The British Retreat: 1760-1770.

by

John Mackenzie Norris.

ABSTRACT

of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the department of

HISTORY

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ABSTRACT.

In the years between 1760 and 1770 the British nation and empire underwent a profound change in structure and function. Some of the change was made necessary by the survival of old institutions and of old forms of still vital institutions beyond the point of obsolescence, while some came as a result of contemporary disruption in the life of the nation.

Obsolescence was particularly apparent in the administrative structure of the Empire, the so-called mercantilist system. The beliefs of mercantilism were largely inherited from the ecclesiastical society of the Middle Ages. Thus, while individualism and nationalism triumphed over Church in the sixteenth century, the idea of regulation, now adopted by the national state, continued to suppress economic individualism for two centuries longer. Imperial self-sufficiency was the ideal of the mercantilist theorists, and in an attempt to achieve this end, direct control by the mother country of the political and economic activities of all parts of the Empire was instituted. As the Empire expanded, however, it became increasingly more difficult to maintain this control. Special local complications, particularly in the cases of Ireland and India, aggravated the problem. Finally, the challenge of political and economic independence in America was successful in bringing to an end the old imperial system.

In the mother country public life was dominated by the Revolution Settlement of 1688, and needed reforms were neglected. Parliament was unrepresentative of the majority of the nation and local government and local interests were far too powerful in relation to national government and national interests. In politics, party differences had been dissolved in 1688 as a result of the nation's need for tranquility. Political life became a struggle, not for principles, but for
patronage and place, between factions of the now-predominant Whig Party. The corruption in politics at this juncture was without precedent in English history.

In addition to these factors of obsolescence and decay, there were a number of disruptive influences which prevented the tranquil reform and change of institutions. A determined monarch was successful for a time in subverting the new institution of responsible government through cabinet. Out of the confusion thus caused, the political parties of the nineteenth century were simultaneously being developed. New classes were arising to seize political power, as a result of the economic revolution of the eighteenth century. In addition, the exhaustion of the nation, resulting from the Seven Years' War, aggravated the disruption.

The economic organization of the nation was also in a state of dynamic change. In agriculture, the expansion of markets and the increase of population forced the adoption of new techniques and a new economic structure for farming on a large scale. This expansion, in turn, made necessary new marketing and price systems and an improved communication system. The chief economic phenomenon of the era, however, was the industrial revolution. The old domestic system of industry had been disintegrating since the beginning of the century, and, in any case, expanded markets demanded a larger scale of production than the old system could achieve. By 1770, the two principal phenomena of industrialism, capitalism and the factory system, were widespread in the nation. Power machinery was applied to industry, and with this application the location of industry was shifted northwards. Moreover, a new individualist economic philosophy was developing, which rejected not only control by the state, but also the responsibility of the individual to the community as a whole. The new influence was reflected in such various aspects of the life of the times as taxation policy, parliamentary reform,
the law, trade unionism, the factory system and the poor law. Its most alarming result was the profound social schism created in the nation.

In her empire, in her public life and in her economy, Britain was at a crossroads in the first decade of the reign of George III. If the transition was to be successful she needed peace, prosperity and order. The decade, however, was one of struggle, depression and disruption. The result was a retreat in British public life.
Argument

In the years between 1760 and 1770 the British nation and empire declined in strength and at the close of the decade was already set on the path which led to Yorktown and the Peace of Versailles. Many of the root causes of this decline are to be found in the empire itself, and these causes have been emphasized in studies of the period, to the disregard of those factors of disruption to be found in the mother country. A study of these latter factors, in conjunction with an examination of the breakdown in the administration of the empire as a whole, is the purpose of this thesis.

The basic system of imperial administration of the time was mercantilism. A study of this system is necessary to an understanding of the eighteenth century decline of the empire. The main burden of government was centred in the mother country, and as the empire grew, so did the weight of government. In the first decade of the reign of George III, this weight became too great for the mother country to support, and her collapse was hastened by political, economic and social dislocations at home. The struggle between the royal executive and the forces of popular representative government was in its final stage, with the royal executive temporarily in the ascendant. The agricultural and industrial revolutions were in their primary, or essentially disruptive
stage, and their long-term benefits had not yet begun to make themselves felt. Finally, a schism was developing between the various classes of English society, largely as a result of the two preceding factors. Thus a general retreat was forced upon the British people in this decade.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part A. The Mercantilist Empire</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I. The Theory and Structure of Mercantilism</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II. The Breakdown of the Mercantilist Empire: 1760-1770</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part B. The Political Crisis: 1760-1770</th>
<th>149</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III. Setting the Stage: 1760-1763</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV. The Royal Prerogative</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V. The Popular Power</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI. Transition in Parties</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part C. Economic and Social Disruption</th>
<th>336</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII. The Revolution in Agriculture and Transportation</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VIII. The Revolution in Industry</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IX. The Revolution in Economic Philosophy and the Social Schism</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion | 430 |

Bibliography | 437 |
When one has been used to glory under Mr. Pitt, I sigh to think how he and we are fallen! We are afraid to meddle even in Corsica, though the French have so woefully miscarried there; and we enjoy half the empire of the Mogul only to traffic on India stock! We are no longer great any way. We have no great men; no great orators, writers or poets. One would think they had all been killed in the last war. Nay, our very actors are uncommonly bad. I saw a new tragedy the other night, that was worse played, though at Drury Lane, than by any strollers I ever beheld; and yet they are good enough for the new pieces (1).

So spoke Horace Walpole, barely six years after the victorious Peace of Paris, at which Britain had been confirmed in the position she had won during the Seven Years' War as the most powerful nation in the world. In 1763 her armies had stood everywhere on conquered soil. Half a continent had been subdued through the leadership of Pitt's "Young Men." In the East, Clive had set her on the road to the subjugation of India, and its wealth began to pour into the British Treasury. The French West Indies, Cuba and the Philippines had all been wrested from the withered hand of the Bourbon Alliance. William Pitt presided, as the war lord par excellence, over an empire that had never seemed so rich and powerful and so secure as then.

Yet, six years later, Walpole, in this case at least a reliable witness, declares: "We are no longer great any way..."! The decline was apparent. The heritage of Pitt

appeared to have been wasted and Pitt himself had declined into partial insanity. The leadership of Rockinghams and Graftons could not fill the place of the "Great Commoner." Yet the age was not barren of leaders, though they seemed powerless to control events. And the events and forces? What were these which, in six short years, had reduced the most powerful of nations to moral and social bankruptcy, and were to reduce her still further?

It will be the purpose of this study to outline some of these forces and to show how, in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, Britain was set upon the path that led to the worst defeat in her history.

Many of the causes of this decline were to be found in the method of governing the empire, under the mercantilist system, which was then the basic pattern of imperial administration. The system involved essentially a centralization of control, which, together with weaknesses, inherent and inherited, gradually made the burden of government unbearable for the mother country. Yet weaknesses in the public life of the mother country were also contributing factors. Politically, a decline was hastened by the struggle between popular power and the royal executive, with the latter temporarily in the ascendent. Economically, the complacent pattern of mercantilist domestic economics was being shattered by the Industrial and Agricultural Revolutions, in their initial, and essentially disruptive stages. Socially, a schism was widen-
ing between the various classes of the English people, and the process was to continue and increase in scope.
Part A. The Mercantilist Empire

Adam Smith's criticism of the mercantilist system in the fourth book of the Wealth of Nations established the nature of its commercial aspects for a long time as essentially gold-getting and gold-keeping. The animadversions cast on the system's colonial aspects by nineteenth century liberals, living in an easier age of deadly certainties, are even more notorious. Both Smith and the "Little Englanders" received the doubtful tribute of having their errors perpetuated in the thinking of succeeding generations of scholars.

Fortunately, in the interest of fairness and historical accuracy, economic historians have imposed extensive modifications on the picture of mercantilism in its economic aspects. Yet the old colonial empire still remains, for many political historians, as the embodiment of all that is evil in imperial administration. The dominance of American nationalist historians in the field is probably the chief reason for this situation. Prominent British and continental historians, however, without the obvious demands of making a case for their own nations, have to a great extent failed to revise the standard conclusions in the light of recent modifications in imperial theory.

Mercantilism was not the epitome of narrow-minded power politics that it has often been pictured. Nor was it
the ultimate sophistication of economic and social development which its contemporary supporters declared it to be. It was essentially a way of life and a method of directing the efforts of the community to what was supposed to be its greater welfare. It possessed a moral foundation to a far greater degree than the succeeding system of laissez-faire. Its mistakes grew largely out of the times in which it flourished, and its triumphs were no less triumphs because they were achieved in the name of national aggrandizement.
Chapter I.

The Theory and Structure of Mercantilism

"For where your treasury is, there will your heart be also." Matthew, VI, 21.

Mercantilism, though it implied in many of its aspects a conscious control over the activities of the individual, cannot be said to have had a conscious body of doctrine (2). The philosophy underlying it, however, was admittedly one of centralization, and was the chief heritage from the Middle Ages to the commercial era.

The first major inheritance from the Middle Ages was the national state. The creation and growth of the state, in fact, paralleled that of commercial policy and it was significant for the future of mercantilism that the original form of the state was an absolute monarchy. Actually, the degree to which mercantilism was devoted to the cause of

(2) The discovery of the existence of a body of mercantilist belief was made in the eighteenth century by men who found security for their own faith in a system of natural law. The bond of mutual sympathy among these observers was created far less by any similarity in their practical recommendations than by their common distrust of the current expedients of statecraft in Western Europe ... It was perhaps only natural that they should seek to strengthen the outlines of their own proposals by systematizing the theories which they discovered lurking behind the institutions that came under their fire.

national unification was limited, and almost entirely unconscious. The lack of organization in economic matters at the close of the Middle Ages was apparent, and the mediaeval centralizing influences were adopted as a result of habit.

During Tudor times, the real commercial policy was formulated in the Navigation Acts, commencing with that of 1540. On the domestic scene, the Statute of Artificers of 1563 and the Elizabethan Poor Law supported industry and maintained a labour force for it. It was of importance, however, in the character of mercantilism in the future, that such measures were instituted at the high point of monarchial absolutism in England.

The national administrative machinery also developed, evolving outwards and downwards from the Crown to the Council, to Parliament, and to the first representatives of modern local government, the justices of the peace. Thus, both the economic and political aspects of the new age, beginning at the same starting point, evolved in different directions, the one inwardly, the other outwardly. As the scope of political government control widened, the necessity for delegation of power became apparent. Economic government, however, and with it the administration of the overseas empire, was subject to the demands of rivalries among the states of Europe, and centralization became all-important. Economically, inter-state relations were the primary concern of the mercantilists, and these had repercussions in
domestic and imperial policy. It was to be the fatal weakness of the imperial administration that, considering the weakening force of geographic diffusion, no recognition of the necessity to delegate authority, such as had been realized in the national political sphere, was or could be successfully made in the imperial or economic spheres.

As late as the end of the fourteenth century, the comprehensible world for Europeans consisted of their own continent, with the fringes of Africa and Asia. Outside this was the misty, half-legendary realm of the tales of Marco Polo and Prester John. Then, as the latent energy of mediaevalism burst into the full flower of the Renaissance, Europe broke its bounds. Henry the Navigator and his Portuguese pirate-explorers like Diaz and da Gama, pioneered the long route around Africa to India. The Atlantic became a part of the world, as Columbus, Cabot, Verrazzano, Cabral and their successors followed in the tracks of numberless and nameless Norse and Breton mariners to the “New” world. The Far East was discovered again, and the riches of both Indies poured in to give the Iberian peninsula a fleeting prosperity, and all western Europe a new commercial outlook; and later, in the seventeenth century, with commerce, came empire and the imperial idea.

For England, the creation of the Board of Trade and Plantations in 1696 marks the transition from a national to an imperial system. By that date England possessed an
empire, small in area, but spread in the form of coastal settlements almost around the globe. The power of the old absolute monarchy had declined, and the new settlement of the "Glorious Revolution" had brought tranquility to the nation and transferred the real power of the state into the hands of a parliamentary oligarchy. Yet the old mores of centralized absolutism continued to influence imperial policy for another half century.

Another heritage from the Middle Ages was, of course, the origin of the commercial idea itself. From the end of the Middle Ages, the twin foundations of commerce, money and credit, had been developing to replace the old limited barter trade. More and larger goods, better transportation and a new supply of precious metals, all combined to increase the volume of trade and introduce the new system. Banks and exchanges developed as international trade grew, and in England the change was marked by the transition of the nation from passive to active trading. With this change there came a new realization of economic nationalism, which was translated, eventually and haphazardly, into government action.

The merchant, moving among foreigners as he does, requires organized assistance more than the farmer or landowner. In addition, trade is social in its nature, requiring the intercommunication of peoples, while agriculture begins and ends with self-sufficiency. Trade must therefore be much more the subject of legislation. The urban trading
element is almost always over-represented in government, and long after the mercantilist system passes into discard, it continues to dominate governmental economic activity.

In addition to activity by the state, trade was pushed abroad by the survivals of its mediaeval predecessors, the guilds, and newer organizations, such as the Merchant Adventurers and the chartered monopolies became active for this purpose. Finally, the ultimate complexity and anchor of the mercantilist trading system, the Staple, was developed.(3)

The regulation of trade also owed much to mediaeval precedents. There had been an orderly control of the small-scale trade of that era through the precepts of Canon Law. The so-called "just price" placed a limit on profit, and under the Great Summa, usury was forbidden and the theoretical guide for all contracts was moral justification. This left a heritage of order and control in trade matters, which the mercantilist system very quickly adopted.

(3) A Staple or Magasin for forraign Corn, Indigo, Spices, Raw-silks, Cotton wool or any other commodity whatsoever, to be imported will increase Shipping, Trade, Treasure, and the King's customs, by exporting them again where need shall require, which course of Trading, hath been the chief mean to raise Venice, Genoa, the low Countreys, with some others; and for such a purpose England stands most commodiously, wanting nothing to this performance but our own diligence and endeavour.
Under the new regime, problems were discussed rationally, without reference to religious tradition, and the distinction between ethical and economic considerations was clearly drawn. The obsessions of the eighteenth century were with property, contract, trade and profits. Locke, the chief philosopher of the age, saw the main purpose of government as being the protection of property, but his definition of "property" included life and liberty as well as worldly goods, and was not narrowed to that materialist profit-protecting concept of nineteenth century theorists.

The collection of interest on loans, without restriction, was now accepted, the moral prohibition on usury having no application to the necessity of profit. The mercantilist, however, still looked to a higher authority to set the rate of interest. Unlike the supporter of *laissez-faire* in the next age, but like the mediaevalist, the mercantilist did not believe in a "predetermined harmony in the nature of economic phenomena."(4) There was no guarantee that unregulated trade would promote the best interests of the state, and it might lead to chaos. Attempts at regulation were often ill-founded, but the mercantilist believed that the desirable economy could be achieved if the proper steps were taken. When mistakes were made, the conclusion drawn was not that there had been too much regulation, but that the

regulation had been inadequate or badly directed.

Externally, the guiding principle behind the management of foreign trade was a favourable balance of trade. The classic expression of this canon is that of Thomas Mun in the seventeenth century.

The ordinary means ... to increase our wealth and treasure is by Forraign Trade, wherein wee must ever observe this rule; to sell more to strangers yearly than wee consume of theirs in value ... because that part of our stock which is not returned to us in wares must necessarily be brought home in treasure (5).

Dazzled by the huge flow of bullion to Spain and Portugal, monarchs were prepared to accept the advice of those experts who called for a high tariff policy to ensure a favourable balance of trade. Very early in the seventeenth century, prohibitions were enforced on the export of articles considered to be of paramount importance in the nation's bid for economic power, among them bullion, naval stores and raw wool. Bounties were laid on the export of corn and of certain manufactures, and duties were imposed on certain foreign and exotic products which were considered expensive luxuries. English shipping was protected by the Navigation Acts which ensured special privileges to English ships in English ports, a monopoly in the Indian and colonial trades, and the exclusive English composition of the crews of English ships (6).


(6) The value of our exportation likewise may be much advanced when we perform it ourselves in our own ships, for then we get not only the price of our wares as they
Colonization was encouraged for national gain, as expressed in many of the colonial charters. Prestige was one motive for this expansion, but the expectation of finding new sources of supply in the colonies must be regarded as the most potent argument offered in favour of English colonization (7). Certainly in regard to naval stores, salt sugar, tobacco, spices and dyestuffs, there was a great urge to obtain control of the source of supply, hitherto in continental or Levantine hands. In the eighteenth century this purpose was carried into effect with the great overseas conquests, but the desire for these exotic products remained, and those colonies which did not supply them were largely neglected, or discriminated against.

For England the need for new markets was also pressing, since her manufacturing industry, especially in the case of woollens, was increasing at a time when the frequency of continental wars made her regular markets especially precarious. By the eighteenth century, this need too was approaching satisfaction, but commercial greed outlasted the considerations of high policy, and there was still a very real appreciation of the value of empire in the trade structure.

(6) cont'd. - are worth here, but also the Merchant gains the charges of ensurance and freight to carry them beyond the seas. Mun, England's treasure by forraign trade, p. 11.

(7) Knorr, K.E., British colonial theories, p. 55.
Previous to 1660, the political and economic theorists in England placed the chief emphasis on over-population as a reason for colonization. The drain of excess population to the colonies was not only accepted, but encouraged. With the influx of large supplies of precious metals from the American continents, there was widespread misery among the labouring classes, while the wage-levels lagged in adjustment. The consequent unemployment was therefore a major factor in emphasizing the belief in over-population (8). The current horror of unemployment, and especially of the social unrest arising therefrom, certainly inspired many of the colonization schemes of the period. It was only with the Civil War that doubts as to the sufficiency of the English population seemed to acquire any substantial support. Fifty years later the fears of under-population dominated all colonial theories. Sir William Petty even urged the return of the population of New England to the mother country (9). The belief had grown up that maximum production required a maximum producing population, and that since there was a labour shortage in Britain, colonial settlement should be discouraged. Other mercantilists, however, successfully urged that the overseas population should be employed in the national interest, thereby eliminating the undesirable aspects of migration.

(8) Knorr, British colonial theories, p. 45.
Internally, once the stagnation of the Middle Ages had been overcome, the prices and quality of goods could not longer be closely regulated in the widespread domestic industry. Officers of search and inspection were still employed, however. Labour was subject to the Statute of Artificers, which regulated wages, usually at a subsistence level. The Elizabethan Poor Law, in support of the doctrine of production for the nation, declared the obligation of the able-bodied to engage in productive labour, and provision was made for training under the Statute of Apprentices. In addition, spasmodic attempts were made to control consumption (10). In this connection, tariff legislation was used to restrain a taste for foreign luxuries. The establishment of political liberty among the upper classes, those who were the greatest consumers of such luxuries, made the administration of the regulations impossible. There was, however, a higher degree of success in the colonies in this connection.

(10) ... there is exported communibus annis of our own native commodities for the value of twenty two hundred pounds sterling, or somewhat more; so that if we were not too much affected to Pride, monstrous Fashions, and Riot, above all other Nations, one million and a half of pounds might plentifully supply our unnecessary wants (as I may term them) of Silks, Sugars, Spices, Fruits and others; so that seven hundred thousand pounds might be yearly treasured up in money to make the Kingdome exceeding rich and powerful in a short time. Mun, England's treasure by forraign trade, pp.98-99.
A study of the amorphous body of philosophy which has been called the doctrine of mercantilism must necessarily view its beliefs from their three points of application, namely: the control of foreign trade, the regulation of the domestic economy, and the management of the colonial empire. The three, of course, were interrelated. The control of the domestic economy was advocated, not only as a survival of the mediaeval concern for a well-balanced social and economic structure, but also to assist in the promotion of foreign trade. Encouragement of colonial ventures was a corollary of the other aspects, since such colonies were intended to assist and strengthen the mother country in its drive for economic and commercial dominance.

Mercantilist theory on foreign trade begins with the bullionist school. This school held to the elementary notion that precious metals meant wealth and that the accumulation thereof increased the national prosperity and power. As early as the reign of Henry VI, the government required gold to be paid into the Mint whenever payment was received for a sale abroad (11). There was also a general policy of support for those trades which brought bullion into the nation.

By the end of the sixteenth century, the growing complexity of international trade had introduced the system of exchange as a major factor in trade. The fluctuation of

(11) Buck, The politics of mercantilism, p. 22.
such exchanges, however, introduced a complication which caused Gerard de Malynes and others to urge the necessity of management of the exchanges by the state, for the protection of the nation's bullion hoard. They were answered by Edward Misselden, in *The circle of commerce* and other pamphlets, in which he declared that the nation should manage the general balance of trade but not interfere with exchanges. This was substantially Mun's view also and received further support from such later economists as Sir William Temple, and Sir James Steuart (12).

The nationalist characteristics which the doctrine came to assume, demanded the use of tariffs, bounties, prohibitions and enumerations, and eventually the extensive control of domestic manufacture and raw materials. Sir James Steuart's declaration of this argument is typical of the eighteenth century attitude to the enlarged scope of controls.

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(12) Both Mun and Misselden were connected with the East India Company, and it was in defence of the Company's spice trade that they wrote. That organization had adopted the hitherto unprecedented practice of paying in gold for its products, being assured that their sale in Europe would bring considerably more than the value of the gold exported and that ultimately the balance in "Treasure" would be in favour of England. This chief tenet of the new "Balance of Trade School" is outlined in the fourth chapter of *England's treasure by foreign trade*. 
The whole purport of this plan is to point out the operation of three very easy principles. The first, That in a country entirely taken up with the object of promoting foreign trade, no competition should be allowed to come from abroad for articles of the first necessity, and principally for food, so as to raise prices beyond a certain standard. The second, That no domestic competition should be allowed articles of superfluity, so as to raise prices beyond a certain standard. The third, That when these standards cannot be preserved, and that from natural causes, prices get above them, public money must be thrown into the scale to bring prices to the level of those exportations (13).

The barometer of prosperity for this new school of mercantilists, therefore, was the balance of trade rather than mere gain in treasure.

Treasure itself was, however, important as the chief asset in time of war, furnishing the means of provisioning the armed forces at short notice. In peacetime, gold and silver constituted a far larger proportion of the currency base than they do at present. Precious metals, outside the framework of exchange, were regarded as factors of production, yielding interest as land yields rent. The greater the quantity in the country, the lower the interest rate. Inside the exchange structure, however, increased quantity meant increased circulation, and unless the productive level rose, there would be a general rise in the price level. Such high prices were recognized as stimuli to trade, though they limited the fluidity of exports. Treasure to the mercantilist,

therefore, was a useful index of the national economic welfare. Mun even saw in its acquisition the chief determinant of domestic land values (14).

The development of the balance of trade theory, moreover, was limited to some degree by the belief that there was only a fixed amount of trade in the world and that the nation must gain as large a share as possible for itself. Thus, Sir William Temple declares:

... it seems to be with trade, as with the sea (its element) that has a certain pitch above which it never rises in the highest tides, and begins to ebb, as soon as ever it ceases to flow; and even loses ground in one place, proportionable to what it gains in another (15).

Trade, the later mercantilists believed, was the only true source of national wealth and the chief yardstick of a nation's economic welfare. Yet the proper regulation of trade was impossible without the regulation of the nation's domestic economy.

The regulation of the domestic economy was an extremely complicated undertaking, since it involved a more direct contact with the bulk rather than with a section of the people, and was, moreover, in unfavourable contrast to the steady progression toward political liberty. In addition, a wide variety of schemes had to be evolved to control such aspects of the national life as industry, labour, agriculture, and the domestic consumption.

Externally, industry was assisted by the imposition of tariffs, as trade had been directed by such imposition. Protection for home industry and the prohibition of certain foreign imports was the goal. There was a belief that exports should be, as far as possible, manufactures, both because manufactures; by reason of the value of the labour put into them, were supposedly of greater value than raw materials (16), and because the export of raw materials provided rivals with the means of production.

In addition, raw materials were to be secured as easily and advantageously as possible, and convenient home industries, which might hold a near-monopoly in production, were to be protected at all costs. Of such a type was the English woollen industry. Much of the controversy of the earlier years of mercantilism centred around woollen manufacture. The exportation of raw wool was continuously forbidden. Despite these regulations, however, a lucrative smuggling trade grew up in wool, and it was calculated that by 1760, nearly half the wool crop of England was being smuggled abroad (17). Such a loss caused the orthodox mercantilist grave concern, and it was even urged that the atrociously neglected Irish woollen industry should be controlled and protected in the interests of the English manufacturer.

Besides encouraging export, the mercantilist wished to preserve the home market for home producers, and throughout the eighteenth century writers condemned the entrance of foreign textiles to England, especially those from India. The silk weavers were at a constant disadvantage, since the French and Italian products were superior in quality and cheaper in price. Other industries, such as leather, tin and iron, also sought, at different times, to come under the wing of the protective tariff system. Foreign imports were to be marked for re-exportation wherever possible. This general attitude toward protection was a part of the historical sequence of attitudes toward commodities, as outlined by Professor Heckscher. The merchant desires mere exchange, while the consumer wishes access to an ample supply and the producer favours restriction. In historical sequence, these are represented by the staple and provision policies (characterized by the prohibition on the export of corn) of the Middle Ages; and by the protective policy (the limitation on imports) which comes as mediaevalism decays, and is the dominant feature of mercantilism—"the fear of goods," as Heckscher calls it (18).

The mercantilists urged the state to action, not only with respect to those industries already existing, but also to those to be created or to be revived. In the fishing industry, so vital to the maritime dominance of England, the

Dutch had long maintained a lead. It was often proposed to set the unemployed to work in the industry, though little was done in this respect, the hard, uncomfortable life of a fisherman being universally unpopular with all but those trained to it. Certainly the neglect of the Irish fisheries, during the long, hungry decades of the eighteenth century, was inexcusable, though here the problem of personnel was even greater than in England. During Elizabeth's reign fish days were proclaimed, but these had been allowed to lapse under the Stuarts. By 1670, proposals were even being made that the state should take over the industry outright, advancing it money for its operations and regulating those operations (19).

Sometimes the method of setting up a monopoly was adopted, and through it the government controlled the industry. This method became, in fact, a useful part of the Stuarts' fiscal evasions in their search for an independent income. The method's application to colonization is perhaps its best known phase. By 1700 it had become discredited and various plans for encouraging invention and bonusing enterprise were suggested. Steuart's plan may be taken as typical of these later suggestions:

(19) Buck, The politics of mercantilism, p.35
The ruling principle, therefore ... is to encourage the manufacturing of every branch of natural productions, by extending the home consumption of them; by excluding all competition with strangers; by permitting the rise of profits, so far as to promote dexterity and emulation in invention and improvement; by relieving the industrious of their work, as often as demand for it falls short, and until it can be exported to advantage, it may be exported with loss, at the expense of the public. To spare no expense in procuring the ablest masters in every branch of industry, nor any cost in making the first establishments; providing machines and every other thing necessary to make the undertaking succeed. (20)

By such assistance, however, the state purchased rights of control in the interest of establishing standards of form and quality which would ensure markets abroad, would keep a favourable balance of trade and would protect the home consumer. The need of state interference for economic strength rather than for imposing the Canonist code of the "just price" was the purpose of such regulation, however. The marketing of goods also needed regulation.

The real concern of the government, however, was with enterprise. Capital and investment (treasure) was only significant when put to work. Hence the mediaeval precedent of the regulation of usury was used in the regulation of investment. Interest rates were kept low enough to make capital available to the merchant imperialists of Britain. High interest was now, not a mortal sin as in the Middle Ages, but a political offense. Even John Locke essayed to enter the economic lists against high interest with his

Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest (1691). A national bank and mobilization of public credit were envisaged as a means of controlling usury to the national benefit. The concern with interest rates was the result of the recognition of the importance of trading capital. Mun wanted treasure to drive England's trade; James Steuart wanted low interest to stimulate domestic manufacturing.

In the control of the factors of this production, mercantilists believed labour to be one of the most productive of all resources. It was therefore important that labour be regulated for the maximum production. Theoretically, it could be dealt with far more easily than other factors of production since it was not "produced," and therefore did not involve questions of economic principle in its regulation (21). The chief, and almost only principle was that wages should be kept as low as possible, with the largest possible population in productive employment.

Since the factory system had not developed, such regulation was tantamount to regulation of the whole process of production. Manufactures were believed, because of the value of their labour, to be of more value than raw materials. Hence it was incumbent upon the nation to have as large a producing population as possible, to ensure the greatest economic strength. One worker was considered as good as another before the advent of machines, so that numbers rather

than quality were striven after. Population was encouraged, especially after 1700, when the older belief that England was over-populated seems to have been dropped (22).

Yet if the people were to work the state must provide training, force the poor to accept employment, care for the indigent and regulate wages. The belief that the Industrial Revolution created child labour is a fallacy. In the mercantilist view no child was too young to go to work. Such writers as Coke and Gee had many suggestions as to workhouses, apprenticeships and similar measures to make sure that people worked. The doctrine was, of course, accompanied by that of low wages.

In agriculture, the chief effort was concentrated upon increasing the area of tillage, to make the kingdom self-sufficient in food, especially in the cheap food consumed by workers who produced for export. Attempts were made to reclaim land, with only moderate success, but also, and more important, improvement in farming methods was sponsored. Between 1500 and 1800 English farming became modern.

(22) It is multitudes of People, and good Laws, such as cause an increase of People, which principally Enrich any Country; and if we retrench by Law the Labour of People, we drive them from us to other Countries that give better Rates, and so the Dutch have drained us of our Sea-men and wollen Manufacturers; and We, the French of their artificers and Silk Manufacturers. Child, Sir Josiah, A new discourse on trade (1694), p.xi.
Manor farms with strip farming and very few head of stock promised little possibility of progress or development. A larger unit of operation and greater freedom of tenure were required before significant advances could be made in agricultural science. The obvious solution was the enclosure of the waste commons and an increase in the unit of production. Enclosures began in the fifteenth century with a few sheep walks, but it was not until the eighteenth century that the enclosure movement really became a major economic and social factor. Mercantilists, wishing greater national production, supported the movement, and the equity and the social consequences were largely forgotten. Adam Moore, in his pamphlet, *Bread for the poor* (1653), even thought that the nation might profit by the discipline on the poor and idle that would result from the disruption of the enclosure movement (23).

The various corn laws also reflected the growth toward government supervision. In the reign of Elizabeth the mediaeval ban on the export of corn was lifted. Under Charles I its export was bountied. Eighteenth century legislation restricted imports of corn and continued to encourage export. Actually, the great population increase during the century and the industrial developments which far outpaced those in agriculture, caused an overall shortage of food in

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the nation which, at times, became acute (24). Consumers' interests were guarded to some extent by giving clerks of the market power over sale prices and practices in the trade, but the opposition of the provision merchants on one side, and the lack of concern for the poorer class of consumer on the other, prevented any really beneficial regulation being instituted. Despite this failure, mercantilist support of agriculture was linked, in theory at least, to the doctrines on trade and wages - the price of labour, regulated by the price of food, would be reduced with better agriculture and render manufactures cheaper to produce.

In order to make the control of the domestic economy complete it remained only to regulate domestic consumption.

Would you believe that such a granary as England has been in as much danger as your mountains? not of famine, but of riots. The demands for corn have occasioned so much to be exported, that our farmers went on raising the price of wheat till the poor could not buy bread; indeed, they will eat none but the best ...

Yesterday the King, by the unanimous voice of his Council, took upon him to lay an embargo which was never done before in time of peace. It will make much clamour among the interested, both in interest and politics; but in general it will be popular. The dearness of everything is enormous and intolerable, for the country is so rich it makes everybody poor.

Walpole, Horace. Letters, Vol. VII, p.42. To Horace Mann, Sept. 25, 1766. Walpole's minimizing of the effects of the corn shortage is by no means an accurate picture of the situation, though his diagnosis of its inflationary secondary effects is reliable.
It was proposed to increase income and at the same time decrease expenditure in the interests of national trade. Political considerations, previously referred to, prevented any well-organized system of rationing. The more immoral or extravagant expenditures could, however, be regulated with a certain degree of popular support, through the so-called sumptuary laws. The mediaeval Canonists had used such legislation in the interests of morality. The sentiment of the mercantilists, however, as stated by Bishop Berkeley, was to the effect that if sins of extravagance must be committed, they should be committed with the produce of and to the benefit of one's own country (25). Sumptuary laws, too, by restraining expenditure, could make more revenue available for taxation. In summary, however, the ultimate effect of the sumptuary laws, in contrast to the mediaeval justification for them, was to justify luxury, and to stimulate it, irrespective of the status of the purchaser, in all cases where it guaranteed a market for the country's products, and put money into circulation.

The third aspect of orthodox mercantilism was the regulation of the empire. In part, the mercantilist imperial organization was an outgrowth of the mercantilist domestic structure, though the main outlines of mercantilist doctrine

did not crystallize until the acquisition of an overseas empire brought the demand for a larger economic system. Control of trade was considered just as important to the empire as to the mother country, and it was hoped to build up a unit, powerful economically and politically, but also serving the old mediaeval function of providing a well-balanced social and economic integration. The navigation policy was used to adjust the relationship of the new territories to the old, and fit the plantations into the scheme.

The best argument for the navigation laws was, of course, defence. Even Adam Smith admitted that: "As defence, however, is much more important than opulence, the Act of Navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England." (26) The close affinity of the merchantman to the man-of-war made the merchant marine the nursery of the navy, and its support was vital to the security of the maritime power.

The economic defence of the Acts followed the argument that the high shipping rates (for Britain had the highest shipping rates of any of the great powers), would accrue to the benefit of Britishers and not to that of foreigners, even though the goods would, in the end, be more expensive. The laws, in this connection, had a special significance for the colonies. The task of the mother country was to protect the colonies, but they must ensure her

commercial advantages, and particularly, were they to direct their productive effort along lines beneficial to the mother country. Thus, with the exception of colonial defence, it was economic rather than political motives which directed policy. The system, the purpose of which was the power of the state, indicated in other aspects a primary concern with the principle of self-sufficiency (27).

Mercantilists applied the fundamental concept of British self-sufficiency to their relations with the colonies.

This desire to free England from the necessity of purchasing from foreigners formed the underlying basis of English commercial and colonial expansion; it led directly to the formation of the East India Company and to the colonization of America." (28)

Production overseas came to be regarded, generally, as British production, and such production was often more profitable to the various individuals concerned (both manufacturers and merchants), than it would have been had it been located in the mother country. Such diffusion of industry, however, was generally discouraged as much as possible, for the mercantilist ideal of a unitary empire demanded that the factors of economic power should be concentrated where they could most easily be brought to bear in the battle for European economic dominance, that is, in the mother country.

The idea of an overseas empire had a further difficulty, in that it might depopulate the mother country.

This belief grew up in the eighteenth century, where before, emigration had been encouraged to rid the country of its permanently destitute and disaffected elements. The return of such population was impossible. Mercantilist thought, therefore, rationalized the situation, accepting the existence of the plantations and their population as an added productive unit, self-supporting and contributing a great deal toward the self-sufficiency of Britain also.

More was expected from the colonies, however, than mere exotic goods and tropical products. They were to be lucrative suppliers of such necessities as naval stores, foodstuffs and raw materials, and were to provide valuable manufactures. The power of the state was therefore invoked to monopolize this valuable trade for the mother country, through the navigation laws and a huge and expensive customs structure.

Industry and manufacture in the colonies also required regulation, lest there be colonial competition with similar endeavours at home. A distinction was made between the plantations and colonies which produced commodities different from those produced in the mother country and those which were, to some degree, in competition with her. Thus the tropical and sub-tropical colonies came to be most highly valued. The preoccupation with the sugar, rice and indigo economies of the West Indian Islands, which were even then in a state of decay, may thus be better understood if considered
in the light of the necessity for such economies as complementing the economy of the mother country (29). Hence, also, the disfavour with which New England was regarded because of her shipbuilding and furniture industries (30).

On close examination, it may be seen that the old colonial policy was merely the expression of the mercantilist economic doctrines applied to the new imperial problems. Control over colonial trade received the sanction of historic precedent, since there had been tariff controls over English mercantile activity long before the colonies were planted.

(29) The argument among British leaders in 1762 as to whether to keep Canada or Guadeloupe under the forthcoming Treaty of Paris, illustrates this concern over West Indian interests. The decision in favour of Canada was made partly because of the insistence of Pitt that the acquisition of Canada would remove the menace of France from North America, and partly because the London West Indian magnates realized that their vested interest in the older British West Indies would be neglected for the new acquisitions, and demanded that the Guadeloupe project be given up.

(30) Of all the American Plantations, his Majesty hath none so apt for the building of Shipping as New-England, nor none so comparably qualified for breeding of Sea-men, not only by reason of the natural industry of that People, but principally by reason of their Cod and Mackerel Fisheries: and in my poor opinion there is nothing more prejudicial, and in prospect more dangerous to any Mother Kingdom, than the increase of Shipping in their colonies, Plantations or Provinces.

To justify the restriction of colonial industry there was the supervision of English manufacturing since the days of the Tudors. The demands, first of economic, and then of political power in the highly competitive relationships of Western Europe, marshalled, under the banner of mercantilist doctrine, the forces of overseas trade, domestic production and the colonial settlements.

At this point, therefore, with the general outlines of the mercantilist system determined, it is necessary to turn to a discussion of that system's operation in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, showing its gradual decline through both external and internal factors; and how that decline accompanied, and in part caused, the decline of the British nation and empire.
Chapter II

The Breakdown of the Mercantilist Empire: 1760-1770

I think I can trace all the calamities of this country to the single source of our not having had steadily before our eyes a general, comprehensive, well-connected, and well-proportioned view of the whole of our dominions, and a just sense of their true bearings and relations. Burke, *Speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts*. (31)

The British Empire in 1760 was as widely spread and widely diversified a political entity as had existed up to that time. Nearly fifteen millions of all races lived under the British flag. The forms of government of its components (excluding the military conquests of the Seven Years' War), varied from theoretical equality with the mother country, to no autonomy at all, and from legal ownership by the Crown to mere economic penetration by chartered companies. In all there were thirty-five separate governments subordinate to that of the mother country.

These governments may be grouped into several main types. The trading colonies were at once the most primitive and the most directly commercial of the Empire's components. These included the Hudson's Bay Company's lands (which extended throughout the drainage basin of the great bay), the Royal African Company's lands (including Gambia, Gold Coast, Wydah Coast, Bight of Benin, and the newly captured Goree and Senegal), and the holdings of the East India Company.

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(including St. Helena, Bombay, Calicut, Surat, Gomroon, Basra, Fort St. George, Fort St. David, Masulapatam, Vizagapatam, Fort William, Bencoolen, Fort Markborough, Benjar, and the newly acquired dominance in Bengal).

The next group was that of the Crown possessions without popular representation. This included Minorca, Gibraltar, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. The latter was given a legislature with limited powers in 1763 and in 1766 Prince Edward Island was made a separate colony with similar privileges. The Royal Colonies, each of which possessed a legislature of sorts (though these varied in power), included New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, North and South Carolina, the Bermudas, the Bahamas, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands and Barbados. The newly conquered areas of Canada and the Floridas were promised legislative government, though nothing was done about this immediately. The Proprietary Colonies included Pennsylvania (owned by the Penn family), the lower Counties on the Delaware (shared between the Penns and the Crown), and Maryland (still held by the Baltimore family). The Trusteeship of Georgia was in a separate category, the colony being ruled and the Governor appointed, by a Board of Trustees in London, in conjunction with the Crown. Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Connecticut, as corporate colonies, were the most highly developed in terms of autonomy, since their original charters guaranteed them a high degree of local power. Finally, the Empire also included the associated
and dependent Kingdom of Ireland, which had the most completely developed governmental machinery and yet was rigidly subordinated to the British government.

The responsibility for governing this diverse empire was divided between a number of British officials in the mother country. The Lords of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer controlled the collection and expenditure of revenue for imperial purposes, though they had no control over the customs, which was placed under a Commissioner of Customs, who owed a vague and divergent allegiance to both the Admiralty and the Treasury. The Bishop of London ruled the Anglican Church in the colonies, but his functions were not very important, since the majority of the colonists were not Anglicans. The Secretary of State for the Southern Department (32), was probably the most important colonial official, since he administered the political relations of the colonies with the mother country and with each other. His was the responsibility for corresponding with the governors of the various colonies and for giving them instructions and altering such instructions from time to time. In addition there was a sub-committee of the Privy

(32) In the Seventeenth Century the two secretaries had come to divide the work of external relations, one handling relations with Catholic (southern), and one with Protestant countries. A third secretary was added for colonies in 1769, but the office was abolished in 1782, when the offices were divided as to functions, - Home and Foreign affairs. In 1794 a third secretary was added, for War and Colonies.
Council, the Board of Trade and Plantations, which was the only body constantly in touch with the colonies, and which was supposed to transmit subjects of paramount importance to the Secretary of State for action. Actually, however, it had come to act only on the initiative of the Secretary of State and was practically a branch of his department (33). These were the chief, and indeed, the only officials with any real power in colonial matters, though there were many others, such as the Commissioner of the King's Forests, who held subordinate posts.

During the whole of the eighteenth century the empire was in a condition of constant, and often of violent change. It can be seen from its divisions, both as to the diversity of the colonies themselves and as to the responsibility for control over them, that the task of governing it was a supremely difficult one. The implicit necessity of conforming to mercantilist doctrines of self-sufficiency and orientation on the mother country added to the difficulty.

Actually, there was a basic struggle throughout the century between these mercantilist demands and the demands of governing a widespread empire effectively from a central point - the "weight of government" of the empire. The latter

(33) The rivalry of Bedford and Newcastle in 1748 led to the increase of the powers of the Board of Trade at the expense of those of the Secretary of State (Bedford). The President of the Board, Lord Halifax, who had wide experience in colonial matters, was admitted as a cabinet member and gained the right of appointing officers. This power was suspended, however, in 1761, when Halifax became Secretary of State.
necessitated some degree of delegation of power to local authorities and a considerable improvement in the existing centralized machinery of government. During the decade with which this chapter is concerned, there occurred a transfer in emphasis, by which an attempt was made to meet the new and almost overwhelming problems of imperial government, at the price of fatally damaging the mercantilist structure. It was the misfortune of those who were responsible for this effort that it came too late, and that the weaknesses of the imperial system were already irreparable.

The great increase in the size of the empire during the early decades of the century, and especially as a result of the Seven Years' War, must be accounted as a principal contributing factor to the decline. By the various treaties of peace between England and France in the seventy years preceding and culminating in the Treaty of Paris (34), England acquired title to the largest part of North America, a controlling position in India, and a great number of lesser coastal settlements.

The cost of administration and defence, especially with regard to the inland areas, was enormously increased. The problem of collecting revenue to meet this cost had, as a result of crushing war debts and a disrupted home economy,

(34) Treaties of Ryswick, 1697; Utrecht, 1713; Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748, and Paris, 1763.
assumed alarming proportions. The growing political and social separatism in the American colonies increased the difficulty of meeting these problems. Finally, the transition to parliamentary government in the mother country and the disruption in that government during the decade, rendered imperial administration more than usually inefficient at a time when efficiency was a vital necessity.

The faults of the old colonial system were most apparent in Ireland. Here, where the weight of government should have been extremely light and the kingdom might have been rendered self-supporting, the need for reform was desperate. The faults of mercantilism and of its application were not entirely to blame. Local social and economic conditions and the age-old enmity between the two nations accentuated the weaknesses of a dying system. Moreover, opposition to its more disastrous measures caused those same measures, in reaction, to be more vigorously and obstinately enforced.

Economically, Ireland was not a promising country. The climate, under the excessive moderating influence of the ocean, seemed to have an enervating effect on the population. This lack of energy coupled with the discouraging terrain (in many places half bogland and half scree), produced a situation which only progressive education and land improvement over several centuries might have corrected. Other factors, however, made such reforms impossible. Land became
more valuable as the changes in agriculture began to take
effect and as the expansion of overseas trade brought
increased markets. Resulting higher rents drove the poorer
tenants out, and new price levels for basic commodities
rendered these beyond the purchasing power of the average
peasant.

Despite these high rents and high prices, the Irish
peasant did not turn to handicrafts and cottage industry as
did his brethren in England and Scotland. The rentals were
lower than in Great Britain, but the Irish earning capacity
was even lower in proportion (35). There was also a huge
structure of sub-leases of the land, which tended toward
inefficiency and divided the landlord from his tenants,
encouraging neglect (36). Tenants, too, when they found

(35) It is not uncommon in Munster to charge from
4 to 5 guineas per acre for potato-ground; but we
shall suppose the price but four guineas, that is
ninety-one shillings; the daily wages of labourers
is four pence per day; there are three hundred and
sixty-five days in the year of which fifty-two are
Sunday, and suppose but thirteen holidays, the remainder
is but three hundred working days, the wages for which
is an hundred shillings, that is, nine shillings above
the price of their land; of which five shillings are
paid for the tythe; and two for hearth money; and the
remaining two go toward the rent of their cabins.
What is left? Nothing - And, out of this nothing
they are to buy seed for their garden, salt for their
potatoes and rags for themselves, their wives and
children. From The Enquiry into the Whiteboys Out-
rages, 1760. Cited by Gipson, Great Britain and
Ireland, p. 205.

(36) In the beginning of the century, when absenteeism
was especially common, and when the conditions of
residence were often not only disagreeable but dangerous,
it was their (the landlords') main object to obtain
from their land a secure revenue without trouble or
they could not renew leases, often did all they could to destroy the usefulness of the farm, mining the soil in the last year of tenure, and neglecting to keep up the fences and farm buildings. Farming was done on an extensive, rather than on an intensive pattern, with tenants demanding forty and fifty acres on long leases, and farming the same inefficiently and extravagantly. Thus the landlord was encouraged to convert his land into sheep walks in order to make farming a paying concern. Such changes freed the landlord from all responsibility for the welfare of those who had previously occupied the land. Conditions among the poorer cultivators were considerably worsened by their tendency to place the chief dependence for livelihood on the potato. At the same time, the peasantry showed a strong sense of attachment to the land, to the extent of preferring to live on scrub land, after the farm lands had been enclosed, rather than emigrate to relative comfort in the colonies. The food of the people consisted of little more than milk, potatoes and salt (37), while the Irish seas teemed with fish, which were caught almost exclusively by the Dutch.

(36) cont'd.
expense, and in order to attain this end, they were prepared to grant fixity of tenure at extremely low rents. Leases, sometimes for ever, more often for lives extending over forty-fifty, sixty or even seventy years, were granted. This led to the creation of a class of middlemen, small country gentlemen, tenants themselves, but the immediate cause of the depopulation of large districts and described as the pest of the country. - Lecky, A history of Ireland in the eighteenth century, Vol. II, p.6.

(37) Gipson, Great Britain and Ireland, p.213.
The agrarian abuses, in fact, led in the opening years of the reign of George III to the series of uprisings known by the general name of the Whiteboys Rebellion. The more immediate causes of the troubles were the enclosure movement, the rise in the price of cattle (and hence in the price of all necessaries), and the abuse of the law of 1727, which had provided that not less than five in every hundred acres in each tract of land should be under cultivation. The magistracy was powerless to enforce such laws as this last, since they were under the domination of the Protestant landlords, whose interest it was to prevent enforcement. The tithe system, too, by which a minority religion was supported by an impoverished peasantry, was a major contributing factor to the insurrections (38). The tithe-proctor, who collected tithes for the clergymen, and the tithe-farmer, who bought them from him at a fixed rate, were among the most reprehensible figures in Irish life, and were at the same time the inevitable product of the Irish ecclesiastical system.

The disruption of the wars of conquest, the destruction of the Irish clan system and the religious restrictions all contributed to the despair and apathy of the Irish people. This despair in turn made them much less adaptable to new conditions. This was a people, living in a dismal past, and ensuring for themselves, thereby, an even more dismal present.

The Irish woollen industry, which might have

successfully absorbed much of the excess labour force, was hamstrung from the beginning by such measures as the British statute of 1699, which limited the export of Irish woollens to Britain, imposing duties of up to 20 percent. The Irish provision trade was also restricted, both by government action and by unfair practices on the part of English competitors. Yet any signs of the revival of the Irish economy were condemned by the mercantilist theorists. Sir Josiah Child disapproved of:

.... the late great improvement of Ireland ... the consequence whereof is, that the Country now supplieth Foreign Markets, as well as our own Plantations in America, with Beef, Pork, Hides, Tallow, Bread, Beer, Wool and Corn, at cheaper prices than we can afford, to the beating us out of those Trades, whereas formerly, viz. presently after the late Irish War, many Men got good Estates by transporting English Cattle thither (39).

Insofar as imports were concerned, only tobacco was consumed in sufficient quantities by all classes of Irish to be significant. Only a quarter of the population had by 1760 sufficient wealth to purchase other types of imports.

The spasmodic freeing of Irish exports in the 1740's raised a storm of protest in England, for the cheaper costs of Irish production made the competition too stiff for English producers. Despite handicaps, however, the Irish cloth industry, especially linens, continued to survive and even to prosper, to the point where the reforms of 1782

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(39) Child, A new discourse on trade, pp. 45-46
gave the Irish economy its first real chance in advancement. The skill of the Irish weavers was recognized and respected abroad. Despite regulations, Irish products were smuggled to the continent, to compete successfully with British goods. By 1750 the linen industry was the most important in Ireland and was out-producing that of England. In that year the exportation of Irish linen to Britain had reached 9,077,712 yards (40).

The application of the mercantilist restrictions to Ireland, as elsewhere, was not done on any pattern, and varied in intensity as economic conditions in the mother country seemed to demand. The Navigation Act of 1660 gave equal rights to English and Irish ships, but these privileges were taken away by the succeeding Acts of 1663 and 1696. The latter Act, in fact, completely subordinated Ireland's trade to that of England. Her exports and imports had to pass through England and could only be handled by English ships. Irish commerce, Irish shipping and Irish geographic advantages were eliminated. This was the worst aspect of the mercantilist system. Irish industry had already been almost destroyed at the behest of English competitors. The export of Irish cattle to England, and the import to England and the export to the colonies of Irish woollens was prohibited by an Act of the British Parliament. The Ulster

(40) Gipson, Great Britain and Ireland, p. 229
linen industry, during the seventeenth century, had been protected against foreign competitors, but it was later abandoned in favour of a much less productive counterpart in Scotland.

The chief reasons for such restrictions on the part of Britain were political. The safety of the realm and the increase of strength and wealth in her struggle with continental powers was seen as the paramount *raison d'être* of the British Empire. The later free trade empire was made possible only because Britain, as the monopoly industrialist of the world, required free markets and free sources of raw material. She could afford, nay, required, to have the barriers destroyed. But in the old empire such advantages were not present. The method of aggrandizing the mother country, the necessity for which was no less apparent in the new empire, was more primitive in the old. The withholding of political liberties seemed, in the case of Ireland, a necessary corollary to the withholding of economic liberties. The division between Catholic and Protestant was fostered with these ends in view.

The fault lay in attempting to apply a policy in Ireland which was repressive; a policy with which the more enlightened course followed in England was in sharp contrast. Sooner or later the Irish Protestants, and still later, the Irish Catholics, were bound to rebel against it. Further, the system of repression was difficult to apply in the face of even so minor a limiting geographical factor as
the Irish Sea. The struggle to control the empire from a central unit was an attempt to retain that empire as a direct weapon for Britain in her long struggle for European security.

The "weight of government" would have been far less had she permitted local economic control; yet the benefits accruing to Britain would have been far less certain. It was a choice between an inefficiently centralized empire and a decentralized, non-contributing empire. It is not surprising that British statesmen, unaware of the degree to which the machinery of government had worn down, chose the former alternative.

Burke's dream of a mercantilist empire administered for the common good of all its parts, like so many of that statesman's dreams, could have no counterpart in fulfilment. It is true that he granted the ultimate supremacy in it to Britain, but this compromise would have been worse than either of the extremes advocated elsewhere. The cession of political control by Britain would have meant the ultimate cession of economic control, in a world peopled by so many potential competitors. Similarly, the cession of economic control, as with the later British Dominions, meant the loss of political control. The two were interdependent. The empire was doomed to dissolution on its current basis.

Politically, the situation was clearer. Britain, in 1689, had conceded the right of the Anglo-Irish to Protestant
ascendancy, but rejected their proposal for political union. Ireland remained a subordinate kingdom, under the tutelage of Britain. Her executive, appointed by the British Privy Council and responsible to it, had the difficult task of most subordinate executives of having to reconcile the opposing opinions of the British government and of the hostile Irish Parliament. The Irish Parliament was subordinate to that of Britain, but could be kept in that state only by a large and complex structure of government patronage and corruption. The Irish House of Lords, and to an even greater extent, the Irish Civil List, bore an unusually heavy load of English patronage as well, being fantastically overloaded with the demands of Court hangers-on.

The franchise for the Irish House of Commons and eligibility for government offices was much restricted, since Roman Catholics were automatically excluded by the Revolution Settlement, and Irish Presbyterians, the majority of the Protestant element, were largely excluded by the Test and Corporation Acts. Thus a minority of a minority, the Irish Anglicans, ruled the country.

Poyning's Act of 1494 had provided that no Irish Parliament could be summoned until measures to be submitted to it had been previously approved by the King in Council. Early in the eighteenth century, however, the Irish Parliament ventured to assert its authority, especially over revenues, and the Irish House of Lords re-asserted its ancient right of having final appellate jurisdiction for the kingdom. The
British, however, rejected these claims, and by the Declaratory Act of 1719, took away completely the appellate powers of the Lords and re-affirmed the supremacy of the British Parliament. The long duration and irregular sessions of the Irish Parliaments was also a serious grievance, to remedy which the Irish ventured to pass a Septennial Act in 1761, modelled on the British Act of 1716. This was rejected by the British Privy Council but the Act was revived to plague succeeding administrations. The principle of judicial independence was also urged. The Irish judiciary were appointed at the pleasure of the administration, and their salaries not being fixed, they were dependent for tenure on the goodwill of their appointers.

Since 1689, Irish of all denominations had protested Poynings Act, and especially those clauses thereof which required that money bills must be certified by the Privy Council before being presented to the Irish Parliament for what amounted to almost perfunctory ratification. Not only was legislation delayed by having to be sent to London, but the Irish Parliament was deprived of the only power which it might conceivably have possessed over the executive.

The army in Ireland was set by an Act of 1698 at an establishment of 12,000. It was made up exclusively of Irish Protestants, and, though paid for by the Irish nation, was organized as an integral part of the British army and subject to the British Mutiny Acts.
The Irish, in fact, had far more reason, especially with regard to economic restrictions, to question British supremacy than had the American colonies. The tradition of protest had a long and, in Ireland, an honourable history, but the more modern protests begin with Molyneux and Swift. The first parliamentary leader of the movement was Charles Lucas of Dublin, who in 1747 founded the Citizen's Journal, devoted to criticism of the arbitrary rule of Dublin Castle.

The Seven Years' War was at once an opportunity for the Irish to show their loyalty and to improve their case for greater liberty, and for the English to acknowledge their debt of gratitude. On the one hand, the opportunity was taken advantage of in generous measure - on the other it was neglected. The Irish Commons voted £500,000 for the war, increased their army establishment to 15,000, and sent drafts of 12,000 overseas, as compared with 17,000 from the much

Charles Lucas (1713-1771), Irish apothecary and politician, first issued political addresses in 1748-49 in the Citizen's Journal; the Irish House of Commons voted him an enemy of the country in 1773. In the following five years he studied medicine at Leiden and practised in London. He was elected Member for Dublin in 1761. His letter to the Viceroy, Lord Halifax (September 19, 1761), was one of the first and most famous manifestoes of Irish freedom. In the 1760's his Addresses to the Lord Mayor were the leading political commentary on the times in Ireland. After 1770 the leadership of the opposition was taken over by Grattan and Flood. He died on November 4th, 1771.
larger British standing army (42). Pitt's militia had its counterpart in Ireland, though the inveterate and unreasoning fear of the power of Catholicism prevented the acceptance of thousands of Catholic volunteers for the war against the two chief Catholic countries of Europe. After 1763 the wartime establishment was reduced to the original 12,000, although in 1765, Grenville, in an attempt to save the British Treasury in its increased military expenditures, proposed unsuccessfully to increase the Irish Army.

Other measures of the Grenville Ministry were more easily put into force. The Stamp Act was applied to Ireland at the same time as to America, and with a much greater degree of success, although the revenue which could be extorted from the poverty-stricken nation was strictly limited (43).

In 1767, the new Viceroy, Viscount Townshend, was instructed to push through the Irish Parliament a bill for the raising of the Irish military establishment to 15,000


(43) The professional class, upon whom the burden of the tax was to fall, was extremely small in Ireland, although the number of transactions in that legalistic age, and among a litigious people, was quite large. As a result, the tax was evaded as often as possible (though not so successfully as in America), and the returns were little more than the cost of collection.
The purpose, as has been pointed out, was not for greater security at home - for, despite the Whiteboys risings, the miserable kingdom was generally quiescent - but to make a contribution to the defence of the Empire, and especially to make up the deficiency caused by the non-cooperation of the American colonies. As a concession in order to secure the easier passage of the measure, Townshend, without authority, granted the independence of judicial commissions. The arrangement was vetoed in practice, if not in principle, by the London government, who, under the influence of the absentee landlords, tacked such amendments on to it as rendered it useless (44).

At the same time the duration of Irish Parliaments was shortened by a Septennial Bill, which the Privy Council changed to an Octennial Bill (45). As any shortening of the Parliaments was an improvement, the Bill was passed, and from this time the Irish Parliament began to take effective control of the country. The augmentation scheme, meanwhile, had met with violent opposition, since the finances of the nation were not on a condition to meet the added expenditure.

(44) The Bill was returned with clauses making it necessary for addresses from the two Irish Houses for the removal of a judge to be certified by the Privy Council, and making the Irish judges removable by the British Parliament, whereas in the original Act the addresses of the two Irish Houses and Royal assent had been sufficient. Lecky, *A history of Ireland in the eighteenth century*, Vol. II, p.82.

(45) The change of the requisite bill, from septennial to octennial, was actually an improvement since the Irish
The scheme failed to pass the Irish Commons, the opposition demanding a dissolution before being asked to give a decision on the measure.

A dissolution was granted in May, 1768, and in 1769 in the succeeding Parliament, the Act was passed. Because of the rejection of a money bill proposed in London, contention arose in the Irish Commons which resulted in the Viceroy proroguing Parliament for fourteen months.

The population movement at this time was such as to give alarm to the orthodox mercantilists. Twenty thousand were driven into exile by the decline of the woollen industry between 1768 and 1772 (46), and many more fled from the limitations imposed by Anglican ascendancy. The largest part of these latter were Ulster Presbyterians and they were to form a large Loyalist element in the Southern colonies in the forthcoming struggle for American independence. Townshend pleaded for a bounty to support the Belfast linen industry, but it was only in 1774, after thousands of weavers and machines had been lost to America that regular support for the industry was agreed to by the British. This drift to America had one further result. American revolutionists

(45) con'td.
Paragraph sat only every second year, and also there would be inconvenience if the general elections in England and Ireland were simultaneous. - Lecky, A history of Ireland in the eighteenth century, Vol. II, p. 91.

were able to point to Ireland as an example of what would happen to the colonies under closer British supervision.

By 1773 the economic and political situation in Ireland had reached its nadir. Despite the fact that excise regulations were most rigidly enforced and the revenue was collected by the army, Ireland was fast becoming a dependent area, financially as well as economically and politically. The country was extremely poor, and in that year it was estimated that no more than three-quarters of the revenue necessary to meet the costs of administration could be collected. (47) The arrears on the establishment were estimated at £300,000 annually.

With a view to increasing the revenue for the nation, and at the same time mitigating some of the evils of absenteeism, it was proposed by the Viceroy, Harcourt, that a 10 percent tax on the incomes of absentee landlords be imposed. The Irish Parliament was eager to pass the tax and it had the support in Britain of North, Chatham, Shelburne and Adam Smith. Rockingham and his party, however, through the voice of Burke, denounced the measure which would limit their incomes so drastically (48). They declared it to be a violation of the Declaratory Act of 1719, which had proclaimed British supremacy. However, North, fearful of an alliance between the City

(47) Lecky, History of Ireland in the eighteenth century, p.118.
merchants and the landlords, ordered the government majority in the Irish Commons to reject the measure. This they did, and the poverty of the Irish establishment continued. Simultaneously the normal money bills were modified and the government increased the tax on tea. In the following year the Irish Habeas Corpus Bill, which had been submitted annually by the Irish Parliament, only to be rejected by the Privy Council, was once more rejected with the order that it was not to be passed again.

Thus, on the eve of the American Revolution, Ireland presented a picture of absolute destitution, and a terrible example of the faults of British administration where British interest was not considered as vital. A change was coming, with the succession of Grattan and Flood to the leadership of the opposition in Ireland, with the prosperity that war was to bring to the country, and with the concessions which defeat in war were to force from the British. Though there were to be dark days in the future history of Ireland, the first decade of the reign of George III was by far the worst.

Why was Ireland, among all the dependancies of Britain, singled out for the harshest treatment? The answer to this question must take account first, of the geographic position of Ireland. Contiguous to Britain, it was inevitable that the task of enforcing the mercantilist regulations would be much easier than in the overseas plantations. Secondly, the traditional hostility between Irish and English, and the
gross political and social inequalities in the country (legacies of the conquest), ensured a hatred of authority on the part of the Irish and an obsession for its exercise on the part of the English and Protestant Irish ruling minority. Thirdly, the value of Ireland to Great Britain was not readily apparent in the eighteenth century. Her exports to Britain of cattle, butter, woollens and linen goods, not only were not vital to the economy of Britain, but were actually in competition with the produce of the mother country. Exports to Ireland could not be assured of a market because of the low purchasing power of a majority of the population.

Certainly, the repression - with its resulting misery - to which the actions of the English statesmen subjected the Irish in the misguided belief that it was essential to the strength of Britain, was quite unnecessary for such purpose. Great improvements could have been effected in the lot of the Irish, through easing the political and commercial restrictions, without affecting the real strength of Britain. The ferocity with which religious and racial divisions were encouraged and widened, would have been avoided in a less savage age. The age-old attitude of the English, of regarding the Irish as being an inferior species was much to blame here. It was as natural to oppress the Irish as to support England's overseas trade. Both were age-old habits, and both, happily for the English attitude of mind, coincided with what appeared to be her interest.

It was far more difficult to impose similar
restrictions on the overseas plantations, because of their greater distance from the mother country, their greater size and wealth, the absence of an economically dominant class of British in the colonies, and by reason of the absence of that tradition of English dominance which had unhappily marked Anglo-Irish relations since the days of Strongbow. Ireland became, and remained, an expensive deadweight on the Imperial structure, the plaything of a few absentee landlords, and the despair of British statesmen for four and a half centuries.

If Ireland presented an example of the defects of too much control under mercantilism, the British possessions in India suffered from too little supervision. The old East India Company, decadent after a century and a half of vital activity, held power while avoiding the responsibility for giving adequate government to its vast territories. While India was believed to be a more lucrative field than America for Imperial endeavours, and the problems of government were in many ways much simpler, mis-government in the first decade of George III's reign reduced the company to bankruptcy and the country to chaos. Mir Jafar and Mir Kasim played at politics while the Company acted as umpire, increasing British power by encouraging Indian divisions, and gradually establishing its power over an ever-increasing extent of the great sub-continent. From the beginning there was power without responsibility, and it was only through a long process of trial and error, in which the great
administrators, beginning with Clive and Warren Hastings, were made martyrs to the inefficiency of the system, that the British Government assumed its full responsibilities with regard to its Indian dominions.

For a long time after the first establishment of English trade in India, the danger in the situation was only potential. The Company, concerned only with trade, desired no territorial conquests in India, and no political power beyond the confines of its few trading townships on the coast, so long as the native administrations were able to maintain the order and security which trade demanded. With very few interruptions this policy was adhered to for a century and a half. Then, in the middle of the eighteenth century, the situation was suddenly changed. The collapse of the Mogul Empire, the resultant spread of internecine strife and anarchy and the growth of French economic and political rivalry combined to force the Company to concern itself not merely with the maintenance of its trade, but with its very foothold in India. From commerce the Company was forced into active politics; and in a few years, through the instrumentality of Clive, the Directors in Leadenhall Street were faced with the, to them, appalling fact that they were responsible as masters of a huge area in Eastern India. The situation was without a precedent. And so, unchecked and almost unobserved, the Company followed the line of least resistance. It ignored the change; it pretended still to be only a trading organization. In order to maintain the
pretence it kept its responsibilities to its new subjects to their absolute minimum and public opinion at home did not appreciate the true situation.

A major factor in this decay was the form of organization of the Company. With no responsibility to the public, it was ruled by its legislative body, the Court of Proprietors, who elected an executive, the Court of Directors, annually. The Court of Proprietors consisted of every shareholder owning £500 or more worth of stock. Its deliberations evinced much of the same instability and irresponsibility as at the time characterized the national Parliament, with the important difference that it did not have the modifying influence of constituents to check the dross of its turgid rhetoric and useless recommendations. Parties and factions grew up within it, and partisan quarrels of progressively increasing ferocity were carried on, to the complete disregard of the welfare of trade or of the subject peoples (49). The Directors had an almost impossible task in attempting to administer such an organization while fending off as best they might the continual and ill-timed demands of the Proprietors for increases in dividends to stockholders.

