

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



Telegram (To be kept in locked file)

(Secret Cipher Process)

Special Train, 28 June 1941  
Received " " "2010 hours  
2030 "

No. 2671R, RAM of 28 June

Most Urgent!

No. 560 of 28 June

1. Diplogerma

Tokyo

2. Cipher Bureau

Secret note for department heads (M.B.D. 36 II)

Marginal  
NoteForwarded  
to Tokyo  
under No.  
916, TELKO,  
28 June  
1941, 2130  
hrs.

I have reached an agreement with Ambassador OSHIMA that he will influence his government in the direction of a speedy military action against Soviet Russia, and I ask you now to utilize on your part all the possibilities that present themselves to influence the government there and the other influential circles in such a direction. In this connection I ask you to make use of the following points:

- 1.) War between Germany and Soviet Russia will not only bring with it the solution of more or less limited individual problems, but will bring as a consequence a solution by final war of the Russian question in its entirety.
- 2.) The destruction of the Russian power, expected within a comparatively short time by our military move, will also make Germany's victory over England an irrevocable fact. If Germany is in possession of the Russian oil wells and grain fields a sufficient supply for the whole of Europe will thereby be ensured so that the English blockade will on the whole be of absolutely no avail. The direct land connection with East Asia will likewise be brought about on this occasion.
- 3.) In this way all the preconditions are given which will render possible the New Order in the European sphere as intended by the Axis Powers.
- 4.) For Japan also a unique chance is presented by the present situation. As Germany does this for Europe, so can Japan now through a military action against Soviet Russia create the prerequisites for the New Order planned by her in East Asia. After the removal of the Soviet power in the Far East also, the solution of the Chinese question will be achieved in the way desired by Japan without running into any more difficulties.



5.) From the standpoint of Japanese interests, the idea of a drive towards the south in the direction of Singapore is and remains also of great importance. As Japan has not yet been prepared on this point and a possibility for such a drive has not yet been presented in the present phase of the war, it lies in the urgent interest of Japan not to leave unused this chance now offered to her for solving the Russian question in the Far East too. Thus she would be left free in the rear to make a drive towards the South.

6.) In view of the speedy course of events to be expected, Japan should come to a decision regarding the idea of a military action against Soviet Russia without hesitation. A Japanese action against a Soviet Russia already beaten to the ground would be quite prejudicial to the moral and political position of Japan.

7.) It can therefore be considered that the swift overpowering of Soviet Russia, especially if Japan participates in it from the East, is the best means to convince the United States of the absolute foolishness of entering the war on the side of England, then completely isolated and set against the mightiest combination in the world.

RIBBENTROP



AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
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W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
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G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



656

Resolutions Concerning the Japanese-American  
Negotiations Adopted Through the Conferences  
in the Imperial Presence.

1. Through the Imperial conference on July 2, 1941.
2. Through the Imperial conference on September 6, 1941.
3. Through the Imperial conference on November 5, 1941.

Proposition (A)

Proposition (B)

4. Through the Imperial conference on December 1, 1941.

1. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conferences on July 2, 1941.

A summary of the Empire's POLICY according to the changes in the situation.

**I** PRINCIPLE.

a. Regardless of any change in the international situation, Japan will adhere to the principle of establishing a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere", and accordingly contribute to the establishment of world-peace.

b Japan will continue the disposition of the Chinese Incident, and will step up the Southward advance in order to establish for herself a basis for self-existence and self-defense. The Northern problems will be dealt with according to the changes in the situations.

c Japan will remove all obstacles for the achievement of the foregoing purpose.

**II** SUMMARY.

a In order to hasten the surrender of Chiang's Regime, further pressure through the Southern regions will be strengthened to the changes in the situations, we shall execute our rights of war against the Chungking Regime at the proper time, and shall confiscate the enemy concessions in China.



*Way*  
*Soze*

b For the sake of her self-existence and self-defense Japan will continue necessary diplomatic negotiations with relevant nations in the Southern regions and will also promote other necessary measures. For this purpose we shall make preparations for a war with Britain and the United States. First, we shall accomplish the execution of our schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand following the "Principle Policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand," and "Matters concerning the Promotion of our Southern Policy," thereby stabilizing our structure for the Southern advance. In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, Japan will not hesitate to have a war with Britain and the United States.

*WAR*  
*on USSR*  
*IF*  
*NAZI*  
*Beem*  
*TO WIN*

c Though the spirit of the tripartite axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while, but take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will be continued with detailed precautions; and should the conditions of the German-Soviet war progress favourable to Japan we shall execute arms to solve the northern problems, thereby securing stability in the Northern regions.

d In the accomplishment of the above, all measures, especially in the case of execution of arms, must be decided so that there will be no great difficulty in maintaining our basic posture for a war with Britain and the United States.

e We shall do our utmost in preventing the United States participation in the War through diplomatic measures in the pre-arranged programmes, and every other possible way, but in case she should participate, Japan will act according to the Tripartite Pact. However, the time and method of military action will be decided independently.

f We shall shift promptly to the complete stabilization of internal war-time structures, particularly we shall strive for the stabilization of national defense.

g As to the definite measures we shall decide separately.

2. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conference on Sept. 6, 1941.

Summary: Execution of the Empire's Policy.



In view of the present acute situation, especially the aggressive movements the United States, Britain and the Netherlands have assumed; the situation of Soviet Russia; and the suppression of our national power; Japan will execute her Southern advance policy, related in the "Principle of Japan's Policy According to the Change of Situations," as follows:

a In order to secure self-existence and self-defense, Japan, with a determination for a war with the United States (Britain and the Netherlands), will have completed her preparations by the end of October.

b Meanwhile, in pace with the above, Japan will strive for the fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic measures with the United States and Britain.

The minimum matters of demand to be accomplished in Japan's negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet.

c If, through the above negotiations, our demands have no hope of fulfillment by the beginning of October, we shall immediately determine to wage war against the United States (Britain and the Netherlands).

All measures, save for those concerned with the South, will be executed according to the pre-arranged national policy, and we shall particularly endeavour to check the formation of a Russo-American combined front against Japan.

#### ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Japan's minimum demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection.

Sect. I. Japan's minimum-demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain).

(1) Matters concerning the CHINESE INCIDENT.

The United States and Britain will neither meddle in nor interrupt the disposition of the Chinese Incident.

a They will not interrupt Japan's attempt to settle the Incident in accordance with the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Japan-Manchukuo-China Tripartite Joint Declaration.



b "Burma Route" will be closed; and the United States and Britain will give Chiang's Regime neither military nor economic support.

REMARK -- The above does not obstruct Japan's existing contentions in the disposition of the Chinese Incident in Plan N. However, particularly regarding the stationing of the Imperial forces under the new arrangements made between Japan and China, we shall adhere to its necessity.

Following the settlement of the incident, we may assert that we have the intention of withdrawing, as a rule, all other forces except those mentioned above that have been sent to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident.

It may also be affirmed that Japan has no intention to place any restrictions on American or British interests in China, provided that they will understand the new East Asia, and act accordingly.

(2) Matters concerning the security of Japan's national defense.

The United States and Britain will not take such action in the Far East as to threaten Japan's national defense.

a Recognition of the special relations existing between Japan and France based on the Japan-French Agreement.

b They will not establish any military interests in Thailand, Dutch East-India, China and far-eastern Soviet territory.

c They will not further strengthen their present armaments in the Far East.

(3) Matters concerning Japan's obtaining necessary materials.

The United States and Britain will cooperate with Japan in obtaining her necessary resources.

a They will restore their commercial relations with Japan and will supply Japan from their territories in the South Western Pacific, with resources indispensable for her self-existence.

b They will gladly collaborate in Japan's economic cooperation with Thailand and French Indo-China.



Sect. II. The Limit Japan is able to come to an agreement.

If the United States and Britain will consent to our demands in Section I:

(1) Japan, with French Indo-China as a base, will make no military advances into any of the adjacent areas except China.

(2) Japan will be ready to withdraw her troops from French Indo-China after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

(3) Japan will be ready to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.

(NOTE)

a In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance, it will be affirmed that there will be no changes in Japan's execution of her obligations to the Axis Agreement. We shall not discuss, of our own accord, either our attitude toward the Tripartite Pact or the attitude of the United States toward the European War.

b In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward Soviet Russia, it will be replied that Japan will not take the initiative for military action as long as Soviet Russia will respect the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact and will not threaten both Japan and Manchuria.

3. PROPOSITIONS (A) and (B), adopted through the Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941.

PROPOSITION (A)

(1) Problem of Commercial Indiscrimination.

In case our proposition of September 25 will have no hope of compromise, it will be revised, "If the principle of indiscrimination is to be universal the Japanese Government will accept it to be enforced in all the areas in the Pacific, including China."

(2) Problem of Interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Treaty. We shall further make it clear that we have no intentions, without good reason on our part, of expanding the meaning of our rights of self-defense; and that at the same time,



we shall act, as we have often explained, according to our own decision concerning the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact. We shall reply that we feel this point has already had the acknowledgement of the United States.

(3) Problems of Withdrawing Troops.

This problem will be eased as follows:

a Stationing and withdrawing of troops in China.

Among the Japanese troops despatched to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident, those in the designated areas in North China and Mongolia and on Hainan Island will be stationed there for a certain necessary term after the establishment of peace between Japan and China. Simultaneously with the establishment of peace we shall commence to withdraw the rest according to a separate agreement between Japan and China, and with the stabilization of public order this will be completed within two years.

(Note) If the United States should make an inquiry as to the necessary term, it will be replied that our aim will be approximately 25 years.

b Stationing and withdrawing of troops in French Indo-China.

Japanese government will respect French Indo-China's sovereignty upon her land. The Japanese troops now despatched to French Indo-China will be withdrawn immediately after the settlement of the Chinese Incident, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

Moreover, every effort will be made to avoid including the Four Principles in the formal agreements between Japan and the United States (both understandings and other statements).

PROPOSITION (B)

(1) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will firmly agree not to make military advances into areas in Southeast Asia and Southern Pacific, excluding French Indo-China.

①/4 (2) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will mutually cooperate to guarantee the obtaining of necessary resources from the Dutch East-Indies.



(3) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will restore their mutual commercial relations to the conditions before the freezing of the assets.

The United States Government will promise Japan her necessary supply of petroleum.

(4) The United States Government will not take such action as to obstruct Japan's efforts for a peace with China.

(REMARKS)

(1) If necessary, after the conclusion of this agreement, it may be promised that the Japanese troops will be withdrawn after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Pacific area.

(2) If necessary, the regulations for commercial indiscrimination, and the prescriptions for interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact, both included in Proposition A, may be additionally inserted.

4. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941.

Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy adopted on November 5 have finally failed. Japan will declare war on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1652Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 16 pages, dated see below, 1941, and described as follows: Resolutions concerning Japanese-American negotiations adopted through the conference in the Imperial presence on July 2, 1941; Sept. 6, 1941; Nov. 5, 1941; and Dec. 1, 1941, respectively.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
5th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above sign official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
\_\_\_\_\_ day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh.  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Douglas L. Waldorf  
2nd Lt., Inf. & Pl.

Investigator, I.P.S.  
Official Capacity



Resolutions Concerning the Japanese-American  
Negotiations Adopted Through the Conferences  
in the Imperial Presence.

*(See doc  
attached)*

- WNY*
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  2. Through the Imperial conference on September 6, 1941.
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Proposition (A)

Proposition (B)

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- WNY*
1. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conferences on July 2, 1941.

A summary of the Empire's POLICY according to the changes in the situation.

## I PRINCIPLE.

a. Regardless of any change in the international situation, Japan will adhere to the principle of establishing a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere", and accordingly contribute to the establishment of world-peace.

b Japan will continue the disposition of the Chinese Incident, and will step up the Southward advance in order to establish for herself a basis for self-existence and self-defense. The Northern problems will be dealt with according to the changes in the situations.

c Japan will remove all obstacles for the achievement of the foregoing purpose.

## II SUMMARY.

a In order to hasten the surrender of Chiang's Regime, further pressure through the Southern regions will be strengthened to the changes in the situations, we shall execute our rights of war against the Chungking Regime at the proper time, and shall confiscate the enemy concessions in China.



b For the sake of her self-existence and self-defense Japan will continue necessary diplomatic negotiations with relevant nations in the Southern regions and will also promote other necessary measures. For this purpose we shall make preparations for a war with Britain and the United States. First, we shall accomplish the execution of our schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand following the "Principle Policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand," and "Matters concerning the Promotion of our Southern Policy," thereby stabilizing our structure for the Southern advance. In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, Japan will not hesitate to have a war with Britain and the United States.

c Though the spirit of the tripartite axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while, but take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will be continued with detailed precautions; and should the conditions of the German-Soviet war progress favourable to Japan we shall execute arms to solve the northern problems, thereby securing stability in the Northern regions.

d In the accomplishment of the above, all measures, especially in the case of execution of arms, must be decided so that there will be no great difficulty in maintaining our basic posture for a war with Britain and the United States.

e We shall do our utmost in preventing the United States participation in the War through diplomatic measures in the pre-arranged programmes, and every other possible way, but in case she should participate, Japan will act according to the Tripartite Pact. However, the time and method of military action will be decided independently.

f We shall shift promptly to the complete stabilization of internal war-time structures, particularly we shall strive for the stabilization of national defense.

