

"Official Announcements Concerning Foreign Relations"

VI. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE BOARD OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION  
OF THE JAPANESE-GERMAN AND JAPANESE-ITALIAN AGREEMENTS ON  
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

January 21, 1943.

*Kase*  
Yesterday, January 20th, at the General Headquarters of the German Fuehrer, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, Lieutenant General Hiroshi Oshima, and the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Joachim von Ribbentrop, signed an agreement between Japan and Germany concerning economic co-operation and on the same day at Rome the Japanese Charge d'Affaires, Mr. Shunichi Kase, and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeano Ciano, signed an agreement on economic co-operation between Japan and Italy.

These agreements possess the same period of validity as the Tripartite Pact, the purpose of which they are to substantiate in the field of economy. In this respect they may be considered as the extension and re-inforcement of the Tripartite Pact. Japan, Germany and Italy have constantly been strengthening their political co-operation established by the Tripartite Pact and now, by concluding these agreements, they intend to prosecute war against their common enemy through the formulation of a grand economic plan and by employing the total combined strength of the two great economic spheres of Greater East Asia and Europe and, at the same time, to lay the foundation for permanent economic co-operation between these spheres after the war. The agreements provide for the acceleration of extensive exchange of various kinds of economic goods and services and also for co-operation regarding all matters pertaining to economy and finance.



VII. STATEMENT OF THE SPOKESMAN OF THE BOARD OF INFORMATION  
CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF THE JAPANESE-GERMAN  
AND JAPANESE-ITALIAN AGREEMENTS ON ECONOMIC  
CO-OPERATION

January 21, 1943.

By concluding the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940, Japan, Germany, and Italy, recognizing and respecting the leadership of Japan in Greater East Asia and that of Germany and Italy in Europe in the establishment of a new order, pledged among themselves to stand by and co-operate with one another. The treaty is the propelling force of an epochal nature for the construction of a new world order which is primarily aimed at establishing permanent peace. Wherever this force has exercised its dynamic influence the work of constructing a new order in Greater East Asia and Europe has steadily produced concrete results.

The economic agreements which have just been concluded are agreements which give concrete expression to the spirit of the Tripartite Pact in the field of economy. The fact that these agreements have been concluded is in itself a demonstration that the construction of the new order is being further substantiated and that economic collaboration among the three Powers will henceforth be rendered increasingly closer.

In addition, these agreements bring to an end an exploitative economic system with which the United States and Britain have endeavoured to dominate the world under their monopolistic control and have opened the way for the direct settlement of accounts between Japan and Germany and Japan and Italy, another fact which is of very great significance.

It is my firm conviction that the co-operation among these three Powers in both the spiritual and material spheres will thereby be further enhanced in strength and that it will not only contribute powerfully toward the prosecution of the war but also to the completion after the war of the grand undertaking of establishing the new world truly based on fairness and righteousness.



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"THE METHOD AND MAIN POINTS OF ENLIGHTENING PUBLIC OPINION ON  
THE PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATION RE 1935 NAVAL LIMITATIONS CONFERENCE"

Decided on 12 October 1934

The enlightenment and guidance of public opinion on the preliminary negotiation re 1935 Naval Limitations Conference shall be done based upon the following according to general principles:

ACCOUNT

I. MATTERS OF ENLIGHTENMENT

- (1) It is the national right of every country to hold sufficient military forces in order to stabilize her own national defense; at the same time for our Empire, it is a necessary duty in order to secure the peace of East Asia.
- (2) Our Empire's claim is not the expansion of armaments but the reduction of armaments; namely, it means to plan the armament reduction of all nations to the utmost based upon the spirit of disarmament and to contrive to lighten the national burden as much as possible in the future. Moreover, it means the promotion of friendship among nations.
- (3) In order to establish the principle of no-threats and no-aggression, it is necessary to carry out limitation of armament by abolishing or by reducing offensive force, and by replenishing defensive force.
- (4) Our Empire denounces the Washington Treaty, but she hopes to conclude a just and appropriate treaty as a substitute.
- (5) In case an agreement is not effected, the Empire has a counter-plan which will make the best of the situation from the standpoint of national defense. However, the Empire will persistently maintain an attitude of just peace and, of course, try willingly not to aggravate peaceful relations with the interested countries.

II. THE WAY OF ENLIGHTENMENT

- (1) Internal enlightenment and propaganda shall be performed through journalists and correspondents. *In* addition, the interested authorities will dispatch lecturers in case of necessity; or it shall be done by contributions to newspapers, by broadcasts, by films, by distribution of pamphlets and so on.
- (2) All interested officials shall guide internal newspaper and magazine writers and correspondents. Even though they will avoid as much as possible

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taking measures such as banning publication of anything except currently banned matters, each ministry shall exert itself and shall attempt to prevent publication of speeches which might destroy a policy already decided by the Empire, which make special mention of opposition of ministry to ministry, of disunity of internal public opinion, or the publishing of articles which would tend unnecessarily to stimulate internal and external public opinion. Each ministry should try to prevent it.

(3) As the newspaper articles containing announcements for internal enlightenment are promptly translated by foreign journalists in Japan and are telegraphed outside Japan, when the aforesaid announcements are made, we must give ample consideration to the foreign reaction.

(4) We should carry on propaganda for foreign enlightenment according to item (5) in addition to carrying it on through foreign correspondents in Japan and Japanese correspondents. We shall direct organizations abroad such as our foreign companies and non-official groups, and Japanese residents abroad to cooperate with the policy of enlightenment of the Government. Special consideration shall be given to the indirect effectiveness of internal enlightenment.

(5) The enlightenment in foreign countries shall be conducted with foreign diplomatic establishments as centers. Concerning this, the central government shall consider and take measures for close liaison with military and naval attaches in diplomatic establishments abroad.

(6) The guidance and the enlightenment of foreign correspondents should be done with the Foreign Office as a center.

(7) As censorship of the communications of foreign correspondents is not established as a system, we make it a rule not to limit them especially, except in the case of an extreme communication; instead the guidance of correspondence is emphasized.

(8) We should make a separate study concerning refutation and counter-propaganda in response to the propaganda from foreign countries.

(9) We should make a separate study concerning the prevention of the bribing of internal newspapers and magazines by others, and the buying of foreign newspapers and magazines.

(10) We should make a separate study concerning the oppositions and the artificialities, etc., in the public opinion of countries which participated in the Conference, especially those of Britain and America.

(11) The controlled and firm attitude of the authorities is a basic condition of enlightenment and guidance, and at the same time, it is the best protective wall for stopping propaganda from foreign countries. Accordingly officials in charge of each interested ministry should maintain the necessary liaison.

The End



REFERENCE (Confidential) 25 Navy

## METHOD OF EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA

## I. The policy of Japan is always to maintain peace in the East.

(1) The maintenance of peace in the East is not only one of the greatest pillars for the Peace System of the world, but also it is the important element of existence for Japan without which self-supply and self-support are impossible and the importing and exporting of goods are necessary.

(2) Therefore, the maintenance of peace in the East and the Japanese national defense are closely connected and indivisible.

(3) History testifies that Japan protected, at the risk of her national fortune, the peace of the East every time it was in danger. In fact, Japan has never taken up arms except in the above instance.

(4) For other powers also, the maintenance of peace in the East is the guarantee of their trade in the East.

(5) When the powers look dispassionately at the actual situation in the East, they will discover Japan as the only defender of the peace of the East and will be unable to help thanking her and respecting her.

## II. The attitude of Japan is always on a basis of justice and duty, and at the Naval Conference of 1935, Japan is to take the same attitude.

(1) The intention of Japan based on the spirit of the reduction of armament, is to abolish increases in armament and to reduce armament. In this case, the powers with the greatest armament should take the lead in making reductions.

(2) It is absolutely necessary to maintain national existence. Therefore, every country has an equal right to feel at ease about her defense; so each nation has an equal right to provide the armament necessary for national defense.

(3) As naval strength is very easily moved, all powers concerned can be at ease as regards national defense when the treaty based on the principle "NOT TO THREATEN OTHERS" is concluded.

(4) This discriminating ratio of naval strength is a violation of the principle of no-threats and no-aggression and should be rejected.

(5) In order not to menace one another, we should abolish or drastically reduce our offensive force, and assert our defensive armament.



III. The abrogation of the existing treaty is a natural stage in concluding a new impartial treaty.

(1) Ten years have passed since the conclusion of the Washington Treaty and this treaty has lost its validity due to the development of sciences and due to the changes in the international situation. The discriminating ratio gives Japan especially a constant menace and makes her anxious about the safety of her national defense. This stimulates still more the idea of opposing powers, and is not the measure for maintaining the international peace; we must abrogate this as soon as possible.

(2) The Washington Treaty itself anticipates the loss of its validity owing to the passing of time, and provides for the abrogation of the treaty. Therefore, according to the stipulation of the treaty, it will be natural for Japan to announce the abrogation of the treaty; this is based on her constructive hope for concluding a new treaty, impartial and suitable for the present situation.

(3) The London Treaty is originally temporary and it is natural that we abrogate it according to its provision and substitute a new agreement.

(4) It is the traditional spirit of the Japanese that they get along with good neighbors and help their neighbors, making nothing of their own lives in the maintenance of justice. No one can terrorize her by putting on a demon's mask.

#### NAVAL COMMITTEE VERBAL NOTE

(to be distributed at the 4th Joint Disarmament  
Information Commission, 5 October 1934)

All the Ministries cannot carry out the concrete details of propaganda and its diffusion in the same way for they all are in different situations, and it may be advantageous for each Ministry to take a different attitude in attaining the object.

The principle should be that all have a close connection beneath the surface. Under separate cover is contained the elementary methods of propaganda diffusion now being used by the Navy. We shall be pleased if you make a suitable selection and use it.



CONFIDENTIAL - REFERENCE 25

Navy

### ELEMENTS OF INTERNAL PROPAGANDA

I. We should be sure to make the people believe that maintaining the national defense power permanently is absolutely essential to the armament reduction treaty.

(1) Generally speaking, it is absolutely necessary that an independent country has the right to armaments necessary to safeguard herself.

(2) Without the safety of national defense, we positively cannot expect to build the international peace system, the stability of the national life, nor the future prosperity of the country.

(3) Therefore, a just and impartial treaty of armament reduction should contain the permanent maintenance of the national defense as its essence.

II. The following items should be emphasized for the conclusion of a just and valid new treaty for armament reduction.

(1) We cannot accept any treaty which threatens the independence of the national defense of Japan and by which the permanence of the national defense of Japan cannot be anticipated.

(2) To insure the principle of no-threats and no-aggression, we abolish the gradation and ratio. Moreover, we should limit our armament on the basis of drastically reducing military strength and replenishing military strength.

(3) All nations should plan to drastically lower their amounts in accord with the spirit of reducing armament.

III. We explain the following concerning the abrogation of the existing treaty.

(1) As ten-odd years have passed since the conclusion of the Washington Treaty, it is not suited to the present situation due to scientific progress and changes in the international situation in the meantime. The treaty itself anticipates its own abrogation, and it is the proper and just preparatory measure for concluding a new and just armament reduction treaty. Therefore, it is not simply as a use of a right proper from the standpoint of the treaty, but as a step in the direction of a fair agreement that we announce the abrogation of the treaty.

(2) The London Treaty is a temporary agreement in force until the end of 1936, and after the term is over it will naturally become invalidated.



IV. Japan who resigned from the League of Nations with regard to the Manchuria Incident experienced the fact that a just claim is not necessarily always recognized in an international conference. Even if our claim should unfortunately not be accepted, and the agreement should not be concluded, we need not necessarily expect the opening of a ship construction race considering the national situation in the various countries. If such competition should appear, the authorities are confident of maintaining the national defense by independent measures. Therefore, we should strongly advocate that the people should not be afraid of it.

V. Due to the situation of the empire, the defense of the empire is connected with East Asiatic peace and indivisibility, and as the maintenance of naval force by Japan is the basis of the peace of East Asia, they should be made to recognize emphatically that the future of Japan depends on the vicissitudes of her Navy.

VI. As the negotiation for the armament reduction reaches its climax, foreign propaganda may become violent. We must spread the warning ahead of time not to be taken in by foreign tricks.



C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Tatsuo TSUKUDO hereby certify  
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the follow-  
ing capacity: Member of Archives and Documents Section, Second  
Demobilization Bureau

and that as such official I had custody of the document hereto attached  
consisting of 1 Volume, dated Sept. and Oct., 1934, and described as  
follows: "Guidance of Public Opinion Re: 1935 London Naval Limitations  
Conference."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official  
document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official  
archives and files of the following named ministry or department (speci-  
fying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official  
designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or  
files): Navy Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
3rd day of Oct., 1946.

TATSUO TSUKUDO  
Signature of Official (SEAL)

Witness: R. IMAMURA (SEAL)

Member of Archives and Documents  
Section, 2nd Demobil. Bureau  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. ERIC W. FLEISHER O-935000, hereby certify that I am  
associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the  
Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from  
the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my  
official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
3rd day of October, 1946

ERIC W. FLEISHER  
NAME

Witness: HENRY SHIMOJIMA

Investigation Division, IPS  
Official Capacity



*Tokyo (1) 913*  
*Slide (2)*  
(Excerpt from Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, December 12, 1941.)

Victory is Undoubted (A talk of Premier TOJO)

With the news of the declaration of war by GERMANY and ITALY against the United States of America, Premier TOJO gave the following statement at 11:00 p. m., on the 11th.

"Today, both GERMANY and ITALY declared war against the United States of America. Furthermore, it made clear that JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY renew their alliance and would firmly carry out the war until final victory has been gained against our common foe, the United States of America and BRITAIN, and that we would not conclude treaties of armistice and peace without mutual understanding.

"The world is now divided into two groups; one that vainly struggles to maintain the status quo, and the other, who earnestly strives to establish the rightful new order; and they are fighting the greatest battle that has ever occurred in history.

With just cause and substantial power, I believe without doubt victory is ours.

I now offer my hearty congratulations on the alliance of the three countries in becoming stronger than ever, and herewith express my firm belief in our glorious future.



C E R T I F I C A T E

Yoshiji NISHIJIMA (Seal)

I certify the following:

That the reduced-size edition of the December, 1941, issues (including the December 12 issue) of the ASAHI SHIMBUN, kept within the Investigation Department of the Main Office of the ASAHI SHIMBUN in Tokyo, was presented to International Prosecution Section on May 10, 1946, upon their request.

Yoshiji NISHIJIMA (Seal)  
Head, Investigation Dept.  
Tokyo Office, Asahi Shimbun



Excerpt from "Tokyo ASAHI" of April 16, 1944

"War for Indian Emancipation towards Achieving Common Objective.  
Premier's Address Lauds Brave Fight Put Up by Germany and Italy

PREMIER TOJO'S ADDRESS

On this event in the opening meeting of the Mixed Specialists' Committee today which is being based on the Tri Partite Pact, I deem it an extreme pleasure to have the opportunity to address you.

Taking a general view of the war situation, we find that the Anglo-Americans who were defeated in each and every consecutive battle in the early part of this war have, since last year, begun proclaiming counter-offense.

They have mobilized their full force and are now pressing the borders of the Axis territories -- in the East and the West. Despite their efforts our strong and solid camp has not even shown the slightest stir. The firm conviction of ultimate victory and the undefeatable positions of Japan, Germany and Italy have been all the more strengthened.

I am always paying my respects to the brave and courageous fight put up by the Germans and Italians in Europe; especially, I am unable to withhold my joy upon receiving the report that German troops have completely smashed the enemy advance on the Italian front; the carrying on of attack on a large scale against London; and besides, that Italy has arrayed new battle formations and is about to join the front lines of this Co-operative War.

Impatience being increased through such state affairs, our enemy, the Anglo-Americans, have recently declared the construction of the Second Front in Europe. It is rather for such rash acts that Germany awaits, and I firmly believe that Germany will not merely drive them back, but will deal them deadly blows and thereby hurry the time of winning the ultimate victory for Japan, Germany and Italy.

In Greater East Asia, our Empire is ensuring the key point of the Southern areas, and smashing the enemies' aggressive attempts in the continents and the Pacific areas. Through the complete cooperation given in war efforts by the countries and nations within the Greater East Asia Sphere, and the utilization of the abundant important resources for armaments, our position of ultimate victory is being strengthened day by day. Our Empire will maintain this position to the last, and resolutely deal blows to the enemies and thereby fight through this war to the end.

As you are all aware, the Japanese forces, with the great help received from Burma, have recently marched abreast with the Free Indian Nationalist Army and have already crossed the Indian-Burmese border into Indian territory, gaining victories after victories. Especially the Free Indian Nationalist Army, <sup>led by</sup> their Chief, Chandra Bose, is fighting for the emancipation of their country with the hearty cooperation accorded by Burma and the other Asiatic nations; and, it is most joyful to note



the fact that the surging tendency for Indian emancipation is now prevailing all over India, which proves the steady achievements of our common objective - that is, the emancipation for the oppressed nations.

It is needless to repeat that this current war was fought by the Axis powers which stood up to fight for self-existence and self-defense and for the construction of a world peace, based upon righteousness against the greedy ambition of world domination of the Anglo-Americans who unashamedly sacrificed others for their own prosperity. Especially the ambition of the two countries has lately become all the more clear and to this we shall further determine our resolution never to put down our arms but fight until we smash exhaustively the insolent ambition of the Anglo-Americans. Even though battle fields may be apart, to the east and the west, the necessity arises for us, the Axis nations, to cooperate and concert much more closely and to increase our fight against our common enemies, America and Britain.

To meet this situation, Japan must carry on connections with the countries of Germany, Italy and the other Axis nations in Europe on a closer basis, and smash all Anglo-American plots to segregate Japan from the other Axis nations. We will then be able to advance together towards the achievement of common objective and thus, with the collaboration of Europe and Asia, gain the ultimate victory. I have the firm conviction that both Germany and Italy possess the same determination as we possess. At this time of emergency, as today, it is most opportune that this meeting has been held, and I heartily pray for its success."



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I. a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that a file of the Japanese Newspapers "Tokyo Asahi" for April 1944 with TOJO's speech of April 15, 1944 was taken from the Imperial Library in Tokyo on or about July 10, 1944, and that the original of the said document may be found in \_\_\_\_\_.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_.

/s/ Lt Col Taranenko  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

July 11, 1946.



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify the following, viz.:- The book, Title: "Tokyo Asahi Shimbun's Miniature Edition of April, 1944" (including issue of the 16th of April);

Publisher: Tokyo Asahi Shimbun Co.