After 1760 the factions gradually formed themselves into parties, opposed to or in support of the rising star of

(49) For an able discussion of the political intrigues in the Company during these years, see Sutherland, L.S., "Lord Shelburne and the East India Company politics," E.H.R., July, 1934, pp. 450-461.
the Company's fortunes, Lord Clive. He had returned to England after the conquest of Bengal, with a fortune which made him the richest man in the kingdom. In the councils of the Company, however, there was not the same unanimity in greeting the hero as had been shown by the nation. Under one, Sullivan, a party of opposition was formed to oppose further extensions of the Company's political control, and to resist the encroachments which were even then being made by the Government - with the encouragement of Lord Clive - on the sovereignty of the Company (50). Trade, it was argued, should be the main purpose of the Company.

In India itself, the situation was only more serious in that the game there was played with human lives rather than with directors' votes. By the settlement after Plassey, the Company became the controlling power in Bengal. The Nawab, or viceroy of the Mogul, was responsible for the government of the country, but was dependent on the Company for military power. Thus the Company held the real power, and its authority - de facto at least - was soon extended to include the revenue collection as well.

Clive left India in 1760 and before his weak successor, Vansittart, had arrived, the Company officials in

(50) As early as 1759, Clive had written to Pitt, urging that the Crown should intervene and take effective control of the huge area won at Plassey. Foster, Wm. "The India board, 1784-1858," in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3rd Ser., Vol.XI, p.61.
Calcutta replaced Mir Jafar (the Nawab-designate after Plassey), with his nephew, Mir Kasim. The ease with which the Company was able to effect this was a revelation to its officials of their power. Mir Kasim had to empty the Bengal treasury to purchase his promotion, and he was also forced to transfer to the Company's administration the three richest districts of Bengal (Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong). The revenue from these three districts was purportedly to defray the cost of the Company's army in Bengal. The arrangement was not, in itself, unfair, since the cost of the army was ruinously heavy, and the Company's government of the districts was better than that in the rest of the country.

Mir Kasim proved to be an efficient ruler, suppressing abuses, retrenching his finances and improving the efficiency of his army. In his efforts he had the support of Vansittart and Hastings, now Resident in Bengal, but the majority of the Council in Calcutta were alarmed at the growing strength of the ruler. The real grievance against Mir Kasim was his attempt to suppress illegal trading.

The revenues of the Indian princes were largely derived from tolls on the transit of merchandise. Since the beginning of the century, however, the Company, on the requisition of the head of each local factory or post, had enjoyed the right of free transit for its goods. Since the servants of the Company were underpaid, the temptation to abuse these requisitions was obvious, and an illicit trade for personal gain grew up among the officials. Armed with
Company passes, they forced the natives to deal with their own native agents, to buy dear and sell cheap. They monopolized the provision trade and grew rich on the miseries of the people. Such private trade and similar irregular practices, while they did little to benefit the Company, made the fortunes of many of its servants, the so-called "nabobs." Horace Walpole has recorded the awe with which these fortunes were regarded in England in his account of the return of Clive from his last mission.

Lord Clive is arrived, has brought a million for himself, two diamond drops worth twelve thousand pounds for the Queen, a scimitar, dagger and other matters, covered with brilliants, for the King, and worth twenty-four thousand more ... (51).

Because of these abuses, native traders had almost disappeared and the revenues of the country fell drastically. Mir Kasim, aroused by the starvation of his people, the ill-treatment of his officers and the robbery of his treasury, determined to put a stop to the depredations of the Europeans and, with the concurrence of Vansittart, abolished all tolls on trade, in order to give the native traders an equal chance with their competitors. The Council promptly over-ruled Vansittart and ordered the tolls re-imposed. Mir Kasim promptly revolted, was beaten and fled to Oudh, Mir Jafar being re-instated as Nawab in 1763.

The troubles of the country were to increase. The Nawab of Oudh invaded Bengal in support of Mir Kasim, bringing with him the Mogul - now bereft of authority. His army was defeated at Buxar in 1764, Oudh and the Mogul were now at the mercy of the Company, and the inland penetration of the British in India had really begun. These revolts and battles, however, had cost the Company a great amount of money. Further, the revenue from Bengal was not available during the uprisings. While the servants of the Company grew rich, the disruption of the peace and normal affairs of the country loaded the Company with debts.

It was at this juncture, in 1765, that the Company sent Clive out on his last mission. To pacify the new areas gained at Buxar and at the same time to work out some method of governing Bengal, whereby the Company might reap a profit and yet not be too deeply involved in the government of the country, were his immediate concerns.

The first problem was that of the Mogul. His presence with the British gave an air of legitimacy to the new arrangements, but any power given to him had to be carefully curbed. To this end, Clive settled him in Allahabad, under the Company's protection, with an annual tribute from Bengal of £260,000. Oudh was restored to its Nawab on payment of half a million pounds and the Nawab remained a separate, dependent ally of the Company until 1856.

It was in the government of Bengal, however, that Clive became mainly engaged. He legitimized the position of
the Company in Bengal by gaining a grant from the Mogul of the diwani, or right to collect revenues there (52). The Company was now to collect the revenue, paying to the Nawab, as the administrative head of the government, the expenses for that government, which were reckoned at £600,000. In practice, the Nawab had control only over a limited field of domestic administration, the Company controlling all external relations. This was the famous system of "Dual Government." In theory it was sound, since it was a revival of a native Indian institution, but in practice the division of authority was to lead to trouble.

The system lasted for seven years, but was not in the long run successful. The division of powers was not clear, and while the real power belonged to the Company, the responsibility for government remained with the Nawab. Mir Jafar died in 1766 and a regency was set up under a Company nominee, Mohammed Reza Khan. Moreover, the Company did not actually collect the revenues of the state (since it refused to be distracted from its own business) and appointed Mohammed Reza Khan, naib, or deputy diwan. He was thus deputy for both the Nawab and the Company and dual government was destroyed. Thus the Nawab had lost all power, Mohammed Reza Khan, afraid of the Company, refused to act with vigour, and the Company refused to accept the ultimate responsibility.

(52) Under the Mogul's government, the Nawab had functioned as the military governor of the province, while the diwan was the treasurer. The system of Dual Government was intentionally patterned on this.
The Company was, however, still determined to profit from the revenues of Bengal, despite the fact that these were now desperately needed to meet the bare costs of administration. Expectations of profit from this source were very great and the shareholders in England and the home government both demanded a share. Mohammed Reza Khan was unable to maintain order, the administration of local government and justice fell into chaos, and the revenue of Bengal declined steadily.

Meanwhile, in London, the Company was very much concerned over the problem of increasing the dividend payable to shareholders. Between 1756 and 1766 the dividend had remained at the wartime level of 6 per cent and the Court of Proprietors, dazzled by the extravagance of the "nabobs", declared that the Company must be able to afford an increase. The directors, in closer touch with the affairs of the Company, claimed that the debts of the Company were too great to warrant such an increase and that the stock might be inflated to such a point that the values could not be maintained, with resulting panic and crash.

At the same time the Chatham-Grafton Government issued a warning that it intended to investigate the affairs of the Company. It was realized that the Company had a deficit which it would soon have to ask Parliament to make good, and Chatham planned at that time to institute a general enquiry and settle what revenues and powers should be surrendered to the nation. At the end of 1766, therefore, when
a shortage of government revenue made the matter more pressing (53), Chatham, with the concurrence of Grafton and Shelburne, planned to have Parliament decide the Company's rights. The Cabinet was not, however, unanimous on the plan (54). Pending the enquiry, the Proprietors again raised the dividend - to 12½ per cent this time. They argued that the Company was a national institution and that limiting dividends interfered with the national interest.

The opposition to Chatham's proposal in Parliament was extreme and vociferous. Such action was declared to be an invasion of the rights of private property and "All who enjoyed any property by abuses, took the alarm, and they who desired to obstruct any measures of the Government, were sedulous not to let the panic cool." (55). Burke, who was one day to plead the cause of the people of India in the interests of party advantage, opposed any interference whatsoever, with the oppressive Company government. In the

(53) The civil list was heavily in debt, the navy needed a grant, and it was proposed to settle an annuity on the Queen of Denmark. This last was finally taken out of the already overburdened Irish revenues.

(54) Grafton and Shelburne supported the idea of Chatham for outright expropriation. Townshend and, to a lesser extent, Conway, wished for the less severe method of a treaty with the Company.

councils of the Cabinet, Chatham, unfortunately, was declining mentally, and would not suggest an alternative to the Company government, preferring to leave the whole matter to Parliament to decide (56). No course of action had been outlined for the various members of the government, Conway, the Commons leader, had no full information, even the Duke of Grafton knew nothing of the details which required consideration in connection with the plan, and Charles Townshend, the most talented as he was the most unpredictable of the Cabinet members, was violently opposed to expropriation of the Company's rights.

Thus, when the presentation of the Company's affairs before Parliament in the spring of 1767 was cautiously made by Townshend, the Directors were easily able to set one faction off against the other and open the way for a negotiated treaty. The agreement finally reached confirmed the Company in its territorial revenues, but found it to pay the Crown the sum of £400,000 per annum for two years, at which time a new agreement was to be negotiated. Dividends were to be restricted to 10 per cent. A new treaty was made in 1769, whereby the Company was permitted to raise its dividends to 12½ per cent in the following five years at the rate of not more than 1 per cent per year. At this time it was noted

that the Company had some £6,000,000 of debt (57).

Not only had the debt assumed alarming proportions but immediate and future requirements of expenditures showed no likelihood of decrease. The revenue derived from Bengal had not increased, despite the fact that more direct control had been assumed in 1769 through three supervisors acting directly under the Council (58). In addition, in the same year the Madras Presidency had blundered into a war with Hyder Ali, the Sultan of Mysore, and had lost heavily in the encounter. The Carnatic was devastated and the revenues and military establishment of Bengal were heavily drawn upon to make up deficiencies. As a result of the disastrous peace forced on the Company by Hyder Ali, the shares of the Company fell by 60 per cent. In the following year a famine killed off a third of the population of Bengal and that province became a liability to the Company. There was a fairly well-founded suspicion that the Company's servants had been hoarding corn for profit and had thereby increased the severity of the famine. In the following year, as if to complete the destruction of the British dominion in

(57) Annual Register, 1769, p.34

(58) The proposal of the Company to send out supervisors in 1769 was countered by a demand from the Government that one of these be a naval officer appointed by the Government, and that he have overriding powers. The Company refused this last term and was informed that its plan was illegal. The Company finally was able to accept the naval officer, while limiting his powers to matters of peace and war. Ibid. p.52.
India, the warrior confederation of the Mahrattas overran all central India and captured Delhi and the Mogul. Supported by these outward and visible signs of sovereignty, they demanded the Mogul's tribute from the Company and the Nawab of Oudh. It was more than time that the British Government intervened.

The worst danger, however, was financial. By 1772 the Company was practically bankrupt and, far from being able to pay its tribute to the Government, had to borrow £1,000,000. Lord North seized the opportunity to intervene and abolish once and for all the pernicious system of divided responsibility. Select and secret committees enquired into the Company and its Indian affairs. North pushed through a bill to forbid the Company to extend its system of supervisors, thereby forestalling an attempt to mitigate the evils of the system at the last moment. Burke declared that such a violation of the Company's rights under its original charter was a dangerous precedent for similar violations of private property and that the government had extorted £400,000 annually from the Company and had given nothing in return. Despite such rhetoric, however, a Regulating Bill was passed in June 1773.

By this Act, a loan was made to the Company of £1,400,000, and the annual payment of £400,000 was remitted until the loan was paid back. Future dividends were restricted as to amount and time, and increase and acceptance of bills of exchange from India by the Company was curtailed.
Accounts were to be submitted to the Treasury and British goods were to be exported to India to a certain minimum value annually. Tea, of which the Company had a surplus of seventeen million pounds, could be exported directly to America free of duty.

The administration of the possessions was also reformed. A court of supreme jurisdiction was established, with a chief justice and three puisne judges paid by the Crown. The governor of Bengal was to be the governor-general of India, assisted by a council of four. All military and civil matters which came before the Company were to be submitted to Parliament for its consideration.

The weak link in the system was to be the usual one of indefinite division of responsibility. The relations between the supreme court and the council and between the governor-general, the directors and the Crown, should have been defined more carefully. The governor-general, who was the supreme authority, representing the British Government, should not have been left in a position in which he could be overruled by his council, which spoke merely with the voice of the London directors. In addition, Members of Parliament should not have been permitted to hold executive positions under the Indian Government.

The Regulating Act undoubtedly began a new and better era in Indian history, however. The decade between 1763 and 1773 was probably the worst in the history of British India, and certainly reforms were needed. It was fortunate for
British power in India that, almost simultaneously with the passage of the Regulating Act, Warren Hastings, one of the greatest of imperial administrators, arrived in Bengal as governor. It was the beginning of the effective rule of the British in India.

We have seen that in Ireland, where control by the home government was strongest, the rigidity and awkwardness of the mercantilist system was most apparent. Local considerations, specifically the mutual hatred of the Irish and English, further jeopardized the success of the English rule. In India, on the other hand, the control of the home government was weak, and the rotten structure of company government, burdened with the new problem of imperial rule, was crumbling rapidly. Thus at two points, widely separated in tradition, culture and distance, the mercantilist imperial system was breaking down in the first decade of the reign of George III. The American colonies, however, were the most important part of the empire, and it was on this stage that the culminating act in the decline was to be played out.

In their structures of government, as in their origins and social organizations, the British colonies in America varied widely. As has been noted before, the most numerous and most closely tied to the mother country were the so-called Royal Colonies. These were New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and the new acquisitions of the Floridas and Canada. They were largely under the power of the Crown. The Privy Council assumed the
responsibility of selecting and instructing the governors and helped to choose the council of each colony from among its leading citizens. In addition there was, of course, an assembly elected on a franchise which varied from restriction by the narrowest of property qualifications in Virginia and New York, to qualifications in New Jersey and New Hampshire which were almost tantamount to manhood suffrage.

The powers of the governor in the Royal colonies were extremely wide in theory. He was commander-in-chief, vice-admiral, head of the council in its judicial capacity, he held the veto power over all acts of the assembly, he could summon, adjourn, prorogue and dissolve that assembly, and could make appointments to the lesser, non-elective posts. Further, he was usually the commissioner for the Indian lands of the colony and supervised their sale and distribution. The governor was, however, responsible to and reported to the home government as its representative. He was, so to speak, its eyes in the colonial field. Unfortunately, both as representative and as observer, he from time to time made himself very unpopular. He was under the necessity in most colonies, of satisfying not only his imperial masters, but also the assembly, on which he depended for his salary and for most other revenue necessary for the administration of the colony. Instructions from Britsin, months out of date, and often wholly inadequate to the situation, were showered on him. In this dilemma, strong governors followed their own judgments, weak ones temporized alternately with either power,
to be labelled as rogues by the home government and tyrants by the colonists.

In the proprietary colonies the division of authority made possible the growth of a greater degree of popular government. Pennsylvania and the colony comprised in the Lower Counties on the Delaware were owned by the Penn family, although the administration in the latter colony was shared with the Crown. Maryland was owned by the Baltimore family, while Georgia, founded by Oglethorpe in 1723 as a haven for imprisoned debtors, had been controlled by a complicated trusteeship, and in 1750 became a Royal colony. In the proprietary colonies, land was granted by the proprietors on such terms as they saw fit, often on a restricted monopoly basis, under the system of quit-rents, which had not spread to the other colonies. Governors were appointed by the proprietors in conjunction with the Crown, the councils being completely under the control of the Proprietors. The assemblies had gradually widened their own powers, beyond those held in Royal colonies, by playing the proprietors off against the Crown, and by shielding themselves, in the last resort, behind the legal protection of the archaic terms of the original grant. In addition, special rights were in some instances possessed by these colonies under their terms of incorporation. Maryland, for instance, alone of the Royal and Proprietary colonies, was exempt from all royal taxation except such as her assembly would permit in wartime under royal letters of requisition.
The corporate colonies had the best developed form of popular government. Each had a charter which guaranteed wide privileges, exemptions and powers of self-government. Rhode Island and Connecticut, in fact, could make their own laws without royal approval, and could select their own governor. All three had the freedom to appoint their councils, but for Massachusetts Bay, under the amended charter of 1691, a royal governor was appointed, and royal approval for all laws was required.

The governors were usually fairly able men, who certainly made an attempt to retain the goodwill of the people, but their conflicts with the assemblies, except in the cases of Connecticut and Rhode Island, tended to limit their popularity. The governor was, in fact, the symbol of the attempt to centralize the empire. To the colonists, he was the appointee of a government with which they never came in direct contact, but which nevertheless presumed to regulate every aspect of their lives. Another agency of control was the huge customs structure which was developed in an attempt to regulate colonial trade. Courts of vice-admiralty were also appointed in the second half of the century, to try violations of the Acts of Navigation. The jurisdiction of these courts was final, and no jury trial was permitted therein. They were appointed by royal commission, and were paid on a stipendiary basis from the fines and penalties imposed. A Surveyor of the King's Woods for North America was also appointed, as well as a receiver of of royal quit-rents,
and deputies to the Postmaster-General in North America (59).

The most important organization in the relations between the mother country and the colonies was, from the colonial viewpoint, the London agency. Each colony or some branch of its government had a representative in London. His instructions were carefully defined by the assembly of the colony, and his powers were carefully limited, although he was to serve as a medium of constant communication between London and the colonies. This institution, however, met with much initial opposition in its creation, the colonies themselves expressing reluctance to having representation in London (60). The agencies became permanent after 1688, and were encouraged by the Board of Trade, since they served to lighten to a considerable extent the weight of governing the colonies. Among the duties of the agents (except in the cases of the representatives of Maryland, Connecticut and Rhode Island), was that of convincing the Attorney-General and the Board of Trade of the value of colonial laws when they were up for review before the Privy Council. In addition, the agents attempted to prevent the cancellation or amendment of the charters of the charter colonies and dunned the home government for reimbursement for colonial military expenditure during time of general war. Their influence was paramount

(59) Benjamin Franklin was deputy Postmaster-General for over twenty years in the colonies. He left the office to become the Postmaster-General of the Revolutionary United States.

(60) Gipson, Great Britain and Ireland, p. 15.
in the capital, so far as the colonies were concerned. Such agents as Franklin, for Pennsylvania, and Jared Ingersoll for Connecticut, were considered the chief authorities on their respective colonies and were almost invariably consulted by British officials, not only on the affairs of their own colonies, but on North America in general.

Some colonies had some degree of autonomy, but no law of a colonial assembly could withstand a refusal by the Privy Council to uphold it. Legally, the King was still the source of authority, because his sanction, through letters patent, had created the colonies in the beginning. By 1760, however, such authority had come to mean the Privy Council, a royal bureaucracy.

The Royal authority, while it, in fact, galled the colonists, and in the end was the agency by which rebellion was excited, was not resented in the same degree as the attempt, in the eighteenth century, to extend the ambit of Parliament over the colonies. In point of fact, the logical application of the constitution, as it had been amended by the Revolution settlement, demanded that Parliament should have, in this as in other matters, paramount authority.

Among the applications of this authority, between 1713 and 1760, the following may be briefly cited as indicative of the attempt to close the gaps in mercantilist practice, and make the empire a self-sufficient whole. No place of trust in law or having to do with the Treasury might be in the hands of other than natural-born subjects in any of the
colonies; lands might not be sold to aliens without the consent of the Crown; lands in the colonies were to be liable for the debts of their owners (61); debts owing in the plantations might be proved before a magistrate in England; unlawful stocks and business undertakings in the colonies were to cease; foreigners living in the plantations for seven years and taking the prescribed oaths were to be deemed naturalized subjects; governors might be tried in England for offenses charged against them in the colonies; pine trees designated as serviceable to the Royal Navy were not to be destroyed; the value of foreign coins in circulation was established; minors consenting thereto might be bound to service in the colonies; no wool, woollen yarn, or woollen manufacture was to be exported from the colonies and beaver hats manufactured in any plantation were not to be sent directly to another plantation, and plantation hatters were not to have more than two apprentices. Actually, there was widespread violation of these acts, and it was primarily

(61) This measure and the two following were enacted largely as a result of the efforts of the Virginia legislature, especially after 1748, to limit the enormous interest bill which the tobacco planters were annually compelled to remit to London in cash or goods. The practice of pledging crops in advance had, of course, been resorted to, but the decline in the price of tobacco, especially after 1760 when the habit became unfashionable, caused the London merchants to demand their returns in cash. An attempt was made to devaluate the debt by an act of the Virginia legislature, which decreed that a certain proportion of it should be paid in Virginia currency, a medium the exchange value of which was almost negligible.
an attempt to enforce them, rather than to extend any unconsti-
stitutional authority over the colonies, that first aroused
the wrath of the colonists.

Of all the possessions of Britain, the West Indies were
considered the most valuable. The production of the tropical
and exotic items, for which there was a market in Britain
and, more important, on the continent, was considered the
most lucrative contribution to imperial self-sufficiency.
Rice, indigo, logwood and spices were all exported, but it
was on sugar that the main reliance for the economic welfare
of the West Indies was placed. Unfortunately, by the third
quarter of the eighteenth century, the sugar lands in the
British islands had declined in productivity. Even under
modern methods of cultivation, sugar is very destructive of
the soil. Under the relatively primitive methods of the
eighteenth century, this was even more the case. For almost
a century the islands had been producing and the land was
nearly exhausted. Export of sugar, by 1760, was restricted
to the luxury market in Britain, protected by enumeration
and bounties, and only carried on at an excessive cost of
production. The French islands, on the other hand, and to
a lesser extent those of the Dutch and Spanish, were new
land, more extensive in area, and more productive. Thus,
while Britain was the chief sugar producer in 1700, by 1760
the continental markets were almost entirely closed to her
and even her colonies ignored the mercantilist restrictions,
to trade with the French and Spanish islands.
The indigenous population of the West Indies, moreover, was neither numerous nor strong enough to provide manual labour for economic development, and the climate militated against the employment of Europeans. This labour shortage was therefore filled by African slaves. The slave trade was revived and modernized on a greater scale than hitherto. Trading factories were set up on the Guinea Coast and slave ships began the triangle trade between Africa, the West Indies and New England. The economic blight of slavery upon the West Indies was the worst aspect of the mercantilist system in the islands. The moral evil has been over-emphasized as one of the blackest pages in mercantilist history. Actually slavery has existed in all climates and ages, and certainly the lot of the West Indian negroes under the abolitionist, moralist, profit-making regime of the nineteenth century plantation owners was no happier than that of their forebears.

It can be seen that the variety and complexity of the types of administration alone were increasing so alarmingly as to limit the effectiveness of mercantilist administration and tend towards the breakdown of the system. Other aspects of the system, however, were also adding to the burden. First among these was the ever-present problem of imperial defence.

The geographic diffusion of the empire created a problem of control which had to be solved in one of two ways. First,
there was naval supremacy, which Britain possessed in the period under discussion. Wherever the ships of Britain could make their power felt, she had complete security. But empires have a tendency to grow beyond the phase of a series of naval bases and coastal settlements. What of possessions which include the major portion of a continent? Beyond the range of the Royal Navy, Britain's fiat could not run, unless she was prepared to raise and maintain standing armies in her possessions for defence, and its ultimate corollary, conquest.

By 1763, it was apparent that a major change was taking place in the empire. Clive had begun the process which, in a century, was to give Britain control over the whole of India. In North America, the Thirteen Colonies were no longer a chain of trading settlements, huddled close to the sea for protection. More than half the continent of North America was now safely within the British grasp. Huge tracts of land in the Mississippi and Ohio valleys and in Canada beckoned the settler to come inland, away from the friendly seas.

The defence of the colonies in America had been a perennial problem. From 1758 on the practice was adopted of having Parliament vote sums for the compensation of the colonies for the military contributions they were required to make in their own defence, in time of general war. The old, inefficient and non-remunerative system of royal letters of requisition was dropped. Each year the Secretary of State urged the raising of troops and promised the parliamentary
grant in return. Much of the grant, however, was in practice a free gift (62). Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York were the only colonies who even approached their full quota of troops. The relatively unprotected colonies of Pennsylvania and Maryland were among the worst offenders. Pitt's plans for 1758 had envisaged a levy of 26,000 men from the colonies, but the response was nearer 23,000, with Massachusetts, under the rule of Pownall, being especially active. The divisions of jurisdiction in the proprietary colonies had a very bad effect on recruiting.

Thus the creation of a standing army in both America and India became, not an imperialist luxury, but an urgent necessity. The continual wars of the East India Company to maintain and extend its hold on Bengal, Oudh and the Carnatic, were a sufficient indication of the urgency of the problem in the east, and Pontiac's Rebellion in America, in 1763, demonstrated at once the scope of the coming problem of the frontier and the incapacity of the separate colonies under their current organization, to deal effectively with it.

The threat from France also remained. The peace of 1763 was considered by her as merely a truce, and the continuance of Spanish power in North America might, through the agency of the Family Compact, be a convenient medium for the revival of French power in the new world. Meanwhile, the

conquest of the new territory brought the entire fur trade into British hands and necessitated the effective occupation of the posts founded by the French in the interior. The military question was thus closely related to the regulation of Indian trade and western settlement.

Up to about 1750 Indian affairs were the responsibility of the separate colonies and were almost universally neglected. The depredations of the traders and settlers on Indian lands kept the frontier continually in a state of guerilla warfare. The success of the French in trade, as in Indian affairs, had been due to centralized government, eliminating destructive competition and even more destructive alienation of the Indians. The land hunger of the English, however, added to their failure to control their traders, had angered the Indians far more than the extensive trade penetration of the French. The Albany Congress of 1754, although it failed in its purpose of uniting the colonies, did manage to gain agreement for the appointment of two Indian superintendents responsible for political and commercial relations with the natives. Proposals for licensing traders were also advanced, but no attempt was made to put these into operation until after the war (63).

With the reduction of the forces in 1763, the method of royal requisitions for raising troops was reverted to.

(63) Such governors as Spotswood of Virginia and Burnet of New York were only exceptions to the rule of colonial indifference or incapacity in Indian affairs. The Indian threat, more than any mercantilist restriction, kept the colonists behind the Appalachians before 1763.
Formerly Pennsylvania and Virginia, with their interests in the Ohio valley, had been much more willing than the northern colonies to supply troops. The Southerners had raised strong objections to sending their troops to fight in Canada, and in the case of Maryland, the war effort was restricted by quarrels between the governor and the assembly. Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York, as the chief contributors between 1755 and 1763, supplied over 70 per cent of the troops. (64)

Britain therefore decided to maintain a standing army of 10,000 men in the colonies, to be paid for by the mother country in the first years, after which the colonies would gradually shoulder the expense. Both Burke and Franklin regarded this as reasonable and even desirable (65). The task of this army was very great - the defence of a three-thousand-mile frontier with few natural barriers, and the garrisoning of a chain of outposts. Amherst, the commander-in-chief, hoped to be able to re-enforce this outpost line with a barrier of settled territory, but disagreement between the home and colonial governments rendered this plan impossible of fulfilment.

The fallacies of the colonial Indian policy were dramatically demonstrated by Pontiac's rising. It resulted from

(64) Beer, British Colonial policy, 1754-1765, p.68
(65) Franklin, Works, Vol. IV, p.89
the trading abuses mentioned above and from the abandonment of the French practice of present-giving. There was certainly some foundation also for the claim that the French traders had incited it. The war against Pontiac was primarily a colonial one and the British Parliament, therefore, with considerable justification, refused to vote the large grants for assistance which had been forthcoming during the common effort of the Seven Years' War. The main burden would therefore have fallen on the colonies, had they not defaulted in respect of most of their obligations. In the event the main brunt of the first attack and of the decisive battle of Bushy Run fell upon less than a thousand time-expired regulars from the frontier garrisons (66).

The incapability and disunity of the colonies in this, as in other matters, seemed to demand the intervention of the home government. The first evidence of this intervention was the promulgation, in October, 1763, of the great proclamation of that year. The proclamation, among other things, forbade permanent settlement beyond the Appalachian divide and forbade Indian trading without a license. This was primarily a preliminary standstill arrangement, pending regulation of trade to protect the Indians. In 1764, on the advice of Sir William Johnson, northern superintendent of Indians, the trade was restricted to certain licensed posts. The plan,

however, was not put into operation at the time, because the problem of obtaining sufficient revenue from the colonies had not been mastered. The difficulty lay in making the trade self-supporting and at the same time avoiding the contentious subject of taxing the colonies.

The appointment of Lord Shelburne to the Secretaryship of State for the Southern Department in 1766, revived interest in the problem of reorganizing the new territory. While Shelburne was not aware of the extent to which the Proclamation of 1763 was defective, his desire to change the basis of the imperial structure and his willingness to consult the reports of his agents in America made it possible for new plans to be laid.

The reports of civil and military authorities... were now to convince him that the old policy of imperial administration and support had broken down. On the one hand, the endless complaints of insufficient authority to punish crime, to maintain order, or to prevent illicit settlements, the reports of the activity of French traders in the Illinois country, the tell-tale returns of the fur trade, and the gloomy prophecies of the Indian superintendents; on the other, the angry protests of Canadian traders against such restrictions as had been imposed upon trade, the land-hungry frontiersmen, the representatives of land companies, the heavy burden of expenditure, and the pressure for economy and retrenchment, all these forced him to devise some alternative plan (67).

His first proposal was for a return of Indian affairs to provincial jurisdiction, and for the immediate establishment of several colonial governments in the new territory. His

final, modified plan, however, was framed in accordance with the desires of the business interests. The plan for a colony in the Illinois country met with some opposition, but the complete organization might have been accomplished, had not Shelburne had the control of colonial affairs removed from his department in January, 1768, with the setting up of the third secretaryship. Shelburne's plan did have the merit of linking the colonies and the mother country together in a westward expansion, and might, had it been adopted, have postponed, if not averted, the Revolution. The system of leaving the responsibility to the individual colonies was reverted to, largely because there was no suitable option ready.

Since the British debt in 1763 stood at £130,000,000 and the land tax at 4 shillings in the pound, there was a great deal to be said for the colonies bearing a part of the burden of their own defence. Bute's government fell before plans for a more efficient system had matured, but it was taken up by the succeeding administration of Grenville. The new Secretary of State, Egremont, questioned Shelburne, the President of the Board of Trade, as to, (a) what form of government should be established in the colonies, (b) what military force should be sufficient for their protection, and (c) what was the easiest and most acceptable method of getting the colonists to contribute toward the new expenses. This last question began to assume paramount importance in the relations of the colonies with the mother country, and a study of the British trade in its relation to the overseas
empire is necessary to its understanding.

The position of the empire in Britain's trade showed that the purpose of its existence was the monopolization of colonial trade and through such monopoly, to make a contribution to the self-sufficiency and hence prosperity of Britain. Exports to the colonies were controlled by such measures as the Staple Act, by which nearly all imports had to be shipped through the mother country, thereby adding duties and handling charges to the cost prices of these articles. Actually, the high degree of competition among British merchants contributed to the lowering of these prices to lowest possible level consonant with profit.

Because of the lack of operating capital among both merchants and planters in America, the trade was largely carried on with British credit, based on the huge potential wealth of the new country. By 1760, British exports to the colonies amounted to £2,000,000 per year in value, but £4,000,000 worth of American debts were carried on British books (68). In the South, the planters mortgaged their future crops, while New England relied upon cash gained from the illegal triangle trade with the Guinea Coast and the French and Spanish West Indies. The basic idea of the controlled trade, however, was not exploitation of the colonies by the mother country, but rather the maintenance of an empire in which every part contributed to the best of its ability.

toward the goal of self-sufficiency. The welfare of the empire as a whole was the motivating factor in such control. In this connection, the value of each colony to the imperial whole was weighed, both as to its contributions and as to its purchases.

In the North American trade, Virginia and Maryland were regarded originally by the British authorities as the most valuable colonies because they supplied tobacco. The prohibition against the growing of tobacco in England was enforced. After 1760, however, as has been noted, the value of the North American trade rapidly declined. In Carolina, the cultivation of rice was begun. From 1730 on this colony was permitted to export rice to southern European countries. With these countries, Britain's provision trade was not extensive. The middle colonies were regarded with some disfavour initially because their production competed with that of Great Britain, but Pennsylvania and later New Jersey and New York, proved to be lucrative sources of lumber and pitch for the navy. The most serious doubts arose as to the value of the New England colonies. These were a replica of Old England in their production, sold provisions to the West Indies and supplied many of their own manufactured wants, largely because of the local shortage of hard money or exchangeable goods. Even the quantity of naval stores produced, which production was once fostered by the British government to discourage competition in other goods, was swallowed up in the local shipbuilding industry; added to which, the
local cost of production was higher than that of the Baltic countries and soon discouraged Britain's purchases from New England. Some asserted, it is true, that the provision trade of the New England colonies increased the value of the colonies, since this trade contributed toward the self-sufficiency of the West Indies in time of war, but this advantage was more than balanced by the loss to the British Treasury resulting from abuses of the trade in time of peace.

The limits of colonial production were fixed by what was desirable rather than by what was possible or profitable. The needs of the pioneering inhabitants were not entirely disregarded, but there was a tendency in examining the larger picture of imperial welfare, to subordinate their interests to those of the more politically vocal and seemingly more important section, i.e. the people of Britain. The cottage industries of Britain had expanded easily to production for export, and were selling in a highly competitive world. Therefore, the obvious step of ensuring a protected market was taken, especially by the Acts of 1699, 1703 and 1709, against colonial or Irish woollen manufacture. These Acts did not affect the overseas markets of the colonists much because such a trade had not yet grown up, but production for local markets created competition with British exports. Actually, however, it was only after 1713 that the real concept of a self-sufficient empire took shape.

The diversion of British trade from its natural channels necessitated the bountying of certain products necessary to
Britain's welfare, yet costly to produce in her own territories. This course was followed for a short time as affecting colonial naval stores, but the Admiralty objected to the low quality of the products, the Treasury to the expense of the bounty and the merchants to the unnatural direction of lucrative trade, with the result that the policy was gradually abandoned. While the bounty system was found too expensive, the encouragement of the inter-colonial provision trade was the only alternative method of keeping the New England colonies within the mercantilist structure. The supply was greater than the demand in the other colonies, however, and illegal trade with the British, French, Spanish and Dutch West Indies grew up.

In the West Indies, the British sugar trade was in a state of permanent decline. Sugar had been an enumerated article since the imposition of the Navigation Acts, and had to pay export duties if exported from Britain, and plantation duties if exported from one of the colonies. The increased consumption of sugar in England in the first decades of the century resulted in a decrease in the surplus available for export to other European countries. More important, however, the French, Spanish and Dutch were now producing sugar in their islands, and at a lower cost of production than the British could attain. The soil of the British plantations was exhausted and the British sugar exports, in any case, bore heavier charges for export than did the foreign sugar. As a result, the West Indian planters in 1724 demanded the
abolition of the enumeration, so that British sugar might compete on better terms with foreign sugar on the continent. The Board of Trade, however, realizing that there would be less sugar available for the British market and therefore less revenue from the importation, refused to abolish the enumeration. There was the added danger that the free export of sugar to the continent might mean the reciprocal free import of continental manufactured goods into the West Indies and the destruction of a lucrative British market.

The enumeration, however, had governed only the question of the first destination of exported sugar. It did not prevent Britain or her colonies from importing foreign sugar, and although protective duties were placed on sugar from the beginning of the century, it was not until 1715 that the Neutrality Treaty with France of 1686 was invoked, to stop not only the importation of foreign sugar, but the colonial trade with the foreign West Indies and the trade between the West Indian colonies of the various nations (69). It was a further complication in an already complicated situation that the British West Indies were in the habit of purchasing not only provisions but sugar from foreign

(69) The Treaty of Neutrality between France and Britain of 1686 guaranteed to each power the exclusive right to the trade with its own colonies. The further interpretation, however, that there was included in it permission to seize one another's ships for violation of the monopoly was not sound in law. Certainly the seizure of colonial ships for trade with the possessions of the opposite party to the Treaty was not sanctioned. In practice, only war would stop the trade.
plantations and re-exporting it as their own product (70). Local acts against this practice only served to raise the price of the British sugar and limit its sale.

It was even more difficult to deal with the trade between the foreign West Indies and the northern colonies. Sugar, and more especially molasses, from the French West Indies, was cheap, because it was excluded from France and because the cost of production was low. The rum distillation industry was a growing one in New England, especially in Rhode Island. The British sugar industry did not produce molasses on the same scale and could not in any case meet the low price of the French competitors. One further incentive for trading with the foreign islands appeared. In the sale of provisions or slaves to the islands, the New Engander could take his payment in molasses or hard money. Thus the chronic shortage of specie in the northern colonies was met through this illegal trade.

The British sugar industry, however, was crippled and the Board of Trade was forced to take action in an attempt to correct the situation. Three solutions were suggested: 1. The duties on British sugar might be reduced; this would mean a loss to the Exchequer. 2. Sugar might be removed from the enumerated list and its export permitted to foreign countries; this would jeopardize the gains made by British shipping, raise the British price of sugar, and possibly open

the West Indies market to foreign manufactures. 3. The cost of production might be lowered by lowering the price of provisions; this would have involved further restrictions on the northern colonies, and would have been very difficult to enforce. Powerful pressure was exerted by the West Indian planters, however, with the result that the Molasses Act was passed in 1733.

This Act imposed on foreign sugar, molasses and rum imported into the colonies duties of five shillings a hundredweight on sugar, sixpence a gallon on molasses, and ninepence a gallon on rum. Such heavy duties would have been ruinous to the trade if they had been enforced, but enforcement proved to be impossible. The Act, however, did not forbid the sending of cargoes to foreign islands, so that as long as the duties charged on the return cargoes could be evaded, the lucrative trade continued. To assist the planters further a drawback of the whole duty on sugar re-exported from Britain was granted, so as to permit competition in the European market.

In 1739 the privilege of exporting sugar directly to Europe was granted, but British sugar was still unable to compete with the foreign-grown product. In an effort to bolster the sagging economy of the West Indies, and partly as a result of the abiding faith of the orthodox mercantilists in the wealth of tropical colonies, the London financial interests poured capital into the islands in the form of long-term credits, increasing thereby that London-West Indian interest
which was to have such an influence in the political and economic life of the nation after 1760. This preoccupation with the West Indies, however, tended to stereotype the attitude to colonies in general, and to retard changes in the system long after these were proven necessary by the experience of the continental colonies of North America. Such rigidity made successful imperial administration impossible and was, in fact, one of the major faults to be found in the mercantilist imperialism. The concept of a mercantilist empire was sufficiently sound and was, moreover, the only method of administration possible under eighteenth century conditions. The fault lay in the rigid interpretation of that concept.

While the sugar problem is an excellent illustration of the economic difficulties which had arisen between the colonies themselves, the controversy over the iron industry is an example of the difficulty of reconciling the interests of the mother country and the colonies. By 1715 the English output of iron was restricted by the depletion of her forests and the resultant shortage of charcoal for smelting. Pig iron had to be imported from Sweden, and at the beginning of the century this supply, because of a rupture of relations with that country, was very uncertain. Attempts to find an alternative source of supply included consideration of the overseas colonies, but the international crisis passed before anything was done to encourage the colonial iron industries.

Meanwhile an incipient iron industry had developed to
supply the shipyards of Virginia, Pennsylvania and Maryland, despite a ban by the British, who wished to retain the colonial market for themselves. By 1730 Britain was importing 20,000 tons of foreign pig iron, of which 15,000 came from Sweden, 5,000 from Russia, and only 2,000 from America (71). By 1750, the revived enmity of Sweden induced Parliament to pass an act which permitted the importation of colonial iron but to the port of London only. The restriction in the Act was removed in 1757, but the volume of colonial iron imported was never very great, not exceeding 10 per cent of Britain's total imports. Gradually the increased use of coal put the British iron industry on a self-sufficient basis and the importation ceased almost entirely. The removal of the import restrictions on pig iron were counterbalanced by the ban, in the act of 1750, on the future erection of rolling, plating or slitting mills in the colonies.

Such limitations on local production, however, were not serious, since in most cases the articles could be secured as cheaply from England, for, as production became more efficient, the price of such goods dropped, the quality was improved, and there was no restriction in any case on colonial production for colonial use. The most important inter-colonial trading - in shoes, soap, candles, coaches and leather - was not affected at all. The restrictions on the colonial iron industry limited the Pennsylvania iron

production, and after 1767, practically destroyed it for several generations, but the purchase of iron products from Britain was much more profitable, especially as the industrial revolution developed in scope. Even under the more stringent restrictions after 1765 there was an era of general prosperity, a significant fact in assessing the causes of the American Revolution. It was a feeling that the mother country was attempting to deprive the colonies of their share in this prosperity which lay at the bottom of much of the unrest and discontent, although the ostensible issues raised were largely political and constitutional. The advantages of being within the protected trade area of the British Empire were acknowledged, but the colonists felt that they must profit to the maximum from this protection without having to pay for their privileges to what they considered an alien authority.

By 1750 a revision of opinion with regard to the relative importance of the colonies was coming about. Jamaica was in a chronic state of decline, with a white population of barely 12,000, which contributed little to the economic welfare of that colony. Barbados and the Leeward Islands were in no better condition. In the whole West Indian possessions there were barely 40,000 whites, compared with a population of one million for the North American continental colonies, which population doubled with each generation. The raised standard of living in the northern colonies, moreover, had led to a higher purchasing power,
with an increase in purchases from Britain. The defence of the colonies from the great outflanking movement of the French in the Mississippi valley had also increased their importance to Britain. This last, against the precepts of mercantilism, involved, on balance, a net contribution from the mother country for their defence, and border wars took on the aspect of major campaigns. It was therefore apparent that, because of the pressure of circumstances, great changes would have to be made in the system.

Even during the Seven Years' War, an effort was being made to correct some of the faults in the application of mercantilism. The first attempts, however, were towards enforcing the existing regulations. The fact that the French West Indies, blockaded during the war, were dependent on New England for their supplies, caused the passage of an Act in 1757 to forbid the export of provisions elsewhere but to Britain or to British colonies. This act, however, continued to be violated, to the extent that in 1760 Pitt issued instructions to the Navy to enforce the regulations, thereby establishing the precedent of naval enforcement of the customs and trade regulations (72). The Contraband Rule of 1756, apart from declaring the British position concerning contraband

(72) ... an illegal and most pernicious trade carried on by the king's subjects in North America, to the West Indies, as well as to the French settlements on the continent of North America, and particularly to the rivers Mobile and Mississippi; by which the enemies, to the great reproach and detriment of government, are supplied with provisions and other necessaries, whereby they are principally, if
on the high seas, laid down the principle that a trade prohibited in peacetime cannot be thrown open in time of war. The French, however, were able to profit from smuggling operations through such free Spanish ports as Monte Christi in San Domingo.

Developments in colonial expansion, therefore, suggested ways in which the existing system of commercial regulation could be applied to future acquisitions. Unfortunately there was an inclination to overlook the difficulty of reconciling conflicting opposites. Enumeration was designed to bring profit to the mother country, especially in the commodities of tobacco and sugar. Tobacco, decreasing in value, was largely re-exported, while the sugar planter exploited the enumeration to his own advantage, but could not hold off the inevitable decline of his economy. Bounties, such as those on pitch and naval stores, profited underdeveloped areas like the Carolinas, but failed to stimulate production in New England. The Navigation Acts helped to foster the New England shipping industry to the detriment of British shipping, although they aided in maintaining a balance of trade between Old and New England. Bans on local woollen, hat and iron industries were more of a nuisance than

(72)(cont'd.) not alone, enabled to sustain and protract this long and expensive war. And it further appearing that large sums of bullion are sent by the king's subjects to the above places, in return whereof commodities are taken, which interferes with the product of the British colonies themselves, in open contempt of the authority of the mother country, as well as the most manifest prejudice of the manufactures and trade of Great Britain ... Annual register, 1760, p.219.
a serious economic restriction. On balance, Britain was able
to maintain her lead in trade, as the exponents of mercan­
tilism desired, but the British private credit structure may
have had as much to do with this result as the official
restrictions and regulations on trade.

The British investments in the West Indies have
already been mentioned. On the North American continent,
the situation was more serious only because those who con­
trolled British credit were disinclined to rescue the
economy of an area which was considered unprofitable. In
Virginia an attempt was made to palliate the burden of colonial
indebtedness, to some extent, through the Virginia Debts Act
of 1748. This Act provided that sterling debts could be
settled in local currency at 125 per cent of their original
value. Because exchange fluctuated, and was at times as
high as 40 per cent, some London and Liverpool merchants com­
plained about the Act (73). The law, however, through an
oversight on the part of the Board of Trade, had already been
confirmed by an Order-in-Council before the complaints had
been registered. It could thus only be repealed by the
joint action of the Crown and the colonial legislature.
Modifications made in 1754 and 1755 placed the fixing of
exchange for the payment of debt in the hands of the local
courts. This was also distasteful to the British merchants

(73) Beer, British colonial policy, 1754-1765, p.179.
who had the added burden of inflation through the issue of great amounts of Virginia paper money after 1755, which by 1762 depreciated 65 per cent in value. The governor could not enforce the regulation of paper money over the opposition of the Assembly, and there were serious doubts as to the legality of the limitations of 1754 and 1755. Thus debts, which had been contracted on a far lower exchange rate, were almost voided by the actions of the Virginia courts and legislature. Ossa was piled on Pelion when the Virginia Assembly in 1758 made many debts payable in tobacco, the price of which was inflated during wartime, at the rate of two pence per pound of tobacco. This "Twopenny Act" was greatly resented by the merchants (74).

Relief was in sight, however. In 1751 the abuses of local currency had led to an Act forbidding its issue in New England (75). In 1764 this prohibition was extended to all

(74) Beer, British colonial policy, 1754-1765, p.183

(75) Bills of credit were used by the colonies to raise supplies during wartime, to be redeemed later by colonial taxation, within a specified length of time. During peacetime the practice was developed of issuing paper money for private loans on mortgage security. Such paper was, however, over-issued and depreciated in value. This led to the passage of the acts of 1751 and 1764. In addition, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1720 was extended to the colonies to forbid the founding of private banks with the right of note issue in the colonies.
the colonies. Such a restriction, however, had a weakening effect on the trade of the colonies. With the banning of paper money, long-term credit from British merchants was the only legitimate source of capital for the colonies. This, to many colonists, was the real British domination, not the Acts of Trade or the regulation of political life. Currency, it is true, did come into the country in the form of the Spanish pieces of eight or dollar, and was almost the only real "hard" money used in the colonies. The rate of exchange for this money in the colonies was fixed in 1708 at four shillings, or one-third higher than the sterling rate of four shillings and sixpence, although the coins were sweated and clipped and lost even more of their face value. Actually, the rate of exchange varied from eight shillings in New York to six in New England (76). Credit bills to England were based on the local rate and dealings with the various colonies were thus still further complicated, the rate of exchange being normally unfavourable to the colonists because of their high degree of indebtedness. Demands for shipment of specie in payment for goods when the rate became too unfavourable led to a shortage of hard money in the colonies.

This restriction of credit and the lack of hard money were more severely felt, once the Acts of Trade were vigorously enforced. The available supply of specie was

immediately cut off and the purchase of British goods would have had to be curtailed even without the action of the colonists in passing non-importation resolutions. These were originally intended to ease the result, or burden of the indebtedness mentioned above, but they soon developed into a weapon against the Stamp Tax. The volume of trade fell greatly and many merchants were able to take advantage of the altered rate of exchange to discharge their debts. Little progress was made in the development of local industries, the flow of capital still being to foreign trade, to fisheries and to the fur trade on the frontier. The South could not look to local industry at all, being bound by its plantation economy to servitude to London. Merchants continued to import (since they were largely British(77)) but the fear of losing their investments caused the London interests to urge the repeal of the Stamp Tax. Actually, the members of this group were not eager to see the debt liquidated but sought to pass the blame to the government for its continuance. Under the Rockingham administration they and the West Indian interests were able to put the older mercantilist policy back into practice.

(77) The British (and especially the Scottish) merchants in the Southern colonies were especially hated. Their unpopularity, in fact, was somewhat analogous to that of the moneylender in present-day Indian villages. When the Revolution came, they remained loyal, and were persecuted by the revolutionists with a virulence that had no counterpart in the northern colonies.
The continual depression in the northern colonies through this lack of specie and the unfavourable credit situation, kept resentment against Britain alive. In 1765 the London merchants protested vigorously against the imposition of the Stamp duties, and this protest was a major factor influencing the repeal of the duties. Thus, up to 1765 at least, British investments in the northern colonies were still sufficiently large to cause the merchant class, in order to protect its interests, to go to the length of opposing the British Governors.

By 1767, however, the situation had changed. The London merchants did not oppose the Revenue Act. British trade with the continent of Europe had finally revived, and there were good harvests in Britain. A basic re-orientation of British trade was developing. The disadvantages of the colonial trade were now apparent, and the constitutional issues raised by the Americans were not popular. British merchants began to foreclose on their investments in the colonies. The new industry of Britain, as well as European markets, began to take up much of the available capital. After 1783 these developments led to the creation of the "Free Trade Empire," and the British trade dominance in manufactured products.

By 1763 the national debt of Britain had swollen to £140,000,000, and Grenville, good financier as he was, felt that after the free wartime expenditure of Pitt, some retrenchment was necessary. At that time the collection of
£2,000 of customs in the colonies cost almost £8,000.

... the British customs service in the colonies was in part both inefficient and venal. The trade with the enemy had been in some degree carried on with the corrupt connivance of these officials. By law they had extensive discretionary powers, of which the chief was the authority to accept in full payment amounts less than the lawful duties. (78).

This discretionary power was exercised to the full. Over £700,000 worth of goods were smuggled annually, European goods being smuggled in and tobacco smuggled out.

At home, British taxation had reached an unprecedented level. Taxes on stamps, windows, excise, and malt and cider were especially unpopular. The greatest weight fell on the landowners, with a land tax of four shillings in the pound, imposed during the war, remaining in force (79). Interest

(78) Beer, British colonial policy, 1754-1765, p.231.

(79) Miller gives a new explanation for the British demand for colonial taxation:

It is the plight of the landowners rather than bribery or corruption that explains the administration's huge majorities in Parliament. The scheme of drawing a revenue from the American colonies required no vote-buying; on the contrary, the squires pricked up their ears whenever the ministers mentioned the 'sweet welcome sound' of revenue ... To the squires, a colonial revenue meant paring the land tax to the peacetime rate of two shillings in the pound and paying off the national debt with the help of the colonists ... A British government that sought to surrender the right of taxing the colonies could not have survived the onslaught of the exasperated squires in the House of Commons. Miller, Origins of the American revolution, p.88.

This explanation, of course, discounts the success of the government on non-American issues, the fact that Newcastle's political machine was transferred intact to the Court party, and the fact that the real Tory squires were almost universally opponents of the Court and supporters of Pitt. The sentiment in favour of taxing the colonists was almost universal, except among a small group of London merchants.
charges alone on the British debt were £5,000,000 annually, while the total American debt was only £2,600,000. The Seven Years' War had also enriched the colonists greatly, especially through privateering and smuggling. The surface wealth of the colonists was certainly very great, especially among the New England merchants and the Virginia planters. Although the Americans often declared that they relied solely on British credit for their prosperity, by 1767 many of the colonies were entirely free from debt. These factors and the fact that the Seven Years' War had begun in the colonies gave a moral basis for the British demands that the colonies share the cost of it. The current cost of defence of the colonies also had to be met.

The government had to choose between burdening still further the already over-burdened British taxpayer, whose objection could be expressed directly and, in terms of political power, uncomfortably for the government; or placing part of the burden on the colonies and risking only an argument on the constitutionality of the taxes. It is not surprising that the government chose the alternative which, on the face of it, promised the least expense and opposition. That they chose rightly under the circumstances is hard to doubt.

Grenville first set himself to correcting the abuses in the existing regulations. Shipmasters were compelled before loading to give bond for all articles, even for those which were not enumerated. Royal Navy officers were employed to blockade the coasts and see that the regulations were
carried out, a measure which was especially unpopular (80). The practice of permitting partial payment of duties was forbidden and, late in 1763, all absentee customs officials were ordered back to their posts (81). The powers of the vice-admiralty courts were enlarged, and the judges paid a 5 per cent commission on the fines imposed (82). The counter-suit for false accusations was abolished and the vice-admiralty courts were centralized in Halifax.

At this time, reports were called for from the colonial governors as to the extent and nature of illegal trade in the colonies. In the older colonies, such as Jamaica and Barbados, there was almost no illicit trade. Dominica and St. Vincent, on the other hand, entirely French in population, traded almost exclusively with the French in St. Lucia. On the mainland, North Carolina, Maryland and Virginia were fairly free from illicit trading, while the situation in Massachusetts was complicated by the presence of a very venal set of customs officials. New York carried on direct trade with

(80) ... all naval officers do occasionally act as tide waiters ... and it is hardly probable that, having once tasted the sweets of taking rich prizes, they should all at once shun these opportunities. Annual Register, 1764, p. 19.

(81) Beer, British colonial policy, 1754-1765, p.232

(82) There were, of course, no juries in vice-admiralty courts, as is the case to the present day. From this fact stems the later accusation on the part of the revolutionaries that the British had deprived them of their right of trial by jury. Beer, British colonial policy, 1754-65, p.248.
Holland and Rhode Island lived almost entirely by the illegal triangle trade. The violation of the staple rights of the mother country was more serious. Direct importation, especially of fruit and wine from Portugal, luxury and tropical goods from France, and gunpowder from Holland, was general.

The right of Britain to regular trade and the general method of regulation were acknowledged by both the British and the colonists, and justified by the fact that naval defence was ensured by Britain. Thus Franklin and Otis both express their acceptance of the customs duties, and of the right of Britain to impose them (83). The change in attitude toward customs duties came, of course, with the improvement in enforcement.

In 1764 higher duties were imposed on imported merchandise and the export of lumber, raw silk, potash and whale fins was prohibited save to the mother country. The logwood trade, a new English staple, was enumerated, coffee and pimento imports were taxed and the import of wine was forbidden, except through England.

The readjustments to the system were not made entirely with a view to enforcing the restrictive laws. Bounties, bonuses and protective duties on colonial produce were all re-adjusted, largely to the benefit of the colonial producer.

(83). These kind of secondary taxes, however, we do not complain of, though we have no share in the laying or dispensing of them ...

Experimental production of silk and potash was begun in the colonies and protected from foreign competition (84). High-priced colonial lumber competed successfully with that of the Baltic countries only because of the protective duties, although these duties were modified in 1765 to permit the Irish and Portuguese trade in American lumber to expand. Rice exportation to the French West Indies, illegal after 1763, was in 1764 again permitted in order to assist the economic recovery of the Carolinas, and this despite the protests of New England, whose illegal provision trade was seriously threatened thereby (85). In the enforcement of all these regulations, moreover, a significant change had been made. The Treasury, not the Board of Trade, was the chief agent, since revenue, not colonial administration, was the chief object. The old mercantilist ideal of a self-sufficient empire was being given up temporarily. There was a return to the revenue policy of the Stuarts (86).

As has been mentioned before, the Molasses Act of 1733 imposed a prohibitively high duty on foreign molasses and sugar, encouraging evasion and a consequent loss of revenue to the Treasury. With the enforcement of customs regulations, however, it was realized that the trade would be killed and a

(84) Beer, British colonial policy, 1754-1765, p.223.
(85) Ibid., p.266.
(86) Ibid., p.234.
lucrative source of revenue, as well as the prosperity of the northern colonies might be destroyed. It was therefore proposed to lower the tax, in order to permit a revival of the trade and to gain revenue. The Sugar Act of 1764 reduced the duty to threepence on the gallon of molasses and made similar reductions for other sugar products. The hoped-for revival was limited, however, by the trade depression which hit the New England colonies and by the fact that the sugar trade could not bear even the nominal duties imposed on it. The Massachusetts Assembly appointed a committee to correspond with the other colonies on the subject, thereby instituting the use of reciprocal committees of correspondence for purposes of protest. Arguments developed as between one part of the empire and another. The British West Indies prospered because a plethora of lumber, fish, horses and provisions brought a drop in the price of these articles. The price of molasses went up. The amount of specie in the colonies declined, as did the value of paper money. Americans overlooked the revenue purposes of the Act and blamed the government for partiality to the interests of the West Indian sugar planters. (87).

Although the act had passed with only one dissenting voice (88), Sam Adams and other American leaders warned the British that there would be resistance. Here the colonists relied, not on force or legal argument, but on the fact that British trade might also be ruined. The Empire, they declared, was too interdependent to survive such treatment.


(88) This was Huske, an American, born in Boston.
The need for revenue was only one aspect of a larger problem, that of lessening the weight of governing the Empire. The determinant of geographic diffusion demanded the modification of orthodox mercantilist doctrine in the interests of more efficient government. It was essentially both an attempt to delegate authority in the economic sphere, and an attempt to centralize more completely the authority in the political sphere.

After 1763, British colonial policy, although still favouring the merchants, was in many of its most important parts, distinctly at odds with them. The Proclamation of 1763, the Stamp Act, the Declaratory Act, the Quebec Act of 1774, and the Carleton Commission and instructions of 1775, were none of them mercantilist in their objectives. With equal truth it may be said that the Sugar Act, the Trade Acts of 1764-66 and the Townshend Acts were designed much more in the interests of revenue which the exchequer greatly needed than of the business prosperity of the capitalists. The British government had other interests at stake than those of the merchants and always found it difficult to satisfy the merchants as much as the merchants wished to be satisfied, a situation of which the latter frequently complained. It is sheer assumption to assert that in England at this time the acts of the executive and the legislation of Parliament were necessarily determined by business pressure, for the one thing the mercantilists did not want was parliamentary taxation of the colonies (89).

The first, and most pressing problem was the inclusion of the newly acquired territories in the Empire. On June 8th, 1763, Lord Shelburne, as the President of the Board of Trade, outlined a plan for three new colonial governments: the West Indies, the Floridas and Quebec. The question then arose as to what to do with the new Indian territories in the Mississippi Valley. Their organization was complicated by the presence of vaguely defined Indian rights and by the almost equally vague and conflicting claims of the colonies. The area had been prohibited to the colonists in time of war, but future prohibition would have to be reconciled with the royal grants given to North Carolina, Virginia, Massachusetts and Connecticut, to lands reaching as far as the Pacific. The Crown, however, proposed to void these grants, if possible (90).

Shelburne, moreover, regarded the interests of the Indians as a royal trust, and urged that the area around the Great Lakes should be made a reserve for them, open to trade, but not to land grants or settlement. The boundary was to be determined by the Indian superintendents, though Virginia was to be permitted to expand into the Ohio Valley. The boundaries of Canada were to run north of the Great Lakes, to prevent settlers thereon from removing to remote places where: "they neither could be so conveniently made amenable to the
jurisdiction of any colony nor made subservient to the interest of trade and commerce of this kingdom by an easy communication with and vicinity to the great River of St. Lawrence." (91) Shelburne resigned soon after, and the Proclamation of October 7th, 1763, based on his proposals, was promulgated by Lord Hillsborough.

The emergency allowed of no delay in the fixing of the boundary of the new reserve. The crest of the Appalachians was fixed upon as an interim boundary, although it was to remain fixed until after the Peace of 1783. The new territories were to be under four governments: Grenada, East Florida, West Florida, and Quebec. Newfoundland was granted the coast of Labrador and Nova Scotia Cape Breton Island. Grenada included the Windward Islands, Dominica, St. Vincent, the Grenadines, Grenada and Tobago.

The governors of Canada and the two Floridas were forbidden to issue warrants for survey or settlement beyond the boundaries of their governments or beyond the crest of the Appalachians. All land to the west of this crest, not under the Hudson's Bay Company, was reserved to the Indians, under British sovereignty. No private purchase of land from the Indians was permitted, and public purchases had to be negotiated by the governors at public meetings with the Indians. Licenses were required for trade with the natives.

Such regulations were an attempt to organize the hitherto haphazard pattern of Indian affairs and strengthen the western boundaries of the colonies from attack.

One shortcoming of the Proclamation was that it did not allow for the acknowledgment of French language and customs in Quebec. The intention was that some later measure would be introduced for the purpose, but this was delayed until the Quebec Act of 1774, guaranteed the rights of the French. In the interim all the colonies were placed under English law and institutions and the instructions to Murray at Quebec were the same as to the other governors. In practice, however, both Murray and his successor, Carleton, gave wide latitude to the French, thereby laying the groundwork for the later Act.

While the administrative machinery was being improved and the control of the home government was re-asserted over the colonies, there was a movement, particularly on the part of English opposition parties, to give the colonists a larger voice in the administration of the Empire. The quarrels over the Stamp Act brought the matter to the fore, but long before this event, plans had been put forward for a centralizing of the administration of the empire, especially in North America. Before he fell from power in 1761, Pitt had even sketched out a proposal for the representation of the
Chatham had an idea for a federal House of Commons which would have included the following representation for the colonies:

Group 1: Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Virginia, four each, or less if desired; Group II: Connecticut, New York and Jamaica, three each, unless Jamaica wished to be included in Group I; Group III: Canada, the Jerseys, Maryland and South Carolina, two members each, unless Maryland and South Carolina may wish to be in Group II; Group IV: Nova Scotia, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, the Lower Counties on the Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, East Florida, West Florida, Bahamas, Bermudas, Barbados, Antigua, St. Christopher, Nevis, Montserrat and Grenada, one member each, unless Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Barbados and Antigua may wish to be in Group III. Islands which found one member too expensive might join together to elect a member or elect one by rotation. Dominica, St. Vincent and Tobago might also be represented when settled sufficiently.

Other terms of the plan included: 1. The members to be elected by the local assemblies.
2. Members would have to be exempted from the property qualification of British M.P's.
3. On dissolution, American M.P's would have to retain their places until such time as their assemblies could re-elect them or choose others.
4. Special time limits would have to be placed on the new writs for American members. Six to twelve months was suggested.
5. The residence of every American member, in or near London, should be left in writing with the Speaker.
6. Internal taxation on the colonists should be limited to a pound rate on their estates (unless the colonial assembly petitioned for a preferable form of taxation), and the rate would not exceed 3d. in peace and 1s. in war; on these conditions the mother country was to protect the colonies without further requisitions.
7. The lifting of the restrictions on the American maritime and inland trade would be considered afterwards.
8. The Act of Navigation was to be preserved intact, since Article 6 thereof ensured the interests of the colonies and it was reasonable that the interests of the mother country should also be preserved.

The plan would have increased the Commons by up to 52 members.

Williams, Basil, "Chatham and the representation of the colonies in the imperial parliament," English historical review, October, 1907, p.756.
colonies themselves, whenever proposed, broke down through jealousy, and the Americans never really seem to have adopted the idea of legislative union with enthusiasm.

Franklin declares that the proposal of

"an union with the colonies, is a wise one; but I doubt it will be thought so here (London) til it is too late to attempt it. The time has been when the colonies would have esteemed it a great advantage, as well as an honour to be permitted to send members to Parliament; and would have asked for that privilege if they could have had the least hopes of attaining it. The time is now (1765) come when they are indifferent about it, and will probably not ask it, though they might accept it if offered to them; and the time will come when they will certainly refuse it (93)."

The colonists were not entirely unrepresented in the House of Commons, but the argument made by some supporters of imperial powers that these American-born Members represented the colonies could not be reconciled with reality. The argument that the colonies were as well represented as most parts of Great Britain was made on sounder ground, since the unreformed Parliament represented barely five percent of the people of Britain. While there were no Americans in the first Parliament of George III, five were returned between 1763 and 1783 (94). In the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, however, Massachusetts led the other colonies, to

(93) Franklin, Writings, Vol. IV, p.400.

(94) The five Members were Barlow Trecothick, Henry Cruger, John Huske, Paul Wentworth and Charles Garth. The first two were elected after the revolutionary conflict had started, for the mercantile constituencies of London and Bristol respectively.
insist upon the abandonment of any proposals for legislative union. The fact that they owned their own land gave the colonists a sense of independence and they were therefore averse to being represented in the legislature of a "foreign" country. In any case the problem of distance was almost insurmountable. Yet the chief reason for refusal hinged upon the constitutional and economic issues raised by the attempts of the government to obtain revenue, through the successive measures of the Sugar, Stamp and Revenue Acts.

The Revolution settlement was still sufficiently recent to seem to British eyes the perfect expression of constitutional liberty; and so, compared to other systems then in existence, it was. American separatism, however, not yet formulated into the doctrine of independence, was searching blindly for some way out of the impasse into which the conflict of the societies two/had brought them. It is not proposed here to discuss the constitutional issues involved, but suffice it to say that where the economic or political privileges of the colonies conflicted with the demands of a home government for which American spokesmen continually expressed undying loyalty, these demands were rejected rather than that the colonists should surrender their privileges (95). Franklin's theory

(95) The extent to which economic factors were responsible for the American Revolution cannot be easily measured. At first sight it is natural to attribute the disruption of England's first empire to a policy avowedly designed to make overseas settlements 'duly subservient and useful.' Yet contemporary English opinion held that
of the imperial structure illustrates this separatist bias:

(95) - cont'd.

colonies 'felt the benefit more than the burden' of the Acts of Trade, and the view on the whole appears well-founded. Irksome as these dis- abilities may seem on paper, the working of the system was not unduly onerous in practice. It was modified by concessions such as those which enabled the colonies to carry on trade direct with southern Europe in certain commodities, or it was evaded with the open connivance of the American authorities. This lax administration of the system helped to bring the authority and prestige of the mother country into disrepute; and habitual dis- regard for the laws of the parent state fostered a spirit of independence, which made any attempt at enforcement of the laws appear a gross act of tyranny ... Against their disabilities, real or nominal, must be set the reciprocal advantages which the colonies enjoyed in the shape of the protection, the credit and the market of the mother country. The old colonial system, as the ruthless destruction of tobacco-growing in England demon- strated, was far from one-sided. Lipson, Edward, The economic history of England, Vol. III, pp.194-196.
"... The British empire is not a single state; it comprehends many... We have the same King, but not the same legislature." Or: "... the Parliament has no right to make any law whatever, binding on the colonies, ... the king, and not the king, lords and commons collectively, is the sovereign." Or again: "Every man in England seems to consider himself as a piece of a sovereign over America; seems to jostle himself onto the throne with the King, and talks of our subjects in the colonies." (96).

