POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND POLITICAL CULTURE: A Case Study

by

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B.A., University of British Columbia, 1966

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

POLITICAL SCIENCE

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

April, 1967
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Date April 21, 1967
ABSTRACT

Stable democratic systems are characterised by the persistence and distinctiveness of political subcultures which offer alternatives to the status quo. This case study describes the New Democratic sub-culture in terms of its persistence and distinctiveness. The data was drawn from a survey of New Democratic activists in the Vancouver area.

The concept of political socialization was used to examine the persistence of the New Democratic sub-culture. Primary and secondary agents of socialization provide continuity of sub-cultural values over time; primary agents such as family and peer groups socialize New Democrats to sub-cultural values, while secondary agents provide socialization both to the general political culture, which is primarily liberal democratic, and to values which are consonant with the organic-socialist New Democratic sub-culture.

New Democrats are strongly committed to their sub-culture, but seem to be attracted to the liberal culture in some degree. The liberal value of equality of opportunity seems to be particularly attractive to
New Democrats. But the New Democratic sub-culture is distinctive in the very strong value placed upon the ordinary working person's welfare. When New Democrats contrast themselves with other sub-cultures, they see themselves as the party of the working class, the underdog, while other parties are for doctors, bankers, and the status quo.

The study of political culture, especially of political sub-cultures which together make up the general political culture of a system, requires more study of two problems which must be examined together. First, it is necessary to establish a taxonomy of the values which constitute a sub-culture. Second, the process of socialization to those values must be studied in a manner that will enable the researcher to make use of that taxonomy of cultural values. An ideal research strategy would combine ideographic testing with small group methods. Political activists provide an excellent laboratory for this kind of study.

Once we know more about the content of political culture and the way in which it is modified in the process of socialization, we will be able to study the interaction of political sub-cultures in a much more systematic way.
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INTRODUCTION

A major premise of democratic theory, e pluribus unum, states that a pluralist society is a stable society. Based on a principle of political liberty and equality, plus the commonsense observation that men's ideas and interests are diverse and often conflicting, democratic political systems provide institutional protection for and control over the basic freedoms of speech and association, and provide channels of entry to the political system for dissenting ideas. Democracy thrives so long as this tension between order and reform is played out against a consensus on the maintenance of democracy itself. Stability, in a democracy, derives from a fundamental agreement on 'the rules of the game', and the first rule is tolerance of dissent. This is a principle of 'voluntary unity'.

The place of dissenting political sub-cultures is therefore central to democracy. The importance of the CCF/NDP in Canadian politics is often said to be in its

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function as 'the conscience of the nation'; this comment sums up the role not only of radical reform parties, but of any political sub-culture which offers alternatives to the status quo. Where such alternatives are suppressed, by any means—legal, social, economic—change can take place only by dictatorship or revolution. Thus stability depends to a great extent upon the healthy state of political sub-cultures.  

Political stability also depends upon continuity in political culture. Democratic values must be passed on from generation to generation. This is done by the process of political socialization. Thus, members of political sub-cultures socialize each other and each new generation to two sets of values: first, those concerning the rules of the game and other values drawn from the general political culture as it has been institutionalized;  


Socialization to democratic values and to the mechanisms of democratic political systems was not studied in the preparation of this thesis; the emphasis here is on socialization to sub-cultural values.
and second, the values of the political sub-culture, including its challenge to aspects of the general, institutionalized political culture.

In the political sub-culture, we have the opportunity to observe two of the vital elements of a stable democracy: the tension between institutionalized (status quo) culture and would-be-institutionalized (reform) culture; and the continuity of these two aspects of culture as it is achieved through socialization. 'Continuity' as it is used here includes similarities of value amongst the various sub-cultures which make up the broad political culture; also included is the continuity over time of the value-system in a particular sub-culture. Thus, the possible variations within this very general framework are: continuity or discontinuity among sub-cultures in terms of their values; and continuity or discontinuity within sub-cultures over time. In this conception, culture and socialization are indivisible; this is a reflection of the theoretical orientation set forth above, in which democratic stability is considered to be dependent upon the 'health' of political sub-cultures, as defined by their distinctive and continuous character.

Political sub-cultures are not only ideal subjects of study from a theoretical point of view; there are many practical advantages as well. In the Case Study which follows, for example, analysis of group culture was
facilitated by the fact that five factors usually considered as 'variables' were 'constants' from the outset. These were: New Democratic Party affiliation; member or active supporter; urban residence; middle or lower-middle class socio-economic status; and high interest in politics. This latter factor was controlled almost by accident; the questionnaire was long and demanding and, judging from the responses, those who were either not interested or considered themselves ill-informed simply did not respond. Without exception, those who returned the questionnaire were both interested in informed about concrete issues and political ideas. Control of basic variables such as these frees the researcher from a great deal of sorting; rather, he can concentrate his own and his respondents' attention upon more subtle questions of political culture and political socialization.

The initial purpose of the survey was, simply, to gather data that would test some fifteen hypotheses about the continuity of a political sub-culture through the operation of the socialization process. Socialization was conceived broadly, including not only the face-to-face agents such as family, peers and social class, but also the impact of the general normative order of Canadian society. In this regard, the specific hypothesis tested was drawn from Gad Horowitz's provocative reinterpretation
of Louis Hartz's 'fragment' theory of ideologies.  

Briefly, Horowitz argues that in Canada, unlike the United States, a tory fragment from Britain has persisted, with the result that socialism was able to flourish, playing an important role in maintaining an ideological spectrum that is not confined, as in the United States, to a liberal base. Horowitz agrees with Hartz that Canada is, by and large, dominated by liberalism. But, "English—Canada's 'essence' is both liberal and non-liberal." The distinction between these two world views is that between organicism and atomism, and a major part of the survey consisted of questions designed to test the mixture of organic and atomistic values held by a group of socialists. The mixture should provide a measure of the impact of these two streams of thought—the one British, the other American—upon a group strategically located upon the Canadian ideological spectrum to receive much socializing pressure from both world views.

Socialization is a developmental process and ideally, longitudinal studies of father and son provide


5 Ibid., p. 156.

the best source of data with which to study the process at work. Since this strategy was not practicable, an inferior procedure was used, in which each respondent was required to recall the political party preference of father, mother and spouse or close friend. In addition, membership and activism of the primary group was questioned. From this data, continuity of political culture in terms of group commitment could be described. With respect to the other aspects of political culture—group image and world view—inference about continuity is the best that could be achieved. The basis for such inference is, however, quite strongly rooted in empirically demonstrated generalizations about the nature of the socialization process. Before turning to the Case Study itself, a brief resume of the history and theory of the concept of socialization will conclude this introduction.

Socialization is one of the traditional concerns of human studies. From Plato's Republic to Rousseau's Emile students of politics and society have been aware of 7 A median value of .5 for correlation between attitudes of parent and child, over a number of disparate studies, seems to provide a good basis for generalizations about continuity. Not a single negative correlation between parent and child in attitudes of political orientation was shown in Herbert Hyman's summary of fourteen empirical studies. These and other findings which provide background for the present study appear in H. Hyman, Political Socialization: A study in the Psychology of Political Behavior (Glencoe, 1959).
the tangled relationship between the social and political beliefs of individuals, their collective expression in culture, their formal expression in the structure of the broad society and the state, the tension between individual beliefs and the institutional expression of collective beliefs, and the implications of that tension for peace, order and justice. The role of political education, or socialization, in maintaining a stable society by providing continuity of beliefs, has been a continuing concern of modern scholars in the social sciences.

Earlier in the century, when the social sciences were more fragmented, each discipline emphasised different aspects of this very complex question, and each different approach developed its own methods and language most appropriate to deal with a special focus. The emphasis is still different, but a movement toward some co-ordination has been taking place since World War II, especially in the United States where inter-disciplinary experience during the war demonstrated the advantages accruing to all fields from recognition of the common interest of each discipline.

Knowledge of cultural continuity, especially in traditional societies, developed along specialized lines in anthropology; the psychologists' learning research; the very important contributions to personality and motivation theory from psychoanalysis; and the structural study of social organization and interaction patterns developed by
sociologists: all these areas of research are now recognized as parts of an underlying concern with the old problem of socialization. It is both difficult and rewarding to tap this vast resource of knowledge: difficult, because of the disparity of language and approach; and rewarding for the wealth of knowledge available as a guide in the use of the concept. The working model that has been developed for use in this thesis was designed to accommodate this variety of approach without distorting the basic assumptions of the many conceptual frameworks within which socialization has been studied.

A
Stable
Pluralist
Model

Socializing Agents
Person
+n
Society

Socializing Agents

IN
OUT

Status quo
Reform

B
Monolithic
Culture
(Unstable)

process
+n
process

STATUS
QUO
Reform

C
Revolutionary
Culture
(Unstable)

process
+n
process

Status quo
REFORM

Figure 1. The basic socialization model and two ideal types*
*n represents people and groups of people

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8 See T. Parsons' combination of these disparate sources into his revised action schema, e.g. "Introduction" to Part IV, "Culture and the Social System," in Parsons and assoc., Theories of Society, vol. 2 (Glencoe, 1961) and elsewhere in his more recent work, e.g. Social Structure and Personality (Glencoe, 1964).
The simplified socialization model presented graphically in Figure 1 is a conversion model designed to express the basic relationship between personality and society. In line with the theoretical orientation of this study, the theme is stability. The pluralist model (A) exemplifies a perfect balance between sub-cultural values, which appear as the bottom feedback loop in each model, and the general political culture, which appears as the top feedback loop. 'Status quo' in this figure refers to the general political culture which is an amalgam of all political sub-cultures. In a monolithic culture (B) almost all the stimuli received by an individual conform to the general culture; this situation is considered to be unstable, since the only means of change is revolution, the state of affairs represented in (C). Model (A) seems closest to the Canadian situation, and is the socialization model which guides the analysis of sub-cultural values in the following Case Study.

As the diagram suggests, the central idea of socialization is very simple: whatever goes in comes out. The political system, through the media of the socializing agents, puts the political culture into the personality system where it is processed and comes out only slightly modified by the somatic and psychological peculiarities of the individual. In studies such as the present one, the actual content of the political culture on the input
side of the personality system is inferred from the observed output to the political system; the only direct indices of continuity between the two is, as was mentioned earlier, the party affiliation, membership and activism of primary group members. With only this sketchy direct evidence of continuity, a great deal of inference is required. The basis for such speculation is in the findings of others, and the apparently firm knowledge available about the process itself.

With the presentation of this stability model of socialization and culture, we have come full circle to the opening remarks of this introduction. In the following chapters, our main concern in the study of New Democratic Party activists will be to describe the sub-culture in terms of its characteristic values and the continuity of those values from generation to generation. If the sub-culture's values are distinctive, and if its values are passed on; if the sub--culture is in some degree receptive to aspects of the broad political culture and other sub-cultures; if, in short, there is evidence of continuous, healthy sub-cultural activity in our study, we will be satisfied that the New Democratic political culture contributes to the stability of the system.
CHAPTER I

METHOD

The New Democrats of Vancouver Burrard were chosen as subjects for a case study for many reasons, but primarily because on two previous occasions they had been most cooperative with political science researchers, and the data from those surveys was to provide a check on the present survey. The executive of the constituency association agreed that, in addition to conducting another survey of the membership, the author should be permitted to attend executive and committee meetings as an observer. This part of the project continued from the spring of 1966 to November, 1966, during which time the author attended nominating, campaign and various ad hoc meetings. During the provincial election of September, the author became an active participant in the activities of the constituency; through this activity it was possible to meet and talk with most of the members and many supporters.

The specific research strategy was vaguely conceived at the outset. The purpose of the project was clearly defined, however, on the basis of previous
experience with the NDP membership. Five areas of interest were decided upon: 1) sources of adherence to the group; 2) group commitment; 3) nature and intensity of participation; 4) group image; and 5) group culture. Only two elements of the research strategy were clearly defined. First, the questionnaire was to provide the structured, quantifiable data for description of the group; and second, the unmeasurable qualities of the group—spirit, cohesion, openness to new recruits, etc.—were to be observed directly. Such direct observation was thought to overcome the problems of dealing with homogeneous, or apparently homogeneous, political sub-cultures, through questionnaires modelled primarily on those used at the macro level of analysis, where questions are designed to sort large, heterogeneous populations into small units such as that in question. It was hoped that, through direct contact, some idea could be gained of the kinds of assumptions that might be made when designing questions of belief, thus avoiding mistakes made in previous studies of the Burrard NDP where the consensus of the group on matters of belief, such as racial integration, was at 100%. In other words, the basic research problem to be solved through direct observation was to assess the areas of conflict and consensus before designing the questionnaire. In addition, an intimate knowledge of the group at work was expected to confine interpretation of the survey data within the
bounds of an informed knowledge of and feeling for the group. For example, contact with the group made it clear that much of the missionary, evangelical quality of the CCF remains in the Burrard NDP. Given only the survey data, which shows a high proportion of a-religious members, one might speculate that the party 'cause' could have a religious quality for many members who do not express their religious inclinations in conventional ways. But without direct observation, this proposition would remain speculation. Feelings of tradition, community, purpose and duty to the group were very strong among the New Democrats observed, both during the provincial election campaign and after; survey data simply cannot provide this kind of information, which is invaluable in the interpretation of quantified survey response.

The questionnaire (see Appendix A) was printed and mailed in November, 1966 to two groups. Table 1 presents the response to that mailing plus some random telephone reminders, about two weeks after mailing. Response to the Group 1 mailing, after three weeks, was inadequate for even the most superficial analysis. There are many possible explanations for this low response, besides the obvious problems of mailed surveys. The

riding had been subjected to surveys twice before, and many members were probably tired of answering questions, many of them the same questions that had been asked previously. Some members had been working in September, 1966 for the provincial campaign, in October and November in the Cariboo by-election and during civic elections for the newly formed Citizens for the Improvement of Vancouver. That organization drew heavily upon the Vancouver Burrard constituency association membership. One of the CIV candidates was secretary of the association, and the CIV campaign manager was an extremely active association executive member, to cite only two examples. Throughout the survey period, then, the active membership was engaged in party work, and had little time for the completion of long questionnaires that may have seemed trivial, inconsequential in comparison with the battles that were being fought.

When, later in November, electioneering was over, some may have been simply tired of politics. During this period, members were besieged by mailed circulars and telephone calls to work, attend functions and send money. And in December, a post-election pamphlet was distributed throughout the riding, thanking constituents for their vote in the provincial election. The active membership was called upon to make this distribution and solicit new memberships from known supporters or delinquent members.
And so, members may have been too busy, too tired, or too fed up with constituency calls to action, to complete and return the questionnaire.

