

730

11/17/41

Doc. No. 11A(6)

Page 1

Berlin, November 17, 1941

Telegram

Code - Sender

VC

To the Foreign Minister of the Reich

Via the Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In accordance with instructions I conferred today with the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the possibility of Japanese action in a Northern or a Southern direction.

General Oshima remarked that he had no information whatever concerning the intentions and deliberations of his Government and therefore could give only his personal opinion:

He is of the opinion that in view of the time of year, military operations against the Soviet Union could take place only on a limited scale. It probably would not prove too difficult to occupy the northern (Russian) part of the island of Sakhalin. In view of the severe losses which the Soviet troops have suffered at the hands of the German troops, they could also probably be driven away from the border. However, any attack on Vladivostok or even any advance toward Lake Baikal at this time of year was scarcely possible and would under present circumstances have to be postponed till spring.

attack on USSR

In view of the grievous economic losses which Japan had suffered in the long war with China, as well as in view of the economic boycott of the Anglo-Saxon powers, an advance by Japan toward the South was in the opinion of the Ambassador unavoidable, especially because of the pressing need for petroleum. To my question as to what in particular was to be understood by an advance toward the South, Mr. Oshima made the following reply:

For the securing of petroleum, the seizure of the island of Borneo was above all necessary. Japan gets her petroleum principally from the ports of Tarakan and Balikpapan in Dutch Borneo. According to his knowledge there were also petroleum resources in British Borneo. We determined on the map that Borneo was 100 kilometers distant from the part of Indo-China occupied by Japanese troops. It was of course

Seize oil Borneo X

theoretically possible for Japan to take possession only of Dutch Borneo and leave British Borneo alone. It was, however probably, though not certain, that the English would react the same way to a Japanese attack on the Netherland-Indies as they would to an attack on English territory.

*Phil*

The Ambassador is of the opinion that an attack on Hongkong is unnecessary and is not being considered. An attack on Borneo would be easiest; an attack on Singapore would be most effective. In his opinion, in connection with an advance on Borneo, in view of the close proximity of the island to the Philippines, it would be desirable to declare that it was the desire on the part of the Japanese to respect American possessions in East Asia. Of course, the action would have to be prepared for in advance, so that in case of need, should there be a corresponding American attitude, one could proceed against the Philippines simultaneously. It would scarcely be possible for the Americans to defend them effectively. The distance from Formosa to Manila is only 800 kilometers.

According to Oshima's opinion, the United States gets principally tin from Sumatra and rubber from the Malay Archipelago as well as Indo-China. American deliveries from Indo-China are now blocked.

*Engl. am  
prop in  
Bangkok*

Upon being questioned further, the Ambassador remarked that the Anglo-Saxon powers might perhaps just put up with a Japanese invasion of Thailand. Such an invasion should if possible be undertaken after prior agreement with the Thailand government. In order to prepare for this the Japanese government in its efforts at mediation in the conflict between Indo-China and Thailand had decided in favor of the latter. Of course there was very active English and American propaganda in Bangkok, so that the attitude of the Government there has become irresolute. In his opinion the Japanese troops in South Indo-China should be still further increased before an invasion of Thailand can be made. The only purpose of such an invasion would be to secure Thailand as a springboard for Singapore. It was not very likely that the English in that case would invade South Thailand, since they would then expose themselves there as well as on the narrow Malayan Peninsula to a Japanese flank attack with landing maneuvers northwest of Singapore. This was admittedly not easy since dense jungle would have to be surmount there.

Only the immediate area around Singapore was fortified, especially strongly fortified is the area facing the sea. Strong naval forces which could match their strength with the Japanese fleet were not present there. Several battleships as well as the English aircraft carrier Eagle had left Singapore after the outbreak of the war. The Dutch fleet was very weak. Of American naval forces there were in Singapore at the most only light cruisers and several destroyers. The unlikely possibility that the Americans would send stronger naval units would only be desirable for Japan, since such forces would then have to operate far from their bases and be exposed to Japanese air attacks. Ambassador Oshima is assuming that the three Japanese infantry divisions on the island of Hainan are being trained for landing operations and combat in tropical regions. He is of the opinion that a Japanese advance against Singapore is to be considered in conjunction with a German advance in the Middle East.

*Kurusu*  
The speeches of Tojo and Togo in Parliament were known to the Ambassador. He does not expect any decision concerning the Japanese attitude to be made until it has become apparent what success is attained by the special mission of Ambassador Kurusu.

The strength of the Japanese army units in South China as well as their distribution in the different areas is made known by the report of the German Military Attache in Tokyo, transmitted together with the telegraphic report of the Ambassador in Tokyo, No. 2430 of November 13. According to that report, there are four infantry divisions in North Indo-China and a motorized brigade, which would have to furnish the protection against a flank attack by Chiang Kai Chek through the province of Yunan in the event of a Japanese advance being undertaken against Thailand. In South Indo-China there are up to now three Japanese infantry divisions.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister of the Reich

Erdmannsdorff

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 11A(6).

/S/ Ulrich A. Straus

TELEGRAM (Code Clerk)

10/1/41

PARIS, German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs.

1 Oct 1941 - 2100 hours

Arrival: 1 October 1941 - 2300 hours

Economic Delegation No. 467 of 1 October 1941

Re. Telegram No. 152 of 22 September 1941, Ha Pol 6075 g111

Re. Interim Report on Indo-Chinese rubber; Japan/U.S.A.

Negotiations have been conducted with the French delegation, presided over by DE BOISANGER, in line with orders as in the above telegram. At the outset DE BOISANGER expressly confirmed the order, reported by me in telegram No. 454 of 22 September 1941, to the Governor-General of Indo-China to release the 5,000 tons which the Japanese had requested for September. He then stated the request of his government for German support of the French efforts to obtain Japanese approval for delivery of 5,000 tons to the U.S.A.

Indo-China urgently needed the proceeds from such sales for buying vital goods obtainable nowhere else, and declared in answer to a question from the German side, that in payment of the said goods the U.S.A. would neither unfreeze French blocked accounts nor accept Martinique gold.

French request was turned down as not in accord with instructions. Concerning our demand which was presented in the session, DE BOISANGER replied to me yesterday on behalf of his government that it appreciated the German attitude and would take the German point of view into consideration during the pending negotiations with Japan. He was not authorized to give a more extended declaration. I pointed out to him again that the German request was urgent and again brought forth that not only the Japanese, but also the German Government would not countenance further export of raw rubber from Indo-China to the U.S.A.

The German Commissioner, JEHLE, has by now left for Berlin. He suggested that at the French delegation, an additional release of 5,000 tons, as requested by Japan, first of all for October, be secured. We are continuing to urgently attend to the matter and may further report on it.

HEMSEN

TELEGRAM (Open)

PARIS - 6 October 1941 - 2045  
Arrival, 6 October 1941 - 2330

No. 3031 of 6 October 1941

State Secretary, BENOIST-MECHIN, today revealed during a conversation, that considerable difficulties with Japan are occurring daily in Indo-China, while Japan, apart from a few exceptions, observes the Treaty's military provisions, she is violating France's economic and political sovereignty more and more.

At the time, Darlan had, in the Vichy Cabinet, personally and very strongly supported the solution sought by Japan with Indo-China since he feared that a different policy would furnish the Anglo-Saxon fighting forces with a pretext for interference and besides he desired to establish good relations with a state that had signed the Tri-partite Pact.

Owing to the aggressive behavior of the Japanese against France's sovereignty in Indo-China, doubts have been expressed within the French Government as to whether Darlan's conception was right; furthermore a stiffening on the part of the adversaries of his policy among French military and administrative circles in Indo-China is to be feared.

I was receptive in regard to Benoist-Mechin's information, the aim of which evidently was German intervention in Tokyo.

ABETZ

Secret State matter - to be kept in locked file.

TELEGRAM

(Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO, 15 October 1941 - 0600 hours  
Arrival, " " " 1520 "

No. 2095 of 14 October

Re. Telegraphic orders dated 8 October, No. 1775 - Pol II

Observations here confirm the description of conditions as reported to Berlin from Saigon by Councillor of Legation, Neumann during the last few days. As was to be expected, the occupation of Indo-China did not proceed without friction.

I heard from the Foreign Ministry that there are numerous points in dispute concerning the interpretation of the defense agreement. The controversy concerns the treatment of the Chungking-appointed Chinese consul, the handing over of certain airplanes, the seizure of quarters and goods, anti-French propaganda disseminated by the Japanese army among the native population, and so on.

The French ambassador has lodged a number of protests, and has pressed hard the removal of matters of complaint. The Japanese government intends to increase the occupation forces, at present being 25,000, according to a report from Saigon, to 40,000. I was assured by the Foreign Ministry that the French-Japanese agreement does not provide for a maximum limit for Japanese occupation troops.

The Japanese Government seems to intend to wrest a number of concessions from the French Colonial administration through local military authorities. Only after the creation of a fait accompli will former Foreign Minister YOSHIKAWA, apparently slated for handling questions relating to Indo-China, leave for Saigon. I understand that this will not materialize before the beginning of November.

VC | I am under the impression that both parties will not let it come to an open conflict. The Japanese government is endeavoring to keep up the outward appearance of a defense alliance and, furthermore, is afraid of diminishing the economic utilization of the country in case of an open clash, through passive resistance of the colonial administration and the native population. The Deputy Foreign Minister told me that the rice quota, amounting to 700,000 tons and urgently needed this year, was secured on the strength of the agreement concluded by MATSUOKA. It is, however, hoped that even greater quantities will be obtained

owing to better prospects for the harvest.

The Foreign Ministry denied that there had been a Japanese-Siamese argument in the Border Commission concerning the supervision of the demilitarized zone. The Border Commission was only just starting out on its tasks. Identical telegram to Saigon.

OTT

CERTIFICATE

I, ULRICH STRAUS, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4065B.

/s/ ULRICH STRAUS

Telegram (Secret Cipher process)

SAIGON, 12 October 1941 1350 hours  
Arrival 12 October 1941 2145 hours

10/11/41

No. 10 of 11 October 1941

Secret documents which have fallen into the hands of the French police throw light on activity of the Pan-Asiatic League as a tool of Japanese expansionist policy in Indo-China.

According to this, the League's branch offices in Hanoi, Haiphong and Saigon were ordered towards the end of June:

1. To train instructors, teachers and propagandists for agitating for the Annamite independence movement.
2. To train a squad of native agitators who are to propagate anti-French uprisings at the proper time.
3. To form special units among the Japanese occupation troops who are to foster a pro-Japanese sentiment through blameless behavior.
4. To place suitable observers at all important centers of production and communications by making use of the provisions of the trade agreement between Indo-China and Japan. Their task would be:
  - a) To report on all French troop movements.
  - b) To locate the storage places and the quantity of all raw materials important for Japan, including foodstuffs.

Such information is termed necessary for the preparation of uprisings. According to the intentions of Imperial General Headquarters the most suitable time for striking will be the end of this year or next spring. For this purpose contingents of Annamites trained in Japan will soon be incorporated into the Japanese occupation army as liaison men and interpreters.

According to Japanese source there are nine Annamite fighting units in Saigon and over twenty rather large Annamite fighting units in Hanoi. The French say that the leaders and a great part of the members are previously convicted criminals.

It is significant that as early as 1935 Prince CUONG DE presided over the Pan-asiatic Congress. The prince is a descendant of Emperor GIALONG and has been recognized as the sole lawful successor to the throne by Annamite

legitimists; he had fled to Japan at the beginning of this century.

/S/ NEUMANN

Identical telegram to Tokyo

Certificate

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4025E(10).

/S/ ULRICH STRAUS

12/9/41

734

MILITARY

Local Military Agreement between the French Authorities and the Japanese Army concerning the Joint Defense of French Indo-China.

General Principles

- (1) The French authorities shall collaborate with all their resources with the Japanese Army in the defense of French Indo-China in conformity with agreements drawn up between France and Japan.
- (2) For the duration of the operations carried out by the Japanese Army, the Indo-China Authorities shall ensure public order in all Indo-China territories in such a way as to secure the rear of the Japanese Army. The Japanese troops shall be able eventually to cooperate to this effect with the French Indo-China authorities.
- (3) The Indo-China authorities shall grant to the Japanese Army on Indo-China soil, all facilities for its movement, subsistence and for the installation of its military establishments.
- (4) The defense will, in principle, be divided up thus:
  - Japanese Army -
    - Southern Indo-China and eventually other regions where it takes up positions
  - Indo-China Army -
    - Northern Indo-China and other regions where Indo-China troops are stationed. In instances where both Japanese and Indo-China troops might be stationed at the same point a special agreement would govern the details of the joint defense at this point.
- (5) Separate agreements shall govern the collaboration as far as it concerns
  - Anti-aircraft defense
  - Coastal defense
  - Sea and air navigation
  - Utilization of means of transport
  - Communications
  - Medical Service
  - Employment of material and labour
  - Anti-Espionage
  - Control of Information

Fanoi 9 December 1941

Squadron Vice-Admiral Jean Decoux  
Governor-General of Indo-China  
Signed: Jean Decoux

Navy Captain FORIUCHI  
Representing the Supreme Commander  
of the Japanese Navy.

Major General TYO  
Representing the Supreme Commander of the  
Japanese Army.

Local Military Agreement between the French  
Authorities and the Japanese Army regarding  
the joint defense of French Indo-China

Detailed Provisions

(1) Air Defense.

The air defense of Indo-China territories is guaranteed by the French authorities who hold themselves, in this respect, in close liaison with the corresponding authorities of the Japanese Army.

The latter can require the French authorities to put into action their means of defense, it being understood that these will be employed primarily in the defense of Indo-China civil and military installations.

(2) The measures for air defense shall come into force immediately.

(3) Orders relative to air alerts (including light control) shall be given in each locality by the Japanese and Indo-China commanders on their own respective initiative under the stipulation that each shall warn the other without delay.

(4) The extinguishing or lighting up of lighthouses, beacon lights, etc., shall be carried out on the demand of the Japanese authorities.

(5) For air look-out and communications between the Japanese and French anti-aircraft defenses the existing network shall be used primarily. Other networks shall be established according to necessity and materials available.

## II Coast Defense

(1) In cases where war or merchant ships or planes belonging to countries at war with Japan approach the coasts of Indo-China, the French authorities shall inform the Japanese Army of it immediately and shall make all dispositions to repulse their attacks.

(2) The defense of the coasts of Indo-China (including laying of mines on the high seas) shall be secured in agreement with the Japanese Authorities.

(3) The moment at which this defence shall come into force shall be fixed by understanding between the French and Japanese authorities.

(4) Liaison personnel may be stationed by the Japanese Army with the command of the fortified zones of CAMRANG BAY, DOSON and CAPESAINTE JACQUES and other coast batteries.

## III. Ship Movements

(1) The Japanese Navy shall be consulted before any movement by French war or merchant ships.

(2) Access to CAMRANG BAY is not allowed without the permission of the Japanese Authorities.

(3) In exceptional and urgent cases Japanese warships and transports may be relieved of the necessity of taking on and Indo-China pilot.

## IV. Movement of Planes.

(1) French military aviation shall concentrate all its units in the North of Indo-China.

(2) French military aviation shall effect preliminary coordination with the Japanese Army for the anticipated modifications of its disposition. These modifications may always be carried out without preliminary consultation in case of necessity for air defence, on condition that the Japanese Authorities be informed of them without delay.

- (3) The installations guaranteeing the safety of air navigation shall operate equally for the benefit of the Japanese Army.
- (4) The service "AIR FRANCE" shall be suspended in the meantime.
- (5) The Japanese Army may use, in case of urgent need, all aerodrome and sea plane bases (including places suitable for aviation) under the reservation that French aviation is free to make use of areas which it is actually occupying and which are indispensable to it. In case of joint-occupation, local agreements will be made guaranteeing the use of the landing ground to French planes.
- (6) The air forces of the two armies stationed in North Indo China shall mutually exchange liaison officers if the need to do so makes itself felt.

#### V. Traffic and Transport.

- (1) The French Indo-China authorities shall satisfy, as far as possible, demands made necessary by the operations of the Japanese Army as regards the carrying out of transportation. In regard to demands which envisage the use of transport installations, there must be a specific request in each particular case and such demands will be completely met as far as the safety of traffic and the carrying out of the transportation permit.
- (2) Where military operations might involve transportation over the Cambodia railway, such transportation will be made, as a general rule, by special through trains.
- (3) If, in the course of Japanese military operations there is any risk that the transportation required by the Japanese Army may be subjected to delays and difficulties, the Japanese Army, after giving sufficient notice, may, for the time being, assume control of the use of railways.
- (4) All matters relating to the use of the railways by the Japanese Army must be kept strictly secret.
- (5) The total indemnity arising from the relevant clause of the present agreement will be finally settled after calculation.
- (6) In cases of destruction of railroads, roads, bridges, etc., repairs shall be rapidly carried out by the personnel normally responsible for such repairs. The Japanese Army shall have the power to take part in such repairs with the object of speeding up their completion.

(7) When operations make it necessary, the Japanese Army shall have the power, after giving notice to the Indo-China authorities, to limit or forbid, land, sea or river traffic within the bounds of Japanese military installations and in certain zones reserved for military operations.

In each case, an agreement with the French authorities shall specify the modifications to be applied to the proposed measures in order to guarantee the needs of the Administration and of the existence of the population.

#### VI. Communications.

(1) In case of pressing need of operations and after it has been demanded by the Japanese Army, the Indo-China Authorities will have certain radio sendings and certain international communications by cable, stopped.

(2) Messages relating to air defence shall have priority over all others.

(3) In case of necessity, the Japanese and Indo-China armies shall have the power to attach liaison agents to their radio stations.

(4) The Indo-China Authorities shall give to the Japanese Army the use of the installations mentioned below. The Japanese Army in using these installations must take into account the rightful needs of the Indo-China Authorities, giving priority to Indo-China official telegrams.

(a) Transmission by wire (actual lines)

1. The Sector SAIGON-PUNOM-PENH-PURSAT  
Telegraph -- 2 lines  
Telephone -- 1 line
2. Sector SAIGON - Cape Saint Jacques  
Telegraph - 1 line

(b) Wireless and Radio Transmission

1. Radio Sending Station of PFU TFO  
(Companie Generale of Wireless Transmission)  
One (12 KW) short wave sending set  
Two (3 KW) short wave sending sets  
One (3 KW) broadcasting set.

An agreement shall be made on the spot for the sharing and use of the sending stations mentioned above, sending stations corresponding to these senders, installations assigned to the operation of these sets and microphone rooms.

It shall be the same for the following stations.

2. Station PFU TFO (radio service)  
1 (5 KW) wireless set
3. Station PHU QUOC  
1 (5 KW) wireless set
4. Station FANOI  
Agreement to be made for the use of the one sender, of 5 KW, in existence there.
5. The use of the broadcasting station (12 KW) of PFU TFO (Compagnie Generale of wireless transmission) shall be the object of a special agreement.
6. The electricity centres of SAIGON and FANOI shall satisfy to the limits of their power, the needs of the Japanese Army, which shall have the power, if the necessity makes itself felt, of attaching liaison agents to them.
7. If events make it necessary, the Japanese Army may be compelled to present fresh demands relative to the control of radio-electric waves.

#### VII Medical Service

(1) The Indo-China Government shall afford to the Japanese Army all possible facilities for the hospitalization and treatment of sick and wounded.

In the last resource and on demand, establishments, medical instruments and appliances and medicines, not indispensable to the needs of the population, may be lent to the Japanese Army.

A total of 6,000 beds divided among the establishments of the regions, SAIGON - CAPE SAINT JACQUES, TOURANE, DALAT, etc., shall be reserved from now on, for the use of the Japanese Army.

In addition to the 6,000 mentioned above, the Indo-Chinese authorities shall make every effort to accommodate a number of wounded as nearly as possible up to a total of 19,000 until the Japanese Army can construct field hospitals.

(2) The Indo-China Government shall grant to the Japanese Army all facilities for its studies in tropical hygiene.

#### VIII. Use of Materials and Labour

(1) The Indo-China Authorities shall comply as far as it is possible with the requisition of war materials and the recruitment of labour demanded by the Japanese Army.

(2) They shall lend their aid for the repair of ships, vehicles, and other Japanese military material.

(3) They shall satisfy as far as possible the demands which the Japanese Army may present to them in the way of workshop arsenals, magazines, cold storage, etc.

#### IX. Counter-Espionage Measures.

(1) The Indo-China Authorities shall collaborate with the Japanese Army in its efforts against espionage and activities liable to endanger its security on Indo-China soil and will lend it their support in the matter of counter espionage.

They shall, without delay, exchange with the Japanese Authorities all information which they may be able to procure on this subject.

(2) The competent Indo-China Authorities shall take the necessary steps against foreigners of every nationality, whose activities might endanger the security of the Japanese forces.

(3) The Indo-China Authorities must recognize how very important secrecy is in the operations undertaken for the joint-defence of Indo-China. With a view to preserving this secrecy, the Japanese Army will place a liaison agent in each of the Indo-China control commissions of telegrams, telephone conversations, and with the censorship of reviews, newspapers and postal delivery.

#### X. Control of Information

(1) The Indo-China Authorities shall jointly decide upon measures which might be necessitated by the exigencies of the joint-defence of Indo-China, for control of Indo-China information both outward and inward.

(2) The Japanese Army will proceed to the establishment and utilisation of Japanese organizations for radio broadcasting to foreign countries after having informed the Government of Indo-China of its intentions.

(3) If events make it necessary, the Japanese Army shall have the power eventually to attach liaison agents to Indo-China broadcasting organizations.

XI. Miscellaneous

(1) The air services of Indo-China and Japan shall acquaint each other of the identification marks of their respective planes.

(2) The Indo-China Authorities shall procure geographical and hydrographical maps and charts for the Japanese Army.

(3) The present agreement shall come into force counting from the day it is signed.

Made at the Government General of Indo-China at HANOI on 9 Dec. 1941.

Squadron Vice-Admiral J. DECOUX  
Governor-General of Indo-China  
Signed

Ship-Captain FORIUCFI  
Representing the Commander-in-Chief of the  
Japanese Squadron.  
Signed.

Major-General TYO  
Representing the Commander-in-Chief of the  
Japanese Army  
Signed.

APPENDIX

Squadron Vice Admiral JEAN DECOUX,  
Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor  
Governor-General of Indo-China

TO

The General  
Head of the Japanese Mission  
HANOI

Dear General,

I have the honour to send to you herewith the text of the Agreement established between the French Authorities and the Japanese Army with a view to settling the joint-defence of Indo-China.

As I stated to you this morning, it is the intention of the Government-General to do nothing which can harm in any way the operations of the Japanese Army.

In order to confirm this immediately as you have asked me, I have put my signature at the foot of this Agreement.

It goes without saying that the French Authorities will give to the Japanese Authorities the facilities for the conduct of the operations which the latter may ask. It must, however, be understood that in any eventuality the sovereignty of France over Indo-China shall be respected and the operation of the Government Services assured.

I have not always been able to effect direct contact with the French Government and the latter may have already entered into engagements with the Japanese Government in the name of Indo-China, which I am ignorant of.

If I should receive instructions from my Government, I might be prevailed upon to impart them to you with a view to eventual new discussions.

Signed: J. DECOUX

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Signed: J. DECOUX

aug - Sept  
1940

735

Intervention by Britain and America as regards  
the question of the occupation of Northern  
Indochina by the Imperial Forces

After the outbreak of the China Incident, the French Indochina Government firmly promised us in October 1937 to prohibit the transportation of arms to China via Indochina. But, in spite of the promise, the transportation of the arms sent to aid Chiang via French Indochina was really continued after that, so the Imperial Government had to earnestly continue the negotiations in order to put a stop to it. The French authorities, however, were so lacking in sincerity as to insist that there was no fact of such transportation, and therefore, we were obliged to resort to such self-protection measures as the bombing of the Yunnan Railway. But, upon the surrender of France proper to Germany on 17 June, 1940, a proposal was made to us to suspend the transportation of the aforementioned materials, and we sent the personnel required for superintending this to the place in question.

However, from the viewpoint of the necessity of our operations against China as well as the promotion of the disposal of the China Incident, it was considered imperative, on the occasion of sudden change in the international status of French Indochina, not only to prohibit the transportation of the materials for aiding Chiang, but also to establish our military, political and economical supremacy over French Indochina. So, we started preliminary negotiations in July at the place in question, and on 1 August we began formal negotiations in Tokyo with the French Ambassador there. The negotiations were extremely difficult as the French Government took a stiff attitude toward the above request of the Imperial Government, but by dint of our efforts at persuasion an agreement between the parties was at last reached on 30 August.

Based upon the above, in French Indochina, talks were begun between the Japanese and French military authorities on practical matters, but they were too reluctant to accept our requests, inventing various reasons.

On 4 September, however, the military agreement was concluded, and detailed negotiations were made as to its enforcement. Meanwhile, due to mutual misunderstanding, some local battles were engaged between the two armies, and the Japanese residents were repatriated, for a time causing the threat of a rupture in negotiations. But after many complications on 22 September the detailed arrangements were at length concluded at the place in question, enabling our forces to peacefully occupy northern French Indochina from the 23rd on.

The negotiations as above with French Indochina attracted the attention of Britain and America, and in the course of the negotiations, the British and American Ambassadors in Tokyo officially expressed the concern of their respective governments as listed below. And each time we refuted them. But the French Indochina authorities, on the other hand, were contriving to bring about American intervention while the Chungking Government took such steps as inciting Britain and America, and concentrated a big force on the French Indochina border, and making propaganda to the effect that they would take counter-measures, doing their utmost to prevent the conclusion of the negotiations. We, on our part, endeavored to settle the negotiations quickly so as to forestall a conspiracy of the powers.

French  
subject  
6/17/40agreed  
8/30/40

9/4/40

## List

America

- 7 August 1940 - Talk between Minister MATSUOKA and U. S. Ambassador GREW.  
 4 September 1940 - Talk between Vice-Minister OHASHI and U. A. Ambassador GREW.  
 14 September 1940 - Talk between Vice-Minister OHASHI and U. S. Ambassador GREW.  
 (our answer to America)  
 20 September 1940 - Talk between Minister MATSUOKA and U. S. Ambassador GREW.  
 22 September 1940 - Talk between our Ambassador to America HORIUCHI and Vice-Secretary WELLES.

Britain

- 10 August 1940 - A letter to Vice-Minister MATSUMIYA from British Councillor DODDS  
 4 September 1940 - Talk between Vice-Minister OHASHI and British Ambassador CRAIGIE  
 16 September 1940 - Talk between Minister MATSUOKA and British Ambassador CRAIGIE  
 18 September 1940 - Talk between Vice-Minister OHASHI and British Ambassador CRAIGIE  
 27 September 1940 - Talk between Vice Minister OHASHI and British Ambassador CRAIGIE

Gist of Talk concerning the French Indochina problem between Minister MATSUOKA and U. S. Ambassador GREW on 7 August 1940 (from 5:00 P.M. to 5:30 P.M.)

The U. S. Ambassador, by way of introduction said, "I should like to relay an oral message to you, the minister, on instructions from the U. S. Government, as regards the various reports and press news concerning the Japanese Government's secret demands toward French Indochina," read the attached document and handed over it and its attached papers, the copies of statements by the Secretary of State on 17 April and 11 May 1940.

