

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1379

Date: 10 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Photostat; Memorandum re conversations between German Foreign Minister and Japanese Ambassador SATO in presence of KURUSU and STAHLER and between HITLER and GIMCO.

Date: 7 and 8 July 1940 Original () Copy (X) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes () No (X)

Has it been photostated? Yes (X) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Doc. Div.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Department

PERSONS IMPLICATED: STAHLER; OSHIMA, Hiroshi; SATO

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

- (1) Memorandum about conversation between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador SATO in presence of Ambassador KURUSU and Consul General Stahlmer on July 8, 1940. After a few introductory words SATO states that "just as the new order is coming into existence in Europe through Germany, Japan for her part has been endeavoring for the last three years to construct a new order in the Far East and the South Seas. This parallelism seems to afford a close cooperation between Germany and Japan. Japan has drawn the attention of the English, French and American governments to herself for these three years and in doing this facilitated in a way Germany's task of creating a new order in Europe. In this way the governments of the two countries may assist each other mutually." In speaking about Soviet Russia he states that both countries are forced to have good neighborly relations with Russia. "About America, Ambassador SATO stated that Japan has drawn the attention

Doc. No. 1379

Page 1

10 April 1946

of that country to herself since the beginning of the Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that America must not overstep her zone consisting of North and South America and must not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters. The pursuit of this principle is also in the mutual interest of both countries. Ambassador SATO closed his remarks by stressing anew the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation must also encompass economic matters.

"In regard to China, Ambassador SATO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavours to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to have free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies."

The Foreign Minister noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He always advocated this cooperation which has already borne fruits for both parties. "Without the existence of a Germany which has become strong again, Japan would not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as it actually happened." Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy had been taken into consideration sometime ago. They did not materialize because Japan lacked interest in European matters. As to the form of this cooperation, he declared himself unable to give any explanations, since he was not sufficiently informed about Japanese political aims. He asked for such information and adds that "he would be especially interested to hear from Japanese side how they thought about cooperation with Germany, whether only in the sphere of economics or in which way besides this." Ambassador SATO replied that Japan has endeavored to orient her policy in a definite direction, but has always been forced to mitigate this new orientation somewhat. "In the new order in the Far East Japan is first of all interested in the creation of a new China, with which she could have friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan should secure order in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan fought for years stubbornly against the so-called regime of Washington, which finds its expression in the treaties of 1921, and especially in the Nine-Power Treaty. This Washington regime gives preponderance in the Far East, not to China and Japan, but to the Anglo-Saxons. However, it is not Japan's intention to exclude foreigners from the Far East; quite to the contrary, Japan also wishes to give a proper position to the economic cooperation with Germany in China. In her relations to America, Japan has to be cautious indeed.

"Questioned by the Foreign Minister for the real and deeper reason of the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO answered that this reason is the fight of Japan against the system of the Nine-Power Treaty. Japan does not fight against the principle of this treaty. Politically, she is quite ready to respect the independence of China. Economically, she also agrees to a so-called principle of the open door. However, she wants to turn the table and be the host while the other nations could only be guests in East Asia.

"In replying to a second question of the Foreign Minister for the deeper reasons of the difficulties between Japan and America SATO states that the points of friction with America are less in the economic than in the humanitarian fields. America's sympathies are with China. America feels that she is, so to speak, the protector of that country and wants to police the Pacific Ocean further by means of her naval superiority. Under these circumstances Japan endeavors to finish the war with China soon. SATO declared that he personally did not believe that Japan could march to Chungking. In this his opinion differs to a certain degree from the Japanese military. Therefore, it is necessary to find a solution of the Chinese question not in a military way, but in a different manner. For this reason Japan aided the Wang Ching-wei government and is ready to make a very generous agreement with it. Japan does not wish to interfere with Chinese matters or to force something upon the Chinese, but is ready to negotiate with Wang Ching-wei on the basis of equality. If the Chinese are reasonable it will be possible to achieve a result which allows China not to lose face. In this case America would also little by little change her attitude and act more friendly towards Japan . . ."

"The Foreign Minister expressed the supposition that maybe America is disturbed by the increasing power of Japan and by her increasingly strong fleet and that the divergences of opinion with that country may be based on the fact that America which so far had ruled the Pacific Ocean alone now is forced to share this rule with Japan. To this SATO replied in the affirmative and added that particularly the Japanese endeavors to obtain a naval parity with America and the fact that the new naval constructions had been kept secret had put America in a very bad temper. Therefore, Japan has to be very careful towards America, especially after Stimson entered the Cabinet, so as not to provoke that country to strong measures against Japan. America has already canceled the trade treaty, but has not yet declared the embargo against Japan. Japan is extremely dependent on America because of the petroleum and iron supply."

The Foreign Minister then points out the connection between a strong policy and a good economic situation. He relates the experiences which Germany

10 April 1946

had in this connection. He then discusses the attitude of the South American countries. SATO replies that "as far as the United States are concerned Japan is not impressed by the economic pressure as much as by the American fleet and has to be careful for this reason. Besides the United States would not be able to remain neutral in the European conflict once she gets into a conflict with Japan.

"The Foreign Minister admitted that the Japanese situation is difficult and that Japan has to accommodate her policy to the actualities of the situation."

The next point deals with German-Russian relations and in conclusion Ambassador SATO asks about the future form of Europe according to German plans. The Foreign Minister replies that at present the one question is how to win the war and that he is not able to say much about the political future. The memorandum is signed by Ambassador Schmidt.

Analyst's note: A partial State Department translation of this document is in IPS Document #11, on pp. 4 ff.)

- (2) Memorandum about the conversation between Hitler and Ciano in presence of Ribbentrop, Von Mackensen, Alfieri and Meissner on July 7, 1940. Hitler begins the conversation by giving an extremely optimistic picture of the situation, stressing particularly a success of German propaganda in France and England. He pays great attention to the methods of dealing with France, and talks about the meeting of the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, where he will demand air bases in Morocco. He states that France, despite her overtures for German-French friendship, remains an enemy. Any order to the German press to treat France a little more mildly was purely tactical. Ciano agrees to this. (The last page or pages of this memorandum are missing in the photostat.)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc No. 1380

Date 16 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Memos and Telegrams from Tokyo to Berlin
(see below).

Date: 16 October 1939 Original () Copy (x) Language:
German

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Department

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Background material.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

(1) Office memo from Foreign Ministry in Berlin, dated 16 October 1939, regarding denial of information which the Japanese Government claims to have received about delivery of German arms to the Chungking Government.

(2) Office memo of the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, dated 16 October 1939, regarding denial of information received by the Japanese Government about a planned air connection between Berlin and Chungking via Moscow.

(3) Telegram from the Embassy in Tokyo to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin dated 16 October 1939. The Ambassador reports about "a revolt of the Foreign Ministry." He states that this revolt was ended by a retreat of the Cabinet on the entire line. This constitutes a grave defeat of the Cabinet and if it does not resign this is due only to the desire of circles connected with the court.

Analyst: 2d Lt. Steiner

Doc. No. 1380

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1381

Date 16 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Photostat: Telegrams exchanged between Foreign Ministry Berlin and Embassies in Tokyo and Paris re: German-Russo Non-Aggression Pact.

Date: 30 June & 25 Aug 1939. Original () Copy (x) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Department.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Tripartite Pact

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

(1) Telegram of the Foreign Minister in Berlin to Embassy in Tokyo, dated 30 June 1939, requesting the Ambassador to send an immediate report about the present situation in regard to the question of concluding an alliance.

(2) Telegram from the Embassy in Tokyo to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, dated 25 August 1939, reporting about a visit to the Foreign Minister in regard to the non-aggression pact concluded between Germany and Russia. The Foreign Minister handed to Ambassador Ott copies of instructions which he has sent to OSHIMA, to wit: (1) that all negotiations regarding a tripartite pact are completely ended with the conclusion of this non-aggression pact, and (2) that the Japanese Government declares that the non-aggression pact with Russia constitutes a violation of the secret agreement attached to the Anti-Comintern Pact, and files solemn protest against it.

(3) Telegram from Embassy in Paris to Foreign Ministry in Berlin, dated August 25, 1939, regarding press reaction to the conclusion of the German-Russian non-aggression pact.

Analyst: 2d Lt. Steiner

Doc. No. 1381

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1382

Date 10 April 1946

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ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Photostat: Two telegrams from Foreign Ministry Berlin to Embassies in Tokyo re: draft for Tripartite Pact.

Date: 15 May 1939 Original () Copy (x) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Department

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA, Hiroshi; ARITA, Hachiro.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare - Tripartite Pact.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

I. (The following is a complete translation:)

Telegram from Foreign Ministry, Berlin, to German Embassy in Tokyo, #158, dated May 15, 1939; exclusively for personal use of the Ambassador.

Regarding telegram #197 - The other day I informed Ambassador OSHIMA in agreement with the Italian Government regarding the German and Italian viewpoint as follows:

(1) The German and Italian Governments are willing to continue their present political line toward Japan unchanged.

(2) The two Governments have decided to sign a bi-lateral pact of alliance during this month because they find it proper to counter the political activities displayed by the Western Powers for propaganda purposes with a quick counter-action.

Doc. No. 1382

Page 1

(3) Tri-lateral negotiations Berlin-Rome-Tokyo are not in any way prejudiced by the anticipated German-Italian pact of alliance. This pact of alliance will prove from a legal point of view the unshakable firmness of the Berlin-Rome Axis. The Japanese must welcome it to see the internal relationship between their two European partners cleared of any doubt and to see that any possibility of internal divergences between these partners is excluded, if they want a tripartite pact.

(4) The fact that the conclusion of the tripartite pact is postponed that long is not the fault of the German or Italian governments. For a long time I have pointed out to the Japanese that there might be a necessity of a prior conclusion of a German-Italian pact if the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact is postponed for a longer period of time.

(5) As far as the Japanese are concerned, it is not a disturbing element that the German-Italian pact will contain in some respects a closer alliance than the present draft of the Tripartite Pact. It is quite natural that the political and military cooperation between the two European neighboring countries which are faced immediately by France and England is more intensive than the cooperation with the far-away Japan. The difference in the two pacts, which is apparent, does not mean that Japan is pressed down politically to a lower level of friendship by Germany and Italy. The world public for whom the Axis Berlin-Rome has been a firm concept for a long time will feel that such a difference is a matter of course. Besides, it was Japan which always urged a cautious formulation of the obligations in the Tripartite Pact. Germany and Italy would only welcome it if Japan would participate in the closer connections of the German-Italian Pact. Japan, however, can not demand and has no interest in the fact that Germany and Italy accommodate themselves to the level desired by Japan for the Tripartite Pact as far as their own internal relationship is concerned.

(6) A parallel existence of the German-Italian pact and the Tripartite Pact involves no difficulties in the matter itself or from a technical viewpoint. The various provisions of the present Japanese draft for a Tripartite Pact may remain entirely unchanged. It is only necessary to insert at the end a formal article clarifying the relationship between the two pacts from a legal viewpoint. I handed a draft of the respective article to OSHIMA.

(7) The German-Italian governments have the urgent wish that the Japanese Government reach it's final decision quickly so that it would be possible to formulate secretly the Tripartite Pact simultaneously with the signing of the German-Italian Pact. This wish shows again that any thought of a political disregard of their relations to Japan is far from them.

I request of you to utilize the above viewpoints towards your confidante and if possible also towards the War Minister directly and thus to work for a quick and positive decision of the Government there. In doing so I ask you to mention casually and in a fitting manner the following: Although the German and Italian governments, as I stressed above, are firmly determined to keep to their policy towards Japan, it is impossible to conceal that the present attitude of the Japanese government is beginning to create a certain skepticism in Rome and Berlin. Mussolini gave expression to anxiety the other day whether the manner in which the matter was dealt with in Tokyo up until now should not be interpreted as meaning that the Japanese Government will in the end not find the strength for a positive decision. Furthermore the Fuehrer declared within the last few days repeatedly in talking to me that he understands the Japanese attitude less and less. Japan must recognize from her viewpoint that her great political interests conform with those of Germany and Italy and that, therefore, her place is on the side of these two powers.

