CONFLICT IN THE BRITISH COLUMBIA-
COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION
AND
THE "CONNELL AFFAIR"

by
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The B.C.-CCF was formed in late 1932 shortly after the formation of the national CCF party. In November of the following year the B.C. party ran in its first election and secured sufficient support to become the official opposition. The party's executive, spurred by the prospects and hopes of its eventual election as government and in response to its need for a moderate image, selected a retired Anglican minister as House leader.

The choice of Robert Connell as House leader was not, however, unanimous. Die hard socialists with different interpretations of society and the role the party should play in achieving social change, fought Connell's leadership and received sufficient support to mount an intensive intra-party campaign of harassment and criticism.

Connell's critics were successful, as a result, in making his leadership intolerable and the subsequent weight of circumstances led him to imprudently reject party convention decisions because they favoured his left wing opponents. This action both isolated him from the rank and file and gave his critics, then in control of the party's executive, an excuse to expel him for his treachery and apostasy. His leadership ended less than three years after it had begun and he became one of three B.C. party leaders dethroned during this period by his party.
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INTRODUCTION

British Columbia has always had a strong socialist tradition relative to the rest of the country. Although it was not until the summer of 1972 that a democratic socialist party, the New Democratic Party, was elected government, that party and its predecessor the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), had been the official Opposition for all but four of the preceding forty years. And, prior to the inception of the CCF in 1932, socialist and labour candidates since 1900 had hounded Liberal and Conservative governments for progressive social and labour legislation.

The CCF emerged as a national party from the chaos and deprivation of the Depression. Other developments had provided a background for the dissatisfaction of farmer, labour and socialist groups which united to form the CCF, but the Depression furnished an urgent justification for cooperative action. The B.C. section of the CCF was initially represented by the Socialist Party of Canada: an urban socialist party of mixed democratic and Marxian persuasions. Although its numbers were small and its base restricted to urban socialists, it was the only party of note that could carry the CCF banner in the province. And, as well, the party was the organizational heir to the socialist tradition in the province and within its ranks were men like Angus MacInnis and Wallis Lefeaux who had contributed significantly to developing that tradition.

In many ways the affiliation of the Socialist Party to the national CCF was, however, an uneasy arrangement. As one would expect, many who saw the CCF as a logical alternative to ineffective Liberal and Conservative governments were drawn to the party for reasons other than ideological.
The national party's federal structure and orientation recognized the importance of these groups and the validity of their concern. But as membership in the CCF was through affiliated provincial parties the Socialist Party, or more specifically the Marxists who had gained control of the party by 1934, viewed these reform groups with alarm. Their numbers and the influence of their reform elements threatened the Socialist Party's organizational identity and ideological purity. It was a point of controversy that marked Socialist Party relations to the national party and later to an expanded B.C. wing.

A federal structure was used in the B.C. party to offset some of this concern. The Socialist Party accepted into the B.C.-CCF the Reconstruction Party which was then considered the organization into which reformers would go thereby lessening the threat to the Socialist Party's ideology. But this turned out to be only a short-term solution. A much deeper problem of achieving party progress and providing direction still existed and there had to be a reconciliation of interests and a unitary form of structure if common goals were to be effectively pursued.

Ideological diversity and structural change, consequently, were major problems with which the B.C. party had to cope as attempts were made to provide coherence and direction to party policy. But the party was also faced with personality differences within its leadership elite which exaggerated the importance of this diversity and change. Tension was further exacerbated by the difficulty of providing leadership to a mass based ideological party. There existed and grew, as a result, tensions resulting from leadership behaviour and performance and a power struggle involving the left and right wings of the party was set into motion.
In an important sense party tensions were the birth pains which necessarily preceded the stabilizing of party norms and loyalties. But to a significant degree personality differences contributed to this discord receiving a prominence that was not warranted. The power struggle which resulted was thus a leadership problem related to the formation of the party and intensified by the degree of ideological diversity in the party, the distances separating personalities in the leadership elite, and the difficulty of providing leadership in a socialist party.

In November 1933 the B.C.-CCF ran in its first election. Winning seven seats in the provincial legislature it became the official opposition and elected Robert Connell as House leader. The influence of the Depression on the B.C. political system was being registered. Prior to the election the inexperienced Tolmie cabinet had been destroyed through its inability to deal with rising unemployment and provincial indebtedness. And on the ashes on the Conservative Party the CCF stood in opposition to the governing Patullo Liberals.

Patullo had been elected on a platform of work and wages. But neither was forthcoming to the degree necessary because of the intransigence of Prime Minister Bennett's provincial grants policy. Growing unemployment and Patullo's handling of the unemployed left their mark. Patullo was fatally cast as villain and deposed in 1941. The CCF which had quickly identified with the unemployed received more public support in the 1935 federal election than either the Liberals or Conservatives.

The failure of Patullo's programs, the dislocations of the Depression and the expectations of an imminent collapse of capitalism conse-
quently occupied much of the thinking of CCF members. And in these times, when hard luck was the rule, the party needed a charismatic leader to help them transcend the uncertainty and misery of their lives.

The national CCF had such a leader in J.S. Woodsworth. Not only did he easily identify with the down and out but he exemplified the kind of life and society sought by the dispossessed. "Powerless in themselves, they saw in Woodsworth the mobilization of ideals which seemed to promise solutions to their problems." (Young, Anatomy, 158) The B.C. party, on the other hand, had an intellectual cleric and part-time botanist, Robert Connell as leader. While he and Woodsworth had much in common Connell was never able to rise above his essential intellectualism. He was never able to provide the inspirational leadership the party needed. Both Connell and the party suffered from his selection. A power struggle which Connell was not able to contain split the party and Connell was subjected to incessant harassment and criticism.

Then in 1936 the party was thrown into chaos by Connell's denunciation of party convention decisions as impractical and fantastic. The "Connell Affair", as these circumstances became known, was a response to left wing control of the party as determined by the 1936 convention. Culminating three years of internecine struggle, it started as an attempt by right wing members to assert influence on party decisions, but ended with the expulsion of Connell and two other M.L.A.'s and the resignation of a fourth.

Connell's actions were thoroughly rejected as unacceptable because of the manner of his taking them. By questioning convention decisions he challenged the value of membership participation in policy making. It
was a challenge a socialist party could not tolerate without throwing into jeopardy one of the main reasons for its existence. Connell thus failed to assert the influence he wanted or bring about the discussion of party policy he thought was needed. And he became another example in this period of a leader rejected by his party.

Our concern with the "Connell Affair" has been to understand the conditions which gave rise to the actions of Connell, to ascertain what determined the outcome of the "Affair" and to see how the party was affected by the conflict. The approach has been to divide the paper into three parts. The first deals with the background of the CCF in B.C. and indicates the conditions which ensured an important role for conflict within the party. The second discusses the manifestations of conflict and the "Connell Affair" itself. The third section discusses the affect of this conflict on the party's electoral image and its ideology.

The terms party and movement are used extensively in this paper and to some extent interchangeably. This is because the CCF was a combination of party and movement. The differences should nevertheless be noted and the analysis Young (Anatomy, 3-4) gives is applicable.

Whereas the "pure" party seeks electoral victory, the movement seeks some major social change or reform. The program the party presents to the electorate is designed as a means to victory. The program of the movement is an expression of its ultimate ideals and goals. Success for a party necessarily includes success at the polls; for a movement the same is not true in that its goals may be achieved by another agency stimulated by the mere existence of the movement.
As a final comment special mention must be made of the assistance given by various people. Most important has been that given by my thesis advisor, Professor Walter D. Young. His courses, criticisms, writing and encouragement have added immeasurably to this work. I wish also to thank Professors Don Blake, and Alan Cairns and Jeremy Wilson for their time and advice; Ron Shaw and David Winterford for their tolerance and Kathy Ratz for her patience. The errors and omissions in this paper are, of course, mine.
PART I

THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

At its beginning the British Columbia section of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation was marked by the diversity of its many points of origin. Like its federal counterpart the constituent groups of the provincial organization were drawn together more by their common aversion to the capitalist system than by a common vision of an ideal society. There existed, certainly, "a shared belief in the need for a cooperative commonwealth". But it was "a common recognition of the inadequacies of the existing system to provide even the necessities of life" that rendered in the heat of the Depression the substance from which the party was to be built. The British Columbia party provided the opportunity for groups as diverse as monetary reformers and Marxist socialists to come together in common cause. And through the intervention of a federal structure which mediated potentially explosive situations, the coexistence of the groups continued despite the fundamental differences which separated them.

The B.C.-CCF was formed in 1932 in the wake of the two conventions which organized the federal party. Initially the sole member of the party was the Socialist Party of Canada (B.C. Section), but within months it had been joined by the Reconstruction Party. The B.C.-CCF then had left and right wing anchors of a structure that would persist until 1935. The party's founding member, the Socialist Party of Canada, had the stronger lineage and ideological convictions of the two affiliates. Comprised of two ideological groups—Marxist and democratic socialists, both of which were to the left of the Reconstruction Party—it became the citadel of the
B.C.-CCF's left wing and its concern for ideological purity. This concern fell primarily to the Marxists, a small but vocal, articulate and persistent band of individuals committed to the letter and execution of Marxian socialist principles.

The lineage of the Socialist Party could be traced back through parent organizations to labour and socialist groups of the early 1900's. The Marxist faction in the party, headed by Wallis Lefeaux, Ernest Winch and A.M. Stephen, traced their Marxist affinity to an older Socialist party of Canada. This party emerged in 1904 as a doctrinaire socialist party and died in the mid 1920's leaving a powerful and romantic legacy of persecution and martyrdom. The moderates in the Socialist Party drew strength from their association with earlier labour parties. Angus MacInnis, in particular, played a leading role in the formation and development of these parties and it was his stewardship which had carried labourism through the politically dismal days of the 1920's. He was joined in his moderate socialism by Robert Skinner and Arthur Turner. Their socialism was pragmatic, Fabian and anti-communist.

The predecessors of the Socialist Party were the Independent Labour Party (Socialist), the Independent Labour Party, and the Federated Labour Party. In the F.L.P. and the I.L.P. MacInnis' brand of labourism and democratic socialism had prevailed. But with the onslaught of the Depression and MacInnis' election to Ottawa as a federal Member of Parliament and his consequent absence from B.C., Winch and Lefeaux moved the party to the left while strengthening the party's organization and ideological convictions. By 1934 the Marxists had gained control of the Socialist
The second affiliate of the B.C.-CCF—the Reconstruction Party—originated from the Vancouver branch of the League for Social Reconstruction. The Reconstruction Party merged in August 1933 with another new group, the Cooperative Commonwealth Clubs, to become the Associated CCF Clubs. In the process of becoming the "right wing" anchor of the B.C.-CCF, the Associated Clubs provided another dimension to the ideological tension that was soon to mark the B.C.-CCF and a vehicle through which the leadership of reformers W.A. Pritchard and Robert Connell found expression.

The nature of the Associated Clubs remained consistent through its evolution prior to amalgamation with the Socialist Party in 1935 and so did much of its leadership. But as the Clubs organization evolved it took on a more overtly political expression, tightened its structure and narrowed its focus. The major concern of the L.S.R., an essentially academic organization, was with the dislocation resulting from the Depression; as the Reconstruction Party and later the Associated Clubs it embraced the policies and platform of the national CCF.

The composition of the Associated Clubs differed markedly from that of the Socialist Party. The ideological boundaries of the Clubs were more fluid, less dogmatic. The Clubs were comprised of reform, not revolutionary groups and could easily accept within their fold the many persuasions of reform doctrines currently popular. This ideological flexibility brought acute concern to the purists of the Socialist Party but this flexibility provided the Clubs with their strength and resistance to change was great.

Socialist Party personnel dominated much of the B.C.-CCF's executive
through the 1933-36 period. Initially the executive was drawn from the two main affiliates and the moderates from the Socialist Party and the Associated Clubs controlled party deliberations. In the 1933-35 period Robert Skinner, John Price, Arthur Turner of the Socialist Party and Bill Pritchard, Victor Midgley, Dorothy Steeves and Grant MacNeil of the Associated Clubs exerted a moderating influence on executive proceedings of the CCF. But in 1935, radicals Ernest Winch, George Weaver, Herbert Gargrave and Lyle Telford joined Wallis Lefeaux on the executive leaving only a rump moderate group of Arnold Webster, Grant MacNeil and W.E. Turner. By 1936 Arthur Turner was the only moderate of note on the party executive.

The presence of Socialist Party personnel on the CCF's executive ensured that some prominence would be given to ideological considerations and that tension would result as left wing members stressed the diversity rather than the commonality of ideological positions. This prominence underlined, moreover, the importance of an ideology to a socialist party.

Ideology is important to all parties as it provides members with a way of viewing themselves and interpreting social and political events. It justifies the party's existence, determines how the party will meet issues and holds the party together. It also provides the party with an image. But the central importance of an ideology to a party resides in the attitude of its adherents to prevailing social norms. The further one is from these norms the greater need there is for an alternative set of norms and the more important this alternative becomes. For the socialist in a capitalist society the ideology validates the need and prescribes the means for a fundamental change in social values and beliefs. It thus
becomes more important to a socialist party than to a Liberal or Conservative party whose positions accept and generally defend prevailing values. And, not surprisingly, it becomes the touchstone to which contending forces of power appeal in the absence of agreement on leadership and direction.

