Proceedings

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1
                                 Vancouver, B.C.
 2
                                 May 14, 1990
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 4
                (PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED AT 9:00 A.M.)
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     THE REGISTRAR:
                       Order in court. Supreme Court of British
 7
                Columbia, this 14th day of May, 1990. Delgamuukw
 8
                versus Her Majesty the Queen at bar, my lord.
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      THE COURT: Mr. Rush, it occurred to me over the weekend that
               none of us mentioned the factor that seems to me to
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11
               have some relevance to the proceedings that I
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               understand are to take place this morning. And that
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                is that I assume that the -- those who are to speak
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                are plaintiffs.
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     MR. RUSH: Yes.
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     THE COURT: Well, if that's so, then it has occurred to me that
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               what they are to say could well be regarded as
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                argument.
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     MR. RUSH: Yes.
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     THE COURT: And I think that may resolve the difficulty I had
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               with the status with what was to be given to the
22
               proceedings this morning.
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     MR. RUSH: Your lordship was of a similar mind to myself, my
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                lord. I was going to submit that the statement that
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               the chiefs will be making to you should be inserted as
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                part of the plaintiffs' argument at the end. And I
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               think that there are two characteristics to it: One,
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                it has the character of argument and, secondly, it has
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                the protocol of completing the plaintiffs' case and
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                completing the plaintiffs' argument. And in this
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                respect, this is the way in which we would ask your
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                lordship to receive the closing statement of the
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                chiefs, and we feel that it may be inserted as part of
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                the written argument of the plaintiffs at its end.
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      THE COURT: All right. Well, that factor that I didn't think of
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               and which I don't think was mentioned -- I hope it
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               wasn't, if it was I overlooked it -- puts the
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               proceedings on a different basis than -- well, it puts
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                it on a basis that I can deal with and which I think
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                your friends can deal with, and I think perhaps we
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               will deal -- we will just proceed from there.
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     MR. RUSH: Thank you, my lord.
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     MR. GOLDIE: My lord, may I make a suggestion? My friend has
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                characterized these statements as argument. I would
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                ask, my lord, that we be given the statements which
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                are about to be read so that we may look at them and
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                consider our position. We do not want to make any
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1
                interruption while the chiefs, who are laymen, are
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               making their statement, such as I might feel free to
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                do so if it was part of my friend's argument. And I
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                would suggest, my lord, that we be given these
 5
                statements, be given five minutes to read them and
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                that we carry on from there.
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     MR. RUSH: Well, my lord, I don't see any need for five minutes
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               to read them. I don't have any objection to that. I
 9
               have copies for the court and for my friends.
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     MR. GOLDIE: No. I mean before they commence.
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     THE COURT: I don't need to hear you, Mr. Goldie. If the
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                statements are ready and they are going to be read in,
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                I don't see any reason why they shouldn't be shown.
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                So we'll take five minutes?
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     MR. GOLDIE: That will be ample, my lord.
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     THE REGISTRAR: Order in court. Court stands adjourned.
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18
                (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 9:05 A.M.)
19
                (PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED AT 9:10 A.M.)
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     THE REGISTRAR: Order in court.
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     MR. RUSH: Thank you, my lord. My friends have read the closing
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                statement of the chiefs. I would like to pass a bound
                copy of this up to your lordship. Copies have been
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               provided to the reporters.
26
                     My lord, I would just like to introduce Alfred
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                Joseph, whom you know, Gisdaywa, who is here to my
28
                left. Earl Muldoe, who is Delgamuukw, successor to
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                the name of Delgamuukw, and Dora Wilson-Kenni,
30
                Yagalahl, and Don Ryan, Maas Gaak.
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                    And my lord, Mr. Joseph and Mr. Muldoe will speak
                to you in respect of the statement, and Mrs.
32
33
                Wilson-Kenni and Mr. Ryan will stand by and witness.
34
                Thank you, my lord.
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     THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Joseph.
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     MR. JOSEPH: Thank you, my lord.
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                    We, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en people, are in
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                the court to state the truth of the ownership and
                jurisdiction we exercise over our territories.
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                     Three years have passed since we made our opening
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                statement to this court. At that time, you did not
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                know who Delgamuukw and Gisdaywa were. Now, this
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                court knows I am Gisdaywa, a Wet'suwet'en chief who
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               has responsibility for the House of Kaiyexwaniits of
45
                the Gitdumden. I have explained how my House holds
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                the Biiwenii Ben territory and had the privilege of
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                showing it to you. Long ago my ancestors encountered
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2.8

Submissions by Mr. Muldoe Submissions by Mr. Joseph

the spirit of that land and accepted the responsibility to care for it. In return, the land has fed the House members and those whom the chiefs permitted to harvest its resources. Those who have obeyed the laws of respect and balance have prospered there.

MR. MULDOE: My lord, I am Delgamuukw, the third since this trial started. I also have obligations to my House and the territories of my House. You have heard oral histories of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en that tell of the many groups that migrated into our territories. Many stayed, contributing to our culture, acknowledging the authority of our chiefs and obeying our laws.

Of all these groups, only the Europeans failed to recognize our ownership and jurisdiction. This court now has an opportunity to redress this situation.

We, the Hereditary Chiefs, decided against wearing blankets and regalia in this courtroom because we believe that our authority would not be respected by the government lawyers. Under our law, disrespect for people and for their territory requires compensation.

We, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en, must be compensated for loss of the land's present integrity and for the loss of economic rents.

We ask that the court not only acknowledge our ownership and jurisdiction over the land, but to restore it to a form adequate for nature to heal in terms of restoration. We would like to see clearcuts and plantations returned to forests, contaminated rivers and lakes returned to their original pristine state, reservoirs of drowned forests returned to living lakes and life-sustaining flows to diverted rivers.

MR. JOSEPH: My lord, we realize that the true financial value of this compensation for restoration would bankrupt both the federal and provincial governments.

Compensation must remain an ongoing obligation of the federal and provincial governments "until our hearts are satisfied".

However, this compensation should not be viewed by this court as an alternative to the acknowledgement of our ownership and jurisdiction of our land. We do not want financial compensation without the recognition of our authority over our territories.

We are asking you to make declarations on the

2.8

Submissions by Mr. Muldoe Submissions by Mr. Joseph

Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en aboriginal title. We, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en people, own our lands.

I will identify those areas where the powers of the province and the federal governments need to be restrained in order for us to exercise our responsibilities under aboriginal title.

MR. MULDOE: First, we the chiefs must have our authority recognized in order to exercise our responsibility to protect the land for the future, and to conserve resources. We must have the power to manage all human activity that brings change to the land, air or water on all of our territories.

Second, to enable each House to provide for its members and all those living in their territory, the chiefs must have control over the local economy by managing natural resource allocations within their territories. This would include licensing, leasing and permitting. As well, royalties and taxation payments from resource use on our territories must be paid to us.

It is not our intention to exert any powers over the non-Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en people living in our territories. Fee-simple lands held by third parties as of October, 1984, would be exempt from this resource allocation.

We see the pulling back of these central government powers as being the minimum required to restore not only individual self-reliance but also community self-reliance. We have presented you with ample evidence of the effects on our land resulting from government resource management. We have also given evidence of the effect that centralized economic management and government welfare has had on our people. The governments' system does not work. We, the Hereditary Chiefs, believe we can change the situation under our laws and practices through our authority.

MR. JOSEPH: My lord, our system of government is as powerful today and will be as powerful tomorrow, as it was one hundred or ten thousand years ago. You have heard both ancient and modern histories tell us of our system --

43 THE COURT: Sorry.

MR. JOSEPH: Tell of how our system has remained relevant throughout the evolving ecological, cultural and economic circumstances in which our people have found themselves. To say we disobey our laws and ignore our

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1 chiefs' authority because we change a piece of 2 technology, or use our land in a different way, is a 3 desperate argument. 4 This case then is about learning from the past so 5 we can repair the present and pass on a healthier land 6 to our grandchildren. It is not about retrieving 7 frozen rights from a nineteenth century ice-box. 8 Our aboriginal title is found in common law and 9 takes precedence over the Provincial Crown. We do not 10 have to, and will not, surrender our aboriginal title 11 in order to be recognized by the federal government. 12 We are self-governing. 13 However, we see a layering of responsibilities 14 among the Gitksan and the Wet'suwet'en, the federal 15 government, and the Provincial Government being 16 resolved in an ongoing series of negotiations. 17 the strong imperative for the Gitksan and the 18 Wet'suwet'en, British Columbia and Canada to have 19 social and economic activities continue within our 20 territories, consensus on the necessary political and 21 administrative framework must be found. 22 We are asking this court to properly apply common 23 law. We want a declaration of recognition and 24 affirmation of our continued ownership and 25 jurisdiction. We will not surrender or diminish our 26 title and rights. We do not request a "right" to use 27 and occupy the land, and we refuse to extend reserve 2.8 lands. We will decide what our future relationship 29 will be with Canada and British Columbia on this 30 basis. 31 We ask nothing more than what should have 32 occurred prior to confederation, and prior to this 33 province entering confederation. We are here to right 34 the wrongs that have been occurring for over one 35 hundred years. This court has the power to recognize 36 and affirm Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en ownership and 37 jurisdiction. 38 Thank you. 39 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. RUSH: Thank you, my lord. I think that concludes the 40 plaintiffs' argument and in closing. 41 42 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I think we will adjourn 43 until -- I think we will adjourn until ten o'clock. 44 MR. RUSH: Thank you.

THE REGISTRAR: Order in court. This court stands adjourned

until ten o'clock.

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                (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 9:25 A.M.)
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                (PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED AT 10:00 A.M.)
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     THE REGISTRAR: Order in court.
     THE COURT: Mr. Goldie.
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     MR. GOLDIE: May it please the court, the three-volume written
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                summary will continue to be the basis for our
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                submissions, supplemented from time to time. And I
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                will be in Volume 1 this morning.
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                     I have had handed up, my lord, a yellow binder,
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                and I should perhaps explain that. It is to be used
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                as the argument proceeds and it consists of extracts
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               of exhibits and authorities. Not the entire exhibit
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               or case, but sufficient to permit reference in the
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               summary to be followed. The tab numbers, my lord,
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               correspond to the tab numbers in the summary, and if I
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               may give your lordship an example of that: If your
18
               lordship would look at the yellow volume, the first
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                tab is a Roman one, and that is referable to Part I of
20
                the written summary, which is identified by Roman
               letters.
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22
                     Then under that there are separate tabs and they
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               have three numbers, a Roman number one, followed by a
                slash and an Arabic one. Arabic one refers to the
24
                sections within the part. The second Arabic number is
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26
                the paragraph in the summary.
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                    Now, I can't promise that that system will work
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                infallibly, but I hope it will be of sufficient use to
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                your lordship to enable you to follow the references
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                in the evidence as the references are made in the
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                summary. The grey binders which are to your
32
                lordship's left are the plaintiffs' authorities.
                have not -- defendant's authorities I should say. We
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34
               have not duplicated those which are found in the
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               plaintiffs' authorities. These are authorities --
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               cases and authorities which are not found there.
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      THE COURT: This yellow book is not for all of your argument,
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               Mr. Goldie, is it?
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     MR. GOLDIE: No. That's just --
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     THE COURT: Volume 1?
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     MR. GOLDIE: -- Volume 1 -- well, not even the whole of Volume
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               1.
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     THE COURT: All right.
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     MR. GOLDIE: On the spine there is an indication of the parts to
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               which the volume refers.
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                    I have also handed up, my lord, and I believe the
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                Registrar has placed it in your Volume 1 of the
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1 summary, a document marked "Introduction". 2 THE COURT: Yes. 3 MR. RUSH: Now, the references in this document are not in the 4 yellow binder. This was prepared very recently and I 5 have attached to it certain of the references or 6 documents to which I wish to make comment as we go 7 along. 8 Following that introduction, I move into the parts 9 of the summary and to which the extracts found in the 10 Volume 1 of the yellow binders relates. 11 Now, my lord, the plaintiffs -- and I'm now 12 referring to the introduction. 13 The plaintiffs seek to establish that historical 14 events, characterized according to a particular view 15 of history, constitute rules of law. In time this 16 historical perspective has ranged from the mid 16th 17 century to 1990. Geographically, the court has been 18 asked to have regard to events in Africa, New Zealand 19 and South America as well as virtually all of North 20 America. Sometimes the description of these events 21 depends on primary sources but in many, many instances 22 the court is asked to accept someone else's judgment 23 of the correct meaning of an historical fact. 24 The plaintiffs say that people of European 25 descent view events and other peoples in an 26 ethnocentric fashion. Mr. Brody, of course, came here 27 to tell us this. But, my lord, ironically, it was Mr. 28 Brody himself who introduced the stereotypes of the 29 frontier and who ignored the safeguards the law 30 affords to those who need protection from 31 stereotyping. 32 The plaintiffs call this re-interpretation of 33 history "The Historical-Purposive Approach to 34 Aboriginal Rights". In their summary it is Section A 35 of Part I, and it is called "The Development of the 36 Fundamental Common Law Principles of Aboriginal 37 Rights" and Mr. Jackson introduced that proposition at 38 transcript 316, page 23705. 39 My lord, in my submission, there is no authority 40 for coupling these two words together as an excuse for 41 or justification for setting aside established law or 42 for invading the realm of the Executive and Parliament 43

or for considering the meaning of documents in other

Historical-Purposive Approach to Aboriginal Rights",

"Historical" in the phrase -- in the clause, "The

than the sense the people who wrote them intended.

is derived, in my friend's submission, from the

1 statement of Mr. Justice Dickson (as he then was) in 2 Kruger and Manuel, and this was quoted by my friend 3 Mr. Jackson: 4 Claims to aboriginal title are woven with 5 history, legend, politics and moral 6 obligations. 7 8 What followed, in my submission, is, in his 9 lordship's reasons, is even more relevant, and I 10 quote: 11 12 If the claim of any Band in respect of any 13 particular land is to be decided as a 14 justiciable issue and not a political issue, it 15 should be so considered on the facts pertinent 16 to that Band and to that land, and not on any 17 global basis. 18 19 The plaintiffs would have the facts pertinent to 20 Spain's 16th century use of slavery in its gold mines 21 of Central and South America provide some guide to the 22 law applicable here. The plaintiffs say that from 23 this factual background principles of international 24 law developed. In my submission, there is authority 25 of equal weight in international law to the contrary. 26 And I refer here to the report of the Indian 27 Commissioners appointed to inquire into the 2.8 application of grants of money paid by the British 29 Parliament to the Indians of the old pre-confederation 30 Province of Canada. And an extract from their report 31 is found attached to this section of my submission. 32 But they referred to Vattel, who was a Swiss pub -- a 33 Swiss commentator born in 1714 and died in 1767, who 34 was a writer of repute in international law. And I 35 have set out the particular portion which -- part of 36 which was referred to by the plaintiffs in their 37 submission, but I will read what is taken from the 38 report, which is found from the first page of it. And 39 I quote: 40 41 The wisdom and justice of this course is most 42 strongly commended by Vattel in his Law of

And then this is from Vattel:

extract:

Nations, from which the following passage is an

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judgment.

Submissions by Mr. Goldie

1	'There is another celebrated question to
2	which the discovery of the new world has
3	principally given rise. It is asked whether a
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	nation may lawfully take possession of some
5	part of a vast country in which there are none
6	but erratic nations, whose scanty population is
7	incapable of occupying the whole? We have
8	already observed, in establishing the
9	obligation to cultivate the earth, that these
10	nations cannot exclusively appropriate to
11	themselves more land than they have occasion
12	for, or more than they are able to settle and
13	cultivate. Their unsettled habitation in those
14	immense regions, cannot be accounted a true and
15	legal possession, and the people of Europe, too
16	closely pent up at home, finding land of which
17	the Savages stood in no particular need, and of
18	which they made no actual and constant use,
19	were lawfully entitled to take possession of it
20	and to settle it with colonies. The earth, as
21	we have already observed, belongs to mankind in
22	general, and was designed to furnish them with
23	subsistence. If each nation had from the
23	
	beginning resolved to appropriate to itself a
25	vast country, that the people might live only
26	by hunting, fishing and wild fruits, our globe
27	would not be sufficient to maintain a tenth
28	part of its present inhabitants. We do not,
29	therefore, deviate from the views of nature, in
30	confining the Indians within narrower limits.
31	However, we cannot help praising the moderation
32	of the English Puritans, who first settled in
33	New England, who, notwithstanding their being
34	furnished with a charter from their Sovereign,
35	purchased of the Indians the lands of which
36	they intended to take possession. This
37	laudable example was followed by William Penn,
38	and the colony of Quakers that he conducted to
39	Pennsylvania.'
40	4
41	That was Vattel. The report from which I have
42	just read an extract is quoted from by Chancellor Boyd
43	in Regina v. St. Catherines' Milling and I'll come
44	back to that later on.
45	THE COURT: You mean the report but not this passage?
45	
40	MR. GOLDIE: Not this passage, no. I mean the Chancellor Boyd's

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                     The report is relied upon by the plaintiffs as a
 2
                summary of the "principles and process embodied in the
 3
                Royal Proclamation..."
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      THE COURT: Again, there you mean -- "it" means Chancellor
 5
                Boyd's judgment?
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      MR. GOLDIE: No. I'm talking about the report of the
 7
                Commissioners --
 8
      THE COURT: All right.
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      MR. GOLDIE: -- of 1844 inquiring into the application of monies
10
                appropriated by the British Parliament for use in the
11
                Old Province of Canada.
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                    Now, my lord, continuing at page 5 of my
13
                introduction: Mr. Jackson stated at transcript 316,
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                page 23702, that, and I quote, "...the legal history
                which we will be introducing..." is intended to
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16
                identify the fundamental principles upon which the
17
                Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en rights to ownership and
18
                jurisdiction can be recognized under Canadian law.
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                     Now, prominent in that history is the New Zealand
                case of Regina v. Symonds. Less prominent, to a point
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21
                of virtual invisibility, is the Report from the Select
22
                Committee on New Zealand ordered printed by the House
23
                of Commons on 29 July, 1844, and that is attached and
24
                I am going to refer to it in a minute.
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                     It was from this report that Mr. Barclay of the
26
                Hudson's Bay Company in his letter to Mr. Douglas,
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                quoted, in 1849, and these were the instructions which
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                Mr. Douglas applied, or took in his administration as
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                agent of the Hudson's Bay Company, dealing with the
30
                native peoples in Vancouver Island at that time.
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                     Now my friend, Mr. Rush, referred to this report
                as reflecting a "settlers'" point of view and that this was why Mr. Barclay adopted the words quoted.
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                And in my submission, this is simply not so. Here, I
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                wish merely to point out that when Mr. Jackson speaks
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                of fundamental principles there are more relevant
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                sources than Spain and the United States. The Report
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                is all the more significant in its references to the
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                Treaty of Waitangi which is so often referred to by
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                the plaintiffs and which has shaped the legal history
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                of aboriginal rights in New Zealand ever since.
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                    And, my lord, if your lordship would turn to the
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                extracts from the report from the Select Committee
44
                itself, and the whole report is not attached here.
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                The whole report is Exhibit 1184, tab 3.
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      THE COURT: Sorry, 1184?
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      MR. GOLDIE: Tab 3. And as I said, the first part of the report
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1 I wish to draw to your lordship's attention is on the 2 first page, and it's the second paragraph beginning 3 with the words "It appears to Your Committee". 4 THE COURT: Yes. 5 MR. GOLDIE: 6 It appears to Your Committee that the 7 difficulties now experienced in New Zealand are 8 mainly to be attributed to the fact, that in 9 the measures which have been taken for 10 establishing --11 12 THE COURT: Sorry, Mr. Goldie. Is this the House of Commons -the Imperial House of Commons or is there a House of 13 14 Commons in New Zealand? 15 MR. GOLDIE: No. This is the Imperial House of Commons. 16 THE COURT: Thank you. 17 MR. GOLDIE: And the circumstances that have given rise to the 18 report are -- I think will become clearer as we go 19 along. THE COURT: Is it pre-treaty or post-treaty? 20 21 MR. GOLDIE: Post-treaty. 22 THE COURT: Thank you. 23 MR. GOLDIE: The -- continuing with paragraph 2 on page 1, and I 24 quote: 25 26 It appears to Your Committee that the 27 difficulties now experienced in New Zealand are 2.8 mainly to be attributed to the fact, that in 29 the measures which have been taken for 30 establishing a British Colony in these islands, 31 those rules as to the mode in which colonization ought to be conducted, which have 32 33 been drawn from reason and from experience, have not been sufficiently attended to. When 34 35 it was first proposed to establish New Zealand 36 as a British Colony dependent upon New South 37 Wales, Sir George Gipps, the Governor of the 38 latter, in a very able address, laid down the 39 following principles as those on which he had 40 framed the Bill, which it was his duty to submit to his legislative council for the 41 42 regulation of the infant colony of New Zealand. 43 44 And your lordship will appreciate that in its 45 earliest colonial history, New Zealand was a dependency of New South Wales. Now, quoting the 46 47 Governor:

Submissions by Mr. Goldie

1 "The Bill is founded," he said, "upon two or 2 three general principles, which, until I heard 3 them here controverted, I thought were fully 4 admitted, and indeed received as political 5 axioms." 6 7 And now he comes to the words which Mr. Barclay used 8 in December of 1849: 9 10 "The first is, that the uncivilized inhabitants 11 of any country have but a qualified dominion 12 over it, or a right of occupancy only; and 13 that, until they establish amongst themselves a 14 settled form of government, and subjugate the 15 ground to their own uses, by the cultivation of 16 it, they cannot grant to individuals not of 17 their own tribe any portion of it, for the 18 simple reason, that they have not themselves 19 any individual property in it. Secondly, that 20 if a settlement be made in any such country by 21 a civilized power, the right of pre-emption of 22 the soil, or in other words, the right of 23 extinguishing the native title, is exclusively in the government of that power, and cannot be 24 25 enjoyed by individuals without the consent of 26 their government. The third principle is, that 27 neither individuals, nor bodies of men 28 belonging to any nation, can form colonies, 29 except with the consent, and under the 30 direction and control of their own government; 31 and that from any settlement which they may form without the consent of their government, 32 33 they may be ousted. This is simply to say, as 34 far as Englishmen are concerned, that colonies 35 cannot be formed without the consent of the 36 Crown." 37 38 And then the report continues after that: 39 40 Referring to the speech of Sir George 41 Gipps for the argument in support of these 42 rules, it may be observed, that with reference 43 to New Zealand, they were, to a certain extent, 44 infringed by the irregular settlement of 45 British subjects on the shores of these 46 islands, which began many years ago; but they

seem to have been first openly and deliberately

Submissions by Mr. Goldie

1 departed from, when an attempt was made by the 2 New Zealand Company to establish a colony, not 3 only without the sanction, but in direct 4 defiance of the authority of the Crown. 5 6 I am not going to read the details of that. 7 I would like to go down to the end of that 8 paragraph beginning with, oh, about eight lines up 9 from the end of the paragraph, "In order to avert 10 these difficulties". 11 THE COURT: Yes. 12 MR. GOLDIE: 13 ...which were soon seen to be likely to arise, 14 a Charter of Incorporation was afterwards 15 granted to the New Zealand Company, with the 16 hope of placing that body in friendly relations 17 with Her Majesty's Government; but this attempt 18 was defeated, partly by the jealousies created 19 between the respective servants of the Crown 20 and of the Company, by the error originally 21 committed by the latter; partly by other causes 22 of difficulty which afterwards arose. These 23 are chiefly to be traced to the means which were adopted for establishing the authority of 24 25 the Crown in New Zealand. 26 The sovereignty over these islands had, at 27 an earlier period, been formally disclaimed, 28 and their independence had been distinctly 29 recognized, both by the Crown and by 30 Parliament. 31 32 Now that's an important factor in the 33 consideration of the history of New Zealand. 34 35 This course had been pursued because it was 36 considered (and by no means upon light grounds) 37 that it was not advisable to extend British 38 dominion in these distant regions; but in 39 adopting this policy it was overlooked, both by 40 the advisers of the Crown and by Parliament, 41 that it was impossible to check the tide of 42 emigration which set so strongly towards the 43 shores of New Zealand, and that the regular 44 establishment of British power was the only 45 practicable mode of guarding against the evils 46 which could not fail to follow from permitting

a large number of Europeans to settle among its

Submissions by Mr. Goldie

uncivilized inhabitants, without being subject to any legitimate authority or control. Looking back at what was then done, with the light to be drawn from subsequent experience, there is no room to doubt that it would have been far better if British dominion over these islands had been asserted as early as 1832, or even 1825; but a different policy having been at that time pursued, it was considered, in the year 1839, when Captain Hobson was sent out, that the difficulties which had thus been created could only be got rid of by obtaining from the natives their assent to the extension of the authority of the British Crown over New Zealand.

