

JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY
DURING THE IKEDA CABINET (1960-1964)

by

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B.A., International Christian University, Tokyo, 1967

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
Political Science

We accepted this thesis as conforming to the
required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

June, 1969

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is the result of research on the nature of Japan's security policy as pursued by the Ikeda Cabinet during 1960 and 1964. The main discussion consists of three parts: internal political impacts on security policy making; external political impacts on security policy of Japan; and Japan's security policy proper.

Three political parties are studied as significant determinants of internal political impacts on the decision making structure of the Japanese political system. The rationale is that these political parties provide channels that connect the decision making core and the outer area of the Japanese political system. Therefore, the study of these political parties is a rewarding attempt at observing political inputs that the decision making core of the Japanese political system receives.

International exchange of the Japanese political system is investigated in the second part of the discussion. This subject is viewed both as inputs and outputs of the Japanese political system in relation to its international environment. The nature of the external impacts such as military, economic, geographic, ideological or cultural impacts is not specified in the following discussion, but is viewed as a Gestalt, or total being which comprises all the elements stated above.

The third section deals with what is usually described as defence policy. A more military aspect of Japan's security policy is studied in this section.

In conclusion, a broad generalisation is derived from the survey cited in the main discussion. The conclusion is characterised as the principle of balance in the Ikeda Cabinet's security policy.

Throughout the following discussion, Japanese names are written in the Japanese order, with family name first and given name last.

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INTRODUCTION

Security policy can be defined in various ways, depending on what a student of politics looks at and emphasises. In a narrow sense it is a policy that guarantees biological or physical survival of a country in the face of violent attack from outside its border lines. In a broader sense it is a set of policies that warrants not only physical, but political, economic, and cultural survival of a country over time.¹ Defence Secretary McNamara of the United States said,

We still tend to conceive of national security almost solely as a state of armed readiness: a vast awesome arsenal of weaponry. We still tend to assume that it is primarily this purely military ingredient that creates safety. We are still haunted by this concept of military hardware.²

In this thesis, security policy is defined as a policy that is to prevent armed attacks and/or to reduce possibilities of armed attacks from outside the border of a country.

The major policies of Japan's national security and the major factors that contributed in formulating these policies during the period of the Ikeda Cabinet (1960-64) will be explored in this thesis. As major Japanese security policies, two subjects will be discussed. One is, how the Japanese Government manipulated its international relations to maximise its friendly relations and minimise the potential sources of threat and danger. This policy was to soften the hostile diplomatic relations and to strengthen the existing friendly relations. The other policy is the actual

enforcement of physical defence power which is observed in the Second Defence Plan (1961-66).³

Generally speaking, there is no objection to labelling an armament policy as a security policy, since in its narrowest meaning a security policy is a defence policy, or a governmental provision for military forces. An objection may stem from constituting governmental manipulation of its international relations as a security policy. For instance, K. W. Deutsch says,

First, the impact of external events upon the internal affairs of a country could be said to decline with the stability and autonomy of the internal decision making system.⁴

and he further adds,

A very large country, very prosperous and with very strong holds upon its population, may be able to withstand even major impacts of foreign propaganda by tying its potential linkage groups so strongly to the domestic system that all the foreign inputs become relatively insignificant.⁵

Although Japan has quite an autonomous and stable government, and although so called linkage groups such as the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) that strongly reflect foreign governments' standpoints, are deeply set in the Japanese political system, Deutsch's above hypotheses do not seem to have worked in the postwar Japanese political situation. The Japanese Government has been highly sensitive to foreign impacts and has reacted carefully to them. There are perhaps two noteworthy reasons for explaining this particular phenomenon. One is that Japan's national

defence has been overwhelmingly dependent upon the United States, which is comparable to West European countries whose defence cannot be discussed without considering NATO which the United States dominates. As well, Japan's security policy cannot be delineated fully without referring to its relations with the United States and the American Strategy for the Far East.

The other reason is that Japan borders the two gigantic military powers in the communist bloc, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. The two important political parties, the JCP and the JSP, function as linkage groups in Japanese politics in relation to the communist bloc. This increases the importance of the communist bloc's impact on the Japanese political system. Furthermore, the Korean Peninsula which is located between Okinawa, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union, is one of the most troubled areas in the contemporary world. This gives Japan potential military trouble and ostensible political trouble.

This thesis adopts the standpoint that international influence is important in Japan's defence policy formulation. Of course, there are affirmative and negative opinions among the students of Japanese politics over this issue.⁶ Actually, there has been little investigation or research on the subject of Japanese security policy. So far, few attempts have been made to explore, systematically and extensively, the security policy making in Japan. Therefore, it seems to be legitimate

and necessary to discuss the international influence on Japan's defence policy formulation.

As the other major source of Japan's security policy making, this thesis will discuss the policies of the three political parties: the JCP, the JSP, and the Liberal-Democratic Party (the LDP). J. N. Rosenau points out the five important factors that collectively work upon the formulation of external policies: governmental, societal, systemic, role, and idiosyncratic variables.⁷ The impact of the political parties which will be discussed in the following chapter, approximately corresponds to the governmental variable of the Rosenau theory. Incidentally these factors, as well as systemic factors, seem to be extremely important in the study of Japan's security policy making. Of course, the distinctions between the five variables are analytical and in practice these five groups of factors are intertwined and mutually effect their influence on external policy formulation. Bearing this in mind, the policies of the JCP, JSP and LDP will be discussed separately from the systemic influences.

The LDP and its conservative predecessors have been the permanent government parties in the Japanese National Diet since 1948, and they have had the greatest influence over the cabinet's activities. In reality, the LDP is the main structure of the Japanese political system in aggregating demands concerning national security, and it is the most active and influential body in formulating the defence policy of Japan.

The JSP and the JCP are usually entirely against the government party in ideology and in foreign policy. One important characteristic of the two parties is that they can often generate anti-government chain reactions in Japanese society by activating the articulate and critical intellectuals who exert strong influence over the mass media, and the militant student radicals. As D. Hellmann observes,

Despite their majority in the Diet, the Liberal-Democrats must give careful consideration to the Socialist opposition on major issues or risk a serious political crisis that may, as in the 1960 Security Treaty incident, endanger the stability of the entire political system.⁸

The Socialists can activate a great number of semi-intellectuals (or quasi-intellectuals) who simply echo the critical intellectuals' opinions.⁹ These chain reactions often produce pressures on the government at three levels. At the highest level, the JCP and the JSP exert their influence over the governmental policies in the National Diet. At the second level, critical intellectuals in the mass media criticise the governmental policies in tune with the JCP and the JSP, and the unionists and student radicals organise their militant demonstrations against the government. At the lowest level, politically aware citizens start echoing what the mass media, influenced by the dissenting intellectuals, try to implant in the mass, and they often join the mass demonstrations against the government under the leadership of the JCP and the JSP. Usually the chain reactions do not go to the lowest level, but in a particular case like the 1960 political crisis,

a great number of compliant quasi-intellectuals can be mobilised to support the JCP and the JSP's line of argument in Japanese politics. Therefore, not only as direct participants in government but also as indirect forces which work as deterrent factors on the LDP's conservatism, the JCP and the JSP have to be dealt with when Japan's defence policy formulation is discussed.

In the construction of this thesis the second chapter covers the three political parties and their policies. The third chapter covers Japan's relations with the United States, Korea, and the communist bloc. The fourth chapter covers the government's domestic provisions for national defence. The last chapter is devoted to a general assessment of the Ikeda Cabinet's security policy with reference to the idiosyncratic factors of the Ikeda Cabinet.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I

¹Takase Shoji, "Anzen to wa nanika," Asahi Shimin Kyoshitsu: Nihon no Anzenhosho, (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1968 vols. 12), Vol. 1, pp. 60-64.

²New York Times, May 19, 1966.

³This plan will be discussed extensively in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

⁴"External Influence on the Internal Behavior of States," R. B. Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 8.

⁵Ibid, p. 11.

⁶Cf. Martin E. Weinstein, "The Origins and Basic Conception of Japan's Post-war Defense Policy," mimeographed paper, delivered at Association of Asian Studies Meeting, Boston, March 27-30, 1969, pp. 5-7.

⁷James M. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," R. B. Farrell, ed., Ibid, pp. 27-92.

⁸Japan in the Postwar East Asian International System, (McLean, Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation, 1969), p. 13.

⁹Cf. Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., "Japan Reviews Her American Alliance," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXX (Spring, 1966), pp. 1-2.

CHAPTER II POLITICAL PARTIES

THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY

POLICIES

During the time of the Ikeda Cabinet, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) had roughly three policies for Japanese security: to expel American military bases from Japan; to disband the National Defence Force; and to neutralise and demilitarise Japan. The JCP's supreme political goal had been and remains to be a communist revolution in Japanese society. All their activities were examined and evaluated from the viewpoint of the communist revolution. Their cardinal concern has been whether a political action facilitates or slows down their revolutionary programme. Therefore, Japan's security question has never been of crucial interest for them in any affirmative sense. However, as the armed forces have a decisive position in controlling people, as well as in defence against foreign aggression, the JCP has paid extraordinarily close attention to Japan's defence arrangement in a negative sense.

In addition, the international characteristics of communism was the other reason that the JCP had always been alert about Japan's defence. What effect Japan's defence power had upon the international communist activities was always the JCP's major concern. For example, the JCP's Seiji Senden Shiryo (Information for Political Campaign) states,

American imperialism and the Japanese monopoly ratified a new Security Treaty on June 23rd, 1960. The nominal end of this new treaty was collective defence. However, the real aims are: to preserve American military bases in Japan as usual and to enforce National Defence Force with nuclear weapons carried by missiles; to send the Defence Force overseas; and to suppress the labour movement. In other words, the Security Treaty of 1960 is in essence an enforced military alliance to threaten and to invade China and the Soviet Union. This Treaty is the manifest revitalisation of nuclear armed militarism.¹

'To suppress the labour movement' is an implicit expression of the JCP's fear of the organised armed force, since the Defence Force has never been used to suppress or to demonstrate against the labour movement. In this particular context, the word 'labour movement' should be interpreted as 'communist uprisings' (which have not taken place so far). This rhetoric shows the conflict between the JCP's aspiration for the revolution and the Defence Force as a deterrent against the communist revolution. Originally the Defence Force was established to fill the power vacuum which was created after the American troops' removal from Japan to Korea at the beginning of the Korean War. The duty of the original Defence Force (The National Police Reserve) was to keep domestic social order in anticipation of communist uprisings in Japan. The JCP's hyper-sensitivity about the Defence Force as the deterrent for their revolutionary movement was generated by this original nature of the Defence Force. Therefore, considering the ostensible and potential power of the Defence Force, the JCP's view that the Force could be the most effective deterrent for

their revolutionary programme was reasonable, and their policy to disband the Force was well in accord with their view of it.

As for the JCP's view of American military bases in Japan and of the enforcement of the Defence Force, the JCP's interpretation reveals the main expectations of the United States for the Security Treaty. For example, an article which appeared in Zenei (the JCP's monthly opinion magazine) in June of 1960, "The American Military Strategy and Japan's Subordination to it" viewed the treaty as having incorporated Japan into the American defence line in the Far East. It viewed that the aim of the treaty was to contain the communist bloc and to suppress communist activities in Japan.²

In 1961, the above interpretation was further extended in the article, "The American Military Strategy and the Aim of Defence Strengthening,"³ that the "American invasion" into Laos, Korea, and Southeast Asia "from Japan"⁴ was enabled particularly because Japan's armed forces became strong enough not to create a power vacuum in Japan and the Far East. This view was an extension of the former view in the sense that it recognised Japan's indirect role in American strategy as being an expansion from the Far East to Southeast Asia. Such a view of Japan's role in American Strategy, when digested by the principle of international communism, produced a policy to disengage Japan from the United States and to expel American military bases from Japan.

The policy goals of the JCP to neutralise and to demili-

tarise Japan were as follows. Internationally the neutralisation of Japan was supposed to contribute greatly to weakening the American position in Asia and was also supposed to encourage Asian communist revolutionaries. Domestically, to demilitarise Japan implied the disbandment of the Defence Force, which was the primary barrier for the communist revolution in Japan. Thus, the JCP's policy for Japan's defence could serve two major goals: to help the international communist movement and to carry out the communist revolution in Japan.

ACTIONS

The JCP's main strategy of executing its policy to reach its goals has been basically to instigate popular movements. Through these popular movements the JCP has tried to spread its influence and enforce its position in the National Diet. In this regard, the 1960 anti-Security Treaty movement was its most successful campaign. However, after the campaign, Ikeda's period (1960-1964) became a relatively inactive period for the JCP for several reasons. First of all, the Sino-Soviet dispute became violent in 1961, which dismayed the JCP, because the JCP had been ideologically dependent on and dominated by the Russian and Chinese party lines. The JCP at this stage could not decide which side it should join, nor was it prepared to take an independent course. Secondly, the Ikeda Cabinet's economic policy satisfied popular demands for

material goods and the Cabinet was on good terms with China and the Soviet Union. Consequently the Japanese people became less interested in security questions, and the relevance of the JCP's discussions on the Japan's security was gradually reduced.

During the Ikeda period, the JCP's immediate goal concerning Japan's defence became mainly to lessen the growth of the Defence Force and to restrict the Defence Force's range of activities. Internationally the strategy was to reduce Japan's role in the Far Eastern anti-communism line-up. Throughout and after the anti-Security Treaty movements of 1960, the JCP proclaimed that the new treaty involved the danger of arming the Defence Force with nuclear weapons; and that Japan's possessing nuclear weapons could provoke the communist countries' retaliatory attack with nuclear weapons. In response, the Ikeda Cabinet firmly and repeatedly stated that nuclear weapons would never be placed in Japan and that the Defence Force would not be armed with nuclear weapons as long as the Ikeda Cabinet stayed in power. Ikeda's statement was a great gain for the JCP strategically, since it successfully prevented the Defence Force from being equipped with nuclear weapons. However, Ikeda's statement was a fatal blow for the JCP in generating popular anti-nuclear weapon campaigns. For, after Ikeda's statements, the Force's nuclear armament virtually disappeared as a political issue. Even worse for the JCP was the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear tests in

1961 after breaking the mutual Test Ban Moratorium with the United States. The Japanese Government did not neglect this occasion to protest the Russian nuclear tests, and Japan's public opinion supported the Government unanimously and denounced the Soviet Union. The JCP was for the first time in its history cornered into a defensive position Vis a Vis the Japanese Government concerning the issue of nuclear armament and tests.

The JCP viewed the Security Treaty of 1960 as a spring-board for Japan to enlarge the Defence Force under the American strategic control, and 'anti-militarism' remained to be a big anti-Cabinet campaign slogan during the Ikeda period after the Kishi Cabinet. Ikeda Cabinet's financial policy and its attitude towards national defence and security gave a detrimental effect to this campaign. In Ikeda's financial policy, the proportion of the defence budget did not increase notably. In fact it was even kept far below the level expected by the United States and the Defence Agency (Boeicho).⁵ Ikeda Cabinet's relatively small defence budget again discouraged the JCP's anti-militarism campaign. This involved almost the same process and had the same effect on the JCP's tactics as Ikeda's non-nuclear armament policy.

