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Sup

Riku Man Mitsu /Army Manchuria Secret/

Master Diary

(13th year /of Show / No. 7).

321, Intendence Section. Transfer of Secret Funds from the Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account
 13.4.13 /13 April 13th year of SHOWA/ 13th year /of SHOWA/
 / c.g. 13 April 1938 / Man Mitsu /Manchuria Secret/

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/Stamp/ War Dept. 13.4.5 /5 April 13th year of SHOWA/
 Intendence Section 5 April, 1938

How long /document/ is to be presented 10 years	Routing to Parliamentary Vice-Minister and Parlia- mentary Councillor.		Before or after decision	Names of sections concerned <u>Military Affairs</u> /seal/		Names of section to which routed after action taken (or decision made)
	Receipt No. /	Received by War Dept.	Riku Man Mitsu Ju /Army Manchuria Secret Receipt/ No. 413	Name of originating bureau (section)	Intendence Section	
Decision route delegated to Vice Minister	Subject: Transfer of Secret Funds from Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account					
	/Var/ Minister	Parliamentary Vice-Minister	Parliamentary Councillor	Secretary		Working draft writer
Execution route delegated /seal/ <u>KUSHIBUCHI</u>	Minister delegated	Vice Minister <u>YAMAZU</u> /seal/	Senior adjutant <u>KUSHIBUCHI</u> /seal/	Competent Adjutant <u>KASHIMADA</u> /Seal/ Indendence officer for secretariat <u>ITO</u> /seal/ Member of Competent Section <u>IKENAGA</u> /seal/		<u>TONAI</u> /seal/
		Acting Chief of Competent Bureau <u>KURIHASHI</u> /seal/	Chief of Competent Section <u>KURIHASHI</u> /seal/			
Competent Bureau and Section	No. Received:	Ku Mitsu /secret account/ No. 37	/Bureau and Section/ Concerned	Chief of Bureau <u>/seal/</u>		Chief of Section Acting <u>MISHIURA</u> /seal/
	Presented:					
Minister's secretariat	Received:	5 April	Routing sub- sequent to action(decision)	Chief of Bureau		Chief of Section
	Finished:	12 April				

Draft of Notification to the Chief of the Extraordinary Army Intendence Section in Tokyo
"Riku Man Mitsu" /Military Manchuria Secret/.

Secret funds from the Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account shall be transferred upon
disbursement as follows:-

Items:

To TOJO, Hideki, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army : ¥ 700,000.

To KITANO, Kenzo, the Chief of Staff of the Chosen Army: ¥ 20,000.

To UMEZU, Yoshijiro, Vice-Minister of War: ¥ 77,800

Riku Man Mitsu No. 134.
/Army Manchuria Secret/

6 April Showa 13 /1938/

SUGATA /seal/

KASHIMA /seal/

PERIOD OF PRESERVATION	DIRECTED TO THE DECISION	DIRECTION TO EXECUTE
10 Years	Vice-Minister	Reviewed

2211

REC'D NO.	WAR MINISTRY RECEIVED RIKUMANMITSU Rec'd No. 1468	Name of Source (Section) of Origin	THE ACCOUNT SECTION
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NAME OF
SUBJECT

re Delivery of Secret Service Funds of the
Manchurian Incident Expenses

MINISTER	PARLIA- MENTARY VICE- MINISTER	PARLIA- MENTARY COUNCILLOR	SECRETARY	
Entrusted	VICE- MINISTER (KOISO)	SENIOR ADMINIS- TRATIVE STAFF (KAWAMURA)	ADMINISTRA- TIVE STAFF IN CHARGE	
	BUREAU DIRECTOR IN CHARGE (KURIHASHI) (Substi- tuted)	SECTION CHIEF IN CHARGE (KURIHASHI)	STAFF OF SECTION IN CHARGE (KIMURA)	

BUREAU SECTION IN CHARGE	NO.	RIKUMANMITSU NO. 38	RELATED	BUREAU DIRECTOR (MURAYAMA)	SECTION CHIEF (MURAYAMA)
	DATE REC'D	—			
	DATE SUBMIT- TED	—			
SECRE- TARIATE OF MINISTRY	REC'D	August 2			
	FIN- ISHED WITH	August 12			

APPROVED
BY:

NAME OF RELATED SECTION

War Affairs

Forwarded to Parliamentary
Vice-Minister and Councillor.WAR MINISTRY
August 11, 1932
ACCOUNT SECTION

8/11/32 ✓

The Draft of Announcement to the
Chief of the Accounts Section in
the Intendence Department.

(Secret)

(Hannitsu)

Deliver Secret Service Funds as follows from the
Manchurian Affairs Expenses.

Y85,000 to TORANOSUKE HASHIMOTO, the Chief of Staff
to the Kwantung Army.

Y5,000 to KADOYA KIKUCHI, the Chief of Staff to the
Japanese Army in China.

Y20,000 to TOMOO KODAMA, the Chief of Staff to the
Army in Chosen.

Y10,000 to JINZABURO IIAZAKI, the Assistant Chief of
General Staff.

Y18,500 to KUNIAKI KOISO, the Vice-Minister of War.

Y1,000 to YOSHISHIGE SHIMIZU, the Chief of Staff to the
Army in Taiwan.

Y1,500 to SHINJI HATA, the Provost Marshal General.

Y5,000 to TAKENOSUKE OGINE, the Chief of the Military
Police despatched to Shanghai.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.

I.P.S. No. 2907

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kanec Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Non-regular of the Archives and Documents Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated Aug. 2, 1932, and described as follows: Matter Concerning the Granting of Secret Service Funds for the Manchurian Incident. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
13th day of Jan, 1947.