The CCF split into two camps regarding the meaning and role of ideology in the party. Favouring greater cooperation with those who sought a moderate change in the social and economic structures of the country and thus willing to modify and moderate socialist doctrine were Socialist Party members Robert Skinner, also president of the B.C.-CCF 1933-35; Arthur Turner, president of the Socialist Party in 1933; and Angus MacInnis, CCF MP. But apprehensive about the influence of reform groups and thinking on doctrinal purity and consequently opposed to cooperation except on terms designed to strictly protect that purity were the Marxists Wallis Lefeaux, Ernest Winch and A.M. Stephen. It was a dispute initially restricted to the Socialist Party.

Steeves relates the concern of Marxist Ernest Winch:

He feared that the revolutionary purpose of socialism would be bogged down in the reforms which were advocated... He felt that the movement would be overwhelmed by an influx of emotional converts, uneducated in socialist theory, possibly seeking political preferment.

Socialist Party concern focused to a large extent on the Associated Clubs. Wallis Lefeaux indicated left wing anxiety:

...as far as I can make out the socialist principles of the party are in a very rudimentary state. They become quite alarmed at the mention of "Socialism" and insist upon all kinds of planks in the provincial platform which, in my opinion, will be extremely difficult for us to explain.

...In my opinion they are nothing more than a bunch of left wing liberals.
But Angus MacInnis outlined the moderates' position and the one that would prevail.

It is rather too bad that we are not having the unstinted cooperation of Lefeaux, Winch and Stephen. I think they are very short-sighted. The movement will have to be built out of the material we have at hand. We cannot make our material and then create our organization.

There are two things we must be aware of: First, activity and office seeking without some understanding of the fundamentals of economics. The second...is education without activity. To suppose that we can formulate a program and put it into effect because it is reasonable and feasible without a struggle, and without changing the basis of human society, is childish. And it is equally childish to think that you can educate people in various abstractions, and that the new Social Order will fall as ripe fruit into our hands.  

As a young political party with a strong movement component the CCF found itself an organization in which ideological diversity rather than agreement was the rule. Its ideological make-up reflected the cross-currents of political opinion that constituted the opposition to the capitalist system in the province. But while the party provided a focal point around which groups could coalesce it failed to unify that opposition to the extent that agreement on direction and leadership was possible. Furthermore, the distance which separated the ideologies of the groups and individuals guaranteed there would be discord regarding the direction of the CCF and the composition of its leadership. It was disagreement complicated, moreover, by the nature of leadership in a socialist party.

There is little agreement as to what constitutes leadership but there seems to be a general consensus that leadership "is a relationship between one or more persons exercising influence (i.e. the leader) and one or more persons submitting to that influence (followers)". As
Dion points out, leadership is best seen as a pattern, in particular, a "circular mode of interaction" involving the exercise of "authority, status, and power of every member in relation to other members".21

Leadership exists in large measure to satisfy individual expectations and collective needs that are reflected in group norms and aspirations.22 The qualities consequently valued in leaders relate to their ability "to reflect group norms and aspirations with an added aptitude for improving group standards and performance".23 Leadership also emerges as a focus around which group formation and motivation can take place. It is thus largely relative to a situation, being "both a function of the social situation and a function of personality, as well as a function of the two in interaction".24 And, in the final analysis, leadership is legitimized not by the organization but rather by the leader's adherence to group norms.25

The leaders of a political party are in no way immune from the application of these factors. Their freedom of action is clearly restricted by group norms and, in particular, by the nature of the party's ideology, the extent and attitude of its membership, and the constitution of the party.26 These restrictions vary, furthermore, in accordance with individual leader's personalities and the pressures exerted by electoral exigencies.27 The men that comprised the ruling elite of the B.C.-CCF were influential for reasons outlined by Michels.28 Robert Connell, W.A. Pritchard, Ernest Winch and Lyle Telford demonstrated those qualities which Michels describes as requisite to leadership which included oratorical and journalistic skills, prestige, and a wider extent of knowledge
(especially of party affairs and personalities) and a "catonian strength of conviction". What Young has to say about the federal party applies equally to our discussion:

...oratorical skills were of great importance in a party which placed such emphasis on discussion... also important was control of the organs of publication and communication in the party....Of equal importance is the fact that as the party grew in size, those known as either "names" or as personalities in the party stood the best chance for re-election. This alone is enough to ensure continuity in office....

Dominance by the party leaders was inevitable because the CCF retained some of the characteristics of a movement and required personalities for focus....These...figures gave the movement its character and image for most of its members.

Thus it is not surprising that the editor and folk hero of the Winnipeg General Strike, W.A. Pritchard, should emerge as a leader in the party. Nor was it surprising that Socialist Party organizer and well-known fighter for the underdog, E.E. Winch, and orator and party propagandist Dr. Lyle Telford should do so as well. But the emergence of an intellectual cleric and part-time botanist Robert Connell as a leader was somewhat unusual. Although he was an effective speaker, he lacked the closeness to party growth, the familiarity with party affairs and personalities and the personal ambition that one would expect in a leader. And he was not well known outside his constituency of Victoria.

It is the paramountcy of ideology at the expense of leadership prerogative that distinguishes leadership in a socialist party; it is the converse which marks the elite party. The importance of the ideology thus affects its priority in the schema of considerations facing a party and its leadership. While it is generally recognized that the winning
of elections is the primary function of a political party, the degree to which the ideology is significant fashions and qualifies this consideration. For a socialist party with combination of movement and party features the impact of the ideology on the central task of winning elections is great. For an elite party in which the ideology has a secondary role the impact is minor. The socialist party leader is consequently circumscribed in his actions by the diagnosis and prescription enunciated in party ideology to a greater extent than an elite party leader. He is in this sense less effective, for the elite party leader responding to a largely undefined ideology has the scope necessary to respond to the political exigencies he faces. In the absence of an elucidation of party ideology he can shift policy to catch the changing winds of popular opinion and thus more efficiently pursue party goals. Further, a dominant strain of democratic involvement which flows through and out of the socialist ideology ensures the active involvement of the rank and file and thus acts as a check against the nonfulfillment of this relationship.

The CCF at national and provincial levels had a democratic structure that was the product of an ideology which saw democracy as both a goal to be achieved and as an essential means to achieving that goal. Control of the party's leadership which naturally issued from this structure was embedded in the party's constitution and found expression at conventions in the selection of leaders and their commitment to an accounting of activities. This accounting was an exercise which had to be undertaken for it was an important point of distinction between
democratic and elite parties. But it was an arrangement of mixed blessings to party leaders.

While heightening the difficulty of providing leadership for the party in terms of allowable prerogative, the democratic structure also gave rise to free and often heated expressions of opinion. It was verbal enthusiasm frequently unaccompanied by a corresponding concern for its affect on the party's image and electoral credibility. Furthermore, as those who sought the greatest change tended to be the most vocal and articulate this feature of the party created problems of considerable degree for its leaders. Ill considered statements could only interfere with attempts to successfully spread the party's gospel.

On the other hand, however, this exercise meant that challenges to the party's leadership made outside this context tended to lack legitimacy. The CCF did not suffer from the coups which mark elite parties largely because the party's structure allowed for dissent and members consequently took a dim view of attempts to change leadership which violated this procedural norm. In this sense a leader of a socialist party is more secure if he accepts and adequately deals with challenges made and attempted in convention. He is more secure in another sense too. Despite the restraint he has to face as a result of the party's ideology he is immune to a degree not present in elite parties from the influence of electoral failure. For the socialist party leader, unlike the elite party leader, it is to some extent the adherence to the party's ideology and not his electoral popularity alone that determines in the eyes of the rank and file whether his stewardship
has been a success and should continue. Thus it is the adherence to party ideology and its procedural dictates that largely determines leadership continuity in a socialist party.

While the party's ideology and the expectations of the membership complicated and restricted the role of leadership its structure further reduced the effectiveness of that role. This was largely deliberate. Members of the left wing noted several times their low regard for leaders and the importance of the movement component with its high level of membership participation reinforced this attitude. As a result the CCF eschewed the office of party leader favouring instead that of House leader and party president. Furthermore, the House leader, like all members, was subject to the disciplinary control of the convention and, more importantly, of the provincial executive. The convention could strip him of either his membership or title; the executive of his membership and concomitantly his title. This surrogate power became clearer in 1936 when this control was written into party policy and later when House leader Connell was expelled by the executive. But the significance of this division of power lay not so much in this disciplinary control, at least not until 1936, but rather in the prominence it gave to the role of the president of the provincial executive. If the president and House leader agreed on fundamentals, as was the case from 1933 to 1936 no real problems arose with respect to pronouncements of party policy. But when antagonistic personalities occupied these roles as Telford and Connell did in 1936, the role of House leader was particularly difficult, if not frustrating. And, further, the party's federal structure fragmented the party and its oligarchy thereby weakening the House
leader's position.

Robert Michels and others have shown that with increased democracy a party tends to become more bureaucratic to efficiently pursue its goals. On the assumption that the logic of a political party lies in winning elections then an extensive bureaucracy is needed to compensate for the party's democratic structure and to allow the party to expand its base and compete effectively with other parties. With this increase in organizational power there thus ensues the tendency for the party's leadership to constitute itself as an oligarchy that is technically necessary and then irremovable. A democratic structure then is something of a two-edged sword: while actively involving the membership it reduces the effectiveness of that involvement by necessitating an oligarchy and thus reinforcing the position of the leaders.

In the B.C.-CCF, however, expression was initially through practices such as an emphasis on education more akin to features of a movement and the organizational aspects of the party remained less significant. The ruling elite, as a result, was subjected to close scrutiny with little corresponding aid from organizational pressures that would have buttressed their position. But, if the oligarchic tendencies of the party have to be qualified by this important consideration, it remains true nevertheless that an oligarchy did exist but one lacking the solidarity of composition and power that Michels and Young describe. Its existence is simply accounted for in terms of the tendency for leaders to extend common control and by the unity of purpose that was provided both by the opposition to the capitalist system and, to a
lesser extent, by the desire for electoral success.

These structural restrictions on the exercise of leadership underlined the need for close cooperation among members of the oligarchy if tension resulting from ideological diversity and the nascent state of the party was to be circumvented. But cooperation was not forthcoming as discord marked relations among important party leaders. While ideological diversity itself accounts for some of this discord, personality differences were clearly more important. Furthermore, it is difficult if not impossible to compare the importance of these two factors. As Duverger indicates, \(^43\) there is a confusing aspect to personal feuds in an ideological party as these disputes often take expression through an ideological context. There were, nevertheless, clear personality differences in the CCF's leadership elite—differences which were largely expressed in ideological terms but which seem more often to be personal than ideological.

Personality discord involved Bill Pritchard, Ernest Winch, Lyle Telford and Robert Connell. It was discord heightened by the alliances Telford and Winch, Connell and Pritchard had entered. And it had roots pre-dating the CCF.

Winch and Pritchard had been involved in the radical politics of the One Big Union in the post war period. \(^44\) Favouring direct political action by the unions—a general strike if necessary—they opposed the more conventional path of reform engineered through labour parties. \(^45\) Winch, Pritchard and others were successful in convincing labour organizations that craft unions, the Trades and Labour Council and political
action had failed the western Canadian working class. The One Big Union was established: Pritchard was chosen to sit on the executive. Winch as secretary of the Lumber-Workers units represented almost one-third of the O.B.U.'s membership.

The life of the O.B.U. was short. Never able to get beyond a Western foothold, it suffered attacks from the American Federation of Labor, the jailing of its most able leaders following the Winnipeg General Strike and harassment by the Federal Government. In September 1921 in a dispute over the autonomy of affiliates and the payment of fees, the loggers pulled out contributing to the collapse of the union.

The confrontation with the loggers was bitter. Winch opposed the centralization of the O.B.U. which had been chiefly the work of Pritchard and Victor Midgley. Pritchard, writing from Stony Mountain Prison where he was under sentence for his activities in the Winnipeg General Strike, maintained that Winch's actions, if adopted by all, would lead to chaos. Midgley, meanwhile, claimed that the withdrawal of the loggers was a good thing for the O.B.U. as they were simply troublemakers. Unfortunately, this disagreement did not die with the O.B.U. Unable to agree on tactics—the constant bane of socialist movements—and frustrated by the course of events affecting the O.B.U., the organization's leadership dissolved leaving lasting hard feelings.

During the 1920's neither Winch nor Pritchard was very active in provincial politics. But Pritchard became active in the Reconstruction Party in the Thirties as interest in the CCF mushroomed. With the onset of the Depression Winch became active once again, forming a local
of the I.L.P.—the predecessor of the Socialist Party—in Burnaby. At the 1930 I.L.P. convention he was elected party organizer. Winch then moved to strengthen the structure and ideological convictions of the I.L.P. and help confirm the party as a socialist rather than a labour party.

Pritchard, on the other hand, was largely responsible for the expansion of the Reconstruction Party and the CCF Clubs. He was president of the Associated CCF Clubs following the merger of the Reconstruction Party and the CCF Clubs in August 1933. Thus while strengthening the relative strength of reformism in the province, he confirmed his opposition to the ideological stance of the Socialist Party in general and Ernest Winch in particular. When in 1933 Pritchard went one step further and with CCF blessing established his own newspaper, The Commonwealth, Winch's annoyance was noted. With Winch's son Harold as editor of the Socialist Party's paper, the B.C. Clarion and Prichard the editor of The Commonwealth, the papers of the party became extensions of the Winch-Pritchard dispute and carried that discord to the rest of the party.

