

The University of British Columbia

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

PROGRAMME OF THE

FINAL ORAL EXAMINATION

FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

of

DONALD DAVID TODD

B.A. (Honours),  
San Francisco State College, California, 1958

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1967, AT 3.30 P.M.

IN ROOM 2271, BUCHANAN BUILDING

COMMITTEE IN CHARGE

Chairman: B. N. Moyls

B. Savery

J. C. Dybikowski

S. Coval

P. Remnant

R. E. Robinson

R. Tees

External Examiner: B. Stroud  
University of California at Berkeley,  
Berkeley, California

Research Supervisor: S. Coval

# AUSTIN AND SENSE-DATA

## ABSTRACT

From 1947 to 1959 the late Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin lectured on several of the main philosophical problems of sense-perception. After his death, his former student, Mr. G. J. Warnock, working from Austin's lecture notes, published Austin's views on the philosophy of perception in a book entitled Sense and Sensibilia.

Austin's purposes in lecturing on the philosophical problems of perception were entirely negative; his aim was to undermine a whole tradition in the philosophy of perception, namely that of sense-datum analysis. His method was that of careful and detailed piecemeal analysis of what he regarded as the chief doctrines, methods, assumptions, and implications inherent in and necessary to any sense-datum analysis. He is widely reputed to have succeeded in his aims, and his analyses of particular aspects of sense-datum philosophy are highly regarded as models of philosophical analysis.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine critically several of the most important parts of Austin's critique of sense-datum philosophy, especially his analysis of the sense-datist use of the Argument from Illusion, his analysis of perceptual locutions such as "looks", "seems", and "appears", and his analysis of the meaning of "real". Austin's work is examined in the light of three critical questions, viz. (1) When it looks as if Austin is engaged in careful exposition of an opponent's position, is he fair to his opponent or does he distort it?, (2) Are the assumptions and implications of sense-datum theory which Austin tries to expose really what he says they are?, and (3) Even if Austin's analysis against a particular opponent is sound, is it relevant against sense-datum theory in general?

The argument of the thesis seeks to establish four main points: (1) Many of Austin's criticisms of the sense-datist use of the Argument from Illusion rest upon misstatements of the sense-datist position, and thus miss

their mark. Moreover, even when Austin's criticisms have considerable merit, they are not decisive, but merely require some revision or reformulation of the sense-datumists' arguments. (2) Austin's analysis of "looks", "seems" and "appears", while correct as far as it goes, is incomplete; it fails to tell the whole story as regards the uses of these locutions. Supplemented and completed, it is consistent with the sense-datum analysis of the meanings of these expressions. (3) Austin's analysis of "real" is partly correct and partly incorrect. Where correct, it is consistent with a sense-datum analysis of "real". Where wrong, Austin's analysis can be corrected in a manner which is consistent both with the correct parts of Austin's analysis of "real" and the sense-datum analysis. (4) Austin's analyses of "looks", "seems" and "appears" and of "real" are inconsistent with each other as they stand in the text. Supplemented and corrected, they are consistent with each other and with sense-datum theory.

In the interstices of criticisms of Austin, many positive suggestions are made pointing to further development of sense-datum theory.

## GRADUATE STUDIES

Field of Study: Philosophy

Philosophy of Mind	S. C. Coval
Philosophical Analysis	S. C. Coval
Kant	A. Maslow
Value Theory	D. G. Brown
Political Philosophy	R. Rowan

#### AWARDS

- 1963 - Mudd Fellowship, Washington University,  
St. Louis
- 1963-65 - University Fellowship, University of  
British Columbia



AUSTIN AND SENSE-DATA

by

DONALD DAVID TODD

B.A., (Honours) SAN FRANCISCO STATE  
COLLEGE, CALIFORNIA, 1958

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Department of Philosophy

We accept this Thesis as conforming to the  
required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

March, 1967

© Donald David Todd 1967

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Philosophy

The University of British Columbia  
Vancouver 8, Canada

Date May 5, 1967

## Austin and Sense-Data

### Abstract

From 1947 to 1959 the late Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin lectured on several of the main philosophical problems of sense-perception. After his death, his former student, Mr. G.J. Warnock, working from Austin's lecture notes, published Austin's views on the philosophy of perception in a book entitled Sense and Sensibilia.

Austin's purposes in lecturing on the philosophical problems of perception were entirely negative; his aim was to undermine a whole tradition in the philosophy of perception, namely that of sense-datum analysis. His method was that of careful and detailed piecemeal analysis of what he regarded as the chief doctrines, methods, assumptions, and implications inherent in and necessary to any sense-datum analysis. He is widely reputed to have succeeded in his aims, and his analysis of particular aspects of ~~sense-datum~~ philosophy are highly regarded as models of philosophical analysis.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine critically several of the most important parts of Austin's critique of sense-datum philosophy, especially his analysis of the sense-datumist use of the Argument from Illusion, his analysis of perceptual locutions such as "looks," "seems," and "appears," and his analysis of the meaning of "real." Austin's work is examined in the light of three critical questions, viz.

- (1) When it looks as if Austin is engaged in careful exposition of an opponent's position, is he fair to his opponent or does he distort it?,

(2) Are the assumptions and implications of sense-datum theory which Austin tries to expose really what he says they are?, and (3) Even if Austin's analysis against a particular opponent is sound, is it relevant against sense-datum theory in general?

The argument of the thesis seeks to establish four main points:

(1) Many of Austin's criticisms of the sense-datum use of the Argument from Illusion rest upon misstatements of the sense-datum position, and thus miss their mark. Moreover, even when Austin's criticisms have considerable merit, they are not decisive, but merely require some revision or reformulation of the sense-datum arguments. (2) Austin's analysis of "looked," "seems," and "appears," while correct as far as it goes, is incomplete; it fails to tell the whole story as regards the uses of these locutions. Supplemented and completed, it is consistent with the sense-datum analysis of the meanings of these expressions. (3) Austin's analysis of "real" is partly correct and partly incorrect. Where correct, it is consistent with a sense-datum analysis of "real." Where wrong, Austin's analysis can be corrected in a manner which is consistent both with the correct parts of Austin's analysis of "real" and the sense-datum analysis. (4) Austin's analysis of "looks," "seems," and "appears" and of "real" are inconsistent with each other as they stand in the text. Supplemented and corrected, they are consistent with each other and with sense-datum theory.

In the interstices of criticisms of Austin, many positive suggestions are made pointing to further development of sense-datum theory.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Chapter One: <u>Introduction.....</u>	1
Chapter Two: <u>What Plain Men Say and What Philosophers Think.</u>	
(1) Introduction.....	12
(2) "Material Things".....	15
(3) "Deception by the Senses".....	27
(4) "Direct" and "Indirect" Perception.....	37
(5) Two Seeming Implications.....	44
(6) Naivete.....	45
(7) Locke's Suggestio Falsi.....	46
Chapter Three: <u>The Argument from Illusions: Sense-Data and</u> <u>Abnormal Experience.</u>	
(1) Introduction.....	50
(2) Ayer's Statement of the Argument.....	55
(3) Austin's Critique.....	57
(4) Examination of Austin's Critique.....	61
(5) Illusions and Hallucinations.....	70
(6) "Privacy" and "Publicity".....	78
Chapter Four: <u>The Argument from Illusion: Sense-Data and</u> <u>Normal Experience.</u>	
(1) Ayer's Argument.....	99
(2) Austin's Critique.....	100
(3) Examination of Austin's Critique.....	103
(a) Qualitative Indistinguishability.....	103
(b) Sense-Data as Extra Objects.....	109
(4) Direct and Indirect Perception.....	111
(5) Some Traditional Problems of Sense-Data Can be Circumvented.....	123

Table of Contents

Page

Chapter Five: Sense Data and The Nature of Reality

(1) Introduction.....	126
(2) "Looks," "Seems," and "Appears".....	127
(a) "Looks".....	129
(b) "Seems," and "Appears!".....	135
(3) <u>The Nature of Reality</u> .....	151
(a) Ayer's Evaluation of the Argument from Illusion.....	151
(b) Austin's Critique.....	153
(c) Examination of Austin's Critique.....	154
(d) Austin's Critique of Ayer's Sense-Datum Distinction Between "Appearance" and "Reality".....	157
(e) Austin's Inconsistency.....	183
Bibliography.....	189

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION.

Philosophers working in the ill-defined borderlands of epistemology and metaphysics have sometimes been given to asking - and seeking answers to - some very large and, indeed, very strange questions. "Are there (really) any material objects?", "What is the nature of material objects?", and "How do we know whether there are any material objects?" are perhaps the three largest questions philosophers, at least in the English-speaking world, have concerned themselves with. And, at first glance, they would certainly appear to be three of the strangest questions anyone ever put to himself or to others. For what could be odder, one might think were one untinctured by any philosophy, than to ask seriously questions everyone already knows the answers to, or at least questions everyone knows how to go about answering. "The world is full of material things - tables and chairs and mountains and rocks and books and .... so on and on. And we know that there are such material things in the world because we can see them, touch them, sometimes smell them, hear the noises they make, and sometimes we can taste them too. As for their nature, well that's a matter for the scientists to deal with, and they are doing very well - we are finding out more and more about the world every day. Why bother with such questions anyway? Such might well be the response to the questions of the philosopher by an ordinary man - after he stopped laughing and before he turned to more important matters.

But the time spent and the ingenuity exercised by philosophers in efforts to answer these questions, or questions very similar to them, are adequate testimony to their power to engross some men, even if not the practical

man of affairs. And the bewildering variety of proffered answers, not to speak of the frequent acrimony in debates between partisans of various answers to these questions, is also adequate testimony to the difficulty of so construing such questions that it becomes clear and acceptable to nearly everyone what a genuine answer ought to look like, at least in the main.

Some philosophers, like the ordinary man, would conceive "material object" to be a blanket expression used to refer indefinitely to a wide range of such things as chairs, tables, pennies, the earth, books, pens and so on through an indefinitely long catalogue. Locke is an example. But Locke's account of the nature of material bodies as collections of the so-called primary qualities inhering in something called substance, together with his analysis of our knowledge of material bodies as consisting finally of "ideas" in the mind representing the qualities of objects, notoriously fails to allow us any perception of material objects and hence knowledge of material objects either directly or indirectly; material objects are, on such an account, rendered entirely inaccessible, and it becomes impossible in principle to know that particular claims about particular objects are true. Philosophers such as Berkeley were thus prompted to deny that there are, or even could be, anything properly called a material object, while allowing that there certainly are tables and chairs and rocks etc. Only the very weirdest philosophers, usually Germans and Asians, have ever denied the existence of both material objects and the ordinary sorts of things with which we have daily congress.

Most modern philosophers who have occupied themselves with epistemology, and particularly with the philosophical problems of perception, seem to



assume that expressions such as "material object", "material thing", and "physical object" are synonymous general designations of the class of things of which chairs, tables, books, flowers, cigarettes, pens, rocks, hands and so on are paradigmatic instances.<sup>(1)</sup> In this they agree with Locke and the ordinary man. This allows them to reduce the big questions about material objects to considerably more manageable questions about the truth, and our knowledge of the truth, of particular claims such as "This is a chair", "I see my house on the horizon", "I hear a motor-car outside" and claims similar to these. G. E. Moore, for example, argues explicitly that to establish that such claims - we will call them perceptual claims - are often true and that we very often know them to be true just is to establish the metaphysical and epistemological theses that there are indeed material objects in the world and that we know that there are.<sup>(2)</sup> Moreover, establishing that particular perceptual claims are true, and, in particular cases, are known to be true, is not a philosophical enterprise, but an empirical one, so that, for philosophical purposes, it would seem that it is always safe to take for granted that specimen perceptual claims are true. The concern of the philosopher can then be focused upon what perceptual claims mean - how, philosophically, they are to be construed and understood. And this is how we find many contemporary philosophers in the English-speaking world oriented.

It has been charged that such a progressive reduction of the scope of the professional interests of philosophers would extrude from philosophy everything that is of interest or importance about the material world and what we know of it. This charge, it can be admitted, is not entirely wrong. But it is

misguided. It assumes, what is false, that philosophers have as part of their professional equipage special techniques not available to non-philosophers for dealing with the world. But the special competence of philosophers has its locus in their trained abilities in the investigation and evaluation of arguments, statements, questions, etc., i.e., in logic - in a broad sense. And logic, whatever it is, is not a technique for dealing with the material world; logical analysis is not comparable with, for example, chemical analysis, and philosophy is clearly not a branch of physical science, nor is it a physical superscience.

It is perhaps somewhat misleading to describe, as I did above, the declension of the interests of contemporary philosophers from interest in the three large questions with which I opened this discussion to interest in the meaning of specimen perceptual claims as "a progressive reduction of the scope of the professional interests of philosophers". It would perhaps be more accurately described as a realization that since the only special techniques in philosophy are those of logical analysis, the proper subject matter of philosophy is the meanings of various sorts of locutions - perceptual claims among them. And indeed it can be argued that philosophers, or the best of them anyway, have always been engaged at the practice of logical analysis, even when they were not fully aware of it. Locke, for example, disclaims any intention to engage in "natural philosophy", but by writing in the material mode he manages to give the impression that he is embarked upon a quasi-scientific treatment of material objects and of our knowledge of them, when all the while he is actually making an analysis of the concepts of material object and knowledge

designed to show what we mean in using material object language in our perceptual claims. Thus the disputes and disagreements between, say, Locke and Berkeley can be construed as disputes over the correctness of Locke's logical analysis of a group of concepts which are part of the subject matter of epistemology and metaphysics - such notions as thinghood, perception, knowledge, physical and sensible quality etc.

In any event, contemporary philosophers have, by and large, come to agree that the proper business of philosophers in dealing with such a subject as perception is to provide an analysis of perceptual claims which will make clear what is, or can be, or must be meant by such claims. I have put in disjunctive form the statement of candidates for what an analysis lays bare because continuing meta-philosophical disputes show that the character of philosophical analysis is itself still unclear, but I cannot here enter into the matter. Even so, it is generally agreed that an analysis which casts doubt on perceptual claims which are ex hypothesi true cannot be correct; we have, at any rate, a negative test for the correctness of a particular analysis.<sup>(3)</sup>

The technical terminology in terms of which an analysis is conducted is naturally of first importance in that the vagueness or ambiguity which often results from careless definition, or careless use of language generally, are likely to be reflected promptly in analyses which falsify one's accounts or which leave one unclear about the suitability of an analysis. It is for this reason that one finds when one comes to consider the vast literature of the philosophy of perception in this century numerous, and frequently tedious, discussions of the language of the philosophical trade. In particular, the term "sense-datum"

receives considerable attention since it has been a major tool in formulating philosophical analyses in the hands of such diverse figures as G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, H.H. Price, A.J. Ayer and many others. But, for all the discussions, the term "sense-datum" (and other terms clearly intended to serve as its logical cognates, e.g., "sense-content") remains unclear. Multifarious arguments have been produced for the purpose of showing the desirability and the utility of introducing some such term as "sense-datum" into philosophical discourse, and of course all these arguments have met with opposition of one or another kind. These arguments have become so standardized and so well-known that they have acquired commonly accepted capitalized names. Some of these are the Argument from the Relativity of Perception, the Argument from Physiology, the Argument from the Ambiguity of Perceptual Verbs, and, the most famous of the family, the Argument from Illusion.

The literature abounds in claims and counter-claims, criticism and replies to criticism both with regard to the details of particular methods of introducing and utilizing some notion or other of sense-data and with regard to the feasibility of sense-datum programs as such.<sup>(4)</sup> On the whole, however, critics of sense-datum theory can be divided into two groups. There are those who in their criticism tend to sympathize, after all is said and done, with some version of sense-datum theory. The other group of critics are those who wish to call the whole sense-datum approach to philosophical analysis in question as in principle wrong from the very start.

The most important, and the most recent, member of this second group was J. L. Austin, lamentably dead at too early an age. For some years Austin

lectured in Oxford, and later in Berkeley, on the key philosophical problems of perception, and after his death his close friend and former student, Mr. G.J. Warnock, published Austin's views on perception in a book entitled Sense and Sensibilia. The book was constructed chiefly from Austin's manuscript lecture notes. Austin's main aim was to deal a death-blow to sense-datum philosophy in any form by undermining ab initio the sorts of arguments and distinctions generally considered indispensable to the sense-datumist. He is widely reputed to have succeeded. If so, his was an important and remarkable accomplishment, laying to rest a whole tradition in philosophy. The usual fate of philosophical traditions has been death by inanition rather than by knock-down argument. It is therefore an important labour to scrutinize and assay Austin's efforts, and it is to this task that the following chapters are primarily devoted.

It should be clearly noted that while in the following chapters I sometimes take Austin to task for what I think are grievous shortcomings, the actual text of Sense and Sensibilia was not, after all, prepared by Austin, but G. J. Warnock. Without doubt, Sense and Sensibilia would have been much superior to the present text had Austin lived to prepare it for publication. The contrast in quality between Sense and Sensibilia as it has come to us and the several articles Austin published during his lifetime is sufficient evidence for this view. I would not wish, therefore, to be understood as thinking that, so to speak, the historical Austin is the real Austin. But, sad as it is, the only Austin we have on the philosophical problems of perception is the Austin of the historical record, and that Austin must be treated very critically indeed. So even if, in assaying the work of the Austin of the record, I sometimes make harsh

judgements, I most emphatically do not wish to be interpreted as in any way traducing or intending to traduce the real Austin.

In his effort "to dismantle the whole (sense-datum) doctrine before it gets off the ground" (p.142)<sup>(5)</sup> Austin takes A. J. Ayer's The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge as his "chief stalking-horse in the discussion" (p.1), although he also mentions H. H. Price's Perception in passing and devotes the final section of Sense and Sensibilia to G. J. Warnock's Berkeley. He focuses his attention on these writers, and especially Ayer, because, he says, their writings are "the best available expositions of the approved reasons for holding" the theories he wants to gun for; they are fuller, more coherent and more terminologically exact than other works which he might have examined, Austin acknowledges that "the authors of these books no longer hold the theories expounded in them, or at any rate would'nt now expound them in just the same form", but he apparently believes, although he does not say so explicitly, that the essence of sense-datum philosophy is contained in the writings he is going to examine, especially Ayer's Foundations. We are thus given the impression that if Austin can successfully "dismantle" the theories of Ayer, sense-datum theory will be done in for good - no patching-up will renovate it sufficiently to make it habitable as a philosophical abode. And it is Ayer whom Austin attacks most severely. He directs a few side-swipes at Price, and his criticism of Warnock is rather like that of an indulgent father gently remonstrating an erring son.

Austin does not argue on a grand scale against sense-datum theory in order to effect his purposes, nor does he embrace and argue for an alternative doctrine, e.g., for realism. Such a course would be "no less scholastic and

erroneous" than that of the sense-datum. (p4) Instead, he employs himself at unpicking "one by one", a mass of seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies, exposing a wide variety of concealed motives - an operation which leaves us, in a sense, just where we began".(p.5) And in accordance with his stated aims and methods, we find Austin examining closely what he takes to be certain key sense-datum doctrines, particularly paying attention to what he regards as their underlying assumptions and their implications.

Because of Austin's stated intentions, a reader of Sense and Sensibilia must try to keep constantly in mind at least three basic questions which have to be asked and answered in assaying his work: (1) When it looks as if Austin is engaged only in exposition of an opponent's position, is he fair to his opponent, or does he distort things? (2) Are the assumptions and implications of sense-datum theory which Austin tries to "expose" really what Austin says they are? And (3) even if Austin's exposition and exposure is, in a particular case, accurate and correct, does it cut any ice, i.e., is it persuasive against sense-datum theory in general? If it should turn out that these questions should probably be answered in the negative, Austin's case against sense-datum philosophy must be ruled out with the Scottish verdict of "not proved". In itself this would not be a very important achievement, given its entirely negative character. It would go no way toward justifying a sense-datum approach to philosophical analysis. But in the course of scrutinizing Austin's criticisms of sense-datum theory, one almost necessarily finds himself offering positive suggestions which, if effective, would be at least a little helpful in justifying a sense-datum approach to the philosophical problems of perception.

In examining Austin's work in the following chapters, I shall focus on (1) his critique of the Argument from Illusion, (2) his analysis of "looks", "seems", and "appears", and (3) his analysis of, as he puts it, "The Nature of Reality", with special attention to his doctrine of adjectival-words. I do not attempt to offer a complete commentary on all of Sense and Sensibilia; I do not, for example, have anything to say about Austin's criticisms of Ayer's attempt to show that ordinary verbs of perception such as "see" are ambiguous such that a concept of sense-datum is, if not necessary, at least desirable as a means of avoiding ambiguity. In my view, Austin's criticisms of Ayer on this point are, on the whole, quite sound. No valuable purpose would be served by detailing the views of Ayer and Austin on this subject and recording my general agreement with Austin. Moreover, the introduction of a concept of sense-datum does not presuppose or entail such a linguistic doctrine as that of the ambiguity of verbs of perception. Ayer's use of the doctrine was rather in the nature of a modish embellishment of an older theory. Since Austin himself acknowledges this (p.102), I take the liberty of ignoring it. Nor do I take up the mass of disconnected loose ends contained in Part X of Sense and Sensibilia - Austin's remarks on doubt, incorrigibility, evidence, precision, vagueness etc. These are certainly important topics, but to deal with them would carry me far beyond the intended scope of this thesis. I do expect, however, that the work I do on the central topics I have set myself to examine will give some presentiment of how I would deal with such matters. Finally, I do not examine Austin's criticisms of Warnock. The work I do on "looks", "seems", and "appears" should, however, give some indication of how I would deal with Part XI.



NOTES: CHAPTER ONE

- (1) Vide A. J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge,

Macmillan & Co., London, 1958, p.1; H. H. Price, Perception, Methuen & Co., London, 1961, p.1; G. E. Moore, "A Defense of Common Sense" in Contemporary British Philosophy II, Muirhead Library of Philosophy, London, 1925. The material objects I have listed are taken directly from Ayer, Price, and Moore.

- (2) Vide G. E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, Allen & Unwin, London, 1953, pp.119-20, 125-6; "Proof of an External World" in Philosophical Papers, Allen & Unwin, London, 1959; and "Some Judgments of Perception", in Philosophical Studies, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1951, p. 222.

(3) G. E. Moore, for example, argues that Hume's theory of knowledge cannot be correct just because it involves an analysis of knowledge which entails, for example, that I do not now know that I am writing with a pen. Since I am fully conscious of the fact that I am writing with a pen, it follows that I know that I am writing with a pen. So Hume's analysis must be wrong. (I will not argue whether Moore was correct in his understanding of Hume since I am only using Moore as an example.)

- (4) See for example: W.H.F. Barnes, "The Myth of Sense and Data", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. XLV, 1944-45; Roderick Firth, "Sense-Data and the Percept Theory", Mind, Vols.LVIII and LIX, 1949-50; W.F.R. Hardie, "The Paradox of Phenomenalism", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1945-46; A.J. Ayer, "Phenomenalism", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1946-7; R.B. Braithwaite, "Propositions about Material Objects", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1937-38; D.G.C. MacNabb, "Phenomenalism", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1940-41; Isaiah Berlin, "Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical Statements", Mind, Vol. LIX, 1950.

- (5) For convenience references to Sense and Sensibilia are contained in parentheses immediately following a quotation when appropriate. Thus (p.2) refers to page 2 of Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford University Press, 1962, first edition.

## CHAPTER TWO

### WHAT PLAIN MEN SAY AND WHAT

### PHILOSOPHERS THINK

#### (1) INTRODUCTION

Austin's frontal assault on sense-datum theory actually begins in Part III of Sense and Sensibilia and focuses upon what he calls the illusion of the argument from illusion. (p.4) In Part II, however, he takes up the stance he is to maintain throughout the rest of the book as Tribune of the Plain Man and Nemesis of the Philosopher, and directs several of his initial blows at the opening paragraphs of Ayer's Foundations. He seems clearly to recognize that what he has to say in Part II is not fatal, but evidently he also believes that it is damaging. The main purpose of this chapter thus will be to take some of the sting out of the Austinian approach by showing that the main points Austin tries to establish in Part II against the sense-datist are either not relevant or are unfair to the sense-datist or raise matters of precision and clarity which the sense-datist can accommodate.

However, before we begin to examine Austin's moves against Ayer, I think it is important to enter a demurrer regarding Austin's formulation of the "general doctrine" he seeks to undermine, viz., that "we never see or otherwise perceive (or "sense") or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, etc.)"(p.2) Prima facie it seems obvious that this is not a formulation of a single general doctrine, but a conflation of two quite distinct doctrines. It

seems to be one thing to hold that we never see or otherwise perceive material objects, but only.....etc., and quite another thing to maintain that we never directly perceive material objects, but only.....etc. (however one explains "directly perceive"). In fact, the second alternant in Austin's formula seems to entail that we do perceive material objects, i.e., it seems to entail that we perceive material objects indirectly. And this doctrine contradicts the doctrine that we never perceive material objects. Austin, of course, must have known this, so some explanation must be sought for why he should have put the "general doctrine" in just this way. It is not hard to find an explanation: Austin later wants to deny "directly/indirectly" any legitimate function in sense-datum theory, and hence to reduce the second alternant to the first. And his reasons for wanting to do this are manifest. To hold that we never perceive material objects would be so absurdly contrary to common sense as to warrant little consideration. But more importantly, the sense-datum philosopher introduces the concept of sense-data in the first place in order (partly) to analyse and explain our perception of material objects, so that if the second doctrine can be effectively reduced to the first, sense-datum philosophy is thereby revealed to be radically incoherent: Sense-data are introduced to help explain our perception of material objects but accepting sense-data makes it impossible to say that we ever really do perceive material objects.

The demurrer I want to enter is this: Austin has subtly built into his formulation of the doctrine he wants to attack the suggestion that it is absurd. His use of "anyhow" dimly suggests that the formula

which precedes it ("we never see or otherwise perceive (or "sense").... material objects") is really only a rather careless or imprecise - but not incorrect - first approximation of "the general doctrine" and hence, via logical feedback, that the formula which follows "anyhow" really does not amount to much, if anything, more than the first formula. In this way the intuitive unacceptability of the first alternant is transferred, without argument, to the second. This, certainly, is a piece of quite unfair legerdemain.

To return to Part II: Austin begins by quoting most of the first two paragraphs of Ayer's Foundations:

It does not normally occur to us that there is any need to justify our belief in the existence of material things. At the present moment, for example, I have no doubt whatsoever that I really am perceiving the familiar objects, the chairs and table, the pictures and books and flowers with which my room is furnished; and I am therefore satisfied that they exist. I recognize indeed that people are sometimes deceived by their senses, but this does not lead me to suspect that my own sense-perceptions cannot in general be trusted, or even that they may be deceiving me now. And this is not, I believe, an exceptional attitude. I believe that, in practice, most people agree with John Locke that "the certainty of things existing in rerum natura, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs."

When, however, one turns to the writings of those philosophers who have recently concerned themselves with the subject of perception, one may begin to wonder whether this matter is quite so simple. It is true that they do, in general, allow that our belief in the existence of material things is well founded; some of them, indeed, would say that there were occasions on which we knew for certain the truth of such propositions as "this is a cigarette" or "this is a pen". But even so they are not, for the most part, prepared to admit that such objects as pens or cigarettes are ever directly perceived. What, in their opinion, we directly perceive is always an object of a different kind from these: one to which it is now customary to give the name of "sense-datum".

A contrast is drawn in this passage, Austin says, between what plain men are said to believe and what philosophers are "prepared to admit". Austin is going to "look at both sides of this contrast, and with particular care at what is assumed in, and implied by, what is actually said". (p.7) He examined the plain man's side first.

(2) "Material Things": It is, Austin says, clearly implied that the plain man believes that he perceives material things. This is "wrong straight off" (p.7) if it is taken to mean that the plain man would say that he perceives material things because "material thing" is not an expression which the ordinary man would use - nor, probably, is "perceive". (p.7) However, perhaps "material thing" is merely intended to designate the "class of things of which the ordinary man both believes and from time to time says that he perceives particular instances". (p.7) But when we ask what this class comprises, we are offered as examples "familiar objects" - chairs, tables, pictures, books, flowers, pens, cigarettes" (pp.7-8), and "material thing" is not "further defined". (p.8) But, Austin asks, does the plain man believe that what he perceives (always) are "moderate-sized specimens of dry goods"? (p.8) (Austin apparently overlooked "flowers" in characterizing Ayer's list of material things.) There are, Austin notes, many other things people say they see, hear, or smell. i.e., "perceive", e.g., "people, people's voices, rivers, mountains, flames, rainbows, shadows, pictures on the screen at the cinema, pictures in books or hung on walls, vapours, gases". (p.8) Are these all material things, Austin asks. If not, which are not and why? "No answer is vouchsafed", Austin says, because "....the expression "material thing" is

functioning already, from the very beginning, simply as a foil for "sense datum"; it is not here given, and is never given, any other role to play, and apart from this consideration it would surely never have occurred to anybody to try to represent as some single kind of things the things which the ordinary man says that he "perceives". (P.8)

Much could be written in commentary on Austin's remarks here, but I shall make merely the following seriatim observations:

(A) Austin is right in saying that "perceive" is not an expression which the ordinary man would use. I cannot, however, find that this is terribly important. Clearly "perceive" is intended as a general expression covering and incorporating in its meaning all that is meant collectively by "see", "hear", "smell" etc., words plain men do use. Insofar as it can be used to do this job, it is perfectly legitimate. Perhaps one should be hesitant about accepting Ayer's use of "perceive", but not on the ground that it is not an ordinary expression. A more reasonable ground for balking would be that "perceive" obscures too many phenomenological distinctions which a fully articulated theory of perception would have to deal with. But just insofar as it is intended and can be made to do wholesale the logical job which the various verbs of perception do retail, it is perfectly proper. At least Austin has not shown that it is improper. To do so would require more than merely pointing out that "perceive" is not an ordinary expression.

(B) Austin is also right in claiming that plain men would not say that they perceive material things, but not as Austin says, because "material thing" is not an ordinary expression. The reason that

that ordinary men would not ordinarily say that they perceive material things is that in making perceptual claims to see or hear this or that, they normally use perceptual verbs together with appropriate identificatory expressions as direct objects of the verbs in order to mark off and distinguish within the class of material things the kinds of things they claim to see or hear or smell etc. This is one of the standard uses of perceptual verbs and objects. Ordinary men rarely, if ever, have occasion to mark off the whole class of material things as a kind of thing in contrast with other kinds of things. Indeed, the tenor of Austin's remarks just is that ordinary men normally make distinctions of kind only within the class of material things, but for some reason he does not offer it as a reason why plain men would not ordinarily say that they perceive material things.

(C) "Material things", in the plural, is an ordinary expression even if the singular "material thing" is rare. "He only cares about material things" is very frequently heard in criticism of a certain type of character. To be sure, the material things referred to are usually expensive manufactured goods such as automobiles and fine clothes and the like; it would be odd indeed to criticize a man whose main passions are his first editions and the view of Vancouver's North Shore mountains by saying that he only cares for material things - mostly mountains and old books. The "material things" of moral criticism are a small class of material things which are intended to be contrasted both with "intangibles" such as friendship, intellectual and aesthetic pleasures, etc. and with other material things such as fine books, paintings, recordings of good

music etc. The man who indulges himself in enjoying the view and in collecting first editions would be doing the very sorts of things which would exempt him from the charge of moral materialism. Nevertheless, automobiles, the North Shore mountains, and first editions are all equally palpable sorts of things, i.e., they are all material things within the meaning of this perfectly ordinary phrase. They occupy a volume of space, have certain colour properties, are tangible and so on. I can think of no good reason for including in the class of material things only the sorts of things the moral materialist cares about just because the extension of the phrase is thus limited when it is used in moral criticism.

Perhaps Austin might retort that this use of "material things" came to be used in ordinary language only by seepage from philosophy. But aside from the difficulty of substantiating such a putative history of the expression, it would not appear to be relevant even if true. For the fact is that ordinary men have found "material things" an apt expression for doing a job that wants doing, and hence have legitimized it. Its origin in the mouth of a philosopher - if that was its origin - could not possibly be more unimportant.

