FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS
WITHIN
THE LIBERAL PARTY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the effects of the federal political system upon the organization of the Liberal Party of British Columbia by means of an examination of those manifestations of disunity and conflict which can be related to the changing balance of power between the federal and provincial segments of the party. Although both parts of a Canadian political party generally recognize the value of a unified and closely integrated organization, their separate interests and requirements frequently create internal conflicts. These sources of strain between the federal and provincial wings of Canadian political parties may well reveal those distinctive attributes of Canadian party organization which are derived from participation within a federal system.

Within the Liberal Party of British Columbia the changing pattern of federal-provincial party relations have been closely associated with the relative electoral strength of the two wings of the party. Challenges to the leadership and control of the provincial Association have generally occurred when the balance of political power was not adequately represented in the leadership of the Association. Since a combination of administrative and policy differences between the two groups
provided the main sources of friction, the changing electoral fortunes of the two wings also affected the emergence and intensity of federal-provincial strains.

With the exception of a five year period between 1928 and 1933, the provincial wing of the party held power in Victoria from 1916 to 1952 and the provincial leader maintained effective control of the Liberal organization in British Columbia. Although the federal party also held power throughout most of this period, the federal wing never demanded control of the provincial organization. Confrontations between strong Liberal premiers and a Liberal Prime Minister were frequently responsible for internal party friction since the sectional policies pursued by Liberal premiers of British Columbia often involved challenges to federal government policy. Although the provincial coalition with the Progressive Conservatives, between 1941 and 1952, eventually initiated severe federal-provincial strains, the campaign by federal leaders to discredit the coalition Liberals was also directed at a specific provincial leader rather than at the principle of the provincial control of the organization.

The electoral eclipse of the party's provincial wing after 1952 for the first time placed the federal
wing in a dominant position within the provincial party. Although the federal leaders in the province sought no official change in the party's organization, they attempted to extend their influence within the Association. The realignment of the federal and provincial wings of the party in turn affected the sources and expression of federal-provincial strains. Although effective control of the Association has shifted from the provincial to the federal leaderships over the past decade, the Liberals in British Columbia have maintained a unified provincial organization. But while the party has always recognized the advantages of a unified organization which serves the needs of both wings of the party, the federal political system has, nevertheless, profoundly influenced the organization and fortunes of the party. The conflicting interests created by the federal division of power not only affect the formal organization of the political party but also determine the pattern of intra-party relations.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER ONE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER TWO</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Emergence of the Liberal Party of British Columbia 1896 - 1916</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER THREE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Dominance of the Provincial Leader 1916 - 1941</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER FOUR</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Repercussions of Provincial Coalition 1941 - 1952</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER FIVE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Eclipse of the Provincial Wing 1952 - 1965</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER SIX</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCES CONSULTED</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between a political party and its environment is often elusive, if not circular. Within federal countries the relationship is particularly complex since the cleavages which prompted the original adoption of federal institutions affect the structure and operation of the political parties, while the political parties by their manipulation of the diverse interests within the society are able to affect the operation of federal institutions. The actual as distinct from the formal degree of centralization and decentralization within a federal political system may well, therefore, be most clearly exhibited in the adjustments of political parties to the federal division of power and responsibility. While the formal organization of federal political parties provides some indication of the degree of party decentralization, a detailed examination of intra-party relations within the federal parties may provide a more realistic analysis of the balance of power between central and local groups and, consequently, of the impact of the federal division of power upon the operation of the federal party. Examinations of the frequency, source and intensity of intra-party strains within the federal political parties may help to elucidate the disruptive effect
of the federal division of power upon the political party organizations.

The effects of the distinctive attributes of the Canadian federal system upon the structure and operation of Canadian political parties have received only limited attention. Although students of Canadian politics have described the formal decentralization of party organization on the provincial level, the necessary emphasis upon the parliamentary system and the practice of party discipline on both provincial and federal levels of government has often diverted attention from the decentralizing effects of the federal division of power upon the major Canadian parties. The occasional but recurrent leadership quarrels between a provincial premier and a federal prime minister of the same party have been identified as manifestations of intra-party strains within the federal party organization. Even these examples of party disunity, however, have often been interpreted as either personality clashes of quarrels which were as much the result of "peculiar circumstances" as of any generic attribute of federal politics. Detailed information on intra-party relations at the local levels of party organization has been scarce and, consequently, the role of federal and provincial groups within the provincial party organizations and the significance of strains
between the two groups is still difficult to assess. Indeed, E.R. Black's study of the Progressive Conservative Party of British Columbia and S.P. Regenstrief's brief review of provincial Liberal organizations have been the only examinations of intra-party relations which have been specifically related to the impact of the federal division of power.

These examinations of provincial party organizations have indicated that while the principle of the provincial control of the provincial party associations is well established, the interests of the federal party have often resulted in informal challenges to provincial control and even the institutionalization of a separate federal organization in the province. Indeed, it has been shown that the formal institutions of the provincial party associations have not always reflected the actual focus of power within the provincial party organizations and have rarely determined the way in which federal business in the province was conducted. Although both wings of the major Canadian political parties have generally recognized the value of a unified and closely integrated organization, the separate interests and requirements of the two groups frequently create strains within the provincial organizations. These sources of strain between federal and provincial wings of Canadian political
parties may well reveal those distinctive attributes of Canadian party organization which are derived from participation within a federal system. This thesis proposes to explore the effects of the federal political system upon the organization of the Liberal Party of British Columbia by means of an examination of those manifestations of disunity and conflict which can be related to the changing balance of power between the federal and provincial segments of the party.

Although the Liberal Party of British Columbia has managed to maintain its organizational unity, the difficulties inherent in accommodating two levels of activity and interest within a single organization have led to periodic clashes and readjustments between the two wings of the party. Many of these strains amount to more than the personal incompatibility of the provincial and federal leadership and often emerge from federally-derived issues. Indeed, most conflicts over the leadership and control of the provincial Association are generally related to differences between the two wings of the party concerning the administration of party business in the province or to differences concerning the public policies of either the federal or the provincial parties. This thesis proposes to explore the effects of the changing electoral positions of the two wings of the party
upon both the focus of power within the Association and also the source and the intensity of intra-party strains.

In order to document the changing focus of power within the Liberal Party of British Columbia it has been necessary to establish and examine the periods of provincial party power and of opposition. This procedure has also facilitated an assessment of the position of the provincial party leader in relation to both the federal leader and to the federal wing within the province during various electoral circumstances. The chronological organization of the thesis is, therefore, designed to illuminate the effects of changes in the federal and provincial electoral positions upon the control of the provincial party organization and upon the source and intensity of federal-provincial party strains. To elucidate the structure of intra-party relations within the Liberal Party of British Columbia, the empirical findings of this case-study will be presented in the concluding chapter under four possible electoral circumstances: Concurrent Federal and Provincial Power; Concurrent Federal and Provincial Opposition; Provincial Power-Federal Opposition; and Federal Power-Provincial Opposition. The relevance of these findings to other Canadian parties and other federal systems will also be explored in relation to what
is known about the general impact of federalism upon the organization and operation of political parties.
FOOTNOTES


CHAPTER TWO

THE EMERGENCE OF THE LIBERAL PARTY
OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

1896 - 1916

The first local Liberal organizations were formed in the eighties and a united provincial Association was created by the first Provincial Convention held in 1897. This early Liberal Association owed its creation and its early survival to the federal representatives elected from the province, who desired to consolidate their own organizations and to encourage provincial Liberal sentiment. Although several members of the provincial legislature belonged to this early Association, the antipathy towards local party lines was strong among many British Columbia Liberals. The early Association, primarily served to unite liberally-minded British Columbians for the purposes of supporting and understanding the policies of the Liberal government in Ottawa.1 With the introduction of provincial party lines and the election of the first partisan Conservative provincial government in 1903 the provincial Liberal Association became active in provincial politics and henceforth served both federal
and provincial needs. The organization was clearly based upon the concurrent membership of locals in both federal and provincial ridings and joint participation of both riding leaderships in the policy-making committees of the Association. From its very inception, however, the Liberal Party of British Columbia has experienced federally-derived strains. These strains have reflected both the sectional politics of British Columbia and the administrative difficulties encountered in serving and coordinating two distinct areas of interest. Before World War I most party conflicts represented growing pains but, nevertheless, some of the recurring sources of federal-provincial strain can be clearly identified.

Between 1896 and 1908 the federal wing of the Liberal Party dominated federal politics within the province and likewise exerted a great deal of influence within the British Columbia Liberal Association. In 1896, of the six seats in the House of Commons from British Columbia, four were held by Liberals and, in 1904, the party held all seven seats. The prestige of the federal Liberals from British Columbia was greatly enhanced when provincial cabinet representation was granted in 1902. Senator William Templeman was appointed a minister without portfolio and in 1906 upon his election to the House of
Commons became Minister of Inland Revenue and later Minister of Mines. During the same period the province was also well represented by two Liberal Senators. Because of their representation in Ottawa, the federal wing of the British Columbia Liberal Party exercised a dominant role within the provincial party which endured long after 1903, when an official provincial leader and a substantial number of Liberal members of the legislature contributed to the leadership of the party.

Templeman was responsible for calling the Liberal Convention of 1897 and for several years thereafter a federal representative held the Association presidency. The federal wing hoped to build an autonomous provincial Liberal party which would also aid the cause of the entire Liberal Party. Most federal Liberals, including the federal leader and Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier, believed that the future success of the Liberal cause within the province was dependent upon the development of a strong local organization and an active partisan provincial party, capable of provincial electoral victory. Templeman, who had been elected "federal leader" of the province by the Liberal members of parliament while still a Senator, provided the main channel of communication between British Columbia and Ottawa and thereby encouraged
provincial Liberals to respect party unity. As a cabinet minister he informed Laurier of political developments within the provincial party and consequently the federal leader was able to avoid any apparent involvement in the internal disputes of the provincial party. After 1911 the term "federal leader" was abandoned but, whenever the Liberals held power in Ottawa, the cabinet minister from the province continued to serve in this capacity.

The early constitutions and platforms of the Liberal Association reflected the principle of a united but provincially managed party. Indeed, the first detailed party constitution provided for united district associations and an Executive Committee, which contained party members active in both spheres of party activity. Although the Executive Committee was charged with the management of both federal and provincial campaigns, the organization was so weak that individual candidates often took the major burden of the organizational, if not financial responsibility for elections. Policy differences between federal and provincial wings of the party also hampered the efficiency of the joint organization. Indeed, some provincial Liberals refused to participate in federal elections, while others openly expressed their opposition to segments of Laurier's program.
Throughout this period issues related to federal powers or policies dominated the party's conventions. Even after 1907 when the provincial Liberals had assumed a dominant role in the direction of Association affairs, federal government policy was the most consuming political issue in British Columbia. The resolutions passed by the provincial Association were usually concerned with matters within the federal sphere of interest. Many resolutions were either openly critical of Laurier's policy concerning "Better Terms," oriental immigration, railroad policy and the tariff, or endorsed federal action in the province on matters which had not yet been approved by the Liberal government in Ottawa. Indeed, the British Columbia Liberal Association used the conventions and the party platforms not only to inform the public of provincial Liberal policy but also to inform Ottawa of its position and demands. Many Liberal members of parliament from the province privately agreed with these sectional provincial policies but they were reluctant to endorse these policies publicly if they obviously conflicted with Laurier's own program. Nevertheless, the success with which the Conservative government of Sir Richard McBride campaigned on behalf of provincial interests compromised all provincial Liberals for the policies of the Laurier government were identified as Liberal policies. Under these circumstances
sectionally-derived issues were responsible for conflicts between Laurier and British Columbia Liberals in both spheres of interest and the provincially based Liberals were naturally more antagonistic than were the federal representatives. 6

Despite endorsement of provincial rights by the early Liberal Party, Laurier insisted that the party in British Columbia should support the entire program of the Liberal government in Ottawa. 7 The provincial leaders continued their independent policy and although the federal leader evidently attempted no direct disciplinary action, he did refuse provincial requests for Eastern funds to start a Liberal newspaper in 1908. 8 Since the federal party in Ottawa had never provided the British Columbia party with substantial financial aid Laurier had few instruments of discipline other than the withdrawal of small patronage jobs from the province. In general, however, the Prime Minister avoided interference in matters of purely provincial party concern and refused in several provincial party disputes to intercede on behalf of provincial Liberals. 9 Since the British Columbia Liberal Association was continually torn by petty arguments, regional quarrels and personality clashes, any interference by the federal leader would have intensified provincial opposition to federal policy.
The growing popularity and strength of McBride's Conservative government and the success of its "fight Ottawa" policy affected both wings of the British Columbia Liberal Party. In 1907 and 1908 Premier McBride's government passed several anti-oriental immigration bills which were either reserved or disallowed. The federal government believed that this particular immigration problem required a diplomatic solution and consequently, although the right to regulate immigration was held jointly by the federal and provincial governments, Ottawa objected to British Columbia's independent action on the issue. Anti-oriental feeling was strong in British Columbia and, by 1907, most groups within the province including the Liberals had made their positions clear. In pursuing an anti-oriental policy the provincial Liberals upheld the right of the province to control oriental immigration. This policy placed provincial Liberals in direct conflict with the federal party.

During the federal campaign of 1908 McBride made the federal government's stand on oriental immigration a major issue. The provincial Liberals could not challenge any of McBride's charges on this particular issue and thus found themselves ineffective in the federal campaign. The Premier also used his record of negotiations for "Better
Terms" in the campaign and embarrassed the provincial Liberals, for although they too stood for "Better Terms," many privately regarded Laurier's solution of a "final and unalterable" settlement for British Columbia as unfair to the province. Few provincial Liberals were surprised when, in the federal election of 1908, their party lost five of the seven seats they had held since 1904. Even William Templeman was defeated in this election but soon regained his seat and returned to the cabinet. Provincial Liberals in both wings of the party maintained that their defeat was the result of Laurier's oriental immigration policy and several provincial party leaders did not hesitate to use this defeat to justify the need for the policy's modification. The Prime Minister was unimpressed by this explanation and charged that rival factions in New Westminster and Vancouver hindered the campaign. Laurier suggested that Templeman's defeat emphasizes a fact however which is only too obvious, and this fact is that the Liberal Party has lost ground simply from want of courage to fight the issues and give battle to the enemy upon the lines laid down by Ottawa.

The federal Liberals from British Columbia failed to recover in the province for in the following election,
when they supported Laurier's policy more consistently, all their candidates were defeated. Indeed, the Liberal Party of British Columbia had no federal parliamentary representation again until 1921, when the Liberals gained three of the thirteen seats in the province. The decline of the federal Liberals in British Columbia was in part the result of the conflict between Laurier's policies and the widely shared and politically significant views of provincial needs which were held by most British Columbians. The success of the strong, popular and federally active Conservative provincial administration further contributed to the decline of the federal wing after 1908. The British Columbia federal Liberals maintained a semblance of unity among themselves and attempted to limit their conflicts with Laurier. While it is doubtful whether action as a more conventional disciplined party, which supported all federal Liberal policy, would have aided their cause during this period, they might have survived with the assistance of a more united provincial party capable of providing a more efficient common party organization.

Although the provincial party was also affected by the unpopularity of the McBride government, provincial and personality cleavages were more damaging. The effectiveness of the party organization was weakened as
much from these provincial sources of friction than from any of the federally-derived issues. Internal cleavages and personality clashes caused constant friction within the British Columbia Liberal Party from its inception. Throughout the period there was competition and distrust between mainland and island Liberals. The friction was caused by the allegedly unbalanced distribution of federal appointments between the two centers of political activity and compounded by competing Liberal factions. At times even on the mainland there were clashes between two provincial cliques. There was, moreover, little organizational coordination and the provincial leader frequently lost effective control of his party. Indeed, it was not until the provincial Liberals had lost all reasonable hope of electoral victory that the internal quarrelling subsided.

At the second provincial Liberal Convention in 1902, the adoption of party lines in provincial politics was approved and the first provincial leader was elected. Joseph Martin, a former member of the Manitoba legislature, had entered British Columbia politics in 1897 when he campaigned for the adoption of party lines. In 1902 he was narrowly elected to the provincial leadership but many Liberals felt that his excitable and often unpredictable personality would split rather than unify the party.
The assessment proved to be accurate for in the first election following his assumption of provincial leadership, Martin did not have the full support of the provincial Liberal organization and the third Liberal Convention held before the election in 1903 refused to give him unanimous support. Because the introduction of party government in British Columbia was not certain until after the election of McBride and his subsequent consultation with Lieutenant-Governor Henri Joly de Lotbiniere, Martin operated in a particularly difficult situation. Many Liberals, including a future provincial leader John Oliver, had campaigned in 1903 in the belief that another coalition would be formed by McBride and that they would be included in the government. In the election of 1903 the Liberals thus campaigned without an effective leader and without a unified organization.

In his correspondence with active Liberals in the province, Laurier commented on the provincial disunity and suggested that the party had no future in the province unless it would stand behind an acknowledged leader. Several days later almost in answer to his comment, the Liberal members of the legislature in caucus elected J. A. Macdonald from Rossland as provincial leader. Although Macdonald was the first acknowledged provincial leader, he failed to prevent internal party quarrels of to
discipline the Liberal members of the provincial legislature. During the election campaign of 1907 he was unable to restrain the public quarrel between John Oliver and Joseph Martin after they had disagreed over the Columbia and Western Land grant. Macdonald was also embarrassed by the Liberal convention's platform of the fall of 1907, which sided with McBride rather than with Laurier on the question of Asiatic immigration. The loss of five seats in the provincial election of 1907 reflected the new dimensions of the immigration issue within the province.

In 1909 Macdonald was appointed Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal in British Columbia and John Oliver succeeded him as provincial leader. Oliver's term of office was a brief and unhappy one for in the provincial campaign of 1909 he was soundly defeated along with most other provincial Liberals. Indeed, after 1909, only H. C. Brewster of Alberni and John Jardine of Esquimalt retained their seats in the legislature. In 1911 Jardine became a Conservative and Brewster as the sole provincial Liberal representative in the legislature became the provincial Liberal leader. Oliver faced many problems in his campaign for the party fought without adequate funds and lacked support from the press. In contrast, the McBride government spent $60,000 in Vancouver alone.
Oliver's platform of extended railroad building was also effectively criticized by McBride who publicized Laurier's rather non-committal support of the provincial Liberal leader's policy. In 1911 H. C. Brewster, John Oliver and a few other provincial Liberals decided to campaign actively for Laurier's reciprocity program, although many Liberal supporters believed that reciprocity would hurt the British Columbia farmer. This provincial support of the federal program may have been a strategy to recover from the defeats of 1908 and 1909, but there is also some evidence which suggests that John Oliver was beginning to hold national as well as purely sectional positions. It is of course possible that the provincial Liberals worked for this federal campaign because the issues were relevant to provincial politics and the McBride ministry was also campaigning actively on behalf of the federal Conservatives. During a period of limited provincial representation provincial Liberal politicians needed to participate in the active political arena in order to retain their identification as Liberals. Their activity on behalf of the federal Liberals did not materially benefit their own situation for in the provincial election of 1912 no Liberals were elected to the provincial legislature. During the
years between 1912 and 1916 local and provincial organization was maintained in a perfunctory manner and H. C. Brewster, the provincial leader, exerted limited control over the weak and diffuse organization.

This emergent period in the growth of the Liberal Party in British Columbia was thus characterized by political weakness and organizational disunity. The federal Liberals in the province were in power at the beginning of the period, but their influence upon provincial affairs was weak and unorganized. Although their power in Ottawa was similarly limited they were provided with cabinet representation. Conflicts between the policies of their leader Wilfrid Laurier and those their British Columbia supporters desired diminished their provincial stature. While the federal wing of the party could have effectively controlled the provincial Liberal Association from its inception, they allowed the provincially-based Liberals to assume the direction of the party. The principle of provincial party autonomy was still recognized by Canadian parties of the period and proved to be exceedingly popular in British Columbia where the related principle of provincial government autonomy was strongly supported but it is possible, however, that the leadership of the party defaulted to the provincial group in the absence of a stronger, more united or more determined federal group.
Federal-provincial relations during this period lacked the lines which clearly divided federal and provincial groups after 1916. Each wing of the party was often divided internally while opposition to Laurier and the Eastern Liberals provided occasional sources of provincial unity. Nevertheless, the popularity of sectional issues in British Columbia along with the poorly developed sense of party discipline and partisan commitment created severe federal-provincial strains throughout the period before World War I. The severe disunity exhibited by the provincial wing of the party was related to both broader sectional issues and to personality conflicts or factional jealousies. The frequency of intra-provincial party quarrels was a unique characteristic of the period of party emergence for once the provincial Liberals held power, party discipline and the control exercised by the provincial leader were more readily accepted by the provincial party. The most enduring legacy of this period of emergence were firstly, the acceptance of a unified party under the formal direction of a provincially-based leadership and secondly the appearance of federal-provincial strains caused by sectionally-derived policy conflicts with the federal government. Such strains were, of course, to become more threatening to federal-provincial party unity when the provincial party was also in power.
FOOTNOTES


3 Templeman served as president of the Association from 1897 to 1902 and E. R. Maxwell, a member of parliament, served from 1902 to 1907.


5 Ibid., p. 33.

6 Ibid., p. 96.


10 The British North American Act, Section 95.

12 Ibid., p. 44.

13 Ibid., p. 55; Laurier to G. G. S. Lindsay, December 17, 1908, Op. Cit., Reel 5, p. 147661.

14 James Morton, Honest John Oliver, J. M. Dent and Sons Limited, Toronto, 1933, p. 79.


16 Morton, Honest John Oliver, p. 79.


21 Ibid., p. 46.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DOMINANCE OF THE PROVINCIAL LEADER
1916 - 1941

After 1916 the electoral fortunes of the Liberal Party improved both within the province and in the nation as a whole. From 1916 to 1921 the Brewster-Oliver provincial government held power while the Union Government retained control in Ottawa but from 1921 to 1928 two successive Liberal governments held power in both Victoria and Ottawa. After a period of five years in opposition in both the federal and provincial parliaments, the Liberals regained control in Victoria in 1933 and, in Ottawa in 1935 and for six years thereafter the Liberals conducted the affairs of both the province and the nation. Because the leader of the provincial party was also premier of the province throughout most of this period, the provincial wing of the party assumed a dominant position. Premier Oliver, who succeeded the short ministry of Brewster from 1916 to 1918 and was followed by the even briefer ministry of John D. MacLean, controlled a sound provincial organization which was revitalized by Premier T. D. Pattullo after the defeat of 1928 and provided the basis of his electoral strength after 1933.
As premiers, both Oliver and Pattullo engaged in confrontations with the federal leader of their party when provincial interests were threatened by federal policies. At first both Oliver and Pattullo believed that as Liberals their demands would receive the understanding consideration of Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King. Oliver's program did not threaten the constitutional powers of the federal government but, nevertheless, failed to receive King's full support. Premier Pattullo's campaign for provincial rights, however, was more vigorous and not only strained relations with Ottawa but also led to a division amongst the provincial Liberals themselves.

BREWSTER: 1916 - 1918

After a long period in opposition the provincial party obtained a suprisingly large mandate in 1916, when it won thirty-seven of the forty-seven seats in the provincial legislature. Although this electoral success was facilitated by the mistakes of the Conservative administration and the departure of the popular Sir Richard McBride, the provincial Liberals also reaped the rewards of continued political activity and organization under the direction of H. C. Brewster throughout the lean years between 1912 and 1916. By 1915 it was
clear that scandals had damaged the public image of the Conservative administration while, even under the new leadership of William Bowser the conservatives were failing to obtain the support of the growing reform elements in the province. The Liberals, therefore, increased their political activity and publicized their sympathy for the temperance and feminist causes. This publicity brought immediate results for, in 1915, Brewster and M. A. Macdonald were elected in a by-election held to test public support for two new cabinet appointments in the Bowser government. From their position in the legislature Brewster and Macdonald launched an effective campaign against the provincial government and provided a focus for the dissatisfied elements within the province. By the time of the next provincial election, the Liberals had the support of many prominent provincial figures, some of whom, like Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper, had previously been associated with the Conservatives.  

CONTROL OF THE PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION:

After a campaign based upon the issues of economic depression, government reform and related war issues, Brewster felt indebted to the soldier and reform vote. There was, however, substantial opposition within his
patronage starved party to civil service reform, but, nevertheless, he was able to proceed with a limited amount of reform. His government was almost immediately upset by public scandal and eventually his attorney general M. A. Macdonald had to resign. The first accusations against the government were made by a Liberal backbencher and this misfortune reflected Brewster's difficulty in maintaining unity within the provincial wing of the party. Nevertheless, the provincial leader continued to control the Liberal organization for, although backbenchers or even his cabinet minister disagreed with him on matters of provincial policy, there was no attempt to challenge his position as party leader. Brewster even survived the serious party split over the issue of support for a federal coalition government for the duration of the war.