The other increasingly important personal conflict was that which involved Lyle Telford and Robert Connell. It was this which cemented Connell's frustration in 1936 when Telford was elected president of the provincial executive committee on a platform Connell could not support.

Connell was chosen Legislative House leader of the CCF following the 1933 Provincial election in which the CCF took seven of the forty-seven seats and became the official Opposition. A retired Anglican
clergyman, he entered politics as an outraged yet studied Christian who saw his world and its values of moderation, tradition, charity and brotherhood destroyed by an economic system that placed private consumption and waste before social necessity. A guild socialist initially, Connell was to revert more systematically to that creed as he became disillusioned with party politics.

Connell was the leading spokesman in the party of those who believed that democratic socialism and Christianity were compatible. He argued, in fact, that the latter was possible only with the former because it was only then that cooperation and social necessity could assume the social roles ascribed to them in Christian doctrine. In this respect he drew strength from the social gospel tradition which had been an influential factor in labour, religious, agrarian and political developments from the late 1890's until the mid 1920's. In its wake was left a legacy which found expression notably in the radical politics of J.S. Woodsworth and the Ginger Group, a precursor of the national CCF.

The social gospel was "a call for men to find the meaning of their lives in seeking the kingdom of God in the very fabric of society". For Connell the question of participation was viewed this way:

We stand at one of the great crises of history when everybody has a vital, burning interest in what we have to decide. It is a question today of brotherhood and justice in human society. ...what is needed is the great revival of social religion. ...he contended the church had an obligation to teach people that Christ actually meant His kingdom should be established on earth.
It was thus as a critic of capitalism and advocate of Christian brotherhood that Connell was known. His connection with the CCF started with his nomination in 1933; his election to leadership was a consequence of his moderate image.\textsuperscript{69} It was a leadership due more to his reputation than to his party activities. But he also drew strength from his style as speaker;

He showed himself a pastmaster in the difficult art of handling an audience, not by the obvious methods of stunning his listeners into attention by dynamic and emotional oratory, or by a facile presentation of what they wished to hear; but by creating an atmosphere of serene and thoughtful receptivity, in which he is able to put across his ideas.\textsuperscript{70}

The style of Lyle Telford was in marked contrast. Telford was the man chiefly responsible for the success of the CCF Clubs and it was during the 1930's as he travelled throughout the province soliciting support for the socialist cause in B.C. that his reputation grew. A long time socialist, Telford was an effective and colorful speaker who consistently drew large crowds. His constant theme at meetings and in The Challenge, the paper he published, was the need for common ownership of the factors of production, distribution and exchange.\textsuperscript{71} Although he was later and more systematically to advocate gradual reform rather than the wide-scale transformation of society, in the early years he spoke of the need for communism: the term being used synonymously by the I.L.P.'s left wing for socialism.\textsuperscript{72}

Telford made effective use of radio. Clark reports:

It is said that on the farms of the Fraser Valley there was a "Telford Time"—a brief interlude which saw the labourers leave the chores to gather about the radio and listen with great interest, to the words of one of the most effective
evangelists of socialism to appear on the B.C. scene.

Telford was a great propagandist for the movement and as later developments indicated for his own theories as well. His effectiveness as a speaker gathered around him a large following enabling him to remain independent, when he chose, of party dictates. In the early years, however, most of his energies were expended on behalf of the socialist cause. Ernest Winch recounted his importance in a report to the Socialist Party in 1933:

"Organization work has been carried on unremittingly. In this respect too much acknowledgement and appreciation cannot be accorded to Comrade Lyle Telford whose energy and enthusiasm has been and continues unbounded...He has cleared and prepared fertile soil for our seeding."

He exhibited the oratorical gifts, force of will and self sufficiency which Michels notes. As indicated in a small sketch of him in The Commonwealth:

"...on the platform he generally speaks with the air of a family physician diagnosing the condition of a patient...."

Clark also notes that he had

"...a certain "news sense" as well as the ability to popularize and humanize doctrines which in the hands of less vital orators were given drab expression."

His strength of conviction was given full and expressive reign in a column written for The Commonwealth after his paper had merged with it.

"Nothing can withstand the determination of a people. If they determine on (sic) social ownership, then social ownership they will attain. It is the half hearted resolutions, the nebulous objectives, the doubt, the fearfulness--and not the capitalist--that constitute the greatest obstacles today."

But Telford's popularity reinforced his tendency to pursue goals
designed to resolve his particular needs. His continued independent stance regarding the operations of his radio broadcasts exasperated the CCF executive who were attempting to control all such party activity in order to reduce public confusion about the CCF's position on public issues. His support of Social Credit monetary policy, while other party executives openly campaigned against it, was an especially acute source of strain. 79 Despite the embarrassment that such a position inevitably incurred for the party and its other spokesmen, Telford persisted, aiding confusion in public debates about party aims.

There is also evidence that Telford was highly vocal in his criticism of the party's leadership. On one occasion criticism was levelled against Connell at a meeting of the legislative group which resulted in a reprimand for Telford from the provincial executive. 80 Telford's lack of concern for the effect of his statements on party unity was underlined by provincial executive attempts to control his broadcasts. Telford's position was that as he was responsible for raising the money for the programs, responsibility for what was broadcast was his. The executive's view was that Telford's close identification with the CCF and his frequent endorsement of it, created the impression that the opinions he was expressing were those of the executive. This was often not the case. When, for instance, he supported the candidacy of Liberal Gerry McGeer for mayor of Vancouver in 1934, he was asked to justify his actions before the Executive. Telford expressed the opinion, after the disapproval of the Executive had been recorded, that his personal affairs were not the concern of the CCF. 81 Unsuccessful attempts were also made in March and April 1935 to bring his radio broadcasting under the direct control of the CCF. 82
The Telford-Connell conflict developed indirectly through the confusion and frustration created by Telford's independence and directly through his criticism of Connell's leadership. It is also likely that Telford's glib manner irritated Connell. The conflict was, furthermore, given support by the close working relationship between Telford and the Winches and the part Ernest played in intensifying the frustration Connell felt regarding his House leadership.

In an important sense Winch was more responsible for left and right wing discord than Telford and this applies in particular to the animosity Connell had for the left wing. Winch made little secret of the fact that he was annoyed that Connell was chosen House leader. Winch had expected and wanted the post for himself. But while the Socialist Party executive had nominated Winch for the position and six of the seven M.L.A.'s were members of the Socialist Party, the Legislative Group selected Connell because of his moderation and the CCF Provincial Executive concurred. Winch undoubtedly found the reasoning behind Connell's election distasteful. This was particularly so since he believed his expression of socialism was the correct version for the province as it had a more "scientific" basis and deeper roots.

Nor did Winch's annoyance stop there. Steeves notes that Winch as CCF organizer wrote to all corners of the province setting forth Connell's shortcomings. Winch and Connell viewed the CCF from opposite vantage points. Winch believed, during this time, that the legislature was to be used for propagandizing a Marxist analysis of social ills. The legislature gave socialist members, he believed, the opportunity to educate the public--
a function he saw as the main purpose of the CCF. But Connell, as House leader, was committed to constructive criticism, workable programs and the election of a CCF government and he took unkindly to the Marxian rhetoric. Winch's promotion of united front activities with the Communist Party, in contrast to what Connell believed to be the best interests of the CCF, added further tension to their relationship.

Unique to the final set of personality discord—that between Pritchard and Telford—was these men's private ownership of semi-official party organs. Pritchard owned and controlled The Commonwealth; Telford a radio program named after his defunct newspaper The Challenge. While ideological differences and attitudes to Connell's leadership separated them, Telford frequently, publicly and hypocritically criticized the private ownership of The Commonwealth. As evidenced by Commonwealth editorials this contributed more than any other single factor to the animosity between the men.

Added important consideration in these personal relationships is due the Winch-Telford alliance. While Winch was the man most responsible for Connell's frustrations as leader, and the one who had made it clear he wanted Connell's job, it was Telford who, because of his oratorical ability, publicly incarnated most of the opposition to Connell's leadership. When Telford was elected president of the provincial executive in 1936 with the help of Winch the degree of the Winch-Telford liaison became obvious. But, if one considers the ideological differences between Telford and Winch—the former a political opportunist more than a socialist; the latter a determined and committed Marxist—then the alliance appears less ideological than personal. Certainly "Telford's railing coupled with Winch's religious fervor", was an effective working relationship which
the left noticed early. Furthermore, Telford had an obviously independent nature and had considerably aided the growth of the CCF in B.C. And as events later showed both Telford and the Winches had designs on the House leadership and were willing to do battle for it. The Telford-Winch arrangement thus suggests that this alliance and the conflict between left and right wings of the party had the clear overtones of a power struggle based as much on personal ambition as on ideological rectitude. The nature of the party meant that the struggle would appear ideological. It also meant that Telford's oratorical ability and the Winches' effective party work would be a potent alliance. But it was a relationship based on a transcendence of ideology which undercut the importance of ideological considerations. It was a practical but tentative alliance designed to work to common advantage in the struggle against the Connell-Pritchard faction.

The unification of affiliates emerged as a simplified version of the larger problem of reconciling structural, ideological and personal differences in the CCF. But the democratic nature of the party's structure and the paramountcy of its ideology reinforced and gave vent to deep-rooted suspicion and concern for the ideological purity of the party and the possible gain by antagonistic personalities. Thus structural change—the need for the party to grow beyond its nascent state—tied together the various expressions of intra-party tension. Discord regarding leadership and direction which one would normally expect from such development was heightened by this impinging tension. And as structural development provided a channel for tension the importance of the leadership
question increased as did the potential for damage to the party.

The federal structure which had been necessitated by the divergence within CCF ranks at its inception presented problems that affected the CCF's ability to educate and organize. There was not only a duplication of effort and energy as a consequence of this structure but also a persistence of often contradictory points of view. From the point of view of the movement there was need for a greater proselytising of party doctrine; for the party a stronger organization and electoral image was needed. For both party and movement there was thus need for a change in structure.

With pressure for a merging of affiliates mounting, discord sharpened regarding the crucial questions of direction and leadership. And as the moderates' influence in the Socialist Party declined greater polarization between the Socialist Party and the Clubs resulted. The response of Socialist Party radicals was one designed to protect the ideological integrity of the Socialist Party, and their own leadership. Additionally, it had to cope with the growing defection of Branch memberships to the Associated Clubs. The path chosen by this group, the Winch-Lefeaux-Stephen faction, was the strengthening of party organization in preparation for the possibility of a break with the CCF. This position was reinforced by the election of a left wing slate to the Socialist Party's executive in January, 1934, and the continued vigilant determination and sometimes dithyrambic attacks of secretary-treasurer Winch. By May, 1934 reports reaching MacInnis indicated that such a break had become an imminent possibility.
The course of action favoured by Socialist Party moderates and the Associated Clubs was complete merger. By June signs indicated that this course of action would prevail as the danger of a split had passed with the idea of a merger being accepted with qualifications by the purists. This shift became more evident over the next few months as the cautious call for a reappraisal of the Socialist Party's position was made by its radical executive.

An October mass meeting of Socialist Party members rejected merger although the Clubs had voted overwhelmingly in favour. But at the Socialist Party convention the following January a resolution passed asking for another referendum. Legitimizing the executive's tacit approval for such a move, Socialist Party president Lefeaux indicated that the previous Clubs' vote was proof of the strength of socialism as they were voting to "identify themselves with the irreconcilable S.P. of C." Winch's position was somewhat veiled. He noted in his secretary-treasurer's report:

In view of the rapid and far-reaching developments now taking place within the structure of Capitalism and the possible nature of conditions with which the working class may shortly be confronted, we suggest this Convention devote some consideration to the Socialist Movement as a whole, the place of the CCF within that Movement, the Provincial organization (B.C. Section) with its present makeup and future possibilities, and the part and place of the S.P. of C. and its membership within (or without) the federation."

The report would appear to be a call to arms for Socialist Party stalwarts to rally behind party principles so that the new party could be held within the firm grasp of Socialist Party leaders.

Winch's report to the merger convention held in July reiterated
party confidence in statements emphasizing the past and future importance to the rank and file and the public of the fundamentals of Marxian analysis. The annunciation was left, however, until after this convention in which the Socialist Party captured six of the nine executive positions. The *B.C. Clarion*, the official paper of the Socialist Party, editorialized:

...the merger has resulted in the whole movement in this province swinging definitely into line with the former Socialist Party and becoming a revolutionary class-conscious organization.

In the shifting of position regarding merger the Socialist Party executive indicated their realization that greater opportunity for doctrinal and personal success lay, in the long run, in the CCF. Socialist Party leaders while responding to the defection of some of their members must have felt that their educational policies had been effective with Associated Club members. They must have thought, too, that their organizational structure was strong enough to assure control, or at least a commanding voice, in CCF policy decision making. Wilson is likely accurate, as well, when he suggests that Socialist Party fervency would likely be expected to drive a certain number of "undesirables" from the party. Furthermore, the majority of Socialist Party rank and file favoured merger. Clearly embedded in the move to merger was not a reconciliation of attitudes; rather a tactical change to avoid disaster. It was thus a change in tactics, not tack.