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Summary: Execution of the Empire's Policy.



war  
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b Meanwhile, in pace with the above, Japan will strive for the fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic measures with the United States and Britain.

The minimum matters of demand to be accomplished in Japan's negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet.

c If, through the above negotiations, our demands have no hope of fulfillment by the beginning of October, we shall immediately determine to wage war against the United States (Britain and the Netherlands).

All measures, save for those concerned with the South, will be executed according to the pre-arranged national policy, and we shall particularly endeavour to check the formation of a Russo-American combined front against Japan.

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b "Burma Route" will be closed; and the United States and Britain will give Chiang's Regime neither military nor economic support.

REMARK -- The above does not obstruct Japan's existing contentions in the disposition of the Chinese Incident in Plan N. However, particularly regarding the stationing of the Imperial forces under the new arrangements made between Japan and China, we shall adhere to its necessity.

Following the settlement of the incident, we may assert that we have the intention of withdrawing, as a rule, all other forces except those mentioned above that have been sent to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident.

It may also be affirmed that Japan has no intention to place any restrictions on American or British interests in China, provided that they will understand the new East Asia, and act accordingly.

(2) Matters concerning the security of Japan's national defense.

The United States and Britain will not take such action in the Far East as to threaten Japan's national defense.

a Recognition of the special relations existing between Japan and France based on the Japan-French Agreement.

b They will not establish any military interests in Thailand, Dutch East-India, China and far-eastern Soviet territory.

c They will not further strengthen their present armaments in the Far East.

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a They will restore their commercial relations with Japan and will supply Japan from their territories in the South-Western Pacific, with resources indispensable for her self-existence.

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(1) Japan, with French Indo-China as a base, will make no military advances into any of the adjacent areas except China.

(2) Japan will be ready to withdraw her troops from French Indo-China after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

(3) Japan will be ready to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.

(NOTE)

a In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance, it will be affirmed that there will be no changes in Japan's execution of her obligations to the Axis Agreement. We shall not discuss, of our own accord, either our attitude toward the Tripartite Pact or the attitude of the United States toward the European War.

b In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward Soviet Russia, it will be replied that Japan will not take the initiative for military action as long as Soviet Russia will respect the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact and will not threaten both Japan and Manchuria.

3. PROPOSITIONS (A) and (B), adopted through the Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941.

PROPOSITION (A)

(1) Problem of Commercial Indiscrimination.

In case our proposition of September 25 will have no hope of compromise, it will be revised, "If the principle of indiscrimination is to be universal the Japanese Government will accept it to be enforced in all the areas in the Pacific, including China."

(2) Problem of Interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Treaty. We shall further make it clear that we have no intentions, without good reason on our part, of expanding the meaning of our rights of self-defense; and that at the same time,



we shall act, as we have often explained, according to our own decision concerning the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact. We shall reply that we feel this point has already had the acknowledgement of the United States.

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This problem will be eased as follows:

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(Note) If the United States should make an inquiry as to the necessary term, it will be replied that our aim will be approximately 25 years.

b Stationing and withdrawing of troops in French Indo-China.

Japanese government will respect French Indo-China's sovereignty upon her land. The Japanese troops now despatched to French Indo-China will be withdrawn immediately after the settlement of the Chinese Incident, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

Moreover, every effort will be made to avoid including the Four Principles in the formal agreements between Japan and the United States (both understandings and other statements).

PROPOSITION (B)

(1) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will firmly agree not to make military advances into areas in Southeast Asia and Southern Pacific, excluding French Indo-China.

(2) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will mutually cooperate to guarantee the obtaining of necessary resources from the Dutch East-Indies.



(3) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will restore their mutual commercial relations to the conditions before the freezing of the assets.

The United States Government will promise Japan her necessary supply of petroleum.

(4) The United States Government will not take such action as to obstruct Japan's efforts for a peace with China.

(REMARKS)

(1) If necessary, after the conclusion of this agreement, it may be promised that the Japanese troops will be withdrawn after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Pacific area.

(2) If necessary, the regulations for commercial indiscrimination, and the prescriptions for interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact, both included in Proposition A, may be additionally inserted.

4. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941.

Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy adopted on November 5 have finally failed. Japan will declare war on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1652

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 16 pages, dated see below, 1941, and described as follows: Resolutions concerning the Japanese-American negotiations adopted through the conference in the Imperial presence on July 2, 1941; Sept. 6, 1941; Nov. 5, 1941; and Dec. 1, 1941, respectively.

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Signed at Tokyo on this  
5th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

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Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above sign official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
\_\_\_\_ day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Douglas L. Waldorf  
2nd Lt., Inf. & Pl.

Investigator, I.P.S.  
Official Capacity



"Minutes of Conference on the Conclusion of Agreement  
for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and Germany

-----  
November 22, 1938 - Original  
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"Minutes of the Privy Council on the Conclusion of  
Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan  
and Germany.

\* \* \*

"Members present:

Chairman: HIRANUMA

\* \* \*

Ministers:

No. 8 Minister of Education - ARAKI

\* \* \*

No. 15 Minister of War - ITAGAKI

\* \* \*

"Chairman HIRANUMA: The conference will open from now on. The topic of discussion is the Conclusion of Agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan and Germany. The reading aloud and first reading will be omitted and I request for a report from the Chairman of the Investigation Committee immediately.

"Report Committeeman HARA: On the inquiry concerning the Conclusion of Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and Germany, we officials who were recently appointed as an investigation committee, held a committee meeting on the 16th day of this month. After hearing the explanations of the minister and various officials concerned, we have concluded the following strict investigation results:

*Real*  
"For many years, on cultural matters concerning medicine, literature, legislation and various other fields, a mutual and close relationship existed between the two nations of Germany and Japan but with and after the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Agreement in November two years ago, national intercourse between the two nations entered into a renewed amity. On the later part of September of this year the German Government proposed for a conclusion of a cultural agreement between Germany and Japan, a recent practice prevalent between the various countries of Europe, so as to legalize the enlightenment of cultural relationship between the two nations, thus leading to furthering the promotion of the cause and provoking to strengthen all the more our tie of friendship. Our Imperial Government approved this proposal. Thereafter the authorities of both parties concerned have conducted numerous negotiations and the arriving at an agreement led to the realization of this definite plan of a pact. However this does not mean that our Imperial Government prefers such an agreement with Germany alone. If conditions permit, similar agreements should be concluded with



other nations also, as this cultural intercourse has a tendency to contribute valuable service to achieve the general aims of diplomacy. This was voiced by our authorized minister concerned.

"This agreement lays down provisions and fundamental rules to legalize cultural relation between Japan and Germany, and as stated in the introduction, both nations by conviction should seek relations key-noting the characteristic spirit of Japan and the racial and national life of Germany, which respectively form the essence of each nation's culture. It will not only help to deepen relations with all forms of culture but also enhance the furthering of mutual knowledge and understanding to a better state so that the friendship and mutual trust already existing between the two nations will be ever firm. In the text, Article I provides that the two nations, Germany and Japan, with close mutual cooperation will put in every effort to establish cultural relation on a solid basis. Article II provides for this purpose, the two nations will systematically promote cultural relations in all fields as science, fine arts, music, literature, motion pictures, radio broadcasts, movement of child and youth, sports, etc. Article III provides that the detailed, necessary means of putting this into practice will be left with and decided upon by negotiation between the responsible authorities of the two nations. Article IV states that this agreement will come into effect from the date of signing and it could be abrogated at twelve months notice from either party of the two nations.

"Our investigation observes that a conclusion of such an agreement is an actual plan to develop cultural relation and promote a friendly relationship of more sincerity between the two nations. This agreement will also contribute to uplift the culture of both nations and at the same time aid to a marked degree in fostering the goodwill of national intercourse. For these reasons it is a pertinent principle and also we see nothing to fear which may be of any hindrance of any kind. Hence, the decision of the investigating committee by unanimous vote is that the plan should be adopted as it stands.

"The foregoing is a report on the result of our investigation.

Read  
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"No. 28 (ISHIZUKA).

"In its introductory provision, which I take forms the basis of this agreement, it is said that the essence of the culture of Japan and Germany as consisting of the characteristic spirit of Japan on one part and the racial and national life of Germany on the other. This seems somewhat out of coordination, but since it is so designated, I want to hear the reason, and what is embraced in the term, 'the racial and national life of Germany.' According to German nationalism or Nazism and a current conception of the present day, the German race is attempting to unify and assimilate even those people who inhabit other nations while banning another race even though living in her own country. Whereas the characteristic feature of our spirit holds equality on all races without prejudice. This exemplifies the differences in view between this and that nation. Although directly nothing is stated relative to politics, this agreement may bring about some kind of influence politically. So I deem it important that special precaution be taken so that the people may not be misled. However, I wish to hear the government's comment on this aspect.



"No. 17 (ARITA):

"In short, the racial and nationalistic life of Germany is none other than the singular spirit of Germany. The reason for the adoption of the term was because of the firm insistence on the part of Germany at the outset of negotiations, explaining that their characteristic spirit being phenominized in the racial and national life of Germany, it should be made the essence of her culture.

"On the second point this agreement proposes to aid in the liaison and systematic uplifting of the culture of the two nations. It recognizes that cultural relations of Japan and Germany form the basis of the characteristic spirits of each respective nation. Therefore it is unlikely that there will be any influence politically. However, if there are such opinions of fear in the carrying into effect of the agreement, sufficient precaution shall be taken.

"No. 28 (ISHIZUKA):

"On the whole I understand, but it is conceivable that during the long life of this agreement there is a possibility that politics will be influenced. In particular, a tendency to go with the German stream is not at all deniable in this country of late. In view of this fact, I repeat and hope that there should be some means to guard against all possible mistake on the part of our nation before this agreement is concluded.

"Chairman (HIRANUMA): Since there are no other questions, we shall omit second reading and procedures and directly take a vote. Those who approve the project, please stand up.

(Everybody present stood up)

"Chairman (HIRANUMA): Decided in favor of, unanimously. This closes our meeting today.

\* \* \*



Doc. No. 956B

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 956B

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, M. TAKATSUJI hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary, Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 22 pages, dated Nov. 22, 1938, and described as follows: Minutes of the Privy Council on the conclusion of Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and Germany, Nov. 22, 1938.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number of citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
26th day of August, 1946.

/s/ M. Takatsuji  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Kichi, Chosokabe Secretary, Privy Council  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
26th day of August, 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan  
NAME

Witness: /s/ R. H. Larsh

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



31 April 1940

658 ✓

Program for the Opening Session of the  
German-Japanese Culture Committee  
and the tea reception in the  
Hotel Kaiserhof.

1. The opening session takes place in the Federal Council Hall of the Foreign Office. The guests arrive at about 1600 hours. The session begins at 1615 hours. It is introduced by a speech of welcome from Freiherr von Weizsaecker. His Excellency the Imperial Japanese Ambassador replies to it. Ambassador von Twardowski speaks last.

Following that, the participators in the opening session go to the Hotel Kaiserhof, where a tea reception takes place.

2. The guests arrive at about 1700 hours in the Hotel Kaiserhof. After taking off their overcoats in the cloakroom, they meet in the Yellow Room. After arrival of the State Secretary, the guests seat themselves at the tables set up in the Great Hall. Tea and cake is first served, which takes about a quarter of an hour. The distribution of the guests at each of the tables is effected so that a prominent participant is named for each table, while the remaining guests freely apportion themselves to the various tables.

After the guests have been served tea and cake, the State Secretary greets those present at about 1730 hours and thus introduces a speech which Ambassador von Twardowski will give. At the end of the speech, a brief, noncompulsory meeting follows.

Berlin, 3 April, 1940

/Signature illegible/



Your Excellency, Gentlemen. It is a pleasant duty to me to welcome you all today on the occasion of the meeting of the German-Japanese Culture Committee.

And my special greetings go to you, Your Excellency, Ambassador KURUSU. Your presence here proves again your active interest in the Committee, which represents a further, and in many respects a new kind of, connecting link between Germany and Japan and has been called upon to play a significant part in the spiritual exchange between our two nations. You have, we know, besides your political and economic professional questions, occupied yourself most deeply with German philosophy and literature. For us, therefore, you are, as a personal expert in German spiritual life, the best guarantee for the advancement of the cultural correlation of our countries.

The formation of the German-Japanese Culture Committee, proposed from the German side, has met with the agreement of the Imperial Japanese Embassy. The Berlin Committee, just like the corresponding committee in Tokyo is composed equally of five Japanese and five Germans.

I warmly welcome the fact that Envoy USAMI, as advisor in the Japanese Embassy has undertaken the leadership of the Japanese group in the committee, and that the other Japanese gentlemen happily represent all Japanese life in Germany. I thank you, gentlemen, for your readiness to undertake the office proposed to you, and gladly count on your lively participation in our common task.

I thank you for your presence, State Secretary ZSCHINTZSCH, as representative of the Reich Ministry for Science, Education and "National Education," and you, Ministry Director GREINER, as representative of the Reich Ministry for National Enlightenment & Propaganda. In relations between Germany and Japan we cannot be satisfied that knowledge of each other's country should be confined to a small circle of experts. Rather must a real mutual understanding between the nations be extended to the widest possible circle in the nations concerned, by means of real knowledge and comprehension. National education and national enlightenment are the most important means for the attainment of the high goal we have in mind. Your presence bears witness that you will do your part in the spheres of your respective ministries to crown these efforts with success.