This last aspect, the social cleavage between the two peoples, will be discussed hereafter. Without arguing the merits of Franklin's case, however, it is apparent that the application of such ideas could not be reconciled with the constitutional ideas current in Great Britain or America, and the British interpretation, in the event, was the only one which could be legally binding.

Proposals for American representation in Parliament, if carried through, would certainly have limited the effectiveness of American protests of "oppression." Defeated constitutionally and legally, the colonists turned to popular opinion, utilizing the propaganda value of restrictions which were often ineptly enforced. When the force of public opinion in Britain, as represented by the Chathamites and the Rockingham Whigs, proved insufficient, the one alternative of independence remained. Chatham and Burke might thunder about "taxation without representation" and press for American representation in Parliament, but when Grenville, as the leader of the government, consented to such representation,
American spokesmen dropped the proposal. Independence, to ensure the colonies against taxation, just or unjust, external or internal, was the prime concern of the popular leaders from this point on. It was the innovation of the insistence on collection, rather than the imposition of the taxes which made them burdensome, and was a major contributing factor to the independence movement.

Like the men of the Great Rebellion, American leaders looked back to mediaeval customary guarantees of the rights of the individual. But these rights were overridden by the prerogative powers of the executive. Therefore any declaration of rights which was to last must, in the last analysis, be based upon armed rebellion. The argument of the colonists for freedom, like that of the English parliamentarians of 1641, was based in logic rather than law or history. "Stone dead hath no fellow," said the Earl of Essex in justifying the attainder of Strafford as an act of self-defence. The underlying philosophy of the statement was to be that of the American leaders after 1770.

The new expenditures necessitated by the new imperial administration were soon found to be beyond the revenue-raising powers of the existing tax machinery. All the measures of the Sugar Act were not sufficient to produce more than a quarter of the £100,000 considered necessary by Grenville for the defence costs in America, let alone sufficient to provide the £350,000 necessary for all administration costs. In March, 1764, therefore, Grenville announced in Parliament that he would
have to obtain additional revenue from the colonies, probably through a stamp duty, such as was already in operation in Great Britain.

George Grenville has been pictured as the corrupt politician who, because of a stubborn insistence on arbitrarily imposing the Stamp Act on America, lost an empire for Britain. Such a picture does not take account, either of Grenville's attitude toward the colonies while in office, or of the steps he, as the most cautious of ministers, took to ensure a favourable reception for a measure from the imposition of which even Sir Robert Walpole had shrunk. His announcement of the proposed duty was made only after consultation with the colonial agents. At a meeting with them he declared that he was not wedded to the stamp duty, and was willing to accept any reasonable alternative they might propose which would bring in the same revenue. None of the agents (except that of Rhode Island) could suggest an alternative at the time, and the various colonial assemblies were unwilling to commit themselves, hoping that the tax would not be put into operation, or might be avoided.

Thus, a year later, when opposition to the measure was mounting in the colonies, the colonial agents tried to dissuade Grenville from imposing it. On being asked again for an alternative source of revenue, they again temporized, Franklin for Pennsylvania suggesting a return to the old method of royal letters of requisition. Grenville, realizing that the requisition had never produced adequate revenue, then asked what proportion of the revenue each colony would supply. Franklin
suggested a colonial congress to decide this, but all agreed that the calling of such a congress would only be an opportunity for the colonies to quarrel over the sharing of the burden. Jared Ingersoll then suggested a tax on the fur and slave trades (his own colony, Connecticut, being engaged in neither). Grenville seems to have given the agents a fair hearing, and even declared himself willing to support a scheme for colonial representation in Parliament. On the necessity for revenue, however, he was obdurate. As the minister responsible for the finances of a nearly-bankrupt nation, he could hardly, in this case, have been otherwise.

In any case, the announcement of the proposal to institute the tax came at an unfortunate time, insofar as its popularity in America was concerned. Pontiac's rebellion had recently been put down, not, it is true, through any great efforts of the colonists; but the finances of the colonies were near collapse, and there was a general air of exhaustion throughout America. The chronic indebtedness of the colonial planters and merchants to London was becoming increasingly burdensome, as the demands of the creditors increased with post-war inflation. The restriction of the lucrative smuggling industry could not be employed as a legitimate grievance, but the employment of naval officers for enforcement of trade regulations was protested. The new duties on foreign trade were also unpopular, although great care had been taken to encourage increased trade with the mother country at the time they were imposed. While the customs revenue, rather than the stamp duties, were
the real burden, American demagogues picked on the latter to attack, as having the least constitutional justification.

The chief advantage of the English Stamp Act, as it had operated for many years, was that it was almost self-executing; it did not require enforcement officers with powers of entering houses and prying into private affairs. Documents without a stamp were void: therefore each citizen saw to it that he procured stamps (97). The cost of extending the system to the colonies would be almost negligible - only one warehouseman would have to be added to the staff in London, and deputy commissioners could be appointed in America. In addition, conditions in America seemed to make the stamp duties an ideal

(97) The English Stamp duties between 1756 and 1763, had grossed £287,307, of which £260,647 was net revenue. Only £7,901. was collected for Scotland, where the cost of collection consumed half the gross receipts. The duty on pamphlets averaged £285., but was actually a fluctuating revenue, while that on almanacks was £3,000. and a regular revenue. Ale house licenses went up in 1756 from one silling to one guinea, and the average receipts therefrom were £56,883, with £24,557 from wine licenses at £4 each. Playing cards yielded £15,307, dice £252, and apprentice premiums £4,203, - this last subject to great frauds. Insurance policies were also uncertain, yielding an average of £12,000. Bills of lading produced £1,710, debentures £1,106, and transfers of stock £717. The system of granting commissions to the collectors on a poundage system produced great inequalities between localities.
form of taxation from the point of view of the British Government. The people were very litigious, haling each other into court on the slightest pretext. Since all legal papers required a stamp, either the weakness for going to law would be curtailed, or the British Treasury would benefit. Newspapers were required to bear a stamp, and the colonists were great newspaper readers. The tax fell on those best able to pay, and yet was not excessive. The burden was to be shared equally between the West Indies and America, an important feature, in view of inter-colonial rivalries. Only a part of the expense for the defence of the colonies was expected to be raised and no part of the revenue was to go toward the payment of the British debt. Grenville prided himself on having asked nothing unreasonable.

The final bill was drafted by Thomas Whateley, Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with Franklin and Ingersoll (98). The possible revenue was expected to be between £60,000 and £100,000. The British were later to blame Grenville for risking the empire for such a paltry sum, but it was because the total amount of the tax was to be small that it was thought that the colonists would not object. Ingersoll declared at the time that the right of Parliament to impose the tax was

(98) Sometime in 1764 a circular letter had been sent to all colonial governors asking for returns on all public transactions, law proceedings, grants, conveyances, etc., probably on the initiative of Charles Jenkinson, who, with Whateley, had been the moving spirit behind the Stamp Act. The immediate decision on it, however, was taken by Whateley.
acknowledged, but that the tax would be unpopular (99).

In Parliament there was very little debate on the measure. Only William Beckford and Colonel Barre objected and General Conway called for the acceptance of colonial petitions against the measure (100).

The act came into operation on November 1st, 1765. Restrictions on trade were slightly relaxed, and a bounty on timber imported into England was granted, as well as freedom to export it to Ireland, Madeira, the Azores and every part of Europe south of Cape Finisterre. Colonists were appointed stamp masters, and this lucrative office was much sought after by indigent friends of the colonial agents (101).


(100) The debate on the passage of the act was so tepid that Horace Walpole, ever a keen observer of political events, records in a letter to his cousin, the Earl of Hertford: "There has been nothing of note in Parliament but one slight day on the American taxes (February 6th, 1765), which Charles Townshend supporting, received a pretty heavy thump from Barre, who is the present Pitt, and the dread of all the vociferous Norths and Rigbys, on whose lungs depended so much of Mr. Grenville's power."


(101) Richard Henry Lee, the future revolutionist, was stamp master for Virginia, while Franklin secured the appointment in Pennsylvania for his friend John Hughes, and Jared Ingersoll assumed the office in Connecticut. Miller, Origin of the American revolution, p.114.
The Sugar Act, the prohibition of paper money in 1751 and 1764, and the enforcement of the customs regulations in 1763 and 1764, had all aroused American opposition to such an extent that the colonists were not in a mood to accept the Stamp Act. The post-war slump of 1764, in addition to impoverishing the mother country, had hit the colonies hard. Specie was rapidly disappearing from the northern colonies and land values were reduced. Unemployment in the colonies increased and the London merchants viewed the decline in trade with alarm. It was unfortunate for the popularity of the measure, and for all attempts to justify it, that it was instituted in a time of depression. What its success would have been in more prosperous times is a matter for conjecture. On paper, Grenville had raised the revenue by £234,000, and reduced expenditure by £130,000.

The depression was, of course, utilized to the full by opponents of the tax. Petitions against the tax emphasized the inability to pay rather than any constitutional objection to internal taxation. The lack of hard money in the colonies and their own impending bankruptcy were both emphasized by the colonists. The refusal of Parliament to accept the petitions against the tax, on the ground that money bills could not be petitioned against, drove the colonists to more definite action. Protests against the act on grounds of actual hardship were in greatly exaggerated terms, but since tavern keepers, printers, lawyers and merchants, the most influential groups in the community, were the hardest hit,
their hardship could be represented as the grievance of the whole people who were already restive under British trade and settlement restrictions.

Possibly the most widespread cause for complaint against the tax was that it could not be evaded. The colonists looked back with pleasure upon the easily evaded system of royal requisitions and called for a return to this royal, in the place of Parliamentary taxation; in effect a cry, for colonial purposes only, for a reversal of the Revolution Settlement.

(102) The Act was also looked upon as a precedent for further taxation of the same type, in support of what the colonists considered British extravagance. The precedent of encroachment was, however, the most dangerous aspect. Governors, judges, assemblies, and churches might all be brought under British control, if once fiscal independence was given up.

The general opinion in America before May 1765 was that the tax could not be evaded, and most of the colonists followed the lead of Franklin in accepting it philosophically. It was from the malcontent element of the population, the ruined merchants and unsuccessful professional men that the first opposition came. The presentation of the seven resolutions of Patrick Henry in the Virginia House of Burgesses in May, 1765, provided the necessary spark for the insurrection. Although

(102) This was the origin of the proposals of the radical wing of the Stamp Tax Congress and later of the New York Assembly in dealing with the Mutiny Act, to address only the King, rather than the King and Parliament, in the petitions.
Virginia itself was not an enthusiastic supporter of Patrick Henry's extreme point of view, the other colonies took up the resolutions enthusiastically.

The mob actions which followed were certainly not spontaneous or unpremeditated, being the result of careful encouragement and planning on the part of many who belonged to the commercial and planter classes. It was in their interest to limit the regulatory power of the home government. Some of the leaders of the mercantile class, such as Hancock and Livingston, publicly encouraged the mobs or marched at their head. This was a surprising and alarming phenomenon to the officials, for they did not realize the degree to which a feeling of social frustration existed among the petty aristocracy of America.

The chief pre-occupation of the mobs, at first, was with hounding the stamp masters out of the country. Oliver of Massachusetts, Coxe of New Jersey, Hood of Maryland, and Messerve of New Hampshire, were all forced to give up their commissions as stamp masters. Even the stamps themselves were a subject for mistreatment, the mobs burning nearly half the supply sent over, and using the search for them as an excuse for working off private grudges.

Once the first wave of terrorism had died down, such demagogues as James Otis and Sam Adams stirred the fires again with accusations as to the source of the original suggestion for the tax. It had, of course, originated in the Treasury, but such a moderate opponent of the Act as Thomas Hutchinson
was mobbed and his house burned. In Philadelphia, Franklin's adherents, like Franklin, supported the Act and were mobbed.

At the same time that the Virginia Resolutions were being proposed, Otis suggested in the Massachusetts Assembly that a continental congress should be called to discuss the Act, and make an united protest against it. The suggestion was taken up and the congress met in October 1765, one month before the Act was to go into effect. New Hampshire, North Carolina, Georgia, Nova Scotia, and Virginia were not represented and the representatives of South Carolina, Connecticut and New York were not empowered to sign any protest. A protest was nevertheless drawn up in the name of all the colonies. Some radicals proposed to petition the King direct, thereby denying the authority of Parliament, but these were over-ruled, and the final petition was addressed to King, and the Lords and Commons, acknowledging thereby colonial dependence upon Parliament. The proposition of no taxation without representation was also rejected, since it implied colonial rights over all taxation, a doctrine not yet accepted by the majority of the colonists.

The Act was not, however, resisted everywhere. In the West Indies only St. Christopher's and Nevis resisted, and in the former the opposition came largely from American seamen in the port. Halifax and Quebec accepted the Act without a murmur. In Georgia, the governor, the merchants of Savannah and the Georgia rangers united to enforce the Act. The firmness of the governor here stopped the insurrection, while in
other colonies, the lack of military strength prevented even protective measures being taken (103). The co-operative attitude of the West Indies towards England at this time led to a threat on the part of the New England merchants to cut off the provision trade to the islands, although this would have been economic suicide for New England.

The extremes to which the riots were carried after the imposition of the Act, especially in New York, led the more conservative elements among the insurrectionists to urge the peaceful method of protest through non-importation. Such luxuries as lace, ruffles, plate and carriages were foresworn, although not for long, since increased exports to the mother country soon improved the economic position of the colonies. The colonial boycott of British goods in 1765 became a formidable threat to British trade (104), and in this situation it seemed as though the fall of the American merchants might bring down the British economic structure as well (105). Moreover, the drainage on specie caused by the Stamp Duties had dried up the return on British investments.

(103) The Sons of Liberty had urged a military union of the colonies against British coercion. Certainly the British military weakness was alarming, since the army of 10,000 regulars which Grenville had proposed had not materialized for lack of money and only fifteen time-expired battalions remained in North America after the peace.

(104) The annual consumption of British goods in the colonies was estimated at £3,000,000. Annual Register, 1764, p.24

(105) In the political sphere, Pitt, in his speech on the imposition of the Stamp Tax, pointed this out:
In Britain, the belief that full-scale rebellion had broken out was widespread. The Stamp Act, it was thought, was merely the ostensible cause of insurrections which reflected the spirit of rebellion inherent in all Americans. The extremes of the rioters and the moderation of the tax combined to convince Englishmen that Americans must have other, more definite grievances, or none at all. Free traders blamed mercantilism and anti-imperialists (like Burke) blamed "oppression." It was a mixture of such opinions which formed the political philosophy of the Rockingham Whigs when they assumed office in July, 1765, determined upon the appeasement of the colonists.

The new government was willing to take the colonists at their word and not only treated the Stamp Act as the real cause of the trouble, but also re-asserted the authority of Parliament over the colonies. In thus trusting to the doubtful behaviour of a people and forces over which they had no

(105) cont'd.

"Sir, I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people so dead to all feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves would have been fit instruments to make slaves of all the rest ... I know the valour of your troops. I know the skill of your officers. In a good cause, on a sound bottom, the force of this country can crush America to atoms. But in such a cause as this your success would be hazardous. America, if she fell, would fall like the strong man. She would embrace the pillars of the state, and pull down the Constitution with her! Is this your boasted peace? Not to sheath the sword in its scabbard, but to sheath it in the bowels of your countrymen!"

control, the Rockingham Whigs placed their political future in jeopardy. The support of the London interests and the Court was vital to the repeal, and it was fortunate for the government that the decline of the American trade and the King's temporary support of the Whigs coincided. Pitt declared his eccentric theory of taxation vs. legislation, but this could have no basis in law (as Mansfield pointed out). It was used only to justify Pitt's claim that internal taxation should be controlled by the local assemblies (106).

As a preliminary to dealing with the Act itself, a Declaratory Act was passed on February 18th, 1766, modelled upon a similar statute passed in respect of Irish legislation. It reiterated the supremacy of Parliament over all local legislatures and the right of Parliament to legislate for the colonies in all matters. The question then remained as to whether to enforce or repeal the Stamp Act.

The support of the King, which was necessary to the existence of the government, was obtained for repeal of the Stamp Act, but only after the fact that military enforcement

(106) Taxation is no part of the governing or legislative power. At the same time on every real point of legislation I believe the authority of Parliament to be fixed as the Polar Star, - fixed for the reciprocal benefit of the mother country and her infant colonies. ... The distinction between legislation and taxation is essential to liberty. The Crown, the Peers, are equally legislative powers with the Commons. If taxation be a part of simple legislation, the Crown, the Peers, have rights in taxation as well as yourselves; rights which they will claim whenever the principle can be supported by might.
was the alternative was pointed out. Actually, the King had wished for a peaceful, but definite enforcement. He resented the humiliation involved in acceding to the policy of his Ministers, and determined to rid himself of the Rockinghams at the first opportunity.

In the colonies the repeal was received with great celebrations, and the Declaratory Act notwithstanding, the colonial assemblies now considered themselves sovereign. The problem of insufficient revenue for the mother country continued, however, and had been aggravated by the fact that the administration of the Stamp Act had resulted in a deficit of £631.9s. The chief result of the Act, apart from a small revenue obtained from the West Indies, had been to call in question the constitutional position of Britain vis à vis the colonies. The "weight of government" had, if anything, been increased. The Rockingham Government also reduced the duty on molasses from 3d. to 1d., secured the repeal of the cider tax and increased the bounties on colonial produce. Thus £130,000 was cut from the revenue and the peace of the empire was maintained, even if only temporarily and uneasily.

Chatham's ministry, which took office in the summer of 1766, although it had a transient popularity with the colonists, found itself called upon almost immediately to deal with several grievances which it had been beyond the powers of the Rockingham Government to abate. The Mutiny Act, extended to America in 1765, provided for the private
quartering of troops in the colonies, since the lack of colonial support for the military had resulted in a shortage of barracks. The Act had been altered to permit such quartering only in empty barns, sheds, etc., but the boycotting of the "lobsterbacks" continued. It was only after the repeal of the Stamp Act, however, that the colonial agitators had time to turn their attention to this grievance. The Act had obliged the colonists to provide, in addition to shelter, fire, candles, beds, vinegar and salt. This provisioning was now construed as taxation without representation.

With the arrival of military re-enforcements in Boston, the quartering issue came to a head. The Council of Massachusetts, obedient to the law, voted provisions for the troops, but the House of Representatives refused to sanction them. The British government, cautious from the outset, failed to punish the offence and the other colonies followed the lead of Massachusetts. New York's disobedience was the most flagrant, with a direct refusal to obey the Act, although an offer was submitted to obey royal requisitions of supply. Other colonies either qualified their acceptance of the Act, or passed their own Acts to supply the troops. Only Pennsylvania carried out the Act to the letter.

While the colonists felt that an army of occupation was being imposed on them unconstitutionally, in Britain the chief concern of the government was with the far-reaching problem of upholding the prestige of Parliament and retaining
the control in the hands of the central authority. Although Charles Townshend has been blamed for the subsequent attempt at legal and economic coercion, it was apparent by 1767 that all British political parties were alarmed at the excessive claims of the colonists, and that the extent of the measures to meet them, rather than the method, was the chief point at issue.

The decline of Chatham into mental decay gave Townshend his opportunity to endeavour to bring the colonists into line. Although Chatham may have opposed the Revenue Acts, it is almost certain that he was moving towards a viewpoint similar to that of Townshend. In the popular reduction of the land tax (107) in the spring of 1767, Townshend found his excuse for reviving the colonial taxation issue.

The advantages of the Revenue Act over the Stamp Act were apparent. As, in substance, it provided for a series of importation duties, the former could not be rejected by the colonists as internal taxation. In addition, the sources of revenue under it were far more lucrative than those of the Stamp Tax. Duties on glass, lead, paint, paper and tea were imposed (108), the proceeds from which were to go toward

(107) The tax was reduced from 4d. to 3d. in the pound. Townshend does not seem to have supported the reduction, although he did not heartily oppose it and was able, because of the shortage of revenue created thereby, to propose taxation of the colonists.

(108) Owing to the concessions made to the East India Company so that it could compete with the Dutch, tea could be sold cheaper in America than in England. In
defraying the cost of administration and defence of the colonies. At the same time, Townshend urged that an American Board of Commissioners of Customs be set up to enforce the navigation acts and the new revenue laws. The revenue from the new measure was not expected to be above £40,000 annually. In addition, an accompanying bill was passed to enforce the Mutiny Act and to suspend the assembly of New York until such time as it complied with the Act.

Warnings against the Revenue Act were heard on all sides. Burke denounced it as merely a repetition of the Stamp Act. Grenville, on more precise grounds, pointed out that the levy was on British goods and would do great injury to British trade. The Act, however, passed quickly through the

(108) cont'd.

England, under the Old and New Subsidies, tea paid in 1767, £23. 18s. 7½d. per £100, gross price in customs, or about 24%. In addition, after being sold at auction, it paid inland duties which were one shilling a pound, and a further duty of £25 in £100. Duties were thus nearly 50% and one shilling on the pound. By an act (21 Geo. 2 c. 14) of 1747, teas could be re-exported to Ireland and America without payment of the inland duty. The Townshend Act removed the one shilling a pound inland duties and instituted a drawback of the whole of the customs duties on condition that the East India Company make good any deficiencies in revenue. The Company, however, found the burden too heavy, and despite the lowering of prices by 25%, tea sales were not much increased. In 1772 the Act was changed to allow a drawback of only three-fifths, but with no indemnity required. In 1773, all importation duties were relaxed and the Company gained the right of direct importation, making teas only a fraction of the English price. The jealousy of American merchants led to the famous "Boston Tea Party" and the restriction of tea sales once more.

House with the usual large government majority.

It was unfortunate for the British Empire that this measure, inherently sound and just, should have been implemented when it was. Three years earlier it might have provided the revenue needed and avoided the conflict. The rejection of Pitt's fictitious distinction between legislation and taxation was, perhaps, a mistake, for in the very short term it might have been used to placate the colonies. By 1767, moreover, even the safety-valve of protest from the British mercantile interests was not available. The Industrial Revolution and increased markets in Europe were now absorbing British capital and trade to a degree which placed America in a secondary position in the eyes of British investors.

Similarly, the use of the Mutiny and Revenue Acts to underline the meaning of the Declaratory Act was a serious blunder, even although they were instituted in the interests of improved administration. Townshend gave the extremists among the colonists what they wanted; a chance to reject any compromise with the mother country.

The intransigent position has been stated by John Dickinson, in his Letters from a Farmer. The authority of Parliament over the colonies was completely denied (109). External duties were admitted to be within the powers of

(109) Beer, British colonial policy, 1754-1765, p.189.
Parliament, but they were not to be intended for the purpose of raising revenue, that is, they were to be for purely regulatory purposes (110). Dickinson also declared, with considerable significance for the future, that the colonies were now an united political body (111).

After the death of Townshend in September, 1767, the mosaic government of Chatham fell apart. The Bedfords, strong supporters of coercion, joined the administration, and as a concession to them, Lord Hillsborough was appointed to a separate Secretaryship for the Colonies. The change might well have improved the situation, but the first action of the new Secretary was to enforce the Mutiny Act on the colony of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts assembly promptly "outlawed" the "standing army" and threatened to raise an army of its own. Virginia led the other colonies in support of the "Resolutions of 1769" against what the colonists regarded as encroachments by the mother country on colonial authority. At the same time the non-importation agreements were reaffirmed.

The non-importation movement was at first a protest against commercial and financial restraints and impositions, and was inspired and led by the merchant classes. As it

(110) This was to counter the declaration of the framers of the Tea Act, who had declared it to be for revenue purposes only.

(111) "Our Strength depends on our union. United we conquer, divided we die."
progressed, however, it passed out of their hands into those of men who were primarily concerned with individual and political privileges and liberties. Prominence was given, not to the commercial grievances which might eventually have been redressed, but to constitutional claims which Parliament would not recognize as valid. Behind these claims, in turn, lay a great variety of local and particular grievances—territorial, governmental, religious and financial—which inspired each particular colony to uphold the larger claim, as a common cause for them all.

In Britain there was a growing weariness with colonial affairs. A proposal was made to repeal the tax on tea, which had yielded only £300, and other revenue measures were also called in question. The breakup of the mercantile structure seemed an accomplished fact. Hillsborough informed the colonists that there was no intention of imposing further taxes on them, thus announcing, in effect, that the attempt to make the colonists share in the expense of their own defence had been abandoned.

With the fall of the Grafton Ministry in March 1770, a new influence in the government began to make itself felt. A planned policy of careful conciliation, with the mother country still retaining legal supremacy, was instituted. Lord North secured the repeal of the Revenue Act, except for

(112) The proposal was rejected by only one vote in the Cabinet.
the tax on tea, which was retained for purposes of prestige (113). He was, of course, fortunate in that a revival of trade and an era of prosperity had developed at the turn of the decade, so that the need for revenue was not so pressing as with his predecessors (114). There was also a lessening of the threat from France, since the latter had become involved in the conquest of Corsica. The garrisons were strengthened in the colonies and it seemed as though a new and better era had begun.

(113) It was remarkable on this occasion that the minister condemned these duties in the gross, and the law by which they were founded, as so absurd and preposterous that it must astonish every reasonable man, how they could have originated in a British legislature; yet, notwithstanding this decisive sentence, proposed a repeal of part of the law, and still continued the duty upon tea lest they should be thought to give way to American ideas, and to take away the impositions, as having been contrary to the rights of the colonies. Annual Register, 1770, p.74.

(114) In 1766 Lord Shelburne had formulated a plan for gaining revenue from America through a taxation of quit-rents in the colonies. This method would probably have been less unpopular than any other scheme proposes for taxing the colonies, but it was rejected by the Grafton Administration once Shelburne himself left office. Humphries, R.A. "Lord Shelburne and British colonial policy, 1766-68," E.H.R., April, 1935, p.274.
It came too late, however. The damage had been done. Insurrections such as the "Boston Massacre" and the "Boston Tea Party" could no longer be considered as protests, but as acts of war. On the one side, the course of repression, and on the other that of independence, had proceeded too far. The relative quiet that existed from 1770 until the Battle of Lexington was the ominous silence of preparation. By 1770 the "weight of government" had broken the last bonds of amity between the mother country and the colonies.

In addition to divergences on matters of policy, there existed a wide gulf between the basic modes of thinking of the two peoples which no administrative reform or plan of conciliation could close. It should not be forgotten that the North American colonies, and New England in particular, were not normal extensions of the English state, but a schism therefrom. With the civil and religious quarrels growing out of the upheaval of the Renaissance came the inevitable penalties to be imposed on the losers in differences with constituted authority. In the less moderate thinking communities, these took the form of capital and other extreme punishment; in England, transportation of offenders to the colonies was a common sentence. Thus, geographically isolated and, by reason of their grievances, individualistic and self-opinionated in the highest degree, the outcasts developed separate communities for themselves, and claimed the rights denied them in the mother country.

Self-government was established in the New World and
was tolerated by the home government, as it eased the weight of government. Legislatures, in the flush of the parliamentarianism of the seventeenth century, were established in nearly all the colonies. Governors and councils acted as checks on the assemblies, yet were dependent upon them. Even in the West Indies the idea of separatism grew (115), and it was observed that it varied in inverse ratio to the strength of Britain's traditional enemies, France and Spain.

Each colony, moreover, had its own historical traditions, and its own peculiar customs and usages, to which the home government had perforce to adapt itself, thus giving the imperial administration a degree of flexibility at the price of the loss of symmetry. To a great extent, pride of race had disappeared in the colonies and patriotism was bounded by the physical limits of each province.

"The colonist, in general, regarded himself not as an Englishman, nor even as an American, but as a Barbadian, a Virginian, and so on throughout the entire list of British colonies. Thus the Empire was a loosely organized political structure, composed of a number of heterogeneous colonies with different economic institutions and with varying degrees of local self-government, all tending, however, toward virtual autonomy."(116)

In such an organization it is hardly surprising that the application or re-enforcement of mercantilist controls was extremely difficult. Economic considerations forced

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(115) Beer, British colonial policy, 1754-1765, p.165.
(116) Ibid., p. 3
Britain to take action regarding the difficulties and troubles which had arisen in the administration of the Empire at a time when constitutional troubles made a satisfactory settlement impossible. By 1763, neither Britain nor the world had reached the stage of political and constitutional development when a federated empire of autonomous states was possible. Royalty, a still vigorous factor in British politics, was reviving in power. Any exercise of its functions as a bond between the various components of the empire, without being accompanied by the functioning of parliamentary rule, would, however, have been regarded by Englishmen as a dangerous manifestation of tyrannical prerogative. George III functioned within the British parliamentary system, and thus, inevitably, King and parliament were to be aligned against the separatist tendencies of the colonists.

Not that a dislike of British institutions formed any large part of this separatism. In his evidence before Parliament on the repeal of the Stamp Act, Benjamin Franklin declared that the attitude of Americans toward Britain before 1763 was:

... the best in the world. They submitted willingly to the government of the Crown, and paid, in all their courts, obedience to acts of Parliament. (117)

And as to the position of that Parliament itself in the affections of the colonists:

(117) Franklin, Writings, Vol. IV, p.418
"They considered it as the great bulwark and security of their liberties and privileges, and always spoke of it with the utmost respect and veneration. Arbitrary ministers, they thought might possibly, at times, attempt to oppress them, but they relied on it, that Parliament, on application, would always give redress." (118)

Yet however much this enthusiasm for the Constitution might have been instilled into the colonial mind, and however much the colonists might think themselves brothers in liberty with the citizens of the mother country, there remained the separatist cast of mind, which could not, under most circumstances, generate a high degree of enthusiasm for the British Empire as their homeland. Thus, though Franklin could say that "to be an Old-England man was, of itself, a character of some respect, and gave a kind of rank among us" (119), when the privileges of the colonists, especially those privileges which guaranteed their economic profit, were curtailed in the interests of the Empire, he could list as legitimate grievances of the colonists against Parliament:

... restraints lately laid on their trade, by which the bringing of foreign gold and silver into the colonies was prevented; the prohibition of making paper money among themselves: and then demanding a new and heavy tax by stamps; taking away, at the same time, trials by juries, and refusing to receive and hear their humble petitions." (120)

It was significant of the attitude of the colonists that the reaction to such restrictions was a drive toward self-sufficiency; in effect a move toward independence and a

(118) Franklin, Writings, Vol. IV, p.420.
(119) Ibid., p.419
(120) Ibid., p.420.
transfer of the ideal of a self-sufficient empire to the level of a self-sufficient nation, or group of communities. Franklin, certainly one of the best representatives of the colonial mind, declared, after visiting the Yorkshire cloth mills in 1771:

"I am more and more convinced of the natural Impossibility there is that, considering our Increase in America, England should be able much longer to supply us with Cloathing. Necessity therefore, as well as Prudence, will soon induce us to seek Resources in our own Industry, which becoming general among the People, ... will do Wonders. Family Manufactures will alone amount to a vast Saving in the Year; and a steady Determination and Custom of buying only of your own Artificers wherever they can supply you, will soon make them more expert in Working, so as to dispatch more Business while constant Employment enables them to afford their Work still cheaper ... tho' still Trade enough should remain between us and Britain to make our Friendship of the greatest importance to this Nation." (121)

The sanguine expectations of Franklin as to independent economic development of America were not to be fulfilled for a century, since the accident of the Industrial Revolution served to prolong British industrial domination, even in the American market. The reference to American population expansion was of importance, however. The population of the colonies was doubling with each generation, and the education and control of such a volatile mass of humanity in the tenets of orthodox imperial thought was beyond the powers of

Franklin, Writings, Vol. V., p.327
any government, even if the attempt had been seriously made. Certainly the attitude of mind of the British toward the colonists was not generally conducive to understanding. The mind of the colonist was incomprehensible to the English official class. As an example of this unfortunate lack of knowledge of the colonies in high places, the opinion of Lord Hardwicke, on the value of the recently acquired territory of Canada, may be cited:

"Canada is a cold northern climate, unfruitful; furnishes no trade to Europe that I know of, but the fur trade, the most inconsiderable of all trades; and therefore never compensated to France the expense of maintaining and defending it. Its products are mostly or nearly of the same kind as those of Great Britain, and consequently will take off not much of ours. Besides, if you remove the French inhabitants, this Kingdom and Ireland cannot furnish, or procure people enough to settle it in centuries to come; and if you don't remove the French inhabitants, they will never become half subjects, and this country must maintain an army there to keep them in subjection." (122)

Can it be wondered that there were many who preferred Guadeloupe as an acquisition?

Yet it was at the social level that the widest cleavage between the two peoples was most apparent. The class distinction in Britain was over-emphasized, while that of America was under-emphasized. The social structure of England was, however, very compact and complex. Outsiders were not easily admitted. The social structure of the

colonists on the other hand, was extremely simple - aristocracy, bourgeoisie, labourers and slaves. The statement that

"Mr. Hancock may be a very good Englishman among Bostonians, but he is no more an Englishman amongst Englishmen, than General Gage is a King among Sovereigns (123)

is illustrative of the exclusiveness of the English attitudes. The concept of British superiority over the colonies was based, not on social distinctions, but the "fetishism of places,"(124) which implied a certain superiority in favour of the inhabitants of the mother country over those who had left it. It was largely the result of thinking of it in terms of personified countries.

The break between England and America came, not as a revolt against real "oppression" - excessive importance must not be attached to the American fears of being "enslaved" by means of stamps or of a tea-duty; such catastrophes are common wherever Anglo-Saxons play at politics, and are called upon to pay taxes ... The revolt was against the superiority assumed by those who stayed behind. The bonds remained close, and there was no real estrangement in the sense of feeling alien to each other ... the idea of the "mother country" and her "children" is pushed to its logical conclusion - as children grow up, the parents become old and weak, which analogy about 1770 produced the belief in America that Great Britain was declining; and the final conclusion is that her inheritance is to pass to the Americans. (125)

Almost the only people in Britain who saw a community of interest between Britain and America were the English Dissenters. These saw the freedom of American Dissent as an

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(124) Namier, England in the age of the American revolution, p.44.
(125) Namier, "The soul of America," The nation (English) January 26th, 1929, p.577.
earnest of their own aspirations. The unity of Dissent, however, was based upon religious particularism, was unable to expand beyond its own prejudices, and did not appeal to the bulk of Englishmen (and certainly not to the ruling classes). The possibilities of unification through the Established Church were even more remote, since only in Maryland and Virginia was it the faith of the majority of the colonists. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, although it provided a missionary link, did not sufficiently enter the lives of the average colonist to become a unifying factor.

Finally, the largest group of Britishers in constant contact with the colonists, the army, was a source of division, rather than unification. The contempt of the British officer for the "Provincials" has become proverbial. In view of the failure of colonial legislatures to provide adequate troops and supplies during times of crisis, and the high proportion of desertions of the colonials under fire, there was at least some ground for such contempt. For the colonials, it must be admitted that even junior officers in the British army were given precedence over colonials (126), and the supreme power exercised by the army over Indian affairs also gave cause for much legitimate dissatisfaction. In the

(126) Toward the close of the Seven Years' War, Pitt had finally gained recognition of near-equality of status under certain conditions for colonial officers under the rank of colonel. Such recognition, however, was very little regarded by officers who had been used to treating the colonials with contempt and saw no reason to alter their conduct.
older provinces the supremacy of the military was resented by both legislature and executive, although the former was naturally much more vociferous in its denunciations. The chief sufferer in prestige in the enforcement of the Mutiny and other Acts was the Royal Governor. He was between two fires; if he yielded to the assembly he was held responsible by the Commander-in-chief, under whose authority came the only police power in the colonies. If he yielded to the military and co-operated in enforcing the law, he lost prestige as governor. In addition, in matters of social precedence, he was usually over-ridden by the Commander-in-chief. In the time of General Gage, moreover, the office of Commander-in-chief was employed as a convenient listening post for the Cabinet in America, a fact only too well-known by the popular party and its leaders. It is hardly surprising that one of the chief grievances of the Americans, recited in the Declaration of Independence, was that the King "has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power."

It can be seen that the decline of the Empire, a very simple process with very simple causes for such publicists as Adam Smith, was, in fact, a long, complicated, and by no means continuous process, with the most involved circumstances contributing to it. Yet not all the factors were present in the Empire or its administration. A tree, the branches of which wither at the extremities, may be afflicted only with external plagues; but it may also be rotting at
the roots. In the destruction of the imperial tree, the basic sapping of its strength was at least as much responsible as the more apparent peripheral decay. In the following sections of this study, the decline in the public life of Britain itself will be studied as a factor in bringing about the British Retreat.
The first decade of the reign of George III was of vital importance in the development of the British nation, as it was in that of the Empire as a whole. In the political sphere, the constitutional framework as established in 1688 continued unshaken. It was, in fact, too out-dated to meet successfully the challenges made to it. The institution of cabinet government, which had been developing since 1688, was temporarily rejected, as a determined monarch, aware of the wide theoretical latitude permitted to the monarchy, attempted to revert to the personal monarchical government of William III. In the first decade of his reign, George III was successful in destroying the cabinet system temporarily. In the second decade of his reign he wielded more real authority than any English ruler since Charles II. British political life, in any case, had reached its nadir. Corruption flourished as never before or since, and the party system had disappeared. The nation, moreover, was exhausted from the drain of the Seven Years' War and seemed unable to meet the new needs for efficient government.

Even while this dismantling of the old system was going on, the foundations of nineteenth century political life were being laid. In the mercantile supporters of Chatham and Wilkes one may see the forerunners of the industrial and trading classes who were to rule England in the nineteenth century.
Moreover, in this decade, the new party system was formed, based largely on the issues created by the royal encroachments on cabinet government. The disruption created in the nation, both by the constitutional adjustments and the rise of new parties and classes, was of major importance in the disruption of the Empire as a whole.
Chapter III.

Setting the Stage: 1760-1763

... the last hundred years of political mystification, during which a people without power or education had been induced to believe themselves the freest and most enlightened in the world, and had submitted to lavish their blood and treasure, to see their industry crippled and their labour mortgaged, in order to maintain an oligarchy that had neither ancient memories to soften nor present services to justify their unprecedented usurpation. (127)

The transfers of political power at the accession of George III are often characterized, superficially and erroneously, as a change from Whiggism to Toryism, or from parliamentary democracy to arbitrary rule by royal prerogative. Such explanations do not take account of the character of the political parties then in existence, of the constitutional position of the Crown, in theory and in practice, and of the functioning of the parliamentary system. Thus, the decay in the political life of the country during the first decade of the reign of George III is viewed as the result of a gigantic plot on the part of the monarchy, with the connivance of a corrupt nobility, to subvert the constitution, and to wreak a private vengeance on the democrats of both England and the colonies. Actually the old political system was by no means so liberty-loving, nor the royal power so arbitrarily-minded as such explanations would infer.

(127) Disraeli, Sybil, (Earl's ed.), p. 17.
The structure of politics in 1760 was extremely complex as compared to the present-day two, or at most, three-party system. In effect, there was only one party in 1760, the Whigs. The Tory Party, out of office since 1714, and out of power since 1688, had almost disappeared, insofar as its party structure was concerned (128).

Before 1688, the division between parties had been too extreme to guarantee tranquility in the nation. It was as a reaction to this unrest, therefore, that both parties had combined to effect the Revolution Settlement. Thereafter the cleavage on fundamental issues disappeared. Unfortunately the division on minor issues was also destroyed. The party system depends for its effectiveness on certain perennial causes which do not strike at fundamentals, but upon which party platforms may be constructed. From 1714 to 1760 these did not exist. Hence politics became a matter of one party split into factions based only on the insecure foundations of place and patronage.

(128) The decline of the Tory party was caused partly by the Jacobite rebellions, with which the party was associated in the minds of the public, and partly by the consummate political organization developed by Walpole in the interests of the Whigs. Once the failure of the "Forty-five" ensured the ultimate disappearance of Stuart claims, even the more rabid Jacobites made peace with the House of Hanover. Tory opinions, however, did not die out, and were to contribute significantly to the political life of the reign of George III.
As a result of this one-party system, and because of the relative newness of political parties in general, there was no real party organization or party discipline, comparable to that of the present day. Followers of the government and even members of it, would on particular occasions speak and vote against it, and a government, which normally could count on a very considerable majority, would at times find itself in danger of defeat. At such times every possible means was used to bring up votes to the government support, and to prevent the opposition from doing likewise. There was, however, no regular pattern of discipline, the whole organization being conducted on an ad hoc basis.

Only 'general support' was expected from 'friends to the Administration' while a certain latitude of judgement on particular issues was conceded to them, at least so long as the government was not in serious danger. It was the line taken on the king's speech and the address which served as a primary test of political alignment, and the importance which to this day attaches to these theoretical exercises, is possibly an unconscious reminiscence from an age when not every single issue in the house was a 'party question'. (129)

Thus factions grew up inside the Whig Party, based on agreement on questions of the moment and owing allegiance to particular luminaries of the party, as the demands of profit and advantage seemed to direct. By 1760, there were at least three such factions, under the leadership respectively of the

Duke of Newcastle, the Duke of Bedford and William Pitt. With the disruptions of the new reign, these were to split and reform into a number of others.

The most important branch of the government, even in this relatively undemocratic age, was the House of Commons. The social history of the age, as Professor Namier has said, could be written in terms of the membership of the Commons. At all times, election to it required some form of popular consent, and it was usually fairly representative of the various interests and parties in the nation. Membership in the House, despite the venality of political life, was considered a necessity for social acceptance among the gentry. Witness Lord Chesterfield, writing to his son on the subject:

I am of a very different opinion from you, about being in Parliament, as no man can be of consequence, in this country, who is not in it; and though one may not speak like a Lord Mansfield, or a Lord Chatham, one may make a very good figure in the second rank. (131)

Certainly the benefit of the country was not considered as the paramount reason for the existence of such an institution. (132) The election of these members and the distribution of political

(130) Namier, England in the age of the American revolution, p.3.


(132) Namier, The structure of politics at the accession of George III, Vol.I, p.4, "Men went there (Parliament) 'to make a figure', and no more dreamt of a seat in the House in order to benefit humanity than a child dreams of a birthday cake that others may eat it..."
patronage was based even less on altruism. The system of rotten boroughs, by which, the economic and social realities of eighteenth century England were translated into political terms, at the expense of a slight nod of acknowledgement to the popular prejudice for equality, had grown to such a degree, that less than fifteen hundred men and women were ultimately responsible for the election of a majority of the Members of the House of Commons (133). If it is remembered that nearly all of these fifteen hundred were either members of, or connections of members of the House of Lords, the concentration of political power may be realized. It is hardly surprising, then, that of the nine ministries between the accession of George III and the Peace of Versailles in 1783, seven could be and were led from the House of Lords; a method which has become practically impossible today.

The chief part of the corruption and electoral abuse came in the borough constituencies, for the counties were represented by the most static and the most secure of the political elements of the country, the landed gentry. Corruption was the mark of political activity, of transition in an age of privilege. Few of the leaders of government represented the county seats. The boroughs, under government management or acquired by the Government at the time of election, opened the gates of the House to budding statesmen and to able civil

servants (who were not yet disqualified from such political activity). The men who had the most varied experience of administration had thus an opportunity of political prominence, which the normal workings of the democratic process might have denied them. Pocket boroughs performed the further function of ensuring a class turnover in the government of the country, since the *nouveaux riches* of every generation could buy political control. At the same time the dominance of the various branches of British commerce was reflected, as these came into prominence.

Among the rotten boroughs there were a few places, such as Old Sarum (which had only two qualified voters for the last few years of its existence) which could be put down as absolutely and -- under the system -- irrevocably under the control of one man. In the control of the boroughs it required phenomenal bad luck or negligence to lose the seat, but there was always room for anxiety, especially, as in 1760, when a new reign brought possible disruption in the political structure of the country. This was true even in the "burgage" boroughs, where control of the electorate was practically guaranteed by the system of land tenure.

In addition to the purchase of votes, either through outright bribery, or through control of the livelihood of the voters and their property, bargains were made between various interests controlling the boroughs, with no regard for the wishes of anyone but the borough patrons. For example, an
agreement between Lord Townshend and Lord Weymouth concerning the election of a Member for the borough of Tamworth in 1765, states that:

In consideration of the present Contest against Mr. Edward Thurlow the Candidate upon the Manour Interest being dropt, and of Lord Townshend's concurring in his Election; Lord Weymouth agrees that upon Lord Townshend and Mr. Luttrell contributing each Five Hundred Pounds towards it, Lord Weymouth will provide a seat in and during the next Parliament for a Person to be named by Lord Townshend... (134)

The attitude toward such corruption was largely governed by the accepted definition of corruption, which differed greatly from that current today. Voters regarded their votes, boroughs their representation and Members their seats in Parliament as valuable assets, for the sale of which the granting of privileges and advantages was expected. Members were expected to secure benefits to their constituents, just as they themselves expected "marks of favour" from the Government if they were included among its friends.

By the middle of the eighteenth century these things had come to be considered perfectly legitimate and honourable; and it was merely the manner and the circumstances in which they were received, and the person from whom they were solicited that distinguished finding one's legitimate account from taking a bribe. A Member could expect to be provided for by the leader of his party or group, and his not being offered any favours would mark him as an insignificant and neglected person; but an interested change of sides at a critical moment was

corrupt. In the same way, every constituency up and down the country, especially every borough constituency, had to be nursed, but such loving care allowed of infinite variations. (135)

The idea that the politically active part of the nation had a claim to maintenance by the State was generally accepted, if only subconsciously. It is a belief that is held in varying degrees in communities which have a representative type of government, yet where strong issues pre-determining votes are absent. The "cohesive power of public plunder" becomes the unifying factor in party politics and, at the same time the issue upon which elections are fought. Two further factors, however, obtained in the eighteenth century. First, the number of offices and appointments available as rewards, i.e. made at pleasure and not under competitive regulations, was much larger than at present. The fighting services and the civil service were both exposed to Parliamentary patronage to the detriment of the national effort, especially in time of war. In the second place, the proprietary character of the seats in the House of Commons demanded that a proper return be made for investment in a pocket borough. Where the number to be rewarded became too great for the conventional means (as with the voters of the more populous urban boroughs) it became

(135) Namier, Structure of politics at the accession of George III, Vol. I, p.199. Possibly the nadir of political honesty was reached, at least in England, in 1771, when the electors of Shoreham banded together to sell the seat to the highest bidder. The practice was universally condemned by all parties, yet it was a far fairer way of distributing the benefits of corruption, than the proprietary system of borough-mongering. Cf. Annual register, 1771, p.54.
a matter of legislative benefits for the whole community, such as bounties for local industry, public works, or commercial treaties. (136)

The system of rotten boroughs and Parliamentary spoils tended to grow worse, since it affected all levels of the political structure. It was bound to have a weakening effect on the political life of the country. Without the contribution of other factors it could, in itself, have led to the downfall, at least temporarily, of British power and prestige. As an example of the long term effects of the system, it may be noted that in the seven general elections between the accession of George III and the end of the century, in which fifty-two counties in England and Wales chose 644 Members of the House of Commons, there were, in all, only fifty-seven unsuccessful candidates -- that is to say, fewer than one in eleven of the members for the counties of England and Wales in those years met with even nominal opposition (137). The turnover was naturally larger among the boroughs where the class barriers did not operate so exclusively, but even here, between two-thirds and three-quarters of the Members were returned without serious opposition.

(136) Namier, Structure of politics at the accession of George III, pp.21-22.
(137) Petrie, The four Georges, p.124.
In 1750 the division between the two bodies of opinion, labelled conventionally Whig and Tory still existed but it was not focussed on particular problems and was not therefore as clear as the personal politics of the last thirty years. Territorial magnates dominated the Court, as the makers and preservers of the Revolution settlement. By 1750 these were all Whigs, whatever their previous loyalties. They were forced, however, to ally themselves with the Crown and with leaders of political ability. A class monopoly of government was thus an impossibility and the "official" class, based on ability, was the chief organ of actual administration. Numbering among its members such figures as Walpole, Henry Pelham, Pitt and Henry Fox, it included younger sons of peers, country gentlemen, and intelligentsia.

With their double capacity of politicians and placemen, such administrators and their landed colleagues could not enter permanent opposition, if their benefits from the spoils system, present and future, were to be assured. Thus the administration, whether under monarchical or oligarchical control, was always guaranteed a substantial number of supporters and quasi-supporters. To this class may be added that of the merchants and the government contractors, the so-called "Treasury Whigs". The rise of party organizations narrowed and finally abolished the freedom of choice of the Sovereign over his Cabinet, and was followed by the elimination or royal influence in politics and political influence in the services.
The country gentlemen, formerly the bulwark of the Stuarts, came to the support of the throne, but abhorred the Court faction, believing in authority but disliking the Government. Toryism by 1750 represented the opposition of local rulers to central authority. Such men were not noted for political acumen, nor for eloquence in debate, but for independence of character and indifference to office. Their initial enthusiasm for George III arose out of the belief that he would destroy the "Court" system against which they had contended so long. They were bound to be disappointed, however, since there could be no government without bureaucracy. Throughout the changes of administrations their character remained the same, and they were the elements of the purest type of class representation in Britain (138). Although they were valuable in giving an appearance of respectability and independence to

(138) The landed gentry was the deciding element in most county elections, though a certain number of seats were conceded by them to the great noble houses - in 1761, 16 out of 80 knights of the shires were sons of peers and nine of them courtesy lords; of the remaining 64, 62 were country gentlemen. The electorate in the counties formed an independent and fairly large class; still, it would be ludicrous to talk of any "democracy" in 39 out of the 40 counties. Taking England as a whole, probably not more than one in every twenty voters at county elections could freely exercise his statutory rights, and the County Members...constituted the purest type of class representation in Great Britain, to a high degree, of an hereditary character. Of no less than 30 among the 80 knights of the shires returned in 1761, the fathers had previously represented the same counties, while another 19 had been preceded by more distant ancestors in the direct male line...

Namier, The structure of politics at the accession of George III, p.92.
the House, their numbers were not such as to disturb the ef-
cient workings of government. They were not great politi-
cians but they were reliable underlings, and provided the
necessary stiffening to the party system when it emerged. The
Government's control over them was negligible, and any inter-
ference in county elections had to be conducted through the
big landowners who controlled all the counties but those im-
mediately contiguous to London.

The smaller businessmen of the City were the urban
counterpart of the Tory gentry, and were radical under George
III, in sympathy with the mob of London. Dissatisfaction
among this last group found expression, not in political ac-
tion, but in riots, which were exploited for political advan-
tage by various factions, and were made easier of accomplish-
ment by the almost total lack of police forces in the large
urban communities. Any serious threat of revolt on the part
of these lower classes, however, brought a complete repudiation
of them by the self-styled political radicals of Parliament.

By 1760, the inclusion of Pitt and his Tory supporters
in the wartime government had tended to confuse party align-
ments even further. Examples of the change may be seen in
the new allegiance of the families of Manners and Russell,
whose heads were the Dukes of Rutland and Bedford respectively.
These families had both been important in the Revolution but
began to show distinct Tory loyalties from about 1755 on (139).

(139) Namier, England in the age of the American revolution,
p.223.
Many amnestied Tories, on the other hand, allied themselves with the Newcastle Whigs, in order to gain patronage or regain position. On such an issue as that of general warrants the majority of the older Tories voted with the Opposition, while a majority of the Whigs was still tied to the Treasury.

A survey of the Whig connections may be obtained from a series of lists made up by the Duke of Newcastle in preparation for the election of 1761. The names listed are those of luminaries with sufficient influence to command the votes of that number of Members listed opposite each name, or of placemen who were assigned to secure the attendance of Members for Government boroughs (140).

1. Duke of Bedford, 10
2. Duke of Devonshire, 12
3. Lord Rockingham, 10
4. Lord Powis, 11
5. Lord Anson, 15
6. Lord Hardwicke, 14
7. H. Fox, M.P., 12
8. Lord Barrington, M.P., 11
9. Lord Sandwich, 5
10. Lord Northumberland, 5
11. Duke of Rutland, 4
12. Lord Buckinghamshire, 4
13. Lord Darlington, 4
14. Duke of Bolton, 4
15. Lord Exeter, 4
16. Lord Archer, 4
17. Duke of Ancaster, 3
18. James Brudenell, M.P., 3
19. Lord Bateman, M.P., 5
20. George Onslow, M.P., 6
21. Lord Rochford, 2
22. Lord Albermarle, 4
23. Lord Kinnoull, 5
24. Andrew Stone, 4
25. James West, M.P., 4
26. F. Gashry, M.P., 3
27. A. Wilkinson, M.P., 3
28. Lord Lincoln, 7
29. Duchess of Newcastle, 4
30. Lord Mansfield, 4
31. Lord Grantham, 4
32. E. Eliot, M.P., 2
33. Thomas Pelham, M.P., 2
34. Lord Ashburnham, 2
35. Lord Robt. Bertie, M.P., 1
36. John Page, M.P., 1

The Members in group 1. were mostly relatives, personal friends and hangers-on of the Duke of Bedford, and those under

the Duke of Devonshire's name were in a similar category. Powis and Rockingham were great territorial magnates and controlled the Members in their groups. Those opposite Lord Anson's name include eleven Members controlled by the Admiralty. Hardwicke's were largely family or legal connections. Fox, owning no pocket boroughs, controlled his seats by political loyalty, being one of the few real faction leaders in the group. Barrington, Kinnoull, West, Stone, the Duchess of Newcastle, Lord Lincoln and Thomas Pelham were all figureheads, the ostensible leaders of groups controlled by Newcastle himself.

The Duke of Cumberland had been the royal leader of the Whigs, or at least the dissentient section thereof, before his military failure in 1757 caused him to resign his commissions and with them, most of the power to reward his followers with patronage. Bedford, Fox and Sandwich left him to form a new faction of the Whigs under Bedford's leadership, the infamous "Bloomsbury Gang", notorious for its rapacity for the political spoils and its unscrupulous conduct in gaining them. It consisted largely of persons who voted with the Grenville Ministry from 1763 to 1765 or who were dependents of the Duke of Bedford. Its political fortunes were in the ascendant from 1761 to 1765 and declined from 1765 to 1767, at which latter date the faction was absorbed by the faction of the "King's Friends".
In the House itself over half the Members appear never to have held an office, pension or contract from the government (141). Of the placemen, some held offices for life and were independent of the Government and some were army officers. Including four Cabinet members in 1760, there were only about fifty whose places were not secure from Government interference (142). So much for the idea that threat of removal from office brought big majorities. In fact, it was hope of future rewards, rather than security for those passed, that ensured Government majorities. Pensions on the Plantations or Irish establishments, baronetcies and Irish peerages were eagerly sought after by the nouveaux riches, such as the East Indian "nabobs". The more important sought English peerages, or promotion in the peerage. It was an age of peers, in which thirty-five dukes were created in less than half a century, and Pelham's Cabinet contained no less than eight (143).

As respecting monetary benefits made available to venal legislators and administrators, two sources were notorious, though only one justified its reputation. The Secret Service Fund, administered by each of the great Whig prime ministers in turn, was actually a branch of the Privy Purse, made available for electioneering and other secret purposes. Its

(141) Namier, England in the age of the American revolution, p.257.

(142) loc. cit.

(143) Turberville, The house of lords in the eighteenth century, p.165.
reputation, however, outstripped its usefulness for such purposes:

Newcastle spent from the Fund - from March, 1754 to November, 1756 and from July, 1757 to May, 1762 - £290,848:17:3; or approximately £291,000. Of this £55,000 were spent on elections and constituencies; and £68,500 in pensions to Members of Parliament - thus £124,000, i.e. almost 43 per cent, was spent on the House of Commons; £50,000 were doled out to the aristocracy, £56,000 went in additional salaries and to secret agents, £40,000 to friends of friends of the Government, and £21,000 to Germans. The vast engine of Parliamentary corruption called "secret service money", when measured, has proved surprisingly small in size, a mere supplement to places and other open favours; and on further enquiry it is found that there was more jobbery, stupidity, and human charity about it than bribery. "For the wicked are more naive than we think; and so are we ourselves!" But the Duke of Newcastle was not even wicked, nor were Sir Robert Walpole, and Henry Pelham, George III and Lord North. (144)

The second source of illicit wealth in the governmental structure was more personal in its effects in that it benefitted directly only one person at a time, although it provided him with the means to benefit others. This was the Army Pay Office. The Paymaster was entitled to use the large sums passing through his hands as if he were a private banker. In time of war it was especially lucrative. Not only was the Paymaster entitled to the interest on the balance in his hands, but also to any capital profit he might make by its investment. Henry Fox, the most notorious and the most successful of the

(144) Namier, The structure of politics at the accession of George III, p.290.
many occupants of the office, has left an amusing explanation of his methods.

The Government borrows money at twenty per cent discount. I am not consulted or concerned in making the bargain. I have, as Paymaster, great sums in my hands, which, not applicable to any present war, must either be dead in the bank, or be employed by me. I lend this to the Government in 1761. A peace is thought certain. I am not in the least consulted, but my very bad opinion of Mr. Pitt makes me think it will not be concluded. I sell out and gain greatly. In 1762, I lend again: a peace comes, in which again I am not consulted, and I again gain greatly. (145)

It is only necessary to add that Fox was Paymaster General for six years during the Seven Years' War; that some £49,500,000 passed through his hands and that some of it remained in the hands of his executors eighteen years after his resignation (146).

Bribery in this era was effective because it was widespread and accepted as the custom of the country. No dishonour was felt in mis-appropriating Government funds and the prizes were such as to attract the average man. The only mystery connected with it was that there should have had to be a secret service fund, since most of the subsidizing of politicians was done in the open. It was probably a survival from the days when monarchs, not wishing to be openly associated with the regular political jobbers, were more scrupulous of their

(146) Hobhouse, J.C., Fox, p.2.
The relationship between the King and his counsellors is of interest, in that the generalizations usually made as to the subservience of George II to the Whig junto and as to his grandson's domination of it have the usual untrustworthiness of such generalizations. Ministers then as now, were held responsible to the people for the measures of the King's Government. They must therefore have no rivals in the King's confidence, otherwise they would have to be responsible for measures not originated by them. As has been stated before, the Crown has no choice concerning the Ministry where there are firmly organized parties and a clear majority. In the eighteenth century, however, the role of the Prime Minister was of too recent and too uncertain an origin to command much respect from politicians. George II to some extent and George III to a great extent, were considered by most political leaders, as rightfully performing that function.

In addition there was a definite belief in the iniquity of formal opposition. The Tory Party, it is true, might have been designated as the Opposition, but forty-five years of Whig dominance and two Jacobite risings in which it had been indirectly implicated, had reduced it to a political nonentity. The Whig leaders (with the exception of Pitt, whose talent for gaining popular support placed him above such generalizations) were naturally reluctant to partake of active opposition when a short turn of the political wheel of fortune might
place them in power, responsible for carrying out measures which they had heartily condemned in opposition. The impossibility of organizing splinter groups was also an apparent cause of the political disruption and lack of formal opposition. The lure of the seals of office and the patronage attendant upon their possession kept men together in governments, but the fruits of opposition were negligible.

Finally there still remained some superstitious doubt as to the moral right of opposing the King's Government. The King, it was believed, had a right to choose his ministers and not have them forced on him from the ranks of opposition. The actual person of the King was the centre of politics and opposition smacked of disloyalty. Even lesser members of the Royal family, such as the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Cumberland aspired to be leaders of political factions.

All these factors operated in the reign of George II and were to operate with even greater force in the reign of his grandson. Thus the royal function of political leader was merely continued and expanded.

When nowadays... support for an independent executive is required, it is obtained through "official members", an expedient which, had it been adopted in the sixteenth century might have fundamentally and irrevocably distorted the character of the House, while the means actually employed tended to adjust the scales within it. As such a make-weight in favour of stable government, the regal influence in elections continued to be worked after 1688. When the struggle commenced between George III and his grandfather's "under-takers", an outcry was raised against "prerogative" - the term was still current by force of
ideological and linguistic survival; for ideas outlive the conditions which gave them birth, and words outlast ideas. In reality, George III never left the safe ground of Parliamentary government, and merely acted the *primus inter pares*, the first among the borough-mongering, electioneering gentlemen of England. (147)

The Opposition changed in personnel, but not in character, and continued to be ineffectual. Lord North was the direct political descendant of those leaders of the "Broadbottom Junto" who abhorred the "disloyal" taint of opposition to the King's Government.

The political situation in 1760 was also characterized by several occurrences which can only be described as fortuitous. Chief among these was the amazing power of survival of the politicians of the day. The two older generations of politicians, those of the reigns of George I and George II, seemed all to be left alive. Only Walpole, Frederick, Prince of Wales and Henry Pelham, of those of note, seemed to have died. The King, Newcastle, Hardwicke, Argyle, Ligonier, Anson, Bath, Granville and Dodington were all from the seventeenth century. The next generation, with Cumberland, Bedford, Devonshire, Pitt, Temple, Grenville, Egremont, Granby, Sandwich, Holderness, Legge, Mansfield, Fox, Townshend, Beckford and Charles Yorke, was also nearly complete. Thus there was bound to be a conflict of generations in the new reign.

Between 1760 and 1770, however, the great majority of the older politicians were to disappear, leaving a long gap to the next generation of leaders. This gap helps to explain the prominence of such nonentities as Rockingham, Grafton, Richmond, Dartmouth and Conway. It was not until the closing years of the American War that the ruling families were able to produce new leaders of sufficient seniority and talent to lead the nation. This gap also helps to explain the very early prominence of William Pitt the Younger and Charles James Fox (148).

Another factor, not strictly speaking fortuitous, was capable on occasion, of disrupting the even tenor of political life. This was the ability of a popular leader to upset the workings of the government political machinery, despite large government majorities. The lack of such leaders was always severely felt among the Government ranks. To gain prominence, however, the leader required a popular issue on which to challenge the Government. Thus Pitt, in November, 1756, was able to overthrow Newcastle's administration on its conduct of the war, although he had only sixteen followers in the House at the time.

General elections, however big the apparent majorities they yielded, did not settle the event of the sessions - witness Newcastle's worries in September, 1754, when he had no first-class leader to put at the head of his enormous majority ... the influence of the Court could secure and command

(148) Namier, England in the age of the American revolution, p.70.
numbers, but not leaders; and the real leader counted for at least as much in the scales as the 'voting herd'. (149)

This was the problem which had to be faced by the successive ministries of Bute, Rockingham and Grafton. That of Grenville was indifferently led, and only North was sufficiently a master of the House (although not of the King) to form a lasting ministry.

By 1760, the over-all managing features of the office of Prime Minister, created by Walpole, had disappeared. The popular leader, Pitt was the real minister. In the alliance of the great Ministry, Pitt was the "Minister of Measures" while Newcastle was the "Minister of Disposal" controlling Government patronage. Unfortunately for the latter, the monopoly of patronage rather than mistakes in policy was the chief source of criticism of the government, and a host of enemies was raised against Newcastle. He chose and managed the House of Commons, but his very success worked against him.

Sir Robert Walpole had a policy and used the royal patronage to secure it; and under Henry Pelham there was less policy and more patronage; with the Duke of Newcastle a policy was hardly traceable; nor did much real opposition remain - the number of "Whigs" was continually growing, and the difficulty of the Administration was merely 'to find pasture enough for the beasts that they must feed'. This the Duke of Newcastle

made the task of his life, leaving the work of
Government to stronger men.... (150)

Newcastle's whole personality was warped by jealousy for power. Intelligent, sensible and kindly, he appeared outwardly to be foolish, dishonest and cowardly through his anxieties. He was overawed by the stronger men who dominated him and was anxious for their favour. Pitt's remark: "Fewer words, my Lord, for your words have long lost all weight with me." (151) is descriptive of the attitude of Newcastle's colleagues toward him. Such lack of resolution and decision was a prime factor in the indiscipline of the Whig Party and its ultimate break-up.

Although lacking in all the qualities of mind necessary for a great statesman, the Duke of Newcastle had, by assiduous application, raised the control of majorities in Parliament to a fine art, of which he alone seemed to possess the secret. He was one of the first leaders in English politics to realize that the secret of party success lay in organization. Possessed of estates in nine counties and owning most of Nottinghamshire, he was able, for a generation, to control elections over the length and breadth of England. The episcopal bench was crowded with his nominees, and peers and excisemen had the common bond of obligation to the Duke. It was a measure of

(150) Namier, England in the age of the American revolution, p.73.
his power that one unpopular, although able, Court favorite, Carteret, was unable to stay in power in the face of the hostility of the Duke's political machine; while another, Bute, even more unpopular, although less able, successfully weathered the storm by first allying himself with, and later (through Henry Fox) controlling the party machine that Newcastle had created.