In answer to this, Minister MATSUOKA said in introduction, "I will reserve comment and observation upon this proposal of the U. S. Government, but I shall tell you the following," and continued, "I know that American newspapers contain various accounts about this matter, but some of them are exaggerated and some others are unfounded. Next, as for our demarche in this matter, though this minister is today not as yet in the position to speak a word about its nature, I shall say for the strictly confidential information of the U. S. Government that the demarche was already approved and agreed on by the French Government on principle."

The minister insisted that he wished this last point to be kept in absolute secrecy so as not to leak out.

/Memorandum pertaining to the French Indochina question given by the American Ambassador in Tokyo to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA on August 7, 1940./

News Agencies are carrying various reports in effect that the Japanese Government has put forward to the French authorities secret demands concerning French Indochina. It is reported that the demands under reference include, among others, the right for Japanese military forces to make use of air bases at certain places in French Indochina, and the right for Japanese armed forces to be transported through French Indochina.

There was set forth in the statements issued by the Secretary of State on April 17 and May 11 the belief held by the United States Government that any intervention in the internal affairs of the Netherlands Indies or the change of their status quo except by peaceful processes would prejudice the cause of peace, security and stability in the entire Pacific area as well as in that of the Netherlands Indies. The observation of the American Government was likewise set forth that this belief had its basis in a doctrine which possesses universal validity and in support of which the United States stands unequivocally. The foregoing belief and observation have thus a natural application also to French Indochina. The demarche reported to have been made by the Government of Japan to the French authorities has, under these circumstances, seriously perturbed the Government of the United States.

August 7, 1940.

/ Japan's Reply to America concerning the French Indochina question. (Reply made orally to Ambassador GREW by Vice-Minister OHSUMI at 6:00 P.M., September 14, 1940 /

In the course of the conversation I had with Your Excellency on August 7, 1940, Your Excellency stated, referring to a newspaper report that the Japanese Government has presented certain demands to France concerning French Indochina, that the United States Government could not note the report without concern.

Necessitated by the task of establishing a new order in East Asia, the Japanese Government has formerly entered into negotiations with the French Government with regard to French Indochina. The discussions have since been going on with the authorities on the spot and are making satisfactory progress.

Japan, while bent on the settling of the China Affairs and determined to secure for herself a minimum sphere of existence, has no intention to resort to conquest and exploitation in order to attain these ends, taking care to regulate her action by considerations of mutual prosperity and brotherly love among the peoples of the regions concerned. She has exerted and is exerting her utmost efforts to avoid any unfortunate changes in the status quo of these regions in so far as such policy does not render impossible the realization of the above objects.

In face, however, of the present world situation which is changing hour by hour, it is obvious that mere observance of old criteria, which may become inapplicable to the actual state of affairs, is not the way to safeguard world peace. It is mainly for that reason that Japan has hitherto strictly refrained from expressing her opinion vis-a-vis the epoch-making changes which are actually taking place in the Western Hemisphere.

In the course of the conversation I had with Your Excellency on

I may be permitted to point out that any action by the United States Government which may be interpreted as an undue interference in matters pertaining to a region so far away from America like the present matter is bound to have undesirable repercussion upon the sentiments of the Japanese people exactly in the same manner as a similar attitude on the part of a third power would affect the public opinion of America were such third power to take an interfering attitude toward an American policy pertaining to the territories of a third power in the Western Hemisphere.

Re: Protests filed by American and British Ambassadors to Vice-Minister OHASHI, regarding the French Indochina question.

1. On the 4th (inst.) the American Ambassador visited Vice-Minister OHASHI and stated that the home government had ordered him to inquire into the reasons why this country had made various military demands on and delivered an ultimatum to French Indochina.

Accordingly, the Vice-Minister answered that no ultimatum was sent so far, but negotiations with regard to French Indochina seemed to be under way.

Then the Ambassador questioned whether such actions did not go counter to the Japanese declaration relating to the STATUS QUO in the Far East. The Vice-Minister answered that although he, being uninformed of the statement, had no knowledge of it, he considered the present problems temporary ones; and asked that whether the fact that the U. S. Government put stress upon the matters, could be construed that the U. S. Government was going to take some action if occasion requires.

The Ambassador said that the U. S. Government has no such intention, but that it is concerned for the situation of French Indochina where the U.S.A. had interests in various senses of the word; and that he, therefore, would like to know how negotiations between Japan and French Indochina were going on as much as possible. Then he left.

2. The British Ambassador also visited Vice-Minister Ohashi on the same day and asked the same kind of a question. The Vice-Minister refused to answer, saying that there might be something to it but not to ask him because he was an uninformed person. British Ambassador was said to have retired without making any further question.

(No. 3. Section of the Europe and West Asiatic Bureau, 20 September 1940). Re: The Visit of the American Ambassador to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and the filing of a protest regarding the French Indochina problems.

American Ambassador residing in Tokyo, at 5:00 P.M. 20 September., visited Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. He read the annexed note "A" to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and said that he would be very happy if he could get an assurance that the report concerning the important demands on the part of the Japanese Government to French Indochina was groundless and did represent neither the intention of the Japanese Military Authority in Hanoi nor that of Japanese Government.

After an introductory remark to the effect that the presented note would be carefully studied by the concerned officials, he stated that Japan and France had reached an agreement and that talks relating to a detailed agreement were begun on the spot for the purpose of the execution of the contents of the above, and that they had progressed to the point where the military authorities of both countries were on the verge of signing the agreement on the 6th of this month. But that the Governor-General of French Indochina for some reason had assumed the attitude of postponing the conclusion of the agreement as long as possible and of trying to nullify it. Thus Japan was compelled to deliver a final note to both France and to French Indochina, the contents of which were almost the same with that note which the Ambassador had just read.

The Governor-General of French Indochina should assume the responsibility for all these, for Japan had no alternative but to resort to these measures on account of the insincere procrastinative policy of French Indochina. Japan, pressed by the urgent necessity of her military operation against China which could not be postponed any more, had taken the above mentioned steps.

The Governor-General of French Indochina was said to have boasted to a certain foreign consul that he was checking the fulfillment of the demands of Japan. This country thought such an attitude of the Governor-General unjustifiable and felt that it would be due to the fact that Vichy Government had no control over him. We, therefore, filed a protest to Vichy Government to ascertain the fact. But Vichy answered that the rumor concerning the Governor-General was not true and he was under its control. Hence the minister (I) could not but understand that all was due to a third power which played an active part in the background.

No further problems in connection with the lodging of the "Note" was made and the talk continued.

By way of introduction the Minister said that he would like to talk to the Ambassador in extreme secrecy about our fair intentions for the purpose of removing unnecessary misunderstanding on the part of the U. S. Government. Then he stated that the true aim of the present Japanese demands to France was only to obtain military facilities in French Indochina necessary for the furtherance of our military operations against China. We, therefore, had made it clear that utilization of the military facilities there was of a temporary nature. Furthermore we gave assurance to France in compliance with the latter's desire to have freedom from care that we would respect the territorial integrity and French sovereignty in French Indochina. Under these circumstances, it was beyond our comprehension why the U. S. Government should find fault with this French Indochina question.

The Foreign Minister said that he had confided our secret to the U.S.A., and that if their talk should leak to France or any other power, the complete agreement between France and Japan would be nullified. So, should such a thing happen, he said, he would call the U. S. Government "a liar."

The Minister added that our protest against French Indochina had been presented with the great objects of accelerating the settlement of the China incident and of bringing peace between Japan and China; and so they

were thinking that the U.S.A. should help us so as to advance the conclusion of the French-Japanese agreement instead of complaining, if she does not want to hinder peace between China and Japan, because to bring peace to all East Asia was a contribution to the world peace.

Lastly the Minister said that Japan would never take a policy of subjugation or exploitation, but would adhere to friendly mutual understanding to the last in our attempt to solve an international problem. Prince KONCYE and the Minister are a minority, but that they would uphold to this policy even at the risk of their lives.

Thus the Foreign Minister concluded his explanation.

Ambassador Grew filed "Note" B as his reply to Vice-Minister OHASHI'S answer made a few days ago. To this the Minister said that he thought that his answer would cover the above and closed their conversation.

/Oral Statement of the American Ambassador  
on his visit at 5:00 P.M., September 20, 1940/

My Government has received from an authoritative source information to the effect that the Governor General of French Indochina has been presented by General Nishihara at Hanoi with demands that Japanese military forces occupy Hanoi, Haiphong, and five airports. My Government is further informed by the same source that General Nishihara has stipulated that Japanese armed forces intend to invade Indochina on September 22 unless the Japanese demands are accepted.

I am instructed by my Government to convey this report to you. The American Government is greatly surprised that the Japanese military authorities in French Indochina should have taken action giving rise to this report in the light of all circumstances, as well as the voluntary Japanese pledge, previously expressed, to preserve and keep the status quo in the Pacific area. My Government assumes that this report, provided it is based on facts, reflects action taken locally and in excess of instructions from the Japanese Government, as was reportedly true when a previous ultimatum was presented by the Japanese military authorities. The Government of the United States would appreciate receiving assurances from the Japanese Government that this report is not warranted and that it does not represent the intentions of the Japanese military authorities at Hanoi nor the intentions of the Japanese Government.

September 20, 1940

/Statement given by the American Ambassador on  
his visit at 5:00 P.M., September 20, 1940,  
as the reply to Vice-Minister OHASHI/

My Government has instructed me to make the following observations in reply to the oral statement which was handed to me by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 14:

It is the opinion of my Government that the status quo of a third country is seriously affected when one of two countries which is engaged in hostilities with another insists, in order to attack the other, upon the right of the use of airdromes and the right of passage for troops through the third country. In the light of the Japanese Government's announced desire that the status quo be maintained in the Pacific area

there appears to be an inconsistency in connection with the stipulations of this nature which are being made upon the authorities in Indochina by the Japanese Government.

The American Government urges upon all governments the employment of peaceful means only in their relations with all other governments and with all other regions. The attitude of my Government toward the unwarranted use of pressure in international relations is global.  
September 19, 1940.

Public Statement by the American Secretary of State on May 11, 1940

I have no full report about the matter referred to in the press despatches from Tokyo. During recent weeks a number of governments, including Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, have made clear in official public utterances their attitude of continued respect for the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. This was in harmony with definite commitments formally made in writing in 1922. This Government assumes that each of the Governments which has made commitments will continue to abide by those commitments. On April 17, 1940, in a public statement, I said: "Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace and security, not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area." In view of these facts, commitments and expressions of interest to respect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies cannot be too often reiterated.

Public Statement by the American Secretary of State on April 17, 1940

I have noted with interest the statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing concern on the part of the Japanese Government for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands Indies.

Any change in the status of the Netherlands Indies would directly affect the interests of many countries.

100  
33 A.  
The Netherlands Indies are very important in the international relationships of the whole Pacific Ocean. The islands themselves extend for a distance of approximately 3,200 miles east and west astride of the equator, from the Indian Ocean on the west far into the Pacific Ocean on the east. They also are an important factor in the commerce of the whole world. They produce considerable portions of the world's supplies of important essential commodities such as rubber, tin, quinine, copra, et cetera. Many countries, including the United States, depend substantially upon them for some of these commodities.

Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area.

This conclusion, based on a doctrine which has universal application and for which the United States unequivocally stands, is embodied in notes exchanged on November 30, 1908, between the United States and Japan in which each of the two governments stated that its policy was directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region of the Pacific Ocean. It is reaffirmed in the notes which the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan -- as parties to the treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, relating to their insular possessions and their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean -- sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1922, in which each of those governments declared that "it is firmly resolved to respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean."

All peaceful nations have during recent years been earnestly urging that policies of force be abandoned and that peace be maintained on the basis of fundamental principles, among which are respect by every nation for the rights of other nations and non-intervention in their domestic affairs, the according of equality of fair and just treatment, and the faithful observance of treaty pledges, with modification thereof, when needful, by orderly processes.

It is the constant hope of the Government of the United States -- as it is no doubt that of all peacefully inclined governments -- that the attitudes and policies of all governments will be based upon these principles and that these principles will be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area, but also in every part of the world.

1940, No. 23881/cipher/ Sent from WASHINGTON on the morning of September 21, Received by FOREIGN MINISTRY on the night of Sept. 21.

TO FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA  
FROM AMBASSADOR HORIUCHI

No. 1513-1 (urgent) (Secret)

On the 22nd I had a talk with Assistant-Secretary WELLES on the problem concerning American rights and interests in CHINA. After that the Assistant-Secretary, in a solemn attitude, said that it was very regrettable that he had to talk with me on an important subject in spite of the fact that I was to leave here in a few days. With this as an introductory remark, he said that it was really a problem relating to FRENCH INDOCHINA but that since this spring, the Japanese Government, as I well knew, had given statements on the maintenance of the status quo of the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Then he read aloud the summaries of the statements that had been made by our Foreign Ministers and Chiefs of the Intelligence Board since the last cabinet, and read out the notes that had been taken of the conversation between the Secretary of State and myself. He then said that although the U. S. Government had been placing full confidence in these words of the Japanese Government, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA told Ambassador GREW in Tokyo on the previous night that Japan had sent an ultimatum to the Government of French Indochina. The items of the Japanese demands, it was reported, contained many important items such as the occupation of the City of Hanoi and of the airfield by the Japanese military forces, and that the occupation would be carried out on and after the 23rd. The American Government, he

said, was greatly surprised, and that in the sight of the American Government it was none other than an invasion of French Indochina.

This matter, he said must be considered the climax of the many problems which had risen between America and Japan for the past three years and more. Should that fact become known to the American people, public sentiment would surely turn worse against Japan. The American Government, which was obliged to respect public opinion in deciding its policy, would be forced to consider some sort of necessary measures for the present situation. (continued)

1940. No. 28884 (cipher)

Dispatched from WASHINGTON, Sept. 21, A.M.  
Received by FOREIGN MINISTRY, Sept. 21, night

TO FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA  
FROM AMBASSADOR HORIUCHI  
No. 1513-2 (urgent) (top secret)

He told me that I must be well aware of the American government's pro-British policy, and that Germany's aggression on Britain was not one directed against Britain but was none other than an infringement on the peace of the whole world, and on the international morals and international principles in which we (Americans) believe. Therefore the American Government found it necessary to give every aid to Britain, who has resisted this. In the case of French Indochina also, should French Indochina try to resist such Japanese demands, the American people would feel obliged to assist that country also. Thus, he said, the American-Japanese relations might make the most unfortunate turn and that he was extremely sorry over the matter especially as he had connection with Japan where he had remained on duty for more than three years, doing his utmost up to the present day to adjust American-Japanese relations. I then told him that as I was not yet informed of anything about the conversation held in Tokyo on the previous night, I was not in the position to discuss the contents of the talk. But I said in return that what I wanted to know first concerning his present conversation with me was on what grounds America's interest was based. The Under-Secretary answered that the American government, as we must be aware and as it had repeatedly declared before, had great interest in maintaining the status quo of the Pacific. Whereby I told him that, as far as I knew, Japan made demands of Dutch East-Indies solely in connection with economic problems such as the export of certain kinds of material and the alleviation of restriction on entrance and enterprises of the Japanese. As he was aware, the Japanese Commerce and Industry Minister and other economic envoys were now negotiating with the authorities of the Netherlands East Indies about this. With French Indochina, an agreement had already been reached between France and Japan with regard to the banning of importation of commodities for China and the supervision of the enforcement of this. (continued)

1940, No. 28880 (cipher)

Dispatched from WASHINGTON, Sept. 21, A.M.  
Received by FOREIGN MINISTRY, Sept. 21, night  
No. 1513-3 (secret) (urgent)

The Japanese Government, I told him, had lately made some demands

necessary for its military activities in the Southwest China area, regarding which some basic understanding had already been reached between Japan and France together with French Indochina. Only, negotiations were being made on the spot with regard to the details. However, because of the recent standstill (in this negotiation,) the Japanese authorities seem to have been forced to take the present step. I considered, I told him, that the Japanese Government had not yet given up hope of reaching some sort of agreement. In short, the Japanese Government had no other intention than to settle the China Incident as soon as possible and prepare against the disadvantageous effect on East Asia that would be caused in the future by the European War.

To this statement WELLES answered that, though he ardently hoped, of course, to see some understanding reached between Japan and France and a crisis avoided, he could not but recognize it as aggression in case Japan should on the contrary send military forces into French Indochina against the latter's will. Then I told him that Japan had to take suitable measures to cope properly with the effect of the European War which might be brought upon East Asia just as much as America would, if necessary, take measures such as military supervision over the possessions of European countries in the Caribbean Sea. He said that as America was not yet being menaced by any aggression, it had not taken such an action, and that America would proceed to protect common interest through consultation with other countries concerned, which step, he said, could not be regarded in the same light as that of Japan which was going to take an independent action against French Indochina. At any rate, he said, he had frankly expressed his point of view in anxiety over the difficulties that stood in the way of American-Japanese relations.

This copy has been forwarded to Washington. Please forward from Washington to Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

/Memorandum regarding the French Indochina problem delivered to Vice-Minister MATSUMIYA by the Councillor of the British Embassy, DODD, on August 10, 1940 /

Reports have come to the notice of His Majesty's Government that demands have been made upon the Government of Indochina by the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government will recall that on April 26th the Parliamentary Under Secretary expressed to the Japanese Ambassador His Majesty's Government's full agreement with the Japanese Government as to the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. His Majesty's Government attach similar importance to the maintenance of the status quo of Indochina and other countries in the Far East.

Summary of the conversation between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and British Ambassador CRAIGIE in Tokyo

(16 September 1940. Second Section of the European and West Asiatic Affairs Bureau)

*Britishers*  
X/ 1. The problem of the arrest of Britishers. Ambassador CRAIGIE after having expressed his desire for the release of the two Britishers, Captain JAMES and WOOLLEY, who had been arrested about the end of July,

as per annexed paper A, stated that the above-said had been transferred and were now in the hands of the public procurators, and that, though the following remark of his was only for the Minister's personal reference, there was a rumor that the Englishmen were observed to be acquitted soon because theirs was slight offense against the military police. He then asked the Minister to make efforts to release them.

In this regard, the Minister immediately telephoned to the Justice Minister for the information thereof and though he received a report a little later from the Director of the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Justice Ministry, he told the Ambassador that he would answer one way or the other at a later date.

2. The French Indo China Problem. The Ambassador presented an oral statement as per attached paper B, instead of an oral explanation and stated that the British Government was very anxious about this matter. To the above the Minister responded that an agreement had already been reached between Japan and France, the content of which he said he was not in the position to disclose, that Japan had been going ahead with everything under the friendly understanding with France, and, that therefore, there was no reason for a third Power to have anything to say about it. Ambassador CRAIGIE stated that Britain feared lest her interests should be damaged and also lest this matter should entail, for example, Chinese invasion of French Indochina. Whereupon the Minister stated that it was for the very purpose of preventing such a situation from arising that Japan desired that a detailed agreement between the authorities on the spot would be speedily concluded. Nevertheless, the French authorities there were not only disobedient to the instructions of the mother country and in opposition to the will of the Vichy Government, but also through the officials of the British, American and Chinese Governments expected aid from these governments and were striving to put off the solution of the situation as long as possible, that such an attitude of the French Indochina authorities was aggravating the situation and also that the Japanese side had not changed in the least the original desire to solve the question amicably under mutual understanding between the governments of both states. Then, Ambassador CRAIGIE denied the alleged fact that the third Power officials were striving to postpone the solution of the situation in conspiracy with the French Indochina authorities. To this denial the Minister stated that he had grounds to confirm such facts and further emphasized that he was not of such temperament as to talk of a non-existent matter as though it existed. When the Ambassador hinted at the passing of troops through French Indochina as being an infringement of the sovereignty of French Indochina, the Minister contradicted that there was no such reason; assuming that an Anglo-Japanese agreement had been reached regarding the passage of troops through India or Burma, and if some third Power protested it as violation of British sovereignty, "would this be considered reasonable?"

*Burmal*

3. The Bombing of the "Empress of Asia" Incident. The Ambassador presented the annexed paper C, concerning the above incident with the premise that he was not going to make any protest or representation, requesting that, as the conditions would possibly give rise to a doubt that the bombing had been done purposely, he desired to be given some

written document which, describing the situation in detail, would specifically enable him to fully realize that the alleged action had not been done purposely, which request the Minister promised that he would consider.

4. The Hongkong and Burma question. Ambassador CRAIGIE, after a remark that the following was according to the instruction from the home government, stated that the British Government had accepted with forbearance, despite various unfavorable discussions within the country, the agreement concerning the cutting off of the Hongkong and Burma Transport Routes, and he asked the Minister if Japan had lost hope of restoring peace, Japan's endeavor for which was specified in the stipulation of the agreement. Whereupon the Minister responded the Japanese Government was doing its utmost to restore peace; that the treaty negotiations then in progress with the WANG Government at NANKING were solely for that purpose. The Minister continued that it was true that Japan had some hope in regard to CHIANG'S Government too, though he could not tell about the terms for peace and that the Japanese Government of course would strive for peace, at the ardent desire of the Japanese people. Then, CRAIGIE asked if the negotiation with the WANG Government would not become the cause of breaking peace with the Chungking Government. The Minister explained some people argued in this way, but he had long been in China and on good terms with WANG CHING-wei, and, further, that he was on such terms with CHIANG KAI SHEK as to have held a six hour consultation with him on one occasion at Nanchen; therefore, he believed that there was a possibility.

CRAIGIE then proceeded to ask the Minister if Japan did not wish the mediation of Britain for peace restoration with CHIANG, to which the latter answered that he found no necessity of the British good offices as he knew CHIANG so well, and CHIANG also knew the Minister was a man who would never make unreasonable demands nor use tactics and as he had assumed the post of Foreign Minister recently he thought that.....

Then, Ambassador Craigie asked the Minister if he had any idea as to what should be done with regard to the Hongkong-Burma problem after the expiration of terms of the agreement, after which everything was to be left to the free decision of Britain. The Minister answered to the effect that this question would be left at the disposal of the British Government and that he might at some later date have occasion to talk about it when necessary.

Telegram sent on September 20, Showa 15, 1940,  
to Ambassador SAIGEMITSU in England by Foreign  
Minister MATSUCKA

Re interview with Ambassador Craigie by the Minister and Vice Minister with regard to the problems about French Indochina and Burma.  
Coded No. 757

1. Ambassador Craigie called on this Minister on the 16th inst. and requested an answer which would satisfy the British Government re the problem about French Indochina, saying that he could not help feeling as if the Imperial Government, taking advantage of the plight of France

*mediation with Chiang*

and French Indochina, were trying to coerce problems of political and strategical importance upon the various powers which are interested in Far East, let alone French Indochina and China.

To the above, this Minister replied that the third powers should have no cause for complaint as the whole matter is carried on with friendly understandings on the basis of the treaty concluded between the Governments of Japan and France, and confuted that it is regrettable to see that the representatives of Britain, U.S.A. and the Chungking Government are delaying the settlement of the issue by instigating the French Indochina authorities against the will of the French Government.

2. Ambassador Craigie in the above interview asked as to the intention of the Imperial Government about one of the stipulations concluded between Japan and Britain in regard to the suspension of traffic via the Burma Route, which clearly states Japan should endeavor to arrange peace with China. This Minister answered that the Japanese Government is endeavoring to bring about peace between Japan and China. When questioned further by the Ambassador whether Japan desired British intermediation to negotiate peace with the Chungking Government, this Minister answered that Japan did not so desire.

3. Then, on the 18th inst. Ambassador Craigie called on the Vice-Minister OHASHI saying that after the above-stated interview with this Minister he had received a telegram from his Government as to its views. Ambassador Craigie said that the demands by Japan upon French Indochina would mean to facilitate an attack upon China from a new direction, and that the demand would be contrary to the spirit of the agreement concerning Burma which stipulated the efforts of Japan to restore peace. When the Vice-Minister asked if this protest meant that Britain would reopen the Burma Route in case Japan should execute her plan upon French Indochina, the Ambassador replied that it did not necessarily so mean but was intended to urge Japan to reconsider the affair as it was considered to be contrary to the spirit of our hitherto mutual understandings.

Re protests of Britain and U.S.A. against the  
occupation of Southern French Indochina  
by the Imperial Forces

The relations between our Empire and French Indochina had been gradually improved since the conclusion of the MATSUOKA-HUARI Agreement on August 30 Showa 15 (1940) and furthermore it seemed as if the amelioration was spurred by the successes of the economic negotiations between Japan and French Indochina and of the arbitration conference for the dispute between Thailand and French Indochina in regard to their boundary which were both held in Tokyo in the Spring of Showa 16 (1941), but the situation is as yet not satisfactory.

On the other hand the then attempted siege of Japan by Britain and the U.S.A. in East Asia was gradually turning into a military cooperation between Britain, U.S.A., the Netherlands and the Chungking Governments; moreover, the situation in French Indochina, especially in its southern

area, caused grave anxieties on the part of our Empire. As it would be a serious matter for our Empire if French Indochina should consequently secede from its mother country of Japan in compliance with the siege by Britain and America, it became imperative for the existence and self-protection of our Empire to prevent such a turn and safeguard French Indochina from encroachment by third powers, perfecting the cooperation between Japan and French Indochina.

Thereupon the Imperial Government decided to demand of the French Government the co-defense of French Indochina and permission for the stationing of our forces and the use of the naval and air bases in its southern area. Considering that there would be a leak in the secrets, a delay in negotiations or some other obstacle if we held the talk in Tokyo, on July 12th we instructed KATO, the Ambassador to France, to make the proposal at Vichy.

The negotiations were mostly conducted with Vice-Premier Darlan and the official documents were formally exchanged on July 22.

Consequently on the 23rd a detailed agreement on practical matters was concluded between the authorities of Japan and French Indochina at the actual place, and more army and naval forces were sent in French Indochina beginning July 29.

As it was anticipated that the British and American Governments would protest against us in regard to this issue, we instructed NOMURA, Ambassador to America, to make an offer as per separate paper at the same time as the occupation; while in Tokyo Foreign Minister TOYODA explained the true intention of the Imperial Government to the Ambassadors of Britain and United States separately.

We contradicted a protest presented by Britain at that time, but we simply ignored the arrogant proposal made later by the U.S.A. as to the actions of our occupation forces, and did not reply.

*we ignored US*

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 772

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 34 pages, dated Aug, Sept., 1940, and described as follows: Anglo-American Intervention at time of Imperial advance into northern French Indo-China, a booklet.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
27th day of Sept. 1946.

K. HAYASHI  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: NIGAHARU CDO

Chief, Archives Section.  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

27th day of Sept., 1946

J.A CURTIS 2nd Lt.  
NAME

Witness T/4 T.TOGUCHI

Investigator  
Official Capacity

TRADE

738

Franco-Japanese Accord Concerning the Customs System, Trade and the Forms of Payment Between Japan and Indo-China.

5/6/41

Signed in Tokyo May 6, 1941  
Ratifications exchanged in Tokyo  
July 5, 1941  
In Force from the same day.  
Promulgated July 9, 1941  
(Gazetted July 10, 1941)

Having consulted the councillors of the Privy Council, we ratify and hereby promulgate the Franco-Japanese accord concerning the Customs System, Trade and the Forms of Payment Between Japan and Indo-China, signed and sealed in Tokyo by the Japanese delegate together with the French delegate on May 6, 1941.

