# A SURVEY OF GREEK HISTORIANS
OF THE 5TH AND 4TH CENTURIES B.C.

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Before we look into the limitations which the written history of the 5th and 4th centuries of Ancient Greece presents, it seems to me that a few remarks upon the subject of history in general would not come amiss; touching, perhaps, upon the different methods of treating history, and determining what we should expect from an historian.

The German, Hegel, assumes that there are three kinds of History, original, reflective and philosophical. Let us look merely at his definition of the first two, the third not pertaining to our survey. To the first category, he tells us, belong the historians "whose descriptions are for the most part limited to deeds, events, and states of society which they had before their eyes and whose spirit they shared." (1)

This idea of spirit, in the sense in which the word is used here, distinguishes the first method from the second. In the first the historian is molded by the same influences which have shaped the events that he relates; he changes these events into an object for the concepitive faculty, and his aim is merely to present to posterity an image of them as clear as that which he himself possessed by virtue of personal observation or life-like descriptions. On the other hand, the spirit of the historian who adopts the second method, transcends the present. He approaches his task with his own spirit, a spirit distinct from that of the element he is to manipulate. His readers,

(1) Philosophy of History, P.l.
therefore, should consider the principles which have guided the author in determining the bearing and motives of the actions and events he describes, and which have decided the form of his narrative. It often happens that the individuality of tone which must characterize a writer belonging to a different culture than that of which he would be the historian, is not modified in accordance with the distance his record must travel; a history which aspires to traverse long periods of time, as to be universal, must forgo the attempt to give individual representations of the past as it actually existed. It must shorten its pictures by abstractions, so that a battle, a great victory, a siege, no longer maintains its original proportions, but is passed by with a bare mention.

How it seems to us that the historians with whom we have to deal in this essay, belong to both of these categories, and we have endeavoured, especially in the case of Herodotus and Thucydides, the two most important of them, to show how this is true, and wherein they succeed in measuring up to the standard thus set for them, and wherein they fall short of it.

What else do we desire in an historian, apart from this fundamental requirement of instinctive grasp of the scope of history? Honesty of purpose first of all, I think; breadth of vision; critical ability in large measure; impartiality, and a clear, readable style. And in the content of a history? A modern expects, I suppose, geographical, political, economic, social, literary and philosophical facts, properly combined in one work. But we must not hope to find such a history among the ancient Greeks. Geographical information they supply to
us liberally. Political history, too, fills the bulk of their
pages, but if one seeks therein for the other factors that are
taken for granted in any modern work of such a nature, he will
scarcely discover them, except where they exist in the germ or
are suggested through the works of persons whose names are
barely mentioned.
HERODOTUS

We will review the life of Herodotus insofar as it appertains to our inquiry, in order that we may see what were the opportunities and advantages that enabled him to compile his work, and what were his handicaps and limitations. Limitations not only in the facilities for travel and investigation, but in the man himself. By so doing we will learn to what extent he merits the name of Historian, and wherein he falls short of that ideal.

Suidas is our main authority for the life of Herodotus. From him we learn certain facts, that, as they are confirmed by indications in the work of the historian himself, we may consider as fairly certain. First, that he was well-born and a native of Halicarnassus; second, that he was connected with Panyasis, who was the poet of Hercules and of the story of the Ionian colonization; third, that he spent part of his early life in Samos, a fact which is borne out by his special familiarity with, and favour for, that island; fourth, that he took part in the colonization of Thurii and died there; fifth, the date of his birth, which we can assert fairly accurately to have been in the early fifth century, about 484 B.C.

Certain obvious advantages accrued to a man born in such a place, in such an age; who had so spent his life. The fact that his city was a sea-port had an important bearing on the subsequent writing and nature of the histories. A sea-port town, then even more than now, afforded innumerable opportunities for a wakeful, eager boy to meet and listen to
widely diverse types of human beings; and Herodotus was a keen lover of human nature. He loved the personal element in history and knew how to depict it. "In his pages statesmen, grooms, doctors, nurses, peasants, gods, thieves, jostle one another. Now a king speaks, now a philosopher, now a café loafer." (1) He lived among all the talk of the market-place, personal, political, commercial, international. He heard all manner of marvellous tales and stored them up in his memory, though somewhat unfortunately for us he neglected their chronology.

His family connections, too, must have been of use to him in furthering his own natural bent. The influence of Panyasis may be traced in Herodotus' History. (2) "Herodotus," writes Dr. Macan, "was trained, so to speak, in the school of his uncle Panyasis, one of the epic poets. His history of the great invasion is but the application of the principles of Panyasis to a new subject, the freshest that could have engaged his attention." (3) But there were gaps in his education. His spelling has been compared to the Elizabethan for its spacious freedom. His arithmetic is not always reliable. There is very little reference to music in his pages. He does not talk philosophy, though it had its influence upon him. But whatever gaps there were in his training, it was pre-eminently Greek, and Greek education not only left alive in the man the ardent and inquisitive mind of the boy, with its perpetual desire to know, but fostered and furthered it.

(1) P. W. Livingstone, "The Greek Genius", p. 151
(2) cf. especially II, 43-5; IV, 8-10; I, 142-150
(3) "Introduction to Herodotus" pp. VII, VIII, IX, XLVIII.
We pass from the child to the man. Somewhere about 454 B.C., the historian left Halicarnassus, banished by its tyrant Lygdamis, who had put Herodotus' uncle Panyasis to death. He stayed for some time, apparently, in Samos, and then went to Athens, where he supposedly delivered recitations from his books. From Athens he proceeded to Italy as one of the first citizens of the new colony of Thurii (445 B.C.). His subsequent life is undetermined and traditional accounts vary. It is possible that he returned to Athens in 431-30 B.C., though if he did he probably returned thence to Thurii. Even the date of his death is uncertain. At best he survived only the first years of the Peloponnesian War.

Into this framework we have to fit his travels, which included the coasts of the Euxine, Babylon, Phoenicia, Egypt, and probably Cyrene. Few stories in his actual narrative are more interesting to us than these voyages of his own, which have made him in some ways the father of geography as well as of history. He went, as a rule, by water, and did not under ordinary circumstances leave the coast. Of the dates of his visits it is not necessary here to discuss the disputed chronology. His most important journeys, to Babylon and Egypt, took place around 449 B.C. As to their motive, it is plausible to suggest that Herodotus travelled as a merchant, at any rate in the north and east. He is careful to mention articles of commerce, is fond of describing methods of transport, mentions curious forms of trade, and uses what seem to be trade terms. Of course his travels were especially interesting and invaluable in that they enabled him to collect the materials
for his history from the various oral sources, and to some extent to use his eyes in seeing the scenes of the events he describes.

The mention of materials brings us to the question of the evidence Herodotus made use of in writing the histories. It may be classified under the heads of written, oral and archaeological evidence. Each of these kinds must be considered separately.

Herodotus continually quotes poetry; he is certainly indebted to the "Persae" of Aeschylus, and perhaps also to Phrynichus' "Taking of Miletus", though this can not be proved. Above all, he knew his Homer thoroughly and did not hesitate to imitate him. Like Homer, he made his characters speak, introducing both short, pointed conversations and dialogues, and orations of considerable length. He adopted another epic feature, and diversified his work with digressions and episodes. "The Homeric qualities of Herodotus, which communicate to his history an epic flavour, accord with the object to produce a work which, like Homer's, should fascinate the minds of men. It was his aim to hold his audience or readers entertained; to do for his world in prose what Homer had done for the ancient world in numbers." (1)

We must remember that Herodotus, in common with all the Greeks, considered Homer history, long before history in the correct sense of the word came to be written. To this extent, at least, they were justified, in that the groundwork and principal motives of the epics were historical, and during

the later centuries they were becoming quasi-historical in form. The body of traditions was being submitted to crude and rudimentary processes of what we may call historical inquiry. The later poets of the Homeric school, and the poets of the Hesiodic school, worked in obedience to the new found need of systematic arrangement and chronological order, while scattered and contradictory traditions were harmonized more or less into a consistent picture of the past. It might be expected that this examining of the ancient literature and traditions, though effected with no thought of questioning their truth as a whole, would have sown the seeds of criticism and paved the way for unbelief. But the paucity of the remains of this literature makes this question a difficult one to answer. It would seem, however, that toward the end of the epic era a spirit arose in Ionia, not incredulous, perhaps, but sceptical and likely to break out at any moment into incredulity. At the same time the mythopoeic instinct of the Greeks was still strong, but with it was a growing tendency to rationalize what men now felt to be impossible. It is believed that much about the same time a western Greek, Theagenes of Rhégium, was attempting to interpret Homer allegorically. Herodotus, of course, does not proceed to such lengths as this, but he does to a large extent make it his custom to strip his own stories of the supernatural, not realizing that in rejecting part of a tale, he makes the rest of it inacceptable.

Homer and the other poets, then, Herodotus was familiar with, and made use of for evidence, doubtful though we realize it now to have been. But besides these, he owed much
to certain prose-writers who preceded him, though he mentions only one. The works of these writers, however, while they included very important episodes in the history of Greece, were properly and formally histories of Persia; the history of Greece entered into them only incidentally.

Xanthus, for example, composed in Greek a history of Lydia. Charon of Lampsaacus wrote a history of Crete and one of Persia down to 492 B.C., and Dionysius of Miletus another as far as Marathon and the death of Darius, which he followed with a sequel narrating the events of the Persian war. Skylax of Caryanda, a Parian Greek, wrote a history which had as its hero Heraclerides, Prince of Mylasa, who deserted the cause of the Persians and helped the Greeks in the invasion of Greece. How far it was biographical we do not know, but at least it is noteworthy as the earliest Greek book we know that made an individual the centre of an historical narrative.

Antiochus of Syracuse made a step forward when he composed a work on the history of the western Greeks, having investigated the early history of Sicily and Italy and the planting of the Greek colonies in those lands. His contemporary, Hellanicus of Lesbos, pointed out a way for a greater advance, and his importance in the history of the development of Greek written history is considerable. His range was a wide one. He wrote on the history of Persia, and the customs of the Barbarians; on the mythical period of Greece; the origin of the Greek cities in Asia Minor; on the later history of Greece, and especially the history of Athens. Moreover he tried, by using the few national or priestly registers that presented
something like contemporary registration, to lay down the foundations of a scientific system of chronology, based primarily on the lists of the Argine priestesses of Uera, and secondarily on genealogies, lists of magistrates (e.g. the archons at Athens), and oriental dates, in place of the old reckoning by generations.

The style of these works, if the testimony of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1) can be believed, was somewhat bare, if concise. Few fragments of them, however, no matter what value as precursors of history they may have had, remain to us. Professor Bury (2) attributes the books of these men to the impulse afforded by the geographical work of Hecataeus, the most important writer of them all.

Hecataeus was first and foremost a geographer. His chief contributions to knowledge were in the field of geographical science. His travels included not only the Greek lands, and the Black Sea, but the interior of the Persian Empire and Egypt. The facts he collected, he published under the title of "Travels Around the World," and it went beyond the realm of geography. It contained in addition a great deal of ethnography and history, and most of all, it introduced the Greeks to the history of the East. In addition to the "Travels Around the World", Hecataeus wrote a history of Greece. It was a compilation from the genealogical epics, written in prose. But, though, as its title "Genealogies" shows, it was strongly influenced by the epics, it was a critical investigation. His

(1) 'De Thucydid', V
(2) 'Ancient Greek Historians', P.26.
opening words lead us to expect that the history was a thoroughgoing revision of what was considered the ancient history of Hellas. But the fragments of it that remain do not enable us, unfortunately, to form an opinion as to the lengths to which his scepticism went. The few instances that we can fasten upon as showing a tendency to question, would indicate that it was only a rationalization of improbabilities, of which we spoke in connection with Herodotus.

To Hecataeus, if to any, Herodotus is most in debt. We know that he knew the works of Hecataeus, and he alludes to him. That he used him but rejected his theories we may infer from his pages. But the charge of plagiarism, made against him in connection with book II particularly and elaborated by Sayce, who tries to prove that Herodotus "drew without scruple on the works of the writer he desired to supersede", depends upon the assumption that those who first made it, - it is quoted by Eusebius from Porphyry - knew for certain that it was the genuine Hecataeus that they held in their hands - something by no means sure. The whole point is of some importance, for if Herodotus borrowed freely without acknowledgment in Book II, he may have borrowed elsewhere. Many scholars, however, have held the view that the genuine "Πέρισσος Ἔλεγχος" of Hecataeus perished early, and that the borrowings are borrowings not by Herodotus but from Herodotus on the part of a forger in the third century B.C. An answer to the whole question is put forward by How and Wells. If there were

(1) cf. II, 21; II, 15-16
(2) "Herodotus" XXI seq.
(3) "Commentary on Herodotus", PP. 25-6.
an easily accessible prose literature in the fifth century at Athens or Samos, Herodotus certainly ought to have studied it; perhaps he did so. But in view of his own silence and of the uncertainty of the connections traced between him and his predecessors, it is more natural to conclude that he collected the mass of his information, apart from poetry, by word of mouth, when he could not use his own eyes. Had his sources been largely literary, we should have had clearer evidence of the fact. Herodotus was too successful a writer to be popular; many would have been eager to point out his obligations."

There is, however, one kind of evidence that Herodotus certainly used. In some way that we cannot explain, he obtained access to Persian official documents from which the list of Persian satrapies, for instance, in his third book, must have come. We know too, for he tells us, that there were great collections of oracles in the temples. Obviously, the responses so eagerly sought after would be carefully kept by those who gave them, if only in their own interest, and a collection of oracles would be a source from which the enquirer could write the history of the past, partly as it had been, still more as the keepers of the oracle wished men to think it had been. He must have consulted the lists of kings and priests which were the beginning of the Greek secular official records—the Spartan kings he lists twice. (1)

With regard to oral tradition, it is usually accepted that Herodotus depended upon it for most of his evidence. The fact that he names only six of his informants by no means

(1) VII,204; VIII,152.2.
implies that these were all. The fact that his evidence was largely of this sort had an important effect upon the character of his narrative, causing him to represent the popular traditions of the past, whether of Egypt, of Persia or of Greece, as he learnt them from the various races with whom he achieved contact.

Finally, Herodotus made use of archaeological evidence; of course he had not the wealth of opportunities that presents itself to the modern historian of the past, to investigate and check. Ancient Greece carried on no excavation on a scientific basis whatsoever; even the few facts that came to light upon the purging of the tombs at Delos were purely incidental. But there were temples and monuments of various sorts in every land that could be consulted and we may be sure that Herodotus made full use of them. Indeed he is far more free in mentioning the works of art or other objects from which he derived, or in connection with which he heard the stories that make up his work, than in naming his actual informants. There is hardly a country within the wide range of his travels, to whose monuments he does not refer. For Hellenic lands it is impossible to give a complete list, but besides innumerable offerings at Delphi, Samos, and elsewhere, there were Spartan fetters and the manger of Mardonius at Tegea; (1) prows of Samian ships at Aegina; (2) offerings of Croesus at Thebes; (3) trophies celebrating a victory over Thebes and Chalcis in Athens; (4) and many others. In countries outside Hellas,

(1) I, 164; IX, 70
(2) III, 59, 5
(3) I, 52, 92
(4) V, 77, 4
Herodotus mentions: in Lydia, the tomb of Alyattes (1) and an inscribed boundary stone of Croesus (2). In Palestine, the temple of Melcarth at Tyre (3); in Babylon, the tomb of Nito-cris (4) and the temple of Bel (5); in Egypt, the manuscripts of Amasis (6) and the tombs of Isiris and the Saite kings near Memphis (7); the Pyramids (8), and the Labyrinth and Lake of Moeris (9); in Scythia, tombs of the kings (10); at Byzantium, the bowl of Pausanias (11) and inscriptions of Darius (12); in Thrace, lake dwellings (13); at Cyrene, statues sent by Amasis and Ladice (14); at Metapontum, a statue to Aristeas (15).

Available though all these mines of information were to the historian, yet it must be remembered that Herodotus could not read inscriptions in any foreign language, and was at the mercy of his guides.

With his evidence now before us, let us see how Herodotus made use of it. We have already said that as far as the mythical period of Greek history was concerned, he accepts the epics as fact, practically without question. Homer is to him a witness who does not "contradict himself" under ordinary circumstances. He regards the whole age as the historic background for subsequent events. He represents Greek history as beginning with a period of great migrations, and Greek civilization as due to foreign influences! At the same time, Herodotus realizes a difference between historic and prehistoric

(1) I.93 (2) VIII.30,2 (3) II.44,2 (4) I.187 (5) I.181,185 (6) II.175 (7) II.169,170 (8) II.101,2; 125-7; 134; 156; 149 (9) II.148-9 (10) IV.71,1 (11) IV.81,3 (12) IV.87,1 (13) V.16 (14) II.182,1, 181,5 (15) IV.15,4
periods. He contrasts Minas and Palyocrates as belonging to different categories. (1) Moreover, in spite of his acceptance of the myths, he can not, as we have mentioned above, forbear to rationalize them by changing the elements of the marvellous which they contain into commonplace matter of fact; a tendency which came to be fully established in the next generation.

When Herodotus treats of the historical period, however, his point of view undergoes a change. He handles his subject differently. He immerses himself in the actual as far as he can, realizing that history is a matter of evidence. Hence his anxiety to record accepted traditions, and where possible the origin of divergent accounts, with the reasons or proofs urged on both sides. Thus, when speaking of Egypt, he makes a distinction between the description of the land and people that depends mainly on his own observations and inquiries, and their past history, drawn in the main from the reports of the Egyptians. Where, moreover, authorities conflict, though Herodotus occasionally comes to some decision on his own account, more often than not he leaves the problem to his readers, quoting both sides. But it must be admitted that this general reticence does not save him from a biased acceptance of Athenian tradition. These attempts at weighing evidence give him, nevertheless, some claim to be called the first critical historian, grasping as he has the principles that eye-witnesses are all important - when reliable - and that it is necessary to put all evidence to test. This point

(1) III.122,2
with regard to Herodotus' critical ability is often overlooked. One must give full credit to him for recognizing these principles of criticism, unsatisfactory and sporadic though his application of them is. "They are maxims of permanent validity; properly qualified they lie at the basis of the modern development of what is called historical methodology."{(1)}

On the great question of how far he was accurate, it must be remembered that a writer's accuracy depends on two things, apart from his memory, of course: on his own conscience in describing what he has himself seen and what he has learnt from others by careful and particular enquiry, and on the conscience of those who report to him what he could not see and cannot verify. As for the latter stipulation, there can, of course, be no answer. We are aware that Herodotus was dependent to a very great extent on guides, priests and informants of every sort and we can only check their reliability by our own knowledge of today, and trust where we cannot check to the common sense of our author and of ourselves. With regard to Herodotus' conscience we can speak, I think, more surely. True, certain scholars, of whom Professor Sayce is a good representative, dismiss Herodotus, first as inaccurate and then as a liar, but one does not read far into the works of other moderns before one discovers an entirely different estimate of the historian. Mr. G. B. Grundy, speaking of Herodotus and military matters, finds him "eminently unmilitary himself" and "peculiarly liable to misunderstand the information at his disposal," but "his painful conscientiousness

{(1) Bury, "Ancient Greek Historians," P.71.}
seems to be genuine, not fictitious," (1) and "he brought to bear upon his material a certain amount of critical acumen which the extreme simplicity of his narrative has a tendency to conceal." (2) In the words of T. R. Glover, "Anyone who will read Herodotus until he knows him with real intimacy will find it hard to bear with patience the suggestion that he is other than the most candid and truthful of men."

The historian had no lack of critics among the ancient world. Thucydides' rather contemptuous attitude is well known. He accuses him of inaccuracy and proceeds to correct him on more or less minor points in a most severe fashion, but his most caustic criticism is in his famous phrase: "Very likely the non-mythical character of my narrative may be disappointing to the ear. My history is a possession for ever, not a prize composition which is heard and forgotten!" (1)

Later on Strabo speaks contemptuously of Herodotus' geography as being less reliable than Homer's; (2) some of it was indeed very wrong, but in at least one instance the older writer was correct, against Strabo.

The most famous of ancient attacks on Herodotus was made by Plutarch, who wrote an essay on his 'Malignity'. Herodotus, he tells us, loves to tell us ill reports of peoples in wanton zest of abuse, and to omit what is good about them; he damns with faint praise; where there are several accounts he prefers the worst; he is a lover of Barbarians and suggests that Greeks learnt their religion from them; he calls the

(1) Grundy, "Great Persian War," P.375
(2) Ibid, P.266
burning of Sardis the beginning of trouble, when it was a stroke for freedom; he bitterly slanders Thebes, but "he can write and his story is pleasant; there is grace and cleverness and bloom upon his tales; he charms and seduces everybody."

According to T. R. Glover, "the general verdict seems to be that Plutarch this time has written himself down an ass, (unless the tract is spurious, which plea is rejected), and that the whole thing is a monument of critical incompetence, based on absurd patriotism and a false conception of history."[1]

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, on the other hand, has better things to say about his townsman. He compares Herodotus favourably with Thucydides. "Herodotus chose a more attractive subject, victory rather than defeat; he showed more judgment in knowing where to begin and where to leave off, what to put in and what to omit; he chose to vary his story in the Homeric way, imitating Homer, and indeed, if we take his book we enjoy it to the last syllable and always wish for more, while Thucydides rarely attempts variety; and Dionysius finds Thucydides' chronology boring; then Herodotus has the kindlier disposition, while Thucydides has a grudge against his country. Both are great writers, Herodotus the superior in character drawing and natural writing, Thucydides in pathos and in cleverness of style. The beauty of Herodotus is bright and happy; that of Thucydides terrible." (2)

Longinus, too, a far stronger and surer critic, supports Dionysius' judgment that Herodotus "chose to vary his

[1] "Herodotus", P.72
story in the Homeric way." (1) "Herodotus most Homeric" is the phrase he uses.