SOURCES OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL STRAIN:

The issue of a Union government in Ottawa did, however, initiate federal-provincial strains for, while several leading members of the provincial cabinet remained loyal to Laurier and the continuance of an independent Liberal campaign, others in the provincial Liberal government supported the formation of a Union government. Brewster not only participated in the first negotiations
for the coalition government but also actively competed for the Unionist (Liberal) nomination for Victoria against fellow Liberal William Sloan. Although he withdrew from the Victoria contest, Brewster continued to be associated with the Union cause and there were rumors of a cabinet appointment in the event of victory for the coalition. While Brewster desired to maintain a friendly relationship with Laurier and refrained from direct public attacks upon the federal Liberal leader, his open support of the Unionist cause created friction within the provincial party. It was obvious that several provincial ministers believed that real Liberals should not be associated with the coalition which their leader had rejected and when Laurier visited Vancouver in December of 1917 he was greeted by a large group of provincial politicians, including the new attorney general J. W. deB. Farris, F. C. Wade and J. W. Weart but, Premier Brewster was absent. Brewster lost the support of a significant part of the provincial Association because of his support of the Unionist cause and even the provincial Liberal Association suffered a decline in membership in spite of its continued support of the straight Laurier-Liberal program and candidates. The Vancouver Province reported
on several occasions that the "great bulk of the party, who are members of the Association, were definite in their support of Sir Wilfried Laurier." The newspaper also indicated that the majority of the rank and file Liberals, who had supported Brewster in 1916, now actively supported the Laurier-Liberal candidates. Those Liberals who were committed to the Unionist cause joined separate federal organizations but evidently continued to support the Liberal provincial government for they hoped to avoid a coalition in provincial politics. While it is difficult to assess the strength of these two groups within the Liberal Association, it is clear that this federally-derived issue split the entire provincial party and at times made it difficult to identify federal Liberals in British Columbia. Because the Unionist cause received overwhelming support in British Columbia, provincial politicians contained their differences in order to maintain their only recently obtained position of power within the province.

The Liberal Party of British Columbia accidently avoided the repercussions of the close association of the provincial leader with the Unionist government when Brewster became ill with pneumonia and died on the way home from a conference in Ottawa in February of 1918.
The three major candidates in the leadership campaign which followed were all closely associated with the Laurier-Liberal cause but this common attribute had little influence on their candidacy or upon the conduct of the campaign. Although, in Brewster's absence, John Oliver had been appointed acting Premier most newspaper commentators believed that the attorney general, J. B. deB. Farris of Vancouver, and the minister of public works, J. H. King, of Kootenay, had better prospects of victory than the veteran Liberal and farmer from Delta. This judgment was, however, based upon the assumed feelings of a convention or of the Executive Committee of the Association for Farris was popular with the rank and file and King was considered to be a safe compromise for the Island and Mainland Liberals. But the composition of the caucus which elected the provincial leader reduced Farris' bases of power and support and the King forces were able to assist the Oliver supporters in their defeat of Farris. After a fourth ballot John Oliver was confirmed as the provincial leader of the British Columbia Liberal party.

OLIVER 1918 - 1927:

CONTROL OF THE PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION:

Conservatives immediately accused the newly elected Liberal Leader of opposition to the Union government in
Ottawa. In his public denial the Premier discounted suggestions that there was friction between his government and Ottawa. Oliver stressed that he would not only work with Ottawa for the benefit of the entire country but also for the interests of British Columbia as well. This statement indicated that although the provincial government was Liberal in sentiment, Oliver himself was not a Unionist and certainly after the war he actively aided the federal Liberal cause within the province. Notwithstanding occasional expressions of dissatisfaction or revolt from the back benches or from his cabinet John Oliver maintained effective control over his party. Although during Oliver's leadership the party never repeated the electoral success of 1916 and often had difficulty in securing a small majority, the provincial Liberals proved to be the most resilient party in British Columbia. They were for example able to withstand several public attacks by members of their own back bench on the issue of a PGE scandal as well as the defection of a small group of Liberals to the nascent Soldiers' Party.

The most serious intra-provincial strain occurred in 1921, when Oliver only had a majority of four excluding the speaker and developed partly because of the Premier's increasingly dictatorial actions within the Liberal caucus and partly because of policy differences within the cabinet.
In October, 1921 David Whiteside of New Westminster announced that he would not attend caucus meetings and shortly thereafter, Harry Perry of Fort George supported Whiteside and informed Oliver of his impatience with the Premier's dictatorial rule. In November of 1921, Mrs. Mary Ellen Smith, the widow of the late Ralph Smith who was a long-time labor leader and Liberal in both federal and provincial spheres, resigned her cabinet post less than one year after her appointment. In a public statement she expressed her disappointment at not receiving a portfolio and her concern over several unspecified cabinet decisions over which she was not consulted. It is difficult to assess the extent of this revolt against Oliver but the newspapers reported an "air of mystery" in the government buildings and indicated that there were many rumors of open "rebellion" within the leadership ranks. The Vancouver Province, however, stressed that: "the members under suspicion show no signs of having jumped the traces." and that the revolt was initiated by the party machine in Vancouver, which was becoming "embarrassingly powerful." While several members of the cabinet and the back bench continued to criticize elements of Oliver's financial policy and liquor policy, the "revolt" did not materialize.
The federal election in early December of 1921 fortunately distracted many of the discontented elements within the party. By mid and late December the attention of the party was concentrated upon the selection of a British Columbia cabinet minister. Although the provincial Liberal leaders had participated as individuals in the federal election, none of the three successful Liberals were of cabinet stature and the entire provincial leadership was forced to campaign to demand cabinet representation for British Columbia. Within one week J.H. King, the provincial minister of public works, M. A. Macdonald, the defeated federal candidate for Burrard, Mr. Charles E. Campbell, the provincial organizer, J. W. deB. Farris, the provincial attorney general, Mayor Gale, a defeated federal candidate for Vancouver Centre and W. M. Ivel, a defeated federal candidate for Victoria all arrived in Ottawa to look after both their own and the province's interest in the business of cabinet making. Many provincial Liberals hoped to convince the federal leader that British Columbia deserved two cabinet positions. In mid-December rumors circulated which suggested that Fred Stork, the member-elect for Prince Rupert, would relinquish his seat to Oliver if the provincial Premier was appointed to the cabinet. Stork soon denied the report and no further suggestions of a cabinet appointment for Oliver was heard. In late
December, however, Farris resigned and it was suggested that he hoped to enter federal politics. Farris had informed Oliver of his possible resignation before he departed for Ottawa and made it clear that he found it impossible to enforce the provincial liquor law or continue to be the focus of anti-government attacks. After Senator Hewitt Bostock was appointed to the cabinet in late December the province abandoned its campaign for a second cabinet post and by the turn of the year most provincial leaders hoped to establish close working relations with their federal colleagues.

SOURCES OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL STRAIN:

POLICY DIFFERENCES:

Relations between Ottawa and Victoria had scarcely commenced when Oliver expressed his annoyance at Prime Minister King's appointment of J. H. King, the provincial minister of public works, to the federal cabinet. Oliver resented this federal "raiding" at a time when his own majority was slender and his cabinet depleted by other recent departures. Since he was planning to request both better terms for the province from Ottawa and a reassessment of the status and policy of the PGE, Oliver was relatively restrained in his reactions to J.H. King's
appointment. When the Prime Minister was unresponsive to his requests Oliver considered a renewal of McBride's successful "fight Ottawa" program. Indeed, the Premier initiated an open attack on the federal Government and threatened to appeal directly to the Imperial Parliament if his suggestions were continually ignored. But after an appraisal of the consequences of this course of action Oliver wisely decided to redirect his hostility by means of an attack on Eastern financial interests and railroad rates. Provincial leaders reasoned that this more conservative policy would satisfy most provincial interests and yet would not directly challenge the federal government. The program met with success and was in part responsible for the increased popularity of the provincial Liberal government.

Indeed, this formula proved so effective that Oliver repeated the campaign for lower freight rates whenever his political position within the province or even within the party proved to be vulnerable. In 1923 and 1924, for example, Oliver felt threatened by the wide appeal of the Provincial Party, which stood for the reform of politics and the modification of the party system, and during the election campaign of 1924 the Premier skilfully renewed his campaign for lower freight rates. But suspicions about its precarious position prompted the
provincial party to capitalize on its political connections with the King government. The newspapers printed ads for the Liberals which reported:

John Oliver, the head of the Liberal Government in British Columbia has the ear of the Hon, Mackenzie King, the head of the Liberal Government in Ottawa; and if the people of British Columbia demonstrate by their votes that they are in accord with John Oliver's fight, we in British Columbia will benefit to a far greater extent than we would if Mr. Bowser or General McRae were placed in power.22

Although the Prime Minister could not publicly endorse or dismiss such a statement, Oliver worded his claim carefully. Nevertheless, this impromptu campaign strategy indicated the insecurity of the provincial party. This assessment proved accurate for Oliver lost his seat and although he regained a seat in a by-election, his Liberal administration governed with only twenty-three of the forty-eight seats.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFERENCES:

In contrast, the federal Liberals in the province exhibited a new vitality and a growing strength in the election of 1925. The federal minister of public works, J. H. King, directed the provincial campaign and made effective use of the growing number of Young Liberal Associations which increasingly identified with federal
passed in the legislature, the party united more forcefully behind Oliver. Until just before his death from cancer in 1927 Oliver maintained control of a fairly well integrated and united party and insisted that the party select his successor. Indeed, federal-provincial strains were well contained throughout the Oliver period. Federally-derived issues, which under some circumstances could have contributed to internal party divisions, were used instead to unite the party or to increase popular support for the provincial administration. Since the freight rates issue satisfied provincial needs, the more threatening sectional-issues of the McBride ministry were avoided. Indeed, when Oliver felt vulnerable during a provincial election he independently traded upon his peaceful relations with King and claimed a special relationship with Ottawa. While the federal party may have tolerated such claims as part of the political game, the relative harmony of the two wings within the province may have been aided by the weakness of the federal wing in British Columbia and by their small numbers throughout the period.

MACLEAN 1927 - 1929:

In the August of 1927 John D. MacLean was officially elected the leader of the provincial Liberal party.
politics rather than with the provincial administration. The provincial party also assumed an active role in this campaign and Premier Oliver spoke at several nominating meetings and announced, at a time when Prime Minister King visited the province, that he would "take the stump" for the Liberal candidates in the federal campaign. The Liberals were relatively successful in this election and the increased provincial participation was appreciated but, in the federal election of 1926, the Liberal representation from British Columbia in Ottawa was reduced from four to one and Oliver's participation in the campaign was now resented. Many prominent Liberals believed that the uneven record of the provincial government had affected the fortunes of the federal party and that in the future the provincial leader's "intervention" in federal affairs should be curtailed.

Although Oliver's leadership of the party was not challenged, both the provincial and federal wings of the party expressed their dissatisfaction with the direction and management of party policy. The administrative difficulties encountered during the preceding federal elections were consequently only one source of party strain. Many provincial leaders feared that Oliver had lost touch with the electorate but after the new reform program was
MacLean had been a member of the Oliver cabinet since 1917 and, although he was considered to be more of an administrator than a politician, both wings of the party supported his leadership. He encountered some opposition, however, when he insisted that he lead the party through one legislative session before calling an election in the summer of 1928. Several provincial leaders believed that the Liberals should renew their mandate while the memory of "Honest John" Oliver was still alive. In the minds of many party members MacLean did not present a new or dynamic image to an electorate, which had never given more than 50 percent of the vote to the Liberals and had only recently returned the party by default with 32 percent of the popular vote. The new provincial leader had also to contend with dissatisfaction within his own party just before the election. A former Liberal member for Vancouver, Charles Woodward, attacked the Liberal party for its failure to give the city of Vancouver cabinet representation in Victoria. The charges were ambiguous but Woodward and several other provincial Liberals approached the Conservatives with an offer of support in exchange for their support of cabinet representation for the city. While this incident presented only a relatively minor challenge to the provincial leadership, it exposed the friction between the Vancouver Liberals and other provincial Liberals.
In this brief ministry federal-provincial relations had little time to mature but in a last attempt to regain popular support, Premier MacLean did revive the issue of the sale of the PGE. He claimed that his government alone, with its close association with Ottawa and the Prime Minister, could effectively negotiate for British Columbia. MacLean, like Oliver, claimed a special relationship with Ottawa but the Premier even suggested that his Conservative opponent, S. F. Tolmie, would experience great difficulty in negotiations with King because he had served as a national conservative organizer. This strategy failed and the Liberals were severely criticized for using both an unfair and unconfirmed claim. Again the federal party maintained a discreet silence in public and neither confirmed or disclaimed MacLean’s implied "special relationship." To unite his provincial party and to gain the support of the British Columbia electorate MacLean made demands on the federal government. Like Oliver, however, MacLean chose relatively safe demands and thereby indicated his desire to maintain reasonable relations with the federal party. The federal party allowed MacLean to retire gracefully after the party suffered a major defeat in the election of 1928 and was reduced to an opposition party of twelve representatives. MacLean was promised a federal appointment if he failed to win a seat in parliament in
the next federal by-election. Although some federal leaders suggested that Maclean campaigned as though he wished to be defeated, in January of 1929 he was appointed to the Federal Farm Loan Commission and soon after the small Liberal caucus selected T. D. Pattullo as House leader for the coming legislative session.

PATTULLO 1929 - 1941

CONTROL OF THE PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION

With the election of Pattullo the Executive Committee of the Liberal Association established the right to select the permanent party leader for the first time, but from the very beginning of his term as party leader Pattullo himself exercised effective control over the provincial Association. To supplement his growing personal popularity, Pattullo inherited and made effective use of certain constitutional powers and informal practices developed during Oliver's administration. The Liberal Association constitution gave the Executive Committee the major source of power and deprived the full Convention of the Association of real power. Conventions were called only upon the request of the Executive Committee every three years and they were unable to debate "any resolution affecting the general policy of the Liberal Party, until
it had first been referred without debate thereon, to the Committee on Resolution. . ." 32 Indeed, not even matters of great importance, such as constitutional amendments, could be discussed by the Convention until they had been referred to special committees appointed by the president of the Association. Throughout the period the president of the Association, as well as other key Association officers and employees, were officially chosen by the Executive Committee but they were also the personal appointees of the party leader. 33

Pattullo established a firm control over the majority of the Executive Committee for it was composed of the Association officers, the presidents of the federal and provincial District Associations along with representatives for Vancouver and Victoria, Liberal Senators, Liberal members of the House of Commons, Liberal members of the provincial legislature and all Liberal candidates defeated in the most recent election. 34 Since the officers of the Association were appointed by Pattullo himself and since most of the Liberal members of the legislature and their defeated colleagues were close to the provincial leader, Pattullo was generally able to override opposition generated by federal leaders. In addition to Pattullo's ability to control the formal apparatus of party machinery, the
tradition conduct of most of the party's business within a small circle of the leader's confidant further enlarged the power of the provincial leader. Before the election victory in 1933 the provincial organizer, Major J. S. Moodie, worked very closely with Pattullo, while A. M. Manson, the former attorney general who was close to Pattullo before he moved into federal politics was a charter member of the powerful Finance Committee established in 1931.

After Pattullo became Premier the Vancouver Centre organization, centered around the Farris brothers, not only exercised a great deal of power within the party but also created the most effective organizational link between the federal and provincial wings of the party. While the Farris group included several provincial Liberals who later moved into federal politics, J. W. deB. Farris continued to participate in provincial politics after he was called to the Senate in 1937 and Wendell Farris served as party treasurer and chairman of the Finance Committee. Although the Farris brothers were especially active in revolt against the Premier in 1941, throughout most of the Pattullo period they coordinated the two spheres of party organization and finance. Indeed, in 1937, Wendell Farris restrained Pattullo when he threatened to separate the two wings of the party after the Premier had been harassed by several federal-provincial strains which
emerged both from the 1935 election and from his own difficulties with Prime Minister King. 36

Within the sphere of provincial politics Pattullo maintained a fairly tight control over his organization. Although Pattullo experienced several public rebukes from legislative members, he maintained a more disciplined party government than did Premier Oliver. In 1934, however, he found that he was unable to prevent five Liberals from voting against a government measure concerning a plan to build the Fraser River bridge. This difficulty occurred because many Liberals had assumed that after 1933 the party would end caucus control. 37 Despite the promise in the Liberal platform of 1933, however, the Premier found that he needed caucus control and evidently convinced most Liberals to voice their criticisms in caucus after this affair.

Until 1939 the isolated conflicts within the provincial party were primarily the result of personality clashes or injured egos. There was, for example, the long standing feud between Pattullo and G. G. McGeer. McGeer had attacked his leader on the eve of the successful election of 1933, possibly because he already knew of his failure to make a cabinet post. 38 McGeer and Pattullo
again feuded when McGeer became mayor of Vancouver and yet again when McGeer entered federal politics. Pattullo also had differences with Harry Perry, a provincial Liberal stalwart, who also was excluded from inner government circles on more than one occasion.  

**SOURCES OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL STRAIN:**

**ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFERENCES:**

Until federal-provincial relations were shattered in 1941 Pattullo maintained effective control over the provincial Association and a single and fairly well integrated organization which served the needs of both federal and provincial elections. Even before his election Pattullo had worked on behalf of federal candidates and made his organization and resources available to the federal wing. In 1930, while King did not wish to be associated with the recently defeated provincial Liberals, he still utilized Pattullo's organization. In the federal election of 1935 Pattullo placed his entire party and government behind King in spite of suggestions of friction between the two men. Almost every major provincial personality, including most cabinet ministers, campaigned for their fellow Liberal candidates with the one exception of G. G. McGeer, who was snubbed by the entire Pattullo government. The close association of the two wings
of the party was so complete and so striking that Bruce Hutchison commented that the Pattullo government:

"... has now identified itself so intimately with the fate of Liberal candidates that a reverse for them certainly would be a grave blow to the Pattullo government, just as their success would be a great help. Mr. Pattullo, apparently well aware of what he was doing, definitely associated himself with the result of the election last week and as this is written is associating himself with Mr. King -- a touching reconciliation after all that has happened between them."41

Although both wings of the Liberal Party assisted each other in elections, they also independently reserved the right to suggest the form of public association during each campaign. Whenever a close alliance between provincial and federal personalities or governments was considered a liability to that wing of the party faced with a campaign, the party disguised the utilization of its joint organization and relied on only individual members of the other wing for campaign purposes. Selective participation of this kind was largely dependent upon the extent of personal obligations amongst the party members. The pattern of joint participation in federal and provincial elections has, moreover, varied for while provincial Liberal leaders and even Liberal premiers have campaigned personally, as a group or as a government for federal Liberals both within and outside the province, the
participation of federal representatives in provincial elections was restricted to individual members and rarely involved the federal Liberal leader. 42

Although the ground rules for joint participation in election campaigns were relatively clear, friction between the two groups often emerged from dissatisfaction with either the form or the results of mutual venture. Since each group believed that its own success both in the campaign and in political life generally was in part dependent upon the contribution of the other wing, federal-provincial friction was particularly prevalent during campaign situations. For example, in 1935, many Liberals had anticipated a substantial increase in the number of members of parliament elected from the province and when the results failed to meet their expectations, they sought an explanation in the inadequacy of the joint campaign and Pattullo was prompted to complain to King that "Some of the soreheads are looking for a scapegoat and want to take it out on me." 43 Because of the dissatisfaction with the result of this election and the subsequent strains between the provincial and federal governments, Pattullo suggested a separation of the two wings of the provincial organization. 44 Pattullo may well have raised possible organizational separation to improve his
bargaining position with King and the federal party. Certainly the party had always considered any separation of the federal and provincial organizations as politically dangerous.

POLICY DIFFERENCES:

Although the major source of federal-provincial friction during this period were derived from conflicts between the governments of British Columbia and Canada, the resultant conflicts had direct repercussions upon the provincial party. Conservative Prime Minister R. B. Bennett had not responded to Pattullo's requests for federal loans, public work schemes, PGE nationalization and "Better Terms" and, therefore, Pattullo expected more from King's Liberal government.\(^5\) The depression was particularly severe in the province and many unemployed men migrated to British Columbia because of the favorable climate. Pattullo had been elected on a vague program of "Work and Wages," which, nevertheless, offered hopes of a small New Deal program of public works and welfare assistance. The resources of the province were, however, insufficient to support the program and Pattullo was badly in need of federal aid to continue and expand the small provincial program which he had initiated. Unfortunately, Pattullo found that King was
as unreceptive as Bennett to most of his requests. With the close of relief camps in 1938 unemployed men demonstrated in Vancouver and occupied the Art Gallery, the Hotel Georgia and the Post Office but King only assumed responsibility for unemployed transients and the labor demands of the War rather than public policy finally eased the provincial unemployment crisis. 46

In 1938 Pattullo renewed British Columbia's claim for "Better Terms" and submitted a detailed brief to a newly appointed federal commission on Dominion-Provincial relations. 47 This claim for "Better Terms" was not only more comprehensive than any of its forerunners but also developed its argument around the principle of provincial autonomy. Although provincial autonomy had been a popular issue during the early years of the province's history, World War I had diluted sectional feeling and made the province more nationally minded. The Commission's report of 1940 expressed and supported the federal government's desire to achieve a permanent solution to the recurrent financial problems related to the ambiguous division of constitutional power between the two levels of government. These constitutional questions were aggravated by the wartime conditions and to this end King stressed that a clearer definition of federal-provincial
relations would aid the war effort and facilitate post-war readjustment. 48

Pattullo strongly opposed constitutional changes and federal-provincial agreements which encouraged centralization especially when they were to be instituted under the pressure of war. He was convinced that provincial governments required not only all their existing functions but also, because of the increasing need for welfare government, even wider constitutional powers and even more benevolent federal aid. This view was not shared by all Liberals in British Columbia and both the federal wing and the Young Liberals had expressed support for a centralist position by 1941. 49 The divisions which this issue created within the party were, however, compounded by several tactical errors committed by Pattullo during the course of the Conference. The Premier's refusal to allow the caucus or legislature to discuss the Commission's report or his own future policy was injurious to his position within the provincial party. Although he insisted the Conference with an open mind, it was clear that Pattullo would not agree to any permanent surrender of provincial rights. Since the war issue was raised as a reason for such constitutional modifications, editorial opinion in the
province expressed opposition to Pattullo's stand and although the Executive Committee expressed their confidence in their leader and his policy, there were some murmurings of discontent within Liberal ranks. Even before the Conference several Liberal back benchers had complained that Liberal members of the legislature were not consulted or even informed on proposed government legislation or policy.

Upon his return from the Conference criticism of Pattullo became particularly acute for he had joined with Premiers Hepburn and Aberhart in open opposition to King's policy and also left the impression that he was inflexible by his refusal to discuss the report in committee. While the provincial cabinet strongly supported Pattullo's position in public, there were rumors that John Hart, the minister of finance, was displeased with the Premier's conduct at the Conference. The only public criticism from within the party at the time was expressed by the federal cabinet minister from the province, Ian MacKenzie and by the New Westminster member of parliament, Thomas Reid. J. G. Turgeon, the member of parliament for Cariboo also questioned Pattullo's position for he called for "An immediate British Columbia Liberal Convention to discuss, define and determine our loyalties." Ironically, only McGeer was hesitant to criticize Pattullo
and warned the party against unnecessary dissension.\textsuperscript{55} Pattullo called for a provincial election for the fall of 1941 and the Dominion-Provincial Conference became one of the major campaign issues. Although Thomas Reid campaigned for Pattullo, most other members of the federal wing remained politely out of the public eye.\textsuperscript{56} The Liberal government lost 10 seats in the election and there were immediate suggestions of a coalition. The idea was popularly presented in the provincial press and gained support within Pattullo’s cabinet. The Premier naturally refused to consider the possibility and without a full consultation with his cabinet departed for Ottawa in order to discuss a tax agreement with King. Many provincial cabinet ministers were opposed to Pattullo’s journey and cabinet minister George Pearson indicated that without the support of his legislative party Pattullo had no right to negotiate for the province in Ottawa.\textsuperscript{57}

Certainly Pattullo’s arbitrary action united various elements of the provincially and federally based party in opposition to the provincial leader over the issue of coalition. Although John Hart had travelled to Ottawa with Pattullo as the most likely successor to the Premier he became the focus of all opposition to Pattullo. When George Pearson refused to accept a cabinet position upon
the Premier's return from Ottawa and when Hart was asked to resign, following his public statement favoring coalition, Pattullo lost all hope of controlling the party. In addition to his major cabinet ministers, the majority of the federal representatives were also eager to see Pattullo step down, even at the cost of coalition. Indeed, even King probably favored coalition at this time. Finally officers of the Association, like president W. J. Knox, who were originally appointed by Pattullo, joined the forces of opposition. Without consultation with the Premier, Knox called a convention only two days before the legislature was to meet. Pattullo made little effort to organize his shrinking supporters and had apparently accepted defeat. Nevertheless, the resolution for coalition was carried by a vote of only 477 to 312 which indicated the surviving depth of Pattullo's support.

