THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRAGMATISM IN RELATION

TO CHRISTIAN FAITH

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The main concern of philosophy has always been to reach out to knowledge of life and its meaning. Until the twentieth century, with the rise of Pragmatism and Neo-Realism, two movements can be said to have included, in a general way, all the various schools of thought. These two movements, Idealism and Naturalism, both reached what seemed to be an insurmountable difficulty in the problem of the Absolute, or, in more popular terms, problem of the existence of God. Hume, on the one hand, contended that it was impossible to prove the existence of God from a belief in logic and science and Kant, on the other hand, contended that it was just as impossible to deduce the existence of God from the idea of God. For three centuries philosophy has given its best thought to an attempt to find a solution of this difficulty.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century two new Schools of Thought, Pragmatism and Neo-Realism, have arisen from the attempt to solve the problem of absolute knowledge. With one of them, Pragmatism, we are chiefly concerned in this essay.

Pragmatism takes its cue from the method of science. Realising that the extraordinarily successful growth of science is due to the method of investigation of hypotheses, it attempts to carry the same method into the field of philosophy. 'The whole experimentalist tendency in English science and philosophy may be said to have anticipated the pragmatic theory' (Perry P.P.T.p.197). Pragmatism comes therefore as a method with a new theory of knowledge and a particular emphasis upon psychology. It suggests that a way of bridging the gap between the finite and the infinite may be found by building out from human experience in a sense similar to that by which a bridge over a chasm may be built from one side until it finally
reaches the other. We are, as yet, too close to pragmatism to
tell whether the metaphor is apt. In the case of the engineer
who plans the bridge some knowledge of the end is always in
sight but it is at present true, as someone has aptly said of
James, that 'he does not know where he is going but he is on his
way'. Yet the pragmatists hope that someday the end may come
in sight. Schiller in his essay on Truth and Survival Value
recognizes the fact that the end may be very far away 'Then,
in the end, a very distant end as things seem at present, all
may perhaps agree upon a mixture of values which all who sur-
vive will welcome as 'the truth'. (Problems of Belief p.175).
The point of emphasis is that pragmatism claims to be nothing

Pragmatism is primarily a theory of knowledge (sic
Perry P.E.T.p.199). Its particular emphasis is upon the
suggestion that knowledge must be grounded in human nature.
Thinking is a mode of conduct, an expression of human living, and consequently psychology, as well as logic, is necessary in a search for truth. The attitude that the pragmatist takes is that life is a practical rather than a speculative matter, and knowledge is of value only in so far as it performs a service to man; hence the pragmatic theory lays particular stress upon the practical reason.

We therefore find that the pragmatists are particularly interested in human truth as a system which has its source in human experience. The chief interest for man is present truth, and the hope is that present truth will lead in the end to absolute truth. Truth according to Schiller is 'that manipulation of objects which turns out upon trial to be useful, primarily for any human end, but ultimately for that perfect harmony of our whole life which forms our final aspiration' (Schiller. Humanism p.61).

Absolute truth for Schiller, and to a great extent
for pragmatism generally, is not the absolute truth as we understand it in Realism or Idealism. In his essay 'Why Humanism?', (Contemporary British Philosophy p.399) he defines final knowledge as being something neither wholly 'a priori' nor wholly empirical. 'It will be a product of the continual interplay and interaction of the knower and his world and will owe its character to both. It is evident that this theory regards both factors as essential, utilizes both, and combines them in the closest intimacy. Thus it does justice to everything that was valuable in both empiricism and 'a priorism' and really effects their synthesis. Knowledge becomes a continuously developing process to which no term need be set.'

Again in his essay on Belief and Action (Problems of Belief p.139) he emphasizes the same point in a slightly different way 'The conception of Absolute Truth in logic is worthy of ranking with the Categorical Imperative in ethics.......Of no truth can it legitimately be asserted that it holds absolute-
ly........The doctrine of absolute truth.......has no practical application to the problems of knowing'. Hence it will be seen that pragmatism is generally conceived as opposed to absolutism, which in its search for absolute truth is dialectic and mathematical in method. Pragmatism, by its emphasis upon 'truth for the present' is empirical in method.

Pragmatism has therefore a definition of truth which is different from the ordinary conception of truth. Royce in the Conception of God (p.p. 30-31) says, 'by the absolute reality we can only mean either that which is present to an absolutely organized experience inclusive of all possible experience, or that which would be presented as the content of such an experience if there were one'. Somewhat the same basic idea is present in Spencer's doctrine of the Absolute, Alexander's Space-Time theory and in fact in all other schools of philosophy. In common language it might be expressed as the foundation principle or bedrock of truth which underlies all thought and
and which all thought is trying to reach. But pragmatism will not allow itself to be concerned with this kind of truth though as James says (E.R.E.p.239) 'The pragmatist does not dogmatically deny the abstract possibility of things-in-themselves or assert the intrinsic absurdity of trans-empirical objects'. To the pragmatist, truth is an ultimate attitude and specific function of our intellectual activity, 'a manipulation of objects valued as true which after trial has been adopted as useful' (Schiller.H.p.61). As Rogers says in reference to James--'the best definition of pragmatism is the identifying of truth with satisfying consequence'.

That is to say that knowledge for the pragmatist is a process and not a product. It involves an individual knower, a something to be known, means of knowing that something, and the cognitive act. This kind of knowledge is humanly attainable (sic Perry P.F.T.p.203) lying within the individual thought process. It differs from the other views of knowledge in its
emphasis upon the principle of present knowledge as opposed to completed knowledge, 'not the truth of God's knowledge, but the truth of my knowledge of God'. Hence it will be seen that pragmatism is psychological in outlook. Yet since pragmatism seeks to distinguish between cases of true and false knowledge, it uses logic also and in spite of Schiller's 'Useless Knowledge' (Humanism Essay III) it must not be supposed that pragmatism has made light of logic. By its emphasis upon psychology it has directed attention to the danger of the over-emphasis of the value of logic. Not only pragmatists but all critics of absolutism will admit that the dialectic method can be carried to extremes. What the pragmatist wishes is that logic should take account of the motives of desire, interest, and feeling, and it is this wish that has given rise to many of the attacks upon the theory. As Schiller points out, 'Even if logic could find and reserve for itself among our conscious processes such a thing as a process of 'pure' thought a distinct mental act
would yet be necessary for its apprehension and this would be psychological' (H.p.51). Again he says (p.52) 'An element of feeling is bound up with, and accompanies every act of thought, and no act of thought is, or can be, conceived of as 'pure thought'.

The above position is the foundation principle of the pragmatic movement. The doctrine of the possibility of pure thought cannot exclude the psychic processes which are inextricably mingled with thought. Even in the exact science of mathematics a process has to be felt, or valued, before it is understood. Again, between the various stages of a mathematical process there must enter some psychical element which carries one from one stage to another while the process is being thought. Thus pragmatism claims that there is no 'pure' thought 'per se'. Upon this claim the whole theory stands or falls; if there is no such thing as pure thought 'per se', logic is compelled to take into account the human element in thought.
The conception of the human element in thought brings in its train the conception of the idea as an instrument of knowledge. The process of knowing is practical and for the pragmatist it is knowledge 'about', or reflective knowledge. Knowing is a phase of life and in consequence the idea is whatever exercises the function of meaning. 'Anything may be an idea provided you mean with it' (Perry P.P.T.p.201). As James says, (H.T.p.110) 'Ideas are practical substitutes for immediacy.' This is quite definitely opposed to the conception that the truth of an idea has something to do with the resemblance between the idea and the thing ideated. Truth for the pragmatist is always humanly attainable truth.

Building upon the definition of an idea as the instrument of belief, the truth or falsity of an idea becomes a matter of chief concern for the pragmatists. For him an idea is true when it works. The criteria by which the truth of an idea may be verified are named by Perry (P.P.T.p.205). They
Verification by perception, consistency, operation, sentiment and general utility. It will be necessary to investigate how pragmatism concerns itself with these.