(D) Austin's chief complaint has to do with the definition of "material thing". Ayer does give a definition in terms of the paradigm "moderate-sized specimens of dry goods" he lists, and Austin tacitly admits that Ayer does define "material thing" in complaining that the phrase is not "further defined". Austin is, of course, quite right to wonder whether, and if so, how, the extremely heterogeneous list of things



he mentions can be collected under a single rubric. And if some of the items he lists are to be excluded, which ones and why are questions which must be answered.

No answer, as Austin notes, is vouchsafed, But I should like to suggest that the reason no answer is vouchsafed is not that the expression "material thing" is functioning simply as a foil for "sense-datum". The reason no answer is vouchsafed is that Ayer's definition of "material thing" is what is called a definition-in-use, and no definition of this type can vouchsafe answers to questions about how a defined expression is to be used beyond the limits established for it by the nature of the paradigms in terms of which it is defined. Like their first-cousins, ostensive definitions, definitions-in-use always leave open the answers to questions about the latitude with which the defined expression is to be further applied. Austin is right to complain that we cannot tell from Ayer's use of "material thing" whether, e.g., shadows are to count as material things. But his diagnosis of why we cannot tell is faulty.

Even so, Austin does have a point. In Ayer's remarks "material things" does serve as a foil for "sense-datum", although not simply as a foil; sense-data are set off by contrast with material things and their (alleged) importance is thereby enhanced, Austin suggests that this is a cheat since "it would surely never have occurred to anybody to try to represent as some single kind of things the things which the ordinary man says that he "perceives" (p.8) save for the need to find a way of introducing "sense-data". Nevertheless, it by no means follows that the introduction of "sense-datum" is dependent upon such a move, that there is no non-cheating way of introducing the expression into the philosophy of

perception.

(E) I want to indicate how Austin's questions about the extension of "material thing" might be dealt with, at least preliminarily.

Although "thing" is extremely vague - indeed its vagueness is maximal - "material thing" as defined with the help of Ayer's examples is considerably less so. Like "material object" and "physical object", which are probably more common expressions in philosophy, Ayer's use of "material thing" suggests tri-dimensionality and a certain degree of stability and endurance through time as necessary conditions of somethings' being a material thing. All of Ayer's examples are of such stable, enduring three-dimensional objects. This would seem to exclude most of the items Austin asks about; people's voices and shadows are clearly not three-dimensional, and flames, rainbows, pictures (as opposed to the materials out of which they are made), and vapours (Austin's inclusion of gases along with vapours seems redundant) are not obviously the sorts of things of which it would make much sense to speak of their dimensions. Of course we can speak of the dimensions of an area containing a gas of a certain sort and in this way speak of the dimensions of a particular mass of gas. But this would be secondary, parasitic use of "dimension". Only people, mountains, and rivers in Austin's list seem to be easily includable in Ayer's list of material things if we take seriously the suggestion of tri-dimensionality and endurance as necessary conditions of material thinghood. But clearly all the things Austin lists are part of the furniture of the world, and it would seem arbitrary to exclude them on the ground that they lack or only doubtfully possess properties shared by things

serving as favored examples in philosophical discourse.

What shall we do? A number of alternatives are open to us.

(1) We can extrude from the world of material things most of the items Austin lists because they are either not three-dimensional or are of brief duration or both. (2) We can reject tri-dimensionality and endurance as necessary conditions of material thinghood and include all the things Austin lists within the concept of material thing. (3) We can try to find some distinction which will allow us to include Austin's items in the world while extruding most of them from the category of material things.

The first alternative is clearly unacceptable because, as Austin points out, people sometimes say they perceive the things he mentions, so we should have to re-introduce these items through some back-door if we are to build a theory in terms of which we can analyse our perception of all the sorts of things we say we see, hear, touch etc., i.e., perceive.

The second alternative is somewhat more visible, but still, I think, unacceptable because it would make the expression "material thing" intolerably vague; it would then apply to almost everything; if we accept people's voices as material things there is no reason why we should not buy the whole hog and include people's movements as material things as well. Intuitively, this goes against the grain, and the reason for it is not hard to find; we can identify voices and movements as people's voices and movements only via our identifications of the persons whose voices and movements they are. Voices and movements have a secondary, dependent existence and identity which, while not excluding them from the furniture

of the world, keeps them from being useful as basic items in the world. The same sorts of considerations apply to shadows. Still, we could accept this second alternative if we are prepared to pay the price of conceptual over-simplicity.

The third alternative seems to be the more likely prospect. The intuition which apparently governed Ayer's choice of examples of material things seems to me to be sound. The conceptual scheme with which we actually operate from day-to-day on the level of common sense is one in which three-dimensional objects enduring through time are fundamental. To be sure, the endurance required is relative to our sensory capacities, and there are special problems raised by skeptics about the numerical identity of such objects through time while not being continuously observed, but these are not pertinent matters here. Whether or not such a conceptual scheme is logically fundamental is one of the contentious issues in contemporary epistemology and metaphysics. But whether or not it is reducible to or alternative to some other conceptual scheme within which some other sort of item is basic, the purpose of a theory of perception is to take our actual experience and discourse as a point of departure for analysis, unless it is to be totally irrelevant. In its basics, then, such a theory will have to focus on perception of the relatively enduring three-dimensional objects which play a central role in discourse and experience, and only later is it necessary to elaborate sufficiently to take into account our perception of non-three-dimensional or non-enduring things, and this is what Ayer, quite properly, does. Certainly, for any revisionist or reductionist theory this would be the best tactic since the really hard-core

material for reduction or revision is furnished by just this fact - that the central role in discourse and experience is played by enduring three-dimensional objects.

Accordingly, we can divide the material world into basic and non-basic, primary and secondary, independent and dependent material items. Perspicuous terminology is hard to come by here, and I have not been able to think of two labels which will enable me to mark the distinction as elegantly as might be desired. But for the purposes at hand, "material thing", "material object", and "physical object" will serve indifferently to refer to the class of enduring three-dimensional objects of the sort which have been mentioned, and we can consign to the category of material phenomena the shadows, rainbows, vapours etc. Austin asks about. In the history of philosophy "phenomena" has usually been defined as "all those things which come to be known through the senses rather than through intuition etc." and hence include material objects, but for present purposes I hope I may be permitted to define "phenomena" negatively and roughly as all those things, events, aspects etc. of the world which are perceivable by the senses and which are not enduring and three-dimensional.

The exact relation of particular material phenomena as thus roughly defined to material things or objects will vary. Some will be collections of material objects; rainbows, for example, are collections of drops of water suspended in the air through which rays of the sun are refracted. Similarly, vapours or gases are diffuse collections of very small three-dimensional material objects suspended in the air. Others

will not be collections of material objects but will be in some way or other the perceivable results of some temporary relation in which some material objects stand to one another; shadows, for example, are dark spaces within an area from which rays from a source of light have been shut out by the interposition of an opaque material object. Still others will be the perceivable results of some process being undergone by some material object or collection of material objects; flames, for example, are burning gases. Yet others, such as people's voices, will be the perceivable results or products of the motions of material objects, or, as with pictures, of the arrangement of material things by an agent.

There are, no doubt, many sorts of very complicated relations of material phenomena to material objects which have not occurred to me, and also, no doubt, there are cases which I or anyone should be hard put to classify because of ignorance of the nature of the cases. But enough has been said, I think, to establish prima facie that there is a distinction to be made between basic and non-basic material items in the world within the conceptual scheme with which we operate at the level of common sense. Non-basic items are those "things" which cannot exist independently of some relatively enduring three dimensional body or group of bodies. They exist, so to speak, only at the sufferance of material objects. The basic items, material objects, can exist without, for example, entering into the collection which makes up a rainbow or without entering into the relation of objects which produce a particular shadow and so on.

However it should be stressed that what I have been calling "basic items" are basic for common sense. It is an important but contingent fact that sight and touch are our dominant modes of perception, and it seems to be for this reason that what I have been calling "basic items" are pragmatically the most useful for common sense as basic items. Sight and touch are for us of overwhelming practical importance, and this fact seems to be reflected in ordinary language and thought about the world, Shadows and sounds and odours and voices and the like are the shadows, sounds, odours or voices of what I have called basic items, i.e., things with which we are primarily acquainted by sight and touch. The preposition orients us toward basic items, i.e., toward the enduring three-dimensional things which are so important for us because of the central role in our lives of sight and touch. And also, no doubt, it is the extreme importance for us of sight and touch that has prevented us from democratizing the language of perception by placing all the senses on a level and introducing feels and looks as internal accusatives of touching and seeing in the same way that sounds, odours, and flavours are internal accusatives of hearing, smelling, and tasting. Such a thing would be so uneconomical as to tend to frustrate us in doing the practical jobs we do in using perceptual language.

But we ought not to allow the overwhelming practical importance of sight and touch and of our current language of perception to become an overweening theoretical consideration in the philosophy of perception.

To do so would be to cut ourselves off at the very beginning from the

possibility that sense-datum philosophy can throw new light on the nature of our common sense beliefs about the world, by providing us with a set of internal accusatives for each sensory faculty which can serve as handy material for both of what P.F. Strawson calls revisionary and descriptive metaphysics.

The point of, and my justification for, departing these last several pages from straightforward exposition and examination of Part II of Sense and Sensibilia is this: Austin has offered as his general opinion of sense-datum doctrine that it is a "typically scholastic view" attributable in large part to a "constant obsessive repetition of the same small range of jejune "examples". (p.3) It is part of his complaint that Ayer and philosophers like him seldom or never discuss seeing flames, hearing voices, smelling vapours etc. They focus their attention on "jejune" examples of perception of pens, tables and chairs, rocks etc. The questions he raises about voices, gases, flames, shadows, etc. are intended by Austin to illustrate and support this point. I want to suggest that while Austin's protest has the merit of recalling to our attention the fact that there are more things in heaven and earth than are usually mentioned in sense-datum philosophy, it nevertheless is wide of the mark. The reason, it seems to me, sense-datum philosophers have tended to concentrate for their examples on seeing chairs and tables and the like is simply that these are the sorts of stable and enduring three-dimensional things which figure as basic items in our common sense conceptual scheme and which, prima facie, will be the hardest cases to manage. We cannot even hope to begin getting clear about things like shadows without also getting clear about the sorts of



things which cast shadows. Or, at least, this should have been their reason if it was not in actual fact their reason. It is with good reason that common sense has it that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. No doubt the world of rainbows, shadows, people's voices, motion pictures, (not to speak of elusive bitterns) is richer and more redolent than the sparsely furnished world of the study. But it is for that very reason initially less amenable to the methods of study the philosopher has available. The sorts of cases of perception of material things Ayer and like-minded philosophers focus on are far from being jejune; they are the proper begin-all of the philosophy of perception.

(3) "Deception by the Senses": Austin raises some interesting and important points about deception. Ayer has said that although we are sometimes deceived by our senses, we believe that, in general, our sense-perceptions can be trusted. But it is important to note, Austin says, that "deceived by our senses" is a metaphor, and that the same metaphor is "taken up by the expression 'veridical' and taken very seriously." (p.11) Actually, "our senses are dumb" - they "do not tell us anything, true or false." And the unexplained introduction by Ayer of "a quite new creation" "sense-perceptions" - compounds the troubles introduced by the metaphor. "These entities.....are brought in with the implication that whenever we "perceive" there is an intermediate entity always present and informing us about something else - the question is, can we or can't we trust what it says? Is it "veridical"? (p.11) To put matters this way, according to Austin, is to soften up the plain man's views, preparing the way for "the so-called philosophers' view" by practically attributing it to the plain man.

Next, it is important to keep in mind that "talk about deception only makes sense against a background on general non-deception....It must be possible to recognize a case of deception by checking the odd case against more normal ones." (p.11) As examples of sense and nonsense in this regard he offers the examples of being deceived by a petrol-gauge and by a crystal ball. The first case is easily understood; the pointer might indicate that we have two gallons in the tank when it is almost empty. We can check out our gauge and discover whether it is accurate. But in the second case we have'nt the faintest idea what not being deceived by a crystal ball would be like. So we have no way of checking-out our crystal ball.

Unfortunately Austin does not clearly connect his point about the conditions of talking sense about deception with anything he says subsequently. However, a tie-in can, I think, be made. His next point is that the cases in which a plain man might say that he was deceived by his senses are "not at all common." (p.12) Plain men would especially not say that they are deceived by their senses in cases of ordinary perspective, seeing themselves in a mirror, or in dreams. In such cases, Austin says, plain men are "hardly ever deceived at all." This is important because of the false suggestion by the philosopher that when he cites these as cases of "illusion" he is either mentioning cases plain men concede to be instances of deception by the senses, or at least, only extending the concept of deception a little beyond what plain men would concede. And this, Austin says, is far from true. The connection between Austin's previous point and this one seems to be something like this: Cases of ordinary perspective

such as when we look down a straight road and seem to see its parallel edges converging at a distant point cannot legitimately be counted as cases of deception by the senses first because we are hardly ever deceived by such phenomena, and second because there is no contrast to be drawn in such a case between sense-perceptions being deceptive and their not being deceptive - we cannot look down the road and see that its edges do not converge; we always see straight roads as having converging edges. If seeing a road taper to a point is to count as having a deceptive sense-perception, we should have to be able to contrast it with a non-deceptive sense-perception in which we look down a road and do not see it tapering to a point. And we cannot do this. Similar points can be made about seeing ourselves in a mirror in which the image exhibits a left-right reversal. We are rarely, if ever, deceived about the relation of the left to the right sides of our bodies by such mirror-images, and we cannot obtain a second, non-deceptive image in which there is no such reversal which we can contrast with our first deceptive perception.<sup>(1)</sup>

Austin's final points in this section are that it would be gravely erroneous to accept the suggestion that plain men regard all the cases which they do accept as deception by the senses "as being of just the same kind. .... Sometimes plain man would prefer to say that his senses were deceived rather than that he was deceived by his senses - the quickness of the hand deceives the eye, etc." (pp.12-13) There are many cases in which it would be "typically scholastic" to try to decide whether they are cases of deception by the senses, but "even the plainest of men would want to distinguish (a) cases where the sense-organ is deranged or abnormal or in

some way not functioning properly; (b) cases where the medium - or more generally, the conditions - of perception are in some way abnormal or off-colour; and (c) cases where a wrong inference is made or a wrong construction is put on things, e.g., on some sound that he hears. (Of course these cases do not exclude each other,") (p.13) Moreover, Freudian oversights, mis-readings etc. do not seem to fit anywhere in this scheme. So, once more, there is no simple dichotomy between things going right and things going wrong, and no good reason for thinking that the way things go wrong can be classified in any simple way. And certainly there is no reason to attribute to the plain man the view that when he is being deceived by his senses he is not perceiving material things or is perceiving something unreal or immaterial. "Looking....at a distant village on a very clear day across a valley, is a very different kettle of fish from seeing a ghost or from having D.T's, and seeing pink rats."(p.14)

(A) Austin is later going to raise connected issues about illusion and delusion, and I will deal with these issues more fully in the following two chapters on the Argument from Illusion. But at least some preliminary work can be done here.

Austin is quite right that "deceived by the senses" is a metaphor and that this metaphor is taken up by "veridical" and that together with "sense-perceptions" they suggest that in perception there is always an intermediate entity informing or misinforming us about something else. And no doubt this suggestion is reinforced by talk about direct and indirect perception. Even more so, talk about mediate and immediate perception - two other favored philosophical expressions - tends to insinuate this

view. Sense-datatists often speak as though we are somehow imprisoned behind an impenetrable curtain the features of which we can perceive perfectly well ("directly") and on the basis of which we can infer sufficiently well enough for our purposes the existence and nature of whatever lies on the other side of the curtain. And it has been one of the most strenuously stressed objections to sense-data (I take it that Ayer's "sense-perceptions" in his introductory paragraphs are essentially sense-data.) that to accept them as well as material objects is to turn one world into two.

The gravamen of Austin's warning about the metaphorical character of "deceived by the senses" (and "veridical") seems to be that Ayer is unaware of the metaphor and as a consequence accepts sense-data ("sense-perceptions" in Ayer's language at this point) as interposed entities standing between us and the material world. He calls this "the so-called philosophers' view" and, at least implicitly, attributes it to Ayer. In justice to Ayer it should be pointed out that a great part of the Foundations is directed precisely at rejecting sense-data as interposed entities. Over one hundred pages - the final two chapters - are expended on just this task. The view which Austin describes as "the so-called philosophers' view" fits most naturally into what traditionally is called the representative theory of perception. It might be argued that Ayer's theory of sense-data is reducible to a view of sense-data as representative entities, but this ought not to be palmed off on the reader without argument.

(B) Although "deceived by the senses" is a metaphor which, if not handled carefully, can seduce us into thinking of the senses as

messengers informing us of events we cannot witness first-hand, it need not do so. Metaphors are generally dangerous if we are not conscious of them or if there are no well-known and fairly specific conventions for their use or if the context in which they are uttered does not make clear what is being asserted. Under these conditions we neither mean what we say nor say what we mean when a metaphor occurs in our statements. But this sort of cul de sac can be avoided in the case of most metaphors. When it cannot, we condemn ourselves to talking nonsense or poetry if we continue to use the metaphor.

Let us call those metaphors which we can use without serious danger of falling into unintelligibility "dispensable metaphors". Those which cannot be dispensed with are the really dangerous metaphors. What I mean by saying that a metaphor can be dispensed with is simply that the claims to truth of the statements in which such a metaphor occurs can be wholly preserved when the statement is replaced with another statement or set of statements the component parts of which are used literally to do the same job - to make the same claims to truth. For example, during the American Rebellion a prominent scoundrel, Benjamin Franklin, is reported to have counselled his fellows by saying, "Gentlemen, unless we hang together we shall assuredly hang separately." In this remark, "hang together" is a dispensable metaphor. Franklin could have made his point by speaking less compendiously of the likely results of failure to agree on and act together in the conduct of the rebellion. And his hearers understood perfectly well the cognitive content of his assertion because they could have produced for themselves a statement in non-metaphorical language which asserted the same thing.

Examples of indispensable metaphors - those the occurrence of which cannot be dispensed with by replacing the statements in which they occur by another statement or set of statements which preserves the claim to truth or the original statement - are not easy to come by in ordinary language. The reason is very simple. By a sort of principle of economy in communication we frequently resort to metaphorical expressions as compendious ways of saying what otherwise would require uneconomical circumlocution. But indispensable metaphors cannot serve this function, and hence are uncommon in ordinary language; a sort of natural selection tends to weed them out whenever they crop up in discussion. But indispensable metaphors abound in philosophy. A single example must suffice here. Locke was particularly guilty of resorting to such metaphors. His doctrine of abstract ideas is a good example. Locke's doctrine is that the mind makes abstract ideas by separating and considering apart from each other the various qualities or modes of things which do not actually exist apart from each other in nature. Berkeley, quite correctly, criticizes Locke's doctrine as having its source in linguistic error.<sup>(3)</sup> The doctrine of abstract ideas is, he says, an instance of the mistake of speaking of the operations of the mind "in terms borrowed from sensible ideas."<sup>(4)</sup> The indispensably metaphorical character of Locke's doctrine is shown by Berkeley by pointing out that we cannot imagine, for instance, motion without imagining a moving body. But this is required by Locke's doctrine if we are to take it literally. The metaphor of "separating" qualities from each other is indispensable for Locke because if we replace statements in which it occurs with literal statements about our power to imagine motion

without imagining a moving body, the claim to truth of the doctrine in its metaphorical formulation cannot be preserved.

Now, what about "deceived by our senses"? Is it a dispensable or an indispensable metaphor? As Austin himself points out, it is a common metaphor - one used in common speech. Indeed, it is what some grammarians call a sleeping metaphor - one of which we are likely to be usually, but not always, unaware. But that a metaphor is common is itself fairly strong evidence that it is dispensable, and "deceived by the senses" is, I think, fairly clearly dispensable. It is commonly used when someone mis-identifies or misdescribes something he perceives. Austin himself points out three (not necessarily exclusive) causal conditions of such errors, viz., derangement of the sense-organs, abnormal or off-colour conditions of perception (eg. bad light, too great a distance for accurate identification or description, inappropriate angle of vision etc.) and wrong inferences made from a sound or shape and the like.. Under such conditions one might mis-identify an after-image as a ring imagine projected onto the wall or hallucinatory pink rats as real rats or misdescribe an oval dinner-platter as round or attribute the sound one hears to a distant train when actually it comes from a distant boiler factory and so on. In such cases, when one discovers one's error, one might well diagnose the trouble by saying, "Well, I thought it was such and such but I was wrong. I was deceived by my senses". Here "deceived by my senses" does double duty. It tends to exempt one from blame for making a mistake - I wasn't careless or inattentive; any sensible person with his wits about him could have made the same mistake in



the circumstances - and it makes an indefinite reference to a range of causal conditions which prompted the mistake and which, if known, would explain why one went wrong. Responsibility for the mistake is shifted from one's self to something else over which one had no control. If we were really keen in a particular case about what went wrong and why, we could easily dispense with the metaphor and come up with a literal description-cum-explanation. There is, in fact, a branch of scientific psychology concerned with doing just this. But because context frequently enables us to apprise ourselves quickly and accurately of the nature of perceptual errors we usually have no need to go through such a procedure and are content to let sleeping metaphors lie. And this is perfectly proper.

Certainly Austin's insinuation that the metaphor in "deceived by the senses" necessarily implicates us in a two-world view is ill-warranted. He calls such a view "the so-called philosopher's view", but clearly, while one philosophical theory of perception - the representative theory - is a two-world view, non-representative theories such as phenomenalism need not be. Certainly, Austin has not shown that the metaphor in "deceived by the senses" is indispensable for the sense-datists.

(C) When Austin notes that the cases in which the plain man would say he was deceived by his senses are not at all common and that e.g., in ordinary cases of perspective plain men are hardly ever deceived, his point seems to be that no case should be cited as a case of deception by the senses unless someone actually is deceived. He rejects as a suggestio falsi the implication that when the philosopher collects mirror-images, dreams, and normal perspective under the catch-all phrase "illusion" he is

merely citing cases which plain men would call or concede to be cases of deception by the senses. A similar criticism of the philosophers' use of "delusory" occurs when he comes to examine the Argument from Illusion. These matters must await sorting out and discussion in the next two chapters. But at this juncture it can be said, fairly, I think, that as they stand Austin's statements are merely objections to the philosophers' use of "illusion" and "deceived by the senses" in regard to such things as ordinary perspective. They go no way at all toward raising suspicions as to the legitimacy of introducing the concept of sense-datum via the sorts of cases Austin and the plain man would agree to be cases of illusion and deception by the senses. And this, after all, is one of the chief interests of the philosopher in these matters. As they stand Austin's demurrers ought only to prompt a sense-datum philosopher to display considerably more assiduity and care in formulating his doctrine. No doubt this would be all to the good.

Even so, Austin's objections to the philosophers' use of "deceived" by the senses" in regard to such things as ordinary perspective are not unexceptionable even on the level on which they can be considered relevant objections. It is true that the cases in which a plain man might say that he was deceived by his senses are uncommon. Fortunately cases of actual deception by the senses are relatively rare, although circumstances are conceivable under which they might become very much more common. It is the relative statistical rarity of actual cases of deception by the senses which make it true that plain men do not say they are deceived by their senses when they look down a long straight road and seem to see it tapering to a

point. In such cases they normally have independent knowledge acquired prior to the occasion that roads do not thus taper. But Austin concedes all that the philosopher really needs when he says that in such cases plain men are "hardly ever" (p.12) deceived. The fact that they could be or perhaps even certainly would be "deceived by their senses" but for independent knowledge of the phenomenon is what justifies the philosopher in refusing to allow his use of this phrase to be governed entirely by the usage of the phrase by plain men to refer only to cases in which error actually occurs.

But it is true, as Austin rightly insists, that there has to be some limit to the application of the phrase - some contrast between deceptive and non-deceptive cases - if the phrase is not to become meaningless. The proper way of understanding the contrast is a large part of sense-datum theory and will be dealt with in Chapter V.

(4) "Direct" and "Indirect" Perception: Shifting his attention to the second side of the contrast he says Ayer has drawn, i.e., to what the philosopher thinks, viz., that such objects as pens or cigarettes are never directly perceived, Austin concentrates on the meanings of "directly" and "indirectly."

Ayer has said that what we always directly perceive are sense-data. "Directly perceive" is "glibly trotted out" by Ayer as though we were familiar with it, in its philosophical use, already, and it is given no explanation or definition. But certainly, in its ordinary use, "it is not only false but simply absurd to say that such objects as pens or cigarettes are never perceived directly". (p.19) What we have here is, Austin says, a typical

case of a word which has certain very special uses in ordinary language being stretched by the philosopher beyond all limits until it becomes "first perhaps obscurely metaphorical, but ultimately meaningless." (p.15)

In coming to understand the proper uses of "direct" and "indirect" it is necessary to realize that it is "indirectly" which "wears the trousers". (p.15) Whatever sense "directly" has it gets from its contrast with "indirectly," and this word has a use only in cases of a special sort, and moreover it has different uses in different cases. It is, in cases of perception, most naturally at home with the sense of sight, and it is associated with "the notion of a kink in direction" (p.16); we thus can contrast seeing something directly with seeing it indirectly through a periscope or in a mirror, i.e., between looking straight at something and looking at it obliquely with the aid of an instrument. But for this very reason, "seeing you... through binoculars or spectacles is certainly not a case of seeing you indirectly at all." (p.16) There is here no kink in the angle of vision.

When we come to senses other than sight, the notion of indirect perception has no clear sense at all. "Hearing indirectly" means being told something by someone, but this is not indirect perception. What about hearing echoes? Do we hear a sound indirectly when hearing an echo? Or do we touch or feel things indirectly when we touch them with a pole? What could smelling indirectly possibly be? Questions like these show that "there seems to be something badly wrong with the question. Do we perceive things directly or not?", where perceiving is evidently intended to cover the employment of any of the senses." (p.17)

It is, Austin says, extremely doubtful how far the notion of indirect perception can or should be pushed. An apparent necessary condition for applying the concept is the concurrent existence and concomitant variation as between what is being perceived straightforwardly and the indirectly perceived thing. So perhaps in talking on the telephone we hear someone's voice indirectly. But then seeing photographs or films which record past events are thus ruled out as cases of indirect perception. A line has to be drawn somewhere because we are not prepared to speak of indirect perception in every case in which we infer the existence of something from something else which we perceive straightforwardly, e.g., "we should not say we see the guns indirectly, if we see in the distance only the flashes of guns." (p.17)

Finally, it is important to see that if we are going to speak seriously of indirect perception, it would seem that whatever is perceived indirectly has to be the sort of thing we sometimes just perceive or could perceive or, like the back of our heads, something which someone else could perceive directly. Otherwise we do not want to say that it is perceived at all, even indirectly, although its signs or effects might be as in the case of the sort of things the traces of which we see in a Wilson cloud-chamber. Moreover, there is little real point in ever using the expression "indirect perception" in cases in which we can be said to perceive indirectly; a cash value expression is to be preferred. We should prefer to be told that you see something in a mirror or through a periscope than that you see it indirectly.

So we can see that Ayer sins against the canons of usage; he

apparently places no restrictions of the use of "direct/indirect" either with regard to any of the senses or any of the circumstances in which it is to be used, and what we are said by Ayer to perceive indirectly - material things - apparently are not the sorts of things which in principle could be perceived directly. A few lines later Ayer asks "Why may we not say that we are directly aware of material things?" and says that the answer is given by the "argument from illusion." Perhaps, Austin says, the answer will help us to understand the question, and accordingly he turns to an examination of this argument.

(A) My own handling of "direct/indirect" comes up in chapter four. Even so, Austin's and Ayer's treatment of "direct" and "indirect" perception requires brief notice here.

(B) First, and trivially, it should be pointed out that Austin's censure of Ayer for having "glibly trotted out" the expression "directly perceive" without explanation or definition is a trifle unjust. It makes it appear as though Ayer had introduced the expression without a "by your leave" and then proceeded on his way, leaving it to the reader to puzzle-out what is meant by it. But this is only trivially true. It is true only in the sense that Ayer does not attempt an explanation of "directly perceive" at its first occurrence. But it is clear that Ayer is only reporting a conclusion of sense-datum theory, viz., that we directly perceive sense-data, not material objects. This is not a starting point of sense-datum theory from which argument proceeds and hence the occurrence of "directly perceived" for the first time here is not an introduction of the expression which Ayer has trotted out in the sense in which one does and ought to trot out one's

special technical vocabulary early in the game before using it in argument. It is not an uncommon stylistic device to state conclusions (which may contain special terminology) before the arguments (in which the terminology is introduced) for the conclusion are stated. And this is all Ayer has done as any examination of the subsequent text will show. Austin's criticism seems to be more literary than philosophical.

(C) It is, I should think, clear that Austin's analysis of the ordinary uses of "direct" and "indirect" is sound. One wonders, however, why Austin does not examine what Ayer has to say about the ordinary uses of these expressions, especially since Ayer's analysis is extremely dubious and would have provided Austin with considerable ammunition. Immediately after complaining that although the philosophers' use of "directly perceive" is not the ordinary use, "we are given no explanation of definition of this new use.....", a numerical superscription calls our attention to a footnote which reads "Ayer takes note of this, rather belatedly, on pp. 60-61." Without Austin's manuscript lecture-notes available for examination it is impossible to tell whether this footnote has its source in some comment by Austin himself, or if it was merely added by G.J. Warnock. In any case, Austin can be faulted for nowhere subsequently adverting to Ayer's comments on the meaning of "directly perceive" (etc.).

(We can ignore the fact that in the passage referred to by the footnote Ayer is discussing the phrase "directly aware" since it is clear that "aware" and "awareness" are only synonyms for "perceive" and "perception" for Ayer at this point. He later distinguishes awareness from perception and confines his use of "perception" to talk about perceiving material objects.)

Had Austin looked at Ayer's remarks he should have had to concede that he and Ayer have no quarrel at all over whether material objects are ever directly perceived in any ordinary or familiar use of this expression. Ayer not only admits, but insists that we directly perceive material objects in any ordinary sense of "directly perceive". His own explanation of the ordinary use of this phrase is that we directly perceive any material thing if our belief in the existence of the thing is "based on sense-experience" and does not "involve any conscious process of inference." As an analysis of the meaning of "directly perceive" as it might ordinarily be used, this is just wrong, and Austin's analysis is much to be preferred. Austin and Ayer could quarrel over whether Ayer has laid bare a necessary but not sufficient condition for the application of "directly perceive" to a particular case, but such a quarrel would be just that - a quarrel over the conditions for the correct ordinary use of "directly perceive" in or of perceptual situations.

Ayer, however, makes it clear that whatever may be said of "direct perception" in any ordinary sense, this expression in philosophy is a correlative of the expression "sense-datum" and that each expression is used in a special technical sense requiring explanation. He points out that it would be unsatisfactory merely to define one in terms of the other: Sense-data are the objects which one perceives directly. Another method such as that of giving examples is first necessary. It is part of the job of the argument from illusion to help do this. If Austin had dealt with this passage he would have had either to face the charge that his analysis of the conditions for a proper ordinary use of "direct/indirect" is strictly irrelevant to the



philosophers' concerns since the philosophers' technical use of these words does not compete with or even supplement or extend the ordinary uses of these words, or he would have had to argue, very dubiously, that it is impermissible to use ordinary words in special or technical senses or at least that it is impermissible to do so in philosophy. He could not have argued, it seems to me, that his analysis of the ordinary conditions for use of "direct" and "indirect" is relevant to an examination of the philosophers' use of these words because the philosophers' use really is in competition with the ordinary use. To be in competition the philosopher and the plain man would have to be playing the same game, so to speak; their respective uses of these words would have to be moves in the same game. But clearly whenever a plain man would say, if he ever would, that he perceives such-and-such directly, no matter what cash-value "directly" might be construed to have, the statement or claim that is made will be an empirical one, a statement or claim to fact. But the philosopher who thinks he perceives directly only sense-data in the very same case does not for that reason expect to see or otherwise perceive anything at all different from what the plain man perceives, nor is he making any claim about the angle of his vision or the like. His contention is not an empirical one and hence does not compete with that of the plain man; it does not deny or imply the denial of anything the plain man asserts.