The leaders of both wings of the British Columbia Liberal Party participated in the revolt against Pattullo. While provincially-based leaders directed the revolt, the federal wing was deeply involved in the proceedings. The unusually active role of federal Liberals from the province in this challenge to the provincial leadership had developed during the Dominion-Provincial Conference.
The provincial revolt was, thus, in part related to a federally-derived issue which had already strained the unity of the provincial Liberals. Those provincial Liberals who opposed Pattullo on this issue found it convenient to ally themselves with the federal wing which was already disturbed by the provincial leader's actions. While the revolt was directed by the provincial leadership and while the provincial wing continued to control the provincial Association, the support for coalition and more particularly the revolt against Pattullo was clearly related to the federal-provincial strains which developed during the last years of the Pattullo administration.

Throughout this period the provincial Liberal leader often dominated the activities and policies of the provincial party. Although Oliver was less successful than the younger Pattullo in the exercise of his control over his provincial associates, he never faced competition from the federal wing which until 1935 remained small and relatively weak. Oliver's relations with King rarely aroused conflicts for his position on federal issues never challenged the position of the federal government. Pattullo's ideas on federal-provincial relations, on the other hand, directly clashed with those
of not only King but also of many of the federal representatives from British Columbia. World War II and the growing centralist feelings in the province made Pattullo's autonomous sentiments particularly threatening to the unity of the party. Until 1940, however, Pattullo maintained virtually complete control of the provincial party and his organization was used quite effectively in both provincial and federal elections. Indeed, these cordial working arrangements with the growing federal wing within the province were only broken during the last year of his leadership.
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid., p. 395.

3 The Vancouver Province, December 19, 1917.


5 Ibid., March 9, 1918.

6 Interview with Senator J. W. deB. Farris, January 19, 1966.

7 The Vancouver Province, March 2, 1918.

8 Ibid., March 6, 1918.

9 Ibid., March 19, 1918.

10 Interview with Senator J. W. deB. Farris, January 19, 1966.

11 The Vancouver Province, January 31, 1919.


13 Ibid., p. 414; Perry to Oliver, Oliver Papers, November 10, 1921.

14 The Vancouver Province, November 21, 1921.
Ibid., November 17, 1921.


The Vancouver *Province*, December 12, 1921 to December 16, 1921.

Ibid., December 13, 1921 and December 16, 1921.

Interview with Senator J. W. deB. Farris, January 19, 1966.


Ibid.

The Vancouver *Province*, October 4, 1925.

Ibid., May 21, 1924.

Ibid., p. 425.

Ibid.

Interview with Senator J. W. deB. Farris, January 19, 1966.

The Vancouver *Province*, July 10, 1928.

Ibid., July 5, 1928.

Interview with Senator J. W. deB. Farris, January 19, 1966.


33  This was confirmed by several Liberals who were active during the Pattullo period.


35  Interview with Mr. James Sinclair, September 30, 1965.

36  Sutherland, _Op. Cit._, p. 84; Wendell Farris to Pattullo, Pattullo Papers, September 24, 1937.

37  _The Vancouver Sun_, November 3, 1933.


39  _Ibid._, p. 83 and _The Vancouver Sun_, December 21, 1938.

40  _The Vancouver Province_, October 8, 1935.

41  _Ibid._, September 28, 1935.

42  Interview with Mr. James Sinclair, September 30, 1965.

43  Sutherland, _Pattullo as Party Leader_, p. 84; Pattullo to King, Pattullo Papers, September 24, 1937.
See p. 45 and footnote 36.


Ibid., p. 95; King to Pattullo, Pattullo Papers, July 6, 1938.


Sutherland, *Pattullo as Party Leader*, p. 98; King to Pattullo, Pattullo Papers, November 2, 1940.

The Vancouver Province, March 22, 1938.

The Vancouver Sun, November 25, 1940.

Ibid., November 20, 1940.

Ibid., January 27, 1941.

Ibid., January 16, 1941.

Ibid., January 21, 1941.

Ibid., January 17, 1941.

Ibid., October 8, 1941.

Ibid., January 17, 1941, p. 125.

Interview with Mr. James Sinclair, January 11, 1965.

The Vancouver Province, November 18, 1941.

Ibid., December 3, 1941.
Although the Liberals in Ottawa and Victoria continued to hold power concurrently until 1952, between 1941 and 1952 the pattern of federal-provincial party relations was substantially altered by the provincial coalition with the Progressive Conservatives. The coalition was dominated by the Liberal Party and the two Liberal Coalitionist premiers of the period, John Hart and Byron Johnson, also served as the provincial leaders of the Liberal Party of British Columbia. The Liberal Association preserved its unified structure and attempted to serve both federal and coalition needs. To accommodate the coalition, however, the provincial party was forced to modify some administrative procedures and develop new guidelines for the public association of the two wings of the party. While these adjustments allowed the provincial Association to function in both spheres of interest, eventually some members of the federal wing felt threatened by the coalition and claimed that it was destroying the effectiveness of the Liberal Party. Consequently,
although the coalition initially found wide support within the Liberal Party, the administrative difficulties posed by a provincial coalition for a partisan federal party eventually initiated and intensified strains within the Liberal Association.

HART 1941 - 1947:
CONTROL OF THE PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION

As premier of the province John Hart retained the control of the Liberal Association. During the Convention of 1941 the Association had approved the party's entry into a coalition with the Progressive Conservatives. Although Pattullo retained some support at that convention, almost every major provincial personality favored coalition and stood firmly behind the leadership of John Hart. Indeed, although federal leaders were generally suspicious of coalitions and were resisting pressures for a war-time coalition in Ottawa, the coalition in British Columbia received the indirect and unofficial support of the federal party, which was relieved to see Pattullo retired. Many Liberals believed that Prime Minister King actually favored the coalition despite his instructions to members of the federal wing in the province to vote as private Liberals and not as representatives of the
federal government. Consequently, while many federal Liberals followed the lead of the cabinet minister from the province, Ian MacKenzie, and refrained from taking sides in public, within the party it was well known that almost every member of the federal wing support coalition and the provincial leadership of John Hart.

In exchange for their support, however, the federal wing of the party demanded that a separate Liberal organization be maintained throughout the term of the coalition. Federal leaders also requested that the Liberal coalitionists should not support a coalition on the federal level of government. These terms were accepted by the provincial leaders and the convention, once it had approved the coalition, passed two resolutions which contained the federal demands. The federal leaders were satisfied with these arrangements and left the party organization entirely under provincial control. It was understood, however, that because the coalition would require a separation of the two wings in public, the federal leaders would assume more direct control of the organization during federal campaigns. Consequently, although federal leaders had originally feared that a provincial coalition with the Conservative Party would erode their own base of support within the province,
they eventually preferred to retain their close association with the strong and successful provincial wing of the party if at all possible. Indeed, even when administrative strains between the two wings of the party emerged because of the coalition, the federal wing made no attempt to challenge the provincial control of the organization. While a few members of the federal party hoped that the coalition would be terminated with Hart's retirement in 1947, several influential members of the federal wing in British Columbia still supported Liberal coalitionists and appeared relatively satisfied with the provincial control of the Liberal Association.⁴

Although Hart encountered some difficulties within the coalition cabinet, there was only occasional opposition to him from within the provincial ranks of his own party. The breaks in Liberal unity which occurred during the provincial election of 1945 when independent Liberal candidates ran in Vancouver, Lillooet, and Revelstoke did not represent a serious threat to Hart's control of the Association or his leadership of the coalition.⁵ The coalition Premier merely refused to endorse these candidates and the Liberal factions which supported them. He treated similar challenges within the Conservative Coalition ranks in the same way and,
thereby, disassociated the rebel groups from the popular coalition administration. In the election all the independent candidates were defeated and the coalition as a whole increased its majority in the legislature. Although Hart often delegated organizational responsibilities to his close associates in the Association because of his desire to preserve his image as a coalition rather than a partisan Liberal Premier, his control of the Liberal Party of British Columbia was never effectively challenged.

SOURCES OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL STRAIN:

POLICY DIFFERENCES:

Relations with Ottawa and Prime Minister King remained outwardly cordial throughout John Hart's leadership of the coalition. Throughout the period of war, the coalition Premier made cooperation with Ottawa a major policy of his administration and even after 1945 he did not fundamentally change his policy with respect to the federal government. While he continued British Columbia's tradition of requesting additional money and assistance from Ottawa, he did not oppose any of the new financial arrangements proposed by Ottawa. Indeed, it appears that Hart valued his personal relationship
with federal leaders and made a determined effort to be cooperative; one federal Liberal recalled that the coalition Premier seemed to "cultivate" federal politicians. But in spite of his strong identification with the Liberal Party and his desire to keep the party united, Hart believed that the coalition required him to maintain an independent identity within the province. While there were no policy differences between the two wings of the party which caused any internal party friction, administrative difficulties created by the circumstances of provincial coalition caused some federal-provincial strains.

**ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFERENCES:**

Although the Liberal Association remained formally intact, the coalition indirectly affected the grass roots organization of the party. For example, Liberal riding organizations which were designated to support Conservative coalitionists, rarely met for partisan activities. Indeed, many Liberal riding organizations functioned as coalition organizations much of the time and there were even instances when Liberal and Conservative riding organizations held joint meetings for purposes other than the nomination of coalition candidates. The separate identity of the
coalition partners was further weakened by the removal from the List of Candidates of all partisan distinctions between coalition candidates. Federal Liberals objected to these practices on the grounds that they weakened the provincial Liberal organization but they also understood that there was little they could do because during the coalition the two wings of the party had to be kept distinct. The necessity for the public separation of federal coalition business made the delicate task of joint administration and reciprocal aid within the Liberal Association more difficult.

In 1944 The Province reported that the federal Liberals had sought provincial support in British Columbia, but Premier Hart had given little encouragement because he felt that his first duty was to the coalition. Indeed, Hart stayed away from King's 25th anniversary party in Vancouver in order to demonstrate the non-partisan nature of his administration. He did, however, send the Prime Minister a personal telegram to explain his action. The occurrence of the federal and provincial elections in close succession in 1945 made it difficult for the provincial leader to alter his non-partisan policy and consequently, the two campaigns were conducted separately. No federal Liberals from British Columbia campaigned on behalf of provincial candidates and only a few members of the provincial coalition government actively campaigned for federal
candidates. During King's visit to the province in 1945, however, all leading coalition Liberals shared the platform with the Prime Minister. This practice was repeated in the Prime Minister's subsequent visits to British Columbia since a complete separation of the two wings of the party was deemed unnecessary and impractical largely because contacts between their respective governments was unavoidable.

When the party lost half of its 10 seats in the federal election of 1945, a few federal Liberals blamed the coalition and its effect upon the partisan Liberal organization. Other members of the federal wing, however, were not yet ready to blame or challenge the provincial control of the organization and, consequently, the federal reversal of 1945 did not initiate public disharmony within the Liberal Association. Federal dissatisfaction with the coalition, however, became more noticeable when John Hart announced his intention to resign. It was well known and widely advertised that Hart hoped to be appointed to the Senate upon his retirement from provincial politics and King was undoubtedly aware of this preference after Hart's visit to Ottawa just before he announced his forthcoming resignation. King, however, could not bring himself to endorse the provincial coalition by granting a reward usually
reserved for undiluted partisan commitment to the Liberal Party. King offered Hart several alternative appointments but the coalition Premier refused them hoping that the Senate seat might be given to him in the end. When Thomas Reid, the stalwart member of parliament for New Westminster, received the Senate post and the rumor of the future Lieutenant-Governor appointment for Hart would never materialize, some provincial Liberals hinted that Hart may have been falsely eased into retirement by the lure of a possible appointment to the Senate. While Hart may have timed his announcement after receiving hints of a federal appointment from King, it was well known that Hart had wanted to retire for some time. Nevertheless, King's action confirmed the growing federal dissatisfaction with the coalition in British Columbia. Indeed, the leadership campaign which followed Hart's resignation exposed the developing anti-coalition groups for the first time. Although federal-provincial strains were effectively contained throughout Hart's leadership of the Liberal Party, the administrative requirements of coalition contained later sources of federal-provincial strains which were to threaten the unity of the provincial Association.
JOHNSON 1947 - 1952:

CONTROL OF THE PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION:

With the retirement of Hart, the campaign for a new leader of the Liberal Party of British Columbia exposed the embryonic cleavages both within the provincial party and between the federal and provincial wings of the party. Gordon Wismer, the attorney general in the coalition government, had generally been expected to assume the provincial leadership and had the support of prominent personalities within the Liberal organization. Wismer's position as the "boss" of the Vancouver Centre organization and his personal enforcement of the controversial provincial liquor laws had aroused great concern within the federal wing of the party. Leading federal Liberals solicited funds to finance a campaign against the Attorney General and James Sinclair, a member of parliament from North Vancouver, Robert Mayhew, a member of parliament from Victoria, along with their associates within the provincial Association risked their political careers by supporting Byron Johnson, a virtually unknown coalition back bencher. Most of Johnson's supporters hoped that he might provide a strong and progressive leadership once the coalition was terminated. Sinclair not only campaigned for Johnson but also vigorously attacked the coalition at the same time. He voiced his
concern at the convention and complained that there was "no organization among British Columbia Liberals" and that "no political party can survive without organization."  

In a confused and tense convention Byron Johnson was elected to the provincial leadership by a small majority. Many of Wismer's supporters claimed that several delayed proxies from the North Shore would have brought victory to their candidate but they subsequently withdrew their support from the coalition and Wismer himself immediately appealed for party unity and offered the new provincial leader his assistance. In spite of his informal agreement with the anti-coalitionists to exclude Wismer from the cabinet, Johnson accepted Wismer's offer and thereby alienated his anti-coalitionist supporters, who realized their miscalculation too late and ironically recalled that "their candidate" was the very Father of Coalition, the delegate who move the original resolution back in 1941. Johnson retained Wismer as a key cabinet minister and as a close personal advisor and demonstrated no inclination to abandon the coalition. Indeed, it was often observed that Wismer's powers in party matters were greater than those of Johnson for the provincial leader delegated most problems of party organization and patronage to Wismer, who led the strong Vancouver Centre organization. Consequently, Johnson's former supporters gained little from
their campaign for not only did Wismer remain in a position of great power but also support for the coalition was as strong as ever. Although the anti-coalitionists were left without representation in the leadership ranks of the provincial party, they were able to elect one of their supporters, Arthur Laing, to the presidency of the provincial Association. As the president of the Association, Laing had little power within the party but before his entry into federal politics in 1949 he provided the main voice of anti-coalition sentiment.

By 1949, it was clear that Johnson could no longer effectively contain the anti-coalition elements within the party. The provincial leader with the assistance of Gordon Wismer managed to retain control of the party organization but the provincial leadership could not restrain the Young Liberal leaders and their associates within the federal wing of the party in their efforts to discredit and dissolve the coalition from within the provincial Association. The Vancouver Branch of the Young Liberal Association of British Columbia had organized the anti-coalition movement and, by 1949, the group was reluctant to "accept the majority decision" on the question of the continuation of the coalition. At the Liberal Convention of 1949, the Young Liberals
formally submitted their arguments against coalition in a statement entitled "An Appeal to Reason" which integrated almost every major argument against coalition. The document did, however, particularly stress the dangers that coalition presented to the federal party. The Young Liberal anti-coalitionists thereby clearly indicated their strong identification with federal politics and their close association with anti-coalitionists within the federal wing of the party. During the convention held in 1952, the federal anti-coalitionists personally entered the dialogue and the controversy rapidly assumed the properties of a federal-provincial quarrel.

During the previous year many federal leaders from the province had campaigned for Johnson's retirement. The members of parliament from British Columbia had held informal meetings in Ottawa in the spring of 1951 and had agreed not only to urge Premier Johnson to retire but also to demand the rapid termination of the coalition with the Conservatives. Many provincial Liberals found the Premier difficult to work with especially after his injury in an automobile accident in 1950 but the federal meetings did not encourage a provincial challenge to Johnson's leadership. The
president of the Association, Harry Perry, alone sided with the federal wing and openly called for Johnson's resignation.\textsuperscript{25} Although the provincial Association was increasingly divided over the desirability of coalition, the Liberal coalitionists retained the control of the Liberal organization and resisted federal pressure to hasten the retirement of the Premier or to end the coalition.\textsuperscript{26}

In 1952 the Premier dismissed the Conservative coalition leader and minister of finance, Herbert Anscomb, and officially ended the coalition but the former Liberal coalitionists retained control of the provincial Liberal organization. With the end of coalition, Johnson and Wismer disagreed over the party's best strategy but, nevertheless, in 1952 the provincial leaders campaigned with the full control of the party's organizational machinery. The Liberal organization was, however, seriously damaged by the cleavages within the Association and by the public conflicts with accompanied the pre-campaign Convention of 1952. The Convention rejected the Premier's major policy on co-insurance and Johnson in turn rebuked the Convention.\textsuperscript{27} With a divided organization and a divided leadership, the Liberals suffered severe electoral losses from which they have never recovered. While the anti-coalitionists' campaign had challenged
the provincial leader and his control of the organization, the Young Liberals and their colleagues within the federal wing had not really attacked the principle of the provincial control of the Liberal Party of British Columbia, and until their defeat in the election of 1952, the Liberal organization remained firmly in the hands of the former Liberal coalitionists.

SOURCES OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL STRAIN:
ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFERENCES:

The longer the coalition was preserved the greater were the administrative problems which the coalition created for the federal wing increased. As the coalition lost support within the province, federal leaders were less tolerant of these administrative inconveniences. They argued that the continuation of the coalition endangered the identity of the Liberal Party and, although the federal Liberals were thankful not to be too closely associated with the coalitionists or coalition policy, they objected to the removal of all references to the Liberal Party within the sphere of provincial politics. The federal leaders maintained that the coalitionists had undermined the provincial organization upon which the welfare of the entire party depended. The Young Liberals' statement to the Convention of 1949 blamed the coalition
for the poor Liberal showing in the federal election of 1945:

The result federally has been obvious. One of the most competent and ethical administrations that any country has known has been able to secure only one-quarter of the seats in this province. It can not be denied that provincial Coalition is largely responsible for this. It has not been possible to proceed with organization with any effectiveness because of the Coalition. In better faith than their partners the Liberals haven't been active in the field of organization since the Coalition was formed. Throughout Canada, the provincial organization is the political key. We cannot afford to dismantle our organization as we have done and we can do nothing else which we continue in coalition.28

Although the federal Liberals in the province more than doubled their numbers in the election of 1949, federal opposition to the coalition continued. As in 1945, the federal and provincial elections were held close together and this contributed to the strains already existing between the two wings of the party. In June, only two days after winning the provincial election, Premier Johnson announced that the members of the coalition cabinet would not participate in the federal election campaign.29 Although the Liberal organization performed many of its traditional functions for the federal wing during the campaign, federal leaders discovered the extent to which the coalition had eroded some Liberal riding organizations. The Liberal candidate in Yale,
for example, was denied the official support of the Liberal riding organization, which carried over the coalition mentality into federal politics and supported the Progressive Conservative candidate in order to ensure the defeat of the socialist candidate by a combined non-socialist vote. 30

In spite of these administrative difficulties posed by the coalition federal leaders resisted the temptation to withdraw from the provincial Association. Although by 1951, most members of parliament from British Columbia favored the dissolution of the coalition, they not only realized the value of a grass roots organization maintained by the provincial party but also appreciated that the duplication of riding organizations was difficult and expensive. Even if the federal wing developed its own organization, federal leaders felt that it would only compound the confusion already created within the province by the coalition provincial Liberal organization. Most federal Liberals hoped to salvage a united provincial party as an electoral asset for both wings of the party. Only when they were convinced that their own political future in British Columbia would be harmed by the declining fortunes of the provincial Liberals did the federal leaders, as members of the provincial Association, campaign for the end of coalition. They hoped that the
friction and disunity demonstrated by their public opposition to coalition would benefit the party as a whole for the coalition administration had lost its appeal in the province. This strategy was, therefore, designed to protect and increase their influence within the provincial party.

POLICY DIFFERENCES:

With the conclusion of World War II, the continuation of the coalition was based upon the argument that only a combination of non-socialist forces could resist the increasing popularity of the C.C.F. in British Columbia. Federal Liberals, as anti-coalitionists, dismissed this reasoning and maintained that the Liberal coalitionists had themselves compromised and perverted the progressive aspects of liberalism by their coalition with the Conservatives. Many anti-coalitionists believed that the provincial Liberals had in fact alienated a large segment of the provincial electorate which was in support of social reform and had, therefore, forced the younger generation to look to the C.C.F. for progressive measures. In 1949 the Young Liberals complained that the party had abdicated its progressive tradition and suggested that it should "rearm" itself, "not only with organization but with our principles." Most of the federal wing joined the Young Liberals in undermining the foundation of the
post-war coalition in British Columbia for they felt that their own electoral success in the province was based upon the attractions of the "progressive" aspects of federal Liberal policy. In addition to this basic disagreement over the desirability of coalition between the federal and provincial wings of the party, after 1950, most federal leaders increasingly expressed opposition to specific policies of the coalition administration.

In 1950, Senator Thomas Reid attacked the conduct of negotiations with the Aluminium Company of Canada by the provincial leader and challenged Premier Johnson to debate the issue. Johnson, in turn, accused the Senator of almost driving the company out of the province. Several members of the federal wing later clashed with the provincial leader over the new forest management policy introduced by the coalition since it apparently threatened the truck loggers of the province. George Cruikshank, the member of parliament for Fraser Valley, openly charged that the coalition was catering to the big business while several other federal Liberals, including James Sinclair, questioned Johnson on the issue because they had close associations with the truck logging interests in the province. It appeared that the new policy would give large companies an unfair advantage if not a monopoly on the timber
resources of the province. Some alterations were made to the original proposals but Johnson suggested that the federal Liberals mind their own business. In 1951 and again in 1952 federal leaders criticized the coalition's hospital insurance plan, which had already created concern within the coalition ranks as well as the provincial Association. Federal Liberals objected to the method of fee collection prescribed by the co-insurance plan and, during the 1952 convention, they helped to organize the rejection of the Premier's major policy. Although the coalitionists were themselves divided in the Convention of 1952, they resented both the open criticism of their policies by federal leaders and the severe disunity which it initiated within the provincial Association.

After 1947 the growing federal opposition to the coalition combined with the determination of the Young Liberal anticoalitionists within the provincial organization and created severe strains within the Liberal Association. Although there was substantial provincial opposition to the coalition, the active involvement of several members of the federal wing gave the coalition controversy the qualities of a federal-provincial quarrel. Special organizational problems are always presented by a provincial coalition when the federal
party continues to operate on a strictly partisan basis. These problems were, however, compounded when the federal wing in British Columbia felt that its own position within the province was threatened by the continuation of the coalition. Consequently, while substantial policy differences existed between the federal Liberals and the Liberal coalitionists, the initial sources of federal-provincial strain emerged from the administrative problems encountered by the federal wing and their perception of electoral interdependence within the province. Although these sources of strain were evident throughout the entire period of coalition, during the war most federal leaders believed that the coalition served the interests of the province and the party and were, consequently, less impatient with administrative problems. Powerful members of the federal party supported John Hart and serious federal-provincial strains were generally avoided. By 1949, however, the federal campaign against the coalition was strengthened by the election of several young members of parliament, who were strongly opposed to coalition and although they challenged the provincial leadership and the provincial administration, they did not directly question the principle of the provincial control of the Liberal Party of British Columbia. Despite the severe strains and
and cleavages within the party during Johnson's leadership of the party, the former Liberal coalitionists retained control of the organization until their defeat as partisan Liberals in 1952.
FOOTNOTES


2 *The Vancouver Province*, November 21, 1941.


4 A group led by Senators Farris and S. S. McKeen still favored the coalition at this time.

5 *The Vancouver Province*, October 1, 1945.


8 Interview with Mr. Harry Dennison, January 20, 1965.

9 *The Vancouver Province*, August 19, 1944.


13 *The Vancouver Province*, May 8, 1947; September 16, 1947.

15 The group around Senator Farris were strong supporters of Gordon Wismer. Interview with Senator J. W. deB. Farris, January 19, 1966.

16 Interview with Mr. James Sinclair, September 30, 1965.


18 *The Vancouver Province*, December 10, 1947.

19 Interview with Senator J. W. deB. Farris, January 19, 1966.

20 Blair Fraser, "British Columbia Coalition Commits Suicide," p. 60.

21 Ibid.

22 *The Vancouver Province*, April 8, 1949.

23 *The Vancouver Branch of the Young Liberals Association of British Columbia, To The Liberals of British Columbia: An Appeal to Reason*, mimeographed, 1949, p.1

24 *The Vancouver Province*, March 28, 1951.