Year of publication: 1944

No. of Volumes: One

Bookshelf No: Miscellany 54/200

owned by the Imperial Library, was, at the request of the International Prosecution Section, Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, loaned out to the said Section on June 13, 1946.

Dated the 28th day of September, 1946.

Sokichi Ishiguro (Sign. & Seal)



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Set - copy of  
General of Navy  
article

TOP SECRET

At the Secret Meeting  
of the Third Special Committee of the  
Japan Diplomatic Association

Delivered by Vice-Admiral TOYODA, Soemu,  
Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry

(SUMMARY)

Outline of Naval Budget for the Fiscal Year 1937  
and the  
General Aspect of National Defense  
Related to the Navy

Capt Robinson

(January, 1937)

Japan Diplomatic Association



This is the gist of the speech delivered by Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry TOYODA at a secret meeting of the Third Special Committee of our association (concerning diplomacy and the Navy). It has been recorded by the secretary of this association. Consequently, we have not obtained the speaker's consent nor his perusal of this speech. Naturally, this association bears entire responsibility for this copy.

Investigation Bureau  
Japan Diplomatic Association

December, 1937

Further, it is requested that special attention be directed so as not to permit these pamphlets to be read by people other than the members of the Special Committee of this association.



Outline of Naval Budget for the  
Next Fiscal Year  
and  
General Aspect of National Defense as  
Related to the Navy

Delivered by

Mr. TOYODA, Soemu, Vice Admiral,  
Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau of  
Navy Ministry

It is an honor for me to have the opportunity to focus my talk on the naval budget for the next fiscal year and to speak on what the Navy is thinking about. As I have made hasty preparations for this speech, I am afraid you will find it hard to listen to. You are cordially requested to ask me questions and to give comments later on.

The order of my speech will be as follows: The present international situation and the viewpoint of the Imperial Navy; recent conditions of the British and U. S. navies and those of other Powers; what the future armament policy of the Imperial Navy should be on the basis of the recent international situation and the recent naval conditions of the various Powers; then the outline and the key points of the naval budget for the next fiscal year drawn up on the basis of the aforesaid policy of armament; and the future of the ship construction competition about which so much is being said. I should like to give my personal opinions on these questions first, and then, taking into consideration the aforesaid future situation, to speak on what the Imperial Navy's budget ought to be in years to come.

1. Determination to cope with the non-treaty era.

Though our delegates attended the disarmament conference held in London from the end of last year to the beginning of this year, with the claim that externally we would promote a feeling of national safety and internally reduce the burden on the people by reducing our naval armament as much as possible by cutting down on aggressive armament and by intensifying the defensive power according to the fundamental policy of non-threat and non-invasion, the Powers



did not recognize our just and rational claim; and the Empire was obliged to withdraw from the conference. Within ten days we entered a naval non-treaty era as far as Japan was concerned, but we do not intend to encourage a ship-building competition nor a threat to other Powers, as we, as the Japanese Government or as the Imperial Navy, have taken every opportunity to declare both before and after the Disarmament Conference and up to the present. We have a firm intention to push our naval armaments in the future with this conviction. But although we would not encourage ship-building competition, we cannot remain a spectator, leaving the armaments to take care of themselves if we look at the present international situation and consider the fact that naval armament has an important relation to the execution of the national policy. There is no denying that there is an urgent need to observe the situation closely and to set up a plan to cope with it. Since the present international situation as it concerns Japan is one of the subjects which it is the duty of this association to study, your Excellencies are well aware of the said situation and as it is I who will have to ask for your instructions, I shall not go into details.

When I think of the diplomatic developments up to now from the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and from the time of our withdrawal from the League of Nations two years ago, I feel that importance and difficulty are being added day by day to Japan's national defense. During the interim, there have been ups and downs, and I cannot say that when we look at the future the present state of affairs is reassuring.

2. Britain, U. S., Soviet Russia and China  
as the central consideration.

I believe that Britain, U. S., Soviet Russia and China will become the core of Japan's external relations to which we shall have to give our closest attention. Though our navy has no direct relation with Soviet Russia, we have, of course, several indirect relationships. However, our navy is not so much concerned with Russia as with Britain and the U. S. Although I shall refrain from speaking in full detail here, we are well aware of the fact that the army will have to replenish its armament as preparation against Soviet Russia.

The greatest obstacle to the execution of Japan's foreign policy can never be limited to Soviet Russia alone. I feel that we must concern ourselves especially with Britain and the U.S.A. Even now we can draw such conclusion, judging from the naval armament of these two countries. England has important rights and interests in China, not to mention India, and, of course, she must have enough power to secure such rights and interests; on the other hand, the U. S. does not have such big interests in China nor in other Oriental countries. She has few overseas investments and little trade as compared with Japan. Nevertheless, the U. S. in the past few years, especially since the



✓ 6 outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, has been making a great effort to complete the equipment of her Navy. If we consider this fact and the attitude which her Navy is taking at present, we shall clearly understand what the U. S. has in mind. Some Americans, and even some Japanese, often say that the U. S. does not have such big interests in the Orient and that for this reason common sense tells us that the U. S. will absolutely not attack Japan. On the contrary, I feel that reality indicates that the U. S. has a special concern to suppress Japan. There are wars in the absolute sense, and wars in the relative sense. If Japan and the U. S. should fight one another in the future the war will be absolute and a question of life and death to Japan; but not to the U. S. That is, to the U. S. it will be a war for her prosperity, while it will be a question of life or death to Japan. Therefore, viewed from a common sense standpoint, it is absurd to say that the U. S. will spend so much money and make various large scale gestures to put pressure on Japan. But actually she is doing so. The U. S. naval installations of recent years and the question of stationing the Pacific fleet permanently in the East, of which I will speak more fully later, have no other object than to check and oppress Japan.

✓ 6 11 In short, both the U. S. and Britain do not like Japan's development in the East. It is their basic idea to wish to check it in some way and to nip it in the bud; consequently, various questions which accidentally occur in the international relation, are always based on the aforesaid idea, though the situations may differ. We must, therefore, keep this in mind all the time, and to say that the U. S. has relaxed her pressure or has tightened it by looking at her superficial behavior must be avoided so that we may not mistake the main issue. After all, the Imperial Navy has not the least intention of attacking the U. S., at least at the present time, but we must be prepared at any cost with an invincible attitude. I believe that it is only by this attitude that Japan's foreign policy will be guaranteed.

### 3. Comparison of Japanese, British and U. S. Naval Expenditures.

I shall speak on the latest situation of British and U. S. navies.

In comparing the British, U. S. and Japanese naval expenditures, as shown in Table I, we find that the Manchurian Incident which broke out in 1931, and the Shanghai Incident in 1932, have made it necessary for Japan to make a supplementary budget, etc., raising the amount to ¥300,000,000. Since then the amount has increased yearly. The measures which Japan was obliged to take to cope with the tenseness in the international situation appear in the budget. Likewise, the budgets of the British and U. S. navies have also rapidly increased during the past three years.



TABLE I

NAVAL EXPENDITURE		(Unit - one million)					
	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936
UNITED STATES (dollars)	383	360	329	406	455	482	527
BRITAIN (pounds)-Navy	52.6	51.6	50.5	53.6	58.8	67.8	84.7
" " -Air Force	17.9	18.1	17.4	17.4	20.4	30.8	55.2
JAPAN (yen)	263	211	307	404	489	530	550

#### 4. U. S. Ship-building Program and its Present Condition.

The latest ship-building program of the U. S. and its present state of progress are shown in Table II. Almost in the same way as the Japanese Navy, the U. S. Navy draws up a comprehensive ship-building program to be effected within a limited number of years, but the budget is not in the form of continuous expenditures like that of Japan, but the necessary budget is appropriated yearly. Consequently, it often happens that even if a program has been decided on the ship building does not go according to the program, depending on the financial situation at the time.

The biggest plan now existing is the Vinson plan which was set up in 1934, involving 102 ships, about 200,000 tons, at a cost of \$800,000,000, which is expected to be completed by 1939, so it will be finished in 1940. In addition to the above, in the preceding year, she was building 32 ships, about 120,000 tons, with a budget of \$238,000,000, derived from the money from the Sangyo Fukkoku (Reconstruction Finance) as an emergency project.

Another is the Navy Completion Plan which was supplemented successively from 1916 to 1929. This, however, was not completed by 1929, as expected, and in 1933, the building of 11 ships of about 35,000 tons, costing approximately \$120,000,000, was left undone. This program is also underway at present.

Of the above programs, about 68 ships are not yet laid down for construction; about 63 ships, 223,000 tons, are under construction; while the rest have already been completed. The expenditures for building these ships do not cover the whole of the naval budget. Construction expenditures were \$38,000,000 in 1931, which increased yearly, and finally amounted to more than \$200,000,000 in 1935. The estimate for 1936 is \$168,000,000. These plans aim at the completion of Treaty navy of which the U. S. so often speaks, i.e., a plan to prepare the amount of ships stipulated both in the Washington and the



London Treaties. Accordingly, if these plans go smoothly, in 1940 the U. S. navy will come to possess the naval force provided for in the two treaties. This includes not only replenishment for the lack of new ships, but also the construction of ships to replace the out-of-date ones. Besides this, though the official report has not yet reached us, it seems that a new plan is under way which mainly provides for the building of 2 battleships and 12 Class-B cruisers. There are, in addition, ships and boats which do not come under the limitations, or special service ships. In the budget for the current fiscal year, a ~~2,120,000~~<sup>220,000</sup> ton building plan was presented, but was not adopted by Congress because it could not get through the discussion stage.

At any rate, it may be perceived that the U. S. will come to possess the number of ships stipulated both in the Washington and the London Treaties. It is not certain whether the U. S. has any intention of expanding her navy beyond this plan, but, according to what was declared by the responsible people of the U. S. Government in Congress, or on various other occasions, she will respect the past two Treaties to the utmost and has no intention of increasing her naval plan. This, however, cannot be fully relied upon (as it may change) according to the development of the situation in the future. Generally speaking, it would not be a great mistake to believe that the U. S. will effect the completion of naval armaments based on the tonnage of ships stipulated both in the Washington and the London Treaties in the coming four or five years.

TABLE II

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U. S. SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM AND ITS PRESENT STATE OF PROGRESS

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Vinson Plan		1934 Program
102 ships, about 200,000 tons		\$800,000,000
		(to be finished by 1939)
From the Sangyo Fukukohi (RFC Funds)		1933 Program
32 ships, about 120,000 tons		\$238,000,000
The remainder of the plan for 1916 and 1929 (construction to be commenced after 1933).		
11 ships, about 35,000 tons	- about	\$120,000,000
Of the above-mentioned plans:		
Not yet begun	about 68 ships	115,000 tons (a part of the Vinson Plan)
Under construction	about 63 ships	233,000 tons
The rest are already completed.		

BUILDING EXPENDITURES							
Year	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936
Unit - One million dollars	49.4	38.3	62.9	90.0	182.2	216.5	168.5



5. U. S. Establishments for naval operations  
in the Pacific.

Next, I shall speak on the U. S. establishments for naval operations in the Pacific. It is an obvious fact that the U. S. has been laying great stress on land and water establishments in the Pacific area of recent years. After the Washington Treaty the U. S. set to work on a 20 year plan with a budget of \$150,000,000 for the improvement of land and water establishments in the Pacific area, but that program has not made much progress since then owing to the policy of financial retraction and so on. She took much interest in the equipment of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, but, besides this, there was no other notable phenomenon.

As soon as the Manchurian Incident broke out, however, the U. S. suddenly changed her attitude. She increased her naval budget and besides she began to lay much stress on the Pacific area by means of Sangyo Fukurohi (RFC funds). The establishment on which the greatest importance was laid was Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The detailed figures of the sum of money spent here are not at hand now, but to cite the latest example, 1936, \$15,000,000 out of \$38,000,000 appropriated as expenditures for land and water equipment was allocated to this port, and we hear that almost 80 or 90 per cent of the work is finished and the whole is nearing completion. Actually when the grand naval maneuver was held last year in the Pacific area, the whole fleet entered Pearl Harbor at the same time for supplies and rest. Hereafter, also, she will take more interest in that harbor; for instance, she has a plan to build two floating docks which will be made with pointed bows so that they can be towed and can sail under their own power. I cannot say for certain, but, at any rate, it seems that she has a plan for building such things and defraying therefor the amount of \$10,000,000 to this harbor. This material is evidence to show how earnest the U. S. is about operations in the Pacific area.

In addition to the above, along the western coast of the continent, starting from the north, at Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Pedro and Panama, she is taking steps to increase equipment so as to perfect these ports for repair, supply and recuperation purposes. Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the U. S. fleet has continued to be stationed in the Pacific area, and the American people as well as ourselves were at the outset anxious that if it were to be stationed there for a long time it would be impossible for the U. S. to maintain the fleet on the Pacific Coast, but the fact is that she has managed to maintain them on the western coast by means of prompt increase of land and water installations.

Only those ships requiring great scale reconstruction sail to the eastern coast, and daily repairs, docking, repainting of the ships' bottoms and such other works are all arranged for somehow or other on the western coast. Last year when the major part of the U. S. fleet sailed to the eastern coast, we heard that no workmen went to the fleet from the New York Navy Yard, which fact is almost unbelievable to us of the Japanese Navy. But this is







# 7. Importance attached to the East by the British Navy.

86 The British Navy, a little different from that of the U. S. or Japan, does not customarily make public comprehensive building programs covering a certain number of years. As she adds or supplements necessary plans each year to the original it is difficult for us to see through to the future, but generally speaking, around the time when the London Treaty was concluded, she was not active in building ships. She was at that time building only about three cruisers, nine destroyers and three submarines yearly. The past two or three years, however, it was suddenly increased and according to the government announcement of last spring, the construction of two capital ships will be started next year and one airplane carrier, five cruisers, over 12 destroyers, some submarines and several non-limitation ships are to be built.

As for the budget, only the estimates for 1936 and 1937 are presented, and how many years are needed after that for the fulfillment of the plan is not made known. At any rate, it can be clearly perceived that her ship-building in the last two or three years has become very active as compared with that of several years preceding. The increase of expenditures is shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV

BUILDING EXPENDITURES OF THE BRITISH NAVY							
Year	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
In million pounds	6.2	6.0	7.7	9.7	11.5	11.9	16.2

86 To touch a little on Britain's intention in regard to her war operations in the Oriental area, that is, her naval forces in the Orient and her installations at the important strategic points in the area, in recent years Britain seems to be laying special emphasis on naval strength in the Orient. After the Russo-Japanese War, following the downfall of the Russian Navy, the revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the rise of the German Navy in Europe and so on, Britain gradually reduced her naval forces in the Orient. A long time ago, she had a powerful navy in the Orient, but it was extremely reduced at one time, and needless to say, during the World War her naval power in the Orient was but a small one, for she relied for the most part on the Japanese Navy. After the World War, however, she gradually augmented the strength and in recent years in the Orient she holds one airplane carrier, 7 cruisers (10,000 ton cruisers of the latest type) - she only has 15 in all, but out of her total of 15 cruisers, 7 are allotted to the Orient - as well as 15 Class-B cruisers. Destroyers and submarines have been attached to this nucleus, not including the gunboats for the use on the Yangtze.



Taking all these into consideration, it is obvious that the strength is far more full and strong than in the past. And, moreover, the ships are new, and it seems that in many cases cruisers, destroyers, submarines, or whatever ships they may be, when newly built, are first sent to the Orient. Besides the naval forces, she lays much stress on the solidification and strengthening of strategic points, making a chain from Gibraltar-Malta-Suez Canal in the West, and Aden-Colombo-Singapore-Hongkong and so on in the East, furnishing fuel oil tanks and other installations in the ports.

Among these ports, the one on which the biggest importance is laid is Singapore. The plan was at the outset a considerably big one, but at the time of the Labor Cabinet it seemed as though it was temporarily stopped, but later, especially after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the plan was resumed with some additions. It is said that Britain has been making strenuous efforts for its realization in recent years. I hear that the money already poured into Singapore is about £15,000,000, but she is still carrying out, step by step, her plan and the construction of her installations; moreover, it is said the work is nearing completion, the drydock being already finished, and 1,000,000 ton fuel-supply facilities, repair shops, armouries, fort barracks, and so on, which have been planned hitherto, to be completed around the end of this year. And it is supposed that additions will be made to the plan in the future. It is reported that despite the fact that Hongkong is situated within the defense restriction zone, it is being considerably strengthened.

#### 8. British Air Force Rapidly Growing.

The British air force grew rapidly during the Great War. At one time later, however, it showed signs of decline, compared with those of France, Italy, and others. But recently Britain has begun to put great efforts into the air force. According to the announcement made by the government at the end of last year, Britain aims to have a strength of 1750 planes, and actually her whole air force around the end of last year was reportedly about 1300 planes already. We can see the recent rapid increase in her budget by looking at her air force expenditures shown in Table I.

#### 9. Far Eastern Navy of Soviet Russia

Besides the above, there are problems concerning the state of the navies of France, Italy, Germany and of Soviet Russia, with which we have an important relationship in the Far East. If I enter into these problems, my talk will become too detailed, and, considering the fact that if our navy manages to cope with the British and U. S. navies, those of the other Powers can be taken care of, I should like to refrain from speaking on those navies today. Yet we cannot entirely ignore the fact that Soviet Russia has begun to increase her naval installations rapidly in recent years and, therefore, we have a great concern for the Russian Navy.



At present, Russia has about 50 submarines in the Orient. Russia apparently has about 120 submarines in all, of which about 50 are assigned to the Far East. Moreover, she has 6 destroyers, which are not worth mentioning, and some so-called high speed torpedo boats, which are of a very small type of several tons of tons, probably used as submarine chasers on some occasions and as torpedo boats on others. She has about 100 of these high speed torpedo boats in all at Vladivostok and there is no denying that these will have a considerable power of restraint upon the Japanese navy in case Russia takes the defensive. However, the power of a navy or the command of the sea is not constituted by submarines or torpedo boats alone. It can't be maintained without a well balanced navy with big ships as its center. The torpedo boats and submarines may have value as defensive forces, but, as far as the command of the sea in the Orient is concerned, these ships have, I believe, no chance of victory over the Japanese navy.

#### 10. Japanese Naval Armament Policy

Taking into consideration the aforesaid international situation and the actual status of the navies of other Powers, what policy should our navy take for its armament? I will speak a little on this matter.