The Imperial Seal  
July 9, 1941

Prime Minister  
Prince KONOYE, Fumimaro  
Foreign Minister  
MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Treaty #13

Franco-Japanese Accord Concerning the Customs System, Trade and the Forms of Payment Between Japan and Indo-China.

The Japanese Government and the French Government, desiring to obtain a closer economic relation between Japan and Indo-China, to assure the equal development of trade between the two countries, and to facilitate the payment for it, have agreed on the following provisions:

Article 1

All natural products or manufactured goods, produced originally in or coming from one of the two countries shall receive on their importation into the territories of the other country, most favoured nation treatment on all matters concerning taxes, fees or other assessments, and regulations and formalities pertaining to importation.

All natural products or manufactured goods produced originally in or coming from one of the two countries, shall receive on their exportation to the other country, the treatment accorded to similar goods destined to the most favoured nation for all matters concerning taxes, fees, or other assessments, and the regulations and formalities pertaining to exportation.

## Article 2

Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding article the import duties applicable in Indo-China to the natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in and coming from Japan, shall be those of the lowest tariff.

Furthermore, the natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in or coming from Japan enumerated in Table A attached to the present Accord, shall enjoy, on their importation into Indo-China, the reduced rates on the duties of the lowest tariff or the exemption of duties, listed in that table.

## Article 3

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1 the natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in or coming from Indo-China, enumerated in Table B attached to the present Accord, shall enjoy, on their importation into Japan, reduced rates on the duties of the national tariff or exemption of the duties listed in that chart.

## Article 4

When one of the two countries finds it necessary to raise, for any one of the products enumerated in Table A and B, the customs duties applicable to the date of signature of the present Accord, it shall notify the other party its intention in writing at least two months before putting the new customs duties into effect. In order to indemnify in friendly fashion the disadvantages which may accrue to the other country by this raising of tariff, a conference may be held, at the request of the other party.

No raise in the customs duties applicable to the products enumerated in Tables A and B shall be made before the expiration of one year from the date of enforcement of this present Accord.

## Article 5

The advantages prescribed in the preceding articles shall remain as acquired advantages, regardless of any change that may be made in the list of articles or the classification of customs duties.

## Article 6

The enjoyment of the tariff advantages prescribed in this Accord is subject to the dual condition of direct shipment and certification of origin.

However, notwithstanding the regulation of direct shipment, the products enumerated in Table A and B attached to this Accord, when transhipped in the ports of Honkong, Manila, Shanghai, or Canton, shall enjoy the tariff advantages prescribed in the above Charts, under the following conditions:

- 1) The shipment should receive a through bill of lading from the country of origin to the port of destination.
- 2) The bill of lading should be endorsed by the consular authorities of the country of destination at the port of transhipment, who will attest that the transhipped merchandise has not undergone at the port of transhipment any transformation or manipulation of this nature as to lose its identity.
- 3) The transportation between the port of transhipment and the port of destination prescribed in the bill of lading shall be made by Japanese or French vessels.

## Article 7

The certificate of origin shall be issued either by the customs authorities of the country of origin, or by qualified organizations of the country of origin which have been approved by the country of destination. In the former case, visas by the consular officials shall be exempted. Shipments by parcel post, ordinary mail, or air-mail shall be exempted from certificate of origin.

When one of the two Governments notifies the other that fraudulent acts were committed in the issuance of the certificate of origin, the Government which received the notification shall immediately begin the investigation of the contravention and communicate the results to the complaining Government, and, if necessary, take every possible step for preventing the continuance of such fraudulent acts.

## Article 8

For the application of ad valorem, duties at the time of importation, the customs declaration should be accompanied by an invoice certified by the consular authorities of the country of destination or by the customs authorities of the country of origin. However, for shipments by parcel post, ordinary mail, or air mail, and also for all shipments the value of which does not exceed one hundred yen or its equivalent piastres, no certified invoices are required. A single deed (mixed document) may be produced in place of a certificate of origin and a certified invoice. This single deed must satisfy the conditions imposed on each of the documents for which it is a substitute.

## Article 9

The natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in and coming from one of the two countries shall be exempted, in the territories of the other, from all taxes and fees for transit, transshipment, storage in bonded warehouses, warehouse entry, temporary duty-free importation and re-exportation. They shall receive for all regulations and formalities pertaining to these operations the most-favoured-nation treatment.

## Article 10

The natural products or manufactured good produced originally in and coming from one of the two countries and imported into the territories of the other country shall not be subject to finished product tax, city admittance tax, or consumption tax collected for the account of the state province, towns, villages, or public or private authorities, higher than those which are being levied or may be levied on similar good produced at home, or if there are no such products, on similar products of the most favoured nation.

The natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in and coming from one of the two countries and imported into the territories of the other for the purpose of being stored in bonded warehouses or of transit, shall not be subjected to any internal tax whatever.

## Article 11

The prohibitions or restrictions on the importation or exportation which are being enforced or may be enforced in the territories of one of the two countries for whatever reason it may be, shall be applied to the trade of the other country only in the case where these prohibitions or restrictions are applied to all foreign countries. They shall be applied in such a manner as will not result in any arbitrary discrimination to the detriment of the other country.

## Article 12

The engagements stipulated in the preceding article shall not constitute an obstacle to the measures of prohibition or restriction which one or the other of the two countries might be led to take, provided that these prohibitions or restrictions are at the same time applicable to all countries coming under the same conditions and provided that they are justified by any one of the following reasons:

- 1) Prohibitions or restrictions concerning public security:
- 2) Prohibitions or restrictions concerning transactions in arms, ammunition, and war materials, or in exceptional circumstances, all other war supplies:
- 3) Prohibitions or restrictions enacted in order to protect public health or morality, or to insure the protection of animals and plants against disease, vermin and harmful parasites:
- 4) Prohibitions or restrictions on the exportation of national, artistic, historical, or archaeological property for the purpose of protecting such property:
- 5) Prohibitions or restrictions which have as their object the extension to foreign products the system established for the country concerning the production, selling, transportation, and consumption of similar home products.
- 6) Prohibitions or restrictions applied to products which are or may become the objects of state monopolies or monopolies exercised under state control within the country in respect to their production or sale.

## Article 13

The two Governments agree that, in all matter concerning commerce, all privileges, favors, or immunities which one of the two countries has accorded or may accord to a third country, shall be extended immediately and without condition to the other country, their intention being that the most-favoured-nation treatment will be assured, in all relations, to the other country.

## Article 14

The stipulation of the present Accord concerning the most-favoured-nation treatment shall not be applicable to the following matters:

- 1) Special advantages which are accorded or may be accorded to Manchukuo by Japan:
- 2) Special advantages based on Customs Union;
- 3) Special advantages which are accorded or may be accorded to adjoining countries in order to facilitate border trade;
- 4) Special advantages which are accorded or may be accorded to domestic fishing industry and to fishing industry similar to domestic fishing industry.

## Article 15

The competent authorities of the two Governments shall decide upon mutual agreement, each year for the following year the list of the products of Indo-Chinese origin and the quantities thereof to be imported into Japan, and on the other hand, the list of the products of Japanese origin and the quantities thereof to be imported into Indo-China, and also the allotment to be given to Japan for the products which are subject to allotment in their importation into Indo-China.

In the same way they shall decide, by mutual agreement, the conditions of application of the foregoing provisions.

## Article 16

The Japanese Government shall permit the importation into Japan of the products of Indo-China origin prescribed in Article 15 in the quantities agreed upon in accordance with the same Article.

The French Government shall permit the exportation of the said products to Japan.

The two Governments shall consider favourably the importation into Japan and the exportation from Indo-China of the products of Indo-Chinese origin prescribed in Article 15 in quantities exceeding the agreed quantities, and also the importation into Japan and exportation from Indo-China of the products of Indo-Chinese origin other than those prescribed in Article 15.

Article 17

The French Government shall permit the importation into Indo-China of the products of Japanese origin prescribed in Article 15 in the quantities agreed upon in accordance with the said Article.

The Japanese Government shall permit the exportation of the said products to Indo-China.

In case the system of allotment of imports into Indo-China is extended during the course of the year to products other than those which are subject to this system of allotment at the time of the grant of the allotted quantities prescribed by Article 15, the allotment granted to Japan for these products shall be, fixed by mutual agreement between the competent authorities of the two Governments.

In case the total allotment of the products subject to the system of allotment for importation into Indo-China is increased during the course of the year, the French Government shall consider favourably the grant to Japan of additional allotments.

In the same way, the two Governments shall consider favourably the importation into Indo-China and the exportation from Japan of the products of Japanese origin prescribed in Article 15 in quantities exceeding the agreed quantities, and also the importation into Indo-China and the exportation from Japan of the products of Japanese origin other than those prescribed in Article 15.

Article 18

The place of origin of the products shall be evidenced by the presentation of the certificate of origin drawn up in accordance with Article 7 of the present Accord.

## Article 19

The competent authoritative officials of the two Governments shall communicate to each other every month a list of the import licenses issued by each of the two countries for the products originating and coming from the other and also statistics of imports and exports between the two countries.

## Article 20

With the exception of the products for which exceptions have been specially agreed upon between the two Governments, the amounts due to creditor in Indo-China in payment for the imports into Japan of the products of Indo-Chinese origin shall be paid in Indo-Chinese piastres, and the amounts due to creditors in Japan in payment for the imports into Indo-China of the products of Japanese origin shall be paid in Japanese yen.

The provisions of the preceding article shall be applied to the payment of freight, insurance and various other charges connected with the trade between Japan and Indo-China.

The Japanese yen and Indo-Chinese piastres prescribed in the two preceding articles shall be acquirable respectively at the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Banque de l'Indochine.

## Article 21

The Banque de l'Indochine shall place at the disposal of the Yokohama Specie Bank, as the counterpart of their equivalent in yen, Indo-Chinese piastres necessary for the payments prescribed in the preceding article.

The Yokohama Specie Bank shall place at the disposal of the Banque de l'Indochine, as the counterpart of their equivalent in Indo-Chinese piastres, yen necessary for the payments prescribed in the preceding article.

The exchange rate between the yen and piastres to be applied to the operations prescribed in the present article shall be determined by mutual agreement between the two Banks on the basis of the gold value of the two monies, such as result from the quotations by the said Banks for these monies in the same foreign money convertible into gold.

## Article 22

The yen acquired by the Banque de l'Indochine in accordance with the provisions of the preceding article, shall be paid into two special yen accounts, which will be opened in the books of the Yokohama Specie Bank in the name of the Banque de l'Indochine; these accounts shall be designated in the present Accord under the names of Account A and Account B.

To the credit of Account A shall be carried the yen acquired by the Banque de l'Indochine as the counterpart of the piastres placed by it at the disposal of the Yokohama Specie Bank for the payments made by application of the present Accord, with the exception of those prescribed in the following paragraph.

To the credit of Account B shall be carried the total in 1941, 70% in 1942, and 55% in 1943 of the yen acquired by the Banque of l'Indochine as a counterpart of the piastres placed by it at the disposal of the Yokohama Specie Bank for the payment of the white rice purchases made by Japan in Indo-China. Account B shall bear interest at the rate to be fixed by mutual agreement between the two Banks.

The Piastres acquired by the Yokohama Specie Bank in accordance with the provisions of the preceding article shall be paid into a special Piastre account to be opened on the books of the Banque de l'Indochine in the name of the Yokohama Specie Bank; this account is designated in the present Accord under the name of Account C.

The Piastres and Yen respectively possessed by the Yokohama Specie Bank by the Banque de l'Indochine at the time of the enforcement of the present Accord shall be carried to credit of Accounts A and C.

#### Article 23

The funds in Accounts A and C shall be appropriated exclusively to the following:

- 1.) The payment of the products traded between Japan and Indo-China.
- 2.) The payment of freight, insurance and other incidental charges related to this trade.

The funds in Account B shall not be used directly for any payment. The sums which will have been carried to the credit of this account in the course of one month shall be transferred to Account A at the end of the corresponding month of the following year.

#### Article 24

Accounts A and B shall be settled at the end of each month after effecting the operation of transfer prescribed in the preceding article. When a comparison of the two accounts shows in favor of one of the Banks a credit balance in excess of 5,000,000 yen or its equivalent in piastres, the amount in excess of the 5,000,000 yen or its equivalent in piastres shall be paid, upon demand by the creditor Bank, in gold or foreign currencies convertible into gold.

However, if a credit balance exists in favor of the Yokohama Specie Bank, the payment prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall be made only for that part of the balance, evaluated in yen, which exceeds the balance

of Account B as of the same date after the addition of 5,000,000 yen.

#### Article 25

On the expiration of the present Accord, Accounts A and C shall be settled and offset against each other.

If the credit balance resulting from the offsetting of Accounts A and C is in favour of the Banque de l'Indochine, it shall, in the absence of a contrary convention previously arranged between the two Governments be immediately paid in gold or in foreign currencies convertible into gold; Account B shall be paid in gold or in foreign currencies convertible into gold, in twelve monthly instalments, the first payment of which shall be made on the last day of the month following the expiration of the Accord.

If the credit balance resulting from the offsetting of Accounts A and C is in favour of the Yokohama Specie Bank; it shall be offset against the balance of Account B. If the credit balance resulting from this second offsetting is in favor of the Yokohama Specie Bank, it shall, in the absence of a contrary convention previously arranged between the two Governments, be immediately paid in gold or in foreign currencies convertible into gold. If the balance is in favor of the Banque de l'Indochine, it shall be paid in gold or in foreign currencies convertible into gold, in twelve monthly instalments, the first payment of which shall be made on the last day of the month following the expiration of the Accord.

#### Article 26

In case of an alteration of the gold value of yen or of piastres as fixed in Article 21, a revaluation of the balances of Accounts A, B, and C shall be made, by mutual agreement, on the basis of the new gold value of the two monies.

#### Article 27

The Yokohama Specie Bank and the Banque de l'Indochine shall decide between themselves the technical methods necessary for the enforcement of the present Accord.

#### Article 28

In the application of the present Accord, the following terms shall be understood:

1.) The terms "the two countries", "each of the two countries" shall be understood as Japan and Indo-China; the terms "either of the two countries", "the other country" shall be understood as Japan or Indo-China.

2.) The term "State", when applied to France, shall be understood as the French Government, or the Government-General of Indo-China.

3.) The terms "the products of domestic production," "domestic products," when applied to Indo-China, shall be understood as products of Indo-Chinese origin.

#### Article 29

The provisions of the present Accord shall be applicable to all the territories or possessions belonging to or under the jurisdiction of Japan and in all the territories constituting the Government-General of Indo-China.

However, the provisions of Articles 15 to 27 shall not be applicable in the Kwantung Leased Territory.

#### Article 30

If during the duration of the present Accord, one of the two Governments finds it impossible to perform any of the provisions owing to unforeseen incidents, the two Governments shall enter into a negotiation for the solution of the difficulties thus arisen.

#### Article 31

The present Accord shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Tokyo as soon as possible. However, the French Government, in case of unavoidable circumstances, may substitute for this instrument of ratification a written notice of ratification, in which case the French Government shall forward to the Japanese Government the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

The present Accord shall come into force from the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall be effective until December 31, 1943. It shall be extended by tacit renewal year by year unless one of the two Governments notifies the other six months before the expiration of the Accord of its intention of ending the Accord.

The present Accord replaces the commercial agreement dated May 13, 1932 entered into between Japan and France, which temporarily fixes the provisions of trade between Japan and Indo-China, and the documents attached thereto.

In witness thereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed and sealed the present Accord.

Drawn up in Japanese and French, in Tokyo, on the 6th of May, in the 16th year of Showa corresponding to May 6, 1941.

/s/ Yosuke MATSUOKA  
/s/ Jun MATSUMIYA

/s/ Charles Arsene Henry  
/s/ Rene Robin

TABLE A

Japanese products which on their importation into Indo-China enjoy the advantages of reduction or exemption of customs-duties prescribed in Article 2 and also the advantages of fixed tariff in accordance with the conditions prescribed in Article 4.

Number of the Tariff of Indo-China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applicable Tariff
Ex 17-Ex 17, 2	Ham		ad valorem	lowest
19	Canned meat			lowest
27	Cocoon, silk for spinning	Exempted		duty-free
	Silk refuse			
31	Oleo-margarine and margarine	Exempted		duty-free
35 to 35,5	Milk, cream, condensed milk, and powdered milk			lowest
36	Cheese	33.33%		10%
37	Butter, fresh or melted	33.33%		6.66%
	Salted	33.33%		10%
38	Honey			lowest
45A and B	Fresh, (refrigerated) or frozen Fish			lowest
46	Dried, salted or smoked fish	33.33%		10%
47	Fish conserved naturally, pickled or processed by other methods	40%		15%
48	Oysters	Exempted		duty-free
49(1 to 3)	Shells, fresh or kept in a fresh condition			lowest
49(4 to 6)	Molluscs, conserved naturally or processed, dried shrimps, dried trepang and dried shark fin	Exempted		duty-free
50	Sea mussels and other molluscs in shells or dried			lowest

Number of the Tariff of Indo-China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applicable Tariff
57	Pearls	50%		25%
75,5	Fancy biscuits or high grade biscuits without sugar	33.33%		10%
77	Kneaded noodles and Italian noodles the so-called Chinese noodles			lowest
80-80,2	Dried vegetables and powder of dried vegetables	Exempted		duty-fr
83	Irish Potatoes	Exempted		duty-fr
84A and B	Fresh table fruits and other kinds of fruits			
(1 to 5)	Citrus fruits			lowest
(6)	Almonds	Exempted		duty-fr
(7 and 8)	Pineapples and bananas			lowest
(9)	Cherries	Exempted		duty-fr
(10)	Dates			lowest
(11 and 12)	Figs and strawberries	Exempted		duty-fr
(13 to 18)	Persimmons, litchis, mangosteen, mangoes, betel nuts and coconuts			lowest
(19 to 22)	Peaches, apricots, apples, pears, plums and grapes	Exempted		duty-fr
(23)	Other kinds of fresh table fruits not specified above	Exempted		duty-fr
85	Dried or crushed and dried table or other kinds of fruits			lowest
86A, B and C	Pickled or conserved table or other kinds of fruits			lowest
93,2	Confectionaries, bonbons, etc.	33.33%		50%

Number of the Tariff of Indo-China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applicable Tariff
94	Sugared biscuits	40%		15%
95	Jams, jelly, marmalade, etc. containing sugar or honey	40%		15%
98	Brick, bar or other forms of chocolate			lowest
98,2	Confectioneries containing cocoa, cocoa butter or chocolate	40%		30%
108	Tea	40%		45%
109	Tobacco, tobacco leaves			lowest
	Manufactured tobacco	33.33%		20%
110-110,2	Fat oils: pure, boiled, oxidized or perfumed			lowest
111,2 A&B	Edible vegetable oils			lowest
111,3	Sulphurated oil			lowest
112 (1-2)	Benzine or essences Rose, geranium-rosat and ylang-ylang			lowest
(3 to 6)	Citron, orange, bergamot, mandarine, citronella, eucalytus, camphor	40%		15%
(7)	Peppermint and safrol oil, de-turpented oil	40%		15%
(9)	Menthol crystals	40%		lowest
(10 to 12)	Thymol, Santalol, Anethol			15%
(13)	Safrol	40%		lowest
(14)	Resinoides, eugenol, isafrol, turpented carbide			15%
122,2	Artificial aroma, vanilla and its derivation or substitutes			lowest
113	Vegetable wax	Exempted		duty-free
114	Vegetable tar	Exempted		duty-free
118	Camphor	Exempted		duty-free
126(1)	The roots of ginseng	50%		25%
126(2)	Roots other than those of ginseng			lowest

Number of the Tariff of Indo- China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction Rate of the Cus- toms Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applic- Able Tariff
127,2	Vermifuge chrysanthemum (rinds, flowers, leaves, stems, and roots)	Exempted		duty-free
158A-D	Vegetables, fresh, salted, pickled, conserved or dried			lowest
170,2(1)	Edible sea-weeds	Exempted		duty-free
170,2(2)	Vegetable products or refuse not mentioned here	Exempted		duty-free
172,3	Beer	Reserved (Note 1)		Reserved (Note 1)
173,2	Japanese liquor	Exempted		duty-free
174,4	Natural mineral water	Exempted		duty-free
185	Cement, white others	40%		15% lowest
189	Sulphur	Exempted		duty-free
190	Coal	Exempted		duty-free
205A	Ordinary pig iron for casting	40%		6%
205B	Hematite pig iron (phosphorus not exceeding 0.15%)	40%		6%
205C-206	Spiegel pig iron, ferro-alloy, and iron or steel ingots			lowest
207	Iron or steel rolled into bars, blooms or billets	40%		6%
207,2	Iron or steel rolled into bars less than 3 millimetres			lowest
207,3-5	Tempered steel for implements, special steel and bars of smelted special steel	40%		6%
208	Iron or steel			lowest
209-209, 2B	Hoop iron or hoop steel rolled by heating or cooling	40%		6%

Number of the Tariff of Indo-China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applicable Tariff
210-212	Thin plates of iron or steel, broad iron plates, tin plated, copper plated, lead plated or zinc plated iron and iron or copper wires	40%		6%
212,2-217	Iron or steel waste, rails, wheels and axles			lowest
011-012	Potassium nitrate, natural or transformed	Exempted		duty-free
044-045	Hydrochloric acid: ordinary or commercially pure	Exempted		duty-free
046,2	Potassium chlorate	Exempted		duty-free
048	Bleaching powder	Exempted		duty-free
062,2	Red phosphorus	Exempted		duty-free
073	Sulphuric acid	Exempted		duty-free
076	Sodium Bisulphite	40%		6%
081	Sodium sulphide	30%		7%
087	Aluminium Sulphate	Exempted		duty-free
0110	Silicated calcium	50%		5%
0114	Potassium Chromide and Potassium Dichromide	Exempted		duty-free
0115,2	Chromic alum	40%		9%
0123	Copper sulphate	Exempted		duty-free
0124 and 0131	Copper sulphate of iron and sulphate of iron	Exempted		duty-free
0165,5	Bicarbonate of soda	40%		9%
0166	Sodium sulphate	40%		6%
0175	Zinc oxide	40%		9%
0178	Lithopone	40%		9%
0180,E	Naphthalene,(1) coarse (2) Powder, lump or plate	Exempted 40%		duty-free 9%

Number of the Tariff of Indo-China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applicable Tariff
0200	Acetone	40%		9%
0379	Phosphatic manure	Exempted		duty-fr
0380	Nitro-lime	Exempted		duty-fr
0381,5	Insecticides made from materials other than copper	Exempted		duty-fr
01 to 0392	Chemical products not mentioned above			lowest
294A,B and C	Dyes made from coal-tar			lowest
298	Varnish and other similar paints			lowest
298,3	Liquid polish for metals			lowest
299	Ink for writing or drafting	60%		10%
299,2	Printing Ink			
(1-2)	Black	30%		7%
(3)	Coloured ink which contains more than 3% of pigments obtained from coal-tar			system of the concern pigment
(4-5)	Other coloured ink	30%		17.5%
300	Black cosmetics	Exempted		duty-fr
301	Pencils, pencil lead, and pastels	60%		10%
308	Cosmetics, kneaded with oil			lowest
308,2-3	Colours			lowest
310	Cosmetics not mentioned here			lowest
311	Perfumes			lowest
312	Soap other than perfumed soap	30%		24.5%
314	Seasonings			lowest
316	Compounded medicine not mentioned here			lowest

Number of the Tariff of Indo-China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applicable Tariff
321	All kinds of candles			lowest
330(1-7)	Wax, cream, paint or paste for shoes	40%		15%
331-332	Fireproof bricks and other fireproof products			lowest
336-337	Other pottery made of ordinary clay			lowest
338-341	Pottery made of grit	40%		9%
341,2	Ceramics or grit pottery for sanitary use	40%		15%
342	Tiles	33.33%		10%
343-344	Ceramics made of ordinary potter's clay or of clay containing tin	33.33%		10%
345-346,3	High-grade ceramics and majolica ceramics, high-grade clay potteries earthenwares and imitation porcelain	60%		10%
347A-B and 347,4	Porcelain, tea and coffee sets of porcelain, porcelain wares	60%		10%
347,2 A-B	Electrical wares made of pottery, porcelain, grit pottery or glass	60%		10%
348	Plate glass	40%		15%
348,2-5	Frosted glass, opaque glass, coloured glass, etc.	40%		15%
348,6	Mirrors	40%		15%
349-349,4	Cast rough glass			lowest
350	Glasswares	40%		15%
351	Window glass	50%		25%
351,2-4	Stained glass, triplex glass and safety glass			lowest
352-354	Glass for clocks and watches			lowest
355-356	Glass for spectacles			lowest

Number of the Tariff of Indo-China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applicable Tariff
357	Optical glass			lowest
358	Small glass articles	40%		15%
359-359,2 to 5	Bottles			lowest
359,6	Vacuum flasks and other vessels for keeping water hot	40%		15%
361	Incandescent electric bulbs	40%		12%
361,2	Other electric implements (lamps, vacuum tubes)	40%		15%
361,3	Dry plate for photography			lowest
368-373	Pure or mixed cotton yarns: Yarns not arranged for retail sale	48%		13%
	Arranged for retail sale or for embroidery	48%		18.2%
372-375	Pure or mixed woolen yarns	40%		15%
379,380, 381	Silk or spun silk yarns, refuse of silk threads	Exempted		duty-free
381,2, and B	Rayon yarns, refuse rayon and fibre	Exempted		duty-free
385-385,2	Oil cloth and linoleum	40%		15%
404-406,3	Pure cotton cloth (raw, refined, bleached, dyed or mercerized, plain, twilled or drilled fabrics, fabrics for bandage, and rubber cloth	28%		18%
407(1-4)	Printed cotton handkerchiefs, comforters, mufflers, scarfs and shawls	28%		25.2%
407(5-7) to 410,2	Pure cotton cloth (printed, plain, twilled or drilled fabrics - coloured lining cloth for binding books-colored cloth-velvet-tulle)	28%		18%

Number of the Tariff of Indo- China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction Rate of the Cus- toms Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applic- able Tariff
411A-E	Pure or mixed plain, twilled or drilled cotton cloth woven with bleached, dyed or mercerized yarns	28%		18%
411F-J	Pure or mixed figured cotton satin or figured cotton textures woven with bleached, dyed or mercerized yarns	28%		18%
411,2 to 418	Pure cotton cloth (crepe for sanitary use, figured satin, or figured texture-(curled texture) wanaori or texture woven in Jacquard style-pique or pique blankets-damask-tulle bobbinots-blankets	28%		18%
419A-D	Cotton hosiery	28%		25.2%
420	Machine knitted cotton lace	28%		36%
420,2	Handmade cotton lace	28%		72%
420,3,421,2 to 422(1-22)	Pure cotton texture (Braided texture-ribbons, ribbons dyed with ink or dyes, plain tulle	28%		18%
422(23) to 426	Pure cotton texture (embroidered tulle, woven embroideries, interlaced weavings-curtains, of muslin or fancy tulle,-embroidered curtains, embroidered muslin	28%		36%
427-431	Pure cotton (without special tariff) wick for lamps and braided wick for candles-incandescent mantel soko of twisted thread for textile use oilcloth	28%		18%
432-433 (1 to 3)	Mixed woven cotton cloth in which cotton weighs the heaviest (velvet, plush and sealskin) textures excepting crepe for sanitary use	28%		18%
433(2)	Mixed woven cotton (crepe for sanitary use)	28%		18%