Left wing ideological predilections and optimism with respect to the fortunes of Marxian socialism were not shared by the moderates of
the Socialist Party, the leaders of the Associated Clubs, nor, apparently by the delegates to the merger convention. The Associated Clubs under the leadership of Bill Pritchard continued to press for a policy of gradualism. Earlier he had stressed a commitment to the Regina Manifesto and constitutional change. He had also favoured policies which would encourage an expanded base of electoral support and which would reflect responses to peculiarly Canadian and British Columbian problems. But the conquest could not, he maintained, be at any price:

We have no desire to delude unthinking people merely because of the weight of present discontent, into voting for something they neither want nor understand.

Following the merger convention support for the Manifesto and constitutional change continued with increased frequency and the leadership of Robert Connell was unequivocally endorsed. It was a position generally favoured by Socialist Party moderates.

The convention was ambivalent towards policy direction. While it elected six of the nine executive from the left wing faction, the convention refused affiliation with the Communist front League Against War and Fascism and refused to endorse any united front with the Communist Party—moves supported by the left wing. It did, however, reaffirm its affiliation and common objective with the national CCF in the new constitution.

The commitment of the right wing to a policy of gradualism consistent with the Regina Manifesto and the national party contrasted sharply to the left wing's support of revolutionary Marxian socialism. And both were convinced that the majority of party members supported their position.
ambition and was given credence by perceptions of support.

The merger of affiliates was consummated with the adoption of a new constitution and its acceptance by the Socialist Party. The unitary form of party structure provided a solution to some of the problems stemming from the origins of the B.C.-CCF. The federal structure was too costly in terms of the utilization of available party support and the effect on the party's image of the squabbles, confusion, and contradictory positions. The move to a unitary structure had to occur, moreover, for it was, of necessity, the first step in the reconciliation and strengthening of the forces opposing the capitalist system.

But while the merger signalled the success of attempts to give the B.C.-CCF coherence and direction, there were embedded in that success many unresolved ideological and personal contradictions. Furthermore, in the transferral of strain to the new party structure a new focus with respect to the leadership arose. The oligarchy was no longer fragmented along and within party lines, but rather solely within the single party structure. Tension which had given rise to discord over the direction, style and personnel, of the CCF's leadership prior to the merger was no longer divided with respect to the three parties; it was now confined to the CCF.
Leadership conflict is not unique to an ideological party. It is, however, likely to be more obvious if the party has a democratic structure which ensures membership participation and open discussions. But although leadership conflict is a typical aspect of leadership exercise, the CCF in B.C. was marked by more than enough leadership tensions to ensure discord. Not only was there stress resulting from the nascent state of the party, but there was also tension because of the degree of diversity which separated groups and individuals in the party and the personal ambition of some of its leaders.

A weak parliamentary leadership role which was a consequence of this nascency and the democratic structure allowed and undoubtedly invited countervailing forces to develop against the House leader. While the House leader lacked the security of a stabilized role the absence of that stability likely decreased his legitimacy as well. The party's structure, moreover, allowed challenges to be made to the leadership and provided positions from which those challenges could be constantly and effectively mounted. Thus the CCF's left wing could go before the party's convention, receive its support through the election of leaders to the provincial executive and from there harass the right wing leadership of Robert Connell. The very existence of such opportunities likely encouraged challenges to Connell's leadership. Certainly they legitimized any such challenges.
In the CCF the meaning of these opportunities was great. While division resulted in discord regarding leadership performance and direction, discontent had an effective avenue for expression. This meant, moreover, that the party's convention would be the major arena for resolving any power struggle. It was here that party democracy had its fullest meaning in the reassertion of the reciprocal relationship between leaders and party members. It was in convention that leaders tested their strength and legitimized control. And in a divided oligarchy such as was in the CCF at the time it became the testing ground for the relative vitality of different group positions—it became the measure of control of party and direction.

The uncertainty and instability of party roles and the democratic structure of the party meant that involvement with rank and file members would be of central importance in determining the outcome of convention proceedings. Active fulfillment of party roles would be less important because it would be less meaningful to the party.

The 1935 party convention had given some insight into the importance of procedural considerations. The Commonwealth was led to comment:

...delegates exercised their right to absolutely frank discussion of the position of the executive and the parliamentary members in the movement to such an extent that Angus MacInnis and Rev. Robert Connell expressed surprise at hostility displayed to elected CCF representatives by some rank and file members.

At times hindering business, the procedure at least demonstrated the movement is run from "the bottom up" and not from "the top down". 121

The significance at this time of involvement with rank and file members was thus one which a leader ignored at the peril of his leadership. And
it was a feature which affected the caucus in general and its relationship to the party.

The influence of a caucus is an important source of support for a House leader. In a party heavily affected by ideological considerations and party affairs, the caucus, with its concern for the party's image and public support, provides some balance to overall party priorities. The influence of Connell's caucus was, however, circumscribed by the short duration of legislative sessions and the fact that they were in Victoria while the party's centre of power was Vancouver. The influence of the caucus, per se, was thus not considerable and the importance of party machinery in determining the outcome of convention deliberations was thereby heightened.

As a possible response to their active participation in party machinery and as an indication of a growing left-ward trend in the party, the 1935-36 executive was strongly left wing. Conditions were, consequently, ready-made for conflict with Connell and his right wing leadership striving for legitimacy while the left wing, ensconced in the executive had a base from which to attack Connell's policies and to try and achieve legitimacy for their own position.

Connell had maintained as early as 1933, following his election as House leader, that the CCF would follow a course of constructive criticism as the official opposition party in the House. The CCF, he said, would "aid not obstruct" governmental proceedings. These were statements which he continually made in his defence of constitutional reform. They were, he maintained, consistent with the logic of the Regina Manifesto.
Demands by the left wing, notably Ernest Winch, that constitutional means to change be breached if necessary as a result did not find favour in Connell's thinking. But he remained relatively quiet throughout 1934 and 1935 on these questions and about the criticism levelled at his leadership. His press statements, which were not numerous, were confined in the main to comments about party policy. But early in 1936, in his speech on the Budget, while outlining a proposal for a program for the CCF in B.C., Connell severely criticized the role of the Marxian socialists in the party.

In his remarks—comments prompted, he indicated, by observations made earlier to the House by Ernest Winch—he said:

It has been suggested—I think without due thought—that the CCF is dominated by what is known as Marxian socialism, which is claimed as peculiarly identified with the old Socialist Party of Canada in this province.... But the CCF has never tied itself to any political master in either economics or philosophy.

Marx, Connell maintained, was

...like other men...a product of his times and environment and must be considered in the light of them. Because I believe in scientific socialism I refuse to be tied to a nineteenth century orthodoxy.

Beginning a discussion of the preamble of the Regina Manifesto he continued:

...(There is) no word of proletarian dictatorship--no word of revolutionary tactics of militant mass action. 126

As he later indicated Connell believed the relationship of the Socialist Party to the CCF to be quite straightforward:

The Socialist Party accepted the National Manifesto of Regina and came into the Federation on that basis. The great majority of its membership are loyal to the Manifesto and are among the most valued members of the CCF today. But there exists a small minority, who apparently not satisfied with the merger, are trying to sow in the CCF the seeds of dissension... 127
Reaction to Connell's speech was mixed. Bruce Hutchison wrote that Connell had "now emerged as a major figure in our politics". In his description of the speech and the reaction of the House he noted:

He was calmly kicking the communists and direct-actionists downstairs, out of his party, and publicly spanking the Winches, father and son....

The elder Mr. Winch listened for some time, but finally left the House to keep an appointment up town. Young Mr. Winch, who was not mentioned by his leader but who had spoken in a fashion completely at variance with Mr. Connell's whole attitude, did not leave, but sat with folded arms and a black scowl. It was an occasion of quiet drama which the Liberal benches watched intently, hoping, perhaps, to profit later on by the division of their opponents. Apart from the Winches, the remaining CCF members beamed....

The Commonwealth, in a broader analysis was led to remark that Connell,...reluctantly accepting the position two years ago as Opposition leader had kept his eyes and ears open, his mouth shut, making observations of many things, and he had come to the conclusion that what the CCF needed was the confidence of the citizens of B.C. at this juncture.

As chief spokesman of the CCF in Parliament he felt a responsibility for maintaining the right attitude. It was a vital and important matter to realize that it was not merely an academic group but had definitely entered the political field for one purpose--to win the power of government in the province.

Connell had turned to directly challenge the legitimacy of the left wing position and its criticism of his leadership. That the challenge should appear first in the Legislative Assembly is not particularly surprising; it was in this forum as nowhere else that Connell's position was clearly superior.

An immediate reaction within the party to the Connell-Winch speeches was the resignation of Harold Winch as party whip. But more importantly, an escalation in the level of animosity had begun as
indicated in a series of intraparty exchanges. In a letter to Arnold Webster, W.E. Turner poetically called Connell's speech...

...soul inspiring....Connell had done the needful thing.... my whole body surged with new hope....we have reached the bridge; Connell...has led the way....dare we accept the challenge. Dare we leave the challenge unaccepted?  

Angus MacInnis' response to Turner's letter and the speeches by Winch and Connell indicated support for Connell's position but hastened to mention that two things needed to be done. First a careful handling of the situation was needed. Second, preparation had to begin for the provincial and to some extent the national convention. He added:

It is extremely important that those who believe as Connell does should not take any steps or any action that would, at the moment, split the movement....Adhere closely to the Constitution and the Manifesto....Nothing would suit the disruptive elements more than to have you bolt the movement....They may hope to make it so uncomfortable for you that you will leave of your own accord.  

Warning of the activities that could be expected from the left wing in preparation for the conventions he continued

You are already quite familiar with the machine tactics of Winch and Weaver....If you people do not get busy the coming convention will be hand picked and will speak and vote according to the instructions received from Winch.

The situation must be put clearly....we are now at the parting of the ways. We can go on building our movement in strength and numbers or we can break it up into fragments by following the will of-the-wisp theoretical doctrine that does not at all fit in with the situation that we are dealing with. 

The left wing believed it had a right and duty to accept Connell's challenge; a challenge which was not seen as a response to left wing criticism. In a note to Provincial Executive President, Arnold Webster, the Winches asked and asserted

Did the Executive authorize the programme as expressed
by Connell and does it endorse his denial of the economics and philosophy of Marxian socialism?

By whose authority does he state that the Winches do not express the principles and policies of the CCF?

As we understand he proposes to have his whole speech printed in The Commonwealth. Either he withdraws his whole action of Friday or we appeal to the membership.\textsuperscript{135}

Having brought the issue into the open, Connell pursued it to the extent that Dorothy Steeves wrote MacInnis noting that there was some danger of a serious split in the movement if Connell went much further.

But MacInnis replied, noting Connell's sensitivity to criticism of his leadership,

I am not very well acquainted with the old fellow and consequently I do not feel easy in approaching him on this subject. ...With Mr. Connell...I am afraid of giving offence....\textsuperscript{137}

And attempts by the Provincial Executive Committee to tone down Connell's attacks also failed.\textsuperscript{138}

No split occurred as efforts to gain control of the party were evidently focused on the upcoming provincial convention. The right wing pressed for support of constitutional change and Connell's leadership.

In an editorial in The Commonwealth Pritchard wrote:

...our first task is to convince the majority of the electors that our program is sound and our tactics correct. Tactics to be effective...must be cast in the mould of realism. The objective facts, never to be ignored by realists, must ever be carefully considered, and the traditions...of the people correctly estimated....

To attain, by consent of the majority, the power of government, to use that power...to dispossession the present malefactors of great wealth....\textsuperscript{139}

Addresses by Connell and references to his statements and activities appeared with increasing frequency in The Commonwealth. And several
attacks were launched against Telford and his Plenty For All programme. The centre, moreover, led by Arnold Webster, president of the provincial executive, stood behind Connell's leadership. Connell, Webster declared, shortly before the convention, had the highest qualifications for leadership.

Ernest Winch, meanwhile, wrote to MacInnis indicating the left's position:

We, who feel we have some scientific knowledge of the economic basis of human society and the factors which dominate it, refuse to be muzzled by utopians whose bourgeois respectability and hunger for the sweets of parliamentary office they feel to be menaced by our class consciousness and actions arising therefrom.

He added that he expected the outcome of the convention to be far-reaching—"having effect not merely within B.C. but beyond". Their position, he neglected to note, was considerably aided by the appointment of left wing members to convention committee chairmanships.

Midgley, also writing to MacInnis noted that "the pro-Communists are strenuously endeavouring to gain control of the movement and of... (the) Convention". And he added:

There is no doubt that the Provincial Convention at Vancouver this summer will be an important one.... Mr. Connell is quite determined to fight this issue to the finish, even if it means his retirement from the leadership of the group in the Provincial Legislature. He is convinced that only by a strict adherence to the CCF manifesto and a platform similar to that which he outlined in his speech on the Budget, will there be any hope of the CCF carrying the Province at the next election.

Four considerations then divided the party when it met in convention in July 1936: the role of House leader; the leadership of Robert Connell; the importance of the Regina Manifesto and constitutional change; and
the relationship of the CCF to the Communist Party. The Winch-Telford faction favoured a restricted, spokesman role for the House leader, one subservient to the provincial executive. They generally opposed the leadership of Robert Connell as he failed to adequately represent the left's position and increasingly because of Connell's criticism of the left. The left, and in particular Ernest Winch, considered the policy of constitutional change too restricting and the sentiments of the Regina Manifesto too bourgeois. Further they actively solicited the cooperation of all groups who would work towards the eradication of capitalism and the relief of the oppressed. They remained divided on the question of a working relationship with the Communist party however; the Winches favouring such action, Telford and Lefeaux were wary of it.