25 Ibid.

26 Interview with Mr. James Sinclair, September 30, 1965.

27 *The Vancouver Province*, April 26, 1952.

29 *The Vancouver Province*, June 17, 1949.


31 The Vancouver Branch of The Young Liberal Association of British Columbia, *loc. cit.*

32 *The Vancouver Province*, May 23, 1950.


34 Interview with Mr. James Sinclair, September 30, 1965.

35 *The Vancouver Province*, March 28, 1951.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE ECLIPSE OF THE PROVINCIAL WING

1952 - 1965

In the post-coalition period the federal wing of the Liberal Party of British Columbia established a dominant position in the affairs of the provincial Association. In the years which followed the defeat of the coalition government the Liberal Party failed to retain sufficient electoral support to become even the official opposition party in Victoria. In contrast, the federal Liberals continued to hold power in Ottawa until 1957 and after five years of opposition, regained power once more and commanded more attention, respect and financial support than did the provincial wing. Under these circumstances, the provincial leaders were unable to retain the same kind of control over the party organization that the Liberal premiers had maintained throughout the preceding decades. Even between 1957 and 1963, when the federal party was in opposition and when the federal wing in the province was almost destroyed, the provincial leader never recovered complete control over the provincial organization. Since 1963, with the federal party's return to power in Ottawa and the

85
election of a new contingent of Liberal MP's from the province, the dominance of the federal wing within the Association has been further emphasized. While the provincial leader and the provincial wing of the party have preserved their right to independent action in many areas of provincial concern, the expanding dialogue between the federal and provincial governments has tended to limit the influence of the provincial wing within the Association because of their limited expectations of power in the provincial legislature.

Until 1959, most federal-provincial strains were created by the increasing power of the federal wing within the provincial Association and by the embarrassingly low electoral fortunes of the provincial party. After 1959, however, with the reorganization of the federal wing, the two levels of the party have achieved an adjustment which more realistically reflected their respective interests and influence within the province. Although the provincial leader had ceased to dominate the affairs of the Association, public clashes between the provincial leader and federal representatives were relatively frequent until 1959. Although open quarrels between the provincial leader and the federal membership ceased after 1959, strains between the two wings have focused upon grass roots resistance to federal demands to improve the
quality of the officers of the Association. Nevertheless, both wings of the party have valued the unified structure of the party and have attempted to publicize their mutual interests and policies.

The deep divisions within the provincial party were openly exhibited in the provincial election of 1952. The feud between Premier Johnson and Gordon Wismer was continued into the campaign while Johnson attacked the Liberal Convention for their rejection of his co-insurance plan. After this display of disunity the federal leaders were not surprised at the defeat of the provincial party. Many federal leaders were privately pleased at the defeat of many former coalitionists but most also realized that the problem of rebuilding a unified and efficient party organization was now particularly critical since the provincial party was weak. Both the prospect of persistent conflicts within the provincial ranks and the probability of weak Liberal representation in Victoria prompted some federal leaders to discuss the feasibility of a separate federal organization. While there was justifiable concern over the possible damage that might be inflicted upon the federal position by the dissension within the provincial wing, separation was considered to be a "last-ditch measure." An independent federal organization, it was
felt, "would deprive the federal people of any influence provincially." By 1952, this extreme alternative was unnecessary for it was apparent that the electoral defeat of the provincial Liberals had created a leadership vacuum and the federal leaders were able to move into positions of greater influence and control.

LAING 1953 - 1959:

CONTROL OF THE PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION:

With the prospect of a long period of opposition and only limited electoral representation, the party was faced for the first time in its history with the need to recruit a provincial leader. In an attempt to reunite the party, the major federal and provincial powers conferred jointly on the choice of possible candidates for the difficult and possible unrewarding position of provincial leader. The federal cabinet ministers, Ralph Campney and James Sinclair, took the initiative and asked Sidney Smith to continue his work as president of the Association and to head an unofficial committee formed to seek a new provincial leader. Smith, who had been a discreet anti-coalitionist and had developed some contacts with federal leaders before 1952, acted unofficially on behalf of the federal leaders throughout the period. Although he had previously been active in
provincial politics and continued to maintain his contacts with several provincial groups. Smith, first as president of the Association and later as a Senator, became more involved with the federal wing and federal interests. During the months in which the party had no provincial leader, Smith assisted Campney and Sinclair in "running the party." With the prospect of both federal and provincial elections in the near future, each minister administered a part of the province and appointed a provincial party organizer.

After it became clear that James Sinclair would not enter provincial politics, Smith approached Gordon Sloan and Dr. Norman MacKenzie. Some Liberals had hoped that a prominent public figure would ensure a quick reversal in the party's electoral fortunes. Arthur Laing's name was also circulated and when both Sloan and MacKenzie declined the leadership position, he received the approval of both wings of the party. After some hesitation Laing resigned his federal seat and was elected provincial leader by acclamation during the Liberal Convention of 1953. Laing's election was regarded in a favorable light by some of the younger elements in the party for they felt that his views coincided with those of the progressive wing of the party. Although many federal leaders praised Laing for his sacrifice of a promising federal career, influential provincial and federal groups
within the party opposed some of his early decisions. The 1953 provincial election was called just after Laing became provincial leader and he had little time to organize a campaign or to establish control over the provincial organization. Many former coalitionists within the party still held positions of influence within the Association and refused to give their cooperation to one of the more belligerent opponents of the coalition. The federal leaders assisted Laing in this election but they also had several disagreements with the provincial leader soon after the campaign.

The provincial party's representation in Victoria was reduced from six to four and Laing became the leader of a defeated and weak provincial rump. Although Laing never had a close liaison with the sitting members from Victoria where coalition sentiment had been particularly strong, he was able to exert his will in the Liberal caucus or at least express his own opinions in the legislature. As provincial leader he was the major voice of Liberal policy in the province. After the 1953 election he was able to consolidate his support within the Association and had some success in retiring former coalitionists from positions of importance in the Association. The interest in provincial politics within the party, however, was declining and Laing and his
supporters found membership dropping and financial support disappearing. The major focus and interest of the Association was federal. Many financial supporters of the party withdrew their contributions from the provincial wing and even requested that the federal Liberals avoid redirecting their contributions back into the provincial sphere. Provincial dependence on the federal wing for money increased each year and by the election of 1956 this dependence was almost total. In this position Laing often had to respect the desires of federal leaders in matters of organization and administration. Despite the attempt of federal leaders to advise Laing on matters of provincial party policy and strategy, the provincial leader frequently expressed his independent opinions. For example, he continued his attacks on the Social Credit government long after the federal leaders had urged him to take a more positive stand in the interests of the party.

Frustration at Laing's actions led to a campaign for his retirement from the provincial leadership. In the provincial election of 1956 Laing had lost his own seat and the party had retained only two seats in the legislature. Federal leaders wanted Laing to resign in favor of one of the sitting-members and when Laing
refused they attempted to find a new leader and an opportunity to depose Laing. Their efforts were hampered by the federal party's defeat in 1957 and the reduction of the elected federal representatives from the province to two members of parliament. In the fall of 1957 a young Liberal announced his intention of opposing Laing at the next provincial convention but the Young Liberals gave Laing a vote of confidence and the challenge soon disappeared. Indeed, Dillon O'Leary reported that Laing had a "firm grip" on the provincial leadership and had prevented a convention from being called. Without a convention it was impossible to elect a new leader and, consequently, Laing frustrated the designs of the party's "old guard" identified as Senator Sydney Smith and ex-fisheries minister James Sinclair while it was also clear that Campney and Senator Farris desired Laing's retirement.

When Laing lost a by-election in Burnaby in 1957, the campaign for his removal was intensified. Many provincial Liberals from Victoria were now openly opposed to Laing's continued leadership of the party and they strongly believed that a sitting-member from Victoria should assume the provincial leadership of the party. Laing, however, not only retained his position until 1959 but also chose the time of his own resignation. While he did
receive some support within the provincial organization, his continued ability to withstand the attempt to depose him was facilitated by the demise of the federal party in 1958 and the defeat of the last two Liberal members of parliament from British Columbia. The shock of defeat, the vacuum left by the defeat of prominent federal Liberals and the withdrawal of some federal Liberals from party politics allowed Laing to maintain his rather unstable position in the party. The organization of the party was weak and the financial situation of both wings of the party poor and therefore, control of the provincial Association was of little immediate consequence.

Although, between 1956 and 1959, the party experienced a period of confusion in which neither wing was strong enough nor active enough to overcome the devastation which electoral defeat had wrought, certain constitutional changes were introduced which affected the future control of the provincial Association. In 1956 the constitutional structure of the party was substantially altered to give the officers of the Association more latitude in the direction of day-to-day organizational matters. Although the constitution of the British Columbia Liberal Association had always been a vague document and had rarely determined the focus of power within the party, the changes initiated in 1956 and refined in
subsequent constitutions did allow the officers of the Association to assume a more active role once the professional wing of the party had been defeated. The constitutional reforms of 1956 were initially designed to improve the articulation between the officers of the riding associations and the leaders of the party and to provide the local and riding associations with a uniform framework of organization so that some organizational continuity could be preserved in spite of the party's rapid turnover in membership.\(^{10}\) The 1956 constitution, however, also altered the size and functions of the major policy-making bodies of the Association. It was these changes which eventually expanded the function of the officers of the Association and particularly that of the president of the Association. Between 1956 and 1959 these reforms had little noticeable effect because Senator Smith wielded substantial power within the party quite apart from his office. The effectiveness of the president was, moreover, always dependent upon the support given to him by the party's professional leaders. The attention given to the office of president of the Association by federal leaders after 1959, however, indirectly testified to the new importance of the post.\(^{11}\)

The most striking change made in the structure of the Association in 1956 was the creation of a new
policy-making and administrative body composed of the officers of the Association, representative of the Young Liberal Association, the British Columbia Woman's Liberal Association and a number of area directors. With the exception of the provincial leader and the leader of the federal party, who were honorary members, the composition of the Committee of Officers was essentially amateur. In the past the officers of the Association and the representatives from the districts and the affiliate Liberal organization were included in larger bodies dominated or at least directed by professional leaders of the party. They had never constituted a formal committee on their own. While the duties and power of these committees have never been specified in the constitutions of the Association and in practice are quite flexible, it is probable that the Committee of Officers assumed many functions fulfilled by the Advisory Council before 1956. This latter body was a sub-committee of the large and powerful Executive Committee and was composed of the officers of the Association, the senior Senator of the province, the senior Member of Parliament, representatives of the affiliated Liberal organizations, the Federal Treasurer, and representatives from each federal electoral districts. The Advisory Council handled some of the day-to-day organizational matters of the party but it was dependent upon
the Executive Committee and was directed not to "usurp any of the duties reserved to the Executive Committee." In 1956 a body named the Executive Council, which in composition was patterned on the Advisory Council, assumed the functions of the old Executive Committee. Since the old Executive Committee, which had consisted of 189 members, was dominated by professional Liberals and particularly the provincial party, the reforms instituted in 1956 reflected not only the increased participation and independence of the amateur leaders but the weakening of the provincial party. After the defeat of the provincial party it is possible that the federal leaders did not want the provincial wing to determine the organizational policies of the party with its large group of defeated candidates in the Executive Committee. An Annual Convention, which was also instituted in 1956, allowed the defeated candidates to participate in some body other than the General Convention but, at the same time, provided amateur Liberals with extensive access to this body. This compromise allowed for more frequent meeting of the amateur leaders and thereby gave many amateur Liberals an added sense of participation but it also limited the power of the defeated candidates and, in effect, reduced the power of the provincial wing.
Between 1952 and 1959 the federal wing enlarged its influence in the affairs of the provincial Association and was able to specify the use of its money within the provincial organization. On the other hand, the federal wing relinquished some areas of control which it had taken over immediately after the provincial defeat of 1952. Although federal leaders were instrumental in the selection of a new provincial leader, they were unable to control the office and failed in their original efforts to retire Laing. Nevertheless, the federal wing held a dominant position within the provincial party largely because the majority of rank and file Liberals were involved with federal affairs while most of the party's resources came from and were devoted to federal politics. Federal leaders had absolute control of the organization within the sphere of federal politics. They organized their own campaigns and maintained their own contacts within the organization. Because the provincial leader no longer exercised the same kind of control over the party organization, the federal wing was no longer dependent upon the organizational favors of the provincial leader. The provincial leadership never challenged federal control of federal areas but federal interference in provincial matters and the weak federal support of the provincial wing were resented by many members of the provincial party.
Indeed, the alteration in the balance of power within the party, which resulted from the defeat and decline of the provincial party, initiated many federal-provincial strains.

**SOURCES OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL STRAIN:**

Throughout the period federal-provincial strains developed from friction between the provincial leader and the members of the federal wing in the province. Although conflicts between the federal leader in Ottawa and the provincial leader may well have occurred, they were less apparent because the provincial leader was weak and in opposition. The strains which resulted from differences in administrative policy usually involved the federal wing in the province while strains which resulted from differences in governmental policy at either the federal or provincial level involved the federal leaders in Ottawa but, since the provincial party was in opposition, these differences were frequently handled by the federal ministers in the province.

**ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFERENCES:**

Friction over the distribution of resources and the selection of priorities is relatively frequent within
most party organizations which are involved in both federal and provincial areas. In the Liberal Party of British Columbia ground rules designed to prevent and to contain internal friction during the fulfillment of electoral responsibilities were developed during the years when the party held power concurrently in Ottawa and Victoria. While some of these practices proved satisfactory during the coalition and post-coalition years, others became unrealistic after 1952 because of the relative weakness of the provincial wing. The success of the joint party organization had previously rested upon the control exercised by each wing over its own campaigns but, during the years following the coalition, the lack of financial support for the provincial wing destroyed this principle of autonomy.

During the 1953 provincial election many large financial supporters of the federal party withdrew their support from the provincial party. After 1953, an increasing number of businessmen in the province confided to provincial leaders that they now supported the Social Credit government and that they were concerned about their share of provincial government business if their names were closely associated with the provincial Liberal Party. Many established Liberals failed to see any advantage in the support of a weak provincial party which had few
prospects of becoming even the opposition party. Because of their fear of the growing support for the C.C.F., other businessmen, who continued to support the party federally, felt obliged to support Social Credit provincially until a real non-socialist alternative emerged.

Under these circumstances, the provincial Liberals became financially dependent upon the federal wing of the party and because the provincial situation was so serious, federal leaders were at first obliged to provide support. When federal leader recruited Laing for the provincial leadership some provincial Liberals reasoned that the federal wing would actively and generously support the party provincially. Indeed a few active Liberals have expressed the opinion that Laing may have received substantial promises of support before he returned to provincial politics. After the 1953 election, however, federal support was slowly withdrawn and one prominent Liberal has suggested that with the party's defeat in the 1953 provincial election, the federal party realized that the provincial party had no hopes of electoral success in the near future. Moreover, support from the federal wing would only slightly improve the position of the provincial party and might also have paved the way for a C.C.F. victory. The federal Liberals were, therefore, careful to provide the
provincial party with just enough financial backing to survive. While several active Liberals have agreed with this reasoning, they suggest that the withdrawal of federal support was also based on specific difficulties encountered by the party between the elections of 1953 and 1956.  

Administrative strains were most frequently concerned with the source, amount and allocation of funds. These strains emerged most clearly during campaigns for the small provincial group was able to maintain itself between elections when the federal party assumed the greater portion of the Association's operating expenses. In the 1953 provincial campaign the federal party gave the provincial wing considerable support even though a federal election was to be called shortly.  

James Sinclair loaned his executive assistant to Laing and assisted the provincial cause while the provincial party was still able to collect some of its campaign funds from strong supporters of the federal party. Federal money was also utilized by the provincial wing. While in retrospect, a few Liberals complained of the limited federal assistance when the election proved disappointing, most party members were fairly satisfied with the party's joint performance and the federal leaders were also relatively satisfied with the
organization of the campaign.

After the federal wing lost three of its eleven seats in the province in the election of 1953, some federal leaders suspected that the low provincial fortunes of the party in British Columbia might eventually undermine their own positions. Once the federal party found that some of its own financial backers in the province refused the federal party money because of "controversial" stands the provincial leader took on key issues in provincial politics, the threat posed by the eclipse of the provincial Liberal party to the position of the federal wing was clearly apparent. When Laing refused to alter some of these stands, the federal party was reluctant to grant assistance to the provincial party. They wished to reserve the right to determine the uses to which their money could be put for in addition to their disagreements with Laing on policy matters, they also believed that the provincial party had been mismanaged. Federal leaders were particularly perturbed over Laing's demand for a by-election in Vancouver Centre at a time when the Liberal organization was totally inadequate. In 1955, after the death of a Social Credit MLA, the Social Credit government failed to call a by-election and Laing forced an election by his announcement of the
vacancy in the legislature. Ironically, the Liberal organization was so disorganized that the party failed to field a candidate. Federal leaders evidently used this disaster to support their claim for greater control over the 1956 provincial campaign.

Grant Deachman, the provincial organizer in 1956, admitted that some serious quarrels took place between provincial leaders and the federal wing during the course of the provincial campaign. He indicated that disagreements took place over the distribution of funds and the general competency of leaders. In general he felt that the irritation resulted from normal day-to-day contact in a joint office where funds had to be split. He inferred that provincial people were jealous of federal resources and power and often believed that the federal leaders were interfering in their affairs. While Deachman suggested that most of the difficulties during the campaign were of a purely administrative nature, he agreed that they were related to differences between the two groups which had developed before the campaign.21

POLICY DIFFERENCES:

Although the strains emerging from the joint administration of elections contributed to the feelings of misunderstanding which occurred during the provincial
campaign of 1956, specific policy differences between Laing and several prominent members of the federal wing were also a source of internal friction. These policy differences had, in fact, created many of the administrative problems because the financial position of the party was related to the stands which Laing took in key provincial issues. Indeed, federal opposition to Laing's continued leadership was the result of the accumulation of such policy differences combined with Laing's defeat in 1956. One major source of federal-provincial strain was the provincial forest policy. During the coalition a new policy was initiated which, to many Liberals, favored the large forest interests. This policy granted long-term tenures to companies willing to develop extensive operations in the province. The truck loggers believed that the policy discriminated against them and they opposed the policy from the beginning. The anti-coalitionists had also objected to the policy and had attempted to convince Johnson of its dangers. They believed that the terms of the tenures were too broad and that they alienated valuable resources without adequate public protection. Laing strenuously opposed the continuation of a modified version of the coalition forest policy by the Social Credit government. While many of the younger federal representatives had opposed the coalition's forest policy, by 1952, many federal members reversed their positions.
Sinclair's support of Bennett's forest management policy was the most striking reversal within federal Liberal ranks for he had led the opposition to Johnson's forest policy during the coalition. Sinclair now held that the licences provided adequate protection for the small truck loggers and at the same time gave the government greater control over the large developers. He felt that some concessions to the larger companies were required in order to build-up the forest industry in the province.22 Laing also encountered strong opposition from Senator S. S. McKeen on this issue and eventually the president of the Association, Sidney Smith, broke with the provincial leader over the forest management policy. Smith found that the financial support of the federal party in the province was now being threatened by Laing's unyielding position for many business interests outside the forest industry believed that extensive forest development would improve the economic position of the province as a whole.

The federal party was also concerned about the role of the provincial party in the Sommers-Sturdy case. Gordon Gibson, a Liberal MLA and a leading member of the truck logger interests within the province, attacked the Social Credit forest management policies and intimated
that in granting of licences, the Lands and Forests Minister, R. E. Sommers, had accepted bribes. Specific charges were made in 1955 by a Vancouver lawyer, David Sturdy, and when the case finally concluded Sommers was sentenced to five years in prison. During the course of the trial Laing and the provincial party attempted to make use of the numerous charges of corruption against the provincial government. Gibson resigned his seat over the matter but was defeated by a Social Credit candidate in his first attempt at re-election. Laing made the case a major issue in the 1956 provincial election and when he lost his seat, the federal wing was critical of his entire strategy on the matter. The federal wing felt that the provincial Liberals had not aided their own political interests by constantly and bitterly attacking the government over the issue. When it appeared that in spite of the scandal the electorate was still willing to support the government and when it was clear that Sommers alone was involved, the federal wing felt that the provincial party should have avoided personal attacks on the other members of the Social Credit government. The federal wing was primarily concerned with the political or electoral side effects of the case but it was also suggested that forest interests which supported the federal party were disturbed at the continued publicity aroused by the provincial Liberals in the Sommers-Sturdy case. The federal lea-
ders may well have been requested to quiet Laing on the issue.

The federal wing thus opposed provincial policy stands when they believed that the electoral or financial interests of the party were threatened. Laing's pledge to take over B.C. Electric if his party were elected also aroused federal hostility because it threatened the party's financial position but many Liberals, who were particularly upset with Laing on this issue, were also opposed on principle to government control. While many Liberals in the federal party were not ideologically opposed on public ownership of utilities, Premier W. A. C. Bennett was able to gain electoral and financial support by accusing Laing of going socialist and many federal Liberals were irritated at Laing's strategy in raising the matter at such an inopportune time. By the time of the provincial election in 1956 the federal wing opposed Laing's general strategy with regard to the Social Credit government. They believed that the provincial Liberal leader was too bitter and too constant in his attacks. The electorate, they argued, was not willing to listen to intense and unbroken attacks. It was suggested that Laing had not varied his approach enough and that he had in a sense "cried wolf" too often.
The federal leaders were cautious about giving Laing extensive financial support, particularly if they could not specify its use for their own support was threatened by the provincial situation. While they often expressed sympathy for the provincial leader's difficult predicament and appreciated his willingness to give up a promising federal career to return to provincial politics, the federal leaders were relieved when Laing lost his seat for they believed that he would resign. When Laing refused to forefit the provincial leadership and insisted upon trying to regain a seat in a forthcoming by-election, federal leaders felt it was necessary to campaign for Laing's retirement. In 1957, Laing failed to win the by-election in Burnaby, and thereby intensified the federal campaign to replace him. Senators Farris and Smith and cabinet ministers Campney and Sinclair were active in this campaign, which continued even after the federal ministers were defeated in the 1957 federal election.

Federal agitation for Laing's retirement began initially because of the provincial leader's inability to retain a seat in the legislature. It was apparent, however, that the federal leaders were unhappy with Laing's general political strategy and were convinced that he could not aid the party on either level by his continued
activity in provincial politics. Laing's electoral defeat along with the friction which developed between Laing and the federal leaders in both administrative and policy areas eventually forced federal leaders into open opposition to the provincial leader. While several members of the federal party believed that many of Laing's difficulties were beyond his control, they felt that the federal party's defeat made the need for a new leader, image and organization even more urgent. The federal party believed that Laing's departure at least might encourage the return of important financial backing which would aid in the federal party's reorganization. Senator Smith's statement to the Executive Council at the time of Mr. Laing's resignation indicated the importance of the party's financial predicament in the pattern of federal-provincial relations during the Laing period.

Being out of power has caused hard times within the Liberal Party. After our bad defeat in the 1956 provincial election and with our leader not sitting in the House, as well as the general collapse of the party, firms are not donating funds to us. The party has little money now and to carry on it must have donations from business. Most provincial spending is from funds intended for the federal organization...

The reciprocal nature of party fortunes combined with the comparative strength of the federal wing to encourage increased federal activity and domination. While
another provincial leader might not have fought for his autonomy as strenuously as did Mr. Laing, it is doubtful whether the strains of the period can be fairly attributed to the provincial leader. The sources of federal-provincial strain were contained within the situation wherein the federal leaders held unusual power in an organization which was designed to allow provincial autonomy and had operated in the past under provincial control. Within the party the clashes of the period have been blamed on the unfortunate circumstances of provincial politics while the actions of the provincial leader have been explained by the immense frustrations of his position. Many federal Liberals may well have held these opinions at the time of Laing's resignation and certainly the federal wing has not held a personal grudge against the former provincial leaders for his successful return to federal politics suggests that the federal party understood Laing's predicament and were, in the last analysis, appreciative of his original sacrifice.

PERRAULT 1959 - 1965:

CONTROL OF THE PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION:

While Laing was the provincial leader, federal control within the provincial organization had greatly
increased but the federal wing was also aware of the resentment created by their position of dominance. At the time of Laing's resignation, Senator Smith expressed this predicament when he suggested that it would be wrong "for the Committee of Officers to name a candidate they support for the leadership because some would say the big boys are supporting this candidate." Discontent in the provincial wing partly reflected the frustrations of defeat but there was also a genuine feeling amongst rank and file Liberals that their party was indifferent to them. The riding associations often complained that they were unaware of leadership decisions. Some efforts had been made to remedy this situation in the constitutional changes of 1956 when the articulation between the riding associations and the officers of the Association had been improved. The subsequent defeat of the party, however, delayed the application of the reforms to the day-to-day operations of the party. To many young amateur Liberals, the leadership Convention of 1959 reflected the growing power of the rank and file for apparently the influence of the remnant "old guard" had been kept to a minimum in the selection of Ray Perrault, the provincial organizer, and George Gregory, a MLA from Victoria, as the two candidates for the provincial leadership. The convention leadership campaign was surprisingly "spirited," in view of the condition of the
party and when Perrault won by a wide margin, some of the party's young members idealized the selection process as one of grass roots democracy. In spite of the open form of the election, the Liberal Senators and former cabinet ministers attended the Convention and served as an imposing backdrop for the leadership candidates. Some party members even believed that Senator Smith favored Perrault and that the federal wing had generally backed this relative newcomer to party politics.