Two other factors may explain part of the non-response. First, the author was well-known to the active membership during this period. Almost everyone knew about the survey research she was doing, and it was expected that this would increase response. On the contrary, many people may have feared recognition. Had the questionnaire been administered personally, this effect might have been minimized, since it is easier to reveal political views face-to-face, where reaction can be gauged and explanations qualified or extended. In some unknown proportion, hostility to the author may have contributed to non-response. This is a good lesson in research design; participant observation and survey techniques must be combined with care if the advantages of each are not to be cancelled by the disadvantages of the other.

<table>
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<th>Group 1</th>
<th>Poss. Replies</th>
<th>Ret'd</th>
<th>Complete</th>
<th>% Response</th>
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<tr>
<td>Burrard executive</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burrard members</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 2</th>
<th>Poss. Replies</th>
<th>Ret'd</th>
<th>Complete</th>
<th>% Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burrard supporters</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver East members</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
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The second factor concerns the questionnaire itself; it was long and demanding of both time and effort. Some of the questions were offensive either to the 'intelligence' or the ideological stance of the respondents. Again, personal interviewing might have removed this difficulty.\textsuperscript{10}

The second mailing, to supporters (people who worked in the provincial campaign) and to members in Vancouver East, was done to increase the number of responses to permit some multivariate analysis. As Table I shows, response to this mailing was even lower than that of the first. The low Vancouver East response needs little comment beyond a reminder of riding association rivalries, agitated not a little in this case by leadership factions and loyalties within the provincial party. The low response of Burrard supporters is explained in part by the same factors that limited member response. Some supporters may have felt that the questionnaire had been mailed to them by mistake since there was an assumption of membership built into the questionnaire. And finally,\textsuperscript{10} There were many reasons why personal interviews were not done. An attempt was made to make appointments with the most active members, but they were very busy and reluctant to make specific commitments. One personal interview was conducted, but the additional depth gained was so slight, the project was abandoned. Also, time limitations, both personal and academic, prohibited a more concerted effort to interview members personally. Ideally, a much shorter questionnaire could be mailed to the entire membership; depth interviews would be restricted to the executive.
people were counting days until Christmas at this time; many may have been preoccupied with personal concerns.

With all these circumstances militating against a good response, it is surprising that the normal 20% response to a mail survey was received. Although it was never intended that the survey would be 'representative' of anything other than the group who actually took the time to answer, those who did answer have some special characteristics that limit, to some extent, the kind of observations that can be made on the basis of survey data.

The proportion of men to women was 70-30% (N=56, here and below unless otherwise indicated). This proportion is similar to that observed in two previous surveys of the Burrard NDP; also, this was roughly the proportion of men to women in the mailing list.

34% respondents were over sixty years of age, a factor that limits observations considerably. This over-representation of older respondents can be explained in part by the probability that few older members were working at party activity during the survey period, and thus had more time for questionnaires. Also, some older members may have felt that the survey response compensated in some measure for their inability to contribute in other ways to the party. There was an indication throughout the responses of older members that this was the case. The predominance of over-sixty respondents cannot help but
lend a special character to the data, and interpretation is appropriately qualified thereby. In fact, the predominant age group in the active membership is in the twenties and early thirties, and many of these were university students who, aside from party activity, were under academic pressures during November and December, which may account for their under-representation. 22% respondents were under thirty, 18% in their thirties, and the remaining 26% were between forty and sixty. This last figure, at least by impressionistic standards, seems about right for the riding membership.

A third of the respondents were born in British Columbia, another third in Canada. The remainder were half British and half European. A third of the respondents had lived in their present home for over ten years, another third for over three years. Considering that the entire population of Canada moves every three years,¹¹ this group seems to be highly stable. 92% had lived in Vancouver over ten years. Only two respondents had not lived in British Columbia for over ten years, and only one was a recent immigrant to Canada (two years). 47% respondents lived in a home owned by a member of the family; the remainder lived in rented accommodation, about half of them in houses, the other half in apartments or

rooms. Certainly, the stability of the group is accounted for in part by the large number of older respondents; yet, direct observation produced the same impression of a highly stable active membership, many of whom were aggressively provincial in outlook and interests. Among the young professionals and students, this feature was particularly outstanding, and if those among the respondents who represent this group were multiplied appropriately to bring their representation up to a more realistic level, the residential stability of the group would be increased.

Only four occupation categories were needed to classify the group. 38% respondents were professional, 22% white collar, and 38% blue collar (N-45). One respondent was a small business owner-proprietor. Annual income levels were grouped according to the pattern of the data into four categories. 22% earned under $3,000 annually. Most of this group were either teaching assistants at university, who were classified as professional, or pensioners whose occupations were previously blue collar. 27.5% earned between $3-5,000 annually. These were mostly white collar service and clerical workers and some female teachers (professional) who worked as substitutes. Also in this category were a few blue collar workers in semi-skilled occupations and one teaching assistant. 39% respondents were in the $6-8,000 range. This group was a mixed bag of professional, white collar and skilled blue
collar workers, predominantly the latter. The remaining 10% earned from $10,000 up. These were professionals. On the whole, the middle income range is under-represented in comparison with the population as a whole, and it is probable that this pattern is a fairly representative one for New Democratic Party membership, at least on the basis of a participant observer's impressions.

An attempt was made to assess the occupation-income history of each respondent in terms of mobility. If the pattern was one of increasingly prestigeful and/or better paid jobs, this was recorded as upward mobility, as opposed to downward, stable or mixed. 51% (N=45) were considered to be upwardly mobile; 40.5% were stable. Only one respondent was downwardly mobile, the remainder had 'mixed' histories which were difficult to assess. Of these latter two groups, each questionnaire was carefully examined for evidence of the possible influence of these patterns upon political culture, and no obvious or consistent patterns were found.

Owing to the small number of respondents, it was impossible to do a group analysis of age, sex and occupation groups to trace the possible patterns these variables might control. It is enough for the purposes of this case study, however, that the above characteristics of the group be kept in mind in the chapters which follow.
CHAPTER II

SOURCES OF ADHERENCE TO THE NEW DEMOCRATIC SUB-CULTURE

Continuity within the political sub-culture, as in the broad culture of which it is a part, is favored by the process of socialization within the family. Children learn social and political norms from their parents who, in their dominant positions of superior physical, intellectual and emotional strength, are able to exact conformity to certain patterns of behavior through a system of reward and punishment. Two modes of socialization can be distinguished in the family. On the one hand, parents consciously instruct their children to think and behave according to the combination of cultural and sub-cultural beliefs held by the family. And, on the other hand, parents act as models for their children in their response to the situations of everyday life. The power of parents, as socializing agents in the early years of a child's life, is rooted in the affective ties of family and the nearly complete physical and emotional dependence of children upon parents at this stage. It is no wonder, then, that patterns of partisanship, as well as over-all political orientation, are influence by the parent-child
Only 70% respondents recorded a federal party preference for their father, and 60% for their mother. 60% recorded a provincial preference for both. Some of the group did not have parents living in Canada, and others—among them many over sixty years of age—may have forgotten or not considered the question important. Whatever the explanations may be, interpretation of the data is severely handicapped by the number of responses.

About three fifths of the group support the party for which their parents voted, either provincially, federally, or both. This proportion compares quite favorably with that found by Campbell and associates in their 1952 and 1956 studies, in which the highest rate of continuity observed was 50%; this was among families where both parents were politically active Democrats, while children were strong Democrats.

For a review of studies of the influence of family upon political behavior, see Hyman, Political Socialization; see also, Angus Campbell and associates, The American Voter (New York, 1960), Chapter VII, for a confirmation of the findings of previous studies.

Almost all of those who did not record a party preference for a parent marked 'deceased' across the entire section of questions dealing with that parent.

Table II provides a very rough measure of the continuity of this political sub-culture over two generations, and it appears to be quite high, at least in terms of adherence to the New Democratic Party. In addition, the high proportion of Conservative fathers in the group—over one quarter of them, federally—suggests that it may be easier for children to 'defect' from a Conservative family to the NDP than from a Liberal family. There are at least two explanations at hand, one in terms of the Canadian system, the other in terms of world view.

In terms of the system, it could be that both Conservative and NDP families share an anti-Liberal party ethos: 'the Liberals are the 'governing' party, expert at 'administrative' politics, ruling by 'divine right'. There is no virtue in them; their only interest is in power.'

The obvious flaw in this measure is that New Democratic parents whose children have transferred their loyalty to another party are not represented, since their children could not possibly be part of our group. To measure continuity properly, all members with children of voting age would have to be studied.
The Conservative and New Democratic parties, by contrast, have principles. Thus, a move from the Conservatives to the NDP is not a betrayal, but a change in principle. And, following Horowitz, the organic world view shared by the tory and socialist provides a fundamental link between these two parties. Thus, a child who moves his political loyalty to the NDP having been socialized in a Conservative family may not represent a discontinuity of political sub-culture in the fundamental areas of world view and anti-center-party sentiment. Essentially, the discontinuity that is involved concerns a rejection of the hierarchical authority and status conception that is part and parcel of tory organicism, and its replacement with material egalitarianism. But this is the subject of Chapter V, in which the components of the group's world view are analysed.

Accepting for the moment the notion that there is only a minor discontinuity of political sub-culture represented by that part of the group that comes from a tory family, the continuity index is raised to between 80-90%, at least in terms of socialization in the family to a political party. Only thirteen of the thirty-five fathers whose party support was recorded were members of a political party, and of these, eight were CCF/NDP members, half of whom were active party workers at some time. When looking at such small numbers, the pattern,
unless it is completely skewed in one direction, does not tell us much. In the case of mothers' memberships, however, the pattern is in one direction only; of the seven mothers who were members of a political party, all were New Democrats. Three of these were active; these were mothers of active children and wives of politically active men. Thus, only three respondents came from the kind of home represented in Campbell's figures. In the light of this comparison, the continuity rate in our group seems to be extraordinarily high. Added to this is the continuity of political culture through peer group socialization, for which our data gives impressive evidence.

Almost 60% (N=31) of those wives, husbands or friends who support the NDP provincially are also members of the party, and 42% of those are active members. Thus, most of the socializing pressures from family and peers tends to reinforce the group's political party adherence, providing an excellent source of sub-cultural continuity.

Respondents were also asked, "How many of your

\[16\text{ Op. cit.}\]
close friends are members or supporters of the NDP?"

60% (N=40) replied either 'many' or with numbers over five. Another frequent answer was 'several'—30%—which was arbitrarily coded as three. Thus, 90% of the respondents to this question are, both socially and politically, within the boundaries of a single subculture. These figures are, obviously, only the roughest of measures for coincidence of political and social boundaries; the impression they give, however, is similar to that obtained through direct observation. The party itself assumes that friendship systems provide a good source of potential membership. Drives are conducted on the premise that every present member has two or three friends who could be persuaded to join; in recent months this assumption has proven valid in Vancouver Burrard, where membership has increased threefold through just this sort of recruitment. To assess the comparative intensity of family and peer group political socialization,

17 This subject has not been treated here at the theoretical level, although there is some question about their comparative intensity. For a good discussion of this and related problems, see Talcott Parsons and W. White, "The Link between character and society," in Parsons, Social Structure and Personality (Glencoe, 1964), 183-235. This article also appears in Lipset and Lowenthal, op. cit. This article and the works of David Riesman provide the basic source of peer group theory upon which this discussion relies. See David Riesman and assoc., The Lonely Crowd (New Haven, 1950) and David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, Faces in the Crowd (Yale, 1952); also James S. Coleman, The Adolescent Society (New York, 1961), and R.H. Turner, The Social Context of Ambition (San Francisco, 1964), especially Chapter VI.
Table IV Frequency of political discussion with family and peer groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>V. Often</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Infrequently</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>N(100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>19.</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>56.</td>
<td>31.</td>
<td>6.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>46.</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work-mates</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>24.</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual acquaintances</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32.</td>
<td>50.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were asked, "How often do you discuss politics with..." the groups shown in Table IV. The modal frequency of discussion with spouse is, as might be expected, very often. Somewhat less frequent, but still high, is discussion with friends, which is slightly more frequent than discussion with work-mates. Parents and casual acquaintances provide partners for political discussion less frequently, with the modal answer for parents tending toward 'often' and that for casual acquaintances more toward 'infrequently'. This pattern is not particularly remarkable, but does confirm the kind of generalizations made, for example, by Leon Festinger in his cognitive dissonance theory.

Festinger observed that people seek to maintain

\[ J. March, "Husband-wife interaction over political issues," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVII (1954), 461-470. \]

\[ A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, 1957). In C. Shepherd, Small Groups: Some Sociological Perspectives (San Francisco, 1964), passim, both the theory and some of the empirical studies to which it has given rise are discussed in very clear language. \]
a general sense of consonance of ideas, opinions and beliefs, to keep them consistent with each other and with those of others with whom contact is frequent. In the marital relationship, dissonance between the ideas of partners tends to increase discussion, in a drive to reduce dissonance. In less intimate relationships, discussion is less frequent or avoided in case of dissonance, and increased where ideas are consonant amongst members of the group. Festinger's theory has many implications, and much controlled experimentation has born out his basic contention.

The high frequency of political discussion with spouse recorded by the majority of this group cannot be explained directly in terms of dissonance reduction, since as we have seen in Table III, most married respondents share political party preference with their spouse. In these cases, it is likely that discussion tends to center around specific political issues and the appropriate policy for the party with respect to those issues. An attempt was made to test this proposition; respondents were asked whether the subject of discussion was more often in the realm of general party philosophy, or specific issues. For the group as a whole, a little over half (N=40) replied that specific issues were more often the topic of discussion. Ideally, a multivariate analysis of married respondents whose spouses were New
Democrats and who engaged often in political discussion would be controlled for discussion of specific issues vs general philosophy. Since our numbers were too small for statistical analysis, however, a study of individual questionnaires was made, and the proposition was confirmed; this sub-group of married people did, indeed, tend to discuss specific issues more frequently than general party philosophy. On the whole, the tendency to discuss the one or the other seems to be more directly related to the special characteristics of the ideological idea organization of the individual, a matter discussed below in Chapter VI.

Our discussion so far has concentrated upon primary agents of socialization which have socialized our respondents to the values of the sub-culture; but individuals are socialized not only to sub-cultural values, but also to values drawn from the broad culture of which the group is but a part. Many formal institutions socialize these generalized norms, among them the school, religious institutions, voluntary associations, and work-related organizations such as trade unions. In addition, the social milieu, roughly defined by class, acts as a socializing agent. We turn now to the socialization of respondents by such institutions.