The Connell-Pritchard faction favoured a fairly independent role for elected representatives in general and the House leader in particular. They believed this was consistent with parliamentary practice and the recognition that an elected member was ultimately responsible to his constituency and not his party. These men were committed to the leadership of Robert Connell, the efficacy of constitutional change, the validity of the Regina Manifesto and no "truck nor trade" with the Communists.

The centre was occupied by people who agreed with the stance of the right but disagreed with the ardour with which it was pursuing its goals. The centre was thus more committed to the preservation of party unity than the right; less involved in the personality disputes; more aware of the dangers of a rift; and more willing to overlook antagonistic statements and needless criticism. The leaders of this group included
Angus MacInnis, Grant MacNeil, Arnold Webster, Robert Skinner and Dorothy Steeves.

The left dominated the Convention due to the effectiveness of Winch's "machine tactics"—the control of convention machinery by the faithful—and Telford's effective platform style. Several contentious issues arose in an atmosphere described by a Connell supporter as unconducive for debate. The Winch-Telford faction triumphed in most debates. The notable exception was a resolution calling for the ouster of Connell which failed by a vote of 138-76.

The most contentious plank—debate which underlined the true nature of the left-wing alliance—dealt with socialized finance. It was pure Social Credit, a particular nostrum of Telford's. The plank was vigorously criticized by Wallis Lefeaux, the party's foremost Marxist, and by Grant MacNeil and Angus MacInnis, federal M.P.'s. Telford dismissed their arguments as acts of sabotage and in reply to their charges that the plank was unconstitutional and unworkable he threatened the resignation from the party of unspecified but allegedly important members. The Convention responded to Telford's plea and the plank was passed. Later it was charged by Connell supporters that left wing members of the executive had suppressed a report by Professor F.R. Scott outlining provincial powers under the B.N.A. Act and advising a cautious policy with respect to provincial planks of this sort. Debate continued on the plank for months following the Convention and it was finally dropped in 1937.

Other attempts by left wing members were not as successful but the point of control was nevertheless made. While Ernest Winch failed to
convince the convention to vote for a resolution declaring clear and emphatic endorsement of marxian socialism, it did pass a resolution indicating the convention was not opposed to it. The resolution was prompted, Winch indicated at the time, by statements made in the Legislature by Connell to the contrary and critical of Winch's position. 157

The most crucial resolution, however, delineated the relationship of the caucus and the provincial executive. It declared:

...This Convention goes on record to the effect that the Provincial Executive is the supreme authority of this movement between Conventions; that M.P.'s, M.L.A.'s, and other elected representatives are at all time subject to its final authority in the same way as rank and file members of the movement; and that the action to be taken should such final authority be defied be the same as would be taken in the case of rank and file members defying that authority. 158

The significance of this resolution was indicated at the next meeting of the provincial executive. A motion was passed which brought speakers, the content of speeches, tours, itineraries and meetings under the control of the speakers committee. 159 The chairman of the committee was A.M. Stephen, a Marxist, advocate of a United Front, and "pro-Communist if not a Communist". 160

A further move, and a foolhardy act of insensitivity, was the refusal of the resolutions committee to give Connell's platform proposals a convention airing. It added needless tension to an already controversial convention. 161 Control of the party by the left wing was assured with the election of new officers. Telford was acclaimed president of the provincial executive; Arthur Turner elected vice-president; 162 Herbert
Gargrave, secretary; J.D. Cloutier, treasurer. Also elected to the
executive committee were Ernest Winch, Helena Gutteridge, A.M. Stephen,
Don Smith, Mildred Osterhaut, Roger Bray, and L.T. Spragge. 163

In response to the overwhelming fact of left wing control, the
Connell group held two important meetings. At the second of these Connell
stated his unwillingness to accept the new programme, or control by the
new executive. According to Grant MacNeil, Connell was encouraged at
this time by Pritchard, Midgley and by expectations of extensive party
support. 164 They anticipated expulsion by the Executive and believed a
strong sense of martyrdom would accrue to Connell as a result. 165 MacNeil,
Steeves and Webster, all present at the meeting, argued against this ap-
proach, noted the effect it would have on the up-coming Burrard by-election
and refused to be part of it. 166

A letter to the provincial executive and the press stating Connell's
position followed immediately. As at the meetings he outlined his opposi-
tion to the executive and the platform, rebuked the party for its lack of
sympathy and trust for elected representatives and condemned the religious
and patriotic intolerance he had been forced to bear. He said in part:

1. I am unable to accept the platform passed by the recent
Convention because in my opinion
a. It is totally unsuitable as a statement of immediate policy
for a CCF Government in this province;
b. It is calculated to excite hopes that cannot be fulfilled....
c. It is fantastic and impractical in its financial plank of
"socialized finance"....

2.a. I am unalterably opposed to any dealings whatever with
the Communist Party or any of its organizations because
history and experience prove its betrayal of all who
trust in it; and for this reason;
b. I cannot approve tacitly or openly of an Executive which
has for Chairman of its Organization Committee (E.E. Winch)
one who is a self declared pro-Communist and whose efforts show their fruits in the invasion of CCF Clubs and of the Convention itself by Communists and their sympathizers.

3. ...I refuse to accept the position of a mere delegate of Convention or Executive speaking "his master's words if not echoing his "voice".

Finally I desire to assert that I am as loyal to the original Manifesto of Regina as ever, and I wholeheartedly accept it as a genuine declaration of principles and policies calculated to benefit in their fulfillment and at every step in that fulfillment all classes of people in this Dominion....It is necessary to save our movement from the sinister influences that are throttling it; it is equally necessary that we present our aims to the people of this province in a sane and wisely considered platform, and in so far as we make promises keeping them well within the confines of possible and probable fulfillment.

The Executive's response was released the following day. It regretted that Connell had not voiced his objections on the floor of the Convention and maintained he had been led into

...adopting the methods of intrigue as advocated by his discredited advisors (Pritchard and Midgley) and has made no attempt whatever to discuss the points raised in his letter with either the movement as a whole or with the Executive.

We feel he has been the victim of treacherous advice....

With regard to Connell's charges that the platform was fantastic the Executive appealed to the "wisdom of the convention". It asserted, as well, that organizational chairman Winch was "absolutely opposed to the Communist Party", and that the convention had sufficient faith in him to elect him by a large majority. Furthermore, control of elected representatives was necessary to avoid the example of the old line parties and that

With all due respect to Mr. Connell, we feel that this attempt on his part to dictate the course of this move-
ment according to his own personal ideas and those of a few men who are swaying him for their own purposes, is in itself overwhelming justification of the resolution that was passed.

The statement continued:

This Executive was elected by the Convention to represent the movement and as such we can only restate our position, that the wishes of the movement will be carried out to the best of our ability, and reaffirm our regret that Mr. Connell has been victimized by the advice of men who have, by their actions during the past year, completely forfeited the confidence of the membership of the CCF. We feel it is deplorable that Mr. Connell would allow himself to be used in this way by men who have betrayed a movement which can do so much towards bringing new hope to the lives of the people of B.C. 168

Having shown its subordination to the will of the convention it released another statement, this one aimed directly at the Clubs in which it stated its resolve and expectations of full party support.

Definite, determined, and immediate action is essential and the Executive stands ready....Your Executive, confident of your support, will fulfill their obligations as determined by the Convention.... 169

The executive tried to meet with Connell to discuss his stand but Connell refused any meeting. 170 Telford had written Connell twice before the release of Connell's statement to the effect that a meeting should be arranged to discuss their working relationship. Because of the nature of the party's platform Connell refused. He wrote,

While...I appreciate your desire for co-operation, I cannot see how it can be. There is both disruption and rift, and it is no use closing one's eyes to the fact. 171

Another attempt at reconciliation was an offer of resignation by Telford. 172 Connell wired Telford his reply:

Your resignation in no way affects my position. No one
desires unity more than I do but I am not prepared to pay the price the present situation demands of me. I refer particularly to the Communist and pro-Communist influences which have already broken our unity.  

Connell was subsequently expelled August 1; formally on August 8. The executive's notification of August 1, read:

Under Clause 2, Section 1, of the Provincial Constitution, which provides that a member of the CCF must subscribe to the Platform and Manifesto of the movement, Mr. Connell by reason of his statements to the Press and to the Executive has automatically placed himself outside of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation.

Reconciliation was not possible or even seriously undertaken; Telford's sincerity being subject to considerable question and Connell's stubbornness being unshakeable. But the impact of Telford's gestures should not be minimized. In conjunction with effective executive action they helped obscure the nature of Connell's challenge--loyalty not policy became the main issue--and they forced the rank and file to choose sides on an issue that undercut the sympathy Connell expected from his expulsion. Telford, not Connell, became the martyr and as rank and file support for the executive quickly grew, reconciliation was less considered or possible.

The executive's position was that Connell's statements were acceptable but that his refusal to resign as a CCF member precipitated the split.

"The whole thing was an attempt of one man to impose his will on our 6000 members in B.C."  

...even at the price of losing such a respected public figure as Mr. Connell, a movement must preserve its right to make its own decisions, decide its own platform and direct its own actions--or perish. Men come and men go, but the cause of Socialism goes on.

...Ninety per cent of this trouble has been caused by Mr. Connell's refusal to meet us at any time.
Mr. Connell was also accused of being dishonest with the electorate of Victoria. The executive maintained that the socialized finance plank in the 1936 platform was the same as the finance plank in the 1933 federal platform on which he was elected.  

Connell's response was that the executive had caused the split through his expulsion. It was not justified he later maintained. Dealing with the socialized finance planks of the 1933 and 1936 platforms he asserted that the earlier plank was an expression of national policy and was sound economics. But the 1936 plank was clearly not within the constitutional power of the province. It was "fantastic and impractical"—the work of economic illiterates. To the charge that he attempted to force a platform on the party—one which was in absolute contravention of the Regina Manifesto—Connell replied that he had never attempted to thrust anything on the movement at anytime in the last three years.

I met the provincial executive and M.L.A.'s in Vancouver prior to the opening of the session, and explained that it had become necessary for us, owing to the constant taunts of the government, that we had no workable concrete proposals that could be put in operation intra vires of the province, to formulate such proposals at the coming session. I therefore read a synopsis of the programme I subsequently submitted to the House, and no objection whatever was raised. Further, in presenting it to the House, I was careful to state that it was my personal proposal, and had not been formally adopted by the party. As I have repeatedly said, and did before the provincial executive last spring: "I challenge you to show anything in this scheme which is not either in the Regina Manifesto or the 1933 B.C. platform, or can be reasonably deduced therefrom.

Finally, to the charge that he was only interested in getting votes and into office, Connell replied:

I have said that the first thing for a movement that bases its plans on political action is to get the support of the people by their votes and so get power, but never has anyone
heard me say this without the qualification that to this end we must obtain and retain the confidence of the people.  

The appeal by the executive for the loyalty of the membership was successful because it was predicated on the premise of convention sovereignty. It was in convention that the party's democratic structure, the involvement of the rank and file in party affairs, and the party's ideology—in so far as its relevance was redefined and reasserted—interrelated as at no other time in party affairs. The paramountcy of the creed and the rank and file's interpretation of it were thus challenged by Connell as they were upheld by the executive. It was a measure of Connell's insight into the workings of the party that such a challenge should be made. By bringing the validity of convention decisions to the fore he called into question the value of the party's ideology and membership participation. Only if the convention was unrepresentative of the larger rank and file could such a challenge have succeeded. But as convention delegates were likely the most active, committed and thus influential members of the individual clubs the odds of such a venture succeeding were remote at the outset. In concert with a sound appraisal of the issues and membership thinking by the executive, Connell's appeal for support was doomed. His fate was further cemented by his needless and naive criticism of Ernest Winch. Winch had made a name for himself as a stubborn fighter for the underdogs of society and Connell's charge of pro-Communism was taken as a smear.  

Also the charge that he was uncooperative likely found support for at this point Connell was a very stubborn and insistent individual. At a time when the very complexity of the issues and the highly emotional nature of the dispute encouraged simplistic explanations
this charge would seem consistent with Connell's aloofness.

Connell fell into the trap that MacInnis had warned of. Finding the situation intolerable Connell refused to bide his time and quit the party. Taking little care to organize an effective attack he was outmanoeuvred by the executive. Don Smith, speaking on behalf of the executive, and indicating that the executive knew of Connell's plans before his letter was released, related its preparedness:

...the executive decided not to fire the first shot....we got ready for what was to happen, lining up speakers and getting our office staff ready...(then) we sat back to wait.

While he failed to mention it this undoubtedly gave the executive time to talk of strategy and when Connell's letter was released, allowed it to act quickly for their advantage.

The executive was accurate in its statement that Connell should have voiced his opinions on the floor of the convention. This was not because he would necessarily have received a sympathetic or conciliatory hearing, but rather because by going beyond the boundaries of the convention he lost all hope for a successful realignment of party thinking. The importance of the convention and the leader's need to accept its authority was expressed by Harold Winch.

I was never challenged in leadership and I think the reason was that I used to battle right out in the open at our conventions. There'd be resolutions brought in...on the surface top notch but I'd disagree on the grounds that if I couldn't do it as the government then I wasn't going to say that the present government had to do it. And if I couldn't do it as government I didn't want it in there if I became the government. And I made that clear at every convention--most unpopular man at conventions--but I always got re-elected without any opposition as leader.
Moreover, by throwing the party into chaos in the manner he did he heightened the need for leadership. And the singleminded determination of the executive contrasted sharply to Connell's indecisiveness and his "let matters take their own course" attitude. Inadvertently Connell strengthened the executive's position.