Now, just pausing there, Captain Hobson was sent out with instructions to negotiate the consent of the native peoples to the establishment of British sovereignty and the Treaty of Waitangi resulted from that.

And then continuing:

Acting under the instructions he had received, Captain Hobson, therefore, immediately on his arrival in New Zealand, at the beginning of the year 1840, concluded, with a large number of the chiefs of the Northern Island a treaty known by the name of the Treaty of Waitangi, by which, in return for their acknowledge of British sovereignty, they were promised protection, and guaranteed in the possession of all lands held by them individually or collectively. The evidence laid before Your Committee has led them to the conclusion that the step thus taken, though a natural consequence of previous errors of policy, was a wrong one. It would have been much better if no formal treaty whatever had been made, since it is clear that the natives were incapable of comprehending the real force and meaning of such a transaction; and it therefore amounted to little more than a legal fiction, though it has already in practice proved to be a very inconvenient one, and is likely to be still more so hereafter. The sovereignty over the Northern Island might have been at once

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Submissions by Mr. Goldie

assumed, without this mere nominal treaty, on the ground of prior discovery, and on that of the absolute necessity of establishing the authority of the British Crown for the protection of the natives themselves, when so large a number of British subjects had irregularly settled themselves in these islands, as to make it indispensable to provide some means of maintaining good order amongst them. This was the course actually pursued with respect to the Middle and Southern Islands, to which the Treaty of Waitangi does not even nominally extend; and there is every reason to presume that, owing to the strong desire the natives are admitted to have entertained for the security to be derived from the protection of the British Government, and for the advantages of a safe and well-regulated intercourse with a civilized people, there would have been no greater difficulty in obtaining their acquiescence in the assumption of sovereignty than in gaining their consent to the conclusion of the treaty; while the treaty has been attended with the double disadvantage, first, that its terms are ambiguous, and, in the sense in which they have been understood, highly inconvenient; and next, that it has created a doubt which could not otherwise have existed, and which, though not, in the opinion of Your Committee, well-founded, has been felt and has practically been attended with very injurious results, whether those tribes which were not parties to it are even now subject to the authority of the Crown.

Your Committee have observed that the terms of the treaty are ambiguous, and in the sense in which they have been understood, have been highly inconvenient, in this we refer principally to the stipulations it contains with respect to the right of property in land. The information which has been laid before us shows that these stipulations, and the subsequent proceedings of the Governor founded upon them, have firmly established in the minds of the natives notions, which they had then but very recently been taught to entertain, of their having a proprietary title of great value

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1	to land not actually accumied, and those is
1	to land not actually occupied; and there is
2	every reason to believe that, if a decided
3	course had at that time been adopted, it would
4	not have been difficult to have made the
5	natives understand that, while they were to be
6	secured in the undisturbed enjoyment of the
7	land they actually occupied, and of whatever
8	further quantity they might really want for
9	their own use, all the unoccupied territory of
10	the islands was to vest in the Crown by virtue
11	of the sovereignty that had been assumed.
12	
13	Now, my lord, there follows a reference which is
14	one that I draw your lordship's attention to, because
15	it makes reference to law as well as policy, and it
16	begins at the bottom of this page:
17	begins at the bottom of this page.
18	Your Committee have already mentioned, that
19	it is one of the fundamental principles of
20	
	colonial law and policy, which they believe to
21	have been correctly laid down by Sir G. Gipps,
22	that "the uncivilized inhabitants of any
23	country have but a qualified dominion over it
24	or a right of occupancy only".
25	
26	And then he goes on to the report goes on to
27	complete the reference to the speech that Sir George
28	Gipps made and which was quoted earlier. And after
29	that quotation the report continues:
30	
31	Unfortunately the original instructions given
32	to Captain Hobson, when he was sent out for the
33	purpose of establishing British dominion in New
34	Zealand, were not sufficiently precise upon
35	this most important point; they contained
36	directions as to the manner in which he was to
37	proceed in purchasing land from the natives,
38	and they did not (as Your Committee think that
39	they ought to have done) clearly lay down the
40	rule that sovereignty being established, all
41	unoccupied lands would forthwith vest in the
42	Crown, and that, except in virtue of grants
43	from the Crown, no valid title to land could be
44	established by Europeans.
45	cocastioned sy Europeans.
4.6	and the going to the end of the next of

And the -- going to the end of the next -- of that paragraph, my lord, reference is made to the $\,$

1	Treaty of Waitangi, it's two, four, six, eight lines
2	up from the bottom:
3	The treaty of Waitangi (which had previously
4	reached England and been approved), it may
5	therefore fairly be assumed, must, when this
6	charter and the instructions which accompanied
7	it were forwarded to the colony, have been
8	
	understood as bearing a meaning not
9	inconsistent with the terms in which they are
10	couched. The lands held "collectively", of
11	which the possession was guaranteed to the
12	aboriginal inhabitants of New Zealand, must,
13	therefore, have been regarded as the lands
14	actually occupied by them, and cultivated in
15	common by a tribe, in the manner frequently
16	practised, and the forests as those actually
17	used for cutting timber.
18	This is the interpretation which,
19	consistently with the ancient and acknowledged
20	principles of colonial law as laid down by Sir
21	
	George Gipps, and consistently also with the
22	terms of the charter of the colony and of the
23	Royal instructions to the Governor, ought to
24	have been put upon the treaty.
25	have been pur apon one creaty.
26	Now, I don't want to proceed any further except
27	to refer to the resolutions that the at the
28	third-to-last page. It's Roman 12 in the upper
29	left-hand corner.
30	
	The first resolution does your lordship
31	THE COURT: Yes.
32	MR. GOLDIE:
33	1st That the conduct of the New Zealand
34	Company, in sending out settlers to New
35	Zealand, not only without the sanction, but in
36	direct defiance of the authority of the Crown,
37	was highly irregular and improper.
38	2 1 - 2
	2d That the conclusion of the musting of
39	2d That the conclusion of the Treaty of
40	Waitangi by Captain Hobson with certain Natives
41	of New Zealand, was a part of a series of
42	injudicious proceedings, which had commenced
43	several years previous to his assumption of the
44	local Government.
45	
46	3d That the acknowledgement by the local
47	authorities of a right of property on the part
4 /	authorities of a right of property on the part

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	of the Natives of New Zealand, in all wild lands in those islands, after the sovereignty had been assumed by Her Majesty, was not essential to the true construction of the Treaty of Waitangi, and was an error which has been productive of very injurious consequences.
8	And then I skip down to number six:
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	6th That means ought to be forthwith adopted for establishing the exclusive title of the Crown to all land not actually occupied and enjoyed by Natives, or held under grants from the Crown; such land to be considered as vested in the Crown from purpose of being employed in the manner most conducive to the welfare of the inhabitants, whether Natives or Europeans.
19	The Select Committee did not recommend that the
20	Treaty of Waitangi be in any way repudiated for the
21	Honour of the Crown. It was bound to be acknowledged
22	and accepted and in the manner which local
23	jurisdiction had assumed.
24	Now, my lord
25	THE COURT: Do I take it this report is dated 1841?
26	MR. GOLDIE: 1844.
27	THE COURT: There is a date at the very bottom, "See papers
28	respecting New Zealand, ordered by the House of
29	Commons" oh, that's a reference, is it?
30	MR. GOLDIE: Yes. That is Captain Grey's report.
31	THE COURT: All right.
32	MR. GOLDIE: Your lordship will have seen and I'm bringing it
33	to your attention now only because of the references
34	in it to colonial law, that the law to which reference
35	is made is the is recognition of a right of
36	occupancy of lands actually occupied.
37	Now, I'm at page 6 of my introduction.
38	I say, my lord, that while the Select Committee's
39	report is an historical example directly linked to British Columbia through the instruction given to
40 41	Douglas by Barclay with respect to Vancouver Island,
42	and thus closer to the Supreme Court of Canada's
43	direction which I have quoted from Kruger and
44	Manuel there are more relevant examples and these
45	will be looked at in due course.
46	In my submission, the legal history introduced by

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of facts so different that it is of no assistance in determining whether as a matter of law justiciable in a Canadian court, the plaintiffs are entitled to the declarations of ownership and jurisdiction set out in the Prayer for Relief in the Amended Statement of Claim as commented on by Mr. Grant on Saturday, and as further commented on by some of the individual plaintiffs, Mr. Joseph and Mr. Muldoe, this morning.

Now my lord we are not concerned whether Andrew

Now, my lord, we are not concerned whether Andrew Jackson was or was not a racist. Now the reference there is to the history of what happened after the Cherokee Nation entered into treaties with the United States and what happened after the judgment in Worcester v. Georgia. In my submission, the legal rights of the plaintiffs do not depend upon the character of politicians or civil servants.

Now, the "purposive" aspect of the approach the court is urged to adopt is said to be supported by a statement of the Court of Appeal in Sparrow. And in my submission, the context of that statement is important.

My lord, it's not in my material, but the statement to which my friends refer, the extract from Sparrow, is found in their final argument, Volume 3, page 3 of the section that Mr. -- my friend Mr. Jackson introduced and spoke to, and it reads as follows, and I quote:

To so construe Section 35(1) would be to ignore its language and the principle that the constitution should be interpreted in a liberal and remedial way. We cannot accept that that principle applies less strongly to aboriginal rights than to the rights guaranteed by the Charter, particularly having regard to the history and to the approach to interpreting treaties and statutes relating to Indians required by such cases as Nowegiijick v. the Queen et al.

Now, my lord, what the court in Sparrow was referring to in that excerpt was a submission -- and I think there was a submission by the province in that case -- that the definition of aboriginal rights was to be achieved by the process of conventions under Section 37 of the Constitution Act, 1982. That's what is referred to with the words "To so construe Section

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35".

2 So it was to the construction of Section 35 3 itself that the court's words were directed and not to 4 the identification of aboriginal rights. These are 5 entirely distinct inquiries. 6 And in my submission, the court's judgment in 7 Sparrow does not justify reading, for instance, an 8 Order-in-Council according to how someone suggests the 9 native peoples would have understand it. 10 Now, my lord, at the end of the day the 11 proposition put forward by the plaintiffs can be 12 reduced to this: And I'm asserting this in terms of 13 how I characterize the plaintiffs' position in its 14 ultimate sense: 15 16 When, in 1858, the British Parliament empowered 17 the Crown to appoint a Governor who was to 18 provide for the peace, order and good 19 government of the new Mainland Colony, there 20 existed law, it is said by the plaintiffs, 21 co-existing with that enacted by Parliament, 22 which conferred ownership and jurisdiction in 23 the terms stated in the Prayer for Relief and 24 which was enforceable in the Queen's courts 25 against the Crown and its grantees. Now this 26 law, so it is said by the plaintiffs, made the 27 Governor's powers, indeed the power of 2.8 Parliament itself, a dead letter over virtually 29 all of the Province unless exercised with the 30 consent of the Indian tribes then resident in 31 the Colony. 32 Now in these terms, this omnipresent law 33 rendered illegal virtually everything Douglas 34 and his successors did down to 1871 and, say 35 the Plaintiffs, enable them to veto the 36 application -- go so far as to say that it 37 enables them to veto the application of any law 38 of the Province to the lands the Plaintiffs say 39 they own. 40 41 My lord, it will be this defendant's submission, 42 no such law exists. 43 It will be this defendant's further submission 44 that a qualified non-proprietary interest of the 45 native peoples in lands actually occupied by them was 46 protected and in a manner which more than met the

recognized principles of the colonial law of the day.

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1 The history of the colony which does have a 2 bearing on the claims made here almost demonstrate, in 3 my submission, that the Indian peoples of British 4 Columbia were fairly treated in the colonial period 5 with the result stated at page 4 of the memorandum of 6 the Attorney General of British Columbia dated August 7 17th, 1875, which is set out in full in Exhibit 1182. 8 MR. RUSH: Who is that speaking, please? 9 MR. GOLDIE: Mr. Walkem. 10 Now, the background of this, my lord, is, of 11 course, the resolution of the serious dispute which 12 had arisen between Canada and British Columbia over 13 the acreage of reserves to be set aside after 1871, 14 and it led to the creation of the Indian Reserve 15 Commission. But Mr. Walkem, in this memorandum which 16 preceded the creation of that commission but which was 17 instrumental in its creation, said this, and I 18 quote -- and he is there referring to the principles 19 that were followed in colonial times: 20 21 Such is but an imperfect sketch of the Colonial 22 Indian policy which was founded in 1858 --23 24 Now that date is, of course, the founding of the 25 Mainland Colony. 26 27 -- and determined in 1871. It was based on the 28 broad and experimental principle of treating 29 the Indian as a fellow subject. The principle 30 was, at least, a lofty one and worthy of an 31 enlightened humanity. Like others of its kind, it had its trials; but it also had its rewards, 32 33 for, through its influence, the Colony was 34 enabled on the day of Confederation to hand 35 over to the trusteeship of the Dominion, a 36 community of 40,000 Indians - loyal, peaceable, 37 contented, and in many cases honest and 38 industrious. This fact is in itself the best 39 commentary that can be offered upon the policy 40 pursued towards the Indians during the 13 years 41 preceding Confederation. 42 43 Now, my lord, obviously that's a self-serving 44 document. Mr. Walkem was saying that the policy 45 followed in the colony was one that was, as he described it, "a lofty one and worthy of an 46

enlightened humanity". It is a fact that unlike the

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1 situation in the adjacent territories in the United 2 States, the history of the colony is completely free 3 of the kind of warfare that characterized the 4 situation in the Oregon territory and then the 5 Washington territory. 6 Now, I note that in 1861 the Governor of the 7 Mainland Colony -- that is to say, Mr. Douglas --8 instructed the Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, 9 who at the time was Colonel Moody of the Royal 10 Engineers -- to mark out proposed Town sites and 11 Indian reserves throughout the colony so soon as it 12 may be practicable. The extent of the latter to be 13 defined, and I quote, "as they may be severally 14 pointed out by the Natives themselves". That's an 15 extract from Exhibit 1182 16 Now, in my submission, this was a direction to 17 execute a policy, and it is my submission that it was 18 carried out then and thereafter. Mr. O'Reilly at 19 Kispiox in 1891 said that the government wanted them 20 to have all the lands they cultivated. By that time 21 Mr. O'Reilly was an Indian -- was the Indian Reserve 22 Commissioner. And this was the same man who had laid 23 out reserves 20 years before at Babine in 1871. In 24 other words, what was directed to be done was done. The origins of that policy, which in my 25 26 submission was an advance on the "fundamental 27 principles of colonial law" -- that phrase is from the 28 New Zealand report -- of the day will be traced. It 29 is, in my submission, a policy of which the people of 30 this province can and should be proud. It stands in 31 bright contrast to the historical events from which 32 the plaintiffs draw their analogies. 33 And I am referring there, of course, to the 34 analogies drawn from the history of Spain and its 35 exploitation of the gold mines of the newer world. 36 I'm referring to the analogies which were sought to be 37 drawn from the enforceable removal of the Cherokee 38 Nation after the judgment of Worcester v. Georgia. 39 Now, my lord, I turn to the General Introduction 40 of the Preliminary Matters. 41 THE COURT: Before you do that, Mr. Goldie, on page 8 -- back to 42 page 7, you say your characterization of the 43 plaintiffs' argument, second last line on page 7, "it 44 is said by the plaintiffs, co-existing with that

enacted by Parliament." That is co-existing with

MR. GOLDIE: That's my understanding -- well, that is my

statutory law?

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1
               understanding, my lord.
 2
     THE COURT: I'm looking in your analogy to where you would -- or
 3
               your description where you would put the common law.
 4
     MR. GOLDIE: I think it falls into the same category.
     THE COURT: You say it falls under good government, "for peace,
 5
 6
               order and good government of the new Mainland"?
 7
     MR. GOLDIE: Those are the words in the statute.
 8
     THE COURT: Yes. You say that includes common law?
 9
     MR. GOLDIE: But -- where the common law of England was
10
                introduced was by virtue of a Proclamation in 1858,
11
               bringing into the colony the law of England as it then
12
                stood. Now, that introduced the common law of
13
               England.
14
      THE COURT: Was the English -- was it November 19th, 1858 or
15
                '59? I can never remember.
16
     MR. GOLDIE: '58, my lord. It was one of the two Proclamations
17
                which were sent out from London with instructions to
18
                Douglas to proclaim. In other words, he -- they were
19
               drafted for him.
     THE COURT: All right.
20
21
     MR. GOLDIE: The other one was the Indemnity Proclamation.
22
     THE COURT: The difference between you and your friend really,
23
               then -- and this may be overly simplistic -- is
24
                whether that common law as modified by local
25
                conditions, includes this further part that you use on
26
                page 8 to describe the plaintiffs' claim.
27
     MR. GOLDIE: That certainly is a major difference.
28
     THE COURT: Yes, all right.
29
     MR. GOLDIE: But as I understand the plaintiffs' argument, it is
30
               not -- their claim to ownership and jurisdiction is
31
               not something which evolved in the past decades, it is
32
                something which existed at the time of the -- that the
33
               colony was erected.
34
      THE COURT: I'm trying -- this may be an unnecessary and
35
               unproductive effort, but I'm trying to see if I can
36
               put your characterization of the plaintiffs' argument
37
                into -- into terms which would make it in conformance
38
               with their submission, as I understand it. And I'm
39
               wondering if the top line of page 8 you would say
40
                after -- after "enacted by Parliament" bracket,
41
                "including the English Law Act"?
42
     MR. GOLDIE: Including the introduction of English law.
43
     THE COURT: Yes.
44
     MR. GOLDIE: Yes, I would agree with that.
45
                    The Act of 1858, itself, created the colony and
46
                authorized the Crown to make provision for peace,
47
                order and good government. And in my submission, that
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1 was a grant by Parliament of all of the legislative 2 authority needed for the rule within the colony. The 3 Crown then appointed Douglas with extraordinary powers 4 of legislation, and one of the first exercise --5 amongst the first exercise of that jurisdiction was 6 the Proclamation of the Introduction of English Law. 7 Now, it is part of the law of the colonies that a 8 settled colony -- I should put it this way: that in a 9 settled colony, English law follows the settlers, 10 whereas in a conquered or ceded colony, the law which 11 is existing there at the time continues until altered, 12 and there are a number of examples of that, my lord. 13 THE COURT: What it really comes down to in part then -- or it 14 might -- this is very preliminary -- as to whether the 15 principles upon which the plaintiffs rely can be said 16 to be part of the common law or not. 17 MR. GOLDIE: That is one of the things which I am going to 18 examine. 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MR. GOLDIE: I am going to examine the claims to ownership and 21 jurisdiction in terms of the law as I will submit 22 existed at the time, namely 1858. 23 THE COURT: We all run the risk of the Alice-in-Wonderland 24 concept or warning that perhaps the common law is 25 whatever anybody says it is. Question, who is to be 26 the master? 27 MR. GOLDIE: Well, from this side of the bench, my lord, I can't 28 say that. It lies within your lordship's province to 29 say that. But the -- it is -- it will be, in my 30 submission, crystal clear that the common law did not 31 recognize any title which emanated from any source 32 other than the Crown. That will be a basic 33 proposition. 34 THE COURT: All right. 35 MR. GOLDIE: Now, if your lordship would turn to the page headed 36 "Part I, Section I, General Introduction, Preliminary 37 Matters". And I note there that the province -- and 38 I'm sure I speak for all counsel -- welcomes the 39 conclusion of the evidentiary part of the trial, and 40 the approaching resolution of legal questions of 41 provincial and national importance. 42 Now, in submissions with respect to the 43 resolution of those questions, counsel for the 44 province will at times be critical of positions taken 45 by witnesses and conclusions drawn in argument. That is part of -- indeed, it is a virtue of the 46 47 adversarial system which the plaintiffs invoked when

1 2 3 4	they commenced this litigation, and in that respect, it is no different than any other lawsuit. Your lordship has pointed out that there are certain aspects of this lawsuit which mark it off from
5 6 7 8	other civil proceedings. But nevertheless, the issues to be resolved are legal issues and they are to be resolved in accordance with the rules of the court and the law of the land.
9 10 11 12	Now, my lord, obviously, my criticisms and criticisms of my colleagues are not intended to reflect upon the sincerity of the plaintiffs who have sought the assistance of this court.
13 14 15	Now, I note that in June of 1988, your lordship said, and I quote:
16 17 18 19 20	We are here not to conduct a royal commission, we are here to determine what the legal rights were of the parties at the date of issuance of the writ.
21 22 23 24	If I may pause and say the yellow binders are now applicable to this, and your lordship will find that $$ the page from that transcript is under tab $I/1-4$ of Volume 1.
25 26 27	Now, in assisting in this task, counsel for the province have been conscious of the continuing force of the following observation made by Mr. J.A.J.
28 29 30	McKenna in his long letter to Sir Richard McBride of July 29th, 1912. Your lordship has had that's the that's the inception of the McKenna-McBride
31 32 33	agreement which led to the Royal Commission on Indian Affairs. And Mr. McKenna said, and I quote:
34 35 36	The easy nonchalance with which loose generalizations have been taken for ascertained facts is the main source of the
37 38 39	misunderstandings that have marked the course of Indian Affairs in British Columbia.
40 41 42	And that was in 1912. Some of the evidence led by the plaintiffs in this case have consisted of complaints about the
43 44 45	administration of the THE COURT: Sorry, Mr. Goldie, can I stop you there. I take it that there is there is no reference
46 47	there to the yellow book? MR. GOLDIE: No.