Number of the Tariff of Indo-China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applicable Tariff
434	Mixed woven ribbons in which cotton weighs the greater part (1) mixed with silk, spun silk or rayon (2) Others			system of tax no. 4 I or J according to circumstances. tax of pure cotton ribbons
435	Mixed braided cotton in which cotton weighs the heaviest (1) mixed with silk, spun silk or rayon (2)-(12) Others	28%		system of tax number 45 I. 18%
436	Other mixed cotton cloth in which cotton weighs the heaviest			tax of pure cotton according to species
437	Fishing net	Exempted		Duty-free
438-441,3	Pure woolen cloth, woolen cloth, padding, muslin, dyed plain wool)	40%		15%
442A-E	Pure woolen cloth (carpets) Pure woolen cloth (hosiery)	40%		lowest 21%
444-447	Pure woolen cloth (braided wool, ribbons, berets, Turkish hats, tapestries and shawls)	40%		21%
448-449	Pure woolen lace and net lace			tax of cotton lace and net lace
450-451	Woolen nets and blankets	40%		15%
452	Woolen slippers with trimmings and the so-called Strausburg slippers			system of tax no. 482, 2 according to its kind
453	Frills of woolen texture	Exempted		duty-free
453,2-454(9)	Woolen velvets for upholstery, mixed woolen cloth (Berry, Serge) wool	40%		15%

Number of the Tariff of Indo-China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction rate of the Customs Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applicable Tariff
54(10)	Mixed woolen carpets			system of pure woolen carpets
54(11)	Mixed woolen hosiery	40%		21%
54(12)	Mixed woolen texture (crepe for sanitary use)	40%		9%
54(13)	Other mixed woolen textures		texture according to its kind	tax of pure woolen
59A	Special silk cloth of Asia	20%		40%
59B	Pure or mixed silk or spun silk without metallic admixture in which silk weighs the heaviest			
1-6)	Crepe (figured or unprinted)	33.33%		40%
7-11,	braided thread, plain serge	33.33%		40%
3-15,17	velvet and plush (not figured)			
3,26-28	net cloth (not figured), plain, gauze, thick cloth (unrefined)			
24)	Thick texture, light silk and other kind of texture not mentioned here weighing over 100 gram per 100 square metres (refined, bleached or dyed).	38.76%		40%
7,12,16,	Crepe (figured or printed) velvet	42.86%		40%
3,19,22,25,	or plush (figured) net cloth			
))	(figured or printed) heavy texture weighing over 100 grams per 100 square metres (figured and unrefined) below 100 grams (figured or printed)			
5)	Thick texture Foulard, etc. weighing over 100 grams per 100 square metres (figured and refined, bleached, dyed or printed)	46.66%		40%
20,21)	Lace	60%		40%
59C	Waste of pure or mixed silk			system of spun silk

Number of the Tariff of Indo-China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction rate of the Customs Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applicable Tariff
459,D, E1, E2, F	Pure or mixed silk, spun silk, waste of spun silk, rayon texture with metallic admixture			10% added to tax of the texture heaviest in weight (Note 2)
459G	Pure or mixed rayon in which rayon weighs the heaviest without metallic admixture		net weight 1 Kg.	10 franc (Note 3)
459H1, H2, I, J, K	Silk, spun silk, rayon mixed with other fibres (wool, horsehair, animal hair, cotton, etc.) and in which the mixed fibres weigh the heaviest and without metallic admixture	46%	ad valorem	70.2%
459,M	Silk, spun silk or rayon carpets or gauze carpet	46%		70.2%
459P-	Hosiery	46%		70.2%
460-460,6	Garments and other ready made articles			lowest
461	Paper (excepting 461,G)			lowest
461,G2	Machine made paper weighing over 35 grams per 1 square metre	30%		17.5%
461,3	Special paper called chemical paper			lowest
461,4A-B	Paper for photographing and films			lowest
462A	Rough cardboard and glossy paper called the "press pan"	40%		9%
462,B	So-called "Fancy board"	40%		15%
462,C 462,2	Processed cardboard and artificial felt, cardboard cut in sizes	40%		9%
463	Cut or processed cardboard	40%		15%
463,2	Vulcanized fibre			lowest
464	Cardboard boxes	40%		15%

Number of the Tariff of Indo-China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction rate of the Customs Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applicable Tariff
464,2	Bobbins and tubes of cardboard	40%		9%
464,3	Superior cardboard products, boxes and others	40%		15%
465-465,2	Typed or lacquered cardboard or fibre products	40%		15%
465,3	Cardboard or fibre products ornamented with pictures or damascene	40%		21%
465,4	Mounts for photographs	40%		15%
465,5-	Notebooks, memorandum books, small pocketbooks, account books			lowest
466,466-2	Books	Exempted		duty-free
468	Newspapers, periodicals, old newspapers	Exempted		duty-free
469	Colour prints, semi-coloured photo prints, lithographs	40%		15%
469,2(1)	Photographs of artistic or record keeping value	Exempted		duty-free
469,2(2)	Other photographs			system of lithograph
469,3	Photograph type-founding and other similar articles			system of lithographs
469,4	Films for motion pictures			lowest
469,5	Transcopied pictures and printed matter	40%		15%
469,6	Post cards	40%		15%
470	All kinds of printed matter specified above	40%		15%
481-483	Footgear made of leather, cloth, etc.			lowest
	Products of morocco leather	40%		30%
491,2-3	Albums and album covers	40%		21%

Number of the Tariff of Indo-China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction rate of the Customs Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applicable Tariff
492,2	Bags, satchels, handbags, etc.	40%		30%
492,5	Leather belts	40%		30%
492,6-7	Leather products not mentioned	40%		21%
497-503,2	Small clocks			lowest
505-505,2	Gauge for rotations, electricity, water, gas, etc., electric gauge	33.33%		10%
504-504,4 506-509,2	Large clocks, besides gauges			lowest
510-536,4	Machinery	lowest		
555	Enamel bathtubs made of moulded iron	40%		15%
568D	Enamel bathtubs of thin steel plate	40%		15%
574	Lamps and tin products	40%		15%
576,4	Batteries	40%		15%
537-579,2	Metalwares not mentioned above			lowest
583	Gunpowder	33.33%		10%
584	Dynamite	Exempted		duty-free
585,2	Detonators for mines	Exempted		duty-free
588	Fuse for mines	Exempted		duty-free
603,4B	Wooden boxes for coffee packing, &c.	20%		20%
604-605	Musical instruments excepting gramophones			lowest
604(52-56)	Gramophones and similar articles	30%		24.5%
609	Fancy mattings			lowest
614	Vehicles			lowest
614(2) 1-4	Bicycles, autocycles, tricycles	50%		25%
614(2) 5-17	Accessories and parts of bicycles			lowest

Number of the Tariff of Indo- China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction rate of the Cus- toms Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applic- able Tariff
614, A 3A 6-11, 13-16	Automobiles Chassis for buses and sightseeing cars. Trucks with equipment for gas generation	20%		20%
1-5,6-11, 12,13-16	Motor cars for riding, trucks excepting those with gas gener- ating equipment	20%		40%
614,3,B	Accessories and parts of auto- mobiles	20%		32%
614,3,C	Headlights, lanterns, etc.	20%		32%
620,A-G	Rubber sheets, gum sulphide threads, elastic cloth, gum sulphide, rubber cloth, ready made goods of rubber cloth, ebonite			lowest
620,1	Solid tyres for wheels			lowest
620,H-J	Tubes and tyres for motor cars			lowest
620,H-J	Tubes and tyres for jinrikishas	40%		15%
620,H-J	Tubes and tyres for bicycles, etc.	28.57%		25%
620,K-M	Soft rubber products, special rubber for combing machines, hot water bottles of rubber or of rubber cloth			lowest
620,NI- NII	Rubber footgear	28.57%		25%
620,O-R	Rubber products for sanitary use, rubber belts, and other rubber goods			lowest
626-627	Felt hats	40%		15%
628,A-G	Hats, hat materials, berets & caps	40%		15%
630,4A-B	Burners and parts of acetylene burners			lowest
635,2A	Cameras and their appliances	43%		20%
635,2B	Bobbins for rolling films	43%		20%
635,3	Medical instruments	40%		15%

Number of the Tariff of Indo- China	The Name of Merchandise	The Reduction rate of the Cus- toms Duties of the Lowest Tariff	Unit of Levy	Applic- able Tariff
636A&D	Fountain pens, sharp pencils			lowest
637	Spectacles	50%		17.5%
641,2	Fancy goods made from materials other than ivory, mother of pearl, tortoise shell, amber and ambroid	20%		28%
642	Pipes, pipes for cigars, etc.	20%		28%
644(4-8)	High-grade brushes	60%		10%
644(1-3)	Ordinary brushes, writing	33.33%		10%
644,2	Brushes and other brush products			
645(1-13)	China or porcelain buttons Ordinary metal buttons	40%		15%
645(1-36)	Buttons made of pressed cardboard, wood, ivory or hemp palm			lowest
646-646(2)	Recreation implements and parts	40%		21%
646,3	Intestinal or artificial intestinal strings, treads and plaited cord	20%		20%
648,2.-C	Lighters			lowest
652	Umbrellas, parasols, etc.			lowest
Misc.	Crown stoppers	Exempted		duty-fr

Note (1) The import duty on beer shall be fixed by mutual agreement in case a quota is granted to foreign countries.

Note (2) For the application of the provisions of Tables 459D to 459F and Note 2 of Table S of the customs tariff of Indo-China, the duty applicable to rayon cloth is fixed at 70.2% ad valorem after making 46 per cent reduction on the duty of the lowest tariff.

Note (3) The enjoyment of the benefit of a specific duty of ten francs per kilogram net is permitted under the conditions that the control of the price of rayon cloth, established according to the methods fixed by the competent authorities of the two Governments, shall secure between the import price of rayon cloth and the import price of rayon yarns a difference which corresponds to the manufacturing costs of the handicraft of Indo-China less the above duties.

Note (4) The ready-made goods, except for the exceptions enumerated in the tariff, shall carry, besides the duty on cloth, a ten percent manufacturing surtax.

Note (5) The price of the packings (external and internal) shall be included in the assessment value of the contents. However, the declarant has the right to demand that the packings be taxed the duty provided for the tariff position to which they belong.

TABLE B

The products of Indo-China which on their importation into Japan enjoy the percentages of reduction or exemptions of customs duties prescribed in Article 3 and also the consolidation of duties according to the conditions prescribed in Article 4.

Number in the Japanese Tariff	Name of Merchandise	Percentage of reduction on duties of national Tariff	Taxation Unit	Applicable Tariff
19	Indian Corn	Exempted		duty-free
26,3	Castor Beans	Exempted		duty-free
37	Pepper Seeds	20%	every 100 kn.	¥7.88
66,2	Salt	Exempted		duty-free
128	Spice	Exempted		duty-free
256	Lacquer	50%	every 100 kn.	¥4.59
402	Silica, excepting coloured ones	Exempted		duty-free
429	Coal	Exempted		duty-free
458	Iron ore			
458	Manganese	Exempted		duty-free
458	Tungsten	Exempted		duty-free
458	Tin ore	Exempted		duty-free
458	Zinc ore	Exempted		duty-free
458	Antimony ore	Exempted		duty-free
609	Rattan (unsplit)	Exempted		duty-free
612(1,C)	Teak	Exempted		duty-free

Final provi:

How Japan

acting under pretense of a mil. alliance, securing the ~~flourish~~ flourish of Indo China War ~~not~~ complete

~~to reveal~~ to ~~the~~ the ~~body~~ body Based on Secret Jap documents, the Final provision showed that Jpn seized the occasion of France's surrender to Germany on 6/17/40 to pressure a military agreement on Sept 4/1940 - ~~and~~ and ~~under~~ under the agreement Jpn secured ~~complete~~ complete Japan secured military and propaganda bases and large source of raw material

Although ~~Britain~~ Britain ~~to~~ to ~~British~~ British ~~ambassador~~ ambassador Craigie offer in an attempt to settle the 9/16/40 to mediate with Clay Kui Stek for Japan Japan declined to settle the issue and the and agreed British contiditly protest of British ambassador at refused the proposal made by amb Stew 3rd Sec of State Wells on 9/22/1940 - protest that Japan's occupation of Indo China but in the Japanese quite "we simply agreed the arrogant proposal made by USA " words of the Jap officer

~~Letter~~ 9 Sept 1941 to secret teleg from Bangkok to Tokyo on Sept 1-1941 was shown out by the ambassador in the state

Shows the extent of Japanese economic aggression

THE SUPREME WAR-LEADERSHIP COUNCIL DECISION No. 16.

RE MEASURES TOWARDS FRENCH INDO-CHINA TO MEET THE SUDDEN  
CHANGE IN THE SITUATION.

.....

February 1, 1945.

I. Principle.

1. In view of the change in the war situation and the attitude of French Indo-China, the Japanese Empire, based on the absolute need of self-existence and self-defence, shall resort to timely independent military action.

The time for resorting to military measures shall be determined separately.

2. Our plans are to be kept in strict secrecy until the time of launching military measures.

II. Essential Points.

1. Prior to the exercising of military force, we shall first of all have our Ambassador, with a time limit, demand the following points of the Governor-General of French Indo-China, in order that the diplomatic procedure may be completed as quickly as possible.

ITEMS.

In view of the general situation, especially of the fact and tendency of exercising of military power by the American forces against the territory of French Indo-China, the Japanese Empire, in order to perfect the defence of Indo-China, shall request the Governor-General of French Indo-China to agree to the following as the materialization of his definite resolution to collaborate with the Japanese Empire against the exercising of military action by the U.S.A. and Britain towards Indo-China and do their utmost to defend Indo-China, on the basis of the fundamental spirit of the joint defence of Japan and French Indo-China.

a) So long as the present situation continues, the Military and armed police forces of French Indo-China should be placed under the joint command of the Japanese Army, and shall act, one and all, according to the orders of the Japanese Army in regard to organization, allotment and movement etc., of units, arms and materials, and such organs as railways

shipping, communications etc., which are of strategic necessity shall be placed under the control of our Army.

b) Immediate orders shall be given to all organs in French Indo-China to co-operate fully and loyally in accordance with the requests of the Japanese Empire.

c) The aforesaid two items shall be accepted in toto within 6 hours

Upon the lapse of the aforementioned time limit, the Imperial Forces shall by considering the French Indo-China Governor General as lacking in sincerity as regards joint defence, resort to necessary measures.

2. Even in the event of French Indo-China accepting our demands in toto, the French Indo-Chinese Military and armed police forces shall be reorganized.

3. Should French Indo-China refuse to accept our demands, the Japanese Empire shall deal with French Indo-China with military force and place same for the present, under military control.

4. The measures towards Annam etc., shall be as follows:-

a) The Japanese forces on the spot shall elevate and support the independent positions of Annam etc., as they deem fit, and devise plans so as to make them co-operate with us actively.

b) The independence of Annam etc., shall be recognized after taking the general situation into consideration,

As regard the time and manner etc., of recognizing independence, same shall be determined separately.

5. Along with the Military disposition, the Imperial Government shall issue a communique at an opportune moment.

6. The Japanese Government shall, depending upon the necessity, explain its true intentions - especially its non-aggressive intentions to Soviet Russia.

7. The Japanese Government shall report to Germany its true intentions as regards the disposition of French Indo-China and make her follow on along the same course as Japan.

8. The French Military forces etc. in the Kwangchow-Wan Leased

Territory and other areas are to be dealt with similarly to French Indo-China.

Note:

The rights and interests of the French people in general shall be treated as leniently as possible.

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## TOP SECRET

The Second Intelligence Conference, 1943  
Document for Distribution, No. 6

The directions in relation to the guidance  
of the White Russians.

June, 1943  
KWANTUNG Army,  
Intelligence

## CONTENTS

- No. 1 Concerning general principle.
- No. 2 Extent of those who should be treated as White Russians.
- No. 3 Concerning guiding principle.
- No. 4 Concerning cultivation of the indomitable fighting morale and the sound and healthy spirit.
- No. 5 Concerning reward and punishment
- No. 6 Concerning intensification of anti-espionage arrangements.
- No. 7 Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys.
- No. 8 Concerning encouragement of national defense physical training.
- No. 9 Concerning diffusion and penetration of the Japanese Language education.
- No.10 Concerning encouragement of return to farm of the city residents.
- No. 11 Concerning dispersed residents' gathering together.
- No. 12 Preparatory matters for the future reform of the organ to guide the White Russians.
- No. 13 Other matters for instruction

## Separate volume

- No. 1 Gist for the intensification of the training for the White Russians young men and boys. (draft)
  - No. 2 Gist for the guidance of the White Russians' national defense physical training. (draft)
  - No. 3 Gist for the enforcement of the diffusion of the Japanese language among the White Russians.
- No. I - Concerning general principle.

1. Whether they are men or women or whether they wish it or not, the White Russians shall be used powerfully and to the maximum degree for the war with the Soviet Union, especially for the secret war with the Soviet Union.

2. Belief to be willing to join the anti-comintern strife with the idea to share happiness and suffering, or life and death with Japan, shall be thoroughly established. Efforts shall also be made for the cultivation of a violent indomitable fighting spirit.

3. Those who are available shall be allowed to retain their racial characteristics and they shall be protected better than before. As to those who are not available, we should not only deny racial consideration, but we must take measures for anti-espionage against them. Bad elements shall be strictly disposed of.

No. II - The limit of those who should be treated as White Russians.

Those who can be used directly or indirectly for the war with the Soviet Union shall be treated as White Russians, considering their racial characteristics. They shall be divided as follows:

(1) Those who are being used, at present, directly or indirectly for the secret war with the Soviet Union by the Intelligence or by the other army authorities: those whom we are training and mooring with the intention to make use of in future, and their families (A).

(2) Those who can possibly be used directly for the war with the Soviet Union now or in future and their families (B).

(3) Those who cannot be used directly now and in future, but who may possibly become loyal to both Japan and MANCHUKUO and who can contribute directly to the war with the Soviet.

No. III - Concerning the guiding principle.

Out of the necessity of attaining the special object of the army, we should let the White Russians retain their racial characteristics and lead them to cultivate anti-comintern thought. Though we admit their wish to return to their homeland we should expect them to perform their duty as the nation of MANCHUKUO. At the same time, we should lead them especially to lay to heart the ideal of the establishment of the Greater East Asia based upon the spirit of universal peace and harmony, and to rush toward the destruction of the communist regime with an indomitable fighting spirit, sharing happiness and suffering and life and death with us and wishing for their racial prosperity in the co-prosperity sphere controlled by Japan.

No. IV - Concerning cultivation of indomitable fighting morale and the sound and healthy spirit.

In view of the fact that there are some among the White

Russians, especially among the city residents who are apt to forget the original mission of the White Russians, and wish only for the quiet life to no purpose, without really understanding the situation and not changing their old ways in their daily life and in other things, we must, by every opportunity, try to convince them our guiding principle. We should especially guide them to cultivate the indomitable fighting spirit to be willing to join the anti-comintern strife, excluding their negative attitude. We should lead them to guard against frivolity; discard gayety and be practical instead, and strengthen a sound and healthy spirit.

No. V - Concerning reward and punishment.

Each person shall be given a different treatment in proportion to his available value. Bad elements shall be properly suppressed or disposed of. Reward and punishment shall be given justly.

1. The following arrangement for a good treatment shall be made for those coming under 2 of Article No. II (A)

(1) Increase in rations.

(2) Reduction of taxes (to be enforced within the limit of the law, keeping in contact with the authorities in the actual place.)

(3) Convenience for children's education (priority for the use of the dormitory and support in tuition).

(4) Gratis for rewriting the foreign residential certificate.

(5) Priority in business, employment, the use of charity and relief facilities.

2. Towards the superior ones among the students and pupils, members of the Young Men's Corps, members of the Volunteer Corps and the Japanese Language School students of 2 of Article No. II proper measures shall be taken into consideration for their good treatment with the object of giving them encouragement.

3. To 3 of Article II, a special good treatment shall not be given, although racial consideration shall be given.

4. Towards the ones who will not follow our guidance and towards bad ones and their families, resolute steps shall be taken when necessary, in addition to the reduction or suspension of ration and other measures of suppression.

No. VI - Concerning intensification of anti-espionage arrangements.

It is needless to say that the White Russians who are the same race as the Red ones and who live among them should be more

prudent than the MANCHURIANS, KOREANS or MONGOLIANS. They should further refrain absolutely from having contact with the Red Russians on their own accord and keep aloof from the company of bad MANCHURIANS. In everything they must not act in such a way as to be observed with suspicion. We must lead them to intensify the system of their mutual watch and joint responsibility, while, on the other hand, strengthening inspection and secret espionage toward them and thus making assurance doubly sure for anti-espionage.

1. Prevention of their having touch with the Red Russians. Though the White Russians shall be lead to try to check themselves from getting in touch with the Red ones, this step must be taken carefully and in a clever manner so as not to excite the Soviet side uselessly.

(1) Strict investigation shall be made to see whether there is any Red one mixing into various arrangements and organizations of the White Russians, and necessary measures shall be adopted, especially as to the matters which may effect the Soviet side, they shall be submitted to the Head Office beforehand, giving the details.

(a) Ration system and ration station.

(b) Schools and places where young men and women gather together.

(c) Temples and charity and relief arrangements.

(d) Trade union, enterprises and employment.

(e) Neighbors' Society (TONARIGUMI)

(f) Residents association.

(2) It is our principle that the White Russians who keep company with the Red Russians shall be strictly punished by oral instructions. It shall be made thoroughly known that this shall be strictly observed thoroughly and the ones who will not stop shall be punished properly.

(3) The White Russians who happen to live next to the Red ones shall be removed to some other suitable places.

2. Intensification of mutual watch and joint responsibility.

(1) The neighbor's society shall be led strongly. The leaders and assistant leaders shall be selected carefully. They shall point out harmful elements by mutual inspection, and establish the system of joint responsibility in each section.

(a) The interior inspection shall be intensified for each residents association and other kinds of associations. Their leaders shall be absolutely responsible for the conduct of their inferiors or the members. Each society or group shall establish the system of joint responsibility.

3. Intensification of general inspection and secret espionage and encouragement of early examination. Inspection and espionage by the gendarmerie and police authorities, not to speak of the special mission shall be strengthened. Suspected persons shall be inspected at an early stage.

No. VII - Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys.

Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys, we have made a representation of our opinion to the authorities, based upon the separate volume No. 1 "Gist of Strengthening of the training of the White Russian Young Men and Boys (Draft)." Regarding the application of the Labor Service Ordinance of MANCHUKUO in order to carry out a long term camping, we must put it into operation after a decision is made by the authorities but as to the other matters, the training which are being given now shall be more strengthened and renovated.

No. VIII - Concerning encouragement of national defence physical training.

Concerning encouragement of national defence physical training, we have made a representation of our opinion to the authorities, based upon the "Gist of the Enforcement of the National Defence Physical Training for the White Russians. (Draft)" We are told that it is impossible to carry out this plan as a whole this fiscal year, because of the expenses, materials and other reasons. As for the Intelligence however, it has been decided that the following plan shall be put in operation in each actual place.

1. Measures shall be taken to spread and intensify all the more the training for gliders already in operation.

2. Measures shall be taken to spread and encourage all the more the making and competition of model planes which is being undertaken in some places.

3. Concerning the construction of a parachute tower, we should try to bring about the atmosphere for it, calling to the influential groups or persons in the actual places.

4. From the point of view of anti-espionage, it shall be clearly understood that the above training measures shall not be given to the White Russians only, but to general Japanese, MANCHURIANS and MONGOLIANS.

Concerning the diffusion and penetration of the Japanese language education.

Concerning the diffusion and penetration of the Japanese language education, we have made a representation of our opinion to the authorities, in accordance with the separate "Gist of the enforcement of the diffusion of the Japanese language (Draft)" Regarding the matters, depending upon the arrangements of the MANCHURIAN Telephone and Telegraph Company and the South MANCHURIAN Railway Company, they shall be enforced after they have been decided upon by the authorities. As to the following matters, efforts shall be made to intensify and promote them in the actual places.

1. Concerning the Japanese language School already in operation, it shall be intensified all the more.
2. The White Russian residents association and the cultural societies shall quickly undertake the diffusion of the Japanese language according to the principle of the Japanese Language School.
3. Necessary propagation shall be put in practice in order to promote the interest of the general public for learning Japanese.
4. For the students of superior ability, good treatment shall be given concerning employment and allowances.
5. The Japanese language column shall be established in the Russian papers and magazines.

No. X - Concerning the city residents' return to farming.

According to the following principle, the return to farming shall be encouraged in order to lead the White Russians to contribute to food production, as well as to cultivate a sound and healthy spirit and heighten a suitable character for the personnel required for the secret warfare.

1. This shall be carried out for each race in order to facilitate the guidance of the racial movement, based upon political espionage standpoint.
2. This shall be carried out voluntarily, apart from the special emigrants, according to the following principle.

(1) This plan shall be based upon the city population dispersal plan which is being carried out by the MANCHUKUO Government. It shall be guided in a positive manner by the colonization organs in provinces and "HSIEN" (district).

(2) In order to facilitate the enforcement of the above plan, attention shall be paid to the following details.

(a) Those who have experience in farming and who have financial influence shall be leaders and the White Russian proletarians shall work under them.

(b) Mechanical farming shall be preferred, but it shall absolutely adopt the system using substitute fuel.

(c) Places shall be selected, as best as possible, where building materials can be obtained without difficulty.

(d) Concerning the obtainment of seeds, proper steps shall be quickly taken by the adjustment committee through the relative organs of the province of "Hsien."

(e) The place shall be chosen taking into consideration the guidance of the White Russians and transport facilities. The residents shall be gathered together as best as possible.

No. XI - Concerning the gathering together of the dispersed residents.

In order to facilitate the guidance and training and also inspection and anti-espionage we must try to gather together those White Russians who live dispersed in various places as best as possible. This shall be carried out following the preceding Article No. X.

No. XII - Preparatory matters for the future reform of the White Russians guiding organ (given orally).

No. XIII - Other matters for instruction.

Concerning the enforcement of collective education of the military training instructors.

1. It is scheduled that a collective camping education shall be given by the Head Office for five days from 1 July with the object of convincing the White Russian military training instructors in various places of the guiding principle and instruct them the method of guidance of practical courses. Each branch office shall select the participants as follows, and report to the Head Office by 25 June.

(1) HAILAR Branch Office  
HAILAR 2    MANCHURI 1            YAKOSHIH 1            SANHO 2

(2) MUTANKIANG Branch Office  
MUTANKIANG 2            MULONG 1            HENZTAOHOTZU 1

(3) CHIAMUSSU Branch Office  
CHIAMUSSU 1

- (4) HEIHO Branch Office.  
HEIHO 1
- (5) MUKUDEN Branch Office  
MUKUDEN 1                      HSINKING 1
- (6) DAIREN Branch Office  
DAIREN 1
- (7) Head Office  
HARBIN 3              TSITSIHAR 1              APULONI 1

(2) Concerning the transfer of the jurisdiction of the guidance of the White Russians in the HSINKING Special City to the HARPIN Special Mission. It is scheduled that the guidance of the White Russians in HSINKING Special City shall be placed under the direct control of the Head Office from 1 July. Regarding the details, instructions shall be given separately. The MUKUDEN branch office shall take charge, as before, of the guidance of the White Russians in various places in KIRIN Province, and in view of the status quo of KIRIN and the district around the "dam", investigation shall be made so as to have the instructors reside permanently for the guidance of the White Russians around these places. The concrete plan shall be handed in by the end of June.