/s/ Kanec Ishibashi Seal
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Shinuji Kobayashi

Non-regular of the Archives
and Documents Section of the
1st Demobilization Bureau
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2nd Lt. Eric W. Fleisher O-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
13th day of Jan., 1947

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt, AUSMI
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis
2d Lt. M.I.

Investigator, I.P.S.
Official Capacity

128

9/5

Tokyo, 8 May. - Domei Radio presents an ITAGAKI-KOISO interview.

War Minister ITAGAKI declared it to be a welcome fact that Germany and Italy had bound themselves through their military alliance still more firmly to the maintenance of peace in their joint efforts to build up a New Order in Europe. Itagaki ascribed the confusion of the European situation to the lack of equilibrium between old and new rising Powers. Asked whether the possibility existed that Japan might enter the Italo-German Military Alliance, Itagaki declared that the spirit which animated the conclusion of the Tri-lateral Anti-Pact was very deeply rooted and in case for that reason Germany and Italy wanted it it was not impossible that Japan might conclude a military alliance with the Axis Powers.

(continuation on page 2)

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/Printed on top of page 2/ Raw Material - For personal information only -
Without editorial guarantees.

No. 128

2 May 1939

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Page 2

(continuation from page) Minister of Colonies KOISO stated that apparently negotiations directed toward the conclusion of a military alliance among the three Axis powers were being conducted. As a private observation Koiso stated: "Whether such negotiations lead to the goal or not depends entirely upon whether Germany and Italy understand Japan's point of view and power in East Asia as well as their own position in Europe." He stated further that it would be suitable for Japan to cooperate with Germany and Italy in the execution of her policies, while it would not only not be suitable but downright dangerous for Germany and Italy to attempt to carry out their policies vis-a-vis the encirclement measures of their opponents without the closest cooperation with Japan, the strongest power in East Asia. The difficulties are constantly causing the lack of mutual understanding, explained Koiso further. Therefore it lay in Japan's interest, as well as Italy's and Germany's for Germany and Italy to understand not only their own position but also that of Japan and her point of view in the Far East. Nearly all Japanese had more knowledge of Germany and German affairs than the Germans of Japan and Japanese affairs. Japan was convinced, ^{Writa /T.N.: sic; error for Koiso?} emphasized, of the "necessity of further strengthening of the Anti-Pact" in view of Japan's earlier experiences and present position in order to be able to face the international situation from "Japan's own standpoint." As for the

Roosevelt Message, Arita declared that this was a dual-purpose action, namely, first as a domestic political gesture and second as a measure to inflame world public against Germany and Italy. Finally having been directed to the China conflict, Arita emphasized that Japan's historic and racial mission lay in the establishment of a New Order in East Asia in closest cooperation with China and Manchoukuo, although third powers were trying to bring into discredit Japan's military actions in China.

(DNB Representative)

135927

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

Office of Military
Government for Germany (U. S.)

EXTRACTS FROM MINUTES (SHORTHAND OF SECOND JOINT
CONFERENCE OF SECTIONS I, II, III and IV of the
COMMITTEE OF ACCOUNTS of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
75th SESSION of the IMPERIAL DIET on MARCH 17th 1940.

(taken from
MINUTES OF COMMITTEE MEETINGS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 75th IMPERIAL DIET SESSION,
ACCOUNTS, PETITIONS, PROPOSALS
OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER,
NAGATA-CHO, KOJIMACHI-KU, TOKYO CITY.)

COMMITTEE-MAN FUKUDA:--/T.N. in part/

For instance, as regards DAVAO in the PHILIPPINES, the population has not decreased so much although approximately over 35 years have elapsed till the present day. Business is reported as flourishing, and the people here are presently engaged in the cultivation of hemp. Moreover it is said that fertilizer has never been used for the past thirty years. For instance, in the LAKE TONDANO /PHONETIC/ region in CELEBES, where rice has been harvested three times annually for more than ten years, it is said that fertilizer, if used even for once, would spoil everything. There are such places as these which are indeed inconceivable from the agricultural viewpoint of the Japanese. Then, how about going ahead and seizing these places? Of course, we cannot do so; nevertheless, the development of the SOUTHERN REGIONS will not necessarily be an impossibility, if we shall be prepared to suffer such hardships as in dealing with MANCHURIA or RUSSIA, or if we possess an equal amount of determination, effort and financial power as required in overcoming the difficulties of the NORTH CHINA Incident. Such being the case, we believe that JAPAN will be confronted with considerable difficulties unless the MINISTER OF STATE /T.N. KOISO/ will carry out a drastic reform in our future national policy in such a way as to make some two-fold policy,--one phase being for defence, and the other for advance. Now, as for TAIWAN /T.N. FORMOSA/ or the SOUTH SEA ISLANDS GOVERNMENT OFFICE, /T.N. "NANYU-CHO"/ they were able to become independent shortly after its occupation or its inauguration of government. As regards CHOSŌN and MANCHURIA -- though MANCHURIA is an independent nation, JAPAN is at present obliged to defray enormous sum of money in accordance with armament and other agreements. This may possibly last for scores of years to come. CHOSŌN, was the first to be annexed to JAPAN, but she is still unable to become independent, and enormous subsidies have to be granted to her. Such are the conditions even in so nice a place like CHOSŌN. I wish to state that it is all the more unnatural to send farmers -- constituting JAPAN's higher-class labours -- to NORTH MANCHURIA where even coolies and KOREANS are unable to go. The policy that they must