The JCP's attack on Japan's defence system being under American control and constituting American strategy, was answered by Ikeda Cabinet's 'autonomous defence policy.' The autonomous defence policy was not Ikeda's original policy,

but in essence it was in the Ikeda period when Japan's armed forces became an important entity among the Far Eastern military forces. In a sense American influence over the Defence Force was reduced except in the Air Defence Force's control system. Thus the JCP's goal was fulfilled by the Ikeda's policy. As a result of it, however, Japan's Defence Force acquired self-confidence as well as fighting power. Therefore, as a whole, Ikeda's defence policy did not reduce the total amount of military power that confronted the communist bloc in the Far East. On the contrary, it strengthened the anti-communist military bloc and gave the United States greater mobility in the Far East and in Asia.⁶ As far as the JCP's aim to disengage the United States from Japan was concerned, the JCP was least successful, since 'autonomous Japan' strengthened its partnership with the United States, and the Japanese people welcomed such a partnership.⁷

The JCP's tactics in the international sphere were more effective than in domestic politics. In 1961, the Ikeda Cabinet showed a great interest in negotiations to normalise diplomatic relations with South Korea. Historically the Korean Peninsula has been the most crucial area around Japan for Japan's national defence.⁸ After the Pacific War, Korea restored its independence, but was divided into North and South Korea. South Korea had been in an inferior position to North Korea both in military and in economic aspects. The economic weakness of South Korea was an Achilles' heel of

the anti-communist bloc in the Far East, and its political and military instability was also a potential danger for Japan's security. Continuous South Korean social unrest was provocative to North Korean aspirations to re-unite Korea. Both the United States and Japan wanted to stabilise the South Korean Government by reinforcing its economy. Japan's economic condition during Ikeda's period was already strong enough to support this policy.

The JCP, accompanied by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), was against the Japanese Government's friendly approaches to South Korea, for fear of North Korea's loss of dominance in the Korean Peninsula. Naturally, the sensitive area for Japan's national defence was also the sensitive area for the communist bloc, especially for North Korea and the Chinese People's Republic. Regardless of their ideological split, the communist countries unanimously protested Japan's negotiations to normalise national relations with South Korea, since Japan's aim in the negotiations was obviously to stabilise the South Korean Government for its own security reasons. With the communist countries' wide support and with the JSP's partnership, the JCP pursued its policy of opposing the Japanese-Korean negotiations, by pointing out three reasons. Firstly, the Japanese-Korean partnership would result in a kind of North East Asian Treaty Organisation (JCP's term) which would provide optimum military bases to American imperialism's war-like policy in Asia. Secondly, Japanese 'monopoly capital'

would go into South Korea and open doors of an 'Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.' Thirdly, it would prevent the peaceful re-unification of Korea, confirm the separation of Korea, intensify confrontations in Korea, and possibly would aim to attack North Korea.⁹

The Japanese-Korean negotiations were prolonged throughout the Ikeda Cabinet and were concluded in 1965 by the succeeding cabinet. The JCP's tactics against the Japanese-Korean negotiations, along with domestic and international support, contributed to prolonging the negotiations, and gained a success which was not acquired in its domestic policies.

In conclusion, during the Ikeda Cabinet's era, the JCP's tactics for Japan's security policy were inactive and ineffective, because of the Sino-Soviet ideological split, the JCP's intra-party power struggle, and because of the Ikeda Cabinet's appealing policy to attract people's attention to economic activities. The only partially successful tactics of the JCP were found in its anti-Japanese-Korean negotiations campaign.

THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY DURING THE IKEDA PERIOD

NATURE

The basic character and nature of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) must be explained briefly in order to discuss the

JSP's policy for Japan's security. The JSP is the second largest political party in Japan. It has a two-fold character in the two dimensions: structure and activities. While the Japan Communist Party (JCP) is a party of hard core communists with a monolithic structure, the JSP is a popular socialist party which consists mainly of Marxists and Fabian socialists. The JSP members can be divided into rightwing and leftwing factions in their ideological orientation. The JSP's major political support comes from two sources: the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Nihon Rodo So Hyogikai or Sohyo) and unorganised popular sympathisers. Sohyo exerts a strong influence over the JSP's policy making since it is the largest organised source of political support for the JSP. However, because the JSP has moderate factions which antagonise the leftwing factions, it gains non-organised popular support whose nature is less militant compared to the militant line of the Sohyo. This gives a two-fold nature to the JSP's behavior.

The party doctrine of the JSP is very similar to that of a communist party in its emphasis on class struggle, and looking at its principle it is hard to distinguish the JSP from a communist party.¹⁰ However in practice, the JSP very often chooses for its executive body rightwing factions' members or members with mild ideology to reconcile its militant principle with its popular support which expects of the JSP less militancy than Marxists' ideology. The JSP's policies

which come out of the party assembly are as militant and radical as those of the JCP, but in the execution of them, these militant policies are softened and re-interpreted by conservative senior members and are transformed into less militant policies. This is roughly the process how the JSP produces a compromised policy to satisfy both strong demands of organised labour which aligns with the leftwing factions and conservatism of non-organised popular supporters who are aligned with the rightwing factions.

With regard to international politics, the leftwing factions are close to 'international communism' in ideology and the rightwing factions are close to democratic socialism and West European communism. While the JCP received a hard blow from the Sino-Soviet split, the JSP was only slightly influenced by it. That is because the JSP is first of all not a genuine communist party and because the leftwing factions traditionally kept close relations with the Chinese Communist Party and have supported the Chinese line from the beginning. The rightwing factions have always been critical of the leftwing factions' pro-communist stand. As the Sino-Soviet split progressed, it became clear that the Chinese rigid line to emphasise popular revolution was not suitable as a tactic for the JSP to gain political control under the existing social situation in Japan. The JSP had to examine its international and general ideological standpoint after the split of China and the Soviet Union. The JSP had to answer also the public

accusation on the question of Chinese Communist Party's control over the JSP's policy making through the pro-Chinese factions.

In 1961 due to the initiative of the rightwing factions', the JSP adopted the 'Structural Reform Theory' of the Italian Communist Party in order to answer the above question. This was a theory of gradual shift from capitalism to socialism without violent revolution, and was presented particularly to justify the European communist parties' non-violent revolutionary strategy. In West European society, the Structural Reform Theory provided an answer to the question of the possibility of realising a communist revolution while still preserving the existing social system. With the gradual Westernisation of the Japanese society, the theory seemed to satisfy the JSP's search for a new ideology. The theory was welcomed by the moderates in the party and by the informed public opinion, but was severely criticised by the radical factions in the party and by Sohyo for its lack of militancy. Throughout the time of the Ikeda Cabinet, the right-left antagonism within the party over party principle continued and the Marxism oriented revolutionary line kept its formal dominant position in its policy making. This was another expression of the JSP's two sided character.

Of course, some radical elements within the leftwing factions had been supporting the revolutionary line both in ideology and in tactics, but because the JSP had been an

'In-Regime' (Taisei-nai) political party,¹¹ they had to bear the responsibility of sustaining parliamentary democracy together with the government party. Therefore, the violent revolutionary line in the JSP has never taken the dominant position in the execution of its policies. Unlike the JCP, the JSP has been too complex and multi-factional in its party structure to take one consistent ideological line like the JCP's revolutionary line. The party doctrine of the JSP is aimed at the Kokumin Seito, a party with widespread support. For the JCP, the popular front is only a tactical means to accomplish the revolution, and it should be disbanded after the revolution. Whereas, for the JSP, the popular party is not a nominal but an ultimate aim. This crucial point distinguishes the JSP from the JCP. Theoretically, the JSP's party doctrine is very similar to that of a communist party, but its ultimate political goals are acquired through the present political system, rather than through a communist revolution, where the existing political system is overturned. In JSP's politics, the complex of the characteristics as a radical socialist party in ideology and as a popular party produced policies which eventually followed the pursuit of the existing 'national interest.' The JSP's political actions did not go outside the framework of the 'national interest.' This dual nature of the JSP must be carefully identified and treated when the JSP's policies are studied.

POLICIES

During the Ikeda era, JSP's political goals were twofold: to extend the socialisation of the Japanese economy; and to gain a greater diplomatic autonomy from the American influence over Japanese external policy formulation. Regarding national security, the JSP proposed three major policies: to neutralise Japan; to officially recognise the Chinese People's Republic as the legitimate government of China; and to block the Japanese-Korean negotiations.

According to the JSP's interpretation, the major cause of the international tension in the Far East was the provocative nature of the American military strategy for the Far East. Unless Japan divorced herself from the United States, this tension would never ease and Japan would always be exposed to the danger of war against its will. One of the most important corollaries of this neutralisation policy was the complete abolition of the Security Treaty of the United States and Japan. The JSP explained the aim of its absolute neutralism,¹²

To establish friendly relations with all the countries. Not to make a hypothetical enemy. Never to rely upon military force. To solve conflicts through negotiations and to establish peaceful coexistence.

Not to join the communist bloc or the Western bloc. To abolish the Security Treaty so as to dismiss the anti-Japanese clause in the Sino-Soviet Pact. The abolition of all the military pacts.

To enlarge trade relations with all the nations. To alter Japan's American dominated

trade structure and to extend the Asian, Chinese, and Russian trades so that Japan's trade structure be readjusted for further economic prosperity.¹³

The JSP was confident in receiving popular support for its unarmed neutralisation policy, and in Moscow, Secretary-General Kawakami said at an interview by the Pravda,

A great majority of the Japanese support our absolute neutrality policy and do not want to get involved with any war under any circumstance. The government party of Japan says that the Soviet Union and the other communist countries are a threat to Japan's security, but as a matter of fact, such a threat does not exist in the Japanese people's minds. Therefore, we strongly demand the abolition of American military presence and the repatriation of American military troops from Japan. We resent the military control of Japan by the American Capitalism.¹⁴

The neutralisation policy apparently came out of the strong influence of the leftwing factions of the JSP which are Marxism oriented. For example, the JSP's study and analysis of the contemporary world situation is well detailed concerning American strategy and militancy, while it unbelievably underestimates or simply neglects the communist bloc's militant activities. The JSP's neutralisation policy was not a simple neutralisation but an 'absolute neutralisation' (unarmed neutralisation) of Japan. The JSP's absolute neutralism was aimed at keeping friendly relations with the United States while at the same time softening Soviet and Chinese militancy towards Japan. Naturally the unarmed neutralisation policy was criticised by the government party and to a certain degree by the public opinion for its hyper-optimistic view of national security. Although the JSP accused the United States of

militant strategy against the communist bloc and advocated absolute neutralism, the JSP neglected the danger of the American militarism to Japan's security. Therefore, most of the criticism against the JSP's unarmed neutralisation policy was centered around the JSP's underestimation of the communist bloc's threat and its lack of consideration of the possible American threat to Japan's national security.¹⁵ The JSP emphasised the militancy of 'American imperialism' and the expansion of American capitalism. Consequently it advocated the absolute neutralisation of Japan, or 'away from the dangerous America' policy, and it emphasised the basically friendly nature of the communist countries. Strangely enough, however, the JSP's unarmed neutralisation policy entirely neglected Japan's preparation for defence against 'militant American imperialism.' The JSP's antipathy towards militant American strategy against the communist bloc and its absolute and blind belief in America's respect for Japan's neutrality made a strange contrast in its policy. This was a typical example of the JSP's contradictory character as a radical socialist party and as a popular party, which reflects both the Marxian militancy and popular good will or in other words the blind belief of the Japanese in American 'good behavior.'

The second policy, to recognise the Chinese People's Republic as the legitimate government of China, represents the general consensus of the JSP. Its policy to recognise Communist China and to withdraw the existing recognition of

Nationalist China, was basically in harmony with the policy of 'international communism.' The JSP's Central Executive Committee (Chuo Shikko Iinkai) released a statement concerning its stand for Japan's position in the recognition of China,

We recognise China's right to representation in the United Nations and to normalising Sino-Japanese relations. We do not recognise two Chinas. We would immediately start negotiations with the Chinese People's Republic to conclude a peace treaty so that we would restore the legitimate and complete diplomatic relations. We would abrogate the Sino-Japanese (Japan and Taiwan's) Treaty...¹⁶

The above statement has two significant implications. One is that the JSP wanted to conclude a peace treaty with Communist China, which would officially end the technical state of war between Japan and Communist China. For more than two decades, Japan has been technically at war with Communist China. This has been a potential threat to Japan's security. So far, no cabinet of Japan has solved this problem. Since there has been the heavy burden of the Yoshida Cabinet's legacy in which Japan recognised Nationalist China in order to regain independence, it has been extremely difficult for any conservative cabinet of Japan to normalise the relations with Continental China. The Japan Communist Party was opposed to the present political system in theory and in practice, and it was useless for the present government to expect the JCP to work for the restoration of Sino-Japanese friendly relations. Naturally in this situation the JSP, being a popular party, considered itself the only mediator in Japan for this mission. Narita Tomomi, Secretary-General of the

JSP, wrote in 1964,

The Sino-Japanese problem is now stirred up by the French recognition of Communist China. The JSP has a principle that we should restore diplomatic relations with China and that China should be given representation in the United Nations...We need to arouse public opinion and, as a good example of our experience in influencing the Liberal-Democratic Party, we can refer to the Japanese-Soviet negotiations. For these negotiations, there were affirmative and negative opinions in the LDP, and the President of the JSP, Suzuki, strongly supported the Prime Minister Hatoyama's negotiations by giving political aid to the Cabinet in contrast to the opposing factions within the LDP. In the same manner, I think we need to exert our efforts to influence Prime Minister Ikeda to recognise the Chinese People's Republic.¹⁷

and Suzuki Mosaburo, former President of the JSP, said to Mr. Utsunomiya Tokuma, a Diet member of the LDP,

Recently Japanese business leaders...have realised the importance of the Chinese trade and commerce, but they still fear a stable and long-term trade with China. Considering the Ikeda Cabinet's inactivity in normalising Sino-Japanese relations, we have a question, "Who solves this question for the Japanese business world?" My conviction is that the JSP is the only possible party to solve it, succeeding to the Hatoyama's legacy.¹⁸

Both Narita, a leader of a rightwing faction, and Suzuki, a leader of a leftwing faction, were conscious of the JSP's special role to mediate between Japan and Communist China and eventually to end the technical state of war between the two countries.

The second implication was that the JSP's attitude toward Taiwan was not the same as that of the JCP. Although the JSP considered Taiwan a domestic problem of China, they did not support the immediate unification of Taiwan under Communist

China's initiative. At one stage, Narita released a JSP senior members' view on this question at a press conference,

The Japan Socialist Party does not change its stand; that the Chinese People's Republic in Peking is the government that represents one China and that Japan must immediately have legitimate relations with that China. The Nationalist Government is the government that actually rules Taiwan, a part of China, and it should be recognised as a belligerent body in international law.¹⁹

Narita withdrew the above view a few days later on the grounds that it might create misunderstandings. This was obviously a result of the leftist pressures on the senior members. It showed that there were conflicting views in the JSP concerning the treatment of the Taiwan Government. The JSP's final stand was that the Taiwan issue was China's domestic problem, without specifying the meaning of the term. Since the JSP viewed it as 'China's domestic problem,' they did not need to explain the problem in detail in the name of the 'non-intervention principle' in domestic affairs of other countries.