For the group as a whole, neither church nor voluntary association has much opportunity to socialize
*O = non-Protestant

respondents to the broad political culture. For the most part, the type of voluntary association to which members of the group belong would tend to reinforce sub-cultural values. Students belong to organizations such as SUPA, Fair Play for Cuba and other student action groups which are simply different expressions of the same cultural values as those of the New Democratic Party. Other sub-cultural reinforcing voluntary affiliations noted by members of the group were the United Nations association, Metro-Coop Services, Red Cross and SPCA. Other memberships such as PTA and the Vancouver Public Aquarium society appear to have little relation to political culture.

A number of respondents belonged to fraternal lodges and
the Canadian Legion; this kind of membership would seem to have potential for socialization to the over-arching political culture. It is interesting to note that no New Democrats were members of voluntary associations such as the Rotary, Chamber of Commerce or Masons, either in the present survey or in previous surveys. It seems reasonable to suggest that in view of the predominantly liberal values which are represented and acted out in almost all aspects of the individual's life, it is unnecessary—indeed, undesirable—from the New Democrat's point of view, to seek out associations which would reinforce values of the liberal culture.

Support for this proposition can be drawn from our data: only half the respondents belonged to any voluntary association other than the NDP. (This is not obvious in Figure 2; it is indicated by N-25.) It is suggested that membership in a radical political party may fulfill most of the needs of the group for voluntary association. That they should choose an association which is consonant with their primary socialization experience follows Festinger's theory that individuals would not seek out dissonance-inducing experiences. Rather, finding a group that combines ideals, action and sociability within a consonance-inducing atmosphere, no further secondary association may be required. This proposition would provide an
interesting hypothesis for small-scale empirical investigation.

Taken together, the religious, voluntary and trade union associations of the group suggest that the potential for secondary socialization to the broad political culture is somewhat attenuated by the tendency to seek reinforcement of sub-cultural values. It is worth noting, however, that mere membership in voluntary associations and trade unions has an implicit effect of reinforcing the general politics norms of free association and democratic procedures. Thus, a combination of general and sub-cultural values is socialized by these secondary agents.

The graph of social class, which shows a split between working and middle class in the group, is not an objective measure of status, but a measure of membership, at least in part. Respondents were asked which of six classes (see Appendix A, no. 10) they belonged to; in replying to such a question, there was probably some degree of attempted objectivity in self-assessment; a multi-variate analysis with control for an objective class criteria could provide some measure of the success of respondents' attempts at objectivity in self-assessment. But again, our numbers are too small for this procedure. The impression gained from an examination of individual questionnaires was, however, that objectivity was at a
minimum. The tendency of well-educated respondents was to identify with the upper-working rather than middle- or lower-middle class, and although this identification might in many cases be justified by reference to fathers' occupations, such identification seems to have its source more in ideological rather than objective criteria. This tendency of professionals and students to identify with the working rather than the middle class was observed in previous surveys of New Democratic activists. One very prominent tendency that reinforces this interpretation is the designation of professional association memberships as 'trade union' membership; this designation has been 'corrected' in the coding of responses, a procedure that, in retrospect, seems not entirely justified. On the whole, the self-assessment of social class by New Democrats tended always to a downgrading from any objective standard. This is a further indication that in the realm of secondary associations, this group seeks ideological consonance, reinforcement for sub-cultural values.

The first graph on Figure 2—education—requires some comment. The school socializes individuals to the broad norms of the society. Democratic political values are transmitted continually, and the more 'progressive' the school system, that is the less 'authoritarian' the methods of teaching and organization of the school, the more likely are democratic values to be prominent. 64%
(N-50) experienced either secondary or university education and while it seems safe to speculate that by and large the influence of these institutions was in the direction of conformity to the general political culture, it seems equally safe to assume that the values of tolerance for diversity—a stabilizing value, in our scheme—were combined with exposure to sub-culture reinforcing values. For example, if a 'liberal' interpretation of equality (equality of opportunity) is presented in the schools, it is presented in the context of the ideals of men of the left in previous political systems such as the French Revolution, the Puritan Rebellion and the American Revolution. English literature, especially the works of Shaw, tends also to reinforce a combination of the general political culture with values which are consonant with the New Democratic sub-culture. In short, the subject matter of higher education contains the material of socialization both to cultural and sub-cultural values, but 'book-learning' has a built-in utopian quality which emphasises idealist, humanitarian values, so much so that hope for international peace is often placed in such organizations as UNESCO. The assumption is that the more 'educated' the people of the world, the more cooperative they will be.

This discussion can be simplified to two very ordinary observations that are made about radical party memberships: members of low education become active
through the trade union movement, from motives of self-interest; members of high education become active through humanitarian ideals awakened in the process of education.

This brings us to the reasons respondents offered for 1) their original interest in politics and 2) their membership in the CCF/NDP.

Table V Reasons given by respondents for their adherence to the New Democratic sub-culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for first interest</th>
<th>Reason for joining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political event</td>
<td>Ideology 67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological conversion</td>
<td>Action 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic situation</td>
<td>Sociability 10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of respondents whose first interest in politics was either ideological or a specific political event contains, in some measure, many replies that seem to cover a response to the economic situation. The old-timer whose first political interest was in the One Big Union movement, for example, is not easily coded in these terms. His was probably an ideological conversion stimulated by a combination of the economic situation in general, his own in particular, and a feeling for mystical experience as well as the call to action which the movement represented. Thirty respondents gave thirty unique answers; shuffling them into three overlapping categories does an injustice to the rich diversity of experience
evident in the simple phrases of their answers. One young man, born in Poland but resident in Canada for thirty years, and apprenticed to a skilled trade, was extremely active and informed about politics; he became interested in politics through Shaw's plays. A seaman's interest was aroused when he was twenty-five years old by his father's participation as an active member of the Progressive Conservative party. One respondent was exercised about Suez; another listened to the soap box speakers in the rear of Winnipeg's old City Hall; a few were stimulated by the 1952 British Columbia election. Many respondents who gave no reply to the question of first interest recorded an age between twelve and fifteen for their initial interest. Does this mean that the school was in some way the agent of interest? Three respondents make direct reference to Social Studies teachers. Others make reference to spouse, trade unions, the depression, and one to the Boer War. One of the most active members became interested through attending a Liberal picnic. Another, female, became incensed when her mother told her that women should vote as their husbands do. The oldest respondent liked the poetry of the socialist movement. Such a list of diverse sources of political interest gives some indication of the complexity of the phenomena which we are simplifying with the concept of 'socialization'.
Patterns of response to the question of reasons for joining the CCF/NDP are much more definite. Those replies (over half the group) that referred to ideology were of the simple, "I was a socialist" type. Action replies referred to "helping with the cause" and were more characteristic of younger members. A small but consistent sub-group of female members who joined since 1960 tended to give sociability replies such as "husband's influence", "I was attracted to Mr. Berger" or "to meet men". Over half (N-47) the group had joined since 1960; one quarter joined between 1933 and 1945, and another quarter between 1946 and 1960, during the lean years. This latter group tended to give action reasons for joining; this was the only clear pattern of relation between time of joining and reason given.

One third (N-48) respondents became interested in politics under fifteen years of age and another third between sixteen and twenty. One quarter of the group became interested between twenty-one and thirty-five years of age. It was this group that showed some pattern of adherence characteristics: they were older than the others, and very recent converts to the party. Otherwise, no pattern of correlation between age of initial interest, time of joining, age at present and reasons for joining were found.

Although this data does not provide the kind of
continuity patterns that were seen in previous indices, it does supplement our previous observations with evidence of the way the socialization experience looks to the individuals involved. If, arbitrarily, we ignore those who responded to the economic situation or 'social' pressures, the remainder of our group believed that of their own free will and through the operation of reason, they attached themselves to the ideology and institution of a political sub-culture. It would be foolish indeed to ignore this evidence of the voluntary aspect of sub-cultural identification.

In this chapter we have looked at four sources of sub-cultural continuity. In the parental family we observed a pattern of socialization to the CCF/NDP and another, weaker pattern of transfer of loyalty from Conservative families to a socialist party; presumably, a shared organic world view provided an underlying source of cultural continuity. In the peer group, including the marital relationship, the pattern of continuity was much stronger. Secondary institutions such as school, church, voluntary association and trade union seemed to reinforce sub-cultural values, although there is implicit socialization to the broad culture in any memberships of this sort. Since over half the group had no voluntary affiliation other than the NDP, it was suggested that
the party functions as the complete secondary association through provision of sociability, opportunity for action, and ideological consonance. And finally, the reasons for membership in the political sub-culture that were given by members of the group were in the main responses to political events or to the ideas of the party and socialism in general.
CHAPTER III
GROUP COMMITMENT

The most obvious index of group commitment is consistency in voting for a political party. By this measure, our group is firmly committed; 86% have never voted for another party. In seeking an explanation for this high rate of faithfulness, the concept of socialization provides a perfect tool, since in the group as a whole, the faithful are the same individuals whose parents and spouses or friends support the NDP.

Socialization theory explains the pattern of voting of those who were not faithful as well. The pressures of conformity should produce child-parent continuity in party preference, and those members of the group who came from families who supported the Liberal or Conservative parties would be expected to have supported the family party at least for their first vote. 20 Although we do not have a chronology of support in our data, a tendency for children of Conservative families to transfer to the NDP through the Liberal party was observed. Where the children of Liberal parents were

20 See Maccoby and Matthews, op. cit.
unfaithful to the NDP, they voted with the family party. Our data on these points is very sketchy indeed, but it does suggest that when transferring loyalty from the family party to another, people tend to follow the conventional left-right spectrum in their travels.

Two respondents do not fit the above analysis, and they are important as an illustration of the kinds of pattern our data might obscure. First, one young man classified as an unfaithful voter (his previous vote was Liberal) came from a New Democratic family. This would appear to be a case of defection, were it not for the circumstance that elsewhere in his questionnaire he commented that he and his father had been 'converted' to the NDP very recently. This illustrates the fragility of our assumption, throughout the previous chapter, that the parents' party affiliation was prior to the child's, and that the parent was the agent of socialization for the child.

The second exception to our interpretation of group commitment as an index concerns one respondent who came from a strong CCF/NDP family, but had voted for other parties from time to time; furthermore, his present identification with the NDP seemed to have a temporary quality, judging from comments in the free section of

21 These observations are limited by the fact that older respondents, some of whom were 'unfaithful', often ignored that section of the questionnaire on parents' vote.
the questionnaire. Illustrated here is the possibility mentioned earlier that our data does not account for discontinuities in the political sub-culture deriving from the defection of children from New Democratic families. Such people simply do not appear in our group, for obvious reasons.

Table VI  Hypothetical recommitment of party allegiance

"If the NDP did not exist, which of the remaining parties would you support?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>I would be pleased</th>
<th>I would wait and see how it worked out</th>
<th>I would work hard to prevent it</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>91.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Credit</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>65.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"What would be your reaction if union between the NDP and another party were proposed?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed union with</th>
<th>I would be pleased</th>
<th>I would wait and see how it worked out</th>
<th>I would work hard to prevent it</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>65.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>91.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With all these difficulties in mind, other measures of group commitment were necessary to gain a more reliable picture of the group. One such measure was gained through the questions which appear in Table VI.

One would suspect that the 29.5% who would vote Liberal if there were no NDP might be the same 30.5% who would wait and see what happened should a union between
the Liberal and New Democratic parties be proposed.

Table VII shows that 66% of that group (N=12) would either be pleased to see a union, or wait to see what happened. Those who would vote for no other party if there were no NDP, the firmly committed by our measure, would for the most part work to prevent a union.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal-tending</th>
<th>Pleased</th>
<th>Wait</th>
<th>Prevent</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm NDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table VII Reaction of Liberal-tending and firmly committed New Democrats to a proposed union of NDP and Liberal parties

If the four respondents who would not work hard to prevent a union with the Liberals, yet would vote for no other party but the NDP—if this number is subtracted from the firmly committed group identified in Table VI, only 38.5% of the group are actually determined to remain within a sub-culture separate from any other in Canadian politics. This is a very different picture of group commitment than that gained through the index of consistency in voting for the NDP. Granted its hypothetical nature, the present index seems to do an excellent job of differentiating between the tenacious members of the sub-culture and those who are more amenable to the influence of other political sub-cultures.
Little of this feeling of amenability extends to the Conservative party. This seems to contradict the proposition, referred to throughout this thesis, that Conservatives and New Democrats share an organic world view which forms a basic link between the two sub-cultures, and separates them from the predominant liberal culture of North America, as well as the Liberal sub-culture of Canada. This point is mentioned here, to draw attention to this very interesting feature of Table VI, which shows that New Democrats are in almost complete agreement that they would work hard to prevent union with the Conservative party. We will return to this matter in Chapter V, where the organic-atomistic qualities of the New Democratic sub-culture are discussed.

Only three respondents of those who answered both questions presented in Table VI would not work hard to prevent union of the NDP and Conservative parties. The most interesting characteristic of those lonely three who would wait and see how such a union worked out is that two of them had previously answered that they would vote Communist if the NDP did not exist. Impressions of the individual questionnaires of those who would vote Communist in the case of a non-existent NDP were that these individuals would not really know what to do in such a situation; this is essentially the same quality that appeared in the answers of many who would vote for no
other party. Either the hypothetical nature of the propositions disturbed an otherwise well-organized set of party references, or there is indeed a sort of 'last resort' quality in the adherence of many to the NDP.

Whatever the subtleties of unique patterns underlying group commitment at its various levels, it seems safe to generalize that between one third and one half of the group is thoroughly committed to the sub-culture in its institutional expression, the NDP, as well as a more basic sub-cultural movement probably best identified as a socialist-labor culture.

If almost half of this group of activists would 'work hard to prevent a union' with one of the old-line parties, about the same proportion work extremely hard at present in support of the NDP. Figure 3 summarizes their activism in terms of time, money contributions, office-holding and recruitment of new support.

Throughout this thesis the subjects of this case study are referred to as 'activists'. Although Figure 3 shows that some proportion of the group could not be described as 'active' according to any one index, there was not a single respondent who did not contribute to the sub-culture in at least one of the ways listed. Over half of the group contributed considerable time, money and effort to the NDP over the past year. The high proportions in A (42%), B (66%), C (44%) and D (58%)
Figure 3 Some indices of activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>5-10 hrs.</td>
<td>Dues only</td>
<td>Dues and Elections</td>
<td>$5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-48</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-36</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A—How much time each month would you estimate that you spend on party activity? (no. 20)*

B—What kinds of financial support do you give the party? (22)

C—How much do you spend annually in your support of the party? (23)

D—How many of your friends have you persuaded to join, campaign or vote for the NDP? (24)

E—What offices have you held in the party? (21)

*These are the question numbers as they appeared in the questionnaire, see Appendix A.