Patronage, and patronage alone, was the foundation of his political power. He was the guardian of majorities he could not use, a leader of men who controlled him. His promises were valueless, his business methods dilatory. Even the King, whom he was supposed to control, overawed him. Above all he feared the opposition of Pitt. He clung to office from habit, from jealousy of others and from a feeling that he was doing his duty.

For forty years he had bought men until there were very few left to buy. Three generations were in his pay, and only the country gentry, the inveterate opponents then, as later, of a Court party, remained outside his system. Schisms had appeared in the Party, it is true, but not in the system. In or out of office, the Foxes, Sandwichs, Rigbys and Dysons were ever 'placemen', unwilling to partake of active opposition for fear of permanently losing the royal countenance and the royal patronage.

Thus, when the time came for Bute to throw off the tute-lage of the Duke, he was able to carry the latter's erstwhile
followers with him. Bute was, without a shadow of a doubt, the new King's favourite. Therefore the road to patronage lay past Bute's door, and the hoards of placemen, obedient to the Newcastle tradition, turned from the old master to the new. The Duke died in 1768, in the midst of the transition which he had unwittingly done so much to bring about. His epitaph is written in the biting remark of Lord Bristol to Lady Chatham:

This morning died the Duke of Newcastle, an event which will make no alteration but with regard to the University of Cambridge, which has a Chancellor to choose. (152)

His system lived on, not in his own party, but in the Court faction which he had done so much to create. He bequeathed to succeeding Whigs, only the name of a faction. The new Whigs such as Savile, Dowdeswell, Verney, Richmond, Burke and Portland, were all either newcomers or former Tory opponents of the old Duke. In the Whig Ministry of 1765 there was a general distrust, on the part of Newcastle, of the leaders of a generation twice removed from his own. Place and profit were the cements of the old Whig structure. Opposition to royal policy-making was to be that of the new. The policy of the party in 1780 was to destroy the structure of politics set up by the party fifty years before.

George II died on October 25th, 1760, to be succeeded by his grandson as George III. The chief political interest

of the time was then centred in the Seven Years' War, up to that time, the most successful in Britain's history. The undoubted leader of the nation was William Pitt, the successful war minister who had created victory. The preceding year, 1759, had seen overwhelming victories in India, Canada and at sea, and 1760 was devoted to rounding out Britain's conquests. Certainly a Ministry and a Minister responsible for such success would seem to be as secure as any in history.

By 1760, however, the war had lost both its novelty and its popularity.

No people were less intoxicated with their success. Victories became familiar to us, and made little impression... Besides the nation had occasion for peace. Though her trade had been greatly augmented... her supplies of money, great as they were, did not keep up with her expenses (sic.). The supply of men, too, which was necessary to furnish the waste of so extensive a war, became sensibly diminished, and the troops were not recruited but with some difficulty, and at a heavy charge. (153)

The drain on the resources of Britain was certainly very great, but certainly not beyond her power. However, the people had reached a state of mind in which, sated with victory, they rejected further participation in war, however glorious. Witness Horace Walpole's comments to Henry Conway on the war:

If all this did but starve us I would not much mind; I should look as well as other people in haughty rags, and while one's dunghill is the first dunghill in Europe, one is content. But

(153) Annual register, 1762, p.45.
the lives! the lives it will cost! to wade through blood to dignity! I had rather be worm than vulture. (154)

A study of the reasons for Pitt's fall from power in 1761 would not be complete if it did not take into account the desire of the politically active part of the community for peace. In a more recent idiom, the nation was "war-weary". In yearning for repose it was also natural that it should yearn for more restful leaders. This sentiment in the nation, which was responsible for the otherwise incomprehensible rise to power of Henry Addington in 1801 and of Mr. Baldwin in 1923, helps to explain the relatively easy transition from the administration of Pitt to that of Bute in 1761.

In addition, opinion was divided between the claims of various theatres of war. The policy of opposing French encroachments on the continent of Europe was traditional with Whig statesmen, and had been followed by the Duke of Newcastle before the accession of Pitt to office. Pitt, however, showed his countrymen a new and lucrative way of making war by flinging expeditions across the world to crush the economic strength of France and bring her military power to the verge of collapse. The older Whigs adhered to their policy of a continental war, but the majority of the nation, and especially the commercial classes, wished to desert the continent for the profitable conquest of the French colonies. The dislike of the English

for the German and especially for the Hanoverian connection was also a factor in this feeling.

France, who has only contracted her expenses by the loss of her navy, encouraged us to enter deeper and deeper into the inextricable toils of a German war, in which we waste our strength only to entangle ourselves further.... The allies, if they deserve the name, supply not the smallest part of the expense. The Hanoverians and Hessians contribute to our service only by enabling us to protract still longer our efforts in a system, in which nothing can so effectually serve us as being defeated as early as possible. (155)

As in the nation, so in the Cabinet. Here the division of opinion was complicated by the overbearing attitude of Pitt. His irritability, which stemmed in equal parts from his poor health and from his impatient conviction that he was right, alienated his colleagues, to the extent that they would gladly have been rid of him if they could have conducted the war without him. As the war went on from year to year and the expense mounted ever higher, the fear became common that even complete victory would leave England bankrupt. This fear was not entirely unfounded. The debt with which Britain was burdened as a result of the Seven Years' War was certainly an important factor in that train of events which led from a British budget deficit in 1763 to the American Revolution in 1775. The dissatisfaction thus caused centred on Pitt. Small though his actual responsibility was for the wasteful methods of

(155) Annual register, 1760, p. 52.
expenditure and for the raising of taxes (156) he was blamed for all the government's mistakes, and his colleagues were so alienated by his reproaches that they were not disposed to lighten his burden.

On the cost of the German war particularly, he and Newcastle disagreed violently. Originally an opponent of the German war, Pitt had become converted to its support in the middle of the war, and in public urged the necessity of supporting England's ally, Frederick the Great in Germany. He was to state later that:

America has been conquered in Germany, where Prince Ferdinand's victories have shattered the whole military power of that great military monarchy, France. (157)

The expenditures on the continental war, however, were the least popular and the most extravagant of those that Britain was called upon to make. Pitt resented this and on one occasion even accused Newcastle of wilfully passing an exorbitant demand for the Hessian troops' forage, in order to render "his war" unpopular with the country (158). In the whole cabinet,

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(156) The land tax, for example, was raised in 1757 to the unprecedented level of 4 shillings in the pound. Pitt dictated the policy of the Treasury where it concerned the conduct of the war, but such interference was not consistent or uniform and was much resented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Legge, and by the Duke of Newcastle. Williams, *The life of William Pitt*, Vol. II, p.50.


he had only one ally, his brother-in-law, Temple, and his disdain of political jobbery ensured that his support in the House of Commons would be small on any issue but the war.

He did not, however, desire to continue the war indefinitely. He realized the need for peace as well as anyone, but his success in war, apart from the fact that it did not fit him for the role of negotiator, had roused the French to an obstinate determination to refuse any but the most lenient peace terms. As Pitt declared in the House of Commons in 1760:

Anybody could advise me in war; but who could draw such a peace as would please everybody? I would snatch at the first moment of peace, though I wish I could leave off at the war. (159)

In addition to the intransigence of the French, British interests dictated that most of the conquests already made should be kept. Certainly the British public, however much it might desire peace, would not permit the Ministry to surrender what had been won at such great cost of men and money.

Peace was very much desired in another quarter, but for a very different reason. The new King, under the influence of his sententious preceptor, the Earl of Bute, and of his ambitious mother, desired peace in order to reform the political structure of the nation and increase the royal power for what he considered the good of the nation. This necessarily involved the displacement of the present Ministry and the

promotion to office of the miscellaneous group of hangers-on who were the political friends of the new monarch. These hangers-on realized, however, that their talents for war were very limited and granted the indispensability of Pitt to the Ministry while the war was on. Hence the urgent need for peace.

The leader of the group and the formulator of its policy was John, third Earl of Bute. He was a pompous, pedantic Scotsman with little ability but with a genuine affection for the King and a determination to protect his interests. He was aware of his unpopularity as a Scotsman, and of his incapacity for public business, but he had an unbounded faith in the soundness of his private advice and so, unfortunately for the nation, had George III. His grasp of public affairs, however, was sufficient to make him realize that the time was not yet ripe for his assumption of power and that in the unpopularity of the German war he had a lever with which to pry Pitt loose from the political throne.

Pitt had refused, on the night of the accession, to come to any terms with Bute, and neither was prepared to undertake an administration in opposition to the other. The King and Bute realized that the presence of Pitt in office was necessary until the conclusion of the peace; and because Newcastle was the necessary figurehead for Pitt's administration, Newcastle must remain also. Party leaders, City merchants and party dependents also wished for the retention of the old Duke. Finally the Duke's ambition for continued control of the political machinery, the pastime of forty years, was probably the
strongest supporter of all. Thus, blithely did Newcastle fall into the snare set for him, and provide the necessary transition from the war policy of Pitt to the "prerogative" policy of Bute.

During the preparations for the general election, necessary on the demise of the Crown, Newcastle began to realize the character of his servitude. The royal declaration that no public money would be spent on the election (160) coupled with several petty intrigues of Bute, put Newcastle into a terror of anticipated dismissal. He even imagined a plot on the part of Bute and Pitt to remove the management of the elections from him (161). This led the Duke to bargain first with Bute, and when rejected, with the Bedford faction, for political support. Actually the influence of Bute did not extend beyond a few over-ripe and disgruntled Whigs who flocked to greet the rising political sun. In any case, so long as Newcastle remained at the Treasury and kept his political organization intact, organized interference by a political amateur like Bute was almost impossible.

The time was not yet ripe for the employment of Henry Fox, the only political manager who could presume to rival

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(160) Elections went very much as Lord Bute wished, who made use of the King's money privately, which was publickly, ostentatiously and really too, refus'd to the Duke of Newcastle for these purposes of elections. Henry Fox, Life and letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, p.41.

Newcastle and who had the incentive to do it. Bute was not yet prepared to accept Fox, nor Fox prepared to desert the Duke of Cumberland (162). The only persons of any political acumen whatever surrounding Bute were the relatively inexperienced Earl of Shelburne (soon to become an inveterate opponent of the Court Party) and the superannuated Bubb Dodington, the former boon companion of the King's father. Both encouraged Bute to take an active part against Newcastle in the election.

In the dispensing of patronage, Bute vied with Newcastle but, more important to the nation, on measures of policy he came into conflict with Pitt. Although not holding an administrative office, Bute, since the accession of George III, by reason of his appointment as Groom of the Stole, had taken

(162) As early as December, 1760, there is a record of Bute's negotiations with Fox and there is reason to believe that they began even before George's II's death. The chief obstruction in the way of their successful conclusion was George III's disapproval of Fox on moral grounds and because he had been instrumental in having Bute removed from the court at Leicester House in 1756. Necessity recognizes no such scruples, however, and in January, 1761, Bute was authorized to approach Fox openly. The latter stipulated for a peerage, but at the first creation of the reign, in 1761, he was omitted purposely, since Bute felt that his interest in the work ahead could only be kept alive by hopes of future ennoblement. After further negotiations he was promised that his wife would receive a peerage at the next creation and that he himself would receive a peerage when he had captured the House of Commons for the Court.

Life and letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, pp.21-24.
part in Cabinet Councils (163). He was drawn toward the Duke of Newcastle's point of view on the war, because the latter was the weaker of his two opponents and because the war was the gap in Pitt's political armour. By January, 1761, therefore, Newcastle seems to have recovered from his initial fear of the Favourite and to have been quite willing to make Bute a Secretary of State over the opposition of Pitt. Meanwhile the new Parliament was chosen, largely through the influence of Newcastle. The very great possibility of converting it to the cause of the Court was, however, envisaged by Bute.

The peace, if it was to be made, must have an unwavering supporter in office, and the Whig lords, while weary of the tyranny of Mr. Pitt and dissatisfied with so much triumph in which they played only subordinate roles, were not prepared to risk the fury of the people, if the terms set by France were unfavourable. Bute, however, with the single-mindedness of a fanatic, was prepared to suffer martyrdom for his King.

(163) In 1740, the Cabinet consisted of the archbishop of Canterbury, the lord chancellor, the lord president, the lord privy seal, the lord steward, the lord chamberlain, the master of the horse, the lord-lieutenant of Ireland, the two secretaries of state, the groom of the stole, the first minister for Scotland, the chancellor of the exchequer, the first commissioner of the navy, the master of ordnance, while the Duke of Bolton had a seat in the cabinet without office, and Sir John Norris was called in when advice was wanted on naval matters.... In 1757 and 1765 Newcastle drew up plans of administration, and each time the archbishop and the officers of the household were included.
Winstanley, D.A., "George III and his first cabinet" E.H.R., October, 1902, p.679.
On March 13th, 1761, he was appointed Secretary of State for the Northern Department in succession to the time-serving Earl of Holderness.

It was only by taking office that Bute could seriously interfere with Pitt, since the business of the Secretary of State was conducted under the harsh light of public opinion. George III, moreover, had unlimited confidence in Bute (a confidence Bute himself did not entirely share). He saw in the Earl the chosen instrument for that reformation of politics which was the first and most abiding of the Royal obsessions. There was actually nothing unconstitutional in this support of Bute, the only limitation on such an appointment being that the Minister required a majority in the House of Commons for carrying on the Government. Parties were not properly organized in 1760, so the choice of Ministers could not be made within their narrower bounds. Nevertheless, the choice of a person unpopular with the nation as a whole, as Bute undoubtedly was, could be supported by a government majority in Parliament only for a limited time. Bute's failure in 1763 was due, not to a lack of royal or parliamentary support, but to violent opposition from the people (and especially the London mob) and to a lack of courage on his part to maintain his position in the face of such opposition.

Pitt seems to have acquiesced for the time in Bute's accession to office. He had little personal feeling in the matter and was prepared to work with Bute or anyone else who
would agree to his policy (164). The King and Bute, on the other hand, were distrustful of both Pitt and Newcastle, and wished to have the latter propose the change so as to be committed to it. Bute's future policy, despite some pointless dissembling before Pitt, seems to have been common knowledge, for Horace Walpole wrote before the new appointment had been announced that:

...it is believed that his taking the Seals in so particular a juncture was determined by the prospect of his being able to make a popular peace, France having made the most pressing offers. Nothing else, I think, could justify Lord Bute to himself for the imprudence of this step, which renders him the responsible minister, and exposes him to all the danger attendant on such a situation. As Groom of the Stole he had all the credit of favourite without the hazard. (165)

Bute realized that Newcastle needed Pitt in the Government, but stipulated for the Duke's support against him. Newcastle soon found himself between two very galling fires, however. On one side, Pitt complained of his lack of support for the war, and Bute, on the other complained that Newcastle refused patronage to Bute's supporters. Newcastle, for his part, complained that he had lost all power (which was strictly true) and that the Treasury was not consulted on measures, in particular on appointments for the new Queen's household. He even

Fox, on the contrary, declares that Pitt and Bute disagreed from the moment of the latter's appointment.
Life and letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, p.42.

toyed with the idea of resigning, but the time for effective resignation had passed. It would have had a poor effect on public credit, the Whig Party and the war effort, and in addition he had a shrewd suspicion that he would not be missed very much. He therefore accepted Bute's pre-eminence in domestic politics, and refused to take part in opposition.

The major differences between Pitt and the rest of the Cabinet came to a head over the peace. Negotiations had been commenced as early as 1758 by the French and the terms became progressively more favourable to Britain as each succeeding year brought more British victories. In 1759, Choiseul, the French war minister, had proposed a return to the status quo ante bellum. Although Pitt was eager for peace, believing that another year of war might jeopardize British conquests, he would not and could not accept such terms. Late in 1760 conversations were begun on the basis of a joint peace, including Prussia, and envoys were exchanged to discuss terms (166). The limiting factor for British bargaining power was the extremely weak position of herself and her allies in Germany, and it was the chief obstruction to more definite negotiations that Pitt refused to desert his ally, Frederick

(166) Hans Stanley was appointed for England and the Abbe Bussy for France.
the Great (167). Pitt and Temple were, in fact, the only members of the Cabinet who supported a total war. Most of the older Whigs, led by Newcastle and Earl Granville, were in favour of restricting the nations effort to the German war. Bute, not yet sure of his position, was in favour of carrying on only the overseas expeditions, since these were popular with the mercantile interests. The Duke of Bedford, brought back from Ireland to join the Cabinet and give support to the peace, was possessed of the traditional narrow pacifism of the Russells, and wished all conquests to be given up and peace made at once on any terms. Thus Bute gave the appearance of being the moderating influence in the Cabinet.

Once the negotiations were begun, a further complication was introduced by the continuous series of British

(167) The desire for peace was very great on the part of Frederick in the autumn of 1760, at the time that the pacifist counsels of Bute and George III were making themselves felt in England. By January, 1761, Frederick was even assuring the British ambassador, Mitchell, that he had no objection to England's seeking a separate peace, provided that the terms were reasonable. Of his enemies, Austria was nearly exhausted, France was feeling the strain of having to give financial support to her allies, and Russia, despite the capture of Berlin, was unwilling to fight Frederick alone. The British declaration of war on Spain, on January 4th, 1762, changed the situation, however, since the British contributions available for the war in Germany had now to be severely curtailed. At the same time Frederick's position improved, with the accession of his admirer, Peter III to the Russian throne, and he became more demanding of his allies. There is no doubt, however, that the later negotiations under Bute, were carried on without the slightest regard for England's allies.

Rose, J.Holland, "Frederick the Great and England" E.H.R., April, 1914, pp.257-75.
successes throughout 1761. Early in the year standstill agreements had been reached, whereby the status quo as of May 1st. for Europe, July 1st. for America and September 1st. for Asia was agreed upon as the basis for final discussions. In the summer, however, British victories changed the situation materially and Pitt insisted that the dates be changed to July 1st., September 1st., and November 1st. respectively. The chief point of disagreement among the Cabinet at this time was the determination of Pitt to eject the French forever from the fisheries of Newfoundland. His insistence on this point brought a split in the Cabinet. The majority followed Bedford's plan of permitting the French to retain the rights, while Bute proposed that the abrogation of the fishery rights be bargained for, but not be made a sine qua non of peace (168). In the meanwhile, Choiseul was playing for time. Throughout the summer his demands became progressively stiffer, until the negotiations were broken off early in September and the envoys recalled. With the approach of autumn the chances of a British descent on the French coast became much less, and in addition, Choiseul was bargaining with the Anglophobe Charles III of Spain to bring his country into war on the side of France. On August 15th, 1761, the so-called Family Compact with Spain was signed secretly at Versailles, and the Spanish attitude towards Great Britain became progressively more hostile.

Pitt seems to have learned about the negotiations with Spain, even before the Compact was signed, but he kept them a secret from the Cabinet until after the rejection of the French terms in July, 1761. These terms had included some demands on behalf of Spain (169). Pitt then realized that war with Spain was inevitable and urged the prompt seizure of the Spanish treasure fleet, then at sea, so as to cripple Spanish ability to make war. The conquest of Panama and the Philippines was also planned for. The Cabinet, however, already attempting to make peace with one enemy, were not prepared to attack another, and closed their ears to reliable reports of Spanish mobilization.

They declared that Britain was not in a position to conduct such a war at such a time and seriously doubted that Spain had hostile intentions. In the face of such unanimity Pitt could do nothing but wait and hope that action would be taken before it was too late. Public opinion, weary of war, seemed to support the Cabinet. Decisions were postponed until the return of the negotiators to their respective capitals.

The old Whigs desired the retention of Pitt in the Cabinet, but Bute had come to the conclusion that he could now do without him, and the King supported this view. On October 2nd, Pitt met the Cabinet for the last time, and after once more being refused his declaration of war, made his resignation speech.

Without having ever asked one single employment in my life, I was called by my Sovereign and by the Voice of the People to assist the State when others had abdicated the service of it. That being so no one can be surprised that I will go on no longer since my advice is not taken. Being responsible I will direct, and will be responsible for nothing that I do not direct. (170)

He was answered by Granville who stated that had Pitt not resigned, the Ministry would have been forced to, and that the rule of the majority had prevailed (171). The fall of the great Minister had, in fact, frightened his timid colleagues, and for a few days they doubted the wisdom of having forced the issue. Horace Walpole also voiced this opinion:

I foresee nothing but confusion. Nor shall we have a war the less: if Spain bullied while Mr. Pitt was minister, I don't believe she will tremble more at his successors.... It required all his daring to retrieve our affairs.... Next to pitying our country and ourselves, I feel for the young King. It is hard to have so bright a dawn so soon overcast! I fear he is going to taste as bitter a cup as ever his grandfather swallowed! (172)

His brother-in-law, Earl Temple, resigned the Privy Seal at the same time.

A strenuous defence was made on the part of the remaining Ministers. "Was it ever heard," said they, "that a sovereign has been censured for listening to the whole body of his Council in preference to the particular opinions of a single man? On the contrary, this uncontrolled sway of a single Minister has been often thought dangerous, and often odious in our free constitution; and is the more justly to be disliked, as perhaps inconsistent with the true spirit, either of absolute monarchy, or of limited government. Let the merit of this Minister be what it will, shall his Majesty be forced to accept him on any terms?"

One person, however, was not dismayed. Bute was glad to be rid of his vigorous colleague, but once rid of him he had to ensure that he would not be dangerous in opposition. At first, the King tried to persuade Pitt to accept a peerage, or an appointment to some lucrative sinecure, the governorship of Canada being suggested. These were refused, but on being further pressed, he accepted a peerage for his wife and a pension of £3,000 for himself.

Although Pitt regarded these honours as nothing more than was due England's most successful war minister, the world at large, egged on by the army of pamphleteers in the pay of Bute, jumped to the worst conclusions and assumed that in accepting the King's bounty he was selling himself to the Court. Horace Walpole's comment is typical:

He insisted on a war with Spain, was resisted, and last Monday resigned. The City breathed vengeance on his opposers, the Council quaked, and the Lord knows what would have happened; but yesterday, which was only Friday, as this giant was stalking to seize the Tower of London, he stumbled over a silver penny, picked it up, carried it home to Lady Hester and they are now as quiet, good sort of people, as my Lord and Lady Bath... (173)

The appearance of venality was heightened by Bute's action of announcing Pitt's resignation, his acceptance of the reward and a cheering item of good news on the Spanish

crisis, within a few paragraphs of one another in the *Gazette*. (174). The announcement of a pension in the *Gazette* was unprecedented, but received the King's sanction. The Court, in fact, very nearly achieved its purpose. For a week Pitt's name was a byword for corrupt sycophancy and his wife was referred to as "Lady Cheat'em". Pitt found it necessary to defend his good name in the City, where hitherto he had received the most enthusiastic support, and from which the power to make 'his war' had largely been derived. On October 15th, he wrote a letter of explanation to his supporter and friend, Alderman William Beckford.

Most gracious public marks of his Majesty's approbation of my services followed my resignation. They were unmerited and unsolicited; and I shall ever be proud to have received them from the best of Sovereigns. I will now only add, my dear sir, that I have explained these matters only for the honour of truth, not in any view to court return of confidence from any man, who, with a credulity as weak as it is injurious, has thought fit hastily to withdraw his good opinion from one who has served his country with fidelity and success... (175)

(174) If after this the late Minister should choose to enter into opposition, he must go into it loaded and oppressed with the imputation of the blackest ingratitude; if on the other hand, he should retire from business, or should concur in support of that administration which he had left, because he disapproved of its measures, his acquiescence would be attributed by the multitude to a bargain for his foresaking the public, and that the title and his pension were the considerations. *Annual register*, 1761, p.45.

(175) *Chatham Correspondence*, II, 158, cited in Williams, *The life of William Pitt*, Vol. II, p.120.
It required only this personal explanation to restore Pitt in the affections of the City, as Bute found out to his cost, when he was mobbed on the next Lord Mayor's Day; a celebration which was converted into a triumph for Pitt. There was no doubt, however, in the minds of the politically-active classes, that Pitt's effectiveness was temporarily destroyed. His exaggerated deference to the King, the result of a semi-mystical reverence for the royal person and office, created a bad impression among those who had seen him as the champion of the people. A suspicion lingered that he had been bought by the Court, and it was not allayed by seeing his continued association with Lord Bute. Bute, had indeed accomplished all that was required. Pitt could not strike effectively against any reasonable peace that the Court might propose, and the field was clear for that reformation in politics which was so dear to the hearts of the King and his Favourite.

Certainly, the political scene was not inviting. The conventional party categories were already being confused by the disruption of the normal exchange of political offices.

Here are no Whigs and Tories, harmless people, that are content with worrying one another for a hundred and fifty years together. The new parties are, I will and You shall not; and their principles do not admit of delay. (176)

(176) Walpole, Letters, Vol. V., p.139
The first problem, however, was to replace the two retired Ministers. On this subject the rifts in the remaining Cabinet became apparent. Bute proposed Henry Fox as Secretary of State in succession to Pitt. The older Whigs, led by Newcastle, remembering from past ministries Fox's domineering traits and desiring more restful colleagues, proposed George Grenville, who had not followed his family into opposition (177). Bute then proposed Grenville for the Exchequer (178), but Grenville himself refused and remained Treasurer of the Navy. Bute then offered the vacant secretaryship to the Earl of Egremont, who with Grenville, henceforth became Bute's staunchest ally in the Cabinet. Fox continued at the Pay Office, which he was reluctant to quit without adequate compensation. Newcastle held on to office, still afraid to give it up. Grenville, fearful of his forceful relative, was also jealous of the growing power of Fox in the House of Commons. Thus three cowards, Newcastle, Bute and Grenville succeeded

(177) The Grenville family included Earl Temple, his brothers, George and James, and his sisters, Lady Chatham and Lady Egremont. Thus, faction politics between 1760 and 1770 had for them something of the appearance of a family quarrel.

(178) Lord Barrington was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, but he was a placeman of Newcastle's (holding office in the successive ministries of Newcastle, Bute, Rockingham, Chatham, Grafton and North) and was perfectly willing to give up any office if compensated sufficiently. He had succeeded the able and influential Henry Legge, who had been dismissed at the behest of Bute in January, 1761, the first of the Whig martyrs.

to the heritage of Pitt.

The character of Bute was an important determinant in the fate of the reconstructed Ministry.

Always upon stilts, he had an extraordinary appearance of wisdom, both in his look and manner of speaking; for whether the subjects were serious or trifling, he was equally pompous, slow and sententious. (179)

He was an upright man of marked fidelity, ambitious for his master's welfare and not for his own aggrandizement. He was hated as a Scotsman, and such nationalistic loathing was increased by his other qualities and by his actions in support of the Court faction. While craving power, he disclaimed all thought of it, and he seems to have had a curious ambition for martyrdom, as was shown in the last moving scene of this faithful retainer's resignation. His political actions were disturbing, but ineffectual, although they were sufficient to upset and confuse the anxious Duke of Newcastle.

War and peace were still the chief points of controversy between them. For years Newcastle had preached peace in the Cabinet and had been effectively suppressed by Pitt. George III and Bute were equally eager for peace, but they realized the need for gradual restriction of the war before peace negotiations could be effective. Here they differed with the old Duke, for while he (still living in the age of Marlborough)

would restrict operations to the German theatre, George III hated the German War and all things German, because his grandfather had preferred them. Bute, having no personal preferences, and slightly more wisdom than either the King or Newcastle, realized that both the country gentry and the City merchants opposed the German war, and that the younger generation as a whole preferred the Empire to Europe. Bute managed to have the annual subsidy to Frederick the Great voted down in February 1762, but the war overseas seemed to continue without appreciable diminution.

This was the chief obstruction in the way of peace. The war machine created by Pitt, despite the limitations placed on it by the Cabinet, seemed to be incapable of functioning badly. On January 4th, 1762, the war with Spain that Pitt had foreseen, was declared, but this seemed only to serve as a further outlet for British prowess. Despite the fact that the treasure fleet had reached Spain, Britain's forces were successful in conquering both the Philippines and Cuba. In the West Indies, Martinique was conquered in February. Even in Europe British fortunes seemed to be in the ascendant, and French forces were driven back out of Hanover and Hesse. To heap Ossa on Pelion, all these victories were attributed to the sound judgement of Pitt. Newcastle wrote of Bute's seeming reluctance to end the war:

Tho' it may be right, to have, at present, an appearance of carrying on the war with vigour, yet - if we think to outwar Mr. Pitt, we shall find ourselves greatly disappointed. But if our
real view is peace, all our measures should tend to that object, which certainly was not Mr. Pitt's. Thus, and by that only, shall we get the better of Mr. Pitt, and serve and please the publick. (180)

The reference to the threat of Pitt was well-taken. Although pledged to loyalty to the king, Pitt returned to the attack in January, 1762, in defence of the subsidy to Prussia. The Duke of Bedford, on February 5th, submitted a motion to have all the troops brought back from Germany, and a further one to the effect that the conflict with Spain made the whole war indefensible. Of this speech, Walpole declared that: "He might as well have termed it an exhortation to Spain not to dread our arms" (181). Shelburne, still a disciple of Bute, defended Bedford's motion, although Bute himself was embarrassed by it and engineered its defeat since he realized that the moment was not opportune to propose disarmament. He had, however, determined to give up the German war entirely, despite the protests of the Whig lords.

Newcastle would have carried on total war rather than give up Germany, but he lacked the services of Pitt for the operation. By this time he was hardly consulted on the war, and he had already lost the key of the royal patronage closet (182).

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(182) The Duke complained that the only method he had of doing business with the King was by message to Lord Bute through the Duke of Devonshire, an embarrassing situation for a prime minister. Williams, The life of William Pitt, Vol. II, p.137, note
The death of the Tsarina Elizabeth freed Frederick of two enemies, Russia and Sweden, and made British withdrawal even more feasible. Newcastle realized that he must now resign, but wished to remain in semi-opposition. His friends, however, principally the Earl of Hardwicke and the Duke of Devonshire, refused the part as impractical. Although he continually pleaded with Bute for some expression of desire for him to remain, if not from the King, at least from Bute, the latter refused to give it. Once Pitt was gone, the utility of Newcastle to Bute was at an end. The old Duke finally screwed up his courage sufficiently to submit his resignation on May 23rd, and after three agonizing days in which he hoped to be persuaded to withdraw it, it became final. An era of politics was ended in a political squabble, in which comedy was mixed with pathos. Newcastle wrote pathetically of his reception by the King:

The King did not drop one word of concern on my leaving him, nor even made me a polite compliment - after near fifty years service and devotion to the interest of his Royal Family. I will say nothing more of myself; but that I believe never any man was so dismiss'd; but all this puts me now in the right. (183)

(183) To Rockingham, Add. MSS. 32938, ff 262-4, cited by Namier, England in the age of the American revolution, p.376
Cf. also Walpole's comment:

The Duke of Newcastle resigned this morning! Finding, at last, to his great surprise that he had not as much power under this King as under his great-grandfather and grandfather, he is retired, meditating, I suppose, a plan for being Prime Minister again under this King's son.... People think that a little more than the want of power had been necessary to make him take this resolution, and that all kind of disgusts have been given to convince him of how unwelcome his company was.... Letters, Vol. V., p.208.
Bute now succeeded to the Treasury, and his place as Secretary was taken by George Grenville, almost the only man of any real administrative ability still in the Government. Lord Barrington left office with Newcastle and his place as Chancellor of the Exchequer was taken by Sir Francis Dashwood, a notorious rake, whose sole experience of finance, it was said, was in the computation of tavern bills. His first budget was greeted with roars of laughter from the House of Commons. The Ministry, in fact was almost devoid of ability.

When a Lord of the Treasury is not master of his province, it suffices if the Chancellor of the Exchequer is a man of business, and capable of conducting the revenue.... But in the new dispensation it was difficult to determine which was the worst suited to his office, the minister or his substitute. While the former shrouded his ignorance from vulgar eyes, and dropped but now and then from a cloud an oracular sentence; the deputy, with the familiarity and phrase of fish-wife, introduced the humours of Wapping behind the veil of the Treasury. (184)

The Ministry was further weakened by a Cabinet crisis early in August. The Duke of Bedford had been appointed to go to France to sign the definitive treaty of peace, the terms of which, while they were less than those demanded by Pitt at the height of his power, were yet sufficiently victorious to be accepted by the people. Bedford's appointment, since he was a notorious pacifist, aroused a storm of indignation. The attention of the public was, however, soon distracted by the

news of the capture of Havana on August 12th. Bute was quite prepared to accept the original terms of the treaty without demanding compensation for the new conquest but a revolt in the Cabinet forced a change in policy. George Grenville and Lord Egremont refused to consent to the surrender of Havana and the former was demoted from the Secretaryship to the Admiralty. The Earl of Halifax succeeded to the vacant Secretaryship and Henry Fox was at last brought into the Cabinet as Leader of the Commons, with orders to make sure that the treaty of peace was successfully passed.

It was none too soon. The Ministry was in a greatly weakened condition and Pitt was recovering some of his prestige (185). In addition he showed some signs of forgiving Newcastle for his apostacy. It was Fox's first duty in his new role to approach Newcastle through the Duke of Cumberland, in order to endeavour to obtain his support for the peace. Newcastle, however, deeply resented his treatment at the hands of the King and Bute and refused to be converted (186).

On November 3rd, 1762, the Preliminary Articles of Peace were signed at Paris. After such a war it would have been hard to make a peace which did not leave England in a better position than before the war. It was not, however, commensurate

(185) Lord Bute's situation is unpleasant: misfortunes would remind us of Mr. Pitt's glory; advantages will stiffen us against accepting even such a peace as he rejected... Walpole, Letters, Vol. V., p.218.

with the unprecedented victories won by British arms. Canada, Senegal, St. Vincent, Tobago, Dominica and the Grenadines were added to the British Empire. Minorca was regained in return for Belleisle and the fortifications of Dunkirk were to be abolished. Yet, by his precipitancy, Bute was forced to give up St. Lucia, Goree and Guadeloupe at once and Martinique as soon as it was conquered. In addition the French fishing rights off Newfoundland were guaranteed and St. Pierre and Miquelon were given to them as depots for their fleets. In India France recovered all those posts she had held in 1749.

Such a peace required all Fox's consummate powers of management to push it through the Commons. Fox believed that the peace could gain a majority in the House if the proper measures were taken and, since Bute was absolutely incapable of political management, the former was given a free hand. It had required a great deal of persuasion to gain the King's acceptance of Fox, for he had always been taught to abhor him, and he clung tenaciously to such advice. His letter to Bute, in October, 1763 reveals this state of mind.

I have one principle firmly rooted in my mind from the many seasonable lessons I have received from my dear friend, never to trust a man void of principle, if any man ever deserved that character 'tis Mr. Fox; the seeing him at the head of the House of Commons was very unpleasant to me; but I consented to it, as that was the only means of getting my dear friend to proceed this winter in the Treasury. (187)

A last and unsuccessful attempt was made to gain Newcastle and then the work of proscription and organization began. Fox was eminently suited to carry the work out successfully, and the result was the greatest mass conversion of a legislature since Pride's Purge.

No cupidity was left untempted, no fear or foible unplayed upon, no stone unturned beneath which one of the creeping things of politics might chance to be lying. Every office-holder in Parliament was given to understand that his place depended on his vote; and every office-seeker got a promise that, when the battle was won, he should have his share in the spoils, and should step into some post of dignity and emolument from which an honester man than himself had been expelled. Money flowed like water; and any honourable gentleman who was too proud to pocket a bank-note had almost unlimited choice as to the form of bargain under which he preferred to sell himself. (188)

Because of the refusal of the Whig lords to co-operate Fox determined that they must be punished and their political influence diminished. Their influence, when united, however, was very great, even greater than that of Pitt.

The power of that gentleman was vast and natural, but it was in a great deal personal and therefore transient. Theirs was rooted in the country. For, with a great deal less popularity, they possessed a far more natural and fixed influence. Long possession of government; most property, obligations of favours given and received (things at that time supposed of some force). (189)

(188) Trevelyan, G.O., The early history of Charles James Fox, p.27.
The first to fall was the Duke of Devonshire, who was dismissed from his office of Lord Chamberlain. In the following weeks the whole Whig system of preferment and place, laboriously built up during the forty-five years of Whig power, was thoroughly demolished. The Dukes of Newcastle and Devonshire and the Marquess of Rockingham were deprived of their county lord-lieutenancies, but the persecution of minor office holders was a new, and to most, an undesirable feature of the change. Every one who belonged to the beaten party was sacrificed without mercy. All public officers who were unlucky enough to have no political connections fared as badly as the population of districts which returned opposition Members. Clerks, messengers, excisemen, coast-guardsmen and pensioners were turned out in droves because they had no vote or because they had supported a Member who voted against the Government. An inquisition was held into the antecedents of everyone who subsisted on public money. Walpole even records the case of a housekeeper of one of the government offices who, although she was a relative of Lady Bute, was dismissed because she bore the hated Whig name of Cavendish (190).

On December 9th, the vote in favour of the peace showed how well Fox had done his work. Three hundred and eighty-four voted in favour of the peace in the Commons while only sixty-five, led by Pitt, were possessed of, or could exercise,

sufficient independence to vote against it. (191). The extent of Fox's success may be judged by the fact that from the time of the resignation of the Duke of Newcastle in 1762 to the fall of Lord North in 1782, no measure of major importance desired by the Court Party, ever wanted for a majority in its passage through the House of Commons. Ministers came and went, but they did so at the sole behest of the Monarch and the legislature was reduced in power to the level of a debating society.

Fox claimed his reward, but even in this Bute demonstrated his innate pettiness. Fox had bargained on being granted an earldom but the King and his Favourite felt that so disreputable a servant must be content with the lesser dignity of a barony. Fox craftily retained the Pay Office as part of his conditions of employment, but he felt that he had been mistreated.

The fury of the mob at the news of the peace and the methods used to have it approved was vented on Lord Bute. His unpopularity was widespread and amazed even himself, who had courted it. Two of his letters to Sir James Lowther, his son-in-law, illustrate this bewilderment.

The Peace is at last sign'd, and such a one as this nation never saw before; but war seems to be declared at home with the utmost virulence; I am the mark for the party watch word, but the whole is a reality aim'd at the King himself, whose liberty is to be now decided on, liberty that his poorest subject enjoys, of choosing his own menial

servants; the happy conclusion of the Peace has however drawn the teeth of faction, but they have made themselves desperate, and must persist in presumptuous folly. (192)

and again:

...tearing from me any merit I can acquire; which to say the truth (as things are situated) is small enough; in short, in the midst of triumph, any good act I am able to do, is so traduc'd, so many infamous falsehoods published concerning things I never thought of, such inveteracy in the enemy, such lukewarmness (to give it no harsher name) such impracticability, such insatiable dispositions in those soi-disant friends; that if I had but 50 l. per annum, I would retire on bread and water, and think it luxury, compar'd with what I suffer. (193)

The stage was set and Bute was prepared for the martyrdom he had dreamed of. It was not to be the result of the peace, however. Although the nation as a whole disapproved of it, it affected too few directly to become a burning political issue. It fell to his Chancellor of the Exchequer, the worthy Dashwood, to provide him with the excuse for political immolation. On March 4th, 1763 a new excise tax on all cider brewed for home consumption was levied; excise officers were given permission to enter and search private houses for contraband cider and all offences were to be tried by commissioners of excise instead of by a jury. This was the normal procedure in the administration of excise in the Empire, but Englishmen

(193) Ibid., p. 132.
resented its application at home. Nor did they acknowledge the necessity for the tax. Glorious wars usually have a price, but the countrymen of William Pitt were inclined to disregard the cost while the war was on, and resent it when the bill had to be paid. The excise tax was a useful source of revenues, and although it was being used to relieve the already overburdened payers of the land tax, it was not unduly heavy. It was the supposed threat to liberty implied in the right of search by officers, and the fact that William Pitt was the chief representative of the cider counties in Parliament, that led to the great agitation against the excise. The most important result of this agitation, apart from the abolition of the excise, was that George Grenville, later in the year, sought in the colonies for the needed revenue which he did not dare to secure from the Mother country.

In the cider counties they dressed up a figure in Scotch plaid, with a blue riband, to represent the Favourite, and this figure seemed to lead by the nose an ass crowned royally. At the same time they voted instructions to their Members to try to obtain a repeal of the Act. The circumstances of the Act being passed under so unpopular an Administration was most unfortunate. It had taken thirty years to open the eyes of mankind to the benefits of excise; the only, at least the best, method of improving the revenue without imposing new burdens. Being started at so ungracious a moment, the old prejudices were industriously revived. (194)

The last point was certainly a significant one, for the disturbances that followed were merely an example to the American colonists to resist excise taxes with even greater effect.

It was from the mob of London, however, that Bute had the most to fear, since it was once more being urged on by the matchless eloquence of Pitt, returned to the favour of the public. Although little could be done, beyond registering a protest, in the House of Commons, and while the House of Lords was restricted in its debating scope by the fact that the measure was a money bill, much could be done to organize protest in the nation. Petitions poured in from the counties, to be rejected by Grenville on the ground that petitions against money bills were not constitutional. The mobs in London pelted Bute wherever he went, and he believed his life to be in danger. The measure easily passed through Parliament, but the Favourite had had enough. On April 8th, 1763, over the protest of the King, he resigned his Seals of office, and was succeeded, after a short interval of negotiation with the opposition, by his ablest lieutenant, George Grenville. The intriguer who had seemed so powerful, had fallen, not through the efforts of the Opposition, but through his own poltroonery. It is not surprising that Walpole assumes a note of contempt for the Opposition when he writes:

It is plain that if Mr. Pitt had headed the opposition sooner, or that the opposition had had any brains without him, this event would have happened earlier. A single fortnight of clamour
and debate on the cider tax... adopted into petitions from the City, frightened this mighty favourite out of all his power and plans. (195)

In the years to come, successive ministries were to suspect the influence of the Earl of Bute behind each exercise of the prerogative by the King. After his fall, however, and certainly after 1765, Bute's influence waned and gradually disappeared. His pupil had learned his lessons well and no longer needed the teacher.

Chapter IV.

The Royal Prerogative

The political parties of the country had been torn into those pieces out of which, in the next seven years, were to be fashioned the foundation of the two great political parties of the nineteenth century, and the political organization which was to revive the royal power to a level with that of the later Stuarts. These changes, however, owed the major share in their development, not to Bute, but to his pupil, the King. George III's character, his actions and his choice of instruments for his policies were certainly major determinants in the political life of the two following decades, and he was able, partly as a result of outside circumstances, to increase the royal powers in regard to policy-making to such a degree that they were not seriously reduced, even in an age of dynamic change, for nearly seventy years.

Inheritor of the habitual quarrels between the generations of the House of Brunswick-Luneburg, George III had the misfortune not to develop his own prejudices, but to inherit those of his father. George I had quarrelled with the Electress Sophia, George II with George I, and Frederick, Prince of Wales with George II. Each of the heirs in turn had built up a shadow court around him against the day of his accession, when the policies would be completely changed. The foolish pretensions of Frederick, however, were
prematurely cut short with his death in 1751, and his "Court" at Leicester House, made up largely of disaffected placemen of the Whig regime, had to look elsewhere for a champion. They found him in the most unpromising person of George, now Prince of Wales.

As far as can be determined, it is reasonably certain that George, up to the moment that his father died, had been generally neglected by his parents and their associates. His mother, a princess of Saxe-Gotha, had the rather narrow, mystical, and arbitrary views of royalty and its prerogatives, long current in petty German courts. Her outlook was completely alien to the English conception of the power of monarchy as a pious fraud, and her influence on her son's later activities was always suspect. Even as late as 1770, Walpole records that:

Lord Chatham some days ago declared to the Lords that there is a secret influence (meaning the Princess) more mighty than Majesty itself, and which had betrayed or clogged every succeeding administration ... In consequence of this denunciation, papers, to which the North Briton were milk and honey, have been published in terms too gross to repeat. The Whisperer and the Parliamentary Spy are their titles. Every blank wall at this end of the town is scribbled with the words, 'Impeach the King's Mother' and, in truth, I think her person in danger (196).

It is always difficult to determine the exact extent of the influence of one person on another and the very complex psychological relationships between mother and son are not

the legitimate field of study for the historian. Certainly the influence of the Princess was considerable during the King's childhood, but this power was shared to a great degree by her Favourite and his, Lord Bute. She was responsible for the Earl's introduction into the royal household, and for two decades thereafter, the mobs of England, with a sounder instinct perhaps than the politicians, continually associated the Favourite and the Princess with the less desirable features of the royal influence.

The influence of the Princess, however, has been overemphasized. It was not the only factor directing the King's conduct, nor even the paramount one. The old fable of the Princess's admonition to her son: "George, be a king!" has been too often the sole basis of explanation for the profound political changes in the first two decades of the reign of George III. Undoubtedly the young prince was continually reminded by his preceptors of the high station to which fate had predestined him - but what heir to a throne is not? It is part of the education of princes and could equally be argued as a causative factor in the conduct of George VI as in that of George III. A much more compelling reason for his conduct, at least in its initial stages, was the atmosphere of dynastic opposition in which he was brought up, both his mother and Lord Bute confirming him in his hatred of the old King, his grandfather.

This might have had no more serious effect on the
government of England than the previous dynastic rivalries had had, if it had not been that the new heir never achieved mental maturity. He was encouraged to hate before he could think, and a cleavage developed in his feelings which made him see himself surrounded by devils and angels. All the devils were at St. James's and all the angels at Leicester House; and the boy, a neurotic from early adolescence, concentrated all the bitterness and hatred of which he was capable on his predecessor, while his unbalanced affections went out without reserve to Lord Bute, who became to him the incarnation of the paternal spirit.

A letter to Bute, dated June 31st (sic), 1756, reveals this quality of hysterical affection, as well as a lack of maturity and a defective education.

It is very true that Ministers have done every­thing that they can to provoke me, that they have call'd me a harmless boy, and have not even deign'd to give me an answer when I so earnestly wish to see my friend about me. They have also threatened my Mother in a cruel manner (which I will neither forget nor forgive to the day of my death) because she is so good as to come forward and preserve her son, from the many snares that surround him. My Friend is also attacked in the most cruel and horrid manner, not for anything he has done against them, but because he is my Friend, and wants to see me come to throne with honour and not with disgrace, and because he is, a friend to the bless'd liberties of his country and not to arbitrary notions. I look upon myself as engag'd in honour and justice to defend these my two Friends as long as I draw breath. I do therefore here in the presence of Our Almighty Lord promiss (sic) that I will ever remember the insults done to my Mother, and never will forgive any­one who shall offer to speak disrespectfully of her. I do in the same solemn manner declare that I will defend my Friend and will never use evasive answers, but will always tell him what is said against him, and will more and more show the world the great friendship I have for him, and all the malice that can be invented
against him shall only bind me the stronger to him ... I will take upon me the man in everything, and will not show that indifference which I have as yet too often done. As I have chosen the vigorous part, I will throw off that indolence which if I don't soon get the better of will be my ruin ... (197).

His letters are full of this consciousness of his own shortcomings. A basically sensitive person, he was brought under abnormal conditions and subjected to an incessant barrage of moralistic advice from people with far stronger wills than his. His obstinacy was probably encouraged by continued reminders of his high destiny. He was basically childist and backward mentally, but he had been robbed of childhood. He was taught to reject and abhor the normal pleasures of youth, so that his life became a long purgation of the sins which he felt himself capable of committing at any moment. Conflicts built up within him rendered him helpless, and he would sink, on occasion, into complete mental indolence.

He was even deficient in many of the ordinary accomplishments of a ruler. His indolence and his defective education resulted in a complete lack of any cultural accomplishments. His knowledge of the world was almost non-existent. Although an Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, he would not visit his German domains. He was ten years on the throne before he even visited the coast of his maritime kingdom (198). Though realizing his limitations, he sought

(197) Add. MSS. 32958, ff. 220-221, cited by Namier, England in the age of the American revolution, pp. 96-97
(198) On the 21st of April (1770), the young Prince of
to achieve great things, and with failure, sought compensation in dissimulation.

His consciousness of guilt caused him to be firmly convinced of the perfidy of other men, with the exception of Bute. Almost everyone to him was immoral, corrupt and unfaithful. The great leaders of the age were especially suspect, not only because of their opposition to his incapable favourite, but because he was always jealous of their transcendent gifts; gifts which his own warped ambitions yearned to possess. Thus Pitt, Fox, Legge, Hardwicke, and Devonshire were all proscribed in the unbalanced mind of the boy long before he came to the throne, not because of what they had done, but because of what they were. The lack of development in his own mind and the warnings of his pompous teacher combined to render him a dangerously unbalanced person, especially dangerous as the King of Great Britain, long before the final darkness of insanity closed over him.

George was not, however, entirely deficient in the qualities necessary in a king. He had abundant courage, as his constant changing of Ministers for his own purposes (though often at the risk of a constitutional crisis) showed. When his interests were threatened he could act with a speed,
courage and cunning that amazed his opponents, as, for example, in the crisis that precipitated the appointment of Lord North in 1770. His faith in the essential righteousness of his cause enabled him to undertake unsavoury measures and employ equally unsavoury servants which even Newcastle, in the full flowering of Whig corruption, would have hesitated to do. He had the great advantage over his enemies that he knew exactly what he wanted, while they were usually divided as to the degree of power which should be accorded to him. He never scrupled to exert his authority and the nation's money to foster dissension among them, to break up alliances and to destroy ancient friendships to gain his ends. He could even charm his opponents if there was no other way of defeating them. Lord Rockingham declared that the King was never so pleasant to him as when he was contemplating his dismissal (199). Horace Walpole says of George:

As far as could be discerned of the King's natural disposition it was humane and benevolent. If flowing courtesy to all men was the habit of his disimulation, at least it was so suited to his temper that no gust or passion, no words of bitterness, were ever known to break from him. He accepted services with grace and appearance of feeling; and if he forgot them with unrestrained felicity, yet he never marked his displeasure with harshness. Silence served him to bear with unwelcome ministers, or to part with them. His childhood was tinctured with obstinacy; it was adopted at the beginning of his reign and called firmness, but did not prove to be his complexion. In truth, it would be difficult to draw his character in positive colours. He

had neither passions nor activity (200).

From the outset he seems to have had a certain popularity, both by reason of his British birth and from the fact that he was young and had all the private virtues; a welcome change for a people who had come to associate the monarchy with superannuated Germans of uncertain health and even more uncertain morals. Fox declares that George was never popular (201), but this may be taken as an exaggeration inspired by later grievances.

The King was not, as he has so often been pictured, an autocrat by nature. He had nothing of the German outlook and sympathies of his grandfather or great-grandfather, and his ideas were solidly grounded in the soil of England. In the Tudor Age he would probably have been pictured as the complete Patriot King. Even in his later years, when his mistakes and stupidities had passed into history, and Britain was faced with the crisis of the French Revolution, the people rallied around him as the symbol of all that was English, both good and bad. Nor was he consciously prone to violate the constitution. He was filled with platitudes about the sanctity of the Revolution Settlement and liberty, and was

Cf. Junius:
It is the misfortune of your life, and originally the cause of every reproach and distress, which has attended your government, that you should never have been acquainted with the language of truth, until you heard it in the complaints of your people.

(201) Life and letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, p.76
honestly convinced that he was preserving it from the enroachments of the corrupt Whig oligarchs. Nor, it must be admitted, did he wander far from the bounds set on his power by the constitution. The legal fiction of the king's power had not been formally limited, and even the idea of cabinet government had been the work of one faction. By 1760, neither time nor the internal harmony within the nation had been sufficient to give it universal acceptance. The King never attempted to reverse the decision of 1688, but merely to change the developments subsequent to that date, in short to abolish cabinet government. In addition, the work of two great publicists had revived the idea of the function of monarchy as the protector of the rights of the people, a proper representation of the old Tudor concept of the "King in Parliament."

In political philosophy, Lord Bolingbroke had sketched a pattern of the "Patriot King," and in law Lord Mansfield had demonstrated that many of the old Whig aphorisms on the "rights of the people" were based not in law, or even in custom, as had been hitherto supposed, but in the last analysis on the amount of force that the Whig oligarchs could command. Cabinet government, certainly, was not yet a sanctified institution.

For a century Bolingbroke's philosophy was rejected as the yearnings of an arbitrarily-minded old man for an era long past. In the nineteenth century, a romantic interest in the Jacobite cause and Mr. Disraeli's search for a
foundation on which to deify the monarchy of his generation, resuscitated Bolingbroke, even to the point of his being considered one of the great political philosophers of all time. He was neither of these. Nor did his *Patriot King* form the working manual for George III. In connection with the policies of George III, Bolingbroke is significant, however, in that he helped to found a school of thought which was prepared to acquiesce in the increased prerogative, powers, and because the character and actions of George III followed with amazing exactness, the patterns which Bolingbroke drew.

Compare, for instance, George III's beliefs in regard to the limitations on the monarchy, with those declared by Bolingbroke, in these passages:

My aim is to fix this principle; that limitations on a crown ought to be carried as far as it is necessary to secure the liberties of a people; and that all such limitations may subsist, without weakening or endangering the monarchy (202).

Or on the abandonment of Ministers:

Some of them perhaps will be abandoned by him; not to party fury, but to national justice; not to sate private resentments and to serve particular interests, but to make satisfaction for wrongs done to their country, and to stand as examples of terror to future administrations (203).

Such a doctrine was bound to threaten parliamentary control of policy through the cabinet system.

(203) Ibid., p.78.
Or again, on the uses of dissimulation:

Dissimulation is a shield, as secrecy is armour; and it is no more possible to preserve secrecy in public affairs without some degree of dissimulation, than it is to succeed in it without secrecy (204).

The comparison becomes almost uncanny when both Bolingbroke and the King discuss the accession to the throne and the treatment of existing political parties. George III, in a letter to Bute following the Peace of Paris, outlines his policy in respect to political factions.

Now I come to the part of my dear friend's letter that gives me the greatest concern, as it over-turns all the thoughts that have kept up my spirits in these bad times; I own I had flattered myself when Peace was once established that my dear friend would have assisted me in purging out corruption, and in those measures that no man but he that has the Prince's real affection can go through; then when we were both dead our memories would have been respected and esteemed to the end of time, now what shall we be able to say that Peace is concluded, and my dear friend becoming a Courtier, for I fear man-kind will say so, the Ministry remains composed of the most abandoned men that ever held those offices; thus instead of reformation, the Ministers being vicious this country will grow, if possible worse; let me attack the irreligious, the covetous, & etc. as much as I please, that will be of no effect for the Ministers being of that stamp, men with reason think they may advance to the highest pitch of their ambition through every infamous way that their own black hearts or the rascality of their superiors can point out (205).

Bolingbroke wrote, of the monarch's first action on ascending the throne:

(204) Bolingbroke, Works, Vol. III, p.81

First then, he must begin to govern as soon as he begins to reign. For the very first steps he makes in government will give the first impression, as it were the presage of his reign; and may be of great importance in many other respects besides that of opinion and reputation. His first care will be, no doubt, to purge his court, and to call into the administration such men as he can assure himself will serve on the same principles on which he intends to govern (206).

Yet the choice of such men must not be on party lines. Bolingbroke quite rightly condemned the dangers of the party system as he saw them; but while the political philosophers of a later age, the Shelburnes and Burkes, urged purification of politics within the guard-rails of the party structure, Bolingbroke could recommend only a step backward to the personal ruler such as had existed in the time of William III. Thus, he urges a "Ministry of the Talents" for the King's guidance, but only of talents in harmony with the purposes of the King.

He may favour one party and discourage another, upon occasions wherein the state of his kingdom makes such a temporary measure necessary; but he will espouse none ...(207)

By comparison, the letter of George III to Pitt, of July 29th, 1766, creating him an Earl, and calling on him to form a Ministry, not only plays on Pitt's known weakness for non-party government, but is also an honest expression of George's own aim in politics.

(206) Bolingbroke, Works, Vol. III, p.77
(207) Bolingbroke, op.cit., p.90.
... I know the Earl of Chatham will zealously give his aid towards destroying all party distinctions, and restoring that subordination to Government, which can alone preserve that inestimable blessing, Liberty, from degenerating into Licentiousness (208).

The other figure of the first rank who supported George's claims was the greatest of all English jurists, Lord Mansfield. The extent of his influence on the King is even harder to measure than that of Bolingbroke. Although he had been Lord Chief Justice since 1756, his official, seemingly non-partisan position, was no indication of his political influence. He was never an administrator, but was an unofficial Cabinet Minister in almost all the administrations from the time of his appointment to the Bench until his death. Early in North's regime he did act as Speaker of the House of Lords in the absence of a Lord Chancellor, but he repeatedly declined the dignity of the Woolsack. He was always a power at Court, though the extent of his influence was probably exaggerated by the popular scribblers and disgruntled placemen of the time.

As a Scot, the relative of Jacobites (his brother had been proscribed in 1746), and a close personal adherent of the King, he was predisposed to the support of increased royal powers. As the greatest lawyer of the age, he naturally looked to the law to support his beliefs and found there adequate justification for the freer exercise of the prerogative. His support of taxation of America and the

(208) Chatham Correspondence, cited in Mumby, F., George III and the American revolution, p.155.
imprisonment of Wilkes were both laid firmly on a legal basis. Junius saw him as the dark and secret power of the closet, the subverter of the common law (209), but far from having subverted it, he reformed and codified the common law to make it applicable to modern conditions. He was a great orator with great powers of concentration and erudition. It was said that Mansfield's mere statement was equal to anyone else's argument (210). He was the one rival to Pitt as an orator.

(209) I see through your whole life, one uniform plan to enlarge the Crown, at the expense of the liberty of the subject. To this object, your thoughts, words and actions have been constantly directed. In contempt or ignorance of the common law of England, you have made it your study to introduce into the court, where you preside, maxims of jurisprudence unknown to Englishmen. The Roman code, the law of nations, and the opinion of foreign civilians, are your perpetual theme; but whoever heard you mention Magna Charta or the Bill of Rights with approbation or respect? By such treacherous arts, the noble simplicity and free spirit of our Saxon laws were first corrupted ... I shall not attempt to refute a doctrine, which, if it was not meant for law, carries falsehood and absurdity upon the face of it; but, if it was meant for a declaration of your political creed, is clear and consistent. Under an arbitrary government, all ranks and distinctions are confounded. The honour of a nobleman is no more considered than the reputation of a peasant, for with different liveries, they are equally slaves.


among the leaders of the day, and they remained antipathetic throughout their careers (211).

As in the case of Bolingbroke, his prestige had far more influence upon public opinion than upon the King's actions. The King revived royal powers which had lain dormant within the framework of the constitution, but the fact that Mansfield gave the weight of his prestige as a jurist to them, helped to make them temporarily acceptable. In the House of Lords, there was no lawyer who could approach him in forensic powers. Camden, the legal champion of the popular party, was continually defeated in his attempts to convince the House of the unconstitutionality of the King's measures. Yet the final defeat of prerogative left Mansfield unaffected in prestige and seemingly unmoved emotionally. Under the younger Pitt he continued to act as the unofficial guide to the Ministry on constitutional questions, and interpreted the new practices in the same cold light of judicial opinion, as he had done the old.

Other supporters of the King were not of this high calibre. The Earl of Bute has already been discussed; others, however, while not so notorious, had perhaps as great a share

(211) As an illustration of this antipathy between the two great leaders and how it was kept alive, Walpole records the following story from the days of the Pitt-Newcastle Administration: "On one occasion, when the Cabinet was asked by Pitt to decide upon an unpopular expedition, which Pitt favoured, the Cabinet being equally divided and Mansfield not having spoken, Pitt adjourned the debate, declaring the vote favourable, and that: 'The Chief Justice of England has no opinion to give in this matter.'" Walpole, *Memoirs of the reign of George III*, Vol I, p.64.
in the formulation of royal policy into legislative terms, and with the administration of it. These people may be divided into three groups. The first, and least implicated, was that large and competent body of senior civil servants upon whom the burden rested for carrying out the measures of the Court Party. The practice of the age, in permitting civil servants to sit as Members of Parliament, not only gave them an incentive for corruption, but also rendered them liable to accusations of nepotism by their fellow Members. In this group were such men as Robert Wood, the very able Under Secretary of State, remembered chiefly for his arrest of Wilkes; Jeremiah Dyson, perhaps the ablest legislative draftsman in the House of Commons of the time; and Charles Jenkinson who, as a reward for his very real services to the nation, was later created Earl of Liverpool.

The second group consisted of broken politicians of the last reign, and Whigs who had outlived their usefulness, or who had diverged from the party policy. They were the chief supporters of the non-partisan aspect of the King's new policy, since they lacked either the ability or the congeniality to be successful under the party system. They included most of the Bedford Faction, such as the Earl of Sandwich, Welbore Ellis Richard Rigby and Earl Nugent. Their chief purpose in politics was the securing of lucrative sinecures for themselves and their connections, and their venality was a scandal even in that very venal age. The group also numbered in its ranks such boon companions of the late Prince of Wales as Bubb
Dodington, created Lord Melcombe in the new reign, and Sir Francis Dashwood, created Lord Despenser. Finally, it included the most notorious and hated, and also the most unfortunate of the King's Friends, Lord George Sackville. Lord George, who was later to lose the American War under the style of Lord George Germaine, was certainly the victim of an over-emphasized and unnecessary unpopularity, following his disobedience at the Battle of Minden. The King, ever sympathetic to failures under his grandfather's reign, promised to rehabilitate the character of the unsuccessful general. Lord George, however, seems to have earned his pardon, for he was kept waiting for five years, until the royal patronage was accorded him. A letter from Bute to Sir Henry Erskine of April 8th 1763, illustrates the quandary that the King was in concerning the pardon, and Lord George's impatience with the delay. It is also indicative of the very slim ties with which the friends of the King were bound to him.

I have had a long conversation with the King on this subject, when after urging his merit and his abilities, his hard usage, ever censured by his Majesty himself, the great use he would be at this critical juncture, the King admitted all to be true, and even added that he flattered himself with hopes of shewing him at this period strong marks of his favour; but though the time was come, it was attended with too many untoward circumstances for him to venture to take a step that to his knowledge would revolt numbers about him ... And now let Lord George seriously reflect on this, and on the part you tell me he meditates if not humoured at present. What, join the greatest enemy ever man had, who aimed at no less than his blood, because the most benign of princes cannot do for him now even
what the prince himself wishes?" (212)

The third group, which functioned largely under Lord Bute's leadership, consisted of old sentimental Tories, with opinions of high antiquity and a mystical reverence for the monarch, and of Scotsmen attracted by the prominence of their countryman. In general, this group attracted the keenest and most abiding hatred of the people of any of the supporters of the King. For example, Junius, in his letter to George III, in 1769, declares:

You are not, however, destitute of every appearance of support: You have all the Jacobites, Non-jurors, Roman Catholics and Tories of this country, and all Scotland without exception. Considering from what family you are descended, the choice of your friends has been singularly directed; and truly, Sir, if you had not lost the Whig interest of England, I should admire your dexterity in turning the hearts of your enemies ... You will not accept the uniform experience of your ancestors; and when once a man is determined to believe, the very absurdity of the doctrine confirms him in his faith. A bigoted understanding can draw a proof of attachment to the House of Hanover from a notorious zeal for the house of Stuart, and find an earnest of future loyalty in former rebellions (213).

Old Tories, such as the Earl of Westmoreland, who had not been to Court since the death of Anne, attended George's coronation. The active cause of Jacobitism, however, was dying fast before the accession, with the failure of the "Forty-Five" and the subsequent degeneration of the House of

Stuart. The new favour shown to Tories and to Scots in the new reign was a major cause, rather than an incidental effect of their new loyalty to the House of Hanover. The Tories, ghosts from a by-gone age, were not much regarded, but national prejudice, still remembering the fright of fifteen years before, when the Pretender's army had held Derby, vilified the Scottish nation, and the King's sympathy for it. George's declaration in his first speech from the throne, that "I glory in the name of Britain" (214) was universally believed to be a declaration in favour of the Scots and to have been inspired by the new Scottish Favourite. Junius made pointed reference to it some years later.

When you affectedly renounced the name of Englishman, believe me, Sir, you were persuaded to pay a very ill-judged compliment to one part of your subjects, at the expense of another. While the natives of Scotland are not in actual rebellion, they are undoubtedly entitled to protection; nor do I mean to condemn the policy of giving some encouragement to the novelty of their affections for the House of Hanover ... But hitherto they have no claim to your favour. To honour them with a determined predilection and confidence, in exclusion of your English subjects, who placed your family, and, in spite of treachery and rebellion, have supported it on the throne, is a mistake too gross, even for the unsuspecting generosity of youth. (215)

There was, however, influential support for the new favouring of Tories, from the University of Oxford, ever a hot-bed of Toryism, and from the few politicians of the day

(214) This was first, and incorrectly quoted as "I glory in the name of Briton." Mumby, George III and the American revolution, p.3.

who did not support the party system, chief among these being Pitt.

The countenance shown to the Tories, and to their citadel, the University of Oxford, was at first supposed by those who stood at a distance from the penetralia, the measure of Mr. Pitt, as consonant to his known desire of uniting — that was breaking — all parties. But Tories, who were qualified for nothing above a secret, could not keep even that. They came to Court, it is true, but they came with all their own prejudices. They abjured their ancient master, but retained their principles; and seemed to have exchanged nothing but their badge, the White Rose, for the White Horse. Prerogative became a fashionable word; and the language of the times was altered before the Favourite dared to make any variation in the Ministry (216).

The reference to Pitt illustrates one of the paramount problems of the Whig opposition in the first decade of George III's reign. The opposition to the party system was not restricted to the King, but was a widespread belief, growing out of the long Whig domination and its attendant abuses. In Pitt's case, this belief was linked with the desire of one who has already dominated his own party to dominate all parties. The plan of a truly national government, "measures, not men," as he was later to characterize it himself, dominated the political peripatations of the Great Commoner from his fall from power until 1769.