Verification by perception and consistency are the traditional criteria of empiricism and rationalism. If the idea is effective in leading to the thing ideated or if the idea stands the test of comparison with other true ideas it is a true idea. In the use of these two criteria pragmatism is in agreement with both rationalism and empiricism and it finds no quarrel with the logical bases of either.

The dividing line is seen when the other three criteria are considered. Verification by perception and consistency are looked upon by pragmatists as theoretical tests of definite value but, as we have seen above, they have not solved the problem of absolute knowledge and some way must be found to lead beyond the bounds of pure reason. Hence the pragmatist advocates the use of three other criteria, as above mentioned, verification
by operation, sentiment and general utility.

These three extralogical criteria are interpreted as follows:— Verification by operation means the testing of an idea by its subsequent utility. 'If I received my reward in heaven for sacrifices deliberately made upon earth, my idea of heaven, according to the pragmatist, would be true' (Perry, F. P. T. p. 207). In a similar way, verification by sentiment means that if my idea of heaven makes me lead a better life my idea of heaven is true. Again, verification by use means that if my idea of heaven proves a good idea to live by, then my idea is true. All three criteria of necessity overlap because they have the same extralogical principle underlying them.

It might have been better for pragmatism if it had been willing to concede that the real test of truth lies in verification by perception and consistency, but that where these failed the other three criteria might be applied as extralogical criteria. The whole attack upon the movement is upon
the extra-logical criteria and in consequence pragmatism has tended to over-emphasize them. It must be constantly kept in mind that the kind of truth that the pragmatist talks about is humanly attainable truth, not, as quoted above, the truth of God's knowledge but the truth of my knowledge of God. That is to say, truth for the pragmatist is a property of the idea. An idea serves a specific practical purpose and when it fulfills that purpose it is a true idea. This definition of truth must never be confused with the definition that truth is the correspondence between the idea and the thing ideated.

The pragmatist does not deny the abstract possibility of absolute truth however much he may affirm that it is unattainable. 'For him, (the pragmatist) as well as for his critic, there can be no truth if there is nothing to be true about...... This is why as a pragmatist I have so carefully posited 'reality' ab initio, and why throughout my whole discussion, I remain an epistemological realist' (James E.P.p.p.XIX-195). All that
pragmatism wishes to say is that, since truth is unattainable, we must try to find a workable basis upon which to build out human experience into human knowledge. There are certain phases of life which seem to hold out the hope that they may lead to a greater knowledge of life and these phases the pragmatist tests by means of ideas and their criteria. Perchance these tests may bring human knowledge nearer to absolute truth and he consistently hopes they may, though he never asserts they will.

When the pragmatist talks about utility as a criterion of truth he means that if my idea is useful then the idea is true. The critic immediately asks, 'Useful for what?'. The pragmatist reply is that it is useful in helping on the general progress of thought and life; for if there is one belief that agitates the minds of all pragmatists alike it is that life is one continual process of evolution. The difficulty here is that the pragmatic definition of utility has not
been sufficiently clarified. Professor Moore (p.112.F.B.) cites the case of the man who, believing his watch was right when it was slow, missed his train and escaped death in a collision which took place. Here a wrong idea seems to have been useful. The pragmatist would not admit the validity of such an example on the grounds that measure-ability 'in toto' is not within the compass of man's mind. Nor does this reply beg the question. If life is an evolutionary process then utility 'in toto' can only be measured by final results.

This broad conception of the criteria is also apparent in the doctrine of the mutability of truth. Pragmatic truth grows and its content becomes constantly greater, but that does not mean for the pragmatist that an idea may be true today and untrue tomorrow. From the pragmatic point of view the idea is simply an instrument and as such is a temporal, not an absolute, idea. Schiller in his essay on Infallibility and Toleration says, 'It is quite clear that absolute truth is not
an operative idea. It is an ideal that even recedes into the distance when we try to grasp it. The truths men deal in are not absolute' (H.p.275). In this sense Newton's laws have helped in the development of science and, though they may be contradicted by some newer discoveries, their truth would be tested by their utility in the development of science and not by the fact of their contradiction. Pragmatic truth is temporal truth in the sense that one may use a half-inch chisel to do the work of an inch chisel when the latter is missing. This brings us back to the starting point that the pragmatic method is the method of hypotheses and if some questions that pragmatism raises seem to be illogical it may possibly be accounted for by the fact that logic has been made the 'be-all and end-all' of philosophic method.

There is one fact that must not be lost sight of. As a new way of thinking, pragmatism has been made by some of its exponents more than was originally intended. Some of its
leaders, probably in their anxiety to meet criticism, have been compelled to over-emphasize their point of view. As a method of thinking it has possibilities and it was originally propagated as a method only. So keen was the opposition of adverse criticism that several of its leading exponents, notably Schiller and Dewey, carried the method into a philosophical attitude. Schiller is always on the point of saying that reality as a whole is not static and knowledge is to be used for forward looking conduct by which principle we are absolved from seeking an answer to speculative perplexities and Dewey emphasizes behaviour as the sole field of philosophical enquiry. Yet Schiller (H. intro. p. XIX) definitely denies that pragmatism 'is the final term of philosophical innovation'.

As a philosophical attitude the extreme developments of pragmatism are open to criticism from a logical standpoint; but as a method which wishes to insist upon the validity of extra-logical criteria it finds its true place in the realm of
philosophy. This insistence upon the use of extra-logical criteria is responsible for a new outlook upon life, and upon religion and ethics and in this direction its possibilities are manifold.
CHAPTER II

PRAGMATISM IS NO NEW THING IN PHILOSOPHY

While Pragmatism, as recently presented by James, Schiller and Dewey, is offered as a new contribution to philosophic thought it is in reality no new thing. The mode of its presentation may be new and its method may be new but its fundamental basis is as old as philosophy itself. This basis is that of utility. James rightly claims that philosophy is as necessary to man as science and religion. Since he believes that philosophy has, for many years, been partaking of the nature of the cloister, he feels that something ought to be done to bring it out of its retirement. Science has its right place in the world as an aid to man's material advancement, religion has its place as an aid to man's moral growth, philosophy then should have its place as an aid to man's effort to satisfy that urge which is forever impelling him to search out truth.

This place is not in the cloister but in the world at
large and unless some means of achieving this can be found, philosophy must become a dead issue, just as dead an issue as mediaeval scholasticism. To bring it out of the cloister James takes a practical standpoint and defines pragmatism as 'a new name for some old ways of thinking', his choice of the term pragmatism signifying the renewed emphasis upon the practical aspect of philosophy. Windleband (p.11 Trans. by Tufts 1914 ed.) uses the term 'pragmatic factor' in the same sense, as designating the practical side of philosophy. It is James' aim to emphasize the utility of philosophy and he lays stress upon a suggestion that runs through all schools of thought. Credit must be given to the pragmatists for their presentation of the problem and their method of isolating and emphasizing it, but pragmatism is as old as the problem of existence. To quote Windleband (ibid p.11) 'The problems of philosophy are in the main given, and this is shewn by the fact that they are constantly recurring in the historical movement of thought as the
"primeval enigma of existence" and are ever anew demanding
imperiously the solution which has never completely succeeded'.
To solve the problem of existence is really the main duty of
philosophy and the problem is constantly to hand.