As I have stated above, Japan, for her part, has no intention whatever to incite a shipbuilding competition even if a no-treaty era should set in; she aims at possessing the minimum invincible force. At the recent naval reduction conference, Japan claimed the maximum equal ratio, which other Powers opposed, saying that Japan does not have the strength enough to possess an equal ratio with Britain and the U. S. and that each Power has its particular geographical condition. In other words, it has specific weakness in the so-called national defense, but Japan has little weakness in this point, while Britain and the U. S. have many weaknesses. To have equal military force, ignoring such difference in weakness, cannot be said to be non-threatening nor non-aggressive. It will only lead to inequality in the feeling of safety. For these reasons, the Powers opposed the Japanese claims, but we of the navy firmly believe even now that we were not wrong in making such claims.

#### 11. Invulnerable Defense Lines in the Western Pacific.

It is too officious to say that it would be a luxury for Japan to have the degree of armaments as Britain and the U. S. without having enough national power. They may say so privately, but to discuss in such a way at an international gathering is not permissible. Furthermore, although we cannot say that there is absolutely no weakness in our national defense, weakness mainly arises in case of aggression. In other words, we can say that weakness will be considerably decreased if only we maintain the defensive attitude. If each Power admits the principle of safeguarding herself and of non-aggression, I believe that each Power can openly and squarely claim the right to possess an



equal number of armaments wherever it may be. I believe it absurd for the first class Powers to say that 60 or 70 per cent of their quota will be enough for us because they will not attack us, notwithstanding the fact that they and we are on equal footing. It would be quite another matter if they forced it on us, but they must consider the difference of Japan's national strength, her national situation and also of her international situation from the time of the former Washington and London Treaty Conferences and the time of the present naval reduction conference held from last year to this year. We were not under any circumstance to be forced to accept their unreasonable demands, and if we are to adhere to our assertion of non-threat and non-aggression from the standpoint that the navy holds an important role, especially as the stabilizing power of the Orient and as the power for assisting the carrying out of Japan's national policy, we cannot but claim that the right of armament of the Powers should be equal.

VVG  
Although Japan demanded equality of military power at the Disarmament Conference, it does not necessarily mean that Japan will immediately build up a military power equal to those of Britain and the U. S. as her future armament plan. Japan has no intention at all to invade other countries. Japan has no intention of attacking the western coast of the U. S. or of invading Singapore and occupying India in the near future. It suffices that Japan complete her national defense. Concretely Japan will be satisfied to have an actual fighting power that is invulnerable in the West Pacific as compared with that of any naval Power.

To have equal fighting power does not necessarily mean to have ships of the same type, of the same tonnage and in the same numbers. If a country makes aggressive operations it will, of course, be at a disadvantage. Whereas, if Japan strategically fights a defensive war she will be able to make full use of her geographical advantage, and if Japan will fight with her particular geographical conditions, with particular installations added thereto, and the strategy of "awaiting the enemy's fatigue after coming a long distance," she will be able to preserve the security of national defense even without a naval strength (means concrete naval strength) equal to that of the opposing country.

### 13. New Armament Program of the Japanese Navy.

Such being the case, the necessary military power for national defense has been unofficially decided in our naval armament plan for the future after the various relations have been considered and in accordance with the new situation, I have no liberty to refer to it here, but the program is aimed at replenishing the naval forces by the new replenishing scheme based on the above unofficial decision. The amount of forces which will form the basis of our naval armament as shown in the budget for the next fiscal year is not necessarily to realize immediately the whole of the strength estimated to be necessary for national defense itself.



Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, Japan has been quite busy externally. She has to complete national defense on one hand, and on the other hand to provide security for the people. All these together with other matters in various fields require enormous national expense. The Army especially requires a prompt replenishment of armaments. On the other hand, as the revenue of the treasury will not allow unlimited expenditures, the minimum tolerable amount has been appropriated as naval expenditures for the budget of the next fiscal year. Consequently because of financial reasons, matters of considerable importance, not only from the strength necessary for the national defense power as a standard, but also in the light of this immediate urgent necessity cannot be realized promptly, would have to be put off to some future fiscal years. I feel that we can but wait for some measures to be taken in the future to tide us over these difficulties in accordance with the national finance or the international situation, etc.

Next comes the question of what degree of equipment should be made according to the new armament plan. I regret to say, we cannot give you the concrete figures today, as we must consider the new London Treaty concluded between Britain, the U. S. and France, the special armament reduction agreement concluded at the Anglo-Russian Meeting, as well as the Anglo-German naval agreement which Germany concluded with Britain last year, all of which will naturally have relation to the new armament reduction of this year, I believe.

In addition to the above, Britain is making vigorous efforts to induce all Baltic border states to come under her control and is trying to restrict their naval armament. Therefore, in the near future the new armament reduction treaty concluded this year will have the effect of restricting the European countries and the U. S. at least.

### 13. Significance of Agreement on Notification of Shipbuilding.

In short, the new London armament reduction treaty concluded this year consists of two parts, i.e., substantial reduction and notification of shipbuilding. Speaking in detail, although there may be some difference in substantial reduction as compared with the former Washington and London Treaties, we will not be greatly mistaken if we say it has been concluded for the most part after the spirit of these treaties. But the shipbuilding notification is considerably different in method from that stipulated in the former treaties, that is, the main part consists in mutual secret notification of shipbuilding among the nations concerned.

Consequently, it is so constituted that non-treaty Powers cannot know the shipbuilding policies or programs of the treaty Powers. As for the method of notification, the Powers are to notify secretly the countries concerned between January and April of the shipbuilding program planned to be put into



practice during the current calendar year, the items of notification to include the types, number, and the maximum calibre of cannon to be installed on the ship. Just before construction work is begun further details are to be made known, these items being the type, important measurements, horse power, and speed of the ship and the armaments to be installed on the ship. The most precise notification is required in regard to the last item, i.e., the number of cannon, torpedoes, machine guns, planes, catapults, and search lights. And the building work cannot be begun until four months after the notification to the countries concerned. If any changes should be made in the principal items during the construction, the work on the changes cannot be begun until four months after the arrival of notifications thereof to the countries concerned as in the above. The provisions are strict to this extent.

#### 14. Reasons why it cannot be made Public.

This is, in short, the device of Britain and the U. S. to check the weak naval Powers, and by means of this device the two countries intend to watch an opponent country so that it will not get ahead of them. The provisions have been made as a means for the strong naval Powers to suppress the weaker naval Powers. At any rate, as Japan has not participated in the Treaty, she has no idea of what shipbuilding plans the U.S. and Britain have, nor of course the contents thereof. Under such circumstances if Japan follows her customary way of making public too early what types of ships will be constructed and in what numbers, the total number, the total tonnage and total expenditures, and so on, according to the new replenishment plan, it would be nothing but showing our hand to others without seeing the other's hand. Such foolishness can absolutely not be tolerated.

In demanding a considerably larger amount of expenditure of the Diet and its approval thereof, the Imperial Navy almost gobbles up the budget without making any full explanation, and without acquiring the understanding of either the Diet or the people at large. This is indeed regrettable and, of course, against our principles, but, the situation of the Powers being such at present, please understand that we unfortunately cannot make public the contents of our plan at this time. However, once a ship is completed, one can know the approximate size of the ship, or of the cannon on the ship, though the details may not be known. The main reason for not making them public is that it is unprofitable for us to let the other Powers know too early the future shipbuilding policy of our navy, whose armaments and materials are making rapid progress from day to day.

#### 15. Analysis of Naval Budget for 1937.

The total amount appropriated for the next fiscal year in the naval budget is a little over ¥681,000,000, a total increase of about ¥129,000,000 compared with that of the working budget of last year, which was ¥551,000,000. To select the important items from among the increased expenditures, among the ordinary expenditures there is a maintenance expense for new ships totalling



¥9,480,000. This is a customary one and covers the expense of maintaining the ships to be completed during the fiscal year of 1936, i.e., till the end of March, 1937, and all these ships are included in the secondary replenishment program.

Then comes the air force units maintenance expense totalling ¥9,630,000, which is for the increase of air units in accordance with the secondary supplement program and will be completed in the next fiscal year. With these, the secondary supplement program will be completed for the most part, and a small part will be left over for the following fiscal year, which will appear in the 1938 budget as a normal increase.

Next come the expenditures to maintain aircraft weapons, a little more than ¥2,270,000. In the navy the so-called air units are those on the land, and the maintenance expenses for aircraft carried on board aircraft carriers and other ships are appropriated separately. Last comes the expenditure for the testing of shipbuilding and armaments, which amount to ¥1,500,000. It is the case, I believe, with not only the navy but in all fields throughout Japan that techniques are always following and running after those of other Powers and it is to be regretted that there has been much imitation and that fundamental research has been lacking. As fundamental experiment and research has been lacking hitherto in the Navy also, the various methods tried usually ended in failure or did not get good results. Therefore, a considerable amount of expenditures has been demanded in the budget for the next fiscal year for experiment and research on all kinds of facilities. In the extraordinary expenditures there is shipbuilding expenditure totalling ¥60,000,000, in which is included the first year allotment of the new supplementary program amounting to about ¥48,000,000, the balance of ¥12,000,000 being the additional expenses arising from the change in the first and second supplement programs.

In addition to this, the allotment for the last year of the supplement program is a little over ¥150,000,000 in the 1937 budget. Together with the newly requested ¥60,000,000, it totals ¥210,000,000 which constitutes the shipbuilding expenses for 1937.

Next comes the expenditure needed for the installations of the Mechanical Engineering Board. As the docks and the various arsenals are of the old type and are inefficient, ¥33,950,000 has been appropriated as miscellaneous improvement expenditures, while ¥9,000,000 has been set aside as necessary for the equipment of Munitions Department, the biggest expense of which is for the additional building of heavy oil storages. The navy has up to now stored liquid fuel as an emergency measure, and has a considerable amount stored today, but it is in no way sufficient to meet the demand of war operations. From the beginning of this year the fuel question has become very grave. Officials and citizens of all fields connected with this problem are deliberating the question and will work according to the national fuel policy. Therefore a considerable amount has been appropriated in the budget of the Commerce and Industry Ministry for the coming year as expenditure for the national fuel policy, but the substitute fuel industry cannot realize in two or three years even the annual



production of only 2,000,000 tons, and I think that vigorous efforts will be needed to increase production to 2,000,000 tons in six years as planned. And even if two million tons are produced according to plans, when viewed from the demand and supply of the past years, that amount only corresponds to the normal amount of increases in that number of years, and therefore the amount to be imported from abroad will not show any remarkable decrease as compared with the present, it is expected. Consequently, the navy cannot stop immediately storing oil even if the national liquid fuel policy is set up, and will have to continue its policy of storage for the time being.

Next, the expenditures for the air units' equipment, ¥26,870,000, is for the equipment of 5 air units to be started in the next fiscal year in connection with the supplementary program for the next fiscal year. The expenditures for the overhauling of ships are ¥36,870,000. Though the overhauling of the capital ships has been for the most part completed by 1936, that of aircraft carriers and other auxiliary ships still remains to be done, and the above expenditure is for these.

Lastly, the expenditure of ¥18,950,000 is for the completion of munitions, including arms, ammunitions, fuels, and so on, but the majority of it is for the purchase and storage of liquid fuel. Besides the above, expenditures for the Manchurian Incident and for the grand maneuver and others are to be found in the budget, but I shall omit them for they are not worth explaining.

#### 16. Equilibrium in the Drafting of the Naval Armament Program.

In connection with the supplement program, I have a while ago stated a general idea that Japan has no intention of inciting shipbuilding competition; and now I should like to speak on it in figures.




In the new armament program we have at present already rid ourselves of the notion of ratio on which many discussions were held in connection with the Washington and London Treaties. Although there is no other way of comparing a completed strength than by percentage, such as the percentage of a certain type of ship out of the total tonnage of ships, we do not fix a percentage first and then fill up the content thereof in order to decide on our own military power. It is, of course, necessary to take into consideration the approximate strength of the Powers in question, since the problem is relative.

Now, considering the relations with the U. S., with our eyes fixed on 1940, the year in which the Vinson Plan and other supplementary plans relating thereto will be completed, we find that the navy of the U. S. is a so-called treaty navy, and will possess the strength stipulated in the Washington and the London Treaties. If Japan had retained the treaty, she would have only built ships to replace her former ones, and the strength would have naturally been fixed. But now, as Japan is not restricted by the treaty, she can decide



on the strength needed, which can be decided naturally by comparing the relative strength of America and Japan, and consider the organization and the unit of all of the forces from a strategic point of view, instead of thinking that our main ships must be 70 per cent of America's, that we must have such and such a percentage of cruisers, etc. In our new armament plan we neither say nor think today that we must have such and such percentage of the armament of the United States. The navy aims at successively adding such units as would build up a navy corresponding to our national strength, from the standpoint of actual war operations. There should be some difference in the results between building up a treaty navy and execution of the new armament policy, which I have just stated. As a matter of fact, they happen to coincide with each other, without the amounts having been equalized intentionally.

17. Investigation of the tonnage of Japanese,  
British and U. S. Shipbuilding.


Table V does not include the new program, and it is divided in three groups: Japanese, British and U. S. The line  on the left shows the average annual tonnage of ships for the next ten years that would have to be replaced by each Power in the following year in order to maintain the military power, assuming that the past Washington and London Treaties were in existence. According to this table, Japan would have to build about 53,000 tons yearly, Britain, about 83,000, and the U. S., about 70,000. The line  to the right of the above shows the tonnage of ships to be built in the course of 1936: Japan, about 30,000 tons, Britain, about 40,000, and the U. S., about 86,000. Furthermore, the black line  to the extreme right shows the average annual tonnage in the five year period of 1931-1935; Japan, about 22,000, Britain, about 33,000, and the U. S., about 48,000. The latter two lines are added only for reference, and as the lines on the left show, even if the past two treaties had continued to exist, Japan would have to build about 53,000 tons, Britain, about 83,000, and the U. S. about 70,000. Keeping in mind the amount of 53,000 tons as shown in this graph, let us see the average annual tonnage in the programs of five consecutive years as given in Japan's new supplementary program and we will find that it comes far below 53,000 tons. This, I am sure, is statistical proof that Japan has no intention of encouraging a shipbuilding competition even in a naval non-treaty era.

Thus, it is clear that the tonnage of ships to be built according to the new program is actually not more than that it would be if the two treaties were still in effect. Then there probably will arise the question of why the total sum of expenditures in the budget has been increased. This will explain itself if the middle and left lines are compared, that is, the building of capital ships has become a very heavy burden. It is true that the former Washington and London Treaties restricted the whole scale of the navy and, for instance, the building of replacements for capital ships was postponed by prolonging the lives of the ships, and that they would have been effective in temporarily checking the increase of national expenditures at that time. But it is not an



absolute problem; so, owing to the suspension of building capital ships, the naval building expenditures would have to be increased the following year. This increase is not in the least the result of withdrawal from the naval reduction treaty nor of having entered into a non-treaty era.

TABLE V





18. Spiritual gains obtained by withdrawal  
from Armament Reduction.

With reference to the armament treaty, although we are about to enter into a non-treaty era beginning next year, we have no intention whatever to applaud it merely as a matter of sentiment. I believe that armament reduction is surely effective if it is really done impartially with mutual understanding. But, sad to say, the two treaties of the past were not in the least impartial; they were extremely unfavorable, especially to Japan. Among such unfavorable points, there were, of course, material disadvantages, but there were also extreme spiritual disadvantages. This is not a question of national dignity, but is a question pertaining to the navy itself; it is my personal opinion that undesirable ideas have been implanted in the naval officers for more than ten years, that is, whenever the Disarmament Conference was broadcast, or discussed in magazines and newspapers. We have been told for more than ten years that in order to attack many with little, Japan which has been allowed only a low ratio, should do this, etc. When the senior officers taught the juniors they always encouraged the latter to do their utmost because Japan had limited strength. This has, I fear, unconsciously planted in the heads of officers, especially of the younger ones, the idea that fighting is impossible with an inferior ratio.

Besides, various demands are made by the young men of the fleet with reason that the strength is inferior. This produces a very undesirable effect on the psychology of war. I am of the belief that, to foster a soldier's spirit it is absolutely necessary to give them discipline so as to have an idea of infallible victory even with an inferior strength and to go ahead with a firm determination in that direction. But as we hear always about the reports, discussions of the Disarmament Conference, etc., we compare the strength of both sides and are apt to think that we have no chance of winning because our strength is inferior. I fear this is the most undesirable idea implanted in us soldiers by the Disarmament Conference.

From now on, after our withdrawal from the reduction treaty, we shall not speak of our strength as being only 60 or 70 per cent of that of the U. S., and so on. Of course, if we make comparison, we may say that she has the advantage and that we are inferior, but there is no need to say such a thing now, and the source of discussions comparing each other's strength has for the most part disappeared. Is this not a valuable spiritual gain obtained by our withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, which in turn has released us from the fetters of the reduction treaty? I also feel that we will have to guide properly the young officers, after taking the above fact into consideration.

19. Lack of Encouragement for Shipbuilding  
Competition.

Next, I shall speak on the problem of shipbuilding competition. It is difficult to foretell the future on this matter, but in the Pacific the U. S. asserts that she will limit herself to the tonnage stipulated in the two treaties.



of the past and will also stick to the spirit of the treaties. Therefore, we may be justified to think that the U. S. will not begin ship-building competition unless she is stimulated by others. Japan, as the rival of the U. S., has no intention whatever of making armament plans which might threaten the U. S. and incite a shipbuilding competition. As we are of the idea that we will be satisfied with the minimum, with that minimum necessary for the security of Japan's national defense on the sea in the West Pacific, we may be able to say there will be no chance for the rise of a shipbuilding competition between the two states; but, putting aside Japan's idea, how will the U. S. public regard Japan's new armament program? If they conclude from the new program that Japan has begun shipbuilding competition against the spirit of the Disarmament Treaty, and begin the same under the above pretext that is another matter. If their real purport is the preparation of a treaty navy, they may not enter into a competition. But, as I first said, if the fundamental idea of the U. S. is that she does not like Japan's development in the Orient and wants to nip her in the bud as soon as possible, the less said, the better.

