Declaration. \u5fc3ccntly\uff0cCor r it\uff1any 1 s Economic Mirdptc.r FU?' r strtcd th. t as in r'ZI \u300c e n . n y , the gold rt&nd-.rd r \u0302 t bo used hcrcr.ft;r in the net* Europe \u2022 \u2018 This is ^nly n t rly \u3057 f\u3064\u2022rc.nciGl and eoroniic^.l '\"T^blcn \u30cff \u3066he ncv r Europe but \u00a3:s boirg iridicctivc \u30cff the ch r: ctcr f the Fcv : Order iteclf, I think it POFS^FBGS: a sigrific: rice of cxtrcnc i -iportmcc. If inc c-.r-Ei dcvF import: r.t r. r\u3001lo gold c. t.\u30d6 1 t.\u3001 exploit t.ho renk -Ir. the v\u3001rld heretofore, ore cr.r,not \u3064 enph\uff1a ?izc thu ir.\u201d\u3064rtrrc\u3057\u3078\u3067 Mr. FUNP* ! c docl: r\u3057ti\u3001r. . \u2018 I \u2018 If the Nov: Order plcnr-cd by r \u3057rd Itr.ly \"^'mld p^rscss such cho.ractcris.ti ce, J-,IC Old Ord\u3057:r r,O r 'cr5, ci\u3002]]\u4e86 FO\u0302 r fr'\u3001 r \u3011 the E'tc-rcl^rint cf the clor.iir'.tir\u0302 clc-s; r -, Fill kn'\u201d r cla-vlj \uff1a t f. pi. rcc str\u5e7fi\u30c1\uff1ac n opnoriti^r t\u3001t\u3057lit ri\uff1a nis r n is. N*^:, ' ith tl c\uff0crcluri.)n nf th\u3057 Tripr.i'titc :\u3001ct by Jc.p?. n, rhc ir rctually rtc rdirrj rt the cr^svvn\uff1a. dr '\u3001\u30ca c h ^ f irg -.nc vc.vty \u4e00r thu thcr. Sjncc the \uff1f^ FCHUn- F Ir?cicl( nt, in vicr \u2022 f the pol > cy. Jr.p:n hr-s Bocumcnt No, 1616 Pr.go N-. 70 rc*hT)t\u3001.d m d norcovcr, \u3002nt of r..g\u3057rd f-.r rg\u3014..dvnc\u3057ted the high iclot.Is nf blirhirg the Grcc tor \/\u2022 sia Now Ordrr, actually Javcn should ht,vo n- thing to c^uso her t\u2019 be i t 1 \u3078\uff01\uff1f\uff1f a? t\u3064 h::.r c^iorsc of r.ction. But it see \u0302 s thrt ^nvti - \u0302 \u2019 f the \u3067 c'\u4e2b\u3015lc rc^s:. to consider the problem i n thf t 3if;ht. With th-, cor elusion of the \u30c9c.v T OrdLr Trc&ty, is it \uff01r\u3001t rcccssary for the rmncnt end the pecnlc to r'-.r!\u30de tli\u00ab ir fcelir^s in rr f, rd t \u2022 r:orlrl pribl.. \u0302 s? Doc# No. l6l6 ^cge No. 71 C E R T I F J C A T E W.D^C. No. I . F . S . No. l6l6 Statement cf \u00a3ource and Authenticity \u30a7 \uff0c \u3068 ? i i b e . t a \uff0c S o s e b u r o , hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capo city \u2022 Second Secretary, Home Ministry .nd that as such ofi icicl I have custody of tho document hereto cttcched consisting of lo8 p .\u8bc9 s , dated ITo\\r , \"^d doscrilDcd as follows\uff1a Dircussi-n of 1 4 he Jcpan - G e r m y - Itcly Aris I further certify that the Gutached rccord aid document is cn \u2022 f f i c i a l document of tho J .jjanese Govcrnnent ? and that it is prrt of the official archives emd files of the following, ncmcd ministry or depcrtment (specifying also tho file nucibcr or citrtion, if r.ny or any other officir.l designrtion of the re^ulrr location of the documont in the CT ch ives or files ) \uff1a Honie Ministry _ \u00a3 igned at Tokyo 011 this \u3001 third dcy of January, 1947 \/s \/ _Shibr :tQ | Kosr:buro Sign\u3057tiure of Official FEAL Witness\uff1a \/s\u30ce Kishichi Cnuna Jrpcncse Ch? rr.cters) \u2018 O f f i c i a l Capacity Statement of Officir.l \"Prcurcnont \u30a7\u300bBic^.crd !\uff1a< Jc,rsh \u00bb hereby certify that \u30a8 cm associated with the Gonercl Headqucrtcrs of ,thc Supreme Commander for tho Alliod Powers, end thct the above c^rtificrtion was obtained by me ro\u4e04.1 the r.bove 3igned officicl of the Japr.nece n-ovornment in the o nduct of my \u00a9if icicl businose 0 t Signed rt Tokyo ov tk..s 3rd day of Jan. \u2019 1947 \/s\/ Bjchrrd E. Lrreh Witness\uff1a \/ s \/ Douglr J L c V Idorf Chief, I m . D iv . IP\u00a3 Invosti^c.tor v IR ; Off icial Capacity","type":"literal","lang":"en"}],"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/identifier":[{"value":"RBSC-ARC-1135-30-7","type":"literal","lang":"en"}],"http:\/\/www.europeana.eu\/schemas\/edm\/isShownAt":[{"value":"10.14288\/1.0128894","type":"literal","lang":"en"}],"http:\/\/www.europeana.eu\/schemas\/edm\/provider":[{"value":"Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library","type":"literal","lang":"en"}],"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/rights":[{"value":"Image provided for research and reference use only. Permission to publish, copy, or otherwise use these images must be obtained from Rare Books and Special Collections http:\/\/rbsc.library.ubc.ca","type":"literal","lang":"en"}],"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/source":[{"value":"University of British Columbia Library Rare Books and Special Collections","type":"literal","lang":"en"}],"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/title":[{"value":"Ex.2208A-2234. Japanese foreign policy","type":"literal","lang":"en"}],"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/type":[{"value":"Text","type":"literal","lang":"en"}]}}