Some of the charges against Herodotus suggest their own answers; some of them are more or less true. Space does not permit us to discuss all these criticisms in detail, but let us take one of them and see what conclusions we reach concerning it; Plutarch's remark, for example, that Herodotus "bitterly slandered Thebes;" for Herodotus' impartiality has often been attacked by more modern critics.

As a general rule, Herodotus' fairness and impartiality can be relied upon; a striking proof of which is his attitude to foreigners and enemies. He is free from the ordinary contempt of the Greek for Barbarians; he extols the maritime and engineering skill of the Phoenicians; (2) the monuments of Egypt and Babylon; (3) the natural products of the ends of the earth; (4) He derives coinage from Lydia; (5) measurement of time from Babylon; (6) and the Greek alphabet from Phoenicia; (7) he exaggerates the debt of Greece to Egypt and to Africa; (8) This freedom from national prejudice shows itself also in his generous estimate of the Persians; he emphasizes their truthfulness, (9) and devoted loyalty, and ascribes their defeat to inferiority in arms and discipline, not to lack of valor.

Just as the historian is quick to recognize the merits of the enemy, so he is cautious in praising his own

(1) Longinus, 13, 3; (2) VII.23, 3, 44; 99, 3; (3) I.93, 2; (4) III.106-114; (5) I.94; (6) II.109, 3; (7) V.58; (8) IV.180-189; (9) I.136, II.153, 1; (10) III.128, 4; 154-5; VIII.118, 3; (11) How and Wells, "Commentary on Herodotus", P.38.
countrymen unduly, "refusing to see a hero in every professed patriot." (11) This has drawn down upon his head the fierce denunciation of Plutarch, as we have seen above, who absurdly accuses him of diminishing the glory of Marathon by underestimating the number of the slain, and of Artemision by representing it as a drawn battle - all of which merely pays tribute without the author's knowledge or desire to Herodotus' good sense and critical judgment.

Unblinded though Herodotus might be by the glamour of patriotism, yet he did not entirely escape the influence of the political sympathies of his day. His very simplicity predisposed him to place a ready confidence in his authorities, and to accept as trustworthy current stories and beliefs; a weakness which frequently led him to become the mirror of Athenian prejudice. But he did not wholly surrender his judgment. Surely, he does right in extolling the 'freedom' which encouraged her citizens to devote their whole energy to her service, (1) in backing their claim to be considered the saviors of Hellas, (2) - this last is a noble defense, and it is true. Herodotus had not travelled the world in vain; he could form a shrewd and sound judgment on world politics; "our old historian's greatness shines in this passage, not least for his resolute candour in putting forward an unpopular truth." (3)

We can pardon a somewhat natural desire to exaggerate the valour of the Athenians at Marathon, contrasted with the proverbial slowness of Sparta. The most elaborate praises of Athens (4) would seem to be reminiscent of the funeral orations

(1) V.78 (2) VII.139,2 (3) T.R. Glover, "Herodotus" P.35 (4) VII.161,3; IX.27
in the Ceramicus, and are suitably put into the mouths of Attic orators. But if Herodotus is ready to praise, he is equally ready if need arise to censure. He represents the Athenian people as suffering tyranny gladly and as duped by the childish trick of Pisistratus; (1) he condemns their cruelty to the Persian heralds, (2) and implicitly their retention of the Aeginean hostages; (3) he tells us that Athens set the example of appealing to Persia, (4) and admits that up to the day of Marathon there were waverers within the army and traitors within her walls. (5)

Of all Athenian statesmen, Themistocles suffers most in Herodotus' pages. The creation of the great navy and the plan of fighting at sea he could not deny him, but he makes no mention of his Long Walls. Moreover, the final decision to fight at Salamis is ascribed in part to the advice of Mnesiphilus, (6) and the glory of the victory is dimmed by the victor's attempt to secure himself a refuge at the Persian court. (7) Themistocles' "crooked ways," his deals in money, his footing in both camps, his extortion, revolted the simple-minded, candid nature from across the Aegean. (8) Herodotus represents, in fine, the ambition of a great leader as mere self-seeking, his cleverness as cunning, (9) while his greed for gain is exaggerated (10) and emphasized by contrast with the nobleness of Aristides, whom he held "to have been the best and most upright of all the Athenians." (11)

(1) I. 60, 3 (2) VII. 133, 2 (3) VI. 86 (4) V. 73
(5) VI. 109, 5 (6) VIII. 57 (7) VIII. 109, 5
(8) T. R. Glover, "Herodotus", P. 33 (9) VIII. 110
(10) VIII. 4, 5, 112 (11) VII. 79
However wrong and even absurd Plutarch's accusations against Herodotus are, he makes a good point when he represents him as being too harsh in his treatment of Thebes and Corinth. Among the states that fought at Salamis, Corinth played no inglorious part, as Herodotus himself records; yet he represented the Corinthian admiral, Adimantus, as having to be bribed by Themistocles to fight at Artemisium, (1) and also as his chief opponent in the Greek councils of war.

Yet more striking is the difference in the weight of the severity he employs in dealing with the states that "Medized." Thebes he assailed almost with malice; the four hundred men she sends to Thermopylae go and remain only under compulsion. (2) Herodotus will not accept the plea later put forward by the Thebans, that their Medizing was brought about by a narrow clique, and not by the whole people; and he makes the oligarchic leader, Timagenidas, declare that the whole state Medized, (3) and insists on the zeal of the Thebans for the Persians. (4)

On the other hand, with the faults of Thessaly and Argos Herodotus deals gently. Although without a doubt the Thessalian princes had been foremost in advising the intervention of Persia, (5) and the whole people had gone over to Xerxes on his arrival, yet in their case he admits the very plea that he denies to the Thebans, namely that the nobles alone were to blame for the betrayal, and the people did but

(1) VII.5,2 (2) VII.222 (3) IX.87 (4) IX.40,67 (5) VII.6,2; 130,3; IX.1
submit to necessity, when the Greeks, by refusing to defend Tempe, abandoned Thessaly to the Barbarian. Even more astonishing is the case of Argos. The Argives warned Mardonius of Pausanias' march against him; (1) indeed the very circumstance of their neutrality was a proof that they had Medized (2) further confirmed as it was later on by the reception accorded at Susa to the Argive embassy by Artaxerxes. (3) Yet Herodotus inclines to accept the Argive apology, with its insistence on gloomy oracles and on the unjust claims of Sparta to hegemony. (4)

Withal, however, Herodotus does not conceal his opinion that Argos' dealings with the Persian were a stain on its honour, palliated only by the misdoings of others, (5) and he has a few praises for Corinth and Thebes. Twice the Corinthians foil unjust Spartan projects for the enslavement of Athens; (6) once they reconcile Athens and Thebes; (7) in the Persian war they contribute large contingents both to the fleet (8) and to the army, (9) and at Mycale behave with distinguished gallantry. (10) At Plataea the cavalry of Thebes showed conspicuous valour (11) and Timagenidas, their leader, engages in an act of self-sacrificing patriotism. (12)

We may come to the conclusion that if occasionally there are traces of malice or calumny in the work of Herodotus, they come rather from an over-faithful reproduction of the stories told him, than from any native malignity; his own

(1) IX.12,2 (2) VIII.73,3 (3) VII.150,1 (4) VII.148,4 (5) VII.152; VIII.73 (6) V.75,92 (7) VI.108,6 (8) VIII.1,1; 43 (9) IX.28,3 (10) IX.105 (11) IX.67-9 (12) IX.97,2
judgments are just, sincere, and even generous; the bent of
his mind is towards excess rather than defect of charity.

The question of the impartiality of Herodotus is
largely a moral one; the criticisms of his intellectual fail-
ings may be more briefly stated. In the first place, his
history is too theological. "It is written, at any rate in
part, to point a moral, and is a sermon on the text 'Pride
goeth before a fall'." (1) "In his case the religious machin-
ery is not, as with Liny's prodigies, a mere ornament to
emphasize a striking point; it is essential to the narrative."
"It may well be said that literary art with Herodotus is
largely a means of religious teaching. The history of nations
is but the grand stage on which may be seen the workings of
divine Providence." (2) We have mentioned above that Herodo-
tus partook of the questioning spirit of his age, but all his
rationalistic criticism did not lead him to deny either the
existence of the gods or their intervention in human affairs.
Yet while the manifestations of divine power occur almost as
frequently as in Homer, the gods are further removed from men;
there is less personal caprice and more unity in their action.
But Herodotus found it difficult to justify the ways of God to
men! He shared the half-conscious pessimism of the masses who
could not rise to the ethical conceptions of Aeschylus and
Pindar, and were oppressed by the apparent injustices of the
world. It was inevitable that he should resign himself to
accept those facts that were beyond his mortal comprehension
and understanding.

(1) How & Wells, "Commentary", P. 45
(2) " " P. 48
The second fault we find in Herodotus is that he had a foolish fondness for the marvellous, and even his contemporaries made a joke of it! (1) Especially in the matter of numbers is this accusation a true one; his estimate of the Persian army, though considerably lower than the general Greek estimate, is still hopelessly exaggerated. The truth is that Herodotus had seen so many real wonders that he was prepared to accept others on mere hearsay; wonders that have since been shown to be unfounded on fact. It is too much to expect that he should have escaped becoming the butt of humorous or malicious persons of his own and succeeding generations, though some of his stories are now used by anthropologists as most valuable materials in the reconstruction of the primitive history of mankind.

A third count we may make against him is his lack of a chronological framework. He never attempted to grapple with this difficulty in Greek history, although many of the episodes which he related raise the problem of synchronizing Hellenic traditions with oriental records. The historical perspective of his story is thus frequently distorted, the most famous instance being the story of Solon and Croesus. (2) Such dates as he does give may be safely said to have been copied without investigation from the work of some earlier writer, Dionysius of Miletus, Charon, or more likely Hecataeus.

As for the contradictions in the works of Herodotus, of which some writers make much, they are bound to occur in a

(1) cf. Aristophanes' 'Birds', 1130 with II.127; I.4
(2) I.29 seq.
work drawn, as the history is, from many sources, and written at many times in many places. A far more serious charge is his failure to appreciate and to trace the real causes and relation of events. Herodotus continually confuses the mere occasion and the cause. He is always stressing personal activity and motive, and seems to understand little of the great movements of which people are the only expression. In fact, with Herodotus everything is personal, as is illustrated by the dramatic way in which he tells his story. To him is due the custom of putting imaginary speeches into the mouths of real persons; a custom that has prevailed so long in history both ancient and modern. The tendency to throw character into a story was an innate part of Greek dramatic genius, a heritage from the age of the epics; it has been well said that the beginnings of the Greek novel are to be found in Herodotus, but interesting as this may be from the literary point of view, its fictional attractions impair his historical value.

To conclude, let us look at the success Herodotus’ history has achieved. Apparently it took a leading place at once in Greek literature, and certainly it has been the occasion of fierce debate ever since, wherever classical literature has been studied. In ancient times, apart from the parodies of Aristophanes, which are good proof of the familiarity of the history to Athenian audiences, Thucydides’ attitude is sufficient evidence. Though he did not like his predecessor and underestimated his work, nevertheless he wrote his own history to continue that of the other, from the capture of Sestos. Xenophon pays Herodotus the compliment of imitating his
phrases. Ephorus, Aeneas, Tacticus, and others, in the 4th century, made use of him. All the attacks upon the history by such men as Ctesias, Manetho, Plutarch and Lucian, the history has survived. More recent attacks it continues to survive. To recognize Herodotus' weaknesses is only to say that history with him was not born complete and at once. His merits far outweigh his defects, as has been said already. He really did attempt to test various kinds of evidence, and to estimate their degrees of value, a principle at the very foundation of history. He was the first to construct a long and elaborate narrative, in which many parts are continued in due subordination and arrangement to make one great whole. Lastly, he is one of the great story-tellers of mankind. To him all can be forgiven, for he is never dull. This gift that appears the easiest, is in reality the rarest, and in his case the merit is all the greater because he was a pioneer. In the words of T. E. Glover, "If he used to the full, if he transcended the means and opportunities that lay to his hand, if by some inspired combination of hard work and intuition, he can recreate the foreign or the ancient scene, and give it to you with the people talking, planning, thinking and emphatically alive all the time; if in addition his honesty is such as to enable you to check his statements, and sometimes from his data to seize a truer interpretation of his reported facts than he has given; if throughout he is human, and makes humanity mean more and more to you as you live with him, then he has surely some strong claim to be called a historian." (1)

(1) T. E. Glover, "Herodotus", P. 49.
The first four books of Herodotus' history are not so pertinent to our essay. The first deals with the Lydians and the Persians; the second with the Egyptians; the third with the Persians again; and the fourth with the Libyans and Scythians. Nevertheless, what account of the Greeks can he gleaned from this maze of information, we will discover, marshal and discuss.

Herodotus' intention was to narrate the history of the Persian war, but he did not begin there. He went back several generations into what even to him were remote, uncertain times – times which, nevertheless, afforded historical events to record and preserve for posterity. An account of the old days of Greece could not but be relevant to the historic Persian epoch. Peoples must be known to the reader before their wars can interest him; to know one generation he must know several. Herodotus, realizing this fact, set himself the task of discovering to his readers the history of these generations, that their peoples might live before them, and their traditions be made known. Expansiveness is the mark of true history. If in truth "the Greek race was of one blood, and one speech, with temples of the gods in common, common sacrifices and ways of like kind," it was part of the task of the historian to show something of these ideas and "ways of like kind." Herodotus saw the need, undertook to supply it to the best of his ability and did not shirk his self-imposed duty. But it must be remembered that his authorities were few and uncertain. Stories that he preserves, of Spartan wars with Iegea, for example, or of Periander's family, and his colonies, are, in all probability,
a matter of folk-memory. Moreover, into all his stories there steals an anachronistic element, a flavour of his own day, which history, indeed, rarely seems to escape. But after all, such stories are again and again our only chance of recapturing history, and we must take them as they are written. Yet when we come to examine what we have of history or of story before the opening of the Persian war, we realise how much more we would like to have. With the exception of Lycurgus and the migrations, Herodotus has little to tell us of historical events before 700 B.C., and naturally his information is fuller for the sixth century than for the seventh. Many facts of the earlier day he merely alludes to. Of these we will speak later on in their turn as we review chronologically the information that he does afford us.

Herodotus knew the tradition of the sea empire of the Cretans and accepted it, though he went further than modern scholars are prepared to go when he recorded Minos — were he man or god — as having had a real existence, and furnished him with ancestors, by name. He had heard also from Cretans of his own day, at Praesos, of the great disaster which overtook the island; and that subsequently, "to Crete, thus destitute of inhabitants — other men, and especially the Grecians, went and settled." (1) The men of Praesos were no doubt foreshortening history by crystallising a process into a single event; but the tradition was there, and it contained a measure of truth. We know today that Herodotus' account of Minos' thalassocracy is substantially correct; that Crete was once a supreme power.

(1) VII.171
in the Mediterranean world; we know, likewise, that her de-
struction was sudden and complete, for the Minoan kingdom did
not fall from over-ripeness and decay; its civilization was
fatally arrested in full strength and growth. But the Minoans
were not Greeks, and it is not necessary to take into account
the earlier Minoan factor, except to mention that it had done
its work in profoundly affecting, if not creating Achaean
culture, which must next concern us. In Homer the Minoan
element has no independent existence and it can hardly be
possible to distinguish any special influence on later Greece.
The Achaeans, however, claim more of our attention.

The culture of the Achaeans overlaid that of the
Minoans, which had flourished in mainland Greece among the men
of Mycenae and Tiryns. Greek was the language of these new
lords, whether the people of the Cretan culture on the mainland
had previously spoken Greek or a cognate language, or not. They
were an invading military race, who came overland from the
north; a pastoral, fighting folk of chieftains and retainers.
Seeking adventure and plunder, some stayed in the sunny South,
establishing themselves in the Argolid, Laconia, and elsewhere,
and took wives from the daughters of the native princes - as
Pelops wedded Hippodamia - ever a favourite way for an intruder
to strengthen his position. Inheriting the art and wealth of
the Minoans whom they succeeded, but small in numbers and rul-
ing a much larger subject population, they came to live in
fortified castles, living by the side of their serfs, the
tillers of the soil, yet having little in common with them
beyond the collecting of their dues. This subject people was
known to the ancient Greeks and is known to us by the name of Pelasgians. Herodotus seems to use the term to indicate that portion of the population which claimed to have been in the country before the fresh element that produced Hellenism came in. (The only true Hellenes, according to him, were the Dorians.) (1) So we find the following peoples are Pelasgians: Aeolians, (2) Arcadians, (3) Argines, (4) Athenians, (5) Dodonaean, (6) It will be seen that these are the peoples which, according to tradition, had changed least. Herodotus clearly meant by 'Pelasgi' the Greeks in an undeveloped stage. This may be seen especially in VIII.44, where he traces the changes of names, not of race, among the 'unchanged' Attic population. Unfortunately Herodotus confuses these theoretical Pelasgi with the real people of that name, when he argues that all the 'Pelasgi' were 'barbarians' in speech because those on the Hellespont were so. (7) It should be noted, on the other hand, that he assumes the contrary in II.52, where he makes "Ωκεανος" a Pelasgian word. But how easy the confusion was, may be seen by the fact that Thucydides also uses 'Pelasgian' in two quite different senses: first, for the primitive inhabitants of Greece; second, for contemporary barbarians. (9) One special development of the Pelasgian theory in ancient times should be mentioned separately. They were identified with the Tyrrenians or Tyrsenians, and so with the Etruscans. This combination appears first in

(1) I.56  (2) VII.95  (3) I.46; VII.78  (4) II.171  
(5) I.56-7; VIII.44  (6) II.50  (7) I.57  
(8) Thucydides' 'History', I.3  (9) Ibid, IV.109
Hellanicus (fr. I.F.H.G. 145) who states that the Pelasgi, being compelled by the Greeks, settled in Italy, changed their name to Tyrseni, and founded Etruria. That the Etruscans came from the east is very probable. What may be taken as certain is that barbarian tribes called Tyrrenhians and Pelasgians were neighbours in the north-west Aegean. Most of the modern theories as to the Pelasgians agree in making the name racial, whether they call them Semites, Illyrians, or Mycenaeans. (1) But in this regard the words of Grote (2) are as true today as when they were written: "If any man is inclined to call the unknown ante-Hellenic period of Greece by the name of Pelasgic, it is open for him to do so. But this is a name—no way of enlarging our insight into real history. We may without impropriety apply the remark of Herodotus, that 'the man who carries his story into the invisible world, passes out of the range of criticism.'"

The Pelasgians, then, whatever their origin, became the subjects of the invading Achaeans. By the time of the Trojan war the whole population of Greece was Achaeanized, although in some districts, such as Attica and Arcadia, less thoroughly than in others. Homer's epic is the account of a great quarrel that arose between two houses of these warlike chieftains, the houses of Atreus and Laomedon, which involved their vassals, interrupted their predatory and exploratory voyages, and led to post-war disorders at home. Herodotus' feeling with regard to Homer and the story of the Trojan war has been noticed in a previous paragraph. He took the Iliad

(1) But see Walter Leaf in "Troy", ch. VII, who (continued page 33)
for history and Homer for his model. The historical value of
the epics has also been touched upon, and indeed the whole sub-
ject has been so much written about from so many angles and by
so many authors that a long discussion here would be superflu-
ous. Suffice it then to say that in time the wounds of warfare
were healed, and in classical Greece we see the results of the
mingling of two unusually gifted races, one autochthonous, the
other immigrant — the former contributing the tradition and
technical skill of a highly advanced native civilisation, the
latter its heritage of Aryan institutions, power of coordina-
tion, and an all-conquering language.

There remains only one more episode to review in this
shifting of the peoples, the Dorian invasion. A Dorian him-
self, Herodotus identified the Dorians with the Hellenes, and
it is one of the paradoxes of early Greek ethnology that these
peoples, who came south last and from farther north than even
the Aeolic peoples, are confidently described as being in the
fullest sense "children of Hellen." Hellas was originally a
district in Thessaly, closely connected with and ruled
by Achilles, (1) whose followers were Myrmidons and Hellenes.
(2) But in the Catalogue it is also used as a general name.
'Hellas' was already used in a general sense by Archilochus and
Hesiod, (3) i.e., in the 7th century, and had become estab-
lished in this sense before 580 B.C. Thucydides describes the
transition from the special to the general sense. (4) The

(1) ll. IX.395 (2) ll. II.684 (3) Strabo, 1370
(4) I.3
adoption of the name may be connected with the spread of Dorian influence. Herodotus' account of the Dorians in I.56,145, with VII.43 and 73, is interesting as showing that the story of the Dorian invasion was fully developed in his time. He assumes its main points, and even refers to details. (1) That the Dorian invasion was an undoubted fact is almost universally accepted; though see Beloch (R.M. XIV) for the contrary. It was an invasion, connected with the Phrygian migration (2) of southern Greece, by ruder tribes, in all probability of mixed race, from the north or north-west, which swept away the Achaean civilization after the Homeric age, infusing a new element into Greece, which stood lower in the scale of art and thought than the Achaean. The conquest was gradual and may have been assisted by the discontented elements in the Peloponnesus. Why it should have been called Dorian is a difficult question. Herodotus says that the name was not given to the invaders till after they had reached the Peloponnesus. (3)

It was not, therefore, a primitive name of the invaders as a whole. The probability is that like the names Ionian and Aeolian, it came from Asia Minor, from a district called Doris, which included originally the islands of Cos, Rhodes, other smaller ones near, Cuidos, Halicarnassus, and one or two other towns on the mainland. It was assumed by Sparta and her neighbours for political reasons, exactly as the Ionian was assumed by Athens. Hence it is that the Greeks themselves could give us no general account of the meaning of the word Dorian. On

(1) cf. VI.52; IX.26,3 (2) Herodotus, "History", VII.73 (3) I.56
the mainland it included Spartans (with Messenians), Corinthians, Argines, Megarians, and excluded Eleans, Aetolians and Phocians, though their dialects were akin, and though, moreover, the Aetolians who occupied Elis had been among the invaders. Of the details of the invasion, it must be frankly admitted that we know nothing. It was part of a series of movements; Thucydides connects it, though not causally, with the conquest of Boeotia, and it may have led to the migration to Asia Minor. That it took place all at once, as Herodotus implies, is most unlikely; whether, too, any great mass of the colonists came from the north of the Peloponnesus, as stated by Herodotus and by Strabo—though with variations—is very uncertain. However, though we do not know the details of the invasion, we know its results. It marked the end of the Achaean dominion which had endured for nearly two centuries. But the Achaean name left a memory. On the mainland, as Herodotus tells us, a remnant of the Acheans held together, and fought their way into possession of the northern coastline of the Peloponnesus, which henceforth was called by their name though the inhabitants preserved no marked individual character, and spoke a dialect practically the same as that of their neighbours. In the colonies the name wholly vanished, absorbed in the new classification of Aeolian, Ionian and Dorian. But even here we can trace a faint survival of the old order of things. The kingship of the old families did not die out at once; the traces of it in the historical age are not the less significant because they are purely a mark of honour and divorced from any political function.