There was reasonable doubt, however, whether Connell's position could have been put before the convention. The left wing controlled the executive and committee chairmanships. A.B. Saunders, on behalf of Connell, related this account of convention proceedings:

There was, in fact, no proper debate on this (socialized finance) or any other portion of the platform, which was railroaded through at lightning speed. As a result, delegates like Mr. Connell, who were opposed to this and other planks, were afforded no adequate opportunity to express their opposition, and the atmosphere created by Dr. Telford and his followers and the fate of Mr. MacNeil's attempt to debate, proved that criticism was utterly useless and impracticable.

Connell's motives for finally taking the action he did, when he did and in the manner he did, still remain somewhat clouded. Perhaps this is because his attack on the left wing was poorly organized and thus tactical rather than strategical. But the executive's charge that Connell had been duped into committing treason against the party by a group of discontented and pretentious individuals is faulty in its simplicity. The executive's interpretation was more than an explanation of Connell's actions. It was a document mainly designed to show why support for the executive position should be given. The element of truth in it—the sense of conspiracy inherent in Connell's challenge—was exaggerated because of this. The challenge with respect to power was amplified; with regard to policy debased;
and as an expression of frustration, ignored. The executive interpretation was accepted only because Connell's actions inherently challenged norms regarding policy decision making and leadership behaviour. This lent credence to the charge of treason.

The explanations given by Connell and his supporters for their actions were more credible. Connell believed executive policy and methods to be impractical, dictatorial, pro-Communist and indecent. The socialized finance plank was unconstitutional as well as impractical. Executive control of elected representatives and party organs in conjunction with the implications of a labour code which declared that through registration, categorization and disciplinary action,

All physically-fit persons are to labour; and it is...

society's right to compel them to do so...\textsuperscript{191}

led to concern for democratic rights and the charge of dictatorship. It was an executive

...which...merely plays the role of the medieval Inquisition in a spirit of ignorant fanaticism that stifles reason and intellectual honesty.\textsuperscript{192}

The pro-Communist charge related to United Front activities and to statements such as;

As a proletarian movement, we are not particularly concerned with protecting the interests of taxpayers. It is probable, on the contrary, that added pressure on the taxpayer would ultimately result in strengthening our cause by bringing about intolerable conditions at an increased rate.\textsuperscript{193}

Connell charged that the executive was going backward instead of forward

...in a futile and childish attempt to create the "revolutionary situation" beloved of the Communists.\textsuperscript{194}
Further, as Hutchison noted, Connell would not have wanted to have had
to try to implement a policy with which he disagreed and believed un-
workable.  

Connell suggested, however, that the most important factor in his
acting as he did was the "incessant badgering and harassing of my
critics for the past two years."

...I was subject to studied and deliberate insult by the Executive at the Convention leading up to the motion of non-confidence, an earnest (sic) of the prearranged move to depose Connell, a move which had been observable for months.

It was a question, he asserted, of "fundamental policy, of deep-dyed intrigue, of indecency, of downright lying".

The overwhelming fact of left wing control of the party had made the situation intolerable for Connell. He valued the role of the party but saw its present leadership and direction as harmful to its success and that of democratic socialism in the province. Unable to pursue recourse to the convention his only alternative was the polar-
ization of opinion within, or if necessary and only through expulsion, outside the party. Such expulsion, he undoubtedly knew, would destroy CCF chances at the next election and if his martyrdom appeal had been significantly successful his warning regarding the danger of the left wing would have been verified. As it was his actions appeared petty and self-indulgent. It was indeed a "sorry affair".

As well as Pritchard and Midgley, three M.L.A.'s--Price, Swailes and Bakewell--and one M.P.--Taylor--followed Connell out of the party. There is some indication why.
Price said he could not support the platform. Swailes stated
he had

...no personal animus against the Provincial Executive
but felt that he had a right to disagree with them. He
thought with Connell that the recently adopted platform
was not practicable. 2Q2

Bakewell was more explicit. He stated he owed his allegiance to members
of his constituency and not the provincial executive.

As a member of the Legislature my first duty is to the
peoples of Mackenzie district irrespective of their
political views: Hence I cannot follow the dictates of
your central executive which is, after all, elected only
by a small portion of the province.

I feel that the present structure of the CCF organ-
ization can be used to violate the principle of democratic
government.

I will continue to support Mr. Connell as Leader of
the Opposition believing this to be in the best interests
of good government. 2Q3

Further, Clark notes that Bakewell and Swailes rejoined the CCF. This
adds credence in their cases to the specific importance of personality
and platform differences. 2Q4 Pritchard and Midgley were undoubtedly
influenced by personal and to a lesser extent ideological factors. Prit-
chard's later comments to Steeves are suggestive:

...I couldn't stand by and see EEW with Machiavellian
movements undercut the man who had been put in the
leadership of the Parliamentary group. I had nothing to
do with Connell being put into the leadership and if he
had to be removed he should have been removed by the
methods and the group by which and through whom he was
put there.

...And they (the Communists) considered Ernie (Winch)
a darling. He was rather a catspaw. They used him.... 2Q5

Moreover, both were locked into the pattern of conflict which had evolved
over the years and logic, if not self respect, meant that they had to follow developments to their conclusion. As well, MacNeil indicated that Connell had been supported by Pritchard and Midgley in his actions and they had all expected the venture would be successful.  

Those that supported the executive did so for a variety of reasons. The main one, of course, was the credibility of the disloyalty charge. But those unable to accept this position or the logic of left wing policies, although they believed Connell did "the right thing at the wrong time", could not support his actions because

...there is no place for open challenging of convention findings or the open disregard of provincial council authority. Such leads to anarchy.  

This was also the position accepted by the national council. Moreover, the singleminded determination of the executive was also a factor.  

As Clark has indicated the split within the caucus was not vertical. There was no single explanation for why individuals chose the position they did and background was a poor indicator of how they would side. Bakewell, Swailes and Price were all "old time socialists"--members of the Socialist Party of Canada yet they left with Connell. Dorothy Steeves stayed with the party although she was closer in terms of inclination and education to the Connell group. The greater importance of personal rather ideological considerations is thereby suggested. Nevertheless, with rank and file acceptance of Connell's expulsion and the departure of Bakewell, Swailes, Price and Taylor, as well as Pritchard and Midgley, the status quo of the party as established at the convention was reaffirmed;
viz., the paramountcy of the party's ideology and the control of the left wing.

The leadership of Robert Connell was a failure; through his unacceptable behaviour he had lost the legitimacy necessary to make a claim on the leadership title. And, paradoxically, although he had been chosen leader because it was believed his moderate leadership would help CCF electoral credibility his departure destroyed CCF chances in the 1937 election.

Connell entered politics through a perceived need to spiritualize the social order, "so that men, women, and children may lead a free life in a free world". He accepted socialism because he saw in it the lost brotherhood and morality of Christian teachings. It was through conservatism and its emphasis on community, spirituality and nobility that Connell thus reached his socialism. But rejecting the conservative hierarchial social structure he opted for the decentralization of guild socialism. His socialism, consistent with other radical church leaders, was infused with conservative values and, in contrast to the Marxists, devoid of revolutionary enthusiasm. He, too, wanted a remaking of society; but he valued orderly change as it ensured the opportunity for preserving what was of worth. His conservatism prevented him from being a Marxist, while his socialism kept him from being a Conservative.

His selfless idealism which thrust him into the political arena brought expectations regarding his behaviour and that of others in the party. But given the nature of the party and the circumstances in which it had arisen they were unrealistic. He accepted the post of House leader as a gentleman; not because he wanted it but rather because something needed to be
done. As a gentleman he expected fair play and cooperation and neither was forthcoming from the more ardent who in their ideological determination had a different perception of politics and social change. He was further frustrated by the extreme individualism and ambition of Lyle Telford and Ernest Winch. Furthermore, but inexplicably, Connell failed to see the similarities between ideological determination and the meaningfulness of his religious beliefs. As a system of beliefs which provided explanations for recurring human events the party's ideology could not be brooked without loss of individual identity and purpose. The veracity of criticism was irrelevant and this was at once its strength and weakness. Connell's idealism as much as the left wing's steadfastness and ambition brought enormous strain to a party already divided.

Connell was thrust into a role which at this stage of the party's development was weak. The greater importance of movement dimensions at the expense of electoral-party considerations significantly reduced the power of the House leader while emphasizing that of the provincial executive. This invited challenges to the House leadership—challenges which because of the party's background were soon coming. Further, although Connell was well known in Victoria, he was scarcely known in Vancouver where the party's strength lay. And in a relatively weak leadership role Connell made little attempt to expand his base of influence. He responded to this role in the fashion one would expect from an elite party leader where emphasis is on power and is centered around the parliamentary leader. To a large extent this was due to the fact that he had not wanted the job. A sense of responsibility had made him accept
it as he had his candidature in 1933. His failure to involve himself actively in the party machinery or to make an attempt to dominate or control it is not surprising. But the effect was to restrict his influence to a relatively small plot of party land—it was thus short-sighted.

The power struggle which culminated in the 1936 convention saw the triumph of party members over parliamentary representatives. The subsequent loss of leadership by Connell resulted from his attempt to rectify this new power arrangement and to reassert right wing influence in the party. Connell had fought on favourable grounds when he had led attacks in the legislature and The Commonwealth. But the Winches, realizing that their strength lay in the party machinery shifted the battle to the convention arena. It was there, because of the democratic nature of the CCF and the particular importance of the convention, that power conclusively changed hands. The party responded to the Winches' "machine tactics"—the voice of prominent party workers with added influence derived from the parliamentary membership.

Arnold Webster described the period as one characterized by the "inability to trust one another, leading to feverish attempts to secure control of the movement". In a sense then the outcome of the "Connell Affair" can be seen as "a purging of incompatible personalities which was functionally necessary for the movement". But while progress would continually be interfered with as long as both groups remained with their disagreements within the CCF the power struggle was costly. Conflict was inevitable given the party's background and the difficult times in which
the party was functioning. And leadership discord seems to be a typical aspect of leadership exercise. But this discord was given full reign because of the extreme degree of oligarchic disunity. The stubborn individualism of Telford, Ernest Winch and Connell, each a person in position of party responsibility, took precedence over party unity. And the purging of the oligarchy was accomplished at tremendous cost to party unity and image.
PART III

AFTERMATH

The CCF became a significant force in B.C. politics because of its concern for the people dislocated by the Depression. In the 1935 federal election it outpolled both Liberal and Conservative parties and there were many who, not unrealistically, thought the CCF might form the next provincial government. It seems surprising then that leadership conflict should have unfolded the way it did with little apparent concern for what voters thought. To some extent the obviousness of this discord lay within the nature of the party's democratic structure—a feature which exaggerated the intensity of leadership conflict relative to other parties. But more significant was the sectarian nature of the party—a characteristic inherited from the Socialist Party of Canada.

The sectarian influence of the Socialist Party gave the CCF elements of introspection and ideological commitment uncommon in elite parties. These two features reinforced one another focusing energies and attention on party policy, direction and leadership. Thus while events occurring outside the party shaped the dimensions of party concern, ideological considerations determined the response heightening the importance of a correct interpretation and the observance of procedural norms. The significance of this introspection in conjunction with the party's democratic structure ensured a relatively high degree of publicity for party discord.

It has been indicated how lack of oligarchic cohesion strengthened the fissiparous elements of the CCF to the point of rupture and finally
left the membership splintered. But, as well, and as a result of this conflict the effectiveness of the CCF was seriously harmed. Its image as a viable, cohesive alternative to the Liberal Party was thrown into question and its ideology was subjected to continual abuse. Further, the impact was felt throughout the national movement.

The tension that developed had party-movement dimensions to it; in part its basis was the nature of ideological sacrifice involved in the realization of CCF goals. The aftermath too, involved these dimensions and it was more specifically in terms of the CCF's image and ideology that the greatest impact of the "Connell Affair" was registered; the electoral credibility of the party suffered a severe setback while the ideology of the movement reasserted its supremacy. The triumph of ideology at the expense of individuals, even leaders, was clearly evident as the provincial executive asserted firm control in the name of the convention. The damage to party image was recognized and then conclusively shown on two important occasions—the Burrard by-election of September 2, 1936 and the general provincial election of June 2, 1937.

The Burrard by-election came just five weeks after Connell's denunciations. Indeed the proximity of the by-election was used as an excuse for Connell (not making statements about the convention) when he did and which consequently helped reinforce his image as a traitor to the party. The CCF's candidate was Lyle Telford, then president of the provincial executive. With the possible exception of Arnold Webster, who had missed carrying Burrard by six votes in the 1935 federal campaign, Telford was the party's strongest candidate. Not only was his name well and generally
favourably known, but his candidacy reaffirmed executive support of his leadership.

The split, however, had the effect of reinforcing the images so often developed by the press; those of internecine warfare, communism, and the stifling of individual liberties. Each was also a theme of the Liberal party: "The Liberal Party vs Socialist Chaos"; "Communism was the issue of Burrard"; "CCF policies...would stifle individual liberties". And Hutchison noted that the Liberals made use of Connell's repudiation of the convention. The government's record was played down; the CCF split played up.