Perhaps Austin may not have bothered himself with what Ayer has to say in this passage because he thought that his subsequent criticisms of sense-datum theory would be sufficiently powerful to knock out for good any attempt to introduce the concept of sense-datum. Any additional criticism of its correlative, "direct perception," would thus be supererogatory. But if this

was Austin's reason for ignoring what Ayer has to say about "direct perception", the relevance of Austin's analysis of the ordinary uses of "direct/indirect" remains unclear. Certainly Austin does not produce even the shred of an argument to show the connection there must be between the philosophers' use of "direct/indirect" and the ordinary uses if his analysis is to have any point.

Final Remarks: I have dealt at length with what Austin has to say in criticism of Ayer's use of "material thing", "deceived by the senses" and "directly/indirectly perceive" because these seem to me to be the really important points raised in Part II of Sense and Sensibilia. Austin does attempt to score a number of other points against Ayer, but none of them seem to me at all damaging. I therefore wish to deal with them rather summarily. Hopefully, my treatment of them will sufficiently adumbrate the fuller treatment which could be offered here. My numbering will be continuous.

(5) Two Seeming Implications: Ayer's remarks seem to imply, Austin says, "(a) that when the ordinary man believes that he is not perceiving material things, he believes he is being deceived by his senses; and (b) that when he believes he is being deceived by his senses, he believes that he is not perceiving material things." (p.8) Both implications are wrong. Austin's counter-example to (a) is seeing rainbows, and to (b) seeing a ship at sea which looks farther away than it actually is.

(A) Austin seems to me to be right here. Ayer's remarks do seem to suggest, although only weakly, the implications Austin draws from them. However, I do not see that this is damaging. Certainly, neither Ayer

nor any other sense-datist is committed to defending the two implications Austin uncovers either as statements of what plain men believe or as statements which pair-off proper alternatives.

(6) Naivete: Next, Austin says, it is "rather delicately hinted" (p.9) that the plain man is a bit naive. This "hint" is effected by Ayer's statement that it "does not normally occur" to the plain man that his belief in the existence of material things needs justifying, with its implication that this belief does need justifying and that this would occur to a more reflective person. Although he is ostensibly only describing the plain man's position, Ayer's language is actually doing "a little quiet undermining" of the plain man's position. (p.9)

(A) This is hardly a criticism. Plain men are naive. This does not mean that they are incompetent in making perceptual judgments or that philosophers, being more reflective, are better situated for making perceptual judgments. But it does mean that plain men are not sufficiently well-armed against certain well-known skeptical arguments designed to raise general doubt about the reliability of the senses. Plain men are philosophically artless. This seems to me to be more the tenor of Ayer's remarks than the view that Austin would attribute to him, viz., that the plain man's belief in the existence of material things does need justifying. Indeed, Ayer's statement that philosophers do allow that the plain man's belief is well founded suggests that the plain man's belief does not need justifying. One does not need to justify a well founded belief. But such beliefs may well need the sort of analysis which will help us - we are all plain men

most of the time - to see through the sorts of arguments which call our beliefs into doubt. Austin's charge that Ayer is intentionally engaged in "a little quiet undermining" of the plain man's position seems to me to be totally at variance with the text. Part of Ayer's purpose in writing the Foundations was just to give an analysis of sense-perception which will exhibit the nature of perceptual claims in a way which will enable us to resist the sorts of arguments the skeptic gets us to buy in order to convince us against our wills that sense-perception cannot generally be trusted. This might be called "justifying" our ordinary beliefs, but if so, it is only the negative sort of justification which permits an initial presumption of innocence to stand. It is not the sort of justification in which evidence of innocence is adduced. It may turn out that in the end sense-datum philosophy undermines the plain man's position, but this is not the purpose of sense-datum philosophy, and if it does have this effect, this requires demonstrating.

(7) Locke's Suggestio Falsi: Ayer's statement also implies, according to Austin, that there is room for doubt about the existence of material things even if plain men feel no doubt. Locke's statement, quoted by Ayer, as one most people would agree with, contains a false suggestion, viz., "...that when, for instance, I look at a chair a few yards in front of me in broad daylight, my view is that I have (only) as much certainty as I need, and can get that there is a chair and that I see it." (p.10) But the plain man would reject this suggestion as "plain nonsense; he would say, quite correctly, "Well, if that's not seeing a real chair than I don't know what is." (p.10)

Moreover, although the plain man's belief is the general reliability of the senses is implicitly contrasted with the philosophers' view, it turns out that the philosophers' view is not really just a disagreement about the degree to which the senses can be trusted, for philosophers "really maintain that what the plain man believes to be the case is really never the case - what, in their opinion, we directly perceive is always an object of a different kind." The philosopher is not really going to argue that things go wrong more often than the unwary plain man supposes, but that in some sense or some way he is wrong all the time. (p.10)

(A) The general lines of an evaluation of Austin's criticism is contained in (3) and (5) above. But Austin is right to this extent: The quotation from Locke can be construed to suggest that unfortunately we are so framed that the best we can practically hope to get in the situation described by Austin is some low degree of practical certitude which still leaves room for real doubt. But it need not be read that way, and would not be so construed by sense-datum philosophy in its phenomenalist form. Quite the contrary; the phenomenalist would reject the insinuation that there is some set of logically ideal conditions of perception which somehow escapes our grasp (because of our "frame") even in looking at something in broad daylight, so that we are condemned to perpetual uncertainty in every perceptual situation. Phenomenalism is not in intention a species of Hume's "unmitigated skepticism," and if, in the end, it should turn out to be nothing more than this, this would require showing. Austin has, it seems to me, again tickled out of Ayer's statements putative implications when read in the

context of sense-datum/phenomenalist philosophy or which run directly counter to the aims of sense-datum philosophy.

In sum, it seems to me that only this can be said of Austin's attempt thus far to "dismantle" sense-datum theory: At best Austin has succeeded in illustrating that Ayer is somewhat careless, imprecise, or unclear in his use of language - a serious charge against any philosopher. But he has not offered even a whiff of evidence that these vices are endemic to the sense-datist enterprise, although, clearly, Austin intends that we should draw this conclusion. He has not shown that the considerations he raises force us to remove even a single brick from the edifice of sense-datum theory. He has not even shown that Ayer's so-called carelessness is required to establish Ayer's case as Austin clearly thinks it is. At worst, Austin is quite unfair to Ayer. After all, only so much can be said with any precision in two short introductory paragraphs even by so pellucid a writer as A.J. Ayer.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II

(1) Austin's example of dreams presents special problems which I do not know quite how to handle here. Clearly dreams are not analogous to seeing in perspective or seeing mirror-images so that it is difficult to see how Austin could extend to dreams the kinds of points he makes about deception in relation to perspective or seeing mirror-images. However, I would hazard the conjecture that Austin's view might be that in dreaming one is not perceiving at all so that the notion of being deceived by the senses cannot get even a toe-hold in the case of dreams.

(2) Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, XVI.

(3) Berkeley, Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge, XVIII.

(4) Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, CXLIV.

## CHAPTER THREE

### The Argument from Illusion:

#### Sense-Data and Abnormal Experience.

(1) Introduction: A reader of Sense and Sensibilia is likely to find himself so preoccupied with the details of Austin's arguments that he loses sight of their relevance (or lack of relevance) to the general purposes of the philosophy of perception and of sense-datum theory in particular. One is particularly apt to fail in this way when one comes to consider Austin's criticisms of the so-called argument from illusion in Parts III and V of Sense and Sensibilia. Austin's piecemeal method of analysis and his studied anti-theoretical bias easily induce his readers to overlook the philosophical context which bestows upon the argument from illusion whatever importance and purpose it might have. As a consequence one finds himself assenting to much of what Austin has to say but failing to ask the basic questions which I raised in Chapter I. (p.10)

Those questions cannot be asked, much less answered, without keeping in view the philosophical landscape as viewed from the highground of the over-all purposes of the philosophy of perception and of sense-datum theory in particular. It is, I think, therefore strategically desirable at this point to state somewhat generally and briefly something of my over-all assessment of Austin's attack on the argument from illusion before entering into any detailed examination of it. For this purpose it is necessary to make some very general remarks on the general aims of the philosophy of perception.

The concerns and motives of traditional philosophers in dealing



with perception have been a mixed lot at best, but historically two concerns stand out as having been paramount: To avoid radical skepticism with regard to the senses and to show how our knowledge of the world can be said to be "based on (sense) experience."

Ordinary doubts can usually be fairly easily laid to rest or shown to be legitimate by perfectly mundane methods. But the radical skeptic tries to call in question the whole practice of making perceptual claims or judgments even though he would confess that he himself made such claims or judgments and could not avoid doing so. Nowadays such general skepticism is no longer considered much of a bother. When it appears it seems more a ghost from the past than a substantial problem. But the set of philosophical problems originally raised by skepticism has won an autonomous life for itself and hence retains some interest and importance.

The skeptics had called attention to the frequent imperfect coincidence of appearance and reality. For the traditional philosopher, then, the first nut to be cracked is to distinguish between the objects of experience (that about which perceptual judgments are made), and the sensory contents of experience (the colours and shapes seen, the felt bulk etc.), for the purposes of showing that and how certain logical relationships obtain between them, something the skeptical had questioned. The quest has been for some basic evidential relationship between the sensory contents of experience and judgments about the objects of experience. Put linguistically, the search has been for some logical relationship between statements about perceptual experience itself and statements about the tables and chairs etc. of philosophical examples. The quest has been for "The Foundations of

Empirical Knowledge." For now I want to confine myself to how the argument from illusion is supposed to serve the aims of the traditional philosopher.

At the very beginning of Part III of Sense and Sensibilia Austin states that "the primary purpose of the argument from illusion is to induce people to accept "sense-data" as the proper and correct answer to the question what they perceive on certain abnormal, exceptional occasions; but in fact it is usually followed up with another bit of argument intended to establish that they always perceive sense-data." (p.20) As with so many of Austin's summary characterizations of sense-datum theory, this statement is prima facie acceptable, but in the end unsatisfactory and somewhat misleading. As I noted above, a primary concern of the traditional philosopher is to distinguish as clearly as necessary for the purposes of argument the sensory from the inferential or judgmental aspects of perception. It is this purpose the argument from illusion is primarily intended to serve; it is supposed to enable us to make some such distinction by giving us directions for isolating the sensory element by contrasting two cases of perception, one normal and the other abnormal or in some way off-colour, such that the sensory element will be the same in both cases while the judgment or inference as to what is perceived is different. This isolation of a common sensory element or aspect in all perceptual experience, however prima facie heterogeneous, is supposed to provide the key for analysing the epistemic status of particular perceptual experiences and particular perceptual claims by making explicit the implicit "premises" and "conclusions" in perceptual

judgments, i.e., by distinguishing "data" and "interpretation" in experience. As such the argument from illusion is mis-named, for it is less an argument and more a means for giving denotative definitions of terms to be used to refer to the sensory contents of experience. Since it is not primarily an argument it need not be logically rigorous. It need only be precise enough to serve its definitional purpose. And that is why Austin's statement of the primary purposes of the argument from illusion is slightly unsatisfactory; it makes it appear that this so-called argument is a proper argument, and this strongly suggests that the sense-datist can be defeated and forced to abandon his position if criticism can be raised which uncover a number of muddles, confusions, obscurities, and a general lack of logical rigour in the argument, especially if such defects can be construed as necessary for producing the conclusion.<sup>(1)</sup>

I shall argue below that many of Austin's criticisms succeed in revealing a lack of clarity in Ayer's method of ostensive definition of "sense-datum" but that Austin falls short of showing that this lack of clarity is essential to any formulation of this so-called argument from illusion and therefore that Austin fails to show that the sense-datist is wrong in supposing that there is a purely sensory element or constituent in perception in terms of which he can give meaning to the terminology of sense-data. As they stand, Austin's criticisms would merely force the sense-datist to revise the argument from illusion, not to abandon it. Even if successful, such a showing would be relatively insignificant. But I shall also argue that at several crucial points Austin makes certain fatal concessions to the sense-datist case; he concedes much of what the sense-datist asks for in order to get his show on

the road.

Even if I succeed in all that I set out to do in this chapter the result will be of limited value. I shall not have shown that the sense-datist has clear sailing - that the concept of sense-datum will take him anywhere nearly as far as he wants to go. I shall have gone no way toward showing that any of the traditional forms of phenomenism are acceptable. That would be beyond the scope of this Thesis.

In what follows I shall continue to use the traditional expression "argument from illusion" without quotes and without prefacing it with "so-called" chiefly because it is traditional, even if misleading. I trust no harm is done.

Austin's own examination of the argument is divided into two "stages" corresponding to the initial introduction of "sense-data" for dealing with "abnormal" perceptual experience and then its extension to normal perception. Austin, of course, will have a very considerable number of criticisms to make of the argument from illusion, but it is no easy matter to sort them out for examination. His piecemeal analysis is only partially responsible for this. Piecemeal analyses can be pasted together into at least a quasi-systematic shape; this was done to advantage in Part II of Sense and Sensibilia. But from Part II onward, the course of analysis and argument is really quite erratic. Austin criss-crosses the field and zig-zags from point to point, taking up a point and then dropping it for something else only to return to it once or twice again some paragraphs and even sometimes many pages later. For example, Austin devotes two chaotic chapters to the argument from illusion which are separated from each other by a chapter of linguistic analysis of

"looks", "seems", and "appears" the relevance of which to the argument from illusion is not even stated, much less argued for. ("Looks", "seems", "appears" will be discussed in Chapter V.) All this certainly makes for choppy sailing. In what follows I will try to pull together as best I can some of Austin's scattered criticisms, but even so, I am afraid that I shall have, from time to time, to deal rather peremptorily with some matters which will come up for subsequent treatment. For this I beg the indulgence of the reader. This chapter will be devoted to "Stage I".

(2) Ayer's Statement of the Argument: As ordinarily stated, according to Ayer, the argument from illusion is "based on the fact that material things may present different appearances to different observers, or to the same observer in different conditions, and that the character of these appearances is to some extent causally determined by the state of the conditions and observer."<sup>(2)</sup> As illustrations of these facts Ayer offers instances of perspective, refraction, drug-induced colour visions, mirror-images, double vision, variations in taste, felt warmth and felt bulk and "complete hallucinations" such as the experience of phantom limbs and mirages.

He makes use of only three of these phenomena in order to introduce the concept of sense-datum, but says that "the same conclusion (we directly perceive sense-data) may be reached by taking any other of my examples."<sup>(3)</sup> He cites the cases of that old friend the straight stick which looks bent when half-immersed in water, mirages, and mirror-images.

First, the stick-in-water case:<sup>(4)</sup> Ayer "assumes"<sup>(5)</sup> that the stick does not really change its shape when placed in water, but will later examine the meaning and validity of this "assumption". From this "assumption"

together with the facts about the variations in the character of the appearances of things under different conditions, it follows that "at least one of the visual appearances of the stick is delusive; for it cannot be both crooked and straight." Even so, when "what we see is not the real quality of a material thing, it is supposed that we are still seeing something; and it is convenient to give this a name," viz., "sense-datum." A sense-datum, then, is "the object of which we are directly aware, in perception, if it is not part of any material thing." In the case of seeing a mirage<sup>(6)</sup>, the man who sees a mirage is "not perceiving any material thing; for the oasis which he thinks he is perceiving does not exist." But "his experience is not an experience of nothing." His visual field is not perfectly blank. So "it is said that he is experiencing sense-data, which are similar in kind to what he would be experiencing if he were seeing a real oasis, but are delusive in the sense that the material thing which they appear to present is not really there."

Next, mirror-images.<sup>(7)</sup> If I look in a mirror "my body appears to be some distance behind the glass; but other observations indicate that it is in front of it." So "these perceptions cannot all be veridical." But one is seeing something, and if, in this case, there really is no such material thing as my body in the place where it appears to be, what is it that I am seeing?" Once again, the answer is supposed to be "a sense-datum."

Ayer's next move is to attempt to extend the notion of sense-datum to cases of normal or veridical experience in which we "see material things as they really are" in order that he can arrive at the concept of a common sensory element in two similar experiences one of which is "delusive"

and the other "veridical". This will be examined in Chapter IV..

(3) Austin's Critique

Austin first directs our attention to the name of the argument - the "argument from illusion." Because names which are compounded out of words having fairly definite meanings in other uses carry the implications of the uses of those words with them in their new role as parts of names, it is clearly important to look carefully at such compounded names. Their associated implications may play a silent but crucial role in the arguments in which the compounded names figure. And this is what interests Austin; he is not going to cavil at mere words as some of his critics seem to think. (8)

So - the argument is called the "argument from illusion." and "it is produced as establishing the conclusion that some at least of our "perceptions" are delusive." From these two facts, "two clear implications" emerge, according to Austin, viz., "(a) that all the cases cited in the argument are cases of illusions; and (b) that illusion and delusion are the same thing." (p.22) Both implications are wrong, and this is important because "the argument trades on confusion at just this point." Although he does not say so explicitly, it is, I think, a clear implication of Austin's remark that the "confusion" engendered by these false implications is somehow essential to the sense-datatist case.

Hardly any of the cases cited by Ayer are genuine illusions, according to Austin. And most are certainly not delusions. Unfortunately Austin never tells us which of Ayer's cases he would regard as genuine illusions, but it is clear from his examination of them that he does not regard

Ayer's examples of the stick-in-water, seeing a mirage, and seeing a mirror-image as illusions; nor as delusions.

Genuine cases of illusion cited by Austin are the Muller-Lyer diagram in which, of two lines of equal length, one looks longer than the other, the Headless Woman on the stage, who is made to look headless by a professional conjurer, the ventriloquist's dummy which appears to be talking, and wheels which are rotating rapidly in the direction but which look as if they are rotating slowly in the opposite direction. But delusions are "altogether different." (p.23) Delusions are primarily "a matter of grossly disordered belief" and "may well have nothing in particular to do with perception," e.g., delusions of persecution. But the man who sees pink rats can also be said to have or suffer from delusions, especially if "he is not clearly aware that his pink rats aren't real rats."

The difference between these (genuine) cases of illusion and delusion are, according to Austin, really quite fundamental. "Delusion" suggests "something totally unreal, not really there at all," i.e., "something totally unreal is conjured up." Delusions "can be completely without foundation" as in some cases of delusions of persecution. There is something "really wrong, and what's more, wrong with the person who has them." (p.24) But none of this is true of illusions; the lines are on the page, the woman is on the stage with her head in a bag and so on. Illusions are quite public; anyone can see them, and usually "standard procedures can be laid down for producing" them. If we sometimes confuse illusions and delusions, this is partly because of loose usage and perhaps also because there are sometimes different theories about the facts in some cases. For example, "some seem to take a mirage to be a



vision conjured up by the crazed brain of the thirsty and exhausted traveller (delusion) while in other accounts it is a case of atmospheric refraction, whereby something below the horizon is made to appear above it. (illusion) (p.25) In any case, the paradigm cases are clear and show the differences between delusions and illusions.

The way in which the argument from illusion trades on confusing illusions and delusions, according to Austin, is this (p.25): While the cases Ayer cites are being called illusions, "there is the implication....that there really is something there that we perceive." But when they begin to be called delusive, "there comes in the very different suggestion of something being conjured up, something unreal, or at any rate "immaterial". These implications jointly insinuate that in the case Ayer cites "there really is something that we are perceiving, but that this is an immaterial something." This insinuation, Austin says, is "well calculated to edge us a little closer towards just the position where the sense-datum theorist wants to have us."

Austin now turns his attention (pp.26-32) to some of the cases cited by Ayer and examines them in the light of what he takes to be the clearly established distinction between illusion and delusion. Fortunately, I can now practice considerable economy of exposition as Austin's points are few and simple and are repeated in varying forms as he passes from case to case.

Consider, for example, mirror-images. Certainly not any case of seeing things in a mirror is an illusion; "seeing things in a mirror is a perfectly normal occurrence, completely familiar. Children and primitives might be taken in, but this is no reason for the rest of us to speak of illusion here. "It is important to realize here how familiarity, so to speak,

takes the edge off illusion," Austin says. In any case, why ought there to be a question of what we are seeing? We are said to be seeing a sense-datum because the body "appears to be some distant behind the glass" but isn't. There is no objection to saying that this is how the body appears, although it does not appear to be behind the glass "in a way which might tempt me (though it might tempt a baby or a savage) to go round the back and look for it.....". ".....But does it follow that, since my body is not actually behind the mirror, I am not seeing a material thing? Plainly not.... I can see the mirror. ...I can see my own body "indirectly". ....I can also see ...a mirror-image. And a mirror-image...is not a sense-datum"; it can be photographed, seen by any number of people, and so on." And "of course there is no question here of either illusion or delusion."

Mutatis mutandis, the same things can be said of the stick-in-water case. Ayer says that since the stick looks bent but is straight, "at least one of the visual appearances of the stick is delusive"; that what we see is "not the real quality of (a few lines later, not part of) a material thing." Austin agrees that the stick looks bent; "we have no better way of describing it." But "...it does not look exactly like a bent stick....out of water." So, Austin asks, what in the situation is supposed to be delusive. What went wrong, he wants to know, what is the problem the introduction of sense-data is supposed to solve?

A question is raised about what we are seeing "if it is not part of any material thing." But this question is really "completely mad." After all, we see the part of the stick which is not immersed, the bit under the water, and the water. So why should a question be raised about what we are

seeing? The initial description of the case already contains the answer, viz. "a stick partly immersed in water." Consider a church camouflaged to look like a barn. "....How could any serious question be raised about what we see...? We see, of course, a church that now looks like a barn. We do not see an immaterial barn, an immaterial church, or an immaterial anything else."

As for mirages, Austin says, if we accept Ayer's views of them, we have a case of delusion, for the traveller is "not" 'seeing a material thing'." But we do not "have to say, however, even here that he is 'experiencing sense-data'," for what he is experiencing "already has a name - a mirage." And we ought also to resist the statement that what he is experiencing is "similar in character to what he would be experiencing if he were seeing a real oasis." It is not really likely to be similar, and "if we were to concede this point we should find the concession being used against us....at the stage where we shall be invited to agree that we see sense-data always, in normal cases too." Even so, Austin concedes that this case is "significantly more amenable" to the sense-datatist treatment of it.

(4) Examination of Austin's Critique:

Well, what are we to make of all this? Clearly some criticisms will have to be reserved until after dealing with "Stage II" of Austin's examination of the argument from illusion in the next chapter. And when we come to consider the doctrine of adjuster-words some of the matters raised here and in "Stage II" will come up for consideration again. Nevertheless, it is possible to raise several serious criticisms of Austin's treatment of the argument for illusion at this point.

(A) In the first place, I think we can set aside as irrelevant without very much ado, Austin's remarks on the normality of seeing mirror-images etc. and the infrequency of (genuine) "delusive perceptions." At the conclusion of Stage II of his discussion, he lists "an implicit but grotesque exaggeration of the frequency of "delusive perceptions"" (p.34) as one of the "rather serious deficiencies" of the argument from illusion. I cannot detect any such grotesque exaggeration, but in any case even if the argument from illusion does imply that "delusive perceptions" are common, it is no serious deficiency since the argument depends in no way at all upon the frequency of illusions or delusions or whatnot. Even if they were much rarer than Austin would have it, they could still be used in what would pass muster as an argument from illusion. Pedagogy might suffer thereby, but philosophy would not.

(B) One wonders what Austin means by "delusive." He never defines the word. Ayer at least tells us that mirages are delusive "in the sense that the material thing which they appear to present is not actually there" (FEK p.4) and that the perception of an object from a distance can be "delusive in the sense that the object appears to be smaller than it really is" (FEK p8) and from these we might at least glean the beginnings of a definition. But Austin does not discuss the meaning of this adjective. He concentrates on the noun "delusion". So we must infer what he thinks "delusive" means from its few occurrences in his argument together with what we know of his purposes in discussing delusions. And this, I think, is not hard to do. It will be recalled that Austin is trying to establish, among other things, that (a) the argument from illusion clearly but falsely implies that illusions and delusions are the same thing, and (b) that the argument trades on so confusing illusions

and delusions that we are induced to buy the introduction of sense-data. This is characterized as a piece of slight-of-hand whereby we can be led to the view that in seeing some illusion we are experiencing directly something "immaterial" (i.e. a sense-datum) in addition to the material things we are seeing indirectly.

Clearly Austin can establish (b) only by establishing (a). Unfortunately, he never argues for (a); he merely asserts it on the basis of the fact that the argument is called the argument from illusion and is produced as "establishing the conclusion that some at least of our 'perceptions' are delusive." (p.22) But since Austin never argues for (a) we must ask why he should have thought (a) a clear implication of the argument from illusion so clear that it need not be argued. And the reason, I think, fairly obvious. Austin thinks that the adjective "delusive" means something like "having the nature or character of a delusion." Indeed, it is only "delusive" thus construed that allows (a) to emerge as a "clear implication" of Ayer's statement that mirages etc. are delusions. Otherwise there would be no temptation to think that the illusions (genuine or not) of the argument from illusion are also delusions, i.e., that illusions and delusions are the same thing.

Does "delusive" mean what Austin takes it to mean? Or rather, does "delusive" mean what Austin thinks it means as it is used in the argument from illusion? Certainly it must be admitted that one of the meanings of "delusive" is "having the nature or character of a delusion." These words are cognates, so it should not be surprising that "delusive" has this meaning. But, in another meaning it is a word calling our attention to features or characterizatics in a situation which are apt to or fitted to mislead or

deceive us, with no implications as to the nature of such deceptive features or characteristics, and certainly with no implication that one jolly well must be deceived or in some way misled. Used in this way "delusive" has nothing in particular to do with proper delusions. The range of its applicability is not thus limited, and it can certainly be used properly of anything Austin would admit to be an illusion, e.g., The Muller-Lyer lines; they are indeed deliberately drawn so as to be fitted to mislead us.

It can be conceded that Austin has uncovered an ambiguity in the argument from illusion - one which could lead someone to confuse illusions and delusions with whatever subsequent difficulties that might entail. But it is far from true that he has revealed a clear implication of the argument if we take that to mean an implication to which the sense-datist is necessarily committed by his use of the argument. Indeed, how could the identity of illusions and delusions be a clear implication to the argument from illusion given the ambiguity of "delusive"? A fortiori we have no good reason to suppose at this point that there is clear ground for thinking that the sense-datist necessarily trades on confusing delusions and illusions. At worst, it need only be conceded that some sense-datist might do so. There is a potential danger in the argument which needs to be guarded against. In any case, Austin is certainly right to the extent that many sense-datists have construed sense-data to be private "immaterial" particulars rather like, one gathers, the conjured up patches one experiences in having visual hallucinations so that grouping illusions and hallucinations together under the rubric "delusive perceptions" could very well insinuate without argument just such a version

of sense-data. Ayer himself (FEK p.154-5) accepts it as a "convention" that sense-data are private immaterial particulars. He hopes to avoid the metaphysical problem of how to get to a public material world from such private immaterial particulars by way of his official doctrine that sense-data are invented linguistic entities. We shall later see that there are very good reasons for rejecting any view of sense-data which construes them as private immaterial particulars.

(C) It is not only the case that we are not compelled to accept Austin's insinuated meaning of "delusive", but also that there is no reason to suppose that Ayer used "delusive" with the meaning Austin tries to foist on him. In fairness to Ayer, it should be pointed out that the word "delusion" never occurs in his statement of the argument from illusion or in his discussion of his examples. It is Austin's word entirely. And "delusive" always occurs in Ayer's remarks with no implications as to the nature of the delusive features of the perceptual situations he discusses, i.e., that there is something wrong with the perceiver which causes him to conjure up something totally unreal. As Ayer uses "delusive" it cuts across Austin's distinction between illusions and delusions, as, indeed, one should expect it to when used in the second sense mentioned above. There is just no way of reading Ayer which can lead one to suppose that he believes that, for example, the delusive character of the stick-in-water case has anything at all to do with having or suffering from delusions. The fact is, "delusive" can always be replaced by "deceptive" in Ayer's text whenever the former appears without any loss of meaning.<sup>T</sup>

(D) There is really a very great deal wrong with Austin's distinction between illusions and delusions. One of the purposes to be

served by Austin's discussion is the subversion of the so-called "bogus dichotomy" of "perceptions" into two groups, the "delusive" and the "veridical." In order to do this, he must show that illusions and delusions are, in his words, "altogether different," i.e., that there is a fundamental distinction in principle between illusions and delusions which prevents them from being brought together as members or instances of some single category of "things gone wrong." Austin's contention is the rather Kiplingesque one that "illusion is illusion and delusion is delusion and never the twain shall meet."

Austin hangs his whole argument on the complete publicity of illusions and the total privacy of delusions (p.31,23) It is the private and the public which are the twain that never shall meet - not even, presumably, at God's great Judgment Seat. And since he has, by fiat, excluded sense-data from publicity ("And a mirror-image....is not a 'sense-datum'; it can be photographed, seen by any number of people, and so on." (p.31) He thereby hopes to preclude the introduction of sense-data via phenomena such as illusions. His further arguments in Stage II, against the qualitative similarity of genuinely delusive experience and so-called veridical experience are designed to close off the possibility of extending sense-data to all perceptual experience from the only sort of case Austin concedes to be amenable to sense-datist treatment, viz., delusions. The upshot will be that even if the notion of a sense-datum can get a tenuous hold in cases of delusion, it will nevertheless be in principle unextendable to perception of the non-private.

However, before I discuss the private/public distinction, I should like to look a little more closely at some of the things Austin says of



illusions and delusions, for it seems to me that Austin's own distinction of illusions and delusions is wrong on at least two counts.

First, it is produced in order to break down Ayer's classification of a variety of phenomena as "delusive" perceptions." But it cannot serve this purpose, for there is no essential connection between having or suffering from delusions and having any sort of perceptual experience. Bang-up delusions really are, as Austin himself notes, primarily a matter of grossly disordered beliefs. The patient who sees pink rats may or may not be suffering from a delusion, depending on whether or not he believes that his pink rats are real rats and, more importantly, whether or not he believes obsessively that he sees pink rats. A momentary belief that there are a couple of pink rats at the foot of the bed, a belief the patient can abandon upon recalling his condition, will not be a delusion. But even if he is clearly aware that his pink rats are not real rats, he continues to have the experience of "seeing pink rats," and this experience is certainly "delusive" in the sense required by the argument from illusion. He continues to have an hallucination, which is what the pink rats case really is. Austin is right to hold that illusions and delusions are altogether different, but his reasons for holding this are wrong. He makes the distinction to rest upon the publicity of illusions and the privacy of delusions, but this will not do. The basic reason illusions and delusions are altogether different is that "delusion" is essentially a belief-word, but "illusion," while connected with beliefs or tendencies to believe, is a perception-word. Illusions are classifiable as "optical," "auditory," and "kinaesthetic" etc. but delusions are not thus classifiable. Delusions are classifiable by reference to the kind of belief

involved, e.g., delusions of persecution, grandeur etc., Austin himself says (p.23) that delusions can be completely without foundation - I should have said without rational foundation - but certainly the belief aspects of illusions (and hallucinations) do have a "foundation," viz., in something being experienced. One certainly should not confuse illusions and delusions, but nothing Austin has said should persuade us to refuse to consider, say, the Muller-Lyer lines and the pink rats case both as delusive.

But there is a more important reason why the distinction between illusion and delusion, as Austin has drawn it, is bogus, viz., that in the end it can be maintained only by a fanatical pursuit of the sui generis. Austin is, indeed, a master of the sui generis; he warns us that there are "plenty of more or less unusual cases" (p.27) which are neither illusions nor delusions, e.g., mis-reading a word, seeing after-images, and dreams. Dreams, he tells us, are dreams and not illusions or delusions, and, presumably seeing after-images is seeing after-images, mis-readings are mis-readings, illusions are illusions and so on. Of course, if one rules out a priori the respects in which two things are similar, one is left with the ways in which they are different; one is left with the sui generis.