(1) I.2,3 (2) I.145 (3) I.45 (4) 385
The Doric invasion led, then, to the next great period, the age of Greek colonization. It was of course by no means the beginning of Greek settlements on the eastern side of the Aegean. The Achaeans, in their initial migration, had been naturally drawn thither. Lesbos and the more northerly section of the Asiatic coast had been taken possession of by settlers from Thessaly and Boeotia, while others were filtering into the cities lying along the coast further south. But the Doric invasion gave the movement new impetus, and before long the rich central portion of the coast, where afterwards some of the most important cities of the Greek world flourished—Ephesus, Miletus, Smyrna—was being occupied by settlers from Attica and the Peloponnesus; and by the 8th century Ionia had become the most prosperous and civilized portion of Hellas. In the next two centuries, Hellas was to become still more widely extended by a new movement, to which, for the sake of distinction, the name of secondary colonization is given. Many cities were concerned in it; some in Asia Minor, as, for example, Miletus, at this time the foremost city of Greece; some on the mainland, such as Corinth and Megara, and Chalcis and Eretria in Euboea. These cities began to send out settlers to colonize advantageous sites along the coast of the Eunine or the Mediterranean. Many were the important towns thus founded: Byzantium, B.C. 666; Syracuse, 734 B.C.; Corcyra; Sybaris, 721 B.C.; Massilia, Cyrene, etc. In time, colonies sent out other colonies in their turn, as, for example, the city of Gume, founded from Chalcis, afterwards colonized a site not many miles away—Neapolis.
Before we notice in detail what Herodotus tells us of the history of the more important Greek sites, both mother and daughter, perhaps it would not come amiss to mention those other countries which, though closely connected both geographically and historically with Hellas, can not be discussed in this essay, owing to their non-Hellenic origins; namely, Epirus, Illyria, Paeonia, Thrace and Macedon. The Thracians, although a nation of great importance in the history of civilization, and speaking a dialect very similar to Greek, were known, even to their Greek neighbours, as Barbarians. The Macedonians, a most important people in Greek history, were not genuine Hellenes either, though their kings may have been of Greek descent. That they were, Herodotus believed, as he tells us in Bk. V.22. He says, "that these descendants of Perdiccas are Hellenes, as they themselves say, I happen to know myself, ---- and, moreover, the Hellanodicae, who manage the games at Olympia, decided that they were so," etc. Then, in Bk. VIII.139, he gives the descent of Alexander, and brings Perdiccas, the founder of the line, from Argos. But the Macedonian people seem to have been an Illyrian nation, or at least to have suffered deterioration by intermixture with the Illyrians. The Macedonian tongue does not appear to have any peculiar connection with the Doric dialect; hence Herodotus' otherwise unsupported statement that the Dorian and Macedonian (Macedonian) nations were originally identical, is not given much credence. According to other authors, Macednus is called the son of Lycaon, from whom the Arcadians were descended, or Macedon is the brother of Magnes, or a son of
Aeolus, according to Hesiod and Hellanicus.(1) But these are merely various attempts to form a genealogical connection between this semi-barbarian race and the rest of the Greek nation.

These peoples, therefore, can have no place in our investigation, save only where their history becomes the history of Hellas.

We now come to Herodotus' account of the early history of individual city states. The first four books of Herodotus' history deal largely, insofar as they deal with Greek history at all, with the Greeks in Asia Minor. They are introduced, even so, as a part of the history of Lydia rather than for themselves alone. Gyges of Lydia became king about 716 B.C., and soon after led an army against Miletus and Smyrna, and he took the lower town of Colophon. (2) Ardys, his son, took Priene and invaded Miletus. Sadyattes and Alyattes continued these attacks against the Asiatic Greek cities, but until the time of Croesus the Greeks remained free. (3) An earlier invasion of Cimmerians into Ionia was not a conquest of cities but only a plundering expedition, as Herodotus remarks. Croesus ascended the Lydian throne in 560 B.C. He attacked the Ephesians first, and then the other Ionian and Aeolian cities one by one, until he had subdued all the Hellenes in Asia, and forced them to pay tribute. With those in the islands, however, he formed friendships. When Croesus' own kingdom fell before Cyrus, the Mede, the Ionian Greeks sought to become Cyrus' subjects on the same terms as they had been subjects of his

predecessor, but their request was refused. They then prepared to resist him, and sent messengers to Sparta to ask for aid, which Sparta refused to give. Ionia, of course, was finally conquered by Cyrus, and the Greeks in the islands surrendered to him of their own accord. Under Cambyses, Cyrus' son, they remained in subjection, being regarded by that monarch as slaves inherited from his father, and he made use of them in his armies during his career of conquest.

This, then, with the exception of a brief description of the Ionian climate, is all we are told by Herodotus in the first four books of the History, of the Asiatic Greeks as a whole. But certain of the individual states had more or less unique experiences which he also relates. Among these, perhaps the most interesting were those of the Phocaeans and the people of Teos. When Cyrus sent his general Harpagos to subdue the Phocaeans, most of them, greatly grieved at the thought of subjection, 'drew down their sacred galleys to the sea, put into them their women and children, and all movable goods, the images out of the temples'—and sailed towards Chios. (1) Many and varied were their subsequent adventures, but finally they came to settle in Kyros, where, twenty years before, they had founded Alalia. While they were there, however, the Etruscans and Carthaginians made expeditions against them. The Etruscans at this time were at the height of their power. The occupation of Alalia was a direct challenge to them, and no doubt it was the common danger from the Greeks that led them to form a commercial treaty with the Carthaginians. (2) Although the Greeks

were, in the main, victorious in these encounters, they re­
moved eventually to Rhegium and thence to Oenotria, where they
settled at Eyle (Velia). This whole digression here is in­
valuable, as giving us our earliest evidence of the Barbarian
reaction in the west, which kept the Greeks out of Corsica and
west Sicily, and prevented the Mediterranean from becoming a
Greek lake.

The people of Teos had a similar, but not so advent­
urous an experience, which arose out of the same cause. For
rather than submit to Cyrus' general Harpagos, they left their
city and sailed to Thrace, where they refounded Abdera.

The history of Smyrna, too, is interesting. According
to Herodotus, Smyrna, before the end of the 8th century, was an
Aeolian city, but was taken from them by Ionians by a trick, as
a result of which the Aeolians were compelled to depart out of
the city, bag and baggage, and leave it in the hands of the
enemies. When the Lydians took it, it was, according to Strabo,
destroyed as a city and only inhabited "κω ριν η δον." (1)
The Lydian conquest was as a rule merciful, but Smyrna, command­
ing as it did the outlet of the Hermas Valley, was too formid­
able to be spared. Clazomenai was also attacked, as Herodotus
mentions, to secure this valley.

Herodotus' account of Miletus is concerned mainly with
its connection with the Lydian history of Asia Minor, as indeed,
as we have said, are most of his accounts of the other Greek
cities there. We are told of the attacks made upon it by
Gyges, Ladyattes, and Alyattes, which it successfully withstood

(1) XIV.1,37
due to the fact that it had 'command of the sea'; and of
Cyrus' friendly agreement with it, but little else. We can not
but deplore in every account, as well as that merely of Milet-
us, the omission of the detail, nay even of the broad outline,
that a modern historian would deem necessary in a history.
There is no mention of Ionian social or economic history, no-	hing of their literary history save the mention of Anacreon
of Teos. But in connection with the story of Miletus we re-
ceive a meagre account of its political history, when we learn
that Thrasybulus was despot of the city and a friend of Perian-
der, the tyrant of Corinth; Periander, a special guest-friend
of Thrasybulus, informed him beforehand of Alyattes' designs
against his city, and thus the tyrant was enabled to frustrate
them. This man, Periander, is introduced to us at greater
length, as we shall see, later. The eleven years' war that
Miletus carried on with the Lydian sovereigns, which lasted
from about 623 to 612 B.C., they waged with no other help than
that of the Chians, who came to their aid because the Milesians
had formerly assisted the Chians throughout the war with Ery-
thrai. Chios, commanding the sea approach to Erythrai,
was its natural enemy; it was also a rival of Samos, the per-
petual trade competitor of Miletus; hence the alliance of Mil-
etus and Chios was a natural one. We learn in Book IV (1)
that Olbia was founded from Miletus (we may place the date as
647 B.C.) and was the oldest colony beyond the Danube. Apart
from such scanty and scattered information, we learn little
more from the first four books of the History. When we discuss

(1) IV.78
later Herodotus and Greek despotism, we will take more notice of the historian’s list of the Ionian despots, who owed their power to Darius. (1) Until then let us turn to what Herodotus tells us of the Greeks in the islands.

We have already seen something of their history as a whole; that when Croesus conquered the Ionian Greeks he made friends with them, and they remained free until the conquest of Cyrus, when, fearing lest he subjugate them forcibly, they surrendered of their own accord. It remains for us, then, to look at the most important states individually, as far as we can learn anything about them from Herodotus, always bearing in mind that this is an account of the Greeks taken from the first four books only. It seems fitting to glean what we can from them separately, and try to complete our pictures later on, than to draw them complete at first with extracts taken from every part of the history. For the first four books are not a history of Greece at all, but of Barbary; and what Greek history enters into it is at best only an introduction to the dramatis personae, as it were, whose history commences in Bk. V. It is well to keep this in mind.

Herodotus knew Samos best. He spent some time there as a young man, as we have seen, and learned a good deal of its history. We have therefore quite a fair amount of material to review. Herodotus himself explains the disproportionate length of his account of it in I.60. The story of Samos comes to us wrapped around the tyrant Polycrates, and so, though we have postponed a discussion of Herodotus and Greek tyranny to a

(1) IV.157
later chapter, we find it necessary to consider this particular despot here. Polycrates, the son of Aeaces, became a despot about 532 B.C. He had risen against the government, and obtaining the rule had divided it at first with his two brothers. But later he slew one and drove out the other and ruled alone. The story of Polycrates' good fortune and his friendship with Amasis, together with the tale of the ring, is well known.

"Herodotus ignores the real reasons of the policy of Polycrates and gives us instead a story illustrating the Nemesis attendant on good fortune, which hides the treachery of Samos."\(^1\)

Amasis had endeavoured to protect Egypt, in accordance with the usual policy of the Saite dynasty, by forming a league of maritime states, but the desertion of Cyprus and the submission of the Phoenicians to the Persians changed the balance of power, and Polycrates went over to the side of the stronger. Even though he ignored all this, or perhaps did not fully realize its significance, Herodotus makes it clear \(^2\) that Polycrates was the real aggressor against Egypt. We are introduced to Polycrates in the midst of a civil war, in which the party opposing him has called in the Lacedaemonians to aid them.

"The Lacedaemonians prepared a force and made an expedition to Samos, as the Samians say, in repayment of former services, because the Samians had first helped them with ships against the Messenians. \(^3\) This passage is particularly interesting as the only definite reference in Herodotus to the Messenian wars. It supports the later tradition that the second Messenian war

\(^1\) How & Wells, "Commentary", P. 266.
\(^2\) Herodotus, Bk. I.44
\(^3\) Herodotus, III.47
had an international character, Argos, Arcadia, and Pisa being allies of Messenia, {1} and Elis, {2} Corinth, and Sicyon {3} of the Lacedaemonians. The Corinthians also took part with zeal in this expedition of Samos, for reasons which are accordingly set forth, but the chronology is inextricably confused. The 'insult' was about 560 B.C., and yet it is in the time of Periander, who died about 585 B.C. "Plutarch {4} puts the events 'three generations' before Polycrates and tells us from independent sources (Dion. of Chalcis. fl.c.350; fr.5. F.H.G. IV.396) that it was Chidians (not Samians) who restored the boys to Corcyra; he confirms this by an appeal to honours granted by Corcyra to Cnidus. Herodotus may have been misled by his Samian informants. The tyrant's brutality, however, may be accepted as fact, characteristic of the oriental leanings of the Cypselidae. {5} The Lacedaemonians and the Corinthians, then, had come with a great armament and were besieging Samos. Then follows an account of the siege which need not concern us. Suffice it to say that after forty days of ill success, they departed and left the Samians to their own devices. These, then, sailed away from Samos to Siphnos for money. Siphnos, one of the western Cyclades, was at that time at the height of its prosperity, we are told, and possessed more wealth than all the other islands. The Siphnians refused to lend the exiled Samians any money, and they took some from them by force as a fine. From the men of Hermione, next, the Samians bought the island of Hydrea and gave it in charge to the Traezenians, but

{1} Strabo. 362. {2} Strabo. 355 {3} Paus. IV.15,5 
{4} U.S.C. 22 {5} How & Wells, "Commentary" P.269
they themselves settled in Cydonia, in Crete, to drive the Zakynthians out. Here they lived for five years, but in the sixth the Aeginetans, with the help of the Cretans, conquered them. The mention of Aegina recalls to Herodotus a grudge the Aeginetans had against the people of Samos. The Samians, under the tyrant Amphicrates, had made an expedition against them and done them much hurt. Many chapters later, Herodotus resumes the story of Samos, and records the miserable death of Polycrates, who, in the historian's own words, "was the first of the Hellenes of whom we have any knowledge, who set his mind upon having command of the sea, excepting Minos the Cnossian, and any other who may have had command of the sea before his time; with whom, excepting those despots of the Syracusans, not one besides the Hellenic despots was worthy to be compared in magnificence." (1) When next Herodotus mentions Samos, we find Macandros despot, "having received the government as a trust from Polycrates", when he sailed away to visit Araites. This man is finally expelled from the island by the Persians, and Sylason, a Samian exile, is installed by them in his place. This is the sum of all Herodotus tells us of the political history of Samos. In addition, he records three great engineering feats which in his judgment surpassed any others that had been achieved by the Hellenes: an aqueduct, a mole and a temple. The aqueduct was discovered in 1882, and remains of the mole can still be seen about six feet below the surface of the harbour. With this we will leave Samos and turn our attention to the little we are told of other important islands, Cnidus.

(1) III.122,25.
Xanos, Aegina, Euboea, etc.

Cnidus is mentioned in several places by Herodotus. It was colonized by Sparta, according to him, but Strabo brings the Cnidians from Megara. (1) When Cyrus subdued the Ionian coast it surrendered to his general Harpagos.

Xanos first enters the history in the account of Pisistratus of Athens. Lygdamis, a man of Xanos, came to Pisistratus of his own accord, and showed very great zeal in providing both men and money. In return Pisistratus conquered Xanos, about 538 B.C., and after placing upon it certain Athenian youths, who were hostages for the good behavior of Athens, he delivered it into the charge of Lygdamis.

Aegina, we will remember, came into the story of Samos. The Aeginetans had a grudge against them because in the time of Amphicrates they had made war against them. They took vengeance later on the exiled Samians who had settled in Crete, by en-slaving them. Both of the previous acts of the Samians had been provocative to Aegina. The purchase of the island of Hydrea, which lay to the south of the Argolic peninsula, and the settling of Cydonia on the north-west coast of Crete, were probably part of a movement to isolate Aegina and extend the relations of the Corintho-Samian alliance. (2) The Aeginetans, resenting the trespass on their preserves, joined the Cretans in expelling the intruders, and secured their hold by a colony at Cydonia. (3) (For the friendly relations between Crete and Aegina, cf. the proverb: "κρητῆς πρός Αίγινην." )

(1) XIV.2,6  (2) Herodotus, V.1  (3) Strabo, 376
Our scanty references to these early wars in the Aegean all tend to establish the theory of the rivalry of two great trade-leagues: Miletus, Aegina, Megara, and Eretria, trading mainly with the north-east, ranged against Corinth, Samos, and Chalcis, whose chief sphere lay in the west.

The mention of Chalcis and Eretria brings us to the island of Euboea. As a matter of fact, nothing is said in the first four books of this island at all. But its principal cities, Chalcis and Eretria, played such an important part in the commercial history of the Greek world, and are so bound up with the 'early wars' referred to in the preceding paragraph, that to anticipate here is not very serious.

One of the most significant events of early Greek history, appears to have been the struggle between Eretria and Chalcis for the Lelantine plain of Euboea. The story is just recalled in Herodotus; Aristagoras persuaded the Eretrians to send five triremes to the aid of Miletus "for the Milesians in former times had borne with the Eretrians the burden of all that war which they had with the Chalcidians, at the time when the Chalcidians on their side were helped by the Samians against the Eretrians and Milesians." (1) The date of the war, upon the subject of which the whole Greek world, according to Thucydides, (2) was divided, is given variously as being at the beginning of the 8th or of the 7th centuries. Scholars have concluded that the division of the world for trading and colonizing purposes was connected with this cleavage of the Euboean

(1) I.99
(2) I.15
cities and their respective allies. Megara and Miletus had, at all events, a practical monopoly of the Black Sea, and lined it with colonies. Corinth and Samos looked westward.

Herodotus preserves some of the history of the western Greeks. We have a few references in Bks. I-IV, which are all we will touch upon for the present. We have already noted the voyages of the Phocaeans, and their importance. Herodotus rightly lays stress on their being 'openers-up', not the discoverers of the west. (cf. IV.153,2 for Samians in Tartessus.) Their activity gave the name 'Ionian' to the sea south of Italy. In the west, as we have seen, they came into violent contact with the Etruscans and the Carthaginians. It was the Carthaginians that kept the Greeks out of Sardinia, where Thales of Miletus had advised the Greeks to sail and to found a single city for all. (1) Corsica was already partly held by them. (2)

In the story of Arion and the dolphin, (3) we have mention of Italy and Sicily. Arion conceived a desire to sail thither and having acquired large sums of money, he set forth from Taras on a Corinthian ship. This story is interesting if for no other reason than that it shows that at the beginning of the 6th century at least there was constant passage of ships from the old world to the new; that then, as now, the new world held a glamour for those in the old.

Before we come to the history of the mainland Greeks, we will endeavour to find some trace of that of the Greeks in Africa and in the Black Sea area.

(1) Herodotus, I.170  (2) I.165
One very important event in the history of the Greeks in Africa was the founding of Cyrene, a story which is told at length in Herodotus, (1) but need only be noted briefly here. People from Lacedaemon colonized the island of Thera, and later on Theraeans, at the instruction of the Delphic oracle, made a settlement at the island of Platea off the north-African coast. There they dwelt for twenty years but without prospering, and finally they removed from Platea to the mainland of Libya, where they lived for six years at a spot opposite the island. At the end of that time they were induced to change their site by the Libyans, and about 630 B.C. founded Cyrene on the spot it was henceforth to occupy. There is no need to try to penetrate here the true details of the planting of Cyrene. Herodotus gives us the story as it was told in the 6th and 5th centuries, and it is evidence as to how Greeks looked at the world in the great formative period that led up to the Persian wars. Fifty-six years the colonists lived there, 'with the same number as when they first set forth,' under the rule of Battos and Arcesilaus, his son. But in the reign of the third kind, Battos the Prosperous, they set out, upon the injunction of the Delphic oracle, to settle Libya, together with great numbers of other Hellenes who came to them there. The Libyans appealed to Egypt for help, and Apries the Egyptian king marched against the Greeks but was defeated by them in two battles. After the death of Battos II, Arcesilaus, his son, became king. In his reign occurred the founding of Barca, which came about as the result of a quarrel with his brothers, that induced them finally to

(1) V.145
leave Cyrene and make a city of their own. At the same time they persuaded the Libyans to revolt from Cyrene. When Arcesilaus pursued the rebels, he was overwhelmingly defeated by them and subsequently slain by his brother Haliarchus. Battos, son of Arcesilaus, succeeded to the throne, but owing to his physical infirmities, a lawgiver was called in, upon the advice of the Delphic oracle, a certain Mantinean by the name of Demonan. This man divided the people into three tribes, one consisting of the Theraeans and their dependents, one of the Peloponnesians and Cretans, and a third of all the islanders. Then for the king he set apart domains of land, and priesthhoods, but the real power he turned over to the people. During the reign of this lame king the arrangement remained satisfactory, but when Arcesilaus III became king, he protested against it and asked to be given back the royal rights of his forefathers. After stirring up strife, he was exiled to Samos, and his mother to Cyprus. But Arcesilaus, returning with Samian forces, regained Cyrene. He began, however, to take vengeance on his enemies, and fearing assassination, removed to Barca, where he was nevertheless slain. Pheretime, the mother of Arcesilaus, who had meanwhile returned to Cyrene from Cyprus, fled to Egypt upon the death of her son, to ask Aryandes, the satrap, for aid, which he granted her. Herodotus remarks that this army was sent out not so much to avenge Pheretime's loss, but to subdue Libya. This expedition set out about 515 B.C. and laid siege to Barca. After nine months the Barcaeans surrendered. The terms they had made for their safety were disregarded by the victorious Persians, and Pheretime exacted her horrible vengeance. The
Persians then made an attempt to take Cyrene, but thought better of it and returned whence they had come. To this long and fairly full history of the Greeks in Libya, which covers, as may be noted, a period from about 650 B.C. to 515 B.C., Herodotus adds a description of the location of Cyrene and its harvests. Taken altogether it forms a continuous narrative of no little value, which compares favourably with any other account of the Hellenes in any one of the first four books.