Furthermore, I ask you to make it clear to your Japanese partner in this conversation that Japan's fear that America might join England and France in the case of war is by no means an argument against the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, since this pact will be the best means to keep America out of the war. On the otherhand it must be clear to Japan that the consolidation of her position in East Asia and particularly in China depends first on the superiority of the Axis powers over the Western powers. If this superiority did not exist Japan would soon feel the consequences. It is, therefore, without a doubt completely in Japan's interest to strengthen this superiority by participating and by not allowing the impression to rise among the Western powers as if they could count on Japanese neutrality in case of a conflict with Germany or Italy.

Added is handwritten note reading: The text of the draft of the pact and all papers belonging to it will be wired to you for your personal information under separate cover.

(signed) Foreign Minister of the
German Reich.

II. Telegram from Foreign Ministry in Berlin to Embassy in Tokyo, dated May 15, 1939, "For the personal use of the Ambassador. In the enclosure you will receive for your personal information the documents mentioned in telegram #158, to wit: (1) the draft of a pact of consultation and assistance agreed upon between the German, Japanese and Italian governments and consisting of (a) the pact itself, (b) the ratification protocol, and (c) the secret attached protocol; (2) the draft of a new article about the relationship between the Tripartite Pact and the pact between Germany and Italy, which is to be inserted before the concluding article; (3) draft of a note regarding statement of the Japanese government in reply to diplomatic inquiries, which is to be handed over by the Japanese Ambassador before signing; (4) the draft of a formulated oral declaration, which is also to be made by the Japanese Ambassador before signing.

The agreement of the Japanese Government to documents 2, 3, and 4 has not yet been given....."

(signed) Weizsaecker.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1383

Date: 14 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: File of Telegrams and Material on Japanese-American Negotiations 1941.

Date; 22 January 1941-24 July 1941.

Original () Copy () Language (x)

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x) Japanese and
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x) English

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

DOCUMENT DIVISION

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MATSUOKA; KONOYE; NOMURA; TATEKAWA;
OSHIMA; HIROSHI.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Violation Kellogg-Briand
Pact; Japanese-American negotiations; Aggression,
French Indo-China.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Pertinent messages:

#68, (7 Feb. 1941) - MATSUOKA to NOMURA urging America be impressed with necessity for collaboration and firmness of Japanese intention. "Even if Japan loses, she will rise up again in 30 years."

#136, (8 March 1941) NOMURA to MATSUOKA on Hull explanation of economic policy and expressing dissatisfaction with Japan's expansion and Axis ties (pp 29-32)

#145, (15 March 1941, - NOMURA to MATSUOKA on secret interview with President Roosevelt. NOMURA points out danger of embargo. Roosevelt said Japan can compete with other nations for goods, no fear of China being bolshevized, and Japan should not be ambitious to rule China (pp 40-48)

#442, (9 April 1941) - TATEKAWA (Moscow) to KONOYE on behalf of MATSUOKA. MATSUOKA states he requested Steinhardt to urge President to trust MATSUOKA, and recommend CHIANG conclude peace with Japan. (pp 49-51)

#427, 9 April 1941, - MATSUOKA asks KONOYE for commission of full powers as he may conclude neutrality pact with Russia. (p 53)

#230, 15 April 1941 - NOMURA to KONOYE, reporting U.S.A. policy towards Japan.

- 1) Tripartite Pact made U.S.A. feel pressure on two fronts, see war with Japan a possibility.
- 2) Formation of a convoy system by U.S.A. tantamount to declaration of war.

#233, 17 April 1941, - NOMURA to KONOYE, asking permission to negotiate "Japanese-American Understanding." Assures KONOYE it will still be in spirit of Tripartite Pact. (pp 59-61)

#234, Japanese draft of Understanding, with interlinear corrections. (Several English versions, including corrected drafts, are included). (pp 112 ff; pp. 194-216; and pp 323 ff.).

"Joint Declaration" was to settle questions of 1) Concept of international relations and nations; 2) attitude toward European war.

- 3) Relation of both to China affair.
- 4) Novoland marine relations
- 5 & 6) Commerce and economic cooperation
- 7) Policies toward political stabilization in Pacific.

Notes on meeting of East Asia Bureau Chief SAKAMOTO's meeting with German and Italian Ambassadors, Tokyo, 4 May 1941. Both express fear projected understanding will obstruct Japan in Asia.

#185, 3 May 1941, - Military Attache' Berlin to Ass't. Chief General Staff. Opposes visit of MATSUOKA to U.S.A.; fears radical change in policy will cause OSHIMA resignation (p 143)

#273, 7 May 1941, - NOMURA to MATSUOKA, reports Hull urged understanding "before too late", and asks permission to open negotiations for understanding with U.S. (pp 150-151).

#204, - MATSUOKA to NOMURA, amending "Japanese-America Understanding" (p 185).

#219 - (p 215 ff shows amended draft in English sent by MATSUOKA to NOMURA, 13 May).

Notes on German instructions to cease negotiations with U.S. "to prevent its participation in war." (pp 240-244).

(#567, 568 and 569), 20 May 1941, - OSHIMA attacks negotiations with U.S.A., saying they will result in Japan

missing its golden opportunity in abandoning their plan for exploitation of southern regions. If understanding signed, should only be on condition United States stop all aid to Britain. In #575, asks that his telegrams be delivered to War and Navy, since "great change in National policy" is involved. (pp 262-265).

Notes of 20 May 1941 on U.S. - Japan negotiations. Report they proceed in amicable atmosphere (pp 291-295)

#424, 23 June 1941, - NOMURA to MATSUOKA on development negotiations for Japanese-American understanding.

#425 - American draft. (In English, pp 354-365)

#234, 20 May 1941 - Japanese draft (MATSUOKA) Notes: pp 400 - 460 contain various drafts and counter-drafts.

(Blank No.) NOMURA to MATSUOKA. Requests urgently instructions from MATSUOKA. Important to note he believes 1) United States anxious for peace; 2) understanding with United States advantageous; 3) delay invites disaster.

#490, 7 July 1941 - NOMURA to MATSUOKA - transmits questions by United States on meaning of "economic cooperation" with China, details of restriction removals, etc. (p 513). (English copy, with statements on attitude of United States toward European war also included - pp 515 - 530)

#273, 12 July 1941, - MATSUOKA to KATO (Ambassador to Vichy), instructing KATO to negotiate agreement with French immediately on military cooperation in French Indo-China, since Japanese forces have decided to advance into Southern Indo-China on or about the 20th of July. (pp 538 - 557)

(Number blank) 14 July 1941, - MATSUOKA to NOMURA asking him to return note bearing Hull's oral statement, because it was "most impolite". (p 574 - 579) Oral statement of June 21st appears in English, - 362 - 365 and in Japanese p 382 - 384).

#365 - MATSUOKA to NOMURA, corrections and draft of understanding (p 581 - 589)

Oral note of July 16, 1941, Hull to Japanese Government, bitterly restating American stand on right of self-defense in attitude to European war, telling Japanese to ask aggressor nations for information on their future plans as key to United States policy. (In English, p 617-618).

Japanese reply of July 17 rejecting idea they may be ranged on side of aggressor nations. Further, "Japanese

Gov't do not feel disposed to enter into discussion regarding the points raised in the reply of the American Gov't."

#550, 23 July 1941, - NOMURA warns MATSUOKA advance into Southern French Indo-China pushed United States to point of severing relations with Japan. (p 620-622)

Notes on off-the-record conversation between NOMURA and Roosevelt, 24 July 1941, who promises Japan access to food supply and raw materials if she will withdraw troops from Indo-China.

Undated note in English and Japanese, apparently from MATSUOKA to HULL, re French Indo-China. Points:

- 1) Japanese advance into French Indo-China only for purposes of settling China affair.
- 2) Is to prevent aggressive encirclement of French Indo-China.
- 3) Threatens action by an inflamed Japanese people if United States takes additional steps or maintains "irritating attitude" (pp 629 - 632)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1384

17 April 194

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: The Foreign Office File.

Date: 1906-1931 Original (x) Copy () Language: Jap.

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:
Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression --
Manchuria; Economic monopolies -- Manchuria.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains:

1. Regulations regarding the South Manchurian Railway
Co. Promulgated 8 June 1906 and amended (Imperial Ordinance
No. 142).

Article 13. The Commandant of the Kwantung
Army can give necessary instruc-
tions for business concerning
military affairs of the company.

2. Chang Hsueh-liang's Govt. and recent conditions
of foreign employees.

(a) Chang admitted submission of the North-
eastern Province to the Nanking Central
Govt. in 1928.

(b) The Legislation, Administration, Diplomacy
and Military affairs came under the dicta-
torship of Chang. Chang employed several
Japanese and foreigners as his advisers in
military affairs. "The army of Northeastern
Provinces has been trained after the model
of Japan."

(c) Education -- "Study toward Japan is very
vigorous."

Analyst: 2d Lt. Kobayashi

Doc. No. 1384

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1385

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Manchurian Incident--Anti-Japanese Movement and Boycott

Date: 1931-35 Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian Incident; censorship and propaganda.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Reports from Jap diplomatic officials in various parts of CHINA sent to Foreign Ministry recording outbreaks of violence against Jap citizens and even against Chinese merchants who dealt in Jap goods. Mentioned are protests made by the Japanese government re such events and efforts made by the Chinese authorities to control the lawless mobs responsible for such acts.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Person

Doc. No. 1385

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1386

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Manchurian Incident--Reparations for Damages Suffered by Foreigners in the SHANGHAI Incident

Date: 1934-35 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Shanghai Incident;
Manchurian Incident

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Records of reparations for damages caused by SHANGHAI Incident to foreigners, arranged according to country: the number of claims; the claimed value; and, assessed value.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Person

Doc. No. 1386

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1387

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Manchurian Incident--Public Opinion and Press Comment. (Intelligence Reports on Foreign Countries)

Date: 1931-32 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian Incident; censorship and propaganda

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Reports by Intelligence Bureau on comments appearing in foreign newspapers and other publications. Includes comments on the Manchurian Incident by Pres. Hoover, Willis J. Abbot, etc., which appeared in various American papers.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Person

Doc. No. 1387

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1388

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Manchurian Incident--Public Opinion and Press Comment (Chinese Student Movements in Foreign Countries)

Date: 1931-33 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian Incident; censorship and propaganda

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Reports of Jap consuls in various Chinese cities addressed to Foreign Ministers in which activities of anti-Jap student movements are described. It was the consuls' opinion that such movements of Chinese students was due not only to patriotic spirits, but to communistic propaganda.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Person

Doc. No. 1388

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1389

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Manchurian Incident--Anti-Japanese Movement and Boycott

Date: 1931-32 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian Incident; censorship and propaganda.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Reports and advices between Jap officials in northern CHINA and Foreign Ministry re anti-Jap movements in CHINA. Included are examples of anti-Jap propaganda.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1390

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Manchurian Incident--Public Opinion and Press Comment (Intelligence Reports on Foreign Countries)

Date: 1932 Original Copy Language: Japanese
English

Has it been translated? Yes No
Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian Incident;
censorship and propaganda

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Reports of Intelligence Bureau on foreign press comments sent from Foreign Ministry to leading Jap officials and businessmen. Included are those chiefly concerned with presenting Jap actions in Manchuria in a favorable light. Also included is MATSUOKA, Yosuke's address before the League of Nations on 6 December 1932.

Analyst 2d Lt. Person

Doc. No. 1390

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1391

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Reports from/Consul-General at Shanghai to Foreign Minister TOGO

Date: 17 Nov 41- Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese
28 Mar 42 English

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HORINOUCI, Kaho; TOGO

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggressive Warfare--
China

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

(1) Reports concerning requisitioning of British and American interests in Central China at outbreak of Pacific War.

(2) Movement of the CHUNGKING Regime prior to and after the outbreak of the Pacific war.

(3) Condition of Shanghai Settlement after occupation by Japanese army.

(4) International political phases of the outbreak of Pacific war and the Chungking Regime.

(5) Comment on Pacific war by the Chinese Communist Party.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Kobayashi

Doc. No. 1391

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1392

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: "Minutes of Joint Conference of Army, Navy, and Foreign Office Authorities on Intensification of Coalition Among Japan, Germany and Italy.

Date: 16 July 40 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ANTO, ISHIZAWA, and TAJIRI (all Chiefs of Section, Foreign Ministry); Lt. Col. TAKAYAMA (Army); Maj. TANEMURA (General Staff); Commander SHIBA (Navy).