He had, in fact, laid the basis for his non-partisan policy in the previous decade, when, as the opponent of Newcastle, he had been the erstwhile champion of the Prince of

Wales faction at Leicester House. Newcastle, in preparing the way for the new King, had been forced to include the champion of Leicester House in his government in 1757, and the Pitt-Newcastle administration was formed to win the war, with the initial support of Lord Bute. The successful war minister, however, as his success grew, was distrusted by Leicester House as a possible rival to the Earl of Bute in the hearts of the populace. A spirit of revenge grew up in the feeble mind of the prince, which required only opportunity to make itself felt.

I suppose you agree with me, wrote George to Bute in 1758, that as Mr. P. does not now choose to communicate what is intended to be done, but defers it till executed, he might save himself sending at all, as I should hear only a few days later, as well as other people, what measures have been taken. Indeed, my dearest friend, he treats both you and me with no more regard than he would do a parcel of children, he seems to forget that the day will come when he must expect to be treated according to his deserts (217).

As early as 1756, Bute had intended to assume the Treasury in the new reign, with Pitt as Secretary of State. With Pitt estranged and the country at war, he hesitated. George therefore determined to carry on with the old Ministry until a favourable opportunity was presented to replace it with Bute. Negotiations with Pitt failed to draw him away from Newcastle, so it was found necessary to begin those negotiations with Fox which were to result in the creation

of an efficient parliamentary instrument to do the King's will.

The decline of Jacobitism in the Tory Party was not nearly so important as the desire to dismiss his predecessor's servants, in moving George III to call those in Opposition into office. His advantages, insofar as personal prestige was concerned, were from the outset far greater than those of his two predecessors. He was young and he had no competing heir, though the Duke of Cumberland was a rather inadequate rallying point for disaffected Whigs. Since the Whigs had relied upon George II for all royal patronage, all the hopes, not only of preferment, but of actual power, on the part of the disaffected elements, rested with Leicester House. Yet there seems to have been no really well-thought-out plan of campaign. It is not surprising, with the administration, as in the cases of Walpole and the Pelhams, almost as permanent as the reign, that there was little speculation as to the future prime minister, or even as to the future of the office itself.

Certainly, much of the articulate portion of the nation seems to have been opposed to the continuation of cabinet and party government and were inclined to seek a return to the more elementary concept of the benevolent king, protecting a helpless people from a tyranny of Parliament. The King alone might stand above party strife. In addition, the change of reigns meant a change in offices. The duty of the King to accept and continue the ministers of his predecessor
was not admitted in 1760.

Actually, the succession, when it came, was not welcomed at Leicester House. The burden of the war and the trouble of negotiating the peace was foreseen as early as 1758 (218), and the hope was expressed that the old King might survive the war. These fears were proven all too true. Bute’s career was wrecked on the peace negotiations, and it was several years before his pupil, working by himself, was able to wield the instrument which had been created for him with sufficient skill to enforce his will invariably.

The function of the King as a controller of elections was certainly not without sound constitutional precedent. George II had taken a supervisory interest in elections, probably much more strongly than was realized, since Newcastle was very cautious about protesting against anything less than excessive interference by the Crown. On one occasion the King even presumed to oppose Pitt in the plenitude of his powers, and in the argument that followed (over a candidate for a government borough), won his point (219). Thus, the crown which George III assumed in 1760 was much more than the political cypher it has often been pictured. The difference in the political activity of the two monarchs was merely one of emphasis, not of type. No real innovation

(218) Namier, England in the age of the American revolution, p.67.
(219) Ibid., p.127.
was made. The Whigs considered the King's interference, while it operated in their favour, as perfectly constitutional. They had created the Hanoverian monarchy of Great Britain, and they should reap the benefit. Even in the new reign, only a small faction of the Whigs continuously opposed the monarchial pretensions, for the habit of bargaining with the dominant power and the acceptance of interference by the Crown had grown too strong to be overcome by scruples for the vague generalization (as it then was) of popular sovereignty.

Although the King resented the limitations which cabinet government placed on his power, he was not unmindful of the duty which he owed his Ministers, to support them whenever possible. In some cases, when the policy of the Ministry was that of the King, there was even cordiality in the support. The King gave unlimited confidence to both Bute and Grenville, only to be disappointed when the latter, jealous of the influence of Bute, loudly disclaimed his master and took his ambitions to what he thought was a more profitable camp. Despite his awkward manner, his insistence on formality (220), and his dislike of Whiggery, George III gave at least half-hearted support to the Rockingham Government. That Ministry, however, despite Burke's panegyricon it, was forced to admit

(220) He was accessible to none of his Court but at state hours of business and ceremony; nor was any man but the Favourite, and the creatures with whom he had garrisoned the palace, allowed to converse with the King. Affection had no share in this management.
its lack of popular support, and continually pleaded for re-enforcement. George was the model of tact amid the seemingly endless vagaries of the Chatham-Grafton administration. Finally, he supported North with greater loyalty than any Hanoverian had shown to a prime minister. His ingratitude to those servants no longer of use to him is another matter. The choice in 1760 lay between a thorough reform of the whole political system, or royal partisanship in the system as it was. Newcastle and his friends were opposed to the first, while Pitt opposed the second. Both policies were eventually tried.
Chapter V.
The Popular Power

The most effective opposition to the royal ambitions in the first decade of the reign, came, not from the broken political parties or their leaders, but from an element of growing political power in the nation, the merchants and Liveried Companies of the City, and their creatures, the mob of London. The prominence of the commercial community in the life of the nation has already been discussed. The continual subservience of the legislature to the wishes and needs of the trading interests was still continuing, though it was to be replaced, within the decade, with an equal concern for the benefit of the rising industrial factor in the economy of Britain. The new individuality in economic matters, arising in part from the expansion of Britain to a world trading nation, in part from the intellectual expansion of the seventeenth century, would not tolerate, by 1760, the obsolete controls of the mercantilist system. The economically powerful classes demanded economic freedom, and as a means to secure that freedom, political power as well.

The use of the mob as the means of expression for a class which was seriously under-represented in the unreformed House of Commons, was an extremely easy and effective method of gaining attention. The police force of the metropolis was almost non-existent, and though the eighteenth century was an era of extreme legalism, the enforcement of law, with
honourable exceptions, was very inefficient. Thus London could be given up to the rioters completely, if the mob was of one mind for the reason of the riot. The Middlesex election riots of 1768 and 1769, and the much more serious Gordon Riots of 1780, were the most flagrant examples of the lack of control over a populace which was coming to political and social awareness of its powers.

It was not only in rioting that the citizens of London were able to make their influence felt. Under the leadership of its Aldermen, a remarkable group including such names as Beckford, Trecothick, Bull, Crosby and Olivier, the mercantile interest was able to preserve and re-assert many of the fundamental rights of the individual implied in the constitution. Most important, through the mouth of John Wilkes, it was able to state and establish the rights of freedom of the press, parliamentary privilege, the freedom of the electorate to choose the representatives it wished, and to re-establish beyond all threat of subversion, the right of habeas corpus.

Before and during the Seven Years' War, the avowed champion of the City had been Pitt. His loss of prestige, through his retirement from office with a pension, his intractable, haughty disposition, and his pursuit of that political will o' the wisp, a non-partisan government, lost him much of the support of the merchant community. The populace soon found another leader, however; one after its own heart, in the unprepossessing person of John Wilkes, Member for Aylesbury and editor of the latest in scurrilous journals, the
North Briton.

Though unimposing in appearance, undistinguished as a parliamentarian, and lacking in either administrative ability or moral character, Wilkes was well-fitted to be the leader of the rabble. The son of a successful brewer, he was, above all else, representative of the prejudices and interests of his fellow citizens of the capital. Though a poor public speaker, he was brilliant in private conversation; (221) his talents as a writer were paramount. It was a complete lack of inhibitions, however, which gave him the advantage in opposing the government. Junius, in his Letter to George III, points this out as the chief reason for the popularity of Wilkes with the English nation.

The natives of that country, are as much distinguished by a peculiar character, as by your Majesty's favour. Like another chosen people, they have been conducted into the land of plenty, where they find themselves effectually marked, and divided from mankind. There is hardly a period at which the most irregular character may not be redeemed. The mistakes of one sex find a retreat in patriotism; those of the other in devotion. Mr. Wilkes brought with him into politics the same liberal sentiments, by which his private conduct had been directed, and seemed to think, that, as there are few excesses in which an English gentleman may not be permitted to indulge, the same latitude was allowed him in the choice of his political principles, and in the spirit of maintaining them (222).

(221) This hero is as bad a man as ever hero was, abominable in private life, dull in Parliament, but, they say, very entertaining in a room, and certainly no bad writer, besides having had the honour of contributing a great deal to Lord Bute's downfall. Walpole, Letters, Vol. V, p.315.
It is probable that if Wilkes had been less of a profligate he might have missed his popularity, since his ill-repute as a rake and a scoffer tempted his enemies to use methods against him which they would have hesitated to use against a more respected adversary. Yet this very lack of respectability ensured that he would never be able to establish himself permanently as a power in the political world. Once the specific issues upon which he was able to agitate the people of London to riot had been settled, he disappeared into distinguished obscurity.

During the war he had been an extreme Whig and an ardent follower of Pitt. When that statesman fell from power, Wilkes suffered with him, since Earl Temple, the patron of Wilkes, was deprived of his Lord Lieutenancy of Buckinghamshire, having first been ordered to deprive Wilkes of his lieutenant-colonelcy in the Buckinghamshire Militia. Wilkes began the North Briton during the regime of Bute, as an organ of attack on the King's Party, and in the 45th number of this paper (April 23rd, 1763), he addressed a violent attack on the King's speech at prorogation of April 19th, describing it as "the most abandoned instance of ministerial effrontery not to be paralleled in the annals of this country." (223)

It was the opening gun in a campaign which, before it was

(223) He has made our Sovereign declare, "My expectations have been fully answered by the happy effects which the several allies have derived from this salutary measure of the definitive treaty. The powers at war with my good brother, the King of Prussia, have been induced to agree
finished, nearly fifteen years later, was to see the pro-
rogative power of the government considerably reduced, the
liberty of the press given a substantial guarantee, and the
freedom of the electorate to choose whom they wished to
represent them, all safely established in the constitutional

The immediate reaction of the Government was to issue a
general warrant for the arrest of the "authors, printers and
publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper entitled the
North Briton, No. 45" (224), and to bring them before the
Secretaries of State for examination. The use of general
warrants was one of those survivals in the English constitution
which continue only because they are not actively offensive

(223) cont'd.

... to such terms of accommodation as that great Prince has
approved, and the success which has attended my
negotiation has necessarily and immediately diffused the
blessings of peace through every part of Europe."
The infamous fallacy of this whole sentence is apparent
to all mankind ... No advantage of any kind has accrued
to that magnanimous Prince from our negotiation; he
was basely deserted by the Scottish Prime Minister of
England.
From the North Briton, No. 45, cited by Walpole,

(224) Warrant for the arrest of John Wilkes:
These are in his Majesty's name to authorize and
require you (taking a constable to your assistance) to
make strict and diligent search for the authors,
printers and publishers of a seditious and treasonable
paper entitled the North Briton No. XLIX, Saturday, April
23rd, 1763, printed for G. Kearsley in Ludgate Street,
London, and them or any of them having found to apprehend
and seize together with their papers, and to bring them
in safe custody before me (Lord Halifax) to be examined
concerning the premises and further dealt with according
to law ...
Annual register, 1763, p.136.
to a sufficient proportion of the nation. Such warrants were certainly a useful method in time of emergency for retaining undesirables, as Pitt demonstrated during the Seven Years' War in the detention of those suspected of spying for the French. Lord Halifax, the principle mover in the indictment, argued, not unsoundly, that the insult to the King's Government and his Majesty's person constituted a treasonable libel and sufficient cause to invoke emergency powers. After a short farcical interlude, in which Wilkes abused the King's Messengers sent to arrest him and thoroughly embarrassed the two Secretaries of State, he was imprisoned in the Tower on April 30th, 1763, in spite of his parliamentary privilege of immunity from arrest on other than major crimes (225).

His abuse of the Government in general, and Bute in particular, made him the hero of the hour. Lord Temple and the Duke of Grafton, among other aristocratic supporters, were refused admittance to him. It must not, however, be supposed that he was a lone champion of liberty. The publication of No. 45 of the North Briton, while done on Wilkes' own initiative, was probably inspired by the resentful ambition of Temple in an attempt to discredit the Ministry. Wilkes was by no means an unwilling instrument, but he was not the

(225) Quennell, Peter, *Four portraits*, pp. 202-204.
only conspirator (226). This was proven when Temple applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Common Pleas, and the case was then fixed for May 3rd,

The case came before Lord Chief Justice Pratt, a friend of Pitt and Temple, and a sympathizer of Wilkes. On May 6th he delivered his judgment, when Wilkes's release was ordered on the ground that seditious libel did not fall within the offences of treason, felony or breach of the peace, for which alone Members of Parliament could then be deprived of their privilege (227). The whole trial had been a triumph for Wilkes. With Westminster Hall packed with his supporters, he complained that he had been treated "worse than any rebel Scot," a remark that was hailed with loud shouts of approval by the crowd. He continued:

(226) Hardwicke's son, Lord Royston, in a letter to Dr. Burch, quotes the story that: Lord Halifax asked Wilkes if he was at the dinners (among the opposition in celebration of the case), and that the latter replied that he did not sit down to table, but only blew on the coals. Albemarle, Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham, Vol. I, p.168.

(227) Pratt stated that Wilkes was "entitled to his privilege as a Member of Parliament, because, although that privilege does not hold against a breach of the peace, it does against what only tends to a breach of the peace."

I have many humble thanks to return for the immediate order you were pleased to issue, to give me an opportunity of laying my grievances before you. They are of a kind hitherto unparalleled in this free country, and I trust the consequences will teach ministers of Scottish and arbitrary principles, that the liberty of an Englishman is not to be sported away with impunity, in this cruel and despotic manner (228).

The judgment had further held that general warrants — that is, warrants issued by the Secretary of State to seize a person, not named therein, charged with being concerned in a specified case — were illegal, oppressive and unconstitutional. Nor was this the end of Wilkes's triumph. After his arrest, the agents of the Secretary of State, under the orders of Robert Wood, the Under Secretary, had broken into Wilkes's house and seized all his papers, both public and private. Wilkes was avenged later in the year when he was awarded £1,000 in damages. After six years' delay — due to his approaching outlawry — Wilkes was awarded a further £4,000 in similar proceedings brought against Lord Halifax for the illegal seizure of his person.

Wilkes was now the most talked-of man in the country, but his position was not as comfortable as the acclaim of the populace might have indicated. The whole machinery of Government, under the inspiration of the mortification and hatred

(228) Annual register, 1763, p.136
of the King, was pitted against him. He could not be sure of the support of his aristocratic friends of the moment, and the excesses of his plebeian supporters were likely to alienate public opinion from him.

The triumph of the Opposition, you may be sure, is great ... It has given so much to Mr. Wilkes and the warmest of his friends, that I think their indiscretion and indecency will revolt the gravest of their well-wishers (229).

Among the latter was Pitt, who resented the slighting references to the Scottish race, and the attack upon the King, and refused to associate himself with one whom he had come to consider as disreputable, seditious scoundrel, whatever Wilkes's political sympathies might be. Wilkes was to return this dislike with interest in the years to come.

In the interval between his release and the following session of Parliament in November, Wilkes occupied his time with re-issuing all the *North Britons* and privately printing twelve copies of the indecent *Essay on woman*, a parody on Pope's *Essay on man*. It was certain that the ministerial party would renew the contest at the opening of Parliament, and in view of this, the publication of the *North Britons* was a needless and provocative gesture. The publication of the *Essay on woman* was to be his undoing, since government spies bribed workmen in Wilkes's printing office and obtained a copy of the *Essay on woman*. Armed with this, the government, in the person of Wilkes's old boon companion, the Earl

of Sandwich, now Secretary of State (230), was prepared to discredit the popular idol.

On November 15th, 1763, Parliament reassembled. In the Commons, Wilkes was determined to raise the question of parliamentary privilege, and according to the rules of the House, his grievance should have been dealt with first. Grenville, however, brought a message from the King requesting that the Commons deal with the case of No. 45 of the North Briton. Obedient to the call of their leader, the government supporters gave precedence to Grenville's motion and a full-dress debate began on a motion by Lord North, stigmatizing the offensive number as a "false, scandalous and seditious libel," tending "to excite to traitorous insurrections against His Majesty's Government". (231) Despite the vigorous support of Pitt for the interests of parliamentary privilege, the vote on the motion was passed 273 to 111 (232).

In the Upper House, meanwhile, an uproarious farce was being enacted. Sandwich, as the most notorious debauchee of the age, as well as Secretary of State, was reading the

(230) Sandwich succeeded Egremont as Secretary for the Southern Department on the latter's death in September, 1763.

(231) Quennell, Peter, Four portraits, p.208.

Essay on woman for the edification of the assembled Peers, and for that of Bishop Warburton in particular, to whom the obscene annotation of the work had been sourrily attributed. Sandwich certainly seems to have done his material credit, pausing at intervals to register disgust and astonishment, but continuing to read with gusto. Walpole describes the scene:

Lord Sandwich laid before the House the most blasphemous and indecent poem that was ever composed, called 'An essay on woman, with notes by Dr. Warburton. I will tell you none of the particulars: they were so exceedingly bad, that Lord Lyttleton begged the reading might be stopped. The House was amazed; nobody ventured even to ask a question; so it was easily voted everything you please, and a breach of privilege into the bargain ... Lord Sandwich moved to vote Wilkes the author; but this Lord Mansfield stopped, advertizing the House that it was necessary first to hear what Wilkes could say in his defence. (233)

Temple demanded an investigation into the means by which the evidence had been obtained, but Mansfield pointed out that coming by evidence illegally does not make the evidence illegal. A protest was drawn up by the Opposition Peers which declared that libel was not included in the more authoritative definitions of breach of the peace (234), and

(233) Walpole, Letters, Vol. V, p.387. Sandwich's apostacy was never forgiven by the English people, who are usually contemptuous of traitors. During the next performance of the Beggar's opera, when Macheath reached the line: "That Jemmy Twitcher should peach I own surprises me," the whole theatre was suddenly overcome by a tempest of amusement and Lord Sandwich remained "Jemmy Twitcher" to the end of his life. Quennell, Four portraits, p.210.

that, moreover, the House was being called upon to sanction the decision of the Commons without prior consultation.

The misfortunes of Wilkes were not ended, however. The following morning he was wounded in a duel with Samuel Martin, a government supporter. The consideration of his case in both Houses had therefore to be postponed, until he had recovered, but Wilkes seems to have had enough of such rough handling. On Christmas Eve, 1763, he eluded the government agents watching his house and slipped across to France.

Mr. Wilkes had imitated some of the great men of antiquity by going into voluntary exile: it was his only way of defeating both his creditors and his persecutors. Whatever his friends, if he has any, give out of his return soon, I will answer for it, that it will be a long time before that soon comes. (235)

In the meantime the offending copy of the North Briton was ordered burned by the public hangman, an event which was the cause for much rioting in favour of Wilkes (236). Early


(236) The North Briton was ordered to be burned by the hangman at Cheapside on Saturday last. The mob rose; the greatest mob, says Mr. Sheriff Blunt, that he has known in forty years. They were armed with that most boorly instrument, the mud out of the kennels: They hissed in the most murderous manner; broke Mr. Sheriff Harley's coach-glass in the most frangent manner ... and obliged the hangman to burn the paper with a link, though faggots were prepared to execute it in a more solemn manner. Numbers of gentlemen from windows and balconies, encouraged the mob, who in almost an hour and a half, were so undutiful to the Ministry, as to retire without doing any mischief.

in the new year, moreover, Parliament settled down to consider
the legality of its action. On January 16th Parliament met
to consider the charges of breach of privilege against Wilkes
to be greeted by a note from the errant Member, with the
affidavits of two French physicians that he was too ill to come
over to England. On January 20th, a sentence of outlawry was
proclaimed against him for his non-appearance to answer the
charge of breach of privilege, and he was expelled from the
House of Commons.

In the meantime a resolution by Sir William Meredith
condemning the illegality of general warrants was being de­
bated in the Commons. The Government was condemned for the
delay in giving a decision on this subject until the episode
of the Essay on woman had destroyed all chance of an impartial
consideration of it (237). The debate continued until
February 17th, and the Government fared very badly in the
closing days of the contest, since Pitt had united with the
Old Whigs for the occasion. The Government saved itself from
defeat only by carrying a motion for postponing the question
for four months.

We spent two or three hours on corrections
of, and additions to, the question of pronouncing
the warrant illegal, till the Ministry had con­
tracted it to fit scarce anything but the individual
case of Wilkes. Pitt not opposing the amendments
because Charles Yorke gave in to them; for it is

(237) Annual register, 1764, p.21.

In addition, the fixing of the responsibility
for the publication of the Essay on woman on Wilkes
was technically inaccurate, since Wilkes had merely
printed twelve copies for private circulation, whereas
the Government had made the work public.
wonderful what deference is paid by both sides to that house. The debate began by Norton's moving to adjourn the consideration of the great question for four months, and holding out a promise of a bill, which neither they mean, nor, for my part, should I like: I would not give prerogative so much as a definition... think how our ears must have tingled, when he told us, that should we pass the resolution, and he were a judge, he would mind it no more than the resolution of a drunken porter! (238)

The notice for postponement was carried by 232 to 218.

The Ministry had been temporarily successful in getting rid of Wilkes and in side-tracking the issues raised in Parliament by his arrest, but stilling the raging tumult among the supporters of Wilkes in the metropolis was not so easy, nor could the Ministry recover its own or the King's popularity. Walpole records the gathering of the storm.

Notwithstanding Lord Sandwich's masked battery, the tide runs violently for Wilkes, and I do not find people in general so inclined to excuse his Lordship as I was. One hears nothing but stories of the latter's impiety, and of the concert he was in with Wilkes on that subject (239).

The King was not immune from the unpopularity of his government, the people rightly conceiving that George was in complete harmony with the Ministers on the subject.

The last time the King was at Drury Lane, the play given out for the next night was All in the wrong: the galleries clapped, and then cried out, 'Let us be all in the right! Wilkes and Liberty!' When the King comes to a theatre, or

goes out, or goes to the House, there is not a single applause; to the Queen there is a little: in short, Louis le bien-aimé is not French at present for King George. (240)

The struggle was over for the time being, but many of the Whig supporters had been willing to abandon Wilkes, their most reliable supporter, and they were to pay the price of their indifference to his fate in the future. In the meantime, the government wrung a few more drops from the vial of public discontent by dismissing from their military appointments all those officers who were also Opposition Members and had voted against the Government on the subject of general warrants. This brought to the active support of the Opposition such accomplished speakers as Colonel Barre and General Conway, but it had little other effect than to increase the Government's already overwhelming load of unpopularity.

The predictions that Wilkes would be forgotten did not take into account either the man's persistence in harrying the Government, nor the support which he continued to enjoy among certain of the Opposition leaders. For a time he remained on the Continent, passing his time in amorous intrigue and living fairly comfortably on a pension of £1,000 per year provided by his friends among the Rockingham Whigs. In 1765, however, he made application to Lord Rockingham, the new prime minister, to be permitted to return to England. He was refused, but he

renewed the application to Rockingham's successor, the Duke of Grafton, once an ardent Wilkite. To add to the advantages which Wilkes might expect in England, early in 1766, the Rockingham Government had passed a resolution finally asserting the illegality of general warrants. In May, 1766, he returned to England, but, finding the times unpropitious, was forced to return to Paris. In November of the same year he returned again, with no better results. His letter of appeal to Grafton on this occasion is burdened with exaggerated expressions of loyalty to the King.

Though I have been cut off from the body of his Majesty's subjects by a cruel and unjust proscription, I have never entertained an idea inconsistent with the duty of a good subject. My heart still retains all its former warmth for the dignity of England, and glory of its Sovereign... I now hope that the rigour of an unmerited exile is past, and that I may be allowed to continue in the land among the friends of liberty. I wish my Lord, to owe this to the mercy of my Prince... I flatter myself that my conduct will justify your Grace's interceding with a Prince who is distinguished by a compassionate tenderness to all his subjects (241).

Wilkes did flatter himself, for Grafton showed the letter the King, who made no comment on it, and to Chatham, the real head of the Ministry, who advised Grafton to take no notice of the letter. In all the dealings of the various governments of George III with Wilkes, this was almost the only wise measure taken. It would have saved the Government a great deal of trouble if it had adopted a similar attitude when, two years later, Wilkes returned, full of thoughts of

(241) Annual register, 1766, p.182
vengeance on the ministers who had rejected him, and declared himself as a candidate for the City of London in the general election of 1768. He was daring the authorities to do their worst. He did, however, try to strengthen his position by a letter to the King expressing zeal and attachment to his Majesty, and complaining of the conduct of the ministers.

Sire: I beg to throw myself at your Majesty's feet, and to supplicate that mercy and clemency which shine with such lustre among your many princely virtues. Some former ministers, whom your Majesty, in condescension to the wishes of your people, thought proper to remove, employed every wicked and deceitful art to oppress your subjects, and to revenge their own personal cause on me, whom they imagined to be the principal author of bringing to the public view their ignorance, insufficiency and treachery to your Majesty and the nation (242).

Wilkes was unsuccessful in his attempt to get elected in London, but at a by-election in the county of Middlesex on March 28th, 1768, he was elected by a margin of more than 400 votes (243). The wise policy at this juncture would have been to continue to ignore him, or to advise a royal pardon, thereby muzzling him effectually. Chatham, however, had already begun to take refuge in inaction and Grafton, under pressure from the Bedford faction which now dominated his Cabinet, while not taking action to restrain Wilkes in his demagoguery, yet declared that opposition to Wilkes would be official government policy. On April 20th, true to his promise made on his nomination for Middlesex, he surrendered.

(243) See Annual register, 1768, p.83, for an account of the rioting at the election.
to his outlawry at the Court of King's Bench, amid wild demonstrations in his favour.

Here, however, the ponderous machinery of the law, so often used by the Government to justify its unpopular actions, failed.

Would you not think that on so common an event as outlawry and surrender, it must be as well known in Westminster Hall what is to be done, as a schoolboy knows he is to be whipt if he play truant? No such matter! All the great lawyers in England are now disputing in barbarous Latin and half English whether 'Wilkes' is 'Wilkes', whether he can surrender himself when he does surrender, with twenty more questions equally absurd, with which they have puzzled themselves, and, by consequence, all England, and, by consequence, all Europe ... Wilkes appeared according to promise. The Attorney-General moves to commit him. Lord Mansfield and the Judges of the King's Bench tell him that the capias ut legatum should have been taken out, and, not having been, there is no such person as Mr. Wilkes before them; nay, that there was no such person, for, Mr. Wilkes being an outlaw, an ut legatus does not exist in the eye of the law. However this nonentity made a long speech, and abused the Chief Justice to his face (244).

Wilkes went free amid the acclaims of the mob which had assembled outside the Court. Not only were the Courts in a quandary over the situation, but the House of Commons, in Camden's words, could hardly expel "a member, either as an outlaw or a convict, while the suit is pending, wherein he may turn out at last to be neither the one or the other ..." (245)

(245) Cited by Mumby, George III and the American revolution, pp. 230-231.
The mob control of London was assuming an alarming aspect. A strike of coal-heavers added to the number available for the rioting. The coal-heavers joined Wilkes, opposed him, or continued to disrupt the waterfront as the mood suited them. In May they were joined by large numbers of unemployed seamen who were petitioning Parliament for an increase in wages, and were prepared to loot and riot, ad interim. On April 27th, Wilkes was committed to King's Bench prison on the former charge of seditious libel, the machinery of the law being now once more in working order. The mob, however, interfered and rescued him, though he later surrendered voluntarily, as if to show the authorities who was the real master of London. On the 10th of May the mob assembled in St. George's Fields near King's Bench prison, demanded the release of Wilkes, and was fired on by the soldiery. One person was killed, the soldier who fired and his officer were tried and acquitted, and the mob returned to the charge; but the situation was becoming serious. For more than two hundred and ninety days during 1768, the mob were effective masters of London (246). The remissness of the Government in not supplying adequate policing of the city brought on several other tumults and disorders. The enemies of the administration did not hesitate to attribute this relaxation of civil authority to design rather than to neglect; and that these disorders

were permitted and even encouraged, in order to justify a frequent and severe use of the military power (247). A new and ominous atmosphere was growing up, the riots ceasing to have the boisterous, holiday aspect that they had had originally.

As worthless a fellow as Wilkes is, the rigours exercised towards him have raised a new spirit that will require still wiser heads to allay. Men have again turned seriously to the study of those controversies that agitated this country an hundred years ago; and instead of dipping in Roman and Greek histories for flowers to decorate speeches of false patriotism, principles are revived that have taken deeper root; and I wish we do not see quarrels of a graver complexion than the dirty squabbles for places and profit. Persecution for politics has just the same issue as for religion; it spreads the oppressed doctrine; and though I think Wilkes as bad a man as if he were a saint, he will every day get disciples that will profit of his martyrdom (248).

The mob, disregarded for nearly a century as a factor in the political life of the nation, had now to be reckoned, at least temporarily, as an equal of the Crown and the unreformed Parliament. Wilkes apart, the riot was a power which could not be bought. It must be crushed or placated, and the Government was not prepared to undertake the crushing.

In the meantime, Wilkes had been freed from his outlawry on a technicality and was sentenced, on June 18th, 1768, for the old offences of the North Briton and the Essay on woman, to serve terms amounting to twenty-two months' imprisonment.

(247) Annual register, 1769, p.60
and to incur financial penalties totalling a thousand pounds.

The imprisonment was not arduous, nor did it prevent Wilkes from taking part in political activity. The feeling of the crowd at this time, and of many more responsible people as well, was definitely in opposition to the repressive, albeit necessary, measures of the Government during the riots. Wilkes, even from prison, was prepared to take advantage of this feeling.

In the spring of 1768, Lord Weymouth, the Secretary of State, had quite properly sent a circular letter to the various magistrates of London and Middlesex, stating that in the present disrupted state of the city, they should not hesitate to call upon the authorities for troops to assist in the repression of riots. The letter was not beyond the normal practice of the Secretary of State in such situations and would certainly have prevented much serious trouble if its recommendations had been followed more strictly. On December 10th, 1768, this letter was published in the *St. James's Chronicle*, with accompanying notes by Wilkes, referring to the letter as "a hellish project brooded over by some infernal spirits without one moment's remorse" (249). It was not, however, the answer of the righteous patriot to the bloody tyrant, but merely one more challenge to the Government by the popular demagogue. Unfortunately, the Government saw fit

(249) *Annual register*, 1769, p.66
to accept the challenge.

Wilkes's fresh offence was immediately voted a seditious libel, and he was summoned before the House of Commons on January 27th, 1769, to answer the offence. There, he declared that, "Whenever a Secretary of State shall dare to write so bloody a scroll, I will through life dare to write such prefatory remarks, as well as to make my appeal to the nation on the occasion." (250) He was thereupon expelled from the House, to be re-elected in February, March and April, 1769, each time with huge majorities, and supported by wholesale rioting, the election being declared void by the House of Commons in each case.

Such expulsions, however, presented the Government with a serious problem. The libel on Lord Weymouth, concerned the House of Lords, as George Grenville pointed out. In addition, the charges were not made separately, but included in one resolution, and imprisonment was not a disqualification for membership in the House of Commons. The House had the alternatives of re-issuing election warrants after expelling Wilkes, hoping that the electors would choose someone else; of refusing to issue new warrants, thus leaving the county unrepresented for the rest of the term of Parliament; or of accepting the candidate with the lesser number of votes as the sitting Member. Only the first could be argued as strictly constitutional, however.

(250) Annual register, 1769,
A further paradox arose from the fact that the House could not permit Wilkes to take his seat in the same session in which he was expelled, so that, however much they might wish to end the controversy gracefully (and this desire was wanting in any case), they could not do so, so long as he continued to be re-elected and re-expelled during the same sessions. The struggle was taking on the appearance of a contest between the five hundred and fifty Members of the House of Commons and the electorate of Middlesex, soon to be expanded to include the electorate of most of England. The right of the electors to re-elect Wilkes could not be controverted; neither could that of the House to expel him; so that it seemed as though there would be an infinite succession of re-elections and expulsions. The ludicrousness of the situation was impairing the dignity of the House, to preserve which they now resorted to illegality in a most flagrant form.

The fourth candidate against Wilkes, in the April by-election, was a Colonel Luttrell, a man of stronger metal than his predecessors, not frightened by the mob, and receiving full Court support. In this election, though Luttrell lost by 296 votes to 1143 for Wilkes (251), he was declared elected by the House of Commons, on Wilkes’s fourth expulsion on April 14th. When this action was petitioned against, the declaration was reiterated. Though no court could call the House to account, there was no doubt that the action was

(251) *Annual register*, 1769, p. 68.
without precedent in British constitutional development (252). The House acted in a judicial capacity to evict Wilkes, which was legitimate, but it could not act at the same time as a legislative body in recognizing Luttrell as the Member, and it could not make legislation alone but only in conjunction with the Lords and the Crown.

The chief opponent of the Government was George Grenville, fighting for the supremacy of the law rather than for the freedom of Wilkes to take his seat. The measure of the superiority of Grenville as a parliamentarian was that he had to overcome a long-standing antipathy to Wilkes as a person to undertake the struggle. The common battle in defence of the constitution had the effect of drawing the various factions of the opposition together. The Government, already weakened by its mistakes in other fields, found itself in a very precarious position.

Instead of annihilating Wilkes by buying or neglecting him, his enemies have pushed the court on a series of measures that have made him excessively important; and now every step they take must serve to increase his faction, and make themselves more unpopular ... We are tired of being in a situation to give the law to Europe, and now cannot give it with safety to the mob — for giving it, when they are not disposed to receive it, is of all experiments the most dangerous; and whatever may be the consequence in the end,

(252) The opposition declared that: "... the house of commons was not a self-constituted power, acting by an inherent right; but an elected body, restrained within the limits of a delegated authority; hence they could not dispute the right of their constituents without sapping the foundation of their own existence." Annual Register, 1769,
seldom fails to fall on the heads of those who undertake it ... If princes or ministers considered, that despair makes men fearless, instead of making them cowards, surely they would abandon such a fruitless policy. (253)

There was certainly a great chance for success for the Opposition. The administration was already tottering and such pamphleteers as Junius were striking telling blows at the characters of the ministers, and even of the King. At this time the pamphlet war reached a new level of virulence.

... the licentiousness of abuse surpasses all example. The most savage massacre of private characters passes for sport; but we have lately had an attack made on the King himself, exceeding the North Briton. Such a paper has been printed by the famous Junius, whoever he is, that it would scarce have been written before Charles I was in Carisbrook Castle. (254)

Junius was certainly the best known, as well as the ablest of the pamphleteers. Some of his popularity, no doubt arose out of the mystery of his identity, which has never been conclusively solved, though the weight of evidence seems to favour Philip Francis, an official in the Treasury, but no friend of the Government. His attacks on Grafton, largely unmerited, have perpetuated that statesman's shortcomings, both political and moral, for succeeding generations. His description of Grafton's relation to Chatham in the administration of 1766, is classic.

(254) Ibid., p.345.
For a short time his submission to Lord Chatham was unlimited. He could not answer a private letter without Lord Chatham's permission. I presume he was then learning his trade, for he soon set up for himself. Until he declared himself the Minister, his character had been but little understood. From that moment, a system of conduct, directed by passion and caprice, not only reminds us that he is a young man, but a young man without solidity or judgment. (255)

Or the sneers of Junius at the Duke's immorality, as being hereditary, though it was as much the result of weakness as were the blunders in his ministerial career.

The character of the reputed ancestors of some men, has made it possible for their descendants to be vicious in the extreme, without being degenerate. Those of your Grace*, for instance, left no distressing examples of virtue, even to their legitimate posterity, and you may look back with pleasure to an illustrious pedigree, in which heraldry has not left a single good quality upon record to insult or upbraid you. (256)

(*) The Duke of Grafton was the great-grandson of an illegitimate son of Charles II.

The descriptions of other statesmen were almost as vitriolic. Chatham, for instance, is seen as "... a lunatic brandishing a crutch, or bawling through a grate, or writing with desperate charcoal a letter to North America." (257)

Or Camden:


Your next figure must bear the port and habit of a judge, The laws of England under his feet, and before his distorted vision a dagger, which he calls the law of nature, and which


marshals him the way to the murder of the constitution. (258)

The letters began in 1768, and under various pseudonyms continued regularly until the middle of 1771, when they became more intermittent, ceasing altogether early in 1772. Other pamphleteers were equally active, though not nearly so popular, so knowledgeable, nor so vitriolic. Wilkes, himself, was not behindhand in agitation, assisting in the formulation of a petition to the King, which the King ignored.

Burke's prediction of the nation warring with the Commons was to be too accurately fulfilled. In the counties and boroughs a movement began to send instructions to the various Members, to support Wilkes and the constitution. The Court inspired counter-addresses, though these were naturally suspect as being the result of bribery. As a matter of fact, the authenticity of the addresses on either side, other than those from London itself (where the electors were too numerous to bribe effectively), is very much open to suspicion.

Walpole's statement that the Opposition's support in the country was negligible (259), is a result of insufficient knowledge and prejudice, and certainly his letter to Horace Mann of December 31st seems to indicate that there was cause for alarm, and that revolution seemed pending.


(259) "The greater part of England, all Scotland to a man, and Wales, were against them." Walpole, Memoirs of the reign of George III, Vol.IV, p.28
Opposition threatens, grave men shake their heads; many fancy they fear, and many do fear. The best observers see no attention, no system, and truly very slender abilities in the opposite scale! (260)

It seemed as though the days of Charles II had come again, with the country divided between petitioners and abhorers. Petitions poured in on the Ministry as soon as the session ended; the most violent, coming from the Livery of London, calling upon the King to dissolve the erring Parliament. Ministerial representatives were sent to their respective counties to keep them from submitting petitions, Richard Rigby going to Essex, the Townshends and Walpoles to Norfolk, and the Duke of Bedford to Devonshire (261). Twelve counties, in all, protested against the Government's action. The factions of Opposition in Parliament were more united than ever before in the last decade. More important than all this, Lord Chatham had returned to active politics at the end of 1769, purged by his illness of all political ambition and prepared to smash the Government in the interests of the constitution. On January 27th, 1770, partly as a result of the hammer blows from the popular power, the decadent Grafton administration fell, and it seemed as though the Court party had fallen with it.


(261) The old Duke of Bedford, when he visited Devonshire, was set upon by mobs at Exeter and Honiton, and his mission was a failure. Walpole, Memoirs of the reign of George III, Vol. III, p. 252.
Then, as the storms seemed to overwhelm the ship of state, the calm guidance of the new leader, Lord North, steered it into a calm political backwater. Though disturbances in the city were to continue for several years more, particularly in the case of the arrest of Lord Mayor Crosby in 1771, the effective power of the mob, as the arbiter of the political destiny of the nation, was ended. The Court had won; from the depths of despair, with no apparent hope of survival as a political faction, it had won so completely that it was not seriously challenged for ten years.

As for Wilkes, the prominence he had sought in vain in Parliament awaited him in the City. In 1769, while he was still in prison, he had been elected an Alderman. In 1774, on his third attempt, he was elected Lord Mayor; he became Chamberlain, and in that lucrative office became a friend of the King whom he had so often thwarted; he was placed in affluent circumstances by his many offices and he retired from political warfare in the prime of life. As if to fill out his victory, in 1775 he was at length returned to Parliament, the ban on his membership having been lifted in 1774. He disappeared into dignified obscurity, passing the rest of his life in support of the Government, and

... never raised his voice for reform or peace, or to mitigate the hostility of our Court to the country that had afforded him shelter in his banishment; nor even quitted the standard of Pitt when it marshalled its followers to assaults on the constitution compared with which all he had ever imputed against Bute sank into mere insignificance. (262)

(262) Murray, Burke, p.147
Inevitably a comparison is made between the Wilkes agitations and the contemporary unrest in America. The connection is very tenuous. At no time did Wilkes appear as the defender of the rights of the colonists. He had, in fact, the typical prejudices of the English parliamentarian against the constitutional claims of the Americans. Nor was the party supporting Wilkes identical with that supporting the claims of the colonists. Burke and Chatham both abhorred Wilkes personally, and neither supported the cause of the electors of Middlesex with any enthusiasm. Similarly, such American aristocrats as John Adams had the greatest contempt for Wilkes. The foundations of the two causes also varied. At no time did Wilkes urge anything which was outside the framework of the English constitution. Nor were his demands out of harmony with the moderate traditions of English radicalism. American revolutionaries, on the other hand, soon ceased to appeal to the constitution and looked to a Grundschicht to gain their point. There was no real break with the past in England; there was a definite break with the past in America.

It is hard to assess the importance of Wilkes as a defender of popular liberties. How much he was a tool of such politicians as Temple, and how much a free agent, will probably never be determined. In addition, his enthusiasm for the popular cause was always open to doubt. The achievements of the agitations of which he was the ostensible leader, are clear, however. In an era when the spirit of parliamentary
opposition had almost died out, there remained in this agitation a rock upon which the storms of prerogative power broke in vain. General warrants, a survival from Tudor times, were finally rejected. Freedom of the press, though it was not achieved at once, received enormous encouragement. Parliamentary privilege, though flagrantly violated in the case of Wilkes, was much more carefully defined and protected in the future. The right of the electors to choose their representatives was not seriously called in question again, and a war between Parliament and the country was averted.

Behind all these political and constitutional issues, there was an economic cause as well. The commercial classes of the capital, in their campaign for economic freedom, attempted to translate their new affluence into political power. For a moment it seemed as if the attempt would be successful. For a moment, also, it seemed as if even the proletariat of London was becoming a political power. Yet the movement did not rest upon a solid foundation of political sense. It was premature, and once constitutional issues were settled, the influence of these rising classes faded with their champion into the political limbo. In the country at large, however, this influence, based upon the more secure rock of local government, was beginning to regulate the economic life of the nation, and in the next century was to seize control of the political life of the nation as well.
Chapter VI.

Transition in Parties

... disconnexion and confusion, in offices, in parties, in families, in parliament, in the nation, prevail beyond the disorders of any former time; these are facts universally admitted and lamented. (263)

We must return now to the political conflicts among the various parliamentary factions, as they developed after the fall of Lord Bute from power, in the spring of 1763. Out of these struggles, in the following seven years, were to come the beginnings of the two major political parties of the nineteenth century, and a third group, labelled for convenience, the "King's Friends," but, as we have seen, based on a far more complex philosophy and of much more varied personnel than could be attributed to mere friendship for the monarch. It was the role of this third group, in fact, to disrupt and destroy party allegiances such as had been known in the former reign. Far from eradicating party, however, the disruptive influence of this group was to inspire the formation of the first real party organizations in English politics. These parties were to be bound together, not by ties of personal friendship, nor by hopes of plunder, but by a strong core of political doctrine and by a permanent party organization which remained in operation whether the party was in power or in opposition.

The immediate successor of Bute in the leadership of the administration was George Grenville, the ablest of his lieutenants. Macaulay, with the Whig-Liberal prejudices concerning the American Revolution and its antecedents, has referred to this government as "the worst administration that has governed England since the Revolution," but from the fall of Pitt in 1761 until the appointment of North in 1770, insofar as administrative ability is concerned, it was certainly the ablest, if not the most successful of the English governments; and, from the issues it was called upon to face, it was probably the most important.

The character of its leader and ablest member was certainly a major factor in both its success and failures. As Mahon has said, Grenville was an excellent Speaker spoiled (264). During the largest part of a lifetime spent under the political domination of his brother Temple and his brother-in-law, Pitt, he had aspired to the Speaker's chair, and would probably have attained it, had not the unsettled state of political affairs consequent on the fall of Pitt and Newcastle inspired him to take counsel of his own ambitions, rally to Bute, and succeed to that leader's rather uneasy inheritance. His was a temperament with more grasp of legal precedent than legal principle, though he was far more at home in either than most of his opponents. He had a high sense of duty, and his political life was a model of honesty and assiduity to business. Like his two distinguished relatives, he was

possessed of a narrow and pertinacious pride and a lack of
tact which gained him many unmerited enemies. He was
querulous, long-winded and self-righteous, and George III's
classic remark that:

"When he has wearied me for two hours,
he looks at his watch to see if he may not
tire me for an hour more," (265)

indicates that he did not disguise his defects, even in the
presence of royalty. He nursed a grudge against his
relatives for his long obscurity, and while he was in office
clashed bitterly with them. Later, after his fall from power,
he held similar antipathies for Bute and the King. An
economist, he firmly believed that the nation could not
support the war or the empire as it was then constituted,
and planned wise and sweeping reforms in the imperial
structure. He certainly had the active support of the House
of Commons throughout his Ministry, as much because of his
great parliamentary gifts as because he had the benefit of the
royal patronage system; in fact, Pitt considered him the
best parliamentarian in the House (266). Burke's panegyric
on him, in the Speech on American taxation, probably comes
nearest to determining his true motive in politics.

Undoubtedly Mr. Grenville was a first
rate figure in the country. With a masculine
understanding, a stout and resolute heart, he had

(266) Ibid., p.66. See also: Namier, England in the age
of the American revolution, p.345, et. seq.
an application undissipated and unwearied.
He took publick business, not as a duty which
he was to fulfil, but as a pleasure he was to
enjoy; and he seemed to have no delight out
of the House, except in such things as some
way related to the business that was to be done
within it. (267)

Initially, he laboured under the disadvantage of having
to administer the heritage of the politically defunct Lord
Bute, whose ghost continued to hover at his elbow. In
addition, he did not succeed to the unchallenged power which
he had hoped for, but had to share it as part of a trium-
virate with the two influential Secretaries of State, the
Earls of Halifax and Egremont. Neither had the ability of
Grenville, although both held more political power. The
death of Egremont in September, 1763, and the subsequent
eclipse of Halifax because of his unpopularity in the Wilkes
drama, left the stage clear for Grenville, although he was
forced to adopt the Bedford faction almost wholesale to keep
his government alive, and was saddled with this alliance for
nearly five years thereafter.

The Bedford faction is certainly worthy of closer
attention than has hitherto been paid to it. Despite the fact
that its prestige as a party was jeopardized by its rapacity
for office and the spoils of office, it represented one of the
most vital factors in a political organization, - the centre
party. In all the combinations of factions that were to be
made and attempted in the following decade, the Bedford

party was almost always the concomitant which made the union possible. Undoubtedly its members were office-seekers; the Duchess of Bedford yearned to be Mistress of the Robes to the Queen; Rigby and Sandwich were the most unblushing of place-men, and even the insignificant Earl Gower had a life-long ambition to be Lord President. However, other parties also had their place-seekers. It was the success of the Bedford faction in gaining and retaining office throughout so many of the turns of the political wheel that rendered them open to the suspicion of lacking political probity, and this very success grew out of their position as the centre party. The Duke of Bedford's ambition had long been to re-unite the segments of the Whig Party under his leadership, and to this end, when his party assumed office in September, 1763, he advised the King to open negotiations with Pitt, - offering to act as go-between. His services were rejected, since Bute distrusted him, and the task of making the contact was assigned to the Earl of Shelburne.

Grenville's position in the Ministry in its first months was by no means secure. Forced to share power with Halifax and Egremont, he had also resented vocally and publicly the King's continued friendship and consultation with Lord Bute. In addition he had alienated Lord Holland by his opposition to that politician's methods in purging the Commons. Thus, when Grenville achieved high office, he was almost isolated. Even five years later, with the wealth and prestige of his brother supporting him, his personal following in the
Commons did not number more than a dozen (268). Such isolation hardened him, and his fear of high office changed to a demand from the reluctant King for the full powers of a prime minister. He felt a sense of a mission to preserve the Crown, but this meant to him preservation from such men as Bute, as well as from Whigs of the Newcastle-Devonshire school. The accusation that he basely deserted Bute after the latter had raised him to high office is nonsense. Grenville became First Lord of the Treasury in April, 1763, because he was manifestly the best person for the post, and his so-called treachery against Bute was merely the perfectly correct and constitutional protest to the King that there cannot be two sets of royal advisers.

(268) Feiling, The second Tory party, 1714-1832, p.92. Note also the contemporary comment on the weakness of the Grenville faction:

Whence, said the opposition party, is derived the power of these new ministers? Not from their overbearing weight of property in the kingdom; not from their great parliamentary interest, or their superior parliamentary talents ... What then was the end of their appointment? This clearly, and nothing else; that having no solid ground of power in themselves, they might act as the passive instruments of that minister, who, from considerations of his own personal safety and quiet, without abandoning his ambitious projects, has thought proper to conceal his operations than retire from action.

Annual register, 1763, pp.40.41
The death of Egremont not only resulted in the inclusion of the Bedford party in the Ministry (269), but also inspired negotiations among the Opposition factions and between them and the King, for the replacement of the manifestly weakened Government. Bute's negotiations with Pitt had been going on for some time and the latter, on the death of Egremont, was sent for by the King, with the purpose of suggesting a ministry. Pitt had already conducted negotiations with the Old Whigs under Newcastle and had disagreed on such vital topics as the Northern Alliance, and the inclusion of the makers of the Peace of Paris in the Cabinet, and was in no mood to accept any but the purest of war-patriot Whigs. The ostensible reason for the failure of the negotiations was the refusal of Pitt to accept Grenville, and of the King to accept Temple in the Ministry, but the unforgiving spirit of the Great Commoner on the one hand, and the fears of Lord Bute as to a possible rival on the other, were probably the real reason. In any event, Grenville was forced to accept the alliance of the Bedfords and found himself increasingly under

(269) Sandwich became Secretary of State for the Southern Department, Rigby, Vice-Treasurer for Ireland, and the Duke of Bedford became Lord President in September, 1763. Shelburne resigned from the Board of Trade soon after, so that only three real "King's Friends" remained in the Cabinet, Lords Egmont, Hillsborough, and Northington, all men of minor abilities.
the necessity of sharing the real power with them.

The administration is settled: the opposition does not come in: and the old ministers have resumed their functions. The Duke of Bedford, who had formerly advised to invite Mr. Pitt to Court, finding himself omitted in Mr. Pitt's list, is cordially united, nay, incorporated with the administration; he has kissed hands for the President of the Council ... Many reasons are given, but the only one that people choose to take is, that, thinking Mr. Pitt must be minister, and finding himself tolerably obnoxious to him, he is seeking to make his peace at any rate. (270)

However much Grenville may have disliked sharing power with Bedford, he found him a loyal and useful ally, in a time of crisis. The Ministry was most unfortunate in the fact that its measures, since both the arrest and expulsion of Wilkes and the passage of the Stamp Act raised a storm of popular, and often unthinking, protest. Certainly the dismissal of army officers for their vote against general warrants was unjustified, and it was this measure, more than any other, which served to unite the opposition and re-open negotiations with Pitt, in the spring of 1765.

The chief grievance of the Government, meanwhile, had been with the continued influence, or supposed influence, of Lord Bute with the King. There was complete unity within the Cabinet on this issue.

Like Grenville, the Duke stipulated for that which the King himself proposed, namely, the exclusion of Lord Bute from his presence, and from any participation in public affairs. And the favourite himself wrote to the King, stating that for his Majesty's service as well as for his own ease, he was resolved to remain at his house the ensuing winter. (271)

The threat was ephemeral, since from the dismissal of Bute until his final eclipse in 1765, his influence was growing steadily weaker. The King was coming more and more to imagine that he could be his own prime minister. Political society, however, observing that Bute was still welcome at the Court, drew its own conclusions.

Lord Bute's friends say 'that he has no wish but for the ease and honour of his Majesty's government; that he does not desire to see the Ministers either dismissed or distressed, nor has he any degree of connexion with those now in opposition, and consequently can have no plan for bringing men into power with whom he has neither friendship or communication ... ' Yet his frequent interviews with the King, his constant attendance when in town at Carleton House, must give rise to many conjectures, and those who have been educated in Court intrigues cannot suppose such private conversations can turn upon any other than the most interesting public subjects. (272)

Bedford's enmity for Bute was greatly increased by the rough handling which he experienced during the Spitalfields

(271) Albemarle, Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham, Vol. I, p.176. Bedford and Bute had originally quarrelled when Bedford was the plenipotentiary for the Peace in 1762, and had opposed Bute's policy of limited war for popularity, in favour of peace at any price.

weavers' riots. Bedford, as a convinced free-trader, voted against a protective tariff on imported silks in the spring of 1765. The mob assaulted his carriage and later stormed his house, its excesses having to be restrained by troops. Bedford openly accused Bute of inciting the mob and openly abused him to the King's face.

The King was certainly weary of the demands of the Ministry and was in search of an alternative. One further event brought him to the final break. In March, 1765, the King became ill, suffering from the first attack of that insanity which in later years was to become incurable. On his recovery it was realized that some provision should be made for a regency in case of a long illness. Accordingly, on April 24th, a Regency Bill was proposed in the speech from the throne. It was introduced in the Lords on April 29th, and by its terms the King was given the right to name the Queen "or any other member of the Royal Family usually resident in England" as regent. The wording was made purposely vague, for the Ministry was anxious to exclude the Princess-Dowager from the Regency, because of her connection with Lord Bute.

At this juncture, however, Temple seized the opportunity to embarrass the Government and questioned the vagueness of the phraseology. When the bill was moved into committee, the Duke of Richmond, for the Whigs, moved an amendment to the effect that eligibility for the Regency should include the Queen, the Princess-Dowager and all descendants of George
II resident in England. The Government at this point, not having the consummate legal and political talents of Mansfield available to them, was confused over this amendment, though it finally rejected it. Next day, however, Lord Halifax announced that he would accept the amendment if the Princess-Dowager's name was omitted.

Sandwich and Halifax had already persuaded the King that such omission was necessary, if the bill was to pass the House of Commons, or, indeed, if the Ministry was to retain the support of the Commons at all. Hence, when Halifax announced his acceptance of the amendment he also stated that the omission of the Princess's name was by the King's request. When the bill came before the House of Commons, however, an amendment to insert the Princess's name was passed 167 to 37! The Secretaries of State then had the supreme mortification of having to urge the acceptance of the measure, thus amended, in the House of Lords. When the details of the affront were fully revealed to the King, he was more determined than ever to get rid of the Grenville Ministry.

One remedy is obvious, and at which, after such insults and provocations, were I Lord Bute, I should not stick; I would deliver myself up, bound hand and foot, to Mr. Pitt ... (273)

It was to Pitt, in point of fact, that the King turned, using the Duke of Cumberland as go-between. It was hoped that through the agency of Cumberland, Pitt might be induced

to patch up his quarrel with the Rockingham Whigs and lead an united Whig Government. It can be judged from these proposals that George was desperate to get rid of his Government. Newcastle was willing to join, though Rockingham demurred, not wishing to be dominated by Pitt in the leadership of the Government. It was, however, from Pitt that the chief objections came. The main points for discussion were the reinstatement of those officers who had been dismissed because of their parliamentary votes; the creation of a northern alliance against the Family Compact; the condemnation of general warrants; the elevation of Chief Justice Pratt to the peerage, and the repeal of the cider tax. When the conditions were communicated to the King, there was much temporizing, since George III evidently hoped to replace Grenville and Bedford by a Ministry which would carry weight with the country, and yet not commit himself to a serious change of policy. He was opposed to the Northern Alliance, and wished that either the Earl of Northumberland or Lord Egmont might be prime minister rather than Pitt's nominee, Earl Temple. Cumberland was thereupon commissioned to see Pitt at his home and try the effects of personal persuasion. Pitt's reaction to the royal proposals is probably best told in Cumberland's own words. Pitt, as was usual when he did not trust his audience, was ambiguous and full of verbiage.

... he had still vigour and strength of mind to undertake business, if he saw probability of success; that, as to foreign affairs (which he began with) he was afraid that his personal ideas
were so much disliked at Court; he would even own that perhaps nine men in ten in the kingdom were against him in opinion, and therefore it rendered him, if not totally improper to enter into his Majesty's Council, at least it would incapacitate him from acting in the intended sphere of Secretary of State, as, in honour, he never could set his hand to what was diametrically opposite to his opinion. That in any other situation, he would give his negative or single voice in Council without further consequence attending thereon; that, without foreign affairs were altered, he could see but little hopes that other things, equally necessary, would follow ... (274)

On the same day (May 12th), that Cumberland was interviewing Pitt, the King told Grenville that he hoped never to see his face in the Closet again, but the next day was forced to accept him back on his own terms. The King indicated plainly, however, that he would take the first opportunity to get rid of the Ministry (275). The Government, however, used this reprieve to triumph unmercifully over the King. The Spitalfields riots seemed to necessitate the appointment of a military commander. The King proposed the Duke of Cumberland who cautiously declined, but the Government declared that the


(275) On the 18th of May, Mr. Grenville waited upon the King with the speech which was to close the session. "There is no hurry," said the King; "I will have the Parliament adjourned, not prorogued." — "Has your Majesty any thoughts of making a change in your Administration?" inquired Grenville. — "Certainly," was the reply, "I cannot bear it as it is." — "I hope your Majesty will not order me to cut my own throat?" — "Then," said the King, "who must adjourn the Parliament?" — "Whoever," replied the Minister, "your Majesty shall appoint my successor." Ibid., p.203.
appointment of Cumberland would be dangerous in a free country. Fortunately, the riots abated before a decision had to be made.

Following this quarrel, the Government presented the King with an ultimatum of terms which must be complied with if the Ministry was to continue in office. The terms were outrageous, even considering the provocation which Grenville had been under.

On Wednesday, the Ministers dictated their terms; you will not expect moderation, and accordingly there was not a grain: they demanded a loyal promise of never consulting Lord Bute; secondly, the dismissal of Mr. Makinsy (Mackenzie) from the direction of Scotland; thirdly, and lastly, for they could go no further, the crown itself - or, in their words, the immediate nomination of Lord Granby to be Captain-General. You may figure the King's indignation - for himself, for his favourite, for his uncle. (276)

In addition to these demands, the Government successfully insisted on the removal of Lord Holland from the Pay Office, which was thereupon given to Charles Townshend. The King choked on the demands, but submitted to them, at the same time re-opening negotiations with Pitt, with whom he was now prepared to bargain at almost any price, to be rid of the odious coalition.

He was forced to submit to one more humiliation, however. He continued to show marked favour to the Duke of Cumberland

and even to the Cavendishes (277). The Government retaliated on June 12th, when the Duke of Bedford, accompanied by Sandwich, Grenville and Halifax, presented a remonstrance to the King. Bedford, in an hour of querulous and impertinent interrogation, sealed the fate of the Ministry. According to his own account he asked the King:

... leave to recapitulate to him what had passed between him and his Ministers from the time he avowed the design of changing his administration to their being called back again by him to resume their functions. Whether his countenance and support had not been promised them? Whether this promise had been kept? but, on the contrary, whether all those who are our most bitter enemies had not been countenanced by him in public? and whether we and our friends had not met with a treatment directly opposite to this? ... Having received no satisfactory answer to any of these questions, nor indeed any other but that Lord Bute was not at all consulted, and that he had never done me any ill offices with his Majesty, I proceeded to beseech him to permit his authority and his favour and countenance to go together; and if the last can't be given to his present Ministers, to transfer to others that authority, which must be useless in their hands, unless strengthened by the former. (278)

When it is remembered that this statement was made in an age when the King's right to choose his own advisers (subject to acceptance by the House of Commons), was acknowledged, it is no wonder that the King almost "suffocated with indignation." (279)

(278) Bedford Correspondence, cited by Mumby, George III and the American revolution, pp. 108-109
(279) Albemarle, loc. cit.
He took Bedford at his word, however, and opened negotiations with Pitt. In two meetings, on the 19th and 22nd of June, he came to a complete agreement on all matters of policy with the Great Commoner. The King was even willing to accept Temple as First Lord of the Treasury, although the latter's sympathy with his brother Grenville made him an undesirable cabinet minister. Pitt felt the need for a reliable colleague in the Lords and Temple had resigned with him in 1761, but the uncertain Grenville temperament now asserted itself. Unattractive personally, proud, ostentatious, insolent, and ambitious, Lord Temple, like his brother, had resented the dominance of Pitt, and wished now to play the role of the indispensable leader. He had divided with Pitt over the taxation of the colonies, and he was certainly suspicious of the latter's continued communications with Lord Bute (280). In addition, he had managed a reconciliation with his brother, Grenville. All of these factors, and principally the first and the last, contributed to his refusal to take office at that time, his explanation being that his reasons were of too private and personal a nature to divulge. The last hope of an administration in which he could have an effective interest was lost to the King, and he turned in desperation to the Rockingham Whigs.

... defeated in his own wish for a veiled Bute restoration, prevented by Temple from using Pitt, and forced to make good his word that 'this

country is not at the low ebb that no adminis-
tration can be formed without the Grenville
family,' ... never was there a less willing act;
'necessity, not choice has made me take several
steps that cut Me to the Soul.'"  (281)

By 1765 several fairly well-defined factions had been
developed out of the ruin of the old Whig Party. The Bed-
fords have been discussed already. In the vaguely defined
party, known now as the "King's Friends," were numbered such
opportunists as Lords Hillsborough, Egmont, and Northington,
and civil servants like Dyson, Ellis and Jenkinson. In
addition there was a legal contingent, represented notably by
Mansfield and Thurlow, and soon to be joined by Alexander
Wedderburn. In addition there were a few intellectual Tories
like Blackstone (author of the famous Commentaries), and Lord
North, nominally a supporter of Pitt, but actually holding to
the precepts of Bolingbroke in the matter of the royal pre-
rogative.

In the opposition, the opinions held by the various
sections depended upon the date at which they made their stand
against the power of the Court, or were rejected from the
patronage system. Thus, the Grenville faction, the smallest
and most recently out of office, was the most virulent opponent
of the Court, and at the same time the least able to make
effective opposition. Its erstwhile allies, the Bedfords,
because of their function as a centre party, were never
vigorou in opposition, and were soon bargaining their way

(281) Walpole, Memoirs of the reign of George III, Vol.II,
p. 122.
back into office. The followers of Pitt, a handful of West Country gentry and a few representatives of the London mercantile interest, were implacable foes of the recent policy in regard to America, and of general warrants, but were willing to negotiate with the Court Party under certain terms. The weakness of this faction was that its whole strength lay in the prestige and forensic skill of Pitt, and without them, it was likely to split between the "King's Friends" and the main Whig body.

Before a discussion of this latter party is entered upon, two figures who, by reason of their peculiar characters and claims, dwelt outside the main framework of factional classifications, should be noted. These were Charles Townshend and Charles Yorke. Both were nominally Whigs, and both divided their allegiance uneasily between the camps of Rockingham and Pitt. Here the resemblance ends. Townshend, the most brilliant man of his or any age, was the attractive and irresponsible weathercock of English politics, deserting Pitt for Grenville in 1765 to obtain the Paymaster-Generalship, cooperating with Rockingham, although he had the greatest contempt for that leader, and finally subverting the policies of the Chatham Ministry, in order to be in a position to lead its successor. He stated frankly that as a younger son he would have to look out for his own interests (282), and,

(282) He told the Duke of Devonshire unblushingly 'that he was a younger brother, and if nothing was to be made out of opposition or no active measures pursued he would ... consider himself at liberty to take what part
although lacking in method, he adhered to this purpose with some degree of success. His consummate debating skill and considerable general political talents were always in demand, which helps to explain his continued acceptance by all factions, despite his untrustworthiness (283).

The case of Yorke is completely different. His was a story of legitimate ambition unfairly thwarted. He had been Attorney-General under Newcastle, and had been promised the Woolsack by both Newcastle and Pitt, and later by Rockingham. He had gone out of office in 1762, with the reasonable hope

(282) cont'd.
would be most convenient to him.

(283) In truth, Sir, he was the delight and ornament of this house and the charm of every private society which he honoured with his presence ... If he had not so great a stock, as some have had who flourished formerly, of knowledge long treasured up, he knew better by far, than any man I ever was acquainted with, how to bring together within a short time, all that was necessary to establish, to illustrate and to decorate that side of the question he supported ... He hit the house just between wind and water. - And not being troubled with too anxious a zeal for any matter in question, he was never more tedious, or more earnest, than the pre-conceived opinions, and present temper of his hearers required; to whom he was always in perfect union. He conformed exactly to the temper of the house; and he seemed to guide because he was always sure to follow it.

As to his reputation for trimming, Chesterfield comments: "We hear the Right Honourable Charles Townshend is indisposed at his house in Oxfordshire, of a pain in his side; but it is not said in which side."
that his promotion would not be too long delayed when the Whigs once more attained office. He returned to the Attorney-Generalship under Grenville, but the debauched person of Northington was still firmly planted upon the Woolsack, as it had been since 1757. When Rockingham came to power, he might have expected promotion, but Northington was retained to please the King; with the accession of Chatham, Camden had to be accommodated. All parties acknowledged the paramount claims of Yorke, yet did nothing to secure them. Finally, in 1770, when hope had almost died, he was asked to succeed Camden in office. It was a poisoned chalice he was handed, however. The Grafton Ministry was dying; Yorke might give it strength, but he would have to desert his party, the Rockingham Whigs, to do it. After three days of persuasion and threats on the part of the King, he accepted. Three days later he was dead, probably a suicide from remorse (284).