In the sense that pragmatism emphasizes the practical
aspect of philosophy, it is no new theory; indeed some of the
earlier theories were more pragmatic than those of the present
day schools. Because of the limitations of human knowledge the
development of philosophy has moved in cycles, apparently pro-
gressing and moving onward but always returning to the starting
place as the man lost in the snow. In consequence of this con-
stant return to the starting place a constant recurrence of the
old theories is seen. Stoicism is repeated in the philosophy
of early Christianity and again at the Reformation. In a some-
what limited form it appears today. Materialism of the time
of Leucippus comes again, in modified form, at the present time.
Again and again the old theories are revived and we are in-
clined to believe them new. It must be accepted that each suc-
ceeding cycle of thought usually marks an advance upon its pre-
decessors. The materialism of today is of greater content than
that of Hobbes, which was itself a great advance upon that of
the old Greek school. Progress in philosophic thought must how-
ever be necessarily slow and limited because of the limitations
of the human mind. Since all we know is the product of our own
self-consciousness it would seem almost impossible to get with
absolute certainty beyond the bounds of self. It may be that
the road to absolute truth will be discovered by the gateway
of self.

Herein lies the importance of the emphasis upon utility
as the basis of later pragmatism and herein lies the importance
of the pragmatic factor in the history of philosophy. Unless
some use is made of the practical value of philosophical theories
no advance can be made. Whenever the cycle of thought returns
to its starting place the pragmatic factor receives fresh
emphasis. This emphasis is the cause of its start upon the next cycle.

The scholasticism of mediseval days and the mysticism which accompanied it were the end of a cycle which, commencing with Plato and Socrates, seemed to start with a fair prospect of achievement, but they became as dead wood. The rediscovery of the Greek philosophers, about the end of the fifteenth century, started a new cycle of thought but this discovery was accompanied by the unrest consequent upon the decadence of civilization during the dark ages. The Renaissance was a revolution which was inevitable under the circumstances and as a matter of necessity the trend of thought under the influences of the time was humanistic. Strange as it may seem, the cycle of new thought, if now it may be called, starts with a pragmatic emphasis. Other examples may be noted to demonstrate that it is the emphasis upon utility which continually revivifies philosophy. We are too close to present day pragmatism to prove that we are
on the commencement of a new cycle, but the appearance of a new emphasis upon utility would point to this fact.

That present day pragmatism is an advance upon what has gone before is only to be expected. With the development of psychology and new theories of substance and an emphasis upon evolution, which have been marked features of the past cycle, present day pragmatism has a bright prospect of giving an impetus to philosophy greater than it has ever received before. It is this emphasis upon doctrines of evolution, upon psychology and upon science that distinguishes the new pragmatism from the pragmatism of earlier days. It is the insistence upon the utility of philosophy and hence of a new method of thinking which makes it closely akin to that of other days. From a historical point of view it would seem that in the latter quality is to be found the real value of pragmatism as now presented.
In early days, under other names, Pragmatism emphasised the practical utility of philosophy.

Cushman, in his History of Philosophy (Vol. I. pp. 20-21), shows how, in the early stages of Greek philosophy, the experiences of the Cosmologists in political troubles made them wonder as to the permanence of things. Neither religion nor science were of any real value to them, since neither seemed to provide them with a refuge from the troubles of the times. Hence they did not ask what was the original form of their changing world but what 'is' fundamental to the world 'always'. The idea of a temporal origin of things gives place to that of an eternal being and the question finally emerges:— 'What is the real substance that constitutes the universe?' The point for emphasis in connection with our discussion is that the utility factor here was a need for some sure refuge and safe foothold in an age when temporal life was cheap and one's hold
upon it insecure. Xenophanes claimed that the single primordial
substance below the changes of nature was God and his insistence
upon this point established a connection between religion and
philosophy.

In a somewhat similar way the 'Republic' of Plato and
the 'Politics' of Aristotle are definite products of the urgency
of the times. As politico-philosophical treatises they are the
result of a demand for better conditions of life and a higher
standard of morality as well as of government. The teachings of
both have a definite utility value. 'Are we to call no man
happy while he lives, and, as Solon would have us do, look to
the end? And again, if we are to maintain this position is then
a man happy when he is dead? or is not this a complete absurd-
Happiness for Aristotle was something tangible, something for
the present life, something practical rather than ideal.

Whatever interpretation may be given to the works of the
early philosophers it must be evident that the real purpose running through the various schools was not the solution of a theoretical problem but the solution of a very practical one. It did not isolate these men from the world except in so far as their teachings contradicted the ways of those in authority. They had many followers driven by the same urge to find how life could be made more secure and how heaven could come among men as Christ himself said at a later time.

It is in this way, under other names and in other guises, that we meet pragmatism at every turn in ancient philosophy. When the Platonic schools have diverged from the teachings of their founder the scepticism of the Hellenic-Roman period takes precedence but the old question still persists:— 'What, after all, is the object of human life and what can give happiness to the individual amid the turmoil of the time?' (Cushman p.213).

'The problem now is:— Show us the man who is sure of his happiness whatever the accidents of the world may bring to him.'
This, it is true, is a variation of the question of the cosmologists, but at the same time it is a question whose underlying purpose is the same.

And so down the ages the same question has been asked, a question of practical value:— What is the meaning of life, how can we arrive at an understanding of its purposes? The question is not, for pragmatists, to be answered by logic but by building upon actual experience. Inevitably both logic and pure intellect have ended in theories of no immediate practical value, and, just as inevitably, the recreation of interest in philosophy has come by way of an insistence upon its utility value. Nietzsche, to whom Thilly (Hist.Phil.p.574) gives credit for the rebirth of pragmatism, claims that the mind or intelligence is merely an instrument in the hands of instinct, of the will for life and power; it is the 'little reason' created by the body; the body and the instincts are the big 'reason'. Knowledge has value only in so far as it promotes and preserves life. To love truth
for its own sake instead of as a means of life is turning things upside down and is a diseased instinct. This insistence upon the practical value of knowledge and the exclusion of 'useless' knowledge is undoubtedly the storm centre around which the philosophical battles of the ages have been fought.

What connection is there between the pragmatism of other days and that of today? Perry says (P.P.T.p.197) 'Pragmatism is, as James acknowledges, an old way of thinking'. It is dangerous, however, to identify contemporary pragmatism too closely with any of the earlier doctrines that resemble it. Thus the whole experimentalist tendency in English Science and Philosophy may be said to have anticipated the pragmatist theory that truth is achieved by the trying of hypotheses. Again he says (ibid. p.198) 'Kant and the Fichtean idealists after him maintained the primacy of the practical reason'. This is the point that we have attempted to make and it can be said with justice that one phase of present day pragmatism,
the pragmatism akin to that of James, is found as a constant factor in the philosophy of ancient as well as mediaeval days. It must be clearly appreciated however that the progress in psychology has coloured the practical philosophy of James so as to make it a distinct advance upon that of its predecessors and insistence upon this point can not be too strongly made. That is a development only to be expected and one which may lead us to hope that ultimately pragmatism will be that 'blend of naivete, vigour and adventurous courage which proposes to possess the future, despite the present and the past' (P.P.T.p.265).

The insistence upon the utility value of philosophy, while establishing a connection between the earlier forms of the theory, marks also the line of their separation. Pragmatism as a theory of knowledge opposed to idealism, is a product of the present era solely. The humanism of Schiller and the ethics of Dewey are likewise not to be found in the 'practical viewpoints' of earlier days. Pragmatism is therefore related to, but
distinguished from, the older forms of applied philosophy. New in name, broader in scope and lacking in prejudice, including all phases of practical thought, religion, ethics and epistemology it is a far more comprehensive line of thought than its prede-
cessors.
CHAPTER IV

THE COORDINATION OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE OF EARLIER DAYS.

'Science and philosophy may be said to have had their origin in religion, or rather, originally science, philosophy and religion were all one' (Thilly, H.P. P.3 intro.). Religion was originally and still is an attempt to formulate a plan of salvation, and its two servants were science and philosophy. In the search for an ideal, there is more religion than science or philosophy; even Aristotle comes close to the religious ideal. 'To introduce order into the unlimited is the work of a divine power, of such a power as holds together the universe' (Chap. VII. iv.9. Jowett’s Trans. Politics). Socrates also comes so close to the Christian ideal as to have been called by some the 'fore­runner of Christ'.