#### 20. Probable Start of Competition in Europe.

I cannot make a definite conclusion, but I think, if any shipbuilding competition should arise, that it might be in Europe instead of in the Orient. In Europe a conference was successfully held between Britain and Germany last year. This conference was motivated by the fact that Germany, after declaring a rearmament policy, began to proceed steadily in that direction, and Britain, foreseeing the seriousness of the situation in case Germany should be left to take her own course, wished to oppress Germany. On the other hand, as Germany would not be able to oppose Britain openly for the next ten years, or at least for some time, she wanted, though reluctantly, to go hand in hand with Britain, and thus they came to hold the conference, I believe. Taking advantage of this conference, Britain wanted to hold the Disarmament Conference of last year, and also direct the reduction treaty of this year in the line of the Anglo-German conference, but she was balked in her designs.

Since the Disarmament Conference, Britain has negotiated with Soviet Russia, Poland, Sweden, and other countries. Now Soviet Russia has stood up again. However, Germany, above all, was so exhausted during the Great War and immediately after the war also, that she could not spend money for navy equipment. In recent years, together with France and Italy she has come to make efforts to replenish her navy, thereby driving Britain into a very tough situation. Such being the case, Britain is striving hard to preserve the stand on which she can always remain invincible against any combination of at least two navies, by controlling the various naval countries in Europe.

You are well aware of the recent situation in Europe. I fear it would become serious should complications arise, brought forth by the Spanish problem. Then any country like Soviet Russia or Germany or France may go into a ship-building competition, and a stone thrown by one country will directly or indirectly stir the other Powers. Then Britain will not be able to remain a



spectator in the impending emergency, especially as Britain has received no restriction of amount whatever by the new reduction treaty, she can build ships whenever she wants to. Britain and the U. S. are tacitly carrying out things in a sort of parity between themselves, and so if Britain increases her strength it is only natural that the U. S. will do so also. I may be a little mistaken, but I am of the opinion that if shipbuilding competition should arise in the future, the origin will be in Europe instead of in the Orient. And I also feel that it will be caused by none other than the international situation in Europe.

#### 21. Standard for Naval Budget in the Future.

As for our naval budget for the future, if all the Powers enter into shipbuilding competition from the outbreak of some abnormal situation, I can say nothing for certain now; but, otherwise, the navy, though she is not fully satisfied with the strength estimated and required in the new supplement program, will not need an enormous increase in the future budget, which, if we set up a plan by looking into the near future, will be based on the standard of 1937 budget. We also hope to follow it as much as possible. This is confidential between ourselves. The budget which the navy has demanded of the Finance Ministry is not the same as that which has been recognized, and much has been deleted. As some items of considerable importance were eliminated or postponed for future years, it cannot be said that the budget for future years will be the same as that of 1937. It is a matter of course that items of importance will have to be accomplished early, and consequently the budget of later years will have to be somewhat increased, but, generally speaking, I think that you may understand that the estimated expenditures for the navy for the next few years will be based on the standard of the budget for 1937 with some inevitable addition, and this will suffice us for the next several years. We, on our part, also wish to make it suffice as far as circumstances permit.

I shall end my speech here and shall answer your questions if you have any. I thank you very much for your courteous attention.



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 903-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity:

Assistant Chief, Archives Section, --- Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 57 pages, dated Jan., 1937, and described as follows: "Outline of Naval Budget for Fiscal Year 1937 and the

General Aspect of National Defense Related to the Navy", a lecture

by Adm. Soemu TOYODA, Chief, Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section --- Foreign Office ---

Signed at Tokyo on this

1st. day of Oct., 1946.

NAGAHARU ODO

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: T. SATO

Ass't. Chief, Archives Section.

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. ERIC W. FLEISHER, O-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

1 day of Oct., 1946

ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

NAME

Witness: HENRY SHIMOJIMA

Investigator, I.P.S.

Official Capacity



List of the total increase in Imperial Japanese  
Navy Personnel both enlisted and commissioned from  
 31 December 1934 until 15 August 1945.

(1934-12-31より1945-8-15までに於ける日本海軍軍人(士官・下  
 士官兵共)の總増加員数表)。

Year (on 31 December) 年次 (12-31 現在)	Officers (士官)	Enlisted men (下士官兵)	Total (計)	Increase (増加)
1934	6.911	88.098	95.009	
1935	6.888	90.835	97.723	2.714
1936	7.039	99.898	106.937	9.214
1937	7.942	125.805	133.747	26.810
1938	9.114	145.581	154.695	20.948
1939	10.659	168.046	178.705	24.010
1940	12.411	215.205	227.616	48.911
1941	15.069	296.290	311.359	83.743
1942	23.634	405.734	429.368	118.009
1943	41.055	667.104	708.159	278.791
1944	64.720	1230.405	1295.125	586.966
1945 8-15	66.024	1627.199	1693.223	398.098
Total Increase (増加計)	59.113	1539.101	1598.214	1598.214



# CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government as Member of Research Division, Second Demobilization Bureau, and that in such official capacity, I have prepared the foregoing table from official records of the Japanese Government. I further certify that the table is true and accurate.

Hidemi Yoshida  
Member of Research Division  
2nd Demobilization Bureau.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan,  
on this 1 day of  
October, 1946.

Hidemasa Shimizu  
Member of Personnel Division  
2nd Demobilization Bureau.

## 證明書

私は茲に第二復員局資料整理部部員として  
公式に日本政府に關係し其の資格に於て日  
本政府の公式記録より前記表を作製したこ  
とも證明する  
更に前記表が眞實且つ正確であることも  
證明する。

第二復員局資料整理部部員  
吉田英三

1946年10月1日  
日本東京に於て。

第二復員局人事部部員  
清水秀政。



"Excerpts from Article Appearing in Dec. 12, 1944 Issue of the Nippon Times."

UNITY WILL WIN VICTORY,  
AVERS FOREIGN MINISTER

High Tribute Paid Axis Efforts  
By Shigemitsu in Exchange Broadcast

"There cannot be the slightest doubt about final Axis victory so long as Japan, Germany, Italy and their Allies remain firmly united together," declared Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, in his exchange broadcast with German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Italian Premier and concurrently Foreign Minister Benito Mussolini delivered Monday evening in commemoration of the third anniversary of the Axis Military Pact.

Paying high tribute to the German people's heroic struggle under the leadership of their Fuhrer, Mr. Shigemitsu said, "we are firmly convinced that Europe will, after all, be saved by Hitler and Mussolini."

Mr. Shigemitsu's radio message follows:

"Today, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy, it is a great pleasure for me to be able to exchange greetings over the radio with His Excellencies the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Italy.

"I recall that in 1939 when the war broke out with Britain's declaration of war on Germany, Japan, in accordance with her traditional policy, exerted every possible effort in order to check the expansion of the war disaster. In her sincere desire to maintain peace in East Asia, Japan exerted her best possible efforts in her negotiations with the United States until the last minute, but as it increasingly transpired that the United States was attempting to deny the existence of the Japanese Empire as a great Power in order to attain her sinister designs of dominating the world, Japan was forced to rise resolutely in arms for her self-existence and selfprotection. That Germany and Italy, abiding faithfully by the Tripartite Alliance, immediately declared war on the United States, following in the footsteps Japan, was greatly appreciated by Japan. I also recall that on December 11, 1941, the three nations, concluding a new treaty, firmly pledged themselves to fight out the common war until final victory and simultaneously clarified again to the world their common ideal of establishing a new world order and also realizing true international justice.

Brilliant Results Achieved

"For three years since then, the Armed Forces of the three nations have achieved numerous brilliant war results in the various battlefields of the east and west. On the other hand, we the Japanese people have made steady efforts and are forging ahead toward the realization of our war objective---international justice---by overcoming all sorts of difficulties.



Despite the fact that two or three minor nations in Europe have recently, becoming unable to bear the heavy pressure of the war, fallen out of the Axis camp, Germany, together with Italy, is still carrying on her gallant fight in order to defend the fatherland. In fact, the German National Army, for the self-protection of the German race, is showing a strong determination of not letting the enemy stain even an inch of her soil by repeating its death-defying struggle. The figures of the German people under the leadership of their Fuehrer are undoubtedly the figures of heroes. We firmly believe that after all Europe will be save by Hitler and Mussolini.

VC "The war situation in Greater East Asia as everyone knows, has today entered the decisive stage. Confident of final victory both on the first line and on the home front, we are fighting this decisive war to a finish. The fighting on Leyte has become truly violent. America, depending on material superiority, has mobilized her material strength and brought this to bear in her Leyte operations. However, it is my belief that our Special Attack Units and the Kamikaze Corps will unflinchingly shatter the American forces. Furthermore, the attacking spirit of the Kamikaze Corps is also the spirit of the entire nationals of Japan, both at the front and at home, and is the propelling force that will lead to the attainment of the ultimate victory.

"The attainment of our aim of international justice must be realized no matter what difficulties confront us or how great the Sacrifices. Nay, our lofty ideas of the liberation of Asia and the resurrection of East Asia are today rapidly seeing realization. It is indeed with great joy and pride that hand in hand with the nations and peoples already liberated in East Asia we throw our full strength in this war of righteousness.

"As the war become a prolonged one the enemy has come to disclose in increasingly stark nakedness his inordinate ambitions of world domination. Spurred on by blind hatred against Japan, Germany and Italy, the enemy leaders seek to efface the three nations of Japan, Germany and Italy from the face of the earth and to rule and police the world by themselves, depriving the various peoples of their right of free development. It is clear to all that such is an inhuman policy that attempts to reverse the flow of history. Their policy is a freak phenomena which in the present time prepares for the next war. With the war sacrifices mounting increasingly, it is but natural that the grave question of why the war is being waged should arise in the minds of the nationals of the enemy countries.

#### Enemy Seen Frantic

VC "Thus, the enemy who has fatal weakness within his country, in spite of material superiority, is eager to end the war as soon as possible by means of desperately moving into the offensive. In order to terminate the war at the earliest possible date, the enemy has been mustering all available military forces and resorting to underhand maneuvers when closing in on the Japanese, German and Italian positions. Thanks to the united efforts of Japan, German, Italy and other Axis nations, the enemy has not achieved any of his strategic Schemes in spite of his enormous attrition and sacrifices and his irritation over the progress of the war has become greatly aggravated. Undoubtedly the decisive war is progressing in our favor.



"We harbor unwavering faith in the fact that the struggle for justice will emerge victorious in the end. As long as, Japan, Germany, Italy and other Axis nations are solidly united, we need entertain no doubt as to the successful outcome of the war. It is of deep significance that we pledge afresh to further tighten our cooperation and forge ahead for final victory ever faithful to our ideal, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Three Power Military Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy.

"In closing I should like to pay highest tribute to the struggle now being waged by Germany and Italy and at the same time, pray for the best of health of the Leaders and Foreign Ministers of those countries."



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel G.I. Taranenko.  
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify  
that This photostat is a true copy of the article appearing in  
Dec. 12, 1944 issue of the Nippon Times.  
was delivered to me by Library of the Document Division of the  
International Prosecution Section, Far East  
on or about July 26, 1946, and that the original of the said  
document may be found in Document Division of International Pro-  
secution Section.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

/s/ Lt. Col. Taranenko  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

\_\_\_\_\_, 194\_\_\_\_.



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify the following, viz.:

The book,

Title: "Nippon Times" of Nov. and Dec. 1944

Year of Publication: 1944

No. of Volumes: One

owned by the Imperial Library, was, at the request of the International Prosecution Section, Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, loaned out to the said Section on May 24, 1946.

Dated the 28th day of September, 1946.

Sokichi Ishiguro(Sign. and Seal)



## Official Gazette (extra)

Proceedings in the 86th Imperial Diet  
Published Jan. 22, 1945.

Speech by Prime Minister KOISO Kuniaki  
(Addressed on Jan. 21, 1945)

P. 12 The present situation of the war is far from reassuring but I firmly believe that now it is the best opportunity for us to gain a victory, for the enemy's long way of supply is exposed as our attacking target.

JG P. 14 The enemies are discussing at random about the post-war international structure, calling for our non-conditional surrender and thus planning to strike out Japan. Of course it is a mere dream of fools.

Their Anglo-American's greedy ambition to control the world has been disclosed to the sun. In the district of their occupation they already are quarreling on the share of their big game. On the contrary the countries in the East Asia are, under the joint ideal of reconstructing East Asia, exerting their utmost to protect it and to fight it out with their total powers. The ideal of co-existence and co-prosperity in the joint declaration of the Greater East Asia could not be compared with their cunning object of the aggressive war.

I believe that only the country which would endure any hardship to come, would stand in the way of critical situation and would fight it out with firm resolution of victory, should win in the end.

Speech by Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU Mamoru  
(Addressed on Jan. 21, 1945)

P. 14 The world war has reached a white-heat point. And the enemy which has weak points in its country is making a headlong rush being impatient to finish the war in a hurry.

P. 15 They call themselves as peace loving countries but their war aim lies not in the protection and respect of freedom of the lesser powers but lies in reconstruction of the world system under the dictatorship of the big powers with U.S.A. and Britain as leaders.

The truth is that the Greater East Asia War was broken out because U.S.A. and Britain tried to remove the Japanese power which will be an obstacle to such enterprises.



Depriving East Asians of their countries they want to make them their eternal colonies and make use of them as a base to control the world.

If we lose the war once, all the nations in the East Asia will be exploited and oppressed forever. Britain's policy of fishing in troubled waters, urging the internal strife among Asians, was succeeded by U.S.A. as it is. And it is clearly seen in China. She has driven China into anti-Japanese front with honeyed words and threat.

Our army's aim in the South China is at U. S. Army and its base in order to drive out the U. S.'s disturbing forces in China, to return China to Chinese and to make them contribute to reconstruction of the East Asia in cooperation with Japan.

P. 16      In brief, Japan's intention lies in constructing the world of non-threat and non-aggression.



The Official Gazette. The extra number on the 22nd of January, in the 20th year of Showa. (1945)

The third number of the shorthand records of the proceedings in the House of Peers. (The 86th session of the Imperial Diet.)

(Mamoru SHIGEMITSU, the Minister of States, goes up on the platform.)

The Minister of State (Mamoru SHIGEMITSU)

The combination between our empire and the other allied countries is becoming firmer and firmer, and we are convinced of carrying out the current war successfully to the last together with our allied countries at any cost.

I am convinced that it is our most sacred mission to exert ourselves to carry out, together with our allied countries both in the East and West, the severe battles destined to exploit the future of mankind in order to accomplish the common war aim of making clear international justice in the war of self-existence and self-defence.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 590

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated 22 Jan., 1945, and described as follows: Official Gazette. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files); Cabinet Secretariat.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17th day of September, 1946.

/s/ M. Takashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: H. Kuriyama /s/

Secretary of Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: Wm C. Prout

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



# MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS OF JAPAN

1931 - 1945

ON HAND AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION

1931年乃至1945年に於ける主な日本軍艦の保有量及建造中量

ON HAND

保有量

No. 1

Year (31 Dec)	Battle Ships 戦艦		Aircraft Carriers 航空母艦		Heavy Cruisers 重巡洋艦		Light Cruisers 軽巡洋艦		Destroyers 駆逐艦		Submarines 潜水艦		Total 計	
年 (12月31日)	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数
1931	10	301,400	3	61,270	8	68,400	19	91,355	110	123,940	67	71,174	217	717,539
1932	10	301,400	3	61,270	12	107,800	19	91,355	101	122,040	62	71,518	207	755,383
1933	10	301,400	4	68,370	12	107,800	19	91,355	101	123,956	59	69,298	205	762,179
1934	10	301,400	4	68,370	12	107,800	19	91,355	100	122,842	57	68,478	202	760,245
1935	10	301,400	4	68,370	12	107,800	21	108,355	96	118,520	60	73,798	203	778,243
1936	10	301,400	4	68,370	12	107,800	21	108,355	97	120,349	55	70,173	199	776,447
1937	10	301,400	5	78,420	15	133,300	20	99,855	108	136,458	59	75,628	217	825,056
1938	10	301,400	5	78,420	17	150,300	19	91,355	112	142,458	62	80,373	225	844,306
1939	10	301,400	6	88,470	18	158,800	19	91,355	116	149,458	62	80,373	231	869,856
1940	10	301,400	7	97,970	18	158,800	19	93,055	104	149,828	54	75,260	212	876,313
1941 (7 Dec)	10	301,400	10	152,970	18	158,800	20	98,855	112	165,868	65	97,900	235	975,793
1941	11	365,400	11	162,470	18	158,800	20	98,855	112	165,868	65	97,900	237	1,049,293
1942	10	370,740	10	153,370	17	156,400	20	100,185	101	156,439	67	102,831	225	1,039,965
1943	9	338,020	13	192,370	17	156,400	21	112,760	85	133,337	83	114,497	228	1,047,384
1944	9	338,020	12	254,730	12	109,850	9	50,570	63	99,159	67	92,922	172	945,251
1945 (31 Aug)	4	122,030	6	87,870	7	62,850	4	25,400	43	62,513	64	73,390	128	434,053



# UNDER CONSTRUCTION

建造中量

IPS Document No. 6260

No. 2

1931	0	0	1	7.100	4	39.400	2	17.000	8	12.604	6	9.669	21	85.773
1932	0	0	1	7.100	0	0	2	17.000	4	5.804	3	4.700	10	34.604
1933	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	25.500	6	8.208	7	9.600	16	43.308
1934	0	0	1	10.050	0	0	5	42.500	7	9.576	12	17.000	25	79.126
1935	0	0	1	10.050	0	0	4	34.000	13	18.180	7	10.200	25	72.430
1936	0	0	2	20.100	0	0	4	34.000	16	22.944	7	10.200	29	87.244
1937	1	64.000	3	50.050	2	17.000	0	0	11	19.000	8	15.420	25	165.470
1938	2	128.000	4	59.550	1	8.500	2	11.600	11	21.000	12	25.050	32	253.700
1939	2	128.000	3	49.500	0	0	3	17.400	15	30.000	19	38.700	42	263.600
1940	2	128.000	4	64.500	0	0	2	12.300	11	22.820	23	45.840	42	273.460
1941 (7 Dec)	2	128.000	4	77.860	0	0	4	27.500	12	27.120	29	42.554	51	303.034
1941	1	64.000	3	68.360	0	0	4	27.500	13	29.820	32	44.912	53	234.592
1942	0	0	7	166.860	1	12.500	4	27.500	11	24.420	49	64.560	72	295.840
1943	0	0	10	218.580	0	0	1	6.500	16	28.260	40	73.698	67	327.038
1944	0	0	2	29.960	0	0	0	0	21	29.340	25	35.910	48	95.210
1945 (15 Aug)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	13.930	26	13.930



## Note on HIEI:

The number and tonnage of Battleships from 1932 to 1940 includes the HIEI which was a training battleship during that period.