Following the precedent in Tokyo, it seemed suitable to us that the Foreign Office should itself be presiding over the committee. Therefore the head of the Cultural Political Department, Envoy Doctor Von TWARDOWSKI has been entrusted with this task.



Just in the last few years relations between organization and societies in the Nazi Party /NSDAP/ and Japan have developed very gratifyingly. As examples of this I mention the fact that the Reich Board of Health has concluded an agreement with the Japanese-German Medical Society and that the Reich Youth Board is permanently represented in Japan by OBERGEBIETS-FUEHRER SCHULTZ. As the utilization of the organizations and societies of the Nazi Party /NSDAP/ should follow a unified point of view, the Foreign Office has asked the Fuehrer's deputy to send a representative to the Committee. I am glad that this proposal has been complied with, and heartily welcome Herr SCHULTE-STRATHAUS to this circle.

This, like the addition of advisors and experts, is an innovation in the sphere of Culture Committees. I expect much for the activity of our committee from the effectiveness of these co-workers. I thank the parties here concerned for the fact that they are willing to fit their work abroad in their occasional special spheres into the great frame of our efforts and tasks in linking our peoples together. Through your share in the committee you, the advisors and experts, will be currently informed of the whole picture of the German-Japanese Culture Committee and be put in a position to adopt suggestions and possibilities, which arise in the one sphere, in your own spheres of work in the same way. In this way every fruitful thought and every show of initiative must be made available to all concerned, and a maximum of achievement be obtained by systematic work which is only possible through the fitting of individual enterprises into the general frame.

The German-Japanese Culture Committee is a working committee which, in accordance with the German-Japanese agreement on cultural cooperation of 25 November 1938 will discuss and advise on practical measures, the achievement of which will be suited to systematically furthering German-Japanese cultural relations.

The activity of the already existing committee in Tokyo is above all serving the deepening of the knowledge of German culture in Japan. Similarly I see the task of the committee here as lying in the main in the direction of Japan-Germany, that is as working for the spread of the knowledge of things Japanese in Germany. The agreed and stipulated systematization of our efforts demands, however, that the activities of both committees are coordinated and that each committee for its own part furthers the enterprises of the other. This will be one of the essential tasks of the Foreign Office.

From what has been said, our Japanese friends may see that we have tried to create all the technical prerequisites for a close practical cooperation.



A fundamental prerequisite, however, for the deepening and broadening of mutual international intercourse is the readiness of the nations themselves to give spiritually as well as to take. This readiness is in existence in wide circles of the German nation. To spread it ever wider is the task of this committee and the circles represented in it.

A second, just as important, fundamental of international cultural work has been expressed in the preamble to the German-Japanese culture agreement. Both governments have there declared that they are impressed with the realization that the German and Japanese cultures have their true basis in the German national and racial life on the one hand and the innate Japanese spirit on the other, and that the cultural relations between the two countries are to be built hereon.

For the first time in the history of international agreements the spiritual basis on which the goal set by the agreement is to be worked for has been expressed and unalterably defined: the clear consciousness of each party of its racial and national self and the mutual recognition of this self. This is the true reciprocity, such as is only possible for nations that are self-conscious, national and self-contained, and just on that account capable and ready to understand other nations.

The work of this German-Japanese Culture Committee will have to be steered along these supreme spiritual guiding lines.

Gentlemen, to our universal satisfaction and joy, there has arisen in this committee a new, effective instrument which shall and will ever strengthen the traditional close spiritual bonds between Germany and Japan. I am however convinced that the political friendship which so fortunately unites our countries will also be further deepened, and that Germany and Japan will set an example in the cultivation of peaceful international intercourse.

I declare the German-Japanese Culture Committee established.



AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



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/Signature illegible/



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For the first time in the history of international agreements the spiritual basis on which the goal set by the agreement is to be worked for has been expressed and unalterably defined: the clear consciousness of each party of its racial and national self and the mutual recognition of this self. This is the true reciprocity, such as is only possible for nations that are self-conscious, national and self-contained, and just on that account capable and ready to understand other nations.

The work of this German-Japanese Culture Committee will have to be steered along these supreme spiritual guiding lines.

Gentlemen, to our universal satisfaction and joy, there has arisen in this committee a new, effective instrument which shall and will ever strengthen the traditional close spiritual bonds between Germany and Japan. I am however convinced that the political friendship which so fortunately unites our countries will also be further deepened, and that Germany and Japan will set an example in the cultivation of peaceful international intercourse.

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AFFIDAVIT

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1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



CopySecret!

Berlin, 29 June 1938

Pro Memoria

I.) In the repeated discussions which Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs von RIBBENTROP had with the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, TOGO, over the economic construction /Aufbau/ in China, the Reich Minister recognized the special position which Japan holds in China and shared the view with the Ambassador that Japan and Germany must cooperate economically still more closely in China in the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact which had been concluded between the two countries. Accordingly, the Reich Minister declared to the Ambassador the willingness of the German Government to try to do its best for economic and technical cooperation with Japan in China. He at the same time expressed the wish that the Japanese Government for its part would proceed in the same manner and that in particular it would take an especially generous and considerate attitude especially as regards German foreign trade in China.

II.) After the Ambassador had informed the Japanese Government of the course and result of the conversations as depicted above, the Ambassador was then instructed by the Imperial Government to communicate the following to the German Government:- The Japanese Government is agreed with the points mentioned in I.) and accordingly intends, with regard to the economic activity concerning Germany's foreign trade in China to observe the following lines in future.

a.) In future the Japanese Government will consider Germany particularly benevolently in her economic activities in China and will at least grant her the most favorable treatment that third powers (excepting Manchukuo, will enjoy, and is accordingly prepared in individual cases, in which future proposals will be made by Germany with a bearing on this, to promote German interests where possible. This benevolent treatment of Germany of course does not exclude Japan's economic cooperation with third powers.

b.) The Japanese Government is of the opinion that German foreign trade in China has to stand fundamentally on the same footing with the Japanese. It will consequently do its best for both countries to enjoy the same treatment as regards customs and accordingly in the event of any special



import and export regulations, management of foreign bills of exchange or other measures for the control of goods and payment arrangements being met with, which make the position of equality of Germany practically impossible, for example concerning the different nature of German or Japanese currencies. German interests will be particularly benevolently considered and at least the most favorable treatment, that other powers (excluding Japan and Manchukuo, enjoy, will be granted to her.



AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



R.H. 240

The Japanese Ambassador TOGO, who had announced himself visited me today at 13.30 hours.

He handed me the Pro Memoria attached in the enclosure. As an explanation he added that the Japanese Government would like to avoid the expression "North China" in such a Pro Memoria and would like to put "China" in its place. Furthermore the Japanese Government was not able to assure Germany a better position than all other powers in a treaty form. Therefore the formula mentioned at the end of the Pro Memoria had been chosen in order to meet our wishes as far as possible. I declared myself not satisfied with the formula.

Among other things I explained to the Japanese Ambassador whether the formula in paragraph a.) of the Pro Memoria could not be changed in such a way so that it would read: "to further German interests to a specially great degree" instead of "to further German interests as far as possible."

The Japanese Ambassador seemed to consider a change of that sort possible.

After that he once more emphasized in epic verbosity that the Japanese Government would do everything necessary to secure the German interests. The idea of his statements seemed to be that one was, to be sure, in practice willing to grant Germany a better position than all the other nations and to express this in the text as far as possible, but that one would not agree to commit oneself in a definite treaty form. The Japanese Ambassador further declared that he would also willingly accept further German proposals for modifications regarding the Pro Memoria.

I explained to the Japanese Ambassador that at present I could not take up a standpoint regarding the text of the Pro Memoria. To me it seemed that the draft did not go further than the most preferential treatment which, in view of Germany's special situation, was not satisfactory. However I would have this plan thoroughly examined and would then give him a report regarding the outcome of this examination.

The Japanese Ambassador then briefly mentioned the present situation of the German-Japanese negotiations for the commercial treaty. Unfortunately Japan was at present not capable of paying foreign bills of exchange to a greater extent.



I declared that I was not informed about details and referred him to Min. Dir. WIEHL.

The Japanese Ambassador then expressed his thanks for the support which Min. Dir. WOHLTAT had given him at the whaling conference in London.

I then informed the Japanese Ambassador that our military advisors would probably leave Hankow on 5 July. It had not been altogether easy to effect their departure. In connection with the recall of Ambassador TRAUTMANN a number of combinations regarding severing of German-Chinese relations and the recognition of the Peking Government had been in the Japanese press. I would be thankful if the Japanese press could be influenced in such a way that it would refrain from such combinations.

The Japanese Ambassador then expressed himself optimistically regarding the further development of the military operations. After a capture of Hankow the position of CHIANG KAI-SHEK seemed to him untenable.

Berlin, 29 June 1938

Signed RIBBENTROP

/135844-6/



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4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



Berlin, 6 July 1938

MEMORANDUMON A CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, ON 6  
JULY 1938

TOGO, who had announced himself, made reference to the fact that the Reichminister in the conversation of 29 June had referred him to me regarding details of the pending economic negotiations. At first he spoke about the present situation of the German-Japanese negotiations for the trade agreement and said that, in the last conversation of his Commercial Attache SHUDO with H. D. WOHLTHIT and L. R. VOSS, we had expressed certain wishes for the acceptance of German goods by Japan up to the amount of 160 million yen, suggested by Japan, for normal export, and had declared ourselves willing to take into consideration the Japanese suggestion for an agreement regarding an additional export of 150 million yen, half against Japanese goods, half on credit, in the event of the Japanese government considering our wishes favorably. He had telegraphed this outcome of the conversation of his Commercial Attache to Tokyo and had recommended consideration of our wishes. After having received instructions he would again contact me.

Then the Ambassador again spoke about the Pro Memoria on German-Japanese economic cooperation in China and insisted particularly and obstinately on his counterplan which he had handed to the German Foreign Minister on 29 June and which the Reichsminister had already declared unsatisfactory. The differences of opinion referred to the following points:

(1) According to our suggestion the Pro Memoria was to refer to "the areas of China which are under Japanese influence". The Ambassador wishes to replace these words throughout merely by "China" and brought up as a reason that the Japanese government hoped to extend its influence over all of China, therefore it was for general reasons undesirable to acknowledge in this document the possibility of a division of China into areas which either were or were not under Japanese influence. In answering this I stressed that, with our stipulation of text, we merely wished to clarify that the agreement did not apply to such areas which finally would remain of China without being under Japanese influence. In itself this was natural because the Japanese government could of course only take over responsibilities for such areas in



which it had influence. Therefore I was willing to ask for the Reichsminister's decision whether he approved of the Japanese suggestion, to put only "China" in the parts of the Pro Memoria concerned.

(2) The Japanese counterdraft wishes to put the words "German foreign trade" where, in various parts, it says "German trade" in China. I declared to the Ambassador that we could not agree to this. The reconstruction and securing of the commercial activity of German firms in China was for us an unavoidable prerequisite for the economic cooperation in China desired by both governments. This commercial activity, however, not only consisted of the import and export of German goods by these firms to or from Germany, but also of trade within China and of mediation for export of Chinese goods to third countries for instance America and England. At last the Ambassador conceded this and consented that at the end of (I) and in (II) before the letter (a), just "Germany's trade in China" should be put in place of "foreign trade".

(3) The Japanese suggestions for changes under the letters (a) and (b) present the main difficulty. The Ambassador persisted that the Japanese government could not promise us a better position than third powers and equal treatment with Japan regarding taxes, revenues, duties, traffic fees, etc. In answering I declared to him again and again that, in view of our support of the Japanese action in China rendered with considerable sacrifices, we felt entitled to a better position than such powers which not only did not support Japan but laid, wherever they could, obstacles in her way. In any case I did not have the right to leave off from this demand in view of the binding instructions of the Reichsminister. Still the Ambassador asked me to again obtain the opinion of the Reichsminister and also referred to the fact that VON RAUMER had promised him another examination, from the legal standpoint of the suggestions which differed from our version. At last I declared myself ready to report to him the final attitude of the Reichsminister and the eventual outcome of this legal examination.

(4) Finally the Ambassador told me that he had been empowered by his government to give the planned Pro Memoria a legally more binding form by a mutual provisional signing. I responded that I would bring this to the notice of the



Reichsminister but pointed out that the Reichsminister, as was known, had proposed through VON RAUMER the form of an exchange of notes. The Ambassador was of the opinion that his government considered the form of an exchange of notes impractical on account of the necessary but difficult and time consuming consent of the Privy Council.

Signed WIEHL

/135851-3/



AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



Berlin, 28 July 1938

MEMORANDUM

On 27 July 1938 I went to see the Japanese Ambassador and told him on instructions of the German Reichs Minister, that the Reichs Minister, even after another thorough deliberation, did not find satisfactory the last Japanese proposal for the wording of the "Pro Memoria" regarding North China, according to which Germany was to be promised only an "especially favorable" treatment and that he stands on the demand for a promise for "preferential treatment over against third states." This demand was merely the natural consequence of the special relation between our two countries and the great sacrifices with which we were supporting the Japanese advance in North China. A treatment which is only "especially favorable", however, did not sufficiently do justice to this situation.