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be sent over is all very fine, but, as this unnaturalness is very hard to overcome, I wish you will kindly give your consideration to this point. Our future national policy should be such that we shall have to endure perseverance no matter what difficulties it may lead us to, just as we have in continuing many years of devotion after having initiated the so-called Sino-Japanese Incident of today. Therefore, if we have that determination to go through hardships, we shall find a real treasure chest in the Southern Pacific, where deposits of coal, gold, silver, iron and petroleum will probably amount to 200 times more than those found in the 400 or so provinces in China. If JAPAN will be in possession of such resources, she shall no longer have to suffer from her present plight of being unable to wage a war as she would like just because of the scarcity of resources. Therefore, we must, for the sake of establishing the national policy of the State, have a change made, at this juncture, in the principles of the traditional national policy of the past. We are extremely pleased at the fact that Minister of State KOISO has, at Cabinet meetings and the like, expressed his opinion several times fairly strongly in that line, or dwelled upon the policy in that line. So, although things may not go so easily as I say -- although it would be splendid if they did -- things will be difficult. Nevertheless, even if we are to sacrifice a great deal of our national power, what will follow shall not be comparable to the results of the efforts in MANCHURIA or CHINA."

This is what we have been thinking about. If peace is restored now, it is needless to say that Japan will suffer from over-population. As you have just mentioned, most of our farmers have only five tans of land /T.W. approximately 1.2 acres/. As they own only that much of land, -- let us say five children are born to a farmer, -- four of them, either male or female, must leave the family to get jobs outside, according to the family system among the farming class. The eldest son is left to take over while the rest must be abandoned as unnecessary. The Japanese nation is unable to make a living. This is the phenomenon among the farming class of present day Japan. This fact alone, I believe, will make you realize that we shall suffer from over-population when peace is restored. What should we do about it? It is quite clear that we shall feed on each other and fall together if we stick to the five Tan farming. We must establish a great national policy right now. Herein, lies the basis for our discussion. Therefore, we have been trying to send people over to Manchuria -- we have heard about your ideals of sending 200,000 or 1,000,000 families over there -- but its realization has been very difficult. Much money is spent with no results. Moreover, people are not interested in going inspite of our encouragement to go. I would like to inform you that unless you take into consideration, when establishing our national policy, some places where people will by all means go even if they are told not to go, rather than places where people will go and return, the great task of reviving Japan, of constructing

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Japan will never be accomplished. In this respect, the military, so far, has been concentrating too much upon the North. I wonder if this is not slightly mistaken? When I say mistaken, I mean mistaken as Japan's national policy. I do not know what you would say from the viewpoint of national defence, but this is, I think, a little mistaken when we consider the great task of truly reviving Japan, of constructing Japan. Therefore, our policy must be to advance both to the North and to the South, putting great efforts in our Southern advance. We must establish policies which will enable us to overcome the difficulties involved in this task -----.

Chairman AOKI: "Mr. FUKUDA, please state the gist of your opinion as we have no more time."

Committeeman FUKUDA: "I hope the State Minister will study further into that direction --

We have become members of the Accounts Committee, and have studied the Ministry for Overseas Affairs' enormous budget for the coming year. As it will be difficult to get any results if you put your efforts to things that will not possibly have any effect, we shall have to take a neutral stand on this point; and I believe I shall have to ask you to put your efforts on the true attainment of an object, even in the execution of this budget. As regards such matters, however, I believe the Ministry for Overseas Affairs has great understanding as to the South; and great efforts have been afforded both the Formosan and the South Seas Governments from which we expect developments in economics and various other fields. Have you any opinion in this line?

We shall be most obliged if the Minister for Overseas Affairs would inform us with his opinions regarding these national policies.

Minister of State KOISO:-

"I fully agree with Mr. FUKUDA's remarks regarding the construction of both the NORTH and the SOUTH. The OVERSEA AFFAIRS Ministry is also advocating the idea of constructing both the NORTH and the SOUTH. There is, however, a slight difference in views in regard to the path to be followed and its substance. I shall give you very roughly the important points of the opinions of the OVERSEA AFFAIRS Ministry which will carry out the idea of constructing both the NORTH and the SOUTH. As towards the CONTINENT, we must enforce the movement of population, which must naturally be accompanied by economic development, and as towards the SOUTH, we must enforce economic

expansion, which must by all means be accompanied by the movement of population. This is our way of thinking. Therefore, as regards CONTINENTAL Expansion, we consider movement of population as of primary importance, and economic expansion of secondary importance; whereas, as for SOUTHERN Expansion, we consider economic expansion as of primary importance and the movement of population of secondary importance. This is the idea on which we are proceeding along. Please note, therefore, that as regards the idea of constructing both the NORTH and the SOUTH, we are entirely of the same opinion with Mr. FUKUDA."

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 2954Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO, Tomi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Cabinet

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _____ pages, dated _____, 19____, and described as follows: Minutes of the Accounts Committee of the House of Representatives. 75th Diet

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat

Signed at Tokyo on this
3rd day of Jan., 1947

/s/ T. Satow
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis
2nd Lt. M.I.

Secretary of the Cabinet
Official Capacity

SEAL

Statement of Official Procurement

I, J. A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
3rd day of Jan., 1947

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2nd. Lt. MI

Witness: _____

Investigator IPS
Official Capacity

Berlin, 28 May 1939

Diplogerna Tokyo

No. 174

Telegram in cipher
(Secret Cipher Processing)

Exclusively for the Ambassador personally.
Re your telegrams No. 213 and 217.