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1
     THE COURT: You have the exhibit number and you have the
 2
               section -- Section VIII is what?
 3
     MR. GOLDIE: That identifies the -- where the exhibit is --
 4
                where the whole exhibit is found.
 5
     THE COURT: Section VIII of what?
 6
     MR. GOLDIE: It's -- that's Section VIII of Exhibit 1203-8.
 7
     THE COURT: I see. All right.
 8
     MR. GOLDIE: Those are the counterclaim documents which consist
 9
               of -- I think it was something like 11 or 12 volumes.
10
     THE COURT: Yes.
11
     MR. GOLDIE: And the -- those are arranged according to parts.
12
                But your lordship will find the extract of that letter
13
                under -- in the yellow book under tab I/1-5, and it is
14
               page 21 of Mr. McKenna's letter.
15
      THE COURT: If I see a quotation like that in your outline, does
16
                that mean I can find it in the yellow book?
17
     MR. GOLDIE: Yes.
     THE COURT: Yes, all right.
18
     MR. GOLDIE: And even if there is not a quotation, if your
19
20
                lordship sees a reference to an exhibit, there will
21
               be -- and in some cases I'm going to be --
22
     THE COURT: Yes, all right.
23
     MR. GOLDIE: -- spending a little time on them.
24
                    But in turning back to my summary:
25
                     Some of the evidence led by the plaintiffs in
26
                this case has consisted of complaints about the
27
                administration of the laws of Canada and British
28
                Columbia. If not wholly irrelevant, such -- and when
29
                I say "irrelevant", my lord, I mean simply this: that
30
                if legal rights existed in 1858, at the time the
31
               colony was founded, which has the effect -- or had the
32
                effect that my friends contend for, then the evidence
33
                with respect to blowing up the fisheries at Hagwilget
34
                and others of comparable nature are irrelevant.
35
                     But I say if not wholly irrelevant, such evidence
36
                demonstrates that the plaintiffs and their ancestors,
37
                in the face of such laws, neither exercised
38
                jurisdiction over persons nor possessed right of
                ownership of land or resources.
39
40
                     I say that as of July 20, 1871, British Columbia
41
                ceased to have the legislative competence to enact
42
                laws relating to Indians as Indians or to lands
43
                reserved for Indians.
44
     THE COURT:
                 I'm sorry again, Mr. Goldie. I'm not -- there is
45
                something wrong with what you are saying in relation
46
                to what I have here. You see I have got on page 2 --
47
     MR. GOLDIE:
                  Yes.
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1
     THE COURT: -- paragraph 6 starts -- I see we have a problem. I
 2
               jump from paragraph 6 to paragraph 22.
 3
     MR. GOLDIE: That is a problem.
 4
     THE COURT: All right. I think there is one page perhaps out of
 5
                place. Just a moment. No, I'm missing two pages.
 6
                Yes, sorry?
 7
     MR. GOLDIE: I'm handing up to your lordship the pages one --
 8
               page 2, 3, 4 --
 9
     THE COURT: I've got three and four and five. My page numbering
10
                is all right, my paragraph numbering is --
11
     MR. GOLDIE: Well, I better give your lordship --
     THE COURT: I think when I get to page 6 -- no, when I get to
12
13
                page 4 I am on paragraph 9. Page 3 has paragraph 22.
14
     MR. GOLDIE: Well, it looks as if there has been a -- pages from
15
               another section have been placed -- erroneously
16
               placed. There are pages two, three, four, five to
17
                ten. If -- and that takes us to the end of Section I.
18
     THE COURT: Yes, all right. I'm with you now.
19
     MR. GOLDIE: I have read paragraph 6 before.
20
     THE COURT: Yes, I followed you to the end of the page.
21
     MR. GOLDIE: Yes. And then over the page the sentence is
22
                concluded with the words, "over persons nor possessed
23
                right of ownership of land or resource."
24
                    And then paragraph 7 begins with these words: "As
25
                of July 20"?
26
     THE COURT: Yes.
27
     MR. GOLDIE: 1871, British Columbia ceased to have the
28
                legislative competence to enact laws relating to
29
                Indians as Indians or to lands reserved for the
30
                Indians. The legal obligations and powers which the
31
                Crown in right of the Colony had assumed towards the
32
                Indian peoples passed to Canada by virtue of the Terms
33
                of Union and Head 24 of Section 91 of the
34
               Constitution Act, 1867. To the native peoples as
35
               residents of the province the Executive and
36
               Legislature of the Province continue to have the
37
               responsibilities they have to all residents of British
38
               Columbia but it is in the Parliament of Canada that
39
                their political aspirations, as Indian peoples, must
40
               be sought.
41
                     And I note that Canada has provided the machinery
42
                for this in the shape of the Comprehensive Land Claims
43
               process which was referred to by my friends in the
44
                course of the trial.
45
                    And I say the purpose of this lawsuit is not to
46
                debate the wisdom of the measures Canada adopted in
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the discharge of its obligations, responsibilities and

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1 powers under Head 24. We are here to ascertain what 2 legal rights, if any, existed immediately prior to 3 July 20, 1871, through which the plaintiffs can claim 4 an interest as against the province, and whether any 5 of these rights survived the transfer of 6 responsibility and power to Canada. 7 In explaining the amendment to the Statement of 8 Claim set out in paragraph 72A, counsel for the 9 plaintiffs said at transcript 312 -- and my lord, that 10 transcript is under tab I/1-8. Counsel for the 11 plaintiffs said the only authority which can act or 12 extinguish the plaintiffs' title is the Federal Crown. 13 And I say one is left with the obvious question: 14 Why, if this is acknowledged to be the exclusive power 15 of Parliament, was this action brought in this court 16 against the province? 17 The legal content of Head 24 evolved over the 18 years as the courts dealt with this subject matter, 19 but one thing was clear from the outset: Canada, and 20 Canada alone, spoke for and to the native peoples. 21 This was apparent to Governor Musgrave in 1870 in 22 his despatch of February 20th to Lord Granville. The 23 last page -- I set that out, my lord. The relevant pages are found under tab I/1-10, but the part to 24 25 which I wish to draw your lordship's attention at this 26 time is in paragraph 9: 27 2.8 In Lord Granville's Despatch No. 84 of 14th 29 August which was communicated to your 30 Excellency, [that is to say the Governor 31 General of Canada] he mentioned the condition 32 of the Indian Tribes as among some questions 33 upon which the Constitution of British Columbia 34 will oblige the Governor to enter personally. 35 I have purposely omitted any reference to this 36 subject in the terms proposed to the 37 Legislative Council. 38 39 That is to say, the Terms of Union. 40 41 Any arrangements which may be regarded as 42 proper by Her Majesty's Government can I think 43 best be settled by the Secretary of State, or 44 by me under his direction, with the Government 45 of Canada. 46

That, in my submission, properly reflects the

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Submissions by Mr. Goldie

1 constitutional arrangement. But then he goes on to 2 say, and I quote: 3 4 But 'Indians and Lands reserved for Indians' 5 form the twenty fourth of the classes of 6 subjects named in the 91st Section of the Union 7 which are expressly reserved to the Legislative 8 authority of the Parliament of the Dominion. 9 10 Now, in my submission, it is perfectly clear that 11 Musgrave was saying in the sentence beginning with the 12 word "but", that whatever arrangements were 13 contemplated must be in light of the exclusive 14 authority which is granted to the central government. 15 Now I note that a half century later, Canada's 16 conception of its exclusive constitutional obligations 17 remained unaltered and I set out the history of the 18 Dominion's -- the Dominion taking exception to 19 legislation which was passed by British Columbia to 20 facilitate the adoption of the Royal Commission. And 21 I quote from Section 3, which is found under the same 22 tab as Musgrave's despatch. I should say that where 23 there are a number of references in one paragraph they are all under the same tab in the yellow binder 24 25 separated by a blue separator sheet. 26 And Section 3 of that act, of the Provincial 27 Legislature provided that: 2.8 29 ...the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council may, for 30 the purpose of adjusting, readjusting or 31 confirming the reductions, cutoffs and 32 additions in respect of Indian reserves 33 proposed in the said Report of the Commission, 34 carry on such further negotiations and enter 35 into such further agreements, whether with the 36 Dominion Government or with the Indians,... 37 38 And I emphasize that last phrase. 39 And then I note that the inclusion of the phrase "or with the Indians" was objected to by the Dominion 40 41 Government and the prospect of a disallowance loomed 42 over any suggestion that British Columbia could 43 negotiate directly with the Indians. And the Deputy 44 Minister of Justice wrote to his counterpart in 45 British Columbia, and he -- not his counterpart but

the Attorney General, and drew his attention in a nice

sort of way to it.

Submissions by Mr. Goldie

But I say it was only upon an understanding of the clause in question that removed any suggestion of direct negotiations that the Minister of Justice directed to the Dominion cabinet that the Act be left to such operation as it may have subject to the constitutional incompetence of the Provincial Legislature to authorize direct negotiations.

And that, my lord, is found under tab I/1-10, and

And that, my lord, is found under tab I/1-10, and the report of the Minister -- and it's the second to last page under that -- it's page 18 of the selection under the tab but it's the second page from the end in that tab, and this is the report of the Minister of Justice which was adopted by Order-in-Council, approved on the 10th of April, 1920. And it reads, beginning with the second complete paragraph on the page, he described the British Columbia Act and the Minister of Justice says: "Upon" -- and I quote:

Upon this the undersigned observes that Indians and Indian reserves are committed by Section 91 of the British North America Act to the exclusive legislative authority of the Dominion, and that if there be occasion for negotiations between the local authorities and the Indians with respect to reserves, these should be carried on through the Government of Canada, as representing the Indians, and not with the Indians directly, and that insofar as it be the intent of this section to authorize direct negotiations upon the subject between the Lieutenant Governor and the Indians the provincial Legislature is in the opinion of the undersigned incompetent to sanction such proceedings. The undersigned apprehends however that it should not be presumed and probably was not the intention that the negotiations in question should be carried on with the Indians otherwise than through the government of the Dominion with which their affairs are constitutionally charged.

Now, my lord, returning to my summary at page 7. I make reference to the Star Chrome case which was a case dealing with Quebec lands and not the subject matter of any treaty, but allotted by statute in respect of which a surrender was taken and, in the result, the judicial committee applied the reasoning

Canada.

in St. Catherines' Milling to resolve a contest
between the grantee of the province and the grantee of
the Dominion, to whom the surrender was made.
And I simply note Mr. Justice Duff's comment
about the exclusive authority of the Parliament of

And in paragraph 13 I say that the plaintiffs stated in their opening that they seek relief which the province and the federal governments can be compelled to respect and with which they will be able to negotiate a relationship with Canada. And I say if such be their aim the constitutional arrangements of Canada cannot be ignored.

Paragraph 14, I note that the openings of the province's case in May of 1987 — not the province's case, but the opening in May of 1987 was in response to comments made on the province's case by the plaintiffs, but — and the opening, July of 1989, referred to the constitutional setting of this case. Prior to July 20th, 1871, the policy that prevailed in what was then the Colony of British Columbia was stated by Governor Musgrave to be that of treating the Indians as British subjects under the same protection, entitled to the same privileges and incurring the same liabilities as the white population. And the excerpt from that document, my lord, is found under tab I/1-15. It's Governor Musgrave's letter of February 15th, 1870 to the Reverend John B. Good.

Returning to my summary. Particular matters affecting the native peoples, such as Indian reserves, were "affairs of administration".

The policy pursued by the Government of Canada after 1871 differed in many respects from that of the Colonial Government. That has since undergone many changes, some of which responded to judicial interpretation of Head 24. In particular, judicial explication of that Head determined beyond doubt that treaty-making powers rested with the Dominion notwithstanding that the benefit derived by the removal of aboriginal title might enure to the benefit of the province. Canada has exercised that power selectively since 1867. West of the Rockies there are no treaties of surrender in either what is now the Yukon Territory or British Columbia nor are there such treaties in Newfoundland or the Maritime Provinces or in large parts of the Province of Quebec. This was clearly a matter of policy determined by Canada and

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                Canada alone.
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                     Now, in denying Canada's claim that it was
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                entitled to recoup the costs it had incurred in
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                freeing lands in Ontario of the burden of Indian
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                title, the Judicial Committee in Canada v. Ontario
 6
                rejected the argument that Canada was acting in the
 7
                province's interest and as its trustee. The extract
 8
                from that, my lord, is found under tab I/1-16.
 9
                     And your lordship has now heard a considerable
10
                amount about that so I won't pursue the matter. And
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                that really brings me to the end of the substance of
12
                the first section.
13
      THE COURT: Mr. Goldie, this is an imposition, but you have a
14
                larger staff than I do. Would it be possible to have
15
                a table of concordance between your yellow book and
16
                your argument so that when I am at a certain page in
17
               your argument, I can look to see where I will find the
18
                reference -- or wait a minute, perhaps I missed
                something you told me. Perhaps I can get it from the
19
20
               page number.
21
     MR. GOLDIE: You get it from the paragraph number, my lord.
22
               instance, going back to --
23
     THE COURT: All right. So I'm on page 9.
24
     MR. GOLDIE: Yes.
25
     THE COURT: So there is a reference in paragraph 16, so if I go
26
               to I/1-16 I'll find it?
27
     MR. GOLDIE: Yes.
28
     THE COURT: Oh, that's fine.
29
     MR. GOLDIE: That's how the extracts are tabbed.
30
     THE COURT: Yes, by paragraph number.
31
     MR. GOLDIE: By paragraph numbers -- well, firstly by the part
32
               which is a Roman, there being ten parts.
33
     THE COURT: Yes.
     MR. GOLDIE: Then by the section within each part and then
34
35
                finally by the paragraph number.
36
     THE COURT: All right.
37
     MR. RUSH: My lord, I wonder if I can impose upon my friend as a
38
               matter of clarification, if he wouldn't mind, to
39
                express if it is the province's position that the
40
                pre-1870 policy of the colony was expressed in --
41
                fully or completely as my friend says in Governor
42
               Musgrave's letter of 1870?
43
     MR. GOLDIE: No, no, my lord. He is writing a letter and I say
44
                that that -- he is stating a policy. But I will deal
45
               with what the policy was in considerable detail.
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     THE COURT: All right.
     MR. GOLDIE: And the policy was stated by Governor Douglas long
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2 3 THE REGISTRAR: Order in court. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Goldie. MR. GOLDIE: My lord, I had completed the first part of -- first 5 6 section of Part I and I was going to deal very briefly 7 with the summary of the defendant Province's position. 8 The plaintiffs seek declarations of ownership and 9 jurisdiction. The ownership in its ordinary sense 10 means the most extensive right allowed by law of 11 dealing with property. In conventional terms, it 12 means the fee simple in land - the highest proprietary 13 interest in land under the Crown. I am of course 14 aware of the qualifications the plaintiffs put on the 15 claim in fee simple. They say we don't claim a fee 16 simple because that's an interest in land which stems 17 from the Crown. They say their interest is 18 independent of that. But nevertheless, they claim an 19 interest which in its scope is comparable to an 20 interest in fee simple.

(PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:30 a.m.)

The jurisdiction is a word which in its ordinary sense refers to the exercise of judicial or legislative powers. In her dissenting judgment in Re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia, Madam Justice Wilson noted that while jurisdiction may flow from ownership the mere exercise of jurisdiction for limited purposes does not necessarily amount to a claim of ownership. And her ladyship, the extract from her judgment, is found in the yellow binder. I say that in the pleadings, which is -- which are collected under tab Roman II, 1/1 and in the evidence led by the plaintiffs in the case at bar it appears that they claim as against the province both ownership and exclusive jurisdiction. Now, I want to acknowledge that we have not yet fully analysed the submission made by Mr. Grant on Saturday with respect to the remedies sought. What is clear, however, is that basically the underlying relief is still comprehended in the prayer for relief and I should add that we have of course not had an opportunity of analysing the effect of the submission made this morning on Mr. Grant's claim. There seem to be certain inconsistencies but we will sort those out by the time we come to make our final submissions on the question of remedy. What I do say at this point is that while exclusive jurisdiction is probably not the appropriate way of describing the interest that Mr.

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Grant described on Saturday morning, the declarations in their wording, even those as suggested by him, still carry with them very, very substantial claims to jurisdiction. Now, I say whatever assertions you take, whether the prayer for relief as set out in the amended Statement of Claim, the prayers for relief as modified by Mr. Grant, they do not -- they are inconsistent with the concept of aboriginal or Native title which was judicially defined in St. Catherine's Milling as a personal and usufructuary right, dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign. note, my lord, that not much attention has been paid in the case so far to the word usufructuary and I can understand that from my friend's point of view because usufructuary is the right to use something belonging to somebody else, and the essential thrust of their case is that the province owns virtually nothing because it no longer has the right of pre-emption. But, my lord, that title, aboriginal title, is defined in St. Catherine's Milling, is not what is claimed by the Plaintiffs at bar. If the claim to ownership and jurisdiction fails then the action must be dismissed. Now, I note that in the text of the summary I may

Now, I note that in the text of the summary I may refer to aboriginal interests as a general statement rather than one that particularizes the distinction between aboriginal title as defined in the St. Catherine's Milling case and the claims that are made here and I note the same kind of distinction in paragraph 20.

Paragraph 21, I say the lay and expert evidence led in the case at bar will be examined and it will be submitted that the Plaintiffs have failed to make out the allegations of fact which they say constitute ownership and jurisdiction. In this respect, the significance of shifting and ephemeral house boundaries, the disappearance of houses and the unresolved territorial conflicts with the Plaintiffs' neighbours will be examined and having regard to all of the evidence it will be submitted that the claim made to the Federal Government in 1977 and the multiple variations that have been produced in this trial demonstrate the exaggerated nature of and the fundamental uncertainties underlying the territorial claims. It will be submitted that these claims have their roots in beaver traplines created in proto-historic and historic times in response to a desire for the trade goods of the white man.

1 Now, in the event -- and I pause here to say that 2 this was drafted at a time when we were not sure of 3 what the Plaintiffs' position would be, and I said, in 4 the event the Court determines that the Plaintiffs' 5 pleadings raise a claim to aboriginal title, the legal 6 and factual reasons for concluding that such an 7 interest was never acknowledged as existing in the 8 Colony of British Columbia prior to July 20, 1871 nor 9 since then even in Dominion lands lying west of the 10 Rocky Mountains in British Columbia and in the Yukon 11 territory will be canvassed. In the course of this the errors in the judgment of Mr. Justice Hall in the 12 13 Calder case will be considered and the court will be 14 invited to conclude, on the basis of material not 15 before the Supreme Court of Canada in Calder, that if 16 aboriginal title ever existed in the Mainland of 17 British Columbia it was extinguished by July 20, 1871, 18 save in respect of course of reserves. 19 Now, at the present time, it will be the 20 Province's submission that the plaintiffs must be 21 taken to have abandoned any claim of the kind that was 22 canvassed in the Calder case. 23 THE COURT: You mean abandoned by the course of trial. 24 MR. GOLDIE: Yes. The position taken has been, so far as I can 25 ascertain it, that the only claim made by the 26 Plaintiffs is ownership and jurisdiction of the kind 27 described by Mr. Grant on Saturday. That's the only 28 claim that I understand they make. 29 THE COURT: Well, I haven't in my mind at the moment absorbed 30 all of the Plaintiffs' argument but I have a clear 31 recollection that at one stage in the trial Mr. Rush 32 said that without resiling in any way from his first 33 position that he was seeking as an alternative what 34 were then described as -- what were then described by 35 me as Calder type claims. 36 MR. GOLDIE: Well, I have been waiting for those to surface, my 37 lord, but they -- we have -- I took it to be the last 38 word on Saturday as to the claims that are made, and I 39 cannot fit the Calder type claims into those. Maybe 40 that when I reread them I will come to a different 41 conclusion but at the time the basis of the 42 Plaintiffs' claim is exclusive possession as against 43 the Province. 44 THE COURT: Well, I will have to review the Plaintiffs' argument 45 as well and no doubt I will hear from them further in 46 reply. I haven't been matching the arguments as they

progressed specifically with various different

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                categories or kinds of claims, but I have been
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               proceeding since that statement by Mr. Rush that there
 3
               was being advanced an alternative claim.
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     MR. GOLDIE: Well, I have -- I can assure your lordship that my
                colleagues and I listened to Mr. Grant with great
 5
 6
                interest. We have yet to examine the transcript but
 7
                we took that to be the last word and we took it to be
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                that the last word is still based upon exclusive
 9
               possession as against the Province.
10
     THE COURT: All right.
11
     MR. GOLDIE: And then, my lord, I make reference to the events
12
               which occurred following July 20, 1871, and to the
13
                counterclaim. I say: In order to obtain some
14
                finality in these matters, the Province seeks a
15
                declaration that Canada discharged British Columbia
16
                from all responsibility for aboriginal title that the
17
                same exists and in so doing bound the Plaintiffs in
18
                this action.
19
                   My lord, that concludes sections 1 and 2, and Mr.
20
                Plant will now deal with Part II section 1, Part II
21
                section 2, and Part II section 3 and 4, all of Part
22
               II.
23
     THE COURT: Thank you.
24
     MR. RUSH: My lord, before Mr. Plant commences, I wonder if I
25
                could have some clarification from him or my learned
26
                friend Mr. Goldie with regard to the replacement
27
               sections I have been handed and I expect that your
28
               lordship has been handed as well replacement sections
29
               for 1, 2 and 4 of Part II, and are we to expect that
30
               there will be, for the most part, replacement sections
31
                for each of the parts of the Defendant's sections, so
32
                that we can have some idea of whether or not we should
33
                rely upon the summary as a guide or should we wait to
34
                see what the argument will be as we have been provided
35
                the replacement pieces?
36
     MR. GOLDIE: Well, I think we are following in my friend's
37
                footsteps. The argument that we make here is the
38
                final argument but there will be replacements and
39
                addenda in order to meet the difference between the
40
                situation we found ourselves when this summary was
41
                prepared and after we have heard my friend's argument.
42
     MR. RUSH: Well, do I --
43
     MR. GOLDIE: And that is a process which is going on right now.
44
     MR. RUSH: May I understand from that then that we can expect
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                that there will be, for the most part, replacements?
     MR. GOLDIE: Not for the most part, not at all. My friend will
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                find that there is more of our written summary that
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                survives than his summary survived in his final -- its
 2
                final appearance.
     THE COURT: Well, I am not sure what Mr. Rush is referring to in
 3
 4
                replacement parts to the moment. Have they been
 5
                substituted in my copy?
 6
     MR. GOLDIE: My friend Mr. Plant will explain that, my lord.
 7
     MR. PLANT: My lord, if I may, your lordship should now have in
 8
               that part of the binder of the summary that is before
 9
                you replacement sections for 1, 2 and 4, and they have
10
               been inserted and I have given --
11
     THE COURT: In Part II.
12
     MR. PLANT: Yes, and I have given my friends copies of the
13
                revisions. The revisions in these three sections are
14
                fairly minor but that is to say the difference between
15
               what your lordship now has and what was in the summary
16
                as delivered the end of March in this part is fairly
17
               minor.
18
     THE COURT: Yes, all right.
     MR. PLANT: There is one particular item that I drew to my
19
20
                friend's attention in the note which I just mentioned
21
                that there was an appendix to Part II section 2, and I
22
                don't want that appendix to be removed and if things
23
               went according to plan your lordship should still have
24
                the appendix.
25
     THE COURT: Yes, I do.
26
     MR. PLANT: That appendix survives into the revised version of
27
               Part II section 2.
28
     THE COURT: The list of the chiefs or houses.
29
     MR. PLANT: That's right.
30
     THE COURT: All right. And I suppose then an amended diskette
31
               might be forthcoming?
32
     MR. PLANT: Excuse me?
     THE COURT: An amended diskette will be forthcoming?
33
34
     MR. PLANT: There will be, yes.
35
     THE COURT: Can you crowd a little less onto each diskette? My
36
               computer keeps telling me that, in the brief sampling
37
                of them, that every time I want to change directories,
38
                that the disk is full, yet I haven't added to it.
39
                Only the second one has most of the argument crowded
40
                onto one argument and it's meeting some opposition
41
                from my computer.
42
     MR. PLANT: I will convey your lordship's concerns to those who
43
                know more about it than I do.
44
                    My lord, I will be speaking to the further
45
                introductory matters covered in Part II of the
46
                summary, the first of which in Section 1 is entitled
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                History of Proceedings. There are really three
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aspects to this section of the argument: The first is a brief summary of the history of the action; the second refers to various amendments which have been made to the Statement of Claim; and the third, which would be under the heading of Part C, refers to other proceedings, that is proceedings other than amendments to the Statement of Claim and in the other proceedings which are part of the larger history of this action, and I have only two points to make arising out of the statements in this summary. But before I do that, it's been brought to my attention that I omitted one proceeding that should be added as a subparagraph (f) on the 13th page or the last page of this section.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PLANT: And the proceeding which has been omitted can be described this way: In separate proceedings the Attorney-General of British Columbia sought an injunction restraining the Plaintiffs and others from blockading highways and forest service roads in the claim area. The injunction application was adjourned generally after the Defendants in that action agreed to remove the blockades and not to erect further blockades. The action, my lord, is A.G.B.C. v. Don Ryan and others, the action number is C895538, British Columbia Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry. Now, that's just by way of completing a survey of other proceedings which are part of the larger history of this action. And if I may, the two points that I wish to spend a moment on are first the reference made to paragraph -- in paragraph 7(a) on page 3 of the summary and that is a reference to the Order of Mr. Justice Taylor as he then was of April 25, 1985, and if I could just pause there for a minute to say that here, for example, to follow the yellow binder series, since this is Part II section 1 paragraph 7(a), there should be a tab in the yellow binder that contains the order of Mr. Justice Taylor. Now, this was a situation where the Plaintiffs amend the Statement of Claim seeking to claim damages in respect of actions of third parties exercising rights as grantees, licensees and lessees of the Province within the claim

area. That claim was denied by Mr. Justice Taylor and

limited to the damage allegedly caused by the Province

recall to incorporate those words. The importance of

the claim for damages in the action was thereupon

and its servants, agents or contractors. And the Statement of Claim was in due course amended as I