Several reports from our representatives in China had contributed to the decision of the German Reichs Minister, from which it could be seen that also in the already peaceful part of North China every foreign trade was being ruthlessly eliminated in favor of the Japanese, and that thereby any more favorable treatment of the German trade was in no way taking place. This action induced the impression, that the long range Japanese economic policy in North China systematically lead to principally eliminating every foreign trade, even the German, and only permitting it in so far as Japan itself was not capable of delivery or receipt. As evidence of this I presented the ambassador the note enclosed in copy, in which five cases of complaint are presented and made supplementary oral explanations based on a detailed memorandum regarding the situation of German economic interests in North China, especially regarding the complete exclusion of Germany which has set in since the Japanese occupation in two fields in which we have had a leading position for many years, namely, in the delivery of railroads and the hydro-electric field. It followed from all of this that it was not a question of an especially favorable treatment, not to speak of a preferential treatment of Germany in North China.

I added, that Ambassador OTT would be commissioned to present these complaints in Tokyo and to ask the Japanese government for information regarding its intended future economic policy in North China. Ambassador OTT, during his presence here, had also been informed of the course of the discussions here regarding economic cooperation in North China and informed of the differences of opinion which still exist regarding the wording of the Pro Memoria and would, when the opportunity presented itself, on his part inform the Japanese government in Tokyo of the concept of the Reichs Minister.

Especially the latter statement was obviously extremely disagreeable to Mr. TOGO and upon my report on the commissioning of Ambassador OTT, which were at first more indicative, he posed several counter questions, until I made this commissioning more precise in the manner shown above.



Impartially (speaking), Mr. TOGO objected that he had always done his best to do something about such German complaints re: North China, and in two instances he had even succeeded in the (later findings showed that he had actually gone to some trouble regarding Point 2 of the Appendix, that, however, the Japanese assent which had been given to it was not sufficient). He would now report to Tokyo the complaints enumerated in the appendix and in my oral statements. If up to now no especially favorable treatment of Germany in North China has taken place, then this was related to the fact that an agreement could just not be reached on the Pro Memoria in which this especially favorable treatment was to be agreed upon.

I expressed my astonishment at this remark, pointing out that from general circumstances alone, such an especially favorable treatment even without agreement was understood to be a matter of course. After a few excuses the Ambassador admitted this, maintained, however, that the stopping of war material delivery to China and especially the recall of the military advisors had only come about such a short time ago that the effect of this gesture of friendship could not yet have carried through to (change) the attitude of the Japanese authorities everywhere in North China. He, too, presumed that on account of this gesture of friendship much would now improve of its own accord along the lines of our wishes.

Finally the ambassador made remarks concerning other details of the wording of the Pro Memoria, from which I could surmise that he was, nevertheless, very much interested in a further discussion also here on this /subject/, and that he possibly still has one or another concession on hand, which up to now, he has not brought forth. He also inquired as to what attitude the German Reichs Minister had taken to the form of the Pro Memoria, namely execution by mutual signing.

I answered that the Reichs Minister had not taken any attitude towards these other details, as it was of no use to go more deeply into these questions, as long as the main point, namely the demand for preferential treatment was rejected by the Japanese side. But since Mr. TOGO insisted, and as it could be of advantage to find out something about other possible Japanese concessions, and as he seems to be somewhat under pressure by the parallel action of our Ambassador in Tokyo, I at last promised him that I would get the decision of the Reichs Minister regarding continuation of the discussion.

signed WIEHL

To be submitted to  
the Reichs Minister  
the Secretary of State



Mr. L. R. VOSS  
W VII  
Pol. VIII

To be submitted to the Reichs Minister, via the State Secretary,  
with the request for a decision on the last sentence of the  
memorandum.

Ambassador OTT has been informed by telegraph and asked to raise  
complaints in the same direction with the Japanese Government.

WIRHL



AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



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## Account

Concerning the situation of German Economic Interests  
in the parts of China occupied by Japan.

## I.

In view of the reactions which the Japanese-Chinese conflict inevitably exercises upon foreign economic interests in China, the Japanese Government has repeatedly declared its intention to respect these foreign interests and to maintain the principle of the Open Door and the principle of the equal possibilities.

In addition to that the Japanese Government has promised our economic interests in China a preferential treatment in consideration of the special relations existing between Germany and Japan and the great friendship which Germany has shown since the conclusion of the anti-Comintern agreement, through the recognition of Manchuria, the recall of military advisors and the suspension of all war material supplies to China.

One could not see clearly what practical consequences these Japanese promises for the German economic interests had as long as the area of TIENTSIN, PEKING and TSINGTAO in North China, and the triangle Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow in Middle China were battle areas as long as there was fighting, it was doubtful whether the measures of the Japanese military authorities were conditioned by war and temporary or whether they were the expression of a policy calculated to be permanent. Now that these territories are for the great part pacified and opened for the admission of Japanese civilians (peddlers, traders and manufacturers), the German authorities could gain a clearer picture of the Japanese economic policy in China and its reactions on the German interests. They confirm in numerous reports that the Japanese military authorities are striving to subjugate the Chinese economy under Japanese domination, to use this economy exclusively in the Japanese interest, and to push aside and eliminate all foreign interests.

In this the German interests are treated no better than any other foreign interests. Principally, Japan wants to exploit China only in her own interest. Foreign cooperation only comes then into the question where the Japanese means do not suffice, but even there only in a way which guarantees Japan's leadership (Japanese majority in mixed enterprises). Considerable orders are to be given internationally, whereby Germany does not possess any



special advantage over other nations. Though the attitude of the Japanese military authorities in North and Middle China is basically the same towards German economic interests, a certain difference is shown in the atmosphere's mood: The Kwangtung Army which protects the Japanese flank in MANCHURIA and Inner Mongolia against Russia, shows a certain willingness for cooperation with Germany whereas they consciously prejudice themselves over against the English. On the other hand, the commercial expert reports about the Japanese attitude in Middle China (W VII 1731 of 23 June):

"Whereas the German merchants in North CHINA are shown a certain consideration, the Japanese military and official sources here are apparently ashamed of this friendship, especially over against the English. Instead of avowing oneself openly to it by permitting the German merchants something which one wants to refuse to the others, one only always talks about cooperation with Germany, and this as much as possible in private circles, that is, for the purpose of reproaching us or to demand something from us."

Consul General FISCHER has referred the Japanese Consulate General in Shanghai, with which he was negotiating about a few factories which are under German influence, to the assurance of the Japanese Government to treat German interests preferentially. The Japanese Consul SCHE answered to this that the Japanese Consulate had not received any such instructions and that it was impossible to make a distinction in the treatment of the members of the various foreign nations.

Consul General FISCHER - who was specifically characterized by Lt. General OSHIMA as a person approved of by Japanese military authorities - comes to the conclusion that the military authorities "up to now have not allowed themselves to become disconcerted by all the statements from Tokyo about the respecting of foreign rights and interests in the ruthless utilization of their position of power and have not taken cognizance of the fact that German interests should be treated with care in the strangulation of foreign commerce."

-2-

The Japanese economic policy aims at the control of all the important industries of North and Middle China. As objects of this national-Japanese policy are named amongst others: shipping railways and other communications, undertakings, mines, salt-production, mills, spinneries and weaving mills, cement, chemical factories, the wool and silk industries.



In practice it has proceeded in the following way: All public or semi-public installations of the Central Provincial Government and the local administrations: railways, telephone, telegraph and wireless stations, arsenals and workshops, mines and salt-fields naturally have been seized by the Japanese military authorities.

The greater part of factories of private industry have been destroyed. The machines have been taken apart so far as they were still useful and the rest has been sent to Japan as scrap metal. As Consul SONE imparted to the German Consul General, Japan wants to retain the power for the decision whether the development of certain industries in China should be permitted at all, which would be regulated according to the requirement of the Japanese economy.

As far as the Chinese factories are still existing, they will be taken over by the Japanese. For instance, the cotton spinning industry of Middle China has thus been taken over by Japan and has been divided up for management by Japanese Spinning mills.

Usually this happened in such way that one day Japanese engineers, most of the time with military escort, appeared, hoisted the Japanese flag and put up signs on which it was announced that the factory was now a Japanese enterprise. The Japanese emphasized that they only aspire to "cooperation" with the Chinese owners who are invited to bear the repair expenses, which are usually considerable, to agree to the appointment of a Japanese manager and a technical advisor and to be content with a partition of the net proceeds (W VII 1876).

Should the Chinese owners object, then they are put under pressure either by refusal of admission to the factory buildings and other administrative measures or the resumption of the management takes place without Chinese consent. In this procedure it is not the arbitrary acts of individual military authorities, but they are the systematic attempt, which is approved by the Japanese Government to manage Chinese industry - as far as it is permitted - in "cooperation" with the Chinese as a Japanese monopoly. That Japanese enterprises in China are to be erected on the basis of special privileges also follows, among other things, from article 11 of the Japanese law concerning the North and Central China Development Co. which states:

"The Government shall make efforts to make the new Government of China consider granting special treatment to the proposed company and its affiliates."



The results of this Japanese policy are very serious for the German commercial activity in China. How incisive they are, is already shown by contemplating two fields which the Japanese want to reserve for themselves, Railways and Electricity.

In the field of railway construction, Germany has always been active and has participated to a great extent since the building of the SHANTUNG and the Tientsin-Pukow railway. Germans were the first who again took up the railway enterprise after the establishment of the Chinese national government and who, with the assistance of middle termed delivery credits made possible the building of the Hangchow-Yushan-Nanchang-Pinghsiang-railway. It was expected that in a nationally united China a grand development of communications would take place and that Germany, together with England, would take a prominent part in it.

On 15 June of this year, 7,000 kilometers of the estimated 11,000 kilometers of the railroad lines were under Japanese control. Now they are run by the South Manchurian Railway Co. The Japanese saw themselves forced to procure an "Ersatz" because the Chinese could have taken with them nearly the entire rolling stock, and have ordered first of all 250 locomotives and 10,000 coaches in Japan. The orders went exclusively to Japan. It is to be expected that the future orders will also go to Japan and that we will lose the old Chinese railways as customers.

In addition to this the receipts of the Tientsin-Pukow line for the loans of 1908 and 1910 and the receipts of the Peking-Hangkow line for a number of middle termed delivery credits were mortgaged to us. These lines at present have no receipts. In order to maintain our rights, after the English had availed themselves of the use of the Tientsin-Pukow and Hukuang loans from Japan on the 2nd of May of this year, we have demanded the same treatment for the German shares of these loans as well as the advance (L670,000) on the Tientsin-Pukow lines. The Japanese Government up to now has not answered this demand.

In the field of Chinese hydroelectricity the SIEMENS company has had a leading position for many years. According to what the firm reports now, one can already clearly see today that Japan is not going to draw any non-Japanese firms in the future into the Chinese territories occupied by Japan, and that she is going to let the Nihon Denshin Koji Kabushiki Kaisha (half national and half pertinent industry) carry out all supply and construction jobs. Examples of the Japanese advance already exist:



a) At the time of the outbreak of the conflict, a delivery of enlargement equipment had just arrived for the automatic telephone exchange which had been built by Siemens and Halske. The Japanese did not accept these, but ordered a new automatic exchange from the Nihon Denshin Denwa Kabushiki Kaisha.

b) The same firm received orders for deliveries for two public automatic telephone exchanges in Shanghai.

c) The same firm participated in the founding of a company for news exchange in Kalgan together with a "Mongolian Government" (Kwantung Army) and received the order for a public automatic telephone exchange.

d) Up to now SIEMENS and HALSKE was almost exclusively the only firms supplying telephone and telegraph equipment for manifold utilization of overland wires. In the territories occupied by Japan such orders are only given to Japanese firms from now on. (Up to now two three-channel telephone constructions for North China and one one-channel do for Tientsin-Peking).

From the examples given above one can clearly see that the German firm has been entirely pushed out by the Japanese from fields, which in the past have been its steadily huge customers.

It is to be feared that we will make the same experience on all fields where Japanese monopolies prevail, until finally Japanese occupied China will be just as closed to our commerce as Korea or Formosa.

B. Outside of the official offices which ordered railways, hydro-electric and water power plants, mine and arsenal equipment in Germany the Chinese private industry was our best customer.

Due to the Japanese action in the industrial field described above, the Chinese private industry is mainly ruined. German trade has been heavily damaged by the fact that many Chinese factory owners became unable to pay, so that they could not accept ordered goods and could not pay them and that for the future they have been eliminated as customers. Most of them will be forced to buy in Japan in the future if they want to continue working.

In a few cases where long-termed business relations existed and where the German demands on Chinese undertakings were especially large, the German firms had constituted liens for



themselves in the undertakings or had transferred them to themselves for security. Their number is not large, because the Consul General in Shanghai watched carefully that such cessions were "bona fide" and that they were commercially justified and not fictitious bargains. In the main it concerns the following cases:

German Paint-  
Trading Co.  
WAIBEL & CO.

Five dye-works. They were established by Chinese who are close to DEFAG, in order to introduce new dyeing methods, and were technically taken care of by the DEFAG. The DEFAG had high claims on all of them. In order to secure these, DEFAG took a mortgage on the dye works in the summer of 1937 and in December had it transferred for security's sake. The Japanese do not want to recognize the transfer. Furthermore they prevent the resumption of work of the 2, 4 and 5 works.