1. The formal communication made to you 20 May at the request of War Minister, General Hajiri, that the Foreign Minister there would have us informed at the latest on Sunday, 21 May of the positive new decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conference has proved to be without effect. The local Japanese Embassy has up to today not been in a position to make any official communication at all regarding the state of affairs.
2. Oshima reported the following in yesterday's strictly confidential and unofficial conversation: He has received a telegram from Arita, according to which the Japanese Government wishes to reserve entrance into a state of war in case of European conflict. In a very energetic telegram to Arita Oshima has refused to pass this point of view on to the German Government at all. Thereupon the War Minister requested Oshima by wire to hold off until later against Arita in order not to disturb the discussions among the various factors in Tokyo. The Army is firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly and even at risk of a cabinet overthrow.
3. I request you without making use of the aforementioned confidential communications of Oshima's to make it clear to your authorities that the absence of the communication formally announced to you as well as of every other communication has produced great astonishment in us and in the Italians. It is unavoidable that as a result of this silence the Japanese attitude is now beginning to be regarded with distrust. We can no longer understand here what can be going on in Tokyo and for what reasons the Japanese Government at this advanced stage of the negotiations is still evading a clear-cut attitude. Our local skepticism is of course still further heightened by the attitude of the Japanese delegation at the World Postal Congress in Buenos Aires.

G.F.M.

/German Foreign Minister/

/Frame Nos. 135951-2./

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Advisor on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.
2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.
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5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Rome, 2 September 1939

Tel. Enciphered 2232
Secret Cipher Process (good)

FOREIGN BERLIN

Quite secret

No. 404 of 2 September

For German Foreign Minister

Japanese Ambassador visited me today to inform me that he had now received his expected recall. Expects to depart in about three weeks would particularly welcome /opportunity/ to have detailed talk with German Foreign Minister on homeward trip which he may take via Moscow. He seemed to be of the opinion that with a new Japanese Cabinet there was a well-founded chance for successful continuation of the stalled further rapprochement with the Axis Powers. For this very purpose of being able personally to work more effectively than was possible from Rome he was going to Tokyo. Ambassador mentioned further that opinion was growing in Japan for a certain settlement with Russia which, if carried through in stages and via economic conversations, might eventuate in a non-aggression pact. Question was for us, too, of considerable significance, for a Japan freed from a Russian threat was in a position to reduce a possible tendency of the United States to intervene in Europe. Ambassador remarked finally that the ill feeling against us after conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact had improved considerably with the Cabinet change.

Sig. Mackensen

/Frane No. 302389/

W.H.Kr.

Rome, 4 September 1939

Secret!Note

After previous appointment by telephone I visited the local Japanese Ambassador today. After Mr. Shiratori, referring to his conversation with the Ambassador on 2 September, had told me why he wished to speak to me, he stated in the course of the conversation -- which lasted a good half hour -- approximately the following:

As is known to me, the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Agression Pact came as a severe blow and made a great sensation in Japan. The friends of Germany had since then been laboring to counteract this effect. He himself, who belongs to this circle, had been trying ever so long to induce the Japanese Government to conclude an alliance with us (and presumably also with Italy). This was the aim of his office here. Since this aim was not attained, he requested recall and was now returning to Japan, for he believes he can be of more use in the aforesaid direction there than here.

VG | Mr. Shiratori went on to say /these words crossed through in original/ the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop proposed to him during his (Shiratori's) presence in Berlin on the occasion of the Fuehrer's birthday that Japan should enter into a closer alliance relationship with Germany. He sent this proposal on to Tokyo at the time without, however, receiving a reply from there. When he again saw the German Foreign Minister 16 June, the latter told him Germany would now conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia, since Japan had not agreed to our proposals. He reported this to Tokyo, too. The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, who as a military man understands naught of these matters, reported to Japan at the time that it was out of the question that Germany would conclude a pact with Russia. The Tokyo Government believed the German Foreign Minister /von Ribbentrop crossed through/ had only "bluffed". It had also spread this around Tokyo with the addition that he (Shiratori) and Oshima had been led around by the nose. Two months had passed without Tokyo's answering him (Shiratori) and finally we had concluded the pact with Russia. Thereupon the Japanese Government had resigned and he had put in four times for recall until it was finally accepted.

As for the supposed Japanese protest against the German-Russian Non-Agression Pact, Mr. Shiratori told me Oshima had doubtless received instructions to protest. He (Shiratori)

had been informed thereof at the same time. He had then got in touch with the Japanese Embassy in Berlin by telephone in order to stop the protest action if possible. Some official -- the embassy counselor, if I am not mistaken -- told him that Oshima had already gone to the Foreign Office. State Secretary von Weizsacker did not accept the protest there. On his return to the Embassy Oshima found the news of his (Shiratori's) telephone call and then reported to Tokyo that he considered a protest inopportune. In spite of this he received instructions from Tokyo to carry out the step. This has, however, not yet taken place.

Concerning the present state of Japanese-Russian relations (here I come to the most important part of the conversation) Mr. Shiratori informed me the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow had received instructions a few days ago to make the following proposals to the Russian Government:

1. To settle by diplomatic means the dispute on the border between Mongolia and Manchoukuo, where for a considerable time a regular battle has been in progress;
2. To appoint a commission for the settlement of the border problems there in general;
3. To conclude a trade treaty. If in the course of the discussions of the trade treaty Russia should make known her desire to conclude a non-aggression pact with Japan, Ambassador Togo should enquire first whether Russia were disposed to deny help to Chang Kai Chek.

He (Shiratori) does not consider these instructions to the Ambassador in Moscow fortunate, even /deems them/ dangerous. Russia, indeed, had never of her own accord proposed a non-aggression pact. The proposal for the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, too, had originated with us. In his opinion, the only way to secure a non-aggression pact with Russia -- which he also considered highly desirable -- was with Germany's mediation. He had therefore proposed to General Oshima, on his own, without instructions from Tokyo, to request Germany's good offices. All this had taken place a few days earlier. General Oshima had not yet been able to see the German Foreign Minister, since he /GFM/ had had no time to receive him before his departure for the front where he had gone with the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer had received General Oshima before his departure, but that was only a matter of a very short visit during which the Fuehrer declared Germany wished to maintain the old, friendly relations with Japan, but during which Oshima had no opportunity

to broach the question of German mediation between Japan and Russia. He (Oshima) wished to attempt to speak to the German Foreign Minister after his return to Berlin.