Certainly we ought to try and keep clear the differences between such varied phenomena as the stick-in-water case, after-images, dreams, seeing pink rats etc. But it is a far cry from the noting of these differences to the conclusion that such things cannot or ought not to be considered together with the view to discovering, if possible, some systematic inter-connection between them which will enhance our understanding of how profitably that can be compared and contrasted with each other, and, more importantly,

how severally and collectively they can be compared and contrasted with so-called veridical perception in which we see things as they really are or in which we see real things. If there is to be any such thing at all as the philosophy of perception, we must explore just such matters.

There are good reasons for not obscuring distinctions, but surely there are also powerful reasons for trying to find out why certain distinctions seem naturally to run together in packs. Certainly we have good reason for not rising to Austin's bait, for there are plenty of cases which his distinction ignores and which share certain important characteristics of both illusions and delusions as Austin has drawn the distinction. If we allow that they too are sui generis, we simply rule out in advance the very possibility of any sort of theoretical enterprise, scientific as well as philosophical, aimed at increasing our understanding by collecting diverse phenomena under general laws and rubrics.

For example, consider the sorts of cases in which, under the influence of some drug, we see the ordinarily drab colours of objects as bright and attractive, or in which we see the sizes and shapes of things undergo rapid and drastic changes. Such cases share important features of both illusions and delusions as analyzed by Austin. On the side of illusions, we have something actually there to be seen; nothing totally unreal is conjured up. On the contrary, there is, e.g., just the book or the pillow we are looking at. Moreover, as with illusions, there can be a standard procedure for producing the experience, e.g., "Take three peyote buds." (Of course, it is likely to be a bit more complicated than this.) And, of course, as with any illusion,

we need not "be taken in" by the experience. On the other hand, on the side of delusions, we have a situation in which there is something wrong with the person who has such experiences; his perceptual apparatus is certainly not functioning normally. And his experience is private. So how are we to characterize such cases? Are they illusions or delusions? If we take Austin seriously, we shall have to say they are neither. They, like after-images etc., are just whatever they are.

Enough has been said, I think, to indicate how much Austin's distinction leaves to be desired. It misclassifies the pink rats case as delusions (and also the mirage case) while actually they are hallucinations, something Austin never discusses, and it divides delusions (really hallucinations) and illusions into two entirely unconnected classes only by a sort of definitional resolve not to allow them to be connected either with each other or with anything else which might resemble both.

(5) Illusions and Hallucinations

It is not enough to reject Austin's way of treating the cases he and Ayer discuss. Accordingly, I want to offer briefly a rather primitive and tentative set of distinctions for handling (most of) these cases. I will try to set out these distinctions in a rough, purely prima facie way, without, I hope, begging or burking any philosophical questions. And although I shall use the patently philosophical expressions "existentially deceptive" and "qualitatively deceptive," I try to use them in a way which would be consonant with anything which an entirely unphilosophical person might say about the phenomena. My reason for this procedure is that I believe that as we go into these unphilosophical prima facie distinctions we will find implications for

the treatment of certain philosophical problems such as the public/private distinction and the nature of veridical perception.

Basically, the distinction we need is one between illusions and hallucinations rather than one between illusion and delusion. But even this two-term distinction will not do. We shall also have to distinguish between two kinds of illusion which I shall call normal and pathological illusions.

It is best to begin by offering a small number of cases of hallucinations - paradigm cases - and illusions to see what can be said about them. I will confine myself to visual cases.

First then, hallucinations: Typical hallucinations are such things as alcoholic visions of pink rats or, if one accepts Ayer's account of them, mirages. Hallucinations can be said to be existentially deceptive; they seem to present us with things which do not exist. There are no rats at the foot of the bed, there is no oasis a few miles ahead. They are not, however, qualitatively deceptive since there are no actual objects which can seem to have qualities they do not actually have; there is no distinction to be made between the real or apparent pinkness of hallucinated pink rats.

Samples of pathological illusions are such cases as I mentioned above of drug-induced visions of changes in the colours of things etc. or, to take a case suggested to me by Prof, D.G. Brown, the case of the road which appears to recede from me as I stop the car. Such illusions differ from hallucinations in that nothing unreal is conjured up; we just see the book which looks bright red or the road in front of us which appears to recede. There is qualitative deception here; the book looks bright red but isn't, and the

road seems to be moving. But like hallucinations, such illusions are private. If I have not joined you in "turning on," the book will not look bright red to me. If I have been reading while you were driving, the road will not seem to recede when we stop.

Normal illusions are such cases as the Muller-Lyer lines, the Headless Woman, normal perspectival views of things seen at a distance such as the apparent tapering of the road ahead, the stick-in-water case, mirror-images, and, on another causal account, mirages. Such normal illusions are like pathological illusions in that nothing unreal is conjured up, but unlike hallucinations and pathological illusions, they are, as Austin insists of illusions, perfectly public, can be photographed etc. Normal illusions, like pathological illusions and unlike hallucinations, are not existentially deceptive. And like pathological illusions and unlike hallucinations, they are qualitatively deceptive; the things seen appear to have qualities which they do not really have.

There is a certain ambiguity in "normal" which is somewhat troublesome. Sometimes "normal" means "the usual or common condition, quality or the like," i.e., the statistically most frequent case. Austin's Headless Woman is not a normal illusion in this sense, but a perspectival view of the road would be; indeed, we cannot avoid perspective. Sometimes "normal" means "occurring naturally," and again the Headless Woman is not normal in this sense since it has to be contrived, whereas seeing the road taper in the distance is normal in this sense. Still other times, "normal" means something like "not deviating from a norm, rule, principle, pattern, or law." In this sense, the stick-in-water case, the Headless Woman, the tapering road etc., are

normal; one just sees what one should expect to see given the laws of perspective, refraction etc. Unfortunately, however, pathological illusions and hallucinations might also be said to be normal in this sense. After all, one expects the road to seem to recede when one stops the car after having driven for some time. Or one expects excessive use of alcohol to conjure up visions of pink rats and the like.

In what sense, then, can normal illusions be said to be normal? I know of no ordinary sense of "normal" which can be used here, and so I propose to invent a sense of "normal" which will enable us to distinguish these illusions from pathological illusions and hallucinations. But my contrived sense of "normal" will not be arbitrary or ad hoc since it is suggested by two other senses of "normal" in current usage, one ordinary and the other technical, and also because it points directly to the crucial difference between all normal illusions on the one hand and hallucinations or pathological illusions on the other. In experimental medicine a subject in an experiment is said technically to be a normal subject if it has not previously been subjected to any particular infection or other experimental treatment. An albino rat would certainly not be normal in respect of pigmentation, but nevertheless could be a normal subject for an experiment. In psychology and in ordinary language a person is said to be normal if he is free of any sort of mental disorder. In both these senses "normal" is an excluder-word <sup>(9)</sup> applicable in virtue of the absence in a subject of some feature or condition which, if present, would disable or disqualify him or it for performing some function. We have here the makings for a sense of "normal" in discussing what I have called normal illusions.

"Normal" in "normal illusion" should be understood as having reference to the absence in a perceiver of a condition which would, if it were present, help explain why he is or could be deceived as to the real qualities of some object which he sees. In the cases which I have cited, for example, anybody else whose sensory apparatus (eyes, nerves, and whatever else is necessary to perception) is functioning normally would see a stick as bent, the road as tapering, the woman as headless, etc. Explanations of the deceptive features of the situation will ignore the condition of the sensory apparatus and will locate the real or possible perceptual difficulty elsewhere.

This points out the basic differences between normal illusions on the one hand and pathological illusions and hallucinations on the other. The latter arise out of some abnormal condition of the sensory apparatus, such as strained eye muscles in the case of the receding road, or disordered nerves from the excessive use of alcohol in the case of hallucinated pink rats. And this also accounts for the privacy of pathological illusions and hallucinations; only the person whose sensory apparatus is thus deranged will have those experiences.

Distinguishing pathological illusions from hallucinations requires raising explicitly something which has been hovering in the background. Normally as we go about dealing perceptually with the world, we depend on the fact that certain stable correlations or coherence patterns hold. We find that things which look straight generally also feel straight when we run the hand along them. And so on. In the case of illusions of both types and hallucinations the usual coherence patterns implied in a correct identification or description of what we would claim to see fail to hold in one or another of two ways; the colours, shapes, sounds etc in our present experience either



fail to cohere in certain standard ways, or our present experience fails to cohere with previous or subsequent standard experience. In cases of visual hallucination, for example, the hallucinatory "object" will have the qualities of colour and shape. But any attempt to correlate appropriate tactile qualities with visual qualities will fail altogether - there will be no tactile qualities of the required sort in the space apparently occupied by the visual object. In the case of illusions of both types there will be both visual and tactile qualities, but they will not cohere properly - the stick will look bent but it will not simultaneously feel bent - or some of them will not cohere with previous and subsequent experience - the bright red book did not look that way an hour ago, although otherwise there is nothing to complain of - it still looks and feels like a book, can be read etc. Pathological illusions and hallucinations are thus distinguishable from each other by reference to the failure in the case of hallucinations to find any other appropriate qualities correlated with the hallucinated qualities; you try to pick up a pink rat and find yourself making a fist instead. Your pink rats are unreal, do not exist, are only hallucinatory. If you can pick up the rat, stroke it, squeeze it and make it squeak, feed it and so on, and others around you can do so as well, you are not hallucinating. Whether you are having a pathological illusion of the colour of the rat, or a normal illusion, or seeing a rat which really is pink will depend on whether there is something wrong with your sensory apparatus or the external, non-sensory, or impersonal conditions of perception. These things are easily enough checked out.

After-images are, I believe, correctly classifiable as hallucinations. They are existentially delusive or deceptive in that one might

mis-identify them as spots on the wall or more likely as flitting images projected on the wall. They have no correlated tactile qualities and are apparently produced by disturbing the sensory apparatus so that it does not function normally. They seem to have all the ear-marks of hallucinations, and I can think of no reason in principle why they should not be so classified.

Dreams, however, do not fit neatly or obviously into the categories of illusion or hallucination, at least not as I have crudely delineated them. They have a very special etiology. Dreams, for example, occur while one is asleep, while the instances of illusions and hallucinations cited above occur while one is awake. Should wakefulness be considered a necessary condition of illusion and hallucination, thus excluding dreams, or might dreams be a special sort of hallucination or illusion? There is something to be said for either view. One might argue as Descartes does at the end of the Meditations<sup>(10)</sup> that dreams are a kind of hallucination on the ground that they are not essentially distinguishable from hallucinations save for the fact that they occur during sleep; one resorts to pretty much the same way as finding out one ~~is~~ dreaming or not dreaming as one resorts to in finding out that one is or is not hallucinating pink rats. On the other hand, we might want to resist this suggestion because while dreams are sometimes rather like hallucinations, at other times they are rather like pathological illusions as when they incorporate actual sounds or dimly apprehended shapes seen while only half-awake the moment before dropping off to sleep. But they cannot be both illusions and hallucinations unless "dreams" is ambiguous. But one would argue that "dream" is ambiguous only if one were determined to fit them into the categories of illusion and hallucination in the first place.

How does one decide these matters? My own inclination is to consider dreams quite a separate category from illusions and hallucinations, chiefly on the ground that they do occur when one is asleep and that they do vary from time to time in their resemblances to paradigm pathological illusions and hallucinations. These seem to me sufficiently important to classify dreams as another sort of experience. Moreover, if one classifies dreams as a sort of illusion or hallucination one would be faced with the problem of how to distinguish between having an illusion and dreaming one is having an illusion or hallucination and dreaming one is hallucinating. Such experiences, if they happened, would only be distinguishable if there is some difference between dreams and illusions or hallucinations which can be made out in terms of the condition in which they occur. I cannot see what this could be save that dreams occur while one is asleep. And since dreams vary so markedly in their resemblances to illusions and hallucinations, one would have to introduce an intolerable ambiguity into "dream" if one were to insist that they have to be one or the other. It seems better to classify them separately. Finally, there is an asymmetry as regards the application of coherence tests as between dreams and illusions or hallucinations. It is a presupposition of doing anything quite so clever as applying a coherence test that one be awake and mindful of what one is doing. We can only apply coherence tests to tell whether we are hallucinating or having an illusion, but we cannot do this to find out whether or not we are dreaming. If one is in a condition to apply a coherence test, one is awake and cannot be dreaming; a coherence test can only show that one was dreaming. So, on the whole, it seems to me best not to construe dreams as illusions or hallucinations.

As for misreadings, I confess that I am quite unsure of how to treat them. However, it seems to me that mis-readings might possibly be a sort of high-grade pathological illusion requiring the parts of the brain which are the seat of the higher intellectual powers to be in some mild and subtle state of disorder or perhaps to be "set" in a certain fashion which causes one to read "casual" for "causal." In any case, we cannot begin to get clear about such sophisticated cases of mis-perception until we begin to get clear about less sophisticated cases, so I do not consider it anything like a fatal concession that I do not know quite how to handle misreadings.

(6) "Privacy" and "Publicity"

Since Austin has rested his sharp distinction between illusions and delusions on the private/public distinction, and has ruled sense-data to be private, he thereby hopes to preclude the extension of the concept of sense-datum from the only sort of case in which he concedes it might get some toe-hold, viz., wholly private hallucinations, to cases in which what is perceived is wholly public. The long way around Austin's move would be for the sense-datist to reject Austin's ruling on the privacy of sense-data because it begs the question against the sense-datist. If sense-data are regarded as private in just the way Austin requires them to be private, the game is over. To regard sense-data as private in the way hallucinatory images are private would be to contrast them with material objects in an invidious way. It would be to rule out a priori the metaphysical neutrality of sense-data which the sense-dateist requires. Sense-data are supposed to be neutral as regards their metaphysical status - they are supposed to be capable of entering into veridical perception of public objects as well as hallucinatory and illusory experience.

The sense-datist cannot allow sense-data to be private in the way Austin rules them to be private without compromising their neutrality. So the sense-datist would have to argue that the concept of sense-datum is to be introduced at a more primitive conceptual level than that on which the private/public distinction is operative. He will have to argue that the distinction between privacy and publicity will have to be made out at a later stage of analysis. If the sense-datist takes this route, it would be incumbent upon him to attempt to develop a primitive language of sense-data free of implications of publicity and privacy.

But perhaps Austin's fiat could be circumvented somewhat more easily if it could be argued that the private/public distinction is merely a contingent one, and that what we now think of as private could, under other conditions involving no "metaphysical" change, come to be thought of as public and perhaps vice versa. But there are ticklish issues here. The distinction between the private and the public is without doubt one of the murkiest in philosophy; it has labyrinthian connections with a whole host of other distinctions and notions. It is involved in attempts to distinguish the mental from the physical; it is connected with the notion of knowledge of one's own states of consciousness and with the idea of privileged access and with our knowledge of other minds; it is related to the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity and to the notions of material thinghood, the existence of unperceived material objects, and the non-existence of unperceived sensations (in some wide sense of "perceive" which includes "feeling"). And, of course, the distinction between the private and the public is clearly connected with the concepts of illusion, dreams, hallucinations, after-images and so on,

and this distinction has very intimate connections with our fundamental and intricately related identity-concepts, e.g., with the notions of sameness, countability, and particularity as they are applied now to this and now to that.

All this naturally tends to insinuate the suspicion that perhaps there is no single, simple private/public distinction, but rather a number of related distinctions, that perhaps things are private or public in a number of different ways or senses. On the other hand, it is well-known that the temptation to regard words which are not patiently ambiguous as having perhaps many different senses is sometimes a sure indication that one is really quite at sea - quite confused as to the concept the word expresses. I must confess a certain qualm of philosophical conscience as regards "private" and "public". Below I will delineate a number of different private/public distinctions and will speak as if there are a number of different senses of these words. But in an inarticulate sort of way I suspect that there may be some deeper lying distinction of which the distinctions I present are facets. But I have not been able to uncover it.

The reason the private/public distinction(s) is so very obscure is that nothing comes labelled "private" or "public"; we identify things as private or public in accordance with a variety of criteria of publicity and privacy, and sometimes these criteria conflict, or appear to do so. When they do appear to conflict, ordinary language contains no special provisions for deciding whether to allocate whatever is at issue to the realm of the public or to the realm of the private; we cannot appeal to "what we should say when....", but have to content ourselves with saying that such-and-such is private in this respect or public in that. Consider, for example, my smile.

My smile is private and subjective in that it is my smile. But it is also objective in that it is publicly observable. As a particular configuration of facial muscles, my smile is a public physical phenomenon, but insofar as it is a smile and not a reflex action, it has a mentalistic character in virtue of the fact that it has certain essential connections with real or pretended private "inner feelings" of a particular sort, i.e., of the sort that makes my facial configuration a smile and not a reflex action, or, say, a grimace. Moreover, my knowledge that I am smiling is private and privileged in a way in which your knowledge that I am smiling is not; I have a direct private access route to the facts, which is denied to you. So - smiles are in some ways private and in other ways public. But are they chiefly private or public? One might want for special purposes to regard them one way rather than another. But ordinary language seems to contain no special provisions which would legitimize or make illegitimate a decision either way; we just decide which criteria are to be given what weight for what reason. But if we should take it that there is some essential characteristics of smiles knowledge of which can be had only via some privileged access route, then the privacy/publicity distinction will take one well-known turn, and if not, then it will take another. What is at stake is which turn we take. If Austin should want to claim that there is some distinction in principle between the private and the public, he will find himself in the whole "Other Minds" jam.

Even worse, ordinary language allows us to say pretty much what we please in certain odd cases. Normally we think of hallucinations as private experiences. But what about mass hallucinations? The hysterical shepherd children of Fatima witnessed a visitation of the Virgin Mary, and

gave identical descriptions of what they saw. Assuming they did not see a wisp of fog or the like which they misinterpreted, are we to say that they severally hallucinated the Virgin Mary - that each had his own private vision - or that they collectively hallucinated the Virgin - that there was a single hallucinatory image common to the group, albeit an image of somewhat limited publicity? Ordinary language does not seem to make provisions for this sort of decision, and some people would prefer the former description of the case while others would accept the latter as appropriate. For theological reasons I should prefer the first to the second description, for the second description seems to me to concede too much to the supernaturalists in that it implies that perhaps there was something actually there to be seen. The limited publicity of what was there to be seen would then be explained by supernaturalists as due to the requirement that candidates for seeing it be in a special state of grace or the like. The first description does not so readily lend itself to such an interpretation and is much more naturalistic. But this is metaphysics, and the point is that our ordinary uses of "private" and "public" do not tend to make us opt for one or the other description of this case. We can say what we please, and what we are pleased to say will largely be determined by metaphysical considerations. But if this is metaphysics, it will be contingent metaphysics. It should be noted, however, that there is a reason for preferring the first description, i.e., that the children severally "saw" the Virgin Mary. I will argue that "public" and "private" are applicable in virtue of the different sorts of conditions under which the supposedly private or the supposedly public are experienced and that one of the important differences in conditions is the ease with which the conditions can be duplicated. But the "special state of grace" of the supernaturalists explanation is not



a condition of experience of which we can have any knowledge independently of its alleged manifestations and hence is not something of which we can take seriously the notion of duplicating it.

What all this suggests is that our criteria for distinguishing the public and the private are conventional, contingent, and utilitarian. If so, then things which are quite clearly private, such as hallucinated pink rats, pathological illusions of various sorts, our sensations etc. are only contingently private. And if so, Austin cannot be allowed to hold that illusions and hallucinations are "altogether different" in any strong sense which would preclude the extension of the concept of sense-datum from private experiences to the perception of the public. He cannot rule sense-data to be irredeemably private so that they cannot (logically cannot) figure in accounts of (normal) illusions and so-called veridical experience.

Let us examine something which unquestionably is private and ask why we regard it as private, i.e., what its privacy consists in, and then go on to ask if it could conceivably come to be thought of as public. There are numerous candidates to choose among - hallucinatory images and sounds, kinaesthetic sensations, memory-images, dream-images, after-images and so on. I shall confine myself to hallucinated visual images but I intend that what I shall say shall apply, mutatis mutandis, across the board to the other candidates. I chose this case just because Austin allows the sense-datist a toe-hold here. (p32)

Why are hallucinated images of pink rats private, and in what sense are they private? Why do we draw a private/public contrast between these sorts of things and, say, chairs? All sorts of considerations come to mind. A chair can belong to me, to you, to everybody, or to nobody. But an

hallucinated pink rat must be some particular person's hallucinated pink rat. An hallucinatory image can be individuated only by reference to the person whose image it is. It is private property with a vengeance. I think it is this sort of difference which some people intend to mark by saying that such images are private. There are actually two sorts of privacy involved here, privacy of ownership and logical privacy or inalienable ownership. They are not always distinguished and some people think they come to the same thing in the case of hallucinated images. But they ought to be distinguished because even if it is true that there can be no ownerless hallucinations as there can be ownerless chairs, it does not follow that ownership is non-transferable unless hallucinated images are also logically private, i.e., cannot in principle be shared by others.

Most philosophers, I think, do intend to hold the strong view that hallucinated pink rats are logically private, and a number of things are apparently to be covered by this notion. For example, it is argued that we do not allow - ordinary language does not provide for - a sense to the suggestion that you can undergo my hallucination; even if you have a hallucinatory image of pink rats of exactly the same description (however detailed) we do not allow that you and I experience numerically the same image in the way you and I can be said to see numerically the same chair. It is tautologically true (it is argued) that if something is a chair (or any other material object) it is perceivable by more than one person, and it is likewise tautologically true that perceiving P's hallucinated pink rats (in some wide sense of "perceive") entails suffering P's hallucination and suffering P's hallucination entails being P. And since for each person P, P is identical only with P,

it follows that no two persons can share the same hallucinated pink rats and hence that hallucinatory images are logically private.

Still another thing that is apparently sometimes meant by saying that hallucinated images are private is that unlike paradigm public objects such as chairs, they cannot exist unperceived. Their esse is percipi. It is denied that there can be any ontological difference between hallucinating and that which is produced in hallucination, viz., the hallucinatory image. The point is sometimes put by saying that hallucinatory images as "objects" are mental rather than physical. I strongly suspect that Austin has something of this sort in mind when he assigns sense-data to the realm of the private. It seems from Austin's text that he regards the realms of the public and the material to be co-extensive, and since Ayer has introduced sense-data in such a way that they need not be considered "part of any material thing" or "real qualities of material things", it would follow for Austin that they are "immaterial," and hence mental and private.

Finally, in regarding hallucinatory images as private, stress is sometimes placed on the epistemological aspects of having an image of this sort rather than on the ontological aspects. Such images are thus regarded as private because only one person can perceive them (again, in some wide sense). The point is sometimes put by saying that persons who have hallucinations have a privileged knowledge of them which is denied to others. Actually, there are really two quite distinct kinds of epistemological privacy here, and they are not always carefully distinguished. If it is true that there are some things which can be perceived only by one person, it will follow that he has a privileged access to that thing, but the converse is not true. From

the fact that someone has a privileged access to knowledge of something, it does not follow that he has exclusive access. It only follows that he is the only person who can perceive it in a certain way. Everyone has a privileged access via sensation to certain bodily states of his own, but this does not preclude others from also perceiving those bodily states. Only I can feel my broken leg, but others can see it. In any case, hallucinatory images are supposed to be epistemologically private in both ways.

Clearly, there are certain logical relationships between these various ways of distinguishing the private from the public, and it is well to state some of them succinctly. For example, if something is owner-private, it may or may not be transferable. If anything is owner-private, it can be epistemologically private in the privileged access sense or in the exclusive access sense, but it need not be epistemologically private in either sense, e.g., my colour. And thus from the fact that something is owner-private, it does not follow that it is mentally private, i.e., that it cannot exist unperceived. If something is mentally private, it follows that it is something to which someone has a privileged access and also that it is owner-private. But it does not follow that the mentally private is something to which someone has exclusive access unless owner-privacy of the mental is non-transferable. The notion of the logical privacy of hallucinations thus seems to be a complex idea of something which is mentally private and non-transferably owner-private to which someone can have an exclusive epistemological access. So it is this notion of the logical privacy of hallucinated images which will have to be attacked if hallucinatory images are to be shown to be only contingently private.

There are obviously a number of inter-related difficulties here, and it is not at all easy to sort them out. I'm not sure I would succeed if I tried. One of the sources of difficulty is the metaphor of ownership and its associated notion of transferability. I don't want to try to dispense with the metaphor as this would require vast circumlocution. But some things regarding the relation of privacy/publicity distinctions to the notion of ownership and transferability have to be noted.

It might be best first to take note of the sort of situation in which the ideas of ownership and transferability, though still metaphorical, have some grip on the facts. They seem to me to be most naturally at home when we are dealing with a part-whole relation. My kidney is mine and it is transferable to you, whereupon it ceases to be mine in one sense, though not in another. In general, parts of bodies are sufficiently identifiable independently of the wholes of which they are or were parts to allow the notions of ownership and transferability a grip. What was part of my spatio-temporal history is now part of yours. It is when we bump up against things which do not exist in part-whole relations that trouble arises. My colour, for example, is uniquely particularized and identifiable only as mine. Even if you are of the same colour as I, your colour is owner-private yours. There are two separate exemplifications of a universal, and they cannot be exchanged. There thus seem to be two kinds of "property," transferable and non-transferable. It should be noted that the distinction between these two kinds of "property"-these two kinds of predicables - cuts across the distinction between persons and non-persons. My examples have been of things "owned" by persons, but I could have as easily chosen a non-personal material object such as a chair.

It should also be noted that the distinction between transferable and non-transferable ownership cannot be used to distinguish the psychological from the material. Both examples are of material properties. And the distinction cannot be used to sort out the epistemologically private from the epistemologically public. Both examples are of things which are epistemologically public. And finally, the distinction cannot be used to distinguish things which can exist only when perceived from things which can exist unperceived, i.e., the mentally private from the non-mentally public.

The question with which we are required to deal, viz., whether two persons can share numerically the same experience, cannot be settled by pointing out that such things as hallucinated images are owner-private, mentally private or epistemologically private. It is true enough - indeed, it is a matter of logic - that such experiences are owner-private as are all particularized "properties," material as well as psychological. And it is also true, at least as a matter of fact, that hallucinatory pink rats are epistemologically private in both senses. And they are mentally private; when I am not hallucinating, my pink rats do not exist, and, moreover, when I am hallucinating them the fact that there is an image does not depend on your being able to have the same experience in the way in which we conceive the existence of material objects to consist in their being perceivable (in the same way) by two or more persons. The question we have then to deal with is whether private experiences are transferable, and if so, to what extent. The question of extent arises because even if we can make out a sense in which you and I can be said to, e.g., see the numerically identical hallucinatory pink rat; (i.e., outline a set of conditions in which it would make sense to say this) there might be some limit to the extent to which I can transfer ownership of my pink rats. It may be

that, unlike my kidney, I can transfer only part-ownership of my hallucinations. But the question of extent does not raise difficulties of principle in making the private over into the public because similar matters of extent are involved in the matter of the perception of wholly public material objects. We do not allow the fact that two people cannot see an object from the same angle simultaneously or the fact that they cannot touch the same part of an object simultaneously to count against their simultaneously seeing and touching numerically the same wholly public object.

At this point I want to state explicitly an assumption which has governed and which will continue to govern much of what I have to say. It is not an assumption for which I intend to argue, chiefly because it would carry me too far afield. I assume that it is a contingently true proposition that all of a person's experiences are in some way or other causally dependent upon various states of his body. This proposition is pretty vague, and any defense of it would require, among other things, specifying whether particular states of the body are causally sufficient to produce particular experiences or only causally necessary. Also the proposition would have to be amplified in such a way as not to exclude a priori certain apparent logical possibilities such as the possibility of various sorts of para-normal experience. But my only concern here is that the proposition be contingently true. Now, are such things as hallucinatory images - things which are mentally and epistemologically private also non-transferably owner-private? Well, as a matter of fact they are. But only as a matter of fact. When I distinguished hallucinations and pathological illusions from normal illusions the distinctions came down primarily to a matter of contingent difference in the locus of the aberrant conditions which explain why a person is having the particular deviant experience

he is having. It is the differences in the locus of the aberrant conditions which is in back of the private/public distinctions. Also, but not universally, contingent differences in the ease with which the conditions can be duplicated are involved.

By way of contrast, let us look first at some of the things involved in seeing or otherwise perceiving public objects. If you and I are normal observers, i.e., our perceptual apparatuses are functioning normally, and I can easily duplicate the conditions under which you truthfully claim to see, hear, touch or otherwise perceive such-and-such, I will be able to do likewise. We are then said to share experiences and to perceive numerically the same thing. And we do not require the sort of Leibnitzian identity of conditions which the skeptic might try to palm off on us. If a skeptic should try to defeat our claim to perceive the same thing or, what comes to the same thing, to have the same ~~ex~~periences, on the ground that we cannot simultaneously see (etc.) from the same angle, we disallow the skeptical tack on the ground that each of us can shift his angle so as to see from the same angle at different moments. In general, all that we require is that the conditions be sufficiently similar, not indiscernably identical. It is not a general requirement for two people to perceive the same thing that they be able to perceive it simultaneously from the same angle, or even that they actually perceive it from the same angle at different moments. It is only required that each of them should be able to have the appropriate experiences upon situating himself on the same angle. What actually counts as sufficiently similar conditions for making identical first-person perceptual claims will depend upon the nature of the case at issue; it is an empirical matter.

If the skeptic should persist, and argue that really we cannot be



said to share experiences and to perceive the same thing because we cannot have our respective experiences under indiscernably identical conditions, he thereby reveals himself merely to be raising a demand which it is logically impossible to satisfy and which therefore can safely be ignored. He is raising the demand that I be you and that you be me. But each of us is individuated by his physical attributes and by his spatio-temporal location and history. It is analytic that each person has a different spatio-temporal history, so the skeptical requirement, if pushed far enough, amounts to the demand that we include spatio-temporal identity under "same conditions," i.e., it amounts to the incoherent demand that two persons be one. The skeptical protest over the propriety of our talk in terms of shared experiences even in respect of perception of public objects amounts to no more than a reminder that I cannot be you. It amounts to the demand that if I have an experience and you have an experience, then no matter how similar the conditions under which we have our experiences, the experiences are to count as two, and not one. But this is merely arbitrarily to insist on a criterion which we have no good reason to accept. And we have very good reason not to accept it. It leads to solipsism.

Similar considerations are at work as regards the privacy of hallucinations and pathological illusions. Generally the conditions under which you hallucinate pink rats will not be easily duplicated by me. The aberrant conditions involved have their locus in your perceptual apparatus. My being able to have the same experience - to see pink rats - perhaps even at the same apparent location at the foot of the bed - will be very much more difficult a matter than my being able to have the same experience as you in seeing the foot of the bed. I shall have to do something to my perceptual apparatus such as

drink copious quantities of alcohol for a long period of time. (Of course, it is likely to be much more complicated than this.) But the differences in the ease with which the conditions necessary for having a particular sort of experience are themselves to be obtained in a merely contingent difference, and it is on this contingent difference together with the difference in the locus of the aberrant conditions that the privacy of the hallucinatory images and pathological illusions rests. It is these contingent differences which make us adopt the convention that my hallucinated pink rats are private.

At this point I should expect that it will be objected that even if we should find ways very easily to duplicate the conditions under which pink rats are hallucinated, they will still be private to the individuals whose perceptual apparatuses are toyed with, and, moreover, that such individuals will only be hallucinating severally and not collectively. For each individual, the hallucinatory images will still be mentally, epistemologically, and ownership private. You and I can have similar such experiences but we cannot share the same experiences. After all, you cannot be me, and the conditions necessary for experiencing hallucinatory images are subjective conditions, not objective or impersonal ones. One does not have to have any disreputable skeptical motives to insist on this. Hallucinations and (normal) illusions are altogether different, as Austin argues, because the conditions by reference to which we distinguish and explain hallucinations and (normal) illusions are subjective in the former case and objective in the latter. This is why hallucinated images are owner-private. I cannot transfer my images to you without becoming you.

This objection, it seems to me, stems from two sources. The first

is a curious failure to see that subjective conditions, i.e., the conditions of the perceptual apparatus itself are always involved in experiencing (normal) illusions (not to speak of veridical experience) as well as in experiencing hallucinations so that the differences between them cannot be made out in terms of the state of our perceptual apparatuses alone unless the distinction is to amount to just a contingent difference in our apparatuses. The differences between illusions and hallucinations are made out in terms of the aberration in the conditions of perception, and not just in terms of the involvement of the perceptual apparatus, which is a constant factor in all experience.