In this chapter we have looked at the strength of the group's commitment to the sub-culture. The indices that were used form a sort of scale of increasing commitment. Beginning with the comparatively easy test of
consistency in voting, we found that over four fifths of the group were completely faithful to the NDP in their voting habits. Only half the group is so exclusive in their sub-cultural commitment that they would vote for no other party if the NDP did not exist. Most of the others would vote either to the left (Communist) or to the right (Liberal) of the NDP, while a handful would vote Conservative or Social Credit.

Less hypothetical was the test, "What would be your reaction if a union between the NDP [and an old-line party] were proposed?" About one third of the group would 'wait and see', but the strongest tendency was 'to work hard to prevent' such a union. These two tests seem to indicate that about half the group is strongly committed and rather exclusive in their attachment to the sub-culture. About the same proportion seems to spend a great deal of time, money and effort in working for the sub-cultural cause. By these measures, the group appears to be fairly well mixed in terms of strength of commitment.

Finally, it should be noted that although there is a tendency for younger members to be more active, many of the older respondents have had a very strong ideological commitment to the sub-culture over a long period of time. If one were to take a snapshot of this group at the present time, it might show a lot of vigorous young people
busily campaigning, a few older women addressing envelopes, and an audience of 'retired' members sitting on the sidelines giving quiet support.
CHAPTER IV

GROUP IMAGE:

THE SUB-CULTURE AS IT SEES ITSELF

In preceding chapters we have described some aspects of continuity and commitment in a political sub-culture which was defined very simply by adherence to the New Democratic Party. In this chapter the New Democratic sub-culture will be defined by the perceptions of our small group of activists as they differentiate New Democrats from members of other political sub-cultures.

This definition has three aspects. First, the party is seen as an agent of interest aggregation. According to many political scientists, the aggregation of interests is a primary function of political parties. What interests are aggregated in the New Democratic Party, in comparison with other parties? In asking this question we want to know what kind of stereotypes New Democrats have of themselves as a group different from

\[22\] For example, see S. J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago, 1964); Gabriel A. Almond and B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Toronto, 1966); a very good discussion of the 'interest' argument appears in Avery Leiserson, Parties and Politics (New York, 1958), Chapter 2.
other political sub-cultures. If, as one would suspect, these stereotypes tend toward a 'good-guy, bad-guy' dichotomy in favor of one's own group, we are also interested in knowing how strong the in-group feeling of New Democrats may be.

The third aspect of our definition of the political sub-culture is that which concerns the political space surrounding the group. In looking at the sub-culture from this point of view, we wanted to remove political parties themselves as the comparative base for stereotypes, providing instead the left-right continuum as an organizing reference for political space, which is filled with a combination of concepts including the individual respondent ('self') as a locational device within the left-right space.

In defining the sub-culture in these ways, it is hoped that some broad patterns will emerge that will identify its major characteristics—group base, interests, 'character', and relative place in political space. Group consensus on the definition of the group's characteristics should provide a measure of group cohesion, that is, it should tell us how justified we are in regarding this group as a homogeneous sub-culture. The analysis which follows is based on five sections of the questionnaire comprising seventy-one questions (see Appendix A, questions 35, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 45).
It is a commonplace of political analysis to associate the interests of the working class with the radical left and although the term itself is rarely used by the left in Canada, one need be neither Marxian, Fabian, New Democrat nor political scientist to sense that social stratification has its political expression in the left-right spectrum of Canadian political parties. A number of questions were designed to test the perception of New Democrats with respect to the class characteristics of their sub-culture. Although these questions vary in the particular way in which the concept of class is associated with parties, the phrasing of each one permits an interpretation of response in terms of interest aggregation.

The consensus of the group on questions one, two and three in Table VIII is very nice indeed; it substantiates in part the speculation in Chapter III that the tendency of middle class activists to downgrade themselves in

23 The 'class struggle' has never been a prominent theme in CCF/NDP literature. See the Ontario CCF publication, Planning for Freedom (1944); Dorothy G. Steeves, The Compassionate Rebel (Boag Foundation, Vancouver, 1960); Stanley Knowles, The New Party (Toronto, 1961); Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics: A biography of J. S. Woodsworth (Toronto, 1959); Research Committee of the League for Social Reconstruction, Social Planning for Canada (Toronto, 1935); and F.R. Scott, Lecture no. 1, in series "Socialism at Mid-Century," (Woodsworth House, Toronto, 1951). The emphasis of the CCF/NDP has been upon economic planning rather than a people's revolution.
Table VIII  Aggregation of class interests as seen by New Democrats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>lib</th>
<th>Cons</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Stands mainly for the working class.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Is most concerned with the standard of living of ordinary people.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Is out to help the underdog.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Stands mainly for the middle class.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Would make the country more prosperous.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subjective class assessment had an ideological source. In terms of interest, the group is seen as predominantly working class, concerned with the standard of living of 'ordinary people', 'the underdogs'. Implicit in this characterisation is a sense of powerlessness of the ordinary working person to control those economic and political resources that might bring a better life for more people. Strangely enough, the group was not agreed that the NDP 'Would make the country more prosperous'. Only 67% associated such capability with the NDP; the rest identified the Liberal party with this capability. Thus, although the group was in complete agreement that the NDP has the will to protect and improve the lot of the ordinary person, almost one third of the group thought that the Liberal party was more capable of attaining this goal. At least, that is one interpretation of the data.

On the other hand, the term 'prosperous' may have associational characteristics of its own, much more
powerful than the logic that would link these two questions in a respondent's mind and stimulate similar answers for both. Perhaps the respondents who associated prosperity with Liberal did so in some pejorative sense; the term may have bourgeois middle-class connotations to some, especially in British Columbia where the term is almost synonymous with Social Credit, a governing party here like the Liberals in Ottawa. For some New Democrats this association may contaminate the term so that it cannot be used in conjunction with an object of favor such as the working class, ordinary people, or the NDP.

In a sense, the entire constellation of key words used as the basis for analysis in this chapter is open to the same kind of ambiguity; since the observer cannot know exactly how words or phrases are perceived by the respondent, we must rely upon our own perceptions of these words as a standard, and remain cautious in our interpretations, constraining analysis by the limits of broad patterns.

In the view of our group, the interests of only two occupational groups are aggregated by the NDP: 96% (N=45) thought that factory workers support the NDP; and 75% (N=44) thought that school teachers would find the NDP most compatible with their interests. Young executives, on the other hand, would identify their interests with the Liberal party, according to the
NDP activists (86%, N-43). These three groups, factory workers, school teachers and young executives, were the only clear cases of interest-party stereotype by the group. The interests of other social groups were identified with different parties by different portions of the group, and the distributions are shown in Table X.

Although a majority identified retired people, European immigrants and university professors with the NDP (Group A, Table X), others tended to identify retired people with the Conservative party (a stereotype of Conservatives as older people) and European immigrants and professors with the Liberal party. With regard to the interests of retired people, one can look at their party affiliation from at least two perspectives. First, the Canadian left has long been concerned with pensions (e.g. J.S. Woodsworth) and housing for pensioners (e.g. E.E. Winch in British Columbia); every NDP campaign includes strong recommendations concerning the welfare of pensioners, and it is reasonable for New Democrats to see their party as the 'most representative' of retired people, at least in the sense of interest aggregation.

There is, however, another perspective. Whatever the opportunities for serving their interests by supporting the NDP, perhaps retired people do not recognize that interest; perhaps they vote Conservative simply because that is what old people do. In addition,
Table IX  Aggregation of interests to political parties, as seen by New Democrats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group A</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>Cons</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retired people</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European immigrants</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University professors</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group B</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group C</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bankers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealthy businessmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group D</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English immigrants</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the Conservative party does profess a concern with the interests of old people, so that their naturally conservative tendencies may find an easy rationale for voting Conservative. If the voting habits of retired people are viewed in this way by a portion of the group, this does not preclude their believing that retired people would be better advised to support the NDP; rather, it may simply be an 'objective' observation on the part of some New Democratic activists who have canvassed and found retired people rather set in their Conservative ways, hard to convince of the benefits of an NDP government.

It is not immediately clear why some of the group
saw European immigrants and university professors as Liberals. Perhaps these two groups have no obvious political home, and are therefore assigned by some to the governing party, by others to their own party, almost at random. There was no correlation between the identification of European immigrants with a party and the background of the respondent, nor was there any obvious pattern, such as low or high education, among those who identified university professors as Liberal.

Catholics and lawyers, along with bankers, doctors and wealthy businessmen, are covered by the stereotype 'establishment'. Although Group B (Catholics and lawyers) are associated with the Liberals, while Group C (bankers, doctors and businessmen) are associated with the Conservatives, the over-all characteristic of these groups is their status quo orientation; since they benefit from the present system, such groups are not likely to espouse changes of a radical nature.

At the risk of unwarranted over-simplification, we could propose, with respect to Group D, that such groups as women and Protestants are such vague, amorphous groupings as to be meaningless in terms of interests that could be aggregated by political parties. Jews, on the other hand, are not likely to support the Conservative party, while English immigrants are not
associated with the Liberal party by more than a few people. The pattern of response does suggest that Jews are associated with the center or center left, while English immigrants are seen as either 'Labour' or 'Tory', a reflection of British politics. These four categories were grouped together, despite these differences, to indicate that stereotypes of certain kinds are shared amongst the parties. It appeared to be easier, for example, for respondents to classify Catholics as non-NDP than it was for them to place the two other religions mentioned, Jews and Protestants. The contrast between the allocation of European immigrants between the NDP and Liberal parties, as opposed to English immigrants who were either NDP or Conservative, points up the interrelated nature of the cues we have used. Had the cue, 'immigrant' been introduced as well, our understanding of these patterns might have been increased.

The shortcomings of the data in this and other respects is quite clearly demonstrated in the lack of consensus on group-party association. If we were dealing with true stereotypes, the pattern of consensus should have been much more clearly defined. To overcome this factor, the data has been regrouped into NDP, old party and shared groups, to highlight the patterns that were observed; very high consensus was attained on the stereotypes which appear in Table X under NDP.
Table X  Aggregation of interests in radical and status quo political cultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>Status quo</th>
<th>Shared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>Retired people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underdog</td>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>European and English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary people</td>
<td>Bankers</td>
<td>English immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory workers</td>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School teachers</td>
<td>Wealthy</td>
<td>Professors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>businessmen</td>
<td>Jews, Protestants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young executives</td>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are other kinds of interests than occupation, ethnicity and religion, and social class. One such is particularly important in Canada: regional interests. Four questions were related to the perception of parties as aggregates of regional interests. The most direct question asked respondents which party was best identified as representing regional interests; 64% (N-33) thought the Conservative party was best described in this way, 27% identified the Liberal party with regional interests. Obviously, the 'facts' of the situation stand out here. One of these is illustrated in the 66% (N-41) identification of the Liberals as 'most sympathetic to Quebec', a traditional association. 31% respondents thought that the NDP was most sympathetic to Quebec; this is another way of understanding 'sympathy', perhaps in terms of a more broad policy stance rather than traditional party links. The import of these stereotypes is not, however, in the particular pattern, but in the contrast between regional associations and the
'national interest' of 'society as a whole'. 96% respondents (N=46) thought that the NDP 'puts society as a whole first,' and 82% (N=39) thought that the NDP 'understands the national interest.' The old parties, by contrast, represent regional interests and establishment groups. It is interesting that most of the respondents (81%, N=41) saw the old parties as favoring 'the ambitious, capable individual'. Recall that a third of the respondents thought that the Liberal party 'would make the country more prosperous'; when this is added to the regional, establishment and capable individual stereotypes, the old parties emerge in contradistinction to the working class-underdog-whole society NDP stereotype.

The group was almost unanimous that the Conservatives suffer from internal dissension (93%, N=42) and that the old parties do not have a united team of top leaders, at least in contrast with the NDP, which does according to 83% (N=41) respondents. 94% (N=48) agreed that the NDP has the most independent foreign policy and would be the most effective in working for peace.

When these diverse stereotypes are added together, a picture of each party and the interests it represents can be distinguished as in Figure 4, which sums up the discussion of the NDP political sub-culture
Figure 4 Stereotypes of parties in terms of interests

as an aggregation of interests. The NDP is the party of the people; the Liberal party is the party of the lawyer and young executive; and the Conservatives are the party of bankers.

Table XI presents the traits of character which the group associated with the three major parties. Half
Table XI  In-group and out-group as defined by character traits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IN-GROUP</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>OUT-GROUP</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>humanitarianism</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>opportunism-Liberals</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independence of</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>selfishness-Conserv.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youth</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>hypocrisy-Liberals</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idealism</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-Conserv.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open-mindedness</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>conformity-Liberals</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>optimism</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-Conserv.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>realism</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>caution-Liberals</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maturity</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-Conserv.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>success</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-NDP</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>success-Liberals</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Conservatives</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of the fourteen traits listed in the questionnaire were assigned by at least three-quarters of the group to the NDP; without exception, these were the favorable traits listed. Two traits were open to ambiguity in obvious ways. 'Maturity' can mean old age alone, or wisdom which comes with experience. In the sense of old age alone, maturity could have pejorative connotations of stodginess and inflexibility. In the sense of wisdom or good judgment, the trait is a favorable one. 'Success' also has ambiguous overtones; does it mean electoral success, and if so at what level, provincial or federal; if provincial, which province, and so on. Success may also have associations with 'young executives' as opposed to the 'underdog'. Thus, our group was ambivalent in stereotyping the parties in terms of maturity and success. The remaining five traits, all rather unpleasant, were assigned in almost random fashion to the old parties.
As expected, the group tends to adopt a 'good-guy, bad-guy' criterion when looking at the differences between its own political culture and its competitors.

If New Democratic activists see themselves in these favorable terms, they do not think that others, on the whole, have the same opinion of their sub-culture. In answering questions about the opinions of others with regard to their party, the group reverted to their image of themselves as 'underdogs'. 71% (N=45) thought that 'many people regard [the NDP] unfavorably.' Not many (only 9%, N=45) thought that other parties would like to 'outlaw' the NDP, but just over half the group thought that other parties might want to 'curb its activities.' Of course, an optimistic view of the electoral potential of the NDP might suggest to the respondent that other parties should desire a curbing of NDP activities, from a purely practical view of electoral competition, rather than from hostility to its political sub-culture.