Regarding these latest developments Berlin was not yet officially informed. He (Shiratori) wanted to keep us au courant here and considered it appropriate that we inform Berlin.

To a remark from me that he had, so far as I understood it, the wish to speak to the German Foreign Minister on his return trip to Japan Mr. Shiratori replied that his travel plans were not yet definite. He would presumably return to Japan via Scandinavia and America and would of course be happy to talk to the German Foreign Minister in case the latter wished it. I got the impression that Mr. Shiratori did not wish to ask for a conference on his own initiative, so to speak, probably out of regard for General Oshima. He expressed the view that the latter was to be found in Berlin.

VG | In the course of the conversation Ambassador Shiratori mentioned that in connection with the Anti-Comintern Pact a secret accord was concluded between Germany and Japan to the effect that the two countries were not to conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia. The whole situation had since then completely altered through the developments in Europe and no one could demand from any country that it commit suicide for a treaty's sake. At the time in question Russia appeared the chief enemy to us as well as to Japan. For both countries, however, (as a further development after the Tientsin Incident) England had now become the chief enemy, who absolutely has to be beaten. The advantage, to us also, of a cleansing or an amelioration of Russian-Japanese relations was self-evident, for America would in this case decide with much greater difficulty to intervene in the present conflict. The goal of Japanese policy in China remains, now as then, the establishing of a new order there, with which was linked the expulsion of England from China. In order to attain this goal Japan was hoping for financial help from America.

We then came to speak of the present conflict. Mr. Shiratori believed that after the overpowering of Poland the opportunity of an understanding with France and England might present itself. Germany and Italy were not at present in a position, and France and England were not disposed, to wage a war on a truly large scale. If it should come to a general conflict into which Italy, the United States, Russia and Japan would then necessarily be drawn, it would simply be a catastrophe whose extent could not be conceived.

In reply to a question of Mr. Shiratori's as to Italy's attitude, I strongly emphasized that Italy was proceeding in closest accord with us and that her attitude corresponded to our intentions in every respect.

/sig./ Plessen

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody, and control of original or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That IPS Document No. 4095, consisting of sixteen photostatic pages, was received by the International Prosecution Section from the Office of the Chief of Counsel of the Nurenburg War Crimes Trials.

/s/ Arthur A. Sandusky
ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY

Tokyo, 31 December 1946.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.)

- against -)

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.)

2244
A F F I D A V I T.

1/24/47

I, Shinichi TANAKA, make oath and say as follows:

Q Were you once Chief of the First Section (Operations) of the General Staff of the Japanese Imperial Army?

A Yes, I was such from October 12, 1940 to December, 1942.

Q What was your rank when you assumed office for the first time?

A I was Major General but was promoted to Lieutenant General in October, 1941.

Q Do you know the defendant Akira MUTO?

A Yes. When I was Chief of the First Section (Operations) under General SUGIYAMA, General MUTO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. He was one of the liaison men who did most of the work between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff

Q As liaison man what was the nature of his work?

A At the General Staff office the work was mostly paper work concerning mobilization, organization, operations, strategy and tactics. The Army General Staff had nothing to do with matters involving politics, foreign relations and finance.

Q In the decision to undertake operations on Indo-China in 1941, what had the War Ministry to do with that decision?

A In matters like that, military policies go to the General Staff from the War Ministry, but it does not mean that the War Ministry makes the decision. First of all the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of Navy and the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of the Navy General Staff, hold a preliminary meeting and arrive at a decision of national policies. The decision of the Cabinet is handed down to the War Ministry which in turn contacts the General Staff on matters which concern the General Staff such as military operations.

Q Who is sent down to the Army General Staff from the War Ministry in order to convey the policy laid down or the decision made?

A In such important matters as the national policy regarding Indo-China, the War Minister would go directly to the Chief of Staff, but in minor details the War Minister approaches the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and he in turn will make connections with the General Staff.

Q Who would follow up the order or the decision arrived at at the conference which is handed down to the War Minister and which is passed on to the General Staff?

A The Chief of the General Staff will carry out that part of national policy as far as operations are concerned. The Chief of General Staff integrates the national policy into operations and strategy.

Q In what way does he carry out the order?

A The Chief of the General Staff had been already included in the preliminary meeting so he knows in general the over-all policies and operations. For this reason, it is easier for him to integrate the policies into the operations. After he comes back to the General Staff office, he calls in the Vice Chief of Staff and the four main assistants and he requests the various assistants, after revealing his plans and policies, to bring in various details to conform to his plans. After such materials are gathered the Chief of General Staff gives out the order for the actual carrying out of the operation.

Q Your section is in charge of operations and strategy?

A Yes.

Q As the Chief of the General Staff attends the conference that makes the decision why is the need for the War Minister to go over to the Chief of Staff and hand him the orders?

A The decisions arrived at the preliminary meetings must be approved by the Cabinet in order to make them legal and binding. Since the Chief of General Staff does not know the decision of the Cabinet, the War Minister contacts the Chief of General Staff.

Q Once you have prepared the plans for operation, to whom do you submit them?

A After the operational plans are completed, they are presented to the Vice Chief of Staff. He makes the necessary correction and in turn delivers them to the Chief of the General Staff.

Q Once it is received by him, what does the Chief of the General Staff do about it?

A He makes the necessary corrections and important matters are discussed with the War Minister. It is shown to the War Ministry and if approved the Chief of the General Staff will give out the orders and if they are important orders, they are first shown to the War Minister, who will sign it if he approves.