As for the Hellenes in Egypt, they lived there from quite early times, chiefly for the purposes of trade. We can trace the fortunes of the adventurers from the time of the bronze men who appeared and ravaged the land, those first Dorians and Ionians whom Psamnetichus (664-610 B.C.) enlisted in his army, (1) to the Egyptian reaction under Amasis, (569-526 B.C.), the sagacious king who headed a nationalistic movement while he yet contrived to maintain and reestablish the foreigners in the land; who appeared to restrict the Greeks' privileges of trading where they pleased, to give them a "concession" at Xaucratis, (2) where a really important Greek city developed.

In the north, as we have mentioned, many Greek colonies sprang up, some destined to become of major importance in the Greek world. In this colonization, Megara and Miletus had a very large share. We have referred to the founding of Olbia by Miletus in 647 B.C.; of Abdera by men of Teos after Timesias of Clazamenae had founded and abandoned it. Chalcedonia and

(1) Herodotus, II.152 (2) Herodotus, II.178
Byzantium were both Megarian colonies; Byzantium being founded about 660 B.C. Sinope was refounded by Milesians in 630 B.C. and Irapezus was one of Sinope's daughter cities. Herodotus includes in his story of the conquests of Darius in this area, a description of the Bosphorus, the Propontis, and the Pontus, which, though he is strangely out in some of his measurements, is not without value. Other cities in that region are mentioned by him more or less in passing, and he gives nothing of their history.

Finally we reach the cities of the Greek mainland, and in searching for an introduction what could we find more appropriate than Herodotus' own words? "The Lacedaemonians and the Athenians had the pre-eminence, the first of the Dorian, and the others of the Ionian race." (1) Herodotus' account of both states is quite long; it will suffice to point out the most important details of it. Herodotus first tells us that Lacedaemon, before the days of Lycurgus, had the worst laws of almost all the Hellenes, both in regard to private affairs and in the fact that they had no intercourse with strangers. How the early history of Sparta, as related by Herodotus, is so wrapped up with the mystical figure of Lycurgus - into the question of whose historical existence I shall not go - that it cannot be called a true history, but it is valuable as the 5th century official Lacedaemonian account of history.

Here we come upon our first questionable statement. It will be seen that Spartan exclusiveness is made pre-Lycur-gean. This is doubtful. Herodotus makes the Minyae be received

(1) I.25.
as citizens in the earliest days.\(^{(1)}\) There is a certain amount of activity in the founding of Thera and the colonizing of Libya.\(^{(2)}\) In the 7th century the Ionic Epos and Aeolic music came in. (cf. the stories of Terpander and Alcman.) Moreover, archaeological discoveries of recent years support the belief that before the extraordinary change that came upon Sparta, the city was an important cultural centre.

At any rate, according to the historian, Lycurgus introduced drastic reforms, as a direct result of which the Lacedaemonians became prosperous and began to look about for conquests. They turned their eyes upon Arcadia, and especially upon the Iegeans, believing that fortune was with them; but they apparently misinterpreted the oracle that had given them this impression, because they suffered a most humiliating defeat. After struggling continually against the Iegeans with ill success, they appealed to the Delphic oracle again and as a result of the application of the second piece of advice it gave them, finally became victors. By the time Croesus sent to them to ask for aid against Cyrus, they had subdued the greater part of the Peloponnesus besides. This early Arcadian war is important as a turning-point in the policy of the Lacedaemonians, the stubborn resistance of the highlanders of central Peloponnesus made them give up attempting complete conquest, which they had carried out in Messenia; the only definite reference to this Messenian war in Herodotus, occurs in III.47, which we have discussed in a previous page. They gave up, then, the idea of conquering the whole of the Peloponnesus, and

\(^{(1)}\) IV.145 \(^{(2)}\) IV.147,159
contented themselves with a hegemony over dependent allies. Friendship with Croesus was established about 547 B.C. and sometime later they were called upon to send him help, but they were engaged at this time in a quarrel with Argos, over the district of Thyrea, which the Spartans had taken from her. By the time this dispute had been settled and preparations made for sending help, Croesus had been taken prisoner. Cyrus, having conquered Lydia, set out to do the same to the Asiatic Greeks, who thereupon sent messengers to Sparta to ask their help. The Spartans, however, would not listen to them. This refusal of Sparta, leader of the Greek world as she was at that time, to come to the aid of her fellow Greeks in Asia Minor, has always been a blot on her good name. It was just another example of her 6th century exclusiveness, if we except her readiness to aid the rich Croesus against Cyrus; in view of which her refusal to help men of her own race in the same case, is not a nice problem for reflection. Some time later, about 532 B.C., Sparta was engaged in helping revolutionary Samians against their tyrant, Polycrates. The outcome has already been noted. They besieged Samos for forty days, and as they made no headway, departed again to their own country. This is almost all the history of Sparta we are told in the first four books.

We have seen that Herodotus spent some time in Athens after he left Samos, and that as a result his political views were coloured considerably by his environment, as well as by his own natural inclination. But he was not wholly blind to her faults, and on the whole what he records is sane and unbiased. His earliest reference is to a war between Athens and the people
of Eleusis. Grote\(^{(1)}\) assumes the battle was against the former, and uses this passage to prove the lateness of the union of Attica. This latter fact is probable on other grounds,\(^{(2)}\) but the battle here mentioned was almost certainly against the Megarians at the border town of Eleusis. The next historical fact about Athens which Herodotus records concerns Solon, 594 B.C., who made laws for the Athenians at their bidding and afterwards left them for ten years, in order that he might not be compelled to repeal any of the laws he had proposed.\(^{(3)}\) He gives an account of the travels of Solon to Lydia and to Egypt. His visit to Egypt is probably true, and indeed there is no reason to doubt that the travels took place, except that for chronological reasons the celebrated story of Solon and Croesus can not have any foundation in fact. It must be noted that Herodotus tells us nothing of the laws of Solon, as he told us something of Lycurgus' reforms. "The explanation of the omission is probably that Herodotus had no interest in constitutional history."\(^{(4)}\) Much greater space is allotted to the rise of Pisistratus. Herodotus' account of the tyranny of this man is one of his most valuable contributions to 6th century history. Pisistratus became despot first in 560 B.C., by making himself leader of the 'men of the mountain-lands' as opposed to those of 'the shore' and 'the plain'. During his subsequent rule Pisistratus administered Athens under the same constitution which was already in effect, without disturbing the existing magistrates or changing the ancient laws. But his

\(^{(1)}\) III.71  \(^{(2)}\) Thucydides, II.15,1  \(^{(3)}\) I.29  
\(^{(4)}\) How & Wells, "Commentary", P. 67
power did not last long. A conspiracy was formed against him and he was driven out. Some time later, however, by an agreement with the conspirators, he was allowed to return and effected his entry into the city by a trick which caused Herodotus to scoff at the credulity and foolish simplicity of the Athenians, "who were counted the first of the Hellenes in ability." (1) In 548 B.C., however, Pisistratus was driven out again, and not till ten years had passed by, during which he lived in Eretria, did he make an attempt to establish himself as despot in Athens again. But in 538 B.C. he made another try with the help of Thebes and Argos, and actually took the city by force. His power now became firmly rooted, and some time later he conquered the island of Xanos for an adventurer who had helped him, and he placed hostages there for the good behavior of the Athenian citizens. This was the condition of affairs in Athens at the time of the Lydian war with the Medes, when Croesus made inquiries as to which people of the Hellenes he should esteem the most powerful.

Next in importance, perhaps, to Sparta and Athens, was the isthmian state of Corinth; commercial Corinth, who least of all the Hellenes despised labour with the hands. Our earliest reference here is to the strife between her and her colony of Coreya, of which Herodotus says only that they had been at variance with each other since the Corinthians first colonized the island, and cites an individual instance of this strife. We next hear of Corinth under her tyrant Periander, the son of Cypselus, who reigned from 625–585 B.C. He had a

(1) 1.60
guest-friendship with Thrasyhulus of Miletus, and gave him some very good advice on one occasion. Later Corinth aided the Spartans in their fruitless expedition against Samos, 531 B.C. The cause of their going was an old grudge against the Samians dating from the time of Periander. The stories about Periander, of which there are three of considerable length in the first four books, need not detain us. One other reference to Corinth is, however, interesting. Gyges, the Lydian, sent gifts to the Delphic oracle, which were lodged in the treasury of the Corinthians. Important states had their own treasuries, where the dedicated objects were under the national charge. We see the importance of Corinth in this fact, that foreign kings put their offerings under its care.

The pre-eminence of Argos in early times, imputed to it by Herodotus,\(^1\) is an inference from Homer and even more from the Cyclic poems, the Thebais and the Epigone. After the heroic age, apparently, her power dwindled, and the part she subsequently played in Greek history was a subordinate one. Most of Herodotus' references to Argos in the first four books were written, as it were, in passing. The only one important enough to need notice here, is the account of the war between Argos and Sparta over Thyrea, B.C. 546,\(^2\) which we have already mentioned in connection with Lacedaemonia. Argos possessed at this time the whole region towards the west, extending as far down as Malea, both the parts situated on the mainland, and also the island of Cythera with the other islands. Thyrea, the Lacedaemonians had cut off and appropriated. The two antagonists

\(^1\) I.1 \(^2\) I.81
met to parley and agreed that three hundred men from each side should fight, the winning side to possess the disputed land. But another dispute arose over the outcome of this encounter, and both armies finally fell to fighting. The Argines were defeated.

There is one mention of Thebes in these books, before we leave this section of our essay. She surpassed the other Greek states in helping Pisistratus with money. We must look to the rest of the history for what we find lacking here.

Several points, however, merit at least a glance before we go on to books V-IX. We must also give a place to our long promised discussion of Greek tyranny. Herodotus does mention names, some of which are recognized now as great names, that have little or no place in the political history of the Hellenic race, and though we cannot here go into literary or philosophical history, we feel bound to notice that Herodotus did mention them. Thus we hear three times of Thales of Miletus; of Bias of Priene twice; of Glaucos of Chios, who discovered how to weld iron; of Aesop, Sappho, Pindar; of Democedes of Croton, the famous physician; Aristeas of Proconnesus; Arion of Methymna; Anacreon of Teos; Mandrocles of Samos, who built for Darius the bridge across the Bosphorus; and finally Pythagoras of Samos, whom indeed he does not actually name, though the inference is clear. Moreover, Herodotus discourses at length upon the Greek religion; criticizes the doctrine of the transmigration of souls; comments on the Greek calendar as opposed to the Egyptian, and finds geometry’s first home in Egypt. From which it can be seen that if he did not
venture far into certain realms of knowledge, he was not unaware that they existed.

Another point is worth mentioning. One cannot read far into Herodotus' history without coming to realize the vast part oracles played in the Greek world; and in the Barbarian world also, for the barbarians consulted them almost as frequently as the Greeks. How many fingers in the marionette show of Greek history the Delphic oracle must have had; how widespread the ramifications of the strings? One noted especially the colonies that were sent out under its direction, and, as in the case of Cyrene, the very definite sites that were often fixed for them beforehand. The Phocaean episode in Corsica throws an interesting light on its policy. The Pythia, not unnaturally, wished to secure for Hellenism one of the keys of the western Mediterranean. Holm \(^1\) thinks the oracle simply sanctioned projects suggested by would-be colonists to it, but it also, in all probability, originated projects itself. The Pythia kept fingers upon the Greek pulse, and no one was more ready to testify to its influence than Herodotus. Aside from his own religious reverence for the place, he depended upon Delphi for much of his information. His Lydian history, for instance, is only the first of a series of narratives derived largely from this source.

There remains only Greek tyranny to discuss, and as a preliminary let us look for a moment at the early monarchic rule in Greece. We find, in Homer, at the head of each tribe of warriors and each community, a king, who is at once leader

\(^1\) "History of Greece", I, p. 232.
in war, dispenser of justice, and high priest for his people; whose sovereignty, whether bestowed upon him by common consent or a legacy from his father, depends upon his personal prowess and superior capacity. Closely associated with him, as a council, are the other warriors, also of noble birth. The government is aristocratical as well as monarchic. King and nobles possess all the power, and the common people have neither authority nor rights; they meet in assembly merely to hear what their rulers have decided for them. This organization of the state was a natural one in a primitive and warlike age, and aristocratic monarchies existed in all the Greek states in early times, and did not die out before the beginning of the 8th century, and in some cases, as in that of Sparta, not even then though here it continued to exist with its powers very much curtailed. In Asia Minor, for example, the name of king where it survived the old order of things, was a purely honorary title and had no political significance. Kingship on the whole, then, disappeared almost entirely as a form of government by the 8th century, its authority passed into the hands of an oligarchy claiming descent from the founder. The people were no better, or perhaps worse off than before, for a privileged class, instead of regarding its advantages as a trust for the benefit of all, tended easily to become selfish and exclusive. Throughout Greece generally, at the opening of the 7th century, there was a growing dissatisfaction among the people at the unequal conditions created by the nobles. In many important Greek states such conditions led to the rise of tyrants during the next two centuries, 650-500 B.C. - men, usually of the upper
class, who espoused the cause of the people either altruistically or to gain power for themselves. During the course of our essay we have met several of these to whom Herodotus has introduced us: Thasybulus of Miletus, Cypselus and Periander of Corinth, Polycrates of Samos, Pisistratus of Athens. The later Greek view of such irresponsible authority was that it was shocking and hateful to men who were free born. Herodotus does not state his own attitude to it, but, as we cannot help finding his tyrants interesting, it is probably true that whatever his views on tyranny, Herodotus found them interesting too. At least he tells us a lot about them; he takes pains to relate the many stories that had gathered around their names, and even in the tales that count most to their discredit he refrains from comment of any sort. If he disliked them he does not say so in so many words. But if we wish to reach as closely as we can into the heart of the matter, we must approach it from the other side, and in finding out what Herodotus' feelings were for democracy, discover his real opinion of tyranny. This will carry us beyond the realm of the first four books, which we are now leaving. We will, therefore, expect to revive the subject later in the essay.

The fifth book of Herodotus' history gives us more information about the states and the men to whom we have been introduced in books I-IV, and then plunges us into the Ionian revolt, which was the beginning of the Persian war.

In Book Four Darius had attempted the conquest of Thrace and Scythia. At the beginning of Book Five he returns to Sardis, leaving his general Megabozas to complete the
conquest. Megabozas, therefore, from about 514-512 B.C., overran the whole of Thrace and subdued it. He then sent envoys to the Macedonians to demand "fire and water", which they yielded. Amyntas was at this time King of Macedonia, and Alexander his son. We have noticed before the origin that they claimed, in which claim Herodotus supports them; his proofs, however, are weak; a family legend, and verdict of the judges at Olympia, probably based on the legend.

Darius, meanwhile, having returned to Sardis, be thought himself of rewarding the two Hellenes who had done him most service in Thrace, Goes and Histiaeos. Goes he made despot of Mytilene; Histiaeos he confirmed in his rule over Miletus, adding the district of Myrkinos to his territory. But presently, on the advice of Megabozas, he called the Milesian to him and took him with him to Susa. At the same time he made his brother Artaphrenes governor of Sardis and Otaxes "commander of those who dwelt along the sea coast", to succeed Megabozas. Otaxes conquered Byzantium and Chalcedon, which, since Darius had already conquered them, must have revolted; Antandros in Troia, Lampionion, and Perinthus, a Samian colony founded about 600 B.C. had already been reduced by Megabozas. Then, with the help of Lesbian ships he conquered Lemnos and Imbros for the first time.

Rest then came upon the Aegean world for a space until it was broken by trouble between Xanos and Miletus. At this point we learn a little more of the previous history of the latter state. At the time of this trouble Miletus was at

(1) Herodotus, VIII.137
the height of her prosperity, but she had come through much strife before she had attained it. For two generations the city had been torn by faction, until the Parians were called in and reformed it. But about 501 B.C. wealthy exiles from Xanos, which was also at the summit of its greatness, arrived in Miletus and sought help from Aristagoras to be restored to their state. This Aristagoras was holding Miletus for Histiaeos, who, it will be remembered, was in Susa. Aristagoras promised to manage the matter for them, and appealing to Artaphernes he persuaded him to send ships. The Mærians received a last minute warning, and made preparations which were sufficient to frustrate the attack. Aristagoras now found himself in a difficult position. He had lost much of his own money and had failed to effect his promise to Artaphernes. His half formed plans to revolt were strengthened by exhortations from Histiaeos, and his friends urged the same course upon him; all save Hecataeus the historian. His advice, however, was disregarded, and they began to make their preparations. In order to win over the various cities they drove out their despots and established democratic governments in them. Then Aristagoras himself set out to seek aid from the mainland states. His appeal to Cleomenes, King of Sparta, meeting with no success, he tried at Athens. The Athenians noted a resolution to despatch twenty ships under Melanthius. "These ships were the beginning of evils for the Hellenes and Barbarians." Aristagoras left for Miletus and prepared to stir up the revolt. When the Athenian ships with five from Eretria arrived, the march

(1) Herodotus, V. 97
against Sardis was begun. Aristagoras remained in Miletus. The Ionians left their ships at Coresos, in the land of Ephesus, and taking Ephesians with them as guides went up quickly against Sardis and burnt it. (B.C. 500) They then made a retreat to Ephesus, whither the Persians pursued them. In the ensuing battle the Ionians were badly beaten. Such as survived dispersed to their own cities. The Athenians sailed home and left the Ionians to their own devices. The revolt went on. Byzantium and the rest of the Hellespontic cities were made to join them; most of Caria also came to their assistance; together with Cyprus, except Amanthus, which was besieged as a consequence. When Darius heard of the revolt he was especially incensed at the Athenians, and set a slave to say three times each day at dinner, 'Master, remember the Athenians.' He despatched Histiaeos to quell the revolt. The siege of Amaltura was meanwhile going on under Onesilus of Salomis in that island. The Persians sent a force against him, and Ionian help arrived just in time. The Cyprians engaged the land forces of the Persians and the Ionians the Phoenician fleet. The Ionians were victorious but the Cyprians defeated. Since the Persians had then taken the island, the Ionians returned home. They found that the Persians had attacked them there too, and were sacking the cities. The Hellespontic cities of Dardanus, Abydus, Percote and Lampsaeos and Parsos had been taken. The Persians, then, turned on the Carians and worsted them in two battles; but their defeat was retrieved. An ambush was prepared for the Persians and it proved successful. They and their commanders were destroyed. But another Persian force
took Cios in Mysia, Ilion, Clazomenae, and Kyme. Aristagoras, the author of these evils, fled to Thrace where he was slain in B.C. 499.

This brings us to the end of the fifth book. But before we leave it we must look at the further history of Sparta, Athens and Corinth continued in it; information that we have purposely left till now for fear of breaking the main thread of the story.

Anaxandridas, son of Leon, was no longer surviving as king of Sparta. His son Cleomenes was ruling in his stead. There was some confusion in the royal house at this time. The two sons of Anaxandridos by his first wife, Doriens and Leonidas, had been passed over upon the death of their father, in favour of Cleomenes, because although he was the son of the second wife, he was the eldest. Doriens, not caring to see his half-brother in what he considered his own place, set out to found a colony. His first attempt, in Libya, was a failure, and after three years he returned to Sparta. Then once more he set out, this time for Sicily; he became involved in a quarrel between Sybaris and Croton and with the Crotonians destroyed Sybaris - 510 B.C. When he arrived in Sicily, however, he and his men were opposed by Phoenicians and men of Egesta and were slain in the battle which followed. The sole survivor of the leaders of this expedition, Euryleon, took possession of Minoa, the colony of Selinus, and helped free the Selinuntians from their despot Pithagoras. He too was later slain when he made himself despot in the latter's place. Meanwhile Cleomenes found himself engaged in strife with the Athenians. Pisistratus
was now dead; Hipparchus, his son, had perished at the hands of Harmodius and Aristogertop. Hippias was now despot of Athens. To escape his harsh rule, the Alemaebnids had fled to Sparta, where they succeeded in obtaining aid to bring about their restoration. Hippias, on his side, accepted Thessalian aid; in the battle which followed he was successful, but the Lacedaemonians made a second invasion under Cleomenes, and this time secured his expulsion - 510 B.C.