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression--French Indo-China; conspiracy for world domination.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

(Fifteen page continuation of conference. First day analyzed in our Evid. Doc.#1308) Importance lies in frank discussion of dividing spoils in Asia at so early a date.

1. Sphere of South Seas as an ideal for Japan should include Burma, Australia and New Zealand. (TAKAYAMA, SHIBA and ANTO, p. 2)

2. "Political leadership in FIC and NEI may mean virtual occupation ultimately.....but the only thing we can do now is make Germany recognize our political leadership as much as possible." (TAKAYAMA, p. 4)

3. Disposition of JAVA and SUMATRA. ANTO heard Germany intended to keep them. But unanimously agreed she would not be able to confront Japan's naval strength.

4. Secretly inciting independence movements in Burma and INDIA by propaganda suggested by ANTO, (p.9), to hit Britain's power.

5. Soviet policy: Maintain peace, but keep only relationship convenient for Axis and Japan, encourage Soviet attack on India. (TAKAYAMA, p. 10)

Doc. No. 1392

Page 1

6. American policy: Economic collaboration with Germany in South America, after New Order in Asia established. (TAKAYAMA, p. 11)

7. Navy attitude: "Essential to recognize reciprocally the New Orders being built by the two countries.(Japan and Germany) respectively, and give assistance to each other."
(SHIBA, pp. 13-14)

(Meeting closes with hearty agreement by all.)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1393

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Telegram #513, KURUSU (Berlin) to ARITA (Tokyo)

Date 20 May 40 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ARITA; KURUSU

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Affairs with China

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

KURUSU urges settlement of the CHINA Incident in view of grave world situation.

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 1393

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1394

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Reports concerning Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration at a conference 15 Aug 45 held at Emperor's library in Imperial courtyard.

Date: 15 Aug 45 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Privy Council

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HIROHITO; HIRANUMA; SHIMIZU; MINAMI; NARA; USHIO; HAYASHI; FUKAI; OBATA; MITSUCHI; IKEDA; MURASE; ISHIGURO; MOROHASHI; TAKATSUJI; SUZUKI; TOGO; HONJO

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Surrender

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains:

1. Emperor HIROHITO's note stating acceptance of terms of Potsdam Declaration.

2. Speeches by Premier SUZUKI and Foreign Minister TOGO concerning negotiations toward peace taken by Japan to 15 Aug 45.

a. Failure of Japan's efforts for Russian mediation to end war.

b. Russia's declaration of war after American threat to obliterate Japan by atomic bombings.

c. Explanation of and Japan's decision to accept terms of Potsdam Declaration.

3. Discussions concerning probable length of occupational period, solution of reparations; relationship between acceptance of Potsdam Declaration and Japan's national policy. (These discussions are not detailed, but consist of speculations as to what the future might hold after acceptance of Potsdam Declaration, and the desire that suitable negotiations concerning same can be arranged.)

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Blumhagen

Doc. No. 1394

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1395

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Photostat: Memo about a conference between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA.

Date: 30 July 42 Original () Copy (x) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Department

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA, Hiroshi

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The contents of this document are connected with those of I.P.S. Document #25, which deals with Ribbentrop's suggestion to OSHIMA, that Japan attack Russia now. (9 July 1942)

"At the beginning of the conference Ambassador OSHIMA declared that unfortunately his wish to receive a positive reply from the Japanese government in the question of participation in a war against Russia has not yet been fulfilled. He wired to Tokyo in detail about the last conversation with the Foreign Minister and added his own viewpoint that he thinks it right to intervene soon against Russia and to carry out intensive actions to strangle English transports in the Indian Ocean."

OSHIMA then states that he received a telegram from Tokyo on the 27th of July, the contents of which he describes as follows: Japanese operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans exert an increasing pressure on the U.S.A. and Britain and thereby contribute greatly to the common war. The resistance of the United States remains stubborn so that Japan has to exert her forces against this enemy.

Doc. No. 1395

Page 1

Under the circumstances, the Japanese action against the Soviet Union would mean a scattering of her forces. This would in turn mean a lessening of the Japanese pressure and an increase of the American and British power in Europe. For these reasons Japan is interested in maintaining order to the North.

"As explanation thereto, Ambassador OSHIMA stated that the problem was without a doubt subjected to a new and careful study in Tokyo. He personally shares the opinion that today Japan is offered a unique opportunity to defeat the Russians; the Japanese Army too has always represented the opinion that such an action against Russia is necessary."

He then states his opinions about the reasons for the statement of his government. They are, as he believes, first, that the conquest of Vladivostok is considered as an enterprise which might take some time and that it is feared that in the meantime the Americans might obtain air bases in East Siberia from where they might bomb Tokyo. Secondly, there is no doubt that the Japanese Army is working under certain difficulties especially in the field of the air forces. Yet, he does not believe that the present reply is final. It may be that an action against Russia is possible before October comes, otherwise, it would be possible only next spring.

The Foreign Minister replied that in his belief Japan will never find such an opportune moment to beat the Russians in Siberia. He believes it possible that an attack by Japan might eliminate Russia as an enemy of the Tripartite powers. Then they could concentrate the entire forces against England and America. In spite of the fact that he is still convinced that an attack of Japan against Russia would be the right thing the Germans believe that Japan should not carry out such an action if she does not feel strong enough for it from a military point of view.

Ambassador OSHIMA then stated that Japan has to give particular stress at first to the Eastern Indian Ocean and the Pacific and mentions the fact that she is already carrying out submarine warfare in the Western Indian Ocean.

Ribbentrop finds that submarine warfare will not suffice to cut off troop transports to the Near East and India and suggests Japanese fleet actions. OSHIMA means that this would jeopardize the position of the Japanese fleet towards the American fleet. Ribbentrop then stresses

the importance of a bold strategy in 1942 while America is still not prepared. "Any advantage which we may secure for ourselves in the year 1942 will make itself paid later on twice and three times. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance to eliminate the Russian factor in this year as far as possible. It is regrettable if Japan can at present not participate in this because she does not feel strong enough militarily. However, the opportunity to get rid of the Russian enemy once and for all is undoubtedly unique as soon as she feels sufficiently well armed for this.

OSHIMA then states that he had always suggested to use the opportune moment. However, he believes that operations in a southward direction have already been initiated which cannot be broken off easily. He personally is, of course, for a push against Russia at the same time.

The conversation then turns to an information which OSHIMA received from Tokyo about a Japanese submarine which will land in a French harbor on August 5th. Since this submarine is to sink some enemy vessels on its return trip to Singapore, it is the desire of the Japanese Navy that it will not be used to transport BOSE to East Asia. BOSE will most likely be flown to East Asia in a German plane.

The question is then discussed whether Japan could not create for herself naval bases in the western part of the Indian Ocean, for instance on Mauritius or in Lourenco Marques. OSHIMA doubts whether such bases could be supplied and held. He concludes his statements with the assurance that in his opinion the push to the North is the decisive question for Japan, a fact which he stresses again and again with his government.

Ribbentrop agrees to this opinion and hopes that Japan will soon feel strong enough to venture this push to the North.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1396

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Photostat: Memo about the conference between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA in FUSCHL.

Date: 31 Aug Original () Copy (x) Language: German and 1 Sept 42

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Department

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA, Hiroshi

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Ribbentrop first criticizes the fact that Japanese sources feed the rumor of a separate peace between Germany and Russia. "If assistance to this idea is only a question of camouflage from the side of Japan in order to give the Russians a false sense of security while they actually are to be attacked at present then of course there is nothing to be said against it." Otherwise, however, he would appreciate it if OSHIMA would inform his government that this rumor is only of advantage to the enemy.

He then expresses his suspicion that the fact that Russia sent strong forces which were withdrawn from the Far East to the German Eastern front may be traced to assurances given by Ambassador SATO in Moscow, according to which Russia is safe as far as Japan is concerned. He states that he would appreciate it if SATO's attitude would be changed.

He then discusses an unofficial suggestion made by the Japanese Army about a delegation of the Japanese Emperor

Doc. No. 1396

Page 1

to Germany. OSHIMA welcomes this plan. Ribbentrop states that Goering would provide two airplanes and suggests that a man who is well-known in Germany and trusted by her such as Ambassador SHIRATORI may lead the delegation. After discussion about the German military representation in Japan OSHIMA handed Ribbentrop a telegram from the Imperial headquarters and from his government with statements about deliveries of steel, aluminum, etc., which are desired by Japan.

In conclusion, the conversation turns to the planned trade agreement between Germany and Japan.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1397

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Official transcript, International
Military Tribunal, Nurnberg

Date: 20 Feb- Original (x) Copy () Language: English
6 Mar 46

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Department

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Background material.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The sessions covered by this material dealt mainly with crimes against humanity. On pp. 5136 ff. are the arguments of the prosecution and the defense in the question of criminal organizations.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Steiner

Doc. No. 1397

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1398

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: File of telegrams and materials, Japanese-American negotiations 1941.

Date: 13 Sept: Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese
English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()
Has it been photostated? Yes () No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MATSUOKA; TOYODA, Teijiro; TOGO, Shigenoru; KONOYE; OSHIMA; AMOU, Eiji

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Violation Kellogg-Briant Pact; Pre Pearl Harbor negotiation; conspiracy, aggression

Following are pertinent:

(1) Interview with TOYODA, Teijiro, Foreign Minister, granted Italian Ambassador Indelli, 15 Sept 41. Questioned on progress, TOYODA answers that while purpose is to neutralize critical situation, "spirit of Tripartite Pact is not forgotten." He refused to show Indelli the messages. (p. 13).

(2) NOMURA to TOYODA, 15 Sept 41, (#819), on U.S. proposals (p. 22).

(3) NOMURA to TOYODA, 16 Sept 41 (#822) (p. 32).

(4) NOMURA to TOYODA, 17 Sept 41 (#823) (T.N. number cancelled). NOMURA believes President may attend proposed meeting in person if suitable formalities and substance arranged. (p.33)

(5) (a) Draft (in Japanese) of proposed "Japanese-American Understanding for Bettering Relations between the two countries." (Dated 18 Sept. 1941), and (b) Revised draft of same (pp. 39-63)

Doc. No. 1398

Page 1

(6) Notes--"Problems connected with CHINA Incident Treated in Japanese-American Diplomacy" (Dated 16 Sept 41)
Explanation of Japanese aims, estimation of American position.

(a) Believes U.S. opposed Japanese moves in CHINA. Would rather settle problem without U. S. interference, but will accept her aid if she must.

NOMURA to TOYODA, 12 Sept 41 (#556) enclosing note in English) from Hull in which latter rejects latest Japanese proposals because

(a) No assurance troops in North China would be removed in specified time.

(b) Economic terms with China not clear.

(c) Suggestion that Japan negotiate with China independently. (Terms given in English, pp. 135-136).

TOYODA to NOMURA, 22 Sept 41 (#585) on Grew meeting. TOYODA says U.S. wants to reach final decision at KONOYE-ROOSEVELT parley, while Japan intends to arrange fundamental terms there. Asks NOMURA to arrange parley soon.

NOMURA to TOYODA, 22 Sept 41 (#839) and Naval Attache to U.S. to Vice-Minister of Navy and Vice Chief Naval General Staff, 23 Sept 41, (number not given). Both estimate U.S. prepared for war and latter says, "I believe it would be advisable for Japan to cease stationing troops in China and come to terms with U.S." (p. 155)

Statement of Japanese on reasons troops must be stationed in China even after any peace with CHIANG (pp. 140-146 in English, 25 Sept 41).

HORIUCHI to TOYODA, 15 Sept 41, (#1721) giving espionage report on telegram. CHIANG KAI-SHEK to Roosevelt agreeing to arbitration of July 7 (1932) conditions restored. (p. 183)

Letter of 17 Sept 41 from Grew to TOYODA enclosing English version of NOMURA's interview with Roosevelt 28 Aug (pp. 195-196).

NOMURA to TOYODA (#606) 28 Sept 41. "Since the 27th of this month, a pro-Axis movement has been active, but we are not opposed to the recovery of Japanese-American relations,and...confident of controlling the movement..."

NOMURA to TOYODA (#865) of 28 Sept 41 is important summary of failure of Japanese government to meet U.S. objections, and NOMURA states "U.S. wishes to negotiate with Japan on basis of 21 June proposal, and Japan would do well to value this proposal."