Equally ambiguous was the question, "Compared with others, do you think that members of the NDP are very different, somewhat different, or about the same?" Again, just over half (52%, N=42) took a median point of view, that New Democrats are somewhat different from others; 19% thought they were very different, and 29% thought they were about the same. By this measure, the in-group feelings of the sub-culture seem to be
very moderate. Had we asked whether young executives, bankers, or even middle class people, would like to outlaw the NDP, or whether these groups were 'different', the pattern of answers would probably be substantially different.

The third definition of the political sub-culture concerns the political space surrounding its core values. The data is presented schematically in Figure 5.

---

**Figure 5** Left-right organization of political space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEFT</th>
<th>around self and party, modal positions</th>
<th>RIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>self</td>
<td>opportunity</td>
<td>patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pacifism</td>
<td>future</td>
<td>mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equality</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>change</td>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the bottom of the figure, consensus of the group was extremely high (see Appendix B for data in %); an increasing portion of the group pulled terms to the right or left going up the diagram on the left and right. Those terms placed down the center were so located by a majority of the group. They were placed to the right or left of center according to the pull of other portions of the group.

The modal position of self location in the group was a little over half-way from left to center. This
position has the character of a median between the NDP—which seems very close to the revolutionary terms 'change' and 'China'—and parents, who balance on the center along with the United Nations. Cast in rather summary terms, 'self' is at the tension point between revolution and order, as represented by parents and the UN. The little bundle of left-wing terms—pacifism, equality and future—are to the left of self. Not appearing in the figure are responses to the term 'individualism'; fifteen respondents put it on the left, twelve on the right, and nine in the center. If, tentatively, individualism were to be grouped with these other three terms, the full content of left-wing ideology—as it was available in the question—appears to the left of self. Terms which appear on the right, especially those toward the bottom of the figure, are definitely outside the political sub-culture of our activists. In the center, closer to the group yet distinct from them, are three terms which can, in a sense, sum up the main threads of an over-arching Canadian political culture: the Liberal party, Protestant, and Canada. The center represents the status quo—to which self is very close—while the right represents reaction. Opportunity is slightly to the left of center, seeming to draw self, which is attracted too by parents and the status quo away from the institution and ideas which express the sub-culture.
Figure 5 represents only the modal positions of the terms as they were located by the group as a whole. Were individual configurations vastly deviant from the combined picture? There were, of course, variations of every sort. China was put on the right by some who consider Chinese ideology to be reactionary (too doctrinaire); pacifism appeared on the right in a few questionnaires, possibly in association with some religions, or perhaps, as in the case of one respondent, because pacifism contradicts a value of revolution which is seen as an extreme left concept. Some respondents put the NDP to the right of center with self at the extreme left. Indeed, the spectrum provided in the questionnaire was used very well by individual respondents to represent their own combination of ideas. On the whole, however, the configuration shown in Figure 5 seems fairly representative of the group.

Impressions gained from participation with the group in its campaign and committee activities also tend to substantiate this picture. Despite the great variety of opinions on specific policy issues, the party does appear rather to the left of self for many activists. One of the attitudes which might control this relationship is attitude toward trade unions. If a New Democrat does not like the trade union link, the party may appear to the left of self. If a New Democrat approves of the link, or
would see it strengthened, the party may appear to the right. It all depends upon the relative position of the trade union on the left-right spectrum. This kind of speculation is doubly difficult since 'reaction' in the NDP scheme is as likely to appear on the left as it is on the right, depending upon the specific frame of reference involved.

Returning to the broad patterns shown in the figure, we note the temporal space differentiated with future on the left and past on the right, change on the left and tradition on the right. Also, nations appear on the right, ideas on the left. This distinction is consistent with that made in this thesis between the institutionalized status quo political culture and the non-institutionalized radical sub-culture. This indirect confirmation of the general orientation of our discussion is a fortunate by-product of the data.

The final problem set for this chapter was the matter of group cohesion. In their answers to these seventy-one questions of self-definition, does this group show such consensus as to permit us to continue to describe it as a homogeneous sub-culture? There is no standard available for making such a judgment, yet the tabulation present in Table XII provides some justification for a description of the group in these terms.
Table XII Rate of consensus in the sub-culture

A) Average consensus by type of question %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Question</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What the parties stand for</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character traits</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B) Highest No. of Agreement Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement Range</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40-49%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-79</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-89</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-100</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The definition of sub-culture in terms of occupational, religious and ethnic stereotypes provided the least consensus, according to Table XII. As a caveat to this rather low consensus, it is worth noting that respondents agreed almost completely in assigning groups to their own sub-culture, but had some difficulty differentiating between the two old parties, thus reducing the overall consensus. Wherever the occupation could not be assigned to the NDP, for example, the group was not in agreement as to which old party was most identified with that occupation. This factor explains the lack of consensus in those questions which required respondents to define their culture in comparison with that of other parties. Yet, if this were the only explanation, we would expect consensus to be much higher for the left-right question, which did not have this problem. With this question, those terms which tended to be assigned immediately to the left or right by all (China, change,
**Figure 6 Definition of the NDP sub-culture in comparison with out-group referents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IN GROUP</th>
<th>OUT GROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interests</strong></td>
<td>(Liberal party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>opportunism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working class, society</td>
<td>young executives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underdog, ordinary people</td>
<td>Catholics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory workers</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School teachers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traits</strong></td>
<td>--Canada--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>humanitarianism</td>
<td>tradition, past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idealism, realism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>optimism</td>
<td>Conservative party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open, independent mind</td>
<td>suffers internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dissension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideas</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>future, change, equality</td>
<td>Social Credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, pacifism, youth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective for peace, has independent foreign policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understands national interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Other people view us unfavorably"

SoCred and Conservative parties) are contrasted with low consensus terms such as Germany and France, and the troublesome 'opportunity'. Figure 6 combines only those defining terms which had consensus of over seventy percent, providing a final summary of this chapter which has defined the sub-culture in its own terms by interests, traits, and political space.
CHAPTER V
SUB-CULTURE AS WORLD VIEW

In this chapter the direction of our discussion is changed once again as we turn our group around to look at the question of sub-cultural continuity from another point of view. In Chapter II the political sub-culture was defined by adherence to the New Democratic Party, and continuity of the sub-culture was described in terms of socialization by agents carrying both the sub-culture and the general political culture. In Chapter III we examined the strength of sub-cultural commitment, again in terms of party adherence. The group's self-definition of sub-cultural boundaries was presented in Chapter IV. We turn now to a description of the group in terms of the rather abstract notion of world view, which comprises aspects of ideology, political culture, and fundamental assumptions about the nature of man and society.

There are two basic world views in western society, the organic and the atomistic. The components of each

24 The following discussion is a summary of Horowitz, 'Interpretation'.

69
Figure 7 Components of organic and atomistic political cultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIC (non-liberal)</th>
<th>ATOMISTIC (liberal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tory</td>
<td>Whig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberty</td>
<td>individualist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fraternity</td>
<td>individualist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corporate</td>
<td>competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collective</td>
<td>competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equality hierarchy</td>
<td>hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equality</td>
<td>equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(more law)</td>
<td>(less law)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

are in opposition to the other. Organicism assumes the value of a corporate, collectivist society; atomism assumes the value of an individualist, competitive society. Underlying this opposition of values is another, more fundamental belief: organicism assumes that society is good, that individual self-realization is contingent upon the good of society as a whole; atomism, on the other hand, assumes that society is a necessary evil, that individual self-realization is hampered by society, which exists only to provide a minimum of order so that the individual is left as free as possible to pursue his own ends. Organicism puts the good of the whole first, atomism puts the good of the individual first.

These two world view are represented in western society by four political cultures which developed in Europe in the chronological order, feudal-tory, liberal-whig, liberal-democrat, socialist.\(^{25}\) The development of

\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 145.
these political cultures was a process of action and reaction; the whig reaction to toryism introduced an atomistic conception of society, but retained the hierarchical principle of social organization; the liberal-democrat reaction to whiggery retained atomism and replaced the hierarchical principle with rationalist-egalitarianism; the socialist reaction to liberal democracy retained the egalitarian principle, but rejected atomism, preferring the organic conception of society.

North American political culture is predominantly liberal-democratic. The United States is thoroughly so; there are few traces of toryism or whiggery, and socialism is extremely weak if not dead. American political culture is based on an essentially complete consensus about the value of liberal democracy. Canadian political culture is dominated by the values of liberal democracy as well; but those values do not constitute the 'one true myth' of Canadian society. Canada has a 'tory touch' which has persisted most obviously in Canadian reluctance to make a complete break with Britain, both as a social and political model. A touch of whiggery was evident in the Family Compact, and the socialist CCF/NDP is a continuous force in Canadian politics. Although there has been an effort amongst some Canadian intellectuals

This is Louis Hartz's interpretation, in *The Founding of New Societies* (Toronto, 1964).
to wed nationalism and liberalism, as was done in the United States, there have always been counter-movements reminding Canadians of tory values such as order and hierarchy, and the importance of these values to the Canadian identity as distinct from the American. Since none of these world views has been successfully married to the idea of Canadian nationality, ideological diversity has retained its legitimacy in Canada; that is, it is not 'un-Canadian' as yet to propose tory or socialist ideals as a basis for policy.

The organic world view is expressed in the Canadian political sub-cultures of the Conservative and New Democratic parties, when it is expressed at all. The link between these sub-cultures is not always obvious, yet Conservatives like Davey Fulton, W.L. Morton and George Grant, to mention only a few, are favorable to the welfare state; although this view is grounded in noblesse oblige rather than egalitarian soil, the fruits are similar to those of socialist reasoning. And New Democrats, despite the highly democratic formal organization of their party membership, show traces of traditionalism and elitism that brings them very close to the tories. Both Conservatives and New Democrats favor a strong, centralized

27 See the various works of Frank Underhill.
28 See the works of W.L. Morton.
state. And both subcultures have been liberalized through the process of action and reaction that hinges on the predominant liberal-democratic political culture of North America in general, and the Canadian focus of that culture, the Liberal party. Ideological diversity in Canada exists not only in the opposition of the three main parties to each other, but in the organic-atomistic tensions within these parties and even, it is suggested, within individual Canadians whose characteristic positions may be one or the other, atomistic or organic, but who are in one instance drawn to the organic view, in another drawn to the atomistic. Canadian political culture is then, a mix of atomism and organicism. The three main political subcultures carry in them the seeds of each other, yet remain fairly distinct in their world views.

This conception of Canadian political cultures provided the basis for a series of questions which were put to New Democratic activists in an attempt to test the hypothesis that their world view would be basically organic-socialist, with some measure of democratic-liberalism mixed in. We were interested to know what aspects of the liberal culture had been absorbed, at the expense of what organic-socialist ideas. How deep does the organic world view go in the New Democratic political culture? Certainly, as Horowitz emphasises, Canadian political culture is predominantly liberal. The tory-
socialist organic 'touch' is just that, a 'touch' and no more.\textsuperscript{29} Accepting this, it is reasonable to suppose that the major secondary agents of socialization—the mass media, the schools, the general 'ethos' of the nation, including the structure of secondary institutions—socialize New Democrats to liberal values, undermining or at least having considerable influence upon the sub-culture as a distinct ideological entity.

Designing a test of this cultural mix was not easy, and the particular method used is open to attack from many angles. The test which was decided upon assumed that the respondents would have an organic tendency; it was not only logically inconceivable that members, especially active members, would not have such a tendency; in addition, conversations with the membership gave an overwhelming impression of support for this assumption. At the same time, there was evidence that with respect to the key concept of equality, many New Democrats accepted the liberal interpretation, 'equality of opportunity', which presupposes a competitive rather than cooperative social organization, and includes the notion of a material 'floor' which provides everyone with an equal chance to win the competition. This is a very different conception of equality than the organic—socialist notion of equal distribution, which is more

\textsuperscript{29}\textsuperscript{29} Horowitz, 'Interpretation,' p. 169.
compatible with an organic than an atomistic conception of society. Horowitz puts it this way:

> It is because socialists have a conception of society as more than an agglomeration of competing individuals—a conception close to the tory view of society as an organic community—that they find the liberal idea of equality (equality of opportunity) inadequate. Socialists disagree with liberals about the essential meaning of equality because socialists have a tory conception of society.  

In view of our impression that New Democrats held mixed views about equality, it was considered necessary to force them to make a choice between socialist and liberal statements. Formulating these statements was very difficult, since the clichés of the sub-culture provide ready-made answers to many of the obvious statements of values. We wanted to get past these clichés to those ideas that fly and collide in discussion and argument, dividing the group into factions or atoms. In fact, an argument seemed the perfect setting in which to oppose liberal and socialist views, and this was the method of testing which was decided upon. Pairs of statements were presented, as though in an argument, and respondents were asked to indicate which side they would tend to take if it were necessary for them to participate. This taking of sides was difficult for many. No one wanted to be tied to the exact content of any statement (noise from

30 Ibid., p. 144.
'moderating' tendencies was shattering) and resistance to taking a polar position was generally very strong. Indeed, this was the virtue of the 'argument' question, as opposed to the conventional 'agree-disagree' attitude test. Knowing that the tendency to moderation was high in any case, and knowing that, if the statements were simply listed with instructions to circle the degree of agreement, respondents would find something to agree with in each one, it was obvious that a great many more questions and a large response would be necessary to test for idea clusters through the use of scaling techniques. The argument technique seemed to be a simple, efficient means of avoiding all this. A logical, if not statistical, scale of socialist-organicism was built into the series of paired statements. In discussing the results, we work down the scale from the most general statement of organicism to more particular and demanding requirements of an organic-socialist world view.