Submissions by Mr. Plant

	this application was that the issue of whether the
1 2	
	Plaintiffs' case was properly constituted as a
3	representative action within the meaning of Rule 5(11)
4	of the Rules of Court was raised. In fact, we opposed
5	their application to amend on the grounds that the
6	amendment in the terms sought would not come within
7	the terms of Rule 5(11). The Plaintiffs made
8	submissions to the court concerning the correct
9	characterization of their claim for the purpose of
10	fitting within the rules, and I am going to return to
11	that submission later.
12	The second item which I do wish to spend a moment
13	on is paragraph 7(b) also on page 3 of the summary, my
14	lord. And also as I recall no, this would be 1986,
15	the Plaintiffs sought to amend to claim an injunction
16	against the Province. That amendment was refused by
17	the Court of Appeal on the 5th of December of 1986 on
18	the basis that an injunction against the Provincial
19	Crown could not be made having regard to Section 11(2)
20	
	of the Crown Proceeding Act. And I do want to take
21	your lordship to the Reasons for Judgment of the Court
22	of Appeal and you should find them in the yellow
23	binder at tab $II/1-7$ (b), they are in my binder in any
24	rate.
O.E.	
25	THE COURT: Looks like them.
25 26	
26	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to
26 27	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice
26 27 28	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to
26 27 28 29	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows:
26 27 28 29 30	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice
26 27 28 29 30 31	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed"
26 27 28 29 30 31 32	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows:
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed" That is to say allowed by the Chambers Judge:
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed" That is to say allowed by the Chambers Judge: "to the prayer for relief by these
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed" That is to say allowed by the Chambers Judge:
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed" That is to say allowed by the Chambers Judge: "to the prayer for relief by these
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed" That is to say allowed by the Chambers Judge: "to the prayer for relief by these paragraphs: 9. An interlocutory and permanent injunction
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed" That is to say allowed by the Chambers Judge: "to the prayer for relief by these paragraphs: 9. An interlocutory and permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendant Province from
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed" That is to say allowed by the Chambers Judge: "to the prayer for relief by these paragraphs: 9. An interlocutory and permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendant Province from interfering with the aboriginal rights and
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed" That is to say allowed by the Chambers Judge: "to the prayer for relief by these paragraphs: 9. An interlocutory and permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendant Province from interfering with the aboriginal rights and title, ownership and jurisdiction of the
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed" That is to say allowed by the Chambers Judge: "to the prayer for relief by these paragraphs: 9. An interlocutory and permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendant Province from interfering with the aboriginal rights and
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed" That is to say allowed by the Chambers Judge: "to the prayer for relief by these paragraphs: 9. An interlocutory and permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendant Province from interfering with the aboriginal rights and title, ownership and jurisdiction of the Plaintiffs."
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed" That is to say allowed by the Chambers Judge: "to the prayer for relief by these paragraphs: 9. An interlocutory and permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendant Province from interfering with the aboriginal rights and title, ownership and jurisdiction of the Plaintiffs." And I won't read the rest of them. Carrying on with
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43	MR. PLANT: Now, the passages I want to refer your lordship to begin on page 3 of the judgment where Mr. Justice Hutcheon, speaking for the Court, said as follows: "I turn then to the amendments allowed" That is to say allowed by the Chambers Judge: "to the prayer for relief by these paragraphs: 9. An interlocutory and permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendant Province from interfering with the aboriginal rights and title, ownership and jurisdiction of the Plaintiffs."
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Submissions by Mr. Plant

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to the plaintiffs in other proceedings. I need not decide on this appeal the availability of	44	
<u> </u>		to the plaintiffs in other proceedings. I need
47 an interim declaration such as that granted in		
	47	an interim declaration such as that granted in

Submissions by Mr. Plant

1	Peters v. The Queen in a proceeding under the
2	Judicial Review Procedure Act.
3	As to the permanent injunction and apart from
4	the prohibition in s. $11(2)$ I agree with what
5	Professor Sharpe said in his book on
6	'Injunctions and Specific Performance'"
7	
8	And there is a quote from page 173 of that book. His
9	lordship continues or concludes on this point by
10	saying:
11	
12	"For these reasons I would allow the appeal"
13	
14	That is to say, the Province's appeal from the
15	chambers judge's order:
16	
17	"and strike out the amendments made by
18 19	Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11."
20	Now the point I want to make is summarized on
21	Now, the point I want to make is summarized on
22	in paragraph 9 on page 8 of the summary of argument, going back to that, my lord. I there start with an
23	observation relating to all of the amendments made by
24	the Plaintiffs and I say that the granting of leave to
25	make such amendments, irrespective of whether the
26	Plaintiffs' applications were opposed or consented to,
27	does not constitute a finding that the Statement of
28	Claim discloses any cause of action. However, the
29	ruling of the Court of Appeal of December 5, 1986
30	resolved at least one matter: by applying the Crown
31	Proceeding Act to limit the Plaintiffs' claim for
32	relief the Court made clear that, contrary to the
33	allegation in paragraph 73 of the Statement of Claim
34	(and formerly in paragraph 2 of the prayer for
35	relief), which I will come to in a moment, the laws of
36	British Columbia do confer jurisdiction over the
37	Plaintiffs and the claim area.
38	I want to pause for a minute here because this
39	argument, and in some of the other arguments that I am
40	going to be making today, are responsive to the
41	pleadings, and as Mr. Goldie has said a few minutes
42	ago, they are not we are not yet in a position to
43	say that they respond completely to the Plaintiffs'
44	argument as it was articulated on Saturday. But what
45	I say arises out of this judgment of the Court of
46	Appeal is that, at the very least, the Court of Appeal
47	has disposed of the specific question whether the

has disposed of the specific question whether the

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1
                Plaintiffs have some kind of constitutional immunity
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                from provincial laws with respect to proceedings
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                against the Crown, and that will become relevant and I
 4
                will make the point again when I submit -- make
 5
                submissions with respect to the effect of the Crown
 6
                Procedure Act on the Plaintiffs' action. And I say
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                that it's open to your lordship to read in the
 8
                judgment of the Court of Appeal that the Court of
 9
                Appeal has disposed here of the larger question
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                whether provincial laws are capable of applying
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                incidentally and their incidental effects to the
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                Plaintiffs and to the claim area by deciding that they
13
                do.
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     THE COURT: Well, are you basing that on the decision of the
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                Court of Appeal that no injunction lies against the
16
                Crown?
17
     MR. PLANT: Yes, by virtue of the decision of the Court of
18
                Appeal that these Plaintiffs, if they want to sue this
19
                Crown, have to comply with a procedure laid down in
20
                the provincial statute.
21
     THE COURT: Does it go that far or does it merely say thou shalt
22
               not obtain an injunction against the Crown?
23
     MR. PLANT: Well, in my submission and the reading of the
24
                reasons, it's clear that the Court finds that
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                prohibition not only -- finds the prohibition in the
26
                common law and the modification of it in the statute.
27
                And it is the application of the statute to say to the
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               Plaintiffs you can't get declaration, you can't get an
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                injunction against the Crown, that I am relying on
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               here. In this context, my lord, I do want to open the
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                door as it were on the jurisdiction claim just a
32
                little bit wider, and I have got some more material
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                here, the first is an extract from the transcript from
                volume 337 which was the 7th of May, 1990, and {\tt I}
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35
                should have one for the registrar and one for the
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                reporter and one for your lordship.
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     THE COURT: Where do I insert it?
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     MR. PLANT: I beg your pardon?
     THE COURT: Where do I insert it?
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     MR. PLANT: I would suggest that you insert it at the end of tab
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                II/1-7b after the judgment of the Court of Appeal in
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                the yellow book.
43
     THE COURT: Yes.
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     MR. PLANT: And I have got some more material to put in the same
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                place. What I have just handed up to your lordship is
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                an extract from the Statement of Claim by which this
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                action was commenced on the 23rd of October, 1984.
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Submissions by Mr. Plant

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Lastly as part of this addition of series, I don't appear to have enough copies of it, but I am handing up copies of pages 8284 to 8286 from volume 134 of the transcript, and these were — this relates to the cross-examination of Mr. Sterritt by Mr. Goldie. THE COURT: Do you know the volume number? MR. PLANT: 134. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. PLANT: Now, if I could refer first to the extract from volume 337, and that's the submissions of Mr. Jackson on the 7th of May. Starting at line 15:
12	HENTE COMPETE AND A STATE OF THE STATE OF TH
13	"THE COURT: Well, I'm sorry, I thought you said
14 15	a moment ago you're not seeking to strike down laws of general application. Now I
16	down laws of general application. Now I think you're saying that you are.
17	MR. JACKSON: My lord, the Plaintiffs are not
18	specifying the particular areas of
19	jurisdiction which they over which they
20	exercise and govern themselves. They have
21	articulated a number of particular heads of
22	jurisdiction upon which we have asked this
23	court to make deculatory rulings.
24	THE COURT: Then the note I made a moment ago,
25	Plaintiffs do not seek an order striking
26	down the general laws of the province, now
27	you tell me now that is not an accurate
28	note of your
29	MR. JACKSON: I was referring, my lord, to your
30	reference to land, education and health.
31	THE COURT: Public health, yes. What about
32	traffic?
33	MR. JACKSON: In relation to lands outside of
34	reserves, I don't think the Plaintiffs have
35	ever voiced an objection to the traffic
36	laws of the province, my lord.
37 38	THE COURT: So the province can continue to
39	regulate the use of the highways and can
39 40	continue to impose roadside suspensions and all those other things that go with the
41	regulation of traffic?
42	MR. JACKSON: I don't believe the plaintiffs
43	have suggested that that would be any
44	different, my lord."
45	allestone, my lola.
46	Now, if your lordship will see, turning over the
47	page to the extract from the original Statement of

1 Claim, I draw your lordship's attention to paragraph 2 2 of the prayer for relief which is at the bottom of the 3 page, and that prayer for relief was in these terms: 4 the Plaintiffs claim a declaration that the 5 defendants -- I pause there for a moment. At that 6 point there was only one defendant, Province, "that 7 the defendants do not have jurisdiction over the 8 territory of the Plaintiffs". I read that then and I 9 read it now, although it's not part of the Statement 10 of Claim today, as saying that the Province of British 11 Columbia has no jurisdiction within the territory 12 which is the subject of this action. And my reading 13 of that, my lord, is supported by the answers which 14 Mr. Sterritt gave under cross-examination by Mr. 15 Goldie in volume 134 of the transcript. I am not 16 going to read all of the extracts but the germane 17 passages begin line at 23 of the first page of the 18 extract and carry on throughout the next page and the 19 following page and lead to the answer given on line 18 20 of page 8286 which is the third page of the extract 21 where Mr. Sterritt said: 22 23 "A The Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en have aboriginal 24 title and jurisdiction over their territory. 25 The -- neither Canada nor the province have 26 sovereignty within that territory until such 27 time as these matters have been dealt with 28 properly, either in court or in negotiation." 29 30 And I should pause to say there, my lord, that that 31 evidence was given after the Statement of Claim, the 32 prayer for relief in particular, had assumed the form 33

which it assumes or has today. Now, those are the submissions which I intended to make in relation to section 1 Part II.

THE COURT: Well, what are you seeking to advance here, Mr. Plant, that the Plaintiffs on the pleadings are claiming immunity from the general laws of British Columbia or not?

MR. PLANT: As I read the pleadings, my lord, they are.

THE COURT: But this paragraph -- you say this paragraph 2 has been deleted.

MR. PLANT: Paragraph 2 has been replaced by the prayers for relief which are in Part II of the prayers for relief and paragraph 73 of the Statement of Claim as it still -- as it is now concluded --

47 THE COURT: 73.

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Submissions by Mr. Plant

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     MR. PLANT: Yes, 73.
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      THE COURT: Yes.
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      MR. PLANT: Leaving out the middle part of it, it reads:
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 5
                       The laws of the Province of British Columbia do
 6
                       not confer any jurisdiction over the territory
 7
                       and resources thereon and therein claimed by
 8
                       the Plaintiffs.
 9
10
      THE COURT: I am sorry, I thought I had the up-to-date Statement
11
                of Claim.
12
      MR. RUSH: I think the whole of the paragraph should be read, my
13
                lord.
14
      MR. PLANT: I will be happy to read it all. The part that I am
15
                interested in is the part that I have read.
16
      THE COURT: What's the date of the final Statement of Claim?
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      MR. RUSH: It is February 9, 1990, my lord.
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      MR. PLANT: Yes.
      THE COURT: I was looking at paragraph 73 and it didn't seem to
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20
                read what Mr. -- paragraph 73 says:
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22
                      "The laws of the Province of British Columbia
23
                       are subject to the reservation of aboriginal
24
                       title, ownership and jurisdiction by the
25
                       Gitksan Chiefs and the Wet'suwet'en Chiefs and
26
                       do not confer any jurisdiction over the
27
                       Territory and resources thereon and therein
28
                       claimed by the Plaintiffs."
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30
                Is that what you read?
31
      MR. PLANT: Yes.
      THE COURT: Then I mislistened to you, Mr. Plant.
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      MR. PLANT: Well, I didn't read all of that. And I don't think
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34
                that the -- what I left out takes away from the
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                submission that there are two aspects of the paragraph
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                or two aspects of the allegation: one is the
37
                allegation that the laws are subject to the
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                reservation of the Plaintiffs' rights; and the second
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                is that they do not confer any jurisdiction over the
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                territory and resources thereon. That is how they,
                the provincial laws, are subject to the reservation of
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                aboriginal title. They are subject in the sense that
43
                the provincial law does not confer any jurisdiction
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                over the territory and resources thereon.
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      THE COURT: So what you are asking me to have in mind is that on
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                the pleadings at least the Plaintiffs are claiming
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                immunity from the laws of British Columbia?
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1 MR. PLANT: Exactly, my lord. 2 THE COURT: Yes,, all right. 3 MR. PLANT: I have more to say about the pleadings in Part II 4 section 2 of the summary which is the section that I 5 am going to turn to now. 6 My lord, I submitted that it is trite law but 7 fundamental law that the duty of the court is to 8 decide cases in accordance with the pleadings. And 9 particular emphasis ought to be placed on an analysis 10 of the Statement of Claim in this case for a number of 11 reasons. The claim as pleaded is novel. Second, the 12 absence of authority prescribing the constituent 13 elements of the cause of action for ownership and 14 jurisdiction means that the Plaintiffs have been 15 afforded considerable latitude to define the case on 16 their own terms. And I say that the place where the 17 facts and issues are defined in the ordinary case is 18 in the pleadings; and this is all the more reason why 19 this should be so where the legal framework for 20 adjudicating the claim as presented is unsettled. And 21 I there set out and in the succeeding passages set out 22 some reference from the case law and other authorities 23 on the importance of pleadings, and I would draw your 24 lordship's attention in particular to the judgment of 25 Lord Radcliffe in the Esso Petroleum case which is 26 referred to in paragraph 5, and one of the reasons is 27 that I have to correct the page reference there, and I 28 have referred to page 240 as being the place where 29 your lordship will find the extract of the judgment of 30 Lord Radcliffe and it's actually 241. Your lordship 31 should find the complete text of that judgment in the 32 grey binders of authorities which are organized more 33 or less alphabetically so that the Esso Petroleum case would be at tab (e) for Esso - 1. 34 35 And I am going to move ahead now if I may to 36 paragraph 7 where there is a lengthy quotation from an 37 article cited in Bullen & Leake, and I am going to 38 direct your lordship's attention in particular to the 39 passages beginning about ten lines down with the 40 words: 41 42 "The court itself is as much..." 43 44 Do you have that, my lord? 45 46 "The court itself is as much bound by the 47 pleadings of the parties as they are

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1 themselves. It is no part of the duty or 2 function of the court to enter upon any 3 inquiry into the case before it other than to 4 adjudicate upon the specific matters in 5 dispute which the parties themselves have 6 raised by their pleadings. Indeed, the court 7 would be acting contrary to its own character 8 and nature if it were to pronounce upon any 9 claim or defence not made by the parties. To 10 do so would be to enter the realms of 11 speculation..." 12 13 And I won't bother reading the rest of it. I think 14 much of it is -- would in ordinary litigation be taken 15 for granted and it's my submission that it deserves to 16 be taken for granted in this case. I want to move to 17 the next proposition which is part of this submission, 18 and that is to analyse the pleadings so as to draw to 19 your lordship's attention the proposition that there 20 is no claim for aboriginal title in the pleadings, and 21 your lordship has a copy of the February 6, 1990 22 Amended Statement of Claim, that would be helpful to 23 have before you. There is another copy of it in the 24 yellow book at tab 2 -- Roman numeral II/2-8, and the 25 first proposition is to identify -- the first task is 26 to identify the essence of the claim and this can be 27 done fairly quickly. Your lordship knows that from 28 paragraphs 1 to paragraph 55 the plaintiffs are 29 identified. Then we have the first substantive 30 assertions of rights, and those are in 56 and 56(a) 31 where there is an assertion that they, the Plaintiffs, 32 own and exercise jurisdiction over a defined area. 33 And this is a claim of present ownership and 34 jurisdiction but it includes a claim of past ownership 35 and jurisdiction, and that claim is developed in 36 paragraph 57 by a -- by a list of the facts which 37 comprise, although not exhaustively, apparently the

submission.

THE COURT: You say (d) covers paragraphs what?

MR. PLANT: 64 to 71, and that's where the plaintiffs draw on the additional sources of their rights, that is the Royal Proclamation Section 91(24) and 109 of the

jurisdiction, and the claimed ownership and

referring to subparagraph (d) on page 5 of my

constituent elements of the assertion of ownership and

jurisdiction is further elaborated on up to paragraph

63, and then from paragraph 64 to 71, and I am now

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1 Constitution Act 1867 and so on. And then just for 2 reference, subparagraph (e) has three parts: 3 first part is a reference to paragraph 73 of the 4 Statement of Claim, that's the assertion that the laws 5 of British Columbia are subject to their rights, I 6 read that to you a moment ago; the admission of 7 underlying title is in 72(a); and then the abandonment 8 or the decision to make no claim in respect of lands 9 held by third parties in fee simple as of October 23, 10 1984 is in paragraph 79; and lastly, there is the 11 damage claim and the facts in support of that are in 12 paragraphs 75 to 77. 13 Now, I say that the core of the claim is the 14 assertion of ownership and jurisdiction which is 15 contained in 56 to 63, and your lordship will find no 16 mention of the phrase aboriginal --17 THE COURT: Oh, yes, I have it, thank you. 18 MR. PLANT: I am now in paragraph 9 of my submission. 19 lordship will find no mention of the phrase 20 "aboriginal title" in any of paragraphs 1 to 71, and 21 in particular the phrase "aboriginal title" does not 22 appear in those crucial paragraphs 56 to 63 which are 23 the heart of the claim to ownership and jurisdiction. 24 Your lordship will see in paragraph 72 the phrase 25 "aboriginal title" and that phrase -- I am going to come back to this in just a second, it reappears in 26 27 72(a), 73, 74, and 74(a), and then it disappears again 28 for the balance of the body of the Statement of Claim. 29 That should be the -- I should have qualified it 30 because "aboriginal title" is referred to in the 31 prayer for relief. 32 33 34 to ownership and jurisdiction as if aboriginal title 35

Now, in each of paragraph 72 to 74(a), that phrase "aboriginal title" appears in conjunction with a claim to ownership and jurisdiction as if aboriginal title was something different than ownership and jurisdiction, and I say that the only way you can read those paragraphs is that aboriginal title must be something different from ownership and jurisdiction, otherwise the phrase in the context is redundant. If it were as simple as saying that aboriginal title equaled ownership and jurisdiction, which is certainly something that could be argued up to paragraph 72, then why in paragraph 72 does an exercise in drafting include aboriginal title, and that's really the question.