NOMURA frankly gives explicit details such as "the passage in your telegram (#595) will not dispel U.S. doubts." (pp. 225-242).

In #866 NOMURA repeats theme, saying only five points covered by TOYODA in reply to Grew's nine points. (TOYODA's answer: # 614, 30 Sept 41, p. 268).

Doc. No. 1398 - Page 3 - SUMMARY cont'd

Again in #881 of 30 Sept 41 NOMURA repeats that stationing of troops in China is main obstacle, and in #870 same date, to private reports that he may be hindering negotiations says, "If this report be true, I should like to ask you whether the intentions of the U.S. are not clear to you after six months' negotiations." (p. 256)

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 1398
Page 3

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1399

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Newspaper clippings on HOSHINO, Naoki

Date: Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: ASAHI SHINBUN

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HOSHINO, Naoki

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

- P. 1 Wife-Misao
Born-GUMMA Prefecture, TONE-GUN, TONAMI-MURA, TOGANO
His career: Head of General Affairs Manchukuo 1937.
Chief Cabinet Secretary, appointed Oct 18, 1941 until
22 July 1944 when TOJO Cabinet resigned.
- P. 2 18 Oct 1941 - Director of Planning Board and
concurrently minister without portfolio.
- P. 9 When he took the post of Chief of General Affairs
of Finance, Manchukuo, KISHI, Sinsuke, was Chief
of Industrial Department, Manchukuo. He is devoted
to the "4 Year Industrial Plan of Manchukuo," with
might and main. The plan had to have its program
altered because of the failure to raise loan abroad
and the extremely limited supply of building
materials. (7 Sept 1938)
- P. 18 Finance Ministry days. Unlike that slow and steady
principle which usually characterizes the financial
officials, he is very flexible, that he is able to
adopt adventurous policy. In this connection (1)
the currency control of Manchukuo; (2) 5-year Develop
ment Plan has achieved success, although many doubt

it very much. He was first to second the motion that Manchuria Heavy Industry Co. should be shifted to Manchukuo. Development of such risky principle has hindered him from appointment to the post of Planning Board, although the militarists recommended it. (22. July 40)

- P. 29 HOSHINO on Greater East Asia. On his homage to Ise Shrine as one of three who were appointed minister without portfolio, Mr. HOSHINO talked of an autocracy, Self-sufficiency system of Japan and Manchukuo. "Considering Manchukuo and Japan as a whole, they are not in the least inferior in respect to self-sufficiency to any other nation. If it is topped by the southern policy, we will be pushed up to the top of world power." Incidentally that statement is significant internationally. He further stated to develop the view more generally by saying, "Our planning for material mobilization will not be affected to any extent by the placing of embargo on exportation of scrap iron and petroleum by U.S. We must end our dependence on U. S. and Britain for materials and products establish the autocracy of Japan and Manchukuo including the South Sea area." Mr. HOSHINO has advocated such rule since his appointment to the Chief of General Affairs Dept. of Manchukuo, and that his idea is now beginning to come forward as the priority point in the drive of national policy may be said to impart a characteristic feature to the Konoye Cabinet. (For further information, refer to Mr. HOSHINO's article contained in the initial number of Manshu-Keijai-Zasshi, title "The Foundation of a Manchukuo-Japan Autocracy.")
- P. 31 5-year plan that was announced in 1935 came out as the revised 5-year plan in the following year in which HOSHINO rests full confidence. All who indicated scepticism about it were run down as defeatists.
- P. 34. Concurrent position in TOJO Cabinet. 6 Dec. 1940, Mr. HOSHINO, Director of Planning Board, was appointed concurrently Minister without Portfolio, including Baron HIRANUMA and ITO, Inagibumi who were also appointed. 7 Dec 1940.

Doc. No. 1399 - Page 3 - SUMMARY cont'd

P. 34 Mr. HOSHINO was appointed member of House of Peers 4 April 1941.

P. 35 Mr. HOSHINO appointed Chief Cabinet Secretary of TOJO Cabinet 18 Oct 1941.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Miwa

Doc. No. 1399
Page 3

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1400

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Cablegrams to Ambassador NOMURA from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA; also chronological list of notations re important international events 8-2-39 to 1-14-40.

Date: 1939-41 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MATSUOKA, Yosuke; NOMURA

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains:

(1) Cablegram 5/12/41 to Ambassador NOMURA from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA re American-Japanese relations.

(2) Cablegram 5/30/41 to NOMURA from MATSUOKA re anti-Japanese sentiment in U.S.

(3) Cablegram to NOMURA from MATSUOKA 7/12/41 declining NOMURA's request to return to Japan and outlining reasons therefor.

(4) Cablegram 7/20/41 to Foreign Minister TOYODA from Ambassador NOMURA re adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations. Also included is information on Japan's views as to her right to self-defence.

(5) Chronological list of notations for reference purposes of important international events from 8/14/40 to 1-14-40.

Analyst: Lt. Suzukawa

Doc. No. 1400

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1401

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Report of basic research of war time industry.

Date: March 43 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Document Division:
SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Cabinet Secretariat
PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: War industry; preparations for war, industrial.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Document published by "Total War Institute" compiled by "Research Section Dept. of Commerce and Industry." Statistical data on,

I. Trend of Mining and Manufacturing Industries in Japan from 1930-1941.

II. Research on demands for Important Goods and Scale of Production, 1938-41.

III. Research on General Proportion Among Important Goods with Steel as Basis, 1939-41.

IV. Production of Important Machines, Vehicles, Electrical Machines, Industrial Machines.

V. Census of Approved Industrial Factories on Iron Ore, Coal, Petroleum, Aluminum, Cement, etc.

Analyst: 2nd. Lt. Miwa

Doc. No. 1401

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1402

17 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: "The Civilization of the World"
March Volume, 1946

Date: 1946 Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Legal Staff

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HASHIMOTO, Kingoro; SAKATA; HIGUCHI;
TATEKAWA, KOISO; NINOMIYA; NEMOTO; YAMAWAKI; OKAMURA;
SHIGEFUJI; UGAKI; OKAWA.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: (1) Preparing public
opinion for war; (2) conspiracy for aggression, MANCHURIA.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Pamphlet is collection of articles dealing with various
topics. Most significant among articles is that of TANAKA,
entitled "True State of March and October Events," beginning
p. 109. Following is taken from this article:

A. March Event (1931)

1. Establishment of Sakura-Kai (Cherry Society)
during later part of Sept, 1930 (association of patriotic
officers).

2. Organized by HASHIMOTO, SAKATA, HIGUCHI, and
others, totaling about 20.

3. Purpose

a. Reconstruct a glorious Japan even though
use of force if necessary.

4. Preparatory actions to achieve this purpose.

a. Impart to all officers, consciousness of
necessity for national reconstruction.

b. Increase membership (about 500 in May 31).

c. Draw up actual plans for reconstruction.

1) Conflicting thoughts among members
regarding reconstruction plans.

Doc. No. 1402

Page 1

- a) Those desiring destruction of prevailing system first, reconstruction second.
- b) Those desiring thorough preparation for reconstruction before destruction.
- c) Those undecided or favoring medial measures.

5. Major Developments.

a. UGAKI decides to step into political circle and form cabinet (9 Jan 31).

b. UGAKI confers with SUGIYAMA; NINOMIYA; KOISO; TATEKAWA; YAMAWAKI; HASHIMOTO; NEMOTO regarding measures for reformation of Japan.

c. NINOMIYA instructs HASHIMOTO as follows:

1) Chief military leaders approving UGAKI are: TATEKAWA; KOISO; NAGATA; OKAMURA; SHIGEFUJI; YAMAWAKI.

2) Policy has full understanding of Army and merits use of military force if necessary.

3) Seize present political power only; social and administrative policies to be developed by superiors.

a) Officers lower than rank of captain not to participate.

b) Action is not to be extenuated; a coup de etat following plan of destruction first.

(1) Necessary funds to be paid from secret service money.

(2) Dr. OKAWA to participate in movement; recruit 10,000 men (death band)

(3) Action on day Labor Bill is laid before Diet.

(4) Military leaders eager; army operation clandestinely arranged.

(5) HASHIMOTO to form connecting link with superiors.

d. Meeting of TANAKA; SAKATA; NEMOTO; SHIGEFUJI (7 Feb. 31) planning:

1) Oratorical meeting at HIBIYA to propagandize toward upsetting Cabinet.

2) Day Labor Bill laid before Diet, seize political power; bomb headquarters of MINSEI and SEIYU political parties and home of Prime Minister. (Effect of bombs not to kill, but to create confusion.)

3) Bombers the confidential adherents of OKAWA.

4) OKAWA's 10,000 men to surround Diet from 8 directions, under competent leaders.

5) Army to invest Diet on pretext of protection; intercept all interior and exterior traffic.

6) Certain Lt. Gen. (unnamed in article) to enter Assembly Hall with KOISO or TATEKAWA and others; proclaim UGAKI Prime Minister and request SHIDEHARA and others resign.

7) Messengers to KANIN and SAIONJI fixed; operate to obtain Imperial command to UGAKI to form cabinet.

(SHIGEFUJI and HASHIMOTO overjoyed at completion of plan.)

e. Meeting 8 Feb 1931 with TATEKAWA; decision to hand plans to UGAKI and await day of execution.

1) Enthusiasm of participants begins to decline.

2) NAGATA and OKAMURA begin positive opposition.

3) Mobilization of OKAWA's 10,000 becomes doubtful.

f. Due to above, movement discontinued.

1) Against insistence to proceed of SHIGEFUJI and HASHIMOTO.

2) HASHIMOTO had already delivered 300 bombs to OKAWA.

3) UGAKI requests OKAWA to stop movement due to unfavorable conditions.

The above is a brief resume of March Event. October Event related between pp. 116-127.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1403

18 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series,
#11, Classified: CONFIDENTIAL

Date: 8 Mar 46 Original () Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: M.I.D., U. S. War Dept.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Treatment of PWs.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Deaths of Allied PWs in Mukden PW Camp, from 1942-45.
Lists 184 deaths. Gives: name, rank, age, cause and date
of death. (181 Americans, 2 British and 1 Australian.)

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 1403

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1404

18 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series,
#12. Classified: CONFIDENTIAL

Date: 15 Mar 46 Original () Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: MID, U. S. War Dept.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: NAKANO, Seigo; Col. MABUCHI, Itsuo;
Rear Adm. SOSA, Tanetsugu.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy; propaganda
and censorship.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Speeches by prominent Japs on the Greater East Asia
War. Only 3 speeches given, dated 25 Mar 41, 20 Sept 41,
and 25 Sept 41.

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 1404

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1405

18 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: PACMIRS, War Crimes Information Series, #13, Classified: CONFIDENTIAL

Date: 22 Mar 46 Original () Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: MID, U.S. War Dept.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Jap Court Martial Proceedings.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

16th Army, in Java, Court Martial proceedings for murders. Relevant articles of Jap Military Code are also shown.

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 1405

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1406

18 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: PACMIRS, War Crimes Information Series, #15, Classified: CONFIDENTIAL

Date: 22 Mar 46 Original () Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: MID, U.S. War Dept.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Jap Military Courts in Java.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Summary of 140 cases of persons condemned to death by Jap Military Courts for anti-Jap activities.

Also, details on 60 additional persons listed as having died of "illness" or "natural causes" while in custody of Jap Military Police.

Analyst: Capt. Phelps.

Doc. No. 1406

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1407

18 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: PACMIRS, War Crimes Information Series, #16, Classified: CONFIDENTIAL

Date: 22 Mar 46 Original () Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: MID, U.S. War Dept.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Organization of Defense Unit, India

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Organization of the Hqs. Defense Section of the Burma Military Police Unit, probably in Rangoon, 23 officers, 128 enlisted men, and 51 civilians.

This is a KEMPEITAI unit. Gives details on personnel, duties, equipment and uniforms.

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 1407

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1408

18 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: United Nations War Crimes Commission,
Far Eastern and Pacific Sub-Commission, Lists #17-23.

Classified: SECRET

Date: Jan 1946 Original () Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: U.N.W.C.C.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: War Criminals and
Material Witnesses; War Criminals Holding Key Positions

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Parts I-V deals with Jap War Criminals and material
witnesses; Parts VI-VII are lists of Jap war criminals
holding key positions, (being members of the Armed Forces).