After having shaken off the despotic line of the Pisistratids, Athens came under the domination of Cleisthenes, who had espoused the cause of the people. He made certain constitutional changes, such as dividing the people into ten tribes instead of four, and changing some of the tribal names. In raising himself to power Cleisthenes had supplanted Tisan-der's son Isagoras, who now sought Spartan aid to regain his position. Cleomenes once more invaded Attica and succeeded in securing the city. The Athenians, however, besieging him in the Acropolis, forced him to retire under truce, and restored Cleisthenes. Then the Athenians, fearing a fourth invasion of Spartans, sought help from Darius, but refused to submit to the terms he proposed. Cleomenes did come a fourth time and entered Eleusis with his Peloponnesian army, while the Boeotians, his allies, took Oione and Hyciæ; the Chalcidians, too, began to ravage the country. But at this crises the Corinthians, thinking better of it, abandoned the army, as did also Demaratus, the other Spartan king, and one by one the rest of the allies followed their example. But the Athenians were not content to let things rest thus. They proceeded against Chalcis and
Boeotia and defeated both the same day. The Lacedaemonians still hoped to restore Hippias, and called a council of their allies to discuss the question. A decision against it was finally made, upon the advice of Sosicles, a Corinthian, who made a long speech upon the wrong of inflicting tyranny on free cities. The introduction of this man gives us a few more facts about Corinthian history. The speaker reminds his hearers of the wrongs Corinth had suffered from despots. The oligarchy of the Bacchiadæ lasted from 745-655 B.C., the last of whom, Amphion, was succeeded by his grandson Cypselus, who made himself a despot and reigned prosperously for thirty years. He was succeeded by his son, Periander, in 625 B.C., whose deeds we have recorded elsewhere. Corinth's real motive in thus opposing Spartan plans for Athens, was her need of an independent Athens as a counterweight to Aegina, and for the maintenance of her own freedom. She was already hemmed in on her northern borders by cities subservient to Sparta. Should Athens join their company, Corinthian liberty and even commerce would be menaced. Corinthian hostility to Athens was to begin with Themistocles' creation of a great navy. Both the earlier friendship and the later hostility were dictated by commercial interest.

Book Six continues with the story of the Ionian revolt. With a clearer and better known road before us, we can proceed at a greater rate. Our data will not have to be taken from here and there and fitted together like the pieces of a picture puzzle.

Aristagoras was now dead, and Histiaeus had taken up
his cause. With some ships from Lesbos, he sailed to Byzantium and intercepted the ships that sailed out of the Pontus, attaching them to himself as allies. The Persians at the same time were marching on Miletus. The Ionians prepared to defend themselves by sea and by land. At the actual encounter on sea the Samians withdrew, thinking that because of the laxness of the Ionians in training they were sure to be beaten. This flight of the Samians was followed by that of the Lesbians and of most of the other Ionians. Of those who remained and fought the Chians were the bravest and suffered the most severely, being finally defeated. Thus ended the battle of Lade, 495 B.C. Miletus was besieged and fell in the same year. Certain of the wealthy Samians, ashamed of the conduct of their fleet in this war, and not wishing to accept Aiaces as tyrant again, which was the price of the island's security from Persian vengeance, set out for Sicily with such Milesians as had escaped. They took possession of Zoncle upon the advice of Anaxilaus, the despot of Rhegium, while the Zancleans were absent besieging a Sikelian town. The Zancleans thereupon appealed to Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, but he betrayed them to the Samians who thus retained possession of the stolen city. Aiaces became despot at Samos, and Histiaeus, after the conquest of Miletus, sailed south from the Hellespont and won a sea battle against the Chians. Subsequently, however, while foraging in Mysia, he was taken by Persians and slain.

The Persians now set out against the islands and took Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos, then the Ionian cities on the mainland. Afterwards they went against the cities in the Hellespont,
those of the Chersonese, Perinthus, Selymbria, Byzantium, Proconnesus, Artake, and took them all save Cyzicus, which had submitted to them before. The people of Byzantium and Chalcedon had retired within the Euxine and settled in the city of Mesambria. Before this time Miltiades of Athens had been despot of the Chersonese, upon the request of the people themselves, who were hard pressed by the Apsinthians. Miltiades defeated these and then went against Lampsacas and was taken prisoner. Croesus, the Lydian, procured his release. After his death he was succeeded by his nephew Stesagoras. Stesagoras pursued the war with Lampsacus and was slain. His brother Miltiades, son of Kimon, succeeded him, being sent out from Athens for that purpose by the sons of Pisistratus. In 495 B.C. he was driven out by nomad Scythians provoked by Darius, but after their departure he was restored. When, two years later, he heard that the Persians were coming against him, he fled once more to Athens - 493 B.C.

The next year, Mardonius, son-in-law of Darius, went to Ionia with a large force and deposed all the despots in order to restore popular government. It would seem that this was done — actually it was done only in some cities — by a distrust of the tyranny which had proved a dangerous instrument of government, and not by a preference for democracy, as Herodotus suggests. Mardonius next made an expedition by way of the Hellespont against Eretria and Athens, taking Thasos on the way, but as his fleet rounded Mt. Athos, a storm arose which wrecked three hundred ships and drowned more than twenty thousand men.

(1) Herodotus, VI.43
Mardonius, who had gone by land, suffered loss also from the
Thracians before he finally defeated them. He was then com-
pelled to abandon his expedition, and returned to Persia in
disgrace. Shortly after this, Darius compelled the Thasians
who were spending the revenues from their gold mines in build-
ing ships of war and stronger walls, to desist from these
operations (491 B.C.) and in the same year he sent heralds to
the states of Hellas to demand 'earth and water.' The island-
ers, including the Aeginetans, gave these tokens of submission.
The Athenians took this act of Aegina ill, thinking it was
aimed at themselves, and demanded Spartan intervention. Cleo-
menes, the Spartan king, finally did intervene; he seized ten
of the noblest Aeginetans and deposited them with the Athenians
as hostages.

This reference to Sparta gives Herodotus an opportuni-
ty to tell us more of Spartan customs and of the lives of some
of the Spartan kings. The deposition of Demaratos, of whom we
hear later in the army of Darius, is retailed at length. The
rights and privileges of the Spartan kings are set forth, to-
gether with certain other Lacedaemonian customs, such as the
inheritance of various offices, that of cook, flute player,
herald, etc. Leotychides, the successor of Demaratos, made an
expedition into Thessaly in 478 B.C., but accepted bribes to
leave it untouched. He was banished to Tegea and died there.
Cleomenes, after the Aeginetan incident, fled to Thessaly for
fear of the Spartans, since he had plotted evil against Demara-
tos, and from there to Arcadia, where he began to stir up the
inhabitants against Sparta. The Spartans, as a consequence,
recalled him to rule again, but he did not long survive. His death was a particularly miserable one, and several opinions as to its cause were advanced. In the course of their telling we learn that some years previously Cleomenes had invaded Eleusis, and in 495 B.C. had made an expedition into Argos; moreover, that he had allied himself with the Scythians in an abortive attempt to invade Media.

Herodotus does scant justice to Cleomenes, who nevertheless emerges from the mists of oblivion and calumny as the one great figure of his day at Sparta. We see in him an active, energetic monarch, a successful campaigner, an astute politician. It may be that he was driven in his old age to madness and suicide by remorse or unsated ambition, but genius, not madness, stamped the policy of his earlier years. Unfortunately, suspicion of his ambition blackened his name early, and the glories of the Persian war threw his exploits into the shade.

After his death the Aeginetans made representations to Sparta to have their hostages restored. The Spartans were willing, but the Athenians refused to restore them. The Aeginetans then took vengeance by capturing a sacred ship of Athens and its crew. Athens retaliated by invading Aegina with the help of some Corinthian ships, and there the war went on with varying successes for both sides.

Darius, meanwhile, had not forgotten the Athenians, and indeed Hippias, too, was there to jog his memory. In the place of Mardonius he appointed Datis and Artaphrenes, and ordered them to conquer Athens and Eretria and bring their
people into his presence. On their way they took Naxos, but spared Delos. When they came to Euboea, they captured Eretria after six days of fighting and then set out for Athens. They landed at Marathon across the strait. The Athenians sent for Spartan help, but before it arrived its need had passed. The Athenians, under the command of that Miltiades who had fled from the Chersonese, fought the Persians and defeated them—490 B.C. The Plataeans were their only allies, and they had come to help of their own accord, because the Athenians had taken them under their wing when they were oppressed by Thebes in 519 B.C.

The Persians, then, were defeated, and suffered great losses. They fled to Eretria, picked up their prisoners there and sailed home. The Eretrians, Darius settled in Ardericea, two hundred and ten furlongs from Susa. Thus ended the first Persian invasion, favourably for Hellas. Miltiades, whose generalship had brought it about, came to be held in very great esteem, but his good fortune was of short duration. As a result of an ill-fated expedition against Paros in 489 B.C., he was put on trial and fined fifty talents. He did not long survive his disgrace. His previous great deeds, numbered among which was the invasion of Lemnos, from which he took the Pelasgian inhabitants, availed him little in his last days. He suffered the fate Themistocles was to suffer; to achieve great deeds for his city and to die in ignominy.

This brings to an end the sixth book. The only other subject not related hitherto, which occurs in it, is the account of the Alemaenids, which Herodotus begins with Alemaeon and
chronicles to Pericles.

Darius sent no more expeditions against Greece. In 485 B.C. he died, and Xerxes, his son, succeeded him. Xerxes had at first no inclination for a war with Greece, but he was urged to that course by his cousin Mardonius, the Alcmaeonidae who were kings in Thessaly and Hippias of Athens. Four years he spent in gathering an army and in the fifth he began his campaign. To preclude any such disaster as had overtaken the fleet of Mardonius at Mt. Athos, a canal was cut through it for the ships. The army was gathered at Ontalla in Cappadocia and marched with the king to Sardis. A bridge was meanwhile built across the Hellespont from Abydos, and the army proceeded thence and crossed into Europe. At this point of the account there follows a list of the tribal contingents which composes Xerxes' army and fleet, which, though it gives a graphic picture of that immense host, and much new and interesting information about the inhabitants of the Persian empire, does not concern us here. Those Hellenes who accompanied him we may mention. The Ionians furnished one thousand ships, the Aeolians sixty, the Hellespontians, excepting the men of Abydos who remained to guard the bridge, one hundred. And from Halicarnassus came Artemisia, daughter of Lygdamis, and queen also of Cos, Nisyros, and Colydna. Demaratus, the Spartan, also accompanied Xerxes, and the Great King asked him whether the Hellenes would fight or not. Upon Demaratus' answer Xerxes had much time to reflect thereafter. Through Thrace, down upon Hellas, marched the great array, drinking the rivers dry and subduing all as it passed. The fleet sailed through the canal
at Mt. Athos, and thence to the Thermaie Gulf, collecting on
its way contingents from the Sithonian cities, Alythnus among
them, and from those of Pallene, including Potidea, Neapolis,
Skione, and Mende. At Therma the fleet awaited the arrival of
the king. While at Therma the king went to visit Thessaly, a
description of which Herodotus, therefore, gives us. To him
at Therma came also Hellenes bringing 'earth and water', chief
of whom were the Thessalians, and the Boeotians, excepting
those of Plataea and Thebians.

The rest of the Greeks were preparing to resist him,
notwithstanding the disaster prophesied to them by the Delphic
oracle. In Athens a new leader had arisen to meet the coming
crisis, Themistocles, son of Neocles, who had made the Atheni­
ans a naval power. The Hellenic states came together (481 B.C.)
and agreed to a general peace till their common danger had
passed. Envoys were sent to Sicily to seek help of Gelon,
tyrant of Syracuse, (485-78 B.C.), but he refused to send aid
because the mainland Greeks would not give him the leadership.
The history of Gelon is hereupon recounted. He was a descend­
ant of a man from the island of Telos, who joined the Lindians
of Rhodes in colonizing Gela. Gelon himself became despot of
that city by force, wresting the tyranny from the sons of the
previous tyrant, Hippocrates - Hippocrates, who had succeeded
Cleander, his brother; who had taken Callipolis, Naxos, Leon-
tini and Zanele, and had almost taken Syracuse, which was saved
by Corinthians and Corcyraeans. Gelon, by restoring the Syra-
cusan 'land-holders' who had been driven out by the common
people, became despot of Syracuse too, and grew rich and
powerful. As a consequence of such a position, he would take no second place, and thus sent no ships to Greece. The outcome showed that it was as well that he had not weakened his own force, for he was faced with a barbarian invasion, led by Amilcar of Carthage, about the same time. The victory Gelon won over them, the battle of Himera, 480 B.C., occurred on the same day as the battle of Salamis.

The Corcyraeans also sent no ships, for they chose to sit on the fence and offend neither side till they knew which was victorious. The Cretans, too, kept out, when they were warned of misfortune by an oracle. The Thessalians, on the other hand, who had first sworn obedience to Xerxes, now sent to the other Greeks for help; but when an army was sent to their assistance it found that it was impossible to guard the country, and left Thessaly to her fate. Alexander, son of Amyntos, also speeded its departure with pointed words of warning. The Thessalians, therefore, had no choice but to go over to the Persians.

The Hellenes now deliberated where to take their stand, and decided upon Thermopylae and Artemisium. The fleet of Xerxes left Thera and sailed south. Herodotus shortly after recording this, enumerates the Persian fleet. The moment is appropriate; the fleet had thus far suffered no loss from storm or battle. The fact that the estimate of the number of the forces is separate from the descriptions of them, indicates that Herodotus found no numbers in the official Persian lists. He relied on tradition for the number of the triremes, and the Asiatic land forces, but the enormously overestimated numbers of
the forces from Greece rest on mere conjecture. Herodotus is, moreover, dominated by the popular belief that Xerxes led three million warriors against Hellas, and he makes no allowance for losses on the march through sickness or desertion.

The fleet set forth, then, and sailed for Magnesia, but the bay by Eupe Sepias in which it anchored was too small for all the ships, and a storm which arose wrecked many of them. The description of the storm is a patent imitation of Homer, and there is evident exaggeration in the losses attributed to it. A preliminary skirmish next took place at Artemisium and fifteen barbarian ships fell to the Greeks. The land armies of both sides had taken up positions; the barbarians in Trachis, and the Hellenes under Leonidas at Thermopylae; they numbered three hundred Spartan hoplites, one thousand Tegeans and Mantineans, one thousand one hundred and twenty Arcadians, four hundred Corinthians, two hundred Philians, and eighty from Mycenae; from Thebes and Thespiae, eleven hundred; from Phocis one thousand, and all the men of Loerian Opus. The rest of the warriors of Sparta were celebrating the festival of the Carneia, and were meant to be sent as reinforcements later. The issue of the battle needs little telling. For two days the Persians hurled their best men against the pass, but owing to its nature could only retire with heavy losses. This state of affairs might have continued indefinitely had not the existence of a path which led around the mountain been betrayed to Xerxes by Ephialtes of Trachis. This path was being guarded by Phocians, but at the first encounter they fled and left the way open for the enemy. When the news reached Leonidas, he, seeing what the
end must be, sent home all his allies save the Thebans, who stayed unwillingly, and the Thespians, who remained of their own accord. His expectations were realized. The Lacedaemonians with the Thespians fell fighting almost to a man; only the Thebans took no part in the final struggle, but surrendered to the Persians. Thus the 7th book is brought to an end.

Of the ships of the Hellenes at Artemisium, the Athenians furnished more than any other of the allies, but they waived their right to command in favour of Euribicides, of Sparta, and it is said that Themistocles only by bribes persuaded the other captains to remain at Artemisium, having himself been bribed by the Euboeans. Battle was, however, joined there with the fleet of Xerxes, and in the first encounter neither side had the better. But during the night a storm arose which did the Persians much damage, and when a second battle took place two days later, the Athenians won it. The land army at the same time was proceeding through Doris and Phocis towards Athens, the inhabitants of which were removing themselves and their goods to the island of Salamis, whither the Greek fleet had repaired. The Persians, having burnt Plataea, and Thespiae, came to Attica and laying waste the countryside took Athens and burnt the Acropolis. This had such an effect on the Greeks in the fleet that they wished to retreat to the isthmus of Corinth, and were only with difficulty prevented by Themistocles. The king's fleet was now at Phalcrum and making ready for battle, while a land army had been sent against the Peloponnesus. This had already been walled off and many men of the various states were present to defend it. A
short account of the races of the Peloponnese is inserted at this point. (1) Once more the majority of the Greeks in the fleet wished to retreat to the Peloponnesus, and were only fore­stalled by Xerxes' fleet beginning the attack and forcing the fight. Themistocles had again saved the day, for it was he who had urged the Great King to this course by promising to desert to him. The sea­fight at Salamis took place on September 20th, 480 B.C. It ended in an overwhelmingly decisive victory for the Greeks. Xerxes, not desiring to risk another defeat, returned as quickly as possible to Asia, sending messengers on before. Mardonius with thirty thousand men remained in Greece.

The Hellenes, deciding against Themistocles' advice, to pursue the barbarians, invested Andros, which had refused money to Themistocles. They could not, however, take the island so laying Carystos waste, they returned to Salamis and divided their spoils, sending 'first fruits' to the Delphic oracle. Themistocles was honoured by all as the ablest commander of the Hellenes and in Sparta he received particular honour, namely an olive wreath, a chariot, and when he departed an escort of three hundred Spartan knights as far as Tegea.

Aristides, son of Lysimachus, was also concerned in this battle, though he was in exile from Athens; he brought the news to Themistocles of the Persian attack and later, with a force of Athenian hoplites, cleared the Persians who had swum to Psyttaleia, off the island.

Mardonius, meanwhile, was wintering in Thessaly, but Artabazos, having escorted the Great King to Asia with a large
force of Mardonius' men, returned and besieged Olynthus, which was on the point of revolt. Olynthus was occupied by Bottiaeans, who had been driven from the Thermaic gulf by Macedonians. But when Artabazos took it, he slew these men and turned the city over to Critabulus of Torone and the natives of Chalcidice. And thus it was that the Chalcidians got possession of Olynthus.

Artabazos next attacked Potidaea, which was in open revolt, and might have succeeded if the treachery of its general had been discovered in time. As it was, they failed to capture the place and retired to Thessaly with great losses. The Persian fleet, such as remained, wintered at Kyme, and in the spring anchored off Samos, keeping watch over Ionia to prevent it from revolting, and awaiting the result of Mardonius' occupation.

The Greek fleet, numbering one hundred and ten ships, met at Regina, under Leotyehides, King of Sparta, and Xanthippus of Athens. When all the fleet was there, Chian envoys from Ionia arrived, and urged the Hellenes, as they had previously urged the Lacedaemonians, to set Ionia free. But they could not coax them to go farther than Delos.

Mardonius now sent an ambassador to Athens in the shape of Alexander, son of Amyntos, who was a guest-friend and benefactor of that city. He endeavoured to persuade the Athenians to make peace with the Great King, who would in return remit all their offences against him and leave them independent. The Lacedaemonians, greatly alarmed lest they should accept these proposals, sent envoys to them and entreated them not to consent. The two speeches of the Athenians which they addressed to Alexander, and to the Spartan envoys, are as noble in
sentiment and expression as any in Herodotus. The determination of Athens to remain true to the Hellenic cause is admirably set forth in both. Alexander departed unsuccessful to make report to Mardonius, and the envoys to Sparta to raise an army there. With this fitting close we are prepared for the last book.

In June, 479 B.C., Mardonius came down from Thessaly and once more took Athens, only to find it deserted. The greater number of the Athenians were in Salamis or on the ships. Mardonius sent to them, once more, proposals of peace, which they again rejected, but they had the effect of hastening the Lacedaemonian army which had not yet been sent out. For the Lacedaemonians had by this time completed their wall and were of two minds as to whether to stay in the Peloponnesus to defend it, or keep their promise to the Athenians. They now, however, set out under their king, Pausanias. Mardonius thereupon burnt Athens a second time and retreated to take up a position in Boeotia, suitable for cavalry action. His purpose was diverted for a time by the arrival of a thousand Spartans in Megara. He advanced and overran the Megarian land, and then retired to Thebes. The army of the Hellenes presently came to Erythrae in Boeotia and encamped there. The barbarian army lay on the Asopas. The first encounter, a cavalry engagement, was a victory for the Greeks. The battlefield then shifted to the ground about Plataea, and at this point Herodotus sets out the number and order of both sides. The Hellenes numbered one hundred and ten thousand men, against thirty thousand of the barbarians. For eleven days the two armies sat opposite one
another, until, on the twelfth, Mardonius opened the battle by sending his cavalry to attack the Greeks. They harassed them to such an extent that the majority fell back upon Plataea, leaving the Spartans, Tegeans and Athenians behind. The final engagement was fought before Plataea, September, B.C. 479, and those who had remained to risk an engagement had won a decisive victory before news of the battle reached the Greeks in the city. Mardonius perished in the struggle. Artabazas, with the surviving Persians, fled north into Thrace, pursued by the Mantineans as far as Thessaly, and thence made their way into Asia. The Greeks, left in possession of the field, buried their dead and collected the spoil, a particularly golden one. They then besieged Thebes for twenty days to punish her for Medizing, and took the guilty men captive. Pausanias, taking them to Corinth, put them all to death.

Thus ended the battle of Plataea, which ended all barbarian attempts upon the mainland of Greece. As it happened another victory had been won by the Greeks on the same day as Plataea. The ships that had proceeded to Delos at the petition of the Delian envoys, had finally determined to engage those of the Persians. But when they went in search of them, they found them beached at Mykale on the Ionian coast, and the Persians ashore. The battle that followed was, therefore, a land battle. Once victorious, the Hellenes completed their victory by burning the Persian ships and then sailed for Samos laden with loot. At Samos they added the Samians, Chians, Lesbians, and other non-medizing islanders to their league, and set off for the Hellespont to break down the bridges. When,
however, they found this already done, the Spartans sailed home, but the Athenians took Sestos before they returned to Athens with the ropes of the bridges as offerings for the temples.

This ends the ninth and last book of Herodotus' history, and only a few remarks remain before we, too, end this division of our essay.

We will not be making a mistake in saying that the Ionic revolt was the cause of the Persian invasion of Hellas. The Persians were led to attempt the conquest of Greece by the same reason that afterwards brought Julius Caesar to Britain. The Persians could not be sure of genuine peace on the Asiatic shore of the Aegean, while a kindred race on the farther shore was always ready to send ships and hoplites to the Ionians in any attempt they made against imperial government; just as Julius Caesar could not be sure of genuine peace in Gaul while a friendly race across the channel was always ready to send ships and fighting men to the Gauls in any attempt they made at rebellion.