比叡に同する記事

1932年より1940年までの戦艦隻数に正数中に  
當時練習戦艦であった比叡も含められている。

CERTIFICATE證明書

I hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese government as Member of Research Division Second Demobilization Bureau, and that in such official capacity, I have prepared the foregoing table from official records of the Japanese government. I further certify that the table is true and accurate.

私は茲に第=復員局資料整理部部員として正式に日本政府に同係し其の資格に於て日本政府の公式記録より前記表を作成したことを証明する。更に前記表が眞実且正確であることを証明する。

第=復員局資料整理部  
部員

吉田英三

Hidemichi Yoshida

Member of Research  
Division 2nd  
Demobilization Bureau.

1946年9月23日

日本東京に於て

高野左平

Signed at Tokyo, Japan  
on this 23 day of September,  
1946:

S. Takano



## TELEGRAM (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 25 July 1941 6.20  
Arrived, 25 July 1941 21.30 hours

*ROSENBLIT - re  
destruction of doc.*

No. 1355 of 25 July

Most Urgent

Simultaneously for the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht and Supreme Army Headquarters.

- 1) The draft of reserves slowly beginning in Japan and Manchukuo on 10 July and the following days, suddenly reached a large and no longer concealable extent, especially in the 1st, 4th, 7th, 12th and 16th division, and continued until today in decreased strength. Until the middle of August supposedly about 900,000 (nine hundred thousand) reservists are to be drafted, that is the 24 to 45 year olds; among the eldest, however, only specialists like drivers, technicians, people able to speak Russian, etc. After that, another 500,000 (five hundred thousand) reservists, are supposedly available.
- 2) Together with the drafting of the reservists on 10 July /orders came for/ a draft of horses, motor vehicles, etc., and a little later, instructions to firms to provide military goods of consumption, like foodstuffs, candles, and others till the end of September at the latest.
- 3) On 11 (12) July limitation of the use of foreign languages in the teletype and telephone communications. In addition, starting 20 July mail censorship on foreigners' letters, also within Japan.
- 4) Since 12 July prohibiting of travel by railway, ship, and airplane for foreigners on gradually all along distance lines within Japan and to Korea, China, Formosa. Japanese are also prohibited from entering Sachalin. Japanese students have to remain in the vicinity of their residence.
- 5) Since about 10 July transporting of troops, beginning with Quartermaster troops, technician troops and artillery of the 16th and 1st division and transport of reservists from Japan. Goal: Seishin and Rashin for troops and reservists, Tientsin and Shanghai only for reservists.



- 6) Since the middle of July preparation in Manchuria for billeting and the arrival of troop transports. In addition increased transport of military goods, which may be interpreted as the establishing of supply bases.
- 7) My impression:
- a) Besides the increase of Japanese troops in Manchuria and probably also in North China, a new army group is being formed in Korea.
  - b) According to conversations with officers of the General Staff, besides the Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea apparently also parts of the North China Army are to be used for action against the Soviet Union. No clarity regarding the Japanese operations plan. But it is probable that it will not be limited only to an attack on the Vladivostok area and in a northerly direction, but will also simultaneously start in the direction of Lake Baikal, along the Manchurian Railroad, through Chita, and from the area of Kalgan through Outer Mongolia.
  - c) Time of start /of operations/ unknown. One fact which might bear this out is that, in my opinion, the deployment of troops will take until about the middle of August, and that General OKAMOTO several times mentioned in his conversations that Japan would only start when the German units had reached the Volga.

✓G  
Volga  
KRETSCHMAR

OTT

Note: Forwarded through the teletype office to the code-clerk of the Headquarters of the WEHRMACHT  
Tel. Ktr. 26 July 1941.



AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



CERTIFICATE

Aug. 7, 1946.

16 The undersigned does hereby certify that it is impossible to submit you the following documents, as they are not in our possession now.

1.) All the files of 1st and 2nd Departments of Japanese General Staff bearing upon the planning of war against the USSR. (Otsu and Kan-Toku-En Plans).

2.) The correspondence of the General Staff and the War Ministry of Japan with the Headquarters of Kwantung and Korean Armies on the question of military preparation of Japan for a war against the Soviet Union.

/s/ Yozo Miyama  
Yozo Miyama

Chief of  
Correspondence Section,  
1st Demobilization Bureau.



919

Doc. No. 1973

The Matter pertaining to Supplementary Education  
of the Interpreters of the Kwangtung Army

Staff H. Q. Directive No. 2,  
Notice No. 1408

To the Entire Army under the H. Q.

The students of foreign language schools in Japan and Harbin College (Harbin Gakuin) who have been employed as Army interpreters on Russian language since the opening of the "Kan toku en" should be given supplementary education, in accordance with the "Outline of Supplementary Education for Kwangtung Army Interpreters", as explained in the separate booklet.

Sept. 16, 1941      Commander, Kwangtung Army,

~~UMEZU, Yoshio~~

UMEZU Yoshiziro



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photostatic copy of the Kwantung Army Headquarters directive under the title: "The Matter Pertaining to Supplementary Education of the Interpreters of the Kwantung Army", was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Records office of the said department.

I do further certify -----

Lt. Col. TARANENKO  
(Signature and rank)

Tokyo, Japan,

September 26, 1946.



(title) Basic Principles for Rapid Conclusion of  
War Against the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND,  
NETHERLANDS, and the CHUNGKING Regime

The Fifth of Five Copies

State Top Secret

LIAISON CONFERENCE DECISION PLAN  
11 November 1941

Policy

- I. We shall endeavor to overthrow quickly the American, British, and Dutch bases in the FAR EAST, establish our self-sufficiency, and at the same time hasten the surrender of the CHUNGKING Regime. Further, we shall endeavor to cooperate with GERMANY and ITALY in planning for the submission of ENGLAND first, and then to deprive AMERICA of her will to continue war.
- II. We shall do our utmost to avoid making more enemies. /TN: can be translated: We shall do our utmost to prevent the expansion of enemy powers./

Principal Points

- I. JAPAN will execute a swift war by force of arms and will overthrow the American, British, and Dutch bases in EAST ASIA and in the Southwestern Pacific, thereby ensuring herself a strategically dominant position. At the same time she will secure areas of vital natural resources and principal communication lines, thereby facilitating self-sufficiency of long duration. We shall exhaust every effort to lure out at an opportune time the main naval force of the UNITED STATES and destroy it.
- II. The three countries, JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY, will cooperate in planning for the submission of ENGLAND first.
  - (1) JAPAN will adopt the following plans:
    - (a) In regard to AUSTRALIA and INDIA, she will use such methods as political warfare and disruption of commerce to cut their ties with the UNITED KINGDOM and so scheme to alienate them.
    - (b) She will promote the independence of BURMA.
  - (2) JAPAN will endeavor to have GERMANY and ITALY adopt the following plans:



- (a) Carry out military operations in the NEAR EAST, NORTH AFRICA, and in SUEZ, and at the same time take measures with regard to INDIA.
- (b) Strengthen the blockade against ENGLAND.
- X (c) Carry out landing operations against ENGLAND, when the situation permits.
- (3) The three countries will cooperate in the adoption of the following plans:
  - (a) Strive for liaison and simultaneous action among the three countries via the INDIAN OCEAN.
  - (b) Intensify warfare for the disruption of commerce.
  - (c) Put an end to ENGLAND's receiving natural resources from occupied territory.

III. JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will endeavor to deprive AMERICA of her will to fight and at the same time carry out measures against BRITAIN.

(1) JAPAN will adopt the following plans:

- (a) A. Alienate the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS from the U.S.A. and give them independence.
- B. Take into consideration that the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS must be so handled that they contribute to the rapid conclusion of war.
- C. Leave <sup>concerning</sup> ~~the internal policies~~ <sup>matters concerning</sup> of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS alone.
- (b) Intensify warfare for the destruction of AMERICA's commerce.
- (c) Put an end to AMERICA's receiving natural resources from CHINA and the SOUTH PACIFIC.
- (d) Intensify propaganda and conspiracies against AMERICA. Lay emphasis on luring the main naval force of the UNITED STATES into the FAR EAST, on causing her to reconsider her Far Eastern policy, and on pointing out the senselessness of a Japanese-American war. Induce AMERICA to develop public opinion against war.
- (e) Plan for the alienation of relations between AMERICA and AUSTRALIA.

Proof X



(2) Endeavor to have GERMANY and ITALY adopt the following plans:

- (a) Intensify on-the-sea aggression against AMERICA in the ATLANTIC.
- (b) Intensify military, economic, and political aggression against CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA.

IV. JAPAN, in her relations with CHINA, will use to her own advantage the war against the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS, especially the successful outcome of the military operations. She will plan to stop aid to CHIANG-KAI-SHEK, thereby reducing his power to fight, and, by positive political and military measures, ensure the downfall of the CHUNGKING Regime.

V. While JAPAN is engaged in military operations against southern areas, she will do all in her power to avoid provoking a war with the U.S.S.R. She will take into consideration that if GERMANY and the U.S.S.R. are so inclined, they may be brought to make peace and the U.S.S.R. enticed into the Axis camp.

VI. While constantly keeping watch on and examining the international situation, trends of enemy public opinion, and developments in the war situation, JAPAN shall endeavor to make use of the following opportunities to end the war:

- A. An important pause in military operations against the southern areas.
- B. An important pause in military operations against CHINA, particularly the downfall of the CHIANG regime.
- C. A favorable change in the European War situation, especially, the downfall of ENGLAND, termination of the Russo-German War, or success of the programme against INDIA.

To achieve these ends, JAPAN will immediately intensify her program of diplomacy and propaganda toward the countries of SOUTH AMERICA, SWEDEN, PORTUGAL, and the VATICAN. At the time of ENGLAND's surrender, the three countries, JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will not immediately conclude peace with her, but will strive to have ENGLAND induce AMERICA /to make peace/.



W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.T. No. 1444

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am  
officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity:

Assistant, Chief Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached  
consisting of 7 pages, dated 11 Nov., 1941, and described as

follows: Liaison Conference Decision Plan, 11 November 1941, entitled

"Basic Principle for Rapid Conclusion of War against the United States,

England, Netherlands and Chungking Regime."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official  
document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official  
archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specify-  
ing also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official  
designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

22nd day of Oct., 1946.

Nagaharu ODO

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: S. KOYAMA

Assistant Chief Archives Section

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHN A. CURTIS, hereby certify that I am associated  
with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,  
and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed  
official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

22 day of Oct., 1946

J. A. CURTIS, 2d Lt.

NAME

Witness: RICHARD H. LARSH

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity



BR. EX. 17

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
22 September 1931(Washington,) September 22,  
1931

I opened the conversation with the Japanese Ambassador by referring to our last talk on September 17th when we had both expressed our feeling that the relations of our two countries were in such a satisfactory condition. I said I had been profoundly surprised and concerned by what was taking place in Manchuria and that I had sent Dr. Hornbeck to see the Ambassador on Saturday and now as the matter had developed I wished to see him myself... He said yes, that he had seen Dr. Hornbeck and he had told him of how surprised he (the Ambassador) had been and how concerned he was and how impossible it was for him to understand the causes of what had taken place.

I explained that as he well knew, I had the utmost confidence in Baron Shidehara and his desire for peace and correct international relations. I told him that I had learned from Dr. Hornbeck's report of what Debuchi had said Sunday--that there was a sharp cleavage between Shidehara and some of the militaristic elements of his government. He said that that was so. I said that what I was now doing was seeking to strengthen Baron Shidehara's hand and not to weaken it. The Ambassador said he understood that perfectly. I then took the memorandum which had been prepared (a copy of which is annexed) and read it very slowly to the Ambassador, paraphrasing the language into more simple words wherever it seemed at all necessary in order that he should fully understand it. He repeated many of the sentences, showing that he did understand. When I had finished I said that this was not to be taken as a formal note or an official action on the part of my government, but as the memorandum of a verbal statement given to the Ambassador for the purpose of enabling him to understand and report to his government how I, with my background of friendship towards Japan, felt towards this situation. I said that the Ambassador was at liberty to send it to Shidehara or not, as he saw fit. He said he understood perfectly and that the memorandum did not represent an official note but that if the situation was not remedied he understood that it might be followed by official action on our part later. He said he would communicate its contents to his government that evening.

I then told him that there was one thing however that I would like to ask of him and that was that he postpone his



departure for Japan until the situation was in better shape. I told him I felt confidence in him from our long relations together and that it would be easier to handle the situation if he was here. He expressed himself as very much touched by this and said that he was glad to be able to say that this morning he had, after having purchased his tickets and made all his plans, decided to postpone his departure and had told Madame Debuchi and his daughter to that effect, and had telegraphed out to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco to cancel the appointments he had made.

I spent quite a little time after reading the memorandum in pointing out what a serious impression it would make in this country if the situation of Manchuria is not restored to the status quo. He said he fully understood that and he had been surprised at the moderation of our American press thus far and attributed that to the care which I had taken in the press conferences. He begged me that if the time should ever come when I did wish to act officially in this matter I would first inform him. I said I would try to do so.

H(enry) L. S(timson)

Foreign Relations I, pp. 5-7



Witness Interrogation Affidavit

May 18th, 1946

At Khabarovsk

Captain of Justice Skolov interrogated the following person as witness, warning that the said witness is responsible under Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. for any false statement made.

1. Name: Japanese Major MATSUURA, Kusuo
2. Year of birth: 1917
3. Official position: Chief of Cipher Section, General Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.
4. Membership in political parties: None.
5. Present address: The town of Khabarovsk.

A certificate is appended in which the witness and the interpreter acknowledge that they are responsible for any false testimony or interpretation made.

Q. What languages have you learned?

A. Japanese and some Chinese.

Q. In what language do you wish to state?

A. I wish to state in Japanese.

Q. State about your official positions in Japanese Army.

A. In 1935, I entered the Military Academy in Tokyo, and graduated at it in the beginning of 1939. I was appointed Sub-lieutenant immediately on graduation. I was assigned to the First Company, Reservist Corps, the 23rd Infantry Regiment, Miyakonojo City. In August, 1939, I was appointed instructor of the Cadets' Company (Training Company) of the same Corps. In March, 1940, I was promoted to Lieutenant, assigned to the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the Sixth Division, the Eleventh Army of the Middle China Expeditionary Forces, and appointed section commander of the First Machine Gun Company of the same Regiment. From August 15, 1940, to October 15 of the same year, I was given a lesson in cryptography at the General Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Forces at Nanking, and after completing it, I returned to the previous position in the previous Regiment. On November 15, 1940, I was despatched to the Army Communications School as a student in cryptography. After having graduated at that school on



January 15, 1941, I returned to the previous Regiment and was appointed cipher officer in the Headquarters of the 23rd Infantry Regiment.

In March, 1941, I was appointed Chief of the Cipher Section in the Headquarters of the Mongolia Stationary Army. The Mongolia Stationary Army Headquarters were stationed in the town of Kalgan, Inner Mongolia.

I served in the above mentioned place until August, 1943.

In March, 1942, I was promoted to the rank of Captain.

In August, 1943, I was assigned to the Cipher Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters.

In August, 1944, I was promoted to the rank of Major and ordered Chief of the Cipher Section. I served in this capacity until the surrender of the Japanese Army on August 19, 1945.

Q. In what sort of work did you engage as Chief of the Cipher Section?

A. I engaged in teaching cryptography to the units of the Kwantung Army as well as in the practical ciphering in the Kwantung Army Headquarters. I took in charge all the cipher communications concerning military operations and various informations which were exchanged between the Kwantung Army and the Army General Staff Office, the War Ministry, the Headquarters of the Tokyo Defence Army and other Defence Armies in homeland, the China Expeditionary Forces and the South Sea Army. In the service, I was placed under the command of Lieut.-Col. Morio TOMURA, senior signal staff-officer, who himself was placed under the command of Colonel MATSUMURA Tomokatsu, Chief of the First Section. Colonel MATSUMURA was afterwards appointed Vice-Chief of Staff and concurrently Chief of the First Section.

When I was the Chief of the Cipher Section in the Mongolia Stationary Army prior to August 1943, I took charge of almost the same work as I did as the Chief of the Cipher Section of the Kwantung Army General Headquarters.

Q. What do you know about the Japanese Army's plan regarding the preparations for offensive against the Soviet Union?

A. Towards the end of June, 1941, when I was perusing the orders concerning the cipher work at the Staff Department of the Mongolia Stationary Army, I found among many orders, an order of the Commander-in-Chief of the North China Area Army, who was the direct superior commander of the Mongolia Stationary Army. It was an order issued in June, 1941, but I do not remember its order number. I remember in it was written the order to the Commander of the Mongolia Army that the preparations for military actions should be completed as soon as possible according to the Appendix, "the Principles of the preparations for military actions". I think it was a document ordering the commencement of putting into practice the war preparation plan against the Soviet Union.



Q. For what reason do you witness think that the said order had some connection with the Japanese Army's preparations in Inner Mongolia for offensive against the Soviet Union?

A. I was led to the conclusion by the following facts:  
After the beginning of the German-Soviet War, about June 23-24, 1941, Gen. OKAMURA, Commander of the North China Area Army, called by cipher telegram Lieut.-Gen. AMAKASU, Commander of the Mongolia Stationary Army, and Col. KABURAGI Masataka, senior staff officer in charge of military operations, to the North China Area Army Headquarters in Peking. The above two left for Peking about June 24, 1941.

On returning from Peking, about July 5, 1941, Lieut.-Gen. AMAKASU Tataro called all commanders of the forces under his command for an assembly. It appeared that directives concerning preparations of war against the Soviet Union were given at this meeting. Regarding the military operations against the Soviet Union, Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia had to act in concert with the Kwantung Army. I was told about this matter by Lieut.-Col. ITSHIKI Masao, senior signal staff officer, who had attended the assembly.

Lieut.-Col. Masao ITSHIKI asked me whether the code book to be used after the outbreak of the war against Soviet and to be distributed by the Imperial Headquarters had been fully prepared.

I reported that the said code-book had been fully prepared and well learned.

It was prearranged that, after the opening of hostilities, the additive tables and the emergency indicator tables to be used in combination with the army code-book No. 3 should be changed according to the instructions of the Army General Staff Office.

These additive tables and indicator tables had been already received from the Army General Staff Office.

At the same time, the Commander of the 26th Division who had been in charge of suppressing Chinese guerilla army received orders to prepare for military operations against Outer Mongolia in the Teisuan-taiku desert district.