That leads then to the appearance of two distinct claims in the Statement of Claim, the claim to

1 ownership and jurisdiction, and a claim to aboriginal 2 title, and the claim to damages was characterized by 3 my friend Mr. Grant I believe on Saturday as a 4 subsidiary claim, and that -- I think that's a correct 5 characterization. But if your lordship reads 6 paragraphs 72 through to 74(a), I say that you will 7 find no facts alleged in support of the claim of 8 aboriginal title which is described or referred to 9 there. 10 The facts that are alleged in paragraphs 56 to 63 11 are alleged in support of the claim to ownership and 12 jurisdiction, not aboriginal title, and I say both on 13 the pleadings and as will be developed in argument by 14 my colleague, Mr. Goldie, there are two quite 15 different ideas. 16 Paragraph 14 on page 7 of my summary --17 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Plant, at one point, and it was late 18 during our time in Smithers, I think in the last week 19 but perhaps in the second last week, I asked Mr. Rush 20 the nature of the aboriginal title he was seeking. 21 said -- I am sorry, I asked him the nature of the 22 ownership he was seeking and he described it in terms 23 of aboriginal title, that is a common law route 24 arising from possession. Now shouldn't I take that as 25 being the Plaintiffs' position? 26 MR. PLANT: Well, first of all, just as a matter of 27 clarification, is your lordship referring to a 28 statement made by Mr. Rush in Smithers in 1987? 29 THE COURT: No, no, not that long ago. Quite a while ago, but 30 it was last month. 31 MR. PLANT: Oh, well, I am not aware of that statement. That 32 would of course have been a statement in argument? 33 THE COURT: I asked him whether he was relying on some form of 34 English, I don't know if I used the word archaic 35 English law or something of that kind, and he defined 36 what it was that he was seeking by way of ownership 37 and he said it was an ownership by way of aboriginal 38 title. 39 MR. PLANT: Well, I don't want to be disingenious about the 40 argument that I am making. I understand the 41 Plaintiffs to be saying that aboriginal title properly 42 construed in the context of the factual matrix of the 43 evidence that they put forward before your lordship 44 means or can be called ownership and jurisdiction. 45 That is a matter of argument. And it will be 46 developed later in our submissions that the two ideas

of aboriginal title on the one hand and ownership and

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jurisdiction on the other are as a matter of law quite different, and so what I am seeking to do here, my lord, is to begin to lay the groundwork for the later submission by concentrating for the moment on the pleadings, and your lordship at the end of the day is going to have to look at the pleadings and say in response to my friend's submission, you know, is that a claim that is founded in law, and it may be that what I am talking about now will be further developed in the course of the submission on whether or not it is part of the law, but for the time being what I am trying to identify for your lordship is the extent to which aboriginal title is not claimed in the pleadings.

MR. PLANT: I don't think I will take your lordship through the paragraphs, in my submission, pages 8 and 9 until we get to page -- or paragraph 18 where I draw your lordship's attention to the reasons for judgment which were produced in February of 1988 when the issue of whether there was a Calder type claim here or not was raised and at that time your lordship said in the second of the two paragraphs which I have quoted:

> "In my view it is highly doubtful if the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded Calder type or other alternative claims to aboriginal rights additional to the claim to ownership and jurisdiction. Such claims are pleaded, if at all, obliquely such as in paragraph 74, 74(a) and in Prayers to Relief 6 and 9."

And it's my submission, my lord, that nothing has changed since February 18, 1988. The claim as plead is not a claim to aboriginal title in the Calder

Now, if I could just jump ahead to paragraph 20. There is in paragraph 16 for the prayer for relief a general prayer which seeks "such further and other relief to this court may seem just". The plaintiffs have not argued that your lordship should go to that paragraph and ask for a declaration of rights akin to aboriginal title in some sense other than that in which it has been put forward by them. But what follows in the written submission is an answer to that possible argument which concentrates on the importance of confining parties to their pleadings, a point that

THE COURT: Yes.

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                submission without derogating from the force or effect
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                of the written word up to paragraph 27 under the
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                heading Pleadings and the Identity of the Plaintiffs,
 5
                and I say in the Statement of Claim --
 6
     MR. RUSH: My lord -- excuse me, Mr. Plant. I would be assisted
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                if my friend could explain to me in paragraph 19 where
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                he says that Plaintiffs' counsel has suggested that
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                aboriginal title and then in his argument he said in
10
                the Calder sense and then he completed that first, and
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                if my friend could simply assist me in telling me what
12
                he means by aboriginal title in the Calder sense.
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     MR. PLANT: Well, first of all let me say that the first
14
                sentence in paragraph 19 was written a long time ago
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                and probably should be taken out of my argument but,
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                as to what aboriginal title in the Calder sense means,
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                without wanting to avoid the question, I think that
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                Mr. Goldie is going to be speaking at length about
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                what aboriginal title is or isn't or can or can't be,
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                and that's when my friend will get the answer to his
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                question.
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      THE COURT: Well, I am not sure that paragraph 19 should be
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                taken out. It seems to me that the opening sentence
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                of paragraph 19, he reflects what Mr. Rush said some
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                years ago, that there was haesitantae and reluctantly
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                an alternative claim in the event that ownership
                wasn't made out. I can't for the moment turn up the
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                reference to that. It was a statement that was made
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                in Vancouver in 1988 I should think but I am not
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                positive about that, or maybe 1989, but I think 1988,
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                and I referred to it a moment ago.
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     MR. PLANT: Your lordship referred to that earlier this morning
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                and I haven't been able to get my hands on that
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                statement by Mr. Rush, and as to what. It was by Mr.
35
                Rush?
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     THE COURT: Yes, it was.
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     MR. PLANT: So what its terms were and what it --
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     THE COURT: Because I remember so well that he stressed that he
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                did he not want to be taken to be weakening in any way
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                his fundamental position that it was ownership he was
41
                seeking but that -- and it seemed to me that he was
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                resiling from the firm position he took in Smithers
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                and I think -- and on a second occasion that there was
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                no alternative position being advanced.
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     MR. PLANT: Well, I know the point has been visited on several
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                occasions. I recall that in the argument that led to
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                the reasons for judgment of the 18th of February,
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has already been made. So that I can move ahead in my

Submissions by Mr. Plant

it, that read the claim of aboriginal title into the prayer for relief that refers to Section 35 of the Constitution Act. THE COURT: All right. MR. PLANT: But I can't recall the statement made by Mr. Rush to the effect that your lordship recalls. THE COURT: Well, I think you should know, Mr. Plant, that my present recollection is, and I won't say this in terrorem, but my present sense of all this is that at least the course of the trial suggests that there is an outstanding alternative claim but it may not be pleaded. I think this statement was made prior to what I said in February of 1988 and for that reason I think it might be useful for you to have that in mind and for your friend to consider whether he wants to find those references before I do and perhaps rely on them in the event that possibly he doesn't want me to rely on them. MR. PLANT: Yes. I may look for those references myself, my lord. THE COURT: All right, thank you. Should we adjourn for lunch, Mr. Plant? MR. PLANT: I was going to refer to — or start the submission in part (b) and that's going to take a few minutes, my lord. THE COURT: Let's look forward to hearing from you at two o'clock. Thank you. THE REGISTRAR: Order in court. Court stands adjourned. (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 12:30 p.m.) I hereby certify the foregoing to be a true and accurate transcript of the proceedings transcribed to the best of my skill and ability. Tannis DeFoe, Official Reporter, UNITED REPORTING SERVICE LTD.	1		1988, Mr. Grant adva	anced an argument, as I can recall
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1 (PROCEEDINGS RECOMMENCED AFTER LUNCHEON RECESS) 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: Order in court. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Plant. MR. PLANT: My lord, if I might begin on page 13 of part II, 5 6 section 2, paragraph 29 -- actually paragraph 28. 7 The Writ of Summons by which the action was 8 commenced named 48 plaintiffs. By the time the trial 9 commenced in May of '87 there were 52 named plaintiffs 10 allegedly representing some 68 named houses. 11 I pause just to remind your lordship that the 12 situation of a named plaintiff representing -- alleged 13 to be representing more than one house, was a 14 situation that occurred as a result of amendments made 15 after the action was commenced. 29 of the houses 16 named in the action when the trial -- when it came to 17 trial in May of '87, or their chiefs had not been 18 plaintiffs when the action was commenced. Some of 19 them, and I have listed names of examples there who 20 were not named when the action started, became 21 plaintiffs as a result of an intervening amendment and 22 were later dropped. 23 I say that there have been some 51 changes to the style of cause, and of course many of those I haven't 24 25 added up the number, but many are the result of chiefs 26 who passed away and their position has been assumed by 27 others. 28 And in this context, my lord, I ask you to look at 29 the appendix to this section, which identifies changes 30 to the style of cause, and it's really for your 31 reference as much as anything else. 32 The way it works is that each of the columns with 33 the numbers in it represents an appearance or a 34 non-appearance in the Statements of Claim identified 35 at the top of the column. To give an example, 36 Delgamuukw, then Albert Tait in the upper -- the very 37 beginning of the very first page, insofar as he is 38 alleged to have represented the House of Delgamuukw, 39 was named in that capacity in the first Statement of 40 Claim, and was named in paragraph 1. That's what the 41 "1" means there, of that Statement of Claim. And you will see that the "1" appears in the columns all the 42 43 way along to the right until SC9, a column headed 44 SC9, which is the ninth Statement of Claim. 45 Tait, as Delgamuukw, drops out of the Statement of 46 Claim, but if you go down three numbers, the one there

refers to the fact that Mr. Tait's place was taken by

the late Ken Muldoe as Delgamuukw. So that there has been continuous representation of Delgamuukw by two individuals.

But if you turn over the page, my lord, to the next page about three quarters of the way down, Larry Wright is identified as a plaintiff holding the name Haak Asxw, H-A-A-K A-S-X-W. And you will see following this along that Haak Asxw, the House of Haak Asxw did not appear until the Statement of Claim filed -- that's September the 10th, 1986 where Larry Wright appears as Haak Asxw in paragraph 16. In the succeeding amendment, the amendment of October 27th Larry Wright is then named as a representative of the house of an additional house. The House of Mool 'Xan, M-O-O-L 'X-A-N. And you see that for the next three versions of the amendment of the Statement of Claim the house named Mool 'Xan appears in the Statement of Claim, and it's later dropped. And it does not appear in the Statement of Claim today. So Mool 'Xan is a house that has -- as far as the pleadings are concerned, come and gone. And I will be coming back to the evidence on the existence of houses and their appearance and reappearance in a later part of the argument.

If I could turn to paragraph 31 of my submission, my lord. It's on page 13.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PLANT: According to my count in the Statement of Claim of February 8th, 1990, there are 51 named plaintiffs.

Each is identified as the hereditary chief of a house.

Each is said to bring the action on his own behalf, and on behalf of the members of the house of which he or she is a chief. The hosts, although identified by name in the pleadings, are not themselves plaintiffs.

And what follows continues to be an analysis of the issue of identification within the context of the pleadings, and some of this is quite obvious. There are two groups of plaintiffs, the Gitksan and the Wet'suwet'en, and as to the Gitksan, they, by definition, do not comprise the totality of the Gitksan hereditary chiefs, because there is a sub-category of chiefs, namely, the Kitwancool chiefs, who are expressly excluded.

Then I want to draw your lordship's attention to an inconsistency between the pleadings and the evidence, which the point can be made in the context of paragraph 50 of the Statement of Claim. And

perhaps at this point I could ask your lordship to get out a copy of the Statement of Claim, because there will be one or two other points that I want to make here. And paragraph 50 is on page 10 of the most recent Statement of Claim. And there it is alleged that the plaintiffs in the paragraphs numbered therein are the hereditary chiefs of the Gitksan, and are descendants and/or successors of the hereditary chiefs, except the Kitwancool chiefs. I say the use of the definite article, the word "they" implies that the named plaintiffs comprise all of the hereditary chiefs of the Gitksan, except the Kitwancool, and the same conclusion follows for the Wet'suwet'en, with the exception that there is no category of chiefs alleged to be excluded from the category of Wet'suwet'en chiefs, and the implication is that there are no other hereditary chiefs; that the evidence is obviously to the contrary. There are many other hereditary chiefs, and both the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en, and they are called wing chiefs, sometimes called sub-chiefs, sometimes they -- there is an uncertainty or an issue as to whether there are two head chiefs of a house who may have different responsibilities, but are equally senior. And as I recall Axtii Hiikw and Tenimgyet is an example of that.

The point is, my lord, that they are all hereditary chiefs, all those other individuals, and so there is a contradiction between the evidence and the pleading.

Now, the allegation of representation has a further problem arising out of paragraphs 52 and 54, where in those paragraphs there is an allegation first in respect of the Gitksan chiefs that they, the named plaintiffs, together represent all of the Gitksan people, and in paragraph 54 of the same allegation is made in respect of the Wet'suwet'en chiefs. And again I should be careful here, because in paragraph 52 the Kitwancool are excluded for the purpose of the claimed territory.

So the Statement of Claim doesn't define this term Gitksan people, and doesn't define the term Wet'suwet'en people, and there is no express allegation that the class of persons who might be described as Gitksan or Wet'suwet'en is synonymous with the membership of the named houses. The Statement of Claim also doesn't expressly tell us whether it's possible to be Gitksan or Wet'suwet'en

1 without being a member of a house. 2 Then there is the claim in paragraphs 52 and 54 3 that -- let's deal with 52. The Gitksan chiefs 4 together represent all of the Gitksan people, and that 5 word "together" in my submission fails to clarify 6 whether the representation consist of the aggregate of 7 separate house representations, that is the jigsaw 8 puzzle is it were, or is rather a global 9 representation, that is to say a representation on 10 behalf of all of the Gitksan people collectively. 11 And the point here really, my lord, is that the 12 pleading is ambiguous. 13 Now, the result, though, of the analysis to this 14 point, in my submission, is that each named Gitksan 15 plaintiff appears in the following capacities. 16 Firstly, on his or her own behalf. 17 Secondly, on behalf of the members of the house of 18 which he or she is hereditary chief. 19 Thirdly, in some cases, on behalf of the members 20 of named houses of which he or she is not alleged to 21 be the hereditary chief, Delgamuukw as an example of 22 this. 23 Fourthly, together with all other Gitksan chiefs, as representative of all of the Gitksan people except 24 25 for the people in the houses of the Kitwancool chiefs. 26 And then I say that paragraph 54 has the same consequence for the Wet'suwet'en. 27 2.8 Now, the problem is to try and figure out who is 29 claiming the rights that are at issue in the action. 30 And I say that the Statement of Claim isn't very 31 helpful in this regard either, and I am going to use 32 the Gitksan path of the claim, as it were, for this 33 purpose, although the same applies for the 34 Wet'suwet'en. 35 Paragraph 56, the allegation is that the Gitksan 36 chiefs, their ancestors and/or predecessors have owned 37 and exercised jurisdiction over the lands claimed in 38 Exhibit 646-9A. 39 And then when you get to paragraph 57, which is a 40 paragraph that enumerates the various incidents or 41 aspects of the ownership and jurisdiction claim, the 42 languages used there is the plaintiffs. It's the 43 plaintiffs who have governed the territory and 44 expressed their ownership of the territory and so on. 45 That language continues in paragraph 58. The 46 plaintiffs continue to own and exercise jurisdiction

over the territory to the present time.

47

1 Then in paragraph 59 there is a shift. And the 2 allegation there is that: 3 4 "The right to own and exercise jurisdiction over 5 the territory of the Gitksan chiefs ... was at 6 all material times a right enjoyed by the 7 Gitksan chiefs and the members of their 8 houses." 9 10 Moving ahead to paragraph 62, we return again to 11 the language. 12 13 "the plaintiffs ..." 14 15 And I am here abstracting from what I say are the 16 core allegations of ownership and jurisdiction. 17 in answer to the question who owns and exercise 18 jurisdiction, the pleadings, I say, suggest three 19 candidates. The Gitksan chiefs, the plaintiffs, and 20 the third candidate is the Gitksan chiefs and the 21 members of their houses. And I say that the three are 22 not, at least not necessarily synonymous. In 23 particular the Gitksan chiefs referred to in paragraph 56, if your lordship turns back, you will see the 24 25 allegation or the central parts of paragraph 56. The 26 Gitksan chiefs referred to in paragraph 56 do not 27 include house members. Because if they did, the addition of the words "and the members of their 28 29 houses" in paragraph 59 would be unnecessary. Since 30 the word "plaintiffs", when it appears in paragraphs 31 57, 58 and 62, since that word in that context must 32 mean the named plaintiffs, because otherwise, going 33 back to paragraph 50, the allegation in paragraph 50 34 that the plaintiffs are the hereditary chiefs of the 35 Gitksan would mean that all house members are 36 hereditary chiefs, which is not contended on the evidence or in argument, then it appears to be only 37 38 the named plaintiffs and not the members of their 39 houses who hold the rights, who are alleged to hold the rights claimed in paragraphs 57, 58, 62, and the 40 41 remaining paragraphs where the word "plaintiffs" 42 appears. 43 THE COURT: Doesn't the fact that the chiefs are plaintiffs 44 reduce the uncertainty from three to two, if one 45 accepts that all the named chiefs are plaintiffs?

MR. PLANT: Yes, it does, my lord. If Gitksan chiefs means

named plaintiffs defined as Gitksan chiefs, yes.

THE COURT: The only one that is left out is the members of the houses.

MR. PLANT: Yes, my lord. Now, in paragraph 41 I say since the term "plaintiff" refers in its context to both Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en chiefs, it is plain that the pleader considers that some rights are held by the Gitksan chiefs collectively, and some are held by the plaintiffs collectively. And the pleadings do not identify materially different types of rights said to vest in the three different right-holders, or the two different right-holders, if that observation of your lordship is correct.

So what we have is a situation where it is extremely difficult to figure out who is claiming what. And it will be seen later, my lord, that the evidence is not going to assist your lordship on this point to any great extent. But for present purposes the result which I wish to draw to your lordship's attention is this. If the interpretation of the significance of the reference to house members in paragraph -- and that should be 59, my lord, because I have been doing this in terms of a Gitksan analysis, although the analysis would be the same for the Wet'suwet'en. If the interpretation in 59 is correct, then the result is that the rights held by the Gitksan chiefs are different from those held by house members. The evidence of differing classes of at least among the Gitksan, chiefs, commoners and referring to pre-contact or early days, the apparent -- the evidence of apparent slavery, reinforces this analysis. As pleaded and proven, I say the claim runs afoul of the requirement in Rule 5 (11) that the persons by whom and for whom -- or whose benefit a representative proceeding is brought must have the "same interest". That's the requirement taken from the rules.

My lord, just parting from the text for a moment. The issue of whether and in what respect the claims of the plaintiffs are claims advanced by a collective entity or to two collective entities or 51 collective entities was raised in argument by my learned friends on Friday and Saturday of last week. On Friday you heard Ms. Pinder argue, as I recall it, that the fishery right was a right held communally by the Gitksan, in the case of the Gitksan, and then by the Wet'suwet'en. There are two communal rights. The fishery right was not a right that was desegregated

into houses.

Then on Saturday, as I heard, and Mr. Grant argued for distinction or a difference of treatment of the ownership claim and the jurisdiction claim, so far as the declarations saw it, because we are concerned because the ownership claim was a claim -- a collection of claims. Again taking your lordship to the houses. But the jurisdiction of the plaintiffs is said to be interlocked or interwoven in such a way that the jurisdictional claim is a claim in the aggregate or the collective. And as I recall it, it would be two jurisdictional claims, one by the Gitksan and one by the Wet'suwet'en.

My first point in responding to those submissions is that neither of those arguments is supported by the pleadings, because the pleadings do not differentiate among types of rights. The pleadings don't say that certain rights are held by -- in the Gitksan, collectively, other rights held by the Gitksan through their houses. But if the position -- if the position taken by Ms. Pinder and by Mr. Grant are correct, then what that leads to, in my submission, is a situation where each individual Gitksan or Wet'suwet'en person has a variety of different rights and interests according to whether he or she is a chief, whether or not the house of which he or she is a member has territory, whether there is a fishing site, in what respect there is a claim to jurisdiction, and then there is a further complication of at least in respect of the ownership claim and the rights that Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en individuals have through their mother's -- through their father's side as opposed to through their mother's side.

So it seems that for some purposes in the action, again drawing from what was submitted on Friday and Saturday, the class is the class of persons who are bringing the action is all of the plaintiffs or is two groups of plaintiffs, or in some cases it is the various groups of houses.

The point I want to draw to your lordship's attention here is it was not always thus. And this brings me back to the submission made before Mr. Justice Taylor in April of 1985. And I am not going to refer at length to this, my lord, but I have a copy of it, for your lordship and for my friends.

THE COURT: Where do you suggest it belongs?

47 MR. PLANT: This could go tab Roman II stroke 2-18 after the

	Statement of Claim. Does your lordship I'm sorry,
	it's 17. It would be right there where your lordship
	is. After the Statement of Claim, which should be the
	contents of I'm sorry, 2-8.
$_{ m THE}$	COURT: 8. Yes. Right. Yes. What Statement of Claim is
	that? I can't read the stamp.
MD	
MK.	PLANT: Now this was the argument advanced by the
	plaintiffs.
MR.	RUSH: That was the last one, my lord, February 6th, 1990.
	COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR.	PLANT: I was going to refer to that. Your lordship didn't
	have a copy involving the trial record.
	The point of interest here, my lord, is that this
	is the argument advanced by the plaintiffs in order to
	meet the province's contention that the claim to
	damages at least ran afoul of Rule 5(11) for the
	reasons considered in the General Motors and Naken
	case, N-A-K-E-N. And the citation of that case
	appears on the bottom of page 1 of this submission. I
	am interested in
mitte	
	COURT: Is that Mr. Justice Estey's judgment?
MR.	PLANT: Yes.
THE	COURT: And is this the argument that was before Mr. Justice
	Taylor?
MR.	PLANT: Yes, my lord.
THE	COURT: You remember the date?
	PLANT: April, 1985.
$_{ m THE}$	COURT: Thank you.
MR.	PLANT: The page 2 has the key paragraph, although there are
	other paragraphs in this submission. And it's the
	paragraph that has the sideline, near the bottom
	reads:
	···
	"In our case, on the other hand, there are, in
	effect, 47 class action and 4 claims. Each
	hereditary chief brings a claim on behalf of
	the members of his house for a declaration as
	to the entitlement of damages with respect to
	the specific territory of each house."
	So what was advanced there was the proposition
	that there were 47 class actions which assume,
	correspond with a number of plaintiffs, named
	plaintiffs that there then were. And that in respect
	of each of these class actions, the members of the
	house had a similar interest or the same interest for
	-1
	the purpose of Rule $5(11)$. And that submission was
	MR. THE MR. THE MR. THE MR. THE MR. THE

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accepted. I say that now that your lordship has had the benefit of the evidence on the issue of the claims to ownership and jurisdiction, that the picture now is quite different from that advanced in this submission, although the structure of the pleadings is unchanged, and what we have now really can only be characterized as a variety of types of class actions.

I want to make this further point, my lord. And that is that -- just to turn to the evidence for a moment, the difficulty of finding in the evidence support for the requirement of same interests, even if you take the claim of ownership, which is said to be advanced on a house by house basis, because clearly there are individuals other than house members who within the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en system have rights or privileges of use of territory. But let me draw this contrast between the evidence on the one hand of Dan Michell, who at -- and I am afraid I am not referring to my $\operatorname{--}$ this is not in my submission, but the reference is volume 61 of the transcript, pages 3772 to 3, where Mr. Michell expressly disavowed any claim to any territory of any other house other than the House of Namox, in which he is one of the chiefs. Contrast that with the situation which pertains with respect to Johnny David, and the Wet'suwet'en house of Smogelgem, and this was described in argument by my friend Mr. Grant, volume 326 of the transcript, pages 24858 and 59.

And what Mr. Grant argued before your lordship was that there is a clear competition within the Wet'suwet'en system between the House of Smogelgem and Johnny David, who comes from a different house altogether, over who will have the right to the north Bulkley territory of Smogelgem after Johnny David passes away.