But Herodotus' narrative of the Ionic revolt is involved and difficult, and it has gaps. The seven years seem telescoped and the names of men who must have fought with a gallantry equalling that of the heroes of Thermopylae and Salamis, are lost to us. It is only by inference that we even realize how grave a struggle it was, and how much more sturdily than some of Herodotus' remarks would lead one to suppose, the Ionians maintained it. Surely, moreover, we are not to believe that men who defied the might of Persian for seven
years, 'would not practise rowing in their triremes but preferred to sit in the shade.'[1] The idea clashes with the whole tone of the narrative. Presumably it was a Samian excuse for their unsavoury part in the battle of Lade.

We must not blame Herodotus for these gaps, nevertheless, while realizing that gaps there are. He recorded all he knew. Rather must we be thankful that he did not record what he did not know and lead us astray. We can appreciate the integrity and value of an historian who resists the impulse to supply deficiencies out of his own head to round off his narrative.

The Ionic revolt, then, began the struggle which was to envelop the whole Greek and Barbarian world. Marathon was a foretaste of Salamis and Plataea, or, as Plato has it, it "was the beginning, as Plataea was the completion, of that great deliverance."[2] The experts tell us that Herodotus sets out the main tactics played at Marathon with general clearness; that "that honest old historian has winnowed out nearly all the chaff from the crop of legends."[3] We can forgive him, therefore, if his general lack of interest in constitutional or official detail, makes his account of the precise position of the polemarch, Callimachus, somewhat uncertain! But generally speaking, where military information is concerned, 'what Herodotus never learnt would be interesting.' There are, to be sure, two hints at commissariat. Somewhere near Athos there was "a meadow where they had an agora and a market, and great quantities of wheat came to them from Asia regularly, ready

(1) Her. VI.12  (2) Laws, 707  (3) Grundy, "Great Persian War", P. 153
ground;" (1) and Xerxes "was making preparations to store provisions for his army on the way, that neither army nor baggage animals might suffer from scarcity in their march against Hellas." (2) But what of the way in which the various contingents were massed at Sardis, and moved, in an army of so many tongues? Once Herodotus glances at the Persian medical service and sufficiently reveals the backwardness of the Greeks in that subject. (3) The truth is that Herodotus had really not even an elementary knowledge of warfare; witness his account of Thermopylae and Artemision. We are able to grasp from some of his remarks that the key to their actions lay in the close connection and inter-dependence of the Persian army and fleet, and we can penetrate to some extent the strategy of the combatants, but Herodotus fails completely to realise the situation and treats the naval operations as though they were independent.

As for his description of the pass of Thermopylae, it is correct enough to allow even a modern reader to recognize its features, but he can hardly have been there himself, for he orients it N.S. instead of E.W. On the other hand, he probably visited and examined the battleground of Plataea, though we have difficulty in reconstructing the battle from his description. This is sufficient to show Herodotus' shortcomings in this respect.

To close our review, we will conclude the discussion of Herodotus' attitude to tyranny, which we began some time ago. Since we have all nine books of the history behind us, we can better form a judgment. Interesting as the stories of the

(1) VII.23  (2) VII.25  (3) VII.181
tyrants were to Herodotus and are to ourselves, yet they are all of an almost unrelieved blackness. They show tyranny to be "the negation of law and order; the arbitrary rule of an individual, puffed up with pride yet racked with suspicions; who sacrifices the lives of men and women to gratify the caprice of the moment."[1] It was as apart from the Greek spirit of freedom as the poles are apart, and therefore from Herodotus' spirit, for he was a true Greek. If he does not denounce tyranny in so many words, he puts it forever beyond the pale in the exaltation of the liberty which Athens had preserved for Greece; an exaltation which bursts from him of necessity, though it may be hateful in the ears of men."[2] The antithesis of liberty and slavery is never absent from his work. "In the last division, where the final struggle of Persia and Greece is related, this contrast between the slavery of the Barbarian and the liberty of the Greek, between oriental autocracy and Hellenic democracy, is ever present and is forcibly brought out. His theme, the struggle of Greece with the Orient, possessed for him a deeper meaning than the political result of the Persian war."[3] It budded and brought to the full bloom, Liberty, the key-note of his History.

N.B. -- For the period from the 2nd Persian invasion onward, we have the history of Diodorus Siculus as a supplementary authority. For the early constitutional history of Greece as a whole, Aristotle's "Politics", and for that of Athens alone, his "Constitution of Athens", are sources of much valuable data. Plutarch's "Lives" of Lysicrates, Solon, Themistocles, Aristides, and Cimon, are likewise mines of relevant information.

[2] VII.139
THUCYDIDES

What we know of the life of Thucydides can be summed up very briefly, but little as it is we can see how it influenced his History, as the life of Herodotus influenced his.

Thucydides was born an Athenian citizen, about the year 460 B.C. but he also belonged by descent to the princely house of Thrace, into which Miltiades had married, and he inherited a rich estate with gold mines there. In 424 B.C. he was elected a strategos and appointed to a command in Thrace. Then, due to no fault of his own, Amphipolis was taken while he was in neighbouring waters, and he was blamed for arriving too late to prevent its capture. He was condemned and banished, and for twenty years was absent from Athens, living, probably, on his estate in Thrace, except when he was travelling to collect material for his work. The extent of his travels we can only conjecture, but it seems certain he visited Sicily, for the narrative of the Sicilian expedition could not have been written save by one who had seen Syracuse with his own eyes.

After the end of the Peloponnesian War, 404 B.C., he was allowed to return to Athens, being recalled by a decree of Oenobius. But he died not long after, about 400 B.C., leaving his history unfinished. These are the few facts we know of his life, gleaned in part from his own meagre statements. All other data relating to it, derived from Plutarch, Pausanias, and especially from two Greek essays, one anonymous, the other bearing the name of Marcellinus, are mere assertions which differ.

(1) Thuc. IV.105
only in degree of probability; the sort of confused and contra-
dictory statements which spring up in the absence of any
contemporary evidence.

Thucydides lived in the time of that intellectual
revolution which we associate with the Sophists, when the
educated Hellenic world was being bathed in the light of reason.
We have no reason to believe that he accepted the positive
teachings of any particular man, but his mind was moulded by
their general influence and he came to learn their greatest
lesson; to weigh and to criticize facts, unprejudiced by
authority or tradition.

His family connections provided him with exceptional
opportunities for obtaining authentic information; he had a
foot in two camps, Athens and Thrace, and this second home gave
him an interest independent of Athens, which enabled him to
look upon the Athenian empire with a detachment that would have
been impossible for a pure-blooded citizen with no home but
Attica. His banishment also tended to the same end, provided
that he did not permit himself any feeling of rancour against
Athens, for what he must have considered an unjust punishment;
and it also gave him opportunity for intercourse with the anti-
egonists of his country. His wealth, too, doubtless, opened
many doors. Thucydides' military training and experience
qualified him to be the historian of a war. He was not so
likely to fall into the tactical errors of Herodotus, or to fail
to appreciate, as Herodotus did, the significance or importance
of military manoeuvres. One can not give him too much credit
for conceiving the idea of recording the events of a great war
at its inception, or for realizing that it was to be a great war; and furthermore, for the fact that he designed his history to be purely a record of that war and the relations of the militant states, which should deviate in no particular into geography, anthropology, or the rest; and so became the founder of "political" history in the special sense in which we are accustomed to use that term.

So far as the evidence which Thucydides makes use of is concerned, one point is self-evident, that he could not fall back on any predecessors for any but a very slight portion of the history; moreover, that there were not likely to be many documents to consult, so recent were the events he was recording. He was confined, therefore, almost entirely to using the evidence of his own eyes, and of others' when he had established to his own satisfaction that their possessors were reliable. He makes a clear statement to this effect himself, deploring elsewhere the credulity and inaccuracy of mankind. Writing a history under such conditions as these was no easy task. The historian had to possess great energy and initiative; not only had he to sort, compare, and criticize his material before he incorporated it in one work, but he had to make actual journeys to collect it. We have seen that he must have gone as far as Sicily on one such mission. But Thucydides covers his traces; he gives us no glimpse into his literary workshop; he names no informants, nor does he even tell us the occasions on which he was himself an eye-witness of what he describes. Occasionally, however, we can penetrate to the source of his information. It 

(1) I.22 (2) I.20
is easy, for example, to see that he consulted Plataeans as to the siege of Plataea, and Athenians and Spartans about Pylos and Sphacteria. We can sometimes divine that his statements are derived from the official orders given to military commanders. "Sometimes the formulae of decrees or treaties peer through the Thucydidean summary."[1] On the whole, however, we have to take the history on trust, for we have little independent evidence with which to test its accuracy. But where original documents do exist, their testimony almost entirely bears out that of Thucydides, and thus our faith in the whole work remains unshaken.

Though we may only be able to make guesses at the sources of his evidence, we are in a much better position to judge the principle that governed his use of it. First and foremost he adopted an attitude of scepticism towards all he had not seen with his own eyes. But though sceptical, critical, quick to doubt, he accepts, in his brief account of non-contemporary Greek history, what modern critics, at least until recently, have been inclined to reject—traditions. Thucydides rejected no traditions, except insofar as they conflicted with probability. For example, he did not question the fact of the Trojan war, but he rationalized the legend. Like Herodotus and everyone else, he granted the actual existence of heroes such as Agamemnon, Pelops and Minos, for whom the genealogies seemed to vouch, and so he carried this historical faith too far; mere intrinsic probability is by no means a sufficient guarantee of reality. For probability varies; not only with the

(1) Bury, "Ancient Greek History", P. 85.
age in which we live, but with our individual tempers and education. His method is here, therefore, deficient, but the deficiency, needless to say, does not reflect to his discredit. Living in the age in which he did, he had to accept without suspicion, what only comparative ethnography and philology have taught us to suspect. But in his acute arguments, he employs methods which may be called modern and scientific. For example, he points to the culture of the backward parts of Greece, as a survival of a culture that at one time had prevailed generally. Again, when he states that the islands once knew Carian occupation, he advances an archaeological proof; the discovery of Carian tombs in Delos, when the island was being purified. He will not hasten to minimise the importance of Mycenae because its remains are small. One had only to look at the size of Sparta as compared with her importance, to realize the folly of such an act. In his treatment of contemporary events, also, the standard of Thucydides is as strictly scientific as the nature of the subject permits. The study of human affairs can never hope to reach the exactitude that the study of physical phenomena has attained; and even were it practicable for the student to be always an eye-witness of events, error and bias, due to upbringing or temperament, or to a preconceived idea, are almost certain to enter into his observation or recording of them.

Thucydides did not escape criticism in the ancient world, any more than Herodotus did. His chief critic, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, wrote an essay, 'On the Character of Thucydides', which is supplemented by letters to Cn. Pompeig,
and Ammæus. Dionysius goes into great detail, but on the whole his judgment is unfair. He falls out first with Thucydides' choice of a subject. The war was ὴοτε καλὸς ὴοτε εὔτοξης and therefore should have been forgotten or ignored by posterity, but if he must choose it, his duty was to be patriotic even at the sacrifice of his critical judgment. He subjects his language to a most minute and unfriendly scrutiny. He finds fault with his lack of variety, and his chronology bores him. He grants, however, that he shows a superiority in pathos and has a clever style, but its beauty, in contrast with the brightness and happiness of Herodotus', is "old-fashioned and wilful." (1)

Dionysius' opinion that Thucydides was antagonistic towards Athens, and showed her in an unfavourable light, is interesting when we remember that some modern critics have suggested just the reverse, namely, that "Thucydides sympathized with Athens in the first years of the war, and manipulated the facts with the purpose of presenting her in a favourable light." (2) Surely the fact that the narrative can convey two such contradictory impressions, is a proof of the author's critical impartiality. Nor has Thucydides any lack of critics in our modern world. Some of the criticisms are more or less general, in that most critics advance them; others are peculiar to their authors. Let us look at some of the most important ones.

(1) 'de Compositione', 165:

(2) Bury, "Ancient Greek History", P. 132.
He has been taken to task generally for a failure to recognize the part economic and commercial interests play in human affairs. On this point two Thucydidean students take up his cudgels in his defense, whose remarks we can briefly summarize. "Not without humour is the notion that the economic factor was an entity her (Thucydides, a mining magnate) never dreamed of."(B) "He fully realizes the importance of finance."(A) "No writer has ever laid greater stress on the supreme importance of money in war."(B) "That he was not blind to economic conditions is shown by the leading significance he attributes to want of material resources in the early Greek communities."(A)

No writer has ever traced more clearly the interdependence of wealth and power, and the fundamental conditions necessary for the production of the one and the promotion of the other. Primitive Greece, he says, was weak, because there was no accumulated wealth; agriculture only yielded the bare means of subsistence, and trade did not exist because there was no accumulated wealth — etc."(B)

It is implied, too, that Thucydides should have furnished a detailed explanation and analysis of the commercial basis on which the Athenian power rested, and of the mercantile interests of other states, which were affected by her empire. His two champions continue: "Thucydides relates how the rivalry between Athens and Corinth arose out of each state's pursuit of wealth and power; — the bone of contention was Megara; — Thucydides describes the struggle in all its vicissitudes,"

(A) Bury, "Ancient Greek History," Pp.91-2
(B) Abbott, "Thucydides"
after which he says no more "for the very sufficient reason that there is no more to be said. The economic aspect of the Megarian question, though probably paramount to Corinth, was certainly not so to Sparta --- her interest in the matter was of a political and strategic nature." (B) "Thucydides did not look upon the economic factor as a master-key for the interpretation of all human action;" (B) and Bury, summing up: "Economic and commercial factors, --- of such immense importance in the present age, certainly did not play anything like the same part in the ancient world, and if the ancient historians considerably underrated them, we may easily fall into the error of overrating them. We may be sure that the interests of Athens presented themselves to statesmen, as to Thucydides, primarily under the political and not the economical point of view. Thucydides created political history; economic history is a discovery of the 19th century."

Another charge against Thucydides is that he failed to realize, if he did not actually misrepresent, the cause of the Peloponnesian war; that it was not the growth of Athenian power, - "which alarmed the Lacedaemonians and convinced them that they must fight," - but the desire on the part of the commercial interests in Piraeus for the profit that command of the main trade routes would entail. Whereupon they forced upon Pericles the policy of coercion towards Megara, which resulted in the Peloponnesian war. Thucydides missed entirely, in the opinion of this critic, (1) this economic factor; and the causes he advances are only "grievances". It seems impossible, in the

(1) F. M. Cornford, "Thuc. Mythistoricus"
the first place, that Thucydides could have ignored a movement of such import on the part of the commercial interests of Piraeus. "We are asked to believe that an agitation which plunged Athens into war went on among the noisiest elements of the populace, and not the faintest hint of its significance reached any contemporary observer." (1) Equally improbable is the insinuation that Thucydides deliberately kept it in the background, in order to devolve the responsibility of the war from Pericles' shoulders. The historian's attitude to Pericles and his policy is a detached one. The tribute he pays to his political ability does not imply that he saw eye to eye with him in all matters, or held his political faith. He exercised, rather, here as in other cases, a cold, independent judgment and would have had no scruples in exhibiting his weakness.

As for the two words which Thucydides uses in the sense of "cause", 

\[ \text{"\'\'cause", } \tau\varepsilon\chi\varepsilon\iota\lambda\iota\alpha\nu\eta \text{ and } \pi\rho\sigma\phi\lambda\sigma\iota\varepsilon \] 

J. B. Bury shows that "\( \tau\varepsilon\chi\varepsilon\iota\lambda\iota\alpha\nu\eta \)" in Thucydides generally means "charge" or "grievance", whereas "\( \pi\rho\sigma\phi\lambda\sigma\iota\varepsilon \)" though in its original meaning it was equivalent to our "pretext", has a wider range in Thucydides, and comes to mean "motive", or "occasion", thus closely approximating to the sense of "cause". (2)

Thucydides insists on the difference between the pretexts alleged for the outbreak of war, as distinct from the real cause, and we certainly cannot prove of either pretext or cause that his judgment was wrong. So much, then, for the charges against Thucydides and their refutation.

(1) Abbott, "Thucy." P.52
(2) "Ancient Greek History", P.93
The work of Thucydides has limitations which we must beware of underrating, but its defects have not prevented it from securing a literary immortality. Thucydides had burst "out of the twilight in which Herodotus still moved, wondering --- into the sunlight, where facts are hard, not to wonder but to understand." (1) "It was the longest and most decisive step that has ever been taken by a single man towards making history what it is today." (2) But, although the greatness and the value of his history won instant recognition, it did not become popular. For several centuries after, his immediate successors, his history, read only by scholars, sank into a neglect amounting almost to oblivion. "He was a great name, not a living influence as a teacher or a model." (3) Not until the first century B.C. with the return to Attic models, did interest in his work revive, and even then it was not such as the author would have desired. It concerned itself with style and phraseology, and in general, aroused mere slavish imitation. "Thucydides had anticipated this reception when he wrote in his preface that the unromantic character of this narrative might not be very pleasing to the ear. -- But he also anticipated the ultimate verdict when he described it as a "possession for ever." (4)

Before we notice the subject matter of the history, there are certain remarks to make about its composition. It falls into two parts; the first ending in 421 B.C. with the Fifty Years’ Peace, the second in 411 B.C., the history being

(1) Ibid. P.147  (2) Ibid., P.147  (3) Ibid. P.147  
(4) Abbott, "Thucydides", P. 234
unfinished. The reason for this is that in 421 B.C., with the signing of the peace, the historian considered his task finished and it was probably not until after the fall of Athens in 404 B.C. that he realised that the undecisive war which he had recorded was only a portion of a greater and decisive war, and so determined to extend the compass of his work to embrace the whole twenty-seven years. The second part then, \(^{(1)}\) he formally introduces with a personal explanation, announcing the continuation of the subject down to 404 B.C. and explaining that the truce which he had formerly considered to have separated two wars, had been in reality only a cessation of hostilities for the time being, and that the wars were really one war, lasting from 431 to 404 B.C. Though this determination was probably not made, as we have suggested, until after the capture of Athens, his statements seem to imply that he had not ceased from following the course of events as they occurred with a view to continuing this work. This continuation had been suggested, in all likelihood, by the Sicilian expedition, which he had probably intended to be the history of a chronologically separate episode. The disaster of 404 B.C., however, must have shown him the events of the previous twenty-seven years in a new light, and hence he rose to the larger conception of producing a history to cover the whole period.

Thucydides based his military history on the natural division of the year, into summer and winter, being fully convinced that accurate history was impossible without strict chronology. He proved it by casting his own work into the form

\(^{(1)}\) V. 26
annals. He could not have failed to see as clearly as his critics, like Dionysius of Halicarnassus, that it was a drawback to any artistic plan, but it was characteristic of him that he preferred to the exigencies of literary art the demand of historical precision. Where his history was of a non-contemporary nature, however, that is, where he outlined the growth of Athenian power after the Persian war, he was chary of giving dates and he criticised Hellenicus, who had briefly covered the same period, for the inadequacy of his work and the inaccuracy of its chronology. Thucydides’ point was that there were no data of a sufficiently dependable character to warrant any pretense to chronological precision.

There is one feature of the history, inbred in its composition and looming large in its pages, which we must discuss here once and have done with for all; the speeches of Thucydides. They are a dramatic feature, and not an invention of the author. The idea of putting speeches into the mouths of the characters had been used by Herodotus, who borrowed it from Homer as we have seen. But both in style and in argument, Thucydides’ speeches are his own. In style they are a bewildering mixture of lucid, straightforward Greek, and Greek of an obscure darkness, that is darker, as Dionysius says, than the dark sayings of Herodotus. Attempts are constantly being made to explain this peculiarity, which struck the ancients no less than ourselves. It has been a mistake to attribute these obscurities to a condensation of thought. As Mahaffy pointed out, he is "condensed in expression, but not in thought."(1)

(1) "Greek Literature", II 1.112
Bury advances the theory that "when Thucydides adopt
what we may fairly call his unnatural style, when he is in
volved and obscure, he is always making points of his own ---
when he writes in the natural style, he is producing document-
ary evidence." (1) G. F. Abbott suggests that Thucydides' connection with Thrace was a closer one than we imagine; that perhaps, if he was not born there, he spent his childhood there, and so Thracian was his vernacular, and Greek an ac-
quired tongue. Something to the same effect is advanced in Dr.
Grundy's "Thucydides and the History of his Age," (2) where a great scholar and very learned man is reported to have said, "Thucydides' Greek is at best good Thracian!" As for the passages, "which for clearness and purity might be compared with the best examples of Attic prose," Mr. Abbott suggests that he could not have written them "without strenuous effort, or (one might almost fancy) external aid." (3) Another hypothesis has been advanced to explain this mystery, which, so far as we can see, will continue to remain one; namely, that the fault lies not with the historian but with the manuscripts which have come down to us, none of which is earlier than the 10th century, being, that is, the outcome of successive transcriptions over a period of thirteen hundred years. But if we are inclined to accept this view, we must remember that the mystification over their recurring obscurities dates back to as early as the 1st century B.C. "before the copyists had much time to contribute to a reputation already established and, in Dionysius' opinion, amply deserved. (4) Enough has been said of hypotheses which

(1) "Anc. Greek History", pp.112,114 (2) P.52
(3) Abbott, "Thuc.", P. 228 (4) Ibid., P. 224
can in all probability only remain such.

If Thucydides' style in the speeches was his own, so was his use of them. He employed them not as an ornament but to conceal the subjective element that inevitably enters into the composition of a history. For an historian has more to do than to chronicle events. He must show why things happen and the forces that are at work. He is bound, therefore, to measure the characters and penetrate the motives of the actors, as well as to realize the conditions in which they act. In the speeches, then, the actors reveal as much of their characters and personalities as will enable us to understand the parts they are playing in public affairs. (cf. Cleon and Alcibiades especially.) The author, like a dramatist, remains in the background. He comes forward only to introduce them to us, or to indicate the impression they made on their contemporaries.