/A.N. More useful to Class B & C war criminals./

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 1408

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1409

18 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: United Nations War Crimes Commission,
List #24, Classified: SECRET

Date: Jan, 1946 Original () Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: U.N.W.C.C.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Lists of war criminals;
suspects; and witnesses.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

These lists will pertain to the Category B and C war
criminals.

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 1409

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1410

18 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Statement of General TANAKA entitled "The Preservation of Japan's Special Position in Manchuria and Mongolia."

Date: 1928-29 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED: General Tanaka

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian aggression.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

General TANAKA as Premier and Foreign Minister at end of Eastern Conference (1928-29) delivered speech outlining China policy. The steps to be taken were:

1. Stabilization of China's internal political situation and restoration of order.
2. Collaboration of Japan with other powers in aiding China.
3. Maintenance of contact with moderate regimes in China until development of strong central government.
4. Maintenance of neutral attitude toward various possible regimes in China.
5. Protection of Japan's rights and interests in event of lawless activities in China which Chinese authorities are unable to suppress.
6. Protection of Japan's rights and interests especially against anti-Japanese movements.
7. Special consideration must be given to Manchuria, Mongolia and three Eastern Provinces in the protection of Japan's rights and interests in economic development.
8. In event political disturbance in China proper spreads to Manchuria and/or Mongolia, Japan must be prepared to combat such a menace and to take appropriate steps to preserve the region.

Analyst: Bettie Renner

Doc. No. 1410

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1411

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Book, "Business Report of South Seas Section in 1940"

Date: 1/1/42 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Overseas Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MATSUOKA; SAVADA

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggressive warfare and economic exploitation--French Indo-China, British Malay, Thailand, Shinnan Islands, and New Caledonia; Tripartite Pact (Thailand)

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains:

FRENCH-INDO CHINA--Chronological sequence of affairs during 1940 between Japan and French Indo-China with detailed account of negotiations leading to Agreement of 9-22-40, providing for advancement of Japanese forces into FIC, and a list of alleged unlawful activities by the Jap in FIC, with special reference to the bombing of the Yunnan Railway.

BRITISH MALAY--Activities of British in Malay during 1940 re: (1) Internal and military affairs; (2) fishing; (3) passports for Japs; and, (4) supervision of Japs in Singapore.

THAILAND--Chronological sequence of affairs during 1940 in Thailand re: (1) Home matters, with reference to Thai's joining the Tripartite Pact; (2) foreign relations: (a) Japan's suspicion of Thai's secret understanding with America and Britain, (b) Thai-Burma border change, (c) frontier dispute between Thailand and FIC; (3) Thai-Jap relationship re Thai-Japanese Non-Invasion Treaty of June 12, 1940.

Doc. No. 1411

Page 1

Doc. No. 1411 - Page 2 - SUMMARY cont'd

SHINNAN ISLANDS--(1) Jap attitude re French on Islands--their removal, (2) mining industry.

NEW CALEDONIA--(1) Political change after French surrender at outset of World War II; (2) French prohibition of exportation of nickel to Japan; (3) Affair concerning French firing at Japanese boat in New Caledonia.

Analyst: Bettie Renner

Doc. No. 1411
Page 2

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1412

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Military Administration Measures
To Be Taken in the Event of Japan's Participation in War

Date: 12 Nov 41 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable):

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggressive warfare;
conspiracy.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Outlines Japan's military administration of occupied territories in the past as follows: (1) During Sino-Jap War; (2) During the Russo-Jap War; (3) During World War I; and, (4) During the Siberian Expedition. Outlined material is to be used as a precedent in event of Japan's participation in World War II.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Suzukawa

Doc. No. 1412

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1413

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Explanatory note concerning the Japanese-American negotiation for peace by Foreign Minister

Date: Dec 41 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggressive warfare--
Pearl Harbor. Relations with U. S.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This pamphlet deals with the progress of Japanese-American peace negotiations, from April to December 1941.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Fleisher

Doc. No. 1413

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1414

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Telegrams to and from abroad from March to April, 1940, while ARITA was Foreign Minister.

Date: Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ARITA; YOSHIDA; SUZUKI; SHIGEMITSU;
USAMI

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggressive warfare--
Philippine Islands, French Indo-China, China

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Telegram from ARITA to YOSHIDA, in Manila, 3/15/40, re desire of Filipinos for non-aggression agreement and requesting opinion on following points: (a) Quezon's attitude in requesting sanction of U. S. (b) attitude of leaders of Philippine Congress; (c) attitude of American Commissioners; (d) possibility of Quezon utilizing treaty to check U.S. from postponing independence.

Telegram from ARITA to SUZUKI, in HANOI, 3/20/40, re adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and France. Discusses negotiations re transportation of munitions to Chiang-Kai-Shek by French Indo-China.

Telegram from SHIGEMITSU, in London, to ARITA, 3/18/40, re conversation of Lloyd George and Sumner Welles concerning Russian-German war and opinion that Welles belonged to Anti-Soviet group.

Telegram from USAMI, in Berlin, to ARITA, 3/21/40, re Germany's recognition of new Central Government of China and relationship of Russia with Chiang-Kai-Shek.

Analyst: Miss Renner

Doc. No. 1414

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1415

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Foreign Office Records on MANCHUKUO

Date: Feb 32- Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese
Feb 35

Has it been translated? Yes () No () Partially

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Economic exploitation--
Manchuria

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains 46 documents, including Cabinet Council drafts, illustrating commercial, industrial, and financial exploitation of Manchuria by Japan during the period of 1932-1935.

Analyst: Miss Renner

Doc. No. 1415

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1416

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: "The November (the Military School) Incident," by IWABUCHI, Tatsuo

Date: Apr 1946 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Investigation Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: KUHARA; NAGATA; TOJO; KATAKURA; TSUJI, etc.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for overthrowing the government.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This is a sequence to the articles by the same author analyzed in IPS Document Numbers 575, 765, and 1107.

The November Incident occurred in the middle of November, 1934. It was a central plot of Japanese Fascism projected by the army, under the leadership of Major General NAGATA, Tetsuzan, the then Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs of the War Ministry and Major General TOJO, Hideki, the then Secretary of the Officers School. The central body of the army, the Officers School, the Military Police Unit, and the court martial worked extensively behind the scene of the Incident.

The officers of the reformation (KAKUSHIN) faction agitated the cadets of the Officers School to project a wave of terrorism on a large scale. They aimed to overthrow the OKADA Cabinet by this drive among the senior statesmen from the political circle and then put the responsibility of the Incident on General MAZAKI, Jinzaburo, the then Inspector General of Military Training. They planned to sweep away with one blow the power of the

KODO Faction in the army and establish military government under the TOSEI Faction (the KAKUSHIN faction). But the cadets did not fall into this trap. Then Major KATAKURA, Akira, of NAGATA group and Captain TSUJI, Masanobu of TOJO group, who had directly plotted this Incident, counter-charged that the terroristic plot was made by the cadets of the Officers School, and tried to call MAZAKI to account, who was responsible for supervision of the cadets.

But as they failed in this plot with the cadets, the NAGATA group then created the so-called "500,000 Yuan affair of TOKONAMI," the then Minister of Communications, in complicity with KUHARA Group of the SEIYUKAI, (T.N. a political party at that time) to overthrow the OKADA Cabinet. In this plot SUZUKI, Kisaburo, and KUHARA, Fusanosuke, of the SEIYUKAI, who were opposed to TOKONAMI and OKADA, worked in complicity with the TOSEI Faction of the army.

This Incident was acquitted after investigation, as there was no actual proof. But MURAKAMI, Koji, and ISOBE, Asaichi, who were oppressed in this Incident, filed a complaint of false accusation against KATAKURA and TSUJI, who plotted this Incident. But as their complaint was rejected, they made public their written opinion for cleaning up the army and thus exposed the corruption and the conspiracy of the army.

In this article the writer analyzes the following points to investigate this Incident.

(1) Conspiracies of the officers of the KAKUSHIN Faction.

(2) The 500,000 Yuan affair of TOKONAMI.

(This article is not yet completed.)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1417

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: The American proposal of June and the last Japanese proposal in November.

Date: 20 Nov 41 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No
Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Office

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Relations with U.S.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Arranges the American and Japanese proposals in separate columns so the differences can be seen at a glance.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Fleisher

Doc. No. 1417

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1418

DATE: April 23, 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Diary of Count Ciano

Date: 1939-1943 Original () Copy (X) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes (X) No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes (X) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of _____:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Office of Strategic Services

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA; SHIRATORI

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for war of aggression.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

January 7, 1939: "I see the Japanese Ambassador who speaks to me of the alliance. He is afraid that the new foreign minister, Arita, will be rather cold toward the idea, but says that the Premier is openly in favor of it. This will not influence the conclusion of the pact but might postpone the date of the signing. Therefore, the Ambassador wishes to be received by the Duce, so that he can send a telegram promptly. The Ambassador is greatly in favor of the alliance which he regards as a weapon to force Great Britain to concede 'the many things she owes to us all.' Ribbentrop sends me the text of the pact, as well as the text of the secret conversation for the use of the military commissions."

February 6, 1939: ". . . Ribbentrop also speaks optimistically of the triple alliance with Japan, as well as of the Yugoslav crisis. He claims that the new Foreign Minister leans toward the Axis.

". . . The Japanese Ambassador is sceptical about the possibility of an early conclusion of the triple alliance. He believes that the Japanese counter-proposal will be a compromise proposal which he himself advises us not to accept."

Analyst: E. Jackson

Doc. No. 1418

Page 1

April 23, 1946

February 20, 1939: "Exchange of telephone calls with Ribbentrop to plan a joint action by our Ambassadors to France to persuade him to adhere to the anti-Comintern pact. The action will be undertaken as soon as the Japanese Ambassador has received his instructions. If Franco agrees, the rumors which have been circulating, even in Italy, of his too close contacts with the western powers, will be dispersed."

March 4, 1939: "Telephone conversation with Ribbentrop; he is still sure of Japanese support of the Tripartite Pact, but claims that it will take several weeks to reach an agreement."

March 6, 1939: ". . . News from Berlin confirms that the Japanese government objects to the signing of the Tripartite Pact. Oshima plans to resign. He says that the Cabinet would fall. And then what? I do not see clearly. Is it really possible to involve distant Japan deeply in European political life, a life which is becoming increasingly complicated and uncertain, and which is subject to change, from one moment to the next, by a simple telephone call?"

March 8, 1939: "I see the Japanese Ambassador. He confirms what Attolico wrote concerning the Japanese reply on the Tripartite Alliance. Many reservations and the intention of regarding the Pact as exclusively anti-Russian; a reply so unsatisfactory as to render very doubtful the possibility of actually concluding this alliance. Oshima and Shiratori have refused to communicate through official channels. They asked Tokyo to accept the Pact of Alliance without reservation, otherwise they will resign and bring about the fall of the Cabinet. A decision will be made within the next few days. Shiratori claims that if it is favorable the signing can take place in Berlin during March, otherwise it will all be postponed till doomsday. The delay and the entire Japanese procedure make me very skeptical of the possibility of an effective collaboration of Fascist and Nazi dynamism with the phlegmatic slowness of the Japanese."

March 16, 1939: "I also see the Japanese Ambassador who speaks to me optimistically of the decisions of his government on the Tripartite Alliance."

March 30, 1939: "~~Over~~ Conversation with Shiratori and Oshima who expect the presentation of proposals for the alliance on April 2."

April 25, 1939: "News arrives from Berlin that the Japanese persist in their reservations with respect to the triple alliance: Therefore the signing is postponed sine die. Mussolini, to whom I telephone the news at Forli' where he has been since this morning, says that he is just as glad; actually for some time he has considered Japan's adherence more harmful than useful. We will meet Ribbentrop on the 6th, in some North Italian city, to define the common policy."

April 23, 1946

April 28, 1939: "I receive news from Japan: It seems now that they are deciding to sign the alliance. I tell Shiratori that in any case they must hasten and tell us yes or no; within a few days I shall meet Ribbentrop and we must make our decision, especially as diplomatic activity among the democracies has become very intense during these last days and as the Anglo-Soviet alliance seems now a concrete and completed fact. The Duce returns to Rome."