The third policy was to block the Japanese-Korean negotiations. The JSP's view of the negotiations was summarised in the party's opinion magazine, Gekkan Shakaito,

It firstly represents a motive or policy of 'Japanese monopoly capital' to invade the Korean market because it is facing over-production caused by the Ikeda Cabinet's 'Rapid Economic Growth' policy. Secondly, it is a result of an American policy to let Japan take over American aid to Korea in order to decrease American overseas expenditures and to protect the dollar. Thirdly, it is an American plan to let Japan take part in her own defence so that the Korean military regime could indirectly be backed up, which incidentally gets unanimous sympathy of the Japanese ruling elite who are afraid of red flags unfurled in Pusan.²⁰

This view was correct but not complete. Throughout Japanese history, the Korean Peninsula has had a specific geo-political role. When Japan introduced continental civilisations, they were usually transmitted by Korea. When China became a strong military power, Korea became the forefront of Japan's defence line. Japan waged two major wars in its early developing stage since its Westernisation started in the late 19th century. They were the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Both wars were fought over the issue of political control in the Korean Peninsula. Korea has been the most sensitive area for Japan's national security vis a vis the Asian continent. The above mentioned view of the JSP is not complete in that it does not emphasise Japan's traditional geo-political interests in the Korean Peninsula. Since Japan's sensitive area was also the special concern of the communist bloc, the JSP tried to reflect and satisfy China and North Korea's expectations by preventing close Japanese-Korean relations. At least, the JSP did not want to provoke them by concluding a 'Japanese-Korean Alliance.'

Although the JSP made the accusation that the Japanese Government in the coming Japanese-Korean friendship would militarily strengthen South Korea, there had never been a Japanese proposal to aid South Korea militarily; and, the Ikeda Cabinet repeatedly denied military implications in the Japanese-Korean negotiations. After the armistice in the Korean War in 1954, there was a military balance of power in

the Korean Peninsula, and there was no need for Japan to aid South Korea militarily. However, economically, North Korea was in a superior position to South Korea, which was of real concern to the Japanese Government. Social unrest, economic difficulties, and political instability in South Korea helped North Korea to gain political dominance in the Korean Peninsula, and South Korea looked like a potential threat for the Japanese Government. For security reasons, the Japanese Government wanted to stabilise the South Korean economy so that North Korea or the communist bloc's political dominance in the Korean Peninsula could be effectively checked. This would immediately guarantee Japan's national security. For North Korea and China, political stabilisation of South Korea meant that they would lose their long preserved dominance, and it would possibly go to South Korea. It was, therefore, a natural reaction that North Korea and China strongly opposed the Japanese-Korean negotiations, when the strategic value of it in the Far East is considered.

SUMMARY

JSP's policy for Japan's security was, as far as literal expression is concerned, not too different from that of the JCP. The important difference was that the JSP was much more nationalistic, patriotic, or ethno-centric when it executed its policies. For instance, President Asanuma of the JSP was quoted as saying at Peking in March, 1959, that "American

imperialism" was the common enemy of the Japanese and Chinese people. For this statement Asanuma was severely criticised by his opponents and by the public to the point where he was finally assassinated. Asanuma's words were very radical but not his political activities. Former President of the JSP, Suzuki, visited Peking after Asanuma and reaffirmed the Asanuma statement. He explained his motives,

In the midst of the negotiations, I once almost decided to come back home without signing the joint communique. However, I thought that the JSP was the only string that tied Japan and China together, and that my impatient decision might discourage Japanese economic interests which had begun to seek a new market in China and in Russia after the Japanese-American Economic Conference. I thought it was the ultimate aspiration of the Japanese that we conclude a joint communique for the sake of future Sino-Japanese association, and that the unsatisfactory points of the communique could gradually be revised later. With our strenuous use of agreements, they may offer us a long, stable, and large trade in the future.²¹

For another example, Iwai Akira, Secretary-General of Sohyo, the biggest organised supporter of the JSP, told Senator Robert Kennedy when he visited Japan,

Next is the problem of export. I will not go into details, but we do wish the United States would accept the principle of free trade...Japan cannot be indifferent to Chinese and Russian trade. As well as to improve American trade, we further like to expand relations with China and the Soviet Union.²²

As can be seen in these statements, the JSP's principle on paper and its activities are sometimes very different. This difference should not be neglected as it represents one of the important characteristics of the JSP - the second most popular party in Japanese politics.

The nationalistic character of the JSP was further emphasised when the Sino-Sviet split was widened and China clearly adhered to its militant revolutionary line. Some of the senior members of the JSP overtly expressed their views of socialism which did not harmonise with the views of the Chinese revolutionary line. Chairman of party's External Affairs Committee, Wada Hiroo, wrote in 1963,

In the present world there is no single person who denies the justice of disarmament. Also, there are few people who do not know that disarmament is in reality to use piecemeal efforts to achieve the ultimate goal. It is not enough only to speak of beautiful high ideals. The efforts should not be to attack people with different standpoints but to make as much agreement as possible in the areas of mutual consensus.²³

Wada also urged the JSP's executive members to adopt an independent policy from the Chinese influence.

In 1964, for the first time in JSP's history, the JSP's mission to Peking officially opposed China's militant policy. The JSP's mission expressed a 'deep regret and resentment' against China's first nuclear test which was performed on the very day they arrived at Peking.²⁴ Thus forced by circumstances rather than by spontaneous choice, the JSP adopted during the Ikeda Cabinet's time principles that were independent from Chinese domination.

THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY DURING THE IKEDA PERIOD

The Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) has been a

multi-factional party and has never produced a monolithically organised cabinet except between 1949 and 1954 during the time of the Yoshida Cabinet. After the Yoshida Cabinets, however, the Japanese cabinets have been a coalition of inner party factions of the LDP.²⁵ In the Hatoyama Cabinet (1954-1956), although Hatoyama's faction was weak, it took initiative in the intra-party power struggle by aligning various competing factions into a common front against the Yoshida faction. The Ishibashi Cabinet (1957) was a coalition of small factions against strong factions led by Kishi. Prime Minister Kishi was noted for his effective factional tactics and outmaneuvered antagonistic factions until his final downfall in 1960. Since the LDP exerts the most decisive influence over policy making in the Japanese political system, and since it constitutes the Cabinet, its various factional stands in defence questions will be discussed here.

One thing that should be noted here is that the factions of the LDP exist primarily to gain political power within the party. Each faction has its own character. In general, the factions are not policy oriented but are power oriented. Therefore, the groupings of the factions presented in the following section are not as rigid as they sound. There are liberal members in conservative factions and conservative members in liberal factions. However, for analytical purposes, these partial elements are not taken into account.

CONSERVATIVE FACTIONS

The Kishi Cabinet's downfall was a great defeat for the conservative factions. The main reason for Kishi's resignation from office was that the Japanese people opposed Kishi's policy for national security and the Kishi Cabinet could not secure the political confidence of the Japanese voters or the majority of the party members'. Since the Kishi faction had been the central core of the conservative factions, Kishi's defeat was regarded as the conservative factions' defeat. As a result, liberal and progressive factions in the LDP became more active after Kishi's retirement from office. During the Ikeda period the conservative factions' influence over security policy making was limited.

Sato Eisaku (the Prime Minister of Japan after Ikeda) led the largest one of the conservative factions after his brother Kishi's downfall.²⁶ Although the Sato faction was psychologically defeated in the 1960 treaty revision issue, it was still strong in number and was considered potentially the strongest successor of the Ikeda Cabinet. The Sato faction was very cautious in expressing its political stand and its policy for national security, for three specific reasons. Firstly, the Sato faction was defeated in 1960 along with the Kishi faction by clinging to a hard line policy, which popular sentiment was against. After this experience, the Sato faction became more aware of public opinion. Secondly, its power position in the LDP was next to the Ikeda

faction's, which meant that the Sato faction was very likely to succeed the Ikeda Cabinet, and its public statements could have a crucial effect in the future competition for the Prime Minister's seat. Moreover, it was unable to openly state an irresponsible policy just for the sake of an intra-party power struggle, because such a statement would become a burden if it formed a cabinet. Thirdly, the Ikeda Cabinet was, in a sense adopting the adjustment policy to strengthen the LDP's once jeopardised popularity after the mistakes of the Kishi faction in the 1960 political crisis. For these mistakes the conservative factions, especially the Sato faction, felt moral responsibility.

The Sato faction's policy for national security was to maintain and, if possible, strengthen the existing Far Eastern defence line of Japan-Okinawa-South Korea-Taiwan-the Philippines against China. In 1961, a member of the Kennedy administration informally released a two-China proposition in which the Ikeda Cabinet showed a great interest. Sato said,

I feel very uncomfortable when I see the Chinese problem coming up at the same time as the Prime Minister's visit to the United States. What does he (Ikeda) really want when he advocates autonomous diplomacy? The Chinese problem cannot be solved by Japan's isolated action. He should be occupied with the negotiations with Korea.²⁷

Sato's aim as expressed above was made to prevent further weakening of Taiwan's jeopardised status so that Taiwan would be secured as a potential member of the Japanese defence line in the Far East. He also aimed to strengthen the South

Korean Government which had been the weakest link of the defence line. Apparently, Sato was afraid that the Ikeda Cabinet would recognise Communist China, which could drastically change the Far Eastern defence line by weakening Taiwan's position. Taiwan is one link in the defence line, but from Japan's viewpoint of regional strategy, Taiwan is an important joint connecting Japan and Southeast Asia. Communist China's reunification of Taiwan would threaten Japan's Southward transportation route. Therefore, securing Taiwan was an indirect policy to protect Japan's existing and prospective trade activities in Southeast Asia.

In 1962, Sato tried to stop the Ikeda Cabinet's extensive approach to Communist China, and said,

I greatly doubt their intelligence if Japanese politicians are thinking about enlarging Sino-Japanese trade at this time. Prime Minister Ikeda once said that it was a mistake to expect too much in Chinese trade. I wish he had not changed his mind. His ingratiating tactics are no longer effective.²⁸

The above statement delineates the more conservative factions' limitations in policy making. 'His ingratiating tactics (harmonious parliamentary tactics in relation to the opposition parties) are no longer effective' suggests that they had been effective so far. Compared to the conservative factions' hard line, the Ikeda Cabinet was far more successful in handling the opposition parties, and Sato ironically recognised the effectiveness of the Ikeda Cabinet's parliamentary tactics.

As for the Sino-Japanese relations, Sato's criticism was not directed at abolishing Japan's Red Chinese contacts but rather directed at slowing down the enlargement of the Sino-Japanese trade. The Ikeda Cabinet's principle in Chinese relations of separation of politics and economics,²⁹ was fundamentally unchallengeable for any conservative faction. The Ikeda Cabinet's approach to China was supported by the opposition parties and was not opposed by the United States. Under these circumstances, the conservative factions could not challenge the Cabinet's principle. The only criticism of the Cabinet by the conservative factions was focused on the discussion that the policy might endanger Taiwan's status. A jeopardised Taiwan could indirectly effect Japan's world strategy. However, the Ikeda Cabinet's principle of separation of politics and economics was assurance that it would not recognise the People's Republic of China without considering the Western bloc's general political orientation. Therefore, during the Ikeda period the anti-Ikeda conservative factions' policy was not sharply antagonistic to the Cabinet's policy.

LIBERAL FACTIONS

In the Ikeda period, liberal factions of the LDP were represented by Kono Ichiro and partially by Miki Takeo. Both factions joined the Ikeda faction to form the Cabinet, and their ideas were not as distinctive from the Ikeda faction's

as were the conservative factions'. Since they were in competition with conservative factions in the succession race to the Ikeda Cabinet, and since they were in the Cabinet their policy was very close to the Ikeda faction's. In order to defeat the conservative factions in the party convention that elects the successor of the Ikeda Cabinet, the liberal factions definitely needed the Ikeda faction's support. Consequently they were very cooperative with the Ikeda Cabinet to secure the Ikeda faction's sympathy. Furthermore, because they joined the Ikeda Cabinet, their ideas were relatively easy to incorporate into governmental policies. As far as security policy was concerned, their dissatisfaction was almost nil in the Ikeda period.

In 1961, Kono Ichiro, the most prominent figure among the liberal faction leaders, said,

It is dangerous to make a biased decision about a partial phase of Japanese diplomacy. I discussed the Chinese problem in each country I visited, and the general opinion was that China would inevitably be accepted by the United Nations. The problem appears to be the time and method of Chinese acceptance in the United Nations...Japan should act carefully when considering the next generation's Sino-Japanese relations, and should not be concerned with an immediate interest such as trade. We should not make a hasty decision.³⁰

The above statement by Kono did break through the barrier of factional antagonism in two respects: in that he turned down partiality in diplomacy; and in that he sincerely advocated careful action for the sake of future Sino-Japanese relations. Kono's statement was no longer a statement of a faction leader

but that of a cabinet member. His statement was a reflection of his identity with the Cabinet's security policy and also a reflection of confidence in cooperation with the Ikeda faction.

Another important leader of a liberal faction, Miki Takeo, Secretary-General (Kanji-cho) of the LDP, said,

The normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations is being prevented by the Taiwan problem. We cannot deny the fact that the Taiwan Government exists as a ruling body...under such circumstances we have to be clear about what we can and cannot do with regards to Communist China and Taiwan.³¹

Miki's statement involves no ideological tone as Kono's statement. This was further evidence that liberal factions had less factional identity in the Ikeda period. As far as security policy was concerned, they were so close to the Ikeda faction which was considered the main stream of the LDP (Hoshu no Honryu), that their factional identity was insignificant.

Situated between the liberal factions and conservative factions was the Ikeda faction. Since the core of the Ikeda faction was in the Ikeda Cabinet, its security policy will be discussed separately.

INDEPENDENTS

Besides these three groups of factions in the LDP, there are people called 'Independents.' They are usually progressive and flexible in dealing with communism. In the Ikeda period, it was these people who actually worked for the Cabinet in approaching the communist bloc. These independents emphasised the priority of Japan's national interests which

sometimes differed from American interests. Their discussion inevitably led to the advocacy of Japan's autonomous or independent diplomacy from American influence. Utsunomiya Tokuma (a Diet member of the LDP) said,

American military bases in Japan were originally established to serve American interests. I believe that they (Americans) would have abandoned the bases if it had not been necessary for them to occupy Japan. The basic principle is that we have to defend our country by ourselves if we recognise the necessity of defence. However, under the present situation there exists American military strategy with the Security Treaty to enforce it. This Security Treaty determines Japan's external policy. This situation is exactly reverse to the normal order of foreign policy making process and its strategy in an independent country. A real security policy cannot be produced in a situation like this.³²

Incidentally, these 'independents' nationalistic and very often anti-American stand was favoured by Communist China's leaders who wanted to re-open Sino-Japanese trade to reduce economic difficulties after the collapse of the Great Leap Forward. Not as representatives of the Cabinet but as representatives of the LDP, the independents visited China upon invitation and started negotiations to conclude private agreements for opening trade relations.³³ Mainly by Matsumura, Kawasaki, Utsunomiya, and Okazaki's efforts, the Sino-Japanese relations were restored in 1962 to the level of 1958.

However, in the LDP, these independents were not strong enough in number to crucially influence the Ikeda Cabinet's security policy. Their successful activities were due to the

coincidental factors. First of all, the Ikeda Cabinet wanted to ease the Sino-Japanese bilateral tension. The Japanese Government could not send official representatives of the Government to Communist China for fear of the provocative effect on anti-communist line-up in the Far East. The Cabinet tried to minimise its appearance of having official relations with Communist China. Secondly, the independents' sympathetic attitude towards the communist bloc was favoured by the Chinese leaders. Thirdly, since these independents were basically conservative politicians who respected Japan's national interests above all, they gained the Ikeda Cabinet's confidence.³⁴ Because of these factors, the Ikeda Cabinet granted the independents an ambiguous status as representatives of the LDP who were to work for the Cabinet. That is, they were utilised by the Cabinet as agents, but at the level of policy making their influence was not notably significant.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II

¹Nihon Kyosanto, ed., (Tokyo: Nihon Kyosanto Senden Kyoiku-ka, 1961), p. 19.

²Kanagawa Yukio, "Amerika no Gunji Senryaku to Nihon no Jieitai," Zenei, June, 1960, No. 169, pp. 85-93.