Thucydides' rule is to commit himself to no personal judgments, and to this rule there are very few exceptions. These statements of course apply to the speeches of the leading actors, such as Pericles, Alcibiades, Nicias, etc. For Thucydides did make the speeches serve another purpose. He employed them often as dramatic disguises of studies of his own. To give one example: "The characters of the two protagonistic cities, Athens and Sparta, are delineated in a speech of a third party, the Corinthians; the author of this famous comparison was unquestionably Thucydides' himself." With these general remarks we are ready to look into the history itself. Our task will be a much simpler one than that with which we found ourselves.

confronted when we approached the history of Herodotus. We will have here few digressions to lead us out of our course. The history, being the history of a war, though it covers a period of twenty-seven years, will nevertheless progress step by step to its conclusion, and will not necessitate more from us than the mere recognition of the most significant events in it.

Book I opens with an account of the early history of Greece. As we have intimated, it shows a curious mixture of ancient and modern methods, ancient in that Thucydides depended on epic poetry and folk-memory; modern in that he had seized upon the comparative system, and used the barbarian customs of his own day, for example, to illustrate the ancient usages of the Greeks—the prevalence of piracy, habitual carrying of arms in everyday life, etc. (1) The power, and the grasp of this account, whether or not we accept it all, is astonishing. Within the limits to which it strictly adheres, it is a most closely reasoned argument, and it proved to be a revelation to Greece of a totally new way of treating history. From the mass of legends and details that had constituted the ill-organized store of Greek tradition, Thucydides constructed a reasoned march of development, with the arguments that led to his conclusions. There is no need for us to criticize the details; his sketch remains a shining example of sheer historical insight.

The outline of the growth of the Athenian empire after the end of the Persian war, is a study of another sort.

(1) Thucydides, I.4
The account of early Greece was a preface to the history, the latter is a digression; but one peculiarly to the point. The reason which Thucydides advanced as to the cause of the Peloponnesian war, was the fear Sparta had of Athens' growing power. The historian saw the need that such a statement indicated, and gave us, in the account of the "Pentecontactia" a valuable piece of historical information that we have received from no other author.\(^1\) In the organization of the Delian League,\(^2\) 478 B.C., we see the sowing of the seed of the Athenian empire, which was destined for a great growth before it inevitably perished. Thucydides has too, by this narration, linked up his own history with that of Herodotus, which ended, as may be recalled, with the success at Mycale, and the eventual return home of the Greek fleet. There exists, therefore, for us, a continuous historical narrative of Greek history from about 650 B.C. to 411 B.C.

We have made sufficient comment upon the "cause" of the Peloponnesian war in the introduction to Thucydides. The occasion of it was the incidents of Epidamnus and Potidaea. It had suited the purpose of Corinth to keep on friendly terms with Athens hitherto; she had done her good service at times, as we saw in Herodotus. But now, her commercial superiority threatened, she determined to destroy her. Corinth it was who called the congress of the Peloponnesian allies, who spurred on, more than once, Sparta's oft-fla1"gging spirits. Corinth it was who would have razed Athens and sold her citizens into slavery, when the city was finally taken. Her influence throughout

\(^1\) Thucydides, I.96
should be kept in mind; the part she played was an unpleasant but important one.

At the end of Book I war is imminent, but it has not actually broken out. "The contending parties still keep up intercourse with one another, and visit each other without heralds, but not with entire confidence."\(^{(1)}\) We are thus prepared for the beginning of Book II. During the course of the first book, we have seen the dismal end of two great men, who were heroes at the end of the previous war. It is "farewell!" to Themistocles and Pausanias.

In Book II the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, and the allies of both sides, actually begins. The Thirty Years' Peace treaty which had been concluded after the recovery of Euboea, B.C. 446, was now broken by a Theban attack on Plataea. The combatants on the one side, let it be remembered, were Sparta and all the other Peloponnesian states save Argos and Achaea, plus Megara, most of Boeotia, Phocis, Locris, Leucas, and Ambracia; on the other side, Athens and her empire, which consisted at that time of nearly all the Aegean islands and the coast cities of Asia Minor; plus Acarnania, Plataea, Corcyra and Zacynthus. The strength of the former lay in its army, of the latter, in its fleet. Towards the end of the war, as we shall see, even Persia was drawn into the struggle. In the early summer of 431 B.C., the Spartans, under Archidamus, invaded Attica. All the Athenians, upon Pericles' advice, had withdrawn into the city, abandoning their country estates. Pericles' policy of tiring the enemy out by

\(^{(1)}\) Thucydides, I.146
proving Athens' invulnerability, was a sound one, but it gave rise a year later to an unforeseen calamity. Meanwhile an Athenian fleet of one hundred ships was retaliating by ravaging the Peloponnesian coast. The Aeginetans, too, received a taste of Athenian anger, and were expelled from their island. An alliance was concluded about the same time by the Athenians with Thrace and Macedonia. In Book II(1) occurs the great 'Funeral Speech' of Pericles, than which no portion of Thucydides' work has ever received greater admiration. In its essence it is a eulogy of the Athenian Democracy; "a magnificent picture of a model state; at once a school for culture and a pattern of civic virtue."(2)

But Book II also records the outbreak of the Plague, that dreadful calamity which was the direct result of herding into the city. Its effect, both upon Athenian morale and manpower (1/3 of the population perished) was inestimable, but the chief loss it inflicted upon them was the death of Pericles, who fell victim to it in the second summer, B.C. 429. Thucydides, in recording his death, speaks in the highest terms of Pericles' political ability. He was convinced that if Pericles had lived or had left a successor as able as himself, the war would have terminated favourably for Athens. But he did not, and his policies, sound enough had he been there to direct them, were changed by his successors or abandoned altogether.

At the end of Book II, however, the outlook for Athens is brighter. In the winter of 430 B.C., Potidaea surrendered to her, and at the end of the summer of 429 B.C. the Athenian

(1) Ch. 33 seq. (2) Abbott, "Thuc." P.109
fleet won a complete victory over the enemy at Naupactos. About the same time Sitalces, son of Teres, king of Thrace, entered into an unsuccessful war with Perdicas of Macedon, and here, as Herodotus was accustomed to do, Thucydides seizes the opportunity to give us some information about the two countries involved. The Athenians, under Phormius, invaded Acarnania, and returned successful, thus bringing the third year of the war and the second book of the history to a close.

In Book III the Spartans, with the coming of spring, repeated their former tactics and ravaged Attica. At the same time Lesbos revolted from Athens. In the speech of the Mytileneans we see how radically opinion had altered. Sparta was now the champion of the oppressed, the saviors of Hellas. At the end of 428 B.C., the siege of Mytilene was still going on, and in 427 B.C. the Spartans once more ravaged Attica, causing great distress. The Mytileneans were finally reduced to making terms, with the Athenians, and for a time were very much in danger of being exterminated by them. Cleon, son of Cleomenes, "the most violent of the citizens, who at that time exercised by far the greatest influence over them," (1) carried a decree of death to the rebels, and spoke strongly against its repeal. Fortunately the feeling of clemency personified in Diodotus, son of Eucrates, prevailed, and the Athenian name was spared in this instance, the blot upon it which the incident of Melos incurred at a later date. But if the fair name of Athens remained unsoiled, the Spartan name did not. They had been besieging for some time the city of Plataea, and had finally

(1) Thuc. III.36
procured its surrender. Thereupon, at the instigation of the Thebans, ignoring the plea of the inhabitants for a just trial, they gave the men up to the sword, the women and children to slavery, and razed the town to the ground. The Plataean territory they converted into public land and let out for terms of ten years. Such was the fate of Plataea, the gallant little state that had fought at Marathon with the Athenians, and had seen the final battle of the Persian wars fought before her walls.

Corcyra was the scene of the next meeting between the ships of Sparta and Athens. The island itself was torn with strife that had originated with the return of the prisoners from Corinth, who, being oligarchs, were seeking to draw Corcyra away from its allegiance to Athens. The Spartan fleet under Prasidas was finally compelled to withdraw, and the Corcyrans, left to their own devices, massacred the majority of the oligarchs "for their designs against the democracy."

This revolution in Corcyra was the beginning of a conflict between democracy and oligarchy which sprang up in almost every city in the Hellenic world; encouraged as it was, by the hope of Athenian or Lacedaemonian help. Thucydides, reflecting with feeling on civic strife, introduces at this point an excursus similar to Aristotle's statements in the "Politics", upon the causes and effects of the revolutionary spirit.

The war now entered new territory. The Sicilian Syracusans and Leontines were at war, and the latter succeeded in obtaining aid from Athens, for the Athenians had an eye to
Sicily already, and they also wished to prevent the Spartans from getting corn there. While affairs were progressing in an indeterminate fashion, the Plague again returned to Athens and earthquakes shook Attica, Boeotia and Euboea. In one respect they were a blessing, for Athens, for they prevented the Lacedaemonians from once more ravaging Attica; a policy they now had adopted permanently. In the following summer, the war continued in Sicily and in various parts of the Greek mainland. Demosthenes, Nicias and Procles were the chief Athenian generals. They attacked the island of Melos to compel the Melians into the Athenian alliance, but proving unsuccessful they turned on Tanagra in Boeotia and took it. The Lacedaemonians next sent an expedition under Burylochus to Naupactus, but it was failed by Demosthenes and some Acarnanian allies. Athenian arms in Sicily were meeting with poor success, but this was offset by a victory won by the Athenian general Loches over the Locrians. In the winter the Athenians purified Delos and restored the Delian games. An Athenian victory over the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots brings Book III to an end. We shall see in a later book the result of Athenian determination at this time to take a more active part in the affairs of Sicily.

The first happening of importance related in Book IV is Demosthenes' fortification of Pylos, which forced the Spartans to cease ravaging Attica and hasten to attack him. The Athenians defeated the Peloponnesians in the bay of Pylos and then blockaded Sphacteria, a densely wooded little island in the mouth of the bay, on which a Lacedaemonian force, consisting chiefly of Spartan citizens, was pent up. The Spartan
government, seeing no way to save their men, offered peace, but the Athenians, overjoyed at their success, were persuaded by Cleon to continue the siege. Eventually Cleon himself set out "to take the men prisoner, and did so within twenty days. Thucydides' comment upon the story - "and so Cleon's undertaking, mad as it was, came off." [1] hardly seems a fair remark. It can perhaps be explained by the fact that the historian, who, as we have seen, called Cleon the most violent of the citizens, could not here hide his dislike of the man or what he stood for. It may also well be that Thucydides, as an experienced military man, was quite right in feeling that a non-military man like Cleon could not hope for one chance in a hundred of succeeding where experts had failed. "Long shots" do occasionally come off; but a person might be called mad, who, like Cleon, guaranteed them to do so. But at least Athens triumphed enormously through the incident, which put one hundred and twenty Spartan citizens into her hands.

The Athenians in Sicily meanwhile, after some success and occasional losses, came to terms with the league of Sicilian cities and withdrew from the island. In Megara the oligarchical party had gained control with the help of the Spartans under Brasidas, but in Corcyra the oligarchs who had made another attempt at power, were cruelly put to death. In the summer of 423 B.C. a truce for one year was concluded between the hostile states. Sparta entered into it to secure the return of the prisoners of Pylos, Athens because she was alarmed at the success of the Spartan general Brasidas, in Thrace; among other places he had taken Amphipolis from Athens.
Nothing of moment was effected by this truce, and in the summer of 422 B.C. hostilities were for a time resumed, and are related in Book IV. Cleon's attempt to win back Amphipolis for Athens resulted only in his death and that of Brasidas; but Athens and Sparta were even more eager than a year before to come to terms; and being urged to that end by Pleistoanax, king of Sparta, and Nicias of Athens, they finally concluded a peace, called the "Fifty Years" Peace, or the "Peace of Nicias". By one of the terms, Sparta was to give up Amphipolis to Athens, but when she tried to do so the city refused to return to her former allegiance. This became a sore point with the Athenians, who had, for their own part, returned the Spartan prisoners taken at Pylos. For six years and ten months the treaty held good, but Greece during this time was by no means tranquil. The "Thirty Years" treaty between Argos and Sparta expired and was not renewed. On the contrary, Argos set out to form an anti-Lacedaemonian confederacy, at the persuasion of Corinth, who hated the peace Sparta had concluded with Athens. Through the trickery of Alcibiades, a treaty was concluded by Athens with Argos and her allies, Mantinea and Elis. This treaty led to a reopening of hostilities, for, on the strength of it, Argos began a war against Epidaurus, and Sparta, after a preliminary skirmish, prepared for war against her in earnest. The affair came to a head in the battle of Mantinea, B.C. 418, a victory for Sparta. The truce then made by Sparta and Argos led to another between Sparta and Mantinea, which severed the Argive-Athenian alliance. The "Fifty Years" peace was still formally unbroken, but the Argive truce did not long remain so. It had been concluded by oligarchs, and the
people, encouraged by Alcibiades, repudiated it. Book V ends on a heavy note for Athens. It was at this time that she be-smirched her name, by no means unspotted though it now was, with an ugly stain. The Athenians made an unprovoked attack on the small, almost defenceless island of Melos, utterly destroyed the male inhabitants and carried off the women and children into slavery. They then colonized the island with five hundred settlers of their own. Athenian policy was probably being directed into such channels by Alcibiades, who deemed such extreme measures necessary to overawe the subjects and allies of the city.

Books VI and VII might almost be taken as history in themselves. They are an entity, relating the whole story of the Sicilian expedition, and as such we will take them together. From the point of view of style, Book VII is the most finished, the most distinct in intensity of all the history. Here the narrative suffers very little from digressions, declamations, and documents; there are no speeches; why we shall never know; but certainly the reason cannot be that the seventh book is incomplete or even unrevised. "In this book the author's gift for carefully planned and vigorously sustained narrative, finds its widest scope and highest expression --- The writing, with one solitary exception, is quite restrained, but the emotion packed into it is tremendous! Beyond a doubt it is Thucydides' crowning achievement."[1] The events related in Books VI and VII are too well known to need setting forth in detail. We will notice only a few of them.

(1) Abbott, "Thuc." pp. 204, 205
The account of the races and cities of Sicily in the beginning of Book VI belongs in the category of the descriptions of Thrace and Macedonia, that is, a conventional digression such as Herodotus made use of. But there is this difference between the two authors' conception of such a digression. Thucydides would have put it with a footnote or an appendix had he known of such things, Herodotus could never have done so. It has been conjectured with some degree of probability, that in writing these chapters (VI.1-5) Thucydides made use of "History of Sicily", a work by Antiochus of Syracuse, which now (only) exists in fragments, but once enjoyed a high reputation among the ancients.

The Athenians, as we have seen, had already fought in Sicily. The rivalries of the Dorian and Ionian colonies there, gave her the opportunity in 424 as in 415 B.C. to interfere on the side of her kinsmen and incidentally 'further the Athenian interests.' The commanders of the expedition, Alcibiades, Nicias and Lamarchus, represented the parties both of peace and of war, and thus disagreed from the outset. The folly of trusting such an expedition to men of widely divergent policies was soon apparent, and one further piece of madness removed nearly all hope of the war being ended successfully. Alcibiades was recalled on a charge of impiety, and to escape certain death he fled to Sparta where he used his admirable talents and generalship for the benefit of the enemy. Fate, however, gave Nicias - a far less able leader than Alcibiades, for his heart was not in his job - a chance to win still. The Syracusans were in despair and had come to the point of yielding should the Athenians press
their advantage. But Nicias let the opportunity slip, and the arrival of the Spartan Gylippus put courage into the enemy and ended all hope of their surrendering. Even then the Athenians might have retreated in safety, but Nicias' superstitious fears at the eclipse of the new moon brought about a delay that was fatal to the expedition. The ultimate completeness of the Syracusans' victory, (1) followed by the cruelty of their vengeance, proved the turning point of the war. For the Athenians at home had been carrying on a struggle as vital as the one in which their navy abroad was engaged, and they had suffered greatly from the invasions of the Peloponnesians, which were no longer periodic but continuous. For the Spartans, on Alcibiades' advice, had fortified Decelea and were using it as a permanent base for their incursions. Twenty thousand of the Athenians' slaves deserted to them there. All the Athenian sheep and cattle had perished at Spartan hands. Provisions for the besieged city could no longer take the overland route, but had to come by sea at great cost. "Athens resembled not so much a city as a fort." (2) In this condition she stood when Book VII comes to an end.

Now comes to the fore the indomitable will of Athens, that was strongest when her danger was greatest. Consider her position. She could no longer present her empire with a united front to the enemy. Her allies were seizing the opportunity that her weakness afforded them to revolt. Sparta, counting on the same weakness, for the first time ventured to send a strong fleet into the Aegaean. The resources of the enemy were doubled (1) 413 B.C. (2) VII.23
with the entry of Sicily into the fray; while Athens' disastrous defeat at Syracuse had robbed her of the flower of her youth, and, what was still more serious, of the skilled sailors that had kept the seas free of her enemies. One more hand was to be lifted against her before all was done. The Persians, long dormant, were roused to action by the Spartans, who were willing to give Ionia back into their hands, provided that they supplied them with money to enable them to prosecute the war with Athens to a successful issue. Yet, in the face of such enormous odds, Athens maintained a gallant struggle for nine years more. It is in such circumstances as these that the Athenian democracy appears in its most favourable light; indeed, its surprising spirit and energy have drawn the remark that there is, in extreme popular government, compensation for the evil it breeds. But its chief ill is caprice, and caprice lost the Peloponnesian war for Athens.

Book VIII is incomplete, and unrevised. Here, as in Book VII, we have arguments presented to us in the third person but it seems likely that had Thucydides been able to complete the book, he would have recast them into direct speeches. Book VIII records the third and final stage of the struggle, but not the 'knock-down blow'. We are indebted to Xenophon for the completion of the history.

Chios took the initiative in the revolt from Athens, and the Athenians spared no pains to recover her. They voted their reserve fund of money - one thousand talents - to be used for the purpose, and set about manning ships. For the revolt of Chios was a signal for all the allies to follow suit; Lesbos,
Erythrae, and Euboea had merely been waiting an opportunity, and Miletus soon added herself to their ranks. The Spartans entered now into their first treaty with Persia, and though professed liberators of Hellas from the Athenian yoke, they handed back in this agreement the Ionian cities to their former masters. At this crisis Samos gave Athens a proof of her loyalty, although only thirty years before she had sought to secede from the Delian league. Her people, aided by the crews of three Athenian ships, rose against the Samian oligarchs and slew or banished some six hundred of them. They then declared for a democracy, and the Athenians, assured of their devotion, granted them independence. Mytilene, by this time, persuaded by the Chians, had broken from Athens, but prompt action enabled her to recover the city with the whole of the island and afterwards Clazomenae. Moreover, Athens defeated the Chians in three battles, and brought them near to surrendering. She also, with Argine help, blockaded Miletus, but upon the advice of her general, Phrynichus, withdrew to Samos without completing the victory she had begun. Alcibiades up to this time was still fighting with Sparta, but after the affair of Miletus he fell into suspicion there and an order was issued for his death. He thereupon fled to Tissaphornes, the Persian representative of the Great King's interests, and by working upon him, did all he could to injure the Peloponnesian cause, while he kept him from materially injuring that of Athens. Indeed, Tissaphernes might have gone over entirely to the Athenians, had not fear of the superior numbers of the Peloponnesian ships prevented him. He finally abandoned, however, any idea of so doing that he
might have entertained, and made a second alliance with the Spartans. The Athenians meanwhile were suffering internally. Oligarchic elements in the city were fast obtaining a hold and the people, from mutual fear and distrust, could not combine against them. The result was, that after a hundred years of popular government, the democracy was brought to an end. A board of five was established, which created another of four hundred, and negotiations were entered into by these with Sparta. Alcibiades at this time was in command of the Athenian fleet, now at Samos; he had been restored to favour, but as yet did not mean to visit the city until he had accomplished a deed great enough to wipe out his past treachery. The oligarchic leaders in Athens were Theramenes, Aristocrates, Phrynichus, Aristarchus, Pisander, and Antiphon. The two former of these were anxious to secure a more constitutional form of government, because they had a threefold fear of the Athenian army in Samos; of Alcibiades, and of their own colleagues, who were negotiating for peace with Sparta, and intended to save their own power at the expense of the city. To this end the extreme oligarchs were building a fort at Piraeus, so that they might admit the Spartans when they wished. Theramenes, however, by circulating whispers of their designs, finally aroused the people to action. After a scene of tumult in which the two parties nearly came to blows, the fort was demolished, to the cry of 'Let the Five Thousand rule!' Some days later a Spartan fleet sailed by Athens, and the Athenians, fearing an attack, hastily put out after it. A battle was fought in the bay of Oropos, in which the Athenians were defeated. The Spartans then induced Euboea
to revolt. They could have taken Athens now, or at least compelled the Athenian fleet to quit Samos, thus leaving Ionia in Persian hands, but these "convenient enemies" sailed off home. The Athenians then called an assembly in the Pnyx, deposed the four hundred and set up the government of the "Five Thousand", all who could furnish themselves with arms. Pisander and the other oligarchic leaders fled to Decelea; Phrynichus had perished earlier. During this same summer, the Peloponnesians transferred their fleet to the Hellespont, where Pharnabazus was in control, having realized at last the dishonest vacillation of Tissaphernes. The Athenian fleet pursued them, and the battle of Cynossema ensued, in which the Athenians were victorious. The news of this victory greatly enheartened the Athenian people. They trusted that with energy they might still win the war. With this hope of the ultimate success of Athens, the history of Thucydides comes to an end, in the twenty-second year of the Peloponnesian war.