Early in Sept., 1941, Lieut.-Col. KOTANI, General Staff Officer arrived by airplane from the Kwantung Army Headquarters.

As regards his arrival, a cipher telegram had been previously received informing that Staff-Officer KOTANI would be dispatched from the Kwantung Army General Headquarters for liaison purpose. He had an interview with the commander of the Mongolia Stationary Army. I do not know what had passed between them at the interview.

Since June, 1941, the discharge from military service upon expiration of the term was suspended, and the increase of troops was enforced by newly conscripted strength. For example, over 5,000 appear to have arrived between June and Dec., 1941.

By 1943, the Army forces had been increased to about 70,000 from about 40,000.

About Aug., 1942, the 3rd Tank Division was organized, with the cavalry group as a cadre unit.

Open Sept 1st 1941

Formal Ltr Kw. A. 1940-44

Postponed Summary 1941-1942



I cannot help but say that the problem of an offensive against the Soviet Far East was openly discussed by Japanese officers. During a conversation with Captain NANI Ichiro, an officer attached to the Army Intelligence Section, he stated that the offensive of the Japanese army against Outer Mongolia was to be directed against Ulanbator-Zabaikalye, the object which lay in making military transportation to the Far East difficult by cutting off the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

In May, 1943, five expeditionary parties were organized, each party being composed of about one company. Among them, three parties were dispatched from the 26th Division, and other two from the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade. Major AOSHIMA Ryoichiro, senior army intelligence staff-officer commanded the parties. The object of the expeditionary parties lay in the actual exploration of the Feisuantaku desert district.

After about one month's exploration, it was found out that the Feisuantaku desert district was passable by tanks, and that water could be obtained by a small digging. I heard this from Captain Tsuboi, company commander of the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade, who had joined the expeditionary parties. In the beginning of August, 1943, I was transferred to the General Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.

Q. What do you know about the plan of operations of the Kwantung Army General Headquarters against the Soviet Union?

A. On August 5, 1943, I arrived at the Kwantung Army General Headquarters. I immediately reported my arrival to Major KOBAYASHI, Chief of the Cipher Section, and after having received directions for an officer attached to the Cipher Section, I asked him the explanation of organization and general conditions of the Kwantung Army. Because these were essential problems for fulfilment of my duties.

Major KOBAYASHI explained by means of a map which was hanged on the wall of the officers' room, and stated that there had been in the Kwantung Army an offensive plan of operations against the Soviet Union called "the Kan-Toku-En/ Kwantung Army Special Manoeuvre 1941. According to the said "Kan-Toku-En" plan, two area armies had been newly organized under the command of the Kwantung Army.

The 1st Area Army consisted of the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and the 20th Armies, and its headquarters were stationed at Mutanchiang. The object of the Army lay in the hostile operations against the Red Army in the occupation of the Soviet Maritime Province.

The 2nd Area Army consisted of the 4th and the 6th Armies, and its headquarters were stationed at Chichihaerh. The object of the Army lay in the defensive operations towards the west, with the object of covering the offensive of the 1st Area Army.

According to this plan of operations, large-scale manoeuvres were put into practice in Manchuria by the Kwantung Army since August, 1941. It was so also with the Korea Army in Korea. It can be said that these manoeuvres meant the completion of preparations for the offensive of the Kwantung Army against Soviet.

The "Kan-Toku-En" plan was effective during 1942 and 1943.



During this period, the military strength of the Kwantung Army was ever increased by the supplementary forces conscripted in Japan proper and Manchuria.

Ex-soldier government officials and officials of the special companies of importance in national defence were subject to special education and training while they were off duty.

In December 1943 I attended the assembly of officers attached to cipher sections held at the Army General Staff Office in Tokyo, in order to receive directives concerning the compilation of the code-book for the year 1944. During a conversation with Captain HATTORI, who had been in the service of the Cipher Section of the Kwantung Army General Headquarters in 1941, and was then an officer attached to the Cipher Section of the Army General Staff, he told me that the offensive plan of operations, for the year 1941, of the Kwantung Army against Soviet had been made with the secret designation "Kan-Toku-En".

According to the above-mentioned plan, two stages were pre-arranged in the military action against Soviet. In the first stage, the 1st Area Army was to occupy the Soviet Maritime Province; and in the second stage, it was previously arranged that the military strength of the 1st Area Army, which would have finished the object of its operations in the first stage, should be transferred for the purpose of increasing the military strength of the 2nd Area Army, with the object of developing the offensive operations against the Soviet Zabaikalye district. At the same time, it was pre-arranged, too, that the Mongolia Stationary Army should begin the advance into the Zabaikal district through the Republic of Outer Mongolia.

Q. What do you know, besides what you have already stated, about the documents concerning cipher business which were intended for use after the commencement of advance of the Japanese Army into the Soviet territory?

A. According to the instructions of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, the Cipher Section of the Kwantung Army General Headquarters completed the compilation of an appendix dictionary to be used in combination with the Army code-book No. 3, which was then used.

In this appendix dictionary, the names of the inhabited places in the Soviet Maritime Province and the Zabaikal Province were contained in form of cipher. That cipher form was four figure type. For instance, Vladivostok, Voroshilov, Grodekowo, Sovgavani, Khabarovsk, in the Soviet Maritime Province; Chita, Borzuya, Blagoveshchenski in the Zabaikal Province, together with other towns and villages were recorded in the document.

The appendix dictionaries were about 100 pages each, published as separate volumes and distributed to the headquarters of divisions, armies and area armies to be used in the occupation of Soviet territories. The like appendix dictionaries were also made by the Mongolia Stationary Headquarters, which contained the place names of the Republic of Outer Mongolia and the Zabaikal Province. Each one copy was sent to the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo for reference and has been kept there from 1941 to the time of the surrender of the Japanese Army.



12/7/21

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~~Handwritten note: The above is not known. Designated will not have directly stated. Report~~

PLOP

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13

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REF



Q. What do you know about the time of the opening of hostilities by the Japanese Army against Soviet?

A. I do not know precisely about the time of the opening of hostilities against Soviet, but judging from the progress of preparations made by the Kwantung Army and the Mongolia Stationary Army according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, it can be concluded that the preparations for the surprise attack had been completed by the end of 1941.

In Aug. 1943, Lieut.-Col. TOMURA, Morio, Senior staff liaison officer of the Kwantung Army Headquarters warned Maj. KOBAYASHI and myself that preparations must be made so that we might change the ciphers speedily when military operations against the Soviet Union were opened.

Lieut.-Col. TOMURA told me that, according to the directives of the Imperial Headquarters, the Kwantung Army would open surprise operations against the Red Army so as to overwhelm it by taking the initiative against its superior force.

When I asked Lieut.-Col. TOMURA about the time of advance into Soviet, he replied he did not know.

It was rumoured at that time among the young officers of the General Headquarters of the Kwantung Army that the opening of war against the Soviet Union would be about the beginning of winter of 1943. For example, Captain Tadao NAKAJIMA, attached to the Intelligence Section of the Second Department, drew this inference from the fact that, in winter, rivers would be frozen over and military movement would be facilitated.

Q. What sort of spiritual education were the Japanese troops and people given regarding the offensive against Soviet?

A. The Japanese public propaganda organs acted so that they might impress deeply on the mind of the people, as early as from the age of school pupils, that the Soviet Union was the perpetual enemy against Japan and that there was a constant danger for Japan of being attacked by Soviet. They further propagated the inevitability of the war against Soviet under the conception that it was a matter affecting the destinies of the nation, as the problem of national defence or national existence for Japan, whether she could occupy Saghalien and the Maritime Province, which were at present possessed by the Soviet Union and which were so near to Japan and accordingly would become the base of military offensive against Japan.

The like propaganda was made through newspapers, magazines and radio broadcastings.

It was at the time of the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Triple Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy when the anti-Soviet propaganda was specially strengthened.

At the time of the German advance into the Soviet Union, all Japanese newspapers reported the situation of war favorable to Germany and foretold the victory won by Germany in the near future. As for the official propaganda for the Manchurian occupation, they expounded that Manchukuo was the child of Japan, that the country was necessary for the Japanese people who were the parents of Manchukuo, and that the Soviet Union was a perpetual menace to the security of Manchuria.



According to the order of Major-General TAKAHASHI, Chief of Staff of the Mongolia Stationary Army, Major AOSHIMA, senior staff-officer in charge of intelligence, gave lectures on current problems to officers, at the dining room, almost every day at the beginning of the German-Soviet War. In these lectures, the Major sometimes referred, concerning the inevitability of the War against Soviet, to matters of Anti-Soviet nature. For example, he stated his opinion that the proper time for opening the offensive against Soviet was the period from July to December, 1941, in view of the reduction of military forces of the Soviet Army in the Far East on account of the outburst of the German-Soviet War.

Q. What units were belonging to the Mongolia Stationary Army? And give the names of the commanders of these units.

A. The Mongolia Stationary Army was composed of the 26th Division. (The Division Commander was Lieut.-Gen. Kaneshiro SHIBAYAMA), a Cavalry Group consisted of three regiments, (The Group Commander was Lieut.-Gen. Masao BABA. This Group was reorganized in August, 1942, to the 3rd Tank Division, Lieut.-Gen. Issaku NISHIHARA being appointed by the Emperor as the Division Commander), the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade (the Brigade Commander was Major-Gen. Goro MANO), the 56th Anti-aircraft Gunnery Regiment, the 23rd Automobile Regiment, and the 11th Telegraph Regiment. (I do not remember the regiment commanders' names).

The Commander-in-Chief of the Army was Lieut.-Gen. Jutaro AMAKASU in 1941, Lieut.-Gen. Ichiro SHIGEDA in 1942, Lieut.-Gen. Yoshio KOZUKI in 1943. The Chief of Staff of the Army was Major-Gen. Mosuke TAKAHASHI in 1941, Major-Gen. Toyojiro INAMURA in 1942, Major-Gen. Masao YANO in 1943. The Senior Staff-officer in charge of military operations was Col. Masataka KABURAGI in 1941, Col. Tomomichi YAZATO in 1942 and 1943. The Senior Staff-officer in charge of intelligence was Major Ryoichiro AOSHIMA from 1941 to August 1942, Major Masujiro NAKANISHI from August 1942.

I hereby testify that the above statement was made by myself and that it was true.

Witness	Japanese Major	Kusuo MATSUURA
Interrogator	Officer of Justice	Captain Sokolov
Interpreter		Tsvilov
Private Stonographer		Chemofeev



C E R T I F I C A T E

KREBAROVSK

March 26, 1946

I, undersigned Major MATSUURA, Kusuo pledge that being a witness in the case of the main war criminals I shall testify truly and correctly.

I am warned of the responsibility I bear for giving false testimony provided for in article 95 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

This certificate is submitted to the Military interrogator Captain SOKOLOV, Sergei Pavlovich.

/s/ MATSUURA, Kusuo

The certificate is submitted to: the Military Interrogator, Captain SOKOLOV.

/s/ SOKOLOV.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. A. KAPLAN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

/s/ V.A. KAPLAN



Seljima Ryuzo, 34, Staff off. 1st Sect, operation Dept.  
you a P.W. of Sov.-Union. 9/27/46, Yes, I wrote it with my own hand,  
it was written by me, I signed each page, contents are true.

#2673



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

The United States of America, etc. )  
 )  
 vs. ) SS.  
 )  
 AFAKI. Sadno and others )

AFR IDAVIT.

I, SEJIMA, Ruizo, ex-Lieutenant-Colonel of the Japanese Army, born in 1911 (Meiji 44) state as follows:

I graduated from the Military Academy in 1932 (showa 7) and from the Military College in 1938 (Showa 13). In January 1940 (Showa 15) I was attached to the Army General Staff Office; then in December 1941 (Showa 16), I was appointed member of the 1st Department (Military Operations Department) of the Army General Staff Office, where I actually worked till August 1944 (Showa 19).

I take oath and testify as follows to the facts I had been able to learn in the execution of my duties while working with the Army General Staff Office from January 1940 (Showa 15) to August 1944 (Showa 19).

I. During this period I worked continuously in Section II /'DAINIKA'/ 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office. This section, called the Military Operations Section, took charge of duties regarding plans for military operations. From January 1940 (Showa 15) to December 1941 (Showa 16), I attended to matters of general business which included safe-keeping of secret documents and incineration of documents for which the custody period had expired. During the period that I was a member of Section II, I had charge of matters regarding employment of military forces, and during the latter part, I also participated in the drawing up of operational plans, some of which I drew up myself.

In about spring of 1941 (Showa 16), I incinerated the documents concerning the plans for the 1939 (Showa 14) military operations which had been kept in the document safe. In the Army General Staff Office, the period of custody for operational plans was generally two years. Before incinerating these documents



I took a glance through them and found among them the plans for the 1939 (Showa 14) operations against the U.S.S.R. It was thus that I learned about these plans and can still recollect their outline.

According to this plan, the chief strategical scheme of Japan's Supreme Command, in case of a Russo-Japanese war, was to concentrate our main forces in Eastern Manchuria and take the offensive against Far East Russia. In this case, the Kwantung Army was to occupy VOROSHILOV, VLADIVOSTOK, IMAN and then KHABAROVSK, BRAGOVESHCHENSK and KUIVSHEVSKA.

After I became a member of Section II, 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office, I was able to learn in far more detail the contents of the operational plans as my duties were related to the employment of military forces. It was because I had to consider operational plans for the various areas concerned, in the employment of military forces. Accordingly, I have been able to learn the plans for operations against Russia for the years 1941 (Showa 16) and 1942 (Showa 17).

According to the operational plan for the year 1941 (Showa 16) the Kwantung Army was to concentrate its main forces in the direction of the Maritime Provinces, a part of its forces in the direction of BRAGOVESHCHENSK and KUIVSHEVSKA, and another part in the neighbourhood of HAILAR while the reserve was to be concentrated in HARBIN in the event of a Russo-Japanese war. The offensive was to be taken from the SUI-REN HO district towards and from the HEI-HO district towards the BRAGOVESHCHENSK and KUIVSHEVSKA districts. Plans were made for the forces in the neighbourhood of HAILAR to take a defensive position in order to protect offensive operations in other areas. The aim of the offensive operations in the Maritime Provinces was to occupy that area, while the offensive in the BRAGOVESHCHENSK and KUIVSHEVSKA districts was meant to cut the railway, to make reinforcement and supply from the west impossible.

In the first phase of the war, they expected to occupy VOROSHILOV, VLADIVOSTOK, BRAGOVESHCHENSK, IMAN, KUIVSHEVSKA and RULOVO, while in the second phase, they expected as far as the situation permitted, to occupy North SAKHALIN, Port PETROPAVLOVSK of KANCHATKA, NIKOLAYEVSK of the Amur River, KOMOSMORISK and SORGAWANI.

Beside the Army's plan of operation worked out at the Army General Staff Office, there were as a part of the operational plans, the plans for joint operations to be carried out in close cooperation by the Army and Navy together. Out of



these plans, those concerning Naval operations were worked out at the Naval General Staff Office and forwarded to the Army General Staff Office where they were inserted as part of the operational plans.

Accordingly, I looked through some of the plans for Naval operations also. For instance, the Naval operations for 1941 (Showa 16) had the three following objects:

(1) to protect the landings on Port PETROPAVIOVSK of KAMCHATKA and NORTH SAKHALIN;

(2) to attack the Russian Pacific Fleet and blockade VLADIVOSTOK from the sea front;

(3) to protect the communication line connecting Japan Proper, Korea and Manchuria by guarding the TSUSHIMA channel.

In 1942 (Showa 17), the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office had worked out a new plan for operations against the U.S.S.R., which was adhered to until the spring of 1944 (Showa 19). Having seen this plan many times, I can still recollect its outline.

Like all the previous operational plans, this plan for the year 1942 (Showa 17) was an offensive plan and the operation was scheduled to commence with a surprise attack.

According to the above plan, about thirty divisions were scheduled to be concentrated in MANCHURIA with the main force in Eastern MANCHURIA and concentrations of some of the forces in the SUN-WU and HAILAR districts respectively. The First Front which was to take the offensive against VOROSHLOV consisted of the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 20th armies. The forces of the four armies were to advance in parallel so that they could fight a decisive battle in the vicinity of VOROSHLOV. The 2nd Front consisted of the 4th and 8th armies and its object was to take the offensive in the SVOVODONUI and KUIBYSHEVKA districts to annihilate the Russian forces in those areas, and cut the railway. Diversional operations were scheduled to be undertaken by the 6th Army in the Western areas. In the first phase of the war, the Japanese Army was scheduled to occupy the Russian cities in the Maritime Province and BRAGOVESHCHENSK, SVOVODONUK and KUIBYSHEVSKA. The forces in HOKKAIDO were to occupy North SAKHALIN, and a division in Japan Proper was to occupy Port PETROPAVLOVSK of KAMCHATKA.



The plans for Naval operations for the year 1942 (Showa 17) was in general the same as that of 1941 (Showa 16). The operational plans against the U.S.S.R. for 1943 (Showa 18) also followed the above plans for 1942 (Showa 17).

It had never been explained to me whether there was to be a war against Russia or not. All I knew were the military matters concerning operational plans as an officer of the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office, and I have no knowledge concerning political relations.

II. In about the summer of 1941 (Showa 16), after the German attack on Russia, I came to learn the following facts in connection with the reinforcement of the Kwantung Army.

A. In about the summer of 1941 (Showa 16), I saw, at the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office, the text of the Imperial Command (handwritten) for despatching two new divisions to the Kwantung Army.

B. In about the summer of 1941 (Showa 16), I saw, at the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office, a military order (printed) reorganization in connection with the fifteen divisions of the Kwantung Army on a semi-war-time basis, which was distributed to each section of the department.

C. Through the documents I saw at the Army General Staff Office, in other words, through the telegrams reporting the progress of mobilization in all districts, I knew that a mobilization was underway in Japan in the summer of 1941 (Showa 16) to reinforce the Kwantung Army. The number of mobilized men was about 300,000, and I came to learn about it through calculation of the strength of the Kwantung Army in 1942 (Showa 17).

The mobilization was secretly carried out, and the usual elaborate send-offs for the conscripts were prohibited. In Tokyo, I often saw mobilized troops passing through or leaving from the stations in profound silence.

The above was written by my own hand and the contents are true.

(signed) Sejima, Ruizo



op. order rec. by any inst. report to  
the or Chief of Staff  
rec. sanction of theme which  
comes under command.