The Rockingham Whigs, who succeeded to office on the 10th of July, 1765, were as yet the successors and survivors of the Old Whigs of the days of Walpole and Pelham. Still under the influence of the old Duke of Newcastle, who was Lord Privy Seal in the new Ministry, they lived constantly in the past, wedded to the sanctity of the settlement of 1688 and all its corollaries established under the first two Hanoverian monarchs. Unfortunately, the great Whig leaders

were nearly all dead by 1765, and their successors were lacking in both experience and talent. The party assiduously challenged the Government on unpopular issues, such as the cider tax and general warrants, but despite its activity, by the time it took office, it was weaker than it had ever been before. The party lacked a platform and a philosophy to cement it together, it lacked leaders, it lacked Pitt, but most of all it lacked office, the one necessary concomitant to party unity in the mid-eighteenth century.

They were the only real champions of the party system in the decade, and therefore incurred the undying enmity of both the King and Chatham, the two individuals upon whom their future strength relied. They were, moreover, a party without a real purpose. Newcastle's philosophy can be summed up in the phrase: "Employment for friends to the Government," in other words, jobs for his friends; Rockingham lacked any real desire to be a party leader and undertook his office out of a sense of duty. Others were reformed Tories, disgruntled office-holders or rabble-rousers. It required a uniting force, a party organization and dogma, to make it a political power. It was to gain these from the work of Rockingham's secretary, an Irishman named Edmund Burke.

Although Burke's party philosophies do not take full effect in the political life of the nation until the end of the eighteenth century, they were a powerful influence in maintaining an effective core of opposition in the Rockingham faction, and ensuring that it remained the one powerful
opposition party from 1766, when it lost office, until 1782, when it regained it. In his writings one can see the framework of the modern political party taking shape, although Burke himself did not fully realize the implications or purposes of his creation.

Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed. For my part, I find it impossible to conceive, that any one believes in his own politicks, or thinks them to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the means of having them reduced to practice. It is the business of the speculative philosopher to mark the proper ends of Government. It is the business of the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect. (285)

He is also very definite as to the necessity of political morality.

When people desert their connections, the desertion is a manifest fact, upon which a direct simple issue lies, triable by plain men. Whether a measure of government be right or wrong is no matter of fact, but a mere affair of opinion, on which men may, as they do, dispute and wrangle without end. But whether the individual thinks the measure wrong or right, is point still a greater distance from the reach of all human decision. It is therefore very convenient to politicians, not to put the judgement of their conduct on overt acts, cognizable in any ordinary court, but upon such matter as can be triable only in that secret tribunal ... I believe the reader would wish to find no substance in a doctrine which has a tendency to destroy all test of character as deduced from conduct. (286)

On the other hand he condemns those combinations which


(286) Ibid., p. 338.
are made, not on the association of people of like mind, but upon principles. He deprecated Chatham's idea of a "Government of Talents":

Of this stamp is the cant of Not men, but measures; a sort of charm, by which many people get loose from every honourable engagement. (287).

and he is particularly scornful of the independent politician, for the Rockingham Party had suffered much at the hands of Chatham, Shelburne and Grenville, who belonged to no party.

That man who before he comes into power has no friends, or who coming into power is obliged to desert his friends, or who losing it has no friends to sympathize with him; he who has no sway among any part of the landed or commercial interest, but whose whole importance has begun with his office, and is sure to end with it; is a person who ought never to be suffered by a controlling parliament to continue in any of those situations which confer the lead and direction of all our publick affairs; because such a man has no connexion with the interest of the people. (288)

Here, in fact, lay the fallacy in his theory of party, for the landed gentry for whom he was the spokesman were not the people of England, however much they might presume to represent them on the basis of an eccentric franchise. It was Burke's achievement that he outlined the essential framework of the party structure, but it was left to the Chathamites, and principally Shelburne, to fill in the details, and bring the party system into harmony with the nation. Burke saw party as a means of preserving the Whig party of 1688; Shelburne saw it as a means of creating a Tory party

(288) Ibid., p. 265.
in 1780.

Personally, Burke was not an able or even a mediocre politician. He lacked influence, it is true, but even more he lacked administrative experience, ability and judgment. His associates have often been condemned for not giving him Cabinet office in the short-lived Ministry of 1782, but he lacked even the experience of the Younger Pitt at the time. Walpole's judgment of him is probably just when he states that:

Having come too late into public life, and being too conceited to study men whom he thought his inferiors in ability, he proved a very indifferent politician ... (such men) apply their knowledge to objects to which it does not belong, and think it is as easy to govern men, when they rise above them, as they found when themselves were lower and led their superiors by flattery. (289)

Unfortunately other members of the party were much less gifted. Their leader, the young second Marquis of Rockingham, was no politician, although a charming personality and a devotee of the turf. He was unable, through shyness, to make comprehensible speeches in Parliament (290), so that the active leadership of the Government passed into the hands of the Duke of Grafton, young, inexperienced and indecisive, and unhappy in his allegiance, since he was at


(290) Though jealous of his position, he was no leader and was shy of his own voice. Conscious of this defect, he once apologized to the House for his silence, owning it was from a natural infirmity proceeding from his high respect for their lordships! Williams, Life of Pitt, Vol. II, p.185.
heart a Pittite. In the Commons, the unhappy figure of General Conway attempted to dominate the scene, while his cousin Horace Walpole and Charles Townshend each played upon his sensibilities and tempted him to quit the Rockinghams for Pitt. Two men of ability were included, but their scope for action was necessarily limited. William Dowdeswell, as a former Tory and a commoner, lacked influence, although he was an excellent Chancellor of the Exchequer; while the Duke of Newcastle, borne down with years and anxieties, could not realize that his days of power were over, and attempted to dominate the Cabinet. Any use his wide experience might have been in guiding the Ministry was nullified by his senile disappointment at not being permitted to rule.

Little did I think that these young men, and particularly my Lord Rockingham, would take any one material step in government ... without previously consulting me or knowing my thoughts, and that they would not do, if they either had that regard for my opinion, which, from vanity, I may think they should have, or in their situation thought they wanted my assistance ... Would you imagine that after this my Lord Rockingham has scarce once spoken to me ... about any measure to be taken by the Treasury? (291)

Finally, the greatest weakness of the Ministry was its total dependence on Pitt for inspiration, although it had failed to gain his accession to its ranks; his abhorrence

(291) Newcastle, Duke of, A narrative of the changes in the ministry, 1765-67, p. 275. Walpole notes that: "The Duke of Newcastle is busy in restoring clerks and tide-waiters, in offering everybody everything, and in patronizing the clergy again; not yet cured by their behaviour of loving to make bishops."
of the party system, his advocacy of measures, not men, and the resentment of Burke and Rockingham for his overbearing airs of superiority and dominance had prevented this (292). In Charles Townshend's cynical description of the Government as "a Lutestring Ministry, fit only for the summer," (293), there was much truth.

Seldom has a government entered office containing as many men so imbued with a sense of their own moral rectitude as did the Rockingham Administration. All the unpopular measures of the Grenville Ministry were now to be corrected, and the Government, its supporters believed, would be remembered as the most popular in the nation's history. Yet good intentions were no substitute for ability, and the Rockingham Whigs, of all factions, were the most lacking in ability and experience. The Government lacked a Pitt, but it also lacked even the more modest talents of a Grenville, a Bedford, or a Shelburne. Finally, of all the factions, they were basically the most obnoxious to the King, and when he had recovered sufficiently from the nausea engendered by the Grenvilles, the Royal borough-monger turned his government out of office with

(292) Chesterfield wrote:

Here is a new political arch almost built, but of materials of so different a nature, and without any key-stone, that it does not, in my opinion, indicate either strength or duration. It will certainly require repairs, and a key-stone, next winter; and that key-stone will and must necessarily be Mr. Pitt. Chesterfield, Letters, Vol. II, p. 340.

(293) Ibid., p. 341.
a light-heartedness and a finality which ensured their political eclipse for a generation.

To please the landed interests, they repealed the cider tax; to humour the London manufacturers, they placed protective tariffs on foreign textiles; to placate the party and the nation, they declared against general warrants. Trouble began only when they ceased to destroy the work of the old Government, and began to create, especially in the case of America.

Their flirtations with Pitt were a revelation of their weakness. The promotion of Pratt to a peerage, the proposed alliance with Frederick the Great, and the several attempts at remodelling the Cabinet were all done to lure the great man, who, standing on the rotten structure of his "principles," refused to be lured.

As far as legislation was concerned, the Government was extremely active, although not very successful. An act to create free ports in Jamaica and Dominica foreshadowed free trade by eighty years. It was to Pitt, however, that they had to turn for the inspiration for their most prominent measure, the repeal of the Stamp Act. Although they were reluctant to be forced, hoping to gain the goodwill of the Bedford faction, the Government consented to the repeal, but insisted on a Declaratory Act as well. Pitt condemned the latter, but in view of the current condition of English public opinion concerning the colonies, it would have been almost
impossible to gain acceptance of repeal without it.

Certainly it was necessary to gain even the passive acceptance of the King. He had consented initially to repeal, but it was soon found that he was advising the Court Party against voting for repeal.

Lord Strange, one of the placemen who opposed the repeal of the Stamp Act, having occasion to go in to the King, on some affair of his office, the Duchy of Lancaster, the King said he heard it was reported that he (the King) was for repeal of that Act. Lord Strange replied, that idea did not only prevail, but that his Majesty's Ministers did all in their power to encourage that belief; and that their great majority had been entirely owing to their having made use of his Majesty's name. Lord Strange no sooner left the closet than he made full use of the authority he had received, and trumpeted all over the town the conversation he had had with the King. (294).

George later declared that he had been in favour of modification of the Stamp Act, and that he preferred repeal only to violent enforcement, but the mischief was done, and a Ministry already without support in the country at large (295), received a further blow to its prestige.

It was in this debate that Bute appeared for the last time as a political power. It was his direction of the Court Party that secured the repeal of the Stamp Act, but this was only because the King preferred to go on with the Rockinghams, rather than risk the Grenville-Bedford combination again.


(295) The support in the country as a whole was trifling, despite Burke's claim in A short account of a short administration, that "They were supported by the confidence of the nation." Burke, Works, Vol. II, p.6.
Many of the "King's Friends" however, voted with Bedford and Grenville on the measure, and Bute was being courted by both Bedford and Pitt. It was Pitt, in fact, who was to decide the fate of the Ministry, as his tacit support had thus far enabled it to carry out its program.

Since December, 1765, Newcastle had urged the inclusion of Pitt in the Ministry, unaware that his own presence therein was one of the chief reasons for Pitt's refusal. It was the repeal of the Stamp Act, however, that removed the chief obstacle to Pitt's inclusion, since it determined the King to send for him at all costs. In April, 1766, the Duke of Grafton resigned, hoping to precipitate a ministerial crisis which would force the inclusion of Pitt (296). Rockingham, however, had grown stubborn with adversity, and overlooking his dependence on the Court for survival, began to assume a more independent attitude. The King, already rebuffed by Pitt three times, was not prepared to negotiate until he was sure of the result. As a temporary measure, the Duke of Richmond was appointed to succeed Grafton as Secretary of State for the Southern Department.

(296) When the Duke of Grafton quitted the seals, he gave that very reason for it, in a speech in the House of Lords; he declared that he had no objection to the persons or to the measures of the present Ministers; but that he thought they wanted strength and efficiency to carry on proper measures with success; and that he knew but one man (meaning, as you will easily suppose, Mr. Pitt); who could give them that strength and solidity; that, under this person, he should be willing to serve in any capacity, not only as a General Officer, but as a pioneer; and would take up a spade and a mattock .. Chesterfield, Letters, Vol. II, p.349.
The credit for repeal had all gone to Pitt, and the idea of a non-partisan ministry naturally appealed to the King. The fall of the Ministry was now daily expected. It was said of them that: "They were dead, and only lying in state; and that Charles Townshend (who never spoke for them) was one of the mutes." (297) Rockingham had offended the King in the declaration by the Commons of the illegality of general warrants, and by his failure to obtain a parliamentary allowance for the King's younger brothers (298). When in June, Rockingham requested that some peers might be created as a proof of the King's confidence, George replied:

As to the Peerage, I thought I had yesterday, as well as on many former occasions, expressed an intention of not, at least for the present, increasing the Peerage, and remain entirely now of that opinion. (299)

Early in July, Lord Northington resigned as Lord Chancellor, after quarrelling with his colleagues, although he probably hoped to facilitate the resignation of the Government. The King advised Rockingham to put the Great Seal into commission, and immediately sent for Pitt.

From the beginning of the negotiations there was the perennial trouble with Temple's sensibilities. He had refused

(299) Albemarle, op.cit., p. 347.
to become First Lord for Pitt, and, in fact, his sympathies were now almost entirely with his brother Grenville. On Pitt's refusal to include the latter in the Cabinet, Temple broke off negotiations (300), and his place was taken by the Duke of Grafton. Pitt, himself, insisted on taking the Privy Seal, probably in order to ensure that Newcastle was removed from office, since the Duke had held that office. Thus, on July 12th, 1766, the Rockingham Ministry, borne down by the weight of its good intentions, was dismissed, and was succeeded by the Chatham-Grafton Administration.

The basic plan of the Chatham Ministry of 1766 was to have been multi-partisan, following the purposes of both Pitt and the King, for the eradication of all faction in politics. A "Government of the Talents" is always a chimera yearned after by successful party leaders, but it seldom appeals to the electorate or to the legislature. Its elements do not usually co-operate well, or if they do, the regular party structures are threatened, and political life may be disrupted for a generation until new organizations can be built up. This Government was more than usually weakened by the confusion in its purposes from the outset. Pitt saw it as an instrument for the revival of popular government, and the glories of his war ministry; the King hoped it would become a new and more

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(300) Temple declared that: "I should refuse to go in like a child to come out like a fool," in a statement to his sister, Lady Chatham, which was full of revelations of his jealousy of Pitt's power. From the moment of this refusal he becomes a political nonentity. Williams, *Life of Pitt*, Vol. II, p.209.
powerful Court party. The slogan of "Measures, not men," lost all meaning as soon as the divergent beliefs of the Government's various members had to be reconciled.

It was originally intended that the Ministry should have a Whig basis, with Pitt's followers and the Rockinghams assuming the chief posts. This plan was crippled almost from the outset by Pitt's refusal to accept Rockingham himself, and by Rockingham's refusal to serve in any capacity but that of Prime Minister. Each element had a different purpose in assuming office. Conway, the Duke of Portland, Sir William Meredith, Lord Granby, and Charles Townshend, representing the Rockinghams, wished a continuation of the previous administration's policies. Northington and Barrington, representing the King, wished for an alliance with Bute. Pitt, Grafton, Camden and Shelburne rejected all thought of further alliances, and centred their interest on foreign policy. Burke's description of the Ministry (from which he had been excluded, much to his chagrin), is classic:

He (Chatham) made an administration, so checkered and speckled; he put together a piece of joinery, so crossly indented and whimsically dove-tailed; a cabinet so variously inlaid; such a piece of diversified Mosaick; such a tesselated pavement without cement; here a bit of black stone, and there a bit of white; patriots and courtiers, king's friends and republicans; whigs and tories; treacherous friends and open enemies: That it was indeed a curious show; but utterly unsafe to touch, and unsure to stand on. (301)

The chief weakness of the Government, however, was its absolute dependence for existence on the prestige and abilities of its leader. The abilities were still paramount, but the prestige was seriously damaged by Pitt's acceptance of a peerage, as Earl of Chatham. Not only did this leave the leadership of the Commons in the hands of the indecisive Conway and the irresponsible and unwanted Townshend (302), but Pitt's popularity with the country was not forthcoming to Chatham. A storm of abuse and lampoons, partly inspired by the now-resentful Temple, greeted the prime minister's elevation. The following is characteristic:

Advertizement: 'Lost or Mislaid: Two ounces and a half of Popularity wrapp'd up in an old City address. Whoever has found the same and will bring it to Ephraim Dingle Dangle, at the luminated House near North End shall be rewarded with an Old Black Mask, a pair of Old Crutches and the Shoe part of an Old Jack Boot.' (303)

Lord Chesterfield, no enemy of Pitt, pointed out the limitations to be experienced by the prime minister in the House of Lords.

The joke is here, that he has had a fall upstairs, and has done himself so much hurt, that he will never be able to stand upon his legs again. Everybody is puzzled how to account for this step; though it would not be the first time that great abilities have been duped by low cunning. But, be it what it will, he is now, certainly, only Earl of Chatham; and no longer Mr. Pitt in any respect whatever. To withdraw, in the fullness of his power, and in the utmost gratification of his ambition, from the House of Commons (which procured him his power, and which alone could ensure it to him), and to go into that Hospital of Incurables, the House of Lords, is a measure so unaccountable

(302) Townshend was accepted into the Cabinet only on the urging of Grafton that the Government needed support in the Commons. Pitt was opposed to his inclusion. Williams, Life of Pitt, Vol. II, p.216.

(303) Ibid., p. 213, note.
that nothing but proof positive could have made me believe it; but true it is. (304)

Actually, Pitt had perfectly valid reasons for taking a peerage. His health, long the limiting factor in the fortunes of the opposition, was not good, and the strain of leading the House of Commons would probably be too much for him. In addition, he expected that the chief opposition to his Government would come in the House of Lords, since the ablest leaders of the Opposition were there and the most controversial issues had been dealt with there in the recent ministries. There is no doubt, however, that the peerage was a mistake. He never gained ascendancy in the Lords, his aristocratic tone and theatrical mannerisms being resented there. The Commons was left free of his dominating personality and Charles Townshend was able to display his vigorous and unstable personality without hindrance. The City, hitherto Pitt's great source of strength, was lost to Chatham, and became part of the Grenville preserves. The administration was designed to demonstrate the futility of the party system. Unfortunately it did more. It demonstrated the futility of English politics of the time, partisan or otherwise.

The Ministry included many hold-overs from the Grenville and Rockingham administrations, who, although they welcomed office, were yet bound to follow their leaders on

certain questions. Nothing had been done to placate those leaders, and with Rockingham especially, Chatham's dictatorial tone made any cooperation almost impossible.

The most important office in the new Government, the Secretaryship of State for the Southern Department, was given to the able Shelburne, while Camden attained the Woolsack, despite the claims of the perennial candidate, Yorke. Northington, weighed down with the burden of his iniquities, and unpopular with the Whigs in the Cabinet, was yet necessary as a channel of communication with the King, and was retained as Lord President. Lord Egmont remained unwillingly at the Admiralty, while Charles Townshend was dragged from the lucrative Pay Office, to become Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Commons was left to the feeble leadership of the upright Conway, and, deep in the subordinate ranks of the Ministry, as President of the Board of Trade, stood the rather ominous figure of Lord North.

At the beginning, however, the chances of success for the Government seemed considerable. The chief points at issue between the various parties seemed to have been settled. The Stamp Act had been repealed; the liberty of the subject had been vindicated by the recent resolution against general warrants; even the Peace of Paris could not now be upset, while the growing strength of the Bourbon Family Compact presented an almost unanswerable argument for Pitt's obsession, the Northern Alliance. On the other hand, some
issues had arisen for the settlement of which the Government
might reasonably expect the cooperation of all good citizens.
The affairs of the East India Company had to be regulated
and their rights in conquered territory determined. The
Government of Canada and the troubles in America still
remained unsettled. At home, bad harvests had caused dis­
tress and general restlessness. Chatham hoped that he would
be able to form another broad-bottomed administration adminis­
tration such as had brought prosperity to the country under
the Pelhams.

Chatham's intransigent temper was certainly the least
of the assets of the Government. The contact with the
Rockingham Whigs, to be maintained through Grafton and Con­
way, was very soon threatened by the Great Commoner's
insulting remarks and attitudes. His proposal for the
Northern alliance broke down over the refusal of the once-
bitten and now twice-shy Frederick to have anything to do with
an English alliance. In the winter of 1766, an embargo was
laid on the export of corn, in order to make up for the
depletion of domestic supplies by the bad harvests. Here,
too, the Government was unfortunate. The emergency demanded
speedy action, and the embargo was laid by an Order-in-
Council, but in the following debates on an indemnity bill
to give protection in respect of the illegality of the
action, the Government came out very badly (305).

(305) The debate revealed the paradox of Mansfield,
Temple and Lyttleton appearing as champions of liberty,
while Camden defended the embargo, saying "it was but a
tyranny of forty days."
It was in November, 1766, however, with the dismissal of the Earl of Edgecumbe from his Court employments, that the Government made its first major and irreparable blunder. Edgecumbe was a close friend of both Rockingham and Conway, and his dismissal and the raising of the Earl of Northumberland to a dukedom, fatally estranged the Rockingham Whigs in the Cabinet. The Duke of Portland, the Earl of Bessborough, Admirals Saunders and Keppel, and Sir William Meredith resigned, the liaison with the Rockingham faction was shattered, and although Conway continued irresolutely in office, his loyalty was only a mere phantom of departed friendship (306). The Ministry was undeniably moving towards the Court party. Approaches were made to the Bedford faction, but the demand on the part of Bedford for several of the chief offices for his supporters quickly caused the King and his Minister to recollect their abhorrence of party government and break off negotiations. Foiled of this support, the Government then turned to a non-partisan party in the King's own image, and many of Lord Bute's followers, among them the eminent Dashwood, were promoted to places.

(306) The wound rankled so deeply in Mr. Conway's bosom, that he dropped all intercourse with Lord Chatham; and though continued to conduct the King's business in the House of Commons, he would neither receive nor pay any deference to the Minister's orders, acting for or against as he approved or disliked his measures.

In the succeeding session, at the end of 1766, the fiasco of the East India Company enquiry revealed the weakness of the Government to the full. Chatham had outlined the main provisions of his plan of reform, which consisted principally in the expropriation of the Company's ruling rights. The plan was supported by both Shelburne and Grafton, but in the vital area of the House of Commons, both leaders, Conway and Townshend, condemned it in the Cabinet as being a gross invasion of the rights of private property, and Chatham himself jeopardized the success of the plan by refusing to formulate details for it.

At Christmas, 1766, he went down to Bath for a cure for his gout, leaving the administration in the hands of Grafton but under the domination of Townshend. The reform of the East India Company was mishandled in the prime minister's absence and the Company was permitted to negotiate, with the result that it staved off government intervention indefinitely.

The second attempt by Townshend to formulate government policy was almost equally unsuccessful. He proposed the continuation of the land tax at the wartime rate of four shillings, having first boasted that he could gain revenue from America. His motion for continuation of the tax was amended by Dowdeswell for the Whigs, and a reduction to three shillings was effected over the protests of the Government. The security of the Ministry with either the Court or the country was not such as to enable them to disregard such a defeat.
The East India Company debacle, meanwhile, had brought Chatham up from Bath, threatening to dismiss Townshend and replace him with North. Such a plan, however, although it would have benefitted the Government, was rendered impossible by the refusal of North to accept office, and Townshend continued to defy his leaders. The days of Chatham's political power were numbered in any case. In the spring of 1767, he retired into melancholic imbecility, refusing to conduct business, although retaining the seals of office, while for two years his government and the nation's prestige collapsed around him.

It is surprising how large a part of the political history of England at this period centred around the personal health and family feuds of this one man.

Whether one sick man did or did not feel a twinge in his foot at Hayes, - whether that sick man would or would not shake hands with his brother from Stowe or his brother from Wotton, - such are the topics which we have here to treat as the most important State affairs! (307)

Certainly Pitt's temper, his pride and his capacity to nurse his wrongs were prime factors in the disruption and decline of English political life during this period. His consummate political talents might, if co-ordinated with one of the factions of the period, have produced order out of chaos and checked the King's disastrous plans. Instead, with an inflated opinion of his own capabilities, an obstinate

contempt for the abilities of others and a high consciousness of his own righteousness, he preferred to watch the ruin of his country from his exclusive Olympus.

His later years were not, however, without their contributions to English statecraft. In the group of politicians which he gathered about him, and which were characterized by an extreme independence of action, were to be found some of the keenest political minds of the day. Out of this group was to come the foundation, not only of the nineteenth century Tory Party, but the largest part of British nineteenth century liberalism.

The English public as yet lacked any coherent body of political doctrine. The Whigs and followers of Grenville had no large views and were incapable of sustained efforts on definite principles. The Bedford faction, by its nature, could not produce statesmen, - merely administrators. Attached to the old shibboleths of faction, these politicians were blind to the need of new and drastic methods to meet the new conditions. Even factional loyalty, to which Burke clung with such pathetic confidence, was not proof against the temptations of office and the destructive effects of royal electioneering. It required a completely new body of philosophy, not merely the definition of party which Burke had formulated, to reform the political system. This was to come from a most unexpected quarter, - the old High Tory section of the followers of Chatham. Although this movement was guided and encouraged by Chatham, and was eventually adopted
wholesale by his son, the real author and moving spirit of it was the Earl of Shelburne.

Shelburne received much contemporary abuse and his reputation is largely a posthumous one. To George III he was the "Jesuit of Berkeley Square," and to Henry Fox, a "perfidious and infamous liar," and to Horace Walpole, a "pedant in villainy." (308) Yet Disraeli declared him to be the ablest minister of eighteenth century England.

To understand Mr. Pitt, one must understand one of the suppressed characters of English history, and that is Lord Shelburne ... from the scattered traits some idea may be formed of the ablest and most accomplished minister of the eighteenth century ... Lord Shelburne seems to have been of a reserved and somewhat astute disposition: deep and adroit, he was however brave and firm. His knowledge was extensive and even profound ... He maintained the most extensive correspondence of any public man of his time. The earliest and most authentic information reached him from all courts and quarters of Europe; and it was a common phrase that the minister of the day sent to him often for the important information which the Cabinet could not itself command. Lord Shelburne was the first great minister who comprehended the rising importance of the middle class, and foresaw in its future power a bulwark for the throne against 'the Great Revolution families.' (309)

He was, in the Chatham tradition, a great imperialist, but

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(308) Junius said of him: "There is still a young man, my Lord, who I think will make a capital figure in the piece. His features are too happily marked to be mistaken. A single line of his face will be sufficient to give us the heir apparent of Loyola and all the College. A little more of the devil, my Lord, if you please, about the eyebrows; that's enough; a perfect Malagrida I protest! So much for his person; and as for his mind, a blinking bulldog placed near him, will form a very natural type for all his good qualities." Woodfall, Letters of Junius, Vol. II, p.472.

he understood far better than Chatham the implications for the future of the possession of the empire. It was he who, while at the Board of Trade in the Bute regime, began that re-organization and reform of the imperial structure described in the second chapter of this thesis. He was an able financier, in an age which was not conspicuous for financial ability or probity among the ruling classes. In a time of national and personal extravagance, he was able to live in comfort on one-fourth of the income which he drew from his estates (310). With Chatham and an enlightened few, he declared against the folly of endeavouring to coerce America, although he, in contrast to Chatham, was careful to ground his case on practical considerations. He was far ahead of his contemporaries in supporting parliamentary reform, free-trade, and religious tolerance, and the scope of his knowledge was immense. His friends included Bentham, Price, Priestly, Romilly, Morellet and Mirabeau. As a debater he was little inferior to Mansfield or Chatham.

Much of the contemporary hatred and suspicion of him arose from his inconsistencies. He began his political life under Bute, associated himself with Fox, Grenville and Sandwich, and finally went over to Pitt. He quarrelled with Halifax, Fox, and Egremont, and in the Cabinet of 1767, with Grafton. He was later to quarrel with Charles James Fox and Rockingham, and destroy the Ministry of 1782. His lack of tact and obsequiousness were proverbial, and his supercilious contempt for the men (and this included the majority) whom he

(310) Trevelyan, Early life of Charles James Fox, p.132.
considered his intellectual inferiors, rankled in the minds of nearly all the political leaders of the day (311). Yet he was a loyal colleague of Chatham and almost the only able and disinterested person in the Chatham-Grafton Administration.

Among the Chathamites who were in opposition to build the framework of the politics of the next age, were such figures as Camden, Barre, Calcraft and Dunning, and with them were associated representatives of the merchant City interest, which had never quite deserted Chatham, such as Serjeant Glynn, and Aldermen Townshend, Demptster, and Beckford. Measures supporting and favouring free trade, religious toleration, imperial reform, the beginnings of a social security program, middle-class democracy and parliamentary reform, were planned by them.

These men were to a greater extent practical politicians, however, than were Burke and his Whig reformers. Although both aimed at change, it was in opposite directions.

(311) While still a youth, he occasionally put enough restraint upon himself to preserve an outward show of respect for some powerful and eminent statesmen who was old enough to be his father; but there was no reverence in his composition, and in his secret thoughts he had less mercy for his patrons than a reasonably good-natured politician bestows on his adversaries ... A man who lived so much in the world as Lord Shelburne could not conceal from the world so marked a feature of his disposition; and his reputation for incurable treachery, for which nothing that he actually did, when judged by the standard of his age, will sufficiently account, was principally due to the consciousness from which his political associates could not free themselves that, however fair he might speak to them to their faces, at the bottom of his soul he regarded them as one less honest and less capable than the other.

Trevelyan, Early life of Charles James Fox, p. 131.
The Rockingham Whigs did not break with the common parent body so completely. Newcastle, until his death in 1768, was a follower of Rockingham, and Portland, Rockingham and Richmond were all landed magnates of the traditional Whig type. Undoubtedly they were free from corruption in opposition, but it was from necessity, not choice. Burke himself could not see beyond the privileges of these oligarchs; he could not feel the present. Hence his philosophy, admittedly suited to the reactionary England of the era from 1793 to 1830, was itself a voice from the past, the revolution of 1688, incarnate. The Chathamites, on the other hand, are the direct political ancestors of the nineteenth century reformers.

Despite such embryo plans of reform, however, the immediate problems of the Ministry in 1767 remained to be settled. The driving of the many-yoked oxen and asses of the Chatham-Grafton Government required a steady hand and almost superhuman powers of reconciling conflicting opposites (31£). A government, however, whose most brilliant ornament presents government policy in "Champagne" speeches, and whose leader retires into melancholic imbecility, cannot be expected to deal effectively with serious crises. The administration was

(31£) Conway and Shelburne agreed on America but nothing else. Granby voted against the repeal of the Stamp Act and for the cider tax, as had Lord North. Townshend had supported the Stamp Act but also its repeal. Egmont opposed Pitt's plan for a Northern alliance and was soon replaced by Admiral Saunders, a Rockingham Whig. Winstanley, Lord Chatham and the Whig opposition, p. 81.
without leaders, without unity and without a policy, and, despite the fact that it was without an effective opposition (313), it gradually disintegrated, its ruins blending imperceptibly into the Grafton and then into the North administrations.

The Government had a new leader now:

For even then, Sir, even before this splendid orb was entirely set, and while the western horizon was in a blaze with his descending glory; on the opposite quarter of the heavens arose another luminary, and, for his hour, became lord of the ascendant. (314)

and Charles Townshend essayed to enter the field of colonial affairs. On January 26th, 1767, after destroying Chatham's constitutional and fictional distinction between internal and external taxation, he pledged himself, without prior consultation with his colleagues, to extract a substantial revenue from the colonies. The colonists had proclaimed, through the voice of Pitt, the unconstitutionality of internal taxation. The taxes would therefore be external. The significance of Townshend's Revenue Act lay in the fact that, baulked of their pseudo-constitutional argument against taxation, the colonists

(313) The divisions of the Ministry also had the result of creating divisions among the opposition factions. Among the Bedfords, Gower and the Duchess of Bedford wanted to adhere to the Ministry, and Rigby favoured an alliance with the Grenvilles. Bute's followers were also divided, Jenkinson dreading a juncture with Temple, while Wedderburn, Elliot and Dyson favoured the Grenvilles.

Feiling, The second Tory party, 1714-1832, p. 91.

were then pre-disposed to independence as the only alternative. To the taxes they would not submit. Money, as well as liberty, was a prime mover with the Fathers of the Revolution.

On April 14th, the Ministry was almost defeated on a Whig motion to drop the East India Company investigation, and was only saved from further threats by a motion to adjourn. The split in the Government ranks was even more apparent, and it was not long before a resolution by Alderman Beckford, representing Chatham's plan for the East India Company, was decisively rejected with the connivance of Conway and Townshend (315). Grafton's dilemma was represented by an almost impossible choice between loyalty to Chatham, whom he believed in, but who was now incapacitated; and Townshend and the unity of government on which both Chatham and the King had set their hopes.

(315) Charles Townshend's tergiversations appear to have been the result of private jobbing. He had dealt largely in India stock, cried up the Company's right to raise that stock, has sold out most advantageously, and now cries it down ... In truth it is a very South Sea year - at least one-third of the House of Commons is dipped in this traffic; and stock-jobbing now makes patriots, as everything else has done.

Townshend had no high conception of State policy and was supremely indifferent to the question of right as between Crown and Company: 'but his responsiveness to popular feeling taught him that the public expected something out of the Bengal revenues, and he proceeded to obtain it in the manner least disagreeable to his friends in Leadenhall Street.
At this time, as if to plague the Government further, America forced itself on the attention of the Ministers, with the opposition to the Mutiny Act in New York and the Indemnity Bill in Massachusetts. Surrender upon one point, it was felt, would lead to surrender on all, and yet the alternative would be revolution brought on by repression. The Cabinet attempted to mix conciliation with coercion, but lacked the finesse for such an operation, and Townshend lacked the consistency. There was, however, almost unanimous support for a firmer stand against the encroachments of the colonists. Even Shelburne and Chatham were favourable. Only Conway, plagued as ever by his shadow allegiance to Rockingham, demurred. On such issues, it seemed that the Government would collapse almost immediately. The opposition, however, failed to unite, Rockingham voting with the Government against Bedford's want of confidence motion concerning Massachusetts.

Shortly thereafter, a united attack was begun on the Government. It was something new in politics to attempt to defeat a Government by depriving it of parliamentary support, rather than by intrigues in the closet; probably too new, in fact, for the attempt failed. The Court was against them and the Court retained tight hold on its parliamentary majority and its patronage system. The Rockingham Whigs, as ever, were afraid to compromise their principles on America at the behest of Bedford, and the sad example of Conway remained as a warning to all Whigs who would think of compromise against their leader's orders. The Opposition united against the
resolution condemning the action of the assembly of New York, but it was an insecure union, based on a trick of words, since the Whigs were divided at opposite poles.

By early summer of 1767, the Ministry's fate was hanging in the balance. Townshend's Revenue Acts had been passed, but only after much quarrelling in the Cabinet, including a threat of resignation from Townshend himself. Shelburne, the only representative of Chatham in the Cabinet, had ceased to attend meetings, and Camden followed suit. It was evident that some guidance from the nominal head of the Ministry, Lord Chatham, was necessary. Chatham was finally persuaded to overcome his abhorrence of business sufficiently to receive Grafton, but could only persuade the latter not to resign and refused to give any more concrete advice. Thus the farce continued, with Grafton, Camden and Northington warming the place of command for Chatham, while Townshend was a law unto himself, Shelburne in sullen retirement, Conway doubtful in his allegiance, and Chatham sunk in insanity. One new element was introduced, however. At the end of the session, Grafton and Northington agreed on the necessity of seeking an alliance with one of the major opposition groups and determined to ask Chatham his opinion on the subject.

Chatham, however, was a broken reed, and the King himself had to sanction negotiations with the Bedford faction. The offer included the Grenvilles but stipulated that Grafton must remain prime minister. Temple demanded equal authority with Grafton (as he had demanded it with Chatham). Bargaining
was then begun with the Rockinghams, and terms were compared. Negotiations with the Whigs, if successful, would have had the advantage of securing Conway in office, either with his friends, or because he might be piqued by their refusal. The chief point of the negotiations, however, was the royal desire to exclude the Grenvilles. Grafton was even willing to turn over the Treasury to Rockingham, although the King would not sanction the offer.

Rockingham doubted his ability to woo the Bedfords away from the Grenvilles, and was not certain of the reason for the Government's offer in any case. There was certainly a realization on the part of the Whigs that the Grenvilles had been proscribed to render an united opposition impossible (316). Grenville was willing to support a Ministry, with Rockingham at the head, but only on the condition that it carried out his coercive colonial policy. The moderate success of these negotiations was blasted, however, when Grafton declared that the King's offer extended only to Rockingham and, to a very limited extent, to Bedford. George III's purpose had been to re-enforce the Ministry, not to replace it.

The threat to the Ministry continued, however; Conway still threatened resignation and Grafton was still uneasy in his inheritance. Rockingham was permitted to formulate his proposals in the hope that when it came to details, the Opposition would split again into its factions. This was, in

fact, what happened. Grenville demanded a firmer policy with the colonies, and the unequivocal assertion of British sovereignty over them. Rockingham indignantly refused. In addition, Bedford objected to the continuance of Conway as leader of the Commons. The King then offered Rockingham the Treasury without his allies, but the latter refused to desert his "principles" and was, in any case, distrustful of being dependent on royal favour (317).

Conway, hovering on the brink of retirement, now felt that the fate of the Government hung on his decision and determined, unwillingly, to stay in office. Much of the credit for the Royal victory must go to Rockingham, for he would not press negotiations with any of the parties very far. In general, however, the principal reason for the triumph of the Court was the impossibility of uniting the opposition for anything but destructive criticism of the Government. It was a division over principles, not places, and as such, harder to repair (318). Rockingham now conceived the duty of his party to be opposition to the ambitions of Grenville, as it had once been opposition to the ambitions of Lord Bute, although he tried to keep the way open for reconciliation. Newcastle continued to urge on the Whigs the necessity of a union with the


(318) By the spring of 1767, the party strengths in the House of Commons were approximately these: Whigs (Rockingham), 101; Tories, 91; Bedford and Grenville factions, 54; and Government, 232, of which 40 were followers of Lord Bute.

Feiling, The second Tory party, 1714-1832, p. 92.
Bedfords, - a wise policy, but in Newcastle's case, dictated by a desire for office. There was no doubt, in any case, of the Court's victory. Grafton and the King, through caution, patience and the blunders of their opponents, had triumphed. The use made of the victory, however, was not to merit the success.

Meanwhile the Government had gained by the death of Townshend early in September, 1767. That restless spirit would disturb ministerial counsels no longer, and the Exchequer was transferred to the competent hands of Lord North. The latter's lack of resolution was a positive advantage in such a mixed government, and his loyalty and strong debating powers were greatly needed to meet the caracoling dialectics of Burke, Grenville and Barre.

The meeting of Parliament in November revealed the weakness of the Opposition. Grenville denounced Rockingham and all his supporters on the issue of conciliation with the colonies. Bedford, in the meanwhile, had probably revealed the negotiations between himself and Rockingham to Grenville. As a result, Rockingham found himself in complete isolation, and renounced all further negotiations with the Bedford faction. Bedford was not prepared to adhere to any lost causes and, true to his trimming instincts, began overtures to the Government. By mid-December it was decided that Earl Gower would succeed Northington as Lord President, Weymouth would assume Conway's Secretaryship (although Conway would continue as leader of the Commons), Hillsborough would assume the new
Secretaryship of State for the Colonies (which had already been refused by Shelburne), and Sandwich was given the minor position of Postmaster-General.

From the moment that Chatham withdrew to his house in Hampstead, the youthful Grafton was playing the game of politics with the dice loaded against him. Having, from the outset, assumed responsibilities beyond his capacity, he was compelled to take complete command after Chatham's illness. Yet he could not set about arranging affairs in his own way, for Chatham still clung stubbornly to office (or rather, the King clung stubbornly to Chatham), and Grafton could not take steps of which a revived Chatham, or a still-active Shelburne, might completely disapprove. Only because of his loyalty to the King and to Chatham was Grafton induced to remain in office; and with the revival of party government on the accession of the Bedfords, the second of these loyalties was strained to the breaking point. The surrender was far too complete for Chatham to have approved. It was the inclusion of a complete political organization, rather than of a few individuals. Soon the strength of this organization was felt to the full as, under the leadership of Weymouth and Sandwich, the Bedfords encroached progressively on the spoils of the patronage system, while the Duke of Grafton drifted, happy in the false security of the majority brought him by his shifty allies.

Yet his colleagues showed little inclination to oppose such encroachment. Shelburne was indifferent to Grafton's
fate, Camden uncertain in his allegiance, and Conway still
yearning for the greener pastures of Rockingham Whiggery (319).
North had actually shown himself a willing colleague of the
Bedfords, but North was to show himself a willing colleague
of almost any political leader who could gain the King's con-
fidence.

Grafton had undermined the basis of his own authority,
since the new ministers, expert placemen as they were, were
far more likely to gain and retain the King's confidence than
he was. Sandwich, though the least prepossessing of them, was
yet a capable administrator, when he cared to exercise his
talents, which was not often. Lord Weymouth lived in the
ultimate stages of debauchery, possessing good brains, but
finding it restful not to use them. Gower was an amiable
mediocrity, while Hillsborough was, on the King's admission,
completely lacking in judgment. They all had one thing in
common, however; an inveterate desire to stay in office, and
a perfect willingness to do exactly what they were told by the
King. In fact, the real beneficiary from the re-enforcement
was the King. The surrender of the Bedfords had more than
(319) Junius, in describing the leaders of the Govern-
ment at this time wrote:

Your principal character, my Lord, is a young Duke,
mounted upon a lofty phaeton; his head grows giddy; his
horses carry him violently down a precipice, and a bloody
carcase, the fatal emblem of Britannia, lies mangled under
his wheels. By the side of this furious charioteer sits
caution without foresight*, a motley thing, half military,
scarce civil. He too would guide, but, let who will drive,
is determined to have a seat in the carriage. If it be
possible, my Lord, give him to us in the attitude of an
compensated him for the loss of Chatham.

The fortunes of the Rockingham Whigs, meanwhile, had reached their lowest ebb, although Rockingham and Burke endeavoured to hold the party together on the principles of the Revolution, thereby paving the way for a genuine revival of party government in 1782. The renewal of the East India Company agreement in the winter of 1767-68 gave them an opportunity to declare their opposition, but very little more, for their strength had fallen to negligible proportions.

In the Nullum Tempus controversy they were more fortunate. Sir James Lowther, Bute's son-in-law, through the favour of the Treasury, had gained control of Inglewood Forest and its voting freeholders. It had been part of the royal domain but had been in the possession of the Dukes of Portland for many years. The old adage of nullum tempus occurrit regi still held good in law; and it was impossible for the Duke of Portland to prove that the area had been formally granted to his ancestors by the Crown, since it was necessary to prove continuous possession for two hundred years to bar crown claims. It was clear, nevertheless, that however well-supported by law it may have been, the real purpose of the attack was to penalize Portland for his Whig loyalties. Landowners all over the country, not in the highest credit with the Court, began to fear for the legality of their title deeds.

(319) cont'd.

of an orator eating the end of a period, which may begin with "I did not say, I would not pledge myself" - the rest he eats." (*Conway)

The agitation value of this controversy for the Rockinghams was immense. As usual, however, Rockingham's hopes were higher than the chances of success. An attempt was made to enlist the support of the landed interest generally by reviving an act of the reign of James I, "for the quieting of the minds of those who possessed crown lands." The motion was introduced unobtrusively. A union of Rockinghams and Grenvilles, including some of the greatest debaters in either House, was formed. Yet they were beaten by twenty votes. It was an indication of the terrible weakness of the Government, even with re-enforcement. The celebration among the Opposition was, however, premature, for the country at large was not with them, as the election of 1768 seemed to prove.

In the election of 1768 the buying and selling of seats was especially flagrant. The mayor and the corporation of the City of Oxford demanded £7,500. from the sitting Members to discharge the City's debts, and the Shoreham "Christian Club" offered the local seat in Parliament to the highest bidder. The nouveaux riches from India, the so-called "nabobs," however, were responsible for much of the increased corruption, which had changed not so much in type or quality as in quantity. The Earl of Chesterfield, for instance, bidding for a seat for his son, found the prices had gone up to an impossible level.
I spoke to a borough-jobber, and offered five-and-twenty hundred pounds for a secure seat in Parliament; but he laughed at my offer, and said, that there was no such thing as a borough to be had now; for that the rich East and West Indians had secured them all, at the rate of three thousand pounds at least; but many at four thousand; and two or three that he knew at five thousand. (320)

Certainly, the activities of this new class were widespread and gave the Government a much worse reputation than perhaps it deserved. To state that the Court won the election by corrupt means is to overlook the corrupt activities of the Whig leaders. The Duke of Newcastle succeeded in returning twenty members personally, and assisting the return of many more (321). Intimidation, bribery, treating and patronage, in short, all the current machinery of electioneering, was used in the name of Rockingham and political purity. The difference between the Opposition and the Government was one of degree, not principle. Where the former counted its seats in tens and its bribes in thousands, the latter counted them in hundreds and tens of thousands respectively. In the contest between Portland and Lowther, the former was found to have

(320) Chesterfield, Letters, Vol. II, p. 366: Pitt, in condemning this new class, pointed out their lack of background in the country:
"Without connections, without any national interest in the soil, the importers of foreign gold have found their way into Parliament by such a torrent of corruption as no private fortune could resist."

(321) Namier, England in the age of the American revolution, p. 91.
spent £40,000. in order to protect his interest (322).

Rockingham, Newcastle and Portland could congratulate themselves on having held their own and nothing more. The substantial Government majorities remained. The affections of the country at this time lay with the opposition, certainly, but not with Rockingham. The idol of the people was John Wilkes, now returned from exile.

While the farce of Wilkes's election and his trial and committal for libel was being played out, the Government was suffering from the results of its mistakes abroad. Loss of British prestige through the Corsican and Falkland Islands episodes (323), revolution threatened in the colonies from the imposition of the Revenue Acts, the fall of stocks and the decline of trade, were all laid at the door of the Government. Grafton, at this juncture, determined that a sacrifice was

(322) Winstanley, Lord Chatham and the Whig opposition, p. 217.

(323) Of the Falkland Islands crisis (which was settled in 1770), with no great credit to Britain), Walpole wrote:

"Seeing such accounts of press-gangs in the papers, and such falling of stocks, you will wonder that in my last I did not drop a military syllable. Alas! when I had a civil war all over my own person, you must not wonder, unpatriotic as it was, that I forgot my country ... I did not even know with whom we were going to war; and now that I know with whom, I do not know that we are going to war. England that lives in the north of Europe, and Spain that dwells in the south, are vehemently angry about a morsel of rock that lies somewhere at the very bottom of America, for modern nations are too neighbourly to quarrel about anything that lies so near to them as in the same quarter of the globe."

necessary to lighten the load of dissension within the Government, and that sacrifice was Lord Shelburne, Secretary of State for the Southern Department.

At this point, however, the long-forgotten leader of the Government made himself heard. Bitterly resenting the alliance with the Bedfords, the colonial and foreign policies of the Government and its treatment of Wilkes, Chatham declared that Grafton had betrayed his trust. Faced now with the loss of the only member of the Government whom he could trust, Chatham resigned, followed by Shelburne (324). The loss of these leaders was decisive. Henceforth the Bedford faction dominated the Cabinet. No explanation could disguise the fact that Chatham had disowned his own creatures. Grafton and Camden both toyed with the idea of resignation, but neither felt that he could desert what he saw as a government in danger. The danger, had they known it, was past. The enemy had won.

They continued on, Grafton becoming helplessly involved with the Bedfords, Camden lapsing into powerless silence. Debates became less important, the Government was secure, and political life might have become exceedingly dull, but for the

(324) "To the King, I am told, Lord Chatham pleaded want of health and despair of it: but to the Duke of Grafton he complained of the treatment of Sir Jeffery Amherst, and the intended removal of Lord Shelburne—the last, an unwise measure of the last accession to the administration. I do not see why want of health should have dictated this step more just now than at any moment for this last year. It being times too at the eve of the Parliament has a suspicious look."

Middlesex election. It was fitting that, when statecraft had reached so low a level, one of the persons chiefly responsible for this situation, the Duke of Newcastle, died, on November 17th, 1768.

The Opposition was not in much better situation than the Government. Policy on the Wilkes case waited upon Government action and the question of the colonies was largely ignored, although the less contentious subjects of the Nullum Tempus bill and the address on the Government's foreign policy were taken up. Neither side seemed prepared to take the initiative on the contentious questions, and each side looked to its doubtful elements - the Government to the Chathamites, the Opposition to the Grenvilles - before committing itself. Most important, all awaited the return of Chatham to the arena, and the declaration of his policy.

In the new session, in the spring of 1769, the colonies were stigmatized as "rebellious" by the Government, and an amendment by the Opposition to delete this description was abandoned. The general tenor of the discussions was set. The Opposition gained only one minor victory in the session, in unseating Sir James Lowther, but here the Ministry supported the action. A wise use of the Government strength at this time might have quelled the unrest in the nation and the empire; but as far as the empire was concerned, little was attempted, and even less succeeded. Only Chatham and Camden were in favour of the repeal of the Declaratory Act, and it was doubtful if even repeal could limit the tendencies of
of the colonists. Certainly the Government was committed to half measures, the result of which was to please few at home and no one overseas. Conciliation, in any case, was difficult for a Government surrounded by the hungry wolves of Opposition, and in danger of being pounced upon once definite action revealed chinks in the armour of its unity.

For Grafton, political life had reached its nadir. His Government was arraigned on both its domestic and foreign policies; his original friends, the Rockingham Whigs, were now his bitterest enemies; Chatham, for whose sake he had borne the brunt of these afflictions, was in open hostility; Camden was unreliable, Gower and Weymouth beyond his control; the King was prepared to charge him with desertion if he resigned; and his own actions were subjected to a barrage of criticism by the pamphleteers (325). He was doomed to dreary

(325) Junius said of his conduct of affairs at this time: "Before you were placed at the head of affairs, it had been a maxim of the English government, not unwillingly admitted by the people, that every ungracious or severe exertion of the prerogative should be placed to the account of the Minister; but that whenever an act of grace or benevolence was to be performed, the whole merit of it should be attributed to the Sovereign himself. It was a wise doctrine, my Lord, and equally advantageous to the King and to his subjects; for whole it preserved that suspicious attention, with which people ought always to examine the conduct of ministers, it tended at the same time rather to increase than to diminish their attachment to the person of their Sovereign. If there be not a fatality attending every measure you are concerned in, by what treachery, or by what excess of folly has it happened, that these ungracious acts, which have distinguished your administration, and which I doubt not were entirely your own, should carry with them a strong appearance of personal interest, and even of personal enmity in a quarter,
isolation in a Government which he could not control and which would not control itself. Wearied of his hopeless position, he determined to raise an issue which would split the Government and break the impasse. On May 1st, 1769, he proposed that the Revenue Acts be totally repealed. He was supported by Camden, Conway and Granby. Gower, Weymouth, Rochford (326), North and Hillsborough voted it down, insisting that at least the tax on tea should be retained. Hawke, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and a supporter of conciliation, was absent.

By such narrow margins are great events controlled!

There followed, during the summer, the long controversy over the expulsion of Wilkes and the representation of Middlesex. The demands from the counties for dissolution during the autumn session and the activities of the Opposition brought about a union of Grenvilles and Rockinghams, agreed on forcing dissolution. Such a union was necessary, and certainly seemed about to succeed, when the reappearance of Lord Chatham changed the situation completely (327).

(325) cont'd.
where no such interest or enmity can be supposed to exist, without the highest injustice and the highest dishonour?"

(326) Viscount Rochford succeeded to the Privy Seal on the resignation of Chatham in October, 1768.

(327) He himself, in proprina persona, and not in a strait waistcoat, walked into the King's levee this morning, and was in the closet twenty minutes after the levee ... The deuce is in it if this is not news. Whether he is to be King, Minister, Lord Mayor or Alderman, I do not know; nor a word more than I have told you.
Remembering when the appearance of William Pitt at Court meant the fall of the Ministry, politicians circulated wild reports of impending changes. It was apparent that over the East India Company issue and the Wilkes affair, he was hostile to the Government and would probably go into opposition. With Chatham at the head of the now-strengthened opposition, the political future of the Court Party and of Bedford and Grafton would be in jeopardy. The Rockinghams, unfortunately, had almost as much to fear from Chatham's inveterate opposition to party politics. He might fatally alienate the now friendly Grenvilles from the Rockingham Whigs. This calculation did not take account of the family reconciliation in the Grenville clan in the previous autumn, nor of Chatham's changed attitude to political life. It was a new Chatham, purged of ambition by his illness, and now a selfless patriot, who reappeared to lead the people of the nation against the Court.

The alliance which was formed was not, however, binding upon all questions. The Grenvilles' attitude on America was not acceptable to Rockingham and Burke, and the whole question had to be left out of the negotiations. In fact, only on the question of the Middlesex elections and general opposition to the Government could agreement be gained. That the old animosities were not forgotten appears to have been the fault of Burke and Rockingham, who still remembered the slights they had received at the hands of the Great Commoner. Chatham expressly advocated a binding alliance with Rockingham,
for "he, and he alone, has a knot of spotless friends such as ought to govern this kingdom" (328).

In the meantime, Grafton, Camden and Granby were threatening to leave the Ministry in which they were now no longer more than ciphers. They had not been capable of resigning while it was honourable to do so, but were now in subversive and apologetic communication with Chatham, in an attempt to overthrow the Government.

This was the political situation when the "Horned Cattle" session began on January 9th, 1770 (329). Chatham sounded the note of the selfless patriot in his denunciation of the persecution of Wilkes. He moved an amendment to the address to the throne, to this effect, which, though it failed to pass, brought into the foreground the one subject upon which the Opposition was in agreement. Camden, finding his voice at last, expressed support for the amendment


(329) The session received this name because the Government, desirous of avoiding controversial issues, had featured as the chief topic of the Speech from the Throne, a distemper that was raging among horned cattle. It was said that the King spoke like "a ruined grazier." The Duke of Grafton and Lord Grosvenor, whose matrimonial troubles were public property, were ironically complimented on the King's feeling allusion to their case.

and resigned (330). It was a mortal blow to the administration. A search was immediately begun for a new Lord Chancellor. George III, never wanting in courage and energy in a political crisis, persuaded Charles Yorke to accept the Great Seal. This expedient was also doomed, however, for three days after his apostacy, the unfortunate Yorke died.

Only one further blow was needed to topple the administration, and this was forthcoming in Chatham's great speech on the Middlesex election petitions on January 22nd, 1770. Rising from the particular to the general, he proceeded in defiance of his class and time to enlarge upon the corrupt and unrepresentative character of Parliament as the root evil from which all others had sprung. Asiatic wealth, he argued, had brought in its train Asiatic methods of government, with the result that thought "the constitution intended that there should be permanent relation between the constituent and the representative body of the people," it had become impossible for any candid man to affirm that "as the house of Commons is now formed, that relation is in any degree preserved."

My Lords, five hundred gentlemen are not ten millions; and if we must have a contention, let us take care to have the English nation on our side ... If they desert their cause they deserve to be slaves. (331)

(330) Camden delayed his resignation until a successor could be appointed, enabling the Government to weather the storm temporarily. Chatham criticised him for "dragging the Great Seal ... at the heels of a desperate minister." Williams, Life of Pitt, Vol. II, p.262.

(331) Ibid., p. 261.
That day, out of the ashes of the Middlesex election controversy, parliamentary reform rose phoenix-like. The spark was carried through the generations of English politics; by Shelburne to Chatham's son; from Pitt to his many disciples - Canning, Huskisson, Melbourne, Grey, and the creators of the Great Reform Bill. The greatest political issue of nineteenth century Britain was born.

Grafton finally resigned on January 27th. Had George III possessed as much patriotism as native cunning, he would, at this point have called for a ministry with popular support. The Opposition was united and ready; the Commons was quiescent; the system of royal government was discredited in popular eyes. Yet he could not overcome his antipathy to Rockingham and Chatham. He went in search of a man, brave or foolish enough to take up Grafton's burden. The appeal was typically fervent; the reply was typically good-natured; and at the eleventh hour Lord North assumed office to save his monarch, to establish the power of the Crown at a high level for half a century to come, to destroy himself and to come near to destroying his country.

Never before or after in his reign did George III have a prime minister so fitted in every way for the work he was intended to accomplish, or so in harmony with the Royal policies; and for twelve turbulent years, North was to continue in office, serving his royal master only too faithfully. Although young, he was wise in the political experience of a diligent subordinate; a steady advocate of Tory principles;
having a mastery of the House of Commons seldom equalled; courageous, industrious, tactful and kindly; he had all the qualities to make him a great minister in a peaceful age (332).

(332) North himself, in a remarkable speech, acknowledged the unpopularity of his beliefs.

Under an Administration whose principles I approved (Pitt-Newcastle), ten years ago I accepted a small office, and was contented with it; those with whom I served know I never molested them on my own account. I had formed principles from which I never deviated, - principles not at all calculated for an ambitious man ... A steady manly resistance of the impatience of those who wanted to ease themselves of the burdens left by the war, put the country at length into a situation to meet other wars. Upon this system I have ever been against popular measures. I supported the Cyder-tax with a view to the ease of the people, and I afterwards opposed the repeal of the tax - a vote which I never repented. In 1765, I was for the American Stamp Act; the propriety of passing which I took very much upon the authority of the right honourable gentleman; and when, in the following year, a bill was brought in for the repeal of the Act, I directly opposed it; for I saw the danger of repeal. And when, again, in the year 1767, it was thought necessary to relieve the people from the pressure of taxation, by lessening the revenue to the extent of half a million, I was against the measure also. Then appeared on the public stage a strange phenomena - an individual grown, by the popularity of the times, to be a man of consequence. I moved the expulsion of Mr. Wilkes. Every subsequent proceeding against that man I have supported; and I will again vote for his expulsion; if he again attempts to take his seat in this House. In all my memory, therefore, I do not recollect a single popular measure I ever voted for - no, not even the Nullum Tempus Bill. I was against declaring the law in the case of general warrants. I state this to prove that I am not an ambitious man. Men may be popular without being ambitious; but there is rarely an ambitious man who does not try to be popular.

Yet his times were too much for him.

The age of Chatham and Temple, of Grenville and Grafton and Townshend was ending. A new age in which the great names were to be North, Wedderburn, Thurlow, Fox and Shelburne was beginning. The long time of transition was over; the stage was set and the actors in place; the tragedy of British defeat was about to begin.

At the moment of supreme crisis, in March 1778, Governor Thomas Hutchinson, a loyalist refugee in England, wrote in despair: "It's certain the political clock stands still." He was wrong; the political clock of Great Britain was ticking the seconds and striking the hours, as it always does, no slower and no quicker; it was a clock, and not a seismograph. (333)

The first significant factor in considering the decline in English public life between 1760 and 1770 was, as we have seen, the obsolescence of the Revolution Settlement. The lack of issues upon which to base a party system was a direct outgrowth of the desire for tranquillity in the nation. In addition, the actual governmental machinery of the Revolution Settlement was sanctified. Parliament remained unreformed, local government continued to outweigh the central authority, and governmental economic policy was more suited to the later middle ages than to the eve of the industrial revolution; all because the spirit of 1688 still ruled. Nor was it only in spirit that the era of William III survived. There was a personal link with the Revolution

(333) Namier, England in the age of the American revolution, p. 46.
through the survival of the politicians of an earlier age. Carteret, Newcastle and Pulteney, although they had not made the Revolution, had been colleagues of Marlborough, Sunderland and Godolphin, who had. When this long domination was finally broken by the disappearance of the elder generation between 1760 and 1770, a gap was left in political life which was not adequately filled by such nonentities as Rockingham and Conway.

The long continuity in politics had other effects. Political life, lacking issues upon which to base parties, split into factions based upon spoils. The corruption of politics in the eighteenth century was without precedent or subsequent imitation. As a result of this corruption and the lack of organized parties, the machinery of politics was not so solidly based that it could survive all threats to its tranquil operation.

In addition, although the Revolution Settlement was firmly established, constitutional developments subsequent to it had not yet been accepted as final. The institutions of cabinet and prime minister were still too new to be habitual. The limitations on the policy-making function of the monarch were not yet part of the normal organization of the English state. Many politicians, particularly those out of favour with the government, even resented these changes and they were resented universally by the House of Hanover. The first two monarchs of that dynasty, however, had lacked
either the interest or the determination to re-assert the still powerful royal authority. George III lacked neither interest nor determination, but only moderation. It is not surprising, therefore, when this doubt as to the permanence of the cabinet is taken into account, that his attempt to re-assert the prerogative power of policy-making met with immediate and widespread success.

The physical, financial and spiritual drain of the Seven Years' War was also a factor in the decline. Pitt was rejected in favour of less ambitious, if less able, leaders. The apathy in political life was reflected in the nation's inability to deal effectively with the great new imperial problems and the new demands of the economic revolution upon the machinery of government. It must not be forgotten that it was an exhausted nation which lost the Thirteen Colonies and which accepted the early abuses of the industrial revolution.

The nation needed tranquillity and had to face unprecedented problems in the empire and in her economy. She was also faced with major transitions in party and class at home. The foundations of the two political parties of the future were laid in the ruins of the Whig system. Opposition to prerogative, as in the seventeenth century, again created issues upon which parties could be established. In addition, the economic revolution was giving new importance to hitherto subordinate classes, and the brief disruptive interval of the Wilkes agitations was an augury of
future changes in political power.

In summary: the machinery of the English state was obsolete in 1760. It needed to be completely overhauled and modernized. An era of security and peace was required if these reforms were to be successfully undertaken. Such an era was not forthcoming. Instead, the empire presented unusual problems requiring immediate solutions, and the temporary revival of the prerogative power, coupled with the rise of new political parties and classes, demanded a high degree of political ability in the nation. In both these fields the nation failed to meet the challenge and lapsed into an era of decline. In addition, the dawn of the industrial age made a wise and vigorous economic policy on the part of the Government essential. The magnitude of this last problem, and the failure of the nation to meet it between 1760 and 1770, will be discussed in the following and final section of this thesis.
PART C: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISRUPTION.

The domestic economy of Britain in 1760, like her political organization, was in a state of transition. It had not yet, however, reached that stage when the more far-reaching and dynamic factors were to plunge her into the most violent era of change in her history. Nor, on the other hand, was the period prior to 1760, one of stagnation. New inventions and discoveries did not galvanize her industries into a great surge of activity. Rather, there were evidences of a gradual expanding of life, which could not develop sufficiently under the old arrangements. The wealth of the continent and lands overseas was being poured through the funnel of English commerce into the English national reservoir. This trade demanded an ever-increasing flow of English manufactures. The old systems of agriculture, communication and transport, industrial and official economic policy were no longer adequate to meet the demands of this new activity. The latter part of the eighteenth century, therefore, was a period of transition in which the national economy adapted itself to meet new requirements. In the transition the life of the nation was profoundly disrupted and a price was paid in human suffering for the prosperity of industrialism. In this section, it is not proposed to deal with the whole vast field of the English economic revolution, but merely with those aspects which were in their nature, directly disruptive in the public life of the nation.
Chapter VII

The Revolution in Agriculture and Transportation.

The change through gradual progress within than revolution, which characterized the transition, is probably best exemplified in the agricultural system in England, in the years immediately preceding and following 1760. By that date, the old type of husbandry was still predominant, but the foundations of change had been laid. The necessity of producing food more efficiently and on a larger scale than ever before, was drawing the wealth of commerce into the land and making England the granary of Europe. Before 1760, the population grew so slowly that, without any real increase in farming skill, and with the new volume of capital made available, the nation could still have produced agricultural surpluses (334). Yet even without the pressure of population to force development, progress was being made, and far-reaching improvements in the cultivation of arable land had already been tested or initiated by men like Jethro Tull and Viscount Townshend.

In the progress of scientific farming, Tull is one of the most remarkable pioneers. His method of drilling wheat and roots in rows was not generally adopted until many years after his death, but the main principles which he laid down in his Horse-hoeing husbandry (1733) proved to be the principles upon which was based the agricultural revolution in tillage. His chief claim to distinction is that he sought, the first of his class, to discover scientific reasons for observed results. In this he was a true heir of the Age of Enlightenment. A shortage of seed determined him to find a new method of sowing and led to the invention of his seed drill. He developed selection cleaning and grading of seed, and demonstrated the value of

(334) Ernle, Lord, English farming, past and present, p. 148.
thin sowing in rows rather than broadcast. He believed that breaking up
the earth prevented the contraction of the area from which the crops fed.
This resulted in the thorough weeding of the land and extended the range
from which the roots of the plants drew their food supply, but the reasons
for the practice rather than the practice was what survived of Tull's work.
His thinly-sown rows failed to mature, and his chief legacies to his successors
were the principles of clean farming, economy of seed, drilling, and
vigorous cultivation.

His principles were not immediately adopted by the majority of farmers,
but many of the most influential landlords took them up. In this connection,
it was fortunate that farming and the outdoor, simple life was becoming
fashionable with the men of the Augustan Age. Thus, such notables as Lord
Halifax in Oxfordshire, Lord Ducie in Gloucestershire, and Lord Cathcart
in Scotland adopted many of the "Tullian improvements". Tull's most impor­tant disciple, however, from the point of view of future progress, was
Charles, second Viscount Townshend.

Retiring from politics in 1730, Townshend devoted the last eight years
of his life to the care of his estates at Raynham in Norfolk. His land
consisted largely of rush-grown marsh and sand dunes. He therefore revived
the ancient custom of marling the sandy soil, a practice which was to make
Norfolk the model for agriculture in England. Arthur Young, in 1769, pays
tribute to the effectiveness of the measure.