³Hayashi Shigeo, "Amerika no Gunji Senryaku to Boeiryoku Zokyo no Nerai," Zenei, June, 1961, No. 181, pp. 154-9.

⁴In the Far East, American troops in Japan were being reduced in number while the United States was increasing its troops in Southeast Asia. These two phenomena were combined in the JCP's policy as interrelated actions of the United States.

⁵Cf. Chapter IV, on Ikeda Cabinet's fiscal policy.

⁶Hayashi Shigeo, Ibid, p. 155.

⁷Cf. Chapter III, on the Japanese-American relations.

⁸The Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 were both fought over the control of the Korean Peninsula. Japan's invasion of North China or Manchuria can be interpreted as the extension of these wars.

⁹Terao Goro, "Shin Anpo Joyaku to Nikkan Kaidan," Zenei, December, 1962, No. 204, p. 116.

¹⁰Cf. The JSP's social analysis and the terminology used by the JSP cannot be distinguished from that of the JCP.

¹¹This term refers to a political party which basically agrees to the sustenance of the existing political system.

¹²In JSP's usage, the absolute neutralism always means unarmed neutralism.

¹³Asahi Shinbun, September 22, 1960.

¹⁴Ibid, March 22, 1961.

¹⁵Cf. Nagai Yonosuke's thesis on Japanese defence and Far Eastern international relations. ie, Heiwa no Daisho, (Tokyo: Chuo Koron-sha, 1967), p. 62.

¹⁶Asahi Shinbun, February 15, 1961.

¹⁷"Shakaito no susumubeki Michi," Ekonomisuto, Vol. 42, No. 10, p. 36.

¹⁸Round table discussion by Utsunomiya Tokuma and Suzuki Mosaburo in Chuo Koron, March, 1962, p. 38.

¹⁹Asahi Shinbun, February 18, 1964.

²⁰Ishino Hisao, "Shinkyokumen o mukaeta Nikkan Kaidan," Gekkan Shakaito, April, 1963, No. 70, p. 42.

²¹Round table discussion by Utsunomiya and Suzuki, Op Cit. p. 43.

²²Record of conversations between Iwai Akira and Robert Kennedy, the Secretary of Justice, in Ekonomisuto, Vol. 40, No. 13, p. 21.

²³"Chuso Ronso to Shakaito no Tachiba," Jiyu, October, 1963, p. 5.

²⁴Asahi Shinbun, February 23, 1962.

²⁵Cf. Frank C. Langdon, "Japanese Liberal Democratic Factional Discord on China," Pacific Affairs, XLI, (No. 3, 1968), pp. 403-15.

²⁶Sato Nobusuke was adopted by his uncle's family, the Kishis. Kishi Nobusuke is an elder brother of Sato Eisaku.

²⁷Asahi Shinbun, May 13, 1961.

²⁸Ibid, October 25, 1962.

²⁹This principle was to separate Japan's diplomatic relations and economic relations with China. Although Japan had economic relations with the mainland, she reserved the diplomatic recognition for the Nationalist Government.

³⁰Asahi Shinbun, May 13, 1961.

³¹The interview by Ekonomisuto, Vol. 42, No. 34, 1964, p. 60.

³²"Heiwa Undo e no Teigen," Jiyu, September, 1964, pp. 122-3.

³³As for this mission, the four Independents mentioned in the discussion should be particularly noted.

³⁴Cf. Chapter III, section on Japan's relations with the communist bloc.

CHAPTER III DIPLOMATIC ARRANGEMENT

During the Ikeda period, the Mutual Security Treaty of the United States and Japan constituted the main part of Japan's security policy. Reflecting the dominant opinion of the conservative party, the basic principle of the Ikeda Cabinet's defence policy was the maintenance and enforcement of the Mutual Security Treaty - a revision of the Security Treaty of 1951. It was a long-lasting national security arrangement concluded by the conservative party. The original idea in the Security Treaty that Japan use American military force for its national defence, was inherited by the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960. However, the period of the Ikeda Cabinet turned out to be the transitional time for Japan: moving from a dependent to a relatively independent country in its defence effort. The three major areas of diplomatic effort explored by the Ikeda Cabinet were roughly, Japanese-American relations, Japanese-Korean relations, and Japanese-communist bloc relations.

THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS

NATIONAL CONCERN

The Ikeda Cabinet acknowledged the indispensability of the Japanese-American close tie both for Japan's national security and for economic prosperity. This perspective was no

different than that of Kishi's previous cabinet. The truly distinctive character of the Ikeda Cabinet's American relation was that the Cabinet recognised the differences in national concern and interest between the United States and Japan, and tried to acquire as much as possible for the national interest of Japan.¹

There were two basic differences of national concern between the United States and Japan in the problem of Japan's defence. First of all, Japan's geographical position was vulnerable to Chinese or Russian attacks from the continent, whereas that of the United States was relatively safe except for attacks by long range missiles. This geographical position was such that it was too risky for Japan to adopt as hostile a policy against China as did the United States. The other difference was the view of the Chinese threat. American recognition of the Chinese threat was basically a reflection of the Chinese threat on American allies in the Southeast Asia and the Far East such as Indo-China, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. The United States did not normally feel any direct threat from China, but it specifically emphasised the Chinese threat because it was expected to prevent the Chinese influence from spreading in Asia. Japan did not share an equally extensive commitment to Asian politics, which made Japan unable to have the same image of China as did the United States. Moreover, Japan had been industrialised rapidly and Japan's economic situation was improving quickly. This

distinguished Japan from most of the Asian countries which were vulnerable to Chinese ideological aggression of Maoism because of their poverty and lack of political unity.² Japan's relatively high living standard and its cultural bias towards the West European civilisation created a firm immunity against indirect aggression of communism, and Japan could hardly share the threat of communism at as high level as most of the Asian non-communist countries.³

Japan's national concern which thus differed from that of the United States and Asian non-communist countries, required a specific defence policy which would satisfy Japan's circumstances. In order to balance the enormous military forces of the communist bloc in the Far East, Japan could not help accepting the military alliance with the United States, which was to make the basic part of Japan's defence system. Unfortunately for Japan, the Mutual Security Treaty was an important part of American Strategy for the Far East as well as a defence provision of Japan. Japan wanted the Security Treaty just to maintain its own national security, which unfortunately did not completely harmonise with the American Strategy for the Far East as a whole. The United States wanted to secure as much free use of Japanese bases as possible to maintain its high military mobility in the Far East. But, for Japan to have active military bases of the United States was very dangerous since it could provoke communist countries' precautionary or retaliatory attacks on the bases

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in Japan. Therefore, the Ikeda Cabinet hoped to achieve as much detachment from the American Strategy for the Far East as possible within a range that would not disturb the functioning of the Mutual Security Treaty guaranteeing Japan's own defence.

THE RULES

The Ikeda Cabinet set up two conditions for Japan's national defence by the Mutual Security Treaty. One was the principle of autonomous defence and the other was non-nuclear armament of all forces in Japan including the American forces in Japanese bases. The autonomous defence meant that Japan would replace American forces in Japan with its own forces at the earliest possible date while maintaining steady economic growth, and the other implication of autonomous defence was that Japan reserved to a certain degree the right to control the activities of American forces in Japan. Non-nuclear armament was intended to prevent an arms race between the communist bloc and the Far Eastern anti-communist bloc, especially between the communist bloc and Japan.

Japan's autonomous defence which was a partial deviation from the American Strategy for the Far East, was favoured in one sense and not in another sense by the United States. The American Government favoured Japan's autonomous defence and its claim for a larger role in the Far East as a nation of the Western bloc. Both President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ikeda emphasised the partnership between the United States

and Japan. The United States encouraged Japan as a partner in the Far East, which changed the Japanese-American relations from that of guarantor-guarantee. For the first time after the Pacific War, the United States and Japan Joint Communiqué of June, 1961 acknowledged that Japan had an equal commitment to the United States in the Far Eastern international problem. However, Japan's field of commitment was limited because of its constitutional restriction for military action outside its territory.

THE ACTION

For the first practical step towards Japanese-American partnership, in March of 1962 the United States sent a military technical survey group to the Far East and Southeast Asia. The group's mission was to investigate Japan's capability to produce weapons for foreign countries, especially for other Asian countries. They studied the nature and types of weapons that these countries needed.⁴ The United States accepted Japan's proposal of greater responsibility for its own defence and expected Japan to actively participate in the American defence effort in East Asia.

However, the United States realised the difference in interpretation between itself and Japan concerning Japan's idea of an autonomous defence. The United States Defense Department informally communicated to the Japanese Government its dissatisfaction with Japan's response to the American

policy for Asia. The Pentagon was particularly dissatisfied with Japan's inflexible interpretation of the Mutual Security Treaty and its unwillingness to support American military action in Southeast Asia.⁵ There was indeed a crucial misunderstanding between the United States and Japan concerning the Japanese interpretation of autonomous defence.

The Japanese Government considered that 'autonomous defence' gave Japan a certain amount of freedom to deviate from American Strategy for the Far East, while the United States interpreted it as meaning Japan would more actively participate in its policy for the Far East. For example, in January of 1963 at the Japanese-American Joint Security Conference, the American representatives pointed out the danger of Japan's low estimation of Chinese power including its military force, and they asked Japan to study China more extensively.⁶ After the conference, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Gilpatrick, communicated America's expectation that Japan play a larger role in American world policy. Ohira, the Foreign Minister of Japan, answered,

For the sake of peace and prosperity in the Far East, Japan must maintain an independent defence policy, and attain this goal by firstly consolidating our domestic politics. This should be the immediate step for Japan.⁷

Prime Minister Ikeda's answer was more direct,

It is inconceivable that you (Gilpatrick) think that you can provide an adequate defence force for Japan simply by letting Japan possess as many submarines and airplanes as possible. What is crucial is psychological preparedness of the Japanese for national defence.⁸

The germ of this dispute was in the first step of the Japanese-American partnership. The United States-Japanese Joint Communiqué of June, 1961, says,

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their concern over the unstable aspects of the situation in Asia and agreed to hold close consultation in the future with a view of discovering the ways and means by which stability and well-being might be achieved in that area.⁹

The American Government placed emphasis on the stability of Asia. This inevitably required a certain amount of military confrontation with the communists acting in Asia. The Japanese Government, however, emphasised the well-being of the people in Asia. Japan's view was based on the understanding that Asian political problems were basically problems of lack of economic development. In short, Japan's policy was a war against poverty whereas American policy was military - such as war against Asian communism.

Differences in interpretation between the United States and Japan of the autonomous defence policy brought bitter disillusionment to the United States as it expected Japan to take a larger role in world policy. However, Japan's autonomous defence effort strengthened Japan's military power considerably, which was favourable to the United States. By accepting Japan's interpretation, the United States gained a stronger defence force at the expense of its free use of and free action in the military bases in Japan. Although these bases make an important link in the American defence line in the Far East, they would not have nuclear weapons and

would not be used for aggressive purposes. As for the Japanese Government, it succeeded in establishing an independent defence force which was not entirely subject to American command, and which could act independently.

THE JAPANESE-KOREAN NEGOTIATIONS

BACKGROUND

Establishing Korean diplomatic relations was one of the important diplomatic aims of the Ikeda Cabinet for Japan's national security. Normalisation of the Japanese-Korean relations was a product of the aspirations between Japan, Korea, and the United States. The American aspiration to stabilise Northeast Asia by Japanese-Korean friendly relations can be traced back historically as far as 1950, when General MacArthur invited Mr. Syngman Rhee, the President of the Republic of Korea, to Tokyo.¹⁰ During the Korean War, Japan was indirectly involved in American military action in the Korean Peninsula. Japan was a principal staging area and base for the American forces fighting in Korea. This situation helped to form a vague political tie between South Korea and Japan for a short period. However, in the 1950's, the attempts to agree on diplomatic relations did not progress at all, mainly because South Korea did not recognise any pressing need to reconcile its relations with Japan.

The anti-Japanese feeling among the Koreans was strong

throughout the 1950's. The South Korean Government used the people's anti-Japanese sentiment for its maintenance in power as well as it exploited the people's anti-communist sentiment.¹¹ Anti-communist sentiment and anti-Japanese feeling were the strongest political feelings that the South Korean Government could find in the postwar Korean political chaos.¹² The Government could not abandon such a valuable political asset only to please the United States or Japan.

MOVE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS

By 1960, the situation in South Korea had changed drastically from that of the early 1950's. The most distinctive change was that the South Korean political elite began to recognise their failure in economic policy, and their self-reflection went to such an extent as to cause the expulsion of President Rhee. South Korea's poor economic condition in comparison to North Korea's created political unrest in the South. Informed public opinion in Korea tended gradually toward the idea of coalition government of South and North Korea. Although they had no illusions about communism, North Korea's economic advancement was still highly inviting for them. After the fall of President Rhee, this tendency became more and more prominent. The South Korean ruling elite had to immediately find a way to satisfy the people's economic dissatisfaction in order to quell any violent expression of their frustration.

In 1960 the United States faced a serious 'Dollar Crisis' which prevented Her from taking any effective action towards easing South Korean political problems that stemmed from economic difficulties. In order to protect South Korea as well as its own dollar as standard currency in world economy, the United States had to use Japan's economic influence in East Asia. Also, from the viewpoint of American Strategy for the Far East, the close Japanese-Korean relations would be valuable since they would strengthen its defence potential as a whole in Northeast Asia.

Nineteen-sixty was the year when the Japanese economy entered into a period of rapid expansion.¹³ Economic growth naturally made the Japanese ruling elite realise the importance of Japan's economic power. Their confidence in Japan's economic potential was reflected in their external policy. In the sphere of national defence, the Ikeda Cabinet proposed the policy of autonomous defence. It further demanded a larger role for Japan in the Western bloc. Japan's demand to acquire a larger role in the Western bloc was fulfilled in that it took over a certain proportion of the American role in Asia as an economic guarantor. This policy was incidentally in harmony with the American policy to defend the 'dollar.'

The autonomous defence policy required the Japanese Government to maintain a rough balance of power in the Far East, or in other words, to maintain the status quo.

'Autonomous defence' in itself was not the supreme goal of the Japanese Government, but a means of pursuing a higher political goal of economic prosperity. In this period as long as the American forces guaranteed Japan's defence, the supreme goal of the Japanese Government remained to be rapid economic growth. The defence effort in the domestic political sphere was kept at the minimum level required for a degree of defence autonomy which would not disturb its economic policy. Alteration in the status quo or change in the power balance in the Far East could force Japan to increase the budget for defence instead of for economic investment - a course which the Japanese Government tried to evade. A great potential danger to the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East was South Korean economic instability. This instability could provoke North Korea to re-unify Korea, of which both the United States and Japan thought there was 'something that could be done'.¹⁴

NEGOTIATIONS

In June of 1961, Prime Minister Ikeda and President Kennedy issued a joint communique in which they agreed to increasing their aid to South Korea. The New York Times reported,

Two major items then discussed were the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations and the prospect for political stability and economic development in South Korea. Sources said, however, that Tokyo and Washington were eager to do what could be done to help the Koreans achieve political stability and to correct the economic stagnation that has troubled South Korea since the end of the World War II.¹⁵

Upon the agreement of Japan, South Korea, and the United States, the Japanese-Korean negotiations started new sessions in October of 1961, and were continued energetically all through the Ikeda period. By the time Prime Minister Ikeda retired from office, almost all the technical problems of the agreements were solved, yet the treaty was not signed. The factors that prevented Japan and South Korea from signing a treaty were many and roughly they can be divided into three groups.