SIEMSEN & CO.

Shanghai Portland Cement Works. Many years of close business contacts and high claims by SIEMSEN. Transfer for security's sake on 27 October 1937. The Japanese have removed the inventories of goods and part of the machines; they do not recognize the transfer. SIEMSEN fears that it will be taken over by force by the Japanese.

CARLOWITZ & CO.

Shun Chang Stone Pulverizing Works. China Wool Manufacturing Co., Ltd. Many years of business contacts and high claims by CARLOWITZ. Transfer of property not recognized by Japanes

The mortgaging and transference, respectively, of these works has been reported to the Japanese Consulate General in each case, with the result that there systematic plundering generally stopped in front of those enterprises under the German flag. When the German firms wanted to start running these enterprises again, it was not possible to get the necessary permission from the Japanese Consulate General, and the Japanese Military Authorities began to get serious about the seizure of these works. Therefore, the German Consulate General found itself forced to take up negotiations with the Japanese Consulate General. At this occasion the Japanese Consul SONE took the following attitude:

- a) No distinction would be made in Germany's favor in the treatment of the various foreign nations;



b) The efficacy of the transfer of property from Chinese to German nationals depends upon recognition by the Japanese.

Japan was in a position to enforce its will by refusing work permits or other measures, which, if necessary, could be taken by the newly set up Chinese Government. The lack of a judicial foundation for this procedure was expressly confirmed. As reason for Japan's attitude Consul SONE stated that the sought-for Chinese-Japanese "Cooperation" would be hindered if the Chinese would find safety behind foreign firms.

Councillor of Embassy Fischer defended the judicial standpoint that German firms, even if they possessed no claims against a Chinese firm, were entitled to acquire property from same, and that for this no Japanese permission was necessary; however, declared himself willing to enter into further discussions with the aim of finding a solution locally. In view of the well known economic policy of the Japanese military authorities he is, however, convinced that in the long run a basic discussion is unavoidable with the Japanese Government regarding the conflicts with legitimate German interests, arising from their economic policy.

c) The German economic activity in the Japanese occupied territories is generally encroached upon in that the Germans, just as the rest of the foreigners, are prohibited from entering into the territories already pacified, whereas they are visited by groups of Japanese peddlers, traders and other civilians. This applies to North China along the Peking-Paotou railway as well as to the triangle Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow.

In Inner Mongolia, the Kwantung Army has ordered the representatives of the firm MELCHERS & CO. to leave the area at once "as this was necessary for the personal safety of the employees", although Japanese businessmen go on working there as before. Thus the buying organizations of the German firm, which for many years has bought wool and skins there are paralyzed, and the business has been concluded into the hands of a Japanese Monopoly Company. The same measures have been taken in MANCHURIA where the MANCHURIAN LIFESTOCK CO. has received a monopoly.

The provisional government in PEKING has further declared that the export of skins and furs from the ports of TIENTSIN, CHEFOO, and TSINGTAO is prohibited, on 30 June of



this year. The German firms, which have about a 50% share in this export, are heavily damaged by this. The German Chamber of Commerce in Tientsin requests remonstrances to the Japanese Government, as this measure was taken at the inducement of the Japanese in the interest of Japanese war economy. A prohibiting of the export of cotton is said to be imminent.

-3-

All in all the reports of the German officials in North and Middle China show that the German economic interests in China are worse off in the Japanese occupied areas than was ever the case in national China, even at the time of the sharpest anti-imperialistic Kuomintang propaganda. This fate is shared by the Germans with all other foreign interests. However, no signs of a preferential treatment of the German interests by Japan are to be found.

Part of the injuries under which the German economic interests suffer are certainly to be traced to the war situation and the urgent critical situation, which forces Japan to take measures which otherwise it would not take. In the main, however, it concerns measures which originate from a consequential economic policy of Japan and aim at the abolition of all foreign influences in China. The example of Korea and Formosa shows where this development will lead to if we do not defend our interests with all our vigor.

The Japanese have promised us, at the very least de facto, a preferential position. The facts give us the right to ask Japan in what respect it has carried out these promises and how it intends to carry them out, and what the attitude of this preferential position will be toward the status quo ante.

Herewith respectfully submitted to Ministry Director  
Wiehl.

Berlin, 24 July 1938.



AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



Extract from a letter of Ambassador OTT - TOKYO - of 15 March, 1939  
to Ministerial Director WIEHL.

..... In the question of our preferential treatment in  
China I was able to gather from conversations in the Foreign Ministry  
that Ambassador OSHIMA has actually telegraphed repeatedly in  
accordance with our interests /in Unserem Sinne/. Generally I have  
the impression that one is not inclined to admit in writing the  
preferential treatment. As a way out, one is thinking of a de facto  
preferential treatment which is to be confirmed solely by actual  
deeds without written fixation. However, the actual deeds offered  
by Japan up to now are not very encouraging.....

Signed OTT

Copy to:

Bureau RAM

ST.S.

POL VIII

U.S.T.S.

W VII

Dg. POL

Dg. W

signed WIEHL



AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



Berlin, 8 October 1940

MEMORANDUM

I informed the Japanese Ambassador on 4 October that we would like to make use of his offer, that Japan could buy raw materials from Netherlands East Indies for us, in excess of her own demands and pass them on to us. Regarding details of our wishes I handed him a note with the following contents: "3 million reichsmark in foreign bills of exchange for tin, rubber and castor-oil plants' seeds or castor oil. 1 million reichsmark in foreign bills of exchange for about 1,000 tons of spices. In the first place information is requested on the quantities that can be delivered, and the time of delivery. The amounts of foreign bills of exchange could be paid in full to the working association of the three biggest Japanese business concerns for a receipt and a declaration of obligation that the goods concerned would be handed over within a period of two months to the confidant on the German side in Dairen (Manchukuo). In the event of a part of the goods not being delivered before the expiry of the period of time, the firms promise to pay back the equivalent of the undelivered parts immediately in foreign bills of exchange according to German choice."

The Japanese Ambassador promised to telegraph my information to his government. He remarked, he would then suggest to his government that on acquiescence of our proposal on its part, it expresses the desire to obtain an enlarged market in Germany and the countries occupied by Germany or those economically dependent on Germany for such Japanese products, which Japan, due to the reaction to the Tripartite Pact, will probably not be able any more to sell in countries of English-American influence, to the previous extent. With regard to this I told the Ambassador that we would be pleased to examine such wishes.

(signed) WIEHL

Copies to:

St. S. U. St. S. Pol, pol VIII, DG W, W VII with the request to inform the departments and the Embassy in Tokyo.

/136434-5/



AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



670

## SECRET STATE AFFAIR

Dir. Ha. Pol. 102

Berlin, 28 April 1941

MEMORANDUMWork Program for the Economic Subcommittee of  
The Tripartite Pact in Berlin.

I) The economic subcommittee has the task of advising what can be done between the countries belonging to the Tripartite Pact in order to secure mutual support, especially in the economic field, in war and in the postwar period. It lays down the results of its deliberations in proposals to the main commission. The individual negotiations necessary for the execution of the proposals after these have been approved by the main commission, will be conducted directly between the participating governments.

II) The economic subcommittee will be charged with examining the possibilities of an accord and mutual support at first in the following fields:

- 1) In waging the commercial and economic war by economic measures (military measures are dealt with by the military subcommittee).
- 2) In the procurement of raw materials.
- 3) In construction and extension of plans for military and defense economy preparations.
- 4) In the utilization and extension of trade routes.
- 5) In the promotion of economic combinations between the states belonging to the Tripartite Pact.

III) The examinations and proposals are at first to include the measures practicable and necessary for the period of the present war, but should also already now extend as far as possible to the preparations for the postwar period.

IV) In the beginning the possibilities existing between the three main powers are to be examined, but already now, as far as it is possible and necessary, the participation of the other states which have joined the Tripartite Pact is to be considered.

## Internal Explanations

On 1) to 5)

On 1) Meant is, for instance, exchange of economic information between the governments and their representatives in neutral countries,



supervision of the trade of neutral countries with enemy countries, control of interference purchases in neutral countries, common economic pressure on neutral countries, economic measures to deprive the enemy of shipping space, measures against enemy property, common economic defence against foreign measures such as freezing of credit, confiscation of ships, etc. Whether joint measures for the running of the enemy blockade should be dealt with by the military or economic subcommission remains to be decided.

On 2) Mutual support in the procurement of raw materials will have to extend to purchasing, transporting and financing. Regarding transport measures compare No. 4).

On 3) Meant is mutual transmission of patents and licenses, granting of technical assistance, partnerships regarding capital.

On 4) Meant is:

a) Question concerning railways, for instance syntonisation of negotiations with Soviet Russia regarding use of the Siberian railway. In doing this the keeping secret of our arrangements with Russia must not be endangered. Therefore Italian procurements from the Far East by the Siberian railway must not come to light.

b) Questions of shipping, for instance improvement of the Japanese shipping lines to Vladivostok, the transport of raw materials from the Netherlands-Indies, Thailand, Indo-China, and China to Japan; later on also accord in the operation of the main routes of world shipping.

c) Questions regarding air transport, for instance establishment of the air-route Rome-Berlin-Tokyo, later on also accord regarding the main routes of world air transport.

On 5) Meant is, for instance, removal of orders and measures hindering or limiting exchange of goods; setting up of principles for future loan and currency policy, etc. To put the promotion of commercial intercourse also between the countries and areas under the de jure or de facto supremacy or the influence of Germany, Italy, and Japan, already now on the order of the day is not recommended, because that might lead to the discussion of questions not yet ripe for judgment, as, for instance, incorporation of the Netherlands Indies in the Great East Asia Sphere, direct trade of Germany with the countries of the Great East Asia Sphere etc.



AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



ADOLF HITLER, German Chancellor to,

His Majesty,  
The Emperor of Japan.

Your Majesty!

Prompted by the desire to fill again the post of German Ambassador in Tokyo which was vacant owing to the recall of Ambassador Dr. Von DIRKSEN, I have resolved to confer this post on Major General EUGEN OTT.

His tested qualities entitle me to expect that he will succeed in presenting to Your Majesty this letter which is to accredit him as my envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

I beg you to receive him with good will, fully trusting everything that he will be called upon to state in my name or on orders of the German Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to assure Your Majesty of my complete respect and sincere friendship, at the same time expressing my best wishes for the well being of Your Majesty and the happiness and welfare of JAPAN.

FUNDBRUCK, 5 April 1938.

/s/ A. Hitler  
Ribbentrop

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C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 I.P.S. No. 2670

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of TWO pages, dated 5 April 1938, and described as follows: German Ambassador, Eugen Ott's Letter of Credentials to the Japanese Government. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of Sept. 1946.

/s/ Nagaharu Odo  
 Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

SIAL  
Asst. Chief, Archives Section  
 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of Sept. 1946

/s/ J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.  
 NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 T. Toguchi

Investigator  
 Official Capacity

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 2670.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus



Tokyo, 5 March 1941

To the Vice Foreign Minister!

Sir,

I am honored to inform Your Excellency that I will leave Tokyo today and will go to Germany for a short time in order to take part there in the conversations of the Imperial Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke MATSUOKA, with The Fuehrer and Chancellor and the leaders of the German Government.

During my absence the plenipotentiary minister Dr. Erich Boltze will conduct the business of the Embassy in the nature of a temporary charge d'affaires.

I avail myself of this occasion for again assuring Your Excellency of my high esteem.

GTT

His Excellency  
The Imperial Japanese Vice Foreign Minister

Mr. OHASHI

Tokyo



## CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 2671

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section -- Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of one pages, dated 5 March 1941, and described as follows: Temporary Leave of Absence of the German Ambassador to Japan, Eugene Ott, from his post -- Minister Boltze named to fulfill the post temporary.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section, -- Foreign Office --

Signed at Tokyo on this  
26th day of Sept. 1946.

Nagaharu ODO  
Signature of Official

(Seal)

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

Asst. Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

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/s/ J. ... Curtis, 2nd. Lt.  
Name

Witness: /s/ T/4 T. Toguchi

Investigator  
Official Capacity



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/s/ Ulrich A. Straus



Copy

Westphalia, 21 Nov. 1941

Bureau RAM 230

Diplogerma

Tokyo

No. 2136

Telegram in Ciphers

(Secret Cipher Process)

(Secret State-Matter)

In regard to telegram No. 2472 of 18 Nov.

I ask you to inform verbally the leader of the division of Foreign Armies yourself, or, if you consider it to be more correct, through the military attache, of the following in regard to his remarks,

You had made a report on this statement to Berlin and you were told that the idea there of concluding peace or armistice only jointly in case Japan or Germany becomes involved in war against the United States, no matter for what reason, is looked upon as natural and that one would be entirely willing to put down a corresponding /statement/ in an agreement to be made for this case.

Telegraphic report on execution.

RIBBENTROP

/60879/



AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



To be kept in locked file

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo	23 Nov 1941	10.00 s
Arrived	24 Nov 1941	3.00 hours

No. 2526 of 23 Nov 1941Most Urgent

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

x) RAM 230 In answer to telegram No. 2136 x) of 21st.