Wherever one searches in the ancient or mediaeval phil­osophy, the religious 'motif' is apparent on every hand. Science
of olden days was of a practical nature, and its great effort was almost identical with that of religion. In the earliest days while man lived in awe of the supernatural, he had one urge and that was to find security. Not only did he look for security of food and shelter and security from his enemies, but he searched also for security after death; as witness the happy hunting grounds of the Indians. His science was of a practical nature which was to take him along the road to a better understanding of life. Science was then limited to a small compass, astronomy being the first science in the modern sense of the term. Man began to realise gradually that the control of nature could not be brought about by sacrifice to the Gods, and as a result the practical motive of science enters into account. This was really the putting into effect of the old axiom 'Heaven helps those who help themselves'. Science of old was forward looking, anticipating a time when man would be able to coordinate and control nature so as to reach his God. Man did not con-
ceive of God as necessarily a person but as an ultimate end, a something explaining the reason of life. In this sense science was the handmaid of religion, for in religion man found his security. The heathen with his wooden god or his fetish, the philosopher with his ideal of happiness, the Stoic with his fatalism and control of desire, all subordinated science to religion. In the same way philosopher and sage made use of philosophy to achieve security. The question of the past, in science, religion and philosophy alike was: How can happiness and security be found?

As science was related to religion so was philosophy but the latter relationship was much closer. Previous to the religious period of thought (100 B.C.-476 A.D.) the connection between religion and philosophy was so close that the two could not be distinguished. As far back as 600 B.C. Anaximander gives the first conception of God from a philosophical standpoint. His search led him beyond the polytheism of the Greeks to the un-
limited, a physical conception of God beyond all mythical tradition. This coordination between philosophy and religion rises to its height in an era of religious fervour during which Christianity was born, to be followed within a few centuries by Mohammedanism. Both religions were so well received and have grown so persistently that the full force of neither can be calculated. The causes of this emphasis upon religion were twofold. In the first place the culmination of scepticism in the validity of reason, a growth of the ethical period, was superseded by a belief in the authority of the supernatural. In the second place the introduction of many eastern religions (Cushman H.P. p.273.) into the Empire gave a new impetus to religion. Both came at a very opportune time, for the religion of the Romans was not merely decadent but was an object of derision among the people. It was Claudius who, at the battle of Saguntum, when the chickens refused to grant him favourable auspices by eating, commanded that they be given an opportunity
to drink by throwing them overboard. Such was the veneration of the Romans for their 'borrowed gods'.

With such auspices dawned the religious era and one of the first demands made was the demand for a supernatural authority. Religious tradition, as of the Jews, was revived and a renewed hope of the future was born. During the following centuries religion dominated everything in the realm of thought. Doctrine and dogma curbed independent thinking and such men as Galileo and Bacon were compelled to suffer extreme punishment because they were unorthodox.

The religious age was but a culmination of what had been developing throughout the years. Limitations of science, of intellectual thought, of man's ability to peer into the future were bound to lead sooner or later to a belief in the supernatural. Hence the practical tendency of all thought, the religious motive which had permeated both science and philosophy, ends in the dogmatic forms of religion which existed for the
first centuries after Christ. Once a man realised his limitations this was bound to happen. The only way in which he could find a solution of the question that life asked was by means of a belief in the supernatural. Whether or not the solution thus found was satisfactory the history of the succeeding ages shows. Yet for the time being, and for some men even up to the present, it was all-sufficient. The question of religion remained, for many centuries, the storm centre round which circled the whirlwind of war and the storms of religious strife.

Religion was therefore inclusive of, rather than apart from, science and philosophy. The limitations of both led to their domination by religion. The acceptance of a belief in the supernatural gave religion the power of claiming that there were no limitations to what man might find with God to lead him. For men in search of a solution of life's question it provided a better hope, greater satisfaction and a surer foothold on life's road.
CHAPTER V

THE SEPARATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

The superior position which the Christian religion attained during the Middle Ages brought about its own downfall and ultimately gave justification for the bitter strife of the Reformation. For the first few centuries after Christ the missionary work of the church and the need for propaganda was sufficient to occupy its attention. The actual members of the Church were close enough to Christ's teaching and that of the Apostles not to need any definite formulation of a creed. As the teachings became more and more of a tradition the need for the formulation of a doctrine became apparent and from about the beginning of the fifth century strife over matters of doctrine is one of the outstanding features of the church.

In the formulation of this doctrine, both science and religion were called into play. The former because of its very practical nature falls into the background, but the latter plays
a very important part in the building up of dogma. When Hellenism was used in an attempt of the Gnostics to defend the Gospel and to make it subserve the interests of both Hellenism and Oriental philosophy, a bitter strife ensues which foreshadows the total separation of religion and philosophy which was to come within a few years.

The great mind in the religious world of the Middle Ages was Saint Augustine, 354-430 A.D. As a Neo-Platonist he emphasized the inner certainties of consciousness as the starting point of his philosophy. He took as the basis of his religion the works of Saint Paul. He had therefore two criteria of truth:— The authority of the church and the authority of the immediate consciousness of the individual. The authority of the church became as the years passed the doctrine of the Supreme Authority of the church and the other criterion was discarded.

Thus Scholasticism came into being as an attempt to
present the doctrines of the church in a logical system of philosophy. By virtue of its insistence upon authority, the church was able to carry its doctrines into practice. Since insistence upon the authority of the church was not sufficient to prove the purity of its dogma, and later scholasticism made no attempt to improve or extend the doctrine but merely assumed that the authority of the church was all sufficient, scholasticism later fell into disrepute.

It was the Renaissance which cast a shadow upon the spirit of authority. With the revival of learning a new spirit of independence rose, a spirit which so permeated the minds of some men that they preferred death at the stake to the dominance of a religion or creed in which they had no faith. The Renaissance marked the beginning of the separation between religion and philosophy because philosophy was freed from the trammels of authority. This separation was never fully completed, but a spirit of independent thought arose which is still developing.
In reality religion and philosophy, with many points of contact, are by no means synonymous terms. When religion dominated philosophy it was only because the utility factor was more urgent than pure thought. Religion, by offering a solution for the 'enigma of existence', assumed the place of importance.

Religion and philosophy differ in many ways. Religion is grounded in the need of doing the right thing under given circumstances. It arises from the need of arriving at a solution of the problem of life. It is an attempt to deal with headquarters (sic. Perry, P.F.I.p.28). The motive of belief is to treat with God directly as a means of salvation. Religion is first of all a matter of life and passion, a matter of absolute trust in ultimate causes. Philosophy, once freed from the bondage of religion, differs in just this respect. Philosophy is not a matter of belief in ultimate causes, it is a dispassionate study of these causes. But a trust in absolute causes, as in religion, can no more be entirely divorced from a theoretical
study of these causes than the theoretical study of chemical dyes can be divorced from their application in the industrial world. The pragmatic factor continually recurs even in the most dispassionate study of philosophical theory. It can not be kept out of such a study.

The practical motive which guides religion is not therefore opposed to the theoretical motive which guides philosophy and there is no valid reason why they should not work hand in hand. For many centuries they did work together. It was religion itself that brought about the divorce between the two, and, as we have mentioned, a new impetus was thereby given to independent thought. At the same time there were minds that realised, previous to the Renaissance proper, the need for the church to take a more reasonable standpoint. Roger Bacon, who died about the end of the thirteenth century, was a notable example in England. The culmination of the Renaissance in the Reformation was but the result of this spirit of independent
thought which could not subserve the interests of a rigid dogma.
The war was waged solely over the question of freedom of belief
and freedom of thought. The direct result of the Reformation
was that the insistence upon authority passed from the mediaeval
church to the reformed church and, as usually happens in reform
movements, the pendulum swung too far in the opposite direction.