But the more important source of the objection seems to me to be a beggarly imagination. It is true that now our resources for duplicating sufficiently similar conditions for enabling you to hallucinate pink rats too are of such a nature as to leave us in the situation posited in the objection; you and I can only experience qualitatively identical images and we can establish this qualitative identity only via identical narrations. Perhaps it will always be so. But it requires only a little effort to imagine fanciful conditions which are free of contradictions and which would allow us to say that you and I are experiencing numerically the same hallucinatory image. Such images would then be public to the only degree required to rule out any putative sui generis difference between hallucinations and (normal) illusions based upon a private/public distinction.

Suppose, for example, that through some rather adroit surgery you and I are able to look into each other's perceptual apparatuses so that when I see pink rats at the foot of the bed you can look up and "see them too" and vice versa. Why on earth shouldn't we say that we both see numerically the

same image? The only reason I can think of is that we are two different people, but we do not allow that to stop us from saying we see the same chair, and I don't see that it is any more potent a reason in these circumstances for saying that we just cannot be experiencing the same hallucinatory image. We can even allow a bit more leeway to our imaginations and imagine that while I am hooked up to you, you take a drug which somehow short-circuits your perceptual apparatus in such a way that you cease to see pink rats while I continue to do so while still hooked up to you. The existence of the image would continue to be dependent upon the condition of someone's perceptual apparatus, but not some particular person's apparatus. We can also imagine cases in which we should want to say that sometimes when I am hooked into you we see the numerically same images and sometimes, because of certain aberrant conditions, we only see very similar images, and we could establish criteria for distinguishing these cases. For example, we could imagine that we are nearly perfect - or perhaps even just perfect - artists with perfect or very nearly perfect tools and paints, and we could test whether we are seeing the same image by making coloured drawings. Congruence in shape and colour would be a criterion of the numerical identity of the image and slight incongruences the criterion of merely similar images. Or we could devise a way of photographing your image and mine by hooking ourselves up to a special sort of camera which translates nervous electrical impulses into photographic images. Again, a congruence test would establish identity or difference. (11)

But enough of fancy. Unless there is some logical incoherence in these imagined circumstances, they are sufficient to illustrate the contingent, indeed, the utilitarian character of our present criteria for distinguishing

the public from the private; the distinction is not a metaphysical one, but merely one of convenience resting upon certain actual conditions which might have been or might become different. Indeed, it would be most unwise to hold otherwise lest science upset our a priori apple-cart. Recent startling experiments in bio-physics clearly point the way to a sort of Orwellian world in which our most precious private possessions would be taken away from us and be made public property. I have in mind recent experiments in the transfer of RNA brain molecules from one set of rats to another. The first set of rats was trained to do certain tasks and the second set was left untrained. Some RNA molecules were extracted from the brains of the trained rats and fed to several untrained rats whereupon the untrained rats began to display an amazing untutored aptitude for performing the same tasks as the trained rats; certain memorial dispositions had been transferred from the first set to the second set of rats. With a growing sophistication of technique there is reason to suppose that in time we can transfer whole sets of memories from one to another human being, including verbalizable memories as well as skill-memories.

A very considerable number of things remain which could be said about privacy/publicity distinctions, but I must beg-off here with a few cursory concluding remarks.

In the first place perhaps it should be noted that privacy is not completely eliminated and "total" publicity is not achieved. Privileged access epistemological privacy remains even under the fanciful conditions imagined above - I have to hook into you, but you do not have to hook up with anything. You have a way of knowing you are hallucinating which I do not have. But this remaining epistemological privacy has no more vicious implications than

has the fact - the logical fact - that you and I cannot simultaneously see a material object from the same angle. Neither of these "facts" is a barrier to publicity, and both are merely amplifications of the tautology that I cannot be you.

Secondly, the kind of publicity obtainable under the imagined conditions should not be regarded as less than or inferior to the kind of publicity of material objects, or as marking a metaphysical difference between hallucinated pink rats, and, say, real rats. To think thusly would merely be to lament that hallucinatory pink rats, unlike real rats, are available only to a single sense modality, i.e., it would be merely to lament that hallucinated rats can never become as real as real rats, i.e., can never become material objects. Of course hallucinated rats can never become public material objects since they can never be found to have sensible qualities other than those they are experienced as having. If they could, they would not have been hallucinatory in the first place. Nevertheless, such hallucinated images can be considered material phenomena in line with the distinction between material objects and material phenomena outlined in chapter Two. Their "immateriality" and "unreality" is merely their lack of appropriate correlateable sensible qualities of the type specific to the sense of touch.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER THREE

THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION: SENSE-DATA AND ABNORMAL  
EXPERIENCE.

- (1) Roderick Firth makes a similar general judgment of the nature of The Argument from Illusion - his article "Austin and the Argument from Illusion" in Philosophical Review, vol. LXXIII, 1964, pp.372-382. His criticisms of Austin, however, are not in general similar to those I will make.
- (2) Ayer, A.J. Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.3.
- (3) Ayer, A.J. Ibid. p.5.
- (4) The underlined expressions here and in the following paragraphs are italicized expressions of Austin's exposition. The quotations of bits and pieces of Ayer's statement are from pages 5-6 of Foundations of Empirical Knowledge.
- (5) I want to note in passing a certain inaccuracy in Austin's exposition of Ayer's statement of the stick-in-water example. Austin states that Ayer says he is making two assumptions, viz., (a) that the stick does not change shape when placed in water, and (b) that it cannot be both straight and crooked. (p.21) Actually Ayer explicitly claims only (a) as an assumption, and it seems to me to be highly dubious that Ayer would claim or admit that (b) is or could be an assumption, i.e., something which we could take seriously the notion of denying. Even though "it (i.e., the stick) cannot be both crooked and straight" occurs in Ayer's argument in the material mode, Ayer would surely regard this statement mere as a rule of language than as an assumed fact about the stick of the example. He surely would not accord it empirical status either as an assumed fact or as the plain and incontestable fact Austin strangely says it is. As far as I can tell, nothing important hinges on Austin's misstatement of Ayer's statement of what he assumes in his argument. But it is worth taking note of because it illustrates how very carefully one must read Austin's text. Something important could hinge on some distortion or inaccuracy in Austin's statements of the views of his opponents, so it is well to be on one's guard at all times while reading Sense and Sensibilia.
- (6) Ayer, A.J. Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.4.
- (7) Ayer, A.J. Ibid. pp.4-5

(8) See, for example, Sir Roy Harrod's review-article "Sense and Sensibilia" in Philosophy, vol. XXXVIII, No. 145, July, 1963.

(9) See Roland Hall's "Excludere" in Analysis, vol. 20, No.1, October 1959 for a full discussion of this technical term. I use it in the way Hall prescribes.

(10) Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Med. VI

(11) N.R. Hanson in his "On Having the Same Visual Experience" in Mind, vol. LXIX, No. 275, July 1960 makes use of an extremely elaborate gedankamexperiment of a similar sort. It is a much more sophisticated one than I can muster. However, Hanson confines himself to trying to show how we could settle the question whether two persons can be known to have qualitatively "the same visual sense-datum experiences," and does not concern himself with the question whether two persons can, under elaborately imagined conditions, be said to have numerically the same sense-datum experience.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION:

#### SENSE DATA AND NORMAL EXPERIENCE

Fortunately, "Stage II" in part V of Sense and Sensibilia can be dealt with relatively briefly. After setting out Ayer's arguments, Austin offers a number of objections, illustrated by a number of cases. His objections can be stated briefly, and the cases he cites do not require detailed examination.

(1) Ayer's Argument: Ayer's argument is as follows: (1) There is "no difference in kind between those of our perceptions that are veridical in their presentation of material things and those that are delusive. When I look at a straight stick, which is refracted in water and so appears crooked, my experience is qualitatively the same as if I were looking at a stick that really was crooked....". But if "when our perceptions were delusive, we were always perceiving something of a different kind from what we perceive when they were veridical, we should expect our experience to be qualitatively different in the two cases. We should expect to be able to tell from the intrinsic character of a perception whether it was a perception of a sense-datum or of a material thing. But this is not possible...".

Ayer further argues that in veridical perceptions "we are not directly aware" of material things because "veridical and delusive perceptions may form a continuous series. Thus if I gradually approach an object from a distance, I may begin by having a series of perceptions which are delusive in the sense that the object appears to be smaller than it really

is. Let us assume that this series terminates in a veridical perception. Then the difference in quality between this perception and its immediate predecessor will be of the same order as the difference between any two delusive perceptions that are next to one another in the series....". But "these are differences of degree and not of kind. But this, it is argued, is not what we should expect if the veridical perception were a perception of an object of a different sort, a material thing as opposed to a sense-datum. Does not the fact that delusive and veridical perceptions shade into one another.....show that the objects that are perceived in either case are generically the same? And from this it would follow, if it was acknowledged that the delusive perceptions were perceptions of sense-data, that what we directly experienced was always a sense-datum and never a material thing."

(2) Austin's Critique: Austin raises a number of objections to all this, some in the form of rhetorical questions and some in the form of serious arguments. His own language suggests, however, that he recognizes that his rhetorical questions merely call for amplification of the sense-datum case, and raise no matters of principle.

Serialim, Austin's arguments are as follows: (1) Austin's first move (pp.48-9) is to question the alleged fact that "delusive and veridical experiences" are not "qualitatively different," i.e., he argues that they are in fact phenomenologically different, at least for the most part. He offers a number of cases: dreaming I am being presented to the Pope (if dreams are allowed as "delusive perceptions") could not, surely, seriously be considered "qualitatively indistinguishable" from actually being presented to the Pope; seeing a bright-green after-image against a white wall is not exactly like

seeing a bright green patch on the wall; seeing a white wall through blue spectacles is not exactly like seeing a blue wall; seeing pink rats in D.T's is not exactly like really seeing pink rats; seeing a stick refracted in water is not exactly like seeing a bent stick.

All these cases, the "delusive" and the "veridical," are "narrated in the same terms," but "it would be wildly wrong to conclude from this" that the cases are exactly alike. "In all these cases we may say the same things ("It looks blue," "It looks bent" etc.) but this is no reason at all for denying the obvious fact that the 'experiences' are different." (p.50)

(2) Next (p.50) Austin wants to know "the credentials" of the "curious general principle" that if two things are not "generically the same," then they cannot be alike, or nearly alike. Ayer says "we should expect" them to be qualitatively different. Austin wants to know why, e.g., if we are told that lemons and soap are generically different, we should expect "that no piece of soap could look just like a lemon."

(3) Another "erroneous principle" Ayer's argument "seems to rely on" is: "it must be the case that 'delusive' and veridical experiences" are not (as such) "qualitatively" or "intrinsically" distinguishable - for if they were distinguishable, we should never be "deluded."" Austin denies this because from the fact that someone fails to distinguish A from B (and hence is taken in), "it does not follow at all that A and B must be indistinguishable." Greater care and attention might be all that is required to make the distinction. But how "is the fact that an uninstructed child probably would not discriminate between being refracted and being crooked supposed to establish.....that there is no "qualitative" difference between the two cases?"

Curiously, Austin concedes that "there may be cases in which 'delusive and veridical experiences' really are 'qualitatively indistinguishable'." (p.52) He merely wishes to deny that (a) they are common, and (b) that there have to be such cases to account for the fact that we are sometimes "deceived by our senses." But he does not think that this concession requires the admission of sense-data for "even if we were to make the prior admission....that in "abnormal" cases we perceive sense-data, we should not be obliged to extend this admission to the "normal" cases too. For why on earth should it not be the case that, in some few instances, perceiving one sort of thing is exactly like perceiving another?"

(4) Finally, Austin points out that a "quite general difficulty in assessing the force of this argument" (p.53) is that we do not know and are not told what "a perception" is. How many circumstances in e.g., the refracted stick case, are to be included in "the perception?" Is the water in which the stick is immersed to be included? If so, "surely this is a perfectly obvious respect in which "the perception" differs from, is distinguishable from, the "perception" we have when we look at a bent stick not in water." Of course, "the presence or absence of water is not the main thing" in these cases since we are chiefly interested in the stick, but "in fact,.....discrimination between one thing and another very frequently depends on such more or less extraneous concomitants of the main thing, even when such concomitants are not consciously taken note of." And if such extraneous concomitants are ruled out, "how much interest or importance would be left in the contention that "delusive" and "veridical" perceptions are indistinguishable? Inevitably, if you rule out the respects in which A and B differ, you may expect to be left with respects in which they are alike."

(3) Examination of Austin's Critique:

(A) Qualitative Indistinguishability, Austin, I believe, has partly missed the point of the argument from illusion regarding "qualitative indistinguishability," but nevertheless suggests, somewhat obliquely, a serious question regarding the legitimacy of the argument.

The point of the notion of qualitative indistinguishability is not that one can never find some difference between, say, looking at a blue wall and looking at a white wall through blue spectacles or seeing a bent stick out of water and seeing a straight stick immersed in water. Austin is right in saying that a closer look at the cases would reveal differences. And in the case of after-images, one would have to be very inattentive to mistake them for spots on the wall; after all, they wiggle in a way spots do not. If the argument from illusion were intended to deny all this, it would unquestionably fail of its purpose. But the point is, rather, that if one were ignorant of the fact that one was seeing through blue spectacles or that water is a refractive medium, one could not infer just from the phenomenal character of the experience that there is some failure of the coincidence of appearance and reality, and if one did not know that there is such a category of things as after-images or hallucinated pink rats one could not tell or have any reason for supposing that one is not seeing a flitting image projected onto the wall from somewhere else or that one is not seeing a pink rat. Similarly, dreams usually seem quite different when viewed retrospectively in the light of the knowledge that one was dreaming. But at the time of dreaming they often seem quite real.

Of course, once one has acquired the relevant knowledge, it is

usually a simple matter to distinguish the real from the apparent in a situation. One learns that water is a distorting medium and thus learns to expect that a stick will look different in water from the way it looks out of water. But acquiring such knowledge is itself a matter of finding out that certain kinds of coherences are obtained under such-and-such conditions but not others. But if one does not know that water distorts, one could be misled as to the shape of the stick. After all, the stick does look bent even if it does not look just like a bent stick out of water. Since normally there is a coherence between the shape things visually appear as having and the shape they are felt to have, ignorance of a special distorting condition effectively amounts to a supposition of the normality of things and an expectation that the stick will continue to look bent when pulled from the water. This, it seems to me, is partly what the notion of qualitative indistinguishability is designed to bring out, and I do not see that Austin has offered any considerations that tend to show that it is somehow wrong. How could paying closer attention to the fact that the stick is half-immersed protect one from expecting it to look bent - to be bent - when pulled from the water if one is ignorant of the refractive nature of water? Attention would reveal a qualitative difference between seeing a stick half-immersed in water and seeing a stick out of water, but no amount of attention to such differences would lead one to suspect that the stick in the water would not continue to appear bent out of water. This is something which could only be discovered by further experience. Moreover, given two sticks half-immersed in water, one straight and the other crooked, both will look bent. One could not determine a priori or by paying closer attention to the case which stick really is bent and which really is straight. And this would be true for the most wary

philosopher as well as for an uninstructed child.

For some reason Austin seems to think it unimportant or uninteresting that hallucinatory or illusory experiences are "narrated in the same terms" as veridical cases, that "I see a pink rat" is an appropriate report in the case of hallucinated rats as well as in the case of actually seeing a pink rat. But this fact cries out for analysis. Why should I choose this expression rather than, say, "I see a pink elephant" in reporting my hallucination? Surely it must be for the reason that I am experiencing a set of qualities which are very similar to what I would be experiencing if I were really seeing a pink rat. My experience would have to be very different to prompt me to say "I see a pink elephant." "I see a pink rat" describes my experience in a way "I see a pink elephant" could not, and this fact requires explaining. Austin's argument is that we cannot infer from the qualitative indistinguishability of the hallucinatory and the veridical case - and he does concede that there can be such cases - that what we see in both cases is of the same kind, i.e., not generically different. But this just ignores the fact that "I see a pink rat" in an hallucinatory case is being used by the sense-datist to describe an experience, not to categorize it as an hallucination. It is being used in a way which is supposed to be consistent with either actually seeing a pink rat or with hallucinating. Only if it is being used to classify the experience as an hallucination or mis-classify it as an experience of seeing a real pink rat could "I see a pink rat" be used to delineate objects of some sort, and of course hallucinated objects are generically different from material objects. But this brings up matters to be discussed below and also in the following chapter.

Nevertheless, Austin has, it seems to me, raised a serious problem. The argument from illusion is not designed merely to illustrate and confirm the fact that things are not always as they seem. It would be pretty trivial, even banal, if it was. It is supposed to be of value in helping us to distinguish between the data upon which perceptual claims are based and the constructions which we put upon the data when we make a perceptual claim as regards some material object. Austin's criticisms suggest that the argument is a question-begging cheat.

The suggestion that the argument from illusion is a cheat arises in the following way: The argument is supposed to help us refine the notion of sense-datum out of the notion of appearances. Actually, of course, "appearance" is chiefly a visual word, but this is held to be no difficulty; sounds, odours etc., are to count as auditory and olfactory appearances by a not too unnatural extension. In any case, "appearance" usually carries with it implications as to the identity of the experience; an appearance will be an appearance of something or other. The concept of a sense-datum is supposed to be refined out of the notion of appearances by cutting off such implications; a sense-datum is supposed to be an appearance qua appearance and is supposed to be without implications as to status. When we make a claim to see (or otherwise perceive) some material object, we go beyond the data themselves and assign them a status as, say, that of a table. Austin's criticisms suggest that this program cannot be carried out because it is impossible to draw a hard line between appearances and their interpretations in a perceptual situation. This is impossible because previous experience, attention, one's expectations, and one's general psychological constitution will make a



difference in appearance - in what is seen and how it seems. Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit would be an excellent illustration of this. Someone who has never seen a duck and has no concept at all of ducks would never see the duck-rabbit as a duck, whereas someone else familiar with ducks and rabbits would be able to see the figure as now a rabbit, now a duck. They would have quite different experiences in seeing the same geometrical figure drawn on a piece of paper. Appearances would be different for each of them. It is difficult to see how the sense-datum could come by the notion of a qualitatively the same datum constant for both observers which is interpreted differently by the two observers, especially since he is barred from defining the single datum experienced by each observer in terms of what physically is there to be seen; a sense-datum is supposed to be without implications as to its status. But how else, in this case, can a datum be individuated in the required way in order that it can be a subject for interpretation?

Such seems to me to be a criticism implied by Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion, and especially by his discussion of qualitative indistinguishability and his complaints about the tendentiousness of the language of the argument.(p.47). Such expressions as "a perception," "delusive perception," and "veridical perception" appear to be highly question-begging because they seem to suggest the thing at issue, viz., that we can draw a clear-cut distinction between data and inference or construction or interpretation in perceptual claims. How else is one to understand the function of "delusive" and "veridical" other than as indicating the inferential or judgmental aspects of perception? Ayer appears to mean by a "veridical perception" (and mutatis mutandis for "delusive perception") something like "an experience of appearances on the basis of which a predictively correct judgment

is made as to the coherence patterns which hold between these appearances and others which are contemporaneously and subsequently obtainable." Since the argument from illusion is commonly taken to provide us with the where-withal for such an analysis, it seems question-begging to use expressions which seem to presuppose this very type of analysis. So, since the differences between delusive and veridical perceptions are supposed to be judgmental and not phenomenological, and since Austin's criticisms of the idea of qualitative indistinguishability raise suspicion in this regard, it would appear that the argument from illusion, at least in Ayer's formulation, is a cheat.

This implicit criticism seems to me to be a powerful one. In order to circumvent it, the sense-datist is going to have to argue that even if it is a pervasive fact that appearances are never destitute of the constructions we put upon them, this is merely a contingent fact, and we do not have to distinguish between appearances and construction so as to preclude the possibility that appearances are always deeply infected with implications as to their status. What is required is a vocabulary for describing appearances in such a way that we do not commit ourselves one way or another on the question of the rightness or wrongness of the implications of appearances. The purity of appearances - their being generically the same in an hallucinatory and a veridical case - is to be understood as the non-implicatory descriptive purity of the language of appearances such that our descriptions will be true of appearances irrespective of the normal implications of our identifications of appearances as say, "pink rat appearances."

Since we begin with ordinary language, an implication-free language of appearances will be genetically dependent upon our ordinary categorical identifications. Normally we identify appearances of x's via our identifications of x's because we are normally chiefly interested in x's; our interest in appearances of x's is normally confined to their roles as intimations of x's. But this seems to be contingent upon the fact that ordinary language is a highly practical tool not fitted for highly theoretical purposes. If so, there should be no reason in principle why "X-appearance" cannot be treated as a purely qualitative description and given pride of place, for special purposes, as analytically primitive.

Such an ambitious bootstrap operation would have to face up to the obstacles placed in its path by Austin's doctrine of adjectival-words - the chief subject of the next chapter.

(B) Sense-Data as Extra Objects: Austin's fire has been chiefly directed at a concept of sense-data as objects, as particulars or entities over and above or in addition to the sorts of entities we allow in our common sense conceptual scheme. This is quite clear from his repeated characterizations of sense-data as "immaterial" somethings seen (or otherwise perceived) in addition to or as well as camouflaged churches, sticks immersed in water, etc. He repeatedly raises the question, in varying forms, why on earth we should, e.g., suppose in the stick-in-water case that there is something which we see and which is not the stick or part of the stick and which really is bent. What we are seeing is provided by the initial statement of the cases Ayer cites, and to ask further questions about what we are seeing is, he says, "completely mad." (p.30)

It is impossible not to feel considerable sympathy for Austin in this matter. Sense-data as extra objects are weighted down with difficulties, as the critics of sense-datum theory have always pointed out; the problem of finding a criterion for distinguishing between the occurrence of two similar sense-data and the recurrence of numerically the same sense-datum would itself be enough to harry a man to an early grave. In any case, Ayer's language certainly does suggest that sense-data are extra entities (although he later disavows any intention to posit such entities) and Austin's criticisms and queries are warranted as warnings against taking such a turn.

Moreover, Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion serves adequately to point out a very real difficulty for sense-datum theory if sense-data are construed as particulars or objects. We cannot make use of particulars such as hallucinated images as examples of sense-data if we are trying to find something common - something generically of the same kind - in abnormal and normal experience, that is, something which would be the same whether or not one is hallucinating. For to say that an image is an hallucinatory image is already to assign it a non-neutral status in rerum natura, i.e., to say that it is not generically the same kind of thing as what one sees when one sees a real pink rat or the like.

Austin's criticisms, then, must be taken seriously to the extent that they indicate a need to modify the argument from illusion so as to eliminate the suggestion that sense-data are entities of some sort. This might be difficult since it would involve, at first anyway, making use of expressions from ordinary language which are loaded with vitiating implications. Intentional words like "see" are especially dangerous in this regard. In any case modifications are called for which make it clear that one is trying to say

something about experience simpliciter, that one is trying to describe an experience without standardizing it.

(4) Direct and Indirect Perception:

More needs to be said about "direct" and "indirect" perception. Since Austin has conceded that the notion of sense-data can perhaps be made to do a job in connection with hallucinated images, it will perhaps be best to begin by considering the notion of "direct perception" as it relates to such images. And since Austin has also conceded that there can be qualitatively indistinguishable veridical and delusive perceptions, I should be able to extend my remarks in order to indicate something of how directly perceived sense-data are also involved in the indirect perception of material objects.

I want to develop my views by contrast with the views of Norman Malcolm in his article "Direct Perception!".<sup>(2)</sup> There is much of value in Malcolm's article, but there is also much that is very badly wrong. By sorting the wheat from the chaff, we ought to be able to form a clearer notion of direct and indirect perception and of sense-data.

Malcolm examines the concept of "seeing an after-image" and compares it with "seeing a physical reality" in order to arrive at a concept of direct perception and also in order to prove that material things cannot be directly seen. Seeing after-image is not very like seeing hallucinatory pink rats, but both are species of hallucinations as I have defined hallucinations, and only minor changes are required in our language in shifting from discussion of hallucinated pink rats to discussion of after-images or vice versa. The principles are the same.

Malcolm contrasts seeing an after-image with seeing a physical reality by means of setting out the sorts of things which can and cannot be said of the two sorts of cases. His discussion is quite detailed, but it can be stated summarily: It is, he says, absurd to suppose that two people can see the same after-image; the concepts of numerical identity and difference do not apply to after-images, but only to material objects. We therefore have no idea at all what it would be like for two people to see the same after-image, or for them to fail to do so. We might think, mistakenly, that we have some idea of the application of the concept of numerical identity to after-images by concluding from the fact that A has an after-image and that B has an after-image that "two after-images exist", but we should be wrong because this is only another - misleading - way of saying that each of two people has an after-image.

Moreover, mistakes, in the sense of perceptual errors, are impossible in seeing and reporting after-images. They contrast sharply with material objects in this way, according to Malcolm. After-image reports are, he says, incorrigible. It is always conceivable that someone making a physical reality report has made a mistake, a perceptual error; what he takes to be flames on the horizon might turn out to be billowing colours in the sky. But if someone is in such circumstances that it would not be a misuse of language to say of him that he sees an after-image, then his claim to see an after-image cannot be mistaken. This does not mean, however, that such reports cannot be corrected in the sense that I cannot correct the language I have used in describing my after-image, as when I say it is blue when "purple" would have been more appropriate, or in the sense that I can withdraw my

report if I find that I was in circumstances in which it would be a misuse of language to say "I see an after-image". But there is a sense in which I cannot be mistaken in my after-image reports; if I am in the proper circumstances and my words are being used correctly, it would be senseless to think that I could be wrong.

Malcolm points out that in discussions of "directly perceive" (and its cognates) in the literature, one frequently finds that which is directly perceived discussed in terms of "the given," or as that about which "no error" or "no doubt" is possible, or as that which is not arrived at "by inference" etc. All of this, Malcolm says, quite correctly, I believe, comes to the same thing, viz., "no possibility of error." The notion of direct perception has to be defined in terms of "no possibility of error." When it is so defined, it is clear that after-images are directly perceived, and also that no material object is or could be directly perceived. Accordingly, he offers a first, provisional definition, viz.;

"A directly perceives x if and only if A's assertion that he perceives x could not be mistaken; and A directly perceives that x has property F if and only if A's assertion that he perceives that x is F could not be mistaken."

He later amends this definition, or, rather, adds an extra condition to make it conform to a requirement of C.E. Moore's that the sense of "perceive" or "see" involved differ from the sense of "see" in "I see my hand." Moore thought that at least two different senses of "see" turn on the question of how much is seen of x. Malcolm's final formula is:

"A directly sees x if and only if A could not be mistaken in asserting that he sees x and there is not a bit of x he does not see."

It is clear that after-images are, on this definition, directly perceived and that opaque material objects are not. Neither are non-opaque material objects such as crystal wine-glasses since one could make some perceptual error in perceiving them.

Malcolm has a long aside on what he regards as the ambiguity of "could not be mistaken." He thinks there are cases, viz., when one is in "the best possible circumstances," in which one "could not be mistaken" in making a perceptual claim to see some physical reality, although such claims remain corrigible in the sense that it is possible for someone to conceive of perceptual error in such a case, albeit not the person actually making the claim. But since there is no contrast between "the best possible circumstances" and some set of faulty circumstances in after-image cases, nobody could conceive of the possibility of perceptual error in seeing an after-image. It is in this latter sense that "could not be mistaken" is to be taken in his definition of "directly perceive." But the details of Malcolm's distinction are not especially pertinent here.

Unfortunately, Malcolm does not discuss the question whether, in accordance with his definition, there is anything which is directly perceived in the indirect perception of material things. And he says distressingly little about sense-data, although he regards after-images as paradigmatic cases of sense-data. In order to sort out the rights and wrongs in Malcolm's discussion, thereby to come to a clearer conception of the direct perception of sense-data, it is important to see how after-images - and hallucinatory images generally - can be said to provide examples of sense-data.

In line with the caveat in(B) above, we must resist the temptation



to think that it is as hallucinated images or as after-images that they provide us with examples of sense-data. Both "hallucinated" and "after-image" are expressions with a place in our common sense conceptual scheme, and their application to a case implies a contrast between, for example, private images which do not exist unperceived and public images such as reflections which exist whether or not they are seen. If we allow after-images or the like to serve as such as paradigms of sense-data, we thereby commit ourselves to a view of sense-data as relatively momentary private particulars. Even though, as I have argued earlier, their privacy can be theoretically eliminated, their relative short-lividdness and ontological dependency remains to give rise to all the familiar old problems of sense-datum theory as regards the construction of a concept of independent, enduring, public material objects which can exist unperceived from such dependent momentary private particulars.

Hallucinations are pedagogically handy for introducing the notion of sense-data just because in hallucinations we are confronted with, so to speak, disembodied sensible qualities having no correlations with other sensible qualities appropriate to other sense modalities. It is thus psychologically easier to abstract the notion of a sensible quality having no entangling alliances from a hallucinatory context than it is from a normal perceptual situation in which, for example, visual qualities are sunk in consanguineous relations with tactual or other qualities. But the danger of introducing sense-data via hallucinations is that we are apt to fail to distinguish what is to count as the sense-datum from the hallucinatory image, and thereby slip into the view of sense-data as private "objects."

In order to distill the notion of a sense-datum from the after-image

case, we can begin by pointing out, contra-Malcolm, that it is possible to make a perceptual error, an error of fact, in making an after-image report. Indeed, Malcolm himself can be credited with stating the conditions under which such an error is possible. If, in answer to the question, "What do you see?", I reply "I see a blue star-shaped after-image," I make a perceptual error if I am in no position to be having the experience of seeing an after-image - if I have not done or had done to me the sorts of things which produce after-images. Malcolm rather queerly supposes that in such a case I have merely misused language in making my report - pasted on the wrong label - but have made no error of fact. But if I identify what I see as an after-image, my statement implies a whole host of factual claims as to the nature of the conditions under which I am having my experience, and any number of these might turn out to be false. You can defeat my claim just by showing me that what would have to be the case if my claim is to be true isn't actually the case. In this respect, after-image reports do not differ at all from ordinary material object claims. Malcolm cheats in trying to distinguish between after-image reports and what he calls physical reality reports in terms of the "proper conditions" for using words "correctly." It turns out on his account that the proper conditions for using "after-image" correctly are just the conditions under which it would be true to say that I see an after-image, whereas the "proper conditions" for my saying "I see flames on the horizon" are such that allow my use of "flames" to be correct but also such that my report need not be true. Malcolm is packing too much into "proper conditions" and "correctly" as these phrases apply to after-image cases or too little as they apply to seeing flames on the horizon. He thereby equivocates on "correct," meaning in the one case "conformity to fact" and in the other something like "conformity

to an approved conventional grammatical standard for using the English word 'flames'."

Even so, there remains something about after-image reports which seems to make them somewhat more secure than the run-of-the-mill material object claim. If we can isolate this, we isolate the sense-datum aspect of after-image reports. "I see a blue star-shaped after-image" - this was my reply to "What do you see?." Borrowing an apt expression from Locke, I want to characterize this statement and all others relevantly similar to it as a statement in a mixed mode. I call it a statement in a mixed mode because it is a complex statement compounded out of two distinct types of statement. When asked "What do you see?" I could have given either of two different types of answer. My reply could have been "What I see is an after-image" or "What I see is blue and star-shaped." That is, I could have given an identification of what I saw, or a description of what I saw. Instead, in accordance with what is probably the more common practice, I gave an answer which was a mixture of identification and description.

Let us look a little more closely at the question "What do you see?" and at the three possible types of answer, viz., (1) "I see a blue star-shaped after-image," (2) "What I see is an after-image," and (3) "What I see is blue and star-shaped." The indefinite pronoun "what", the copula "is" and the indefinite articles are what concern us for the moment. (We can ignore the fact that the article is "a" in one sentence and "an" in the other - the difference is merely a matter of English grammar.) One of the chief uses of indefinite articles is to tie down the application of a noun or noun phrase to a case, i.e., in one of their chief uses they are a grammatical indication

that an identification is in the offing. In this way they differ significantly from the definite article "the" as used in identity statements. But "is" and "what" are notoriously ambiguous, and can be used in identity statements, identifications, descriptions, and in many other ways as well.