May 5, 1939: "Many conversations, but none of particular interest except the one with the Japanese Ambassador. The final formula for the Tripartite Pact has been sent to Arita in Tokyo. Very weak. Ribbentrop too is dissatisfied with it. But the Ambassador warns me that now it is difficult to push matters further and that we are close to the breaking point."

May 9, 1939: "Conversation with Shiratori, very much impressed by our agreement of alliance with Berlin. He hopes that Tokyo will wake up in time to be the third. But I don't think it will."

May 14, 1939: "Ribbentrop is making a last attempt to add a tripartite pact with Japan to the signature of the alliance. I do not object although I am fundamentally skeptical of the possibility and also of the usefulness of the thing."

July 4, 1939: "The Japanese ambassador affirms that his Government is now prepared to sign the pact with some reservations which are more pro forma than anything else."

August 9, 1939: "The Japanese Ambassador informs me that Tokyo has decided to support the Alliance. After so much indecision I wonder if it's true. And, if it is true, I wonder if it's a good thing, since the negotiations with Moscow have not been settled one way or the other. And again: won't this serve to make Germany bolder and push her forward on a path of intransigence and hence towards a crisis over the Danzig question?"

September 19, 1940: "Arrival of Ribbentrop. He is in a good humour and very pleased with the welcome given him by the 'applause squad' which was well coached by the Questura. In the car he immediately speaks of the surprise he has in his portfolio; this is the Japanese military alliance which is to be signed in a few days in Berlin. The Russian dream vanished forever in the halls of the Belvedere at Vienna after the guarantees to Rumania were made. He believes that this stroke will have a double edge. Against Russia and against America. The threat of the Japanese fleet will keep the latter from making any move..."

April 23, 1946

September 24, 1940: "Agreement was reached on the final text of the Tripartite Pact. The signing can now take place within a few days."

September 27, 1940: "Signing of the Pact. It takes place more or less in the same way that the Steel Pact was signed. But the atmosphere is colder. Even the crowd in the streets . . . a small crowd, composed largely of school children--demonstrates methodically and without conviction. Japan is far away. Aid from there is problematical. . ."

May 12, 1941: "We joined the Germans in requesting Tokyo to take a clear-cut stand against America. I do not know whether the note had any great effect. Matsuoka does not conceal his great sympathy and respect for the United States. Phillips, whom I saw today, no longer excludes the possibility of early intervention on the part of his country, and as always speaks of a very long war. . ."

May 14, 1941: "Meanwhile, matters in Japan are not going as they should and in Russia they are even worse. . ."

December 3, 1941: "Sensational move by Japan. The Japanese Ambassador asks for an audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion that they have reached a dead end. Then, invoking the apposite clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on America immediately after the beginning of hostilities between Japan and America and that Italy and Japan sign an agreement not to conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the communication. He said: 'We are now on the brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as September 1939.' What does this new event mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed, and that it is now easy - much too easy - to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin's answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive."

May 3, 1942: "In agreement with Berlin, we reply to Tokyo that this is not the moment to make a declaration for Arabian and Indian independence. It would be a platonic gesture of no practical value, and the results might perhaps be unfortunate. Such a move can be made only if and when the Axis armies are in a position to back up the declaration of independence with armed force."

April 23, 1946

March 11, 1942: "The Duce was greatly exercised about Urach's statements. He countered, by affirming his extreme pro-Japanese feelings. 'Furthermore, what does it matter if gaining of wealth by the Japanese lowers the European standard of living? Such materialistic worries reveal that despite national socialism, the German is Marxist in his soul.'"

April 6, 1942: "There is news of a Japanese air attack on Colombo. Is this the first move toward India? I think it more likely that it is intended to frighten the Indians during the Cripps negotiations, which are apparently approaching a conclusion, at least partially successful."

April 11, 1942: "Mussolini visits the Society of the Friends of Japan. He likes, more and more, to call himself 'the world's leading pro-Jap.' But his words are purely anti-German in tone. He spoke a few words of warm friendship and concluded by saying that 'Italian soldiers, Japanese soldiers, and the other armies of the Tripartite will carry us to victory.'"

April 14, 1942: "The Japanese propose a Tripartite declaration for the independence of India and Arabia. Berlin protested at first; Germany does not welcome action in areas which are ever closer to Europe. Mussolini, on the other hand, would like to support the proposal immediately."

April 24, 1942: "The Japanese Military Attache in a conversation with Frunas delivered a tirade on the German attitude and on their method of waging the war. In the eyes of the Japanese everything has been done wrong. If Germany continues at this rate, she will encounter many grievous surprises. I showed the notes to the Duce who expressed his agreement with the Japanese."

May 23, 1942: "The Duce telephones and is very indignant about the Japanese Ambassador, Shiratori, who made some really bald statements. He states that it is Japan's right to rule the world, that the Mikado is the only God on earth, and that Hitler and Mussolini will have to resign themselves to this fact. Although Shiratori's mission to Rome did not last very long, I remember him well. He was a fanatical extremist, but, above all, he was a boor."

January 7, 1943: "Japan desires to sign economic agreements with Germany and with us. These accords would establish the vital spheres of the three countries and specific preferential tariffs. It is obvious that our situation would be the weaker, therefore I am blocking the action."

Analyst: E. Jackson

Doc. No. 1418

Page 5

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1419

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Affidavit, Harold Frank Gill and
YEH YOEH SU

Date: 6 Apr 46 Original Copy Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: British Consulate, Shanghai

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Maj. GOTO

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Narcotics, in
Shanghai.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Two narcotics detectives' testimonials re opium in
Shanghai, from 1939-1943.

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 1419

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1420

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Affidavit, Frederick Chas. Parr.

Date: 27 Mar 46 Original (x) Copy () Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: British Consulate, Shanghai

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression--China;
Class B offenses--at sea.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Sinking of "H.M.S. PETEREL," and Jap occupation of The Bund, 2345 hours, 7 Dec 41.

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 1420

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1421

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Affidavit, Edward Austen Irwin Crowder

Date: 6 Apr 1946 Original Copy Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: British Consulate, Shanghai

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Death of men aboard
"H.M.S. PETEREL."

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Deaths by infection, etc.

(See Doc. # 1420)

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 1421

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1422

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Affidavit, Herbert Reginald Hales

Date: 3 Apr 46 Original (x) Copy () Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: British Consulate, Shanghai

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Propaganda and censorship.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Showing propaganda films, 1937.

(See Documents Nos. 1420 and 1421.)

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 1422

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1423

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Affidavit, Leo Rozoff (Original and three carbon copies)

Date: 10 Apr 46 Original Copy Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: British Consulate, Shanghai

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression--China;
Class B offenses---at sea.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Sinking of "H.M.S. PETEREL," 8 Dec 41. Machine-gunning of survivors.

(See Doc. Nos. 1420, 1421 and 1422)

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 1423

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1424

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Affidavit of Secretary of State.

Date: 6 Apr 46 Original (x) Copy () Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Relations with U.S.--
after 16 Oct 1941; aggression; conspiracy.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1. While the peaceful settlement of problems in the whole Pacific area were being discussed at her request, Japan attacked American territory in Hawaii on 7 Dec 41 without warning.

2. Japan did not, on or before 7 Dec 41, take or have recourse to mediation or the good offices of any friendly power in the settlement or arbitration of any dispute she had with the United States.

3. Prior to her attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan gave no explicit warning, either in the form of a declaration of war or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 1424

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1425

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Manchurian Incident--Reparations for Damage (Reparations Investigation Committee)

Date: 1933-34 Original Copy Language:

Has it been translated? Yes No Partially

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression--Manchurian indemnities.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Correspondence between Foreign Ministry and Jap consular officials in CHINA; text of Imperial Ordinance #143, dated, 31 May 1933; table of indemnity payments in Manchurian Incident; and a resolution of the minor committee on reparations investigation. All are concerned with reasons for indemnities and the Jap Government's liability in this respect (according to the above Imperial Ordinance).

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Person

Doc. No. 1425

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1426

22 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Manchurian Incident--Public Opinion and Press Comment. (Telegrams Sent by Foreign Correspondents in TOKYO).

Date: Sept.-Oct. Original Copy Language:
1931

Has it been translated? Yes No Partially

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MINAMI

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian Incident; conspiracy.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Dispatches sent from TOKYO, by foreign correspondents, re JAPAN's policy in MANCHURIA, as was agreed upon by Foreign and War Ministries for presentation to the League; government and public opinion of anti-Japanese movement and boycotts; dispatch of Japanese troops to CHINA and MANCHURIA; Japanese views of foreign opinion, etc.

War Minister MINAMI's statement that it was the fundamental policy of the army to disapprove the participation of a third country in solving the Manchurian problem.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Person

Doc. No. 1426

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1427

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Project for colonization works in
MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA

Date: Jan 32 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Officials of corporation below.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for
economic monopolies--MANCHURIA

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Nature of project was a corporation to be called
"MANCHURIA-MONGOLIA Industrial Corporation."

Doc. Purpose: Develop resources of the two countries,
establish a variety of industries.

Capital to be raised by capital-stock, subsidy, and
industrial bonds. (Source of subsidy not stated.)

Necessary conditions for establishment were to include
(1) "guarantee of land-lease rights in MANCHURIA and
MONGOLIA," (2) acquisition of priority on purchase of
government lands, forest, and mining rights, and eminent
domain for settling groups of immigrants.

Date: Jan 32 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 1427

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Officials of corporation below.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1428

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Pamphlet: "Editorial Policy and Special Characteristics

Date: Undated, Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese but pre-war

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Legal Staff

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SHORIKI, Matsutaro

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparing public opinion for war; propaganda.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Pamphlet emphasizes positive, partial policy of slanting the views of owner and paper; his theory is that the news is only candy to attract the populace, like children, so their thoughts may be led in the right direction; "enlightening and propagandizing elements should cleverly be mixed in the substance of the information." (p. 3)

Role of press is to pull people along a course; "an impartial attitude is not worthy of a great press, we think." (p. 2). Their missions are to furnish news, to enlighten and propagandize people, to back up national diplomacy, social welfare, and amusement. In this connection, "with news strategy" we must seek to unify public opinion with reference to the national mobilization." (p. 9)

This paper's "Social Services" include a parachute tower service, airplane rides, and glider training. (p. 15).

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 1428

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1429

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Newspaper clipping, YOMIURI HOCHI
re wounding of SHORIKI, Matsutaro, by a Nationalist.

Date: 22 Feb 35 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: SHORIKI

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SHORIKI, Matsutaro; ATSUTA, Tasuke;
SHINOKUBO, Kosaku, ITO, Shiro.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Ultra-nationalist
groups.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Would be assassin NAGASAKI, Katsutake, ^{was member of} of BUJINKAI, an
organization claiming to support Imperial Rule. Chairman
was ATSUTA, Tasake, and among members were SHINOKUBU,
Kosaku, and ITO, Shiro. Claimed he attacked because
SHORIKI invited Americans to play baseball at MEIJI
Stadium, etc.

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 1429

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1430

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: PW information on inspection, interview calling.

Date: 6 Jan 43 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Treatment of PWs.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1. Report on Switzerland Vice-Consul's inspection of PW camp at Shanghai. Inspected the PW's barracks, recreation hall, medical office, sick room, kitchen, etc. (pp. 9-12)

2. Refusal to the Swedish Consul's request to visit the PW camp in Bangkok, Nov. 6, 1942; 18 Jan 1943 Swedish Consul in Tokyo sent a protesting letter to Foreign Ministry in representing English interest, that military authorities in Bangkok refused Swedish Consul's request to visit PWs in Siam, and also to distribute food material and clothes to PW. (pp. 19-30)

3. Protest of U. S. to Japanese government on the inhuman and uncivilized treatment accorded American Nationals both civilians and PWs in violation of Geneva Convention. Cases of mistreatment of American Nationals in Japanese hands. Furnished unhealthful and inadequate rations of common criminals to those in jails and those interned were supplied meager diet for which they were compelled to pay for at times. No sanitation, heat or medical care provided. Compelled to sit by day and sleep at night with filthy and

Doc. No. 1430

Page 1

Doc. No. 1430 - Page 2 - SUMMARY cont'd

inadequate blankets on cold floor. Not allowed to converse with each other or smoke at any time. Received torture and physical violence such as being kicked while unconscious with a broken rib being lashed with rubber hose and pulley belting making half inch deep cuts on arms and legs. Deaths due to mistreatment and neglect. Violation of exchange agreement.