3. Concerning the tour of inspection to Japan and KOREA or to South MANCHURIA. The tour of inspection to Japan and KOREA or to South MANCHURIA which used to be undertaken by the Japanese Language School, the Concordia (ISEH-HO) Youths' and Boys' Corps, etc. shall not be given this fiscal year. There will be no objection, however, to the Concordia Youths' and Boys' Corps, etc., making use of the HARPIN Exhibition which is to be held from 1 August to 20 September.

4. Concerning the control on the removal of residence of the White Russians in MANCHUKUO. In view of the fact that the ration system is getting complicated and also of the principle of intensifying the city population dispersal plan and anti-espionage arrangements, the change of abode of the White Russians in MANCHUKUO shall be controlled as follows:

1. Removal from farming villages to cities shall be checked.

2. Though the return to farming and the gathering together shall be much encouraged in moving the White Russians into the district belonging to the other secret mission control organ, report shall be made mutually between the organs concerned.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I.,  
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that  
the "2nd Meeting of the Kwantung Army Information Section."-- The Direct-  
ions in relation to the guidance of the White Russians"  
was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department,  
Moscow.

on or about March 21, 1946, and that the original of the said docu-  
ment may be found in the archives of the said department. Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_.

/s/ Lt. Col. TARANENKO  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,  
17 May, 1946.

admitted - "major dec."

Ready possible.

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DOCUMENT NO. 2363

PAGE 1

THE AFFIDAVIT

OF SEMYONOV, GRIGORI MIKHAILOVICH OF APRIL 1946.

SEMYONOV, G. M. born in 1890 in the Gossack village Durulguevskaya of the Zabaikalye Region; Russian, a non-country citizen. Former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Eastern Frontier Area; a whiteguard army general.

**QUESTION** During the Civil War in Russia and later on, during your stay abroad, you actively fought against the Soviet Power. Who supported you financially and directed your anti-Soviet activities?

**ANSWER:** During the period of 1918-1920, I received pecuniary subsidies, weapons and equipment from the Japanese Government. The main role in intensifying my anti-Soviet activities was played by the then Japanese Prime-Minister, Count TERAUCHI and War Minister Baron TANAKA.

I was personally connected with SATO, the Japanese Consul-General in Kharbin; Colonel Kurasawa, Chief of the Kharbin Military Mission; and Major KUROKI, representative of the Japanese Army General Staff. From them I learned about the decision of the Japanese Government to support me in every way; they also informed me that both Count TERAUCHI in the capacity of the Premier of the Japanese Cabinet and Baron TANAKA as War Minister, persistently strived with the help of Japan to secure by force the outcome of the 1918-1920 events in my favor.

**QUESTION:** Why were the Japanese Government, and TERAUCHI and TANAKA in particular, interested in the initiating of the hostilities in the Far East?

**ANSWER:** I was informed of the Japanese plans providing for the seizure of the territory of the Soviet Far East. In 1918, 12 Japanese divisions encroached into the Russian territory and completely occupied the Primorye and the Eastern

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part of the Amur Region. Concurrently, the Japanese started negotiations with KOLCHAK and with myself promising the support of their expeditionary army.

The aim of Japan was to achieve the annex of the Primorye by cutting it from Russia at any cost and to incorporate it with Japan. This was disclosed to me by the Japanese themselves.

In autumn of 1919 I met KATO, Envoy plenipotentiary of the Japanese Government, who later on became Vice-Foreign Minister of Japan. KATO was enroute to Osaka to meet KOLCHAK and to hand in the proposal of the Japanese Government concerning joint actions against the Red Army.

KATO informed me that the Japanese Government was desirous to come to terms with KOLCHAK on the Japanese occupation of the territory of Siberia up to the Urals. This would secure the safety of the rear of the KOLCHAK Army; in exchange KOLCHAK must give his consent to recognize the right of the Japanese to colonize the Soviet Primorye. X (1)

In the beginning of 1920 the Japanese Government endeavored to create a puppet Government in Primorye under its control. They reckoned that under the disguise of the supposed independence of that Government Japan would make the Soviet Primorye serve her interests.

On November 20, 1920, when I, and my Staff were at the Station of Manchuria, Colonel ISOME, representative of the Japanese General Staff came from Vladivostok and informed me, that the Japanese Government was planning to create an independent Government in the Primorye and was ready to support me as a candidate for the post of the head of this Government.

With the view of continuing the negotiations on the subject, I arrived at Vladivostok at the end of November, 1920, where I met Major-General TAKAYANAGI, chief of the Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Siberia.

On behalf of the Japanese Government, TAKAYANAGI assured me that ISOME had correctly presented the Japanese view point on the destiny of the Primorye, and I gave my consent to become the head of the future government in the Primorye.

After that, to define more accurately and fully the conditions offered by Japan, I met High General TAGHIBANA, Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, who was soon appointed to the post of the Commanding General of the Japanese Occupational Forces in Siberia. I also met his successor, General KANAI, the future Chief of the General Staff; I was similarly elucidated by them as to the desire of Japan to see me at the head of the Primorye Government.

The final conditions proposed by the Japanese Government on the Primorye issue was forwarded to me by Count MATSUDAIRA, the Head of the Japanese Mission in the Soviet Far East, who later on, prior to the surrender of Japan, was Imperial Household Minister. (2)

/ Question: On

QUESTION: On what conditions did you settle the question of capturing the Soviet Primorye with the Japanese?

ANSWER: The Japanese conditions were as follows:  
Japan took upon herself to place at my disposal the necessary loan in cash, weapons, and ammunitions.

I, on my part, had to do away with all so-called frontier formalities between the Primorye and the territory under the Governor-General of Korea, as soon as I became the head of the Far Eastern Government. Korea  
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In other words, according to this condition set forth by MATSUDAIRA, I agreed to the annex of the Primorye by Japan. I also agreed to take all decisions pertaining to the questions connected with the possible extension of the territory under the Primorye Government, only together with the Japanese representative.

Along with that I was obliged to make a statement to the effect that I agreed to leave Japan the right to freely carry on the immigration of the Japanese and Koreans to the territories of the Soviet Far East and the Soviet Sakhalin. 4

QUESTION: Was it only the Soviet Primorye and Northern Sakhalin that the Japanese territorial claims were limited to?

ANSWER: No. The seizure of Northern Sakhalin and the Soviet Primorye was only part of the Japanese plans, which provided for far wider territorial gains at the expense of Russia; Japan planned to seize the whole of Eastern Russia as far as the Baikal. 5

In 1920 I conducted negotiations on this issue with General TOCHIBANA, who at that time was promoted to the post of the Commanding General of the Japanese Occupational Forces in the Far East, and with Colonel UEDA who later on was in the rank of General and commanded the Kwantung Army.

TOCHIBANA and UEDA invited me to come to Vladivostok and informed me that the Japanese Command was preparing an offensive into the depth of the Russian territory from the Khabarovsk district in the direction of the E.C.R.R.

As a result of the offensive, TOCHIBANA told me, the Japanese troops would carry out the full occupation of the Soviet territory up to the Baikal.

TOCHIBANA and UEDA also informed me that the Japanese Government was planning to create an independent Government under me in the Zabaikalye and to completely annex the Primorye.

Japan failed to carry out the plan of seizing the Zabaikalye and the Primorye, yet she kept her forces on the Soviet territory until 1922, reckoning that she would succeed somehow to annex the Primorye from the Soviet Russia by force.

/Question: What

**QUESTION:** What was the Japanese's attitude towards the population of the Soviet Primorye and Eastern Siberia during the intervention?

**ANSWER:** Throughout the period of the Japanese occupation in the Far East, the Japanese troops treated the local population most inhumanly. The regime established by them in the Primorye and Siberia was a combination of plunder, coercion and unheard of atrocities. (6)

Upon entering Khabarovsk the Japanese troops went looting throughout the town. They broke into the houses, stole valuables, raped women, and there were cases when earrings were torn off the ears of Russian Women.

I also know that by personal order of the Japanese General OOI all cattle and horses were taken away from the population of the town of Inan. A great amount of railroad equipment, captured by the Japanese in the stores of the Ussuri Railroad was shipped to Japan. At the same time threatening the local population of the Primorye with repressive measures, the Japanese took away their land allotments and settled colonists from Korea and Japan on them.

As a result of the Japanese policy of colonization, the Russian population of the Primorye and Eastern Siberia was placed in an exceedingly hard situation.

As far as I know the Japanese went on preparing for attacks on the Soviet Union, pursuing the same aim of territorial seizure even after the Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East was over.

**QUESTION:** What do you know about the Japanese preparations for military aggression against the Soviet Union?

**ANSWER:** Upon the failure of the Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East, they started working out new aggressive plans in Japan. (7)

In 1927 the so-called "TANAKA MEMORANDUM" was published in the world press. The Japanese tried to refute the existence of that document through their press, but I was personally informed by TANAKA himself that the said plan actually existed.

In 1926 when it became known in Japan that the "GENRO COUNCIL" took the decision to offer TANAKA to form a new Japanese Government, the Minseito party accused TANAKA of having allegedly bought for himself the leadership in the Seiyukai party for 20 million yen, which funds had been assigned by the Diet for the expenditures on the military operations during the Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East and were entrusted to TANAKA, who was War Minister at that time. (8)

This question was investigated by Prosecutor-General of the Tokyo prefecture, and in December 1926 I was summoned by him to bear witness in the case.

/ At

At the Tokyo Station I was met by General YAMANASHI, TANAKA's closest friend, who took me to TANAKA's private residence.

TANAKA welcomed me and speaking fluent Russian told me that he knew I was summoned by the Prosecutor; he also told me about the alleged crimes he was being accused of and asked me to speak in his favor before the Prosecutor, when giving my testimony concerning the 1918-1922 events.

TANAKA recommended that I ground the expenditure of the 20 million yen by persuading the Prosecutor that the War Ministry supported financially not only myself but the white-guard generals KHORVAT, KOLMYKOV and KUSNETSOV as well.

At that time TANAKA corroborated the information of the "GENRO COUNCIL's" decision to entrust him with the formation of a new Japanese Cabinet.

TANAKA said that when he became the Premier he would direct the Japanese Government to carry out his plan of the annex of East Siberia from the U.S.S.R., that plan having been elaborated by him long before, and he said he would carry out the creation of a limitrophe state on that territory.

During the conversation TANAKA promised that I should be appointed the head of the Far-Eastern State to be.

TANAKA went on developing his ideas and stated that the realization of the plan would be effected in a somewhat different way, as compared with that of the period of the intervention in Siberia.

As TANAKA put it, his plan was as follows: Japan would seize Manchuria and proclaim the creation of a separate state on the Manchurian territory, and then she would attack the U.S.S.R. and seize Eastern Siberia up to Lake Baikal.

TANAKA proposed to create a government which would please the Japanese on the annexed Soviet territory, and then to declare the independence of the annexed Soviet Far East. The next day I called on the Prosecutor-General and in accordance with TANAKA's request testified that the 20 million yen had positively been spent on the military needs connected with the intervention.

Ensuing my calling on the Prosecutor I was invited by TANAKA to dinner with himself, General YAMANASHI and SHOODJI, the interpreter.

At dinner I asked TANAKA what Japan was going to do with Manchuria in case China protested against turning it into a separate state.

TANAKA replied that he was speaking quite frankly with me and then told me that the creation of a separate state in Manchuria would be just the first step which would be immediately followed by another, to-wit, the complete incorporation of Manchuria with Japan and the subjugation of the former to the purpose of Japan.

I asked TANAKA whether Japan would attack the U.S.S.R. if the plan of the seizure of Manchuria failed due to some or other cause. YAMANASHI answered this question saying that following TANAKA's coming to power, he, YAMANASHI would be appointed Governor of Korea and, if the realization of the plan of attacking the U.S.S.R. through Manchuria failed, the Korean territory would be used as a military base for the attack on the Soviet Primorye.

TANAKA corroborated YAMANASHI's statement and said that when a final scheme of attack against the U.S.S.R. was chosen, the advantage of using the Russian whiteguard emigrants, residing in the sphere of the Japanese influence would be taken into consideration.

TANAKA recommended that I should intensify the preparation of whiteguard emigrants for war against the U.S.S.R. so that they might play a definite role in it.

Towards the end of our conversation it was decided that I should maintain a close contact with YAMANASHI and TANAKA's closest associate - TANAKA SHASHIN, one of the leaders of the "BLACK DRAGON" society.

In 1928 when the "TANAKA MEMORANDUM" became known and the Japanese refuted the existence of that document, I still had an opportunity to convince myself that the Japanese were intensely preparing for the realization of that plan.

In 1928 I met TANAKA SHASHIN in Tokyo and asked him to elucidate me as to Baron TANAKA's future plans. TANAKA SHASHIN told me that Baron TANAKA's plans were not changed and to confirm this he showed me a scheme of the railroad construction in Manchuria, provided the occupation of Manchuria were effected by the Japanese troops.

The existence of TANAKA's plan became quite indisputable when the incident of 1931 took place and when the Japanese occupied Manchuria as was set forth in the plan.

QUESTION: Did you participate in the seizure of Manchuria by the Japanese?

ANSWER: Yes I did. I personally took an active part in the preparation for the occupation of Manchuria. As far back as 1928, in Tyantsin, I established a personal contact with PU-YI through my old acquaintance, the Chinaman LO-DZU-YUI, who was PU-YI's tutor. At that time PU-YI lived on the territory of the Japanese concession in Tyantsin. First LO-DZU-YUI and then PU-YI himself intimated to me that negotiations had been started between PU-YI and the Japanese on the restoration of PU-YI's claims on the Imperial Throne in Peking.

The Japanese had promised PU-YI their support but delayed the solution of the question.

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PU-YI

Black Dragon  
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PU-YI asked me to assist him in his negotiations with the Japanese. I gave my consent, and arriving in Tokyo met with Count OKUDAIRA and TOYAMA MITSURA who was at that time a well known politician. I asked both of them to use their influence and assist in the quick solution of this question.

After that, during the period from 1929 to 1930 I several times entered into negotiations with the representatives of the Japanese Command on behalf of PU-YI, and in March 1931 I succeeded in having Lt.-Gen. NINOMIYA, then Deputy Chief of the Japanese Army General Staff, state that PU-YI would be rendered a substantial assistance by the Japanese. General NINOMIYA asked me to forward his request to PU-YI to send his representative from among the Chinese.

I got connected with LO-DU-YUI, and PU-YI's private secretary LU arrived in Tokyo. General NINOMIYA received him and informed him of the firm decision of the Japanese Government to assist PU-YI in the restoration of his Imperial prerogatives.

Presently the Japanese staged the Chinese General WAN's aggression against the Japanese which served as a pretext for the opening of hostilities which ended in the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese.

Then a government was formed in Chanchung which would please the Japanese, and PU-YI was placed at the head of the Government.

QUESTION: Who of the Japanese military leaders played the most active role in the seizure of Manchuria.

ANSWER: General HONJO, the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army directed the operations of the seizure of Manchuria. Besides, an active role in initiating war in the Far East was played by the group of the so-called young officers. Among them there were Colonel ITAGAKI who occupied the post of deputy Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, Colonel DOIHARA, Chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Mukden. Colonel SHIMAMOTO, Chief of the Mukden garrison, and Maj. Gen. HASHIMOTO, Chief of the Japanese gendarmery in Manchuria.

As a pretext for attacking Manchuria, the Japanese staged the notorious "Mukden Incident", the preparation for which had been conducted since July 1931.

At the time I was in Mukden. I met ITAGAKI, DOIHARA, SHIMAMOTO and HASHIMOTO there, and was aware of the provocation that was being brewed by them.

I was beforehand personally informed by SHIMAMOTO of the plan of the Japanese in which the objectives that were to be taken first were shown, as well as artillery positions for opening fire at the Chinese barracks were prepared.

(11)  
TOYAMA,  
MITSUURA

PU-YI

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At the same time another division of the Japanese troops was brought into Mukden in smaller units. Later on this division participated in disarming the Chinese garrison.

At that time DOIHARA was conducting an active political preparation selecting his agents from among the Chinese who further on constituted the backbone of the administrative body created by the Japanese in Manchuria.

Among the Chinese selected by DOIHARA for the collaboration with the Japanese there were TSIN, the first Premier of Manchoukuo, CHIANG-CHIN-KUI, the second Premier of Manchoukuo, IO, DZU-YUI Chairman of the Manchoukuo Senate, and many others.

On September 17, 1931 under the supervision of SHIMAMOTO and DOIHARA a railroad bridge of no significance near Mukden was blown up by the Japanese. The Japanese press published a report of the Chinese soldiers having allegedly blown up the bridge, ensuing which the Japanese opened hostilities which resulted in the attaining of their aim - the seizure of Manchuria.

Having accomplished this part of their aggressive plan Japan started intensive preparations of the Manchurian military base for their attack on the U.S.S.R.

In their plans the Japanese emphasized the significant role that the whiteguard emigrants were to play.

QUESTION: What role were the Russian whiteguard emigrants to play according to the Japanese military plans?

ANSWER: Soon after the occupation of Manchuria, in 1931, I was called to Colonel ISHIMURA, Chief of the Second Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters to confer on the question concerning the Russian emigrants. ISHIMURA informed me that the Japanese Government in virtue of its benevolent attitude towards the whiteguard emigrants, was desirous to help us realize our long cherished dream--to return to the Fatherland. When I asked him to explain what he meant by saying it, he replied that the Japanese General Staff was working out a plan of invasion of the Japanese army into the territory of the Soviet Union with the whiteguards playing an important role in that operation.

Then ISHIMURA suggested that I start preparing armed forces composed of whiteguards and said that I should report to him about the measures taken, as soon as possible.

When we next met I reported to ISHIMURA my proposal as to the necessity of uniting the whiteguard emigrants in China Japan and Manchuria into one organization giving it the name of the Russian Whiteguard Emigrants Affairs Board under the Ministry of the Interior of Manchoukuo. ISHIMURA agreed with me and said that I should be at the head only of that part of

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the Russian emigrants that lived on the Manchoukuo territory, as to the other emigrants' settlements, they would be supervised respectively by the headquarters of the Japanese Army in the areas of which they resided.

In 1934 as a result of negotiations between me and Major General ANDO, Chief of the Japanese Military Mission, the question of the creation of the whiteguard emigrants' organization in Manchuria, was finally decided.

When in 1934 ANDO and I met in the "Nagoya Hotel" in Mukden we composed a draft of the whiteguard emigrants organization to be in Manchuria, and came to an agreement as to the nominees for the leading posts in the organization.

In the same year, 1934, the organization of the Russian emigrants in Manchuria was created and by suggestion of the Kwantung Army Headquarters was called the "Russian Emigrants Affairs Bureau", abbreviated: "BREm".

I must say here that the creation of the "Russian Emigrants Affairs Bureau" must by no means be considered as an expression of the Japanese's care for the Russian emigrants.

Although they needed the whiteguard emigrants as an instrument for carrying on work hostile to the Soviet Union, they did not at all care to give them any rights whatsoever. Quite the contrary, the Japanese encouraged all sorts of manifestation of ill-will against Russians as the representatives of the white race.

General KOISO was the ideological leader in the sphere of racial discrimination, as well as religious persecution policy. He was chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters from 1933 to 1935 and later on Prime-Minister of Japan.

On KOISO's urgent request an instruction of the Japanese Ministry of Education found its application in the Japanese schools, that instruction prescribing the teachers as a matter of obligation to inculcate in the Japanese children hatred towards Russians, Americans and English and to imbue them with the idea of the Japanese being a higher race in comparison with the other nationalities.

Also it was on KOISO's initiative that in 1940 in Manchuria was published PU-YI's manifesto which prescribed the entire population of Manchuria, regardless of the religious convictions of these or those national groups, to worship the Japanese goddess Amatorase.

The persecution of Russians became still worse following the beginning of Japan's war against the U. S. A., and Great Britain, when one could see Russians beaten openly by the Japanese in the streets of Kharbia and Dairen.

These facts prove that Japan needed the "BREm" only in view of her war against the U. S. S. R.

/Question: What

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*doc*  
*"The effort we give is another matter. We may be influenced by the fact that the deponent was exercised by the Soviet Union presented the effort."*

DOCUMENT NO. 2363

QUESTION:

What basic tasks were given the "Russian Emigrants Affairs Bureau" in Manchuria by the Japanese?

PAGE 10

*no opinion on end part. 11 notes*

ANSWER:

By the creation of "BREm" were pursued the aims of the consolidation of the anti-Soviet ideology among the emigrants and of the preparation of them for war against the Soviet Union on the side of Japan.

The work of the "BREm" was carried on in accordance with these tasks. The "Chief Russian Emigrants Affairs Bureau" was in Kharbin. At the beginning General RYCHEV was at the head of it. Major-General VLADYEVSKIY, who was later on appointed by the Japanese to the post of the Chief of the "BREm", was my personal representative in the Chief "BREm".

There were five sections in the chief BREm:

- 1st--Propaganda;
- 2nd--Military training of the whiteguard emigrants;
- 3rd--Intelligence and counter-intelligence;
- 4th--Economic;
- 5th--Charity.

Besides, the council of nationalities was organized in the BREm. It was composed of the chairmen of the national communities: Dr. KAUFMANN of the Jewish Community, Professor KULYABKO--KORETSKY of the Ukrainian Community, and also the representatives of the Turkic-Tartar and Armenian groups.

The council of nationalities periodically held conferences with the Chief of the "BREm" and decided questions concerning contact of the national organizations with one another.

Anti-Soviet propaganda was widely disseminated among the emigrants. Upon my approval RODZAEVSKIY who escaped from the Soviet Union in 1925 was appointed the Chief of the propaganda section. He started intensive anti-Soviet activities.

On the initiative of AKIKUSA, Deputy Chief of the Japanese Military Mission, a print-shop was equipped in Kharbin in 1934. RODZAEVSKIY supervised the publishing of the newspaper "Nash Put" (Our Way) and the Magazine "Natsia" (Nation), which were printed in that print-shop.

(12)

At that time was also started the printing of pamphlets and leaflets which were widely spread in Manchuria, and part of those publications were printed on especially fine paper to facilitate their smuggling to and scattering throughout the U.S.S.R.

Prior to the transfer of the E.C.R.R. into the hands of the Japanese, RODZAEVSKIY told me that they managed to smuggle their pamphlets and leaflets into the U.S.S.R. with the assistance of the railroad employees.

In 1941, when the U.S.S.R.--Japanese Pact was concluded, the Kwantung Army Headquarters ordered that they should change the

tone

tone of their publications with regard to the U.S.S.R., but it was pointed out that the anti-Soviet propaganda should not be checked altogether and that it should be conducted by publishing and spreading pamphlets and leaflets among the emigrants.

The newspaper "Nash Put" office was transferred to Shanghai, whereas the cover of the "Natsia" Magazine began to bear an inscription of allegedly being also published in Shanghai, though it was still being published in Kharbin.

Along with all that the Japanese instructed that oral propaganda should be intensified through various literary and historic circles. The sole aim of such circles was conducting anti-Soviet propaganda.

It was at that time that the young emigrants began to be drawn into the created by the Japanese "Kyo-Wa-Kai" association (Commonwealth of Nations), where they were to familiarize themselves with the Japanese politics.

The "Kyo-Wa-Kai" was created in 1932, by the Japanese pursuant to Emperor PU-YI's special manifesto. The "Kyo-Wa-Kai" was an organization spread widely among all the strata of the Manchurian population including the whiteguard emigrants. The aim of that organization was to implant in the minds of the population the ideas requisite to the Japanese and justifying Japan's aggressive designs.

The "Kyo-Wa-Kai" also preached the idea of Japan's domination over the other nations of East Asia.

The Kwantung Army Headquarters supervised the activities of the "KYO-Wa-Kai" and its directives were obligatory for the leadership of the society.

Manshoukuo Prime Minister CHIANG-CHIN-KUI was the President of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai", but its actual supervisors were the Japanese TAKEBA and MIYAKI, former Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters.

The Central Office of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" was in Changchun, and there were the local branch offices of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" in other towns, which supervised the network of the primary nuclei among the population.

In 1938 I published a book under the title of "About Myself" in which I described the progress of my struggle against the Soviet power during the Civil War, and pointing out to the mistakes made by the whiteguards army. I developed the idea of the necessity of uniting the whiteguard emigrants with the view of overthrowing the Soviet power.

In 1942 I wrote another book following the suggestion of General DOI, Chief of the Kharbin Military Mission. The title of the book was "Thoughts on the New Era"; I handed the manuscript to the Japanese.

In this book I advocated the idea of Japan's being the leader of East Asia, and suggested that an authoritative body be established in Japan which would represent the block of the states of East Asia.

I proposed that the whiteguard emigrants be given a separate territory in Inner Mongolia.

In addition to those, on the order of Colonel UKAI and Major-General KAMATSU, the Chiefs of the Military Mission, I wrote articles directed against measures carried out in the Red Army.

In this way the ideological preparation of the whiteguard emigrants for war against the U.S.S.R. was combined with military training carried out on a large scale.

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QUESTION: How was the military training of the whiteguard emigrants conducted?

ANSWER: "The Whiteguard Emigrants Affairs Bureau" included military training in the curricula of the emigrant schools, and beginning from 1938 special military detachments were organized.

One of these detachments, 500 men strong, was stationed at Hartachedza, the second-800 men strong-at the railroad station Sungari 2. Throughout the existence of both detachments 4,500 emigrants were given complete training, and subsequently they were mustered every summer for additional training.

In Zakhinganye Area (the area beyond the Khingan Mountain Range), where the whiteguard emigrants were mainly occupied in agriculture, and it was not profitable for the Japanese to have them interrupt their work, the young emigrants were mustered for a three-week period of military training every year.

Colonel PORTNYAGIN's detachment was stationed in Khailar and another, under the command of Cossack Captain PESHKOV, was stationed in Yakishi. Each of those detachments was 1,200 men strong. During their musters the said detachments were used for military operations against Chinese guerrillas.

All those military detachments were trained to be ready for military operations together with the Japanese against the U.S.S.R.

Question: What was your particular role in the Japanese plans of attack on the Soviet Union?

Answer: In 1936, I was called by Major-General ANDO, the Chief of the Japanese Intelligence Service in Manchuria who informed me that he wanted to initiate me into the military plans of the

Japanese

Japanese, ANDO stated that the Japanese Government had planned for the nearest future to effect the invasion of the Japanese troops into the Soviet Primorye, where it was planned to create a limitrophe state of Manchoukuo type, in which I should play the leading role.

In the same year 1936, I met General OKAMURA, Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. I learned from him, that according to the Japanese plan of invasion, the Ussuri region was to be incorporated into Manchoukuo, and a buffer state was to be created extending from, Lake Baikal to the East, with myself at the head of the Government.

QUESTION: Tell the names of the Japanese politicians and military war lords, who initiated those aggressive plans.