Telford lost to the Liberal Forrester by 277 votes of a total 20,000 votes cast. The executive maintained, though, that Burrard was a triumph. The percentage of party vote had increased by six points despite conditions. It was a moral victory for the party.

In the loss of the seat the CCF has paid the price of political honesty and adherence to principles.

But Bruce Hutchison wrote that

No Liberal politician with any ideas to realism pretends the government could have carried Burrard if there had been no CCF split and if Mr. Connell had remained in the party....

He also indicated the importance of the by-election to government chances of re-election. It was, he wrote,

(a) first rate psychological break for a government which simply couldn't afford to lose the by-election and hope to survive. If the government had lost Burrard...it would have privately written off the next election as lost....
The 1937 election campaign saw the entrance of the Connellites as the British Columbia Constructives and the re-emergence of a revitalized Conservative party. The platform of the B.C. Constructive was mildly reformist combining economic control with Christian concern. It had a fourteen point program calling for honest government; a reduction and realignment of cabinet to promote greater efficiency; administration of production and distribution of liquor; the creation of a public utilities commission; the encouragement of producers and consumers agricultural cooperatives; collective bargaining rights for labour; the development of social services; and measures to improve education, forest conservation, mining and highway construction. In some respects it was a good distance from the CCF program of a planned economy, public ownership of public utilities and natural resources; and strict regulation of agricultural production and distribution. But in terms of areas of concern there were important similarities and differences in programs were largely ones of degree rather than type. There were three notable exceptions; socialized finance, the collectivization of agriculture and the categorization and control of labour—all part of the CCF program and unacceptable to the Constructives.

The Constructives' program, more moderate than the CCF's, was to the right of the proposals Connell made in his Budget address of March 1936. Several factors likely account for this new position: the need to move to the right to differentiate the Constructives from the CCF; Connell's own preference; and the desire to retain the claim of being the only true expression of the Regina Manifesto in the province. It is difficult if
not impossible to indicate the relative importance of each factor. Connell's own preferences would push the party to the right while his support of the Regina Manifesto would construct definite limits. Further, Connell made specific mention of the similarities between his platform proposals and those set out for B.C. by Frank Scott of the national party. He thus apparently had genuine sympathy for the earlier platform.

While economic control became the aim of the Constructives there was an underlying emphasis on Christian morality. This was present in Connell's thinking prior to the split but never as emphasized. The party was motivated, its declaration of principles maintained, by the belief in the principle

...that honesty of purpose and Christian ethics points the way out of the present conditions.

And in a statement reflecting some of the conservative element in Connell's thinking, Connell said that the group would

...work towards its end, preserving always personal liberty and legitimately increasing it, respecting religious loyalties and upholding...the supremacy of the Crown as the constitutional expression of the rights of the people as a whole.

But he remained consistently critical of the capitalist system:

What we require in British Columbia is...the establishment of a new economic order and...a clear cut policy of constructive co-operation towards the goal.... The question is, (with regard to capital) what amount is necessary and who shall own and control it. Private monopoly, ruthless exploitation and wild speculation were features of the capitalist system that had led to poverty, discouragement and hopelessness.

The Constructives, marked by the overwhelming influence of Connell
exhibited his Christian concern, conservative interpretation of community and moderate reformist style. Moreover, his leadership was never subjected to convention approval and with the calling of an early summer election, the unprepared Constructives resorted to appointing candidates for public office. With each new development it was further alienated from CCF norms and rank and file support.

The CCF executive was in an altogether different set of circumstances as it confronted opposition charges and division within the party. The latter was the most pressing as it reinforced charges by Connell of pro-communism and by the Liberals of communism and division. Discontent did not stem from activities related to the Connell group, however, but rather from those sympathetic to Communist proposals for a United Front against war and fascism. Not only the conflict but also the nature of the conflict lent credence to criticism of the party.

The triumph of the left wing during 1936 had undoubtedly given united front supporters new impetus and this was reinforced by the election of its leading spokesman within the party, A.M. Stephen, to the executive. This impetus was offset, but not without conflict, by the determination of the executive to control external expressions of disagreement. Although there was considerable tolerance as the conflict involved left wing members, the practice of advocating party policy of united front activities was clearly contrary to both national and provincial convention decisions. Further, old time socialists such as Wallis Lefeaux, Angus MacInnis, Grant MacNeil and Lyle Telford strongly opposed any dealings with the Communists as they were well aware of its dangers. The advocacy of a united front
gave rise to additional conflict, as well, as Trotskyites led by Rod Young opposed such a move because of its connection to the Third International. The nature of the controversy led Arnold Webster to comment:

...it is true beyond dispute that the CCF in B.C. is providing the arena for the local battle between the Stalinists and the World Revolutionists...  

He then added in forboding terms

...if allowed to continue much longer the present warfare will destroy the movement as a force in B.C.  

A.M. Stephen was finally suspended from the party for refusing to obey convention dictates and an agreement he had made with the executive to refrain from advocating a united front for the party. But caught in the dilemma of the democratic structure and unable to control expressions of criticism thought to be detrimental to party progress, the executive was unable to neutralize the poignancy of opposition charges.

There was some discussion of the National Council intervening to stabilize the situation. Webster queried the possibility of some federal action after indicating the damage that was being done by the debate which was foreign in thinking to the majority of members. MacInnis responded that the National Council with the exception of Grant MacNeil were favourable to taking action. But MacNeil's opposition, in particular his accusation that MacInnis was being too anti-communist quashed direct National Council intervention. The national leadership did attempt though to influence developments and to draw attention to the effect that conflict—both the Connell Affair and the trouble with the Communists—was having on the national party.
Moves to prevent an escalation of conflict in 1936 had proven ineffective. The speed and intensity of developments in B.C. and the distance from Eastern Canada where the party's activities quickly gravitated, reinforced regional proclivities. National leaders could only regret and criticize the lack of concern shown for the effect of discord on the movement elsewhere in the country.

Robert Connell had not bothered to discuss his contemplated actions with Woodsworth at the 1936 Convention although Webster stated he was certain Connell had made up his mind then to break with the party. Connell later indicated that the national leaders had followed the correct policy by not interfering; the points of argument being purely provincial. In an interview, Harold Winch made similar comments. It was strictly a provincial matter, he indicated.

George Williams, Leader of the Opposition in the Saskatchewan legislature wrote J.S. Woodsworth with a complaint that echoed across the country. "Why can't they quit fighting in B.C.?" he asked. In reply Woodsworth asserted:

The CCF members in B.C. are coming to realize the serious consequences of the split in our ranks so far as capturing the Government of B.C. is concerned. Few realize the disastrous effect on the Dominion wide movement....

...our provincial organizations have not yet gained the Dominion wide point of view....The B.C. organization is an integral part of the whole CCF movement....

This perspective was clearly not shared by provincial leaders who viewed provincial autonomy of overriding concern.

The sensitivity of the B.C. organization to any national intervention
was further indicated by the refusal of the *Federationist*, the new B.C.-CCF's paper, to print Woodsworth's article *The Need For Unity* quoted above. It would, wrote H. Gargrave, provincial secretary, be poor tactics: "some of the more sensitive members would be liable to consider this an attempt at interference".  

But as if to have the last word on the dangers of conflict, Woodsworth warned the B.C. party:

> Outsiders are saying—and with a considerable measure of truth—that if we cannot keep our own house in order we are not fit to run the affairs of a province or of a nation.

The electors of B.C. evidently thought so too as they re-elected the Liberal government in the June election. The CCF faced the voters with no House leader, a platform of repudiated value and a house dividend. It retained seven seats though, losing Victoria (Connell's old seat) and Mackenzie (Bakewell), and taking Comox and Cowichan. Their percentage of the popular vote dropped from 31.53 to 28.29. It was an election which a year earlier some had predicted would easily go to the CCF. The Constructives' vote was also conclusive. The party ran in eight ridings and did poorly in all. Their best showing was in Victoria with Connell, but even there Connell trailed all Liberal and Conservative candidates and was just slightly ahead of the CCF. Of the three M.L.A.'s who left with Connell, Price and Swailes ran for re-election. Both trailed well behind CCF candidates. Connell's challenge to the provincial executive was finished. Indeed in some measure the knell had been sounded when the national council supported the provincial executive. But the election removed all doubt as to who represented the CCF in B.C. It was an important but shallow victory for the executive.
No House leader was elected until 1938 when Harold Winch was chosen in a two-say context with Lyle Telford. With the defeat of the right wing the Winch-Telford alliance quickly ran its course and the designs each had on the leadership emerged. Telford subsequently ran and was elected mayor of Vancouver. But his holding two elected offices—he was successful in the 1937 provincial election—was contrary to the CCF constitution and he was forced to relinquish his membership in the party. He failed to be re-elected as either mayor or M.L.A. and went back to practicing medicine. Connell returned to his writings on natural science and was soon active again in the Anglican ministry. In his final statement regarding the outcome of the 1937 election he indicated he had lost all hope for change through third parties and said only the old-line parties provided a vehicle for change.

The party's ideology condoned some degree of conflict—indeed made it inevitable through its advocacy of membership participation, a democratic structure and leadership control. It was the touchstone for the power struggle and the damage eventually done to party unity and electoral credibility. But while it juxtaposed elements of conflict and cohesion in uneasy fashion what was made of this relationship depended on how leaders exercised their power—how they related and responded to their rights, responsibilities, and the reciprocal relationship which united them to other party members. Professor Young notes the centrality of the oligarchy in a democratically structured party:

Oligarchy seems inevitable in democratic organizations, particularly those which aspire to and achieve a mass base. It is also necessary, and particularly so in a party which is at the same time a political movement, since leadership of a direct and forceful kind gives the focus and impetus which the movement would otherwise lack. Thus the paradox of a democratic movement is the necessity for oligarchic
leadership and the inevitability of a managerial elite which, conscious of the democratic structure of the party and fully in sympathy with it, must nevertheless manipulate it in order to achieve the ends of the movement.268

In the absence of cohesion in the B.C. party it was increasingly difficult for the oligarchy to fulfill this function. Leadership did not, as a consequence, positively contribute to the realization of collective goals in the manner or to the degree one would expect.

It was Connell's folly to ignore party procedural norms; it was also his failure as a leader. But his actions were clearly only the precipitate that crystallized the fragments of intra-party disunity. Other party leaders brought strain to the party and aggravated existing tensions, as well. Differences of opinion are inevitable in a democratically structured party; open conflict and disunity are not. Party and leaders ignore their responsibilities at their peril.
FOOTNOTES

Legend: A.M.C.-Angus MacInnis Collection--Special Collection Division--U.B.C. Library; 45/8 means Box 45, file 8.


2. Ibid., p. 34.

3. The Socialist Party sent a delegate--Hope--to the Western Labour Conference of July 30/31, 1932 and the Joint Conference of Farmer-Labour of Aug. 1, 1932. The party was then given the assurance it could become the founding member of the CCF in B.C. if it so chose. M.P. and Socialist Party member, Angus MacInnis also attended and became the B.C. representative on the Executive of the national CCF. AMC-S.P. of C. Executive and Convention Minutes, Aug. 8, 1932. 45/4.

4. See footnote 104 with regard to left and right wing anchors. Further, in 1935 the CCF (B.C. Section) changed from a federal to unitary form.


6. Ibid, part two, outlines the difficulties the old S.P. of C. faced. The new party not only adopted a similar name but its paper did as well. The sense of continuity was developed in an interview with Harold Winch of Feb. 24, 1973.


9. The merger of the organizations and the use of the title CCF was given the blessing of the national executive. But the Socialist Party executive instructed its delegates on the CCF executive to vote against affiliation. When they did not there was a motion within the S.P. Executive Committee to prevent affiliation. As affiliation had already been granted, however, this motion was defeated. Min. S.P. Exec. Committee, Sept. 10, 1933, A.M.C. 45/3.

11. L.S.R. publication, "A programme for the new social order in Canada to end the existence of poverty in the midst of plenty", n/d, likely late 1932. AMC 31/32.


13. Steeves, op. cit., p. 80. This is obvious from their platform too.


15. R. Skinner to A. MacInnis, Mar. 22, 1933. AMC 54/6.


17. W.W. Lefeaux to A. MacInnis, Apr. 21, 1933. AMC 54/6.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 4-5.


23. Dion, op. cit., p. 4.

26. Young, op. cit., p. 139
27. Ibid.
29. Young, op. cit., 168.
32. Ibid., chapter 6, passim.
33. Ibid., passim.
34. Ibid., p. 140.
36. See for instance W.W. Lefeaux's Pres. Report to the 1935 S.P. of C. Convention, A.M.C. 45/7; and S.P. Sec. E.E. Winch's letter to *The Commonwealth*, Dec. 6, 1934. This concern for leadership did not, however, prevent either Winch or Lefeaux from seeking or accepting leadership posts.
38. Young, ibid., ch. 6; Duverger, *Political Parties* (London, 1967), Book 1, Section 3.
40. Ibid., passim.
41. Young, op. cit., re national CCF, chapter 6, passim.
42. Michels, passim.
43. Duverger, op. cit., 2.
46. Ibid., 173.