4. American Nationals were required to pay for their passage, subjected to baggage limitation and search.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Miwa

Doc. No. 1430
Page 2

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1431

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Duty log kept by First Section,
Fourth Department, Intelligence Bureau, Home Affairs Ministry

Date: Mar-Apr Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese
1943

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Home Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TANABE, Harumichi; censorship officials

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Propaganda and censorship.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This is a log kept by officials whose duty it was to direct censorship of certain items. Newspaper clippings are included. Samples of entries:

Daytime watch (name)

March 5/--To the leading daily newspapers in Tokyo, Osaka, etc. (telephone message). You are not allowed to publish the following item: "At the meeting of the Small Committee on Liquidation, a question concerning the disposal of the enemy's properties in the Southern Area was raised by Mr. YAMAZAKI of the Standing Committee and was answered by Mr. HANADA of the Government Committee." (p. 21)

March 6, Daytime watch (name)--To the leading daily newspapers as well as industrial magazines and newspapers dealing with waterfront activities, mining, stevedoring, etc. "You are not to publish anything on the immigration of Chinese laborers as well as their movements in Japan, except those announced by the government." (Telephone messages were sent) (p. 25)

Doc. No. 1431 - Page 2 - SUMMARY cont'd

March 25, Daytime watch (name)--To the leading daily newspapers, news agencies and magazine publishers. You are not allowed to publish anything about the leaders of the newly developed country of Burma and its political structure, territorial boundaries as well as dates of actual realization of independence other than those announced by both governments.

April 6, Daytime watch (name)--(1) To the leading daily newspapers and religious papers and magazines. No publication is allowed concerning a new regulation prohibiting the three Christian denominations to organize associations as well as the cancellation of the permission to organize churches by the said bodies. (p. 181)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1432

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: PW camp reports. Inspectional tour.

Date: Original (x) Copy () Language:

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Treatment of PWs.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This document contains letters from International Red Cross to Japanese Foreign Ministry asking permission to visit PW camps and answers thereof from Japanese Foreign Ministry. Also letters between Foreign Office and PW Intelligence Bureau.

Some questions and answers of delegates and PWs:

ITEM 1, 22 Sept. 1943--

Delegate: Was your food supply reduced as punishment?

Major Moore: Six months ago it happened twice when some officer received less food for not working.

Lt. IWAHARA: Do you not mean the discriminatory treatment for heavy, light and non-laborers?

Major Moore: Six months ago we were forced to line up before officers and told that we would get only half the amount of regular ration if we did not work.

Delegate: What kind of work were you made to do?

Major Moore: It is not pleasant to say, but we were forced to carry stones from the river to the embankment and also to weed and clean fields.

Chief of Branch Camp: It was for making the play ground and not for work outside of camp.

Doc. No. 1432

Page 1

Doc. No. 1432 - Page 2 - SUMMARY cont'd

ITEM 2, 14 March 1943--

Dr. Paravijini, delegate of International Red Cross visited PW camp in Fukuoka, PWs in the 7th Branch Camp complained of the food shortage and that they were always hungry.

ITEM A-- The request of Royal Swedish Legation for permission to visit the Changi Civilian Internment Camp in Syonan was rejected. 7 July 1943.

ITEM B--The request of Royal Swedish Legation for the Swedish Consul General at Bangkok to visit the PW camps in Thailand was rejected. 28 June 1943

ITEM C--The request of Swiss Legation to visit PW camp in Thailand was rejected. 24 July 1943.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1433

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Book, "Collection of Theories Concerning National Reformation"

Date: May 1935 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Home Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: KITA, Ikki; TACHIBANA, Kosaburo; SUZUKI, Zenichi; NAGAI, Ryokichi; KOBAYASHI, Junichiro

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for and instigation to a war of aggression. (Ultra-nationalistic societies and propaganda.)

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This document contains writings on the principles of "Restoration" by KITA, Ikki; TACHIBANA, Kosaburo; SUZUKI, Zenichi; NAGAI, Ryokichi; KOBAYASHI, Junichiro; the KODOKAI (Imperial Way Society), etc.

A translation of the Index is attached to the document. Added to the Index (in Japanese) are short biographies of the various authors.

The following is an analysis of the more important articles with particular stress on "Principles of Japanese Reformation Methods" by KITA, Ikki, which, because of its importance, has been referred to as "the bible of Japanese Reformation Movements."

- 1) "Principles of Japanese Reformation Methods" (KAIZO HOAN) by KITA, Ikki. Published in 1919. (pp. 1-84)

The preface stresses the importance of a great reformation for Japan. Chapter I advocates that the Emperor put his prerogatives into action, suspend the Constitution for 3 years, dissolve the Diet and place the entire country under Martial Law (p. 13). He justifies the concept of a "Coup d'etat" as "a direct exercise of national authority, that is the will of the society."

Doc. No. 1433

Page 1

On the following pages, he deals with the following: the original meaning of "TENNO", abolition of the vorage system, suffrage, restoration of the people's freedom, a national reformation cabinet, a national reformation Diet, granting of the Imperial Household assets to the nation. (p. 18).

Chapter II: The limit of private property, state ownership of the surplus of the private property, the excess private property after the reformation, conference of ex-soldiers (p. 21).

Chapter III: The limitations of private land ownership, state ownership of the surplus of the private land, etc. (p24)

Chapter IV: The limit of private manufacturing industry; state ownership and management of industries, the capital of which exceeds the limit; productive organization of the state (p. 29).

Chapter V: The rights of laborers, distribution of profits to laborers, women labor. (p. 33)

Chapter VI: The rights of children, education, women's personal rights (p. 42).

In Chapter VII he advocates treating KOREA as a part of the Japanese Empire. He expresses his expansionist views in comparing the future Japan with the Great Roman Empire. He mentions the fact that Australia and Eastern Siberia will be part of that Empire and concludes: "The Great Empire of Japan is the only nation in the world that can unite the races and civilizations of the East and the West." (p. 48)

In Chapter VIII he deals with the rights of the State and counts among them "the positive right of waging war." He states: "Besides for self-defence, a nation has the right to wage a war for the sake of another nation or race which is oppressed by an unrighteous power. (As a practical question it is the nation's right to wage a war for Indian independence or Chinese security.) A nation has the right to wage war against those who disregard the heavenly way of common existence of mankind by monopolizing an enormous land. (As a practical question, it is the nation's right to wage a war in order to take Australia or Far Eastern Siberia.)" (p. 53) "If class struggle within a country is allowed, why not class struggle in the world?.....When the reformed rational nation, the revolutionary empire, cries loudly for the justice among nations, there is no theory that can confront it." (p. 60)

Attached to the KAIZO HOAN for reference purposes are KITA, Ikki's:

- a) Preface to "Unofficial History of the Chinese Revolution" (pp 86 ff)
 - b) Letter to MITSUKAWA, Kametaro, dated June 28, 1919, about "the Supreme Judgement about the Versailles Conference," criticizing U.S. and Japanese "blunders" and stating that the policy of Japan hereafter must be to split America away from England. KITA foretells that Germany will have a social revolution, making the Treaty of Versailles a piece of scrap paper. Then the question will be how to divide the British Empire. Japan must cooperate with U.S., or she will join hands with England against Japan (p. 71).
 - c) "An Open Letter to Mr. Joffe" dated 9 May 1923, sharply criticizing Joffe's mission to Japan to obtain Japan's recognition of the Soviet Union.
 - d) Preface to "Thesis on National Structure and Pure Socialism," written in 1906. (See analysis of IPS Doc. No. 825)
- 2) "The Basic Principle of Japanese Patriotic Renovation" by TACHIBANA, Kosaburo, May 1932, (pp. 93 ff)

The main two trends of the time after the First World War are the downfall of Western civilization and the rise of nationalism. Japan's condition is blamed on the misery of the farmers and the resulting rush of the country population to the cities which lead to a neglect of agriculture as the basis of the nation.

The only way of saving Japan is to rise above the capitalistic, materialistic civilization of the West, and to realize the principle of patriotic fraternity in Japan. The soldiers and the farmers must cooperate in reforming the corrupt conditions in Japan. "If the common masses will be relieved of their burden of supporting and feeding great monopolistic organizations, Japan will be able to destroy the American influences on the Pacific, sweep the Chinese military cliques away, liberate India from under the yoke of the British, make Russia realize her mistake, and execute another revolution on the agricultural basis and make Germany rise." (p. 146)

- 3) "Plans of Reconstruction on Japanese Principles" by SUZUKI Zenichi. (pp. 423 ff) (A.N.: SUZUKI participated in the SHIMPOTAI Incident and was tried in court for this.) He advocates replacement of Bolshevized teachers by those with nationalistic ideas in all fields.

4) Plans for Constructing New Japan by NAGAI , Ryokichi

An explanation of "KODO" (the Imperial Way) the world policy. North China must become another Manchukuo. As far as England, America, France and Russia are concerned, they do not wish to have another world war, so that we must start a world-wide peace movement. In the meantime, we will make every preparation for war, and if ten years are to elapse as it is, the balance of power will become very favorable for us. It is regrettable that most of us neglect Fukien, Siam and New Guinea policies.

Educational policies, economic policies, political organization. (p. 542)

The other theories are generally along the same lines as the above.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1434

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Book "Principles of Japanese Reformation Methods" by KITA, Ikki

Date: 1933 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

Home Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: KITA, Ikki

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Instigation to aggressive warfare. (Ultra-nationalist propaganda.)

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This book has formed the basis for the activities of most ultra-nationalistic societies and has been referred to as the "Bible of Japanese Reformation Movements." It is contained in IPS Doc. No. 1433, where an analysis can be found under Item 1.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Steiner

Doc. No. 1434

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1435

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Booklet, "Theory and Methods of Labor Education" by OKURA, Kunihiro

Date: Oct 1938 Original Copy Language: Japanese
Reedited 1942

Has it been translated? Yes No
Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Legal Staff (Mr. Hauxhurst)

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OKURA, Kunihiro

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Ultra-nationalist propaganda

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This study shows OKURA as a believer in totalitarianism. Science is studied for the sake of the State, not for truth's sake. Buddhism has been losing his attraction for Japanese, because it does not give enough consideration to the State. He gives praise to German Labor Service Education, but wishes Japan to be a step ahead of Germany. He stresses the importance of various "Austerities" (Labor, Military Training) for the human development. He attacks imitation of the West as "disintegrating the personality."

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Steiner

Doc. No. 1435

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1436

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: File of printed "YOMIURI HOCHI
Bulletin"

Date: 30 Jan 43 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese
to 19 Feb 44

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Legal Staff

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SHORIKI, Matsutaro

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Use of propaganda,
war.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Lecture of SHORIKI before employees 1 Jan 43 contains
following remarks on the "Mission of Newspapers."

"As newspapers are public organs for leading the
public, newspaper men should not only not publish any
news which disturbs the public peace, but should refrain
from discussing it." (p. 1, Bulletin 85)

"The principal rule in enlightening the people is to
lay emphasis on the idea of the national polity. Newspaper
men should always bear in mind that the Emperor himself
is the country." (Bulletin 85, p. 1)

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 1436

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1437

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Allowance and Ration File of PW
and Civil Internees

Date: 1943 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Treatment of PWs.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Letter from Foreign Vice-Minister to Superintendent of PW Information Bureau, dated 17 June 1943, subject, "Lending of Public Funds of U.S. Government to Americans."

Letter states: "The U. S. Government came to hear and know from an unofficial source that in Japan the authorities are avoiding the lending of public funds of U.S. Government to Americans interned in Japan, fearing reparation in the future."

"The U.S. Government earnestly desires that the Japanese Government direct the competent officials in Japan, and her occupied territories, to induce the representatives of nations which look after U.S. interests in the above regions, and, in regions where there are no such representatives--the representatives of the International Red Cross, to get in touch with the Americans freely and lend them the necessary funds in exchange for appropriate receipts." (pp 8,

The Japanese Foreign Office verbally replied to Swiss Legation in Tokyo advising Japan would comply with the American request. (p. 10)

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Miwa

Doc. No. 1437

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1438

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Allotment and supplies to PWs.
Date Original Copy Language: Japanese
Has it been translated? Yes No
Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Treatment of PWs.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains:

- (1) Request by U.S.A. for increase of salary of officers with which Japan does not comply (p. 23);
- (2) Japanese refusal of English request to provide PWs with soy beans, (p. 85);
- (3) Protest by British Government against the shortage of food containing vitamin 1 (p. 87);
- (4) Protest by U.S. regarding treatment of PWs detained in three localities. Complaints re payment of salaries, shortage of food and daily needs, and inadequate communication facilities.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Miwa

Doc. No. 1438

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1439

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Treatment of PWs.