The emphasis upon belief and faith in the times of the
Reformation was so strong that no sympathy was given to those
who did not agree with the tenets of the church. As a conse­
quen ce, the divorce between religion and philosophy was completed
within the early days of the Reformation. It was so well com­
pleted that many of the philosophers of the period considered
philosophy to be a purely intellectual study. It has been re­
marked with justice that Hobbes wrote his Leviathan on Mondays,
after attending service on the previous day, without thinking
that there was any inconsistency in his attitude. Whatever
controversies were waged around his theories, it made no apparent
difference in his beliefs. It must be assumed, however, that the philosophy of that era had no bearing upon religion. It would be foolish to suppose that the divorce was anything but a temporary phase of thought. As a matter of fact the real situation was that the Protestant church was engaged in such a struggle for existence that no time could be spared for attention to philosophical theories. In addition these theories did not seem to really touch upon the doctrines of the church and hence could be neglected. It seems as if such emphasis was being placed upon freedom of belief that freedom of thought was unintentionally allowed at the same time. When the throes of the Reformation had ushered in a strong Protestant church, the war between philosophy and religion really began.
CHAPTER VI

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUALISM HEIGHTENED
THE ESTRANGEMENT BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.

Down to the seventeenth century the logic of Aristotle was the basis of all thought. With the decay of Scholasticism a new school of thought came into prominence. The Scholastics, by emphasis upon dogma, had been able to rank faith as superior to reason. With Aristotle reason was superior to faith and the rediscovery of Greek philosophy gave rise to a new emphasis upon logic. Christian thought, not being able to explain many of the mysteries of its doctrine by logic, explained much by saying it was of divine origin. As a consequence the church held a "body of truth" not subject to the criticism of reason. The issue of the new struggle between religion and philosophy was therefore a logical one:— Can you verify the major premise? The Scholastics said that the premise was a matter of divine illumination, and when such men as Bacon made the appeal to logic they suffered
imprisonment. But sooner or later the conclusion of the syllogism was bound to be investigated and when that was done Modern philosophy was born. The Scholastics put their thought in the form of a maxim:— I believe what is absurd.— The modern world refused to accept a major premise which had not been made in the realm of reason. Descartes and Hobbes and other philosophers of the age believed in religion but not by 'reason'. They considered religion as unrational rather than irrational.

At the same period there came an emphasis upon geometry and the exact sciences, which calls attention to their certainty from a logical standpoint. Geometry, starting from a few axioms so fundamentally true as to be self-evident, led the way into realms of knowledge which were nothing short of amazing, and yet were capable of logical demonstration. This mathematical method, as it comes to be called, made such an appeal on account of its exactness that it kindled the desire for the application of the same method in religion and philosophy: the Leviathan is a good example of this in philosophy. Galileo showed that the method
of geometry could be applied in the study of the natural sciences. Columbus revives the globular theory of the world which was found originally with the Greeks and whence Copernicus got his theory of the sun as centre of the universe. In astronomy, natural science, mechanics and other phases of intellectual thought the mathematical method comes to the fore. It would naturally follow that it also becomes the method for philosophy. Mediaeval thought started with God and hence assumed too much. The modern systems started with some simple facts. As a consequence, the problem of God, which was the centre of the mediaeval systems, becomes an incomprehensible problem, almost without the bounds of philosophy. Modern philosophy, therefore, tends to be a development of epistemology and not of metaphysics.

In fact the keynote of modern philosophy is the question of knowledge. The study of method, an emphasis upon logical thinking, a recast of principles through which an adequate philosophy might be brought into being were found to be of much
greater value and much more in line with principles of logical thought than were the assumptions of earlier schools. The matter in Descartes is interesting but his method of arriving at it is more valuable. The same is true of Hobbes, Hume and Locke. This distinction between mediaeval and modern philosophy is better seen if we consider how Berkeley, interested particularly in replying to agnosticism and materialism, loses both in interest and power by his lack of method. It matters not that the method of Descartes was one of synthesis or that that of Kant was a method of analysis. What is important is that this emphasis upon method took philosophy out of the realm of practical religion and put it where it belonged as a theoretical discussion of ultimate causes, a study to which the new emphasis on method was bound to lead. From the time of the breaking up of the mediaeval schools philosophy became more and more an intellectual study, not without its practical value, but an intellectual study whose practical value was to be proved
when the fruits of the study came to hand.

The modern schools take one of two directions, broadly speaking. The influence of science and its wonderful growth during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries naturally influenced one group towards materialism and realism. The reaction from the influence of extreme materialism turns to idealism. Both divisions include many variations of thought and contain much that is worthy of consideration. Such a division is purely a matter of convenience and there is a good deal of overlapping. Both schools of thought are distinctly intellectualistic and both are definitely apart from the old schools because they do not consider the practical utility of philosophy. They recognise that the first function of philosophy is to find knowledge itself, the application of that knowledge to the betterment of the world is a secondary consideration.

In one respect the two schools of naturalism and idealism are sharply opposed. The desire for exactness has made realism
the ally of science. In realism or, more correctly, in naturalism the positivistic tendency develops in the direction of a systematic materialism, or in the direction of a more refined criticism of scientific concepts. In idealism the romantic tendency amplifies and reinforces the theory of knowledge upon which it must rest its case:—'the theory of the priority of the forms and ideals of the cognitive consciousness' (Perry, P.P.T. p.38). The real contrast between the two is marked, on the part of naturalism, by the emphasis on science and, on the part of idealism, by the emphasis on mind. Neither method has led to any success in achieving a solution of the problem of ultimate truth. In fact the present situation seems to lead one to believe that neither can hope to bring any success. Naturalism is too narrow and idealism is too extravagant and the extravagance of one is just as limiting as the narrowness of the other. Their fundamental opposition has led to a real dilemma in philosophy, to which reference has been made above, and this dilemma
is apparently incapable of solution, a dilemma which has com-
pelled philosophy to choose between either science or religion.
This has never been the wish of philosophy; it has no desire to
be the servant of either, and yet the development of intellect-
ualism has driven philosophic thought round a vicious circle
from which there seems no escape.
CHAPTER VII

THE URGENCY OF PRAGMATISM DUE TO THE DILEMMA OF PHILOSOPHY.

"The most striking feature of the present situation is the absence of any really constructive or reconstructive metaphysical effort. On all hands we find signs of dissatisfaction with idealism in particular. . . . . . The reaction against idealism takes various forms, that of a reassertion of empiricism, of a new 'realism' and of pragmatism" (Prof. James Seth. Eng. Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy p.359.). Hegel is, properly speaking, the last of the great philosophers. The second half of the nineteenth century cannot be styled a philosophical age. Nothing essentially new has appeared. There has been no lack of writers, but speculation has assumed the aspect of the criticism of past attempts or the combination of previous theories rather than the origination of fresh views (Prof. Alexander. Short Hist. Phil. p.509.). There is no doubt, as evidence
the above quotations, that philosophy has made no real advance during the past years. As we have seen above, the dilemma of philosophy seems impossible of solution along the lines in which it has been directed by idealism and naturalism. The general tendency of the past century or two has been, in spite of many practical features, to make philosophical study a purely intellectual matter. In this, by a revision of method along synthetic or analytic lines, it has succeeded fairly well. But a purely intellectual study must ultimately find itself confined within the limits of the mind of man and that is just what has happened to the philosophy of the past era.

It may be assumed as an axiomatic fact that man cannot extend his knowledge into the infinite as completed knowledge such as God’s knowledge would be. There will always be a place where he arrives at boundaries beyond which he cannot go. In the realm of purely theoretical knowledge we may not yet have reached those boundaries, certainly in the realm of pure science.
we have not even come close to reaching them. Yet there are signs that even in science man cannot reach the ultimate cause. Electricity is used, guided, collected and sent to distant places and put to work there; yet there seems to be no real grounds for supposing that we can ever know what it really is. In a similar way we know many of the rules of life but where life comes from and where it goes no man can tell.