ANSWER: War Minister General ARAKI most strikingly expressed the Japanese aggressive aspirations at that period. We were friendly, General ARAKI and myself, since the 1918-1922 Japanese intervention. At that time ARAKI was chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin. (1)

When from 1931 ARAKI became War Minister and then a member of the Supreme Military Council of Japan I repeatedly went to see him in Tokyo and had long talks with him.

In 1936 ARAKI told me that Japan was striving at the creation of heavy industry in Manchuria, in as short time as possible, with the task of partial provision of the Kwantung Army needs. (14)

Ensuing the creation of this industrial base Japan would begin war against the Soviet Union. It was then that I learned for the first time from ARAKI that AIKAWA, a representative of the industrial circles, was appointed to supervise the creation of the Manchurian industrial base for the army. ARAKI characterized AIKAWA as one of the official industrial leaders. AIKAWA

At that time under the supervision of AIKAWA the intensive construction of an iron-and-steel plant was started in Southern Manchuria, as well as the reconstruction of the Anshan and Mukden works.

When enlarging on the question of war against the U.S.S.R. ARAKI told me that the Japanese plan at that time essentially was to effect the annexation of Eastern Siberia and the Primorye from the U.S.S.R. by the use of force and to create a limitrophe state on that territory.

Along with that ARAKI stated that only the seizure of the Primorye might be effected by Japan at first, which would in no way mean the cessation of the further advance into the core

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of the U.S.S.R., the ultimate aim of Japan, ARAKI concluded, for all times being the territory immediately East of Lake Baikal.

Towards the end of our conversation ARAKI suggested that I should maintain a close contact with the Kwantung Army Headquarters, whose immediate task it was to carry the plan of the seizure of the Soviet Far East into effect.

When later on ARAKI and I met, he was always true to his word and confirmed his previous statements to the effect that the preparation for war against the U.S.S.R. was the main purpose of his activities.

In 1933 the Japanese General Staff decided to reconnoitre the power of the Red Army in the Far East by battle, and opened hostilities in the Lake Hassan district. Major YAMAOKA, a General Staff Officer, came to Dairen from Tokyo to see me, with a special task to inform and have me prepared for the events which were taking place. YAMAOKA warned me that I with the whiteguard emigrant units had to be ready to participate in the operations as, provided the operations in the Lake Hassan district progressed successfully, large forces of the Japanese Army would be thrown into the Soviet Primorye, and the whiteguard emigrants units would be used for the consolidation of the occupied territory.

When the Red Army liquidated the Japanese break-through into the Soviet territory in no time, and peace negotiations were started, the Japanese Command initiated the preparation for a new diversion in the direction of the M.P.R. and the Soviet Zabaikalye.

I was to take part in this operation, and, in case of a successful break-through, I, with the whiteguard emigrants units, had to begin an advance in Inner Mongolia through the M.P.R. into the Soviet Union. The Japanese pointed out that the main strategic direction of the Japanese blow was the Zabaikalyc which in the opinion of the Japanese was the narrow outlet thru which went the supplies for the Soviet Primorye.

Major-General ANDO in his talk with me said that the Japanese reckoned that in case they succeeded in intercepting the Red Army communications at Lake Baikal, the Soviet Far East would be annexed from the Soviet Union.

Although the Nomongan Incident ended in a defeat for the Japanese they went on drawing plans of war against the U.S.S.R. and M.P.R.

I was included in this work as well.

At the end of 1941, by order of Colonel UKAI, Chief of the Dairen Military Mission, I worked out a plan of the formation of Mongolian units, taking into consideration the modern technic and the peculiarities of the Mongolian armed forces.

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With the view of the utilization of the Mongols in the war against the U.S.S.R. and the M.P.R., the Japanese were deciding the question of what particular type of units would be most suitable for them and sought my collaboration in the working out of this plan.

I handed in my plan of the formation of Mongolian Units to Colonel UKAI in November, 1941, when the battles between the German troops and the Red Army were raging on the approaches to Moscow.

Colonel UKAI, who had the right of direct contact with the Japanese General Staff and was always informed about the decisions, taken in the General Staff, told me that the time was approaching when Japan would enter into the war against the U.S.S.R.

I reminded UKAI of the existing peace treaty between Japan and the U.S.S.R. To this UKAI replied that the Japanese General Staff had already taken the decision to launch an attack on the Soviet Union and would certainly realize it as soon as the fall of Moscow became known.

The Army General Staff's attitude to the peace treaty between Japan and the U.S.S.R., UKAI went on, was as follows: If the Japanese are benefited by the observance of the treaty, it should be observed; if, on the contrary, gains may be obtained by violating the treaty,--violated it must be by all means.

The following fact is worth one's attention, though. Japan went through great military hardships in 1944-1945, the Japanese military circles did not give up their designs of attacking the U.S.S.R.

In 1944 I was called by Major-General AKIKUSA, Chief of the Kharbin Military Mission, who informed me that the Japanese units would possibly soon retreat from their positions in China, and if this was the case, the Army General Staff would not consider the possibility of Japan's war against the U.S.S.R. fully eliminated; therefore it was necessary to consolidate the Inner Mongolian military base by means of forming new Mongolian Military Units. I was commissioned by the Japanese Army General Staff to lead these formations.

In connection with this decision, the Manchurian detachment formed by the Japanese under Lieutenant-General GARMAEV-URZHIN and consisting of six cavalry regiments and an artillery division, which were to constitute the backbone of the Mongolian Army to be, were transferred from Khailar to Khingan.

In

will attack  
when  
moscow fall

In June 1945 I had a talk with Major-General KUBO, Chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Mukden. He said that if Japan succeeded in coming to terms with China on the conclusion of peace, Japan would be able to transfer her troops now engaged in China to Manchuria, and then she would have her hands free to begin war against the Soviet Union.

Saying this KUBO referred to the alleged decision of the Japanese Government on this question. From that conversation with KUBO I came to the conclusion that the Japanese Army General Staff had a specially worked out plan of an attack on the Soviet Union.

I personally witnessed how throughout 1944-1945, in view of the realization of that plan, the Japanese actively consolidated the Kwantung Army and prepared for the invasion into the territory of the U.S.S.R. But the offensive operations of the Soviet troops in Manchuria smashed all their military plans.

The record is taken down from my words correctly and has been read by me.

Signed /SEMENOV/

Interrogated: Counter--Intelligence Officer

Lieutenant-Colonel  
/ SOKOLOV/

C E R T I F I C A T E

The City of Moscow.

April 11, 1946.

I, Semyonov, Grigory Michailovich, sign this certificate to the effect that I promise to testify the truth bearing witness in the case of the main Japanese War Criminals.

I was duly warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony as set forth in Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

Signed: /SEMENOV/

The certificate is taken by  
the Counter-Intelligence Officer

Lieutenant-Colonel /SOKOLOV/

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. A. Kaplan, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: V. Kaplan

744

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN  
 TOKYO  
 OFFICE OF THE MEMBER  
 FOR  
 THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt-Colonel Kurkov, Chief of the Secretariat of the Office of the Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Allied Council for Japan, hereby certify that the Map of the Soviet Far East and Northern Manchuria has been prepared by the Office of the Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Allied Council for Japan and for this purpose was used part of the Administrative Map of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is an official publication of the Department of Topographical Survey and Cartography under the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs of the U. S. S. R., of 1937.

September 13, 1946

Allied Council for Japan

Office of the Member

for

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Chief of Secretariat Kurkov

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. A. KAPLAN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document.

September 13, 1946

Signature: V. Kaplan

*not captured  
or from files of Jap Govt* 786

Talks Between General ARAKI and ISHIWATA,  
Secretary General of the Imperial Rule  
Assistance Association.

From the "Kokunin Shinbun" of August 14, 1941

W 17867

*on occasion  
of German  
attack on Sov. Un.*

Looking back at the Siberian Expedition, I feel that the plans were complete, but it seems there had been considerable regret on account of the failure to make the expected last stroke. There is a proverb, 'History repeats itself,' and I believe this principle is still the same today.

What will happen if we shall be satisfied by merely looking on with folded arms without dispatching troops or doing anything?

Next, we shall deal with the Siberian Expedition. Unqualifiedly, we simply call it the Siberian Expedition, but there were many very complicated circumstances lying in its background. Japan's present ambition to dominate the Continent may fully be said to have germinated in the Siberian Expedition. Unfortunately, however, I feel that, in the execution of this expedition, there had been lacking in contemporary internal situations, the courage and the determination to strive for the calculated ends by deciding on a Cabinet resolution under a firm and resolute policy. With a very complicated and congested environment as its background, it had been very cleverly planned. However, it is exceedingly regretful that we had met with various obstacles which had arisen at home and abroad and that we had been unable to carry this plan to perfection.

The first foundation of the Siberia incident, thus looking from all angles, has been justified as an impartial and proper measure. So at that time if our country had held strict confidence, had not hesitated to carry out a national retaliatory measure to return for the violation of international agreement law under the guarantee of real ability, and had proceeded resolutely for the stability of East Asia, presenting a common front with the countries with goodwill for us, such a movement as the establishment of new order which is also the heaviest task up to the present would have been set about already and made progress. Now I am thinking about it thus and am full of deep emotion.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G. H. Q., S. C. A. P., and as such have possession custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said section.

2. That Document No. 2367 was delivered to me by the Russian Division of International Prosecution Section as being a file of the Japanese Newspaper "Kokumin Simbun" for 1941 including the issue of 14 August 1941, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

9 September 1946

/s/ E. E. Danly  
E. E. DANLY

CERTIFICATE

I, SOKICHI ISFIGURO, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library do hereby certify the following, viz:-

The book

Title:	"KOKUMIN SHIMBUN" of July and August 1941 (incl. Issue No. 17867 of Aug. 14).
Publisher:	KOKUMIN SHIMBUN SHA
Year of Publication:	1941
No. of Volumes:	One
Book-shelf No.	<u>"Shin"</u> 501

owned by the Imperial Library, was at the request of the International Prosecution Section, Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, loaned out to the said Section on June 12, 1946.

Dated the 28th day of September, 1946.

SOKICHI ISFIGURO  
(sign and seal)

## EXCERPTS FROM THE BOOK

*Shidehara*

"Conference on the Limitations of Armaments in 1922" (Baron Shidehara's statement).

THE CHAIRMAN (speaking in English): I am directed by the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions to report to the Conference that in the discussion of matters relating to Siberia the following statement was made to the Committee by Baron Shidehara on behalf of the Japanese Government. The statement is as follows:

"The military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken in common accord and in cooperation with the United States in 1918. It was primarily intended to render assistance to the Czecho-Slovak troops who, in their homeward journey across Siberia from European Russia, found themselves in grave and pressing danger at the hands of hostile forces under German command. The Japanese and American expeditionary forces together with other Allied troops fought their way from Vladivostok far into the region of the Amur and the Trans-Baikal Provinces to protect the railway lines which afforded the sole means of transportation of the Czecho-Slovak troops from the interior of Siberia to the port of Vladivostok. Difficulties which the Allied forces had to encounter in their operations in the severe cold winter of Siberia were immense.

"In January, 1920, the United States decided to terminate its military undertaking in Siberia, and ordered the withdrawal of its forces. For some time thereafter, Japanese troops continued alone to carry out the duty of guarding several points along the Trans-Siberian Railway in fulfillment of interallied arrangements, and of affording facilities to the returning Czecho-Slovaks.

"The last column of Czecho-Slovak troops safely embarked from Vladivostok in September, 1920. Ever since then, Japan has been looking forward to an early moment for the withdrawal of her troops from Siberia. The maintenance of such troops in a foreign land is for her a costly and thankless undertaking, and she will be only too happy to be relieved of such responsibility. In fact, the evacuation of the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces was already completed in 1920. The only region which now remains to be evacuated is the southern portion of the Maritime Province around Vladivostok and Nikolsk.

"It will be appreciated that for Japan the question of the withdrawal of troops from Siberia is not quite as simple as it was for other Allied Powers. In the first place, there are a considerable number of Japanese residents who had lawfully and under guaranties of treaty established themselves in Siberia long before the Bolshevik eruption, and were there entirely welcomed. In 1917, prior to the joint American-Japanese military enterprise, the number of such residents was already no less than 9,717. In the actual situation prevailing there, those Japanese residents can hardly be expected to look for the protection of their lives and property to any other authorities than Japanese troops. Whatever districts those troops have evacuated

*"majority of court fall def. the right to cross-examine"*

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in the past have fallen into disorder, and practically all Japanese residents have had precipitately to withdraw, to seek for their personal safety. In so withdrawing, they have been obliged to leave behind large portions of their property, abandoned and unprotected, and their homes and places of business have been destroyed. While the hardships and losses thus caused the Japanese in the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces have been serious enough, more extensive damages are likely to follow from the evacuation of Vladivostok, in which a larger number of Japanese have always been resident and a greater amount of Japanese capital invested.

"There is another difficulty by which Japan is faced in proceeding to the recall of her troops from the Maritime Province. Due to geographical propinquity, the general situation in the districts around Vladivostok and Nikol'sk is bound to affect the security of the Korean frontier. In particular, it is known that these districts have long been the base of Korean conspiracies against Japan. Those hostile Koreans, joining hands with lawless elements in Russia, attempted in 1920 to invade Korea through the Chinese territory of Chientao. They set fire to the Japanese Consulate at Hunchun and committed indiscriminate acts of murder and pillage. At the present time, they are under the effective control of Japanese troops stationed in the Maritime Province, but they will no doubt renew the attempt to penetrate into Korea at the first favorable opportunity that may present itself.

"Having regard to those considerations, the Japanese Government have felt bound to exercise precaution in carrying out the contemplated evacuation of the Maritime Province. Should they take hasty action without adequate provision for the future, they would be delinquent in their duty of affording protection to a large number of their nationals resident in the districts in question and of maintaining order and security in Korea.

"It should be made clear that no part of the Maritime Province is under Japan's military occupation. Japanese troops are still stationed in the southern portion of that Province, but they have not set up any civil or military administration to displace local authorities. Their activity is confined to measures of self-protection against the menace to their own safety and to the safety of their country and nationals. They are not in occupation of those districts any more than American or other Allied troops could be said to have been in occupation of the places in which they were formerly stationed.

"The Japanese Government are anxious to see an orderly and stable authority speedily reestablished in the Far Eastern possessions of Russia. It was this spirit that they manifested a keen interest in the patriotic but ill-fated struggle of Admiral Kolchak. They have shown readiness to lend their good offices for prompting the reconciliation of various political groups in Eastern Siberia. But they have carefully refrained from supporting one faction against another. It will be recalled, for instance, that they withheld all assistance from General Rozanov against the revolutionary movements which led to his overthrow in January, 1920. They maintained an attitude of strict neutrality, and refused to interfere in these movements, which it would have been quite easy for them to suppress, if they had so desired.

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"In relation to this policy of nonintervention, it may be useful to refer briefly to the past relations between the Japanese authorities and Ataman Semenoff, which seem to have been a source of popular misgiving and speculation. It will be remembered that the growing rapprochement between the Germans and the Bolshevik Government in Russia in the early part of 1918 naturally gave rise to apprehensions in the Allied countries that a considerable quantity of munitions supplied by those countries and stored in Vladivostok might be removed by the Bolsheviks to European Russia, for the use of the Germans. Ataman Semenoff was then in Siberia and was organizing a movement to check such Bolshevik activities and to preserve order and stability in that region. It was in this situation that Japan, as well as some of the Allies, began to give support to the Cossack chief. After a few months, such support by the other Powers was discontinued, but the Japanese were reluctant to abandon their friend, whose efforts in the Allied cause they had originally encouraged, and they maintained for some time their connection with Ataman Semenoff. They had, however, no intention whatever of interfering in the domestic affairs of Russia, and when it was found that the assistance rendered to the Ataman was likely to complicate the internal situation in Siberia, they terminated all relations with him and no support of any kind has since been extended to him by the Japanese authorities.

"The Japanese Government are now seriously considering plans which would justify them in carrying out their decision of the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province, with reasonable precaution for the security of Japanese residents of the Korean frontier regions. It is for this purpose that negotiations were opened some time ago at Dairen between the Japanese representatives and the agents of the Chita Government.

"Those negotiations at Dairen are in no way intended to secure for Japan any right or advantage of an exclusive nature. They have been solely actuated by a desire to adjust some of the more pressing questions with which Japan is confronted in relation to Siberia. They have essentially in view the conclusion of provisional commercial arrangements, the removal of the existing menace to the security of Japan and to the lives and property of Japanese residents in Eastern Siberia, the provision of guaranties for the freedom of lawful undertakings in that region and the prohibition of Bolshevik propaganda over the Siberian border. Should adequate provisions be arranged on the line indicated, the Japanese Government will at once proceed to the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province.

"The occupation of certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin is wholly different, both in nature and in origin, from the stationing of troops in the Maritime Province. History affords few instances similar to the incident of 1920 at Nikolaiovsk, where more than seven hundred Japanese, including women and children, as well as the duly recognized Japanese Consul and his family and his official staff, were cruelly tortured and massacred. No nation worthy of respect will possibly remain forbearing under such a strain of provocation. Nor was it possible for the Japanese Government to disregard the just popular indignation aroused in Japan by the incident.

*Tokuda*  
 To carry him away here now from wherever he is in Russia would be very difficult and - combatative.  
 You must permit his interrogation if the court so orders - that effort can be admitted only in the future.

Under the actual condition of things, Japan found no alternative but to occupy, as a measure of reprisal, certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin in which the outrage was committed, pending the establishment in Russia of a responsible authority with whom she can communicate in order to obtain due satisfaction.

"Nothing is further from the thought of the Japanese Government than to take advantage of the present helpless condition of Russia for prosecuting selfish designs. Japan recalls with deep gratitude and appreciation the brilliant role which Russia played in the interest of civilization during the earlier stage of the Great War. The Japanese people have shown and will continue to show every sympathetic interest in the efforts of patriotic Russians aspiring to the unity and rehabilitation of their country. The military occupation of the Russian Province of Sakhalin is only a temporary measure, and will naturally come to an end as soon as a satisfactory settlement of the question shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government.

"In conclusion, the Japanese Delegation is authorized to declare that it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions."

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I, E. E. Danly, do hereby certify that the foregoing extract is a true and correct copy of the statement of Baron SHIDEHARA which appears on pages 340 to 346 of the volume "Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921, February 6, 1922", published by the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., and is in my custody.

/s/ E. E. DANLEY  
E. E. DANLEY  
Chief, Document Division, IPS

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Affidavit of the Witness  
KHADAROVSK  
26 March (SHOWA 21) 1946

I, Colonel of Justice BAGINYAN, Military Interrogator for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, with Lieutenant Petrov as interpreter, interrogated, having warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony according to Article 25 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., as a witness the below named, who testified:

1. Name - TAKEBE, Rokuzo
2. Age - 54
3. Name of Profession - Former Chief of General Affairs Department of the Manchurian Government.
4. Kind of Political Party - None.
5. Present Address - Khabarovsk.

The certificates of the witness being warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony and of the interpreter for giving false translation are attached to the affidavit.

Interrogation was done in Japanese.

- 0.1
- Q. Mention the names of persons among the leaders of Japan with whom you had close relation.
- A. My acquaintances or those whom I met are the following: GENERAL TOJO; Former Prime Minister KOISO; Former Prime Minister SUZUKI; Former Prime Minister ABE, Nobuyuki; Generals UMEZU and YAMADA; Lieut-Gen. HATA; Former Commander of the Kwantung Army UEDA; Former Commander of the Kwantung Army MINAMI; Former Minister of Greater East Asia Affairs AOKI, Kazuo; MATSUOKA; and ODATE, Shigeo, Former Minister of Home Affairs and Former Head of General Affairs Bureau during SHOWA 11-12 (1936-1937), and Chief of General Affairs just before my installation; HOSHINO, Naoki, and Former President of the South Manchurian Railway and Former Transportation Minister KOHJIMA, Naoto.
- Q. What was the purpose of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria?
- A. The most important aim of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria was to build up a military base on the continent.
- Q. Against what country was this base built?
- A. Mainly against the U.S.S.R. and China.
- Q. Where did you find out that the aim of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria was to make Manchuria a military base against the U.S.S.R. and China?
- 0.2
- A. This was the opinion of the Japanese political leaders and the Kwantung Army. I know that the problem of preparing for a war against the U.S.S.R. was discussed at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. I heard about it from the Commanders of the Kwantung Army, Generals UMEZU, UEDA, MINAMI, and Lieutenant-General IKEDA. I have attended conferences held at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army when I held high positions of leader in Changchun.
- Q. What was the fundamental mission of the Kwantung Army?
- A. The purpose of the Kwantung Army being stationed in Manchuria was for defense, and it maintained an offensive stand to attain this purpose. In SHOWA 19 (1944) the Greater East Asia War became very difficult and disadvan-

tageous; and at the same time the Kwantung Army changed its attitude to a defensive one. Until the Nomonhan Incident, the Kwantung Army had taken an offensive stand towards the U.S.S.R., but after the above incident it changed to an attitude of aggressive defense. After SHOWA 19 (1944) it became absolutely on the defensive.

Q. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive concerning the operation of the base of operation against the U.S.S.R. within Manchuria?

A. The Kwantung Army kept its military plan secret, but it demanded the government to take up many kinds of measures in political and economical administration.

Q. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive?

A. First I received orders from the Kwantung Army concerning the first and second plans on developing Manchuria. The main points of this plan are to develop industry, to supplement the demands of the Kwantung Army, to set up railways and roads which can be useful in the case of a war breaking out against the U.S.S.R., and to prepare a food base.

Q. The ultimate aim was for Japan to prepare an economical base for operations against the U.S.S.R., wasn't it?

A. Yes, it was for an attack against the U.S.S.R.

Q. When and from whom and what kind of orders did you receive concerning the first and second plans?

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A. I received documentary orders through the secretariat, and I met the Commander of the Kwantung Army to talk it over. Also, every year I went up to Tokyo to report and received orders concerning my future work.

Q. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive concerning the preparation of the base for a war against the U.S.S.R.?

A. After all the political and economical demands of the Kwantung Army to the government were the preparation for a war against the U.S.S.R. I received orders from the Commander (Generals of the Kwantung Army UMEZU and YAMADA), Chiefs of Staff (Lieut. Generals KIMURA, YOSHIMOTO, KASAHARA, and HATA), Assistant Chief of Staff (Lieut. Generals HATA and IKEDA), and Chief of the Fourth Section (Colonels KUROKAWA and OBI).

Q. Have you ever talked with the Japanese War Minister?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. What kind of orders did you receive from the War Minister?

A. I didn't receive any concrete orders from the War Minister. For instance, the situation just after the beginning of the Russo-German War not being clear, I went to TOJO by airplane to make sure whether reinforcement of the Kwantung Army meant the opening of a war against Soviet Russia. War Minister TOJO said only that it was necessary to reinforce the Kwantung Army and didn't explain the reason.

Q. What was the reason for the reinforcement of the Kwantung Army which began about the summer of SHOWA 16 (1941)?

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A. The reinforcement of the Kwantung Army began just after the beginning of the Russo-German War, and its purpose was to complete the preparation for the war against Soviet Russia.

Q. What do you know about the measure by the "Kwantung Special Manoeuvre, the plan called "Kantokuen"?

A. The "Kwantung Special Manoeuvre" was a name for keeping secret the actions of the Kwantung Army. Actually the Kwantung Army was reinforced by this plan. According to this plan there were orders concerning the delivery of food and other things, supplying laborers, and transportation of goods.

Q. When and by whom were you made to know the existence of the "Kantokuen"?

A. I heard about it at the beginning of July SHOWA 16 (1941) from KUROKAWA, Chief of the Fourth Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, and also from UMEZU, Commander of the Kwantung Army.

Q. What kind of concrete things did UMEZU say concerning the "Kantokuen" plan?

A. During his talk with me, UMEZU told me about the increase-ment of the troops of the Kwantung Army and demanded the delivery of food for these troops.

Q. Under your command what measures should be taken by the Manchurian Government regarding the "Kantokuen" plan?

A. First of all, the delivery of goods necessary for the re-inforced troops, transportation of these goods, the mobilization of laborers, and anything else necessary for the Army.

Q. When were the measures of the Manchurian Government according to the Kantokuen plan to be realized?

p.5 A. Its measures were to be realized within six months.

Q. Was food to be replenished with the crop of SHOWA 16 (1941)?

A. At the beginning food was prepared with the crop of SHOWA 15 (1940).

Q. It proves that the measures had to be realized in a very short time, doesn't it?

A. Yes, there was no time to wait for the crop of SHOWA 16 (1941), and we had to prepare it with the crop of SHOWA 15 (1940).

Q. What really did the head of the Fourth Section of the Kwantung Army inform you concerning the plan of the Kantokuen plan?

A. He informed me of two things. One is that the troops of the Kwantung Army would be greatly reinforced, and the other is the delivery of goods for the Army must be increased.

Q. What kind of steps did you take towards the organs under you in the Manchurian Government to realize these measures?

A. Conferences which I attended were held many times.

Q. To whom did you report about the demands concerning the Kantokuen plan? And in what way did the actual realization of the plan begin?

A. I informed the Prime Minister of all the demands of the Kwantung Army, and also the vice-chief. I also held meetings of the vice-chiefs of each section.

p.6 Q. Was the military mobilization of the government officials to be prepared by the Kantokuen plan?

A. Yes, I relieved the officials so that they might be mobilized by the army by the Kantokuen plan.

Q. What do you think is characteristic of the political and military actions of TOJO?

A. I think that TOJO should take the responsibility of preparing for the attack on Soviet Russia, and also of starting a war against America and England in the South.

Q. What part did TOJO play in the war against China in SHOWA 12 (1937)?

A. At that time TOJO was the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and I think he is responsible for leading the troops of the Kwantung Army into a certain district of China and also, after he became War Minister and Prime Minister, for the whole management of the China Incident.

Q. Was the National Service Law of SHOWA 14 (1939) in Manchuria proposed by the Japanese?

A. The National Service Law was proposed by the Kwantung Army, and it was made by the demand of UEDA, Commander of the Kwantung Army.

Q. What was the reason for this demand?

A. The reason was that it was necessary to have a large army for the war against the U.S.S.R.

P.7. Q. By whom was the mobilization of laborers enforced in Manchuria?

A. The mobilization of the laborers was enforced in compliance with the Kantokuen plan according to two ways. One was by supplying in the administrative way, and the other was supplying by the Labor Service Law. More than a million people were mobilized every year.

Q. How long was the term of this mobilization? And in what way was it realized?

A. The mobilization of the laborers was compulsory. They were mobilized for from 4 to 6 or 8 months. By the Labor Service Law youths of 21 to 23 years of age were mobilized and by executive order people were mobilized regardless of age.

Q. By whose proposal was the mobilization carried out?

A. It was carried out by the proposal of UMEZU.

Q. When was mobilization by the Labor Service Law enforced in Manchuria? And what was its purpose?

A. The mobilization of laborers by the Labor Service Law was enforced in Manchuria in SHOWA 18 (1943). Its purpose was mainly to fill deficiency of laborers in the military production factories.

P.8. Q. What do you know about the KYOWA KAI?

A. I myself was a member of this association, and also a member of the Central Headquarters Committee. The leader of the KYOWA KAI was Prime Minister CHANG, and the actual leader was Lieutenant-General MIYAKE, Chief of Central Headquarters. The Central Headquarters Committee held a meeting once a month. At this meeting the problems concerning guidance of the Manchurian people were discussed. For instance, the problem of the mobilization of laborers: the Chinese disliked the law of Labor Mobilization, so the mobilization of the laborers had to be carried out with the aid of the KYOWA KAI.