All the country from Holkam to Houghton was a wild sheep
walk before the spirit of improvement seized the inhabitants
and this glorious spirit has wrought amazing effects; for in­
stead of boundless wilds, and uncultivated wastes, inhabited
by scarce any thing but sheep; the country is all cut into en­
closures, cultivated in a most husbandlike manner, richly man­
ered, well-peopled, and yielding an hundred times the produce
that it did in its former state. What has wrought these vast
improvements is the marling; for under the whole country run
veins of a very rich soapy kind, which they dig up and spread upon
old sheep-walks, and then by means of enclosing they throw these
farms into a regular course of crops, and gain immensely by the improvement. (335)

Townshend used the marle for two purposes - to consolidate the light soil and to assist in that pulverization of the soil before planting that Tull had recommended. Also following Tull's lines, he drilled and horsehoed his turnips instead of sowing them broadcast. In addition he was the initiator, though not the inventor, of the Norfolk, or four-course system of cropping in which roots, cereals and artificial grasses (now being introduced into England) were alternated. The use of grasses eliminated the unprofitable fallow, hitherto necessary to revive the exhausted land. Now a profitable crop of fodder could be used for this revival. Furthermore, Townshend specialized in the growing of turnips, which were especially easy to raise in the light soil of Norfolk, provided good fertilizer, and fed livestock both summer and winter. (336)

These new discoveries did not immediately take effect with the farmers of even the localities in which they were made, and many of them had to be rediscovered at least once in the succeeding decades, but they created a sufficient impression to encourage further innovations and importation of improvements from other countries. The adoption of artificial grasses has been referred to. The transfer of garden crops such as turnips and cabbages to the field was also begun, and potatoes, already widely cultivated in Ireland, were grown as a source of cheap food for the labouring poor. New

(335) Young, Tour of the southern counties of England, pp. 21-22.

(336) The culture of turnips is here carried on in a most extensive manner; Norfolk being more famous for this vegetable than any other county in the kingdom...the use to which they apply their vast fields of turnips, is the feeding their flocks, and expending the surplus in fatting Scotch cattle, which they do in several methods; by stall-feeding - in binns (sic) in their farmyards - in pasture fields - and lastly, hurdle them on the turnips as they grow, in the same manner as they do the sheep. By stall-feeding they make the crop go much the furthest.

machinery, following on the drills of Tull, was developed, with lighter ploughs (especially the patent plough, introduced in 1730), and a new type of scythe for mowing. The Dutch fanning mill was being adopted in place of the old flail for threshing the grain. New manures were adopted, with rags, bones, refuse of fulling mills, ashes, soot, seaweed and oil cake all being tried. The drainage of low-lying areas, a practice neglected since Roman times, was taken in hand on a considerable scale by 1770. The mixture of soils, particularly in the case of marling, had some popularity. Barnyard manure was applied continuously, but the innovation of stall-feeding, while it saved crops, lessened the available amount of manure, and was only slowly adopted to any degree after 1760. (337)

If any permanent advance in the science of agriculture was to be made, the livestock of the nation must be improved. Wool was still the chief source of profit to the English farmer, and the carcass of the sheep was sacrificed to the fleece. Cattle were valued for their milking or draught capacity, not for their early maturity or fattening properties. Similarly with horses, though racing and hunting had revived the thoroughbred strain, the work-horses were a sorry lot. Because of the poor roads horses needed to be wiry and were therefore useless for heavy draught. The draught animal most widely used was the ox, the draught animal of static societies. The chief difficulty in development, hitherto, had been the poor feeding, but the growing of artificial grasses made an increase in the size of the livestock possible and paved the way for the work of Robert Bakewell. (337). In some counties, as, for instance, Buckinghamshire, open-field farmers hired sheep, with or without a shepherd, for folding on their arable land. The flocks, hired from Bagshot Heath, were fed, partly on the commons, partly on the arable fallows, where they were folded every night from April to October. No money was passed. The flock-master was paid by the feed; the farmer by the folding. The one made his profit by the wool, the other by the manure. Ernle, English farming, past and present, p. 77.
When Bakewell began his experiments at Dishley in the 1750's, crossing was understood to mean the mixture of two alien breeds, one of which was relatively inferior. Bakewell adopted a different principle, since he regarded the method as adulteration of stock rather than improvement. He bred in-and-in, using not only animals of the same breed and line of descent, but of the same family. As a result, he united the finest specimens of the better breeds which he had selected for the possession of points which he wished to reproduce and strengthen. In the case of sheep, he crossed the old Leceister and old Warwickshire breeds, to produce the new Leceistershire breed, notable for their compact forms, small bone, fattening properties and early maturity. He was less successful with cattle and failed entirely with horses, but the principle of in-breeding for the best qualities was established. Breeders everywhere followed his example. Some idea of the effect of the new practices may be gathered from a comparison of the weights of sheep and cattle sold at Smithfield Market in 1710 and 1795.

In 1710, the average weight for beeves was 370 lbs, for calves 50 lbs, for sheep 28 lbs, and for lambs 18 lbs. In 1795, beeves had risen in average weight to 800 lbs, calves to 1148 lbs, sheep to 80 lbs, and lambs to 50 lbs. (338)

The list of pioneers in English agriculture would not be complete without the inclusion of the name of Arthur Young. Though he was a failure at practical farming, he was responsible, more than anyone else, for the spread of knowledge of agricultural improvements. Commencing in the 1760's, he wrote a long series of epistolary accounts of his "tours" about the country, observing all types of agricultural technique in practice and reporting on the usefulness thereof. Possessed of a vigorous and pungent style and a talent for observation, he was one of the most-widely read authors of his time - the invaluable publicist of the agricultural revolution.

(338) Ernle, English farming, past and present, p. 188.
The need of such publicity was all-too apparent. During the first half of the eighteenth century many advances had been made in theory, and some put into practice, but the progress was still confined to localities and often to individuals. The old practices of three-crop rotation, heavy broadcast seeding, soil-mining and out-breeding of livestock still dominated the vast majority of English farms. Such counties as Hertfordshire, Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk and Leceistershire were exceptions in which a relatively high standard of farming was established. Hertfordshire had good roads, a high proportion of arable soil and was near the capital. There was a development of dairy-farming to supply London, and the use of manure and root crops made the growth of better crops much easier. In addition, the relatively large area of newly-enclosed land made the establishment of the open-field system practically impossible. In Essex and Suffolk, the nearness to the capital's industrial area, the use of water transport and the development of draught horses were all significant factors. These were also almost the only counties in England in which the relatively cheap source of meat, pork, was raised on any large scale. (339). Norfolk and Leceistershire benefitted from the human factor, since their industrious populations and the lead given them by the work of Townshend and Bakewell were used to advantage.

All these improvements, however, had been carried out by the wealthier land-owners, gentleman-farmers like Tull and Townshend. (340). To enable

(339) Young, Tour through the southern counties of England, pp. 291-292.

(340) They who suppose any improvement originally owing to common farmers are somewhat mistaken. All the well-known capital strokes of husbandry are traced accurately to gentlemen: from whence comes the introduction of tynreps (sic) in England? But from Tull. Who introduced clover? But Sir Richard Weston. Marling in Norfolk is owing to Lord Townshend and Mr. Allen. In a word the most noted improvements were devised and first practiced by gentlemen; common husbandmen in a long period of years, imitated the method in proportion to the success, and so by slow degrees it becomes general. Ibid., pp. ix-x.
common farmers to develop anything like the invention or the enterprise of the pioneers, the conditions of land tenure and economic organization of agriculture needed to be altered radically. This process was already in full tide, with the substitution of the enclosed capitalist farming for the old open-field, strip-farming system. In the second half of the eighteenth century this change was to be accelerated a hundredfold, partly by the rise of the price of corn, partly by the pressure of a growing population, and partly by the improved technique in agriculture. (343).

The movement had been going on for centuries before 1760, and was really a manifestation of that individualism which had developed during the Renaissance and the commercial revolution. The new commercially-minded gentry of England grew restive under the restrictions of the backward communities, a general intellectual activity manifested itself throughout the nation, and there was a universal desire to cast off the old system. The agrarian disruption attendant upon the dispoiling of the monasteries helped the movement enormously. The recipients of sequestered lands were able, if only temporarily, to organize farming on a capitalistic basis, and their example was followed wherever possible in the two succeeding centuries. The change was, in fact, the effect, while still the accompaniment, of the new technique. Without substitution of the separate occupation for the ancient system of common cultivation in village units, this new technique was impossible to put into practice. Efficient farming cannot be carried on in a system where each man's land is impossibly split into widely-separated and minute strips; nor can it be carried on where each reactionary peasant has an equal voice in the planning and administration thereof. Yet in carrying out the necessary changes, rural society was

(343) According to Toynbee, 334,974 acres were enclosed between 1710 and 1760, while nearly 7,000,000 were enclosed between 1760 and 1813. Toynbee, Arnold, The industrial revolution, p. 38.
convulsed and its general conditions disrupted. The drift of the peasant from the soil and the elimination of the commoners and the open-field farmers was the price the nation paid for the supply of bread and meat to an increasing industrial population.

The old agricultural organization had three prominent features. The first was the so-called "waste-land", which might be forest, stoney ground or marsh, though often it was cultivated if reclaimed. Arthur Young calculated in 1768 that fifteen million out of thirty-four million acres in England was still waste land (342). The second feature was the open-field in which the land was divided into three fields of good, medium and poor land, and further sub-divided into strips which were assigned to the village farmers for cultivation. In order that no farmer should have an undue advantage, the strips were parcelled out equally in the good and poor soil so that the holdings of each man were not consolidated and the separate strips were too small to farm efficiently. All peasants were bound to follow the customary system of tillage, All soil had to be treated alike and all crops had to be sown and reaped at the same time. No winter crops could be grown so long as the arable land was subject to pasture rights from August to February. Drainage was primitive and wasted more land than it saved. The ploughed area was much too large and much of it should have been used for pasture. Footpaths, made necessary by the division into strips, cris-crossed the land and wasted acreage. In the actual farming, one strip was left fallow each year; on the other two wheat and barley were grown, and sometimes oats or tares. It was substantially the agrarian system of the middle ages still flourishing in the eighteenth century. A modern authority has given a vivid picture of the open-field system.

The cultivated fields were generally foul, if not from the fault of the occupier, from the slovenliness of his neighbours;

(342) Young, Farmer's letters, p. 4.
the turf-baulks harboured twitch; the triennial fallows left their heritage of crops of docks and thistles. The unsheltered hedgeless open-fields were hurtful to the livestock, though the absence of hedges was not without its advantages to the corn. The farm buildings were gathered together in the village, often a mile or more from the land. As each man's strips lay scattered over each of the open-fields, he wasted his day in visiting the different parcels of his holding, and his expenses of manuring, reaping carting and horse-keeping were enormously increased...Vexatious rights interfered with proper cultivation. One man might have the right to turn his plough on another's strip, and the victim must wait his neighbour's pleasure or risk damage to his sown crops. (3h3)

The third feature of the old system was the common field. This was held in common by all the peasantry in the village and was used for pasture. Naturally, since it was not the charge of any individual and the village was not under the pressing necessity to co-operate, the land was neglected. Even in good seasons, there was barely enough grass to keep the cattle and sheep alive. When the weather was cold or wet, the grass was late and scanty, and much of the livestock died for want of food. Such cattle were naturally miserable specimens. Timothy Nourse's description of them is noteworthy.

And as the men, so are the cattle, that are bred upon such commons, being a starved, scabby, and rascally race. Their sheep are poor, tattered and poisoned with rot. Their cattle and colts are dwarfed and ragged: for little beggarly Stone-colts, running promiscuously amongst the herd, beget a miserable, shotten and bastardly breed...Nor are commons only injurious to horses, but also cattle, the increase of such places being nothing but a sort of starved, tod-bellied runts, neither fit for dairy nor the yoke. (3h4)

Furthermore, though most of the commoners were restricted as to the number of their stock, a few, sometimes including the lord of the nearby manor, could turn out as many cattle as they wished and might even pasture those of strangers for a fee. Such inequalities naturally operated against the poorer commoners. If the commons were thus thrown open, every man who held other pastures saved them until the last moment, ordinarily feeding his

(3h3) Ernle, English farming, p. 155.
livestock on the common. Once the old local Courts Baron had disappeared, the small commoner had no redress against his neighbour who pastured more than custom permitted.

In addition to the evils inherent in the communal system, the various methods of land tenure operated against the weaker tenants. The increase in population had long ago replaced feudal services, including tithes (345), with money rents in return for land, but the form of tenure was much as it had been in the middle ages. There was, however, a tendency to concentrate all rights in a parcel of land in a single owner—usually through the methods of fee simple or a freehold after a certain number of years. The old system of copyhold (the payment of a fine on renewal or inheritance) was an obstacle to such consolidation and attempts were made, wherever possible to convert these into leaseholds for a number of years. This change tended to turn the landlord into the absolute owner. By 1760, copyholds were rapidly disappearing.

The new leaseholds, however, were full of drawbacks for the tenant. Though the right of inheritance for a certain number of lives or years was specified in the title, there was no guarantee of tenure for the tenant, nor of profit for the landlord. Fines were often raised against a renewal of tenure and the tenant, uncertain of renewal, often mined the land in the last few years of tenancy, ruining it for succeeding tenants. Even when a tenant farmer possessed both enterprise and capital, such systems of land-tenure discouraged improvement, and the covenants in some leases, designed to preserve the fertility of the land, were also limitations on progressive methods.

(345) The Church still levied its tithe, but many were now compounded for money. The money tithe was more rigid throughout economic fluctuations and was therefore more unpopular with tithe owners. Many were acquired from the clergy and were bought and sold as investments. The old tithe in kind, however, was a hinderance to agricultural progress since it ate up surpluses which might have been used for improvement. Moffit, England on the eve of the industrial revolution, p. 35.
The concentration on leasehold tenancy also tended to increase the size of the farms. Between 1720 and 1785 consolidation of leases was fatal to the small owner, and there was also much termination of leases and buying out of small freeholders. By 1755, farms as large as 3,000 acres were to be found in Norfolk, though Arthur Young noted that these were the exception, rather than the rule.

...the greatest part of the kingdom is divided into small farms; for these under 300 acres (including the most waste and barren soil) cannot be thought large in any county. The tour extends twice through the large one of Northumberland which contains few farms that are small, and some so great as 6,000 acres, several of which class are included in the average; the generality, therefore, must be of very moderate size for the medium of the whole to be no more than 287 acres. (346).

There had been, moreover, a close connection between the small holdings and the domestic system of industry. As this latter developed, rents increased. Gradually, in the early part of the eighteenth century, the weavers and clothiers of the northern counties were driven into the country districts by the restrictions of the town corporations and the increased cost of living. On the land, the worker was able to supplement his earnings during slack times by farming. The rise in rents and the gradual consolidation of holdings in the second half of the century, however, was a major contributing factor in destroying domestic system and driving the worker back on the town and the factory system.

The waste under the old system of agriculture was excessive, but so long as farming remained unprogressive and the population stationary, the economic loss to the nation was unimportant. With the improvement of methods and increase of resources for farming, and with the demand for food threatening to increase above the supply, the need for change became imperative. In the second half of the eighteenth century, there was a general upsurge in the number of enclosures. Between 1755 and 1637, 2.1 per cent

of the area of England was enclosed, while in the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries, nearly 20 per cent was enclosed (347). The reasons for
this increase varied with the different localities. In the border counties,
in the north and west, there was generally a preponderance of forest or
unbroken land. Where this was encroached upon, it was generally farmed by
individuals with considerable amounts of capital and the old system never
really took root. In addition, the uncertainties of border warfare had pre-
vented communal villages from growing up to any marked degree. Where in-
dustrial areas grew up, there was also a rapid breakdown of the open-field
system, since the need for supplying those areas with food on an unpreceden-
ted scale transcended any rights of the communes.

Furthermore, the revolution in stock-breeding demanded larger areas
for grazing. This has often been cited as the chief reason for enclosure,
especially in the case of sheep-raising. Actually the wool trade was res-
ponsible for much of the early enclosure, but by the eighteenth century it
had declined to a minor factor. Of greater significance was the fact that
the eighteenth century saw an unprecedented demand for corn for export.
The corn-growing areas of the East, Northeast and Midlands were those most
widely affected by the enclosures after 1760. With the rise in prices of
corn, soon after the accession of George III, the drive to place farming on
a capitalistic basis was quickened. Finally, the broadening outlook among
the more intelligent classes came into sharp conflict with the old restricted
and localized views of the commoners, as it was coming into conflict with
the old economic system in all its aspects. So long as the commons remained
they represented in the short term the fixed obsession of the English peas-
antry with the past. The villagers could look no further than the bounds
of the common and developments in agriculture were impossible.

What is loosely called the enclosure movement was actually three closely related processes: the reclamation and appropriation of wastelands, the break-up of the open-fields, and the appropriation of the commons. They were brought about in a number of ways. The common fields were often extinguished by the legal uniting of various rights, by the severing of rights from the tenancy to which they were attached, by disuse, or by destruction of the produce for which the right was held. Often the enclosure was not the arbitrary act of a single landlord but the consolidation of various claims by consent, after which the land was redistributed on a more efficient basis.

In respect to the open-field, approvement was often practiced, whereby the landlord gained the right to make what use he wished of the land of indigent tenants, provided commons rights were preserved. Agreements were also made for cash payments. The most spectacular of the enclosures, however, were made by Acts of Parliament, both private and general. Private acts began to be instituted systematically in the reign of Anne, but had been passed at intervals since Tudor times. From 1702 until 1800, these acts operated as a generally-recognized system, and thereafter they were passed under a General Enclosure Act. From 1702 to 1760, 200 of these acts were passed, of which 130 concerned open-fields, and 70 waste or commons. In 1760 the nation was on the eve of a great wave of enclosures, in which 2,000 acts were passed up to 1800, and ten times as much land enclosed as hitherto. (348).

In these operations, the small owner or leaseholder was at a terrible disadvantage. Throughout the process, two interests were primarily protected, those of the lord of the manor and of the tithe-holder. The large landowner might be able to influence Parliament, and he could, in any case

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(348) Toynbee, The industrial revolution, p. 28.
retain a lawyer to present his case. The small farmer often could do neither.

(349) The arguments for and against the enclosure movement have continued up to the present day. Certainly some of the results of the change were a horrible price to pay for efficiency. Though the acts often contained safeguards against injustice, the old system was far too widespread to prevent its destruction resulting in a mass displacement of population. On the purely economic side, the movement was a distinct benefit. Yet, though agriculturists scarcely looked beyond the economic waste of the open-fields (350), and social reformers condemned the human wastage in the system, the social evils of its cure were soon to become apparent. Few realized the full consequences of the change, or appreciated the strength of the upsurge in capitalist farming. In human misery alone, the cost was enormous, as the rural social structure was dislocated, the cottars and squatters on the common driven from the land and the number of charges on the parish rates enormously increased.

(349) He could not read or write and he could not afford to get a lawyer to speak for him. About his rights he knew little except that as long as he could remember he had kept a cow, driven geese across the waste, pulled his fuel out of the brushwood and cut his turf from the common and that his father had done all these things before him. Even if he succeeded in making out his claim, he would often receive his compensation in the form of a small plot of land which he had to sell because he could not afford to fence it. Hammond, J.J. and B., The rise of modern industry, p. 87.

(350) The common plea in favour of downs and sheep-walks, is the produce of wool; but the most exact calculations that can be made plainly prove the vast superiority of arable farms, with a proper proportion of grasses; nor does the rent of any tract of land, in the employment of manufactures, by a hundred degrees equal the population tending the plough. What an amazing improvement it would be, to cut this vast plain (Salisbury) into farms, by enclosures of quick hedges, regularly planted with such trees as best suited the soil. A very different aspect the country would present from what it does at present, without a hedge, tree or hut; and inhabited only by a few shepherds and their flocks. Young, Southern tour, p. 202.
The benefits of the new system were not universal, moreover. In many places the farmers on the enclosures continued the same inefficient methods of farming and in some cases the landlord bound them to the old ways. Individual responsibility helped good farmers to progress, but rendered bad farmers helpless. Where the village commune had been able, under good leadership, to co-operate effectively many of the old practices had been extremely beneficial. (351).

The destruction of the old relationships between master and man was one of the chief costs of the change. Landlords as they prospered drew away from their tenants, and farmers, in turn, ceased to work with their labourers. The labourer's lot was made much worse. He felt most of the burden of high prices while his wages were steadily falling, and he had not the security of a plot of land. The result was the disappearance of two classes, the agricultural labourer and the small yeoman. With this disappearance began the decline of the highly specialized industry of British agriculture. (352).

A most important aspect of any industry is its marketing organization, and in the case of agriculture, this was of special importance in the lives of the people, and serves to illustrate the changes in marketing in general in the period under discussion. The chief phenomenon of eighteenth century marketing was the rise of the middleman. Before 1660, his activities had been banned by legislation, but gradually his usefulness came to be realized. (353). The activities of such men were necessary if the trade economy

(351) Emile, English farming, p. 199.

(352) Toynbee, The industrial revolution, p. 92.

(353) Sir Josiah Child in 1694, defends the middleman; condemning: Our Law against engrossing Corn and other Commodities, there being no Persons more beneficial to a Trade in a Nation, than Engrossers, which will be worthy Employment for our present Usurers, and under them truly useful to their Country. Child, A new discourse on trade, p. 72.
was to function efficiently. Their influence varied with different industries. In the sale of perishable foods, speed of turnover was required and the middleman was almost completely eliminated. In the cattle trade, his status varied. Graziers had been responsible for fattening beasts and bought from farmers to sell to butchers. They employed drovers to drive the cattle to market and eventually these began to sell to the butchers. Gradually the structure grew with jobbers and salesmen intervening between drover and butcher. Stock yards grew up in the market towns, culminating in the huge livestock market in Smithfield, with its complex organization of buyers and sellers. Despite the change of functions and the development of stock-breeding, the prices of meat throughout the eighteenth century remained remarkably steady. The organization of the marketing system and the fact that meat was a relatively perishable item prevented manipulations of price through hoarding, so that normal seasonal and cyclical fluctuations were the only serious limitation on free marketing.(354).

In the dairy industry and the woollens, marketing and prices tended to reflect much the same trends. The wool trade was subject to severe export restrictions under the mercantilist system, and it gradually declined as the pasturing for wool was discouraged in the latter half of the century in favour of the cultivation of corn. Once the industrial revolution began to affect the manufacture of woollens in Yorkshire, moreover, the balance swung in favour of the import of raw wool and home production was further discouraged.

The chief interest in markets and prices in the eighteenth century,

(354) In 1764, the middlemen were accused of raising prices, however. The arguments of a higher demand in London, the premature slaughter of hogs leading to a shortage in 1762, the poor weather and the scarcity of fodder in 1762 were all rejected, and the combinations among buyers of livestock to raise the price was judged to be the real reason, despite the obvious inflationary tendencies following the war. Annual register, 1764, p. 68.
however, concerned the corn trade. Here the function of the middleman was best developed and the abuses of price-fixing and hoarding most widely suspected and practiced. Licensing of middlemen was adopted as early as the fifteenth century, but the system broke down, and by the middle of the eighteenth century the number of corn factors was out of all proportion to the trade involved. The demands of local markets were often at the root of legislation against middlemen. By 1760 the metropolitan market's ascendancy had been so established, however, that only where a real surplus was proven were buyers from a distance permitted to operate. The Corn Exchange was built by the corn factores, and they held the control of the trade completely in their hands. They were actually a stabilizing in the market, despite the objections of the uninformed. The era before 1760, was one of steadily increasing profit in any case, since the population did not increase fast enough to deplete the surpluses of corn, and the payment of bounties and shortages abroad encouraged its export.

The resentment manifested for the middleman in the grain trade was not confined to the factor. Millers who dealt directly with both producer and consumer, were the object of dangerous food riots in the 1750's and 1760's. Even as late as 1772, it is noted that:

"About eleven o'clock at night, a mob assembled at Chelmsford, armed with bludgeons, and next day went in a body to visit the mills in that neighbourhood, from whence they took great quantities of wheat and wheat flour. At Witham and Sudbury, upon the same road, they stopt the cars laden with meat for the London markets, and exposed it to sale at three-pence per pound; the wheat they seize, they sell at 4s. a bushel, and give the money to the owners." (355)

By 1772, however, a secondary post-war depression following the Seven Years' War was in full tide, and the resentment against middlemen was also linked to the economic cycle. Rural middlemen, such as mealmen and flourmen were unpopular as well as their more notorious brethren in the cities.

(355) Annual register, 1772, p. 91.
Adulteration of flour by Manchester mealmen caused food riots which lasted for a fortnight in 1758 (356), and the general flavour of popular lawless resentment against depression, was accurately reflected throughout the nation. Malting also expanded as the increase in the consumption of alcoholic liquors in the eighteenth century expanded the size and scope of the market. Brewers, inn-keepers and bakers became engrossers of grain and owners of retail businesses, illustrating the expansion of the functions of the middleman in both directions in the trade structure. It was the beginning of the consolidation of industry on a vertical plane which has continued down to the present day.

The surplus grain had three main markets: the industrial non-self-sufficing areas, the urban area of London, and the foreign market. Before 1760 there was little local exclusion of corn-growing except in the textile areas of Yorkshire and Lancashire. Hence, the land was usually over-productive in respect to the needs of the nation as a whole. In the industrial areas, however, the land was not productive and supplies from other areas, in that era of uncertain transportation, were not always adequate. In addition, London was both the largest consumer and the largest exporter of corn, and drained most of the surrounding area to the extent that she handled about two-fifths of the total production. (357).

The foreign market was the most significant, in that it controlled all the others through its dependence on the English Corn Laws. Charles II had imposed duties on the importation of corn which decreased as the domestic price increased. These were repealed, however, in 1689 in favour of a more flexible method of controlling price. The new regulations declared that when wheat prices were at or under forty-eight shillings a quarter, 

(356) Moffit, England on the eve of the industrial revolution, p. 81.
(357) Ibid., p. 86.
a bounty of five shillings a quarter was to be allowed on every quarter of home-grown wheat exported and importation of foreign grain was forbidden. Importation might be permitted, however, when prices rose above forty-eight shillings. The value of the legislation is open to serious doubt. Prosperity generally seems to have been unaffected by it, but it did, except in the last few years of its operation, tend to modify the great fluctuations in price. (358). Since England was, up to 1770, almost entirely dependent upon home-grown supplies, prices of corn were extremely sensitive to fluctuations in harvests. Average harvests provided sufficient bread, but the margin was often narrow. Even the slightest falling-off in yield was unnaturally reflected in phenomenal increases in price. Similarly, even the prospect of surplus served to drive prices ridiculously low.

Any hope of importing foreign corn at reasonable prices during a time of national shortage, however, overlooked the homogeniety of the corn-growing area of Europe. A harvest failure usually hit all areas simultaneously, and foreign corn with the cost of shipment added, even in times of shortage, was usually more expensive than the home-grown product. The consumers, therefore, suffered very little from the heavy duty on imports of corn.

The laws on bounty, liberty of export and restriction on import were continuously operative, however. The era between 1700 and 1765 was one of rapid increase of surpluses. Wheat export increased 416 per cent, barley 281 per cent and malt 317 per cent. (359). In that time, prices showed a fall of 16 per cent. In nine years (1698, 1699, 1700, 1709, 1710, 1711, 1757, 1758, and 1759) the bounty on the export of corn was prohibited. It will be noted that all these were years of political crisis and some of

actual war. In addition, in 1741, 1757 and 1758 corn was admitted duty-free. (360).

Up to 1765 the market was remarkable for low prices, a large export trade in home-grown corn, and the undoubted prosperity of the labouring classes. (361). By contrast, the period after 1765 was notable for high prices, a growing importation of foreign corn, and great misery among the wage-earning population. The average price of wheat before 1765 practically trebled by the end of the century. The rise in prices was attributed variously to the manipulations of corn factors, the growth of population, the increased cost of capitalist farming under the newly-consolidated system, the depreciation of currency, unfavourable seasons and the economic drain of the Seven Years' War. Probably the most effective reasons were the unfavourable seasons and the strain of the war. Certainly the price of corn was an important political determinant. The coal-heavers, seamen, weavers and miscellaneous paupers which formed the bulk of the mobs in these years, and under the leadership of Wilkes terrorized the capital, had very often at the basis of their grievances, the high price of food. In addition, as we shall see, the Government was very reluctant to impose further burdens of taxation on the land and fearing to tax the mercantile interests, was driven to a variety of ineffective expedients, the most notable of which were the Cider Tax, the national lotteries, the Stamp Act and the Revenue Act.


(361) With the exception of the years in which deficient harvests occurred, the period was generally a prosperous one for the labouring classes in England. The level of prices was low and steady. As compared with the average price of wheat in the seventeenth century, the first sixty-five of the eighteenth century show a fall of sixteen percent, and its relative cheapness was accompanied by a rise of the same percentage in the wages of the agricultural labourer. It seems probable that the reign of George II was the nearest approach to the Golden Age of the labouring classes. Ibid. p. 262.
In the administration of the Corn Laws, the varying interests of the producer and consumer clashed, with the producer generally benefitting, since the protection of the corn trade was believed by the Government to be in the national interest. (362). The laws were framed for the benefit of the producers to relieve them from the pressure of accumulated stock, and so that they might, in the form of the land tax, bear their share in the increased public burdens. One further reason for the continuance of the benefits to agriculture was strictly political. Whig politicians found it cheaper to bribe the Tory squires into submission to the "Court Party", than to be forever under the necessity of ferreting out Jacobite plots.

It was hoped, from the consumers' point of view, that the bounty would stimulate the production of home-grown grain and so provide a constant supply of corn and stabilize prices at a lower average. In the years of scarcity, as we have seen, the bounty had little direct effect. In the years of abundance the bounty may have stimulated production to prevent a fall in prices, and this was agreed to be a sufficient compensation to producers. In addition, since the bounty was paid without regard to the quality of the grain exported, it was believed that English consumers benefitted from having the superior qualities retained for home consumption. Against such a benefit, however, may be measured the interference with natural cheapness in years of abundance and the loss of six million pounds, which was the bill that had to be paid out of general taxation for bounties to the producers.

(362) Producers' strengths pulled one way and consumers' necessity the other. For wheat was a necessity of the poor, and agriculture was the symbol of productive strength at home. Cotton and wool were also objects of national concern; but cotton was an upstart, and more wool meant more sheep and more sheep had hitherto meant fewer husbandmen. By contrast, the smiling wheat fields with their human labour always on or about them were a precious boon for which England like other wheat-raising nations thanked Divine Providence, and therefore she took such measures as she could to keep them smiling. Fay, C.R., "The significance of the corn laws in English history", Economic history review, Vol. I, p. 43.
up to the year 1765. (363).

A nation which was thus expanding its economy required a unity of all localities, both as to economic and social, and such unity could only be achieved with an efficient communication system. The English communication system in the middle of the eighteenth century was very bad. With the exception of a few miles of canal in the making, and a few river estuaries of very limited navigability, the roads were the chief means of transportation.

The dependence on roads as a unifying factor is best illustrated by the role of itinerant pedlar.

The arrival of the pedlar was still eagerly expected in country villages, where he did not appear only as the philosophical enthusiast of the poet's license. Rather he was the milliner of rural beauties, the arbiter of fashion to village bucks, the newsagent of the alehouse politician, the retailer of the most recent gossip, the vendor of smuggled tea, the purveyor of the latest amorous ditty. He was typical of the times when villages were isolated, self-sufficing, dependent on his summer and winter circuits for their knowledge of the world beyond the parish boundaries. (364).

The roads, in fact, were as bad as possible. No really systematic mending or replacement had been attempted since the Romans had left the country, and even the Roman roads were beginning to wear down after fourteen centuries. In many cases the Roman roads were ignored altogether for the muddy tracks which, as G.K. Chesterton has pointed out, were twisted across the face of the countryside by the devious English genius. Most of these so-called roads, especially in the north, were impassable for carriages, except in extremely dry summers. Pack-horse and post-horse were the usual means of conveyance. A contemporary description of Lancashire roads, illustrates the primitiveness of communication.

(364) Ibid., p. 284.
For many ages, and to the middle of this (eighteenth) century, a causeway about 2 feet wide paved with round pebbles was all that man or horse could tread on, practically, in the winter season both in Lancashire and Cheshire. This causeway was guarded by posts at a proper distance to keep carts off it, and the open part of the road was generally impossible in the winter for mire and ruts. (365).

Or Arthur Young's expletives on the roads of Essex:

Of all the cursed roads that ever disgraced this kingdom, in the very ages of barbarism, none ever equalled that from Billericay to the King's Head at Tilbury. It is for near 12 miles so narrow, that a mouse cannot pass by any carriage; I saw a fellow creep under his wagon to assist me to lift, if possible, my chaise over a hedge. The ruts (sic) are of incredible depth — and a pavement of diamonds might as well be bought for a quarter. The trees everywhere over-grow the road, so that it is totally impervious to the sun, except at a few places: And to add to all the infamous circumstances, which occur to plague a traveller, I must not forget the eternally meeting with the chalk-waggons; themselves frequently stuck fast, till a collection of them are in the same situation, that twenty or thirty horses may be tacked to each, to draw them out one by one. (366).

In many cases, where the drainage was poor and the mud deep, only horsemen could make their way. The usual "roads" were strips of mud bordered by a narrow pebbled "pack and prime" way. Pack trains moved along this as did pedestrians. The width of the roads varied from four to fourteen yards, though there were eight or nine, with a four foot "pack and prime" way. (367) Ferrys were used for crossing streams, for it was not until 1770 that the bridge-building era began. Drainage varied in quality, but even where it was good, the unmetaled tracks soon broke down under the strain of having to support the migrating herds of cattle which were driven to London market. (368)


(366) Young, Southern tour, p. 88.


(368) Already in the middle of the eighteenth century it was estimated that 40,000 Highland cattle annually tramped their way to the meadows of Norfolk, there to be fattened and sent off in weekly droves throughout the winter, to walk to the London market....Altogether, during the third quarter of the eighteenth century, something like a hundred thousand head of cattle and three-quarters of a million sheep found their way to Smithfield annually... by whose feet the highways leading to the Metropolis must have been kept constantly in a state of mud that we find it difficult nowadays to imagine. Webb, Sydney and Beatrice, English local government, The king's highway, pp. 67-68.
Gradually such tracks widened as vehicles deviated to avoid the ruts of their predecessors. Isolation of villages from one another was often complete and the possibilities of unity on a national scale for progressive change were almost non-existent.

The responsibility for the upkeep of the roads was that of the parish, and was supposed to be enforced by the justices of the peace at the quarter sessions. Where the hopelessly inefficient system of parish administration was held responsible, however, little permanent improvement could be effected. The parishes were often too poor to support the roads or too content in isolation to care if they were supported. The responsible officers, the parish constable or the surveyor, appointed for only a year at a time by their fellow-ratepayers, had no idea of road-engineering and were inclined to relieve their fellows of the statutory labour on the roads for a small monetary consideration. The roads grew worse instead of better with every advance of industry.

As the strain of supporting roads grew too great for the separate parishes, Parliament began in the seventeenth century to grant concessions to corporations for turnpiking large sections of the road, that is, providing for the upkeep through tolls. These had developed to a considerable degree in the south of the country before 1700, but it was not until after 1750 that the north and west received their benefit. The turnpikes were operated by trusts set up by private acts of Parliament, and charged with constructing and maintaining a definite piece of road. The usual method was for the trust to raise a loan for the cost of construction and pay the interest on it by collecting tolls. Since the initial outlay was high, improvement in roads and maintenance usually took some years to make itself felt. Certainly there was a general improvement over conditions under parish authority. The method put private enterprise and public direction in much the same relation as that established by the chartered company in
foreign trade, with the difference that the turnpike trusts were not subject to parliamentary control to the same extent, and were, in fact, subordinated to the parish authorities — with much the same disadvantages to the public service as had been apparent under the old system.

The districts for which the trusts were set up were often much too small to be useful. Thus the road from Shrewsbury to Bangor (eighty-five miles) was under six trusts, most of them deep in debt, too poor to pay for skilled labour and too jealous to co-operate with one another. (369). The main thoroughfares, instead of being systematically dealt with, were left by Parliament to the palsied hand of local authority. Here the trusts in many cases gradually came to dominate local government and free themselves from its restrictions. The old inefficient system of statutory labour was employed, and the local inhabitants often compounded with the trusts to evade their just contributions of money and labour for the roads. The result was an amazing patchwork in place of proper highways.

The trusts were very unpopular locally for two reasons. The first was the old localized resentment against contact with "foreign ideas and people of the rest of the kingdom, and fear that the building of good roads would mean the end of local prosperity. Arthur Young observed this resentment, and was inclined to support it.

I found all the sensible people attributed the dearness of their country to the turnpike roads; and reason speaks the truth of their opinion. I can imagine many tracts of country, and there are certainly such in the kingdom, wherein provisions cannot be dear. The inhabitants of those tracts, are in the right to keep their secret; make but a turnpike road through their country, and all the cheapness vanishes at once. (370).

There was also much active resentment in the form of riots and the destruction of toll-gates. Where the road had always been free, the peas-

(369) Ernle, English farming, p. 284.

(370) Young, Southern tour, pp. 317-318.
entry resented having to detour their cattle through the bogged bye-ways or pay the ruinous tolls of the turnpike. They could not understand the reason for the obstruction, nor that it was progress in a most beneficial form, according to the lights of the enlightened oligarchs at Westminster. From the middle of the eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth, the annals of the times are filled with accounts of turnpike riots, especially in the north of England. The multiplication of these trusts, though it often defeated its own purpose, is the strongest evidence of the growing awareness of the need to improve the roads, however. Between 1760 and 1774, no less than 452 turnpike acts were passed, and this number was considerably increased in the following decades (371) The trusts were usually created for twenty-one years at a time, but gradually renewal came to be practically automatic.

After 1760 also, there was a definite improvement both in road engineering and in the construction of conveyances for the new roads. Here and there some local genius like "Blind Jack" Metcalf of Knaresborough was already constructing properly metaled all-weather roads. Metcalf built his first road in 1765, and gradually he was able to improve the road system of Yorkshire, anticipating the work of Macadam and Telford by half a century. Special conveyances were also being developed. The "land carriage" for perishable and luxury products, like fish, game and butter, had been constructed, and special types of fast carriage horses were being bred to pull them. Coaches and carriages, which hitherto had been sturdily, not to say crudely, constructed to withstand the wear and tear of the roads, were now being built for the comfort of the passengers, and the use of steel springs in them was developing. The construction of great commercial passenger coaches was also undertaken and travel throughout the kingdom, other than

by water, was, for the first time, feasible. A craze for travelling developed, of which Arthur Young's "Tours" and the journey of Boswell and Johnson through the Hebrides are two of the more famous illustrations.

The effect of this travel was remarkable. For the first time the whole island became a social unit. The movement of people, long restricted by the lack of roads, began, with great migrations from the less productive areas of the kingdom to the new industrial and urban ones. Arthur Young notes this new trend with disapproval, in 1769.

To find fault with good roads, or any such public convenience in this age, would have the appearance of paradox and absurdity; but it is nevertheless a fact that giving the power of expeditious travelling, depopulates the kingdom. Young men and women in the country villages, fix their eye on London, as the last stage of their hope; they enter into service in the country for little but to raise money enough to go to London, which was no such easy matter when a stage-coach was four or five days creeping an hundred miles; the fare and the expenses ran high. But now! A country fellow, one hundred miles from London, jumps to a coach box in the morning, and for eight or ten shillings gets to town by night; which makes a material difference; besides rendering the going up and coming down so easy, that the numbers who have seen London are increased to tenfold, and of course ten times the boasts are sounded in the ears of country fools, to induce them to quit their healthy clean fields, for a region of dirt, stink and noise. (372).

If the improvement of the roads was taken alone, as an isolated factor, the result in the disruption of the lives of the people would have been profound. The human quality of curiosity by itself would have sent many out to see the world. It was not an isolated factor, however; it was combined with the very great developments in agriculture which in turn resulted in the displacement of large numbers of people; and by the growth of industry which was prepared to absorb this drifting population into its huge framework. In the first decade of the reign of George III this process was in its first stages, but it had already advanced sufficiently to change the life of the people out of all recognition, and the adaption of government policy to these new conditions was to be the work of the following three-

(372) Young, Farmer's letters, p. 30h.
quarters of a century. The implications of change, in fact, were in the nature of a challenge to the older organization of England in all its aspects, and hence tended to be a weakening element in a time of national emergency.
Chapter VIII

The Revolution in Industry.

The chief economic phenomenon of the eighteenth century was the amazing upsurge in the development of industry, which has been called the industrial revolution. With the opening of the eighteenth century, England began to develop her productive capacity. Agriculture, by the adoption of new technical methods, and a new economic organization, was rapidly increasing the food supply of the nation. In industry, there was first the localizing of staple industries in the provinces and then growth of the industries, aided by a benevolent attitude on the part of the government and by a rigidly protective tariff. Before the industrial revolution began, mines, blast furnaces and smelting houses were all organized on a capitalistic basis. The gathering together of workmen under one roof, the hall-mark of the capitalistic-factory system, was present only in a few industries where non-human power was used, and even there it was not on a capitalistic basis, but merely adopted to save time and trouble in the distribution and collection of material.

Mining was the industry nearest to being organized on a capitalistic basis. In coal mining, the need for centralizing labour and the high-cost basis of operation had already reduced the miners to the level of labourers. Much the same was true of the copper and iron mines, though lead and tin mining were on a freer basis. Other industries on a semi-capitalistic basis included the calico-printing works of London, the blast furnaces, the great silk mill at Derby, and some iron works, notably those at Birmingham and Falkirk. In places where non-human power was used, such as corn mills, fulling mills, swivel looms for cotton fabrics and water mills for power generally, the capitalist organization had been adopted without
the accompanying factory organization or division of labour. Apart from these, industry in the middle of the eighteenth century was organized on a domestic basis.

Certainly that type of system had its advantages. There was household unity; the workman was his own master and the superintendent of his family and apprentices. There was supposed to be healthier atmosphere for work than in the city, and a greater pride of the craftsman in the work. All factors of production were centred in the workman. Thus the social unity of the employer and employee was preserved. Only the material for manufacture and the marketing of the product were out of his hands. In addition, the peasant-manufacturer usually held a few acres of land, which in slack seasons provided him with a livelihood and kept him from idleness.

Gradually, however, the functions were changing. Such development was not clear-cut, and often the old existed side by side with the new in the same industry. Various operations were taken over by the merchant who supplied the materials of the industry and marketing the product, as the demand and markets widened. There also developed a tendency to divide labour in the actual process of manufacture. Such division had long been advocated, as tending to increase efficiency of production. Sir William Petty, at the end of the seventeenth century, declared:

Cloth must be cheaper made when one cards, another spins, another weaves, another draws, another dresses, another presses and packs, than when all operations above-mentioned were clumsily performed by the same hand. (373).

Or again:

In the making of a watch, if one man will make the wheels, another the spring, another shall engrave the dial plate, and another shall make the cases, then the watch will be better and cheaper. (374).

(374) Ibid., Vol II, p. 473.
Adam Smith's example of the pin manufacture is classic in this regard. (375) The reason why the division of labour was not carried out to a greater extent, was, as Adam Smith pointed out, that the limitation of the markets and the poor means of communication made it uneconomic.

In industry, too, as in agriculture, the middleman developed as the process of manufacturing and marketing became more complex. The control of circulating capital in the form of materials, was almost entirely monopolized by them, and, as the worker became increasingly divorced from the land, his dependence on the middleman grew. Eventually even the fixed capital of machinery and location were taken from the worker, and the factory system was developed.

The intervention of the middleman between the producer of raw material and the worker (and this was particularly true in the silk industry) developed the phenomenon of commercial capital in industry and the challenge to the worker's independence became even greater. Workers in one process tended to become employers of those in another, as for instance, the woollen weavers employing a number of spinners each. Over each of these sub-employers, however, there was usually a middleman, on whose goodwill rested the prosperity of the industry, and who often took unfair advantage of his position. (376)

(376) The position of the manual worker under the domestic system was often superior to that of the small producer who enjoyed a nominal independence and eked out a miserable pittance by the sweated labour of his family and himself. The "garret masters" in the metal trades, for example, were worse off than the employees of the larger producers, since they were at the mercy of the middleman who sold them the raw material on credit and bought the finished product at their own price...in the textile and metal trades the scales were definitely weighted in favour of the "great dealers" long before the introduction of machinery. Lipson, E., The economic history of England, II, p. 6.
In the woollen industry, the stapler middleman developed because the manufacturer needed different types of fleece for different cloths. Fleece was packed together in bails by the primary producer, without any regard for quality, and it was the original employment of the stapler to sort and grade the wool, and sell it to different manufacturers. From this point he began first to encroach on all stages of the purchase of raw material, and then through his control over the producer, on all the stages of marketing the finished product. His control of the material in the woollen industry was aided by the fact that the entire wool-clip was ready for sale within a few weeks, and the individual farmers could not afford to hold the raw wool until it was needed. Thus the large-capital middleman with a warehouse assumed responsibility for selling the raw material. In the case of the linen and cotton industries the raw material came from abroad at great expense, and only the merchant with large amounts of ready circulating capital could afford to ship it in. The commercial structure of the nation was, in any case, already capitalistic, and thus, on the financial side, the cotton and linen industries were primarily capitalistic from the start. (377)

Certainly there were some exceptions to this trend. Some industries were far more independent as to raw material, the West Yorkshire woollen industry for example. Here production was for many years largely for local consumption and the local markets traded in special grades of the raw material. Wool was often produced by the manufacturer-shepherd, but where it was not, a system of "putting out" of material to be worked was developed.

(377) In Lancashire we can trace step by step, the growth of the capitalist employer. At first we see, as in Yorkshire, the weaver furnishing himself with warp and weft, which he worked up in his own house and brought himself to market. By degrees he found it difficult to get yarn from the spinners; so the merchants at Manchester gave him linen warp and raw cotton, and the weaver became dependent on them. Finally the merchant would get together thirty or forty looms in a town. This was the nearest approach to the capitalist system before the great mechanical inventions. Toynbee, Industrial revolution, p. 54.
and the middleman or clothier did not encroach on any of the other processes of production. Where an ancient skill survived, as in some of the metal trades, the independence of the worker was also maintained long after the majority of industries had come under the capitalist economic organization.

The development of even the most elementary machinery also required the use of large amounts of capital, but at first the control rested in the hands of the master workman, who might employ first, his family, and then outside workmen in his shop. Weavers, notably, were conducting this form of enterprise, though there was no large use of outside circulating capital as yet. Merchants and traders assisted, by subsidizing the master workman where the more complicated looms had to be set up. Much of the machinery was of local manufacture, but where such improvements as draw-boys, flying shuttles or Dutch looms had to be installed, the cost was too high for the local manufacturer to meet. The essentials of the factory system were present in varying degrees in many industries in 1760. In the textile industry employer's capital embodied not only the circulating capital of materials, but also in many cases, the fixed capital of plant and machines. In some individual plants, moreover, there was a gathering of work people under one roof for all operations, for the sake of convenience.

The unit of production for the domestic system was usually the cottage, with a loom-shop or spinning-shop attached. There was a definite link between the textile workers in domestic industry and agriculture, especially among the yeomanry. Industry for some was merely a part-time relief from farming, and this class was relatively prosperous at all times. (378). The smaller yeomanry and cottagers relied primarily on industry and there was a

(378) In view of the prevailing cheapness of meat, bread, butter, cheese and beer before the industrial revolution, and of the fact that many silk weavers were able to combine their handicraft with agricultural pursuits, the lowness of wages must not lead us to take a gloomy view of the welfare of the workers. Indeed, the wages themselves are little below the normal English standard. Hertz, "The English silk industry in the eighteenth century". E.H.R., pp. 726-27.
third class who were entirely dependent, as labourers, on industry and possessed no land at all. As the enclosure movement developed, this last class increased rapidly. Only about ten percent of farmers in 1760 were dependent on agriculture alone. (379). In the towns there was, of course, no connection with the land, industrial discipline was much more formal, and labourers worked by the day or the piece, though they still worked in their own houses.

The master workman not only controlled his fixed capital to some extent, but was also the manager and foreman of his "plant". In the textile trade, he was included in the general category of "clothier", though this title came increasingly to be applied to the middleman only. In this category there were three classes by 1760. The small independent clothier was confined to his own household, where all processes of manufacture were carried out, and the marketing was done at the local fairs. Out of the proceeds, any work which needed to be done outside the household was paid for. A second class, included those who employed several units of production in the immediate locality. The third class, the big clothiers, anticipated the factory system by gathering large numbers of workmen together in one organization, but retained the domestic system, in that the workers remained at home. It required only the widespread use of machinery to convert the third type of organization into the factory system. In 1760, the only machinery in widespread use was the spinning wheel. As the industries came more and more to be represented by the larger unit, and the small producer disappeared, the economic structure of industry was imperceptibly converted into the factory system. The workman was gradually becoming the servant of the merchant-capitalist; soon he was to become the servant of the machine-owning capitalist. (380).

(379) Moffit, England on the eve of the industrial revolution, p. 205.
In the towns, this change was complicated by the breakdown of the medieval guilds and the struggle of the small producer to maintain himself, first in the guild, and later in the equally regulated structure controlled by the government. The decline of the guilds came with the expansion of commerce. Both agriculture and industry had been regulated originally by associations of producers. These had varied in character with the industry and place, and were even totally absent in some industries. As they declined, struggles took place within them between different interests which changed the character of the guilds completely.

The most important struggle was that between the small masters and the commercial capitalists which began in the late middle ages. The small masters tried to keep the guilds in a form favourable to their own independence; the commercial capitalists often evaded the control of the guilds by setting up outside the incorporated towns (to which the guilds were allied), in places where it was difficult to enforce guild regulations. There was also another method open to them; they could capture the guild themselves, and turn the machinery to their own uses. The need for credit of the small producer helped to undermine his independence, and to weaken him in his struggle with the power of the larger producer, on whom he was forced more and more to rely. By the end of the seventeenth century the medieval craftsman had split up into several other persons: the large merchant, the shopkeeper, the merchant employer, the large master, the small master and the journeyman. Thus the guild declined and was gradually replaced as a regulating agency by the state. (381).

The regulations survived, however, and were administered by the state, or delegated to the local justices of the peace to administer. Most restrictions in the clothing industry remained in force until 1765. The woolen industry, for instance, was regulated by many laws. Some aimed at

protecting the interests of the towns in which industries were established, others at protecting the interests of the branch of industry or craft, still others at promoting the good conduct of the industry. During the last half of the eighteenth century there was a constant struggle between masters and men over these laws. Between 1728 and 1765 there was a long struggle in Gloucestershire over their enforcement. The small workmen, who supported the regulations as their only protection, were finally defeated and the laws were repealed. It now needed only the expansion of industry on a major scale to regularize this defeat into the laissez-faire doctrines of the early nineteenth century.

"The insensible progress of society," wrote Sir Frederick Eden, in 1797, "has reduced charter rights to a state of inactivity; and both private and national interests have succeeded the necessity of having recourse to antiquated customs". (382).

On the eve of the industrial revolution, therefore, the organization of industry was partly capitalistic and partly domestic. In connection with the supply of raw materials and ownership of circulating capital the control of this economic function had passed to the merchant employers on the one hand or to the masters of one or two processes on the other. Fixed capital remained largely in the hands of the craftsman. Master workmen were managers on a capitalistic basis, and though this was uneconomical and inefficient, it helped to preserve the small unit long after the factory system was established.

To complete the transition to the factory-capitalist system, it now required only technical changes in the means of production itself, principally in the development of machinery. In this change, the chief requirement was power. Watt's invention of the separate condenser in 1769 was the greatest single advance made in this regard, but the fact that Newcomen's engine had been functioning in many industries for half a century made

possible all later development. Newcomen's engine, since its efficiency
was very small, was not easily applicable to rotary machinery, and was re­
stricted to the drainage of mines. In any case the need for adequate power
had to be met before other mechanical inventions could be utilized, and it
was only in the late 1770's that Watt's engines were harnessed to factory
machinery. (383).

In 1760, mining was organized on a largely capitalistic basis. The
exceptions to this were in the relatively primitive workings of the lead
mines of Derbyshire and the tin mines of Cornwall, where mineral rights
could be obtained and worked on an individual basis. Hand power was large­
ly used here and the smelting was also primitive, though the use of coal
was more widespread than in the more highly-skilled and better developed
iron industry. In iron mining the large scale of production and high cost
of organization rendered capitalism a necessity. By 1740 there were, in
the nation, fifty-nine blast furnaces with an output of 17,350 tons of pig
iron annually. (384). This was considerably below the total output of such
nations as Sweden, Russia and Spain, but the dependence upon charcoal as a
smelting fuel limited the output of England, with her less extensive for­
est. Notable among the smelting works were the Carron Works at Falkirk
and the Soho Works at Birmingham, of which Mathew Boulton, Watt's partner,
was the manager. Actually, surprisingly little iron was used in industry
generally. The high cost of smelting with charcoal limited its popularity,
but even where attempts to use coal were partially successful, only a few
farm implements were shod with the metal and such machinery as was used in
the textile industry was usually made of wood. In 1735, however, Abraham
Darby succeeded in making coke from coal and in developing a more powerful
type of blast furnace. In 1740 Benjamin Huntsman developed crucible steel,


(384) Toynbee, Industrial revolution, p. 25.
thereby ensuring the prominence of the Sheffield cutlery trade. In 1766 the Cranages produced a reverberating furnace in which coal could be used for smelting, and the manufacture of bar iron, hitherto impossible in the smaller furnaces, was now undertaken.

The result was that the hardware trade, which had been exposed to difficulties from the scarcity of fuel, migrated from its centres in Sussex and moved north to the coal areas. A further development was that England, from being a major importer of pig iron, soon began to produce a surplus for export. As the industry made its home in the coal fields of the Midlands, Yorkshire and Derbyshire, it was easy to combine furnace, forge and mill in a single establishment, which had not hitherto been the case. Thus the iron industry, already developed on a capitalistic basis, was to continue its concentration with increased momentum.

In coal mining the coal rights as late as the eighteenth century were included in most copyholds. Thus the ownership of coal rights, while not universally common to the small landowner, was much more widespread than mineral rights in other aspects of mining. In the case of the larger landowners, the ultimate ownership rested with them, a form of absentee control which had produced abuses even as early as the eighteenth century. Most of the coal was mined from surface outcroppings, or from bell-shaped pits. Gunpowder was used for blasting, but the primitive type of tunnelling and the softness of the surface soil limited its use. The chief problems were drainage and fire-damp. Fire-damp was tested for with candles and burned out or blown out by ventilation, but most methods of limiting this hazard were unsatisfactory and dangerous. (385). Those mines below the level of

(385) Bishop Pococke, in 1751, describes the ventilation system of a Lancashire mine: "The foul air is very common in these pits, and in order to carry it off they enclose a shaft and place three or four wooden pipes in it about four inches square, which are carried up to the surface, and all the foul air going into this shaft is conveyed up the pipes, to which there are small funnels at the top, about two inches in diameter, by which one may perceive the air comes up; on them they lay a plate of iron, with holes made through it: if they put a candle to it or any flame, the air takes fire and continues burning." Pococke, Travels through England, Camden Society, Vol. I, pp. 16-17.
free drainage required to be pumped, and it was here that Thomas Newcomen's crude steam engine was first employed. By 1729, it was in general use throughout the country. In addition, wooden railways using horse power were widely used for transporting ore, especially where the roads were in a primitive condition. Cast-iron rails were experimented with in 1757, but were rejected as too brittle, and were not used again until the 1790's, after the great developments in iron smelting had been accomplished.

Improvements in the pottery industry had been going since the late seventeenth century. The area of the Five Towns in Staffordshire had special advantages in coal and clay. The clay especially was important, since it was found to possess all those qualities found in the high-grade pottery clays of Samos and Etruria. In addition the population of the area was largely one of enfranchised copyholders who could function as small manufacturers. Lead was available for glazing and markets were not far distant. The conversion of the pottery industry into a highly specialized process was not due, moreover, to some great invention or to the application of mechanical power. It was the result of a long series of improvements in the methods of manufacture and distribution. Certainly the development of tea-drinking was a major factor in this change. The contributions of the Dutchmen, the Elers, in the late seventeenth century gave new life to the art and at the beginning of the eighteenth century it possessed all the conditions necessary for progress.

In the glazing process the uses of salt, flint and lead were all discovered early in the eighteenth century. The use of flint was especially valuable, but it exacted a price in the decline of the health of the workers from attacks of the deadly potter's rot, a form of silicosis. By 1730 the potter's wheel was being replaced by the mould and the decorating of pottery was progressing. Rederich and Jones in 1724 developed porphyry pottery through the use of the new glazes, but the potteries were again in
a state of stagnation when Josiah Wedgewood began his career of innovation in the 1750's. In addition to agitating for better roads and improved marketing facilities, he introduced new patterns and techniques into the industry. He became famous in 1761 for his cream-coloured "Queen's Ware". In addition he delighted the taste of his own and succeeding generations with his jasper ware, in which he imitated models from Greece and Rome, pressing white figures on a coloured background. Soon even the poorest in England were eating from the Wedgewood earthenware and a revolution in the art of living was accomplished.

Certainly, the development of the potteries was not as disruptive as that in other industries. This was probably attributable to the fact that mechanical power played almost no part in the change, so that skilled workmen, despite the fact that they often worked under the most appalling health conditions, were yet not displaced by the machine, and the feeling of industrial insecurity, the most significant price paid for industrialization, was not present in this industry. (386).

It was in the textile industry that the most drastic technological changes were made, and here it was also, that the disruptive effect was greatest. The application of machinery to the textile industry was the most famous, as it was the most far-reaching, of any of the mechanical applications of the eighteenth century. The revolution in the cotton industry, for example was primarily due to a remarkable series of inventions, in the later years of the eighteenth century. The cotton had formerly been prepared by hand, was carded on winders, spun on the old fashioned spinning-wheel and woven on the hand loom. In the technological progress of the various processes, weaving, up to 1761, was usually in advance of the others. Thus there was always a shortage of spinners to keep up with the production of the weavers, a fact of great significance in the develop-

ment of management, since one weaver might employ a dozen spinners. In 1764, however, Hargreaves invented his spinning-jenny and for a time spinning advanced while weaving lagged, until the development of Cartwright's power loom in 1785 restored the balance.

Spinning had progressed very slowly technologically. The Jersey and Saxony wheels, which appeared at the beginning of the eighteenth century, had merely been variants of the old spinning-wheel, and an attempt to develop roller spinning, by Wyatt and Paul in 1738, failed because cotton fibres were not strong enough to withstand the strains imposed by the crude machinery. A successful carding machine was developed by Paul in 1748, but as with all machinery, its adoption was very slow in a system which lacked ready capital. At the beginning of the century the Dutch had introduced swivel-weaving for several narrow fabrics at once, but each fabric had to have its separate shuttle and the reversing of these was a slow process. In 1733, however, the flying shuttle was developed by John Kay, by which the weaver pulled a string which operated hammers knocking the shuttle through the fabric without having to reverse it or throw it by hand. This was not adopted immediately in the cotton industry because of the already serious lag of spinning technique, but in the woollen industry it had an immediate and remarkable success. Kay's son, Robert invented the drop-box which enabled several colours of thread to be used at the same time. All these inventions naturally involved a great expense and some centralization of industry, though in the case of the spinning-jenny the unit of production remained the worker's home for several generations after its invention. The invention which forced the factory system on the industry, however, was Arkwright's water-frame, developed in 1768. Here, at last, the necessity for water power forced the concentration of industry in "mills".

The inventions changed not merely the power, but the character of the industry. Before the industrial revolution, spinning was the employment of
women and weaving that of men. With the introduction of machinery, women and children were capable of tending the new machines and the skill of the craftsman was completely discounted.

Another problem indirectly connected with machine power was the fear of foreign competition and the reliance on foreign sources for material. Until well after 1760, cotton fabric had to be strengthened by linen threads, lest the crude machinery tear it to pieces. This involved the importation of Irish linen and the consequent appeals from the Scottish and Lancashire linen industries to cease the importation. More serious was the importation of foreign calico which resulted in the alliance of the cotton and linen industries to demand government protection against such importation. At the beginning of the eighteenth century it was becoming a serious threat to domestic producers and in 1721 the use of calicoes was prohibited entirely. After 1760 the printing of calicoes was revived in Lancashire, Sussex, and Surrey, with the invention of the flat press and cylindrical printing.

The woollen industry was much slower to change from the domestic system. Spinning was usually done with a wool-wheel, and the proportion of spinners to weavers here was usually about ten to one. The process of weaving, however, was far more primitive than in the cotton industry, so that spinners could keep pace with the weaving much more easily. In weaving the varying of the size of the cloth remained a problem to the end of the century. Probably the chief reason for the failure to adopt machinery was that the woollen industry was still closely tied to agriculture, and had not developed the capitalist economic structure to the same degree as had cotton. The final stages of the woollen production, those of fulling and stretching, were carried on in "mills" organized on a capitalist basis, though here the necessity of depending upon outside sources of material had brought the change.

The linen industry, as has been shown, suffered from foreign competi-
The industry was of recent creation in any case, since it was only in the late seventeenth century that it was undertaken on a large scale and under government encouragement. (387). Because mercantilist doctrine considered that self-sufficiency required the development of the manufacturer, the industry grew up without being subject to the restrictions of guilds and producers associations and even employed foreigners. A group of chartered companies was formed to promote the manufacture, but it never rivalled the Irish or foreign industries. Another problem was that of bleaching, for the poor quality of English flax made the rather primitive process more awkward than it might otherwise have been. The industry continued, throughout the eighteenth century, to operate much as it had done from the beginning, that is, capitalist as to finance and domestic as to the organization of the workers. Moreover, it gained a measure of state protection, since linen when exported paid no duty, but received a bounty. In 1756 the duties on imported yarn were removed in the interests of linen manufacturers, amidst the protests of such producing localities as Glasgow, Paisley and Preston, who declared that the measure would ruin domestic spinners.

The growth of the silk industry from the beginning of the eighteenth century was attributed to the production of French silks, but more important, perhaps, was the stimulus of the immigration of alien silk workers, particularly the Huguenots who settled in Spitalfields. They introduced or developed the making, dressing and lustrating of the fine products known as celamodes, lustrings and renforces. The modern factory system had its beginnings in the silk industry with the work of Thomas Lambe, who introduced the art of making fine silks by water-powered machinery in 1718. The organizing silk thus produced was finer than any produced hitherto in England, and raised a considerable amount of opposition among the

London weavers. It was for this reason, therefore, that the chief factory for the new process was established in Derby, though the citizens of that city objected, stating that the erection of a mill in their midst would cause an increased burden on the poor rates. (388) By 1765 there were seven such mills in the county employing principally women and children.

According to the statement of a silk thrower in 1765, he employed 1500 at a time (only 100 were men) - 500 in London, 400 in Dorset, 400 in Cheshire, and 200 in Gloucestershire. At Macclesfield seven firms engaged between them 2,700 men, women and children (the largest of them 720); and a London firm 800. On the weaving side two partners maintained 100 looms... (389).

This indicates the large scale of the industry, and the dependence of the worker on the employer. Even where he was not under the control of the factory, the high cost of foreign silks which were needed to augment the native ones was ruinously high. Turkish silks were good only for damasks and stockings and the better Chinese and Bengal silks had to pay heavy duties. (390). The French were the greatest competitors to the British producers.

After 1765 there was a total prohibition of imports of French silk, but there was still considerable smuggling. Protectionism, insofar as the home industry was concerned, became predominant as a result of the distrust of France arising out of the Seven Years' War. The fact that the home industry was organized on a factory basis, however, had much more to do with such legislation. The first beginnings of industrial unionism were making their appearance among the silk workers, and the absolute dependence of the workers on the employer made them particularly vulnerable to foreign competition. As a result, the Spitalfields riots of 1765,

(389) Ibid., p. 104.
which preceded and accompanied the exclusion legislation were a first violent demonstration of the new desperate strength of the industrial workers under the modern industrial system. The silk industry was therefore protected and maintained at enormous expense because it was considered to be an exotic industry necessary to the maintenance of British self-sufficiency and because in the absence of an adequate police force, the legislators were more than usually sensitive to the pressure of opinion from the riotous silk workers. Once power machinery was harnessed to the industry it out-produced all others in quantity, but it did not survive the introduction of free trade. (391).

A further source of disruption in industry was the fact that it was forced, in many cases, through circumstances of raw material communications or markets to move from its ancient locations to ones more convenient for it prosperity. There was not, however, a great movement of actual industries, but rather a movement of population to follow the rise of new industries in localities from those in which industry already flourished. The only industry which was really mobile was the iron industry, and here the conditions for movement had existed long before the industrial revolution. The dependence of iron works, whether furnaces or forges, on woodlands led to migration from Sussex long before the era of the great inventions. Iron works and charcoal burning were introduced in Wales, the Midlands and South Yorkshire before the use of coal was widespread, and district after district was stripped of its trees to provide charcoal. Later the tendency of industry to disperse in search of fresh woods was counteracted to some extent by the tendency which brought forges, slitting mills and rolling mills to the coal districts. These forges and mills supplied raw material for the smith's industries, and the smith's industries depended on coal, and flourished in districts where coal abounded.

Consequently there was an early development of iron works around the metal trade districts of Birmingham and Sheffield, as well as in the northeast of England. (392). In addition, the iron workers were a markedly mobile class, and the price of movement in terms of social disruption, was negligible.