Date: 1942-43 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Treatment of PWs.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains:

(1) Request from Swiss Legation to improve treatment of PWs in Seaul and Jinsen; especially with reference to clothes, dental equipment, PX goods, religious workings, and communications.

(2) Request from Swiss Legation to improve treatment in Zentsuji relating particularly to gloves, PX goods, and undergarments.

(3) Protest from Britain on the mistreatment of British PWs in Thailand. Very poor sanitary equipment, shortage of food, and hard labor.

(4) Protest against execution of British PWs on pretext they escaped from PW camp in Burma.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Miwa

Doc. No. 1439

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1440

24 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Privy Council Proceedings on (a) German-Japanese, (b) Japanese-Italian Economic Agreements, and (c) French Indo-China Note on Accounts.

Date: 19 Jan 43 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Privy Council

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HIRANUMA, Kiichiro; SUZUKI, Teirchi; SHIMADA; TANI, Masayuki; AOKI; TOJO; ANTO.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Relations French Indo-China. Relations Germany, Italy.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

German and Italian agreements outline in general terms economic cooperation, except no Italian protocol, because "at present Italy's economic sphere in Europe cannot be determined."

F.I.C. Agreement provides "special yen" should be used in settling accounts between the two countries, Indo-China in return to give Japan "piastre" currency for payment to troops, merchants, etc. Exchange value to be on basis of rate of 1 Jan 43.

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 1440

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1441

23 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Report, "Fundamental Foreign Tenets Concerning the Execution of the National Policies Decided by the Imperial Conference of November 5"

Date: 13 Nov 41 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TOJO

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This document, with minor changes, is a later draft of Document No. 1440.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Suzukara

Doc. No. 1441

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1442

24 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: "Fundamental Tenets of Foreign Policy on the Execution of National Policies Decided by Imperial Conference of 5 Nov 41"

Date: 11 Nov 41 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TOJO; MATSUOKA; OIKAWA; TANI

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparation for conspiracy of aggressive warfare; violation Kellogg-Briand Pact; aggression--Thailand

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The conference--this document reveals--clearly decided to attack America and England on 5 November, while planning to maintain negotiations as shield.

Decision entailed plans to

- a) Disclose intention to Germany and Italy;
- b) Opening of negotiations with Dutch "with the purpose of concealing and disguising our scheme";
- c) Force Thailand to permit passage of troops.

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 1442

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1443

24 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Report, "Basic Principle for Rapid Conclusion of War Against America, England, Netherlands, and Chungking Regime"

Date: 12 Nov 41 Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MATSUOKA, Yosuke; TANI, Masayuki

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1. A "No-Separate-Peace Treaty" shall be concluded with Germany and Italy.

2. We shall perform a service in behalf of peace between Germany and the Soviet with the consent of the former, and the restoration of connection by land between Japan and Germany must be realized. On the other hand, the adjustment of our relations with the Soviet should not be neglected, and if it is possible, we should encourage or induce her expansion in the direction of India or Iran.

3. Our oppression against Chungking Government and the measures to accelerate the solution of the China Incident shall be performed in the form of a complete disruption of military supply routes to Chungking; the occupation of foreign concessions, and the utilization of the Chinese merchants in the South Sea areas, leading them to direct their activities against the Chungking government.

4. The independence of Philippine Islands shall be recognized and proclaimed to the world at the earliest occasion after the occupation of the Islands.

Doc. No. 1443

Page 1

5. The independence of part of Dutch East Indies shall be allowed and other necessary area is to be kept in our possession.

6. We will give independence to Burma. Thus we may instigate the movement for the independence of India.

7. We will give support to Thailand's movement against England for the recovery of lost territory.

8. The administrative policy towards the occupied area shall be performed in such a way as to advance the general welfare and win the hearts of the people, avoiding interference in the national affairs as much as possible.

9. We shall declare our intention to guarantee an equal supply of tin and rubber in the South Seas to the U.S.A. and England when the time becomes suitable.

NOTE:1. Judging from the fact proved in World War I, the policy to utilize Americans of German descent for the purpose to break up the public opinion of the U.S.A. will be impractical and fruitless.

2. One cannot expect much from activities in Central and South America.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1444

24 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Report, "Basic Principle for Rapid Conclusion of War Against America, England, Netherlands, and Chungking Regime" (For Liaison Committee use, Imperial HQ.)

Date: 11 Nov 41 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No
Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

A plan of decision by the Liaison Conference giving details as to how the war could be speedily brought to a successful end. Similar to the report with the same title, dated 12 November 1941, which was translated in full.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Suzukawa

Doc. No. 1444

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1445

24 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Report, "Fundamental Foreign Tenets Concerning the Execution of the National Policies Decided by the Imperial Conference of November 5"

Date: 12 Nov 41 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No
Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Japanese Government

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

(TN This is a revised plan made by the Foreign Ministry on 12 November 1941 and is identical to the one of the same title which was decided at the Liaison Conference and dated 13 November 1941.)

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Suzukawa

Doc. No. 1445

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1446

24 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: "I Express My Opinions Concerning Extra-ordinary Situations," by ARAKI, Sadao

Date: 1938 Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Legal Staff

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Pamphlet contains opinions expressed by ARAKI, then Minister of Education, mainly re role of education in aiding Japan solve problems confronting her. Significant points are:

1. Despite Japan's desperate efforts to promote peace and happiness, relationships between Japan and China became increasingly worse after World War I.

a. Culminated in Sino-Japanese conflict.

1) Began with gunfire incident at PEIPIN

(7 July 1937)

2) Extended to China Incident

a) Must be looked upon not merely as Sino-Japanese problem, but grave incident traceable to World War I and affecting entire world.

b) Cannot be completely solved unless true security of Japan's position can be attained.

(1) Japan must enhance glory of its empire.

(2) Japan on road toward becoming leading nation of Orient.

Doc. No. 1446

Page 1

- b. Fundamental aims of policy re China.
 - 1) Punish outrageous China; then aid in construction and development.
 - a) Establishment of restoration government at NANKING.
 - b) Recognition of MANCHUKUO.
 - c) Proclaim spirit of unity of five races.
 - c. Necessary procedures for establishment of above aims.
 - 1) Act with strong determination through promotion of national spirit; inspiring confidence; utilization of labor service; continuation school duties for promotion of industry.
 - d. Necessities of present school education.
 - 1) Develop recognition of present situation to gain understanding of course Japan must take.
 - a) Encourage foreign trade to obtain favorable balance.
 - b) Increase internal production.
 - c) Practice economy in consumption.
 - 2) How education can succeed in above necessities.
 - a) Emphasis laid upon character training; enlargement of cultural training; cultivation of mind and body; study of sciences; creation of feeling of responsibility to country; unify knowledge and morale.

Speech delivered at 600th anniversary of KEMBU Restoration, by ARAKI (13 Mar 34). Major features of speech are:

- 1. Primary missions of Japan
 - a. Restoration of Imperial rule within Japan.
 - b. With all nations, bring about eternal peace based upon welfare of mankind.
- 2. SHOWA Restoration not bloody revolution, as some mistakenly maintain.
 - a) If such term as "SHOWA Restoration" exists, purposes are:
 - 1) Better internal conditions.
 - 2) Gain respect and honor for Japan.
 - 3) Help save world.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1447

24 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Report, "Matters To Be Decided for Japanese-American Compromise"

Date: Presumably Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese
1941

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable):

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Gives position to be taken in anticipation of an agreement in accordance with "B" plan, which is as follows:

1. Return to status preceding freezing of assets.
2. Contract for delivery of 3,500,000 tons of oil to Japan by U.S.
3. U.S. will not hamper any effort for peace mediation between Japan and China.
4. Understandings with Britain and the Netherlands will be obtained after obtaining understandings with U.S.

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 1447

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1448

24 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Report, "The Fundamental Administrative Policy of Occupied Territory in the South." (For Liaison Committee use, Imperial HQ.)

Date: 20 Nov 41 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Imperial General Headquarters

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare; preparation for war, political.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Provides for coordination of occupation with local governments, acquisition of raw materials, handling of local residents and Japanese civilians, and possibility of institution rule by Home Ministry.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Suzukawa

Doc. No. 1448

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1449

24 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Miscellaneous reports.

Date: 1941 Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable):

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Japanese Government; TOJO; SUZUKI; and KAYA

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare. Preparations for war; preparing Japanese opinion for war.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains:

Item 1: Draft of causa belli opening hostilities against Britain and America, dated 11 November 1941, to be decided by the liaison conference.

Item 2: Outline for guiding public opinion concerned with Jap-American negotiations, issued by Information Bureau and dated 1 December 1941. It informs that negotiation will be continued despite the adverse note delivered by Secretary of State Hull to Ambassador NOMURA on 26th; that the TATSUTA MARU will depart YOKOHAMA on the 2nd of December to pick up Japanese nationals in U.S.; that the aforementioned situation does not mean the breaking-off of the negotiation by the U.S. so people should hear the situation and carry on as usual.

Item 3: Propaganda outline in waging war against Britain and America. Cited as its fundamental policy the emphasizing of Imperial consent by publicizing the Imperial Rescript proclaiming war; clarifying of the righteousness

Doc. No. 1449

Page 1

of Jap victory; strengthening of the people's confidence in victory; and opening of a world-wide ideological warfare for the support of equal rights to existence and for establishment of a lasting peace.

Item 4: Outline for guiding public opinion concerning Jap-American diplomatic negotiations as decided at the cabinet conference of 3 October 1941 and published by the Information Board. It cites as its policy the elimination of vacillating public opinion and the speedy promotion of a wartime condition (TAISEI). Restriction on unfavorable news portending war was removed as long as it was not exaggerated or distorted, and the people were psychologically being prepared for war.

Item 5: Outline for guiding public opinion toward British and American problems as the result of understandings reached at Cabinet Conference of 4 November 1941 and published by the Information Board. It instructs easing of restrictions on news giving objective facts on tenseness of relations with America and Britain; raising of fever of public opinion; elimination of any news pertinent to Jap preparation for war and strategic moves; and elimination of any direct action by Jap people against foreign nationals in Japan.

Item 6: Report, dated 12 November 1941, informing the contents of instructions given Ambassador NOMURA on 2 November and 4 November 1941, by Foreign Ministry, for conducting Jap-American negotiation. Report states that on 2 November 1941, instructions were given NOMURA that the decision will be made at the Imperial Conference of the 5th, that the above decision is the final step in the negotiation, and that in the event negotiations are to be resumed, a very speedy agreement and conclusion must be reached due to various circumstances. (This instruction was given only to the ambassador.) On 4 November 1941, instruction was given to NOMURA saying that the Imperial Liaison Conference decided upon a plan for negotiation ("A" and "B" Plans) and that negotiations will be continued with the hope for maintaining peace in the Pacific, but that this was the final try and that the result of the subsequent negotiation would decide the destiny of Japan.

Item 7. Draft of message (in English) presumably written by MATSUOKA, acknowledging receipt by the Emperor of the message dispatched to him by President Roosevelt. The Emperor was said to have commanded the Jap Government to make replies to the President's queries and for the Jap Government to continue its effort for peace.

Item 8: Press clippings of speeches made by Premier TOJO, President of Cabinet Planning Board SUZUKI, and Finance Minister KAYA. According to the 25 November 1941 issue of the newspaper "KOKUMIN," Premier TOJO gave a speech to certain prefectural governors who were meeting at his home, and he exhorted them to lead the people so they will move as one body for prosecution of the holy war and for realizing certain victory. According to 26 November 1941 issue of newspaper "YOMIURI," President of Planning Board, SUZUKI, gave a speech saying the troublemakers of the world are Churchill and Roosevelt, and that he is certain Japan would come out victorious in a war against them. The same issue of the newspaper carried a speech by Finance Minister KAYA before the meeting of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association where he exhorted strengthening the wartime economic structure, liberating Asia from the white yoke, and creation of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and a "HAKKO ICHIU" Japan,--("all nations under one roof").