Whatever the specific role of the federal leaders during this convention, it was clear that the federal wing of the party maintained its influence in the affairs of the Association. The Convention of 1959 did, however, represent a turning point in the pattern of party leadership. After 1959 the scarcity of professional leaders allowed new amateur Liberals to assume a more important role in the leadership of the party. With many of the federal leaders in semi-retirement and the provincial wing still in a state of collapse, the federal wing encouraged the development of a stronger and more self sufficient amateur organization. The new amateur Liberals were thus closely allied with the federal party and they were at first resented by some of the established rank and file leaders. Indeed, after 1959, the major manifestations of federal-provincial friction occurred in part because of
the competition between two groups of amateur Liberals for the positions of Leadership within the Association.

After 1959 two factors contributed to the growing importance of the Association officers. Firstly, their new position was aided by the relative absence of dominant professional Liberals in the Association especially when Senator Smith retired from the presidency in 1959. Secondly, the new provincial leader was unable to select the officers of the Association in the manner of Oliver, Pattullo or Hart. The new provincial leader now attempted to confine his attention entirely to matters of provincial concern. With the exception of the organization of provincial campaigns, Perrault also abdicated most of the general organizational matters to the officers of the Association. Since the small Liberal contingent in the legislature consisted of several influential Liberals, Perrault's position as provincial party leader did not greatly enhance his position of power within the party and, consequently, in order to stabilize his relations with the federal wing of the party, he tried to remain as neutral as possible in the difficulties which emerged between the officers of the Association. His withdrawal from certain aspects of Association business allowed the officers of the party to assume a much more active role.
During this period, the influence of the federal wing within the Association was in part preserved by the activity of several provincial businessmen who had supported the federal party. Several of these businessmen actively entered the party as a result of the Conservative victories in the federal elections of 1957 and 1958. Their contact with federal leaders was maintained by a Liberal businessmen's club which raised funds and recruited additional amateur leaders for future federal campaigns. These amateur leaders played an active part in the affairs of the Association and helped to re-build the organization during the period in which the federal wing had no provincially-based federal professionals. Several newcomers, who formally entered the party at this time, campaigned for the positions of leadership in the Association.

The influence of the amateur leaders was, however, dependent upon their ability to obtain entry into the leadership ranks of the Association itself. The election for President of the Association in 1961 provided an opportunity for the federal wing to support their amateur patrons. In this highly competitive campaign many of the former and aspiring federal leaders in the province openly backed Mr. Hugh Martin, a leading provincial businessman and relative newcomer to party
politics. These federal leaders hoped that Martin would give the party a new image in the province and provide the party with more competent administrative leadership. Furthermore, his ability to attract important financial capital to the party's campaign fund was particularly critical at this time. In contrast, the federal wing was sceptical about the administrative ability of another strong candidate, Mr. William Gilmour. Although Gilmour had worked for the party many years many federal leaders felt that his personality would alienate support from important quarters. With a federal election imminent, the federal party hoped to have a president who would work closely with them in the campaign. A third candidate, Mr. John D. Taggart, was encouraged to seek the presidency by several important figures within the provincial organization and apparently he also had the support of Senators Smith and Farris. Many rank and file Liberal workers believed that both Taggart and Martin were "outsiders" and pawns of the "old guard" or the "big boys."

The suspicions of the rank and file regarding the supporters of Martin and Taggart were correct for both candidates openly sought the support of the prominent figures within the provincial party. Gilmour, on the other hand, worked among the riding associations and
campaigned with particular zeal in the north and in the interior of the province where he presented himself as the candidate of the rank and file. At the election many party supporters from Vancouver and the urban areas of the lower mainland voted for Gilmour not only because they respected his dedication to the party but also because they objected to the manner in which the party leaders expected to select the Association's officers. Many amateur Liberals particularly resented Martin's candidacy because they felt that the presidency was being "offered" to a newcomer to provide a convenient base from which to organize the forthcoming federal campaign. Gilmour was elected on the basis of this rank and file sentiment and although the defeated candidates were offered positions as vice-presidents to create an image of party unity, the three never really cooperated on any joint ventures. The effort to displace Gilmour by the federal wing of the party was resumed in the fall of 1962, when Mr. George Van Roggen, who had been president of the Coast Capilano Liberal Riding Association and had close alliances with the federal leaders, ran against Gilmour for the presidency of the Association. Disharmony within the party became an issue discussed by the candidates during the campaign but when Gilmour won re-election once again he denied that such disharmony existed.
Although the federal wing and their amateur representatives were unable to obtain official positions of leadership within the provincial Association, their close ties with the former federal leaders and professional and amateur leaders of the party in Eastern Canada insured their effectiveness within the provincial party. The activity of the new amateurs provided the support for the new federal leaders, who emerged after the election of 1963 and although their interest was originally federal, they later became more involved with provincial politics. By their participation in both spheres of party activity for an extended period of time, they seemed to have placated those sections of the rank and file organization who had resented their initial entry into the party. Since 1963 the federal ministers from the province, Arthur Laing and Jack Nicholson, have become active in the provincial Association as have several Liberal members of parliament. The federal organization in the province has recovered much of its former strength and, consequently, still tends to dominate the interests of the Association. The federal party has directed its own organization and conducted its own campaigns throughout the period but often to the exclusion and irritation of some provincial personalities. While strains emerged during the elections of 1962 and 1963, the two wings presented a much
more unified front in the most recent election in 1965.

Since the federal party's return to power in 1963, there has been a genuine attempt by both wings of the party to rectify the imbalances which were responsible for federal-provincial difficulties in the past. Although financial imbalances still exist and continue to create friction, a recently instituted membership fee helps the provincial wing to contribute to Association expenses.34 Many of the federal party's financial supporters still refuse to support the provincial party but since this condition is no longer related to specific provincial policies, it threatens neither federal sources of income nor the relationship between the two wings of the party. The provincial wing has not openly expressed dissatisfaction with organizational and financial arrangements that now exist and while some provincial leaders have stressed that no sharing of funds is permitted, the relative strength of the federal wing suggests that they pay a larger share of joint party expenses.35

The absence of significant administrative strains suggests that some financial agreement has been reached between the two wings or alternatively, that the provincial party is now willing to finance its own campaigns. The provincial leaders seem satisfied to direct policy within
the provincial field and to leave many aspects of general organization to the officers of the Association. While their participation in federal campaigns and affairs depends upon invitation the provincial wing has occasionally lacked information on federal policy concerning the province and has at times suffered embarrassment but these breakdowns of communication have not caused public disharmony and the federal party has tried to keep the provincial leaders fairly well informed. Certainly the relative harmony since 1963 suggests that some adjustments have been made to accommodate and maximize federal dominance within the Association.

SOURCES OF FEDERAL - PROVINCIAL FRICITION:

Since 1959 there have been a few direct conflicts between the provincial leader and the members of the federal wing in the province. Although Perrault privately may have supported some members of the provincial wing who had resisted the growing power of those amateurs supporting the federal party, in public he attempted to remain neutral. Since many situations which created federal-provincial friction involved questions of personal competence and compatibility, Perrault's neutrality was skillful and discreet and certainly his position as party
leader has remained relatively stable. There have been occasional rumors within the party which suggest that the "old guard" may intend to replace Perrault and his caution in federally-derived conflicts may well reflect feelings of insecurity as well as a desire to maintain a unified provincial party. Despite Perrault's careful neutrality friction which has developed into clear federal-provincial conflicts, has occurred between well-defined segments of the provincial and the federal wings.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFERENCES:

During this period, the major administrative differences developed over the organization of the federal campaigns of 1962 and 1963. These strains first appeared during the 1961 campaign for the president of the Association when the federal wing of the party hoped to install a president who would be more receptive to federal needs and more attractive to financial patrons. When this effort failed and Gilmour retained the Presidency of the Association, the divided control of the party had administrative repercussions during the federal campaign of 1962. The appointment of a separate federal campaign committee was undoubtedly the prerogative of the federal leader but Martin was named chairman of the federal campaign committee and Gilmour believed that he had been
unfairly excluded from the proceedings. Differences with the federal wing were aggravated even further when the federal campaign committee hired Mr. Ronald Fairclough whom Gilmour had fired from a position of provincial organizer because of his support for Martin in the presidential campaign. The hostility between the federal campaign committee and Gilmour's provincial Association office became particularly intense during the campaign and at times federal workers were denied access to crucial mailing lists and other information housed in the permanent party office. At the end of the campaign the federal organizers maintained their separate office and some provincial Liberals assumed that the federal wing intended to separate their organization but it was rather the prospect of another federal campaign that prompted this action on the part of the federal wing. Certainly they quickly closed their office once objections were raised within the Association.

The differences between Gilmour and the federal leaders continued into the next federal campaign. Mr. Van Roggen, who had unsuccessfully opposed Gilmour for the presidency of the Association in 1962, was appointed co-chairman of the federal campaign with Mr. L. C. Jolivet, a Vancouver businessman and Gilmour and his associates in the provincial party office once
more refused to give the campaign committee full cooperation. The strains were so serious that Mr. Walter Gordon, the national campaign chairman, attempted to bring the two groups together when he visited the city. The provincial leader without appearing to take sides, also tried to bring Gilmour and the federal campaign committee together but these overtures were not very successful.

While the federal wing of the party exercised its own discretion in the selection of the campaign committee and was not pressured into any decisions regarding the conduct of the campaign, the provincial wing of the party made its strong feeling of autonomy clear to the professional federal leadership. The strong support which Gilmour received in spite of his indiscretions testified to the strong feelings amongst provincial rank and file Liberals over their right to choose their own leaders. Although many of the rank and file never objected to the professional leaders of either wing supporting or even introducing the candidates, they objected to the federal wing's support of a man who had never previously been active in the party. They also objected to the manner in which the newly elected president of the Association was ignored by the federal leaders once their own candidates had been defeated. Although many of those who supported Gilmour strongly believed that the principle of autonomy
needed to be preserved, they also realized that the choice of Gilmour as the symbol of this principle was unfortunate. Nevertheless, the strains caused by this conflict made the federal leaders aware of the sensitivity of the provincial rank and file.

The riding organizations also valued their autonomy and, in particular, their right to select party candidates. In 1963, the federal party encountered resentment in the Victoria riding when they attempted to ensure the proper execution of a nomination election. The difficulty had started in 1962 when Mr. Foster Isherwood won the Oak Bay Liberal nomination over General Foulkes, a candidate favored by several prominent federal leaders. During the course of the campaign Mr. Isherwood irritated the federal leaders and they proceeded to obstruct his nomination for the next election. In the following year, the federal Liberals strongly supported Mr. David Groos for the nomination and dispatched a representative to the nomination meeting when rumors of illegal practices circulated within the party. Groos was nominated by a close vote and the federal representative prevented a second vote despite accusations of irregularities by Isherwood's supporters. Isherwood believed that this decision was based upon the federal leadership's support of Groos rather than upon the
evidence presented at the meeting. He charged that this constituted federal interference in the affairs of a riding association. Isherwood subsequently defied the party and ran as an independent and was expelled from the Greater Victoria Liberal Association along with many of his supporters. The matter caused additional embarrassment to the party when two of Isherwood's supporters, who had also been officers of the riding association, announced their support for Social Credit on the eve of the following provincial election. Because of the dominance of the federal leadership within the party at this time, the riding organizations were particularly sensitive to alleged "federal interference" and, certainly, the incident caused more concern within the Association than it would have in the past. Since Isherwood's later defiance of the party was calculated to embarrass the party, many rank and file Liberals were willing to accept the judgment of the federal wing in the controversy.

The election of L. C. Jolivet to the presidency of the Association in January of 1964 was widely recognized as a symbol of party unity. After a period of considerable suspicion and misunderstanding of the motives of the federal leadership of the party, this image of unity was achieved because Jolivet had served on both the
the federal and provincial campaign committees and had firm support from both federal and provincial quarters. His candidacy was also supported by rank and file leaders and since his election, Jolivet has worked closely with both wings of the party. His contacts with the federal party are extensive and he also represents the British Columbia Liberal Association on national party committees in Ottawa. Although Jolivet was originally brought into the party by the Liberal businessmen's group because of his interest in federal politics, he has since involved himself with provincial organization as a whole.

Recently Jolivet has proposed a plan for a selective modification of the provincial organization, which would remove the distinction between federal and provincial riding organizations in some parts of the province. Because of the organizational inconveniences of large, rural or isolated ridings, Jolivet hoped to reconstruct the provincial organization on the basis of population contiguity and concentration rather than upon legal riding boundaries. The plan creates self-sufficient party organizations in population centers "bounded but not intersected by either federal or provincial riding boundaries," so that they can be utilized in both federal and provincial campaigns. These new organizations would participate in conventions in order to nominate the various riding candidates and thus the main legal function of the riding sub-division
could be performed without disturbing the organization of the party itself. 40

The plan was presented as a symbol of the party's concern for a unified and efficient organization. It will be used selectively in the areas where either the quality of the campaign organization needs to be improved or the continuity of the party's organization established. The interest in this plan demonstrated by all segments of the British Columbia Liberal Association may reflect genuine concern for the development of a more unified party organization. The disruptive experiences of recent federal campaigns have certainly made the party well aware of the damaging effects of internal party conflicts. Many party leaders continue to maintain the administrative difficulties which accompanied the federal campaigns and the presidential elections were nothing more than personality clashes but, nevertheless, the strains which they created have prompted party leaders to reassess many administrative practices which involve federal-provincial party cooperation.
POLICY DIFFERENCES:

Since 1959 there have been no major differences over public policy between the provincial and federal wings of the party. On a few issues the provincial position with respect to the federal policy has been ambiguous but even within the federal wing these issues provoked a dialogue. For example, in 1963, Perrault was not kept informed on the negotiations on the Columbia River Treaty between Premier W. A. C. Bennett and the Liberal government in Ottawa. The provincial party thus did not know whether the federal party had maintained its original policy of seeking to renegotiate the treaty or whether they had made some compromise with the provincial Premier. When Bennett indicated that he had concluded a successful arrangement with Ottawa on the controversial matter, the provincial Liberals, according to one newspaper report, were "simultaneously unwilling or unable to contradict Bennett. Inquiries at Liberal officers here yield only the impression they are both confused and angry over the Ottawa deal."41

The provincial party was eventually informed of the arrangements and were able to utilize some of their information in the next campaign.42 Indeed, the provincial Liberals tried to use the success of the federal
party to their advantage and claimed that the province received more benefits from the revised treaty because the Liberals had included several safeguards which Bennett had not requested. The friction generated between several members of the federal wing over substantial policy differences was greater than that which occurred between the provincial wing and the federal party because of faulty communications. Throughout the years during which the treaty was an issue in provincial politics, the provincial wing of the party attempted to follow the general lines of federal policy. At times it appeared that the party was actively trying to coordinate federal and provincial policy on the matter. This type of coordination was more difficult to achieve when the federal party was in power because they had certain responsibilities to the provincial government and could not always openly consult with the provincial party. While friction could well have emerged between the two wings of the party if the provincial leaders had objected to Ottawa's policy toward the provincial government, in this particular issue no major conflicts developed.

After 1959 the federal leaders ceased to wage general attacks on provincial strategy and policy. Since Perrault became provincial leader, the tone of the provincial party has changed and, in general, federal
leaders have been satisfied with his approach. Because of the peculiar characteristics of federal-provincial administrative difficulties and the more neutral role of the present provincial leader, policy and administrative problems have been less closely related than they were during Laing's leadership of the party. Owing to the less frequent manifestations of federal-provincial strains, the new role of the amateur Association leaders and the emergence of a new group of professional federal leaders since 1963, federal-provincial party relations appear to be more stable today than they have been at any time since the end of coalition. This adjustment seems to be based upon a more realistic acceptance of federal dominance within the affairs of the Association and perhaps a more specific definition of this dominance within party circles.
FOOTNOTES

1 Interview with Mr. Frank G. P. Lewis, January 27, 1966.

2 Ibid.

3 Interview with Senator Sidney Smith, April 19, 1965.

4 Interview with Mr. James Sinclair, September 30, 1965.


6 Interview with Mr. Ralph Campney, January 18, 1965.

7 There was some disagreement about the degree of provincial dependence on the federal wing of the party, although most Liberals believed that it constituted dependence by 1956.

8 The Vancouver Province, October 28, 1957.

9 Dillon O'Leary, "Laing's Grip Firm as Liberal Leader," The Vancouver Province, November 4, 1957.

10 Interview with Mr. Don Lanskail, February 14, 1966. Mr. Lanskail headed the committee which re-drafted the constitution in 1956.

11 This topic will be discussed further in a later section of this chapter.

13 The constitutions of the British Columbia Liberal Association usually define the role of the policy making committees negatively by stating that they may transact all business except what is reserved to the Convention.


15 Ibid.

16 The Executive Committee contained all defeated provincial and federal candidates and, consequently, could be dominated by the provincial wing of the party.

17 None of the Liberals interviewed presented concrete evidence for such an agreement.

18 Interview with Mr. Hugh Martin, January 31, 1966. Mr. Martin was not active in the party at this time but he had some contact with federal leaders. Other active Liberals agreed with the substance of this suggestion, although many questioned whether federal action was quite so self-conscious.

19 Interview with Mr. Frank G. P. Lewis, February 14, 1966.

20 This topic will be discussed in another section of this chapter.

21 Interview with Mr. Grant Deachman, January 18, 1965.

22 Interview with Mr. James Sinclair, September 30, 1966.

23 The Vancouver Province, November 4, 1957.

24 Several Liberals interviewed hinted at such pressure.
25 Interview with Senator J. W. deB. Farris, January 19, 1966. Senator Farris opposed this policy on principle and was upset with Laing's general strategy.

26 This opinion was expressed by almost all Liberals interviewed who were active in the party between 1952 and 1959.


30 Interview with Mr. James Sinclair, January 11, 1965.

31 Interviews with Mr. Hugh Martin, January 31, 1966 and Mr. Jack Taggart, February 3, 1966.

32 Some of Gilmour's supporters believed that this motion was an indirect way of getting Martin and Taggart on the Committee of Officers.

33 *The Vancouver Sun*, October 29, 1962.

34 Although most provincial leaders claim that the membership fee helps the Association maintain an independent position, others within the party infer that this contribution is almost meaningless in terms of the present cost of the Association's facilities.

35 Interview with Mr. Grant Deachman, January 18, 1965.

36 It was reported that Gilmour believed that a paid employee of the party should not enter internal party politics.

37 Interview with Mr. Richard Sonley, January 27, 1966 and Mr. Jack Taggart, February 3, 1966.
38 The Vancouver Province, July 5, 1963.


40 Interview with Mr. L. C. Jolivet, February 1, 1966.


42 The Vancouver Sun, September 12, 1963.

43 Ibid., January 22, 1964.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

This thesis proposed to examine the impact of federalism upon the organization of the Liberal Party of British Columbia by means of an examination of intra-party relations and those manifestations of disunity between federal and provincial leaders which seemed directly relevant to the federal division of power. In particular this case-study attempted to determine the source, frequency and intensity of strains between federal and provincial wings of the party and to explore what effect the electoral fortunes of the two groups may have had upon the broad structure of intra-party relations. Although the provincial control of the provincial organization was well established as a formal principle of party organization in the Liberal Party, it was known that in some provinces the often diverse interests and needs of the federal leaders had encouraged them to seek wider control of the party organization.1 It was assumed, therefore, that an examination of the reality and the stability of provincial control would not only indicate the focus of power within the Association but would help to clarify the role of the federal wing within provincial organization. It was also believed that an analysis of the changing focus of power within the party, as reflected not only in the leadership of the provincial organization but in the relative
political strength of the two groups of leaders, might be related to the source and intensity of federal strains.

Despite the maintenance of a unified provincial organization, the accommodation of two levels of activity and interest has been a continual source of internal friction within the Liberal Party of British Columbia. While the provincial control of the Association has been firmly established as a principle of party organization, challenges to individual provincial leaders and even indirect challenges to the provincial control of the Association have occurred within the framework of the unified party organization. The source of these challenges and, indeed, other less serious examples of strain between the federal and provincial wings of the party have generally been related to the conduct of federal business within the province. In almost all cases these strains were related either to the administration of the party organization or to conflicting policies of the federal and provincial groups. In spite of the almost continual existence of both these general sources of intra-party strain, at times administrative differences have provided the most serious threats to party unity and at other times policy differences have dominated all federal-provincial exchanges. While the development and the importance of each individual party conflict has undoubtedly been affected by particular circumstances and the personalities and
abilities of the leaders involved, the general pattern of intra-party relations has been directly associated with the changing electoral fortunes of the federal and provincial wings of the party. The pattern of intra-party relations within the Liberal Party of British Columbia emerges more clearly as the empirical findings of this study are summarized in relation to the four possible electoral positions of the two wings of the party in Ottawa and Victoria. The empirical conclusions of this case-study will be offered in the form of tentative propositions and these conclusions will be examined in light of what has been written on intra-party relations in other Canadian provinces and other federal systems.

CONCURRENT FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL POWER:

With the exception of a five year period between 1928 and 1933, the provincial wing of the party held power in Victoria from 1916 to 1952 and although the federal party also held power throughout most of this period, the provincial leaders maintained effective control of the Liberal organization in British Columbia. While the federal party was strong in Canada as a whole, until 1930 the federal wing in the province was extremely weak and not until 1940 did the Liberals hold the majority of seats from the province. Even after 1940, however, the provincial leader
as premier of the province remained the most powerful individual within the party organization. His resources in terms of both financial support and patronage were much more extensive than those of the federal cabinet minister from the province, who would ordinarily be his most serious federal competition for control of the provincial organization when the federal party held power in Ottawa. In addition, the provincial leader, as the premier of the province, led the largest group of elected representatives within the party and could, therefore, dominate the formal policy-making bodies of the Association. If a challenge to provincial control was initiated through formal channels the strong provincial leader, who maintained provincial party discipline on matters of Association business, could easily dissolve them. Indeed, unless the provincial wing was itself seriously divided the federal wing had little hope of retiring an individual provincial leader or of assuming the control of the provincial organization.

When the provincial wing of the party was in power it assumed almost the entire financial burden of the provincial Association and, consequently, the provincial leader exercised considerable influence in the choice of the paid party organizers and the rank and file leaders of the Association. Indeed, the officers of the provincial Association were usually carefully chosen by the provincial leader.
and only during a successful revolt against the provincial leader would the Association officers act without the provincial leader's consent. Under these circumstances the federal cabinet minister from the province, who usually led the federal wing of the party, attempted to gain some control over the administration of federal election campaigns while utilizing the provincial organizational resources to the maximum. Although the provincial leader permitted the cabinet minister or federal representative to supervise the campaign according to rules developed by the two leaders, these procedures tended to be informal and unstable. Indeed, friction between the two groups was so often initiated during federal campaigns that informal negotiations between the two wings were usually required before each federal election. But despite the difficulty presented by the joint administration of federal campaigns, the federal wing was given enough autonomy to insure the protection of their special interests and they were, therefore, hesitant to challenge the status quo.

In assessing the relative position of the two wings of the party, however, it must be recalled that when the Liberals held power in Ottawa the federal representatives and senators from the province had enough resources, particularly in the form of patronage and federal appointments, to maintain a considerable following within the Association.
Many of the rank and file leaders of the federal constituency organizations looked as much to the federal leaders for advice and support as they did to the provincial leadership. Since the local organizations had the legal power to nominate the candidates for public office, the informal support which the federal wing could maintain within the constituency organizations was often as important to their ability to control federal business within the province as was the cooperation of the provincial leader. Thus, the federal wing retained considerable control over federal business within the province despite their fundamental dependence on the provincial organization and the good will of the provincial leader.

The control of the provincial organization remained firmly in provincial hands regardless of the numerical or political strength of the federal wing within British Columbia. During the coalition period the relationship between provincial party power and the ability to control the Liberal Association was most striking. Despite deep cleavages within the party and finally within the provincial wing itself, which limited the effectiveness of the provincial leader, the control of the party organization remained in provincial hands. While the circumstances of coalition politics forced the provincial leaders to grant the federal wing more autonomy in the direction of federal business, federal
strength within the Association was not great enough to defeat the coalition. Federal leaders within the province felt strong enough to openly oppose the continuation of the coalition but they did not feel strong enough to separate themselves from an established provincial organization. Although the anti-coalition sentiment within the Association increased federal influence within the organization, as long as the provincial coalition Liberals were in power they maintained their hold on the Liberal Association.