The limitations of man's knowledge are so evident on every hand that it is not surprising to find that they constantly make themselves felt in the realm of philosophy. But within man is the constant urge to reach outside the limits of knowledge which are apparently so arbitrary. The great duty of philosophy, the whole aim of philosophy, has ever been to discover the ultimate causes of things and yet inevitably this aim and consequent effort have run through similar channels to similar ends. We have attempted to show above (Chap. II) how the new effort of philosophy at the end of each cycle has been caused by the fact
that mere intellectual discussion seems to reach nowhere in the end. At the head of this chapter two quotations from two historians representative of different groups were used to indicate that at the present time philosophy has reached the end of a cycle. The criticism and the reaffirmation of the older systems which is a feature of present day philosophy is evidence for the fact that from a purely intellectual standpoint philosophy has, as yet, nothing new to tell.

We are too close to present day thought to be able to pass a very definite judgment upon it, but it has its parallel in the Renaissance. As Windleband puts it (H.F.p.326), 'Universalism and Individualism, as in the days of the Renaissance, have once more clashed in violent opposition'. The real question which awaits reply is: In what sense can the psychical life be subjected to the methods and concepts of natural science? An attempt to answer this is made by an appeal to psychology and in consequence psychology makes a great advance
during the nineteenth century. This phase of thought is what distinguishes the present day appeal of philosophy from that of the Renaissance.

That is not all. Psychology, of necessity, is a science rather than a philosophy and the emphasis upon this point would possibly have brought an end to the estrangement between philosophy and science. But the intellectualistic character of the philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was such as to cast out psychology. It was therefore compelled to estrange itself from philosophy. To quote Windleband (H.P.p.626) "The systematic significance of psychology has never been more vigorously contested than in the nineteenth century..... Psychology as the latest of the special disciplines, has completed its separation from philosophy, at least as regards the fundamental principles of its problem and method'.

But psychology, while a science, is closely allied to philosophy since both concern themselves with the problem of consciousness, though the methods of treatment of the problem are
not the same. It is therefore not difficult to appreciate that a new direction might be given to philosophic thought through the medium of psychology. This is exactly what has happened in respect to the pragmatic theory and this is exactly what James has attempted to do. By emphasis upon the scientific side of the mind he claims for his theory that it is a mediator between the two lines of thought which have been so irreconcilable. The most important point that he makes in this connection is the emphasis upon the utility factor in philosophy, an emphasis denoted not only by the nature of the treatise he writes but by the name under which he writes it:—Pragmatism.

We have seen above that intellectualism in philosophy always seems to lead to a blind end beyond which it seems impossible to go. Every epoch of growth has culminated in a blind intellectualism. A rebirth is invariably made by an appeal to the pragmatic factor in philosophy. The Renaissance period is an excellent example of this cyclical growth. Present day prag-
matism is a renewed emphasis upon the utility factor. One of the exponents of pragmatism, Schiller (H. chap. I), calls it 'a justification of faith against reason'. James (Pragmatism, chapter I) claims that truth is expedient thinking.

There is a right place in the world, as Perry says, for philosophy as a calm disinterested study of ultimate causes. The true pragmatist will not deny this but he does consider that unless this calm dispassionate study leads somewhere it might just as well be discarded and forgotten. As a matter of fact the mutual ridicule of intellectualism and pragmatism may be evidence of the value of both. In any case it is quite clear that pragmatism is but the effort to make philosophy of more practical value in the life of man and to emphasize this by an attempt to coordinate science, religion and philosophy. James for instance was not only a psychologist; he was keenly interested in biology, natural science and religion. This is true of most pragmatists, whose interests were wider by far than the limits which the in-
Telle Walt predictive tendency of the philosophy of the past century had set for itself.
There are three distinct phases of pragmatism which call for notice in any attempt to establish the religious significance of the theory. These are the views expounded by Professor James in his 'Pragmatism', by Professor Dewey in his 'Studies in Logical Theory' and by Professor Schiller in his 'Humanism' and his 'Riddle of the Sphinx'. Each represents an appeal to a different class of thinker and each is an evidence of the comprehensive nature of the pragmatic appeal.

Professor James expounds what may be called the popular appeal, an appeal to common-sense. 'In practical talk, a man's common-sense means his good judgment, his freedom from eccentricity. In philosophy it means his use of certain intellectual forms or categories of thought' (Pragmatism, p.171). 'Our fundamental ways of thinking about things are discoveries of exceeding remote ancestors, which have been able to preserve them-
selves throughout the experience of all subsequent time. They form one great stage of equilibrium in the human mind's development, the stage of common-sense' (ibid. p.170). James therefore, at a word, takes philosophy from its pedestal of intellectualism and presents it to the 'man in the street'. In another passage he says, quoting Ostweld, 'All realities influence our practice and that influence is their meaning for us'. In short, he claims that there is no meaning to anything other than a practical meaning. The question that philosophy should ask is: 'What are the practical consequences?' The pragmatist, he says, (ibid. p.51) turns away from abstraction, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems and pretended absolute and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power. At the risk of quoting too much, we turn again to James (ibid. p.80). 'Her (i.e. Pragmatism's) only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of experience's demands, nothing
The necessity of a practical appeal, we have attempted to show above, has come as result of the dilemma of philosophy. That James provides such an appeal is beyond all doubt. That this appeal is adequate to meet the situation is not generally accepted. As a matter of fact for James pragmatism was first a method. 'Originally set forth in his 'Will to Believe', Pragmatism was in Professor James' hands little more than a method, a working conception.... After maintaining this guarded attitude for a number of years, Professor James has convinced himself that pragmatism is not a method only but a certain theory of truth' (Alexander, Short History of Phil., p.580).

The fact is that the situation as depicted by Professor Alexander is true. In order to appreciate why James, and indeed the other pragmatists, have dropped this guarded attitude it is necessary to realise that it was done, unwisely perhaps, because of the urgent need to meet attacks from all quarters. Professor
Alexander admits that no comprehensive reply has yet been made in spite of a few strictures. The worst that can be said is that it is too soon to appreciate its full value. It is an open question as to whether the pragmatists or their critics raised pragmatism from a method to a theory or attitude. The only really extreme writer is Dewey and his emphasis upon the ethical side of the method would naturally tend to make him assume more for it than was perhaps wise. Both James and Schiller are always guarded. Both hope that pragmatism may lead to something but neither is dogmatic about it. As doctrines of evolution are more or less hypotheses so is pragmatism rather a 'hypothetical' doctrine in spite of the apparent contradiction in terms. It is the critics of pragmatism who have made it a 'dogmatic' doctrine. The real vindication of pragmatism is James' appeal to the 'men in the street'. That it will stand the test of logic and experience is more than we can say, especially in view of the fact that the utility basis of pragmatism is extra- logical. But pragmatism has opened a new road to possible know-
ledge which brings it within the field of practical life and takes it out of the cloister. That absolute knowledge will be reached by way of pragmatism is not at all certain but the method which has been so successful in science and religion deserves an opportunity in philosophy. This and no more is what pragmatism hopes and intends.

While James represents the practical side of pragmatism, the side of appeal to common-sense, Schiller develops more particularly the religious side. In his introduction to the 'Riddles of the Sphinx' he says 'This is an age which professes to have despaired of the ultimate problems of life with its lips, wherever the secret hopes it may cherish in its heart; it is an age in which a theory of what we can 'not' know has usurped the name of philosophy........in which, even in religion, God has become an unknowable infinite, and Faith has been degraded into an unthinking assent to unmeaning verbiage about confessedly insoluble difficulties, instead of being the prescience that forecasts the
future beyond what is rigorously justified by the data as yet given, the pillar of flame that points out the path of the soul beyond the limits of unaided 'sight' (Riddles of the Sphinx p.31). There is no doubt that Schiller realised, as James did in the field of practical life, that, in the field of religious life, intellectualism in philosophy was robbing religion of its vitality. This is the keynote of his emphasis upon pragmatism, or, as he called it, 'Humanism'. His effort is to establish if possible a keen religious outlook and amid the turmoil of thought and the notoriety given to various forms of agnosticism during the past two centuries there is not doubt that he supplies an urgent need.