7/2/41
13 Q Following the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 do you recall if you were directed by General SUGIYAMA to make operational study on a campaign against Malaya, Java, Borneo, Bismarck, Dutch East Indies and Philippines?

A Yes.

9/6/41 Q Following the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941 do you remember if you were directed by General SUGIYAMA to begin preparations for operations against those countries?

A Yes, I was ordered to do so following the Imperial conference which was attended by KONOYE, TOJO, OIKAWA, SUGIYAMA, TOYODA and NAGANO.

Q Can you tell us if Generals TOJO, KIMURA and MUTO had knowledge of these instructions by General SUGIYAMA to you in September 1941?

A Yes, for by the very nature of the rules and practices governing the relationship between the War Ministry, and the General Staff at the time, Generals TOJO, KIMURA and MUTO had to know and did know of those instructions. As I stated before, the paper work for the preparation of the operation is done by the General Staff, however, the actual preparation such as supply and strength, etc., was carried on by the War Ministry. Since General MUTO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau

of the War Ministry explanations for the preparation of the operation had to be made to him by the General Staff. He was well informed, especially on supply and money matters.

Q Was it the duty of the General Staff to alert the field commanders about the imminence of hostilities?

A If necessary, the field commanders were alerted by the General Staff. It wasn't the duty of my Section, it was more the duty of the Intelligence Section.

12/1/41 Q Following the Imperial Conference on 1 December 1941 were you directed on the next day by General SUGIYAMA to draft an alert order to all commanding generals of troops in the South Seas Areas that war with the United States, England and Holland was imminent and warning them that hostilities should commence on X-Day?

A I was directed by General SUGIYAMA to write the order to the field commanders in the South Seas so that in case war should break out they would be ready. Actually, SUGIYAMA issued the order because his signature was necessary to make the order valid and effective; but before the order could be wired to the various commanders in the South Pacific it also had to have the signatures of approval of Generals TOJO, KIMURA and MUTO in their respective capacities as War Minister, Vice Minister of War and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. It was the customary rule in our office to obtain the signatures of the War Minister, the Vice War Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs on those important orders before they could be sent out.

Q When were you so directed?

12/1/41 }
12/2/41 } A I am not sure, thought I think it was December 2nd or 1st when I was directed by General SUGIYAMA to write and issue the order in his name.

Q Was the alert order sent by wire to the commanding generals of all troops of the South Seas areas?

A Yes, they were sent that day after it had been signed by General SUGIYAMA.

Q Did General SUGIYAMA tell you what day was X-Day?

50nd
12/8 A Yes, about 27th or 28th November 1941 he told me that X-Day would be December 8, 1941.

/s/ Shinichi TANAKA
Shinichi TANAKA

Sworn to and subscribed before me at
Tokyo, Japan this 22nd day of 1946.

T. D. White, Capt., AUS-0264083

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Ogita, Yoshiaki, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages and that I truly and correctly translated from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English the oath administered to TANAKA, Shinichi, the nature and purpose of which oath was fully understood by the said affiant.

/s/ Ogita, Yoshiaki
Ogita, Yoshiaki

4245

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

NOTE: Translation requested by Legal Section.

Military Police Report No. 352

Report on the Matter Concerning
the Investigation of the American
Airmen Who Raided the Japanese Homeland.

FROM: Military Police Commander NAKAMURA, Akito

TO: Chief of General Staff SUGIYAMA, Gen.

26 May 1942.

Attached is the report of the investigation of the eight officers and men of the American planes who took part in the raid on JAPAN proper on 18 April and were forced down at NANCHANG and NING PO in CENTRAL CHINA.

FORWARD TO: Minister of War, Vice-Minister of War, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, Chief of Home Defence. (3).

Chief of General Staff, Vice-Chief of General Staff, Chief of 1st (Administration) Section, Chief of 2nd (Intelligence) Section, Chief of General Affairs Bureau. (3)

Chief of Naval General Staff, Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff, Chief of 1st (Administration) Section, Chief of 2nd (Intelligence) Section, Chief of 5th Bureau.

Navy Minister, Vice-Minister of Navy, Chief of Bureau of Naval Affairs (3) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Defense.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I certify that the original document, of which
ATIS Document No. 6789 is a translation, was used in the
Doolittle fliers case, tried in Shanghai and appears in
extract form as Defense Transcript Exhibit No. 14 in
Volume IV, of the record of trial.

/s/ Charles A. Reinhard
CHARLES A. REINHARD, Major, F.
Chief, CRD

2246

Extract from The Tokyo Nichi Nichi dated Tuesday, July 1, 1941.

CONFERENCE IS HELD BY ARMY MEMBERS OF SUPREME
COUNCIL

TOJO EXPLAINS

7/1/41

Candid Views are Exchanged Regarding Fast-Moving
Situation

The Army called a conference of Army members of the Supreme War Council on June 30 at 1:30 p.m. at the War Minister's official residence.

War Minister Lieut. General Tojo and related officials explained in detail the present fast-changing international situation, after which candid views were exchanged regarding the attitude to be taken by Nippon in the future.

Tenna The Army members of the Supreme War Council who attended the conference were T. I. H. Marshal Prince Kan-in, General Prince Asaka, and General Prince Higashi-Kuni; General Count Hisaichi Terauchi, General Kenji Doihara and General Yasuji Okamura.

Representing the Army organs were War Minister Tojo; General Gen Sugiyama, Chief of the General Staff; General Otozo Yamada, Inspector-General of the Army Education; War Vice-Minister Kirura, Vice-Chief Tsukata of the General Staff, and other officials concerned.

Picture

Ott, German Ambassador Handing the Decoration to Sugiyama, Chief of General Staff.