THE DIFFICULTIES

The first group of difficulties was South Korea's domestic factors. The planned Japanese-Korean treaty was regarded by the Koreans as likely to consolidate the status quo in the Korean Peninsula. The consolidation might jeopardise their rather distant goal to re-unify Korea. The negotiations alone reminded the Koreans of 'Japanese imperialism' that controlled Korea for more than thirty years. Because the two countries were not equal in their economic capacity and because the South Korean Government tried to extract as much economic benefit from Japan as they could, the negotiations in the people's eyes, amplified their economically inferior position to Japan. Agitated by anti-Japanese sentiment, the South Koreans organised large anti-treaty demonstrations in spite of the fact that they were under strict martial law.

The second group of difficulties involved genuinely

technical problems. Japan and Korea had a direct conflict of interest over fishing rights in the same waters as well as a territorial controversy over Takeshima (an island without any residents). Korea once had been incorporated into Japan and was placed under the control of the Allied Powers after the Pacific War. This situation complicated the interpretation of ownership and the estimation of value of the Japanese property and debt in Korea. These technical problems had to be straightened out through reparations. Furthermore, separation of North and South Korea caused complications with regard to treatment of the Koreans in Japan.

The third group of difficulties stemmed from military implication in the expected treaty between Japan and Korea. Japan's Foreign Minister once stated that Japan's larger role in the 'Containment of China' as asked for by President Kennedy, could only be enacted by concluding the Japanese-Korean negotiations. Of course, the coming Japanese-Korean treaty had the immediate purpose of settling the conflicts of the two neighbouring countries. Nonetheless, what motivated Ohira was the American calling for enforcement of an anti-communist defence network.¹⁶ For the communist bloc, stabilisation of the South Korean economy by the coming treaty was not only a loss of their economic dominance in the Korean Peninsula but it was expected that economically enforced South Korea would reverse the existing economic relations of North and South Korea. A strengthened South Korea could change the

overall strategic balance in the Korean Peninsula where the communist bloc had always maintained military and economic superiority to South Korea. Therefore, the expected treaty between Japan and South Korea was understood by the communist bloc as a serious political threat. The communist bloc communicated their antipathy for the negotiations in two ways. They issued a series of statements attacking the negotiations, and they also used communist sympathisers in Japan to oppose the Japanese Government. The Ikeda Cabinet's well designed public relations programme prevented the anti-negotiations movement from growing as large as the anti-Security Treaty movement of 1960.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the movement was effective enough to threaten the Ikeda Cabinet to such an extent that it would not take the risk of signing the treaty immediately.

The Ikeda Cabinet's supreme aim in the Japanese-Korean negotiations was the stabilisation of South Korea, which was supposed to increase the security of Japan. Signing the treaty was avoided by the Cabinet so as not to provoke the communist bloc militarily or to cause domestic unrest. The Ikeda Cabinet had to continue its public relations tactics in hopes of a more favourable response. When they reached the basic agreements, the Cabinet did 'what could be done to help the Korean.' The business Union of Tokyo (Tokyo Jitsugyo Rengokai) sent its mission for research and encouragement of Japanese-Korean trade in February of 1963. A "Memorandum for Cooperation" was signed by the Japanese-Korean Commission

of Commerce and Industry (Nikkan Shoko Kaigisho) in July of 1963. The South Korean Government also moved towards cooperation and enacted a special law that permitted the introduction of Japanese capital, and it also accepted Japan's friendship gift of twenty-thousand tons of food to meet its food crisis.¹⁸ Thus, having solved almost all the technical questions between South Korea and Japan, instead of signing the treaty, the Japanese Government started to send economic aid to South Korea as the first practical measure towards friendly relations. These actions were in accord with Japan's security policy to strengthen the South Korean Government. This provision was expected to eliminate a potential source of military conflict around Japan.

THE COMMUNIST BLOC

The Ikeda Cabinet was the most active of all the postwar cabinets in approaching the communist bloc, on the verbal level at least. The policy to approach the communist bloc had namely two goals: to respond to the domestic demand for good relations; and to aid national security indirectly by dissolving the communist countries' suspicion of Japan's intentions under the Mutual Security Treaty. When these two objectives are examined it becomes clearer why the Ikeda Cabinet was active on the verbal level and not on the practical level. Since the main theme of this paper is the security policy and not the policy proper, the first objective should

be discussed briefly.

AIMS OF THE CABINET

Ikeda's first statement expressing his willingness to approach China, was issued four weeks after Prime Minister Kishi declared his resignation from office.¹⁹ At this time the public sentiment was overwhelmingly resentful of the Mutual Security Treaty. This was interpreted by the Japan Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party as a provocative treaty by nature in relation to the communist bloc. The opposition parties attacked the government's unfriendly handling of its relations with the communist bloc in comparison to its friendly or often submissive relations with the United States. In 1960, the Ikeda Cabinet had to respond to the accidentally amplified popular sentiment opposing Japan's over-involvement in American Strategy for the Far East. Led by the JSP and the JCP, the opposition and informed public opinion demanded an independent foreign policy, or more bluntly, Japan's rapprochement with the communist countries.²⁰ The energy of the rebellious movement could only be mollified by the conciliatory moves towards the communist bloc. Ikeda emphasised his willingness to seek reconciliation with China and to enlarge trade relations with communist countries. Obviously this policy was in response to the sweeping popular movement of 1960 and Ikeda's policy was not meant to be an extensive enlargement of Japan's relations with the communist

bloc. Nor did popular sentiment demand it to such an extent.²¹

The second and salient reason that the Ikeda Cabinet tried to maintain friendly relations with the communist bloc, was the defensive implication of Japan's approach to them. Ikeda attained his 'diplomatic' training in the Yoshida Cabinet (1948-54) mostly as the Minister of Finance (which will be mentioned in the final chapter). In short, the common principle of Yoshida and Ikeda's diplomacy can be found in their respect for economic ties in international relations.²² Yoshida was reported to have said, "International loans have a significant role in maintaining international relations."²³ Ikeda said in his administrative speech,

According to our principle of Peace Diplomacy, we will strenuously seek friendly relations with communist countries. As for relations with continental China, mutual non-intervention in domestic politics and mutual respect of each polity will gradually increase friendly relations. At the present I strongly favour Sino-Japanese trade, which although once ceased, is now reviving.²⁴

The Ikeda Cabinet did not expect Sino-Japanese trade to grow extensively, and it even discouraged the trade when it was about to grow as high as Japan's trade with other countries outside the communist bloc. The Japanese Government did not authorise long term loans of the government Export-Import Bank funds for Sino-Japanese trade except in a few cases. Such loans were to be used to encourage Japan's export to non-communist countries.²⁵ Moreover, Ikeda considered that Sino-Japanese trade would not expand to the extent that it could effect a major structural change in Japan's international trade.

When Ikeda visited West Germany in 1962, he said to Prime Minister Adenauer,

Although Communist China has little to offer Japan it wants to buy various goods on our market, and it inevitably requires extending credits. Sino-Japanese trade will not grow because of this barrier.²⁶

Thus, while not expecting its large scale growth nor encouraging it, the Ikeda Cabinet maintained Sino-Japanese trade and cultural exchange with communist countries. This approach of the Ikeda Cabinet to the communist bloc, especially to China, can best be understood as a scheme to ease the Sino-Japanese tension which could threaten Japan's security, as it once did during the time of the Kishi Cabinet.²⁷

OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS

The objective conditions which enabled the Ikeda Cabinet to acquire good terms with the People's Republic of China must be briefly mentioned before continuing the discussion of Japan's approach to the communist bloc.

Firstly, having watched China's external policy for more than a decade after its independence, the Japanese Government could judge with confidence that China had no particular intention to threaten Japan's security with military means.²⁸ As for the indirect interference from China, Ikeda as well as Yoshida, was convinced that the people's well-being was the best protection against it, and Japan's economic situation in 1960 was considered strong enough to give immunity against indirect aggression from communism.²⁹

Secondly, China's policy of the 'Great Leap Forward' ended in failure and resulted in a further Sino-Soviet split, which forced China to stop short. China could no longer expect a high level of trade with the Soviet Union and had to look elsewhere for the material to reconstruct its damaged economy. Japan was one of the countries that could provide goods and services necessary for China to revitalise its economy.

Thirdly, the Japanese Government acquired enough information about China's military power and could judge China's capability to support its politically militant but strategically discreet action. Several incidents in and over the Taiwan Strait in 1958 and after, revealed China's weakness in sea and air forces. The Korean War proved that China could well cope with the American forces in conventional warfare on the land. The obvious conclusion was that China's military force was defensive and its offensive capacity was limited.

Fourthly, China had to accept the political stability of Japan, especially the consistent support of the people to the conservative government headed by the Liberal-Democratic party. The conservative party won the general election in December of 1960 despite two unfavourable incidents - the 1960 anti-Cabinet demonstrations and the assassination of Asanuma Inajiro, Chairman of the JSP. Both incidents had been speculated as disadvantageous for the LDP in the election. As a result of the LDP's victory, the Chinese Government turned its attention to the Japanese Government and favoured the Ikeda

Cabinet's cooperative attitude towards the communist bloc.

Fifthly, the liberal image of the Kennedy administration in the United States encouraged the Ikeda Cabinet to push forward its conciliatory policy towards the communist countries.

These were roughly the objective conditions that gave a frame and a basis to the Ikeda Cabinet's policy for China and other countries in the communist bloc.

ACTIONS OF THE CABINET

Ikeda's policy towards the communist bloc was mostly hampered by the fact that Japan was incorporated into the American anti-communist military network in the Far East. Concerning Japan's policy for China, the fact that both Taiwan and China had never tolerated one another made an additional barrier. No important government in the world could recognise China and Taiwan at the same time because both countries firmly and consistently turn down the idea of two Chinas. Consequently, the Japanese Government could not normalise diplomatic relations with China without breaking off with Taiwan, because this would cause a too radical change in the power balance in the Far East.

The Ikeda Cabinet's solution to such a dilemma was the 'separation of politics and economics' (Seikei Bunri). This principle had two connotations. One was that Japan would not recognise Communist China even though it had economic relations with her, and the other was mutual non-intervention in

domestic politics. China insisted upon the inseparability of politics and economics (Seikei Fukabun). In 1960, China and Japan reached a strange agreement that they would mutually respect each other's principles (which were logically contradictory to each other) and that through the accumulation of economic exchanges both parties would expect normalisation of diplomatic relations in the future.³⁰

The Ikeda Cabinet sent four 'semi-official' missions to China in four years. The ostensible role of the missions was the negotiations with the Chinese Government concerning trade. The first mission was led by a conservative Diet member Takasaki Tatsunosuke in October, 1960, and the mission consisted mainly of businessmen. This mission re-opened the Sino-Japanese semi-official governmental exchange channel. Six weeks after the Takasaki mission, the Japanese Government decided to remove a restriction on Sino-Japanese trade. The 'Compulsory Balanced-Trade Formula' for Sino-Japanese trade was lifted. Ikeda stated in December, 1960, that Sino-Japanese trade should be encouraged even without governmental agreements.

Some of the progress observed in the early Ikeda period concerning Japan's relations with the communist bloc were as follows. In January, 1961, the 'Russo-Japanese Cultural Agreement and Cooperation Plan' was signed. In April, the 'Compulsory Balanced-Trade Formula' was abolished for all communist countries. In February, 1962, the Russo-Japanese Trade Enlargement Commission was organised, which was to make plans

to develop Siberia with Japanese capital and encourage Russo-Japanese trade. In May, 1962, the Japanese Government authorised extended credit for trade with China for a period of less than five years.

In September, 1962, a conservative Diet Member Matsumura Kenzo, was sent to Peking and his mission was followed by the second Takasaki mission accompanied by a business group. Takasaki signed an agreement, called, "Liu-Takasaki Agreement" which was a semi-governmental agreement between the two parties. The L-T agreement approved 100 million dollars in trade per year for five successive years starting in 1963. The agreement permitted the use of governmental loans for export.

The Ikeda Cabinet not only sent semi-official missions, but also encouraged the LDP Diet members to visit communist countries as well as Communist and Socialist Diet members. Such a liberal attitude of the Ikeda Cabinet towards the communist bloc annoyed the Taiwan Government. Above all, the L-T agreement was taken as a threat to Taiwan's status because it looked like Japan's first step to recognise Communist China. The Taiwan Government communicated a strong protest to the Ikeda Cabinet. However, it did not change the general trend very much. In late 1963 after having exercised gradual pressure on Japan, the Taiwan Government took a drastic action against Japan at the end of the "Chou Heng-ching Incident."³¹

REVERSE TREND

Immediately after the Chou Incident, the French Government recognised the People's Republic of China as the legitimate Government of China and Taiwan was recognised as Taiwan, not as China. According to its established process and principle, Taiwan broke off its relations with France. The French recognition of China greatly weakened Taiwan's status in international relations. Taiwan's international status had been based on a fiction that it represented whole China, and the French recognition of Continental China was a severe blow. Now that Taiwan's status was weakened, the Ikeda Cabinet felt it had to support Taiwan in order to preserve the status quo in the Far East. The Cabinet decided to tentatively check its policy toward reconciliation with China.³²

Four weeks after the French recognition of China, the Ikeda Cabinet sent ex-Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to Taiwan to assure her that the Cabinet would not permit governmental credit to be extended for mainland trade any longer. This implicitly meant that Japan would not move towards recognition of Communist China as the legitimate government of China. Thus, the Ikeda Cabinet's policy to approach the communist bloc extensively on certain dimensions, such as economic and cultural exchange, was checked and retarded by the French recognition of China. It was anticipated that the recognition could give a drastic effect to the existing Far Eastern power balance.³³

The Ikeda Cabinet's strenuous effort to encourage or pretend to encourage trade relations with the communist bloc, was a scheme to support Japan's security indirectly. Ikeda was very well aware that more intimate economic relations would contribute to producing a friendly atmosphere between the parties involved. Ikeda also encouraged personal exchange with communist countries in order to enrich the understanding of each country and its polity. For example, during the Ikeda period, the JSP sent several missions to China, and they apparently tried to explain Japan's intention under the Mutual Security Treaty.³⁴ This contributed to further understanding of both countries' government by each other.

The LDP's delegates on four occasions talked about Japan's defence scheme and the defensive nature of the Mutual Security Treaty when they met Chou En-lai, Ch'en Yi and other high officials of the Chinese Government. Takasaki Tatsunosuke on his first mission answered Chou En-lai's attack on the Mutual Security Treaty,

There is no Japanese who intends to attack China with American aid under the Security Treaty. Japan was hurt after the American conquest and the Security Treaty is a result of the wound. The Security Treaty is a naturally grown shelter that protects wounded Japan from germs. Once Japan has recovered from the wound it will become unnecessary. For example, the American land force has already been evacuated from Japan. When the United Nations begins exerting its security maintenance functions, the Security Treaty will become unnecessary. Such is the agreement of both parties in the treaty.³⁵

Thus, the first Takasaki mission simply communicated the Ikeda Cabinet's 'good will' towards China, and re-opened

trade relations.

The Matsumura mission of 1962 further supported the Cabinet's scheme. Matsumura succeeded in convincing Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi that the Ikeda Cabinet's ultimate goal in its China policy was to recognise China and that the accumulation formula (to pile up empirical facts and actions, and eventually to restore diplomatic relations) was a practical step towards that goal.³⁶ The Matsumura mission was immediately followed by the second Takasaki mission. Thus the L-T agreements were concluded. This rapid process implies the Matsumura mission's significance in promoting Sino-Japanese understanding, especially China's understanding of Japan's defensive provision in the Security Treaty.