James very cleverly says (Pragmatism p.189), 'First a new theory is attacked as absurd; then it is admitted to be true but obvious and insignificant; finally it is seen to be so important that its former adversaries claim that they discovered it'. In the field of religion it would seem that the prophecy is about to be fulfilled, for present religious thought is
developing along the line of a return to practical utility.

People are beginning to be more and more concerned, not with
creed and dogma, though they still retain their force, but with
the essential fact of religion as a way to a higher and happier
life. For religion means the development of right conduct with
a view to the ultimate achievement of happiness, or, as a notable
divine once said, 'being right with God'. Hence religion is not
mere worship of the supernatural, nor even mere worship of God.

It is more than worship and more than a code of ethics, for it
is worship with a view to future satisfaction. Hence it must
contain more than a creed, and the emphasis in religion is there­
fore upon 'the way of life' that is, upon its practical utility.
The importance of religion as a basis of life is recognised by
everybody, irrespective of creed or dogma, and it is very signif­
icant that as a precursor to the reunion of philosophy and reli­
gion the union between science and religion has already taken
place. As Schiller puts it:— 'Among the great discoveries of
science in the latter part of the nineteenth century, was that of
the existence of religion" (R.S. p. 462).

The value of his emphasis upon religion is further enhanced by the attempt which pragmatism makes to rationalise faith, the basis of religion. The failure of creeds and narrow dogmas, which has been responsible for a great increase in the number of agnostics, leads one to believe that the revitalising of faith as the basis of religion offers the only way by which a revival of religious interest can be achieved. As we shall discuss pragmatic faith and Christian faith in closer relation shortly, it will be sufficient to point out that pragmatic faith assumes the value of the extra-logical criteria in the study of knowledge which we have mentioned above. This point is worthy of more emphasis than the pragmatists have seen fit to give it.

Dewey develops the ethical side of pragmatism with the same practical end in view as James and Schiller. 'The point that occurs to mind most readily is that philosophy will have to surrender all pretensions to be particularly concerned with ul-

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timate reality" (Creative Intelligence, p. 53). Dewey is more concerned with the conduct of life in general, his appeal is made to logic and ethics. He is unquestionably the most extravagant of the pragmatists and it is Dewey who leads pragmatism into most of the difficulties with which it is faced. We have attempted in our general outline of pragmatism to explain his idea of the mutation of truth and to point out particularly that it is not fair to pragmatism to judge it by the interpretation set upon it by adverse critics. In the same way it is not quite fair to judge pragmatism by Dewey, its most extreme advocate. His ethical and logical bias are responsible for making him much more dogmatic than either James or Schiller. He is over anxious to make pragmatism a logical system in view of the fact that most of its exponents believe its strength to be in its extra-logical aspects. He is over-anxious to bring pragmatism into philosophy as a proof of the evolution of morality and by forcing its hand he oversteps the mark. Pragmatism as a method of hypotheses we
accept readily but that acceptance means no more that the acceptance of a method. We are still too near to this method to be able to estimate whether it will be of sufficient importance to be ranked as a definite philosophical attitude.

One thing is significant in all three writers as it is significant of pragmatism as a theory:—Whatever aspect of life is considered the pragmatic theory emphasizes above all the utility value of philosophy. All its exponents are united in the belief that unless philosophy can use itself, and be used, to achieve present results in practical life it must be relegated to the position of a purely speculative exercise. Whether the appeal is made from the religious, ethical or common-sense side it makes no difference for pragmatists; all realize that religion, ethics and science have 'no bones to pick' with each other. Each has its function, and that a very necessary one, in the life of men and cooperation not dissociation should be their aim. If pragmatism did nothing more than emphasize the need of cooperation
between the three it would have accomplished much; but it has done a great deal more in revitalising philosophy and pointing out a possible way by which we may be able to escape the black forests of pessimism and agnosticism and reach the bracing heights of a clearer purpose in life.
CHAPTER IX

THE IDENTITY OF PURPOSE BETWEEN FAITH AS IN CHRISTIANITY AND FAITH AS IN PRAGMATISM.

The main purpose of this essay is to establish, if possible, the similarity between the Christian use of faith and the use of the same in pragmatism. With that end in view the attempt has been made to stress at all points the utility factor in the pragmatic theory. The utility factor as well as the method of hypotheses are the points of real value in pragmatism. It must not be supposed that our enthusiasm for such a practical philosophy leads us to be blind to the fact that, as yet, pragmatism is a more or less untried theory. But it does leave us with a bright hope that it may point out the way to a solution of the apparently insoluble dilemma of philosophy.

As we have pointed out above, one point that the pragmatists have not emphasised sufficiently is the necessity for some extra-logical criteria in any attempt to solve the question
of life. In our attempt to correlate Christian faith with that of pragmatism the emphasis is necessarily laid upon this side of pragmatism.

For a definition of faith as used in pragmatism we turn to James and Schiller, the sponsors of the movement. For a definition of Christian faith we likewise turn to the Founder of the movement and those earlier followers of His who were close to the Christian tradition. There are two purposes in doing this. First it is only reasonable to expect that the sponsors of a movement are the ones best able to define their meaning. Secondly, particularly in the case of Christianity whose two thousand years of existence have been witness to continued dogmatic wars and doctrinal turmoil, there are many doctrines so inextricably intermingled as to make them almost impossible of being deciphered. Yet the Pauline treatise on Faith and Christ's own teaching are both clear and well-defined.

In his lecture on Pragmatism and Religion, in which he claims that his theory is not an atheistic system, James says,
'On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily, in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it does work and that the problem is to build it out and determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths' (P.p.299). Far from being atheistic, pragmatism comes close to religion by recognising its value in the world, just as it comes close to science by its use of the method of hypotheses in common with science. In fact James defines his belief as a melioristic type of theism (ibid.p.301.). For the actual use of the word faith we turn to Schiller whose emphasis in pragmatism is always on the side of religion. We have quoted above (Chap.VII) from his Riddles of the Sphinx in which he claims that faith has been degraded into a blind assent concerning insoluble difficulties instead of making it the 'pillar of flame' that points out the path of the soul. Again, (R.S.p.208) in his essay on the Formules of the Law of Evolution, he says,
'To speak of evolution, of a world process, is to put before ourselves a metaphysical ideal, to which we assert the cause of reality will conform. This faith might be held even though we were utterly unable to define this world purpose.... But such a strain upon the faculty of faith is fortunately uncalled for. The same scientific evidence which first suggested the application of the metaphysical conception of process to the world also instructs us as to the nature of the process. The formulae of the law of evolution are generalisations similar to the other generalisations about the world, and to some extent they have already been discovered!

Again (ibid. p. 456.) he discusses the rejection of pessimism in the same light. 'Thus the end of philosophic theory is to confess its impotence to make the supreme decision between two alternative interpretations, each of which is warranted intellectually by the facts of life. It needs an act of will to decide between them, an act of faith in the possibility of the better alternative. This faith in the rationality of things, in the
light of which we must read the ambiguous indications of reality, is "to be acquired by no process of reasoning". Hence the final rejection of pessimism is the highest and most difficult act of faith, and to effect it the soul must draw the requisite strength from itself, it may be, gather courage from the very immanence of despair'. Still again, he says, (ibid. p. 437.)

'Thus in appealing to faith we are not appealing to anything that takes the place of reason and still less to anything hostile to it, but to that which both precedes and perfects it'.

Schiller's use of the term faith is very close to that of Christ if indeed it is not identical with it. To Schiller faith is the supplement of reason, something which clothes reason and gives it meaning and strength and beauty. In support of this we quote from his essay on Science and Religion (R.3.p.417.).

'Science, therefore, indubitably starts from postulates which are envisaged by faith before they are proved by experience'.

Schiller points out that religion has been backward in
confirming its postulates when it should have been claiming that prayer 'works'. That this is denied by the rationalist, he points out, is because the rationalist takes the attitude of one who refuses to believe the reality of phenomena with which he could not experiment. The parallel between Christ's teaching of faith and that of Schiller as representing pragmatism comes in the common ground which both take when they emphasise the teaching that faith works and brings results.

Religion is not a philosophy in the present sense of the term. It is no theory but is a very practical attitude of mind. As a consequence while philosophy remains purely intellectual, it can have no dealings with religion. Intellectualistic philosophy is logical and theoretical, religion is extra-logical and practical. That is the reason why there is a close relation between Pragmatism and Christianity in the utility phase as well as in the extra-logical phase. The logical argument against Christianity is that the 'Blind Faith' of Christian teaching is not and cannot be a safe ground for achieving knowledge. This
claim is made in spite of the fact that Christianity has been remarkably successful in giving a melioristic tone to life. We believe that the difficulty here is that knowledge to the pragmatist is not the absolute knowledge of the other schools, a matter which has been discussed above. But intellectualism is also wrong in saying that Christian faith is blind faith. Whatever stress was laid upon blind faith as essential to salvation in the middle ages, it is emphatically not the teaching of the early church.

The Epistle to the Hebrews, chapter eleven, has probably the best definition of faith in the New Testament. 'Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the proving of things not seen' (Revised Version). These things hoped for and yet not seen are intelligible and real, faith not only assures us of their existence but it gives them substance, tests and proves their reality. Faith is simple trust but it is not credulity since it has a basis in reason. Christian faith takes its birth
in the person of Christ; its exercise in the persons of his followers proves its validity. Thus Christian faith fulfils the test of the pragmatist in that it 'works'. A record of the miracles of the Gospels will show that Christ performed miracles only upon the exercise of faith. Regarding the centurion whose servant was sick, (Matt. VIII. 10.) he said:— "Verily I say unto you, I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel". Even if we do not accept the miracles as valid ground for argument it must be realised that the basis of Christ's teaching was faith. In another passage (Luke xvii. 6.) he say, in reply to the request of the disciples that their faith might be increased, "If ye had faith as a grain of mustard seed ye would say to this sycamine tree, 'Be thou rooted up and be thou planted in the sea,' and it would obey you". He definitely points out the fact that faith is essential to knowledge and power.

The acceptance of the validity of the miracles does not concern the teaching of faith as given by Christ. The emphasis is continually upon the result of faith. The famous passage from
John (St. John X1V. 7.) illustrates this better than any other. Philip saith unto him, "Lord, shew us the Father and it sufficeth us". Jesus saith unto him, "Have I been so long time with you and dost thou not know me Philip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father". His constant references to the Kingdom of God upon earth imply the same thing. Trust and faith are synonymous terms and trust with Christ meant the faith that works. His emphasis upon the fact that faith came before works is constantly shown (John XVI. 33, etc.) but this can only be taken to imply that faith came before reason.

In Saint Paul the message is even clearer, due possibly to the fact that Saint Paul was a trained philosopher, a Pharisee of the Pharisees, and concerned in justifying his position for the sake of the emphasis it would give to a comparatively intellectual audience. Reuss (Christian Theology in the Apostolic Age II. 90.) says, 'Faith, according to Paul, is at once an act of reason or conviction, an act of the heart or trust, an act of the will or self-surrender'. In fact Paul's whole thesis
is developed upon the idea that salvation comes by faith and not by works of the law. Chapter eleven of the Epistle to the Hebrews is quite clear on this point and the writer illustrates by numerous references to the Old Testament (Hebrews XI.13.)

'Thus all these (Enoch, Noah etc.) died in faith, not having received the promises but having seen them and greeted them from afar'.

Christianity claims that the basis of a valid religion is faith, it claims also that faith works. Christianity has nineteen hundred years of growth to prove this. Its emphasis upon faith is a constant reminder of the same emphasis in pragmatism. Christian faith is willing and anxious to stand the test of practical application and pragmatism claims the same. That is, both are apparently aware that faith is something beyond the bounds of logic but they both ask that this extra-logical factor be given a trial. In neither case is this faith to be confused with blind faith. They claim that the testing will prove whether or not faith is a valid basis for life.
It was the mediaeval church, with its emphasis upon authority which taught the doctrine of blind faith and which brought about the estrangement between philosophy and religion. Compulsion was never thought of in the earlier days. When Christ asked the young nobleman to give up all his riches he lamented his lack of faith and considered him with sorrow (Mark, X.22). The young man had enough evidence of Christ’s power to help him reason as to the validity of the Master’s teaching. He had reasoned or he would never have asked the question concerning eternal life. It must be realized that faith and reason go hand in hand and that the extra-logical principle is as important as the logical principle. Pragmatism, by its emphasis upon the extra-logical principle bids fair to coordinate again philosophy and religion.
Apart from questions of philosophy and religion the place of faith in practical life is of extreme importance. It is possible to exist without much theoretical knowledge but history proves conclusively that without faith civilisation would immediately break down. The present state of world affairs is sufficient evidence of this fact. A lack of trust between nation and nation, class and class, man and man is creating a state of turmoil which will be hard to remedy. It is a peculiar fact that this should happen at a time when 'civilization' is at a higher level than ever before and when 'knowledge' is so much ahead of previous knowledge. The emphasis upon pragmatism would point to the fact that present day knowledge is a matter of theory without belief.

The development of science in the past few years has given birth to a reliance upon theory but the confusion between
pure and practical science is avoided by the development of an organized technique and this places it in the hands of experts who are trained in the realm of pure science. Hence theory has but little bearing upon the practical effort of science so far as the average man is concerned. Yet out of the development of science has come, despite this separation of theory and practice, a developed agnosticism which repudiates belief and emphasizes theory. But such a development of the present scientific age is not so remarkable when one considers the subject matter of science. Theories of evolution, of atoms and such are bound to bring doubts in their train.

In the realm of philosophy the separation of belief and reason is even more marked. This is largely because philosophy is an individual matter for every man. In the mind of the average person is the tendency to confuse theoretical philosophy with religion and vice versa. Hence, for the majority of men, a reconstruction of philosophical method may mean, incorrectly, a readjustment of religious values. The emphasis upon reason
and logic which comes with this readjustment results frequently in a loss of belief because we are more concerned with a search for absolute knowledge that we are in the application of mediate knowledge. We are asking what the goal of life may be without realising that the goal can never be reached without hewing out a path for our feet. There is a place in life for those who hew out the path as well as for those who 'behold the hill-tops from afar'.

The truth is that, as pragmatism attempts to show, if crudely, both belief and reason are methods by which knowledge may be reached. Reason plans but belief hews the wood and draws the water. In this sense belief is the essence of practical life. Columbus theorized concerning the globular theory of the world but his belief sent him out to test his theory. If, therefore, pragmatism offers a way by which we may be helped along the road to truth, we unhesitatingly accept it and in its emphasis upon method and the use of extra-logical criteria it does help.

By this emphasis upon faith and mediate knowledge it suggests
a way by which the dilemma between idealism and naturalism may be overcome.

Its imperfections as a theory of knowledge are many and few will consent to accept the whole of pragmatism as it stands, but time will in all probability remove many of these imperfections and extravagant pragmatism will remain only as a feature of its early days. As a new theory it still needs time and testing to remove its crudities. The salient features will we believe stand the test of time.
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