The statements are complex, and it would be foolish to interpret the apparent consensus which was elicited as evidence of anything other than a very general organicism. A single individual could easily agree with both statements at different levels of abstraction and drawing from different issue referents. For example, we must sacrifice (by way of taxes) in order to help under-developed countries if we want peace. In terms of physical,
Table XIII  Elements of an organic vs atomistic world view, A

Corporate vs individualist conception of society

a) Corporatism

We must sacrifice our own advantage to help those who cannot help themselves if we want to live in a better world. 93%

b) Individualism

Our first responsibility is to ourselves. If everyone looked after his own affairs properly, this would be a better world. 5%

c) Undecided 2%

N-43

---------------------------------------------

psychological, social and political space this is a different order of organic thinking than that required in a situation where, for example, proposals to integrate public housing and middle class residential communities posed a 'threat' to the playground vocabulary of middle class children. Had the statements involved relevant, immediate issue referents the consensus might have broken down. We have some evidence in previous surveys where simple attitude questions were used that there was complete agreement among New Democratic activists that "Negroes should be allowed to move into residential neighborhoods that have always been all white." Yet even this question is removed from the immediate life-space of New Democrats. The consensus shown in Table XIII is, then, only at the most general level of organicism.
Table XIV Elements of an organic vs atomistic world view, B

Collectivism vs competition

a) Collectivism

Man is capable of creating a truly cooperative society, eventually 78%

b) Competition

Man has a competitive instinct and a need for material incentive; therefore, a cooperative society is only an unattainable ideal. 22%

N-45

In this second pair of statements, shown in Table XIV, we were trying to break down the general organic consensus by making the competitive notion appear to be a very reasonable idea. In statement b) the cooperative society is not rejected, it is merely considered to be unrealistic; man does, in fact, have a competitive instinct, according to the statement, and the implication is that we had better provide for it in our politico-social organization. With this statement, we attracted 22% (of those who answered the question) away from the pure organic view. Here, we see the hint of a liberal view of equality—equality of opportunity to engage in the competitive struggle—inasmuch as some portion of the group is open to the idea that competition is inevitable. In order to test the strength of the remaining 77% organicists
Table XV  Elements of an organic vs atomistic world view, C

Cooperation vs competition and the promise of equal distribution

a) Almost all the problems of society would be solved if society were changed so that nobody could have any more than anybody else. 42.5%

b) If you changed society so that nobody had any more than anybody else, it wouldn't be long before there were rich and poor again. 57.5

N-33 (Includes only those respondents who took position a) in Table XIV, i.e. the organicists.)

in their resistance to this notion, we have them argue with Shaw.31 The results are shown in Table XV.

This pair of statements tests the strength of commitment to socialist-organicism in the face of a 'realist-pessimist' liberal expression of the inevitability of competition, plus the inability of equal distribution to accomplish the ends intended. Less than half the pure organicists in the group could agree that the 'problems' of society have a socio-economic base, and that equal distribution would remove the cause of these problems. One activist, whose comments seem to typify the majority response to this question, noted that it would be chaotic if everyone had the same income. He would certainly not work for such a policy; after all, doctors should get paid more than a swamp, provided

31 This argument was taken from Chapter I, The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism.
swamper has a certain minimum. This activist thought that man was 'basically good', and he felt that working for the New Democratic Party was working toward the abolition of classes. He recognized that the obstacles to individual freedom (which he defined as 'opportunity to use my capabilities') were financial, particularly where the social and educational handicaps of parents, in addition to economic deprivation, prevented people from using their skills ('exploiting themselves'); and his solution to this problem was equality of opportunity rather than equal distribution.

With only fourteen activists left of an original group of forty-three, we had not much hope of finding any extreme socialist-organicists left after the fourth test, in which the most radical notion of the abolition of private property was opposed to the attraction of home-owning; although home-owning in itself is not necessarily incompatible with organic thought, the statement includes the classic status-quo argument that property owners are 'responsible' members of the community. It was thought that this statement would have some appeal to New Democratic activists, since in previous surveys we have found them to be, for the most part, home owners. At the same time, the political implications of the statement create an unfavorable tension, especially when contrasted with the simple, black-and-white
Table XVI  Elements of organicism vs atomism, D

a) Private ownership of property should be done away with. 18.5%

b) Home-owning serves an important function by giving people a real feeling of responsibility, a stake in the community. 81.5%

N-33

proposition that private property should be abolished. In many conversations with New Democrats, it was the author's impression that they were opposed to civic voting regulations which only permit property owners to vote on money by-laws, and resentful of the rationale for this rule, which implies that renters are irresponsible and have no right to voice their opinions on matters of civic interest. For this reason, opposition of these two ideas seemed to be reasonably balanced in terms of bias. In retrospect, the question was probably very strongly biased in favor of the home-owning answer. The results are presented, despite their many problems.

All those who would abolish private property were organicists according to the previous questions. Only six activists, then, are thorough-bred socialist-organicists by this measure. Five of these are 'doctrinaire' according to the pair of statements presented in Table XVII. Almost 90% of the group are 'revisionist'. Although this terminology is somewhat arbitrary, it does seem reasonable as a distinction between those who would challenge
Table XVII  Elements of organic vs atomistic world views, E
Doctrine vs revision

a) Doctrinaire

Socialism today is unwilling to challenge the foundations of the system, resting content with welfare state palliatives.  11%

b) Revisionist

Socialism is a changing doctrine capable of adjusting to modern conditions and modern ideas.  89%

N-45

We have in this short series of argument questions some measure of the organic-atomistic tension that exists in the New Democratic sub-culture. Almost the entire group have a corporate-organic conception of society; over three-quarters of the group believe that a cooperative society is attainable, that man's nature is not so competitive as to prevent his reaching this goal of the perfect organic state; but less than half of these activists accept the argument of equal distribution, while the majority think that an economically stratified society is inevitable. And only a handful are committed to challenging the foundations of the state, to the point of abolishing private property. This small proportion of 'other-worldly' socialists in the group supports Horowitz's
description of Canadian socialists as Fabian, labor and Protestant rather than Marxist, doctrinaire, *other-worldly*. It seems that the majority of this group of New Democrats fits the Fabian-labor description. They have an over-arching corporate-collectivist world view; but in their understanding of equality, the influence of the liberal political culture seems to have been very strong.

There is another aspect to the organic-atomistic contrast, that is the matter of the strong state. It was expected that New Democrats would favor a strong, centralized government in Ottawa, and 92% (N-39) did so. (See Appendix A, no. 46.7 for original question.) In this respect, socialists share with tories a distaste for the laissez-faire, rugged individualism of the American liberal tradition.

These were the only questions designed to test Horowitz's thesis. They support his contention that Canadian socialists share an organic world view that is continuous with toryism, but fail to support his suggestion that "...because socialists have a conception of society...as an organic community...they find the liberal idea of equality...inadequate." This group has

32 Horowitz, 'Interpretation,' p. 160.

33 Ibid., p. 144.
the organic view, but over half of them accept the liberal idea of equality of opportunity. Within the group, there seems to be a tendency to combine organicism with the liberal notions of competition and equal chance. Although this investigation provides only a hint of the possibility of testing the influence of the liberal political culture upon the socialist sub-culture, even these results are interesting inasmuch as they seem to indicate that the question of cultural mix is more complicated than Horowitz assumed.

In his discussion of the organic world view, Horowitz did not approach the problem of boundaries for the organic unit. Is it bounded by humanity itself, or lesser units such as the Christian or Catholic brotherhood, the Western world, the nation-state, the province, the community? Does the tory set characteristic boundaries; does the socialist? We asked our respondents to take sides in this argument:

Nationalism is essential if societies are to be organized to work toward common goals.

vs

In the long run, nationalism can never benefit mankind.

65% (N-40) agreed that nationalism could have no beneficial effects in the long run. How do we interpret this? Liberalism, especially in its economic theory, was an internationalist movement. The idea of international
brotherhood is usually associated with socialism, yet the atomistic individualism of liberal-democrats is also internationalist, for example, L.B. Pearson seems to combine aspects of both kinds of conception. In Canada, Liberals have attempted to make internationalism the core of 'nationalism', and continentalism has been a traditional Liberal party plank since Laurier. Are the 'nationalists' the true organicists? The twelve activists who were organicists by the test presented in Table XV were 83% internationalist. By contrast, those who thought that there would be rich and poor again (implying inevitable competition) were split on the nationalist question: 48% thought that nationalism was essential (N-23) and 52% thought that it could never benefit mankind. Much more study of this relationship between organic and internationalist values is needed, but our data does suggest that since the rich-poor and nationalist tests are excellent discriminators within this sub-culture, the key areas of study for the measurement of combinations of liberal and socialist world view may be the connotations of equality (equal distribution vs equality of opportunity) and the value of nationalism vs internationalism.

In this chapter, the New Democratic sub-culture was studied in terms of world view. The predominant liberal-democratic political culture of North America appears to have some expression in the sub-culture,
especially with regard to the concepts of equality and nationalism. There is an organic consensus within the group at a high level of abstraction; organic assumptions were built into all our tests, but liberal-tending statements attracted over half the group. Less than half the group was thoroughly organic-socialist, which includes concepts of the corporate, collectivist society, and an interpretation of equality as equal distribution. Although this interpretation of equality is logically consistent with an organic world view, a majority of our group seemed to hold a belief in the competitive, and therefore atomistic interpretation of equality, while at the same time expressing an organic conception of society. It is suggested that much of the ideological and policy conflict that was observed in discussion with New Democratic activists may revolve, in some fundamental way, around difficulties with the concept of equality, and the tension between organic and atomistic interpretations of that concept in specific issue situations.

Given the apparent influence of the broad culture upon the socialist sub-culture, we might speculate on the source of the persistent organic concept which differentiates the group from the liberal culture. Referring back to Chapter II, it will be recalled that when the party affiliation of parents was discussed, between eighty and ninety percent of the group come from either CCF/NDP or
Conservative families. It seems reasonable to suggest that the organic world view is socialized in the family, the strongest socializing agent in society. This accounts for the tenacity with which the corporate-collectivist value is held in the group, despite conflicting socialization pressures from the secondary socializing agents of the broad political culture. Furthermore, we have evidence that the peers and spouses of these activists are also New Democrats, and probably organicists. As they socialize their children to the political sub-culture, the continuity of an organic world view is assured. But their children will also be socialized, in the family and in the broad culture, to ambivalent notions of equality. Whether the liberal interpretation will eventually erode the organic concept is an interesting area for speculation; Horowitz mentions the liberalization

34 In the discussion of group commitment in Chapter III it was noted that the group was completely unfavorable to a proposed union with the Conservative party. This can be explained with reference to the importance of 'equality' as a socialist value. The opposition between hierarchy (a conservative value) and equality is probably much stronger than that between the liberal and socialist interpretations of equality. Thus, although socialists may share aspects of a world view with tories, making it easy for children to transfer loyalty from a Conservative family vote to NDP membership, the reason for transferring is probably concerned with the egalitarian value vs the hierarchical value. This has the effect of creating a strong hostility to the Conservative party with respect to a central value. There is less hostility to the Liberal party; New Democrats are probably ambivalent about the differences of interpretation of equality between themselves and liberals.
of socialism in western Europe and Canada, without, unfortunately, specifying just what aspects of socialism are being liberalized. But this point is less important to our analysis than the more general question of the distinctiveness of the New Democratic political sub-culture, and its penetration by the liberal culture. Our conclusion is that the sub-culture is socialist-organic, but with a liberal 'touch'.

35 Horowitz, *Interpretation,* p. 150.
CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL SUB-CULTURES AS A LABORATORY FOR
THE STUDY OF THE SOCIALIZATION OF CULTURE:
SOME SUGGESTIONS

In the introduction to this thesis it was argued that democratic political systems depend upon the healthy state of political sub-cultures for the maintenance of democratic stability. The only value on which there must be consensus is the value of the democratic rules of the game: majority rule and the right of dissent. Neither of these rules works without the other. The free formation and expression of sub-cultural values would tend toward anarchy without the mechanism of majority rule, and the rule of the majority would be a farce without the existence, indeed the flourishing, of dissenting sub-cultures.

A political society in which the political culture is monolithic, having a single value base—whether that base is liberalism, feudalism, socialism or communism—does not have the requirements for a stable democracy. That is not to say that such a political system is not stable; it may be quite stable, in between revolutions.
This is not, however, democratic stability, which is based on the overt expression of tension or conflict amongst political sub-cultures; revolutionary change is unnecessary in such a system since open challenge is built into the system and provided for in its structure and supporting myths. In a democratic system change is effected through the process of action and reaction of the sub-cultures to each other, through their conflict. Thus, the continued existence of a democratic political system depends upon the existence of political sub-cultures which engage in this conflict.

The 'health' of political sub-cultures depends upon a variety of circumstances, but one of the most important is their continuity. The term continuity as it is used here includes the two concepts of homogeneity and persistence. The sub-culture must be identifiable by the similarity of political views held by its members, at a single point in time; this is what is meant by

36 The author is unaware of any interpretation of democratic stability in the literature resembling that put forth here. Essentially, the argument is an analogue to that usually stated in terms of pressure groups; in the discussion presented here, 'competing' sub-cultures provide the mechanism of stability rather than 'competing' pressure groups, and the subject of competition is ideas rather than interests.

37 There are other requirements which are more practical than theoretical; for example, there should not be more than three or four very different sub-cultures, since in that case the majority principle is unsatisfactory as a means of conflict resolution.
homogeneity. Persistence refers to the similarity between the present political values of the sub-culture and those held by previous generations. There have been three examples of the formal expression of sub-cultural discontinuity in Canada. In 1942, the Conservative party changed its name to 'Progressive Conservative' as part of a general movement to change the orientation of the party from Bay Street outward, especially to the West. In the late fifties and early sixties the CCF wished to express a reorientation that had been taking place in that party towards an urban, labor, updated social democratic policy approach. When the Winnipeg Declaration had little effect, the name of the party was changed and the trade union link was formalized. The third example is more recent; the Social Credit party in Quebec wished to express its discontinuity from the western

38 J.M. Beck and D.J. Dooley, "Party images in Canada," Queens Quarterly, LVII, no. 3 and in H.G. Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada (Toronto, 1963), 30-40. Earlier, the Conservatives had considered changing their name to the 'National Conservatives' (1938). At the time, the Conservative sub-culture had almost no apparent content, little support, and no leadership. While it can be argued that the party was changing its 'image' in an attempt to gain support, it can also be argued that a sub-culture without adherents is not a sub-culture in any meaningful sense. The conservatives were searching not only for supporters, but for a cultural, a value base of some kind, and an issue or interest reference was needed to tie it down. The term chosen, 'progressive', was meant to convey the liberalization of a sub-culture that had previously been associated with pure toryism.
party and did so by changing its name to the Ralliement des Creditistes. These formal expressions of sub-cultural discontinuity are only meant as illustrations. More subtle changes of fundamental outlook may take place over time without such changes, and these changes in name may not, in fact, represent a true discontinuity. In many ways the New Democratic Party is still the CCF of the Regina Manifesto. Some of the membership, especially the committed, hard working activists, are not agreed about the value of the change expressed in the new name. Some seem not to have perceived a discontinuity at all, others are resentful of the change, and still others think that the discontinuity should have been much greater, and expressed much more clearly. In short, the problem of continuity of sub-cultures is a very complex one.