- Q. By whose proposal was the KYOWA KAI organized?
- A. The KYOWA KAI was established by the proposal of the Japanese, especially General HONJO, former Commander of the Kwantung Army. In this association, the Japanese held the position of leaders and through this association the Japanese thoughts were made known.
- Q. How was the KYOWA KAI made use of for the preparation of the war against the U.S.S.R.?
- A. As mentioned before, the government received orders concerning this from the Kwantung Army, but the KYOWA KAI cooperated in making Manchuria a base for preparations for a war against the U.S.S.R.
- Q. Mention the facts of the cooperation between the KYOWA KAI and the Japanese Government in preparing for the war against the U.S.S.R.
- A. The KYOWA KAI did not cooperate directly with the Japanese Government but only through the Kwantung Army. Lieutenant-General MIYAKE, representative of the Kwantung Army, appointed the leaders of the KYOWA KAI. Also, officers of the Kwantung Army often attended the conferences and took the lead in its actions.

- p.8 Q. How many members were there in the KYOWA KAI?
- A. There were more than 4,000,000.
- Q. What do you think is distinctive of the activities of AYUKAWA in Manchuria?
- A. He played an important part in developing the heavy industry in Manchuria according to the first 5-Year Plan. Almost all of his activities were concentrated upon the establishment of the munition industry. He directed the production of coal, iron, light metals, aeroplanes and motor cars. He established the Manchurian Heavy Industry Development Co., Ltd., and directed it from December of SHOWA 12 (1937) to SHOWA 17 (1942).
- Q. Did AYUKAWA'S activities in Manchuria bring forth great profit?
- A. All the industries under AYUKAWA's direction showed a deficit.
- Q. Who supplemented the loss?
- A. The Manchurian Government granted a subsidy. From SHOWA 12 (1937) the total subsidy came to be about 500,000,000 yen.
- Q. Was the compulsory mobilization of the laborers mainly for AYUKAWA's work?
- A. The laborers who were mobilized were, in the field of developing heavy industry, used for AYUKAWA's work.
- p.10 Q. Have you ever heard ARAKI's speeches?
- A. When I was the governor of AKITA Prefecture around SHOWA 8 or 9 (1933, 1934), I heard ARAKI's speech at a meeting of prefectural governors. He was at that time the War Minister. ARAKI hung up a map of the U.S.S.R. and Manchuria, and explained the necessity of the Maritime Province of the U.S.S.R., Siberia and Zabaikalye (Phonetic) for Japan. SUZUKI, Teiichi also spoke on the same thing as ARAKI did.

- Q. What did you learn from OSHIMA, former Japanese Ambassador to Germany?
- A. I have never met OSHIMA personally. But I have heard of him from MORISHIMA, Japanese Minister at Moscow. According to MORISHIMA, OSHIMA trusted the ability of Germany and Hitler, and he always reported to the Japanese Government that Germany would surely win. Last year, when the Japanese residents of Germany passed CHANGCHUN, I heard from them that OSHIMA had prohibited them from reporting to Japan the actual circumstances in Germany.

(Signature) TAKEBE, Rokuzo

I prove by my signature that the above answers are written in my own handwriting.

(Signature) TAKEBE, Rokuzo

Interrogator: Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.  
at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo.  
Colonel of Justice BAGINYAN.

Interpreter Lt. Petrov

Secretary-Stenographer Timoleeva

Beginning of Interrogation 11:35

Close of Interrogation 17:15

C E R T I F I C A T E.

At Khadarovsk, 26 March 1946

Swearing that I, former Chief of General Affairs of the Manchurian Government TAKEBE, Rokuzo, will, as a witness, make only true statements concerning the chief war criminals to Colonel of Justice BAGINYAN, Military Interrogator at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, I deliver this certificate.

749

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel G. I. TARANENKO, a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that this photostat is a true copy of the article appearing in July 11, 1938 issue of "Japan Advertiser"; was delivered to me by the library of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section on or about July 26, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, the Far East.

(Sgd) Lt.Col. TARANENKO

Tokyo, Japan.

ARAKI CHIDES NATION FOR EXTREME ECONOMY: CAN'T GO WITHOUT SHOES FOR 20 YEARS, HE SAYS.

Government officials and the people at large are going too far in their efforts to support the campaign in China, Education Minister General Baron Sadao ARAKI told members of the Politics and Economics Study Society in Osaka yesterday. Since Japan is determined to continue the war for 20 or 30 years if necessary, emergency measures and stringent savings cannot be continued indefinitely, he insisted.

"In today's economy, national attention is concentrated more on materials than on money, on men rather than materials and on thoughts instead of men", the retired general pointed out, according to Domei. "Japan's determination to fight to a finish with China and the Soviet Union is sufficient to carry it on for more than a decade." In spite of this circumstance, however, the nation seems to be carrying its sacrifices to extremes. To me, seeking a quick victory seems too hasty. It is contrary to the

real trend of events. People are being encouraged to wear "geta" rather than shoes. If the war ends in a year or two, this is all right, as the public can go without leather footwear for a while, but we cannot be shoeless for 20 or 30 years.

"I want to call to the attention of both officials and citizens the need for re-examining their basic ways of thinking about the war. The Japanese have a habit of respecting the occupations handed down by their ancestors. However, the idea that unemployment can be solved merely by putting the jobless to work on tasks for which they are not adapted is a mistaken one".

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Dated the 28th day of September, 1946.

Sokichi Ishiguro (Sign. & Seal)

TELEGRAM

670

Ultra Secret

Urgent

To : Vice-War Minister and Vice-Chief of General Staff

From: Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army

9 June 1937

1. Judging the present situation in China from the point of view of military preparations against Soviet Russia, I am convinced that if our military power permits it, we should deliver a blow first of all upon the Nanking regime to get rid of the menace at our back.

If our military power will not permit us to take such a step, I think it proper that we keep a strict watch on the Chinese government that they do not lay a single hand on our present undertakings in China until our national defence system is completed. We will thus wait for the Chinese government to reconsider.

We should not take the initiative to become friendly with the Nanking government, which has no intension whatsoever of adjusting diplomatic relations with Japan, for, judging from their national characteristics, such a step will only aggravate their disdainful attitude toward Japan.

2. As for Japan's policy toward China, as stated in the telegram from Shanghai (No. 121) and Nanking (No. 159), we of the Kwantung Army are entirely of the same opinion. For further particulars, I shall report to you myself when I go to Tokyo.

But I hope for the present that a deliberate scrutiny will be added to the practical plan toward China and the leading policy in North China which were made public at the time the cabinet was changed some time ago.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Signed at Tokyo on this  
30th day of August, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
 Signature of Official  
 SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

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I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

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/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
 NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis  
 2nd Lt. M.I.

Investigator, IPS  
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THE JAPANESE-ENGLISH-CHINESE WAR

by KONDO Shigeki

Published by The Research Institute for Chinese Problems

(Page 74, line 5-10) What is it that has been influencing Europe, which is a peninsula of Asia, and the whole world, if not the propellant force of Japan in the far distant East. Has not Japan been the actual, the only motivating power in modern world history?

Sino-Japanese War  
Russo-Japanese War  
World War I  
Manchurian Incident  
The Nazi Regime in Germany  
The Annexation of Ethiopia  
The Spanish War  
The Occupation of the Rhineland  
The China Incident  
The Annexation of Czechoslovakia, Austria and Albania

- - - -

(Page 78, line 9, 10) Thus, the fall of modern Europe will mean the rise of Asia, and great propaganda for the Imperial way in which all races will be unified. Develop the European Incident into a world-wide incident!

- - - -

The Japanese-English-Chinese War

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Publisher: Research Institute on Chinese Problems

Year of Publication: 1939

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Sokichi Ishiguro (Sign. & Seal)

75-2

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3 day of Sept., 1946

(signed) Kosaburo Shibata  
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) C.H.C. Norton  
(illegible)

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Police Affairs Section  
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/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis  
2d Lt. W.I.

Investigator, IPS  
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Excerpts from the magazine "KAIZO" (Reconstruction)  
Vol. 23, No. 21 of November, 1941  
TANAKA's article "A NEW STAGE OF SOVIET-GERMAN  
WAR and JAPAN" (pp. 206-211)

(Page 206) (Title) "The New Development in the  
Russo-German War and Japan"

by TANAKA, KANAE

Hitler's speech on the night of Oct. 3 was a  
declaration of German victory over Russia, and the  
world soon came to know this concretely.

The Soviet-German front, for a long time stable,  
had turned active in the area of Vyazma east of  
Smolensk with a death struggle of 7 million men, and  
the last Timoshenko army 70 divisions was being  
encircled and annihilated.

While Russia was proudly showing her tough power  
of resistance in the seige battles of Leningrad and  
Odessa, Moscow and Donetsk industrial zone have  
approached the crisis.

The attack on Moscow, which appeared impossible  
before the end of year, seems to have become an  
accomplished fact during these ten days.

Before the arrival of <sup>General</sup> "German Winter" the firm  
resolution of the German army will make impossible  
the recurrence of "Napoleon's defeat" which the Anti-  
Axis countries are expecting.

The faces of America and Britain, so long self-  
complacent, have assumed wry expressions. Here again  
has began another agony for Churchill and a worried  
look for Roosevelt. Thus we may say that the world-  
wide struggle between the Axis and the anti-Axis is  
gradually approaching its turning point.

(Page 210)

How should Japan move at this time? Japan's  
standpoint is definite. Japan rejoices in and hopes  
for the victory of Germany, her confederate .

Needless to say Japan should make efficient use of the world situation created by the victory of Germany in order to achieve her primary great mission. However, this does not mean that Japan depends upon German victory, nor should our attention be drawn to a single phase of battle or to one isolated diplomatic battle.

What we should do is to plan to be ready for a fight when opportunity knocks and to take what measures are necessary for the three principles which have been repeatedly advocated during these 5 years of the China Incident, that is, respect for the Tripartite Pact, the settlement of the China Incident, and the establishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

(Page 211)

What does that mean on this occasion? It means to see into the essence of America, to resolve not to rely upon what can not be relied upon, and to give concrete form to what follows from the above.

In disposing of the China Incident and establishing the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere as well, we must first clearly grasp what is the real enemy and consider him as an enemy. It is only in compliance with the above that our position as the leader of the East Asiatic races will be confirmed, the only way in which the areas vital to the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere will be prevented from falling away from and rebelling against the Co-prosperity Sphere Construction Camp. Moreover, we can expect active establishment of the cooperative relation between us and those races. A truly moral state with all its hardships can be expected to proceed with vigorous strides, while if a state should tend too much to profiteering, there would be the danger of her losing the lucid impulse for racial progress.

However, what must be borne in mind here is that no matter how much the lowering of the power of resistance of the Soviet Union, no matter how much the decline in the weight of Far Eastern Army appears to be a fact, it is extremely dangerous to place too much simple faith in England's impotence and the U.S.A.'s dilemma: but we must not be over discreet in grasping the opportunity, and get ourselves farther into a predicament.

What is necessary for the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere and the adjustment of China Incident? And what should we do about it? For one thing should we not be brave to take the necessary steps--based on independent necessity and on virtue--to make the places within the Co-prosperity Sphere feel deeply that their scope is really an essential element of the Co-prosperity Sphere; and must we not consider how to express our wisdom?

Including the above-mentioned, the American-Japanese negotiations and the new situation created by a German victory in the Russo-German war should be considered by carrying out more thoroughly the three great principles, namely the Tripartite Alliance, the disposition of the China Incident and the establishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

C E R T I F I C A T E

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Witness: /s/ \_\_\_\_\_

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_ SEAL  
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3 day of Sept. 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis  
2d Lt. M.I.

Investigator, IPS  
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Excerpts from the Article entitled "A MESSAGE TO YOUNG MEN" ("Seimen Shoshi Da Tsugu") by Kingoro HASHIMOTO, published in the "TAIYO DAI NIPPON" 17 December 1936.

2302  
2289

"This August I retired from active military service and entered with high spirit the front line of the renovation movement. When one is in the military profession, the prosecution of his own aspirations is restricted in no small degree, but when one retires from public life, he finds himself in the happy situation of being able, if he would only try, to work fully from a broadminded, high viewpoint. I decided at once to begin a new action for the next generation and organized the Greater Japan Young Men's Party (DAI NIPPON SEIJEITOU)."

"Our aim is renovation. In order to effect renovation, blood and enthusiasm are absolutely essential. The blood and enthusiasm thus required are the possessions of young men."

"From the physical point of view, old people never can accomplish such a great work as the second creation of the world. For the sake of the renovation I hope that pure, sincere and ardent young people will surely succeed in it. To make young men become the framework of New Japan and to unite the whole strength, both tangible and intangible, of the Japanese race in our Emperor, is the way to be loyal to our country, and that is also the spirit of the DAI NIPPON SEIJEITOU."

Excerpts from the Article entitled. "The Reform of Parliamentary System" appearing in the Taiyo Dai Nippon January 17, 1932, Page 1

"Responsible government - Party Cabinet system - runs absolutely counter to the Constitution. It is the democratic government which ignores the "TEMU" government."

Then what is the nature of state ministries? The above mentioned 'Exposition of the Imperial Constitution' says: 'The way for state ministries to serve the Throne is to strive to encourage good and correct wrongs, and if they commit any mistakes, they shall not evade responsibility under the pretence of having made them under Imperial command.' It further says: 'According to the Constitution, state ministers have the heavy responsibility of assisting the Throne and possess great administrative powers. They not only occupy posts of making decisions on their own responsibility, but also have the duties of correcting wrongs. Hence, they should themselves bear responsibility for them!'"

"No matter how much the existing political parties, imitating the constitutional system of Europe and America, might try to make it the basis of party government under the pretence of responsible government, it is very clear that it runs counter to the "TEMU" government, which has been established firmly since the founding of our Empire, and which remains solemnly unshaken in the constitution granted by the Emperor."

X  
"Dissolve the Political Parties at Once.

They who destroyed the national structure, desecrated the Constitution and corrupted the government, not realizing their faults, are now bewildered by the demand for the rejection of party government and the reformation of the parliamentary system and are trying their best to glorify their own rule by deceiving the people in the name of 'Movement for the defense of the Constitution.' When we consider their dangerous anti-national structure, political ideology and their aggressive evils, we believe it most urgently necessary first of all to make a scapegoat of the existing political parties and destroy them for the sake of the construction of a cheerful new Japan."

\* \* \* \* \*

"Prohibit Party Cabinet by Enacting a Political Party Law or a State Ministers' Limitation Ordinance.

That is, we subjects cannot know to whom His Majesty orders to form a new cabinet since this is divine will, but whoever becomes a State Minister must, on entering the cabinet, renounce membership in a political party and also resign from the Diet."

\* \* \* \* \*

Excerpts from the Article entitled, "From the Point of View of National Defense. It is the Duty of the Military to Mix in Politics," appearing in the Taiyo Dai Nippon 17 March 1937, Page 1.

"In the present 70th session of the Imperial Diet, liberalists who stand for the maintenance of the status quo, are busily denouncing the military for mixing in politics. This is a subtle trick on their part to spread anti-military thought among the people through the Diet, thereby separating the people from the military and obstructing the military's movement for political renovation. We must watch closely their speech and conduct. The liberalists cry aloud against the mixing in politics by the military, quoting the Imperial Rescript wherein it is graciously commanded, 'Do not be misled by public opinion and do not meddle in politics, but devote oneself solely to the performance of loyal service.' But we interpret the Imperial words, 'do not meddle in politics' to mean 'not to be a stickler for politics.' Needless to say, not only soldiers, but also other persons, whether they be physicians or merchants, have their own works according to their occupation. However, is there any reason why, because of this, soldiers, physicians and merchants should not mix in politics? There is no reason where politics should be taboo and entrusted only to professional politicians."

\* \* \* \* \*

Excerpts from the Article entitled, "Powers are Desperately Building Up Air Forces - Build Up an Invincible Air Force,"  
 a appearing in Taiyo Dai Nippon July 1, 1937, Page 1

\* \* \*

"In comparison with such desperate efforts of the powers to enlarge and reinforce their air forces, Japan is in a pitifully poor condition at present. If we allow things to remain in their present state, it is certain that there will be an irretrievable handicap between Japan and the other powers in the future. Especially how shall we be able to battle against the Soviet Union which is not making irresistible progress?"

The declaration by Kingoro HASHIMOTO says: 'Make an invincible air force the mainstay of armaments, get rid of the concept that the air force belongs to the army and foster instead the concept that it is the air force of the State, the same as our ancient concept of the sword.' In other words, the strongest and most promising air force should constitute the mainstay of armaments, with which we intend to complete an invincible structure."

Excerpts from the Article entitled, "The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence (Dai Toa Koka Ken)" by Kingoro HASHIMOTO, President of Dai Nippon Sekisei Kai, appearing in Taiyo Dai Nippon, January 5, 1942, Page 1

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"The war to bring an end to the Euro-American culture which has dominated for several centuries the peoples of the whole world, has been started. The blow struck in the Pacific on the 8th of December, 1941 is a blow of initiation of the movement for the turning of world history. The world culture based on the old principle of domination will probably meet doom with a violent crash.

The utmost efforts of the leaders of the world to avert such a situation were all in vain. History, like the universe, revolves in a stately form. It is beyond the power of man to control it. Why does history revolve so? People may say: 'from liberalism to totalitarianism; from national economy to regional economy: from the old order to the new order.' But there are merely superficial views of the matter. The world is striding forward as if it were the divine will, toward a greater, higher and truer principle of governing mankind.

The present great world upheaval is a scene of strife where we are groping for a high philosophy and principle of governing mankind. Seeing this scene of strife, "AMANO MINAKANUSHI NO KAMI" (the creator of the universe) must be very anxious to make us grasp the highest principle of guiding mankind. Well, then, what is the highest principle of mankind? That is our national structure. It is the great ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu' (universal concordia)."

\* \* \*

"Such capitalism and communism have no significant philosophy, nor any humanitarianism, and yet Britain, America and U. S. S. R. have theologized these shallow principles, and have tried to exploit the people of the world. But they have now reached their last days in the present great world war. Hitler said that the present great world

war was a war of the outlook of the world. I would like to say that it is a war for the establishment of a guiding principle. It should be called a war for the establishment of the great ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu.' Whether we like it or not, the world is progressing steadily toward the above-described guiding principle.

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the European Co-Prosperity Sphere of Germany and Italy are the manifestations of this progress. The North and South American Co-Prosperity Sphere is, in its pattern, a similar manifestation, although it is still bearing the name of old capitalistic guiding principle for co-prosperity, it is certain that it will have to rely on our guiding principle someday in the future. Among these three regional blocs, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere possesses the highest and most philosophical guiding principle. By guiding principle, I mean the principle of 'Hakko Ichiu', a principle similar to that of the human body. And that is why I call this sphere 'Dai Toa Koka Ken' (The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence). That is, in the 'Koka Ken', the constituent countries form an organic whole, with Japan as the brain, growing and developing as one living substance under the august virtues of His Majesty the Emperor. If it is only a horizontal federation of the countries of Greater East Asia, it not only lacks life, but is also very far from the ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu.'

\* \* \* \* \*

"It follows that, as the first cardinal point of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under Imperial Influence, the races of Greater East Asia must religiously grasp the above described principle. Otherwise, it would be meaningless. In order to achieve this, first of all the Yamoto race must be fully imbued with this principle and disseminate and inculcate it into other races. The Yamoto race must be fully imbued with and practice this principle. This is Showa Renovation. Without this it is not possible to establish the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence.

In fixing the limits of the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence, we must turn our attention first of all to national defense, because however abundant our resources may be, and however solid the political combination of the various races may be, we shall be very easily destroyed by outsiders if our national defense is deficient. From the national defense point of view in the light of the present world situation, it is absolutely necessary to include the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean in our national defense sphere. This is because we shall automatically be able to control the countries of the Sphere if we gain control of the seas. Little consideration needs to be given to the armaments with reference to countries within the Sphere, but armaments against those outside the Sphere are necessary. The mainstay of our national defense is our invincible air force. From this standpoint the minimum requirement is the inclusion of islands within the line extending in the east from Hawaii and New Zealand, and in the

West from the Persian Gulf eastward. In the north it is necessary to take possession of the Aleutian Islands. I refrain from saying here about the U. S. S. R. sector, but you can imagine what I want to say. Besides these, Japan, Manchuria, China and other countries on the continent should be added of course, and further, great naval ports are necessary in the northern part of Japan, Singapore, the southern point of India, Sidney and Devao. With these places as operational bases, it is necessary to establish many air bases and bases for minor war vessels in the neighboring islands. By means of a series of operational spheres of our air forces, we should ensure the safety of the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence, and at the same time post a considerable army on the continent and other countries of the Sphere under Imperial Influence.

Next the Japanese army and navy as the axis should supervise local armaments and defend the Sphere under Imperial Influence. The military expenditures should be borne jointly by all the constituent countries. This is only proper from the ideology of co-existence. Time will come in the future when minor weak countries will not be allowed an independent existence. Already, the time has arrived when there is no other way than to extend a nation's own existence under the protection of a great power. That does not mean, however, that the independence of minor weak countries will be impaired. It is true independence to maintain independence under the protection of a great power just as a child grows up freely and safely under the protection of his father. There is no room whatever to doubt this feeling if we become thoroughly imbued with the principle of the Sphere under Imperial Influence.

Then I should like to think that the Greater East Asia Sphere includes the undermentioned countries. With respect to the western boundary line especially, this is the time to fix the line of demarcation from the Italo-German Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan, Manchukuo, China, the Soviet Far East, French Indo-China, Burma, Malay, the Dutch East Indies, India, Afghanistan, Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Philippines, and the islands of the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.

We cannot yet decide whether all these countries should be incorporated at once into the Sphere under Imperial Influence, but it is at least absolutely necessary to include for the sake of national defense these countries in the sphere of our influence.

Although full studies are necessary and careful considerations should be given to the racial, historical, economic, military and other factors in deciding how these countries should be divided and administered. I think it appropriate to apply the following general principles:

1. Give independence to each race and give each its proper place.
2. Incorporate completely into Japanese territory those areas where the inhabiting races have no capacity for independence, or areas which are strategically important.

From this standpoint, Greater East Asia may be divided administratively as follows:

1. Districts which are to be Japanese territory:
  - a. Hainan Island and Hong Kong.
  - b. Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes.
  - c. Ceylon Island and the opposite coast of India.
  - d. Australia, New Guinea and New Zealand.
  - e. Other islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans (excluding Madagascar)

2. Independent Countries:

Manchukuo, China (special areas to be designated in North China and Fukien), Burma (including Bengal area of India), French Indo-China (French control to be withdrawn in the future), India, Philippines, Afghanistan (to be given Baluchistan), Siam (to be given portions of Malaya and Burma), and Java.

Territories incorporated into Japan should be administered by Governor-Generals, while Japanese advisers should be appointed for independent states. Military and diplomatic affairs should be placed absolutely under Japanese guidance. Other matters also should be controlled by Japan.

A Supreme Council for the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence should be set up in Tokyo, under which there should be set up a Planning Board for the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence in order to handle business affairs.

In the Greater East Asia War, the most important matter in the future will be economic warfare. From this point of view, Greater East Asia has great significance. The following is an enumeration of various things to be done in respect to the economy of Greater East Asia:

1. Greater East Asia should have a self-sufficient economy, doing away with gold economy as a whole and replacing it with community economy.
2. It should exchange goods with the European Co-Prosperity Sphere but not with the American Sphere, thereby bringing to submission the American Co-Prosperity Sphere in respect to material resources. Although decision should be made in the light of the future situation in respect to whether

the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea or the Suez Canal should be made the point of contact with the European Co-Prosperity Sphere, it would be advantageous to make it as close to Europe as possible without considering the sacrifices on our part.

3. With respect to currency, the note-issuing banks of each locality should be taken over and other paper currencies should be additionally issued. The exchange rate between the local currencies and the yen should be based on the exchange quotations prevailing at each time. A greater East Asia Central Bank should be established in Tokyo to effect financial control.

4. Resources in stock should be immediately recovered in order to replenish as quickly as possible the war attrition of Japan.
5. In the early stage of government, the local states should be so guided as to concentrate their efforts on economic activities. With the vast resources to be made available from such activities, we should improve to the greatest extent Japan's heavy and light industries.
6. Therefore Japanese people in their status of officers in the direction of economic affairs, should grasp only the main lines of economy of the various countries, and not interfere with minor details.
7. Of course, economic plans based on geographical, economic and other relevant factors should be drawn up for each country, and their industries appropriately distributed. In making this distribution, attention should be paid with a view to making the countries incapable of separating from Japan politically.
8. In respect to economy, Japan should plan and supervise the main points, and make each country proceed toward laissez-faire economy.
9. From the point of view of the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Rule, Japan's industries should be re-examined and reorganized with a high measurement.
10. Australia should be mapped up as a heavy industry district in the future.
11. In order to supplement the labor power in the districts with scarce population, Chinese, Indians and some of the local inhabitants should be migrated. Only those Japanese who are left over after the adjustment of internal industries should be migrated. Furthermore, Japanese should be migrated in the capacity of officers, as much as possible.
12. With respect to shipping, enemy ships in the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence should be seized as much as possible, and new ships constructed with great speed.

#### Education and Religion

1. The cardinal principle is to spread and inculcate the ideology of the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence.
2. The spirit of labor should be cultivated.
3. Anti-American and Anti-British movements should be launched and solidarity sought.
4. Culture should be improved and guidance given so as to develop superior races. This is to prepare for the great future fight between the white race and the colored races whose culture is inferior to that of the European races.

5. There should be freedom of religion, but Christianity should be destroyed step by step, while "TENNO" teaching should be disseminated and thoroughly inculcated step by step.
6. The Japanese language should be the common language in the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence.

Let's become a great Yamato race!

The Yamato race is no longer an island race as before. It is the Yamato race of the world, the leader of the race. It is necessary for us to be broadminded and to have the magnanimity worthy of a great race.

Furthermore, the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence which we are going to establish has no precedent. In this age, the old rules, customs and manners no longer count. The bureaucratic spirit is taboo. Matters should be disposed of only by creative power. It is necessary for us to be broadminded enough to adopt "Hakko Ichiu" as our rule. At the same time, we should place analytic studies into secondary importance and devise a system of synthesized studies of national defense, politics and economics.

Excerpts from Article entitled "Clear the Clouds from the East Asia Sky" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 1 May 1939 issue of the Taiyo Dai Nippon:

"On coming back to the homeland from the battlefield, the first pledge I made is to 'pay homage to the soldiers.' We can pay no higher homage to them in leading the China Incident to its solution, and the cardinal point of the solution lies in solving the problems in connection with England and the Soviet Union who assist Chiang Kai-shek. Without solving these problems, all our efforts in destroying Chiang Kai-shek would be fruitless. The longer we fight, the firmer the Chinese people will unite, adoring Chiang as their hero. Chiang Kai-shek is a puppet fed and manipulated by England and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the key of solving the Chinese problem lies in the destruction of those supporters of Chiang.

The chief supporter is England rather than the Soviet. She has great interests in China, and as her retreat from China leads necessarily to her retreat in India and in her other territories in Asia, it is perfectly natural that she is making desperate efforts to stick to China.