What I want to suggest is that inattention to the functions of the indefinite articles, and the ambiguities of "is" and "what" together with the peculiar nature of after-images such that the looks/is distinction does not apply to them tend to make us slip back and forth between identity and identification when confronted with mixed mode perceptual statements about such things as after-images; a sort of logical illusion tends to be produced in which the reference of the indefinite pronoun "what" and of the grammatical object of "see" in the descriptive statement "What I see is blue and star-shaped" are identified with the referent of the indefinite pronoun "what" and the grammatical object of "see" in the identificatory statement "What I see is an after-image." It is this sort of thing, I think, which leads Malcolm, and also a number of other sense-datum theorists in the past, to suppose that after-images and the like are sense-data in a way which pushes us into thinking of sense-data as "objects" like after-images - insubstantial coloured patches in one's private visual field and the like. From this it is but a short step to asking and trying to answer questions in terms appropriate for questions and answers about after-images, e.g., "Can sense-data exist unperceived?" But attention to the fact that even in cases of (putative) after-images one can maintain that one's descriptive statement is true while withdrawing one's identificatory statement should help us to see our way through at least part of the woods.

What I am arguing, then, is that in cases in which "What do you see?" can be asked, this question can always be given either a descriptive answer or an identificatory answer, and further that what is referred to in the descriptive answer is never to be identified with - is never identical with - that which is referred to in the identificatory answer. Rather, that to which I refer in my descriptive answer is identified as that to which I refer in my identificatory answer. I identify the blue star shape which I see as an after-image. If we think of examples of identity statements in which what is apparently one thing is identified with what is apparently another, e.g., "The Morning Star is the Evening Star" we find that in such cases two independent identificatory expressions are asserted to have the same referent. We do not find identity statements in which the referent of a descriptive expression is asserted to be identical with the referent of an identificatory expression. Nor do we find cases in which what is referred to by an identificatory expression is identified as what is referred to by a descriptive expression, although it might seem so in such statements as "My copy of Sense and Sensibilia is blue." Here we have an identification by means of description.

"Sense-datum" then is to be understood as a generic name for anything which can be referred to by the grammatical objects of perceptual verbs in descriptive perceptual claims, whereas "material object" and "material phenomenon" are generic names for the sorts of things referred to by the grammatical objects of perceptual verbs in identificatory perceptual claims. (It should be clear that I regard hallucinatory images and the like as material phenomena.) A sense-datum is a Berkeleyian sensible quality considered as such irrespective

of its status as a quality of a material object, the quality of an after-image or what not.

Questions concerning the relations between descriptions and identifications e.g., whether the latter can be reduced to the former, cannot be treated here, but at least some things can be said which will throw light on the idea of direct perception and on the chief flaws in Malcolm's treatment of the notion. Malcolm quite correctly defined "directly see" in terms of "could not be mistaken!" and "not a bit of x which is not seen." We have already seen how Malcolm is wrong in thinking that one cannot be factually mistaken in claiming to see an after-image, and the source of his error - his identification of the sensible qualities he saw with the after-image - has been exposed. But his intuition is nevertheless sound. There is a sense in which one could not be mistaken other than merely verbally in making a sense-datum report or, indeed, an after-image report in a mixed mode. Since the looks/is distinction is inapplicable to both after-image and sensible qualities it would be senseless to suggest that I might be mistaken in saying that what (descriptively) I see is, say, blue and star-shaped. But the reason it would be senseless in respect of sensible qualities is different from the reason it would be senseless in respect of after-images. The reason why it would be senseless to suggest the possibility of error in respect of sensible qualities is that the question "Is what you see (descriptively) really blue?" suggests that it might be possible for an instantiation of the universal "blue" not to be blue, and this is nonsense. But the reason it is senseless to suggest that the after-image might not be blue is that the notion of qualitative error as regards the properties of some object presupposes that

one can vary the conditions under which one sees the object in order to get a better look at it; but this, as Malcolm says, is impossible as regards after-images. Indeed, this is one of the things about after-images which distinguishes them from other sorts of images and from material objects.

We can also see why Malcolm was intuitively right to include "not a bit of x which is not seen" in his definition of "directly see". It is true that when one sees an after-image there is not a bit of it which one does not see. One of the rough and ready ways of contrasting after-images with material objects (at least opaque ones) is to point out that material objects can have parts which cannot be seen all at once. Even crystal-clear material objects can have parts which contingently cannot be seen if, e.g., they are half-hidden from view. It is also true, but in another sense, that whatever one offers as a sense-datum answer to the question "What do you see?", there must not be a bit of it which is not seen. But here "not a bit of x which is not seen" is not being used to contrast two kinds of object but rather to reject the very possibility of raising the question whether sense-data are the sorts of things which can have unseen parts, i.e., to reject the question whether they are more like material objects or more like after-images. At least this is how this phrase ought to be used, if it is used at all, in defining "directly see." Finally, we can also see what is wrong with the second half of Malcolm's initial definition, viz., "A directly perceives that x has property F if and only if A's assertion that he perceives that x is F could not be mistaken." Malcolm here is clearly but mistakenly thinking of things which can be directly perceived as objects of some sort.

By contrasting seeing sensible qualities with seeing material objects

in terms of the above discussion, we can see straightaway without the need of detailed discussion why material objects cannot be directly perceived. When we make a material object perceptual claim we use an identificatory expression of some sort - say, "chair" - which thereby commits us to a number of far-flung implications. Identifications are necessarily tendentious in ways descriptions are not. They are tendentious in two ways which are not always easy to distinguish, but which, I take it, it is part of the business of philosophy to distinguish. They commit us to the whole conceptual apparatus of common sense and also to certain empirical implications within the framework of common sense. If, for example, I claim to see a chair, I commit myself to innumerable implications as to the sorts of experiences I would have if I were to do certain things - try to touch it, try to burn it etc. I also commit myself to certain other implications, e.g., that it occupies space (in the sense that it fills a volume, not merely in the sense that it has spatial location,) that it has had a history, that it can exist when not perceived, that it will look different under different conditions, that it is public etc. For present purposes I do not need to decide which of these implications form part of the metaphysical framework of common sense and which are empirical implications which follow from my statement once the framework is granted. The point is that in making my claim I do not actually see that these implied facts (empirical or metaphysical) are the case. If I am reminded of the possibility of illusion etc. I will be forced to retreat to a descriptive answer to the question "What do you actually or strictly speaking see?". This traditionally has been one of the main attractions of the argument from illusion - to force upon us a recognition of a distinction between what we can say "incorrigibly" or "strictly speaking" and what we can say only subject



to error. It is in this that the distinction between direct and indirect perception resides, as Malcolm rightly points out. Malcolm's main mistake was to try to isolate that which is directly perceived by means of examining the sorts of things referred to by means of common sense identificatory expressions such as "after-image" and to suppose that after-images are identical with the sensible qualities one experiences in the having of after-images. It is only natural if one goes this route that common sense will protest, rightly, that there is nothing at all anywhere nearly like after-images involved in seeing physical objects. But if we construe "sense-datum" in a quasi-Berkeleyian fashion, i.e., without Berkeley's unfortunate tendency both to hypostatize sensible qualities and to regard them as not existing "without the mind", we can regard the distinction between direct and indirect perception as a queer sort of reflection of the differences between the circumspection of description and the tendentiousness of identification.

I do not intend to discuss further here or in subsequent chapters the notion of direct perception. I want to leave it with the observations that "direct" and "indirect" have been the source of no end of trouble in philosophy and perhaps ought to be dropped altogether.

(5) Some Traditional Problems of Sense-Data can be Circumvented.

Finally (for now), I want to point out that a number of the metaphysical problems of sense-datum theory are circumvented altogether if one avoids the hypostatization of sensible qualities. For example, the question whether sense-data can exist unperceived can be prevented from arising at all, or it can be allowed but given a perfectly innocent answer. We can rule that only those things which can be referred to by means of an identificatory

expression are things about which we can raise questions of existence, and thus rule out the question. Or we can permit the question but give it an innocent answer by saying that the ideas of "existing unperceived" and "existing only when perceived" are endemic to our common sense conceptual scheme and apply respectively to things like chairs and after-images so that to ask, e.g., whether blueness can exist unperceived is to ask whether blue things can exist unperceived. The answer is that some can and some cannot. Both ways of treating the question come to the same thing. Questions about privacy and publicity or about the ontological status of sense-data can be similarly dealt with.

The danger of hypostatization is, however, great. The grammar of our language together with our overwhelming practical interest in material objects virtually forces it upon us.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER FOUR

- (1) Ayer, A.J: Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, pp.5-9.
- (2) Malcolm, N: "Direct Perception" in Knowledge and Certainty,  
Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New  
Jersey, 1963, pp.73-95.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SENSE-DATA AND THE NATURE OF REALITY

(1) Introduction: Most of the remainder of Sense and Sensibilia is devoted to an evaluation of Ayer's own evaluation of the argument from illusion and to various criticisms of his reasons for wishing to introduce sense-data. Austin continues to examine Ayer's use of language in formulating his sense-datum views. But a new dimension of criticism not hitherto present in the text to any important degree makes its appearance. Ayer not only uses language in ways Austin considers inappropriate, but he also utters a number of pronouncements about language which Austin regards as thoroughly wrong-headed. These centre chiefly on the meaning of "real" and on an alleged ambiguity in perceptual verbs in ordinary language. Austin therefore undertakes to examine Ayer's views on these linguistic matters in considerable detail. As I stated in Chapter One, I will not deal with Austin and Ayer on "two senses of 'see'" because I regard Austin's criticisms of Ayer on this matter as generally satisfactory and because Austin himself admits (p.102) that the introduction of sense-data does not turn upon allegiance to the doctrine that verbs of perception in ordinary language are ambiguous.

Toward the end of Chapter One I raised three questions to be kept in mind in assaying Austin's work, viz., (1) When it looks as if Austin is engaged in careful exposition of an opponent's position, is he fair to his opponent, or does he distort things?, (2) Are the assumptions and implications behind sense-datum theory which Austin tries to "expose" really what Austin says they are?, and (3) Even if Austin's exposition and exposure is, in a

particular case, accurate and correct, does it cut any ice, i.e., is it persuasive against sense-datum theory generally? These heuristic questions will continue to impart shape and direction to what follows. However, I think I have sufficiently demonstrated throughout the previous three chapters how unfair Austin sometimes is in his exposition of the views of his chief bete noir, A. J. Ayer. I shall therefore henceforth largely neglect matters arising out of reading Austin in the light of the first question. I am not, after all, primarily interested in rapping knuckles or in handing out kudos. I am mainly interested in matters relating to the second and third questions.

As I have remarked previously, Sense and Sensibilia is a very poorly organized book. I shall therefore take the liberty of arranging the remainder of the material I will be dealing with in ways more suitable to my purposes.

(2) "Looks," "Seems," and "Appears":

Austin's work on "looks," "seems," and "appears" must be dealt with first. As I noted in the previous chapter, the part of Sense and Sensibilia in which Austin deals with these words is inserted between the two parts of the book dealing with the argument from illusion, and Austin nowhere states, much less argues for, the connection of his work on "looks," "seems," and "appears" with anything which precedes or follows it. His sole justification, such as it is, for including this material is that Ayer "makes pretty free use of the expressions "look," "appear" and "seem" - apparently (my italics) in the manner of most other philosophers, attaching no great importance to the question which expression is used where, and indeed implying by the speed of his philosophocal flight that they could be used interchangeably (my

italics); that there is nothing much to choose between them." (p.33) But, he says, these words "have quite different uses, and it often makes a great difference which one you use." (p.33) He concedes that there are cases or contexts in which they are more or less interchangeable, But the differences are important so that "by way of avoiding misguided assimilations" we have to consider "numerous examples of uses of ~~these~~ expressions, until in the end we get the feel of the thing." (p.34) The implication seems to be that Ayer has misguidedly assimilated quite different uses of these words; and presumably the cogency of his arguments is thereby rendered doubtful or problematic.

Since Austin does not actually attempt to make a case against Ayer, I shall pass over his implied criticism of Ayer, noting only that Ayer's use of "looks," "seems," and "appears" seem quite normal, quite natural, to me. But perhaps I haven't got "the feel of the thing." So I shall confine myself to taking a look at what Austin has to say of these words with the aim of determining whether his remarks militate against sense-datum theory.

Even this modest task is not easy. Austin groups his examples according to the sorts of grammatical constructions in which "looks," "seems," and "appears" can occur in the English language rather than in accordance with the differences in the logical functions of these words which, I take it, his examples are intended to exhibit. Even worse, in his actual discussions of the various uses of "looks," "seems," and "appears," Austin makes no use of his initial examples, but uses other examples which often seem quite different. Part IV of Sense and Sensibilia is therefore really quite messy. Sorting out all of Austin's examples into groups more clearly exhibiting similarities and differences in the logical functions of "looks," "seems,"

and "appears" would be a lengthy task which I do not care to undertake. I shall therefore concentrate only on several examples which will enable me to see something about several typically different uses of these words. Austin does not bother to name or classify the different uses in question. I shall do so in my explication of what I think Austin is doing. There is, unavoidably, some danger here in misreading Austin.

Before I begin, let me concede from the outset that Austin entirely succeeds in illustrating the fact that English words "looks," "seems," and "appears" cannot always occur in the same grammatical constructions in the English language and also in establishing the fact that each of these words can have quite different uses. It is quite true that we can say "It appears as a dark spot on the horizon" but not "It seems as a dark spot on the horizon." And it is also true that "The hill looks steep," i.e., it has the look of a steep hill can be contrasted with "The hill seems steep" - to judge by the fact that we have had to change gears twice. I have no quarrel with Austin over either of these interesting facts about English usage.

(1) "Looks"

The following are some of the examples offered by Austin:

- (1) It looks blue (heliotrope.)
- (2) He looks guilty.
- (3) The hill looks steep.
- (4) She looks chic.
- (5) The sky looks blue.
- (6) Petrol looks like water.
- (7) This looks like water.
- (8) The moon looks no bigger than a sixpence.
- (9) It looks as if it is (were) raining (empty, hollow)
- (10) It looks as though we shan't be able to get in.

These are some of Austin's examples, and those I have not listed are relevantly similar. The first thing to notice about "looks" is its various

constructions, according to Austin, is that it is "to put it very roughly, restricted to the general sphere of vision" and is thus analogous to "sounds", "tastes," "smells," and "feels," "each of which does for its own particular sense (nearly enough) just what "looks" does for the sense of sight." (p.36) I should not think this is obviously true of (10), as a blind person on the basis of his own experience could make such a remark; there is here no obvious connection with anything visual. But since we would have had no use for such a use of "looks as though" (or for any other use of "looks") were it not for the fact that most of us are endowed with sight, it can pass on the ground that it is somehow derivative from more basically visual uses of "looks."

The significance of (10) as an example for Austin is that it illustrates how very judgmental the uses of "looks" can be. And this gives us a clue, I believe, to Austin's implicit view of the proper analysis of "looks" in all its various uses, even the most phenomenological uses: Austin's true view is, I believe, that the uses of "looks" are always judgmental, and never purely phenomenological. If this were true, a sense-datum analysis of perception erected on the basis of (alleged) purely phenomenological uses of "looks", "sounds" etc. would be excluded on the ground that there are no such uses of these words. Sense-datum theory could be condemned ab initio as being a gigantic linguistic muddle. This is connected with the point, raised in the last chapter, that Austin suggests, in his criticism of the argument from illusion, the general doctrine that the appearance of things are always saturated with interpretation.

The evidence that this is Austin's view has to be collected from his



scattered remarks about "looks" in conjunction with his statement, in a footnote, of a version of his doctrines of adjuster-words and trouser-words, viz., that "contrary to what some philosophical theories seem to imply, the notion of being a so-and-so must be prior to the notion of being like a so-and-so."

(p.41) Nota bene: Austin formulates his doctrine of the priority of being-statements or being-concepts in terms of being a so-and-so and being like a so-and-so. Here "so-and-so" is a stand in for some identificatory expression. But it is perfectly reasonable to think that he also holds the view that being so-and-so is prior to looking so-and-so, appearing so-and-so or seeming so-and-so where "so-and-so" is a stand in for descriptive expressions. This is clear from the fact that he discusses the expression "looks bent" in terms of the doctrine of the priority of being-statements. (p.42)

Austin says that "there is, of course, no general answer at all to the question how "looks" or "looks like" (presumably he would also include "looks as if" and "looks as though") is related to "is"; it depends on the full circumstances of particular cases." (p.39) Doubtless this is so, not because of any logical features of "looks," "looks like" etc., but because of what it is that is said to look however or what it is that is said to look like whatever. Differences in particular cases arises out of the differences in the sorts of things we talk about and differences in the conditions or circumstances in which we have occasion to use "looks" etc. Even so, if we look at what Austin has to say of looks-locutions we find that he implicitly believes that they are always used judgmentally quite as much as are being-locutions.

This is clear enough in examples (61-10). The full circumstances of

the cases in which they might be used would determine what sort of judgment is being made, but in any circumstances in which these might be used, some sort of judgment is made or is at least implicit. For example, each of (6)-(10) could be used to make a comparative judgment: Petrol is comparable to water in respect of some of its properties, and so is "this," whatever it actually is. Similarly, the size of the moon as seen from earth is about that of a sixpence seen from, perhaps, an arm's length. If it looks as if it is raining or as though we shan't get in, the present situation is in some ways comparable to past situations in which it was raining or in which we did not get in. We can call this the comparative use of looks-locutions. The important thing about them is that these judgments are all in some sense parasitic. We cannot compare petrol with water without prior (logically prior, not just temporally prior) knowledge of, so to speak, the being of water, i.e., the real, genuine, or proper qualities of water. However, it should be noted that the qualities of "this" which are being compared to the qualities of water are entirely independent of the parasiticism of "looks" in "this looks like water." This is a point I shall return to below.

Of course, in other circumstances, these very same sentences could be used to make other sorts of judgments, or, at least, to express an inclination to judge or, perhaps, believe. As Austin points out (pp.39-40) I am under no inclination to believe that petrol is water if I say it looks like water, but if I say "This looks like water," I might, if I don't know what "this" is, be judging it to be water on the basis of what it looks like, or at least I might be inclined to judge it to be water; but it may or may not be water. Again we have a case in which being is prior to being like. We

can call this the inclination to believe or judge use of looks-locutions.

Still other types of judgments can be made in using some of the examples (6)-(10). For example, if I say "This looks like water" or "It looks as if it is raining" I might be expressing a probability judgment that this is water or that it is raining. This can be called the probability use of looks-locutions. It is, no doubt, psychologically closely related to the inclination to judge or believe uses, and, no doubt, one can use looks-locutions both ways simultaneously. But they seem to me logically distinct, i.e., it seems to me to be possible to make a probability judgment without believing or being inclined to believe that one judges to be probably the case actually is the case.

Finally, there is what one might call the disclaimer use of looks-locutions. I might say "This looks like water" or "It looks as if it is raining" in order to avoid being held accountable if it should turn out that this is not water or that it is not raining.

Both the probability use and the disclaimer use are, like the others, parasitic in the sense that they both presuppose acquaintance with actual cases of rain or water. The disclaimer use qua disclaimer does not express a judgment, but it is nevertheless judgmental in that the very same locution used to disclaim responsibility could be taken by a hearer to imply a judgment or inclination to judge on the part of the speaker, or could elicit a judgment in the hearer. And, no doubt, "looks like" etc. can be used simultaneously to disclaim responsibility, indicate an inclination to judge and to express a probability judgment.

It is, I think, fairly clear that "looks like", "looks as if" and

"looks as though" are all used in making various sorts of judgments, depending on the circumstances in which they are used. It is true, as Austin says, that how they are "intended and taken will depend on further facts about the occasion of utterance; the words themselves imply nothing either way." (p.40) But it is equally clear that Austin intends that we, in getting "the feel of the thing," should conclude that "looks like" etc. are always used in ways which include an element of judgment, and hence are not available to the sense-datist for formulating purely neutral phenomenological sense-datum statements. In all these judgments there is some implicit reference to, so to speak, the "being" of material objects, or things, events, or situations essentially presupposing material objects (e.g. the house we shan't be able to get in) etc.

And, I think, it is equally clear that Austin thinks the same thing is true in statements in which "looks" occurs without its auxiliaries "as if", "as though" and "like." That is, for Austin, "looks x" always involves an implicit or explicit reference to some sort of judgment about public material objects and hence is not available to the sense-datist for use in constructing a sense-datum language which does not essentially presuppose a material object language. This is clear from his insistence that "descriptions of looks are neither 'incorrigible' nor 'subjective'" (p.42) and that "the way things look is, in general, just as much a fact about the world, just as open to public confirmation or challenge, as the way things are." (p.43) There is, he says, "certainly nothing in principle final, conclusive, irrefutable about anyone's statement that so-and-so looks such-and-such." (p.42) And Austin takes it that if these things are true of all statements in which "looks" occurs simpliciter, such statements include a logically unextrudable element of judgment about

objects, things etc. in the open, public world of common sense. So "looking so-and-so," quite as much as "looking like so-and-so," will be a notion which is posterior to the notion of being so-and-so.

It would be an easy enough matter to run through examples (1)-(5) and find circumstances in which various of these sentences could be used to make various of the sorts of judgment I have distinguished above. But it would be tedious and unnecessary. I am willing to concede to Austin that "looks x" (whatever "x" might be) can be used in statements which express a comparative or probability judgment or which indicate an inclination to judge or are used more or less performatively to disclaim responsibility for a particular judgment. And I am willing to concede that in such cases the notion of being so-and-so is prior to the notion of looking so-and-so. What interests me is whether all this actually cuts any ice as a criticism of sense-datum theory. This will be discussed below following an examination of Austin on "seems" and "appears."

(3) "Seems" and "Appears"

"Seems" and "appears" can be dealt with jointly. There is some difficulty in dealing with them at all because Austin offers very few examples of "seems" even though he says quite a bit about this word; on the other hand, he gives many examples of the uses of "appears," but says almost nothing about the uses of this word. Nevertheless, it is possible to abstract a "rational reconstruction" of Austin's views from the welter of hints, undiscussed examples, and explicit statements which constitute his work on these words. The following are some of the examples he gives:

- (1) It appears/seems blue.
- (2) He appears/seems a gentleman.

- (3) It appears like/seems like blue.
- (4) He appears like/seems like a gentleman.
- (5) It appears/seems as if (as though).....
- (6) He appears/seems as if (as though).....
- (7) It appears/seems to expand.
- (8) It appears/seems to be a forgery.
- (9) It appears/seems that they've all been eaten.
- (10) He appears/seems guilty.
- (11) He appears/seems to be guilty.
- (12) The hill appears/seems steep.
- (13) It appears as a dark spot on the horizon.
- (14) He appears as a man of good character (sc.from this narrative.....).

(To be perfectly accurate I should point out that in listing the above examples I have taken justifiable liberties with Austin's actual, printed, examples. I have constructed (1)-(9) from Austin's actual examples in which "appears" alone occurs. I did so because Austin says that "appears" and "seems" share these constructions, although he has some reservations about "appears" in (3) and (4). In (10-12) I have merely collapsed examples given separately; (13) and (14) are Austin's own.)

It is unfortunate that Austin fails to discuss "appears" since his failure to do so makes it difficult to be sure one is being just in attributing particular views of "appears" to him. In any event, his view seems to be that since "appears" shares a number of constructions with "looks" and "seems" it will have similar analyses, which analysis depending on the full circumstances of the particular case. And this seems to me to be very possibly true in some cases and certainly false in others. Austin's emphasis on grammatical construction seems to me to be misguided since it does not seem to me that grammatical constructions are really reliable indices of meaning. It is easy enough, in the pursuit of fine distinctions, to come up with plenty of cases in which, e.g., "appears" and "seems" share the same construction but such that one could justifiably prefer one over the other.e.g, one might well prefer "It appears blue" over "It seems blue" in just the case in which "it" looks blue although one knows perfectly well "it" isn't

blue; in such a case it would not seem blue at all, in the sense that one would not be inclined to judge it to be blue. But if one were so inclined to judge, one might use "seems," "appears," or "looks" indifferently.

In any event, it can, I think, reasonably be assumed that Austin intends his remark that "there is....no general answer at all to the question how "looks" or "looks like" is related to "is" (p.39). to apply also to "appears" and "seems." And, again, I agree that "it depends on the full circumstances of particular cases." Nevertheless, as with "looks," but more clearly so, Austin does intend us to see that "appears" and "seems" are always in some way judgmental as regards "the world," and never phenomenological.

"Seems" and "appears" differ from "looks" in that their use "does not require, or imply, the employment of any one of the senses in particular," according to Austin. (p.36) This seems true, but it also seems a reasonable inference that the employment of some one sense or another or possibly several forms part of the background of circumstances in which one would use "appears" or "seems." Even in cases fairly remotely connected with sense-perception, e.g., "Smith seems to me to be the best candidate," there will be some tie-in with the employment of the senses. Smith might seem to me to be the best candidate because of some remark I heard him make on Free Trade at a party we both attended. Incidentally, I would conjecture that the lack of any apparent implication of the use of a particular sense when one uses "seems" or "appears" was a strong selling-point for the traditional sense-datist since one of their prime concerns was to formulate sense-data statements not presupposing material object statements; "It looks blue"

Could be taken as presupposing the existence of eyes or some analogous material organ if, as most people are strongly inclined to think, there is a logical connection between having eyes or some sort of visual organ and the experiences of seeing. Insofar as this is a consideration "It seems blue" might be better fitted than "It looks blue" to serve the purposes of the sense-datum philosopher.

Be that as it may, it is clear that Austin holds that "appears" and "seems," however they might differ from case to case, are essentially judgmental. This is especially clear as regards "seems." He notes that we can say "To judge from its looks...." or "Going by appearances..." but not "To judge by the seemings...." and asks why not. His answer is that "whereas looks and appearances provide us with facts on which a judgment may be based, to speak of how things seem is already to express a judgment." This is, he says, "highly indicative of the special, peculiar function of "seems."" (p.43) Earlier, (P.37) he says that "He seems guilty" "fairly clearly makes an implicit reference to the evidence - evidence bearing.... on the question whether he is guilty" and contrasts with "He appears guilty" which "would typically be used with reference to certain special circumstances," e.g., his behaviour under questioning as contrasted with his general demeanour. But even when contrasted with "seems" this way, "appears," while not expressing a judgment, could be taken to express an inclination to judge. Similar considerations hold for his contrast between "The hill appears steep" and "The hill seems steep."

In some of its uses, according to Austin, "seems" is compatible with "may be" and "may not be," e.g., when we have some, but not conclusive,



evidence. In other uses "seems" can occur in conjunction with "is" or "is not," and when it does it implicitly refers to the evidence presented so far. "Seems like", on the other hand, "calls for special treatment. Its function seems to be that of conveying the general impression which something makes" and sometimes comes close to "seems to be" when the general impression is taken as evidence. But when the general impression is not taken as evidence, e.g., in "The next three days seemed like one long nightmare," "there is little to choose between "seems" and "is". (p.39)

This pretty much exhausts what Austin has to say of "seems" and, by implication, "appears." Clearly he regards both as judgmental and as generally occurring properly only in special cases when one is not in a position to make the logically prior "is-statements." It is also clear that one could run through the whole gamut of examples I gave at the beginning of this section and find cases in which one or another of the sorts of judgment I distinguished in the previous section could be made in using "seems" or "appears". It would be tiresome to do so, and so I resist the (admittedly weak) temptation to do so.

The question which now confronts us is: In all this, is there a case, or the makings of a case, against the sense-datumist attempt to make use of "looks", "seems," and "appears" in introducing the concept of sense-datum? I think not.

In order that we can go straight to the heart of the matter - to what essentially is at stake - let me concede at once that most of what I take Austin to be saying about the uses of these words is undeniably correct. This is particularly true of "appears" and "seems" as they are used in the

various sorts of judgments I have delineated. And Austin is also right about "looks like," "looks as if (though)" and even "looks" simpliciter insofar as these are used in the various sorts of ways I have distinguished. And it is also true that in such uses the notion of being so-and-so is logically prior to that of being like so-and-so. In general, for most uses of these expressions, being so-and-so is logically prior to looking so-and-so, appearing so-and-so, or seeming so-and-so, eg., where comparisons are being made between this and some paradigm or standard case, where a probability judgment is being made or where one disclaims responsibility for a particular judgment.

From now on I shall pretty much ignore "seems" since it actually occurs only rarely in full-blown perceptual judgments outside philosophical literature. And when it does it can always be replaced by "appears," "looks," "sounds" etc. And it is very judgmental in the indicated ways when it does occur in clear perceptual cases. I shall therefore concentrate on "appears," "looks" etc. I treat "appears" in its perceptual uses as simply a general blanket-expression for which we can always substitute "looks," "sounds," "feels" etc. I realise that "appears" is highly suggestive of something visual. This is because we tend to be caught up in what Austin calls, in "A plea for Excuses," the "trailing clouds of etymology." In its original meaning "appear" meant simply "to come in sight; become visible." But it seems to me not an unnatural or vicious extension to use "appear" appropos of hearing, smelling etc. In accordance with my usual practice, I concentrate on visual cases.

With all this said, we are now in a position to confront the main issue: Are "appears x" or "looks x" etc. in their various constructions always and only to be understood in terms of "is x" or are there uses of

"appears x" and "looks x" in terms of which "is x" can be analyzed? Austin clearly thinks that "appears x" and "looks x" can be understood only in terms of "is x". And let it be clear that "x" is a place holder for anything which we can be said literally and truly to see or otherwise perceive; it can stand in for sensible qualities and for "things" - for both pinkness and rats. For Austin does not intend to allow us to prize the sensible qualities of things off the things themselves in a quasi-Berkeleyian approach to the introduction of sense-data. And this gives us a clue to his strenuous objections to the use of the argument from illusion as a way of introducing sense-data, to why he regards it as a question-begging cheat, an illegitimate back-door move. For in descriptions of illusions and hallucinations we typically make use of expressions such as "appears," "looks," etc. We might not if we are unaware that we are experiencing an illusion or hallucination, but we certainly should use such expressions if we were so aware. And if we are trying to use phenomena which are by hypothesis illusion or hallucinations to introduce sense-data, we would have to use such expressions in identifying and describing the sort of illusion or hallucination in question. If, by hypothesis, I am hallucinating a pink rat, then I cannot say literally and truly that I see a pink rat, but only such things as "There appears to be a pink rat in front of me" or "The image I see looks like a pink rat" or "In my visual field there appears to be a rat which looks pink" or the like. If Austin is right, such expressions are parasitic for their meaning on the use of such expressions as "pink" and "rat" in their literal uses to refer to things which are pink or are real rats, while "appears" and "looks like" merely adjust us to the abnormality of the experience. So to try to introduce an ontologically uncommitted sense-datum language via such disembodied, conjured up things like

hallucinatory images would be illegitimate. All the more so would it be illegitimate to make use of phenomena like the bent appearance of the straight stick half-immersed in water if we construe sense-data, as Austin and many sense-datists do, to be immaterial private somethings. For the bent appearance of the stick is certainly not an immaterial private something, and certainly in such cases the description "looks bent" seems quite amenable to the sort of parasitic-judgment analysis Austin suggests.