Not only Matsumura and Takasaki, but many Diet members of the LDP visited China on a private level during the Ikeda period. They opened private access to the Chinese Government, and these channels helped the Cabinet to communicate its ideas to the Chinese Government. However, what should be noted here is that the Ikeda Cabinet's policy to approach the communist bloc was essentially formed to ease the antagonistic relations of China and Japan that had existed since the time of the Kishi Cabinet. In other words the salient objective was the security of Japan, and the main goal was not reconciliation with the communist countries. For example, while approaching the communist bloc, the Ikeda Cabinet communicated stern protests to the Soviet Union concerning the recommencing

of its nuclear testings.³⁷ Such protests reveal the Ikeda Cabinet's basic stand in its policy for the communist world. The LDP's policy Research Committee (Seimu Chosa-kai) summarises its defence policy as follows,

As for our national defence, until the United Nations becomes a perfect peace-keeping organisation, our party will firmly maintain the Mutual Security Treaty to guarantee our national security and prosperity with the cooperation of the United States...At the same time, Japan will exert its effort to foster the friendly relations with neighbouring countries, especially with Asian neighbours. Being located in Asia, we believe that Japan has a special responsibility to contribute to stabilisation and prosperity of Asia for the sake of the world peace...³⁸

The Ikeda Cabinet successfully carried out its policy for the communist bloc until the end of 1963. However, Taiwan's sharp reaction to Japan's policy towards Mainland China shown in the Chou Incident, forced the Cabinet to re-organise its China policy. The Japanese Government speculated that the unexpected French recognition of China could change the systemic situation of the Far East considerably. This situation obliged the Ikeda Cabinet to appease the Taiwan Government at the expense of its policy for Communist China so that the status quo in the Far East would be maintained. This change of policy was obviously a retreat from the former position of the Ikeda Cabinet, and was a necessary retreat for the sake of Japan's national security.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III

- ¹Ekonomisuto, Vol. 39, No. 22, 1961, p. 11.
- ²Utsunomiya Tokuma, Heiwa kyozon to Nihon Gaiko, (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1960), pp. 14-18.
- ³Asahi Shinbun, February 18, 1964.
- ⁴Ibid, March 17, 1962.
- ⁵Ibid, May 26, 1962.
- ⁶Ibid, January 19, 1963.
- ⁷Ibid, February 7, 1963.
- ⁸Ito Masaya, Ikeda Hayato: Sono Sei to Shi, (Tokyo: Shiseido, 1967), p. 199.
- ⁹New York Times, June 23, 1961.
- ¹⁰Ajia-Afurika Koza, ed., Nihon to Chosen, (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1965), pp. 61-62.
- ¹¹Asahi Shinbun, September 4, 1948.
- ¹²For such psychology, consult David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, Richard R. Fagen, Enemies in Politics, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967), pp. 13-22.
- ¹³Cf. Minami Ryoshin, "The Turning Point in the Japanese Economy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXXII, (August, 1968), 382.
- ¹⁴New York Times, June 22, 1961.
- ¹⁵loc. cit.
- ¹⁶Kuse Yuzo, "Konohito o hyotei suru," Ekonomisuto, Vol. 40, No. 52, 1962, p. 39.
- ¹⁷Ito Masaya, Op. Cit., pp. 173-4.
- ¹⁸Ajia-Afurika Koza, ed., Op. Cit., p. 83.

¹⁹Asahi Shinbun, July 23, 1960. Ikeda's statement at a foreign press conference, "China is our Neighbour and has had extensive historical relations with us. We would like to establish friendly relations. But in practice, it involves a great many difficulties."

²⁰Asanuma Inajiro, "Kokumin ni uttaeru," Asahi Shinbun, May 19, 1960, and JSP's statement concerning the Security Treaty, Asahi Shinbun, May 22, 1960.

²¹For example, the Chairman of the JSP, Asanuma, made a speech in Peking, stating, "American imperialism is the common enemy of the Chinese and the Japanese people." This statement was severely criticised not only by the Government but also by the public opinion. As a result, the conservative party won the 1960 general election although it was predicted that the LDP could be defeated after the 1960 political turmoil. Former Chairman of the JSP, Suzuki, was criticised severely when he confirmed the above statement of Asanuma in Peking in 1961.

²²Haji Fumio, Ningen Ikeda Hayato, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1967), p. 140. "According to Ikeda's calculation, even one half of the national budget, 300 billion Yen, would not make a powerful new army. Therefore, national security should be maintained by collective defence by the American force, and defeated Japan should primarily be concerned with saving capital and revitalising economy. Thus, Yoshida and Ikeda's ideas of defence and armament were fused into one."

²³Kosaka Masataka, "Saisho Yoshida Shigeru Ron," Chuo Koron, February 1964, p. 84.

²⁴Asahi Shinbun, October 22, 1960.

²⁵Cf. The Yoshida letter of February, 1964, in Asahi Nenkan, 1965, p. 298.

²⁶Ito Masaya, Op. Cit., p. 153.

²⁷New China News Agency, January 14, 1960. (from Asahi Shinbun) The External Affairs Office of the Chinese Government issued a statement concerning the signing of the Japanese-American Mutual Security Treaty at Washington, "Prime Minister Kishi of Japan, disregarding the Japanese people's antipathy and disregarding the Chinese and other countries' warning, decided to sign the Japanese-American military alliance pact on the 19th of January in Washington. This is an important step of American imperialism and Japanese reactionaries to prepare a new aggressive war to threaten Asia and the world.

The Chinese people have paid attention to the Japanese people's struggle to gain national independence, democracy,

peace and neutrality, and oppose revival of militarism...The Chinese Government cannot help pointing out that the conclusion of the Japanese-American military pact vindicates revitalisation of Japanese militarism and it manifestly demonstrates Japan's participation in the aggressive military bloc led by the United States."

²⁸Cf. Note 3.

²⁹Ikeda's statement at a foreign press conference on June 13, 1961 (from Asahi Shinbun). "Communism permeates into and develops in an area of low living standard. When the living standard goes up, communism goes under. That is why we think our effort should be concentrated on economic growth and on improvement of the people's living standard."

³⁰Chou En-lai implicitly and vaguely recognised Japan's separation principle of politics and economic at the farewell party for the Matsumura mission of 1962. Chou's speech was recorded in the Asahi Shinbun, September 20, 1962.

³¹Chou Heng-ching Incident. A Chinese-Japanese interpreter, Chou Heng-ching, who came to Japan with China's machinery investigation group, deserted from the group and asked asylum of the Russian Embassy in Tokyo. He was sent to the Japanese immigration office, where he changed the country of his destination from Russia to Taiwan, and then to Japan. He finally started a hunger strike demanding to be sent back to the original country, China.

³²In January of 1964, pro-Taiwan faction of the LDP (the Ishii faction, namely) worked actively to change Ikeda's policy for China and Taiwan. Ishii Mitsujiro's faction was the most active to change the Cabinet's attitude towards Taiwan. It was believed that Ishii proposed the idea to send ex-Prime Minister Yoshida to Taiwan with a 'private letter' to Chiang Kai-shek on limiting trade with the mainland.

³³Ito Masaya, Ibid, pp. 221-2.

³⁴Cf. The previous chapter, section on the JSP.

³⁵"Shu Onrai to Kaidan shite," Chuo Koron, February, 1961, p. 248.

³⁶Secretary-General of the LDP Mase Shigesaburo issued a statement, "The accumulation formula does not directly lead us to future recognition of China. This agreement will surely encourage Sino-Japanese trade to a certain degree. I think this agreement has solved problems extensively. I cannot refer to the details until Mr. Matsumura comes back." (from Asahi Shinbun, September 20, 1962)

³⁷Cf. The previous chapter, section on the JCP.

³⁸The Liberal Democratic Party Political Research Committee, ed., (Tokyo: The Liberal-Democratic Party Public Relations Committee, 1964), p. 103.

CHAPTER IV DOMESTIC PROVISIONS

The Ikeda Cabinet's domestic political arrangement for national defence can be viewed from two perspectives. One is the improvement of public relations concerning the National Defence Force (Jieitai), and the other is the reinforcement of the defence capacity of the Defence Force.

PUBLIC RELATIONS OF THE IKEDA CABINET

In the second chapter, the three political parties' impact on the Ikeda Cabinet was discussed. The emphasis was placed on the input side of the Ikeda Cabinet's public relations: the impact of the Japan Socialist Party; the Japan Communist Party; and some groups of factions in the Liberal-Democratic Party in the process of security policy making. In order to avoid redundancy, here the emphasis will be put on the output side - the Cabinet's pursuit of anti-nuclear armament policy.

During four years in office, the Ikeda Cabinet promised that Japan would not be armed with nuclear weapons. As early as February of 1961, Ikeda, answering Yajima, a Diet member of the JSP, said,

Regardless of whether China has nuclear weapons, Japan would not possess nuclear weapons.¹

Not only Japan's military forces, but also the American forces in Japan were prohibited by the Ikeda Cabinet from bringing nuclear weapons into Japan. Minister of the Defence Agency

Fujieda, answered Oka Ryoichi of the JSP in the Diet,

We would not allow the American forces to deploy their nuclear weapons in Japan. We will maintain our defence policy not to arm our Defence Force with nuclear weapons regardless of the situation that China might produce nuclear weapons.²

Both Ikeda and Fujieda's statements contain the word Japan, but it obviously does not include the Okinawa Islands.

What is the main policy goal of the Ikeda Cabinet, when it so strongly emphasised non-nuclear armament of Japan? What was its perception of Japan's international environment with regard to the nuclear armament of the countries surrounding Japan? These two questions will be discussed respectively.

The first question concerns the immediate objective of the anti-nuclear armament policy. The answer is that the Ikeda Cabinet tried to avoid stirring up public fear of the Defence Force. As a result of the miserable defeat in the Pacific War, the Japanese have been disillusioned over their past possession of military forces as well as their exercise of it. Consequently the Japanese populace have become highly suspicious of any form of military establishment, as demonstrated in the following table. After the Yoshida Cabinet established the National Police Reserve in 1950, Japan's defence force grew steadily in military capacity year after year. First, it changed the name to the National Security Force (Hoantai) and then to the present National Defence Force (Jieitai). By 1960, the Defence Force was one of the most stable and balanced military forces in the Far East. Thus, it was always the

Table I

(question: Do you think it is better for Japan to have the Defence Force?) (from Seisaku Geppo, No. 96)

	1956	1959	1963
It is better to have it	32 %	39 %	52 %
It is acceptable	26	26	24
Acceptable but not necessary	12	12	11
Better not to have it	11	5	3
Not necessary	7	6	3
Don't know	12	12	7

Table II

(question: Do you like to know about the Defence Force?) (from Asahi Shinbun, December 30, 1963)

Yes	22 %
Have interest, but not particularly	22
Have no interest in it	56

(question: Do you think the number of the Defence Force personnel should be increased?)

Increase as many as possible	16 %
Increase a little more	13
Do not change	46
Decrease a little	5
Do not know	20

target of public suspicion because of its nature and structure. The only effective means by which the government could quell the people's suspicion against the Force was to permit its troops to help citizens on various occasions of natural disasters. Ten years' of governmental manipulation of public relations was barely enough to keep the people tolerant of the existence of the Force.³ This was the initial trouble with which the Ikeda Cabinet had to cope as well as did the preceding cabinets.

Beyond this initial trouble, the Japanese have a hypersensitivity against nuclear weapons as the first and perhaps the last people to experience the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the early years of the Ikeda period, the subject of nuclear weapons was highly provocative for the Japanese to talk about as a means of national defence, and a thoughtless speech by any cabinet member could have caused a stormy denunciation of the Cabinet.⁴ Provoking people by presenting the possibility of Japan having nuclear defence could have generated people's antipathy against the whole structure of governmental policy for national security, and it could have eventually led the Japanese to fear the Defence Force as a potential source of evil.

An opinion poll by the Seisaku Geppo (the Liberal-Democratic Party's opinion magazine) and the Asahi newspaper declares how difficult it was for the Ikeda Cabinet to have the Defence Force accepted by the people.

Just before Ikeda formed his cabinet, less than forty per cent of the Japanese positively approved of the existence of the Defence Force, and the Ikeda Cabinet's cautious handling of the defence policy raised popular support of the Force to more than fifty per cent by the end of 1963. The important thing was, however, that more than fifty per cent of the Japanese declined to express their interest in the Force. This was a typical manner in which the Japanese expressed their suspicion about the Force.

Another expression of their suspicion was that more than fifty per cent of them did not approve of increasing the number of the Defence Force personnel nor agreed to decreasing it. The principle of national defence was not well settled in the people's mind, and social approval of the Force by the people was so unstable that the Ikeda Cabinet's policy and attitude for national security could change the position of the Force in Japanese society affirmatively or negatively, depending on the success of its handling of the problem. Hence, it was quite reasonable that the Ikeda Cabinet was highly sensitive to the problem of Japan's nuclear defence and kept it out of its consideration for awhile.

From the point of view of Ikeda's economic rationalism, defence expenditure was the most undesirable of all, although he recognised it was an absolute necessity for Japan's security. In conclusion, Ikeda felt that the subject of nuclear weapons was a dangerous one as it threatened the existing security

system since it could provoke people's emotional reaction against the Force. Also, economically nuclear weapons were a non-productive and extravagant project for the Japanese economy since its secondary effect on the whole national economy was calculated to be too small for its gigantic initial investment.

Now the second question should be answered. Besides considering the domestic situation, the Ikeda Cabinet's perception of the international situation concerning nuclear defence and strategy should be noted. The Ikeda Cabinet's adherence to a non-nuclear armament policy was based on two major perceptions of its environment. Firstly, it trusted the strength of the American nuclear umbrella which covered Japan against possible nuclear attack from the communist bloc. Secondly, the Ikeda Cabinet simply underestimated China's capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

As was already mentioned in the earlier chapters, Ikeda was the man who actually negotiated with the United States to formulate Japan's security system under the Yoshida Cabinet. Ikeda was firmly committed to maintaining the existing provision that the United States guarantee Japan's security. When Tsuji Masanobu (a Diet member, Independent) asked Ikeda about Japan's defence capacity, he answered,

Presently it is difficult for Japan to protect itself with only its own forces. There is no alternative choice but the existing joint defence scheme between the United States and Japan.⁵

For the Ikeda Cabinet, there could be no safer arrangement

than the Mutual Security Treaty of Japan and the United States to guarantee its national security. The treaty involved the American obligation to defend Japan in case of necessity.

The other perception that should be recalled was that the Cabinet underestimated China's capacity to produce nuclear weapons, due, perhaps, to the misinformation from the United States. Ikeda said to an American news agent,

China may potentially be able to activate nuclear reaction, but it is not clear that they actually can. Even when they are able to do so, it will take at least another ten years for them to produce nuclear weapons.⁶

The combination of trust in the American nuclear umbrella and underestimation of China's potential to produce nuclear weapons produced the Ikeda Cabinet's optimistic policy for nuclear defence. When Ikeda was asked at a foreign press conference about China's possession of nuclear weapons, he answered,

We cannot deny that there are nuclear weapons near Japan, in such places as Kunashiri, Etrofu, and Saghalien. It is not surprising to learn that China has them, too. It is not a serious question whether or not some countries possess nuclear weapons.⁷

This does not mean that the Ikeda Cabinet was completely indifferent to the genuine importance of nuclear defence of Japan. On the contrary, whenever the Cabinet stated its position on nuclear armament, it always limited its application to the present Cabinet. For instance, Ikeda said, "As long as the present Ikeda Cabinet lasts, we will not possess nuclear weapons," which carefully avoided its future commitment

to non-nuclear armament. Furthermore, Ikeda clearly stated that Japan had the legitimate right to possess nuclear weapons when he said,

The Japanese Constitution does not prohibit nuclear armament. However, as a political application of it, we do not possess nuclear weapons. The Japanese Constitution prohibits us from maintaining military forces but not defence forces. Therefore, it does not forbid our maintenance of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes, but it does not allow us to make up military forces.⁹

Thus, Ikeda guaranteed Japan's security under the American nuclear umbrella, and shunned the touchy subject of nuclear armament for awhile in order not to provoke the Japanese public. The policy was meant to carry out smooth and gradual acceptance of the Defence Force by the Japanese - a provision which was to preserve national security.

REINFORCEMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

The second perspective to look at in the Ikeda Cabinet's domestic arrangement for defence is the intensification of the national defence policy. This subject will be viewed from three points of view: fiscal policy for defence; the Second Defence Plan as a policy alternative; and the application of the new defence policy.

FISCAL POLICY FOR DEFENCE

The Ikeda Cabinet's fiscal policy for national defence is perhaps the most controversial of all the policies produced. By looking at the first column of table III, it can be clearly

Table III

	DE/NB	(DB-DB')/DB'	(NB-NB')/NB'
1960	9.4 %	.000	.000
1961	8.9	.174	.184
1962	8.5	.328	.467
1963	8.1	.500	.746
1964	8.5	.720	.899

(DB: defence budget, NB: national budget, DB': the 1960 defence budget, NB': the 1960 national budget) Figures are based on Zaimu Tokei, published by the Ministry of Finance, 1966.

seen that the Ikeda Cabinet reduced the relative amount of the defence budget over the total budget, and kept it constantly under a lower level than did the previous cabinets. To compare it internationally, in 1961 West Germany's defence budget was 23 per cent of the total national budget, which was more than two and one-half times larger than the figure for Japan. West Germany's defence expenditure was 4.3 per cent of its gross national product (GNP) and that of Japan was 1.4 per cent, thus showing the relative figure of Japan's defence expenditure.


Ikeda did not want to increase the defence budget rapidly as shown by the statement,

It is our manifest duty to strengthen the Defence Force with our own effort, but it should not be beyond our national capacity. That is why Japan has look to the United Nations and the Mutual Security Treaty of Japan and the United States for its basic national security provisions, and has gradually increased its National Defence Force.¹⁰

He did not want to increase the defence budget to a point which would disturb his fiscal policy for stimulating the national economy to rapid expansion. For example, in the Second Defence Plan which will be discussed in the later sections, the Defence Agency (Boei-cho) wanted to have two per cent of Japan's GNP spent for national defence. This demand was turned down by the Cabinet, and the Agency had to accept the Cabinet's revised figure of 1.5 per cent of the GNP. In practice the Ikeda Cabinet never spent as much as 1.5 per cent of the GNP for national defence. Therefore, one implication of the Ikeda Cabinet's fiscal policy for national defence was that its aspiration to provide for defence forces had a clear limitation.

However, if the second column of the preceding table is observed, it is found that the Ikeda Cabinet spend a good deal of its revenue for defence. The increase ratio of the defence budget over the 1960 base year is extremely high throughout the four fiscal years of the Ikeda Cabinet. The average increase ratio is 18 per cent a year. Although, in relative figures, the defence budget is not increasing, in absolute figures it is increasing at a rate which is not comparable in any other major country in the world. When looking at the same thing over a longer period as in the table IV, it can be said that the Ikeda Cabinet increased its defence budget to a degree which had not been observed in the fiscal policy of any previous cabinets.

Table IV



Looking at the third column of table III, it is found that the 1964 national budget is approximately 90 per cent larger than it was in 1960. The average increase ratio of the national budget in the four years of the Ikeda Cabinet is 22.5 per cent a year. When this figure is compared to the average increase ratio of the defence budget, the increase in the amount of defence expenditure in the whole national budget decreased during the Ikeda period. This once again makes us feel that the Ikeda Cabinet was not willing to strengthen the Defence Force very rapidly.

How the Ikeda Cabinet's financial policy for national defence is judged, depends greatly upon the criterion taken. If the figures of the defence budget relative to the national economy are taken, it can be concluded that the Ikeda Cabinet was reluctant to enhance the Defence Force rapidly. On the other hand, if the absolute figure of the defence expenditure by the Cabinet is considered, it is appropriate to say that the Ikeda Cabinet was the very cabinet that gave the financial basis to establish the Force as one of the most powerful military forces in the Far East. To attribute the growth of the defence budget in the Ikeda period to the general economic expansion seems to be valid, but when examining the Cabinet's defence provision more precisely, it can be said that the increase was not solely due to the secondary effect or accidental effect of the overall economic expansion, but rather to a carefully calculated enlargement policy of military capacity

as will be discussed in the continuing section.

THE SECOND DEFENCE PLAN

As Ikeda Cabinet's security policy in a narrow sense, the Second Defence Plan will be discussed in this section. The content and actual application of the plan will be discussed in the next section, and here the focus will be cast upon the conditions by which the Second Defence Plan came into being.

At the beginning of the Ikeda period, there were roughly three conditions that invited some new form of a reinforced defence plan. Firstly, the Japanese political elite as well as the informed public opinion, demanded a more independent diplomacy. As a prerequisite to this, the enlargement of Japan's defence capacity was felt necessary in order to build up a more autonomous defence force. Secondly, in order to acquire greater independence in maintaining national security, Japan had to build its own system of defence industry and weaponry which had long been subsidiary to American system of military equipment. Thirdly, it was a long lasting aspiration of the people in the Defence Force to be recognised by the public as a legitimate entity in the society. These three conditions will be discussed respectively.

Japan's autonomous course of diplomacy was felt necessary even before the time of the Ikeda Cabinet. The Kishi Cabinet's effort to revise the Mutual Security Treaty of the United

States and Japan was a way in which the Japanese Government tried to improve Japan's position vis a vis the United States so that Japan could employ more independent diplomatic manoeuvres. During the Ikeda period the cry for greater diplomatic independence or the cry to lessen American influence over Japan's external policy, became louder. Kono Ichiro, a strongman in the Ikeda Cabinet and a sometimes colleague, as well as an often times rival for Ikeda, expressed such sentiment when he wrote,

As the international situation has changed like this (in Asia, China is getting aggressive and is frightening its neighbouring countries as Japan once did to them), I think it is time for Japan to clearly map out independent diplomatic principles of its own.¹¹

and on a different occasion he wrote,

World politics has been divided into two blocs and is dominated by Soviet-American competition. However, the present Japanese national power is not inferior to that of the West European nations, so is it desirable that Japan keep inactive in world politics? I believe that it is the right time for Japan to start moving towards the deterrence of a total war...leading nations have lost their direction in the thick mist. Is it not an important time for us to stop following other countries and start searching for the light with our own effort in this thick mist?¹²

On encountering such demands for independent diplomacy, Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi said,

Independent diplomacy is a word I do not understand. Diplomacy is by definition independent and there can be no non-independent diplomacy...the Japanese economy is based on political and economic associations with many countries. We have to be careful in realising what is best for the Japanese interest in the whole framework of diplomacy...¹³

This statement implies how strong the demand was to adopt an independent course of diplomacy. Ironically, an unreasonable apology such as this, reveals how 'non-independent' the Japanese diplomacy had been. Such a strong demand eventually took a more concrete policy. Minister of the Defence Agency Fukuda Tokuyasu, said,

Japan's economic growth has been so high as to be noticed by the world. Japan has paid more than **forty per cent** of the reparation obligation and it is forwarding economic cooperation programmes. The time is now due for us, as an independent country, to be prepared to protect our country with our own forces...¹⁴

This was a typical statement rationalising Japan's military enlargement plan through the Second Defence Plan.

The second condition was Japan's necessity to build its own defence industry so that it could free itself from American domination over its defence planning and activities. One of the greatest barriers to Japan's producing tactical weapons was the excess weapons that the United States had given to Japan gratuitously.¹⁵ By 1960, the total amount of American weapons aid for Japan was over two hundred billion Yen. In addition to that, a continuous flow of surplus weapons was expected from the United States to Japan. This flow of weapons would increase the stockpile of unused and obsolete war materials. The Defence Force personnel was not in proportion to the flow of incoming surplus weapons from the United States. Two problems stemmed from this phenomenon: discouragement of domestic industry from military production; and increase of

unused and obsolete weapons which did not fit the Japanese soldiers. In order to strengthen Japan's defence capacity, the Ikeda Cabinet had to establish a new long term plan for replacement and modernisation of land and sea forces' weapons as well as for domestic production of airplanes. This was one of the most important excuses for the Second Defence Plan which was to last for five years, starting in 1962.

The original draft of the Second Defence Plan as written by the Defence Agency involved two difficulties. One reflected strong American interest. The emphasis was placed too heavily on the adoption of new types of weapons which did not fit the present system of armament of the Defence Force. The system consisted mainly of old American weapons. The other difficulty was that the Defence Agency demanded to have two per cent of the GNP spent for defence expenditure. This figure had almost no rationale, but was made in order to increase the Defence Agency's prestige. These two difficulties were pointed out by the economic ministers at the defence conference of the Cabinet members and the Joint Chief of Staff.¹⁶ The conference emphasised the idea of improving the existing weapons rather than purchasing the latest weapons in order that Japan's domestic war industry could be protected. One of the members of the conference said, "Rather than producing the latest armament, we should consider replacing old guns and tanks with new ones and build new ships in place of obsolete ships."¹⁷ Consequently, the Defence Agency agreed to re-draft

the plan to include this recommendation. What should be noted here is that although the defence conference criticised and demanded a greater change in the original draft, it accepted the basic idea that the Japanese defence industry should be helped and protected.

The third condition was a long lasting aspiration of the Defence Agency and the Force to be recognised by the public as a legitimate entity in society. Since the Japanese Constitution firmly prohibits the existence of any military force in Japan, the force had been considered from the moment of its birth, an illegitimate body in the Japanese society. This frustrated the men in the Defence Force. Every newly appointed Minister of the Defence Agency has expressed his hope to upgrade the agency's status to a ministry. This was one way to put their dissatisfaction into a concrete form. The magic figure of 'two per cent of the GNP' was another way to express this type of hope. Of course, two per cent of the GNP would also be intended for support of the defence industry. By protecting the defence industry, it could secure a firm position in a society which had been rapidly industrialised. Failing to secure a good deal of the budget in a rapidly growing society meant that it would reduce its existing value in the society over time. Minister of the Defence Agency Nishimura, said,

...long term defence planning is necessary to protect the defence industry, and I will do my best to realise it (the Second Defence Plan) in the coming Diet session. The first thing to do is to

make the plan more reasonable. It is not crucial to get the plan in the 1961 budget.¹⁸

Although Nishimura knew it required revision, as the representative of the Agency, he had to push the unreasonable original plan. Such was the expression of the irritated feeling of the people in the Defence Agency in order to impress the Cabinet and to let the public recognise its existing value.

These three conditions were fused into the revised Second Defence Plan which was true to the recommendation by the defence conference. The revised plan accepted 1.5 per cent of the GNP spent for national defence. The figure was only a "goal for the effort" and was never practically observed by the Ikeda Cabinet's fiscal policy.

APPLICATION OF THE NEW DEFENCE POLICY

The third point is the application of the defence policy by the Ikeda Cabinet. According to traditional categorisation, this subject will be divided into three fields: air; land and naval defence forces. The general orientation of the underlying principle of the Ikeda Cabinet in building up the Defence Force was to establish Japan's own defence forces for national security. From the American point of view about Far Eastern defence, such places as Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Okinawa are extremely important. Hokkaido provides an optimum base to attack and/or to watch the Russian Far Eastern military bases. Kyushu makes a stable hinterland base for

South Korea which has been under constant pressure of North Korean unification moves. The Okinawa Islands which are located between Japan and Taiwan, give an important position to attack the central part of China. Although these geographic positions are important for Japan's national security, they are not as important for Japan as they are for the United States, because they do not defend Honshu, the main island of Japan. That is, the American strategy for the Far East and Japan's national security involve some incompatible objectives,¹⁹ which the Ikeda Cabinet realised and tried to solve.

Air Defence Force (Koku Jieitai)

In 1961, the Ikeda Cabinet presented and passed two defence laws with which the Cabinet aimed to strengthen the air defence of the central part of Japan. The law set up the Sixth Air Squadron at Komatsu in Ishikawa Prefecture and the Seventh Air Squadron at Matsushima in Miyagi Prefecture. The Sixth Squadron was expected to cover the Japan Sea which had been thinly defended. The Japan Sea is the shortest path between the Northern part of China and the central part of Japan. This area had been covered by the American air force in Japan. Before 1961, no Japanese air force was ever placed in the central part of Honshu - the politically and economically most important part of Japan. Therefore, the Sixth Squadron was expected to form the front line to defend Tokyo against attack from the Northern part of China.

At the same time in Matsushima, the Seventh Squadron was added to the Fourth Squadron. These two squadrons were expected to form the second front behind the Chitose base in Hokkaido which faces the Russian Far East. The Matsushima base is located on the Pacific coast of the Honshu Island and the position is approximately between Tokyo and Chitose. This position is important with regards to the Russian air force's operation in the Far East. The Russian operation, which is called "Tokyo Express" by the Defence Force, takes the route which by-passes Hokkaido in the eastern sea and heads to Tokyo directly from the Pacific Ocean. This operation to attack Tokyo from the northeastern Pacific can only be stopped by the air force in Matsushima with the assistance of the force in Chitose.

In addition, the Cabinet decided to aid the air defence force by locating the ground-to-air missile bases around the Keihin (Tokyo-Yokohama) Industrial Area and in Hokkaido.²⁰ It also decided to equip the air force with all weather F-104-J jet fighters, one of the latest models of fighters in the world at that time.

The salient action for the Japanese air defence taken by the Ikeda Cabinet was that it gave an important guide line to Japan's air force. The principle is that Japan's air defence is not for protection of such points as Hokkaido, Kyushu, or the Okinawa Islands, but for protection of the area which is crucial to the survival of Japan as a working unit

for the Japanese. First of all, in order to protect Japan, the Keihin Industrial Area which is the political and economic centre of Japan, must be protected. This is the greatest and final task of Japan's air force. Although, protecting the heart of Japan is an important and appropriate task, it is not the ultimate goal for the American forces in Japan. Their goal is to protect the United States bases and/or to maintain the threat to the communist world by holding military bases surrounding it. These bases are a deterrent factor in that they avoid total confrontation of the two blocs, and in this regard they make an important element of Japan's defence. The Ikeda Cabinet's action was a striking attempt at the transition from a purely American dominated strategy to a Japanese defence by the Japanese.

Land Defence Force (Rikujo Jieitai)

In the Second Defence Plan, the Defence Agency proposed an idea to re-organise the land force divisions and increase its number from 9 to 13 divisions. However, the number of men in each division was not maintained at the same level as before. The plan increased the number of divisions but not the total personnel in the land force in proportion to the increase of divisions. Therefore, it virtually decreased the number of men in each division. This re-organisation plan had two goals: to give regional autonomy to each division; and to preserve the potential capacity to expand the land force to the level which, in case of need, could be

comparable to the size of the threatening country's land force.