The history of Thucydides was unfinished, and three men set themselves to bring it to completion; Xenophon, Cratippus, and Theopompus. Of Cratippus, thirty years ago, little was known; not even a fragment was extant to indicate the character of his work. There were only three or four references to him in ancient literature, but one, a passage from Plutarch, suggested that his history possessed more than ordinary merit. Then, in 1909 A.D., a historical fragment was discovered by Grenfell and Hunt which was ascribed by some eminent scholars to Theopompus, whose history, the "Hellenica" covered the same period as that of Cratippus, and had also been lost; by others,
too, notably Mr. E. M. Walker, to Ephorus; (1) but the weight of evidence would seem to establish it as the work of Cratippus. This substantial fragment covers a part of the year 396 B.C. and most of the year 395 B.C. The complete history embraced, probably, the period from 411 to 350 B.C. The narrative of the fragment bears the stamp of an original composition, written by a contemporary, not compiled from books; written, too, without the knowledge of Xenophon's work, which we will consider next. There are no speeches in it; the phraseology is simple and clear, free from rhetorical or didactic devices and from any element of personal criticism. Professor Bury inclines to the view that "if the whole work had survived, it would occupy a distinctly higher place than the "Hellenica" of Xenophon, though the author did not possess Xenophon's technical knowledge of warfare." (2)

Xenophon's history was, however, the one of the three lucky enough to survive, and to it we are indebted for the account both of the end of the Peloponnesian war and of events subsequent thereto. Xenophon, son of Gryllus, was born at Athens about 428 B.C. His childhood and youth coincided, therefore, with the Peloponnesian war. He became a disciple of Socrates, and wrote a series of works in defense of his master's principles. Xenophon was an aristocrat, and his sympathies were not with the democratic party, to whom the continuance of the war was due; and when it was over and the democracy was restored, he left Athens to go on an expedition with Cyrus.

(1) Powell & Barber, "New Chapters in Greek Literature", first series.
(2) "Ancient Greek History", P. 158
against the prince's brother, Artaxerxes. The fate of this expedition Xenophon sets forth in his popular work, "The Anabasis". In 396 B.C. Xenophon took service with Agesilaus, King of Sparta, and probably fought with him against his own city in the battle of Coronea, B.C. 394. He was now in exile from Athens - the cause and date of which are unknown - but it is clear that he was wholly out of sympathy with the Athenian government as it had been since the restoration of the democracy in 403 B.C., and especially since the death of Socrates in 399 B.C. For some years after Coronea he stayed in Sparta, and then in Elis where the Spartan government had given him an estate; here he began his literary works. But in 371 B.C. he was forced to leave Elis and went to Corinth, where he spent the rest of his days. In 369 B.C. the sentence of banishment from Athens against him was rescinded, but he never returned there. He lived, occupied with his writings, till 355 B.C., or possibly later.

Widely different estimates have been made of his literary powers and his qualifications as an historian. In some respects he was admirably fitted to be the historian of the epoch he described. He was an Athenian by birth and training; in his youth a devoted follower of Socrates; he had travelled and lived in many parts of the Greek world. He had been on several of the campaigns which he described in the "Hellenica". We might have reason to presume from these facts, therefore, that he possessed the temper to write an impartial history and the information and capacity to write an accurate one. But the "Hellenica" is neither accurate nor impartial.
His errors are rather of omission than of commission, but there are sufficient to leave the reader either sadly puzzled or with an entirely wrong impression. For example, while we know that the primary purpose of the "Hellenica" was to finish Thucydides' narrative, yet Xenophon took no pains to secure precise continuity between the closing chapters of Thucydides' and his own work's opening ones, and he was as little careful about precise continuity between the different chapters of the "Hellenica" itself. Instead he often alludes to events or introduces personages of which we know nothing. More serious still, some of the omissions seem to be intentional, as though dictated by the author's partiality or bias—not for Athens, indeed, but for Sparta and Thebes. For Sparta he had conceived an admiration which led him to excuse her defects and omit her humiliations, while his hatred for Thebes that he could not conceal made him construe her actions wrongly, and abridge the record of her achievements.

His style, despite the carelessness and the irregularity of its vocabulary, possesses the great merits of clearness, directness and entire freedom from exaggeration or a striving after effect. It is characterized not infrequently by beauty and power, and at all times it is rendered attractively graceful and easy by the amiable personality of the writer.

The "Hellenica" covers the events of the fifty years from 411-362 B.C. It falls into three main divisions, which scholars have shown to have been written at considerable intervals. Part I, (1.1.1 - 11.3.11) completes Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian war; Part II, (11.3.11 - V.1.36) carries
on from the close of the war to the peace of Antalcidas, and Part III, (V.2.1 - the end) from the peace of Antalcidas to the battle of Mantinea. The dates of the composition of these various parts, have been approximately fixed as follows: Part I in 395 B.C. or a very little later; Part II, between 385 and 380 B.C.; Part III, between 362 and 354 B.C. The history is, in brief, the story of Sparta's triumph over her old enemy, Athens, of her heyday of power, and of her overthrow by a new enemy, Thebes. The hero of the narrative is the rather medioc­re Agesilaus. That it might have been Epaminondas can only remain the sigh of modern commentators.

At the end of Thucydides' history we find the Athenians full of the hope of success and putting forth tremendous efforts to accomplish it. And for a time they made head against their enemies, largely through the lukewarmness of Tissaphernes, and the military skill and vigour of Alcibiades. But the tide was soon to turn. Three unfortunate occurrences, following almost one after the other, changed the appearance of things. In the first place, the Great King, dissatisfied with the con­duct of Tissaphernes, sent down his younger son, Cyrus, to replace him, B.C. 407, and almost simultaneously the Spartans sent out a new admiral, Lysander, who won Cyrus' confidence, and proved himself the most able commander the Peloponnesian fleet had yet had. Some time later, in the same year, the Athenians, annoyed at a minor naval defeat, dismissed Alcibiades and put ten new generals in his place, Pericles the younger among them, and Conon at their head. The stage was now set for the last defeat, but before it came the Athenians were to win
one more victory. At the battle of Arginusae, B.C. 406, they succeeded in severely beating a Peloponnesian fleet, and causing the death of Calliocrates, its commander. But the Athenian commanders, with the exception of Conon and two others who did not return to Athens, suffered the fate of the Spartan. They were tried, illegally too, in that they were accused in a body, on a charge of failure to rescue the crews of the disabled ships, and put to death. Conon still remained head of the Athenian fleet, but he was either inefficient or unlucky, and quite incapable of coping with the strong combination of Lysander and Cyrus. In the following year, B.C. 405, the battle of Aegospotami, less a battle, indeed, than a surprise, brought the war to a close. When the Paralus arrived at Athens with tidings of the disaster, "a sound of wailing ran from Piraeus through the long walls to the city, one man passing on the news to another, and during that night no man slept."(1) The Athenians, having neither time nor money to build another fleet, prepared for a siege, and their city was soon invested by land and sea. For a long time the inhabitants held out, but, after many months of negotiating for peace with no success, famine induced them to an unconditional surrender. The victors proceeded to lend the Long Walls to the music of flutes, and Lysander, after winning a second victory, over the Samians, returned to Sparta, with all the Athenian ships save twelve. All the dependencies of Athens except Salamis were taken from her, and at the instigation of Lysander, an oligarchy of 'Thirty' was established, in the city itself, with Theramenes and Critias

(1) Xenophon, "Hellenica", II.2.1
at its head. At first these two leaders were agreed in their policies, but when Critias set about slaying all the enemies of the oligarchy as dangerous, and the resident aliens for their wealth, Theramenes strenuously opposed him. Critias thereupon with the backing of the rest of the "Thirty", had him put to death. Then they inaugurated a reign of terror such as Athens had never known. Wealthy or obnoxious citizens to the number of fifteen hundred were put to death, and their property confiscated; thousands more fled to save their lives. But the rule of the "Thirty" was too intolerable to last, supported though it was by a strong garrison of Spartans. Thrasybulus, placing himself at the head of the exiles, succeeded in defeating the superior numbers of the "Thirty", slew Critias, and restored the democracy, 405 B.C. Lysander did not intervene again in Athenian affairs, but the general policy of establishing a military despotism throughout Greece was persisted in by Sparta for a generation.

Thus the Peloponnesian war came to an end. The Sicilians, during the latter part of the struggle, had been engaged in one of their own. The Carthaginians, in 410 B.C. under the leadership of Hannibal, invaded Sicily with one hundred thousand men, and in the course of three months, captured Selinus and Himera. Three years later they returned once more, and were defeated in battle by the Syracusans, but they took Agrigentum from the Siceliots after a seven months' siege. In 405 B.C. Dionysius, son of Hermocrates, became tyrant of Syracuse, to lose, in the following year, Gela and Camarina to the barbarians; and so matters stood in Sicily at the close of the war.
The "Hellenica" thus concludes the story of the Peloponnesian war, and the civil strife in Athens that followed it. The first two books have been engaged in telling of the war and its outcome, bringing us in date to 401 B.C.

As in the case of the period that the history of Herodotus covered, so we have for the period covered by the histories of Thucydides and Xenophon, the history of Diodorus Siculus as a supplementary authority; also certain of Plutarch's "Lives", such as those of Pericles, Alcibiades, Nicias, etc.

The "Hellenica" proceeds with what is, from this point especially, almost a history of Sparta. From 399-387 B.C. the Lacedaemonians, now the undisputed leaders of all Hellas, were engaged in a war with Persia. (It was at this time, 401 B.C., that the "march of the ten-thousand Greeks" occurred, which Xenophon also recorded in the "Anabasis".) The Lacedaemonians had entered upon their struggle with their second ally, at the plea of the Ionian Greeks, who were in danger of being subjected once more to their former masters. The details of it are not very important, because the struggle was inconclusive. For some time, in truth, Sparta, through her king, Agesilaus, carried on successful warfare in Asia, but a Spartan fleet, on the other hand, met disaster in 394 B.C. from a Persian fleet under the command of the Athenian general Conon, at Cnidus. Persia meanwhile had been stirring up trouble for Sparta in Greece, no hard task; for Sparta's aggressive, domineering attitude towards her late enemies was causing everywhere a deep resentment. Athens, which since the expulsion of the 'Thirty' had been quietly regaining her former commercial
preeminence, was now in league with Thebes and Corinth. War was not long in breaking out (B.C. 395), and this threat to Spartan dominion at home finally forced the recall of Agesilaus and his army, and the Greek cities of Asia Minor were abandoned to Persia. Persia, in return, promised to cease from supporting Sparta's enemies in Greece. The war in Hellas proper had been waged in earnest from 394 B.C., and it continued, as attempts of various Greek states, to curb the growing power of Sparta — until the inglorious peace of Antalcidas, whereby the Persian king assumed the confirmation of Sparta's title to mistress of Hellas brought it to an end. Still, however, Sparta continued to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, and broke up any alliance that threatened her power. Mantinea and Olynthus were only two of the cities that suffered at her hands. The later years of Spartan leadership, from 387 to 371 B.C., were especially marked by sometimes harsh, sometimes treacherous, but ultimately futile, efforts to check the rise of Thebes, culminating, as they did, in the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C., which resulted in the humiliation of Sparta and the triumph of her enemy. Then followed the brief era of Theban supremacy, from 369-362 B.C. It was brought to a close, in its turn, by the battle of Mantinea, in which the Thebans, though victorious, lost their great commander Epaminondas. The battle of Mantinea, B.C. 362, brings the "Hellenica", likewise, to an end.

Xenophon had included brief chronicles of Sicily in his history, but another historian made the island his limit. Philistus was born in Syracuse in 432 B.C. Like Thucydides, by
whom his writing was influenced, he had experience in public affairs; he suffered exile and lived to be recalled. But he did not confine himself to contemporary history as Thucydides had done in the main. He began the story of Sicily, from its earliest days, and brought it down to 363 B.C. His work was in eleven books, and like that of Thucydides, unfinished. But it, too, found someone to complete it, in the person of Athanas. Acero called Philistus a miniature of Thucydides, (1) and indeed he had made Thucydides his model; "not by a slavish imitation of his style, but rather in temper and method, and we may suspect that of all Greek historians he was most Thucydidean." (2) Fragments, unfortunately, are all that remain of this Sicilian author.

Xenophon carried the history of mainland Greece down to the battle of Mantinea, 362 B.C., and for the half century of which he wrote, he is by far the best authority we have. But he is not the only one. Two orations of Lysias, dealing with the rule of "the Thirty" at Athens, and the "Constitution of the Athenians" by Aristotle, contribute additional information of great value, to supplement the earlier portion of Xenophon's narrative. Books XIII-XV of Diodorus Siculus, also treat the period covered by the "Hellenica." We have, too, in Plutarch's "Lives" of Alcibiades, Lysander, Agesilaus, and Pelopidas, further facts of these years presented to us.

One other historian, contemporary with the events following the end of the Peloponnesian war, wrote a history of Greece, of which only fragments are extant today. But he is

(2) Bury, "Ancient Greek History", P.159
(1) Ad.Q. fr. 11,11
very worthy of our notice. I refer to Ephorus of Cyme, whose
dates are 400-330 B.C. He wrote a history in twenty-nine books,
from the return of the Heraclidae into the Peloponnesus, which
took him back almost into mythical times, to the taking of
Perinthus by Philip of Macedon in 340 B.C. Each book was a
unit in itself, and had a preface of its own. The history was
unique, in that it embraced all the Greeks, and non-Greek
peoples entered into it only as far as they were connected with
Greek history. He thus produced a work which might be called a
quasi-national history of Greece. But here we must remember
that the Greeks had never formed a nation. They had no national
history in the true sense of the word. How, then, did this con­
ception of the unity of Greek history come to Ephorus? It was
inspired in him principally by the teachings of the orator
Isocrates. The rise of Macedon and the extraordinary abilities
of Philip had given birth in Isocrates to a hope for the unifi­
cation of Greece under Macedonian leadership. It became his
ruling passion, and in defiance of Demosthenes, he preached the
doctrine of a Hellas, united under Macedon, standing square a­
gainst her barbarian enemies. Such an idea, fostered by
such a man, took root and grew in the fertile Athenian mind,
and as a result there arose an entirely new conception of his­
tory which, up till this time, had been concerned either with
particular episodes, such as the combined efforts of Greek
states against Persia; with inter-state wars; or with the his­
tories of individual states or groups. Ephorus, therefore,
wrote his history during the first flush of this new idea. He
seems to have had a wide knowledge of historical and
geographical literature, and he exercised a sharp critical faculty in using it. Strabo (1) attached much importance to his geographical investigations, and praised him for being the first to separate the historical from the merely geographical element. Polybius (2) credited him with a knowledge of conditions of naval warfare, but ridiculed his descriptions of Leuctra and Mantinea, as showing ignorance of the nature of land operations. His battle-scenes do indeed merit this criticism; they are conventional, and conform more or less to a model scheme. But his work, nevertheless, received much praise from the ancients, and was used by Diodorus, Siculus, among others.

If Isocrates was responsible for the idea that brought the history into being, he was likewise responsible for a number of defects in the writing of it. The style, for one thing, is high-flown and artificial; truth is sacrificed to the attainment of rhetorical effect; the narrative is interrupted continually by moralising platitudes, elaborate Isocratean speeches and panegyrics. But Ephorus wrote for a society that demanded such effects. He wanted to be read and so had to write what would please the public, whose taste Isocrates had done much to educate. This craving for popular success dominated historiography henceforward, with few exceptions.

Theopompus of Chios, born in 380 B.C., belonged also to the Isocratean school, and his history shows the same bowing to popular will. We have mentioned in connection with Cratippus that he continued the work of Thucydides in his "Hellenica", and that authorities claimed for him the fragment discovered by Grenfell and Hunt. But he was also the author of another work,

(1) VIII.332 (2) XII.25g.
different again, in spirit, from that of Ephorus. He too was
affected by the national idea of Isocrates; he too saw in the
power of Macedon a unifying factor, which he made the pivot of
his history. But that history he called the "Philippica", not
the "Macedonica", and in this he was original. The "Philippica"
covers the period from 360-336 B.C. Theopompos shows himself
fairly impartial, but he is over-fond of the marvellous. The
ancients blamed him, too, for his censoriousness. And indeed
he seemed to be more concerned with the private morality of men
of action, than with their political or military capacity. The
critic, Dionysius, says that his aim was to dive into the pro­
fundities of the human soul and discover the wickedness almost
invariably lurking beneath the semblance of virtue. (1) Theo­
pompus was probably the most interesting historian of the 4th
century, but he has no real claim to greatness.

At this point, we come to another historian of
Sicily, who, like Philistus, was born on the island, and also
suffered exile. The dates of Timaeus are 345-250 B.C. His
history, which he wrote in Athens after 317 B.C., was of Sicily
and Italy down to 320 B.C., in thirty-three books. Not content
with consulting all available authorities and records, Timaeus
made special trips to gain accurate information about the ill­
known western nations, Iberians, Celts, and Ligurians. He de­
voted much of his time to chronology, and was the first to
introduce into Greek histiography the clumsy, inconvenient way
of reckoning time by the Olympic years. Timaeus rejected myths
but countenanced daemonic influences in historical events. He

(1) Letter to Pompey, 6,7
could not discriminate, in his material, between important and trivial things. He was not impartial in his treatment of the contemporary period of his history, making a hero of Timoleon, and a villain of Agathocles. Other historians bitterly attacked him for his unfairness, likewise, to his predecessors, but Cicero commended him, and Diodorus Siculus made great use of his work. His style, said Dionysius and Longinus, was frigid (ψυχρόν), but otherwise satisfactory. We, however, are not able to say so much. We find that Timaeus, notwithstanding his Attic environment and Isocratean training in rhetoric, had abandoned Attic measure and Attic sanity, and adopted a new kind of writing which we know as the Asianic style. It came into being first in the prose of Gorgias and Alcidamas, but Timaeus carried it far beyond the boundaries these men had set. His prose "produces the impression of a bacchic revel of rhymes and verbal effects."(1) The general public, however, adapted themselves to this style with the ease with which they had adapted themselves to that of Ephorus, and it predominated for two hundred years.

Another author who wrote in the Asianic way was Hegesias of Magnesia, who flourished about 300 B.C. Strabo,(2) indeed, speaks of him as the founder of this florid style. We cannot tell whether he and Timaeus worked independent of each other or not, for one reason, because we do not know Hegesias' precise dates. As a historian he must be classed among the writers of the lives of Alexander the Great; the fragments of his history that are quoted by Dionysius describe Alexander's

(1) Bury,"A.G.H." p.170  (2) XIV.1.41
treatment of Gaza and its inhabitants; it is possible, however, that this fragment is part of a show-piece and not of an historical work. Of his ancient critics, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Cicero disparaged him, but Varro, on the other hand, praised his work.

Timaeus and Hegesias, then, were representatives of the Asianic school of style, and their popularity shows the public taste. But there was another school of historical art bidding for public favour at the same time, and initiated by Duris of Samos. Duris was born about 340 B.C. and passed his early years in exile. He was a pupil of Theophrastus of Eresus whom he met at Athens. He became, in some way, tyrant of Samos, and wrote a comprehensive historical work on Hellenico-Macedonian history, from Leuctra, 371 B.C. to the death of Lysimachus, 281 B.C., also a life of Agathocles of Syracuse, and annals of Syracuse, chronically arranged, according to the lists of the priests of Hera. In the opinion of ancient authorities he had not much worth as an historian. Plutarch (1) expresses a doubt as to his trustworthiness; Dionysius speaks disparagingly of his style; (2) and Photius (3) regards the arrangement of his work as altogether faulty. Cicero (4) has, nevertheless, praise for him as an industrious writer and Diodorus Siculus made use of his works.

His style was intended to overthrow the conventionalism of the school of Ephorus and Theopompus, which lacked, so Duris declared, "mimesis", or what we would call "realism". Duris was extremely interested in the drama; he wrote books on

(1) Pericles, 28 (2) De Compos. Verborum, 4 (3) Cod.176 (4) Ad. Att., VI.1
tragedy and the history of art, and he thought that historians
could produce in history the effects that dramatists produced
in tragedy; so that the feelings of the readers should be
stirred by highly-wrought, pathetic scenes, conjured up by the
imagination of the writer. There is much to be said for his
reaction against conventionalism, but it opened the way, too,
to a real danger. While the historian is striving for effect,
he is tempted to distort the truth, and so it was with Duris.
His school subordinated history, as Thucydides had understood
it, to art. While the conventionalists were appealing to taste,
the realists were appealing to the emotions. For both alike,
history became simply a branch of rhetoric.

The next event of importance which gave men an opportu­
nity to write history, was the career of Alexander the Great.
Such a romantic epoch as this could not fail of its recorders,
especially since history was beginning to invade the realm of
fiction. The shining example of a writer of quasi-historical
work on Alexander's conquests was Clitarchus, of Colophon, who
wrote at the end of the 4th century. He made the most of the
possibilities of his theme, and "captured his public by fantas­
tic descriptions of the gorgeous East." (1) His work became
the standard book on the subject, and influenced the tradition­
al history of Alexander very deeply. All writers on that topic,
however, were not carried away by the rhetorical possibilities
of their subject. Chief among these were Aristobulus of Cassan­
dreaia, and Ptolemy, son of Tagus. Both men were eye-witnesses
of the events they recorded.

(1) Bury, "Ancient Greek History"
Aristobulus' account was mainly geographical and ethnological; Ptolemy's had more of the nature of a military memoir, distinguished by its straightforward honesty and sobriety. Their works have unfortunately not survived in their original form; but they were, in their essence, too important to be allowed to perish unrecognized. Four centuries after they had been written, Flavius Arrianus, composing a history of Alexander's conquests, made them, together with the geographical work of Nearchus, his chief authorities; and his history, complete and trustworthy as it was, written, too, in a simple, lucid, manly style, became a fitting receptacle for the memoirs of these sober and veracious historians.

With the historians of the period of Alexander the Great, we bring our investigation of the historians of two centuries, to an end.
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