I first informed General OKAMOTO orally through the military attache of the above telegraphic instructions, adding that I was myself prepared for discussions any time.

General OKAMOTO then asked to be received by me and in a subsequent conversation made the following statement.

The Japanese Minister of War expressed his deepest gratitude for the statements made through the Military Attache. He, OKAMOTO, was very pleased to find the fact once more confirmed that Germany would not leave Japan in the lurch in case of a conflict with the United States. He asks for information whether, in my opinion, Germany would likewise consider herself to be at war with the U. S. in the event of a Japanese commencement of war against her. I referred to the formulation of the above mentioned telegraphic instructions and to our readiness to conclude a reciprocal agreement on this matter.

OKAMOTO declared the army /Wehrmacht/ assumed that a decision would soon be made on an advance in the South. To be sure, the result of the KURUSU-talks would have to be awaited first. Even if no final time limit had been set for these discussions, the army surely insists on speeding up since the season favorable for an operation in the South was imminent.

With regard to operational intentions, I got the following impression from the conversation. A surprise occupation of Thailand about as far as the Kra Isthmus seems to be planned. At the same time seizure of the oil wells of North and East Borneo should take place. It seems not yet to have been decided how the Philippines should be dealt with. I explained, in connection with earlier instructions that, with the presupposition of the preparation of sufficient forces, in view of American weakness, a hesitant attitude would be initially possible and suitable, in order to drive the U.S. to a decision, difficult from the domestic political standpoint, on entry into the war. I further pointed to the necessity of stopping American supplies to Vladivostok, which appeared to be obvious to OKAMOTO.



OKAMOTO expressed his thanks for my statements, and declared he hoped to be able to inform me soon of the result of further deliberations of the army. He requested me to treat the conversation confidentially and in the first place to confine /it/ to army/Wehrmacht/ channels.

I got the impression from the conversation that discussions within the army /Wehrmacht/ had become much more concrete, but that a decision on the question of an advance in the South had not yet been reached.

OTT



AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

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s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



"From: Berlin

"To: Tokyo

"29 November 1941

"#1393 (in 3 parts, complete)

"By his request, I was supposed to have called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop during the evening of yesterday, the 28th. Suddenly, however, he requested that the time be postponed and it was not until 10:30 at night that I finally saw him.

"This delay was occasioned by the fact that a long conference of the bigwigs of the government and military, from Goering down, was being held at the official residence of the Fuehrer. The war against the Soviet Union has now taken definite shape and the outcome can be unerringly foretold. Next year's campaigns were mapped at this conference, taking into consideration the points brought up at the conference of the various Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Europe. It is an absolute certainty that Japan's moves were also given discussion at this conference.

"1. Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japanese-U.S. negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.

"Ribbentrop: 'It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan.'

"'As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-U.S. negotiations being concluded successfully, because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

"'If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself.'



"I: 'I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and the United States?'"

// "Ribbentrop: 'Roosevelt's a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do.'

"Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops", and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech as well as that of Ribbentrop's, I feel that German attitude toward the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.

(Part 2)

"2. I made inquiries as to the future of the war against the Soviet Union.

11/29/41  
VICTORY  
BY  
XMAS  
"Ribbentrop: 'The Fuehrer has stated that he is now determined to crush the Soviet Union to an even greater extent than he had planned at first. He is now bent on completely wiping out that state and went on to announce that practically all of the main military objectives had been attained and that a greater part of the German troops would shortly be brought back to Germany.'

"Following up those campaigns, the Caucasus campaign will be launched in earnest. Next spring, Germany will advance to and cross the Ural Mountains and chase Stalin deep into Siberia.'

"I: 'Approximately when do you expect that?'

"Ribbentrop: 'The campaign will be launched in about May of next year, according to present schedules.'

"I: 'According to what you say, Germany is apparently preparing to gamble quite a bit in her Russian campaign. We hope that air connections between Germany and Manchukuo can be established at an early time.'

"Ribbentrop: 'That is an item that Germany has been considering for some time. By summer of next year I do not believe that air connection from the Ural area to Manchukuo will be an impossibility.'



"3. I then asked him about the campaign against England proper to which he replied that before launching landing operations against England, Germany will probably completely wipe out Britain's influence in the Near East, Africa, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea. I got the impression that more emphasis is being placed on this area than heretofore. So, I asked whether it was Germany's intention to conclude the war without attempting to go through with a campaign against England.

"Ribbentrop: 'Germany has, of course, made all necessary preparations for this campaign. However, Germany is in receipt of intelligences which would seem to indicate that all is not well within England herself. For example, we hear that there is a split within the ranks of the Conservatives; that Churchill's influence is on the wane; that Bewin, Chief of the Labor Party, is advocating revolutionary measures. All of these are tending to make the preservation of order there increasingly difficult.

"Of course, I am not one to implicitly believe all of this. However, I am convinced that things are getting bad in England. Under these circumstances, it may be that Germany's various other campaigns may cause England to fall even without our going through with our landing operations against England herself.

(Part 3)

3 BLOC  
"In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever, in international affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African colonies. Germany desires above all else, to control European Russia.'

"4. In conclusion, I said: 'I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's war campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual enemy but also have all of those areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?'



"Ribbentrop: 'We would like to end this war during next year. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible that it will have to be continued on into the following year.

"Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point.'

"In closing this conference, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret. Please, therefore, exercise particular caution in handling this message.

"I have shown copies of this message to the military and naval attache's Lt.-Gen. (Vice Adm.?) Nomura, and Maj-Gen (Rear Adm.?) Abe. Please show a copy to the Army and Navy authorities in Tokyo, too.

("In the last section of the first part of this message, we wrote \*\*\* 'the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops' \*\*\* That should have read: 'the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid war'.")

25556

JD-1: 6942

\*See end of message.

(D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (7)



Doc. No. 2593

S E C R E T

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke  
CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

S E C R E T



Excerpts from Interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi  
dated 26 February 1946:

\* \* \*

"Q. General, I have some questions on these matters to ask, but I think we will defer those for a time and let you proceed with your narrative.

"A. The no-Separate peace pact was first brought up around the first or second of December 1941, by a telegram from the Japanese Government to me. The gist of this telegram was as follows: that the Japanese Government in case of a United States-Japanese conflict desired Germany's participation in this war, and further that the Japanese Government desired that a no-separate peace pact be signed. In this regard I had heard sometime in November and had conveyed this news to Japan, from a man named Dietrich, the Reichspressechef (head of the German press under Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister), that Hitler would be in favor of entering the conflict in case a United States-Japanese conflict started. Based on this information the Japanese Government in this telegram to me stated that they were desirous of having me approach Hitler in regard to Germany's entry in case of war with the United States.

\* \* \*

Interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi dated 27 February 1946:

"Q. General, you may proceed with your narrative at the point where you left off yesterday.

"A. To clear up this before I go any further: almost since the beginning of United States-Japanese talks I had received absolutely no information concerning their progress from the Japanese Government, nor had I received any information about relations with the Soviet Union. The main reason for this, I believe, was that formerly we had used couriers to carry information of this sort, but due to the difficulties because of the German-Soviet war this became impossible, and for security reasons no communications of this sort were sent. Around the 29th or 30th of November 1941, I received word from Japan to the effect that Secretary of State Hull's reply of November 26, to Japanese proposals was extremely severe in tone. Not knowing much about what the negotiations had covered, I was not able to make an analysis of the situation, this being the first communication regarding United States-Japanese



negotiations that I had received. Following this, I believe it was around the end of November or the very beginning of December, I received another communication to the effect that the Japanese Government had issued an order to its Consulates in the United States to burn all but a very small portion of their codes.

around  
1st - 2nd  
Dec.

"Q. Did these communications all come from the Foreign Office?

"A. Yes. Now, these were the two communications that I had received before the orders from the Government regarding the no-separate peace pact, of which I have told you.

"Q. This message that you referred to yesterday that you got on the first or the second of December 1941 came from the Foreign Office also, did it?

"A. I am not absolutely certain whether this communication regarding the no-separate peace pact came before or after the one that told me of the orders to burn code books. In any case I may be a couple of days off in my dates and I have the feeling that this one regarding the no-separate peace was around the third of December - I just wish to clear up this matter of dates.

"Q. These telegrams or these despatches that you received from the Foreign Office, I suppose, were all signed MATSUOKA?

"A. MATSUOKA was no longer Foreign Minister at this time. In any case, signature or no signature, all these despatches came from the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister at this time was TOGO,"

\* \* \*



677

Gen. No. 37421

Telegram No. 1405

(Ambassador's Code)

To: Foreign Minister TOGO (Rec'd 3 Dec 1941)

From: Ambassador OSHIMA (Berlin) Despatched 2 Dec 1941

Top Secret

Referring to your telegram No. 1401:

(1) In accordance to his request, I visited the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop again at 7:00 P.M. of the 1st (Gaus in attendance). Foreign Minister Ribbentrop stated that, much to his regret, he has been unable to contact Chancellor Hitler today, due to the location, but believes that he might be able to contact him the following day or probably the day after tomorrow, and since the German side fully understands the haste on the part of Japan, utmost efforts shall be exerted to contact Hitler.

(2) On that occasion Gaus asked me, in regard to the question of immediate participation in wars against America, whether it would be proper for him to interpret the aforementioned obligation as being mutual; to which your Ambassador gave affirmative answer. Furthermore, in regard to the "draft of the declaration providing for non-conclusion of separate peace", I stated that in my opinion it would be better for the three countries of Japan-Germany-Italy to issue a joint declaration since a Japanese-German and a Japanese-Italian declaration issued separately would be too juridical and feared to produce less political effects. However, since Foreign Minister Ribbentrop earnestly requested me not to despatch any telegram to Japan to that effect as the matter has not yet received the approval of the Chancellor, I request that you will take this matter into consideration.

(3) As mentioned previously, I have not yet succeeded in contacting Chancellor Hitler. However, as soon as it become possible, your Ambassador shall meet him and directly suggest to him the import of your instructions.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1532A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, FAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, and described as follows: Telegram from Ambassador Oshima despatched 2 Dec 1941 to Foreign Minister Togo, rec'd 3 Dec 1941, No. 1405. (Gen. No. 37421) I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
3rd day of Sept., 1946

/s/ K. Kayashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness : /s/ Takegoro Sato

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
3rd day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



S E C R E T

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

3/12/41

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke  
CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

S E C R E T



"From: Rome

"To: Tokyo

"3 December 1941  
(Purple-CA)

"#985

"Re your message #985\* to Berlin.

"On this day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, I accompanied by Ando, called on Premier Mussolini, (Foreign Minister Ciano was also present). I described the developments in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #986\*\* to Berlin.

"Mussolini: 'I have been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U. S. talks from the very beginning and therefore am not at all surprised to receive your report. As a matter of fact, in view of the utter bull-headedness of the United States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt, I should say that the outcome was nothing but what should have been expected. One of the aims of the United States is to make the Far East her own, from an economic standpoint. I have felt from the beginning that if it was the intention of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis first and then intervene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail because of Japan's loyal and sincere nature.'

"'As Your Excellency and Your Excellency's predecessor know, I wholeheartedly endorse Japan's policy of creating a New Order in East Asia. This has been true in the past, is true now and will be so in the future. I am one who is firmly convinced that Japan has every right to be the leader of the Great East Asia area.'

"I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred to in the heading, (with regard to paragraph 3 of that message, I said that I had been advised that some arrangements were being made between our Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop.)

"With regard to paragraph 2, Mussolini said that should war break out, Italy would give every military aid she had at her disposal, i.e., that she would make every effort to keep the British navy checked in the Mediterranean.



"Mussolini: 'Recently, the formation of an Italian-German air force bloc was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the two to apply further pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. The negotiations on this proposal have progressed to a point where it may be signed any day now.'

"Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: 'Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obligated to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point.'

"With reference to paragraph 3, I submitted the French text of your message #987\*\*\*, as one proposal, and asked him whether he preferred it to be separately or jointly. He replied that as long as it was done simultaneously with Germany it did not make much difference to him, but if it were done jointly he thought it would give the impression of more strength. He said he would confer with Ambassador MAKKENZEN.

"Mussolini failed to bring up the subject of Soviet Russia, so the matter was not brought up at all.

(Translator's note: Up to this point, message was in Purple-CA. The following paragraph was not encoded in the CA. Cannot find phrase referred to, in the text)

"In the first part of this message, please correct 'N-NKEN WA' to 'KINKENSHA WA.'

25833

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (W-T

\*JD-1: 6943 (S. I. S. #25552-53).

\*\*JD-1: 6944 (S.I.S. #25554-55).

\*\*\*Not available.

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KING +  
DUCE  
GLAD of War in U.S.  
COUNT CIANO DIARY

\* \* \*

December 3, 1941

Sensational move by Japan. The Japanese Ambassador asks for an audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion that they have reached a dead end. Then, invoking the apposite clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on America immediately after the beginning of hostilities between Japan and America and that Italy and Japan sign an agreement not to conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the communication. He said: "We are now on the brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as September 1939." What does this new event mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed, and that it is now easy - much too easy - to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin's answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive.

December 4, 1941

Berlin's reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but the idea of facing America's intervention pleases the Germans less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about it.