ASAHI SHIMBUN 2 October 1942

"AWARDING OF DECORATIONS TO GENERAL SUGIYAMA AND OTHERS FROM FUEHRER HITLER."

CEREMONY HELD AT EMBASSY TODAY

"Answering to the decorations which were conferred by His Majesty the Emperor upon military and civil officials of Axis nations residing in Japan on the anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, the ceremony of awarding decorations conferred by Fuehrer Hitler upon Japanese officials was held at the German Embassy, NAGATACHO KOJIMACHI KU TOKYO at 12.30, 1st October.

SUGIYAMA, Chief of General Staff, DOHIHARA, Army Air Inspector General, KOURA, Vice War Minister, SATO, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, NINOMIYA, Secretary to the Prime Minister proceeded to the Embassy in dignified official military uniform. Ambassador OTT, after handing the "Grand Cross of the German Eagle" to General SUGIYAMA and DOHIHARA and Lieutenant General KIMURA, "Order For Merit with Star" to Major General SATO and "First Class Order For Merit" to Colonel NINOMIYA, stated as follows: "We acknowledge your merits in having by your efforts won glorious victories in the joint execution of the War." Representing the others General SUGIYAMA stated as follows: "We pledge that we will march steadily towards the final victory with a firmer belief in the victory of the Axis in order to respond to the honour given by the FUEHRER today."

The decorations conferred by the FUEHRER today are all newly issued war time decorations with swords attached to them.

After the ceremony was over, all the attendance drank a toast. They had dinner with friendly conversation and atmosphere and the meeting was closed at 2 P.M.

ASAHI SHIMBUN

TOKYO

Jan. 9, 1947

I, Yoshiji Nishijima, certify that I am employed by The Asahi Shinbun in the capacity of Chief of Investigation Department and that the attached photograph is an exact and true copy of the article entitled "General Sugiyama and others cited by Hitler", which appeared in The Asahi Shinbun of 2 Oct. 1942.

Chief of Investigation Department

/s/ Yoshiji Nishijima
Yoshiji Nishijima

Sworn and subscribed to before me this
9th day of January, 1947.

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher
Eric W. Fleisher, 2nd Lt. AUSMI

To: Minister /initialled/
To: Vice Minister /initialled/
To: Chief of America Bureau /initialled/

(General #36413, #36412)

Head of Telegraph Section /seal by Kameyama/
Despatched from Washington Nov. 26, 1941 P.M.
Received by Ministry Nov. 27, 1941 A.M.

SECRET

Top Secret	Superintendent's Code
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To Foreign Minister Togo
No. 1180
From Nomura, Kurusu

TO Togo
sum Nomura

11-26-41

As /stated/ in our frequent cables, there is no hope to get acceptance for the whole of B plan, while we have not much time left. If the condition does not change we must give up the negotiation though it is not desirable at all. We are deeply humiliated at our lack of influence. In this case the only way to bridge over this difficulty is to let President Roosevelt cable to His Majesty first of the hope of Japan and America's cooperation to maintain peace in the Pacific, (we will try our best to do so, if we can get your permission) and in return, to ask His Majesty to answer this message, clearing the air. At the same time, if we can get a little time more, it is possible to take the initiative in proposing the establishment of neutral countries including French Indo-China, Netherland East Indies and Siam, considering that England and America may start protective occupancy (as you know, President Roosevelt suggested to make the Netherlands East Indies and Siam neutral countries in September of this year).

Though there is an opinion that the rupture of this negotiation does not decidedly mean the outbreak of war, after the breakdown of the negotiations, it is possible for them to occupy Netherlands East Indies, as I stated previously and the conflict will inevitably start by our attack. But it is very doubtful whether Germany will take action in accordance with Article Three of the (Tri-Partite) treaty, and the solution of the China incident must be carried over at least to the end of this World War.

As this telegram may become the last one of my suggestions, I wish you to show this at least to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO and answer us by return telegram.

(END)

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. _____

I. P. S. No. 1532 E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated Oct. 26, 1941 and described as follows: No. 1180 despatched Oct. 26 1941, by Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo .

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

14th day of January, 1947

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

Chief, Archives Section
Official CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

14th day of Jan, 1947

/s/ Henry Shimojima
NAME

Witness: Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt. AUS, MI

Investigator IPS
Official Capacity

ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE CHINA INCIDENT
PRINTED IN THE "EDUCATION MINISTRY REVIEW"
DATED JULY 1, 1938.

Baron ARAKI, Sadao
Minister of Education

One year has passed since the outbreak of this Incident which was started by the violent firing of Chinese armed force at the Marco Polo Bridge and the day of July 7 which is never to be forgotten by the Japanese people has come around again. Upon the outbreak of the Incident, strenuous and patient efforts were exerted by our side not to extend the trouble, aiming at an early solution on the spot. Thus reconsideration of the Chinese Government was sought for the maintenance of the peace of the Orient. (T.N. This attitude of Japan), however, was answered by an insulting oppression over her subjects in China. Besides (T.N. the Chinese Government) infringed upon international justice by going hand in hand with communists and arrogant challenges were made on us.

Such being the case, the Imperial Japan took the decisive steps in returning the fire in order to sweep away the enemy of peace from the territories of East Asia.

For the last one year, Chiang Kai-shek has given free play to tyranny for the maintenance of his influential power, sacrificing the welfare of the people, while the war has spread to whole China and the main points of strategic advantages have fallen to the hand of Japanese troops. It has become clear that

the fall of Hankow, the second capitol so to speak, is a question of time.