47. Ibid., 192, 197.

48. Steeves, op. cit., 58; Robin, ibid, 193.

49. Steeves, ibid., 58-59.

50. Ibid., 59.

51. Ibid., 82-84.

52. Ibid., 76.

53. Ibid., 76.

54. Stuart, op. cit., 61.

55. Clark, op. cit., 16.


58. Steeves, op. cit., 83.

59. The aim of the Clarion was to "Transmit High Tension Marxian Socialism with a view of Generating Class Conscious Workers", August 12, 1932. It was a "students' paper", the literary mouthpiece for the left wing and it dutifully and systematically detailed its philosophy and position on fundamental issues. The Commonwealth was more topical and reflected a reform orientation to social issues.


64. Ibid., 398; Young, op. cit., 29.

65. Allen, ibid., 382.

68. Ibid., Dec. 22, 1934.
69. Steeves, op. cit., 91.
71. The Challenge, March 1931.
72. Ibid., article by W.W. Lefeaux, Oct. 1931.
73. Clark, op. cit., 16.
75. Michels, op. cit., 16.
77. Clark, op. cit., 16.
78. The Commonwealth, Challenge Column, March 15, 1934. The Challenge amalgamated with The Commonwealth in Aug. 1933 and articles continued in most issues of the paper until Dec. 1934. No reason for the discontinuation was given.
81. Ibid., Summary for meetings of Dec. 1,8,15, 1934.
82. Ibid., March 30/31 and April 1, 1935: 45/10.
83. Steeves, op. cit., 91.
85. Steeves, op. cit., 91.
86. E. Winch Report to the 1935 Merger Convention; AMC: 45/11. Similar comments were made by Harold Winch to the writer in an interview on Feb. 24, 1973.
87. Steeves, op. cit., 107. Winch was elected chairman of the CCF's Organization Committee in July 1935.


89. See below pp. 26-27.


91. Ibid.

92. Steeves, op. cit., p. 91.


94. Ibid., Lefeaux comments that he has no doubt but that the arrangement could carry the CCF into government if an election were called.

95. Winch interview, op. cit.


97. R. Skinner to A. MacInnis, March 14, 1934. AMC 54/7.


99. R. Skinner to A. MacInnis, May 17, 1934 and V. Midgley to A. MacInnis, May 15, 1934. AMC 54/5.

100. Skinner to A. MacInnis, May 17, 1934.

101. The Clubs voted overwhelmingly for merger; no vote was recorded.

102. E. Winch decided to make an issue of the expulsion of the Communists from the Ontario CCF at the National Convention. This was done, suggests Stuart, instead of pulling the S.P. out of the CCF. See Stuart, op. cit., p. 124.

103. The S.P. branches vote failed by 23 votes to receive the necessary two-thirds vote. Report of the Sec. Treas. to 1935 S.P. Convention. No count was to be found for the Clubs vote.

104. Min. of the 1935 S.P. of C. Convention, Jan. 5 and 6, 1935. AMC 45/7.
105. Ibid., President's Report.

106. Ibid., Treas. Report.

107. There is an apparent contradiction in Stuart's appraisal of this development. If Winch had decided not to pull the S.P. out of the CCF in June 1934 and with that decision he "... must have realized that complete merger with the Clubs was not only inevitable, but also wide" (p. 124), then there is no reason to think that in his Report to the 1935 S.P. Convention he showed "...herself as strongly opposed to the merger as ever". (p. 132).


109. Aug. 9, 1935, quoted in Steeves, op. cit., 96. Harold Winch was no longer editor of the paper having resigned because of legislative duties, in particular those relating to his office as party whip. As well, he found the financial burden of the paper too heavy. Subsequent to Winch's resignation, the paper was placed under the control of a committee of the Socialist Party.

110. J. Wilson, "A History of Tensions within the CCF in B.C." (Unpublished Graduate Studies essay, Dept. of Pol. Sc. UBC, 1971), 10. Although S.P. Exec. members' attitudes reflected this perception it is curious. One of the reasons S.P. Executive changed their attitudes towards the merger was the defection of branch members to CCF Clubs and this was as due likely to ideological alienation as to anything.
R. Skinner to A. MacInnis, Mar. 14, 1934. AMC 54/7.

111. Wilson, ibid., p. 9.

112. The rank and file were generally more in favour of affiliation with the CCF and closer cooperation with other groups within the province than the Marxists in leadership positions. Although the first referendum for amalgamation with the Clubs failed, this was because two-thirds rate was necessary for passage. The vote was, nevertheless, 586-328 in favour. The second referendum passed easily. The Executive position remained wary of amalgamation until it was apparent they had little choice. See Report of Prov. Sec. S.P. of C., EE. Winch to the 1935 Provincial Convention, Jan. 5 and 6, 1935; also Min. Exec. Cttee. S.P. of C. of May 19, 1935; also p. 22-26 below.

113. The Commonwealth, May 24, 1934 and Nov. 8, 1934.
114. Ibid., May 24, 1934.

115. Ibid., July 5, 1933

116. Ibid., May 1, 1936.

117. Ibid., May 8, 1936. This is evident from the letters to and from MacInnis. See below pp. 28-29.

118. Vancouver Sun, July 29, 1935.


120. Party leaders Tolmie and Patullo were dismissed by their parties too. Tolmie, a Conservative was deposed in 1932; Patullo, a Liberal in 1941. Sec. M.A. Ormsby, British Columbia: A History, Vancouver, MacMillan, 1958, chap.15.


122. Duverger, op. cit., goes into considerable detail regarding party-caucus tension, p. 182-205.


125. See for instance The Commonwealth for April 9, 1936.

126. The Commonwealth, Mar. 20, 1936.

127. Ibid.


129. Ibid.

130. The Commonwealth, April 9, 1936.


133. Ibid., A. MacInnis to W.E. Turner, April 3, 1936.

134. Ibid.
135. E.E. Winch and H.E. Winch to A. Webster, n/d, Winch's papers AMC 56/19.


137. A. MacInnis to A. Webster, April 23, 1936. AMC: 54/9.


139. The Commonwealth, Mar. 27, 1936.

140. Ibid., May 8, 1936 and May 15, 1936. The Plenty For All program was organized to provide cheaper food for its patrons and funds for Telford's radio programs. Controversy surrounded its transfer to Telford, the quality of food sold and the private ownership. The Commonwealth, May 15, 1936.

141. Ibid., May 8, 1936.

142. E.E. Winch to A. MacInnis, June 14, 1936. AMC 54/9.

143. CCF Prov. Exec. Min. April 8, 1936. It was a procedure that Winch and the left wing had opposed at the 1935 convention when the centre/right executive had made similar appointments. Sun, July 29, 1935.

144. V. Midgley to A. MacInnis, April 3, 1936. AMC 54/9.


146. 1935 Provincial Convention of S.P. of C., Jan 20-21, 1935. AMC 45/5.

147. Vancouver Sun, July 29, 1935. That there is a difference between pro-Communist and Communist should be noted. Steeves overlooks this in her discussion of the Connell Affair, op. cit., 107-114. D.J. Roberts seems to overlook this too when she writes that Connell confused Marxism with Communism and this led to his charge that E. Winch was pro-Communist, op. cit., p. 44.

148. J. Wilson, op. cit., 17.

149. This became readily apparent when reasons for refusing support for the 1936 platform were given.


152. The resolution read: "Non confidence in the present House leader at Victoria".


155. Vancouver Province, Aug. 21, 1936; British Columbia Constructive, May 29, 1937. AMC 56/19.

156. Steeves, op. cit., 111.

157. Vancouver Sun, July 6, 1936.

158. There may have been, in the passage of this motion, an indication that rank and file members wanted the Prov. Exec. to curtail disagreement in the oligarchy. There were four resolutions put before the Resolutions Committee with this intent.


161. The Commonwealth, Aug. 14, 1936. It should be noted that as chief spokesman for the CCF, Connell, more than anyone would have had to publicly defend CCF policies.

162. Arthur Turner was likely the only important Exec. member not sympathetic to the left wing position.

163. Vancouver Sun, July 5, 1936.


165. Ibid.

166. Ibid.

167. Ibid., July 28, 1936.

168. Ibid., July 29, 1936.

169. Ibid., July 30, 1936.

170. Ibid., Aug. 1, 1936; it is not clear if the meeting referred to here is the same as the Telford-Connell one below. A. Webster in a later letter to J.S. Woodsworth stated: "At the moment he is
adamant; I have met few men more stubborn". Oct. 12, 1936.


174. Ibid., Aug. 1, 1936. AMC 45/11.

175. Michels, op. cit., 46-47 notes that an attempted resignation by a leader is done to reinforce his position by showing his indispensability. Further, Telford had used the same tactic to force the previous owner of the Plenty For All program to sell his shares. The Commonwealth, May 15, 1936.


179. Vancouver Province, Aug. 21, 1936.

180. Ibid., May 28, 1937.

181. Ibid., Aug. 21, 1936; The 1933 Finance Plank read:

Cooperation with the other Provinces to obtain a complete Socialization of all the financial machinery of the Country—Banking, Currency, Credit and Insurance—and, if compelled by a situation of Provincial emergency, to develop purely Provincial Credit, based on Provincial Resources. (Ex. and Conv. Min., Oct. 4, 1933).

The 1936 Plank read:

The adoption of provincial socialized finance based upon the wealth in the province for the purpose of facilitating the equitable distribution of our commodities and services among our citizens. (Min. of Prov. CCF Convention, July 3-6, 1936 AMC 45/11). As Connell pointed out the platform of 1933 "was limited to the development of provincial credit, which is a very different thing from the complete socialization of all the financial machinery of the province". (Vancouver Province, Aug. 21, 1936.)
182. Vancouver Province, Aug. 21, 1936.

183. Ibid.

184. Steeves, op. cit., 110.


188. H.E. Winch interview, op. cit.


191. Ibid.

192. Ibid.

193. Ibid.


197. Ibid.

198. Ibid.

199. Prudence, as time would tell, could have been something of an alternative. Control of the caucus never materialized. Interview with H.E. Winch, op. cit.

200. John Price a M.L.A. who followed Connell out of the party indicated Connell wanted the rift within the party. They had no intention prior to Executive action of forming another party. Vancouver Sun, Aug. 1, 1936.

201. Vancouver Sun, Aug. 1, 1936.


203. Ibid., Sept. 22, 1936.
204. Clark, op. cit., 23.


209. Clark, op. cit., 23, explains the singleminded determination of the Executive in terms of the legacy left by the S.P. of C. This is likely correct, but does not stem as he suggests from their adherence to policy but rather from their strongly held belief that theirs was the correct expression of socialism for the province and one with some tradition in the province.


211. Steeves had come into the party through the L.S.R. and held a LID from The Netherlands. See also A. Webster to J.S. Woodworth, Oct. 12, 1936, (in the possession of W.D. Young), in which concern for her leaving because of this similarity in background is discussed.

212. Connell, Price, Swailes and Taylor were expelled. Bakewell resigned. Midgley and Pritchard left.


214. In my interview with H. Winch, op. cit., he said of Connell that he was "a product of old Victoria".


219. An example of Connell's initially weak position was given by the election to the 1933 CCF Prov. Exec. Council. One of the ten nominated for the five posts, Connell placed eighth. This was just prior to his election as House leader. AMC CCF Prov. Convention Sept. 30, Oct. 1, 1933. 45/10.
220. It seems that the safest ideological position in a socialist party is to the left, especially at convention times when the ritual of authenticating socialist credentials is undertaken.


222. J. Wilson, op. cit., 15.

223. Also important to the party was the loss of the services of W.A. Pritchard, V. Midgley and the loss of The Commonwealth and with it the savings of many CCF'ers who could ill afford it. Steeves, op. cit., 111.


225. Post election reports suggested that Webster would have won and that this was admitted by Telford. The Commonwealth, Sept. 4, 1936.


227. Ibid., Aug. 8, 1936.

228. The Commonwealth, Sept. 4, 1936.

229. Vancouver Province, Sept. 5, 1936.

230. Ibid.

231. The group had originally formed as the Social Constructives but fear of confusion with the Social Credit led to a change of party name. Victoria Daily Times, April 17, 1937.

232. B.C. Constructive Program: document in possession of W.D. Young, n/d.


234. The Vancouver Sun, Aug. 26, 1936 gives a good summary of the debate regarding the socialized finance plank and labor code. The collectivization of agricultural was contrary to national policy and, in any event, likely not acceptable to the group.


236. A. Webster to J.S. Woodsworth, Oct. 12, 1936. (Possession of Walter D. Young)

238. It may be that the platform of the Constructives was closer to reflecting Connell's preference than was his address to the Budget Speech. It is, however, of little relevance as he was willing to accept, as parliamentary leader, the earlier statement of policy.

239. Document in possession of W.D. Young n/d; likely early 1937.


241. Ibid.


244. Ibid., Jan. 16, 1937.

245. J. Wilson, op. cit., 17.


247. Ibid.


249. The National Council had intervened in Ontario in 1934 to save the provincial federation from collapsing. The communists were the source of difficulty there but in a more direct and damaging way. See Stuart, op. cit., p. 104-122.

250. A. Webster to A. MacInnis, Feb. 26, 1937. AMC 54/10.

251. A. MacInnis to A. Webster, March 5, 1937. AMC 54/10.

252. In particular the letters and visits of A. MacInnis and the visit of J.S. Woodsworth during the 1936 Convention.

253. Young, op. cit., 69.


255. Ibid: clipping attached to letter, n/d.

257. George Williams to J.S. Woodsworth, Nov. 25, 1936; in possession of W.D. Young.


262. Sanford, op. cit., 108.


264. Victoria was a four seat riding. Connell's vote in 1933 was 5607.


266. Winch interview.


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