"acts under order of Emperor.  
Generalissimo, Dai ginsui"

Am. Jap. war + Brit Jap. war 1941

Ben Togo + Amegh.

Lt Col Seizme Ryugo, staff officer in operation section <sup>Planning</sup>  
army under cross examination Ben. Blakely regarding originator  
of offensive operational plans of 1941- and 42 anti Russia  
said order originated in Chief Staff - "operation order in the  
Imperial army with respect to operation Chief of army Gen. Staff  
rec. sanction of the theme which ~~acts under~~  
... acts under order of the Emperor." <sup>comes under Imperial Command.</sup>

YAMOTO =



Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named SEIJIMA, Ruizo, at the Soviet Embassy Building, Tokyo, Japan, this day 27th of September, 1946.

/signed/ Roland J. Schwartz  
Roland J. Schwartz, Capt. T.C.  
Summary Courts Martial

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, 2nd Lt. John D. Hattori, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said SEIJIMA, Ruizo, was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 27th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

/signed/ John D. Hattori

JOHN D. HATTORI

2nd Lt.

Central Interrogation Section.



922

BR. EX. 19

TELEGRAM  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE CHARGE IN JAPAN  
(NEVILLE)

Washington, September 24, 1931--  
4 p.m.

167. Please deliver to the Minister for Foreign Affairs immediately as a note, the identical text of which will be communicated by the American Minister to China to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, the following:

"The Government and people of the United States have observed with regret and with great concern events of the past few days in Manchuria. In view of the sincere desire of the people of this country that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies between nations without resort to use of force, the American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military forces to refrain from any further hostilities will so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy the requirements of international law and international agreements, and will refrain from activities which may prejudice the attainment by amicable methods of an adjustment of their differences."

STIMSON

Foreign Relations I, v. 9



AUTOGRAPH TESTIMONY

P.W. Former Commander of the First Area Army  
of the Kwantung Army. General KITA, Seichi.  
From April 20 to April 23, 1946.

I, former Commander of the first Area Army of Kwantung Army, General KITA, Seichi shall state about the preparation for seizure of Manchuria and the attack against U.S.S.R. by Japan.

At the beginning of Showa era, i.e., in 1926, the civil war in China expanded. This civil war was caused by the anti-northern expedition carried out by Sun-Bun and CHIANG Kai-shek with the object of unifying and restoring the national rights of China. If this movement should extend to Manchuria, the Japanese rights in that area would be contradicted. The Japanese government, therefore, decided the following measures:

1. That the civil war of China shall not be allowed to extend over Manchuria.
2. That the influence of Sun-Bun shall not be allowed to penetrate into Manchuria.
3. That the government of CHANG Tsuo-lin in Manchuria shall be supported to the utmost so that he might be able to make every effort to prevent the Chinese national liberation movement from penetrating into Manchuria and also to suppress the anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria itself.

These political measures of Japan were decided by the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs and were sanctioned by Premier TANAKA. I myself saw the documents concerning the above decisions at the War Ministry office in July, 1927. The then War Minister was General UGAKI.

In May 1928, the nationalist forces in North China smashed the resistance of CHANG Tsuo-lin and drove him into Manchuria. The nationalist movement did not penetrate into Manchuria, but the anti-Japanese sentiment there gradually aggravated. Under such conditions in China and Manchuria in August 1929, I was appointed assistant Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking by the order of the Chief of the General Staff, General KANAYA, and was attached to Military Attache, Major-General SATO, who was stationed in Shanghai. I was appointed to this post, because I had studied the general situation in China, the characters and customs of the Chinese people, and the Chinese language, and also because I had some acquaintances among the important persons of the Army in the Nanking government. For instance, I met War Minister General HO Ying-Chin at CHENKIANG in 1927 through one of his friends who was working at the Japanese consulate in Nanking. At that time the Japanese War Ministry dispatched me for the investigation of the Nanking Incident in China. (Japanese residents took refuge in the Nanking Consulate, which was attacked by the nationalist force). I went to CHEN KIANG with the



object of spying upon the conditions of the nationalist anti-northern expedition. It was there that I made the acquaintance of HQ Ting-Chin, then the highest commander of the nationalist army in that section. HQ Ying-chin had formerly studied in the Military Academy of Japan and was kind to the Japanese. Besides this person, I was on good terms with the vice-chief of the Military Administration Section of the Nanking Government, CHEN-Yi, Inspector-General of Military Discipline, Lt. General CHU Ya-wei, Chief of the Survey Bureau of Army, Lt. General HUANG, MU-sung, and Commander of Engineer Corps, Lt. General YANG-Chieh. With them I was friends from the time when we were students of the Military Staff College in Tokyo. When I was appointed assistant Military Attache to the Embassy, my personal opinion regarding the Japanese policy in China was taken into consideration in addition to the above-said conditions. I, of course, was in accord with this policy. Before my departure for Nanking, I received the following instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, General KANAYA:

1. To spy upon the military strength of the Central Army of the Nanking Government.
2. To collect data regarding the national liberation movement originated by the Nationalist party, to pay special attention to the trend of expansion of this movement into Manchuria, and to make efforts to prevent it from penetrating into Manchuria.
3. To form friends among the military circles of the Nanking Government to facilitate execution of my duties.

I received the same instructions from the military attache to the Embassy, Major-General SATO in Shanghai, who directed me further on the day that I was dispatched to Nanking, to pay attention to the situation of military administration of the Nanking Government. After my arrival in Nanking, I established contact with the above-mentioned military authorities of the Nanking Government and I carried out my duties as instructed. Aside from the above, I took charge of the intelligence work pertaining to Military Administration. I executed this work through connections with important persons in the Nanking Government and by the utilization of secret agents. The situation in China at that time can be said to have facilitated intelligence work -- the segregation of society due to the civil war, the confrontation of the Chinese military cliques, the existence of anti-government elements and so on. We could easily fulfill whatever requirements concerning intelligence under such circumstances. I succeeded in forming somewhat better relationship with the military authorities of the Nanking Government, but the situation in Manchuria at that time was aggravated day by day by anti-Japanese movement which caused many incidents. Not long before the Manchurian Incident in 1931, a Japanese captain whose name was NAKAMURA was killed on a road in HSINGAN LING near Solon. Captain NAKAMURA was one of the staff officers of the General Staff. The General Staff had dispatched him to attend to the intelligence work in the neighborhood of HSING AN LING. After my arrival as Chief of the second section of the Headquarters of Kwantung Army, in 1932, I heard from many people working at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army that the said NAKAMURA was dispatched with the object of investigating the roads in HSING AN LING and I am convinced of the statements being true.



I think I can safely say concerning the Japanese preparation for the occupation of Manchuria that the fact that Japan has long been covetous of Manchuria could be testified by the condition before the Manchurian Incident and by various other situations there. Japan wanted to have military bases in Manchuria for the execution of aggressive plans against Soviet Russia. The construction of strategic railway lines in Korea such as the Seoul-Fumen line, the Ranan line, and the Fusan-Mukden line was carried out with the same objective. To realize this cherished plan some proper historical time had to be chosen. The year of 1931 afforded a good opportunity, because countries which had interests in Manchuria, for instance, China and Soviet Russia were absorbed in their own affairs and could not afford to direct their attentions to Manchuria, the former being absorbed in civil war, and the latter, in the five-year national construction program. Japan, taking all these facts into consideration, increased the expeditionary forces in Manchuria on Sept. 18 1931. The action resulted in the occupation of the whole of Manchuria. Following the occupation, Japan set to work on the establishment of Manchukuo. There were two opinions--one was to place Manchuria under Chinese administration with certain number of Japanese advisers in the Manchurian government, the other was to form an independent monarchical state, Manchukuo, and to keep the real power of the country in the hands of Japan. The latter plan was advocated by Lt. Col. ISHIMURA and Col. ITAGAKI who were at the headquarters of Kwantung Army, and was supported by Gen. ARAKI. In accordance with the latter program, all the ministers of the cabinet were selected from among the Manchurians, and the positions of vice-ministers were filled by Japanese subjects. Moreover, it was decided that some Japanese officials should serve in various Manchurian government offices. Such a policy aggravated the anti-Japanese sentiment among the Manchurian people, and caused the increase of anti-Japanese troops which had actively resisted the Japanese forces in Manchuria. In this connection Kwantung Army made it their primary task to annihilate all the anti-Japanese elements either by subjugating them or by advising their allegiance by means of propaganda. Major punitive expeditions were carried out around the cities of Harbin, Chinchow, and in the vicinity of TUNG PIEN TAO. The pursuit of the armies of MA Chan-shan and LI-Tu and the subjugation of Jehol were also punitive campaigns. These military operations were directed by the Chief of the Staff Lt. Gen. MIYAKE and Lt. Gen. KOISO when Generals Honjo and Muto were commanders of the Kwantung Army. These punitive operations caused the innocent Manchurian civilians enormous damage and brought many of them to bankruptcy. We cannot but definitely admit that such operations caused the dispersion of the people, destruction of houses, loss of properties and such like. Owing to the number of years that have elapsed I do not remember well the amount and scope of losses and damage caused by these operations, but I cannot but recognize the fact for seven long years warfare was conducted at a considerable sacrifice on the part of the Chinese people. During the period when I served at the headquarters of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army as Chief of the second section, the subjugation plans and measures were formed in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army by Col. SAITO and Lt. Col. NEDO. Those officers who directly commanded the expeditions are as follows:

1. Harbin and the vicinity of KIRIN the 10th Division  
(Commander, Lt. Gen. HIROSE)
2. The vicinity of Chinchow and Jehol the 8th Division  
(Commander, Lt. Gen. NISHI).



3. The Province of HEILUNGKIANG and the vicinity of CHIHINHAIERH the 14th Division (Commander, Lt. Gen. MATSOKI, later succeeded by Lt. General HATA, Shinroku.
4. Vicinity of Jehol, the 6th Division (Commander, Lt.Gen.SAKAMOTO)  
Mixed brigade (Commander, Maj. Ge. HATTORI)

A part of the above-mentioned divisions simultaneously launched a punitive campaign in another area. The operations in Jehol was directly commanded by the commander of Kwantung Army General MUTO and I also participated in the Jehol operations. I, as chief of the second section, presented to the chief of staff of Kwantung Army the data of intelligence concerning both the doings and movements of the anti-Japanese troops; and the districts whose population was imbued with anti-Japanese sentiments. Then the first section made the subjugation plan based on my reports. In the spring of 1934 a large scale military operation was carried out in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, south of CHIA MU SSU. The operation was carried out to subjugate the Manchurian units which, being dissatisfied with the purchase of Manchurian possessed land by the Manchurian Development Company of Japan, revolted and attacked the Japanese forces with the result of annihilating the whole strength of a company and killing the regimental commander, Colonel IIZUKA. In order to suppress the rioters in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, the Japanese army sent a large number of forces there. Bestirred by the retaliative sentiment provoked by the death of their own regimental Commander Col. IIZUKA, they caused enormous damages to the Manchurian residents. This fighting was directed by the chief of staff Col. KANO of the 10th Division (Commanded by Lt. Gen.HIROSE). The responsibility for these subjugation campaigns in general carried out by Kwantung Army in Manchuria during the period from 1931 to 1936 should be borne by the then commanders of Kwantung Army--Generals HONJO, MUTO, HISHIKARI, MINAMI and UEDA. At the same time in 1933 Japan began to take measures to expel from Manchuria the influence of Soviet Russia which at that time confined itself to the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. With this object in view, the Japanese put various kinds of pressure upon the railway and its employees. These machinations were chiefly made by the head of military Special Service in Harbin, Maj. Gen. KOMA TSUBARA, the Representative of the South Manchuria Rly. Company in Harbin. Director USAMI and other agents, they were all under the direction of Col. HARADA, chief of the third section of headquarters. I cannot flatly deny the fact that Japan made use of agitators in the Chinese Eastern Rlys. in order to expel the influence of Soviet Russia from Manchuria or that Japan utilized some bandits to disturb the railway administration as well as to bring pressure to bear upon its employees. But at that time, not only the business of the Chinese Eastern Rlys, but also those of all other railways throughout Manchuria were disturbed by bandits.

*ant* In 1935 Japan, by resorting to every possible means, induced Soviet Russia to sell the right and interest of the Chinese Eastern Rlys. After that Japan gradually enlarged her preparation for military bases in Manchuria for war against Soviet Russia. Along with it, the building of fortresses in ten areas, the establishment of 200 airfields of all sizes,



the construction of railways extending 9,000 kilometers, the construction of HASHIN harbor, the construction of communications and roads, the establishment of munition factories etc., were carried out. Most of these construction works were executed in accordance with the plans prepared by the General Staff of the Japanese Government the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. The Kwantung Army took the following measures in order to carry out these plans, the instructions of the General Staff, and requests made by myself.

1. The fortification department to build fortresses.
2. The air force units to build air-fields.
3. The Manchurian Civil Engineering Bureau to build military roads.
4. The Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Company to establish communications.
5. The construction of harbors and railways shall be entrusted to the South Manchuria Rly Company.
6. The Manchurian Heavy Industry Company shall be founded for the establishment and management of munition factories.

The Japanese authorities, either purchased at low prices by compulsion the land owned by Manchurians or forced them to remove to other places for the sake of these construction works and for the settlement of Japanese immigrants, and thereby provoked intense dissatisfaction among the Manchurian people. In addition, the Japanese authorities established the system of compulsory labor to conscript Manchurians for military construction works. The conscripted laborers received lower wages than the free laborers to the detriment of their welfare. Moreover, the bad condition of housing, sanitation and supply, the defective management by the Japanese and so on resulted in the death of many laborers from sickness. In 1944, for instance, about 20,000 Manchurian laborers were employed for the construction of fortresses in the neighborhood of HSING AN LING and the number of those who died from illness mounted to 500. The former chiefs of staff of the Kwantung Army, Lt. Gen. HATA and General USHIROKU explained to me that there were cases of death reported from other districts but they did not tell me the number of the dead laborers. The total number of Manchurian laborers conscripted by Kwantung Army amounted to 120,000 or 130,000.

Those who were responsible for the strengthening of Manchuria as military bases against Soviet Russia since the Manchurian Incident in 1931 are Japanese Premier, INOUE, KONOE, and General TOJO; Japanese War Ministers Generals ARAKI, SUGIYAMA and TOJO; Chiefs of the General staff, Generals KANAYA, Prince KAN-IN, SUGIYAMA and TOJO; Commanders of the Kwantung Army, Generals HONJO, HISHIKARI, MINAMI, UEDA and UMEZU, and those members of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army to whom I referred to in this testimony. In August of 1934 I was transferred to the position of Chief of the China section the General Staff. The then chief of the General Staff was Prince KAN-IN, Deputy Chief, Lt. Gen. SUGIYAMA (later General); Chief of the 1st department, Maj. Gen. SUZUKI (later Lt. Gen.); chief of the 2nd Department, Maj. Gen. ISOYA (later Lt. Gen.), and chief of the 3rd department, Maj. Gen. USHIRO-KU (later General). The work of the China section was the adjustment and judgment of the intelligence pertaining to China and the investigation of topography for military purposes. The section constituted of two groups, that is, the China group (chief, Lt. Col. KUSUMOTO) and the geography group (chief Lt. Col. WACHI), with four or five officers being attached to each of them. The work was executed



by studying and putting together all the intelligence and documents from the Korea Army, Kwantung Army, Tientsin Army and Formosa Army; from the military attaches and officers stationed in the various countries, especially from the attache at the Embassy in China and officers stationed in Peking, Tientsin, and Canton, together with those from the Navy and Foreign Ministers. While I was in that post, the anti-Japanese sentiment in China gradually increased and spread owing to the Manchurian Incident, but nothing serious happened. At that time a plan for strengthening the forces in Manchuria was furthered and in 1936 the program to increase Kwantung Army to four divisions, five railway guard units (each five battalions) and four frontier garrisons, was realized.

In 1934 the General Staff gave Kwantung Army instructions pertaining to the building of fortresses. In this connection investigation had already been made since about 1933.

The Anti-Comintern Pact among Japan, Germany, and Italy:

In 1936 the anti-Comintern Pact was concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy. Negotiations relative to this pact had already been in progress since autumn 1935 between the military attache to the Embassy in Germany, Lt. Gen. OSHIMA, and the German government authorities. Since then through the efforts of Military Attache OSHIMA its conclusion was reached. It is not clear who, among the important governmental officials in Tokyo supported this measure, but I, as well as other persons clearly recognized the fact that the appearance of this pact, whose nature was provocative to Soviet Russia, brought an ill effect on the diplomatic relations between the two countries. In Japan this anti-Comintern Pact was used to unify the National thought against Soviet Russia. Every possible effort was made to instigate the people that we had to fight to the utmost against the Communist politics of Soviet Russia, and that it was necessary to dissolve the PA LU Army of China, etc. This pact resulted in strengthening Japanese national spiritual preparation for war against Soviet Russia and also in the interference in the internal administration of China.

The days when I was the Military Attache to the Embassy in China:

In April 1936, having been appointed the Military Attache to the Embassy in China, I reported to Shanghai. Before this, the Foreign Minister of the Tokyo Government, considering the fact that the Sino-Japanese relation was becoming more serious, had newly appointed Ambassador KAWAGOE to China. The problems to be solved by the Ambassador were as follows:

1. China shall connive the Japanese rights in Manchuria, that is to say, China shall pretend not to notice the occupation of Manchuria by Japan.
2. China shall suppress movements which are anti-Japanese and which are insulting to Japanese. Both countries shall co-operate economically.



3. China shall cooperate with Japan in anti-Commintern activities.

I remember that as the compensation for the above three conditions Japan promised China economic and technical aid. Although in June 1936, Ambassador KAWAGOE began negotiations with the Nanking Government on these problems, the Nanking Government did not agree and the negotiations were suspended. The Nanking Government made the following answers as to the proposals offered by Japan:

1. China will not officially recognize Manchukuo, but will connive the situation in Manchuria.
2. China herself will resist Communism. Materially speaking, China is fighting against the Pa Lu Army. But she cannot promise Japan that she will cooperate against Communism lest it should aggravate diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.
3. The Chinese Government cannot suppress the anti-Japanese movements in China by its own power as it represents the sentiment of the whole Chinese people, and not sentiment of an individual.