In this case study, we have tried to simplify the question of sub-cultural continuity by concentrating on only a few aspects of homogeneity and persistence. To investigate the latter, the concept of political socialization was used to trace the pattern of group membership through the parental family, peers and marriage partners, as well as secondary groups such as the school and voluntary associations. We found strong evidence of sub-cultural continuity from generation to generation, and at the present time in the primary and secondary agents to which the members expose themselves.
Accepting Horowitz's thesis concerning the persistence of an organic world view in Canadian political cultures, and finding evidence in the group of an organic conception of society, we concluded that members of the sub-culture were carriers of that conception, that they had been socialized to an organic world view in their CCF and Conservative party families, and that they would in turn socialize their children to a corporate, collectivist conception of society. On the basis of this evidence, the group can be described as a persistent, continuing sub-culture.

With regard to homogeneity of cultural values, the group appeared to be a reasonably continuous unit. Its self-definition in terms of interest and character traits was quite consistent, and although parts of the group tended to pull concepts one way or another in political space, there was general agreement on the kinds of ideas that go on the left, right or center. The group seemed much less homogeneous in its sub-cultural values when its views on equality and nationalism were tested; here the influence of other political cultures within the system was evident, especially the great liberal-democratic culture of North America. In this respect, the socialist sub-culture seems more continuous with the dominant political culture than with its own, sub-cultural system of values.
It is in these areas of nationalism and equality that the sub-culture is most vulnerable to absorption by the dominant culture; if the sub-culture were to accommodate not only the superficial aspects of the liberal interpretation of equality, but the fundamental assumption of the value of competition over collectivism as well, the sub-culture would lose its identity completely. Socialists are in a much more vulnerable position, in many ways, than true-blue tories, since the latter differ completely from liberal democrats. Whereas tories hold a corporate-collectivist value, liberal democrats value competitive individualism; and whereas tories hold to a hierarchical principle of social organization, liberal democrats uphold the principle of rationalist-egalitarianism. Socialists, on the other hand, agree with liberal democrats on the value of equality; it is only the interpretation of the term that differs—and the difference can be seen as one of degree rather than kind. Thus, the health of a social democratic sub-culture is endangered by the attraction of the dominant culture in its similarity of egalitarian values. In addition, the democratic socialist, in his day-to-day non-political activities, and in the general culture transmitted to him at every turn, is socialized to liberal values. The combination of these two factors necessarily creates tensions—dissonance, in Festinger's terms—that may eventually be resolved in favor of the
predominant culture.\textsuperscript{39} The dissonant interpretation of equality may be abandoned, and with it may go the organic conception as well.

The data of the case study did not provide the basis for a study of this aspect of sub-cultural continuity, but it did stimulate a number of questions. Is the group really homogeneous as a cultural unit; is there not a split between small '1' liberals and democratic socialists among the active membership; how are New Democrats different from Liberals; are they not just 'Liberals in a hurry'; are there any social democrats in the New Democratic sub-culture at all; just how does the New Democratic sub-culture differ, in a fundamental way, from the broad political culture of North America?

Our survey findings give only a hint about the direction answers to these questions might take. In studying sub-cultural continuity over time, we simply assumed that New Democratic supporters or members had a definitive sub-cultural value system which they transmitted to their children. In chapters II, III, and IV the primary means of identifying the group was adherence to a political party. In Chapter V, which included the only direct tests of fundamental sub-cultural identity, we

\textsuperscript{39}\textsuperscript{}Festinger, \textit{op. cit.}
found that despite a general organicism in the group, there was considerable accommodation to liberal views. Thus, in studying the group in terms of persistence and homogeneity we were, for the most part, accepting a very superficial definition of sub-culture, one that could not provide an indication of the homogeneity or otherwise of fundamental values within the group. When we did have an indication of fundamental values, it pointed to the continuity between the dominant political culture and the sub-culture, rather than a discontinuity between the two, which would have justified our original assumption, based on adherence to a party, that the group was, indeed, fundamentally different from the dominant culture.

One very prominent explanation for our inability to penetrate this very important question is in the nature of the method used to gather data. The questionnaire was designed in accordance with conventions which have been developed, especially in the United States, for dealing with large, heterogeneous populations. The purpose of ordinary surveys of this kind is to gather data that will enable the researcher to sort his population into sub-groupings of various kinds—by party, socioeconomic status, religious, ethnic and personality groups—which, when subjected to multi-variate analysis will indicate gross patterns of correlation among the variables used. This technique is appropriate enough for
heterogeneous populations such as the voting public, since only a very high level of generalization is meaningful in such a context; but it is clearly inappropriate as a basic tool in the study of homogeneous groups such as political sub-cultures. As was pointed out in the Introduction, many of the 'variables' in voting studies are 'constants' in the study of homogeneous groups. And when the group studied is not only homogeneous in terms of party identification, urban residence, status and general level of interest and participation in politics, but also in its commitment to the party as a major voluntary association in which its members participate, it is obvious that if we are to look closely at the group at all, it is necessary to go beyond the confirmation of these constants to a more fundamental set of questions about sub-cultural identity as it is expressed in the actual content of the sub-culture.

A much more appropriate research strategy for the study of political sub-cultures would use a variety of techniques such as those developed in cultural anthropology for dealing with tribes, 40 those developed in sociology for studying small groups, 41 and those that

40 See the works of Margaret Mead.
41 An excellent compendium of theory and applications has been done by C.R. Shepherd, Small Groups: Some Sociological Perspectives (San Francisco, 1964).
have been developed by social psychologists in the study of the nature and influence of ideas. Drawing from all these sources, and from the literature of political ideologies, it would be possible to design a program of research directed toward the study of the transmission of ideas and the modification of concepts which takes place in a political sub-culture through the face-to-face activities of the most active members. Although many of the particular questions that are used in survey research would be necessary as a basic source of information about the group, the major tool that would be used to test and record the idea content of the sub-culture as it is carried by individual members and modified by participation in the group and in the broad political system would be the ideographic map, developed by Allport in the thirties.

The ideographic map is very much like Kurt Lewin's topological map of the life-space, and much of Lewin's theory would provide useful links in some difficult areas where ideas must be linked to the process of

42 See ibid., and Gordon Allport, Becoming (Yale, 1955).

43 Especially very recent work such as that done by Patrick Corbett in his Ideologies (London, 1965).

44 Charles Osgood and T.M. Newcomb have also made important contributions to non-linear social psychology, e.g. C.G. Osgood and assoc., The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana, 1957); also, see Osgood, "The Prediction of interpersonal attraction," American Psychologist, XI (1956), 575-586.
interaction. By combining Allport's personality mapping with Lewin's cognitive mapping, and by adding, through our knowledge of political ideology, a means of ideological mapping, a special kind of ideographic map can be devised to deal with the process of socialization in political sub-cultures. One of the advantages of this device is that the content of the culture can be studied simultaneously with the interaction processes which constitute political socialization.

The main idea of the ideograph is that ideas are not to be conceived as linear entities, but as moving points in mental space, around which other ideas cluster. As problems or issues are introduced to the ideographic space, particular clusters or parts of clusters attract the problem or issue, which becomes an issue-referent of that cluster. The cognitive process, then, takes place within this space, and ideas and issues are constantly moving about, combining with other clusters, attaching and detaching from a set of issue referents when another issue

45 See Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science (New York, 1951). Of more immediate use in setting up experiments is the work of Festinger, a student of Lewin. See Festinger, op. cit.

46 To date, aspects of political culture have been grossly simplified in the study of socialization to facilitate the tracing of patterns of influence. The study of political culture, what little there is, is not directly related to socialization. See Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe, 1959), for extensive documentation.
or idea attracts it away.

By way of illustration, consider the organic conception of society to be a point in ideographic space. Clustering around it are such ideas as corporatism, collectivism and equal distribution. Introduce to that space the liberal conception of equality of opportunity. Elsewhere in the space are many ideas and issue referents which attract this particular conception. In fact, the cluster around organicism is only a very small pinpoint on the total map. The rest of the space is crowded with ideas and their issue referents which have been introduced, via agents of socialization such as the schools, jobs, and particularly the mass media. With very little exception, all the ideas that enter will be attracted to these clusters. As the man works at his job, as he shops or eats his dinner, as he watches television, as he reads newspapers or magazines, the liberal democratic culture bombards his mind with stimuli which fill his ideographic space, floating around the pin-point of organicism.

The organic cluster may be small, but it is strong; it must be so, to exist in spite of the pressures surrounding it. In our case study, we found some of the sources of this strength; family and friends provide support, and the single voluntary association to which he belongs protects the cluster by renewing its relevance to the political system. The party surrounds the little
organic cluster with issues and ideas which strengthen it, give it vitality, to resist the atomist pressures around it.

But one component of the organic cluster, the concept of equality, is attracted by the liberal notion of equality of opportunity. And it is the conception of equality which is most vital in the organic cluster; most of the issue referents are attached to the egalitarian concept. If that concept were to pull away from the organic cluster, attracted by the liberal idea, it is probable that the organic cluster would be fatally weakened. It is this proposition which we hope to be able to explore through the use of ideographic mapping. The promise of that technique is illustrated, at least in part, by its heuristic utility in the above discussion.

The essence of the ideographic way of looking at political culture is its spatial quality. This is in contrast to the linear characteristics of the conventional method of studying socialization and political culture. The socialization model is linear in at least two important respects. First, the conversion model—presented in the introduction—consists of inter-locking sub-systems which are analytically arranged in a hierarchical manner. Talcott Parsons, one of the foremost theorists of socialization, describes the analytic scheme thus:
The main analytic device is the repetition at each level of the same basic paradigm of system structure and functioning, on the assumption that the relations between higher and lower order systems are those of system and sub-system in an order of differentiation and segmentation.

System and sub-system are related in a hierarchy in which the vertical dimension is one of differentiation. At the top are the very general sub-systems such as the economic and political; at the bottom might be the galaxy of unique, or at least highly personalized and transitory, peer group systems which are identified primarily in terms of the individuals involved. The hierarchy offers no definition of horizontal links other than their structural similarity within the vertically defined strata. In other words, any system that is of the same order of differentiation as another is analytically the same, for example, the working class and the New Democratic Party. The analytic tools which are used to travel up and down this hierarchy are the concepts of structure and function. Structure describes the line of influence, and function the properties of the influencing parts. The structural concept, obviously cannot be used to study ideas; and the functional concept can only describe ideas as functional or dysfunctional for the system. Neither

concept can look at ideas qua ideas, or examine their qualities. It is suggested that ideas as a subject of study do not lend themselves to linear treatment as in the hierarchically arranged systems model.

The second linear quality of conventional socialization analysis is its use of correlation to establish patterns, a technique widely used in social science. Correlation, as opposed to causality, does not establish any direct link between variables; rather, variables are 'associated', for example, socio-economic status and religion seem to vary with each other in certain characteristic patterns. But the two never meet; they run parallel to each other, very close, but not touching. 'If-then' causal statements are also linear; instead of parallel lines, as in correlation, the causal sequence is a single line. The 'continuum' of socialization agents from childhood to old age is also a linear conception.

A spatial, or non-linear, approach to the study of socialization would enable the researcher to examine,

G. Poggi, in "A main theme of contemporary sociological analysis: its achievements and limitations," Brit. Journal of Sociology, XVI (1965), p. 294, note 20, refers to an unpublished study which purports to show that sociological jargon is distinguished by a poor ratio of verbs to nouns. It is remarkable that this should be the case in a field which is supposed to be concerned with inter-action. Correlational analysis suffers from the same deficiency; variables rise and fall with each other in pattern, but they never have contact, engage in action with each other.
not only the 'lines' of influence—conceptualized as differences in strength of socializing power of different agents at different stages of the life cycle—but also the content of the sub-cultural and cultural values which are transmitted in the process. Given basic data of the type used in the present study, the conventional socialization model could be filled in as a preliminary to more intensive study of the process in spatial terms. For example, a spatial model of socialization would resemble a sociometric diagram such as those used in small group studies. Distinctions among agents such as family, work-mates and so on could, for analytic purposes, be set aside; the group representing a sub-culture could be viewed as a group of peers (which it is, for the most part) who receive stimuli from a variety of agents including each other. The structural aspect of the socialization process could be analysed in terms of distance and impact; we would want to know the kinds of perceptual filters that are at work in the sub-culture, preventing it from receiving some stimuli, distorting, modifying or simply changing the emphasis of stimuli, and permitting other stimuli free access to the sub-culture. The whole process of interchange amongst sub-cultures—referred to earlier as the 'action-reaction' process which keeps democracy alive—should be handled in terms of a socialization model which is flexible enough to
recognize a great variety of sources for sub-cultural values, each with differential impact depending upon distance from the core values of the group and the relevance of issue-referents with which the sources are associated. That the linear socialization model simply cannot deal with the actual content of culture is amply illustrated in the literature which has grown up around David Riesman's attempt to reformulate the concept in non-linear terms; 49 in addition, a review of socialization studies indicates that political culture and political socialization have never been treated together. 50 A spatial model of socialization, on the other hand, should be ideal for the simultaneous study of culture and socialization, since analogous techniques for studying the structure of interaction 51 and the content of that process 52 have been developed, and should be amenable to combination. The reason this has not been done, it is suggested, is that both techniques are relatively new and not altogether respectable in their parent disciplines.

49 See Lipset and Lowenthal, op. cit., for critiques of Riesman. See also, David Riesman and assoc., The Lonely Crowd (New Haven, 1950) and D. Riesman and Nathan Glazer, Faces in the Crowd (New Haven, 1952); in Faces, Riesman used a clinical approach to culture.

50 See Hyman, op. cit.

51 See Lewin and Festinger, op. cit.

52 See W.F. Whyte, abstract of "Corner Boys" in Shepherd, op. cit., p. 83.
Like socialization, political culture has also been studied in a primarily linear manner, usually through the indirect method of 'attitude' testing. At least two aspects of attitude study are linear. First, and most obvious, is scaling, which involves a linear progression. Second, the attitude questions upon which scales are based are noun-verb sentences. The statement, 'The nation exists for the benefit of the individuals composing it,' establishes a linear, one-to-one relationship between nation and individual. But value systems, such as those of a political sub-culture, are much more complex than this, and such values cannot be inferred from this one-to-one, linear type of statement. For example, Figure 8 shows five possible value clusters which could result in a single attitude, that is, a noun-verb expression of opinion. (See Figure 8, on page following.)