I think it is probably true that the uses of appears-locutions in cases of illusions and hallucinations, are, as a matter of fact, genetically parasitic for their meaning upon the literal use in paradigm cases of the descriptive and identificatory expressions used in identifying and describing the sort of illusion or hallucination in question. That is, I think it is probably true that we should not actually have the sorts of hallucinations (or dreams) we do have were it not for our previous experience in seeing, say, real rats or pink things. This is, of course, not true of normal illusions; we could see a stick which looks bent even if we had never seen a really bent stick, and this is an important point to which I shall return later. But I should like to argue that it is only contingently true that what we call hallucinations are ontologically dependent upon or posterior to veridical experience and that it is thus only contingently true that the language we use in talking about hallucinations has to be parasitic upon the language we use to talk about so-called veridical experience. Our ordinary language is tailored to fit the normal, the veridical, the standard case, and so its use to talk about non-standard experience will naturally be a secondary sort of use. And as Austin points out in discussing "real," it would be practically impossible to have a language fitted to deal with every

odd situation that crops up, so that we need expression like "appears" "looks like" etc. by the use of which other words ("pink," "rat") are adjusted to meet the innumerable and unforeseeable demands of the world upon language." (p. 73) But it is important to realize that in saving all this I am speaking from a standpoint which is provided by our common sense conceptual scheme, and it is important to see how radically contingent that conceptual scheme is. It is only contingent that we standardize certain experiences and not others and thus obtain "the real world" of common sense. If we were different sorts of creatures with different sorts of sensory and intellectual capacities we should not have our present common sense conceptual scheme. Another way of putting this is that if it were not for the fact that the greater part of experience comes to us fairly highly regularized in a repeatable, orderly, coherent fashion, we should not be able, or find it practically useful, to standardize certain types of experience, taking them as paradigms, and treating others as deviate, abnormal, etc. and, of course, we should not have or find it useful to develop the sort of language we do have.

Naturally enough, it would be extremely difficult to imagine a radically alternative conceptual scheme, or, what comes to the same thing, a world which is very very different from "the real world" of common sense. This is perhaps because we are so firmly wedded to common sense that our imaginations are inveterately linked to what we consider the real world. And it would be even more difficult, perhaps even humanly impossible, to describe such an alternative conceptual scheme, such an alternative world, without falling prey to the vice of question-begging or without using our ordinary language, tailored as it is to common sense, absolutely outrageously.

People have not been stopped from trying however; a great deal of the history of philosophy, particularly the Idealists, can be understood best in terms of just such attempts to transcend common sense.

Be all this as it may, I do not think that an attempt to justify the introduction of sense-data as a philosophical concept requires support by an argument that the back-door route via hallucinations is only contingently a back-door route. For sense-data can be introduced through the front door, on the level of common sense, via veridical experience of perfectly public objects and phenomena.

There are a number of closely interconnected considerations in view of which one can argue that sense-data can be introduced via veridical experience by means of "appears," "looks" etc. Each of these considerations promptly suggests others, but I shall try to keep them apart and will proceed serially.

As a first approach, we can ask whether the judgmental analyses of the uses of "appears x" or "looks x" can possibly tell the whole story in the circumstances in which such analyses would be appropriate. Clearly they cannot. I will not run through the whole gamut of judgmental uses of these expressions. Let us consider just the comparative use and the inclination to judge use. Consider "This looks blue" said in circumstances in which I could be considered to be comparing this (whatever it is) with things which are standardly blue. What am I comparing with what? In what respect, or how am I comparing this with something standardly blue? Surely I am comparing how this looks with how standard blue looks in a purely phenomenal use of "looks." How does standard blue look? Well, it just looks blue. And here "looks blue"

just means "looks blue." Or suppose I say, in an inclination to judge sort of way, "This looks round." Why should I be inclined to just the judgment that perhaps this is round? Again, because this has the same look round things have - it looks round in a sense which is more fundamental than "the inclination to judge" sense of "looks," in a sense which underpins the "inclination to judge" use of looks. What these considerations suggest is that exclusively judgmental analyses of "appears" or "looks" are really much too superficial. After all, our judgments require some sort of grounding in something non-judgmental if we are not to be caught up in an inescapable circle of judgments which are linked to other judgments but never to anything else.<sup>(1)</sup>

If, as the foregoing considerations suggest, there are such fundamental non-judgmental uses of "appears x" or "looks x" (etc.), they must be unanalyzable, i.e., they must be definable ostensively, which, as I noted in the last chapter, is what the argument from illusion tries to do. And surely they are. Consider "looks round" in the basic, non-comparative, literal sense which is required. Surely "looks round" could be defined ostensively in a veridical case by reference to what is seen when something which really is round is held up directly in front of one's eyes. For surely something which really is round must look round at least from certain angles. If not, how could anything which looks round but isn't ever be compared with things which are round?

The foregoing consideration brings up an important point about ostensive definition. I pointed out earlier that one could see a stick which looks bent without previously ever having seen a stick which is bent. What this shows is that ostensive definitions of "appears bent" and "looks blue"

can be given in illusory as well as in veridical cases, and even more importantly, that sensible quality expressions such as "blue," "bent," "round" etc. can be defined ostensively in illusory cases as well as veridical cases. That is, "looks round" is not parasitic in its literal meaning upon a prior understanding of "round" as ostensively defined in terms of paradigm cases of material objects which are round. And with a slight modification this is also true of "looks round" and "round" in hallucinatory cases. One could not give an ostensive definition in hallucinatory cases since this suggests being able to point to something and one cannot point to an hallucinatory image. But if we had available sufficiently sophisticated technique for producing hallucinatory images, we could produce the hallucinatory experience of seeing something round in a person who had never before seen anything really round. And we could thereby give what we can call an exemplary definition - roundness would be exemplified in his field of vision - and he could go on to use "round" and "looks round" in non-hallucinatory cases.

What implications has all this for Austin's doctrine that the notion of being so-and-so is prior to the notions of being like so-and-so, or appearing so-and-so or looking so-and-so? I have already granted that Austin's doctrine holds at the level of common sense where we use these expressions judgmentally. But I wish strenuously to deny that it holds when "appears x" or "looks x" are used phenomenologically, i.e., in situations in which they can be given exemplary or ostensive definitions.

It is fairly clear from Austin's remarks and examples (p.41-2) that he thinks of "being a so-and-so" or "being so-and-so" in terms of material



objects and their properties. It is these which are really prior for Austin. He must hold this view if he is going to disallow sense-data any place in an analysis of our concepts of material objects after having allowed them a toe-hold in hallucinations which he admits can be very like material objects in some ways.

Confining ourselves for the moment to the sensible properties of material objects, such as colour and shape, why is it that the notion of a material object's being red or round is not prior to the notions of its looking red or round? Part of the answer lies in what is meant by saying that one notion is prior to another. Traditionally what has been meant by this is that the prior notion is simpler than the posterior notion, that the posterior notion is more complex and is intelligible only in terms of the prior notion. If this is what Austin means - and I think it must be from the general tenor of his handling of "looks," "seems," and "appears" - then he is surely wrong. For certainly the notion of a thing's being red or round is terribly more complex than the notion of its looking red or round. Looking red or round will be only one element in what is meant by saying that a material object is red or round. If the object in question is, say, a coin, then for it to be round it must look round when held directly in front of one's eyes with one of its flat sides forward, it must have other appearances of shape which are projectively related to the round appearance, it must feel round to the touch, one should be able to roll it across a smooth flat surface and perhaps much else besides. Or if the object is to be red, it must not merely look red, it must look red to normal observers under standard conditions of illumination - a much more complex matter than merely looking red.

And, of course, if an object is to be a coin of the realm - a real coin and not a counterfeit - it must not only look like a coin of the realm but must pass other tests as well. So the notion of being a so-and-so will be enormously more complex than the notion of being like a so-and-so in this or that respect, say, looking like a real coin. As with the expression "looking around," so with "looking like a coin of the realm" - one could give an ostensive definition of this expression by means of a counterfeit, an unreal coin, i.e., strictly speaking, in terms of something which is not really a coin of the realm at all. It is true that our notion of counterfeit money is logically dependent upon our notion of real money, just as our notion of hallucination depends upon our notion of veridical experience just in the sense that "hallucination" gets its meaning by contrast with the sorts of situation which are not hallucinatory. But these things are not at issue, for these expressions play their roles in common life as expressions in our ordinary language which is tailored to fit the normal or standard case. What is at issue is whether the concepts of actually being real money or actually being a real pink rat are simpler concepts than looking like a pink rat or looking like real money issued by the Crown. For the reasons I have given I think they are not.

Indeed, it is just because "looking round" or "looking like a (real) penny" are simpler concepts than "being round" or "being a penny" that appearances can be deceiving. We recognize the applicability of "looking x" or "looking like an x" and jump to the conclusion that the conditions for applying "is x" or "is an x" also hold.

Enough has been said, I believe, to throw very serious doubt on the

viability of exclusively judgmental analyses of appearance-locutions. But before proceeding to other matters I should like to conclude this section with some general remarks tying-in the foregoing discussion with several aspects of sense-datum theory.

(1) First there is the matter of sense-datum construed as private particulars. I have already argued in a previous chapter that the privacy/publicity distinction is a radically contingent one, and so will not run through the arguments here. Those arguments help to show that we need not be pushed into accepting the idea that sense-data and material objects are two separate, contrasting classes of entities. There is, however, a sense in which we can consider sense-data as (contingently) private particulars. We can so privatize the experience of perceiving a material object that we obtain the notion of sense-data as private somethings by insisting that sense-data are to be defined in terms of what I here now see, hear, etc. That is, sense-data could be defined in terms of a slice of personal experience in terms of which "looks x" (etc.) could be given exemplary definitions. Many sense-datists have taken this route, but it does not seem to me to be terribly profitable and it can be dangerous. It does, however, have the merit that it helps us guard against the dominating naive realist picture of our knowledge of "the world as it really is" as being something entirely dependent on us. Austin exemplifies this naive metaphysics very clearly when he said "I am not disclosing a fact about myself, but about petrol, when I say that petrol looks like water." (p.43) Of course he does disclose a fact about himself in saying this, viz., that he is a normal observer, i.e., that he standardizes experience in certain ways and not others. And so do we all.

(2) If "appears x," "looks x" etc. can be given exemplary

definitions in hallucinatory cases as well as ostensive definitions in illusory as well as in veridical cases, the sense-datist case is enormously strengthened, for the implications of this is that in every perceptual situation there is something that answers to the sense-datist requirement of an "appearance." Austin (p.38 and elsewhere) thinks that "looks" and "appears" are properly used only in special circumstances, viz., when there is less than the usual amount of evidence for saying "is", or when some condition or circumstance prompts us to refuse to commit ourselves flat-footedly. We use these expressions to adjust ourselves or our hearers to these special circumstances. But if, as I believe, there are more fundamental uses of "appears," "looks" etc., then the sense-datist view that what we always get, even in perception of material objects, is how things look, feel, etc., i.e., "appearance," is very much strengthened.

Indeed, Austin makes fatal concessions to the sense-datist case when he says that there are some uses of "looks," "seems," and "appears" which are compatible with "may be" or "may not be" (pp.38,40) and when he says that "looks and appearances provide us with facts on which a judgment may be based....". (p.43) He fails to see that this latter statement is a concession to the sense-datist case because he mistakenly thinks that sense-data must be logically private particulars. He fails to understand that the former statement is a concession to the sense-datist because he fails to see that for special philosophical purposes we can always refuse to commit ourselves on whether standard conditions obtain in a given perceptual situation. Normally, in daily practice, it would be pointless, perhaps even neurotic, to refuse ever to indicate it when one judges that things are up to par. We have very good reasons in common life for wanting to distinguish between things being up to par and things

being off-colour. But these exigencies do not even nearly add up to enough to rule out the appropriation, for philosophical purposes, of "appears," "looks" etc. as analytically primitive or "prior" terms.

(3) "The Nature of Reality"

(A) Ayer's Evaluation of the Argument from Illusion

Ayer, as Austin notes, does not accept the argument from illusion at face value; it requires evaluating in order to determine its worth. In his evaluation<sup>(2)</sup> Ayer makes pretty free use of the words "real" and "really", and in the final sections of The Foundation of Empirical Knowledge he gives his analysis of the meanings of these expressions. This provides Austin with the occasion for examining both Ayer's use of these expressions and his "official" analysis of "real." This will be discussed below in section (2).

The official upshot of Ayer's evaluation of the argument from illusion is that while it does not force us to accept the concept of "sense-datum," it does provide us with reasons for thinking that the introduction of a special sense-datum terminology is desirable.

Ayer begins with an argument designed to show that the argument from illusion, construed as a factual argument, is inconclusive, and he follows, this up with an argument designed to show that there are no situations in which we have to say that we perceive sense-data. Since this second argument is the more important one, we may safely ignore the first.

The reason the argument fails to show that we never directly perceive material things, i.e., always directly perceive sense-data, is that we have to admit sense-data only if we admit that some of our perceptions are

delusive.<sup>(3)</sup> We might think that we have to admit this since otherwise "we shall have to attribute to material things such mutually incompatible properties as being at the same time both green and yellow, or both elliptical and round."<sup>(4)</sup> We would thus be forced into contradiction.

But Ayer imagines an opponent who might argue that this is not so. Someone who wished to persist in maintaining that we always directly perceive material things could argue that we fall into contradiction only if certain suitable assumptions are made, e.g., that the real shapes or colours of things remain the same despite the variations of the conditions under which we see them. Normally we do assume this because when we return to our original point of view after looking at some object from some other angle we find that the object will look the same as it did originally. But suppose we assume that material things are much livelier than we normally think and are constantly undergoing very rapid cyclical changes. On this assumption what we now take as the non-veridical elliptical appearance of a round penny could be considered the changed but nevertheless real shape of the penny. Similarly, by postulating a much larger number of material things we could account for the fact that two people on the same occasion seem to attribute incompatible properties to a single material thing; but there is only the thing you see and the one I see and each really has the properties we attribute to it.

How, Ayer asks, could a person who argues in this way be refuted? Ayer's answer is that he cannot be refuted so long as we (sense-datatists) regard the arguments as arguments over matters of fact. We cannot get him to accept "sense-data" as an answer to the question what it is we directly perceive because the dispute over this question is really only a verbal dispute.

Whereas the sense-datist (and the ordinary man too, no doubt) says that the real shape of a coin is unchanging, his opponent "prefers to say that its shape is really undergoing some cyclical process of change."<sup>(5)</sup> The dispute appears genuine because both parties use the same words, but it has been assumed throughout that they agree "about the nature of the sensible appearances; and no other evidence is or can be available."<sup>(6)</sup> But since the facts to which the words of the disputants are intended to refer are the same, they cannot be disputing over the facts, but are merely arguing "about the choice of two different languages." Each disputant is assigning different meanings to the words being used by both and are thus actually disputing only over how to describe the phenomena.

(B) Austin's Critique of Ayer's Evaluation:

Austin's reaction to this evaluation of the argument from illusion is that Ayer's views are "pretty astonishing propositions" (p.59), particularly Ayer's apparent view that words like "real," "really," "real shape," "real colour" etc. can be used however one likes. So before taking up the subject of "The Nature of Reality," Austin evaluates Ayer's evaluation.

Ayer's way of proving that the issue between himself and his imaginary opponent is verbal "actually shows....that he does not regard it as merely verbal at all - his real view is that, in fact we perceive only sense-data," according to Austin. (pp.59-60) If it is not a question of fact whether a penny or any other material thing does or does not constantly change its shape or size or colour etc., where, Austin wants to know, are the facts to be found? Ayer's answer, he says, "is quite clear- they are facts about sense-data, or as he also puts it, "about the nature of the sensible appearances" "the phenomena;" this is where we really encounter "the empirical evidence.""(p.60)

Ayer's real view, as opposed to his official view, is that "the hard fact is that there are sense-data; these entities really exist and are what they are; what other entities we may care to speak as if there were is a pure matter of verbal convenience, but 'the facts to which these expressions are intended to refer' will always be the same, facts about sense-data." (p.60) Ayer's official linguistic doctrine, Austin says, "really rests squarely on the old Berkeleyan, Kantian ontology of the 'sensible manifold'." Ayer "has all along, it seems, really been completely convinced by the very arguments that he purports to 'evaluate' with so much detachment." (p.61)

(C) Examination of Austin's Critique:

It is not, I think, necessary to dwell at length on Austin's own evaluation of Ayer's evaluation of the argument from illusion. But some things need saying.

First, it is clear that Ayer's use of language is tendentious in a way that is unconscionable. Austin is right to ask where the facts are to be located if it is not a question of fact whether a penny undergoes constant and rapid cyclical changes as we move about it. Ayer's location of the facts in the "sensible appearances" does seem to be his own version of the old ontology of the sensible manifold, especially if one is mindful of his subsequent analysis of "The Constitution of Material Things"<sup>(7)</sup> the upshot of which is that our common sense beliefs are theoretical with respect to the course of sensory experience. Insofar as we can take a main burden of Austin's remarks to be an objection to building intimations of such a view into an evaluation of arguments which might be used to support that very view, his remarks are very well taken.



On the other hand, we can take legitimate umbrage at some of Austin's remarks, especially his statement that Ayer's real view is that in fact we perceive only sense-data and his attribution to Ayer (and presumably to all sense-datists) of the view that we can only speak as if there were material objects. I don't want to labour long in defense of Ayer, but, taking the second point first, it just seems to me flatly wrong to construe Ayer as a sort of neo-Vaihinger who regards our common sense beliefs as "fictions" in a sense which would imply, outrageously, that none of them are true. (Nor, incidentally, would it be correct to view Berkeley as a sort of proto-Vaihinger, whatever may be the case with Kant.) As regards Ayer's alleged view that in fact we perceive only sense-data, it needs only be noted that there is a sense in which this is true, but not in a sense which precludes us from perceiving material things since material things are supposed by Ayer to be analyzable as concatenations of sense-data.

Whatever the case with Ayer himself, the point of his evaluation of the argument from illusion can be rescued. The dispute between Ayer and his imagined opponent really is verbal. It is not, of course, merely a suitable assumption which can be questioned that pennies and the like do not undergo rapid changes in their properties, and it would indeed be a perfectly astonishing proposition to be told that it is merely an assumption that pennies etc. retain their colour, sizes, shapes etc. over fairly long periods of time. These are facts, not assumptions, and are verifiable easily enough. And, of course, Ayer's opponent cannot simply "prefer to say" that the elliptical appearance of a penny seen from an odd angle presents us with the real shape of the penny. The fact just is that the elliptical appearance of the penny is "delusive"

or "deceptive" in the sense that one could be misled as to the real shape of the object being seen. The reason why Ayer's imagined opponent cannot argue the way Ayer has him argue and still be arguing about the facts is simply that expressions like "penny," "real," "real shape" etc. function within an elaborate conceptual scheme which sets the conventions for the uses of these words to make statements of fact. Ayer's adversary is merely appropriating expressions of this sort and attempting to use them independently of the very conventions under which alone they can be used in factual arguments, independently, that is, of the very conceptual scheme within which they function. So of course Ayer's antagonist cannot make use of these words together with their meanings and all the implications of their uses in ordinary language in order to argue that it is a questionable assumption that the stable and enduring objects of our common sense conceptual system really are stable and enduring objects. His arguments really are verbal, and amount only to an attempt to operate within and at the same time independently of our common sense conceptual scheme and our ordinary language. Perhaps the matter can be put this way: Ayer's opponent fails to see that while it is true that it is only a contingent fact that we have the conceptual system and the sort of language we do have, it is not, given that conceptual system and language, merely a contingent fact (much less an assumption) that not every view we might have of a material object can be a view of its real properties. And for particular objects such as the penny of the example, it is just plain false that an elliptical appearance of it presents us with its real shape.

And, of course, Ayer's own argument amounts to an argument that we ought to introduce the notion of sense-data as an analytical tool in analyzing

expressions such as "real shape," "real colour," "penny" etc. as given in ordinary language. This is in line with the view expressed in Chapter Three that the so-called argument from illusion is really only a method, however clumsy or defective, for defining the expression "sense-datum" and not a method of disclosing hitherto over-looked facts. The question now is: Can a sense-datum analysis of, e.g., "real shape" be made to work without perversely distorting ordinary language? In order to investigate this question we shall have to take Austin's analysis of "real" into account.

(D) Austin's Critique of Ayer's Sense-Datum Distinction Between "Appearance" and "Reality" (SS.pp.78-83)

Ayer begins drawing his general distinction between appearance and reality by distinguishing between "qualitatively delusive" and "existentially delusive" perceptions. The former are cases in which "the sense-data endow material things with qualities that they do not really possess" while the latter are cases in which "the material things that they (i.e., the sense-data) seem to present do not exist at all."<sup>(8)</sup>

This distinction, Austin says, is unclear. "Existentially delusive" apparently refers to cases of hallucination, e.g., the oasis case in which the oasis does not exist at all. "Qualitatively delusive" apparently applies to cases in which there is some material object before us but such that one of its qualities is questionable, e.g., it looks blue, but is it really blue? And "it seems to be implied that these two types of cases exhaust the field." (p.79) But, according to Austin, the distinction omits entirely the largest part "of the territory within which we draw distinctions between "appearance and reality...", and thus offers us false alternatives. For example, there

is the case in which we might see a decoy duck and take it for a real duck. In which of Ayer's two ways is my perception delusive in this case? "It might be held to be "qualitatively" delusive, as endowing the material thing with 'qualities it does not really possess'; for example, I mistakenly suppose that the object I see could quack. But then again it might be said to be 'existentially' delusive, since the material thing it seems to present does not exist; I think there is a real duck before me but in fact there isn't." (p.79) Ayer thus "has frozen on the truly 'delusive' sort of case, in which I think I see something where nothing really is, and has simply overlooked the much more common case in which I think I see something where something else really is." He thus omits the "cases in which something is or might be taken to be what it isn't really - as paste diamonds.....might be taken to be real diamonds." (pp.79-80)

We need not tarry long over this criticism. Austin has simply overlooked - or deliberately ignored - Ayer's explicit statement that his account of "qualitatively delusive" perception is intended to cover "what is described as the mistaking of one material thing for another."<sup>(9)</sup> But Austin's criticism does uncover an ambiguity in the notion of "qualitatively delusive" perception. It covers both the sort of case in which one misdescribes some material thing as having some property it doesn't really have and the sort of case in which one misidentifies some kind of material thing as being of another kind. Moreover, Ayer's distinction has the further defect that it obscures the fact that in hallucinatory experience the error one makes, or is tempted to make, is the very same sort of error one makes in mistaking one sort of material thing for another, viz., misidentification. In the hallucinated rat case the "existential

delusion" is the error of misidentification - one identifies an item which is not a material object, i.e., a visual image with a very special etiology, as being a material object of a particular type, viz., a rat. And in the decoy duck and paste diamond cases the "qualitative delusion" is also the error of misidentification - an item which happens to be a material object is misidentified as being a material object of a type other than its actual type. The differences in the two cases have to do with the ontological status of the items being misidentified. But epistemologically the cases are the same.

We can therefore acknowledge the force of Austin's criticism at least to the extent that it helps us to see that Ayer was mistaken in trying to sort out cases of misperception in terms of illusions and hallucinations as paradigms of types of error. Indeed, it has been a major vice of philosophers since Descartes to discuss illusions and hallucinations in too epistemological a frame of mind, in terms, that is, of the sorts of errors into which one might fall in hallucinatory and illusory cases. But the differences between hallucinations and illusions are not epistemological but causal, i.e., "illusion" and "hallucination" chiefly call for different causal stories in uncovering the sources of error. They do not demarcate types of error.

We can, and, I think, ought to dispense with Ayer's distinction between qualitative and existential delusion in perception and, instead, discuss misperception in terms of misdescription and misidentification. This procedure seems to me to have at least three advantages. (1) It seems to me intuitively more in accord with that part of common language used to talk about mistakes than are Ayer's expressions. (2) It helps to put to rest whatever misgivings we might have about "delusive" since "misidentification" and

"misdescription" do not tend to prompt us to the assimilation of illusions and hallucinations which so worries Austin. And (3) it accords very well with part of Austin's analysis of "real". Austin lists "illusion" and "hallucination" along with "toy" "dummy" "mirage," "artificial," "fake" etc. as words which fulfill the same function. (SS p.71) Presumably he would include "decoy". We can now more readily see why this should be so. In giving explanations of, e.g., why this is "not a real duck" we have to advert to expressions like "decoy," "dummy," "toy," "illusion" or "hallucination" in order to account for the actual or possible error of misidentifying this (whatever it is) as a (real) duck. The extreme heterogeneity of Austin's list of words which fulfill the same function is at first glance puzzling, but the puzzlement disappears when we view it in this light. This is very considerably more than can be said for the expressions "qualitatively delusive" and "existentially delusive."

It now remains to be asked what sort of general sense-datum distinction can be made between appearance and reality which can accommodate illusions, hallucinations, paste diamonds, decoy ducks, etc. We shall then want to enquire how such a general sense-datum distinction compares with Austin's analysis of "real." In what follows I will give only a quasi-Ayerian account of the distinction between appearance and reality rather than a straightforward exposition of Ayer's analysis. Ayer's manner of exposition has the defect that sense-data are spoken of much too substantively, as though sense-data were entities themselves possessing various qualities, and I wish to avoid any tacit commitment to entityhood for sense-data. Austin's criticisms of Ayer are equally relevant (or not) to the account I will give.

Assuming that we have some material object of an already identified kind, say a round copper-coloured penny, why do we take the copper colour or the round shape as real qualities of the penny? Why not take the elliptical shape we can see when looking at the penny from certain angles as its real shape? Or why not take the red colour we might see when observing the penny in a certain light as the real colour? What makes these qualities "not real qualities," only "apparent qualities," of the penny?

The answer is clearly not to be found in the nature of the experienced qualities themselves, for these same qualities experienced on another occasion might well be the real qualities of some object. This penny may look elliptical and be round, but it is certainly possible that something should both look elliptical and really be elliptical. So the difference in the epistemological status of the round and elliptical appearances or the copper and red appearances of the penny must be looked for elsewhere, viz., in some special sorts of relationships to each other.

The special relationships are provided by the context of the particular case; it is the shape and colour of a coin of the realm that is at issue. We can therefore say, initially, in the context of dealing with pennies, which by hypothesis are round copper-coloured objects, that the elliptical shape or the red colour are not real qualities of the penny since they can be experienced as qualities of the penny only when viewing it from some odd angle or in some unusual light. The real qualities - the round appearance and the copper colour - are those we experience when viewing the penny from angles and in light which we consider to be standard or normal conditions for viewing the shape or colour of a coin. This, as far as it goes, I think, would be correct.

However, since the context varies for different sorts of objects, i.e., different sensible qualities and different general conditions of perception are taken as standard or normal for different kinds of objects, some explanation is required for why certain qualities and conditions, for particular cases, should be pre-empted and conventionalized upon. Otherwise, the selection as "real" of the round shape we see from the series of projectively related shapes it is possible to see when looking at a coin would seem to be perfectly arbitrary. The selection as "real" of certain qualities of the penny experienced under certain conditions is a matter of convention, but it is not a matter of arbitrary convention. Our conventions serve purposes which, though contingent, are of fundamental importance to us.

The chief purpose served by these conventions, according to many philosophers, is that of providing us with reliable means of prediction. And I believe this is fundamentally correct. Our need for reliable means of prediction stems simply from the fact that ultimately we should not be able to live well or even survive without them.

In the case of the penny, the round shape is pre-empted as "real" because it is the most reliable member of the series of visible shapes to which it belongs in the sense that it has the greatest value for making certain predictions. The same thing can be said for the copper colour. The round shape, of course, is not the most reliable member of the series simply for the purpose of predicting what other visible shapes can be obtained. Any member of the series could serve that purpose since any visible shape can be projectively related to all the others of a series by the methods of geometry. But it is the most reliable member of its group as a source of prediction of the sorts



of coherences or correlations of both visual and tactual experiences which can be further obtained. The round shape we see is the real shape of the coin because it coheres with certain predictable tactual experiences we should have in handling the coin, and together the seen and felt shapes enable us to further predict cogently that, e.g., if we should set the coin upright on an incline we should see it roll. Similar sorts of things can be said about the copper colour of the coin seen under what we take as standard conditions of illumination - except, of course, there are no coherences with other sense-modalities.

Generally speaking, then, the real qualities of an object are those we have selected from among the groups to which they belong for their predictive power. We standardize them and treat the other members of the group as deviate. And because all sensible qualities are experienced under some conditions or other we have to incorporate the notion of standard conditions for making correct predictions in the distinction between appearances and reality in order to distinguish between two identical exemplifications of some sensible quality as being in one case a "real" quality and in another case only an "apparent" quality since there is nothing intrinsic to the nature of a sensible quality which marks it as real or unreal. The real shape and colour of our penny are the colour and shape we see and feel (in the case of shape) under those conditions which we conventionally make our standards because of their influence on our predictions, e.g., angle of vision, a high degree of natural illumination, normal eyes and tactile and kinesthetic nerves and, doubtless, innumerable other conditions. The innumerability of all the conditions

of perception together with the extreme variability of conditions of perception is disheartening to those who lust after the certainties of logical demonstration in the field of perception, but they present us with no general problem we cannot overcome. In particular cases the variability of conditions and over-looking some relevantly important condition can present us with particular problems, but since every doubt which can in principle be raised in particular cases can also in principle be laid to rest, we are not pushed into a finally unmitigated skepticism. If we cannot allay some actual reasonable doubt in a particular case, we shall have to come to rest in skepticism only as regards that case. This might be uncomfortable for persons of a certain temperament, but it will not bother reasonable people.

Up to this point I have been discussing some of the very general principles which underlie the practice of describing material objects in such a way as to distinguish very generally some of the things involved in correct and incorrect descriptions. But it should be evident that the same sort of general account can be extended to cover correct or incorrect identifications of hallucinatory images or paste diamonds and decoy ducks. Misidentifications as well as misdescriptions can be construed as predictive errors.

Take the paste diamond case. Being a real diamond is much more complicated a matter than having certain visual qualities to the naked eye or certain crude tactual qualities to the normal hand. This is exactly why paste diamonds are so well-fitted to deceive the unwary. The superficially observed qualities of a paste diamond may well be real qualities of the paste diamond (indeed, they will be under standard conditions) but they are not really like the qualities of a diamond, or the qualities of a real diamond. Some, perhaps the colour, may even be exactly similar to the qualities of a real diamond to the

naked eye under standard conditions of illumination. Nevertheless, what makes an identification of a paste diamond as a real diamond a mistake is similar to what makes a description of a coin as elliptical a mistake. There is a failure of coherence or correlation of some of the qualities of the object with other qualities the object should have if it is really a diamond. For example, one of the essential features of real diamonds is that they be of a certain degree of hardness. Real diamonds will cut glass; paste diamonds won't. Someone who identifies a paste diamond as a real diamond makes a predictive error just in the sense that his identification commits him to certain predictions which, if checked out, will turn out to be false. Falsification of his identification will, as in the case of the misdescribed coin, turn out to be the absence of an expected coherence between various of the qualities the object is experienced to have.

Similar considerations are involved in the misidentifications in hallucinatory cases. If anyone misidentifies what is actually only a visual image as being a real rat, he commits himself to certain predictable correlations of his visual experience with experiences involving other sense-modalities. And these correlations will fail to obtain.

No doubt an adequate theory of what I have been calling identifications and descriptions would require considerable elaboration.- Certainly such a theory would require an excursion into precincts of the philosophy of language far beyond the scope of this thesis. But I believe my admittedly primitive treatment of these matters is sufficient for the purposes now at hand, viz., (1) to show that Austin's criticisms of this kind of general distinction between appearance and reality is inadequate, and (2) to show that Austin's own positive

analysis of the uses of "real" is, in the main, compatible with this quite general sense-datum account of "real."

Austin's criticisms of Ayer's general distinction between appearance and reality are, as I noted earlier, equally applicable (or not) to my own quasi-Ayerian account. They are somewhat difficult to deal with because they are hardly criticisms at all. Austin's procedure is to heap up a number of examples of sentences in which "real" and "not real" occur; these are stated to be counter-examples illustrating the inapplicability of the general sense-datum account of "real" outlined above. Generally, Austin's putative counter-examples are presented within rhetorical questions or surrounded by rhetorical questions, and orthodox philosophical argumentation is notably absent. In its place there is insinuation and innuendo, effected by phrases like "will-o'-the-wisp," "fatal enterprise," "of course," and "simply" and by suitable uses of italics the total effect of which is to elicit the very strong feeling that Ayer and philosophers like him must be really quite perfect asses. A fortiori, their doctrines must be asinine. All this leaves the critic of Austin no alternative but to examine Austin's putative counter-examples and to attempt to answer his rhetorical questions. I shall not attempt to examine all of Austin's examples or to answer all of his rhetorical questions. To do so would be both tedious and unnecessary. I shall instead select for treatment those which seem to me most conspicuously to require dealing with. The ways I handle those matters I have selected are easily enough extensible to those I have chosen to ignore.