Mr. Grant made the submission that this contest was testimony to the vitality of the Wet'suwet'en system, that there could be this kind of dispute within the Wet'suwet'en system. Well, that may be so, but the point for present purposes is that it cannot be said that the — there is only a house of Smogelgem that has an interest in or claims an interest in this north Bulkley territory. There is Johnny David and his sons, and those to whom he wishes to pass on the right, which would be outside the general principle of matrilineal descent, and would follow some other principle

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1
                    I say when your lordship has evidence of this kind
 2
                of competition, the problem it raises is the problem
 3
                of whether or not the claim falls within Rule 5(11) or
 4
                doesn't. And in my submission if the claim is the
 5
                desegregated claim of ownership on behalf of houses,
 6
                then it is virtually impossible on the evidence to
 7
                reconcile the action with the requirements of the
 8
                rule.
 9
     THE COURT: What about if you looked at it the other way, a
10
                collective action?
11
     MR. PLANT: If the action is at the level of the nation or the
12
               people?
13
     THE COURT: Yes.
14
     MR. PLANT: If the action were -- an action on behalf of the
15
                Gitksan in respect of all of the claimed rights, then
16
                that difficulty, taken at the level of allegation
17
                would not arise. Then your lordship has to deal with
18
                the problem whether that's the claim as pleaded. It's
19
                certainly not the claim as argued. But if your
20
                lordship were to say there is a Gitksan people, then I
21
                agree that the Rule 5(11) problem I am talking about
22
                doesn't arise.
23
      THE COURT: But it would be a collective claim advanced by 47
24
                chiefs?
25
     MR. PLANT: Yes, or 51 or whatever the number.
26
     THE COURT: Have different interests --
27
     MR. PLANT: I mean, you have said 47. I say 51. I don't see
28
               how you could say that there was a collective claim on
29
                the part of the Gitksan, Wet'suwet'en. I think at the
30
                highest you could take it, there would have to be
31
                considered to be two claims, because there is clearly
32
               no -- well, not clearly, but --
      THE COURT: Some of the Gitksan members have different interests
33
34
               than others?
35
     MR. PLANT: Yes. Dealing with my example, and it is apparent
36
                that Dan Michell, dealing with the Wet'suwet'en,
37
                claims no interest in respect of any territory other
38
                than territory of his house.
39
      THE COURT: Yes. He has a different interest on the members of
40
               all of the houses except Namox?
41
     MR. PLANT: Yes.
42
     THE COURT: All right.
43
     MR. PLANT: There is one more point I want to make about the
44
               plaintiffs' pleadings, my lord, and it's not -- again
45
               not in my submission, written submission. And it
46
                comes back again to the characterization of the claim
47
                as being either a collective one or a collection of
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Submissions by Mr. Plant

separate claims. And taking what I understand to be the plaintiffs' position that at least with respect to the jurisdiction claim, the jurisdiction claim is being advanced by the Gitksan collectively and the Wet'suwet'en collectively, then I want to draw to your lordship's attention the fact that the Gitksan plaintiffs who are in the action must therefore have jurisdictional rights in respect of the territory of the Kitwancool, or alternatively, the Kitwancool plaintiffs who are expressly excluded from the action would, on the assumption that the laws are the same as was, as I recall the evidence of Solomon Marsden, the Kitwancool chiefs would equally have jurisdictional rights in respect of the territory claimed by the Gitksan in this action.

The same applies with respect to the Wet'suwet'en, given Mr. Grant's statement, and I am afraid I don't have the transcript reference at the moment, but the Babine are Wet'suwet'en. And I will come back to that issue, and I will give you Mr. -- you the reference to Mr. Grant's submission on that point.

But having made that observation, what I really want to do right now is to take your lordship to the pleadings, because I say that that contention can't survive, or rather is inconsistent with the pleadings.

And here I want to direct your lordship to paragraph 61 of the Statement of Claim, and the particulars which were delivered of it. And paragraph 61 is the pleading that the plaintiffs and their ancestors and/or predecessors exercised jurisdiction over the territory as against other aboriginal peoples. Now, there were particulars delivered of this, and my copy of the trial record — I have got them at tab 4B, but that doesn't make sense. The particulars identified the aboriginal peoples against whom the plaintiffs are alleged to have exercised jurisdiction, and in paragraph KK the UU An Wea'teen, U-U space A-N space W-E-A 'T-E-E-N, are identified. Those are the Babine. And then in paragraph MM it is said:

"Gitksan who are not members of the Kitwancool houses."

And in my submission if your lordship reads that, that has to be Gitksan who are members of the Kitwancool houses, otherwise the particular makes no

1 sense. 2 So what you have is an allegation by the 3 plaintiffs that they have exercised jurisdiction 4 against the Kitwancool on the one hand and the Babine 5 on the other. And I say that it is difficult, if not 6 impossible, to reconcile that with the argument that 7 jurisdiction is somehow at this -- the jurisdiction of 8 the people is a national concept, and the case of the 9 Gitksan must include the Kitwancool. 10 My lord, the next submission is at -- is Part II, 11 section 2, page 20. 12 Now, this is headed "pleadings and the province's 13 case". This is a new part of the argument. I'll just 14 read the first paragraph. 15 In volume 7 Part IX of the plaintiffs' summary of 16 argument, at pages 80 to 85 the plaintiffs advance an 17 argument with respect to the pleadings of the 18 province. That argument misreads the province's 19 Statement of Defence. For convenience, the 20 plaintiffs' argument is reproduced verbatim below 21 (using a computer diskette of this section of the 22 plaintiffs' summary), with comments inserted to 23 respond to the plaintiffs' submissions where appropriate. The emphasis is that of the plaintiffs. 24 25 So what your lordship has on pages 20 to 28 is an 26 extract from the plaintiffs' argument into which $\ensuremath{\mathsf{I}}$ 27 have inserted some comments, and those comments are 28 identified as responses. And an example appears on 29 page 21 about two thirds of the way down the page. 30 I just wanted to say that volume 7, Part IX of the 31 plaintiffs' summary of argument reappeared at pages 91 32 to 97 of volume A through their final argument in the 33 same form. I am not going to address your lordship with respect to this. I think the responses speak for 34 35 themselves. I would like to turn then to the next 36 section, section 3. 37 My lord, the principle thrust of this submission 38 in this section is to ask your lordship to revisit and 39 reconsider the rulings which were made in 1987 with 40 respect to the admissibility of oral history. 41 I start at paragraph 6 by saying that the problem 42 that arises here, arise because a claim of aboriginal 43 rights necessarily requires that the court investigate 44 events that occurred long before the memory of living 45 man, and in many instances the history of such events 46 is known orally, if at all.

This fact led Mr. Justice Steel, the trial judge

Submissions by Mr. Plant

1 2	in the Bear Island case, to rule as follows:
3	"Indian oral history is admissible in aboriginal
4	land claim cases where their history was never
5	recorded in writing."
6	
7	Now, I won't refer now to the rest of what Mr.
8	Justice Steel said in that context, but he does speak
9	about the importance even though he admits the
10	evidence and finds that oral history is admissible, he
11	does have observations with respect to weight, which I
12	say are applicable here.
13	My principle concern here, though, is with the
14	question of admissibility, and I don't accept what Mr.
15	Justice Steel said in Bear Island.
16	Your lordship ruled to similar effect, however,
17	albeit with recognition of the different types of
18	evidence which might be described as oral history, and
19	the reasons for judgment which you delivered in this
20	regard are in the authorities binder, volume 2, and
21	its case D2. And I don't think it will be necessary
22	for me to take your lordship to that report, because
23	the important parts are excerpted in my submission. I
24	say firstly that your lordship invited reconsideration
25	of the ruling which you made.
26	Page 334 of the report in the B.C. Law Reports you
27	stated:
28	
29	"The questionable evidence will be received
30	subject to a later determination of
31	admissibility."
32	
33	And then you also said:
34	1
35	"It seems to me that there are at least two
36	reasons why I should not finally decide this
37	question at this time."
38	•
39	"First, I was particularly struck by the
40	comments of both Mr. Jackson and Mr. Goldie
41	about extensive anthropological and other
42	expert testimony which counsel proposed to
43	adduce. There may be independent corroboration
44	or confirmation of the details which the
45	witnesses wish to relate in their evidence
46	which may tilt scales away from anecdote
47	towards history. I am also heartened by Mr.

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Submissions by Mr. Plant

Jackson's assurance that there is not a large volume of this kind of evidence." "Secondly, there is a practical consideration I mentioned in my previous reasons. I refer to the fact that in most cases it will be necessary to hear the evidence in order to determine whether it is a general historical fact or a particular or anecdotal fact. As I said earlier, it may be necessary to decide these questions somewhat arbitrarily, doing the best I can, but there is no reason, having regard to the position taken by counsel for the Attorney General, to pronounce finally on this question at this time." My lord, you have now heard the evidence, both lay evidence and expert evidence, necessary to pronounce finally on this question, and I -- but before turning

My lord, you have now heard the evidence, both lay evidence and expert evidence, necessary to pronounce finally on this question, and I — but before turning to that question, I want to identify the context in which it arises, because there is, and we will be coming back to it again and again, a fundamental distinction to which reference should be made here. And that is the distinction between the claim of ownership and jurisdiction, the claim of present ownership and present jurisdiction based on present day facts. That's the claim pleaded. And I say there is a radical difference between that claim and the traditional claim of aboriginal title which seeks recognition of an ancient tenure as burden on the Crown's title. I say there is no room for oral history in determining whether the plaintiffs exercise present day ownership and jurisdiction at the expense of the Crown and those who hold under the Crown.

The question of whether the plaintiffs exercise present day ownership and jurisdiction is really a question that has to be determined on present day facts.

My lord, you have referred, and we have all referred on a number of occasions in this trial to the two great principles of necessity and trustworthiness, which come to bear on any consideration of the admissibility of hearsay evidence. The reasons which I am going to elaborate on, my submission is that although the oral history of the plaintiffs has contained in what have been described by them as their adaawk and kungax, may meet the test of necessity, and in certain circumstances they undoubtedly do, it is so

1 lacking in the essential element of trustworthiness as 2 to be inadmissible. 3 Alternatively, if the requirement of necessity 4 alone is sufficient to allow the admissibility of the 5 oral history, I say that such evidence ought to be 6 accorded no weight whatsoever. 7 Now, this submission applies, my lord, with 8 respect to the evidence of all events said to have 9 occurred prior to the lifetime of living witnesses, 10 and which is sought to be admitted for the truth of 11 its contents by virtue of its status as an adaawk or 12 kungax. 13 It's really only that evidence which gives rise to 14 the necessity problem. 15 Now -- and a further qualification on my 16 submission, my lord. 17 THE COURT: You wouldn't extend that submission to declarations 18 of ownership made by deceased persons, would you? 19 MR. PLANT: I am going to not be dealing with the guestion of 20 reputation evidence in that context, my lord, as to 21 declarations of ownership. 22 THE COURT: Are you intending it to be included in the 23 submissions you are now making? 24 MR. PLANT: To the extent that the adaawk is offered as evidence 25 of territorial ownership, yes. 26 THE COURT: But not to my deceased grandmother told me "x". You 27 are not including that in this submission, are you, or 28 are you? 29 MR. PLANT: No. I think not. Because in large measure those 30 statements were not tendered as adaawk type 31 statements. 32 THE COURT: No. That's right. MR. PLANT: Mr. Mackenzie will be dealing with that in the 33 context of the evidence about boundaries. 34 35 THE COURT: All right. 36 MR. PLANT: And another qualification on this submission, my 37 lord, that I am making is this: To the extent that 38 such evidence, that is the adaawk and kungax evidence 39 is tendered not as history, but as evidence explaining 40 the plaintiffs' understanding of their social or 41 cultural practises today, it may be admissible. And I 42 revise that, my lord. It is admissible. In the same 43 way --44 MR. RUSH: Excuse me, my lord. Just in terms of your present 45 query, it may be helpful if my friend would state what 46 he means by adaawk and kungax for the purposes of this 47 argument, and the distinction about the question that

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would pertain to reputation.

2 MR. PLANT: Well, my lord, I think it's clear from the argument 3 that I am going to be making what I mean by adaawk or 4 kungax. 5 I was in the context of saying that the -- to the

I was in the context of saying that the -- to the extent that adaawk or kungax evidence is tendered as evidence explaining the plaintiffs' understanding of their social or cultural practises today, it's admissible, but even here it's admissible because it's evidence of motive, intent or belief. It's not evidence of the truth of the facts of the -- particularly it's not evidence of the truth of the historical facts which -- in respect of which it has been tendered.

Evidence of events to which there may be living witnesses must be proven conventionally, and in this respect the province relies upon your lordship's ruling on this subject in the reasons for judgment of June 4, 1987. And that subject is dealt with at page 343 of the report in the B.C. Law Reports. It matters not in my submission whether the witness in question has recently deceased. The evidence of witnesses such as Stanley Williams, Martha Brown and David Gunanoot, who have died since the action has commenced, assumes no different character, even though they are no longer alive.

And I make the point in paragraph 17 that reputation as to boundaries will be a subject that we will be returning to.

So I turn now to the issue of the inadmissibility of oral history, and I have some general statements here, my lord. I say that if an aboriginal interest is to be established as a matter of legal right as opposed to a moral or a political claim, it must be established on the basis of facts proven in accordance with the rules of evidence according to which courts operate. And I say this is implied by the much cited statement of Mr. Justice Dickson as he then was in Kruger and Manuel versus The Queen. The paragraph is set out there, and its been read many times, but I would draw your lordship's attention to the distinction which Mr. Justice Dickson draws between a justiciable issue and the political issue, and I say that there are good policy reasons for the approach.

I say questions of aboriginal interests must be decided on the basis of evidence adduced in accordance with established rules. There cannot be one law for

the proof of aboriginal rights and another for the proof of other rights. If the result is the claims of aboriginal rights are difficult to establish at law, then in my respectful submission that is no more than a reflection of the marginal justiciability of such claims.

Now, in your lordship's ruling of June 4th, the passage which appears at page 340 of the B.C. Law

Now, in your lordship's ruling of June 4th, the passage which appears at page 340 of the B.C. Law Report, the key part of your lordship's reasoning is the passage which I set out -- set out in paragraph 20 of my submission, where your lordship said this:

"There is little doubt that the oral history of a people based upon successive declaration of deceased persons may be given in evidence, as a matter of admissibility, for it could not otherwise be proven: Relying on Simon versus The Queen. When there is no written history, such evidence obviously satisfies the test of necessity. In my view admissibility does not depend upon the particular historical events being a part of an adaawk although such could lend weight to the evidence because of its enhanced trustworthiness resulting from what has been called the sifting process. But inclusion in an adaawk is not an open door to the admissibility of anything said to be historical. Historical facts sought to be adduced must be truly historical and not anecdotal."

The first point I wish to make concerning this ruling, my lord, is that the Simon case, I say, is distinguishable.

Now, Simon was a case where the accused was charged with illegal possession of a shotgun and a rifle contrary to the Nova Scotia legislation, and he argued in his defence that he had a treaty right. He argued that the 1752 treaty granted him immunity from prosecution. The Crown argued that Simon had not shown that he was direct descendant of a member of the original Micmac Indian Band covered by the treaty. And this argument was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada. Chief Justice Dickson -- pausing there for a moment, because I have a note that it may be that this passage comes from page 407 of his lordship's judgment. But the holding by his lordship for the

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1 court was that the appellant has established a 2 sufficient connection with the Indian band, who were 3 signatories to the Treaty of 1752. His lordship then 4 describes the circumstances of the treaty, and said 5 that the appellants admitted at trial that he was a 6 registered Indian under the Indian Act, and was an 7 adult member of the particular band living in the same 8 area as the original Micmac Indian tribe who were 9 party to the treaty. His lordship goes on to say: 10 11 "This evidence alone, in my view, is sufficient 12 to prove the appellant's connection to the 13 tribe originally covered by the treaty. True, 14 this evidence is not conclusive proof that the appellant is a direct descendant of the Micmac Indians covered by the Treaty of 1752. It must, however, be sufficient, for otherwise no Micmac Indian would be able to establish descendancy. The Micmacs did not keep written records. Micmac traditions are largely oral in nature. To impose an impossible burden of proof would, in effect, render nugatory any right to hunt that present day Shubenacadie Micmac Indian would otherwise be entitled to invoke based on this Treaty. The appellant, Simon, as members of the 27 Shubenacadie Indian Brook Band of Micmac 28 Indians, residing in Eastern Nova Scotia, the 29 area covered by the Treaty of 1752, can 30 therefore raise the Treaty in his defence." 31 32 My lord, I respectfully submit that the 33

considerations which apply to a case where an accused raises a treaty right in his defence do not apply to a case where ownership and jurisdiction over some 22,000 square miles of British Columbia are in issue.

Simon is clearly authority for the proposition that entitlement to treaty rights as defence to a criminal prosecution may be established merely by proof of membership in an Indian Act band which occupies the same area as that occupied by the tribe party to the original treaty. In effect, membership of the band operates as a presumption sufficient for purposes of the criminal law, particularly where the issue is ancestry.

Where, however, as in this case, as in the case at bar, there is no treaty, no reliance on the Indian Act

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1 and the question whether the ancestors of the present 2 claimants occupied the claim area is very much 3 contested, and I say the different considerations 4 apply. And I say it is not a question of imposing an 5 impossible burden of proof. Rather, it is a question 6 of ensuring that the evidence offered in support of 7 the assertion of title satisfies both as requirements 8 of reliability, necessity and trustworthiness. 9 My first point, then, my lord, is that the Simon 10 case is distinguishable. 11 My second point is that necessity by itself is not 12 sufficient. And this refers to the proposition that 13 oral history may be given in evidence as a matter of 14 admissibility, for it could not otherwise be proven. 15 I say that that proposition implies that necessity 16 alone is a sufficient ground for the admissibility of 17 evidence. My lord, conventionally, hearsay which 18 cannot otherwise be proven, cannot be proven at all. 19 And I say that there is no reason in principle or 20 policy to depart from this principle in the case at 21 bar. Thus in my submission in order to be admitted, 22 oral history must satisfy the requirements of proof as 23 part of the law of evidence. And I say the oral 24 history offered as evidence in this case fails to meet 25 those requirements. 26 THE COURT: Well, I am having a little trouble just knowing what 27 you're saying there, Mr. Plant. What oral history 28 offered in evidence are you talking about now in this 29 area? 30 MR. PLANT: The examples include the adaawk of the grizzly bear 31 said to have destroyed the village of Temlaxam. And 32 that adaawk is being offered as proof of the truth of 33 the destruction of Temlaxam by a giant grizzly bear. 34 That's the oral history I have in mind. The adaawk 35 which were the subject matter of Ms. Marsden's expert 36 report collected by Marius Barbeau and William Beynon 37 and others. 38 THE COURT: Her report doesn't rely entirely. I haven't looked 39 at it for awhile or studied it carefully. You say 40 that her whole report is based upon that fact? 41 MR. PLANT: Well, in my submission her report is almost entirely 42 a project of internal reconstruction of the adaawks. 43 THE COURT: Yes. But you are not limiting it to the adaawk 44 about the grizzly bear. 45 MR. PLANT: I am saying that's an example. I mean, that's the

example that I refer you, because it's -- if it's not

the example your lordship heard first, it's one of the

1		first. An example your lordship heard first, I think,
2		is the adaawk told by Mary MacKenzie of the Warrior.
3		That's another example of the adaawk that I say.
4	THE	COURT: You are really saying that I should rule
5		inadmissible the content of the adaawk.
6	MR.	PLANT: To the extent that they are offered as historical
7		fact, yes.
8	THE	COURT: All right. Thank you.
9	MR.	PLANT: My lord, I am about to begin a new section. I
10		wonder I am happy to carry on.
11		COURT: I was going to split the afternoon in half.
12		PLANT: Oh, yes.
13	THE	COURT: I do have to adjourn in about five minutes time. We
14		will go for another five minutes, if you don't mind.
15	MR.	PLANT: I am happy to.
16		The next proposition I wish to address, then, is
17		the issue of whether there is the sifting process
18		which is said to satisfy the requirement of
19		trustworthiness, and it is this sifting process that
20		is said to be the special or distinguishing aspect of
21		both the adaawk and the kungax, and the sifting is
22		said to take place in the feasts where the adaawk are
23		told. And in my respectful submission, my lord, oral
24 25		history is a political act. If support for this
25 26		proposition is needed, it may be found in the
27		plaintiffs' opening where Ken Muldoe said:
28		"My power is carried in my house's histories
29		it is recreated at the feast when the
30		histories are told"
31		miscories are cord
32		There is a direct connection between Delgamuukw's
33		power and the histories of his house.
34		Alfred Joseph added more when he said:
35		riffica obsepti added more when he bara.
36		"The histories of my house are always being
37		added to. My presence in this court room today
38		"
39		
40		He meant May 11th, 1987 or May 12th.
41		
42		"Will add to my House's power, as it adds to the
43		power of the other Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
4 4		chiefs who will appear here or who will witness
45		the proceedings through the witnessing of
46		all the history, century after century, we
47		have exercised our jurisdiction."
		<u> </u>

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1 2 I say that oral history therefore is not history 3 as the layman understands it. It is no mere record of 4 past events. Rather, it is the taking of a position, 5 quite literally a Statement of Claim. There is no 6 sifting process. The chief who speaks simply dares 7 others to disagree. Disagreement is not a process 8 that has to do with the making of truth. It is rather 9 a process that has to do with struggle for power. It 10 has little to do with the events of the past, and much 11 to do with how things -- and particularly status 12 within the community are to be ordered for the future. 13 Now, since delivering the Reasons for Judgment of 14 July 27th, 1987, your lordship has had the benefit of 15 further lay evidence and expert evidence concerning 16 the oral history of the plaintiffs. And in their 17 final argument, my lord, delivered on April 7th, I am 18 referring here to transcript 314, page 2353A, they say 19 this: 20 21 "Adaawk are the historical record of the 22 Gitksan. They record actual historical 23 events." 24 25 And they go on to say that the kungax of the 26 Wet'suwet'en similarly record significant historical 27 events. And I say that the evidence which your 2.8 lordship has heard is undermined the plaintiffs' 29 position with respect to the reliability as historical 30 fact of such evidence. 31 One example of evidence, which your lordship has 32 heard since July of '87, is the evidence of Mr. Brody. 33 Mr. Brody, one of the plaintiffs' experts, has 34 suggested that the plaintiffs have a different 35 conception of truth. Their conception of truth is 36 different from the Euro-Canadian, that's Mr. Brody's 37 term, conception. And here I am going to ask your 38 lordship to refer to page 22 of his report. And that 39 should be in the yellow book at 2-3-33. 40 THE COURT: Yes. 41 MR. PLANT: Your lordship have that? THE COURT: Yes. 42 43 MR. PLANT: This is from Exhibit 991, Mr. Brody's report.