I receive a message from Gambara. Naturally, he is offended by the fact that the command was given to Rommel, but aside from this he regards the situation as difficult and full of unknown factors. Nistri - who is an ardent Fascist and an intelligent officer - is very pessimistic and adds verbally the things which Gambara was unwilling to put in writing. He says that the exhaustion of our troops is considerable, that the enemy has infiltrated all parts of Cyrenaica and, finally, that we are not in a



position to withstand an early resumption of the British offensive. "We shall make it a glorious fight to the end," he concluded, "However, this will not prevent it from being the end."

December 5, 1941

A night interrupted by Ribbentrop's restlessness. After delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my house to submit a plan for triple action on Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and the latter was very glad I hadn't.

I gave Mussolini a copy of Gambara's letter, from which, however, I had removed the anti-Rommel points. The Duce is so proud of having given the command to the Germans that he would have been furious with Gambara. All the more as Cavallero is working toward this end; he has no love for Gambara. Their characters differ: one is a soldier, the other a scheming politician.

December 6, 1941

I write a few lines in answer to Gambara's letter - lines of friendship and good wishes. But the situation is not improving in Libya, and I am afraid that we are facing bitter days.

December 7, 1941

Bad news from Libya. Our forces are no longer able to attempt a prolonged resistance; it will be necessary to break off contact with the enemy and break it off decisively in order to attempt a defense of the Djibel. Mussolini is calm and even talks of the possibility of rallying. Cavallero, on the other hand, is gloomy, and he regards everything as dependent on French concession of the harbor of Bizerte. He thinks I should discuss this with Darlan on Wednesday. However, in the evening Mackensen comes to tell me in Ribbentrop's name that I must not start any definite negotiations with the French on this subject. This is Hitler's exact wish of which Mussolini had already been informed through Rintelen. Hitler is right. Tunis is 101 percent de Gaullist; any inopportune pressure would serve only to hasten the separation of the French Empire from the Vichy Government. But, according to Cavallero, without Bizerte, Libya is lost.



This morning the Duce was much irritated by the small number of casualties in East Africa. Sixty-seven men were killed at Gondar in November; 10,000 were taken prisoner. It does not take any long reflection to understand what these figures mean.

December 8, 1941

A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is overjoyed about the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain: that America will enter the conflict, and that the conflict will be so long that she will be able to realize all her potential force. This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased about the event. He ended by admitting that in the "long run" I may be right. Mussolini was happy too. For a long time he has wanted the real relations between America and the Axis to be definitely clarified.

In Libya things seem to be going a little better. In the Duce's opinion, the danger of the last forty-eight hours is past. Both Cavallero and Admiral Riccardi inform me that there will be a great naval operation to force the blockade on the 12th, 13th, and 14th of this month. All the ships and all the admirals on the sea. Heaven send us good luck!

Mackensen gives an account of the conversations between Goring, Petain, and Darlan. No facts; words, suggestions, and advice. I do not think that my interview will have any better results.

December 9, 1941

At Turin to await the arrival of Admiral Darlan.

December 10, 1941

I have made a verbal transcription of the meeting with Darlan. He makes a favorable impression: a little man, energetic, wilful and somewhat abrupt, who talks without beating about the bush and calls a spade a spade. He is a soldier who is having a taste of politics, and since he is a Frenchman he manages it with a certain finesse. Sincere? I would not like to commit myself except on one point: he is sincere in his hatred of the British. Certain words and certain expressions cannot be feigned. Furthermore, he declares that for him, personally, there is no choice; if the British were to win the war, his fate would not be pleasant.



Results of yesterday's meeting: None, except for an improvement in relations with the French, which, in any case, is not difficult to achieve. It is enough for us to see each other. Relations deteriorate when we do not see each other. And this has always been the recipe used by Mussolini when he desired a break. When he has talked to them, he himself has not been able to prevent a rapprochement. Even the population of Turin was cordial toward the guests; applause, though scattered, was not lacking.

Amazing reports of the Japanese naval victories continue to arrive. The military situation, however, in Libya and Russia, is not very good. These are the incredible surprises of this war.

December 11, 1941

Mussolini takes very little interest in the Darlan conversation. He is occupied with thoughts of war against America. At 14:30 I receive the Charge' d'Affaires, a nice, rather timid man with whom I have never had much contact. He thinks that I have summoned him in order to discuss the arrest of some journalists but I immediately set him right. He pales as he hears the declaration of war. He says, "It is very tragic." Then he gives me a personal message from Phillips who, realizing that the zero hour was near, had telegraphed to express his gratitude and extend his good wishes to me. Phillips is a fine man, and he loves Italy; I am sure that this is a sad day for him.

? Mussolini spoke from the balcony. A short and cutting speech which fell upon a square overflowing with people. Demonstration showed much pro-Japanese sympathy; the news of the naval victories has excited the imagination of the Italians. On the whole, however, the demonstration was not very enthusiastic; it must not be forgotten that it was three o'clock in the afternoon, the people were hungry, and the day was rather cold. These are factors which are not conducive to arousing enthusiasm.

In the evening Ribbentrop asks us to join a German move to urge the countries of the Tripartite Alliance to declare war on the United States. What about Spain?

December 12, 1941

The Vichy press speaks of the cordiality of the reception in Turin and this has made the Duce nervous. I gave Mackensen the report of my talk with Darlan; I emphasized the advisability of sending a political representative to Vichy. This would also deprive the Armistice Commission of the political functions it is not competent to carry out and which generals do not always handle very successfully.



TELEGRAM  
(Secret Cipher Process)

TO BE KEPT IN LOCKED FILE

Tokio, 5 December 1941, 0100 hours

Arrived, 6 December 1941, 1255 hours

No. 2657 of 5 December 1941

MOST URGENT

For the Reich Foreign Minister

In strict confidence I was informed from a Foreign Ministry source that the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 has not been sent yet. The reply is expected to be composed, but firm. It will declare that American principles are not applicable to the Far East. It is expected that then the United States will break off the negotiations. Upon an oral inquiry by Secretary of State Hull to the two Japanese Ambassadors as to the aim of the Japanese preparations in Indo-China, they have been instructed to reply that the Japanese Government is making preparations which have become necessary in view of Chinese massing of troops in Yunnan. The preparations are, furthermore, being kept within the limits of the contracted stipulations with France, as has been declared in the meantime by Vichy. The confidante notices in this connection that a limitation of the number of troops to 25,000 exists only for Northern Indo-China, while no maximum limitation has been stipulated in the agreement for the South.

The Foreign Ministry is at the moment endeavoring to stress vis-a-vis us the determination of Japan to take measures against the encirclement. For instance it was intimated to Italian Embassy which apparently has not been notified about the Imperial Conference at the end of last week about which OSHIMA will have informed Berlin, that Italy must start considerations to which other power she wishes to transfer the handling of her interests in the future.

A leading official of the Foreign Ministry stated in a conversation that Japan has always been of the opinion as already announced by MATSUOKA, namely, that Article III of the Tripartite Pact is to be considered as applicable in any conflict between one of the three powers and the United States except in the case, for example, that one of these powers would for instance attack without reason the American Continent. I took proper cognizance of this.

SHIRATORI explained to me that the leading circles of Japan have come to the conviction that Roosevelt wants now to enter the war by means of a conflict in the Far East. From various sides the opinion has been advocated that the United States are now sure of the coalition of the A B C D States and Russia, which has



been striven for for more than ten years. Therefore, Roosevelt believes that the moment for a settlement has come, since one cannot be certain of the adherence of these states in the future.

Deliberations are under way in the Foreign Ministry in which manner Japan should open a conflict which cannot be avoided. They tend to the opinion that for reasons of interior politics it is unavoidable to declare the existence of a state of war or to declare war on America simultaneously or after the beginning of hostilities. I have in accordance with the hitherto existing instructions about official statements advocated the opinion that if a direct attack is avoided, (the clear text of the cable is missing) . . . . could be put upon the United States for this difficult decision regarding entrance into the war. In view of the important role which this point might play in the gradual aggravation of the situation and in the conflict between the groups which I have frequently mentioned I would appreciate an early instruction.

(signed) OTT



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.Q., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached document was delivered to me by the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

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E. E. DANLY



TOP SECRET

Page 1.

Aufz. Fue 66/41 gRs

Reception of the Japanese Ambassador, General Oshima, by the Fuehrer on 14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 o'clock in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister.

First the Fuehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold. With cordial words he acknowledges his services in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperation, which has now obtained its culmination in a close brotherhood of arms.

General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now come about between Germany and Japan.

p.2 The Fuehrer continues: "You gave the right declaration of war!" This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as long as possible. But if one sees that other is interested only in putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is not willint to come to an agreement, then one should strike -- as hard as possible, indeed -- and not waste time declaring war. It was heartwarming to him to hear of the first operations of the Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times, for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then realized, that the other did not want to come to an agreement, he struck suddenly and without formalities. He would continue to go this way in the future.

FOR The Japanese Government did indeed not act thoughtlessly; it had, he must say, shown angelical patience toward that ruffian, Roosevelt. There is a German proverb, saying: "The most virtuous cannot live in peace if his evil neighbor dislikes it". These are words containing a bitter truth. If the neighbor is unwilling, one just has to destroy him.

p.3 The entry of Japan into the war was a great relief to Germany. He must freely admit having been worried about the prospects for success of the submarine war. How could a commander tell when he could torpedo and when not? American ships went in convoys and under dimmed lights, and besides the Americans had delivered to the English 50 destroyers of a type of which they themselves had 80 more. One could not expect a U-boat commander to work through an entire book before each torpedoing in



p.4

order to establish whether the ship were English or American. The U-boat commanders had been under an intolerable psychological strain, for in the last analysis each one of them felt the enormous responsibility at the thought that he might bring his country into a new war by a misjudged torpedoing. These days were now definitely past. He had given the German U-boat commanders orders to torpedo everything in sight. The German surface naval forces could also feel more free to operate. Up till now American ships had stood nearby and radioed until the British naval forces arrived, without any possibility for the Germans to defend themselves against this. He would now send the U-boats up to American ports and would not have to take the three-mile zone into consideration any more.

FDR  
US  
TROOPS

He, the Fuehrer, was convinced that Roosevelt must be beaten. It was a great feat of the Japanese that they had destroyed at the very start the nimbus of American superiority. Then he tells of the American fighting capacity, which he does not consider high, and gives examples from the year 1918. At that time the German troops were exhausted and tired and the American ones fresh and well fed. Nevertheless, wherever Germans met Americans, the latter were so thoroughly beaten that they required weeks before they could be sent into action again. How could troops whose God is the dollar hold firm to the last?

p.5

Clear conditions had now been created. A weight had been lifted from the minds of the German U-boat commanders. All the Jewish concepts like "western hemisphere", "300-mile zone", etc. had become untenable. Germany would make the ocean insecure.

In 1939 he had faced an important decision. He would either have had to send the German U-boats into combat and would then have had no more crews for the subsequent mass production, or he would have had to use the greatest part of the available U-boats for training purposes, in order to have sufficient submarine personnel for the future. Thank God, he had decided to adopt the second solution, and this would now have its effect, since 19,20 even 24 U-boats would be put into service monthly. The number of our U-boats would increase enormously each month, especially since, on the average, we had hitherto lost less than two U-boats a month.

p.6

General Oshima tells the Fuehrer that Japan had fought under similarly difficult conditions, when Nanking was bombed and the pilots had orders to spare the foreign legations under all circumstances. This was an impossible restraint for the pilots. It was infinitely fortunate, the Fuehrer continues, that now he could relieve the men in the submarines of the responsibility and now once more bore it himself.



On the remaining front there now came the winter standstill. Unfortunately a temperature drop of 38° had occurred right in the middle of the development of a big operation. Any operation ceases at such a temperature. Besides the burden for the individual man of fighting in this cold weather, there is the trouble with the motorized vehicles. Above all, however, the automatic weapons would not operate any more. Of course, some operations would be completed. First, Sevastopol must be taken; the preparations for this were almost concluded. Then, the siege of Leningrad would be continued, and third, he hoped soon to be able to resume the operations in the direction of the Caucasus. He must align the remaining sectors of the Eastern front on as short a line as possible, corresponding approximately to a straight line from Leningrad to Taganrog. This would then give him the possibility of withdrawing the motorized and armored units and the best infantry divisions, in order to freshen them up during the winter. Large-scale operations would then be resumed in the spring.

In the meantime he would now take strong action in the Mediterranean. Next week, 51 German U-boats would be in the Mediterranean, and in the meantime a large number of motor torpedo boats had also arrived there. The Luftwaffe was moving an entire air force (Luftflotte) under the command of General Kesselring there. In the end the English would have to pay dearly for their stay in the Mediterranean. In this connection he recalls the Norway undertaking, where the English fleet suffered such losses through the action of U-boats and Luftwaffe that it finally had to withdraw.

His major objectives at present were the destruction of Russia, the southward drive over the Caucasus, and the torpedoing of the Anglo-Saxon navy and merchant marine. Today the tonnage of the Anglo-Saxon nations was already too small to carry an expeditionary force to the continent.