Yet Chiang's bigoted thought has not shown any symptom of changes and his unspeakable acts of tyranny can never be stopped before he comes to the end of his devil's luck. Our Imperial Japan, who is entrusted by God, took the arm and stood up for justice and humanity, will, of course, inflict chastening blows persistently against CHIANG's Regime and it is our policy that we will not lag down arms until anti-Japanese China is completely crushed to the extent that they can not stand up again. As we announced many times previously the Chinese people are not the enemy of our Imperial Japan.

Furthermore, the peoples under the Chiang Kai-shek's regime have suffered for many years from the misgovernment and they are still wandering on the brink of starvation.

For the Chinese people of four hundred thousand are now under the protection of Japanese Army and they are receiving our Army's warm sympathy.

In the area of North and Central China the lively look has appeared already, promising the reconstruction of the China of tomorrow.

Originally, China, as the senior nation of East Asia has long been in close relations with Japan throughout her history, and this relationship should not be changed forever. Consequently the mission on the part of Japan is to expel from Chinese

territory the Communistic devils, the enemy of humanity, as well as the Chiang Government persisting in their anti-Japanese policies, and save China from the present conflicts and poverty, at the same time speaking her cooperation for the establishment of co-prosperity and the eternal friendship of the two nations. We are now in the situation that the closer cooperation between Japan and China, which is the impelling force for the security of the East Asia, is about to be realized with the growth of the two regimes -- the Temporal Government and the Renovation Government.

The development of this new tendency reveals that Japanese Empire holds the actual power as the real leader of East Asia, and that the existence of China, as a power in East Asia, will fall into a delicate situation without the assistance of our country. And furthermore, this fact proves here clearly that our country takes consistently action with the actual intention to contribute to the establishment of peace relations in East Asia or all over the world and to the promotion of the welfare of mankind. I believe that every country in the world, facing this stern and fixed fact, will be obliged to recognize the Spirit of Japan and its true value. However, as the trend of the international political situations will be intricate and delicate owing to the influence of the Incident, direct or indirect, so we must be prepared for many difficulties in the future in the way of our Empire.

We, the people of Japan therefore, must not be puffed up with victories in the past and must not halloo till we are out of the wood. We must make up our minds to overcome all the difficulties which we may face and not to stop till our object is completely achieved, sacrificing ourselves for the sake of the country.

So in this sense, the spiritual mobilization of the nation should be strongly advocated and understood by all.

With the outbreak of the Incident last summer, the self-awakening of the nation was realized and the aspiration and enthusiasm for surmounting the national crises were pervaded to the whole country, which brought about the solid unification of the people. This awakening and enthusiasm of the people have been embodied as meritorious service in battlefield and as heroic deeds on the home front.

This is the true picture of Japan and it is due to the virtuous merits of successive emperors and to the earnestness of loyalty and patriotism, which runs through the bloodvessels of our people that Japan has won her present prosperity by having surmounted her critical moments in her long history and by protecting infinite national structure. The spiritual mobilization of the nation was realized by the power of inevitability and the work is

steadily bearing fruits under the complete unification of the one hundred million fellow-countrymen. It is a matter of reassuring that the situation is showing the unmovable perfection by cherishing the iron wall on the home front. As the situation will become more serious with the development of the war, it is beyond the question whether the substance of the system of this movement has to be perfected further or not.

We the people even though we shall engage in various occupations according to our divine duties -- such as cultivation of rice-fields, wood-cutting in the forests, fishing along the coasts, beating hammers in the factories, teaching on the platforms, or keeping the homes, we must -- keeping in mind that each of us is one of the elements of the strong motive power in this spiritual movement -- show our sincerity of loyalty and patriotism, assist and encourage each other, old or young and men or women, fill up the storehouses with products by making industries prosperous, endeavor to strengthen finance and economy by performing thrift and savings and moreover, we must be prepared for the aggrandizement of national strength required to wage long-period war.

With deep understanding of the national thought, we should clarify the absolute superiority of our national constitution and the thought of HAKKO ICHIU or the unification of the world under one roof should be pervaded to the whole world.

National Mobilization must be achieved both in the material and spiritual sense, which will promote the conspicuous ever-progressing prosperity of the nation, who must not be left as a power in East Asia only but must be promoted to the world's Japan as the leader of the new era and the proper magnanimity and full vigour of her people should be cultivated so that the mission given to her may be thoroughly fulfilled.

Educators and others who are in the leading position of this movement must take special care to keep this point in their mind, and must set good examples of themselves to the people of the nation. In this sense, the Imperial Rescript on Education should be observed before everything as the fundamental creed of daily life and the path that should be followed by loyal subjects.

The great spirit of the Imperial Way which is free from mistakes throughout all ages and countries is the light shining all over the world forever. In facing the great turning point of the world history and when the cultivation of the nation which will work as impellent force for fulfilling the mission of Japan is in an urgent necessity, the strenuous efforts of the educators and other leaders of cultural fields are strongly aspired.

On the day of the first anniversary of the China Incident, I have stated parts of my opinion demanding the firm resolution of the nation and at the same time, I like to express my heartiest gratitude to the members of the Imperial armed forces in the front who are fighting persistently by overcoming all difficulties and also to those who sacrificed their lives for the ideals of our nation.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 2155-C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Chikara Tsujita, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Director of the Investigation Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages, dated 1 July, 1938, and described as follows: The first anniversary of the China Incident speech by ARAKI, Sadao, Minister of Education. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Ministry of Education.

Signed at Tokyo on this
23 day of Jan., 1947

/s/ Chikara Tsujita
Signature of Official

SEAL

Director of the
Investigation Bureau
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Isao Amagi

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2nd Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, O-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this
23rd day of Jan., 1947.

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher, 2nd Lt.,
AUS, MI
NAME

Investigator, IPS

Witness: /s/ Douglas L. Waldorf Official Capacity
Chief, Inv. Div., IPS.