45
46 "A person who says 'I know' is implying that he

has firsthand experience of something. A

Mr. Brody says:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	scientist who says 'I know' is implying that something has been tested and proved to be true. A Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en chief who says 'I know' means that she or he is referring to something that has been witnessed and validated repeatedly at the feast. One Wet'suwet'en chief ends his statements at feasts with the words",
9	
10	And I won't pronounce them. They are words that
11	mean "that is how it is". He is saying that his
12	statements are been fully verified in the
13	Wet'suwet'en intellectual tradition. This analogy
14	should not be overstated. There are fundamental
15	differences between the two epistemologies. That is
16 17	to say the epistemology of Euro-Canadian society and the epistemology of Gitksan Wet'suwet'en. And another
18	sentence down the into this paragraph.
19	sencence down the into this paragraph.
20	"Both sides feel passionately that their society
21	understands the nature of knowledge. Both
22	sides rightly insist that their kind of truth
23	is integral to their form of ownership and
24	management to their system of authority."
25	
26	I won't bother reading the rest, but I commend
27	that to your lordship's attention.
28	Coming back to paragraph 33. Mr. Brody's
29	argument, for that is what it is, is that the idea of
30	truth which is integral to the Gitksan and
31	Wet'suwet'en form of ownership and management is not
32	truth as Euro-Canadians know it. He says "there are
33	fundamental differences between the two
34	epistemologies".
35	Thus, if your lordship is to give Mr. Brody's
36	opinions any weight, then unless the Court is prepared
37	to see truth in Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en terms, then
38	it is bound to reject much of the plaintiffs'
39	evidence. I say the plaintiffs seek ownership as
40	defined by the Canadian legal system, but urge the
41 42	court to found its judgment on evidence which is
42	unacceptable to that system. I don't want to push my luck here, my lord.
44	
	THE COURT. I think I am going to have to adjourn now I'll ho
45	THE COURT: I think I am going to have to adjourn now. I'll be back as quickly as I can.

Proceedings

1 2 3	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 3:05 P.M.)	
3 4 5 6 7 8	I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING T A TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT O PROCEEDINGS HEREIN TO THE BEST O SKILL AND ABILITY.	F THE
10 11 12 13 14 15 16	LORI OXLEY OFFICIAL REPORTER UNITED REPORTING SERVICE LTD.	
17 18 19 20 21 22		
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(PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED AT 3:25 P.M.)
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 3
     THE REGISTRAR: Order in court.
 4
     THE COURT: Mr. Plant, as long as we are going to be sitting
 5
                until 4:30, we will take the afternoon adjournment at
 6
                3:15 in the future. I overlooked that today when I
 7
               made an appointment for three o'clock. Thank you.
 8
     MR. PLANT: Thank you, my lord. I was in paragraph 34.
 9
     THE COURT: Yes.
10
     MR. PLANT: And the views of Mr. Brody -- I should say, while I
11
                was about to begin paragraph 34, I have a comment
12
                that's not in the written text. I say that the views
13
               of Mr. Brody with respect to the reliability of the
14
               adaawk and kungax can be summarized into two
15
               propositions: One, they are true because the Gitksan
16
               and Wet'suwet'en say they are; two -- which may be, in
17
               the alternative, its truth -- the adaawk and kungax
18
               are true to the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en, but because
19
                they are radically different epistemologies, they are
20
                admittedly not true to Euro-Canadian's. And I say
21
                that neither of those statements is particularly
22
               helpful to the plaintiffs.
23
      THE COURT: Is that true, Mr. Plant? Couldn't it just be not
24
               necessarily true according to Euro-Canadian thought or
25
                views? They could be -- they could both be.
26
     MR. PLANT: Oh, I quite agree they could be. I'm here
27
               summarizing Mr. Brody's views.
28
     THE COURT: Yes, all right.
29
     MR. PLANT: And I say that neither of those views, as I've
30
                stated them, assists the plaintiffs, particularly when
31
                the burden lies on them to establish that the oral
32
                tradition is admissible not because it is Gitksan and
33
                Wet'suwet'en truth and not because it is an
34
                anthropological source of research or study, but
35
                rather as evidence.
36
                     Now returning to paragraph 34. The verification
37
                theory, which is said to justify the claim that the
38
                adaawk/kungax are true, is, in my submission,
               profoundly implausible. The verification theory is
39
40
               the theory that people sitting in the feast hall have
41
                the opportunity to correct errors and this is the
42
                testing or the sifting process.
43
                     Now, if Mr. Brody is correct and the Gitksan and
44
               Wet'suwet'en do not recognize the distinction between
45
                observed events and hearsay, and that's -- I imply
46
                that from the passage which I read to your lordship
47
                from page 22 of his report -- then clearly there is no
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1 way of knowing whether the first account of an event 2 said to be the subject of an adaawk, is based on 3 actual experience or hearsay. And the most that can 4 ever be verified is the conformity between various 5 tellings: thus the "truth" of the second telling lies 6 only in its resemblance to the first telling, which 7 may itself bear no resemblance to the actual events. 8 Since the lapse of time between the repetition of 9 official tellings is likely to be the length of the 10 preceding chief's, chieftainship, repetitions may 11 occur only a few times in the life of each hearer, if 12 at all, thus the opportunities for the verification 13 are few and far between. 14 There are some examples here from the evidence, my 15 lord. The first is Mary McKenzie's statement that she 16 last told the adaawk of Gyolugyet at a feast in 1963. 17 And I've given the transcript reference there. But I 18 should say that in another part of her evidence, it 19 appears to be the situation that the two previous 20 instances on which she heard the adaawk told occurred 21 in 1949 and 1935. And the reference there is to 22 Volume 4 of the transcript, page 238, lines 25 to 44. 23 Now, the second observation there, my lord, is --24 should not be a quote, referring now to what I say of 25 Martha Brown. Martha Brown said that Edward Sexsmith 26 (her predecessor in title) never told the adaawk at a 27 feast. And I've given the transcript reference there. 28 Fred Wale, when asked if he had heard the adaawk 29 in the feast said, "We don't like to tell it outside 30 of the house, but it is told within the house." 31 And Vernon Smith, the head chief of the Eagle clan 32 in Kitwanga has never heard his adaawk told at a feast. In fact, he doesn't know it. 33 The community of verifiers --34 35 THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Plant. Did you say that the second 36 item about Martha Brown should not be a quotation? 37 MR. PLANT: Correct, my lord. Delete the quotation marks. THE COURT: Thank you. 38 MR. PLANT: It's a summary of evidence. 39 THE COURT: And is this reference to Mary McKenzie at page 238 40 41 include both the 1949 and the 1935 tellings? 42 MR. PLANT: Yes, my lord. 43 THE COURT: Thank you. 44 MR. PLANT: That is a construction which I place on the evidence 45 that she gives at that page. 46 THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PLANT: I think I will, my lord, take you, if I might, to

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1
                the reference to the Edward Sexsmith evidence, and
 2
                that would be in II/3-34. And when your lordship gets
 3
                there, it's the second item.
 4
     THE COURT: Under 34?
     MR. PLANT: Thirty-four, yes, my lord.
 5
     THE COURT: Yes, I have it.
 6
 7
     MR. PLANT: You have that as page 11 from Exhibit 68B?
 8
     THE COURT: No, I'm afraid I don't. I've got -- which one are
 9
               you referring me to?
10
     MR. PLANT: The Martha Brown extract.
11
     THE COURT: Yes, I think I have it. Yes, thank you.
     MR. PLANT: And just for reference, my lord, in the lower
12
13
                right-hand side of that page there is a number, and
14
                the "p. 2" indicates that this is the second page in
15
                the collection of extracts at this tab.
16
     THE COURT: Yes.
17
     MR. PLANT: And it's at line seven where Mr. Grant in chief
18
                asked Mrs. Brown:
19
20
                          Q Did Edward Sexsmith ever tell the ada'ox
21
                             at a feast?
22
                          A No.
23
24
                    I just wanted to give your lordship the reference
25
                there, because it was -- what appears in our argument
26
                is really an attempt to summarize the evidence.
27
     THE COURT: Yes. Thank you.
28
     MR. PLANT: And if I could refer now back to paragraph 35 in my
29
               argument, still dealing with the issue of
30
                verification, I say that the community of "verifiers"
31
                is extremely small, because only chiefs are entitled
32
                to stand up at a feast and disagree with what has been
33
                said. And the reference to Exhibit 446D there, my
34
                lord, is a reference to the evidence of Stanley
35
               Williams. And I have an additional reference, and
36
                that is to the evidence of Dr. Daly who said in
37
               Exhibit 884-1 at page 80, "Oral histories are for the
38
                ears of the chiefs."
39
                     Significantly, my lord, the listeners, those who
40
                listen to the adaawk and the kungax in the feast hall,
41
               have no responsibility for possessing the knowledge
42
               necessary to verify effectively. Because as Mr. Brody
43
               says on page 19 of his report, individuals -- that
44
               meaning individual chiefs -- are only "separately
               responsible for their part of the culture's history
45
46
                and for knowledge of their particular territories".
47
                The individuals in question would be the chiefs and
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those in training to become chiefs.

Now, I say in such circumstances, it can hardly be maintained that the adaawk or the kungax are matters of reputation within the community as a whole. There is a very select group of individuals who know the adaawk and the kungax and with -- and that knowledge is at a high level, generally. The knowledge that you have to know with any detail is really only the knowledge of your own adaawk, and that constrains the ability to verify, according to the theory of the plaintiffs'.

Furthermore, the suggestion which Mr. Brody makes that the adaawk and the kungax are -- and these are his words "inductive and value free" is, I say, absurd. Because oral history is both a charter for the exercise of power and an exercise of power itself. All parts of the adaawk and the kungax, including the text itself as well as the circumstances of its telling, and those are inseparably interrelated, because as an oral text, the adaawk and the kungax only exist in their telling. And I say that all parts of the adaawk and the kungax are parts of a political act, namely the assertion of and the acquiescence in claims to power, whether this be seats in the feast hall, traplines, fishing sites, the right to claim larger payments at the next feast, or whatever. And I say that no part of political rhetoric is value free.

Now, to some extent, my lord, I have focused on the adaawk. The kungax, in my submission, are markedly different from the adaawk, and this distinction is ignored by Mr. Brody. The difference, I say, with respect, is also obscured by Dr. Mills' discussion at Exhibit 906, that's to say, her expert report at pages 61 and 62. And I'm not going to refer to that, but I commend it to your lordship because of the way in which Dr. Mills attempts to connect the adaawk and the kungax without coming to grips, in my submission, with the evidence given by the lay witnesses who translated kungax as crest. That is to say, not as history. And there is evidence of other witnesses who equated the Gitksan word "nax nox" with kungax, not adaawk. And I do want to take your lordship to some of these references which would be at II/3-37, the reference to the evidence of Alfred Joseph, and that would be the transcript extract which is in page 4 of the tab. Does your lordship have that?

1	THE COURT: Yes.
2	MR. PLANT: And this is during the course of Mr. Joseph's
3	examination in chief by Mr. Rush. And starting at
4	line 33, Mr. Rush asks this question:
5	
6	Q All right. Now, you've made mention of
7	the term Kungax, and you've heard in thi
8	court case mention of the Gitksan word
9	adaawk. Are there differences between
LO	the Wet'suwet'en Kungax and the Gitksan
L1	adaawk?
L2	A Yes, there is a difference.
L3	Q Can you tell his lordship what that is?
L 4	A The the Gitksan Kungax relates to
L5	migrations within the territory.
L6	y <u>-</u> -
L7	Skipping down a few lines:
L 8	
L9	Q By that do you mean the Gitksan adaawk?
20	A Yes.
21	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
22	THE WITNESS: And our Kungax is more more
23	around the it's not migrations; it's
24	just it tells about happening in
25	the within the territory, how clans
26	and crests were created, and how people
27	defended their territory and their
28	people.
29	* *
30	Now, turning ahead a few pages the next
31	extract, page 6, is another extract from the evidence
32	of Alfred Joseph. Turning ahead to page 7, and this
33	would be an extract from the evidence of Mrs.
34	Wilson-Kenni. Beginning at line 35:
35	
36	A In it was in the old hall.
37	
38	Do you have that, my lord, down near the bottom of th
39	page?
10	THE COURT: Yes.
11	MR. PLANT:
12	
13	A It was in the old hall that was right in
14	the middle of Hagwilget.
15	Q Okay. Now, you described that as a
16	Kungax and that's a Wet'suwet'en word,
17	right?

1	A Kungax, yes.
2	Q Yes. Had you seen Nox Nox performed at
3	Gitksan feasts?
4	A Yes.
5	Q Is the okay. Is there a difference or
6	can you between the Kungax and the Nox
7	Nox?
8	A That's the Kungax. The Nox Nox is the
9	Kungax. Kungax. You are starting to
10	make me pronounce it like you now. It's
11	Kungax.
12	
13	That's and then the reference over the page:
14	
15	Q Kungax?
16	A Kungax.
17	Q And so they are the same?
18	A Yes.
19	
20	So the kungax are to be equated with the nax nox
21	which is the performance of the crest in the feast
22	hall, not the adaawk.
23	The the last reference on page 10 is from the
24	examination for discovery of Sylvestor William which
25	was read in. Beginning at line 8:
26	
27	Q Mr. William, does Hag Wil Negh have a
28	Kungax; if you can, if you have got it
29	then go ahead, Mr. Holland.
30	
31	That's a reference to the interpreter.
32	•
33	A Yes.
34	Q And without telling it to me, do you
35	know, do you know it?
36	A It is a song, I do not know.
37	Q Is that all that he said?
38	THE WITNESS: (NODS HEAD)
39	MR. PLANT:
40	Q Mr. William, are you able to describe for
41	me what is a Kungax?
42	THE INTERPRETER:
43	A It is a ceremonial performance in a
44	feast.
45	Q Is there a story of where the name Hag
46	Wil Negh
47	-

1 That's a Wet'suwet'en chief's name, my lord. 2 3 O -- came from? 4 A That I don't know. 5 Q Do you know territories of Hag Wil Negh? 6 A No, I have just trapped and hunted across 7 here; I never venture too far. 8 9 That -- "across from here" would be across from 10 Smithers where the Examination for Discovery took 11 place. 12 And the last reference in the tab --13 MR. GRANT: Just, I think my friend is mistaken. I think that 14 one took place in Moricetown, Mr. William's discovery. 15 In fact, I'm certain of that. 16 MR. PLANT: That may be. I just have a vision in my head, the 17 vision of the basement of the Hudson Bay Hotel, but I 18 may be wrong. 19 The last reference in that tab is to the 20 examination. 21 THE COURT: Is there any reason why he would know the kungax of 22 Hag wil negh? 23 MR. PLANT: He was Hag wil negh. 24 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. You have got Hag wil negh in your 25 chart twice: William, Sylvester once and Ron Mitchell. 26 MR. GRANT: Mr. William passed away and Mr. Mitchell took the 27 name, that's why there is a change. 28 MR. PLANT: Yes, that's right. 29 THE COURT: I see. So he was Hag wil negh when he gave that 30 evidence? 31 MR. PLANT: Yes, correct. THE COURT: All right, thank you. 32 33 MR. PLANT: Yes. 34 Paragraph 38 of my submission, my lord, there is 35 an illustrative example of the use of adaawk as a 36 political tool (as opposed to an historical record) is 37 found in the report of Mr. Hugh Brody which is Exhibit 38 991. And the chapter which I have mentioned there, chapter 4, is really -- has to be read in full to get 39 40 the flavour of what's going on here. But this is a 41 chapter in Mr. Brody's report in which he describes a 42 series of events which took place at Bear Lake that 43 arose out of the attempt to resolve the overlap 44 between the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en claim and the 45 Carrier-Sekani claim. And I should observe that there 46 were objections taken on numerous occasions to this 47 part of Mr. Brody's evidence, but subject to those

1 objections, I don't think that they touch on the point 2 that I want to make here, and that is this, down to 3 paragraph 39: 4 Mr. Brody sees in the struggle to resolve 5 overlapping claims signs of the vitality of two 6 cultures; cultures which, in his words, are "fiercely 7 alive". The more significant question, in my 8 submission, is whether the native institutions work. 9 Here is an instance of the interaction of two cultures where alleged problems of cross-cultural translation 10 11 and misconceptions do not exist. That is to say, 12 there isn't the difficulty of Euro -- of, again using 13 Mr. Brody's terms, of an interaction between a Euro-14 Canadian Frontier mentality and the Gitksan-15 Wet'suwet'en. And as a result, the misconceptions 16 that Mr. Brody says taint all such relations are 17 obviously not present, and at the same time, there is 18 what appears to be an equality of bargaining power. 19 Yet, what you see in this account here, is that the institutions of jurisdiction and authority, in 20 21 particular the institutions of dispute settlement, 22 fail. 23 And what happens here is that the two groups of people meet at Bear Lake and they meet for several 24 25 days at the old Bear Lake Village. And if I could 26 just refer for a moment to the extract in the next tab 27 in the yellow binder, my lord, page 42 of the chapter 28 4. That should be in tab II/3-38. 29 THE COURT: All right. 30 MR. PLANT: Does your lordship have that? 31 THE COURT: Yes. MR. PLANT: In this tabulation it's page 6. I'll just read a 32 33 little bit from the first full paragraph: 34 35 On July 15th, 1985, Gitksan met with Carrier 36 and Sekani elders and representatives at the 37 centre of the overlap: the old Bear Lake 38 village. Helicopter flights to high points 39 resulted in detailed naming of landmarks, and 40 helped define the differences between the 41 various elders' territorial claims. 42 Miluulak --43 44 And that's the House, as I understand it, the Gitksan 45 House that claims that territory. 46

Miluulak history was told by both sides, and

divergences as well as rival opinions as to whether or not these histories pertained to the same Miluulak were made clear.

I have to stop there because that's the point, my lord. The point is that the parties cannot even agree on the content of the adaawk, and there appears to be no other mechanism for compromise or adjustment of this problem at the level of jurisdiction.

Now, I — turning now to page 19 of my summary. I think that's all I want to ask you to read in that extract for now, although I do say that the whole chapter bears on the point.

What happens to resolve this problem is that the Gitksan chief, Wii Gaak, who, as I recall at the time at least, was Neil Sterritt Sr., puts a jacket on William Charlie, one of the Carrier-Sekani chiefs, and says — and as I recall the jacket has the crest of Wii Gaak on it. And he says, "I give you this jacket, William, to keep you warm and you can hunt here in my territory." But there is no — well, in the Gitksan terms, among other things, there is no eagle down going on here. There is no settlement of the dispute. What there really is, is a temporary truce, which I say amounts to no more than an act of grace on the part of the Gitksan chief, Wii Gaak.

And in paragraph 40 I draw your lordship's attention to the fact that the impetus for this meeting at Bear Lake which took place, of course, after the action had been commenced, was not the desire of Gitksan chiefs to hunt, trap or fish or exercise any rights in the disputed area — to exercise what might be called practical sovereignty — but, rather, was the pending land claim litigation. Thus, it is clear that the adaawk are intended to be called in aid of politics and yet are singularly ineffective in that regard.

My lord, since the community of informed listeners is small — that is to say, no individual is required to know more than his own history and the chiefs are often unaware of their history. And I give there examples from the evidence of Vernon Smith and Sarah Layton. And I do think I should ask your lordship to turn to Table 2216, and that will be a few tabs along in the yellow book. That would be tab II/3-41, pages four and five.

THE COURT: Yes.

1 MR. PLANT: Just to draw your lordship's attention to this 2 exhibit which purports to describe familiarity with 3 House histories for population, firstly, 16 years of 4 age and older. And then when you turn over the page, 5 you find that it's a chart dealing with the degree of 6 familiarity for those who are 15 years of age and 7 less. And you find that on the first page, by far and 8 away the greatest category is the -- those who claim 9 to be not at all familiar with their House histories. 10 That number, 426, on the right-hand column corresponds 11 to that category. 12 And there is also an additional reference, my 13 lord, that I would ask your lordship to make a note of 14 on the summary here. 15 THE COURT: What is this table from? 16 MR. PLANT: The Gitksan Carrier Tribal Council census which is 17 Exhibit 901-4. 18 THE COURT: And for what year is it? MR. PLANT: I'll give that date to you later, my lord. 19 20 THE COURT: Yes. 21 MR. GRANT: My lord, I have a concern about this. Is my friend 22 suggesting that this document which was put to, I 23 believe, Dr. Daly by Ms. Koenigsberg in cross, and he had not seen it, and it was marked as an exhibit for 24 25 that purpose, is my friend suggesting that he is now 26 adopting this for the truth of the contents therein? 27 Because I think that is the only time it would be 28 referred to and I think it was put in as a document 29 that Dr. Daly did not have an opportunity to review 30 and consider in his analysis. And that was the intent 31 of that document, not for the truth of the contents 32 therein, because I don't believe any other witness was 33 examined on the document. 34 MR. PLANT: Well, my lord, I haven't seen the point in the 35 transcript where this was put into evidence for 36 awhile. But it certainly appears to me, for the 37 purposes of my argument, to be a document created by 38 the plaintiffs which contains admissions against 39 interest, and to that extent, is admissible. 40 MR. GRANT: It was a statistical survey, my lord. I think my 41 objection is clear for your lordship that I do take 42 the position that it is not put in for the truth of 43 the contents stated therein. 44 THE COURT: But it's a plaintiffs' document. It comes from your 45 files, it comes from the tribal council which, on your 46 case at least, is an emanation of the chiefs or the 47 plaintiffs.