The Nanking Government continued to maintain this opinion till the last moment, and brought about the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. Before my departure for Shanghai as Military Attache to the Embassy in China, I received from the Deputy Chief of the Staff, Lt. Gen. NISHIO instructions, the important points of which were as follows: "I shall collect intelligence regarding the political trend of the Nanking Government, especially the military situation and at the same time co-operate with Ambassador KAWAGOE to adjust the diplomatic relations between both countries." I went from time to time to Nanking and saw the Ambassador. However, relations with China became serious day by day and at last an incident broke out when, in July 1937, Japanese troops stationed in the suburbs of Peking on maneuver were fired upon by the Chinese. Japan strived to solve the problem on the spot but did not succeed. Japan later announced in the press and to the diplomatic representatives that she would not recognize CHIANG Kai-shek's Government and would attack to punish the Chinese troops. In August 1937 the Japanese landing party (Navy) collided with the Chinese forces near Shanghai. This incident formed the second stage of the gradually expanding Sino-Japanese War.

The period when I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Chief of the Liaison Section of the China Affairs Board (Ko-A-In).

In August 1937 at the time of the expansion of the Sino-Japanese War the North China Area Army was established in Peking. At the same time, I was appointed Chief of the Special Service Section of the Army and reported to my new post in Peking. I was appointed to that post by War Minister Gen. SUGIYAMA. The duties of the Special Service Section



were to execute the work of Military administration, and the actual work was to Japanize the occupied area in China, i.e. to establish a government as a guiding organ of politics, economics and culture. I made the following bureaux in the Special Service Section.

1. General Affairs Bureau--in charge of political matters.
2. First Economic Bureau--in charge of finance and economy.
3. Second Economic Bureau--in charge of traffic and industries.
4. Culture Bureau--in charge of education and culture.

Experts were sent to the Special Service Section from various departments of the Japanese government and in order to establish a plan for managing administration and economy in the occupied areas in China at that time. An important measure, which I took in North China while I was chief of the Special Service Section, was the establishment of a regime in North China with Wang Ko-min, a pro-Japanese at its head. He was formerly a finance minister, but I do not remember in what regime. Japanese representatives were employed as advisers in the Wang Ko-min regime. As one of the advisers I took direct charge of political affairs. The others were economic adviser HIRAO Hachisaburo, administrative adviser YUSAWA Michio, and legal adviser ODATE Shigeo. These three were not military men. The principle of the advisers was to carry out the policies of the Japanese government in the activities and operations of the Wang Ko-min regime and to cooperate to the fullest extent with Japanese Military forces in the war against China. In 1939 the Special Service Section was DISSOLVED and its duties were transferred to the newly organized Asia Development Board (Koain). I was appointed Chief of the North China Liaison Section of the Asia Development Board. I received this appointment from the cabinet, HIRANUMA was Premier at that time. Since the board was not a military organ, I became a civilian official, but still remaining in active service. I was also a committeeman on the board. The headquarters of the Asiatic Development Board was in Tokyo and Premier HIRANUMA was the head and the president. Vice-presidents were War Minister Lt. General ITAGAKI, THE Navy Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Finance Minister; and there were about sixty board members. The actual work was not carried out by the president but by Chief of the General Affairs Bureau YANAGAWA Heisuke. Since this board was not a social organization but a purely national organization, civilian officials as well as military officers could become board members. As stated above during the time when I was Chief of the Liaison Section up until 1940 the planning duty of the Asia Development Board was to Japanize China. I know well that such a plan was not to be applied to the other countries which came into the system of greater East Asia. Later, however, upon the break of the Jap--U. S. war when Japan occupied other countries in East Asia such as Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, the Phillipine Islands and other islands in the Southern Pacific, the scope of such activities as those of the Asia Development Board was greatly expanded. Therefore, so as to perform the planning duties of the board not only in China but also in the occupied territories in Greater East Asia, a larger and stronger organization based on the Asian Development Board was required. Consequently, in the beginning of 1942, the Board was absorbed by the newly established Greater East Asia Ministry and the duty of the Chief of the



Liaison Section of the Board was transferred to the embassies set up in the various occupied territories. For example there was General YAMADA, the commander of the Kwantung Army as Envoy Extra-ordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Manchuria, TANI as Ambassador in a similar position in the Wang Ching-Wei regime and similar embassies in Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, other countries occupied by Japan. These embassies performed the planning duty of the former Asia Development Board, that is, they Japanized the territories under Japanese occupation. While I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Liaison Section in North China, I did much to assure the suitable condition of the strategic operation of our North China Army and to help to strengthen the military foundation in Manchuria.

In the summer of 1937, the Inner Mongolian Garrison Army was set up in Kalgan concurrently with the operations of the North China Army. In August 1937, the Kwantung Army under the command of the Chief of Staff Lt. General TOJO (later full general) captured Inner Mongolia and established the Special Service Agency TOKUMU-KIKAN, appointing Major General MATSUI its chief. Later, when the Mongolian Army was established its Commander was Lt. General HASUNUMA, the Special Service Agency was changed into the Special Service Section (TOKUMU-BU and Major General MATSUI remaining as chief. In November 1937, Major General MATSUI established a Japanized Mongolia-Hsinking government headed by Prince Te. Japanese advisors from Manchuria were placed in this government. The object of our occupation of Inner Mongolia and the establishment of a Japanized government was the same as our object at the time when we got possession of Manchuria, that is to say, to hold Inner Mongolia at Japan's command and set up a military base there against Outer Mongolia. This measure was carried out at the insistence of Lt. General TOJO, the then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and the same policy was continued by him even after he became Prime Minister of Japan. The assistance which I offered to the measure for the taking of Inner Mongolia was in creating in North China a provision for driving out of China and out of Inner Mongolia the Chinese forces which opposed our North China Army thereby facilitating Lt. General TOJO's occupation of Mongolia. The Japanese assets in Inner Mongolia being lacking, Japan did not build fortresses there as she did in Manchuria but maintained a force of 50,000 soldiers in Inner Mongolia until 1941. As to the border line troubles at Chang-Ku-Feng in 1938 and at Nomonhan in 1939, the hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Russia initiated by Lawless actions of the Japanese Army; and since the details and the persons responsible for those incidents are well known, I need not make any further answer here.

vc In March 1940, I was recalled from the position of Chief of the Liaison Section of the Asiatic Development Board and appointed commander of the 14th Division in Utsunomiya (Japan). In September 1940, I was told confidentially by the Chief of the General Staff His Highness Prince Kan-in that the 14th Division would be diverted to Manchuria in accordance with a plan to increase the Kwantung Army to 15 divisions. In October 1940, I arrived at Chichihaerh with my division. Since such an increase in strength was not necessary for defense of order in Manchuria it was in preparation for Japanese operations against the Soviet Russia.



When I was in Chichihaerh with the division in 1940, I received secret instructions from the commander of the 6th Army to the effect that the officers of the 14th Division were requested to be thoroughly familiar with the topography in the vicinity of Hairaerh, as the division would be employed on the Hairaerh plain in case of the outbreak of war; and also that training should be carried out so as to be chiefly capable of sustained defense against the well-equipped Russian forces. Moreover, the 6th Army in Hairaerh executed map strategic maneuvers in the vicinity of Hairaerh twice in 1940, by way of studying the operation against Soviet Russia. I and my staff participated in these and I stressing combat with Soviet Russia trained my subordinates.

After the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia in 1941, the General Staff Headquarters heavily increased the Kwantung Army by sending troops, horses and guns from Japan in order to strengthen the preparation for the operations against Russia. This increase was executed in accordance with a plan known as "Ken-Toku-En" (Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers). The amount of troops and ordnance of the Kwantung Army reached the maximum limit under the plan of the summer of 1941. First of all, two fresh divisions were sent from Japan and added to the thirteen divisions already there. Besides this, each division was increased by 5,000 personnel and 3,500 horses. Consequently, the Kwantung Army which, before the "Ken-Toku-En" consisted of:

13 divisions.....	195,000 men
2 tank divisions.....	30,000 men & 400 tanks
Air forces.....	24,000 men & 1,000 planes
Border guards (28 battalions).....	19,000 men
Railway guards (5 units).....	17,500 men
Rear forces.....	100,000 men
Total... (men).....	386,00
(horses).....	40,000

It now possessed 600,000 men and 80,000 horses due to the increase made by the "Ken-Toku-En" plan. As for guns, the 14th Division under my command had the increased number of 48 while the number previously was 36. It may be considered that similar increases were made in other divisions.

When the increase was put into effect, the Imperial Headquarters issued an order to hasten preparations for the operations against Soviet Russia. This order was issued in the latter part of June 1941, but I did not read it, and I do not know its number, as I simply heard of it from a man in the service of the Kwantung Army. At that time I received no other order except an instruction from the Commander of the 6th Army to which my 14th Division belonged. However, the Commander of the 6th Army ordered the 23rd Division at Hairaerh to build field fortifications on the heights east of Hairaerh in order to quickly prepare for the operation. All the conditions in Kwantung Army during the summer of 1941 were of such a nature as to hasten preparations for a war against Russia. But, at that time, the Japanese forces had invaded and occupied French Indo-China. This caused a sudden tension in the Jap-American relations, making the situation acute and, as a consequence, Japan was placed at a crossroad. That is to



say, the Japanese Government did not know whether she should open a war first against the Soviet Russia or against America. The following three items were decided at an Imperial Council in Tokyo in June 1941:

- (1) To go on independently with no opinions and policies of our own as regards the Russo-German War.
- (2) To prepare for the operations in the South.
- (3) To keep peace with Russia on the borders.

But at this time, too, Japan suddenly irritated Russia by continuing the reinforcements of Kwantung Army based on the "Kan-Toku-En" plan. I was appointed to the Commander of the 6th Army in October 1941, and soon after that I was called to the Kwantung Army Headquarters together with other commanders. At that time, the commander of the Kwantung Army General LIMEZU gave individually to each army commander instructions as regards the duties of the war-time armies. I received the following instructions for the 6th Army: At the outbreak of war the 6th Army should firmly hold the positions in Hailaerh and its adjacent key-points, and plan for sustained defence. One division shall be added to the 6th Army after one month. General LIMEZU however, did not indicate to me the duration of time for the sustained defense and the time for opening the war. I was only instructed to maintain the positions in Hailaerh for a long period of time.

In accordance with the duty given me, I reinforced the fortifications already built by the 23rd Division on the heights east of Hailaerh and strengthened the operational preparations; and at the same time stored enough ammunition and food supplies for six months near Hailaerh. In June 1942 at Chichihaerh, when the Second Area Army, to which the 6th Army belonged was set up, its Commander Lt. General ANAMI Korechika explained to me the object of establishing the Second Area Army and its present duty as well as the present and future duties of the 6th Army under my command. In this explanation I was informed of the preparations for attacking Soviet Russia, which had been underway in the Kwantung Army in accordance with the strategic plan known by the secret name as plan "B" (Otsu), which was decided at General Staff Headquarters. Troops, horses, guns and ammunition were sent to the Kwantung Army from Japan and China according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, which was preparation for a part of the general strategic plan known as "No. B". Lt. General ANAMI further indicated to me that, since the 6th Army was going to assume the offense at the third stage of the operations, I should make necessary investigation and preparation for it. He further explained the strategic plan which should be followed by main force of the Second Area Army at the second stage. The details will be given later. The offensive movement at the first stage in the area of Maritime Province was to be carried out by the First Area Army according to the Strategic Plan "B". I was told about the plan of the First Area Army for the offensive operation by the former Commander of the First Area Army General YAMASHITA at Tokyo in October 1944 when his duties were transferred to me. This same operation was explained to me in more detail by the Chief of Staff Lt. General SHIDEI when I took over my duties as Commander of the First Area Army in Mutanchiang.



Thus I was fully informed of the progress of the preparations and offensive operation of the First and Second Area Armies of the Kwantung Army based on Plan "B". Under this plan the following measures were to be taken.

#### Preparatory Measures

**Heihe District:-** In the peace time there were in this district two divisions of the Fourth Army and one detachment of borderguards. The Army Headquarters was at Sunwu. Before the war was opened against Soviet Russia the Second Area Army and N Army were to be set up at Tsitsikar and Heike respectively. N Army seemed to be changed to 8th Army later. This formation was to be made by diverting four divisions from China and Japan. Consequently the Second Area Army was to have attained a strength of six divisions before the outbreak of war, that is. There were three divisions of the 4th Army at Sunwu, two divisions of 8th Army at Heike and one division under the direct control of the Area Army. Besides, the 6th Army under the Second Area Army consisting of the 23d Division and the Arshan detachment (about one division strong) should be increased by the addition of another division after the outbreak of war. Two more divisions were to be added in the future.

**Maritime Province District:-** Those stationed in peace time in this district were three divisions of the 5th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, the 71st Division at Hunchung and one division under the direct control of the Kwantung Army at Chiamusu--eight divisions in all together with two tank divisions. In 1941, 20th Army Headquarters was established at Tsining and to that army was given one division each from the 3rd, and 5th Armies. Prior to the outbreak of war, the 1st Area Army Headquarters, and the 2nd Army Headquarters were to be set up at Mutanchiang and Chientao respectively according to Plan B. Eight more divisions were to be transferred to this district from Japan and China, making the First Area Army possess fifteen divisions and two tank divisions, that is, three divisions and one tank division of the 5th Army, five divisions and one tank division of the 20th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, two divisions of the 2nd Army and two divisions under the direct control of the First Area Army. In addition there was one air force army under the direct control of the Kwantung Army Commander with 1,000 planes. The Kwantung Army was expected to be in the above condition on the Eastern, Northern and Western fronts just before the opening of war against the USSR according to the Plan "B".

**Offensive Plan:-** In accordance with the offensive Plan "B" we expected to seize the entire Far East as far as Baikal in four successive steps. In the first step the 4th and the N Armies of the Second Area Army were to carry out demonstrations on the Russian border near Sunwu and Heike, pretending offensive preparations by occasionally shooting into Russian territory. No actual offensive, however, was to be made. Thus the Red Army was expected to be fettered within that area. Should the Red Army start an offensive it must be checked. The 6th Army should maintain its positions at Hailor and Arshan.



In case an attack was made by the Red Army from Chita via Manchuria it must be checked by keeping these positions firm. In this case, the 1st Area Army in the Maritime Province District would act decisively on the offensive according to the following plan:-

(a) The 5th Army shall advance from Kuling with 3 divisions and 1 tank division and occupy Iman, and, while securing Iman to the North with a portion of its force, the main force shall march southward to join the battle to be fought by the main force of the First Area Army near Voroshilov.

(b) Two divisions of the 2nd Army shall advance from Hunchung break through the border; proceed North through the Nunn District toward Voroshilov. Its action shall be in concert with the main force of the Area Army.

(c) Five divisions and one tank division of the 20th Army shall go south toward Voroshilov, passing the south-west side of Lake Hsingkoi.

(d) Three divisions of the 3rd Army shall advance from Tunking to ~~Chadokovo~~ and join the area army's main force there. All these forces were to press the Red Army at Voroshilov, and part of them, after seizing Voroshilov, were to cooperate with the Japanese Navy at Yuanshan to capture Vladivostok by envelopment. This was to end the first stage. Its chief object was to secure Japan proper and the industrial areas of Manchuria from the Red Army's air raids from the Maritime Province district, by entirely occupying the district.

Second Stage:- In case the first stage of the offensive was successful, the main force of the First Area Army was to advance Northward toward Habarovska along the railroad, leaving part of the Army in the Maritime Province to maintain the occupied area. The division stationed at Chiamusu would occupy the positions facing Leninsk to protect the wings of the First and Second Armies in the vicinity. At this time the 4th and the 9th Armies of the Second Area Army would cooperate with the First Area Army and commence an offensive operation from Heike and its vicinity; cross the Amur; seize Blagoveshchensk Kuibishevka and Svobodny and cut off the Siberian Railway. One part of the forces were to defend the West and the main force was to move eastward along the railway line to Habarovsk. Then the First and the Second Area Armies were to cooperate in attacking in a decisive battle the Red Army from both sides and occupy Khabarovsk. This was to complete the second stage.

Third Stage:- After the occupation of Khabarovsk the Second Area Army would immediately turn westward to make preparations for the reinforcements necessary for the future offensive operations upon the Zabaikalye. At this time the 6th Army at Hailar was to be reinforced raising its strength to four divisions which were to prepare to advance the attack. In the Maritime Province the First Area Army was to secure the important districts and the rear of the Second Area Army. The main force of the Second Area Army would turn West after completing preparations and commence the advance to Chita along the railway.



As soon as the Second Area Army's main force reached Mogacha, the 6th Army was immediately to start the attack by breaking through the border near Sanho and Manchuria. And the 6th Army was to act in cooperation with the Second Area Army's main force and advance to Chita and its southern area. On seizing Chita and its vicinity, the Second Area Army was to secure important districts in the West; and thus the operation of the third stage was to come to a close.

In the fourth stage it was planned to continue the offensive until the Zabarkalye as far as Lake Baikal was seized. But I do not know about the offensive plan of the fourth stage.

Operations Regarding Outer Mongolia: - In the third stage, at the same time as the commencement of the advance of the 6th Army, the Arhshan Detachment (approximately one division) was to have been brought under the direct control of the Second Area Army to combine with and take command of the Mongolian force in Manchuria (approximately one division) and advance to Chita from Arhshan via Tampsakbulak, Baintumen and Ulan-Orasomon. This unit would cover the right wing of the Second Area Army by marching through the eastern part of Outer Mongolia.

Maintaining coordination of all Military Operations the Imperial Headquarters was to transfer one mechanized army group from North China and to have it begin strategic operations from Kalgan toward Ulan-Bator. But I am not able to explain the plan for the future development of the offensive action since I don't know it. The general outline of the offensive plan against Soviet Russia is as above. This plan for the offensive operation against the Soviet Union in 1942 was set up by the General Staff and the Kwantung Army; it was revised every year thereafter. This plan for Japanese military measures existed till around the middle of 1944. Since Japan faced difficult conditions in the battle field of Greater East Asia War, she could not carry out this plan. This hand-written testimony is confirmed by my signature.

General Kita Seiichi  
Ex-Commander of the First Area Army  
Kwantung Army

Interrogator: Lt. Colonel Derevyankin

Interpreter: Shehebenkov



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I. ,  
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify  
that 22 pages of a photostat of the testimony of the Japanese  
prisoner of war general Kita Seiichi, written by him in Japanese on  
April 20-23  
was delivered to me by the Prosecutor of the Khabarovsk Region of the  
U.S.S.R.  
on or about June 27, 1946 , and that the original of the said  
document may be found in the files of the Prosecutor's Office of the  
Khabarovsk Region.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_.

Lt. Col. TARANENKO  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

September 26 , 1946.