Most of Austin's supposed counter-examples and a very great many of his rhetorical questions occur in Pt.VII of Sense and Sensibilia in his preliminary survey of the complexities of "real," but they are quite evidently

intended as ground-work for his attacks, in Pt.VIII, on Ayer's analysis of "real."

(1) "'That's not the real colour of her hair.' Why not? Because the colour her hair now looks is an unreliable basis for prediction? Because the colour her hair now looks is not 'most conspicuously differentiated' from the other constituents of my sense-field? No. That's not the real colour of her hair because she's dyed it."(p.82)

This example seems to me quite off-target. In the first place, "dyed" as it is used here has all of the salient features which Austin says are characteristic of the uses of "real" and "not real." (pp.68-77) It is coupled with the substantives "colour" and "hair." As it is used here it is a negative dimension-word pairing off with the affirmative "natural". As such it belongs with "not real" in Austin's list of negative terms which "fulfill the same function." (p.71) Moreover, "dyed," like "not real" appears to wear the trousers; the suggestion that that is the real colour of her hair derives its pointedness by excluding ways in which that might not be the colour of her hair. And, finally, "dyed," like "not real," but more specifically, adjusts us to a peculiarity of circumstances in the case. If we paid attention simply to these features of "dyed" and "not real" in this case, we should have to conclude that Austin's counter-example, "That's not the real colour of her hair because she's dyed it" amounts to little, if anything, more than "That's not the real colour of her hair because it's not the real colour of her hair," a true but unhelpful remark going no way toward undermining the sense-datum account of "real." But, of course, there is more to this example.

That which saves "That's not the real colour of her hair because

she's dyed it" from the emptiness of tautology is located in the adjusting function of "dyed" and "not real," or rather, in the circumstances of the case which call for adjustment. And this is where the sense-datum analysis enters the picture. The colour dyed hair looks is not the real colour of her hair because dyeing introduces an abnormal, non-standard condition which prevents us from predicting, for example, the colour the hair will have as it grows from its roots, i.e., how it will look under natural, normal, or standard conditions for determining the colour of hair.

It might be objected that even if all this is so, still the case does not fit into the sense-datum analysis. In the sense-datum analysis given above "real" and "not real" were discussed in terms of misperception, and misperception were analyzed in terms of mis-identification and misdescription. But suppose a criminal disguises himself by dyeing his hair and then proceeds to rob a bank. His victims describe him to the police and he is arrested before he can undo his disguise and is promptly identified by his victims. The dyed colour of his hair was not the real colour of his hair. But where, in this case, is the misperception? Where is the misdescription or misidentification?

This objection seems to me to be weak. The description given to the police may well have been correct, and certainly the identification of the criminal was correct. Even so, the description was a description of the man's appearances, not a description of the man as he really is. Correct descriptions of appearances are not necessarily correct descriptions of the object to which the appearances are referred. And of course, in cases where all one has ever had to go on were deceptive appearances, correct identifications of an

object as a particular object (rather than as an object of a particular kind) do not require correct descriptions of the object as it really is but only correct descriptions of its appearances. And the robber's victims did misperceive. That they should was his purpose in disguising himself. His disguise was ineffective only because of his bad luck in being arrested before he could undo it.

(2) Similar things can be said about Austin's example of a normally white flower grown in a green fluid so that its petals are a pale shade of green. Here, he says, "I can, after all, make all the standard predictions about how my specimen will look in various conditions. But my reason for saying that pale green is not its real colour has nothing at all to do with that; it is simply that the flower's natural colour is white." (p.82)

Since Austin has included "natural" in the same list with "real" (SS p.71) as words fulfilling the same function, one could suppose that he is here saying nothing more than that pale green is not the real colour of the flower because its real colour is white. But, again, there is more to the example than this.

It is true enough that we could make all the standard predictions about how Austin's peculiar green flower will look in various conditions if we confine ourselves to that specimen flower. But it is not at all true that we could say how flowers of that species normally look in standard conditions of illumination and standard conditions of growth for flowers of that species. Moreover, if we take the real colour of the flower to be green, we should certainly commit ourselves to certain predictions which would be false, e.g., that the flower's progeny will be pale green.

I cannot, therefore, see that this example in any way runs counter to the sense-datist account. To say that pale green is not the real colour of the flower is to call our attention to a certain abnormal condition preventing us from having an appropriately cohering range of experiences.

(3) "If I look very closely indeed at a piece of cloth I may see it as a criss-cross pattern of black and white, and be able to predict that from other points of view it will look grey; if I look at it from a range of several yards, it may look grey, and I may not be able to predict that, close to, it will look black and white; but we say, all the same, that its colour is grey." This example, Austin says, "runs directly counter to Ayer's doctrine." (pp.82-3)

The force of this example is not at all clear. Certainly it is no part of sense-datum doctrine that if one is able correctly to ascribe to something its real colour, then every conceivable prediction one makes as regards further colour appearances will be reliable. Some will and some won't. All that is required is that an indeterminately broad range of predictions should be reliable for an indeterminately broad range of further appearances in an indeterminately broad range of conditions affecting perception. In the present case one might not be able to predict that, close to, the grey piece of cloth will look black and white - at least to the naked eye. But since Austin's piece of cloth is, by hypothesis, grey and since grey is a colour obtained by blending of black and white such that the resulting colour has no hue or saturation, then at some point close to the piece of cloth it will look black and white, although, of course, we may require the use of a magnifying glass in order to get visually close enough to the piece of cloth.



(4) Austin raises a question about taste. (p.83). "If someone who isn't in the habit of drinking wine says of the glass I give him that it's sour, I might protest, 'It isn't really sour'- meaning thereby, not that the notion that it's sour will provide a poor basis for prediction, but that, if he savours it a bit more sympathetically, he'll realize that it just isn't like things that are sour, that his first reaction, though understandable perhaps, was inappropriate."

Prima facie, this example is effective against the predictive analysis. But its effectiveness is deceptive. It depends mainly on a curious social convention among wine drinkers that dry wines are not to be called sour even though they plainly taste sour. And it also depends partly on the fact that "sour" is fairly vague and even ambiguous. Certainly dry wine is sour in one common meaning of the term; it is devoid of sweetness. And chemically dry wine is a sour substance; it contains certain of the esters and ethers which typically produce a sour taste. Austin's inchoate wine-drinker is right to describe the wine as sour, and Austin is just wrong in saying that it is not sour or just isn't like things that are sour; it is.

The example fits in with the sense-datum predictive analysis easily enough. A sophisticated drinker of Austin's offering could predict reliably enough on the basis of the flavour of the wine that chemical analysis would reveal the presence of esters and ethers which would account for the flavour—even if he does not know it is wine he is drinking. A naive taster could reliably enough predict that any other normal naive taster, uneducated in the ways and language of socially experienced wine-bibbers, would find the wine sour too. The sour flavour is the real flavour of the wine for just these sorts of reasons.

Admittedly, talk about real flavours in terms of predictions is strained and artificial. But this is because we only infrequently use taste in identifying and describing things or in distinguishing appearance from reality.

(5) Austin raises a number of examples in the form of questions, but does not stop for answers. (pp.65-67) What is the real colour of a fish which looks multi-coloured at a depth of a thousand feet but greyish white on deck under normal conditions of illumination? What is the real colour of the sky, of the sun, of a chameleon? What is the real colour of a pointilliste painting of a green meadow if the painting is composed mainly of blue and yellow dots? Dissolved in tea, a tablet of saccharine makes the tea taste sweet; taken neat, it tastes bitter. What is the real taste of the saccharine? What is the real colour of an after-image? What is the real shape of a cloud? Or what is the real shape of a cat? Does its real shape change as it moves? If not, in what posture is its real shape on display? Is its real shape fairly smooth-outlined, or must it be finely enough serrated to take account of each hair?

Austin says of the cat example, that "it is pretty obvious that there is no answer to these questions - no rules according to which, no procedure by which, answers are to be determined." (p.67) Obviously he intends this to apply to his other examples as well. And we can, I think, accept Austin's point as more or less accurate. But what his examples show is not that the sense-datum analysis in terms of prediction, standard or normal cases etc. is wrong where there are procedures or rules for answering the question "real or not?", but only that there are many many kinds of cases for which we have no conventions, and thus no distinction between the real and the apparent.

This should not be surprising; not every situation in which we find ourselves is so fraught with importance that we have to establish distinctions between appearance and reality. The shapes of clouds have so little bearing on our lives that it is no wonder that we do not conventionalize upon certain shapes seen from certain viewpoints, raising them to the status of real shapes.

None of Austin's examples, however, is of such a nature as to prohibit us from making the appearance/reality distinction in the same ways and for the same sorts of purposes operative in cases where we now do make the distinction. Consider just one of Austin's cases: Suppose there were a readily available poison in tablet form having the following characteristics: (1) It looks just like saccharine tablets. (2) Dissolved in tea and other beverages, it makes them taste sweet. (3) Taken neat, it tastes sweet. (4) Taken neat it is harmless. (5) It is subject to such rapid dissipation that it is undetectable in an autopsy. And (6) it works by producing a coronary thrombosis. Under just such circumstances as these we might very well conventionalize upon the bitter taste of saccharine taken neat, taking it as a ready standard in terms of which we identify saccharine and distinguish it from the poison, and, of course, we should be much more concerned than we now are about the condition of our taste buds since an aberrant condition could lead to a fatal mis-identification of a poison tablet as saccharine.

It would be an easy task to run through all of Austin's examples and place them in conceivable contexts in which we should make distinctions between appearance and reality. That we do not now do so for the shapes of clouds, the colour of the sky, the taste of saccharine etc. betokens much that is important about the conditions of our lives, but nothing important

about our conceptual system.

We now need to consider how Austin's positive analysis of "real" compares with the sense-datatist predictive analysis. Where it is not quite compatible, Austin's analysis will be shown to be suspect, and an adjustment will be made which will save the appearances and preserve Austin's genuine insights. (10)

First-off, we can grant Austin the substantive-hungriness of "real," i.e., that we must have an answer to "A real what?" before the question "Real or not?" can have a definite sense. And we can grant that this latter question can be raised only if there is a way in which things may not be what they seem. (pp.68-70) All of this is only to say that "real" operates in accordance with certain conventions within the conceptual system of common sense and that we cannot understand its functions independently of that conceptual system and those conventions. But this observation alone does not allow one to burke the predictive analysis of "real" given by sense-datists since their analysis is intended as an analysis of the underpinnings of "real" as it operates on the level of common sense.

We can also agree with Austin's characterization of "real" and "not real" as dimension-words heading up whole families of "reality" and "unreality" words. (pp.71-3) I should want to amend Austin's remarks only by adding that such expressions as "standard" and "normal" also belong in his list of "reality" words along with "true," "natural," "authentic" etc. I should also want to add "looks," "sense" and "appears" to Austin's list of "unreality" words. The really interesting and important features of Austin's analysis are to be found in what he says of "real" as a trouser-word

and as an adjuster-word.

Neither the substantive-hungriness nor the dimensionality of "real" are inconsistent with the predictive analysis of "real." The sense-datist analysis is not, after all, directed toward distinguishing "the real," construed as some sort of realm, from "mere appearance," i.e., say, the manner of F.H. Bradley. Sense-datists are as concerned as Austin is in "a real x" and "not real x" where "x" can be filled in with such mundane expressions as "duck," "diamond" etc.

Austin tells us that although normally the affirmative use of an expression is basic, with "real" it is the negative use which is basic, or, as he puts it, wears the trousers. (pp.70-71) The function of the affirmative "real" is not to contribute positively to the characterization of anything, but to exclude possible ways of being not real....". Thus, "a real x" differs from "an x" only by excluding various and possibly numerous ways of being not a real x, and we can understand "a real x" only in the light of the ways in which x might be or might have been not real but a toy, a dummy, a decoy, an hallucination, a mirage etc. It is the negative use of "real" and, presumably the members of the family of "unreality" expressions presided over by "not real" which contributes positively to the characterization of things. So the prima facie negative "not real" is actually affirmative and the prima facie affirmative "real" actually functions as a negative excluder-expression.

Austin, unfortunately, does not tell us why the prima facie functions of "real" and "not real" are so deceptive, why, that is, there should be such a curious reversal of the actual functions of these expressions. Explanation of this fact, if it is a fact, is wanting. We need an explanation

of why Austin should have thought his doctrine of the basicity of "not real" to be true. And we need to enquire whether there are considerations which militate sufficiently strongly against Austin to call for another account of "real" which is supple enough to preserve Austin's insights while correcting his errors. For certainly, if Austin is right the sense-datum account given above must be wrong since it construes "not real" as a genuine negative and "real" as a genuine affirmative. And there is at least the implication that "real" is basic.

Apparently a consideration which weighed heavily with Austin was the fact, which I have conceded, that the question "Real or not?" cannot be raised at all unless there are specific, known ways in which things may not be what they seem, i.e., ways in which this may not be a real x or a real property of this x. But this fact is not at all sufficient to support the doctrine of the basicity of "not real" in the required sense, i.e., the doctrine that "real" is a purely negative excluder-word playing only a dependent role. For surely the statement that this is not a real x can equally well be said not to be propoundable at all unless there are quite positive ways in terms of which this might be, or might be said to be, a real x.

Nor can the doctrine of the basicity of "not real" be defended by reference to the fact that normally we just do not make any use of "real" unless we wish to allay some suspicion or reasonable possibility of suspicion. Going through a good museum with a friend, one might point to a painting and say "That's a Rembrandt" but not "That's a real Rembrandt." The latter remark would be inappropriate in the circumstances. But it might well be

true, nevertheless. It would not be senseless, i.e., conceptually inappropriate; its inappropriateness would be merely the inappropriateness of banality. If I actually owned a Rembrandt and pointed it out to my guests as a real Rembrandt, my remarks would surely suffer from the inappropriateness of gaucherie, but they equally surely would not be conceptually inappropriate or senseless.

Our intuitions certainly seem to run counter to Austin's doctrine when we examine some of the other members of the "reality" and "unreality" families. If I say "This is a genuine/authentic Rembrandt" or "This is the natural/true colour of her hair" or "This is a proper duck all right" I surely enough exclude this from being taken to be a forgery, dyed hair, or a decoy. But, surely, I also positively characterize this painting as, say, being of a certain age, or this creature as having a certain genesis or certain behavioral propensities, or this hair as having grown with that colour. And, to take some of Austin's "unreality" expressions, if I say "this is a decoy duck" or "That's not really an oasis; it's a mirage" or "This is a paste diamond" I not only positively characterize this/that, but I also exclude this/that from being taken as either a toy or a real live duck, a real diamond or a synthetic diamond, a real oasis or a total hallucination. There seem to be, that is, certain excluder aspects to the functioning of "not real" (etc.) as well as of "real" (etc.), and there seem to be certain positive properties associable with both "real" (etc.) and "not real" (etc.).

The fact is, "real" and "not real" (and the members of their respective families) seem to be on a par with other adjectives, simultaneously excluding and contributing, or at least suggesting or calling for

for something positive in both their affirmative and negative uses. This should not be surprising; exclusion is, after all, symmetrical. If x excludes y, then y excludes x, whether x and y are merely paired terms negating each other (natural/dyed; genuine/false) or where x and y are both "affirmative" terms (blue/red). If "real" excludes "decoy," "illusion," "hallucination" etc. then surely "decoy" excludes "real," "hallucination," "toy" etc. But in neither case can the meanings of these terms be understood solely in terms of exclusion. "Real duck" excludes "decoy duck" but this cannot be all that it does since "duck" simpliciter also excludes "decoy duck" - unless one wants to argue, implausibly, that "real" is always logically otiose. Similarly, "blue" excludes "red" (and all other colours) and attributes something positive, while "not blue" both excludes something and calls for further specifications. In these ways "blue" and "real" ("not blue" and "not real") are very similar. Since both are adjectives, it should not be surprising that they have some common features. The important differences between them are to be found in their other functions. "Real," as Austin says, is an adjuster-word (p.73). "Blue" is not. "Blue" is a specific property word, and "real" is not, although there are certainly various properties associable with "real" depending upon the substantive expression with which "real" is coupled.

Austin's doctrine of adjuster-words is, I think, the most fruitful part of his analysis of "real," for it provides us with the wherewithal for an account of "real" which (1) shows more clearly why "not real" should seem to wear the trousers, and (2) why "not real" actually wears the trousers.

Very succinctly, an adjuster-word, according to Austin, is one



is one which enables us to deal more or less systematically, rather than in an ad hoc sort of way, with any of the many situations in which our finite vocabularies are too poor to meet the exigencies of a situation. (pp.73-6)

Austin's explanatory example is that of an animal which looks and acts very much, but not quite as pigs do. We could invent a new word ad hoc in order to speak of the animal, and sometimes we do. But straightaway we can say "It's like a pig," thus adjusting ourselves and our extant vocabulary to this new situation. "Like," Austin says, is the great adjuster-word.(p74)

"Real" is also, according to Austin, an adjuster-word. All of his examples however, indicate that it is "not real" which is actually the adjuster-expression. For example, he remarks that ".....having said of this animal that it's like a pig, we may proceed with the remark, 'But it isn't a real pig'.....". The use of these adjuster-words is "to free us from the disability of being able to shoot only straight ahead; by their use on occasion, such words as "pig" can be.....brought into connection with targets lying slightly off the simple, straightforward line on which they are ordinarily aimed." Again, when asking why we need "real" as an adjuster as well as "like", his example shows that it is "not real" which does the adjusting; "Why exactly do we want to say, sometimes, "It is like a pig," sometimes "it is not a real pig?" (p.76)

Despite the fact that Austin's explicit statement that "real" is an adjuster-word is curiously at odds with his examples, which show "not real" doing the adjusting, I think Austin is right on both counts: "Real" and "not real" are both adjusters, as is also "like". By seeing how they perform their adjusting functions we can easily see why "not real" should

seem to wear the trousers by doesn't actually and also why "like" is required as an adjuster as well as "not real."

We can begin by noting, and rectifying, a certain mis-placed emphasis or distortion in the focus of Austin's conception of the adjuster functions of adjuster-words. Austin explains the adjuster function of "not real" and "like" by reference to an example of which "pig" is adjusted to a new and unforeseeable situation. This is how Austin describes the situation. No doubt our adjusters do this work from time to time. They would be poor flexibility-devices if they did not. But this is not, surely their main line of work. They are more commonly used in situations which are not new and unforeseeable but which are in some way deviant or aberrant in commonly known, standard ways. Many of Austin's examples make this clear. And his examples also make clear that frequently the ways in which such situations are deviant are such that we are liable to be misled. The importance of refocusing Austin's conception of adjuster-words in this way so as to emphasize that the really salient feature of "not real" and "like" is that they mark deviance in a situation, rather than merely newness or unexpectedness, is this: It follows directly from this that "not real" must appear to wear the trousers and also that it cannot. And it helps us to understand why "like" is needed as an adjuster along with "not real."

Clearly, if we are confronted with a deviant situation or one which we suspect is deviant or even merely one in which suspicion could reasonably be invoked, it will be "not real" or "like" which will mark the possible deviance and adjust us and our vocabulary to the situation. "Real" could not do this job, but will come into play, if at all, only post hoc in a denial or

rebuttal of the suggestion of deviance. It is this which makes it appear that "not real" wears the trousers and that "real" is actually merely a dependent and negative expression. But it is also this which makes it certain that "not real" cannot wear the trousers in the required sense. For if "not real" is required to mark a deviance and to adjust us to it, it can do so only by a departure from the non-deviant standard, normal case which the deviant case resembles in one or another degree. It will be this standard case which actually wears the trousers, i.e., is basic. "Not real" adjusts off the standard, and it will be the standard x which determines what it is to be not really an x or not a real x. It is this that makes "not real" a dependent or non-basic expression. The adjuster work of "real" will thus be to rebut "unreality" claims, i.e., positively to affirm that the standard case obtains; it adjusts us back to the standard. But the standard x and the real x are, of course, identical. This is why it is "real" that actually wears the trousers. Austin was misled by the undoubted fact that normally "real" comes into use only post hoc in rebuttal of a prior "unreality" claim; but it does not follow at all from this fact that the meaning of "real" is, so to speak, post-logical to that of "not real."

We can now see why "like" should be required as an adjuster-word as well as "not real" and "real." Adjustment runs in two directions - away from the standard case and toward the standard case. "Not real" adjusts us away from the standard, whereas "like" points us toward the standard, while "real" puts us, to continue Austin's metaphor, right on target - indeed, right on the bull's eye. It seems natural that we should have an expression - "not real" - to signal and emphasize differences from the standard case and another expression - "like" - to signal and emphasize similarities to the standard

case. But these cannot be the only functions of "not real" and "like," for this would be to construe these expressions as serving to mark and emphasize differing degrees of deviance from the standard case. This would suggest, falsely, that "not real" marks a greater degree of difference from the standard than that marked by "like." But "not real x's" are often very remarkably similar to real x's - indeed often more so than things we should say are merely like x's. Decoy ducks, for example, are rather like real ducks in some ways, and this might be worth remarking. Brand A decoy ducks are better than Brand B decoy ducks because Brand A decoys look more like ducks than Brand B's. But it is difficult to think of a case in which one should want to deny that a decoy duck is a real duck. On the other hand, paste diamonds can be so like real diamonds, that it is very worth remarking that a specimen is not a real diamond. What these cases suggest is that "not real" is most appropriately used in cases in which we are very likely to be deceived, whereas "like" is most appropriately used for cases which are similar to the standard cases but not so much so that anyone is likely to mistake the like case as a real or standard case.

Finally, we can now see why our intuition that "real" is a genuine affirmative used positively to characterize things is correct, i.e., why Austin is wrong in thinking that "real" functions merely as a negative excluder-word. If "real" in its role as an adjuster were used merely to rebut a particular "unreality" claim, it could exclude only the particular way in which it is suggested that this is not a real x, leaving open the possibility that here might be other ways in which this is a non-standard or unreal case. But if "real" adjusts us to the standard, it does more than merely exclude

a specific way in which we might be confronted with something which is "not a real x." It excludes or rebuts all further need for adjustment, and in so doing it affirms that this is an x, i.e., has the standard properties of x's.

It might seem that, in the end, "real" is otiose because the properties of, say, real ducks and ducks are the same and because a particularly strong emphasis on "is" in "This is a duck" could be used to rebut the claim that this is not a real duck. But "real" is save from otiosity by its mate "not real," i.e., by our need for a device which warns us of the likelihood of deception. This is an additional reason why "not real" might seem to wear the trousers.

(E) Austin's Inconsistency:

Before concluding with this section on "The Nature of Reality", I want to note very briefly how certain aspects of Austin's analysis of "real" compares with his analysis of "looks," "seems," and "appears."

The most striking - indeed startling - fact which emerges from a comparison is that part of Austin's analysis of "real" is inconsistent with his analysis of "looks," "seems," and "appears." Given the ontological identity of x's and real x's, Austin cannot consistently hold that (1) it is the (prima facie) negative use of "real" that wears the trousers, i.e., that the meaning or use of "not real" is logically prior to that of the (prima facie) affirmative use of "real" and (2) that the notion of being a so-and-so or being so-and-so is logically prior to the notion of being like (a) so-and-so, ie, looking, seeming, or appearing to be (a) so-and-so. These

two views are clearly inconsistent, for the notion of not being a real x is (partly) analyzable just in terms of looking like, seeming to be, or appearing x, particularly in such "not real" cases as illusions and hallucinations. And if "looking x," "appears x," "seems x" are dependent locutions the meanings of which are parasitic upon the notions of being (a) so-and-so, then a fortiori "not real" will be parasitic upon the notion of being so-and-so or being a so-and-so, i.e., on the standard, normal, or real case.

It is not easy to come by an explanation of why a philosopher of such undoubted perspicacity as Austin should have failed to spot such a glaring inconsistency. I can only attribute it to excessive partisanship - Austin not only thinks sense-datum theory is false, he despises it - and to an approach to the analysis of philosophical problems and doctrines which is much too piecemeal. I must admit, however, that this explanation seems to me slightly unsatisfactory, perhaps too facile. But I can think of no other explanation.

Finally, in sum, it may be that sense-datum theory is ultimately untenable, but Austin's case against Ayer and other sense-datists on the analysis of "real" must be rejected with the Scottish verdict of "not proven". Austin's entire case was directed to proving that no general analysis of the distinction between appearance and reality can be given. An examination of many of Austin's examples which allegedly run counter to the general predictive analysis of "real" by the sense-datist has shown that many of his putative counter-examples fit very well into a predictive analysis. Where they do not fit, they fail as counter examples since they involve

cases where no distinction between appearance and reality has been conventionally established because no purpose would be served by such a distinction in such cases. One such failed counter-example - that of the saccharine tablet which tastes bitter taken neat and sweet dissolved in tea - was placed in an imaginary context in which serious purposes would be served by establishing an appearance/reality distinction and it was shown how such a distinction could be made and also that an appearance/reality distinction in the imagined circumstances would be entirely analogous in the distinction in cases where we presently make it in identifying or describing the things we perceive.

An examination of Austin's own positive analysis of the four salient features of "real" showed that where Austin is least insightful, viz., in characterizing "real" as a dimension-word and as a substantive-hungry, his analysis is not incompatible with or in competition with the predictive analysis. And it was shown that where Austin is most insightful and interesting i.e., on trouser-words and adjuster-words, there are good reasons for thinking him wrong just on points which would tend against the predictive analysis, e.g., his view that "not real" is basic while "real" is the dependent member of the pair. On adjuster-words Austin's account just as it stands in Sense and Sensibilia is not compatible with the predictive analysis. But it was argued that Austin's account of adjuster-words is slightly out of focus, and that when it is adjusted to emphasize the importance of the fact that it is deviance in a situation which initially calls for adjustment, his account becomes quite compatible with the standard predictive analysis of the sense-dativist; "not a real x"

or "not really x" point to a deviance which would cause the predictions implicit in our identifications and descriptions to be falsified by subsequent experience, while "is a real x" reassures us that our descriptions or identifications and the predictives they imply are reliable.



FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER FIVE

(1) Vide D.M. Armstrong's Perception and The Physical World for a very curious and instructive example of the sort of thing that results when a philosopher refuses to accept the necessity of grounded judgments. Armstrong analyzes "having a sense-impression" as merely "having an inclination to believe" some proposition about physical reality. After considerable fast and fancy peregrinations through the implications of this analysis he ends with what can only be described as a phenomenalism of cohering beliefs or judgments which have no connections with anything but each other.

(2) Ayer, A.J.; The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, pp.11-19.

(3) \_\_\_\_\_; Ibid, p.12.

(4) \_\_\_\_\_; Ibid, p.14.

(5) \_\_\_\_\_; Ibid, p.18.

(6) \_\_\_\_\_; Ibid, p.18.

(7) \_\_\_\_\_; Ibid, pp.229-274.

(8) \_\_\_\_\_; Ibid, p.263.

(9) \_\_\_\_\_; Ibid, p.269.

(10) A very great deal of what follows has been suggested by Prof: S.C. Coval and the late Mr. Terry Forrest in a paper entitled "Which Word Wears the Trousers" published in Mind, vol. LXXVI, No.301, January 1967. However, their detailed criticisms of Austin's treatment of "real" are fairly purely linguistic, and they make no attempt to relate their work to sense-datum theory. Moreover, I disagree with several essential points which their paper tries to establish. I particularly disagree with their view, in agreement with Austin, that the meaning of "real" is post-logical to that of "not real." It is this fatal concession to Austin which forces them to take their rather odd views that "real" and "not real" operate, not as a duo, but as members of

a trio the third member of which, viz., "the standard x" really "wears the trousers," i.e., is "basic." In my view, which is more in accord with common sense and common language, "real" and "not real" do operate as a duo, with "real" as the "basic" and affirmative member. This enables me, among other things, to do without altogether too tendentious technical expression "re-adjuster" which they use in characterizing the work of "real;" it suggests what is false, viz., that the meaning of real is parasitic upon and thus secondary to that of "not real."

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aaron, R.I. "The Common Sense View of Sense Perception", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol.LVIII (1957-58).
- Armstrong, D.M. Perception and The Physical World. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.
- Austin, J.L. Philosophical Papers, ed. Urnson and Warnock. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962.
- Ayer, A.J. "Can There Be a Private Language?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp: vol. 1954.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. London: Macmillan and Co., 1940.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Language, Truth and Logic. second edition. London: Victor Gallancz, 1946.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Perception," British Philosophy at the Mid-Century, ed. C.A.Mace. London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1957.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Phenomenalism," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. XLVII, (1947).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Privacy," Proceedings of the British Academy, 1959.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Terminology of Sense-Data," Mind, vol. 54 (1945), pp.289-312.
- Barnes, W.H.F. "The Myth of Sense-Data," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. XLV, (1944-45).
- Berkeley, G. Principles of Human Knowledge. London: J.M.Dent and Sons, Ltd. (1957) Everyman's Library, No. 483.
- Berlin, I. "Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical Statements," Mind, vol. LIX, (1950).
- Braithwaite, R.B. "Propositions about Material Objects," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. XXXVIII (1938)

Bibliography - 2

- Brood, C.D.        Scientific Thought. London: Kegan Paul Ltd, 1923.
- Chisholm, R.       Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957.
- Clarke, T.        "Seeing Surfaces and Physical Objects," Philosophy in America. London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1965. pp.98-114.
- Coval, S. and Forrest, T. "Which Word Wears the Trousers?", Mind, vol. LXXVI, No. 301, January 1967, pp.73-82.
- \_\_\_\_\_.        Scepticism and the First Person. London: Methuen and Co., 1966.
- Descartes, R.     Meditations on First Philosophy, Med.VI. New York: The Modern Student's Library, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927.
- Firth, R.        "Austin and The Argument from Illusion," Philosophical Review, vol. LXXIII, (1964) pp.372-382.
- \_\_\_\_\_.        "Sense-Data and The Percept Theory," Mind, vols.LVIII and LIX, (1949-50).
- Grice, H.P.       "Some Remarks About the Senses," in Analytic Philosophy, ed. R.J.Butler, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.
- Hall, R.        "Excluders," Analysis, vol. 20, No.1, October 1959, pp.1-7.
- Hampshire, S.     "Identification and Existence" in Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. H.D.Lewis. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961.
- Hanson, N.R.     "On Having the Same Visual Experiences," Mind, vol. LXIX, No.275, July 1960.
- Hardie, W.F.R.    "The Paradox of Phenomenalism," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, (1945-46).
- Harrod, Sir Roy. "Sense and Sensibilia," Philosophy, vol.XXXVIII, No. 145, July 1963.
- Lewis, C.I.       An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. LaSalle, Ill: Open Court Publishing Co., 1946.
- \_\_\_\_\_.        Mind and The World Order. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1956.

Bibliography - 3

- MacNabb, D.G.C. "Phenomenalism," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. XLI (1941).
- Malcolm, N. "Direct Perception," Knowledge and Certainty. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963, pp.73-95.
- Moore, G.E. "A Defense of Common Sense," Contemporary British Philosophy II. London: Muirhead Library of Philosophy. 1925.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Proof of an External World," Philosophical Papers. London: Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1959.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Some Judgments of Perception," Philosophical Studies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Some Main Problems of Philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Visual Sense-Data," British Philosophy in the Mid-Century, ed. C.A.Mace, London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1957 pp.203-211.
- Paul, G.A. "Is There a Problem about Sense-Data?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp: vol.XV (1936), pp.61-77.
- Price, H.H. Perception. London: Methuen and Co. 1932.
- Quinten, A. "The Problem of Perception," Mind vol.LXIV, 1955.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Foundations of Knowledge," British Analytical Philosophy, ed. Williams and Montefiore, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966. pp.55-86.
- Russell, B. The Problems of Philosophy. London: Oxford University Press, 1957.
- Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1949.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Sensation," Contemporary British Philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1961.
- Soltis, J.F. Seeing, Knowing and Believing. London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1966.