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1
     MR. GRANT: Well, I wouldn't say it's an emanation of -- oh, you
 2
               mean the tribal council?
 3
     THE COURT: Yes.
 4
     MR. GRANT: Yes, it came out of the tribal council files, it was
 5
                a specific research project that was done, and in
 6
                terms of its accuracy or veracity it was never
 7
               testified to in any regard in that way.
 8
     THE COURT: All right. Well, I will have to look at that, at
 9
               what happened when it went in. I've got your two
10
               positions and I'll have to sort that out.
11
     MR. GRANT: Thank you, my lord.
     MR. PLANT: My lord, Exhibit 901-3 is the census document
12
13
                itself, and it appears to be described -- called
14
                "Phase 1 Results". And from the introduction it says,
15
                "The census results are intended for use by Band
16
                Councils, and my tribal council information was
17
                gathered by the land claims research team in late 1979
18
                and early 1980." So that's the closest that I can get
19
                to a date for that information.
20
     THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
21
     MR. PLANT: There is in the context of this submission, an
22
                additional reference that I give your lordship, and
23
                that is to the evidence of Dr. Daly at transcript 194,
24
                page 12660 at line 35 where he says, "Specific songs
25
                and histories are known by very few".
26
     THE COURT: What's the reference again? It's not in the text,
27
                is it?
28
     MR. PLANT: Transcript 194 -- that's Volume 194 of the
29
               transcript, page 12660.
30
     THE COURT: 12660?
31
     MR. PLANT: 660, yes, at line 35. And that's not in the
               material, my lord.
32
33
     THE COURT: Yes, all right.
34
     MR. PLANT: And I say, therefore, that the opportunity for
35
                correction within such a system is small. And I say
36
                that it is, in any event, an exaggeration to describe
37
                as a "system" of knowledge "shared out" that which is,
38
                in substance, an ad hoc collection of narratives (and
               which, in the case of the Wet'suwet'en, is admitted to
39
40
               be incomplete). And the reference there to the report
41
               of Dr. Mills is the last page in that tab in the
42
               yellow book, and it's the first full sentence on the
43
               page: "The kungax do not recount the origin of every
44
               house and crest and title."
45
                     Turning over the page, my lord, I say that
46
               moreover, much of what is important appears to be kept
                secret. And your lordship may recall the evidence of
47
```

1	Art Mathews when he said that some parts of the adaawk
2	may be told at feasts but the well, perhaps I
3	better take your lordship to it. It's just the next
4	item in the book. That would be $II/3-42$. And
5	starting at line 40, Mr. Grant:
6	
7	Q I'll come back to that area in a few
8	minutes. When the adaawk is taught in
9	detail who is usually present?
10	A This is where we get serious. Just the
11	family hears a Simoogit tells an
12	adaawk in its it's like I described,
13	all these material things, and nobody is
14	allowed to hear this, because wisdom
15	leaking out about our sisatxw
16	[S-I-S-A-T-X-W], how we do it and how we
17	realize things, hunting signs, all other
18	things they say belongs to that house
19	itself. But actually the actual adaawk
20	itself publicly is told in feast halls,
21	but not the secret parts of it. That
22	belongs to the house itself.
23	
24	And I as I recall, it was Mr. Mathews' evidence
25	that to tell the full adaawk took something like three
26	or four months. That would be the adaawk including
27	all of the many secret parts.
28	And the next is an extract in the evidence of
29	Jessie Sterritt which is a couple of pages further on
30	in the tab. It's page 4 of the material at the tab,
31	and this is the evidence of Mrs. Sterritt who gave
32	evidence on commission. She was examined in chief by
33	Mr. Rush and in answer to a question said:
34	
35	A It was the responsibility of the elders
36	of the House to pass on the knowledge of
37	the history of the House and anything
38	that may enhance the lives of the young
39	people of the House, and it was usually
40	not related to another House, it was
41	something that was kept right in the
42	House, the methods that they used.
43	
44	And while I say in paragraph 42 that it is
45	uncertain whether the adaawk is history or "a guide
46	for life", what I really mean is that there are a
47	number of different descriptions of what the adaawk

1 is. Some have said that the adaawk is history, 2 others -- and my recollection is that it was Mrs. 3 McKenzie said that the adaawk is information you need 4 to know. 5 Correction of "errors", to the extent that it 6 occurs at all, occurs only when a subsequent feast is 7 held for the purpose. And this was -- there was 8 testimony concerning this by Joan Ryan and by Art 9 Mathews, both of whom gave evidence, as did Stanley 10 Williams, concerning a feast that Stanley Williams 11 hosted as a result of what was said to be an error 12 made in a feast that had been hosted by Buddy 13 Williams, Stanley Williams' son. And that -- if it is 14 not the only instance -- specific instance of a 15 correction, it certainly is one of the very few in the 16 records before your lordship. And I mean to contrast 17 specific instance with the statements expressed in 18 general terms, that this is how they do things. 19 Art Mathews had -- when I say by Art, he had not 20 heard an error corrected for four years. It was, as I 21 recall, Stanley Williams and the Buddy Williams 22 correction that he referred to in his evidence, and 23 Mr. Mathews was unable to recall any other examples of 24 such correction ever having occurred. 25 And my lord, I say that the evidence is clear 26 that critical discourse is not a feature, at least of 27 Gitksan society. When a dispute is settled it is a 28 violation of Gitksan "law" to raise the matter again. 29 Thus, the idea of free historical inquiry is 30 apparently not present within the Gitksan communities. 31 And the reference there is to the evidence of Olive 32 Ryan which would be in the II/3-44, and I ask your 33 lordship to look at it. Starting at line 29, and this 34 is in cross-examination: 35 36 Q I suggest to you that in your lifetime, 37 there was a disagreement about who should 38 sit in the seat at the Feast Hall that 39 Gwis Gyen --40 41 That is to say, the name held by Stanley Williams. 42 43 Q -- now sits in? 44 A Well, I can't answer you. 45 Q Why can't you answer me? 46 A Well, that's happened before long time 47 and we not supposed to bring it up. They

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	<pre>already settled it. Q That's a part of Gitksan law, isn't it? A Yes. Q When you settle a dispute, you are not supposed to talk about it anymore; right? A Yes.</pre>
8 9 10 11 12 13 14	And turning over the page to the next extract, this is from the evidence of Stanley Williams, and I'm in the yellow book again, my lord. This is Mr. Williams giving evidence about the fact that it's a violation of Gitksan law even to tell the adaawk of another house without permission. And at line ten, this was in examination by Mr. Grant:
16 17 18 19 20 21	A It is not our law to tell the adaawk of any any from any house. Like I could not tell anybody's adaawk and they would not tell my adaawk, and this is our law, the Gitksan people's law. I can't use their adaawk and they can't use mine.
23 24 25 26 27	And what happens, this evidence was may well have been given in the context of Mr. Williams giving adaawk evidence of other Houses where he took pains to say that he had the permission of the chiefs to give that kind of evidence.
28 29 30 31 32	My lord, on page 21 of my submission, where I say that there are circumstances where the trustworthiness of oral histories can be tested by comparing the oral histories to written records of the same event.
33 34 35 36	And the reference made in the following paragraphs is to a story related by Johnny David, which he said the chiefs themselves told to him. It concerns a Fishery officer who seized a fishing fence in the Babine area. And I think that this may be well,
37 38 39 40 41	it's important that I identify that this story was not advanced by Mr. David as part of his kungax, it was really a retelling of events that occurred when Johnny David was a young man, and thus it falls outside the umbrella of the protection for oral tradition which
42 43 44 45 46	the plaintiffs have advanced. It's a different kind of problem, my lord. I would say that generally speaking, this is pure hearsay and therefore inadmissible. THE COURT: Well isn't it hearsay on both sides?
47	MR. PLANT: Yes, probably. But what you have at any rate, is

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1 you have Mr. David's recollection of events that took 2 place a long time ago, and there are documents in 3 evidence concerning the same events, and if Mr. 4 David's evidence is admissible at all, then your 5 lordship is going to have to compare Mr. David's 6 recollection of the events to the recollection 7 contained in the reports of the Fishery's officers and 8 so on. 9 THE COURT: I suppose the Fishery's officer's report would only 10 be admissible if it was in a business record, would 11 12 MR. PLANT: And my submission has already been admitted for that 13 purpose. 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 MR. PLANT: But I want to say that this example here falls 16 outside the umbrella, really, of the submission that I 17 am making. 18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 19 MR. PLANT: Jumping ahead then to paragraphs 49 and 50, I think 20 it continues -- I say it continues to be significant, 21 even though it's outside the context of this 22 particular problem, that the differences between the 23 versions of these stories makes some sense when you 24 see that Mr. David's recollection -- and I'm at the 25 bottom of the page -- in 1980 -- in the 1980's, is 26 that this was a land claims matter in which the 27 natives asserted their claim to the land. And then 28 your lordship will not find that proposition supported 29 by the documentary record of the event. 30 The comparison serves as an example of the 31 proposition restated by Drs. Bishop and Ray, which I 32 will be coming back to, that -- particularly in the 33 context if your lordship should decide that oral 34 history is admissible. "The validity of oral 35 tradition and historical 'truth' must be carefully 36 cross-checked against other categories of data." 37 Now, paragraph 52, I set out another series of 38 examples, and the -- these examples relate to the oral record, as it were, of the Kitsegukla fire of 1872. 39 40 Once again, this example falls outside the umbrella of 41 the adaawk, because on my reading of these accounts 42 from the Barbeau-Beynon files, they are not tendered

as part -- they weren't created as part of the adaawk

individuals recorded in the 1920s of events that took

of the various Houses that these individuals came

from. So what you have there is an oral account by

place in the 1870's. And what you have again is a

1 problem of competing and conflicting accounts of what 2 took place, and the difficulty of reconciling the 3 accounts as to particular details, especially when the 4 versions of -- that are recorded here by Dan Guxsan 5 and Mark Wiget are compared with the existing 6 historical record concerning the same events. 7 Now I am going to move ahead to paragraph 57. 8 Mr. Grant has just asked me a question which I am 9 unable to answer, but there is one thing that it 10 brings to my mind. There are some errors in the 11 exhibit numbers in the -- on pages 23 and 24, 12 paragraph 48, my lord. 13 THE COURT: Yes. 14 MR. PLANT: The last reference there which is -- ends dash 12 15 should be dash 13. And similarly, the first line of 16 paragraph 49, that should also be dash 13 not dash 12. 17 Over the page to paragraph 51, the reference to 18 the Bishop and Ray proposition, I've transposed the numbers. That should be Exhibit 902-6, and it's at 19 page 122. That page is included in the material in 20 21 the yellow binder, but the full exhibit is 902-6. 22 Now, paragraph 57, my lord, I want to come back to 23 the evidence of the lay witnesses who, in this courtroom, told adaawk or related their kungax, and I 24 25 say there is no issue of credibility here, my lord. 26 It's unnecessary to dispute the plaintiffs' belief 27 in their oral histories, that belief perhaps best 28 stated by Mary McKenzie when she said, "In Gitksan law 29 all adaawks are true". And I say, with respect, but 30 rights to land cannot, and do not, flow from beliefs. 31 I adopt by way of argument, the following extracts from an article by M.I. Finley entitled 32 "Myth, Memory and History" in a publication entitled 33 History in Theory, and you'll find the complete 34 35 article, my lord, in the binder of articles which I 36 won't take you to, but in the grey books. It's the 37 one with the yellow label. 38 THE COURT: I don't have -- oh yes, I have one over there. Yes, 39 all right. 40 MR. PLANT: And it's at tab 4. 41 And I'm going to read from the extracts in the 42 argument starting in the quotation about seven or 43 eight lines down with the sentence that begins, "Now 44 there is the tradition". 45 THE COURT: Yes. 46 MR. PLANT:

Now there is the tradition which shapes a large

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1 part of our lives, perpetuating customs, habits 2 of behaviour, rites, ethical norms and beliefs. 3 There is nothing mysterious about tradition in 4 this sense; it is transmitted from one 5 generation to the next, partly by the ordinary 6 process of living in society, without any 7 conscious effort on anyone's part, partly by 8 men whose function it is to do so: priests, 9 school masters, parents, judges, party leaders, 10 censors, neighbours. There is also nothing 11 reliable about this sort of tradition; that is 12 to say, its explanations and narrations are, as 13 anyone can judge by a minimum of observation, 14 rarely quite accurate, and sometimes altogether 15 false. Reliability is, of course, irrelevant; 16 so long as the tradition is accepted, it 17 works, and it must work if the society is not 18 to fall apart. 19 20 But "tradition" detached from living practices 21 and institutions - a tradition about a war two 22 hundred years back, for example - is not the 23 same thing at all; only a semantic confusion 24 seems to place it in the same category. 25 Wherever tradition can be studied among living 26 people, the evidence is not only that it does 27 not exist apart from a connection with a 28 practice or belief, but also that other kinds 29 of memory, irrelevant memories, so to speak, 30 are short-lived, going back to the third 31 generation, to the grandfather's generation, 32 and, with the rarest of exceptions, no further. 33 This is true even of genealogies, unless they 34 are recorded in writing; it may be taken as a 35 rule that orally transmitted genealogies, 36 unless some very powerful interest intervenes 37 (such as charismatic kingship), are usually 38 fictitious beyond the fourth generation, and 39 often even beyond the third... 40 41 ... Group memory, after all, is no more than the 42 transmittal to many people of the memory of one 43 man or a few men --44 45 That should probably be one woman or man or a few 46 people.

1	repeated many times over; and the act of
2	transmittal, or communication and therefore of
3	preservation of the memory, is not spontaneous
4	and unconscious but deliberate, intended to
5	serve a purpose known to the man who performs
6	it
7	
8	Oral tradition, therefore, is not a tool the
9	historian can count on "in the nature of
10	things". He must always ask Cui bono?
11	_, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
12	That is, who gains? And I
13	MR. GRANT: My lord, I didn't want to interject my friend when
14	he was in the middle of this, but I take it this is
15	not a treatise that has been put into evidence,
16	firstly. And I take it also that these propositions,
17	although extensive cross-examination was made of Dr.
18 19	Daly and Ms. Marsden and other witnesses about the
20	concept of oral tradition, that none of the propositions from this particular treatise was put to
21	them. Am I correct in both those assumptions?
22	MR. PLANT: I don't think this is an exhibit, my lord. My
23	friend misheard me. I said that I am adopting this by
24	way of argument and I'm commending it to you on that
25	basis, my lord, not as something that is a text that
26	is in evidence or that was put to a witness.
27	THE COURT: Yes.
28	MR. PLANT: And from the top of page 29, the about four, five
29	lines down, the objective that is to say, the
30	objective associated with the relation or telling of
31	oral tradition:
32	
33	was an immediate and practical one, whether
34	it was fully conscious or not, and that was
35	the enhancement of prestige or the warranty of
36	power or the justification of an institution.
37	
38	And then Professor Finley goes on to say that
39	there are several conclusions that follow from the
40	observations made. The third of these is this, that:
41	
42	individual elements of the tradition were
43	conflated, modified, and sometime
44	mhat aboutd be the manatiment
45 46	That should be "sometimes"
46 47	invented Family rivalvies conflicts
4 /	invented. Family rivalries, conflicts

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	between communities and regions, changes in power relationships, new values and beliefs - all these historical developments shaped tradition. They had a relatively free hand with what was happening currently, but often they could not afford to ignore traditions they themselves had inherited. Where a vital interest was affected, it was imperative that corrections be made. Even in a world which makes considerable use of writing, this process is not too difficult.
12 13 14 15	And then he gives an example. It says that when at the bottom of that paragraph:
16 17 18 19 20	When tradition is entirely oral, conflation and falsification are childishly simple to bring about. They cannot, indeed, be prevented.
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	THE COURT: What is conflation? MR. PLANT: I beg your pardon? THE COURT: What is conflation? MR. PLANT: I think it's the merging of two or more possibly reconcilable and possibly irreconcilable ideas. My lord, turning over the page, I have an observation here that is not in the written text. Plaintiffs argued that transcript 314, page 23533 of the evidence this was their argument:
30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37	The evidence respecting the adaawk and the kungax of the Wet'suwet'en and the Gitksan chiefs were effectively unchallenged in cross-examination. What they said is not merely their belief, what they said was, "This is true."
38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47	And that's the end of the quote. Well, my submission, my lord, is there are reasons why hearsay evidence is generally admissible. One of these reasons is the difficulty of testing a proposition which, in substance, if not in form, reads, "I was told this by someone else." When such a statement is, by definition, derived from successive repetitions through generations, the cross-examiner has virtually no means of testing the truth of the proposition. His only recourse is to

1 investigate the circumstances of the telling. And I 2 say that if the truth of a statement is inherently not 3 susceptible to cross-examination -- and that is 4 manifestly the case with the adaawk and the oral 5 history of the Wet'suwet'en -- then such a statement 6 ought to be ruled inadmissible. 7 And I say, with respect, that the test of 8 admissibility is not whether oral tradition counts as 9 evidence among the community of scholars who practice 10 history today. The test is whether it amounts to 11 evidence at law. The oral history offered in this 12 case, the adaawk and the kungax, do not meet the twin 13 requirements of necessity and trustworthiness. It 14 cannot be admissible. 15 THE COURT: Is there room for such evidence, in your submission, 16 when it's used by others such as Ms. Albright, or is 17 she notionally deemed to have excluded it, if I find 18 that I should exclude it? Or put it another way, can 19 I exclude it from your argument but still use it to 20 the extent -- still rely upon it to the extent that 21 she relied upon it? 22 MR. PLANT: If the oral tradition is inadmissible, then that 23 part of the body of evidence which was before your 24 lordship which is the oral tradition itself, is excluded. So that then takes you to the question of 25 26 what do you do with the experts who relied on it? And 27 I say that any opinion expressed on the basis of 28 inadmissible evidence is itself inadmissible. That 29 won't rule out the evidence of people such as Ms. 30 Albright altogether because, of course, Ms. Albright 31 did actual field work and is -- she is entitled to report on the results of that field work. So that the 32 33 overall effect -- or it's -- the overall effect of Ms. 34 Albright's opinion is going to be a matter of weight. 35 But I say that you can't go to Ms. Albright's 36 report and find any independent validity for the oral 37 tradition. I mean there is the exercise of 38 corroboration which is what Ms. Albright was seeking 39 to do, what the Gottesfeld and Dr. Mathewes attempted 40 to do. And I'm going to be dealing with that in the 41 next part of my submission, under the heading of 42 weight -- "Considerations going to weight". But I say 43 that if you find that the oral history is inadmissible 44 for the reasons that I've argued, then that 45 consequence carries on right through into the expert 46 opinion reports.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. PLANT: And I might say, my lord, in this context, that while it's not referred to in the submissions, the recent Supreme Court of Canada judgment in the Lavallee case, and by recent I mean the same day as the Horseman judgment, may have a bearing on this, particularly, the judgment of Mr. Justice Sopinka. I'll get my hands on that and speak further on that. THE COURT: Yes. MR. PLANT: The next heading, however, is the heading "Considerations going to weight". And I state the obvious, that a basic principle is that the court should always be given the best evidence. Thus, even if oral history of events alleged to have occurred prior to first contact is to be ruled inadmissible, even for the period after contact when

documentary evidence does exist, the oral record must be heavily discounted in favour of the written record, where that written record exists.

If oral histories are admissible as prima facie proof of the truth of their contents then there are a number of points which I say must be considered when

assessing the weight to be accorded to them. I submit that little or no weight can be accorded to oral histories of events allegedly taking place more than a hundred years prior to the relating of the event. Even then, the oral histories should only be prima facie proof when corroborated by other admissible evidence.

Now, the first proposition is that an oral history may be accorded no weight even if Your Lordship finds that the informant or the witness honestly believed in its veracity. And that much is made clear by Dr. Catherine McLellan in an article that is entitled Indian Stories About The First Whites In Northwestern America, and is Exhibit 902-7, and the relevant extract is in the yellow book, but the quote here is sufficient for my purposes:

We are all familiar with attempts to generalize about categories of oral literature. Bascom, for example, has suggested that two major kinds of prose narrative are myths, which focus on the activities of non-human beings in an earlier or other world, and legends, which tell of recent human exploits in a world like that of today. Both kinds of narrative are thought to be true, unlike the third category:

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Submissions by Mr. Plant

1 folktales, which are pure fiction deliberately 2 devised for entertainment. 3 4 Dr. McLellan goes on to say: 5 6 Different narrators may classify the same story 7 in different ways...While their decisions 8 certainly involve more than temporal 9 considerations, the point for us is that the 10 ethnohistorian must not expect the Indians to 11 handle time in the same way that historians do. 12 13 None of the Indians, however, should ever face 14 the dilemma of the western historiographer in 15 deciding what is fact and what is fiction in 16 their oral literature. In theory, at least, no 17 deliberately fictitious stories are ever told. 18 19 Now, Dr. Daly has said in his evidence that there 20 are myths and legends in Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en oral 21 tradition. 22 Two points I say arise from Dr. McLellan's 23 observations. The first, is that when reviewing an oral history "You shouldn't impose the western 24 25 historiographer's perspective on the teller of the 26 story...however the western historiographer's 27 perspective is important for western civilization's 28 attempts to date the history". And that's a quote 29 from Dr. Daly's evidence. 30 Second, the fact that the events recounted in an 31 oral history are inherently implausible or incredible does not necessarily detract from the informant's 32 33 belief that the events set out in the oral history are 34 true. To this extent, at least, the fact that an 35 informant or a witness at trial believed the oral 36 history to be true is irrelevant for the purpose of 37 assessing the oral history's weight as evidence. This 38 is because oral histories generally are not factual 39 narratives, nor are they intended to be factual 40 narratives. They are myths and legends as we 41 understand myths and legends. 42 Now, in paragraph 66 I refer to the discipline 43 known as ethnohistory, and say that whether 44 ethnohistorians are anthropologists or historians is

really irrelevant. I don't think your lordship will

get any assistance from Exhibit 1051-2 on that

proposition. But I say that since the test for

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	veracity of ethnohistory in a court of law must be at least as rigorous as the test for its veracity in the academic disciplines concerned with it, whatever you call that discipline. THE COURT: What is 1051-2? MR. PLANT: It is the report or paper by Julie Cruikshank which is a critical bibliography concerning oral
8 9	tradition. I think I will be making some reference to that.
10 11 12 13 14	THE COURT: Oh yes. All right. MR. PLANT: So really, paragraph 66 is argument. I don't point to any authority here for it. Paragraph 67, we have Drs. Bishop and Ray, who say that:
15 16 17 18 19	Even when employed carefully, memory ethnography can only provide totally accurate information for relatively short time spans, usually one hundred years at the very most.
20 21 22 23 24 25 26	That's where the 100 year time limit that I've urged upon your lordship comes from. Now, there is a fairly extensive quote here from Dr. Trigger, Bruce Trigger, and this is from Exhibit 888. I'll just read the first couple of sentences and the last sentence:
27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35	The use of oral traditions to understand historical events requires a detailed understanding of their derivation and a critical comparison of alternative versions of the same story. While oral traditions may provide a valuable record of former beliefs and values, caution is needed in interpreting that sort of information historically.
36 37	And carrying on down to the bottom of the page:
38 39 40 41 42	In general, some kind of independent verification is required before such traditions can be accepted as accurate historical accounts.
43 44 45 46 47	My lord, I say that the extracts from the plaintiffs' evidence cited in the two preceding paragraphs should not be taken to represent a universal academic acceptance that oral histories are entitled to any weight, as history, at all. In fact,

1	the debate in the anthropological and historical
2	disciplines as to the value of oral history continues.
3	And here I will not ask your lordship I won't take
4	
	your lordship to it now, but this is where the
5	reference to Dr. Cruikshank's bibliography comes into
6	
	play.
7	And I say even those scholars who accept the
8	value of oral histories agree that the recounting of
9	events of more than 100 years ago is extremely
10	problematic and independent verification is required
11	
	before the contents of an oral history can be accepted
12	as objective "truth", again, as history. This is
13	because, as Dr. Daly admitted:
	bedabe, as br. bar, admireda.
14	
15	where oral histories refer to the distant
16	past, they must be handled with a good degree
17	of reserve, for experience shows that the
18	historical and mythical merge inextricably
19	
	beyond a certain point
20	
21	And I should pause here. This is really a
	<u>-</u>
22	question posed in cross-examination. The question was
23	put this way:
24	÷
	3
25	oral traditions frequently reflect
25	
25 26	contemporary social and political conditions as
25 26 27	
25 26	contemporary social and political conditions as
25 26 27 28	contemporary social and political conditions as much as they do historical reality.
25 26 27 28 29	contemporary social and political conditions as much as they do historical reality. Dr. Daly's answer was, "Some do."
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1	THE	COURT: It's in this tab?	
2	MR.	GRANT: Yes.	
3	THE	COURT: All right. Thank you.	
4		All right, 9:30 tomorrow, please.	
5	THE	REGISTRAR: Order in court. Court stands adjourned un	ntil
6		9:30 tomorrow morning.	
7			
8		(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 4:30 P.M.)	
9		(,	
10		I hereby certify the foregoing	ina to
11		be a true and accurate trans	
12		of the proceedings transcrib	
13		the best of my skill and abi	
14		<u></u>	1
15			
16			
17			
18			
19		Toni Kerekes,	
20		Official Reporter,	
21		UNITED REPORTING SERVICE LTI).
22		ONTINE TOPOTOR BEI	•
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