SOURCES OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL STRAIN:

POLICY DIFFERENCES:

When Liberal governments have been in power in both Ottawa and Victoria the politics of federal-provincial relations have often brought Liberal leaders into public conflict. Such public confrontations between strong Liberal premiers and a Liberal Prime Minister were frequently but not always responsible for initiating strains within the provincial organization. Under some circumstances sectional policies were expected and well tolerated by the federal leader and were strongly supported by federal leaders within the province, whereas, in other situations provincial policies and demands either conflicted with those of the federal party or they appeared to threaten the federal government's power. In these cases intransigence on the part of either government
might initiate a public quarrel between the two Liberal leaders which threatened the unity of the provincial Association. Thus, while policy differences between the two wings of the party appeared to be the dominant source of intraparty strain when both wings of the party held power, the impact of these policy differences on the provincial Association depended on the substance of the policy, its significance to federal-provincial relations and, of course, the way in which the policy was presented and received as a political issue within the province.

For example, John Oliver fulfilled sectional feelings within the party and the province by attacking the Eastern financial interests and railroad rates rather than the federal government and was, therefore, able to maintain cordial relations with the federal party and with Prime Minister King. This provincial Liberal policy was intentionally designed to avoid challenging the power of the federal government or the policies of federal Liberals since an earlier attack on the federal government had threatened to divide the provincial party and initiate a public quarrel with the federal leader. Indeed, some provincial Liberals believed that the more extreme "fight Ottawa" policy pursued by the previous Conservative administration had lost its political appeal after World War I. The Premier's compromise campaign was designed to satisfy the political temperament of both the party and the province.
Therefore, while Oliver's earliest dealings with the federal party indicated that policy differences between the two governments were potentially threatening to intra-party relations, serious strains were successfully avoided by the alteration of provincial policy.

In contrast, under Pattullo's administration, negotiations between Ottawa and Victoria created severe federal-provincial party strains. Minor strains between the Premier and the Prime Minister were evident when Pattullo's requests for federal aid during the depression were not met on the terms he demanded. Pattullo's policy and actions at the Dominion-Provincial Conference of 1941, however, not only initiated a public quarrel with Prime Minister King, alienated federal leaders within the province but eventually contributed to a division within the provincial cabinet. Although the issue upon which the leaders clashed was fundamental to the substance of Canadian federalism, the party's reactions to the Premier's behavior at the conference were undoubtedly encouraged by the strong public support for a policy of federal-provincial cooperation in British Columbia. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether this significant issue of federal-provincial relations would have had such serious repurcussions within the Liberal Party had not both the federal and provincial wings held power concurrently.
During the years of the provincial coalition government intra-party strains assumed different forms. Although the Liberal Party was in power in both Ottawa and Victoria, policy differences between the two governments did not dominate intra-party relations and actually contributed very little to the friction which existed between the two wings of the party. Consequently, public contacts between the coalition Premiers and the Liberal Prime Minister no longer provided a focus for intra-party friction. The policy differences between the two wings of the party which were associated with intra-party strains, were prompted by federal attacks on coalition policies initiated by members of the federal wing within the province. Because these attacks occurred after the anti-coalition campaign was well organized, these policy differences were as much a reflection as a source of strain between the two groups.

The absence of leadership quarrels involving the coalition Premiers and the Liberal Prime Minister may have been related to the coalition's willingness to negotiate with the federal government on many important aspects of inter-governmental relations and the coalition's popularity within British Columbia until some years after the war. While the federal leader was known to object to the coalition for partisan reasons after the war, as Prime Minister he had to maintain the support of a cooperative provincial government. The
members of parliament from British Columbia, however, felt directly threatened by the continuation of the coalition and as members of the provincial Association could oppose the coalition more openly. Therefore, policy strains during the coalition had little direct relationship to the Liberal government in Ottawa except in so far as federal leaders within British Columbia were privately encouraged and supported by federal leaders in Ottawa. In comparing the significance of policy differences between the two wings of the party to the development of intra-party strain during the coalition and the preceding Liberal administrations in Victoria it appeared that while the existence of a coalition in itself had no direct relationship to the lack of federal-provincial policy strains, the absence of such strains did not reflect the unity of the party.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFERENCES:

Administrative differences between federal and provincial leaders within the provincial organization have been exceedingly difficult to document because of the desire on the part of party leaders to maintain a united image. Indeed, only those differences which initiated considerable public friction have been recorded in the press or in the memories of party leaders. Despite these difficulties, however, administrative strains emerge as the most enduring characteristic of intra-party relations within the B.C. Liberal
145

Party. The intensity of these strains and their importance to intra-party relations at a given time have, nevertheless, varied considerably. During periods of concurrent federal and provincial power administrative strains usually involved the joint conduct of federal campaigns. In general, during the administrations of Oliver and Pattullo these strains were well contained. Strains usually emerged after a federal election when either unexpected or disappointing election results initiated retrospective assessments of the organization's efficiency which in turn initiated friction between the two wings of the party. Even during the campaigns, however, strains between federal and provincial leaders could be discerned as provincial leaders refused to campaign openly for federal candidates or federal leaders requested that provincial leaders remain out of sight during the campaign. During the leaderships of Oliver and Pattullo the local strength of the provincial organization, the stability of the provincial control of the organization, the degree of autonomy granted to the federal organization and the dependence of the federal party on the provincial Liberal organization combined to minimize the disruptive effects of administrative differences.

During the coalition years, however, administrative differences between the two groups were the major source of intra-party strain. Although federal leaders were able to assume more complete direction of federal affairs they expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the state of the
provincial organization. The coalition, they believed, was dissolving partisan Liberal commitment within the party organization as well as within the province and, consequently, was threatening the very foundation of the Liberal Party. Federal leaders clashed with coalition Liberals on decisions relating to the general administration of the party organization as well as on the administration of federal business within the province. They also clashed with provincial leaders during a provincial leadership convention, when they backed one provincial leadership candidate and campaigned for the election of officers of the Association supporting the anti-coalition group. These confrontations eventually assumed the proportions of a federal challenge to the provincial leadership and indirectly to the coalition government as federal leaders attempted to expand their influence within the rank and file leadership in order to encourage the anti-coalition sentiment. As the anti-coalition campaign gained strength, federal strains became intense and public conflict between the two groups assumed almost uncontrollable dimensions. The organizational and political requirements of the federal and provincial groups were perceived so differently after the war that the formal survival of the unified provincial organization was an achievement in itself.

CONCURRENT FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL OPPOSITION:
The Liberal Party of British Columbia and the Liberal Party of Canada were both in opposition from 1911 to 1916, from 1930 to 1933 and from 1957 to 1963. During these three periods the party's circumstances differed considerably as did the balance of power between federal and provincial groups within the Liberal Association in British Columbia. In the first period both federal and provincial parties were extremely weak but in the absence of a federal wing within the province the control of the Association was in the hands of the provincial leader, who was able to attract a large following once the prospect of political power became apparent. Between 1930 and 1933 a new provincial leader was rebuilding a provincial organization under his own personal control. There is no evidence to suggest that the new provincial leader attempted to assume more control over federal business when the federal party was defeated in 1930. The five Liberal members of parliament from British Columbia were probably able to maintain the status quo in terms of their influence and participation within the Association.

Between 1957 and 1963, however, the situation was entirely different. The provincial wing of the party had been extremely weak for five years before the federal party's defeat in 1957 and the provincial leader's control of the Association had been threatened constantly since 1953 by a strong and active federal wing. While the provincial leader
maintained enough control over the Association to prevent federal leaders from forcing his retirement, he was not able to improve his position once the federal wing within the province was defeated. Indeed, after the provincial leader resigned in 1959 federal leaders immediately moved to consolidate their influence within the Association. The new provincial leader, who had received the support of the federal leaders, made no attempt to restrict the influence of the federal party. While the federal leaders and their representatives within the Association were not able to control the office of the president of the Association during this period, their complete control of federal business, their influence with the provincial leader and their superior financial resources made them the dominant force within the party.

The circumstance of concurrent party opposition in Ottawa and Victoria has given little indication of the distribution of power within the provincial Association. Nevertheless, during these periods the relative electoral strength, financial resources and political futures of the two groups within the province affected the focus of power within the party. The distribution of power in the years immediately preceding the period of concurrent opposition also appeared to influence the relative positions of the two groups in defeat. Indeed, within the B.C. Liberal Party
the balance of power in the period preceding concurrent
defeat has tended to survive by the power of inertia alone.

SOURCES OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL STRAIN:

POLICY DIFFERENCES:

There was no evidence of public policy differences initiating strains between the federal and provincial wings of the Liberal Party of British Columbia during periods of concurrent opposition. While opposition status often allowed each wing of the party to remain vague or uncommitted on issues affecting both Ottawa and British Columbia, it also enabled the party to keep policy strains out of the public eye. Policy differences between the provincial and federal leaders existed between 1930 and 1933 and between 1957 and 1963 but intra-party friction did not seem related to these issues. These policies had no immediate political significance since the parties were both out of power and, therefore, as long as the party made no attempt to coordinate their policies the differences between the two wings could be ignored.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFERENCES:

Although administrative differences did not appear to initiate friction between the two wings of the party between 1911 and 1916 and between 1930 and 1933, administrative strains were evident between 1957 and 1963. During the
federal campaigns of 1962 and 1963 representatives of the federal wing, who had been appointed to the federal campaign committee, clashed with the President of the Liberal Association. The President claimed that federal leaders had disregarded the Association officers in the organization of the federal campaign but the origin of this strain was directly related to previous campaigns for the Association presidency. At that time federal leaders supported a new and prominent member of the party, who was particularly interested in federal politics. While the federal wing's candidate was defeated, the federal leader appointed him to direct the federal campaign committee. The President of the Association opposed the expanding influence of federal leaders and offered little assistance to the federal party. Although the provincial leader did not openly participate in the quarrel between the Association President and federal leaders, the administrative strains which occurred in connection with the election of the president of the Association and the direction of the federal campaign reflected both the federal challenge to the provincial control of the organization and the increasing but as yet unstable influence of the federal wing.

PROVINCIAL POWER - FEDERAL OPPOSITION

From 1916 to 1921 and from 1933 to 1935 the provincial Liberals formed the government in Victoria while the
federal Liberals were in opposition in Ottawa. With the provincial party in power the provincial leader could easily maintain effective control of the Association. Between 1916 and 1921 the provincial leader had virtually no competition from the federal wing of the party for the control of the Association since the province did not return a Liberal member of parliament in the federal elections of 1911 and 1917. But even when the federal group was more numerous and much more powerful, as they were between 1933 and 1935, provincial control was firm. Nevertheless, the provincial leader did not attempt to extend his influence over federal business. Arrangements between the two groups remained much as they had during the previous provincial administrations when the federal party had also been in power. This stability was probably encouraged by the influence and size of the federal wing within the province and the prospect of a federal Liberal victory at the next election. Indeed, the role of the federal wing within the provincial organization during periods of provincial power but federal defeat are most probably dependent upon the size of the federal wing within the province and their immediate political prospects.

SOURCES OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL STRAIN:

POLICY DIFFERENCES:

Although opposition status often allowed a party to remain uncommitted on major issues of federal-provincial
relations, the formation of a federal coalition government in 1917 was one issue that could not be avoided by the provincial Liberal parties. In British Columbia differences between the provincial leader and Premier, who supported the Union cause and the majority of the provincial cabinet ministers and back benchers, who supported Laurier, were exceptionally well contained within the party. While the issue caused some strain within the provincial party leadership, the strong support of the Union cause in the province and the tenuous position of the new provincial administration discouraged open party strife. The absence of an established federal wing in the province and the sudden death of the provincial leader also helped to contain intra-party friction. Nevertheless, the party organization was deeply affected by this issue since each constituency organization had to either align itself with the Laurier-Liberal cause or form a Liberal-Union organization. The Union Government controversy indicated the way in which a federally-derived issue could divide a provincial party that had no firmly established federal wing.

Between 1933 and 1935 federal-provincial policy differences did not noticeably disturb intra-party relations. From his private correspondence with the federal Liberal leader the Liberal Premier of British Columbia had assumed that the federal party supported him in many of his various conflicts with the Conservative Prime Minister of Canada.
When the federal Liberals returned to power in 1935, however, the Premier was often surprised by the apparent reversal of federal Liberal policy. While political correspondents of the period had recognized several areas of real and potential policy conflict, federal party positions on these issues were not of immediate concern to the provincial party while the party was in opposition in Ottawa. Likewise, the policies and actions of the provincial Liberal government could be conveniently ignored by the federal leader, who desired the cooperation of the provincial organization in the forthcoming federal election.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFERENCES:

While administrative complications accompanied the Union Government controversy within the Liberal Party of British Columbia, administrative differences between provincial leaders and federal candidates were not in themselves a source of intra-party strain. During the second period under consideration a minor administrative strain developed immediately after the federal election of 1935, when the successful federal leader complained of the relatively poor showing in British Columbia. The Premier felt that his unusually active support of the federal party during the campaign had not been appreciated by the federal party and he suggested privately to party leaders that the federal wing
might prefer to separate its organization from the provincial Association. Both federal and provincial leaders within the province insisted that this issue should not be pursued and that federal comments on the election had been primarily expressions of disappointment and not of criticism.

In both these periods administrative and policy differences created only minor sources of strain for the Liberal Party. Although the Union Government debate provided an unusual problem for the provincial party and the short period between the provincial election of 1933 and the federal election of 1935 gave intra-party strains little time to mature, the opposition status of one wing of the party appeared to lessen the chances of a public quarrel between the federal leader and the provincial leader and minimize the repercussions of policy differences between the two groups. An explanation for the containment of administrative strains during the earlier period may be found in the weakness of the federal party in the province and the willingness of many provincial leaders to support the federal party. During the more recent period the desire of the provincial leader to gain favor with party colleagues he would eventually have to negotiate with as the government in Ottawa may have minimized administrative friction. Clearly, if the federal party had been in different circumstances relative to the provincial party in either periods,
administrative differences might have provided more serious or more obvious intra-party strains.

FEDERAL POWER - PROVINCIAL OPPOSITION:

The federal party held power in Ottawa during periods of provincial opposition from 1896 to 1911, from 1928 to 1930, from 1952 to 1957 and finally from 1963 to 1965. During most of these periods the influence of the federal wing of the party within the provincial organization was considerable, although the influence only approximated an effective control of the Association in the earliest and the most recent years under consideration. From 1896 to about 1903 the provincial Association was in reality a federal organization because party lines had not been firmly established in provincial politics. But federal leaders continued to dominate the organization until 1908, when their numbers were substantially diminished. Throughout the period, however, the federal cabinet minister from British Columbia encouraged the development of a strong provincial organization and supported the principle of the provincial control of the organization. Although the provincial leader could never maintain unity within the provincial wing, after 1908 the leadership of the party defaulted to the disunified provincial wing of the party in the absence of a stronger or more determined federal group.
While the role of the small federal wing of the party within the provincial Association between 1928 and 1930 was not clear, federal leaders evidently encouraged the defeated provincial leader to resign by offering him a federal appointment. The federal wing within British Columbia was, however, too weak to attempt to control the organization and it appeared that federal interests were satisfied to see a new leader rebuild a strong Liberal organization. In contrast, after the provincial party's defeat in 1952 federal leaders were not only instrumental in the selection of a new provincial leader, who was recruited from the federal wing, but were determined to maintain their influence within the Association in view of the unpromising electoral future of the provincial party. Indeed, it was not long before the federal wing, with its major financial responsibilities within the Association, attempted to supervise administrative and policy decisions pertaining specifically to provincial politics.

Although the provincial leader had no objections to the federal wing of the party controlling federal business, he ignored those federal directives which he believed encroached upon the provincial sphere of influence. The federal leaders and their associates extended their control of the organization through their control of federal business, their maintainence of the Association office and their
influence with the officers of the Association. Nevertheless, the provincial leader continued to pursue his own strategy in the provincial legislature and refused to resign from the provincial leadership even after he had lost his seat in the legislature. He had enough support with rank and file Liberals to survive federal pressures to unseat him, although the defeat of the federal party in 1957 distracted the party and weakened the campaign against him.

When the federal party returned to power in 1963 their position of dominance was much more secure. Although federal leaders now made an attempt to avoid internal friction by consulting with the provincial leader on many aspects of party policy, the provincial leader avoided policies which might have alienated federal leaders. Federal influence within the Association was aided by the election of officers of the Association who were close to the federal wing. After 1963 the president and the officers of the Association controlled the day-to-day operation of the organization. Although the provincial leader had some latitude in choosing his own strategy in the legislature and during provincial campaigns, he had little control over the small group of Liberal MLAs, little control of the organizational apparatus of the party, little control over the selection of the Association officers, few sources of independent financial resources and, consequently, few bases from which
to recapture an effective control of the Association. The provincial leader had strong support among the rank and file Liberals but this support could at best only maintain him in an office which depended upon independent political and financial resources for its power. From 1963 to 1965, therefore, federal influence approximated the effective control of the Association.

The eclipse of the Liberal Party in British Columbia after 1952 made it extremely difficult for the provincial leader to retain his control of the Association. A determined provincial leader, however, was able to maintain himself in office with little more than rank and file support. Indeed, between 1953 and 1957 the provincial leader ignored federal "advice" and was able to prevent the federal wing from stabilizing their influence within the provincial organization. This suggested that the extent of federal influence within the provincial Association most recently may be less attributable to the superior federal resources than to the withdrawal of the provincial leader to a position approximating his personal and political resources within the Association. Thus, while the defeat of the provincial party may provide a federal wing with an opportunity for increased influence with a provincial party organization, the immediate political prospects of the provincial party, its resources, the quality of its leadership, the personal
determination of the provincial leader to control the organiza-
tion and, of course, the strength of the federal wing in the province determine the extent to which federal influence may approach an effective control of the provincial Association.

SOURCES OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL STRAIN:

POLICY DIFFERENCES:

The source and intensity of intra-party strain varied significantly during these four periods. Many of the differences, however, may be attributed to the unique circumstances of the period of party emergence and to the lack of detailed information concerning intra-party relations in the short period between the provincial election of 1928 and the federal election of 1930, when the federal wing in British Columbia was weak. For example, conflicts between provincial Liberals and the Liberal Prime Minister over both federal and provincial party positions on federal-provincial relations were intense before 1911, but in the other periods considered here there was no evidence of policy strains which directly involved the Prime Minister. In some situations opposition status afforded the provincial wing of the party the opportunity to remain vague or uncommitted on potentially explosive issues, while in other situations the political environment of the province demanded that they take precise
positions on such issues even if it initiated a public quarrel with the federal party. Before 1911 the weak provincial party believed that they strengthened their position within the province by attacking federal policies, while in the most recent period it often appeared that the provincial party believed that their position within the province was improved by their close association with Ottawa.

Policy strains of an entirely different nature did occur, however, between 1952 and 1957 when federal leaders opposed several of the programs proposed by the provincial leader. Their differences with the provincial leader in these policy areas and in the administration of the party created severe strains and finally prompted the federal wing to attempt to retire the provincial leader. While federal leaders had often felt threatened by the policies of the provincial party they have rarely attacked them if they pertained specifically to the provincial field. Indeed, the only other example of such policy differences occurred during the last years of the provincial coalition government, when the federal party was also challenging the provincial leadership. While policy differences during the coalition developed as part of the federal anti-coalition campaign, policy differences between 1953 and 1957 actually initiated strains between the provincial leader and the federal wing, although in the latter period policy strains were dominated by more severe administrative clashes.
ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFERENCES:

Although administrative strains before 1911 were generally associated with the lack of organizational coordination between federal and provincial groups and the existence of disunity within the provincial wing of the party itself, administrative differences in the two most recent periods under consideration were directly related to the increased activity of the federal wing. While the focus and intensity of administrative strains varied in these most recent periods, all administrative sources of strain were derived from the superior financial resources of the federal wing and their expanded influence within the Association. In both periods, therefore, administrative strains were the basis of a federal challenge to the provincial control of the organization. Between 1952 and 1957 the dependence of the provincial leader on the federal wing for campaign funds encouraged federal leaders to offer advice and criticism on the conduct of provincial campaigns. When the provincial leader rejected or ignored this advice the federal party withdrew its support of the provincial leader, which in turn alienated the two wings further. Administrative differences during these years occurred in connection with the distribution of money, the conduct of provincial campaigns and the role of the federal party in Association affairs. After 1963 the stability of federal influence minimized the strains
initiated by administrative differences. There were minor differences associated with the 1963 campaign but after officers of the Association close to the federal wing assumed the control of the organization administrative differences have been well contained.

THE STRUCTURE OF INTRA-PARTY RELATIONS IN THE B.C. LIBERAL PARTY:

The following chart summarizes the relationship which has been found between electoral circumstances and the structure of intra-party relations within the Liberal Party of British Columbia.
## The Structure of Intra-Party Relations in the B.C. Liberal Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Variable</th>
<th>Control of Organization*</th>
<th>Sources of Strain**</th>
<th>Intensity of Strain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concurrent Power</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921 - 1928</td>
<td>Prov./strong</td>
<td>POLICY/admin.</td>
<td>moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935 - 1941</td>
<td>Prov./strong</td>
<td>POLICY/admin.</td>
<td>great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941 - 1952</td>
<td>Prov./moderate</td>
<td>ADMIN./policy</td>
<td>great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concurrent Opposition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 - 1916</td>
<td>Prov./moderate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930 - 1933</td>
<td>Prov./strong</td>
<td>ADMIN./policy</td>
<td>great/moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 - 1963***</td>
<td>Prov./weak</td>
<td>ADMIN./policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fed. challenge</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provincial Power</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Federal Opposition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916 - 1921</td>
<td>Prov./strong</td>
<td>POLICY/admin.</td>
<td>moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933 - 1935</td>
<td>Prov./strong</td>
<td>ADMIN./admin.</td>
<td>weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal Power</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Provincial Opposition</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1896 - 1911</td>
<td>Federal-1903</td>
<td>POLICY/admin.</td>
<td>great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prov./weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928 - 1930</td>
<td>Prov./moderate</td>
<td>/admin.</td>
<td>weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952 - 1957</td>
<td>Prov./weak</td>
<td>ADMIN./policy</td>
<td>great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fed. challenge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963 - 1965</td>
<td>Federal/moderate</td>
<td>ADMIN./</td>
<td>moderate/weak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHART (Cont.)

* The effectiveness of the control of the provincial organization has been classified generally as strong, moderate or weak. The existence of a federal challenge to the provincial leadership of the organization has also been indicated here.

** The source of major intra-party strains appears first in capital letters. If minor strains also existed they are indicated in the lower case.

*** After 1960 the control of the organization could also be classified as weak Federal control with a provincial (rank and file) challenge.
The structure of intra-party relations in the Liberal Party of British Columbia has suggested the following propositions and relationships:

(1) Whenever the provincial wing of the party formed the provincial government in Victoria the provincial leader's control of the unified party organization has been relatively secure.

(2) When the provincial group was in opposition effective control of the Liberal Association was more difficult to maintain. The retention of control of the organization by provincial leaders depended not only upon the federal party's position in Ottawa and the strength of the federal leaders in British Columbia but the length and the extent of the provincial party's defeat.

(3) When both federal and provincial groups have been in opposition the provincial leader's ability to control the Liberal Association was contingent upon the balance of power existing within the party in the period immediately preceding that of concurrent opposition. Even if the provincial wing had been out of power longer than the federal wing, the defeat of the federal party often strengthened the position of the provincial leader.

(4) While federal influence within the unified party organization has assumed significant dimensions when
the federal wing was in power during an extended period of provincial opposition, this influence only approximated an effective control of the Association with the indirect approval of the provincial leader.

(5) The great majority of intra-party strains within the Liberal Party of British Columbia involved differences between clearly identifiable federal and provincial groups. Many of the strains which developed within either the provincial or federal wings were also often related to federally-derived issues.

(6) Whenever both federal and provincial wings of the party were in power in Ottawa and Victoria policy differences relating to the conduct of federal-provincial relations often initiated strains between the two wings of the party. These strains tended to dominate federal-provincial party relations since they often involved public quarrels between the Liberal Premier and the Liberal Prime Minister.

(7) When either or both of the two wings of the party were in opposition policy differences were not as threatening to the unity of the provincial Association. Public friction between the provincial leader and the federal leader was also less likely to occur under these circumstances.
(8) The absence of public quarrels between the federal leader and the provincial leader was not an accurate measure of the unity of the party since the most continuing source of federal-provincial party friction has been derived from the difficulties of administering a joint organization under the formal and often effective control of the provincial leader.

(9) When the provincial wing of the party was in opposition, administrative strains between federal and provincial groups within the province were almost always evident and were often intense. Serious administrative strains usually reflected increased federal activity and influence within the provincial Association, which was threatening to alter the established balance of power within the organization.