Japan consists of four 'big' islands which can very easily be separated from one another militarily. Honshu and Kyushu are connected with an under-sea tunnel. Hokkaido and Honshu will also be connected with an under-sea tunnel very soon. However, transportation through one under-sea tunnel is very limited in capacity and consequently the four islands can be isolated with little military effort. Moreover, the four islands of Japan are almost entirely covered by mountains, and only fourteen to sixteen per cent of the whole area is arable. The arable plains which are scattered all over Japan, permit each small plain to be isolated from the next by mountains. Considering these geographic conditions, each division of the Japanese land force must have autonomy so that it maintains its military activity in case it is isolated from other neighbouring units. In Japan, very few divisions can expect to secure a constant and large amount of material supply in a crisis situation. Consequently, the regional autonomy of each division is a matter of life and death for each division and the area it covers.

The other objective of re-organising the land force was to enhance the land force's potential capacity to expand its size to a degree that could cope with the gigantic land force of China or Russia. Each division had been under-manned because the land force was not very popular among the Japanese

youth; and the expansion of the number of divisions under the Ikeda Cabinet exaggerated the shortage of each division's number of personnel. The constant shortage of land force personnel became a distinctive phenomenon especially after the Ikeda period, because the rapid expansion of the Japanese economy attracted the Japanese youth away from the military service to the economic field. In a situation like this, the best thing the Force could do was to establish an organisation to train men as quick as possible when needed. This goal was realised by the re-organisation of the land force. By increasing its potential for future expansion, the Force acquired a better position than it had ever had before in relation to its hypothetical enemy: the People's Liberation Army of China.²¹

Sea Defence Force (Kaijo Jieitai)

Japan's naval forces have long limited their role to Japan's coastal defence. Japan's naval force was originally planned to defend Japan's long coast line while the American navy was aiding its forces in Korea during the Korean War. After the fall of the Imperial Navy, Japan acquired its first offshore fleet during the Ikeda period. In 1962, the Sea Defence Force formed its First Submarine Fleet,²² with which it showed a determination to concentrate its operational goal of attacking submarines. Therefore, the existing Japanese naval force is strong and well equipped for attacking submarines, but it can never be considered as a well balanced

force. Modern equipment for the naval force is so expensive that it is extremely difficult for any country except the United States and the Soviet Union to build up and maintain a well balanced naval force. Hence, Japan's naval defence is heavily dependent on the American Seventh Fleet in the Far East, and therefore, the naval force is the least independent of all the three military forces of Japan in structure and in strategy.

The Japanese navy's emphasis on anti-submarine operations has two goals: to cope with the Russian Far Eastern Fleet which consists mainly of submarines; and to defend Japan's trans-Oceanic transportation route for trade activities.

Russian naval bases in the Far East, such as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, are located between Saghalien and North Korea. The Russian fleet that bases in this area can easily be trapped in the Japan Sea when the three straits are closed. These are the Soya Strait (between Saghalien and Hokkaido), the Tsugaru Strait (between Hokkaido and Honshu), and the Tsushima Strait (between Korea and Kyushu).²³ When these three straits are effectively blocked, Japan's anti-submarine force might be effective in destroying the Russian Far Eastern Fleet, or at least limiting, to a certain degree, the Russian fleet's operation in the Pacific Ocean.

The second reason for Japan having an anti-submarine force is that the Japanese navy has to protect Japan's long trans-Oceanic trade routes, especially, the trade route that

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connects Japan and Southeast Asia and the west of India. Such a route goes into the eastern sea along the long Chinese coast line. If China regains Taiwan, it can cut off Japan's trade route with its submarine operations without difficulty. Under such circumstances, it is not a meaningless effort for Japan to emphasise an anti-submarine force rather than a well balanced naval force.

However, it is obvious that Japan's naval defence force is dependent upon the Seventh Fleet of the United States, and is not an independent naval force in structure. Even the Japan Communist Party considers that Japan's naval force "has no capacity of its own to wage a war."²⁴ Strategically, anti-submarine operations against the Russian fleet in the Far east is more advantageous for the United States than for Japan. For, the operation aim to enclose the fleet in the Japan Sea, which is not as great a help for Japan's defence as it is an advantage for American naval operations in the Pacific Ocean. Thus, structurally and strategically, Japan's naval force has acquired the least autonomous character of the three branches of Japanese military forces during the Ikeda period.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

- ¹Asahi Shinbun, February 2, 1961.
- ²Ibid, October 11, 1961.
- ³Cf. Chira Masayoshi, Shumpu Shuu, (Tokyo: Kashima Kenkyujo Shppankai, 1966), pp. 174-5.
- ⁴In 1968, Minister of Agriculture Kuraishi was forced to resign his position by the opposition parties which were supported by the mass media, when he carelessly advocated Japan's necessity of having stronger military force and nuclear weapons. This incident shows the political atmosphere in the Japanese Diet. For reference, Asahi Shinbun, February 7-24, 1968, and Kiroku Kokkai Anpo Ronso, Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu, ed., (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1968), pp. 50-68.
- ⁵Asahi Shinbun, February 2, 1961.
- ⁶Ibid, February 12, 1963.
- ⁷Ibid, March 20, 1962.
- ⁸Ibid, July 19, 1962.
- ⁹Ibid, March 5, 1961.
- ¹⁰Ibid, October 21, 1960.
- ¹¹Bungei Shunju, July 1962, p. 76.
- ¹²Chuo Koron, July 1962, p. 197.
- ¹³Ekonomisuto, Vol. 42, No. 5, 1964, p. 16.
- ¹⁴Kokubo, August 1963, p. 57.
- ¹⁵Shima Yoshihiko, Gunjihi, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966), p. 170.
- ¹⁶Asahi Shinbun, May 3, 1961.
- ¹⁷loc. cit.
- ¹⁸Ibid, January 6, 1961.
- ¹⁹Utsunomiya Tokuma, Heiwa Kyozon to Nihon Gaiko, (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1960), pp. 14-18.

²⁰Asahi Shinbun, July 5, 1961.

²¹Information Office of the Defence Force (Jieitai Senshi Shitsu) has published its studies of war strategy, the subjects of which assume China to be the potential enemy. Some of the titles are, "Study of Chinese Psychological Warfare," "Study of the Operation at Hsian Kuei," "Study of the Operation at Tsi-tsi-har," "Study of the Operation at Shih-chia-chuang," "Study of the Operation at Momonhan," and ect.

Other than that, the Force's publications are very rich in information on China.

²²Asahi Shinbun, June 3, 1962.

²³Asahi Shinbunsha, ed., Nihon no Jieiryoku, (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1967), p. 106.

²⁴The Japan Communist Party, ed., Seiji Senden Shiryo, (Tokyo: The Japan Communist Party Public Relations and Education Section, 1961), p. 38.

CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS

To summarise the preceding discussion, one generalisation will be discussed in this Chapter. The Ikeda Cabinet's security policy can be characterised as one of a principle of balance. This principle of balance in the Ikeda Cabinet's behavior will be viewed from three different perspectives. These are: the systemic impact as studied in the approaches to the communist bloc and the Western bloc; the internal political impact as observed in its receptiveness to the demands of both the opposition parties and the government party; and the security policy as observed in the enlargement of the Defence Force and the emphasis on economic development.

Before detailing these three aspects, the idiosyncratic factor of the Ikeda Cabinet's policy making process, or in other words, Prime Minister Ikeda's personality and past experience has to be briefly mentioned. Ikeda was an able bureaucrat of the Ministry of Finance (Okura Kanryo). The finance bureaucrats are considered to be the elite of the elites in Japanese society. Ikeda joined the Liberal Party in 1947 and became the Minister of Finance in the Yoshida Cabinet in 1949, after a long career as a successful career official in that ministry.

Students of Japanese politics and economics attribute the present economic prosperity of Japan to the Yoshida

Cabinet's elaborate economic policies in the late 1940's and early 1950's.¹ However, Yoshida himself was an ex-diplomat and knew nothing about economics. Most of the economic policies of the Yoshida Cabinet were formulated by the finance ministry officials under Finance Minister Ikeda's leadership. Ikeda was noted for his rigid economic policies,² and he often did not hesitate to sacrifice small segments of society in order to attain a balanced development of the national economy. However, the other side of Ikeda's contribution to Japanese politics has to be remembered. The contribution can be seen in Japan's original security policy - the Security Treaty of 1951 between Japan and the United States. It was worked out in 1950 by the Ikeda mission to the United States³ under the Yoshida Cabinet. The major amendment of the treaty accomplished in 1953 by the Ikeda-Robertson conference, confirmed Japan's security policy. Japan's security was to be supported by American military aid and protection. Thus, in his view and policy, Ikeda always maintained the balance between economic policy and security policy as the Minister of Finance in the Yoshida Cabinet.

The first instance of Ikeda's balanced politics can be found in his approach to the communist bloc and the Western bloc. The first external policy that the Ikeda Cabinet declared was its willingness to approach the communist bloc, especially the Chinese People's Republic. This was Ikeda's first political action as the Prime Minister of Japan in July,

1960. The Ikeda Cabinet quickly resumed Sino-Japanese trade relations and gradually enlarged it throughout four years of its tenure. In contrast to this policy, the Cabinet improved to a great extent the Japanese-American relations as can be observed in the Kennedy-Ikeda talks of 1961, or the elaborate manoeuvre of Prof. Reischauer, Ambassador of the United States, in manipulating Japanese public opinion. The cabinet's friendly attitude towards the United States was welcomed by the Americans and was never opposed by many Japanese. The Cabinet's approach to the communist bloc greatly improved Japan's relations with the communist bloc, but at the same time the Cabinet always counter-balanced its approach with the improvement and enrichment of its ties with the Western bloc. In this regard, Ikeda's two trips to Europe and two meetings with the Kennedy brothers should be noted. Consequently, when the Cabinet faced a drastic change in the power balance in the Far East, such as the weakening of Taiwan as observed in the French recognition of Communist China, it did not hesitate to weaken its relations with the communist bloc. Thus, Japan maintained a power balance between the Western and the communist blocs in the Far East.

Secondly, the Ikeda Cabinet's politics of balance can be observed in its management of the National Diet. Japanese politics had never been and has never been so peaceful and harmonious as it was at the time of the Ikeda Cabinet. This relative peacefulness can be attributed to the Ikeda Cabinet's

receptive attitude towards the opposition parties' demands. Concerning this topic, two examples will be cited. These are the Japanese-Korean negotiations and the anti-nuclear armament policy.

The normalisation and improvement of the Japanese-Korean diplomatic relations was supported by the government party, the LDP. As previously mentioned, the Japanese-Korean negotiations received almost unanimous support of the LDP, but was strongly opposed by the opposition parties, namely the JCP and the JSP. The informed public opinion maintained a neutral position over this issue. The Ikeda Cabinet's action was, to solve disagreements between the two countries, to draft a treaty and to start normalising diplomatic relations on the de facto level in order to satisfy the demands of the government party. However, in order not to provoke the opposition parties over this issue, the Cabinet did not sign the treaty which was ready to be signed at the beginning of 1964. While satisfying the two opposing groups to a certain degree, the Cabinet strengthened its public relations efforts in order to create a more favourable atmosphere for signing the treaty.

Another example of the Ikeda Cabinet's policy of balance in party politics was its anti-nuclear armament policy. The three anti-nuclear principles (Not to produce, Not to possess, Not to deploy nuclear weapons) were strictly observed during the Ikeda period and the Cabinet stated its anti-nuclear

armament policy repeatedly. An anti-nuclear policy was strongly advocated by the opposition parties and was conditionally supported by the government party. Public opinion did not support nuclearisation of the Defence Force. Over fifty per cent of the Japanese supported the three anti-nuclear principles. If the conditional support is included, over eighty per cent of the Japanese supported the principles. Under such circumstances, the Ikeda Cabinet had no choice but to adopt the policy although the principle would apparently limit and weaken the combat capacity of the Defence Force.

Table V

(Question: Do you think the three anti nuclear principles should be observed?) (from Mainichi Shinbun, July 1, 1968)

	Men	Women	Total
Should be maintained for good	52 %	46 %	49 %
Could be changed to circumstances	31	24	27
The principles are meaningless	12	10	11
Do not know	5	20	13

On the other hand, the government party strongly demanded the strengthening of the Defence Force and the Cabinet's response to this demand was its policy of increasing the defence forces as was discussed in the previous chapter. To this policy, the opposition parties objected but public opinion seemed to have supported the Cabinet.

Table VI

(question: What do you think is the appropriate provision for Japan's national defence?) (from Mainichi Shinbun, July 1, 1968)

	Men	Women	Total
The Defence Force and the Japanese-American Mutual Security Treaty	24 %	19 %	21 %
Neutrality with the strengthened Defence Force	43	34	38
Unarmed neutrality	26	30	28
Alliance with the communist bloc	2	2	2
Do no know	5	15	11

Nearly sixty per cent of the Japanese approved of the Defence Force for Japan's defence. A situation such as this enabled the Ikeda Cabinet to adopt the Second defence plan which was to strengthen the fighting capacity of the Force. By this policy the Cabinet counter-balanced the restriction and the weakening effect of the anti-nuclear armament policy. Through manipulation of these two policies, the Cabinet attained a balanced defence that satisfied both the opposition and the government parties.

The final discussion is the Cabinet's balancing of defence and economic policies. The Ikeda Cabinet enacted the Second Defence Plan which brought about a distinctive change in Japan's defence capacity. The net amount of the defence budget increased 72 per cent over four fiscal years of the Ikeda Cabinet. However, the Cabinet set up a ceiling as to

what proportion the defence budget could be over the GNP. It was decided that the figure should not exceed 1.5 per cent of the GNP and this rule was strictly observed. Therefore, under the Ikeda Cabinet, the growth of national economy always surpassed the growth of the defence budget. Of course, this does not lead to a conclusion that the Cabinet neglected national defence. On the contrary, Japan's defence force was enlarged to such an extent as to make Japan the second strongest military power in the Far East.⁴ But the growth of defence expenditure was kept under the level which harmonised with the growth of Japan's total economy.

The above three points hopefully support the theme of this chapter, the Ikeda Cabinet's principle of balance for national security. Indeed, there can be counter arguments for the three discussions cited above. The discussion would vary according to the level of abstraction. In the world atlas, Italy looks like a boot, but no traveler feels that the country looks like a boot when he is actually in Italy. No one can judge which perception of the two is more valid. Perhaps the only thing to be said is that both perceptions are valid but are different in their level of abstraction. As well, a researcher who examines the Ikeda Cabinet's security policy in far more detail would very likely arrive at a different type of generalisation. Neither the one presented here nor the one a researcher might attain alone is the only valid one. Rather, both are valid with a different level of

abstraction. Therefore, the generalisation presented in this chapter is simply one possible generalisation derived from the survey which was cited in the previous chapters, and it is valid within the realm of abstraction on which the whole discussion of this thesis has taken place.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V

¹Kosaka Masataka, "Saisho Yoshida Shigeru Ron," Chuo Koron, February, 1964, pp. 76-111.

²Ikeda's nickname was "The Minister of Wheat," because he was reported to have said that the poor people should eat wheat instead of rice. His statement was taken as a lack of sympathy to the poor people.

³Miyazawa Kiichi, Tokyo Washington no Mitsudan, (Tokyo: Jitsugyo no Nihon-sha, 1956), p. 46.

⁴Number of men in the three forces is as follows,

Country	Land	Sea	Air
Japan	171,500	35,000	41,000
South Korea	540,000	17,000	25,000
North Korea	340,000	8,000	20,000
Taiwan	400,000	62,000	82,000
China	2,250,000	140,000	100,000
the Philippines	25,000	5,000	7,000

(the figures above are based on Boei Nenkan: 1967, (Tokyo: Boei Nenkan Kanko-kai, 1967), pp. 242, 254, 400-416.

Taiwan's figures are larger than Japan's, but Taiwan's figures of sea force and air force equipment are smaller than Japan's figures.

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