In general, the transfer of industry was of enormous benefit to some localities. Lancashire was notable among these areas. Textiles, coal, and iron industries developed around Manchester; there were potteries around Liverpool, and glass, paper-making and chemical industries in the Mersey Valley. In addition, the woollen industry of the West Riding of Yorkshire was closely joined to the markets of Lancashire. The population of the area reflected the growth - Liverpool increased thirty-four percent between 1700 and 1760, while the population of the whole county doubled. (393).

In the distribution of industry throughout the country the change can best be illustrated by reference to the mineral and textile trades. The coal trade had developed much as it is at present. Cumberland sent most of its coal to Ireland, while that of Durham and Northumberland supplied the east coast and London, being shipped from Newcastle, South Shields and Sunderland. Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Shropshire and Worcestershire as well as Lancashire and Cheshire furnished coal for the inland districts. South Wales supplied the cloth-manufacturing areas of the southwest. As new areas were opened up, trade went to them, but it did not desert the old areas as long as the coal lasted.

The textile industry was widespread and yet more permanent. The woollen trade, since its supply of raw materials could be taken from the agricultural areas, would ordinarily have moved very little. Thus, the demands


(393) Moffit, England on the eve of the industrial revolution, P. 140.
of markets were the chief determinants of migration in the woollen industry. Norwhich, the worsted centre of the nation for centuries, began to decline after 1763 because war and poverty had limited its continental market. Similarly, the west country declined to the extent that it produced only the finer woollens, because its original overseas markets now preferred the cheaper produce of Yorkshire. (394). In 1744 and 1765 there were petitions presented to Parliament from the older areas, complaining of this new ascendancy. The expansion of the woollen industry was about thirty per cent between 1700 and 1760, and most of this was in Yorkshire. The increased use of cottons also marked the northward movement, since the cotton industry stationary in Lancashire for two centuries, was now developing with the use of power machinery.

Even with the northward movement, the metropolis of London grew at an amazing rate. The trade of the nation was still under the influence of the London market. More than one-tenth of the population lived in this area which produced no food of its own, and as a consuming and collecting centre it was of enormous importance. In addition its wealth was out of all proportion to its population. (395).

Other urban areas were beginning to assert their independence, however. Liverpool was always free from the tutelage of the capital, and between

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(395) As to the wealth of the metropolis, it was asserted at this period that the county of Middlesex paid more taxes to the government than any other ten shires. This was not surprising when one realizes that it was the heart of the financial, industrial and commercial as well as the political activities of empire. Here was the Bank of England, the headquarters of the great trading companies, Blackwell Hall, the chief mart for woollen cloth in the world, with innumerable other important business establishments; here also the Thames at all times swarmed with ships and small craft of every and description, for two-thirds of England's foreign trade was concentrated at this point. Gipson, Great Britain and Ireland, p. 38.
1685 and 1760 had increased ten times. Manchester had increased five times in the same period, Birmingham seven times, Sheffield six, Nottingham twice and Bristol three. (396). The process was to continue with even greater impetus in the nineteenth century. The population of the nation was 5,134,516 in 1700 and increased to 6,039,681 by 1750, an increase of 905,168, of which Yorkshire and Lancashire provided nearly one-third. Lancashire increased by 78 per cent, the West Riding of Yorkshire by 52 per cent and Durham by 41 per cent in the same period. (397). In 1700, after the London area, the west country was the most populous area. Not one of the twelve most populous counties was north of the Trent. By 1750, however, Lancashire was third after Middlesex and Surrey in density of population, while West Yorkshire and Durham were high on the list. The industrial revolution accentuated this change which was already in progress. Iron and coal had already moved north, textiles were there already, profiting from the low cost of living and great wool producing areas. It was really only an intensification of factors already present.

The economy was further disrupted by the fluctuations in the world economic structure resulting from wars, famines and other untoward events. England's commerce in becoming world-wide, found itself exposed to the vicissitudes of a world economy and the course of her economic life was profoundly disturbed by occurrences remote from her territory. Wars affected English trade in two ways. They inflated certain branches of industry, such as iron and shipbuilding, so that a conclusion of the war brought a depression of such trades - this happened following the Spanish Succession and Swedish Wars. The second effect was that war put a strain on the solvency of the continental financial houses, upon which Britain was dependent until after the close of the American War in 1783, and limited the ability

(396) Toynbee, The industrial revolution, p. 11.

(397) Ibid., p. 8.
of English industry to sell on the continent. This was the case, as we have seen, with the Norwich worsted industry in the second part of the eighteenth century. In the eighteenth century there were barely two decades without a war, and the alternate inflation and decline of industries, especially after 1760, was extremely disturbing to the economy of the nation.

In 1742, for example, when England was at war with Spain, the clothing towns ordered their representatives in Parliament to give serious attention to the woollen industry, "the decay of which is so sensibly felt in these parts by the starving conditions to which many thousands of his majesty's subjects are reduced". (398). At the close of the Seven Years' War there was primary depression caused by the failure of the Amsterdam banking firm of de Neufville, which had backed Frederick the Great. As a result of this and the general over-expansion of credit, eighteen of the great banks of Amsterdam collapsed, and the effects were felt in a severe financial depression in London, Hamburg and Stockholm. This depression, at its most severe in 1763, was an important determinant in the attempts of the British Government to find alternative sources of revenue, even to the extent of imposing an excise tax at home, and the Sugar and Stamp Acts on the American colonies. Other, and deeper causes of the depression were the destruction of the carrying trade through war and high insurance rates, and the inflation of currency, which resulted in a rise in prices and an advance in wage levels.

A second depression came in 1772-73, but this one had its origin in London, and affected all the markets of Europe. Gambling in East India Company stock, and especially the practice of "splitting" the stock to gain votes in the Court of Proprietors, resulted in a rapid decline in its value from 1766 on. There was a reckless re-discounting of East India Company notes in the English banks and early in 1772 the Bank of England

began restricting discount. Scottish firms ceased payment later in the year and the Bank of Ayr failed entirely. A financial panic was only averted by the issue of credit by the Bank of England late in 1773. It was concerning the results of this depression that John Wesley wrote in 1775.

I aver, that in every part of England where I have been (and I have been East, West, North and South within these two years) trade in general is exceedingly decayed, and thousands of people are quite unemployed. Some I know have perished from want of bread; other, I have seen creeping up and down like walking shadows. I except three or four manufacturing towns which have suffered less than the others. I aver that the people in general all over the nation are so far from being well satisfied that they are far more deeply dissatisfied than they appear to have been a year or two before the Great Rebellion, and far more dangerously dissatisfied. (399).

Apart from wars and tariffs the influence of the trade cycle was also realized. The glut of goods resulting from sudden or unusual demands was always a problem. The prices in the country rose with shortages and an expansion of industry to meet the demand usually left the small producer, especially in the textile trade, with unsaleable surpluses and debts. Hands had to be laid off, with no real alternative occupation, want and misery were widespread, and the burden on the poor rates increased enormously.

Society was bewildered by this alternation between boom and depression, but under the mercantilist system an attempt was made to mitigate the extremes of the fluctuation by government action, as in the case of the Corn Laws. With the breakdown of mercantilism, however, there was formulated a new body of economic doctrine which rejected government interference in the economy and which looked to increased production and wealth to eliminate the fluctuations of the economic cycle. The first unconscious beginnings of the doctrine of laissez-faire were making their appearance.

Chapter IX
The Revolution in Economic Philosophy and the Social Schism

In this age of progress when, throughout the nation, the capitalistic organization of industry was making possible production for the mass, and energy and brains were devoted to meeting the needs of the average consumer, it was not surprising that a fundamental change in the outlook of the community toward economic matters should come about. It was a change that was long overdue. It was in fact a further installment of that rebellion in the cause of individualism which had begun with the Renaissance. Then the rebellion had been against the restrictions on national and individual life laid upon them by the custom of the middle ages. The restrictions on economic life, however, had remained, to be administered by the authority of the state which the rebellion had helped to create. By the middle of the eighteenth century these restrictions were far out of harmony with the desires of the responsible part of the population.

The restraints of custom, tradition and religion had never been so weak over the classes which held power as in the middle years of the eighteenth century. The guilds were gone, and their rule of custom discredited; the Church of the eighteenth century no longer concerned itself with ethical concepts applied to economics, but was merely a very worldly and godless part of the civil order. Wealth was seen as the
sovereign good for society and the individual. It was, in fact, the individual who now counted for most. Liberalism in the eighteenth century was a crusade for the individual and regarded society as existing to protect the rights that man, according to Locke, was supposed to have brought with him into society. Society was not regarded as a corporate community whose members served different purposes, but stood in some relationship to one another. The basic fault of the new beliefs was that they forgot that man, though driven by ambition and the lust for wealth, is also a social animal.

Mercantilist doctrine lauded national wealth. The form of economic goods, not their intrinsic value in the competitive market, was of prime importance. The labour of the worker, and especially how it was applied, was seen as of supreme importance to the nation. The social and economic welfare of the worker was of secondary importance, but the duty of the government to labour was recognized, albeit inadequately, through such agencies as the Poor Law, the Statute of Apprentices and the Settlement Laws. Yet under the new doctrine, such considerations were hardly taken into account. Cheap labour, and cheap labour alone, was now the chief consideration.

The adjustments made in two related fields of economic activity serve to illustrate this change in economic philosophy. These are the fields of regulation of production generally, and of the regulation of wages in particular. The economic activities of the state were not confined solely to the
broader concepts of mercantilism, but embraced the sphere of production by prescribing the processes of manufacture. The minutest rules were made concerning the nature of the materials, the mechanical appliances and the form of the finished product. Yet the very multiplicity of the rules defeated their purpose.

There was certainly justification for much of the regulation, since there were definite abuses among manufacturers as to production, but the complexity of the regulating machinery, by the middle of the eighteenth century, did not admit of extensive reform. There remained the alternative of complete abolition. As has been shown, the old guild restrictions were already dying out. It remained only to eradicate the heirs of the guilds, the state regulators of production. In the eighteenth century the chief struggle in this connection was between the workman for the revival of customs and laws and the employers who wished to be free of such laws. The employers were for unchecked enterprise, the employees, and in some cases the small masters, for restoring or putting into practice regulations that had been imposed first by the guilds and then by the state.

The woollen manufacture was the chief industry affected, although every branch of industry had, in one degree or another, been brought under state restriction. In the woollen manufacture, acts governing quality, a standard of measures, and stretching of cloth were instituted in the sixteenth century.
Search regulations were introduced, not only to safeguard the consumer, but also to ensure that the customs was not defrauded in placing a levy on exports. Control was originally exercised through aulnagers, or state officials appointed for the purpose of regulation. Gradually, however, the office became a sinecure and the duties were deputed to corrupt underlings. Sir Josiah Child, as early as the late seventeenth century, condemned the system.

And in England the attempts which our forefathers made for regulating of Manufactures, when left to the execution of some particular person, in a short time resolved but into a Tax upon the Commodity, without respect to the goodness thereof; as most notoriously appears in the business of AULNAGE, which doubtless our Predecessors intended for a scrutiny into the goodness of the Commodity, and to that purpose a Seal was invented, as a signal that the Commodity was made according to the Statutes, which Seals, it is said, may now be bought by thousands, and put upon what the buyers please. (400)

Under the Stuarts the system developed into supervision by corporations and monopolies. Many of the aulnagers' functions were taken over by the searchers, who were to inspect and seal the cloth. By the early eighteenth century the obligation was also placed upon fullers to measure and stamp the cloth brought to their mills. Yet gradually, as with most other regulations of local government which had lost their purpose, the practice was being neglected. After 1688, most of the restrictions on production were taken off.

The policy of standardizing industry was already being severely criticized, especially by the merchants (401). In the cotton industry, regulation manifested itself, not in the control of wages or of the quality of the work, but in the protection of the industry as a whole, as with the act of 1721, which prohibited the use of calicoes. Here the borough restrictions were a blight to the producers. Child, in 1694, demanded:

A more easie (sic.) and free admission of inhabitants, Merchants and Artificers, to be Burgesses of our Cities and Boroughs.

and also

not to hinder any man from having as many Servants as he can, nor Looms, working Tooles, and etc. (402)

In 1738 and 1765, Parliament progressively abandoned the system of statutory dimensions and the attempt to standardize the industry. It was impossible to manufacture cloths according to statutory dimensions, when the taste of foreign buyers demanded a wide variety of materials. The regulations against stretching cloth were no longer considered necessary because

(401) All our laws that oblige our people to the making of strong, substantial (and, as we call it, loyal) cloth of a certain length, breadth and weight, if they were duly put into execution would, in my opinion, do more hurt than good because the humours and fashions of the world change, and at some time, in some places (as now in most), slight, cheap, light cloth will sell more plentifully and better than that which is heavier, stronger and twice wrought.... I conclude all our laws limiting the number of looms, numbers and kind of servants, and times of working, to be certainly prejudicial to the clothing trade of the kingdom in general. Child, A new discourse on trade, pp.159-161.

(402) Ibid., p.169.
it was believed that the manufacturer (and here the identification of the individual with the national interest became apparent) was the one most interested in maintaining the credit of his cloth. The argument was that though the state control of industry was useful in the past, competition might now be trusted to remedy the abuses. "The interest of the seller is sufficient security to the buyer for fair dealing" was now the current maxim (403).

The fundamental feature of capitalism is the wage system, whereby the worker sells, not the product of his labour, but the labour itself. This phenomenon did not arise with the invention of machinery, however, but was present long before the eighteenth century. The conflict between capital and labour throughout the eighteenth century was fought over the issues of low wages and unemployment. The hours of labour, though long, were not initially a source of grievance against employers, since there was already an acceptance of long hours under the domestic system. Nor were the conditions, particularly as to unemployment, harsh as compared to the old system (404).

In the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the state assumed the function of maintaining the standard of


(404) In small towns and country villages, the wages of the journeymen taylors frequently scarce equal those of a common labourer; but in London they are often many weeks without employment, particularly during the summer. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Vol. I, p.158.
living of the working community. It would not admit the claim of the wage-earners to determine the conditions of their labour, but on the other side it assumed the responsibility of securing to every man a just remuneration for his work. This system was operated through the Statute of Artificers of 1563, by which the local justices of the peace through annual "assessments", fixed the wages. In addition, from 1593 on there was an attempt to set a minimum wage, especially in the woollen industry (405).

By the eighteenth century, however, the system was not in general operation. It had died out in such capitalistically-dominated industries as the woollens of West Yorkshire and the west country and special legislation was needed to establish it in the tailoring industry in 1721 and in the silk industry in 1773. By this time the attention of the justices was devoted to setting limits to agricultural change rather than to the developments of industry. By 1724, a parliamentary committee was unanimously recommending that the system be replaced and Henry Fielding, in 1751, declared that the law had gone into neglect and disuse (406). Thus, throughout the first decade of the reign of George III, the Statute was applied only in some districts, and there not in a regular pattern.

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(406) cited by Lipson, op. cit., p.264.
The history of wage regulation, like that of the regulation of production, also demonstrates the clear connection between the fall of the absolute monarchy and the rise of capitalism. The industrial legislation of the sixteenth century was allowed to fall into disuse and spasmodic attempts to revive it only served to emphasize the contrast between the old order and the new. The whole industrial outlook of the eighteenth century was permeated by a growing economic individualism which resisted or ignored the attempts to limit the complete freedom of action which it claimed. The success of Adam Smith as an economic publicist was largely due to the fact that he gave expression to ideas which had long been implied in the methods and actions of the leaders of industry.

The example of the Gloucestershire weavers has already been cited as a case where the new power of the employer defeated that of the worker and the Elizabethan Poor Law combined. The clothiers presented an eloquent plea for the right of freedom of contract. They declared that the system of assessments was not workable (which was partly true) because it was not possible to set equitable rates beforehand. It was further stated that raising the wages would restrain industry and therefore prejudice trade, and the political argument was put forward that a victory for the workers would encourage rebellion and strikes. The fear of a combination among workmen was very great, and certainly helped to inspire
unions of producers. Adam Smith declared that:

Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rates. To violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals.... Masters too sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution, and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do, without resistance, though severally felt by them, they are never heard of by other people. (407)

In describing the corresponding movement among the workers, however, this prophet of laissez-faire reveals where the sympathies of the new economists lay in wage disputes.

Such conditions, however, are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive combination of the workmen; who sometimes too, without any provocation of this kind, combine of their own accord to raise the price of their labour. Their usual pretences are, sometimes the high price of provisions; sometimes the great profit which their masters make by their own work. But whether their combinations be offensive or defensive, they are always abundantly heard of. In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they have always recourse to the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They are desperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve or frighten their masters into immediate compliance with their demands. (408)

(408) Loc. cit.
The triumph of the employers in the Gloucestershire case in 1757 marked the ending of the wage assessment system, despite the fact that as late as 1773, Parliament, under the threat of riots in London, passed an act granting the state regulation of wages to the silk-weavers. There was also a supplementary fixing of wages in the case of the coal-heavers in 1770. Such expedients, however, cannot disguise the fact that there was a drift toward laissez-faire in government economic policy.

The chief argument against the regulation of wages was coming to be the interference with the trade and price structures which such control implied. The basis on which regulation should be governed was also involved, and the question of whether the national interest was best served by higher or lower wages was discussed. The theory was already held that wages should be controlled by the laws of supply and demand, a cautiously economic method, if not notably humanitarian (409). As to the national interest in the price of labour,

(409) Equal quantities of labour, at all times and places, may be said to be of equal value to the labourer. In his ordinary state of health, strength and spirits; in the ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity, he must always lay down the same portion of ease, his liberty, and his happiness. The price which he pays must always be the same, whatever be the quality of goods he receives in return for it. Of these, indeed, it may sometimes purchase a greater, and sometimes a lesser quantity; but it is their value which varies, not that of the labour which purchases them. At all times and places that is dear which is difficult to come at, or which it costs much labour to acquire; and that cheap which is to be had easily, or with very little labour.

the more far-seeing publicists, such as Child, Defoe and Burke, were already arguing for the economy of high wages (410).

Generally the state control did protect the weak from undue oppression and did permit the raising of wages, though the process was so slow and cumbersome as to amount almost to a veto. The effort under the old system to relate wages to the price of provisions broke down early in the eighteenth century, however. The expedient of economists and officials alike then, was to support the old prices, whatever the price of labour might be. Sir William Petty, and many of his contemporaries, in defence of the newer system, argued that wages did not fall when food was plentiful, but rather the reverse (411). The argument assumed that the poor worked only for the bare necessities of life and implied a static society. It is not to be wondered at that the basic changes which were needed were not universally welcomed!

These changes in philosophy had an important influence on the public life of the times. The Whig Party, dominated by the great landlords, was initially and primarily interested

(410) Wherever wages are high universally throughout the whole World, it is an infallible evidence of the Riches of that Country; and wherever Wages for labour run low, it is a proof of the poverty of the place. Child, A new discourse on trade, p.xi.

(411) It is observed by clothiers and others who employ great of poor people, that when corn is extremely plentiful, that the labour of the poor is proportionately dear. And scarce to be had at all, so licentious are they who labour only to eat, or rather to drink. Petty, Economic writings, Vol. I., p.274.
in the changes in agriculture. Nor was the English farmer merely protected in the home market but, by giving a bounty on the export of corn, the government aided the landed gentry to bear the chief burden of national taxation. As with most aspects of economic life, the government policy of taxation was hopelessly out of date. The reliance upon the land tax as the principle source of revenue stemmed from the Middle Ages though it was, in the middle of the eighteenth century, enjoying a renewed popularity in the writings of the Physiocratic economists (412). Yet there was no doubt that it was now inadequate as a source of revenue, and the continued reliance upon it meant undue discrimination in favour of the lightly taxed mercantile class. Taxation of this latter class, in fact, with the breakdown of the mercantile system, was subject to confusion and indecision, in which taxes were evaded or avoided with remarkable ease.

It was only with the financial strain of the Seven Years' War that the need for change was made apparent to the government. Not only was the landed interest growing restive

(412) The adoption by the Physiocrats of the idea that land was the sole taxable economic factor owed much to the Anglomania that was sweeping French intellectual circles in the middle years of the eighteenth century. Frenchmen were invited to admire all English institutions without reserve. English government finance, compared to that of the French government, was amazingly efficient. The English government still relied largely upon the antiquated land tax. Therefore the Physiocrats jumped to a simple, logical, but wrong conclusion.
under a system which, while it gave some privileges, demanded in return, most of the taxes, but the unusual needs of war had found the revenues wholly inadequate. Taxation of the trading classes was restricted to the archaic system of customs and tariffs. Repeated loans were negotiated on a most expensive plan, and nepotism was rife in these negotiations (413). It is not to be wondered that the national debt mounted by nearly one-third during the Seven Years' War (414). In times of emergency, and later at any time when the Government wished to raise additional revenue painlessly, the expedient of lotteries was resorted to. Two lotteries, launched in 1763, as part of Dashwood's Budget for that year, yielded £350,000 each, and some were even more profitable. This budget was famous for the subterfuges resorted to to avoid having to impose new taxes and yet give the impression of complete bankruptcy necessary to secure a peace with France. Thus £2,000,000

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(413) Lord North's method of negotiating a loan was typical of the financial methods of the period. "His custom was to arrange the price of issue with a few friends in the City, and there to allot the scrip well below that figure to his political supporters; who were thus able to sell at a handsome profit. In these circumstances it is not surprising that when he left office the National Debt amounted to £245,466,855, and if this figure should appear a mere trifle to the reader living in this democratic age, the latter must remember that it was only with the greatest difficulty that the country could raise £25,000,000 in revenue...by 1781 the state of the public credit was such that the Government had to allot £150 of stock in 5 per cents and £25 in 4 per cents for every £100 borrowed. Thus a loan of £12,000,000 cost the nation £1,000,000." Petrie, Sir Charles, *The four Georges*, p.127.

was borrowed from the Sinking Fund; £1,800,000 was issued in Exchequer bills; £2,800,000 was borrowed on annuities and two lotteries of £350,000 each were launched; - a total of £7,300,000 - while about half this amount was secured from taxation, including the unpopular Cider Tax (415).

Another financial dodge was to place a price on the renewal of the charters of commercial concerns. Thus the East India Company was taxed in 1767, 1769 and 1773, under agreements which brought not only disaster to the Company, but a depression to the nation. Even the Bank of England was not immune from such extortion.

As the Bank contract was to be revised, the treasury availed itself very prudently of so favourable an opportunity, and stipulated this body should take a million (exchequer) bills for two years at an interest reduced by one-fourth, and at the same time, should pay a fine on this renewal of one hundred thousand pounds. (416)

Such financing helps to explain the preoccupation of governments in the first decade of the reign of George III with the problem of gaining revenue from the colonies. After a long war, abounding in needless and destructive expense, and the almost equally disastrous regime of Dashwood, George Grenville was faced with a serious deficit and increased drains on the exchequer. The colonies were prosperous, justice seemed to demand that they pay a part of the expense of the

(415) Annual register, 1763, p.33.
(416) Annual register, 1764, p.30.
common war, and necessity drove Grenville to institute the Stamp Tax. In the case of the Revenue Act, apart from the irregularities of Charles Townshend's financial methods, the necessity of relieving the landed gentry of some of the financial burden demanded new sources of revenue. The reconstruction and revival of the customs and excise system does not seem to have occurred to government leaders, but the difficulties involved were probably too great for governments resting on very uncertain foundations. When the reconstruction was accomplished after the American War, it taxed even the genius of the Younger Pitt.

These apparently disastrous financial methods also had a political purpose. If the country party of the Tory squires were to continue to pay the taxes they must be continually placated. If the trading classes could not be taxed, the consumers, both at home and in the colonies, might. Yet such principles of taxation could not be continued for long. No longer could the huge field of taxation afforded by industry be ignored. Nor could the wealth of the new classes. As early as 1758, long before the Younger Pitt instituted his financial reforms, proposals were being made to impose an income tax on the merchants of the City (417).

It was to the great change in classes rather than in the workings of government finance, however, that the new

doctrines of laissez-faire capitalism owed their translation into practical politics. The radical movement of the eighteenth century gained considerably from the great increase in population in the unrepresented towns during the period. The anomalous nature of the representation in Parliament was accentuated and the need for a redistribution of seats emphasized. Factories might develop, machinery and steam power might be used, the population of the nation might have crowded into the northern counties, but politically the nation seemed to have received the final Revelation of Truth in 1688. Time stood still at Westminster. Yet, in fairness to the defenders of the Revolution Settlement, there was very little demand from the new areas for representation.

In the new industrial towns themselves, no demand for parliamentary representation seems to have been made during the early part of the reign of George III. In parliamentary speeches and in pamphlets the opponents of reform emphasized the apathy of the populous towns on this subject. An attempt by some of the inhabitants to make Manchester a borough in 1763 met with very little support. (418)

The leaders of the new progressive movement, however, were quite aware of the usefulness of the new classes. Throughout the decade the sense of the growing power of the new classes is never out of the calculations of the popular leaders.

Chatham appealed to the "voice of the people" and for parliamentary reform in 1770 with the power of the City at his back. Wilkes declared himself the champion of "the liberty of all the middling and inferior sort of people", and demonstrated that while mobs might be useful to overawe the government, his power was also solidly based among the mercantile interests of London.

Most of the references to the rise of the unrepresented classes in the eighteenth century deal with the results of the trading development rather than with the changes brought about by the industrial revolution. The claims of the merchants, investors, and professional class were being considered, rather than those of the manufacturers and small bourgeoisie. Yet in the case of manufacturers the need was not so pressing. During the eighteenth century, as we have seen, they dominated that strange amalgam of medieval privileges, decayed parish councils, justices of the peace and local magnates which served as local government for England. The central government was unable or unwilling to cope with the new problems of the industrial revolution. Thus, apart from the occasional petition to parliament, the needs of the new capitalist were met by his dominance of the locality, and he desired only that government would remain weak and passive. Once the central government became convinced of the need for reform, the manufacturer demanded national control, but for most of the eighteenth century, he was content with power on the smaller stage.
The adoption of the *laissez-faire* policy by local government was naturally a signal for great unrest among the working class, as the riots of the 1760's in London partly demonstrated. No one as yet envisaged the enfranchisement of the labourer, however. Yet when the government abandoned the safeguards of its paternal system and left all men to shift for themselves, new needs were made apparent to some classes. Chief among these needs was political power for protection against the economic appetites of the unrestricted profit system. Thus the idea of Rousseau, that the franchise was a protection rather than an acknowledgment of capacity, was foreshadowed by nearly a decade in the disruptive political effect of *laissez-faire* (419).

Reform through political acts was to be the work of the nineteenth century. The work of the early Hanoverian epoch had been the establishment of the rule of law. In the eighteenth century parliamentary politics and the social life of the community were dominated by legalism to a disastrous extent. Eighteenth century Anglo-Saxons thought that the law could cure all evils, whether international, political, economic or social. The supremacy of the law was established by the beginning of the century, but as with many hallowed English institutions, it was allowed to become archaic through a desire to preserve continuity. Law must always be conservative, in

(419) Whale, *Royal historical society*, p.121.
any case, but English law, because it had survived the seventeenth century constitutional struggles, was held sacrosanct. Old forms and old punishments were preserved because it was thought easier and more tranquil to work through the existing machinery rather than make a break with the past.

The anomalous condition of the penal laws, and their cumbersome application gave good lawyers every chance of securing their clients from conviction. False witnesses could be bought cheaply at Westminster Hall, where they daily walked up and down with straw in their shoes to denote their profession (420). If the crime were not too serious, "benefit of clergy", a medieval survival, might be allowed, and for those who were literate a burned hand might be substituted for hanging. A study of the records of the time reveals the severity of the punishments, especially where theft or damage of property was concerned. The Annual register for those years has many such notices as:

 Ended the sessions at the Old Bailey, when Robert Tilling, for robbing the house of Mr. Lloyd, his master, received sentence of death. (421)

Or again:

 Ended the sessions at the Old Bailey, when seven for foot-pad robberies; two for sheep-stealing; and a boy aged fifteen against whom there were four capital charges for shop lifting, received sentence

(420) Paston, George, Sidelights on the Georgian period, p.105.

(421) Annual register, 1761, p.96.
of death; and twenty-three to be transported for seven years. Of those sentenced to die, five were soon executed, among whom was the boy of fifteen. (422)

And this was the age of Reynolds, Garrick, Chippendale and Lord Chesterfield!

Such severity did not guarantee observance of the law, however. Rather, it encouraged evasion of the law. Juries, faced with the responsibility of condemning a man to death for a relatively trivial offence would often prefer to acquit him. The lucky felons might be acquitted as many as four times, and continue to commit crimes, confident in the assurance that the law was choking itself by its rigidity.

Perhaps the system would have undergone a gradual and peaceful change in the later years of the eighteenth century, had not the problems created by the new industrial age demanded, more than ever, a rule of law. As with other aspects of government, the law was not prepared to meet the challenge of the industrial age (423). New felonies were added, the forms and personnel of the law were increased, but reform of the whole structure, and of the frame of mind which lay behind its application, came only gradually, and only after much unnecessary misery and injustice had been caused. The result of

(422) Annual register, 1763, p.77.

(423) The English Bar was not entirely unaware of the shortcomings of the law. Lord Mansfield devoted over half of a long life to modernizing the common law and bringing it into line with existing conditions. But Mansfield was an exception.
attempting to apply the old machinery was that the chaos of the disrupted era was deepened.

Such archaism was passively encouraged by conservatives, who hated the idea of change in itself, and actively encouraged by industrialists, who saw in the obsolete, class-conscious law an admirable weapon for securing their property and protecting their industrial discipline. The eighteenth century has been stigmatized as undemocratic, and it was so, not because the proletariat lacked the parliamentary franchise, but because the law, the basic guarantor of freedom, was not available to all on equal terms. Sedition, and worse, was tolerated from the powerful aristocratic politicians, as a study of the career of Charles James Fox makes evident, but the really reprehensible sedition in the eyes of the law was that practised by the labourer against his employer.

The division between master and man had been long developing before its full impact was realized by the society of mid-eighteenth century Britain. Under the domestic system there was little differentiation between the employed labourer and the master. Socially they were on a level, as the journeymen usually came from a neighbour's home or from that of a friend. Economically, the journeyman, if he wished might be as well off as his master, or at least as independent. With the growth of the capitalist organization, however, a sharper line was drawn between employers and employed, and the distinction was both economic and social. The employer became
a merchant-manufacturer; the wage-earner became a labourer. Apprenticeship lost its legal guarantees in the eighteenth century, and with them, its social prestige. Under the medieval system, the apprentice resided with the master, who was responsible for training him in his craft and the social and moral virtues. In the eighteenth century the practice grew up of paying wages for apprenticeship, in lieu of board and lodging (424).

Employer and employee already divided by the barriers of wealth and social status, were to have their relations still further marred by chronic disputes over wages. As early as 1757, Dean Tucker was moved to write:

As the master is placed so high above the condition of the journeyman, both their conditions approach much nearer to that of the planter and the slave in our American colonies than might be expected in such a country as England. The master is tempted by his situation to be proud and over-bearing, to consider his people as the scum of the earth whom he has a right to squeeze whenever he can. The journeymen are equally tempted to get as much wages and to do as little for it as they possibly can and to look upon their master as their common enemy with whom no faith is to be kept. (425)

The direct result of such a division was, of course, the rise of the trade unions; and their counterpart, the producers associations. The latter have been discussed elsewhere, but

the functioning of the former is important, since the attitude of the ruling part of the community toward them was a gauge of the degree to which the new economic philosophy was being adopted.

Unionism began before the great economic change, probably in the later years of the seventeenth century (426). In the early years of the eighteenth century, complaints about combinations among workers were being made in Parliament, and petitions and counter-petitions revealed the existence of journeymen's associations in most of the skilled trades. The significance of these associations in this earlier era, insofar as the official viewpoint was concerned, was that their existence tended to jeopardize the state control of wages and working conditions. It was not until much later that the struggle was begun between the worker and the great employer, with the state entirely outside the quarrel.

These records of combinations were accompanied by a steady increase in the number of acts of Parliament condemning combinations, culminating in the great Act of 1799. Thus, in 1761, for example, the *Annual register* records that:

> An order of council was issued to suppress the unlawful combination lately formed by the journeymen cabinet-makers, and to enjoin all magistrates to prosecute the masters of public houses where such journeymen shall resort. The journeymen, on the other hand, charge the masters with entering into a combination, every whit as dangerous and blameable...

(427)


(427) *Annual register*, 1761, p.175.
And again in 1765:

At the sessions ten journeymen tailors were tried, on an indictment for conspiring together to raise wages, and lessen hours of work, settled by an order of the sessions pursuant to an Act of parliament for that purpose. (428)

Such combinations usually began as social organizations, but soon adopted discussion of labour problems as their main purpose. The first of them grew up among such hand crafts as the printers, as early as 1666 and the feltmakers and hatters in 1667. It will be noticed that the organizations were made up of journeymen and that their activities, though often directed against the conditions fixed upon them by the state, were increasingly directed against the masters of the liveried companies and guilds, who were coming more and more to assume the characteristics of the modern employer.

Cause of growth of unionism varied with different industries. In the tailoring trade the division of labour and the rise of unionism were caused partly by the higher cost of production. The increasing luxury of clothing made tailoring by the small producer an impossibility, and he was gradually pushed out of business or became the unskilled labourer of his more successful competitor. Much the same conditions obtained in the Spitalfields silk industry and among the gold beaters, where the high cost of raw material created a subordinate labouring class, united against their masters. Unionism was

(428) Annual register, 1765, p.79.
slow in developing in those areas where the old independent crafts survived longest. Thus, in the West Yorkshire woollen industry it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that there was any great support of combinations. In other cases, such as that of the wool-combers, the machine threat to an ancient craft brought unity. Long before the introduction of machinery, the wool-combers had held the masters in awe of them (429). In the hosiery industry, the use of the stocking-frame in the seventeenth century had created a capitalist and a labouring class. With the final breakdown of the apprenticeship system in 1753, the use of the parish poor as unskilled labour became widespread in the industry. Hence combinations grew up, not against masters, but in alliance with them against the limitations of the old industry. A similar alliance occurred in the cutlery industry of Sheffield. It was the greatest threat to unionism in the eighteenth century that there were usually large numbers of the parish poor who could be drafted into industry, and therefore successful strikes were impossible.

(429) The wool-combers in particular had a strong organization that was almost national in its scope. It was in existence for some years before 1741, when it is described by a pamphleteer. It had evidently begun as a friendly society, the members paying 2d. to 3d. per week and receiving benefits when sick or unemployed. Gradually the union began to dictate to the masters and boycott those who would not agree to their terms. When a member was out of employment he was given a travelling ticket, and money to enable him to seek employment elsewhere. Moffit, England on the eve of the industrial revolution, p.268.
The factory system, of course, facilitated the formation of unions. The massing together of workers in one building was an incentive to combination. The accompanying phenomenon of the rise of the capitalist-industrialist was even more important, since it accentuated the class divisions of the industrial hierarchy. In fact, only where the worker ceased to be concerned with the competitive processes of buying and selling were permanent associations established (430). This was not the only basis for unionism under the new system, however. There had always been a certain number of unskilled or semi-skilled workers outside the guild system, or who were migratory. This number increased rapidly as the eighteenth century advanced and the effects of the enclosure movement and the machine age began to be felt. From these new classes were to come the foundation of the trade unions of the nineteenth century, but in the eighteenth the leaders were still too lacking in skill to make the organizations effective.

The essentials of trade unionism were already in being in the first decade of the reign of George III. There was an endeavour to improve the position of the workers by collective action, and a collection of funds to be used for strike pay, picketing, and threats to employers were used. One dissimilarity with the present is noticeable. The workers had not yet reached the stage where they dealt with the employers as a whole, but a strike affected only those masters who refused

to accede to their demands.

The great change in the processes and markets of industry seemed to demand a sweeping away of all restrictions on the employment of labour, and the placing of all wage-earners under the law of the "natural wage". The skilled trades of the woollen industry, as we have seen, were the first to come under the new system. In 1757 the Woollen Weavers Act of 1756 was repealed at the insistence of the employers. The latter were successful in removing the control of wages from the hands of local government, and thus let down the barriers to unrestricted competition for cheaper labour. As the century advanced, industry after industry succumbed to the logic of profit, lost its government protection, and was ridden with the most appalling labour conditions. The change was not one of unbroken progress toward laissez-faire, however. In the case of the Spitalfield weavers, the system of government regulation was reverted to between 1766 and 1773, and a similar exception was made in the case of the coal heavers. On the protective side, moreover, it was still possible for the workers to gain protection through parliamentary petition, but Parliament became increasingly identified with the interests of the great employers. In any case the machinery of petition was so cumbersome as to be almost useless.

The new conditions created by this freedom of the employers were the natural result of too much freedom without responsibility, but they also owed much to the precedents of
the domestic system and to the brutality of the age. A generation which saw nothing wrong in hanging children for theft could hardly be expected to worry itself over the misery of a few thousand displaced farm labourers and artisans, or over the fact that children of six were expected to work fourteen hours a day in the new factories. Probably the greatest price paid for the benefits of industrialization was in the profound disruption in the minds and lives of the men, women and children who were swallowed up by the new factory system.

No economist of the day, in estimating the gains and losses of factory employment, ever allowed for the strain and violence that a man suffered in his feelings when he passed from a life in which he could smoke or eat, dig or sleep as he pleased, to one in which somebody turned the key on him, and for fourteen hours he did not even have the right to whistle. It was like entering the airless and laughterless life of a prison. (431)

The greatest concern of the worker in the early factory age was not with whether the factory was healthier than the domestic workshop, nor even with whether he was better off economically. There was, in fact, a preoccupation with making profound spiritual readjustments, which were especially difficult for those men and women who had never known variety or change in their earlier lives. This factor was of the utmost significance in the great unrest in the life of the nation in the early decades of the reign of George III.

With this spiritual upheaval, poverty acquired a new and more bitter significance. Civilization began to be based upon wealth and poverty excluded the poor from the sources of happiness and self-respect. The new system offered only one incentive, the hope of becoming rich. This contrast of rich and poor now dominated the social life of the nation as it had never done before.

The greater the wealth of the time, the more evident the power of man, the greater and more biting the sense of right and oppression in the classes that were excluded from any share in its enjoyment. In this sense the triumphs of the Industrial Revolution brought a new bitterness into the life and mind of the working classes. This was not a primitive people absorbed in the struggle for food and clothing, just able to maintain itself. It was a prosperous people whose standard of values left out of account the needs of the imagination. (432)

Very few of the evils of the factory system, however, were new in kind. The hours were long in the domestic industry and the pay was poor. Children worked from an early age, there was overcrowding, and both workshop and home were made less enjoyable by the inclusion of the two under one roof. Even in the worst cases, however, the domestic workman was, in most cases, his own master. He worked long hours, but they were his own. His wife and children worked, but under his direction without interference by an alien authority. The forces which ruled him did not yet overshadow every action

of his daily life, and were still outside the normal field of his existence.

With the new factory system, life changed. Hours of labour, which might vary from nine to sixteen, were fixed by factory discipline and the wear and strain of the monotonous, specialized unskilled labour. Certainly the hours were long, especially for apprentices. An apprentice, applying for his freedom from a London founder in 1764, was confronted with the accusation that he had: "refused to work longer than from six in the morning until eight O'clock in the evening; whereas he ought to have worked until nine o'clock." The court decided that the hours were to be from six to eight. (433)

Again, in 1764, the London tailors had their hours set at what was soon to be considered hours for slave labour.

At the adjourned sessions of the peace for the city of London, at the Guildhall, the court was pleased to order that journeymen tailors shall be allowed 2s. 7d. half-penny per day the whole year, and their hours of work to be from six in the morning to eight at night. (434)

Nor was the situation concerning child labour radically worse under the factory system, at least at first sight. There is plenty of evidence to show that child labour had been a common feature of industry for centuries before the rise of the machine age. Actually the slowness with which

(434) Annual register, 1764, p.47.
the evils of child labour were mitigated is an indication of
the insensitiveness of the public, born of centuries of habit. 
There were, however, some important differences under the
factory system. The unit of industry under the domestic sys-
tem was the family; under the factory system it was the indi-
vidual. The difference affected not only the earning power of
the family, but also the position of the child. Under the old
order the family worked under the same roof; under the factory
system the members of the family were dispersed and the child-
ren came under the control of strangers. How far the change
was detrimental to the children depended upon the regard par-
ents had for the welfare of their children. Some parents
avoided inflicting exhausting toil and the evils were mitigat-
ed. All too often, however, the parents, especially where
they were dominated by the capitalist middlemen, were forced
to drive their children to exhaustion. In this brutal age
children were not always treated humanely by their parents,
in any case. Where this situation obtained, the change to
the factory system was often a change for the better for the
children.

The new struggle between the capital and labour was
also inspiring extreme opinions as to the usefulness of labour
and its share in the new society. No longer was the "honest
artisan" considered a partner of his employer, but was now
looked upon as a potential threat to the social order. Arthur
Young's description of the northern miners in 1771, for example,
shows how far the division between the various classes of society had progressed at that date.

In general, I might almost say universally, a most tumultuous sturdy set of people, greatly impatient of control, very insolent, and much void of common industry. Thos employed in the lead mines of Craven and in colleries can scarcely, by any means, be kept to the performance of a regular business; upon the least disgust they quit their service and try another. No bribes can tempt them to any industry after the first performance of their stated work, which leaves them half the day for idleness or rioting at the alehouse. (435)

The working classes were regarded as persons incapable of profiting by leisure and fit only for factory discipline. In fact, the favourite argument for long hours of work was that workmen spent their leisure in drinking and other profligacy, and this argument was also extended to justify low wages.

It is little wonder that the general standard of living of the people declined, when this philosophy was applied. We have seen that in the first half of the century, the general price level remained low, but that thereafter it rose rapidly. The drift from the land added to the expense of living. Bishop Pococke, in 1751, noted the extremely simple

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fare of the people of Lancashire (436).

The comparison of the dress of urban and rural groups in the eighteenth century also demonstrated the problem of the more complex mode of living. In the new industrial areas of the midlands, the labourer usually purchased his clothing from the shopkeeper. In the metropolis, according to Eden, the chief source of workers' clothing was second-hand dealers (437). In the North, on the other hand, in areas still rural, all clothing except hats and shoes was of home manufacture. The dependence of the industrial worker on outside sources of supply grew out of his increased specialization and his rigorous working conditions. Unskilled workmen, employed at machine tending for fourteen hours a day, did not have the leisure or the skill for hand crafts. Where the whole family was employed in the factory, not only was it dependent on outside sources for clothing, but for food as well. The diet of the labourer declined from the relatively well-balanced one of the farmer-manufacturer, to the bread and cheese which formed the staple article of food for the factory family. It is

(436) ...I sent my horses from Buttock of Pendle by a boy about thirteen; he was a pretty handy youth; and giving him of the provisions I had brought, he came and sat down by me on the settle. He told me that oat-cake and butter milk was the common food, that on a festival day they had a piece of meat and a rye-pudding; that his father paid six pounds a year, kept a horse, three cows, and forty sheep; that his father and he wove woollen both for their clothing and to sell...

hardly surprising, under the circumstances, that the art of cooking almost disappeared among the women of the factory labour class.

With urbanization it became more difficult to live simply, though Arthur Young and many of his school accused the labourer of profligacy. Such people quite ignored the fact that prices had risen by one-third, or that the changes in the economic structure of the country, of which they were warm advocates, were bringing misery as well as progress.

"I have great reason to assert," wrote Young in 1769, "that I experimentally know, our poor in no part of England, would have cause to complain of high prices of provisions, were they to be persuaded to use less expensive, though not less wholesome and nutricious food; and the same time totally to desist from that pernicious practice, the drinking of tea. (438)

Riots against high prices were naturally condemned as threats to the security of the new social order. Here again, according to Young, it was only the disorderly and idle elements of the population which undertook such forms of protest (439).

(438) Young, Arthur, Farmer's letters, pp.207-208.

(439) It has always been my opinion, and experience confirms it; that sober and industrious workmen, of any sort, never riot. In all occupations, there will be idle, drunken, unsettled and disorderly persons; a few of these getting together, and talking over the dearness of provisions (which presently becomes a cant among them) inflame each other, and all of their own stamp; they know a riot is their best diversion; to stroll in a party about the country, entering and drinking at free cost, and having no work to do but mischief, suits such geniuses to a hair; and one riot is no sooner kicked up, than the news occasions many others. Young, Southern tour, p.331.
Young wrote with the Wilkes riots in London in mind and certainly could not help being prejudiced against the mob. He and his kind, however, do not seem to have seen the deeper economic and social causes of the rioting. "Wilkes and Liberty" was a useful rallying cry, but the crowds who shouted in the wake of Wilkes, or who later cried "No Popery" in the Gordon Riots were not particularly interested in parliamentary privilege or the religious tests. Their chief concern was to gain the attention of the government to their reduced standard of living and to try to recapture, in a moment of riot, the social prestige which they had lost when they lost their land or craft.

The contrast between the new order and the old was heightened by the lack of individuality and social attraction in the new towns. There was no change of scene or colour, and no break in the form or design of their brooding outlines. Everything was uniform, from the long rows of identical hovels in which the human cattle of the factory existed, to the smoke-filled sky overhead. Men and women who passed from the factory to their homes became not less, but more conscious of the burden that the universal power of industry had laid upon every aspect of their lives. The town was as little theirs as the factory. Outside the factory, as inside it, their fates were decided by an alien control.

A further cause of social disruption was the failure of the government's system of poor relief. With the new
economic changes and the increase of the destitute, the out-
worn machinery of the Poor Law and the Settlement Laws was not capable of coping with the greatly expanded problem. The idea that government had a duty to protect labour had been re-
jected. The economic changes, which defeated the efforts of the small producer, also made the advancement of the indivi-
dual so expensive that thrift was now discounted. Legalized charity had been made rigid by the Settlement Laws, and was incapable of being expanded. All these factors served to in-
crease the numbers of the poor, out of all proportion to the facilities available for relieving them.

Yet it must be admitted that the attitude of mind in the nation had never been strongly in favour of relieving the poor. The statutes dealing with relief of the poor, from the days of Elizabeth to those of George III had hardly regarded humanitarian considerations. The state disliked having to accept the responsibility in any case. It was initially sloughed off on to the parish councils, and there it remained for two centuries, in which the parishes soon became useless as a unit of government, and their various duties were neglect-
ed. Under such a system the wealthier areas received more than their fair share of the indigent. Thus London and Nor-
wich, for example, were flooded with beggars of all sorts, and the basis for the great urban mobs was established.

The official attitude was sharply divided as between the aged and impotent, and the able-bodied unemployed.
Poverty, in any case, was considered a moral evil, but the helpless did receive considerable, if rudimentary and inadequate care. The able-bodied, in the early sixteenth century were subjected to whipping, branding and even death, as deterrents to poverty and unemployment. By the later years of the reign of Elizabeth it was realized that such methods had failed to suppress the persistent paupers. An attempt was therefore made to institutionalize poor relief and houses of correction were set up, the so-called Bridewells. Here the inmates were whipped, but they were also employed, and an attempt was made to teach them crafts. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, poor administration and lack of supervision by the central government had permitted the Bridewells to become schools for crime and idleness.

After the Restoration, with the great increase of unemployment resulting from the Dutch wars, and the disbandment of Cromwell's army, the main concern of the parish officials was to keep vagrants out of their parishes as much as possible. The migrant population of beggars became a universal nuisance, where parishes were hard put to it to care for their own poor. The system of compulsory poor rates instituted by the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, augmented from time to time by such regulations as the Book of Orders, could not support the added burden. It was realized that a purely local solution to the problem was not possible and a change to a quasi-national scheme was made in the form of the famous Settlement Laws,
beginning in 1662. Successive laws from 1662 to 1712 provided that the justices of the peace could expel any vagrant not a native of the parish, from the parish within forty days of his arrival. This led, not to the parish being able to care for its own, but to the continual expulsion and migration of an even greater number of vagrants, since unscrupulous parishes seized the opportunity to get rid of many of their own charges. Since the transportation of the vagrant to his parish of origin was made at the expelling parish's expense, the cost of the system continued high. Sir Josiah Child gives a vivid description of process, and its evils.

As for instance, a poor idle person, that will not work, or that no Body will Employ in the Country, comes up to London to set up the trade of Begging, such a Person probably may Beg up and down the Streets seven years, it may be seven and twenty, before any Body asketh why she doth so, and if at length she hath ill hap in some Parish, to meet with a more vigilant Beadle than one of twenty of them are, all he does is but to lead her the length of five or six houses, into another Parish, and then concludes, as his Masters the Parishoners do, that he hath done the part of a most diligent Officer; but suppose he should go further to the end of his Line, which is to the end of the Law; and the perfect execution of his Office, that is suppose he should carry this poor wretch to a Justice of the Peace, and he should order the Delinquent to be Whipt, and sent from Parish to Parish, to the Place of her Birth or last Abode, which not one Justice of twenty (through pity or other cause) will do; even this is a great charge upon the country, and yet the business of the Nation itself wholly undone; for no sooner doth the Delinquent arrive at the place assigned, but for shame or idleness she presently deserts it and wanders directly back, or some other way, hoping for better fortune, whilst the Parish to which she is sent,
knowing her a lazy, and perhaps worse quality'd person, is as willing to be rid of her, as she is to be gone from them. (440)

As the enclosure movement developed, the drift of population and the number of vagrants increased rapidly. In places where enclosure was followed by a decrease of the land under the plough, there was less work than before, and even where there was as much, many families who kept above the subsistence level by the help of common rights, fell below it under the new system and required partial relief. In industry, even before the application of power machinery, displacement was widespread because of the introduction of new skills and techniques. The craftsman became, if he was lucky, a machine tender under the new system. If he was unlucky, he joined the swollen ranks of the parish poor. In the case of the farmer-manufacturer, the displacement was a double blow, and his changes of adapting himself to the new system were usually even lower than those of the displaced urban craftsman. The poor rates in most parishes rose enormously, and the self-sufficiency of the displaced workmen rapidly declined, so that they often became permanent charges on the parish. Sir Frederick Eden, at the end of the eighteenth century, noted these changes.

The rapid rise of the Poor's Rates...is generally attributed to the high price of provisions; the smallness of wages, and the prevailing spirit

among the gentry of landed property in the neighbourhood, of consolidating small farms; and the consequent depopulation of villages: the effects of which it is said, oblige small industrious farmers to turn labourers, or servants; who, feeling no opening towards advancement, become regardless of the futurity, spend their little wages as they receive them, without preserving a provision for old age... (441)

There was no doubt that public opinion, shocked by the great scope of the poverty and misery bred by the economic change, was sympathetic to a more generous provision for the poor. The work of such men as Jonas Hanway and John Howard was not unsupported, even among the most influential. Unfortunately the governmental machinery, for poor relief, as with other aspects of economic life, was incapable of dealing with the new demands made by the industrial revolution. The fact that the need for reform was realized is illustrated by the great number of stop-gap acts in the first half of the eighteenth century, which reformed minor aspects of the decadent whole. In 1696 the first workhouses were established in Bristol, and the institutions spread rapidly throughout the country. They necessitated an increase in the poor rates, but made possible a simplification of administration. Where the poor were all gathered together they might be regulated and the costs of administration considerably reduced. Some of the workhouses represented a definite advance in the treatment of the poor. Some, however, where the parish was poor, or the

parish overseer dishonest, merely increased the misery of the paupers.

Other acts were passed to improve administration and lighten the burden on the rates. In 1720, an act was passed which prevented men from leaving their families as a charge on the parish while they went away to work. An act of 1733 placed the housing of the poor under the control of church wardens, a reflection of the continuing faith in the parish system. Accounts of poor relief were regularized by an act of 1744. This was especially necessary, since the overseers of the poor were notoriously corrupt. No real attempt was made, however, to alter the parochial basis of poor relief in order to meet the new demands of the age. In 1767, the Earl of Hillsborough but forward a scheme for local governors of the poor, independent of the parish and responsible to the national government. Local governments, however, were still sufficiently powerful to force rejection of the plan, and the national government, unwilling or unable to alter the system, concurred in the rejection. It was only very slowly, and as a result of the changes and developments forced on the nation by the American and French Revolutionary Wars, that poor relief, in common with other governmental economic and social responsibilities, was brought into line with existing conditions.

In the early years of the reign of George III, however, government probably had less regard for its responsibilities
toward the subject than at any time in the history of England. Faced with new and overwhelming problems, government first failed in its attempts to deal with those problems, and then rejected all responsibility for them. Government regulation of the great changes was essential, if the nation was to remain a social unit, but government economic machinery in 1760 was obsolete, and it was abolished at the insistence of the new capitalist class. This gap in government responsibility was to continue for a generation, while the new industrialists remade the nation.

England was on the eve of a great expansion of resources, numbers, wealth and power. What were the new towns to be like? What their schools, their pleasures, their houses, their standards of a good life, their plans for co-operation and fellowship? What the fate of the masses of people who did not feel or force their way through the doors thrown open to enterprise? To all these questions the Industrial Revolution gave the same answer: "Ask Capital." And neither conservative nor radical, the man defending and the man attacking bad laws and bad customs, thought the answer wrong. But that answer meant that the age had turned from making a society in order to make a system of production. (442)

Thus, we have seen that economic and social changes in mid-eighteenth century England brought with them a threat to the settled order of English life which, in the succeeding decades of the century was to place extensive limitations on
the power of British governments to lead and regulate the nation. Certainly these changes did not arise exclusively in the years between 1760 and 1770, nor did they all come to fruition then. It was in this decade, however, that the most significant changes, particularly in industrial mechanics, were made, and the extent of change between 1760 and 1770 is greater than in any other decade of the eighteenth century. When George III ascended the throne, the economy of his kingdom was much as it had been under Queen Anne. In 1770, however, the economic and social life was, in essentials, much as it would be in 1840.

The changes in themselves, as in the imperial and political spheres, were largely beneficial, but the machinery of government was not in a condition to meet the challenge of great change. The government of England could not deal effectively with the American revolution, and it lost an empire; because it could not deal with the industrial revolution effectively, the social development of the nation was retarded for a century. Both revolutions were eventually to benefit the nation, yet in the initial decade of chaos, the more undesirable features of each were most apparent. Out of the misery of the economic revolution was coming the huge productive capacity of Britain, and the new prosperity of the nineteenth century. Yet the first result was chaos, and a most significant factor in the British retreat.
Conclusion

In this study of the British Retreat I have attempted to give a picture of a nation beginning its transition from the status of a mercantile community to that of an industrial-imperial community. In this initial phase, the change necessarily involved the destruction of the old order, and hence dislocation and disruption in the national life. The English use institutions as long as these can possibly be adapted to changing conditions, and sometimes longer. The method has its advantages. There is a minimum of breaks with the past. Continuity in the national development is preserved. There are few of the violent alternations of the political pendulum between extremes which have disrupted the histories of continental nations. The method is based upon moderation, but there must be moderation in all things, even in the retention of old institutions. If these institutions fall too far out of harmony with the times, a violent change is forced on the nation and the pendulum is set in motion. The principal underlying cause of the disruption in the British nation and Empire between 1760 and 1770 was the fact that many of its institutions had become obsolete and had to be forcibly replaced. This replacement process involved a retreat in most fields of public life from the high position which the nation had held in 1760.
The English imperial administration in the eighteenth century represented a survival from the middle ages. Mercantilism was, in many of its aspects, an extension of the medieval control of the economic life of the community to the larger imperial field. The trading nation replaced the village community as the unit of application, and the national state replaced the church as the enforcing authority. The machinery of control, however, was not equal to the task of extending its regulations to the even wider field of the Empire. The expansion of the comprehensible world and the increase in markets and the volume of goods traded, inspired a new economic outlook analogous to the contemporary intellectual Renaissance. The economic and intellectual revolutions combined to present the mercantilist authority of the state with the serious challenge of economic individualism. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the fundamental antagonism mounted, and in the middle of the eighteenth century burst forth into a struggle in which the authority of the state over the trading economy was rejected.

It was not only at the purely economic level that the mercantilist system operated, however. Trade, to be successful, required security abroad, both as to markets and lines of communication. Thus an overseas empire was developed, first in the form of littoral trading communities, later spreading inland and culminating in the conquest of Canada and India in 1760. Mercantilist control was exercised as rigidly as
possible over these imperial possessions in the interests of imperial self-sufficiency.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the system had begun to break down. Even when the empire was merely a series of trading ports the attempt to rule it through a centralized authority met with great difficulties. With the expansion inland, the weight of government became unbearably heavy. Special local complications arose in various parts of the Empire to further limit the effectiveness of mercantilist rule. In Ireland, racial antipathies and a rigid adherence to bureaucratic method; and in India the reliance upon indirect rule through a chartered company greatly weakened the imperial structure. In the American colonies, the development of local trade economies in competition with that of the mother country, and the growth of local governments challenging the authority of the home government, were the immediate causes of the collapse of the mercantilist system.

In the mother country itself, the transition was less abrupt but even more complete. The Revolution of 1688 had destroyed the absolute monarchy, but because the nation needed tranquility, the revolution was enshrined in the national political system. England in the eighteenth century looked back to 1688 as to the date of the final change in her political history. As a result, much-needed reforms were neglected. Parliament effectively represented barely five per cent of the nation. Local government, from which much of the
strength of the Revolution had come, remained much too powerful and the central government much too weak. The need for tranquility in 1688 had also brought a dissolution of party differences, and hence a dissolution of parties themselves. The Whig Party ostensibly continued as the government party throughout the early eighteenth century, but it was divided into factions based, not on political issues, but on rivalries for place and patronage. The corruption of politics at this juncture was without precedent in English history.

While old institutions survived, new institutions did not receive complete acceptance. This was particularly true in the case of the cabinet system. The control by Parliament, through the cabinet, of the prerogative power of policy-making had developed only in the reigns of the first two Hanoverian monarchs. Under George III this development was reversed, and the theoretical powers of the monarchy were exercised to the full. The decline of the party system and the corruption of politics made this reversal particularly easy.

The threat to cabinet government had one beneficial result, however. Out of the ruins of the old political system there arose new political parties, based initially upon the issues raised by the revival of the royal powers. In addition, the mercantile and industrial classes, which were to rule England in the nineteenth century, were making their first bid for power. Other factors, such as the exhaustion of the nation after the Seven Years' War and the sudden disappearance
between 1760 and 1770 of the men who had ruled England since the Age of Anne, seemed to increase the disruption and decline in the public life of the nation.

The economic organization in England in 1760 was also in a state of change. The mercantilist system had been discredited in the English nation even before it lost favour in the Empire. The rising spirit of individualism was a principal factor in bringing about the change, but the chief influence came from the great economic revolution of the eighteenth century.

In agriculture, new techniques, inspired partly by the new scientific age, partly by the demands of expanded markets, were applied to farming. These in turn necessitated a consolidation of land holdings to make large-scale capitalist farming practicable, and the instrument for such consolidation was found in the already widespread enclosure movement. The increased productivity of agriculture made new marketing and price systems necessary, and communication was improved to make marketing easier.

The principal economic phenomenon of the eighteenth century, however, was the industrial revolution. Since the beginning of the century the old domestic system of industry had been disintegrating, as the enclosure movement drove the manufacturers from the land and the expanded markets demanded a larger scale of production. In various industries the chief characteristics of the new industrialism, capitalism and the
factory system, were being established. At the same time the old unifying organizations of the village economy and the guild were breaking down. After 1760 there was a sudden upsurge in the rate of change, as steam power and new machinery were applied to production. The disruption in the economy was extensive and was increased by the migration of industry northwards, and by the extreme fluctuations in the economic cycle between 1760 and 1770.

Accompanying the change in industry and agriculture there was an important change in the economic philosophy and social structure of the nation. The system of government regulation of the economy which had become very unpopular as early as 1700, collapsed during the middle decades of the eighteenth century. In place of government supervision, the new capitalist and mercantile classes dominated the economy in their own interests. The influence of these new classes can be seen in the government taxation policies, which avoided as much as possible the burdening of industry. In addition, the beginnings of the campaign for parliamentary reform in the interests of the new group began at the end of the decade. That it was not more vigorously prosecuted was due to the fact that capital and industry already controlled local government in their own interests and did not immediately see the need of controlling the national government. The law, trade unionism, the factory system and the system of poor relief also reflected this domination by wealth, which domination,
in addition, was creating a profound social schism in the nation.

In her empire, in her public life, and in her economy, Britain was at a crossroads. If the transition was to be successfully accomplished, she needed peace, prosperity and order. The decade, however, was one of struggle, depression and disruption. The result was a decline in the national life, a British Retreat.
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(Probably the most useful single reference used. Informative, well-balanced and very readable.)

(Of more limited use than the preceding, but a particularly intensive study of the political life in 1760.)
(A series of four essays on Boswell, Gibbon, Wilkes and Sterns; useful for the interpretive study of Wilkes.)

(Possibly the most authoritative of the biographies of Chatham, factual and careful, the interpretive qualities are marred by a preoccupation with any possible contributions Chatham may have made to the advancement of the Teutonic peoples.)

(A new and interesting discussion of the decline of the mercantilist empire, but of little use to this study.)

(The conclusions arrived at in this work do not seem, in my opinion, to correspond with the facts in the decline of the old empire. There is too much emphasis upon the political connection between the political leaders in England and those in America.)

(A discussion of the activities of the short-lived Department for American Affairs. Some new and useful material included therein.)

(The most famous study of the new industrial age and its advent. Very useful, especially as to statistics.)

(The first volume of the most authoritative biography of Fox. Invaluable for its study of the first Lord Holland.)

(A very useful study of the role of the Lords in eighteenth century politics.)
(A series of lectures, with some good interpretation but no new material.)

(A very useful study of the corruption of eighteenth century politics.)

(A standard biography with very valuable interpretations.)

(Excellent summary treatment of the era of cabinet development.)

(A thorough and authoritative account of the intrigues inside the Whig Party from the fall of Newcastle in 1760, to the beginning of the American revolution. Very useful.)

**Special Studies in Periodical Publications**

(A study of the problem of administering the Old Northwest; written from the American point of view.)

(A small amount of useful material, but very generalized.)

(A study of economic and social conditions in the coal areas of England. Of limited use.)

(A discussion of the American department's activities, of very little value.)
(Informative but largely factual account of the problems of the West Indian trade.)

(Largely factual, but useful material contained therein.)

(Gives some interesting and new material on the influence of the army in Anglo-American relations in the period.)

(Some discussion of the change in the economic structure of industry.)

(Very useful discussion of the problem of governing the inland territories.)

(Good political and statistical study of the effects of the famous tax on tea.)

(A general discussion of the principal instrument of control over the trade economy of Britain. Very useful.)

(A description of the Board of Control for India, both before and after the reforms of 1784.)

(A study of social changes in the middle of the eighteenth century. Of limited value.)
(A study in the rise of militant trade unionism, and the riots in eighteenth century London.)

(Useful for its study of the activities of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts.)

(A statistical account of the change in wages at the beginning of the industrial revolution.)

(A very useful and authoritative article concerning the social disruption as a result of the industrial revolution.)

(A study of the earliest factory system in England; very useful.)

(Interesting account of the diplomatic and political background of the peace.)

(A discussion of the English stamp duties in comparison with those imposed upon the colonies.)

Hughes, Edward, "North country life in the eighteenth century", *History*, 1940.
(A study of the north country and the impact of the economic revolution upon it.)

(An account of the new problems of empire and Shelburne's attempts to reform the administration. Some new material.)

Hunt, William, "Pitt's retirement from office, 5th October, 1761", English historical review, Vol. XXI, pp.119-132. (A discussion of the background for Pitt's retirement. The material is not new and some of the interpretation has been challenged by other authorities.)

Imlach, G.M., "Earl Temple and the ministry of 1765", English historical review, Vol. XXX, p.317. (An interpretive study of the intrigues leading up to Pitt's refusal to form a ministry in 1765.)


———, "The circular letters, and eighteenth century whip to members of parliament", English historical review, Vol. XLVIII, p.588. (A careful study of the Whig political machine in the eighteenth century.)

(The influence of the London merchants on the mercantilist imperial administration is very well discussed. Useful work.)

(Also a review of Heckscher's work, and very useful.)

(A study of the irregular systems of English government finance. Largely statistical.)

(A discussion of the English contribution to the war on the continent during the Seven Years' War.)

(A study of the limitations present in the old smaller plantation economy of the empire. Of limited use.)

(Shows the relationship between the new economic philosophy and the change in government policy at the beginning of the industrial revolution.)

(An examination of the influence of Burke on the development of political philosophy, with illustrations from his writings. Of limited use.)

(A very interesting and informative study of a little-known, but important aspect of the relations between England and her colonies. A complete study of the hard currency problem.)

(A study of the dissensions in the new Whig Party; of limited value.)
(An account of the problems facing the English rule of India and Shelburne's attempt to reform the administration.)

(A criticism of the article by William Hunt on the same subject.)

(An able and interpretive study of cabinet development.)

(A discussion of the growth of the conciliabulum.)

(A careful interpretive study of the relationship between industrialism and the beginnings of nineteenth century liberalism.)


(A study of one of the most talented political families in eighteenth century England. Includes some new material and a very able study of the whole period concerned.)
Winstanley, D.A., "George III and his first cabinet", English historical review, Vol. XVII, p.678. (Interesting discussion of the crosscurrents of opinion at the beginning of the new reign.)