(10) The intensity of intra-party strains appeared to have no relationship to the electoral circumstances of the two wings of the party. The diverse interests and the often conflicting political needs of the two groups, which either initiated or encouraged most intra-party strains, were neither restricted nor resolved by the changing electoral position of the party.
THE IMPACT OF FEDERALISM ON INTRA-PARTY RELATIONS - SOME COMPARISONS:

The propositions stated above have referred to the experience of only one local party in one federal country. While the findings of this case-study are most directly relevant to Canadian political parties and Canadian federalism, more general statements on the impact of federalism on intra-party relations require comparisons with political parties in other federal countries. While the literature on federalism is rich and expanding rapidly, unfortunately the study of intra-party relations, indeed, even the study of the impact of federalism upon the structure and operation of political parties has received only limited attention in most federal countries. This has been true on both theoretical and empirical levels of analysis. Consequently, detailed comparisons of intra-party relations are difficult to make even within the context of Canadian politics. In turn, without detailed comparisons, generalizations on the impact of federalism on intra-party relations are extremely hazardous. Furthermore, if the patterns of intra-party relations vary considerably within the same federal party and between the parties in a federal system, the variables and relationships which appear to clarify one local party situation may not be useful in another local party or for that matter within a party system as a whole.
Although interest in Canadian political parties has been increasing steadily, Alexander Brady's analysis of the literature on federalism and Canadian parties in 1963 is still accurate when he reports that:

The relation of the political parties to the operation and success of the federation is a large and important theme which unfortunately has never been fully explored in a major and single treatise.... It is dealt with briefly in books on national government, in biographies and in a few special studies on the parties.... Each of the two chief national parties still awaits a detailed history.... The writers of books have devoted more attention to the minority and regional than to the national parties, although all their studies reflect something of the strains and stresses of federal politics. 4

The identical problem within other federal systems has also been recognized. Within the Australian federalism, for example, S.R. Davis and C.A. Hughes have observed, "As influences, one might expect party organization, policy and stratagems to illustrate the force of federalism in Australia. But even here the writing is scant and the concern is with other things." 5 After a brief review and critique of those few examples of general treatments on the topic the authors suggest several unpublished and generally unavailable local studies have given a new slant to the nature of federal party organization in Australia and they remark that: 6

It is very likely that this tendency to write down the effects of a state-based national party system
is about to end and that a much more useful interpretation of the party system will come from the increasing attention paid to state, regional and city differences. 7

This is, of course, the usefulness of detailed studies of intra-party relations on the local level for such examinations not only provide information on the informal organization and the strains characteristic of the local party but on the comparative level within the context of a single federal system provide a dynamic view of the federal party system and the diversities which it embraces.

CANADIAN PARTIES: GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPACT OF FEDERALISM:

Although few students of Canadian politics have ignored the impact of federalism on the general structure of the federal and provincial party systems, systematic documentation of the impact of federal strains within the two major federal parties has been rare. Nevertheless, many of the general reviews of Canadian party organization have offered observations and interpretations of some aspects of federal-provincial party relations within the Liberal and Conservative Parties. R. MacGregor Dawson, 8 H. McD. Clokie, 9 Corry and Hodgetts, 10 and Alexander Brady 11 have described the formal organization of the provincial organizations of the two major federal parties. All of these
writers have remarked on the strength of provincial control of the local organization and on the tendency for occasional disagreements to break out between the federal leader and the provincial leader of the same party. Few of these authors, however, have explored the competition between the federal and provincial leaders within the province for influence or control within the unified party organization. Dawson has suggested that the "acquiescence by the Dominion interests in provincial leadership may be given more readily in that the larger part of petty patronage is now the gift of the province." He does not, however, theorize on the stability of the provincial party control of the unified organizations once the provincial leaders are cut off from patronage resources. Although none of these writers have discussed the extent to which the federal wing may dominate a provincial organization, Corry and Hodgetts have suggested that federal parties have been less dependent on provincial organizations for campaign funds since the war and Dawson has stressed that the general decline in patronage on both levels of government and the federal control of the best jobs has offset provincial claims for the control of the local organization.

But while the conditions and extent of federal-provincial competition for the control of the local party organization is obscure, several interpretations have been
offered within these general works on the nature and development of federal-provincial party strains. Almost without exception these interpretations have referred only to public quarrels between a premier and a prime minister of the same party. The impact of these quarrels on the operation of the party organization in the province, however, was rarely discussed. The development of independent quarrels between the federal and provincial wings within the province was not examined independently, although the existence of such strains was indirectly recognized. Nevertheless, some interesting observations and propositions have been provided by general assessments of federal party politics in Canada. Clokie, for example, remarked that the local focus of the provincial organization often distracts the allegiance of the provincial leader and his associates, just as "regional or racial jealousies" may encourage a provincial leader to confront the federal leader of the same party. While Clokie believed that such quarrels could develop at any time, he suggested that such cleavages were more frequent when federal and provincial wings were in power in their prospective capitals at the same time. In a similar analysis Gwendolen Carter has suggested that such leadership quarrels between a premier and a prime minister of the same party are encouraged by the centralization of power within both the federal and provincial wings of the party on one hand, and the "looseness of organization between
the two levels of party organization" on the other hand.\footnote{18}

It has been suggested that most examples of public quarrels between leaders of the same party have been related to the conduct of federal-provincial relations. Neither of the major parties have maintained a general policy on federal-provincial relations, indeed, it has often been noticed that "various leaders national and provincial will adopt different attitudes according to whether they are in or out of office."\footnote{19} William H. Riker has observed that in Canada the provincial Liberal premiers have looked to "Liberal leaders in Ottawa not for leadership, but for bargaining concession," because within Canadian federalism "there is something to bargain about."\footnote{20} Nevertheless, the lack of commitment to consistent policies of federal-provincial relations and the periodic popularity and decline of the sectional issues pursued by provincial wings of the two major parties have led some students of federal politics to believe that most differences between the federal and provincial wings of the major parties are derived from a pragmatic analysis of politically rewarding issues rather than from any ideological differences between the two groups. Denis Smith has cynically remarked that "A provincial party leader will deny his federal loyalties when the federal party is unpopular and parade them when it is popular. The relationship is one of prudence resting on a basis of common
sentiment and not of principle."21 Indeed, E.R. Black has suggested on the basis of a detailed study of the Progressive Conservative Party of British Columbia that real policy differences between the two wings of the party have been so rare in comparison the conflicting administrative claims of the two groups within the provincial Association that the "brokerage theory" of federal party politics, which views the federal party as "broker or middleman between the provinces which have diverse and often contradictory policy claims," may not adequately account for the majority of federal strains within Canadian parties.22 To examine this thesis, however, much more must be known about intra-party strains when the two wings of the party are not both in power.

Indeed, an assessment of the strength of the various sources of federal strains within Canadian parties can only be derived from detailed studies of intra-party relations within the provincial party organizations. Although a few studies on Canadian parties have provided insights on some aspects of intra-party relations within the various provincial parties, E.R. Black's study of the Progressive Conservative Party of British Columbia is the only detailed study of a provincial party specifically focused on the problem of federal strains.23 A very general outline of intra-party relations within the various provincial organizations
of the Liberal Party has been provided by S. Peter Regen- 
strief in an unpublished PhD. dissertation. These stu-
dies, however, are the only ones which deal with intra-
party relations in any systematic way. Most of the studies 
which have been published on provincial politics have been 
more concerned with the rise of the minority and regional 
parties or the general political exchanges between the 
parties in a province than with the relations between federal 
and provincial groups within a party. Consequently, neither 
J. Murray Beck's detailed study of The Government of Nova 
Scotia nor Hugh G. Thorburn's book, Politics in New Brunswick 
gives a very clear picture of the structure of intra-party 
relations within either of the two major parties. Similarly 
the study of Alberta's Liberal Party by L.G. Thomas con-
centrates on the history and policies of the Liberal party 
in Alberta but does not systematically deal with the role 
of the province's small federal wing within the party organ-
ization or of the impact of strains between federal and pro-
vincial leaders on the party organization.

Studies like S.M. Lipset's Agrarian Socialism, John A. Irving's The Social Credit Movement in Alberta, W.L. Morton's The Progressive Party in Canada, and C.B. Macpherson's Democracy in Alberta: The Theory and Practice of a Quasi-Party System have concerned themselves with the conditions which gave rise to these various parties and
and the impact of sectionalism on the provincial party systems. They have paid very little attention to the nature of the relationship between provincial and federal members of these parties or even between the various provincial units of the same party. It is clear, however, that intra-party relations have assumed somewhat different forms in these parties because of the weakness of their federal organizations and their strength in only one or two provinces. It has been observed in a general way that the decentralizing pull of federal politics has affected the informal organization of the C.C.F. - N.D.P. even though the party has often expressed a commitment to a fairly centralized party organization. Systematic studies of the relationship between federal and provincial members of the party in provinces where both wings of the party have had support, however, have not been published and, consequently, data which would be comparable to intra-party relations in the major parties is not available.

SOME COMPARISONS ON THE STRUCTURE OF INTRA-PARTY RELATIONS IN CANADA:

Aspects of the formal organization of the two major federal parties have been discussed in detail in three unpublished Ph.D. dissertations but in all cases the focus has been on the national organization and treatment of the
provincial organizations and the role of the federal personnel within them has been weak. Indeed, one study contended that the formal organization uniting the federal and provincial wings of the party showed "a relationship, but the real operation of the party demonstrated a lack of cohesion and an absence of any organic connection." The importance of the provincial organization as a focus for federal-provincial party interaction has been recognized in a general way by many observers of Canadian politics, although the informal structure of intra-party relations within the provincial organizations of the major parties has remained obscure. The following review of intra-party relations in some of the provincial organizations of the two major federal parties may clarify some of the more complex and elusive interdependencies which exist within the party organizations and, in addition, may provide a basis for evaluating the approach and conclusions of this case-study of the Liberal Party of British Columbia.

THE LIBERAL PARTY:

Almost all the information available on intra-party relations within provincial Liberal Parties may be found in a single chapter of S. Peter Regenstrief's study of The Liberal Party of Canada: A Political Analysis. Although Regenstrief was mainly interested in whether the provincial
and federal organizations in each province were united within a single Liberal Association and whether the provincial party had been divided by any serious and public quarrels between federal and provincial leaders, he also attempted to determine which group actually controlled the provincial organization and in doing so has given some indication of the extent of federal control in the various Liberal organizations. He did not, however, give close attention to those provinces which have not had serious leadership quarrels or separate federal and provincial organizations. Indeed, if federal and provincial organizations coincided and there were no public quarrels between federal and provincial leaders Regenstrief interpreted this as an indication of complete federal-provincial cooperation.

Regenstrief reported that only the Liberal Parties in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec have been plagued by "actual or potential discord between federal and provincial interests." In Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan there had been a long tradition of "unbroken federal-provincial cooperation," and in New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, federal and provincial organizations had generally coincided. The predicament of the Manitoba organization appeared difficult to classify but Regenstrief indicated that despite a great deal of organizational overlap of provincial and federal organizations, the existence of a coalition Liberal-Progressive administration
had possibly complicated the joint administration of party business during the 1920's and 1930's. While intra-party relations remained obscure during most of this period, strains were evident after 1935 when James H. Gardiner, a Minister of Agriculture and unofficial leader of the Saskatchewan organization, attempted unsuccessfully to "impose his own organization on the province."\(^{36}\)

The precise classification of the focus of control of the Liberal organizations in Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan provided Regenstrief with some difficulties also, as there were instances in both organizations when the provincial leader moved into federal politics but retained control over the provincial organization personally or left it under the control of a hand-picked successor.\(^{37}\) While Regenstrief believed that under these conditions there was complete cooperation between federal and provincial interests in both provinces with the exception of the Union Government period, it would be interesting to determine whether the assumed federal careers of W.S. Fielding and Angus L. Macdonald of Nova Scotia and James G. Gardiner of Saskatchewan initiated any changes in the priorities of the unified provincial organization and whether any segment of the provincial group resented the continued influence of these men within the Association once they entered the federal cabinet. A more detailed analysis of these two organizations might indicate
if intra-party cooperation was based on the organizational practices developed by the party, the "personal liaison of the leaders within the province," or possibly on the ability of the organization to keep intra-party friction out of the public eye. Since both federal and provincial wings held power concurrently for extended periods in these two provinces, however, it is doubtful whether the party organizations could have avoided intra-party strains entirely.

Since the Liberals have returned to power in Saskatchewan federal-provincial strains have been observed within the party organization. Friction between the Liberal Premier Ross Thatcher and the Liberal Prime Minister Lester Pearson has been noted as well. While the nature and extent of the strains were not altogether clear, it appeared that the federal party took the administration of the federal campaign out of provincial hands after only one Liberal member of parliament was elected from the province in 1962. It was reported that the federal leader found the right wing orientation of the provincial party unacceptable and had requested that a new and separate organization be created in the province for federal purposes. The provincial leader was not consulted on the creation of the organization and when the provincial group was excluded from the 1963 campaign organization the provincial party offered no assistance to federal candidates. In commenting on the origin of this intra-party conflict E.R. Black has suggested:
Here the problem would appear to have issued in ideological terms primarily because of a tactical situation. In seeking to overthrow Saskatchewan's C.C.F. government, the Provincial Liberal leader, Ross Thatcher, carefully cultivated a strong right wing look for his group, an attitude in notable contrast with that of the federal party.38

While Regenstrief described intra-party strains within the four provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec, he did not attempt to classify these strains or to generalize on the long-term experiences of these four Liberal organizations. A systematic classification of these strains, however, was impossible in some cases because of the uneven quality of his information. In Alberta many aspects of federal-provincial party relations have remained obscured because of the weakness of the party and the regional variations in the extent of federal and provincial organizational overlap and cooperation. In the 1920's there was not an effective party administrator but in the 1930's while the quality of the provincial administration of the organization improved, regional variations continued so that while in one part of the province there was no federal organization, in another part federal interests were openly conflicting with provincial groups for the control of the regional organizations. Regenstrief inferred that the intensity of intra-party strains increased after 1935 when the federal Liberals returned to power.

Since the province had no cabinet representative, James H. Gardiner attempted to control federal business within the
province and was fought by provincial groups. After 1950 Alberta's new cabinet minister clashed with provincial groups and in 1955, Regenstrief reported, he opened a separate office for the federal party in Edmonton. From Regenstrief's description of the Alberta Liberal organization it would appear that the major sources of intra-party strain have been administrative and have centered on the control of federal business in the province. The weakness of the Liberal Party in the province, however, had made it more difficult for federal representatives within the province to assume control of the legal provincial organization.

In Quebec there was a separation of federal and provincial business from about 1911 to 1960. While federal leaders from Quebec occasionally received help from provincial Liberal leaders on an informal basis, after the victory of the Union Nationale federal M.P.s from Quebec became increasingly alienated from Liberal politicians, who often discovered their federal colleagues making "non-aggression pacts" with the Union Nationale. When the provincial organization was rebuilt in the 1950's and 1960's, provincial leaders renewed contacts with federal leaders in Ottawa. After the Liberals gained power in the province the federal and provincial organizations were formally reunited but the "old-guard" federal interests within the province were virtually excluded from the negotiations. Until the older group of federal personnel are completely retired, the unification of the two wings of the party will be incomplete
and the arrangements for the organization of joint facilities will probably remain unstable.

Intra-party relations in Ontario and British Columbia have exhibited striking similarities. Although Regenstrief's review of intra-party relations in British Columbia was most fragmentary and dealt mainly with the organizational strains of the coalition period, his more detailed description of the Ontario Liberal organization has provided many parallels with the findings of this study on the Liberal Party of British Columbia. The Liberal organization in Ontario has remained formally united throughout its history despite the existence of a separate and quasi-autonomous federal organization during the 1930's. Ontario Liberals were divided more seriously than were British Columbia Liberals on the issue of Union Government in 1917 and as a result the provincial organization had to be rebuilt during the 1920's. While information on intra-party relations was not available for this period, after Mitchell Hepburn became the provincial leader in 1930 federal-provincial party strains became quite public. Differences between Hepburn and King began, Regenstrief reported, at the time of Hepburn's election when the federal leader stayed away from the party nominating convention supposedly to avoid any confusion between federal and provincial affairs. After Hepburn became Premier of Ontario he consulted King on the selection of the cabinet and the federal leader, who was still in opposition, refused to cooperate.

It is clear that in refusing to interfere in the
provincial cabinet-making process, King wished to forestall similar attempts by Hepburn to impose any conditions he might have upon King should the federal party succeed in winning the forthcoming federal election which by that time it seemed certain to do.46

Indeed, after the successful federal election Hepburn, without consulting King, announced the name of the "forthcoming federal minister of justice in an attempt to pressure his federal colleague into naming his choice for the post. King ignored Hepburn's actions and wishes and did not consult with the Ontario Premier on the composition of the cabinet. Hepburn interpreted this as "tantamount to urging that separate organizations be set up."47 By 1936 the federal and provincial organizations were quite distinct and by 1938 the public feud between the two leaders was becoming infamous. The origins of this feud were complex and while they appeared to be related to Hepburn's desire for influence in Ottawa, later clashes between the two leaders were based on issues of federal-provincial relations. Hepburn, for example, united with Duplesis to block what the Premiers considered "federal government encroachments on provincial rights," initiated direct negotiations with Washington on the possibility of exporting hydroelectric power and finally joined with Ontario Conservatives in passing a motion of censure on the federal government.48 As in the case of Pattullo's clash with King, members of the Ontario provincial organization eventually sided with the federal leader and, thereby, initiated divisions within the provincial wing of the party itself.
These intra-party cleavages were clearly visible, Regenstrief reported, when Hepburn retired in 1942 and attempted to name his own successor. Federal and provincial factions opposed to Hepburn backed another candidate, who became the new provincial leader with the open support of the federal cabinet ministers and King himself. When the provincial party was defeated in the following year the federal wing took advantage of provincial disunity and their strengthened position within the provincial organization. Regenstrief, reflecting on the effect of the provincial party's electoral position, commented:

Accordingly, any objections the 'provincials' might have had to federal cabinet domination could not have the impact comparable to that which such objections would have emanated from a party in power. In fact, these are grounds for claiming that the balance had shifted in the other direction and that federal ministers and federal M.P.'s played an overwhelming role in provincial affairs.

The federal control of the provincial organization was so complete that federal leaders comprised one-half of the membership of the provincial platform committee and used the provincial wing in the Ontario legislature as a "device for embarrassing the Conservative provincial government."

In both Ontario and British Columbia, therefore, the extended period of provincial party eclipse has been accompanied by the increased influence of the federal party. Indeed, in both cases this influence appeared to constitute the control of the provincial organization. In both cases
the initial position of the federal wing was aided by a federal-provincial party conflict which finally divided the provincial group itself. Comparisons on the stability and repercussions of federal domination of the provincial organizations in Ontario and British Columbia, however, are difficult to make on the basis of Regenstrief's information of the contemporary Ontario situation.

THE PROGRESSIVE-CONSERVATIVE PARTY:

Although John R. Williams has studied the Conservative Party between the years of 1920 and 1949, the only detailed examination of intra-party relations in the party has been provided by E.R. Black. While the Conservative Party's formal party organization differs in a few key areas from that of the Liberal Party's, the structure of intra-party relations and the sources of intra-party strain within the two parties would appear to be quite similar on the basis of the experience of the Conservative Party in British Columbia. Indeed, the tentative propositions suggested by Black's study of the B.C. Conservatives and published in an article for the Dalhousie Review have not only proved invaluable in the organization of this case-study but have been confirmed in many cases by the findings of Regenstrief's study as well. The discussion of these propositions and those of this case-study, however, will be aided by a brief
review of intra-party relations within the Conservative Party of British Columbia.

The provincial Conservatives in British Columbia were in power between 1902 and 1916, 1928 and 1933, and in coalition between 1941 and 1952. In the first period a strong provincial leader, as Premier, helped to build the federal organization and after the federal wing assumed power in Ottawa in 1911 the federal party continued to rely upon the provincial organization. Between 1928 and 1933 the federal wing within the province was fairly strong even before the party assumed power in Ottawa in 1930, but the control of the provincial organization rested with the provincial group. Severe federal strains developed within the party during the coalition period, although the most open and severe federal-provincial party conflict emerged after the coalition was defeated. "While the dispute appeared to involve nothing more than the status of the provincial leader," Black concluded, "the question embraced both the shape and control of all party organization in the province as well as the selection and final approval of candidates for both federal and provincial contests." 52

Although the provincial group was extremely weak after the coalition's defeat, Black stressed that they were able to control the only legal Conservative organization in spite of repeated federal challenges to the provincial
leadership. In 1956 the provincial Association voted a motion of no confidence in the federal leader and openly attacked the activity of the federal wing for creating a separate federal organization in the province. The two groups continued to clash until 1960, when the determination of the provincial group was weakened by continued electoral defeat, retirement and death. But Black stressed that "not until one of the two factions was able to attain public office were its representatives able to assimilate the other groups." Consequently, while Black found that severe federal strains developed during the coalition and when both parties were in opposition, the determination of the provincial group balanced the relative strength of the federal group until the federal party assumed power in Ottawa.

Several of Black's tentative propositions on the impact of federalism on Canadian political parties are of particular significance in relating the experience of the B.C. Conservatives to the diverse experiences of the provincial Liberal Parties examined above.

Just as the virtual independence of a provincial government's policy-making depends to considerable extent on its provincial resources, so the effective control of provincial organization by the local officers depends upon the local unit's political resources in comparison with those of the central party; such resources are considered to be size and commitment of membership, financial capabilities, quality and appeal of leadership, and, of course, electoral success.
The interests and energies of the party machinery within one province cannot be converted readily and with equal efficiency to both federal and provincial objectives. Attempts to treat the party as if it were readily convertible impose almost intolerable stresses on the organization, stresses which we may expect to be manifested in difficulties between the party leaders.

Even where a provincial party organization is controlled by relatively ineffectual persons, if they are determined in their leadership, representatives of the central party can undertake 'corrective' action only at considerable risk.

The pattern of authoritative relationships between central and provincial party groups will depend upon whether public office is held by one, neither, or both the two groups. These relationships will also be affected by the nature of any rehabilitative process through which an out-of-office party faction may be going and by the degree of ideological and policy solidarity between the central and provincial units. 54

Black has suggested, therefore, that the local control of the provincial party organizations has been effective and that federal challenges to this control may often be defeated by relatively weak provincial leaders. Despite the risk of federal challenges to the local leadership, however, the conflicting interests of the two groups and the difficulties involved in administering a unified party organization have encouraged the development of intense leadership quarrels which have often assumed the dimensions of a federal challenge to the local leadership of the party. Black suggested, therefore, that the different
organizational needs federal and provincial groups within a party organization and the general competition between the groups for the same resources was a major source of strain within a provincial Canadian party and it was often responsible for the leadership quarrels which have occurred from time to time in the major parties. Indeed, in his study of the Conservative Party of British Columbia he found few issues of policy associated with strains between federal and provincial groups.

While Black identified several variables which affected the balance of power within the party organization, he suggested that the electoral circumstances of the two wings of the party was probably a major factor in determining the "pattern of authoritative relationships between central and provincial party groups." This thesis attempted to determine to what extent the structure of intra-party relations was associated with the electoral position of the federal and provincial groups within the Liberal Party of British Columbia. In particular, the focus of control within the provincial Association and the sources of intra-party strain were examined in relation to the electoral variable. Although Black had found no evidence of policy conflicts between the two groups in the B.C. Conservative Party, both policy and administrative sources of strain were identified in this case-study of the B.C.
Nevertheless, Black's suggestion that administrative strains were the basis of many of the leadership quarrels within Canadian parties was confirmed by this examination of the Liberal Party in British Columbia and Regenstrief's brief outline of other Liberal organizations also reflected the disruptive effects of the federal division of power on the operation of a unified party organization. The more specific propositions on the structure of intra-party relations in the B.C. Liberal Party, which have been enumerated above, also appear to have wider relevance within the major Canadian parties.

In almost all cases examined in this review, when a provincial party has been in power the provincial leader or a provincial group seemed to be in control of the legal provincial organization. The extent of federal influence within the organizations, however, varied considerably during periods of provincial power. In some party organizations federal leaders appeared to have extensive power over federal business in spite of the dominant position of the provincial group. When federal parties were also in power the tradition of allowing the federal cabinet minister or federal representative to make the major administrative decisions pertaining to federal activity within the province was fairly well established within many Liberal Parties. Nevertheless, if federal leaders utilized a provincial party's
facilities the provincial leader was often able to influence the form of federal activity. In other provincial organizations, however, even when federal groups have been strong, provincial leaders have occasionally believed that their power extended over all organizational matters in the province. In the B.C. Conservative Party this belief was retained by a provincial leader even after the party was defeated. Although this precise situation has not been documented within the Liberal Party, similar situations have been suggested by federal party actions in one province. 57 Nevertheless, when a federal Liberal group has separated its organization informally from the provincial organization between campaigns it occasionally has been a reflection of the federal party's response to provincial desires to control federal business more closely. 58 While the role of federal and provincial leaders within a party organization has often been closely associated with their respective electoral strength, the provincial control of a party organization has been most directly based on electoral power. Federal influence within a party organization has varied considerably during similar electoral circumstances within the parties examined above. Nevertheless, in all instances of federal domination of a party organization, federal influence was only established during a period of provincial eclipse and federal party power. Indeed, within the Liberal and Conservative Parties of British Columbia and the Liberal Party of Ontario,
federal influence was only established with indirect approval of weakened and divided provincial groups.