Above all, the aerial torpedo weapon must be further developed. In this regard the Japanese Government was of great assistance by supplying Japanese torpedos. The fact that we are still backward with this weapon was due to the mistake that the torpedos were constructed and tested by the Navy, while the planes designated to carry them were constructed and tested by the Luftwaffe. The development was parallel but was not carried on in unison. General Oshima asks whether these Japanese torpedos could not be utilized soon. Germany now had 70 of them and also the corresponding drawings. He is convinced that Germany could have great success with it, since the training was not too difficult and the German pilots were very valiant. The English did not know that Germany had Japanese torpedoes, and so a surprise would be possible. The Fuehrer agrees with Oshima and says that he would make use of the torpedo weapon soon. For quite some time now an entire wing (Geschwader) had been training with aerial torpedoes exclusively. He would make a concentrated surprise attack, an attack on which everything would be staked.



General Oshima now spreads out a map and gives the Fuehrer a comprehensive lecture on the war situation in the Pacific and the Archipelago area. He tells the Fuehrer of the successes of the Japanese air force and fleet and about the advance of the Japanese land forces in the Philippines and the Malay Peninsula. At the conclusion of his report on the situation, Oshima says that after the capture of Singapore Japan must turn toward India. In this connection he considered it important that German and Japanese operations should be synchronized. It would be very advantageous if when Japan attacked India from the East, the German troops would threaten India from the West. The Fuehrer again explains to Oshima his plans for the Spring and says that first he intends to  
p.10 attack in the South, since a thrust to the Caucasus, also with regard to oil, and an advance to Iraq and Iran -- which also implies a threat to India -- would be of primary importance, to begin with. Only then would he resume operations in the center of the Eastern front. The Russians thought we would want to take Moscow first, but this was of lesser importance to him.

Meanwhile, he would turn his entire attention to North Africa. We would furthermore, as he had already mentioned, torpedo every ship we encountered, and he believed that thereby heavy damage could be inflicted on the Anglo-Saxon fleet. Oshima expresses his great desire that in all these German and Japanese undertakings the operations should be synchronized. If this were done cleverly and if the method of operations worked as a sort of lever or exchange action, this would inevitably lead to the ruin of the Anglo-Saxon powers. To this the Fuehrer agrees and declares fur-  
p.11 ther that November and December are always the worst months to carry on warfare. As soon as the weather improved he would again ruthlessly attack English ports and dockyards. The Luftwaffe had already made extensive preparations for this. With the English ports and docks ruined, England would be helpless.

Then General Oshima spoke about landing warfare, which had been greatly developed and practiced in Japan during the past 30 years. On the island of Hainan, which was occupied by Japan, the attempts and exercises had been carried out with great energy. The necessary landing boats had also been extensively developed. He suggests that as soon as contact has been reestablished between Germany and Japan -- which is possible by air and surely will soon be possible by long-distance U-boats -- delegates of the German Wehrmacht should come to Japan to study the methods developed by the Japanese.

p.12 The Fuehrer briefly mentions the necessity of stopping American shipments to Vladivostok. Oshima says that it would be an easy task to halt American shipments to Vladivostok, since, in order to get there, American ships have to pass through straits which could be covered by artillery: besides, he is of the opinion that America would not make any more shipments to Russia.



III. (Photostatic copy in Doc. Rm.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 2952-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office Files and Archive.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss  
O-2052152  
Capt., JAGD



TOP SECRET

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Reception of the Japanese Ambassador, General Oshima, by the Fuehrer on 14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 o'clock in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister.

First the Fuehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold. With cordial words he acknowledges his services in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperation, which has now obtained its culmination in a close brotherhood of arms.

General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now come about between Germany and Japan.

p.2 The Fuehrer continues: "You gave the right declaration of war!" This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as long as possible. But if one sees that other is interested only in putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is not willint to come to an agreement, then one should strike -- as hard as possible, indeed -- and not waste time declaring war. It was heartwarming to him to hear of the first operations of the Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times, for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then realized, that the other did not want to come to an agreement, he struck suddenly and without formalities. He would continue to go this way in the future.

The Japanese Government did indeed not act thoughtlessly; it had, he must say, shown angelical patience toward that ruffian, Roosevelt. There is a German proverb, saying: "The most virtuous cannot live in peace if his evil neighbor dislikes it". These are words containing a bitter truth. If the neighbor is unwilling, one just has to destroy him.

p.3 The entry of Japan into the war was a great relief to Germany. He must freely admit having been worried about the prospects for success of the submarine war. How could a commander tell when he could torpedo and when not? American ships went in convoys and under dimmed lights, and besides the Americans had delivered to the English 50 destroyers of a type of which they themselves had 80 more. One could not expect a U-boat commander to work through an entire book before each torpedoing in



p.4 order to establish whether the ship were English or American. The U-boat commanders had been under an intolerable psychological strain, for in the last analysis each one of them felt the enormous responsibility at the thought that he might bring his country into a new war by a misjudged torpedoing. These days were now definitely past. He had given the German U-boat commanders orders to torpedo everything in sight. The German surface naval forces could also feel more free to operate. Up till now American ships had stood nearby and radioed until the British naval forces arrived, without any possibility for the Germans to defend themselves against this. He would now send the U-boats up to American ports and would not have to take the three-mile zone into consideration any more.

He, the Fuehrer, was convinced that Roosevelt must be beaten. It was a great feat of the Japanese that they had destroyed at the very start the nimbus of American superiority. Then he tells of the American fighting capacity, which he does not consider high, and gives examples from the year 1918. At that time the German troops were exhausted and tired and the American ones fresh and well fed. Nevertheless, wherever Germans met Americans, the latter were so thoroughly beaten that they required weeks before they could be sent into action again. How could troops whose God is the dollar hold firm to the last?

p.5 Clear conditions had now been created. A weight had been lifted from the minds of the German U-boat commanders. All the Jewish concepts like "western hemisphere", "300-mile zone", etc. had become untenable. Germany would make the ocean insecure.

In 1939 he had faced an important decision. He would either have had to send the German U-boats into combat and would then have had no more crews for the subsequent mass production, or he would have had to use the greatest part of the available U-boats for training purposes, in order to have sufficient submarine personnel for the future. Thank God, he had decided to adopt the second solution, and this would now have its effect, since 19,20 even 24 U-boats would be put into service monthly. The number of our U-boats would increase enormously each month, especially since, on the average, we had hitherto lost less than two U-boats a month.

p.6 General Oshima tells the Fuehrer that Japan had fought under similarly difficult conditions, when Nanking was bombed and the pilots had orders to spare the foreign legations under all circumstances. This was an impossible restraint for the pilots. It was infinitely fortunate, the Fuehrer continues, that now he could relieve the men in the submarines of the responsibility and now once more bore it himself.



p.7 On the remaining front there now came the winter standstill. Unfortunately a temperature drop of 38° had occurred right in the middle of the development of a big operation. Any operation ceases at such a temperature. Besides the burden for the individual man of fighting in this cold weather, there is the trouble with the motorized vehicles. Above all, however, the automatic weapons would not operate any more. Of course, some operations would be completed. First, Sevastopol must be taken; the preparations for this were almost concluded. Then, the siege of Leningrad would be continued, and third, he hoped soon to be able to resume the operations in the direction of the Caucasus. He must align the remaining sectors of the Eastern front on as short a line as possible, corresponding approximately to a straight line from Leningrad to Taganrog. This would then give him the possibility of withdrawing the motorized and armored units and the best infantry divisions, in order to freshen them up during the winter. Large-scale operations would then be resumed in the spring.

In the meantime he would now take strong action in the Mediterranean. Next week, 51 German U-boats would be in the Mediterranean, and in the meantime a large number of motor torpedo boats had also arrived there. The Luftwaffe was moving an entire air force (Luftflotte) under the command of General Kesselring there. In the end the English would have to pay dearly for their stay in the Mediterranean. In this connection he recalls the Norway undertaking, where the English fleet suffered such losses through the action of U-boats and Luftwaffe that it finally had to withdraw.

p18 His major objectives at present were the destruction of Russia, the southward drive over the Caucasus, and the torpedoing of the Anglo-Saxon navy and merchant marine. Today the tonnage of the Anglo-Saxon nations was already too small to carry an expeditionary force to the continent.

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p.9 Above all, the aerial torpedo weapon must be further developed. In this regard the Japanese Government was of great assistance by supplying Japanese torpedos. The fact that we are still backward with this weapon was due to the mistake that the torpedos were constructed and tested by the Navy, while the planes designated to carry them were constructed and tested by the Luftwaffe. The development was parallel but was not carried on in unison. General Oshima asks whether these Japanese torpedos could not be utilized soon. Germany now had 70 of them and also the corresponding drawings. He is convinced that Germany could have great success with it, since the training was not too difficult and the German pilots were very valiant. The English did not know that Germany had Japanese torpedoes, and so a surprise would be possible. The Fuehrer agrees with Oshima and says that he would make use of the torpedo weapon soon. For quite some time now an entire wing (Geschwader) had been training with aerial torpedoes exclusively. He would make a concentrated surprise attack, an attack on which everything would be staked.



General Oshima now spreads out a map and gives the Fuehrer a comprehensive lecture on the war situation in the Pacific and the Archipelago area. He tells the Fuehrer of the successes of the Japanese air force and fleet and about the advance of the Japanese land forces in the Philippines and the Malay Peninsula. At the conclusion of his report on the situation, Oshima says that after the capture of Singapore Japan must turn toward India. In this connection he considered it important that German and Japanese operations should be synchronized. It would be very advantageous if when Japan attacked India from the East, the German troops would threaten India from the West. The Fuehrer again explains to Oshima his plans for the Spring and says that first he intends to attack in the South, since a thrust to the Caucasus, also with regard to oil, and an advance to Iraq and Iran -- which also implies a threat to India -- would be of primary importance, to begin with. Only then would he resume operations in the center of the Eastern front. The Russians thought we would want to take Moscow first, but this was of lesser importance to him.

Meanwhile, he would turn his entire attention to North Africa. We would furthermore, as he had already mentioned, torpedo every ship we encountered, and he believed that thereby heavy damage could be inflicted on the Anglo-Saxon fleet. Oshima expresses his great desire that in all these German and Japanese undertakings the operations should be synchronized. If this were done cleverly and if the method of operations worked as a sort of lever or exchange action, this would inevitably lead to the ruin of the Anglo-Saxon powers. To this the Fuehrer agrees and declares further that November and December are always the worst months to carry on warfare. As soon as the weather improved he would again ruthlessly attack English ports and dockyards. The Luftwaffe had already made extensive preparations for this. With the English ports and docks ruined, England would be helpless.

Then General Oshima spoke about landing warfare, which had been greatly developed and practiced in Japan during the past 30 years. On the island of Hainan, which was occupied by Japan, the attempts and exercises had been carried out with great energy. The necessary landing boats had also been extensively developed. He suggests that as soon as contact has been reestablished between Germany and Japan -- which is possible by air and surely will soon be possible by long-distance U-boats -- delegates of the German Wehrmacht should come to Japan to study the methods developed by the Japanese.

The Fuehrer briefly mentions the necessity of stopping American shipments to Vladivostok. Oshima says that it would be an easy task to halt American shipments to Vladivostok, since, in order to get there, American ships have to pass through straits which could be covered by artillery; besides, he is of the opinion that America would not make any more shipments to Russia.



III. (Photostatic copy in Doc. Rm.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and :

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 2932-PS by said Documentation Division.

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/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss  
O-2052152  
Capt., JAGD



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Excerpt from "Important Decisions Regarding International  
and National Policies -- August and November 1938"

to

729

Despatched to the Foreign Ministry  
November 26th at 1 p.m.

## Section 7

Top Secret

The agenda introduced by the Navy Minister and agreed at Five Minister Conference on 25th November 1938, upon the decision on the principle for adjusting new Sino-Japanese relationship.

While the main purpose in settling the present incident is the establishment of a new order in East Asia, based on the security gained by military victories, we must also guard against a third power checking our activities.

However for this purpose our attitude towards a third power should be defensive at present, meanwhile without neglecting to supply our army and navy with necessary armaments. Backed by this potential force we must exert our effort in the diplomatic field.

Above mentioned points are only an outline of our present policy for adjusting the Sino-Japanese relationship and may be regarded as a part of our national policy. But there is an urgent need at the present juncture to reinvestigate with the basis of our national policy for both defensive and diplomatic fronts in order to establish a policy capable of coping with the new situation.

The agenda introduced by the Navy Minister and agreed at Five Minister Conference on 25th November 1938, upon the decision on the principle for adjusting new Sino-Japanese relationship.

As for the Hainan Island, it will be captured by military action in case of necessity.

(Note) Exclusively for Five Minister Conference.

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Understanding of Foreign Minister November 25th, 1933

It is natural that the economic activities and interests of a third power in China should be affected to some extent by the strengthening of economic ties between Japan, Manchuko and China. But, I understand that this cooperation should not extend to the limit imposed by the necessity for national defense and existence and the activities and interests of a third power should in no way suffer accordingly. Otherwise, it would not only complicate the international situation unnecessarily but would also check Japan's economic expansion elsewhere outside of China and considering from the wider point of view it would be a great disadvantage to Japan.



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 2577

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages, dated Aug. Nov., 1938 and described as follows: Sections from handwritten, type-written and mimeographed binder re. "Important Decisions regarding international and national policies" November 1938.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

21th day of Sept., 1946.

K. HAYASHI

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

Chief Archives Section

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

25 day of Sept., 1946.

RICHARD H. LARSH

NAME

Witness: T/4 Taguchi

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity