

THE POSITION OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES  
IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

by

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# ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the variables responsible for the fact that Southeast Asian Communist parties sided with Peking in the latter's ideological dispute with Moscow.

The analysis is to a large extent based upon a comparison of Communist journals, the most important being the Peking Review and the World Marxist Review. I have assumed that the latter, controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, will print only those items reflecting its interpretation in the dispute. And the former, published by the Communist Party of China, will do likewise. In addition, the author has relied heavily on Western sources which specialize in translating Communist material relating to Sino-Soviet polemics.

The assumption of this paper has been that Southeast Asian Communists would realistically assess which protagonist in the dispute offered the best advice on the question of how to gain power and, consequently, would confer their loyalty to that side. However, after an analysis of differing Chinese and Russian opinions of the best way to obtain power and an examination of the domestic position of the individual Communist parties the above assumption had to be qualified. It was found that although all parties examined opted for the Chinese side, this was not so much a consequence of the greater utility of Chinese-

advocated strategy but more a factor of domestic necessity for and Chinese organizational control of the Southeast Asian Communist parties.



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## ABBREVIATIONS

APL	-	Albanian Party of Labour
BCP	-	Burmese Communist Party (White Flag)
BTI	-	Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasant Front)
BSPP	-	Burma Socialist Programme Party
BWPP	-	Burmese Workers' and Peasants' Party
CPB	-	Communist Party of Burma (Red Flag)
CPC	-	Communist Party of China
CPP	-	Communist Party of the Philippines
CPSU	-	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPUSA	-	Communist Party of the United States of America
KM	-	Kabataan Makabayan (Nationalist Youth Movement)
LM	-	Lapiang Manggagawa (Labour Party)
MANIPOL	-	Political Manifesto
Masjumi	-	(moderate) Moslem party
MCP	-	Malayan Communist Party
NASAKOM	-	Nationalism; Religion; Communism
NPDF	-	New People's Democratic Force
NU	-	Nahdatul Ulama (Party of the Association of Moslem Scholars)
PAP	-	People's Action Party
PKI	-	Partai Komunis Indonesia
PMIP	-	Pan Malayan Islamic Party

PNI	-	National Party of Indonesia
PSI	-	Socialist Party of Indonesia
SED	-	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SOBSI	-	All-Indonesia Federation of Trade Unions
SUPP	-	Sarawak United People's Party
UMNO	-	United Malay Nationalist Organization

## INTRODUCTION

This essay seeks to account for the varying degrees of support which a number of Southeast Asian Communist parties have displayed for the Chinese position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Five parties have been selected for the purpose: the Communist parties of Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. This choice has been based not only upon the premise that each of these parties operates in a relatively similar political environment, but also upon the fact that each is still striving to obtain control of the governmental apparatus of its respective country.

Chronologically, the survey shall be limited to a seven-year span -- 1960 to 1966. The first date marks the beginning of public polemics between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In late 1966, two rival Communist party congresses were convened: one attended by pro-Soviet Communist parties in Bulgaria, the other by pro-Chinese Communist parties and splinter-groups in Albania.<sup>1</sup> As the meetings, in effect, signal the establishment of two competing Communist Internationals, December 1966 may be a suitable terminating date for this survey.

No comprehensive description of the Sino-Soviet rift shall be attempted in this analysis. Nevertheless, one

of the most contested issues, the Chinese versus the Soviet "model" of the proper road to power, shall be examined at length. The acceptance of one or other of these models by Southeast Asian Communists provides, in the opinion of this writer, a major indicator of which side in the polemics has in their view inherited the legitimate ideological leadership of the world Communist movement.



## CHAPTER ONE

### THE CHINESE AND SOVIET "REVOLUTIONARY MODELS" OF THE ROAD TO POWER

An examination of some of the major documents in the present Sino-Soviet polemics leaves one with the impression that the key to the dispute over taking power is a difference of opinion over the question of strategy and tactics. Indeed, one of the principal points of contention between the two Communist powers centers on the type of tactics to be employed by those Communist parties in underdeveloped areas still seeking to capture governmental power. As the protagonists developed their arguments, it became quite apparent that each battled not only for the ideological hegemony of the world Communist movement but, at the same time, sought to offer local Communists a distinctly Chinese or Soviet tactical guide, each of which promised the biggest and quickest returns in terms of taking power.

One of the immediate effects of the open polemics between Moscow and Peking on the international Communist movement was a concentration of parties around the two divergent points of view. From this polarization one must draw a tentative conclusion that the attraction to these opposite poles was not only the result of organizational control by one or other center, but also an acknowledgment of

certain common interests regarding immediate tactics and certain long-range goals. The Communist creed had long been interpreted by one authoritative source -- Moscow. But the ever increasing dissensions between the CPC and CPSU encouraged every Communist party to make a declaration of loyalty. In the process, each had to consider which center could best defend its interests and which proffered advice would most likely, in its specific operational sphere, produce desired results. In effect, most Communist parties of the developed countries opted for the Soviet position. By contrast, the Communist parties of Southeast Asia, with one exception, accepted that of the Chinese.

Since, for the purpose of this study, it is essential to maintain a clear distinction between Chinese and Soviet differences in the field of tactics, the present chapter shall attempt to summarize their competing opinions in the form of two models. While a description of Sino-Soviet differences in the form of models is, perhaps, not entirely satisfactory -- insofar as such an approach tends to over-emphasize distinctions but to play down similarities -- the division shall, hopefully, offer the analytical clarity which might otherwise be lacking.

Having made the qualification, one may move to a summary of the distinctive ingredients which the tactical revolutionary model of each protagonist contains. Briefly,

the distinctions are as follows: differing views over which area of the world -- the developed or underdeveloped -- constitutes the "revolutionary center"; how much effort the international Communist movement should devote to the development of "national liberation" movements; what role the "national bourgeoisie" and the local Communist party should play in each of these movements; by what methods -- i.e., peaceful or armed "struggle" -- the national liberation movement should seek its twin objectives of political and economic independence.

In the opinion of the CPC leadership, member-states of the Communist camp should shift their attention from the industrialized countries of Western Europe and North America to the underdeveloped areas of the world. For Peking,

the vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America ... /are/ ... the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm centers of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism.

Chinese leaders have, in effect, relegated Communist activities in the advanced Western nations to an auxiliary status and, hence, quite openly assumed the position of ideological arbiter of Marxism-Leninism, claiming that

It is impossible for the working class in European and American capitalist countries to liberate itself unless it unites with the oppressed nations and unless those oppressed nations are liberated. (emphasis added).<sup>1</sup>

It is quite obvious, the Chinese maintain, that Communism will not achieve victory in the industrialized nations -- because the middle class is too strong and because workers are concerned more with immediate material gains -- until it has become the dominant force in the underdeveloped areas. That such an assertion almost wholly robs Marxist-Leninist theory of its Marxist content -- Marx having stated that the Communist revolution would begin in capitalist countries -- is of marginal relevance for this analysis. The potency of the Chinese argument derives from their belief that Communism, as a revolutionary doctrine, has much greater appeal -- and chance to succeed -- among the "have-not" states than among the "haves" of the West. The opinion that the greatest revolutionary potential lies precisely in that area of which China is a constituent part provides Peking with the justification to usurp the ideological leadership of the world Communist movement from Moscow.

Because of this shift in the revolutionary center Peking has demanded that the "socialist commonwealth" -- and especially the Soviet Union -- give every support, both material and political, to national liberation movements, that is, to those forces seeking to rid their country of Western political and economic domination. According to CPC leaders, the national liberation movement has become the most decisive weapon in the tactical armoury of the international

Communist movement:

... the Communist Party of China holds that the struggle for the defence of world peace and the national liberation movements and the peoples' revolutionary struggles in various countries support each other and cannot be separated ...

Facts have shown that every victory for the national liberation movement and for the revolutionary struggle of the people hits and weakens the imperialist forces of war and strengthens and augments the peace forces of the world. To take the stand of fearing revolution, of opposing revolution, results in setbacks and defeats for the national liberation movements and the peoples' revolutionary cause, and this will only damage the peace forces and heighten the dangers of imperialists starting a world war. <sup>2</sup>

Peking has accused Moscow of relegating national liberation movements to a place of secondary importance. It indicts the Soviet leadership on the inadequate material support the latter has thus far provided anti-colonial and anti-neo-colonial forces. The following passage, from the article "Hail the Great Victories of the National-Liberation Movement" is typical of the polemics Peking has traded with Moscow on this subject: using President Kennedy as a surrogate for Khrushchev the article self-righteously asserts that

Kennedy [Khrushchev], of course, wishfully hopes that the socialist countries will shut themselves up and completely engross themselves in their national construction, and not give support to the revolutions of the oppressed nations ... [Needless to say], the socialist countries regard support to the national liberation movements of the oppressed nations as their glorious, international obligation because the national liberation movements are the

ally of the socialist revolution ... in order to achieve favourable international conditions for the building of socialism, the victorious revolution must also have the support of the national liberation movements. (emphasis added).<sup>3</sup>

Chinese views of the present duties of the international Communist movement are by no means altruistic. Indeed, had the various Communist powers all supported Peking's proclaimed priorities no one would have derived more immediate benefit from such support than Peking itself.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Chinese leadership acted as self-appointed spokesman for many Communist parties, especially those operating in the politically emergent regions of the world.

Perhaps Peking's perception of the roles to be performed by the various political groups participating in a movement for national liberation has been, so-to-speak, its major trump card in its polemical game with Moscow. Using the 1960 Moscow Statement<sup>5</sup> as their point of departure, CPC leaders have established the suggested desirability of Communist hegemony of liberation movements as immutable orthodoxy. The Chinese have upheld the reservations of the Statement vis à vis the reliability of the so-called "national bourgeoisie". Contrary to Soviet contentions, the Chinese insist that, at the outset of any broad "popular front" strategy which includes elements of the middle class or national bourgeoisie as well as the peasantry and workers, Communists must immediately strive for the leadership of the front.

Chinese opposition to "bourgeois" control, even in the early stages of a national liberation movement, is not the product of recent differences with the CPSU. As early as 1939 Mao Tse-tung, in his treatise "On New Democracy",<sup>6</sup> made Communist domination of any united front a prerequisite for cooperation with bourgeois nationalists. Communists, he insisted, must divide their tactical campaign into two stages: one, combatting foreign "imperialists"; two, eliminating national capitalists from the front. During the first stage cooperation with the national bourgeoisie is permissible, during the second it clearly is not. The main actor during the second stage must be the "dictatorship of the proletariat", i.e., a Communist party.

The Chinese much more than the Soviet leadership is convinced that "time is not necessarily on the Communist side in all colonial and politically emergent areas; that the liberation movements may falter or be retarded without strong block support ..."<sup>7</sup> Largely drawing from their own party's experience of close cooperation with the Kuomintang, Mao and his entourage emphasize that the middle class is a completely unreliable ally. For Peking, the duty of Communist parties is unmistakably clear:

History has entrusted to the proletarian parties in these areas [Asia, Africa and Latin America] the glorious mission of holding high the banner of struggle against imperialism, against old and new colonialism and for national independence

and people's democracy, of standing in the forefront of the national democratic [i.e., liberation] movement and striving for a socialist future ...

On the basis of the worker-peasant alliance the proletariat must unite all the strata that can be united and organize a broad united front against imperialism and its lackeys. In order to consolidate and expand this united front it is necessary that the proletarian party should maintain its ideological, political and organizational independence and insist on the leadership of the revolution. (emphasis added).

Further, it warns:

If the proletariat becomes the tail of the landlords and the bourgeoisie in the revolution, no real or thorough victory in the national democratic revolution is possible, and even if victory of a kind is gained, it will be impossible to consolidate it.<sup>8</sup>

In other words, to maintain a smooth progression from the point of eliminating Western political influence from any particular country or colonial area to the establishment in that country of a "dictatorship of the proletariat", Communists must be in control of the liberation movement at all times. What the Chinese seem to advise local Communists to do is to refuse to cooperate with bourgeois nationalist leaders on all but the former's terms:

... only thus can [they] carry the national democratic revolution through to the end and guide the revolution on to the road of socialism.<sup>9</sup>

CPC leaders agree with those of the CPSU on the beneficial aspects of Communist collaboration with the bourgeoisie, but they point out that the long-term aims of



bourgeois leaders are only the short term demands of Communists. The two groups agree, for example, that all vestiges of Western political and economic domination must be removed from their country. However, for the middle class nationalists this is an end in itself. Further, when nationalists have attained their objectives they often turn on their former allies, the Communists, and persecute them. And the CPC points to its own experience in 1927 and that of the Iraqi Communists in 1958 to stress that it utters no empty warning. The Russians, on the hand, are much more vague on the question of Communist leadership. Indeed, while not often explicitly stating so, they apparently don't mind bourgeois control of a liberation movement. They even shut their eyes to Communist persecution by nationalists as long as the liberation movement is anti-Western and pro-Soviet. Egypt may serve as an example.

Of the various points of contention between Chinese and Soviet leaders vis à vis tactics in the underdeveloped areas perhaps none has caused more disagreement than the issue of peaceful versus non-peaceful "transition to socialism". Mao interpreted Soviet technological breakthroughs (the intercontinental ballistic missile and the sputnik) in 1957 as effecting a decisive shift in the balance of world forces in favour of the socialist bloc. He thought the bloc could and should, naturally enough, shift to a very tough and militant foreign policy. What is more, since the "imperialist powers"

could no longer afford to begin a world war without suffering complete annihilation, socialist countries could now give more aid to Communist and radical nationalist groups engaged in armed uprisings against colonial or Western-oriented bourgeois nationalist régimes.

Peking denounced the Soviet view that Communists could now capture power "peacefully" by means of the "parliamentary road". For in the opinion of the CPC leadership the possibility of a "peaceful transition to socialism" appears extremely remote. Parliament, after all, is a bourgeois institution aimed at keeping the middle class in power. By manipulation of the electoral machinery the bourgeoisie can easily minimize or even eliminate any threat to its hegemony from the Communist opposition. Changes in French electoral law during the 1950s and the ouster of the Communist Party of India from the Kerala state government in 1959 are cases in point. "Peking, unlike Moscow, is not interested in changing the existing state of affairs through piecemeal structural reforms. Nor does it deem this possible. Hence its insistence on the non-peaceful means of the transition to socialism -- the dictatorship of the proletariat."<sup>10</sup> Its violent attack on Togliatti's "structural reform" thesis may be explained in this light.<sup>11</sup>

Consequently, the Chinese argue that armed struggle is necessary to any successful revolutionary movement:

Certain persons [i.e., the Soviet leaders] have one-sidedly exaggerated the role of peaceful competition between socialist and imperialist countries in their attempt to substitute peaceful competition for revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples .... According to their preaching, it would seem that imperialism will automatically collapse in the course of this peaceful competition and that the only thing the oppressed peoples and nations have to do is to quietly wait for the advent of this day. What does this have to do with Marxist-Leninist views? 12

Perhaps the most concise statement of Chinese views concerning the function of violence is made in the concluding paragraphs of the article "Hail the Great Victories of the National-Liberation Movement":

Without such [armed] struggles the imperialists and colonialists never make any concessions of their own accord. Armed struggles waged by the oppressed nations against imperialism arise from the armed oppression by imperialism of these countries ... In striving for their own liberation, the Chinese people gained a deep understanding of what it means to wage armed struggle against imperialists and reactionaries ... The oppressed nations in the vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America are today confronted with the same situation. (emphasis added).13

The implication is clear. Since the "people" of these continents are faced with "the same" type of dilemma, they must follow CPC strategy and tactics. The call to use the strategy of Mao Tse-tung is obviously a demand to turn away from the one formerly advocated by Khrushchev and presently by his successors.

The Chinese opinion that the revolutionary banner of Communism now flies in Peking became ever clearer as

polemics between the two leadership groups degenerated to little more than name-calling. Thus the article "The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism", printed a few months before his downfall, labels the CPSU first secretary a "traitor" to the cause of Communism. By placing too much emphasis on the "parliamentary road" he reneged on his "proletarian duty" to further revolutionary violence. The article observes that, after 1945, a "number of countries" achieved emancipation from imperialist domination by means of "armed struggle". And the main lesson to be drawn from the appearance of these socialist countries is that all realized their new status by the use of force. While the Chinese concede that revolutionary violence is by no means inevitable, they stress that peaceful transition shall, for some time to come, remain an exception to the rule. Only in the rare case where Communist influence already predominates and the likelihood of Western intervention in the event of a Communist takeover is minimal, can a peaceful transition be accomplished.

Without a doubt, further differences over tactics were, during Khrushchev's leadership, magnified by a "personality factor". By 1964 the dispute had almost turned into a personal feud between Khrushchev and Mao. Indeed, personal antagonism strongly exacerbated the quarrel during the last few months before the first secretary's downfall.<sup>14</sup>

The Chinese even stated quite openly that the state of affairs would improve only with a change in the Soviet leadership. Thus, for a short period after Khrushchev's fall, public polemics ceased. But upon Brezhnev's and Kosygin's declaration of loyalty to the "peaceful line", it became apparent to Peking that the leadership change did not entail a concurrent change in Soviet tactics.

Soviet efforts in 1965 to achieve a formal condemnation of the Chinese position through the medium of a proposed conference of the world Communist movement provoked numerous polemical broadsides from Peking. That it would not bow to Moscow's demands either to terminate its "splitting activities" among numerous Communist parties or to cease public discussion of differences became obvious with the publication of the essay "The Leaders of the CPSU are Betrayers of the Declaration and the Statement". In essence, it is a complete rejection of the post-Khrushchev leadership. While the author of the treatise does not attack anyone by name, he labels Brezhnev and Kosygin "Khrushchev's close comrades-in-arms" and claims they removed Khrushchev simply because of his "stupidity". Since this is the case Peking has no alternative but to continue to shoulder the burden of ideological leadership for the Communist movement:

By clinging to their revisionism and splittism the new leaders of the CPSU have placed themselves in direct antagonism to Marxism-Leninism. In such circumstances, can the Marxist-Leninists be expected to fail to draw a line of demarcation, both politically and organizationally, between themselves and the new leaders of the CPSU? (emphasis added).<sup>15</sup>

Hence Peking's continuing call for the formation of "true" Marxist-Leninist parties.

At first glance, it appears that Peking's attitude on the issue of tactics has become increasingly inflexible. Its call for unerring revolutionary zeal and emphasis on armed uprisings give an impression of the impeccable revolutionary doing his utmost to uphold the Leninist legacy. Yet this image did not, it seems, produce a myriad of loyal Communist retainers from many of the new "storm centers of revolution". Indeed, its allies were concentrated mainly in Southeast Asia.

By offering their tactical model as a prototype for all Communist parties operating in an environment similar to that of their own, Chinese leaders promised guaranteed returns in terms of power. However, Moscow attaches similar claims to its model. The major dissimilarities between the two seem to involve differences in stress and timing.<sup>16</sup> Consequently, apart from the issue of the central focus of the present revolutionary struggle, both disputants appear, in the main, to agree on the ingredients necessary for a successful revolutionary model.

But, as to the emphasis which each of these factors should receive at the present stage, they are at complete variance. First, since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU Moscow has held that peaceful economic competition would henceforth compose the main form of struggle between capitalist and socialist states. Therefore, the "world socialist system", i.e., the countries of the Communist bloc -- in conjunction with the national liberation movement -- is the current focal point of revolutionary struggle. In other words, Khrushchev's vision was global, Mao's restricted to the underdeveloped areas. And, parenthetically, stress on the overall importance of economic competition with the West gives pre-eminence to the Soviet Union within the Communist movement. Hence also Khrushchev's emphasis on the necessity to expand production facilities within the U.S.S.R. [in Communist jargon, "building the material base for Communism"<sup>7</sup>].

What Khrushchev proclaimed in 1956 became enshrined Soviet doctrine at subsequent CPSU congresses. Indeed, at the Twenty-Second Congress, Khrushchev, in spite of intense Chinese pressure,<sup>17</sup> reiterated the overall importance of peaceful economic competition with the West, as well as the necessity of increasing production in the Soviet Union. It was only after this Congress that the Chinese dropped the use of all surrogates and openly attacked the Soviet leadership.<sup>18</sup>

In order to retain its historic leadership role Moscow had to justify -- particularly to those Communists whose interests Peking sought to represent -- that primary emphasis must be given to a continued build-up of Soviet industry rather than to more aid to liberation movements. Soviet leaders attempted to rationalize away the Chinese thesis that these movements had become the weapon par excellence of the anti-imperialist struggle by stating that

The successes of the national liberation movement in the East are inseparable from the existence of socialist states [i.e., they are directly dependent on the Soviet Union both for material and political aid] and their irreconcilable attitude to colonialism. This reveals the profound objective connection and community between the anti-imperialist interests of the oppressed peoples and those of the peoples of the socialist system.<sup>19</sup>

National liberation movements cannot succeed by themselves, particularly those dominated by a Communist party. If isolated such anti-colonial, anti-Western rebellions may easily be crushed by the "imperialist" and "neo-colonialist" powers. Besides, as Yu. Bochkaryov points out in New Times, since the Bolshevik Revolution the Soviet Union has consistently supported liberation struggles. In addition, the fact that the socialist camp has become increasingly powerful provides an important stimulus both to the formation and growth of such movements:



... a favourable international situation is of immense importance for the success of any such revolution. The vast sweep of the movement in the past ten years should be seen in context with the new and more favourable world situation. The socialist world system, which had emerged by this time, was developing into the chief factor determining the pace and direction of world history. The mounting strength of the socialist commonwealth and the support its members give the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America is today the decisive international factor in the success of the national liberation revolution. (emphasis supplied).<sup>20</sup>

Another writer, L. Stepanov, in the same journal supports Bochkaryov's thesis that national liberation movements cannot succeed without the aid of the Soviet Union. Quite explicitly, therefore, the "storm center" is not located in the underdeveloped areas of the world. Rather, the "storm center" is the Soviet Union itself. Without its help, Communist-dominated revolutions fail; with it their prospects are better. Russian aid to Cuba and North Vietnam are cases in point. This author attacks Chinese "dogmatism" for having counterposed "the national liberation movement in the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries to the revolutionary forces of Europe and North America..."<sup>21</sup> Stepanov denigrates the Chinese not only for attempting to split Communism along racial lines but also for having turned Marx upside down and therefore underemphasized the importance of the Communist movement in the "Western world".

Again Bochkaryov argues, since only the Soviet Union with its industrial and military might can prevent

Western interference with "liberation struggles" it is in the interest of local Communists that the Soviet Union continue its industrial expansion. Continued industrialization and success for liberation movements are symbiotic:

Successful fulfilment of the Soviet Union's programme of Communist construction is, consequently, in the interest of every country seeking complete liberation from imperialist and colonial oppression and of every champion of such liberation.<sup>22</sup>

Having asserted the overall importance of the Soviet Union, CPSU theorists move on to construct the correct path by which Communist parties will achieve power. Their model is flexible. In fact, its flexibility has increased with the concomitant Soviet desire to woo the so-called uncommitted leaders of the third world.

For example, while the 1960 Moscow Statement stressed that Communists should take a leading role in the liberation movement, Soviet pronouncements and views have since become more ambiguous. Khrushchev at times suggested that local Communists should subordinate themselves to national bourgeois leaders. On occasion he had even gone so far as to advise various Communist parties to dissolve themselves so that their members could join radical and bourgeois nationalist parties on an individual basis.

Underlying this policy [of "boring from within"] is an awareness of the impossibility of creating and maintaining a broad anti-imperialist front while insisting on proletarian hegemony. This

intention is not to permit an extended and essentially unchallenged middle-class leadership but to achieve effective infiltration through broad coalitions that blur the dividing line between Communist and non-Communist. 23

It is precisely this Soviet dexterity in fostering Communist-bourgeois cooperation which has given Peking the excuse to encourage more orthodox-minded local Communists to form pro-Chinese Communist splinter groups.

Soviet theorists have designated a new tactical stage which seeks to integrate the possibility of prolonged proletarian-bourgeois collaboration into Marxian thinking. According to W. Shinn the concept of the national-democratic state serves the following purpose:

While [it] is, in effect, a programme for ultimate Communist revolution in the developing countries, Communist spokesmen have thus far used it primarily to emphasize the immediate tactical desirability of supporting non-Communist nationalism, even where institutionalized in the form of governmental authority. (emphasis added). 24

The concept seeks to account for, and take advantage of, strong nationalism by encouraging anti-Western sentiment among the developing nations as well as closer relations with the socialist camp. Khrushchev maintained, especially after the 1960 Statement, that segments of the bourgeoisie may lead the national liberation movement and even dominate affairs in a national democratic state for an extended period of time.

If, Soviet leaders assert, political parties and leaders of underdeveloped countries uphold a socialist program, be it Marxist or not, they are moving in the right direction. Initially Soviet support for national democratic states was tied to the latter's willingness to permit Communists to organize and operate freely. The CPSU has since dropped this requirement.

In the opinion of both Khrushchev and his successors, as long as the leadership of a country is "neutral" or "anti-Western" and adheres to a socialist political program, it deserves Soviet material aid. At the same time it was to receive Soviet political backing should it embark on an extensive nationalization campaign.

The Chinese argue that Soviet material aid to non-Communist underdeveloped countries and the creation of a state capitalist sector can only strengthen the position of the bourgeoisie and do immeasurable harm to the Communist movement.<sup>25</sup> Moscow, on the other hand, believes reliance on Soviet aid will make underdeveloped countries more dependent on the socialist bloc and interprets such developments as facilitating an ultimate assumption of power by the local Communist party.

The difference between the Soviet and Chinese view on the role of the bourgeoisie is clearly a major one. While Moscow maintains that before a Communist party may lead a national liberation movement or "anti-imperialist front" the

prerequisite proletariat must exist, Peking points out the Communist party is "the proletariat" and must therefore attempt to gain control of such a front from its inception. Perhaps N. Chaoui, writing for the World Marxist Review, states the Soviet position most succinctly:

... what is in question is the emergence of the possibility to cooperate, on a higher plane and for a longer time, with those forces whom objective historical conditions draw into the mainstream of common development initiated by the working class as a whole /that is, the international Communist movement and, more specifically, the socialist commonwealth/ and who in the course of the struggle accept /to varying degrees/ the views and aims of the working class. (emphasis supplied). 26

Chaoui's article, written well after Krushchev's downfall, is an accurate indication that the new leaders of the CPSU have no intention to favour Chinese-advocated tactics any more than did their predecessor. Mr. Chaoui continues his analysis, stating that the national bourgeoisie must at times play the leading role in the national front for the simple fact that

Where the young working class has not yet had the opportunity or the time to become a politically and organizationally independent force, a "class for itself", it is unable at the outset to play the leading role in the social changes taking place in its country. However, in the course of non-capitalist development and economic construction more favourable conditions are bound to arise for the numerical growth of the working class and the gradual heightening of its influence on the economic and political life of the country. 27

The development of state planning and state capitalism stimulate the growth of a proletariat and, thus, must be interpreted as positive features.<sup>28</sup>

Perhaps the major distinction between the revolutionary models of the Chinese and Soviets has been the latter's cautious attitude toward "armed struggle". This seems to be a direct consequence of the conclusions drawn by the Russian leadership of the destructive results which a total war with the West would have. While acknowledging the Chinese assertion that advances in Soviet weaponry represented a change in the balance of forces, Khrushchev interpreted the change as becoming decisive. Mao held that it had become decisive. Khrushchev cautioned that if provoked the West could still deliver fatal nuclear blows at the socialist camp. He apparently shared little of Mao's conviction that the bloc could reap immediate interest on Soviet military superiority. Evidently, the Soviet leadership was of the opinion that rash action by Communist powers could incite the West to nuclear retaliation.<sup>29</sup> Such provocation seemed to include encouragement and support of Communist-inspired uprisings in colonial areas and newly independent countries. China, on the other hand, thought such action would not justify nuclear attacks. Rather, it was a case of civil war where any intervention by a foreign power would constitute domestic interference.

The CPSU, in spite of its changing attitude, has nevertheless continued to give material aid to revolutionary groups. China would like to do the same but is unable to provide much more than moral encouragement. For their part, the Russians have stressed that there are forms other than "armed struggle" which may achieve the aims of the liberation movement as well.

Certainly it is not in the immediate or perhaps even long-range interest of the Soviet leadership to foment armed revolutions while at the same time attempting a rapprochement both with Western nations and with leaders of newly independent countries. Khrushchev and his successors appeared convinced that, at least as a middle-range goal, efforts to draw uncommitted states closer to the socialist camp would pay back the greatest dividends both in terms of undermining Western power and in the requisites necessary to permit unfettered Communist organizational and agitational activities. Soviet leaders have never ruled out armed struggles -- either in word or deed. What they do quite convincingly stress is that violent revolution can only be completely successful when "objective conditions" for such action are "ripe":

... for an armed uprising to be successful certain objective and subjective preconditions, a corresponding revolutionary situation, are required. Not always and not everywhere does such a revolutionary situation exist. The countries striving for liberation show a diverse pattern of entirely different conditions, aims and methods of struggle. The Chinese leaders do not want to notice these

things. Painting the situation in these countries in one colour, they demand everywhere the immediate establishment of a people's democracy, that is, the socialist system and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Moreover, the Chinese leaders ignore the basic propositions of Marxism-Leninism on the need to master all forms of struggle.

The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, evidently wishing to gain easy popularity with the Asian, African and Latin American peoples [Communist parties?] and subordinate the national liberation movement to their influence, claim that the struggle of the Soviet Union ... for peaceful coexistence and general disarmament runs counter to the interests of the peoples striving for liberation and is incompatible with proletarian internationalism. This assertion is contrary to the facts, since the Socialist states, while opposing predatory wars, recognize wars of national liberation and just wars against colonialists and aggressors ...<sup>30</sup>

It is apparent from this passage that the CPSU leadership views national liberation struggles per se in a favourable light. The most important liberation war is presently waged in Vietnam. And the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU, held in March and April 1966, was most emphatic in its declaration of solidarity with the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.<sup>31</sup> Thus overall peaceful coexistence with the West does not imply a refusal to support liberation movements in the cause of Communism.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, in contrast to Khrushchev, the present Soviet leaders appear prepared to give much greater aid to movements of national liberation. Parenthetically, their readiness to do so is an acknowledgment that the Chinese are at least partially right about the safety of supporting liberation movements.



According to one observer, Moscow is always willing to contribute military aid to guerrilla wars, especially if they are Communist-inspired and dedicated to ousting a political elite unsympathetic toward the Soviet Union.<sup>33</sup>

The above description represents, in some detail, the Chinese and Soviet guides to power. From a review of the one proffered by the Chinese it is apparent that Peking was quite ready to classify the importance of Communist parties operating in the more industrialized areas as secondary. Primacy, in its opinion, must be given to revolutionary movements in politically emerging areas. Moscow, however, explicitly follows the old Communist concept that the "anti-colonial revolution" must be linked to the proletarian revolution of the West. Even Lenin, although stating that the anti-colonial movement would deal capitalist powers a major blow, was careful to uphold the Marxist maxim that the "proletariat" in industrialized states represented a very important revolutionary force.

The difference in viewpoint between the Chinese and Russians seems, in the last analysis, a simple theoretical quibble unless interpreted in a context of struggle for the ideological leadership of the world Communist movement. Although the Chinese in all probability realized that their hopes of capturing control of the movement were extremely slim, they probably did anticipate to gain the leadership of Communist parties operating in underdeveloped areas. To

retain -- or better, to rebuild -- its position as the only legitimate interpretive center of Communist ideology, Moscow must prove the correctness of its thesis that economic competition with the West will decisively undercut the position of the latter.

Peking, in turn, bases its bid for hegemony upon the assertion that the revolutionary center has shifted. Its claim for a revolutionary and political model for these areas is nothing new. The following remarks, for example, were uttered by the now purged Lu Ting-yi in 1951:

Mao Tse-tung's theory of the Chinese Revolution is a new development of Marxism-Leninism in the revolutions of the colonial and semi-colonial countries ... [It] has significance not only for China and Asia, it is of universal significance for the world Communist movement. It is indeed a new contribution to the treasury of Marxism-Leninism ... [The] classic type of revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries is the Chinese Revolution. 34

When the latter contention is combined with the former it becomes clear that, in the opinion of the Chinese, the hub of the new ideological center must be located in Peking.

The two assertions were fused with the commencement of the Sino-Soviet dispute. To date Peking has failed, with the exception of Communists in Southeast Asia, to bring about a wholesale conversion to its point of view. The reasons for Peking's failure are varied. One of the most important, apart from Soviet organizational control, would

appear to be the fact that the tactical path advocated by the CPSU leaders is also a source of inspiration for local Communist parties.

While, in practice, both protagonists support "armed struggles",<sup>35</sup> they part ways on the question of tactical alternatives to be employed by local Communists. Although they recognize that, in the underdeveloped areas, discontent may be exploited among at least three groups -- an impoverished peasantry, dissatisfied minorities and anti-Western and nationalistic élites -- they are at odds on how to extract the greatest benefit.

One student of Sino-Soviet competition has made an accurate summary of the differences. The Chinese, in his opinion, are advocating a "united front from below" strategy. That is, they advise local Communists to stress " ... both radical social and extreme nationalist demands; [Communist parties should] emphasize independent action among the workers and the peasants rather than cooperation with nationalist leaders, and they [must] strive for Communist hegemony, rather than acquiesce in nationalist hegemony in the broad nationalist front".<sup>36</sup>

This type of policy, the observer remarks, is modified to the extent that Peking believes collusion with national bourgeois leaders is possible. At the same time, radical socialist demands may be watered down to an extent.

Nevertheless, the application of the Chinese model demands that Communists organize local, ethnic and peasant discontent in order to put pressure on nationalist leaders in the central government.

The Russians, by contrast, advocate "Right or moderate phases and emphasize primarily nationalist rather than social goals; they assign a higher priority to co-operation with nationalist leaders than to independent action among workers and peasants; they look benevolently upon the nationalist leaders and they even accept temporary nationalist leadership of the national front." <sup>37</sup> Unlike Chinese tactics, Soviet policy may be termed a "united front from above".

In summary, Chinese and Soviet tactical prescriptions designed for consumption by Communists operating in non-Western, "transitional" societies, have been examined rather extensively. The intent of the description is to provide the requisite framework within which the position of the five Southeast Asian Communist parties in the Sino-Soviet dispute may be analyzed.

Since each of the parties to be surveyed is still seeking to gain control of its respective country's governmental apparatus, one may assume that the stand they take in the polemics will be influenced in no small way by the degree of attraction one or other model has for them. Nevertheless, it is surprising that, with one exception, all opted for the

Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Since Moscow did not experience such a mass defection in any other geographical area, one suspects that a number of other facts apart from the appeal of the Chinese model may have influenced the pronouncements of Southeast Asian Communists. Of these factors geographical propinquity -- i.e., the area where China might exercise its economic, military and political power -- is perhaps the most obvious. The presence of Chinese minorities -- or a Chinese majority as in Singapore -- may be another.

With these qualifications in mind, one may now turn to an examination of the individual parties, the political environment within which they operate and the degree to which each adheres to the Chinese or Soviet model.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF BURMA

Of all Communist movements in Southeast Asia, the one in Burma appears to have been particularly affected by Sino-Soviet dissension. Burmese Communists are not as fortunate as some of their Southeast Asian counterparts to be able to meet the disruptive effects of Sino-Soviet competition with one disciplined party apparatus. Indeed, for the past two decades the Burmese Communist movement has been divided into a number of factions. At the time of writing rivalry for political leadership seems to be centered amongst three Communist groups: the Burmese (White Flag) Communist Party, the Communist (Red Flag) Party of Burma and the Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party (BWPP). The latter's members and leaders are popularly labelled "Red Socialists".

Difference of opinion over tactics, strongly seasoned by personal rivalry among top leaders, were the primary factors contributing to the disintegration of the parent organization, the Communist Party of Burma, in the early post-war years. The faction leader of the Red Flags, Thakin Soe, argued Burmese independence should be won not by extracting piecemeal concessions from the British but by revolutionary war. His most important protagonists in the politburo, Than Tun and H.N. Goshal, disagreed. In their opinion the party should not only

work with the nationalist organization then negotiating with the British but also seek to capture the leadership of that organization.

When Thakin Soe and his followers found themselves in the minority they left the party, went underground and organized a guerrilla force. The rest, under Than Tun, remained a component part of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), the then dominant political force in Burma. The White Flag -- now Burmese Communist Party, changed its tactics when U Nu, AFPFL leader, refused to give Communists more than one seat in his cabinet. The overwhelming majority of BCP members consequently also went into armed opposition.

Yet Than Tun's decision again caused a group of dissident Communists to stay behind and continue cooperation with U Nu. The dissidents founded the last of the three Communist political parties, the BWPP, in 1951.

The schismatic nature of Burmese Communism seemed to indicate an absence of outside direction and control. In fact, the parties lacked, until the early post-war years, significant contacts with the international Communist movement. The Communist ideology itself came late to Burma. And then, it was not introduced by Comintern agents dispatched from Moscow or Shanghai but by indigenous Burmese nationalists and intellectuals. Propagation of the faith was restricted to miniscule study circles and book clubs. The Communist Party of Burma

was not actually formed until 1943.

The Calcutta Conference held in 1948 and attended by a Burmese Communist (White Flag) delegation, was apparently the first time Moscow attempted to give direction to the Burmese Communists. Whether the CPSU encouraged the faction leaders to patch up their differences and cooperate is unknown. But it is nonetheless noteworthy that the three groups already reflected a division over tactics which, with the eruption of Sino-Soviet polemics, was to split the entire world Communist movement. Thus, at a time when Stalin's lieutenant Zhdanov formulated the "two-camp" doctrine at Calcutta, those Communists who were subsequently to form the BWPP already proclaimed that cooperation with bourgeois nationalists was practicable. In 1951, they contested the national election and won ten seats in the Lower House. For the 1956 election the BWPP sponsored the National United Front (NUF), an alliance of Marxist splinter parties. The NUF formed the legal opposition from 1956 to 1960, having obtained 47 of the 240 seats.<sup>2</sup> It was displaced from this position after the third national election and in 1962, after the military coup, parliament was dissolved.

This act did not terminate the NUF leadership's willingness to work with bourgeois nationalists. In fact, after a brief, initial period of hesitation U Chit Maung, chairman of the NUF, impressed by the Marxist content of the military's political program, expressed support for the Revolu-



tionary Council of General Ne Win. Even after the latter banned all political organizations except the military-sponsored Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), U Chit Maung declared the Front was prepared to disband itself and that its members were ready to join the BSPP on an individual basis.

NUF leaders therefore followed tactics the flexibility of which were only gradually incorporated into accepted tactics by the Russians. BWPP leaders were at best regarded as heretics by their more orthodox comrades fighting a protracted guerrilla war against the very government which the former were willing to support.

While the White Flag Communist Party, accredited as the Burmese representative in the international Communist movement, continued its extreme opposition to the governments both of U Nu and, subsequently, of Ne Win, Moscow apparently became disenchanted with White Flag strategy. In reaction, it lauded the moderate policies followed by the NUF. This Soviet shift coincided with their reassessment in favour of the national bourgeoisie.

After the military putsch and Ne Win's accession to power Soviet writers took a very sympathetic view of Burmese political developments. Thus they comment favourably on the attempts by the "military intelligentsia" to establish an independent economy by means of nationalizing foreign-owned business firms. Further, in 1963, the Burmese government

announced that, with minor exceptions, no more private enterprise would be permitted. Henceforth, Burma's entire economy was to be state-owned and -operated.

This nationalization scheme served a two-fold purpose: first, it was an expression of nationalism in that it aimed at eliminating the Indian middleman from the economy; secondly, it was to enable the government to plan and manage more efficiently. Actually the first part of the plan was a complete success; the Indians had, for the most part, to give up their economic functions. However, it appears that the second part failed. Today economic prosperity in Burma is conspicuous by its absence.

Soviet observers on the whole approve the development of state capitalism in Burma. The Revolutionary Council "took over the oil industry ... and nationalized the banks [including the Rangoon branch of the Bank of China], stopping state loans to private capitalists ... [the] programme of demolishing foreign capital by means of a 'progressive, anti-imperialist policy' is almost complete ... and is an example to other Southeast Asian countries."<sup>3</sup> Yet this Soviet writer urges a more cautious (!) implementation of the military's programme: "the Burmese must beware of a fall in production since nationalization 'not infrequently leads to undesirable consequences'."<sup>4</sup> After the policies of the New Win régime became clear<sup>5</sup> Soviet policy formulators labelled Burma a "national democratic state"

and held that the military occupies a position "in the first ranks of national liberation movement fighters in the Asian countries."<sup>6</sup>

As outlined in Chapter One, Communists operating in a state wearing the "national democratic" tag must cooperate with and, if necessary, subordinate themselves to the established political leadership. This the BWPP and NUF have willingly done. Consequently Moscow has not hesitated to regard the NUF both as an ally in its dispute with Peking and as an example of the successful application of Soviet tactical advice.

At the same time, it commenced to launch virulent attacks against the White and Red Flag parties. While the CPSU has been somewhat ambiguous on the position of the White Flags, Thakin Soe's insurgents, often considered to favour a revolutionary line even more radical than the one advocated by the CPC, come under particularly heavy fire:

The ultra-Leftists come out with the slogan of immediate socialist revolution and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. In their view nothing has changed in Burma since the advent to power of the Revolutionary Council which they regard as a dictatorship of the military and bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and which they even compare with Chiang Kai-shek's regime. [The arrogant attitude of Thakin Soe/... aroused 'righteous anger among wide strata of Burmese society and dissatisfaction in the ranks of his own party'...]<sup>7</sup>

Although the polemical broadside was explicitly aimed at the Red Flag party chief one may assume that the Russians are using him as a surrogate for the Burmese

Communist Party. Russian observers have, for example, expressed their satisfaction that Ne Win in 1963 made a call for unconditional peace talks with all insurgent forces -- including Red and White Flag guerrillas. However, these same observers have indicated considerable discomfiture that the onus for the failure of negotiations seemed to rest not only with the incorrigible Thakin Soe but also with the forces of Than Tun.

In making a post mortem analysis of the peace talks A. Malov contends that not Communist but ethnic minority leaders attempted to exact exorbitant concessions from the government. When surveying the position of the White Flag insurgents he remains carefully neutral:

The negotiations between the Revolutionary Council and the Communist Party at first took a favourable turn. But the subsequent talks between the Council and [the various groups of Communist insurgents] brought no results ... [because of] ... the [groups'] demand that [they] keep [their] armed forces and retain a number of areas pending full settlement.

But in Mr. Malov's view this obstacle will most certainly be removed in due time since "the preliminary peace talks revealed an area of agreement between the Revolutionary Council and the patriotic underground forces ... Although the Council and the [patriotic forces] ... reached no agreement for a ceasefire, conditions for the resumption of talks remain quite favourable ..." <sup>8</sup> The Soviet author's logic

rests on the assumption that "all democratic forces" want peace.

How much and what kind of pressure CPSU leaders could exert on Red and White Flag Communists is not clear. Apparently they used to channel funds to insurgents through cadres of the NUF and through the office of the Burma-Soviet Friendship Society.<sup>9</sup> It is not known whether they threatened to cut all aid to the rebels. In any case, they appeared to view the lengthy guerrilla campaign a failure and openly stated that war is harmful to Burma's development.<sup>10</sup>

The Revolutionary Council's offer for peace talks was a generous one. It granted amnesty to all dissidents who surrendered voluntarily. This would have been an opportune time, in the opinion of Soviet tacticians, for the White Flag Party to resume peaceful tactics and follow the lead of the BWPP by encouraging Communist cadres to join the BSPP. The Russians probably believed that large and immediate gains could be made by adhering to the concept of a united front from above.<sup>11</sup>

The government itself had shifted decidedly to the left in 1963. The resignation of Brigadier Aung Gyi from the Revolutionary Council eliminated the principal propagator of moderate policies and made way for increased pressure on Ne Win from radical leftists within the Council. In fact, according to one Western analyst, some members of the BWPP

had already succeeded in securing high government positions. For example,

U Ba Nyein, a director of the Union Bank of Burma and the Government's adviser in the Ministry of Finance, was formerly a prominent member of the United Workers' Party [i.e., the forerunner to the BWPP]. He and others ostensibly broke with the Communists to join the ruling [Burma] Socialist Programme Party. Much attention has also been given [by the BWPP] to those organs of government that translate government policy into action. The School of Political Science is one such body into which 'defectors' from the Communist ranks have infiltrated. Such 'defectors' are also to be found among the officers on special duty to government departments and the private advisers to certain Ministers. <sup>12</sup>

This observation undoubtedly rests in part on speculation.

In Burma the dividing line between Communist and Marxist-nationalist has often been rather blurred. And it is frequently difficult to distinguish one from the other. Therefore, the action of switching one's allegiance from the BWPP, White or Red Flag Communist Party to the official government party would not involve a wholesale renunciation of one's ideals.

Nevertheless, the assertion is surely correct that conditions for effective infiltration were, at the time of the ceasefire negotiations, optimum. This in part explains the reason for the sense of urgency with which Soviet articles and publications conveyed the desire for a peace settlement. The CPSU leadership seemed, at the time, to consider Burma the prototype of a "national democracy". The Revolutionary

Council had indicated its desire to come to an accord with the various Communist groups. It was in the process of implementing large-scale nationalization schemes, establishing workers' councils and peasant cooperatives, and, not least important, displaying a neutralist attitude in foreign affairs which on balance appeared to favour the Communist world.

However, the failure of Communist-government negotiations contributed to a decisive change in the attitude of the Revolutionary Council vis à vis all Communist organizations -- above- or underground. The NUF had offered its services as a liaison between the government and the Communist insurgents during the abortive talks. And surprisingly, according to one source, the NUF supported the position of the White Flags.<sup>13</sup> Ne Win, apparently disenchanted with Communist intransigence, ordered the arrest of seven hundred NUF leaders. Twenty-three of the forty central committee members were incarcerated; sixteen managed to escape apprehension by going underground. Only U Chit Maung eluded the government's dragnet. At the time, he was in the Soviet Union undergoing medical treatment.<sup>14</sup>

Although "former" Communists now active in the governmental apparatus were not affected by the order, the national united front from above tactics so intensely propagated by Moscow suffered a severe setback -- as did the Communist party which followed its advice. Subsequent Soviet pronouncements on the Burmese political scene have become somewhat less

enthusiastic. While the party newspaper Pravda only "noted with regret that talks between the Burmese government and the underground armies ... had failed,"<sup>15</sup> recent articles have become more candid. To elaborate, one analyst warned that

a section of the army élite has become tainted by bourgeois ideology ... that fifteen years of attempts by successive bourgeois governments to instil into the army the ideology of anti-Communism have left a certain mark, and thus there is a danger that anti-Communist elements might come to the fore.<sup>16</sup>

But in whatever ideological interpretations Soviet writers might engage they could not hide the fact that the CPSU line had suffered a major defeat.

This not only resulted in a noticeable decline in Moscow's influence on the Burmese Communist movement, but also enhanced the prestige of Peking. As indicated above, both White and Red Flag Communists commenced a guerrilla campaign in the early post-war years. In the initial period the groups operated independently of each other. Instead they preferred to cooperate on an ad hoc basis with dissident ethnic minority armies and rebellious government troops. While for a number of years all insurgent forces experienced considerable success -- at one time all areas except the city of Rangoon were rebel-controlled -- Communist fortunes declined precipitously when the forces of Thakin Soe and Than Tun were finally confronted in 1949 by a reorganized Burmese Army under the leadership of General Ne Win.



Increasing Communist setbacks encouraged Red and White Flag leaders to consider the establishment of a united front to combine their efforts. Peking, its star rising rapidly after Chiang Kai-shek had been driven from the mainland, gave verbal encouragement to these developments. However, attempts to achieve a Red and White Flag working relationship failed largely due to Thakin Soe's ambition to become leader of the temporarily united Communist forces. His forceful personality and inflexible ideological stance particularly alienated H.N. Goshal, Than Tun and a number of second echelon BCP leaders.

Hence, the ephemeral partnership disintegrated and Thakin Soe's small army returned to its favourite operational base, the Arakanese autonomous region. The Red Flag Communist Party of Burma has since been dismissed as an important factor in Burmese politics. Soe, often tagged a "Trotskyite", has been vigorously attacked by the Soviet press<sup>17</sup> and, strangely enough, ignored by the Chinese. Nevertheless, he seems to have had an impact on some of the more extremist-oriented groups in Arakan. Apparently he even established an affiliated political organization called the Red Flag Communist Party of Arakan.<sup>18</sup> The Red Flags were the first Communist insurgent group to accept Ne Win's call for a ceasefire.<sup>19</sup> But they were also the first to decline the government's terms for a final settlement.<sup>20</sup> In all likelihood, Soe simply used the peace parley as

a pretext to permit his forces to regroup.

It is highly doubtful that the CPB is under the influence of Peking, let alone Moscow. Although it virulently denounces American "imperialism" and "neo-colonialism" and regarded Khrushchev a "traitor" to the international Communist movement, it reputedly also views Peking's position as too conservative.<sup>21</sup>

Undoubtedly the most important Communist party in Burma today is the one of the White Flags. The claims of the "deviant" faction of Thakin Soe aside, the Burmese Communist Party is today regarded the legitimate heir to its parent organization, the Communist Party of Burma. In continual opposition to the government since 1948 the party had reportedly come under the ideological influence of Peking by 1952.<sup>22</sup> But this is conjecture. At the time China was unable to impose its suggestion that the two feuding insurgent groups cooperate more closely.

On the other hand, it appears that Peking had managed to convert BCP leaders to its position en masse by 1963. According to one reporter<sup>23</sup> the CPC operates an indoctrination center for Southeast Asian Communists in Yunnan, South China. Here supposedly at least fifty Burmese Communists, occupying positions in the middle and upper echelons of the White Flag power structure, received indoctrination and guerrilla training courses. Even Goshal, chief theoretician for the BCP, evidently

attended "refresher" courses at this institute.

The reporter claims that Goshal then became a proponent of the Peking line and managed to sway Than Tun from his pro-Soviet stand. The latter still seemed to agree with the CPSU that the White Flags should terminate their guerrilla activities. Goshal, with the support of the majority of the BCP central committee carried the day. And Peking reinforced the militant faction of the White Flags by sending at least thirty Burmese Communists, who had lived in China for over a decade, back to Burma during the crucial ceasefire negotiations. Four of the repatriates took an active part in the government-White Flag discussions. After their termination twenty-eight of these leaders remained in Communist-held enclaves in Burma while the other two returned to Peking.<sup>24</sup> From that point onward, one may assume that the BCP had become even more amenable to CPC directives.

This is not to suggest that the White Flags had not before supported Peking in its ideological dispute with Moscow. Indeed, at the start of the polemics, the BCP immediately came out in favour of Mao Tse-tung.<sup>25</sup>

BCP pronouncements either on the controversy or on internal political developments have not often been reprinted in Chinese or Soviet journals. While the reasons for their scarcity will be indicated below, the views expressed by the BCP delegate at the Sixth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party

of East Germany in 1963 may be taken as representative of the White Flag position:

[This] party congress has been convened at a time when the forces of ... the peace-loving Socialist camp are becoming stronger than the forces of war and of the war-mongering imperialist camp. [The war-like acts] ... particularly arranged by U.S. imperialists and the Kennedy regime demand greater unity and solidarity as well as heightened revolutionary vigilance to counter the provocations and intrigues of the imperialists, especially the U.S. imperialists ... We [i.e., the BCP central committee] sincerely hope that [this] party congress will positively contribute to these goals ... In view of the ... traitorous actions of the revisionists, we regard it as absolutely essential to intensify our combined efforts in our battle against modern revisionism, ... the main danger in the international Communist movement ... 26

Although the message is relatively mild in tone, it leaves no doubt that the "revisionists" [read CPSU leaders] are guilty for the present disunity in the Communist world. Already in 1961, when Soviet and Chinese polemicists still attacked Albanian "dogmatism" and Yugoslav "revisionism" respectively, the White Flags solidly backed the Albanians.

On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Albanian Party of Labour (APL) the BCP central committee sent the following message:

... United around the banner of the APL, the Albanian people confidently march toward the building of a better life and a brighter future ... We are convinced that in the spirit of [the 1957 Moscow Declaration and the 1960 Statement] the Albanian Party of Labour, headed by Comrade Hoxha, correctly applying Marxism-Leninism, will achieve other and greater successes, for the benefit of the Albanian people. (emphasis added).<sup>27</sup>

These declarations of support for Peking's viewpoint may be a simple derivative of the predominance of central committee and politburo members who had undergone extensive training in China. On the other hand, as mentioned above, before 1963 CPC organizational control of the White Flag Party was not complete. There is little evidence available that, during this period, the Chinese were supplying insurgents with anything more than training and possibly some funds through their various diplomatic and trade missions and friendship organizations. Significantly, while Burmese Communists rebels control territory along the Chinese border, they had apparently received few, if any, weapons from Peking.<sup>28</sup>

This omission is largely explained by the fact that Peking had upheld exceptionally amicable relations with both the U Nu and Ne Win governments. Evidently the endeavour of Chinese diplomacy was to build Sino-Burmese friendship into a type of "model" for inter-state relations which other Southeast Asian countries were encouraged to follow. Hence the lack of sustained overt support for the BCP.

The CPR has also been competing with the U.S.S.R. for the sympathy of General Ne Win. The former had, therefore, to be extremely careful not to antagonize the General by openly siding with the rebels. Since 1960 Burma has been called a "very close friend" by the Chinese. Thus Ho Lung, speaking on the occasion of Burma's National Day in 1963, made the

following comments:

... relations between China and Burma are a good example of amicable coexistence and friendly cooperation between Asian-African countries. The boundary of peace and friendship established between the two countries and the Sino-Burmese Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression ... are... lively examples of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in action and the crystallization of the great friendship between the two peoples. 29

After Chou En-lai's fifth visit to Burma, the resultant Sino-Burmese accord was given the label "kinsman-like".<sup>30</sup> Although Peking has repeatedly pointed to Sino-Burmese cooperation it is difficult to explain why the CPC did not press White Flag insurgents to accept the Revolutionary Council's amnesty offer. Two reasons may be suggested: one, the Chinese did not have organizational control of the BCP apparatus and thus could not force White Flag leaders to accept the government's terms; two, the Chinese wanted to see the BCP eventually assume power in Burma. The weight of available evidence rests largely on the second alternative.

It appears that White Flag leaders and their Chinese advisers always regarded the pursuit of guerrilla war as likely to bear more fruit than such policies as followed by the NUF. That intra-party dissension occurred over the question of tactics is evident not only from the reported vacillation of Than Tun but also from the surrender of a number of important Communist military leaders and party officials.<sup>31</sup> Nonetheless, from the inception of the liberation war, the BCP (and Thakin

Soe's CPB for that matter) has constantly attempted to implement a united front from below strategy. White and Red Flag Communists continuously exploited dissatisfaction among Burma's numerous ethnic minorities, managed to cooperate with a number of insurgent groups such as the Arakanese, Kachins, Karens and Shans and, when possible, sought to bend them to their own purposes.

This part of the strategy has yielded a measure of success. White Flag guerrillas presently seem to be on good terms both with a rebellious faction of Karens and, more important, with the Kachin Independence Army -- currently in control of Burma's northernmost state. Yet White Flag accomplishments have remained regional. In fact, one is tempted to argue that, while the leaders with the exception of H.N. Goshal are apparently mainly of Burman extraction, both the BCP and the CPB have degenerated into communal political parties.

To date, the most important Communist group, the Peking-oriented White Flag Party, has been unable to realize the decisive component of the Chinese tactical guide: to gain the support of the peasantry and to discredit the national leadership. White Flag attempts to denigrate nationalist leaders have followed the usual Communist pattern of charging "bourgeois nationalist-imperialist" collusion. Obviously Thakin Soe, Than Tun and H.N. Goshal saw no positive value in the policy of neutrality followed by U Nu and Ne Win. Further,

blame for the continuing civil war was placed on the national government. In the words of the Burmese representative at the East German party congress,

... the fratricidal civil war, encouraged by the Anglo-American imperialists /has/ since 1948 obediently been continued by our country's bourgeois régimes. Therefore, our party has repeatedly called upon the bourgeois régimes ..., including the current military régime of General Ne Win, to end the civil war and /through negotiations/ ... return to internal peace ... However, the latter has thus far refused /to negotiate/. /Its refusal to do so is the direct consequence of / its own class interests and the interests of its imperialist masters ... Ne Win's régime is /nothing more than/ an anti-Communist military dictatorship. Yet, in spite of the most cruel armed suppression of the revolutionary forces, which includes the national minorities, ... we are confident that final victory will most certainly belong to the people.<sup>32</sup>

Since the unexpected did occur and Ne Win offered to negotiate, both White and Red Flag leaders demanded the right to retain their armed forces and "liberated areas" as well as taxation powers in these areas as preconditions for a satisfactory settlement. Failure to agree with the government as well as the subsequent dissolution of the NUF without a doubt strengthened the hand of the militants within the BCP. Hence the CPSU lost its ability to counterbalance Peking's influence in the White Flag organization, at least to some extent, through its contacts with the NUF.

The fact that the pro-Peking faction gained the ascendancy will not, in the opinion of this writer, increase the Communists' ability to effectively utilize nationalist



sentiment. First, they have -- out of necessity -- already committed the cardinal sin of sympathising with minority dissidence against the national government and hence -- albeit implicitly -- against the Burman majority. Second, White or Red Flags, in the attempt to present themselves as champions of the entire Burmese population face another serious obstacle -- the influence of Buddhism especially among the Burman peasantry. Indeed, on occasion the military has attempted to use religion as an anti-Communist weapon.<sup>33</sup> While the effectiveness of religious campaigns is not assessable in concrete terms, there is little doubt that the existence of Buddhist monks<sup>34</sup> in rural areas provides a counterweight to Communist influence.

But the Communist potential for winning converts among the peasantry is quite large. It has been indicated that the Burmese economy today is stagnating. Although farm tenancy is not widespread, prices received for agricultural produce are static; production is falling; black markets are thriving. While the Revolutionary Council is dedicated to improving the lot of the peasantry, it has thus far proved incapable of doing so.<sup>35</sup> Should this trend continue peasants may become increasingly receptive to Communist promises. White and Red Flag insurgents have recently attempted to exploit this discontent more efficiently by proposing another united front.<sup>36</sup>

In summary, the following points may be reiterated. Peking's dominance of the Communist movement in Burma today is unquestioned.<sup>37</sup> The CPC-BCP relationship appears to have been cemented following the dissolution of the NUF. Peking's tactics have had greater ideological and practical appeal while those of Moscow have become discredited. Peking's present attraction is, in all probability, a partial result of the professed superiority of its tactical model. However, the decisive factor would appear to be the presence in the BCP central committee of a faction unquestionably loyal to Mao Tse-tung. To what degree Peking's influence has been reduced by the renewed cooperation between Thakin Soe and Than Tun is unknown. Most likely, however, it is very small.

Burmese Communists have thus far been unable to build an effective united front from below. While they gained some support among the minorities and students and have recently stepped up their efforts to infiltrate student organizations and recruit guerrilla cadres,<sup>38</sup> their attempts to discredit the national leadership have failed. And the peasantry has, until now, remained relatively impervious to Communist appeals. Excessive fraternization with the ethnic minorities may have tarnished the Communists' claim to be the only true representative of Burmese nationalism.

To re-emphasize, Chinese ideological and organizational influence as well as the vagaries of the Burmese political

environment combined to minimize Russian influence among Burmese Communist parties.

Whether the recent worsening of Sino-Burmese relations will have an advantageous effect on the Burmese Communist movement is still conjecture. Presumably, the Chinese may now increase their material aid to the Communists and may provide Communist insurgents with safe staging bases on Chinese territory. At the same time, however, the reservoir of goodwill which Peking has sought to build up in Burma has largely been dissipated. The current vogue of anti-Chinese sentiment in Burma could also work to the disadvantage especially of the BCP, which has made no secret of its ties with Peking.

Close association with China also seems, in the last analysis, to be detrimental to a number of other Southeast Asian Communist parties.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA

There is overall agreement among Western observers that the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) has, since its birth, been oriented toward the CPC rather than the CPSU. Unlike the Communists of Burma, who had originally trained themselves in Marxist ideology without Comintern tutelage, Communism in Malaya and Singapore was strictly a Chinese import. Indeed, the first organized Communist cells operated as part of the Overseas Kuomintang Party.

Initially, Communism made a greater impact on the Chinese in Malaya and Singapore for the simple reason that they formed most of the labour force in the area. By contrast, the Malays displayed a predilection for such occupations as farming, fishing and government service. Hence, in Malaya Communism has suffered from a distinctly Chinese "taint". As shall be seen shortly, this fact along with the communal tensions which developed between the Chinese and the Malays has, so to speak, left the MCP sitting between two chairs. The party, in order to achieve a nationalist identity, must be able to appeal to all major ethnic groups in Malaysia.<sup>1</sup> But, to date, it has been unable to escape its historical association with the Chinese.

However, since in most areas of Malaysia the Chinese not only form a significant part of the population but also dominate the economy, the power potential of the MCP must by no means be underemphasized. Communists associate themselves with many causes popular in the Chinese communities. By integrating demands for the preservation of the Chinese language, culture and education system into its overall political program the MCP can appeal to almost all strata in the Chinese community. In the eyes of the younger Chinese it is the representative of a new and powerful China; for the older it acts as the protector of tradition.

Not surprisingly therefore, Singapore -- in which three-quarters of the population is of Chinese extraction -- represents a major MCP stronghold. At this point a word of caution must be inserted. It has not been established with any certainty whether the MCP directs the operations of the Singapore Communist organization. Reportedly the party's supreme political command is located somewhere on the Thai-Malaysia frontier. Coordination of tactics among and communication between the two areas are anything but efficient. Nevertheless, this may be more the result of geography and government repression of Communist activity than the existence of competing or separate party hierarchies. At the same time, since all Communist units operating in Malaysia -- including the "Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO)" of Sarawak --

have been adamantly opposed to the Federation but do advocate a political union of Singapore and Malaya proper, they shall, for the purposes of this analysis, be treated as components of the MCP.

The party is illegal in all parts of Malaysia and the variety of tactics followed by Communist groups in each geographical area gives the MCP a very loose-knit appearance. Singapore's terrain, for example, does not lend itself particularly well to guerrilla warfare. Thus, since the outset of Communist activity here, the MCP has placed heavy reliance on front organizations. For the most part this strategy appeared to pay handsome dividends. Until 1960 its members occupied key positions in the People's Action Party (PAP), the most important political party on the island.

The MCP faction broke with PAP's moderate leader, Lee Kuan Yew, in mid-1961 over the question of granting concessions to the British after Singapore's independence. The Singapore Communist leadership denounced Mr. Lee's willingness to permit the British to retain their naval base as well as his inability to convince Britain of the wisdom of a Singapore-Malaya merger.

The MCP subsequently sponsored a new political front, the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front), which became the leading opponent of the PAP in Singapore's legislature. In addition, the Barisan not only dominated the labour movement

through the Singapore Association of Trade Unions but also attracted a large student following from Chinese middle-schools and the Chinese-language Nanyang University. The MCP has been able to capitalize on student discontent resulting from an inability to get good jobs. Chinese middle-schools and Nanyang University are private institutions and their academic standing is reportedly quite low. Degrees granted by Nanyang University, for example, were recognized by neither the government of Malaya nor Singapore. Suspicion of discrimination against Chinese education gained the MCP a large number of activists.

The Clandestine Communist Organization in Sarawak -- as the Sarawak government has branded the MCP branch there -- appeals to segments of the population and follows policies quite similar to those of its counterpart in Singapore. Again its success has been mainly among the Chinese community. Thus Communists have effectively infiltrated the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), the acknowledged spokesman for the Chinese community in East Malaysia. SUPP, formed in 1959, is led by middle-class Chinese businessmen. But it is generally conceded that today, Communist cadres occupy positions at all levels of the SUPP's organizational structure. And the CCO apparently completely controls a number of party branches.

The MCP unit in Sarawak has been particularly adept

at attracting Chinese youths to its cause. This again appears to be due to a paucity of jobs available for Chinese middle-school graduates. One analyst describes the situation in these words:

... at a time when the proportion of Sarawak Chinese with middle-school education is rapidly rising, Sarawak -- never a land of great opportunities -- has had less and less to offer the educated youth, particularly those in the Chinese-language stream. As a result, there have been large numbers of middle-school graduates who were either unemployed or not suitably employed; and there have been others who remained in school beyond the usual time because of the lack of employment opportunities, and who became the nuclei for subversive activities.<sup>2</sup>

Apart from the SUPP, the Sarawak Advanced Youths' League has become the MCP's most important front in Sarawak. Besides furnishing recruits for the Communist apparatus, League members also play their part in indoctrinating the peasantry, evidently to create a solid rural base. The task of League members in rural Chinese schools is to encourage peasant membership in the Sarawak Farmers' Association, another MCP front.<sup>3</sup> Communists have also attempted to build a trade-union structure in Sarawak. However, even here their appeal tended to follow communal lines, "with Chinese workers ... readily coming under the [CCO's] control but little support being drawn among the Malay, Dayak and workers of other ethnic groups."<sup>4</sup>



While traditional racial animosities between the Malays and the Chinese dampened the MCP's popularity among the former it appears that Chinese communities are also confronted by much more real government discrimination -- cultural, economic and political -- than are other ethnic groups. Dissatisfaction with the status quo and government restrictions on the Chinese have kept their loyalty to Malaysia rather tenuous. What is more, the resurgence of a powerful China serves as an attractive alternative. The skill with which the MCP plays on this sense of alienation has led a reporter to remark that " ... the Communist appeal effectively goes to the very roots of the ethnic identity of the Chinese community in Sarawak."<sup>5</sup>

MCP tacticians in Malaya proper have encountered stiffer competition for the loyalty of the Chinese. There, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) acts as spokesman for Chinese interests. Although this organization mainly serves the more conservative business elements in the Chinese community it also acts as guardian for the community's cultural and political interests. The MCP furthermore laboured against a legacy of ill-will collected in its extended guerrilla campaign first against the British colonial administration, then against an independent Federation of Malaya. Since the Malay population suffered particularly from the effects of this campaign the party has had difficulty convincing Malays both of its multi-

racial composition and the sincerity of its inter-communal political program. This situation, incidentally, bears a marked similarity to the one encountered by Burmese Communists.

The party needs Malay support to replace the present political élite. Malays not only slightly outnumber the Chinese but also form the bulk of the rural population. Thus in Malaya, much more so than in Singapore, the MCP must be able to appeal to the nationalist sentiment of -- and exploit potential and actual grievances among -- both the Chinese and Malays. But according to all indications it has thus far failed to bridge the communal gap.

Until recently the MCP has pursued a two-fold tactical line in Malaya. On one side it has continued its guerrilla war; presently its military arm -- the Malayan Races Liberation Army -- operates in the Thai-Malaysia border area. In this region Communist forces have managed to establish a small but fairly invulnerable base area. While Thai and Malaysian security forces often embark on joint military ventures to eliminate the remaining Communist units, their efforts have been quite unsuccessful. Indeed, the most recent reports indicate that Malaysian Communists not only have found a relatively safe refuge immediately inside Thai territory but also have managed to amass considerable support among the Chinese minority there.

As in Sarawak the first loyalty of the Chinese is to China, not Thailand. A local Thai schoolteacher describes

Chinese communities in southern Thailand as follows:

This is little China ... When you ask young people of Chinese extraction their homeland they say 'China'. They give the Communists their ethnic, not ideological support. (emphasis added). <sup>7</sup>

In this respect the MCP remains a communal party. And even as it manipulates traditional Chinese nationalist symbols it still relies on coercion and terror especially to enlist the services of peasants and small rubber producers.<sup>8</sup>

Significantly, in spite of the MCP's "Chineseness", it appears to have achieved an important breakthrough by building a base of support among the Malays inhabiting four southern provinces in Thailand. At the same time that Malaysian Communists presented themselves as Chinese nationalists to the Chinese they were not averse to fanning Malay discontent against the Bangkok government.

This Malay minority has proved to be a headache for the Thai administration. Islamic religion and particularistic sentiments seem to make it an unassimilable ethnic group, especially since it is oriented much more toward Kuala Lumpur than Bangkok. One is thus confronted by the rather bizarre phenomenon of two ethnic groups -- quite hostile to one another -- which respond to a manipulation of two distinct sets of nationalist symbols by supporting the one political party of which, theoretically, a basic tenet is internationalism.

In other parts of peninsular Malaysia the MCP, for a

number of reasons, did not present the same image of vitality. First, since the beginning of its insurrection in 1948, it has been proscribed. And the Kuala Lumpur government has repeatedly initiated mass arrests of suspected Communist party members and sympathizers; second, the Chinese community in Malaya does not display the cohesiveness evident in Sarawak and Singapore. In addition, much of its articulate leadership finds its way into the MCA, not the MCP. Third, while the geography of the peninsula may lend itself to guerrilla tactics, most of the rural inhabitants are Malays and the Communists have been unable to gain their support.

Hence, as in Singapore, the MCP is forced to operate on a quasi-legal basis through political fronts. Apart from a number of ephemeral labour and student organizations the most important of these was the Socialist Front. (This Front is not identical with the Barisan Sosialis). A loose alliance of three left-wing political parties -- the Labour Party of Malaya, the People's Party and the National Convention Party -- it sought to gather both Chinese and Malay adherents. As the latter two parties are mainly Malay in composition the Front was given something of a Malayan flavour. However, the alliance appears to have been dominated by the Labour Party of Malaya. And since that organization consists mainly of Chinese the partnership has been fragile.

As the Labour Party obviously had contacts with the

MCP and was quite openly pro-Peking it proved exceptionally vulnerable to government suppression. In 1966, for example, Kuala Lumpur revoked the licence of four of its branches on the grounds that they were Communist fronts controlled by the Malayan Races Liberation League.<sup>9</sup> The Socialist Front finally disintegrated when the Labour Party withdrew.<sup>10</sup>

The MCP has attempted to extract itself from its political doldrums by totally opposing the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, as proposed by Tunku Abdul Rahman. When the Malayan Prime Minister first enunciated the plan for a federal state -- comprising the territories of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei -- his intention was to provide an alternative to a political union only comprising Singapore and Malaya, as favoured by Singapore's Premier Lee Kuan Yew and, incidentally, also by the Barisan Sosialis and the MCP. The Tunku feared Chinese numerical preponderance in any Singapore-Malaya union, but also desired closer surveillance of Singapore's radical left by Kuala Lumpur's security agency -- hence his demand that Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei be encouraged to join the Federation. He also argued that the more territories were included the more viable Malaysia's economy would be.

Although the Tunku's plan was received with mixed emotions, especially by the Chinese -- whose influence an enlarged Malaysia would curb -- Lee Kuan Yew accepted the

proposal. Communist units from all areas of the proposed Federation immediately denounced the "Malaysia scheme". Initially their opposition, it seems, was based on three principal factors: the anti-Communist attitude of Malaya's political leaders; the implicitly anti-Chinese nature of the Malaysia plan; and, the pro-Western position of the Kuala Lumpur government.

Not unexpectedly, therefore, Communist and Chinese communal interests coincided; Communists in Singapore and Sarawak would be faced by decidedly harsher government repressive measures; Chinese in general would be exposed to the "Malayanization" process fostered by the Tunku's administration. Thus the MCP and its fronts

were able to mobilize the resentment in the Chinese community over the formation of Malaysia and to direct it along the paths of violent opposition. For even among the non-Communist Chinese in Sarawak -- as among non-Communist Chinese in Singapore and Malaya -- the formation of the Malaysian Federation is regarded as a device to curb or dilute Chinese economic and political influence in the area. The opposition of SUPP to the Malaysia concept, for example, struck a responsive chord among virtually all Sarawak Chinese ...<sup>11</sup>

The almost simultaneous reaction of all Communist groups to the Malaysia plan suggests careful coordination. But it is quite doubtful that Chen Ping, secretary general of the MCP, or Lim Chin Siong and Lee Siew Choh, Barisan leaders, initiated and directed the anti-Malaysia campaign. This conclusion may be drawn from the fact that before 1962

(i.e., before the Tunku's plan came into the political limelight) the activities of the various Communist units displayed much less evidence of central guidance.

Since the birth of Malaysia the MCP has not ceased to heap invective upon the political figures responsible for implementing the plan as well as to denigrate the concept itself. The Barisan Sosialis tersely pictured Malaysia as a British "plot" to retain their economic and strategic interests:

- (1) The British are imperialists pure and simple. The Malaysia plan is meant to protect British interests in the area.
- (2) The Federation plays the part of neo-colonialists, and wants to preserve and protect the interests of the feudalists as well as the interests of the British.<sup>12</sup>

The Brunei uprising and the resultant failure of the British protectorate to join the Federation was hailed by the MCP as a "blow to neo-colonialism." Malaysian Communists received considerable aid -- financial and political -- from Djakarta when Indonesia in turn began to oppose the formation of Malaysia.<sup>13</sup> Just how much assistance and direction was given the MCP, especially by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), remains subject to further investigation.<sup>14</sup> But there is no question that Indonesia's increasing militancy and its policy of "confrontation" gave a tremendous boost to MCP activities. In 1963, a Malayan Liberation League, led by the MCP, established its headquarters in Djakarta. In all proba-

bility this organization henceforth acted as the coordinating center for all anti-Malaysia activity.

Communist opposition to Malaysia also attracted the support of the Malaysia-based Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP). While the goal of the PMIP is to create a Muslim theocracy which would include all Malays and Indonesians and the aim of the MCP is to establish a Communist state, their short-term interests are identical: to destroy the political unit of Malaysia. PMIP support is invaluable to the MCP particularly in its operational base of southern Thailand and northern Malaya. Here, the former's influence among the Malays is quite strong.<sup>15</sup>

In spite of vocal and active resistance on the part of MCP fronts and the PMIP, the new Federation of Malaysia was created in September, 1963. Reaction from all its opponents was immediate and extreme. Peking launched a violent polemical campaign against the Federation only a few days after its formation and summarized its hostility in an article entitled "'Malaysia' - Offspring of Neo-Colonialism":

Malaysia [the article states, is nothing but a British-American] neo-colonialist plot [to] continue to suppress the national liberation movement in this area and thus maintain British colonial interests there intact ... The U.S. propaganda machine has done its utmost to push the idea of the creation of an "anti-Communist bulwark" in "Malaysia" and the use of "U.S.-British military forces" to cope jointly with so-called "aggression from Indonesia, Red China and North Vietnam." [Moreover, the] U.S. revealed its true neo-colonialist nature when it expressed "increasing interest in the



possibility of American investment in Malaysia" ... For its part, China stands solidly behind the people of North Kalimantan /i.e., Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei/, Malaya and Singapore in their struggle to exercise their right to national self-determination, oppose the Malaysia "neo-colonialist" plot and achieve real independence. Their struggle is part and parcel of the struggle of the people of the world against imperialism, against old and new colonialism and for the preservation of peace in Asia and throughout the world. 16

It is impossible to say how much MCP-CPC opposition stems from a willingness to protect Chinese community interests and how much it is the result of a desire to undercut the position of Malaysia's pro-Western political élite and to back President Sukarno's irredentist claims in North Borneo. In all probability the latter factors weighed much more heavily in their decision. Happily, however, since Chinese minority aspirations also appeared restricted by the formation of Malaysia, Peking could present itself as the protector of these aspirations as well.

Had Moscow taken a more ambivalent position on the question of Malaysia, Peking's tough stand might have been sufficient to cement the MCP's loyalty. But the Soviet Union took just as dim a view of the new Federation. Already in mid-1962 an editorial in the pro-Soviet magazine Eastern World accused the Tunku of "browbeating" the population of the prospective territories of Malaysia into accepting his plan. Anyone opposed to it, the editor contends, is branded a Communist.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, while originally the intent of the

Federation was to "further economic development and check the spread of Communism in these areas ... the Tunku now conceives the prevention of Communism as its sole purpose."<sup>18</sup> An editorial in the September issue of the same magazine goes so far as to call the formation of Malaysia an Anschluss, suggesting that the Tunku used annexation procedures similar to those of Hitler Germany.<sup>19</sup>

Since Soviet writers dismiss Malaysia's present leadership as British "vassals" and "feudal compradores" there seems no major distinction between the Chinese and Soviet analyses of the Malaysian political environment. Obviously the CPSU did not encourage the MPC to follow a united front from above strategy. Indeed, in the specific case of Malaysia, a "puppet regime",<sup>20</sup> Soviet leaders appear to condone the tactics thus far employed by the MPC. They point out, for example, that East Malaysia has become the "center of revolutionary struggle"<sup>21</sup> (Communists started an insurgency campaign there in 1963).

But the Russians, in the opinion of the MCP, still do not place sufficient emphasis on, or provide significant aid for, revolutionary violence. The Chinese-controlled journal Revolution underlines this shortcoming, stating that " ... the Soviet Union [as well as] the United States and Britain ... exerted pressure on President Sukarno not to be openly involved in the [Brunei] uprising ..."<sup>22</sup> Hence Moscow

placed itself squarely on the side of the "anti-revolutionary" forces.

An article in the Malayan Monitor, unofficial organ of the MCP, revealed even more explicit anti-Soviet sentiment. It scored

those who take a short-sighted view of history and try to minimize the achievements of the national liberation struggle in Malaya. For ... the national liberation movement in Malaya broke the back of colonialism in Malaya and contributed to the worldwide upsurge against imperialism in general. This is the first and most important fruit gained for the Malayan people and for the anti-colonialist struggle in general ... By prescribing a "blanket" programme of "peaceful coexistence" and even "peaceful cooperation" between ... social systems the Soviets have betrayed the world Communist movement ... The denial of the basic duty to struggle unremittingly against imperialism and colonialism, leads inevitably to substantive collaboration with imperialism against the forces of peace, freedom, democracy and socialism ... To undertake the struggle for the total defeat of imperialism and liquidation of colonialism and pursue it to its victorious conclusion is the very touchstone of all hopes, all aspirations and all endeavours for the elimination of war, for peace, ... freedom, for the exploitation of man by man, for the creation of brotherhood of man on a universal scale.<sup>23</sup>

This rather lengthy diatribe against Soviet "revisionists" indicates complete contempt of the argument that economic competition with the West will, in the long run, prove more beneficial to Communism than revolutionary war. But since the CPSU acknowledges the "reactionary" nature of Malaysia's

national leadership and quite openly condones the use of guerrilla tactics, the MCP's denunciation seems rather academic.<sup>24</sup>

Nevertheless, there are indications that the Soviet Union is seeking to normalize relations with Malaysia. Thus, when the MCP stepped up its agitation and guerrilla campaign against the Federation, the U.S.S.R. attempted to increase trade with it.<sup>25</sup> The party's arguments do, therefore, have their practical side.

The latter's militant pro-Chinese position was undoubtedly reinforced by the growing intensity of Indonesia's "Crush Malaysia" campaign. This not only encouraged the MCP to bolder action but also stimulated the Kuala Lumpur government to intensify its anti-Communist drive. In Singapore Barisan student and labour leaders were arrested; in Sarawak Malaysian forces stepped up their counter-insurgency campaign. Here a large number of guerrillas, principally members of the Sarawak Advanced Youths' League and SUPP, had been trained by the Indonesian Army in Kalimantan and sent back to harass government installations and police units.

Kuala Lumpur commenced to dissolve pro-Communist trade unions, detain Chinese middle-school students, proscribe district organizations of the SUPP, and resettle whole communities of Chinese suspected of aiding Communist guerrillas. These operations were still in full swing at the end of 1966.<sup>26</sup>

How seriously they affected Communist capabilities is difficult to assess. One fact is certain; Sarawak Communists had begun to rely less on the SUPP to achieve power. Indeed, one of their documents had already stressed in 1954 that the "so-called parliamentary struggle is only a tactic ... armed revolutionary struggle is the only efficacious form of struggle."<sup>27</sup> The veracity of this statement remains to be seen.

Perhaps of all Malaysian Communist units the one in Singapore suffered most. Kuala Lumpur regarded Singapore's radical left with a particularly suspicious eye, both because of its strength and its pro-Peking leanings. Consequently Sosialis fronts were repeatedly dissolved, and in 1964 Nanyang University was reorganized and placed under stricter government supervision. The MCP was constantly kept "on the run" and forced to create new fronts. Its operational efficiency undoubtedly suffered in the process. Thus Communist leaders must have been delighted when Singapore seceded from Malaysia in 1965.

But the newly independent government of Lee Kuan Yew continued to harrass the Barisan Sosialis and its organizational adjuncts. Communists had increasingly to rely on and expand their underground apparatus. That the Singapore administration, like its counterpart in Kuala Lumpur, had earned the dislike of the Communists became evident in a programmatic statement issued by the Malayan Liberation League on the

occasion of Singapore's secession. In its view the immediate cause for the withdrawal was the desire of the "Lee Kuan Yew clique" to become the "principal lackey" for the British in Malaysia.<sup>28</sup>

Due to the tense political situation between the central government and Singapore, the British, to protect their interests, encouraged Mr. Lee to secede. But in spite of Singapore's new, nominal independence, matters have not really changed:

Actually, Singapore is a new-type British imperialist colony. The Lee Kuan Yew clique is still a British lackey which loyally protects the military bases and the political and economic interests of British imperialism in Singapore. [The division of Singapore and Malaya is artificial and cannot be permitted. On the contrary], the people of our country must firmly continue their staunch struggle to attain true independence, democracy and peace in our country as well as [to reunite] Singapore with the Peninsula.<sup>29</sup>

The achievement of this task requires "armed struggle" against both the British and their "lackeys".

Apart from the damaging effects of persistent government suppression, the army takeover in Indonesia and the commensurate drastic decline in PKI power must have represented an exceptionally severe setback for the MCP. Members of the Malayan Liberation League headquarters in Djakarta were arrested; Communist guerrillas in Sarawak lost the use of Indonesian Borneo as a staging area for their forays; and PKI financial and organizational support crumbled.

Nonetheless, on the CPC's initiative a new command headquarters for MCP activities was set up in Peking. On January 13, 1966 Kang Yung-ho, vice-chairman of the Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, announced that the "National Liberation League and National Liberation Army of Malaya headed by P.V. Sarma" had established a "mission" in Peking. Mr. Sarma, at a banquet given in his honour, emphatically stated that the strategy developed by Mao Tse-tung must be applied in Malaysia:

The Malayan people have learned from their experience that in order to free themselves from the rule of imperialism and its puppets, revolutionary violence is the only answer to counterrevolutionary violence and a people's revolutionary war is the only answer to counterrevolutionary war ...<sup>30</sup>

On the eighteenth anniversary of the League's founding Mr. Sarma summarized the specific achievements of the MCP:

[1966 was]... a year of the upsurge of the Malayan people's national liberation movement to crush 'Malaysia' and achieve the genuine independence of our country of which Singapore is an integral part. Every field of activity bore abundant testimony to the great truth of Mao Tse-tung's thinking that where there is oppression there is resistance ... Notwithstanding the murderous plans the British imperialists plotted in collaboration with the Malayan puppets and the reactionaries of Thailand, the Malayan puppet authorities had to admit time and again during the year that the Malayan national liberation army and people led by the Communist Party were increasingly active in Central and Northern Malaya, and especially in the latter region bordering Thailand. The Malayan people have fully understood that political power grows out of the gun barrel. (emphasis added).<sup>31</sup>

Parenthetically, it is interesting that P.V. Sarma fails to mention the accomplishments of the Sarawak Communist unit. Perhaps this is an indication that Communist operations in East Malaysia do not directly fall under the jurisdiction of the MCP.

But even at the danger of generalization, one finds it difficult to believe that some organizational ties do not exist between the CCO and the MCP. They have too much in common: they operate within the same national political unit, one which, in addition, each opposes to the extreme; the membership and leadership of each consists mainly of Chinese -- the accent on youth, though noticeable in both the Singapore and Sarawak organizations, is especially strong in the latter; they draw support mainly from the Chinese minorities but have not hesitated to cooperate with orthodox Muslim pan-Malay nationalists; finally, both the CCO and the MCP lean strongly toward Peking.

The reasons for such an orientation should, by now, be obvious. Pro-China sentiment has traditionally been strong among Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia. And clearly the Chinese communities in Malaysia are no exception to this rule. This feeling is particularly noticeable among Malaysian Chinese youths. As the MCP is thought to be, not altogether incorrectly, the most legitimate representative of mainland China, it has gained the adherence of some segments of the younger



generation. This support itself undoubtedly serves to reinforce the MCP's position.

On the other hand, the "Chineseness" of the party has almost completely alienated it from the Malays and other ethnic groups. Even MCP fronts have failed to attract anyone but Chinese adherents.

To summarize, Malayan like Burmese Communists have relied heavily on ethnic minority support. But the MCP relies much more on the Chinese communities than, for example, does the BCP.

Unless China were actually to dominate Southeast Asia by force MCP prospects for achieving power in the near future seem quite dim. Strong anti-Chinese sentiment among the Malays and the MCP's close association with the Chinese minorities in Malaysia will undoubtedly continue to limit its popular appeal. Actually, therefore, adherence to the Russian tactical guide -- i.e., cooperation with the national leadership -- would perhaps be more profitable to the MCP. However, the Malaysian government has not shown any willingness to permit the party to operate on a legal basis. Hence, out of necessity, the MCP has continued to depend on the CPC's advice and support. But, in the last analysis, dependence on Peking is not only a feature of the MCP and Burmese Communists. The other Southeast Asian Communist parties to be examined also maintain close ties -- openly or surreptitiously -- with the Chinese Communists.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES

In the words of a Filipino Communist, "[the] anti-imperialist movement in the Philippines has not infrequently suffered from international isolation."<sup>1</sup> And, upon a review of international Communist activity during the period in question, his statement seems no exaggeration. Members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) do not seem to have attended any of the important Communist summit conferences within the past six years. It was represented neither at the Moscow Conference of 1960 nor at the Albanian or Bulgarian party congresses held in late 1966. More important, no pronouncement by the CPP on the Sino-Soviet differences could be found.

Yet some Western observers still place the party in the pro-Peking camp.<sup>2</sup> Their premise for doing so seems to rest on at least three observations: one, the CPP draws the bulk of its support from the peasantry and has, for a number of years, followed Maoist tactics quite closely; two, contacts between the CPP and Moscow -- the Communist Party of the U.S.A. acting as the intermediary -- were reportedly ruptured with the outbreak of World War II. During the war years Chinese Communist cadres apparently filled the resultant ideological vacuum;<sup>3</sup> three, reports in the Philippine press which cite

government sources to the effect that Chinese and Indonesian Communists are helping the CPP to expand its operations.

For example, in December 1966 Kuala Lumpur Radio claimed "that a resurgence of Chinese-inspired Communist activities had been discovered in schools, labour organizations and among the peasantry."<sup>4</sup> And the same source quotes a Radio Peking broadcast, transmitted in the Filipino national language, Tagalog, as stating that "the mass struggle of the Philippine citizens continued to spread last year [1966] with increasing protests from various social circles against the debasing and opportunist attitudes of Americans and their business monopolist clique and the Philippine administration's conformity to American policy."<sup>5</sup>

In spite of these brief references by Peking itself and by the Philippine press, CPC-controlled journals have not given extensive coverage to the activities of the purportedly Chinese-oriented Filipino Communists. The Peking Review from 1960 to 1966 did not have one article devoted to the CPP. In view of the claim that the party is a staunch supporter of Peking, this is rather surprising. But even more astonishing, the World Marxist Review, the English-language edition of the Soviet-controlled journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism, printed two articles by a Filipino Communist, Jorge Maravilla.

One is tempted to surmise, therefore, that the CPP has not as yet completely sided with Peking. Through the medium

of the CPUSA Moscow may still be able to wield some influence within the CPP apparatus. Mr. Maravilla may even be the spokesman of a pro-Soviet faction within the politburo or central committee. However, since no authoritative statements of the Filipino Communist leadership are available one must at least partially agree with reporters that the CPP favours Peking to Moscow.

In 1960 the CPP appeared doomed to play a marginal role in Philippine politics. Most of its leaders were in jail and only isolated guerrilla units remained of the once powerful liberation army which had threatened to defeat the government in the early 1950's. The surrender of Casto Alejandrino, politburo member of the CPP, in 1960 and the arrest of Dr. Jesus Lava, secretary general, in 1964 seemed to deliver the party its coup de gr<sup>^</sup>ace.

In spite of these organizational setbacks various factors indicated, even before Dr. Lava's imprisonment, that the CPP was making a "comeback". Central Luzon, traditional Communist stronghold, experienced a noticeable increase in organizational, propaganda and terrorist activities. Peasants in this area were encouraged to pay taxes to the insurgents; cattle thieves, the plague of the peasantry, were dealt with in summary fashion; military units were harrassed.

One analyst has attributed the resurgence of the Huks -- as Communists are popularly called -- to the following

factors:

... the energetic leadership provided by Jesus Lava, ... persistent peasant unrest aggravated by a lapse in the implementation of the land-reform programme after President Magsaysay's death and ... a steadily widening civic discontent fueled by the corruption and inefficiency of successive government administrations.<sup>6</sup>

Furthermore, growing anti-American sentiment among certain intellectual circles has favoured the establishment of Communist front organizations.

At the time the CPP seemed to emerge from its political limbo, W.J. Pomeroy, one-time military and political adviser to the Huk leadership, published an article in the journal Revolution significantly entitled "The Unfinished Revolution in the Philippines."<sup>7</sup> For Mr. Pomeroy the historic revolutionary force in the Philippines has been the peasantry. He points out that in the five provinces of Central Luzon 65.87 per cent of the peasants own no land of their own. In one, Pampanga, the tenancy rate is 88 per cent. The peasants, exploited by ruthless landlords, are continually on the edge of starvation. Since Magsaysay's promised land-reform has come to nothing, it is small wonder that the peasants are again turning to the Huks for aid.

The Communist-dominated revolt of 1949 was partially the result of this discontent as well as the consequence of the

peasants' revolutionary tradition:

It was a full-scale national liberation war that was in every sense a continuation of the revolt that had been crushed by American military might forty years before. But the distinguishing feature between this and the former liberation movement is that now it had organized working class leadership. Based in the peasantry and still in the main an agrarian revolt, it projected the concept not only of a completion of the unfinished bourgeois democratic revolution but also of a popular democracy in which the working classes would share power with all other anti-imperialist forces.<sup>8</sup>

W. Pomeroy adds the "national liberation movement" had thus far failed because the CPP neglected to "develop" a "many-sided struggle." Since it had relied too much on "armed struggle" it became isolated from potential allies. But, as he indicates, the party must now attempt to attract the middle-class to its fold, as the latter has been strengthened by the development of an indigenous "economic base":

This has not been a factor previously in the Philippine situation, and it can be an important ingredient for the next stage of the anti-imperialist anti-feudal struggle.<sup>9</sup>

Whether Mr. Pomeroy's article is intended as a Chinese directive<sup>10</sup> is not clear. Nonetheless, he did not mention that the task "for the next stage" might entail the use of the parliamentary road.

Conversely, J. Maravilla, writing for the World Marxist Review, alludes favourably to the model propagated by the CPSU:

... the Communist Party [of the Philippines] has declared that the objective of a complete liberation can be attained today not by resort to armed struggle but by legal parliamentary means. Dr. Lava, at the time of his arrest ..., affirmed that the armed Huk units had in fact been dissolved. This position is based on the development in recent years of a broadened Philippine nationalist movement, which includes a growing industrial bourgeoisie as well as revived trade union, peasant, youth and intellectual groups with an anti-imperialist outlook. (emphasis added).<sup>11</sup>

The "Huk units" have not been "dissolved", as Mr. Maravilla claimed. In fact, they are increasing in number. But his assertion that "parliamentary struggle" is becoming an increasingly attractive alternative for the CPP may be taken at face value.

A year later, he continues to expound the same theme in greater detail. Like W.J. Pomeroy, Mr. Maravilla contends the principal reason for the Filipino Communists' previous defeat was their demand that the liberation movement be under the control of the CPP:

... the Party failed to project and to build a united front against imperialism and to find forms of struggle by which broader masses of the people could have been drawn into action.<sup>12</sup>

Today the middle-class industrialists, organized into the Philippine Chamber of Commerce, have become a very "progressive force". Since the United States continually compels Filipino industrialists to compete on unfavourable terms the latter have come to take a very dim view of "American imperialism":

Faced by efforts to retard or to put back the clock of Philippine development, the Filipino nationalist bourgeoisie has begun an open fight against neo-colonialism ... They are urging the drastic revision of all relations with the United States, including the military agreements.<sup>13</sup>

Left-wing labour organizations have not only expanded but also directly affected the Philippine political environment. Thus the National Association of Trade Unions, the Philippine Association of Free Labour Unions and the National Association of Federated Labour Unions together supported the founding of a new political force, the Labour Party (LM or Lapiang Manggagawa in Tagalog),

... which has adopted an anti-imperialist programme, including demands for industrialization, land reform, the extension of civil liberties legalization of the CPP?, the removal of American military bases and the abrogation of unequal treaties with the United States.<sup>14</sup>

The resurgence of Huk activity is given only passing attention. The revolutionary potential of the peasantry has increased, Mr. Maravilla states, because all government promises to implement land reform simply remain on paper. Instead, the regime has moved a large number of military units to the restive areas in order to "intimidate the peasants."

Apart from the Labour Party the most "progressive" of the new anti-imperialist groups is the Nationalist Youth Movement (KM -- or Kabataan Makabayan). It not only has "linked a militant student movement with worker and peasant youth" but also, in conjunction with the Labour Party,



has been the main factor in the series of anti-imperialist demonstrations that began in August 1964 as a protest against the use of military bases in the Philippines to bomb Vietnam and against the multiple murder of Filipinos by American troops on the bases.<sup>15</sup>

Most important are Mr. Maravilla's concluding remarks.

It is essential, at this point, to recall one of the main functions of journals such as the World Marxist Review. Their content is by no means only of propaganda value. More often than not the intent of the articles and editorials is to indicate to various local Communist parties the tactical line they ought -- "must" would have been a more concise term before the development of rival Communist power centers -- to follow. Maravilla's suggestions thus assume special significance:

One of the main tasks of the nationalist forces at this stage is the dissipating of the oppressive atmosphere of suppression, fostered by the imperialists during the period of anti-Huk terror, which still permeates the Philippines ... A struggle for the release of political prisoners, particularly the Communists and other Huk leaders, must go hand in hand with a struggle to repeal the Anti-Subversion Law and to restore the legality of the Communist Party and of the outlawed labour and peasant unions.

Of greater importance is the need to find an organized form of expression of a national united front. The /Labour/ party representing the militant sectors of the organized workers, is small and limited and could comprise but one element in such a front. The nationalist bourgeoisie, with no party of its own /the two major political parties are dominated by large landowners and pro-American business interests/ ... needs a political organization of its own in order to win or share power ... In this situation it is crucial for the nationalist

forces to shape their own political instrument around which a national united front of workers, peasants, intellectuals and nationalist bourgeoisie with an anti-imperialist programme can be formed. This is the main task in the present stage. (emphasis added).<sup>16</sup>

Interestingly enough, no mention is made of the necessity of Communist hegemony of such a front. Nor does the writer stress the need for revolutionary violence. Rather, his advice comes very close to the standard Soviet model. He implies a united front from above strategy insofar as cooperation with the middle-class is possible. However, since the present political "in group" continues to lean heavily on American support and, furthermore, consists in the main of large landowners -- and, to a much lesser extent of industrialists and members of the lower middle-class -- having vested interests to protect, this strategy clearly has its limitations. An alliance with the latter group is impossible.

Notwithstanding the fact that the present CPP leadership seems to agree with Mr. Maravilla on the desirability to expand the party's organization and include all potential allies, it proved unwilling to rely simply on peaceful tactics. In effect, for the past decade Filipino Communists have followed a "two-front struggle".<sup>17</sup> On one side, the party seeks to expand its clandestine military arm by organizing peasant discontent in the countryside, particularly in Central Luzon; on the other, it attempts to create legal political

fronts of which the purpose is to discredit the present political élite and to play on familiar nationalist themes. Anti-American sentiment, disenchantment with government corruption and ineptitude and the discontent of the large number of un- and under-employed provide Communist fronts with ample ammunition.

Huk efforts in the countryside appear, at the time, to concentrate more on the formation of a viable organizational apparatus than on an armed confrontation with government military forces. While the Huks have not avoided minor skirmishes with the Philippine Constabulary their primary concern at this time is to establish a reputation as agricultural reformers rather than revolutionaries.

One report estimates that in the province of Pampanga alone the Huks have amassed some 300,000 sympathizers. Tenant farmers in this area are so poor and so shabbily treated by local landlords and government officials that they have shifted their allegiance to the Huks, providing assistance in the form of recruits, taxes and intelligence on government troop movements. In return, the Communist political organization in the rural areas, the New People's Democratic Force (NPDF), shields peasants from the excessive demands of landlords and the ravages of criminal bands.<sup>18</sup>

Political leadership of the NPDF is exercised by Pedro Taruc; the chief of the Huk military arm is Sumulong

(also called Faustino del Mundo). The NPDF has apparently become so powerful that local officials in Central Luzon are now often quite dependent on the Huks for election. Even one provincial governor has privately admitted that he cannot get elected without Huk backing.<sup>19</sup> And, although by June 1966 several towns in Pampanga were placed under direct police control, one "militant peasant group, identified as the Samaka [presumably a branch organization of the NPDF], conducts open forums on Communist doctrines."<sup>20</sup> Active members in the Huk movement are now apparently even paid an attractive salary. In all likelihood, the NPDF is today the most important arm of the CPP. It is in the countryside, also, that Filipino Communists can make use of the organizational techniques so successfully evolved by the Chinese. This, one suspects, is one factor which may influence the CPP leadership to favour Peking.

But even the statements of the above-ground Communist fronts indicate that the CPP leans more toward Peking than Moscow. Apart from the fact that "Filipino Communist, unlike their European or American counterparts [but similar to the Chinese] are peasant-oriented",<sup>21</sup> their political fronts display an anti-Americanism reminiscent to that of the CPC:

Based on captured party documents as well as on the pronouncements and activities of [Communist] leaders and suspected individuals, anti-Americanism [now] serves as the main rallying point of the movement's agitation-propaganda activities. Feudalism which [also] used to be a primary target of Communist propaganda appears to have been temporarily relegated to the background ...<sup>22</sup>

Growing anti-American sentiment was particularly exploited by the two most important CPP fronts: the Labour Party and the National Youth Movement. Both, as indicated previously, received favourable mention in the World Marxist Review. And both appeared to follow Soviet-sponsored techniques, but only to a degree. The heavy accent on anti-American activity and propaganda represents an implicit vote of confidence for Maoist strategy -- Moscow, not Peking, advocated a partial détente with the United States.

The following excerpt from the Progressive Review, organ of the KM, states definitively the current tasks of the Filipino avant-garde:

The principal objective of the Filipino nation today is the triumph of Philippine democracy over American imperialism in all its covert and overt forms in every field of endeavour ... All classes and forces in Philippine society -- with the clear exception of the compradore, and landlords, allies of American imperialism -- are now being forced by objective conditions to mobilize themselves into one massive movement determined to accomplish the tasks of the Philippine Revolution ... The task of bringing about genuine national freedom and democratic reforms can be achieved only after the successful anti-imperialist and anti-feudal union of the national bourgeoisie composed of Filipino industrialists and traders; the pretty [sic] bourgeoisie composed of small-property owners, intellectuals, students and professionals; and the broad masses of the people composed of the working class and the peasantry ... As a matter of democratic principle and with the most realist consideration of the situation, the union of these four major classes of Philippine society should be founded on the solid alliance of the working class and the peasantry, with the former assuming the leadership in this industrializing era. (emphasis added). 23

From the concluding phrase one may infer that the Chinese warning of the need for the maintenance of organizational independence has been heeded. Communists must be in command of any broad nationalist front which seeks to free the Philippines from its "vassal status". Since the editor of the Progressive Review, José Sison, holds high offices in both the KM and the LM, the journal undoubtedly also reflects the political programme of the latter. This constant reiteration of Philippine subservience to the United States has enabled Communists to gain considerable support among student and labour organizations. One estimate claims twenty-one student and twenty-eight labour groups are "Communist-infiltrated".<sup>24</sup>

Recently the Manila government started to curtail the activities of Communist fronts. "Twenty-three college professors, thirteen student leaders and two labour leaders" have been implicated for "allegedly subversive activities." Criminal proceedings against José Sison, a "security risk", are pending. And reports of the Philippines National Intelligence Coordinating Agency have linked Mr. Sison "with the Communist parties of China, Indonesia, Singapore and Belgium [The latter presumably refers to the dissident pro-Chinese group under the leadership of Jacques Grippa]". Of what the Agency's evidence consists is not known but it does accuse some "'Red-leaning groups' in the Philippines [of] receiving direct financial assistance from domestic and international Communist 'financial sources'."<sup>25</sup> "Domestic sources" probably

include both the CPP apparatus and the branch of the CPC said to exist in the Philippines.<sup>26</sup>

Whether the CPC and CPSU both contribute to the Filipino Communists' party coffers remains a matter for speculation. A similar qualification must be attached to any estimate of the degree of organizational control which either Peking or Moscow exercises over the Philippine Communist movement. The latter may still be able to delegate orders (or advice) and financial assistance to the CPP through the CPUSA. The fact that Soviet-controlled journals print articles written by Filipino Communists indicates that Moscow still does not regard the CPP a completely subservient satellite of the CPC.

However, the evidence available suggests that the CPP is following the Chinese ideological and tactical guide. And although there is resentment against the Chinese community in the Philippines this does not seem to have adversely affected the fortunes of the Communist party. Further, Filipino Communists do not regard themselves the spokesmen for Chinese communal interests as does the MCP. Rather, they have projected the image of land reformers and ardent anti-American nationalists.

In summary, there appear to be no obstacles to a declaration of loyalty to Peking. Actually, the present Filipino desire to completely shed the label "little brown Americans", the growing desire to achieve an Asian identity as

well as a sudden increase in the attraction of People's China<sup>27</sup> would seem to make such a declaration propitious.

It is difficult to believe that the CPP has been able to maintain a neutral attitude in the dispute for at least two reasons: first, the party is definitely following the main tactics outlined in the Chinese revolutionary model and is, therefore, implicitly indebted to Peking; second, the small size of the party leaves it quite vulnerable to the pressure of the two competing Communist giants. And the CPC -- through its contacts with local Chinese Communists and, until late 1965, the PKI -- seems to be in a much better position to apply such pressure. Why the CPP has as yet, to the knowledge of this writer, failed to openly denounce Moscow remains an open question. Its hesitancy to do so is unique among the small Communist parties under review.

In view of the stiff competition between Moscow and Peking for the loyalty of local Communist parties, it is highly unlikely that the two have been willing to tolerate CPP neutrality. On the other hand, it is possible that Filipino Communist leaders have been so occupied with rebuilding their party apparatus that they regard the Sino-Soviet dispute of secondary importance. At present they have their hands full simply avoiding government capture, organizing peasant unrest in Central Luzon and seeking to enlarge labour union and student organizations the CPP controls or has infiltrated.



The position of the CPP is unequalled by any of the other Southeast Asian Communist parties. In spite of attempts by the government to suppress Filipino Communism the CPP presents a picture of dynamism. Factors such as increasing peasant support, nascent industrialization -- and all the social dislocation which is involved in this process, growing anti-American sentiment, popular dissatisfaction with political corruption and a large amount of unemployment have all contributed to this dynamism.

In contrast to the BCP and the MCP the CPP has no overt close ties with any unpopular minority. It thus seems in a better position than the other Communist parties to convincingly present itself as a Filipino nationalist organization. Perhaps this explains the lack of CPP pro-Chinese and pro-Mao statements. On the other hand, all other parties have openly associated themselves with the Chinese cause, even at the risk of antagonizing nationalist sentiment.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THAILAND

The concluding remarks of the last chapter are particularly applicable to the Communist movement in Thailand, as "expressed nationalist feeling [here] was, at least until recent years, directed primarily at the Chinese..."<sup>1</sup> But, as the same expert remarks, strong nationalist sentiment is restricted in the main to the small Thai political élite. Hence, since Thailand had never been reduced to colonial status there presently appears to be "no basis for any mass nationalist movement. [And even] against the Chinese there is little strong feeling of antagonism."<sup>2</sup>

Since a general consensus among observers of the Thai political scene exists that the Chinese element is very strong in the Communist movement in Thailand one suspects that Communism has little appeal for the political élite. In its mind "Communism" and "Chinese" must appear as two interchangeable terms. Some analysts in fact contend that two Communist parties -- one Chinese and one Thai -- exist side by side in Thailand.<sup>3</sup> Although this is not the usual practice (the same claim has been made for the Philippines, though) they observe that Communism first made its impact on the Chinese community. As in Malaysia the Chinese in Thailand are burdened by discriminatory legislation which prohibits them from practicing

certain occupations and from owning land. It is thus not surprising that some of the Chinese should give their support to a political movement which promises the attainment of equality and social justice.

The bulk of the Thai population, on the other hand, has remained politically apathetic. Two factors have strongly influenced this quiescence: first, the present military government has, since 1958, prohibited all political parties; second, there seems to be little revolutionary discontent among the Thai population. C. Roll reports that

social tensions are fewer in Thailand than anywhere else in Southeast Asia. Of twenty-nine million Thais, 90 per cent are rural inhabitants and of these the majority are peasants. There is no 'land problem' because 70 to 75 per cent of the peasants work their own land. An industrial proletariat is also missing, as only 7 per cent of the working force is employed in industry. The average income of the Thais is ... decidedly higher than ... that of some other Asian countries. And the needs of the peasants are few.<sup>4</sup>

The difference in the social stability between the Thai and Chinese communities seems, largely, to explain the relatively greater impact Communism has had on the latter.

The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was founded on December 1, 1942.<sup>5</sup> By contrast a Western reporter claims that the Chinese Communist Party in Thailand was formed on this date and that it acted on a directive from the CPC to establish the CPT in 1946.<sup>6</sup> In all probability, the CPT represents some form of merger of the Chinese Communist organization in Thailand and

local Thai Marxist groups which then existed. It is quite dubious that two completely separate Communist parties still exist in Thailand today.

The newly established CPT only enjoyed a brief period of legality. The party was banned in 1952 and its secretary general Sapsunthorn (also called Prasert Nai) and some central committee members fled to China. Evidently an underground Communist organization continued to exercise propaganda and subversive functions especially amongst the Bangkok Chinese community and among Thai workers and politicians displeased with military rule. In 1962 two important Communist leaders, Ruam Wongpan and Ret Savros, who had remained behind to direct the party's clandestine operations were arrested and executed.<sup>7</sup>

At present little information is available on the political arm of the CPT in Thailand. According to one source an illegal Communist cell in Bangkok aids the guerrilla movement in Northeast Thailand by providing the latter with propaganda material and logistic support.<sup>8</sup> But as Mr. Roll quickly points out "it is not easy to describe accurately the extent of present Communist activity since the reports of the government and the press are slanted for propagandistic reasons."<sup>9</sup> The Thai ruling élite not only has a disposition to brand anyone foolish enough to voice opposition to its rule a "Communist" but also plays up the "Communist threat" to

justify the continuation of military domination as well as the call for more U.S. aid. In the opinion of C. Roll for example, the CPT presently does not possess a "cohesive organization" in Thailand itself.

On the other hand, recent statements in the Communist press and insurgent activity in Northeast Thailand point to the existence of a resuscitated Thai Communist organization outside the borders of Thailand. The year 1962 marked not only the execution of two prominent Thai Communist leaders but also the establishment of a radio programme in China or North Vietnam named "The Voice of the Thai People", which commenced to transmit propaganda to Thailand. And in August, 1964, the transmitter revealed that a Thai delegation, headed by Kulard Saipradit -- author of a popular Siamese novel, convicted in 1952 of being a Communist party member -- was attending a scientific symposium at Peking.

This sudden resurgence on the part of the CPT indicated that the badly-shaken party had undergone a vigorous reorganization and that, in all probability, it had received outside aid to achieve this task. Just what kind of aid was involved is not certain. But, apart from granting Thai Communists asylum in China, the CPC must have provided at least the facilities to broadcast CPT propaganda. Thus, if the CPT was not already dominated by Peking at the time it was declared illegal, it definitely came under the organizational control of

the Chinese after establishing its base of operations on the latter's territory.

In essence, therefore, it is no great task to explain why the CPT has taken Peking's side in the current Communist debate. The CPT leadership is indebted to China for its continued survival. Further, for ethnic and nationalistic reasons the Chinese component of the party is presumably attracted much more to Peking than to Moscow. Not least important, the CPSU's position is ideologically and politically quite unacceptable to Thai Communist leaders.

The Bangkok administration prohibits all political organizations not under its control. In addition, it exhibits a firmly anti-Communist outlook. Hence, only by revolutionary means can the CPT hope to achieve power. But Moscow had, formally at least, already renounced revolutionary war as the principal method of competing with an established political élite. Similarly, Khrushchev's stated intention of seeking an accommodation with the United States, a steadfast supporter of the Thai political establishment, could not but have an indirect effect on Communist efforts in Thailand.

The CPT representative at the Sixth Congress of the SED unconditionally backed China's stand. Surprisingly, his speech had an even sharper tone than those of the other pro-Chinese delegates. He expressed his dismay that

there are some irresponsible leaders of fraternal parties who exploit their party congresses to deliver open attacks on some other fraternal parties; these actions not only seriously disrupt the unity of the international Communist movement but also had an effect on the revolutionary struggles of certain countries ... We must point out that the attacks on the APL as well as on the CPC and the practice at this Congress of hindering the representative of the Communist Party of China from speaking are, in our opinion, not conducive to improving the unity of the international Communist movement ... No fraternal party should force its opinion on any other party ... We are of the opinion that the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and ... Statement of 1960 are by no means outdated and that they still constitute the common programme which must be respected by the ... international Communist movement.<sup>10</sup>

A statement by the central committee of the CPT, which follows the delegate's speech, emphasizes that "revisionism", embodied by the "Tito clique" is an American fifth column which attempts to "ideologically disarm ... the revolutionary people."<sup>11</sup>

Although the CPT did not go so far as to denounce Khrushchev and his entourage by name its message was worded much more harshly than even the one of the MCP. But, as will be demonstrated below, the CPT's statement is mild when compared with some of its later denunciations.

By December, 1964, Thai Communists started another political offensive, this one, however, directed at overthrowing the Thai government. A CPT manifesto issued December 1 announced the establishment of the Thailand Independence Movement and briefly described its intent:

The Thailand Independence Movement is a political organization aimed at uniting all patriotic democrats irrespective of their class or social standing, sex, age, history, occupation or past record ... All individuals, groups, organizations or political parties can cooperate fully or to a certain extent with us in the common struggle against the enemy so long as they are genuinely patriotic, democratic, brave and ready to make sacrifices, faithful to their duty, place the interests of the nation and the people above all else, and have political ideas consistent with our programme and policies.

The last phrase clearly limits membership to those who display a penchant for left-wing policies.

The Movement's action programme runs as follows:

- (1) Drive out the U.S. imperialist aggressors from Thailand.
- (2) Overthrow the traitorous, despotic Thanom government and set up another to be composed of patriotic and democratic political parties and individuals, and committed to a policy of neutrality and peace.
- (3) Fight for the salvation and preservation of the genuine democratic rights of the people.
- (4) Fight for a policy of neutrality, peace, democracy, prosperity and for the people's well-being.<sup>12</sup>

The Thailand Independence Movement, headed by Monkon Na Nakorn, reportedly operated the radio programme "The Voice of the Thai People" and circulated a clandestine newspaper in Thailand called Ekkarat (Independence). Another organization, the Thai Patriotic Front, came into existence in early 1965, and soon superseded the Independence Movement. The enunciated political platform of the former is almost identical to the one of its antecedent, advocating the defeat of



... the fascist dictatorial government which is subservient to United States imperialism, establishing a government of patriots and democrats ... Withdrawing from SEATO ... opposing the war provocations of United States imperialism ... Abolishing all unequal treaties signed by Thailand with the United States and driving all imperialist and aggressive troops out of Thailand ...<sup>13</sup>

The Patriotic Front appears, even at its formative stage, to have been the more important of the two organizations as, according to one source, it controlled a number of other Thai Communist fronts: the Federation of Patriotic Workers, the Association of Thai Monks, the Association of Patriotic Teachers, the Organization of Patriotic Thai Youths and the League for Self-Liberated Farmers and Planters.<sup>14</sup> It is not clear what influence these associations have on the Thai political scene. They probably cater mainly to Thais living in exile and perhaps also operate on a clandestine basis in Thailand itself.

Whether the Independence Movement and the Patriotic Front were actually two rival political associations or simply two creatures of the CPT is another imponderable. Whatever the case, on November 1, 1965, the former "issued a declaration that its central committee had agreed to affiliate the movement with the Thailand Patriotic Front as a member organization and that it would accept the political leadership of the Front."<sup>15</sup> The enlarged Patriotic Front has a central committee of ten; its secretary general is Mongkon Na Nokorn and his assistant

Nai Vatanachi Chayakit Dhives. Sapsunthorn must have passed away or been purged.

This burst of organizational dynamism on the part of the CPT paralleled a similar increase in guerrilla activity, particularly in the underdeveloped region of Northeast Thailand. Aside from the fact that, in comparison with the rest of Thailand, the Northeast is extremely poor, a large number of Lao and Vietnamese refugees inhabit this area. A combination of poverty and tenuous loyalty to the Thai central government has facilitated the CPT's efforts to gain a foothold in Thai territory. Although Bangkok has initiated a rural development scheme to aid peasants of the Northeast, the success of the programme leaves something to be desired. A reporter who visited this area in 1966 feels that Bangkok must do more than build a few new roads and irrigation systems to bridge peasant mistrust created by a somewhat corrupt and indifferent local Thai officialdom.<sup>16</sup>

By the admission of Lieutenant Colonel Phayom Chulanont, a CPT central committee member, the party began its insurrection "on August 8, 1965 in [a village in the Northeast] when armed guerrillas shot at the leader of a three-man police squad, which came to oppress the people, and killed him."<sup>17</sup> Why the Communist spokesman chose this date to mark the official inauguration of the "armed liberation movement" is a minor puzzle, for Thai government sources had reported armed

clashes with guerrillas before this time. It is important to note however, that in this period the CPT not only increased its organizational and guerrilla activities but also moved much closer to Peking on the ideological plane and intensified its propaganda campaign on the subject of "American imperialism".

One emission of the "Voice of the Thai People" appears to reflect the CPT's complete subservience to Peking. The broadcast, in fact, represents little more than a eulogy to the wisdom of the CPC and Mao Tse-tung. And in broad sweeps it outlines the tactics required at the present time:

... the Thai people [i.e., Communist Party] have learned a very valuable lesson from the experience: power should be seized by means of armed force. [Thai Communist cadres are urged] to study conscientiously the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the high point of Marxism-Leninism in our era ... Since the day of its founding ... the Communist Party of Thailand has adhered firmly to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and has carried on a resolute struggle for the national liberation and independence of Thailand, for the well-being of the Thai people and for world peace. At the present time, it has become the nucleus of the political forces which are struggling resolutely and courageously against American imperialism and its traitorous lackeys.<sup>18</sup>

The announcer strongly seconds the Chinese position in the dispute and states that Peking's, not Moscow's, proffered tactical guide will best serve the CPT's needs:

The Communist Party of Thailand has developed and gained power in the great upheaval which is taking place in the country as well as abroad. At the present moment especially, the struggle

of the revolutionary peoples and nations is surging forward against American imperialism, the reactionaries of all countries, and revisionism, and the class struggle on the international level has become more violent and more sustained [i.e., this is not the time to move toward a détente with the West]. The wind of the east is winning over the wind of the west. The revolutionary forces of the entire world are surely bearing off the victory and the reactionary forces are going under.<sup>19</sup>

A hard, not soft, line must be followed against the West. By doing so Communist forces will be in a position to maximize their gains.

On the ideological level, the CPT leadership seems one with Peking:

Today, under the brilliant leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, with Comrade Mao Tse-tung at its head, and making use of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung as an ideological weapon, the Chinese people have achieved immense successes in all spheres of socialist construction. [And the CPT will utilize Chinese experience because the] Thai people have learned, during their relentless and long struggle, that the only possible way of bringing the sufferings of the people to a complete halt and saving the country is to carry on with the popular armed struggle to seize power and to dare to employ revolutionary violence in order to overcome counter-revolutionary violence. The Thai people, especially the population of the vast countryside ... have developed popular armed struggle in many regions ... The first victories won by the people's armed forces in the northern and southern [that is, the Thai-Malaysian border area, hub of the MCP's operational sphere] parts of the country show that the struggle carried on by the Thai people has entered a new phase.<sup>20</sup>

There is no evidence that the CPT has actually gained the "support of the vast countryside." But, like all other

Communist parties thus far examined, it has indeed exploited regional and minority dissidence.

To attract a following among Thai peasants the CPT has followed a two-pronged policy: one, it reportedly recruits Thai peasants and sends them to a cadre training center at Hoabinh, near Hanoi. Having received basic training in Communist ideology and guerrilla strategy these cadres are then returned to their native villages to proselytize the Communist cause. Two, CPT propaganda harps on the danger of American cultural, economic and military penetration and warns that the Thai population must oppose these developments or lose its political independence and ethnic identity.

The latter tactic becomes quite explicit in a propaganda tract published in Jen-min Jih-pao. Thai Communist forces, the tract explains, started to coordinate their efforts by establishing the Thai Patriotic Front and appealing

... to the patriotic people of the country to unite and struggle for expelling U.S. imperialism, overthrowing the reactionary government, and thoroughly realizing the independence, democracy, peace, neutrality and prosperity of Thailand. Under the guidance of the Front, the anti-imperialist patriotic struggle of the Thai people gathered momentum and the flame of the revolutionary armed struggle expanded ever wider.

Using Mao's dictum "a spark may start a wildfire" the article contends that American use of Thailand as a "base of aggression" will incite the population to overthrow the Bangkok government.

In spite of attempts by "U.S. and Thai reactionaries"

to curb the development of the guerrilla war by increasing the size and strength of their armed forces, their efforts are to no avail:

The cruel suppression practiced by the U.S. and Thai reactionaries has only added oil to the fire as far as the armed struggle of the Thai people [is] concerned, and forced more people to join the people's militia and fight the reactionaries. U.S. imperialism is afraid that Thailand will turn into a second South Vietnam and another grave [in which] to bury the U.S. paper tiger. Nevertheless, no matter how reckless [is] the U.S. and Thai reactionaries struggle, the people of Thailand will win a great victory in the liberation of Thailand.<sup>22</sup>

The appeal to Thai nationalist sentiment is unmistakable. But there are as yet no indications that Thai Communists have succeeded in doing what the CPC accomplished by 1945: usurping the nationalist mantle from the established political élite. Just how unpopular American presence in Thailand is remains an imponderable since all organs of public opinion are government-controlled.

The tactic nonetheless remains a primary method of bringing the government leadership into disrepute. And the CPT continues to hammer out the same theme ad nauseam. Thus, in a recent statement Phayom Chulanont accused the military regime of prostituting Thailand's independence:

... ever since Thailand was transformed into a new type U.S. colony, it has been tightly controlled by the U.S. imperialists politically, economically, militarily and culturally ...

In addition, they conspired with the country-selling Thanom-Praphas clique to use armed force to launch brutal armed suppression against the people. Now more than 60,000 U.S. occupation troops are in Thailand. Faced with this situation the Thai people have risen up to carry out armed struggles. These have been expanded to various parts of the country ... And under the leadership of the Thai Patriotic Front the Thai people's struggles continue to surge forward.<sup>23</sup>

All the above pronouncements may appear somewhat repetitious, but they do drive home one point: the CPT has rejected the Soviet guide to power as inefficacious. The party, in addition, takes an extremely dim view of the CPSU's vacillating attitude toward the United States as well as its disruptive influence on the world Communist movement. Perhaps Kulard Saipradit, central committee member, referring to the Soviet-sponsored Afro-Asian Writers' Conference held in Beirut, has made the most piercing comments on the Soviet position:

The Soviet revisionists have suffered one defeat after another in their contemptible splittist activities against the Afro-Asian Writers' movement ... the Soviet revisionists are U.S. imperialist agent provocateurs in the Afro-Asian writers' movement. They are acting in the interests of U.S. imperialism and in antagonism to the Afro-Asian people who are now fighting a life-and-death struggle with U.S. imperialism.<sup>24</sup>

There is, then, no question that Moscow, in addition to Washington, has been singled out as a major enemy of the CPT. Although the former by no means insists that the party use peaceful tactics,<sup>25</sup> Thai Communists have opted --

voluntarily or otherwise -- completely for the Chinese point of view. Total agreement between the CPT and the CPC suggests not only that Thai leaders believe Chinese experience to be most applicable to the Thai political scene but also that Peking has transformed the CPT into a creature to be utilized for the former's own ends.

When the visible resurgence of Thai Communist activities in the Northeast is added to the simultaneous revival of the MCP in South Thailand, facts point to an overall coordinating agent -- the CPC. Both the CPT and the MCP maintain liaison bureaus in Peking. And as will be recalled, Thai Communist statements claim victories both in the Northeast and the South. The latter area can only refer to the political roost of the MCP. One source even speculates that Peking has welded the activities of Thai and Malaysian Communists to the overall purpose of defeating the pro-American Thanom administration by a type of pincer movement. To achieve this goal CPT guerrillas are to expand southward and those of the MCP to the north. While the general blueprint for this strategy has been developed by Peking the immediate tasks of supervision are said to be entrusted to the CPT leader, Mongkon Na Nakorn: "A long-time resident of the southern province of Trang, Mongkon knows the Communist movement in that area well."<sup>26</sup>

In conclusion, the reasons for the position of the



CPT in the Sino-Soviet dispute are not overly difficult to understand. Without China's backing, the party could not hope to gain power in Thailand; with it, its prospects are somewhat brighter. In spite of this dependence, its anti-Soviet vituperations do not seem to lack conviction. Granted, the Russians have recently considerably expanded their influence in North Vietnam. However, the CPT has remained staunchly pro-Chinese. China, in all probability, is responsible for intensified CPT activities. It is significant to remember that the first U.S. troop units moved into Thailand under the Kennedy administration in 1961. Consequently, China's attitude toward the Bangkok government, never very friendly, hardened and its support for Thai Communists increased. This suggests that Peking will readily use Communist parties under its control to exert pressure on the countries in which these parties operate. In the case of Thailand, China obviously wants U.S. troops to withdraw and Bangkok to assume a more neutral position in foreign affairs.

For their part Thai Communists, while working in the interest of Peking, really have no alternative -- Chinese organizational control aside -- but to follow CPC advice. Since all political activities are prohibited by the military there is presently only one way to achieve power for the CPT -- by the use of revolutionary violence. This belief, surprisingly enough, seemed to be shared by the one party which followed the Soviet guide most successfully -- the PKI.

## CHAPTER SIX

### THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA

In recent months the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI or Partai Komunis Indonesia) has not infrequently been compared to that legendary symbol of rebirth, the phoenix.<sup>1</sup> The oldest Communist party in Southeast Asia it had, before 1965, twice attempted to gain power by the use of force. In 1926 the Dutch quashed an abortive PKI putsch; in 1948 it was the turn of the infant Republic of Indonesia to perform the same task. Both times the party recovered from subsequent government repressive measures. Indeed, within a decade of the second uprising at Madiun, the PKI could boast to possess one of the largest political organizations in Indonesia. By 1960 the party claimed the largest Communist organization outside the socialist bloc. As such it naturally constituted a major asset for that side in the Sino-Soviet dispute which could gain its support.

Before examining the variables responsible for the party's growth and those factors influencing its leaders' decision to take Peking's rather than Moscow's side, one must point out that, in contrast to all other parties surveyed, there is an abundance of literature on the PKI.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, to avoid tedious repetition this chapter will only introduce that historical background which may have had a direct impact

on both the party's fortunes and its attitude to Moscow-Peking polemics.

Perhaps one of the most important factors contributing to the PKI's expanding influence was the accession of a group of young and able leaders. The group -- composed of D.N. Aidit, M.H. Lukman and Njoto -- gained control of the PKI in January 1951. It was Aidit's task, as secretary general, to rebuild the shattered party organization and reshape PKI strategy so as to bring it more into step with the realities of the Indonesian political environment. In effect, he attempted to "Indonesianize" Communism by injecting a strong dose of nationalism into its appeals and by stipulating that the present stage of Indonesian development necessitated an alliance of the four "progressive classes" -- the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty and national bourgeoisie.

More precisely, the Aidit leadership adopted a gradualist or moderate political programme which, at first glance, resembled the Soviet-advocated united front from above as much as it did its Chinese counterpart. Utilizing the united front from above concept the PKI first sought to form electoral alliances and, if possible, parliamentary coalitions with any willing political party. Both the PNI and NU (National Party of Indonesia and Moslem Scholars respectively) proved amenable to the PKI's newly acquired flexibility. For example, during two PNI-dominated governments in the early

1950's the Communists enjoyed almost unrestricted organizational freedom.

Aidit's emphasis on moderation also required a change in the party's attitude toward the President of Indonesia, Sukarno. Hence, while the PKI had opposed the President practically since the end of the Japanese occupation, this policy was gradually reversed by 1952. As shall be seen shortly, this aspect of Communist strategy was soon to render exceptionally profitable returns.

In attempting to implement united front from below tactics PKI leaders sought to heed the Chinese warning to create an independent political base, one which would insulate Communists from the caprice of a hostile government administration. The Aidit consortium indeed appeared very successful in building new and expanding old front organizations. By 1960 such groups as SOBSI (All-Indonesia Federation of Trade Unions), Pemuda Rakjat (People's Youth), BTI (Indonesian Peasants' Front), Gerwani (women's front) and Lekra (front for artists and intellectuals) played an extremely important auxiliary role for the Communist party. One source even claimed PKI-dominated fronts had a total membership of some twenty-two million, or approximately one-fifth of Indonesia's population.<sup>3</sup>

Of all Southeast Asian Communist parties the position of the PKI was, in terms of tactics, somewhat unique. Aidit attempted to extract important components of both the Chinese

and Soviet models and combine them to strictly Indonesian conditions. That he was able to accomplish this depended not only upon his tactical ingenuity but also on the relatively liberal Indonesian political climate which existed until 1957. This initial period of political quiescence proved exceptionally important to the subsequent growth of the Communist apparatus. The brief heyday of parliamentary democracy was, so to speak, the PKI's "incubation" period; already during the 1955 national elections the new right-wing strategy vindicated itself and the party became a full-fledged political force, receiving over 16 per cent of the total vote. Moreover, Javanese regional elections held in 1957 even provided the PKI with a plurality in many electoral districts.

Three political forces viewed this resurgence of Communist strength rather uneasily: the Masjumi, a Moslem reformist party, the PSI or Socialist Party of Indonesia and the officer corps of the TNI or National Army of Indonesia. It is not the object of this paper to delve into the various factors contributing to the antipathy between these groups and the Indonesian Communist Party. Suffice it to say here that the long-range political goals as well as short term aims of the Masjumi and PSI were completely incompatible with those of the PKI. While the same could be said of the officer corps, especially of those officers holding high rank, the PKI and the army seemed to have at least a few common interests. Both

had a stake in the national aggrandizement of Indonesia; both viewed Western presence in Southeast Asia in a dim light; finally, each professed loyalty to President Sukarno.

However, their Weltanschauungen were diametrically opposed. High-ranking officers displayed a complete contempt for what they regarded as an alien ideology and a political party controlled by a foreign power. The animosity was compounded by the fact that the PKI attempted to overthrow the Republic in the midst of the latter's struggle to gain complete independence from the Dutch. This display of opportunism on the part of the Communists provided only further proof, in the opinion of army leaders, that PKI members would never work for the interest of the nation. Indonesian Communists reciprocated this feeling of mutual distrust, remembering the army's responsibility in the bloody suppression of the Madiun uprising.

The PKI was, therefore, quite fortunate to be able to securely establish an organizational framework before the demise of parliamentary democracy. Indeed, a shift in the relation of political forces occurred within a brief period after the 1955 elections. The results of the elections were disappointing. They did not give any party a majority mandate and thus dashed the hope for a more stable and responsible government. The electoral campaign itself had been one of "no holds barred"; spokesmen of each major party did their utmost to discredit their opponents. And if the election did

not produce sufficient disappointment with, and lower the appeal of, the democratic process, the two ensuing cabinet governments completed the task.

In sum, their ineptitude encouraged a rapid expansion of corruption in the civil service; they were unable to cope with the problems of streamlining a burgeoning administrative apparatus, rising prices and unemployment; the second cabinet, headed by Ali Sastroamidjojo, failed to come to grips with the demands of the non-Javanese areas for more fiscal autonomy.

The blatant incompetency of the parliamentary regime contributed directly to the growth in importance of three authoritarian-oriented competitors: the army, President Sukarno and his entourage and the PKI. Actually the latter two did not compete but increasingly combined their efforts to curb the expanding influence of the former. Neither the army leadership nor Sukarno had ever demonstrated excessive respect for Western parliamentary procedure. As in the latter part of 1956 and early 1957, Indonesia's economic and political problems rapidly assumed crisis proportions, Sukarno and the army quickly moved to replace Western political concepts with a presidential innovation -- "guided democracy".

The catalyst for Sukarno's conceived new order proved to be the Outer Island crisis of 1957 which culminated in a regional rebellion and the establishment of a rival national government. Without going into details one may briefly summa-

rize the rebellion as ethnic, financial and political conflicts. The non-Javanese were dissatisfied with Javanese predominance in the executive and administrative branches of government; with the central government's policy of exploiting the economic wealth of the exporting regions mainly for Javanese benefit; and with the PKI's increasing power. To counter the dissidents' challenge, in March 1957 the President declared a state of war and siege, thus virtually placing the country under martial law. This declaration greatly enhanced the power of the army. Subject only to Sukarno as supreme commander of the armed forces, the officer corps was virtually given a free hand in terminating the rebellion.

Under the guise of the emergency the army penetrated the governmental apparatus. Many officers commenced to serve on regional and local government councils; others assumed censorship functions within the country's communication system. Further, the army seized upon the event to harrass its major political opponent, the PKI, often banning its publications, on occasion interrogating its leadership supposedly for having made subversive remarks against the Republic and, in some of the outlying military districts where Sukarno's influence was weak, placing a complete ban on all PKI activities.

But the Outer Island crisis also enabled the Communist party to chalk up considerable gains. True, the advent of martial law hampered its organizational drive and



severely restricted its political maneuverability. At the same time, however, the leaders of two of its most bitter enemies, the Masjumi and the PSI were implicated in the rebellion and, as a result, Sukarno banned both organizations in 1960. Two other events also increased the PKI's political elbow room vis à vis the army. In brief, these were the West Irian (i.e., West New Guinea) campaign against the Dutch and the creation by Sukarno of a maze of political symbols all stressing national unity.

It appears that Sukarno had been able to assume the initiative in bending Indonesia's political currents to his own purpose. His aim seems to have been two-fold: first, to forge the various ethnic and religious groups of Indonesia into one cohesive nation by manufacturing various types of nation-building symbols and external crises; second, by holding the monopoly of this symbolism, to establish himself as the fount of political legitimacy. The President amply demonstrated his skills in both endeavours. And of importance for this study, by creating external crises Sukarno greatly radicalized the Indonesian political environment and, in the process, abetted the PKI's growth.<sup>4</sup> The Communist leaders, as indicated above, had already laid the foundations for a close alliance with Sukarno in 1952. This foresight was now turned to good advantage. In the words of one specialist on Indonesian affairs,

It was Sukarno who has acted as the principal buffer for the PKI against charges that Communism is an 'alien' element in Indonesian life. It was ... he who, with such concepts as NASAKOM, aided the party in its attempt to acquire an indigenous and national character.<sup>5</sup>

NASAKOM, each syllable referring respectively to nationalism, religion and Communism, is one of the President's political symbols designed to unite the most important political groups in Indonesia. According to Sukarno the fulfilment of NASAKOM was a vital pre-condition for the achievement both of successful nation-building and modernization. On numerous occasions he went out of his way to demonstrate that the PKI could only help, not harm, Indonesian development. And he repeatedly lectured his countrymen not to display "Communist-phobia", declaring that he himself was also a Marxist as well as a Moslem and nationalist.

Sukarno made the principle NASAKOM an integral component of his new state policy MANIPOL. The latter concept, also called Political Manifesto, refers to the President's policy speech of July 1959, in which he dissolved Parliament, replaced it with a strong executive regime and, in effect, commenced to implement his "guided democracy". Also by decree Sukarno reduced the number of political parties to ten. The price to remain an accepted part of the political mosaic was a commitment to defend the principle of NASAKOM. Even the army had to make a similar pledge. Thus the political security

of the PKI seemed assured.

A combination of presidential support for the Communist party and the militant political environment seemed sufficient to check the anti-PKI drive of the army leadership. The West Irian campaign gaining momentum at approximately the same time as the escalation of regional dissidence provided the party with the opportunity to closely identify with Indonesian nationalism -- indeed, to outperform the nationalists by displaying even more extreme anti-Dutch sentiment than the latter. Thus, member unions of its labour front SOBSI forcibly seized numerous Dutch assets and demanded that Djakarta eject all Dutch nationals from Indonesia. Once prodded by PKI fronts the government did indeed assume the initiative and nationalize all Dutch property. Diplomatic relations with the kingdom were ruptured shortly thereafter.

Agitating against external enemies proved "safe territory" for the PKI. The Communists and army leaders as well as Sukarno had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. The latter depended on successive emergencies to prevent a clash between the army and the Communist party, to shift the blame for the country's deteriorating economy from his administration to the "saboteurs" and "reactionaries" on the domestic and international scene and, finally, for Sukarno the "romantic nationalist",<sup>6</sup> to realize his own goal of becoming an acknowledged revolutionary leader. The PKI, apart

from being able to demonstrate its patriotic fervour, likewise benefitted from the President's militant foreign policy. First, the economic dislocation resulting from such a policy not only gained it new adherents but also contributed further to the radicalization of the Indonesian political environment.

Second, nationalization of foreign capital also seemed to the advantage of the party. Former Dutch enterprises, for example, were staffed with new managerial personnel, in many cases consisting of army officers. As a consequence, the army became more closely associated with the administration's economic failures. Paradoxically, therefore, while the army's assumption of economic functions enabled the officer corps to expand its influence even more widely, it also served to discredit the corps.

Of course the army also profited by supporting Sukarno's militant policies. Clearly, by proclaiming a state of war and siege the President had -- perhaps involuntarily -- almost transformed the army into a governing political party. Further, by conjuring up external foes he gave the armed forces an excuse both to expand their size and obtain ultra-modern equipment and weapons from abroad. Obviously a rationalization of the army structure and the inevitable partial demobilization which such a move entailed would only have resulted in large-scale unemployment.

Hence all major Indonesian political actors vocifer-

ously took up the task of advocating the liberation of West Irian. For the Communist leadership such a policy inevitably meant a decisive shift to the left. Elections were repeatedly postponed by the government, probably to the satisfaction not only of the army but also of a number of political parties, including the PNI. All feared that, should elections be held, the PKI would make large gains. Aidit, unable to use parliamentary tactics, relied on what is termed in Communist jargon as "mass action". Demonstrations against "imperialism" and "neo-colonialism" by Communist fronts became the order of the day. Strikes instigated by SOBSI-controlled labour unions against Western business establishments were common. Although these activities were directed mainly at Dutch interests, the PKI soon made the United States responsible for the former's failure to surrender its last colonial possession in Southeast Asia. The United States did not back Indonesia in the U.N. when the latter demanded a condemnation of the Dutch position. And it refused, until 1962, to pressure Holland into ceding West New Guinea.

Mass action also involves the use of front organizations to criticize the government. Since Indonesia was under martial law, and the army leadership literally pounced on the party everytime it criticized government performance the PKI directed its auxiliaries to speak and act for it. The ineptitude of "bureaucratic capitalists" -- managers of

nationalized enterprises, often officers, the government's failure to halt the rise in prices and the lapse in the implementation of a major land reform project came under particularly heavy fire. The fact is, by the time the West Irian issue had been settled, the PKI appeared to have tamed the army's political aggressiveness. True, the latter gained prestige upon the successful termination of the Outer Island rebellion, enhanced its defensive capacity, receiving modern Soviet weapons, and at the same time reintegrated those army units having participated in the uprising.

On the other hand, with the formal transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia, Sukarno rescinded the six-year-old state of war and siege in May 1963. At least theoretically the army had now to renounce its civilian government functions. However, even more important, the PKI now launched a major political offensive, "ganyang" (crush) Malaysia. In the opinion of numerous reporters the commencement of the Malaysian confrontation represented an important turning point in army-PKI relations. As briefly noted in Chapter Three, Indonesian and Malayan Communists were among the first to oppose the formation of Malaysia. Shortly after Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman enunciated his proposal the PKI and its fronts launched widespread protest campaigns. But it took over a year before the party's bitter protests attracted Sukarno's attention. In 1963 Indonesia's "crush Malaysia" drive was

officially started. One observer immediately noted that this represented "the first time a Communist-initiated tactic with its attendant symbols and ideology became an official Indonesian policy norm."<sup>7</sup>

Unwittingly or not, Aidit, Lukman and Njoto had partially usurped Sukarno's previously sacrosanct position as the nation's sole symbol wielder. Significantly, Malaysia was sponsored by Britain, a long-time colonial power and close ally of the United States. The link proved invaluable to the PKI's propaganda machine. Henceforth the party never failed to claim America's intentions were to surround Indonesia and ultimately to reduce it to a U.S. political and economic appendage.

"Foreign military bases" was a key phrase as the anti-Malaysia drive shifted into high gear. D.N. Aidit, speaking on this subject issued the following warning:

In order to maintain its colonial and neo-colonial policies, the United States has built large military bases on five continents. From these bases American imperialists have carried on intimidation, subversion, intervention and armed aggression to stop national independence movements, to force other nations to agree to their policies and to encircle socialist nations.

What follows must by now have a familiar ring for the reader:

Foreign bases are not only steppingstones for intervention and armed aggression but they serve also as bases of aggression against national culture. Serious effects have been suffered by the people living near foreign bases because of the poison of foreign culture in obscene films,

strip tease shows and the immoral actions of soldiers who commit rape, assault, robbery and other inhuman crimes which wreck the lives of the people.<sup>8</sup>

Anti-Communist forces managed to rally twice more before the events of September 30, 1965. But on both occasions their efforts rapidly collapsed. First, in May 1963, the presidential cabinet was pressured into passing a series of economic reform measures designed to stabilize Indonesia's shaky economy. Such political groups as now represented the non-Javanese regions (the PKI excluded) as well as the moderate wing of the PNI and the small but very influential Marxist Murba (Proletariat) Party gave the bill their support. A few weeks earlier, a series of anti-Chinese demonstrations and riots rocked many parts of Indonesia. Both the demonstrations and the economic rationalization measures displayed an anti-PKI character. As one writer pointed out,

Whoever organized the rioting and it is fairly clear that it was men of both anti-Communist and anti-Sukarno orientation, they certainly succeeded in embarrassing the President, all the more so because his pro-Chinese orientation in foreign affairs had been expressed with particular great emphasis just four weeks earlier, when he had received his counterpart, Liu Shao-chi on an eight-day state visit. The general effect seems to have been to weaken the left and strengthen the right.<sup>9</sup>

The role of Indonesia's Chinese minority will be examined shortly. For the moment it is more important to observe that, before the end of 1963, the political pendulum swung decisively to the left again. The shift was reflected



in a number of ways: one, the Djakarta government accelerated its campaign against Malaysia, even initiating a number of small-scale military actions in Sarawak and on peninsular Malaysia. Two, men such as Djawoto and Ali Chanafiah, known to have strong PKI sympathies, were given important ambassadorial postings, the former to Peking and the latter to Colombo. Three, Aidit, Lukman and Njoto received ministerial rank. Although their functions were largely ceremonial, the PKI's prestige soared. Four, much to the satisfaction of the PKI the economic rationalization scheme was allowed to lapse. Since the plan sought to utilize the International Monetary Fund Communists claimed its implementation would permit the United States to expand its influence in Indonesia. Five, anti-American agitation, initiated by the PKI and actively seconded by Sukarno, came into vogue. Six, the Communist party in conjunction with the Malaysian confrontation started another campaign to incite peasants and workers to radical action. The former, under the leadership of the BTI, were encouraged to unilaterally seize land promised under the Agricultural Settlement Act of 1960. A number of clashes between BTI members and local officials resulted, further radicalizing Indonesia's political atmosphere.<sup>10</sup> Seven, the President acceded to a PKI demand that a hastily-formed anti-Communist federation known as the BPS (Body for the Propagation of Sukarnoism) be dissolved. The BPS, backed by army leaders,

the Murba Party and a number of moderate Djakarta daily newspapers, suffered the same fate as the Masjumi and PSI. Its supporters, the extremely anti-PKI Murba Party as well as the newspapers were also banned.

The direction in which these events pointed seemed quite clear: the crystallization of an extremely anti-Western, radical nationalist and quite openly pro-Communist state policy, culminating in Indonesia's withdrawal from the U.N. and Aidit's repeated call on the government to supply BTI, Pemuda Rakjat and SOBSI members with weapons. While General Yani, chief of staff of the army vigorously rejected the Communist leader's request, Sukarno reportedly viewed it in a more favourable light.<sup>11</sup> And the power of the army was to be shackled even further by the establishment of a political commissar system modelled after that of Communist armies.<sup>12</sup>

Aidit in a speech commemorating the PKI's forty-fifth anniversary on May 23, 1965 exuded confidence as he outlined the main points of the party programme. He held the time had come to instil the masses with an even greater militancy and to

... intensify [the party's] revolutionary offensive, directed first of all at the 'five devils' 1) 'Malaysia'; 2) the seven village evils [i.e., despotic landlords, usurers, seedling buyers, bureaucratic capitalists in rural areas, dishonest middle-men, village bandits and corrupt administrators]; 3) world devil U.S. imperialism; 4) bureaucrat-capitalists and 5) modern revisionism ... The Indonesian Communist Party is convinced that only the armed people and especially the armed workers and peasants can halt invasion by imperialist

troops and defeat any invasion should they dare to come ... I [i.e., Aidit] would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express thanks to President Sukarno for the promise he has made to arm the workers and peasants when necessary.<sup>13</sup>

Sukarno, in the last analysis, appeared to have given the PKI a carte blanche in Indonesia's domestic and foreign affairs. This explains, to a large degree, the widespread anti-Americanism pervading Indonesia's political life. Boycotts of American products and transportation facilities were organized by SOBSI; U.S.I.S. centers were demolished; frequent demonstrations harried the American embassy in Djakarta and a number of regional U.S. consulates. And, as a by-product of the Malaysia issue and anti-Western sentiment in general, PKI front members seized British-owned estates. The government subsequently also placed these under its control.

Apart from its displays of overt political prowess the party demonstrated a finesse for organizational infiltration unsurpassed by any other political group in Indonesia. For example, in early 1964 President Sukarno established a political organization, the National Front, which was to transform his concept NASAKOM into reality. Membership for all political parties was compulsory. The ultimate purpose of Sukarno's creation was to unite all political parties into one mass movement. However, by 1965 it was obvious that the PKI seemed on the verge of dominating the Front. Communists also

managed to extensively infiltrate the Partindo, a left-wing splinter of the PNI. Even the armed forces were not immune to Communist tactics. Although airforce personnel in particular displayed a penchant for the PKI's programme it was generally conceded that the party had also converted members of the army's officer corps.

In sum, the PKI under the umbrella of Sukarno's protection and the dexterity of its own leaders matured into a complex, far-flung political apparatus, maintaining cells and branches on every island of consequence. Indeed, one is tempted to describe the Communist-Sukarno alliance as the only major dynamic political force in Indonesia. In the immediate years before the attempted coup this alliance literally determined the speed as well as the direction of Indonesian political life. And their interests dictated that the speed should be fast and the direction to the left. Since all opponents to this partnership were apparently cowed, or at least visibly inactive, it is not surprising that some analysts concluded the PKI would soon assume power.<sup>14</sup>

At this point it may be convenient to briefly analyze the PKI's pronouncements vis à vis the Sino-Soviet rift. The main intent of the above outline is to provide sufficient evidence to support the premise that the Indonesian Communists' position was influenced primarily by the dynamics of Indonesian domestic politics. The PKI, as has been stressed,

even at the outbreak of open polemics in 1960 was, so to speak, a "going concern". In contrast to the smaller Southeast Asian Communist parties, all possessing a close-knit and tightly disciplined organizational character, the Communist Party of Indonesia with its myriad of fronts could perhaps best be described as a mass political movement.

Having built up the largest Communist party in the non-Communist world, its "leaders [were] in a very real sense self-made men, beholden only to themselves for their success."<sup>15</sup> This observation bears a large amount of truth. Aidit, the party's chief tactician had proven exceptionally eclectic in assimilating concepts from both the Chinese and Russian tactical guide. Moreover, Aidit often claimed to have adjusted Communism to specifically Indonesian conditions. This contention may partially explain his hesitancy to favour one or other side in the dispute. Until September 1963 the party overtly sought to minimize the importance of Sino-Soviet differences. Even as late as June 1963 the World Marxist Review reprinted Aidit's statements. This final contribution is of interest because it reflects the delicate neutralism to which the PKI was, at the time, committed. Briefly, he describes Chinese and Soviet achievements in very balanced terms:

... the socialist countries have achieved outstanding successes. The brilliant success of the Soviet Union in launching Vostok III and Vostok IV which established contact in outer space testifies once again to Soviet superiority

in rocketry. People's China has succeeded in surmounting the tremendous difficulties caused by successive natural calamities, testifying to the might of a socialist economy and to the tremendous staying powers of the people's communes.<sup>16</sup>

However, some analysts contend that the turning point in CPSU-PKI relations had already occurred in the fall of 1962.<sup>17</sup> Of course the exact date at which PKI leaders decided to start open polemics with Moscow is a minor concern for this study. But there is general agreement that Aidit made one last effort to mediate the differences during a ten-week tour through the socialist bloc. Apparently only after his talks with the CPSU leadership did he become completely disillusioned with the Soviet stand. In essence a combination of variables have made Peking's position more attractive than Moscow's: the primary cause was the steady radicalization and increasingly anti-Western character of Indonesia's internal and foreign politics. After competition for power had literally been reduced to the army, Sukarno and the PKI, the accelerating militancy was in the latter's direct interest. Consequently, Peking's radical tactics proved much more attractive than Moscow's.

The CPC's tough anti-American attitude provided PKI leaders with an additional incentive to turn their back on the CPSU. On a number of occasions United States' loans had helped shore up Indonesia's sagging economy. It reportedly also backed the economic reform measures of 1963. But poli-

tical and economic stabilization were anathema to Indonesian Communists. Within the framework of "guided democracy" their party thrived on economic insecurity. Complete opposition to and denigration of America was, therefore, a cornerstone of PKI strategy. Aidit made this unmistakably clear:

Before a settlement had been reached of the West Irian question, Dutch imperialism was the enemy number one of the Indonesian people, while American imperialism was the most dangerous enemy /i.e., tactically Dutch influence had to be eliminated first but strategically the United States was the far more important adversary. The West Irian campaign, Aidit seems to imply, only served as a revolutionary primer<sup>7</sup>. But now that it is certain that Dutch colonial power is coming to an end, enemy number one of the Indonesian people /read PKI/ is U.S. imperialism. Not only as regards political influence and capital investments, but also as regards military and cultural penetration, U.S. imperialism is ahead of all the rest. (emphasis added).<sup>18</sup>

A number of other probables may have hastened the PKI's turn toward China: one, disenchantment with Moscow's readiness since 1960 to supply the Indonesian army with a huge arsenal of modern weapons; two, reported -- but unsubstantiated -- factionalism within the PKI leadership; three, the PKI's "special relationship" with Indonesia's Chinese minority. According to one specialist, as the Indonesian Communist Party moved ever closer to Peking, Moscow shifted its support to the army and, perhaps most surprisingly, the Murba Party,<sup>19</sup> thus displaying a pattern of tactics quite similar to those it had followed in Burma.

Soviet readiness to bolster the strength of the army

strongly alienated the PKI leadership. This became particularly evident when, in the wake of the September coup, the military turned Soviet-made weapons against Indonesian Communists. For example, the Albanian party newspaper Zeri I Popullit claimed that Soviet aid to the military played no small part in decimating the PKI's strength:

In these days the peoples of all countries judge a man not by his words but by his deeds. The demagogic statements of the Soviet leaders and the articles in the Soviet press, which seem to defend the Indonesian Communist Party, can only deceive the innocents [sic]. The "crocodile tears" they shed while working hand-in-glove with the Indonesian reactionaries to oppose the Indonesian Communist Party are intended to obscure the criminal collaboration between the revisionists and the imperialists. The Khrushchov revisionists dare not reveal the truth about the actual culprits in the Indonesian situation, lest people recall the crimes committed by Khrushchov, Mikoyan and their kind in the creation of a situation in Indonesia advantageous to imperialism, in order to undermine the revolutionary position of the [PKI] and instigate the reactionary forces, Trotskyites, Titoites [i.e., the Murba Party] and fascists to commit criminal acts against that Party. <sup>20</sup>

The effect of factionalism within the PKI on its drift toward China is somewhat more difficult to discern. One group of analysts identified pro-Moscow and -Peking factions in the PKI politburo. But opinions diverged as to who belonged to which faction. For example, three observers believed Aidit and Njoto favoured the Moscow line.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, Lukman and Sudisman, the latter another politburo member, were supposedly pro-Peking. This conclusion is countered by a second source describing Lukman's affinity for the CPSU and



Njoto's for the CPC.<sup>22</sup> Another specialist, while not discarding the possibility of dissension within the PKI's executive organs, states there is no basis in fact for categorizing Indonesian Communist leaders into pro-Moscow or -Peking cliques.<sup>23</sup>

The latter view seems more likely. PKI leaders always displayed, for public consumption at least, complete unanimity on all questions in dispute. And, as a Western reporter admits, "... the most significant aspect of the PKI's success .. is the fact that it has maintained its freedom from publicly visible internal division despite the increasing acerbity of Moscow-Peking relations ..."<sup>24</sup> Whether this demonstration of consensus was simply a factor of expediency, conviction or a combination of both must for the time being remain conjecture. But it was surely obvious to the various leaders that the PKI could not afford the luxury of an open intra-party debate on the merits of one or other position in the dispute. The fate of the Indian Communist Party, of which the pro-Moscow wing often came under heavy PKI fire,<sup>25</sup> doubtless served as a timely warning to Indonesian Communists.

Whether pressure was exerted by the CPC on the PKI through Indonesia's Chinese minority is another unknown. There is no doubt that a number of Chinese helped Indonesian Communists to rebuild their party organization:

The Chinese had become a primary source of funds and technical know-how for the PKI. Chinese clerks handled the party's book-keeping and other administrative chores. As Mao consolidated his victory in China, the Chinese community in Indonesia contributed lavishly to the PKI ... 26

Indonesian nationalism, it seems, had always been anti-Chinese. And the latter constantly served the function of a scapegoat on whom all Indonesia's economic and political ills could be blamed. Expressions of popular satisfaction for the retail trade nationalization act of 1959, one which stipulated that all "foreign nationals" (that is, Chinese) could no longer serve as traders or middlemen in rural areas, the 1963 anti-Chinese riots briefly described above and, most recently, the excesses committed against CPR diplomatic missions and Chinese minority members<sup>27</sup> are cases in point.

But on the first two occasions the PKI strongly defended the Chinese. Just how much this tended to alienate potential supporters is difficult to say. The fact, is, nevertheless, that PKI leaders were willing to assume such a risk. Communist-local Chinese collusion was substantiated in the aftermath of the coup. Indonesian authorities while closing down one office of Baperki -- a Chinese-sponsored Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Council -- discovered files "containing lists of contributors of Chinese ethnic origin to the PKI treasury."<sup>28</sup> What weight Chinese minority assistance carried in Aidit's decision to align his party with Peking remains an imponderable. In all probability, when compared to

some of the other variables, it represented no more than an auxiliary factor in the PKI's shift toward China.

In any case, upon his return from a ten-week tour of Communist states, Aidit publicly dissociated the PKI from Moscow's position. Henceforth, every Indonesian Communist leader unreservedly defended the CPC. For instance, in September 1963 the PKI secretary general, addressing a rally in Djakarta, came out squarely in favour of the Chinese position:

People may argue where the focus of world revolution is today. But the fact is that at present the most acute anti-imperialist struggle is in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia, where the sound of gunfire has not stopped since the end of World War II. In Southeast Asia there are already a socialist country and large-scale revolutionary movements of the masses. There are also Communist parties which exert a very broad influence on the revolutionary movement, like the Communist parties of Indonesia, Burma and other countries. It may be said that all Communist parties in Southeast Asia are holding high the banner of Marxism-Leninism. There is no market for revisionism in Southeast Asia. The Communists and other revolutionaries of Indonesia should feel fortunate and happy that we are in such an area. We are in the forefront of the struggle against world imperialism. (emphasis added). 29

That Aidit meant what he said and that his party gave assistance to other Communist parties in the region has already been indicated in previous chapters.

In contrast to most Southeast Asian Communists PKI leaders did not simply regurgitate CPC slogans but "refreshed" polemics by adding their own contributions. Aidit

for one insisted that, as a result of Sino-Soviet differences, a process of "crystallization" had occurred in the international Communist movement. In fact, four types of Communist parties now existed:

Firstly, the Communist party that is Marxist-Leninist from its highest leaders to its cadres and members, and that is the only Communist party in its country. Secondly, the Communist party whose leadership is controlled by revisionists or is inclining to revisionism that is the only Communist party in its country, but within which there exists a strong or rather strong opposition from a genuine Marxist-Leninist group. Thirdly, the Communist party that is completely controlled by the revisionists that is the only Communist party in its country and that has ejected the genuine Marxist-Leninists. Those that have been evicted have formed, with or without new persons, Marxist-Leninist circles; some have already issued periodicals, and some have not yet done so but are active in propagandizing their thoughts verbally in many forms. Fourthly, the old Communist party that is alongside a new Communist party, so that there exist two parties in one country /or three, as was the case in Burma/, the new one formed as a correction of the old party that is considered to have deviated from Marxism-Leninism, to have taken the revisionist road.<sup>30</sup>

The PKI chief's analysis is not only an assessment but also a legitimization of this process.

Understandably, pro-Chinese journals gave wide coverage to PKI statements. By contrast, in pro-Soviet journals, particularly after mid-1963, they are conspicuous by their absence. The laudatory remarks made by Peng Chen, former CPC politburo member, on the occasion of the PKI's forty-fifth anniversary are an accurate indication that the PKI's strategy had Peking's full support:

Since 1951 the Indonesian Communist Party has had a Marxist-Leninist nucleus of leadership headed by Comrade Aidit at its centre ... The Communist Party of Indonesia is a creative, militant and powerful proletarian vanguard. It upholds the Marxist-Leninist line; it has always held aloft the revolutionary banner of anti-imperialism and national liberation and waged an untiring struggle for complete independence, democracy, freedom and independence.

And, in the opinion of the former Peking mayor the skill of this leadership has rendered the PKI handsome dividends:

The Indonesian Communist Party has scored tremendous successes in consolidating and expanding the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal national united front which is led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance.<sup>31</sup>

Mutual "backslapping" has become common practice among Communist parties holding similar or identical views on developments in the Communist movement. In fact, the practice has become rote. It would be little more than tiresome repetition to detail the PKI leadership's many monologues on the subject of "Soviet revisionism". Suffice it to re-emphasize that the PKI and Sukarno had, by the time of the September coup, shifted their policies far to the left. Not a few Western specialists believed Peking, Sukarno and the PKI had fallen into an almost total ideological and political embrace. China was reportedly even prepared to "give Djakarta its 'own' atomic bomb to cement this alliance."<sup>32</sup>

The power of the radical left overtly unchallenged few, if any, experts on Indonesian politics expected the rapid

dénouement triggered by the abortive putsch against the army leadership on the night of September 30 and the early morning hours of October 1, 1965. Six generals were killed, but the two key men, generals Nasution and Suharto escaped, rallied loyal troops and quickly ended the insurrection. No attempt will be made to provide a detailed account of the events leading up to the coup. Briefly, however, numerous post mortem analyses<sup>33</sup> indicate that the PKI was implicated.<sup>34</sup> They maintain that reports of Sukarno's supposedly rapidly deteriorating health and a rumored plot by a "Council of Generals" against the party apparently encouraged Communist leaders to strike the first blow.

Writers still marvel at the lightning counter-coup delivered by the military. And the PKI, because of its purported involvement quickly became the object of a massive campaign of terror. Moslem religious leaders were reported to have called on the faithful to launch a holy war against party members and front activists.<sup>35</sup> To outside observers it appeared that the PKI's organizational cohesion was completely shattered within the space of a few months. Aidit<sup>36</sup> and the majority of the PKI leadership<sup>37</sup> were either shot or arrested. For a time it seemed as if the Communist party had been consumed by the very revolutionary atmosphere it itself had helped to build up.

The almost wholesale destruction of the PKI must have represented a severe loss to the CPC. One source estimates that the demise of the PKI and Sukarno was the worst defeat for the Chinese in 1965 because "Communist China had lost not only an alliance with the most populous and potentially powerful country of Southeast Asia, but also a base for the infiltration of the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia."<sup>38</sup> But, in the light of more recent reports, this conclusion may have been drawn somewhat hastily. There is some evidence that remnants of the PKI have concentrated in Central and East Java and Peking. Communist guerrillas still harrass government troops<sup>39</sup> and a radio broadcast from Djakarta claims that approximately "seven hundred members of the PKI are at present in Peking. They are engaged in directing a political guerrilla campaign propaganda? against the Indonesian Government."<sup>40</sup> Djawoto, former Indonesian Ambassador to Peking, has apparently even formed an Indonesian government-in-exile.<sup>41</sup>

The PKI's resurgence has been attributed to the army's efforts to oust Sukarno and to a still deteriorating economy.<sup>42</sup> Sukarno's appeal is strongest among the peasants of East and Central Java and among members of the PNI. The latter in particular has resisted the President's loss of power. Consequently, " ... the ranks of the PNI and pro-Sukarno fronts began to grow, and with it the antagonism between the President and the army leadership, providing new tactical openings to the PKI underground."<sup>43</sup>

But infiltration seems to be an auxiliary tactic at the present time. If one is to credit a report in the Communist Party of New Zealand organ People's Voice the PKI has established its operational headquarters in Central Java and is engaged in planning a Mao-style liberation war. According to a statement of the PKI politburo the present task of the party is:

[to] ... arouse, organize and mobilize the masses, especially the workers and peasants; ... [to] be ready to lead a protracted armed struggle which is integrated with the agrarian revolution of the peasants in the country ... [and to] form a united front of all the forces that are against the military dictatorship of right-wing generals, headed by Suharto-Nasution. [This] ... united front must be one that is based on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat.<sup>44</sup>

The above is not to suggest that the PKI has regained its old organizational format. Its forces are scattered, many of its ablest leaders and cadres have been executed and its above-ground fronts banned. If the PKI was formerly an independent -- or at least autonomous -- Communist party it is today, much like the MCP, CPT and BCP, quite subordinate to Peking. The Soviet Union, although denouncing Indonesia's persecution of PKI members, has not become a haven for self-exiled Indonesian Communists. In fact, Moscow has invalidated their passports and asked them to leave the country.<sup>45</sup> Further, the CPSU's ambivalent attitude to post-coup Indonesian developments, its willingness to grant a moratorium on



Djakarta's huge debt has only fortified the PKI's anti-Soviet feeling.

Suar Suroso, PKI member and student expelled from the Soviet Union, neatly sums up this attitude:

The Kosygin government has never stood on the side of the Indonesian people in their struggle to oppose the most barbarous terror ... Rather ... it tried to lighten the burden of the Suharto-Nasution right-wing dictatorial regime by making an agreement with the latter to extend the time limit for its clearance of debts ... The savagery and arrogance shown by the leading clique of the Soviet Communist Party has made the members of the Indonesian Communist Party understand ... even more clearly the correctness of the view repeatedly and explicitly stated by the Chinese Communist Party and the Albanian Party of Labour, that the two struggles, one against U.S.-led imperialism and the other against modern revisionism with the leading clique of the Soviet Communist Party at its center, are indivisible ... [By] arming ourselves with the mighty thought of Mao Tse-tung, the acme of Marxism-Leninism in this era, we will successfully accomplish the arduous task of defeating the ... right-wing military dictatorial regime, of opposing U.S.-headed imperialism and of winning victory for the people's democratic revolution in our country.<sup>46</sup>

Whether the PKI can again rise from the ashes of defeat and accomplish the tasks outlined by Mr. Suroso remains to be seen. In the last analysis, the party's fate, its liquidation or recovery and ultimate attainment of power, depends in large part on the success or failure of the current political élite to achieve economic stability and a measure of prosperity for Indonesia's population. Nevertheless, at present the PKI is comparatively small in membership and its political influence

has been drastically reduced. For the time being, therefore, one may expect the PKI, like all other parties examined -- with the possible exception of the CPP -- to be extremely dependent on the aid and support of Peking.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### THE POSITION OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE DISPUTE - AN EVALUATION

In summary, it has been the theme of this study that the acceptance of either the Chinese or Soviet model of the proper road to power by Southeast Asian Communist parties provides a major indicator of which side in the dispute has, in the opinion of the latter, inherited the ideological leadership of the international Communist movement. By the end of 1966 every Communist party surveyed -- the pro-Soviet NUF, it will be remembered, disintegrated in late 1963 -- had opted for the Chinese model. One could assume, therefore, that at least Southeast Asian Communists regard Peking's advice more efficacious than Moscow's.

But this assumption is true in one sense only. In each of the five (six, if one is to count Singapore) Southeast Asian states today, the Communist party is illegal, its members hunted by its country's security forces, and thus unable, even should it have the inclination, to utilize Soviet strategy. Interestingly enough, both in Burma until late 1963 and Indonesia until October 1965 the Communist parties could, if they so desired, apply Russian tactical concepts -- specifically, cooperation with the nationalist leadership. And in each country the Communist movement either resorted to a combination

of Peking's and Moscow's advice or split into pro-Moscow and -Peking parties.

Utilization of the Chinese model has proven less hazardous for Southeast Asian Communists than adherence to the Soviet approach. Peking advocates minimal cooperation with middle-class politicians and nationalists unless Communists can gain control of their respective political organizations. The maintenance of organizational independence is one of the principal points contained in Peking's model.

Understandably, after Ne Win ordered the arrest of members of the pro-Soviet NUF and the Indonesian army imprisoned and shot those of the PKI, this Chinese warning proved quite realistic and the prestige of Soviet strategy suffered commensurately.

But not one of the Communist parties following the CPC's tactical guide was able to chalk up any major victories during the 1960 - 1966 period. In fact, every party which attempted to implement a united front from below policy has thus far failed to make impressive gains, let alone come close to replacing the political élite presently in power.

All of the Southeast Asian Communist parties operate in a relatively similar political environment: their countries are close to China, yet far removed from the Soviet Union; the societies in which the parties exist are economically underdeveloped and largely agrarian; finally, each of the countries -- with the exception of Thailand -- had been a colony of a

Western power at least until the end of World War II.

Hence Peking contends that similar strategic concepts may be applied by Communist parties seeking to gain power in Southeast Asia. Theoretically, the strategy appears simple. In retrospect, it requires the destruction of the legitimacy of the local ruling élite -- again excluding Thailand and, to a large extent, the Philippines these élites have been in power for a relatively short time -- and entails the construction of a new set of political symbols which the Communist party seeks to present as the suitable -- or better, only -- alternative to the present political system. In the particular political setting of Southeast Asia how better to achieve this task, CPC leaders believe, than by accusing political élites of colluding with the major Western powers -- interestingly, the Soviet Union has recently also been drawn into this "imperialist" vortex -- and thus bringing the threat of renewed foreign political domination to countries which just gained their independence.

All the Communist parties examined in this study did indeed point out the imminent danger especially of "U.S. imperialism" and "neo-colonialism". It seems that they were attempting to manufacture -- or expand -- an atmosphere of crisis within their specific political environment, one which would appear sufficiently grave and make the ruling élite appear sufficiently inept to encourage the "masses" to flock to

the Communist banner. Such a policy, strictly speaking, is an attempt to reapply tactics similar to those employed by the CPC from 1937 to 1945. By being the only major political force which advocated resistance to the Japanese invaders the CPC convincingly established itself as the representative of the Chinese national interest and attracted large-scale support from the peasantry and intelligentsia.

Should the various Southeast Asian Communist parties just as convincingly demonstrate themselves to be the sole source of national salvation, there is little doubt that they too would gain a larger following. Southeast Asian Communists with Chinese encouragement and vocal support have chosen the United States, local pro-Western political élites and, to a lesser extent, Britain to assume the role played by the Japanese in China.

It seems that especially the United States -- along with its small SEATO allies Australia and Thailand, as well as the pro-U.S. South Korean government -- has, perhaps unwittingly, conformed to Communist requirements. By sending troops to aid local regimes to quell Communist insurgency Washington may provide the catalyst necessary to fuse Communist and nationalist sentiment. Cases in point are South Vietnam and, possibly, Thailand. It is in this context that one of the many remarks on the subject of U.S. diplomacy in Southeast Asia made by Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia assumes special significance:

"Where there are American troops the Communists gather like ants around sugar."<sup>1</sup>

But it appears that a number of factors intervene to put definite limitations on the utility of the Chinese model. As in the case of the CPC, the success of Southeast Asian Communists depends in large part on their ability to capture the loyalty of the peasantry. The guerrilla wars waged by the CPC against the Japanese, the Vietminh against the French and the Vietcong against Saigon -- and increasingly against the United States -- would seem to support this assertion. And although each country, with the exception of Singapore, has a large peasant population, traditional patterns of authority between the peasantry and political élites have, for the most part, not broken down. This fact stands in stark contrast to the situation prevailing in rural China during the growth of CPC power.

Southeast Asian Communists have thus found it quite difficult to destroy political symbolism accepted by the peasants. Religion -- Buddhism in Burma and Thailand, Mohammedanism in Indonesia and Malaysia, and Catholicism in the Philippines -- has more often than not tended to strengthen traditional authority patterns and to limit the appeal of Communism for the peasantry. Only two parties, the CPP and PKI had gained the adherence of a sizeable number of peasants. But peasant support for the CPP appears restricted to Central Luzon,

an area of traditional peasant unrest, and for the PKI mainly to Central and East Java. Filipino and Indonesian peasants have apparently turned to the CPP and PKI respectively because of unscrupulous landlord exploitation and a desire to possess their own land. The tenancy problem does not seem as acute in Burma, Malaysia, Thailand nor other parts of the Philippines and Indonesia. As a result, peasant discontent is comparatively lower.

The greatest success for a number of the smaller Communist parties -- the BCP, CPB, MCP and, to an extent, the CPT -- has been among their respective countries' ethnic minorities. For the Burmese Communists the Arakanese, Kachins, Karens and Shans have on occasion provided useful military and logistic support. However, Burmese Communist-ethnic minority association appears to have hindered the former's efforts to appeal to Burman nationalist sentiment. The MCP, for reasons detailed in Chapter Three, has had its greatest impact upon some members of Malaysia's Chinese communities. In turn, the MCP's "Chineseness" seems to have reduced its attractiveness for the Malay population. Finally, even the CPT has been most active among inhabitants of Northeast Thailand, of whom many are of Lao and Vietnamese stock. The party is also said to have a large Chinese membership.

In essence, the impact of the small Southeast Asian Communist parties upon the various ethnic minorities in one



sense appears to be the most successful part of the united front from below strategy. In another, this may have diminished the parties' ability to appeal to the nationalist sentiment of the countries' ethnic majorities.

In contrast to most Communist parties examined, the PKI utilized many components of the Soviet model. And unlike these parties the PKI was exceptionally successful in attracting a mass following. Undoubtedly the Indonesian Communist Party's increasing strength was in no small part due to its progressively close collaboration with President Sukarno. In other words, the PKI worked with the established political elite -- the officer corps of the army largely excepted -- and readily utilized recognized political symbols. Nevertheless, since the PKI followed Soviet-advocated tactics it was very vulnerable to repression. This may also be said of the National United Front of Burma.

Both models, therefore, have their shortcomings. But for a number of reasons the Chinese were in a better position than the Russians to have theirs accepted by Southeast Asian Communist parties: one, similarities do exist between the situation faced by Southeast Asian Communists and the one encountered by the CPC on its drive to achieve power. For example, the former could employ organizational techniques among the peasantry already tested by the Chinese. They could also draw on Chinese experience in fighting a guerrilla war

against their country's government.

Two, Peking's emphasis on radical political action -- including guerrilla war -- struck a responsive chord among all parties surveyed. By contrast, Moscow's formal accent on caution, particularly in confronting the United States, was completely rejected. The penchant for radical action displayed by the entire Communist movement in Southeast Asia -- be it strikes in Singapore, guerrilla war in Burma, Malaysia, Thailand and, to a minor extent, in the Philippines or the coup in Indonesia -- was a factor of the domestic political situation faced by each party. Thus, at least to a degree, the interest of local Southeast Asian Communists and Peking coincided.

While the acceptance of the Russian stress on moderation and cooperation -- where possible -- with middle-class nationalists may have been to the advantage of the various Communist parties, necessity dictated the adoption of the Chinese approach. After 1963 in Burma and 1965 in Indonesia no government proved willing to permit legal Communist activity.

Finally, organizational control -- combined with ethnic ties to mainland China in the case of the MCP -- of the smaller Communist parties, with the possible exception of the CPP, reinforced the loyalty of Southeast Asian Communists to Peking. Many Communist cadres have undergone ideological

training in China. Most, if not all, the parties -- and this includes the PKI today -- depend on Chinese financial, logistic and propaganda support to continue and expand their operations. Although the Russians could presumably also supply these services China is geographically in a much better position to advance its influence among the parties studied. Burma and Thailand, for example, have borders contiguous to Communist-controlled states, the former with China and the latter with Communist-dominated areas of Laos.

Further, the existence of Chinese communities in Southeast Asia provides Peking with important "access points" through which it may apply pressure on the local Communist parties. How much pressure the CPC could exert through the Chinese -- and it must be stressed that only a small number of these serve as "middlemen" for Peking -- remains an imponderable. Most likely, however, they facilitate CPC organizational control over the Communist parties in Southeast Asia.

In the final analysis, one may conclude that a combination of necessity and Chinese organizational control has encouraged -- or forced -- Southeast Asian Communists not only to come out in favour of Peking in the latter's dispute with Moscow but also to utilize most, if not all, of the CPC's tactical guide.

## FOOTNOTES

### INTRODUCTION

- 1 For the significance of these congresses, see N. Lang, "Le conflit sino-sovietique et le mouvement communiste international", Est & Ouest, vol. 18 (December 1 - 15, 1966), pp. 16 - 19.

### CHAPTER ONE

- 1 Peking Review (hereafter cited as P.R.), No. 30 (July 26, 1963), pp. 13 - 14.
- 2 P.R., No. 1 (January 4, 1963), p. 11.
- 3 P.R., No. 2 (January 12, 1962), p. 9.
- 4 It is not my intention to discuss those aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute which turn on intra-bloc affairs, i.e., Soviet economic aid to the less-developed member-states, as well as political support for the Chinese in their various confrontations with non-Communist countries. For a full view of these issues the reader may wish to consult: D. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956 - 1961, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962; W. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1964; W. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-65", China Quarterly, No. 25 (January-March 1966), pp. 3 - 143; R. Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964; W. Osten, "Der Konflikt Moskau - Peking und Seine Auswirkung auf den Weltkommunismus", Osteuropa, vol. 14 (July - August and September 1964), pp. 502 - 515 and 646 - 665.
- 5 This document stressed the leadership role which Communist parties must play in national liberation movements.
- 6 See Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy", Selected Works, Peking, Peking Foreign Languages Press, vol. 2, 1965, pp. 339 - 384.
- 7 D. Zagoria, op. cit., p. 252

- 8 P.R., No. 30 (July 26, 1963), p. 14.
- 9 Ibid., p. 15.
- 10 E.K. Valkenier, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the National Liberation Movement", International Communism After Khrushchev, ed. L. Labedz, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1965, p. 197.
- 11 The attack is contained in the article "The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us", P.R., No. 1 (January 4, 1963), pp. 9 - 21.
- 12 P.R., No. 25 (June 21, 1963), pp. 6 - 22.
- 13 P.R., No. 2 (January 12, 1962), p. 8.
- 14 See, for example, E. Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking, Penguin Books Ltd., 1963, pp. 83 - 96; D. Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, New York, Praeger, 1964, p. 192; and F. Isenberg, The Russian-Chinese Rift, New York, H.W. Wilson Co., 1966, p. 158.
- 15 P.R., No. 1 (January 1966), p. 11.
- 16 The question of "stress" and "timing" in the liberation movement is raised by D. Zagoria, op. cit., pp. 252-254.
- 17 See especially Document No. 10 in W.E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1964.
- 18 At least this is what the Chinese claim in P.R., No. 6 (February 7, 1964), pp. 5 - 21.
- 19 O.V. Kuusinen, Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961. It is interesting to note that Mr. Kuusinen, in his description of the three Asian Communist states -- China, North Korea and North Vietnam -- fails to attribute these countries with a path of development significant for others in underdeveloped areas. He only concedes that they "are vividly demonstrating the advantages and merits of the path of socialism to the other people that have thrown off the yoke of imperialism" (p. 505).
- 20 Yu. Bochkaryov, "The Soviet Union and the National Liberation Movement", New Times, No. 26 (July 3, 1963), p. 6.
- 21 R. Stepanov, "The Present Stage of the National Liberation Movement", New Times, No. 32 (August 14, 1963), pp. 7 - 10.

- 22 Yu. Bochkaryov, op. cit., p. 7.
- 23 E.K. Valkenier, op. cit., p. 196.
- 24 W. Shinn, Jr., "The National-Democratic State: A Communist Program for Less-Developed Areas", World Politics, vol. 15 (April 1963), p. 378.
- 25 Of course, even though underdeveloped, non-Communist states receive Soviet (or Western) aid, the Chinese may still support such states in the international political arena. The Chinese, for example, still back the Arab states against Israel.
- 26 N. Chaoui, "New Features of the National Liberation Movement", World Marxist Review (hereafter cited as WMR), vol. 9 (July 1966), p. 29.
- 27 Ibid., p. 29
- 28 O.V. Kuusinen, a former patriarch of the Comintern, made a similar point, op. cit., pp. 510 - 512.
- 29 For an elaborate analysis of the impact on Sino-Soviet relations of advances in Soviet military technology, refer to D. Zagoria, op. cit., pp. 152 - 171.
- 30 G. Starushenko, "The National Liberation Movement and the Struggle for Peace", International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 9 (October 1963), pp. 5 - 6. See also the Soviet classification of wars into "just" and "unjust" categories in B. Crozier, "The Struggle for the Third World", International Affairs (London), vol. 40 (July 1964), pp. 440 - 452.
- 31 For the declaration, refer to "Statement of the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU Concerning U.S. Aggression in Vietnam", Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1966, pp. 425-430.
- 32 This Soviet problem is discussed further in R.K. Furtak, "Friedliche Koexistenz und das Vietnam Dilemma", Osteuropa, vol. 16 (July-August 1966), pp. 556 - 562.
- 33 One of the more comprehensive treatises by a Western observer on the Soviet attitude toward guerrilla wars is S.P. Gilbert's "Wars of Liberation and Soviet Military Aid Policy", Orbis, vol. 10 (Fall 1966), pp. 839 - 858.

- 34 Lu Ting-yi, cited in C.P. Fitzgerald, "Sino-Soviet Balance Sheet in Underdeveloped Areas", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 351 (January 1964), p. 42.
- 35 See "Statement ...", Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU, loc. cit.
- 36 D.S. Zagoria, "Communist Policy and the Struggle for the Developing Countries", Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, vol. 28 (April 1965), p. 70.
- 37 Ibid.

## CHAPTER TWO

- 1 The terms "Burmese" and "Burman" are often confused. In general usage "Burmese" refers to a citizen of Burma; "Burman", on the other hand, refers to a member of that ethnic group which forms the majority of the population. Apart from the Burmans, the country also has five important ethnic minorities: the Arakanese, Kachins, Karens, Mons and Shans.
- 2 Observers seem somewhat at variance as to the exact number of seats won. J. Badgley claims the NUF obtained forty-eight seats and H. Brimmel contends it gained forty-seven. See J.H. Badgley, "The Communist Parties of Burma", ed. R.A. Scalapino, The Communist Revolution in Asia, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965, p. 294 and H. Brimmel, Communism in Southeast Asia, London, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 319.
- 3 Yuva Newsletter, vol. 3 (March 1964), p. 13.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 The military's major programmatic statement is The Burmese Way to Socialism. For an analysis of the Revolutionary Council's policies, refer to J.H. Badgley, "Burma's Zealous Wungyis: Maoists or St. Simonists?" Asian Survey (hereafter cited as A.S.), vol. 5 (January 1965), pp. 55-61.
- 6 Yuva Newsletter, vol. 3 (December 1964), p. 13. For a Soviet critique of the Burmese government's socialist programme, see ibid., pp. 5 - 14.

- 7 Ibid., p. 8.
- 8 A. Malov, "Burma's New Path", New Times, No. 22 (June 3, 1964), p. 10.
- 9 A. Kaznacheev, Inside a Soviet Embassy, Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 1962, pp. 203 - 218.
- 10 This is A. Kaufman's contention. See the review of his book in Yuva Newsletter, vol. 2 (July 1963), pp. 1 - 6.
- 11 In other words, the CPSU wanted all Burmese Communists to join the BSPP, a political organization dominated by nationalists. The Russians probably hoped that the Communists could capture the leadership of the nationalist movement from within.
- 12 B. Crozier, "The Communist Struggle for Power in Burma", The World Today, vol. 20 (March 1964), p. 110.
- 13 New York Times, December 30, 1963, pp. 1 and 6.
- 14 See A. Tong, "Le communisme international et la Birmanie", Est & Ouest, vol. 18 (January 16 - 31, 1966), pp. 17 - 23.
- 15 Pravda, January 4, 1964, as translated in Yuva Newsletter, vol. 3 (March 1964), p. 19.
- 16 Mizan, vol. 8 (May - June 1966), p. 103.
- 17 See footnote No. 7, above.
- 18 A. Tong, op. cit., p. 18.
- 19 The Times (London), June 28, 1963, p. 11.
- 20 The Times (London), August 21, 1963, p. 6.
- 21 See J.H. Badgley, "The Communist Parties of Burma", op. cit., pp. 301 - 302.
- 22 Ibid., p. 305.
- 23 A. Tong, op. cit.
- 24 New York Times, December 30, 1963, pp. 1 and 6, and The Times (London), October 8, 1963, p. 13.



- 25 A. Tong, op. cit., p. 21.
- 26 Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Protokoll der Verhandlungen des VI. Parteitages der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands (hereafter cited as Protokoll ...), Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1963, vol. 2, pp. 426 - 427.
- 27 A. Dallin, Diversity in International Communism: A Documentary Record, New York, Columbia University Press, 1963, p. 575.
- 28 S. Topping remarked in the December 30, 1963 issue of the New York Times that Communist insurgents lacked modern weapons.
- 29 P.R., No. 2 (January 5, 1964), p. 5. In view of the recent worsening of Sino-Burmese relations, one might expect the Chinese to step up their aid to the Communist armies.
- 30 P.R., No. 8 (February 21, 1964), pp. 6 - 8.
- 31 An observer writing for the journal Eastern World, vol. 17 (July 1963), reports that the "military chiefs of the Burma Communist Party have surrendered to the Government under the Amnesty Order. They are Bo Ye [H] Tut [secretary of the central committee], Bo Sein Tin and Bo Ye Maung, former officers of the Army. [In the writer's view their] surrender has virtually dealt a crippling blow to the Burma Communist Party, as the Party will now be totally devoid of military leadership ..." Perhaps the subsequent lack of military experts provides a partial explanation for the thirty Burmese Communists that Peking shipped back to Burma.
- 32 Protokoll ..., op. cit., pp. 424 - 425.
- 33 See F. von der Mehden, "Burma's Religious Campaign Against Communism", Pacific Affairs, vol. 33 (September 1960), pp. 290 - 300.
- 34 But the Communists have, on occasion, used monks to spread the Marxist-Leninist gospel.
- 35 R. Butwell, "The Tiger's Tail", Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 53, pp. 401 - 405.

- 36 New York Times, July 23, 1964, p. 2.
- 37 Although Soviet writers continue to claim that the Burmese Communist Party favours Moscow, this seems to be done largely for propagandistic purposes. For example, see Eastern World, vol. 17 (August 1963), p. 18 and vol. 18 (January 1964), p. 20.
- 38 The Times (London), April 2, 1966, p. 7.

### CHAPTER THREE

- 1 While Singapore is no longer a component part of Malaysia, it still seems to be included in the MCP's operational sphere. In fact, an integral part of the MCP's programme consists in advocating the union of Singapore and peninsular Malaya.
- 2 F. Starner, "Communism in Malaysia: A Multifront Struggle", ed. R.A. Scalapino, The Communist Revolution in Asia, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965, p. 228.
- 3 For details, see "Un foyer de troubles en Asie: la 'République du Nord-Kalimantan'", Est & Ouest, vol. 19 (April 16 - 30, 1967), pp. 14 - 19.
- 4 J.M. van der Kroef, "Communism and Chinese Communalism in Sarawak", China Quarterly, No. 20 (October-December 1964), p. 42.
- 5 Ibid., p. 59.
- 6 New York Times, August 18, 1966, p. 5.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 See Straits Times, April 3, 1967, p.1.
- 9 The Times (London), April 2, 1966, p. 11.
- 10 The Times (London), January 12, 1966, p. 9.
- 11 J.M. van der Kroef, "The Dynamics of Communism in Malaysia", Communist Affairs, vol. 3 (May-June 1965), p. 8.
- 12 J.M. van der Kroef, "Singapore's Communist Fronts", Problems of Communism, vol. 13 (September-October 1964), p. 56.

- 13 Kuala Lumpur accused President Sukarno of attempting to subvert Malaysia through both the MCP and the PMIP. For its detailed allegations, see Kuala Lumpur, Malaya-Indonesia Relations: August 31, 1957 to September 15, 1963, Government Printing Office, 1964, and Dato Bin Shafie, Communism and Sukarno's Aggression, Federal Department of Information, Kuala Lumpur, September 4, 1964.
- 14 A pioneer attempt is by J.M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communisms' Expansionist Role in Southeast Asia", International Journal, vol. 20 (Spring 1965) pp. 189-205.
- 15 See D. Davies, "Backdoor Dangers", Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 45 (August 13, 1964), pp. 274 - 276.
- 16 P.R., No. 40 (October 4, 1963), pp. 23 - 25.
- 17 His allegation bears some truth. Evidently zealous officials in the employ of the Kuala Lumpur government were all too ready to pin the label of "Communist" or "Communist sympathizer" on anyone having serious reservations about the merits of the proposed Federation.
- 18 "Malaysian Malaise", Eastern World, vol. 16 (June 1962), pp. 9 - 10.
- 19 Eastern World, vol. 16 (September 1962), pp. 9 - 10.
- 20 See V. Trapeznikov, "Malaysia: Sharpening Conflict", International Affairs (Moscow), No. 8 (August 1964), p. 90.
- 21 Yuva Newsletter, vol. 1 (October 1962), pp. 1 - 13.
- 22 A.R. Karim, "'Malaysia': The Neo-Colonialist Federation", Revolution, vol. 1 (July 1963), p. 33.
- 23 P.R., No. 29 (July 19, 1963), pp. 19 - 20.
- 24 See also Protokoll ..., pp. 434 - 438.
- 25 Refer to Mizan Supplement B, No. 2 (March-April 1967), p. 3.
- 26 New York Times, December 7 and 8, pp. 5 and 22 respectively.
- 27 "Un foyer de troubles en Asie: la 'République du Nord-Kalimantan'", Est & Ouest, vol. 19 (April 16-30, 1967), p.15.

- 28 While this analysis may be somewhat biased, Lee Kuan Yew did in fact wish to expand his political influence to Malaya proper. By establishing branches of his PAP on the peninsula he did antagonize the Tunku and other highly-placed officers in the governing party -- the United Malay Nationalist Organization. For an examination of the factors contributing to the secession, see R.S. Milne, "Singapore's Exit from Malaysia: The Consequences of Ambiguity", A.S., vol. 6 (March 1966), pp. 175 - 184.
- 29 JPRS, 32294, No. 97, p. 26.
- 30 New York Times, January 14, 1966, p. 4. "Sarma" is an East Indian name. The purpose of appointing an Indian to such an important position is probably to give the MCP a multi-racial appearance.
- 31 Mizan Supplement B, No. 2 (March - April 1967), pp. 9 - 10.

#### CHAPTER FOUR

- 1 WMR, vol. 7 (December 1964), p. 78.
- 2 For example, see "The Pro-Peking Communist Party Line-Up", Communist Affairs, vol. 4 (November-December 1966) pp. 14-17.
- 3 See Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, New York, Praeger, 1967, pp. 33 - 34.
- 4 Mizan Supplement B, No. 1 (January-February 1967), p. 7.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 J.M. van der Kroef, "Communist Fronts in the Philippines", Problems of Communism, vol. 16 (No. 2) (March-April 1967), p. 66.
- 7 Revolution, vol. 1 (No. 9) (January 1964), pp. 71 - 82.
- 8 Ibid., p. 81.
- 9 Ibid., p. 82.
- 10 The journal Revolution, it will be remembered, is controlled by Peking.

- 11 J. Maravilla, "Stop the Terror in the Philippines", WMR, vol. 7 (December 1964), pp. 77 - 78.
- 12 J. Maravilla, "Upsurge of the Anti-Imperialist Movement in the Philippines", WMR, vol. 8 (November 1965), p. 41.
- 13 Ibid., p. 43
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Ibid., p. 44.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 See J.M. van der Kroef, op. cit., pp. 65 - 75.
- 18 For vivid accounts of the social conditions in which Huk activities thrive, see E.R. Kiunisala, "Inside Huklandia" and "Behind the Talahib Curtain", Philippines Free Press, September 3, 1966 and September 10, 1966, pp. 6 and 69 - 70 and pp. 6 and 79 - 80 respectively. Mr. Kiunisala's estimate of 300,000 sympathizers has not been officially confirmed.
- 19 New York Times, April 16, 1967, p. 11.
- 20 Manila Times, June 4, 1966, p. 1.
- 21 Philippine News, June 6, 1967, p. 5.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 "For a Broad National Front", Progressive Review, No. 5 (January - February 1965), pp. 1 - 2.
- 24 Philippine News, op. cit.
- 25 Manila Chronicle, November 2, 1966, pp. 1 - 2.
- 26 See S. Appleton, "Communism and the Chinese in the Philippines", Pacific Affairs, vol. 32 (December 1959), pp. 376 - 391. Mr. Appleton estimates that approximately 2000 Chinese in the Philippines are enrolled in the local branch of the Communist Party of China.
- 27 See J.M. van der Kroef, "The Long, Long Hangover", Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 53 (July 1, 1966), pp. 70 - 74.

## CHAPTER FIVE

- 1 D.A. Wilson, "Thailand and Marxism", ed. F. Trager, Marxism in Southeast Asia, Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press, 1959, p. 75.
- 2 Ibid., p. 76.
- 3 For example, see D. Barnett, Communist China and Asia, New York, Random House, 1959, p. 490 and A. Tong, "La Thailand sera-t-elle un nouveau Vietnam?", Est & Ouest, vol. 19 (February 1-15, 1967), pp. 18 - 22.
- 4 C. Roll, "Thailand-Nächster Krisenherd in Südostasien?" Aussenpolitik, vol. 16 (July 1965), p. 499.
- 5 "Radio Propaganda Broadcast by the Communist Party of Thailand", JPRS 39969, No. 77, pp. 42 - 44.
- 6 A. Tong, op. cit., p. 18.
- 7 For details, see A. Tong, "La Thailand, prochain objectif du communisme chinois", Est & Ouest, vol. 17 (May 16 - 31, 1965), pp. 23 - 26.
- 8 New York Times, July 12, 1966, p. 8.
- 9 C. Roll, op. cit., p. 501.
- 10 Protokoll ..., pp. 430 - 431. Delegates of pro-Soviet parties whistled and stamped their feet when Peng Chen, the Chinese Communist representative went up to the speaker's podium.
- 11 Ibid., p. 433.
- 12 P.R., No. 51 (December 18, 1964), p. 13.
- 13 New York Times, February 6, 1965, p. 6. For a more detailed review of the Front's programme, see the same article.
- 14 See A. Tong, Est & Ouest, vol. 19 (February 1 - 15, 1967), and New York Times, July 12, 1966, p. 8.
- 15 Mizan Supplement B, No. 1 (January-February 1966), p. 13.
- 16 See R. Christian, "Programme Gegen die Subversion in Nordost - Thailand", Aussenpolitik, vol. 18 (February 1967), pp. 118 - 124.

- 17 Cited in A. Tong, Est & Ouest, vol. 19 (February 1 - 15, 1967), p. 20.
- 18 JPRS 39969, No. 77, p. 42.
- 19 Ibid., pp. 42 - 43.
- 20 Ibid., p. 43.
- 21 New York Times, December 2, 1966, p. 2.
- 22 "On the Revolutionary Situation of Thailand", Jen-min Jih-pao, September 30, 1966, translated in JPRS 39013, No. 73, pp. 10 - 11.
- 23 Mizan Supplement B, No. 1 (January - February 1967), p. 8.
- 24 Survey of the China Mainland Press, No. 3916 (April 11, 1967), pp. 37 - 38.
- 25 The Russians call the Bangkok regime "reactionary" and a "staunch supporter of SEATO". Hence cooperation with this government is out of the question. But since the U.S.S.R. maintains an embassy in Bangkok it must be very careful when expressing itself on the CPT's activities. For a Soviet view of Thai politics, see "Soviet Writing on Thailand", Yuva Newsletter, vol. 1 (October 1962), pp. 14 - 23.
- 26 M. Parker, "Squeeze Play in Thailand", The Reporter, August 11, 1966, p. 16.

## CHAPTER SIX

- 1 See, for example, New York Times, January 16, 1966, VI, pp. 12 - 13 and 68 - 69.
- 2 The more important Western treatises on the subject of post-World War II PKI strategy and tactics are: A.C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism, New York, Praeger, 1963; D. Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1964; J.M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, Publications Center, University of British Columbia, 1965.
- 3 New York Times, May 8, 1966, VI, pp. 25 and 89 - 92.

- 4 The effect of external crises on the PKI's development is examined, among others, by D. Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives", A.S., vol. 4 (June 1964), pp. 903 - 913.
- 5 J.M. van der Kroef, op. cit., p. 260.
- 6 D. Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963, p. 285.
- 7 J.M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power", Pacific Affairs, vol. 37 (Winter 1964 - 1965), pp. 357 - 383.
- 8 Harian Rakjat (People's Daily), Djakarta, September 29, 1965, in JPRS 33263, pp. 1 - 4.
- 9 H. Feith, "President Soekarno, the Army and the PKI : The Triangle Changes Shape", A.S., vol. 4 (August 1964), p. 971.
- 10 See J.M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communisms' 'Revolutionary Gymnastics'", A.S., vol. 5 (May 1965) p. 221.
- 11 This is J.M. van der Kroef's contention in his article " 'Gestapu' in Indonesia", Orbis, vol. 10 (Summer 1966), pp. 458 - 487.
- 12 A.J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia", China Quarterly, No. 25 (January - March 1966), p. 157.
- 13 P.R., No. 23 (June 4, 1965), p. 10.
- 14 A proponent of this view was G.J. Pauker, "Indonesia : The PKI's 'Road to Power'", ed. R.A. Scalapino, The Communist Revolution in Asia, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965, pp. 256 - 289. See especially his concluding remarks.
- 15 D. Hindley, "The Indonesian Communist Party and the Conflict in the International Communist Movement", China Quarterly, No. 19 (July - September 1964), p. 115.
- 16 WMR, vol. 6 (June 1963), p. 15.
- 17 See, for example, U. Ra'anan, "The Coup that Failed : A Background Analysis", Problems of Communism, vol. 15 (March - April 1966), pp. 37 - 43, and H. Ray, "Die Indonesischen Kommunisten Zwischen Moskau und Peking", Osteuropa, vol. 14 (March 1964), pp. 185 - 195.



- 18 WMR, vol. 6 (June 1963), p. 13.
- 19 U. Ra'anan, op. cit., pp. 38 - 39, makes this claim.
- 20 Global Digest, vol. 3 (January 1966), pp. 79 - 80.
- 21 See A. Brackman, op. cit., pp. 203 - 206; H. Feith, op. cit., pp. 976 - 977; and H. Ray, op. cit., p. 186.
- 22 J.M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, op. cit., p. 158.
- 23 D. Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963, op. cit., pp. 298 - 299.
- 24 H. Feith, op. cit., p. 976.
- 25 See, for example, JPRS 23682, p. 3.
- 26 A. Brackman, op. cit., p. 149. See also D. Hindley, "The Indonesian Communist Party and the Conflict in the International Communist Movement", op. cit., p. 116. The latter concedes that the PKI received funds from the Chinese community and defended Chinese minority interests, but contends that this is not sufficient evidence to impute the existence of CPC control over the PKI.
- 27 For a brief account of "anti-China" activities, refer to P.R., No. 46 (November 12, 1965), pp. 24 - 29.
- 28 A.J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 151.
- 29 P.R., No. 41 (October 11, 1963), p. 18.
- 30 Harian Rakjat, October 4 and 5, 1963, cited in D. Hindley, "The Indonesian Communist Party and the Conflict in the International Communist Movement", op. cit., pp. 108-109.
- 31 P.R., No. 23 (June 4, 1965), p. 5.
- 32 See B. Lazitch, "L'Indonésie avant le coup d'état du 30 Septembre", Est & Ouest, vol. 17 (November 1 - 15, 1965), pp. 1 - 4 and U. Ra'anan, op. cit., p. 41.
- 33 To cite only a few: H. Bechthold, "Peking Verliert Seinen Wichtigsten Partner", Aussenpolitik, vol. 16 (November 1965), pp. 729 - 732; A.J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia", China Quarterly, No. 25 (January - March 1966), pp. 144-167; B. Lazitch, "Le parti communiste

- d'Indonésie et le putsch du 30 septembre", Est & Ouest, vol. 17 (November 16 - 30, 1965), pp. 1 - 4; U. Ra'anah, "The Coup that Failed : A Background Analysis", Problems of Communism, vol. 15 (March - April 1966), pp. 37 - 43; and J.M. van der Kroef, "'Gestapu' in Indonesia", Orbis, vol. 10 (Summer 1966), pp. 458 - 487.
- 34 Even the Soviet journal New Times, No. 10 (March 1966), pp. 5 - 8, concedes that some individual Communists may have been involved in the coup. But it argues that those involved were "provoked" by the "right-wing forces".
- 35 New York Times, May 8, 1966, VI, pp. 89 - 92.
- 36 See A.J. Dommen, op. cit.
- 37 Duta Masyarakat (Jakarta), May 18, 1966, p.1, in JPRS 36181, p. 12, reports that Sakirman and Sudisman, both politburo members, had been captured. It seems that J. Adjitorop, politburo member presently in Peking, is the only top-ranking PKI leader left.
- 38 S. Topping, "Southeast Asia Isn't Scared of the Chinese Dragon", New York Times, January 16, 1966, VI, p. 13. See also H. Bechthold, op. cit.
- 39 New York Times, March 9, 1967, p. 19 and March 10, 1967, p.2.
- 40 Mizan Supplement B, No. 6 (November-December 1966), p. 7.
- 41 Mizan Supplement B, No. 4 (July-August 1966), p. 7.
- 42 J.M. van der Kroef, "How Dead is the Indonesian Communist Party?", Communist Affairs, vol. 5 (January - February 1967), pp. 3 - 9.
- 43 Ibid., p. 7.
- 44 Global Digest, vol. 4 (January 1967), p. 69.
- 45 One such deportee, Anwar Dharma, former Harian Rakjat correspondent in Moscow, summarized the PKI's attitude toward Moscow as follows:  
"Through the action of theirs [sic], the modern revisionists -- the leading clique of the CPSU -- can only make a glaring self-exposure of their

hypocritical attitude toward the Indonesian situation. On one side they are blatantly clamouring their 'solidarity' with ... Indonesian Communists ... who are under brutal suppression of the Indonesian fascist-military regime of Nasution - Suharto, but on the other side are working hand-in-glove with the fascist-militarists while expelling Indonesian Communists." P.R. No. 42, (October 14, 1966), p. 32.

46 SCMP, No. 3898 (March 14, 1967), pp. 18 - 19.

#### CHAPTER SEVEN

1 New York Times, January 16, 1966, VI, p. 69.

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- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Struggle for the Third World". International Affairs (London), vol. 40 (July 1964), pp. 440 - 452.
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