Each ideographic map results in an attitude that is the same as another; but the content of the maps cannot be inferred from the attitude, 'Poverty should be eliminated.' The spatial quality of an ideographic approach gets away from the linear problems of attitude analysis by presenting a series of 'cues' or 'key words' to the subject, who is asked what that word means to him. This was, essentially, the technique adopted by Robert Lane

Eysenck makes this point in Sense and Nonsense in Psychology (London, 1958), 286-300 where he comes very close to an ideographic approach to the study of attitude.
Figure 8 Five ideographs of clusters supporting the attitude, 'Poverty should be eliminated.' *

MAP I

**Value**

Men ought to be free

Men ought to be capable of self-realization

Men should help others to help themselves

'Poverty should be eliminated'

**Belief**

The poor are not free

The poor are not capable

The rich can help

'Poverty should be eliminated'

MAP II

Communism should be prevented

Democracy is good and ought to be protected

Democracy means everyone should have a chance

Communism creates poverty

No one is really poor in a democracy

Democracies are rich

Only the poor are attracted by communism

'Poverty should be eliminated'

MAP III

Crime ought to be prevented

Crimes are committed by the poor

'Poverty should be eliminated'

MAP IV

People should be good

People should get ahead

People are always looking for cheap labor

To get ahead you have to leave some behind

'Poverty should be eliminated'

(but probably cannot be....)

MAP V

Life is good

Life should be joyous

Poor people die too soon

You have to worry about the poor all the time

'Poverty should be eliminated'

*These maps are imaginary.
in his study of fifteen working class men. These cues impose the least possible degree of a priori organization or issue-idea reference upon the subject; he provides the issues that are relevant to him; he relates them to ideas that, in his view, are appropriate to the cue; and from the explanation of the word, by the subject, an ideographic map is drawn to represent the field or space which surrounds that cue. The observer simply records the individually organized and completed ideograph.

To illustrate the texture and content of an ideographic study, Figure 9 (see page following) presents a few samples of those drawn from two 'cue' questions included in the New Democratic case study. (See Appendix A, questions 40 and 47). Despite the unique quality of each ideograph, the core clusters—control, insecurity (fear), spirituality and self-realization—are basic concepts of political cultures. Map 1 is highly organized and rich with issue referents, yet it does not contain the idea of control, a concept included in almost every other ideograph constructed. Map 2 contains a control concept, within a cooperative cluster; some issue referents float around the center, but insecurity seems to come between the core and its issue referents. Map 3 is suggestive of a dominance—

54 Political Ideology (Glencoe, 1962).
Figure 9 Three ideographs of response to cues,
'What does individual freedom mean to you?'
"What are the obstacles to individual freedom in Canada today?"
'What are the preconditions for a world without wars?'

MAP I

Meaning of individual freedom: "Time and opportunity to explore, fulfill and express the self. Mobility among people, situations, places, social classes."

Obstacles: "Bad laws, apathy, conformity, ignorance, poverty, large organizations, early marriage and unwanted children."

Preconditions for world without wars: "Belief in the possibility."

MAP II

Meaning of individual freedom: "Freedom within the law without fear of recrimination."

Obstacles: "High cost of education, housing, fear of communism, socialism."

Preconditions for a world without wars: "Use science to raise children; build cooperative societies; a World Court."
MAP III

Meaning of individual freedom: "Being allowed to act or express ideas without intimidation or harassment."

Obstacles: "Selfishness, bigotry of a vociferous minority." (The respondent is referring to Quebec.)

Preconditions for a world without wars: "World government of philosopher kinds."

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![Diagram](image-url)
submission syndrome; strong leadership is necessary to deal with grasping, threatening minorities. Throughout the free section of the questionnaire (see Appendix A, questions 38-40, 47, 48), this activist hammered away at fear and control. In the closed questions (nos. 41-46) the patterns of response for these three activists was almost identical, and their group commitment, socialization histories and socio-economic status were similar. The ideograph enables us to see them as unique individuals, while at the same time an element of control—the cues—in the ideograph provides for similarity of modal cluster, while leaving the surrounding ideas and issues free. Given a great many cues, the possibility of comparison in terms of strength of cluster and the relationship amongst clusters should give us a much better idea of the cultural values of small groups of activists in a sub-culture.

One testing device is especially appropriate for the study of political cultures; the semantic differential provides single-word cues which are located according to some organizing idea such as the opposition of strong-weak or left-right. 55 Ideographic and semantic

55 See Eysenck, op. cit. and J. Laponce, "The perception of left and right: a topographical analysis," unpublished research, mimeo, University of British Columbia, Department of Political Science.
differential testing can be combined with the conventional procedures of small group experiment for the clinical study of political sub-cultures through the intensive investigation of values and socialization amongst the most active members of political parties. The advantages of studying activists are many, but most prominent are these: activists magnify the characteristics of the broad support base of a political party, and in this way the active membership provides an excellent laboratory for the study of the political sub-culture as a whole; the 'laboratory' quality of activist study is also evident in the ease with which committee and action groups within the membership can be adapted for controlled experimentation; activists are an on-going group within the party, which facilitates longitudinal study of value modification. In sum, activists can be studied in somewhat the same manner as that used by Whyte in his study of gangs and Lane in his study of fifteen voters—both studied socialization and culture as an indivisible subject.

Initially, one would hope to develop, on the

56 See the author's honors essay, "An empirical study of New Democratic Party activists," Dept. of Political Science, University of British Columbia, for a comparison of voters and activists in Vancouver Burrard.

basis of such data, a taxonomy of values in one political culture. There is at present no such taxonomy; it is for this very simple reason that the study of political culture has not proceeded beyond vague formulations, usually in terms of whole nations. Horowitz's atomistic-organic interpretation of Canadian politics was, in a sense, an attempt to systematize some elements of political culture; Lane's treatment of American political culture provides some useful clues to the scope and types of concepts that might be used, at least as a beginning.

Once such taxonomies have been developed for, say, the three main political sub-cultures of Canada, comparisons should provide the basis for empirically-based generalizations about the continuities among the political cultures and the way in which they act and react with each other, modifying the content of sub-cultures and in the process, changing the whole of Canadian politics.

Using this approach, we can study ideological differences in the political system in a systematic way,

58 e.g. H. Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York, 1963); Richard Rose, Politics in England (Toronto, 1964); and Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics (Toronto, 1966), as well as other volumes in the Little, Brown series in Comparative Politics.

59 Lane used 'freedom' as a general organizer and developed from it a series of other referents, e.g. tension, stability, identity, and so on. See Lane, Political Ideology (Glencoe, 1962), passim.
and avoid the trap of adopting simplistic descriptions such as 'end of ideology', 'Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee' and the pervasive NDP-Liberal-Conservative-SoCred left-right continuum in terms of which some analyses of Canadian politics have completely missed the substantive differences among the components of our political system.\textsuperscript{60} And finally, by studying activists we avoid the problems of over-simplification involved in pure voting study\textsuperscript{61} on the one hand and elite study on the other.\textsuperscript{62} Activists stand between these two extremes, providing an excellent vantage point from which to measure the differences that may, or may not, exist between the political culture as it is perceived by the population and the political culture as it is perceived by leaders. This, perhaps more than any other factor, should make the study of political subcultures in the activist 'laboratory' a worthwhile endeavor.

\textsuperscript{60} e.g. R. Alford, \textit{Party and Society} (Chicago, 1963).
\textsuperscript{61} e.g. John Miesel, ed., \textit{Papers on the 1962 Election} (Toronto, 1964).
\textsuperscript{62} e.g. John Porter, \textit{The Vertical Mosaic} (Toronto, 1965).
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Articles


APPENDIX A
VANCOUVER BURRARD NDP SUPPORTERS QUESTIONNAIRE
November, 1966

1. Date of birth  2. Sex  3. Place of birth

4. Length of residence in present home, in Vancouver area, in B.C., in Canada

5. Type of housing presently occupied: own your own home, rent house, rent apartment, rent rooms, live with parents

6. If you live with your parents, do they: own their home, rent house, rent apartment, other (specify)

7. Number of people in your household

8. Present occupation, length of employment at this job, average annual income at this job

Former occupations, length of employment, average annual income at each

9. Education history: elementary, secondary, technical/vocational, on-job-apprenticeship, university, postgrad

10. The people of this country are sometimes put into these classes. Which one would you say you belong to? upper middle, middle middle, lower middle, upper working, middle working, lower working

11. Religious affiliation (if none, please answer "none")

12. Trade union membership: present member, past member, never a member

13. Please list those voluntary associations of which you are a member. Examples: legions, chess clubs, discussion groups, Red Cross, or even ad hoc community action groups such as the Vietnam Day Committee

14. As far as you can remember, how old were you when you first became interested in politics? Was there any particular event which aroused your interest; if so, what was that event?

15. When did you join the CCF?NDP?
16. Why did you join?  17. After you joined, what was the first kind of work you did for the party?

18. Did you ever vote for another party in a federal election? If yes, which one? Did you ever vote for another party in a provincial election? If yes, which one?

19. Did you ever belong to another party? If yes, which one? Were you active? How long were you a member?

20. How much time each month would you estimate that you spend on party activity?

21. What offices have you held in the party?

22. What kinds of financial support do you give the party?

23. How much do you spend annually in your support of the party?

24. How many of your friends have you persuaded: to join, to vote for the NDP, to help in campaigns, to attend meetings or social events

25. If the NDP did not exist, what other party would you support?

26. What would be your reaction if union between the NDP and the Liberal party were proposed? (also Conservative)
   1. I would be pleased
   2. I would wait and see how it worked out
   3. I would work hard to prevent it

27. Do you know your candidates in the recent provincial election personally?

28. Do you know the president of your riding association personally?

29. How many of your close friends are members, supporters?

30. How often do you discuss politics with the following people:

   Parents                    very         infre-
   Wife/husband              often         quently
   Friends                   often         never
   Work-mates
   Casual acquaintances
31. In these discussions, do you most often discuss general party philosophy, specific issues.

32. Please answer the following questions for your FATHER:

1. Place of birth  
2. Ethnic origin  
3. Length of residence in present home, Vancouver, B.C., Canada  
4. Present occupation, present annual income, former occupations, annual income at each  
5. Education history  
6. In which of these social classes would you say your father belonged: upper middle, middle middle, lower middle, upper working, middle working, lower working  
7. Religious affiliation (if none, please answer "none")  
8. Trade union membership: present member, past member, never a member  
9. Party supported federally, party supported provincially  
10. Of which political party was/is your father a member, if any? Was/is he active? When did he join?

33. Please answer the following questions for your MOTHER:

(As above, except question 3 (length of residence) is not included.)

34. If married, please answer the following questions for your HUSBAND or WIFE. If not, for a CLOSE FRIEND.

(As above, circle which of these applies)

35. Compared with others, do you think that members of the NDP are very different, somewhat different, about the same?

36. Do you think that many people regard your party unfavorably?

37. Do you think other parties would like to: outlaw the NDP, curb its activities, do neither of these?

38. What would you say is meant by these terms:  
1. liberalism  
2. conservativism  
3. socialism

39. In the light of your answer to the question above, what would you say is, or is not, liberal about the Liberal party; conservative about the Conservative party; socialist about the NDP?

40. a. As briefly as you can, please explain what the words
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individual freedom mean to you.

b. In your opinion, what are the major obstacles to individual freedom in Canada today, if any?

41. In the realm of federal politics, here are some statements often used to describe the three main parties. For each statement, please check the party to which it applies most.

   1. Would make the country more prosperous
   2. Has a united team of top leaders
   3. Puts society as a whole first
   4. Favors the ambitious, capable individual
   5. Is most concerned with the standard of living of ordinary people
   6. Represents regional interests only
   7. Is out to help the underdog
   8. Would be most effective in working for peace
   9. Suffers from internal dissension
   10. Understands the national interest
   11. Stands mainly for the middle class
   12. Has the most independent foreign policy
   13. Is most sympathetic toward Quebec
   14. Stands mainly for the working class

42. Which level of politics interests you most: federal, provincial, both

43. Below is a list of various traits of character. Please check the party with which you think each trait is identified. Please think in terms of federal politics, and in each case, check the party that comes first to your mind so that you have only one answer for each trait.

   1. humanitarianism
   2. success
   3. idealism
   4. maturity
   5. hypocrisy
   6. caution
   7. optimism
   8. conformity
   9. open-mindedness
   10. independence of mind
   11. realism
   12. selfishness
   13. youth
   14. opportunism
44. As in the question above, please check the party you think each of the following would support. Again, please check just one federal party for each type.

(This question was arranged as 41 and 43 above, with the following groups listed: English immigrants, school teachers, Jews, retired people, wealthy businessmen, young executives, women, factory workers, Catholics, bankers, doctors, Protestants, lawyers, university professors, European immigrants, in that order.)

45. Please mark, as indicated in the example below, the position on left-right scale which you think is most appropriate for each word given:

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(These terms were listed, in the following order: United Nations, patriotism, Social Credit, Canada, the future, Liberal party, China, Conservative party, change, individualism, Catholic, United States, tradition, opportunity, father, Protestant, the past, mother, pacifism, Jew, equality, self, NDP, Germany, France.)

46. Suppose you were taking part in a discussion on politics and it was necessary for you to take sides. Below are a number of the issues being discussed. In each case, the two sides of the argument are given. Please check the side you tend to support.

1. If you changed society so that nobody had any more than anybody else, it wouldn't be long before there were rich and poor once again.

   Almost all the problems of society would be solved if society were changed so that nobody could have any more than anybody else.

2. There is no great need for reform of the trade unions.

   Radical reform is needed if trade unions are to continue to contribute to the betterment of society.

3. Nationalism is essential if societies are to be organized to work toward common goals.

   In the long run, nationalism can never benefit mankind.
4. Our first responsibility is to ourselves. If everyone looked after his own affairs properly, this would be a better world.

We must sacrifice our own advantage to help those who cannot help themselves if we want to live in a better world.

5. Man is capable of creating a truly cooperative society, eventually.

Man has a competitive instinct and a need for material incentive; therefore, a cooperative society is only an unattainable ideal.

6. Socialism is a changing doctrine capable of adjusting to modern conditions and modern ideas.

Socialism today is unwilling to challenge the foundations of the system, resting content with welfare state palliatives.

7. The present tendency toward strong provincial government and a weak federal government is probably good for Canada.

The provincial governments are seeking too much power; only a strong federal government can do the job.

8. Private ownership of property should be done away with.

Home-owning serves an important function by giving people a real feeling of responsibility, a stake in the community.

9. Even in the best of all possible worlds, wars are inevitable.

It would be possible to have a world without wars.

47. Please list the preconditions for a world without wars, as you see them.

48. In your opinion, what are the major problems facing Canada today?
APPENDIX B

ACTIVISTS PERCEPTION OF SELF, NDP AND OTHER 'CUES'

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