The examination of the focus of power within a party organization, therefore, has helped to identify the strains and conflicts of federal politics. The competition between groups to extend their power or maintain their autonomy within the provincial party organizations has reflected the pressures exerted by two distinct arenas of political activity and political power as clearly as public policy quarrels between leaders of the same party or formal separations of federal and provincial party organizations. Intra-party competition also has indicated how closely interrelated the sources of federal strains within a party are once they develop into conflicts between the federal and provincial groups. While both administrative differences and policy differences could be identified as separate sources of intra-party strain, after intra-party friction developed often both policy and administrative issues were intertwined. The relationship of either policy or administrative sources of strain to the electoral circumstances of the Liberal or Conservative Parties has been difficult to confirm from the information now available.

The significance of policy differences as a major source of federal strain in the two major parties has been most difficult to assess since a detailed analysis of intra-
party relations was not available for most Liberal and Conservative Parties (during periods of party defeat). While serious policy quarrels were only recognized in British Columbia and Ontario during periods concurrent provincial and federal Liberal governments, the experience of the Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta Liberal Parties must be examined in more detail before the development of policy strains can be clearly associated with political power and the conduct of inter-governmental relations. It should be stressed, however, that the connection between policy quarrels in the two major parties and political power does not in any way suggest that sectional issues have not been an important source of intra-party friction within the two major federal parties. The very dominance of third parties in the capitals of so many provinces where sectional feeling has been strong has indirectly but significantly affected the pattern of intra-party relations and the development of federal strains within the two major federal parties. The weakness of the provincial Liberal and Conservative parties in these provinces has often intensified federal pressures to control the party organization more completely and has encouraged the development of intra-party strains. While policy quarrels have not been documented in these parties, a closer examination of the Liberal and Conservative Parties in the prairie provinces may indicate the way in which increased
federal influence within some of these provinces has modified or contained potential policy differences between the two groups. In Saskatchewan the policy strains between the federal and provincial groups most recently have indicated the force that minor party dominance can exert upon the policy orientations of the major federal parties.

The experience of the political parties reviewed above has suggested, however, that even in the absence of public leadership quarrels and policy differences between federal and provincial groups intra-party strains may often exist within a unified party organization. These strains usually involved the administration of federal business in the province and were occasionally well contained or were well kept party secrets. More severe and public administrative strains, however, usually developed into public leadership quarrels when the balance of power within the Associations was being directly challenged. In British Columbia, in both the Liberal and Conservative Parties, the most severe administrative sources of strain developed during periods of provincial party eclipse and in Ontario, Alberta and possibly Manitoba similar situations seem to have occurred in the Liberal Parties. In several cases intra-party friction has forced federal leaders to formally or informally separate their organizations from the legal provincial party associations.
While administrative sources of strain seem to have been particularly intense during periods of provincial party defeat, the severity of federal strains did not seem to have any direct relationship to a particular electoral situation. Some policy strains, which occurred when a provincial party was strong, appeared just as threatening to the operation of a provincial party organization as those administrative strains derived from challenges to the established leadership of the party associations. Indeed, it is probably that the real significance of federal strains to a party organization is dependent upon the flexibility of the machinery a party develops for the conduct of joint party business and upon the success of the joint organization in the past. Nevertheless, the survival of joint party organizations may also be affected by the balance of power between the two wings of the party. In the Liberal Party of British Columbia the clear dominance of one group within the provincial Association at a time seemed to encourage the weaker group to accept readjustments of the balance of power within the organization. At the present time, however, the sources of party unity are almost as obscure as the sources of intra-party strain. In both cases the perceived interests, political needs and political interdependences of the two groups probably condition the manner in which they view the "mutual self-interest" that
may help to keep the federal parties unified.\textsuperscript{59}

Federalism has affected not only the structure of the party system and the formal organization of the major federal parties but also the structure of intra-party relations. Indeed, the structure of intra-party relations in Canadian parties has reflected the balance of power between federal and provincial groups and, consequently, has reflected the actual degree of decentralization within the major Canadian parties. In studying intra-party relations and the force of federal strains as an indication of the impact of federalism upon the organization and operation of political parties it has become apparent that political parties must deal not only with the social, racial or regional cleavages which necessitated the adoption of federal forms but must also function with the additional disruptions encouraged by the existence of two competing and relatively autonomous centers of political power. The degree to which these federal forces decentralize and disrupt party politics is seemingly dependent upon a complex of forces which seem to include the formal institutions of government, the electoral devices utilized within the political system, the political strength of regional identities and most probably the unifying capabilities of the political parties in the past.\textsuperscript{60}

The relationship between the social and institutional aspects of federalism and the party system, indeed,
has been termed a circular one.61 This may explain why the pattern of intra-party relations in federal countries, on one hand, has been said to reflect the impact of federalism on political parties and, on the other hand, has been said to determine the actual substance of a particular federal system in so far as it determines the degree to which power on both governmental and non-governmental levels is decentralized.62 These two viewpoints are not mutually exclusive and are not methodologically opposed since both recognize the force of social and institutional aspects of political systems as well as the force of tradition and localism in the dynamic process of federal politics. Neither approach, furthermore, actually attempts to establish simple and direct cause-and-effect relationships.63 Indeed, both are appreciative of the inter-connections of political, institutional and social forces in the creation of a party system in a federal country. Consequently, on a theoretical level these two approaches are quite similar and they seem to conflict only in that one approach is centered on the political party and one on the study of federalism.

The circular relationship between political parties and their environments, however, suggests that the structure of intra-party relations will vary considerably in different federal systems. While some general features of federal party politics have been proposed and others will undoubtedly
emerge as parties in different federal systems are more systematically studied and compared, such comparisons of federal parties will also illustrate the great diversity of political forms and experience associated with federalism and the diversities embraced by the term federalism itself. Although detailed studies of intra-party relations are rare, a few discussions of the structure of party systems in other federal countries have given some indication of the degree to which the parties are centralized or decentralized and the degree to which the federal division of power has encouraged intra-party strains. It is on this level alone that the structure of intra-party relations and the impact of federalism on political parties may be compared on an empirical level in different political systems at the present time.

SOME COMMENTS ON INTRA-PARTY RELATIONS IN OTHER FEDERAL COUNTRIES: THE UNITED STATES:

It has been observed that while the tone of Canadian politics is more decentralized than politics in the United States, the political parties in the United States are more decentralized than their counterparts in Canada. Indeed, the parties in the United States have been characteristically described as "confederal" rather than federal since the independent national party organization is really lacking.
Several studies of the American party system have described the extreme factionalization of the national political parties. Most students of American politics have contended that cohesion of the formal party organization is not only weak between the state and national levels but is almost non-existent on each individual level. While the federal division of power has encouraged this decentralization in some ways, the major responsibility for the looseness of party organization on the national level has been attributed to the presidential system, the separation of powers and the nomination system for presidential candidates.

The difficulties of constructing a national party organization are well known. The prospective party leader as a presidential hopeful must first compete for the support of party leaders throughout the country. Then, as a presidential candidate he must unite the party and consolidate his support by negotiating not only with the state organizations but also with his congressional colleagues, who often maintain their own state organizations. These organizations usually demand wide discretion in the distribution of federal patronage. V.O. Key has observed that in the question of patronage distribution "Senators and Representatives have an important voice and they are not interested in building an organization with power centered in the hands of the national leader. Instead, they wish to strengthen their own organizations or those state and district organizations with which
they are affiliated." Consequently, Congressional organizations are often as independent of national control as are the state and local organizations. Whatever unity exists within the national campaign organizations is a reflection of the strength of the presidential candidate and the force of the bargains he has made with the many components of the party. When the campaign is over this ad hoc organization often fades and if the presidential candidate has been defeated it almost never survives to the next election. The national committees set up by the national parties have attempted to coordinate party organization between campaigns but on the whole they have not been successful. Thus, Clinton Rossiter has described American national party organization as feudal but he stressed that "it is feudalism with few enforceable pledges of faith, feudalism in which the bonds of mutual support are so loose that it often seems to border on anarchy, feudalism in which one party does not even have a king."  

On the state and local levels the cohesion of party organization may also be weak, although efficient political machines may operate on the local levels. The most pertinent analysis of the state party organizations has been provided by V.O. Key in study entitled *American State Politics*. Key argues that although the foundation of the national parties rests on independent state organizations, these organizations
are not only decentralized but are constantly divided and influenced by the pressures of national politics. He suggests that the separate elections of the governor and the legislature and the various electoral devices and procedures which have encouraged the election of an executive and at least one house of the legislature of different parties combined with the separation of powers on the state level have put "a wonderous damper on party government." But despite of this looseness of formal party organization between and within the levels of government Key believes that an autonomous state party system is impossible. Indeed, he suggests that state parties and leaders have been intimately tied to the national parties because the American voter has tended to vote as a national rather than a federal citizen. Under these circumstances the force of national issues is so strong that minor, regionally-based parties have not been able to gain power and state leaders have often found their political futures in the hands of their party's presidential candidate.71

These informal political connections between state and national groups had indicated that while intra-party strains in the United States are probably as frequent within state and national parties as between them because of the nature of the nomination and primary systems and the separation of executive and legislative power, the force of
federal strains within American parties may be viewed through the impact of national "issues, cleavages and loyalties" upon the state party systems. Some of these federally-derived strains may be observed in the relations between a presidential and a gubernatorial candidate, when the state leader fears the effect of the national party's image upon his own electoral success and "succumbs to the temptation to wage an independent campaign." Others may be seen in the way that national party issues often determine the issues of state primary campaigns and the victory of one state faction over another. The examples of federal strains are not difficult to cite but very little is known about the frequency or force of these intra-party conflicts in the many state organizations. Consequently, assessments of those variables which encourage the development of federal strains or determine the source and intensity of such party friction have been difficult to make. Key has suggested that the long-term electoral position of a party in both national and state party systems and the force of regional clevages probably influence the form of these strains. Nevertheless, he has stressed that even in states which appear to be immune from national election tides "are not so immune to national movements of sentiment as might appear. Within the intra-party affairs of such states different types of individuals probably tend to rise to positions of leadership,
depending on the tenor of the predominant national sentiments. 74

From this viewpoint it would seem that federal strains within the state party organizations in the United States are derived primarily from the impact of national issues and national associations upon intra-state party competition. The strains found in Canada between clearly identifiable federal and provincial groups for the control of a unified party organization do not seem to occur as frequently within the American parties, although the competition between a congressional leader and a state leader for the control of a state or local party organization is somewhat similar within the context of American party organization. The conflicts between Canadian prime ministers and provincial premiers of the same party appear to have some parallels within American politics to the conflicts between a president and a governor of the same party, although it is doubtful whether such confrontations have been as severe in the United States or have had such significant repercussions on the efficiency of the local party organizations. In an article entitled "Decision-Making in a Federal System," Arthur Weidner has argued that:

...in the federal system in the United States there are relatively few direct clashes or compromises between state and national governments on large issues of national domestic policy. The
disagreements and conflicts that do arise and that may be encouraged by federalism's structural features are not basically clashes between state and national governments. Instead, they are clashes between much smaller groups of people and the opposing groups are located within a single governmental level as often as not.\textsuperscript{75}

In support of this thesis Weidner examined the values of state governors on inter-governmental relations as an indication of the tendency of state officials to support policies which protect state autonomy of power consistently and then compared these findings with the concepts of inter-governmental relations held by state legislators and administrators in Minnesota.\textsuperscript{76}

Weidner concluded that while it was not possible to find a state or a national attitude on inter-governmental relations from either the values or actions of state governors or legislators, elective officials had "more intense expediency values relative to state government as a whole" than other groups of state officials or employees but that these values often had to compete with more pressing issues.\textsuperscript{77}

If this thesis is accurate, the incidence of conflicts between governors and presidents of the same party may not only be less frequent than conflicts between Canadian prime ministers and premiers of the same party but may be less threatening to party unity since they do not often involve
issues related to the substance of the federal division of power. The more centralized tone of American federalism, the weaker position of state governors, the dominance of national party issues within American politics, the absence of an autonomous state party system and the strong national ambitions of many governors may be related to the force inter-governmental relations has had on the development of leadership quarrels between state and national leaders in the United States. While the impact of federalism on intra-party relations has not been analysed in detail within the many state party organizations, the wealth of information on American national parties and some provoking insights into the dynamics of state politics has indicated some of the complexities and strains characteristic of intra-party relations on the local level which are either derived from or encouraged by the federal division of power. In the United States the factionalization of national and state groups and the mobility of state and national politicians often distracts attention from conflicts between national and state leaders. Nevertheless, if Key's suggestion that the impact of national politics determines the structure of state politics and state party politics is correct, then a more detailed analysis of intra-party relations in the state party organizations may more fully explain the reason why the tone of American federalism is often much more
centralized than the decentralization of the formal party system seems to indicate.

EUROPEAN FEDERALISM: THE CASE OF WEST GERMANY:

The formal structure of European federalism has differed significantly from federalism in either the United States or Canada. Federal aspects of the political systems of many European federations have often been overlooked because of the strength of the central governments and political parties. While the party systems of the European federations have bore little formal resemblance to party systems in either the United States or Canada, intra-party strains which can be connected to the federal division of power have been recognized recently in West Germany. Although the constitutional features of West German federalism and the structure of party politics have been cited as forces of centralization, a study by Arnold J. Heidenheimer has argued that the separation of federal and land politics by the West German voter has strengthened minor parties on the Land level and, consequently, has allowed local units of even the Christian Democratic Union to remain relatively independent of federal party directives. Heidenheimer reported that Land politicians base their policies and strategies on "local conditions, rather than on the desires of the party leaders on the federal level."
Many of the Land leaders have made alliances and formed coalitions on the basis of local conditions in spite of the wishes of party leaders on the federal level. Partly because of the dominance of the CDU and Konrad Adenauer on the federal level, the strength of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has been on the Land levels. Their position on the local level has encouraged the SPD to become "strong champions of Land rights."

Federal strains within the CDU have been particularly strong. Adenauer clashed with Land politicians on issues relating to party administration, inter-governmental relations and the nature of the Land policies and ministries. Heidenheimer has observed:

If Adenauer has not dominated Land politics it is not because he has not tried to do so. When he first assumed power in Bonn he fought hard to force the more independent CDU Land ministers to toe the line by following Land policies parallel to his, especially by breaking previously existing coalitions with the Socialists. He got many of the weaker CDU Land leaders to fight Land elections (which are held two at a time, at odd dates between federal elections) on federal issues, and sought to force the creation of Land ministries that were almost exact replicas of the Bonn cabinet as far as party make-up and policies were concerned. For a while it appeared that the Laender would become coordinated to the point where German federalism would become a dead letter.

The reversal of this trend was attributed to several events
but in general the behavior of the West German voter insured the autonomy of Land politics by showing "a curious immunity to the Chancellor's charm when voting for deputies to the Landtage." Since certain precedents for Land autonomy have been established in party affairs, Heidenheimer has suggested that the formal administrative functions of the Land governments have encouraged the Land politicians to bargain privately with federal officials concerning major policy differences between the two groups in order to minimize the political nature of the disputes. Therefore, while the force of inter-governmental relations on party affairs may be exceedingly difficult to determine because of the private nature of these conflicts, it is evident that the mainly administrative functions of the Land governments have affected the structure of intra-party relations. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the division of federal power within the West German Constitution left the degree of Land autonomy quite flexible. Heidenheimer has suggested that autonomy of the Land governments has depended "mainly on their ability to guard their tax revenues and to maintain a strong political position." Consequently, the federal strains within West German parties have reflected the establishment and the maintenance of the informal division of federal power.
COMMONWEALTH FEDERALISM: THE CASE OF AUSTRALIA:

The federations of the Commonwealth countries are often grouped together because of their use of the parliamentary system and their common British heritage. Despite the multiplication of Commonwealth federations in the last decade, Canada and Australia, with the most mature political systems and the most established party systems among the Commonwealth federations, invite the most useful comparisons in a review of this kind. It should be mentioned, however, that political parties have been studied in several of the newer Commonwealth federations and while the recent failures of several of these federations has dated the bibliographic reviews in Federalism in the Commonwealth, edited by William R. Livingston, an idea of the kinds of studies available on political parties and the special problems of federal parties in these newly emergent nations can be derived from many of the essays.86

Although only a few studies of Australian politics and parties have considered the impact of federalism in a detailed way, the existence of federally-derived party strains have been noted and described in a general way.87 Of the three Australian parties, the Australian Labour Party has seemingly exhibited the most frequent and intense intra-party conflicts because "its quarrels are carried out in the open while those of the other parties are often
conducted behind closed doors..." Part of the reason for the intensity of strains in the ALP may be derived from the fact that although each state organization is both autonomous and powerful, in that they control the endorsement of parliamentary candidates, the federal party has attempted to enforce some centralized controls through a federal party conference. While unified state organizations have been able to ignore the federal conference, this conference may officially expel the state organizations from the party. In the 1930's the leader of the state organization in New South Wales, however, retained control of the party organization even after he had been formally expelled from the party.

While many of the strains recognized within the ALP are associated with administrative competition between federal and state groups, other strains have been related to policy differences between federal and state leaders and federal and state governments. Although detailed information on the frequency and intensity of such strains is not available in the Australian states there is apparently great variation in the frequency of strains in the state Labour parties. William S. Riker has commented, that while the New South Wales Labour Party has "opposed the federal Labour Party more often than it supported it," other state Labour parties, as for example the Tasmanian Labour Party,
have been "ideologically and personally cooperative with
the federal Labour Party." Issues which have divided the
ALP have concerned both the party's ideological position on
economic policy and various governmental issues, particularly
those associated with wartime conscription and amendments
to the constitution. Louise Overacker has suggested in her
study of Australian parties that proposed amendments to
the constitution have been sources of difference between
state and federal Labour governments and parties because
"political leaders in the state, jealous of the prestige of
the party in the national arena, sometimes refuse to support
the position of the federal party organization takes in a
referendum campaign." These referendum campaigns, however,
have often involved constitutional recognition of the
increased wartime and postwar powers of the federal govern-
ment. Conflicts between the state and federal parties on
these issues have helped to defeat the great proportion of
these amendments. Nevertheless, the federal government has
confirmed their position of leadership "by the processes of
judicial review and financial control."  

Intra-party strains have been reported to be less
frequent in the Liberal and Country Parties even though the
two parties have formed coalitions in some states and on the
national level while the parties in other states have been
strongly opposed to each other. Because party conflicts are
kept out of the public view little is known about the actual frequency or significance of intra-party strains in these parties. Indeed, there has been little information provided on the kinds of issues which may divide the members of these two parties. William H. Riker has inferred that the extreme decentralization of the two parties and the willingness of federal party leadership "to accommodate itself to the state leadership" has prevented the necessity for federal-state party quarrels. Nevertheless, much more must be known about the internal relations of the two parties before the importance of federal strains in the coordination of the various state party organizations is discounted. Liberal Parties have held power concurrently in the nation and the states and until a systematic analysis of the effect of intergovernmental relations on the party organization is known, very little can be said about the impact of federalism on the Australian Parties. While Australia is usually characterized as having mainly economic cleavages and Canada is often characterized as having both racial and regional cleavages, there seems to be some similarities between the extent of party decentralization and the nature of intra-party strains in the two countries. The parliamentary system combined with the autonomy of the state party organizations has suggested that in Australia, as well as in Canada, federal and state groups within the
state organizations often clash on administrative matters, particularly when state leaders subject federal M.P.'s to "unusual pressure." Inter-governmental issues relating to the substance of federalism have also been issues of dispute between the wings of the Australian parties despite the weakness of sectionalism. When more is known about federal strains and intra-party relations in both Australia and Canada it may be possible to assess the effects of various institutional forms and social cleavages upon the activities of these federal political parties.

Although parallel comparisons between intra-party relations in Canada, the United States, West Germany and Australia have not always been possible because of the lack of detailed information, it would appear that even in countries where the constitutional system is fairly centralized by either formal or informal means and even in countries where regional loyalties appear to be weak, the existence of two distinct centers of political activity and political power seem to encourage not only extensive decentralization of the party organization but also strains between the federal and local leaders. Although the degree of party decentralization and the frequency and form of federal strains has varied considerably, an assessment of the variables which have encouraged these differences has been impossible with
the information presently available on intra-party relations. If the empirical findings of this local case-study have any direct relevance to federal parties outside Canada, it is in suggesting that the systematic and detailed study of intra-party relations provides not only a dynamic view of the focus of power within the party organizations and, therefore, an assessment of the actual degree of decentralization in the parties but also provides a basis for assessing the significance of federal strains in the party system. A study of intra-party relations is only one aspect of an analysis of the impact of federalism on a political system, yet it would seem to be an important one since the diversities and cleavages which are both reflected and encouraged by the federal division of power are only significant as they emerge as part of the political process and as they are utilized by different groups and interests within the society. The dynamics of this process intimately involves those political parties which operate on both federal and local levels of political activity. While it is undoubtedly true that the structure of both federal institutions and party systems are based upon the same cleavages and diversities which prompted the original federal bargain, it would be hoped that eventually the empirical data on intra-party relations will enable more precise theoretical assessments of the extent to which the political parties utilize and encourage
the potentially disruptive elements of federalism, and how they are in turn restricted by them. A more complete understanding of the federal political process and the parties within individual federal systems must precede such complex theoretical tasks and it is for this reason that this local case-study on intra-party relations has endeavored mainly to increase the understanding of Canadian political parties.
FOOTNOTES


2 During this period federal strength within the province was mainly reflected in the size of the parliamentary wing. The following table indicates the size of the parliamentary group during the years of the provincial Liberal administrations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party in Power in Ottawa</th>
<th>Total Seats in B.C.</th>
<th>Liberal M.P.s in B.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Although officers of the Association are formally elected by the rank and file membership, the professional leaders of the party usually influence the outcome of the elections by their nomination and support of certain candidates.


6 The most promising unpublished material on Australian parties include: D.W. Rawson, "Federalism and Political Parties," a paper for the History and Politics section of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of


16 Ibid., p. 200.

17 Ibid., p. 200.


36 Ibid., p. 243.

37 Ibid., p. 243.

38 Ibid., p. 243.


41 Ibid., p. 319.


43 Ibid., p. 252.

44 Ibid., pp. 257-258.


46 Ibid., p. 247.


48 Ibid., pp. 248-250.

49 Ibid., pp. 250-251.

50 Ibid., p. 251.


52 Black, Dalhousie Review, pp. 318-319.

53 Ibid., p. 319.

54 Ibid., pp. 321-322.

55 Ibid., pp. 321-322.

56 Regenstrief's review of early Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan Liberal organizations casts the only doubt on the relation between provincial control and provincial power.

57 See Regenstrief's review of Alberta, pp. 245-246.

58 See Regenstrief's analysis of Ontario in the 1930's, pp. 246-248.


71  V.O. Key Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1965, see chapter II.
72  Ibid., pp. 38-39.
73  Ibid., p. 37.
74  Ibid., p. 33; see the footnote.
76  Ibid., pp. 55-59.
77 Ibid., pp. 61-62.


81 Ibid., p. 158.

82 Ibid., p. 159.

83 Ibid., p. 159; see also Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "Federalism and the Party System: The Case of West Germany," American Political Science Review, LII, 1958, pp. 809-828.

84 Ibid., p. 159.

85 Ibid., p. 155.


90 Truman, Op. Cit., p. 120.


95 Riker, *Op. Cit.*, p. 120.


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Mr. David Johnston, president, Point Grey Liberal Association January 9, 1965.

Mr. L. C. Jolivet, president, British Columbia Liberal Association February 1, 1966.

Mr. Leon Ladner, former Conservative M.P. January 25, 1966.

Mr. Frank G. P. Lewis, former president, British Columbia Liberal Association January 27, 1966.

Mr. Don Lanskail chairman, constitutional committee, 1956 February 14, 1966.

Mr. Hugh Martin, former vice-president, British Columbia Liberal Association and federal campaign chairman January 31, 1966.


Mr. Ray Perrault, provincial party leader January 15, 1965.

Senator Sidney Smith, former president, British Columbia Liberal Association April 10, 1965.

Mr. Richard Sonley, president, Point Grey Young Liberal Association January 27, 1966.

Mr. Jack Taggart, former vice-president, British Columbia Liberal Association and federal campaign co-chairman February 3, 1966.

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