When we overthrow England, the Soviet Union will be left alone. To begin with, it is unnatural and impossible for the Soviet Union to make an alliance with England. Communism, which is the fundamental principle of the Soviet Union, advocates a challenge to capitalism. It was the failure in our foreign policy to have made Russia intent on the oriental affairs. If we show our decision to attack England, the Soviet Union will immediately turn the point of her spear toward India, the treasure house of capitalism. We must defend on the north and advance toward the south. Our destiny will be decided in the south.

I have heard recently of the need of strengthening Axis collaboration. From the viewpoint that the success in solving the China Incident depends entirely upon the expulsion of England, the policy of Germany and Italy to destroy England and France are on the same foundation with that of Japan. Accordingly, we must instantly expand and strengthen the hitherto superficial Tri-Partite Pact, including democracy as well as communism as the object of attack. If we strengthen our collaboration, it is easy to put an end to England and France. In Europe, Germany and Italy will eliminate communism and democracy, the two enemies of human civilization, and in Asia, in the area east to India at least, Japan will expel those countries which are founded upon communism and democracy."

Excerpt from Article entitled, "Expel the British Influence from the Far East" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 15 May 1939 issue of Taiyo Dai Nippon:

"Under the present condition, it is very easy to beat England. We have only to say decisively that we will occupy Hong Kong and her concession in Shanghai. How can the British troops come to the Far East? The British fleet will not be able to enter Singapore. For we have our peerless aviators in addition to the fleet! Even though England is wealthy, she will suffer greatly if her warship which costs 100,000,000 yen will be sunk by our 300,000 yen airplane. Even if we need 100 airplanes to sink a warship, the account is entirely on our side."

Short Cutting Remarks on the Present Situation by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro which appeared in the 1 June 1939 issue of Taiyo Dai Nippon:

"It is a humiliation to have a talk with England."

"Define England as the enemy!"

"Our way is one: Expulsion of England."

"Arm the Axis!"

"The enemy that blocks our way to the South of England."

Excerpts from the article entitled "The Solution of the Incident Depends upon the expulsion of England" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 20 June 1939 issue of the Taiyo Dai Nippon:

"If it had not been for the support of England, the Chiang Government would have been already destroyed. It is clear that if we attack England, the Incident will be brought to an end immediately.

The Premier and the Foreign Minister have told us that it is necessary to strengthen the Axis collaboration, but they have been hesitating to conclude the Military Alliance. It is because they are afraid of England. If the Tri-Partite Military Alliance is useful in solving the Chinese problems, we must instantly proceed toward it.

The Foreign concessions in Tientsin are blockaded. This is an opportune moment to start the attack. Because the whole nation has recognized its necessity, the Government should avail itself of this opportunity and attack

instantly. The attack should not be stopped at Tientsin, but extended to Shanghai and to Hong Kong. This is the only possible solution of the China Incident. We have no choice. Fight England!"

Excerpt from an article entitled, "Organize a Class A Wartime Cabinet that Has no Fear of England and the Soviet Union" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro appearing in the 10 July 1939 issue of the Taiyo Dai Nippon:

"Now our real opponents are England and the Soviet Union. When there is only one way ahead of us, why are we hesitating? Are we afraid of economic blockade? Even if it should be enforced, it is only a group of plutocrats that suffer. Japan as a whole can make her way through with a complete war-time system in which every subject returns his property to the Emperor.

A Government without policy and decision is a great obstacle in the way of the nation. It is passion, power and blood that matters. We have nothing to fear. What we need now is a war-time cabinet with the highest authority."

Excerpt from an article entitled "Build a State Union of China and Manchukuo with Japan as its Leader" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 20 July 1939 issue of Taiyo Dai Nippon:

"The public opinion of the whole people has taken an anti-British turn. This is natural and satisfactory, but a deplorable fact is that we Japanese do not know what to do with China. My opinion is as follows:

1. The thorough destruction of the old order is necessary. We must destroy the Kuo-ming-tang Government, and the economic, political and ideological influences of England and Russia.
2. China and Manchukuo should organize a state union with Japan as its leader. We must organize a self-supplying bloc within the Far East, and that economical, defensive block must be led by Japan, the saviour of East Asia. We should then have friendly terms with those countries that recognize our union state, and allow no commercial relations with other countries."

Excerpt from an article entitled, "No More Compromise!" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 25 September 1941 issue of Taiyo Dai Nippon:

"I have often pointed out that England and America have been hostile to us throughout the China Incident. The Government authorities also have recently warned the nation of this fact. Moreover, have they not been taking such challenging attitudes as to give birth to the term "ABCD bloc"? The abolishment of the commercial treaty by England, America's freezing of our funds and Anglo-American economic embargo of Japan is a declaration of war. There is no hope of readjusting the friendly relations between Japan and the two countries. Germany and Italy have already gone into a state of war with America. What Japan should do now is clearly expressed in the Tri-Partite Pact.

The Incident will come to an end when the leaders of China become aware of the true facts and become oriental again. If we should put an end to the Incident now, by compromising with England and America, China will be left as she has been - dependent on England and America. If this should happen, how could we apologize to the war dead who have sacrificed themselves for the cause?

The Government seems to be taking the attitude of an opportunist. It is not a good attitude. We Japanese must decide by ourselves. It is up to us to create our own victorious history."

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

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I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

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PAGE 1

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/s/ Richard H. Lears  
NAME

day of Sept, 1946.

Investigator, IS  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Robert F. Nelson

A GREAT UNION OF ASIA by TANAKA Namokichi

The Meiji Renovation, Showa Renovation and the World Renovation form together a consistent highway of the world history. Because on the first step a modern Japan has been established by the Meiji Renovation in opposition to the fate of the poor colonized Asia, secondly, a great union of Asia is to be completed after the expulsion of the imperialistic influences of Western powers by the Showa Renovation, and further through the next closing war in the World we will be able to realise our great idea of "The World of One Family" cherished since the beginning of our nation.

Thus the present is the epoch of the Showa Renovation progressing steadily through the Manchurian Incident, Sino-Japanese Incident and Greater East Asia War. In fact, we are living in the great epoch-making period in the world history, the mission of which consists in the extension of the ideal of Meiji Renovation into Asia for the purpose of re-establishment of a modern Asia. This is nothing but the union of Asia directed by the moral league or organization of nations through the emancipation of the Asiatic nations from the fetters of European and American Powers, thus preparing ourselves for the certain victory in the closing war in the world.

We have been calling the east region of Singapore "East Asia", and emphasized to unite East Asia immediately through the emancipation from the imperialistic influences of the Western countries. And the Sphere of this union should be extended steadily according to the development of might of Japan. The first cornerstone for this union was laid when Manchoukuo has become an independent state through Manchuria Incident which has been made identified with Japan. China, however, had advocated the chauninism against Japan so loudly without any recognition of the direction of the world history, that China conflict has broken out finally. But out of this rebellion in East Asia our proclamation of establishment of a new order in East Asia has been explicated home and abroad, the new national government founded, and the movement developed between Japan, China and Manchukuo to form a moral league in East Asia.

Chanking Regime has continued the anti-Japanese conflict aided by America and Britain, whose defeat of this time has given so great a shock that it is expected the Chiang Regime will surrender and participate in the co-prosperity sphere of East Asia in a short time.

Now that the might of Japan has been rapidly extended to the south according to the growth of Great East Asia War, Thailand declared war upon America and Britain after the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance between Japan, and French Indo-China is co-operating with Japan as a member of our union. At the 79th diet session Premier Tojo stated that Japan would warrant the independence of P. I. and Burma if they co-operate with Japan. The very mission charged on Japan, who occupies

the position of a senior in Asia, consists in the countenancing of independence of Asiatic Nations, who have their proper culture, through the emancipation out of the fetters of the whites. Thus, the day might not be far distant when Thailand, Annam, P. I., Burma, etc. will become members of One family in East Asia directed by Japan.

Besides, if the influences of our enemy, America and Britain, are swept away from the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean by the Great East Asia War, the freedom of Australia and independence of India will be realized, and the release of Eastern Siberia may be attained with a fundamental adjustment of relations between Japan and Russia. In that way, the East Asia co-prosperity sphere will develop into the union all over Asia, as well as the sphere under the real power of Japan will extend.

As above mentioned, for the purpose of great union of Asia, it is to be the first step to unite morally Japan, China and Manchuria, under the leadership of Japan; the second is a participation of Thailand, Annam, P. I., and Burma in this union and the third- to effect the emancipation of Australia, India and Siberia. We have expected that the league of Japan, Manchuria, and China would develop into the co-operation of Great Asia, but judging from the bright triumph of our troops, it might be possible for us to expect the accomplishment of the third step almost simultaneously with those of the first and second. The Great East Asia War which is being waged by us at present is the one that is to determine Japan's fate and Asia's destiny. It must be a great achievement of the establishment of Asia.

Therefore, it is required for us to continue our advance towards our ideal of great union of Asia, never relaxing our war spirit and solidifying our footing ground step by step.

(The writer is a professor of the Ritsumeikan University).

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.F.Q., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That Document No. 1955 was delivered to me from the Imperial Library of Tokyo as being a file of the Osaka Jiji Shimbun for January 1942 including the issue of 31 January 1942 and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

9 September 1946

\_\_\_\_\_/s/ E. E. Danly  
E. E. DANLY

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify that one copy of the "Osaka jiji Shimpō" dated January 31, Showa 17 /1942/ year owned by the Imperial Library was, at the request of the International Prosecution Section, SCAP, loaned out to the said Prosecution Section on May 24, Showa 21 /1946/ year.

Dated this 20th day of September, Showa 21 /1946/ year.

/s/ Sokochi Ishiguro (Seal)

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753

p.1

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/Cover of book/

"TAI - KOKU" (Thailand)

"Advance to the South" Library

No 4

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Price 1.30 ¥

Imaginary map of New East Asia Federation.

There is a small island called "Greenwich" situated, one minute and so many seconds North Latitude in the southern extremity of the territories governed by the great Japanese Empire. If we draw a circle like the rising sun with this small island as the center and its radius extending to Lake Baikal, to the north of Manchoukuo, it will include the Maritime Provinces, Kamchatka Peninsula, the Aleutian Islands and the Hawaiian Islands in the North, India in the West, Australia and New Zealand in the southeast and thousands of islands scattered in the Southern Pacific like big and small stars.

The creation of New East Asia is certainly nothing but the realization of a great ideal which embraces the Great South Seas. This as has been stated in our announcement is to be economic, geographic and racial unity with Japan as its leader. This will be the way to freedom from past aggressive exploitations and the utilitarian white evils.

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Page 173

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Tokyo, Kanda, Asahi-cho No 2

Published by Nan-Shin-Tsya on January 15, 1942

Tokyo, Kanda, Asahi-cho No 2.

Price ¥1.30

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
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I, Sokichi Ishiguro, chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify that the book entitled "Thailand," Volume IV of the Southward Advance Series, author: Southward Industrial Research Society ("Nampo Sengyo Chosa Kai"), published by Nanshinsha in Showa 17 /1942/ year, book-shelf number 919/131, was, at the request of the International Prosecution Section, SCAP, loaned out to the said Prosecution Section on June 13, Showa 21 /1946/ year.

Dated this 20th day of September, Showa 21 /1946/ year.

/s/ Sokichi Ishiguro

(Seal)

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Dated this 20th day of September, Showa 21 /1946/ year.

/s/ Sokichi Ishiguro

(Seal)

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756

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

United States of America, et al. )  
 )  
 vs. ) SS AFI IDAVIT  
 )  
 ARAKI, Sadao, et al. )

I, Kazuo YATSUGI, state as follows:-

I was born in NISHIKIE-MURA, SAGA Prefecture in 1899.

I held the office of the Chief of the Business Bureau of National Policy Investigation Association /KOKUSAKU KENKYUKAI JIMUKYOKU cho/ from February 1937 to June 1945. At the same time I was entrusted with the business of the Research Section of the War Ministry from December 1938 to the end of 1944.

During the above period I was made to know and did the following which I am going to testify to, according to my duties.

The National Policy Investigation Association was instituted by Baron KINMOCHI OKURA, a member of the House of Peers, myself and others in 1937 with the purpose to investigate the graver political problems of immediate attention to our country and to submit the resulting reports to the Japanese Government and to the public.

Founded 1937

1. The number of individual members of this Association was approximately 2000 and the number of the juridical persons about 150, all of them paying a subscription.

X

Among the members of this Association, there were included Japanese Statesmen, political leaders, high officials, retired officers who had formerly held positions of leadership, representatives of the learned class, some Japanese concerns, the representatives of industrial companies as well as banking facilities, etc.

A list of some juridical persons who were members to the Association is as follows:-

1.	Prime Minister's Secretariat - Yearly subscription		¥3,000
2.	War Ministry	" "	¥3,000
3.	Naval Ministry	" "	¥3,000
4.	Home Ministry	" "	¥1,000
5.	Oversea Affairs Ministry	" "	¥ 500
6.	Foreign Ministry	" "	¥1,000
7.	Communication Ministry	" "	about ¥1,000
8.	The Mitsubishi Concern	" "	¥5,000
9.	The Aikawa Concern	" "	¥5,000
10.	The Mitsui Concern	" "	from ¥3,000/ to ¥5,000
11.	The South Manchurian Railway Co.	" "	¥1,000
12.	Other big companies and banking facilities also subsidized the Association. The annual fee of an individual member was from ¥50 to ¥200.		

The annual budget of this Association was ¥170,000/180,000 for the purpose of carrying out specially important investigations, it received extra contributions. For instance, we received ¥300,000 to cover the special expenses of planning a ten years' programme for the construction of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, including ¥100,000 which was received from the Governmental organizations (viz. ¥20,000 from the Cabinet Information Board which was under the direct control of Hideki, TOJO, ¥20,000 from the War Ministry through Akira, MUTO, ¥20,000 from the Foreign Ministry through the Vice Minister, the then Minister being TOGO, ¥20,000 from the Naval Ministry, and ¥5,000 from the Greater East Asia Ministry, etc.

2. ¥100,000 was contributed by the big companies (including ¥20,000 from MITSUI, ¥10,000 from the SUMITOMO through Keijiro KITAZAWA, a director to the company, and large sums of about ¥10,000 to ¥20,000 each from some other companies.

The above stated ¥300,000 was received in response to a letter addressed to the above named Government office and the brains of the public concerns in which we explained the ways the money was going to be spent.

¥240,000 out of the above-mentioned sum was spent in making the plan for the ten years' programme. The document was issued by this Association in April 1943 and sent to the Greater East Asia and Foreign Ministries. I assure you that the document written in Japanese entitled "The Plan for the Measures for Constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in four parts which you showed (and which had been seized when the residence of Baron OKURA was searched) is the very document for which compilation this Association received the above stated subscription of ¥300,000.

The Board of Managing Directors which assumed leadership in the Association had ten members including:

1. Kinmochi OKURA (Member of the House of Peers)
2. Michio YUZAWA (Prior to his taking the Portfolio of Home Minister)
3. Hiroshi SHIMOMURA (Later took the Office of Minister without Portfolio and in the SUZUKI Cabinet was appointed Chief of the Information Board)

I, as the Chief of the Business Bureau, which consisted of 30/40 clerks, was looking after the affairs of the Association.

The work of the Association was sometimes participated in by those who were qualified as not the members of the Association. (For instance, Lt. Gen. Akira MUTO who was in active service not only made speeches two or three times in the interest of the Association but gave financial support as stated above. Lt. Gen. Kenryo SATO also made speeches more than once. Besides the above, some influential Japanese statesmen who were not members participated in the important works of the Association.)

The reports, documents and plans which were made by the Association on the most important problems were submitted to the Government (The Premier's Secretariat) and the Ministers concerned on the instructions of the Board of Managing Directors.

The Governmental Organizations furnished us with necessary materials and data (including those of top-secret character) for investigating important problems regarding national policies and presenting our opinions about them.

In October of the 16th year of Showa (1941) when it seemed definite that Japan should enter a war in the near future, the Board of Managing Directors of the National Policy Investigation Association instituted a Committee for Administrative Measures with the purpose of working out a plan to be submitted to the Government in preparation for wars in the North and in the South.

This Committee consisted of a fine set of men, such as former ministers and generals who were in close connection with the Government and military authorities, including the following principal figures:

Nobuyuki, ABE, Premier in Showa 14/15 /'39/'40/,  
President of Imperial Rule Assistance Association in  
Showa 17 /'42/.

Fumio GOTO, A member of the House of Peers,  
Acting Premier in Showa 11 /1936/, Minister  
without Portfolio in TOJO Cabinet. President  
of Imperial Rule Assistance Association in Showa  
18 /1943/.

Seizo KOBAYASHI, Admiral. Vice Minister of Navy.  
Minister without portfolio in Koiso Cabinet.

Sankichi, TAKAHASHI, Admiral. A war councillor.

Shinsuke, KISHI. The Commerce and Industry Minister  
of TOJO Cabinet. Since Showa 18 /1943/, Minister with-  
out portfolio, Vice Minister of Munitions, and others.

I affirm that the document you showed to me entitled  
"The Report of the Committee for Administrative Measures"  
is the very report that was made by the above-mentioned  
committee and submitted to the Premier, Army, Navy, and  
Foreign Ministers in October 1941.

During the war, three men of the Committee for Administra-  
tive Measures were appointed by the Government to be adminis-  
trative leaders in the Southern occupied areas, viz. Lt. Gen.  
Rensuke ISOGAI to be Gov. Gen. of Hongkong; Shigeo OTATE to  
be Mayor of Singapore and Hyozoro SAKURAI to be political  
adviser to Burma.

As stated before, I was on the non-official staff of the Research Section of the War Ministry during the period of Showa 13-19 /1938-1944/. The Chief of the Research Section was Major Gen. Naofuku MIKUNI during Showa 15-17 /1940-1943/.

Early in Showa 17 (1942), there arose a necessity to make clear the official idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was needed for carrying out the function of this Association in investigating this same problem. I requested the War Ministry to show me the documents wherein was expressed the official opinion on this subject.

Early in Showa 17 (1942), in February or March, I borrowed two documents, the titles thereof were - "The Gist of Policy for Management of the Southern Areas Occupied as a Result of the Greater East Asia War" and "The Plan for the Disposal of Land in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" from the research section of the War Ministry (although my memory cannot identify the person).

I affirm that judging by the contents the photostated copies of the two Japanese documents shown to me are those of the above-mentioned documents which I received from the War Ministry early in Showa 17 /1942/.

I made a report to Baron Kinmochi OKURA at that time concerning these documents. By my autograph signature I certify that each of the 29 photostated pages, judging by the contents, is the same as that of the document in question. The fact that the Overseas Affairs Ministry participated in compiling these documents is clear as is written in them, and the participation of the General Staff Headquarters and Naval General Staff is also doubtless, considering that the disposition of the Army and Navy forces in the Southern Areas is mentioned in these documents, such matters being under the exclusive charge of the General Staff Headquarters and Naval General Staff, even the Army and Navy Ministries claiming no function in them.

/signed/ Kazuo YATSUGI

30th August 1946

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. James MURAKAMI, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said YATSUGI, Kazuo was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 30th day of August 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ James MURAKAMI, 2nd Lt. A.U.S.  
Lt. James MURAKAMI

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named YATSUGI Kazuo, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 30th day of August, 1946.

/s/ Arthur A. SANDUSKY  
ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY  
Capt., J.A.G.D.

Tokisaburo

Shobana - for Kenjiro

772

Document No. 2229

A Tentative Plan Concerning the Scope and the Structure of  
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

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Drawn up by the Secretariat of the  
National Policy Research Association  
(KOKUSAKU-KENKIU-KAI) on 18 February  
1942 (Showa 17)

PREFACE

This is a tentative plan drawn up by the Secretariat  
as a reference material for discussion concerning the scope  
and the structure of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity  
Sphere, which is to be discussed hereafter by a small com-  
mittee of the Investigation Committee on the Problems of  
Greater East Asia.

For convenience<sup>1</sup> sake, this tentative plan was drawn  
up by dividing the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere into Greater  
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and Greater East Asia  
Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Further, the tentative plan leaves behind many problems  
concerning the scope and composition of the Greater East Asia  
Co-Prosperity Sphere. We should appreciate hearing especially  
the views of each member of the committee in regard to these  
points.

*Pop  
Tokisaburo*

*For  
Final Report  
Deep Report*

CONTENTS

- I. The scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
- II. The composition of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
- III. The kernel zone of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
- IV. The problem of organizing major countries which are to assist the leading country for the smooth management of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
- V. The position of the border zones.

\* \* \* \* \*

- I. The scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

- A. The Greater Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

1. The inner sphere.

Inner and Outer Mongolia, China, French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, other Oceanic Islands, and Hawaii.

2. The border and the neutral zones (including unfortified areas).

- a. The border zones

Islamic zone in the Near East, and Alaska.

- b. The neutral zones.

Parts of Africa bordering the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the southern part of South America, land and sea of the North and South Poles.

B. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

1. The Inner Sphere.

The zone along the Sea of Okhotsk and Bering Sea, Inner and Outer Mongolia, China, French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, the Bismarck Archipelago and New Guinea, and New Caledonia. (Should we include the eastern part of India?)

2. The border and neutral zones (including unfortified areas.)

a. The border zones.

Australia, other Oceanic Islands, and India.

b. The neutral zones.

Hawaii, the Islamic zone in the Near East, parts of Africa bordering on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the southern part of South America, the land and sea zones of the North and South Poles.

c. Unfortified areas.

The Aleutian Islands.

C. The points to be discussed.

1. The counter-plan for preventing the concentration in Siberia of the Slavs who are being driven away from the European part of Russia.

2. The areas (Islamic zone, the Indian Ocean Coasts, Africa and the southern part of South America) where we should demand the establishment of emancipated zones in the Euro-American Co-Prosperity Sphere in return for our emancipating India and Australia as our border zones.

3. Matters concerning the sea fishery rights which should be secured from the standpoint of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

II. The composition of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

A. Independent states.

1. Existing independent states.

2. The areas which should be made newly-independent.

B. Protectorates.

C. Areas under direct control.

(What should be their positional relation with Chosen and Taiwan?)

D. The disposition and the status of the European and American possessions in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

III. The kernel zone of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

A. The kernel area from the stand-point of national defence against countries outside the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

1. The plan for the northern frontier under the threat of a powerful Russia.

2. The plan for preparing against America.

3. The plan for preparing against the strong powers of Europe.

B. The kernel zone from the standpoint of securing peace in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. (Specifically, the stand-point of completely shutting out any possibility of another war against the Chinese.)

1. The formation of the satellitic countries to check the Chinese in the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

a. Northern area.....Manchukuo, Inner and outer Mongolia.

b. Southern area-----Burma (?) Annam (?)

2. The division and the independence of China herself. For example, whether China should be divided up into North, Central, South and Interior China, with North China as the kernel zone.

3. Plans for controlling the fate of China or of checking her resistance power through economic measures.

C. The kernel zone from the standpoint of securing and developing the superior characteristics of the Yamato race.

D. The actual composition of the kernel zone combining the foregoing points.

IV. The problem of forming states which are to assist the leading power for the smooth management of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

A. A-Class states (Director-class).

1. The satellitic states of the leading power. Large states, under direct control, such as Manchukuo and Malaya. (Should Mengchiang be included?)

2. Powerful independent states.

China (should it be divided into independent states and made into separate units?), Thailand, Burma (?).

3. Problems.

a. The problem of whether many satellitic states should be selected as director-states.

b. The problem of how to manage such colonies as French Indo-China.

c. The problem of what consideration should be given to the reconstruction or selection of Director states from the standpoint of checking the Chinese.

B. B-class states.

1. Other independent states.

2. B-class states under direct control.

C. C-class states.

1. Protectorates and C-class states under direct control.

2. Problems.

a. How to deal with Chosen and Taiwan in respect to their status in the composition of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

V. The status of the border zones.

A. The problem of what relation should be established with the outer zones.

1. Positive demands.

2. Passive demands (such as demilitarization and special treaties with third countries.)

B. What treatment should be given in the Co-Prosperity Sphere to the states in the border zones?

\* \* \* \*

2227  
19 June 1946

Seizure of Evidentiary Documents

On 3 June 1946 this Agent, together with five other Counter-Intelligence Corps representatives, three language officers and one representative of the G-2 Section, entered and seized from the home of YATSUGI, Kazuo, Shibuyaku, Sakuraguoka, No. 5 a number of documents among which were the following:-

1. Preliminary Draft of the Borders of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and its structure, 18 Feb. 1942 (General Affairs Bureau of the "Kokusaku Kenkyu-Kai" society).
2. "Kainmeibo Narabi Yoran" - book of reference and list of members of the "Kokusaku Kenkyu - Kai" society. ("Kokusaku Kenkyu - Kai" Publishing House, Tokyo, 1942)

The aforementioned seizures was made under authority given in AG 200.2, 10 November 1945, CIS, SCAP Index No. 261.

I hereby certify that the action described herein and the document described above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ James Williamson  
Special Agent, CIC

Hereby I acknowledge that the documents described above were among those obtained at my home.

/s/ YATSUGI, Kazuo

CERTIFICATE:

I, Junior Lieutenant BORIS ALECSANDROVICH PETROV, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with Japanese and English languages to do oral and written translations.

Today YATSUGI, Kazuo in my presence signed the above said document and I certify that this document has been correctly translated from the English language into Japanese and was correctly understood.

I am duly warned that for the false translation I bear responsibility according to Article 92 of the R.S.F.S.C. Criminal Code.

Signature: B. Petrov  
BORIS PETROV, Junior Lt.

The Certificate is taken by  
Military Interrogator Major BASENKO.

Although Soviet does not appear to press for  
Empire's arrest and trial or war crime at present ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~concern~~ <sup>concern</sup>  
indicates ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> reflects general Soviet attitude  
that ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~must~~ <sup>must</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~share~~ <sup>share</sup> of responsibility  
for ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~war~~ <sup>war</sup> ~~life~~ <sup>life</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~war~~ <sup>war</sup>

Special Agent, SAC  
James Williamson


YATSUJI, KASIO

Special Agent, SAC  
John P. ...

Карта Советского Дальнего Востока и сев. части Манчжурии

MAP OF THE SOVIET FAR EAST AND THE NORTHERN PART OF MANCHURIA.

聯極東及北滿地圖



АДМИНИСТРАТИВНО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ДЕЛЕНИЕ СССР

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

Российская Советская Федеративная Социалистическая Республика	Украинская Советская Социалистическая Республика	Белорусская Советская Социалистическая Республика	Литовская Советская Социалистическая Республика	Латвийская Советская Социалистическая Республика	Эстонская Советская Социалистическая Республика	Армянская Советская Социалистическая Республика	Азербайджанская Советская Социалистическая Республика	Грузинская Советская Социалистическая Республика	Осетинская АССР	Ивановская АССР	Владимирская АССР	Нижегородская АССР	Орловская АССР	Тульская АССР	Ярославская АССР	Иркутская АССР	Читинская АССР	Бурятская АССР	Забайкальская АССР	Хакасская АССР	Тывинская АССР	Калмыцкая АССР	Северная Осетия	Южная Осетия	Алтайская АССР	Хакасия	Тыва	Калмыкия	Северная Осетия	Южная Осетия	Алтай																																																																				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100